ANG LADLAD VS.

COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-
list organization to public respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the
latter denied the said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited
certain biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that
since their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are
considered nuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the
Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.

A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant

Petition on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the
exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees
against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the
Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy,
freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as
constituted violations of the Philippines’ international obligations against
discrimination based on sexual orientation.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a
concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and
that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for
the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by
the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful
statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to
actual verification reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.

Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the
Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and
legal grounds.
Held:
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands
for the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the
law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the
party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor
Party v. Commission on Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized and
under-represented sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial element is not
whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular
organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA
7941.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be
made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
“government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental
reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of
neutrality.” We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-
establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to
justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action
must have a secular purpose.

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be

prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has
the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s
admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably
damage the moral fabric of society.

We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal

and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil
Code defines a nuisance as “any act, omission, establishment, condition of
property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or
morality,” the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised
Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without
judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code,
on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a
criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation
of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public
morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a
judicial determination of liability or culpability.

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient

governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from
participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s
registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of
dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any
substantial public interest.

Facts:
Comelec refused to recognize Ang Ladlad LGBT Party, an organization
composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs),as a party list based on
moral grounds. In the elevation of the case to the Supreme Court, Comelec
alleged that petitioner made misrepresentation in their application.
Issue:
Whether or not Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualifies for registration as party-list.

Ruling:
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party’s application for registration should be granted.

Comelec’s citation of the Bible and the Koran in denying petitioner’s application was a
violation of the non-establishment clause laid down in Article 3 section 5 of the
Constitution. The proscription by law relative to acts against morality must be for a
secular purpose (that is, the conduct prohibited or sought to be repressed is “detrimental
or dangerous to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of
human society"), rather than out of religious conformity. The Comelec failed to
substantiate their allegation that allowing registration to Ladlad would be detrimental to
society.

The LGBT community is not exempted from the exercise of its constitutionally vested
rights on the basis of their sexual orientation. Laws of general application should apply
with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the
same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors. Discrimination based
on sexual orientation is not tolerated ---not by our own laws nor by any international laws
to which we adhere.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

... [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere
shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart
of the existing order.

Justice Robert A. Jackson

West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette[1]

One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the freedom to choose is that others may make
different choices - choices we would not make for ourselves, choices we may disapprove of, even
choices that may shock or offend or anger us. However, choices are not to be legally prohibited
merely because they are different, and the right to disagree and debate about important questions
of public policy is a core value protected by our Bill of Rights. Indeed, our democracy is built on
genuine recognition of, and respect for, diversity and difference in opinion.
Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep disagreements about the definitions and
demands of morality. In many cases, where moral convictions are concerned, harmony among those
theoretically opposed is an insurmountable goal. Yet herein lies the paradox - philosophical
justifications about what is moral are indispensable and yet at the same time powerless to create
agreement. This Court recognizes, however, that practical solutions are preferable to ideological
stalemates; accommodation is better than intransigence; reason more worthy than rhetoric. This will
allow persons of diverse viewpoints to live together, if not harmoniously, then, at least, civilly.

Factual Background

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application for a writ of
preliminary mandatory Injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 2009[2] (the First
Assailed Resolution) and December 16, 2009[3] (the Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228
(PL) (collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the COMELEC's refusal to
accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known
as the Party-List System Act.[4]

Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians,
gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied
for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the
ground that the organization had no substantial membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad
again filed a Petition[5] for registration with the COMELEC.

Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-
represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender
identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative
societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad
complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor
Party v. Commission on Elections.[6] Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of
individual members and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance.[7]

On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioner's evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division)
dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating that:

x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines the Filipino Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus:

x x x a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their

sexual orientation and gender identity.
and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:

x x x refers to a person's capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and
intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a different gender, of the same gender, or more
than one gender."

This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates immorality which
offends religious beliefs. In Romans 1:26, 27, Paul wrote:

For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for even their women did change the natural
use into that which is against nature: And likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of the
woman, burned in their lust one toward another; men with men working that which is unseemly,
and receiving in themselves that recompense of their error which was meet.

In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:

For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women "ye are indeed a people transgressing
beyond bounds." (7.81) "And we rained down on them a shower (of brimstone): Then see what was
the end of those who indulged in sin and crime!" (7:84) "He said: "O my Lord! Help Thou me against
people who do mischief" (29:30).

As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its Comment dated October 2, 2008:

The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual immorality as indicated in the Petition's par. 6F:
`Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age'. It is further
indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the record: `In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men
or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000 (Genesis 19 is the history of Sodom and
Gomorrah).

Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit, license, relationship, or accreditation.
Hence, pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code are deemed part of the
requirement to be complied with for accreditation.

ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines nuisance as `Any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which x x x (3) shocks, defies; or
disregards decency or morality x x x

It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: `The contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code
provides that `Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy' are inexistent and void from the beginning.

Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
penalizes `Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows' as follows:
Art. 201.Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent shows. ÔÇö The
penalty of prision mayor or a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such
imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed upon:

1.Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals;

2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any form; the editors
publishing such literature; and the owners/operators of the establishment selling the same;

(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place, exhibit indecent or immoral
plays, scenes, acts or shows, it being understood that the obscene literature or indecent or immoral
plays, scenes, acts or shows, whether live or in film, which are prescribed by virtue hereof, shall
include those which: (1) glorify criminals or condone crimes; (2) serve no other purpose but to satisfy
the market for violence, lust or pornography; (3) offend any race or religion; (4) tend to abet traffic
in and use of prohibited drugs; and (5) are contrary to law, public order, morals, good customs,
established policies, lawful orders, decrees and edicts.

3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculpture or literature which
are offensive to morals.

Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral doctrines but
likewise for not being truthful when it said that it "or any of its nominees/party-list representatives
have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections."

Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we will be exposing our youth to an
environment that does not conform to the teachings of our faith. Lehman Strauss, a famous bible
teacher and writer in the U.S.A. said in one article that "older practicing homosexuals are a threat to
the youth." As an agency of the government, ours too is the State's avowed duty under Section 13,
Article II of the Constitution to protect our youth from moral and spiritual degradation.[8]

When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration,[9] three commissioners voted to overturn the First
Assailed Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V. Sarmiento, and Armando
Velasco), while three commissioners voted to deny Ang Ladlad's Motion for
Reconsideration(Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R. Yusoph). The
COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking for the majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld
the First Assailed Resolution, stating that:

I. The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941

Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list system. Even assuming that it
has properly proven its under-representation and marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlad's
expressed sexual orientations per se would benefit the nation as a whole.
Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the purpose of the party-list system of
electing congressional representatives is to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
under-represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation
that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.

If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability of an organization to represent its
constituencies, then all representative organizations would have found themselves into the party-list
race. But that is not the intention of the framers of the law. The party-list system is not a tool to
advocate tolerance and acceptance of misunderstood persons or groups of persons. Rather, the
party-list system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals whose
interests are also the nation's- only that their interests have not been brought to the attention of the
nation because of their under representation. Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify
that having mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its
application for accreditation under the party-list system will remain just that.

II. No substantial differentiation

In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine pervades Philippine jurisprudence, courts do
not recognize lesbians, gays, homosexuals, and bisexuals (LGBT) as a "special class" of individuals. x x
x Significantly, it has also been held that homosexuality is not a constitutionally protected
fundamental right, and that "nothing in the U.S. Constitution discloses a comparable intent to
protect or promote the social or legal equality of homosexual relations," as in the case of race or
religion or belief.

xxxx

Thus, even if society's understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBT's is elevated, there can be
no denying that Ladlad constituencies are still males and females, and they will remain either male
or female protected by the same Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike.

xxxx

IV. Public Morals

x x x There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or Muslim religious practices.
Neither is there any attempt to any particular religious group's moral rules on Ladlad. Rather, what
are being adopted as moral parameters and precepts are generally accepted public morals. They are
possibly religious-based, but as a society, the Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years of
Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some moral precepts espoused by said religions have
sipped [sic] into society and these are not publicly accepted moral norms.

V. Legal Provisions

But above morality and social norms, they have become part of the law of the land. Article 201 of
the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor upon "Those who shall publicly
expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals." It penalizes "immoral doctrines,
obscene publications and exhibition and indecent shows." "Ang Ladlad" apparently falls under these
legal provisions. This is clear from its Petition's paragraph 6F: "Consensual partnerships or
relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age' It is further indicated in par. 24 of the
Petition which waves for the record: `In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines
were estimated as 670,000. Moreoever, Article 694 of the Civil Code defines "nuisance" as any act,
omission x x x or anything else x x x which shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality x x x."
These are all unlawful.[10]

On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed
Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlad's application for accreditation. Ang Ladlad
also sought the issuance Ex Parte of a preliminary mandatory Injunction against the COMELEC, which
had previously announced that it would begin printing the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by
January 25, 2010.

On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file its Comment on
behalf of COMELEC not later than 12:00 noon of January 11, 2010.[11] Instead of filing a Comment,
however, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension, requesting that it be given until January 16, 2010 to
Comment.[12] Somewhat surprisingly, the OSG later filed a Comment in support of petitioner's
application.[13] Thus, in order to give COMELEC the opportunity to fully ventilate its position, we
required it to file its own comment.[14] The COMELEC, through its Law Department, filed its
Comment on February 2, 2010.[15]

In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a temporary restraining order on
January 12, 2010, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, directing
the COMELEC to cease and desist from implementing the Assailed Resolutions.[16]

Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a Motion to Intervene or to
Appear as Amicus Curiae, attaching thereto its Comment-in-Intervention.[17] The CHR opined that
the denial of Ang Ladlad's petition on moral grounds violated the standards and principles of the
Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). On January 19, 2010, we granted the CHR's motion to intervene.
On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his Motion to Intervene[18] which motion was
granted on February 2, 2010.[19]

The Parties' Arguments

Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using
religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion.
Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy,
freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of
the Philippines' international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.

The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlad's petition and argued that the COMELEC erred in denying
petitioner's application for registration since there was no basis for COMELEC's allegations of
immorality. It also opined that LGBTs have their own special interests and concerns which should
have been recognized by the COMELEC as a separate classification. However, insofar as the
purported violations of petitioner's freedom of speech, expression, and assembly were concerned,
the OSG maintained that there had been no restrictions on these rights.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine
national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral
grounds. It also argued for the first timethat the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated
by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition
when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELEC's field
personnel.

Our Ruling

We grant the petition.

Compliance with the Requirements of

the Constitution and Republic Act No.

7941
The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad's application for registration on the ground that the LGBT sector is
neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of
the sectors in the enumeration.

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that
only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we
explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections,[20] "the
enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive". The crucial element is
not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with
the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.

Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged
that it had nationwide existence through its members and affiliate organizations. The COMELEC
claims that upon verification by its field personnel, it was shown that "save for a few isolated places
in the country, petitioner does not exist in almost all provinces in the country."[21]

This argument that "petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national
existence" is a new one; previously, the COMELEC claimed that petitioner was "not being truthful
when it said that it or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to
comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections." Nowhere was this ground for denial
of petitioner's accreditation mentioned or even alluded to in the Assailed Resolutions. This, in itself,
is quite curious, considering that the reports of petitioner's alleged non-existence were already
available to the COMELEC prior to the issuance of the First Assailed Resolution. At best, this is
irregular procedure; at worst, a belated afterthought, a change in respondent's theory, and a serious
violation of petitioner's right to procedural due process.

Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlad's
initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines. Rather,
petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at least
670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044 members
in its electronic discussion group.[22] Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be "a national LGBT
umbrella organization with affiliates around the Philippines composed of the following LGBT
networks:"

Abra Gay Association

Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB) - Aklan

Albay Gay Association

Arts Center of Cabanatuan City - Nueva Ecija

Boys Legion - Metro Manila

Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS)

Can't Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC) - Metro Manila

Cebu Pride - Cebu City

Circle of Friends

Dipolog Gay Association - Zamboanga del Norte

Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender Youth Association (GABAY)

Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for Gender Equality (GALANG) - Metro Manila

Gay Men's Support Group (GMSG) - Metro Manila

Gay United for Peace and Solidarity (GUPS) - Lanao del Norte

Iloilo City Gay Association - Iloilo City

Kabulig Writer's Group - Camarines Sur

Lesbian Advocates Philippines, Inc. (LEAP)

LUMINA - Baguio City

Marikina Gay Association - Metro Manila

Metropolitan Community Church (MCC) - Metro Manila

Naga City Gay Association - Naga City

ONE BACARDI

Order of St. Aelred (OSAe) - Metro Manila

PUP LAKAN

RADAR PRIDEWEAR

Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights), Inc. - Metro Manila

San Jose del Monte Gay Association - Bulacan

Sining Kayumanggi Royal Family - Rizal

Society of Transexual Women of the Philippines (STRAP) - Metro Manila

Soul Jive - Antipolo, Rizal

The Link - Davao City

Tayabas Gay Association - Quezon

Women's Bisexual Network - Metro Manila

Zamboanga Gay Association - Zamboanga City[23]

Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it is no
surprise that they found that petitioner had no presence in any of these regions. In fact, if
COMELEC's findings are to be believed, petitioner does not even exist in Quezon City, which is
registered as Ang Ladlad's principal place of business.

Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the
legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELEC's moral objection and the belated
allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang
Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA
7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlad's
morality, or lack thereof.

Religion as the Basis for Refusal to

Accept Ang Ladlad's Petition for

Registration

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At bottom, what our non-
establishment clause calls for is "government neutrality in religious matters."[24] Clearly,
"governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality."[25] We
thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the
Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.

Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend,
instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere
conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must act for secular purposes and in
ways that have primarily secular effects. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:[26]

x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious as the dissent
of Mr. Justice Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may influence the civil
public order but public moral disputes may be resolved only on grounds articulable in secular
terms." Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies and
morals, the resulting policies and morals would require conformity to what some might regard as
religious programs or agenda. The non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform to a
standard of conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion," anathema to
religious freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly
approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious
views that would not support the policy. As a result, government will not provide full religious
freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are
second-class citizens.
In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal
law like concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That is, the government proscribes this conduct
because it is "detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence and
progress of human society" and not because the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion
or the other. Although admittedly, moral judgments based on religion might have a compelling
influence on those engaged in public deliberations over what actions would be considered a moral
disapprobation punishable by law. After all, they might also be adherents of a religion and thus have
religious opinions and moral codes with a compelling influence on them; the human mind endeavors
to regulate the temporal and spiritual institutions of society in a uniform manner, harmonizing earth
with heaven. Succinctly put, a law could be religious or Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its
deepest roots, but it must have an articulable and discernible secular purpose and justification to
pass scrutiny of the religion clauses. x x x Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos and the
elevating influence of religion in society, however, the Philippine constitution's religion clauses
prescribe not a strict but a benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government
must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time strive to uphold religious liberty to
the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality
contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality
based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.[27]

Public Morals as a Ground to

Deny Ang Ladlad's Petition for

Registration

Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of homosexuality and homosexual
conduct may be religion-based, it has long been transplanted into generally accepted public morals.
The COMELEC argues:

Petitioner's accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group consists of LGBTs but
because of the danger it poses to the people especially the youth. Once it is recognized by the
government, a sector which believes that there is nothing wrong in having sexual relations with
individuals of the same gender is a bad example. It will bring down the standard of morals we
cherish in our civilized society. Any society without a set of moral precepts is in danger of losing its
own existence.[28]

We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals
themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the reasons
behind this censure - religious beliefs, convictions about the preservation of marriage, family, and
procreation, even dislike or distrust of homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle.
Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct.
Evidently, therefore, these "generally accepted public morals" have not been convincingly
transplanted into the realm of law.[29]
The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang
Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees that "there should have been a finding by the COMELEC that the
group's members have committed or are committing immoral acts."[30] The OSG argues:

x x x A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, of a different gender, or
more than one gender, but mere attraction does not translate to immoral acts. There is a great
divide between thought and action. Reduction ad absurdum. If immoral thoughts could be
penalized, COMELEC would have its hands full of disqualification cases against both the "straights"
and the gays." Certainly this is not the intendment of the law.[31]

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special
protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position
that petitioner's admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage
the moral fabric of society. We, of course, do not suggest that the state is wholly without authority
to regulate matters concerning morality, sexuality, and sexual relations, and we recognize that the
government will and should continue to restrict behavior considered detrimental to society.
Nonetheless, we cannot countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of intentions,
situate morality on one end of an argument or another, without bothering to go through the rigors
of legal reasoning and explanation. In this, the notion of morality is robbed of all value. Clearly then,
the bare invocation of morality will not remove an issue from our scrutiny.

We also find the COMELEC's reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at
best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as "any act, omission,
establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or
morality," the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local
ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings.[32] A violation of Article 201 of
the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a
criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not
proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or
criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to
justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang
Ladlad's registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and
disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.
Respondent's blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets
homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is this
selective targeting that implicates our equal protection clause.

Equal Protection
Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides "nor shall any
person be denied equal protection of the laws," courts have never interpreted the provision as an
absolute prohibition on classification. "Equality," said Aristotle, "consists in the same treatment of
similar persons."[33] The equal protection clause guarantees that no person or class of persons shall
be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the
same place and in like circumstances.[34]

Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a
suspect class, we will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to some
legitimate government end.[35] In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng
Pilipinas,[36] we declared that "[i]n our jurisdiction, the standard of analysis of equal protection
challenges x x x have followed the `rational basis' test, coupled with a deferential attitude to
legislative classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution."[37]

The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers homosexual conduct as
immoral and unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the petitioner.
Unfortunately for the respondent, the Philippine electorate has expressed no such belief. No law
exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or parties about homosexual behavior.
Indeed, even if we were to assume that public opinion is as the COMELEC describes it, the asserted
state interest here - that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority - is not a legitimate state
interest that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the equal protection clause. The
COMELEC's differentiation, and its unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot contribute to the
formulation of legislation that would benefit the nation, furthers no legitimate state interest other
than disapproval of or dislike for a disfavored group.

From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the
same interest in participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political parties
similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general
application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list
system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.

It bears stressing that our finding that COMELEC's act of differentiating LGBTs from heterosexuals
insofar as the party-list system is concerned does not imply that any other law distinguishing
between heterosexuals and homosexuals under different circumstances would similarly fail. We
disagree with the OSG's position that homosexuals are a class in themselves for the purposes of the
equal protection clause.[38] We are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a separate class
meriting special or differentiated treatment. We have not received sufficient evidence to this effect,
and it is simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has merely demanded that
it be recognized under the same basis as all other groups similarly situated, and that the COMELEC
made "an unwarranted and impermissible classification not justified by the circumstances of the
case."
Freedom of Expression and Association

Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to persuade
society of the validity of its position through normal democratic means.[39] It is in the public square
that deeply held convictions and differing opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon. As we
held in Estrada v. Escritor:[40]

In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is distilled in the public square.
Where citizens are free, every opinion, every prejudice, every aspiration, and every moral
discernment has access to the public square where people deliberate the order of their life together.
Citizens are the bearers of opinion, including opinion shaped by, or espousing religious belief, and
these citizens have equal access to the public square. In this representative democracy, the state is
prohibited from determining which convictions and moral judgments may be proposed for public
deliberation. Through a constitutionally designed process, the people deliberate and decide.
Majority rule is a necessary principle in this democratic governance. Thus, when public deliberation
on moral judgments is finally crystallized into law, the laws will largely reflect the beliefs and
preferences of the majority, i.e., the mainstream or median groups. Nevertheless, in the very act of
adopting and accepting a constitution and the limits it specifies - including protection of religious
freedom "not only for a minority, however small - not only for a majority, however large - but for
each of us" - the majority imposes upon itself a self-denying ordinance. It promises not to do what it
otherwise could do: to ride roughshod over the dissenting minorities.

Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and this
freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or
disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.
Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on
the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no
better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.

This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal in this
country. It follows that both expressions concerning one's homosexuality and the activity of forming
a political association that supports LGBT individuals are protected as well.

Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even overwhelming public
perception that homosexual conduct violates public morality does not justify criminalizing same-sex
conduct.[41] European and United Nations judicial decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights
claimants on both privacy and equality grounds, citing general privacy and equal protection
provisions in foreign and international texts.[42] To the extent that there is much to learn from other
jurisdictions that have reflected on the issues we face here, such jurisprudence is certainly
illuminating. These foreign authorities, while not formally binding on Philippine courts, may
nevertheless have persuasive influence on the Court's analysis.
In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have ruled that existing free
speech doctrines protect gay and lesbian rights to expressive conduct. In order to justify the
prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, public institutions must show that their actions
were caused by "something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness
that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint."[43]

With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs, in Europe, with its
vibrant human rights tradition, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has repeatedly stated
that a political party may campaign for a change in the law or the constitutional structures of a state
if it uses legal and democratic means and the changes it proposes are consistent with democratic
principles. The ECHR has emphasized that political ideas that challenge the existing order and whose
realization is advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper opportunity of expression
through the exercise of the right of association, even if such ideas may seem shocking or
unacceptable to the authorities or the majority of the population.[44] A political group should not be
hindered solely because it seeks to publicly debate controversial political issues in order to find
solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned.[45] Only if a political party incites violence or
puts forward policies that are incompatible with democracy does it fall outside the protection of the
freedom of association guarantee.[46]

We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual conduct is distasteful,
offensive, or even defiant. They are entitled to hold and express that view. On the other hand, LGBTs
and their supporters, in all likelihood, believe with equal fervor that relationships between
individuals of the same sex are morally equivalent to heterosexual relationships. They, too, are
entitled to hold and express that view. However, as far as this Court is concerned, our democracy
precludes using the religious or moral views of one part of the community to exclude from
consideration the values of other members of the community.

Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay rights litigants. It well
may be that this Decision will only serve to highlight the discrepancy between the rigid constitutional
analysis of this Court and the more complex moral sentiments of Filipinos. We do not suggest that
public opinion, even at its most liberal, reflect a clear-cut strong consensus favorable to gay rights
claims and we neither attempt nor expect to affect individual perceptions of homosexuality through
this Decision.

The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent punishment
imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its members have not been deprived of their right to voluntarily
associate, then there has been no restriction on their freedom of expression or association. The OSG
argues that:

There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or any assembly denied. [COMELEC]
simply exercised its authority to review and verify the qualifications of petitioner as a sectoral party
applying to participate in the party-list system. This lawful exercise of duty cannot be said to be a
transgression of Section 4, Article III of the Constitution.

xxxx

A denial of the petition for registration x x x does not deprive the members of the petitioner to freely
take part in the conduct of elections. Their right to vote will not be hampered by said denial. In fact,
the right to vote is a constitutionally-guaranteed right which cannot be limited.

As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election, petitioner contends that the denial of Ang
Ladlad's petition has the clear and immediate effect of limiting, if not outrightly nullifying the
capacity of its members to fully and equally participate in public life through engagement in the
party list elections.

This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is not a right but a privilege subject to
limitations imposed by law. x x x[47]

The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to participate in the
party-list system, and - as advanced by the OSG itself - the moral objection offered by the COMELEC
was not a limitation imposed by law. To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has been
precluded, because of COMELEC's action, from publicly expressing its views as a political party and
participating on an equal basis in the political process with other equally-qualified party-list
candidates, we find that there has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioner's fundamental rights.

Non-Discrimination and International Law

In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and promise, international
human rights law, in particular, has grown dynamically in its attempt to bring about a more just and
humane world order. For individuals and groups struggling with inadequate structural and
governmental support, international human rights norms are particularly significant, and should be
effectively enforced in domestic legal systems so that such norms may become actual, rather than
ideal, standards of conduct.

Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect and promote
human rights. In particular, we explicitly recognize the principle of non-discrimination as it relates to
the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR.

The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows:

Article 26

All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal
protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all
persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status.

In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application relating
to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual
orientation is not specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the
ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has opined that the reference to "sex" in Article 26
should be construed to include "sexual orientation."[48] Additionally, a variety of United Nations
bodies have declared discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under various
international agreements.[49]

The UDHR provides:

Article 21.

(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely
chosen representatives.

Likewise, the ICCPR states:

Article 25

Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in
article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:

(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal
suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the
electors;

(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.

As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope of the right to electoral participation
is elaborated by the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No. 25 (Participation in Public
Affairs and the Right to Vote) as follows:

1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of every citizen to take part in the
conduct of public affairs, the right to vote and to be elected and the right to have access to public
service. Whatever form of constitution or government is in force, the Covenant requires States to
adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that citizens have an
effective opportunity to enjoy the rights it protects. Article 25 lies at the core of democratic
government based on the consent of the people and in conformity with the principles of the
Covenant.

xxxx

15. The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to stand for elective office ensures
that persons entitled to vote have a free choice of candidates. Any restrictions on the right to stand
for election, such as minimum age, must be justifiable on objective and reasonable criteria. Persons
who are otherwise eligible to stand for election should not be excluded by unreasonable or
discriminatory requirements such as education, residence or descent, or by reason of political
affiliation. No person should suffer discrimination or disadvantage of any kind because of that
person's candidacy. States parties should indicate and explain the legislative provisions which
exclude any group or category of persons from elective office.[50]

We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the responsibility of giving
effect to the Philippines' international law obligations, the blanket invocation of international law is
not the panacea for all social ills. We refer now to the petitioner's invocation of the Yogyakarta
Principles (the Application of International Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and
Gender Identity),[51] which petitioner declares to reflect binding principles of international law.

At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are
obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in said Principles which
are not reflective of the current state of international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources
of international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice.[52] Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these alleged
principles of international law to ascertain their true status.

We also hasten to add that not everything that society - or a certain segment of society - wants or
demands is automatically a human right. This is not an arbitrary human intervention that may be
added to or subtracted from at will. It is unfortunate that much of what passes for human rights
today is a much broader context of needs that identifies many social desires as rights in order to
further claims that international law obliges states to sanction these innovations. This has the effect
of diluting real human rights, and is a result of the notion that if "wants" are couched in "rights"
language, then they are no longer controversial.

Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration
formulated by various international law professors, are - at best - de lege ferenda - and do not
constitute binding obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary international law
is characterized by the "soft law" nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of principles that
promote international cooperation, harmony, and respect for human rights, most of which amount
to no more than well-meaning desires, without the support of either State practice or opinio juris.
[53]

As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by this case are
emotionally charged, societal attitudes are in flux, even the psychiatric and religious communities
are divided in opinion. This Court's role is not to impose its own view of acceptable behavior. Rather,
it is to apply the Constitution and laws as best as it can, uninfluenced by public opinion, and
confident in the knowledge that our democracy is resilient enough to withstand vigorous debate.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections
dated November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) are hereby SET ASIDE. The
Commission on Elections is directed to GRANT petitioner's application for party-list accreditation.

SO ORDERED.

FACTS: Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who

identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals
(LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with
the COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the
ground that the organization had no substantial membership base. On August
17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition for registration with the
COMELEC.

Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a

marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged
because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims
of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal
attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang
Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections. Ang Ladlad laid
out its national membership base consisting of individual members and
organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance.

On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners evidence, the

COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating
that: This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines the
Filipino Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus a
marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged
because of their sexual orientation and gender identity. and proceeded to
define sexual orientation as that which refers to a persons capacity for
profound emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and intimate and
sexual relations with, individuals of a different gender, of the same gender, or
more than one gender.

ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines
nuisance as Any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property,
or anything else which (3) shocks, defies; or disregardsdecency or morality.

It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: The contracting parties may
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code provides that
Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy are inexistent and void from the
beginning.

Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, penalizes Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and
exhibitions and indecent shows as follows:

Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and

indecent shows.

When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration, three commissioners voted to

overturn the First Assailed Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y.
Larrazabal, Rene V. Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while three
commissioners voted to deny Ang Ladlads Motion for Reconsideration
(Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R. Yusoph).
The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking for the majority in
his Separate Opinion, upheld the First Assailed Resolution, stating that:

Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list system.

Even assuming that it has properly proven its under-representation and
marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlads expressed sexual orientations
per se would benefit the nation as a whole.

Thus, even if societys understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBTs is

elevated, there can be no denying that Ladlad constituencies are still males
and females, and they will remain either male or female protected by the same
Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike.

There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or Muslim

religious practices. Neither is there any attempt to any particular religious
groups moral rules on Ladlad. Rather, what are being adopted as moral
parameters and precepts are generally accepted public morals. They are
possibly religious-based, but as a society, the Philippines cannot ignore its
more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some
moral precepts espoused by said religions have sipped [sic] into society and
these are not publicly accepted moral norms.

On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court
annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlads
application for accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of a
preliminary mandatory injunction against the COMELEC, which had
previously announced that it would begin printing the final ballots for the May
2010 elections by January 25, 2010.

ISSUE: Should Ang Ladlad's application for accreditation be

granted?

HELD: The lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in
participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political
parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome.
Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs,
and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as
other marginalized and under-represented sectors.

It bears stressing that our finding that COMELECs act of differentiating

LGBTs from heterosexuals insofar as the party-list system is concerned does
not imply that any other law distinguishing between heterosexuals and
homosexuals under different circumstances would similarly fail. The Court
disagree with the OSGs position that homosexuals are a class in themselves for
the purposes of the equal protection clause. It should not single out
homosexuals as a separate class meriting special or differentiated treatment.
We have not received sufficient evidence to this effect, and it is simply
unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has merely
demanded that it be recognized under the same basis as all other groups
similarly situated, and that the COMELEC made "an unwarranted and
impermissible classification not justified by the circumstances of the case."
xxx
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and
attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position through normal
democratic means. It is in the public square that deeply held convictions and
differing opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon.

In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is

distilled in the public square. Where citizens are free, every opinion, every
prejudice, every aspiration, and every moral discernment has access to the
public square where people deliberate the order of their life together. Citizens
are the bearers of opinion, including opinion shaped by, or espousing religious
belief, and these citizens have equal access to the public square. In this
representative democracy, the state is prohibited from determining which
convictions and moral judgments may be proposed for public deliberation.
Through a constitutionally designed process, the people deliberate and decide.
Majority rule is a necessary principle in this democratic governance. Thus,
when public deliberation on moral judgments is finally crystallized into law,
the laws will largely reflect the beliefs and preferences of the majority, i.e., the
mainstream or median groups. Nevertheless, in the very act of adopting and
accepting a constitution and the limits it specifies including protection of
religious freedom "not only for a minority, however small not only for a
majority, however large but for each of us" the majority imposes upon itself a
self-denying ordinance. It promises not to do what it otherwise could do: to
ride roughshod over the dissenting minorities.

Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a

democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are
favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any
restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim
pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or
this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the
COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason
than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall
prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective
protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status.

In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that

laws of general application relating to elections be applied equally
to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual
orientation is not specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for
discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights
Committee has opined that the reference to "sex" in Article 26
should be construed to include "sexual orientation." Additionally, a
variety of United Nations bodies have declared discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under various
international agreements.

Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 203766)

April 2, 2013 | G.R. No. 203766

Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other disqualified party list groups, petitioners
COMELEC, respondent

FACTS: 

In line with the then upcoming national elections in May 2013, approximately 280 groups and
organizations manifested their desire to participate in the party-list elections. However, 52 of
these groups were subsequently disqualified by COMELEC, including some that were duly registered
and accredited as political parties. The reasons for their exclusion were based on the contention
that said groups failed to establish they were representatives of marginalized and
underrepresented sectors and that their nominees were indeed members of the sectors they were
seeking to represent. 

ISSUE: 

Whether or not COMELEC erred in disqualifying 52 party list groups from participating in the May
2013 elections. 

HELD:

No, what COMELEC did was merely follow existing jurisprudence set forth by the SC in its earlier
rulings. So for purposes of setting uniform standards and understanding of the party-list system in
the Philippines, the Court provides a lengthy account of the history and dynamics of the party-list
system as embodied in the 1987 Constitution and as envisioned by the Framers, and institutes new
guidelines to be used in resolving issues of similar nature in the future. 

Q: Where can the party-list system be found in the 1987 Constitution? 

A: Section 5, Art. VI; Sections 7 and 8, Art. IX-C

Q: What is the rationale behind the party-list system?

A: To democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district
elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives.

Q: Is the party-list system synonymous with sectoral representation?

A: No. Under the party-list system, all voters get to have two votes: one for their choice of
legislative district representative, and another for their choice of party-list representative. But
under sectoral representation, majority of the electorate will only have one vote, which is for their
choice of legislative district representative. In contrast, members of sectoral communities (e.g.
farmers, laborers, indigenous cultural communitoes, etc.) will have two votes: one for their district
representative and another for their choice of sectoral representative. In other words, sectoral
representation is discriminatory.

Q: Is the party-list system exclusive to sectoral parties?

A: No. The party-list system is open to both sectoral and non-sectoral groups. The framers intended
sectoral groups to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system.

Q: Who can participate in party-list elections?

A: As per Section 5(1) of Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, any of the following can take part in
party-list elections: national parties and organizations, regional parties and organizations, and
sectoral parties and organizations.  
Q: What is the enabling law of the party-list system?
A: RA No. 7941, or the Party-List System Act.

Q: Do party-list groups need to represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors?

A: No. Art. 6 of RA No. 7941 identifies six grounds for disqualification of a party-list group, and
none of these grounds touches on the failure of a party to represent the marginalized and
underrepresented. For non-sectoral groups, it is enough that its members are united in their cause
or ideology. But for sectoral groups, a majority of their members must come from marginalized and
underrepresented sectors.

Q: What are the marginalized and underrepresented sectors?

A: Section 5 of RA No. 7941 lists the following as marginalized and underrepresented sectors: labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas
workers, and other similar sectors. 

FACTS:

 The case constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed
by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections,
either by denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their
registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.
 Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and
manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections
 December 5, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division’s
resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) registration and accreditation as a political party
in the National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the elections because PBB
does not represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
 13 petitioners were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court. The COMELEC,
on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, and excluded the names of these 13 petitioners in the
printing of the official.
 Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled
summary evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed
manifestations of intent to participate in the elections have continually complied with the requirements
of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani).
 39 petitioners were able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court, directing the
COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the
elections.
 Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions. 

ISSUE:

 Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the elections.

HELD:

 No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions
in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming elections. However, since the Court adopts
new parameters in the qualification of the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the
decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the
present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the party-list
system, and to participate in the coming elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this
Decision.
 Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first
three consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the
seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election
from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision clearly shows again
that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons.
 First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be
open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is
exclusively for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and underrepresented."
 Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for
the first "three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list
system fully open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after this
period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the three
groups constituting the party-list system.
 Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and
(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral
parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
 R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the
party-list system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by
judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. How will these
ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections, participate
in the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from the
party-list system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option
the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously
senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A.
No. 7941

y Abby

ATONG PAGLAUM v. COMELEC, GR No. 203766, 2013-04-02

Facts:
These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and
Prohibition[1] filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions
issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them... from
participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for
registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and
accreditation as party-list organizations.
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered
and manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
The COMELEC, however, denied the petitions for registration
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction.
Issues:
We rule upon two issues: first, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from
participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their new petitions
for... registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing
registration and accreditation as party-list organizations;... second, whether the criteria
for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay
Association for
National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections[49] (BANAT)
should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Ruling:
the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion
Principles:
The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation.
Simply put, the party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving
political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in
the House of
Representatives
G.R. No. 206952 : OCTOBER 22, 2013

ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST (ABANG LINGKOD), Petitioner, v.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.

REYES, J.:

FACTS:

ABANG LINGKOD is a sectoral organization that represents the interests of

peasant farmers and fisherfolks, and was registered under the party-list
system on December 22, 2009. It failed to obtain the number of votes needed
in the May 2010 elections for a seat in the House of Representatives.

On August 16, 2012, ABANG LINGKOD, in compliance with the COMELEC

August 9, 2012 resolution, filed with the COMELEC pertinent documents to
prove its continuing compliance with the requirements under R.A. No. 7941.

In a Resolution dated November 7, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc cancelled

ABANG LINGKOD registration as a party-list group. It pointed out that
ABANG LINGKOD failed to establish its track record in uplifting the cause of
the marginalized and underrepresented; that it merely offered photographs of
some alleged activities it conducted after the May 2010 elections.

ABANG LINGKOD field a petitioner for certiorari alleging that the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion in cancelling its registration under the party-list
system. The said petition was consolidated with the separate petitions filed by
51 other party-list groups whose registration were cancelled or who were
denied registration under the party-list system. The said party-list groups,
including ABANG LINGKOD, were able to obtain status quo ante orders from
the court.

The Court remanded to the COMELEC the cases of previously registered

party-list groups, including that of ABANG LINGKOD, to determine whether
they are qualified under the party-list system pursuant to the new parameters
laid down by the Court and, in the affirmative, be allowed to participate in the
May 2013 party-list elections.

On May 10, 2013, the COMELEC issued the herein assailed Resolution, which,
inter alia, affirmed the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration under
the party-list system. The COMELEC issued the Resolution dated May 10,
2013 sans any summary evidentiary hearing, citing the proximity of the May
13, 2013 elections as the reason therefor.

On May 12, 2013, ABANG LINGKOD sought a reconsideration of the

COMELEC's Resolution dated May 10, 2013. However, on May 15, 2013,
ABANG LINGKOD withdrew the motion for reconsideration it filed with the
COMELEC and, instead, instituted the instant petition with this Court,
alleging that there may not be enough time for the COMELEC to pass upon the
merits of its motion for reconsideration considering that the election returns
were already being canvassed and consolidated by the COMELEC.

ISSUE: hether or not ABANG LINGKOD was denied due process?

HELD: BANG LINGKOD was not denied of due process.

POLITICAL LAW: administrative due process

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or as applied

to administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings, an opportunity to explain
one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all
instances essential. The requirements are satisfied when the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice or
hearing.

In the instant case, while the petitioner laments that it was denied due
process, the Court finds that the COMELEC had afforded ABANG LINGKOD
sufficient opportunity to present evidence establishing its qualification as a
party-list group. It was notified through Resolution No. 9513 that its
registration was to be reviewed by the COMELEC. That ABANG LINGKOD
was able to file its Manifestation of Intent and other pertinent documents to
prove its continuing compliance with the requirements under R.A. No. 7941,
which the COMELEC set for summary hearing on three separate dates, belies
its claim that it was denied due process.

There was no necessity for the COMELEC to conduct further summary

evidentiary hearing to assess the qualification of ABANG LINGKOD pursuant
to Atong Paglaum. ABANG LINGKOD's Manifestation of Intent and all the
evidence adduced by it to establish its qualification as a party-list group are
already in the possession of the COMELEC. Thus, conducting further
summary evidentiary hearing for the sole purpose of determining ABANG
LINGKOD's qualification under the party-list system pursuant to Atong
Paglaumwould just be a superfluity.

Contrary to ABANG LINGKOD's claim, the Court, in Atong Paglaum, did not
categorically require the COMELEC to conduct a summary evidentiary hearing
for the purpose of determining the qualifications of the petitioners therein
pursuant to the new parameters for screening party-list groups.

POLITICAL LAW: cancellation of party-list registration

Court finds that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling the
registration of ABANG LINGKOD under the party-list system. The COMELEC
affirmed the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration on the ground
that it declared untruthful statement in its bid for accreditation as a party-list
group in the May 2013 elections, pointing out that it deliberately submitted
digitally altered photographs of activities to make it appear that it had a track
record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented. Essentially,
ABANG LINGKOD's registration was cancelled on the ground that it failed to
adduce evidence showing its track record in representing the marginalized and
underrepresented.

R.A. No. 7941 did not require groups intending to register under the party-list
system to submit proof of their track record as a group. The track record
requirement was only imposed in Ang Bagong Bayani where the Court held
that national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations seeking
registration under the party-list system must prove through their, inter alia,
track record that they truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented.

In Atong Paglaum, the Court has modified to a great extent the jurisprudential
doctrines on who may register under the party-list system and the
representation of the marginalized and underrepresented. For purposes of
registration under the party-list system, national or regional parties or
organizations need not represent any marginalized and underrepresented
sector; that representation of the marginalized and underrepresented is only
required of sectoral organizations that represent the sectors stated under
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 that are, by their nature, economically marginalized
and underrepresented.

Contrary to the COMELEC's claim, sectoral parties or organizations, such as

ABANG LINGKOD, are no longer required to adduce evidence showing their
track record, i.e. proof of activities that they have undertaken to further the
cause of the sector they represent. Indeed, it is enough that their principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.
Otherwise stated, it is sufficient that the ideals represented by the sectoral
organizations are geared towards the cause of the sector/s, which they
represent.

Dissenting, Mr. Justice Leonen, however, maintains that parties or

organizations intending to register under the party-list system are still
required to present a track record notwithstanding the Court's pronouncement
in Atong Paglaum; that the track record that would have to be presented
would only differ as to the nature of their group/organization. He opines that
sectoral organizations must prove their links with the marginalized and
underrepresented while national or regional parties or organizations must
show that they have been existing as a bona fide organization. GRANTED.
Facts:

This is a petition for certiorari filed by Abang Lingkod

challenging the May 2013 resolution issued by COMELEC cancelling
the Abang Lingkod's party-list registration.

COMELEC says that it is not enough that the party-list

organization claim representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented because representation is easy to claim. 
Records shows that Abang Lingkod failed to stablish its track
record which is important to prove that the party-list
continuously represents the marginalized.

Abang Lingkod merely offered pictures of some alleged activities

they conducted after the 2010 elections. These pictures appears
to be edited. Under The Party-List System Act, a group’s
registration may be cancelled for declaring unlawful statements
in its petition. Photoshopping images to establish a fact that
did not occur is tantamount to declaring unlawful statements. It
is on this ground that the Commission cancels ABANG LINGKOD’s
registration.
Abang Lingkod filed a motion for reconsideration but it was
denied by COMELEC, thus this current Petition for certiorari.

Issues:
I. Whether national, regional, and sectoral parties and
organizations are required under the law to show their
genuineness and bona fide existence in determining if they are
eligible for registration with the Commission on Elections; and
II. Whether the Commission on Elections gravely abused its
discretion in cancelling ABANG LINGKOD’s registration under the
party-list system.

Ruling:
(1) A party, by law, is either "a political party or a sectoral
party or a coalition of parties."17 A political party is defined
as:
x x x an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or
platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of
government and which, as the most immediate means of securing
their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its
leaders and members as candidates for public office. (Emphasis
provided)
A party is a national party "when its constituency is spread over
the geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions.
It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the
geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and
provinces comprising the region."
On the other hand, a sectoral party:
x x x refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any
of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector.

R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or
organizations to represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional
parties under the party-list system to represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by
judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the
party-list system.

Petitioner is a sectoral party-list group that purports to

represent the peasant farmers. However, it did not even comply
with the bare requirement that sectoral party-list groups
representing a sector should show that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. As
correctly argued by the public respondent, petitioner will not,
therefore, qualify even under the new parameters set forth in
Atong Paglaum.

(2) COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 206952               October 22, 2013

ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST ABANG LINGKOD, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by
(Abang Lingkod Party-List ABANG LINGKOD) assailing the Resolution 1 dated May 10, 2013
issued by the Commission on Elections COMELEC) En Bane in SPP No. 12-238 PLM}, which,
alia, affirmed the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration as a party-list group.

The Facts

ABANG LINGKOD is a sectoral organization that represents the interests of peasant fanners and
fisherfolks, and was registered under the party-list system on December 22, 2009. It participated
in the May 2010 elections, but failed to obtain the number of votes needed for a seat in the
House of Representatives.

On May 31, 2012, ABANG LINGKOD manifested before the COMELEC its intent to participate in
the May 2013 elections. On August 2, 2012, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9513, 2 which,
inter alia required previously registered party-list groups that have filed their respective
Manifestations of Intent to undergo summary evidentiary hearing for purposes of determining
their continuing compliance with the requirements under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941 3 and the
guidelines set forth in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC. 4

Accordingly, on August 9 2012, the COMELEC issued a Resolution, which set the summary
evidentiary hearing of previously registered party-list groups. The COMELEC scheduled three (3)
dates -August 17, 31 and September 3, 2012 -for the summary hearing of ABANG LINGKOD's
Manifestation of Intent to enable it to show proof of its continuing qualification under the party-list
system.

On August 16, 2012, ABANG LINGKOD, in compliance with the COMELEC's August 9, 2012
Resolution, filed with the COMELEC pertinent documents to prove its continuing compliance with
the requirements under R.A. No. 7941.

After due proceedings, the COMELEC En Bane in a Resolution dated November 7 2012,
cancelled ABANG LINGKOD's registration as a partylist group. The COMELEC En Bane
pointed out that ABANG LINGKOD failed to establish its track record in uplifting the cause of the
marginalized and underrepresented; that it merely offered photographs of some alleged activities
it conducted after the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC En Bane further opined that ABANG
LINGKOD failed to show that its nominees are themselves marginalized and underrepresented
or that they have been involved in activities aimed at improving the plight of the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors it claims to represent.
ABANG LINGKOD then filed with this Court a petition 5 for certiorari alleging that the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion in cancelling its registration under the party-list system. The said
petition was consolidated with the separate petitions filed by fifty-one (51) other party-list groups
whose registration were cancelled or who were denied registration under the party-list system.
The said party-list groups, including ABANG LINGKOD, were able to obtain status quo ante
orders from this Court.

On April 2, 2013, the Court, in Atong Paglaum Inc. v. Commission on Elections, 6 laid down new
parameters to be observed by the COMELEC in screening parties, organizations or associations
seeking registration and/or accreditation under the party-list system, viz:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to

organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any marginalized and
underrepresented sector. 3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided
they register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district
elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative
district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that
can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented or

lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interests and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth.

5. A majority of the members of the sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
''marginalized and underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral
parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the
sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent
the "marginalized and underrepresented" or that represent those who lack "well-defined
political constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a
track record or advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and
regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if

some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee
who remains qualified.

Thus, the Court remanded to the COMELEC the cases of previously registered party-list groups,
including that of ABANG LINGKOD, to determine whether they are qualified under the party-list
system pursuant to the new parameters laid down by the Court and, in the affirmative, be allowed
to participate in the May 2013 party-list elections.

On May 10, 2013, the COMELEC issued the herein assailed Resolution, 7 which, inter alia
affirmed the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration under the party-list system. The
COMELEC issued the Resolution dated May 10, 2013 sans any summary evidentiary hearing,
citing the proximity of the May 13 2013 elections as the reason therefor.
In maintaining the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration, the COMELEC held that:

The Commission maintains its position in the previous en bane ruling cancelling the registration
of ABANG LINGKOD. To reiterate, it is not enough that the party-list organization claim
representation of the marginalized and underrepresented because representation is easy to
claim and to feign. It is but reasonable to require from groups and organizations consistent
participation and advocacy in the sector it seeks to represent, and not just seasonal and sporadic
programs which are unrelated to its sector.

ABANG LINGKOD submitted pictures showing a seminar held on 10 July 2010, Medical Mission
on 11 November 2010, Disaster Management Training on 21 October 2011, Book-giving on 28
June 2011, and Medical Mission on 1 December 2011.

And as if to insult the Commission, the photographs submitted appear to have been edited to
show in the banners that ABANG LINGKOD participated in the activities. ABANG LINGKOD's
name and logo was superimposed on some banners to feign participation in the activities (Joint
Medical Mission, Book-giving).

Under the party-list System Act, a group s registration may be cancelled for declaring unlawful
statements in its petition. Photoshopping images to establish a fact that did not occur is
tantamount to declaring unlawful statements. It is on this ground that the Commission cancels
ABANG LINGKOD s registration.8

On May 12, 2013, ABANG LINGKOD sought a reconsideration of the COMELEC s Resolution
dated May 10, 2013. However, on May 15, 2013, ABANG LINGKOD withdrew the motion for
reconsideration it filed with the COMELEC and, instead, instituted the instant petition 9 with this
Court, alleging that there may not be enough time for the COMELEC to pass upon the merits of
its motion for reconsideration considering that the election returns were already being canvassed
and consolidated by the COMELEC.

In support of the instant petition, ABANG LINGKOD claims that the COMELEC gravely abused
its discretion when it affirmed the cancellation of its registration sans a summary evidentiary
hearing for that purpose, asserting that the COMELEC should have allowed it to present
evidence to prove its qualification as a party-list group pursuant to Atong Paglaum. It claims that
there was no valid justification for the COMELEC to cancel its registration considering that it
complied with the six-point parameters m screening party-list groups laid down in Atong
Paglaum.

On the other hand, the COMELEC avers that the instant petition should be dismissed for utter
lack of merit. It asserts that ABANG LINGKOD was not denied due process when the COMELEC
affirmed the cancellation of its registration since it was given every reasonable opportunity to be
heard. The COMELEC further claims that it did not abuse its discretion when it cancelled ABANG
LINGKOD’s registration on the ground that it failed to establish a track record in representing the
marginalized and underrepresented. Further, the COMELEC alleges that its finding of facts may
not be passed upon by this Court as the same is supported by substantial evidence.

The Issues

In sum, the issues presented for the Court s resolution are the following: first whether ABANG
LINGKOD was denied due process when the COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of its
registration under the patiy-list system sans any summary evidentiary hearing; and second
whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling ABANG LINGKOD’s
registration under the party-list system.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

First Issue: Due Process

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or as applied to administrative

or quasi-judicial proceedings, an opportunity to explain one s side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all
times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied when the parties are afforded
fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned
upon is the absolute lack of notice or hearing. 10

In the instant case, while the petitioner laments that it was denied due process, the Court finds
that the COMELEC had afforded ABANG LINGKOD sufficient opportunity to present evidence
establishing its qualification as a party-list group. It was notified through Resolution No. 9513 that
its registration was to be reviewed by the COMELEC. That ABANG LINGKOD was able to file its
Manifestation of Intent and other pertinent documents to prove its continuing compliance with the
requirements under R.A. No. 7941, which the COMELEC set for summary hearing on three
separate dates, belies its claim that it was denied due process.

There was no necessity for the COMELEC to conduct further summary evidentiary hearing to
assess the qualification of ABANG LINGKOD pursuant to Atong Paglaum. ABANG LINGKOD’s
Manifestation of Intent and all the evidence adduced by it to establish its qualification as a party-
list group are already in the possession of the COMELEC. Thus, conducting further summary
evidentiary hearing for the sole purpose of determining ABANG LINGKOD s qualification under
the party-list system pursuant to Atong Paglaum would just be a superfluity.

Contrary to ABANG LINGKOD’s claim, the Court, in Atong Paglaum, did not categorically require
the COMELEC to conduct a summary evidentiary hearing for the purpose of determining the
qualifications of the petitioners therein pursuant to the new parameters for screening party-list
groups. The dispositive portion of Atong Paglaum reads:

WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED. The 13 petitions, which have been
granted Status Quo Ante Orders but without mandatory injunction to include the names of the
petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections only for
determination whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system under the
parameters prescribed in this Decision but they shall not participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections. The 41 petitions, which have been granted mandatory injunctions to include the names
of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections for
determination whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system and to
participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the parameters prescribed in this
Decision. The Commission on Elections may conduct summary evidentiary hearings for this
purpose. This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis ours)

Thus, the cases of previously registered party-list groups, including ABANG LINGKOD, were
remanded to the COMELEC so that it may reassess, based on the evidence already submitted
by the former, whether they are qualified to participate in the party-list system pursuant to the
new parameters laid down in Atong Paglaum. The Court did not require the COMELEC to
conduct a hearing de novo in reassessing the qualifications of said party-list groups.
Nevertheless, the Court gave the COMELEC the option to conduct further summary evidentiary
hearing should it deem appropriate to do so.

The records also disclose that ABANG LINGKOD was able to file with the COMELEC a motion
for reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 10, 2013, negating its claim that it was denied
due process. As it has been held, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked
where a party was given a chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration. 12

Second Issue: Cancellation of

ABANG LINGKOD’s Registration

However, after a careful perusal of the factual antecedents of this case, pinned against the new
parameters in screening party-list groups laid down in Atong Paglaum the Court finds that the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling the registration of ABANG LINGKOD
under the party-list system.

The COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration on the ground that it
declared untruthful statement in its bid for accreditation as a party-list group in the May 2013
elections, pointing out that it deliberately submitted digitally altered photographs of activities to
make it appear that it had a track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented.
Essentially, ABANG LINGKOD's registration was cancelled on the ground that it failed to adduce
evidence showing its track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented.

The flaw in the COMELEC's disposition lies in the fact that it insists on requiring party-list groups
to present evidence showing that they have a track record in representing the marginalized and
underrepresented.

Track record is a record of past performance often taken as an indicator of likely future
performance.13 As a requirement imposed by Ang Bagong Bayani for groups intending to
participate in the party-list elections, track record pertains to the actual activities undertaken by
groups to uplift the cause of the sector/s, which they represent.

Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 however provides:

Sec. 5 Registration. Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or
coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety
(90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to
participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a
coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or
program of government list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the
COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals. (Emphasis ours)

R.A. No. 7941 did not require groups intending to register under the party-list system to submit
proof of their track record as a group. The track record requirement was only imposed in Ang
Bagong Bayani where the Court held that national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations
seeking registration under the party-list system must prove through their, inter alia track record
that they truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented, thus:

xxx

In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the following guidelines, culled from the law
and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work.

First, the political pat1y, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Secdon 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show --
through its constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and
track record -- that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And
it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest
of such sectors. (Emphasis ours)

Track record is not the same as the submission or presentation of "constitution, by-laws, platform
of government, list of officers, coalition agreement, and other relevant information as may be
required by the COMELEC," which are but mere pieces of documentary evidence intended to
establish that the group exists and is a going concern. The said documentary evidence presents
an abstract of the ideals that national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations seek to
achieve.

This is not merely a matter of semantics; the delineation of what constitutes a track record has
certain consequences in a group's bid for registration under the party-list system. Under Section
5 of R.A. No. 7941, groups intending to register under the party-list system are not required to
submit evidence of their track record; they are merely required to attach to their verified petitions
their "constitution, by-laws, platform of government, list of officers, coalition agreement, and other
relevant information as may be required by the COMELEC."

In Atong Paglaum the Court has modified to a great extent the jurisprudential doctrines on who
may register under the party-list system and the representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented. For purposes of registration under the party-list system, national or regional
parties or organizations need not represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector; that
representation of the marginalized and underrepresented is only required of sectoral
organizations that represent the sectors stated under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 that are, by
their nature, economically marginalized and underrepresented.

There was no mention that sectoral organizations intending to participate in the party-list
elections are still required to present a track record, viz:

x x x In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list
elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:

xxxx

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented or lacking

in well-defined political constituencies. It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the
special interests and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are marginalized and
underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack well-defined
political constituencies'' include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth. (Emphasis
ours)

Contrary to the COMELEC's claim, sectoral parties or organizations, such as ABANG LINGKOD,
are no longer required to adduce evidence showing their track record, i.e. proof of activities that
they have undertaken to further the cause of the sector they represent. Indeed, it is enough that
their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. Otherwise
stated, it is sufficient that the ideals represented by the sectoral organizations are geared
towards the cause of the sector/s, which they represent.

If at all, evidence showing a track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors is only required from nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
marginalized and underrepresented who do not factually belong to the sector represented by
their party or organization.

Dissenting, my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Leonen, however, maintains that parties or
organizations intending to register under the party-list system are still required to present a track
record notwithstanding the Court's pronouncement in Atong Paglaum that the track record that
would have to be presented would only differ as to the nature of their group/organization. He
opines that sectoral organizations must prove their links with the marginalized and
underrepresented while national or regional parties or organizations must show that they have
been existing as a bona fide organization.

To submit to the dissent's insistence on varying track records, which are required of those
intending to register under the party-list system, depending on the nature of their group, would
result into an absurd and unjust situation. Under the varying track record requirement, sectoral
organizations must present evidence showing their track record in representing the marginalized
and underrepresented, i.e. actual activities conducted by them to further uplift the cause of the
sector/s they represent. On the other hand, national and regional parties or organizations need
only prove that they exist as bona fide organizations which, as the dissent suggests, may be
done through the submission of their constitution, by-laws, platform of government, list of officers,
coalition agreement, and other relevant information required by the COMELEC.

However, submission of a group's constitution, by-laws, platform of government, list of officers,

coalition agreement, and other relevant information required by the COMELEC, as explained
earlier, is not synonymous with the track record requirement. In such case, only sectoral
organizations would be required to present a track record (actual activities conducted by them to
further the cause of the marginalized and underrepresented); while national and regional
organizations need not present their track record as they are only required to submit
documentary evidence showing that they are bona fide organizations.

There is no logic in treating sectoral organizations differently from national and regional parties or
organizations as regards their bid for registration under the party-list system. The varying track
record requirement suggested by the dissent would unnecessarily put a premium on groups
intending to register as national and regional parties or organizations as against those intending
to register as sectoral organizations The imposition of an additional burden on sectoral
organizations, i.e. submission of their track record, would be plainly unjust as it effectively deters
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors from organizing themselves under the party-list
system.

Likewise, that there was no explicit reversal of the guidelines in ng Bagong Bayani in tong
Paglaum does not mean that groups intending to register under the party-list system are still
required to submit a track record. The track record of groups intending to register under the
party-list system was required under the first guideline of Ang Bagong Bayani for a very specific
purpose to show that the national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations that would be
allowed to participate in the party-list elections are truly representative of the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors It was necessary-then to require groups seeking registration under the
party-list system since representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, as understood
in the context of Ang Bagong Bayani is easy to claim and feign.

There exists no reason to further require groups seeking registration under the party-list system
to submit evidence showing their track record. Pursuant to Atong Paglaum not all groups are
required to represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors and, accordingly, there is
no longer any incentive in merely feigning representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors.

In the case of sectoral organizations, although they are still required to represent the
marginalized and underrepresented, they are likewise not required to show a track record since
there would be no reason for them to feign representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented as they can just register as a national or regional party or organization. Thus,
the Court, in Atong Paglaum stated that, for purposes of registration under the party-list system,
it is enough that the principal advocacy of sectoral organizations pertains to the sector/s they
represent.
There is thus no basis in law and established jurisprudence to insist that groups seeking
registration under the party-list system still comply with the track record requirement. Indeed,
nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is it mandated that groups seeking registration thereunder must submit
evidence to show their track record as a group.

The dissent likewise suggests that the deceit committed by ABANG LINGKOD goes into its
qualification as a party-list group since it seriously puts in question the existence of ABANG
LINGKOD as a group per se and the genuineness of its representation of the farmers and
fisherfolk.

It must be stressed that the COMELEC cancelled ABANG LINGKOD s registration solely on the
ground of the lack of its track record -that it falsely represented, by submitting digitally altered
photographs of its supposed activities, that it had a track record in representing the marginalized
and underrepresented. The existence of ABANG LINGKOD as a party-list group per se and the
genuineness of its representation of the farmers and fisherfolks were never raised in the
proceedings before the COMELEC. It would thus be the height of injustice in the Court, in this
certiorari action, would scrutinize the legitimacy of ABANG LINGKOD as a party-list group and
the genuineness of its representation of the farmers and fisherfolk, and affirm the cancellation of
its registration, when the issue is limited only to the track record of ABANG LINGKOD.

Moreover, ABANG LINGKOD had been previously registered as a party-list group, as in fact it
participated in the May 2010 party-list elections, and it was able to obtain a sufficient number of
votes in the May 2013 party-list elections to obtain a seat in the House of Representatives.
These are circumstances, which clearly indicate that ABANG LINGKOD is indeed a legitimate
party-list group.

ABANG LINGKOD, notwithstanding the cancellation of its registration three days prior to the May
13, 2013 elections, was able to obtain a total of 260 215 votes out of the 26 722 131 votes that
were cast for the party-list,14 thus entitling it to a seat in the House of Representatives. This is
indicative of the fact that a considerable portion of the electorate considers ABANG LINGKOD as
truly representative of peasant farmers and fisherfolk.

Anent the photographs submitted by ABANG LINGKOD, these only show book-giving and
medical missions, which are activities it conducted. Suffice it to state, however, that said activities
do not specifically or directly pertain to the interest or advocacy espoused by ABANG LINGKOD.
As such, the misrepresentation committed by ABANG LINGKOD with regard to said activities
would not necessarily militate against its representation of the farmers and fisherfolk.

Lest it be misunderstood, the Court does not condone the deceit perpetrated by ABANG
LINGKOD in connection with its bid for continued registration under the party-list system. That
ABANG LINGKOD, to establish its track record, submitted photographs that were edited to make
it appear that it conducted activities aimed at ameliorating the plight of the sectors it represents is
a factual finding by the COMELEC, which the Court, considering that it is supported by
substantial evidence, will not disturb. The Court does not tolerate ABANG LINGKOD s resort to
chicanery and its shabby treatment of the requirements for registration under the party-list
system.

Nevertheless, considering that track record is no longer a requirement, a group’s

misrepresentation as to its track record cannot be used as a ground to deny or cancel its
registration -it is no longer material to its qualification under the party-list system. In this case,
ABANG LINGKOD s submission of digitally altered photographs cannot be considered material
to its qualification as a party-list group. Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941, in part, reads:

Sec. 6 Refusal and/or Cancellation o Registration The COMELEC may, motu propio or upon
verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the
following grounds:

xxxx

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

Declaration of an untruthful statement in a petition for registration, or in any other document

pertinent to the registration and/or accreditation under the party-list system, as a ground for the
refusal or cancellation of registration under Section 6(6) of R.A. No. 7941, is akin to material
misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy filed by an individual candidate under Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code. Both provisions disallow prospective candidates from participating
in an election for declaring false statements in their eligibility requirements. Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code reads:

Sec. 78. A verified petition seeking to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material misrepresentation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any
time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and
shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

Elucidating on what constitutes material misrepresentation in a certificate of candidacy under

Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, the Court, in Lluz v. Commission on
Elections,15 explained that:

From these two cases several conclusions follow. First a misrepresentation in a certificate of
candidacy is material when it refers to a qualification for elective office and affects the candidate
s eligibility. x x x Third a misrepresentation of a non-material fact, or a non-material
misrepresentation, is not a ground to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy
under Section 78. In other words, for a candidate s certificate of candidacy to be denied due
course or canceled by the COMELEC, the fact misrepresented must pertain to a qualification for
the office sought by the candidate.16 (Emphasis ours)

In Velasco v. Commission on Elections,17 the Court further clarified that a false representation

under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, in order to be a ground to deny due course or
cancel a certificate of candidacy, must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or
hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. Thus:

The false representation that [Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code] mention must
necessarily pertain to a material fact, not to a mere innocuous mistake. This is emphasized by
the consequences of any material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if
he runs and is elected, cannot serve; in both cases, he or she can be prosecuted for violation of
the election laws. Obviously, these facts are those that refer to a candidate s qualification for
elective office, such as his or her citizenship and residence. The candidate's status as a
registered voter similarly falls under this classification as it is a requirement that, by law (the
Local Government Code), must be reflected in the COC. The reason for this is obvious: the
candidate, if he or she wins, will work for and represent the local government under which he is
running.

Separately from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must
consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render
a candidate ineligible." In other words, it must be made with the intention to deceive the
electorate as to the would-be candidate's qualifications for public office. 18 (Citation omitted and
emphasis ours)
Similarly, a declaration of an untruthful statement in a petition for registration under Section 6(6)
of R.A. No. 7941, in order to be a ground for the refusal and/or cancellation of registration under
the party-list system, must pertain to the qualification of the party, organization or coalition under
the party-list system. In order to justify the cancellation or refusal of registration of a group, there
must be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact, which would otherwise render
the group disqualified from participating in the party-list elections.

The digitally altered photographs of activities submitted by ABANG LINGKOD to prove its
continuing qualification under R.A. No. 7941 only pertain to its track record, which, as already
discussed, is no longer a requirement under the new parameters laid down in Atong Paglaum
Simply put, they do not affect the qualification of ABANG LINGKOD as a party-list group and,
hence, could not be used as a ground to cancel its registration under the party-list system.
Further, the Court notes that the COMELEC, in its Resolution dated November 7 2012, asserted
that ABANG LINGKOD failed to adduce evidence that would show the track record of its five
nominees, composed of a non-government organization worker, an employee and three farmers,
in uplifting the cause of the sector that the group represents.  The COMELEC opined that the
1âwphi1

failure of ABANG LINGKOD to present a track record of its nominees justified the cancellation of
its registration as a party-list group.

The Court does not agree. Assuming arguendo that the nominees of ABANG LINGKOD, as
opined by the COMELEC, indeed do not have track records showing their participation in
activities aimed at improving the conditions of the sector that the group represents, the same
would not affect the registration of ABANG LINGKOD as a party-list group.

To stress, in Atong Paglaum the Court pointed out that [t]he nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the 'marginalized and underrepresented,' or that represent those
who lack 'well-defined political constituencies,' either must belong to their respective sectors or
must have a track record o advocacy for their respective sectors. Stated otherwise, the nominee
of a party-list groups may either be: first one who actually belongs to the sector which the party-
list group represents, in which case the track record requirement does not apply; or second one
who does not actually belong to the sector which the party-list group represents but has a track
record showing the nominee's active participation in activities aimed at uplifting the cause of the
sector which the group represents."

In the case under consideration, three of the five nominees of ABANG LINGKOD are farmers
and, thus, are not required to present a track record showing their active participation in activities
aimed to promote the sector which ABANG LINGKOD represents, i.e. peasant farmers and
fisherfolk. That two of ABANG LINGKOD's nominees do not actually belong to the sector it
represents is immaterial and would not result in the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's
registration as a party-list group. This is clear from the sixth parameter laid down by the Court in
tong Paglaum which states that "national, regional and sectoral organizations shall not be
disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one
nominee who remains qualified." At the very least, ABANG LINGKOD has three (3) qualified
nominees, being farmers by occupation.

Indeed, the disqualification of one or some of the nominees of a party-list group should not
automatically result in the disqualification of the group.  Otherwise it would accord the nominees
1avvphi1

the same significance, which the law holds for the party-list groups; it is still the fact that the
party-list group satisfied the qualifications of the law that is material to consider. The
disqualification of the nominees must simply be regarded as failure to qualify for an office or
position. It should not, in any way, blemish the qualifications of the party-list group itself with
defect. The party-list group must be treated as separate and distinct from its nominees such that
qualifications of the latter must not be considered part and parcel of the qualifications of the
former.
In sum, that ABANG LINGKOD's registration must be cancelled due to its misrepresentation is a
conclusion derived from a simplistic reading of the provisions of R.A. No. 7941 and the import of
the Court's disposition in tong Paglaum. Not every misrepresentation committed by national,
regional, and sectoral groups or organizations would merit the denial or cancellation of their
registration under the party-list system. The misrepresentation must relate to their qualification as
a party-list group. In this regard, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it insisted on
requiring ABANG LINGKOD to prove its track record notwithstanding that a group s track record
is no longer required pursuant to the Court s pronouncement in Atong Paglaum

Likewise, upholding the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD s registration, notwithstanding that it

was able to obtain sufficient number of votes for a legislative seat, would serve no purpose other
than to subvert the will of the electorate who voted to give ABANG LINGKOD the privilege to
represent them in the House of Representatives.

WHEREFORE in light of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
The Resolution dated May 10, 2013 issued by the Commission on Elections in SPP Case No.
12-238 (PLM), insofar as it affirmed the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD s registration and
disallowed it to participate in the May 13, 2013 elections is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The Commission on Elections is hereby ORDERED to PROCLAIM ABANG LINGKOD as one of

the winning party-list groups during the May 13, 2013 elections with the number of seats it may
be entitled to based on the total number of votes it garnered during the said elections.

SO ORDERED.

by John Lloyd Macunat

ATTY. ISIDRO Q. LICO v. COMELEC EN BANC, GR No. 205505, 2015-09-29

Facts:
Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) jurisdiction over the expulsion of a sitting party-
list representative: from the House of Representatives, on the one... hand; and from his
party-list organization, on the other.
Ating Koop is a multi-sectoral party-list organization... registered... under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7941, also known as the Party-List System Act (Party-List Law).
Ating Koop filed its Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of
Representation for the 10 May 2010 Elections.
it filed with the COMELEC the list of its nominees, with petitioner Lico as first... nominee
OMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as one of the winning party-list groups.
Ating Koop earned a seat in the House... of Representatives. Petitioner Lico
subsequently took his oath of office... and thereafter assumed office.
Several months prior to its proclamation as one of the winning party-list organizations,...
Ating Koop issued Central Committee Resolution 2010-01, which incorporated a term-
sharing agreement signed by its nominees
Under the agreement,... petitioner Lico was to serve as Party-list Representative for the
first year of the three-year term
Ating Koop... introduced amendm... ents to its Constitution and By-laws. Among the
salient changes was the composition of the Central Committee,... The amendments
likewise mandated the holding of an election of Central Committee members within six
months after the Second National
Convention.
In effect, the amendments cut short the three-year term of the incumbent members
(referred to hereafter as the Interim Central Committee) of the Central Committee.
The Interim Central Committee was dominated by members of the Rimas Group.
almost one year after petitioner Lico had assumed office, the Interim Central Committee
expelled him from Ating Koop for disloyalty.
Apart from allegations of malversation and graft and corruption, the Committee cited
petitioner
Lico's refusal to honor the term-sharing agreement as factual basis for disloyalty and as
cause for his expulsion under Ating Koop's Amended Constitution and By-laws.
Rimas Group... h COMELEC a Petition against petitioner Lico... prayed that petitioner
Lico... be ordered to vacate the office of Ating Koop in the House of Representatives
COMELEC
RESOLVES... to:
DISMISS the instant Petition to Expel Respondent Atty. Isidro Q. Lico in the House of
Representatives and to Sanction the Immediate Succession of the Second Nominee of
ATING KOOP Party List, Mr. Roberto C. Mascarina as its Party Representative, for lack
of... jurisdiction
Issues:
Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) jurisdiction over the expulsion of a sitting party-
list representative: from the House of Representatives, on the one... hand; and from his
party-list organization, on the other.
Ruling:
the COMELEC En Banc held that it had no jurisdiction to expel Congressman Lico from
the House of Representatives, considering that his expulsion from Ating Koop affected
his qualifications as member of the House, and therefore it was... the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that had jurisdiction over the Petition.
the COMELEC upheld the validity of petitioner Lico's expulsion from Ating Koop,
explaining that when the Interim Central Committee ousted him from Ating Koop, the
said Committee's members remained in hold-over capacity even after their terms had...
expired;... and that the COMELEC was not in a position to substitute its judgment for that
of Ating Koop with respect to the cause of the expulsion.
We find that while the COMELEC correctly dismissed the Petition to expel petitioner Lico
from the House of Representatives for being beyond its jurisdiction, it nevertheless
proceeded to rule upon the validity of his expulsion from Ating Koop - a matter beyond
its purview.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution... ndows the HRET with jurisdiction to
resolve questions on the qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of party-list
representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case... upon
proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of
office as member of the House of Representative
In this case, the COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group;
petitioner Lico took his oath; and... he assumed office in the House of Representatives.
Thus, it is the HRET, and not the COMELEC, that has jurisdiction over the
disqualification case.
We find to be without legal basis, however, is the action of the COMELEC in upholding
the validity of the expulsion of petitioner Lico from Ating Koop, despite its own ruling that
the HRET has jurisdiction over the disqualification issue. These findings already touch
upon... the qualification requiring a party-list nominee to be a bona fide member of the
party-list group sought to be represented.
The rules on intra-party matters and on the jurisdiction of the HRET are not parallel
concepts that do not intersect. Rather, the operation of the rule on intra-party matters is
circumscribed by Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and jurisprudence on
the... jurisdiction of electoral tribunals. The jurisdiction of the HRET is exclusive. It is
given full authority to hear and decide the cases on any matter touching on the validity of
the title of the proclaimed winner.
In the pre
The Court held that it was for the HRET to interpret the meaning of the requirement of...
bona fide membership in a party-list organization. It reasoned that under Section 17,
Article VI of the Constitution, the HRET is the sole judge of all contests when it comes to
qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The COMELEC En
Banc Resolution dated 31 January 2013 and the COMELEC Second Division Resolution
dated 18 July 2012 in E.M. No. 12-039 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE insofar
as it... declares valid the expulsion of Congressman Lico from Ating Koop and it upholds
the ATING KOOP Party-list Group represented by its President, Amparo T. Rimas, as
the legitimate Party-list Group.
FACTS:  Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64[1] in relation to Rule 65,[2] seeking to annul
the Resolutions in E.M. No. 12-039 dated 18 July 2012 and 31 January 2013 of the
COMELEC.  Ating Koop is a multi-sectoral party-list organization  On 30 November 2009,
Ating Koop filed its Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of
Representation for the 10 May 2010 Elections.[4] On 6 March 2010, it filed with the
COMELEC the list of its nominees, with petitioner Lico as first... nominee and Roberto
Mascarina as second nominee.  On 8 December 2010, COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop
as one of the winning party-list groups  Petitioner Lico subsequently took his oath of office on
9 December 2010 before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives,[7] and
thereafter assumed office.  Several months prior to its proclamation as one of the winning
party-list organizations, or on 9 June 2010, Ating Koop issued Central Committee Resolution
2010-01, which incorporated a term-sharing agreement signed by its nominees.[8] Under the
agreement,... petitioner Lico was to serve as Party-list Representative for the first year of the
three-year term.  On 5 December 2011, or almost one year after petitioner Lico had
assumed office, the Interim Central Committee expelled him from Ating Koop for disloyalty. 
The said Petition, which was subsequently raffled to the Second Division, prayed that
petitioner Lico... be ordered to vacate the office of Ating Koop in the House of
Representatives, and for the succession of the second nominee, Roberto Mascarina as
Ating Koop's representative in the House.  Ating Koop had expelled Congressman Lico for
acts inimical to the party-list group, such as malversation, graft and corruption 

ISSUE:  Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) jurisdiction over the expulsion of a sitting

party-list representative: from the House of Representatives, on the one... hand; and from
his party-list organization, on the other 

DECISION:  Granted 

RATIO DECIDENDI:  We find that while the COMELEC correctly dismissed the Petition to
expel petitioner Lico from the House of Representatives for being beyond its jurisdiction, it
nevertheless proceeded to rule upon the validity of his expulsion from Ating Koop - a matter
beyond its purview.  The COMELEC notably characterized the Petition for expulsion of
petitioner Lico from the House of Representatives and for the succession of the second
nominee as party-list representative as a disqualification case. For this reason, the
COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of... jurisdiction, insofar as it relates to the
question of unseating petitioner Lico from the House of Representatives.  Section 17, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution[34] endows the HRET with jurisdiction to resolve questions on
the qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of party-list representatives, the
HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case... upon proclamation of the winning
party-list group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of office as member of the House of
Representatives.[35] In this case, the COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-
list group; petitioner Lico took his oath; and... he assumed office in the House of
Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not the COMELEC, that has jurisdiction over the
disqualification case  The jurisdiction of the HRET is exclusive. It is given full authority to
hear and decide the cases on any matter touching on the validity of the title of the
proclaimed winner.

DECISION

SERENO, C.J.:

The pivotal and interrelated issues before Us in this case involve the seemingly
elementary matter of the Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) jurisdiction over the
expulsion of a sitting party-list representative: from the House of Representatives,
on the one hand; and from his party-list organization, on the other.

The instant case involves two rival factions of the same party-list organization, the
Adhikaing Tinataguyod ng Kooperatiba (Ating Koop). One group is headed by
petitioner Atty. Isidro Q. Lico (the Lico Group), who represents the organization in
the House of Representatives, and the other group by Amparo T. Rimas
(respondents herein, or the Rimas Group).

THE CASE

Before Us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 641 in relation to Rule 65,2 seeking to

annul the Resolutions in E.M. No. 12-039 dated 18 July 2012 and 31 January 2013
of the COMELEC.

THE ANTECEDENT FACTS

Ating Koop is a multi-sectoral party-list organization which was registered on 16

November 2009 under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, also known as the Party-List
System Act (Party-List Law).

Under Ating Koop's Constitution and By-Laws, its highest policymaking body is the
National Convention. The Central Committee, however, takes over when the
National Convention is not in session. 3

On 30 November 2009, Ating Koop filed its Manifestation of Intent to Participate in

the Party-List System of Representation for the 10 May 2010 Elections. 4 On 6 March
2010, it filed with the COMELEC the list of its nominees, with petitioner Lico as first
nominee and Roberto Mascarina as second nominee.

On 8 December 2010, COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as one of the winning party-
list groups.5 Based on the procedure provided in BANAT Party-List v.
COMELEC,6 Ating Koop earned a seat in the House of Representatives. Petitioner Lico
subsequently took his oath of office on 9 December 2010 before the Secretary-
General of the House of Representatives, 7 and thereafter assumed office.

Several months prior to its proclamation as one of the winning party-list

organizations, or on 9 June 2010, Ating Koop issued Central Committee Resolution
2010-01, which incorporated a term-sharing agreement signed by its
nominees.8 Under the agreement, petitioner Lico was to serve as Party-list
Representative for the first year of the three-year term. 9

On 14 May 2011, Ating Koop held its Second National Convention, during which it
introduced amendments to its Constitution and By-laws. Among the salient changes
was the composition of the Central Committee,10 which would still be composed of
15 representatives but with  five each coming from Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao (5-
5-5 equal representation).11 The amendments likewise mandated the holding of an
election of Central Committee members within six months after the Second National
Convention.12

In effect, the amendments cut short the three-year term of the incumbent members
(referred to hereafter as the Interim Central Committee) of the Central
Committee.13 The Interim Central Committee was dominated by members of the
Rimas Group.

On 5 December 2011, or almost one year after petitioner Lico had assumed office,
the Interim Central Committee expelled him from Ating Koop for disloyalty. 14 Apart
from allegations of malversation and graft and corruption, the Committee cited
petitioner Lico's refusal to honor the term-sharing agreement as factual basis for
disloyalty and as cause for his expulsion under Ating Koop's Amended Constitution
and By-laws.15

On 8 December 2011, Congressman Lico filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the
Interim Central Committee,16 which subsequently denied the same in a Resolution
dated 29 December 2011.17

While petitioner Lico's Motion for Reconsideration was pending, the Lico Group held a
special meeting in Cebu City (the Cebu meeting) on 19 December 2011. At the said
meeting, new members of the Central Committee, as well as a new set of officers,
were elected.18 The election was purportedly held for the purpose of implementing
the 5-5-5 equal representation amendment made during the Second National
Convention.19
On 21 January 2012, the Rimas Group held a Special National Convention in
Parañaque City20 (the Parañaque convention), at which a new Central Committee
and a new set of officers were constituted. 21 Members of the Rimas Group won the
election and occupied all the corresponding seats.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMELEC

SECOND DIVISION

On 16 March 2012, the Rimas Group, claiming to represent Ating Koop, filed with
COMELEC a Petition against petitioner Lico docketed as E.M. No. 12-039. 22 The said
Petition, which was subsequently raffled to the Second Division, prayed that
petitioner Lico be ordered to vacate the office of Ating Koop in the House of
Representatives, and for the succession of the second nominee, Roberto Mascarina
as Ating Koop's representative in the House.

The Rimas Group thereafter filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC on 14 May
2012, this time impleading not only petitioner Lico but the entire Lico Group. The
Amended Petition also prayed that the COMELEC nullify the election conducted at
the Cebu meeting and recognize the Paranaque convention.

In both the Petition and the Amended Petition, the Rimas Group alleged that Ating
Koop had expelled Congressman Lico for acts inimical to the party-list group, such
as malversation, graft and corruption, and that he had "boldly displayed his
recalcitrance to honor party commitment to be upright and consistently honest, thus
violating basic principles of the Ating Koop."23 The Amended Petition stated further
that the Cebu meeting held by the Lico Group violated notice and quorum
requirements.24

In a Resolution dated 18 July 2012,25 the COMELEC Second Division upheld the

expulsion of petitioner Lico from Ating Koop and declared Mascarina as the duly
qualified nominee of the party-list group. 26 The Second Division characterized the
issue of the validity of the expulsion of petitioner Lico from Ating Koop as an intra-
party leadership dispute, which it could resolve as an incident of its power to register
political parties.27
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMELEC

EN BANC

Consequently, the Lico Group filed a Motion for Reconsideration from the Second
Division's Resolution, which the COMELEC En Banc denied on 31 January 2013. The
dispositive portion of its Resolution reads: cralawlawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (En Banc) RESOLVES, as it

hereby RESOLVED, to:
a. DISMISS the instant Petition to Expel Respondent Atty. Isidro Q. Lico in the
House of Representatives and to Sanction the Immediate Succession of the Second
Nominee of ATING KOOP Party List, Mr. Roberto C. Mascarina as its Party
Representative, for lack of jurisdiction; ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

b. UPHOLD the Expulsion of Respondent Atty. Isidro Lico from ATING KOOP Party-
list Group; [and]

c. UPHOLD the ATING KOOP Party-list Group represented by its President, Amparo

T. Rimas, as the legitimate Party-list Group accredited by the Commission on
Elections, to the exclusion of respondents Atty. Isidro Q. Lico, Rafael A. Puentespina,
Proculo T. Sarmen, Amelito L. Revuelta, William C. Ybanez, Silverio J. Sanchez,
Gloria G. Futalan, Hilario De Guzman, Eugene M. Pabualan, Rodolfo E. Perez,
Hipolito R. Quillan, Mario Arenas, Tirso C. Buenaventura, Lydia B. Tubella, and
Jonathan Dequina.28
chanrobleslaw

In arriving at its Resolution, the COMELEC En Banc held that it had no jurisdiction to

expel Congressman Lico from the House of Representatives, considering that his
expulsion from Ating Koop affected his qualifications as member of the House, and
therefore it was the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that had
jurisdiction over the Petition.

At the same time, the COMELEC upheld the validity of petitioner Lico's expulsion
from Ating Koop, explaining that when the Interim Central Committee ousted
him from Ating Koop, the said Committee's members remained in hold-over capacity
even after their terms had expired;29 and that the COMELEC was not in a position to
substitute its judgment for that of Ating Koop with respect to the cause of the
expulsion.30

Finally, the COMELEC En Banc recognized the Rimas Group as the legitimate

representative of Ating Koop considering that: 1) it found nothing in the records to
show that the Lico Group made a valid call for the special election of Central
Committee members as required under the Amended Constitution and By-Laws; 31 2)
there is nothing on record indicating that a minimum of 100 attended the Cebu
meeting;32 and 3) the Parañaque convention was in accordance with Ating Koop's
Amended Constitution and By-Laws.33

Hence, this Petition: the Lico Group now comes before Us, praying for a review of
the COMELEC Resolutions.

The Court's Ruling

On the COMELEC's jurisdiction over

the expulsion of a Member of the House
of Representatives from his party-list
organization

We find that while the COMELEC correctly dismissed the Petition to expel petitioner
Lico from the House of Representatives for being beyond its jurisdiction, it
nevertheless proceeded to rule upon the validity of his expulsion from Ating Koop - a
matter beyond its purview.

The COMELEC notably characterized the Petition for expulsion of petitioner Lico from
the House of Representatives and for the succession of the second nominee as
party-list representative as a disqualification case. For this reason, the COMELEC
dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, insofar as it relates to the question of
unseating petitioner Lico from the House of Representatives.

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution 34 endows the HRET with jurisdiction to
resolve questions on the qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of
party-list representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case
upon proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and
assumption of office as member of the House of Representatives. 35 In this case, the
COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took
his oath; and he assumed office in the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the
HRET, and not the COMELEC, that has jurisdiction over the disqualification case.

What We find to be without legal basis, however, is the action of the COMELEC in
upholding the validity of the expulsion of petitioner Lico from Ating Koop, despite its
own ruling that the HRET has jurisdiction over the disqualification issue. These
findings already touch upon the qualification requiring a party-list nominee to be
a bona fide member of the party-list group sought to be represented.

The COMELEC justified its Resolution on the merits of the expulsion, by relying on
the rule that it can decide intra-party matters as an incident of its constitutionally
granted powers and functions. It cited Lokin v. COMELEC, where We held that when
the resolution of an intra-party controversy is necessary or incidental to the
performance of the constitutionally-granted functions of the COMELEC, the latter can
step in and exercise jurisdiction over the intra-party matter. 36 The Lokin case,
however, involved nominees and not incumbent members of Congress. In the
present case, the fact that petitioner Lico was a member of Congress at the time of
his expulsion from Ating Koop removes the matter from the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC.

The rules on intra-party matters and on the jurisdiction of the HRET are not parallel
concepts that do not intersect. Rather, the operation of the rule on intra-party
matters is circumscribed by Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
jurisprudence on the jurisdiction of electoral tribunals. The jurisdiction of the HRET
is exclusive. It is given full authority to hear and decide the cases on any matter
touching on the validity of the title of the proclaimed winner. 37

In the present case, the Petition for petitioner Lico's expulsion from the House of
Representatives is anchored on his expulsion from Ating Koop, which necessarily
affects his title as member of Congress. A party-list nominee must have been,
among others, a bona fide member of the party or organization for at least ninety
(90) days preceding the day of the election. Needless to say, bona fide membership
in the party-list group is a continuing qualification. We have ruled that
qualifications for public office, whether elective or not, are continuing requirements.
They must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election, or of
assumption of office, but during the officer's entire tenure.39

This is not the first time that this Court has passed upon the issue of HRET
jurisdiction over the requirements for bona fide membership in a party-list
organization. In Abayon v. HRET,40 it was argued that the petitioners did not belong
to the marginalized and under-represented sectors that they should represent; as
such, they could not be properly considered bona fide members of their respective
party-list organizations. The Court held that it was for the HRET to interpret the
meaning of the requirement of bona fide membership in a party-list organization. It
reasoned that under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, the HRET is the sole
judge of all contests when it comes to qualifications of the members of the
House of Representatives.41

Consequently, the COMELEC failed to recognize that the issue on the validity of
petitioner Lico's expulsion from Ating Koop is integral to the issue of his
qualifications to sit in Congress. This is not merely an error of law but an error of
jurisdiction correctible by a writ of certiorari; 42 the COMELEC should not have
encroached into the expulsion issue, as it was outside its authority to do so.

Distinguished from Reyes v. COMELEC

Our ruling here must be distinguished from Regina Ongsiako Reyes v. Commission

on Elections.43 In that case, We upheld the disqualification by the COMELEC of
petitioner Reyes, even as she was already proclaimed winner in the elections at the
time she filed her petition with the High Court. In doing so, We rejected the
argument that the case fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET.

In Reyes, the petitioner was proclaimed winner of the 13 May 2013 Elections, and
took her oath of office before the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
However, the Court ruled on her qualifications since she was not yet a member of
the House of Representatives: petitioner Reyes had yet to assume office, the term of
which would officially start at noon of 30 June 2013, when she filed a Petition
for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante Order dated 7 June 2013 assailing the
Resolutions ordering the cancellation of her Certificate of Candidacy. In the present
case, all three requirements of proclamation, oath of office, and assumption of office
were satisfied.

Moreover, in Reyes, the COMELEC En Banc Resolution disqualifying petitioner on

grounds of lack of Filipino citizenship and residency had become final and executory
when petitioner elevated it to this Court. 44 It should be mentioned that when
petitioner Reyes filed her petition with the Court, the COMELEC En Banc had, as
early as 5 June 2013, already issued a Certificate of Finality over its 14 May 2013
Resolution disqualifying her. Therefore, there was no longer any pending case on the
qualifications of petitioner Reyes to speak of. Here, the question of whether
petitioner Lico remains a member of the House of Representatives in view of his
expulsion from Ating Koop is a subsisting issue.

Finally, in Reyes, We found the question of jurisdiction of the HRET to be a non-

issue, since the recourse of the petitioner to the Court appeared to be a mere
attempt to prevent the COMELEC from implementing a final and executory
judgment. We said that the petitioner therein took an inconsistent, if not confusing,
stance, considering that she sought remedy before the Court, and yet asserted that
it is the HRET which had jurisdiction over the case. 45 In this case, the question on
the validity of petitioner Lico's expulsion from Ating Koop is a genuine issue that falls
within the jurisdiction of the HRET, as it unmistakably affects his qualifications as
party-list representative.

On which group legitimately represents

Ating Koop

We now pass upon the question of which, between the two contending groups, is the
legitimate leadership of Ating Koop.

At the outset, We reject the Lico Group's argument that the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction to decide which of the feuding groups is to be recognized, and that it is
the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies.
Indeed, the COMELECs jurisdiction to settle the struggle for leadership within the
party is well established. This power to rule upon questions of party identity and
leadership is exercised by the COMELEC as an incident of its enforcement powers. 46
That being said, We find the COMELEC to have committed grave abuse of discretion
in declaring the Rimas Group as the legitimate set of Ating Koop officers for the
simple reason that the amendments to the Constitution and By-laws of Ating Koop
were not registered with the COMELEC. Hence, neither of the elections held
during the Cebu meeting and the Paranaque conference pursuant to the said
amendments, were valid.

Both the Lico Group and the Rimas Group indeed assert that their respective
elections were conducted pursuant to the amendment introduced in the Second
National Convention held on 14 May 2011. In particular, Section 1 of Article VI of
Ating Koop's By-laws called for the conduct of an election of Central Committee
members within six months after the Second National Convention. 47

There is no showing, however, that the amendments were actually filed with the
COMELEC.

A party-list organization owes its existence to the State and the latter's approval
must be obtained through its agent, the COMELEC. In the 2013 case of Dayao v.
COMELEC,48 We declared that it is the State, acting through the COMELEC, that
breathes life to a party-list organization. The implication, therefore, is that the State,
through the COMELEC, is a party to the principal contracts entered into by the party-
list organization and its members - the Constitution and By-laws - such that any
amendment to these contracts would constitute a novation requiring the consent of
all the parties involved. An amendment to the bylaws of a party-list organization
should become effective only upon approval by the COMELEC.

Such a prerequisite is analogous to the requirement of filing of the amended by-laws

and subsequent conformity thereto of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) under corporation law. Under the Corporation Code, an amendment to a by-
law provision must be filed with the SEC. The amendment shall be effective only
upon the issuance by the SEC of a certification that it is not inconsistent with the
Corporation Code.49

There being no showing that the amendments on the by-laws of Ating Koop were
filed with and subsequently approved by the COMELEC, any election conducted
pursuant thereto may not be considered valid. Without such requisite proof, neither
the Lico Group nor the Rimas Group can claim to be the legitimate set of officers of
Ating Koop.

Even assuming arguendo that the amendment calling for a special election were

effective, this Court still cannot declare any of the feuding groups as the legitimate
set of officers considering that the respective sets of evidence presented were
evenly balanced. With respect to the Lico Group's Cebu meeting, the COMELEC
correctly found - and the records bear out - that the notices sent were deficient and
that there was no sufficient proof of quorum. Hence, the Cebu meeting was held to
be invalid. On the other hand, the COMELEC failed to appreciate the fact that the
Paranaque convention suffered from the same infirmity, the records of the said
convention, consisting merely of the Minutes thereof, likewise fail to establish due
notice and a quorum.50

Accordingly, as neither group can sufficiently lay claim to legitimacy, the equipoise
doctrine comes into play. This rule provides that when the evidence in an issue of
fact is in equipoise, that is, when the respective sets of evidence of both parties are
evenly balanced, the party having the burden of proof fails in that issue. Since
neither party succeeds in making out a case, neither side prevails. The courts are
left with no other option but to leave them as they are. The consequence, therefore,
is the dismissal of the complaint/petition. 51

The Rimas Group, being the petitioner before the COMELEC, had the burden of
proving that it is the petitioner, and not the Lico Group, that is the legitimate group.
As the evidence of both parties are in equipoise, the Rimas Group failed to discharge
its burden. The COMELEC should have dismissed the petition of the Rimas Group
insofar as it sought to be declared the legitimate group representing Ating Koop.

Yet, the COMELEC held that the Paranaque convention "appeared to be in

conformity" with Ating Koop's Amended Constitution and By-Laws. 52 It should be
stressed that the COMELEC did not even substantiate this conclusion. 53

The Court ordinarily refrains from reviewing the COMELEC s appreciation and
evaluation of the evidence.54 But when the COMELECs assessment of the evidence is
so grossly unreasonable that it turns into an error of jurisdiction, the Court is
compelled to intervene and correct the error.55

As seen in the above discussions, neither of the parties was able to establish its
legitimacy. The evaluation of the evidence by the COMELEC in deciding the issue of
which group legitimately represents Ating Koop was therefore grossly unreasonable,
which amounts to a jurisdictional error that may be remedied by certiorari under
Rule 65.

The final, and most important question to be addressed is: if neither of the two
groups is the legitimate leadership of Ating Koop, then who is?

We find such legitimate leadership to be the Interim Central Committee, whose

members remain as such in a hold-over capacity.

In Seneres v. COMELEC,56 the validity of the Certificate of Nomination filed by Buhay

Party-List through its President, Roger Robles, was questioned on the ground that
his term had expired at the time it was filed. The Court applied by analogy the
default rule in corporation law to the effect that officers and directors of a
corporation hold over after the expiration of their terms until such time as their
successors are elected or appointed.57Señeres ruled that the hold-over principle
applies in the absence of a provision in the constitution or by-laws of the party-list
organization prohibiting its application.

In the present case, We have gone through the Constitution and Bylaws of Ating
Koop and We do not see any provision forbidding, either expressly or impliedly, the
application of the hold-over rule. Thus, in accordance with corporation law, the
existing Interim Central Committee is still a legitimate entity with full authority to
bind the corporation and to carry out powers despite the lapse of the term of its
members on 14 November 2011, since no successors had been validly elected at the
time, or since.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The COMELEC En

Banc Resolution dated 31 January 2013 and the COMELEC Second Division
Resolution dated 18 July 2012 in E.M. No. 12-039 are hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE insofar as it declares valid the expulsion of Congressman Lico from Ating
Koop and it upholds the ATING KOOP Party-list Group represented by its President,
Amparo T. Rimas, as the legitimate Party-list Group.
 A new one is entered DECLARING that the legitimate Central Committee and set of
officers legitimately representing Ating Koop are the Interim Central Committee and
set of officers prior to the split of Ating Koop.

SO ORDERED. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Tobias vs Abalos Gr No. L-114783. December 8, 1994

Facts:
            Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 7675, “An Act Converting the
municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of
Mandaluyong”.
            Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the Munnicipalities of
Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo
Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this legislative district,
sponsored the bill which eventually became RA 7675, President Ramis signed it into
law.
            Pursuant to Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held. The
people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved the conversion. The
turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless,
18,621 voted “yes” whereas 7, 911 voted “no”. By virtue of these results, RA 7675
was deemed ratified in effect.
            Petitioners contention were that RA 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 46
thereof, is unconstitutional. They alleged that it contravenes the “one subject – one
bill” rule. They also alleged that the subject law embraced two principal subjects,
namely: 1. the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and 2. the
division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate
districts.
            Petitioners argue that the division has resulted in an increase in the
composition of the House of Representative beyond that provided in the Constitution.
Furthermore, petitioners contend that said division was not made pursuant to any
census showing that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum
population requirements.

Issue:
1.      Whether or not RA 7675 is unconstitutional.
2.     Whether or not the number of the members of the House of Representative may
increase.
3.     Whether or not the subject law has resulted in gerrymandering.

Ruling:
1.      No.
The conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population
of not less than 250, 000 indubitably ordains compliance with the “one city – one
representative” as provided in Article VI, Section 5, par.3 of the Constitution.
The creation of separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a
subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly
urbanized city but is a natural ang logical consequence of its conversion into a highly
urbanized city. It should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It
 should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the
general subject and all provisions are germane to that general subject. It suffices if
the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the
legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of the
nature, scope and consequence of the proposed law and its operation.

2.     Yes.
The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law. The
present composition of the Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so
mandates through a legislative enactment.

3.     No.
Gerrymandering is the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a
particular candidate or party. It should be noted that Rep. Zamora, the author of the
assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong
district, having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San
Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora’s constituency has in fact been diminished, which
development could hardly be considered as favorable to him.

Petition dismissed.

FACTS:

Prior to Republic Act No., 7675 also known as “An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong”, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one
legislative district.  A plebiscite was held for the people of Mandaluyong whether or not they approved of the said
conversion.  The plebiscite was only 14.41% of the said conversion.  Nevertheless, 18,621 voted “yes” whereas
“7, 911” voted “no”.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ratification of RA7675 was unconstitutional citing Article VI, Sections 5(1), 4 and 26(1)

HELD/RULING:

For the purposes of discussion, let’s breakdown all of the claimed violations to the 1987 Constitution.

Section 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof.

The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the
subject of its conversion.  Moreover, a liberal construction of the “one-title-one-subject” rule has been liberally
adopted by the court as to not impede legislation (Lidasan v. Comelec).

Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party
list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.

The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250
members, unless otherwise provided by law.  The emphasis on the latter clause indicates that the number
of the House of Representatives may be increased, if mandated via a legislative enactment.  Therefore, the
increase in congressional representation is not unconstitutional.

Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section.

The argument on the violation of the above provision is absurd since it was the Congress itself which drafted,
deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law.

The petition is thereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 114783

BIDIN, J.:
Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong,
herein petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675,
otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be Known as the City of
Mandaluyong."
Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of
Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district.
Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of
this legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A.
No. 7675. President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into law on February 9,
1994.
Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on
April 10, 1994. The people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they
approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a
highly urbanized city as provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at
the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless,
18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results,
R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.
Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675,
specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional for being
violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution.
Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides:
"As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own
legislative district with the first representative to be elected in the next
national elections after the passage of this Act. The remainder of the
former legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the
new legislative district of San Juan with its first representative to be
elected at the same election."
Petitioners' first objection to the aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 7675
is that it contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in
Article VI, Section 26 (1) of the Constitution, to wit:
"Section 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."
Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the
subject law resulted in the latter embracing two principal subjects,
namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city;
and (2) the division of the congressional district of San
Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
Petitioners contend that the second aforestated subject is not germane to
the subject matter of R.A. No. 7675 since the said law treats of the
conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, as expressed in
the title of the law. Therefore, since Section 49 treats of a subject distinct
from that stated in the title of the law, the "one subject-one bill" rule has
not been complied with.
Petitioners' second and third objections involve Article VI, Sections 5 (1)
and (4) of the Constitution, which provide, to wit:
"Section 5 (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by
law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall
be elected through a party list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations."
"Section 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census,
the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based
on the standard provided in this section."
Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into
separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has
resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of
Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5 (1) of the
Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners contend that said division was
not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities
have attained the minimum population requirements. And finally,
petitioners assert that Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of
Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5 (4) as
aforecited.
The contentions are devoid of merit.
Anent the first issue, we agree with the observation of the Solicitor
General that the statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city with a population of not less than two hundred fifty
thousand indubitably ordains compliance with the "one city-one
representative" proviso in the Constitution:
"x x x Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand,
or each province, shall have at least one representative" (Article VI,
Section 5(3), Constitution).
Hence, it is in compliance with the aforestated constitutional mandate
that the creation of a separate congressional district for the City of
Mandaluyong is decreed under Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675.
Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate
congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and
distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but
is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly
urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675. "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of
Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated
under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional
district for Mandaluyong.
Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has
been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede
legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled
that the constitutional requirement as now expressed in Article VI,
Section 26(1) "should be given a practical rather than a technical
construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if
the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane
to that general subject."
The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had been
further elucidated in Lidasan v. Comelec (21 SCRA 496 [1967]), to wit:
"Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the
title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index
or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if
the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it
inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill
and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed
law and its operation" (emphasis supplied).
Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues raised by petitioners to
the effect that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census to
show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum
requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two
legislative districts, the same does not suffice to strike down the validity
of R.A. No. 7675. The said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed
through the regular congressional processes, including due
consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum
requirements for the establishment of separate legislative districts. At
any rate, it is not required that all laws emanating from the legislature
must contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment
of said laws.
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on
the number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading
of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5 (1), as aforequoted,
shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The
Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by
law." The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present
composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so
mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in
congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not
unconstitutional.
Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan do not
qualify to have separate legislative districts, the assailed Section 49 of
R.A. No. 7675 must be allowed to stand.
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts
the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts, the said
argument borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the glaring
fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and
enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot
possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.
Aside from the constitutional objections to R.A. No. 7675, petitioners
present further arguments against the velidity thereof.
Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made
to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a
change in their legislative district. The contention is bereft of merit since
the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district
representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San
Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing
to do with the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong.
Similarly, petitioners' additional argument that the subject law has
resulted in "gerrymandering," which is the practice of creating legislative
districts to favor a particular candidate or party, is not worthy of
credence. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, it should be
noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the
incumbent representative of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district,
having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San
Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's constituency has in fact been
diminished, which development could hardly be considered as favorable
to him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Mariano v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 118577 & 118627,

March 7, 1995.
Facts: Two petitions are filed assailing certain provisions of RA 7854,
An Act Converting The Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to
be known as the City of Makati, as unconstitutional.

Section 52 of RA 7854 is said to be unconstitutional for it increased the

legislative district of Makati only by special law in violation of Art. VI, Sec.
5(4) requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed
by Congress within 3 years following the return of every census. Also, the
addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Sec.
5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the population of
Makati stands at only 450,000.

Issue: Whether or not the addition of another legislative district in

Makati is unconstitutional
Held: Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a
special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly
provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than 250 members,
unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not
preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other
than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done
by Congress in enacting RA 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati’s
legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made
through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the
legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would
create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created
by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate
period of time. The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new city
or province a particle of their sovereignty.

Petitioner cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in

Makati is not in accord with Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the
1990 census, the population of Makati stands at only 450,000. Said section
provides that a city with a population of at least 250,000 shall have at least
one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the
1990 census stood at 450,000, its legislative district may still
be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of
250,000.
Re: Based on verifiable indicators of viability/projected capacity

FACTS: Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA 7854 which sought to convert the
Municipality of Makati to a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati.
Petitioners contend that the special law did not properly identify, in metes and bounds with
technical descriptions, the territorial jurisdiction of Makati; that it attempted to alter or restart
the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective officials; that it increased the legislative
district of Makati only by special law; that the increase in legislative district was not
expressed in the title of the bill; and that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is
not in accord with the population requirement, thus violative of the constitution and the LGC.

HELD:
(1) WON RA 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by
metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.

(2) WON it attempted to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective
officials.

(3) WON it is unconstitutional for it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special
law (the Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general
reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three (3) years following the return of
every census.

(4) WON it is unconstitutional for the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the
title of the bill.
(5) WON it is unconstitutional for the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in
accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990
census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000. Said section provides, inter alia,
that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at
least one representative.

HELD:
(1) No. Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the
proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. We note that said
delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a
municipality. In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 of RA 7854 stated that, the
city's land area "shall comprise the present territory of the municipality." The court take
judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using the metes and bounds
description of land areas of other local government units with unsettled boundary dispute.

(2) No. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well
delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of
constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question
must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. Petitioners have far from complied
with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent
events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would
be reelected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the
1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners
merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy.
Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to
raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory
relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.

(3) No. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than
two hundred fifty (250) members, "unless otherwise fixed by law". As thus worded, the
Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law,
other than a general reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done by
Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative
district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general
apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local
government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or
province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate
period of time.

(4) No. The Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully
index, or completely catalogue all its details. it should be sufficient compliance if the title
expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject.

(5) No. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four
hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met
the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section
3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has
increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one
congressional representative.

FACTS:
 Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with residents of Taguig suing as taxpayers, assail Sections 2, 51
and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 (“An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City to be known
as the City of Makati”).  Another petition which contends the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7854 was also filed
by John H. Osmena as a senator, taxpayer and concerned citizen.

ISSUES:

1. Whether Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati violating sections 7
and 450 of the Local Government Code on specifying metes and bounds with technical descriptions
2. Whether Section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854 collides with Section 8, Article X   and Section 7, Article VI of
the Constitution stressing that they new city’s acquisition of a new corporate existence will allow the incumbent mayor to
extend his term to more than two executive terms as allowed by the Constitution
3. Whether the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional as the reapportionment cannot be
made by a special law
HELD/RULING:

1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 states that:

Sec. 2. The City of Makati. — The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the
City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati
in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City
of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the
southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila.
Emphasis has been provided in the provision under dispute.  Said delineation did not change even by an inch the
land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality.  It must be noted that the requirement of metes and
bounds was meant merely as a tool in the establishment of LGUs.  It is not an end in itself.

Furthermore, at the time of consideration or R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of
Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation.  Out of becoming a sense of respect to co-
equal department of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide.

1. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 provides that:

Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. — The represent elective officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue as the
officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new election is held and
the duly elected officials shall have already qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new
corporate existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising their functions
and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of Makati.
Section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution provide the following:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.

No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.

This challenge on the controversy cannot be entertained as the premise on the issue is on the occurrence of
many contingent events.  Considering that these events may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a
 hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy.  Moreover, only Mariano among the
petitioners is a resident of Taguig and are not the proper parties to raise this abstract issue.

1. Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution clearly provides that the Congress may be comprised of not more than
two hundred fifty members, unless otherwise provided by law.  As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude
Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law.

312 Phil. 259

PUNO, J.:
At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic
Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act
Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be
known as the City of Makati." [1]

G.R. No.  118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory

relief. It was filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista,
Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita
Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto
Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The
others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as
taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A.
No. 7854 on the following grounds:

"1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or
territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in
relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code;

2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the 'three-

consecutive term' limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section
8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.

3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:

(a)    it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the
Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general
reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three (3) years
following the return of every census;

(b)    the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of
the bill; and
(c)   the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord
with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest
survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000."

G.R. No. 118627 was filed by petitioner John H. Osmeña as senator,

taxpayer, and concerned citizen. Petitioner assails section 52 of R.A. No.
7854 as unconstitutional on the same grounds as aforestated.

We find no merit in the petitions.

Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land area of the
proposed city of Makati, thus:

"SEC. 2. The City of Makati. - The Municipality of Makati shall be

converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati,
hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present
territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over
which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and
beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the
southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest
by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the
northwest, by the City of Manila.

The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the resolution by

the appropriate agency or forum of existing boundary disputes or cases
involving questions of territorial jurisdiction between the City of Makati
and the adjoining local government; units." (Underscoring supplied)

In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this delineation violates

sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code which require that the
area of a local government unit should be made by metes and bounds,
with technical descriptions. [2]

The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial

boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be overemphasized. The
boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial
jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise
powers of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction.
Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any
uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly
conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will
prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil sought to be avoided by the
Local Government Code in requiring that the land area of a local
government unit must be spelled out in metes and bounds, with
technical descriptions.

Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil
can be brought about by the description made in section 2 of R.A. No.
7854. Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land
area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its
boundaries. We note that said delineation did not change even by an
inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality.
Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land
area of Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated
that the city's land area "shall comprise the present territory of the
municipality."

The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason

why the land area of the proposed City of Makati was not defined by
metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. At the time of the
consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the
municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court
litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to a co-equal department of
government, the legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the
courts to decide. They did not want to foreclose the dispute by making a
legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue. This would have
ensued if they defined the land area of the proposed city by its exact
metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. [3] We take judicial notice
of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using the metes and
bounds description of land areas of other local government units with
unsettled boundary disputes. [4]

We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per

se present an insurmountable difficulty which will prevent Congress
from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a
local government unit. In the cases at bench, Congress maintained the
existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati but as an act of
fairness, made them subject to the ultimate resolution by the courts.
Considering these peculiar circumstances, we are not prepared to hold
that section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional. We sustain the
submission of the Solicitor General in this regard, viz:
"Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, it is
beyond cavil that the requirement stated therein, viz: 'the territorial
jurisdiction of newly created or converted cities should be described by
metes and bounds, with technical descriptions' - was made in order to
provide a means by which the area of said cities may be reasonably
ascertained. In other words, the requirement on metes and bounds was
meant merely as tool in the establishment of local government units. It is
not an end in itself. Ergo, so long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city
may be reasonably ascertained, i.e., by referring to common boundaries
with neighboring municipalities, as in this case, then, it may be
concluded that the legislative intent behind the law has been sufficiently
served.

Certainly, Congress did not intend that laws creating new cities must
contain therein detailed technical descriptions similar to those appearing
in Torrens titles, as petitioners seem to imply. To require such
description in the law as a condition sine qua non for its validity would
be to defeat the very purpose which the Local Government Code seeks to
serve. The manifest intent of the Code is to empower local government
units and to give them their rightful due. It seeks to make local
governments more responsive to the needs of their constituents while at
the same time serving as a vital cog in national development. To
invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on the mere ground that no cadastral type of
description was used in the law would serve the letter but defeat the
spirit of the Code. It then becomes a case of the master serving the slave,
instead of the other way around. This could not be the intendment of the
law.

Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when ascertained,
although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute.
Courts will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart
from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield
conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act (Torres v.
Limjap, 56 Phil., 141; Tañada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v.
Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 1105). Legislation is an active instrument of
government which, for purposes of interpretation, means that laws have
ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but
to carry out such ends and purposes (Bocobo v. Estanislao, 72 SCRA
520). The same rule must indubitably apply to the case at bar."

II

Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of section

51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 51 states:

"SEC. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. - The present elective

officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials of
the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions until
such time that a new election is held and the duly elected officials shall
have already qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new
city will acquire a new corporate existence. The appointive
officials and employees of the City shall likewise continue exercising
their functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by
the city government of the City of Makati."

They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X and
section 7, Article VI of the Constitution which provide:

"SEC. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay

officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no
such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.

x x x                        x x x                               x x x

SEC. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for

a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by
law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.

No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than

three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected."

Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials,

including Members of the House of Representatives, have a
term of three (3) years and are prohibited from serving for
more than three (3) consecutive terms. They argue that by
providing that the new city shall acquire a new corporate existence,
section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the present municipal
elective officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously served by
them. In particular, petitioners point that section 51 favors the
incumbent Makati mayor, respondent Jejomar Binay, who has already
served for two (2) consecutive terms. They further argue that should
Mayor Binay decide to run and eventually win as city mayor in the
coming elections, he can still run for the same position in 1998 and seek
another three-year consecutive term since his previous three-year
consecutive term as municipal mayor would not be counted. Thus,
petitioners conclude that said section 51 has been conveniently crafted to
suit the political ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay.

We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51.

The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of
a law are well-delineated. They are: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the
proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional
question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. [5]

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition
is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that
Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he
would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election
for the same post in the 1998 elections. Considering that these
contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a
hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or
controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano)
are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they
hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which
this Court has no jurisdiction.

III

Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail the

constitutionality of section 52, Article X of R.A. No. 7854. Section 52 of
the Charter provides:

"SEC. 52. Legislative Districts. - Upon its conversion into a highly-

urbanized city, Makati shall thereafter have at least two (2) legislative
districts that shall initially correspond to the two (2) existing districts
created under Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 7166 as implemented by
the Commission on Elections to commence at the next national elections
to be held after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays
Magallanes, Dasmariñas, and Forbes shall be with the first district, in
lieu of Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo which shall form part of the second
district." (underscoring supplied)

They contend that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is

unconstitutional for: (1) reapportionment [6] cannot made by a special
law; (2) the addition of a legislative district is not expressed in the title of
the bill; [7] and (3) Makati's population, as per the 1990 census, stands at
only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000).

These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v.
Abalos. [8] In said case, we ruled that reapportionment of legislative
districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a
new city. The Constitution [9] clearly provides that Congress shall be
composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless
otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not
preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law,
other than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done
by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in
Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can
only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all
the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit
nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or
province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for
an indeterminate period of time. [10] That intolerable situation will
deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their
sovereignty. [11] Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is
indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty.

Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district

in Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI [12] of the
Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of
Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). [13] Said
section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least
two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one
representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the
1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its
legislative district may still be increased since it has met the
minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended to
the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to
more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at
least one congressional representative. [14]

Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the creation

of an additional legislative district in Makati should have been expressly
stated in the title of the bill. In the same case of Tobias v. Abalos, op
cit, we reiterated the policy of the Court favoring a liberal construction
of the "one title-one subject" rule so as not to impede legislation. To
be sure, the Constitution does not command that the title of a law should
exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. Hence,
we ruled that "it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the
general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general
subject."

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo,

Melo, Quiason, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., J., see concurring opinion.

[1]
 R.A. No. 7854 is a consolidation of House Bill No. 12240 sponsored by
Congressman Joker Arroyo and Senate Bill No. 1244 sponsored by
Senator Vicente Sotto III.
[2]
 "SECTION 7. Creation and Conversion. - As a general rule, the
creation of a local government unit or its conversion from one level to
another level shall be based on verifiable indicators of viability and
projected capacity to provide services, to wit:

x x x   xxx     xxx

'(c) Land Area. - It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or

more islands or is separated by a local government unit independent of
the others; properly identified by metes and bounds with technical
descriptions and sufficient to provide for such basic services and
facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.

Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the

Department of Finance (DOF), the National Statistics Office (NSO), and
the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).'

x x x   xxx     xxx

SECTION 450. Requisites for Creation. - x x x

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly

identified by metes and bounds. x x x"

[3]
 August 18, 1994, Senate Deliberations on H.B. No. 12240, pp, 23-28.
[4]
 Ibid, citing as example the City of Mandaluyong.
[5]
 Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392 (1980); Cruz, Constitutional Law,
1991 ed., p. 24.
[6]
 Section 5(4), Article VI of the Constitution provides:

"(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on
the standards provided in this section."

[7]
 Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:

"Sec. 26 (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."
[8]
 G.R. No. 114783, December 8, 1994.
[9]
 Section 5(1), Article VI.
[10]
 In this connection, we take judicial notice of the fact that since 1986
up to this time, Congress has yet to pass a general reapportionment law.
[11]
 Section 1, Article II provides that "The Philippines is a democratic and
republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanate from them."
[12]
 "SEC. 5. x x x

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,

contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population
of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative."

x x x   xxx     xxx

[13]
 As per the certificate issued by Administrator Tomas Africa of the
National Census and Statistics Office, the population of Makati as of
1994 stood at 508,174; August 4, 1994, Senate Deliberations on House
Bill No. 12240 (converting Makati into a highly urbanized city), p. 15.
[14]
 Sec. 3 provides: "Any province that may hereafter be created, or any
city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred
fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to
at least one Member or such number of Members as it may be entitled to
on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the
standards setforth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the
Constitution. The number of Members apportioned to the province out
of which such new province was created or where the city, whose
population has so increased, is geographically located shall be
correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such
adjustment shall not be made within one hundred, and twenty days
before the election."
Montejo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 118702, March 16,
1995.
Facts: The province of Leyte is composed of 5 legislative districts. Biliran, located in
the third district of Leyte, was made its sub-province by virtue of RA 2141. When Biliran
was converted into a regular province, 8 municipalities of the third district composed the
new province. As a consequence, the composition of the third district was reduced to 5
municipalities. To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants,
voters and municipalities in Leyte, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2736
where it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the second district and
the municipality of Palompon of the fourth district to the third district of Leyte.

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC has the power to transfer municipalities

from one legislative district to another legislative district

Held: The COMELEC relies on the Ordinance appended to the 1987

Constitution as the source of its power of redistricting which is
traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. But
based on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it
denied to the COMELEC the major power of legislative
apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Section 2 of the
Ordinance only empowered the COMELEC to make minor
adjustments of the reapportionment made. Consistent with the
limit of its power to make minor adjustments, Sec. 3 of the
Ordinance did not also give the COMELEC any authority to transfer
municipalities from one legislative district to another district.

It may well be that the conversion of Biliran from a sub-province to a

regular province brought about an imbalance in the distribution of voters and
inhabitants in the 5 legislative districts of Leyte. But the issue involves a problem
of reapportionment of legislative districts and petitioner’s remedy lies
with Congress. Section 5(4), Art. VI of the Constitution categorically
gives Congress the power to reapportion. The Court held that COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
promulgated a resolution transferring the municipality of Capoocan of the second
district and the municipality of Palompon of the fourth district to the third district
of Leyte.
Facts:

Petitioner Cerilo Roy Montejo, representative of the first district of Leyte, pleads for the annulment of
 on the ground
Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte,
that it violates the principle of equality of representation.
The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and Ormoc is composed of 5 districts. The 3rd district
is composed of: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Calubian, Culaba, Kawayan, Leyte, Maripipi,
Naval, San Isidro, Tabango and Villaba.

Biliran, located in the 3rd district of Leyte, was made its subprovince by virtue of Republic Act No. 2141
Section 1 enacted on 1959. Said section spelled out the municipalities comprising the subprovince:
Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi and Naval and all the territories
comprised therein.

On 1992, the Local Government Code took effect and the subprovince of Biliran became a regular
province. (The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was approved by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite.) As a consequence of the conversion, eight municipalities of the 3rd district composed
the new province of Biliran. A further consequence was to reduce the 3rd district to five municipalities
(underlined above) with a total population of 146,067 as per the 1990 census.

To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in the
province of Leyte, respondent COMELEC held consultation meetings with the incumbent representatives
of the province and other interested parties and on December 29, 1994, it promulgated the assailed
resolution where, among others, it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the 2nd district and the
municipality of Palompon of the 4th district to the 3rd district of Leyte.

Issue:

Whether the unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of the legislative power of redistricting and
reapportionment is valid or not.

Held:

Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736 is annulled and set aside.

The deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission shows that COMELEC
was denied the major power of legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the power.
Regarding the first elections after the enactment of the 1987 constitution, it is the
Commission who did the reapportionment of the legislative districts and for the
subsequent elections, the power was given to the Congress.

Also, respondent COMELEC relied on the ordinance appended to the 1987 constitution as the source of its
power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. Said ordinance
states that:

Section 2: The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor adjustments to the
reapportionment herein made.”

Section 3 : Any province that may hereafter be created…The number of Members apportioned to the
province out of which such new province was created or where the city, whose population has so
increases, is geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections
but such adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and twenty days before the election.

Minor adjustments does not involve change in the allocations per district. Examples include error in the
correct name of a particular municipality or when a municipality in between which is still in the territory
of one assigned district is forgotten. And consistent with the limits of its power to make minor
adjustments, section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the respondent COMELEC any authority to
transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district. The power granted by section 3
to the respondent is to adjust the number of members (not municipalities.)
Notes:

Petitioner also prayed for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the 1st district to the 2nd
district. It is likewise denied.

ACTS:

Petitioner Cirilo Montejo, representing the First District of Leyte, pleads the annulment of Section 1 of Resolution
No. 2736 of the COMELEC, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte as it is said to violate the principle of
equity of representation.  Petitioner now seeks to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the
Second District of the province.

For an overview of the distribution in the province, see the below table for the population distribution, census
1990 and 1994:

Census 1990 Census 1994

First District 303, 349 178, 688
Second District 272, 167 156, 462
Third District 214, 499 125, 763
Fourth District 269, 347 155, 995
Fifth District 309, 148 181, 242
ISSUES:

Whether COMELEC has the jurisdiction to promulgate Resolution No. 2736

HELD/RULING:

The basic powers of COMELEC are spelled out in Section 2(c), Article IX of the Constitution, which states:

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor adjustments of the reapportionment herein made.
The meaning of minor adjustments is found in the debates of the Commission wherein it was stated that the
transfer of one municipality in a district to another district is not a minor adjustment; rather it is a substantive
one.  Minor adjustments does not allow the change in allocations per district.

It is then held that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
promulgated Section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736.  Section 1 is then annulled and set aside.  The petition praying
for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province of Leyte
is denied.

312 Phil. 492

PUNO, J.:
More than political fortunes are at stake in the case at bench. Petitioner
Cirilo Roy G. Montejo, representing the First District of Leyte, pleads for
the annulment of section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 of the COMELEC,
redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it
violates the principle of equality of representation. To remedy the alleged
inequity, petitioner seeks to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from his
district to the Second District of the province. Intervenor Sergio A.F.
Apostol, representing the Second District, vigorously opposed the
inclusion of Tolosa in his district. We gave due course to the petition
considering that, at bottom, it involves the validity of the unprecedented
exercise by the COMELEC of the legislative power of redistricting and
reapportionment.

The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and Ormoc is composed
of five (5) legislative districts.[1]

The first district[2] covers Tacloban City and the municipalities of

Alangalang, Babatngon, Palo, San Miguel, Sta. Fe, Tanauan and Tolosa.

The second district[3] is composed of the municipalities of Barugo,

Barauen, Capoocan, Carigara, Dagami, Dulag, Jaro, Julita, La Paz,
Mayorga, MacArthur, Pastrana, Tabontabon, and Tunga.

The third district[4] is composed of the municipalities of Almeria, Biliran,

Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Calubian, Culaba, Kawayan, Leyte, Maripipi,
Naval, San Isidro, Tabango, and Villaba.

The fourth district[5] is composed of Ormoc City and the municipalities of

Albuera, Isabel, Kananga, Matagob, Merida, and Palompon.

The fifth district[6] is composed of the municipalities of Abuyog, Bato,

Baybay, Hilongos, Hindang, Inopacan, Javier, Mahaplag, and Matalom.

Biliran, located in the third district of Leyte, was made its sub-province
by virtue of Republic Act No. 2141 enacted on April 8, 1959.[7] Section 1 of
the law spelled out the municipalities comprising the sub-province, viz:
"Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi and
Naval and all the territories comprised therein."

On January 1, 1992, the Local Government Code took effect. Pursuant to

its Section 462, the sub-province of Biliran became a regular province. It
provides:

"Existing sub-provinces are hereby converted into regular provinces

upon approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be held in
the sub-provinces and the original provinces directly affected. The
plebiscite shall be conducted by the COMELEC simultaneously with the
national elections following the effectivity of this code. The new
legislative districts created as a result of such conversion shall continue
to be represented in Congress by the duly-elected representatives of the
original districts out of which said new provinces or districts were
created until their own representatives shall have been elected in the
next regular congressional elections and qualified."

The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was approved by a

majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held on May 11, 1992. As a
consequence of the conversion, eight (8) municipalities of the Third
District composed the new province of Biliran, i.e., Almeria, Biliran,
Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi, and Naval. A further
consequence was to reduce the Third District to five (5) municipalities
with a total population of 145,067 as per the 1990 census.

To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants,

voters and municipalities in the province of Leyte, respondent
COMELEC held consultation meetings with the incumbent
representatives of the province and other interested parties. On
December 29, 1994, it promulgated Resolution No. 2736 where, among
others, it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the Second District
and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third
District of Leyte. The composition of the First District which includes the
municipality of Tolosa and the composition of the Fifth District were not
disturbed. After the movement of municipalities, the composition of the
five (5) legislative districts appeared as follows:

Registered
First District: Population
Voters
  (1990) (1994)
 
1.Tacloban City, 137,190 81,679
2. Alangalang, 33,375 20,543
3.Babatngon, 17,795 9,929
4. Palo, 38,100 20,816
5. San Miguel, 13,438 8,167
6. Sta Fe, 12,119 7,497
7. Tanauan and, 38,033 22,357
8.Tolosa; 13,299 7,700
 
TOTAL - 303,349 178,688
 
Registered
Second District: Population
Voters
  (1990) (1994)
 
1.Barugo, 23,817 13,237
2.Barauen, 46,029 23,307
3.Carigara 38,863 22,036
4.Dagami, 25,606 16,519
5.Dulag, 33,020 19,375
6. Jaro, 31,727 17,139
7.Julita, 9,944 6,196
8.La Paz, 14,311 9,003
9.Mayorga, 10,530 5,868
10.Mac Arthur, 13,159 8,628
11. Pastrana, 12,565 7,348
12. Tabontabon, and 7,183 4,419
13.Tunga; 5,413 3,387
 
TOTAL - 272,167 156,462
 
Registered
Third District: Population
Voters
  (1990) (1994)
 
1. Calubian, 25,968 16,649
2. Leyte, 32,575 16,415
3.San Isidro, 24,442 14,916
4. Tabango, 29,743 15,487
5. Villaba, 32,339 21,227
6.Capoocan, and 23,687 13,595
7. Palompon; 45,745 27,474
 
TOTAL - 214,499 125,763
 
Registered
Fourth District: Population
Voters
  (1990) (1994)
 
1. Ormoc City, 129,456 75,140
2.Albuera, 32,395 17,493
3.Isabel, 33,389 21,889
4.Kananga, 36,288 19,873
5. Matagob, 15,474 9,407
6.Merida, and 22,345 12,474
 
TOTAL - 269,347 155,995
 
Registered
Third District: Population
Voters
(1990) (1994)
     
1.Abuyog, 47,265 28,682
2. Bato, 28,197 16,130
3. Baybay, 82,281 47,923
4. Hilongos, 48,617 26,871
5. Hindang, 16,272 9,659
6.Inopacan, 16,894 10,401
7. Javier, 18,658 11,713
8. Mahaplag, and 22,673 13,616
9.Matalom 28,291 16,247
 
TOTAL - 309,148 181,242

Petitioner Montejo filed a motion for reconsideration calling the

attention of respondent COMELEC, among others, to the inequitable
distribution of inhabitants and voters between the First and Second
Districts. He alleged that the First District has 178,688 registered voters
while the Second District has 156,462 registered voters or a difference of
22,226 registered voters. To diminish the difference, he proposed that
the municipality of Tolosa with 7,700 registered voters be transferred
from the First to the Second District. The motion was opposed by
intervenor, Sergio A.F. Apostol. Respondent Commission denied the
motion ruling that: (1) its adjustment of municipalities involved the least
disruption of the territorial composition of each district; and (2) said
adjustment complied with the constitutional requirement that each
legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact and adjacent territory.

In this petition, petitioner insists that Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736

violates the principle of equality of representation ordained in the
Constitution. Citing Wesberry v. Sanders,[8] he argues that respondent
COMELEC violated "the constitutional precept that as much as
practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as
much as another's." The Solicitor General, in his Comment, concurred
with the views of the petitioner. The intervenor, however, opposed the
petition on two (2) grounds: (1) COMELEC has no jurisdiction to
promulgate Resolution No. 2736; and (2) assuming it has jurisdiction,
said Resolution is in accord with the Constitution. Respondent
COMELEC filed its own Comment alleging that it acted within the
parameters of the Constitution.

We find section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 void.

While the petition at bench presents a significant issue, our first inquiry
will relate to the constitutional power of the respondent COMELEC [9] to
transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another legislative
district in the province of Leyte. The basic powers of respondent
COMELEC, as enforcer and administrator of our election laws, are
spelled out in black and white in section 2(c), Article IX of the
Constitution. Rightly, respondent COMELEC does not invoke this
provision but relies on the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution
as the source of its power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded
as part of the power to make laws. The Ordinance is entitled
"Apportioning the Seats of the House of Representatives of the Congress
of the Philippines to the Different Legislative Districts in Provinces and
Cities and the Metropolitan Manila Area." Its substantive sections state:

"SECTION 1. For purposes of the election of Members of the House of

Representatives of the First Congress of the Philippines under the
Constitution proposed by the 1986 Constitutional Commission and
subsequent elections, and until otherwise provided by law, the Members
thereof shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila Area as follows:

x x x                     x x x                   x x x

"SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to

make minor adjustments of the reapportionment herein made.

"SECTION 3. Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city

whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty
thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at
least one Member or such number of Members as it may be entitled to on
the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the standards
set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution.
The number of Members apportioned to the province out of which such
new province was created or where the city, whose population has so
increased, is geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by
the Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made
within one hundred and twenty days before the election." (Italics
supplied)

The Ordinance was made necessary because Proclamation No. 3[10] of

President Corazon C. Aquino, ordaining the Provisional Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines, abolished the Batasang Pambansa.[11] She
then exercised legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution. [12]

The Ordinance was the principal handiwork of then Commissioner

Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,[13] now a distinguished member of this Court. The
records reveal that the Constitutional Commission had to resolve several
prejudicial issues before authorizing the first congressional elections
under the 1987 Constitution. Among the vital issues were: whether the
members of the House of Representatives would be elected by district or
by province; who shall undertake the apportionment of the legislative
districts; and, how the apportionment should be made.[14] Commissioner
Davide, Jr., offered three (3) options for the Commission to consider: (1)
allow President Aquino to do the apportionment by law; (2) empower
the COMELEC to make the apportionment; or (3) let the Commission
exercise the power by way of an Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
[15]
 The different dimensions of the options were discussed by
Commissioners Davide, Felicitas S. Aquino and Blas F. Ople. We quote
the debates in extenso, viz:[16]

x x x                     x x x                   x x x

"MR. PADILLA. Mr. Presiding Officer.

"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Padilla is

recognized.

"MR. PADILLA. I think I have filed a very simple motion by way of

amendment by substitution and this was, I believe, a prior or a proposed
amendment. Also, the chairman of the Committee on the Legislative said
that he was proposing a vote first by the Chamber on the concept of
whether the election is by province and cities on the one hand, or by
legislative districts on the other. So I propose this simple formulation
which reads: 'FOR THE FIRST ELECTION UNDER THIS
CONSTITUTION THE LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS SHALL BE
APPORTIONED BY THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS.' I hope the
chairman will accept the proposed amendment.

SUSPENSION OF SESSION

"MR. DAVIDE. The effect is, more or less, the same insofar as the
apportionment is concerned, but the Bernas-Sarmiento et al. proposal
would also provide for a mandate for the apportionment later, meaning
after the first election, which will in effect embody what the Commission
had approved, reading as follows: 'Within three years following the
return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.'

"So, Mr. Presiding Officer, may I request for a suspension of the session,
so that all the proponents can work together.

"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The session is suspended.

"It was 3:33 p.m.

RESUMPTION OF SESSION

"At 3:40 p.m., the session was resumed.

"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The session is resumed.

"Commissioner Davide is recognized.

"MR. DAVIDE. Mr. Presiding Officer, as a compromise, I wonder if the

Commission will allow this. We will just delete the proposed
subparagraph (4) and all the capitalized words in paragraph (5). So that
in paragraph (5), what would be left would only be the following: 'Within
three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make
a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards
provided in this section.'

"But we shall have an ordinance appended to the new Constitution

indicating specifically the following: 'FOR PURPOSES OF THE
ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
IN THE FIRST CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION IMMEDIATELY
FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION
PROPOSED BY THE 1986 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION AND
SUBSEQUENT ELECTIONS AND UNTIL OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY
LAW, THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SHALL BE ELECTED FROM LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS
APPORTIONED AMONG THE PROVINCES, CITIES AND THE
METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA AS FOLLOWS.'

"And what will follow will be the allocation of seats to Metropolitan

Manila Area, to the provinces and to the cities, without indicating the
municipalities comprising each of the districts. Then, under Section 2,
we will mandate the COMELEC to make the actual apportionment on the
basis of the number of seats provided for and allocated to each province
by us.

"MS. AQUINO. Mr. Presiding Officer.

"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Aquino is

recognized.

"MS. AQUINO. I have to object to the provision which will give mandate
to COMELEC to do the redistricting. Redistricting is vitally linked to the
baneful practices of cutting up areas or spheres of influence; in other
words, gerrymandering. This Commission, being a nonpartisan, a
nonpolitical deliberative body, is in the best possible situation under the
circumstances to undertake that responsibility. We are not wanting in
expertise and in time because in the first place, the Committee on the
Legislative has prepared the report on the basis of the recommendation
of the COMELEC.

"MR. OPLE. Mr. Presiding Officer.

"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Ople is

recognized.

"MR. OPLE. I would like to support the position taken by Commissioner

Aquino in this respect. We know that the reapportionment of provinces
and cities for the purpose of redistricting is generally inherent in the
constituent power or in the legislative power. And I would feel very
uncertain about delegating this to a quasi-judicial body even if it is one of
the constitutional offices created under this Constitution. We have the
assurance of Commissioner Davide, as chairman of the Committee on
the Legislative, that even given the very short time remaining in the life
of this Commission, there is no reason why we cannot complete the work
of reapportionment on the basis of the COMELEC plan which the
committee has already thoroughly studied and which remains available
to the Constitutional Commission.
"So, I support the position taken by Commissioner Aquino, Mr.
Presiding Officer. I think, it is the safest, the most reasonable, and the
most workable approach that is available to this Commission.

"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). What does Commissioner

Davide say:

"MR. DAVIDE. The issue now is whether this body will make the
apportionment itself or whether we will leave it to the COMELEC. So,
there arises, therefore, a prejudicial question for the body to decide. I
would propose that the Commission should now decide what body
should make the apportionment. Should it be the Commission or should
it be the COMELEC? And the Committee on the Legislative will act
accordingly on the basis of the decision.

"MR. BENGZON. Mr. Presiding Officer.

"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Bengzon is

recognized.

"MR. BENGZON. Apropos of that, I would like to inform the body that I
believe the Committee on the Legislative has precisely worked on this
matter and they are ready with a list of apportionment. They have, in
fact, apportioned the whole country into various districts based on the
recommendation of the COMELEC. So they are ready with the list and if
this body would wish to apportion the whole country by district itself,
then I believe we have the time to do it because the Committee on the
Legislative is ready with that particular report which need only to be
appended to the Constitution. So if this body is ready to accept the work
of the Committee on the Legislative we would have no problem. I just
would like to give that information so that the people here would be
guided accordingly when they vote.

"MR. RODRIGO. Mr. Presiding Officer.

"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Rodrigo is

recognized.

"MR. RODRIGO. I just would like to ask Commissioner Davide some

questions.

"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Davide may

yield if he so desires.
"MR. DAVIDE. Gladly.

"MR. RODRIGO. Will this apportionment which we are considering

apply only to the first election after the enactment of the Constitution?

"MR. DAVIDE. On the basis of the Padilla proposal, it will be for the first
election; on the basis of the Sarmiento proposal, it will only apply to the
first election.

"MR. RODRIGO. And after that, Congress will have the power to
reapportion.

"MR. DAVIDE. Yes.

"MR. RODRIGO. So, if we attach this to the Constitution - the

reapportionment based on the COMELEC study and between the
approval of the Constitution and the first election - the COMELEC no
longer has the power to change that even a bit.

x x x           x x x                  x x x

"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Regalado is

recognized.

"MR. REGALADO. May I address a clarificatory question to

Commissioner Davide?

"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The Gentleman will please

proceed.

"MR. REGALADO. On the basis of the Commissioner's proposed

apportionment and considering the fact that there will be a
corresponding reduction to 183 seats, would there be instances of
underrepresentation or non-representation?

"MR. DAVIDE. None at all, Mr. Presiding Officer. I can assure the
Commission that there will be no case of inequitable distribution. It will
come out to be one for every 350 to 400,000 inhabitants.

"MR. REGALADO. And that would be within the standard that we refer
to.

"MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

"MR. REGALADO. Thank you.

"MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer.

"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The Floor Leader is

recognized.

"MR. RAMA. The parliamentary situation is that there was a motion by

Commissioner Sarmiento to mandate COMELEC to do the redistricting.
This was also almost the same motion by Commissioner Padilla and I
think we have had some kind of meeting of minds. On the other hand,
there seems to be a prejudicial question, an amendment to the
amendment as suggested by Commissioner Aquino, that instead of the
COMELEC, it should be this Commission that shall make the
redistricting. So may I ask Commissioner Aquino, if she insists on that
idea, to please formulate it into a motion so we can vote on that first as
an amendment to the amendment.

"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Aquino is

recognized.

"MS. AQUINO. The motion is for this Commission to undertake the

apportionment of the legislative districts instead of the proposal that
COMELEC be given the mandate to undertake the responsibility.

x x x           x x x             x x x

"MR. SARMIENTO. May I be clarified, Mr. Presiding Officer. Is it the

motion or the proposed amendment?

"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The proposed amendment.

"MR. SARMIENTO. May we move for the approval of this proposed

amendment which we substitute for paragraphs 4 and 5.

"MR. DAVIDE. May I request that it should be treated merely as a

motion to be followed by a deletion of paragraph 4 because that should
not really appear as a paragraph in Section 5; otherwise, it will appear
very ugly in the Constitution where we mandate a Commission that will
become functus officio to have the authority. As a matter of fact, we
cannot exercise that authority until after the ratification of the new
Constitution.
"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). What does Commissioner
Sarmiento say?

"MR. SARMIENTO. It is accepted, Mr. Presiding Officer. So, may I move

for the approval of this proposed amendment.

"MS. AQUINO. Mr. Presiding Officer.

"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Aquino is

recognized.

"MS. AQUINO. Would that require a two-thirds vote or a simple

plurality to adopt that motion?

"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). That will require a two-thirds

vote.

"MS. AQUINO. Thank you. Mr. Presiding Officer.

"MR. SARMIENTO. May I restate the motion, Mr. Presiding Officer.

"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The Gentleman may proceed.

"MR. SARMIENTO. May I move that this Commission do the

reapportionment of the legislative districts.

"MS. AQUINO. Mr. Presiding Officer.

"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). What is the pleasure of

Commissioner Aquino?

"MS. AQUINO. May I be clarified again on the motion. Is Commissioner

Sarmiento, therefore, adopting my motion? Would it not be right for him
to move that the COMELEC be mandated?

"MR. SARMIENTO. No, we accepted the amendment. It is already the

Commission that will be mandated.

"MS. AQUINO. So, the Gentleman has accepted the amendment.

"Thank you.

"MR. SARMIENTO. I am voting that this Commission do the

reapportionment.

VOTING

"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Let us proceed to vote.

"As many as are in favor, please raise their hand. (Several Members
raised their hand.)

"As many as are against, please raise their hand. (No Member raised his
hand.)

"The results show 30 votes in favor and none against; the motion is
approved."

Clearly then, the Constitutional Commission denied to the COMELEC

the major power of legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the
power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only empowered the COMELEC "to
make minor adjustments of the reapportionment herein made." The
meaning of the phrase "minor adjustments" was again clarified in the
debates[17] of the Commission, viz:

x x x                     x x x                   x x x

"MR. GUINGONA. This is just clarificatory, Mr. Presiding Officer. In

Section 2, the Commission on Elections is empowered to make minor
adjustments on the apportionment made here.

"MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

"MR. GUINGONA. We have not set any time limit for this.

"MR. DAVIDE. We should not set a time limit unless during the period
of amendments a proposal is made. The authority conferred would be on
minor corrections or amendments, meaning to say, for instance, that we
may have forgotten an intervening municipality in the enumeration,
which ought to be included in one district. That we shall consider a
minor amendment.

"MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.

x x x                           x x x                           x x x
"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Romulo). Commissioner de Castro is
recognized.

"MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.

I was about to ask the committee the meaning of minor adjustment. Can

it be possible that one municipality in a district be transferred to another
district and call it a minor adjustment?

"MR. DAVIDE. That cannot be done, Mr. Presiding Officer. Minor,

meaning, that there should be no change in the allocations per
district. However, it may happen that we have forgotten a municipality
in between, which is still in the territory of one assigned district, or there
may be an error in the correct name of a particular municipality because
of changes made by the interim Batasang Pambansa and the Regular
Batasang Pambansa. There were many batas pambansa enacted by both
the interim and the Regular Batasang Pambansa changing the names of
municipalities.

"MR. DE CASTRO. So, the minor adjustment may be made only if one of
the municipalities is not mentioned in the ordinance appended to, and it
will be up for the COMELEC now to adjust or to put such municipality to
a certain district.

"MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer. For instance, we may not have
the data regarding a division of a municipality by the interim Batasang
Pambansa or the Regular Batasang Pambansa into two municipalities,
meaning, a mother municipality and the new municipality, but still
actually these are within the geographical district area.

"MR. DE CASTRO. So the minor adjustment which the COMELEC

cannot do is that, if, for example, my municipality is in the First District
of Laguna, they cannot put that in any other district.

"MR. DAVIDE. That is not even a minor correction. It is a substantive

one.

"MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.

Consistent with the limits of its power to make minor adjustments,

Section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the respondent COMELEC
any authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to
another district. The power granted by section 3 to the respondent
COMELEC is to adjust the number of members (not municipalities)
"apportioned to the province out of which such new province was
created...".

Prescinding from these premises, we hold that respondent COMELEC

committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
when it promulgated section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736 transferring the
municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of
Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of Leyte.

It may well be that the conversion of Biliran from a sub-province to a

regular province brought about an imbalance in the distribution of
voters and inhabitants in the five (5) legislative districts of the province
of Leyte. This imbalance, depending on its degree, could devalue a
citizen's vote in violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Be that as it may, it is not proper at this time for petitioner
to raise this issue using the case at bench as his legal vehicle. The issue
involves a problem of reapportionment of legislative districts and
petitioner's remedy lies with Congress. Section 5(4), Article VI of the
Constitution categorically gives Congress the power to reapportion, thus:
"Within three (3) years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on
the standards provided in this section." In Macias v. COMELEC,[18] we
ruled that the validity of a legislative apportionment is a justiciable
question. But while this Court can strike down an unconstitutional
reapportionment, it cannot itself make the reapportionment as
petitioner would want us to do by directing respondent COMELEC to
transfer the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second
District of the province of Leyte.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as it

transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and the
municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of
the province of Leyte, is annulled and set aside. We also deny the
Petition praying for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the
First District to the Second District of the province of Leyte. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,

Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Francisco,
JJ., concur.
[1]
 Ordinance Appended to the Constitution.
[2]
 Represented by Congressman Cirilo Roy G. Montejo.
[3]
 Represented by Congressman Sergio A.F. Apostol.
[4]
 Represented by Congressman Alberto S. Veloso.
[5]
 Represented by Congressman Carmelo J. Locsin.
[6]
 Represented by Congressman Eriberto V. Loreto.
[7]
 Section 9, Article XVIII of the Constitution provides: "A sub-province
shall continue to exist and operate until it is converted into a regular
province or until its component municipalities are reverted to the
mother province."
[8]
 376 US 1. See also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 US 533; WMCA, Inc. v.
Lomenzo, 377 US 633, Maryland Commission For Fair Representation v.
Tawes, 377 US 656, etc.
[9]
 The power of the respondent COMELEC to redistrict does not appear
to have been disputed by the parties in the proceedings below.
[10]
 Promulgated March 26, 1986 and otherwise known as Freedom
Constitution.
[11]
 See Article I, Section 3 of Proclamation No. 3.
[12]
 See Section 1, Article II of Provisional Constitution.
[13]
 He was the Chairman of the Committee on the Legislative. The other
co-sponsors of the Ordinance, introduced in the Commission as
Resolution No. 551, were Commissioners Azcuna, Sumulong, Calderon,
Alonto, Jamir, Lerum, Guingona, Abubakar, Rodrigo, Aquino,
Concepcion, de los Reyes, Jr., Garcia and Treñas.
376 Phil. 443

PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside Resolution No.
2950 promulgated on November 3, 1997 by respondent Commission on
Elections, which amended its Resolution Nos. 2379, 2396 and 2778 on
the districting and adjustment of Sangguniang Panlalawigan and
Panglungsod seats in connection with the May 11, 1998 elections, on the
alleged ground of grave abuse of discretion tainting the same.  In
particular, petitioners, as taxpayers, assail the portion of subject
Resolution dividing the Province of Guimaras into two provincial
districts and apportioning eight (8) elective Sangguniang Panlalawigan
seats therefor.

The facts that matter are as follows:

In view of the addition of the two (2) new municipalities, San Lorenzo
and Sibunag, to the Province of Guimaras, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Guimaras decided to have the province subdivided into
two provincial districts.  Conformably, on March 25, 1996, it passed
Resolution No. 68 requesting the Commission on Elections to bring
about the desired division.

Acting upon the said Resolution, the Provincial Election Supervisor in

the Province of Guimaras conducted two consultative meetings on
August 21,1996 and on October 2 of the same year, with due notice to all
elected provincial and municipal officials, barangay captains, barangay
kagawads, representatives of all political parties, and other interested
parties.  Through secret balloting, a consensus was reached unanimously
in favor of a division as follows:

1. First District shall be composed of the Municipalities of Jordan

Buenavista and San Diego with three (3) Sangguniang
Panlalawigan Members, and

2. The Second District shall be composed of the Municipalities of

Jordan, Nueva Valencia and Sibunag with three (3) Sangguniang
Panlalawigan Members.

On October 3, 1996, guided by the result of the consultative meetings,

the Provincial Election Supervisor issued a Memorandum
recommending the division of the Province of Guimaras into two (2)
provincial districts.

On April 30, 1997, the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the

Department of Finance issued Memorandum Circular No. 97-1
reclassifying several provinces including the Province of Guimaras,
which was reclassified from fifth class to fourth class province.

In line with such reclassification, the Commission on Elections issued,

on November 3, 1997, the Resolution No. 2950 under attack, which
allotted eight (8) Sangguniang Panlalawigan seats to the Province of
Guimaras, dividing it into two provincial districts in the following
manner:

Region VI  
   
1. GUIMARAS
(8 seats)
- 126,470
   
1  District -
st
2nd District - 70,252
56,218
   
(3 seats) (5
 
seats)
   
1. Buenavista -
1. Jordan - 25,321
37,681
   
2. San
Lorenzo - 2. Nueva Valencia - 27,158
18,537
   
  3. Sibunag - 17,773
Resolution No. 2950 of the Commission on Elections is the subject of the
present Petition for Certiorari brought by the petitioners, as taxpayers
and residents of the Province of Guimaras.

Petitioners question the manner in which the province was so divided

into districts, pointing out that: 1) the districts do not comprise a
compact, contiguous and adjacent area; 2) the "consultative meeting"
upon which the districting was based did not express the true sentiment
of the voters of the province; 3) the apportionment of the province into
two districts is not equitable, and 4) there is disparity in the ratio of the
number of voters that a Board Member represents.  Petitioners propose
that the province be redistricted as follows:

FIRST
- 63,002 voters
DISTRICT
(4 seats)  
Buenavista - 37,681
Jordan - 25,321
resulting in a ratio of one (1) Board member per 15,000 voters

SECOND
- 63,468 VOTERS
DISTRICT
(4 seats)  
Nueva
  - 27,158
Valencia
Sibunag - 17,773
San Lorenzo - 18,537
resulting in a ratio of one (1) Board member per 15,696 voters, pointing
out that such redistricting is more in accordance with provisions of law
and the Constitution.

The division of provinces into districts and the corresponding

apportionment, by district, of the number of elective members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan are provided for by law.  Under Republic Act
No. 6636,[1] allotment of elective members to provinces and
municipalities must be made on the basis of its classification as a
province and/or municipality.  Section 4 of R.A. 6636 provides:

SEC. 4  Provinces and Municipalities - First and second class provinces

shall each have ten (10) elective members; third and fourth class
provinces, eight; and fifth and sixth class provinces, six to be elected at
large by the qualified voters therein.

All other municipalities shall have the same number of elective members
as provided in existing laws.
Thus, a fourth class province under R.A. 6636 shall have eight
Sangguniang Panlalawigan members.

In relation thereto, Republic Act No. 7166[2] reads:

SEC. 3 (b) For provinces with only one (1) legislative district, the
Commission shall divide them into two (2) districts for purposes of
electing the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, as nearly as
practicable according to the number of inhabitants, each district
comprising a compact, contiguous and adjacent territory, and the
number of seats of elective members of their respective sanggunian shall
be equitably apportioned between the districts in accordance with the
immediately preceding paragraph;

xxx  xxx  xxx     

A province with only one legislative district, such as Guimaras, should
therefore be divided into two provincial districts.

It must be noted that on April 30, 1997, the Province of Guimaras was
re-classified from a fifth class to a fourth class province under
Memorandum Circular No. 97-1 issued by the Bureau of Local
Government Finance of the Department of Finance. Hence, the Province
of Guimaras, having only one legislative district, has to be divided into
two provincial districts with an allotment of eight elective members of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan by virtue of its reclassification into a
fourth class province.

The rules and guidelines to be followed by the Commission on Elections

in the apportionment, by district, of the number of elective members of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in provinces with only one (1) legislative
district is provided for by law. Under the above cited R.A. 7166, division
of provinces into districts shall be done in a manner: (1) as nearly as
practicable, (2) according to the number of inhabitants, (3) each district
comprising a compact, contiguous and adjacent territory, and (4) the
number of seats of elective members of the respective Sanggunian
equitably apportioned between the districts.

Corollarily, COMELEC also promulgated Resolution No. 2131 which

provides the rules and guidelines for the apportionment by district of
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in provinces with only one
legislative district and Sangguniang Bayan of municipalities in the Metro
Manila area.  The said Resolution provides, among others, that for
provinces with only one (1) legislative district:

a) The province shall be divided into two (2) Sanggunian districts for
provincial representation, as nearly as practicable according to the
number of inhabitants based on the 1990 census of population.

b) Each district shall comprise a compact, contiguous and adjacent

territory;
c) A municipality shall belong to one (1) district ONLY, in no case shall a
part thereof be apportioned to another provincial Sanggunian district.
The same Resolution requires that (1) the 1990 census of population be
secured from the provincial or municipal representative of the National
Statistics Office concerned; (2) consultations, hearings and meetings be
conducted with elective local officials, representatives of political parties,
non-government organizations, civic and religious groups and other
sectors of the community for their suggestions and proposals for possible
incorporation into the project of apportionment, and (3) the project of
apportionment and the map of the province indicating the districts, the
population of each district and showing the delineation of boundaries be
submitted to the COMELEC for study and evaluation.

Petitioners aver that the apportionment of the Province of Guimaras into

two districts is not equitable due to disproportionate representation. It is
claimed that the districting embodied in Resolution No. 2950 results in a
disparity of representation in that, in the first district, there is a ratio of
one board member per 18,739 voters while in the second district, the
ratio is one board member per 14, 050 voters.

Petitioners' contention is untenable. Under R.A. 7166 and Comelec

Resolution No. 2313, the basis for division into districts shall be the
number of inhabitants of the province concerned and not the number of
listed or registered voters as theorized upon by petitioners. Thus,
Comelec did not act with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed
Resolution because clearly, the basis for the districting is the number of
inhabitants of the Province of Guimaras by municipality based on the
official 1995 Census of Population as certified to by Tomas P. Africa,
Administrator of the National Statistics Office.

Petitioners' next contention is that the consultative meetings upon which

the districting was based did not express the true sentiment of the voters
of the province as the inhabitants were not properly represented during
the said meetings.

Again, this contention of petitioners is bereft of any basis. As duly

certified to by Mr. Romulo L. Lequisia, Provincial Election Supervisor of
the Province of Guimaras, two consultative meetings were held by the
Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, one on August 21 and
another on October 2, 1996, in order to arrive at a consensus on the
matter of the proposed districting of Guimaras into two Sangguniang
Panlalawigan districts. And, as shown by the documentary exhibits, all
interested parties were duly notified and represented during the two
consultative meetings as required by Comelec Resolution No. 2313.
Appended to respondent Comelec's Comment are the attendance sheets
where the names and signatures of those who attended the consultative
meetings and the corresponding barangay and/or group which they
represented appear and which belie petitioners' allegation that there was
no valid representation.

Finally, petitioners maintain that the Comelec committed grave abuse of

discretion when it issued Resolution No. 2950 because thereunder, the
municipalities which comprise each district  do not embrace a compact,
contiguous and adjacent area.

Petitioners' asseveration is equally erroneous. Under Comelec

Resolution No. 2950, the towns of Buenavista and San Lorenzo were
grouped together to form the first district and the second district is
composed of the municipalities of Jordan, Nueva Valencia and Sibunag.
R.A. 7166 requires that each district must cover a compact, contiguous
and adjacent territory. "Contiguous" and/or "adjacent" means
"adjoining, nearby, abutting, having a common border, connected,
and/or touching along boundaries often for considerable
distances."[3] Not even a close perusal of the map of the Province of
Guimaras is necessary to defeat petitioners' stance.  On its face, the map
of Guimaras indicates that the municipalities of Buenavista and San
Lorenzo are "adjacent" or "contiguous". They touch along boundaries
and are connected throughout by a common border. Buenavista is at the
northern part of Guimaras while San Lorenzo is at the east portion of the
province. It would be different if the towns grouped together to form one
district were Buenavista and Nueva Valencia or Buenavista and Sibunag.
In that case, the districting would clearly be without any basis because
these towns are not contiguous or adjacent. Buenavista is at the north
while Nueva Valencia and Sibunag are at the southern and southeastern
part of the province, respectively.

Premises studiedly considered in proper perspective, the Court is of the

irresistible conclusion, and so finds, that the respondent Comelec did not
gravely abuse its discretion when it issued Resolution No. 2950.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit the petition under consideration is

hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,

Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes,
Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon Jr., JJ., concur.

[1]
 entitled "An Act Resetting The Local Elections From November 9, 1987
to January 18, 1998, Amending For This Purpose Executive Order
Number Two Hundred and Seventy" effective November 6, 1987.
[2]
 entitled "An Act Providing For Synchronized National and Local
Elections and For Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations
Therefor and For Other Purposes" approved on November  26, 1991.
Facts:

In its Resolution no. 68, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Guimaras requested the COMELEC to have the
province subdivided into two provincial districts. Acting upon the request, the Provincial Election
Supervisor conducted two consultative meetings with the provincial and municipal officials, barangay
captains, barangay kagawads, representatives of all political parties, and other interested parties. A
consensus was reached in favor of the division.
The PES then issued a memo recommending the division of the province.
Guimaras was then reclassified from 5th class to 4th class province under the Memo Circular No. 97-1
issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department of Finance.
The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2950 which allotted 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan seats to Guimaras—
1st district (Buenavista and San Lorenzo)= 3 seats and 2nd district (Jordan, Nueva Valencia, and
Sibunag)= 5 seats.

The petitioners questioned Resolution No. 2950, pointing out that:

1.the districts do not comprise a compact, contiguous and adjacent area.
2.the consultative meetings did not express the true sentiment of the voters of the province.
3.the apportionment of the two districts are not equitable.
4.there is disparity in the ratio of the number of voters that a Board Member represents.

Issue:

Whether or not the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing Resolution No. 2950?

Held:

COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion. The petition is dismissed.

Ratio:

1. The municipalities belonging to each district are compact, contiguous and adjacent. Contiguous and
adjacent means adjoining, nearby, abutting, having a common border, connected, and/or touching along
boundaries often for considerable distances. On its face, the map of Guimaras shows that the
municipalities grouped together are contiguous or adjacent.
2. There were two consultative meetings held by the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor. As
required by COMELEC Resoluiton No. 2313, all interested parties were duly notified and represented.
3. Under Republic Act 6636, a 4th class province shall have 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan members. Also,
under Republic Act 7166, provinces with 1 legislative district shall be divided into 2 districts for purposes
of electing the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The province of Guimaras, being a 4th class
province and having only 1 legislative district, shall have 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan members and 2
districts.
4. Under Republic Act 7166 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2313, the basis for division shall be the number
of inhabitants of the province concerned not the number of listed or registered voters. The districting of
the Province of Guimaras was based on the official 1995 Census of Population as certified by the National
Statistics Office.

373 Phil. 668

Samson v aguiree

QUISUMBING, J.:
On February 23, 1998, President Fidel V. Ramos signed into law
Republic Act No. 8535, creating the City of Novaliches out of 15
barangays of Quezon City. Petitioner Moises S. Samson, incumbent
councilor of the first district of Quezon City, is now before the Court
challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8535.

Petitioner also seeks to enjoin the Executive Secretary from ordering the
implementation of R.A. 8535, the COMELEC from holding a plebiscite
for the creation of the City of Novaliches, and the Department of Budget
and Management from disbursing funds for said plebiscite. Lastly, he
prays for the issuance of a preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order, through a motion we duly noted.

Petitioner bases his petition on the following grounds:

"a) R.A. No. 8535 failed to conform to the criteria established by the
Local Government Code particularly, Sections 7, 11(a) and 450(a), as to
the requirements of income, population and land area; seat of
government; and no adverse effect to being a city of Quezon City,
respectively, and its Implementing Rules as provided in Article 11(b)(1)
and (2), as to furnishing a copy of the Quezon City Council of barangay
resolution; and

b) The said law will in effect amend the Constitution." [1]

Petitioner asserts that certifications as to income, population, and land
area were not presented to Congress during the deliberations that led to
the passage of R.A. No. 8535. This, he argues, is clear from the minutes
of the public hearings conducted by the Senate Committee on Local
Government on the proposed charter of the City of Novaliches. Petitioner
particularly cites its hearings held on October 3 and 27, 1997. He is
silent, however, on the hearings held by the appropriate Committee in
the House of Representatives.
Likewise, petitioner points out that there is no certification attesting to
the fact that the mother local government unit, Quezon City, would not
be adversely affected by the creation of the City of Novaliches, in terms of
income, population, and land area.

In their Comment, respondents through the Office of the Solicitor

General, traversed all the allegations of petitioner. They claimed he failed
to substantiate said allegations with convincing proof. In their
memorandum, respondents argued that petitioner had the burden of
proof to overcome the legal presumption that Congress considered all
the legal requirements under the Local Government Code of 1991 in
passing R.A. 8535. Further, respondents stated that the petition itself is
devoid of any pertinent document supporting petitioner's claim that R.A.
8535 is unconstitutional. Respondents pray that the present petition be
dismissed for lack of merit.

In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union,[2] we had occasion to

stress that:

"All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who

attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity
beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship does not
render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived
which supports the statute, it will be upheld, and the challenger must
negate all possible bases; that the courts are not concerned with the
wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; and that a liberal
interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of
legislation should be adopted."[3]
Every statute is presumed valid.[4] Every law is presumed to have passed
through regular congressional processes.[5] A person asserting the
contrary has the burden of proving his allegations clearly and
unmistakably. Having this in mind, we now proceed to examine whether
or not petitioner was able to successfully overcome the presumption of
validity accorded R.A. No. 8535.

The Local Government Code of 1991 provides under Section 7:

"SECTION 7. Creation and Conversion. As a general rule, the creation of

a local government unit or its conversion from one level to another level
shall be based on verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity
to provide services, to wit:
(a) Income. It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to
provide for all essential government facilities and services and special
functions commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of
the local government unit concerned;

(b) Population. It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants

within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned;
and

(c) Land Area. It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two or more

islands or is separated by a local government unit independent of the
others; properly identified by metes and bounds with technical
descriptions; and sufficient to provide for such basic services and
facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.

Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the

Department of Finance (DOF), the National Statistics Office (NSO), and
the Land Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR).
Corollarily, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Code provide in
Article 11:

ART. 11. Cities. (a) Requisites for creation A city shall not be created

unless the following requisites on income and either population or land
area are present:
Income an average annual income of not less than Twenty Million
Pesos (P20,000,000.00), for the immediately preceding two (2)
consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by DOF.
(1)
The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the
general fund, exclusive of special funds, special accounts, transfers,
and nonrecurring income; and
(2 Population or land area Population which shall not be less than one
) hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the
NSO; or land area which must be contiguous with an area of at least
one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by LMB. The
territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more
islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not
contribute to the income of the province. The land area requirement
shall not apply where the proposed city is composed of one (1) or
more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a city sought to be created
shall be properly identified by metes and bounds.
The creation of a new city shall not reduce the land area, population,
 and income of the original LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation
to less than the prescribed minimum requirements. All expenses
incidental to the creation shall be borne by the petitioners."
Petitioner argues that no certifications attesting compliance with the
foregoing requirements were submitted to Congress, citing in particular
public hearings held by the Senate Committee on Local Government.

However, we note that the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 8535
originated in the House of Representatives. Its principal sponsor is Cong.
Dante Liban of Quezon City. Petitioner did not present any proof, but
only allegations, that no certifications were submitted to
the House Committee on Local Government, as is the usual practice in
this regard. Allegations, without more, cannot substitute for proof. The
presumption stands that the law passed by Congress, based on the bill of
Cong. Liban, had complied with all the requisites therefor.

Moreover, present during the public hearings held by the Senate

Committee on Local Government were resource persons from the
different government offices like National Statistics Office, Bureau of
Local Government Finance, Land Management Bureau, and Department
of Budget and Management, aside from officials of Quezon City itself.

The representative from the Bureau of Local Government Finance

estimated the combined average annual income of the 13 barangays [6] for
the years 1995 and 1996 to be around P26,952,128.26. [7] Under the Local
Government Code, a proposed city must have an average annual income
of only at least P20,000,000.00 for the immediately preceding two
years. The representative from the NSO estimated the population in the
barangays that would comprise the proposed City of Novaliches to be
around 347,310.[8] This figure is more than the 150,000 required by the
Implementing Rules. There is no need to consider the land area, given
these figures, since under the Local Government Code, the proposed city
must comply with requirements as regards income and
population or land area. Other than the income requirement, the
proposed city must have the requisite number of inhabitants or land
area. Compliance with either requirement, in addition to income, is
sufficient. Judicial notice may also be taken that Novaliches is now
highly urbanized.

Petitioner avers that the oral manifestation made by the representatives

of government offices is not enough certification. But respondents reply
that in the hearings, particularly by the Local Government Committee
headed by Senator Sotto, on October 3 and 27, 1997, the DBM, DILG,
and Finance Officials were present along with other officers armed with
official statistics and reference materials. In their official capacity, they
spoke and shed light on population, land area and income of the
proposed city. Their official statements could serve the same purpose
contemplated by law requiring certificates. Their affirmation as well as
their oath as witnesses in open session of either the Senate or the House
of Representatives give even greater solemnity than a certification
submitted to either chamber routinely.

Moreover, petitioner failed to show that, aside from the oral declarations
during the public hearings, the representatives present did not also
submit written certifications. Note that under the Implementing Rules,
written certifications are required to be attached to the petition for the
creation of a city, to be submitted by interested municipalities or
barangays to Congress in the form of a resolution. Petitioner, however,
did not even bother to present a copy of said petition if only to prove that
it was without the written certifications attached as required by law. We
are thus constrained to presume, as respondents urge, that these
requirements were met appropriately in the passage of the assailed
legislative act.

Petitioner then argues that R.A. No. 8535 failed to specify the seat of
government of the proposed City of Novaliches as required under Section
11(a) of the Local Government Code:

"SECTION 11. Selection and Transfer of Local Government Site, Offices,

and Facilities. (a) The law or ordinance creating or merging local
government units shall specify the seat of government from where
governmental and corporate service shall be delivered. In selecting said
site, factors relating to geographical centrality, accessibility, availability
of transportation and communication facilities, drainage and sanitation,
development and economic progress, and other relevant considerations
shall be taken into account."
Indeed, a reading of R.A. No. 8535 will readily show that it does not
provide for a seat of government. However, this omission, to our mind, is
not as fatal to the validity of R.A. No. 8535 as petitioner makes it to be.
We agree with respondents that under Section 12 of the Local
Government Code, which applies to the proposed City of Novaliches by
virtue of Section 54 of R.A. No. 8535,[9] the City of Novaliches can still
establish a seat of government after its creation. For said Code already
provides as follows:
"SECTION 12. Government Centers. Provinces, cities, and municipalities
shall endeavor to establish a government center where offices, agencies,
or branches of the National Government, local government units, or
government-owned or controlled corporations may, as far as practicable,
be located. In designating such a center, the local government unit
concerned shall take into account the existing facilities of national and
local agencies and offices which may serve as the government center as
contemplated under this Section. The National Government, local
government unit or government-owned or controlled corporation
concerned shall bear the expenses for the construction of its buildings
and facilities in the government center."
While Section 12 speaks of the site of government centers, such site can
very well also be the seat of government, "from where governmental and
corporate service shall be delivered."[10]

With regard to the alleged adverse effect on Quezon City by the creation
of the City of Novaliches, petitioner again failed to present any concrete
evidence on this point. Quezon City Mayor Ismael Mathay, Jr., was
present during the deliberations of the Senate Committee on Local
Government, and made no mention of anything concerning such adverse
effects. As chief executive of Quezon City, Mayor Mathay would be the
first person to protest any development that might prove detrimental to
Quezon City. The fact that he did not raise any adverse issue during the
public hearings on R.A. No. 8535, stressing instead his concern on the
matter of inclusion of all Quezon City voters in the plebiscite that would
decide the fate of the City of Novaliches, is indicative of the non-
existence of such negative issues. Moreover, in the plebiscite as
contemplated on R.A. 8535, all persons concerned will obviously have
the opportunity to raise those issues even before they vote on the
principal question of the cityhood of Novaliches.

That the Quezon City Council was not furnished a copy of the petition of
concerned barangays calling for the creation of the City of Novaliches, if
true, will also not render invalid R.A. No. 8535. The evident purpose of
this requirement, found in the Implementing Rules, is to inform the City
Council of the move to create another city and to enable it to formulate
its comments and recommendations on said petition. The Quezon City
Council members are obviously aware of the petition. The matter has
been widely publicized in the mass media. Surely members of the
Quezon City Council, including petitioner, could not now be heard to
claim they have not known of the contents of the barangays' petition to
create the City of Novaliches.
The proposed creation of the City of Novaliches will in no way result in a
prohibited amendment of the Constitution, contrary to petitioner's
contention. The ordinance appended to the Constitution merely
apportions the seats of the House of Representatives to the different
legislative districts in the country. Nowhere does it provide that Metro
Manila shall forever be composed of only 17 cities and municipalities as
claimed by petitioner. Too literal a reading of the ordinance in or
appendix of the Constitution will only result in its erroneous
interpretation.

Clearly, from the foregoing considerations, petitioner has failed to

present clear and convincing proof to defeat the presumption of
constitutionality being enjoyed by R.A. No. 8535. Nor did he succeed to
convince the Court with substantial and persuasive legal reasons for us
to grant the reliefs he seeks.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,

Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago,
JJ., concur. Panganiban, J., in the result.

[1]
 Rollo, p. 233.
[2]
 59 SCRA 54 (1974).
[3]
 Id. at 66.
[4]
 Basco v. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52, 59 (1991); Peralta v. COMELEC, 82
SCRA 30 (1978).
[5]
 Tobias v. Abalos, 239 SCRA106, 111 (1994).
[6]
 Before the inclusion of Greater Lagro and North Fairview.
[7]
 Rollo, p. 129.
[8]
 Id. at 199.
[9]
 SEC. 54. Applicability of Laws. The provisions of Republic Act No.
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, other
laws pertaining to Quezon City, and such laws as are applicable to cities
shall govern the City of Novaliches insofar as they are not inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act.
[10]
 LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, Sec. 11(a).

by Jong Bong

MOISES S. SAMSON v. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, GR No. 133076, 1999-09-22

Facts:
President
President Fidel V. Ramos signed into law Republic Act No. 8535,... of Novaliches out of
15 barangays of Quezon City.
Moises S. Samson, incumbent councilor of the first district of Quezon City, is now before
the
Court challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8535.
also seeks to enjoin the Executive Secretary from ordering the implementation of R.A.
8535, the COMELEC from holding a plebiscite for the creation of the City of Novaliches,
and the Department of Budget and Management from disbursing funds for said
plebiscite.
prays for the issuance of a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, through
a motion we duly noted.
R.A. No. 8535 failed to conform to the criteria established by the Local Government
Code... as to the requirements of income, population and land area... seat of
government;... no adverse effect to being a city of Quezon
City, respectively... its Implementing Rules... as to furnishing a copy of the Quezon City
Council of barangay resolution... law will in effect amend the Constitution.
certifications as to income, population, and land area were not presented to Congress
during the deliberations that led to the passage of R.A. No. 8535... petitioner points out
that there is no certification attesting to the fact that the mother local government unit,
Quezon City, would not be adversely affected by the creation of the City of Novaliches,
in terms of income, population, and land area.
respondents... claimed he failed to substantiate said allegations with convincing proof.
argued that petitioner had the burden of proof... to overcome the legal presumption that
Congress considered all the legal requirements under the Local Government Code of
1991 in passing R.A. 8535.
petition itself is devoid of any pertinent document supporting petitioner's claim that R.A.
8535 is unconstitutional.
Issues:
whether or not petitioner was able to successfully overcome the presumption of validity
accorded R.A. No. 8535.
Ruling:
Petitioner did not present any proof, but only allegations, that no certifications were
submitted to the
House Committee on Local Government
Allegations, without more, cannot substitute for proof. The presumption stands that the
law passed by Congress, based on the bill of Cong. Liban, had complied with all the
requisites... therefor.
The representative from the NSO estimated the population in the barangays that would
comprise the proposed City of Novaliches to be around 347,310... more than the
150,000 required by the Implementing Rules.
no need to consider the land area, given these figures, since under the Local
Government Code, the proposed city must comply with requirements as regards income
and population... or land area.
Compliance with either requirement, in addition to income, is sufficient. Judicial notice
may also be taken that Novaliches is now highly... urbanized.
Principles:
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union
All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality... one who attacks a statute,
alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt;... courts
are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; and that a
liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of... the constitutionality of legislation
should be adopted."
Every statute is presumed valid.
Local Government Code of 1991 provides under Section 7... creation of a local
government unit or its conversion from one level to another level shall be based on
verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit
Income
Population
Land Area
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Code provide in Article 11
Requisites for creation A city
Income an average annual income of not less than Twenty Million Pesos... immediately
preceding two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices,... shall include the
income accruing to... the general fund, exclusive of special funds, special accounts,
transfers, and nonrecurring income;
Population or land area Population which shall not be less than one hundred fifty
thousand... inhabitants... territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more
islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income
of the province.
land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed city is composed of one (1) or
more... islands.
creation of a new city shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the
original LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less than the prescribed minimum
requirements
Aldaba vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188078, January 25, 2010

Facts: This case is an original action for Prohibition to declareunconstitutional,

R.A. 9591 which creates a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan.
Allegedly, the R.A. violates the minimum population requirement for the
creation of a legislative district in a city. Before the May 1, 2009, the province
of Bulacan was represented in Congress through 4 legislative districts. Before
the passage of the Act through House Bill 3162 (later converted to House Bill
3693) and Senate Bill 1986, Malolos City had a population of 223, 069 in 2007.

House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested to be issued to

Mayor Domingo (then Mayor of Malolos), by Region III Director Miranda of
NSO that the population of Malolos will be as projected, 254,030 by the year
2010. 

Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the

minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to meritrepresentative
in Congress.

Issue: Whether or not R.A. 9591, “Án act creating a legislative district for the
City of Malolos, Bulacan” is unconstitutional as petitioned. And whether the
City of Malolos has at least 250,000 actual or projected. 

Held: It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591

isunconstitutional for being violative of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution
on the grounds that, as required by the 1987 Constitution, a city must have at
least 250,000 population. In relation with this, Regional Director Miranda
issued a Certification which is based on the demographic projections, was
declared without legal effect because the Regional Director has no basis and no
authority to issue the Certification based on the following statements supported
by Section 6 of E.O. 135 as signed by President Fidel V. Ramos, which
provides:
The certification on demographic projection can be issued only if such are
declared official by the Nat’l Statistics Coordination Board. In this case, it was
not stated whether the document have been declared official by the NSCB.

The certification can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated
certifying officer, in which case, the Regional Director of Central Luzon NSO is
unauthorized.

The population projection must be as of the middle of the year, which in this
case, the Certification issued by Director Miranda was undated.

It was also computed that the correct figures using the growth rate, even if
compounded, the Malolos population of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will grow
to only 249,333 as of August 1, 2010. 

It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this Court ruled that the aim
of legislative reappointment is to equalize the population and voting power
among districts.
ALDABA VS. COMELEC
Jan. 25, 2010

Facts:
This is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional Republic Act No. 9591 (RA
9591), creating a legislative district for the city of Malolos, Bulacan, for violating the minimum
population requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city.

On 1 May 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos City Charter,2 by creating a separate
legislative district for the city. The population of Malolos City was 223,069. The population of
Malolos City on 1 May 2009 is a contested fact but there is no dispute that House Bill No. 3693
relied on an undated certification issued by a Regional Director of the National Statistics Office
(NSO) that “the projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year
2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000.”

Issue:
RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for
a city to merit representation in Congress as provided under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.

Held:
We grant the petition and declare RA 9591 unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5(3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution

Ruling:
YES. The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a legislative district, the city must have
“a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand.”

House Bill No. 3693 cites the undated Certification of Regional Director Alberto N. Miranda of
Region III of the National Statistics Office (NSO) as authority that the population of the City of
Malolos “will be 254,030 by the year 2010.” The Certification states that the population of
“Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is 175,291.” The Certification further states that it was
“issued upon the request of Mayor Danilo A. Domingo of the City of Malolos in connection with
the proposed creation of Malolos City as a lone congressional district of the Province of Bulacan.”

First, certifications on demographic projections can be issued only if such projections are
declared official by the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB). Second, certifications
based on demographic projections can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated
certifying officer. Third, intercensal population projections must be as of the middle of every
year.

Moreover, the Certification states that “the total population of Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1,
2000 is 175,291.” The Certification also states that the population growth rate of Malolos is 3.78%
per year between 1995 and 2000. Based on a growth rate of 3.78% per year, the population of
Malolos of 175,291 in 2000 will grow to only 241,550 in 2010.

Any population projection forming the basis for the creation of a legislative district must be based
on an official and credible source. That is why the OSG cited Executive Order No. 135, otherwise
the population projection would be unreliable or speculative.

629 Phil. 537

CARPIO, J.:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration of respondent Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) of the Decision dated 25 January 2010. [1]

The COMELEC grounds its motion on the singular reason, already

considered and rejected in the Decision, that Congress' reliance on the
Certification of Alberto N. Miranda (Miranda), Region III Director,
National Statistics Office (NSO), projecting Malolos City's population in
2010, is non-justiciable. The COMELEC also calls attention to the other
sources of Malolos City's population indicators as of 2007 (2007 Census
of Population - PMS 3 - Progress Enumeration Report [2]) and as of 2008
(Certification of the City of Malolos' Water District, dated 31 July 2008,
[3]
 and Certification of the Liga ng Barangay, dated 22 August 2008[4])
which Congress allegedly used in enacting Republic Act No. 9591 (RA
9591). The COMELEC extends its non-justiciability argument to these
materials.

We find no reason to grant the motion.

First. It will not do for the COMELEC to insist that the reliability and
authoritativeness of the population indicators Congress used in enacting
RA 9591 are non-justiciable. If laws creating legislative districts are
unquestionably within the ambit of this Court's judicial review power,
[5]
 then there is more reason to hold justiciable subsidiary questions
impacting on their constitutionality, such as their compliance with
a specific constitutional limitation under Section 5(3), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution that only cities with at least 250,000 constituents are
entitled to representation in Congress. To fulfill this obligation, the
Court, of necessity, must inquire into the authoritativeness and
reliability of the population indicators Congress used to comply with the
constitutional limitation. Thus, nearly five decades ago, we already
rejected claims of non-justiciability of an apportionment law alleged to
violate the constitutional requirement of proportional representation:

It is argued in the motion to reconsider, that since Republic Act 3040

improves existing conditions, this Court could perhaps, in the exercise of
judicial statesmanship, consider the question involved as purely political
and therefore non-justiciable. The overwhelming weight of
authority is that district apportionment laws are subject to
review by the courts[:]

The constitutionality of a legislative apportionment act is a judicial

question, and not one which the court cannot consider on the ground
that it is a political question.

It is well settled that the passage of apportionment acts is not so

exclusively within the political power of the legislature as to preclude a
court from inquiring into their constitutionality when the question is
properly brought before it.

It may be added in this connection, that the mere impact of the suit upon
the political situation does not render it political instead of judicial.

The alleged circumstance that this statute improves the

present set-up constitutes no excuse for approving a
transgression of constitutional limitations, because the end
does not justify the means. Furthermore, there is no reason to doubt
that, aware of the existing inequality of representation, and impelled by
its sense of duty, Congress will opportunely approve remedial legislation
in accord with the precepts of the Constitution.[6] (Emphasis supplied;
internal citations omitted)

To deny the Court the exercise of its judicial review power over RA 9591
is to contend that this Court has no power "to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government," a duty mandated under Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution. Indeed, if we subscribe to the COMELEC's theory, this
Court would be reduced to rubberstamping laws creating legislative
districts no matter how unreliable and non-authoritative the population
indicators Congress used to justify their creation. There can be no surer
way to render meaningless the limitation in Section 5(3), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution.[7]

Second. Under Executive Order No. 135 (EO 135), the population
indicators Congress used to measure Malolos City's compliance with the
constitutional limitation are unreliable and non-authoritative. On
Miranda's Certification, (that the "projected population of the [City] of
Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth
rate of 3.78[%] between 1995 and 2000"), this fell short of EO 135's
requirements that (a) for intercensal years, the certification should
be based on a set of demographic projections and estimates declared
official by the National Statistical and Coordination Board (NSCB); (b)
certifications on intercensal population estimates will be as of the
middle of every year; and (c) certifications based on projections or
estimates must be issued by the NSO Administrator or his designated
certifying officer. Further, using Miranda's own growth rate assumption
of 3.78%, Malolos City's population as of 1 August 2010 will only be
249,333, below the constitutional threshold of 250,000 (using as base
Malolos City's population as of 1 August 2007 which is 223,069). That
Miranda issued his Certification "by authority of the NSO administrator"
does not make the document reliable as it neither makes Miranda the
NSO Administrator's designated certifying officer nor cures the
Certification of its fatal defects for failing to use demographic
projections and estimates declared official by the NSCB or make the
projection as of the middle of 2010.

Nor are the 2007 Census of Population - PMS 3 - Progress Enumeration

Report, the Certification of the City of Malolos' Water District, dated 31
July 2008 and the Certification of the Liga ng Barangay, dated 22 August
2008, reliable because none of them qualifies as authoritative population
indicator under EO 135. The 2007 Census of Population - PMS 3 -
Progress Enumeration Report merely contains preliminary data on the
population census of Bulacan which were subsequently adjusted to
reflect actual population as indicated in the 2007 Census results
(showing Malolos City's population at 223,069). The COMELEC,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), adopts Malolos City's
claim that the 2007 census for Malolos City was "sloped to make it
appear that come Year 2010, the population count for Malolos would still
fall short of the constitutional requirement."[8] This unbecoming attack
by the government's chief counsel on the integrity of the processes of the
government's census authority has no place in our judicial system. The
OSG ought to know that absent convincing proof of so-called data
"sloping," the NSO enjoys the presumption of the regularity in the
performance of its functions.

The Certification of the City of Malolos' Water District fares no better.

EO 135 excludes from its ambit certifications from a public utility
gathered incidentally in the course of pursuing its business. To elevate
the water district's so-called population census to the level of credibility
NSO certifications enjoy is to render useless the existence of NSO. This
will allow population data incidentally gathered by electric, telephone,
sewage, and other utilities to enter into legislative processes even though
these private entities are not in the business of generating statistical data
and thus lack the scientific training, experience and competence to
handle, collate and process them.

Similarly, the Certification of the Liga ng Barangay is not authoritative

because much like the Malolos City Water District, the Liga ng Barangay
is not authorized to conduct population census, much less during off-
census years. The non-NSO entities EO 135 authorizes to conduct
population census are local government units (that is, province, city,
municipality or barangay) subject to the prior approval of the NSCB and
under the technical supervision of the NSO from planning to data
processing.[9]

By presenting these alternative population indicators with their widely

divergent population figures,[10] the COMELEC unwittingly highlighted
the danger of relying on non-NSO authorized certifications. EO 135's
stringent standards ensuring reliability of population census cannot be
diluted as these data lie at the core of crucial government decisions and,
in this case, the legislative function of enforcing the constitutional
mandate of creating congressional districts in cities with at least
250,000 constituents.

There can be no doubt on the applicability of EO 135 to test the

constitutionality of RA 9591. The COMELEC invoked EO 135 to convince
the Court of the credibility and authoritativeness of Miranda's certificate.
[11]
 It is hardly alien for the Court to adopt standards contained in a
parallel statute to fill gaps in the law in the absence of an express
prohibition.[12] Indeed, one is hard-pressed to find any distinction,
statistically speaking, on the reliability of an NSO certification of a city's
population for purposes of creating its legislative district and for
purposes of converting it to a highly-urbanized or an independent
component city.[13] Congress itself confirms the wisdom and relevance of
EO 135's paradigm of privileging NSO certifications by mandating that
compliance with the population requirement in the creation and
conversion of local government units shall be proved exclusively by an
NSO certification.[14] Unquestionably, representation in Congress is no
less important than the creation of local government units in enhancing
our democratic institutions, thus both processes should be subject to the
same stringent standards.

Third. Malolos City is entitled to representation in Congress only if,

before the 10 May 2010 elections, it breaches the 250,000 population
mark following the mandate in Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to
the 1987 Constitution that "any city whose population may hereafter
increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the
immediately following election to at least one Member." COMELEC
neither alleged nor proved that Malolos City is in compliance with
Section 3 of the Ordinance.

Fourth. Aside from failing to comply with Section 5(3), Article VI of the
Constitution on the population requirement, the creation by RA 9591
of a legislative district for Malolos City, carving the city from
the former First Legislative District, leaves the town of
Bulacan isolated from the rest of the geographic mass of that
district.[15] This contravenes the requirement in Section 5(3), Article VI
that each legislative district shall "comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory." It is
no argument to say, as the OSG does, that it was impracticable for
Congress to create a district with contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory because Malolos city lies at the center of the First Legislative
District. The geographic lay-out of the First Legislative District is not an
insuperable condition making compliance with Section 5(3)
impracticable. To adhere to the constitutional mandate, and thus
maintain fidelity to its purpose of ensuring efficient representation, the
practicable alternative for Congress was to include the municipality of
Bulacan in Malolos City's legislative district. Although unorthodox, the
resulting contiguous and compact district fulfills the constitutional
requirements of geographic unity and population floor, ensuring
efficient representation of the minimum mass of constituents.

WHEREFORE, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of

respondent Commission on Elections dated 22 February 2010
is DENIED WITH FINALITY. Let no further pleadings be allowed.
SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Carpio Morales, Brion, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr.,

Perez, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Corona, Nachura, Peralta, and Bersamin, JJ., joins the dissent of J.
Abad.
Velasco, Jr., J., no part due to relationship to a party.
Abad., J., adopted dissent on the main opinion.

[1]
 Malolos City's motion for leave to intervene and file a motion for
reconsideration was denied in the Resolution of 16 February 2010. The
COMELEC, in its Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, adopted as
its own the arguments raised in Malolos City's rejected motion for
reconsideration.
[2]
 Showing that as of 5 November 2007, Malolos City's population was
255,543.
[3]
 Stating that as of 31 July 2008, Malolos City's population was 281,413.
[4]
 Stating that as of 22 August 2008, Malolos City's population was
258,229.
[5]
 Macias v. COMELEC, No. L-18684, 14 September 1961, 3 SCRA 1.
[6]
 Id. at 7.
[7]
 Just recently, the Court, in the exercise of its judicial review power,
struck down a law creating a province for non-compliance with
population and land mass requirements under relevant legislation
(Navarro v. Ermita, G.R. No. 180050, 10 February 2010, declaring
unconstitutional Republic Act No. 9355 creating the province of Dinagat
Islands for non-compliance with Republic Act No. 7610).
[8]
 Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, p. 3.
[9]
 Section 6(e) of EO 135 provides:
(e) The smallest geographic area for which a certification on population
size may be issued will be the barangay for census population counts,
and the city or municipality for intercensal estimates. If an LGU wants
to conduct its own population census, during off-census years,
approval must be sought from the NSCB and the conduct must be under
the technical supervision of NSO from planning to data processing.
(Emphasis supplied)
[10]
 See notes 2-4.
[11]
 Malolos City invoked EO 135 for the same purpose in its Comment-in-
Intervention (pp. 11-12) which the Court did not admit.
[12]
 Thus, in Menzon v. Petilla, 274 Phil. 523 (1991), we applied by
analogy two statutory provisions to resolve the question of the validity of
a succession via a Presidential appointment, to fill a temporary vacancy
in a provincial legislative council: (1) Commonwealth Act No. 588 and
the Revised Administrative Code authorizing the President to make
temporary appointments in appointive positions; and (2) Section 49 of
Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160) governing succession
to permanent vacancies in the office of the vice-governor.
[13]
 Section 7, RA 7160.
[14]
 Section 7 of RA No. 7160 provides that in the creation or conversion of
a local government unit, compliance with the income, population and
land mass indicators "shall be attested to by the Department of Finance
(DOF), the National Statistics Office (NSO), and the Lands
Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR)," respectively.
[15]
 The municipality of Bulacan, one of the five municipalities comprising
the First Legislative District, is bounded on the northwest by Malolos
City, on the northeast by the Second Legislative District, on the southeast
by the fourth Legislative District, and on the northwest by the Manila
Bay. (Per the administrative map of the Province of Bulacan furnished
the Court by the National Mapping and Resource Information
Authority).

SENATOR BENIGNO C. AQUINO III V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010
Perez, J.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/189793.htm
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional legislative district for the province of Camarines
Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province. The
said law originated from House Bill No. 4264 and was signed into law by President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009.
To that effect, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to
create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities
of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the
second district Municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.
Petitioners claim that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716 violates the
constitutional standards that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand
( 250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Thus, the proposed first district will end up
with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

ISSUE:
Whether a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the
creation of a new legislative district in a province.

HELD:
NO. The second sentence of  Section 5 (3), Article VI of the constitution states that: “ Each
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative.”
There is a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one
hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For a province is entitled to
at least a representative, there is nothing mentioned about the population. Meanwhile, a city
must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.

It should be clearly read that Section 5(3) of the constitution requires a 250,000 minimum
population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.

Aquino III V. Comelec

Apr. 7, 2010

Issue:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners
Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo seek the nullification as
unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled “An Act Reapportioning the Composition of
the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and
Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment.”

Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009 creating an
additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first
and second legislative districts of the province.

The Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of 1,693,821,2 distributed
among four (4) legislative districts. Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first
and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional
legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan,
Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district
municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.

Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of
the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Petitioners rely on Section 5(3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum population standard.
The provision reads:
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative.

The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second
districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with
a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

Issue:
w/n a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a
new legislative district in a province?

Held:
We deny the petition.

Ruling:
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that
must compose a legislative district.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase “each city with a population
of at least two hundred fifty thousand” from the phrase “or each province” point to no other
conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for
a province.26
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a
province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus,
Section 461 of the Local Government Code states:

Requisites for Creation. –

(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department
of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant
prices and either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the
Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by
the National Statistics Office.

Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an

alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.

FACTS: Republic Act No. 9716 was signed into law by President Arroyo on 12
October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009, or fifteen (15) days following
its publication in the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation. In
substance, the said law created an additional legislative district for the
Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second
legislative districts of the province.

Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was estimated
to have a population of 1,693,821, distributed among four (4) legislative
districts.

Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second
districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional
legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of
Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined
with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new
second legislative district.

Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No.

9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a
minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation
of a legislative district.The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by
Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is
unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a
population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for
the cited 250,000 minimum population standard.

ISSUE: Is the population of 250,000 an indispensable

constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative
district in a province?
HELD: Yes, it is an indispensable constitutional requirement. The second
sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides:
"Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative."

The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a
city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on
the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with
nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population
minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.

The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or
each province" point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum
population is only required for a city, but not for a province.

Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a250,000 minimum

population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a
province. DISMISSED.

SECTION 6
BENGSON vs. HRET and CRUZ
G.R. No. 142840
May 7, 2001
FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view
of the constitutional requirement that “no person shall be a Member of the
House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.”
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in
1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine
Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an
oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino
citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which
Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a
Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, “rendering service
to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.”

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship

was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection
with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.

In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation

under RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine
Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To,
or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States
(1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd
District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner
Bengson who was then running for reelection.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with

respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a
member of the HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under
Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and
declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative in the said election.

ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American

citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
HELD: petition dismissed
YES
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the
same in the manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes
by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:

1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
**

Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their
citizenship due to:

1. desertion of the armed forces;

2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means

that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his
prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he
will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

R.A. No. 2630 provides:

Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering
service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United
States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States,
acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by
taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides
or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and
having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan
in accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have
recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he
acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the
act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status
before he lost his Philippine citizenship.

Facts: The citizenship of Teodoro Cruz, a member of the HOR, is being questioned on the ground that
he is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

Cruz was born in the Philippines in 1960, the time when the acquisition of citizenship rule was still jus
soli. However, he enlisted to the US Marine Corps and he was naturalized as US citizen in connection
therewith. He reacquired Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 and ran for and
was elected as a representative. When his nationality was questioned by petitioner, the HRET
decided that Cruz was a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Issue: WON Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Held: YES. Natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship." On the other hand, naturalized
citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under
Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the
former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an
applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications12 and none of the disqualification.

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation,
and (3) by direct act of Congress.

Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of
initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as
amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is
governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63.16 Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to
reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of the disqualification
mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship
due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World
War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time, (4) marriage of a
Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political economic necessity.

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking
of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil
Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On
the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he
will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed
Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A.
No. 2630.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in
the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent
Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he
acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him
to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship

ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner,

vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C.
CRUZ, respondents.

CONCURRING OPINION

DISSENTING OPINION

KAPUNAN, J.:
The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the
constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative
unless he is a natural-born citizen."1

Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente,
Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935
Constitution.2

On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps
and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the
United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act
No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering
service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision of
law reads:

SECTION 1. How citizenship may be lost. – A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in
any of the following ways and/or events:

xxx

(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed of a foreign
country: Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such
commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking of an oath of
allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not
divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the following circumstances is
present:

(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with
said foreign country; or

(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the
consent of the Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned,
at the time of rendering said service, or acceptance of said commission, and taking the
oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only in connection with his
service to said foreign country; And provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen who is
rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign country under
any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be Republic of the
Philippines during the period of his service to, or commission in, the armed forces of said
country. Upon his discharge from the service of the said foreign country, he shall be
automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and politically entitled to the full
enjoyment of his civil political rights as a Filipino citizen x x x.

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his
naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine
Corps.

On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation
under Republic Act No. 2630.3 He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second
District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin of 26,671
votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection. 1âwphi1.nêt

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of

Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to
become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as
required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution. 4
On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision 5 dismissing the petition for quo warranto and
declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May
1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision
in its resolution dated April 27, 2000.6

Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision on the
following grounds:

1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
excess of jurisdiction, when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being such in view of the loss and
renunciation of such citizenship on his part.

2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
excess of jurisdiction, when it considered private respondent as a citizen of the
Philippines despite the fact he did not validly acquire his Philippine citizenship.

3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid, the
HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of
jurisdiction, when it dismissed the petition despite the fact that such reacquisition could
not legally and constitutionally restore his natural-born status.7

The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an
American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship.

Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino
since he lost h is Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the United States in 1995,
and had to reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists that Article citizens are those who are
from birth with out having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.

Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as natural-born citizen
when he was repatriated since the phrase "from birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate,
inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.

The petition is without merit.

The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follow:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution;

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mother, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, and

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. 8

There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of
acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the
naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a
natural-born citizen thereof.9
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship." 10

On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through
naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by
Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the
qualifications12 and none of the disqualification13 provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The
decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its
promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1)
not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not
been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed
any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced
policies.14

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by
repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.15

Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode
of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No.
473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine
citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63. 16 Under this law, a former Filipino citizen
who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications 17 and none of
the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473. 18

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their
citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces;19 services in the armed forces of the allied
forces in World War II;20 (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other
time,21 (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; 22 and (5) political economic necessity.23

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the
taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the
Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.

In Angat v. Republic,24 we held:

xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the
person desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a
petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of
his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines. [Italics in the original. 25

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. 26 This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed
Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under
R.A. No. 2630, which provides:

Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or
accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from
the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire
 Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last
resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any
other citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the
same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited
provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born
citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. 27 It bears stressing that
the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his
Philippine citizenship.

Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to
perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its
decision, the term "natural-born citizen" was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973
Constitution as follows:

Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.

Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a
Filipino citizen birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his
Philippine citizenship.

Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which were
not considered natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January
17, 1973,38 of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine
citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not considered natural-born obviously because
they were not Filipino at birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those
born of Filipino mothers before the effectively of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not
considered natural-born because they also had to perform an act to perfect their Philippines
citizenship.

The present Constitution, however, now consider those born of Filipino mothers before the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
majority age as natural-born. After defining who re natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV
adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),
Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos
are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens
under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are
natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a
naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine
citizenship, necessarily is natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of
a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire
it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or
naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by
the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to
go through naturalization proceeding in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a
natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as
member of the House of Representatives.

A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House. 29 The
Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check "whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter. 30 In the
absence thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power and annul the
decision of the HRET nor to substitute the Court's judgement for that of the latter for the simple
reason that it is not the office of a petition for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the
assailed decision.31 There is no such showing of grave abuse of discretion in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, and JJ., concur.

Melo, Vitug, Mendoza, no part.

Panganiban, concurring opinion.

Quisumbing, Buena, De Leon, Jr., on leave.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, dissenting opinion.

Pardo, Gonzaga-Reyes, concur on this and the concurring opinion of J. Panganiban

Ynares-Santiago, certify majority opinion of J. Kapunan.

Footnote

1
 1987 Constitution, Article IV, Section 6.

2
 Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution states:

The following are citizens of the Philippines:

1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution;

2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution had been elected to public office in the Philippine
Islands;

3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines;

4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the
age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship; and

5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

3
 An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such
Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of
the United States (1960).

4
 Said provision reads:
 No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least
twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and except the party-list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and
a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding
the day of the election.

5
 Rollo, p. 36.

6
 Id., at 69.

7
 Id., at 13.

8
 Article IV, Section 1.

 TOLENTINO, COMMETARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE

9

PHILIPPINES 188, 1990 Ed.

10
 1987 Constitution, Article IV, Section 2.

11
 During the period under Martial Law declared by President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
thousands of aliens were naturalized by Presidential Decree where the screening of the
applicants was undertaken by special committee under Letter of Instructions No. 270,
dated April 11,1975, as amended.

12
 Section 2, Act 473 provides the following qualifications:

(a) He must be not less than 21 years of age on the day of the hearing of the
petition;

(b) He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less
than ten years;

(c) He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying
the Philippine Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines
in his relation with the constituted government and well as with the community in
which he is living;

(d) He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand
pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession,
or lawful occupation;

(e) He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any of the
principal languages; and

(f) He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public
schools or private schools recognized by the Bureau of Private Schools of the
Philippines where Philippine history, government and civic are taught or
prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of the
residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the learning of his petition for
naturalization as Philippine citizen.

13
 Section 4, Act 473, provides the following disqualifications:
 (a) He must not be opposed to organized government or affiliated with any
association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all
organized governments;

(b) He must not be defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence,

personal assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of their
ideas;

(c) He must not be polygamist or believer in the practice of polygamy;

(d) He must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude;

(e) He must not be suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious

diseases;

(f) He must have, during the period of his residence in the Philippines (of not less
than six months before filing his application), mingled socially with the Filipinos,
or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs,
traditions and ideal s of the Filipinos;

(g) He must not be a citizen or subject of a nation with whom the Philippines is at
war, during the period of such war;

(h) He must not be citizen or subject of foreign country whose laws do not grant
Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.

14
 Section 1, R.A. 530.

15
 Section 2, C.A. No. 63.

 An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or
16

Reacquired (1936).

17
 1. The applicant must have lost his original Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a
foreign country or by express renunciation of his citizenship (Sec. 1 [1] and [2], C.A. No.
63);

2. He must be at least twenty-one years of age and shall have resided in the Philippines
at least six months before he applies for naturalization (Sec. 3[1], C.A. No. 63);

3. He must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the
entire period of his residence (of at least six months prior to the filing of the application) in
the Philippines, in his relations with the constituted government as well as with the
community in which he is living (Sec. 3[2], C.A. No. 63);

4. He subscribes to an oath declaring his intention to renounce absolutely and

perpetually al faith and allegiance to the foreign authority, state or sovereignty of which
he was a citizen or subject (Sec. 3[3], C.A. No. 63).

18
 See note 13.

19
 Sec 4, C.a. No. 63.

20
 Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 965 (1953).
 21
 Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 2630 (1960).

22
 Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 8171 (1995).

23
 Ibid.

24
 314 SCRA 438 (1999)

25
 Id., at 450.

26
 Jovito R. Salonga, Private International Law, p. 165 (1995)

27
 See Art. IV, Sec. 1, 1935 Constitution.

28
 The date of effectivity of the 1973 Constitution.

29
 Article IV, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides thus:

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representative shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members three of whom shall be Justices of
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be Members of the Senate of the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be
its Chairman.

30
 Garcia vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 312 SCRA 353, 364 (1999).

EN BANC

G.R. No. 142840      May 7, 2001

ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner,

vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C.
CRUZ, respondents.

CONCURRING OPINION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

I concur in the ponencia of Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, holding that the House Electoral
Tribunal did not gravely abuse its discretion in ruling that Private Respondent Teodoro C. Cruz
remains a natural-born Filipino citizen and is eligible to continue being a member of Congress.
Let me just add a few points.

The Facts in Brief

It is undisputed that Congressman Cruz was born on April 27, 1960 in San Clemente, Tarlac, to
Filipino parents. He was, therefore, a Filipino citizen, pursuant to Section 1 (2), 1 Article IV of the
Constitution. Furthermore, not having done any act to acquire or perfect the Philippine
citizenship he obtained from birth, he was a natural-born Filipino citizen, in accordance
with Section 22 of the same Article IV.

It is not disputed either that private respondent rendered military service to the United States
Marine Corps from November 1958 to October 1993. On June 5, 1990, he was naturalized as an
American citizen, in connection with his US military service. Consequently, under Section 1
(4)3 of CA No. 63, he lost his Philippine citizenship.

Upon his discharge from the US Marine Corps, private respondent returned to the Philippines
and decided to regain his Filipino citizenship. Thus, on March 17, 1994, availing himself of the
benefits of Republic Act (RA) No. 2630, entitled "An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine
Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such by Rendering Service to, or Accepting Commission in,
the Armed Force of the United States,"4 Cruz took his oath of allegiance to the Republic and
registered the same with the Local Civil Registry of Mangatarem, Pangasinan. On the same day,
he also executed an Affidavit of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship.

Main Issue

The main question here is: Did the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) commit
grave abuse of discretion in holding that, by reason of his repatriation, Congressman Teodoro C.
Cruz had reverted to his original status as a natural-born citizen? I respectfully submit that the
answer is "No." In fact, I believe that the HRET was correct in its ruling.

1. Repatriation Is Recovery of Original Citizenship

First, repatriation is simply the recovery of original citizenship. Under Section 1 of RA 2630, a

person "who ha[s] lost his citizenship" may "reacquire" it by " taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines." Former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga, a noted authority on
the subject, explains this method more precisely in his treatise, Private International Law.5 He
defines repatriation as "the recovery of the original nationality upon fulfillment of certain
condition."6 Webster buttresses this definition by describing the ordinary or common usage
of repatriate, as "to restore or return to one's country of origin, allegiance, or citizenship; x x
x."7 In relation to our subject matter, repatriation, then, means restoration of citizenship. It is not a
grant of a new citizenship, but a recovery of one's former or original citizenship.

To "reacquire" simply means "to get back as one's own again." 8 Ergo, since Cruz, prior to his
becoming a US citizen, was a natural-born Filipino citizen, he "reacquired" the same status upon
repatriation. To rule otherwise – that Cruz became a non-natural-born citizen – would not be
consistent whit the legal and ordinary meaning of repatriation. It would be akin to naturalization,
which is the acquisition of a new citizenship. "New." Because it is not the same as the with which
he has previously been endowed.

In any case, "the leaning, in questions of citizenship, should always be in favor of [its] claimant x
x x."9 Accordingly, the same should be construed in favor of private respondent, who claims to be
a natural-born citizen.

2. Not Being Naturalized, Respondent Is Natural Born

Second, under the present Constitution, private respondent should be deemed natural-born,

because was not naturalized. Let me explain.
There are generally two classes of citizens: (1) natural-born citizens and (2) naturalized
citizens.10 While CA 63 provides that citizenship may also be acquired by direct act of the
Legislature, I believe that those who do become citizens through such procedure would properly
fall under the second category (naturalized). 11

Naturalized citizens are former aliens or foreigners who had to undergo a rigid procedure, in
which they had to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that they possessed all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications provided by law in order to become Filipino citizens. In contrast,
as stated in the early case Roa v. Collector of Customs,12 a natural-born citizen is a citizen "who
has become such at the moment of his birth."

The assailed HRET Decision, penned by Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, explains clearly who
are considered natural-born Filipino citizens. He traces the concept as first defined in Article III of
the 1973 Constitution, which simply provided as follows:

"Sec 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship."

Under the above definition, there are two requisites in order that a Filipino citizen may be
considered "natural-born": (1) one must be a citizen of the Philippines from birth, and (2) one
does not have to do anything to acquire or perfect one's Philippine citizenship. 13 Thus, under the
1973 Constitution, excluded from the class of "natural-born citizens" were (1) those who were
naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching
the age of majority, elected Philippine citizenship. 14

The present Constitution, however, has expanded the scope of natural-born citizens to include
"[t]hose who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof,"
meaning those covered under class (2) above. Consequently, only naturalized Filipino citizens
are not considered natural-born citizens. Premising therefrom, respondent – being clearly and
concededly not naturalized – is, therefore, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. 15

With respect to repatriates, since the Constitution does not classify them separately, they
naturally reacquire their original classification before the loss of their Philippine citizenship. In the
case of Congressman Teodoro C. Cruz, upon his repatriation in1994, he reacquired his lost
citizenship. In other words, he regained his original status as a natural-born Filipino citizen,
nothing less.

3. No Grave Abuse of Discretion on the Part of HRET

Third, the HRET did not abuse, much less gravely abuse, its discretion in holding that
Respondent Cruz is a natural-born Filipino citizen who is qualified to be a member of Congress. I
stress that the Court, in this certiorari proceeding before us, is limited to determining whether the
HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing
its assailed Decision. The Court has no power to reverse or modify HRET's rulings, simply
because it differs in its perception of controversies. It cannot substitute its discretion for that of
HRET, an independent, constitutional body with its own specific mandate.

The Constitution explicitly states that the respective Electoral Tribunals of the chambers of
Congress "shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications their respective members."16 In several cases,17 this Court has held that the
power and the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals are original and exclusive, as if they
remained in the legislature, a coequal branch of government. Their judgment are beyond judicial
interference, unless rendered without or in excess of their jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion.18 In the elegant words of Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez Jr.:19
 "The Court does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of
independent branches of the Government. It comes in only when it has to vindicate a
denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less
than the Constitution calls for remedial action."

True, there is no settled judicial doctrine on the exact effect of repatriation. But, as earlier
explained, the legal and common definition of repatriation is the reacquisition of
the former citizenship. How then can the HRET be rebuked with grave abuse of discretion? At
best, I can concede that the legal definition is not judicially settled or is even doubtful. But
an interpretation made in good faith and grounded o reason one way or the other cannot be the
source of grave abuse amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The HRET did not violate the
Constitution or the law or any settled judicial doctrine. It was definitely acting within its exclusive
domain.

Be it remembered that our Constitution vests upon the HRET the power to be the sole judge of
the qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, one of which is citizenship.
Absent any clear showing of a manifest violation of the Constitution or the law or nay judicial
decision, this Court cannot impute grave abuse of discretion to the HRET in the latter's actions
on matters over which full discretionary authority is lodged upon it by our fundamental law. 20 Even
assuming that we disagree with the conclusion of public respondent, we
cannot ipso facto attribute to it "grave abuse of discretion." Verily, there is a line between
perceived error and grave abuse. 21

By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. "It must be grave abuse
of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of
a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation
of law."22

That the HRET, after careful deliberation and purposeful study, voted 7 to 2 to issue its Decision
upholding the qualifications of Congressman Cruz could not in any wise be condemned as
gravely abusive. Neither can I find any "patent or gross" arbitrariness or despotism "by reason of
passion or hostility" in such exercise.

4. In Case of Doubt,  Popular Will Prevails

Fourth, the court has a solemn duty to uphold the clear and unmistakable mandate of the people.
It cannot supplant the sovereign will of the Second District of Pangasinan with fractured legalism.
The people of the District have clearly spoken. They overwhelmingly and unequivocally voted for
private respondent to represent them in the House of Representatives. The votes that Cruz
garnered (80, 119) in the last elections were much more than those of all his opponents
combined (66, 182).23 In such instances, all possible doubts should be resolved in favor of the
winning candidate's eligibility; to rule otherwise would be to defeat the will of the people. 24

Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that in case of doubt, political laws must be
so constructed as to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the
ballot.25 Public interest and the sovereign will should, at all times, be the paramount
considerations in election controversies.26 For it would be better to err in favor of the people's
choice than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms. 27

"Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in
order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a reversal
of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a
manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to
cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully
challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrative that the
ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such
ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create
greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution
and laws so zealously protect and promote."28

5. Current Trend Towards Globalization

Fifth, the current trend, economically as well as politically, is towards globalization. 29 Protectionist

barriers dismantled. Whereas, in the past, governments frowned upon the opening of their doors
to aliens who wanted to enjoy the same privileges as their citizens, the current era is adopting a
more liberal perspective. No longer are applicants for citizenship eyed with the suspicion that
they merely want to exploit local resources for themselves. They are now being considered
potential sources of developmental skills, know-how and capital. 1âwphi1.nêt

More so should our government open its doors to former Filipinos, like Congressman Cruz, who
want to rejoin the Filipino community as citizens again. They are not "aliens" in the true sense of
the law. They are actually Filipino by blood, by origin and by culture, who want to reacquire their
former citizenship.

It cannot be denied that most Filipinos go abroad and apply for naturalization in foreign countries,
because of the great economic or social opportunities there. Hence, we should welcome former
Filipino citizens desirous of not simply returning to the country or regaining Philippine citizenship,
but of serving the Filipino people as well. One of these admirable Filipino is private respondent
who, in only a year after being absent from the Philippines for about eight (8) years, was already
voted municipal mayor of Mangatarem, Pangasinan. And after serving as such for just one term,
he was overwhelmingly chosen by the people to be their representative in Congress.

I reiterate, the people have spoken. Let not a restrictive and parochial interpretation of the law
bar the sovereign will. Let not grave abuse be imputed on the legitimate exercise of HRET's
prerogatives.

WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition.

Footnote

1
 "Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

x x x      x x x      x x x"

2
 "Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. x x x."

3
 "Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. – A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in
any of the following ways and/or events:

x x x      x x x      x x x"

(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a
foreign country: x x x ."

4
 Sec. 1 thereof provides:
 "Sec. 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service
to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after
separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired U.S. citizenship,
may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines and registering the same with the Local Civil Registry in the
place where he resides of last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of
allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.

5
 1995 ed.

6
 Ibid., p. 165; cited in the assailed HRET Decision, p. 13. (Italics ours.)

7
 Webster's Third New International Dictionary: Unabridged, 1993 ed.

8
 Webster's, ibid., defines reacquire as "to acquire again", and acquire as "to get as one's
own."

 Roa v. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil 315, 338 (1912), per Trent, J.; citing Boyd v.

9

Thaye, 143 US 135.

 Ronaldo P. Ledesma, An Outline of Philippine Immigration and Citizenship Laws, 1999

10

ed., p. 354. See also 14 CJS S1, 1128; 3A Am Jur 2d aliens and Citizens, s1411.

11
 See Ledesma, ibid., p. 355.

12
 Supra.

13
 Assailed Decision, p. 8.

14
 Ibid.

15
 Ibid., p. 9.

16
 Sec.17, Art. IV. (Emphasis ours.)

 Lazatin v. HRET, 168 SCRA 391, December 8, 1988; Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the

17

House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, July 30, 1991; citing Angara v. Electoral

Commission, 63 Phil 139 (1936).

 Co v. HRET, ibid., citing Robles v. HRET, 181 SCRA 780, February 5, 1990;

18

and Morrero v Bocar, 66 Phil 429 (1938). See also Libanan v. HRET, 283 SCRA 520,
December 22, 1997.

19
 Co. v. HRET, ibid.

20
 Santiago v. Guingona Jr., 298 SCRA 756, November 18, 1998.

21
 Ibid.

22
 Tañada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997, per Panganiban, J.

23
 "The following were the results of the election:
 Teodoro C. Cruz 80,119

Antonio E. Bengson III 53,448

Alberto B. Zamuco 11,941

Manuel R. Castro 622

Mariano A. Padlan 171"

(HRET Decision, pp. 2-3; rollo, pp. 37-38.)

24
 Sinaca v. Mula, 315 SCRA 266, September 27, 1999.

25
 Frivaldo v. Comelec, 257 SCRA 727, June 28, 1996; per Panganiban, J.

26
 Olondriz v. Comelec, 313 SCRA 128, August 25, 1999.

27
 Frivaldo v. Comelec, supra.

28
 Ibid

 See Pacifico A. Agabin, "Globalization and the Judicial Function," Odysey and Legacy:
29

The Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa Centennial Lecture Series, complied and edited by
Atty. Antonio M. Eliciano, published by the Supreme Court Printing Services, 1998
ed. See also Artenio V. Panganiban, "Old Doctrines and New Paradigms," a lecture
delivered during the Supreme Court Centenary Lecture Series, on February 13, 2001.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 142840      May 7, 2001

ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner,

vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C.
CRUZ, respondents.

DISSENTING OPINION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

With due respect, I disagree with the ponencia of Justice Santiago M. Kapunan. I am convinced
that private respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is not natural born citizen and, therefore, must be
disqualified as a member of Congress.

Who are natural-born citizens?

The laws on citizenship – its acquisition or loss, and the rights, privileges and immunities of
citizens – have given rise to some of the most disputations and visceral issues resolved by this
Court. The problem is taken up connection with the sovereign right of voters to choose their
representatives in Congress.

In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Antonio Bengson III asks this Court of Representative of
the Second District of Pangasinan because he does not posses the constitutional requirement of
being a natural-born citizen of this country. Respondent, on the other hand, insists that he is
qualified to be elected to Congress considering that by repatriation, he re-acquired his status as
a natural-born Filipino citizen.

Records show that Teodoro Cruz was born in the Philippines on April 27, 1960 to Filipino
parents, spouses Lamberto and Carmelita Cruz. On November 5, 1985, he enlisted in the United
States Armed Forces and served the United States Marine Corps. While in the service for almost
five years, he applied for naturalization with the US District Court of Northern District of California
and was issued his Certificate of Naturalization No. 14556793 as an American citizen. On
October 27, 1993, he was honorably discharged from the US Marine Corps. He then decided to
return to the Philippines.

Cruz availed of repatriation under R.A. No. 2630, an act providing for reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship by persons who lost such citizenship by rendering service to or accepting commission
in the Armed Forces of the United States. On March 17, 1994, he took his oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines. The oath was registered with the Local Civil Registry of
Mangatarem, Pangasinan. On the same date, he executed an Affidavit of Reacquisition of
Philippine Citizenship. Thus, on April 11, 1994, the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
ordered the cancellation of his Alien Certificate of Residence (ICR No. 286582) and issued him
an Identification Certificate.

The cancellation of his ACR and ICR was affirmed by the Justice Department. On January 18,
1995, the United States Embassy in Manila issued to him a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of
the United States.

In the local election of 1995, Cruz filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of Mangatarem,
Pangasinan, declaring himself to be a naturalized Filipino citizen. He won and served as mayor
for one term.

Thereafter, Cruz filed his certificate of candidacy for a seat in Congress, this time declaring
himself as a natural-born Filipino. Again, he won with a lead of 26,671 votes over candidate
Antonio Bengson, III.

On September 3, 1998, Cruz was proclaimed winner in the congressional race in the Second
District of Pangasinan.

Bengson then filed a petition for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with the House of Representative
Electoral not being a natural-born Filipino citizen when he filed his Certificate of Candidacy on
March 15, 1998, is not qualified to run as a member of the House of Representatives. That he
should be a natural-born citizen is a qualification mandated by Section 6, Article VI of the
Constitution which provides: "No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines."

After oral arguments and the submission by the parties of their respective memoranda and
supplemental memoranda, the HRET rendered a decision holding that Cruz reacquired his
natural-born citizenship upon his repatriation in 1994 and declaring him duly elected
representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections, thus:

"WHEREFORE, the petition for quo warranto is DISMISSED and Respondent Teodoro

C. Cruz is hereby DECLARED duly elected Representative of the Second District of
Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections.
 "As soon as this Decision becomes final and executory, let notices and copies thereof be
sent to the President of the Philippines; the House of Representatives, through the
Speaker, and the Commission on Audit, through its Chairman, pursuant to Rule 76 of the
1998 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Costs de oficio."

On March 13, 2000, Bengson filed a motion for reconsideration of the said Decision but the same
was denied by the HRET in Resolution No. 00-48.

Bengson now comes to us via a petition for certiorari assailing the HRET Decision on grounds
that:

"1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
excess of jurisdiction, when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being such in view of the loss and
renuciation of such citizenship on his part.

"2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
excess of jurisdiction, when it considered private respondent as a citizen of the
Philippines despite the fact that he did not validly acquire his Philippine citizenship.

"3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid,
the HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess
of despite the fact that such reacquisition could not legally and constitutionally restore his
natural-born status."

The sole issue raised in this petition is whether or not respondent Cruz was natural-born citizen
of the Philippines at the time of the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy for a seat in the House of
Representatives.

Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution1 provides:

"Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. xxx."

Petitioner and respondent present opposing interpretations of the phrase "from birth" contained
in the above provisions.

Petitioner contends that the phrase "from birth" indicates that citizenship must start at a definite
point and must be continuous, constant and without interruption. The Constitution does not
extend the privilege of reacquiring a natural-born citizen status to respondent, who at one time,
became an alien. His loss of citizenship carried with it the concomitant loss of all the benefits,
privileges and attributes of "natural-born" citizenship. When he reacquired his citizenship in 1994,
he had to comply with requirements for repatriation, thus effectively taking him out of the
constitutional definition of a natural-born Filipino. For his part, respondent maintains that the
phrase "from birth" refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a "natural-
born". Since he was born to Filipino from birth. His reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under
Republic Act No. 2630 results in his reacquisition of his inherent characteristic of being a natural-
born citizen.

For his part, respondent maintains that the phrase "from birth" refers to the innate, inherent and
inborn characteristic of being a "natural-born". Since he was born to Filipino parents, he has
been a natural-born Filipino from birth. His reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under Republic
Act No. 2630 results in his reacquisition of his inherent characteristic of being a natural-born
citizen.
The state of being a natural-born citizen has been regarded, not so much in its literal sense, but
more in its legal connotation.

The very first natural-born Filipinos did not acquire that status at birth. They were born as
Spanish subjects. In Roa vs. Collector of Customs,2 the Supreme Court traces the grant of
natural-born status from the Treaty of Paris, and the Acts of Congress of July 1, 1902 and March
23, 1912, which is a reenactment of Section 4 of the former with a proviso which reads:

"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not
come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other Insular possessions of the
United States and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who could
become citizens of the United State under the laws of the United State, if residing
therein."

It was further held therein that under the said provision, "every person born the 11 th of April, of
parents who were Spanish subjects on that date and who continued to reside in this country are
at the moment of their birth ipso facto citizens of the Philippine Islands."

Under the April 7, 1900 Instructions of President William McKinley to the Second Philippine
Commission, considered as our first colonial charter of fundamental law, we were referred to as
"people of the Islands," or "inhabitants of the Philippine Islands," or "natives of the Islands" and
not as citizens, much less natural-born citizens. The first definition of "citizens of the Philippine
Islands" in our law is found in Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902. 3

Philippine citizenship, including the status of natural-born, was initially a loose or even non-
existent qualification. As a requirement for the exercise of certain rights and privileges, it became
a more strict and difficult status to achieve with the passing of the years.

Early decisions of the Supreme Court held that Philippine citizenship could be acquired under
either the jus sanguinis or jus soli doctrine.4

This liberal policy was applied even as the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law of the
Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 appear to have limited "citizens of the Philippine Islands" to
resident inhabitants who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899, their children born subsequent
thereto, and later, those naturalized according to law by the Philippine legislature. Only later
was jus sanguinis firmly applied and jus soli abandoned.

Hence, the status of being a natural-born citizen at its incipient is a privilege conferred by law
directly to those who intended, and actually continued, to belong to the Philippine Island. Even at
the time of its conception in the Philippines, such persons upon whom citizenship was conferred
did not have to do anything to acquire full citizenship. 5

Respondent wants us to believe that since he was natural-born Filipino at birth, having been born
in the Philippines to Filipino parents, he was automatically restored to that status when he
subsequently reacquired his citizenship after losing it.

Public respondent HRET affirmed respondent's position when it pronounced that the definition of
natural-born citizen in Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution refers to the classes of citizens
enumerated in Section 1 of the same Article, to wit:

"Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution;
 (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."

Thus , respondent HRET held that under the above enumeration, there are only two classes of
citizens, i.e., natural-born and naturalized. Since respondent Cruz is not a naturalized citizen,
then he is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

I do not agree. I reiterate that Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution defines natural-born
citizens as " those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."

Pursuant to R.A. No. 2630, quoted as follow:

"Republic Act No. 2630. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR REACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE

CITIZENSHIP BY PERSONS WHO LOST SUCH CITIZENSHIP BY RENDERING
SERVICE TO, OR ACCEPTING COMMISSION IN, THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
UNITED STATES, provides:

Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship be rendering service to, or
accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from
the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire
Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
and registering the same with the Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or
last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of
any other citizenship."

respondent Cruz had perform certain acts before he could again become a Filipino citizen. He
had to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and register his oath with the
Local Civil Registry of Mangatarum, Pangasinan. He had to renounce his American citizenship
and had to execute an affidavit of reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

Clearly, he did not reacquire his natural-born citizenship. The cardinal rule in the interpretation
and constitution of a constitution is to give effect to the intention of the framers and of the people
who adopted it. Words appearing in Constitution are used according to their plain, natural, and
usual significance and import and must be understood in the sense most obvious to the common
understanding of the people at the time of its adoption.

The provision on "natural-born citizens of the Philippines" is precise, clear and definite. Indeed,
neither HRET nor this Court can construe it other than what its plain meaning conveys. It is not
phrased in general language which may call for construction of what the words imply.

In J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration, 6 this Court held:

"Ascertainment of meaning of provisions of Constitution begins with the language of the

document itself. The words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary
meaning, except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance
thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it
being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's
consciousness, its language as much as possible, should be understood in the sense
they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be
 construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on
the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say."

The definition of a natural-born citizen in the Constitution must be applied to this petition
according to its natural sense.

Respondent HRET likewise ruled that the "reacquisition of Philippine citizenship through any of
these modes: (naturalization, repatriation and legislation under Section 3, C.A. No. 63) results in
the restoration of previous status, either as a natural-born or a naturalized citizen" is a simplistic
approach and tends to be misleading.

If citizenship is gained through naturalization, repatriation or legislation, the citizen concerned

can not be considered natural-born. Obviously, he has to perform certain acts to become a
citizen.

As expressed in the Dissent of Justice Jose C. Vitug7 in the instant case, concurred in by Justice
A.R. Melo:8

"Repatriation is the resumption or recovery of the original nationally upon the fulfillment of
certain conditions. While an applicant need not have to undergo the tedious and time
consuming process required by the Revised Naturalization Law (CA 473, s amended),
he, nevertheless, would still have to make an express and unequivocal act of formally
rejecting his adopted state and reaffirming his total and exclusive allegiance and loyalty
to the Republic of the Philippines. It bears emphasis that, to be of section 2, Article IV, of
the 1987 Constitution, one should not have to perform any act at all or go through any
process, judicial or administrative, to enable him to reacquire his citizenship. willoughby
opines that a natural-born citizen is one who is able to claim citizenship without any prior
declaration on his part of a desire to obtain such status. Under this view, the term 'natural
born' citizens could also cover those who have been collectively deemed citizens by
reason of the Treaty of Paris and the Philippine Bill of 1902 and those who have been
accorded by the 1935 Constitution to be Filipino citizens (those born in the Philippines of
alien parents who, before the adoption of the 1935 Constitution had been elected to
public office.)"

The two dissenting Justice correctly stated that the "stringent requirement of the Constitution is
so placed as to insure that only Filipino citizens with an absolute and permanent degree of
allegiance and loyalty shall be eligible for membership in Congress, the branch of the
government directly involved and given the dedicate task of legislation."

The dissenting opinion further states:

"The term 'natural-born' Filipino citizen, first constitutionally defined in the 1973 Charter,
later adopted by the 1987 Constitution, particularly in Section 2, Article IV thereof, is
meant to refer to those ' who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship,' and to those ' who elect Philippine
citizenship.' Time and again, the Supreme Court has declared that where the laws
speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation
or equivocation – there is only room for application. The phrase 'from birth indicates that
there is a starting point of his citizenship and this citizenship should be continuous,
constant and without interruption."

Thus, respondent is not eligible for election to Congress as the Constitution requires that a
member of the House of Representative must be a "natural-born citizen of the Philippines."

For sure, the framers of our Constitution intended to provide a more stringent citizenship
requirement for higher elective offices, including that of the office of a Congressman. Otherwise,
the Constitution should have simply provided that a candidate for such position can be merely a
citizen of the Philippines, as required of local elective officers.

The spirit of nationalism pervading the 1935 Constitution, the first charter framed and ratified by
the Filipino (even as the draft had to be approved by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt of the
United States) guide and governs the interpretation of Philippine citizenship and the more narrow
and bounden concept of being a natural-born citizen.

Under the 1935 costitution,9 the requirement of natural-born citizenship was applicable to the
President and Vice Persident. 10 A person who had been a citizen for only five (5) years could be
elected to the National Assembly.11 Only in 1940,12 when the first Constitution was amended did
natural-born citizenship become a requirement for Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives.13 A Filipino naturalized for at least five (5) years could still be appointed Justice
of the Supreme court or a Judge of a lower court. 14

The history of the Constitution shows that the meaning and application of the requirement of
being natural-born have become more narrow and qualified over the years.

Under the 1973 Constitution, 15 the President, members of the National Assembly, Prime
Minister, Justices of the Supreme Court, Judges of inferior courts, the chairmen and members of
the Constitutional Commission and the majority of members of the cabinet must be natural-born
citizens.16 The 1987 Constitution added the Ombudsman and his deputies and the members of
the Commission on Human Rights to those who must be natural-born citizens. 17

The questioned Decision of respondent HRET reverses the historical trend and clear intendment
of the Constitution. It shows a more liberal, if not a cavalier approach to the meaning and import
of natural born citizen and citizenship in general.

It bears stressing that we are tracing and enforcing a doctrine embodied in no less that the
constitution. Indeed, a deviation from the clear and constitutional definition of a "natural born
Filipino citizen" is a matter which can only be accomplished through a constitutional
amendment. Clearly respondent HRET gravely abused its discretion.

Respondent Cruz has availed himself of the procedure whereby his citizenship has been
restored. He can run for public office where natural-born citizenship is not mandated. But he
cannot be elected to high offices which the Constitution has reserved only for natural-born
Filipino citizens.

WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition. 1âwphi1.nêt

Footnote

1
 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.

2
 23 Phil 315 (1912).

3
 Section 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who
were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine
and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be
deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the
protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provision of the treaty of peace
 between the United States and Spain signed at Paris, December tenth, eighteen hundred
and ninety-eight.

 Roa vs. Collector of Customs, supra; Lim Teco vs. Collector, 24 Phil 84; (1913) United
4

State vs. Lim Bin, 36 Phil 924 (1917).

5
 Roa vs. Collector of Customs, ibid.

6
 31 SCRA 413 (1970).

7
 Member of the HRET.

8
 Chairman, ibid.

9
 This refers to the 1935 Constitution as adopted by the Philippine Constitution
Convention on February 8, 1935, signed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on March
23, 1935 and ratified by Filipino voters in a plebiscite held on May 14, 1935.

10
 Section 3, Article VIII. 1935 Constitution.

11
 Section 2, Article VI, ibid.

 The 1935 Constitution was amended by Resolution Numbered Seventy-three, adopted

12

by the Second National Assembly on the 11th day of April 1940, and approved by the
President of the United Sates on December 2, 940.

13
 Section 4 and 7, Article VI, 1935 Constitution, as amended.

14
 Section 6 and 8, Article VIII, ibid.

 This refers to the 1973 Constitution as approved by the Filipino people in a referendum
15

held between January 10, 1973 and January 15, 1973 and which became effective on
January 17, 1973.

 Section 2, Article VII; section 4, Article VIII; Section 3 and 4, Article IX; Section 3 (1)
16

and (2), Article X; Section 1 (1) Article XII-B, Section 1(1), Article XIII-C; Section 1(1)
Article XII-D, 1973 Constitution.

17
 Section 8, Article XI; and Section 17(2), Article XIII, 1987 Constitution

Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013

Petitioner: Regina Ongsiako Reyes

Respondents: Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and Joseph Socorro B.
Tan
Facts:
Petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of
Representative of the lone district of Marinduque. Respondent, a registered
 voter and resident of the Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before
the COMELEC a petition for the cancellation of petitioner’s COC. On October
31, 2012, the respondent filed the amended petition on the ground that the
petitioner’s COC contained material misrepresentations regarding the
petitioner’s marital status, residency, date of birth and citizenship.
Respondent alleged that the petitioner is an American citizen and filed in
February 8, 2013 a manifestation with motion to admit newly discovered
evidence and amended last exhibit.

On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution

cancelling the petitioner’s COC on the basis that petitioner is not a citizen of
the Philippines because of her failure to comply with the requirements of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9225.

The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 8, 2013. But on May
14, 2013 the COMELEC en banc promulgated a Resolution denying the
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.

On May 18, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013
elections and on June 5, 2013 took her oath of office before the Speaker of
House of Representatives. She has yet to assume office at noon of June 30,
2013.

On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued a Certificate of Finality

declaring the May 14, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC en banc final and
executory.

Petitioner then filed before the court Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC has the jurisdiction over the petitioner who is a
duly proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position
of member of the House of Representative.
2. Whether or not the COMELEC erred in its ruling that the petitioner is illegible
to run for office
Discussion:
1. Pursuant to Section 17, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution, the House of
Representative Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election returns and qualification of the members of House
of Representative.
2. In R.A 9925, for a respondent to reacquire Filipino citizenship and become
eligible for public office, the law requires that she must have accomplished the
following 1) take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the
consul-general of the Philippine Consulate in the USA, and 2) make a personal and
sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer authorized
to administer an oath. In the case at bar, there is no showing that petitioner complied
with the requirements. Petitioner’s oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot
be considered as the oath of allegiance in compliance with RA 9225. As to the issue of
residency, the court approved the ruling if the COMELEC that a Filipino citizen who
becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile of origin. Upon
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship, he must still show that he chose to establish his
domicile in the Philippines through positive acts, and the period of his residency shall
be counted from the time he made it his domicile of choice. In this case, there is no
showing that the petitioner reacquired her Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so
as to conclude  that the petitioner renounced her American citizenship, it follows that
she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA. Petitioner claim that she
served as Provincial Administrator of the province of Marinduque from January 18,
2011 to July 13, 2011 is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency for she has
never recognized her domicile in Marinduque as she remains to be an American
citizen. No amount of her stay in the said locality can substitute the fact that she has
not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.
Held:
The instant petition was DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the COMELEC.

G.R. No. 207264               June 25, 2013

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PEREZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante Order dated 7 June 2013 filed by petitioner Regina
Ongsiako Reyes, assailing the Resolutions dated 27 March 2013 and 14 May 2013 issued by
public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA No. 13-053. The assailed
Resolutions ordered the cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy of petitioner for the position
of Representative of the lone district of Marinduque.

On 31 October 2012, respondent Joseph Socorro Tan, a registered voter and resident of the
Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC an Amended Petition to Deny
Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner on the ground that it
contained material misrepresentations, specifically: (1) that she is single when she is married to
Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas of Batangas;1 (2) that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac,
Boac, Marinduque when she is a resident of Bauan, Batangas which is the residence of her
husband, and at the same time, when she is also a resident of 135 J.P. Rizal, Brgy. Milagrosa,
Quezon City as admitted in the Directory of Congressional Spouses of the House of
Representatives;2 (3) that her date of birth is 3 July 1964 when other documents show that her
birthdate is either 8 July 1959 or 3 July 1960;3 (4) that she is not a permanent resident of another
country when she is a permanent resident or an immigrant 4 of the United States of America;5 and
(5) that she is a Filipino citizen when she is, in fact, an American citizen. 6

In her Answer, petitioner countered that, while she is publicly known to be the wife of
Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas (Congressman Mandanas), there is no valid and binding
marriage between them. According to petitioner, although her marriage with Congressman
Mandanas was solemnized in a religious rite, it did not comply with certain formal requirements
prescribed by the Family Code, rendering it void ab initio. 7 Consequently, petitioner argues that
as she is not duty-bound to live with Congressman Mandanas, then his residence cannot be
attributed to her.8 As to her date of birth, the Certificate of Live Birth issued by the National
Statistics Office shows that it was on 3 July 1964. 9 Lastly, petitioner notes that the allegation that
she is a permanent resident and/or a citizen of the United States of America is not supported by
evidence.10

During the course of the proceedings, on 8 February 2013, respondent filed a "Manifestation with
Motion to Admit Newly Discovered Evidence and Amended List of Exhibits" 11 consisting of,
among others: (1) a copy of an article published on the internet on 8 January 2013 entitled
"Seeking and Finding the Truth about Regina O. Reyes" with an Affidavit of Identification and
Authenticity of Document executed by its author Eliseo J. Obligacion, which provides a database
record of the Bureau of Immigration indicating that petitioner is an American citizen and a holder
of a U.S. passport; (2) a Certification of Travel Records of petitioner, issued by Simeon Sanchez,
Acting Chief, Verification and Certification Unit of the Bureau of Immigration which indicates that
petitioner used a U.S. Passport in her various travels abroad.

On 27 March 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution 12 cancelling petitioner’s
COC, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Certificate of Candidacy of respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES is hereby CANCELLED.

The COMELEC First Division found that, contrary to the declarations that she made in her COC,
petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to comply with the requirements
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003,
namely: (1) to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; and (2) to make a
personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer authorized
to administer an oath. In addition, the COMELEC First Division ruled that she did not have the
oneyear residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. 13 Thus, she is
ineligible to run for the position of Representative for the lone district of Marinduque.

Not agreeing with the Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration14 on 8 April 2013 claiming that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and that she
has not lost such status by simply obtaining and using an American passport. Additionally,
petitioner surmised that the COMELEC First Division relied on the fact of her marriage to an
American citizen in concluding that she is a naturalized American citizen. Petitioner averred,
however, that such marriage only resulted into dual citizenship, thus there is no need for her to
fulfill the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225. Still, petitioner attached an Affidavit of
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship sworn to before a Notary Public on 24 September 2012. As
to her alleged lack of the one-year residency requirement prescribed by the Constitution, she
averred that, as she never became a naturalized citizen, she never lost her domicile of origin,
which is Boac, Marinduque.

On 14 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc, promulgated a Resolution 15 denying petitioner’s

Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.
Four days thereafter or on 18 May 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the 13 May 2013
Elections.

On 5 June 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality 16 declaring the 14 May
2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc final and executory, considering that more than
twenty-one (21) days have elapsed from the date of promulgation with no order issued by this
Court restraining its execution. 17

On same day, petitioner took her oath of office18 before Feliciano R. Belmonte Jr., Speaker of the
House of Representatives.

Petitioner has yet to assume office, the term of which officially starts at noon of 30 June 2013.

In the present Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante Order, petitioner raises the following issues: 19

31) Whether or not Respondent Comelec is without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is a
duly proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of
Member of the House of Representatives for the lone congressional district of
Marinduque.

32) Whether or not Respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it took cognizance of Respondent Tan’s alleged
"newly-discovered evidence" without the same having been testified on and offered and
admitted in evidence which became the basis for its Resolution of the case without giving
the petitioner the opportunity to question and present controverting evidence, in violation
of Petitioner’s right to due process of law.

33) Whether or not Respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it declared that Petitioner is not a Filipino citizen
and did not meet the residency requirement for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives.

34) Whether or not Respondent Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, by enforcing the provisions of
Republic Act No. 9225, it imposed additional qualifications to the qualifications of a
Member of the House of Representatives as enumerated in Section 6 of Article VI of the
1987 Constitution of the Philippines.

The petition must fail.

At the outset, it is observed that the issue of jurisdiction of respondent COMELEC vis-a-vis that
of House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) appears to be a non-issue. Petitioner is
taking an inconsistent, if not confusing, stance for while she seeks remedy before this Court, she
is asserting that it is the HRET which has jurisdiction over her. Thus, she posits that the issue on
her eligibility and qualifications to be a Member of the House of Representatives is best
discussed in another tribunal of competent jurisdiction. It appears then that petitioner’s recourse
to this Court was made only in an attempt to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing its final
and executory judgment in SPA No. 13-053.

Nevertheless, we pay due regard to the petition, and consider each of the issues raised by
petitioner. The need to do so, and at once, was highlighted during the discussion En Banc on 25
June 2013 where and when it was emphasized that the term of office of the Members of the
House of Representatives begins on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.
According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when she was duly
proclaimed20 because pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET has
the exclusive jurisdiction to be the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications" of the Members of the House of Representatives.

Contrary to petitioner’s claim, however, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction for the following
reasons:

First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s qualifications, as well
as over the assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a petition is duly filed with said tribunal.
Petitioner has not averred that she has filed such action.

Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of
the House of Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:

Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members. x x x

As held in Marcos v. COMELEC,21 the HRET does not have jurisdiction over a candidate who is
not a member of the House of Representatives, to wit:

As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s supposed assumption of jurisdiction over

the issue of petitioner’s qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that
HRET’s jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of
the House of Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it
is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question. (Emphasis supplied.)

The next inquiry, then, is when is a candidate considered a Member of the House of
Representatives?

In Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC,22 citing Aggabao v. COMELEC23 and Guerrero v.

COMELEC,24 the Court ruled that:

The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his
oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the
HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. (Emphasis supplied.)

This pronouncement was reiterated in the case of Limkaichong v. COMELEC, 25 wherein the
Court, referring to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC vis-a-vis the HRET, held that:

The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his
oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the
HRET's own jurisdiction begins. (Emphasis supplied.)

This was again affirmed in Gonzalez v. COMELEC,26 to wit:

After proclamation, taking of oath and assumption of office by Gonzalez, jurisdiction over the
matter of his qualifications, as well as questions regarding the conduct of election and contested
returns – were transferred to the HRET as the constitutional body created to pass upon the
same. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid
proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.

Indeed, in some cases, this Court has made the pronouncement that once a proclamation has
been made, COMELEC’s jurisdiction is already lost and, thus, its jurisdiction over contests
relating to elections, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
However, it must be noted that in these cases, the doctrinal pronouncement was made in the
context of a proclaimed candidate who had not only taken an oath of office, but who had also
assumed office.

For instance, in the case of Dimaporo v. COMELEC,27 the Court upheld the jurisdiction of the
HRET against that of the COMELEC only after the candidate had been proclaimed, taken his
oath of office before the Speaker of the House, and assumed the duties of a Congressman on 26
September 2007, or after the start of his term on 30 June 2007, to wit:

On October 8, 2007, private respondent Belmonte filed his comment in which he brought to Our
attention that on September 26, 2007, even before the issuance of the status quo ante order of
the Court, he had already been proclaimed by the PBOC as the duly elected Member of the
House of Representatives of the First Congressional District of Lanao del Norte. On that very
same day, he had taken his oath before Speaker of the House Jose de Venecia, Jr. and
assumed his duties accordingly.

In light of this development, jurisdiction over this case has already been transferred to the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). (Emphasis supplied.)

Apparently, the earlier cases were decided after the questioned candidate had already assumed
office, and hence, was already considered a Member of the House of Representatives, unlike in
the present case.

Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives because,
primarily, she has not yet assumed office. To repeat what has earlier been said, the term of office
of a Member of the House of Representatives begins only "at noon on the thirtieth day of June
next following their election."28 Thus, until such time, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction.

In her attempt to comply with the second requirement, petitioner attached a purported Oath Of
Office taken before Hon. Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 5 June 2013. However, this is not the oath of
office which confers membership to the House of Representatives.

Section 6, Rule II (Membership) of the Rules of the House of Representatives provides:

Section 6. Oath or Affirmation of Members. – Members shall take their oath or affirmation either
collectively or individually before the Speaker in open session.

Consequently, before there is a valid or official taking of the oath it must be made (1) before the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, and (2) in open session. Here, although she made the
oath before Speaker Belmonte, there is no indication that it was made during plenary or in open
session and, thus, it remains unclear whether the required oath of office was indeed complied
with.

More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy – that before the
proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally disposed
of the issue of petitioner’s lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its Resolution dated 14
May 2013. After 14 May 2013, there was, before the COMELEC, no longer any pending case on
petitioner’s qualifications to run for the position of Member of the House of Representative. We
will inexcusably disregard this fact if we accept the argument of the petitioner that the COMELEC
was ousted of jurisdiction when she was proclaimed, which was four days after the COMELEC
En Banc decision. The Board of Canvasser which proclaimed petitioner cannot by such act be
allowed to render nugatory a decision of the COMELEC En Banc which affirmed a decision of the
COMELEC First Division.

Indeed, the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC First Division which was promulgated on 27
March 2013, and the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc which was promulgated on
14 May 2013, became final and executory on 19 May 2013 based on Section 3, Rule 37 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides:

Section 3. Decisions Final after five days. Decisions in pre-proclamation cases and petitions to
deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy, to declare nuisance candidate or to
disqualify a candidate, and to postpone or suspend elections shall become final and executory
after the lapse of five (5) days from their promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court.

To prevent the assailed Resolution dated 14 May 2013 from becoming final and executory,
petitioner should have availed herself of Section 1, Rule 3729 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure or Rule 6430 of the Rules of Court by filing a petition before this Court within the 5-day
period, but she failed to do so. She would file the present last hour petition on 10 June 2013.
Hence, on 5 June 2013, respondent COMELEC rightly issued a Certificate of Finality.

As to the issue of whether petitioner failed to prove her Filipino citizenship, as well as her one-
year residency in Marinduque, suffice it to say that the COMELEC committed no grave abuse of
discretion in finding her ineligible for the position of Member of the House of Representatives.

Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took cognizance of
"newly-discovered evidence" without the same having been testified on and offered and admitted
in evidence. She assails the admission of the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the
photocopy of the Certification from the Bureau of Immigration. She likewise contends that there
was a violation of her right to due process of law because she was not given the opportunity to
question and present controverting evidence.

Her contentions are incorrect.

It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules of
procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure "shall be liberally construed in order x xx to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission." In
view of the fact that the proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of
candidacy are summary in nature, then the "newly discovered evidence" was properly admitted
by respondent COMELEC.

Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was given every
opportunity to argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October 2012 when Tan’s petition
was filed up to 27 March 2013 when the First Division rendered its resolution, petitioner had a
period of five (5) months to adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of the
opportunity given her.

Also, in administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party be given
the opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v. COMELEC: 31

The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not necessarily mean or require a
hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal
presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and predictable than oral
argument, through pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated
with due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be
successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for
reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied)

As to the ruling that petitioner is ineligible to run for office on the ground of citizenship, the
COMELEC First Division, discoursed as follows:

"x x x for respondent to reacquire her Filipino citizenship and become eligible for public office, the
law requires that she must have accomplished the following acts: (1) take the oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines before the Consul-General of the Philippine Consulate in the
USA; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath.

In the case at bar, there is no showing that respondent complied with the aforesaid requirements.
Early on in the proceeding, respondent hammered on petitioner’s lack of proof regarding her
American citizenship, contending that it is petitioner’s burden to present a case. She, however,
specifically denied that she has become either a permanent resident or naturalized citizen of the
USA.

Due to petitioner’s submission of newly-discovered evidence thru a Manifestation dated February

7, 2013, however, establishing the fact that respondent is a holder of an American passport
which she continues to use until June 30, 2012, petitioner was able to substantiate his
allegations. The burden now shifts to respondent to present substantial evidence to prove
otherwise. This, the respondent utterly failed to do, leading to the conclusion inevitable that
respondent falsely misrepresented in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Unless
and until she can establish that she had availed of the privileges of RA 9225 by becoming a dual
Filipino-American citizen, and thereafter, made a valid sworn renunciation of her American
citizenship, she remains to be an American citizen and is, therefore, ineligible to run for and hold
any elective public office in the Philippines."32 (Emphasis supplied.)

Let us look into the events that led to this petition: In moving for the cancellation of petitioner’s
COC, respondent submitted records of the Bureau of Immigration showing that petitioner is a
holder of a US passport, and that her status is that of a "balikbayan." At this point, the burden of
proof shifted to petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino
citizen and has not lost the same, or that she has reacquired such status in accordance with the
provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the bare allegation that she is a natural-born citizen,
however, petitioner submitted no proof to support such contention. Neither did she submit any
proof as to the inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to her.

Notably, in her Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc, petitioner admitted
that she is a holder of a US passport, but she averred that she is only a dual Filipino-American
citizen, thus the requirements of R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to her. 33 Still, attached to the said
motion is an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship dated 24 September
2012.34 Petitioner explains that she attached said Affidavit "if only to show her desire and zeal to
serve the people and to comply with rules, even as a superfluity." 35 We cannot, however,
subscribe to petitioner’s explanation. If petitioner executed said Affidavit "if only to comply with
the rules," then it is an admission that R.A. No. 9225 applies to her. Petitioner cannot claim that
she executed it to address the observations by the COMELEC as the assailed Resolutions were
promulgated only in 2013, while the Affidavit was executed in September 2012.

Moreover, in the present petition, petitioner added a footnote to her oath of office as Provincial
Administrator, to this effect: "This does not mean that Petitioner did not, prior to her taking her
oath of office as Provincial Administrator, take her oath of allegiance for purposes of reacquisition
of natural-born Filipino status, which she reserves to present in the proper proceeding. The
reference to the taking of oath of office is in order to make reference to what is already part of the
records and evidence in the present case and to avoid injecting into the records evidence on
matters of fact that was not previously passed upon by Respondent COMELEC." 36 This
statement raises a lot of questions – Did petitioner execute an oath of allegiance for re-
acquisition of natural-born Filipino status? If she did, why did she not present it at the earliest
opportunity before the COMELEC? And is this an admission that she has indeed lost her natural-
born Filipino status?

To cover-up her apparent lack of an oath of allegiance as required by R.A. No. 9225, petitioner
contends that, since she took her oath of allegiance in connection with her appointment as
Provincial Administrator of Marinduque, she is deemed to have reacquired her status as a
natural-born Filipino citizen.

This contention is misplaced. For one, this issue is being presented for the first time before this
Court, as it was never raised before the COMELEC. For another, said oath of allegiance cannot
be considered compliance with Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 9225 as certain requirements have to be met
as prescribed by Memorandum Circular No. AFF-04-01, otherwise known as the Rules
Governing Philippine Citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-05-
002 (Revised Rules) and Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004 issued by the Bureau of
Immigration. Thus, petitioner’s oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as
the oath of allegiance in compliance with R.A. No. 9225.

These circumstances, taken together, show that a doubt was clearly cast on petitioner’s
citizenship. Petitioner, however, failed to clear such doubt.

As to the issue of residency, proceeding from the finding that petitioner has lost her natural-born
status, we quote with approval the ruling of the COMELEC First Division that petitioner cannot be
considered a resident of Marinduque:

"Thus, a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile of
origin. Upon re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225, he must still show that he
chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines through positive acts, and the period of his
residency shall be counted from the time he made it his domicile of choice.

In this case, there is no showing whatsoever that petitioner had already re-acquired her Filipino
citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that she has regained her domicile in the
Philippines. There being no proof that petitioner had renounced her American citizenship, it
follows that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.

The only proof presented by petitioner to show that she has met the one-year residency
requirement of the law and never abandoned her domicile of origin in Boac, Marinduque is her
claim that she served as Provincial Administrator of the province from January 18, 2011 to July
13, 2011. But such fact alone is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency. For, petitioner has
never regained her domicile in Marinduque as she remains to be an American citizen. No amount
of her stay in the said locality can substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her domicile of
choice in the USA."37 (Emphasis supplied.)

All in all, considering that the petition for denial and cancellation of the COC is summary in
nature, the COMELEC is given much discretion in the evaluation and admission of evidence
pursuant to its principal objective of determining of whether or not the COC should be cancelled.
We held in Mastura v. COMELEC:38

The rule that factual findings of administrative bodies will not be disturbed by courts of justice
except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such
findings should be applied with greater force when it concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of
the Constitution intended to place the COMELEC — created and explicitly made independent by
the Constitution itself — on a level higher than statutory administrative organs. The COMELEC
has broad powers to ascertain the true results of the election by means available to it. For the
attainment of that end, it is not strictly bound by the rules of evidence.1âwphi1

Time and again, We emphasize that the "grave abuse of discretion" which warrants this Court’s
exercise of certiorari jurisdiction has a welldefined meaning. Guidance is found in Beluso v.
Commission on Elections39 where the Court held:

x x x A petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proved to
exist. "Grave abuse of discretion," under Rule 65, has a specific meaning. It is the arbitrary or
despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical,
arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a
positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down
as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and
gross. (Emphasis supplied.)

Here, this Court finds that petitioner failed to adequately and substantially show that grave abuse
of discretion exists.

Lastly, anent the proposition of petitioner that the act of the COMELEC in enforcing the
provisions of R.A. No. 9225, insofar as it adds to the qualifications of Members of the House of
Representatives other than those enumerated in the Constitution, is unconstitutional, We find the
same meritless.

The COMELEC did not impose additional qualifications on candidates for the House of
Representatives who have acquired foreign citizenship. It merely applied the qualifications
prescribed by Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that the candidate must be a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines and must have one-year residency prior to the date of elections.
Such being the case, the COMELEC did not err when it inquired into the compliance by petitioner
of Sections 3 and 5 of R.A. No. 9225 to determine if she reacquired her status as a natural-born
Filipino citizen. It simply applied the constitutional provision and nothing more.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections. The 14 May 2013 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Bane affirming the 27 March 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division is
upheld.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
ARTURO D. BRION
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
 (On official leave)
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

I joint the dissent of J. Brion No Part

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

No Part Due To Voluntary Inhibition

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

I join the dissent of J. Brion

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Resolution were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* On official leave.

1
 Rollo, p. 70.

2
 Id..

3
 Id. at 71.

4
 Respondent relies on the following facts: (a) [petitioner] was admitted to the California
State Bar on June 12, 1995; (b) [petitioner] maintained a US address and earned her
undergraduate studies in Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.; (c) [petitioner]
married an American citizen named Saturnino S. Ador Dionisio in 1997, which marriage
was subsequently dissolved; and (4) [petitioner] acquired properties and established
businesses in the U.S.; COMELEC Resolution dated 27 March 2013. Id. at 44.

5
 Id. at 71.
6
 Id. at 72.

7
 Id. at 84.

8
 Id. at 87.

9
 Id. at 93.

10
 Id. at 94.

11
 Id at 127-139.

12
 Id. at 40-51.

13
 Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-
five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a
registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a
period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.

14
 Id. at 140-157.

15
 Id. at 52-60.

16
 Id. at 163-165.

17
 Section 13, Rule 18 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure in relation to Par. 2,
Sec. 8 of Resolution No. 9523 provides that a decision or resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc in special actions and special cases shall become final and executory five (5) days
after its promulgation unless a restraining order is issued by the Supreme Court. Sec. 3,
Rule 37, Part VII also provides that decisions in petitions to deny due course to or cancel
certificates of candidacy shall become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days
from promulgation, unless restrained by the Supreme Court.

18
 Id. at 162.

19
 Id. at 9.

20
 Id.

21
 318 Phil. 329, 397 (1995).

22
 G.R. No. 172131, 2 April 2007, 520 SCRA 166, 179.

23
 G.R. No. 163756, 26 January 2005, 449 SCRA 400, 404-405.

24
 391 Phil. 344, 352 (2000).

25
 G.R. Nos. 179240-41, 1 April 2009, 583 SCRA 1, 33.

26
 G.R. No. 192856, 8 March 2011, 644 SCRA 761, 798-799.

27
 G.R. No. 179285, 11 February 2008, 544 SCRA 381, 390.
 28
 Section 7, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

 Section 1.Petition for Certiorari; and Time to File.—Unless otherwise provided by law,
29

or by any specific provisions in these Rules, any decision, order or ruling of the
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within thirty (30) days from its promulgation.

 Section 2.Mode of review.—A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission

30

on Elections and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party to the
Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided.

FACTS: This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the En Banc Resolution of

June 25, 2013 which found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Commission on Elections and affirmed the March 27, 2013 Resolution of the
COMELEC First Division.

Petitioner raised the issue in the petition which is: Whether or not Respondent
COMELEC is without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is duly proclaimed
winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of
Member of the House of Representatives for the lone congressional district of
Marinduque. Petitioner is a duly proclaimed winner and having taken her oath
of office as member of the House of Representatives, all questions regarding
her qualifications are outside the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and are within
the HRET exclusive jurisdiction.

The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner

submission.The crucial question is whether or not petitioner could be
proclaimed on May 18, 2013. Differently stated, was there basis for the
proclamation of petitioner on May 18 , 2013.

The June 25, 2013 resolution held that before May 18, 2013, the COMELEC En
Banc had already finally disposed of the issue of petitioner lack of Filipino
citizenship and residency via its resolution dated May 14, 2013, cancelling
petitioner certificate of candidacy. The proclamation which petitioner secured
on May 18, 2013 was without any basis. On June 10, 2013, petitioner went to
the Supreme Court questioning the COMELEC First Division ruling and the
May 14, 2013 COMELEC En Banc decision, baseless proclamation on 18 May
2013 did not by that fact of promulgation alone become valid and legal.
ISSUE: Was Reyes denied of due process?

HELD: Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion

when it took cognizance of "newly-discovered evidence" without the same
having been testified on and offered and admitted in evidence. She assails the
admission of the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the photocopy of
the Certification from the Bureau of Immigration. She likewise contends that
there was a violation of her right to due process of law because she was not
given the opportunity to question and present controverting evidence.
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to
the technical rules of procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section
2 of Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure "shall be liberally construed in
order to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and
disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission."
In view of the fact that the proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to
cancel certificate of candidacy are summary in nature, then the "newly
discovered evidence" was properly admitted by respondent COMELEC.

Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as

petitioner was given every opportunity to argue her case before the
COMELEC. From 10 October 2012 when Tan's petition was filed up to 27
March 2013 when the First Division rendered its resolution, petitioner had a
period of five (5) months to adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail
herself of the opportunity given her.

In administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the

party be given the opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the case of
Sahali v. COMELEC: The petitioners should be reminded that due process
does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or
right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also,
and perhaps many times more creditably and predictable than oral argument,
through pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot
be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed,
deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was
given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.

In moving for the cancellation of petitioner's COC, respondent submitted

records of the Bureau of Immigration showing that petitioner is a holder of a
US passport, and that her status is that of a "balikbayan." At this point, the
burden of proof shifted to petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to prove that
she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and has not lost the same, or that she has
re-acquired such status in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 9225.
Aside from the bare allegation that she is a natural-born citizen, however,
petitioner submitted no proof to support such contention. Neither did she
submit any proof as to the inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to her. DENIED.

SECTION 9
G.R. No. 113107

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

After the issues had been joined in these consolidated cases, the Court
resolved to give due course to the petitions therein and to decide the
cases on the merits. It can no longer allow the parties to delay these
cases. Their legal skirmishes, which have unduly magnified
uncomplicated issues, have effectively deprived the people of the Second
Legislative District of Northern Samar of representation in the House of
Representatives for more than two years now.
These cases are sequels to G.R. No. 105717, entitled "Jose L. Ong, Jr. vs.
Commission on Elections and Wilmar P. Lucero,"which we finally
resolved on 22 April 1993.[1] The petitioners were two of the five
candidates[2] for the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar in the
synchronized national and local elections held on 11 May 1992.
The canvass of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) of Northern
Samar credited Jose L. Ong, Jr. with 24,272 votes and Wilmar P. Lucero
with 24,068 votes, or a lead by Ong of 204 votes. However, this tally did
not include the results of Precinct No. 7 of the municipality of Silvino
Lobos, where the submitted election returns had not been canvassed
because they were illegible; of Precinct No. 13 of Silvino Lobos, where the
ballot boxes were snatched and no election was held; and of Precinct No.
16, also of Silvino Lobos, where all copies of the election returns were
missing.
On 22 May 1992, Lucero asked the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), in SPA No. 92-282, to:
"1. Forthwith order Respondent Provincial Board of Canvassers for
Northern Samar to suspend the proclamation of Private Respondent
Jose L. Ong, Jr.;
2. Direct Respondent Provincial Board of Canvassers for Northern
Samar to correct the Certificate of Canvass (CEF 20) for Las Navas and,
accordingly, to correct the total votes so far counted by it for Petitioner
from 24,068 to 24,088, thus reducing the margin it found in favor of
Private Respondent Jose L. Ong, Jr. from 204 to 184 votes only;
3. Order a special election in Precinct 13, Barangay Gusaran, Silvino
Lobos, pursuant to Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code;
4. Order a recount of the votes for Representative of the Second District
of Northern Samar in Precinct 16, Barangay Tubgon, and Precinct 7,
Barangay Camayaan, both of Silvino Lobos, pursuant to Section 234 of
the Omnibus Election Code;
5. Order a recount of the votes for Representative in the 52 precincts
herein above enumerated in order to correct 'manifest errors' pursuant
to Section 15 of Republic Act 7166 and for this purpose order the
impounding and safekeeping of the ballot boxes of all said precincts in
order to preserve the integrity of the ballots and other election
paraphernalia contained therein."[3]
On 2 June 1992, the COMELEC, acting on Lucero's urgent
manifestation, directed the PBC to desist from reconvening until further
orders.
On 8 June 1992, Ong moved to lift the suspension of the proceedings by
the PBC, which Lucero opposed on 10 June 1992 on the ground that the
canvass could not be completed even if the PBC were to reconvene
because no election was held in Precinct No. 13 (Barangay Gusaran) of
Silvino Lobos and there was no canvassing of the votes in Precinct No. 7
(Barangay Camayaan) and Precinct No. 16 (Barangay Tubgon) both of
Silvino Lobos.
On 13 June 1993, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"Accordingly, the Commission hereby orders the Provincial Election,
Supervisor of Northern Samar to bring to the Commission within three
(3) days from receipt hereof the ballot boxes from Precinct 7 and 16 of
Silvino Lobos, to be escorted by representatives from the petitioner and
the respondents as well as other parties who have an interest to protect,
and too notify said parties hereof. The Municipal Treasurer of said town
is directed to turn over custody of said ballot boxes to the Provincial
Election Supervisor, and the keys thereof shall likewise be turned over by
the appropriate officials in custody thereof to the PES, who shall in turn
give one key for each ballot box to the duly authorized representatives of
the petitioner and the respondent.
The Commission likewise orders the Election Registrar of Silvino Lobos,
Northern Samar, and the Chairman and members of the Boards of
Election Inspectors of Precincts 7 and 16 of said municipality to appear
before the Commission within three (3) days from receipt hereof."
Below the signatures of the Chairman and the six Commissioners,
however, Chairman Christian S. Monsod and Commissioners Haydee B.
Yorac, Dario C. Rama, and Regalado E. Maambong directed as follows:
"We vote in favor of this resolution except that portion which denied the
correction of the Certificate of Canvass for Las Navas. Correction of the
Certificate of Canvass for Las Navas is in order in view of the testimony
of the election registrar of Las Navas to the effect that Wilmar Lucero
garnered 2,537 votes for Las Navas and not 2,517. Petition for correction
was duly filed by Lucero with the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Northern Samar on May 19, 1992. The Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Northern Samar is therefore directed to retabulate the total number of
votes for Las Navas for Lucero and enter the same in the Provincial
Certificate of Canvass."[4]
On 15 June 1992, Lucero filed an urgent motion to constitute a Special
Board of Election Inspectors (SBEI) to count the votes of Precincts Nos.
7 and 16 of Silvino Lobos.[5]
On 20 June 1992, Ong, in a special civil action for certiorari filed with
this Court and subsequently docketed as G.R. No. 105717, questioned the
order for the recount of ballots in Precincts No. 7 and 16. Despite the
pendency of this petition, the COMELEC ordered the recount of the
ballots in Precinct No. 16 by a SBEI which recorded 43 votes for Lucero
and 2 votes for Ong.[6]
On 25 June 1992, this Court issued in G.R. No. 105717 a temporary
restraining order against the implementation by the COMELEC of its
Order of 2 June 1992 and its Resolution of 13 June 1992.
On 23 December 1992, this Court promulgated its decision in G.R. No.
105717,[7] the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and a writ of
preliminary injunction is hereby ISSUED directing the COMELEC to
CEASE and DESIST from implementing its order of June 2, 1992, and its
resolution dated June 13, 1992, and the same are hereby declared
NULLIFIED. Consequently, the election returns based on the recounted
ballots from Precinct 16 are hereby DISCARDED and in lieu thereof,
authentic returns from said precinct should instead be made a basis for
the canvassing. The Provincial Board of Canvassers of Northern Samar is
hereby directed to PROCEED WITH DISPATCH in the canvassing of
ballots until completed and to PROCLAIM the duly elected winner of the
congressional seat for the Second District of Northern Samar.
This decision is immediately executory."[8]
Acting on the motions for reconsideration and clarification respectively
filed by the COMELEC and Lucero, this Court, on 22 April 1993,
modified[9] its aforesaid disposition in G.R. No. 105717 as follows:
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the dispositive portion of the
December 23, 1992 Decision is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:
'WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS GRANTED. THE JUNE 2, 1992
ORDER OF RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS IN SPA NO.
92-282 IS HEREBY ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. ITS JUNE 13, 1992.
RESOLUTION THEREIN IS LIKEWISE ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE
INSOFAR AS IT AFFECTS PRECINCT NO. 7 OF SILVINO LOBOS, THE
RECOUNT OF VOTES IN THE 52 OTHER PRECINCTS AND THE
CORRECTION OF THE CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS OF LAS NAVAS,
BUT IS AFFIRMED WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUE OF HOLDING A
SPECIAL ELECTION IN PRECINCT NO. 13 AND THE RECOUNT OF
THE BALLOTS IN PRECINCT NO. 16.
THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS IS HEREBY
DIRECTED TO ASSIGN SPA NO. 92-282 TO ANY OF ITS DIVISIONS
PURSUANT TO ITS RULE ON RAFFLE OF CASES FOR IT TO
RESOLVE THE PRE-PROCLAMATION ISSUES THEREIN, TAKING
INTO ACCOUNT THE ABOVE PRONOUNCEMENTS AND THE
EXCEPTIONS PROVIDED FOR IN SECTION 15 OF R.A. NO. 7166.
WHENEVER WARRANTED BY THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE
COMMISSION MAY (A) CALL A SPECIAL ELECTION IN PRECINCT
NO. 13 OF SILVINO LOBOS, NORTHERN SAMAR, AND (B)
RECONVENE THE SPECIAL MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS
AND THE SPECIAL PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS IT HAD
EARLIER CONSTITUTED OR CREATE NEW ONES.
ALL THE FOREGOING SHOULD BE DONE WITH PURPOSEFUL
DISPATCH TO THE END THAT THE WINNING CANDIDATE FOR
CONGRESSMAN REPRESENTING THE SECOND CONGRESSIONAL
DISTRICT OF NORTHERN SAMAR MAY BE PROCLAIMED AS SOON
AS POSSIBLE.'"[10]
As to the certificate of canvass of the municipality of Las Navas, this
Court explicitly stated:
"The correction of the certificate of canvass of Las Navas is likewise in
order. Even though a pre-proclamation issue is involved, the Correction
of the manifest error is allowed under Section 15 of R.A. No. 7166." [11]
Conformably with the aforesaid modified judgment in G.R. No. 105717,
SPA No. 92-282 was raffled to the First Division of the COMELEC which
conducted hearings thereon and received the arguments and evidence of
both parties who then submitted their respective memoranda on 25 June
1994. However, during the consultations on the case by the Members of
the First Division, the concurrence of at least two of them could not be
obtained; accordingly, pursuant to the COMELEC Rules, the case was
elevated for proper disposition to the COMELEC en banc to which the
parties submitted their respective memoranda on 19 November 1993. [12]
On 7 January 1994, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a
resolution[13] whose dispositive portion reads as follows:
"1.  To direct the special Provincial Board of Canvassers for Northern
Samar (a) to include in the municipal certificate of canvass of Silvino
Lobos the forty-three (43) votes of petitioner Lucero and the two (2)
votes of private respondent Ong as reflected in the election returns of
Precinct No. 16 (Barangay Tubgon) prepared by the special Board of
Election Inspectors constituted by the Commission to recount the votes
(ballots) in said precinct, as canvassed by the special Municipal Board of
Canvassers for Silvino Lobos; (b) to include in the municipal certificate
of canvass of Silvino Lobos, the sixty-one (61) votes of private
respondent Ong and 29, 30, or 31 votes of petitioner Lucero as reflected
in the election returns (MBC Copy submitted as 'Comelec Copy') of
Precinct No. 7 (Barangay Camaya-an), as canvassed by the special
Municipal Board of Canvassers for Silvino Lobos; (c) to retabulate the
total number of votes of petitioner Lucero for the Municipality of Las
Navas and to enter in the provincial certificate of canvass the correct
total which is two thousand five hundred thirty-seven (2,537) as reflected
in the Statement of Votes (C.E. Form 20-A) prepared and submitted by
the Municipal Board of Canvassers for Las Navas; and (d) to submit to
the Commission a computation of the votes of the contending parties
including therein all the votes of petitioner Lucero (with alternative
totals) and private respondent Ong, in Precinct Nos. 7 and 16 of Silvino
Lobos and the total votes of petitioner Lucero in the Municipality of Las
Navas as corrected. However, under no circumstances should the Board
proclaim any winning candidate until instructed to do so by the
Commission;
2. To issue an Order calling for a special election in the last remaining
Precinct No. 13 (Barangay Gusaran) of the Municipality of Silvino Lobos
if justified by the result of the canvass by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers for Northern Samar, and to notify the parties of the schedule
of election activities for that precinct; and
3. After including in the tabulation the results of the special election of
Precinct No. 13, to decide the issue of the recount of the votes (ballots) of
Precinct No. 7 of Silvino Lobos, pursuant to Section 236 of the Omnibus
Election Code, to resolve the discrepancy of the votes of petitioner
Lucero in the same return, if such discrepancy of votes of the candidates
concerned would affect the over-all results of the election after the
totality of the votes of the contending parties shall have been
determined."
Both Lucero and Ong have come to this Court by way of separate special
civil actions for certiorari to challenge the Resolution.
In G.R. No. 113107, Lucero maintains that (1) the count of the ballots in
Precinct No. 7 of Silvino Lobos must be unconditional because the
election returns therefrom are invalid; and (2) his chances in the special
election in Precinct No. 13 of Silvino Lobos would be spoiled if the
returns for Precinct No. 7 were to be included beforehand in the canvass.
In G.R. No. 113509, Ong questions (1) the authority of the COMELEC to
order the correction of the alleged manifest error in the Municipal
Certificate of Canvass of Las Navas despite the absence of any appeal;
and (2) the authority of the COMELEC to call for a special election in
Precinct No. 13 almost two years after the regular election.
As we see it, the core issues in these consolidated cases are:
(1) Whether there should first be a count of the ballots of Precinct No. 7
of Silvino Lobos before determining the necessity of holding a special
election in Precinct No. 13 of Silvino Lobos;
(2) Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in
ordering the correction of the alleged manifest error in the Municipal
Certificate of Canvass of Las Navas; and
(3) Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in
calling for a special election in Precinct No. 13 after almost two (2) years,
or more specifically after one (1) year and ten (10) months, following the
day of the synchronized elections.
We shall take up these issues seriatim.
I.
The answer to the first issue is in the affirmative.
We find the COMELEC's disposition regarding Precinct No. 7 to be
unclear. In the first paragraph of the dispositive portion of the
challenged resolution, it directs the Provincial Board of Canvassers "to
include in the municipal certificate of canvass of Silvino Lobos the sixty-
one (61) votes of private respondent Ong and 29, 30, or 31 votes of
petitioner Lucero as reflected in the election returns (MBC copy
submitted as "COMELEC Copy") of Precinct No. 7 (Barangay Camaya-
an), as canvassed by the special Municipal Board of Canvassers for
Silvino Lobos," and "to submit to the Commission a computation of the
votes of the contending parties including therein all the votes of
petitioner Lucero (with alternative totals) and private respondent Ong,
in Precinct Nos. 7 and 16 of Silvino Lobos...." On the other hand, in the
fourth paragraph of the said dispositive portion, it orders theProvincial
Board of Canvassers, after "including in the tabulation the results of the
special election of Precinct No. 13," to "decide the issue of the recount of
the votes (ballots) of Precinct No. 7 of Silvino Lobos, pursuant to Section
236 of the Omnibus Election Code [and] to resolve the discrepancy of the
votes of petitioner Lucero in the same return, if such discrepancy of votes
of the candidate concerned would affect the over-all results of the
election after the totality of the votes of the contending parties shall have
been determined."
Obviously, instead of ordering an outright recount of the ballots of
Precinct No. 7, the COMELEC would first give full faith and credit to the
questioned election returns thereof, which it describes as the "Comelec
Copy," and, accordingly, direct the PBC to include in the municipal
certificate of canvass of Silvino Lobos the 61 votes for Ong and the
uncertain votes for Lucero -- 29, 30, or 31. The recount would only be
made if after a special election in Precinct No. 13 shall have been held, it
shall be determined that such a recount would be necessary.
We fail to grasp the logic of the proposition. First, it is clear to us that the
COMELEC, which has in its possession the so-called "Comelec Copy" of
the questioned election returns of Precinct No. 7 and heard the witnesses
who testified thereon, doubts the authenticity of the so-called "Comelec
Copy" of the election returns of Precinct No. 7;[14] hence, it authorizes the
PBC to decide the issue of a recount "pursuant to Section 236 of the
Omnibus Election Code." Since it doubts such authenticity, it could not,
without arbitrariness and abuse of discretion, order the inclusion of the
"votes" of Ong and Lucero found in the doubtful "Comelec Copy" of the
election returns in the municipal certificate of canvass. Second, it is an
uncontroverted fact that an election was held in Precinct No. 7. None was
held in Precinct No. 13 for reasons the parties fully knew. Pursuant to
Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), a special election
may be held in Precinct No. 13 only if the failure of the election therein
"would affect the result of the election." This "result of the election"
means the net result of the election in the rest of the precincts in a given
constituency, such that if the margin of a leading candidate over that of
his closest rival in the latter precincts is less than the total number of
votes in the precinct where there was failure of election, then such failure
would certainly affect "the result of the election"; hence, a special
election must be held. Consequently, the holding of a special election in
Precinct No. 13 can only be determined after the votes in Precinct No. 7
shall have been included in the canvass by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers.
We may further state that the so-called "Comelec Copy" of the election
returns of Precinct No. 7 can by no means be validly included in the
municipal canvass. The summary of the evidence in the "preparation" of
the election returns of Precinct No. 7, both in the challenged Resolution
and in the separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of
Commissioners Gorospe and Claravall, leaves no room for doubt that
there was actually no counting of the votes in Precinct No. 7. Quoted in
the challenged Resolution is a portion of the testimony of Sabina T.
Jarito, Precinct Chairman of Precinct No. 7, which clearly shows that on
questions by COMELEC Chairman Christian S. Monsod and
Commissioner Vicente B. de Lima, the witness candidly admitted that
the election returns were prepared at the "munisipyo" or municipal
building and not at the polling place of Precinct No. 7 in barangay
Camaya-an.[15] This "munisipyo" is located at the poblacion of Silvino
Lobos. Under the law, the board of election inspectors shall prepare the
election returns simultaneously with the counting of votes in the polling
place.[16] There is no evidence whatsoever that the COMELEC had, for
valid reasons, authorized the transfer of venue of the counting of the
votes of Precinct No. 7 from the polling place in barangay Camaya-an to
the municipal building and that the counting did in fact take place at the
latter. Although in the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of
Commissioners Gorospe and Claravall there is a reference to Exhibit "E,"
the Joint Affidavit of Sabina Jarito and Mevilyn Surio wherein they
declare that after the voting the Board of Election Inspectors
unanimously approved to transfer the counting of votes to the Municipal
Building in the Poblacion of Silvino Lobos, which was allegedly
concurred in by all the watchers of political parties and the candidates
present, the alleged "counting" at the municipal building was denied by
no less than the Municipal Election Officer of Silvino Lobos, Antonio
Tepace, and the Municipal Treasurer thereof, Mr. Gabriel Basarte, in
their affidavits marked as Exhibit "F" and Exhibit "G," respectively. [17]
Since there was no counting of the votes of Precinct No. 7, no valid
election returns could be made and any copy of election
returns purporting to come therefrom is a fabrication. A recount thereof,
which presupposes a prior count, would obviously be unwarranted.
Only a count then of the votes of Precinct No. 13 would heretofore be in
order. Sections 234, 235, and 236 of the Omnibus Election Code are thus
still inapplicable. And, in the light of what we stated before in relation to
the holding of a special election, such a count of the votes of Precinct No.
7 must, perforce, precede the special election in Precinct No. 13.
II.
Ong's first grievance in G.R. No. 113509 is without merit.
The order of the COMELEC for the correction of the manifest error in
the municipal certificate of canvass of Las Navas was made pursuant to
the declaration made by this Court in G.R. No. 105717 (Ong
vs. COMELEC)[18] that:
"The correction of the certificate of canvass of Las Navas is likewise in
order. Even though a pre-proclamation issue is involved, the correction
of the manifest error is allowed under Sec. 15 of R.A. No. 7166."
Since no motion for reconsideration was filed in that case, the decision
therein became final and entry of judgment was made on 4 August 1993.
Consequently, Ong cannot now re-litigate the issue of the correction of
the certificate of canvass of Las Navas.
III.
On the authority of the COMELEC to order the holding of a special
election, Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
"SEC. 6. Failure of election. -- If, on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in any polling
place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before
the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and
during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in
the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect,
and if in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would
affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a
verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and
hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably
close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in
a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the
cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to
elect."
The first paragraph of Section 4 of R.A. No. 7166 likewise provides:
"SEC. 4. Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections. -- The
postponement, declaration of failure of election and the calling of special
elections as provided in Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Omnibus Election
Code shall be decided by the Commission sitting en banc by a majority
votes of its members. The causes for the declaration of a failure of
election my occur before or after the casting of votes or on the day of the
election."
There are, therefore, two requisites for the holding of special elections
under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz., (1) that there is a
failure of election, and (2) that such failure would affect the results of the
election. The parties admit that the failure of the election in Precinct No.
13 was due to ballot-box snatching and do not dispute the finding of the
COMELEC as to the necessity and inevitability of the holding of a special
election in said precinct, even if the result of Precinct No. 7 should be
based on the questionable "Comelec Copy" of its election returns. The
COMELEC held:
"Based on the adjudged correction of the votes in favor of petitioner
Lucero in the Municipality of Las Navas, the results of the recount of
votes (ballots) of Precinct No. 16 (Silvino Lobos), and the votes reflected
in the available copy of the election returns for Precinct No.
7 (Silvino Lobos), it is safe to predict that when the special Provincial
Board of Canvassers will reconvene to sum up the votes of the
contending parties, the original lead of private respondent Ong of two
hundred four (204) votes against petitioner Lucero -- 24,272 as against
24,068-- will be reduced to either 175 or 173 depending on whether
Lucero will be credited a low of 29 or a high of 31 votes as reflected in the
election returns of Precinct No. 7.
Without preempting the exact figures which only the special Provincial
Board of Canvassers can correctly determine, undoubtedly it is inevitable
that a special election will have to be held in Precinct No. 13 (Barangay
Gusaran) of the Municipality of Silvino Lobos.
...
Given the established lead of private respondent Ong over petitioner
Lucero, We answer in the affirmative. According to Comelec records, the
number of registered voters in Precinct No. 13 is two hundred thirteen
(213). Since the lead of respondent Ong is less than the number of
registered voters, the votes in that precinct could affect the existing
result because of the possibility that petitioner Lucero might get a
majority over Ong in that precinct and that majority might be more than
the present lead of Ong."[19]
On the basis of the additional votes credited so far to the parties, [20] the
following computation is in order: to Ong's 24,272 votes will be added 2
more from Precinct No. 16, to make a total of 24,274, while to Lucero's
24,068 votes will be added 20 more from Las Navas and 43 from
Precinct No. 16, for a total of 24,131. Ong's earlier lead will thus be
reduced to 143, which is admittedly less than the 213 registered voters in
Precinct No. 13.[21]
The two requirements then for a special election under Section 6 of the
Omnibus Election Code have indeed been met.
In fixing the date of the special election, the COMELEC should see to it
that: (1) it should be not later than thirty days after the cessation of the
cause of the postponement or suspension of the election or the failure to
elect, and (2) it should be reasonably close to the date of the election not
held, suspended, or which resulted in failure to elect. The first involves
questions of fact. The second must be determined in the light of the
peculiar circumstances of a case. In the instant case, the delay was not
attributable to the poor voters of Precinct No. 13 or to the rest of the
electorate of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar. The
delay was, as stated in the opening paragraph of this ponencia, primarily
caused by the legal skirmishes or maneuvers of the petitioners which
muddled simple issues. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that
G.R. No. 113509 is the third case Ong has brought to this Court.
[22]
 Considering then that the petitioners themselves must share the
blame for the delay, and taking into account the fact that since the term
of office of the contested position is only three years, the holding of a
special election in Precinct No. 13 within the next few months may still
be considered "reasonably close to the date of the election not held."
Ong's postulation should then be rejected.
In the course of the deliberations on these cases, the Court considered
the possible application, by analogy, of Section 10, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution providing that no special election in the event of a vacancy
in the Offices of the President and Vice President "shall be called if the
vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next
presidential election," and of the second paragraph of Section 4 of R.A.
No. 7166 which provides:
"In case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of
Representatives at least one (1) year before the expiration of the term,
the Commission shall call and hold a special election to fill the vacancy
not earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer than ninety (90) days after the
occurrence of the vacancy. However, in case of such vacancy in the
Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the next
succeeding regular election."
A view was expressed that we should not hold the special election
because the underlying philosophy for the prohibition to hold the special
election if the vacancy occurred within a certain period before the next
presidential election or the next regular election, as the case may be, is
obviously the avoidance of the expense to be incurred in the holding of a
special election when a regular election is, after all, less than a year away.
The Court ultimately resolved that the aforesaid constitutional and
statutory proscriptions are inapplicable to special elections which may be
called under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code. First, the special
election in the former is to fill permanent vacancies in the Office of the
President, Vice President, and Members of Congress occurring after the
election, while the special election under the latter is due to or by reason
of a failure of election. Second, a special election under Section 6 would
entail minimal costs because it is limited to only the precincts involved
and to the candidates who, by the result of the election in a particular
constituency, would be affected by the failure of election. On the other
hand, the special election for the Offices of the President, Vice President,
and Senators would be nation-wide, and that of a Representative,
district-wide. Third, Section 6, when specifically applied to the instant
case, presupposes that no candidate had been proclaimed and therefore
the people of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar would be
unrepresented in the House of Representatives until the special election
shall ultimately determine the winning candidate, such that if none is
held, they would have no representation until the end of the term. Under
the aforesaid constitutional and statutory provisions, the elected officials
have already served their constituencies for more than one-half of their
terms of office. Fourth, if the law had found it fit to provide a specific and
determinate time-frame for the holding of a special election under
Section 6, then it could have easily done so in Section 4 of R.A. No. 7166.
Another serious obstacle to Ong's proposition is that, considering the
COMELEC's disposition of Precinct No. 7 in the challenged Resolution,
he would then be declared and proclaimed the duly elected
Representative of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar
despite the fact that as earlier observed, there was no counting of the
votes of Precinct No. 7, and the results of the district elections for
Representative would be affected by the failure of the election in Precinct
No. 13. To accept the proposition is to allow a proclamation based on an
incomplete canvass where the final result would have been affected by
the uncanvassed result of Precinct No. 7 and by the failure of the election
in Precinct No. 13 and to impose upon the people of the Second
Legislative District of Northern Samar a Representative whose mandate
is, at the very least, uncertain, and at the most, inexistent.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered:
I.     DISMISSING, for lack of merit, the petition in G.R. No. 113509; and
II.    In G.R. No. 113107, DIRECTING the respondent Commission on
Elections to:
(1)  Reconvene, in its main office in Manila, within five (5) days from
notice hereof, the Special Board of Canvassers of the municipality of
Silvino Lobos, Northern Samar, which shall then, as a special Board of
Election Inspectors of Precinct No. 7 of said municipality, within forty-
eight (48) hours from its reconvening, count the ballots of said Precinct
No. 7, and deliver to the special Provincial Board of Canvassers of the
said Province a copy of the election returns;
(2)  Reconvene, in its main office in Manila, within the same period as
aforestated, the special Provincial Board of Canvassers of Northern
Samar which shall then, within seventy-two (72) hours from its
reconvening:
(a)   Include in the Municipal Certificate of Canvass of Silvino Lobos (1)
the total number of votes for petitioner Wilmar P. Lucero and for
petitioner Jose L. Ong, Jr., respectively, in Precinct No. 7 of Silvino
Lobos as recorded in the election returns submitted by the
aforementioned special Municipal Board of Canvassers, and (2) the
forty-three (43) votes for petitioner Wilmar P. Lucero and the two (2)
votes for petitioner Jose L. Ong, Jr. as reflected in the election returns of
Precinct No. 16 (Barangay Tubgon) prepared, after a recount of the
ballots, by the special Board of Canvassers; and after such inclusions to
enter the new totals of the votes for the petitioners in the Certificate of
Provincial Canvass;
(b)   Retabulate the total number of votes for Wilmar P. Lucero for the
Municipality of Las Navas, Northern Samar, which shall be two thousand
and five hundred thirty-seven (2,537) as reflected in the Statement of
Votes (C.E. Form 20-A) prepared and submitted by the Municipal Board
of Canvassers of Las Navas, and to enter the same in the Certificate of
Provincial Canvass;
(c)   After the accomplishment of all the foregoing, to sum up anew in the
Certificate of Provincial Canvass the canvassed municipal certificates of
canvass of all the municipalities of the Second Legislative District of
Northern Samar and if the same would establish that the difference in
votes between petitioner Wilmar P. Lucero and petitioner Jose L. Ong,
Jr. is less than two hundred and thirteen (213), hence the failure of the
election in Precinct No. 13 would unavoidably and inevitably affect then
the result of the election, to report to the Commission on Elections such
fact and to furnish the latter with a certified photocopy of the Certificate
of Provincial Canvass;
(3) Within three (3) days after receipt of the aforesaid report from the
special Provincial Board of Canvassers, to CALL a special election in
Precinct No. 13 of Silvino Lobos, which shall be held not later than thirty
(30) days from such call; a copy of the election returns of said special
election shall forthwith be transmitted to the Special Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Northern Samar, which shall then enter the results thereof
in its canvass and make a final summation of the results in the Certificate
of Provincial Canvass, and thereafter, pursuant to the Omnibus Election
Code, pertinent election laws and rules and resolutions of the
Commission, proclaim the winning candidate for Representative of the
Second Legislative District of Northern Samar.
If for any reason whatsoever it would not be possible to immediately
reconvene the Special Municipal Board of Canvassers of Silvino Lobos
and the Special Provincial Board of Canvassers of Northern Samar, the
COMELEC may create new ones.
No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Romero, Melo,

Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., on leave.

[1]
 221 SCRA 475 [1993].
[2]
 Footnote no. 1, challenged COMELEC Resolution of 7 January
1994; Rollo, G.R. No. 113107, 30.
[3]
 Rollo, G.R. No. 113107, 31.
[4]
 Rollo, G.R. No. 13107, 32-33.
[5]
 Id., 33.
[6]
 Rollo, G.R. No. 113107, 33.
[7]
 216 SCRA 806 [1992].
[8]
 Id. at 817.
[9]
 221 SCRA 475 [1993].
[10]
 Id. at 483-484.
[11]
 Id. at 483.
[12]
 Rollo, G.R. No. 113107, 35-36.
[13]
 Annex "A" of Petition, G.R. No. 113107; Annex "A" of Petition, G.R.
No. 113509. Per Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong, with full
concurrence of Chairman Christian S. Monsod, Commissioner Vicente B.
de Lima, and Commissioner Remedios A.S. Fernando. Commissioners
Graduacion A.R. Claravall and Manolo B. Gorospe concurred, except as
to the disposition on Precinct No. 7, which point they elaborated upon in
a Concurring and Dissenting Opinion (Rollo, G.R. No. 113107, 57-
75). Commissioner Magdara B. Dimaampao put above his signature the
words "See Concurring/Dissenting Opinion."
[14]
 It even explicitly stated that "[t]he authenticity of the votes indicated
in the election return, however, is placed in serious doubt because
respondent Ong presented before the Commission a certificate of votes
dated May 12, 1992, supposedly signed by Precinct Chairman Sabina T.
Jarito and Precinct Third Member Mevilyn A. Surio, wherein the votes
for respondent Ong is only forty-five (45) not 61, and the vote of
petitioner Lucero is 30." (Rollo, G.R. No. 113107, 40-41).
[15]
 Pages 12-13 of challenged Resolution; Rollo, G.R. No. 113107, 42-43.
[16]
 Section 212, Omnibus Election Code.
[17]
 Rollo, G.R. No. 113107, 73-74.
[18]
 221 SCRA 475 [1993].
[19]
 Rollo, G.R. No. 113107, 47-48 (footnotes omitted).
[20]
 Pending the count to be made in Precinct No. 7.
[21]
 Unavailing is Ong's assertion that the registered voters in Precinct No.
13 have been reduced from 213 to 185 as a result of the transfer and
death of some of the voters. The original and exclusive jurisdiction over
all matters of inclusion and exclusion of voters from the voter's list lies
with the municipal and metropolitan trials court under Section 138 of
the Omnibus Election Code (as amended). Their decisions are appealable
to the proper regional trial court, whose decisions are immediately final
and executory.
[22]
 The other two are G.R. No. 105717 as earlier noted, and G.R. No.
108700 which this Court dismissed on 9 November 1993.
TOPIC: SPECIAL ELECTION AFTER FAILURE OF ELECTION
 
G.R. No. 113107. July 20, 1994
 
WILMAR P. LUCERO vs. COMMISSIONER OF ELECTIONS and JOSE L. ONG, JR.
 
ONE LINER:
There are, therefore,
two requisites
 for the holding of special elections underSection 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz.,
 
1. that there is a
failure of election
, and2. that such failure would
affect the results of the election
.
FACTS:
 
The petitioners were two of the five candidates for the Second Legislative District of
NorthernSamar in the synchronized national and local elections held on 11 May 1992.
 
The canvass of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) of Northern Samar credited
Jose L.Ong, Jr. with 24,272 votes
 and
Wilmar P. Lucero with 24,068 votes
, or a lead by
Ong of 204votes.
However, this tally did not include the results of Precinct No. 7 of the municipality of SilvinoLobos,
where the submitted election returns had not been canvassed because
they wereillegible
; of
Precinct No. 13 of Silvino Lobos, where the ballot boxes were
 
snatched and noelection was held
; and of Precinct No. 16, also Silvino Lobos, where all copies of
the electionreturns were missing.
 
Lucero asked the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), in SPA No. 92-282, to:
 
3. Order a special election in Precinct 13, Barangay Gusaran, Silvino Lobos, pursuant
toSection 6 of the Omnibus Election Code;
 
Ong moved to lift the suspension of the proceedings by the PBC, which Lucero opposed on
10June 1992 on the ground that the canvass could not be completed even if the PBC were
toreconvene because no election was held in Precinct No. 13 (Barangay Gusaran) of Silvino
Lobosand there was no canvassing of the votes in Precinct No. 7 (Barangay Camayaan) and
PrecinctNo. 16 (Barangay Tubgon) both of Silvino Lobos.
 
Lucero filed an urgent motion to constitute a Special Board of Election Inspectors (SBEI) to
countthe votes of Precincts Nos. 7 and 16 of Silvino Lobos.
 
Ong, in a special civil action for certiorari filed with this Court, questioned the order for the recountof
ballots in Precincts No. 7 and 16. Despite the pendency of this petition, the COMELEC orderedthe
recount of the ballots in
Precinct No. 16
by a SBEI which recorded
43 votes for Lucero and2 votes for Ong.
.
 
COMELEC EN BANC RESOLUTION
 
2. To issue an
Order calling for a special election in the last remaining Precinct No. 13
 (Barangay Gusaran) of the Municipality of Silvino Lobos if justified by the result of the canvass
bythe Provincial Board of Canvassers for Northern Samar, and to notify the parties of the
scheduleof election activities for that precinct; and
 
Both Lucero and Ong have come to this Court by way of separate special civil actions for
certiorarito challenge the Resolution.

SECTION 11

A. F. TRILLANES IV v . HON. O. PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS

PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT- BRANCH 148, MAKATI
CITY, et al . 556 SCRA 471 (2008)

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.

On July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier
Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President
and key national officials. After a series of negotiations, military soldiers surrendered
that evening. In the aftermath of such event dubbed as the Oakwood Incident,
petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged with coup d’état before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati. Four years later, Trillanes remained in detention and won a
seat in the Senate. Before starting his term, Trillanes filed with RTC an Omnibus
Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related
Requests. Trillanes requested to be allowed to attend senate sessions and fulfill his
functions as senator. The RTC however denied his motion. Thus, he filed Petition for
Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set aside orders of the RTC.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Trillanes‘ case is different from that of the Jalosjos case
2. Whether or not Trillanes‘ election as senator provides legal justification to allow
him to work and serve his mandate as senator
3. Whether or not there are enough precedents that allows for a liberal treatment of
detention prisoners who are held without bail

HELD:

No distinction between Trillanes’ case and that of Jalosjos case

The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in

Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions
which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted
in liberty of movement.
The Constitution provides: All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as
may be provided by law. The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the
criminal action. That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d’état cases,
both being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of
offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no
distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime
charged. In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner’s application for bail
and for release on recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of
guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported
from a trial court’s judgment of conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a
valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that
the denial of the right to bail in such cases is “regardless of the stage of the criminal
action.” 
Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense
applies equally to detention prisoners like Trillanes or convicted prisoners-appellants
like Jalosjos. The Court in People v. Hon. Maceda said that all prisoners whether
under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession
nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while
in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.
The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is no “prior
term” to speak of. In a plethora of cases, the Court categorically held that the
doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more precisely,
re-election to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner’s electoral
victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate,
“they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action with the
knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could
accomplish within the confines of prison.
It is opportune to wipe out the lingering mis impression that the call of duty
conferred by the voice of the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints
articulated in the Constitution and echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord
may be harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of the people yields to
the Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule of
law. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has
never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the
“mandate of the people” are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty
to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is
only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24
members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to
function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. x x x Never has
the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those
others who are validly restrained by law.
Trillanes’ case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all
prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. That this
discretion was gravely abused, petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the trial court
previously allowed petitioner to register as a voter in December 2006, file his
certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be
proclaimed as senator-elect, and take his oath of office on June 29, 2007. In a
seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands of the trial court lest it be accused of
taking a complete turn-around, petitioner largely banks on these prior grants to him
and insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations.

FACTS:

 July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City
and publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials.
 On the same day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and
General Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the
rebellion. 
 Petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup d’etat
defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the RTC of Makati.
 4 years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention, threw his hat in the political arena
and won a seat in the Senate with a 6-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007.
 Petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court
to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests".
 The trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which
apply to validly incarcerated persons in general

HELD:
 No, it is impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the
purpose of maintaining jail security; and while pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional
rights upon confinement, the fact of their detention makes their rights more limited than those of the
public.
 When a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of
the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the
commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him,
unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance.
 Presumption of innocence does not carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and political rights.
 Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5
days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his
position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special
class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

 G.R. No. 179817             June 27, 2008

 ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV, petitioner,

vs.
HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT- BRANCH 148, MAKATI CITY; GEN. HERMOGENES
ESPERON, VICE ADM. ROGELIO I. CALUNSAG, MGEN. BENJAMIN DOLORFINO,
AND LT. COL. LUCIARDO OBEÑA, respondents.

 DECISION

 CARPIO MORALES, J.:

 At the wee hours of July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led
by junior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood
 Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the
President and key national officials.

 Later in the day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and
General Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to
suppress the rebellion.1 A series of negotiations quelled the teeming tension and
eventually resolved the impasse with the surrender of the militant soldiers that evening.

 In the aftermath of this eventful episode dubbed as the "Oakwood Incident," petitioner
Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup d’etat defined
under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784, "People v. Capt. Milo D.
Maestrecampo, et al."

 Close to four years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention, 2 threw his hat in the
political arena and won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on
June 30, 2007.3

 Before the commencement of his term or on June 22, 2007, petitioner filed with the RTC,
Makati City, Branch 148, an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend
Senate Sessions and Related Requests"4 (Omnibus Motion). Among his requests were:

 (a) To be allowed to go to the Senate to attend all official functions of the
Senate (whether at the Senate or elsewhere) particularly when the Senate is in session,
and to attend the regular and plenary sessions of the Senate, committee hearings,
committee meetings, consultations, investigations and hearings in aid of legislation,
caucuses, staff meetings, etc., which are normally held at the Senate of the Philippines
located at the GSIS Financial Center, Pasay City (usually from Mondays to Thursdays
from 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.);

 (b) To be allowed to set up a working area at his place of detention at the Marine Brig,
Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, with a personal desktop computer
and the appropriate communications equipment (i.e., a telephone line and internet
access) in order that he may be able to work there when there are no sessions, meetings
or hearings at the Senate or when the Senate is not in session. The costs of setting up
the said working area and the related equipment and utility costs can be charged against
the budget/allocation of the Office of the accused from the Senate;

 (c) To be allowed to receive members of his staff at the said working area at his place of
detention at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, at
reasonable times of the day particularly during working days for purposes of meetings,
briefings, consultations and/or coordination, so that the latter may be able to assists (sic)
him in the performance and discharge of his duties as a Senator of the Republic;

 (d) To be allowed to give interviews and to air his comments, reactions and/or opinions to
the press or the media regarding the important issues affecting the country and the public
while at the Senate or elsewhere in the performance of his duties as Senator to help
shape public policy and in the light of the important role of the Senate in maintaining the
system of checks and balance between the three (3) co-equal branches of Government;

 (e) With prior notice to the Honorable Court and to the accused and his custodians, to be
allowed to receive, on Tuesdays and Fridays, reporters and other members of the
media who may wish to interview him and/or to get his comments, reactions and/or
opinion at his place of confinement at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort
 Bonifacio, Taguig City, particularly when there are no sessions, meetings or hearings at
the Senate or when the Senate is not in session; and

 (f) To be allowed to attend the organizational meeting and election of officers of the
Senate and related activities scheduled in the morning (9:00 or 10:00 a.m.) of 23 July
2007 at the Senate of the Philippines located at the GSIS Financial Center, Pasay City. 5

 By Order of July 25, 2007,6 the trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration in which he waived his requests in paragraphs (b),
(c) and (f) to thus trim them down to three. 7 The trial court just the same denied the
motion by Order of September 18, 2007.8

 Hence, the present petition for certiorari to set aside the two Orders of the trial court, and
for prohibition and mandamus to (i) enjoin respondents from banning the Senate staff,
resource persons and guests from meeting with him or transacting business with him in
his capacity as Senator; and (ii) direct respondents to allow him access to the Senate
staff, resource persons and guests and permit him to attend all sessions and official
functions of the Senate. Petitioner preliminarily prayed for the maintenance of the status
quo ante of having been able hitherto to convene his staff, resource persons and
guests9 at the Marine Brig.

 Impleaded as co-respondents of Judge Oscar Pimentel, Sr. are AFP Chief of Staff, Gen.
Hermogenes Esperon (Esperon); Philippine Navy’s Flag Officer-in-Command, Vice
Admiral Rogelio Calunsag; Philippine Marines’ Commandant, Major Gen. Benjamin
Dolorfino; and Marine Barracks Manila Commanding Officer, Lt. Col. Luciardo Obeña
(Obeña).

 Petitioner later manifested, in his Reply of February 26, 2008, that he has, since
November 30, 2007, been in the custody of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Custodial Center following the foiled take-over of the Manila Peninsula Hotel 10 the day
before or on November 29, 2007.

 Such change in circumstances thus dictates the discontinuation of the action as against
the above-named military officers-respondents. The issues raised in relation to them had
ceased to present a justiciable controversy, so that a determination thereof would be
without practical value and use. Meanwhile, against those not made parties to the case,
petitioner cannot ask for reliefs from this Court.11 Petitioner did not, by way of substitution,
implead the police officers currently exercising custodial responsibility over him; and he
did not satisfactorily show that they have adopted or continued the assailed actions of the
former custodians.12

 Petitioner reiterates the following grounds which mirror those previously raised in his
Motion for Reconsideration filed with the trial court:

 I.

 THE JURISPRUDENCE CITED BY THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO IS CLEARLY

INAPPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE BECAUSE OF THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

 A.

 UNLIKE IN THIS CASE, THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOSJOS CASE WAS ALREADY
CONVICTED AT THE TIME HE FILED HIS MOTION. IN THE INSTANT CASE,
ACCUSED/PETITIONER HAS NOT BEEN CONVICTED AND, THEREFORE, STILL
ENJOYS THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE;
  B.

 THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOJOS (SIC) CASE WAS CHARGED WITH TWO (2)
COUNTS OF STATUTORY RAPE AND SIX (6) COUNTS OF ACTS OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS, CRIMES INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE. HEREIN
ACCUSED/PETITIONER IS CHARGED WITH THE OFFENSE OF "COUP D’ETAT", A
CHARGE WHICH IS COMMONLY REGARDED AS A POLITICAL OFFENSE;

 C.

 THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOSJOS CASE ATTEMPTED TO FLEE PRIOR TO BEING

ARRESTED. THE ACCUSED/ PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY SURRENDERED TO THE
AUTHORITIES AND AGREED TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIS ACTS AT
OAKWOOD;

 II.

 GEN. ESPERON DID NOT OVERRULE THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE MARINE

BRIG’S COMMANDING OFFICER TO ALLOW PETITIONER TO ATTEND THE
SENATE SESSIONS;

 III.

 ACCUSED/PETITIONER SUBMITS THAT THE FACT THAT THE PEOPLE, IN THEIR

SOVEREIGN CAPACITY, ELECTED HIM TO THE POSITION OF SENATOR OF THE
REPUBLIC PROVIDES THE PROPER LEGAL JUSTIFICATION TO ALLOW HIM TO
WORK AND SERVE HIS MANDATE AS A SENATOR;

 - AND -

 IV.

 MOREOVER, THERE ARE ENOUGH PRECEDENTS TO ALLOW LIBERAL

TREATMENT OF DETENTION PRISONERS WHO ARE HELD WITHOUT BAIL AS IN
THE CASE OF FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH "ERAP" ESTRADA AND FORMER
ARMM GOV. NUR MISUARI.13

 The petition is bereft of merit.

 In attempting to strike a distinction between his case and that of Jalosjos, petitioner
chiefly points out that former Rep. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was already convicted,
albeit his conviction was pending appeal, when he filed a motion similar to petitioner’s
Omnibus Motion, whereas he (petitioner) is a mere detention prisoner. He asserts that he
continues to enjoy civil and political rights since the presumption of innocence is still in
his favor.

 Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving moral
turpitude, i.e., two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness,
whereas he is indicted for coup d’etat which is regarded as a "political offense."

 Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the presence of noble causes in expressing
legitimate grievances against the rampant and institutionalized practice of graft and
corruption in the AFP.
 In sum, petitioner’s first ground posits that there is a world of difference between his case
and that of Jalosjos respecting the type of offense involved, the stage of filing of the
motion, and other circumstances which demonstrate the inapplicability of Jalosjos.14

 A plain reading of. Jalosjos suggests otherwise, however.

 The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement

in Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions
which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in
liberty of movement.15

 It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into custody for
purposes of the administration of justice. No less than the Constitution provides:

 All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when

evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or
be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive
bail shall not be required.16 (Underscoring supplied)

 The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, 17 or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action. 18

 That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d’etat cases, both being
punishable by reclusion perpetua,19 is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered
by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the
political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged.

 In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner’s application for bail and for
release on recognizance was denied.20 The determination that the evidence of guilt is
strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail 21 or imported from a
trial court’s judgment of conviction,22 justifies the detention of an accused as a valid
curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial
of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action." Such
justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense 23 applies
equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants like
Jalosjos.

 As the Court observed in Alejano v. Cabuay,24 it is impractical to draw a line between

convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security;
and while pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement,
the fact of their detention makes their rights more limited than those of the public.

 The Court was more emphatic in People v. Hon. Maceda:25

 As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed

placed under the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so
that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense. He must be detained
in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court
to be released on bail or on recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether
under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor
engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in
 detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention. 26 (Underscoring
supplied)

 These inherent limitations, however, must be taken into account only to the extent that
confinement restrains the power of locomotion or actual physical movement. It bears
noting that in Jalosjos, which was decided en banc one month after Maceda, the Court
recognized that the accused could somehow accomplish legislative results. 27

 The trial court thus correctly concluded that the presumption of innocence does not carry
with it the full enjoyment of civil and political rights.

 Petitioner is similarly situated with Jalosjos with respect to the application of the
presumption of innocence during the period material to the resolution of their respective
motions. The Court in Jalosjos did not mention that the presumption of innocence no
longer operates in favor of the accused pending the review on appeal of the judgment of
conviction. The rule stands that until a promulgation of final conviction is made, the
constitutional mandate of presumption of innocence prevails.28

 In addition to the inherent restraints, the Court notes that petitioner neither denied nor
disputed his agreeing to a consensus with the prosecution that media access to him
should cease after his proclamation by the Commission on Elections. 29

 Petitioner goes on to allege that unlike Jalosjos who attempted to evade trial, he is not a
flight risk since he voluntarily surrendered to the proper authorities and such can be
proven by the numerous times he was allowed to travel outside his place of detention.

 Subsequent events reveal the contrary, however. The assailed Orders augured well
when on November 29, 2007 petitioner went past security detail for some reason and
proceeded from the courtroom to a posh hotel to issue certain statements. The account,
dubbed this time as the "Manila Pen Incident,"30 proves that petitioner’s argument bites
the dust. The risk that he would escape ceased to be neither remote nor nil as, in fact,
the cause for foreboding became real.

 Moreover, circumstances indicating probability of flight find relevance as a factor in

ascertaining the reasonable amount of bail and in canceling a discretionary grant of
bail.31 In cases involving non-bailable offenses, what is controlling is the determination of
whether the evidence of guilt is strong. Once it is established that it is so, bail shall be
denied as it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion. 32

 Petitioner cannot find solace in Montano v. Ocampo33 to buttress his plea for leeway
because unlike petitioner, the therein petitioner, then Senator Justiniano Montano, who
was charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder, 34 was able to rebut the
strong evidence for the prosecution. Notatu dignum is this Court’s pronouncement therein
that "if denial of bail is authorized in capital cases, it is only on the theory that the proof
being strong, the defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the
verdict of the jury."35 At the time Montano was indicted, when only capital offenses were
non-bailable where evidence of guilt is strong,36 the Court noted the obvious reason that
"one who faces a probable death sentence has a particularly strong temptation to
flee."37 Petitioner’s petition for bail having earlier been denied, he cannot rely
on Montano to reiterate his requests which are akin to bailing him out.

 Second, petitioner posits that, contrary to the trial court’s findings, Esperon did not
overrule Obeña’s recommendation to allow him to attend Senate sessions. Petitioner
cites the Comment38 of Obeña that he interposed no objection to such request but
recommended that he be transported by the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms with adequate
 Senate security. And petitioner faults the trial court for deeming that Esperon, despite
professing non-obstruction to the performance of petitioner’s duties, flatly rejected all his
requests, when what Esperon only disallowed was the setting up of a political office
inside a military installation owing to AFP’s apolitical nature. 39

 The effective management of the detention facility has been recognized as a valid
objective that may justify the imposition of conditions and restrictions of pre-trial
detention.40 The officer with custodial responsibility over a detainee may undertake such
reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the safety and prevent the escape
of the detainee.41 Nevertheless, while the comments of the detention officers provide
guidance on security concerns, they are not binding on the trial court in the same manner
that pleadings are not impositions upon a court.

 Third, petitioner posits that his election provides the legal justification to allow him to
serve his mandate, after the people, in their sovereign capacity, elected him as Senator.
He argues that denying his Omnibus Motion is tantamount to removing him from office,
depriving the people of proper representation, denying the people’s will, repudiating the
people’s choice, and overruling the mandate of the people.

 Petitioner’s contention hinges on the doctrine in administrative law that "a public official
can not be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since
his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to
the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor." 42

 The assertion is unavailing. The case against petitioner is not administrative in nature.
And there is no "prior term" to speak of. In a plethora of cases,43 the Court categorically
held that the doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more
precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner’s electoral
victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate, "they did
so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action [and] x x x with the
knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish
within the confines of prison."44

 In once more debunking the disenfranchisement argument, 45 it is opportune to wipe out
the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the voice of the people is
louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution and echoed by
jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by the overarching tenet that
the mandate of the people yields to the Constitution which the people themselves
ordained to govern all under the rule of law.

 The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never
been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of
the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate
ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250
members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the
Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the
physical absence of one or a few of its members. x x x Never has the call of a particular
duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly
restrained by law.46 (Underscoring supplied)

 Lastly, petitioner pleads for the same liberal treatment accorded certain detention
prisoners who have also been charged with non-bailable offenses, like former President
Joseph Estrada and former Governor Nur Misuari who were allowed to attend "social
functions." Finding no rhyme and reason in the denial of the more serious request to
perform the duties of a Senator, petitioner harps on an alleged violation of the equal
protection clause.
 In arguing against maintaining double standards in the treatment of detention prisoners,
petitioner expressly admits that he intentionally did not seek preferential treatment in the
form of being placed under Senate custody or house arrest, 47 yet he at the same time,
gripes about the granting of house arrest to others.

 Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all

prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. 48 That this discretion
was gravely abused, petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously
allowed petitioner to register as a voter in December 2006, file his certificate of candidacy
in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as senator-elect, and
take his oath of office49 on June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands
of the trial court lest it be accused of taking a complete turn-around, 50 petitioner largely
banks on these prior grants to him and insists on unending concessions and blanket
authorizations.

 Petitioner’s position fails. On the generality and permanence of his requests alone,
petitioner’s case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves. Jaloslos succinctly
expounds:

 x x x Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee

meetings for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the
privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates
accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the
purposes of the correction system. 51

 WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

 SO ORDERED.

 CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

 WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 RUBEN T. REYES TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

 CERTIFICATION

 Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

 REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

 Footnotes

 1
 The validity of both issuances was decided by the Court in SANLAKAS v. Executive
Secretary Reyes, 466 Phil. 482 (2004), notwithstanding the petitions’ mootness
occasioned by Proclamation No. 435 (August 1, 2003) that lifted the declaration of the
state of rebellion. It ruled that the declaration of a state of rebellion is an utter superfluity
devoid of any legal significance.

  Petitioner had been detained at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort
2

Bonifacio, Taguig City since June 13, 2006. Prior thereto, he was detained at the ISAFP
Detention Cell; rollo, pp. 8, 278.

 3
 Garnering 11,189,671 votes, petitioner was proclaimed the 11th Senator-Elect in the
May 2007 Elections by Resolution No. NBC 07-28 of June 15, 2007; rollo, pp. 8, 33, 58-
59; Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 4.

 4
 Rollo, pp. 61-65.

 5
 Id. at 62-64. For items (d) and (e), petitioner further manifested that he is willing to abide
by the restrictions previously imposed by the trial court when it previously granted him
access to media, to wit: (a) that he will not make any comments relating to the merits of
the instant case or otherwise make statements tending to prejudge or affect the outcome
of the case (i.e., sub judice statements); and (b) that he will not make any libelous
statements or seditious remarks against the Government.

 6
 Id. at 89-99.

 7
 Id. at 114-115. Petitioner reiterated only his requests in paragraphs (a), (d), (e) with the
additional concession that "the Senate Sgt-at-Arms or his duly authorized representative
(with adequate Security) be authorized to pick up and transport herein accused from his
place of detention at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig
City, to the Senate and back every time he needs to attend the official functions of the
Senate when the Senate is in regular session[.]"
 8
 Id. at 137-147.

 9
 Id. at. 14-15. Petitioner alleges that several government officials and private individuals
met with him at the Marine Brig from July 2, 2007 to September 26, 2007. The initial
organizational meeting of the Senate Committee on the Civil Service and Government
Reorganization, of which he is the Chairperson, was held inside the Marine Brig on
September 20, 2007. On September 27, 2007, however, petitioner’s staff, resource
persons and guests were refused entry, causing the cancellation of the meeting.

 10
 Id. at 297.

 11
 Cf. Allied Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 56279, February 9, 1993,
218 SCRA 578; Matuguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc. v. CA, 331 Phil. 795 (1996)
following the legal axiom that no person shall be affected by proceedings to which he is a
stranger.

  Vide Rules of Court, Rule 3, Sec. 17 which also accords the party or officer to be
12

affected a reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard; Heirs of Mayor Nemencio

Galvez v. CA, 325 Phil. 1028 (1996); Rodriguez v. Jardin, G.R. No. 141834, July 30,
2007, 528 SCRA 516.

 13
 Rollo, pp. 22-24.

 14
 381 Phil. 690 (2000).

 15
 Vide People v. Jalosjos, supra at 707.

 16
 Art. III, Sec. 13.

  Defined in the Rules of Court, Rule 114, Sec. 6; vide Republic Act No. 7659 (1993); but
17

cf. Republic Act No. 9346 (2006).

 18
 Rules of Court, Rule 114, Sec. 7.

 19
 Vide Revised Penal Code, Arts. 266-B & 135.

  Rollo, pp. 86, 257 citing the RTC Orders of July 24, 2004 and June 13, 2006,
20

respectively.

  Rules of Court, Rule 114, Sec. 8; vide Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 427 Phil. 820, 864
21

(2002); People v. Manes, 362 Phil. 569, 576 (1999).

  SC Administrative Circular No. 2-92 (January 20, 1992); People v. Divina, G.R. Nos.
22

93808-09, April 7, 1993, 221 SCRA 209, 223; People v. Fortes, G.R. No. 90643, June
25, 1993, 223 SCRA 619, 625-626; Padilla v. CA, 328 Phil. 1266, 1269-1270
(1996); People v. Gomez, 381 Phil. 870 (2000).

 23
 People v. Jalosjos, supra at 703, which states the rationale that society must protect
itself.

 24
 G.R. No. 160792, August 25, 2005, 468 SCRA 188, 212.

 25
 380 Phil. 1 (2000).
 26
 People v. Hon. Maceda, 380 Phil. 1, 5 (2000).

  People v. Jalosjos, supra at 706, even while remarking that the accused should not
27

even have been allowed by the prison authorities to perform certain acts in discharge of
his mandate.

 28
 Mangubat v. Sandiganbayan, 227 Phil. 642 (1986).

 29
 Rollo, pp. 68, 91.

 30
 Supra note 10.

 31
 Vide Rules of Court, Rule 114, Secs. 5, 8.

  Obosa v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 253, 271 (1997). In exceptional cases, the court
32

may consider serious illness or an ailment of such gravity that his continued confinement
will endanger his life or permanently impair his health. [De la Rama v. People’s Court, 77
Phil. 461 (1946) cited in Borinaga v. Tamin, A.M. No. RTJ-93-936, September 10, 1993,
226 SCRA 206, 213; vide People v. Fitzgerald, G.R. No. 149723, October 27, 2006, 505
SCRA 573, 585-586].

 33
 No. L-6352, January 29, 1953, 49 O.G. No. 5 (May 1953), 1855.

  Notably, at that time, "reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death" was the
34

imposable penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code prior to
Republic Act No. 7659 (1993) which, inter alia, increased the penalty.

 35
 Supra note 33.

  Vide Rules on Criminal Procedure (1940), Rule 110, Sec. 6; Rules on Criminal

36

Procedure (1964), Rule 114, Sec. 6.

  Bravo, Jr. v. Borja, No. L-65228, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 466, 472; vide Obosa
37

v. Court of Appeals, supra at 268-269 citing De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6-7

(1971). It must be understood, however, that the standard of strong evidence of guilt is
markedly higher than the standard of probable cause sufficient to initiate criminal cases.
(Vide Cabrera v. Marcelo, G.R. Nos. 157419-20, December 13, 2004, 446 SCRA 207,
217).

 38
 Rollo, pp. 71-74. Obeña rejected, however, his request to set up a working area at his
place of detention, citing space and security reasons, but stated that other areas within
the Marine Barracks Manila can be considered as an immediate and temporary working
area.

 39
 Id. at 31-32.

 40
 Alejano v. Cabuay, supra at 206.
  Republic Act No. 7438 (1992) or "An Act Defining Certain Rights of the Person Arrested,
41

Detained or Under Custodial Investigation, as well as the Duties of the Arresting, Detaining, and

Investigating Officers and Providing Penalties for Violations imenez vs

Cabangbang (G.R. No. L-15905)
Posted: July 25, 2011 in Case Digests

0
Freedom of Speech & Debate

Facts: Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense. On

14 Nov 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of an open letter addressed to the Philippines. Said letter alleged that there

have been allegedly three operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some

civilian political strategists. That such strategists have had collusions with communists and that the Secretary of Defense,

Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup d’état to place him as the president. The “planners” allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez,

among others, under their guise and that Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are being used as a tool to meet

such an end. The letter was said to have been published in newspapers of general circulation. Jimenez then filed a case

against Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages against Cabangbang alleging that Cabangbang’s statement is libelous.

Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be dismissed because he said that as a member of the HOR he is immune from suit

and that he is covered by the privileged communication rule and that the said letter is not even libelous.

ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to members of Congress. Whether

or not the said letter is libelous.

HELD: Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides “The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives

shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the

sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be

questioned in any other place.” The publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which refers to utterances

made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes

cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in

session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in

the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform

its functions as such at the time of the performance of the acts in question. Congress was not in session when the letter was

published and at the same time he, himself, caused the publication of the said letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the

communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of
any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower court the said communication is not absolutely

privileged.

The SC is satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support Jimenez’ action for damages. Although the letter

says that plaintiffs are under the control of the persons unnamed therein alluded to as “planners”, and that, having been

handpicked by Vargas, it should be noted that defendant, likewise, added that “it is of course possible” that plaintiffs “are

unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge”. In other words, the very document upon

which plaintiffs’ action is based explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely unaware of the alleged operational plans,

and that they may be merely unwitting tools of the planners. The SC does not think that this statement is derogatory to

Jimenez to the point of entitling them to recover damages, considering that they are officers of our Armed Forces, that as

such they are by law, under the control of the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in

question seems to suggest that the group therein described as “planners” include these two (2) high ranking officers.Petition

is dismissed.

FACTS:

 This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, for
the recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of
money, by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome
Cabangbang.
 According to the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines,
dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused
said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or about
said date. It is obvious that, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or
as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, said communication is not absolutely privileged.
 Upon being summoned, the latter moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the
letter in question is not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged communication.
 This motion having been granted by the lower court, plaintiffs interposed the present appeal
from the corresponding order of dismissal. 

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged communication.

HELD:
 No, the publication in question is not a privileged communication.
 The determination of the issue depends on whether or not the aforementioned publication
falls within the purview of the phrase "speech or debate therein" — that is to say, in Congress — used
in this provision.
 Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their
official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of
Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is
in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the
premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of
Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the
performance of the acts in question.
 The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the
complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958,
when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in
several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that,
in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either
as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made
by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely privileged.

Facts: Defendant Cabangbang was a member of the House of

Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense. He
wrote an open letter to the President and caused its publication in
several newspapers of general circulation exposing the
allegedly operational plans by some ambitious AFP officers regarding a
massive political build-up of then Secretary of National Defense, Jesus
Vargas, to prepare him to become a candidate for President in 1961.

Issue: Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged

communication

Held: The determination of the issue depends on whether or not the

publication falls within the purview of the phrase “speech or debate
in Congress” as used in Art. VI, Sec. 15 (now Sec. 11). Said expression
refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their
official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes
cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills
introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts
performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises
housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members
of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its
functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question.

The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. It was
an open letter to the President, when Congress presumably was not in
session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in
several newspapers of general circulation. In causing the communication to
be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member
of the Congress or as officer of any committee thereof. Hence, said
communication is not absolutely privileged.

DECISION

CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, for the recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez,
Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of money, by way of
damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of
defendant Bartolome Cabangbang. Upon being summoned, the latter
moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the letter in
question is not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged
communication. This motion having been granted by the lower court,
plaintiffs interposed the present appeal from the corresponding order of
dismissal. The issues before us are: (1) whether the publication in
question is a privileged communication; and, if not, (2) whether it is
libelous or not. The first issue stems from the fact that, at the time of said
publication, defendant was a member of the House of Representatives
and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense, and that pursuant
to the Constitution:
"The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all
cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from
arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in
going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate
therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place." (Article VI,
Section 15.)
The determination of the first issue depends on whether or not the
aforementioned publication falls within the purview of the phrase
"speech or debate therein" - that is to say, in Congress - used in this
provision.
Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the
performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered,
statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is
in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in
session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in
Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official
discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional
Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time
of the performance of the acts in question. [1]
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category.
According to the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President
of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably
was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in
several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or about
said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so
published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of
Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the
finding made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not
absolutely privileged.
Was it libelous, insofar as the plaintiffs herein are concerned? Addressed
to the President, the communication began with the following
paragraphs:
"In the light of the recent developments which however unfortunate had
nevertheless involved the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the unfair
attacks against the duly elected members of Congress of engaging in
intriguing and rumormongering, allow me, Your Excellency, to address
this open letter to focus public attention to certain vital information
which, under the present circumstances, I feel it my solemn duty to our
people to expose.
"It has come to my attention that there have been allegedly three
operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers,
with the aid of some civilian political strategists."
Then, it describes the "allegedly three (3) operational plans" referred to
in the second paragraph. The first plan is said to be "an insidious plan for
a massive political build-up" of then Secretary of National Defense, Jesus
Vargas, by propagandizing and glamorizing him in such a way as to "be
prepared to become a candidate for President in 1961". To this end, the
"planners" are said to "have adopted the sales-talk that Secretary Vargas
is 'Communists' Public Enemy No. 1 in the Philippines." Moreover, the
P4,000,000.00 "intelligence and psychological warfare funds" of the
Department of National Defense, and the "Peace and Amelioration
Fund" - the letter says - are "available to adequately finance a political
campaign". It further adds:
"It is reported that the 'Planners' have under their control the following:
(1) Col. Nicanor Jimenez of NICA, (2) Lt. Col. Jose Lukban of NBI, (3)
Capt. Carlos Albert (PN) of G-2 AFP, (4) Col. Fidel Llamas of MIS, (5) Lt.
Col. Jose Regala of the Psychological Warfare Office, DND, and (6)
Major Jose Reyna of the Public Information Office, DND. To insure this
control, the 'Planners' purportedly sent Lt. Col. Job Mayo, Chief of MIS,
to Europe to study and while Mayo was in Europe, he was relieved by
Col. Fidel Llmas. They also sent Lt. Col. Deogracias Caballero, Chief of
Psychological Warfare Office, DND, to USA to study and while Caballero
was in USA, he was relieved by Lt. Col. Jose Regala. The 'Planners'
wanted to relieve Lt. Col. Ramon Galvezon, Chief of CIS (PC) but failed.
Hence, Galvezon, is considered a missing link in the intelligence
Network. It is, of course, possible that the officers mentioned above are
unwittingly tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no
knowledge." (Underscoring ours.)
Among the means said to be used to carry out the plan, the letter lists,
under the heading "other operational technique", the following:
(a) Continuous speaking engagements all over the Philippines for
Secretary Vargas to talk on "Communism" and "Apologetics" on civilian
supremacy over the military;
(b) Articles in magazines, news releases, and hundreds of letters - "typed
in two (2) typewriters only" - to Editors of magazines and newspapers,
extolling Secretary Vargas as the "hero of democracy in 1951, 1953, 1955
and 1957 elections";
(c) Radio announcements extolling Vargas and criticizing the
administration;
(d) Virtual assumption by Vargas of the functions of the Chief of Staff
and an attempt to pack key positions in several branches of the Armed
Forces with men belonging to his clique;
(e) Insidious propaganda and rumors spread in such a way as to give the
impression that they reflect the feeling of the people or the opposition
parties, to undermine the administration. Plan No. II is said to be a
"coup d'etat", in connection with which the "planners" had gone no
further than the planning stage, although the plan "seems to be held in
abeyance and subject to future developments". Plan No. III is
characterized as a modification of Plan No. I, by trying to assuage the
President and the public with a loyalty parade, in connection with which
Gen. Arellano delivered a speech challenging the authority and integrity
of Congress, in an effort to rally the officers and men of the AFP behind
him, and gain popular and civilian support.
The letter in question recommended: (1) that Secretary Vargas be asked
to resign; (2) that the Armed Forces be divorced absolutely from politics;
(3) that the Secretary of National Defense be a civilian, not a professional
military man; (4) that no Congressman be appointed to said office; (5)
that Gen. Arellano be asked to resign or retire; (6) that the present chiefs
of the various intelligence agencies in the Armed Forces, including the
chiefs of the NICA, NBI, and other intelligence agencies mentioned
elsewhere in the letter, be reassigned, considering that "they were
handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano", and that, "most
probably, they belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique"; (7) that all military
personnel now serving civilian offices be returned to the AFP, except
those holding positions by provision of law; (8) that the Regular Division
of the AFP stationed in Laur, Nueva Ecija, be dispersed by battalion
strength to the various stand-by or training divisions throughout the
country; and (9) that Vargas and Arellano should disqualify themselves
from holding or undertaking an investigation of the planned
"coup d'etat".
We are satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support
plaintiffs' action for damages. Although the letter says that plaintiffs are
under the control of the unnamed persons therein alluded to as
"planners", and that, having been handpicked by Secretary Vargas and
Gen. Arellano, plaintiffs "probably belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique",
it should be noted that defendant, likewise, added that "it is of course
possible" that plaintiffs "are unwitting tools of the plan of which they
may have absolutely no knowledge". In other words, the very document
upon which plaintiffs' action is based explicitly indicates that they might
be absolutely unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that they
may be merely unwitting tools of the planners. We do not think that this
statement is derogatory to the plaintiffs, to the point of entitling them to
recover damages, considering that they are officers of our Armed Forces,
that as such they are by law, under the control of the Secretary of
National Defense and the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in question
seems to suggest that the group therein described as "planners" include
these two (2) high ranking officers.
It is true that the complaint alleges that the open letter in question was
written by the defendant, knowing that it is false and with the intent to
impeach plaintiffs' reputation, to expose them to public hatred,
contempt, dishonor and ridicule, and to alienate them from their
associates, but these allegations are mere conclusions which are
inconsistent with the contents of said letter and cannot prevail over the
same, it being the very basis of the complaint. Then too, when plaintiffs
allege in their complaint that said communication is false, they could not
have possibly meant that they were aware of the alleged plan to stage a
coup d'etat or that they were knowingly tools of the "planners". Again,
the aforementioned passage in the defendant's letter clearly implies that
plaintiffs were not among the "planners" of said coup d'etat, for,
otherwise, they could not be "tools", much less, unwittingly on their part,
of said "planners".
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
SECTION 14
: After an election for the Directors of the International
Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) was held, one group, the
respondent Acero group, instituted at the SEC quo warranto proceedings,
questioning the election. Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the
Interim Batasang Pambansa, entered his appearance as counsel for
respondent Acero to which the petitioner, Puyat group, objected on
Constitutional ground that no Assemblyman could “appear as counsel before
any administrative body,” and SEC was an administrative body.
Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for
respondent Acero.

Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased 10 shares of IPI for P200.00 upon

request of respondent Acero. Following the notarization of Assemblyman
Fernandez’ purchase, he filed a motion for intervention in the SEC case as
the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation.
The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Fernandez’ ownership of
the said 10 shares.

Issue: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholder of

IPI, may intervene in the SEC case without violating Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now
Sec. 14, Art. VI) of the Constitution

Held: Ordinarily, by virtue of the motion for intervention, Assemblyman

Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not
appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the cause of the
private respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection
of his ownership of 10 shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation.

However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of

Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC case. He had acquired a mere P200.00
worth of stock in IPI, representing 10 shares out of
262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them “after the fact” that is, after
the contested election of directors, after the quo warranto suit had been filed
before the SEC and 1 day before the scheduled hearing of the case before
the SEC. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified
his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Acero, but which was
objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection,
he decided, instead, to intervene on the ground of legal interest in the
matter under litigation.

Under those facts and circumstances, the Court is constrained to find that

there has been an indirect appearance as counsel before an administrative
body. In the opinion of the Court, that is a circumvention of the
Constitutional prohibition contained in Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art.
VI). The intervention was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in
the proceedings in some other capacity.
FACTS:

 An election for the 11 Directors of the International Pipe Industries

Corporation (IPI) was held. The Puyat Group would be in control of the Board and of
the management of IPI.
 The Acero Group instituted at the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) quo warranto proceedings, questioning the election. The Acero Group claimed
that the stockholders' votes were not properly counted.
 The Puyat Group claims that at conferences of the parties with respondent
SEC Commissioner de Guzman, Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez, orally entered his
appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the Puyat Group objected on
Constitutional grounds. Sec 11, Art VIII, of the 1973 Constitution, then in force,
provided that no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before ... any
administrative body", and SEC was an administrative body. Incidentally, the same
prohibition was maintained by the April 7, 1981 plebiscite. 
 May 31, 1979. When the SEC Case was called, it turned out that:
 Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez had purchased from Augusto
A. Morales 10 shares of stock of IPI for P200.00 upon request of respondent Acero
to qualify him to run for election as a Director.
 The deed of sale, however, was notarized only on May 30, 1979 and
was sought to be registered on said date.
 May 31, 1979, the day following the notarization of Assemblyman
Fernandez' purchase, the latter had filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the
SEC Case as the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in
litigation.
 The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Atty. Fernandez'
ownership of the said ten shares. It is this Order allowing intervention that
precipitated the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction.
 Edgardo P. Reyes instituted a case before the Court of First Instance of Rizal
(Pasig) against N.V. Verenigde Bueinzenfabrieken Excelsior — De Maas and
respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero and others, to annul the sale of Excelsior's shares
in the IPI to respondent Acero. In that case, Assemblyman Fernandez appeared as
counsel for defendant Excelsior.
 The Court issued a temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondent SEC
Associate Commissioner from allowing the participation as an intervenor, of
respondent Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez at the proceedings in the SEC
Case.
 The Solicitor General, in his Comment for respondent Commissioner,
supports the stand of the latter in allowing intervention. The Court, on November 6,
1979, resolved to consider the Comment as an Answer to the Petition.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a then stockholder of IPI may
intervene in the SEC Case without violating Sec 11, Article VIII of the Constitution. 

HELD:
 We are constrained to find that there has been an indirect "appearance as
counsel before ... an administrative body" and, in our opinion, that is a circumvention
of the Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention" was an afterthought to enable him
to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. To believe the avowed
purpose, that is, to enable him eventually to vote and to be elected as Director in the
event of an unfavorable outcome of the SEC Case would be pure naivete. He would
still appear as counsel indirectly.
 A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision
ineffective. All an Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an administrative
body is to acquire a minimal participation in the "interest" of the client and then
"intervene" in the proceedings. That which the Constitution directly prohibits may not
be done by indirection or by a general legislative act which is intended to accomplish
the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited.
 In brief, we hold that the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez falls within
the ambit of the prohibition contained in Sec 11, Article VIII of the Constitution.

198 Phil. 420

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This suit for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction is
poised against the Order of respondent Associate Commissioner of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) granting Assemblyman
Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747.
A question of novel import is in issue.  For its resolution, the following
dates and allegations are being given and made:
a) May 14, 1979.  An election for the eleven Directors of the International
Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) a private corporation, was held.  Those
in charge ruled that the following were elected as Directors:
Eugenio J. Puyat           Eustaquio T.C. Acero
Erwin L. Chiongbian      R. G. Vildzius
Edgardo P. Reyes         Enrique M. Belo
Antonio G. Puyat            Servillano Dolina
Jaime R. Blanco            Juanito Mercado
Rafael R. Recto
Those named on the left list may be called the Puyat Group; those on the
right, the Acero Group.  Thus, the Puyat Group would be in control of the
Board and of the management of IPI.
b) May 25, 1979.  The Acero Group instituted at the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) quowarranto proceedings, docketed as
Case No. 1747 (the SEC Case), questioning the election of May 14, 1979. 
The Acero Group claimed that the stockholders' votes were not properly
counted.
c) May 25-31, 1979.  The Puyat Group claims that at conferences of the
parties with respondent SEC Commissioner de Guzman, Justice
Estanislao A. Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang
Pambansa, orally entered his appearance as counsel for respondent
Acero to which the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional grounds. 
Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution, then in force, provided
that no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before x x x any
administrative body", and SEC was an administrative body.  Incidentally,
the same prohibition was maintained by the April 7, 1981 plebiscite.  The
cited Constitutional prohibition being clear, Assemblyman Fernandez
did not continue his appearance for respondent Acero.
d) May 31, 1979.  When the SEC Case was called, it turned out that:
(i) On May 15, 1979, Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez had
purchased from Augusto A. Morales ten (10) shares of stock of IPI for
P200.00 upon request of respondent Acero to qualify him to run for
election as a Director.
(ii) The deed of sale, however, was notarized only on May 30, 1979 and
was sought to be registered on said date.
(iii) On May 31, 1979, the day following the notarization of Assemblyman
Fernandez' purchase, the latter had filed an Urgent Motion for
Intervention in the SEC Case as the owner of ten (10) IPI shares alleging
legal interest in the matter in litigation.
e) July 17, 1979.  The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Atty.
Fernandez' ownership of the said ten shares.[1] It is this Order allowing
intervention that precipitated the instant petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction.
f) July 3, 1979.  Edgardo P. Reyes instituted a case before the Court of
First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch XXI, against N.V. Verenigde
Buinzen-fabrieken Excelsior - De Maas and respondent Eustaquio T. C.
Acero and others, to annul the sale of Excelsior's shares in the IPI to
respondent Acero (CC No. 33739).  In that case, Assemblyman
Fernandez appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior.  In L-51928, we
ruled that Assemblyman Fernandez could not appear as counsel in a case
originally filed with a Court of First Instance as in such situation the
Court would be one "without appellate jurisdiction."
On September 4, 1979, the Court en banc issued a temporary Restraining
Order enjoining respondent SEC Associate Commissioner from allowing
the participation as an intervenor, of respondent Assemblyman
Estanislao Fernandez at the proceedings in the SEC Case.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment for respondent Commissioner,
supports the stand of the latter in allowing intervention.  The Court en
banc, on November 6, 1979, resolved to consider the Comment as an
Answer to the Petition.
The issue which will be resolved is whether or not Assemblyman
Fernandez, as a then stockholder of IPI, may intervene in the SEC Case
without violating Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution, which, as
amended, now reads:
"SEC. 11.
No Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before
any court without appellate jurisdiction,
before any court in any civil case wherein the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party,
or in any criminal case wherein any officer or employee of the
Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office,
or before any administrative body.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly be interested financially in any
contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation, during his
term of office.
He shall not accept employment to intervene in any cause or matter
where he may be called to act on account of his office.  (Emphasis and
paragraphs supplied)
What really has to be resolved is whether or not, in intervening in the
SEC Case, Assemblyman Fernandez is, in effect, appearing as counsel,
albeit indirectly, before an administrative body in contravention of the
Constitutional provision.
Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman
Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel.  Ostensibly, he is
not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the cause of
the private respondents.  His appearance could theoretically be for the
protection of his ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI in respect of the
matter in litigation and not for the protection of the petitioners nor
respondents who have their respective capable and respected counsel.
However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention
of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case.  He had acquired a mere
P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing ten shares out of 262,843
outstanding shares.  He acquired them "after the fact", that is, on May
30, 1979, after the contested election of Directors on May 14, 1979, after
the quo warranto suit had been filed on May 25, 1979 before SEC and
one day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC on May
31, 1979.  And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had
signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Eustaquio T.
C. Acero, [2] but which was objected to by petitioners.  Realizing, perhaps,
the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the
ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation.  And it may be
noted that in the case filed before the Rizal Court of First Instance (L-
51928), he appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior, co-defendant of
respondent Acero therein.
Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find that
there has been an indirect "appearance as counsel before x x x an
administrative body" and, in our opinion, that is a circumvention of the
Constitutional prohibition.  The "intervention" was an afterthought to
enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. 
To believe the avowed purpose, that is, to enable him eventually to vote
and to be elected as Director in the event of an unfavorable outcome of
the SEC Case would be pure naiveté.  He would still appear as counsel
indirectly.
A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional
provision ineffective.  All an Assemblyman need do, if he wants to
influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal participation in
the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings.  That
which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection
or by a general legislative act which is intended to accomplish the objects
specifically or impliedly prohibited.[3]
In brief, we hold that the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in
SEC No. 1747 falls within the ambit of the prohibition contained in
Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Our resolution of this case should not be construed as, absent the
question of the constitutional prohibition against members of the
Batasan, allowing any stockholder, or any number of stockholders, in a
corporation to intervene in any controversy before the SEC relating to
intra-corporate matters.  A resolution of that question is not necessary in
this case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Commissioner's Order granting Atty.
Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747 is
hereby reversed and set aside.  The temporary Restraining Order
heretofore issued is hereby made permanent.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.