HAZOP Study 01-TAA-AQA-110012-00 AB 2/10

REVISION RECORD

REV DATE SECTION/CLAUSE PAGE DESCRIPTION

AA 21/03/2013 All All First issuance

AB 07/07/2013 All All Adaptation

HAZOP Study 01-TAA-AQA-110012-00 AB 3/10

Table of Contents

1. Purpose .......................................................................................................... 4

2. Applicable scope ............................................................................................ 4

3. Referenced procedures and documents ........................................................ 4

4. Definition ........................................................................................................ 4

4.1 Definition of hazard and operability .............................................................. 5

4.2 Human Factors ............................................................................................. 5

4.3 External Events ............................................................................................ 5

4.4 Mechanical Integrity ..................................................................................... 7

5. Drafting and Execution Department ............................................................... 7

6. Responsibilities .............................................................................................. 7

6.1 Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) Team Leader............................................. 7

6.2 Engineering Experts ..................................................................................... 7

7. Provision......................................................................................................... 8

7.1 HAZOP method statement ........................................................................... 8

7.2. Deviations Studied ...................................................................................... 9

7.3 Risk Ranking .............................................................................................. 10

8. Records ........................................................................................................ 10

9. Attachment ................................................................................................... 10
HAZOP Study 01-TAA-AQA-110012-00 AB 4/10

1. Purpose

HAZOP study is according to scientific procedures and methods, to identify in advance,

analyze and evaluate the potential danger in the project or production facility from the
point of system. To identify the design and operation and maintenance procedures of
production facility, so that to improve device process safety and operability by putting
forward some improvement opinions and suggestions, which will provide basis of
decision for setting up basic disaster prevention measures and providing the emergency
plan .

- Identify events, which potentially have a significant impact on the safety of

personnel and operations. These concerns include effects on surrounding
populations as well as on operating personnel and equipment damage.

- Identify some issues, but not all, in non-safety-related areas such as operability,
environmental, reliability, and other possible sources relating to loss of production.

- Assess the risk level associated with each safety hazard.

- Suggest changes or further study to overcome the potential unsafe deviations with
unacceptable risks.

- Record the causes, risk level, and potential consequences of the safety hazards.

2. Applicable scope

The team will use the HAZOP guideword method in conjunction with key process
parameters. In addition, some general issues will be addressed as a separate
GENERAL node with the team and documented as a separate node in the session
worksheets.

The HAZOP Study will include:

 A human factors analysis of working conditions that may impact the performance of
operating personnel and potentially produce accident event or upset condition
sequences

 Applicable External Events and Startup and shutdown operating modes

3. Referenced procedures and documents

None

4. Definition

The HAZOP Concept:

HAZOP Study 01-TAA-AQA-110012-00 AB 5/10

The HAZOP process is based on the principle that a team conducts hazard analysis
which will identify more problems than individuals working separately to get combined
results.

The HAZOP team is made up of individuals with varying backgrounds and expertise.

The expertise are brought together during HAZOP sessions and through a collective
brainstorming effort that stimulates creativity and new ideas, a thorough review of the
process under consideration is made. Definition of hazard and operability is given
below:

4.1 Definition of hazard and operability

4.1.1 Hazard - any operation that could possibly cause a catastrophic release of toxic,
flammable or explosive chemicals or any action that could result in injury to personnel.

4.1.2 Operability - any operation inside the design envelope that would cause a
shutdown that could possibly lead to a violation of environmental, health or safety
regulations or negatively impact profitability.

4.2 Human Factors

Human factors will be addressed by having the HAZOP Team consider the following
areas in the analysis of each node:

4.2.1 The human/facility interface – Examples include the accessibility of emergency

shutdown equipment, proximity of such equipment to potential release points, and
potential for incorrect lineups as a result of human error that could lead to a catastrophic
release

4.2.2 The human/instrument interface – Examples include clarity and distinctiveness of

emergency alarms, as opposed to routine process indicators.

4.3 External Events

External events, such as earthquakes, volcanos, and other natural disasters, airplane
crashes, and sabotage are generally considered as causes for the process deviations
they could produce.

Specific effects of equipment damage and release from typical causes of external
impact (e.g., vehicle collision, crane failure) will also be considered. Thus, a “qualitative”
approach for the evaluation of external events will be used for this Process Hazard
Analysis:

 Treat external events as an additional type of hazard

HAZOP Study 01-TAA-AQA-110012-00 AB 6/10

 Identify potential/credible events

 Focus on special dependencies and "common cause" failures

 Identify any potentially significant vulnerability

 Identify recommendations for operations, design, or necessary additional

information

Below is a partial list of external events (CCPS - Guidelines for Chemical Process
Quantitative Risk Analysis, 1989) that will be considered by the Process Hazard
Analysis Team. The Team will only discuss in detail the events that were deemed as
credible.

Partial List of External Events:

• Aircraft Impact • Nearby Industry. Accident (e.g., pipeline)

• Avalanche • Precipitation (extremely high levels)

• Barometric Pressure • Release of Chemicals from Onsite Storage

• Coastal Erosion

• Crane/Forklift Impact • River Diversion

• Drought • Sabotage

• External Flooding • Sandstorm

• Extreme Winds or Tornadoes • Seismic Activity

• Fire & Explosion • Shipwreck

• Fog • Snow

• Forest Fire / Brush Fire • Soil Shrink-Swell or Consolidation

• Frost • Storm Surge

• Hail • Terrorist Attack

• High Tide, High Lake Level, • Transportation Accidents

or High River Stage •Tsunami

• High Summer Temperature •Toxic Gas

• Hurricane • Turbine Generated Missiles

HAZOP Study 01-TAA-AQA-110012-00 AB 7/10

• Ice Cover • Vehicular Impact

• Industrial or Military Facility Accident • Volcanic Activity

• Internal Flooding • War

• Landslide • Waves

4.4 Mechanical Integrity

General mechanical integrity issues will be addressed by the Team during the course of
the HAZOP study as each node was analyzed

5. Drafting and Execution Department

Drafting: Engineering dept. is responsible for the drafting of this procedure.

Execution: All the subcontractors.

6. Responsibilities

6.1 Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) Team Leader

The PHA team leader works with the PHA coordinator in defining the scope of the
analysis and selection of team members, directs the team members in gathering of
process safety information prior to the start of the study, plans the study with the PHA
coordinator and schedule team meetings, leads the team in the analysis of the selected
process keeping team members focused on discovering hazards associated with the
process and directs the team scribe in recording the results of the team’s findings,
ensures that the analysis thoroughly covers the process as it is defined at the start of
the hazard analysis and ensures that the study is completed in the time allotted during
the planning stage, writes a report detailing the study findings and recommendations the
group makes and report the findings and recommendations to management, fields any
follow-up inquiries by project implementation regarding the study recommendations.

6.2 Engineering Experts

The engineering experts assigned to the process hazard analysis may include some or
all of the following: a project engineer, a machinery engineer, an instrument engineer,
an electrical engineer, a mechanical engineer, a safety engineer, a quality assurance
engineer, maintenance engineer or technician and a corrosion/materials engineer.
These individuals will be responsible for providing expertise in their respective discipline
as it applies to the hazard analysis of the process being studied. These individuals are
responsible for attending the initial hazard analysis kick-off meeting. They are also
HAZOP Study 01-TAA-AQA-110012-00 AB 8/10

required to be available to the team as required with the understanding that the team
leader will give adequate advance notice when their expertise is required. They are
required to provide documentation of any existing safeguards and procedures.

7. Provision

7.1 HAZOP method statement

The HAZOP Guideword method, used in conjunction with key process parameters (to
define deviations from design or operations), prompts the Team to identify possible
causes and potential consequences of deviations from anticipated design and operation
configurations. For example, adding the guideword “NO” to the parameter “FLOW” to
get the deviation "NO FLOW" would prompt the leader to ask the Team, "What causes
could result in no flow in this node or line segment?" The potential hazard scenarios that
include possible "Causes" and potential "Consequences" are documented in the report
worksheets projected for the Team. The possible "Safeguards" in place to reduce the
risk associated with the specific cause/consequence scenario are then discussed and
documented. For scenarios involving significant potential risk, “Recommendations" are
documented if the Team believes they may further reduce risk or improve operability.

By design, the guideword approach often results in redundancies, because many

possible "Cause/Consequence" scenarios can be identified from an evaluation of two or
more deviations. As an example, a valve failing open might cause “MORE FLOW” in a
line segment within the portion of the system being studied. Later in the study, as the
Team moves on to “HIGH PRESSURE,” they may determine that the same valve failing
open would be a cause for “HIGH PRESSURE.” Thus, the valve failing open is a cause
of both deviations.

The specific steps of the HAZOP methodology are identified in the following flow chart:
HAZOP Study 01-TAA-AQA-110012-00 AB 9/10

Select a Study Node

Explain design intention

of the Study Node Repeat for all Study Nodes

Select a process parameter

Repeat for all process parameters

and protection

Apply guide word to process

parameter to develop meaningful Repeat for all guide words
deviation

Identify credible causes of Develop recommended action

deviation

Assess acceptability of risk based

Examine consequences
on consequences, causes,
associated with deviation
(assuming all protection fails)

Identify existing safeguards to

prevent deviation or mitigate
consequences

7.2. Deviations Studied

The systematic approach of a HAZOP Study requires that deviations (combinations of

guide words and parameters) be uniformly applied to all nodes. As appropriate, the
following standard deviations will be applied to each study node where the HAZOP
Study technique is applied:
HAZOP Study 01-TAA-AQA-110012-00 AB 10/10

Table 1: List of Guidewords

Design/ Guide Words

Operations
Misdirecte
Parameters No/Low More/High Reverse
d
Misdirecte
No/Low Reverse
Flow More Flow d
Flow Flow
Flow
Lower Higher
Temperature Temperatur Temperatur
e e
Lower Higher
Pressure
Pressure Pressure
No/Lower Higher
Level
Level Level
Composition, Maintenance, Start-up/Shutdown, Heat Tracing, Piping
Other/ Specifications, Phase, Viscosity, Density, Reaction, Corrosion,
General Erosion/Fatigue, Sampling, Service Loss, Duration, Sequence, Human
Factors, Safety/Health, Instrumentation, Agitation, Speed

The HAZOP technique will be used to analyze, node-by-node, the specific process
equipment/components.

7.3 Risk Ranking

The HAZOP Study Team will use the risk-ranking matrix presented in this section to
qualitatively assess the risk associated with cause/consequence scenarios. After the
consequences and safeguards are developed, the scenario will be evaluated based on
how serious the potential consequences are (severity), and how probable it is that the
scenario would fully develop to those consequences (likelihood), taking into account the
safeguards within the design. The severity ranking (A-E) and likelihood ranking (1-5) are
combined using the risk-ranking matrix to provide a qualitative risk-ranking. Each
developed cause/consequence scenario is ranked with a SLR value, S representing
severity, L representing likelihood (probability), and R representing risk.

8. Records

N/A

9. Attachment
HAZOP Study 01-TAA-AQA-110012-00 AB 11/10

Attachment 1: MOM- Responsibilities for Recommendations

Attachment 2: RasAlKhair-2012-HAZOP-Risk Ranking Matrix

Attachment 1 MOM Responibilities for Recommendations
Attachment 2 RasAlKhair.2012.HAZOP.RiskRankingMatrix

Ras Al-Khair
Power and Desalination Plant – Phase 1

RISK RANKING MATRIX EXAMPLE REV. 0

Facilitation and Scribe Support from:

RMP Risk Management Professionals, Inc.

Irvine, CA 92618 – Tel: 949/282-0123 – FAX: 949/743-2932 – E-mail: [email protected]
 RISK RANKING MATRIX
CONSEQUENCE SCALE
Injury requiring 
Injury requiring  Permanent disabling 
Health &  Minor Injury ‐First Aid  medical treatment, 
medical treatment  injury and/or long  Fatality
Safety Treatment time off work and 
with no lost time  term time off work
rehabilitation
Destruction of 
Negligible impact on  Long term impact of 
Impact on fauna/flora  Short term impact on  sensitive 
fauna/flora, habitat,  regional significance 
and/or habitat but no  sensitive  environmental 
aquatic ecosystem or  on sensitive 
Natural  negative effects on  environmental  features. Severe 
water resources.  environmental 
Environment ecosystem. Requires  features. Triggers  impact on ecosystem. 
Incident reporting  features. Likely to 
immediate regulator  regulatory  Regulatory & high 
according to routine  result in regulatory 
notification. investigation. level government 
protocols. intervention/action.
intervention/action.
Asset loss or process  Asset loss or process  Asset loss or process  Asset loss or process  Asset loss or process 
Financial/Asset downtime amounting  downtime amounting  downtime amounting  downtime amounting  downtime amounting 
to <$5 million to >$5 million to >$20 million to >$50 million to >$100 million
LIKELIHOOD SCALE 
 Risk Ranking Legend 
1  This level of risk exposes the Company to losses of People, Assets, Environment, and/or Reputation. 
High Risk  2  The hazard should be eliminated or its risk reduced to tolerable levels immediately. Short term, 
3  interim risk reduction is required. 
 The hazard must be managed to reduce the frequency and/or the severity of the hazardous event. 
4 
Medium  Long term risk reduction is required. 
Risk  Risk is acceptable provided the mitigating safeguards in place are confirmed for existence and 
5 
applicability. 
6 
Low Risk  7  Risk is managed, and acceptable without further action. 
8