a.

Tenchavez vs Escano
A foreign divorce between Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity
of the New Civil Code ( R.A 3896) is not entitled to recognition as valid in the
Philippines; and neither the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced
consort.
Innocent consort is entitled to legal separation.
Invalid divorce entitles innocent consort to recover damages.
FACTS:
27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish
ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old
engineer, and ex-army officer before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The
marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the couple and was duly registered
in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be their match-maker and
go-between who had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San
Carlos college student where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are
supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicentas
parents. However after translating the said letter to Vicentas dad , he disagreed for
a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor
went back to work in Manila.
Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was
approved she left for the United States and filed a complaint for divorce against
Pastor which was later on approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the
State of Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of her marriage to the
Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada
and has begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner
filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have
dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.
ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon
courts of the Philippines.
HELD:
Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give
recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because
it would be a violation of the Civil Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in
favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce in foreign countries. The adulterous
relationship of Escano with her American husband is enough grounds for the legal
separation prayed by Tenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and
Escano are still married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is
not entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity
in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by
one spouse entitled the other for damages

g. Republic vs Orbecido III (2005)

Subject:
Art 26 paragrah 2, Family Code; Recognition of Foreign Divorce by Philippine Courts
Facts:
In 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva in Ozamis City,
Philippines. They had a son and a daughter.In 1986, Cipriano's wife left for the
United States bringing along their son Kristoffer.
In 2000, Cipriano learned that his wife, who had been naturalized as an American
citizen, had obtained a divorce decree in the USA and then married a certain
Innocent Stanley and they now live in California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the Philippine trial court a petition for authority to
remarry invoking Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code. The court granted the same.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, contends that Article 26
par 2 does not apply to Cipriano since it only applies to a valid mixed marriage
(between a Filipino citizen and an alien). The proper remedy is to file a petition for
annulment or for legal separation
Held:
Art 26, Par. 2 of the Family Code
1. The second paragraph of Art 26, Family Code reads: Where a marriage between
a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law
2. On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation at
hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one
where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino
citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and
subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry
3. Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the
intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member
of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce,
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

4. Taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we
hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other
party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule
otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
5. The twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
(a) There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner; and
(b) A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
6. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
7. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are
both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be
allowed to remarry.
Statutory Construction (Ratio Legis est Anima)
8. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import
would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature,
it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as
necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not
within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or
intent.
Burden of Proof; Recognition of Foreign Divorce by Philippine Courts
9. Cipriano did not present any evidence concerning the divorce decree and the
naturalization of his (ex) wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.
10. For his plea to prosper, he must prove his allegation that his wife was
naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove
(a) the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing
it.
(b) such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved.

(c) that the divorce decree allows his former spouse to remarry as specifically
required in Article 26.

h. Garcia-Recio vs Recio (2001)

Subject:
Nationality Principle; Types of Divorce; Recognition of Divorce Obtained Abroad;
Proof of Foreign Laws; Bigamy
Facts:
Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in
Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in
Australia.
On May 18, 1989,a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was
issued by an Australian family court.
In 1992, Rederick Recio (respondent) also became an Australian citizen. In 1994,
Rederick Recio married Grace Garcia (petitioner), a Filipina, in Cabanatuan City. In
their application for a marriage license, Rederick was declared as "single" and
"Filipino. Not long afterm however, the couple was living separately in Australia
without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.
In 1998, Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
Rederick on the ground of bigamy for he allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at
the time he married her in 1994. She claimed that she learned of his marriage to
Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
Rederick contended that his first marriage to Editha Samson had been validly
dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989, thus, he was legally
capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
While the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending, Rederick was able to secure
a divorce decree in Australia because the "marriage had irretrievably broken down.
Consequently, he prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on the
ground that it stated no cause of action.
Held:

Nationality Principle
1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot
grant it.
2. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained
abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code.
3. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family
Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is
"validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry."
4. Rederick Recio was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired
Australian citizenship in 1992. By becoming an Australian, he severed his allegiance
to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal
laws.
Recognition of Divorce Obtained Abroad
5. A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws
6. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
7. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document
must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is
proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the
judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an
official body or tribunal of a foreign country.
Proof of Foreign Divorce
8. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a writing or
document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either
(1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must
be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
9. In this case however, when the divorce decree of 1989 was submitted in
evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact
that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.
Petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a
written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia

Burden of Proving Foreign Laws

10. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact or
thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action."
11. Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent Rederick Recio, the
burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
12. Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts,
they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those
matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.
Types of Divorce
13. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for
a cause arising after marriage.
14. Divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a
vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind
terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full
force.
Legal Capacity to Remarry
15. Recio presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a conditional or
provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed
and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the
prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected.
16. The Australian divorce decree contained a restriction that reads: A party to a
marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other
party has died) commits the offence of bigamy
17. The divorce obtained by respondent appears to be restricted. It did not
absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law.
Hence, the trial court erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto
restored respondent's capacity to remarry. In other words, in the absence of
sufficient proof, it cannot be concluded that respondent Recio was legally
capacitated to marry Grace Garcia on January 12, 1994.
18. The legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the
party concerned.
19. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been
sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in
court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal
capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license
Bigamy

20. The court cannot grant Garcia's prayer to declare her marriage to Recio null and
void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he
was really capacitated to marry her as a direct result of the divorce decree.
21. The most judicious course is to remand the case to the trial court to receive
evidence, if any, which show Recio's legal capacity to marry Garcia. Failing in that,
then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground of
bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which
were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1,
1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994

i. Amor Catalan vs CA
FACTS:
Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in
Mabini, Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and
allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas
and Orlando divorced in April 1988. On June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent
Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan.
Petitioner contends that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior
subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol. She filed a petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against Orlando and Merope.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the personality of a spouse to file a complaint for declaration of
nullity of the second marriage of the other spouse after an alleged divorce obtained
abroad?
Whether or not petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy?
RULING:
Petitioners personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot
be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law
allowing it. After all, she may have the personality to file the petition if the divorce
decree obtained was a limited divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may
restrict remarriage even after the divorce decree becomes absolute. We note that it
was the petitioner who alleged in her complaint that they acquired American
citizenship and that respondent Orlando obtained a judicial divorce decree. It is

settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence
Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is
necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree
and whether the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage.
If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow
respondent Orlandos remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondents
marriage as bigamous and void ab initio.