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    Penera Vs Comelec

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    Star Garyen
    The Supreme Court reversed its previous ruling and ruled that Penera was not guilty of premature campaigning. [1] A candidate is only considered such once they have filed their certificate of candidacy and the campaign period has begun. [2] Penera filed her COC before the campaign period started and her motorcade occurred during this time, so she was not officially a candidate and could not have engaged in campaigning. [3] However, one dissenting justice argued that Section 80 of the Election Code prohibits any person, not just candidates, from campaigning outside the campaign period.

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    Penera Vs Comelec

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    Star Garyen
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    The Supreme Court reversed its previous ruling and ruled that Penera was not guilty of premature campaigning. [1] A candidate is only considered such once they have filed their certificate of candidacy and the campaign period has begun. [2] Penera filed her COC before the campaign period started and her motorcade occurred during this time, so she was not officially a candidate and could not have engaged in campaigning. [3] However, one dissenting justice argued that Section 80 of the Election Code prohibits any person, not just candidates, from campaigning outside the campaign period.

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    Penera vs Comelec

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    The Supreme Court reversed its previous ruling and ruled that Penera was not guilty of premature campaigning. [1] A candidate is only considered such once they have filed their certificate of candidacy and the campaign period has begun. [2] Penera filed her COC before the campaign period started and her motorcade occurred during this time, so she was not officially a candidate and could not have engaged in campaigning. [3] However, one dissenting justice argued that Section 80 of the Election Code prohibits any person, not just candidates, from campaigning outside the campaign period.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as docx, pdf, or txt
    74 views2 pages

    Penera Vs Comelec

    Uploaded by

    Star Garyen
    The Supreme Court reversed its previous ruling and ruled that Penera was not guilty of premature campaigning. [1] A candidate is only considered such once they have filed their certificate of candidacy and the campaign period has begun. [2] Penera filed her COC before the campaign period started and her motorcade occurred during this time, so she was not officially a candidate and could not have engaged in campaigning. [3] However, one dissenting justice argued that Section 80 of the Election Code prohibits any person, not just candidates, from campaigning outside the campaign period.

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    of 2

    PENERA vs.

    COMELEC

    FACTS:

    Petitioner and private respondents were candidates for mayor of the Municipality of Sta.Monica,
    Surigao del Norte during May 2007 elections. The former filed her certificate of candidacy on the day
    before the prescribed campaign period. After filing her COC to the COMELEC, Penera and the other
    members of her political party conducted a motorcade and went around the different barangays in the
    municipality of Sta. Monica. The motorcade consisted of two jeepneys and ten motorcycles
    accompanied with marching music and the individuals on board the vehicles threw candies to the
    people they passed by along the streets. Due to this, private respondent filed a case against her alleging
    premature campaigning as provided in the Omnibus Election Code Section 80 which says: “Election or
    partisan political activity outside campaign period.--- It shall be unlawful for any person, whether or
    not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of persons, to engage in an election campaign
    or partisan political activity except during the campaign period.” Penera argued that she is not guilty
    since she was not yet a candidate at that time and the campaign period has not yet started when the
    motorcade was conducted. She further alleged the motorcade was not a campaign and was unplanned.
    While the petition was pending in the COMELEC, she was voted as mayor and took her office
    thereafter. The COMELEC Second Division decided in favor of the complainant and found her guilty
    of premature campaigning. She appealed in the COMELEC En Banc but the previous decision was
    affirmed. Subsequently, she filed with the Supreme Court which decided against her. It held that the
    conduct of the motorcade is a form of election campaign or partisan political activity and that she
    should vacate the position. Now, she comes for a motion for reconsideration using the same arguments.

    ISSUE: Is petitioner guilty of premature campaigning?

    RULING:

    No, she is not.

    The Decision reverses Lanot v. COMELEC, which held that a person who files a certificate of
    candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period. In Lanot, this Court explained:
    Thus, the essential elements for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code are: (1) a person
    engages in an election campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is designed to promote the
    election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates; (3) the act is done outside the campaign
    period.

    The second element requires the existence of a "candidate." Under Section 79(a), a candidate is one
    who "has filed a certificate of candidacy" to an elective public office. Unless one has filed his
    certificate of candidacy, he is not a "candidate." The third element requires that the campaign period
    has not started when the election campaign or partisan political activity is committed.

    It is a basic principle of law that any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law. This is
    specially true to expression or speech, which Congress cannot outlaw except on very narrow grounds
    involving clear, present and imminent danger to the State. The mere fact that the law does not declare
    an act unlawful ipso facto means that the act is lawful. Thus, there is no need for Congress to declare in
    Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, that political partisan activities before the start of the
    campaign period are lawful. It is sufficient for Congress to state that "any unlawful act or omission
    applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period." Hence, in ruling
    that Penera is liable for premature campaigning for partisan political acts before the start of the
    campaigning, the assailed Decision ignores the clear and express provision of the law.

    Congress has laid down the law — a candidate is liable for election offenses only upon the start of the
    campaign period. This Court has no power to ignore the clear and express mandate of the law that "any
    person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a
    candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy." Neither
    can this Court turn a blind eye to the express and clear language of the law that "any unlawful act or
    omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period." Hence,
    Penera’s Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED.

    DISSENTING OPINIONS: Chico-Nazario, J:

    Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, on premature campaigning, explicitly provides that "[i]t
    shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of
    persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity, except during the campaign
    period." Very simply, premature campaigning may be committed even by a person who is not a
    candidate. For this reason, the plain declaration in Lanot that "[w]hat Section 80 of the Omnibus
    Election Code prohibits is ‘an election campaign or partisan political activity’ by a ‘candidate’
    ‘outside’ of the campaign period," is clearly erroneous.

    True, that pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as amended, even after the filing of the
    COC but before the start of the campaign period, a person is not yet officially considered a candidate.
    Nevertheless, a person, upon the filing of his/her COC, already explicitly declares his/her intention to
    run as a candidate in the coming elections. The commission by such a person of any of the acts
    enumerated under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code (i.e., holding rallies or parades, making
    speeches, etc.) can, thus, be logically and reasonably construed as for the purpose of promoting his/her
    intended candidacy.

    When the campaign period starts and said person proceeds with his/her candidacy, his/her intent
    turning into actuality, we can already consider his/her acts, after the filing of his/her COC and prior to
    the campaign period, as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate, hence, constituting premature
    campaigning, for which he/she may be disqualified.

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