People vs. Palma

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-44113 March 31, 1977
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JUDGE MERICIA B. PALMA and ROMULO INTIA Y
MORADA, respondents.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Guillermo C. Nakar, Jr. and

Solicitor Celia Lipana-Reyes for petitioner.
Hon Judge Mericia B. Palma for and in her own behalf.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
The Court resolves the sole issue of conflict of jurisdiction between the City Court
of Naga (presided by respondent judge) and the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Courts for Camarines Sur and Cities of Naga and Iriga over criminal
cases where the accused is 16 but under 21 years of age and rules that the
issuance of the Child and Youth Welfare Code (PD 603) which includes such
accused within the definition of youthful offenders (over 9 years but under 21
years at the time of the commission of the offense) did not transfer jurisdiction
over such cases from the regular courts (the City Court in this case) to the
Juvenile Courts.
Respondent-accused Romulo Intia y Morada, 17 years of age, was charged on

February 10, 1976 by the Naga City fiscal's office with vagrancy (Article 202,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code) in respondent judge's court. In an Order
dated March 6, 1976, respondent judge dismissed the case on the ground that
her court "has no jurisdiction to continue to take further cognizance of this case"
without prejudice to the refiling thereof in the Juvenile Court.
The prosecution shares the view of the Camarines Sur Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court presided by Judge Ma. Rosario Quetulio-Losa that jurisdiction
over 16-year olds up to under 21 years remains with the regular courts and has
not been by implication transferred to the Juvenile Court. Hence, the petition at
bar.
The Court sustains the petition on the following grounds:
1. Republic Act 6591 which took effect on September 30, 1972 created the
Camarines nand limited jurisdiction over "criminal cases wherein the accused is
under sixteen years of age at the time of the filing of the case. 1
The subsequent issuance of P. D. 603 known as the Child and Youth Welfare
Code which took effect on June 11, 1975 and defines in Article 189 a youthful
offender as "one who is over nine years but under twenty-one years of age at the
time of the commission of the offense" did not by such definition transfer
jurisdiction over criminal cases involving accused who are 16 years and below 21
years of age from the regular courts 2 to the Juvenile Court, as opined by respondent judge.
2. The Child and Youth Welfare Code (P.D. 603) concerning the welfare of the
child and youth throughout the country is a general law while R.A. 6591 which
defined and confer jurisdiction on the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for
Camarines Sur is a special law 3 classifying expressly that it can try in criminal cases involving
offenders below the age of majority only those accused who are under 16 years of age at the time of
the filing of the case.
Jurisdiction is conferred by law and there is nothing in either R.A. 6591 or P.D.
603 that would sustain respondent judge's ruling on reconsideration that
"together, these two laws, the latter amending the former confer jurisdiction on
youthful offenders who are above 16 years but under 21 years of age at the time
of the commission of the crime upon the JDRC of Camarines Sur and remove the
same from the City Court."
A general law cannot repeal a special law by mere implication. The repeal must
be express and specific. Furthermore, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
of Camarines Sur is a court of special and limited jurisdiction and the
enlargement or conferment of additional jurisdiction on said court to include
accused persons who are 16 years and under 21 years of age must positively
appear in express terms.
It is quite patent that the mere definition in a single article of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code (P. D. 603, Article 189) of youthful offenders (over 9 and under 21
years of age) did not withdraw from the regular courts their jurisdiction to try
accused persons who are 16 but below 21 years of age and transfer the same to
the Juvenile Courts whose criminal jurisdiction is expressly limited to those where
the accused is under 16 years of age.
3. If it were the intent and purpose of P.D. 603 to remove from the City Court the
jurisdiction over youthful accused who are 16 but below 21 years of age and
transfer the same to the Juvenile Court, it would have expressly so provided for
repeal of the corresponding provision as when it repealed the Civil Code
provisions on Adoption in Article 26 thereof. 4
The issuance of a later decree, P.D. No. 798, which went into effect on
September 11, 1975 strengthens the prosecution's stand that jurisdiction over
accused who are 16-years old up to 21 years remains with the regular courts
while the Juvenile Courts retain their limited jurisdiction only over those under 16
years. Thus, P. D. No. 798, "Authorizing the Confinement in Rehabilitation
Centers or Reformatories of Truants and Youths out of School for No Legitimate
Reason," retains the classification and provides that the application for
confinement of truants or out of school youths shall be filed with the proper court
of First Instance of the province or city save that in the case of youths under 16
years of age the application shall be filed with the Juvenile Court where such a
court has been established. 5
4. The Solicitor General has properly acknowledged respondent judge's

"impressive and commendable dissertation" on the State's objective of
rehabilitating juvenile delinquents and the role that Juvenile Courts should play in
the attainment of such objective. The role and jurisdiction of Juvenile Courts are
matters of policy and wisdom, however, and in the face of the clear letter of the
law, the special jurisdiction granted to juvenile Courts which is limited to cases
where the accused is under 16 years of age cannot be expanded by judicial fiat.
The lawmakers have limited the jurisdiction of Juvenile Courts only where the
accused is relatively younger, i.e. under 16 years at the time of the filing of the
case and have conferred jurisdiction over the older offenders, i.e. 16 years up to
below 21 years at the time of the commission of the offense to the regular courts,
and there has been no claim that this is an unfair or unreasonable classification.
5. Furthermore, a reading of the provisions of P.D. 603 shows that measures to

promote and enhance the general welfare and rehabilitation of youthful offenders
are therein spelled out and provided for. The Code establishes the criteria and
guidelines under which all youthful offenders under 21 years are to be tried and
attended to, regardless of whether the cases be filed with the Juvenile Courts for
those under 16 years or with the regular courts for the older ones. Thus the
Solicitor General points out that Chapter 3 of the Code on youthful offenders
decrees special provisions on the following:
Art. 190. Physical and mental examination of the youthful offender
191. Care of youthful offender held for examination or trial

192. Suspension of sentence and commitment of youthful offender
193. Appeal by the youthful offenders as in criminal case
194. Care and maintenance of youthful offender
195. Report on the conduct of the child
196. Dismissal of the case against the youthful offender
197. Return of the youthful offender to court
198. Effect of release of child based on good conduct
199. Living quarters for youthful offenders sentenced
The cited codal articles, it may be stressed, adequately provide as in Article 192
that the courts in general shall suspend sentence instead of pronouncing a
judgment of conviction and commit the youthful offender "to the custody or care
of the Department of Social Welfare, or to any training institution operated by the
government, or duly licensed agencies or any other responsible person, until he
shall have reached twenty-one years of age or, for a shorter period as the court
may deem proper, after considering the reports and recommendations of the
Department of Social Welfare or the agency or responsible individual under
whose care he has been committed."
ACCORDINGLY, the dismissal orders of respondent judge dated March 6, 1976

and April 1, 1976 are set aside. The case filed with respondent judge's court is
ordered reinstated for prompt trial and determination on the merits. In the public
interest 6 this decision resolving the jurisdictional conflict shall be immediately executory upon
promulgation.
Castro C.J., Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz-Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr.,

and Martin, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J, reserves his vote.

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Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-44113 March 31, 1977

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Guillermo C. Nakar, Jr. and

Hon Judge Mericia B. Palma for and in her own behalf.

Respondent-accused Romulo Intia y Morada, 17 years of age, was charged on

The Court sustains the petition on the following grounds:

4. The Solicitor General has properly acknowledged respondent judge's

5. Furthermore, a reading of the provisions of P.D. 603 shows that measures to

Art. 190. Physical and mental examination of the youthful offender

191. Care of youthful offender held for examination or trial

193. Appeal by the youthful offenders as in criminal case

194. Care and maintenance of youthful offender

195. Report on the conduct of the child

196. Dismissal of the case against the youthful offender

197. Return of the youthful offender to court

198. Effect of release of child based on good conduct

199. Living quarters for youthful offenders sentenced

ACCORDINGLY, the dismissal orders of respondent judge dated March 6, 1976

Castro C.J., Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz-Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr.,

Fernando, J, reserves his vote.

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