Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-37633 January 31, 1975

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FELICISIMO MEDROSO, JR., accused-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Eduardo C. Abaya
and Trial Attorney Josefina C. Castillo for plaintiff-appellee.

Crispo B. Borja for accused-appellant.

MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:

The only question or issue involved in this appeal is the correctness of the judgment rendered by
the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur in Criminal Case No. 403 wherein accused-appellant,
Felicisimo Medroso Jr., on a plea of guilty, was convicted of "Homicide through reckless
imprudence" and sentenced

to suffer the penalty of, from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY, as minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS, as maximum, of prision correccional and
ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P12,000.00 as actual
damages, P4,000.00 as moral damages and P4,000.00 as exemplary damages,
Philippine currency, and to pay the cost of this proceeding. (p. 11, Rollo)

Sometime on August 6, 1971, the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur filed with the local Court of
First Instance an Information accusing the herein appellant, Felicisimo Medroso Jr., of "Homicide
through reckless imprudence" alleged to have been committed as follows:

That on or about the 16th of May, 1971, in the barrio of San Roque, municipality of
Bombon, province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused without any license to drive motor vehicles
issued by competent authority, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully manage
and operate a BHP dump truck bearing Plate No. 7329, S. 1969 and with BHP
truck No. 14-H3-12P and while passing along the said barrio in a negligent,
careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to traffic laws, rules and
regulations to prevent accident to persons and damage to property, caused by
such negligence and imprudence, said truck driven and operated by him to bump
and hit one Iñigo Andes thereby causing his death. (p. 4, Rollo)

The case was called for trial on July 18, 1972, on which date appellant with the assistance of his
counsel pleaded guilty to the charge with two mitigating circumstances in his favor, viz: plea of
guilty and voluntary surrender, to which the prosecuting fiscal offered no objection.

In its decision, the trial court, presided by Hon. Delfin Vir Sunga, after appreciating the above-
mentioned mitigating circumstances and considering as an aggravating circumstance the fact that

1
appellant drove the vehicle in question without a license, sentenced the accused as indicated
above.

Not content with the penalty imposed, accused appealed to the Court of Appeals.

On September 19, 1973, the Appellate Court, through its Second Division at the time, certified the
case to this Court on the ground that the appeal covers pure questions of law.

Appellant is charged with homicide thru reckless imprudence for which the penalty provided for in
Paragraph 6, sub-section 2 of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code is prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods or from two years, four months and one day to six years.

Appellant now contends that inasmuch as he has two mitigating circumstances in his favor without
any aggravating circumstance, as driving without a license is not to be considered such, he is
entitled to a penalty one degree lower than that prescribed by law pursuant to Article 64 of the
Revised Penal Code1 or, arresto mayor in its maximum period to correct in its minimum period, that
is, from "four months and one day to two years, four months and one day," and that applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the trial court should have imposed a minimum within the penalty
still one degree lower, which is arresto mayor minimum and medium periods (1 month and 1 day
to 4 months) and to a maximum of not more than two years, four months, and one day of prision
correccional.

Appellant's proposition would indeed be correct if he were charged with any of the offenses
penalized in the Revised Penal Code other than Article 365 thereof, But because appellant is
accused under Article 365, he is not entitled as a matter of right to the provisions of Article 64 of
the Code.

Paragraph 5 of Article 365 expressly states that in the imposition of the penalties provided for in
the Article, the courts shall exercise their sound discretion without regard to the rules prescribed
in Article 64. The rationale of the law can be found in the fact that in quasi-offenses penalized
under Article 365, the carelessness, imprudence or negligence which characterizes the wrongful
act may vary from one situation to another, in nature, extent, and resulting consequences, and in
order that there may be a fair and just application of the penalty, the courts must have ample
discretion in its imposition, without being bound by what We may call the mathematical formula
provided for in Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code. On the basis of this particular provision, the
trial court was not bound to apply paragraph 5 of Article 64 in the instant case even if appellant
had two mitigating circumstances in his favor with no aggravating circumstance to offset them.

In People vs. Agito, 1958, 103 Phil. 526, the accused, Simplicio Agito, was charged with triple
homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence before the Court of First Instance
of Negros Occidental of Mindoro. He pleaded guilty and the trial court, applying Article 365,
paragraph 6, sub-section 2 of the Revised Penal Code, sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate
penalty from one year and one day to three years, six months and twenty one days of prison
correccional. The accused appealed questioning the propriety of the penalty imposed and
appellant contended inter alia that the trial court erred in not considering the mitigating
circumstance of plea of guilty so as to reduce the penalty to a minimum period. This contention
was held by this Court to be untenable for to uphold it would be contrary to Article 365, paragraph
5, of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 384 which provides that "(I)n the imposition of
these penalties (referring to the penalties defined in Article 365), the courts shall exercise their
sound discretion without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64." (Portion in parenthesis
supplied)

In the case now before Us, the penalty for homicide thru reckless imprudence with violation of the
Automobile Law isprision correccional in its medium and maximum periods with a duration from
two years, four months, and one day to six years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law to
which appellant is entitled 3 the imposable penalty covers a minimum to be taken from the penalty

2
one degree lower than that prescribed by law or arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period, i.e. four months and one day to two years and four
months, and a maximum to be taken in turn from the penalty prescribed for the offense the duration
of which is from two years, four months and one day to six years. The determination of
the minimum and maximum terms is left entirely to the discretion of the trial court, the exercise of
which will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a clear abuse.4

The penalty imposed by the trial court is well within the periods we have given above except for
the one day excess in the minimum thereof. The minimum of the indeterminate sentence given by
His Honor the trial Judge should have been "two years and four months of prision correccional"
instead of "two years, four months and one day", because with the addition of one day the minimum
term fell within the range of the penalty prescribed for the offense in contravention of the provisions
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. On this score, there is need to correct the minimum of the
indeterminate penalty imposed by the court a quo.

As regards the second issue raised by appellant, We do not find any reversible error in the
judgment awarding to the heirs of the deceased P4,000.00 as moral damages and another
P4,000.00 as exemplary damages in addition to P12,000.00 by way of actual damages.

Moral damages compensate for mental anguish, serious anxiety and moral shock suffered by the
victim or his family as the proximate result of the wrongful act, and they are expressly recoverable
where a criminal offense result in physical injuries as in the instant case before Us which in fact
culminated in the death of the victim.

In People vs. Pantoja, L-18793, Oct. 11, 1968, 25 SCRA 468, this Court fixed the sum of
P12,000.00 as compensatory damages for a death caused by a crime (Art. 2206 of the Civil Code)
and it was there stated that, in proper cases, the courts may adjudge additional sums by way of
moral damages and exemplary damages.

The determination of the amount which would adequately compensate the victim or his family in a
criminal case of this nature is left to the discretion of the trial judge whose assessment will not be
disturbed on appeal unless there is a manifest showing that the same is arbitrary or excessive, for
it has been said that "(T)here can be no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of a human
life and the measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculation, but the
amount recoverable depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case." (25 C.J.S.,
1241, cited in Alcantara vs. Surro, et al., 93 Phil. 472, 477)

With respect to the exemplary damages awarded by the trial court, the same are justified by the
fact that the herein appellant without having been issued by competent authority a license to drive
a motor vehicle, wilfully operated a BHP dump truck and drove it in a negligent and careless
manner as a result of which he hit a pedestrian who died from the injuries sustained by him.
Exemplary damages are corrective in nature and are imposed by way of example or correction for
the public good (Art. 2229, Civil Code), and the situation before Us calls for the imposition of this
kind of damages to deter others from taking into their hands a motor vehicle without being qualified
to operate it on the highways thereby converting the vehicle into an instrument of death.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby MODIFIED in that the minimum term is reduced
by one day. The herein appellant is sentenced therefore to an indeterminate penalty ranging from
TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of prision correccional as minimum to SIX (6) YEARS
also of prision correccional as maximum. In all other respects, the decision stands. Without
pronouncement as to costs.

Castro (Chairman), Teehankee, Makasiar and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

3
Footnotes

1 Article 64, Revised Penal Code: —

Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods.

xxx xxx xxx

5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating

circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable according to the
number and nature of such circumstances.

2 As amended by Republic Act 384.

3 Indeterminate Sentence Law, Act No. 4103 as amended by Act No. 4225:

Section 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the

Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to
an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view
of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the
said Code, and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the code for the offense; and if the offense is punished
by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said
law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the
same.

4 People vs. De Joya, et al., 98 Phil. 238.

5 Art. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's
wrongful act or omission. (Civil Code).

6 Art. 2219. Moral damages may he recovered in the following and analogous
cases:

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) xxx xxx xxx(Civil Code)