BENJAMIN ABUBAKAR, Petitioner, THE AUDITOR GENERAL, Respondent. G.R. No. L-1405 July 31, 1948

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Abubakar vs Auditor general

BENJAMIN ABUBAKAR, petitioner,
vs.
THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.

G.R. No. L-1405             July 31, 1948

Facts: The Auditor General refused to authorize the payment of treasury warrant no. A-2867376 for
P1,000 which was issued in favor of Placido S. Urbanes but is now in the hands of petitioner Benjamin
Abubakar. The Auditor General argued that first, the warrant does not come within the purview of RA
No. 80 (Item F-IV-8); and second, the requirements of his office had not been complied with. Since, the
Court deemed the first reason to be sufficiently valid, it no longer passed upon the second.

Issue: whether or not the auditor general erred in refusing to permit payment out of a particular
appropriation in item f-iv-8 of RA 80.

Held: No.

It was admitted that the warrant was originally made payable to placido s urbanes in his capacity as
disbursing officer of the food administration for “additional cash advance for food production campaign
in la union” Thus, it is apparent that the treasury warrant was issued in favor of a public officer or
employee but held in possession by a private individual. The Auditor General was correct in refusing to
authorize its redemption since RA 80 Item f-iv-8 provides for treasury warrants issued in favor of and
held in possession by private individuals. Since this warrant was not issued in favor of a private
individual, the rule cannot apply.

Moreover, petitioner cannot argue that he is a holder in good faith and is entitled to the rights and
privileges of a holder in due course, free from defenses because the treasury warrant in question is not
within the scope of the negotiable instruments law. The document bears on its face the words “payable
from appropriation for food administration” which is an order for payment out of a particular fund thus
making it not unconditional and therefore, not a negotiable instrument.

Surigao century sawmill vs CA

SURIGAO CENTURY SAWMILL, CO., INC., Petitioner, vs. COURT


OF APPEALS and PHOENIX ASSURANCE CO.,
INC., Respondents.

G.R. No. 83889 February 9, 1993


Standard Plywood Corporation leased a barge, LCT “Tantoy” from Surigao Century Sawmill Co., Inc.,
manned by the latter’s crew for delivery of plywood from Butuan City to its consignee, A-1 Construction,
Inc. in Surigao City. Such was covered by a Contract of Lease and a Bill of Lading. However, the shipment
failed to reach the consignee which resulted in damages to Standard, amounting to P490,000.00. But
since the cargo was insured by Standard with Phoenix Assurance Co., Inc. under a Certificate of
Insurance, Phoenix settled its obligation in the aforesaid amount and as a legal consequence, was
subrogated to the rights and interests of the shipper, Standard. Failing to satisfy its demand from
Surigao, Phoenix filed a complained with the RTC of Manila.

Issue: Whether or not the bill of lading should prevail over the lease contract for purposes of venue

Held: yes, the bill of lading should prevail over the lease contract simply because the former is a
subsequent covenant and shall, therefore, take precedence in determining the intent of the parties.

In determining which document should prevail, the real intent of the parties and/or characteristics of
the documents should be examined. A bill of lading serves three functions: (1) as receipt for goods; (2)
as contract of carriage; (3) as documentary title to the goods. Thus, Phoenix’s reliance on the bill of
lading to support its cause of action is well-taken.

Furthermore, respondent has the choice of venue of where to file its complaint for a sum of money and
damages against petitioner.

Far east bank vs querimit

FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST


COMPANY, Petitioner, vs.  ESTRELLA O. QUERIMIT, respondent.

G.R. No. 148582 : January 16, 2002


Estrella O. Querimit opened a dollar savings account in FEBTC for which she was issued 4 Certificates of
Deposit. The certificates were to mature in 60 days and were payable to bearer at 4.5% interest per
annum. The certificates bore the word accrued meaning, if they were not presented for encashment or
pre-terminated prior to maturity, the money deposited with accrued interest would be rolled over by
the bank and annual interest would accumulate automatically. In 1989, respondent accompanies her
husband to the US for medical treatment, using all her savings in another bank to pay for the trip and
medical expenses. After the death of her husband, respondent returned to the Philippines and went to
FEBTC to withdraw her deposit but she was told that her husband had withdrawn the money in deposit.
FEBTC alleged that respondent’s late husband was given an accommodation to allow him to withdraw
Estrella’s deposit, even presenting certified true copies of documents showing that payment has been
made. Respondent, through counsel, sent a demand letter to petitioner for the update and payment of
the certificates but petitioner refused to respond. Thus, respondent filed a complaint. The trial court
rendered judgment in favor of Querimit. Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals but to no avail.
The CA contends that FEBTC failed to prove that the certificates of deposit had been paid out of its
funds. Hence, this petition.

Issue: whether or not the certificates of deposit have already been paid by petitioner
Held: No. FEBTC failed to prove that it had already paid Estrella Querimit, the bearer and lawful holder
of the subject certificates of deposit. Evidence showed that the certificates are still in the possession of
respondent and have not been indorsed or delivered to FEBTC. As a rule, one who pleads payment has
the burden of proving it. Even where the plaintiff must allege non-payment, the general rule is that the
burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove payment. The
debtor has the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged by
payment.29cräläw

In this case, the certificates of deposit were clearly marked payable to bearer, which means, to [t]he
person in possession of an instrument, document of title or security payable to bearer or indorsed in
blank.30 Petitioner should not have paid respondents husband or any third party without requiring the
surrender of the certificates of deposit.virtualibräry

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