Points of Controversy (Kathavatthu), Aung, Davids, 1915 PDF
Points of Controversy (Kathavatthu), Aung, Davids, 1915 PDF
Points of Controversy (Kathavatthu), Aung, Davids, 1915 PDF
or
Subjects of Discourse
I p a l i Xteyt S o c i e t y
Points of C o n t r o v e r s y
OR
Subjects of Discourse
BEING
A TRANSLATION OF T H E
M T H A - V A T T H U
FROM THE
A B H I D H A M M A - PIT A K A
BY
ILontian
PUBLISHED FOR THE PALI TEXT SOCIETY
BY
HUMPHREY MILFORD
OXFORD U N I V E R S I T Y PRESS W A R E H O U S E , AMEN CORNER,
1915
TO
KATHA-VATTHU
v
CONTENTS
PA L
T H E POINTS OP ^CONTROVERSY ACCORDING TO THE CANONICAL '
ORDER t > ^ vili
SOME CORRIGENDA IV
T H E COMMENTATOR'S INTRODUCTION 1
POINTS OF CONTROVERSY 8
APPENDIX :
SUPPLEMENTARY N O T E S . . . . . . 369
INDEXES :
I . QUOTATIONS FROM THE CANON . . . . 401
IL SUBJECTS . . . . . . . . 404
I I I . P A L I W O R D S DISCUSSED 413
DIAGRAMS:
T H E SECESSIONS ACCORDING TO THE COMMENTARY TO face p 1
T H E SAME ACCORDING TO VASUMITRA p. xxxiv
T H E SAME ACCORDING TO BHAVYA p. xxxv
vii
THE POINTS OF CONTROVERSY ACCORDING TO
THE CANONICAL ORDER
BOOK II
1. Of Conveyance by Another . . . .
2. Of the Knowledge of the Arahant . . . . .
3. Of Doubt in the Arahant . . . . . . . i
4. Of the Arahant being Excelled by Others . . . .119
5. Of Articulate Utterance during Ecstasy . . . . 120
6. Of Inducing [Insight] by saying ' Borrow 1' . . . 124
7. Of the Duration of Consciousness . . . . . 12
8. Of the World as only a Cinderheap . . . . 127
9. Of a Specified Progress in Penetration . . . 130
10. Of a Buddha's Every-day Usage . . . . 134
11. Of Cessation . . . . . . . . , 135
viii
Contents ix
BOOK IV
1. As to whether a Layman may be an Arahant
2. Of Arahantship as conferred by Rebirth alone 158
3. Of the Arahanfs Common Humanity . . . . 160
4. Of the Retaining of Distinctive Endowments . 161
5. Of the Arahant's Indifference in Sense-Cognition . 163
6. Of becoming 1 the Enlightened One5 through Enlightenment 164
7. Of one gifted with the Marks . . . . . 166
8. Of entering on the Path of Assurance . . . . 167
9. More about Endowment . . . . . . 170
10. Of putting off the Fetters . . . 172
BOOK V
1. Of Emancipation . . . . . . . 173
2. Of the Knowledge of the Adept . , 174
3. Of Perverted Perception or Hallucination (in Jhana) . 175
4. Of Assurance . . . . . . . . 177
5. Of Analytic Insight . 179
6. Of Popular Knowledge . 180
7. Of the Mental Object in Telepathy . 4 180
8. Of Insight into the Future . . . . . 182
9. Of Knowledge of the Present . . . . . 183
LO. Of Knowing Others' Fruition . . . . 184
BOOK VI
1. Of Assurance of Salvation . 185
2. Of Causal Genesis . . . . . . . 186
3. Of the Four Truths . .. . • • . • 188
4. Of the Four Immaterial Spheres of Life and Thought . 189
5. Of the Attaining to Cessation (Jhana) . . . . 190
6. , 191
7. Of Space as Visible . . . . 192
8. Of the Four Elements, Five Senses, Action, as Visibles .194
T.S» V. b
X Contents
BOOK VIII
1. Of Divers Destinies . . . . . . .211 .
2. Of an Intermediate State . . . . . .212 .
3. Of the Pleasures of Sense , 214
4. Of Sense-Desires . . . . . . . 215
5. Of the Riipa-Element . . . . . . .217
6. Of the Ar upa-Element . . . . . .217
7. Of the Senses in the Riipa-Sphere . . . . . 218
8. Of Matter in the Arupa-Sphere 220
9. Of Matter as ethically Good or Bad . . . . . 221
10. Of Vital Power . . . . . . . . 226
11. Of a Result of Karma . . . . . . .228
BOOK IX
1. Of Release through Seeing the Good . . . . ,230
2. Of the Ambrosial as an Object by which we are Bound . . 231
3. Of Matter as Subjective . . . . . . . 233
4. Of Bias as without Mental Object . . . . . 234
-5. Of InsigM as without Mental Object . . . . 236
6. Of Past Ideas . . . . . . . . 237
7. Of Future Ideas . . . . . . . , 237
8. Of Initial Application of Mind . . . . . 238
9. Of Sound as purely Mental . . . . . . 239
10. Of Speech conforming to Thought . . . . . 240
11. Of Action conforming to Thought . . . . .241
12. Of Past, Future and Present . . . . . 242
BOOK X
1. Of Cessation . . . . ,. . . . , 243
2. Of the Path and Bodily Form . . . . . . 244
3. Of Path-Culture and the Senses . . . . . . 245
4. Of Sensations as Moral and Immoral . . 247
3. Of Sensations and Ideation . . . . v , 247
6. Of Two Codes of Morals . . . . . . . 248
7. Of Virtue or Morality as Automatic > . . . . 249
9 • ' *' I
Contents xi
PAGE
8. Of Virtue as conforming to Thought 250
9. Of Growth through Observance . . . . . . 250
10. Are Acts of Intimation Virtue ? . . . . . a 251
11. Of Non-Intimation as Immoral . . . . . . 252
BOOK XI
1. Of Three Facts about Latent Bias . . . . . 233
2. Of Insight 255
3. Of Insight and Ordinary Consciousness . . . . 256
4. Of the Utterance : ' This is Pain and Sorrow ! ' . . . 257
5. Of the Force of the Magic Gift (idd h i) . . . * 258
6. Of Concentration . . . . . . . 260
7. Of the Causality of Things . . . . . .261
8. Of Impermanence . . . . . . . . 262
BOOK XII
1. Of Self-Restraint . . . . . . . . 264
2. Of Action . . . . . . . . . 265
3. Of Sound as Result of Karma . . . . . . 266
4. Of the Sense-Orga?is 267
5. Of the Seven Rebirths' Limit . . . . . . 268
-6. Sequel . 269
7. Of Murder . . . . . . . 269
8. Of Evil Tendency . . . . . . . . 270
9. Of him who has reached the Seventh Reb irth . . . .271
BOOK XIII
1. Of Age-long Penalty . 272
2. Of a Doomed Man's Morality . . . . . . 273
3. Of Abettors of Cardinal Crimes . . . . . . 274
4. Of one whose Salvation is Morally Certain . 27i?
5. Of one in the Toils . . . . . . . . 276
6. Of Captivity and Release . . . . . . .277
7. Of Jhdna as Enjoyment . . . . . . .277
8. Of Lust for the Unpleasant . . . . . . 279
9. Of Natural Desire for Mental Objects as Unmoral . . 279
10. Of Desire for Ideas and the Cause of III . «. * .281
BOOK XIV
1. Of the Mental Consecutiveness of Good and Bad . . . 282
2. Of the (pre-natal) Development of Sense-Organs . . . 283
3. Of Immediate Contiguity in Sense . . . . . 285
4. Of the Outward Life of the Ariyan . . . . . 286
5. Of Latent Bias as something Apart . . . . . 287
6. Of Unconscious Outbursts of Corruption . . . . 288
7. Of Desire as inherent in Heavenly Things . . . ... 289
S. Of the Unmoral and the Unrevealed . . . . . 290
9. Of the Unincluded . . . . «r - . . 291
Contents
BOOK XV page
1. Of Correlation as specifically Fixed . . • • 293
2. Of Reciprocal Correlation 294
2 9 5
3. Of Duration
4. Of Instants, Moments, Seconds of Time . * • * 296
5. Of the Intoxicants .297
6. Of Decay and Death . 297
7. Of Trance (i.) • * .298
8. Of „ (ii.) 298
9. Of „ (iii.) 299
10. Of Trance as a Means of reaching the Unconscious Sphere . 300
11. Of Karma and its Accumulation . . . . . 301
BOOK XVI
1. Of Control 303
2. Of Assisting Another's Mind . . . . • 304
3. Of making Another Happy according to his Deserts . . 304
4. Of Attending to Everything at once 305
5. Of Matter as a Moral Condition (hetu) . . . . 307
6. Of Matter and Morality . . . . . . . 307
7. Of Matter as Morally Good or Bad . . . . . 308
8. Of Matter as Result . .309
9. Of Matter as in the Material and Immaterial Heavens . . 309
10. Of Desire in the Higher Heavens 310
BOOK XVII
1. Of an Arahant having Accumulating Merit . . . .312
2. Of Arahants and Untimely Death . . . . . . 313
B. Of Everything as due to Karma . . * . 314
4. Of III {duhkha) and Sentient Organisms . . . . 315
- 5. Of'save only the Ariyan Path* . . . . . 317
6. Of the Order and the Accepting of Gifts . . . 318
7. Of the Order and the Purifying of Gifts . . . .319
8. Of the Order and Daily Life . . . . . . 319
9. Of the Order and the Fruit of Giving . . . . . 320
10. Of the Buddha and the Fruit of Giving . . . 321
11. Of the Sanctification of the Gift . . . . . . 321
BOOK XVIII
1. Of the Buddha and this World , . . . - 323
2. Of how the Norm was Taught . . . • • • 324
3. Of the Buddha and Pity . . . . . • * . 325
4. Of the Buddha and Fragrant Things . . . . . 326
5. Of a One and Only Path . . . . . . . 327
6. Of the Transitions from Cne Jhana to Another . . . 328
7. Of Jhana and its Intervals . . . . . : 329
8. Of Hearing in Jhana , . . • . . . . . 331
• 9. Of the Eye and Seeing . . . .. . * . . . 332
Contents
BOOK XXI
1. Of our Religion . . . . . 351
2. Of Experience as inseparable from Personality 352
3. Of Certain Fetters . 352
4. Of Supernormal Potency . 353
5. Of Buddhas . . . . 354
6. Of All-pervading Power 354
7. Of Phenomena (d ha mm a) 355
8. Of Karma 356
BOOK XXII
1. Of the Completion of Life . . . . 358
2. Of Moral Consciousness . 358
3. Of Imperturbable (Fourth Jhana) Consciousness 359
4. Of Penetrating the Truth . . . . 360
5. Three other Arguments . . 361
6. Of the Unmoral . . . . . 361
7. Of Correlation by Repetition 362
8. Of Momentary Duration . . 363
BOOK XXIII
1. Of United Resolve . . . . 365
2. Of Bogus Arahants . 366
3. Of Self-governed Destiny . . 366
4. Of Counterfeit States of Consciousness 367
5. Of the Undetermined 368
THE POINTS OF CONTROVERSY GROUPED
ACCORDING TO THE SUBJECT OF DISCOURSE
I. Of the Buddha :
1. His Every-Day Usage, II. 10.
2. His Powers, III. 1, 2.
3. Enlightened through Enlightenment ? IV. 6.
4. His Marks, IV. 7.
5. Gifts to Him brought Blessing, XVII. 10.
6. Bid he visit earth by proxy only ? XVIII. 1.
7. Did he teach by proxy only ? XVIII. 2.
8. Did he feel pity ? XVIII. 3.
9. Was everything of him fragrant ? XVIII. 4.
10. Could he work wonders against nature ? XXI. 4.
11. How do Buddhas mutually differ ? XXI. 5.
12. Do they pervade the firmament ? XXI. 6.
13. Do Bodhisats decree their own sufferings ? XXIII. 3.
14. Are Bodhisats assured prior to their last birth ? IV. 8;
XIII. 4.
IV. Of Devas:
1. Do they lead the c higher life' ? I. 3.
2. Do they practise self-control ? III. 10.
3. Can Unconscious Devas be conscious ? III. 11.
V. Of the Order:
1. As Abstract Notion, it cannot accept gifts, XVII. 6.
2. Or purify the same, XVII. 7.
3. Or share in daily life, XVII. 8.
4. Or confer great merit, XVII. 9.
II
T H E SAMMITIYAS HELD THAT
Ill
T H E SABBATTHIVADINS HELD THAT
Ilia
O F T H E SABBATTHIVADINS, THE KASSAPIKAS HELD THAT
IV
T H E MAHASANGHTKAS HELD
V
T H E ANDHAKAS I N GENERAL :—(i.) PTTBBASELIYAS, (ii.) APARASELIYAS,
(iii.) KAJAGIRIKAS, (iv.) SIDDHATTHIKAS—HELD
1. Confused views on object and subject (in the Satipatthanas),
I. 9; on Modes of Existence, I. 10; on the sequences of
conscious units, X. 1; on spiritual liberty, V. 1, IV. 10; on
consciousness of 4 the void,5 XIX. 2; and on the ' goodness 5
of Nibbana, XIX. 6.
2. That a unit of consciousness lasted a day, II. 7.
3. That utterance of a Shibboleth can induce insight, XI. 4, ef.
Pubbaseliyas, 2.
4. That spiritual liberty supervenes while one is lustful, III. 3,
and comes gradually, III. 4, as its blessings become foreseen,
IX. 1.
5. That one may be conscious in the Unconscious sphere, III. 11,
but not conscious in the 4 Neither-conscious-nor-unconscious'
Jhana, III. 12.
6. That space is visible, VI. 7, also the elements of matter, senses,
and action, (Karma, VI. 8).
7. That the present instant, and the future can be known, V. 8, 9.
Contents
8. That the past and future persist as possessions, IX. 12; thus
in the Fourth Path, the Fruits of the earlier Paths persist
as possessions, IV. 9.
9. That to bring about Jhana, sense gets perverted, V. 3.
10. That all knowledge is analytic, V. 5; when popular, truth is
its object no less than when it is philosophical, V. 6.
11. That thought-reading is of bare consciousness only, V. 7.
12. That Arahantship is the realizing of a tenfold release, IV. 10;
but the Arahant dies not wholly freed, XXII. 1.
13. That Karma produces land, VII. 7; also old age and death,
VII. 8.
14. That resultant states themselves entail results, VII. 10; but
Ariyan states are negations only, VII. 9.
15. That Assurance is unconditioned, VI. 1; so too is trance, VI. 5.
16. That the essential element in the sphere called Rupa is the
presence of matter, VIII. 5, but there is matter in the sphere
called Immaterial A-rupa, VIII. 8, as in the Bipa-sphere
also, XVI. 9, and lust in* both, XVI. 10.
17. That a certain utterance may induce insight, XI. 4.
18. That X in the Path can discern Y's spiritual victories, V. 10.
19. That each Nidana is predetermined, also impermanence itself,
XI. 7, 8.
20. That Jhana may be enjoyed as an end, XIII. 7.
21. That latent bias differs in kind from open vice, XIV. 5, and that
the latter happens involuntarily, XIV. 6.
22. That there may be counterfeit consciousness, XXIII. 4.
23. That the Arahant accumulates merit, XVII. 1, and dies with
meritorious consciousness, XXII. 2.
24. That there are no guards in Purgatory, and that animals are
reborn in Heaven, XX, 3, 4.
25. That Buddhas differ mutually in many ways, XXI. 5, and choose
the woes they undergo as Bodhisats, XXIII. 3; that all their
powers are Ariyan, III. 2, and are common to their disciples,
III. 1, and both can work wonders against nature, XXI. 4.
26. That a Buddha's daily habits, notably speech, are supramundane,
II. 10.
27. That one in the First Path has not the five spiritual controlling
powers, III. 6.
With the Sammitiyas :
28. That physical sight and hearing can be 'celestial' organs when
conveying ideas, III. 7, 8.
29. That on entering the First Path, there is First Fruition, III. 5.
30. That six senses and sensuous desires obtain in Rupa-heavens,
VIII. 7; XIV. 7.
xxii Contents
31. That action and its accumulating result are different things,
XV. 11.
32. That matter is a result of action, Karma, XVI. 8.
Some AndhaJcas :
33. That Jhana has five stages, not four, XVIII. 7.
With the Mahirjsasahas:
34. That there are two cessations of 111, II. 11.
Some Andhakas, with the MahiysdsaJcas held:
35. That there is immediate transition in Jhana, XVIII. 6.
With the Uttardpathalcas:
36. That Asura-rebirth constitutes a sixth sphere, VIII. 1.
37. That the six senses obtain in Ru pa-heavens, VIII. 7.
38. That trance-unconsciousness is unconditioned, VI. 5.
39. That views as such are un-moral, XIV. 8.
40. That natural kinds are immutable, XXI. 7; so too are Karma
processes, XXI. 8.
41. That there is but one Path, not four, XVIII. 5.
42. That everything of the Buddha was fragrant, XVIII. 4.
43. That the Buddha entered the Path in a previous birth, IV. 8.
44. That fruitions persist as possessions, IV. 9.
45. That latent bias has no mental object, 4.
With some of the above :
46. That latent bias is without mental object, IX. 4.
With the Vetulyahas:
47. That sex-relations may be entered on by any human pair (even
recluses) with a united resolve, XXIII. 1.
With the Sahbatthivadins, Sammitiyas, and Bhadrayanihas;
48. That penetration is acquired piecemeal, II. 9.
Va
O F THE A N D H A K A S : — ( I . ) THE PUBBASELIYAS HELD THAT
Yb
T H E (i.) PUBBASELIYAS AND (ii.) APARASELIYAS HELD THAT
•
1. Everything has only momentary being, XXII. 8.
2. The embryo does not develop organs in sequence, XIV. 2.
3. All may be attended to at once, XVI. 4.
4. Arahants may be defiled by devils, II. 1.
5. Bodhisats are, when prophesied about, already in the Path,
XIII. 4.
Vc
(iii.) T H E RAJAGIRIKAS HELD
Yd
THE (iii.) R A J A G I R I K A S AND (iv.) SIDDHATTHIKAS HELD THAT
VII
T H E BHADBAYANIKAS HELD
IX -
T H E UTTARAPATHAKAS HELD THAT
X
T H E H E T U V A D I N S HELD THAT
XI
T H E VETULYAKAS (OF THE MAHA-SUNNAVADINS) HELD THE
C
• DOCETIC ' VIEWS THAT
1. The Buddha never lived as Very Man on this earth, XVIII. 1.
2. Nor was he benefited by gifts; hence these bring no reward,,
XVII. 10.
3. The Order is an abstract idea, hence it cannot accept gifts,.
XVII. 6, 7, 8, 9.
With the Andhakas:
4. That sex-relations may be entered on by any human pair (even
recluses) with a united resolve, XXIII. 1.
XII
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THE SECESSIONS ACCORDING TO THE COMMENTARY ON THE KATHA-VATTHU.
To face p. xxix.
PREFATORY NOTES
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xxxviii Prefatory Notes
C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS.
CHIPSTEAD, SURREY,
September, 1915.
SOME CORRIGENDA
SUBJECTS OF DISCOURSE
{KA THA-VA TTHU)
T H E COMMENTATOR'S INTRODUCTION.
Ibonour to the B^altefc One Brabant BuDDba Supreme.
Seated in heavenly mansions, by clevas surrounded,
Teacher of earth and of heavenPerson unrivalled,
Skilled in the term and the concept, ending his discourse
Called the c Description of Persons,1 he, supreme Person,
Set forth in outline the Book of the ' Subjects of Discourse/
Giving account of the ' soul' and such points controverted.
By the mere heads thus laid down in delectable mansions
Moggaits sonfilled out, here on earth, the full detail.
No w inasmuch as achieved is the way for the comment,
I will discourse on the matter. Listen attentive !
Now when he had wrought the Twin-Miracle, the Exalted
One repaired for the rains to the City of the Thrice Ten
Devas. And there beneath the Coral Tree, seated on the
Pandukambala Bock, making his mother chief witness,
he discoursed to the assembly of Devas on matters philo-
1
P u g g a 1 a-P aft n a 1t i. P aft ft a 11 i signifies both the idea or
-concept of any cognizable thing or group of things, and also the
verbal expression of the same. See Compendium of Philosophy,
p. 4 f.} 198,264.
T . S . V. 1
2 Points of Controversy
POINTS OF CONTROVERSY
BOOK I
T.S. V. 2
18 Of Soul or Person
Associated Characteristics.
[146] Th.—Is 'the person' known in the sense of a real
and ultimate fact ?
P.—Yes.
Th.—Is ' the person' related, or is it absolute ? Is ' the
person ' conditioned, or is it unconditioned ? Is it eternal ?
or is it temporal? Has it external features ? or is it
without any ?
P.—Nay, these things cannot truly be predicated about
it. . . . (Continue as in § 1: ' Acknowledge the refuta-
tion/ etc. 1
[147] P.—Is 4 the person' unknown in the sense of a
real and ultimate fact ?
Th.—It is.
Th,— Yes.
P.—Is 4 physical frame ' one thing, ' individual' (or
4
personal entity') another ?
Th.—Nay, that cannot truly be said.
P.—Acknowledge my rejoinder r 1 If there be this identity
and coincidence between ' physical frame5 and ' body and
if it was said by the Exalted One 4 There is the individual,
etc.2 . . then indeed, good sir, it should also have been
admitted that ' physical frame' is one thing and ' indi-
vidual ' or ' personal entity' another. You are wrong in
admitting the first two propositions and denying the third.
If you cannot admit the third, neither should you have
admitted the first two . . . {complete the discourse as in
§§ 3-16).
Examination continued by way of Rebirth.3
[158] Th.—Does (a person or) soul 4 run on (or trans-
migrate) from this world to another and from another
world to this ? 6
P.—Yes.
Is it the identical soul who transmigrates from this
world to another and from another world to this ? 6
Nay, that cannot be truly said . . . (complete as above).
Th— Then is it a different soul who transmigrates. . . .
P.—Nay, that cannot truly be said.7 . . . (complete as
above).
Th.—Then is it both the identical and also a different
soul who transmigrates . , .?
P.—Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
1 2
Namely, to § 156. Puggalo.
3
Gr ati-anuyogo.—Corny. The PTS. text omits the title
after § 170.
4
P u g g a l o is now rendered by soul, that term being in eschato-
logical discussion more familiar to us than ' person,'
5
This question eliciting an essential feature in the Puggala-vadin's
or animistic position is repeated, as a matter of form, before each of
the four following questions.
6
The Eternalisfc view.—Corny. See Dialogues, i. 46 f.
1
He fears lest he side with the Annihilationists.—Corny.
29. Transmigration 27
Th.—Then is it neither the identical soul, nor yet a
different soul who transmigrates . . .?*
P.—Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Th— Is it the identical, a different, both identical and
also different, neither identical, nor different soul who
transmigrates . . .?
P.—Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[159] P.—Then is it wrong to say, ' The soul trans-
migrates from this world to another world, and from
another world to this ?'
Th.—Yes.
P.—Was it not said by the Exalted One :—
' When he hath run from birth to birth
Seven times and reached the last, that soul
Endmaker shall become of ill,
By tvearing every fetter down ' ? 2
Is the Suttanta thus ?
Th.—Yes.
P.—Then surely the soul does transmigrate from this
world to another world and from another world to this.
Again (:repeating his first question) was it not said by the
Exalted One: ' Without a known beginning, 0 bhikkhus, is
the way of life ever renewed ; unrevealed is the origin of souls
(lit. beings) ivho, shrouded' in ignorance and bound by the
fetters of natural desire, run on transmigrating.'3 Is the
Suttanta thus ?
Th.—Yes.
P. —Then surely the soul does transmigrate as was
said.
[160] Th.—Does the soul transmigrate from this world,
etc.?
P.— Yes.
Th.—Does the identical soul so transmigrate ?
1
He fears in this and the next question lest he side with certain
Eternalists and the 'Eel wrigglers' respectively.—Corny. Cf. Dialogues,
i. 37 f.
2
Iti-vuttaka, § 24.
3
Sayyutta-Nikaya, iii. 149.
28 Of Soul or Person I.'l.
P.—Yes.
Th.—Does the self-same human become anyone of these,
say, a buffalo ?
P.—Nay, that cannot truly be said . . . (complete the
refutation as usual).
Th.—[I repeat] is the self-same human the buffalo ?
P.—Yes.
Th.—[But all this, namely, that] having been man, he
becomes a buffalo, or having been buffalo he becomes man,
again, that having become a man, he is quite different
from the buffalo, and yet that the self-same soul goes on
transmigrating, is wrong . . . (.complete as usual).
Surely if the identical soul, when deceasing from this
world and being reborn in another, is nowise different, then
there will be no dying, nor will taking life be possible.
There is action; there is action's effect; there is the result
of deeds done. But when good and bad acts are maturing
as results, you say that the identical person transmigrates,
—this is wrong.
Yes.
Is the concept of good soul derived from good feeling ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
I repeat my question.
Yes.1
Now, does feeling entail result or fruit, fruit that is
desirable, pleasing, gladdening, unspotted, a happy result,
and such as conveys happiness ?
No.
I repeat my question.
Yes.
But does ' good soul' entail result or fruit of like nature
with the above ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said.2 . . .
[175] If the concept of soul is derived from feeling, is the
concept of bad soul derived from bad feeling ?
Yes.
Now does bad feeling entail result or fruit, fruit that is
undesirable, unpleasing, spotted, an unhappy result, and
such as conveys unhappiness ?
Yes.3
But does bad soul entail result or fruit of like nature to
the above ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[176] If the concept of soul is derived from feeling, is
the concept of indeterminate soul—one to be termed neither
good nor bad—derived from indeterminate feeling ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Is the concept [I repeat] of an ethically indeterminate
soul derived from an ethically indeterminate feeling ?
Yes.4
1
He now assents, taking 'good' in the sense of expertness, pro-
ficiency.—Corny.
2
He rejects because it is not customary to speak thus of 'soul.'
—Corny.
3
Taking 4 bad 5 analogously to ' good' above.—Corny.
4
He now assents, because of the indeterminateness [of soul] with
respect to the Eternalist or Nihilist heresies. The changed replies are
to evade the imputation of Eternalism, etc.—Corny. .
Derived Concepts 35
Is indeterminate feeling impermanent, conditioned ?
Does it happen through a cause ? Is it liable to
perish, to pass away, to become passionless, to cease, to
change?
Yes.
Has an ethically indeterminate soul any or all of these
qualities ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Yes.
Ought it, again, to be said that when the given part
ceases, the soul so derived ceases ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[183] Is the concept of soul derived from material
qualities and feeling ?
Yes.
Then could the concept of a double soul be derived from
the pair of aggregates ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Or could the concept of a double soul be derived from
material quality coupled with any of the other three aggre-
gates . . . or the concept of five souls be derived from all
five aggregates?1
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
[184] Is the concept of soul derived from the organs of
sight (eye) and hearing (ear) ?
Yes.
Then could the concept 'two souls' be derived from
the two organs ? . . . (and so on as in § 183, to include
all the twelve ayatanas—i.e., organs and objects of sense
and the organ and object of sense co-ordination, ma no,
dhamma.)
IV.—CONSCIOUSNESS.
[193] Is there the notion of soul to each [moment of]
consciousness ?
Yes.
1
U p ad ay a is only now defined in the Corny. as 'having come
(or happened) because of, not without such and such.' And as from
the impermanent only the impermanent can come, this idea of
p u g g a 1 a as 4 derived fromT impermanent aggregates, bodily and
mental, is obviously unfavourable for its upholder.
3
Worded analogously to § 190.
3
More literally a fetter or chain, and a ' fetterer3 or 4 chainer,'
n i g a l o, n e g a l i k o .
40 Of Soul or Person I.
Th.—Yes.
P.—But if that be so, surely it is right to speak of the
' person' as known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.
[224] Th.—Granting that there are the Four, the Eight,
is it for this reason you assert the first proposition?
P.—Yes.
Th.—Do the Four, the Eight, appear because of the
Buddha's appearing?
Yes.
Does the /person' appear because of the Buddha's
appearing ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
I repeat the question.
Yes.
Then at the Buddha's final Nibbana, is the 4 person '
annihilated, so that no personal entity exists ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Yes.
But was it not said by the Exalted One: ' There are,
bhikkhus, these two irreducible categories—ivhat are the two?
The irreducible category of the conditioned, the irreducible
category of the unconditioned. These are the tivo ' ?l
Is the Suttanta thus ?
Yes.
Hence it is surely wrong to say that apart from the
conditioned and the unconditioned, there is another, a
third alternative.
[226] Th. (continues).—You say that the person is neither
conditioned nor unconditioned ? Are then the conditioned,
the unconditioned, the person, entirely different things ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
Are the aggregates conditioned, Nibbana unconditioned,
the person neither conditioned nor unconditioned ?
Yes.
Then are the aggregates, Nibbana, and the person, three
entirely different things ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
(The last two questions are then applied to each aggregate
taken separately:—material qualities, feeling, perception,
mental co-efficients, consciousness).
[227] Th.—Is the genesis of the person apparent/ and its
passing away also, and is its duration distinctively ap-
parent ?
Yes.
[Then] is the person conditioned ?
Nay, that cannot truly be said. . . .
It was said by the Exalted One: 'Bhikkhus, there are
these three characteristics of the conditioned: of conditioned
things the genesis is apparent, the passing away is apparent,
the duration2 amidst change is apparent.' Hence if these
three are characteristics of the person, this is also
1
Gt Dlgha^Nih, iii. 274.
2
T h i t a s s a a n ii a t h a 11 a i) , literally ' duration's other-nessJ
Buddhaghosa paraphrases by j a r a, decay. Anguttara-Nilci. 152.
See Note on TMti, Appendix.
56 Of Soul or Person
Th.—Yes.
P.—Now it was said by the Exalted One : ' There is the
person tvho works for his own good . . 1
Is the Suttanta thus ?
Th.—Yes.
P.—Hence surely the person is known in the sense of a
real and ultimate fact.
[287] . . . again, it was said by the Exalted One:
' There is one person, bhikkhus, who, being reborn in this world,
is born for the good, for the happiness of many, to shoiv com-
passion on the world, for the advantage, the good, the happi-
ness of devas and of men'2
Is the Suttanta thus ?
Th.—Yes.
P.—Hence surely the person is known in the sense of a
real and ultimate fact.
[288] Th.—Granting this, and also the veracity, etc., of
the Exalted One:—it was said by the Exalted One: 6All
things are without soul.'3
Is the Suttanta thus ?
P.—Yes.
TJi.—Hence surely it is wrong to say the person is
known in the sense of a real and ultimate fact.
[239] . . . again, it was said by the Exalted One : ' He
does not doubt that misery arises, comes to pass, that misery
ceases, passes away, nor is he perplexed thereat. And there-
upon independent insight4" comes herein to him. Now this,
Kaccana, thus far is right views.'5
Is the Suttanta thus ?
1
See § 74.
2
Anguttara-Nik, i. 22 ; quoted in Questions of King Milinda, ii. 56.
3
A t t a . DJiammapada, ver. 279 ; Sayyutta-Nik., iv. 28.
4
A-p a r a- p a cc a y a - n a n a r), 4 insight not conditioned by others.'
5
Sayyutta-Nik., ii. 17; iii. 135. The quotation does not obviously
bear on the controverted point to us, but to a Buddhist versed in his
Suttas the context (apparently a familiar one) arises: Insight comes
to him who has rejected the theories that the world is a persisting
entity, or a concourse of fortuitous illusions, being convinced that it is,
in its essentials, a cosmos of conditioned becoming.
. Appeals to Authority
P.—Yes.
Th.—Hence surely it is wrong to say ' the person is
known/etc.
[240] Th.—. . . again, was it not said by Bhikkhuni
Vajira to Mara the evil one:
' " Being " t1 What dost thou fancy by that ivord ?
'Mong false opinions, Mara, art thou strayed.
This a mere bundle of formations is.
Therefrom no s 6 being " may est thou obtain.
For e'en as, when the factors are arranged,
The product by the name " chariot" is known,
So doth our usage covenant to say :
"A being," when the aggregates are there.
'Tis simply III that riseth, simply III2
That doth persist, and then fadeth away.
Nought beside III there is that comes to be;
Nought else but III there is that fades away' ? 3
Is the Suttanta thus ?
P.—Yes.
[241] Th— . . . again, did not the venerable Ananda say
to the Exalted One: ' It is said, lord, " the world is void, the
world is void." Noio in what way, lord, is it meant that the
world is void V [and did not the Exalted One reply:]
4
Inasmuch, Ahanda, as it is void of soul4 and of what belongs
to soul,6 therefore is the world called void. And wherein,
Ananda, is it void of soul and of what belongs to soul? The
eye, Ananda, is verily void of soul and of what belongs to soul,
so is visible object and the sense and contact of sight. So are
the other organs, and objects of the senses, and the other senses.
So is the co-ordinating organ, cognizable objects, mental con-
sciousness and contact. All are void of sotd and of what belongs
to soul. And whatever pleasurable, painf ul, or neutral feeling
1
Satta.
2
On this term see Ledi Sadaw, J.P.T.S., 1914, 188 i , and Mrs.
Eh. D., Buddhist Psychology, 1914, p. 88 f.
3
Scvyyutta-Nik., i. 134 f.; Pss. Sisters, 190. Her verses are not in
the Anthology of the Therls or Senior Sisters. She is not called Then,
but only BhikkhunL
6
* Atta. At t a n i y a.
62 Of Soul or Person
2. Of Falling Away.
Controverted Point—That an Arahant can fall away
from Arahant ship.
From the Commentary.—Because of such statements in the Suttas as
4
liability to fall away, and the opposite, these two things, bhikkhus, are
concerned with the falling away of a bhikkhu who is training'; 1 and
s
these five things, bhikkhus, are concerned with the falling away of
a bhikkhu who now and then attains emancipation,'2 certain sects in
the Order incline to the belief that an Arahant can fall away. These
are the Sammitiyas, the Vajjiputtiyas, the Sabbatthivadins, and some
of the Mahasanghikas. Hence, whether it be their view or that of
others, the Theravadin, in order to break them of it asks this
question.'3
has 'comprehended 111, has put away its cause, has realized
its cessation, has cultivated the Path [thereto],' 1 who has
' understood that which is to be understood,2 compre-
hended that which is to be comprehended, put away that
which is to be put away, developed that which is to be
developed, realized that which is to be realized.'3
How then can you say that an Arahant can fall away
from Arahantship ?
4. Of Purification Piecemeal.
Controverted Point—That [the converted man] gives up
the corruptions piecemeal.2
From the Commentary.—' This discussion is to break down the
opinion, held now by the Sammitiyas and others, that when Stream-
Winners and those in the other paths, through the higher comprehen-
sion gained in jhana, attain insight into the nature of 111 and so on,
1
The simile is not apt in so far as the Non-Returner's final birth
£
there' is likened to the dying only of the deer, and not to the last,
expiring run before it sinks dying. The arrow, for the Never-Returner,
has still work to do. Only for the Arahant is its work done. The
former, as deva, has one more spell of running to do.
2
O d h i s - o d h i s o . This term is applied also, in the Fatisam-
bhidd-magga (ii. 180), to the more specialized variety of the
< love-irradiating' contemplation prescribed as a religious exercise,
a n o d h i s o being the more catholic form of the same. As we
pointed out in reviewing this work (JBAS, 1908, p. 591), in a
corresponding differentiation in the Jdtaka Atthahathd (i. 80 f.; ii. 61),
the word appears as a n - o d i s s a k a . We have not found either
variant elsewhere in the Pitakas.
103. Man Progresses as a Whole 77
the putting away of corruptions [or vices] goes on piecemeal, that is,
by one portion at a time.5
1
Anguttwra-Nik., iv. 104 f. (The last line expands the one Pali
word: p a r i n i b b u t o.)
2
Sansk. Sarvasthivadins, literally, ' every tbing-exists-belie vers.'
On the history and literature of this influential school, see Professor
Takakusu in JPTS, 1905, 67 f.; T. Watters, On Yuen Chwang (in
which consult Index).
1 . The Implication of ' i 8
past, present, future,' etc., all phenomena, past, present, future [once
they arise among the aggregate constituents of personal life and
experience] persist in that state, 1 and that therefore all go on existing.
[59] S.—Is it wrong to say c the past exists,5 ' the future
exists
Th.—Yes.
S.—But was it not said by the Exalted One: ' What-
soever material quality, bhikkhus, whether past, future,
or present, is either internal or external, gross or subtle,
common or excellent, distant or near, is called the material
aggregate. Whatsoever feeling, whether past, future, or
present, o/ which the foregoing may be said, is termed the
aggregate of feeling. So also are the other three aggregates'?1
Surely then the past exists, the future exists.
[60] Th. — But was it not said by the Exalted One :
' These' three modes in word, term, or name, bhikkhus, which
have been distinct in the past, are now distinct, and will be
distinct, are not condemned by recluses and brahmins who are
wise. Which three ? (1) That material aggregate which is past,-
which has ceased, which is changed, is reckoned, termed, named
" has been99; it is not reckoned as " exists99 nor as " will be J9
And so for the aggregates of feeling, perception, mental co-
efficients, consciousness. (2) That material aggregate which
is not yet born, and which has not appearedis reckoned,
termed, named 6( will be," but is not reckoned as "exists "
nor as " has been." And so for the mental aggregates.
(3) That material body which has come to birth, has appeared,
is reckoned, termed, named "exists," but is not reckoned as
" has been," nor as <£ will be." And so for the mental aggre-
gates. Verily these three modes in word, term, or name, bhik-
khus, are distinct, have been distinct in the past, are not,
will not, be condemned by recluses and brahmins who are
%oise.
' Bhikkhus, the folk of Ukkala, Lenten speakers of old,2
1
Majjhima-Nik., iii. 16 f.; Sapj.-Nih, iii. 47,
2 Ukkala-vassa bhanna. In B h O k k a l a . . . , The Br.
translation renders this by a d i p u r i s a, men of old. But that, the
district so-called (? identified with Orissa) is referred to is Buddha-
ghosa's opinion: 4 Those dwelling in the country Ukkala.' He divides
the rest: v a s s o (sic) c a b h a n n a c a — 'for these causation-
theorists are two.' Presently, however, he refers to them collectively
6 Of Persisting Existence
[6] 2 (i.) To the question 'Does the future exist?' you reply
'some of it exists, some does not.' You must then admit [in
equivalent terms] that some of it is born, produced, has
happened, appeared, some of it not. Yet you deny this.
Granting your declaration, do some things that have been
inevitably determined3 exist, and some not? You are
committed to this, and also to this: that some future things
which are not inevitably determined exist, and some not.
[7] Referring to your declaration (ii.):—which of the
future exists, which does not exist? You reply: 'Those
future things which are inevitably determined exist, those
that are not so determined do not.' You deny then that
those future things not inevitably determined do exist,
though you are really committed to this by the former half
of your reply. Again, if future things not inevitably
determined are non-existent, then also future things which
are inevitably determined are also non-existent.
With regard to those future things inevitably determined
which you say 'exist,' would you not admit that such future
things have not been born ? Yes ? Then how can you say
that things not yet born exist ?
[8] Or, if inevitably determined future things, which are
not yet born, do exist, then future things not so determined,
which are not yet born, exist. Or again, if future things
1
Namely, that past things are present things.
2
§§ 6-10 correspond to §§ 1-5.
3
U p p a d i n o. CL Bud. Psy. JEth§ 1037, n. 4. They will
certainly arise from the fact that their conditions are stable, however
long the maturing may take, e.g. the consummation to be achieved
in the coming of Metteyya Buddha. Atthasalinl, 361.
10 Of Some of the Past as Still Existing I. 8
not inevitably determined, which are not yet born, are non-
existent, then you must say no less of similar but inevitably
determined things.
[9] K.—Then is it wrong to say ' those future things
which are inevitably determined exist' ?
T/z.—Yes.
K—But will not future things which are inevitably
determined happen ?
Th.—Yes.
K.—Surely then things inevitably determined exist.
[10] Th.—Granting that future things, if inevitably
determined, will happen, do they exist ?
X.—Yes.
Th.—Granting they will happen, are they present ?
K.—No [the future is not the present].
Th.—I repeat my question.
K.—Yes [since, if they are existent, they are present].
Th—And granting that present things will cease, are
they non-existent ?
K.—Nay, that cannot truly be said.
Th.—But you have already admitted this.
9. Of Applications in Mindfulness.
Controverted Point.—That all mental states are appli-
cations in mindfulness.
From the Commentary.—The groups holding special views who arose
later, to wit, the Andhakas, comprising the sub-groups of the Pubbaseliyas,
Aparaseliyas, Rajagirikas, and Siddhatthikas, held the opinion that the
objects of mindfulness, namely, the body and the rest, were themselves
[the conscious subject;] mindfulness. This they deduced from the
passage in the c Satipatthana-Sarjyutta5: ' I will show you, bhikkhus,
the induction and the cessation of applications in mindfulness.'1 To
break down this opinion, the Theravadin puts the question.
1
Sayyutta-Nikaya, v. 184. The controversy turns upon the double
sense, subjective and objective, of the term sa t i - p a t t h a n a, or
mindfulness-applications. The Opponent confuses the objects of this
important fourfold religious exercise with the mental exercise itself,
155. Limiting the Intension 105
[1] Th.—Do all cognizable things constitute applications
in mindfulness 2 1
Andhaka.—Yes.
Th.—Then must you also admit that all cognizable
things constitute mindfulness, the controlling faculty and
force of mindfulness, mindfulness that is perfect, that is a
factor of enlightenment, the ' sole conveying' path ' leading
to extinction,' to 4 enlightenment,' to £ disintegration,' are
'not [bound up with] the intoxicants,' not akin to the
fetters, ties,floods, bonds, hindrances, contagions, graspings,
corruptions'; you must admit that all cognizable things
constitute the ' ten recollections,1 namely of the Buddha,
the Norm, the Order, morals, pious liberality, the devas,
tf
mindfulness in respiration,' c reflection on death,' 4 mind-
fulness concerning the body,' 'reflection on peace.'2 But
this you deny.
if this same past both exists and does not exist, then is also
existence non-existence and conversely, then is the state of
being a state of non-being and conversely, then are ' is'
and ' is not' convertible terms, identical, one in meaning,
the same, same in content and in origin. And this of course
you do not admit.
[2] Similarly, you say the future exists only on this wise,
not on that wise. This is to say it both exists and does not
exist; and that involves the same antinomy.
[3] Similarly, you say the present exists only on this
wise, not on that wise—and you are landed as before.
[4] If the past exists only as you say it does, how is it
existent, how non-existent ?
A.—The past exists only as past; it does not exist as
future, it does not exist as present.
Th.—But this still commits you to saying that the same
both is and is not, and thus to the same antinomy.
[5, 6] Similarly as regards the 'how' of such future
and present as you hold to exist.
BOOK II
1. Of Conveyance by Another.
Controverted Point.—That an Arahant has impure dis-
charge.
From the Commentary. — This was asked concerning a notion
entertained by the Pubbaseliyas and Aparaseliyas. These had noted
seminal discharge among those who professed Arahantship in the belief
that they had won that which was not won, or who professed Arahant-
ship, yet were overconfident, and deceitful. And they wrongly
attributed to devas of the Mara group the conveyance, to such, of an
impure discharge. This leads to the second question, since even a
pure discharge is caused by passion.
[1] Th.—You contend that he may have. Yet you deny
that in the Arahant there remains any lust, sensuous
desires or assailing passion, any 'fetter,' 'flood,5 'bond,'
or ' hindrance of sensuality.' But this denial commits you
to negate your proposition.
[2] You admit that the average worldling may have both
the one and the other, both the desires and the physical
result. But then you must also admit both as true in the
case of the Arahant.
[3] What is the cause of that physical impurity which
you impute to the Arahant ?
p, —The devas of the Mara group convey it to the
Arahant.
Th.—Have then these devas themselves that physical
impurity?
P. A— No, in them it is non-existent.
Th.—Then you should not say that they convey it to
the Arahant. [4] From whom do they convey it? Not,
112 Of Conveyance by Another II. 1.
you affirm, from their own bodies, nor from the Arahant
himself, nor from other beings [which is absurd]. [5] You
deny also that they effect the conveyance through the pores
of the body. Then you should also deny that they convey
it at all. What [do you allege] is the reason of their con-
veying it ?
p. A.—Their idea is: 'we shall cause doubt as to his
attainment to be laid hold of.'1
Th.—Is there doubt in an Arahant ? If you reply 4 No,'
then your argument falls through. Or if you reply ' Yes,'
then must you herein admit that an Arahant may hold
doubts about the Teacher, the Doctrine, the Order, the
ethical training, the beginning and end of time—either or
both—and about things as happening through assignable
causes—which is absurd. [6] The average man holds
doubts about such things, but an Arahant does not [else is
he like the average man]. Or if both hold doubts not on
any of these eight points, but on other matters,2 then
again the Arahant is no better than the average man.
[7] Granting your proposition, to what is the impurity
due ? You reply, to eating, drinking, chewing, tasting. But
you deny that the proposition is true of all who eat, drink,
chew, taste. Or, if you maintain the opposite conclusion,
you must admit that children, eunuchs, devas eat, drink,
etc., yet that the proposition is not true in their case.
[8] Nor can you refer to any specific repository for that
impurity which you call a result of eating, drinking, etc.,
similar to that which is provided for the natural results of
eating, drinking, etc.
[9] If your proposition were true, then the Arahant
would pursue and produce things relating to sexual inter-
course, live a family life, use Kasi sandalwood preparations,
1
Y i m a t i g g a h a y i s s a m a t i . A Singhalese v.I. has g a h i s -
samati.
2
' Such as the name, family, etc., of a given woman or man, and
the like.'—Corny. The ' eight points 5 constitute a stock formula even
up to the present. See ' Some Points in Buddhist Doctrine,' by Ledi
Sadaw, JPTS, 1913-14, p. 119. Bud. Psy. Ethics, § 1004.
169 Are all Arahants equally Immune ? 113
adorn himself with wreaths, perfumes, and cosmetics,
hoard gold and silver, like any average man, concerning
whom your proposition were true. [10] But how can it
be true of the Arahant who, as you admit, has put away
passion, has cut it off at the root, and made it as the
stump of a palm tree, made it incapable of rising up again
in future renewal ?—of the Arahant who has treated in
like manner hate, ignorance, conceit, error, doubt, sloth,
distraction, impudence, and indiscretion ?
[11, 12] How, again, should it be true of one who, like
the Arahant, has cultivated the means for the putting away
of passion, etc., and all the other factors of enlightenment.1
[13] How should it be true of one who, like the Arahant,
has [consummated as having] done with lust, done with
hate, done with nescience, by whom that which was to be
done is done, by whom the burden is laid down, by whom
the good supreme is won, and the fetter of becoming is
wholly broken away, who is emancipated through perfect
knowledge, who has lifted the bar, has filled up the
trenches, is a drawer-out, is without lock or bolt, an
Ariyan, of one for whom the banner is lowered, the burden
is fallen, who is detached, conqueror of a realm well-
conquered, who has comprehended 111, has put away the
<jause thereof, has realized the cessation thereof, has culti-
vated the Path thereto, who has understood that which is
to be understood, comprehended that which is to be compre-
hended, put away that which is to be put away, developed that
-which is to be developed, realized that which is to be realized? 2
[14-20] Do you still maintain your proposition ?
P. A.—Yes, but only in the case of an Arahant who is
proficient in his own field, not of an Arahant who is
proficient in other things.3
1
These are enumerated under heads in the test as above, I. 2, § 47.
2
See II., §47 (p. 67).
3
This curious distinction is explained by the Corny, as that between
-the Arahant who is 1 freed by reason ' ( p a n n a v i m u t t o ) and one
who is freed by the ' eight attainments' (or stages in deliverance),
or who is 4 freed both ways.' See Dialogues, ii. 69, 70. The modified
position may be compared with a similar recourse above, p. 68.
t.s. v. 8
11 Of Conveyance by Another II. 1
[19] Again, did not the Exalted One say in the Suttanta:
' The man, 0 bhikkhus, ivho does not understand and compre-
hend all, ivho has not emptied himself of all, and given up all,
is not capable of extinguishing III. And he, 0 bhikkhus, iclio
understands, comprehends, empties himself of, and gives up all,,
he is capable of extinguishing IU1L
How then can the Arahant [who knows who sees] lack
knowledge ?
[20] Again, did not the Exalted One say in the Suttanta :
' For him e'en as insight doth come to pass,
Tin 'ee things as bygones are renounced for aye :
Belief that in him dwells a soul,
And faith in rule and rite—if aught remain.
Both from the fourfold doom is he released,
And neer the six fell deeds are his to do
How then can the Arahant be said to lack knowledge?
[21] Again, did not the Exalted One say in the Suttanta:
< Whenever, 0 bhikkhus, for the Ariyan disciple there doth
arise the stainless, flawless eye of the Norm—that whatsoever
is liable to happen is also liable to cease—together with the
arising of that vision are these three fetters : belief in a soul,
doubt, and the contagion of mere rule and ritual put away by
him '?3
How then can the Arahant be said to lack knowledge ?
[22] P.—Is it wrong to say 'the Arahant lacks know-
ledge '? May he not be ignorant of the name and lineage
of a woman or a man, of a right or wrong road, or of how
grasses, twigs, and forest plants are called ? If this is so,
surely, good sir, it is right to say that he lacks knowledge.
[23] Th—If you say that, in not knowing such things,
the Arahant lacks ' knowledge/ would you also say he lacks
knowledge as to the fruition of Stream-Winning, Once-
Returning, Never-Returning, Arahantship ? Of course not -
hence it should not be said that he lacks knowledge.
1
Swjyuttar-Nikaya, iv. 17. The Br. translator renders the second
line—avirajayai) a p p a j a h a r j — b y 'is not free from ' e dust," has
not given up the corruptions.5
2 3
See above (I. 4), p. 80. See ibid.
118 Of Doubt in the Arahant II. 3.
Th. Then you must also affirm that all who utter that
word are practising2 the Path, which is absurd.
Or if you do affirm this, notwithstanding, then you must
also affirm that the average foolish person, in uttering that
word, is practising the Path, and, again, that matricides,
parricides, murderers of Arahants, those that shed blood
[of Buddhas], those that cause schism in the Order, in
uttering the word ' sorrow !' are practising the Path, which
is absurd.
say tf no.' Then you cannot affirm that one [and the same
unit of] consciousness lasts a whole day.
[6] Similarly, if you deny that one moves backward with
the same [unit of] consciousness as one moves forward,
and vice versa, you cannot affirm your proposition. A
similar argument applies to looking backward, looking
forward, and to bending, extending by means of the same
unit of consciousness.1
[7] In the case of the devas who have reached the realm
of space-infinity, does any unit of consciousness last their
whole lifetime ? You affirm it does, yet you deny a similar
duration in the case of humanity. You deny it also in the
case of all devas of the plane of sense-desires, and of all
devas of the higher or Exipa plane,2 why not of those of
the first-named non-Eupa plane?
[8] You affirm, I say, this duration of a unit of conscious-
ness during the 20,000 geons of the Arupa-deva's life, yet
you deny an analogous duration in a unit of human con-
sciousness, lasting, say, for 100 years, and you deny it in
the case of all those devas of the Kamaloka and Rupaloka,
whose lifetime varies from 500 years in the Four Great
Kings to 16,000 ©ons of years in the senior3 devas.
11. Of Cessation.
Controverted Point.—That there are two cessations [of
sorrow].
From the Commentary.—It is a belief of the Mahiijsasakas and
the Andhakas that the Third Truth (as to the Cessation of 111),
though constructed as one, relates to two cessations, according as
sorrow ceases through reasoned or unreasoned reflections about
things.
1
So the Corny.
One Goal, Ttuo Modes of Access 137
[1] If you assert that there are two kinds of cessation,1
you must also assert this duality with respect to the cessa-
tion of 111, the Truth about the cessation of 111, the Truth
about the nature of 111, its cause, and the path leading to
the cessation of 111—to none of which you consent.
Further, you must assert that there are two shelters,
two retreats, two refuges, two supports, two deathless-
nesses, two ambrosias, two Nibbanas2—which you deny.
Or if you admit that there are, say, two Nibbanas, you
must admit some specific difference, say, of high, low, base,
sublime, superior, inferior—some boundary, division, line
or cleavage3 in these two Nibbanas—which you deny.4
[2] Further, you admit, do you not, that things 5 which
have ceased without deep reflection,6 may also be made
1
N i r o d h a . In religions import, the term is a synonym of
Nibbana, whether it refers to cessation of 111 (dukkha), or to the
conditions of rebirth which inevitably result in 111. In the medically
inspired formula of the four Truths, n i r o d h a is tantamount to
£
health,' i.e., to the ' cessation' of disease. Hence it suggests happiness,
rather than the reverse. Hence the English word ' riddance' might
often be a better rendering.
2
These terms are all similes for Nibbana, from the Suttas.
3
To the different readings of this word (see text, 226, n. 3), we would
add a n t a r i k a , 'interstice in threads,' from Vinaya Texts, III. 94.
* The somewhat scholastic insistence on the oneness of Nibbana
in the mediaeval Compendium (p. 168) is here shown to have early
authority, but we cannot quote any Suttanta support for it.
5
S a n k h a r a. On the meaning in this context, cf. Compendium,
211, n. 3. It should not be .concluded that on any idealistic view
4
things' are made no longer to exist now for the individual thinker
through his thought. According to the Commentarial tradition,
' to cease' means here prospective cessation; ' to make to cease =
to cause to go into a state of not re-arising ( a n u p p a t t i b h a v a j } ) ' —
the negative of the term used to express future rebirth.
6
P a t i s a n k h a , literally, re-reckoning. On this term, large, if
vague in import, yet rarely used in the Nikayas, see Bud. Psy. Mth.,
p. 354, n. 2. In popular diction its use in negative form is well
shown in the simile of the thirsty, exhausted man drinking 'rashly,
unreflectingly,3 from a cup against the contents of which he had been
warned. Sayyutta-Nih, ii. 110. Bee Compendium, loo. cit. Deep
reflection of spiritual insight, through its purity and the absence of state-
ments and questionings, is said to make worldly things cease.—Corny.
138 Of Cessation II. 11.
BOOK III
1. Of Po wers.
Controverted Point—That the powers of the Buddha
are common to disciples.
From the Commentary.—This is an opinion among the Andhakas,
derived from a thoughtless consideration of the ten Suttas in the Anurud-
dha Sa^yutta, 1 beginning: 1 J, brethren, from practice and development
of the Four Applications of Mindfulness, understand even as it really
is the causal occasion2 as such, and what is not the causal occasion
etc. Now of a Tathagata's ' ten powers,' some he holds wholly in
common with his disciples, some not, and some are partly common
to both. All can share insight into extinction of intoxicants (a s a v a);
he alone discerns the degrees of development in the controlling powers
( i n d r i y a n i ) . The causal occasion of anything, as well as seven
other matters, a Tathagata knows without limit, the disciple knows
them only within a certain range. 3 The latter can state them; the
former can explain them. But the Andhakas say that the whole of
his power was held in common with his [leading] disciples.
8. Of Emancipation.
Controverted Point—That ' becoming emancipated 5 has
reference to the heart being [at the time] in touch with
lust,1 etc.
From the Commentary.—"Whereas it is true that, in minds or hearts
devoid of e.g. lust, there is no need to get emancipated, the opinion held
at present by such as the Andhakas is that, just as a soiled garment is
released from its stains on being washed, so emancipation means that
a heart beset with lust is emancipated from lust. 2
4. Of Emancipation as a Process.
Controverted Point.-—That spiritual emancipation is a
[gradual] process of becoming free.1
From the Commentary.—The opinion is questioned of those who
•confuse the emancipation by partial arrest in the exercise of Jhana
with that emancipation by complete severance experienced in a ' Path-
moment.' They think that the mind, partially liberated by the former,
completes its emancipation by the gradual process of the latter.
[1] Th.—If your proposition is to stand, you must affirm
also that such a mind is then in part freed, in part not. And
if you assent to the second proposition, you must admit
that your subject is part Stream-Winner, part not—in other
words, that he has all the attributes of the Stream-Winner
in part only.2
[2-4] The same argument holds for the other three Paths.
[5] You must also affirm as to whether [each conscious
unit] is emancipated at the moment of its genesis, and in
process of being emancipated as it ceases.3 . . .
1
The heresy seems to be analogous to that in III. 3, and to involve
a misapprehension of the orthodox meaning of the term in question
{ v i m u 11 i).
2
Here and in [2-4] the same lists are given as in I. 4, §§ 1, 5, 9, IB.
3
Cf. II. 7, § 1 : e k a i ) c i t t a r j (unit of consciousness).
1 0
T.S. V.
146 Of Emancipation as a Process III. 4*
[6] Opponent —You do not assent to my proposition;
but was it not said by the Exalted One: 4 For him loho thus
knows thus sees, the heart is set free from the intoxicants of
sense-desires, of becoming, and of ignorance 9 ?1 Is there no
' being emancipated' here of the emancipated mind ?
[7] Th.—But is there not also a Suttanta in which the
Exalted One said: ' With heart thus made serene, made
wholly pure, and very clean9 freed from lust and from de-
filement, become pliant, ready to work and imperturbable, he-
bends over the mind to insight in the destruction of intoxi-
cants1?2 There is no process here of being set free.
[8] You would not speak of a mind partially lusting,
hating, being bewildered, being corrupted. How can you
then maintain your proposition ? "Would you not say
[straight away] that the mind is lustful or not, mal-
evolent or not, confused or not, suspended or not, destroyed
or not, finished or not ? 3
[1] Th.—If you affirm this, you must also say lhat the
fleshly eye is the celestial eye, and conversely/ that the
two are like in kind, are, in fact, identical, the one having
the same range, power, andfield as the other. This you deny.
[2] Again, if you make the two thus on a par, you are
affirming that something grasped at [as effect by previous
karma] 1 becomes something not so grasped at, that ex-
perience in the universe of sense is experience in the
universe of 'Rupa,' that experience, analogously reasoning,
in the universe of Rupa is experience in the universe of the
remoter heavens, that the things included in these universes
are f the On-included '2—which is absurd.
[3] Further, you are, by your proposition, also admitting
that the celestial eye, when it is the medium of a sensuous
idea [in Jhana], becomes the fleshly eye. And, again, that,
when it is the medium of a [spiritual] idea, it then becomes
the eye of understanding—which you must deny.
[4] Further, you are also admitting that there are only
two kinds of vision (or 4 eye ')• If you deny, your proposi-
tion falls. If you assent, I would ask whether the Exalted
One did not speak of three kinds of vision—the fleshly, the
celestial, and the eye of understanding, thus: ' Three,
bhikkhus, are the modes of sight3—lohich are they? The
fleshly eye, the celestial eye, the eye of understanding ?
' The eye of flesh, the heavenly eye,
And insight's eye, vision supreme :—
These are the eyes, the visions three
Revealed by the man supreme.
The genesis of fleshly eye,
The way of eye celestial,
How intuition took its rise :—
The eye of insight unsurpassed.
Whoso doth come that eye to know,
Is from all ill and sorrow freed J4
1 2
See Compendium, 159, n. 6. QLBud. Psy. Eth.f xc. ; 254, n. 1.
3 4
Literally, * are these eyes.' I t i - v u t t a k a , § 61.
254-7. Does Celestial Vision explain Destiny ? 151
BOOK IV.
1. As to whether a Layman may be Arahant.
Controverted Point.—That a layman may be Arahant.
From the Commentary.—This concerns the belief of those who, like
the Uttarapathakas, seeing that Yasa, the clansman's son, and others
attained Arahantship while living amid the circumstances of secular
life, judge that a layman might be an Arahant. Now the meaning*
in the Theravadin's question refers to the spiritual' fetters ' by which
a layman is bound. But the opponent answers 'yes,' because he
sees only the outward characteristics. Now a layman is such by the
spiritual fetter, and not merely by the outward trappings, even as the
Exalted One said:
' Though he he finely clad, if he fare rightly, *
At peace and tamed, by right la%v nobly living,
against his will, was brought bv Ghatikara, the potter, to hear Kas-
sapa Buddha, and became a bhikkhu. Gotama Buddha affirmed that
Jotipala was a former impersonation of himself.
' 1 Cf. Buddhist Birth Stories, p. 18 f. 2
S a y a m - b h u.
3 4
Oj?. cit, 109. MajjUma-Nih, i. 80, 245.
2 - . Appeal to Authority
fact of III, and that this Truth was to be understood, and ivas
understood by me. It ivas concerning things unlearnt before
that vision, insight, understanding, wisdom, light arose in me
at the thought of the Ariyan Truth as to the Cause of III, and
that this Truth was concerning something to be put away, and
was put away by me. It ivas concerning things unlearnt before
that vision, insight, understanding, wisdom, light arose in me
at the thought of the Ariyan Truth as to the Cessation of III,
and that this Truth ivas concerning something to be realized,
and ivas realized by me. It was concerning things unlearnt
before that vision, insight, 'understanding, wisdom, light arose
in me at the thought of the A riyan Truth as to the Course
leading to the cessation of III, and that this truth was to be
developed, and ivas developed by me ' ?l
How then can you say that the Bodhisat entered on the
Path of Assurance and lived the higher life thereof [as far
back as] the age of Kassajaa Buddha ?
gous parados will apply in that case; and yon must [8, 4]
be able to describe such persons in terms of lower stages,
e.g. one practising for the topmost stage in terms of one
who has only got to the first—which is anomalous.1
[5] But can a person who is a proximate candidate for
Arahantship be described in terms of a Stream-Winner ?
Can he be both at the same time? Even if he be a Never-
Returner, is he rightly so described when he is in process
of becoming Arahant? 2 [6] Similarly for a candidate for
the Third and Second Fruitions.
[7] Would you not rather maintain that a person prac-
tising in order to realize Arahantship had evolved past 3
the fruition of Stream-Winning ?
[8] Or do you maintain that one so evolved was still
holding that first Fruit [as a distinctive quality] ? For
then you must also hold that he also remains possessed of
those evil qualities which as Stream-Winner he has evolved
out of—which is absurd.
[9-18] A similar argument applies to a proximate'candi-
date for Arahantship (Fourth Fruit) and the Second Path
and Fruit; to such a candidate and the Third Path and
Fruit; to a proximate candidate for the Third Fruit and
the First and Second Paths and Fruits; and to a proximate
candidate for the Second Fruit, and the First Path and Fruit.
[19] U. A.—If our proposition is wrong, surely you would
nevertheless say that a person who is a proximate candi-
date for realizing Arahantship had both won the preceding
three Fruits, and had not fallen away from them?
Th.—Yes, that is true.
U. A.—Surely then he is still possessed of them. [20-21]
And so for candidates in the Third, Second and First Paths.
[22] Th.—Assuming that he is still possessed of the
three Fruits, do you also admit that, having attained to all
four Paths, he is still possessed of all the Paths? Of
course you do not; [there at least you see my point]
1
Cf. above, I. 2, I. 6, and subsequently.
2
I.e., in the Fourth Path, striving to realize its Fruit.
3 gee IV..4, 8.
£>172- Of putting of the Fetters IY. 10.
[23, 24], neither do you admit a similar possession in
other candidates.
BOOK V
1. Of Emancipation.
Controverted Point.—That the knowledge of emancipation
has itself the quality of emancipation.
From the Commentary.—Four sorts of knowledge (or insight, n a n a )
are grouped under knowledge of emancipation, to wit, insight or intui-
tion, path-knowledge, fruit-knowledge, reflective knowledge. In other
words, emancipation considered as (1) freedom from perceiving things
as permanent or persisting, or through perceiving the opposite ; (2) the
severance and renunciation effected by the Paths; (3) the peace of
fruition 1 ; (4) contemplation of emancipation as such. Now only the
peace of fruition is abstract, unqualified emancipation. The rest
cannot be called emancipated things. But the Andhakas say that all
four are such.
4. Of Assurance.
Controverted Point.—That one who has not made sure
has the insight for entering the Path of Assurance.1
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Uttarapathakas, at present
hold this view on these grounds : The Exalted One judged t h a t £ anyone
who will enter on the right Path of Assurance 2 is capable of pene-
trating the Truths.' Therefore only the average worldling who has
•not made sure has the religious insight requisite for entering.
. [1] Th.—If one who has not made sure has the insight
for entering the Path of Assurance, then his opposite—one
who has made sure—must have the insight for not entering
it. 3 If you deny, your proposition falls through. If, by it,
you maintain that one who has made sure has not the in-
sight for not entering that Path, then you imply that one
who has not made sure has not the insight for entering
iihereon. Which, by your proposition, is wrong.
[2] Again, if one who has not made sure has the insight
for entering the Path of Assurance, do you then admit that
one who has made sure is in the same intellectual stage? 4
You deny. And if you admit, on the contrary, that one
who has made sure has not [i.e., no longer] the insight
1
' Assurance ( n i y a m a ) is a synonym of the Path ' [to Arahant-
.•ship].—Corny. The expression 'made sure,' n i y a t o , is applied to
those who have entered on it, and are ' assured of' eventual attainment.
2
S a m m a t t a - n i y a m a . Cf. Sayyvdta-Nih, iii. 225 (the last
•clause is different) ; and Anguttara-Nik., i. 121.
3
Literally, for entering the opposite path of non-assurance.
4
'Inasmuch as for the initial purpose of the Path he no longer
.needs the requisite insight.'—Corny.
T.S. V. 12
178 Of Assurance V. .
for entering, then you must surely deny that insight also
to one who has not made sure.
[3] Again, in affirming that one who has not made sure
has the insight for entering the Path of Assurance, do you
admit that he has also the insight for not entering it?
You deny, that is, you affirm he has not the insight for
not entering it. Do you equally admit then that he has not
the insight for entering it ? You deny. . . }
2
The Path proper being reserved for one who has made sure.
3
G o t r a b h u p u g g a l o . See V. 1, § l.j
309-10. All Knowledge is not Analytic 179
5. Of Analytic Insight1
Controverted Point.—That all knowledge is analytic.
From the Commentary.—It is a belief of the Andhakas that in an
Ariyan (that is, one who has fi made sure,5 is in some Stage of the Path or
Way) all 4 knowledge' whatsoever is supramundane or transcendental. 2
Hence they conclude that it is also analytic.
6. Of Popular Knowledge.
Controverted Point.—That it is wrong to say: Popular
knowledge has only truth as its object and nothing else.
From the Commentary.—This discourse is to purge the incorrect
tenet held by the Andhakas, that the word ' truth 3 is to be applied
without any distinction being drawn between popular and philo-
sophical truth. 1
[1] Anclhaka.—You admit, do you not, that one who
attains Jhana by way of the earth-artifice, has knowledge ?
Does not that earth-artifice come under popular truth ?
Th.—Yes.
A.—Then why exempt popular knowledge from the search
for truth?
[2] The same argument applies to the other artifices,
and to gifts as stated above (V. 5).
[8] Th.—Then according to you, popular knowledge has
only Truth as its object. But is it the object of popular
knowledge to understand the fact and nature of 111, to put
away the Cause, to realize the Cessation, to develop the
Path thereto? You must deny. (Hence the need for a
distinction between truths.)
BOOK VI
1. Of Assurance [of salvatioii].1
Controverted Point.—That ' Assurance5 is unconditioned.
From the Commentary.—In the Word: ' Capable of entering into
Assurance, the culmination in things that are good,'2 the Ariyan Path
is meant. But inasmuch as a person therein would not forfeit salvation
even if that Path which [for him] had arisen were to pass away,
therefore there is an opinion, among Andhakas for instance, that this
Assurance is unconditioned in the sense of being eternal.3
But are these terms that you can apply to what is uncon-
ditioned ? Of course not. . . .
[8] Again, is the Path (the Fourfold) 'unconditioned ?
' Nay,' you say, ' conditioned.'1 Yet you would make Assur-
ance unconditioned; the Path of Stream-Winning, Once-
Returning, Never-Returning, Arahantship, conditioned; but
Assurance of Stream-Winning, etc., unconditioned! . . .
[4] If then these four stages of Assurance be uncon-
ditioned, and Nibbana be unconditioned, are therefive kinds
of the unconditioned ? If you assent, you are in the same
difficulty as before (§1).
[5] Finally, is false Assurance2 unconditioned ? ' No,
conditioned,' you say. But has true Assurance the same
quality ? Here you must deny. . . .
[6] A.—If I am wrong, would you say that, if Assurance
having arisen for anyone and ceased, his work of making
sure [his salvation] would be cancelled ?
Th.—No.
A.—Then Assurance must be unconditioned [that is, it
cannot begin and cease].
Th. — But your argument can be applied to false
Assurance. You would not therefore call that uncon-
ditioned !
2. Of Causal Genesis.
Controverted Point.—That the causal elements in the
law of causal genesis are unconditioned.
From the Commentary.—Because of the Word in the chapter on
causation—' whether Tatbagatas arise or do not arise, this elemental
datum which remains fixedetc., some, as the Pubbaseliyas and the
Mahiijsasakas, have arrived at the view here affirmed.
[1] This is exactly similar to the opening argument in
VI.l, § 1;
1 4
Since it is something that has a genesis and a cessation.'—Corny.
2
M i c c h a 11 a - n i y a m a, assurance • in the wrong direction,
applied to the five heinous crimes (p. 71, n. 4) which entail retribution
in the next existence.
3 1 . Is Unconditioned 187
1
, Of the five ' aggregates' of being, only < body ' is absent.
2
A n e j a , a n a n j a ; Anguttara-Nihy ii, 184: he who has
entered into the Jhanas so called is said to have won the Imper-
turbable.
327-28. Is Cessation Unconditioned ? 191
done., attained, it is called ' completed,' but it cannot be spoken of as
conditioned or unconditioned, since the features of one state or the
other are absent. But some, as the Andhakas and Uttarapathakas,
hold that, because it is not conditioned, it is therefore unconditioned.
[1] Th.—Does this mean that this state is Nibbana,
the Shelter, etc. ? You deny. Then are both similarly
described as unconditioned ? You affirm ? Then are there
two unconditioneds . . . two Nibbanas ? . . .
[2] Are there any who attain to Cessation, acquire it,
cause it to rise, to keep rising, set up, induce, produce,
bring to pass, make to be born, to happen ? If so, can you
so speak of the unconditioned ? Of course not. . . .
[8] Is there apparent such a thing as a purging through,
emerging from,1 Cessation ? If so, is there the same from
the unconditioned ? Of course not. . . .
In attaining Cessation, first speech, then action, then
consciousness ceases. Can you so speak of attaining the
unconditioned ?
In emerging from Cessation, first consciousness, then
action, then speech occurs. Can you so speak of emerging
from the unconditioned ?
[4] After emerging from Cessation, one is in touch with
three contacts : that of the void, of the signless, of the
unhankered-after.2 Can you so speak of emerging from
the unconditioned ? Or that, when one emerges from
Cessation, consciousness is inclined for, tends to, takes
shelter in solitude?
[5] A. U.—If we are wrong, we would just ask you, Is
Cessation conditioned? No, you say; then it must be
unconditioned.3
1
These two terms refer to the attainment of Fruition after
emergence.—Corny.
2
See above, pp. 142, n. 4, 148, n. 1.
3
Indian logic recognizes four alternatives to our two: is, is not,
is and is not, neither is nor is not. The reply here would be in terms
of the last. The state is outside that 'universe of thought' which com-
prises conditioned and its opposite, as much, as green is outside music.
192 Of Space VI. 6.
6. Of Space.
Controverted Point.—That space is unconditioned.
From the Commentary.—Space is of three modes: as confined or
delimited, as abstracted from object, as empty or inane. Of these the
first is conditioned; the other two are mere abstract ideas. But some,
like the Uttarapathakas and Mahiijsasakas, hold that the two latter
modes also, inasmuch as [being mental fictions] they are not condi-
tioned, must therefore be unconditioned.
[1] Th.—II space is unconditioned, as you affirm, you
must class it with Nibbana, or you must affirm two [sorts
of] unconditioned—and so two Nibbanas—all of which you
deny. . . .
[2] Can anyone make space where there has been no
space? Then one can make that which is conditioned
unconditioned—which you deny. . . . So, too, for the
reverse process. . . .
[8] Again, if you admit that birds go through space,
moon, sun, and stars go through space, supernormal move-
ment is worked in space,1 the arm or hand is waved in
space, clods, clubs, a supernormally moved person, arrows
are projected through space, you must state as much about
movement through or in the unconditioned—which you
cannot. . . .
[4] Again, if people enclose space when they make
houses or -barns, do they enclose the unconditioned ? Or
when a well is dug, does non-space become space ? Yes ?
Then does the unconditioned become conditioned? Or,
when an empty well, or an empty barn, or an empty jar, is
filled, does ' space ' disappear ? If so, does the uncon-
ditioned disappear ?
[5] U. M.—If then it is wrong to say space is un-
conditioned, is it conditioned? You deny. Then it must
be unconditioned.2
1
Aka.se . . . i d d h i r ) v i k u b b a n t i .
2 On space see JBud. JPsy. Fthlviii. 194, and cf. MiUnda, ii. 103,
and 3161
830-31. Is Void Space visible ? 193
7. Of Space as visible.
Controverted Point.—That space is visible.
From the Commentary,—This is the view, among the Andhakas for
instance, namely, that because we have cognition of enclosed space,
•such as keyholes, etc., therefore all void space is visible. They argue
that in that case space is r u p a , that is, material visible object. In
ijhe absence of a Sutta authorizing this, the opponent rejects it, yet
insists on the testimony of pillar-interstices, etc., as visible things.
In such cases, however, what is seen are the pillars, trees, and so forth.
That what lies between is space, there being no visible objects, is an
act of ideation, not of sense-cognition.1 This applies throughout.
Hence the opponent's argument is not conclusive.
't.s. v . 13
194 Of Visibles VI. 8*
BOOK VII
[1] Th.—But you do not also deny that any things may
combine or be included with other things under a concept
of totality or universality. Hence, how can you deny that
they may be grouped together ? [2] The organs of sense
[3] and their objects are, you admit, computed under the
material aggregate [of a living individual]. [4] Pleasant,
painful, or neutral feelings are computed under the aggre-
gate of feeling. [5] Percepts on occasion of sense and idea-
tion come under the aggregate of perception. [6] Volitions
on occasion of sense and ideation come under the aggregate
of conscious concomitants. [7] Consciousness on occasion
of sense and ideation comes under the aggregate of con-
sciousness. Hence, by admitting these inclusions, you must
admit that things may be grouped by an idea.
1
The title should, in the Pali, be S a n g a h a n o t S a n g a h i t a -
ka t h a .
2
Physical grouping is, of course, the bringing together a number of
individuals. But things may be grouped mentally, i.e., included under
a concept of totality involved in counting, or a general concept by
generalizing.
196 Of Mental Facts as connected VII. 2.
3. Of Menial Properties.
Controverted Point.—That they do not exist.
From the Commentary.—Once more, some, like the Bajagirikas and
Siddhatthikas, hold that we can no more get ' mentals' ( c e t a s i k a )
from mind (citta), than we can get 'contactals' from contact,
so that there is no such thing as a property, or concomitant, of
mind. The Theravadin contends that there would be nothing wrong
if custom permitted us to say ' contactal' for what depends on contact,
just as it is customary usage to call 'mental' that which depends on
mind (c i 11 a-n i s s i t a k o).
[1] Th.—You surely do not also deny that some mental
phenomena are concomitant, co-existent, conjoined with
consciousness, have their genesis and cessation, physical
basis and object in common with it ? Why then exclude
the 'mental?' [2] Contact, for instance, is co-existent with
consciousness; hence it is a 'mental,' i.e., a property or
concomitant of mind. So are feeling, perception, volition,
faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, understanding,
lust, hate, dulness, . . . indiscretion—all the ' mentals.'
[3] R. S.—You allow then that what is co-existent with
consciousness is a 'mental.' Do you equally admit that
what is co-existent with contact is a 'contactal,' or that
what is co-existent with each of those mental phenomena
is to be analogously regarded ; for instance, that what is
co-existent with indiscretion is an ' indiscretional'?
Th.—Certainly. [4] And if you assert that there are
no mental phenomena corresponding to our term ' mentals/
was it not said by the Exalted One :
' Yea ! verily this mind and mental states
Are void of soul for one loho understands.
Whoso discerns the loiv and high in both,
The seer, he knows that neither can endure' ?1
essential difference between sesamum and its oil as we can between
feeling and perception. " Sesamum" is the customary name for
something that is kernel, husk, and oil. When the former appearance
is changed, we call it oil.'—Corny. The MSS. and B r are discrepant
in detail here, but we believe we have given the intended meaning.
1
We cannot trace these verses.
198 Of Giving and Gift VII. 4.
[5] Or again, was it not said by the Exalted One:
4
Suppose in this case, Kevatta,1 that a bhikkhu can make
manifest the mind, and the mental [property], and the direction
unci application of thought in other beings, other individuals,
saying : Such is your mind. This is your mind. Thus and
thus are you, conscious 72
Hence there is such a thing as a ' mental' [that is,
a property, or concomitant, of conciousness or mind] . 3
1
Or Kevaddha. The KV. MSS. read as above.
2
JDigha-NiTcaya, i. 213.
3
O n c e t a s i k a see Compendium, 287 f.; Buddh. Psychology, 175 f.
4
D a n a means grammatically both giving and gift and liberality#
Hence the necessity of retaining the Pali word.
6
So B r . The readings in the PTS edition are impossible.
Of Giving and Gift
proposition falls through. If you assent,1 you then imply
that it is possible to give any mental property to others:
contact, feeling, perception, volition, faith, energy, mind-
fulness, concentration, understanding.
[2] R. S.—If we are wrong, we ask you, is giving
attended by undesirable, disagreeable, unpleasant, barren
consequences?2 Does it induce, and result in, sorrow? Is
not rather the opposite true? Surely then dana is a
mental state.
[3] Th.—Granting that giving was pronounced by the
Exalted One to produce desirable results, is giving a robe,
or alms-food, or lodging, or materia medica and requisites
for illness dana ? You admit they are, but you cannot
assert that these directly bring about desirable, agreeable,
pleasant, felicific mental results.
[4] R. S.—If we are wrong, let us quote the words
of the Exalted One :
1
' Faith, modesty, and meritorious giving :
These are the things that men of zvorth pursue ;
This, say they, is the path celestial,
Hereby we pass into the deva-world.'3
[5] Again: ' Bhikkhus, these five giving s, the Great Dana's*
are supreme, secular, hereditary; ancient [customs'], unmixed
now or in the past; they are not mixed one with the other, nor
shall be, and they am not despised by recluses or brahmins, or
by the wise. What are the five? First, there is the Ariyan
disciple who, having put away taking life, is opposed to it
Such an one gives to all beings u-ithout limit security, amity,
1
On the ground that anything mental cannot be given as if it were
food, etc., the opponent denies ; when the question is insisted upon, he
recollects the Sutta on ' giving security, etc.,' and assents.—Corny.
2
If d a n a means the material gift, and this be, say, a nauseous
medicine, the giver must reap corresponding undesirable fruit.—
Corny.
3
Anguttara-Nik., iv. 286.
4
In his Commentary on Anguttara-Nih Buddhaghosa calls these
4
the gifts of the will' (c e t an a), deliberate, intentional giving.
200 Of Giving and Gift VII. 4.
5. Of Utility.
Controverted Point.—That merit increases with utility.
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Bajagirikas, Siddhattikas,
and Sammitiyas, from thoughtlessly interpreting such Suttas as
4 4
merit day and night is always growingand the robe, bhikkhus,
3
which a bhikkhu enjoying the,lose of . . . / hold that there is such
a thing as merit achieved by utility.
1
Anguttara-Nik., iv. 246.
2
Op. city iv. 289. This is a 4 stock' catalogue ; cf. op. citi. 107 ;
ii. 85, 203 ; Dig/ia-Nik., iii. 259.
3
See below.
343-44. Does Utility increase Merit I 201
BOOK VIII
1. Of Divers Destinies.1
Controverted Point.—That there are six spheres of destiny.
From the Commentary.—There is an opinion among some schools
—the Andhakas and Uttarapathakas—that the Asuras form a sixth
plane of rebirth. The Theravadin contradicts this in virtue of the
hair-raising illustration of the five divisions of destiny in the Sutta:
' There are these five destinies, Sdriputta.'2 . . . It is true that a
troop of Asuras—that of Yepacitti3—was freed from the fourfold plane
of misery, but not to form a separate plane. They were taken up
among the devas. The Kalakanjakas were taken up among the Petas.
[1] Th.—Did not the Exalted One name five destinies—
purgatory, the animal kingdom, the Peta-realm, mankind,
the devas? [2] And did not the Kalakanjaka Asuras, who
resembled the Petas in [ugly or frightful] shape, sex-life,
diet, and length of life, intermarry with them? [3] And
did not Vepacitti's troop, who in the same respects re-
sembled the devas, intermarry with devas? [4] And had
not Vepacitti's troop been formerly devas ?
[5] A. U.—But since there is an Asura-group, it is
surely right to speak of it as a [possible] destiny? 4
1
G a t i , literally, a going, or bourne, a career. On these, concisely
stated, see Compendium, p. 137.
2
Majjhima-Nik., i. 73.
3
Sayinitta-Nih, i. 221 f. Cf. Dialogues, ii. 289 ; Pss. of the
Brethren, verse 749.
4
The Commentary includes between £ in shape 5 and 4 sex-life,' the
[bracketed] term b x b h a c c h a — B i b h a c c h a t i v i r u p a dud-
d a s i k a . It also paraphrases s a m a n a b h o g a . (rendered as 're-
sembling . . . in sex-life') by s a d i s a - m e t h u n a - s a m a c a r a ;
and s a m a n a h a r S ('resembling . . . in diet') by s a d i s a - k h e l a -
s i n g h a n i k a - p u b b a -1 o h i t a d i - a h a r a.
212 Of an Intermediate State VIII. 2.
2. Of an Intermediate State.
Controverted Point.—That there is an intermediate state
of existence.
From the Commentary.—Some (as, for instance, the Pubbaseliyas
and Sammitiyas), by a careless acceptation of the Sutta-phrase—
'completed existence within the interval'1—held that there is an
interim stage where a being awaits reconception for a week or longer.
The counter-argument is based on the Exalted One's dictum that there
are three states of becoming only—the Kama-, the Rupa-, and the
Arupa-worlds.2 And it is because of that dictum that the opponent
[in so far as he is orthodox] has to deny so many of the questions.
4. Of Sense-Desires.
Controverted Point.—Whether the subjective sense-desires
or the objectivefive fields of sense constitute kama's.
From the Commentary.—Going merely by the Sutta last quoted
above, some, like the Pubbaseliyas, hold the latter view. The
1
Safyutta-Nik., i. 16.
2
Here k a m a d h a t u == k a m a - b h a v a or - l o k a .
3 Bee above, I. 3, §§ 9,10.
4
Anguttara-Nik., iii. 411, etc.
216 Of Sense-Desires VIII. 4.
Theravadin shows that 'corruptions' alone truly constitute sen-
suality.1
5. Of the Rupa-element.
Controverted Point.—That the ultimate 'datum or ele-
ment of rupa9 is things [cognized as] material.
From the Commentary.—The Theravadin criticizes this view—
held, for instance, by the Andhakas—on the ground that the 1 Bupa-
element' includes all the spheres of life known as B i i p a - b h a v a,
and is therefore more extensive than just material qualities of things. 1
[1] Th.—Is then rupa a sphere of life, a destiny, a realm
of beings, renewed life, a matrix, a station for rebirth-con-
sciousness, an acquiring of individuality ? Is there karma
leading to it, beings to be reborn in it ? Do they get born,
grow old, die, decease, get rebirth there? Are the five
aggregates e in' rupa ? Is it a five-mode existence ? [2]
Now all these you can predicate of the Kupa-datum, but
not 6f rupa, or material quality. Hence the latter has not
all that is implicated in the former.
Again, if the EzTpa-datum consists only of material quali-
ties—and, as you will admit, there is material quality in the
jOma-datum—is this latter datum the same asEwpa-datum?
You say ' no.' But think. You must admit it is.2 Then
we get a man in two life-spheres at the same time. . . .
6. Of the Arupa-FAement.
Controverted Point. — That the ultimate c datum, or
element' of arupa is things [cognized as] immaterial.
From the Commentary. — Here the same method is followed.
Instruction is given by taking a certain immaterial notion—'feeling'
—and asking if that is a sphere of life, etc.; thus it is showed that in
no case are the two identical.
[1] Th.—Is then feeling a sphere of life, a destiny, a realm
of beings, renewed life, a matrix, a station for rebirth-
consciousness, an acquiring of individuality? Is there
1
Here there is the corresponding difficulty of the ambiguity of
r & p a. See Compendium, 271 f.; Bud. Psy. Eth., 48 f.
2
He denies, so as not to contradict the accepted triad of life-spheres.
When pushed, he assents, because of his thesis.—Corny/
218 Senses in the Rivpa-Heavens VIII. 7.
karma leading to it? Are beings to be reborn in it? Do
they get old, die, decease from, get reborn in it ? Are the
five aggregates ' in' feeling ? Is it a five-mode existence ?
[2] Now all these you can predicate of the Arupa-datum or
element, but not of feeling only.
Again, if the Arupa-element mean only immaterial things
—and you will admit there is feeling and other mental
aggregates in the Kama-element—are these two elements
or data identical ? Either you must deny (which were
unorthodox) or assent. In the latter case we get a person
in two spheres of life at the same time. The same argu-
ment holds good for Arupa and Rupa data. And if all
three be mutually identical, we get a person in three
spheres of life at the same time. . . .
8. Of Matter in Arupa-Sphere.
Controverted, Point.—That there is matter among the
Immaterial.
From the Commentary.—Some (as, for instance, the Andhakas),
judging by the Word—' Because of consciousness there comes mind
and bodyn—imagined that, even in the Arupa-sphere of exist-
ence, there was a subtle, refined matter segregated from grosser
matter.
BOOK IX
[1] Th —But are not the Fetters also put off when the
world3 is considered as impermanent? You admit this, of
course. But [then you should not confine yourself to the
optimistic side].
[2] You admit, too, they are put off when the world is
considered as full of 111, as disease, as a canker, a piercing
dart, as woe, as unbearable,4 as an enemy,6 as crumbling
away, as a calamity, as oppression, as peril, as trouble, as
fluctuating, as dissolving, as transient, as shelterless, as no
retreat, as no refuge, as without protection, as empty, bare
and void, as without soul, as full of danger, and mutable.
[But your statement hereby becomes one-sided.]
1
A n i s a r j s a (literally, 1 praise,' with two intensive prefixes; com-
mendable, because good; profit, advantage). The argument is that
the realization of present actual evils is as strong a stimulus, as vis
a tergo, to betterment, as the faith in the happiness of that betterment
attained—-the vis a fronte.
2
In the PTS edition read va or e va for evarj.
3
Sankhara.
4
Or £ an affliction5 (aba dh a to).
5
Literally, < as other.'
401. Of Release through seeing the Good 231
[8] You admit then that (at the same moment) a man
can both consider the impermanence and so on of the
world, and see the blessings in Nibbana? No? But you
have admitted that he loses the Fetters when he does both.
You admit then that he can? But does this not involve us
in two simultaneous mental reactions, two consciousnesses,
and so on?
[4] A.—You reject my proposition. But did not the
Exalted One say: 4 Take, bhikkhus, the ease of a bhikkhu
who lives contemplating the happiness in Nibbana, perceiving
and feeling that happiness continually, constantly, and un-
diluted, convinced of it in his mind and permeated with it by
insight?1 . . .
Surely then it is for one who discerns the happy prospect
that the Fetters are put off.
3. Of Matter as Subjective.
Controverted Point.—Whether matter should be termed
subjective or objective.
From, the Commentary.—It is an opinion of some—for instance,
the Uttarapathakas—that matter should be termed s a r a m m a n a
(i.e., co-object), not because it is so in the sense of making a mental
object [for itself], but inasmuch as it causes mental presentation.
The argument seeks to point out the distinction be ween the two
meanings of a r a m m a n a . 2
[1] Th.—If that is so, you must also affirm of matter or
body, that it has the mental features of ' adverting,' idea-
ting, reflecting, co-ordinated application, attending, willing,
anticipating, aiming3—things which you would, on the
contrary, deny of matter.
[2] All, or any of them you can rightly affirm of mental
properties, such as contact (mental reaction), feeling, per-
ception, volition, cognition, faith, energy, mindfulness,
concentration, understanding, lust, hate, illusion, conceit,
1
Majjhima-Niki. 4 : a Sutta, says the Commentary, which is
here inconclusive, because the Nibbana spoken of is simply temporal
well-being, so called. ' Falsely mistaken by the worldling for the real
thing; a matter connected with the satisfaction of natural desires
only,' wrote Buddhaghosa in the Papanca Sudani (Commentary on
the Majjhima-Nik.).
2
So Br. edition: a r a m m a n a - d v a y a s s a v i b h a g a - d a s -
s a n ' a t t h a r j . The PTS reading is not intelligible. S a r a m -
m a n a , in the orthodox view, means 'subjective,' because mind has
mental object. The opponent takes s a r a m m a n a to mean ' objective/
because matter is presented as object. This confusion of the terms
applicable to mind arises from the fact that he substitutes a r a ra-
ni a n a for p a c c a y a in the compound s a p p a c c a y a, and misreads
s a r a m m a n a t t h e n a s a r a m m a n a r ) . Thus the word a r a m -
m a n a r) has two meanings—' object' and p a c c a y a. See § 4.
3
See VIII. 9, § 1.
234 Of Bias as without Mental Object IX. 4.
erroneous opinion, doubt, mental inertia, distraction, im-
modesty, indiscretion—all of which you admit as subjective.
But matter is not one of these, and therefore such things
may not be affirmed of it.
[3] You deny in the case of matter all those mental
features—adverting, etc.—but claim for it the term ' subjec-
tive,' which is really applicable to ' contact,' sensation, etc.
These, as you admit, do not lack those mental features named.
[4] £7.—But is not matter correlated (as an object)? 1
Of course you assent. Then as correlated it is surely right
to apply the term £ subjective' to matter, etc. [since ' object'
is one of the twenty-four (causal) relations].
6. Of Past Ideas.
Controverted Point.—That consciousness of a past object
is without object.
From the Commentary.—Some—for instance, the Uttarapathakas—
hold that, since past and future mental objects are not actually
existing, therefore mind recalling a past object is mind without object.
[1] Th.—But you admit that there is such a thing as a
mental object that is past ? Then how can you make such
a self-contradictory statement? [2] Again, is there not
adverting of mind, ideation, co-ordinated application, atten-
tion, volition, anticipation, aim, concerning that which is
past? . . .
7. Of Future Ideas.
Controverted Point.—That a consciousness, having an idea
that is future, is without object.
The Commentary makes no separate comment.
[1, 2] are verbatim as in 6, 'future' substituted for ' past.
1
N a n i . It is used as a synonym of p a n n a v a in § 6. Cf.
Anguttara-Nihiv. 840.
2
The insight is potential, not always actualized, i.e., exercised
about an object. There cannot be two mental objects at the same
instant of time.
288 Of Initial Application of Mind IX. 8.
[8] Th. continues. — You admit of course concerning
what is present, that there can be adverting of mind,
ideation, and so on (6, § 2), so that consciousness of a
present idea has its mental object. And you admit that
there can be adverting of mind and the rest about the past
and also about the future. Yet in both these cases mind,
you say, is without mental object. [4] Why not also say
then that, while there can be adverting of mind, etc., about
the present, mind occupied about a present object is mind
without object ?
[5] A.—But you admit that a ' past object' does not
exist [at the present moment] ? Surely then a mind occu-
pied with past object is occupied with no (that is, with a
non-existent) object. . . .
1
C e t a s i k a . Of. vii. 3.
2
Digha-Nik., iii. 219; Majjhima-Nik., iii. 162; Sayyutta-Nih,
iv. 363; Anguttara-Nik., iv. 300.
3
In other words, that sounds are psychical ' thrillings' (v i p p h a r a,
or reverberations, or vibrations).
4
Majjhima-Nik., i. 301, where it is said that speech is an activity
or co-efficient of mind, because there is first thought, then speech.
240 Of Speech conforming to Thought IX. 10.
1
tion of mind. The Theravadin submits that if sound can be so
specialized, each mental property would send forth its own peculiar
sounds. If,not, then we cannot speak of auditory cognition of a sound
that is merely a matter of intellect, and not an object of sense. But
the Word : 'Hearing a sound, an irradiation of initial application
of mind, he reveals'2 . . . shows there is auditory consciousness also.
[1] Th.—If this be true, you must affirm no less that
sounds from mental contact are solely an irradiation of
mental contact; that such as are from feeling are solely
an irradiation of feeling. So also for such as are from
perception, volition, thought in general, mindfulness, un-
derstanding. This you will not do.
[2] Must you not also affirm of a sound that is an irra-
diation of mental application, that it is [none the less] to
be cognized by hearing, impinges on the ear, comes into
the auditory avenue? This you deny; you affirm that
such a sound is not cognizable by hearing, etc. How then
can you speak of it as sound ?
BOOK X
1. Of Cessation.
Controverted Point.—That before five aggregates seeking
rebirth have ceased,five operative1 aggregates arise.
From the Commentary.—Some—for instance, the Andhakas—hold
that if, before a unit of snb-consciousness lapses, another unit of con-
sciousness, with its [operative] fourfold aggregate and the material
aggregate sprung from it, has not arisen, the living continuum must
be cut off.2
Th—Yes.
A.—What! do the dead, does one who has ended his
days, develop the Path? 1
BOOK XI
2. Of Insight.
Controverted Point.—That it is wrong to say 4 he has
insight' of one who, though he has banished nescience,
has thoughts not conjoined with insight.
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Mahasanghikas, hold that
one who, having banished spiritual ignorance by Path-insight, is
experiencing ordinary cognitions by way of sense, cannot at the time
be said to ' have insight,5 since Path-consciousness is then not active.
The criticism reveals their ineptitude in the notion of what an [Ariyan]
person is, and also the propriety of ascribing insight to one who,
having acquired insight [has it always potentially, if not actually].1
[1] Th.—Then you must also admit it is not right to
say that, when lust has departed, a man has ' done with
lust.' Similarly for hate, and for dulness, and for worldly
corruptions generally. [2] If, on the contrary, you main-
tain that it is right to affirm these latter propositions, then
it is no less right to say, of one for whom nescience is
departed, but for whom cognition not conjoined with insight
is active, that he has insight.
1
Cf. this borrowing of a modern turn (anticipated by Aristotle) in
X. 12, p. 248.
256 Of Insight and Ordinary Consciousness XI. 3.
[3] M.—But if it be right to say thus of that person, is
it in virtue of past insight? Can he be said 'to have in-
sight ' by an insight that has ceased, that is past, that has
subsided ? You deny this . . .
4
4. Of the Utterance, This is Pain and Sorrow/'
Controverted Point.—That from utterance of the word,
'This is 111!' insight into the nature of 111 is set working.
From the Commentary.™Some, like, the Andhakas, hold that this
befalls the devotee at the moment when he enters on the Path. 1 The
opponent's reply admits both utterance and insight. In the last
-question, to which the opponent replies in the negative, he is asked
whether, by the procedure he upholds, he is not committed to allow
an insight issuing from each syllable: I - d a r) d u - k k h a t ) ?
6. Of Concentration.
Controverted Point.—That the continuity of conscious-
ness 2 is concentration of mind ( s a m a d h i ) . 3
From the Commentary,—Some, like the Sabbatthivadins and
Uttarapathakas, hold that, because of the Word—'to spend seven
days and nights motionless, speechless, in the experience of absolute
bliss*—the flow of consciousness itself may constitute concentration.
They do not take the latter term as meaning collectedness of thought,
even when the coefficient of individualizing intentness ( e k a g g a t a )
has arisen in a momentary unit of consciousness.
[1] Th.—Your statement must include of course past
and future states of consciousness in the series. You
forgot that, and you must agree that the pust having
ceased and the future being unborn, it is not right to say
that they form a [present] concentrated state of mind.4
1 Anguttara-Nikii. 172.
2
C i t t a - s a n t ati. See Compendium, 6,153, n. 1; 157, n. 4; 252 f.
3
S a m a d h i means the placing, establishing of consciousness ex-
clusively and voluntarily on any single object. E k a g g a t a is the
essential factor in consciousness, the cultivation of which may bring
about the state called S a m a d h i .
4
There is no use in speaking of a ' state' without a f function' of
mind. And only the present state can be functioning (p a c c u p -
p a n n a m eva c i t t a r j k i c c a k a r a r i hoti).—Corny.
458. Consciousness and Rapt Absorption 261
8. Of Impermanence.
Controverted Point.—That impermanence is predeter-
mined.
From the CommentarySome, like the Andhakas, hold that im-
permanence itself is no less predetermined than impermanent things,
such as the body, etc. By this they are involved either in a plural
order of impermanence, or in an interminable series of temporal
features, each predetermined in its own way, with no prospect of
coming to the end of predetermination.3
[1-8] Th.—Then is impermanence predetermined by im-
permanence already predetermined. And if you admit this,
1
He judges that the correlation may hold by way of contiguity and
reciprocity (two of the twenty-four Paccayas or conditioning i elation ),
—Corny.
2
Literally, predetermination of one by the other.
3
The idea is that things possess impermanence as a characteristic
feature. If this characteristic were predetermined, it should possess
another feature of impermanence equally predetermined.
264 Self-Restraint and Sense-Control XII. 1.
BOOK XII
1. Of Self Restraint.1
Controverted Point.— That self-restraint is [positive]
action (karma).
From the Commentary.—This is a view held, for instance, by the
Mahasanghikas, and based on the Sutta: ' When he sees an object,
hears a sound, etc., he grasps, etc., at the general characters thereof,'2
etc. They hold that both self-restraint and want of self-restraint amount
to overt action, or karma. In our doctrine it is volition that con-
stitutes karma. And it is argued that just as volition, proceeding by way
of deed, word, and thought, gets the name of action of body, speech, and
mind, so, if self-restraint be action, that self-restraint, proceeding by
way of sense-control, would get the name of visual karmas, auditory
karmas, etc. This, as not warranted by the Suttanta, the opponent
rejects till the fifth sense is mentioned. Here he stumbles at the
ambiguity of k a y a : 'sentient skin-surface' and 'intimating body.'
The Sutta quoted is concerned with the presence and absence of
self-restraint, not of karma, hence it is inconclusive.
[ l j Th.—If this be so, you imply that ocular self-
restraint is moral action of the eye; so for the other
senses — you cannot admit this. . . . But as to self-
restraint, involved in sense-control of body and in control
of mind, you at first deny i t 3 to be moral action, and then
i Cf. above, III. 10.
, 2 Anguttara-Nik., ii. 16; also Dialogues, i. 80, and elsewhere. The
' general characters' ( n i m i t t a), according to the Commentators, are
usually taken, in this connection, as referring to sex-features and sex-
attraction. Self-restraint is the carrying out of the volition (c e t a n a),
which alone ranks as morally effective action—i.e., karma.
3
He rejects for k a y a as organ of touch; accepts for it as the
vehicle of intimation. As to 4 mind,' he rejects it as organ of sense,
accepts it as an avenue of karma.
463. Are Acts or Omissions MoralI 265
assent to the proposition that it is moral action. Why
then do you not concede this for the remaining four senses ?
That which you admit as true for mind, the co-ordinator
of sense, you must admit as true no less for thefive senses.
[2] Want of self - restraint you admit of course is
[immoral] action (karma): is it eye-karma when self-
restraint is not practised by the controlling power of
sight ? . . . (proceed as in § 1).
[8] M.—But if I am wrong, was it not said by the
Exalted One: ' Here, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu, when he sees an
object with the eye, grasps at the general characters thereof,1
. . . [again] ' does not grasp at the external appearance, . . .
when he hears a sound, . . . cognizes a thing with the mind,
, . . does not grasp, etc' P
Surely both self-restraint and want of it are herein
shown to be morally effective action ?
2. Of Action.
Controverted Point.—That all action (karma) entails
moral result (v i p a k a).
• From the Commentary.—Some, like the Mahasanghikas again, hold
this view, basing their opinion on the Sutta quoted below. Now
whereas the Master, without any qualification, spoke of volition as
moral action (karma), the argument here shows that only good or
bad volition as entailing moral result was meant, and that volition
which is morally indeterminate is without moral result. The Sutta
quoted is inconclusive, since it refers to the experience of results in
actual life or lives, given the necessary conditions.
[1] Th.—Do you imply that all volition entails result
[volition being moral action]? If you deny, then your
proposition is not universally valid. If you do imply that
volition entails result, then you are committed to this—
that volition which is indeterminate as to moral result
entails moral result; that volition which is inoperative and
1
See preceding note. 2
266 Is Sound a Mental Phenomenon ? XII. 2.
therefore indeterminate as to moral result entails such
result, whether such volition be exercised in any one of the
three spheres of life, or in that which is not included in
them.1 . . . All of this you must deny. . . . [2] For do
you not hold that resultant or inoperative volition, which
is indeterminate as to moral result, cannot be said to entail
result ? Where then is your universal proposition ?
[8] M.—But if I am wrong, was it not said by the
Exalted One : ' I declare, bhikkhus, that there can be no
annulment of voluntary deeds done and' accumulated, without
experience of the results thereof, be it in this life or in the
after-life'?2
Wherefore all action surely entails result.
4. Of the Sense-Organs.
Controverted Point.—That the sense-organs are results
of karma.
From the Commentary.—Here again it is a Mahasanghika belief
that, because the sense-organs have arisen through the doing of past
actions, therefore they are results (understood as subjective or mental).
Of them the sixth, or co-ordinating, sense may at times be such a
result, but not the others.
[1-4] The argument folloivs that of the previous dialogue
verbatim, the ' sixth sense' {man'ayatana) being omitted.
1 In the PTS edition the reply should here be, Na h ' e v a i )
vattabbe.
2
Dlgha Nikaya, iii. 178.
3
Though,the sense-organs are well produced through karma, they
are not designated as vipaka's.—Corny.
268 Of the Seven-Rebirths-Limit XII. 5.
5. Of the Seven-Rebirths'-Limit.1
Controverted Point,—That he who is said to be liable to
seven more rebirths at most is assured of final salvation2
only at the end of the seven-rebirths' interval.3
From the Commentary.—This is a belief held, for instance, by the
Uttarapathakas. The Theravadin's object is to show that there is
no such immutablyfixed order. There is only (1) the ' true order' of the
Ariyan Path, and (2) the ' false order,' 4 to which belong thefive heinous
crimes entailing inevitable retribution in the very next existence.
7. Of Murder.
Controverted Point—That a person who has attained to
sound views3 may yet designedly commit murder.
From the Commentary. — Some, like the Pubbaseliyas, hold that,
since a person who has attained to sound views has not entirely put
1
Explain* d by Buddhaghosa, commenting on Anguttara-Nih.,
i. 233, as meani g ' a goer from family (kula) to family,' ( k u l a
here standing for b h a v a ' (rebirth). See above, p. 77, n. 8.
2
Burmese translators give alternative renderings—in or by his rank
—for k o l a n k o l a t a .
3
D i t t h i s a m p a n n o p u g g a l o , a technical term of religious
life, wherein the word di t t h i no longer means erroneous opinion,
but the opposite. Such an one is still a learner (sekha), but has
put away all but the last fetters and residual lust, hate, and nescience,
and is incapable, so the Buddha taught, of any of the misdeeds or of
the irreverence mentioned above.—Scvyyutta-Ni7cn ii. 48 f.; vi. s.v.
B i t t h i ; Anguttara-Nik., iii. 438 f.
270 Of Murder XII. 7,
away enmity, and since he who takes life has enmity in his heart,
therefore one who thinks rightly may yet commit wilful murder.
[1] Th.—Then you imply that he may designedly com-
mit [any murder, even the worst, to wit] matricide, parri-
cide, Arahanticide, or with enmity at heart may wound a
Tathagata, or create schism in the Order. . . .
[2] You imply, moreover, that [since he may commit
such a deed] he can have no reverence for Master, Doctrine,
Order, or Training, [3] while you know, on the other hand,
that such a person feels just the opposite.
[4] You imply, moreover, that such a person may defile1
Buddha shrines, desecrate them, spit on them, behave as
an infidel in presence of them ? 2
[5] But was it not said by the Exalted One: ' Just as
the ocean, bhikkhus, remains of the same native, and passes
not beyond the shore, just so is the body of precepts which I
have established for those who are hearers of my word, and
which they their lives long do not pass beyond' ?3
Hence it is not right to say that a person who has
attained to sound views may designedly deprive a living
creature of life.
8. Of Evil Tendency.4
Controverted Point.—That for a person holding sound
views evil tendencies are eliminated.
From the Commentary.—This view is due to the lack of making
proper distinction, by such as the Uttarapathakas, between an evil
1
See Yin. Texts, iii. 277, n, 3.
A p a b y a m a t o , Br. a s a b y a k a t o , Br. translation: a b y a s a -
k a t o . The Burmese scholar, U. Pandi, suggests we should read
a p a b y a k a t o , by which he understands 'blasphemously.' The
Commentary on 8ar>yutta-Nik., i. 226, only remarks: a p a b y a m a t o
karitva abyamato katva.
8
s Vin. Texts, iii. 303.
4
D u g g a t i denotes evil destiny, and connotes the sense-desires
of beings involved therein. The orthodox position is, that one who
holds sound views may still possess sense-desires which may involve
such a destiny.
473. Of Evil Tendency 271
destiny and the natural desires concerning objects of sense felt by
those who are involved in such a destiny.
[1-4] Th,—But you concede that such a person [though
safe as to his destiny] may still get infatuated with any
purgatorial objects of sense,1 may commit fornication with
females that are not human, whether demons, animals, or
fairies ; may keep worldly possessions, such as goats and
sheep, poultry and swine, elephants, cattle, horses and
mules, partridges, quails, peacocks and pheasants.2 If
you assent to all this, your proposition cannot stand.
Moreover, you cannot possibly admit all this in the case
of an Arahant. Contrariwise, you repudiate it for him,
while you admit (as you must) that it may prove true for
one who has [merely] sound views.
[5] U.—Then if I am wrong, you imply that the person
holding sound views may yet be reborn in purgatory, in
the animal kingdom, in the realm of the Petas ? If you
deny, you must also retract your contradiction.3
BOOK XIII
1. Of Age-Long Penalty.
Controverted Point.—That one doomed to age-long retri-
bution must endure it for a whole k a p p a .
From the Commentary.—This concerns those who, like the Raja-
girikas, hold the notion that the phrase, 1 one who breaks up the
concord of the Crder is tormented in purgatory for a kappa,'1
means that a schismatic is so £ tormented for an entire k a p p a . ' 2
1
Here the text (both PTS and Br.) has n i y a ma, while the Com-
mentary has n i y a m a. The former is technically more correct. See
V. 4, and Appendix : Assurance.
2
A n a n t a r i y a k a m r n a . See above, VIII. 9-11.
3
Read for p u n n a s s a d a t v a , p u n i i 5 u s s a d a t t a . The title
of N i y a t a is extended to a Bodhisat by courtesy, so to speak,
because his final salvation, through accumulating merit, amounts
almost to a certainty, is highly probable. Cf. IY. 8.
276 Hindrances and the Hindered XIII. 5.
7. Of Jhana as Enjoyment,
Controverted Point.—That the expert enjoys Jhana, and
the desire for Jhana has Jhana as its object.5
1 2
Quoted in full on p. 201 f. Dialogues, i. 92.
3 4
Ibid., 93. This is inconclusive, not being spoken concerning one
still in the toils/— Corny. "With this discourse cf. III. 8.
4
Literally, is face to face with it.
5
Jh ana-exercises, rightly valued, are solely a means, not an end, the,
end, for the Ariyan, being a d h i c i t t a , or the consciousness called,
278 Pleasure in Jhana Retrospective XIII. 7.
From the Commentary.—This opinion, held, for. instance, by the
Andhakas, is based upon the Word : £ He attaining to and abiding in
First Jhana finds enjoyment in it.7
[1] Th.—Do you mean that a given Jhana is the mental
object to that same Jhana ? If you deny,1 your proposi-
tion falls. If you assent, you must equally admit that he
touches a given mental contact with the same contact,
feels a given feeling with that feeling, and so on for per-
ception, volition, thought, applied and sustained intellec-
tion, zest, mindfulness, understanding. . . .
[2] You admit that desire for Jhana and Jhana itself
are forms of conscious experience ? But are you prepared
to admit further that they constitute two conscious pro-
cesses going on at once ? You deny; then your former
admission is invalid. And if you admit further that desire
for Jhana is wrong while Jhana itself is good, you bring
the good and the bad up against each other in the same
consciousness—things as ' far apart as earth and sky,' etc.2
[3] A.—But, if I am wrong, was it not said by the
Exalted One : e Take the case, bhikkhus, of a bhikkhu who,
aloof from sensuous ideas, aloof from evil ideas, entering into,
abides in First Jhana: he enjoys it, he yearns over it, and
by it he is delighted ' P
Hence surely the expert enjoys Jhana, and the desire for
Jhana has Jhana as a mental object. ,
BOOK XIV
1. Of the Mutual Consecutiveness of Good and Bad.
Controverted Point—That a basis1 of bad thought is con-
secutive to a basis that is good, and conversely.
From the Commentary.—That which is good cannot directly and
immediately follow after what is bad, nor conversely. Such reciprocal
consecutiveness is anomalous. Some, however, like the Mahasanghi-
kas, hold that, inasmuch as one can both like and then dislike the
same thing, therefore there has been, in such a case, reciprocal con-
secutiveness. Good and bad thoughts cannot occur consecutively
during the stages of j a v a n a (apperception) in one and the same
process of cognition, inasmuch as each course of good or of bad
thought entails a distinct preliminary ' adverting5 of consciousness.
[1] Th.—You are implying that the adverting,2 the
adjusting of the mind arising for ethically bad conscious-
ness is precisely the adverting and adjusting of the mind
arising for ethically good consciousness. You say 4 No,'
while insisting on your proposition. Then you must mean
that the good consciousness can arise without our advert-
ing or adjusting the mind ? You maintain the opposite to
this ? Then, if the good consciousness in question arise
for a mind already adverted and adjusted, it must be
1
Literally, root, or conditioning state.
2
The seven terms characteristic of this work should here be supplied.
See, e.g., VII. 5, 2. The Commentary here for the first time explains
that ' adverting5 (a v a 11 a n a = a v a j j a n a) is the turning of the
mind from the subconscious life-flux to full consciousness, and that
'adjusting' (or 'aiming,' p a n i d h i ) is the further move on to a
definite mental object, and persistence thereon.
491. Commingling of Good and Bad 288
1
As heterodox.
2 4
The illustration is inconclusive, because it only alludes to a mixed
state of rapidly alternating grouped objects of mind, not to the succes-
sion in a unity.7—Corny. It is tantalizing that our historical materials
concerning a drama, which was apparently ultra-Wagnerian in pro-
viding stimuli for all the senses, are so slender.
3
Extended, cohesive, hot, and mobile elements, popularly called
earth, water, fire, air.
4
Majjhima-Nih., i. 53 ; cf. 185.
6
498. Ariyan' a Spiritual Notion 287
[1] Th.—You admit that the qualities1 of the Ariyan
are moral, and not unmoral. But the primary qualities of
matter are not moral; they are unmoral. . . .
[2] Again, there is in these primary qualities nothing
akin to the absence of intoxicant, fetter, tie, flood, bond,
hindrance, infection, grasping, corruption, characteristic of
the Ariyan5s qualities. On the contrary, the former are
concomitant with these [ethically undesirable things].
[3] U.—But if I am wrong, was it not said by the
Exalted One: ' Whatever matter there is, bhikkhus, is the
four primary qualities and their derivatives' P Hence it is
surely right to say that the material qualities of the Ariyan
are derived from the primary qualities.
TS. v. 19
c
290 Things Undeclared' XIV. 8.
9. Of the Unincluded.
Controverted Point.—That erroneous opinions [may enter
into] 4 the Unincluded/ 8
From the Commentary.—Inasmuch as when a man of the world
has attained to Jhana, he may be called passionless as to sense-
desires, but not free from erroneous opinions, some, like the Pubba-
seliyas, hold that erroneous views beset also that other consciousness
which is ' Unincluded.'
1
Sayyutta-Nihiv. 898, 401 (neither is quite verbatim as the text).
2
Anguttara-Nik„, v. 212.
3
The opponent would break down the exclusive content of the
term a - p a r i y a p a n n a — t h e Unincluded—which, according to the
Abhidhamma-Pitaka, is reserved for the consciousness and conscious
experiences of those qualifying in the Path, and for Nibbana
(Dhamma-sangani [Bud. Psy. Eth.\ §§ 992, 1287). Such conscious-
ness would not be shared by a 4 man of the world' or ' average person ?
(p u t h u j j a n a, literally, one of the many-folk, or hoi polloi).
It is 'not included' in the mental range of one whose interests
are confined to any sphere of hfe earth or in heaven,
292 Of the Unincluclecl XIV. 9.
[1] Th.—Then you must be prepared to class them
among the category of the ' Unincluded,' to wit, as Path,
Fruit, Nibbana, as one of the Four Paths, or Four Fruits,
-as one of the Factors of Enlightenment—which you may
not do.
[2] P.—But if I am wrong, why do you admit that a
worldly person [in Jhana] may be called passionless as to
sense-desires, but deny: that he has lost all erroneous
opinion ?
Surely then it is right to say that erroneous opinion
may enter into 4 the Unincluded.'
508. Of Correlation as specifically fixed 293
BOOK XV
1. Of Correlation as specifically fixed.
Controverted Point.—That one phenomenon can be re-
lated to another in one way only.
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Mahasanghikas, hold that
if anything be correlated to another as its moral condition or motive
( h e t u ) , 1 it is not correlated to that other by way of [subject-]object,
or of contiguity, or of immediate succession.2 Or again, if anything
be correlated to another as its object, it is not correlated to that other
by way of contiguity, or immediate succession.
[1] Th.—Bat take the attitude of investigation,3 is not
that correlated both as moral condition and as dominance ?
You assent. Then your proposition falls through.
Again, is not predominant desire-to-do the dominant
factor in coexistent mental states? If so, we ought to
admit a dual correlation by way of [i.] dominance, [ii.] co-
existence. [2] The same holds wfren energy is the dominant
factor. Or if dominant energy be considered as 'controlling
power' or faculty ( i n d r i y a ) , we ought to admit a dual
correlation by way of dominance and controlling power.
Or if we consider dominant energy as a factor of the Path, 4
we ought to admit a dual correlation by way of dominance
and path or means (magga). [3] The same holds when
apperception4 is the dominant factor. Or if dominant con-
sciousness be considered as nutriment (or cause, a h a r a ) ,
1 2
See Compendium, p. 279 f. Ibid., 191, § 7.
3
V i m a r) s a. Ibid., 177, n. 3. This in terms of h e t u is
a m oh a = p a n n a=intelligence, understanding, insight.
4
0 i 11 a in this connection is an abbreviation for j a v a n a-c i 11 a,
apperceptional consciousness.
294 Of Correlation as specifically fixed XV. 1.
2. Of 'Reciprocal3 Correlation.
Controverted Point—That whereas actions are conditioned
by ignorance, we may not stay that ignorance is conditioned
by actions.
1
D h a m m a ; i.e., a Path, a Fruit, Nibbana, corruptions ex-
tirpated, or not yet extirpated. On this specific culture see Com-
pendium, pp. 58, 69.
2
A s e v a n a , from a s e v a t i , to serve over and over again (a + si,
or s I, to bind, hence to be a pendant, or dependent), is a difficult term to
translate. In the Compendium (p. 192, § 12) we used ' succession/ but
repetition, or even retention, is in some respects better. The Burmese
translators render by * repetition so as to form a habit'; hence,
habitual repetition.
3
An n a- m - a n n a, or one-another. The discourse shows that a
classification of relations in recent philosophy has been anticipated.
See Hon. Bertrand Russell's Our Knowledge of the External World,
etc., London, 1914, p. 47. See Appendix : P a c c a y a .
510. Of Asymmetrical Relations 295
From the Commentary.—This view, held, for instance, by the
Mahasanghikas, is met by the opposite doctrine that there is a
reciprocal conditioning obtaining between ignorance and actions, and
so on.1
[1] Th.—But is not ignorance coexistent with action ? 2
If so, here is a reciprocal correlation [namely, of coexist-
ence].
[2] Again, ' grasping is conditioned by craving.' Now, is
it wrong to say that craving is conditioned by grasping ? 3
Yes, you say. But the argument above is valid here also.
[3] M.—( Birth, bhikkhus, is conditioned by decay and
death, the tendency to become is conditioned by birth'—is
the Suttanta thus ?
Th.—No.
M.—Neither is the reciprocal conditioning correlation
between ignorance and activities reciprocal, nor that be-
tween craving and grasping.
[4] Th.— Mincl and body, bhikkhus, are conditioned by
rebirth-consciousness, and this by mind and body'—is the
Suttanta thus ? 4
.M.—Yes.
Th.—Then the conditioning relation may be reciprocal.
3 .Of Duration.5
Controverted Point.—That duration is predetermined.
From the Commentary.—Taking the word duration ( a d d h a ) in
the sense of period of time, they 6 who hold this opinion base it on the
1
Namely, in the P a t i c c a - s a m u p p a d a formula; see VI. 2.
2
S a n k h a r e n a. c Here only non-meritorious activity is meant.
The correlation between this and ignorance may he analyzed into
"related by way of co-existence, reciprocity, presence, continuance,
association."'—Corny.
3
Here ' grasping' excludes k a m a-grasping (which=t an h a).—
Corny. On the four f graspings ' see Bud. Psy. Eth., pp. 323 f.
4
Sayyutta-Nik., iii. 114.
5
The opponent evidently uses a d d h a . in this sense, suggestive of
M. Bergson's concept of time.
6
No adherents are named. Possibly the Andhakas. See above, XI. 8.
296 Duration as Divisible Reality XV. 3.
Sutta quoted below. The argument seeks to show that no interval
whatever is predetermined,, except as mere time-notion. But matter,
etc., when meaning the five aggregates (bodily and mental) is pre-
determined.
[1] Th.—Then must duration be one of the five aggre-
gates, which of course it is not. This holds good whether
you take past, 1 [2] future, or present duration. [8] Now,
you say that any past aggregate, bodily or mental, consti-
tutes past duration; any future, any present aggregate,
future or present duration respectively. Then are there
five past durations, five future, five present durations ? . . .
[4]fifteen durations in all? Or, if they are regarded as
twelve past, future, present organs-and-objects-of-sense,
are there thirty-six durations in all ? . . .
[5] Or if we consider them as eighteen elements, are
therefifty-four durations? or as controlling powers,2 are
there sixty-six durations?
[6] Opp.—But was it not said by the Exalted One:
6
There are these three subjects of discourse,3 bhikkhus—
which are the three ? One may talk about past time :
" Thus was it in times past." Or abo ut future time : " Thus
will it be in future times" Or about the present: "Thus is
it now at present "' ? 4
Hence surely duration is predetermined ?
1
Insert A m an t a in PTS edition.
2 3
See above, p. 15 f. K a t h a v a t t h u ni.
* AnguHara-Nik., i. 197. Cf. p. 95, § 60.
6
K h a n a , l a y a, m u h u t t a : 10 ' instants' = 1 £ moment,' 10
1
moments' = 1 'second.' There is no measured coincidence between
second and m u h u t t a.
514. Is a Vitiating Thing Vice ? 297
7. Of Trance.
Controverted Point—That to attain cessation of con-
sciousness is supramundane.
From the Commentary.—Inasmuch as what is called [trance or]
attaining cessation of feeling and perception is not a positive mental
state, but is the suspension of the mental aggregates, it is neither a
mundane nor a supramundane state. Some, however, like the
Hetuvadins, hold that since it is certainly not mundane, it must be
supramundane.
9. Of Trance (iix.).
Controverted Point.—That a person may die while in a
state of trance.
From the Commentary — The Rajagirikas and others hold that
since life is so uncertain, even one who has attained in Jhana to trance
may die, no less than anyone else. The argument shows that there
i s 1 a time for dying and for not dying.
[1] Th.—You must, then, admit that, while in that state,
he has all the mental symptoms2 betokening death—to wit,
in mental contact, feeling, perception, volition, conscious-
ness. But you agree that all moribund mental symptoms
are absent. Hence your proposition falls through.
[2] You will further agree with this: not only that for
one in a state of trance is all mental life in abeyance, but
also that death is accompanied by contactual, emotional,
volitional, and cognitive symptoms.2
[3] Moreover, can poison, weapons, or fire affect the body
of one in trance ? You deny.8 You assert, on the con-
trary, that those causes of death cannot affect him. Then,
can you maintain your proposition ?
[4] Or do you now maintain that poison, weapons, or
fire can affect his body? 4 Then, is his attainment not
genuine? . . .
i?.r>—But in opposing my proposition you imply that
there must be some principle of certainty (or uniformity)
by which one is assured of not dying while in trance. If
you say that such an assurance does not exist, your
proposition cannot stand.
[5] Th.—But one who is enjoying visual consciousness
is not dying, even though there be no uniform principle of
certainty by which he is assured of being kept from death.
Hence I assert as much of one who is in trance.
1
Beady for samapannaya, samanaya.
2
This word is not in the Pali text.
3
Because of the abnormal power of his attainment.—Corny.
4
' He assents because of the body's natural liabilities. Hence there
is no abnormal power in the attainment.5—Corny.
5
In Commentary, PTS edition, read, for s a k a v a d i s s a , p a r a -
vadissa.
300 Spiritual Trance XV. 10.
BOOK XVI
1. Of Control
Controverted Point.—That one can control the mind of
another.1
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Mahasanghikas, hold that
the attainment of power and authority in the world is only genuine if
it include power to control the consciousness of others.
[1] Th.—Do you mean that one can bid the consciousness
of another not to lust, not to hate, not to be bewildered, not
to be corrupted ? Of course you deny. But how then can
you maintain your view ? Or do you mean that one can
bid any mental phase uprisen in another's consciousness—
reaction, feeling, perception, volition . . . understanding—
to cease ? Equally you deny. . . . [2] Or do you mean
that anyone puts away lust, hate, or any evil mental
coefficient2 on account of another? Or practises the
[Ariyan] Path, or applications in mindfulness, or any other
set of the factors of enlightenment3 because of another?
Or masters the Four Truths—understanding 111, putting
away its Cause, realizing its Cessation, practising the Path
thereto—because of another? Or finally, do you mean
that anyone makes another the doer of his actions, that
anyone's happiness and ill are wrought by another, that
one acts while another experiences? If you deny, you
must deny your own view.
1
To know (or, as we say, 'read 3 ) the thoughts of another was one
of the supernormal knowledges (see above, Y. 7; Compendium, p. 209),
but control or influence over another so as to prevent corruption was
not assumed for it.
2
See above, p. 229, n. 2.
3
See Compendium, p. 179.
304 Well-doing through Another's Mind. XVI. 2.
[3] And was it not said by the Exalted One:—
6
' Tis thou alone dost work thine evil deeds ;
'Tis thou alone dost make thyself corrupt;
' Tis thou alone dost leave the wrong undone;
5
Tis thou alone dost purify thyself
Self-torought is cleanness and impurity.
None may his brother's heart1 make imdefded' P
Hence it is surely wrong to say that one can control the
mind of another.
[4] M.—But have not some admittedly won power and
authority? Surely this includes control over others'
minds.
1
Majjhinia-Niki. 447.
2
S a b be s a n k h a r e e k a t o m a n a s i k a r o t l — C o r n y .
T.S V. 20
306 The Range of Attention XVI. 4.
[1] Th.—Do you imply that we know the consciousness
by which we so attend ? You deny.1 But I ask you again
—now you assent.2 Then do we know as consciousness the
consciousness by which we so attend ? You deny. But I
ask you again—now you assent. Then is the subject of
consciousness its own object ? You deny. But I ask you
again—now you assent. Then do we experience mental
reaction by the same mental reaction ? Do we feel a feel-
ing by that feeling? And so on for perception, volition,
cognition, applied thought, sustained thought, zest, mindful-
ness, understanding ? If you deny, you undo your previous
affirmations. . . . >.
[2] When we attend to the past as past, do we then attend.,
to the future*as future ? You deny. But I ask you again
—now you assent. But this commits you to a collocation of
two parallel mental processes. . . . And this holds if I sub-
stitute 4 present' for 4 future.' . . . And if you claim that
we can, while attending to the past as past, attend also to
the future as such, and to the present as such, we get a
collocation of three parallel mental processes. . *. . And—
[3-4] [we may ring the changes with] the same argument
on other permutations of the time relations. . . .
[5] But was it not said by the Exalted One :
* When he by wisdom doth discern• and see :
"Impermanent is everything in life /"
Then lie at all this suffering feels disgust.
Lo! herein lies the way to purity.
When he by wisdom doth discern and see,
That " Everything in life is bound to III I . .
That u Everything in life is Void of Sold /"
Then he at all this suffering feels disgust
Lo ! herein lies the way to purity' ?3
Hence we can attend to all at once.
1
Because it cannot be subject and object at once.—Corny.
2
Because we are already aware of the nature of our thought in
general, or because of the thesis advanced.—Corny.
3
Fss. of the Brethren, verses 67£-678; ascribed to Anna-Kondanna,
the first amoug thefirst five disciples to grasp the new gospel.
532. Matter and Motives 807
8. Of Matter as Result.
Controverted Point.— That material qualities are results
[of karma].
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Andhakas and Sammitiyas,
hold that, just as consciousness and its concomitant attributes arise
because of karma that has been wrought, so also do material [i.e.,
corporeal] qualities arise as results [of karma]. 1
BOOK XVII
BOOK XVIII
8. Of Hearing in Jhana.
Controverted Point.—That one who has attained Jhana
hears sound.
.Prom the Commentary.—The opinion is held by some—the Pubba-
seliyans, for instance—that because the Exalted One called sound a
thorn to First Jhana, and since sound, if not heard, cannot be a thorn
in the flesh of one who had attained that state, it was inferable that
such an one was able to hear.
BOOK XIX
2. Of the Void.
Controverted Point.—That ' the Void ' is included in the
aggregate of mental co-efficients (sankharakkhandha).
From the Commentary.—4 The Void [or Emptiness] has two im-
plications : (a) Absence of soul, which is the salient feature of the five
aggregates [mind and body]; and (b) Nibbana itself. As to (a), some
marks of ' no-soul' may be included under mental coefficients (the
ourth aggregate) by afigure of speech.3 Nibbana is not included there-
under. But some, like the Andhakas, drawing no such distinction, hold
the view stated above.
[1] Th —Do you then imply that the ' Signless,' that
the £ Not hankered-after 5 is also so included ? If not, ' the
1
See VII. 5, § 8, for the full quotation.
2
The putting away of corruptions, past, future, or present, is not a
work comparable to the exertions of a person clearing away rubbish-
heaps. With the following of the Ariyan Path having Nibbana as its
object, the corruptions are 'put away* simply because they don't get
born. In other words, the past has ceased; the cure as to present and
future is preventive.—Corny.
3
E k e n a p a r i y a y e n a . Marks of other aggregates cannot be so
included, even by way of figurative speech.
336 Of Spiritual Fruition XIX. 3.
1
All three being names for Nibbana, they are adduced to expose
the flaw in a theory which does not discriminate.—Corny. Cf. Com-
pendium, p. 216.
2
See I. 1, §§ 241, 242. The nearest verbatim reference that we can
trace is Sayyutta-Nifc, iv. 296 ; but even there the word s a n k h a r a,
which here seems dragged in by the opponent, is omitted. f The
Theravadin suffers it to stand, because it is not inconsistent with the
orthodox " s a b b e s a n k h a r a a n i c c a," where s a n k h a r a stands
for all five aggregates [exhausting all conditioned things].'—Corny.
3
Hence unconditioned, i.e., unprepared, uncaused, unproduced by
the our conditions—karma, mind, food, or physical, environment
(utu). Cf. Compejidiiim, ip.
579. Of Spiritual Fruition 337
[1] 27*,—Do you then identify that £ fruit ' with
Nibbana:—the Shelter, the Cave, the Refuge, the Goal, the
Past-Decease, the Ambrosial ?* Or are there two < uncon-
ditioned's'? You deny both alternatives [but you must
assent to one or the other]. If to the latter, I ask are
they both . . . Nibbanas, and is there one higher than the
other, . . . or is there a boundary . . . an interstice between
them? 2
[2] Again, do you imply that recluseship itself is uncon-
ditioned ? *' No, conditioned,' you say. Then is its fruit or
reward conditioned ? . . .
[3, 4] You admit, again, that the four stages in the
recluse's Ariyan Path—the Four Paths—are conditioned.
Yet you would deny that the Four Fruits are conditioned!
.[5] In fact, you would have in these four and Nibbana
five ' unconditioned's.' Or if you identify the four with
Nibbana, you then get five sorts of Nibbana, five Shelters,
and so on. . . .
4. Of Attainment (patti).
Controverted Point—That attainment is unconditioned.
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Pubbaseliyas again, hold
that the winning of any acquisition is itself unconditioned.
5. Of ' Thusness.'
Controverted Point.—That the fundamental character-
istics of all things (sabba-clhammd) are unconditioned.
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Uttarapathakas, hold that
there is an immutable something called thusness (or suchness) 1 in the
very nature of all things, material or otherwise [taken as a whole].
And because this ' thusness' is not included in the [particular] con-
ditioned matter, etc., itself, therefore it is unconditioned.
BOOK XX
1. Of Unintentional Crime.
Controverted Point.—That the five cardinal crimes, even
when unintentionally committed, involve retribution im-
mediately after death.
From the Commentary. - Inasmuch as the grounds for immediate
retribution after death are very weighty and grave, some—for instance,
the Uttarapathakas—hold that even the unintentional infliction of such
injuries calls for it.
2. Of Insight.
Controverted Point.—That' insight' is not for the average
man.
From the Commentary.—'' Insight' (nana) is of two kinds—worldly
and spiritual. The former is intellection concerned with various
1
He denies, because he is judging such an one to be convinced that
his side is in the right; he assents, in the case of one who knows that
right is on the other side.—Corny. Cf. Anguttara-Nik., i. 85 f.
Similarly in the following change of reply.—Corny.
2
Vinaya, ii. 205, v. 202, 203; Vinaya Texts, iii. 268. The latter
mistakes bad doctrine or discipline for good, good doctrine or discipline
for bad, and records his opinion by his acts. His intentions are good.
In the Vmaya passage a t t h i , 4 there is,' is rendered as s i y a ,
' there may be.'
3
Literally, from the y o g a k k h e m a , or safety, salvation. Cut off
i
that is, while this world-cycle lasts. Ibid.
595. Intuition and Analysis 345
attainments, and in noting the course of karma by way of righteous
acts of giving, etc.; the latter is intuition concerned with the Paths
and their Fruits, Path-intuition being learned by analysis of truth. 1
Now some, like the Hetuvadins, failing to distinguish this, accept only
Path-intuition as insight.2 Hence they deny it in the average man.
[1] Th.—But you imply that a worldly man has no
analytic discernment, no analytic understanding, no ability
to investigate or examine, no faculty of research, no ability
to mark well, observe closely, mark repeatedly.3 Is not the
opposite true ?
[2] Again, you admit, do you not ? that there is not one
of the four Rupa-jlianas or of the four Arupajhanas to
which a man of the world may not attain, and that he
is capable of liberality towards the Brethren as to the four
requisites : raiment and so forth. Surely then it is not
right to say a worldly man can have no insight.
[3] H.—If he can have insight, does he by that insight
recognize the truth about 111, eliminate its cause, realize
its cessation, develop the Path going thereto ? You
admit that he does not. Therefore, etc. . . .
4. Of Animals in Heaven.
Controverted Point.—That animals may be reborn among
the devas.
From the Commentary.—Among devas many—for instance, Eravana
*—assume animal shapes, such as those of elephants or horses, but
no animals are reborn as such among them. Some, however, like the
Andhakas, assume that because such celestial shapes have been seen,
therefore these were celestially reborn animals.
6. Oj Insight.
Controverted Point.—That insight into the twelve-fold
base is spiritual.2
From the Commentary.—There is an opinion—held by the Pub-
baseliyas, for instance—concerning the ' twelve constituent parts' in
the First Sermon, ' The Turning of the Norm-Wheel5—namely, that
knowledge based on those twelve belongs to the Four Paths and Fruits.
BOOK XXI.
1. Of our Religion.
Controverted Point.—That our religion is (has been an d
may again be) reformed.1
From the Commentary.—Because after the three Councils at which
the differences in our Religion were settled, some—for instance, certain
of the Uttarapathakas—hold that it has been reformed, that there was
such a person as a Reformer of the Religion, and that it is possible
yet to reform it.
3. Of Certain Fetters.
Controverted Point.—That Arahantship is won without
a certain 'Fetter -quantity being cast off.
From the Commentary.—Some—for instance, the Mahasanghikas—
hold this view with respect to the Fetters of ignorance and doubt, for
the reason that eyen an Arahant does not know the whole range of
Buddha-knowledge.
[1] Th.—Do you imply that the one or the other could
effect such wishes as ' Let trees be ever green ! ever bios-
1
It is curious that the Theravadin does not confine himself to one
or other of the Fetter-categories. However, there was more than one
category, and the'list given may have formed another of them. Cf.
Bud. Psy. Eth., p. 303.
2
I.e., of 111 (as inseparable from life), and of No-soul, and other
natural laws, as in the text.
3
S a n t a t i . See Compendium, p. 252
4
Vinaya Texts, ii. 65.
TS. v. 23
354 Mutual Resemblance in Buclclhas XXL 5.
soming ! ever in fruit! Let there be perpetual moonlight!1
Let there be constant safety! Let there be constant
abundance of alms ! Let there be always abundance of
grain' ? [2] Or such wishes as ' Let this factor of con-
sciousness that has arisen [contact, feeling], etc., not cease!'
[3] Or such wishes as ' Let this body, this mind, become
permanent!' [4] Or such wishes as ' Let beings subject to
birth, old age, disaster, death, not be born, grow old, be
unfortunate, die !' All this you deny. "Where then is your
proposition ?
[5] A.—But if I am wrong, how was it that when the
venerable Pilindavaccha resolved: £ Let the palace of Seniya
Bimbisara, King of Magadha, be only of gold!' it was
even so? . . .
5. Of Buddhas.
Controverted Point— That Buddhas differ one from
another in grades.
From the Commentary.—We hold that, with the exception of
differences in body, age, and radiance,2 at any given time, Buddhas
differ mutually in no other respect. Some, however, like the Andhakas,
hold that they differ in other qualities in general.
[1] Th.—"Wherein then do they differ—in any of the
matters pertaining to Enlightenment? 3 in self-mastery?4
in omniscient insight and vision? . . .
1
6. Of All-Pervading Power.
Controverted -Point.—That the Buddhas persist in all
directions^ •
1
J u n h a q. The Br. translator renders this by 6 growth,'
2
Some manuscripts read p a b h a v a - m a t t a i ) , measure of power,
which is scarcely plausible for a Buddhist. Pacceka Buddhas are
presumably not taken into account.
3 See p. 65.
4
V a s l b h a va, literally, the state of one who has practice.
608. Buddha-Pervasion 355
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Mahasanghikas, hold that
a Buddha 1 exists in the four quarters of the firmament, above, below,
and around, causing his change of habitat to come to pass in any-
sphere of being.
7. Of Phenomena.
Controverted Point.—That all things are by nature im-
mutable.6
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Andhakas and certain of
the Uttarapathakas, hold this, judging from the fact that nothing
1
In the PTS edition for b u d d h a read b u d d h o a t t h i t i .
2
T i t t h a n t i , lit. ' stand '; the word used in XIII. 1 for 'endure.'
3
He denies with respect to [the locus of] the historical S a k y a-
m u n i \&ic\; he assents, since by his view the persisting is in different
places.—Corny. ?
* On the possible birthplace of these deities, see Moulton, Zoro-
astrianism, 22-27, 242.
5
Cf. Compendium, p. 140 f.
6
N i y a t a. On this term, see above, V. 4; VI. 1. 'Not fixed' ,
below is a - n i y a to. On the three alternatives in § 1, see Childers's
Dictionary, s.v. r a s i. The three are affirmed in Dlgha-Nik., iii. 217. .
356 Things as Immutable XXI. 7.
8. Of Karma.
Controverted Point.—That all karmas are inflexible.2
From the Commentary.—The same parties hold also this opinion,
judging by the fact that karmas which work out their own effects
under present conditions in this or the next life, or in a posterior series
of lives, arefixed with respect one to the other.
BOOK XXII
2. Of Moral Consciousness.
Controverted Point.—That the Arahant is ethically con-
scious when completing existence at final death.
From the Commentary.—Some, like the Andhakas, hold this view
on the ground that the Arahant is ever lucidly conscious, even at the
hour of utterly passing away. The criticism points out that moral
(ethical or good) consciousness inevitably involves meritorious karma
[taking effect hereafter]. The doctrine quoted by the opponent is
inconclusive. It merely points to the Arahant's lucidity and aware-
ness while dying, to his ethically neutral and therefore inoperative
presence of mind and reflection at the last moments of his cognitive
process [ j a v a n a ] . But it was not intended to show the arising of
morally good thoughts.
[1] Th —You are implying that an Arahant is achieving
karma of merit, or karma of imperturbable character; 1 that
1
Or 4for remaining static,' & n e n j a b h i s a n k h a r a i ) . See the
same line of argument in XVII. 1. The alternatives refer to the
sensuous and to the immaterial planes of existence.
618. Final Passing Away 359
he is working karma affecting destiny, and rebirth, con-
ducive to worldly authority and influence, to wealth and
reputation,1 to beauty celestial or human. . . .
[2] You are implying that the Arahant, when he is pass-
ing away, is accumulating or pulling down, is eliminating
or grasping, is scattering or binding, is dispersing or collect-
ing.2 Is it not true of him that he stands, as Arahant,
neither heaping up nor pulling down, as one who has pulled
down? That he stands, as Arahant, neither putting off
nor grasping at, as one who has put off? As neither
scattering nor binding, as one who has scattered ? As
neither dispersing nor collecting, as one who has dispersed ?
[3] A.—But does not an Arahant pass utterly away with
lucid presence of mind, mindful and aware ? You agree.
Then is this not ' good ' consciousness ? 3
6. Of the Unmoral.
Controverted Point.—That all dream-consciousness is
ethically neutral.
From the Commentary.—From the "Word, ' There is volition, and
that volition is negligible4 some—that is, certain of the Uttara-
pathakas—hold the aforesaid view. But this was spoken with refer-
1
Anguttara-Nih., i. 87.
2
This was a favourite legend. See Pss. of the Brethren, Ixx. 4 Sivali,'
the child-saint in question ; Jataka, No. 100; Udana, ii. 8 ; Dhamma-
pada Commentary, iv. 192 f. Also on the mother, Anguttwra-Nik.,
ii. 62.
3
The embryonic consciousness carrying the force of previous,
culminating karma into effect. See previous page, n. 1.
4
Vinaya% iii. 112, commenting on Vinaya Texts, ii. 226. Abbo-
h a r i - k a (or -ya), i.e., a - v o h a r i k a , not of legal or conventional
status.
362 Habitual Repetition XXII. 7.
ence to ecclesiastical offences,1 Although a dreamer may entertain
evil thoughts of murder, etc., no injury to life or property is wrought.
Hence they cannot be classed as offences. Hence dream-thoughts are
a negligible quantity, and for this reason, and not because they are
ethically neutral, they may be ignored.2
7. Of Correlation by Repetition.3
Controverted Point.—That there is no correlation by
way of repetition.
From the Commentary.—Inasmuch as all phenomena are momen-
tary, nothing persisting more than an instant, nothing can be so
correlated as to effect repetition; hence there never is repetition.
This is also an opinion of the TJttarapathakas.
[1] Th.—But was it not said by the Exalted One : ' The
taking of life, bhikkhus, when habitually practised and multi-
plied, is conducive to rebirth in purgatory, or among animals,
or Petas. In its slightest form it results in, and is conducive
to, a brief life among men[2] And again : ' Theft,
bhikkhus, adultery, lying, slander, uttering harsh words, idle
talkf intoxication, habitually practised and multiplied, are
each and all conducive to rebirth in purgatory, among animals,
or Petas. The slightest theft results in, conduces to destruc-
tion of property; the mildest offence against chastity gives
rise to retaliatory measures among men; the lightest form
of lying exposes the liar to false accusation among men; the
mildest offence in slander leads to a rupture of friendship
1
A p a t t i , explained (after an exegetic fashion) as & 1.1 a rj p l l a n a i )
p a j j a 111 i , ' is come to infliction of punishments.'
2
Cf. Compendium, pp. 47, 52.
3
As e v a n a. See p. 294, n. 2.
620. Eternal Things and Duration 863
among men ; the lightest result of harsh -words creates sounds
jarring on the human ear; the slightest result of idle talk
is speech commanding no respect1 among men ; the mildest
inebriety conduces to want of sanity among men 2 [3, 4] And
again: ' Wrong views, bhikkhus, wrong aspiration, effort,
speech, activity, livelihood, mindfulness, concentration—each
and all, if habitually practised, developed, and multiplied,
conduce to rebirth in purgatory, among animals, among Petcis
And again: £ Right views, right purpose, etc, habitually
practised9 developed, and multiplied, have their base and their
goal and their end in the Ambrosial*P
8. Of Momentary Duration.
Controverted Point.—That all things are momentary
conscious units.
From the Commentary.—Some—for instance, the Pubbaseliyas and
the Aparaseliyas—hold that, since all conditioned things are imper-
manent, therefore they endure but one conscious moment. Given
universal impermanence—one thing ceases quickly, another after an
interval—what, they ask, is here the law ? The Theravadin shows it
is but arbitrary to say that because things are not immutable, therefore
they all last but one mental moment.
BOOK XXIII
1. Of United Resolve.
Controverted Point.—That sexual relations may be entered
upon with a united resolve.1
From the Commentary.—Snch a vow may be undertaken, some
think—for instance, the Andhakas and the Vetulyakas2—by a human
pair who feel mutual sympathy or compassion3 [not passion merely],
and who are worshipping, it may be, at some Buddha-shrine, and
aspire to be united throughout their future lives.
[1] Th.—Do you imply that a united resolve may be
undertaken which does not befit a recluse, does not become
a bhikkhu, or that it may be undertaken by one who has
cut off the root [of rebirth], or when it is a resolve that
would lead to a Parajika offence ? 4
Or when it is a resolve by which life may be slain, theft
committed, lies, slander, harsh words, idle talk uttered,
burglary committed, dacoity, robbery, highway robbery,
adultery, sack and loot of village or town be committed . . 5
[You must be more discriminating in your use of the
term ' with a united resolve'!]
1
E k a d h i p p a y o. There is nothing objectionable in the relation
so entered upon, except, of course, for the recluse or a member of
the Order.
2
See XVII. 6.
3
K a r u l i l i a , 'pity,' not the term a n u k a m p a n a , which does
much duty in Buddhism to express affection in social and conjugal
relations. See Ency. Beligions, ' Love, Buddhist.' On the belief in
such repeated unions, see Maha Kassapa's legend, Pss. of the Brethren,
p. 359 i.y and Bhadda's (his wife's) verses, Pss, of the Sisters, p. 49.
4
Meriting expulsion from the Order.
5
Dialogues, i. 69.
366 The Bodhisafs Choice XXIII. 3.
2. Of Bogus Arahants.
Controverted Point.—That infra-human beings, taking the
shape of Arahants,1 follow sexual desires.
Fro?n the Commentary.—This belief arose in consequence of the
dress and deportment of evil-minded bhikkhus, and is held by some—
for instance, certain of the Uttai apathakas.
[1] Th.—Would you also say that such beings, resem-
bling Arahants, commit any or all such crimes as are stated
above (XXIII. 1) ? You deny; but why limit them to
one only of those crimes ?
3. Of Self-govern ed Destiny.
Controverted Point.—That a Bodhisat (or future Buddha)
(a), goes to an evil doom, (b) enters a womb, (c) performs
hard tasks, (d) works penance under alien teachers of his
own accord and free will.
From the Commentary.—Some—for instance, the Andhakas—-judge
that the Bodhisatta, in the case of the Six-toothed Elephant Jataka 2
and others, was freely so reborn as an animal or in purgatory, that
he freely performed difficult tasks, and worked penance under alien
teachers.
5. Of the Undetermined
Controverted Point.—That the aggregates, elements, con-
trolling powers—all save 111, is undetermined.1
From the Commentary.—Such is the opinion held by some—for
instance, certain of the Uttarapathakas and the Hetuvadins. Their
authority they find in the lines :
3
Tis simply III that riseth3 simply III
That doth persist, and then fadeth away.
Nought beside III it is that doth become ;
Nought else but III it is doth pass away.'1
[1] Th.—Do you then maintain that [the marks of the
conditioned are lacking in, say, the material aggregate—
that] matter is not impermanent, not conditioned, has not
arisen because of something, is not liable to decay, to perish,
to be devoid of passion, to cessation, to change? Is not
the opposite true ?
[2] Do you imply that only 111 is caused ? Yes ? But
did not the Exalted One say that whatever was impermanent
was 111 ? Hence, if this be so, and since matter is imper-
manent, you cannot maintain that only 111 is determined.
[3] The same argument holds good for the other four
aggregates (mental), for all the mechanism of sense,3 for all
controlling powers.4
END OF THE TRANSLATED TEXT
1
A p a r i n i p p h a n n a . See p. 261, n. 6.
2
Verses of Vajira, BhikkhunT. SayyuMa-Nih, i. 185 ; Fss. of the
Sisters, p. 191. Cf. above, p. 61.
3
This includes the categories 22-51, enumerated on p. 15 f.
4
This includes those enumerated (52-73) on p. 16.
A P P E N D I X
369
NOTES ON—
I . PARAMATTHA, SACCIKA: THE R E A L - 871
% T H I T I : THE STATIC - - - - - - 374
8 . SABBAM ATTHI : ' EVERYTHING EXISTS ' 875
4 . PATISAMBHIDA : ANALYSIS 377
5 . PATISAMBHIDA, ABHISAMAYA : ANALYSIS AND PENETRATION - 881
6 . ( A ) NIYAMA, KIYAMA: ' A S S U R A N C E ' - 888
( B ) NIYAMA AND KARMA - - . - - - 884
7. THITATA, NIYAMATA - - - - - 886
8 . NIMITTA - - - - - - - 887
9 . SANGAHA : CLASSIFICATION - - - - 888
1 0 . PARIBHOGA: UTILITY - - - 889
I I . PACCAYA : CORRELATION - - - - - 890
12. TIME AND SPACE - 892
1 3 . ACCANTA : FINALITY - 894
1 4 . APARINIPPHANNA : UNDETERMINED - 895
1 5 . W I L L I N G , ANTICIPATING, AIMING - 896
1 . PARAMATTHA, SACCIIVA : T H E PTEAL.
(L 6, p. 84 f.)
At first sight it would appear that the emphasis is on the
first word : 'everything,' 'all.' This would be the case if
the thesis were here opposed to e k a e c a m a t t h i : ' some
things exist, some do not,' which is discussed in the next
discourse but one. But the context shows clearly that, in
both these theses, the emphasis is really on the word
' a t t h i ' : 'is,' in the sense of 'exists.'
Now the Burmese translator supplies after s a b bag, a
term which, in Pali, is d h a m m a - j at aij. This, dis-
connected, is d h a m m a s s a j a t a i j : the arising or
happening of d h a m m a ; anything, that is, which exists
as a fact, as opposed to a chimaera, or in the Pali idiom,
a hare's horn. (We use the term ' thing' not in the sense of
substance, or having a substrate, but as anything which is
exhausted, as to its being, by some or all of the known twenty-
eight qualities of body or matter, and by the facts of mind.
Should s a b b a g be understood collectively—' all,' or
distributively—' everything' ? Taken by itself, one of the
questions in § 1, p. 85 : " Does 4 all' exist in all [things] ?"
would incline us at first sight to the former alternative, at
least in the case of the locative term. Yet even here we do
not read the question as: Is there in the whole a whole ?
but as: Does the whole exist in everything, or every part ?
taking the nominative, s a b b a i j , collectively, the locative,
s a b b e s u, distributively. And the context in general leads
us to the latter alternative. The Sabbatthivadin believes
in the continued existence of any particular [thing] past,
876 Sabbam atthi
present, and future. The Commentator accounted for this
belief by that school's interpretation of this postulate:
No past, present, or future d h a m m a ' s (facts-as-cognized)
abandon the kh andha-nature (sabbe pi a t i t ad i-
bheda dhamma khandha-sabha vaij na vijahanti).
Once a dhamma, always a dhamma. The five aggre-
gates (khandha's), in other words matter-mind, however
they may vary at different times, bear the same general
characteristics all the time.
Perhaps the following quotation from John Locke's critics,
taken from Green and Grose's Hume, vol. i., p. 87, may
help to show the Commentator's meaning with reference to
the r u p a k k h a n d h a , or material aggregate : ' But of
this (that is, of another thing which has taken the place of
a previous thing, making an impact on the sensitive tablet
at one moment, but perishing with it the next moment),
the real essence is just the same as the previous thing,
namely, that it may be touched, or is solid, or a body, or a
parcel of matter; nor can this essence be really lost. . . .
It follows that real change is impossible. A parcel of
matter at one time is a parcel of matter at all times.'
Thus, the Sabbatthivadin might say, because a parcel of
matter to which we assign the name 'gold'' was yellow,
fusible, etc., in the past, is so now, and will be so in future,
therefore gold c exists.' Again, because fire burned yester-
day, bums to-day, and will burn to-morrow, therefore fire
exists.
In some such way this school had come to believe in the
immutable existence, the real essence of all or everything,
taken in the distributive sense of everything without excep-
tion ; but not always excluding the collective sense.
R u p a—e.g., in § 8 : 4 Do past material qualities exist ?'—
refers to the r u p a k k h a n d h a , i.e., in a collective sense.
That, however, does not preclude any one of the twenty-eight
qualities of body (Compendium, pp. 157-160) from being
taken distributively, or prevent any material object com-
posed of eight or more of these qualities from being discussed
separately.
fi 9
Everything Exists 377
4 . PATISAMBHIDA ; ANALYSIS.
P a t i s a m b h i d a in the Vihhaitf/a.
(PTS edition, chap, xv., p. 293 f.)
The definition quoted above, § 2, cites this work:
h e t u m h i n a n a i j d h a m m a p a t i s a m b h i d a , p. 298.
In the list of exegetical definitions of the four branches,
entitled ' Suttanta-bhajaniyag,' we find (1) A t t h a - p a t i -
s a m b h i d a defined as analysis of phenomena, dhamma,
or things that ' have happened, become, . . . that are mani-
fest'; (2) d h a m m a - p a t i s a m b h i d a , defined as knowledge
of conditions (hetu), of cause and effect (hetuphala), 'of
phenomena by which phenomena have happened, become,'
etc. Thus (1) may be knowledge of decay and death ;
(2) is then knowledge of the causes (samitdaya) of decay and
death. Similarly for the third and fourth Truths (Cessation
and the Path). But (2) may also refer to the Doctrine, or
Dhamma :—' knowledge of the Suttas, the Verses,' and the
rest.
1
P a t i b h a n a is here defined as a technical term of Buddhist
philosophy. Its popular meaning of fluency in literary expression is
well illustrated in the Vangisa Sayyutta (i. 187 of the Nikaya).
Vangisa, the irrepressibly fluent ex-occultist, is smitten with remorse
for having, because of his rhetorical gifts ( p a t i b h a n a ) , despised
friendly brethren, and breaks forth once more to express his re-
pentance, admonishing himself—as Gotama, i.e., as the Buddha's
disciple (Corny.)—to put away conceit. "When the afflatus was upon
him in the Buddha's presence, he would ask leave to improvise with
the words : 4 It is manifest [is revealed] to me, Exalted One I3 The
response is: 'Let it be manifest to thee, Vangisa!' And he would
forthwith improvise verses. Cf. Pss. of the Brethren, p. 395, especially
pp, 399, 404.
880 Patisambhida
Of the third and fourth branches, n i r u t t i - p a t i s ° is
always, in this chapter, defined as abhilapa, or verbal
expression, or statement. And patibhana-patis° is always
defined as ' knowledge in the knowledges,' as if it referred
to psychological analysis.
In the following section or Abhidhammabhajaniyaij, we
find an inverted order in branches 1, 2. The d h a m m a ' s
considered are all states of consciousness. If they are
moral or immoral—i.e., if they have karmic efficacy (as
causes)—knowledge of them is called d h a m m a-analysis.
Knowledge of their result, and of all mi moral or inoperative
states, which as such are results, is called a ttha-analysis.
As to 8, 4: knowledge of the connotation and expression of
d h a m m a ' s as p a n n a 1 1 i ' s (term-concepts) is n i r u t t i -
analysis. And ' the knowledge by which one knows those
knowledges ' (1-8) is p a t i b h a n a-analysis.
(II., 9, 10.)
(V., 4 , p . 1 7 7 ; Y L , 1 , p . 1 8 5 ; X I I I . , 4 , p . 2 7 5 . )
( X X L 7, 8 . )
7 . THITATA, NITAMATA.
8. NIMITTA.
(X. 8, § 4, p. 246.)
N i m i t t a is derived by some from n i + ma, to limit;
and is defined as ' that which limits its own fruit (effect) *:
a t t a n o p h a i a g n i r a i n a t e t i (.4bhidhanappcuUpikcl-
siccl). According to this definition it denotes a causal
factor, limiting, determining, conditioning, characterizing,
etc., its own effect.1 Hence anything entering into a causal
1
Cf. p. 226, n. l.
888 Nimitta
relation, by which its effect is signified, marked, or charac-
terized, is a n i m i t t a . An object, image, or concept
which, on being meditated upon, induces s a m a d h i
(Jhana) is a n i m i t t a (see the stages specified in Com-
pendium, p. 54). False opinion ( d i t t h i ) engendered by
hallucination concerning impermanence—in other words,
a perverted view of things as permanent—is a n i m i t t a
(ibid., p. 217). This functions either as a cause of ' will-to-
live,' or as a sign of worldliness. Emancipation from this
n i m i t t a is termed a n i m i t t a v i m o k k h a (ibid.,
p. 216). Again, sexual characters are comprised under
four heads: linga, nimitta, akappa, kutta, nimitta,
standing for outward characteristics, male or female (Bud.
Psy. Eth., §§ 633, 634).
Later exegeses, deriving the word from the root mill,
to pour out, are probably derivations d'occasion.
Now in this argument (X. 3) the opponent confuses the
n a n i m i 11 a [-g a h i]—4 does not grasp at the general [or
sex] characters of the object seen, heard, etc.'—of the
quotation with a n i m i t t a , a synonym, like 'emptiness'
( s u n n a t a ) of Nibbana. He judges that the Path-
graduate, when he is not -n i m i 11 a-grasping, is grasping
the a - n i m i t t a or signless (Nibbana), instead of exercising
self-control in presence of alluring features in external ob-
jects, whether these be attractive human beings or what not.
According to the Commentary the expression cited,
'does not grasp at, etc.,' refers 'not to the moment of
visual or other sense-consciousness, but to the j a v a n a-
k k h a n a, or moment of apperception ; hence even in the
worldly course of things it is inconclusive.' This is made
clearer in the following discourse (X. 4), where ethical
matters are stated to lie outside the range of sense-con-
sciousness as such.
9 . SANGAHA: CLASSIFICATION.
(VII. 1, p. 195.)
This little discourse is interesting for its bearing on the
historic European controversy between Universals and
Sang alia: Classification 389
1 0 . PARIBHOGA : UTILITY.
(VII. 5.)
1 1 . PACCAYA : CORRELATION.
(XV. 1, 2.)
The word p a c c a y a , 1 used in popular diction, together
with h e t u , for ' cause5 or ' reason why,' is closely akin to
our 4 relation.' lie and pati (p a c c a y a is contracted from
p a t i - a y a) are coincident in meaning. Ay a is a causative
form of i, ' to go,' giving ' go back' for the Latin [re]latus,
£
carry back.' Now£ relation,' as theory of' things as having
to do with each other,' put into the most general terms
possible, includes the class called causal relation, viz.,
things as related by way of cause-effect. But p a c c a y a ,
as relation, implies that, for Buddhist philosophy, all modes
of relation have causal significance, though the causal
efficacy, as power to produce the effect, may be absent.
To understand this we must consider everything, not as
statically existing, but as 'happening,' or 'event.' We
may then go on to define p a c c a y a as an event which
helps to account for the happening of the pa c cay u p -
panna, ie., the effect, or e what-has-happened-through-the-
p a c c a y a . ' These two terms are thus ? related.' Dropping
our notion of efficient cause (A as having power to pro-
duce B), and holding to the ' helping to happen ' notion,
1
Pronounce pdch-chdyd with the same cadence as ' bachelor.'
Paccaya: Correlation
1 3 . ACCANTA : FINALITY.
(XIX. 7.)
A c c a n t a is a t i - a n t a : 2 beyond the end, or the very
last. Like e k a n ta, it is rendered by Burmese translators
' true/ and for this reason : The only assurance we get
from science that the sun will rise to-morrow, and at
a given time, is our belief in the uniformity of Nature,
a belief established by past observation yielding no excep-
tion to the rule. The belief amounts, as we say, to a moral
certainty—i.e., we can act upon it. But since, for all we know,
some unforeseen force may divert the relative positions of
sun and earth, the uniformity of physical nature is not an
order of things which has reached finality in certainty. In
other words, it is not ' true ' absolutely.
1
Cf. Compendium, Mrs. Eh. D., Buddhist Psychology,
1914, p. 194 i
2
This, when pronounced a t y a n t a , slips into the full cerebral
double c (which is pronounced cch). Cf. p a c c a y a (see Note 11).;
Nipphanna, Parinipplianna 395
( X I . 7 ; X X I I I . 5).
II. SUBJECTS.
1
The passages are quoted by volume and page of Oldenberg's
Vinaya, volume and number of Fausboll's Jutaka, volume and page of
the Four Nikayas P.T.S. ed., section and page of KJmddalm-patlia and
UdQna, P.T.S. ed., section of Iti-vuUaka and DhammasangarL% P.T.S.
ed., page of Viblianga, and verse of the other works, all P.T.S. ed.
I
PASSAGES IN THE KATHA-VATTHU QUOTED
FROM THE PITAKAS
(O. appended to the page number means tliat the passage is quoted
in the Commentary only.)
63 iv. 74 182 ii 88
114 i. 295 198 i. 213
118 i. 2 (in footnote, 218 C. L 34
read Fin. Texts, 220 ii. 56
i. 78) 239 iii. 219
128 i. 34 240 0. iii. 104
169 i. 8 258 ii. 103
270 ii. 238 265 i. 70 :
280 i. 10 267 iii. 173
319 iv. 75 f. 329 i. 73 f., etc.
319 i. 246 342 ii. 38
344 ii. 205 ; v. 202 f. 348 ii. 151 •
349 f. i. 11
354 i. 209 MAJJHISJIA-'
3610. iii. 112
1 6 f. i. 3 4 1
62 i. 1 3 8
Digha-NIKAYA. 6 4 C. i. 2 7 1
16 f. i i i . 232 67 i. 1 3 9
55 i i i . 274 95 i i i . 1 6 f.
59 i i i . 175 122 i. 3 0 1 .
'63 0. i . 202 128 i. 8 5 , 9 2
119 i i . 275 151 ii. 1 9
146, 277 i. 84, 83 158 i. 4 8 3
151 i . 82 169 i. 1 7 1
155 i i i . 33 193 i. 2 5 9
158 . i i i . 132 211 i. 7 3
167 i i i . 145 214 0. i. 8 5
T.S. V. 401 26
402 Indexes
PAGE PAOE
II
SUBJECTS
III
PALI WORDS DEFINED OE DISCUSSED
akathitatta, 290 adhippaya, 365
akanittha, 78 n. 2 I adhimuccamano, 233 n. 1
accanta, 340, 389 | ananja, 190 n. 2 *
annathattaij, 55 n. 2 ; anupatita, 238 n. 1
annamanna, 294 n. 3 anupavittha, 196
annanag, 114 n. 2 ; anulomapatiloma, xlvii
atthamako, 146 n. 4 ; anusaya, 236 n. 2
atthanam anavakaso, 114 n. 1 I anejag, 190 n. 2
anusahagato, 66 n. 3 | antarika, 137 n. 3
attaniya, 61 | apabyamato, 268 n. 2
atta, 8, 23 n. 1, 61 f. apariyapanna, 293 n. 3
attha, 375 apaya, 47 n. 1
addha, 295 appiyag karitva, 24 n, 3, 87
adhicitta, 277 n. 5 abbokinnag, 233 n. 1
414 Indexes
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