Manalo v.

Sistoza

Facts: In accordance to Republic Act 6975 creating the Department of Interior and Local Government
the President of the Philippines, through then Executive Secretary Franklin M. Drilon, promoted the
fifteen respondent police officers herein, by appointing them to positions in the Philippine National
Police with the rank of Chief Superintendent to Director. The said police officers took their oath of office
and assumed their respective positions without their names submitted to the Commission on
Appointments. On October 21, 1992, the petitioner brought before this Court this present original
petition for prohibition, as a taxpayer suit, to assail the legality of subject appointments and
disbursements made.

Petitioner contends that Respondent officers, in assuming their offices and discharging the functions
without confirmation of the Commission on Appointments as required by the Constitution are acting
without or in excess of their jurisdiction.

Supreme Court Ruling: The Petition must fail

The power to make appointments is vested in the Chief Executive by Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.

It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first group require the
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The appointments of respondent officers who are
not within the first category, need not be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. As held in the
case of Tarrosa vs. Singson, Congress cannot by law expand the power of confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of appointments of other government officials
not mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

It is Manalo’s submission that the Philippine National Police is akin to the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and therefore, the appointments of police officer whose rank is equal to that of colonel or
naval captain require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. This contention is equally
untenable. The Philippine National Police is separate and distinct from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. The Constitution, no less, sets forth the distinction. The police force is different from and
independent of the armed forces and the ranks in the military are not similar to those in the Philippine
National Police.

Thus, directors and chief superintendents of the PNP, such as the herein respondent police officers, do
not fall under the first category of presidential appointees requiring the confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments.

Digested by : Salman M. Johayr

Subject : PubCorp
Topic : Appointments by the President

Matibag v. Benipayo
G.R. No. 149036 April 2, 2002

Facts:

In this case, petitioner Matibag was appointed by the COMELEC en banc as “Acting Director IV” of the
EID and was reappointed twice for the same position in a temporary capacity. Meanwhile, then PGMA
also made appointments, ad interim, of herein respondents Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC
Chairman and Commissioners, respectively. Their appointments were renewed thrice by PGMA, the last
one during the pendency of the case, all due to the failure of the Commission of Appointments to act
upon the confirmation of their appointments.

Thereafter, respondent Benipayo, acting on his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, issued a memorandum
removing petitioner as Acting Director IV and reassigning her to the Law Department. Petitioner
requested for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the
appointment and the right to remain in office of herein respondents, claiming that their ad interim
appointments violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC, as well as on
the prohibitions on temporary appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and members.

Issue/s:

1. Whether the ad interim appointments made by PGMA were prohibited under the Constitution

2. Whether the ad interim appointments made by PGMA were temporary in character

Ruling:

1. No.

While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC “shall be independent”, this provision
should be harmonized with the President’s power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold that the
independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad interim
appointees before the appointees can assume office will negate the President’s power to make ad
interim appointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to give meaning and effect
to every provision of the law. It will also run counter to the clear intent of the framers of the
Constitution. The original draft of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution – on the nomination of
officers subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments – did not provide for ad interim
appointments. The original intention of the framers of the Constitution was to do away with ad interim
appointments because the plan was for Congress to remain in session throughout the year except for a
brief 30-day compulsory recess. However, because of the need to avoid disruptions in essential
government services, the framers of the Constitution thought it wise to reinstate the provisions of the
1935 Constitution on ad interim appointments. Clearly, the reinstatement in the present Constitution of
the ad interim appointing power of the President was for the purpose of avoiding interruptions in vital
government services that otherwise would result from prolonged vacancies in government offices,
including the three constitutional commissions.

Evidently, the exercise by the President in the instant case of her constitutional power to make
ad interim appointments prevented the occurrence of the very evil sought to be avoided by the second
paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. This power to make ad interim appointments is
lodged in the President to be exercised by her in her sound judgment. Under the second paragraph of
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, the President can choose either of two modes in appointing
officials who are subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. First, while Congress is in
session, the President may nominate the prospective appointee, and pending consent of the
Commission on Appointments, the nominee cannot qualify and assume office. Second, during the recess
of Congress, the President may extend an ad interim appointment which allows the appointee to
immediately qualify and assume office. Whether the President chooses to nominate the prospective
appointee or extend an ad interim appointment is a matter within the prerogative of the President
because the Constitution grants her that power. This Court cannot inquire into the propriety of the
choice made by the President in the exercise of her constitutional power, absent grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on her part, which has not been shown in the
instant case.

Hence, the Supreme Court ruled that the ad interim appointments extended by the President to
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners, respectively, do not constitute
temporary or acting appointments prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.

2. No.

An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and

can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that
it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent
character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it
effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of
Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides as follows:

“The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.” Therefore, the ad interim
appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it can no
longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President.

It should be noted that while an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as
provided by law, an appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity can be withdrawn or
revoked at the pleasure of the appointing power. A temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy any
security of tenure, no matter how briefly. This is the kind of appointment that the Constitution prohibits
the President from making to the three independent constitutional commissions, including the
COMELEC.

In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the vacancies in
the COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason were extended permanent appointments during the recess of Congress. They were not
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. The ad interim appointments of Benipayo,
Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed by the Constitution which authorizes the President, during the
recess of Congress, to make appointments that take effect immediately.

--------------------NOTHING FOLLOWS--------------------

FUNA VS. VILLAR

DENNIS A. B. FUNA, PETITIONER, VS. THE CHAIRMAN, COA, REYNALDO A. VILLAR

G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012

FACTS:

Funa challenges the constitutionality of the appointment of Reynaldo A. Villar as Chairman of

the COA.
Following the retirement of Carague served(feb 2,2001- feb 2,2008) on February 2, 2008 and
during the fourth year of Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting
Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008. Subsequently, on April 18, 2008,
Villar was nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly thereafter, on June 11,
2008, the Commission on Appointments confirmed his appointment. He was to serve as
Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in the appointment papers, until the expiration of the
original term of his office as COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011. Challenged in this
recourse, Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of title to his hold on the chairmanship, insists
that his appointment as COA Chairman accorded him a fresh term of 7 years which is yet to
lapse. He would argue, in fine, that his term of office, as such chairman, is up to February 2,
2015, or 7 years reckoned from February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to that position.

Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter dated February 22, 2011
addressed to President Benigno S. Aquino III, signified his intention to step down from office
upon the appointment of his replacement. True to his word, Villar vacated his position when
President Benigno Simeon Aquino III named Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan (Chairman Tan) COA
Chairman. This development has rendered this petition and the main issue tendered therein
moot and academic.Although deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of Chairman
Tan and the resignation of Villar, We consider the instant case as falling within the requirements
for review of a moot and academic case, since it asserts at least four exceptions to the
mootness rule discussed in David vs Macapagal Arroyo namely:

a. There is a grave violation of the Constitution;

b. The case involves a situation of exceptional character and is of paramount public interest;
c. The constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar and the public;
d. The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
The procedural aspect comes down to the question of whether or not the following requisites for
the exercise of judicial review of an executive act obtain in this petition, viz:
a. There must be an actual case or justiciable controversy before the court
b. The question before it must be ripe for adjudication;
c. The person challenging the act must be a proper party; and
d. The issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and must be the very
litis mota of the case

ISSUES:
a. WON the petitioner has Locus Standi to bring the case to court
b. WON Villar’s appointment as COA Chairman, while sitting in that body and after having
served for four (4) years of his seven (7) year term as COA commissioner, is valid in light of the
term limitations imposed under, and the circumscribing concepts tucked in, Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D)
of the Constitution

HELD:
Issue of Locus Standi: This case before us is of transcendental importance, since it obviously
has “far-reaching implications,” and there is a need to promulgate rules that will guide the
bench, bar, and the public in future analogous cases. We, thus, assume a liberal stance and
allow petitioner to institute the instant petition.
In David vs Macapagal Arroyo, the Court laid out the bare minimum norm before the so-called
“non-traditional suitors” may be extended standing to sue, thusly:

a. For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax
measure is unconstitutional;
b. For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in
question
c. For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental
importance which must be settled early; and
d. For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes their
prerogatives as legislators.

On the substantive issue:

Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution provides that:
(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment.
Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one commissioner for
five years, and the other commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to
any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In no case
shall any member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Petitioner now asseverates the view that Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution
proscribes reappointment of any kind within the commission, the point being that a second
appointment, be it for the same position (commissioner to another position of commissioner) or
upgraded position (commissioner to chairperson) is a prohibited reappointment and is a nullity
ab initio.

The Court finds petitioner’s position bereft of merit. The flaw lies in regarding the word
“reappointment” as, in context, embracing any and all species of appointment. The rule is that if
a statute or constitutional provision is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.

The first sentence is unequivocal enough. The COA Chairman shall be appointed by the
President for a term of seven years, and if he has served the full term, then he can no longer be
reappointed or extended another appointment. In the same vein, a Commissioner who was
appointed for a term of seven years who likewise served the full term is barred from being
reappointed. In short, once the Chairman or Commissioner shall have served the full term of
seven years, then he can no longer be reappointed to either the position of Chairman or
Commissioner. The obvious intent of the framers is to prevent the president from “dominating”
the Commission by allowing him to appoint an additional or two more commissioners.

On the other hand, the provision, on its face, does not prohibit a promotional appointment from
commissioner to chairman as long as the commissioner has not served the full term of seven
years, further qualified by the third sentence of Sec. 1(2), Article IX (D) that “the appointment to
any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor.” In addition,
such promotional appointment to the position of Chairman must conform to the rotational plan or
the staggering of terms in the commission membership such that the aggregate of the service of
the Commissioner in said position and the term to which he will be appointed to the position of
Chairman must not exceed seven years so as not to disrupt the rotational system in the
commission prescribed by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).

In conclusion, there is nothing in Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) that explicitly precludes a promotional
appointment from Commissioner to Chairman, provided it is made under the aforestated
circumstances or conditions.

The Court is likewise unable to sustain Villar’s proposition that his promotional appointment as
COA Chairman gave him a completely fresh 7- year term––from February 2008 to February
2015––given his four (4)-year tenure as COA commissioner devalues all the past
pronouncements made by this Court. While there had been divergence of opinion as to the
import of the word “reappointment,” there has been unanimity on the dictum that in no case can
one be a COA member, either as chairman or commissioner, or a mix of both positions, for an
aggregate term of more than 7 years. A contrary view would allow a circumvention of the
aggregate 7-year service limitation and would be constitutionally offensive as it would wreak
havoc to the spirit of the rotational system of succession.

In net effect, then President Macapagal-Arroyo could not have had, under any circumstance,
validly appointed Villar as COA Chairman, for a full 7- year appointment, as the Constitution
decrees, was not legally feasible in light of the 7-year aggregate rule. Villar had already served
4 years of his 7-year term as COA Commissioner. A shorter term, however, to comply with said
rule would also be invalid as the corresponding appointment would effectively breach the clear
purpose of the Constitution of giving to every appointee so appointed subsequent to the first set
of commissioners, a fixed term of office of 7 years. To recapitulate, a COA commissioner like
respondent Villar who serves for a period less than seven (7) years cannot be appointed as
chairman when such position became vacant as a result of the expiration of the 7-year term of
the predecessor (Carague). Such appointment to a full term is not valid and constitutional, as
the appointee will be allowed to serve more than seven (7) years under the constitutional ban.

To sum up, the Court restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution, viz:

1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions, after the
expiration of the uneven terms of office of the first set of commissioners, shall always be for a
fixed term of seven (7) years; an appointment for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional.
The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven (7) years in case of the
expiration of the term as this will result in the distortion of the rotational system prescribed by
the Constitution.

2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation, disability or

impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor, but such
appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as this will likewise disrupt the
staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were appointed for a full
term of seven years and who served the entire period, are barred from reappointment to any
position in the Commission. Corollarily, the first appointees in the Commission under the
Constitution are also covered by the prohibition against reappointment.

4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is
eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of
the departing chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment,
provided that the aggregate period of the length of service as commissioner and the unexpired
period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed seven (7) years and provided further that
the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal
by impeachment. The Court clarifies that “reappointment” found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a
movement to one and the same office (Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to
Chairman). On the other hand, an appointment involving a movement to a different position or
office (Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in the
strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under the Constitution.

5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting

capacity.

APPOINTMENTS BY THE PRESIDENT

Sarmiento v. Mison
GR No. 79974, December 17, 1987

Facts: Herein Respondent Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau
of Customs by then-President Corazon Aquino.
Thereafter, said appointment made by the President is being questioned by petitioner
Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla who are both taxpayers, members of the bar, and both
Constitutional law professors, stating that the said appointment is not valid, since such was not
submitted to the Commission On Appointments (COA) for approval.
Under the Constitution, the appointments made for the "Heads of Bureau" requires the
confirmation from COA.
Issue: Whether or not the Presidential Appointment made by the President without approval
from the CoA is valid.

Ruling: Yes. It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, there are
four groups of officers whom the President shall appoint:
1. F
irst, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;

2. S
econd, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for
by law;

3. T
hird, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

4. F
ourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.

The first group of officers are clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination
is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints. The second, third
and fourth groups of officers are the present bone of contention.
The Court notes that RA 1937 and PD 34, which allows for the Presidential appointment of
the head of the bureau of customs, were approved during the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution, under which the President may nominate and, with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus, like the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs.
After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, Rep. Act No. 1937( a decree to
consolidate and codify all the tariff and customs laws of the philippines ),
as amended by PD No. 34
have to be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while the appointment of
the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on the President, as an
appointment he is authorizedby law to make, such appointment, however, no longer needs the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.

Bautista v. Salonga
April 13, 1989

Facts: The President appointed herein petitioner Mary Concepcion Bautista as the Chairman of
the Commission on Human Rights pursuant to the second sentence in Section 16, Art. VII,
without the confirmation of the CoA because they are among the officers of government "whom
he (the President) may be authorized by law to appoint."
Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163, authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman
and Members of the Commission on Human Rights. However, the CoA disapproved Bautista's
alleged ad interim appointment as Chairperson of the CHR, in view of her refusal to submit to
the jurisdiction of the Commission on Appointments.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is subject to CoA's confirmation.

2. Whether or not Bautista's appointment is an ad interim appointment.

Ruling:
First, No. The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the
first sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7 of the Constitution, which provides that the appointments which
are to be made with the confirmation of CoA. Rather, it is within the authority of President,
vested upon her by Constitution (2nd sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7), that she appoint executive
officials without confirmation of CoA.
The Commission on Appointments, by the actual exercise of its constitutionally delimited
power to review presidential appointments, cannot create power to confirm appointments that
the Constitution has reserved to the President alone.
Second, No. Ad interim appointments are to remain valid until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress; but appointments that
are for the President solely to make, that is, without the participation of the Commission on
Appointments, cannot be ad interim appointments.
Under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not apply to appointments
solely for the President to make. Ad interim appointments, by their very nature under the 1987
Constitution, extend only to appointments where the review of the Commission on Appointments
is needed.

Calderon v. Carale
April 23, 1992

Facts: Sometime in March 1989, RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law), amending the Labor Code
(PD 442) was approved. Section 13 provides that the Chairman, the Division Presiding
Commissioners, and other Commissioners of NLRC shall all be appointed by the President,
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
 President Aquino appointed Respondents Carale as the Chairman and Commissioners of
the NLRC.
Calderon filed a petition for prohibition questioning the constitutionality and legality of
respondents’ permanent appointments. Calderon insists that the appointments must be
submitted to the CA for confirmation. He also posits that RA 6715 is not an encroachment on
the appointing power of the executive contained in Section 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, as
Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of other
officers appointed by the President additional to those mentioned in the first sentence of Section
16 of Article VII of the Constitution.
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that RA 6715 which amended the Labor
Code transgresses Section 16, Article VII by expanding the confirmation powers of the
Commission on Appointments without constitutional basis.

Issues:
1. W
hether or not Congress may require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
of appointments extended by the President to government officers, additional to those
expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, whose
appointments require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
2. W
hether or not RA 6715 is constitutional.

Ruling:
First, No. The second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII refers to all other officers of the
government whose appointment are not otherwise provided for by law and those whom the
President may be authorized by law to appoint.
Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the second sentence of
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, more specifically under the "third groups" of
appointees referred to in Mison, i.e. those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint.
Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among the officers mentioned
in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose appointments requires confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
Second, Yes. To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of the appointments of respondents Chairman and Members of the National
Labor Relations Commission, it is unconstitutional because:
1) it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by adding
thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and

2) it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, by
imposing the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments on appointments which are otherwise
entrusted only with the President.
 It can not be overlooked that Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution was deliberately, not
unconsciously, intended by the framers of the 1987 Constitution to be a departure from the
system embodied in the 1935 Constitution where the Commission on Appointments exercised
the power of confirmation over almost all presidential appointments, leading to may cases of
abuse of such power of confirmation.
G.R. No. 164978 October 13, 2005
Pimentel et al (Senators) vs Exec Sec Eduardo Angara
Facts:
Case decided: 10/13/2005
Commencement of regular session in congress - 07-26-2004
Commission on Appointment was consulted on (next day)
Composition of Comm on Appts - Senators and Representatives.

President Arroyo issued appts to respondents as acting secretaries on the following:

Appointee Department Date of Appointment

Arthur C. Yap Agriculture 15 August 2004
Alberto G. Romulo Foreign Affairs 23 August 2004
Raul M. Gonzalez Justice (same)
Florencio B. Abad Education (same)
Avelino J. Cruz, Jr. National Defense (same)
Rene C. Villa Agrarian Reform (same)
Joseph H. Durano Tourism (same)
Michael T. Defensor Environment and Natural (same)
Resources

Respondents to their oath of office (no date mentioned)

On the cause of action:

Who filed: senators Aguilino Pimentel Jr. , Enrile, Edgardo Angara, Luisa Estrada,Jinggoy
Estrada, Lacson, Alfredo Lim,Jamby Madrigal and Sergio Osmena III.
Petition for certiorai and prohibition
prayer: to declare the appts of Arroyo as unconsitiutional and to prohibit respondents from
performing the duties of department secretaries.

grounds: the ad interim appt constitutionality without the consent of the Comm on appts and
while congress is in session.
Congress adjourned on 9-22-2004, on the next day, Arroyo issued an ad interim appointent.
The senators believed that this act in unconsitutional, as it the appts made by the President
without the consent of the Comm on Appts and during session.

Issue:
WON President Arroyo’s act of appoiting the acting secretaries without CA’s consent and while
congress is in session allowed?

Held: No. It is constitutional; no law violated.

1. GR: The writ of prohibition will not lie to enjoin acts already done.
exception: courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading
review.

So? The mootness of the petition does not bar its resolution. The question of the
constitutionality of the President’s appointment of department secretaries in an acting capacity
while Congress is in session will arise in every such appointment.

2. Nature of the power to appoint: executive in nature. The legislature may not interfere with the
exercise of this executive power except in those instances when the Constitution expressly
allows it to interfere.
Statcon application:
Limitations on the executive power to appoint are construed strictly against the legislature.

The scope of the legislature’s interference in the executive’s power to appoint is limited to the
power to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress cannot appoint a person
to an office in the guise of prescribing qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose
on the President the duty to appoint any particular person to an office.

Even if the Commission on Appointments is composed of members of Congress, the exercise of

its powers is executive and not legislative.

What Comm on Appt is not:

The Commission on Appointments does not legislate when it exercises its power to give or
withhold consent to presidential appointments. The Commission on Appointments is a creature
of the Constitution. Although its membership is confined to members of Congress, said
Commission is independent of Congress. The powers of the Commission do not come from
Congress, but emanate directly from the Constitution. Hence, it is not an agent of Congress.In
fact, the functions of the Commissioner are purely executive in nature.

On issue of legal standing: Not all senators are members of Comm on Appts: only Enrile,
Lacson, Angara, Estrada are members. Therefore, Congress has no standing.

Another contention of Senators: Arroyo cannot appt secretaries as in case of vacancy, USECs
will takeover.

Can Arroyo appoint officials? Yes.

EO 292
SEC. 16. Power of Appointment. — The President shall exercise the power to appoint such
officials as provided for in the Constitution and laws.
SEC. 17. Power to Issue Temporary Designation. —

(1) The President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or
any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch,
appointment to which is vested in him by law, when: (a) the officer regularly appointed to the
office is unable to perform his duties by reason of illness, absence or any other cause; or (b)
there exists a vacancy.

(2) The person designated shall receive the compensation attached to the position, unless he is
already in the government service in which case he shall receive only such additional
compensation as, with his existing salary, shall not exceed the salary authorized by law for the
position filled. The compensation hereby authorized shall be paid out of the funds appropriated
for the office or agency concerned.
(3) In no case shall a temporary designation exceed one (1) year.

In lieu the prohibition (non appt in an acting capacity while congress is in session)., is only for
temporary appts. Ad interim is permanent, therefore, it is allowed.

Quirog vs Aumentado
11/11/2008
GR 163443

dates:
Appt of Quirog - 05-28-2001
Embodied in: Resolution 2001-199; 06-01-2001
Took oath: 06-1-2001
CSC Resolution invalidate appts 2 mos prior end of term: 06-04-2001
Date of CSC invalidating his appt: 06-28-2001

Facts:
On May 28, 2001, Provincial Governor Rene Relamagos permanently appt Liza M.
Quirog as Provincial Government Department Head of the office of Bohol provincial agriculture
(PGDH-OPA), to which appt was confirmed by Sanguniang Panlalawigan on a resolution 2001-
199 dated 06-01-2001. On even date, he took his oath of office. HOWEVER, prior to that, the
Personnel Selection Board (PSB) of HRMO of Bohol issued a certificate that Quiroy was 1 of 2
candidated qualified for the position of PGDH-OPA. A copy of the monthly report on personnel
actions covering May and June 2001of provincial government was submitted to CSC Cebu.

DECISION: In an order daed 06-28-2001, Director of CSC region 7 invalidated his appt,
upon finding that the same was part of the bulk appts issued by Gov Relampagos after 05-14-
2001 elections allegedly in violation of item 3(d) of CSC Reso 010988 (Midnight appt).

Gov and Quirog moved for recon alleging that he took oath prior to the effectivity of 06-
01-2001 (CSC Resolution was effective 06-4-2001).
That it was not a midnight appt as it was made days prior to the end of Relampagos’
term, and he is already the acting provincial agriculturist a year prior to said appt or since 06-19-
2000.
That since he has taken his oath, he acquired a legal right and assumed all duties and
collect her salary fpr the month of June 2001, and it cannot be take away form her either by
revocation or the appt of by removal except for a cause and with previous notice and hearing.
DECISION: On the decision dated 06-23-2001, CSC denied their MR, lacking legal
personality, CSC said that only appt officer may request recon of the disapproval. Even if
Relampagos is the one who appt Quirog, he could not file MR as his term already expired.
Aggreived, in GR 163443, they appeal to CSC to which CSC granted the joint appeal,
setting aside CSC RO7 order, for a reason that his appt was not midnight as it was not hurried
nor did it subvert the policies of the incoming administration.
DECISION: CSC said that the resolution ordering that appt should have gone thru reguar
screening by PSB before the eleciton ban or is prohibited period form March 30-May 14,2001,
after noting that board only deliberated his qualifications on May 24, 2001 or after election ban,
“the spirit, rather than the said rule shall prevail”. And he was included among 46 post election
appts because there is a need to immediately fill up in a permanent capacity the vacant position
and on the fact that Gov Relampagos declared his trust and confidence in a Memorandum No. 1
(07-2-2001).
On 12-10-2001 Bohol Governor Erico Aumentado filed MR, insisting lack of legal
personality to file by Q and R, that the board who screened his appt was not validly constitued
and that the appt was made more than 6 mos in violation of CSC Reso 010114 (June 10-2001).
Relampagos has 97 not 46 mass appointments on the eve of his term, 95 of which was
invalidated by CSC Bohol including Quirog.

DECISION: CA reversed the order of the CSC and said Quirog’s appeal should be
dismissed (lack of legal personality), MR was denied. Hence this petition for certiorari.
Issue/s: WON the appointment made by Governor Relampagos is a midnight appointment?
(note: CSC Memo circular 40 says, appt authority may request for recon for CSC disapproved
appts)
Held: No it is not a midnight appointment.

CSC's disapproval of an appointment is a challenge to the exercise of the appointing authority's

discretion. The appointing authority must have the right to contest the disapproval. Thus,
Section 2 of Rule VI of CSC Memorandum Circular 40, s. 1998 is justified insofar as it allows the
appointing authority to request reconsideration or appeal.

Although the earlier discussion demonstrates that the appointing authority is adversely affected
by the CSC's Order and is a real party in interest, the appointee is rightly a real party in interest
too. He is also injured by the CSC disapproval, because he is prevented from assuming the
office in a permanent capacity. Moreover, he would necessarily benefit if a favorable judgment
is obtained, as an approved appointment would confer on him all the rights and privileges of a
permanent appointee.

pursuant to Abella, Jr., Quirog had the right to ask for reconsideration of, or to appeal the
adverse ruling of CSCROVII. In contrast, Relampagos, by reason of the expiration of his term as
governor, had lost the legal personality to contest the disapproval of the appointment.
CSCROVII should not have subjected Quirog's appointment to the requirements under said
resolution, as its application is against the prospective application of laws. Having no provision
regarding its retroactive application to appointments made prior to its effectivity, CSC Resolution
No. 010988 must be taken to be of prospective application

Midnight appts (ppt 2 months prior to next presidential elections)., applies only to
President/acting president.

De Rama vs CA provides, there is no law that prohibits local elective officials from making
appointments during the last days of his or her tenure.

the prohibition is precisely designed to discourage, nay, even preclude, losing candidates from
issuing appointments merely for partisan purposes.

The appointment of Quirog cannot be categorized as a midnight appointment. For it is beyond

dispute that Quirog had been discharging and performing the duties concomitant with the
subject position for a year prior to her permanent appointment thereto.

Nazareno vs. City of Dumaguete

527 SCRA 509

FACTS:
· Agustin R. Perdices won over incumbent Mayor Felipe Antonio B. Remollo for the mayoralty
post. He was to assume office on June 30, 2001.
· Before Perdices’ assumption, Remollo made fifteen (15) promotional appointments, and
seventy-four (74) original appointments for various positions in the city government.
· July 2, 2001: Remollo dishonored the appointments made by Remollo.
· Leah M. Nazareno, et al, filed with the RTC of Dumaguete City a Petition for Mandamus,
Injunction and Damages against the City of Dumaguete, represented by Mayor Remollo.
· Aug. 1, 2001: Director Abucejo of the Civil Service Commission Field Office (CSCFO)
invalidated and revoked the questioned appointments as they were issued in violation of the
guidelines set forth by the CSC.
· Aug. 3, 2001: RTC issued a writ of prelim injunction against the City Government pending the
final adjudication of the case. The court reversed Director Abucejo’s on the ground that the
questioned appointments may only be invalidated by the Regional Office upon recommendation
by the CSCFO.
· City of Dumaguete claimed that Director Abucejo’s decision already became final after
petitioner’s failed to move for reconsideration of the same. They moved for the dismissal of the
injunction case. RTC denied the motion to dismiss but agreed with the finality of the decision. It
permanently lifted the preliminary injunction. Hence, appointees asked for their salaries and
moral damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appointees can claim salaries and moral damages to the appointing
authority.

RULING:

· Yes. The Court stresses that Section 3, Rule VI of the Revised Omnibus Rules on
Appointments and Other Personnel Actions only categorically recognizes the right of the
appointee to payment of salaries from the government, during the pendency of his motion for
reconsideration or appeal of the disapproval of his appointment by the CSC-FO and/or CSC-RO
before the CSC Proper, "[i]f the appointment was disapproved on grounds which do not
constitute a violation of civil service law, such as failure of the appointee to meet the
Qualification Standards (QS) prescribed for the position."
What happens then if the appointment was disapproved for violation of civil service law? In such
a situation, Section 4, Rule VI of the Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other
Personnel Action applies. It states:
Sec. 4. The appointing authority shall be personally liable for the salary of appointees whose
appointments have been disapproved for violation of pertinent laws such as the publication
requirement pursuant to RA 7041.
It is clear from the afore-quoted provision that when the appointment was disapproved for
violation of pertinent laws, the appointing authority shall be personally liable for the salary of the
appointee. This is in complete accord with the Section 65, Chapter 10, Book V, of Executive
Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, to wit:
Section 65. Liability of appointing authority. - No person employed in the Civil Service in
violation of Civil Service law and rules shall be entitled to receive pay from the government, but
the appointing authority responsible for such unlawful employment shall be personally liable for
the pay that would have accrued had the employment been lawful, and the disbursing officials
shall make payment to the employee of such amount from the salary of the officers so liable.
To recall, petitioners' appointments were invalidated and revoked by CSC-FO Director Abucejo,
in a letter dated 1 August 2001, on the ground that said appointments were made by former
Mayor Remollo in violation of Items No. 3(d) and 4 of CSC Resolution No. 010988 dated 4 June
2001, which prohibit the outgoing chief executive from making mass appointments after
elections. The rules laid down by the CSC in CSC Resolution No. 010988, dated 4 June 2001,
are deemed included in what is the "civil service law," it having the force and effect of law.
Upon disapproval by CSC-FO Director Abucejo of petitioners' appointments on 1 August 2001,
for being in violation of civil service law, petitioners may no longer claim entitlement to the
payment of their salaries from the government. There is no doubt that, pending their appeals
before the CSC-RO, then the CSC Proper, petitioners' appointments remained effective and
they could still continue reporting to work and rendering service, but there already arose the
question as to who shall be liable for their salaries during the period, i.e., whether it is the City
Government of Dumaguete (under Section 3, Rule VI of the Revised Omnibus Rules on
Appointments and Other Personnel Action) or former Mayor Remollo who appointed them
(under Section 4, Rule VI of the same Revised Omnibus Rules). Hence, petitioners' right to
salary cannot be firmly anchored as
of yet on Section 3, Rule VI of the Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other
Personnel Action.

2. Provincial Government of Aurora vs Marco

FACTS:
Governor Ramoncita P. Ong permanently appointed Marco as Cooperative Development
Specialist II on June 25, 2004, five (5) days before the end of her term as Governor of the
Province. On June 28, 2004, Marco's appointment, together with 25 other appointments, was
submitted to the Civil Service Commission Field Office-Aurora (the Field Office). On June 30,
2004, newly elected Governor Bellaflor Angara-Castillo assumed office. The next day, she
called to an executive meeting all the department heads of the Province. During the executive
meeting, Provincial Budget Officer Clemente allegedly manifested that the Province had no
funds available to pay for the salaries of Governor Ong's 26 appointees. She subsequently
issued a Letter recalling the previously issued certification of the availability of funds:
In view of the result of the dialogue of the concerned offices regarding the financial status of the
Provincial Government of Aurora, we hereby recall/retrieve our previously issued certification of
availability of funds relative to the appointments issued by Governor Ramoncita P. Ong. Due to
the recall of the certification, the Field Office disapproved Marco's appointment in the Letter
dated July 5, 2004. The Province, through Human Resource Management Officer Liwayway G.
Victorio, served Marco a copy of the Letter dated July 5, 2004. Marco was, thus, advised to
refrain from reporting for work beginning July 8, 2004, the day he received notice of the
disapproval of his appointment. Marco wrote the Civil Service Commission Regional Office No.
IV (Regional Office), moving for the reconsideration of the disapproval of his appointment. The
Regional Office, however, denied reconsideration in its Decision dated April 6, 2005 and
affirmed the disapproval of Marco's appointment. It said that "[t]he lack of funds for the [26
appointments Governor Ong issued] was established during the meeting of the different
department heads of Aurora Province and their new governor." Through the Letter dated May
17, 2005, Marco appealed before the Civil Service Commission. The Province, through its
Human Resource Management Office, received a copy of Marco's Letter on May 23, 2005.
However, it failed to comment on the appeal within 10 days from receipt as required by Section
73 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. In the Resolution dated
April 14, 2008, the Civil Service Commission granted Marco's appeal and
set aside the Regional Office's Decision dated April 6, 2005. It ruled that Marco's appointment
was valid since it was accompanied by a certification of availability of funds. As to the Letter
withdrawing the certification, the Civil Service Commission ruled that it did not affect the validity
of Marco's appointment because the Province "failed to submit documentary evidence to
support its claim [that it had no funds to pay for the services of Governor Ong's appointees]."

ISSUE:

Whether or not Marco was a midnight appointee.

RULING:
No.
A midnight appointment "refers to those appointments made within two months immediately
prior to the next presidential election. Midnight appointments are prohibited under Article VII,
Section 15 of the Constitution:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SECTION 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end
of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety.
Midnight appointments are prohibited because an outgoing President is "duty bound to prepare
for the orderly transfer of authority to the incoming President, and he [or she] should not do acts
which he [or she] ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his [or her]
successor." An outgoing President should not "deprive the new administration of an opportunity
to make the corresponding appointments." However, the constitution prohibition on midnight
appointments only applies to presidential appointments. It does not apply to appointments made
by local chief executives. In De Rama v. Court of Appeals, Mayor Conrado L. de Rama (Mayor
de Rama) of Pagbilao, Quezon sought to recall 14 appointments made by former Mayor Ma.
Evelyn S. Abeja on the sole ground that they were midnight appointments.The Civil Service
Commission denied Mayor de Rama's request, ruling that the prohibition on midnight
appointments only applies to outgoing Presidents. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
Civil Service Commission's decision.

DE CASTRO VS JBC

FACTS:
This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy that has arisen from
the forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven days
after the presidential election. On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an
ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for
nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately.
In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a resolution which stated that they
have unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to be
vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice.
As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or recommendation,
and published for that purpose its announcement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the
Philippine Star.

In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing
the names of the following candidates to invite to the public to file their sworn complaint, written
report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010.
Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno in
accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list
of nominees for the position due to the controversy in this case being unresolved.
The compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for either the
prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass the shortlist, or that
the act of appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight appointment.
A precedent frequently cited by the parties is the In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of
Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of Branch 62,
Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred to here as the
Valenzuela case, by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by
the President of the power to appoint to judicial positions during the period therein fixed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice.

RULING:
Yes. Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in
the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or
Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme
Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc
or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could
not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely
written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could
not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely
written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the
President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does not
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect
the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to
appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies
only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of
the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be
considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between
Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential
appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers,
if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most
likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.