People Vs Amigo

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People vs.

Amigo
G.R. No. 116719 January 18, 1996

FACTS OF THE CASE:

On December 29, 1989, 1pm, Benito Ng Suy was driving their grey Ford Fiera

back home with his daughter, Jocelyn and a younger one together with his two year old

son. An accidental head on collision occurred between the Fiera and a Tamaraw being

driven by one Virgillio Abogado. With Abogado was the accused, Patricio Amigo alias

"Bebot". The collision caused slight damage to the right bumper of the Tamaraw.

While Abogado and Benito were having verbal confrontation, Patricio

approached Benito asking the latter to leave as it was only a minor incident. However,

Benito said that Patricio should not interfere, which made Patricio irritated and caused

the latter to stab Benito, rendering the victim into a critical condition which eventually

caused his death due to sepsis.

Patricio Amigo was charged initially with frustrated murder, but was modified to

the crime of murder to which he was convicted with a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.

Accused-Appellant claims that the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua is too cruel and harsh

and pleads for sympathy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the penalty imposed upon the accused "Reclusion Perpetua" be

modified or reduced by virtue of Section 19 (1) of Article III of the Constitution which

prohibits the imposition of death penalty.


Held:

No. The Supreme Court held that Article III, Section 19 (1) does not change the

penalty periods prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except only insofar

as it prohibits the imposition of death penalty. The range of the medium and minimum

penalties remains the same. Thus, a person originally subject to death penalty and

another who committed the murder without the attendance of any modifying

circumstances will now be both punishable with the same medium period although the

former is conceitedly more guilty than the latter. But that is the will of the constitution

and the duty of the court is to apply the law, disregarding the sympathy or pity for an

accused. Dura Lex Sed Lex.


Tenchavez vs. Escaño et al.
G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño entered into a secret marriage before a

Catholic chaplain. Upon discovery of their daughter’s marriage, spouses Mamerto and

Mena sought priestly advice where it was suggested that the marriage be recelebrated.

However, the recelebration did not take place and the newlyweds eventually became

estranged. Later, unknown to Pastor, Vicenta left for the United States. There, she filed

a complaint for divorce on the ground of extreme mental cruelty, and an absolute

divorce was granted by the Court of Nevada. She later sought for the annulment of her

marriage from the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta eventually married an American in

Nevada and acquired American citizenship.

Pastor filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against Vicenta

and her parents whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged their

daughter from joining him and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic

Church for having decreed the annulment of the marriage. He asked for legal separation

and one million pesos in damages.

Vicenta claims a valid divorce from Pastor and an equally valid marriage to her

American husband; while her parents filed a counterclaim for moral damages, denying

that they had in any way influenced their daughter’s acts. The trial court did not decree

a legal separation but freed Pastor from supporting his wife and to acquire property to

her exclusion. It granted the counterclaim of the Españo spouses for moral and
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees against Pastor, to the extent of P45,000.00.

Thus, he filed a direct appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

1.) Whether or not the divorce obtained by Vicenta abroad was valid and binding in the

Philippines;

2.) Whether or not Pastor is entitled to legal separation and to moral damages.

RULING:

1.) No. The Court held that under Philippine law, the valid marriage between Tenchavez

and Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved notwithstanding the decree of

absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained in Nevada. Article 15 of the Civil

Code of the Philippines which was already in force at the time expressly provided that,

“laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of

persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.”

Here, at the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta, like her husband, was still a

Filipino citizen. She was then still subject to Philippine law, which does not admit

absolute divorce. Thus, under Philippine law, the divorce was invalid.

2.) Yes. The Court ruled that Pastor is entitled to a decree of legal separation on the

basis of adultery as provided under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code. Since our

jurisdiction does not recognize Vicenta’s divorce and second marriage as valid, her

marriage and cohabitation with the American is technically “intercourse with a person

not her husband” from the standpoint of Philippine Law. Her refusal to perform her
wifely duties, her denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband also constitute

in law a wrong for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity. Thus,

the latter is entitled to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law. As to

moral damages the Court assessed Pastor’s claim for a million pesos as unreasonable,

taking into account some considerations. First, the marriage was celebrated in secret,

and its failure was not characterized by publicity or undue humiliation on his part.

Second, the parties never lived together. Third, there is evidence that Pastor had

originally agreed to the annulment of the marriage, although such a promise was legally

invalid, being against public policy. Fourth, the fact that he is unable to remarry under

our law is a consequence of the indissoluble character of the union that he entered into

voluntarily and with open eyes. Therefore, he should recover P25,000 only by way of

moral damages and attorney’s fees.

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