VOL.

290, MAY 20, 1998 279

Joson vs. Torres

G.R. No. 131255. May 20, 1998.*

HON. EDUARDO NONATO JOSON, in his capacity as the

Governor of the Province of Nueva Ecija, petitioner, vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RUBEN D. TORRES, the
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR & LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS, represented by SECRETARY ROBERT
Z. BARBERS and UNDERSECRETARY MANUEL R.
SANCHEZ, MR. OSCAR C. TINIO, in his capacity as
Provincial Vice­Governor of Nueva Ecija, and MR.
LORETO P. PANGILINAN, MR. CRISPULO S.
ESGUERRA, MS. SOLITA C. SANTOS, MR. VICENTE C.
PALILIO and MR. NAPOLEON G. INTERIOR, in their
capacity as Provincial Board Members of Nueva Ecija,
respondents.

Administrative Law; Public Officers; Verification; An

administrative complaint against an erring elective official must
be verified

_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.

280

280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Joson vs. Torres

and filed with the proper government office.—An administrative

complaint against an erring elective official must be verified and
filed with the proper government office. A complaint against an
elective provincial or city official must be filed with the Office of
the President. A complaint against an elective municipal official
must be filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan while that of a
barangay official must be filed before the Sangguniang
Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan.

Same; Same; Same; The lack of verification is a mere formal

defect.—Assuming, nonetheless, that the letter­complaint was
unverified when submitted to the Office of the President, the
defect was not fatal. The requirement of verification was deemed
waived by the President himself when he acted on the complaint.
Verification is a formal, not jurisdictional requisite. Verification is
mainly intended to secure an assurance that the allegations
therein made are done in good faith or are true and correct and
not mere speculation. The lack of verification is a mere formal
defect. The court may order the correction of the pleading, if not
verified, or act on the unverified pleading if the attending
circumstances are such that a strict compliance with the rule may
be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served.

Same; Same; Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary

actions against elective local officials is lodged in two authorities:
the Disciplining Authority and the Investigating Authority.
—Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against
elective local officials is lodged in two authorities: the Disciplining
Authority and the Investigating Authority. This is explicit from
A.O. No. 23. Pursuant to these provisions, the Disciplining
Authority is the President of the Philippines, whether acting by
himself or through the Executive Secretary. The Secretary of the
Interior and Local Government is the Investigating Authority,
who may act by himself or constitute an Investigating Committee.
The Secretary of the DILG, however, is not the exclusive
Investigating Authority. In lieu of the DILG Secretary, the
Disciplining Authority may designate a Special Investigating
Committee.

Same; Same; Power of the President over administrative

disciplinary cases against elective local officials is derived from his
power of general supervision over local governments.—The power
of the President over administrative disciplinary cases against
elective

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Joson vs. Torres

local officials is derived from his power of general supervision over
local governments. The power of supervision means “overseeing or
the authority of an officer to see that the subordinate officers
perform their duties.” If the subordinate officers fail or neglect to
fulfill their duties, the official may take such action or step as
prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. The
President’s power of general supervision means no more than the
power of ensuring that laws are faithfully executed, or that
subordinate officers act within the law. Supervision is not
incompatible with discipline. And the power to discipline and
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed must be construed to
authorize the President to order an investigation of the act or
conduct of local officials when in his opinion the good of the public
service so requires.

Same; Same; Power to discipline evidently includes the power

to investigate.—The power to discipline evidently includes the
power to investigate. As the Disciplining Authority, the President
has the power derived from the Constitution itself to investigate
complaints against local government officials. A.O. No. 23,
however, delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a
Special Investigating Committee, as may be constituted by the
Disciplining Authority. This is not undue delegation, contrary to
petitioner Joson’s claim. The President remains the Disciplining
Authority. What is delegated is the power to investigate, not the
power to discipline.

Same; Same; The power of the DILG to investigate

administrative complaints is based on the alter­ego principle or the
doctrine of qualified political agency.—Moreover, the power of the
DILG to investigate administrative complaints is based on the
alter­ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency.
Thus: “Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of
a single executive, all executive and administrative organizations
are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the
various executive departments are assistants and agents of the
Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is
required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the
multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.”

282
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Joson vs. Torres

Same; Same; Strictly applying the rules, the Office of the

President did not comply with the provisions of A.O. No. 23.—In
the case at bar, petitioner claims that the DILG Secretary
usurped the power of the President when he required petitioner to
answer the complaint. Undisputably, the letter­complaint was
filed with the Office of the President but it was the DILG
Secretary who ordered petitioner to answer. Strictly applying the
rules, the Office of the President did not comply with the
provisions of A.O. No. 23. The Office should have first required
petitioner to file his answer. Thereafter, the complaint and the
answer should have been referred to the Investigating Authority
for further proceedings. Be that as it may, this procedural lapse is
not fatal. The filing of the answer is necessary merely to enable
the President to make a preliminary assessment of the case. The
President found the complaint sufficient in form and substance to
warrant its further investigation. The judgment of the President
on the matter is entitled to respect in the absence of grave abuse
of discretion.

Same; Same; Officials deserve to be cleared expeditiously if

they are innocent, also expeditiously if guilty, so that the business
of government will not be prejudiced.—Petitioner should know
that the formal investigation of the case is required by law to be
finished within one hundred twenty (120) days from the time of
formal notice to the respondent. The extensions petitioner
requested consumed fifty­five (55) days of this period. Petitioner,
in fact, filed his answer nine (9) months after the first notice.
Indeed, this was more than sufficient time for petitioner to comply
with the order to file answer. The speedy disposition of
administrative complaints is required by public service. The
efficiency of officials under investigation is impaired when a case
hangs over their heads. Officials deserve to be cleared
expeditiously if they are innocent, also expeditiously if guilty, so
that the business of government will not be prejudiced.

Same; Same; Suspension; Instances where preventive

suspension may be imposed by the Disciplining Authority.—In
sum, preventive suspension may be imposed by the Disciplining
Authority at any time (a) after the issues are joined; (b) when the
evidence of guilt is strong; and (c) given the gravity of the offense,
there is great probability that the respondent, who continues to
hold office, could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the
safety and integrity of the records and other evidence.
 283

VOL. 290, MAY 20, 1998 283

Joson vs. Torres

Same; Same; Same; Rejection of petitioner’s right to a formal

investigation denied him procedural due process.—The rejection of
petitioner’s right to a formal investigation denied him procedural
due process. Section 5 of A.O. No. 23 provides that at the
preliminary conference, the Investigating Authority shall
summon the parties to consider whether they desire a formal
investigation. This provision does not give the Investigating
Authority the discretion to determine whether a formal
investigation would be conducted. The records show that
petitioner filed a motion for formal investigation.

Same; Same; Same; An erring elective local official has rights

akin to the constitutional rights of an accused.—An erring elective
local official has rights akin to the constitutional rights of an
accused. These rights are essentially part of procedural due
process. The local elective official has the (1) right to appear and
defend himself in person or by counsel; (2) the right to confront
and cross­examine the witnesses against him; and (3) the right to
compulsory attendance of witness and the production of
documentary evidence. These rights are reiterated in the Rules
Implementing the Local Government Code and in A.O. No. 23.
Well to note, petitioner formally claimed his right to a formal
investigation after his Answer Ad Cautelam has been admitted by
Undersecretary Sanchez.

Same; Same; Same; Petitioner’s right to a formal investigation

was not satisfied when the complaint against him was decided on
the basis of position papers; Administrative disciplinary
proceedings against elective government officials are not exactly
similar to those against appointive officials.—Petitioner’s right to
a formal investigation was not satisfied when the complaint
against him was decided on the basis of position papers. There is
nothing in the Local Government Code and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations nor in A.O. No. 23 that provide that
administrative cases against elective local officials can be decided
on the basis of position papers. A.O. No. 23 states that the
Investigating Authority may require the parties to submit their
respective memoranda but this is only after formal investigation
and hearing. A.O. No. 23 does not authorize the Investigating
Authority to dispense with a hearing especially in cases involving
allegations of fact which are not only in contrast but contradictory
to each other. These contradictions are best settled by allowing
the examination and cross­examination of witnesses. Position
papers are often­times prepared with the assistance of lawyers
and their artful preparation can make the discovery of truth
difficult. The jurisprudence cited by the DILG in its order denying
peti­

284

284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Joson vs. Torres

tioner’s motion for a formal investigation applies to appointive

officials and employees. Administrative disciplinary proceedings
against elective government officials are not exactly similar to
those against appointive officials. In fact, the provisions that
apply to elective local officials are separate and distinct from
appointive government officers and employees. This can be
gleaned from the Local Government Code itself.

PETITION to review a resolution of the Executive

Secretary.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Padilla, Jimenez, Kintanar & Asuncion Law Offices
for petitioner.
Matias, Pangilinan, Bansale, Tan, Felix, Alberto,
Hernal, Buazon & Associates for private respondents.

PUNO, J.:

The case at bar involves the validity of the suspension from

office of petitioner Eduardo Nonato Joson as Governor of
the province of Nueva Ecija. Private respondent Oscar C.
Tinio is the Vice­Governor of said province while private
respondents Loreto P. Pangilinan, Crispulo S. Esguerra,
Solita C. Santos, Vicente C. Palilio and Napoleon G.
Interior are members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
On September 17, 1996, private respondents filed with
the Office of the President a letter­complaint dated
September 13, 1997 charging petitioner with grave
misconduct and abuse of authority. Private respondents
alleged that in the morning of September 12, 1996, they
were at the session hall of the provincial capitol for a
scheduled session of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan when
petitioner belligerently barged into the Hall; petitioner
angrily kicked the door and chairs in the Hall and uttered
threatening words at them; close behind petitioner were
several men with long and short firearms who encircled the
area. Private respondents claim that this incident was an
offshoot of their resistance to a pending legislative measure
supported by petitioner that the province of Nueva Ecija
obtain a loan of P150 million from the Philippine

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Joson vs. Torres

National Bank; that petitioner’s acts were intended to

harass them into approving this loan; that fortunately, no
session of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was held that
day for lack of quorum and the proposed legislative
measure was not considered; that private respondents
opposed the loan because the province of Nueva Ecija had
an unliquidated obligation of more than P70 million
incurred without prior authorization from the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan; that the provincial budget officer and
treasurer had earlier disclosed that the province could not
afford to contract another obligation; that petitioner’s act of
barging in and intimidating private respondents was a
serious insult to the integrity and independence of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan; and that the presence of his
private army posed grave danger to private respondents’
lives and safety. Private respondents prayed for the
suspension or removal of petitioner; for an emergency audit
of the provincial treasury of Nueva Ecija; and for the
review of the proposed loan in light of the financial
condition of the province, to wit:

“In this regard, we respectfully request for the following

assistance from your good office:

1. To immediately suspend Governor N. [sic] Joson

considering the actual dangers that we are facing now,
and provide adequate police security detail for the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Nueva Ecija. Should the
evidence warrant after investigation, to order his removal
from office.
2. To conduct an emergency audit of the provincial treasury
of Nueva Ecija by the auditors from the Commission on
Audit Central Office with adequate police security
assistance. Should the evidence so warrant, to file
necessary charges against responsible and accountable
officers.
 3. To advise the Philippine National Bank to review the
capability of the province of Nueva Ecija to secure more
loans and the feasibility of the same in the light of the
present financial condition of the province. Or if said loan
will be contrary
1
to sound banking practice, recommend its
disapproval.”

_______________

1 Letter­complaint, Annex “E” to the Petition, Rollo, pp. 80­81.

286

286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Joson vs. Torres

The letter­complaint was submitted with the joint affidavit

of Elnora Escombien and Jacqueline Jane Perez, two (2)
employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan who
witnessed the incident. The letter was endorsed by
Congressmen Eleuterio Violago and Pacifico Fajardo of the
Second and Third Districts of Nueva Ecija, former
Congressman Victorio Lorenzo of the Fourth District and
Mayor Placido2 Calma, President of the Mayors’ League of
said province.
The President acted on the complaint by writing on its
margin the following:

“17 Sep 96

To: SILG info Exec. Sec. and Sec. of Justice:

1. Noted. There appears no justification for the use of force,

intimidation or armed followers in the situation of 12 Sep at the
Session Hall. 2. Take appropriate preemptive and investigative
actions. 3. BREAK NOT the PEACE.
FIDEL V. RAMOS3
(Signed).”

President Ramos noted that the situation of “12 Sep at the

Session Hall,” i.e., the refusal of the members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan to approve the proposed loan,
did not appear to justify “the use of force, intimidation or
armed followers.” He thus instructed the then Secretary of
the Interior and Local Governments (SILG) Robert Barbers
to “[t]ake appropriate preemptive and investigative
actions,” but to “[b]reak not the peace.”
The letter­complaint together with the President’s
marginal notes were sent to Secretary Robert Z. Barbers on
September 20, 1996. Acting upon the instructions of the
President, Secretary Barbers notified petitioner of the case
against

_______________

2 Cover­page of Letter­complaint, Annex “D” to the Petition, Rollo, pp.

78­79.
3 Annex “E” to the Petition, Rollo, p. 80.

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VOL. 290, MAY 20, 1998 287

Joson vs. Torres

4
him and attached to the notice a copy of the complaint and
its annexes. In the same notice, Secretary Barbers directed
petitioner “to submit [his] verified/sworn answer thereto,
not a motion to dismiss, together with such documentary
evidence that [he] has5 in support thereof, within fifteen
(15) days from receipt.”
Immediately thereafter, Secretary Barbers proceeded to
Nueva Ecija and summoned petitioner and private
respondents to a conference to settle the controversy. The
parties entered into an agreement whereby petitioner
promised to maintain peace and order in the province while
private respondents promised to refrain from filing cases6
that would adversely affect their peaceful co­existence.
The peace agreement was not respected by the parties
and the private respondents reiterated their letter­
complaint. Petitioner was again ordered to file his answer
to the letter­complaint within fifteen days from receipt.
Petitioner received a copy of this order on November 13,
1996. On the same day, petitioner requested for an
extension of thirty (30) days to submit his answer because
he was “trying to secure the services of legal counsel7
experienced in administrative law practice.” The
Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG),
acting through Director Almario de los Santos, Officer­In­
Charge of the Legal Service, granted the motion, with the
thirty­day extension to be reckoned, however, from
November 13, 1996,
8
i.e., the day petitioner received the
order to answer.
In a letter dated December 9, 1996, petitioner moved for
another extension of thirty (30) days to file his answer. He

_______________
 4 The complaint was docketed as DILG Administrative Case No. P­02­
96.
5 Order dated September 20, 1996, Annex “H” to the Petition, Rollo, p.
85.
6 Motion to Dismiss of Petitioner Joson, Annex “O” to the Petition,
Rollo, p. 107.
7 DILG Records, pp. 148, 149.
8 DILG Records, p. 188.

288

288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Joson vs. Torres

stated that he had already sent letters to various law firms

in Metro Manila but that he had not yet contracted their
services; that the advent of the Christmas season kept him9
busy with “numerous and inevitable official engagements.”
The DILG granted the request 10
for extension “for the last
time up to January 13 only.”
On January 7, 1997, petitioner requested for another
extension of thirty (30) days to file his answer. According to
him, the Christmas season kept him very busy and
preoccupied with his numerous official engagements; that
the law firms he invited to handle his case have favorably
replied but that he needed time to confer with them
personally; and that during this period, he, with the help of
his friends, was exploring11
the possibility of an amicable
settlement of the case. The DILG granted petitioner’s
request “for the last time” but gave him an extension of
only ten (10) days from January 13, 1997 to January 23,
1997. The DILG also informed him that his “failure to
submit answer will be considered a waiver and that the
plaintiff
12
[shall] be allowed to present his evidence ex­
parte.”
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the order. He
reiterated his prayer for an extension of thirty (30) days on
the following grounds: (a) that he was still in the process of
choosing competent and experienced counsel; (b) that some
law firms refused to accept his case because it was
perceived to be politically motivated; and (c) the
multifarious activities, appointments and official functions
of his 13office hindered his efforts to secure counsel of
choice.
Three months later, on April 22, 1997, Undersecretary
Manuel Sanchez, then Acting Secretary of the DILG, issued
an order declaring petitioner in default and to have waived
_______________

9 DILG Records, p. 160.

10 DILG Records, p. 187.
11 DILG Records, p. 169.
12 DILG Records, p. 186.
13 DILG Records, p. 184.

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VOL. 290, MAY 20, 1998 289

Joson vs. Torres

his right to present evidence. Private respondents were

ordered to present their evidence ex­parte. The order reads
as follows:

“ORDER

It appearing that respondent failed to submit his answer to the

complaint despite the grant to him of three (3) extensions, such
unreasonable failure is deemed a waiver of his right to present
evidence in his behalf pursuant to Section 4, Rule 4 of
Administrative Order No. 23 dated December 17, 1992, as
amended.
Respondent is hereby declared in default, meanwhile,
complainants are directed to present their evidence ex­parte.
However, considering the prohibition on the conduct of
administrative investigation due to the forthcoming barangay
elections, complainants will be notified on the date after the
barangay election for
14
them to present their evidence.
SO ORDERED.”

Two days later, on April 24, 1997, the law firm of Padilla,
Jimenez, Kintanar & Asuncion, representing petitioner,
filed with the DILG an “Entry of Appearance with Motion
for Time to File Answer Ad Cautelam.”
Petitioner received a copy of the order of default on May
2, 1997. Through counsel, he moved for reconsideration. On
May 19, 1997, Undersecretary Sanchez reconsidered the
order of default in the interest of justice. He noted the
appearance of petitioner’s counsel and gave petitioner “for
the last15 time” fifteen (15) days from receipt to file his
answer.
On June 23, 1997, Undersecretary Sanchez issued an
order stating that petitioner’s counsel, whose office is in
Manila, should have received a copy of the May 19, 1997
order ten days after mailing on May 27, 1997. Since
petitioner still failed to file his answer, he was deemed to
have waived his right to present evidence in his behalf.
Undersecretary Sanchez reinstated the order of default and
directed private

_______________

14 Annex “J” to the Petition, Rollo, p. 88.

15 Annex “N” to the Petition, Rollo, pp. 101­102.

290

290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Joson vs. Torres

respondents
16
to present their evidence ex­parte on July 15,
1997.
The following day, June 24, 1997, petitioner, through
counsel, filed a “Motion to Dismiss.” Petitioner alleged that
the letter­complaint was not verified on the day it was filed
with the Office of the President; and that the DILG had no
jurisdiction over the case and no authority to require him
to answer the complaint.
On July 4, 1997, petitioner filed an “Urgent Ex­Parte
Motion for Reconsideration” of the order of June 23, 1997
reinstating the order of default. Petitioner also prayed that
the hearing on the merits of the case be held in abeyance
until after the “Motion to Dismiss” shall have been
resolved.
On July 11, 1997, on recommendation of Secretary
Barbers, Executive Secretary Ruben Torres issued an
order, by authority of the President, placing petitioner
under preventive suspension for sixty 17(60) days pending
investigation of the charges against him.
Secretary Barbers directed the Philippine National
Police to assist in the implementation of the order of
preventive suspension. In petitioner’s stead, Secretary
Barbers designated Vice­Governor Oscar Tinio as Acting
Governor until such time as petitioner’s
18
temporary legal
incapacity shall have ceased to exist.
Forthwith, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the Court of Appeals challenging19the order
of preventive suspension and the order of default.
Meanwhile, the proceedings before the DILG continued.
On August 20, 1997, Undersecretary Sanchez issued an
order denying petitioner’s “Motion to Dismiss” and “Urgent
Ex­
_______________

16 Order, Annex “P” to the Petition, Rollo, pp. 114­115.

17 Order dated July 11, 1997, Annex “T” to the Petition, Rollo, pp. 125­
126.
18 Memoranda of Secretary Barbers, Annexes “U,” “V” and “W” to the
Petition, Rollo, pp. 127­129.
19 CA­G.R. SP No. 44694.

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VOL. 290, MAY 20, 1998 291

Joson vs. Torres

Parte Motion for Reconsideration.” In the same order, he

required the parties to submit their position papers within
an inextendible period of ten days from receipt after which
the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution, to wit:

“WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, both motions are denied.

However, for this office to have a better appreciation of the issues
raised in the instant case, the parties, through their respective
counsels are hereby directed to submit their position papers
within a period of ten (10) days from receipt hereof, which period
is inextendible,
20
after which the case is deemed submitted for
resolution.”

On August 27, 1997, petitioner filed with the DILG a

“Motion to Lift Order of Preventive Suspension.” On
September 10, 1997, petitioner followed this with a “Motion
21
to Lift Default Order and Admit Answer Ad Cautelam.”22
Attached to the motion was the “Answer Ad Cautelam”
and Sworn statements of his witnesses. On the other hand,
complainants (private respondents herein) manifested that
they were submitting the case for decision based on 23the
records, the complaint and affidavits of their witnesses.
In his Answer Ad Cautelam, petitioner alleged that in
the morning of September 12, 1996, while he was at his
district office in the town of Muñoz, he received a phone
call from Sangguniang Panlalawigan member Jose del
Mundo. Del Mundo, who belonged to petitioner’s political
party, informed him that Vice­Governor Tinio was enraged
at the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan who
were in petitioner’s party because they refused to place on
the agenda the ratification of the proposed P150 million
loan of the province. Petitioner

_______________
 20 Order dated August 20, 1997, Annex “Z” to the Petition, Rollo, pp.
175­177.
21 Annex “AA” to the Petition, Rollo, pp. 178­181.
22 Annex “AA­1” to the Petition, Rollo, pp. 182­187.
23 Resolution of the Executive Secretary suspending Governor Joson,
Annex “C” to the Motion for Leave to File Herein Incorporated Urgent
Motion for the Issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, p.
3, Rollo, p. 246.

292

292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Joson vs. Torres

repaired to the provincial capitol to advise his party­mates

on their problem and at the same time attend to his official
functions. Upon arrival, he went to the Session Hall and
asked the members present where Vice­Governor Tinio
was. However, without waiting for their reply, he left the
Hall and proceeded to his office.
Petitioner claimed that there was nothing in his conduct
that threatened the members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan or caused alarm to the employees. He said
that like Vice­Governor Tinio, he was always accompanied
by his official security escorts whenever he reported for
work. He also alleged that the joint affidavit of Elnora
Escombien and Jacqueline Jane Perez was false.
Escombien was purportedly not inside the session hall
during the incident but was at her desk at the office and
could not in any way have seen petitioner in the hall. To
attest to the truth of his allegations, petitioner submitted
three (3) joint affidavits—two (2) affidavits executed by six
(6) and ten (10) employees, respectively, of the provincial
government, and a third24 by four members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
On September 11, 1997, petitioner filed an “Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration” of the order of August 20, 1997
denying his motion to dismiss. The “Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration” was rejected by Undersecretary Sanchez
on October 8, 1997. Undersecretary Sanchez, however,
granted the “Motion to Lift Default Order and to Admit
Answer Ad Cautelam” and admitted the “Answer Ad
Cautelam” as petitioner’s 25
position paper pursuant to the
order of August 20, 1997.
On October 15, 1997, petitioner filed a “Motion to
Conduct Formal Investigation.” Petitioner prayed that a
formal investigation of his case be conducted pursuant to
the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991 and
Rule 7 of Administrative Order No. 23; and that this be
held at the province of

_______________

24 Annexes “II,” “JJ” and “KK” to the Petition, Rollo, pp. 209­212.
25 Order dated October 8, 1997, Annex “DD” to the Petition, Rollo, p.
201.

293

VOL. 290, MAY 20, 1998 293

Joson vs. Torres

26
Nueva Ecija. On October 29, 1997, petitioner submitted a
“Manifestation and Motion” before the DILG reiterating his
right to a formal investigation.
In the meantime, on October 24, 271997, the Court of
Appeals dismissed petitioner’s petition.
Hence this recourse.
The proceedings before the DILG continued however. In
an order dated November 11, 1997, the DILG denied
petitioner’s “Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation”
declaring that the submission of position papers
substantially complies with the requirements 28
of procedural
due process in administrative proceedings.
A few days after filing the petition before this Court,
petitioner filed a “Motion for Leave to File Herein
Incorporated Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.” Petitioner alleged that subsequent to the
institution of this petition, the Secretary of the Interior and
Local Governments rendered a resolution 29
on the case
finding him guilty of the offenses charged. His finding was
based on the position papers and affidavits of witnesses
submitted by the parties. The DILG Secretary found the
affidavits of complainants’ witnesses to be

_______________

26 Annex “CC” to the Petition, Rollo, pp. 195­200.

27 The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Portia
AlinoHormachuelos and concurred by Associate Justices Emeterio Cui and
Buenaventura Guerrero.
28 Annex “A” to the Motion for Leave to File Herein Incorporated
Urgent Motion for the Issuance of TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, Rollo, pp. 239­242.
29 The Resolution reads:
“x x x. The complained acts tested against the foregoing, we find respondent to be
liable for the acts complained of and consequently, must be sanctioned
administratively.” (Resolution of the Executive Secretary quoting the Resolution of
the DILG Secretary, pp. 4­5, Rollo, pp. 247­248).

294

294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Joson vs. Torres

“more natural, reasonable 30

and probable” than those of
herein petitioner Joson’s.
On January 8, 1998, the Executive Secretary, by
authority of the President, adopted the findings and
recommendation of the DILG Secretary. He imposed on
petitioner the penalty of suspension from office for six (6)
months without pay, to wit:

“WHEREFORE, as recommended by the Secretary of the Interior

and Local Government, respondent Nueva Ecija Governor
Eduardo Nonato Joson is hereby found guilty of the offenses
charged and is meted the penalty of 31suspension from office for a
period of six (6) months without pay.”

On January 14, 1998, we issued a temporary restraining

order enjoining the implementation of the order of the
Executive Secretary.
On January 19, 1998, private respondents submitted a
Manifestation informing this Court that the suspension of
petitioner was implemented on January 9, 1998; that on
the same day, private respondent Oscar Tinio was installed
as Acting Governor of the province; and that in view of
these events, the temporary restraining order 32had lost its
purpose and effectivity and was fait accompli. We noted
this Manifestation.
In his petition, petitioner alleges that:

“I THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN

HOLDING THAT RULES OF PROCEDURE AND
EVIDENCE SHOULD NOT BE STRICTLY
APPLIED IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE
DISCIPLINARY AND CLEARLY PUNITIVE
PROCEEDINGS IN THE CASE AGAINST
PETITIONER GOVERNOR EDNO JOSON;

_______________

30 Resolution of the Executive Secretary, p. 3, Rollo, p. 246.

 31 Order of Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, Annex “C” to the Motion
for Leave to File Herein Incorporated Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a
TRO and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.” Rollo, pp. 244­248.
32 Rollo, pp. 289­291.

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VOL. 290, MAY 20, 1998 295

Joson vs. Torres

II THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN

APPLYING THE ALTER­EGO PRINCIPLE
BECAUSE, CONTRARY TO LAW, IT WAS THE
SECRETARY OF THE DILG WHO WAS
EXERCISING THE POWERS OF THE
PRESIDENT WHICH ARE CLEARLY VESTED BY
LAW ONLY UPON HIM OR THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY.
III THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE PETITIONER WAS PROPERLY
DECLARED IN DEFAULT WHEN HE FILED A
MOTION TO DISMISS INSTEAD OF AN
ANSWER, AS DIRECTED BY THE DILG,
BECAUSE A MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON
JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS IS NOT A
PROHIBITIVE [sic] PLEADING IN
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY CASES.
IV THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE IMPOSITION OF PREVENTIVE
SUSPENSION AGAINST THE PETITIONER WAS
PROPER BECAUSE THERE WAS NO JOINDER
OF ISSUES YET UPON ITS IMPOSITION AND
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE33
OF GUILT
AGAINST PETITIONER.”

In his “Motion for Leave to File Herein Incorporated

Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction,” petitioner
also claims that:

“I THE RESOLUTION OF JANUARY 8, 1998 AND

THE MEMORANDA ISSUED PURSUANT
THERETO (i.e., ANNEXES “C,” “D,” “E,” “F” AND
“G” HEREOF) WERE ISSUED WITH UNDUE
HASTE, IN VIOLATION OF THE PERTINENT
PROVISIONS OF THE 1991 LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE AND ADMINISTRATIVE
 ORDER NO. 23, AND IN COMPLETE
DISREGARD OF PETITIONER’S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
II THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INVALID
RESOLUTION OF JANUARY 8, 1998 (ANNEX “C”
HEREOF) BY THE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS
ENTITLES PETITIONER TO THE IMMEDIATE
ISSUANCE OF THE TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING OR

_______________

33 Petition, pp. 16­17, Rollo, pp. 26­27.

296

296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Joson vs. Torres

DER/WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
34
INJUNCTION
HEREIN PRAYED FOR.”

We find merit in the petition.

Administrative disciplinary proceedings against elective
local officials are governed by the Local Government Code
of 1991, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991, and Administrative Order No.
23 entitled “Prescribing the Rules and Procedures on the
Investigation of Administrative Disciplinary Cases Against
Elective Local Officials of Provinces, Highly Urbanized
Cities, Independent Component Cities 35
and Cities and
Municipalities in Metropolitan Manila.” In all matters not
provided in A.O. No. 23, the Rules of Court and the
Administrative
36
Code of 1987 apply in a suppletory
character.

Section 60 of Chapter 4, Title II, Book I of the Local

Government Code enumerates the grounds for which an
elective local official may be disciplined, suspended or
removed from office. Section 60 reads:

“Sec. 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions.—An elective local

official may be disciplined, suspended or removed from office on
any of the following grounds:

(a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;

 (b) Culpable violation of the Constitution;
(c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross
negligence or dereliction of duty;

_______________

34 Motion for Leave to File Herein Incorporated Urgent Motion for the
Issuance, etc., pp. 6­7, Rollo, pp. 226­227.
35 Issued by President Ramos on December 17, 1992 and took effect in
February 1993. This has been amended by A.O. No. 159, Nov. 25, 1994.
36 Section 1, Rule 13, A.O. No. 23.

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VOL. 290, MAY 20, 1998 297

Joson vs. Torres

(d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an

offense punishable by at least prision mayor;
(e) Abuse of authority;
(f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working
days, except in the case of members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlunsod, sangguniang
bayan and sangguniang barangay;
(g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or
residence or the status of an immigrant of another
country; and
(h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and
other laws.

An elective local official may be removed from office on the

grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court.”

When an elective local official commits an act that falls

under the grounds for disciplinary action, the
administrative complaint against him must be verified and
filed with any of the following:

“Sec. 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints.—A

verified complaint against any erring local elective official shall be
prepared as follows:

(a) A complaint against any elective official of a province, a

highly urbanized city, an independent component city or
component city shall be filed before the Office of the
President.
 (b) A complaint against any elective official of a municipality
shall be filed before the sangguniang panlalawigan whose
decision may be appealed to the Office of the President;
and
(c) A complaint against any elective barangay official shall be
filed before the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang
bayan concerned
37
whose decision shall be final and
executory.”

An administrative complaint against an erring elective

official must be verified and filed with the proper
government office. A complaint against an elective
provincial or city official must be filed with the Office of the
President. A complaint

_______________

37 Local Government Code of 1991.

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298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Joson vs. Torres

against an elective municipal official must be filed with the

Sangguniang Panlalawigan while that of a barangay
official must be filed before the Sangguniang Panlungsod or
Sangguniang Bayan.
In the instant case, petitioner Joson is an elective official
of the province of Nueva Ecija. The letter­complaint against
him was therefore properly filed with the Office of the
President. According to petitioner, however, the letter­
complaint failed to conform with the formal requirements
set by the Code. He alleges that the complaint was not
verified by private respondents and was not supported by
the joint affidavit of the two witnesses named therein; that
private respondents later realized these defects and
surreptitiously inserted the verification and sworn
statement while the complaint
38
was still pending with the
Office of the President. To prove his allegations, petitioner
submitted: (a) the sworn statement of private respondent
Solita C. Santos attesting to the alleged fact that after the
letter­complaint was filed, Vice­Governor Tinio made her
and the other members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
sign an additional page which he had later notarized; and
(b) the fact that the verification of the letter­complaint and
the joint affidavit of the witnesses do not indicate the
document, page or book number of the notarial39 register of
the notary public before whom they were made.
We find no merit in the contention of the petitioner. The
absence of the document, page or book number of the
notarial register of the subscribing officer is insufficient to
prove petitioner’s claim. The lack of these entries may
constitute proof of neglect on the part of the subscribing
officer in complying with the requirements for notarization
and proper verification. They may give 40
grounds for the
revocation of his notarial commission. But they do not
indubitably prove that the veri­

_______________

38 Petition, pp. 19, 21, Rollo, pp. 29, 31.

39 Petition, pp. 22­23, Rollo, pp. 32­33.
40 Section 249 in relation to Section 246, Article II, Chapter 11, Title IV,
Book II, Revised Administrative Code.

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VOL. 290, MAY 20, 1998 299

Joson vs. Torres

fication was inserted or intercalated after the letter­

complaint was filed with the Office of the President.
Nor is the fact of intercalation sufficiently established by
the affidavit of Solita C. Santos. Private respondent Santos
was one of the signatories to the letter­complaint. In her
affidavit, she prayed that she be dropped as one of the
complainants since she had just joined the political party of
petitioner Joson. She decided to reveal the intercalation
because she was disillusioned with the “dirty tactics” of 41
Vice­Governor Tinio to grab power from petitioner Joson.
Private respondent Santos cannot in any way be considered
an unbiased witness. Her motive and change of heart
render her affidavit suspect.
Assuming, nonetheless, that the letter­complaint was
unverified when submitted to the Office of the President,
the defect was not fatal. The requirement of verification
was deemed waived by the President himself when he
acted on the complaint. 42
Verification is a formal, not jurisdictional requisite.
Verification is mainly intended to secure an assurance that
the allegations therein made are done in good 43
faith or are
true and correct and not mere speculation.
44
The lack of
verification is a mere formal defect. The court may order
the correction of the pleading, if not verified, or act on the
unverified pleading if the attending circumstances are such
that a strict compliance with the rule may be dispensed
45
with in order that the ends of justice may be served.

_______________

41 Annex “FF” to the Petition, Rollo, p. 206.

42 Vda. de Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, 264 SCRA 137, 143 [1996]; Sy v.
Habacon­Garayblas, 228 SCRA 644, 647 [1993]; Oshita v. Republic, 19
SCRA 700, 702 [1967].
43 Id.
44 Buenaventura v. Halili­Uy, 149 SCRA 22, 26 [1987]; Quimpo v. de la
Victoria, 46 SCRA 139, 145 [1972]; Oshita v. Republic, 19 SCRA 700
[1967].
45 Buenaventura v. Halili­Uy, supra, at 26; Oshita v. Republic, supra,
at 703.

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300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Joson vs. Torres

II

In his second assigned error, petitioner questions the

jurisdiction and authority of the DILG Secretary over the
case. He contends that under the law, it is the Office of the
President that has jurisdiction over the letter­complaint
and that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the alter­
ego principle because the power to discipline elective local
officials lies with the President, not with the DILG
Secretary.
Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions
against elective local officials is lodged in two authorities:
the Disciplining Authority and the Investigating Authority.
This is explicit from A.O. No. 23, to wit:

“Sec. 2. Disciplining Authority.—All administrative complaints,

duly verified, against elective local officials mentioned in the
preceding Section shall be acted upon by the President. The
President, who may act through the Executive Secretary, shall
hereinafter be referred to as the Disciplining Authority.”
Sec. 3. Investigating Authority.—The Secretary of the Interior
and Local Government is hereby designated as the Investigating
Authority. He may constitute an Investigating Committee in the
Department of the Interior and Local Government for the
purpose.
 The Disciplining Authority may, however, in the interest of the
service, constitute a Special Investigating Committee
46
in lieu of
the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government.”

Pursuant to these provisions, the Disciplining Authority is

the President of the Philippines, whether acting by himself
or through the Executive Secretary. The Secretary of the
Interior and Local Government is the Investigating
Authority, who may act by himself or constitute an
Investigating Committee. The Secretary of the DILG,
however, is not the exclusive Investigating Authority. In
lieu of the DILG Secretary, the Disciplining Authority may
designate a Special Investigating Committee.

_______________

46 Sections 2 and 3, A.O. No. 23 as amended by A.O. No. 159 which took
effect on November 25, 1994.

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Joson vs. Torres

The power of the President over administrative disciplinary

cases against elective local officials is derived from his
power of general supervision over local governments.
Section 4, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:

“Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general

supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to
component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities
with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of
their component units47 are within the scope of their prescribed
powers and functions.”

The power of supervision means “overseeing or the

authority of an officer48to see that the subordinate officers
perform their duties.” If the subordinate officers fail or
neglect to fulfill their duties, the official may take such
action or step49
as prescribed by law to make them perform
their duties. The President’s power of general supervision
means no more than the power of ensuring that laws are
faithfully
50
executed, or that subordinate officers act within
51
the law. Supervision is not incompatible with discipline.
And the power to discipline

_______________
 47 The President’s power of supervision over local governments was
taken from Section 10 (1), Article VII of the 1935 Constitution which
reads:

“Section 10 (1). The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may
be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”

The 1935 Constitution lumped both the power of control and

supervision in one provision. The 1987 Constitution carries the two
powers in separate provisions.
48 Ganzon v. Court of Appeals, 200 SCRA 271, 283­284 [1991]; Mondano
v. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143, 147 [1955].
49 Mondano v. Silvosa, supra, at 147­148.
50 Bernas, the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A
Commentary, pp. 968­969 [1996]; III Record of the Constitutional
Commission 451­452, 453­454.
51 Ganzon v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 283.

302

302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Joson vs. Torres

and ensure that the laws be faithfully executed must be

construed to authorize the President to order an
investigation of the act or conduct of local officials when in
52
his opinion the good of the public service so requires.
Thus:

“Independently of any statutory provision authorizing the

President to conduct an investigation of the nature involved in
this proceeding, and in view of the nature and character of the
executive authority with which the President of the Philippines is
invested, the constitutional grant to him of power to exercise
general supervision over all local governments and to take care
that the laws be faithfully executed must be construed to
authorize him to order an investigation of the act or conduct of the
petitioner herein. Supervision is not a meaningless thing. It is an
active power. It is certainly not without limitation, but it at least
implies authority to inquire into facts and conditions in order to
render the power real and effective. If supervision is to be
conscientious and rational, and not automatic and brutal, it must
be founded upon a knowledge of actual facts 53
and conditions
disclosed after careful study and investigation.”

The power to discipline evidently includes the power to

investigate. As the Disciplining Authority, the President
has the power derived from the Constitution itself to
investigate complaints against local government officials.
A.O. No. 23, however, delegates the power to investigate to
the DILG or a Special Investigating Committee, as may be
constituted by the Disciplining Authority. This is not
undue delegation, contrary to petitioner Joson’s claim. The
President remains the Disciplining Authority. What is
delegated 54is the power to investigate, not the power to
discipline.

_______________

52 Hebron v. Reyes, 104 Phil. 175, 186­189 [1958]; Ganzon v. Kayanan,

104 Phil. 483, 488­489 [1958]; also cited in Martin, the Revised
Administrative Code, vol. 1, pp. 299­301 [1961].
53 Planas v. Gil, 67 Phil. 62, 77­78 [1939]; see also Villena v. Secretary
of the Interior, 67 Phil. 451, 459 [1939].
54 Pimentel, The Local Government Code of 1991, p. 173, [1993].

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Joson vs. Torres

Moreover, the power of the DILG to investigate

administrative complaints is based on the alter­ego
principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency. Thus:

“Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a

single executive, all executive and administrative organizations
are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the
various executive departments are assistants and agents of the
Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is
required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the
multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the55 Chief Executive
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.”

This doctrine
56
is corollary to the control power of the
President. The power of control is provided in the
Constitution, thus:

“Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus 57and offices. He shall ensure that the laws
be faithfully executed.”
Control is 58
said to be the very heart of the power of the
presidency. As head of the Executive Department, the
President, however, may delegate some of his powers to the
Cabinet members except when he is required by the
Constitution to act in person or the exigencies
59
of the
situation demand that he acts personally. The members of
Cabinet may act for and in behalf of the President in
certain matters because the President cannot be expected
to exercise his control (and su­

_______________

55 Carpio v. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290, 295­296 [1992].

56 Id., at 295.
57 Section 17, Article VII, 1987 Constitution.
58 Carpio v. Executive Secretary, supra, at 295.
59 Id.

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304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Joson vs. Torres

pervisory) powers personally all the time. Each head of a

department is, and must be, the President’s alter ego in the
matters of that department where
60
the President is required
by law to exercise authority.
The procedure how the Disciplining and Investigating
Authorities should exercise their powers is distinctly set
forth in the Local Government Code and A.O. No. 23.
Section 62 of the Code provides:

“Sec. 62. Notice of Hearing.—(a) Within seven (7) days after the
administrative complaint is filed, the Office of the President or the
sanggunian concerned, as the case may be, shall require the
respondent to submit his verified answer within fifteen (15) days
from receipt thereof, and commence investigation of the case
within ten (10) days after receipt of such answer of the
respondent.
x x x.”
61
Sections 1 and 3, Rule 5 of A.O. No. 23 provide:

“Sec. 1. Commencement.—Within forty­eight (48) hours from

receipt of the answer, the Disciplining Authority shall refer the
complaint and answer, together with their attachments and other
relevant papers, to the Investigating Authority who shall
commence the investigation of the case within ten (10) days from
receipt of the same.
“x x x
“Sec. 3. Evaluation.—Within twenty (20) days from receipt of
the complaint and answer, the Investigating Authority shall
determine whether there is a prima facie case to warrant the
institution of formal administrative proceedings.”

When an administrative complaint is therefore filed, the

Disciplining Authority shall issue an order requiring the
respondent to submit his verified answer within fifteen (15)
days from notice. Upon filing of the answer, the
Disciplining Authority shall refer the case to the
Investigating Authority for investigation.

_______________

60 Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil. 451, 464 [1939].

61 Rule 5 is entitled “Preliminary Investigation.”

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VOL. 290, MAY 20, 1998 305

Joson vs. Torres

In the case at bar, petitioner claims that the DILG

Secretary usurped the power of the President when he
required petitioner to answer the complaint. Undisputably,
the letter­complaint was filed with the Office of the
President but it was the DILG Secretary who ordered
petitioner to answer.
Strictly applying the rules, the Office of the President
did not comply with the provisions of A.O. No. 23. The
Office should have first required petitioner to file his
answer. Thereafter, the complaint and the answer should
have been referred to the Investigating Authority for
further proceedings. Be that as it may, this procedural
lapse is not fatal. The filing of the answer is necessary
merely to enable the 62President to make a preliminary
assessment of the case. The President found the complaint
sufficient in form and substance to warrant its further
investigation. The judgment of the President on the matter
is entitled to respect in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion.

III
In his third assigned error, petitioner also claims that the
DILG erred in declaring him in default for filing a motion
to dismiss. He alleges that a motion to dismiss is not a
pleading prohibited by the law or the rules and therefore
the DILG Secretary should have considered it and given
him time to file his answer.
It is true that a motion to dismiss is not a pleading
prohibited under the Local Government Code of 1991 nor in
A.O. No. 23. Petitioner, however, was instructed not to file
a motion to dismiss in the order to file answer. Thrice, he
requested for extension of time to file his answer citing as
reasons the search for competent counsel and the demands
of his official duties. And thrice, his requests were granted.
Even the order of default was reconsidered and petitioner
was given additional time to file answer. After all the
requests and seven months later, he filed a motion to
dismiss!

_______________

62 See Pimentel, supra, at 174—“[T]he Office of the President may

conduct a preliminary assessment of the case.”

306

306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Joson vs. Torres

Petitioner should know that the formal investigation of the

case is required by law to be finished within one hundred
twenty (120) days from the time of formal notice to the
respondent. The extensions petitioner
63
requested consumed
fifty­five (55) days of this period. Petitioner, in fact, filed
his answer nine (9) months after the first notice. Indeed,
this was more than sufficient time for petitioner to comply
with the order to file answer.
The speedy disposition of administrative complaints is
required by public service. The efficiency of officials under
investigation is impaired when a case hangs over their
heads. Officials deserve to be cleared expeditiously if they
are innocent, also expeditiously if guilty, 64so that the
business of government will not be prejudiced.

IV

In view of petitioner’s inexcusable failure to file answer,

the DILG did not err in recommending to the Disciplining
Authority his preventive suspension during the
investigation. Preventive suspension is authorized under
Section 63 of the Local Government Code, viz.:

“Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension.—(a) Preventive suspension may

be imposed:
(1) By the President, if the respondent is an elective official of a
province, a highly urbanized or an independent component city;
x x x.
(b) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the
issues are joined, when the evidence of guilt is strong, and given
the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the
continuance in office of the respondent could influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records
and other evidence;

_______________

63 He was granted three extensions or a total of 60 days less fifteen (15) days­­
fifteen days because his first extension of 30 days was counted from the time he
received a copy of the complaint, not from the time the first 15­day period expired.
64 Id.

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VOL. 290, MAY 20, 1998 307

Joson vs. Torres

Provided, That, any single preventive suspension of local elective

officials shall not extend beyond sixty (60) days: Provided, further,
That in the event that several administrative cases are filed
against an elective official, he cannot be preventively suspended
for more than ninety (90) days within a single year on the same
ground or grounds existing and known at the time of the first
suspension.
x x x.”

In sum, preventive suspension may be imposed by the

Disciplining Authority at any time (a) after the issues are
joined; (b) when the evidence of guilt is strong; and (c)
given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability
that the respondent, who continues to hold office, could
influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the records and other evidence.
Executive Secretary Torres, on behalf of the President,
imposed preventive suspension on petitioner Joson after
finding that:

“x x x
 DILG Secretary Robert Z. Barbers, in a memorandum for the
President, dated 23 June 1997, recommends that respondent be
placed under preventive suspension considering that all the
requisites to justify the same are present. He stated therein that:

‘Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are
joined, that is, after respondent has answered the complaint, when the
evidence of guilt is strong and, given the gravity of the offense, there is a
great possibility that the continuance in office of the respondent could
influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the
records and other evidence (Sec. 3, Rule 6 of Administrative Order No.
23).
The failure of respondent to file his answer despite several
opportunities given him is construed as a waiver of his right to present
evidence in his behalf (Sec. 4, Rule 4 of Administrative Order No. 23).
The requisite of joinder of issues is squarely met with respondent’s
waiver of right to submit his answer. The act of respondent in allegedly
barging violently into the session hall of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
in the company of armed men constitutes grave misconduct. The al

308

308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Joson vs. Torres

legations of complainants are bolstered by the joint­affidavit of two (2)

employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Respondent who is the
chief executive of the province is in a position to influence the witnesses.
Further, the history of violent confrontational politics in the province
dictates that extreme precautionary measures be taken.’

Upon scrutiny of the records and the facts and circumstances

attendant to this case, we concur with the findings of the
Secretary of the Interior and Local Government and find merit in
the aforesaid recommendation.
WHEREFORE, and as recommended by the Department of the
Interior and Local Government, respondent EDUARDO N.
JOSON, Governor of Nueva Ecija, is hereby placed under
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION FOR A PERIOD OF SIXTY (60)
DAYS, effective 11 July 1997, pending investigation of the
charges filed against
65
him.
SO ORDERED.”

Executive Secretary Torres found that all the requisites for

the imposition of preventive suspension had been complied
with. Petitioner’s failure to file his answer despite several
opportunities given him was construed as a waiver of his
right to file answer and present evidence; and as a result of
this waiver, the issues were deemed to have been joined.
The Executive Secretary also found that the evidence of
petitioner Joson’s guilt was strong and that his
continuance in office during the pendency of the case could
influence the witnesses and pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the evidence against him.

We now come to the validity of the January 8, 1998

Resolution of the Executive Secretary finding petitioner
guilty as charged and imposing on him the penalty of
suspension from office for six (6) months from office
without pay.
Petitioner claims that the suspension was made without
formal investigation pursuant to the provisions of Rule 7 of

_______________

65 Annex “T” to the Petition, Rollo, pp. 125­126.

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VOL. 290, MAY 20, 1998 309

Joson vs. Torres

A.O. No. 23. Petitioner filed a “Motion To Conduct Formal

Investigation” three months before the issuance of the
order of suspension and this motion was denied by the
DILG for the following reasons:

“On November 19, 1997, complainants, through counsel, filed a

Manifestation calling our attention to the Decision dated October
24, 1997 of the Court of Appeals, Fifth Division in CA­G.R. SP No.
44694, entitled “Eduardo Nonato Joson versus Executive
Secretary Ruben D. Torres, et al.” In the aforestated decision, the
Court of Appeals resolved to sustain the authority of this
Department to investigate this administrative case and has
likewise validated the order of default as well as the order of
preventive suspension of the respondent.
We offer no objection and concur with the assertion of
respondent that he has the right for the conduct of formal
investigation. However, before there shall be a formal
investigation, joinder of issues must already be present or
respondent’s answer has already been filed. In the case at bar, the
admission of respondent’s answer after having been declared in
default was conditioned on the fact of submission of position
papers by the parties, after which, the case shall be deemed
submitted for resolution. Respondent, instead of submitting his
position paper filed his subject motion while complainants
manifested to forego the submission of position paper and submit
the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings on hand.
Settled is the rule that in administrative proceedings, technical
rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied
(Concerned Officials of the Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System v. Vasquez, 240 SCRA 502). The essence of due
process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard
and to submit evidence one may have in support of one’s defense
(Tajonera v. Lamaroza, 110 SCRA 438). To be heard does not only
mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through
pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral
arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of
procedural due process (Juanita Y. Say, et al. vs. IAC, G.R. No.
73451). Thus, when respondent failed to submit his position paper
as directed and insisted for the conduct of formal investigation, he
was not denied of his right of procedural due process.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for the Conduct of Formal
Investigation, for lack of merit, is DENIED.

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310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Joson vs. Torres
66
SO ORDERED.”

The denial of petitioner’s Motion to Conduct Formal

Investigation is erroneous. Petitioner’s right to a formal
investigation is spelled out in the following provisions of
A.O. No. 23, viz.:

“SEC. 3. Evaluation.—Within twenty (20) days from receipt of the

complaint and answer, the Investigating Authority shall determine
whether there is a prima facie case to warrant the institution of
formal administrative proceedings.
SEC. 4. Dismissal motu proprio.—If the Investigating
Authority determines that there is no prima facie case to warrant
the institution of formal administrative proceedings, it shall,
within the same period prescribed under the preceding Section,
submit its recommendation to the Disciplining Authority for the
motu proprio dismissal of the case, together with the
recommended decision, resolution and order.
SEC. 5. Preliminary conference.—If the Investigating Authority
determines that there is prima facie case to warrant the
institution of formal administrative proceedings, it shall, within
the same period prescribed under the preceding Section, summon
the parties to a preliminary conference to consider the following:
 a) whether the parties desire a formal investigation or are
willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the
evidence on record; and
b) If the parties desire a formal investigation, to consider the
simplification of issues, the possibility of obtaining
stipulation or admission of facts and of documents,
specifically affidavits and depositions, to avoid
unnecessary proof, the limitation of number of witnesses,
and such other matters as may aid the prompt disposition
of the case.

The Investigating Authority shall encourage the parties and

their counsels to enter, at any stage of the proceedings, into
amicable settlement, compromise and arbitration, the terms and
conditions of which shall be subject to the approval of the
Disciplining Authority.

_______________

66 Order of Undersecretary Sanchez, Annex “A” to the Motion for Leave

to File Herein Incorporated Motion for the Issuance of a TRO and/or a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction, Rollo, pp. 241­242.

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Joson vs. Torres

After the preliminary conference, the Investigating Authority shall

issue an order reciting the matters taken up thereon, including the
facts stipulated and the evidences marked, if any. Such order
shall limit the issues for hearing to those not disposed of by
agreement or admission of the parties, and shall schedule the
formal investigation within ten (10) days from its issuance, unless
a later date67
is mutually agreed in writing by the parties
concerned.”

The records show that on August 27, 1997, petitioner

submitted his Answer Ad Cautelam where he disputed the
truth of the allegations that he barged into the session hall
of the capitol and committed physical violence to harass the
private respondents who were opposed to any move for the
province to contract a P150 million loan from PNB. In his
Order of October 8, 1997, Undersecretary Sanchez
admitted petitioner’s Answer Ad Cautelam but treated it as
a position paper. On October 15, 1997, petitioner filed a
Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation. Petitioner
reiterated this motion on October 29, 1997. Petitioner’s
motion was denied on November 11, 1997. Secretary
Barbers found petitioner guilty as charged on the basis of
the parties’ position papers. On January 8, 1998, Executive
Secretary Torres adopted Secretary Barbers’ findings and
recommendations and imposed on petitioner the penalty of
six (6) months suspension without pay.
The rejection of petitioner’s right to a formal
investigation denied him procedural due process. Section 5
of A.O. No. 23 provides that at the preliminary conference,
the Investigating Authority shall summon the parties to
consider whether they desire a formal investigation. This
provision does not give the Investigating Authority the
discretion to determine whether a formal investigation
would be conducted. The records show that petitioner filed
a motion for formal investigation. As respondent, he is
accorded several rights under the law, to wit:

“Sec. 65. Rights of Respondent.—The respondent shall be accorded

full opportunity to appear and defend himself in person or by

_______________

67 Sections 3 to 5, Rule 5, A.O. No. 23.

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312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Joson vs. Torres

counsel, to confront and cross­examine the witnesses against him,

and to require the attendance of witnesses and the production of
documentary evidence in his favor through compulsory process of
subpoena or subpoena duces tecum.”

An erring elective local official has 68rights akin to the

constitutional rights of an accused. These69 rights are
essentially part of procedural due process. The local
elective official has the (1) right to appear and defend
himself in person or by counsel; (2) the right to confront
and cross­examine the witnesses against him; and (3) the
right to compulsory attendance of witness and the
production of documentary evidence. These rights are
reiterated in the 70
Rules Implementing 71
the Local
Government Code and in A.O. No. 23. Well to note,
petitioner formally claimed his right to a formal
investigation after his Answer Ad Cautelam has been
admitted by Undersecretary Sanchez.
Petitioner’s right to a formal investigation was not
satisfied when the complaint against him was decided on
the basis of position papers. There is nothing in the Local
Government Code and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations nor in A.O. No. 23 that provide that
administrative cases against elective local officials can be
decided on the basis of position papers. A.O. No. 23 states
that the Investigating Authority may require the parties to
submit their respective memoranda 72
but this is only after
formal investigation and hearing. A.O. No. 23 does not
authorize the Investigating Authority to dispense with a
hearing especially in cases involving allegations of fact
which are not only in contrast but contradictory to each
other. These contradictions are best settled by allowing the
examination and cross­examination of witnesses. Position
papers are often­times prepared with the assistance of
lawyers and their artful preparation can make the
discovery of truth diffi­

_______________

68 Section 14 (2), Bill of Rights, 1987 Constitution.

69 See Section 1, Rule 7, A.O. No. 23.
70 Article 129.
71 Section 1, Rule 7.
72 Section 13, Rule 7, A.O. No. 23.

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Joson vs. Torres

cult. The jurisprudence cited by the DILG in its order

denying petitioner’s motion for a formal investigation
applies to appointive officials and employees.
Administrative disciplinary proceedings against elective
government officials are not exactly similar to those
against appointive officials. In fact, the provisions that
apply to elective local officials are separate and distinct
from appointive government officers and employees. This
can be gleaned from the Local Government Code itself.
In the Local Government Code, the entire Title II of
Book I of the Code is devoted to elective officials.
73
It provides
for their 74qualifications and75 election, vacancies76 and
succession,
77
local legislation, disciplinary actions and
recall. Appointive officers and employees are covered in
Title III of Book I of the Code entitled “Human Resources
and Development.” All matters pertinent to human
resources and development in local government units are
regulated by “the civil service law and such rules and
regulations and other issuances promulgated
78
thereto,
unless otherwise provided in the Code.” The “investigation
and adjudication of administrative complaints against
appointive local officials and employees as well as their
suspension and removal” are “in accordance with the civil
service law and rules and other pertinent laws,” the results
of which “shall79
be reported to the Civil Service
Commission.”
It is the Administrative Code of 1987, specifically Book
V on the Civil Service, that primarily governs appointive
officials and employees. Their qualifications are set forth in
the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the said Code.
The

________________

73 Chapter 1.
74 Chapter 2.
75 Chapter 3.
76 Chapter 4.
77 Chapter 5.
78 Section 78, Title III, Book I, Local Government Code of 1991.
79 Section 84, Id.

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314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Joson vs. Torres

grounds for administrative disciplinary action in Book V

are much more in number and are specific than those
enumerated in 80
the Local Government Code against elective
local officials. The disciplining81authority in such actions is
the Civil Service Commission although the Secretaries
and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces,
cities and municipalities are also given the power to
investigate and decide disciplinary actions
82
against officers
and employees under their jurisdiction. When a complaint
is filed and the respondent answers, he must “indicate
whether or not he elects a formal investigation
83
if his
answer is not considered satisfactory.” If the officer or
employee elects a formal investigation, the direct evidence
for the complainant and the respondent “consist[s] of the
sworn statement and documents submitted in support of
the complaint and answer, as the case may be, without
prejudice to the presentation of additional evidence deemed
necessary x x x, upon which the cross­examination by 84
respondent and the complainant, respectively, is based.”
The investigation is conducted without adhering to the 85
technical rules applicable in judicial proceedings.”
Moreover, the appointive official or employee may be
removed or dismissed summarily if (1) the charge is serious
and the evidence of guilt is strong; (2) when the respondent
is a recidivist;
86
and (3) when the respondent is notoriously
undesirable.
The provisions for administrative disciplinary actions
against elective local
87
officials are markedly different from
appointive officials. The rules on the removal and suspen­

_______________

80 Section 46, Chapter 6, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987

lists 30 grounds for the suspension or dismissal of an officer or employee
in the Civil Service.
81 Section 47 (1), Id.
82 Section 47 (2), Id.
83 Section 48 (2), Id.
84 Section 48 (5), Id.
85 Section 48 (7), Id.
86 Section 50, Id.
87 Nera v. Garcia and Elicano, 106 Phil. 1031, 1037 [1960].

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Joson vs. Torres

sion of elective local officials are more stringent. The

procedure of requiring position papers in lieu of a hearing
in administrative cases is expressly allowed with respect to
appointive officials but not to those elected. An elective
official, elected by popular vote, is directly responsible to
the community that elected him. The official has a definite
term of office fixed by law which is relatively of short
duration. Suspension and removal from office definitely
affects and shortens this term of office. When an elective
official is suspended or removed, the people are deprived of
the services of the man they had elected. Implicit in the
right of suffrage is that the people are entitled 88
to the
services of the elective official of their choice. Suspension
and removal are thus imposed only after the elective
official is accorded his rights and the evidence against him
strongly dictates their imposition.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Resolution of January 8, 1998
of the public respondent Executive Secretary is declared
 null and void and is set aside. No Cost.
SO ORDERED.

          Regalado (Chairman), Melo, Mendoza and

Martinez, JJ., concur.

Resolution declared null and void.

Note.—Except for dismissal for just cause and in the

manner provided by law a government employee can
neither be removed nor suspended without due process of
law. (Rosete vs. Court of Appeals, 264 SCRA 147 [1996])

——o0o——

_______________

88 Nera v. Garcia and Elicano, supra; see also Layno, Sr. v.

Sandiganbayan, 136 SCRA 536, 541 [1985].

316

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