The hope as well as the ultimate desire of human beings, wherever they find themselves particularly in

their home country, is to enjoy certain level of good and quality life. As a result, all nations aspire to
achieve or attain the goals of rapid economic transformation and sustainable development that would
ensure that their citizens enjoy better conditions of living in their various communities. The so called
developed nations, by most indicators, are closer to some of the goals of economic transformation and
sustainable development. Better conditions of living for citizens, has been achieved in the developed
nations of the world.

However, in recent time, literatures have continue to stress that governance, broadly defined by Daron,
Simeon, James and Yunyong, (2003), as the traditions and institutions that determine how authority is
exercised in a country, matters to economic development. That is, experts have increasingly recognized
that the issue of good governance has become an important concept in the international development
debate and policy discourse. How important is good governance for economic growth and sustainable
development? Can economic growth be sustained without good governance?

The Concept of Governance

Governance generally, implies the process by which decision making and the process by which decisions
are implemented or not implemented. Governance is the manner in which power is exercised in the
management of a country's economic and social resources for development. It is essentially a political
process whereby decision and policies are taken for the benefit of the citizenry. According to UNESCAP
(2009), governance is the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are
implemented (or not implemented). It is a concept that is applicable to corporate, international,
national, local governance or to the interactions between other sectors of society.

In short, governance refers to tradition and institution that determine how authority is excised in a
particular country. This includes: 1) The process by which government are selected, held accountable,
monitored and replaced; 2) The capacity of government to manage resources efficiently and formulate
implement and enforce sound policies and regulations; and 3) The respect of citizens and the state for
the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them (Kaufmann, et al. 2000).

Viewed in this context, governance could be good or bad depending on the manner and method of
governing. Essentially, good governance is a model or methodology of comparing ineffective economies
or political bodies with viable ones. Governance refers to structure and process for decision-making and
accountability and the International Institute for Sustainable Development has long had an interest in
governance as it relates to the achievement of sustainable development.

Good governance describes how public institutions conduct public affairs and manage public resources.
The UNDP (2002) defines good governance as striving for rule of law, transparency, equity,
effectiveness/efficiency, accountability, and strategic vision in the exercise of political, economic, and
administrative authority. Simply put, it is the process whereby public institutions conduct public affairs,
manage public resources and guarantee the realization of human rights. Good governance accomplishes
this in a manner essentially free of abuse and corruption, and with due regard for the rule of law. Good
governance is the exercise of power or authority, political, economic, administrative or otherwise to
manage a country's processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their
interests, excise their legal rights and harmonizes their differences.

Governance as pointed out by the UN Human Development Report (2004) has two faces. The first is the
leadership which has responsibilities derived from the principles of effective governmental organizations.
The second is the governed, that is, the citizens who are responsible for making relevant inputs to the
socio-economic and political affairs of their society. Simply put, governance is a relationship between
rulers and the ruled, the state and society, the governors and the governed.

Good governance is about leadership and people-focused political institutions, working with the people
to empower them to reach the highest points of their productive and creative abilities. Good governance
is about democratizing politics and economic opportunities, and opening sustainable option and
possibilities for peace, harmony, unity, collective work, and collective progress.

Although good governance implies many different things in many different contexts depending on the
organization in focus, it could be said to have several general characteristics. Good governance
according to UNESCAP (2009) has eight major characteristics. The first is participatory by both men and
women which is key to good governance. The second is the rule of law which requires fair legal
framework that are enforced impartially. It also requires full protection of human rights, particularly
those of minorities. Impartial enforcement of laws requires an independent judiciary as well as
incorruptible police force. The third characteristic is transparency which means that decisions taken and
their enforcement are done in a manner that follows rules and regulations. The fourth is responsiveness
which means that good governance requires that institutions and processes try to serve all stakeholders
within a reasonable timeframe.

The fifth characteristic of good governance is consensus orientation. Good governance requires
mediation of the different interests in the society to reach a broad consensus in society on what is in the
best interest of the whole community and how this can be achieved. It also requires a broad and long-
term perspective on what is needed for sustainable human development and how to achieve the goals of
such development. The sixth characteristic is equity and inclusiveness. A society's well being depends on
ensuring that all its member feel that they have a stake in it and do not feel excluded from the
mainstream of society. This requires that all groups, particularly the most vulnerable, have opportunities
to improve or maintain their well being.

The seventh is effectiveness and efficiency. Good governance means that processes and institutions
produce results that meet the needs of the society while making the best of use of resources at their
disposal. The concept of efficiency in the context of good governance also covers the sustainable use of
natural resources and the protection of the environment. The last characteristic of good governance is
accountability. This is a key requirement of good governance, not only of governmental institutions but
also the private sector as well as civil society organizations.
Sustainable Development

Sustainable development involves meeting the needs of people today, without compromising those of
future generations (Todaro and Smith, 2009). This requires governance to rise to new levels of
effectiveness and develop new capacities for integrated policy-making around a clear vision for
sustainable development. Nigeria has the capacity to design pathways to a future grounded in equitable
and sustainable development, which meets the needs of current generations without compromising
those of the future.

Sustainable development must be about enabling countries to accelerate and sustain that progress. It
must be about establishing a trajectory of human development which allows all people to exercise their
choices and meet their aspirations, both in this generation and those to come. It must also be about
enabling the benefits of development to spread to those left behind in the progress made to date. Good
governance which drives the achievement of development results must also now rise to the challenge of
achieving the equitable and sustainable development which will secure our common future.

Economic and human development progress cannot be sustained if the ecosystems on which they
depend are irreparably damaged, and if gross inequity leaves our societies unstable and lacking
cohesion. Effective governance is a prerequisite for putting in place the integrated policymaking capacity
which is needed to drive sustainable development. A sustainable development response to the complex
and interlinked challenges countries face today demands policymaking which views economic growth,
poverty reduction, social development, equity, and sustainability not as competing goals to be traded off
against each other, but as interconnected objectives which are most effectively pursued together.

The Interface between Good Governance and Sustainable Development

Good Governance and rapid economic transformation are separate conceptual entities and yet in
practice often interact with each other. An old doctrine in the development process as noted by Stiglitz
(2000) sees it purely as transformation of the society. A new form of thinking on development and
development transformation does not talk only about a move from the old ways of thinking, and of
social and economic organization to new ones, but a change in the way people think and the way
societies function. That is, a change in norms, expectation and institutions.

Good governance is an essential precondition for rapid economic transformation. Various countries that
are quite similar in terms of their natural resources and social structure have shown strictly different
performance in improving the welfare of their people. Much of this is attributable to standards of
governance which stifles and impedes development. A nation where there is corruption, poor control of
public funds, lack of accountability, indiscipline, among other vices, there can never experienced any
meaningful economic transformation.

It is good governance that can makes rapid economic transformation possible. It is governance that
provokes and defines the nature of developments. In effect, when there is governance failure, the
policies and programs put together to drive development would remain what they are only on paper.
Africa is replete with fantastic developmental policies put together by the best brains, but they have not
translated into economic development due to bad governance. There are extensive econometric studies
that show strong correlation between long-term economic performance and good governance.

In other words, the quality of governance fundamentally determines long-run developmental outcomes.
The World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project (developed by Kaufmann, Kraay and
Mastuzzi) reports aggregate and individual governance indicators for 215 economies over the period
1996 – 2011, for six dimensions of governance – Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence
of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption. The
authors, as reported by Daron, et al. (2003), conclude that good governance is not only critical to
development but also that it is the most important factor in determining whether a country has the
capacity to use resources effectively to promote growth and reduce poverty.

In a related development, Fayissa and Nsiah (2013) studied the impact of governance on economic
growth in Africa. Using fixed and random effects models, they found out that good governance or the
lack, contributes to the differences in growth of African countries. Furthermore, these results indicated
that without the establishment and maintenance of good governance, achieving the goals of NEPAD
eradicating poverty, promoting sustainable growth and development, integrating Africa into the world's
economy, and accelerating the empowerment of women-will be hampered in Africa.

As noted by Fayissa and Nsiah (2013), sub-Saharan African countries have had a mixed governance
record in comparison to other regions of the world as a result of being bogged down with manifestations
of bad governance like political instability, government ineffectiveness, the lack of rule of law, and
serious problems of corruption. The above traits are also inherent in Nigeria. Hence, there is a clarion on
the Nigerian government to tackle the problem of corruption, inefficiency and ineffectiveness in
governance, political and party rancour, and enthrone the rule of law.

The crucial role of good governance in development has been the focus of the New Partnership for
Africa's Development (NEPAD), which is a program of the African Union. NEPAD seeks to attract
increased investment, capital flows and funding, providing an African-owned framework for
development as the foundation for partnership at regional and international levels with its secretariat in
Midrand, South Africa. The eight priority areas of NEPAD are political, economic and corporate
governance, agriculture, infrastructure, education, health, science and technology, market access and
tourism and environment.

Economic and human development progress cannot be sustained if the ecosystems on which they
depend are irreparably damaged, and if gross inequity leaves our societies unstable and lacking
cohesion. Just as the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro set a new direction for our world twenty years ago,
so now, current development models should be re-examined to see what works, why, and where we can
and must do better.

First, active governance, which anticipates and responds to the needs of its citizen and evolving
development challenges, with deliberate, targeted, and pro-active planning and delivery, is essential to
getting the business of development done.
Second, effective governance is a prerequisite for putting in place the integrated policymaking capacity
which is needed to drive sustainable development. A sustainable development response to the complex
and interlinked challenges countries face today demands policymaking which views economic growth,
poverty reduction, social development, equity, and sustainability not as competing goals to be traded off
against each other, but as interconnected objectives which are most effectively pursued together.

The important realization is that in pursuing one objective, we can either advance, slow, or stall progress
in another. Reducing environmental degradation, for example, can create jobs, and help alleviate
poverty. The converse also applies: a degraded environment can undermine the long term economic and
social health of a country. To get the wide range of policies moving in the same direction, governments
must be able to understand and harness the connections between them. Policy makers and their advisors
need to be able to weigh the evidence and identify the 'triple-win' solutions which can bring economic,
environmental, and social benefits.

Policy and regulatory frameworks must also be designed to attract and use finance and new
technologies in ways which generate sustainability and meet the needs of citizens, including the poorest
and most vulnerable. Third, fair governance matters for sustainable development because it holds the
key to building stable and secure societies and to driving inclusive growth within the finite boundaries of
our planet over the long term. Fair, reliable, and accountable governing institutions build trust between
people and government. Such institutions need to be free of corruption. Meaningful engagement and
participation of citizens in shaping decisions which impact on them is also important, as is the existence
of independent institutions which can hold government to account.

Through its democratic governance work, UNDP is supporting over one hundred countries to strengthen
the institutions and processes needed to build trust, improve responsiveness, and advance development.
Through our experience of this work, we have learned that there can be no uniform approach to it. Our
efforts are tailored to individual countries' contexts and respond to their requests, for example, to help
strengthen electoral, legislative, justice and anti-corruption systems, and enhance public administration
and service delivery, including to reach those most in need. Meeting the needs of people today, without
compromising those of future generations, requires governance to rise to new levels of effectiveness and
develop new capacities for integrated policy-making around a clear vision for sustainable development.

East Asia's dynamic economic performance has benefited hundreds of millions of people, but, as
elsewhere in the world, that growth model has also led to environmental degradation, and it has
exposed inequalities within nations, as some have clearly benefited far more than others. There are
dimensions to the sustainability challenge where regional frameworks for co-operation and integration
are useful, enabling exchange of best practices and innovation, and fostering a sense of shared
responsibility for trans-border issues.

As a founding member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Singapore has always
given strong commitment to regional integration and to South-South co-operation across the grouping.
The ASEAN Plan of Action for Energy Co-operation (APAEC) 2010-2015 is an example of how a regional
framework can lead the way, by providing targets for energy security and sustainability, and promoting
shared responsibility for the region's development. UNDP has proposed, as an option, the creation of a
Sustainable Development Council. Such a Council could be equipped with a universal periodic review
mechanism, through which countries would review each other's performance, on a voluntary basis,
across the three dimensions of sustainable development. The review could be tailored to the specific
circumstances and challenges of each particular country, and might also include an assessment of the
international support being provided by the UN and the International Financial Institutions.

Decentralization and Good Governance

Decentralization is sometimes regarded as an alternative to centralization, yet, when viewed from the
policy angle, decentralization is a complement and not an alternative to centralization. Both local and
central elements are needed in every political system. Sometimes decentralization is considered as falling
exclusively within public sector reform, yet it is much more than public sector, civil service, or
administrative reform. It involves the relationship of all societal actors, whether 50 governmental,
private sector, or civil society. The concept of “governance” has been applied to the processes through
which public decisions are made (Ronald & Henry, 2000).

Landell-Mills & Serageldin (1991) have defined governance as the use of political authority and exercise
of control over a society and the management of resources for social and economic development. This
definition emphasizes the political nature and the management aspect of governance. However, it does
not define the nature of the relationship between the authorities (the governors) and the public (the
governed). Charlick (1992) looked at governance as the effective management of public affairs through
the generation of a regime (set of rules) accepted as legitimate, for the purpose of promoting and
enhancing societal values sought by individuals and groups.

The fundamental principles of good governance include respect for the rule of law and human rights,
political openness, participation and inclusiveness, equality and non-discrimination, effective and
efficient processes and institutions, transparency, and accountability. According to Ronald & Henry
(2000), decentralization offers a key element of the enabling environment for good governance through
which responsibilities are transferred from the central government to the local level, where citizens can
more readily participate in decisions that affect them. Decentralization offers partnerships between local
government institutions, civil society organizations and the private sector for attainment of good
governance.

Institutional decentralization

Institutional decentralization refers to the administrative bodies, systems, and mechanisms, both sub-
national and intergovernmental, which help to manage and support decentralization. It includes
mechanisms that link formal government bodies to other key local actors-traditional, local decision-
making structures (where they exist), non-governmental organizations, private sector partners (Olaa,
Martin, 2003): this is the basic institutional foundation on which decentralization is built. Interaction
among government levels must be structured to balance national imperatives with local priorities,
creating incentives for appropriate behavior and good performance by relevant actors at all levels
(Devas, 2004).
According to the decentralization Secretariat (1996), sub-national government staff must have access to
organizational structures and procedures that allow them to meet their obligations, including the
development of a good working relationship with elected representative councils and adequate
responsiveness to citizens. The general implication by the literature reviewed is that the institutional
frameworks in which decentralization must be designed and implemented are complex and poorly
coordinated. According to Schneider (1999), decentralization and good governance thrives on
institutional arrangements and implementation, so it is essential to avoid inefficiencies in the
institutional arrangements. It must be part of an integrated development policy reflecting locally owned
models and the country's commitment.

At a minimum, most developing countries have a central agency with local government oversight
responsibilities, such as a Ministry of Local Government, a Ministry of Home Affairs, and a Ministry of the
Interior (Devas, 2004). Often various sectoral ministries also have some say over local government
provision of services that fall under their general responsibilities and expertise. According to Siato (2009),
even in countries where local government councils are at least partially elected, they may not possess
genuine political or bureaucratic independence, and they may be dominated by clientelistic local elites, in
which case, local accountability means little if the center can override the results of local democratic
processes, which is frequently the case in African countries.

Even at local levels, according to Ronald & Henry (2000), participatory approaches often meet
considerable resistance in most developing countries. Local managers complain that NGOs do not have
the capacity to engage in partnerships, or that citizens' lack the technical awareness to debate service
options. Conversely, citizens and NGOs complain that local governments are too bureaucratic, are
arrogant, and do not want to share power. Mutual mistrust is the standard. Without appropriately
designed and implemented structures and processes, as well as adequate sub-national capacity to
manage the political and fiscal functions of sub-national governments, it becomes difficult to discern
whether it is decentralization-the concept that fails good governance, or the inherent institutional lapses
within the design/implementation.

One key ingredient of decentralisation, the transfer of more political and administrative power to local
leaders may also provide an avenue for abuse. This feature opens the system to corruption, especially in
awarding lucrative service contracts to friends, family, relatives, clan chiefs and to those who pay
kickbacks. This can lead to the poor, women, disabled, the less politically favoured and other minorities
being marginalised unless measures are explicitly put in place to deter it. In Uganda, the constitution and
Local Government Act (1997) require the representation of special interest groups like women, youth and
disabled on local councils. However evidence on the status of accountability and corruption in Uganda‘s
decentralised structures remains mixed and inconclusive. On a rather positive note, a report by
Kullenberg and Porter (1998) whilst recognising that institutions and legal frameworks to promote
accountability are not strong, argues that the budgeting and expenditure process has become more
transparent. The report concludes by observing that ―whereas malfeasuce and corruption went
undetected at the central level, increased transparency in local government has greatly improved the
capacity to expose these practices and initiate corrective action.‖ Flanay and Watt (1999) and others,
highlight the contribution of the press in Uganda in exposing corruption. However, most of the literature
by far points to rampant corruption in Uganda‘s decentralised system. May and Baker (2001) observe
that despite pressures on local politicians and staff at both district and sub-county level, corrupt
behaviour still occurs. The authors further observed that generally financial management, procurement
systems and audit systems were weak and that decentralisation had exacerbated this owing to a chronic
shortage of qualified accountants at all levels of government.

Another documented observation pertains to weak internal audit systems that open up the way for
corruption such as with tender boards. They conclude with a disturbing observation that ―corruption
itself has been devolved, creating opportunities for the enrichment of local elites‖ (ibid). Flanay and Watt
(1999) also hint on what they called decentralisation of corruption. The problem with elite capture is best
summarized by Olowu (1990) who notes that ―in many instances, it is local elites rather than the most
vulnerable that capture decentralised power.‖ Naidoo (2002) in a comparative analysis of
decentralization of education in several sub-Saharan African countries including Uganda concluded that
initial indications are that decentralization creates intermediate levels of power which are accountable
not to the grassroots they are supposed

Governance in Uganda

Development thinking is in paradigmatic transition. The previously hegemonic

framing of development as ‘poverty reduction through good governance’ and of
NGOs as agents of democratization is now in question. Within this vision NGOs
were credited with fostering a pluralist civil society, representing the poor in
poverty reduction policy-making processes, and providing services in support of
more inclusive social and economic development. Cautious optimists argue that
the good governance agenda has resulted in an expansion of the public sphere.
Structuralist critics suggest this participatory agenda has failed to tackle the
disadvantageous power relations inherent in a capitalist system and served
therefore only to legitimize a status quo that de-politicizes development and
perpetuates inequality.

As Hickey suggests, ‘the problem remains one of how to link a politics of

recognition with a politics of social justice and economic transformation in
meaningful ways’. In the Ugandan context, the intertwining of political and
economic power within a neo-patrimonial system and the absence of significant
levels of popular pressure for redistributive change compounds this challenge.
One factor that has been identified as a major stumbling block to the achievement of good governance
in Uganda is corruption. The economic costs of corruption are numerous. Corruption undermines the
economic development by introducing distortion and inefficiency in the economy. Corruption is also an
obstacle to poverty alleviation as it widens the gap between the rich and the poor who are marginalized
and are completely powerless as the financial costs of fraud and corruption are passed down the supply
chain reducing their purchasing power.

In the private sector, corruption restricts the growth of small businesses, as they are unable to pass on
the costs of corruption to consumers in a competitive environment. Foreign investors are also scared off
due to the costs of corruption; creating a non-level playing field, due to over- regulation and lack of
predictability in the legal system.

One area where corruption has been identified to be endemic is the area of procurement i.e. in the
award of contracts for supply of goods, services and works. In the public sector a high percentage of
government expenditure is in procurement. A weak procurement institutional framework and disregard
or lack of understanding of procurement systems has created many loopholes resulting in mega
corruption. The suppliers can also introduce corruption in the bidding process by colluding among
themselves to fix bid prices or by creating improper interference in the evaluation work.

However, the elimination of corruption was one of the objectives of the NRM’s 10-Point Programme
developed in the mid-1980s during the struggle against the Obote II regime. The problem had become
endemic in the public service on account of very poor salaries and conditions and the lack of effective
accountability and oversight mechanisms. The prevalence of corruption was a key consideration in the
government’s civil service reform programme and the creation of the URA and other semi-autonomous
agencies. The aim of these reforms was respectively to create a living wage and an ethos of efficient and
transparent government, and to devolve implementation to executive agencies that could establish
systems and build incentives as a means of discouraging corrupt practices.

As an integral part of the effort to combat corruption, the government strengthened existing
institutional mechanisms and created a series of new institutions that were responsible for ensuring
probity and integrity in the public service. Existing institutions included the Office of the Auditor General
(AG), the Department of Public Prosecutions (DPP), and the Criminal Investigation Department (CID).
Years of neglect and under-funding had weakened their effectiveness and legitimacy had become
compromised by corruption and inefficiency. The NRM government sought to reinvigorate these
institutions through infusion of financial resources and capacity building, largely funded by aid donors.
Many legal measures were introduced in the 1990s to strengthen the mandate and powers of existing
institutions such as the AG, the DPP, and the CID.

The Auditor General’s (AG) office is charged with auditing public accounts and submitting reports to
Parliament for scrutiny and deliberation through the Public Accounts Committee (PAC). Its reports are
shared with the DPP and IG (Inspectorate of Government) for follow-up action and investigations. The
AG is a semi-autonomous body established under the Constitution. The Auditor General is appointed by
the President, who has the power to remove the AG on the grounds of misconduct or incompetence.
Unlike the Uganda Human Rights Commission there is no independent board which makes or ratifies
appointment decisions. The AG has some degree of independence in formulating a programme of work,
but only to a limited extent in staff recruitment and appointments which are largely determined by the
Public Service Commission in line with other government departments. The AG’s budget is submitted to
MOFPED which then proposes an allocation that is endorsed by the cabinet, subject to the constraints
imposed by the Medium Term Expenditure Framework. This is distinct from the practice adopted in other
countries where the office of the AG is funded through a direct parliamentary appropriation that does
not require executive endorsement.

In the late 1980s there were significant delays in reporting to Parliament with backlogs of several years
which circumscribed the scope for identifying and acting on corrupt practices. The AG lacked qualified
staff and used out-of-date methods for collecting and analysing public expenditure data. Over time the
office of the AG was able to recruit more capable staff with accountancy qualifications and to modernise
systems through computerisation and the development of modern auditing methods. The backlog of
reports covering the ten-year period 1986-1996 was not tackled until the creation of a new PAC in the
sixth parliament after the 1996 elections. While gradual progress was made the PAC did not hold
sessions in the run-up to the 2001 elections when parliamentary business was suspended and this was a
cause of renewed backlog. The AG reports are now produced on time (by the end of March each year)
but the PAC has yet to catch up on a backlog of reports, even though it is presently reviewing two reports
per year. The backlog reduces the effectiveness of parliamentary oversight as it becomes more difficult
for the PAC to recommend action and call public officials to account when the reports refer to
expenditures committed in past financial years. The PAC is also compromised by the no-party system of
government since all MPs are technically members of the Movement and the scope for detailed cross-
examination of government accounts is compromised.

One of the key institutions created by the NRM government to address problems of corruption is the
Inspectorate of Government (IG). It was established in 1986 as an independent institution charged with
the promoting adherence to the rule of law in public administration and responsibility for eliminating
corruption and abuse of authority and public office, reporting directly to the President. The 1995
Constitution strengthened its powers of investigation, arrest and prosecution and increased its
autonomy, requiring it to report directly to Parliament rather than any individual or authority. The
Inspector-General can only be removed from office for gross violation of power by the President on the
recommendation of a special parliamentary tribunal. The IG is also responsible for implementing the
Leadership Code of Conduct which was initially promulgated in 1992 and affirmed in the Constitution,
requiring government officials and members of parliament to declare their income, assets and liabilities
on a yearly basis. This provision provides the IG with the powers to enforce the Code and prosecute
officials found guilty of corruption and abuse of public office though legislation was not introduced until
2002. A new Inspectorate of Government Act in 2002 clarified and strengthened the powers of the IG in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. It is funded directly through a parliamentary vote
from the consolidated fund.

The IG was restructured in 2001 to strengthen its work and improve its effectiveness in discharging it’s
constitutionally mandates duties. This reorganisation took place in response to public and donor criticism
of its poor record in prosecuting corruption cases and inefficiencies in its management structure.
Information technology has been employed to improve its speed and efficiency in handling cases.
But the reorganization of the IG and strengthened powers through new legislation has not markedly
improved the performance of the institution. Its record in identifying and prosecuting corruption cases
remains poor and its legitimacy and effectiveness open to question. Judicial action on cases furnished by
the IG is marked by delays and many case reports are returned as lacking essential pieces of information
and evidence. It suffers from resource constraints in terms of budget, skilled staff and vehicles and office
support, which impact adversely on its ability to carry out its full range of responsibilities. It has proved
difficult to recruit and retain staff with appropriate skills and expertise, especially lawyers. Professional
staff are employed on contract status with no pension rights, with the result that conditions are
perceived to be inferior to regular civil servants. This feeds into a vicious circle of inadequate resources,
poor staffing calibre, reduced efficiency and effectiveness, low rates of prosecution and diminishing
credibility. The IG has sought to supplement its limited budget with donor funds for information
technology, capacity building and strategic planning, but to limited effect.

Political support for the IG has also ebbed. The present incumbent is reportedly a close relative of the
First Lady but this has not prevented erosion in the political status of the institution. The President no
longer provides strong public support for the work of the IG. Parliament does not debate the six-monthly
reports submitted by the IG.

The central problem in Uganda’s anti-corruption efforts lies not in the absence of institutions for tackling
the problem but rather their systematic marginalisation and consequent inability to investigate and
prosecute officials and politicians at the highest level of government. In narrow institutional terms
Uganda’s anti-corruption effort might be interpreted as a success, reflected in an impressive array of
organisations with power and responsibility for investigation, prosecution and punishment. However,
evidence on their performance in curbing the level of corruption measured through the number of
successful prosecutions and dismissals points to a consistent record of under-achievement.

Corruption has a high political profile and the President has publicly associated himself with anti-
corruption efforts. The more cynical commentators allege that the government’s high profile anti-
corruption efforts are designed to assuage donor criticism of its failure to address the root causes of the
problem than emanating from conviction and political will (Flanary and Watt 1999). The problem of
political will is compounded by the shortage of material and human resources facing all the agencies
engaged in anti-corruption work. All face staff shortages and budgetary constraints and are poorly-
equipped, which undermines their effectiveness (Watt, Flanary and Theobold 1999).

The lack or fragility of constitutional safeguards weakens their autonomy and independence, rendering
them vulnerable to political influence. Corruption is a manifestation of the political compulsions of
patrimonialism, taking the form of a reward for political loyalty and a division of spoils that maintains
the support base of the Movement. In view of the evident reluctance of the government to tackle the
problem with conviction, the scope for curbing corruption and fostering accountability through under-
resourced and politically marginalised institutions, especially at the highest levels, will remain extremely
limited.
The impact of all these initiatives has only had a limited impact on levels of corruption. Uganda is rated
among the most corrupt countries in the world in the Transparency International, ranked 117 out of 133
countries surveyed for the Corruption Perceptions Index in 2003, up eight places from the previous year.
Various developments have served to perpetuate and further deepen the problem. Privatization in the
early 1990s was a source of illicit gain among highly-placed government functionaries who used their
official connections in securing bids for state-owned enterprises (Tangri and Mwenda, 2011). No-party
elections fuel corrupt practices by encouraging politicians to invest considerable amounts of money in
the expectation of being able to cover these outlays through returns from corruption.