Mahinay Vs CA
Mahinay Vs CA
Mahinay Vs CA
It
is intended to secure an assurance that the allegations contained in the pleading are
true and correct; are not speculative or merely imagined; and have been made in good
faith.
A pleading may be verified by stating that the pleaders have read the allegations in
their petition and that the same are true and correct based either on their personal
knowledge or authentic records, or based both on their personal
knowledge and authentic records.
FACTS:
Constantina H. Sanchez, Josefina H. Lopez and Susan Honoridez are the registered
owners (the owners) of a parcel of land known as Lot 5 located in Cebu City. Petitioner
Mahinay filed a complaint for specific performance against the owners and one Felimon
Suarez (Suarez), to compel them to convey Lot 5 to him. Mahinay alleged that in an
earlier case he filed against the owners, the parties therein arrived at a Compromise
Agreement wherein the owners gave him preferential right to buy the portion of lot on
condition that he will withdraw said case. The trial court thus issued a Judgment based
on said Compromise Agreement. However, the owners sold the entire Lot 5 to Suarez
without first offering the same to Mahinay. According to Mahinay, said transaction
violated his preferential right to buy as he was willing and capable of buying the
property.
In traversing Mahinay's allegations, the owners asserted that they did not violate
Mahinays preferential right to buy as the transaction between them and Suarez was
actually an equitable mortgage, and not a sale as evidenced by an Acknowledgment
Receipt stating that no sale between them actually pushed thru.
The RTC rendered a Decision debunking the owners theory of equitable mortgage. It
held that the notarized documents Mahinay presented, particularly the Deed of Absolute
Sale, outweigh the owners evidence consisting of private documents. The CA affirmed
the RTC Decision.
Mahinay and Suarez filed a Joint Manifestation informing the RTC that in compliance
with its Decision, Suarez executed a Deed of Conveyance in favor of Mahinay,
deposited in the RTC.
The RTC, then already presided by Judge Gako, issued a Resolution granting Mahinays
motion that he should have the actual and physical possession of the entire Lot 5.
Mahinay riposted, postulating that the Deed of Absolute Sale he attached to his
Complaint sufficiently confutes the owners’ defense of equitable mortgage. Besides, the
owners and Suarez failed to deny under oath the authenticity and due execution of said
Deed of Absolute Sale.
RTC debunked that theory and held that the notarized documents Mahinay presented,
particularly the Deed of Absolute Sale, outweigh the owners’ evidence consisting of
private documents.
The owners and Suarez moved for reconsideration but was denied by the RTC. Thus,
appealed to the CA.
Mahinay filed a Motion to Issue an Order Directing Sorensen to Turn Over the title.
Judge Gako issued the assailed Resolution 37 in G.R. No. 165338 denying Mahinay’s
motion, the pertinent portions of which read: [Mahinay’s] Motion to Direct Jocelyn B.
Sorensen to turn over TCT to the sheriff is hereby denied.
Mahinay’s MR.
On July 20, 2004, what seemed to be an interminable wait for Mahinay finally ended,
albeit with unwanted result on his part – Judge Gako came up with a one-page
Order denying his Motion for Reconsideration.
Aggrieved yet still refusing to concede defeat, Mahinay directly went to this court.
The CA for not taking a liberal stance in resolving Sorensen’s petition for certiorari as
the dismissal thereof did not impair or affect her substantive rights.
The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing Sorensen’s petition for certiorari.
Respondent Contention: Sorensen admits that due to inadvertence she failed to state in
the verification portion of her petition that the allegations therein are true and correct
based on authentic records. Nonetheless, such omission, according to Sorensen, does
not justify the outright dismissal of her petition. She posits that the purpose of
verification is simply to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true
and correct. Thus, "the requirement that a petition for certiorari be verified is not an
absolute necessity where the material facts alleged are a matter of records and all the
questions raised are mainly of law," just like in her CA petition. After all, the absence of
verification is a mere formal, not jurisdictional, defect.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and
that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or
based on authentic records.
"[A]uthentic" records as a basis for verification bear significance in petitions wherein the
greater portions of the allegations are based on the records of the proceedings in the
court of origin and/or the court a quo, and not solely on the personal knowledge of the
petitioner. To illustrate, petitioner himself could not have affirmed, based on his personal
knowledge, the truthfulness of the statement in his petition before the CA that at the pre-
trial conference respondent admitted having received the letter of demand, because he
(petitioner) was not present during the conference. Hence, petitioner needed to rely on
the records to confirm its veracity.
In her CA petition, Sorensen questioned the Orders of Judge Gako which respectively
granted Mahinay’s Reiteratory Motion and denied her Motion for Reconsideration. In
addition to said Orders and Motions, and to support the allegations in her petition,
Sorensen also attached copies of the August 12, 2005 Decision of this Court in G.R.
No. 153762 and other material portions of the records of Civil Case No. CEB-16335.
Quite obviously, Sorensen had no participation in the preparation and execution of
these documents although they constitute the main bulk of her evidence. Hence, it was
necessary for Sorensen to state in the verification that the allegations in her petition are
true and correct not only based on her personal knowledge but also based on the
information she gathered from authentic records. 83 The CA is, therefore, correct in its
observation that Sorensen’s verification is insufficient.
Nonetheless, the Rules and jurisprudence on the matter have it that the court may allow
such deficiency to be remedied, "non-compliance x x x or a defect [in the verification]
does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its
submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such
that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the needs of
justice may be served thereby."
Pitted against this test, we sustain the CA for not taking a liberal stance in resolving
Sorensen’s petition for certiorari as the dismissal thereof did not impair or affect her
substantive rights.