Republic of the Philippines pay her damages in the amount of not less than

SUPREME COURT P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses

Manila amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and
granting her such other relief and remedies as may be
THIRD DIVISION just and equitable. The complaint was docketed as
Civil Case No. 16503.
 
In his Answer with Counterclaim,  petitioner admitted
3

G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993 only the personal circumstances of the parties as
averred in the complaint and denied the rest of the
allegations either for lack of knowledge or information
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or
vs.
because the true facts are those alleged as his
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T.
Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed
GONZALES, respondents.
that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be
married with the private respondent; he neither sought
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner. the consent and approval of her parents nor forced
her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her,
Corleto R. Castro for private respondent. but only told her to stop coming to his place because
he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing
his money and passport; and finally, no confrontation
took place with a representative of the barangay
DAVIDE, JR., J.: captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the
complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into
Rules of Court seeking to review and set aside the court and compelled to incur expenses, and has
Decision  of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-
1
suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation,
G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the 16 he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for
October 1939 Decision of Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil damages.
Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether or
not damages may be recovered for a breach of After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the
promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order  embodying the
4

Code of the Philippines. stipulated facts which the parties had agreed upon, to
wit:
The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
1. That the plaintiff is single and
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the resident (sic) of Bañaga, Bugallon,
assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial Pangasinan, while the defendant is
court a complaint  for damages against the petitioner
2
single, Iranian citizen and resident
for the alleged violation of their agreement to get (sic) of Lozano Apartment, Guilig,
married. She alleges in said complaint that: she is Dagupan City since September 1,
twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty 1987 up to the present;
lass of good moral character and reputation duly
respected in her community; petitioner, on the other 2. That the defendant is presently
hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano studying at Lyceum Northwestern,
Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an Dagupan City, College of Medicine,
exchange student taking a medical course at the second year medicine proper;
Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City;
before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and 3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an
proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette ,
condition that they would get married; they therefore Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City
agreed to get married after the end of the school since July, 1986 up to the present and
semester, which was in October of that year; a (sic) high school graduate;
petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents
in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their
4. That the parties happened to know
approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August
each other when the manager of the
1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the
Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johhny
Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she
Rabino introduced the defendant to
began living with him; a week before the filing of the
the plaintiff on August 3, 1986.
complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to
change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a
result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries; After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying
during a confrontation with a representative of the Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16 October
barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of 1989 a decision  favoring the private respondent. The
5

the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages
agreement and asked her not to live with him and attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of the
anymore and; the petitioner is already married to decision reads:
someone living in Bacolod City. Private respondent
then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing
consideration, judgment is hereby
 rendered in favor of the plaintiff and was good and trusted him, they
against the defendant. agreed to his proposal for him to
marry their daughter, and they
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to likewise allowed him to stay in their
pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty house and sleep with plaintiff during
thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as the few days that they were in
moral damages. Bugallon. When plaintiff and
defendant later returned to Dagupan
2. Condemning further the defendant City, they continued to live together in
to play the plaintiff the sum of three defendant's apartment. However, in
thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as atty's the early days of October, 1987,
fees and two thousand (P2,000.00) defendant would tie plaintiff's hands
pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and and feet while he went to school, and
to pay the costs. he even gave her medicine at 4
o'clock in the morning that made her
sleep the whole day and night until the
3. All other claims are denied. 6

following day. As a result of this live-in

relationship, plaintiff became
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings pregnant, but defendant gave her
and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private some medicine to abort the fetus. Still
respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not plaintiff continued to live with
a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who defendant and kept reminding him of
readily submits to sexual advances, (c) petitioner, his promise to marry her until he told
through machinations, deceit and false pretenses, her that he could not do so because
promised to marry private respondent, d) because of he was already married to a girl in
his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed Bacolod City. That was the time
herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that plaintiff left defendant, went home to
deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents her parents, and thereafter consulted
— in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions a lawyer who accompanied her to the
— made some preparations for the wedding that was barangay captain in Dagupan City.
to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother,
pigs and chickens, inviting friends and relatives and and a barangay tanod sent by the
contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his barangay captain went to talk to
promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the defendant to still convince him to
petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted
Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of that he could not do so because he
morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The was already married to a girl in
trial court gave full credit to the private respondent's Bacolod City, although the truth, as
testimony because, inter alia, she would not have had stipulated by the parties at the pre-
the temerity and courage to come to court and expose trial, is that defendant is still single.
her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and
ridicule if her claim was false.
7

Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also

claimed that after defendant had
The above findings and conclusions were culled from informed them of his desire to marry
the detailed summary of the evidence for the private Marilou, he already looked for
respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by the sponsors for the wedding, started
respondent Court as follows: preparing for the reception by looking
for pigs and chickens, and even
According to plaintiff, who claimed that already invited many relatives and
she was a virgin at the time and that friends to the forthcoming wedding.  8

she never had a boyfriend before,

defendant started courting her just a Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the
few days after they first met. He later respondent Court of Appeals which docketed the case
proposed marriage to her several as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief,  he contended
9

times and she accepted his love as that the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the case
well as his proposal of marriage on for lack of factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering
August 20, 1987, on which same day him to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation
he went with her to her hometown of expenses and costs.
Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he
wanted to meet her parents and
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated
inform them of their relationship and
the challenged decision   affirming in toto the trial
10

their intention to get married. The

court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining the
photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and
trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made
their submarkings) of defendant with
the following analysis:
members of plaintiff's family or with
plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on
that occasion, defendant told plaintiffs First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years
parents and brothers and sisters that old when she met defendant who was
he intended to marry her during the already 29 years old at the time, does
semestral break in October, 1987, and not appear to be a girl of loose morals.
because plaintiff's parents thought he It is uncontradicted that she was a
virgin prior to her unfortunate woman, just like what he did to
experience with defendant and never plaintiff. It is not surprising, then, that
had boyfriend. She is, as described by he felt so little compunction or
the lower court, a barrio lass "not used remorse in pretending to love and
and accustomed to trend of modern promising to marry plaintiff, a young,
urban life", and certainly would (sic) innocent, trustful country girl, in order
not have allowed to satisfy his lust on her.  11

"herself to be deflowered by the

defendant if there was no persuasive and then concluded:
promise made by the defendant to
marry her." In fact, we agree with the In sum, we are strongly convinced and
lower court that plaintiff and defendant so hold that it was defendant-
must have been sweethearts or so the appellant's fraudulent and deceptive
plaintiff must have thought because of protestations of love for and promise
the deception of defendant, for to marry plaintiff that made her
otherwise, she would not have allowed surrender her virtue and womanhood
herself to be photographed with to him and to live with him on the
defendant in public in so (sic) loving honest and sincere belief that he
and tender poses as those depicted in would keep said promise, and it was
the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We likewise these (sic) fraud and
cannot believe, therefore, defendant's deception on appellant's part that
pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to made plaintiff's parents agree to their
him except a waitress at the daughter's living-in with him
restaurant where he usually ate. preparatory to their supposed
Defendant in fact admitted that he marriage. And as these acts of
went to plaintiff's hometown of appellant are palpably and
Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at undoubtedly against morals, good
least thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta on customs, and public policy, and are
February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, even gravely and deeply derogatory
1988), at (sic) a beach party together and insulting to our women, coming as
with the manager and employees of they do from a foreigner who has been
the Mabuhay Luncheonette on March enjoying the hospitality of our people
3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1, and taking advantage of the
1987 when he allegedly talked to opportunity to study in one of our
plaintiff's mother who told him to marry institutions of learning, defendant-
her daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.). appellant should indeed be made,
Would defendant have left Dagupan under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the
City where he was involved in the Philippines, to compensate for the
serious study of medicine to go to moral damages and injury that he had
plaintiff's hometown in Bañaga, caused plaintiff, as the lower court
Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some ordered him to do in its decision in this
kind of special relationship between case.  12

them? And this special relationship

must indeed have led to defendant's
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the
insincere proposal of marriage to
instant petition on 26 March 1991; he raises therein
plaintiff, communicated not only to her
the single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the
but also to her parents, and (sic)
Civil Code applies to the case at bar.  13

Marites Rabino, the owner of the

restaurant where plaintiff was working
and where defendant first proposed It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not
marriage to her, also knew of this love applicable because he had not committed any moral
affair and defendant's proposal of wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public
marriage to plaintiff, which she policy; he has not professed love or proposed
declared was the reason why plaintiff marriage to the private respondent; and he has never
resigned from her job at the restaurant maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for liberally
after she had accepted defendant's invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and
proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988). ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not
conversant with such Filipino customs, traditions and
culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with
Upon the other hand, appellant does
Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if
not appear to be a man of good moral
he had made a promise to marry, the subsequent
character and must think so low and
failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable
have so little respect and regard for
because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to
Filipino women that he openly
the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim
admitted that when he studied in
to take four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis
Bacolod City for several years where
thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not
he finished his B.S. Biology before he
posses good moral character. Moreover, his
came to Dagupan City to study
controversial "common law life" is now his legal wife
medicine, he had a common-law wife
as their marriage had been solemnized in civil
in Bacolod City. In other words, he
ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful
also lived with another woman in
cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner
Bacolod City but did not marry that
claims that even if responsibility could be pinned on (7) The findings of the Court of
him for the live-in relationship, the private respondent Appeals are contrary to those of the
should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit trial court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals,
arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that even 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v.
if it was to be assumed arguendo that he had Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593
professed his love to the private respondent and had [1986]); (8) When the findings of fact
also promised to marry her, such acts would not be are conclusions without citation of
actionable in view of the special circumstances of the specific evidence on which they are
case. The mere breach of promise is not actionable.  14
based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had petitioners main and reply briefs are
filed her Comment to the petition and the petitioner not disputed by the respondents
had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave due (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of
course to the petition and required the parties to the Court of Appeals is premised on
submit their respective Memoranda, which they the supposed absence of evidence
subsequently complied with. and is contradicted by the evidence on
record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of 242 [1970]).
the petitioner's arguments in support of his thesis, it is
clear that questions of fact, which boil down to the Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the
issue of the credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It existence of any of the above quoted exceptions in
is the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will this case. Consequently, the factual findings of the
not disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility trial and appellate courts must be respected.
of witnesses, the latter court having heard the
witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe And now to the legal issue.
closely their deportment and manner of testifying,
unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of The existing rule is that a breach of promise to
substance or value which, if considered, might affect marry per se is not an actionable wrong.   Congress
17

the result of the case. 15

deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil
Code the provisions that would have made it so. The
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that reason therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate
both the appellate and trial courts had overlooked any Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from which
fact of substance or values which could alter the result We quote:
of the case.
The elimination of this chapter is
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law proposed. That breach of promise to
may be raised in a petition for review marry is not actionable has been
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is definitely decided in the case of De
not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all Jesus vs. Syquia.   The history of
18

over again the evidence introduced by the parties breach of promise suits in the United
before the lower court. There are, however, States and in England has shown that
recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina no other action lends itself more
vs. Asistio, Jr.,   this Court took the time, again, to
16
readily to abuse by designing women
enumerate these exceptions: and unscrupulous men. It is this
experience which has led to the
xxx xxx xxx abolition of rights of action in the so-
called Heart Balm suits in many of the
(1) When the conclusion is a finding American states. . . .  19

grounded entirely on speculation,

surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a
Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the
When the inference made is concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by
manifestly mistaken, absurb or granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number
impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the
abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, statute books. 20

95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the

judgment is based on a As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
misapprehension of facts (Cruz v.
Sosing, But the Code Commission had gone
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the farther than the sphere of wrongs
findings of fact are conflicting (Casica defined or determined by positive law.
v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; Fully sensible that there are countless
unrep.) (6) When the Court of gaps in the statutes, which leave so
Appeals, in making its findings, went many victims of moral wrongs
beyond the issues of the case and the helpless, even though they have
same is contrary to the admissions of actually suffered material and moral
both appellate and appellee injury, the Commission has deemed it
(Evangelista v. Alto Surety and necessary, in the interest of justice, to
Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
 incorporate in the proposed Civil Code these opposite spectrums are injurious acts
the following rule: which, in the absence of Article 21, would
have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21
Art. 23. Any person fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that
who wilfully causes together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil
loss or injury to Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the
another in a manner scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has
that is contrary to become much more supple and adaptable
morals, good customs than the Anglo-American law on torts.  23

or public policy shall

compensate the latter In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article
for the damage. 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a
man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause
An example will illustrate the purview of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the representation to fulfill that promise thereafter
nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself
promise of marriage either has not unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in
been made, or can not be proved. The reality, no intention of marrying her and that the
girl becomes pregnant. Under the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive
present laws, there is no crime, as the device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to
girl is above nineteen years of age. obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the
Neither can any civil action for breach award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because
of promise of marriage be filed. of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and
Therefore, though the grievous moral deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and
wrong has been committed, and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential,
though the girl and family have however, that such injury should have been
suffered incalculable moral damage, committed in a manner contrary to morals, good
she and her parents cannot bring customs or public policy.
action for damages. But under the
proposed article, she and her parents In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was
would have such a right of action. the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to
the forgoing rule is approved, would him and to live with him on the honest and sincere
vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for belief that he would keep said promise, and it was
that untold number of moral wrongs likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part
which it is impossible for human that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's
foresight to provide for specifically in living-in with him preparatory to their supposed
the statutes. 21 marriage."   In short, the private respondent
24

surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of

Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi- every single Filipina, not because of lust but because
delict thus: of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code
Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The
petitioner could not be held liable for criminal
Whoever by act or omission causes
seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article
damage to another, there being fault
338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at
damage done. Such fault or
the time of the seduction.
negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that
governed by the provisions of this Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to
Chapter. marry where the woman is a victim of moral
seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of
Appeals,  this Court denied recovery of damages to
25

is limited to negligent acts or omissions and

the woman because:
excludes the notion of willfulness or
intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal
treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law . . . we find ourselves unable to say
concept while torts is an Anglo-American or that petitioner is morally guilty of
common law concept. Torts is much broader seduction, not only because he is
than culpa aquiliana because it includes not approximately ten (10) years younger
only negligence, but international criminal acts than the complainant — who was
as well such as assault and battery, false around thirty-six (36) years of age,
imprisonment and deceit. In the general and as highly enlightened as a former
scheme of the Philippine legal system high school teacher and a life
envisioned by the Commission responsible for insurance agent are supposed to be
drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and — when she became intimate with
malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to petitioner, then a mere apprentice
be governed by the Revised Penal Code while pilot, but, also, because the court of
negligent acts or omissions are to be covered first instance found that, complainant
by Article 2176 of the Civil Code.   In between
22 "surrendered herself" to petitioner
 because, "overwhelmed by her love" persuasion or
for him, she "wanted to bind" him by deception is the
having a fruit of their engagement essence of the injury;
even before they had the benefit of and a mere proof of
clergy. intercourse is
insufficient to warrant a
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals,   while this Court
26 recovery.
likewise hinted at possible recovery if there had been
moral seduction, recovery was eventually denied Accordingly it is not
because We were not convinced that such seduction seduction where the
existed. The following enlightening disquisition and willingness arises out
conclusion were made in the said case: of sexual desire of
curiosity of the female,
The Court of Appeals seem to have and the defendant
overlooked that the example set forth merely affords her the
in the Code Commission's needed opportunity for
memorandum refers to a tort upon a the commission of the
minor who had been seduced. The act. It has been
essential feature is seduction, that in emphasized that to
law is more than mere sexual allow a recovery in all
intercourse, or a breach of a promise such cases would tend
of marriage; it connotes essentially the to the demoralization
idea of deceit, enticement, superior of the female sex, and
power or abuse of confidence on the would be a reward for
part of the seducer to which the unchastity by which a
woman has yielded (U.S. vs. class of adventuresses
Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. would be swift to profit.
Arlante, 9 Phil. 595). (47 Am. Jur. 662)

It has been ruled in xxx xxx xxx

the Buenaventura case (supra) that —
Over and above the partisan
To constitute seduction allegations, the fact stand out that for
there must in all cases one whole year, from 1958 to 1959,
be some sufficient the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult
promise or age, maintain intimate sexual relations
inducement and the with appellant, with repeated acts of
woman must yield intercourse. Such conduct is
because of the incompatible with the idea of
promise or other seduction. Plainly there is here
inducement. If she voluntariness and mutual passion; for
consents merely from had the appellant been deceived, had
carnal lust and the she surrendered exclusively because
intercourse is from of the deceit, artful persuasions and
mutual desire, there is wiles of the defendant, she would not
no seduction (43 Cent. have again yielded to his embraces,
Dig. tit. Seduction, par. much less for one year, without
56) She must be exacting early fulfillment of the alleged
induced to depart from promises of marriage, and would have
the path of virtue by cut short all sexual relations upon
the use of some finding that defendant did not intend to
species of arts, fulfill his defendant did not intend to
persuasions and wiles, fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude
which are calculated to that no case is made under article 21
have and do have that of the Civil Code, and no other cause
effect, and which result of action being alleged, no error was
in her person to committed by the Court of First
ultimately submitting Instance in dismissing the complaint.  27

her person to the

sexual embraces of In his annotations on the Civil Code,   Associate
28

her seducer (27 Phil. Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired from
123). this Court, opined that in a breach of promise to marry
where there had been carnal knowledge, moral
And in American Jurisprudence we damages may be recovered:
find:
. . . if there be criminal or moral
On the other hand, in seduction, but not if the intercourse
an action by the was due to mutual lust. (Hermosisima
woman, the vs. Court of Appeals,
enticement, L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs.
 Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; . . . She is also interested in the
Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); petitioner as the latter will become a
Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, doctor sooner or later. Take notice
et al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In that she is a plain high school
other words, if the CAUSE be the graduate and a mere employee . . .
promise to marry, and the EFFECT be (Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN, p. 51,
the carnal knowledge, there is a January 25, 1988) in a luncheonette
chance that there was criminal or and without doubt, is in need of a man
moral seduction, hence recovery of who can give her economic security.
moral damages will prosper. If it be Her family is in dire need of financial
the other way around, there can be no assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18,
recovery of moral damages, because 1988). And this predicament prompted
here mutual lust has intervened). . . . her to accept a proposition that may
have been offered by the petitioner.  34

together with "ACTUAL damages, should

there be any, such as the expenses for the These statements reveal the true character and
wedding presentations (See Domalagon v. motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a
Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471). condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private
respondent on account of the latter's ignoble birth,
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino   is also of the same
29 inferior educational background, poverty and, as
persuasion: perceived by him, dishonorable employment.
Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not
It is submitted that the rule in Batarra at all moved by good faith and an honest motive.
vs. Marcos,   still subsists,
30 Marrying with a woman so circumstances could not
notwithstanding the incorporation of have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his
the present article  in the Code. The
31 profession of love and promise to marry were empty
example given by the Code words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile
Commission is correct, if there and deceive the poor woman into believing that
was seduction, not necessarily in the indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his
legal sense, but in the vulgar sense of life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he
deception. But when the sexual act is wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed
accomplished without any deceit or that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of
qualifying circumstance of abuse of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease
authority or influence, but the woman, and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's
already of age, has knowingly given concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional
herself to a man, it cannot be said that respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be
there is an injury which can be the said that the petitioner committed such deplorable
basis for indemnity. acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code
which directs every person to act with justice, give
everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith
But so long as there is fraud, which is
in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
characterized by willfulness (sic), the
his obligations.
action lies. The court, however, must
weigh the degree of fraud, if it is
sufficient to deceive the woman under No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of
the circumstances, because an act our laws, customs and traditions.
which would deceive a girl sixteen
years of age may not constitute deceit The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for
as to an experienced woman thirty while indeed, the private respondent may not have
years of age. But so long as there is a been impelled by the purest of intentions, she
wrongful act and a resulting injury, eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual
there should be civil liability, even if congress not out of lust, but because of moral
the act is not punishable under the seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms
criminal law and there should have of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as
been an acquittal or dismissal of the she found out that the petitioner was not going to
criminal case for that reason. marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore,
in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in
alternative proposition to the effect that granting, for guilt or in legal fault."   At most, it could be conceded
35

argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the that she is merely in delicto.
private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at
fault. According to him, both parties are in pari delicto; Equity often interferes for the relief of
hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code the less guilty of the parties, where his
and the doctrine laid down in Batarra transgression has been brought about
vs. Marcos,   the private respondent cannot recover
32 by the imposition of undue influence of
damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as the party on whom the burden of the
far as stating that if the private respondent had original wrong principally rests, or
"sustained any injury or damage in their relationship, it where his consent to the transaction
is primarily because of her own doing,   for:
33 was itself procured by
fraud. 36
In Mangayao vs. Lasud,   We declared:
37
14 In support thereof, he cites Despi
vs. Aliosco, [CA] 64 O.G.; Wassmer
Appellants likewise stress that both vs. Velez, 12 SCRA 648 [1964];
parties being at fault, there should be Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
no action by one against the other 109 Phil. 629 [1960]; and Estopa vs.
(Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule, Piansay, 109 Phil. 640 [1960].
however, has been interpreted as
applicable only where the fault on both 15 People vs. Garcia, 89 SCRA 440
sides is, more or less, equivalent. It [1979]; People vs. Bautista, 92 SCRA
does not apply where one party is 465 [1979]; People vs. Abejuela, 92
literate or intelligent and the other one SCRA 503 [1979]; People vs. Arciaga,
is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 98 SCRA 1 [1980]; People vs.
Phil. 209). Marzan, 128 SCRA 203 [1984];
People vs. Alcid, 135 SCRA 280
We should stress, however, that while We find for the [1985]; People vs. Sanchez, 199
private respondent, let it not be said that this Court SCRA 414 [1991]; and People vs.
condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in Atilano, 204 SCRA 278 [1991].
letting her and the petitioner stay together in the same
room in their house after giving approval to their 16 191 SCRA 218 [1990], footnote
marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect omitted; see also, Remalante vs. Tibe,
the honor of their daughters and infuse upon them the 158 SCRA 138 [1988].
higher values of morality and dignity.
17 Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the 109 Phil. 629 [1960]; Estopa vs.
challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby Piansay, 109 Phil. 640 [1960].
DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.
18 58 Phil. 866 [1933].
SO ORDERED.
19 Congressional Record, vol. IV, No.
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur. 79, Thursday, 14 May 1949, 2352.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave. 20 Philippine National Bank vs. Court

of Appeals, 83 SCRA 237 [1978].
 
21 Report of the Code Commission,
# Footnotes 39-40. This passage is quoted, except
for the last paragraph, in Tanjanco vs.
1 Annex "G" of Petition; Rollo, 53-62. Court of Appeals, 18 SCRA 994, 996-
Per Associate Justice Alicia V. 997 [1966]; the Article 23 referred to is
Sempio-Diy, concurred in by now Article 21.
Associate Justices Jose C. Campos,
Jr. and Jaime M. Lantin. 22 Report of the Code Commission,
161-162.
2 Annex "A" of Petition; Rollo, 20-22.
23 TOLENTINO, A.M., Commentaries
3 Annex "B" of Petition; Rollo, 23-24. and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code
of the Philippines, vol. 1, 1985 ed., 72.
4 Annex "C", Id.; Id., 25.
24. Rollo, 61.
5 Annex "D" of Petition; Rollo, 26-33.
Per Judge Antonio M. Belen. 25. Supra.

6 Id., 33. 26. Supra.

7 Rollo, 31-33. 27 At pages 997-999.

8 Rollo, 54-55. 28 Civil Code of the Philippines

Annotated, vol. I, Eleventh ed., (1984),
91-92.
9 Exhibit "E" of Petition; Rollo, 34-50.
29 Commentaries and Jurisprudence
10 Annex "G", Id.; Id.; 53-62.
on the Civil Code of the Philippines,
vol. 1, 1985 ed., 76-77, omitting
11 Rollo, 58-59. footnotes.

12 Rollo, 61. 30 7 Phil. 156 [1906].

13 Id., 11. 31 Article 21.

32 Supra.

33 Rollo, 16.

34 Id., 16-17.

35 Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth ed.,

1004.

36 37 Am Jur 2d, 401, omitting

citations.

37 11 SCRA 158 [1964]; see also,

Liguez vs. Court of Appeals 102 Phil.
577 [1975].