Lee V CA GR No. 145498

Download as docx, pdf, or txt
Download as docx, pdf, or txt
You are on page 1of 3

LEE vs.

Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 145498 January 17, 2005

The facts are as follows:

On October 4, 1993, an Information was filed against petitioner Dr. Benjamin F. Lee and a
certain Cesar Al. Bautista, for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

Petitioner pleaded not guilty in his arraignment on February 1, 1995. Presiding Judge
Godofredo L. Legaspi noted in the assailed judgment that trial proceeded insofar only as
petitioner is concerned, "since accused Cesar Bautista is presently detained at Municipal Jail at
Calapan, Mindoro.

On July 22, 1997, the RTC promulgated its decision finding accused Benjamin Lee guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and accordingly sentences him to
suffer an imprisonment of one (1) year of prision correccional, and to pay the offended party
P980,000.00 and to pay a fine of P200,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and non-payment of the fine by the accused.

Petitioner went to the Court of Appeals which modified the trial court's judgment deleting the
fine of P200,000.00. CA denied the motion for reconsideration.

Issues:

(1) whether the RTC, which tried and convicted petitioner, has jurisdiction over the case;
(2) whether petitioner had actual knowledge of the sufficiency or insufficiency of funds handled
by his co-accused;
(3) whether the check was issued on account or for value;
(4) whether the private complainant, at the time of issuance, had knowledge that the check had
no sufficient funds; and
(5) whether the guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

On the First issue. The SC disagree for RTC has jurisdiction over cases in violation of BP Blg. 22.
Since the Information in the present case was filed prior to the amendment of R.A. No. 7691,
the old rule governs. As a general rule the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is to be
determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action.

A perusal of R.A. No. 7691 will show that its retroactive provisions apply only to civil cases that
have not yet reached the pre-trial stage. Neither from an express proviso nor by implication can
it be understood as having retroactive application to criminal cases pending or decided by the
Regional Trial Courts prior to its effectivity at the time the case against the appellant was
commenced by the filing of the information on July 3, 1991, the Regional Trial Court had
jurisdiction over the offense charged.
On the Second issue. Whether petitioner had actual knowledge of the insufficiency of funds.

We have held that knowledge involves a state of mind difficult to establish, thus the statute
itself creates a prima facie presumption that the drawer had knowledge of the insufficiency of
his funds in or credit with the bank at the time of the issuance and on the check's presentment
for payment if he fails to pay the amount of the check within five banking days from notice of
dishonor.

In the present case, the prosecution has established the prima facie presumption of knowledge
of petitioner of insufficient funds through the demand letter sent to petitioner which was duly
received by petitioner as shown by the registry return receipt.

On the Third issue. Whether or not the check was issued on account or for value.

We have held that upon issuance of a check, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is
presumed that the same was issued for valuable consideration.

In this case, petitioner himself testified that he signed several checks in blank, the subject check
included, in exchange for 2.5% interest from the proceeds of loans that will be made from said
account. This is a valuable consideration for which the check was issued.

We have held that what the law punishes is the mere act of issuing a bouncing check, not the
purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. This is
because the thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them
into circulation.

Fourth issue. Whether the private complainant, at the time of issuance, had knowledge that the
checks had no sufficient funds.

We have held that knowledge of the payee that the drawer did not have sufficient funds with
the drawee bank at the time the check was issued is immaterial as deceit is not an essential
element of the offense under B.P. Blg. 22.[50] This is because the gravamen of the offense is
the issuance of a bad check, hence, malice and intent in the issuance thereof are
inconsequential.

Fifth issue. Whether the guilt of the accused was proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean absolute certainty. Suffice it to say the law
requires only moral certainty or that degree of proof which produces conviction in a prejudiced
mind.

After reviewing the entire records of this case, we find that there is no reason to depart from
the trial court's judgment of conviction. The weight and quantum of evidence needed to prove
the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt were met and established by the prosecution
and correctly affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

However, in view of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, as clarified by


Administrative Circular No. 13-2001, establishing a rule of preference in the application of the
penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22; we find that the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals
should be modified by deleting the penalty of imprisonment and imposing only a fine of
P200,000.00 and award 12% legal interest per annum from the date of finality of judgment.

You might also like