TOGUAY, Paul Jeffrey U.

2019-80129
Block 4

WHEREFORE, finding the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 32, to have no jurisdiction over Crim.
Case Nos. 84- 32335 to 8432340, inclusive, the assailed decision of respondent Court of Appeals
affirming the decision of the trial court dated 24 September 1991 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
without prejudice to the filing of appropriate charges against petitioner with the court of competent
jurisdiction when warranted.

Citation G.R. No. 119000

Date July 28, 1997

Petitioner ROSA UY

Respondent COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

PRINCIPLES/ It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by

DOCTRINES courts in criminal cases the offense should have been committed or
any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the
territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the
offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take
jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed
outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over
the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or
information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance
of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the
offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action
for want of jurisdiction.

In the crime of estafa, deceit and damage are essential elements of the offense
and have to be established with satisfactory proof to warrant conviction.

In violation of BP 22, deceit and damage are not are neither essential nor required.

laches is failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of

time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier; it is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert
has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
LAUREL, J.:

FACTS:
Rosa Uy, an accountant in Don Tim Shipping Company and an efficient and hardworking
employee, resigned in March 1982, a few months before she was to give birth. Meanwhile, Rosa helped
her husband managing their lumber business. The wife owner of the Shipping Company, Consolacion
Leong and Rosa agreed to form a partnership for Consolacion to contribute additional capital for the
expansion of Rosa’s Lumber Business and the Rosa as Industrial Partner. Consolacion claimed that she
gave a total amount of Php 500,000.00 for the Lumber Business, but no receipt was issued thereto
because of the trust she had for Rosa.

A Lumber Store in Bulacan was erected with the funds given by Consolacion evidenced by
various receipts. But their relationship became sour because the partnership documents were never
processed. This prompted Consolacion to demand the return of her investment. Consequently, Rosa
issued checks to satisfy the obligation but all were dishonored by the drawee bank for INSUFFICIENCY
OF FUNDS.

Consolacion filed a COMPLAINT FOR ESTAFA against Rosa before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila for violation of B.P. 22.

In 1984, an information for ESTAFA and other several informations for violation of B.P. 22 were
filed against Rosa. The offenses were subsequently consolidated and tried jointly.

The prosecution tried to establish that Rosa employed deceit in obtaining the amount of PhP
500,000.00. The manager of the drawee bank testified to the dishonored (6) checks.

The defense said that there is no misrepresentation that happened in the transaction for the
funds were utilized for the construction of the Lumber Store in Bulacan. Rosa did not deny the
existence of the checks and said that such checks were evidence to the investment of Consolacion in
the proposed partnership between them.

RTC Manila acquitted Rosa of ESTAFA but convicted her of the charges under B.P. 22. On
appeal in Court of Appeals, Cosolacion questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC Manila. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC Manila.

ROSA OSG
the evidence presented established that even if there is no showing of any evidence that
(a) Consolacion was a resident of Makati; the essential ingredients took place or the offense
(b) Rosa was a resident of Caloocan City; was committed in Manila, what is critical is the
(c) the place of business of the alleged partnership fact that the court acquired jurisdiction over the
was located in Malabon; estafa case because the same is the principal or
(d) the drawee bank was located in Malabon; and, main case and that the cases for violations of the
(e) the checks were all deposited for collection in Bouncing Checks Law are merely incidental to
Makati. Taken altogether, petitioner concludes the estafa case.
that the said evidence would only show that none
of the essential elements of B.P. Blg. 22 occurred
in Manila.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the RTC of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the violations of the Bouncing Checks
Law.

2. Whether or not the proposition of the OSG that inasmuch as the Regional Trial Court of Manila
acquired jurisdiction over the estafa case then it also acquired jurisdiction over the violations of B.P.
Blg. 22. was correct.

3. Whether or not the question on jurisdiction was barred by estoppel as it was raised only after five (5)
years.

RULING:
1. NO. The RTC Manila has no jurisdiction over the case of BP 22 of Rosa as the essential ingredients
were not proved to happen within the jurisdiction of the court.

It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal

cases the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients
took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in
criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the
offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a
person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations
in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take
cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense
was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.
 In the case at bar, (a) Consolacion was a resident of Makati; (b) Rosa was a resident of Caloocan
City; (c) the place of business of the alleged partnership was located in Malabon; (d) the drawee bank
was located in Malabon; and, (e) the checks were all deposited for collection in Makati.

Verily, no proof has been offered that the checks were issued, delivered, dishonored or
knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in Manila, which are essential elements necessary for the
Manila Court to acquire jurisdiction over the offense.

2. NO. The proposition of the OSG that inasmuch as the Regional Trial Court of Manila acquired
jurisdiction over the estafa case then it also acquired jurisdiction over the violations of B.P. Blg. 22.,
was NOT correct or INCORRECT BECAUSE the crime of estafa and the violation of B.P. Blg. 22 have to be
treated as separate offenses and therefore the essential ingredients of each offense have to be satisfied.

In the crime of estafa, deceit and damage are essential elements of the offense and have to be
established with satisfactory proof to warrant conviction.

In violation of BP 22, deceit and damage are not are neither essential nor required.

Rather, the elements of B.P. Blg. 22 are

(a) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value;

(b) the maker, drawer or issuer knows at the time of issuance that he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and,

(c) the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without valid reason, ordered the
bank to stop payment.

Hence, it is incorrect for respondent People to conclude that inasmuch as the Regional Trial Court of
Manila acquired jurisdiction over the estafa case then it also acquired jurisdiction over the violations of
B.P. Blg. 22. The crime of estafa and the violation of B.P. Blg. 22 have to be treated as separate offenses
and therefore the essential ingredients of each offense have to be satisfied.

3. NO.

The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, under Rule 117, Sec. 3, provides that the
accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following
grounds: . . . (b) that the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged
or over the person of the accused.

Moreover, under Sec. 8 of the same Rule it is provided that the failure of the accused to
assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information,
 either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said
motion, shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash, except the
grounds of . . . lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged . . . as provided for in
paragraph . . . (b) . . . of Section 3 of this Rule.

In the case at bar, Rosa timely questioned the jurisdiction of the court in a memorandum before
the Regional Trial Court and thereafter in succeeding pleadings. On this finding alone, we cannot
countenance the inadvertence committed by the court. Clearly, from the above-quoted law, we can see
that even if a party fails to file a motion to quash, he may still question the jurisdiction of the court
later on. Moreover, these objections may be raised or considered motu propio by the court at any stage
of the proceedings or on appeal.

No judgment has yet been rendered by the trial court in this case. As a matter of fact, as soon as
the accused discovered the jurisdictional defect, she did not fail or neglect to file the appropriate
motion to dismiss. They questioned the jurisdiction of the trial court in a memorandum before the
lower court. Hence, finding the pivotal element of laches to be absent, we hold that the ruling in Tijam
v. Sibonghanoy does not control the present controversy. Instead, the general rule that the question of
jurisdiction of a court maybe raised at any stage of the proceedings must apply. Petitioner is therefore
not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court.

NOTE: Tijam v. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the presence of laches. The
exceptional circumstance involved Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted
concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket
doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the
exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle
that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. laches is failure or neglect for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier; it is the negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.