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§ 703 TITLE 5—GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYEES Page 112
denied on the ground that it is against the § 704. Actions reviewable

United States or that the United States is an in-
dispensable party. The United States may be Agency action made reviewable by statute and
named as a defendant in any such action, and a final agency action for which there is no other
judgment or decree may be entered against the adequate remedy in a court are subject to judi-
United States: Provided, That any mandatory or cial review. A preliminary, procedural, or inter-
injunctive decree shall specify the Federal offi- mediate agency action or ruling not directly re-
cer or officers (by name or by title), and their viewable is subject to review on the review of
successors in office, personally responsible for the final agency action. Except as otherwise ex-
compliance. Nothing herein (1) affects other lim- pressly required by statute, agency action
itations on judicial review or the power or duty otherwise final is final for the purposes of this
of the court to dismiss any action or deny relief section whether or not there has been presented
on any other appropriate legal or equitable or determined an application for a declaratory
ground; or (2) confers authority to grant relief if order, for any form of reconsideration, or, unless
any other statute that grants consent to suit ex- the agency otherwise requires by rule and pro-
pressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is vides that the action meanwhile is inoperative,
sought. for an appeal to superior agency authority.
(Pub. L. 89–554, Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 392; Pub. L. (Pub. L. 89–554, Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 392.)
94–574, § 1, Oct. 21, 1976, 90 Stat. 2721.) HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES
HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES Revised Statutes and
Derivation U.S. Code
Statutes at Large
Derivation U.S. Code Revised Statutes and
Statutes at Large .................. 5 U.S.C. 1009(c). June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 10(c),
60 Stat. 243.
.................. 5 U.S.C. 1009(a). June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 10(a),
60 Stat. 243.
Standard changes are made to conform with the defi-
Standard changes are made to conform with the definitions applicable and the style of this title as outlined
nitions applicable and the style of this title as outlined in the preface of this report.
in the preface to the report.
§ 705. Relief pending review
AMENDMENTS
When an agency finds that justice so requires,
1976—Pub. L. 94–574 removed the defense of sovereign
immunity as a bar to judicial review of Federal admin-
it may postpone the effective date of action
istrative action otherwise subject to judicial review. taken by it, pending judicial review. On such
conditions as may be required and to the extent
§ 703. Form and venue of proceeding necessary to prevent irreparable injury, the re-
The form of proceeding for judicial review is viewing court, including the court to which a
the special statutory review proceeding relevant case may be taken on appeal from or on applica-
to the subject matter in a court specified by tion for certiorari or other writ to a reviewing
statute or, in the absence or inadequacy thereof, court, may issue all necessary and appropriate
any applicable form of legal action, including process to postpone the effective date of an
actions for declaratory judgments or writs of agency action or to preserve status or rights
prohibitory or mandatory injunction or habeas pending conclusion of the review proceedings.
corpus, in a court of competent jurisdiction. If (Pub. L. 89–554, Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 393.)
no special statutory review proceeding is appli-
cable, the action for judicial review may be HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES
brought against the United States, the agency Revised Statutes and
by its official title, or the appropriate officer. Statutes at Large
Except to the extent that prior, adequate, and .................. 5 U.S.C. 1009(d). June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 10(d),
exclusive opportunity for judicial review is pro- 60 Stat. 243.
vided by law, agency action is subject to judicial
review in civil or criminal proceedings for judi- Standard changes are made to conform with the defi-
cial enforcement. nitions applicable and the style of this title as outlined
in the preface of this report.
(Pub. L. 89–554, Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 392; Pub. L.
94–574, § 1, Oct. 21, 1976, 90 Stat. 2721.) § 706. Scope of review
HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES To the extent necessary to decision and when
Revised Statutes and
presented, the reviewing court shall decide all
Derivation U.S. Code Statutes at Large relevant questions of law, interpret constitu-
tional and statutory provisions, and determine
.................. 5 U.S.C. 1009(b). June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 10(b),
60 Stat. 243. the meaning or applicability of the terms of an
agency action. The reviewing court shall—
Standard changes are made to conform with the defi- (1) compel agency action unlawfully with-
nitions applicable and the style of this title as outlined held or unreasonably delayed; and
in the preface to the report. (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency ac-
AMENDMENTS tion, findings, and conclusions found to be—
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of dis-
1976—Pub. L. 94–574 provided that if no special statu-
tory review proceeding is applicable, the action for ju- cretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
dicial review may be brought against the United law;
States, the agency by its official title, or the appro- (B) contrary to constitutional right,
priate officer as defendant. power, privilege, or immunity;
Page 113 TITLE 5—GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYEES § 801
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, au- (iv) any other relevant information or re-
thority, or limitations, or short of statutory quirements under any other Act and any rel-
right; evant Executive orders.
(D) without observance of procedure re-
(C) Upon receipt of a report submitted under
quired by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in subparagraph (A), each House shall provide cop-
a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this ies of the report to the chairman and ranking
title or otherwise reviewed on the record of member of each standing committee with juris-
an agency hearing provided by statute; or diction under the rules of the House of Rep-
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent resentatives or the Senate to report a bill to
that the facts are subject to trial de novo by amend the provision of law under which the rule
the reviewing court. is issued.
(2)(A) The Comptroller General shall provide a
In making the foregoing determinations, the report on each major rule to the committees of
court shall review the whole record or those jurisdiction in each House of the Congress by
parts of it cited by a party, and due account the end of 15 calendar days after the submission
shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error. or publication date as provided in section
(Pub. L. 89–554, Sept. 6, 1966, 80 Stat. 393.) 802(b)(2). The report of the Comptroller General
shall include an assessment of the agency’s com-
HISTORICAL AND REVISION NOTES pliance with procedural steps required by para-
Revised Statutes and graph (1)(B).
Statutes at Large (B) Federal agencies shall cooperate with the
.................. 5 U.S.C. 1009(e). June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 10(e),
Comptroller General by providing information
60 Stat. 243. relevant to the Comptroller General’s report
under subparagraph (A).
Standard changes are made to conform with the defi- (3) A major rule relating to a report submitted
nitions applicable and the style of this title as outlined under paragraph (1) shall take effect on the lat-
in the preface of this report. est of—
ABBREVIATION OF RECORD (A) the later of the date occurring 60 days
Pub. L. 85–791, Aug. 28, 1958, 72 Stat. 941, which au- after the date on which—
thorized abbreviation of record on review or enforce- (i) the Congress receives the report sub-
ment of orders of administrative agencies and review mitted under paragraph (1); or
on the original papers, provided, in section 35 thereof, (ii) the rule is published in the Federal
that: ‘‘This Act [see Tables for classification] shall not Register, if so published;
be construed to repeal or modify any provision of the
Administrative Procedure Act [see Short Title note set (B) if the Congress passes a joint resolution
out preceding section 551 of this title].’’ of disapproval described in section 802 relating
to the rule, and the President signs a veto of
CHAPTER 8—CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF such resolution, the earlier date—
AGENCY RULEMAKING (i) on which either House of Congress votes
Sec. and fails to override the veto of the Presi-
801. Congressional review. dent; or
802. Congressional disapproval procedure. (ii) occurring 30 session days after the date
803. Special rule on statutory, regulatory, and ju- on which the Congress received the veto and
dicial deadlines. objections of the President; or
804. Definitions.
805. Judicial review. (C) the date the rule would have otherwise
806. Applicability; severability. taken effect, if not for this section (unless a
807. Exemption for monetary policy.
808. Effective date of certain rules. joint resolution of disapproval under section
802 is enacted).
§ 801. Congressional review
(4) Except for a major rule, a rule shall take
(a)(1)(A) Before a rule can take effect, the Fed- effect as otherwise provided by law after submis-
eral agency promulgating such rule shall submit sion to Congress under paragraph (1).
to each House of the Congress and to the Comp- (5) Notwithstanding paragraph (3), the effec-
troller General a report containing— tive date of a rule shall not be delayed by oper-
(i) a copy of the rule; ation of this chapter beyond the date on which
(ii) a concise general statement relating to either House of Congress votes to reject a joint
the rule, including whether it is a major rule; resolution of disapproval under section 802.
and (b)(1) A rule shall not take effect (or con-
(iii) the proposed effective date of the rule. tinue), if the Congress enacts a joint resolution
(B) On the date of the submission of the report of disapproval, described under section 802, of
under subparagraph (A), the Federal agency pro- the rule.
mulgating the rule shall submit to the Comp- (2) A rule that does not take effect (or does not
troller General and make available to each continue) under paragraph (1) may not be re-
House of Congress— issued in substantially the same form, and a new
(i) a complete copy of the cost-benefit analy- rule that is substantially the same as such a
sis of the rule, if any; rule may not be issued, unless the reissued or
(ii) the agency’s actions relevant to sections new rule is specifically authorized by a law en-
603, 604, 605, 607, and 609; acted after the date of the joint resolution dis-
(iii) the agency’s actions relevant to sec- approving the original rule.
tions 202, 203, 204, and 205 of the Unfunded (c)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of
Mandates Reform Act of 1995; and this section (except subject to paragraph (3)), a
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
RIGHTS GUARANTEED
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF CITIZENSHIP,
DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
CONTENTS
Page
Section 1. Rights Guaranteed ................................................................................................... 1565
Citizens of the United States ............................................................................................ 1565
Privileges and Immunities ................................................................................................. 1568
Due Process of Law ............................................................................................................ 1572
The Development of Substantive Due Process .......................................................... 1572
‘‘Persons’’ Defined ................................................................................................. 1578
Police Power Defined and Limited ...................................................................... 1579
‘‘Liberty’’ ................................................................................................................ 1581
Liberty of Contract ...................................................................................................... 1581
Regulatory Labor Laws Generally ...................................................................... 1581
Laws Regulating Hours of Labor ........................................................................ 1586
Laws Regulating Labor in Mines ........................................................................ 1586
Laws Prohibiting Employment of Children in Hazardous Occupations .......... 1587
Laws Regulating Payment of Wages .................................................................. 1587
Minimum Wage Laws .......................................................................................... 1587
Workers’ Compensation Laws ............................................................................. 1588
Collective Bargaining ........................................................................................... 1591
Regulation of Business Enterprises: Rates, Charges, and Conditions of Service .. 1594
‘‘Business Affected With a Public Interest’’ ....................................................... 1594
Nebbia v. New York .............................................................................................. 1596
Judicial Review of Publicly Determined Rates and Charges ................................... 1597
Development ......................................................................................................... 1597
Limitations on Judicial Review ........................................................................... 1600
The Ben Avon Case .............................................................................................. 1602
History of the Valuation Question ...................................................................... 1603
Regulation of Public Utilities (Other Than Rates) ................................................... 1607
In General ............................................................................................................. 1607
Compulsory Expenditures: Grade Crossings, and the Like .............................. 1608
Compellable Services ........................................................................................... 1610
Safety Regulations Applicable to Railroads ....................................................... 1612
Statutory Liabilities and Penalties Applicable to Railroads ............................ 1613
Regulation of Corporations, Business, Professions, and Trades .............................. 1614
Corporations ......................................................................................................... 1614
Business in General ............................................................................................. 1615
Laws Prohibiting Trusts, Discrimination, Restraint of Trade ......................... 1615
Laws Preventing Fraud in Sale of Goods and Securities ................................. 1616
Banking, Wage Assignments and Garnishment ................................................ 1618
Insurance .............................................................................................................. 1619
Miscellaneous Businesses and Professions ........................................................ 1622
Protection of State Resources ..................................................................................... 1624
1559
1560 AMENDMENT 14—RIGHTS GUARANTEED
Section 1. Rights Guaranteed—Continued

Due Process of Law—Continued
Oil and Gas ........................................................................................................... 1624
Protection of Property and Agricultural Crops .................................................. 1625
Water ..................................................................................................................... 1626
Fish and Game ..................................................................................................... 1627
Ownership of Real Property: Limitations, Rights .................................................... 1628
Zoning and Similar Actions ................................................................................. 1628
Estates, Succession, Abandoned Property .......................................................... 1630
Health, Safety, and Morals ......................................................................................... 1632
Safety Regulations ............................................................................................... 1632
Sanitation ............................................................................................................. 1633
Food, Drugs, Milk ................................................................................................ 1633
Intoxicating Liquor .............................................................................................. 1634
Regulation of Motor Vehicles and Carriers ........................................................ 1634
Protecting Morality .............................................................................................. 1636
Vested Rights, Remedial Rights, Political Candidacy .............................................. 1636
Control of Local Units of Government ....................................................................... 1637
Taxing Power ............................................................................................................... 1637
Generally ............................................................................................................... 1637
Public Purpose ...................................................................................................... 1638
Other Considerations Affecting Validity: Excessive Burden; Ratio of
Amount Of Benefit Received ............................................................................ 1638
Estate, Gift and Inheritance Taxes .................................................................... 1639
Income Taxes ........................................................................................................ 1640
Franchise Taxes ................................................................................................... 1640
Severance Taxes ................................................................................................... 1640
Real Property Taxes ............................................................................................. 1641
Jurisdiction to Tax ...................................................................................................... 1642
Sales/Use Taxes .................................................................................................... 1643
Land ...................................................................................................................... 1643
Tangible Personalty ............................................................................................. 1643
Intangible Personalty ........................................................................................... 1646
Transfer (Inheritance, Estate, Gift) Taxes ......................................................... 1650
Corporate Privilege Taxes ................................................................................... 1654
Individual Income Taxes ..................................................................................... 1655
Corporate Income Taxes: Foreign Corporations ................................................ 1656
Insurance Company Taxes .................................................................................. 1657
Procedure in Taxation ................................................................................................. 1659
Generally ............................................................................................................... 1659
Notice and Hearing in Relation to Taxes ........................................................... 1659
Notice and Hearing in Relation to Assessments ............................................... 1660
Collection of Taxes ............................................................................................... 1662
Sufficiency and Manner of Giving Notice ........................................................... 1664
Sufficiency of Remedy .......................................................................................... 1665
Laches ................................................................................................................... 1665
Eminent Domain ......................................................................................................... 1666
Substantive Due Process and Noneconomic Liberty ................................................ 1666
Abortion ................................................................................................................ 1669
Privacy: Its Constitutional Dimensions .............................................................. 1679
Family Relationships ........................................................................................... 1688
Liberty Interests of Retarded and Mentally Ill: Commitment and Treat-
ment ................................................................................................................... 1690
AMENDMENT 14—RIGHTS GUARANTEED 1561
Section 1. Rights Guaranteed—Continued

Due Process of Law—Continued
‘‘Right to Die’’ ....................................................................................................... 1692
Procedural Due Process: Civil ................................................................................................... 1693
Some General Criteria ................................................................................................ 1693
Ancient Use and Uniformity ............................................................................... 1693
Equality ................................................................................................................. 1694
Due Process, Judicial Process, and Separation of Powers ................................ 1694
Power of the States to Regulate Procedure ............................................................... 1695
Generally ............................................................................................................... 1695
Commencement of Actions .................................................................................. 1696
Pleas in Abatement .............................................................................................. 1696
Defenses ................................................................................................................ 1697
Amendments and Continuances ......................................................................... 1697
Costs, Damages, and Penalties ........................................................................... 1698
Statutes of Limitation .......................................................................................... 1699
Evidence and Presumptions ................................................................................ 1701
Jury Trials ............................................................................................................ 1704
Appeals .................................................................................................................. 1704
Jurisdiction .................................................................................................................. 1705
Generally ............................................................................................................... 1705
In Personam Proceedings Against Individuals .................................................. 1707
Suability of Foreign Corporations ....................................................................... 1710
Actions in Rem: Proceedings Against Land ....................................................... 1716
Actions in Rem: Attachment Proceedings .......................................................... 1718
Actions in Rem: Estates, Trusts, Corporations .................................................. 1720
Notice: Service of Process .................................................................................... 1722
The Procedure Which Is Due Process ........................................................................ 1723
The Interests Protected: Entitlements and Positivist Recognition .................. 1723
Proceedings in Which Procedural Due Process Must Be Observed ................. 1732
When Is Process Due ........................................................................................... 1735
The Requirements of Due Process ...................................................................... 1740
Procedural Due Process: Criminal ........................................................................................... 1745
Generally ...................................................................................................................... 1745
The Elements of Due Process ..................................................................................... 1747
Clarity in Criminal Statutes: The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine ..................... 1747
Other Aspects of Statutory Notice ...................................................................... 1749
Entrapment .......................................................................................................... 1750
Criminal Identification Process ........................................................................... 1752
Initiation of the Prosecution ................................................................................ 1753
Fair Trial .............................................................................................................. 1753
Guilty Pleas .......................................................................................................... 1757
Prosecutorial Misconduct ..................................................................................... 1758
Proof, Burden of Proof, and Presumptions ......................................................... 1761
Sentencing ............................................................................................................ 1765
The Problem of the Incompetent or Insane Defendant or Convict .................. 1769
Corrective Process: Appeals and Other Remedies ............................................. 1770
Rights of Prisoners ............................................................................................... 1772
Probation and Parole ........................................................................................... 1776
The Problem of the Juvenile Offender ............................................................... 1780
The Problem of Civil Commitment ..................................................................... 1783
Equal Protection of the Laws ................................................................................................... 1786
Scope and Application ........................................................................................................ 1786
Equal Protection of the Laws—Continued

Scope and Application—Continued
State Action ................................................................................................................. 1786
‘‘Persons’’ ...................................................................................................................... 1802
‘‘Within Its Jurisdiction’’ ............................................................................................. 1803
Equal Protection: Judging Classifications by Law .......................................................... 1804
Traditional Standard: Restrained Review ................................................................. 1805
The New Standards: Active Review ........................................................................... 1809
Testing Facially Neutral Classifications Which Impact on Minorities .......................... 1815
Traditional Equal Protection: Economic Regulation and Related Exercises of the Police
Powers ..................................................................................................................................... 1821
Taxation .............................................................................................................................. 1821
Classification for Purpose of Taxation ....................................................................... 1821
Foreign Corporations and Nonresidents .................................................................... 1824
Income Taxes ............................................................................................................... 1825
Inheritance Taxes ........................................................................................................ 1826
Motor Vehicle Taxes .................................................................................................... 1826
Property Taxes ............................................................................................................. 1827
Special Assessment ..................................................................................................... 1828
Police Power Regulation .................................................................................................... 1829
Classification ............................................................................................................... 1829
Other Business and Employment Relations ..................................................................... 1834
Labor Relations ........................................................................................................... 1834
Monopolies and Unfair Trade Practices .................................................................... 1835
Administrative Discretion ........................................................................................... 1835
Social Welfare .............................................................................................................. 1836
Punishment of Crime .................................................................................................. 1838
Equal Protection and Race ........................................................................................................ 1839
Overview .............................................................................................................................. 1839
Education ............................................................................................................................ 1840
Development and Application of ‘‘Separate But Equal’’ ........................................... 1840
Brown v. Board of Education ..................................................................................... 1842
Brown’s Aftermath ...................................................................................................... 1843
Implementation of School Desegregation .................................................................. 1845
Northern Schools: Inter- and Intradistrict Desegregation ....................................... 1847
Efforts to Curb Busing and Other Desegregation Remedies ................................... 1852
Termination of Court Supervision ............................................................................. 1853
Juries ................................................................................................................................... 1854
Capital Punishment ........................................................................................................... 1857
Housing ............................................................................................................................... 1858
Other Areas of Discrimination .......................................................................................... 1859
Transportation ............................................................................................................. 1859
Public Facilities ........................................................................................................... 1859
Marriage ....................................................................................................................... 1860
Judicial System ........................................................................................................... 1860
Public Designation ...................................................................................................... 1861
Public Accommodations .............................................................................................. 1861
Elections ....................................................................................................................... 1861
Permissible Remedial Utilization of Racial Classifications ............................................ 1861
The New Equal Protection ........................................................................................................ 1869
Classifications Meriting Close Scrutiny ............................................................................ 1869
Alienage and Nationality ............................................................................................ 1869
Sex ................................................................................................................................ 1875
The New Equal Protection—Continued

Classifications Meriting Close Scrutiny—Continued
Illegitimacy .................................................................................................................. 1886
Fundamental Interests: The Political Process ................................................................. 1892
Voter Qualifications .................................................................................................... 1893
Access to the Ballot ..................................................................................................... 1897
Apportionment and Districting .................................................................................. 1902
Weighing of Votes ........................................................................................................ 1911
The Right to Travel ............................................................................................................ 1911
Durational Residency Requirements ......................................................................... 1911
Marriage and Familial Relations ...................................................................................... 1914
Poverty and Fundamental Interests: The Intersection of Due Process and Equal Pro-
tection .............................................................................................................................. 1916
Generally ...................................................................................................................... 1916
Criminal Procedure ..................................................................................................... 1918
The Criminal Sentence ............................................................................................... 1920
Voting ........................................................................................................................... 1921
Access to Courts .......................................................................................................... 1922
Educational Opportunity ............................................................................................ 1923
Abortion ........................................................................................................................ 1925
Section 2. Apportionment of Representation ........................................................................... 1926
Sections 3 and 4. Disqualification and Public Debt ................................................................ 1928
Section 5. Enforcement .............................................................................................................. 1928
Generally ............................................................................................................................. 1928
State Action ......................................................................................................................... 1929
Congressional Definition of Fourteenth Amendment Rights .......................................... 1933
RIGHTS GUARANTEED
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF CITIZENSHIP, DUE
PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
SECTION 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law; nor deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws.
CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES
In the Dred Scott Case, 1 Chief Justice Taney for the Court
ruled that United States citizenship was enjoyed by two classes of
individuals: (1) white persons born in the United States as de-
scendents of ‘‘persons, who were at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution recognized as citizens in the several States and [who]
became also citizens of this new political body,’’ the United States
of America, and (2) those who, having been ‘‘born outside the do-
minions of the United States,’’ had migrated thereto and been nat-
uralized therein. The States were competent, he continued, to con-
fer state citizenship upon anyone in their midst, but they could not
make the recipient of such status a citizen of the United States.
The ‘‘Negro,’’ or ‘‘African race,’’ according to the Chief Justice, was
ineligible to attain United States citizenship, either from a State or
by virtue of birth in the United States, even as a free man de-
scended from a Negro residing as a free man in one of the States
at the date of ratification of the Constitution. 2 Congress, first in
§ 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 3 and then in the first sentence
1 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404–06, 417–18, 419–20 (1857).
2 The controversy, political as well as constitutional, which this case stirred and
still stirs, is exemplified and analyzed in the material collected in S. KUTLER, THE
DRED SCOTT DECISION: LAW OR POLITICS? (1967).
3 ‘‘That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign
power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United
States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous
1565
of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 4 set aside the Dred Scott

holding in a sentence ‘‘declaratory of existing rights, and affirma-
tive of existing law. . . .’’ 5
While clearly establishing a national rule on national citizen-
ship and settling a controversy of long standing with regard to the
derivation of national citizenship, the Fourteenth Amendment did
not obliterate the distinction between national and state citizen-
ship, but rather preserved it. 6 The Court has accorded the first
sentence of § 1 a construction in accordance with the congressional
intentions, holding that a child born in the United States of Chi-
nese parents who themselves were ineligible to be naturalized is
nevertheless a citizen of the United States entitled to all the rights
and privileges of citizenship. 7 Congress’ intent in including the
qualifying phrase ‘‘and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,’’ was ap-
parently to exclude from the reach of the language children born
of diplomatic representatives of a foreign state and children born
of alien enemies in hostile occupation, both recognized exceptions
to the common-law rule of acquired citizenship by birth, 8 as well
as children of members of Indian tribes subject to tribal laws. 9 The
lower courts have generally held that the citizenship of the parents
determines the citizenship of children born on vessels in United
States territorial waters or on the high seas. 10
In Afroyim v. Rusk, 11 a divided Court extended the force of
this first sentence beyond prior holdings, ruling that it withdrew
condition of slavery or involuntary servitude . . . shall have the same right[s]. . . .’’
Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
4 The proposed amendment as it passed the House contained no such provision,
and it was decided in the Senate to include language like that finally adopted.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2560, 2768–69, 2869 (1866). The sponsor of the
language said: ‘‘This amendment which I have offered is simply declaratory of what
I regard as the law of the land already, that every person born within the limits
of the United States, and subject to their jurisdiction, is . . . a citizen of the United
States.’’ Id. at 2890. The legislative history is discussed at some length in Afroyim
v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 282–86 (1967) (Justice Harlan dissenting).
5 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 688 (1898).
6 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74 (1873).
7 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
8 Id. at 682.
9 Id. at 680–82; Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 99 (1884).
10 United States v. Gordon, 25 Fed. Cas. 1364 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 15,231);
In re Look Tin Sing, 21 F. 905 (C.C.Cal. 1884); Lam Mow v. Nagle, 24 F.2d 316
(9th Cir. 1928).
11 387 U.S. 253 (1967). Though the Court upheld the involuntary expatriation
of a woman citizen of the United States during her marriage to a foreign citizen
in Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915), the subject first received extended judi-
cial treatment in Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958), in which by a five-to-four
decision the Court upheld a statute denaturalizing a native-born citizen for having
voted in a foreign election. For the Court, Justice Frankfurter reasoned that Con-
gress’ power to regulate foreign affairs carried with it the authority to sever the re-
lationship of this country with one of its citizens to avoid national implication in
from the Government of the United States the power to expatriate

United States citizens against their will for any reason. ‘‘[T]he
Amendment can most reasonably be read as defining a citizenship
which a citizen keeps unless he voluntarily relinquishes it. Once
acquired, this Fourteenth Amendment citizenship was not to be
shifted, canceled, or diluted at the will of the Federal Government,
the States, or any other government unit. It is true that the chief
interest of the people in giving permanence and security to citizen-
ship in the Fourteenth Amendment was the desire to protect Ne-
groes. . . . This undeniable purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment
to make citizenship of Negroes permanent and secure would be
frustrated by holding that the Government can rob a citizen of his
citizenship without his consent by simply proceeding to act under
an implied general power to regulate foreign affairs or some other
power generally granted.’’ 12 In a subsequent decision, however, the
Court held that persons who were statutorily naturalized by being
born abroad of at least one American parent could not claim the
protection of the first sentence of § 1 and that Congress could there-
fore impose a reasonable and non-arbitrary condition subsequent
upon their continued retention of United States citizenship. 13 Be-
tween these two decisions there is a tension which should call forth
further litigation efforts to explore the meaning of the citizenship
sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Citizens of the United States within the meaning of this
Amendment must be natural and not artificial persons; a corporate
body is not a citizen of the United States. 14
acts of that citizen which might embarrass relations with a foreign nation. Id. at
60–62. Three of the dissenters denied that Congress had any power to denaturalize.
See discussion supra pp. 272–76. In the years before Afroyim, a series of decisions
had curbed congressional power.
12 Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 262–63 (1967). Four dissenters, Justices Har-
lan, Clark, Stewart, and White, controverted the Court’s reliance on the history and
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and reasserted Justice Frankfurter’s pre-
vious reasoning in Perez. Id. at 268.
13 Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971). This, too, was a five-to-four decision,
Justices Blackmun, Harlan, Stewart, and White, and Chief Justice Burger in the
majority, and Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall dissenting.
14 Insurance Co. v. New Orleans, 13 Fed. Cas. 67 (C.C.D.La. 1870). Not being
citizens of the United States, corporations accordingly have been declared unable ‘‘to
claim the protection of that clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which secures the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States against abridgment or im-
pairment by the law of a State.’’ Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 557, 561 (1869).
This conclusion was in harmony with the earlier holding in Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S.
(8 Wall.) 168 (1869), to the effect that corporations were not within the scope of the
privileges and immunities clause of state citizenship set out in Article IV, § 2. See
also Selover, Bates & Co. v. Walsh, 226 U.S. 112, 126 (1912); Berea College v. Ken-
tucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908); Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Tobacco Growers, 276 U.S. 71,
89 (1928); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936).
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

Unique among constitutional provisions, the privileges and im-
munities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment enjoys the distinc-
tion of having been rendered a ‘‘practical nullity’’ by a single deci-
sion of the Supreme Court issued within five years after its ratifi-
cation. In the Slaughter-House Cases, 15 a bare majority of the
Court frustrated the aims of the most aggressive sponsors of this
clause, to whom was attributed an intention to centralize ‘‘in the
hands of the Federal Government large powers hitherto exercised
by the States’’ with a view to enabling business to develop
unimpeded by state interference. This expansive alteration of the
federal system was to have been achieved by converting the rights
of the citizens of each State as of the date of the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment into privileges and immunities of United
States citizenship and thereafter perpetuating this newly defined
status quo through judicial condemnation of any state law chal-
lenged as ‘‘abridging’’ any one of the latter privileges. To have fos-
tered such intentions, the Court declared, would have been ‘‘to
transfer the security and protection of all the civil rights . . . to the
Federal Government, . . . to bring within the power of Congress
the entire domain of civil rights heretofore belonging exclusively to
the States,’’ and to ‘‘constitute this court a perpetual censor upon
all legislation of the States, on the civil rights of their own citizens,
with authority to nullify such as it did not approve as consistent
with those rights, as they existed at the time of the adoption of this
amendment. . . . [The effect of] so great a departure from the
structure and spirit of our institutions . . . is to fetter and degrade
the State governments by subjecting them to the control of Con-
gress, in the exercise of powers heretofore universally conceded to
them of the most ordinary and fundamental character. . . . We are
convinced that no such results were intended by the Congress . . .
, nor by the legislatures . . . which ratified’’ this amendment, and
that the sole ‘‘pervading purpose’’ of this and the other War
Amendments was ‘‘the freedom of the slave race.’’
Conformably to these conclusions, the Court advised the New
Orleans butchers that the Louisiana statute, conferring on a single
corporation a monopoly of the business of slaughtering cattle, abro-
gated no rights possessed by them as United States citizens; inso-
far as that law interfered with their claimed privilege of pursuing
the lawful calling of butchering animals, the privilege thus termi-
nated was merely one of ‘‘those which belonged to the citizens of
the States as such.’’ Privileges and immunities of state citizenship
15 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71, 77–79 (1873).
had been ‘‘left to the state governments for security and protection’’
and had not been placed by this clause ‘‘under the special care of
the Federal Government.’’ The only privileges which the Four-
teenth Amendment protected against state encroachment were de-
clared to be those ‘‘which owe their existence to the Federal Gov-
ernment, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws.’’ 16
These privileges, however, had been available to United States citi-
zens and protected from state interference by operation of federal
supremacy even prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The Slaughter-House Cases, therefore, reduced the privileges
and immunities clause to a superfluous reiteration of a prohibition
already operative against the states.
Although the Court has expressed a reluctance to attempt a
definitive enumeration of those privileges and immunities of Unit-
ed States citizens which are protected against state encroachment,
it nevertheless felt obliged in the Slaughter-House Cases ‘‘to sug-
gest some which owe their existence to the Federal Government, its
National character, its Constitution, or its laws.’’ 17 Among those
which it then identified were the right of access to the seat of Gov-
ernment and to the seaports, subtreasuries, land officers, and
courts of justice in the several States, the right to demand protec-
tion of the Federal Government on the high seas or abroad, the
right of assembly, the privilege of habeas corpus, the right to use
the navigable waters of the United States, and rights secured by
treaty. In Twining v. New Jersey, 18 the Court recognized ‘‘among
the rights and privileges’’ of national citizenship the right to pass
freely from State to State, 19 the right to petition Congress for a re-
dress of grievances, 20 the right to vote for national officers, 21 the
16 Id. at 78–79.
17 Id. at 79.
18 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908).
19 Citing Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (65 Wall.) 35 (1868). It was observed in
United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 299 (1920), that the statute at issue in
Crandall was actually held to burden directly the performance by the United States
of its governmental functions. Cf. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 282, 491–92
(1849) (Chief Justice Taney dissenting). Four concurring Justices in Edwards v.
California, 314 U.S. 160, 177, 181 (1941), would have grounded a right of interstate
travel on the privileges and immunities clause. More recently, the Court declined
to ascribe a source but was content to assert the right to be protected. United States
v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629–31
(1969). Three Justices ascribed the source to this clause in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112, 285–87 (1970) (Justices Stewart and Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
20 Citing United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
21 Citing Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S.
58 (1900). Note Justice Douglas’ reliance on this clause in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112, 149 (1970) (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
right to enter public lands, 22 the right to be protected against vio-

lence while in the lawful custody of a United States marshal, 23 and
the right to inform the United States authorities of violation of its
laws. 24 Earlier, in a decision not mentioned in Twining, the Court
had also acknowledged that the carrying on of interstate commerce
is ‘‘a right which every citizen of the United States is entitled to
exercise.’’ 25
In modern times, the Court has continued the minor role ac-
corded to the clause, only occasionally manifesting a disposition to
enlarge the restraint which it imposes upon state action. Colgate
v. Harvey, 26 which was overruled five years later, 27 represented
the first attempt by the Court since adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment to convert the privileges and immunities clause into a
source of protection of other than those ‘‘interests growing out of
the relationship between the citizen and the national government.’’
Here, the Court declared that the right of a citizen resident in one
State to contract in another, to transact any lawful business, or to
make a loan of money, in any State other than that in which the
citizen resides was a privilege of national citizenship which was
abridged by a state income tax law excluding from taxable income
interest received on money loaned within the State. In Hague v.
CIO, 28 two and perhaps three justices thought that freedom to use
municipal streets and parks for the dissemination of information
concerning provisions of a federal statute and to assemble peace-
fully therein for discussion of the advantages and opportunities of-
fered by such act was a privilege and immunity of a United States
citizen, and in Edwards v. California 29 four Justices were prepared
to rely on the clause. 30 In Oyama v. California, 31 in a single sen-
tence the Court agreed with the contention of a native-born youth
that a state Alien Land Law, applied to work a forfeiture of prop-
erty purchased in his name with funds advanced by his parent, a
Japanese alien ineligible for citizenship and precluded from owning
land, deprived him ‘‘of his privileges as an American citizen.’’ The
right to acquire and retain property had previously not been set
22 Citing United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76 (1884).
23 Citing Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892).
24 Citing In re Quarles and Butler, 158 U.S. 532 (1895).
25 Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47, 57 (1891).
26 296 U.S. 404 (1935).
27 Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 93 (1940).
28 307 U.S. 496, 510–18 (1939) (Justices Roberts and Black; Chief Justice
Hughes may or may not have concurred on this point. Id. at 532). Justices Stone
and Reed preferred to base the decision on the due process clause. Id. at 518.
29 314 U.S. 160, 177–83 (1941).
30 See also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 149 (1970) (Justice Douglas); id.
at 285–87 (Justices Stewart and Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger).

31 332 U.S. 633, 640 (1948).
forth in any of the enumerations as one of the privileges protected

against state abridgment, although a federal statute enacted prior
to the proposal and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment did
confer on all citizens the same rights to purchase and hold real
property as white citizens enjoyed. 32
In other respects, however, claims based on this clause have
been rejected. 33
32 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, now 42 U.S.C. § 1982, as amend-
ed.
33 E.g., Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 380 (1898) (statute limiting hours of
labor in mines); Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900) (statute taxing the busi-
ness of hiring persons to labor outside the State); Wilmington Mining Co. v. Fulton,
205 U.S. 60, 73 (1907) (statute requiring employment of only licensed mine man-
agers and examiners and imposing liability on the mine owner for failure to furnish
a reasonably safe place for workmen); Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915); Crane
v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915) (statute restricting employment on state public
works to citizens of the United States, with a preference to citizens of the State);
Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Castle, 224 U.S. 541 (1912) (statute making railroads liable
to employees for injuries caused by negligence of fellow servants and abolishing the
defense of contributory negligence); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Milling Co., 218 U.S.
406 (1910) (statute prohibiting a stipulation against liability for negligence in deliv-
ery of interstate telegraph messages); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130,
139 (1873); In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894) (refusal of state court to license
a woman to practice law); Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U.S. 491, 499 (1879) (law tax-
ing a debt owed a resident citizen by a resident of another State and secured by
mortgage of land in the debtor’s State); Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129
(1874); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86,
91 (1890); Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U.S. 657 (1893) (statutes regulating the manufac-
ture and sale of intoxicating liquors); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (statute
regulating the method of capital punishment); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21
Wall.) 162 (1875) (statute regulating the franchise to male citizens); Pope v. Wil-
liams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904) (statute requiring persons coming into a State to make
a declaration of intention to become citizens and residents thereof before being per-
mitted to register as voters); Ferry v. Spokane, P. & S. Ry., 258 U.S. 314 (1922)
(statute restricting dower, in case wife at time of husband’s death is a nonresident,
to lands of which he died seized); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1876) (statute
restricting right to jury trial in civil suits at common law); Presser v. Illinois, 116
U.S. 252, 267 (1886) (statute restricting drilling or parading in any city by any body
of men without license of the Governor); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 596, 597–
98 (1900) (provision for prosecution upon information, and for a jury (except in cap-
ital cases) of eight persons); New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63,
71 (1928) (statute penalizing the becoming or remaining a member of any oathbound
association (other than benevolent orders, and the like) with knowledge that the as-
sociation has failed to file its constitution and membership lists); Palko v. Connecti-
cut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (statute allowing a State to appeal in criminal cases for
errors of law and to retry the accused); Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937)
(statute making the payment of poll taxes a prerequisite to the right to vote); Mad-
den v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 92–93 (1940), (overruling Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S.
404, 430 (1935)) (statute whereby deposits in banks outside the State are taxed at
50¢ per $100); Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944) (the right to become a can-
didate for state office is a privilege of state citizenship, not national citizenship);
MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948) (Illinois Election Code requirement that
a petition to form and nominate candidates for a new political party be signed by
at least 200 voters from each of at least 50 of the 102 counties in the State, notwith-
standing that 52% of the voters reside in only one county and 87% in the 49 most
populous counties); New York v. O’Neill, 359 U.S. 1 (1959) (Uniform Reciprocal
DUE PROCESS OF LAW

The Development of Substantive Due Process
Although many years after ratification the Court ventured the
not very informative observation that the Fourteenth Amendment
‘‘operates to extend . . . the same protection against arbitrary state
legislation, affecting life, liberty and property, as is offered by the
Fifth Amendment,’’ 34 and that ‘‘ordinarily if an act of Congress is
valid under the Fifth Amendment it would be hard to say that a
state law in like terms was void under the Fourteenth,’’ 35 the sig-
nificance of the due process clause as a restraint on state action ap-
pears to have been grossly underestimated by litigants no less than
by the Court in the years immediately following its adoption. From
the outset of our constitutional history due process of law as it oc-
curs in the Fifth Amendment had been recognized as a restraint
upon government, but, with the conspicuous exception of the Dred
Scott decision, 36 only in the narrower sense that a legislature must
provide ‘‘due process for the enforcement of law.’’
Thus, in the Slaughter-House Cases, 37 in which the clause was
invoked by a group of butchers challenging the validity of a Louisi-
ana statute which conferred upon one corporation the exclusive
privilege of butchering cattle in New Orleans, the Court declared
that the prohibition against a deprivation of property ‘‘has been in
the Constitution since the adoption of the Fifth Amendment, as a
restraint upon the Federal power. It is also to be found in some
forms of expression in the constitution of nearly all the States, as
a restraint upon the power of the States. . . . We are not without
judicial interpretation, therefore, both State and National, of the
meaning of this clause. And it is sufficient to say that under no
construction of that provision that we have ever seen, or any that
we deem admissible, can the restraint imposed by the State of Lou-
isiana upon the exercise of their trade by the butchers of New Orle-
ans be held to be a deprivation of property within the meaning of
that provision.’’ Four years later, in Munn v. Illinois, 38 the Court
again refused to interpret the due process clause as invalidating
State Law to secure attendance of witnesses from within or without a State in

criminal proceedings); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (a provision in a state
constitution to the effect that low-rent housing projects could not be developed, con-
structed, or acquired by any state governmental body without the affirmative vote
of a majority of those citizens participating in a community referendum).
34 Hibben v. Smith, 191 U.S. 310, 325 (1903).
35 Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 199 U.S. 401, 410 (1905). See also French v.
Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U.S. 324, 328 (1901).

36 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1857), is the exception.
37 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 80–81 (1873).
38 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1877).
state legislation regulating the rates charged for the transportation

and warehousing of grain. Rejecting contentions that such legisla-
tion effected an unconstitutional deprivation of property by pre-
venting the owner from earning a reasonable compensation for its
use and by transferring to the public an interest in a private enter-
prise, Chief Justice Waite emphasized that ‘‘the great office of stat-
utes is to remedy defects in the common law as they are developed.
. . . We know that this power [of rate regulation] may be abused;
but that is no argument against its existence. For protection
against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the polls,
not to the courts.’’
Deploring such attempts, nullified consistently in the preceding
cases, to convert the due process clause into a substantive restraint
on the powers of the States, Justice Miller in Davidson v. New Or-
leans, 39 obliquely counseled against a departure from the conven-
tional application of the clause, albeit he acknowledged the dif-
ficulty of arriving at a precise, all-inclusive definition thereof. ‘‘It
is not a little remarkable,’’ he observed, ‘‘that while this provision
has been in the Constitution of the United States, as a restraint
upon the authority of the Federal government, for nearly a century,
and while, during all that time, the manner in which the powers
of that government have been exercised has been watched with
jealousy, and subjected to the most rigid criticism in all its
branches, this special limitation upon its powers has rarely been
invoked in the judicial forum or the more enlarged theatre of public
discussion. But while it has been part of the Constitution, as a re-
straint upon the power of the States, only a very few years, the
docket of this court is crowded with cases in which we are asked
to hold that state courts and state legislatures have deprived their
own citizens of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
There is here abundant evidence that there exists some strange
misconception of the scope of this provision as found in the Four-
teenth Amendment. In fact, it would seem, from the character of
many of the cases before us, and the arguments made in them, that
the clause under consideration is looked upon as a means of bring-
ing to the test of the decision of this court the abstract opinions of
every unsuccessful litigant in a State court of the justice of the de-
cision against him, and of the merits of the legislation on which
such a decision may be founded. If, therefore, it were possible to
define what it is for a State to deprive a person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, in terms which would cover
every exercise of power thus forbidden to the State, and exclude
39 96 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1878).
those which are not, no more useful construction could be furnished

by this or any other court to any part of the fundamental of law.
‘‘But, apart from the imminent risk of a failure to give any def-
inition which would be at once perspicuous, comprehensive, and
satisfactory, there is wisdom . . . in the ascertaining of the intent
and application of such an important phrase in the Federal Con-
stitution, by the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion,
as the cases presented for decision shall require. . . .’’
A bare half-dozen years later, in again reaching a result in
harmony with past precedents, the Justices gave fair warning of
the imminence of a modification of their views. After noting that
the due process clause, by reason of its operation upon ‘‘all the
powers of government, legislative as well as executive and judicial,’’
could not be appraised solely in terms of the ‘‘sanction of settled
usage,’’ Justice Mathews, speaking for the Court in Hurtado v.
California, 40 declared that ‘‘[a]rbitrary power, enforcing its edicts
to the injury of the persons and property of its subjects, is not law,
whether manifested as the decree of a personal monarch or of an
impersonal multitude. And the limitations imposed by our constitu-
tional law upon the action of the governments, both state and na-
tional, are essential to the preservation of public and private
rights, notwithstanding the representative character of our political
institutions. The enforcement of these limitations by judicial proc-
ess is the device of self-governing communities to protect the rights
of individuals and minorities, as well against the power of num-
bers, as against the violence of public agents transcending the lim-
its of lawful authority, even when acting in the name and wielding
the force of the government.’’ Thus were the States put on notice
that every species of state legislation, whether dealing with proce-
dural or substantive rights, was subject to the scrutiny of the Court
when the question of its essential justice was raised.
What induced the Court to dismiss its fears of upsetting the
balance in the distribution of powers under the federal system and
to enlarge its own supervisory powers over state legislation was the
increasing number of cases seeking protection of property rights
against the remedial social legislation States were enacting in the
wake of industrial expansion. At the same time, the added empha-
sis on the due process clause afforded the Court an opportunity to
compensate for its earlier virtual nullification of the privileges and
immunities clause of the Amendment. So far as such modification
of its position needed to be justified in legal terms, theories con-
cerning the relation of government to private rights were available
40 110 U.S. 516, 528, 532, 536 (1884).
to demonstrate the impropriety of leaving to the state legislatures

the same ample range of police power they had enjoyed prior to the
Civil War. Preliminary to this consummation, however, the Slaugh-
ter-House Cases and Munn v. Illinois had to be overruled at least
in part, and the views of the dissenting Justices in those cases con-
verted into majority doctrine.
About twenty years were required to complete this process, in
the course of which the restricted view of the police power ad-
vanced by Justice Field in his dissent in Munn v. Illinois, 41 name-
ly, that it is solely a power to prevent injury, was in effect ratified
by the Court itself. This occurred in Mugler v. Kansas, 42 where the
power was defined as embracing no more than the power to pro-
mote public health, morals, and safety. During the same interval,
ideas embodying the social compact and natural rights, which had
been espoused by Justice Bradley in his dissent in the Slaughter-
House Cases, 43 had been transformed tentatively into constitu-
tionally enforceable limitations upon government. 44 The con-
sequence was that the States in exercising their police powers
could foster only those purposes of health, morals, and safety which
the Court had enumerated, and could employ only such means as
would not unreasonably interfere with the fundamentally natural
rights of liberty and property, which Justice Bradley had equated
with freedom to pursue a lawful calling and to make contracts for
that purpose. 45
So having narrowed the scope of the state’s police power in def-
erence to the natural rights of liberty and property, the Court next
proceeded to read into the concepts currently accepted theories of
laissez faire economics, reinforced by the doctrine of Social Darwin-
ism as elaborated by Herbert Spencer, to the end that ‘‘liberty,’’ in
41 94 U.S. 113, 141–48 (1877).
42 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887).
43 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 113–14, 116, 122 (1873).
44 Loan Association v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 662 (1875). ‘‘There are
. . . rights in every free government beyond the control of the State. . . . There are
limitations on [governmental power] which grow out of the essential nature of all
free governments. Implied reservations of individual rights, without which the social
compact could not exist. . . .’’
45 ‘‘Rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are equivalent to the
rights of life, liberty, and property. These are fundamental rights which can only
be taken away by due process of law, and which can only be interfered with, or the
enjoyment of which can only be modified, by lawful regulations necessary or proper
for the mutual good of all. . . . This right to choose one’s calling is an essential part
of that liberty which it is the object of government to protect; and a calling, when
chosen, is a man’s property right. . . . A law which prohibits a large class of citizens
from adopting a lawful employment, or from following a lawful employment pre-
viously adopted, does deprive them of liberty as well as property, without due proc-
ess of law.’’ Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 116, 122 (1873) (Justice
Bradley dissenting).
particular, became synonymous with governmental hands-off in the

field of private economic relations. In Budd v. New York, 46 Justice
Brewer in dictum declared: ‘‘The paternal theory of government is
to me odious. The utmost possible liberty to the individual, and the
fullest possible protection to him and his property, is both the limi-
tation and duty of government.’’ And to implement this point of
view the Court next undertook to water down the accepted maxim
that a state statute must be presumed to be valid until clearly
shown to be otherwise. 47 The first step was taken with opposite in-
tention. This occurred in Munn v. Illinois, 48 where the Court, in
sustaining the legislation before it, declared: ‘‘For our purposes we
must assume that, if a state of facts could exist that would justify
such legislation, it actually did exist when the statute now under
consideration was passed.’’ Ten years later, in Mugler v. Kansas, 49
this procedure was improved upon, and a state-wide anti-liquor law
was sustained on the basis of the proposition that deleterious social
effects of the excessive use of alcoholic liquors were sufficiently no-
torious for the Court to be able to take notice of them, that is to
say, for the Court to review and appraise the consideration which
had induced the legislature to enact the statute in the first place. 50
However, in Powell v. Pennsylvania, 51 decided the following year,
the Court, confronted with a similar act involving oleomargarine,
concerning which it was unable to claim a like measure of common
knowledge, fell back upon the doctrine of presumed validity and
sustained the measure, declaring that ‘‘it does not appear upon the
face of the statute, or from any of the facts of which the Court must
take judicial cognizance, that it infringes rights secured by the fun-
damental law.’’
In contrast to the presumed validity rule, under which the
Court ordinarily is not obliged to go beyond the record of evidence
submitted by the litigants in determining the validity of a statute,
the judicial notice principle, as developed in Mugler v. Kansas, car-
ried the inference that unless the Court, independently of the
record, is able to ascertain the existence of justifying facts acces-
sible to it by the rules governing judicial notice, it will be obliged
to invalidate a police power regulation as bearing no reasonable or
adequate relation to the purposes to be subserved by the latter;
46 143 U.S. 517, 551 (1892).
47 See Fletcher v. Peck, 10. U.S. (6 Cr.) 87, 128 (1810).
48 94 U.S. 113, 123, 182 (1877).
49 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
50 Id. at 662. ‘‘We cannot shut out of view the fact, within the knowledge of all,
that the public health, the public morals, and the public safety, may be endangered
by the general use of intoxicating drinks; nor the fact . . . that . . . pauperism, and
crime . . . are, in some degree, at least, traceable to this evil.’’
51 127 U.S. 678, 685 (1888).
namely, health, morals, or safety. For appraising state legislation

affecting neither liberty nor property, the Court found the rule of
presumed validity quite serviceable, but for invalidating legislation
constituting governmental interference in the field of economic re-
lations, and, more particularly, labor-management relations, the
Court found the principle of judicial notice more advantageous.
This advantage was enhanced by the disposition of the Court, in
litigation embracing the latter type of legislation, to shift the bur-
den of proof from the litigant charging unconstitutionality to the
State seeking enforcement. To the State was transferred the task
of demonstrating that a statute interfering with the natural right
of liberty or property was in fact ‘‘authorized’’ by the Constitution,
and not merely that the latter did not expressly prohibit enactment
of the same.
In 1934 the Court in Nebbia v. New York 52 discarded this ap-
proach to economic legislation, and has not since returned to it.
The modern approach was evidenced in a 1955 decision reversing
a lower court’s judgment invalidating a state statutory scheme reg-
ulating the sale of eyeglasses to the advantage of ophthalmologists
and optometrists in private professional practice and adversely to
opticians and to those employed by or using space in business es-
tablishments. ‘‘The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state
laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they
may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular
school of thought. . . . We emphasize again what Chief Justice
Waite said in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134, ‘For protection
against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the polls,
not to the courts.’ ’’ 53 Yet the Court went on to assess the reasons
which might have justified the legislature in prescribing the regu-
lation at issue, leaving open the possibility that some regulation
might be found unreasonable. 54 More recent decisions, however,
have limited inquiry to whether the legislation is arbitrary or irra-
tional, and have not addressed ‘‘reasonableness.’’ 55
52 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
53 Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
54 Id. at 487, 491.
55 The Court has pronounced a strict ‘‘hands-off’’ standard of judicial review,
whether of congressional or state legislative efforts to structure and accommodate

the burdens and benefits of economic life. Such legislation is to be ‘‘accorded the tra-
ditional presumption of constitutionality generally accorded economic regulations’’
and is to be ‘‘upheld absent proof of arbitrariness or irrationality on the part of Con-
gress.’’ That the accommodation among interests which the legislative branch has
struck ‘‘may have profound and far-reaching consequences . . . provides all the more
reason for this Court to defer to the congressional judgment unless it is demon-
strably arbitrary or irrational.’’ Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study
Group, 438 U.S. 59, 83–84 (1978). See also Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.,
‘‘Persons’’ Defined.—Notwithstanding the historical con-

troversy that has been waged concerning whether the framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment intended the word ‘‘person’’ to mean
only natural persons, or whether the word was substituted for the
word ‘‘citizen’’ with a view to protecting corporations from oppres-
sive state legislation, 56 the Supreme Court, as early as the Grang-
er Cases, 57 decided in 1877, upheld on the merits various state
laws without raising any question as to the status of railway cor-
poration plaintiffs to advance due process contentions. There is no
doubt that a corporation may not be deprived of its property with-
out due process of law, 58 and although prior decisions had held
that the ‘‘liberty’’ guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment is the
liberty of natural, not artificial, persons, 59 nevertheless a news-
paper corporation was sustained, in 1936, in its objection that a
state law deprived it of liberty of press. 60 As to the natural persons
protected by the due process clause, these include all human beings
regardless of race, color, or citizenship. 61
Ordinarily, the mere interest of an official as such, in contrast
to an actual injury sustained by a natural or artificial person
through invasion of personal or property rights, has not been
428 U.S. 1, 14–20 (1976); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 333 (1981); New Motor
Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 106–08 (1978); Exxon Corp. v. Gov-
ernor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 124–25 (1978); Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen
v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R., 393 U.S. 129, 143 (1968); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S.
726, 730, 733 (1963).
56 See Graham, The ‘‘Conspiracy Theory’’ of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 YALE
L. J. 371 (1938).
57 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877). In a case arising under the Fifth Amend-
ment, decided almost at the same time, the Court explicitly declared the United
States ‘‘equally with the States . . . are prohibited from depriving persons or cor-
porations of property without due process of law.’’ Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700,
718–19 (1879).
58 Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 522, 526 (1898); Kentucky Co. v. Paramount
Exch., 262 U.S. 544, 550 (1923); Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928).
59 Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906); Western Turf
Ass’n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 363 (1907); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 535 (1925). Earlier, in Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197,
362 (1904), a case interpreting the federal antitrust law, Justice Brewer, in a con-
curring opinion, had declared that ‘‘a corporation . . . is not endowed with the in-
alienable rights of a natural person.’’
60 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936) (‘‘a corporation is
a ‘person’ within the meaning of the equal protection and due process of law
clauses’’). In First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), faced with
the validity of state restraints upon expression by corporations, the Court did not
determine that corporations have First Amendment liberty rights—and other con-
stitutional rights—but decided instead that expression was protected, irrespective of
the speaker, because of the interests of the listeners. See id. at 778 n.14 (reserving
question). But see id. at 809, 822 (Justices White and Rehnquist dissenting) (cor-
porations as creatures of the state have the rights state gives them).
61 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197,
216 (1923). See Hellenic Lines v. Rhodetis, 398 U.S. 306, 309 (1970).
deemed adequate to enable him to invoke the protection of the

Fourteenth Amendment against state action. 62 Similarly, munici-
pal corporations are viewed as having no standing ‘‘to invoke the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment in opposition to the will
of their creator,’’ the State. 63 However, state officers are acknowl-
edged to have an interest, despite their not having sustained any
‘‘private damage,’’ in resisting an ‘‘endeavor to prevent the enforce-
ment of laws in relation to which they have official duties,’’ and,
accordingly, may apply to federal courts for the ‘‘review of decisions
of state courts declaring state statutes which [they] seek to enforce
to be repugnant to the’’ Fourteenth Amendment. 64
Police Power Defined and Limited.—The police power of a
State today embraces regulations designed to promote the public
convenience or the general prosperity as well as those to promote
public safety, health, and morals, and is not confined to the sup-
pression of what is offensive, disorderly, or unsanitary, but extends
to what is for the greatest welfare of the state. 65
Because the police power is the least limitable of the exercises
of government, such limitations as are applicable are not readily
definable. These limitations can be determined, therefore, only
62 Pennie v. Reis, 132 U.S. 464 (1889); Taylor and Marshall v. Beckham (No.
1), 178 U.S. 548 (1900); Tyler v. Judges of Court of Registration, 179 U.S. 405, 410
(1900); Straus v. Foxworth, 231 U.S. 162 (1913); Columbus & G. Ry. v. Miller, 283
U.S. 96 (1931).
63 City of Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil Co., 250 U.S. 394 (1919); City of Trenton
v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923); Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36
(1933). But see Madison School Dist. v. WERC, 429 U.S. 167, 175 n.7 (1976) (reserv-
ing question whether municipal corporation as an employer has a First Amendment
right assertable against State).
64 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 441, 442, 443, 445 (1939); Boynton v. Hutch-
inson Gas Co., 291 U.S. 656 (1934); South Carolina Hwy. Dept. v. Barnwell Bros.,
303 U.S. 177 (1938).
The converse is not true, however, and the interest of a state official in vindicat-
ing the Constitution gives him no legal standing to attack the constitutionality of
a state statute in order to avoid compliance with it. Smith v. Indiana, 191 U.S. 138
(1903); Braxton County Court v. West Virginia, 208 U.S. 192 (1908); Marshall v.
Dye, 231 U.S. 250 (1913); Stewart v. Kansas City, 239 U.S. 14 (1915). See also Cole-
man v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 437–46 (1939).
65 Long ago Chief Justice Marshall described the police power as ‘‘that immense
mass of legislation, which embraces every thing within the territory of a State, not
surrendered to the general government.’’ Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,
202 (1824). See California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Works, 199 U.S. 306, 318
(1905); Chicago B. & Q. Ry. v. Drainage Comm’rs, 200 U.S. 561, 592 (1906); Bacon
v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311 (1907); Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912);
Schmidinger v. Chicago, 226 U.S. 578 (1913); Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 58–
59 (1915); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v.
Walters, 294 U.S. 405 (1935). See also Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (police power encompasses preservation of historic land-
marks; land-use restrictions may be enacted to enhance the quality of life by pre-
serving the character and aesthetic features of city); City of New Orleans v. Dukes,
427 U.S. 297 (1976); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
through appropriate regard to the subject matter of the exercise of

that power. 66 ‘‘It is settled [however] that neither the ‘contract’
clause nor the ‘due process’ clause had the effect of overriding the
power of the state to establish all regulations that are reasonably
necessary to secure the health, safety, good order, comfort, or gen-
eral welfare of the community; that this power can neither be abdi-
cated nor bargained away, and is inalienable even by express
grant; and that all contract and property [or other vested] rights
are held subject to its fair exercise.’’ 67 Insofar as the police power
is utilized by a State, the means employed to effect its exercise can
be neither arbitrary nor oppressive but must bear a real and sub-
stantial relation to an end which is public, specifically, the public
health, public safety, or public morals, or some other phase of the
general welfare. 68
A general rule often invoked is that if a police power regulation
goes too far, it will be recognized as a taking of property for which
compensation must be paid. 69 Yet where mutual advantage is a
sufficient compensation, an ulterior public advantage may justify a
comparatively insignificant taking of private property for what in
its immediate purpose seems to be a private use. 70 On the other
hand, mere ‘‘cost and inconvenience (different words, probably, for
the same thing) would have to be very great before they could be-
come an element in the consideration of the right of a state to exert
its reserved power or its police power.’’ 71 Moreover, it is elemen-
tary that enforcement of uncompensated obedience to a regulation
passed in the legitimate exertion of the police power is not a taking
without due process of law. 72 Similarly, initial compliance with a
regulation which is valid when adopted occasions no forfeiture of
the right to protest when that regulation subsequently loses its va-
lidity by becoming confiscatory in its operation. 73
66 Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908); Eubank v. Richmond,
226 U.S. 137, 142 (1912); Erie R.R. v. Williams, 233 U.S. 685, 699 (1914); Sligh v.
Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 58–59 (1915); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915);
Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917); Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. v.
Highway Comm’n, 294 U.S. 613, 622 (1935).
67 Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 558 (1914).
68 Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 111–12 (1928); Treigle v. Acme Home-
stead Ass’n, 297 U.S. 189, 197 (1936).

69 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Welch v. Swasey, 214
U.S. 91, 107 (1909). See also Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104 (1978); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). See supra, pp. 1382–
95.
70 Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 110 (1911).
71 Erie R.R. v. Williams, 233 U.S. 685, 700 (1914).
72 New Orleans Public Service v. New Orleans, 281 U.S. 682, 687 (1930).
73 Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.S. 765, 776 (1931).
‘‘Liberty’’.—The ‘‘liberty’’ guaranteed by the due process clause

has been variously defined by the Court, as will be seen herein-
after. In general, in the early years, it meant almost exclusively
‘‘liberty of contract,’’ but with the demise of liberty of contract came
a general broadening of ‘‘liberty’’ to include personal, political and
social rights and privileges. 74 Nonetheless, the Court is generally
chary of expanding the concept absent statutorily recognized
rights. 75
Liberty of Contract
Regulatory Labor Laws Generally.—Liberty of contract, a
concept originally advanced by Justices Bradley and Field in the
Slaughter-House Cases, 76 was elevated to the status of accepted
doctrine in Allgeyer v. Louisiana. 77 Applied repeatedly in subse-
quent cases as a restraint on federal and state power, freedom of
contract was also alluded to as a property right, as is evident in
the language of the Court in Coppage v. Kansas. 78 ‘‘Included in the
right of personal liberty and the right of private property—partak-
ing of the nature of each—is the right to make contracts for the ac-
quisition of property. Chief among such contracts is that of per-
sonal employment, by which labor and other services are ex-
changed for money or other forms of property. If this right be
74 See the tentative effort in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102 &
n.23 (1976), apparently to expand upon the concept of ‘‘liberty’’ within the meaning
of the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause and necessarily therefore the Four-
teenth’s.
75 See the substantial confinement of the concept in Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S.
215 (1976); and Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976), in which the Court ap-
plied to its determination of what is a liberty interest the ‘‘entitlement’’ doctrine de-
veloped in property cases, in which the interest is made to depend upon state rec-
ognition of the interest through positive law, an approach contrary to previous due
process-liberty analysis. Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). For more
recent cases, see DeShaney v. Winnebago County Social Servs. Dep’t, 489 U.S. 189
(1989) (no Due Process violation for failure of state to protect an abused child from
his parent, even though abuse had been detected by social service agency); Collins
v. City of Harker Heights, 112 S. Ct. 1061 (1992) (failure of city to warn its employ-
ees about workplace hazards does not violate due process; the due process clause
does not impose a duty on the city to provide employees with a safe working envi-
ronment).
76 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
77 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897). ‘‘The liberty mentioned in that [Fourteenth] Amend-
ment means not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical re-
straint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the
right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties, to be free to use
them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by
any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to
enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying
out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned.’’
78 236 U.S. 1, 14 (1915).
struck down or arbitrarily interfered with, there is a substantial

impairment of liberty in the long-established constitutional sense.’’
By a process of reasoning that was almost completely discarded
during the Depression, the Court was nevertheless able, prior
thereto, to sustain state ameliorative legislation by acknowledging
that freedom of contract was ‘‘a qualified and not an absolute right.
. . . Liberty implies the absence of arbitrary restraint, not immu-
nity from reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in the
interest of the community. . . . In dealing with the relation of the
employer and employed, the legislature has necessarily a wide field
of discretion in order that there may be suitable protection of
health and safety, and that peace and good order may be promoted
through regulations designed to insure wholesome conditions of
work and freedom from oppression.’’ 79
While continuing to acknowledge in abstract terms that free-
dom of contract is not absolute, the Court in fact was committed
to the principle that freedom of contract is the general rule and
that legislative authority to abridge it could be justified only by ex-
ceptional circumstances. To maintain such abridgments at a mini-
mum, the Court intermittently employed the rule of judicial notice
in a manner best exemplified by a comparison of the early cases
of Holden v. Hardy 80 and Lochner v. New York, 81 decisions which
bear the same relation to each other as Powell v. Pennsylvania 82
and Mugler v. Kansas. 83
In Holden v. Hardy, 84 the Court, in reliance upon the principle
of presumed validity, allowed the burden of proof to remain with
those attacking the validity of a statute and upheld a Utah act lim-
iting the period of labor in mines to eight hours per day. Taking
cognizance of the fact that labor below the surface of the earth was
attended by risk to person and to health and for these reasons had
long been the subject of state intervention, the Court registered its
willingness to sustain a limitation on freedom of contract which a
state legislature had adjudged ‘‘necessary for the preservation of
health of employees,’’ and for which there were ‘‘reasonable
grounds for believing that . . . [it was] supported by the facts.’’
Seven years later, however, a radically altered Court was pre-
disposed in favor of the doctrine of judicial notice, and applied that
79 Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 567, 570 (1911). See also
Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court, 262 U.S. 522, 534 (1923).
80 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
81 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
82 127 U.S. 678 (1888).
83 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
84 169 U.S. 366, 398 (1898).
doctrine to conclude in Lochner v. New York 85 that a law restrict-

ing employment in bakeries to ten hours per day and 60 hours per
week was an unconstitutional interference with the right of adult
laborers, sui juris, to contract for their means of livelihood. Deny-
ing that in so holding the Court was in effect substituting its own
judgment for that of the legislature, Justice Peckham nevertheless
maintained that whether the act was within the police power of the
State was a ‘‘question that must be answered by the Court,’’ and
then, in disregard of the accumulated medical evidence proffered in
support of the act, uttered the following observation. ‘‘In looking
through statistics regarding all trades and occupations, it may be
true that the trade of a baker does not appear to be as healthy as
some trades, and is also vastly more healthy than still others. To
the common understanding the trade of a baker has never been re-
garded as an unhealthy one. . . . It might be safely affirmed that
almost all occupations more or less affect the health. . . . But are
we all, on that account, at the mercy of the legislative majori-
ties?’’ 86
Two dissenting opinions were filed in the case. Justice Harlan,
pointing to the abundance of medical testimony tending to show
that the life expectancy of bakers was below average, that their ca-
pacity to resist diseases was low, and that they were peculiarly
prone to suffer irritations of the eyes, lungs, and bronchial pas-
sages, concluded that the very existence of such evidence left the
reasonableness of the measure open to discussion and that the lat-
ter fact of itself put the statute within legislative discretion. ‘‘The
responsibility therefor rests upon the legislators, not upon the
courts. No evils arising from such legislation could be more far
reaching than those that might come to our system of government
if the judiciary, abandoning the sphere assigned to it by the fun-
damental law, should enter the domain of legislation, and upon
grounds merely of justice or reason or wisdom annul statutes that
had received the sanction of the people’s representatives. . . . [T]he
public interests imperatively demand that legislative enactments
should be recognized and enforced by the courts as embodying the
will of the people, unless they are plainly and palpably, beyond all
question, in violation of the fundamental law of the Constitu-
tion.’’ 87
The second dissenting opinion, written by Justice Holmes, has
received the greater measure of attention because the views ex-
pressed therein were a forecast of the line of reasoning to be fol-
85 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
86 Id. at 58–59.
87 Id. at 71, 74 (quoting Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 223 (1903)).
lowed by the Court some decades later. ‘‘This case is decided upon
an economic theory which a large part of the country does not en-
tertain. If it were a question whether I agreed with that theory, I
should desire to study it further and long before making up my
mind. But I do not conceive that to be my duty, because I strongly
believe that my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with
the right of a majority to embody their opinions in law. It is settled
by various decisions of this court that state constitutions and state
laws may regulate life in many ways which we as legislators might
think as injudicious or if you like as tyrannical as this, and which
equally with this interfere with the liberty to contract. . . . The
Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s So-
cial Statics. . . . But a constitution is not intended to embody a
particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic
relations of the citizen to the state or of laissez faire. It is made
for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our
finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and even
shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question
whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution.
. . . I think that the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is
perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a domi-
nant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man
necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe
fundamental principles as they have been understood by the tradi-
tions of our people and our law.’’ 88
In part, Justice Holmes’ criticism of his colleagues was unfair,
for his ‘‘rational and fair man’’ could not function in a vacuum, and,
in appraising the constitutionality of state legislation, could no
more avoid being guided by his preferences or ‘‘economic predi-
lections’’ than were the Justices constituting the majority. Insofar
as he accepted the broader conception of due process of law in pref-
erence to the historical concept thereof as pertaining to the enforce-
ment rather than the making of law, and did not affirmatively ad-
vocate a return to the maxim that the possibility of abuse is no ar-
gument against possession of a power, Justice Holmes, whether
consciously or not, was thus prepared to observe, along with his op-
ponents in the majority, the very practices which were deemed to
have rendered inevitable the assumption by the Court of a ‘‘perpet-
ual censorship’’ over state legislation. The basic distinction, there-
fore, between the positions taken by Justice Peckham for the ma-
jority and Justice Holmes, for what was then the minority, was the
88 198 U.S. at 75–76 (1905).
espousal of the conflicting doctrines of judicial notice by the former

and of presumed validity by the latter.
Although the Holmes dissent bore fruit in time in the form of
the Bunting v. Oregon 89 and Muller v. Oregon 90 decisions modify-
ing Lochner, the doctrinal approach employed in the earlier of
these by Justice Brewer continued to prevail until the Depression
in the 1930’s. In view of the shift in the burden of proof which ap-
plication of the principle of judicial notice entailed, counsel defend-
ing the constitutionality of social legislation developed the practice
of submitting voluminous factual briefs replete with medical or
other scientific data intended to establish beyond question a sub-
stantial relationship between the challenged statute and public
health, safety, or morals. Whenever the Court was disposed to up-
hold measures pertaining to industrial relations, such as laws lim-
iting hours of work, 91 it generally intimated that the facts thus
submitted by way of justification had been authenticated suffi-
ciently for it to take judicial cognizance thereof. On the other hand,
whenever it chose to invalidate comparable legislation, such as en-
actments establishing minimum wage for women and children, 92 it
brushed aside such supporting data, proclaimed its inability to per-
ceive any reasonable connection between the statute and the legiti-
mate objectives of health or safety, and condemned the statute as
an arbitrary interference with freedom of contract.
During the great Depression, however, the laissez faire tenet of
self-help was supplanted by the belief that it is peculiarly the duty
of government to help those who are unable to help themselves. To
sustain remedial legislation enacted in conformity with the latter
philosophy, the Court had to revise extensively its previously for-
mulated concepts of ‘‘liberty’’ under the due process clause. Not
only did the Court take judicial notice of the demands for relief
arising from the Depression when it overturned prior holdings and
sustained minimum wage legislation, 93 but, in upholding state leg-
islation designed to protect workers in their efforts to organize and
bargain collectively, the Court had to reconsider the scope of an
89 243 U.S. 426 (1917).
90 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
91 Id.
92 Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Stettler v. O’Hara, 243
U.S. 629 (1917); Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
93 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). Thus the National
Labor Relations Act was declared not to ‘‘interfere with the normal exercise of the
right of the employer to select its employees or to discharge them.’’ However, re-
straint of the employer for the purpose of preventing an unjust interference with
the correlative right of his employees to organize was declared not to be arbitrary.
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 44, 45–46 (1937).
employer’s liberty of contract and recognize a correlative liberty of

employees that state legislatures could protect.
To the extent that it acknowledged that liberty of the individ-
ual may be infringed by the coercive conduct of other individuals
no less than by the arbitrary action of public officials, the Court in
effect transformed the due process clause into a source of encour-
agement to state legislatures to intervene affirmatively to mitigate
the effects of such coercion. By such modification of its views, lib-
erty, in the constitutional sense of freedom resulting from restraint
upon government, was replaced by the civil liberty which an indi-
vidual enjoys by virtue of the restraints which government, in his
behalf, imposes upon his neighbors.
Laws Regulating Hours of Labor.—Even during the
Lochner era, the due process clause was construed as permitting
enactment by the States of maximum hours laws applicable to
women workers 94 and to workers in specified lines of work thought
to be physically demanding or otherwise worthy of special protec-
tion. 95 Because of the almost plenary powers of the State and its
municipal subdivisions to determine the conditions for work on
public projects, statutes limiting the hours of labor on public works
were also upheld at a relatively early date. 96
Laws Regulating Labor in Mines.—The regulation of mines
being patently within the police power, States during this period
were also upheld in the enactment of laws providing for appoint-
ment of mining inspectors and requiring payment of their fees by
mine owners, 97 compelling employment of only licensed mine man-
agers and mine examiners, and imposing upon mine owners liabil-
ity for the willful failure of their manager and examiner to furnish
a reasonably safe place for workmen. 98 Other similar regulations
which have been sustained have included laws requiring that un-
derground passageways meet or exceed a minimum width, 99 that
boundary pillars be installed between adjoining coal properties as
94 Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915) (statute limiting work to 8 hours/day,
48 hours/week); Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385 (1915) (same restrictions for
women working as pharmacists or student nurses). See also Muller v. Oregon, 208
U.S. 412 (1908) (10 hours/day as applied to work in laundries); Riley v. Massachu-
setts, 232 U.S. 671 (1914) (violation of lunch hour required to be posted).
95 See, e.g., Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898) (statute limiting the hours of
labor in mines and smelters to eight hours per day); Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S.
426 (1917) (statute limiting to ten hours per day, with the possibility of 3 hours per
day of overtime at time-and-a-half pay, work in any mill, factory, or manufacturing
establishment).
96 Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207 (1903).
97 St. Louis Consol. Coal Co. v. Illinois, 185 U.S. 203 (1902).
98 Wilmington Mining Co. v. Fulton, 205 U.S. 60 (1907).
99 Barrett v. Indiana, 229 U.S. 26 (1913).
a protection against flood in case of abandonment, 100 and that

washhouses be provided for employees. 101
Law Prohibiting Employment of Children in Hazardous
Occupations.—To make effective its prohibition against the em-
ployment of persons under 16 years of age in dangerous occupa-
tions, a State has been held to be competent to require employers
at their peril to ascertain whether their employees are in fact
below that age. 102
Laws Regulating Payment of Wages.—No unconstitutional
deprivation of liberty of contract was deemed to have been occa-
sioned by a statute requiring redemption in cash of store orders or
other evidences of indebtedness issued by employers in payment of
wages. 103 Nor was any constitutional defect discernible in laws re-
quiring railroads to pay their employees semimonthly 104 and to
pay them on the day of discharge, without abatement or reduction,
any funds due them. 105 Similarly, freedom of contract was held not
to be infringed by an act requiring that miners, whose compensa-
tion was fixed on the basis of weight, be paid according to coal in
the mine car rather than at a certain price per ton for coal
screened after it has been brought to the surface, and conditioning
such payment on the presence of no greater percentage of dirt or
impurities than that ascertained as unavoidable by the State In-
dustrial Commission. 106
Minimum Wage Laws.—The theory that a law prescribing
minimum wages for women and children violates due process by
impairing freedom of contract was finally discarded in 1937. 107 The
modern theory of the Court, particularly when labor is the bene-
ficiary of legislation, was stated by Justice Douglas for a majority
of the Court, in the following terms: ‘‘Our recent decisions make
plain that we do not sit as a superlegislature to weigh the wisdom
of legislation nor to decide whether the policy which it expresses
offends the public welfare. The legislative power has limits. . . .
But the state legislatures have constitutional authority to experi-
ment with new techniques; they are entitled to their own standard
100 Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531 (1914).
101 Booth v. Indiana, 237 U.S. 391 (1915).
102 Sturges & Burn v. Beauchamp, 231 U.S. 320 (1913).
103 Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U.S. 13 (1901); Dayton Coal and Iron Co.
v. Barton, 183 U.S. 23 (1901); Keokee Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U.S. 224 (1914).
104 Erie R.R. v. Williams, 233 U.S. 685 (1914).
105 St. Louis, I. Mt. & S.P. Ry. v. Paul, 173 U.S. 404 (1899).
106 Rail Coal Co. v. Ohio Industrial Comm’n, 236 U.S. 338 (1915). See also
McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539 (1909).

107 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (overruling Adkins v.
Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), a Fifth Amendment case); Morehead v.
New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
of the public welfare; they may within extremely broad limits con-
trol practices in the business-labor field, so long as specific con-
stitutional prohibitions are not violated and so long as conflicts
with valid and controlling federal laws are avoided.’’ 108 Proceeding
from this basis the Court sustained a Missouri statute giving em-
ployees the right to absent themselves four hours on election day,
between the opening and closing of the polls, without deduction of
wages for their absence.
It was admitted that this was a minimum wage law, but, said
Justice Douglas, ‘‘the protection of the right of suffrage under our
scheme of things is basic and fundamental,’’ and hence within the
police power. ‘‘Of course,’’ the Justice added, ‘‘many forms of regula-
tion reduce the net return of the enterprise. . . . Most regulations
of business necessarily impose financial burdens on the enterprise
for which no compensation is paid. Those are part of the costs of
our civilization. Extreme cases are conjured up where an employer
is required to pay wages for a period that has no relation to the
legitimate end. Those cases can await decision as and when they
arise. The present law has no such infirmity. It is designed to
eliminate any penalty for exercising the right of suffrage and to re-
move a practical obstacle to getting out the vote. The public welfare
is a broad and inclusive concept. The moral, social, economic, and
physical well-being of the community is one part of it; the political
well-being, another. The police power which is adequate to fix the
financial burden for one is adequate for the other. The judgment
of the legislature that time out for voting should cost the employee
nothing may be a debatable one. It is indeed conceded by the oppo-
sition to be such. But if our recent cases mean anything, they leave
debatable issues as respects business, economic, and social affairs
to legislative decision. We could strike down this law only if we re-
turned to the philosophy of the Lochner, Coppage, and Adkins
cases.’’ 109
Workers’ Compensation Laws.—‘‘This court repeatedly has
upheld the authority of the States to establish by legislation depar-
tures from the fellow-servant rule and other common-law rules af-
fecting the employer’s liability for personal injuries to the em-
ployee.’’ 110 ‘‘These decisions have established the propositions that
the rules of law concerning the employer’s responsibility for per-
sonal injury or death of an employee arising in the course of em-
108 Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952).
109 Id.at 424–25. See also Dean v. Gadsden Times Pub. Co., 412 U.S. 543 (1973)
(sustaining statute providing that employee excused for jury duty should be entitled
to full compensation from employer, less jury service fee).
110 New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 200 (1917).
ployment are not beyond alteration by legislation in the public in-

terest; that no person has a vested right entitling him to have
these any more than other rules of law remain unchanged for his
benefit; and that, if we exclude arbitrary and unreasonable
changes, liability may be imposed upon the employer without fault,
and the rules respecting his responsibility to one employee for the
negligence of another and respecting contributory negligence and
assumption of risk are subject to legislative change.’’ 111 Accord-
ingly, a state statute which provided an exclusive system to govern
the liabilities of employers and the rights of employees and their
dependents to compensation for disabling injuries and death caused
by accident in certain hazardous occupations, 112 was held not to
work a denial of due process in rendering the employer liable irre-
spective of the doctrines of negligence, contributory negligence, as-
sumption of risk, and negligence of fellow-servants, nor in depriv-
ing the employee or his dependents of the higher damages which,
in some cases, might be rendered under these doctrines. 113 Like-
wise, an act which allowed an injured employee an election of rem-
edies permitting restricted recovery under a compensation law al-
though guilty of contributory negligence, and full compensatory
damages under the Employers’ Liability Act, did not deprive an
employer of his property without due process of law. 114
The imposition upon coal mine operators, and ultimately coal
consumers, of the liability of compensating former employees who
terminated work in the industry before passage of the law for black
lung disabilities contracted in the course of their work was sus-
tained by the Court as a rational measure to spread the costs of
the employees’ disabilities to those who have profited from the
fruits of their labor. 115 Legislation readjusting rights and burdens
is not unlawful solely because it upsets otherwise settled expecta-
tions, but it must take account of the realities previously existing,
i.e., that the danger may not have been known or appreciated, or
that actions might have been taken in reliance upon the current
state of the law; therefore, legislation imposing liability on the
basis of deterrence or of blameworthiness might not have passed
muster.
111 Arizona Employers’ Liability Cases, 250 U.S. 400, 419–20 (1919).
112 In determining what occupations may be brought under the designation of
‘‘hazardous,’’ the legislature may carry the idea to the ‘‘vanishing point.’’ Ward &
Gow v. Krinsky, 259 U.S. 503, 520 (1922).
113 New York Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917); Mountain Timber Co.
v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917).

114 Arizona Employers’ Liability Cases, 250 U.S. 400 (1919).
115 Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 14–20 (1976). But see id.
at 38 (Justice Powell concurring).

Contracts limiting liability for injuries, consummated in ad-

vance of the injury received, may be prohibited by the legislature,
which may further stipulate that subsequent acceptance of benefits
under such contracts shall not constitute satisfaction of a claim for
injuries thereafter sustained. 116 Also, as applied to a nonresident
alien employee hired within the State but injured outside, an act
forbidding any contracts exempting employers from liability for in-
juries outside the State has been construed as not denying due
process to the employer. 117 The fact that a State, after having al-
lowed employers to cover their liability with a private insurer, sub-
sequently withdrew that privilege and required them to contribute
to a state insurance fund was held to effect no unconstitutional
deprivation as applied to an employer who had obtained protection
from an insurance company before this change went into effect. 118
As long as the right to come under a workmen’s compensation stat-
ute is optional with an employer, the latter, having chosen to ac-
cept benefits thereof, is estopped from attempting to escape its bur-
dens by challenging the constitutionality of a provision thereof
which makes the finding of fact of an industrial commission conclu-
sive if supported by any evidence regardless of its preponder-
ance. 119
When, by the terms of a workers’ compensation statute, the
wrongdoer, in case of wrongful death, is obliged to indemnify the
employer or the insurance carrier of the employer of the decedent,
in the amount which the latter were required under the act to con-
tribute into special compensation funds, no unconstitutional depri-
vation of the wrongdoer’s property was discernible. 120 By the same
course of reasoning neither the employer nor the carrier was held
to have been denied due process by another provision in an act re-
quiring payments by them, in case an injured employee dies with-
out dependents, into special funds to be used for vocational reha-
bilitation or disability compensation of injured workers of other es-
tablishments. 121 Compensation also need not be based exclusively
on loss of earning power, and an award authorized by statute for
injuries resulting in disfigurement of the face or head, independent
of compensation for inability to work, has been conceded to be nei-
ther an arbitrary nor oppressive exercise of the police power. 122
116 Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549 (1911).
117 Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Industrial Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
118 Thornton v. Duffy, 254 U.S. 361 (1920).
119 Booth Fisheries v. Industrial Comm’n, 271 U.S. 208 (1926).
120 Staten Island Ry. v. Phoenix Co., 281 U.S. 98 (1930).
121 Sheehan Co. v. Shuler, 265 U.S. 371 (1924); New York State Rys. v. Shuler,
265 U.S. 379 (1924).

122 New York Cent. R.R. v. Bianc, 250 U.S. 596 (1919). Attorneys are not de-
prived of property or their liberty of contract by restriction imposed by the State

Collective Bargaining.—During the 1930s, liberty, as trans-

lated into what one Justice labeled the Allgeyer-Lochner-Adair-
Coppage doctrine, 123 lost its potency as an obstacle to legislation
calculated to enhance the bargaining capacity of workers as against
that already possessed by their employers. Prior to the manifesta-
tion, in Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 124 of a greater willingness to
defer to legislative judgment as to the wisdom and need of such en-
actments, the Court had, on occasion, sustained measures affecting
the employment relationship, e.g., a statute requiring every cor-
poration to furnish, upon request by any employee being dis-
charged or leaving its service, a letter, signed by the superintend-
ent or manager, setting forth the nature and duration of the em-
ployee’s service and the true cause for leaving. 125 Added provisions
that such letters should be on plain paper selected by the em-
on the fees which they may charge in cases arising under the workmen’s compensa-
tion law. Yeiser v. Dysart, 267 U.S. 540 (1925).
123 Justice Black in Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal
Co., 335 U.S. 525, 535 (1949). In his concurring opinion, contained in the companion
case of AFL v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 543–44 (1949), Justice
Frankfurter summarized the now obsolete doctrines employed by the Court to strike
down state laws fostering unionization. ‘‘[U]nionization encountered the shibboleths
of a premachine age and these were reflected in juridical assumptions that survived
the facts on which they were based. Adam Smith was treated as though his gen-
eralizations had been imparted to him on Sinai and not as a thinker who addressed
himself to the elimination of restrictions which had become fetters upon initiative
and enterprise in his day. Basic human rights expressed by the constitutional con-
ception of ‘liberty’ were equated with theories of laissez faire. The result was that
economic views of confined validity were treated by lawyers and judges as though
the Framers had enshrined them in the Constitution. . . . The attitude which re-
garded any legislative encroachment upon the existing economic order as infected
with unconstitutionality led to disrespect for legislative attempts to strengthen the
wage-earners’ bargaining power. With that attitude as a premise, Adair v. United
States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915), followed
logically enough; not even Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921), could be consid-
ered unexpected.’’
In Adair and Coppage the Court voided statutes outlawing ‘‘yellow dog’’ con-
tracts whereby, as a condition of obtaining employment, a worker had to agree not
to join or to remain a member of a union; these laws, the Court ruled, impaired the
employer’s ‘‘freedom of contract’’—the employer’s unrestricted right to hire and fire.
In Truax, the Court on similar grounds invalidated an Arizona statute which denied
the use of injunctions to employers seeking to restrain picketing and various other
communicative actions by striking employees. And in Wolff Co. v. Industrial Court,
262 U.S. 522 (1923); 267 U.S. 552 (1925) and Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286
(1924), the Court had also ruled that a statute compelling employers and employees
to submit their controversies over wages and hours to state arbitration was uncon-
stitutional as part of a system compelling employers and employees to continue in
business on terms not of their own making.
124 301 U.S. 486 (1937).
125 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530 (1922). In conjunction with its
approval of this statute, the Court also sanctioned judicial enforcement of a local
policy rule which rendered illegal an agreement of several insurance companies hav-
ing a local monopoly of a line of insurance, to the effect that no company would em-
ploy within two years anyone who had been discharged from, or left, the service of
any of the others.
ployee, signed in ink and sealed, and free from superfluous figures
and words, were also sustained as not amounting to any unconsti-
tutional deprivation of liberty and property. 126 On the ground that
the right to strike is not absolute, the Court in a similar manner
upheld a statute under which a labor union official was punished
for having ordered a strike for the purpose of coercing an employer
to pay a wage claim of a former employee. 127
The significance of Senn v. Tile Layers Union 128 as an indica-
tor of the range of the alteration of the Court’s views concerning
the constitutionality of state labor legislation, derives in part from
the fact that the statute upheld therein was not appreciably dif-
ferent from that voided in Truax v. Corrigan. 129 Both statutes
withheld the remedy of injunction. Because, however, the invali-
dated act did not contain the more liberal and also more precise
definition of a labor dispute set forth in the sustained enactment
and, above all, did not affirmatively purport to sanction peaceful
picketing only, the Court was enabled to maintain that Truax v.
Corrigan, insofar as ‘‘the statute there in question was . . . applied
to legalize conduct which was not simply peaceful picketing,’’ was
distinguishable. The statute upheld in Senn authorized the giving
of publicity to labor disputes, declared peaceful picketing and pa-
trolling lawful, and prohibited the granting of injunctions against
such conduct; the statute was applied to deny an injunction to a
tiling contractor being picketed by a union because he refused to
sign a closed shop agreement containing a provision requiring him
to abstain from working in his own business as a tile layer or help-
er. Inasmuch as the enhancement of job opportunities for members
of the union was a legitimate objective, the State was held com-
petent to authorize the fostering of that end by peaceful picketing,
and the fact that the sustaining of the union in its efforts at peace-
ful persuasion might have the effect of preventing Senn from con-
tinuing in business as an independent entrepreneur was declared
to present an issue of public policy exclusively for legislative deter-
mination. 130
Years later, the policy of many state legislatures had evolved
in the direction of attempting to control the abuse of the enormous
economic power that previously enacted protective measures had
126 Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Perry, 259 U.S. 548 (1922).
127 Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306 (1926).
128 301 U.S. 468 (1937).
129 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
130 Cases disposing of the contention that restraints on picketing amount to a
denial of freedom of speech and constitute therefore a deprivation of liberty without

due process of law have been set forth under the First Amendment. See pp. 1102,
1121, supra.
enabled labor unions to amass, and here too the Court found re-
strictions constitutional. Thus the Court upheld application of a
state prohibition on racial discrimination by unions, rejecting
claims that the measure interfered unlawfully with the union’s
right to choose its members and abridged its property rights, and
liberty of contract. Inasmuch as the union ‘‘[held] itself out to rep-
resent the general business needs of employees’’ and functioned
‘‘under the protection of the State,’’ the union was deemed to have
forfeited the right to claim exemption from legislation protecting
workers against discriminatory exclusion. 131
Similarly approved as constitutional in Lincoln Federal Labor
Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co. 132 and AFL v. American
Sash & Door Co. 133 were state laws outlawing the closed shop.
When labor unions invoked in their own defense the freedom of
contract doctrine that hitherto had been employed to nullify legisla-
tion intended for their protection, the Court, speaking through Jus-
tice Black, announced its refusal ‘‘to return . . . to . . . [a] due proc-
ess philosophy that has been deliberately discarded. . . . The due
process clause,’’ it maintained, does not ‘‘forbid a State to pass laws
clearly designed to safeguard the opportunity of nonunion workers
to get and hold jobs, free from discrimination against them because
they are nonunion workers.’’ 134 Also in harmony with the last men-
tioned pair of cases is UAW v. WERB, 135 upholding enforcement of
the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act to proscribe as an unfair
labor practice efforts of a union, after collective bargaining negotia-
tions had become deadlocked, to coerce an employer through a
‘‘slow-down’’ in production achieved by the frequent, irregular, and
unannounced calling of union meetings during working hours. ‘‘No
one,’’ declared the Court, can question ‘‘the State’s power to police
coercion by . . . methods’’ which involve ‘‘considerable injury to
131 Railway Mail Ass’n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 94 (1945). Justice Frankfurter, con-
curring, declared that ‘‘the insistence by individuals of their private prejudices . . .,

in relations like those now before us, ought not to have a higher constitutional sanc-
tion than the determination of a State to extend the area of nondiscrimination be-
yond that which the Constitution itself exacts.’’ Id. at 98.
132 335 U.S. 525 (1949).
133 335 U.S. 538 (1949).
134 335 U.S. 525, 534, 537. In a lengthy opinion, in which he registered his con-
currence with both decisions, Justice Frankfurter set forth extensive statistical data
calculated to prove that labor unions not only were possessed of considerable eco-
nomic power but by virtue of such power were no longer dependent on the closed
shop for survival. He would therefore leave to the legislatures the determination
‘‘whether it is preferable in the public interest that trade unions should be subjected
to state intervention or left to the free play of social forces, whether experience has
disclosed ‘union unfair labor practices,’ and if so, whether legislative correction is
more appropriate than self-discipline and pressure of public opinion. . . .’’ Id. at 538,
549–50.
135 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
property and intimidation of other employees by threats.’’ 136 Fi-

nally, in Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., 137 the Court acknowl-
edged that no violation of the Constitution results when a state law
forbidding agreements in restraint of trade is construed by state
courts as forbidding members of a union of ice peddlers from peace-
fully picketing a wholesale ice distributor’s place of business for the
sole purpose of inducing the latter not to sell to nonunion peddlers.
Regulation of Business Enterprises: Rates, Charges, and

Conditions of Service
‘‘Business Affected With a Public Interest’’—In endeavoring
to measure the impact of the due process clause upon efforts by the
States to control the charges exacted by various businesses for
their services, the Supreme Court, almost from the inception of the
Fourteenth Amendment, devoted itself to the examination of two
questions: (1) whether the clause precluded that kind of regulation
of certain types of business, and (2) the nature of the restraint, if
any, which this clause imposed on state control of rates in the case
of businesses as to which such control existed. For a brief interval
following the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Su-
preme Court appears to have underestimated the significance of
the due process clause as a substantive restraint on the power of
States to fix rates chargeable by an industry deemed appropriately
subject to such controls. Thus, in Munn v. Illinois, 138 the first of
the ‘‘Granger Cases,’’ in which maximum charges established by a
state legislature for Chicago grain elevator companies were chal-
lenged, not as being confiscatory in character, but rather as a regu-
lation beyond the power of any state agency to impose, the Court,
in an opinion that was largely dictum, declared that the due proc-
ess clause did not operate as a safeguard against oppressive rates,
that if regulation was permissible, the severity thereof was within
legislative discretion and could be ameliorated only by resort to the
polls. Not much time elapsed, however, before the Court effected a
complete withdrawal from this position. By 1890 139 it had fully
converted the due process clause into a positive restriction which
the judicial branch was duty bound to enforce whenever state agen-
cies sought to impose rates which, in its estimation, were arbitrary
or unreasonable.
136 Id.at 253.
137 336 U.S. 490 (1949). Other recent cases regulating picketing are treated
under the First Amendment. See pp. 1173–79, supra.
138 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
139 Chicago, M. & St.P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
In contrast to the speed with which the Court arrived at those

above mentioned conclusions, more than fifty years were to elapse
before it developed its currently applicable formula for determining
the propriety of subjecting specific businesses to state regulation of
their prices or charges. Prior to 1934, unless a business was ‘‘af-
fected with a public interest,’’ control of its prices, rates, or condi-
tions of service was viewed as an unconstitutional deprivation of
liberty and property without due process of law. During the period
of its application, however, this standard, ‘‘business affected with
a public interest,’’ never acquired any precise meaning, and as a
consequence lawyers were never able to identify all those qualities
or attributes which invariably distinguished a business so affected
from one not so affected. The most coherent effort by the Court was
the following classification prepared by Chief Justice Taft. 140 ‘‘(1)
Those [businesses] which are carried on under the authority of a
public grant of privileges which either expressly or impliedly im-
poses the affirmative duty of rendering a public service demanded
by any member of the public. Such are the railroads, other common
carriers and public utilities. (2) Certain occupations, regarded as
exceptional, the public interest attaching to which, recognized from
earliest times, has survived the period of arbitrary laws by Par-
liament or Colonial legislatures for regulating all trades and
callings. Such are those of the keepers of inns, cabs and grist mills.
. . . (3) Businesses which though not public at their inception may
be fairly said to have risen to be such and have become subject in
consequence to some government regulation. They have come to
hold such a peculiar relation to the public that this is super-
imposed upon them. In the language of the cases, the owner by de-
voting his business to the public use, in effect grants the public an
interest in that use and subjects himself to public regulation to the
extent of that interest although the property continues to belong to
its private owner and to be entitled to protection accordingly.’’
Through application of this now outmoded formula the Court
found it possible to sustain state laws regulating charges made by
grain elevators, 141 stockyards, 142 and tobacco warehouses, 143 and
fire insurance rates 144 and commissions paid to fire insurance
agents. 145 Voided, because the businesses sought to be controlled
140 Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court, 262 U.S. 522, 535–36 (1923).
141 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877); Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517, 546
(1892); Brass v. North Dakota ex rel. Stoesser, 153 U.S. 391 (1894).
142 Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 183 U.S. 79 (1901).
143 Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441 (1937).
144 German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U.S. 389 (1914); Aetna Insurance
Co. v. Hyde, 275 U.S. 440 (1928).

145 O’Gorman & Young v. Hartford Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251 (1931).
were deemed to be not so affected, were state statutes fixing the

price at which gasoline may be sold, 146 or at which ticket brokers
may resell tickets purchased from theatres, 147 and limiting com-
petition in the manufacture and sale of ice through the withholding
of licenses to engage therein. 148
Nebbia v. New York.—In upholding, by a vote of five-to-four,
a depression-induced New York statute fixing prices at which fluid
milk might be sold, the Court in 1934 finally shelved the concept
of ‘‘a business affected with a public interest.’’ 149 Older decisions,
insofar as they negatived a power to control prices in businesses
found not ‘‘to be clothed with a public use’’ were now viewed as
resting, ‘‘finally, upon the basis that the requirements of due proc-
ess were not met because the laws were found arbitrary in their
operation and effect. Price control, like any other form of regula-
tion, is [now] unconstitutional only if arbitrary, discriminatory, or
demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to
adopt, and hence an unnecessary and unwarranted interference
with individual liberty.’’ Conceding that ‘‘the dairy industry is not,
in the accepted sense of the phrase, a public utility,’’ that is, a
‘‘business affected with a public interest,’’ the Court in effect de-
clared that price control henceforth is to be viewed merely as an
exercise by the government of its police power, and as such is sub-
ject only to the restrictions which due process imposes on arbitrary
interference with liberty and property. Nor was the Court dis-
turbed by the fact that a ‘‘scientific validity’’ had been claimed for
the theories of Adam Smith relating to the ‘‘price that will clear the
market.’’ However much the minority might stress the
unreasonableness of any artificial state regulation interfering with
146 Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929).
147 Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927).
148 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932). See also Adams v. Tan-
ner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917); Weaver v. Palmer Bro., 270 U.S. 402 (1926).
149 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 531–32, 535–37, 539 (1934). In reaching
this conclusion the Court might be said to have elevated to the status of prevailing
doctrine the views advanced in previous decisions by dissenting Justices. Thus, Jus-
tice Stone, dissenting in Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350, 359–60 (1928), had de-
clared: ‘‘Price regulation is within the State’s power whenever any combination of
circumstances seriously curtails the regulative force of competition so that buyers
or sellers are placed at such a disadvantage in the bargaining struggle that a legis-
lature might reasonably anticipate serious consequences to the community as a
whole.’’ In his dissenting opinion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,
302–03 (1932), Justice Brandeis had also observed: ‘‘The notion of a distinct category
of business ‘affected with a public interest’ employing property ‘devoted to a public
use’ rests upon historical error. In my opinion the true principle is that the State’s
power extends to every regulation of any business reasonably required and appro-
priate for the public protection. I find in the due process clause no other limitation
upon the character or the scope of regulation permissible.’’
the determination of prices by ‘‘natural forces,’’ 150 the majority was

content to note that the ‘‘due process clause makes no mention of
prices’’ and that ‘‘the courts are both incompetent and unauthorized
to deal with the wisdom of the policy adopted or the practicability
of the law enacted to forward it.’’
Having thus concluded that it is no longer the nature of the
business that determines the validity of a regulation of its rates or
charges but solely the reasonableness of the regulation, the Court
had little difficulty in upholding, in Olsen v. Nebraska, 151 a state
law prescribing the maximum commission which private employ-
ment agencies may charge. Rejecting the contentions of the employ-
ment agencies that the need for such protective legislation had not
been shown, the Court held that differences of opinion as to the
wisdom, need, or appropriateness of the legislation ‘‘suggest a
choice which should be left to the States;’’ and that there was ‘‘no
necessity for the State to demonstrate before us that evils persist
despite the competition’’ between public, charitable, and private
employment agencies. The older case of Ribnik v. McBride, 152
which had invalidated similar legislation upon the now obsolete
concept of a ‘‘business affected with a public interest,’’ was ex-
pressly overruled.
Judicial Review of Publicly Determined Rates and Charges

Development.—In Munn v. Illinois, 153 its initial holding con-
cerning the applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to govern-
mental price fixing, 154 the Court not only asserted that govern-
mental regulation of rates charged by public utilities and allied
businesses was within the States’ police power, but added that the
determination of such rates by a legislature was conclusive and not
subject to judicial review or revision. Expanding the range of per-
150 Justice McReynolds, speaking for the dissenting Justices, labelled the con-
trols imposed by the challenged statute as a ‘‘fanciful scheme to protect the farmer
against undue exactions by prescribing the price at which milk disposed of by him
at will may be resold.’’ Intimating that the New York statute was as efficacious as
a safety regulation which required ‘‘householders to pour oil on their roofs as a
means of curbing the spread of a neighborhood fire,’’ Justice McReynolds insisted
that ‘‘this Court must have regard to the wisdom of the enactment,’’ and must deter-
mine ‘‘whether the means proposed have reasonable relation to something within
legislative power.’’ 291 U.S., 556, 558 (1934).
151 313 U.S. 236, 246 (1941).
152 277 U.S. 350 (1928). Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917), was disapproved
in Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), and Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S.
418 (1927), was effectively overruled in Gold v. DiCarlo, 380 U.S. 520 (1965), with-
out the Court hearing argument on it.
153 94 U.S. 113 (1877). See also Peik v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 94 U.S. 164 (1877).
154 Rate-making is deemed to be one species of price fixing. FPC v. Natural Gas
Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 603 (1942).

missible governmental fixing of prices, the Court in Nebbia 155 de-

clared that prices established for business in general would invite
judicial condemnation only if ‘‘arbitrary, discriminatory, or demon-
strably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to adopt.’’ The
latter standard of judicial appraisal, as will be subsequently noted,
represents less of a departure from the principle enunciated in the
Munn case than that which the Court evolved, in the years follow-
ing 1877, to measure the validity of state imposed public utility
rates, and this difference in the judicial treatment of prices and
rates accordingly warrants an explanation at the outset. Unlike op-
erators of public utilities who, in return for the grant of certain ex-
clusive, virtually monopolistic privileges by the governmental unit
enfranchising them, must assume an obligation to provide continu-
ous service, proprietors of other businesses are in receipt of no
similar special advantages and accordingly are unrestricted in the
exercise of their right to liquidate and close their establishments.
Owners of ordinary businesses, therefore, at liberty to escape by
dissolution the consequences of publicly imposed charges deemed to
be oppressive, have thus far been unable to convince the courts
that they too, no less than public utilities, are in need of protection
through judicial review.
Consistently with its initial pronouncement in the Munn case
that reasonableness of compensation allowed under permissible
rate regulation presented a legislative rather than a judicial ques-
tion, the Court, in Davidson v. New Orleans, 156 also rejected the
contention that, by virtue of the due process clause, businesses
were nevertheless entitled to ‘‘just compensation’’ for losses result-
ing from price controls. Less than a decade was to elapse, however,
before the Court, appalled perhaps by prospective consequences of
leaving business ‘‘at the mercy of the majority of the legislature,’’
began to reverse itself. Thus, in 1886, Chief Justice Waite, in the
Railroad Commission Cases, 157 warned that ‘‘this power to regu-
late is not a power to destroy; [and] the State cannot do that in
law which amounts to a taking of property for public use without
just compensation or without due process of law;’’ in other words,
a confiscatory rate could not be imposed. By treating ‘‘due process
of law’’ and ‘‘just compensation’’ as equivalents, the Court, contrary
to its earlier holding in Davidson v. New Orleans, was in effect as-
serting that the imposition of a rate so low as to damage or dimin-
ish private property ceased to be an exercise of a State’s police
155 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934).
156 96 U.S. 97 (1878). See also Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226
(1897).
157 116 U.S. 307 (1886).
power and became one of eminent domain. Nevertheless, even the

added measure of protection afforded by the doctrine of the Rail-
road Commission Cases proved inadequate to satisfy public utili-
ties; the doctrine allowed courts to intervene only to prevent legis-
lative imposition of a confiscatory rate, a rate so low as to be pro-
ductive of a loss and to amount to taking of property without just
compensation. The utilities sought nothing less than a judicial ac-
knowledgment that courts could review the ‘‘reasonableness’’ of leg-
islative rates. Although as late as 1888 the Court doubted that it
possessed the requisite power, 158 it finally acceded to the wishes
of the utilities in 1890, and, in Chicago, M. & St.P. Railway v. Min-
nesota 159 ruled as follows: ‘‘The question of the reasonableness of
rates . . . , involving as it does the element of reasonableness both
as regards the company and as regards the public, is eminently a
question for judicial investigation, requiring due process of law for
its determination. If the company is deprived of the power of charg-
ing rates for the use of its property, and such deprivation takes
place in the absence of an investigation by judicial machinery, it
is deprived of the lawful use of its property, and thus, in substance
and effect, of the property itself, without due process of law. . . .’’
Despite a last-ditch attempt to reconcile Munn with Chicago,
M. & St.P. Railway by confining application of the latter decision
to cases in which rates had been fixed by a commission and deny-
ing its pertinence to rates directly imposed by a legislature, 160 the
Court in Reagan v. Farmer’s Loan and Trust Co. 161 set at rest all
lingering doubts over the scope of judicial intervention by declaring
that, ‘‘if a carrier,’’ in the absence of a legislative rate, ‘‘attempted
to charge a shipper an unreasonable sum,’’ the Court, in accordance
with common law principles, will pass on the reasonableness of its
rates, and has ‘‘jurisdiction . . . to award the shipper any amount
exacted . . . in excess of a reasonable rate. . . . The province of the
courts is not changed, nor the limit of judicial inquiry altered, be-
cause the legislature instead of a carrier prescribes the rates.’’ 162
Reiterating virtually the same principle in Smyth v. Ames, 163 the
158 Dow v. Beidelman, 125 U.S. 680 (1888).
159 134 U.S. 418, 458 (1890).
160 Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517 (1892).
161 154 U.S. 362, 397 (1894).
162 Insofar as judicial intervention resulting in the invalidation of legislatively
imposed rates has involved carriers, it should be noted that the successful complain-
ant invariably has been the carrier, not the shipper.
163 169 U.S. 466 (1898). Of course the validity of rates prescribed by a State for
services wholly within its limits must be determined wholly without reference to the
interstate business done by a public utility. Domestic business should not be made
to bear the losses on interstate business and vice versa. Thus a State has no power
to require the hauling of logs at a loss or at rates that are unreasonable, even if
a railroad receives adequate revenues from the intrastate long haul and the inter-
Court not only obliterated the distinction between confiscatory and

unreasonable rates but contributed the additional observation that
the requirements of due process are not met unless a court not only
reviews the reasonableness of a rate but also determines whether
the rate permits the utility to earn a fair return on a fair valuation
of its investment.
Limitations on Judicial Review.—Even while reviewing the
reasonableness of rates the Court recognized some limits on judi-
cial review. As early as 1894, the Court asserted: ‘‘The courts are
not authorized to revise or change the body of rates imposed by a
legislature or a commission; they do not determine whether one
rate is preferable to another, or what under all circumstances
would be fair and reasonable as between the carriers and the ship-
pers; they do not engage in any mere administrative work; . . .
[however, there can be no doubt] of their power and duty to inquire
whether a body of rates . . . is unjust and unreasonable . . . and
if found so to be, to restrain its operation.’’ 164 And later, in 1910,
the Court made a similar observation that courts may not, ‘‘under
the guise of exerting judicial power, usurp merely administrative
functions by setting aside’’ an order of the commission within the
scope of the power delegated to such commission, upon the ground
that such power was unwisely or expediently exercised. 165
Also inferable from these early holdings, and effective to re-
strict the bounds of judicial investigation, is a distinction between
factual questions that relate only to the wisdom or expediency of
a rate order, and are unreviewable, and other factual determina-
tions that bear on a commission’s power to act and are inseparable
from the constitutional issue of confiscation, hence are reviewable.
This distinction was accorded adequate emphasis by the Court in
state lumber haul taken together. On the other hand, in determining whether intra-
state passenger railway rates are confiscatory, all parts of the system within the
State (including sleeping, parlor, and dining cars) should be embraced in the com-
putation, and the unremunerative parts should not be excluded because built pri-
marily for interstate traffic or not required to supply local transportation needs. See
Minnesota Rate Cases (Simpson v. Shepard), 230 U.S. 352, 434–35 (1913); Chicago,
M. & St.P. Ry. v. Public Util. Comm’n, 274 U.S. 344 (1927); Groesbeck v. Duluth,
S.S. & A. Ry., 250 U.S. 607 (1919). The maxim that a legislature cannot delegate
legislative power is qualified to permit creation of administrative boards to apply
to the myriad details of rate schedules the regulatory police power of the State. To
prevent a holding of invalid delegation of legislative power, the legislature must con-
strain the board with a certain course of procedure and certain rules of decision in
the performance of its functions, with which the agency must substantially comply
to validate its action. Wichita R.R. v. Public Util. Comm’n, 260 U.S. 48 (1922).
164 Reagan v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 154, U.S. 362, 397 (1894).
165 ICC v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 215 U.S. 452, 470 (1910). This statement, made
in the context of federal ratemaking, appears to be equally applicable to judicial re-

view of state agency actions.
Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Garrett, 166 in which it declared that

‘‘the appropriate question for the courts’’ is simply whether a ‘‘com-
mission,’’ in establishing a rate, ‘‘acted within the scope of its
power’’ and did not violate ‘‘constitutional rights . . . by imposing
confiscatory requirements.’’ The carrier contesting the rate was not
entitled to have a court also pass upon a question of fact regarding
the reasonableness of a higher rate the carrier charged prior to the
order of the commission. All that need concern a court, it said, is
the fairness of the proceeding whereby the commission determined
that the existing rate was excessive, but not the expediency or wis-
dom of the commission’s having superseded that rate with a rate
regulation of its own.
Likewise, with a view to diminishing the number of opportuni-
ties courts have for invalidating rate regulations of state commis-
sions, the Court placed various obstacles in the path of the com-
plaining litigant. Thus, not only must a person challenging a rate
assume the burden of proof, 167 but he must present a case of
‘‘manifest constitutional invalidity’’; 168 if, notwithstanding this ef-
fort, the question of confiscation remains in doubt, no relief will be
granted. 169 Moreover, even though a public utility which has peti-
tioned a commission for relief from allegedly confiscatory rates
need not await indefinitely for the commission’s decision before ap-
plying to a court for equitable relief, 170 the court ought not to
interfere in advance of any experience of the practical result of
such rates. 171
In the course of time, however, a distinction emerged between
ordinary factual determinations by state commissions and factual
determinations which were found to be inseparable from the legal
and constitutional issue of confiscation. In two older cases arising
from proceedings begun in lower federal courts to enjoin rates, the
Court initially adopted the position that it would not disturb find-
ings of fact insofar as these were supported by substantial evi-
dence. Thus, in San Diego Land Company v. National City, 172 the
Court declared that after a legislative body had fairly and fully in-
vestigated and acted, by fixing what it believed to be reasonable
rates, the courts cannot step in and set aside the action due to a
different conclusion about the reasonableness of the rates. ‘‘Judicial
166 231 U.S. 298, 310–13 (1913).
167 Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines, 238 U.S. 153 (1915).
168 Minnesota Rate Cases (Simpson v. Shepard), 230 U.S. 352, 452 (1913).
169 Knoxville v. Water Co., 212 U.S. 1 (1909).
170 Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 270 U.S. 587 (1926).
171 Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19 (1909).
172 174 U.S. 739, 750, 754 (1899). See also Minnesota Rate Cases (Simpson v.
Shepard), 230 U.S. 352, 433 (1913).

interference should never occur unless the case presents, clearly

and beyond all doubt, such a flagrant attack upon the rights of
property under the guise of regulation as to compel the court to say
that the rates prescribed will necessarily have the effect to deny
just compensation for private property taken for the public use.’’
And in a similar later case 173 the Court expressed even more clear-
ly its reluctance to reexamine ordinary factual determinations. It
is not bound ‘‘to reexamine and weigh all the evidence . . . or to
proceed according to . . . [its] independent opinion as to what are
proper rates. It is enough if . . . [the Court] cannot say that it was
impossible for a fair-minded board to come to the result which was
reached.’’
Moreover, in reviewing orders of the Interstate Commerce
Commission, the Court, at least in earlier years, 174 chose to be
guided by approximately the same standards it had originally for-
mulated for examining regulations of state commissions. The fol-
lowing excerpt from its holding in ICC v. Union Pacific R.R. 175 rep-
resents an adequate summation of the law as it stood prior to 1920:
‘‘[Q]uestions of fact may be involved in the determination of ques-
tions of law, so that an order, regular on its face, may be set aside
if it appears that the rate is so low as to be confiscatory . . . ; or
if the Commission acted so arbitrarily and unjustly as to fix rates
contrary to evidence, or without evidence to support it; or if the au-
thority therein involved has been exercised in such an unreason-
able manner as to cause it to be within the elementary rule that
the substance, and not the shadow, determines the validity of the
exercise of the power. . . . In determining these mixed questions of
law and fact, the Court confines itself to the ultimate question as
to whether the Commission acted within its power. It will not con-
sider the expediency or wisdom of the order, or whether, on like
testimony, it would have made a similar ruling . . . [The Commis-
sion’s] conclusion, of course, is subject to review, but when sup-
ported by evidence is accepted as final; not that its decision . . .
can be supported by a mere scintilla of proof—but the courts will
not examine the facts further than to determine whether there was
substantial evidence to sustain the order.’’
The Ben Avon Case.—These standards of review were
abruptly rejected by the Court in Ohio Valley Co. v. Ben Avon Bor-
173 San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Jasper, 189 U.S. 439, 441, 442 (1903). See
also Van Dyke v. Geary, 244 U.S. 39 (1917); Georgia Ry. v. Railroad Comm’n, 262
U.S. 625, 634 (1923).
174 For its current position, see Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
175 222 U.S. 541, 547–48 (1912). See also ICC v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 215 U.S.
452, 470 (1910).

ough, 176 as being no longer sufficient to satisfy the requirements

of due process. Unlike previous confiscatory rate litigation, which
had developed from rulings of lower federal courts in injunctive
proceedings, this case reached the Supreme Court by way of appeal
from a state appellate tribunal; 177 although the state court had in
fact reviewed the evidence and ascertained that the state commis-
sion’s findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence, it
also construed the statute providing for review as denying to state
courts ‘‘the power to pass upon the weight of such evidence.’’ Large-
ly on the strength of this interpretation of the applicable state stat-
ute, the Court held that when the order of a legislature, or of a
commission, prescribing a schedule of maximum future rates is
challenged as confiscatory, ‘‘the State must provide a fair oppor-
tunity for submitting that issue to a judicial tribunal for deter-
mination upon its own independent judgment as to both law and
facts; otherwise the order is void because in conflict with the due
process clause, Fourteenth Amendment.’’
Without departing from the ruling previously enunciated in
Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Garrett, 178 that the failure of a State
to grant a statutory right of judicial appeal from a commission’s
regulation is not violative of due process as long as relief is obtain-
able by a bill in equity for injunction, the Court also held that the
alternative remedy of injunction expressly provided by state law
did not afford an adequate opportunity for testing judicially a con-
fiscatory rate order. It conceded the principle stressed by the dis-
senting Justices that ‘‘where a State offers a litigant the choice of
two methods of judicial review, of which one is both appropriate
and unrestricted, the mere fact that the other which the litigant
elects is limited, does not amount to a denial of the constitutional
right to a judicial review.’’ 179
History of the Valuation Question.—For almost fifty years
the Court wandered through a maze of conflicting formulas for val-
uing public service corporation property only to emerge therefrom
in 1944 at a point not very far removed from Munn v. Illinois. 180
176 253 U.S. 287 (1920).
177 Id.at 289. In injunctive proceedings, evidence is freshly introduced whereas
in the cases received on appeal from state courts, the evidence is found within the
record.
178 231 U.S. 298 (1913).
179 253 U.S. 287, 291, 295 (1920).
180 94 U.S. 113 (1877). Because some of these methods or formulas, no longer
required as a matter of constitutional law, may continue to be used by state commis-

sions in drafting rate orders, a survey is provided below.
(1) Fair Value.—On the premise that a utility is entitled to demand a rate
schedule that will yield a ‘‘fair return upon the value’’ of the property which it em-
ploys for public convenience, the Court in Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 546–47
(1898), held that determination of such value necessitated consideration of at least

such factors as ‘‘the original cost of construction, the amount expended in perma-
nent improvements, the amount and market value of . . . [the utility’s] bonds and
stock, the present as compared with the original cost of construction, [replacement
cost], the probable earning capacity of the property under particular rates pre-
scribed by statute, and the sum required to meet operating expenses.
(2) Reproduction Cost.—Prior to the demise in 1944 of the Smyth v. Ames fair
value formula, two of the components thereof were accorded special emphasis with
the second quickly surpassing the first in measure of importance. These were: (1)
the actual cost of the property (‘‘the original cost of construction together with the
amount expended in permanent improvements’’) and (2) reproduction costs (‘‘the
present as compared with the original cost of construction’’). For varied application
of the reproduction cost formula, see San Diego Land Co. v. National City, 174 U.S.
739, 757 (1899); San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Jasper, 189 U.S. 439, 443 (1903);
Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 52 (1909); Minnesota Rate Cases
(Simpson v. Shepard), 230 U.S. 352 (1913); Galveston Elec. Co. v. Galveston, 258
U.S. 388, 392 (1922); Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm’n, 262 U.S. 276 (1923); Bluefield Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S. 679
(1923); Georgia Ry. v. Railroad Comm’n, 262 U.S. 625, 630 (1923); McCardle v. Indi-
anapolis Co., 272 U.S. 400 (1926); St Louis & O’Fallon Ry. v. United States, 279
U.S. 461 (1929).
(3) Prudent Investment (Versus Reproduction Cost).—This method of valuation,
championed by Justice Brandeis in a separate opinion in Missouri ex rel. Southwest-
ern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S. 276, 291–92, 302, 306–07 (1923),
was defined as follows: ‘‘The compensation which the Constitution guarantees an op-
portunity to earn is the reasonable cost of conducting the business. Cost includes
not only operating expenses, but also capital charges. Capital charges cover the al-
lowance, by way of interest, for the use of capital . . . the allowance for the risk
incurred; and enough more to attract capital. . . . Where the financing has been
proper, the cost to the utility of the capital, required to construct, equip and operate
its plant, should measure the rate of return which the Constitution guarantees op-
portunity to earn.’’ Advantages to be derived from ‘‘adoption of the amount pru-
dently invested as the rate base and the amount of the capital charge as the meas-
ure of the rate of return’’ would, according to Justice Brandeis, be nothing less than
the attainment of a ‘‘basis for decision which is certain and stable. The rate base
would be ascertained as a fact, not determined as a matter of opinion. It would not
fluctuate with the market price of labor, or materials, or money.
As a method of valuation, the prudent investment theory was not accorded any
acceptance until the Depression of the 1930’s. The sharp decline in prices which oc-
curred during this period doubtless contributed to the loss of affection for reproduc-
tion costs. In Los Angeles Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, 289 U.S. 287 (1933) and
Railroad Comm’n v. Pacific Gas Co., 302 U.S. 388, 399, 405 (1938), the Court upheld
respectively a valuation from which reproduction costs had been excluded and an-
other in which historical cost served as the rate base. Later, in 1942, when in FPC
v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, the Court further emphasized its aban-
donment of the reproduction cost factor, there developed momentarily the prospect
that prudent investment might be substituted. This possibility was quickly
negatived, however, by the Hope Gas case, (FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S.
591 (1944)), which dispensed with the necessity of relying upon any formula for the
purpose of fixing valid rates.
(4) Depreciation.—No less indispensable to the determination of the fair value
mentioned in Smyth v. Ames was the amount of depreciation to be allowed as a de-
duction from the measure of cost employed, whether the latter be actual cost, repro-
duction cost, or any other form of cost determination. Although not mentioned in
Smyth v. Ames, the Court gave this item consideration in Knoxville v. Water Co.,
212 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1909); but notwithstanding its early recognition as an allowable
item of deduction in determining value, depreciation continued to be the subject of
controversy arising out of the difficulty of ascertaining it and of computing annual
By holding in FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 181 that the ‘‘Con-
stitution does not bind rate-making bodies to the service of any sin-
gle formula or combination of formulas,’’ and in FPC v. Hope Natu-
allowances to cover the same. Indicative of such controversy was the disagreement
as to whether annual allowances shall be in such amount as will permit the replace-
ment of equipment at current costs, i.e., present value, or at original cost. In the
Hope Gas case, 320 U.S. at 606, the Court reversed United Railways v. West, 280
U.S. 234, 253–254 (1930), insofar as that holding rejected original cost as the basis
of annual depreciation allowances.
(5) Going Concern Value and Good Will.—Whether intangibles were to be in-
cluded in valuation was not passed upon in Smyth v. Ames, but shortly thereafter,
in Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines, 238 U.S. 153, 165 (1915), the Court declared
it to be self-evident ‘‘that there is an element of value in an assembled and estab-
lished plant, doing business and earning money, over one not thus advanced, . . .
[and that] this element of value is a property right, and should be considered in de-
termining the value of the property, upon which the owner has a right to make a
fair return. . . .’’ Generally described as going concern value, this element has never
been precisely defined by the Court. In its latest pronouncement on the subject, ut-
tered in FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 589 (1942), the Court de-
nied that there is any ‘‘constitutional requirement that going concern value, even
when it is an appropriate element to be included in a rate base, must be separately
stated and appraised as such. . . . [Valuations have often been sustained] without
separate appraisal of the going concern element. . . . When that has been done, the
burden rests on the regulated company to show that this item has neither been ade-
quately covered in the rate base nor recouped from prior earnings of the business.’’
Franchise value and good will, on the other hand, have been consistently excluded
from valuation; the latter presumably because a utility invariably enjoys a monopoly
and consumers have no choice in the matter of patronizing it. The latter proposition
has been developed in the following cases: Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S.
19 (1909); Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines, 238 U.S. 153, 163–64 (1915); Gal-
veston Elec. Co. v. Galveston, 258 U.S. 388 (1922); Los Angeles Gas Co. v. Railroad
Comm’n, 289 U.S. 287, 313 (1933).
(6) Salvage Value.—It is not a constitutional error to disregard theoretical re-
production cost for a plant which ‘‘‘no responsible person would think of reproduc-
ing.’’ Accordingly, where, due to adverse conditions, a street-surface railroad had
lost all value except for scrap or salvage, it was permissible for a commission, as
the Court held in Market Street Ry. v. Railroad Comm’n, 324 U.S. 548, 562, 564
(1945), to use as a rate the price at which the utility offered to sell its property to
a citizen. Moreover, the Commission’s order was not invalid even through under the
prescribed rate the utility would operate at a loss; for the due process clause cannot
be invoked to protect a public utility against business hazards, such as the loss of,
or failure to obtain patronage. On the other hand, in the case of a water company
whose franchise has expired, but where there is no other source of supply, its plant
should be valued as actually in use rather than at what the property would bring
for some other use in case the city should build its own plant. Denver v. Denver
Union Water Co., 246 U.S. 178 (1918).
(7) Past Losses and Gains.—‘‘The Constitution [does not] require that the losses
of . . . [a] business in one year shall be restored from future earnings by the device
of capitalizing the losses and adding them to the rate base on which a fair return
and depreciation allowance is to be earned.’’ FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315
U.S. 575, 590 (1942). Nor can past losses be used to enhance the value of the prop-
erty to support a claim that rates for the future are confiscatory, Galveston Elec.
Co. v. Galveston, 258 U.S. 388 (1922), any more than profits of the past can be used
to sustain confiscatory rates for the future Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., 258
U.S. 165, 175 (1922); Board of Comm’rs v. New York Tel. Co., 271 U.S. 23, 31–32
(1926).
181 315 U.S. 575, 586 (1942).
ral Gas Co., 182 that ‘‘it is the result reached not the method em-
ployed which is controlling, . . . [that] it is not the theory but the
impact of the rate order which counts, [and that] if the total effect
of the rate order cannot be said to be unjust and unreasonable, ju-
dicial inquiry under the Act is at an end,’’ the Court, in effect, abdi-
cated from the position assumed in the Ben Avon case. 183 Without
surrendering the judicial power to declare rates unconstitutional on
ground of a substantive deprivation of due process, 184 the Court
announced that it would not overturn a result it deemed to be just
simply because ‘‘the method employed [by a commission] to reach
that result may contain infirmities. . . . [A] Commission’s order
does not become suspect by reason of the fact that it is challenged.
It is the product of expert judgment which carries a presumption
of validity. And he who would upset the rate order . . . carries the
heavy burden of making a convincing showing that it is invalid be-
cause it is unjust and unreasonable in its consequences.’’ 185 The
Court recently reaffirmed Hope Natural Gas’s emphasis on the bot-
tom line: ‘‘[t]he Constitution within broad limits leaves the States
free to decide what rate-setting methodology best meets their needs
in balancing the interests of the utility and the public.’’ 186
182 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944). Although this and the previously cited decision
arose out of controversies involving the National Gas Act of 1938, the principles laid
down therein are believed to be applicable to the review of rate orders of state com-
missions, except insofar as the latter operate in obedience to laws containing unique
standards or procedures.
183 Ohio Valley Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920).
184 In FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 599 (1942), Justices
Black, Douglas, and Murphy, in a concurring opinion, proposed to travel the road
all the way back to Munn v. Illinois, and deprive courts of the power to void rates
simply because they deem the latter to be unreasonable. In a concurring opinion,
in Driscoll v. Edison Co., 307 U.S. 104, 122 (1939), Justice Frankfurter temporarily
adopted a similar position; he declared that ‘‘the only relevant function of law . . .
[in rate controversies] is to secure observance of those procedural safeguards in the
exercise of legislative powers which are the historic foundations of due process.’’
However, in his dissent in FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 625 (1944),
he disassociated himself from this proposal, and asserted that ‘‘it was decided [more
than fifty years ago] that the final say under the Constitution lies with the judici-
ary.’’
185 FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944), See also Wisconsin
v. FPC, 373 U.S. 294, 299, 317, 326 (1963), wherein the Court tentatively approved
an ‘‘area rate approach,’’ that is ‘‘the determination of fair prices for gas, based on
reasonable financial requirements of the industry, for . . . the various producing
areas of the country,’’ and with rates being established on an area basis rather than
on an individual company basis. Four dissenters, Justices Clark, Black, Brennan,
and Chief Justice Warren, labelled area pricing a ‘‘wild goose chase,’’ and stated
that the Commission had acted in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner entirely
outside traditional concepts of administrative due process. Area rates were approved
in Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
186 Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 316 (1989) (rejecting takings
challenge to Pennsylvania rule preventing utilities from amortizing costs of canceled

nuclear plants).
In dispensing with the necessity of observing the old formulas

for rate computation, the Court did not articulate any substitute
guidance for ascertaining whether a so-called end result is unrea-
sonable. It did intimate that rate-making ‘‘involves a balancing of
the investor and consumer interests,’’ which does not, however, ‘‘‘in-
sure that the business shall produce net revenues’. . . . From the
investor or company point of view it is important that there be
enough revenue not only for operating expenses but also for the
capital costs of the business. These include service on the debt and
dividends on the stock. . . . By that standard the return to the eq-
uity owner should be commensurate with returns on investments
in other enterprises having corresponding risks. That return, more-
over, should be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial in-
tegrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to attract
capital.’’ 187
Regulation of Public Utilities (Other Than Rates)
In General.—By virtue of the nature of the business they
carry on and the public’s interest in it, public utilities are subject
to state regulation exerted either directly by the legislature or by
duly authorized administrative bodies. 188 But because the property
of public utilities remains under the full protection of the Constitu-
tion, it follows that whenever the state regulates in a manner that
infringes the right of ownership in what the Court considers to be
an ‘‘arbitrary’’ or ‘‘unreasonable’’ way, due process is violated. 189
Thus, a city cannot take possession of the equipment of a street
railway company, the franchise of which has expired, 190 although
it may subject the company to the alternative of accepting an inad-
equate price for its property or of ceasing operations and removing
its property from the streets. 191 Likewise, a city desirous of estab-
lishing a lighting system of its own may not remove, without com-
pensation, the fixtures of a lighting company already occupying the
streets under a franchise, 192 although it may compete with a com-
187 FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944) (citing Chicago G.T.
Ry. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345–46 (1892)); Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell
Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S. 276, 291 (1923).
188 Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Corporation Comm’n, 206 U.S. 1, 19 (1907) (cit-
ing Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Iowa, 94 U.S. 155 (1877)). See also Prentis v. Atlantic
Coast Line, 211 U.S. 210 (1908); Denver & R.G. R.R. v. Denver, 250 U.S. 241 (1919).
189 Chicago & G.T. Ry. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 344 (1892); Mississippi R.R.
Comm’n v. Mobile & Ohio R.R., 244 U.S. 388, 391 (1917). See also Missouri Pacific
Ry. v. Nebraska, 217 U.S. 196 (1910); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S.
405, 415 (1935).
190 Cleveland Electric Ry. v. Cleveland, 204 U.S. 116 (1907).
191 Detroit United Ry. v. Detroit, 255 U.S. 171 (1921). See also Denver v. New
York Trust Co., 229 U.S. 123 (1913).

192 Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Gas Corp., 251 U.S. 32 (1919).
pany that has no exclusive charter. 193 The property of a telegraph

company is not illegally taken, however, by a municipal ordinance
that demands, as a condition for the establishment of poles and
conduits in city streets, that the city’s wires be carried free of
charge, and which provides for the moving of the conduits, when
necessary, at company expense. 194
And, the fact that a State, by mere legislative or administra-
tive fiat, cannot convert a private carrier into a common carrier
will not protect a foreign corporation which has elected to enter a
State the constitution and laws of which require that it operate its
local private pipe line as a common carrier. Such foreign corpora-
tion is viewed as having waived its constitutional right to be secure
against imposition of conditions which amount to a taking of prop-
erty without due process of law. 195
Compulsory Expenditures: Grade Crossings, and the
Like.—Generally, the enforcement of uncompensated obedience to
a regulation for the public health and safety is not an unconstitu-
tional taking of property without due process of law. 196 Thus,
where the applicable rule so required at the time of the granting
of its charter, a water company may be compelled to furnish con-
nections at its own expense to one residing on an ungraded street
in which it voluntarily laid its lines. 197 However, if pipe and tele-
phone lines are located on a right of way owned by a pipeline com-
pany, the latter cannot, without a denial of due process, be re-
quired to relocate such equipment at its own expense, 198 but if its
pipes are laid under city streets, a gas company validly may be ob-
ligated to assume the cost of moving them to accommodate a mu-
nicipal drainage system. 199
To require a turnpike company, as a condition of its taking
tolls, to keep its road in repair and to suspend collection thereof,
conformably to a state statute, until the road is put in good order,
does not take property without due process of law, notwithstanding
the fact that present patronage does not yield revenue sufficient to
193 Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 U.S. 561 (1904). See also
Skaneateles Water Co. v. Skaneateles, 184 U.S. 354 (1902); Helena Water Works
Co. v. Helena, 195 U.S. 383 (1904); Madera Water Works v. Madera, 228 U.S. 454
(1913).
194 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Richmond, 224 U.S. 160 (1912).
195 Pierce Oil Corp. v. Phoenix Ref. Co., 259 U.S. 125 (1922).
196 Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 558 (1914). See also
Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 255 (1897); Chicago, B. & Q. Ry.
v. Drainage Comm’rs, 200 U.S. 561, 591–92 (1906); New Orleans Pub. Serv. v. New
Orleans, 281 U.S. 682 (1930).
197 Consumers’ Co. v. Hatch, 224 U.S. 148 (1912).
198 Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Highway Comm’n, 294 U.S. 613 (1935).
199 New Orleans Gas Co. v. Drainage Comm’n, 197 U.S. 453 (1905).
maintain the road in proper condition. 200 Nor is a railroad bridge

company unconstitutionally deprived of its property when, in the
absence of proof that the addition will not yield a reasonable re-
turn, it is ordered to widen its bridge by inclusion of a pathway for
pedestrians and a roadway for vehicles. 201
Similarly upheld against due process/taking claims were re-
quirements that railroads repair a viaduct under which they oper-
ate, 202 or reconstruct a bridge or provide means for passing water
for drainage through their embankment, 203 or sprinkle that part of
the street occupied by them. 204 On the other hand, a requirement
that an underground cattle-pass is be constructed, not as a safety
measure but as a means of sparing the farmer the inconvenience
attendant upon the use of an existing and adequate grade crossing,
was held to be a prohibited taking of the railroad’s property for pri-
vate use. 205 As to grade crossing elimination, the rule is well es-
tablished that the state may exact from railroads the whole, or
such part, of the cost thereof as it deems appropriate, even though
commercial highway users, who make no contribution whatsoever,
benefit from such improvements.
While the power of the State in this respect is not unlimited,
and an ‘‘arbitrary’’ and ‘‘unreasonable’’ imposition may be set aside,
the Court’s modern approach to substantive due process analysis
makes this possibility far less likely than it once was. Distinguish-
ing a 1935 case invalidating a statutorily mandated 50% cost shar-
ing which in effect prevented particularized findings of reasonable-
ness (and which contained language suggesting that railroads could
not fairly be required to subsidize competitive transportation
modes), 206 the Court in 1953 ruled that the costs of grade separa-
tion improvements need not be allocated solely on the basis of ben-
efits that would accrue to railroad property. 207 While the Court
cautioned that ‘‘allocation of costs must be fair and reasonable,’’ it
also took an approach very deferential to local governmental deci-
sions, stating that in the exercise of the police power to meet trans-
portation, safety, and convenience needs of a growing community,
200 Norfolk Turnpike Co. v. Virginia, 225 U.S. 264 (1912).
201 International Bridge Co. v. New York, 254 U.S. 126 (1920).
202 Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Nebraska, 170 U.S. 57 (1898).
203 Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Drainage Comm’n, 200 U.S. 561 (1906); Chicago &
Alton R.R. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67 (1915); Lake Shore & Mich. So. Ry. v. Clough,
242 U.S. 375 (1917).
204 Pacific Gas Co. v. Police Court, 251 U.S. 22 (1919).
205 Chicago, St. P., Mo. & O. Ry. v. Holmberg, 282 U.S. 162 (1930).
206 Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405 (1935). See also Lehigh
Valley R.R. v. Commissioners, 278 U.S. 24, 35 (1928) (upholding imposition of grade
crossing costs on a railroad although ‘‘near the line of reasonableness,’’ and reiterat-
ing that ‘‘unreasonably extravagant’’ requirements would be struck down).
207 Atchison T. & S.F. Ry. v. Public Util. Comm’n, 346 U.S. 346, 352 (1953).
‘‘the cost of such improvements may be allocated all to the rail-

roads.’’
Compellable Services.—The primary duty of a public utility
being to serve on reasonable terms all those who desire the service
it renders, it follows that a company cannot pick and choose and
elect to serve only those portions of its territory which it finds most
profitable, leaving the remainder to get along without the service
which it alone is in a position to give. Compelling a gas company
to continue serving specified cities as long as it continues to do
business in other parts of the State entails therefore no unconstitu-
tional deprivation. 208 Likewise, a railway may be compelled to con-
tinue the service of a branch or part of a line although the oper-
ation involves a loss. 209 But even though a utility, as a condition
of enjoyment of powers and privileges granted by the State, is
under a continuing obligation to provide reasonably adequate serv-
ice, and even though that obligation cannot be avoided merely be-
cause performance occasions financial loss, yet if a company is at
liberty to surrender its franchise and discontinue operations, it can-
not be compelled to continue at a loss. 210
Pursuant to the principle that a State may require railroads to
provide adequate facilities suitable for the convenience of the com-
munities they serve, 211 such carriers have been obligated to estab-
lish stations at proper places for the convenience of patrons, 212 to
stop all their intrastate trains at county seats, 213 to run a regular
passenger train instead of a mixed passenger and freight train, 214
to furnish passenger service on a branch line previously devoted ex-
clusively to carrying freight, 215 to restore a siding used principally
by a particular plant but available generally as a public track, and
to continue, even though not profitable by itself, sidetrack 216 as
well as the upkeep of a switch track leading from its main line to
208 United Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, 278 U.S. 300, 308–09 (1929). See also
New York ex rel. Woodhaven Gas Light Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 269 U.S. 244
(1925); New York & Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, 245 U.S. 345 (1917).
209 Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 262 (1910); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry.
v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 242 U.S. 603 (1917); Fort Smith Traction Co. v. Bourland,
267 U.S. 330 (1925).
210 Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 242 U.S. 603, 607 (1917);
Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, 251 U.S. 396 (1920); Railroad Comm’n v.
Eastern Tex. R.R., 264 U.S. 79 (1924); Broad River Co. v. South Carolina ex rel.
Daniel, 281 U.S. 537 (1930).
211 Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Railroad Comm’n, 283 U.S. 380, 394–95 (1931).
212 Minneapolis & St. L. R.R. v. Minnesota, 193 U.S. 53 (1904).
213 Gladson v. Minnesota, 166 U.S. 427 (1897).
214 Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 262 (1910).
215 Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 242 U.S. 603 (1917).
216 Lake Erie & W. R.R. v. Public Util. Comm’n, 249 U.S. 422 (1919); Western
& Atlantic R.R. v. Public Comm’n, 267 U.S. 493 (1925).

industrial plants. 217 However, a statute requiring a railroad with-

out indemnification to install switches on the application of owners
of grain elevators erected on its right-of-way was held void. 218
Whether a state order requiring transportation service is to be
viewed as reasonable may necessitate consideration of such facts as
the likelihood that pecuniary loss will result to the carrier, the na-
ture, extent and productiveness of the carrier’s intrastate business,
the character of the service required, the public need for it, and its
effect upon service already being rendered. 219 Requirements for
service having no substantial relation to transportation have been
voided, as in the case of an order requiring railroads to maintain
cattle scales to facilitate trading in cattle, 220 and a prohibition
against letting down an unengaged upper berth while the lower
berth was occupied. 221
‘‘Since the decision in Wisconsin, M. & P.R. Co. v. Jacobson,
179 U.S. 287 (1900), there can be no doubt of the power of a State,
acting through an administrative body, to require railroad compa-
nies to make track connections. But manifestly that does not mean
that a Commission may compel them to build branch lines, so as
to connect roads lying at a distance from each other; nor does it
mean that they may be required to make connections at every
point where their tracks come close together in city, town and
country, regardless of the amount of business to be done, or the
number of persons who may utilize the connection if built. The
question in each case must be determined in the light of all the
facts and with a just regard to the advantage to be derived by the
public and the expense to be incurred by the carrier. . . . If the
order involves the use of property needed in the discharge of those
duties which the carrier is bound to perform, then, upon proof of
the necessity, the order will be granted, even though ‘the furnish-
ing of such necessary facilities may occasion an incidental pecu-
niary loss.’ . . . Where, however, the proceeding is brought to com-
pel a carrier to furnish a facility not included within its absolute
duties, the question of expense is of more controlling importance.
In determining the reasonableness of such an order the Court must
consider all the facts—the places and persons interested, the vol-
217 Alton R.R. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 305 U.S. 548 (1939).
218 Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Nebraska, 217 U.S. 196 (1910).
219 Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 242 U.S. 603, 607 (1917).
220 Great Northern Ry. v. Minnesota, 238 U.S. 340 (1915); Great Northern Ry.
Co. v. Cahill, 253 U.S. 71 (1920).
221 Chicago, M. & St. P. R.R. v. Wisconsin, 238 U.S. 491 (1915).
ume of business to be affected, the saving in time and expense to

the shipper, as against the cost and loss to the carrier.’’ 222
Although a carrier is under a duty to accept goods tendered at
its station, it cannot be required, upon payment simply for the
service of carriage, to accept cars offered at an arbitrary connection
point near its terminus by a competing road seeking to reach and
use the former’s terminal facilities. Nor may a carrier be required
to deliver its cars to connecting carriers without adequate protec-
tion from loss or undue detention or compensation for their use. 223
But a carrier may be compelled to interchange its freight cars with
other carriers under reasonable terms, 224 and to accept, for
reshipment over its lines to points within the State, cars already
loaded and in suitable condition. 225
Due process is not denied when two carriers, who wholly own
and dominate a small connecting railroad, are prohibited from ex-
acting higher charges from shippers accepting delivery over said
connecting road than are collected from shippers taking delivery at
the terminals of said carriers. 226 Nor is it ‘‘unreasonable’’ or ‘‘arbi-
trary’’ to require a railroad to desist from demanding advance pay-
ment on merchandise received from one carrier while it accepts
merchandise of the same character at the same point from another
carrier without such prepayment. 227
Safety Regulations Applicable to Railroads.—Govern-
mental power to regulate railroads in the interest of safety has
long been conceded. The following regulations have been upheld: a
prohibition against operation on certain streets, 228 restrictions on
speed, operations, and the like, in business sections, 229 require-
ment of construction of a sidewalk across a right of way, 230 or re-
moval of a track crossing at a thoroughfare, 231 compelling the pres-
ence of a flagman at a crossing notwithstanding that automatic de-
vices might be cheaper and better, 232 compulsory examination of
222 Washington ex rel. Oregon R.R. & Nav. Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U.S. 510, 528–
29 (1912). See also Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Michigan R.R. Comm’n, 236 U.S. 615
(1915); Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Georgia R.R. Comm’n, 240 U.S. 324, 327 (1916).
223 Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Stock Yards Co., 212 U.S. 132 (1909).
224 Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Michigan R.R. Comm’n, 236 U.S. 615 (1915).
225 Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Iowa, 233 U.S. 334 (1914).
226 Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minneapolis Civic Ass’n, 247 U.S. 490 (1918).
Nor are railroads denied due process when they are forbidden to exact a greater
charge for a shorter distance than for a longer distance. Louisville & Nashville R.R.
v. Kentucky, 183 U.S. 503, 512 (1902); Missouri Pacific Ry. v. McGrew Coal Co., 244
U.S. 191 (1917).
227 Wadley Southern Ry. v. Georgia, 235 U.S. 651 (1915).
228 Railroad Co. v. Richmond, 96 U.S. 521 (1878).
229 Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548 (1914).
230 Great Northern Ry. v. Minnesota ex rel. Clara City, 246 U.S. 434 (1918).
231 Denver & R. G. R.R. v. Denver, 250 U.S. 241 (1919).
232 Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. White, 278 U.S. 456 (1929).
employees for color blindness, 233 full crews on certain trains, 234
specification of a type of locomotive headlight, 235 safety appliance
regulations, 236 and a prohibition on the heating of passenger cars
from stoves or furnaces inside or suspended from the cars. 237
Statutory Liabilities and Penalties Applicable to Rail-
roads.—A statute making the initial carrier, 238 or the connecting
or delivering carrier, 239 liable to the shipper for the nondelivery of
goods is not unconstitutional; nor is a law which provides that a
railroad shall be responsible in damages to the owner of property
injured by fire communicated by its locomotive engines and which
grants the railroad an insurable interest in such property along its
route and authority to procure insurance against such liability. 240
Equally consistent with the requirements of due process are the fol-
lowing two enactments: the first, imposing on all common carriers
a penalty for failure to settle within a reasonable specified period
claims for freight lost or damaged in shipment and conditioning
payment of that penalty upon recovery by the claimant in a subse-
quent suit of more than the amount tendered, 241 and the second,
levying double damages and an attorney’s fee upon a railroad for
failure to pay within a reasonable time after demand the amount
claimed by an owner for stock injured or killed. However, the Court
subsequently limited its approval of the latter statute to cases in
which the plaintiff had not demanded more than he recovered in
court; 242 when the penalty is exacted in a case in which the plain-
tiff initially demanded more than he sued for and recovered, a de-
fendant railroad is arbitrarily deprived of its property for refusing
to meet the initial excessive demand. 243
Also invalidated during this period of heightened judicial scru-
tiny was a penalty imposed on a carrier that had collected trans-
portation charges in excess of established maximum rates; the pen-
alty of $500 liquidated damages plus a reasonable attorney’s fee
233 Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Alabama, 128 U.S. 96 (1888).
234 Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Arkansas, 219 U.S. 453 (1911); St. Louis, I. Mt.
& So. Ry. v. Arkansas, 240 U.S. 518 (1916); Missouri Pacific R.R. v. Norwood, 283
U.S. 249 (1931); Firemen v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. 393 U.S. 129 (1968).
235 Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Georgia, 234 U.S. 280 (1914).
236 Erie R.R. v. Solomon, 237 U.S. 427 (1915).
237 New York, N.H. and H.R.R. v. New York, 165 U.S. 628 (1897).
238 Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Nye Schneider Fowler Co., 260 U.S. 35 (1922). See
also Yazoo & Miss. V.R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217 (1912); cf. Adams
Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491 (1913).
239 Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Glenn, 239 U.S. 388 (1915).
240 St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. v. Mathews, 165 U.S. 1 (1897).
241 Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Nye Schneider Fowler Co., 260 U.S. 35 (1922).
242 Kansas City Ry. v. Anderson, 233 U.S. 325 (1914).
243 St. Louis, I. Mt. & So. Ry. v. Wynne, 224 U.S. 354 (1912). See also Chicago,
M. & St. P. Ry. v. Polt, 232 U.S. 165 (1914).

was disproportionate to actual damages and was exacted under

conditions not affording the carrier an adequate opportunity to
safely test the validity of the rates before liability attached. 244
Where the carrier did have an opportunity to test the reasonable-
ness of the rate, however, and collection of an overcharge did not
proceed from any belief that the rate was invalid, the Court indi-
cated that the validity of the penalty imposed need not be tested
by comparison with the amount of the overcharge. Inasmuch as a
penalty is imposed as punishment for violation of law, the legisla-
ture may adjust its amount to the public wrong rather than the
private injury, and the only limitation which the Fourteenth
Amendment imposes is that the penalty prescribed shall not be ‘‘so
severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense
and obviously unreasonable.’’ In accordance with the latter stand-
ard, a statute granting an aggrieved passenger (who recovered
$100 for an overcharge of 60 cents) the right to recover in a civil
suit not less than $50 nor more than $300 plus costs and a reason-
able attorney’s fee was upheld. 245
For like reasons, the Court also upheld a statute requiring rail-
roads to erect and maintain fences and cattle guards, and making
them liable in double the amount of damages for their failure to
so maintain them, 246 and another law that established a minimum
rate of speed for delivery of livestock and that required every car-
rier violating the requirement to pay the owner of the livestock the
sum of $10 per car per hour. 247 On the other hand, the Court
struck down as arbitrary and oppressive assessment of fines of
$100 per day (and aggregating $3,600) on a telephone company
that, in accordance with its established and uncontested regula-
tions, suspended the service of a patron in arrears. 248
Regulation of Corporations, Business, Professions, and
Trades
Corporations.—Although a corporation is the creation of a
State, which reserves the power to amend or repeal corporate char-
ters, the retention of such power will not support the taking of cor-
porate property without due process of law. To terminate the life
of a corporation by annulling its charter is not to confiscate its
property but to turn it over to the stockholders after liquidation. 1
244 Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Tucker, 230 U.S. 340 (1913).
245 St. Louis, I. Mt. & So. Ry. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 67 (1919).
246 Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512 (1885); Minneapolis Ry. v.
Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1889).

247 Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Cram, 228 U.S. 70 (1913).
248 Southwestern Tel. Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482 (1915).
1 New Orleans Debenture Redemption Co. v. Louisiana, 180 U.S. 320 (1901).
Foreign (out-of-state) corporations also enjoy the protection

which the due process clause affords, but such protection does not
entitle them to the unconditional right to enter another State or,
once having been permitted to enter, to continue to do business
therein. There is language in the early cases suggesting that the
power of a State to exclude or to expel a foreign corporation is al-
most plenary. 2 While modern doctrines of the ‘‘negative’’ commerce
clause constrain states’ authority to discriminate against foreign
corporations in favor of local commerce, it has always been ac-
knowledged that states may subject corporate entry or continued
operation to reasonable, non-discriminatory conditions. Thus, a
state law which requires the filing of articles with a local official
as a condition prerequisite to the validity of conveyances of local
realty to such corporations is not violative of due process. 3 Also
valid are statutes which require a foreign insurance company, as
part of the price of entry, to maintain reserves computed by a spe-
cific percentage of premiums, including membership fees, received
in all States, 4 or to consent to direct actions filed against it by per-
sons injured in the State by tort-feasors whom it insures. 5 Simi-
larly a statute requiring corporations to dispose of farm land not
necessary to the conduct of their business was not invalid as ap-
plied to a foreign hospital corporation, even though the latter, be-
cause of changed economic conditions, was unable to recoup its
original investment from the sale which it is thus compelled to
make. 6
Business in General.—‘‘The Constitution does not guarantee
the unrestricted privilege to engage in a business or to conduct it
as one pleases. Certain kinds of business may be prohibited; and
the right to conduct a business, or to pursue a calling, may be con-
ditioned. . . . Statutes prescribing the terms upon which those con-
ducting certain businesses may contract, or imposing terms if they
do enter into agreements, are within the State’s competency.’’ 7
Laws Prohibiting Trusts, Discrimination, Restraint of
Trade.—Even during the period when the Court was measuring
statutes by substantive due process liberty of contract principles, it
recognized the right of states to limit liberty of contract by prohib-
iting combinations in restraint of trade. Thus, states could prohibit
2 National Council U.A.M. v. State Council, 203 U.S. 151, 162–63 (1906).
3 Munday v. Wisconsin Trust Co., 252 U.S. 499 (1920).
4 State Farm Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154 (1945).
5 Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
6 Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, 326 U.S. 207 (1945).
7 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 527–28 (1934). See also New Motor Vehicle
Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 106–08 (1978) (upholding regulation of fran-
chise relationship).
agreements to pool and fix prices, divide net earnings, and prevent
competition in the purchase and sale of grain. 8 Nor, the Court
held, does the Fourteenth Amendment preclude a State from adopt-
ing a policy against all combinations of competing corporations and
enforcing it even against combinations which may have been in-
duced by good intentions and from which benefit and no injury may
have resulted. 9 Also upheld were a statute that prohibited retail
lumber dealers from uniting in an agreement not to purchase mate-
rials from wholesalers selling directly to consumers in the retailers’
localities, 10 and another law punishing combinations for ‘‘mali-
ciously’’ injuring a rival in the same business, profession, or
trade. 11
Similarly, a prohibition of unfair discrimination for the pur-
pose of intentionally destroying competition of any other regular
dealer in the same commodity by making sales thereof at a lower
rate in one section of the State than in another, after equalization
for distance, effects no invalid deprivation of property or inter-
ference with freedom of contract. 12 A law sanctioning contracts re-
quiring that commodities identified by trademark will not be sold
by the vendee or subsequent vendees except at prices stipulated by
the original vendor does not violate the due process clause. 13 Also
upheld as not depriving a company of due process was application
of an unfair sales act to enjoin a retail grocery company from sell-
ing below statutory cost in violation of a state unfair sales act, even
though its competitors were selling at unlawful prices. There is no
constitutional right to employ retaliation against action outlawed
by a State, and appellant had available a remedy whereby it could
enjoin illegal activity of its competitors. 14
Laws Preventing Fraud in Sale of Goods and Securi-
ties.—Laws and ordinances tending to prevent frauds and requir-
ing honest weights and measures in the sale of articles of general
consumption have long been considered lawful exertions of the po-
8 Smiley v. Kansas, 196 U.S. 447 (1905). See Waters Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212
U.S. 86 (1909); National Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas, 197 U.S. 115 (1905), also uphold-
ing antitrust laws.
9 International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U.S. 199 (1914). See also Amer-
ican Machine Co. v. Kentucky, 236 U.S. 660 (1915).

10 Grenada Lumber Co. v. Mississippi, 217 U.S. 433 (1910).
11 Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194 (1904).
12 Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U.S. 157 (1912). But cf. Fairmont
Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1 (1927) (invalidating on liberty of contract grounds simi-
lar statute punishing dealers in cream who pay higher prices in one locality than
in another, the Court finding no reasonable relation between the statute’s sanctions
and the anticipated evil).
13 Old Dearborn Co. v. Seagram Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936); Pep Boys v. Pyroil,
299 U.S. 198 (1936).

14 Safeway Stores v. Oklahoma Grocers, 360 U.S. 334 (1959).
lice power. 15 Thus, a prohibition on the issuance or sale by other

than an authorized weigher of any weight certificate for grain
weighed at any warehouse or elevator where state weighers are
stationed is not unconstitutional. 16 Nor is a municipal ordinance
requiring that commodities sold in load lots by weight be weighed
by a public weighmaster within the city invalid as applied to one
delivering coal from state-tested scales at a mine outside the city. 17
A statute requiring merchants to record sales in bulk not made in
the regular course of business is also within the police power. 18
Similarly, the power of a State to prescribe standard contain-
ers to protect buyers from deception as well as to facilitate trading
and to preserve the condition of the merchandise is not open to
question. Accordingly, an administrative order issued pursuant to
an authorizing statute and prescribing the dimensions, form, and
capacity of containers for strawberries and raspberries is not arbi-
trary inasmuch as the form and dimensions bore a reasonable rela-
tion to the protection of the buyers and the preservation in transit
of the fruit. 19 Similarly, an ordinance fixing standard sizes is not
unconstitutional. 20 Regulations issued in furtherance of a statutory
authorization which imposed a rate of tolerance for the minimum
weight for a loaf of bread were upheld. 21 Likewise, a law requiring
that lard not sold in bulk should be put up in containers holding
one, three, or five pounds weight, or some whole multiple of these
numbers, does not deprive sellers of their property without due
process of law. 22
The right of a manufacturer to maintain secrecy as to his com-
pounds and processes must be held subject to the right of the
State, in the exercise of the police power and in the promotion of
fair dealing, to require that the nature of the product be fairly set
forth. 23
15 Schmidinger v. City of Chicago, 226 U.S. 578, 588 (1913) (citing McLean v.
Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539, 550 (1909)).

16 Merchants Exchange v. Missouri, 248 U.S. 365 (1919).
17 Hauge v. City of Chicago, 299 U.S. 387 (1937).
18 Lemieux v. Young, 211 U.S. 489 (1909); Kidd, Dater Co. v. Musselman Grocer
Co., 217 U.S. 461 (1910).

19 Pacific States Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935).
20 Schmidinger v. City of Chicago, 226 U.S. 578 (1913).
21 Petersen Baking Co. v. Bryan, 290 U.S. 570 (1934) (tolerances not to exceed
three ounces to a pound of bread and requiring that the bread maintain the statu-
tory minimum weight for not less than 12 hours after cooling). But cf. Burns Baking
Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924) (tolerance of only two ounces in excess of the min-
imum weight per loaf is unreasonable, given finding that it was impossible to manu-
facture good bread without frequently exceeding the prescribed tolerance).
22 Armor & Co. v. North Dakota, 240 U.S. 510 (1916).
23 Heath & Milligan Co. v. Worst, 207 U.S. 338 (1907); Corn Products Ref. Co.
v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427 (1919); National Fertilizer Ass’n v. Bradley, 301 U.S. 178
(1937).
A statute providing that the purchaser of harvesting or thresh-

ing machinery for his own use shall have a reasonable time after
delivery for inspecting and testing it, and permitting recission of
the contract if the machinery does not prove reasonably adequate,
and further declaring any agreement contrary to its provisions to
be against public policy and void, does not violate the due process
clause. 24 A prohibitive license fee upon the use of trading stamps
is not unconstitutional. 25
In the exercise of its power to prevent fraud and imposition,
a State may regulate trading in securities within its borders, re-
quire a license of those engaging in such dealing, make issuance
of a license dependent on a public officer’s being satisfied of the
good repute of the applicants, and permit the officer, subject to ju-
dicial review of his findings, to revoke the license. 26 A State may
forbid the giving of options to sell or buy at a future time any grain
or other commodity. 27 It may also forbid sales on margin for future
delivery, 28 and may prohibit the keeping of places where stocks,
grain, and the like, are sold but not paid for at the time, unless
a record of the same be made and a stamp tax paid. 29 Making
criminal any deduction by the purchaser from the actual weight of
grain, hay, seed, or coal under a claim of right by reason of any
custom or rule of a board of trade is valid exercise of the police
power and does not deprive the purchaser of his property without
due process of law nor interfere with his liberty of contract. 30
Banking, Wage Assignments and Garnishment.—Regula-
tion of banks and banking has always been considered well within
the police power of states, and the Fourteenth Amendment did not
eliminate this regulatory authority. A variety of regulations has
been upheld over the years. For example, state banks are not de-
prived of property without due process by a statute subjecting them
to assessments for a depositors’ guaranty fund. 31 Also, a law re-
quiring savings banks to turn over to the State deposits inactive
for thirty years (when the depositor cannot be found), with provi-
sion for payment to the depositor or his heirs on establishment of
24 Advance-Rumely Co. v. Jackson, 287 U.S. 283 (1932).
25 Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis, 240 U.S. 342 (1916); Tanner v. Little, 240 U.S.
369 (1916); Pitney v. Washington, 240 U.S. 387 (1916).
26 Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock
Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917); Merrick v. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917).
27 Booth v. Illinois, 184 U.S. 425 (1902).
28 Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606 (1903).
29 Brodnax v. Missouri, 219 U.S. 285 (1911).
30 House v. Mayes, 219 U.S. 270 (1911).
31 Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911); Shallenberger v. First
State Bank, 219 U.S. 114 (1911); Assaria State Bank v. Dolley, 219 U.S. 121 (1911);
Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.S. 765 (1931).
the right, does not effect an invalid taking of the property of said
banks; nor does a statute requiring banks to turn over to the pro-
tective custody of the State deposits that have been inactive ten or
twenty-five years (depending on the nature of the deposit). 32
The constitutional rights of creditors in an insolvent bank in
the hands of liquidators are not violated by a later statute permit-
ting re-opening under a reorganization plan approved by the court,
the liquidating officer, and by three-fourths of the creditors. 33
Similarly, a Federal Reserve bank is not unlawfully deprived of
business rights of liberty of contract by a law which allows state
banks to pay checks in exchange when presented by or through a
Federal Reserve bank, post office, or express company and when
not made payable otherwise by a maker. 34
In fixing maximum rates of interest on money loaned within
its borders, a State is acting clearly within its police power; and the
details are within legislative discretion if not unreasonably or arbi-
trarily exercised. 35 Equally valid as an exercise of a State’s police
power is a requirement that assignments of future wages as secu-
rity for debts of less than $200, to be valid, must be accepted in
writing by the employer, consented to by the assignors, and filed
in public office. Such a requirement deprives neither the borrower
nor the lender of his property without due process of law. 36
Insurance.—The general relations of those engaged in the in-
surance business 37 as well as the business itself have been pecu-
liarly subject to supervision and control. 38 Even during the
Lochner era the Court recognized that government may fix insur-
ance rates and regulate the compensation of insurance agents, 39
and over the years the Court has upheld a wide variety of regula-
tion. A state may impose a fine on ‘‘any person ‘who shall act in
any manner in the negotiation or transaction of unlawful insurance
32 Provident Savings Inst. v. Malone, 221 U.S. 660 (1911); Anderson Nat’l Bank
v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 (1944). When a bank conservator appointed pursuant to
a new statute has all the functions of a receiver under the old law, one of which
is the enforcement on behalf of depositors of stockholders’ liability, which liability
the conservator can enforce as cheaply as could a receiver appointed under the pre-
existing statute, it cannot be said that the new statute, in suspending the right of
a depositor to have a receiver appointed, arbitrarily deprives a depositor of his rem-
edy or destroys his property without the due process of law. The depositor has no
property right in any particular form of remedy. Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S.
326 (1933).
33 Doty v. Love, 295 U.S. 64 (1935).
34 Farmers Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 262 U.S. 649 (1923).
35 Griffith v. Connecticut, 218 U.S. 563 (1910).
36 Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U.S. 225 (1911).
37 La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S. 465 (1919); Stipich v. Insurance Co., 277
U.S. 311, 320 (1928).

38 German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U.S. 389 (1914).
39 O’Gorman & Young v. Hartford Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251 (1931).
. . . with a foreign insurance company not admitted to do business

[within said State].’ ’’ 40 A state may forbid life insurance companies
and their agents to engage in the undertaking business and under-
takers to serve as life insurance agents. 41 Foreign casualty and
surety insurers were not deprived of due process, the Court held,
by a Virginia law which prohibited the making of contracts of cas-
ualty or surety insurance except through registered agents, which
required that such contracts applicable to persons or property in
the State be countersigned by a registered local agent, and which
prohibited such agents from sharing more than 50% of a commis-
sion with a nonresident broker. 42 And just as all banks may be re-
quired to contribute to a depositors’ guaranty fund, so may all
automobile liability insurers be required to submit to the equitable
apportionment among them of applicants who are in good faith en-
titled to, but are financially unable to, procure such insurance
through ordinary methods. 43
However, a statute which prohibited the insured from contract-
ing directly with a marine insurance company outside the State for
coverage of property within the State was held invalid as a depri-
vation of liberty without due process of law. 44 For the same reason,
the Court held, a State may not prevent a citizen from concluding
a policy loan agreement with a foreign life insurance company at
its home office whereby the policy on his life is pledged as collat-
eral security for a cash loan to become due upon default in pay-
ment of premiums, in which case the entire policy reserve might
be applied to discharge the indebtedness. Authority to subject such
an agreement to the conflicting provisions of domestic law is not
deducible from the power of a State to license a foreign insurance
company as a condition of its doing business therein. 45
A stipulation that policies of hail insurance shall take effect
and become binding twenty-four hours after the hour in which an
application is taken and further requiring notice by telegram of re-
jection of an application was upheld. 46 No unconstitutional re-
straint was imposed upon the liberty of contract of surety compa-
nies by a statute providing that, after enactment, any bond exe-
40 Nutting v. Massachusetts, 183 U.S. 553, 556 (1902) (distinguishing Allgeyer
v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897)). See also Hoper v. California, 155 U.S. 648 (1895).
41 Daniel v. Family Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949).
42 Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53, 68–69 (1940). Dissenting from the conclusion,
Justice Roberts declared that the plain effect of the Virginia law is to compel a non-
resident to pay a Virginia resident for services which the latter does not in fact
render.
43 California Auto. Ass’n v. Maloney, 341 U.S. 105 (1951).
44 Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
45 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918).
46 National Ins. Co. v. Wanberg, 260 U.S. 71 (1922).
cuted for the faithful performance of a building contract shall inure

to the benefit of materialmen and laborers, notwithstanding any
provision of the bond to the contrary. 47 Likewise constitutional was
a law requiring that a motor vehicle liability policy shall provide
that bankruptcy of the insured does not release the insurer from
liability to an injured person. 48
There also is no denial of due process for a state to require
that casualty companies, in case of total loss, pay the total amount
for which the property was insured, less depreciation between the
time of issuing the policy and the time of the loss, rather than the
actual cash value of the property at the time of loss. 49
Moreover, even though it had its attorney-in-fact located in Illi-
nois, signed all its contracts there, and forwarded therefrom all
checks in payment of losses, a reciprocal insurance association cov-
ering real property located in New York could be compelled to com-
ply with New York regulations which required maintenance of an
office in that State and the countersigning of policies by an agent
resident therein. 50 Also, to discourage monopolies and to encourage
rate competition, a State constitutionally may impose on all fire in-
surance companies connected with a tariff association fixing rates
a liability or penalty to be collected by the insured of 25% in excess
of actual loss or damage, stipulations in the insurance contract to
the contrary notwithstanding. 51
A state statute by which a life insurance company, if it fails
to pay upon demand the amount due under a policy after death of
the insured, is made liable in addition for fixed damages, reason-
able in amount, and for a reasonable attorney’s fee is not unconsti-
tutional even though payment is resisted in good faith and upon
reasonable grounds. 52 It is also proper by law to cut off a defense
by a life insurance company based on false and fraudulent state-
ments in the application, unless the matter misrepresented actu-
ally contributed to the death of the insured. 53 A provision that sui-
cide, unless contemplated when the application for a policy was
made, shall be no defense is equally valid. 54 When a cooperative
life insurance association is reorganized so as to permit it to do a
life insurance business of every kind, policyholders are not deprived
47 Hartford Accident Co. v. Nelson Co., 291 U.S. 352 (1934).
48 Merchants Liability Co. v. Smart, 267 U.S. 126 (1925).
49 Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 577 (1899) (the statute was in effect when
the contract at issue was signed).

50 Hooperston Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313 (1943).
51 German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Hale, 219 U.S. 307 (1911). See also Carroll v.
Greenwich Ins. Co., 199 U.S. 401 (1905).

52 Life & Casualty Co. v. McCray, 291 U.S. 566 (1934).
53 Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243 (1906).
54 Whitfield v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 205 U.S. 489 (1907).
of their property without due process of law. 55 Similarly, when the

method of liquidation provided by a plan of rehabilitation of a mu-
tual life insurance company is as favorable to dissenting policy-
holders as would have been the sale of assets and pro rata distribu-
tion to all creditors, the dissenters are unable to show any taking
without due process. Dissenting policyholders have no constitu-
tional right to a particular form of remedy. 56
Miscellaneous Businesses and Professions.—An act impos-
ing license fees for operating employment agencies and prohibiting
them from sending applicants to an employer who has not applied
for labor does not deny due process of law. 57 Also, a state law pro-
hibiting operation of a ‘‘debt pooling’’ or a ‘‘debt adjustment’’ busi-
ness except as an incident to the legitimate practice of law is a
valid exercise of legislative discretion. 58
The Court has sustained a law establishing as a qualification
for obtaining or retaining a pharmacy operating permit that one ei-
ther be a registered pharmacist in good standing or that the cor-
poration or association have a majority of its stock owned by reg-
istered pharmacists in good standing who were actively and regu-
larly employed in and responsible for the management, super-
vision, and operation of such pharmacy. 59 The Court also upheld
a state law forbidding (1) solicitation of the sale of frames, mount-
ings, or other optical appliances, (2) solicitation of the sale of eye-
glasses, lenses, or prisms by use of advertising media, (3) retailers
from leasing, or otherwise permitting anyone purporting to do eye
examinations or visual care to occupy space in a retail store, and
(4) anyone, such as an optician, to fit lenses, or replace lenses or
other optical appliances, except upon written prescription of an op-
tometrist or opthalmologist licensed in the State is not invalid. A
State may treat all who deal with the human eye as members of
a profession that should refrain from merchandising methods to ob-
55 Polk v. Mutual Reserve Fund, 207 U.S. 310 (1907).
56 Neblett v. Carpenter, 305 U.S. 297 (1938).
57 Brazee v. Michigan, 241 U.S. 340 (1916). With four Justices dissenting, the
Court in Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917), struck down a state law absolutely
prohibiting maintenance of private employment agencies. Commenting on the ‘‘con-
stitutional philosophy’’ thereof in Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron
& Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 535 (1949), Justice Black stated that Olsen v. Nebraska,
313 U.S. 236 (1941), ‘‘clearly undermined Adams v. Tanner.’’
58 Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
59 North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder’s Drug Stores, 414 U.S. 156
(1973). In the course of the decision, the Court overruled Liggett Co. v. Baldridge,
278 U.S. 105 (1928), in which it had voided a law forbidding a corporation to own
any drug store, unless all its stockholders were licensed pharmacists, as applied to
a foreign corporation, all of whose stockholders were not pharmacists, which sought
to extend its business in the State by acquiring and operating therein two additional
stores.
tain customers, and that should choose locations that reduce the
temptations of commercialism; a state may also conclude that eye
examinations are so critical that every change in frame and dupli-
cation of a lens should be accompanied by a prescription. 60
The practice of medicine, using this word in its most general
sense, has long been the subject of regulation. 61 A State may ex-
clude osteopathic physicians from hospitals maintained by it or its
municipalities, 62 may regulate the practice of dentistry by prescrib-
ing qualifications that are reasonably necessary, requiring licenses,
establishing a supervisory administrative board, and prohibiting
certain advertising regardless of its truthfulness. 63 But while stat-
utes requiring pilots to be licensed 64 and setting reasonable com-
petency standards (e.g., that railroad engineers pass color blind-
ness tests) have been sustained, 65 an act making it a misdemeanor
for a person to act as a railway passenger conductor without hav-
ing had two years’ experience as a freight conductor or brakeman
was invalidated as not rationally distinguishing between those
competent and those not competent to serve as conductor. 66
The Court has also upheld a variety of other licensing or regu-
latory legislation applicable to places of amusement, 67 grain ele-
vators, 68 detective agencies, 69 the sale of cigarettes 70 or cosmet-
ics, 71 and the resale of theatre tickets. 72 Restrictions on advertis-
ing have also been upheld, including absolute bans on the advertis-
ing of cigarettes, 73 or the use of a representation of the United
60 Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
61 McNaughton v. Johnson, 242 U.S. 344, 349 (1917). See also Dent v. West Vir-
ginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898); Reetz v.
Michigan, 188 U.S. 505 (1903); Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173 (1910); Barsky
v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954) sustaining a New York law authorizing
suspension for six months of the license of a physician who had been convicted of
crime in any jurisdiction, in this instance, contempt of Congress under 2 U.S.C.
§ 192. Three Justices, Black, Douglas, and Frankfurter, dissented.
62 Collins v. Texas, 223 U.S. 288 (1912); Hayman v. Galveston, 273 U.S. 414
(1927).
63 Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 611 (1935). See also Douglas v.
Noble, 261 U.S. 165 (1923); Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 425, 427 (1926).
64 Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904).
65 Nashville, C. & St. L. R.R. v. Alabama, 128 U.S. 96 (1888).
66 Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S. 630 (1914). See DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144,
157–60 (1960), sustaining New York law barring from office in longshoremen’s
union persons convicted of felony and not thereafter pardoned or granted a good
conduct certificate from a parole board.
67 Western Turf Ass’n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359 (1907).
68 W.W. Cargill Co. v. Minnesota, 180 U.S. 452 (1901).
69 Lehon v. Atlanta, 242 U.S. 53 (1916).
70 Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U.S. 183, 185 (1900).
71 Bourjois, Inc. v. Chapman, 301 U.S. 183 (1937).
72 Weller v. New York, 268 U.S. 319 (1925).
73 Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932).
States flag on an advertising medium. 74 Similarly constitutional

were prohibitions on the solicitation by a layman of the business
of collecting and adjusting claims, 75 the keeping of private markets
within six squares of a public market, 76 the keeping of billiard
halls except in hotels, 77 or the purchase by junk dealers of wire,
copper, and other items, without ascertaining the seller’s right to
sell. 78
Protection of State Resources

Oil and Gas.—To prevent waste, production of oil and gas
may be prorated; the prohibition of wasteful conduct, whether pri-
marily in behalf of the owners of oil and gas in a common reservoir
or because of the public interests involved, is consistent with the
Constitution. 79 Thus, the Court upheld against due process chal-
lenge a statute which defined waste as including, in addition to its
ordinary meaning, economic waste, surface waste, and production
in excess of transportation or marketing facilities or reasonable
market demands, and which limited each producer’s share to a pro-
rated portion of the total production that can be taken from the
common source without waste. 80 Whether a system of proration
based on hourly potential is as fair as one based upon estimated
recoverable reserves or some other combination of factors is a ques-
tion for administrative and not judicial judgment. In a domain of
knowledge still shifting and growing, it has been held to be pre-
sumptuous for courts, on the basis of conflicting expert testimony,
to invalidate an oil proration order, promulgated by an administra-
tive commission in execution of a regulatory scheme intended to
conserve a State’s oil resources. 81 On the other hand, where the
evidence showed that an order, purporting to limit daily total pro-
duction of a gas field and to prorate the allowed production among
several wells, had for its real purpose, not the prevention of waste
nor the undue drainage from the reserves of other well owners, but
rather the compelling of pipeline owners to furnish a market to
those who had no pipeline connections, the order was held void as
74 Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907).
75 McCloskey v. Tobin, 252 U.S. 107 (1920).
76 Natal v. Louisiana, 139 U.S. 621 (1891).
77 Murphy v. California, 225 U.S. 623 (1912).
78 Rosenthal v. New York, 226 U.S. 260 (1912).
79 Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Co., 300 U.S. 55, 76–77 (1937) (citing Ohio Oil
Co. v. Indiana (No. 1), 177 U.S. 190 (1900)); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,
220 U.S. 61 (1911); Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
80 Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm’n, 286 U.S. 210 (1932).
81 Railroad Comm’n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573 (1940). See also
Railroad Comm’n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 311 U.S. 570 (1941); Railroad
Comm’n v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 311 U.S. 578 (1941).
a taking of private property for private benefit. 82 Also sustained as

conservation measures were orders of the Oklahoma Corporation
Commission, premised on a finding that existing low field prices for
natural gas were resulting in economic and physical waste, fixing
a minimum price for gas and requiring one producer to take gas
ratably from another producer in the same field at the dictated
price. 83
Even though carbon black is more valuable than the gas from
which it is extracted, and notwithstanding a resulting loss of in-
vestment in a plant for the manufacture of carbon black, a State,
in the exercise of its police power, may forbid the use of natural
gas for products, such as carbon black, in the production of which
such gas is burned without fully utilizing for other manufacturing
or domestic purposes the heat therein contained. 84 Likewise, for
the purpose of regulating and adjusting coexisting rights of surface
owners to underlying oil and gas, it is within the power of a State
to prohibit the operators of wells from allowing natural gas, not
conveniently necessary for other purposes, to come to the surface
without the lifting power having been utilized to produce the great-
est quality of oil in proportion. 85
Protection of Property and Agricultural Crops.—An ordi-
nance conditioning the right to drill for oil and gas within the city
limits upon the filing of a bond in the sum of $200,000 for each
well, to secure payment of damages from injuries to any persons
or property resulting from the drilling operation, or maintenance of
any well or structure appurtenant thereto, is consistent with due
process of law and is not rendered unreasonable by the require-
ment that the bond be executed, not by personal sureties, but by
a bonding company authorized to do business in the State. 86 On
the other hand, a Pennsylvania statute, which forbade the mining
of coal under private dwellings or streets of cities by a grantor that
had reserved the right to mine, was viewed as restricting the use
of private property too much and hence as a denial of due process
and a ‘‘taking’’ without compensation. 87 Years later, however, a
quite similar Pennsylvania statute was upheld, the Court finding
that the new law no longer involved merely a balancing of private
82 Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Co., 300 U.S. 55 (1937).
83 CitiesService Co. v. Peerless Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950); Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Oklahoma, 340 U.S. 190 (1950).
84 Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300 (1920). See also Henderson Co.
v. Thompson, 300 U.S. 258 (1937).

85 Bandini Co. v. Superior Court, 284 U.S. 8 (1931).
86 Gant v. Oklahoma City, 289 U.S. 98 (1933).
87 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). On the ‘‘taking’’ juris-
prudence that has stemmed from this case, see supra, pp. 1382–84.
economic interests, but instead promoted such ‘‘important public

interests’’ as conservation, protection of water supplies, and preser-
vation of land values for taxation. 88 Also distinguished from Penn-
sylvania Coal was a challenge to an ordinance prohibiting sand and
gravel excavation near the water table and imposing a duty to refill
any existing excavation below that level. The ordinance was
upheld; the fact that it prohibited a business that had been con-
ducted for over 30 years did not give rise to a taking in the absence
of proof that the land could not be used for other legitimate pur-
poses. 89
A statute requiring the destruction of cedar trees within two
miles of apple orchards in order to prevent damage to the orchards
caused by cedar rust was upheld as not unreasonable even in the
absence of compensation. Apple growing being one of the principal
agricultural pursuits in Virginia and the value of cedar trees
throughout the State being small as compared with that of apple
orchards, the State was constitutionally competent to require the
destruction of one class of property in order to save another which,
in the judgment of its legislature, was of greater value to the pub-
lic. 90 Similarly, Florida was held to possess constitutional author-
ity to protect the reputation of one of its major industries by penal-
izing the delivery for shipment in interstate commerce of citrus
fruits so immature as to be unfit for consumption. 91
Water.—A statute making it unlawful for a riparian owner to
divert water into another State was held not to deprive the owner
of property without due process of law. ‘‘The constitutional power
of the State to insist that its natural advantages shall remain
unimpaired by its citizens is not dependent upon any nice estimate
of the extent of present use or speculation as to future needs. . . .
What it has it may keep and give no one a reason for its will.’’ 92
This holding has since been disapproved, but on interstate com-
merce rather than due process grounds. 93 States may, however,
enact and enforce a variety of conservation measures for the protec-
tion of watersheds. 94
88 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 488 (1987).
The Court in Pennsylvania Coal had viewed that case as one of ‘‘a single private
house.’’ 260 U.S. at 413.
89 Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
90 Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277, 279 (1928).
91 Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52 (1915).
92 Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1908).
93 Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982). See also City of
Altus v. Carr, 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex.), aff’d per curiam, 385 U.S. 35 (1966).
94 See, e.g., Perley v. North Carolina, 249 U.S. 510 (1919) (upholding law requir-
ing the removal of timber refuse from the vicinity of a watershed to prevent the
spread of fire and consequent damage to such watershed).
Fish and Game.—A State has sufficient control over fish and
wild game found within its boundaries 95 that it may regulate or
prohibit fishing and hunting. 96 For the effective enforcement of
such restrictions, a state may also forbid the possession within its
borders of special instruments of violations, such as nets, traps,
and seines, regardless of the time of acquisition or the protesta-
tions of lawful intentions on the part of a particular possessor. 97
The Court also upheld a state law, designed to conserve for food
fish found within its waters, restricting a commercial reduction
plant from accepting more fish than it could process without dete-
rioration, waste, or spoilage, and applying such restriction to fish
imported into the State. 98
The Court’s early decisions rested on the legal fiction that
states owned the fish and wild game within their borders, hence
could reserve these possessions solely for use by their own citizens.
The Court soon backed away from the ownership fiction, 99 and in
Hughes v. Oklahoma 100 overruled Geer v. Connecticut, indicating
instead that state conservation measures discriminating against
out-of-state persons were to be measured under the commerce
clause. Although a state’s ‘‘concerns for conservation and protection
of wild animals’’ were still a ‘‘legitimate’’ basis for regulation, these
concerns could not justify disproportionate burdens on interstate
commerce. 101 More recently still, in the context of recreational
rather than commercial activity, the Court reached a result more
deferential to state authority, holding that access to recreational
big game hunting is not within the category of rights protected by
the Privileges and Immunitites Clause, and that consequently a
state could without differential cost justification charge out-of-
staters significantly more than in-staters for a hunting license. 102
Suffice it to say that similar cases involving a state’s efforts to re-
serve its fish and game for its own inhabitants are likely to be
95 Bayside Fish Co. v. Gentry, 297 U.S. 422, 426 (1936).
96 Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891); Geer v. Connecticut, 161
U.S. 519 (1896).
97 Miller v. McLaughlin, 281 U.S. 261, 264 (1930).
98 Bayside Fish Co. v. Gentry, 297 U.S. 422 (1936). See also New York ex rel.
Silz v. Hesterberg, 211 U.S. 31 (1908) (upholding law proscribing possession during
the closed season of game imported from abroad).
99 See, e.g., Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928) (invalidat-
ing Louisiana statute prohibiting transportation outside the state of shrimp taken
in state waters, unless the head and shell had first been removed); Toomer v.
Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (invalidating law discriminating against out-of-state
commercial fishermen); Douglas v. Seacoast Products, 431 U.S. 265, 284 (1977)
(state could not discriminate in favor of its residents against out-of-state fishermen
in federally licensed ships).
100 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (formally overruling Geer).
101 Id. at 336, 338–39.
102 Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
challenged under commerce or privileges and immunities prin-

ciples, rather than under substantive due process.
Ownership of Real Property: Limitations, Rights

Zoning and Similar Actions.—That states and municipal
subdivisions may zone land for designated uses is now a well estab-
lished aspect of the police power. Zoning authority gained judicial
recognition early in the 20th century. Initially, analogy was drawn
to public nuisance law, the Court recognizing that States and their
municipal subdivisions may declare that in particular cir-
cumstances and in particular localities specific businesses, which
are not nuisances per se, are to be deemed nuisances in fact and
in law. 103 Thus, a State may declare the emission of dense smoke
in populous areas a nuisance and restrain it; regulations to that ef-
fect are not invalid even though they affect the use of property or
subject the owner to the expense of complying with their terms. 104
So too, the Court upheld an ordinance that prohibited brickmaking
in a designated area, even though the land contained valuable clay
deposits which could not profitably be removed for processing else-
where, was far more valuable for brickmaking than for any other
purpose, had been acquired before it was annexed to the municipal-
ity, and had long been used as a brickyard. 105
With increasing urbanization and consequent broadening of
the philosophy of regulation of land use to protect not only health
and safety but also the amenities of modern living, 106 the Court
has recognized the discretion of government, within the loose con-
fines of the due process clause, to zone in many ways and for many
purposes. The Court will uphold a challengened land-use plan un-
less it determines that the plan is clearly arbitrary and unreason-
able and has no substantial relation to the public health, safety, or
general welfare, 107 or unless the plan as applied amounts to a tak-
103 Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) (location of a livery sta-
ble within a thickly populated city ‘‘is well within the range of the power of the state
to legislate for the health and general welfare’’). See also Fischer v. St. Louis, 194
U.S. 361 (1904) (upholding restriction on location of dairy cow stables); Bacon v.
Walker, 204 U.S. 311 (1907) (upholding restriction on grazing of sheep near habi-
tations).
104 Northwestern Laundry v. Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486 (1916). For a case em-
bracing a rather special set of facts, see Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223 (1904).
105 Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
106 Cf. Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427 (1978).
107 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Zahn v. Board
of Pub. Works, 274 U.S. 325 (1927); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183
(1928); Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917); St. Louis Poster Adv.
Co. v. City of St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269 (1919).
ing of property without just compensation. 108 Applying these prin-

ciples, the Court has held that the creation of a residential district
in a village and the exclusion therefrom of apartment houses, retail
stores, and billboards is a permissible exercise of municipal
power. 109 So too, a municipality restricting housing in a commu-
nity to one-family dwellings, in which any number of persons relat-
ed by blood, adoption, or marriage could occupy a house but only
two unrelated persons could do so, was sustained in the absence of
any showing that it was aimed at the deprivation of a ‘‘fundamen-
tal interest.’’ 110 Such a fundamental interest was found impaired
by a zoning ordinance in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 111 which
restricted housing occupancy to a single family but so defined ‘‘fam-
ily’’ that a grandmother who had been living with her two
grandsons of different children was in violation of the ordinance.
Similarly, black persons cannot be forbidden to occupy houses in
blocks where the greater number of houses are occupied by white
persons, or vice versa. 112 But aside from such basic constraints, a
wide range of regulation is permissible. Government may regulate
the height of buildings 113 and establish building setback require-
ments. 114 The preservation of open spaces, through density con-
trols and restrictions on the numbers of houses, 115 and the preser-
vation of historic structures 116 are also permissible utilizations of
the zoning power.
In one aspect of zoning—the degree to which such decisions
may be delegated to private persons—the Court has not attained
consistency. Thus, it invalidated a city ordinance which conferred
the power to establish building setback lines upon the owners of
two thirds of the property abutting any street, 117 and, subse-
quently, it struck down an ordinance which permitted the estab-
lishment of philanthropic homes for the aged in residential areas
but only upon the written consent of the owners of two-thirds of
108 See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992),
and discussion of the Fifth Amendment’s eminent domain power, supra pp. 1382–
95.
109 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
110 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
111 431 U.S. 494 (1977). A plurality of the Court struck down the ordinance as
a violation of substantive due process, an infringment of family living arrangements

which are a protected liberty interest, id. at 498–506, while Justice Stevens con-
curred on the ground that the ordinance was arbitrary and unreasonable. Id. at 513.
Four Justices dissented. Id. at 521, 531, 541.
112 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
113 Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909).
114 Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927).
115 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
116 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
117 Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
the property within 400 feet of the proposed facility. 118 In a deci-
sion falling chronologically between these two, it sustained an ordi-
nance which permitted property owners to waive a municipal re-
striction prohibiting the construction of billboards. 119 In its most
recent decision, upholding a city charter provision permitting the
petitioning to citywide referendum of zoning changes and variances
by the city planning commission and necessitating a 55% approval
vote in the referendum to sustain the commission’s decision, the
Court distinguished between delegating to a small group of affected
landowners such a decision relating to other people and the peo-
ple’s retention of the ultimate legislative power in themselves
which for convenience they had delegated to a legislative body. 120
The zoning power may not be delegated to a church, the Court in-
validating under the Establishment Clause a state law permitting
any church to block issuance of a liquor license for a facility to be
operated within 500 feet of the church. 121
Estates, Succession, Abandoned Property.—The Court
upheld a New York Decedent Estate Law that granted to a surviv-
ing spouse a right of election to take as in intestacy, as applied to
a widow who, before enactment of the law, had waived any right
to her husband’s estate. Impairment of the widow’s waiver by sub-
sequent legislation did not deprive the husband’s estate of property
without due process of law. Because rights of succession to property
are of statutory creation, the Court explained, New York could
have conditioned any further exercise of testamentary power upon
the giving of right of election to the surviving spouse regardless of
any waiver however formally executed. 122
Even after the creation of a testamentary trust, a State retains
the power to devise new and reasonable directions to the trustee
to meet new conditions arising during its administration, especially
such as the Depression presented to trusts containing mortgages.
Accordingly, no constitutional right is violated by the retroactive
application to an estate on which administration had already begun
of a statute which had the effect of taking away a remainderman’s
right to judicial examination of the trustee’s computation of income.
Under the peculiar facts of the case, however, the remainderman’s
118 Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
119 Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917). The Court
thought the case different from Eubank, because in that case the ordinance estab-
lished no rule but gave to decision of a narrow segment of the community the force
of law, whereas in Cusack the ordinance barred the erection of any billboards but
permitted the prohibition to be modified by the persons most affected. Id. at 531.
120 City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, 426 U.S. 668 (1976). Such
referenda do, however, raise equal protection problems. See infra, p. 1858.
121 Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
122 Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 564 (1942).
right had been created by judicial rules promulgated after the

death of the decedent, so the case is not precedent for a broad rule
of retroactivity. 123
States have several jurisdictional bases for application of es-
cheat and abandoned property laws to out-of-state corporations.
Application of New York’s Abandoned Property Law to insurance
policies on the lives of New York residents issued by foreign cor-
porations did not deprive such companies of property without due
process, where the insured persons had continued to be New York
residents and the beneficiaries were resident at the maturity date
of the policies. The relationship between New York and its resi-
dents who abandon claims against foreign insurance companies,
and between New York and foreign insurance companies doing
business therein, is sufficiently close to give New York jurisdic-
tion. 124 In Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 125 a divided Court held
that due process is not violated by a statute escheating to the State
shares of stock in a domestic corporation and unpaid dividends de-
clared thereon, even though the last known owners were non-
residents and the stock was issued and the dividends were held in
another State. The State’s power over the debtor corporation gives
it power to seize the debts or demands represented by the stock
and dividends.
The large discretion the States possess to define abandoned
property and to provide for its disposition is revealed in Texaco v.
Short. 126 There upheld was an Indiana statute which terminated
interests in coal, oil, gas, or other minerals which have not been
used for twenty years and which provided for reversion to the
owner of the interest out of which the mining interests had been
carved. With respect to interests existing at the time of enactment,
the statute provided a two-year grace period in which owners of
mineral interests that were then unused and subject to lapse could
preserve those interests by filing a claim in the recorder’s office.
The ‘‘use’’ of a mineral interest which could prevent its extinction
included the actual or attempted extraction of minerals, the pay-
ment of rents or royalties, and any payment of taxes. Merely filing
a claim with the local recorder would preserve the interest. The
statute provided no notice, save for its own publication, to owners
123 Demorest v. City Bank Co., 321 U.S. 36, 47–48 (1944).
124 Connecticut Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541 (1948). Justices Jackson and
Douglas dissented on the ground that New York was attempting to escheat un-
claimed funds not actually or constructively located in New York, and which were
the property of beneficiaries who may never have been citizens or residents of New
York.
125 341 U.S. 428 (1951).
126 454 U.S. 516 (1982).
of interests, nor did it require surface owners to notify owners of

mineral interests that the interests were about to expire. By a nar-
row margin, the Court sustained the statute, holding that the
State’s interest in encouraging production, securing timely notices
of property ownership, and settling property titles provided a basis
for enactment, and finding that due process did not require any ac-
tual notice to holders of unused mineral interests. Property owners
are charged with maintaining knowledge of the legal conditions of
property ownership. The act provided a grace period and specified
several actions which were sufficient to avoid extinguishment. The
State ‘‘may impose on an owner of a mineral interest the burden
of using that interest or filing a current statement of interests’’ and
it may similarly ‘‘impose on him the lesser burden of keeping in-
formed of the use or nonuse of his own property.’’ 127
Health, Safety, and Morals
Even under the narrowest concept of the police power as lim-
ited by substantive due process, it was generally conceded that
states could exercise the power to protect the public health, safety,
and morals. 128 Illustrative cases are noted below.
Safety Regulations.—A variety of measures designed to re-
duce fire hazards have been upheld. These include municipal ordi-
nances that prohibit the storage of gasoline within 300 feet of any
dwelling, 129 or require that all tanks with a capacity of more than
ten gallons, used for the storage of gasoline, be buried at least
three feet under ground, 130 or which prohibit washing and ironing
in public laundries and wash houses, within defined territorial lim-
its from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. 131 Equally sanctioned by the Fourteenth
Amendment is the demolition and removal by cities of wooden
buildings erected within defined fire limits contrary to regulations
in force at the time. 132 Construction of property in full compliance
with existing laws, however, does not confer upon the owner an im-
munity against exercise of the police power. Thus, a 1944 amend-
ment to a Multiple Dwelling Law, requiring installation of auto-
matic sprinklers in lodginghouses of non-fireproof construction
erected prior to said enactment, does not, as applied to a
lodginghouse constructed in 1940 in conformity with all laws then
127 Id. at 538. The four dissenters thought that some specific notice was re-
quired for persons holding before enactment. Id. at 540.

128 See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887), and discussion supra
p. 1575.
129 Pierce Oil Corp. v. Hope, 248 U.S. 498 (1919).
130 Standard Oil Co. v. Marysville, 279 U.S. 582 (1929).
131 Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885); Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703
(1885).
132 Maguire v. Reardon, 225 U.S. 271 (1921).
applicable, deprive the owner of due process, even though compli-

ance entails an expenditure of $7,500 on a property worth only
$25,000. 133
Sanitation.—An ordinance for incineration of garbage and
refuse at a designated place as a means of protecting public health
is not taking of private property without just compensation even
though such garbage and refuse may have some elements of value
for certain purposes. 134 Compelling property owners to connect
with a publicly maintained system of sewers and enforcing that
duty by criminal penalties does not violate the due process
clause. 135
Food, Drugs, Milk.—‘‘The power of the State to . . . prevent
the production within its borders of impure foods, unfit for use, and
such articles as would spread disease and pestilence, is well estab-
lished.’’ 136 Statutes forbidding or regulating the manufacture of
oleomargarine have been upheld as a valid exercise of such
power. 137 For the same reasons, statutes ordering the destruction
of unsafe and unwholesome food, 138 and prohibiting the sale and
authorizing confiscation of impure milk 139 have been sustained,
notwithstanding that such articles had a value for purposes other
than food. There also can be no question of the authority of the
State, in the interest of public health and welfare, to forbid the sale
of drugs by itinerant vendors 140 or the sale of spectacles by an es-
tablishment not in charge of a physician or optometrist. 141 Nor is
it any longer possible to doubt the validity of state regulations per-
taining to the administration, sale, prescription, and use of dan-
gerous and habit-forming drugs. 142
Equally valid as police power regulations are laws forbidding
the sale of ice cream not containing a reasonable proportion of but-
ter fat 143 or of condensed milk made from skimmed milk rather
than whole milk 144 or of food preservatives containing boric
acid. 145 Similarly, a statute which prohibits the sale of milk to
which has been added any fat or oil other than a milk fat, and
133 Queenside Hills Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80 (1946).
134 California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Works, 199 U.S. 306 (1905).
135 Hutchinson v. City of Valdosta, 227 U.S. 303 (1913).
136 Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 59–60 (1915).
137 Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888); Magnano v. Hamilton, 292 U.S.
40 (1934).
138 North American Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
139 Adams v. City of Milwaukee, 228 U.S. 572 (1913).
140 Baccus v. Louisiana, 232 U.S. 334 (1914).
141 Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337 (1929).
142 Minnesota ex rel. Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U.S. 41, 45 (1921).
143 Hutchinson Ice Cream Co. v. Iowa, 242 U.S. 153 (1916).
144 Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248 U.S. 297 (1919).
145 Price v. Illinois, 238 U.S. 446 (1915).
which has, as one of its purposes, the prevention of fraud and de-
ception in the sale of milk products, does not, when applied to
‘‘filled milk’’ having the taste, consistency, and appearance of whole
milk products, violate the due process clause. Filled milk is inferior
to whole milk in its nutritional content and cannot be served to
children as a substitute for whole milk without producing a dietary
deficiency. 146 However, a statute forbidding the sale of bedding
made with shoddy, even when sterilized and therefore harmless to
health, was held to be arbitrary and therefore invalid. 147
Intoxicating Liquor.—‘‘[O]n account of their well-known nox-
ious qualities and the extraordinary evils shown by experience to
be consequent upon their use, a State . . . [is competent] to pro-
hibit [absolutely the] manufacture, gift, purchase, sale, or transpor-
tation of intoxicating liquors within its borders. . . .’’ 148 And to im-
plement such prohibition, a State has the power to declare that
places where liquor is manufactured or kept shall be deemed com-
mon nuisances, 149 and even to subject an innocent owner to the
forfeiture of his property for the acts of a wrongdoer. 150
Regulation of Motor Vehicles and Carriers.—The highways
of a State are public property, the primary and preferred use of
which is for private purposes; their uses for purposes of gain may
generally be prohibited by the legislature or conditioned as it sees
fit. 151 In limiting the use of its highways for intrastate transpor-
tation for hire, a State reasonably may provide that carriers who
have furnished adequate, responsible, and continuous service over
a given route from a specified data in the past shall be entitled to
licenses as a matter of right but that the licensing of those whose
service over the route began later than the date specified shall de-
pend upon public convenience and necessity. 152 To require private
contract carriers for hire to obtain a certificate of convenience and
necessity, which is not granted if the service of common carriers is
impaired thereby, and to fix minimum rates applicable thereto,
which are not less than those prescribed for common carriers, is
valid as a means of conserving highways, 153 but any attempt to
146 Sage Stores Co. v. Kansas, 323 U.S. 32 (1944).
147 Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U.S. 402 (1926).
148 Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 33 (1878); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623 (1887); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888); Purity Extract Co. v. Lynch, 226
U.S. 192 (1912); Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry., 242 U.S. 311 (1917);
Barbour v. Georgia, 249 U.S. 454 (1919).
149 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 671 (1887).
150 Hawes v. Georgia, 258 U.S. 1 (1922); Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465
(1926).
151 Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932).
152 Stanley v. Public Utilities Comm’n, 295 U.S. 76 (1935).
153 Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932).
convert private carriers into common carriers, 154 or to subject them

to the burdens and regulations of common carriers, without ex-
pressly declaring them to be common carriers, is violative of due
process. 155 In the absence of legislation by Congress, a State may,
in protection of the public safety, deny an interstate motor carrier
the use of an already congested highway. 156
In exercising its authority over its highways, on the other
hand, a State is not limited merely to the raising of revenue for
maintenance and reconstruction or to regulating the manner in
which vehicles shall be operated, but may also prevent the wear
and hazards due to excessive size of vehicles and weight of load.
Accordingly, a statute limiting to 7,000 pounds the net load permis-
sible for trucks is not unreasonable. 157 No less constitutional is a
municipal traffic regulation which forbids the operation in the
streets of any advertising vehicle, excepting vehicles displaying
business notices or advertisements of the products of the owner
and not used mainly for advertising; and such regulation may be
validly enforced to prevent an express company from selling adver-
tising space on the outside of its trucks. Inasmuch as it is the judg-
ment of local authorities that such advertising affects public safety
by distracting drivers and pedestrians, courts are unable to hold
otherwise in the absence of evidence refuting that conclusion. 158
Any appropriate means adopted to insure compliance and care
on the part of licensees and to protect other highway users being
consonant with due process, a State may also provide that a driver
who fails to pay a judgment for negligent operation shall have his
license and registration suspended for three years, unless, in the
meantime, the judgment is satisfied or discharged. 159 Compulsory
automobile insurance is so plainly valid as to present no federal
constitutional question. 160
154 Michigan Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Duke, 266 U.S. 570 (1925).
155 Frost Trucking v. Railroad Comm’n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926); Smith v. Cahoon,
283 U.S. 553 (1931).
156 Bradley v. Public Utils. Comm’n, 289 U.S. 92 (1933).
157 Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374 (1932).
158 Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
159 Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941); Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety,
369 U.S. 153 (1962). But see Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971). Procedural due
process must, of course be observed. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971). A non-
resident owner who loans his automobile in another state, by the law of which he
is immune from liability for the borrower’s negligence and who was not in the state
at the time of the accident, is not subjected to any unconstitutional deprivation by
a law thereof, imposing liability on the owner for the negligence of one driving the
car with the owner’s permission. Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933).
160 Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933). See also Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S.
140 (1924); Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U.S. 163 (1928); Hodge Co. v. Cincinnati, 284
U.S. 335 (1932); Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U.S. 352 (1932).
Protecting Morality.—Unless effecting a clear, unmistakable

infringement of rights secured by fundamental law, legislation sup-
pressing prostitution 161 or gambling will be upheld by the Court as
concededly within the police power of a State. 162 Accordingly, a
state statute may provide that, in the event a judgment is obtained
against a party winning money, a lien may be had on the property
of the owner of the building where the gambling transaction was
conducted when the owner knowingly consented to the gam-
bling. 163 For the same reason, lotteries, including those operated
under a legislative grant, may be forbidden, irrespective of any par-
ticular equities. 164
Vested Rights, Remedial Rights, Political Candidacy
Inasmuch as the Due Process Clause protects against arbitrary
deprivation of ‘‘property,’’ privileges not constituting property are
not entitled to protection. 165 Because an existing right of action to
recover damages for an injury is property, that right of action is
protected by the clause. 166 Thus, the retroactive repeal of a provi-
sion which made directors liable for moneys embezzled by corporate
officers, by preventing enforcement of a liability which already had
arisen, deprived certain creditors of their property without due
process of law. 167 But while a vested cause of action is property,
a person has no constitutionally protected property interest in any
particular form of remedy and is guaranteed only the preservation
of a substantial right to redress by any effective procedure. 168 Ac-
cordingly, a statute creating an additional remedy for enforcing
stockholders’ liability is not, as applied to stockholders then hold-
ing stock, violative of due process. 169 Nor is a law which lifts a
statute of limitations and makes possible a suit, theretofore barred,
161 L’Hote v. New Orleans, 177 U.S. 587 (1900).
162 Ah Sin v. Wittman, 198 U.S. 500 (1905).
163 Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212 (1905).
164 Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1880); Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U.S. 488
(1897).
165 See, e.g., Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944) (right to become a candidate
for state office is a privilege only, hence an unlawful denial of such right is not a
denial of a right of ‘‘property’’). Cases under the equal protection clause now man-
date a different result. See Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 75
(1978) (seeming to conflate due process and equal protection standards in political
rights cases).
166 Angle v. Chicago, St. Paul, M. & D. Ry., 151 U.S. 1 (1894).
167 Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434, 442, 448 (1932).
168 Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326, 332 (1933). See Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (limitation of common-law liability
of private industry nuclear accidents in order to encourage development of energy
a rational action, especially when combined with congressional pledge to take nec-
essary action in event of accident; whether limitation would have been of question-
able validity in absence of pledge uncertain but unlikely).
169 Shriver v. Woodbine Bank, 285 U.S. 467 (1932).
for the value of certain securities. ‘‘The Fourteenth Amendment

does not make an act of state legislation void merely because it has
some retrospective operation. . . . Some rules of law probably could
not be changed retroactively without hardship and oppression . . . .
Assuming that statutes of limitation, like other types of legislation,
could be so manipulated that their retroactive effects would offend
the constitution, certainly it cannot be said that lifting the bar of
a statute of limitation so as to restore a remedy lost through mere
lapse of time is per se an offense against the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.’’ 170
Control of Local Units of Government

The Fourteenth Amendment does not deprive a State of the
power to determine what duties may be performed by local officers,
and whether they shall be appointed or popularly elected. 171 Thus,
a statute requiring cities to indemnify owners of property damaged
by mobs or during riots effects no unconstitutional deprivation of
the property even in circumstances when the city could not have
prevented the violence. 172 Likewise, a person obtaining a judgment
against a municipality for damages resulting from a riot is not de-
prived of property without due process of law by an act which so
limits the municipality’s taxing power as to prevent collection of
funds adequate to pay it. As long as the judgment continues as an
existing liability no unconstitutional deprivation is experienced. 173
Local units of government obliged to surrender property to
other units newly created out of the territory of the former cannot
successfully invoke the due process clause, 174 nor may taxpayers
allege any unconstitutional deprivation as a result of changes in
their tax burden attendant upon the consolidation of contiguous
municipalities. 175 Nor is a statute requiring counties to reimburse
cities of the first class but not other classes for rebates allowed for
prompt payment of taxes in conflict with the due process clause. 176
Taxing Power
Generally.—It was not contemplated that the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment would restrain or cripple the taxing power
170 Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 315–16 (1945).
171 Soliah v. Heskin, 222 U.S. 522 (1912); City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262
U.S. 182 (1923). The equal protection clause has been employed, however, to limit
a State’s discretion with regard to certain matters. Infra, pp. 1892–1911.
172 City of Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U.S. 313 (1911).
173 Louisiana ex rel. Folsom v. Mayor of New Orleans, 109 U.S. 285, 289 (1883).
174 Michigan ex rel. Kies v. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233 (1905).
175 Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
176 Stewart v. Kansas City, 239 U.S. 14 (1915).
of the States. 1 Rather, the purpose of the amendment was to ex-

tend to the residents of the States the same protection against ar-
bitrary state legislation affecting life, liberty, and property as was
afforded against Congress by the Fifth Amendment. 2
Public Purpose.—As a general matter, public moneys cannot
be expended for other than public purposes. Some early cases ap-
plied this principle by invalidating taxes judged to be imposed to
raise money for purely private rather than public purposes. 3 How-
ever, modern notions of public purpose have expanded to the point
where the limitation has little practical import. Whether a use is
public or private, while it is ultimately a judicial question, ‘‘is a
practical question addressed to the law-making department, and it
would require a plain case of departure from every public purpose
which could reasonably be conceived to justify the intervention of
a court.’’ 4 Taxes levied for each of the following purposes have been
held to be for a public use: a city coal and fuel yard, 5 a state bank,
a warehouse, an elevator, a flourmill system, homebuilding
projects, 6 a society for preventing cruelty to animals (dog license
tax), 7 a railroad tunnel, 8 books for school children attending pri-
vate as well as public schools, 9 and relief of unemployment. 10
Other Considerations Affecting Validity: Excessive Bur-
den; Ratio of Amount of Benefit Received.—When the power to
tax exists, the extent of the burden is a matter for the discretion
of the lawmakers, 11 and the Court will refrain from condemning a
1 Tonawanda v. Lyon, 181 U.S. 389 (1901); Cass Farm Co. v. Detroit, 181 U.S.
396 (1901).
2 Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas, 217 U.S. 114, 119 (1910).
3 Loan Association v. City of Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1875) (voiding tax
employed by city to make a substantial grant to a bridge manufacturing company

to induce it to locate its factory in the city). See also City of Parkersburg v. Brown,
106 U.S. 487 (1882) (private purpose bonds not authorized by state constitution).
4 Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 515 (1937). In apply-
ing the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause the Court has said that discretion as
to what is a public purpose ‘‘belongs to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong,
a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment.’’ Helvering v. Davis, 301
U.S. 619, 640 (1937); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 67 (1936). That payment
may be made to private individuals is now irrelevant. Carmichael, supra, at 518.
Cf. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976) (sustaining tax imposed
on mine companies to compensate workers for black lung disabilities, including
those contracting disease before enactment of tax, as way of spreading cost of em-
ployee liabilities).
5 Jones v. City of Portland, 245 U.S. 217 (1917).
6 Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233 (1920).
7 Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228 (1920).
8 Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Dist., 262 U.S. 710 (1923).
9 Cochran v. Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
10 Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 300 U.S. 644 (1937).
11 Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87, 99 (1935).
tax solely on the ground that it is excessive. 12 Nor can the con-
stitutionality of taxation be made to depend upon the taxpayer’s
enjoyment of any special benefits from use of the funds raised by
taxation. 13
Estate, Gift, and Inheritance Taxes.—The power of testa-
mentary disposition and the privilege of inheritance being legiti-
mate subjects of taxation, a State may apply its inheritance tax to
either the transmission, or the exercise of the legal power of trans-
mission, of property by will or descent, or to the legal privilege of
taking property by devise or descent. 14 Accordingly, an inheritance
tax law, enacted after the death of a testator but before the dis-
tribution of his estate, constitutionally may be imposed on the
shares of legatees, notwithstanding that under the law of the State
in effect on the date of such enactment, ownership of the property
passed to the legatees upon the testator’s death. 15 Equally consist-
ent with due process is a tax on an inter vivos transfer of property
by deed intended to take effect upon the death of the grantor. 16
When remainders indisputably vest at the time of the creation
of a trust and a succession tax is enacted thereafter, the imposition
of the tax on the transfer of such remainder is unconstitutional. 17
But where the remaindermen’s interests are contingent and do not
vest until the donor’s death subsequent to the adoption of the stat-
ute, the tax is valid. 18
The Court has noted that insofar as retroactive taxation of
vested gifts has been voided, the justification therefor has been
that ‘‘the nature or amount of the tax could not reasonably have
been anticipated by the taxpayer at the time of the particular vol-
untary act which the [retroactive] statute later made the taxable
event. . . . Taxation . . . of a gift which . . . [the donor] might well
12 Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U.S. 550 (1935). See also Kelly v. City
of Pittsburgh, 104 U.S. 78 (1881); Chapman v. Zobelein, 237 U.S. 135 (1915); Alaska
Fish Salting & By-Products Co. v. Smith, 255 U.S. 44 (1921); Magnano Co. v. Ham-
ilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934); City of Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369
(1974).
13 Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933); Carmichael v.
Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937). A taxpayer therefore cannot contest
the imposition of an income tax on the ground that, in operation, it returns to his
town less income tax than he and its other inhabitants pay. Dane v. Jackson, 256
U.S. 589 (1921).
14 Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U.S. 137, 140, 141 (1925).
15 Cahen v. Brewster, 203 U.S. 543 (1906).
16 Keeney v. New York, 222 U.S. 525 (1912).
17 Coolidge v. Long, 282 U.S. 582 (1931).
18 Binney v. Long, 299 U.S. 280 (1936); Nickel v. Cole, 256 U.S. 222 (1921). See
also Salomon v. State Tax Comm’n, 278 U.S. 484 (1929) (contingent remainder); and
Orr v. Gilman, 183 U.S. 278 (1902) (power of appointment).
have refrained from making had he anticipated the tax . . . [is]

thought to be so arbitrary . . . as to be a denial of due process.’’ 19
Income Taxes.—The authority of states to tax income is ‘‘uni-
versally recognized.’’ 20 Years ago the Court explained that
‘‘[e]njoyment of the privileges of residence in the state and the at-
tendant right to invoke the protection of its laws are inseparable
from responsibility for sharing the costs of government. . . . A tax
measured by the net income of residents is an equitable method of
distributing the burdens of government among those who are privi-
leged to enjoy its benefits.’’ 21 Also, a tax on income is not constitu-
tionally suspect because retroactive. The routine practice of making
taxes retroactive for the entire year of the legislative session in
which the tax is enacted has long been upheld, 22 and there are
also situations in which courts have upheld retroactive application
to the preceding year or two. 23
Franchise Taxes.—A city ordinance imposing annual license
taxes on light and power companies is not violative of the due proc-
ess clause merely because the city has entered the power business
in competition with such companies. 24 Nor does a municipal char-
ter authorizing the imposition upon a local telegraph company of
a tax upon the lines of the company within its limits at the rate
at which other property is taxed but upon an arbitrary valuation
per mile, deprive the company of its property without due process
of law, inasmuch as the tax is a mere franchise or privilege tax. 25
Severance Taxes.—A state excise tax on the production of oil
which extends to the royalty interest of the lessor as well as to the
interest of the lessee engaged in the active work of production, the
tax being apportioned between these parties according to their re-
spective interest in the common venture, is not arbitrary as applied
to the lessor, but consistent with due process. 26
19 Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147 (1938).
20 New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 313 (1937).
21 Id. See also Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 49–52 (1920); and Travis v. Yale
& Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60 (1920) (states may tax the income of nonresidents
derived from property or activity within the state).
22 See, e.g., Stockdale v. Insurance Companies, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 323 (1874);
United States v. Hudson, 299 U.S. 498 (1937); United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S.
292 (1981).
23 Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134 (1938) (upholding imposition in 1935 of tax li-
ability for 1933 tax year; due to the scheduling of legislative sessions, this was the
legislature’s first opportunity to adjust revenues after obtaining information of the
nature and amount of the income generated by the original tax). Since ‘‘[t]axation
is neither a penalty imposed on the taxpayer nor a liability which he assumes by
contract,’’ the Court explained, ‘‘its retroactive imposition does not necessarily in-
fringe due process.’’ Id. at 146–47.
24 Puget Sound Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 619 (1934).
25 New York Tel. Co. v. Dolan, 265 U.S. 96 (1924).
26 Barwise v. Sheppard, 299 U.S. 33 (1936).
Real Property Taxes.—The maintenance of a high assess-

ment in the face of declining value is merely another way of achiev-
ing an increase in the rate of property tax. Hence, an
overassessment constitutes no deprivation of property without due
process of law. 27 Likewise, land subject to mortgage may be taxed
for its full value without deduction of the mortgage debt from the
valuation. 28
A State may defray the entire expense of creating, developing,
and improving a political subdivision either from funds raised by
general taxation or by apportioning the burden among the munici-
palities in which the improvements are made or by creating, or au-
thorizing the creation of, tax districts to meet sanctioned outlays. 29
Where a state statute authorizes municipal authorities to define
the district to be benefited by a street improvement and to assess
the cost of the improvement upon the property within the district
in proportion to benefits, their action in establishing the district
and in fixing the assessments on included property, after due hear-
ing of the owners as required by the statute cannot, when not arbi-
trary or fradulent, be reviewed under the Fourteenth Amendment
upon the ground that other property benefited by the improvement
was not included. 30
It is also proper to impose a special assessment for the prelimi-
nary expenses of an abandoned road improvement, even though the
assessment exceeds the amount of the benefit which the assessors
estimated the property would receive from the completed work. 31
Likewise a levy upon all lands within a drainage district of a tax
of twenty-five cents per acre to defray preliminary expenses does
not unconstitutionally take the property of landowners within that
district who may not be benefited by the completed drainage
plans. 32 On the other hand, when the benefit to be derived by a
railroad from the construction of a highway will be largely offset
by the loss of local freight and passenger traffic, an assessment
upon such railroad is violative of due process, 33 whereas any gains
from increased traffic reasonably expected to result from a road im-
provement will suffice to sustain an assessment thereon. 34 Also the
27 Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1940).
28 Paddell v. City of New York, 211 U.S. 446 (1908).
29 Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., 111 U.S. 701 (1884).
30 Butters v. City of Oakland, 263 U.S. 162 (1923).
31 Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Road District, 266 U.S. 187 (1924). See also Roberts v.
Irrigation Dist., 289 U.S. 71 (1933), in which it was also stated that an assessment
to pay the general indebtedness of an irrigation district is valid, even though in ex-
cess of the benefits received.
32 Houck v. Little River Dist., 239 U.S. 254 (1915).
33 Road Dist. v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 274 U.S. 188 (1927).
34 Kansas City Ry. v. Road Dist., 266 U.S. 379 (1924).
fact that the only use made of a lot abutting on a street improve-
ment is for a railway right of way does not make invalid, for lack
of benefits, an assessment thereon for grading, curbing, and pav-
ing. 35 However, when a high and dry island was included within
the boundaries of a drainage district from which it could not be
benefitted directly or indirectly, a tax imposed on the island land
by the district was held to be a deprivation of property without due
process of law. 36 Finally, a State may levy an assessment for spe-
cial benefits resulting from an improvement already made 37 and
may validate an assessment previously held void for want of au-
thority. 38
Jurisdiction to Tax
The operation of the Due Process Clause as a limitation on the
taxing power of the states has been an issue in a variety of dif-
ferent contexts, but most involve one of the other of two basic is-
sues, first, the relationship between the state exercising taxing
power and the object of that exercise of power, and second, whether
the degree of contact is sufficient to justify the state’s imposition
of a particular obligation. Often these issues arise in conjunction
with claims that the state’s actions are also violative of the Com-
merce Clause. Illustrative of the factual settings in which such is-
sues arise are 1), determining the scope of the business activity of
a multijurisdictional entity that is subject to a state’s taxing power,
2) application of wealth transfer taxes to gifts or bequests of non-
residents, 3) allocation of the income of multijurisdictional entities
for tax purposes, 4) the scope of state authority to tax the income
of nonresidents, and 5) collection of state use taxes.
The Court’s opinions in these cases have often discussed due
process and Commerce Clause issues as if they were indistinguish-
able. The recent decision in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 39 how-
ever, utilized a two-tier analysis that found sufficient contact to
satisfy due process but not Commerce Clause requirements. Quill
may be read as implying that the more stringent Commerce Clause
standard subsumes due process jurisdictional issues, and that con-
sequently these due process issues need no longer be separately
considered. This interpretation has yet to be confirmed, however,
and a detailed review of due process precedents may prove useful.
35 Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Barber Asphalt Co., 197 U.S. 430 (1905).
36 Myles Salt Co. v. Iberia Drainage Dist., 239 U.S. 478 (1916).
37 Wagner v. Baltimore, 239 U.S. 207 (1915).
38 Charlotte Harbor Ry. v. Welles, 260 U.S. 8 (1922).
39 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992).
Sales/Use Taxes.—In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 40 the

Court struck down a state statute requiring an out-of-state mail
order company with neither outlets nor sales representatives in the
state to collect and transmit use taxes on sales to state residents,
but did so on Commerce Clause rather than due process grounds.
Taxation of an interstate business does not offend due process, the
Court held, if that business ‘‘purposefully avails itself of the bene-
fits of an economic market in the [taxing] State . . . even if it has
no physical presence in the State.’’ 41 A physical presence within
the state is necessary, however, under Commerce Clause analysis
applicable to taxation of mail order sales. 42
Land.—Even prior to the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, it was a settled principle that a State could not tax
land situated beyond its limits; subsequently elaborating upon that
principle the Court has said that, ‘‘we know of no case where a leg-
islature has assumed to impose a tax upon land within the jurisdic-
tion of another State, much less where such action has been de-
fended by a court.’’ 43 Insofar as a tax payment may be viewed as
an exaction for the maintenance of government in consideration of
protection afforded, the logic sustaining this rule is self-evident.
Tangible Personalty.—As long as tangible personal property
has a situs within its borders, a State validly may tax the same,
whether directly through an ad valorem tax or indirectly through
death taxes, irrespective of the residence of the owner. 44 By the
same token, if tangible personal property makes only occasional in-
cursions into other States, its permanent situs remains in the State
40 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992).
41 The Court had previously held that the requirement in terms of a benefit is
minimal. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 622–23 (1982),
(quoting Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 521–23 (1937)). It
is satisfied by a ‘‘minimal connection’’ between the interstate activities and the tax-
ing State and a rational relationship between the income attributed to the State and
the intrastate values of the enterprise. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes,
445 U.S. 425, 436–37 (1980); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 272–73
(1978). See especially Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Department of Revenue, 419
U.S. 560, 562 (1975); National Geographic Society v. California Bd. of Equalization,
430 U.S. 551 (1977).
42 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. at 1911–16 (refusing to overrule the
Commerce Clause ruling in National Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue, 386

U.S. 753, 756 (1967)). See also Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 498
U.S. 358 (1991) (neither the Commerce Clause nor the Due Process Clause is vio-
lated by application of a business tax, measured on a value added basis, to a com-
pany that manufactures goods in another state, but that operates a sales office and
conducts sales within state).
43 Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 204 (1905). See also Louisville
& Jeffersonville Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U.S. 385 (1903).

44 Carstairs v. Cochran, 193 U.S. 10 (1904); Hannis Distilling Co. v. Baltimore,
216 U.S. 285 (1910); Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473 (1925); Blodgett v. Silber-
man, 277 U.S. 1 (1928).
of origin, and, subject to certain exceptions, is taxable only by the

latter. 45 The ancient maxim, mobilia sequuntur personam, which
had its origin when personal property consisted in the main of arti-
cles appertaining to the person of the owner, yielded in modern
times to the ‘‘law of the place where the property is kept and used.’’
The tendency has been to treat tangible personal property as ‘‘hav-
ing a situs of its own for the purpose of taxation, and correlatively
to . . . exempt [it] at the domicile of its owner.’’ 46 When rolling
stock is permanently located and employed in the prosecution of a
business outside the boundaries of a domiciliary State, the latter
has no jurisdiction to tax it. 47 Vessels, however, inasmuch as they
merely touch briefly at numerous ports, never acquire a taxable
situs at any one of them, and are taxable by the domicile of their
owners or not at all, 48 unless of course, the ships operate wholly
on the waters within one State, in which event they are taxable
there and not at the domicile of the owners. 49 Airplanes have been
treated in a similar manner for tax purposes. Noting that the en-
tire fleet of airplanes of an interstate carrier were ‘‘never continu-
ously without the [domiciliary] State during the whole tax year,’’
that such airplanes also had their ‘‘home port’’ in the domiciliary
State, and that the company maintained its principal office therein,
the Court sustained a personal property tax applied by the domi-
ciliary State to all the airplanes owned by the taxpayer. No other
State was deemed able to accord the same protection and benefits
as the taxing State in which the taxpayer had both its domicile and
its business situs; the doctrines of Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 50
as to the taxability of permanently located tangibles, and that of
45 New York ex rel. New York Cent. R.R. v. Miller, 202 U.S. 584 (1906). As to
the competence of States to tax equipment of foreign carriers which enter their ju-
risdiction intermittently, see supra, pp. 227–33.
46 Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193, 209–10 (1936); Union Transit Co.
v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 207 (1905); Johnson Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 290 U.S. 158
(1933).
47 Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905). Justice Black, in Central
R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607, 619–21 (1962), had his ‘‘doubts about the use
of the Due Process Clause to . . . [invalidate State taxes]. The modern use of due
process to invalidate State taxes rests on two doctrines: (1) that a State is without
‘jurisdiction to tax’ property beyond its boundaries, and (2) that multiple taxation
of the same property by different States is prohibited. Nothing in the language or
the history of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, indicates any intention to es-
tablish either of these two doctrines . . . And in the first case [Railroad Co. v. Jack-
son, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 262 (1869)] striking down a State tax for lack of judisdiction
to tax after the passage of that Amendment, neither the Amendment nor its Due
Process Clause . . . was ever mentioned.’’ He also maintained that Justice Holmes
shared this view in Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky, supra, at 211.
48 Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63 (1911).
49 Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. Virginia, 198 U.S. 299 (1905).
50 199 U.S. 194 (1905). See also Central R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607,
611–17 (1962).
apportionment, for instrumentalities engaged in interstate com-

merce 51 were held to be inapplicable. 52
Conversely, a nondomiciliary State, although it may not tax
property belonging to a foreign corporation which has never come
within its borders, may levy on movables which are regularly and
habitually used and employed therein. Thus, while the fact that
cars are loaded and reloaded at a refinery in a State outside the
owner’s domicile does not fix the situs of the entire fleet in that
State, the latter may nevertheless tax the number of cars which on
the average are found to be present within its borders. 53 Moreover,
in assessing that part of a railroad within its limits, a State need
not treat it as an independent line, disconnected from the part
without, and place upon the property within the State only a value
which could be given to it if operated separately from the balance
of the road. The State may ascertain the value of the whole line
as a single property and then determine the value of the part with-
in on a mileage basis, unless there be special circumstances which
distinguish between conditions in the several States. 54 But no
property of an interstate carrier can be taken into account unless
it can be seen in some plain and fairly intelligible way that it adds
to the value of the road and the rights exercised in the State. 55
Also, a state property tax on railroads, which is measured by gross
earnings apportioned to mileage, is not unconstitutional in the ab-
sence of proof that it exceeds what would be legitimate as an ordi-
nary tax on the property valued as part of a going concern or that
it is relatively higher than taxes on other kinds of property. 56 The
tax reaches only revenues derived from local operations, and the
fact that the apportionment formula does not result in mathemati-
cal exactitude is not a constitutional defect. 57
51 Pullman’s Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891).
52 Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 294–97, 307 (1944). The case
was said to be governed by New York ex rel. New York Cent. R.R. v. Miller, 202
U.S. 584, 596 (1906). As to the problem of multiple taxation of such airplanes, which
had in fact been taxed proportionately by other States, the Court declared that the
‘‘taxability of any part of this fleet by any other State, than Minnesota, in view of
the taxability of the entire fleet by that State, is not now before us.’’ Justice Jack-
son, in a concurring opinion, would treat Minnesota’s right to tax as exclusively of
any similar right elsewhere.
53 Johnson Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 290 U.S. 158 (1933).
54 Pittsburgh C.C. & St. L. Ry. v. Backus, 154 U.S. 421 (1894).
55 Wallace v. Hines, 253 U.S. 66 (1920). For example, the ratio of track mileage
within the taxing State to total track mileage cannot be employed in evaluating that
portion of total railway property found in the State when the cost of the lines in
the taxing State was much less than in other States and the most valuable termi-
nals of the railroad were located in other States. See also Fargo v. Hart, 193 U.S.
490 (1904); Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U.S. 275 (1919).
56 Great Northern Ry. v. Minnesota, 278 U.S. 503 (1929).
57 Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Minnesota, 309 U.S. 157 (1940).
Intangible Personalty.—To determine whether a State, or

States, may tax intangible personal property, the Court has applied
the fiction, mobilia sequuntur personam and has also recognized
that such property may acquire, for tax purposes, a business or
commercial situs where permanently located, but it has never
clearly disposed of the issue whether multiple personal property
taxation of intangibles is consistent with due process. In the case
of corporate stock, however, the Court has obliquely acknowledged
that the owner thereof may be taxed at his own domicile, at the
commercial situs of the issuing corporation, and at the latter’s
domicile; constitutional lawyers speculated whether the Court
would sustain a tax by all three jurisdictions, or by only two of
them, and, if the latter, which two, the State of the commercial
situs and of the issuing corporation’s domicile, or the State of the
owner’s domicile and that of the commercial situs. 58
Thus far, the Court has sustained the following personal prop-
erty taxes on intangibles:
(1) A debt held by a resident against a nonresident, evidenced
by a bond of the debtor and secured by a mortgage on real estate
in the State of the debtor’s residence. 59
(2) A mortgage owned and kept outside the State by a non-
resident but on land within the State. 60
(3) Investments, in the form of loans to a resident, made by a
resident agent of a nonresident creditor, are taxable to the non-
resident creditor. 61
(4) Deposits of a resident in a bank in another State, where he
carries on a business and from which these deposits are derived,
but belonging absolutely to him and not used in the business, are
subject to a personal property tax in the city of his residence,
whether or not they are subject to tax in the State where the busi-
ness is carried on. The tax is imposed for the general advantage
of living within the jurisdiction (benefit-protection theory), and may
be measured by reference to the riches of the person taxed. 62
(5) Membership owned by a nonresident in a domestic ex-
change, known as a chamber of commerce. 63
58 Howard, State Jurisdiction to Tax Intangibles: A Twelve Year Cycle, 8 MO. L.
REV. 155, 160–62 (1943); Rawlins, State Jurisdiction to Tax Intangibles: Some Mod-
ern Aspects, 18 TEX. L. REV. 196, 314–15 (1940).
59 Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U.S. 491, 498 (1879).
60 Savings Society v. Multnomah County, 169 U.S. 421 (1898).
61 Bristol v. Washington County, 177 U.S. 133, 141 (1900).
62 Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Louisville, 245 U.S. 54 (1917).
63 Rogers v. Hennepin County, 240 U.S. 184 (1916).
(6) Membership by a resident in a stock exchange located in

another State. ‘‘Double taxation’’ the Court observed ‘‘by one and
the same State is not’’ prohibited ‘‘by the Fourteenth Amendment;
much less is taxation by two States upon identical or closely relat-
ed property interest falling within the jurisdiction of both, forbid-
den.’’ 64
(7) A resident owner may be taxed on stock held in a foreign
corporation that does no business and has no property within the
taxing State. The Court also added that ‘‘undoubtedly the State in
which a corporation is organized may . . . [tax] all of its shares
whether owned by residents or nonresidents.’’ 65
(8) Stock in a foreign corporation owned by another foreign cor-
poration transacting its business within the taxing State. The
Court attached no importance to the fact that the shares were al-
ready taxed by the State in which the issuing corporation was dom-
iciled and might also be taxed by the State in which the stock
owner was domiciled, or at any rate did not find it necessary to
pass upon the validity of the latter two taxes. The present levy was
deemed to be tenable on the basis of the benefit-protection theory,
namely, ‘‘the economic advantages realized through the protection
at the place . . . [of business situs] of the ownership of rights in
intangibles. . . .’’ 66
(9) Shares owned by nonresident shareholders in a domestic
corporation, the tax being assessed on the basis of corporate assets
and payable by the corporation either out of its general fund or by
collection from the shareholder. The shares represent an aliquot
portion of the whole corporate assets, and the property right so rep-
resented arises where the corporation has its home, and is there-
fore within the taxing jurisdiction of the State, notwithstanding
that ownership of the stock may also be a taxable subject in an-
other State. 67
(10) A tax on the dividends of a corporation may be distributed
ratably among stockholders regardless of their residence outside
the State, the stockholders being the ultimate beneficiaries of the
corporation’s activities within the taxing State and protected by the
latter and subject to its jurisdiction. 68 This tax, though collected by
the corporation, is on the transfer to a stockholder of his share of
64 Citizens National Bank v. Durr, 257 U.S. 99, 109 (1921).
65 Hawley v. Malden, 232 U.S. 1, 12 (1914).
66 First Bank Corp. v. Minnesota, 301 U.S. 234, 241 (1937).
67 Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania, 302 U.S. 506 (1938).
68 International Harvester Co. v. Department of Taxation, 322 U.S. 435 (1944).
corporate dividends within the taxing State and is deducted from

said dividend payments. 69
(11) Stamp taxes on the transfer within the taxing State by
one nonresident to another of stock certificates issued by a foreign
corporation, 70 and upon promissory notes executed by a domestic
corporation, although payable to banks in other States. 71 These
taxes, however, were deemed to have been laid, not on the prop-
erty, but upon an event, the transfer in one instance, and execution
in the latter which took place in the taxing State.
The following personal property taxes on intangibles have been
invalidated:
(1) Debts evidenced by notes in safekeeping within the taxing
State, but made and payable and secured by property in a second
State and owned by a resident of a third State. 72
(2) A property tax sought to be collected from a life beneficiary
on the corpus of a trust composed of property located in another
State and as to which the beneficiary had neither control nor pos-
session, apart from the receipt of income therefrom. 73 However, a
personal property tax may be collected on one-half of the value of
the corpus of a trust from a resident who is one of the two trustees
thereof, not withstanding that the trust was created by the will of
a resident of another State in respect of intangible property located
in the latter State, at least where it does not appear that the trust-
ee is exposed to the danger of other ad valorem taxes in another
State. 74 The first case, Brooke v. Norfolk, 75 is distinguishable by
virture of the fact that the property tax therein voided was levied
upon a resident beneficiary rather than upon a resident trustee in
control of nonresident intangibles. Different too is Safe Deposit &
T. Co. v. Virginia, 76 where a property tax was unsuccessfully de-
manded of a nonresident trustee with respect to nonresident intan-
gibles under its control.
(3) A tax, measured by income, levied on trust certificates held
by a resident, representing interests in various parcels of land
(some inside the State and some outside), the holder of the certifi-
cates, though without a voice in the management of the property,
69 Wisconsin Gas Co. v. United States, 322 U.S. 526 (1944).
70 New York ex rel. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152 (1907).
71 Graniteville Mfg. Co. v. Query, 283 U.S. 376 (1931).
72 Buck v. Beach, 206 U.S. 392 (1907).
73 Brooke v. City of Norfolk, 277 U.S. 27 (1928).
74 Greenough v. Tax Assessors, 331 U.S. 486, 496–97 (1947).
75 277 U.S. 27 (1928).
76 280 U.S. 83 (1929).
being entitled to a share in the net income and, upon sale of the
property, to the proceeds of the sale. 77
A State in which a foreign corporation has acquired a commer-
cial domicile and in which it maintains its general business offices
may tax the latter’s bank deposits and accounts receivable even
though the deposits are outside the State and the accounts receiv-
able arise from manufacturing activities in another State. 78 Simi-
larly, a nondomiciliary State in which a foreign corporation did
business can tax the ‘‘corporate excess’’ arising from property em-
ployed and business done in the taxing State. 79 On the other hand,
when the foreign corporation transacts only interstate commerce
within a State, any excise tax on such excess is void, irrespective
of the amount of the tax. 80 A domiciliary State, however, may tax
the excess of market value of outstanding capital stock over the
value of real and personal property and certain indebtedness of a
domestic corporation even though this ‘‘corporate excess’’ arose
from property located and business done in another State and was
there taxable. Moreover, this result follows whether the tax is con-
sidered as one on property or on the franchise. 81 Also a domiciliary
State, which imposes no franchise tax on a stock fire insurance cor-
poration, validly may assess a tax on the full amount of its paid-
in capital stock and surplus, less deductions for liabilities, notwith-
standing that such domestic corporation concentrates its executive,
accounting, and other business offices in New York, and maintains
in the domiciliary State only a required registered office at which
local claims are handled. Despite ‘‘the vicissitudes which the so-
called ‘jurisdiction-to-tax’ doctrine has encountered . . . ,’’ the pre-
sumption persists that intangible property is taxable by the State
of origin. 82 But a property tax on the capital stock of a domestic
company which includes in the appraisal thereof the value of coal
mined in the taxing State but located in another State awaiting
sale deprives the corporation of its property without due process of
77 Senior v. Braden, 295 U.S. 422 (1935).
78 Wheeling Steel Corp v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193 (1936). See also Memphis Gas Co.
v. Beeler, 315 U.S. 649, 652 (1942).
79 Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, 165 U.S. 194 (1897).
80 Alpha Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203 (1925).
81 Cream of Wheat Co. v. County of Grand Forks, 253 U.S. 325 (1920).
82 Newark Fire Ins. Co. v. State Board, 307 U.S. 313, 318, 324 (1939). Although
the eight Justices affirming this tax were not in agreement as to the reasons to be
assigned in justification of this result, the holding appears to be in line with the
dictum uttered by Chief Justice Stone in Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 368
(1939), to the effect that the taxation of a corporation by a State where it does busi-
ness, measured by the value of the intangibles used in its business there, does not
preclude the State of incorporation from imposing a tax measured by all its intangi-
bles.
law. 83 Also void for the same reason is a state tax on the franchise
of a domestic ferry company which includes in the valuation there-
of the worth of a franchise granted to the said company by another
State. 84
Transfer (Inheritance, Estate, Gift) Taxes.—Being com-
petent to regulate exercise of the power of testamentary disposition
and the privilege of inheritance, a State may base its succession
taxes upon either the transmission or an exercise of the legal
power of transmission, of property by will or by descent, or the en-
joyment of the legal privilege of taking property by devise or de-
scent. 85 But whatever may be the justification of their power to
levy such taxes, States have consistently found themselves re-
stricted by the rule, established as to property taxes in 1905 in
Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 86 and subsequently reiterated in
Frick v. Pennsylvania 87 in 1925, which precludes imposition of
transfer taxes upon tangible personal property by any State other
than the one in which such tangibles are permanently located or
have an actual situs. In the case of intangibles, however, the Court
has oscillated in upholding, then rejecting, and again currently sus-
taining the levy by more than one State of death taxes upon intan-
gibles comprising the estate of a decedent.
Until 1930, transfer taxes upon intangibles levied by both the
domiciliary as well as nondomiciliary, or situs State, were with
rare exceptions approved. Thus, in Bullen v. Wisconsin, 88 the domi-
ciliary State of the creator of a trust was held competent to levy
an inheritance tax, upon the death of the settlor, on his trust fund
consisting of stocks, bonds, and notes kept and administered in an-
other State and as to which the settlor reserved the right to control
disposition and to direct payment of income for life, such reserved
powers being equivalent to a fee. Cognizance was taken of the fact
that the State in which these intangibles had their situs had also
83 Delaware, L. & W.P.R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 198 U.S. 341 (1905).
84 Louisville & Jeffersonville Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U.S. 385 (1903).
85 Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U.S. 137, 140–41 (1925).
86 199 U.S. 194 (1905). In dissenting in State Tax Comm’n v. Aldrich, 316 U.S.
174, 185 (1942), Justice Jackson asserted that a reconsideration of this principle had
become timely.
87 268 U.S. 473 (1925). See also Treichler v. Wisconsin, 338 U.S. 251 (1949); City
Bank Co. v. Schnader, 293 U.S. 112 (1934).

88 240 U.S. 635, 631 (1916). A decision rendered in 1926 which is seemingly in
conflict was Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Doughton, 272 U.S. 567 (1926), in which
North Carolina was prevented from taxing the exercise of a power of appointment
through a will executed therein by a resident, when the property was a trust fund
in Massachusetts created by the will of a resident of the latter State. One of the
reasons assigned for this result was that by the law of Massachusetts the property
involved was treated as passing from the original donor to the appointee. However,
this holding was overruled in Graves v. Schmidlapp, 315 U.S. 657 (1942).
taxed the trust. Levy of an inheritance tax by a nondomiciliary

State was sustained on similar grounds in Wheeler v. New York,
wherein it was held that the presence of a negotiable instrument
was sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the State seeking to tax
its transfer. 89 On the other hand, the mere ownership by a foreign
corporation of property in a nondomiciliary State was held insuffi-
cient to support a tax by that State on the succession to shares of
stock in that corporation owned by a nonresident decedent. 90 Also
against the trend was Blodgett v. Silberman, 91 wherein the Court
defeated collection of a transfer tax by the domiciliary State by
treating coins and bank notes deposited by a decedent in a safe de-
posit box in another State as tangible property, albeit it conceded
that the domiciliary State could tax the transfer of books and cer-
tificates of indebtness found in that safe deposit box as well as the
decedent’s interest in a foreign partnership.
In the course of about two years following the Depression, the
Court handed down a group of four decisions which placed the
stamp of disapproval upon multiple transfer and—by inference—
other multiple taxation of intangibles. 92 Asserting, as it did in one
of these cases, that ‘‘practical considerations of wisdom, conven-
ience and justice alike dictate the desirability of a uniform rule
confining the jurisdiction to impose death transfer taxes as to in-
tangibles to the State of the [owner’s] domicile,’’ 93 the Court,
through consistent application of the maxim, mobilia sequuntur
personam, proceeded to deny the right of nondomiciliary States to
tax and to reject as inadequate jurisdictional claims of the latter
founded upon such bases as control, benefit, and protection or
situs. During this interval, 1930–1932, multiple transfer taxation of
intangibles came to be viewed, not merely as undesirable, but as
so arbitrary and unreasonable as to be prohibited by the due proc-
ess clause.
While the Court expressly overruled only one of these four de-
cisions condemning multiple succession taxation of intangibles, be-
ginning with Curry v. McCanless 94 in 1939, it announced a depar-
ture from the ‘‘doctrine, of recent origin, that the Fourteenth
Amendment precludes the taxation of any interest in the same in-
tangible in more than one State. . . .’’ Taking cognizance of the fact
89 233U.S. 434 (1914).
90 Rhode Island Trust Co. v. Doughton, 270 U.S. 69 (1926).
91 277 U.S. 1 (1928).
92 First Nat’l Bank v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312 (1932); Beidler v. South Carolina Tax
Comm’n, 282 U.S. 1 (1930); Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586 (1930); Farmer’s
Loan Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204 (1930).
93 First National Bank v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312, 330–31 (1932).
94 307 U.S. 357, 363, 366–68, 372 (1939).
that this doctrine had never been extended to the field of income
taxation or consistently applied in the field of property taxation,
the Court declared that a correct interpretation of constitutional re-
quirements would dictate the following conclusions: ‘‘From the be-
ginning of our constitutional system control over the person at the
place of his domicile and his duty there, common to all citizens, to
contribute to the support of government have been deemed to af-
ford an adequate constitutional basis for imposing on him a tax on
the use and enjoyment of rights in intangibles measured by their
value. . . . But when the taxpayer extends his activities with re-
spect to his intangibles, so as to avail himself of the protection and
benefit of the laws of another State, in such a way as to bring his
person or . . . [his intangibles] within the reach of the tax gatherer
there, the reason for a single place of taxation no longer obtains,
. . . [However], the State of domicile is not deprived, by the tax-
payer’s activities, elsewhere, of its constitutional jurisdiction to
tax.’’ In accordance with this line of reasoning, Tennessee, where
a decedent died domiciled, and Alabama, where a trustee, by con-
veyance from said decedent, held securities on specific trusts, were
both deemed competent to impose a tax on the transfer of these se-
curities passing under the will of the decedent. ‘‘In effecting her
purposes,’’ the testatrix was viewed as having ‘‘brought some of the
legal interests which she created within the control of one State by
selecting a trustee there, and others within the control of the other
State, by making her domicile there.’’ She had found it necessary
to invoke ‘‘the aid of the law of both States and her legatees’’ were
subject to the same necessity.
These statements represented a belated adoption of the views
advanced by Chief Justice Stone in dissenting or concurring opin-
ions which he filed in three of the four decisions during 1930–1932.
By the line of reasoning taken in these opinions, if protection or
control was extended to, or exercised over, intangibles or the per-
son of their owner, then as many States as afforded such protection
or were capable of exerting such dominion should be privileged to
tax the transfer of such property. On this basis, the domiciliary
State would invariably qualify as a State competent to tax as
would a nondomiciliary State, so far as it could legitimately exer-
cise control or could be shown to have afforded a measure of protec-
tion that was not trivial or insubstantial.
On the authority of Curry v. McCanless, the Court, in Pearson
v. McGraw, 95 also sustained the application of an Oregon transfer
tax to intangibles handled by an Illinois trust company and never
95 308 U.S. 313 (1939).
physically present in Oregon. Jurisdiction to tax was viewed as de-

pendent, not on the location of the property in the State, but on
control over the owner who was a resident of Oregon. In Graves v.
Elliott, 96 the Court upheld the power of New York, in computing
its estate tax, to include in the gross estate of a domiciled decedent
the value of a trust of bonds managed in Colorado by a Colorado
trust company and already taxed on its transfer by Colorado, which
trust the decedent had established while in Colorado and concern-
ing which he had never exercised any of his reserved powers of rev-
ocation or change of beneficiaries. It was observed that ‘‘the power
of disposition of property is the equivalent of ownership, . . . and
its exercise in the case of intangibles is . . . [an] appropriate sub-
ject of taxation at the place of the domicile of the owner of the
power. Relinquishment at death, in consequence of the nonexercise
in life, of a power to revoke a trust created by a decedent is like-
wise an appropriate subject of taxation.’’ 97 Consistent application
of the principle enunciated in Curry v. McCanless is also discern-
ible in two later cases in which the Court sustained the right of a
domiciliary State to tax the transfer of intangibles kept outside its
boundaries, notwithstanding that ‘‘in some instances they may be
subject to taxation in other jurisdictions, to whose control they are
subject and whose legal protection they enjoyed.’’ In Graves v.
Schmidlapp, 98 an estate tax was levied upon the value of the sub-
ject of a general testamentary power of appointment effectively ex-
ercised by a resident donee over intangibles held by trustees under
the will of a nonresident donor of the power. Viewing the transfer
of interest in the intangibles by exercise of the power of appoint-
ment as the equivalent of ownership, the Court quoted from
McCulloch v. Maryland 99 to the effect that the power to tax ‘‘‘is an
incident of sovereignty, and is coextensive with that to which it is
an incident.’’’ Again, in Central Hanover Bank Co. v. Kelly, 100 the
Court approved a New Jersey transfer tax imposed on the occasion
of the death of a New Jersey grantor of an irrevocable trust exe-
cuted, and consisting of securities located in New York, and provid-
ing for the disposition of the corpus to two nonresident sons.
The costliness of multiple taxation of estates comprising intan-
gibles is appreciably aggravated when each of several States founds
its tax not upon different events or property rights but upon an
identical basis, namely that the decedent died domiciled within its
96 307 U.S. 383 (1939).
97 Id.at 386.
98 315 U.S. 657, 660, 661 (1942).
99 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 429 (1819).
100 319 U.S. 94 (1943).
borders. Not only is an estate then threatened with excessive con-

traction but the contesting States may discover that the assets of
the estate are insufficient to satisfy their claims. Thus, in Texas v.
Florida, 101 the State of Texas filed an original petition in the Su-
preme Court, in which it asserted that its claim, together with
those of three other States, exceeded the value of the estate, that
the portion of the estate within Texas alone would not suffice to
discharge its own tax, and that its efforts to collect its tax might
be defeated by adjudications of domicile by the other States. The
Supreme Court disposed of this controversy by sustaining a finding
that the decedent had been domiciled in Massachusetts, but inti-
mated that thereafter it would take jurisdiction in like situations
only in the event that an estate did not exceed in value the total
of the conflicting demands of several States and that the latter
were confronted with a prospective inability to collect.
Corporate Privilege Taxes.—Since the tax is levied not on
property but on the privilege of doing business in corporate form,
a domestic corporation may be subjected to a privilege tax grad-
uated according to paid-up capital stock, even though the latter
represents capital not subject to the taxing power of the State. 102
By the same token, the validity of a franchise tax, imposed on a
domestic corporation engaged in foreign maritime commerce and
assessed upon a proportion of the total franchise value equal to the
ratio of local business done to total business, is not impaired by the
fact that the total value of the franchise was enhanced by property
and operations carried on beyond the limits of the State. 103 How-
ever, a State, under the guise of taxing the privilege of doing an
intrastate business, cannot levy on property beyond its borders;
therefore, as applied to foreign corporations, a license tax based on
101 306 U.S. 398 (1939). Resort to the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction was
necessary because in Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292 (1937), the
Court, proceeding on the basis that inconsistent determinations by the courts of two
States as to the domicile of a taxpayer do not raise a substantial federal constitu-
tional question, held that the Eleventh Amendment precluded a suit by the estate
of the decedent to establish the correct State of domicile. In California v. Texas, 437
U.S. 601 (1978), a case on all points with Texas v. Florida, the Court denied leave
to file an original action to adjudicate a dispute between the two States about the
actual domicile of Howard Hughes, a number of Justices suggesting that Worcester
County no longer was good law. Subsequently, the Court reaffirmed Worcester Coun-
ty, Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85 (1982), and then permitted an original action to pro-
ceed, California v. Texas, 457 U.S. 164 (1982), several Justices taking the position
that neither Worcester County nor Texas v. Florida was any longer viable.
102 Kansas City Ry. v. Kansas, 240 U.S. 227 (1916); Kansas City, M. & B. R.R.
v. Stiles, 242 U.S. 111 (1916).

103 Schwab v. Richardson, 263 U.S. 88 (1923).
authorized capital stock is void, 104 even though there be a maxi-

mum to the fee, 105 unless apportioned according to some method,
as, for example, a franchise tax based on such proportion of out-
standing capital stock as it represented by property owned and
used in business transacted in the taxing State. 106 An entrance
fee, on the other hand, collected only once as the price of admission
to do an intrastate business, is distinguishable from a tax and ac-
cordingly may be levied on a foreign corporation on the basis of a
sum fixed in relation to the amount of authorized capital stock (in
this instance, a $5,000 fee on an authorized capital of
$100,000,000). 107
A municipal license tax imposed as a percentage of the receipts
of a foreign corporation derived from the sales within and without
the State of goods manufactured in the city is not a tax on business
transactions or property outside the city and therefore does not vio-
late the due process clause. 108 But a State lacks jurisdiction to ex-
tend its privilege tax to the gross receipts of a foreign contracting
corporation for work done outside the taxing State in fabricating
equipment later installed in the taxing State. Unless the activities
which are the subject of the tax are carried on within its territorial
limits, a State is not competent to impose such a privilege tax. 109
A tax on chain stores, at a rate per store determined by the
number of stores both within and without the State is not unconsti-
tutional as a tax in part upon things beyond the jurisdiction of the
State. 110
Individual Income Taxes.—Consistent with due process of
law, a State annually may tax the entire net income of resident in-
dividuals from whatever source received, 111 and that portion of a
nonresident’s net income derived from property owned, and from
any business, trade, or profession carried on, by him within its bor-
ders. 112 Jurisdiction, in the case of residents, is founded upon the
rights and privileges incident to domicile, and, in the case of non-
104 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 (1910); Pullman Co. v. Kansas,
216 U.S. 56 (1910); Looney v. Crane Co., 245 U.S. 178 (1917); International Paper
Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 135 (1918).
105 Cudahy Co. v. Hinkle, 278 U.S. 460 (1929).
106 St. Louis S. W. Ry. v. Arkansas, 235 U.S. 350 (1914).
107 Atlantic Refining Co. v. Virginia, 302 U.S. 22 (1937).
108 American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919). Nor does a state license
tax on the production of electricity violate the due process clause because it may
be necessary, to ascertain, as an element in its computation, the amounts delivered
in another jurisdiction. Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932).
109 James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
110 Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412 (1937).
111 Lawrence v. State Tax Comm’n, 286 U.S. 276 (1932).
112 Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920); Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252
U.S. 60 (1920).
residents, upon dominion over either the receiver of the income or

the property or activity from which it is derived and upon the obli-
gation to contribute to the support of a government which renders
secure the collection of such income. Accordingly, a State may tax
residents on income from rents of land located outside the State
and from interest on bonds physically without the State and se-
cured by mortgage upon lands similarly situated 113 and from a
trust created and administered in another State, and not directly
taxable to the trustee. 114 The fact that another State has lawfully
taxed identical income in the hands of trustees operating therein
does not necessarily destroy a domiciliary State’s right to tax the
receipt of income by a resident beneficiary. ‘‘The taxing power of a
state is restricted to her confines and may not be exercised in re-
spect of subjects beyond them.’’ 115 Likewise, even though a non-
resident does no business within a State, the latter may tax the
profits realized by the nonresident upon his sale of a right appur-
tenant to membership in a stock exchange within its borders. 116
Corporate Income Taxes: Foreign Corporations.—A tax
based on the income of a foreign corporation may be determined by
allocating to the State a proportion of the total. 117 However, such
a basis may work an unconstitutional result if the income thus at-
tributed to the State is out of all appropriate proportion to the
business there transacted by the corporation. Evidence may always
be submitted which tends to show that a State has applied a meth-
od which, albeit fair on its face, operates so as to reach profits
which are in no sense attributable to transactions within its
jurisdication. 118 Nevertheless, a foreign corporation is in error
when it contends that due process is denied by a franchise tax
measured by income, which is levied, not upon net income from
intrastate business alone, but on net income justly attributable to
all classes of business done within the State, interstate and foreign,
113 New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937).
114 Maguire v. Trefy, 253 U.S. 12 (1920).
115 Guaranty Trust Co. v. Virginia, 305 U.S. 19, 23 (1938).
116 New York ex. rel. Whitney v. Graves, 299 U.S. 366 (1937).
117 Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920); Bass,
Ratcliff & Gretton Ltd. v. Tax Comm’n 266 U.S. 271 (1924). The Court has recently
considered and expanded the ability of the States to use apportionment formulae to
allocate to each State for taxing purposes a fraction of the income earned by an inte-
grated business conducted in several States as well as abroad. Moorman Mfg. Co.
v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S.
425 (1980); Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980). Exxon re-
fused to permit a unitary business to use separate accounting techniques that di-
vided its profits among its various functional departments to demonstrate that a
State’s formulary apportionment taxes extraterritorial income improperly. Bair,
supra, at 276–80, implied that a showing of actual multiple taxation was a nec-
essary predicate to a due process challenge but might not be sufficient.
118 Hans Rees’ Sons v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1931).
as well as intrastate business. 119 Inasmuch as the privilege grant-

ed by a State to a foreign corporation of carrying on local business
supports a tax by that State on the income derived from that busi-
ness, it follows that the Wisconsin privilege dividend tax, consist-
ent with the due process clause, may be applied to a Delaware cor-
poration, having its principal offices in New York, holding its meet-
ings and voting its dividends in New York, and drawing its divi-
dend checks on New York bank accounts. The tax is imposed on the
‘‘privilege of declaring and receiving dividends’’ out of income de-
rived from property located and business transacted in the State,
equal to a specified percentage of such dividends, the corporation
being required to deduct the tax from dividends payable to resident
and nonresident shareholders and pay it over to the State. 120
Insurance Company Taxes.—A privilege tax on the gross
premiums received by a foreign life insurance company at its home
office for business written in the State does not deprive the com-
pany of property without due process, 121 but a tax is bad when the
company has withdrawn all its agents from the State and has
ceased to do business, merely continuing to be bound to policy-
holders resident therein and receiving at its home office the re-
newal premiums. 122 Also violative of due process is a state gross
premium tax imposed on a nonresident firm, doing business in the
taxing jurisdiction, which purchased coverage of property located
therein from an unlicensed out-of-state insurer which con-
summated the contract, serviced the policy, and collected the pre-
miums outside that taxing jurisdiction. 123 Distinguishable there-
from is the following tax which was construed as having been lev-
ied, not upon annual premiums nor upon the privilege merely of
doing business during the period that the company actually was
within the State, but upon the privilege of entering and engaging
in business, the percentage ‘‘on the annual premiums to be paid
119 Matson Nav. Co. v. State Board, 297 U.S. 441 (1936).
120 Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 448–49 (1940). Dissenting, Jus-
tice Roberts, along with Chief Justice Hughes and Justices McReynolds and Reed,
stressed the fact that the use and disbursement by the corporation at its home office
of income derived from operations in many States does not depend on and cannot
be controlled by, any law of Wisconsin. The act of disbursing such income as divi-
dends, he contended is ‘‘one wholly beyond the reach of Wisconsin’s sovereign power,
one which it cannot effectively command, or prohibit or condition.’’ The assumption
that a proportion of the dividends distributed is paid out of earnings in Wisconsin
for the year immediately preceding payment is arbitrary and not borne out by the
facts. Accordingly, ‘‘if the exaction is an income tax in any sense it is such upon
the stockholders (many of whom are nonresidents) and is obviously bad.’’ See also
Wisconsin v. Minnesota Mining Co., 311 U.S 452 (1940).
121 Equitable Life Soc’y v. Pennsylvania, 238 U.S. 143 (1915).
122 Provident Savings Ass’n v. Kentucky, 239 U.S. 103 (1915).
123 State Bd. of Ins. v. Todd Shipyards, 370 U.S. 451 (1962).
throughout the life of the policies issued.’’ By reason of this dif-

ference a State may continue to collect such tax even after the com-
pany’s withdrawal from the State. 124
A State which taxes the insuring of property within its limits
may lawfully extend its tax to a foreign insurance company which
contracts with an automobile sales corporation in a third State to
insure its customers against loss of cars purchased through it, so
far as the cars go into possession of a purchaser within the taxing
State. 125 On the other hand, a foreign corporation admitted to do
a local business, which insures its property with insurers in other
States who are not authorized to do business in the taxing State,
cannot constitutionally be subjected to a 5% tax on the amount of
premiums paid for such coverage. 126 Likewise a Connecticut life in-
surance corporation, licensed to do business in California, which
negotiated reinsurance contracts in Connecticut, received payment
of premiums thereon in Connecticut, and was there liable for pay-
ment of losses claimed thereunder, cannot be subjected by Califor-
nia to a privilege tax measured by gross premiums derived from
such contracts, notwithstanding that the contracts reinsured other
insurers authorized to do business in California and protected poli-
cies effected in California on the lives of residents therein. The tax
cannot be sustained whether as laid on property, business done, or
transactions carried on, within California, or as a tax on a privilege
granted by that State. 127
When policy loans to residents are made by a local agent of a
foreign insurance company, in the servicing of which notes are
signed, security taken, interest collected, and debts are paid within
the State, such credits are taxable to the company, notwithstanding
that the promissory notes evidencing such credits are kept at the
home office of the insurer. 128 But when a resident policyholder’s
loan is merely charged against the reserve value of his policy,
under an arrangement for extinguishing the debt and interest
thereon by deduction from any claim under the policy, such credit
is not taxable to the foreign insurance company. 129 Premiums due
from residents on which an extension has been granted by foreign
companies also are credits on which the latter may be taxed by the
State of the debtor’s domicile; 130 the mere fact that the insurers
124 Continental Co. v. Tennessee, 311 U.S. 5, 6 (1940) (emphasis added).
125 Palmetto Ins. Co. v. Connecticut, 272 U.S. 295 (1926).
126 St. Louis Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U.S. 346 (1922).
127 Connecticut General Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77 (1938).
128 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. City of New Orleans, 205 U.S. 395 (1907).
129 Orleans Parish v. New York Life Ins. Co., 216 U.S 517 (1910).
130 Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co. v. Orleans Assessors, 221 U.S. 346 (1911).
charge these premiums to local agents and give no credit directly

to policyholders does not enable them to escape this tax. 131
Procedure in Taxation
Generally.—Exactly what due process requires in the assess-
ment and collection of general taxes has never been decided by the
Supreme Court. While it was held that ‘‘notice to the owner at
some stage of the proceedings, as well as an opportunity to defend,
is essential’’ for imposition of special taxes, it has also ruled that
laws for assessment and collection of general taxes stand upon a
different footing and are to be construed with the utmost liberality,
even to the extent of acknowledging that no notice whatever is nec-
essary. 132 Due process of law as applied to taxation does not mean
judicial process; 133 neither does it require the same kind of notice
as is required in a suit at law, or even in proceedings for taking
private property under the power of eminent domain. 134 If a tax-
payer is given an opportunity to test the validity of a tax at any
time before it is final, whether the proceedings for review take
place before a board having a quasi-judicial character, or before a
tribunal provided by the State for the propose of determining such
questions, due process of law is not denied. 135
Notice and Hearing in Relation to Taxes.—‘‘Of the dif-
ferent kinds of taxes which the State may impose, there is a vast
number of which, from their nature, no notice can be given to the
taxpayer, nor would notice be of any possible advantage to him,
such as poll taxes, license taxes (not dependent upon the extent of
his business), and generally, specific taxes on things, or persons, or
occupations. In such cases the legislature, in authorizing the tax,
fixes its amount, and that is the end of the matter. If the tax be
not paid, the property of the delinquent may be sold, and he be
thus deprived of his property. Yet there can be no question that the
proceeding is due process of law, as there is no inquiry into the
weight of evidence, or other element of a judicial nature, and noth-
ing could be changed by hearing the taxpayer. No right of his is,
therefore, invaded. Thus, if the tax on animals be a fixed sum per
head, or on articles a fixed sum per yard, or bushel, or gallon, there
is nothing the owner can do which can affect the amount to be col-
lected from him. So, if a person wishes a license to do business of
a particular kind, or at a particular place, such as keeping a hotel
131 Orient Ins. Co. v. Assessors of Orleans, 221 U.S. 358 (1911).
132 Turpin v. Lemon, 187 U.S. 51, 58 (1902); Glidden v. Harrington, 189 U.S.
255 (1903).
133 McMillen v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 37, 42 (1877).
134 Bell’s Gap R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 239 (1890).
135 Hodge v. Muscatine County, 196 U.S. 276 (1905).
or a restaurant, or selling liquors, or cigars, or clothes, he has only

to pay the amount required by law and go into the business. There
is no need in such cases for notice or hearing. So, also, if taxes are
imposed in the shape of licenses for privileges, such as those on for-
eign corporations for doing business in the State, or on domestic
corporations for franchises, if the parties desire the privilege, they
have only to pay the amount required. In such cases there is no
necessity for notice or hearing. The amount of the tax would not
be changed by it.’’ 136
Notice and Hearing in Relation to Assessments.—‘‘But
where a tax is levied on property not specifically, but according to
its value, to be ascertained by assessors appointed for that purpose
upon such evidence as they may obtain, a different principle comes
in. The officers in estimating the value act judicially; and in most
of the States provision is made for the correction of errors commit-
ted by them, through boards of revision or equalization, sitting at
designated periods provided by law to hear complaints respecting
the justice of the assessments. The law in prescribing the time
when such complaints will be heard, gives all the notice required,
and the proceedings by which the valuation is determined, though
it may be followed, if the tax be not paid, by a sale of the
delinquent’s property, is due process of law.’’ 137
Nevertheless, it has never been considered necessary to the va-
lidity of a tax that the party charged shall have been present, or
had an opportunity to be present, in some tribunal when he was
assessed. 138 Where a tax board has its time of sitting fixed by law
and where its sessions are not secret, no obstacle prevents the ap-
pearance of any one before it to assert a right or redress a wrong
and in the business of assessing taxes, this is all that can be rea-
sonably asked. 139 Nor is there any constitutional command that
notice of an assessment as well as an opportunity to contest it be
given in advance of the assesment. It is enough that all available
defenses may be presented to a competent tribunal during a suit
to collect the tax and before the demand of the State for remittance
becomes final. 140 A hearing before judgment, with full opportunity
to submit evidence and arguments being all that can be adjudged
vital, it follows that rehearings and new trials are not essential to
due process of law. 141 One hearing is sufficient to constitute due
136 Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., 111 U.S. 701, 709–10 (1884).
137 Id. at 710.
139 State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575, 610 (1876).
140 Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 393, 396 (1934). See also Clement Nat’l Bank
v. Vermont, 231 U.S. 120 (1913).

141 Pittsburgh C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Backus, 154 U.S. 421 (1894).
process, 142 and the requirements of due process are also met if a
taxpayer, who had no notice of a hearing, does receive notice of the
decision reached there and is privileged to appeal it and, on appeal,
to present evidence and be heard on the valuation of his prop-
erty. 143
However, when special assessments are made by a political
subdivision, a taxing board or court, according to special benefits,
the property owner is entitled to be heard as to the amount of his
assessments and upon all questions properly entering into that de-
termination. 144 The hearing need not amount to a judicial in-
quiry, 145 but a mere opportunity to submit objections in writing,
without the right of personal appearance, is not sufficient. 146 If an
assessment for a local improvement is made in accordance with a
fixed rule prescribed by legislative act, the property owner is not
entitled to be heard in advance on the question of benefits. 147 On
the other hand, if the area of the assessment district was not deter-
mined by the legislature, a landowner does have the right to be
heard respecting benefits to his property before it can be included
in the improvement district and assessed, but due process is not
denied if, in the absence of actual fraud or bad faith, the decision
of the agency vested with the initial determination of benefits is
made final. 148 The owner has no constitutional right to be heard
in opposition to the launching of a project which may end in assess-
ment, and once his land has been duly included within a benefit
district, the only privilege which he thereafter enjoys is to a hear-
ing upon the apportionment, that is, the amount of the tax which
he has to pay. 149 Nor can he rightfully complain because the stat-
ute renders conclusive, after a hearing, the determination as to ap-
portionment by the same body which levied the assessment. 150
142 Michigan Central R.R. v. Powers, 201 U.S. 245, 302 (1906).
143 Pittsburgh C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Board of Pub. Works, 172 U.S. 32, 45 (1898).
144 St. Louis Land Co. v. Kansas City, 241 U.S. 419, 430 (1916); Paulsen v. Port-
land, 149 U.S. 30, 41 (1893); Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 590 (1897).
145 Tonawanda v. Lyon, 181 U.S. 389, 391 (1901).
146 Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
147 Withnell v. Ruecking Constr. Co., 249 U.S. 63, 68 (1919); Browning v. Hoo-
per, 269 U.S. 396, 405 (1926). Likewise, the committing to a board of county super-
visors of authority to determine, without notice or hearing, when repairs to an exist-
ing drainage system are necessary cannot be said to deny due process of law to
landowners in the district, who, by statutory requirement, are assessed for the cost
thereof in proportion to the original assessment. Breiholz v. Board of Supervisors,
257 U.S. 118 (1921).
148 Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 168, 175 (1896); Brown-
ing v. Hooper, 269 U.S. 396, 405 (1926).

149 Utley v. Petersburg, 292 U.S. 106, 109 (1934); French v. Barber Asphalt Pav-
ing Co., 181 U.S. 324, 341 (1901). See also Soliah v. Heskin, 222 U.S. 522 (1912).
150 Hibben v. Smith, 191 U.S. 310, 321 (1903).
More specifically, where the mode of assessment resolves itself

into a mere mathematical calculation, there is no necessity for a
hearing. 151 Statutes and ordinances providing for the paving and
grading of streets, the cost thereof to be assessed on the front foot
rule, do not, by their failure to provide for a hearing or review of
assessments, generally deprive a complaining owner of property
without due process of law. 152 In contrast, when an attempt is
made to cast upon particular property a certain proportion of the
construction cost of a sewer not calculated by any mathematical
formula, the taxpayer has a right to be heard. 153
Collection of Taxes.—To reach property which has escaped
taxation, a State may tax estates of decedents for a period prior to
death and grant proportionate deductions for all prior taxes which
the personal representative can prove to have been paid. 154 Collec-
tion of an inheritance tax also may be expedited by a statute re-
quiring the sealing of safe deposit boxes for at least ten days after
the death of the renter and obliging the lessor to retain assets
found therein sufficient to pay the tax that may be due the
State. 155 Moreover, with a view to achieving a like result in the
case of gasoline taxes, a State may compel retailers to collect such
taxes from consumers and, under penalty of a fine for delinquency,
to remit monthly the amounts thus collected. 156 Likewise, a tax on
the tangible personal property of a nonresident owner may be col-
lected from the custodian or possessor of such property, and the
latter, as an assurance of reimbursement, may be granted a lien
on such property. 157 In collecting personal income taxes, however,
most States require employers to deduct and withhold the tax from
the wages of employees, but the duty thereby imposed on the em-
ployer has never been viewed as depriving him of property without
due process of law, nor has the adjustment of his system of ac-
counting and paying salaries which withholding entails been
viewed as an unreasonable regulation of the conduct of his busi-
ness. 158
151 Hancock v. Muskogee, 250 U.S. 454, 458 (1919). Likewise, a taxpayer does
not have a right to a hearing before a state board of equalization preliminary to is-
suance by it of an order increasing the valuation of all property in a city by 40%.
Bi-Metallic Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
152 City of Detroit v. Parker, 181 U.S. 399 (1901).
153 Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U.S. 30, 38 (1893).
154 Bankers Trust Co. v. Blodgett, 260 U.S. 647 (1923).
155 National Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 232 U.S. 58 (1914).
156 Pierce Oil Corp. v. Hopkins, 264 U.S. 137 (1924).
157 Carstairs v. Cochran, 193 U.S. 10 (1904); Hannis Distilling Co. v. Baltimore,
216 U.S. 285 (1910).

158 Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 75, 76 (1920).
Moreover, no unconstitutional deprivation of the property

rights of vendors of trucks, sold under conditional sales contract to
a carrier, results when a State asserts against such trucks a prior
lien for highway use taxes levied against the carrier and (1) accru-
ing from the operation by the carrier of trucks, other than those
sold by the vendors, either before or during the time the carrier op-
erated the vendors’ trucks, or (2) arising from assessments against
the carrier, after vendors repossessed their trucks, and based upon
the carrier’s operations preceding such repossession. A vendor is
not privileged to contend that the lien asserted must be limited to
taxes attributable solely to operation of its own trucks; for the wear
on the highways occasioned by the carrier’s operation is in no way
altered by the vendor’s retention of title. 159
As a State may provide in advance that taxes shall bear inter-
est from the time they become due, it may with equal validity stip-
ulate that taxes which have become delinquent shall bear interest
from the time the delinquency commenced. A State may adopt new
remedies for the collection of taxes and apply these remedies to
taxes already delinquent. 160 After liability of a taxpayer has been
fixed by appropriate procedure, collection of a tax by distress and
seizure of his person does not deprive him of liberty without due
process of law. 161 Nor is a foreign insurance company denied due
process of law when its personal property is distrained to satisfy
unpaid taxes. 162
The requirements of due process are fulfilled by a statute
which, in conjunction with affording an opportunity to be heard,
provides for the forfeiture of titles to land for failure to list and pay
taxes thereon for certain specified years. 163 No less constitutional,
as a means of facilitating collection, is an in rem proceeding, to
which the land alone is made a party, whereby tax liens on land
are foreclosed and all preexisting rights or liens are eliminated by
a sale under a decree. 164 On the other hand, while the conversion
of an unpaid special assessment into both a personal judgment
against the owner as well as a charge on the land is consistent
with the Fourteenth Amendment, 165 a judgment imposing personal
liability against a nonresident taxpayer over whom the state court
acquired no jurisdiction is void. 166 Apart from such restraints,
159 International Harvester Corp. v. Goodrich, 350 U.S. 537 (1956).
160 League v. Texas, 184 U.S. 156 (1902).
161 Palmer v. McMahon, 133 U.S. 660, 669 (1890).
162 Scottish Union & Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Bowland, 196 U.S. 611 (1905).
163 King v. Mullins, 171 U.S. 404 (1898); Chapman v. Zobelein, 237 U.S. 135
(1915).
164 Leigh v. Green, 193 U.S. 79 (1904).
165 Davidson v. City of New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 107 (1878).
166 Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U.S. 193 (1899).
however, a State is free to adopt new remedies for the collection

of taxes and even to apply new remedies to taxes already delin-
quent. 167
Sufficiency and Manner of Giving Notice.—Notice, insofar
as it is required, may be either personal, or by publication, or by
statute fixing the time and place of hearing. 168 A state statute,
consistent with due process, may designate a corporation as the
agent of a nonresident stockholder to receive notice and to rep-
resent him in proceedings for correcting assessment. 169 Also
‘‘where the State . . . [desires] to sell land for taxes upon proceed-
ings to enforce a lien for the payment thereof, it may proceed di-
rectly against the land within the jurisdiction of the court, and a
notice which permits all interested, who are ‘so minded,’ to ascer-
tain that it is to be subjected to sale to answer for taxes, and to
appear and be heard, whether to be found within the jurisdiction
or not, is due process of law within the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. . .’’ 170 A description, even though it not be technically cor-
rect, which identifies the land will sustain an assessment for taxes
and a notice of sale therefor when delinquent. If the owner knows
that the property so described is his, he is not, by reason of the in-
sufficient description, deprived of his property without due process.
Where tax proceedings are in rem, owners are bound to take notice
thereof, and to pay taxes on their property, even if assessed to un-
known or other persons, and if an owner stands by and sees his
property sold for delinquent taxes, he is not thereby wrongfully de-
prived of his property. 171
However, due process was deemed not to have been accorded
an incompetent taxpayer, for whom a guardian had not yet been
appointed, but who was well known to town officials to be finan-
cially responsible, when, in accordance with statutory procedure,
notice of a real property tax delinquency was mailed to her and
published in local papers as well as posted in the town post office,
and thereafter, without appearance on her part, the property was
foreclosed and deeded to the town. 172 On the other hand, due proc-
ess was not denied to appellants when, through dereliction of their
167 League v. Texas, 184 U.S. 156, 158 (1902). See also Straus v. Foxworth, 231
U.S. 162 (1913).

168 Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908). See also Kentucky Railroad Tax
Cases, 115 U.S. 321, 331 (1885); Winona & St. Peter Land Co. v. Minnesota, 159
U.S. 526, 537 (1895); Merchants Bank v. Pennsylvania, 167 U.S. 461, 466 (1897);
Glidden v. Harrington, 189 U.S. 255 (1903).
169 Corry v. Baltimore, 196 U.S. 466, 478 (1905).
170 Leigh v. Green, 193 U.S. 79, 92–93 (1904).
171 Ontario Land Co. v. Yordy, 212 U.S. 152 (1909). See also Longyear v. Toolan,
209 U.S. 414 (1908).

172 Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956).
bookkeeper, they were not apprised of the receipt of mailed notices,

and thus were unable to avert foreclosure of liens for unpaid water
charges outstanding against two parcels of land held by them in
trust; this conclusion is unaffected by the disparity between the
value of the land taken and the amount owed nor by the fact that
the city, in one instance, retained the proceeds of sale after lapse
of time to redeem. Having issued appropriate notices, the city can-
not be held responsible for the negligence of the bookkeeper and
the managing trustee in overlooking arrearages on tax bills, nor is
it obligated to inquire why appellants regularly paid real estate
taxes on their property. 173
Sufficiency of Remedy.—When no other remedy is available,
due process is denied by a judgment of a state court withholding
a decree in equity to enjoin collection of a discriminatory tax. 174
Requirements of due process are similarly violated by a statute
which limits a taxpayer’s right to challenge an assessment to cases
of fraud or corruption, 175 and by a state tribunal which prevents
a recovery of taxes imposed in violation of the Constitution and
laws of the United States by invoking a state law limiting suits to
recover taxes alleged to have been assessed illegally to taxes paid
at the time and in the manner provided by said law. 176 In this as
in other areas, the state must provide procedural safeguards
against imposition of an unconstitutional tax. These procedures
need not apply predeprivation, but a state that denies
predeprivation remedy by requiring that tax payments be made be-
fore objections are heard must provide a postdeprivation rem-
edy. 177 In the case of a tax held unconstitutional as a discrimina-
tion against interstate commerce and not invalidated in its en-
tirety, the state has several alternatives for equalizing incidence of
the tax: it may pay a refund equal to the difference between the
tax paid and the tax that would have been due under rates af-
forded to in-state competitors; it may assess and collect back taxes
from those competitors; or it may combine the two approaches. 178
Laches.—Persons failing to avail themselves of an opportunity
to object and be heard cannot thereafter complain of assessments
as arbitrary and unconstitutional. 179 Likewise a car company,
which failed to report its gross receipts as required by statute, has
173 Nelson v. New York City, 352 U.S. 103 (1956).
174 Brinkerhoff-Faris Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930).
175 Central of Georgia Ry. v. Wright, 207 U.S. 127 (1907).
176 Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363 (1930). See also Ward v. Love County, 253
U.S. 17 (1920).
177 McKesson Corp. v. Florida Alcohol & Tobacco Div., 496 U.S. 18 (1990).
178 Id.
179 Farncomb v. Denver, 252 U.S. 7 (1920).
no further right to contest the state comptroller’s estimate of those

receipts and his adding thereto the 10 percent penalty permitted
by law. 180
Eminent Domain
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been
held to require that when a state or local governmental body, or
a private body exercising delegated power, takes private property
it must provide just compensation and take only for a public pur-
pose. Applicable principles are discussed under the Fifth Amend-
ment. 181
Substantive Due Process and Noneconomic Liberty
At the heyday of economic substantive due process, the Court
ruled in two cases which, while they also involved property, prom-
ised substantially to extend judicial supervision of the reasonable-
ness of legislation. This promise was not realized, but later cases
brought forth an avalanche of exposition. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 182
the Court struck down a state law forbidding the teaching in any
school in the State, public or private, of any modern foreign lan-
guage, other than English, to any child who had not successfully
finished the eighth grade; in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 183 it de-
clared unconstitutional a state law which required public school
education of children aged eight to sixteen. Both cases involved, as
noted, property rights which the Court asserted were protected; the
statute in Meyer interfered with the occupation of a teacher of Ger-
man who had been convicted of teaching that language, while the
private school plaintiffs in Pierce were threatened with destruction
of their businesses and the values of their properties. 184 Yet in
both cases the Court also permitted these persons adversely af-
fected in their property interests to represent the interests of par-
ents and children in the assertion of other aspects of ‘‘liberty’’ of
which they could not be denied.
‘‘Without doubt,’’ Justice McReynolds said, liberty ‘‘denotes not
merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the indi-
vidual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of
life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and
bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his
180 Pullman Co. v. Knott, 235 U.S. 23 (1914).
181 For analysis of the law of eminent domain, see supra, pp. 1369–95.
182 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Justices Holmes and Sutherland entered a dissent, ap-
plicable to Meyer, in Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 412 (1923).

183 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
184 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 531, 533, 534 (1928).

own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recog-

nized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happi-
ness by free men.’’ 185 The right of the parents to have their chil-
dren instructed in a foreign language was ‘‘within the liberty of the
[Fourteenth] Amendment.’’ 186 Meyer was relied on in Pierce by the
Court in asserting that the statute there ‘‘unreasonably interferes
with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing
and education of children under their control. . . . The child is not
the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct
his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize
and prepare him for additional obligations.’’ 187
Other assertions of the liberty to be free from compulsory state
provisions proved unsuccessful, 188 although dicta in these cases
continued to broadly define liberty. 189 And in Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 190 a statute prohibiting interracial marriage was held to
deny due process. Marriage was termed ‘‘one of the ‘basic civil
rights of man’’’ and a ‘‘fundamental freedom.’’ ‘‘The freedom to
marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.’’ The clas-
sification of marriage rights on a racial basis was ‘‘unsupportable.’’
But the expansion of the Bill of Rights to restrict state action, espe-
cially the religion and free expression provisions of the First
Amendment, afforded the Court an opportunity to base certain de-
cisions voiding state policies on these grounds rather than on due
process. 191
In Poe v. Ullman, 192 Justice Harlan advocated the application
of a due process standard of reasonableness—the same standard he
185 262 U.S. at 399.
186 Id. at 400.
187 268 U.S. at 534–35.
188 E.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S.
174 (1922) (compulsory vaccination); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (sexual steri-
lization of inmates of state institutions found to be afflicted with hereditary forms
of insanity or imbecility); Minnesota v. Probate Court ex rel. Pearson, 309 U.S. 270
(1940) (institutionalization of habitual sexual offenders as psychopathic personal-
ities).
189 See also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (marriage and
procreation are among ‘‘the basic civil rights of man’’); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (care and nurture of children by the family are within ‘‘the pri-
vate realm of family life which the state cannot enter’’).
190 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
191 Indeed, in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965), Justice Douglas
reinterpreted Meyer and Pierce as having been based on the First Amendment. Note
that in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 105 (1968), and Tinker v. Des Moines
School District, 393 U.S. 503, 506–07 (1969), Justice Fortas for the Court approv-
ingly noted the due process basis of Meyer and Pierce while deciding both cases on
First Amendment grounds.
192 367 U.S. 497, 522, 539–45 (1961). Justice Douglas, also dissenting, relied on
a due process analysis, which began with the texts of the first eight Amendments
would have applied to test economic legislation—to a Connecticut

statute banning the use of contraceptives, even by married couples.
According to the Justice, due process is limited neither to proce-
dural guarantees nor restricted to the rights enumerated in the
first eight Amendments of the Bill of Rights, but is rather ‘‘a dis-
crete concept which subsists as an independent guaranty of liberty
and procedural fairness, more general and inclusive than the spe-
cific prohibitions.’’ The liberty protected by the clause ‘‘is a rational
continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all
substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints . . .
and which also recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judg-
ment must, that certain interests require particularly careful scru-
tiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment.’’ Apply-
ing a lengthy analysis, he concluded that the statute infringed
upon a fundamental liberty without the showing of a justification
which would support the intrusion. Yet, when the same issue re-
turned to the Court, a majority of the Justices, rejecting reliance
on substantive due process, 193 decided it on the basis of the stat-
ute’s invasion of privacy, a ‘‘penumbral’’ right protected by a matrix
of constitutional provisions. 194 The analysis, however, approached
the matter in terms, and in reliance on cases, reminiscent of sub-
stantive due process, although the separate concurrences of Jus-
tices Harlan and White specifically based on substantive due proc-
ess, 195 indicates that the majority’s position was at least definition-
ally different. Subsequent cases, functionally grounded in equal
protection analysis, relied in great degree upon a view of rational-
ity and reasonableness not too different from Justice Harlan’s dis-
sent in Poe v. Ullman. 196
The Court remains divided over how broadly to define a liberty
interest. In Bowers v. Hardwick, 197 for example, the Court major-
ity found no right to engage in homosexual sodomy, and rejected
the dissent’s suggestion that focus should instead be placed on a
right to privacy and autonomy in matters of sexual intimacy. Simi-
lar disagreement over the appropriate level of generality for defini-
tion of a liberty interest was evident in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,
as the basis of fundamental due process and continued into the ‘‘emanations’’ from
this as also protected. Id. at 509.
193 ‘‘We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and
propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social condi-
tions.’’ Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (opinion of Court by Jus-
tice Douglas).
194 Supra, pp. 1504–05.
195 381 U.S. at 499, 502.
196 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), is the principal case. See also Stan-
ley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).

197 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
involving the rights of an adulterous biological father to establish

paternity and to associate with his child. 198 Justice Scalia, joined
only by Chief Justice Rehnquist in this part of the plurality deci-
sion, argued for ‘‘the most specific level at which a relevant tradi-
tion protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be
identified.’’ 199 Dissenting Justice Brennan, joined by two others,
rejected the emphasis on tradition, and argued instead that the
Court should ‘‘ask whether the specific parent-child relationship
under consideration is close enough to the interests that we already
have protected [as] an aspect of ‘liberty.’ ’’ 200 The resurgence of
substantive due process reasoning became evident upon the Court’s
confrontation with cases raising the constitutionality of laws pro-
scribing or limiting abortions.
Abortion.—Laws limiting or prohibiting abortions in prac-
tically all the States, the District of Columbia, and the territories
were invalidated by a ruling recognizing a right of personal privacy
protected by the due process clause that included a qualified right
of a woman to determine whether or not to bear a child. On the
basis of its analysis of the competing individual rights and state in-
terests, the Court in Roe v. Wade 201 discerned a three-stage bal-
ancing of rights and interests extending over the full nine-month
term of pregnancy.
‘‘(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first
trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to
the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physi-
cian.
‘‘(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the
first trimester, the State, in promoting its interest in the health of
the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in
ways that are reasonably related to maternal health.
‘‘(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promot-
ing its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses,
198 491 U.S. 110 (1989). Five Justices agreed that a liberty interest was impli-
cated, but the Court ruled that California’s procedures for establishing paternity did
not unconstitutionally impinge on that interest.
199 Id. at 128 n.6.
200 Id. at 142.
201 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). A companion case was Doe v. Bolton, 410
U.S. 179 (1973). The opinion by Justice Blackman was concurred in by Justices
Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and Powell, and Chief Justice Burger. Jus-
tices White and Rehnquist dissented, id. at 171, 221, arguing that the Court should
follow the traditional due process test of determining whether a law has a rational
relation to a valid state objective and that so judged the statute was valid. Justice
Rehnquist was willing to consider an absolute ban on abortions even when the
mother’s life is in jeopardy to be a denial of due process, id. at 173, while Justice
White left the issue open. Id. at 223.
regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary,

in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or
health of the mother.’’ 202
A lengthy history of the medical and legal views of abortion ap-
parently convinced the Court that the prohibition of abortion
lacked the solid foundation necessary to preserve such prohibitions
from constitutional review. 203 Similarly, a review of the concept of
‘‘person’’ as protected in the due process clause and in other provi-
sions of the Constitution established to the Court’s satisfaction that
the word ‘‘person’’ did not include the unborn, and therefore that
the unborn lacked federal constitutional protection. 204 Without
treating the question in more than summary fashion, the Court an-
nounced that ‘‘a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain
areas or zones of privacy, does exist in the Constitution’’ and that
it is ‘‘founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal
liberty and restrictions upon state action.’’ 205 ‘‘This right of privacy
. . . is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy.’’ 206 Moreover, this right of privacy
is ‘‘fundamental’’ and, drawing upon the strict standard of review
in equal protection litigation, the Court held that the due process
clause required that the regulations limiting this fundamental
right may be justified only by a ‘‘compelling state interest’’ and
must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state inter-
ests at stake. 207 Assessing the possible interests of the States, the
Court rejected as unsupported in the record and ill-served by the
laws in question justifications relating to the promotion of morality
and the protection of women from the medical hazards of abortions.
The state interest in protecting the life of the fetus was held to be
limited by the lack of a social consensus with regard to the issue
when life begins. Two valid state interests were recognized, how-
ever. ‘‘[T]he State does have an important and legitimate interest
in preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman . . .
[and] it has still another important and legitimate interest in pro-
tecting the potentiality of human life. These interests are separate
and distinct. Each grows in substantiality as the woman ap-
proaches term and, at a point during pregnancy, each becomes
‘compelling.’ ’’ 208
202 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973).
203 Id. at 129–47.
204 Id. at 156–59.
205 Id. at 152–53.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 152, 155–56. The ‘‘compelling state interest’’ test in equal protection
cases is reviewed infra, pp. 1809–14.

208 410 U.S. at 147–52, 159–63.
This approach led to the three-stage concept quoted above. Be-

cause medical data indicated that abortion prior to the end of the
first trimester is relatively safe, the mortality rate being lower
than the rates for normal childbirth, and because the fetus has no
capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb, the State
has no ‘‘compelling interest’’ in the first trimester and ‘‘the attend-
ing physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine,
without regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the
patient’s pregnancy should be terminated.’’ 209 In the intermediate
trimester, the danger to the woman increases and the State may
therefore regulate the abortion procedure ‘‘to the extent that the
regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of
maternal health,’’ but the fetus is still not able to survive outside
the womb, and consequently the actual decision to have an abortion
cannot be otherwise impeded. 210 ‘‘With respect to the State’s im-
portant and legitimate interest in potential life, the ‘compelling’
point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably
has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb.
State regulation protective of fetal life after viability thus has both
logical and biological justifications. If the State is interested in pro-
tecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe
abortion during that period, except when it is necessary to preserve
the life or health of the mother.’’ 211
In a companion case, the Court struck down three procedural
provisions of a permissive state abortion statute. 212 These required
that the abortion be performed in a hospital accredited by a private
accrediting organization, that the operation be approved by the
hospital staff abortion committee, and that the performing physi-
cian’s judgment be confirmed by the independent examination of
the patient by two other licensed physicians. These provisions were
held not to be justified by the State’s interest in maternal health
because they were not reasonably related to that interest. 213 And
a residency provision was struck down as violating the privileges
and immunities clause. 214 But a clause making the performance of
an abortion a crime except when it is based upon the doctor’s ‘‘best
clinical judgment that an abortion is necessary’’ was upheld against
vagueness attack and was further held to benefit women seeking
209 Id. at 163.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 163–164. A fetus becomes ‘‘viable’’ when it is ‘‘potentially able to live
outside the mother’s womb, albeit with artificial aid. Viability is usually placed at
about seven months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks.’’ Id. at 160
(footnotes omitted).
212 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
213 Id. at 192–200.
214 Id. at 200. The clause is Article IV, § 2. See supra, pp. 867–77.
abortions inasmuch as the doctor could utilize his best clinical

judgment in light of all the attendant circumstances. 215
These decisions were reaffirmed and extended when the Court
was faced with a restrictive state statute enacted after Roe making
access to abortions contingent upon spousal or parental consent
and imposing restraints upon methods. 216 Striking down all the
substantial limitations, the Court held (1) that the spousal consent
provision was an attempt by the State to delegate a veto power
over the decision of the woman and her doctor that the State itself
could not exercise, 217 (2) that no significant state interests justified
the imposition of a blanket parental consent requirement as a con-
dition of the obtaining of an abortion by an unmarried minor dur-
ing the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, 218 and (3) that a criminal pro-
215 410 U.S. at 191–92. ‘‘[T]he medical judgment may be exercised in the light
of all factors—physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman’s age—rel-

evant to the well-being of the patient. All these factors may relate to health.’’ Id.
at 192. Presumably this discussion applies to the Court’s ruling in Roe holding that
even in the third trimester the woman may not be forbidden to have an abortion
if it is necessary to preserve her health as well as her life, 410 U.S. at 163–64, a
holding which is unelaborated in the opinion. See also United States v. Vuitch, 402
U.S. 62 (1971).
216 Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). See also Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (parental consent to minor’s abortion); Colautti v. Frank-
lin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979) (imposition on doctor determination of viability of fetus and
obligation to take life-saving steps); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976) (stand-
ing of doctors to litigate right of patients to Medicaid-financed abortions); Bigelow
v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (ban on newspaper ads for abortions); Connecticut
v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975) (state ban on performance of abortion by ‘‘any person’’
may constitutionally be applied to prosecute nonphysicians performing abortions).
217 Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67–72 (1976). The Court rec-
ognized the husband’s interests and the state interest in promoting marital har-
mony. But the latter was deemed not served by the requirement, and, since when
the spouses disagree on the abortion decision one has to prevail, the Court thought
the person who bears the child and who is the more directly affected should be the
one to prevail. Justices White and Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger dissented.
Id. at 92.
218 Id. at 72–75. Minors have rights protected by the Constitution, but the
States have broader authority to regulate their activities than those of adults. Here,
the Court perceived no state interest served by the requirement that overcomes the
woman’s right to make her own decision; it emphasized that it was not holding that
every minor, regardless of age or maturity, could give effective consent for an abor-
tion. Justice Stevens joined the other dissenters on this part of the holding. Id. at
101. In Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979), eight Justices agreed that a parental
consent law, applied to a mature minor, found to be capable of making, and having
made, an informed and reasonable decision to have an abortion, was void but split
on the reasoning. Four Justices would hold that neither parents nor a court could
be given an absolute veto over a mature minor’s decision, while four others would
hold that if parental consent is required the State must afford an expeditious access
to court to review the parental determination and set it aside in appropriate cases.
In H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981), the Court upheld, as applied to an
unemancipated minor living at home and dependent on her parents, a statute re-
quiring a physician, ‘‘if possible,’’ to notify the parents or guardians of a minor seek-
ing an abortion. The decisions leave open a variety of questions, addressed by some
concurring and dissenting Justices, dealing with when it would not be in the minor’s
vision requiring the attending physician to exercise all care and

diligence to preserve the life and health of the fetus without regard
to the stage of viability was inconsistent with Roe. 219 Sustained
were provisions that required the woman’s written consent to an
abortion with assurances that it is informed and freely given, and
provisions mandating reporting and recordkeeping for public health
purposes with adequate assurances of confidentiality. A provision
that barred the use of the most commonly used method of abortion
after the first 12 weeks of pregnancy was declared unconstitutional
since in the absence of another comparably safe technique it did
not qualify as a reasonble protection of maternal health and it in-
stead operated to deny the vast majority of abortions after the first
12 weeks. 220
In other rulings applying Roe, the Court struck down some re-
quirements and upheld others. A requirement that all abortions
performed after the first trimester be performed in a hospital was
invalidated as imposing ‘‘a heavy, and unnecessary, burden on
women’s access to a relatively inexpensive, otherwise accessible,
and [at least during the first few weeks of the second trimester]
safe abortion procedure.’’ 221 A state may, however, require that
abortions be performed in hospitals or licensed outpatient clinics,
as long as licensing standards do not ‘‘depart from accepted medical
practice.’’ 222 Various ‘‘informed consent’’ requirements were struck
down as intruding upon the discretion of the physician, and as
being aimed at discouraging abortions rather than at informing the
pregnant woman’s decision; 223 while the state has a legitimate in-
best interest to avoid notifying her parents and with the alternatives to parental
notification and consent. In two 1983 cases the Court applied the Bellotti v. Baird
standard for determining whether judicial substitutes for parental consent require-
ments permit a pregnant minor to demonstrate that she is sufficiently mature to
make her own decision on abortion. Compare City of Akron v. Akron Center for Re-
productive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (no opportunity for case-by-case determina-
tions); with Planned Parenthood Ass’n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983) (adequate
individualized consideration).
219 Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 81–84 (1976). A law requiring
a doctor, subject to penal sanction, to determine if a fetus is viable or may be viable

and to take steps to preserve the life and health of viable fetuses was held to be
unconstitutionally vague. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
220 Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75–79 (1976).
221 City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 438
(1983); Accord, Planned Parenthood Ass’n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983). The
Court in Akron relied on evidence that ‘‘dilation and evacuation’’ (D&E) abortions
performed in clinics cost less than half as much as hospital abortions, and that com-
mon use of the D&E procedure had ‘‘increased dramatically’’ the safety of second
trimester abortions in the 10 years since Roe v. Wade. 462 U.S. at 435–36.
222 Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506, 516 (1983).
223 City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 444–
45 (1983); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476

U.S. 747 (1986).
terest in ensuring that the woman’s consent is informed, the Court

explained, it may not demand of the physician ‘‘a recitation of an
inflexible list of information’’ unrelated to the particular patient’s
health, and, for that matter, may not demand that the physician
rather than some other qualified person render the counseling. 224
The Court also invalidated a 24-hour waiting period following a
woman’s written, informed consent. 225 On the other hand, the
Court upheld a requirement that tissue removed in clinic abortions
be submitted to a pathologist for examination, since the same re-
quirements were imposed for in-hospital abortions and for almost
all other in-hospital surgery. 226 Also, the Court upheld a require-
ment that a second physician be present at abortions performed
after viability in order to assist in saving the life of the fetus. 227
The Court refused to extend Roe to the area of public funding
to pay for abortions for the pregnant indigent, holding that neither
due process nor equal protection requires government to use public
funds for this purpose. 228 Due process, the Court held, does not ob-
ligate the States to pay the pregnancy-related medical expenses of
indigent women, even though both abortion and the right to bear
the child to birth are ‘‘fundamental’’ rights. 229 But the more critical
question was the equal protection restraint imposed when govern-
ment does provide public funds for medical care to indigents; may
it accord differential treatment to abortion and childbirth and pre-
fer the latter? The States may do so, the Court continued, because
it is rationally related to a lawful purpose to encourage normal
childbirth. The use of the rational basis test required a rejection of
the compelling state interest test in the following manner. First,
the more severe test was not activated by a classification impacting
on a suspect class, neither wealth nor indigency being such a class.
Second, and most significant for abortion adjudication, the Court
held that state refusal to pay for abortions did not impinge upon
a fundamental right. Prior state restrictions which had been invali-
dated, the Court continued, had created absolute obstacles to the
224 City of Akron, 462 U.S. 416, 448–49 (1983).
51 (1983). But see Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (upholding a 48-hour
waiting period following notification of parents by a minor).
226 Planned Parenthood Ass’n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 486–90 (1983).
227 Id. at 482–86, 505.
228 Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
See also Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977) (states are not required by federal law
to fund abortions); Harris v. McRae, supra, at 306–11 (same). The state restriction
in Maher supra at 466, applied to nontheraputic abortions, whereas the federal law
barred funding for most medically necessary abortions as well, a distinction the
Court deemed irrelevant, Harris, at supra, 323, although it provided Justice Stevens
with the basis for reaching different results. Id. at 349 (dissenting).
229 Maher, 432 U.S. at 469 & n.5; Harris, 448 U.S. at 312–18.
obtaining of an abortion. While a state-created obstacle need not be

absolute to be impermissible, it must at a minimum ‘‘unduly bur-
den’’ the right to terminate a pregnancy. To allocate public funds
so as to further a state interest in normal childbirth does not cre-
ate an absolute obstacle to obtaining an abortion nor does it unduly
burden the right. The condition—indigency—that is the barrier to
getting an abortion was not created by government nor does the
State add to the burden that exists already. ‘‘An indigent woman
who desires an abortion suffers no disadvantage as a consequence
of Connecticut’s decision to fund childbirth; she continues as before
to be dependent on private sources for the services she desires. The
State may have made childbirth a more attractive alternative,
thereby influencing the woman’s decision, but it has imposed no re-
striction on access to abortions that was not already there.’’ 230 Ap-
plying the same principles, the Court held that a municipal hos-
pital could constitutionally provide hospital services for indigent
women for childbirth but deny services for abortion. 231
In 1983 the Court expressly reaffirmed Roe v. Wade, 232 and
continued to apply its principles to a variety of state statutes at-
tempting to regulate the circumstances of abortions. The Court’s
1989 decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 233 how-
ever, signalled a break with the past even though Roe v. Wade was
not overruled.
Webster upheld two aspects of Missouri’s statute regulating
abortions: a prohibition on the use of public facilities and employ-
ees to perform abortions not necessary to save the life of the moth-
er; and a requirement that a physician, before performing an abor-
tion on a fetus she has reason to believe has reached a gestational
230 Maher, 432 U.S. at 469–74 (the quoted sentence is at 474); Harris, 448 U.S.
at 321–26. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun dissented in both cases and
Justice Stevens joined them in Harris.
231 Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
20 (1983). In refusing to overrule Roe v. Wade, the Court merely cited the principle
of stare decisis. Justice Powell’s opinion of the Court was joined by Chief Justice
Burger, and by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. Justice O’Con-
nor, joined by Justices White and Rehnquist, dissented, voicing disagreement with
the trimester approach and suggesting instead that throughout pregnancy the test
should be the same: whether state regulation constitutes ‘‘unduly burdensome inter-
ference with [a woman’s] freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy.’’
462 U.S. at 452, 461. In the 1986 case of Thornburgh v. American College of Obste-
tricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), Justice White, joined by Justice
Rehnquist, advocated overruling of Roe v. Wade, Chief Justice Burger thought Roe
v. Wade had been extended to the point where it should be reexamined, and Justice
O’Connor repeated misgivings expressed in her Akron dissent.
233 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
age of 20 weeks, make an actual viability determination. 234 In two

1990 cases the Court then upheld parental notification require-
ments. Ohio’s requirement that one parent be notified of a minor’s
intent to obtain an abortion, or that the minor use a judicial bypass
procedure to obtain the approval of a juvenile court, was ap-
proved. 235 And, while the Court ruled that Minnesota’s require-
ment that both parents be notified was invalid standing alone, the
statute was saved by a judicial bypass alternative. 236
The Webster Court was split in its approach to Missouri’s via-
bility determination requirement, and in its approach to Roe v.
Wade. The plurality opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined in
that part by Justices White and Kennedy, was highly critical of
Roe, but found no occasion to overrule it. Instead, the plurality’s
approach would water down Roe by applying a less stringent stand-
ard of review. The viability testing requirement is valid, the plural-
ity contended, because it ‘‘permissibly furthers the State’s interest
in protecting potential human life.’’ 237 Justice O’Connor concurred
in the result because in her view the requirement did not impose
‘‘an undue burden’’ on a woman’s right to an abortion, and Justice
Scalia concurred in the result while urging that Roe be overruled
outright. That Webster may have changed the focus of debate was
illustrated by the Court’s approach to the parental notification
issue. A Court majority in Hodgson invalidated Minnesota’s alter-
native procedure requiring notification of both parents without ju-
dicial bypass, not because it burdened a fundamental right, but be-
cause it did ‘‘not reasonably further any legitimate state inter-
est.’’ 238
Roe was not confronted more directly in Webster because the
viability testing requirement, as characterized by the plurality,
merely asserted a state interest in protecting potential human life
from the point of viability, and hence did not challenge Roe’s tri-
mester framework. 239 Nonetheless, a majority of Justices appeared
234 The Court declined to rule on several other aspects of Missouri’s law, includ-
ing a preamble stating that life begins at conception, and a prohibition on the use
of public funds to encourage or counsel a woman to have a nontherapeutic abortion.
235 Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990).
236 Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
237 492 U.S. at 519–20. Dissenting Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Bren-
nan and Marshall, argued that this ‘‘permissibly furthers’’ standard ‘‘completely dis-
regards the irreducible minimum of Roe . . . that a woman has a limited fundamen-
tal constitutional right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy,’’ and instead
balances ‘‘a lead weight’’ (the State’s interest in fetal life) against a ‘‘feather’’ (a
woman’s liberty interest). Id. at 555, 556 n.11.
238 497 U.S. at 450.
239 492 U.S. at 521. Concurring Justice O’Connor agreed that ‘‘no decision of
this Court has held that the State may not directly promote its interest in potential
life when viability is possible.’’ Id. at 528.
ready to reject a strict trimester approach. The plurality asserted

a compelling state interest in protecting human life throughout
pregnancy, rejecting the notion that the state interest ‘‘should come
into existence only at the point of viability;’’ 240 Justice O’Connor
repeated her view that the trimester approach is ‘‘problematic;’’ 241
and, as mentioned, Justice Scalia would do away with Roe alto-
gether.
Three years later the Court, invoking principles of stare deci-
sis, reaffirmed Roe’s ‘‘essential holding,’’ but restated that holding
in terms of undue burden and also abandoned Roe’s reliance on the
trimester approach. Roe’s ‘‘essential holding,’’ said the Court in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 242 has
three parts. ‘‘First is a recognition of the right of a woman to
choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without
undue interference from the State. Before viability, the State’s in-
terests are not strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion
or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to the woman’s effective
right to elect the procedure. Second is a confirmation of the State’s
power to restrict abortions after fetal viability, if the law contains
exceptions for pregnancies which endanger a woman’s life or
health. And third is the principle that the State has legitimate in-
terests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health
of the woman and the life of the fetus that may become a child.’’
This restatement of Roe’s essentials, recognizing a legitimate
state interest in protecting fetal life throughout pregnancy, nec-
essarily eliminated the rigid trimester analysis permitting almost
no regulation in the first trimester. Viability still marked ‘‘the ear-
liest point at which the State’s interest in fetal life is constitu-
tionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic
abortions,’’ 243 but less burdensome regulations could be applied be-
fore viability. ‘‘What is at stake,’’ the three-Justice plurality as-
serted, ‘‘is the woman’s right to make the ultimate decision, not a
right to be insulated from all others in doing so. Regulations which
do no more than create a structural mechanism by which the State
. . . may express profound respect for the life of the unborn are
permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman’s ex-
240 Id. at 519.
241 Id. at 529. Previously, dissenting in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Repro-
ductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 458 (1983), Justice O’Connor had suggested that the
Roe trimester framework ‘‘is clearly on a collision course with itself. As the medical
risks of various abortion procedures decrease, the point at which the State may reg-
ulate for reasons of maternal health is moved further forward to actual childbirth.
As medical science becomes better able to provide for the separate existence of the
fetus, the point of viability is moved further back toward conception.’’
242 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804 (1992).
243 Id. at 2811.
ercise of the right to choose.’’ Thus, unless an undue burden is im-

posed, states may adopt measures ‘‘designed to persuade [a woman]
to choose childbirth over abortion.’’ 244
Application of these principles led the Court to uphold several
aspects of Pennslyvania’s abortion control law, in the process over-
ruling precedent, but to invalidate what was arguably the most re-
strictive provision. Four challenged provisions of the law were
upheld: a definition of ‘‘medical emergency’’ controlling exemptions
from the Act’s other limitations; recordkeeping and reporting re-
quirements imposed on facilities that perform abortions; an in-
formed consent and 24-hour waiting period requirement; and a pa-
rental consent requirment, with possibility for judicial bypass, ap-
plicable to minors. Invalidated as an undue burden on a woman’s
right to an abortion was a spousal notification requirement.
It was a new alignment of Justices that restated and preserved
Roe. Joining Justice O’Connor in a jointly authored opinion adopt-
ing and applying Justice O’Connor’s ‘‘undue burden’’ analysis were
Justices Kennedy and Souter. Justices Blackmun and Stevens
joined parts of the plurality opinion, but dissented from other
parts. Justice Stevens would not have abandoned trimester analy-
sis, and would have invalidated the 24-hour waiting period and as-
pects of the informed consent requirement. Justice Blackmun, au-
thor of the Court’s opinion in Roe, asserted that ‘‘the right to repro-
ductive choice is entitled to the full protection afforded by this
Court before Webster,’’ 245 and would have invalidated all of the
challenged provisions. Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices
White, Scalia, and Thomas, would have overruled Roe and upheld
all challenged aspects of the Pennsylvania law.
Overruled in Casey were earlier decisions that had struck
down informed consent and 24-hour waiting periods. 246 Given the
state’s legitimate interests in protecting the life of the unborn and
the health of the potential mother, and applying ‘‘undue burden’’
analysis, the three-Justice plurality found these requirements per-
missible. Requiring informed consent for medical procedures is both
commonplace and reasonable, and, in the absence of any evidence
of burden, the state could require that information relevant to in-
formed consent be provided by a physician rather than an assist-
ant. The 24-hour waiting period was approved both in theory (it
244 Id. at 2821.
245 Id. at 2844.
246 City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983)
(invalidating ‘‘informed consent’’ and 24-hour waiting period); Thornburgh v. Amer-

ican College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (invalidating
informed consent requirement).
being reasonable to assume ‘‘that important decisions will be more

informed and deliberate if they follow some period of reflection’’)
and in practice (in spite of ‘‘troubling’’ findings of increased bur-
dens on poorer women who must travel significant distances to ob-
tain abortions, and on all women who must twice rather than once
brave harassment by anti-abortion protesters). 247 The Court also
upheld application of an additional requirement that women under
age 18 obtain the consent of one parent or avail themselves of a
judicial bypass alternative.
On the other hand, the Court 248 distinguished Pennsylvania’s
spousal notification provision as constituting an undue burden on
a woman’s right to choose an abortion. ‘‘A State may not give to
a man the kind of dominion over his wife that parents exercise over
their children’’ (and that men exercised over their wives at common
law). 249 Although there was an exception for a woman who be-
lieved that notifying her husband would subject her to bodily in-
jury, this exception was not broad enough to cover other forms of
abusive retaliation, e.g., psychological intimidation, bodily harm to
children, or financial deprivation. To require a wife to notify her
husband in spite of her fear of such abuse would unduly burden
the wife’s liberty interest as an individual to decide whether to
bear a child.
Privacy: Its Constitutional Dimensions.—Roe v. Wade and
its progeny could have had significant effect outside the abortion
area in the general area of personal liberties, inasmuch as the revi-
talization of substantive due process in the noneconomic regulation
area, overlaid with the compelling state interest test, could call into
question many governmental restraints upon the person. Roe’s em-
phasis upon the privacy rationale seemed to presage an active judi-
cial role in defining and protecting the interests of persons ‘‘to be
let alone.’’ Those developments have not occurred, however, and the
cases reflect the intention of the Court to curb the expansion of any
doctrinal ramifications flowing beyond the abortion cases.
Privacy has in a number of cases been identified as a core
value of the Bill of Rights, 250 but it was not until Griswold v. Con-
necticut 251 that an independent right of privacy, derived from the
confluence of several provisions of the Bill of Rights or discovered
in the ‘‘penumbras’’ of these provisions, was expounded by the
247 112 S. Ct. at 2835.
248 The plurality Justices were joined in this part of their opinion by Justices
Blackmun and Stevens.
249 Id. at 2831.
250 E.g., the Fourth Amendment.
251 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Court and actually used to strike down a governmental restraint.

The abortion cases extended Griswold many degrees in several re-
spects. First, the cases removed any lingering possibility that the
right is a marital one that depends upon that relationship. 252 Sec-
ond, the right of privacy was denominated a liberty which found its
source and its protection in the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 253 Third, by designating the right as a ‘‘fun-
damental’’ right, the Court required a governmental restraint to be
justified by a ‘‘compelling state interest.’’ Necessary to assessment
of the effect of this development is a close analysis of the limits of
the right thus protected as well as of its contents.
‘‘The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of pri-
vacy. In a line of decisions, however, . . . the Court has recognized
that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or
zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution. . . . These deci-
sions make it clear that only personal rights that can be deemed
‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), are included in this guar-
antee of personal privacy. They also make it clear that the right
has some extension to activities relating to marriage, Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541–42 (1942); contraception, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. at 453–54; id. at 460, 463–65 (White, J., concurring in result);
family relationships, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944); and child rearing and education, Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925), Meyer v. Nebraska, supra.’’ 254 In the por-
nography cases decided later in the same Term, the Court denied
the existence of any privacy right of customers to view unprotected
material in commercial establishments, repeating the above de-
scriptive language from Roe, and saying further: ‘‘the constitu-
tionally protected privacy of family, marriage, motherhood,
procreation, and child rearing is not just concerned with a particu-
lar place, but with a protected intimate relationship. Such pro-
tected privacy extends to the doctor’s office, the hospital, the hotel
room, or as otherwise required to safeguard the right to intimacy
involved.’’ 255
252 In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), the court had declined to extend
the Griswold principle to the unmarried on privacy grounds, relying on an equal

protection analysis instead.
253 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). See id. at 167–71 (Justice Stewart
concurring). Justice Douglas continued to deny that substantive due process is the
basis of the decisions. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 209, 212 n.4 (1973) (concurring).
254 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
255 Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 n.13 (1973).
What is apparent from the Court’s approach in these cases is

that its concept of privacy is descriptive rather than analytical,
making difficult an assessment of the potential of the doctrine. Pri-
vacy as a concept appears to encompass at least two different but
related aspects. First, it relates to the right or the ability of indi-
viduals to determine how much and what information about them-
selves is to be revealed to others. Second, it relates to the idea of
autonomy, the freedom of individuals to perform or not perform
certain acts or subject themselves to certain experiences. 256 Gov-
ernmental commands to do or not to do something may well impli-
cate one or the other or both of these aspects, and judicial decision
about the validity of such governmental commands must nec-
essarily be informed by use of an analytical framework balancing
the governmental interests against the individual interests in
maintaining freedom in one or both aspects of privacy. That frame-
work cannot now be constructed on the basis of the Court’s decided
cases.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 257 voiding a state statute proscribing
the use of contraceptives, seems primarily to be based upon a judi-
cial concept of privacy flowing from the first aspect of privacy de-
scribed above. That is, the predominant concern flowing through
the several opinions is the threat of forced disclosure about the pri-
vate and intimate lives of persons through the pervasive surveil-
lance and investigative efforts that would be needed to enforce such
a law; moreover, the concern was not limited to the outward pres-
sures upon the confines of such provisions as the Fourth Amend-
ment’s search and seizure clause, but extended to techniques that
would have been within the range of permissible investigation.
Subsequent cases, however, have returned to Fourth and Fifth
Amendment principles to regulate official invasions of privacy. 258
For example, in United States v. Miller, 259 the Court evaluated
in Fourth Amendment terms the right of privacy of depositors in
restricting Government access to their cancelled checks maintained
by the bank as required by the Bank Secrecy Act. The cancelled
checks, the Court held, were business records of the bank in which
the depositors had no expectation of privacy and therefore no
256 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598–600 (1977).
257 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
258 E.g., California Bankers Ass’n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974). See also Laird
v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972); United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S.
297 (1972); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,
436 U.S. 547 (1978).
259 425 U.S. 435 (1976). See also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 401
(1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712–13 (1976); United States v. Bisceglia, 420
U.S. 141 (1975).
Fourth Amendment standing to challenge government legal process

directed to the bank, and this status was unchanged by the fact
that the banks kept the records under government mandate in the
first place. And in Fisher v. United States, 260 the Court denied that
the Fifth Amendment’s self-incrimination clause operated in any
way to prevent the IRS from obtaining by summons income tax
records prepared by accountants and in the hands of either the tax-
payer or his attorney, no matter how incriminating, because the
Amendment only protects against compelled testimonial self-in-
crimination. ‘‘[T]he Court has never suggested that every invasion
of privacy violates the privilege. Within the limits imposed by the
language of the Fifth Amendment, which we necessarily observe,
the privilege truly serves privacy interests; but the Court has never
on any ground, personal privacy included, applied the Fifth Amend-
ment to prevent the otherwise proper acquisition or use of evidence
which, in the Court’s view, did not involve compelled testimonial
self-incrimination of some sort.’’ 261 Further, ‘‘[w]e cannot cut the
Fifth Amendment completely loose from the moorings of its lan-
guage, and make it serve as a general protector of privacy—a word
not mentioned in its text and a concept directly addressed in the
Fourth Amendment.’’ 262 The First Amendment itself affords some
limitation upon governmental acquisition of information but here
again the gravamen is a violation of speech or association or the
like concomitant with exposure of personal information, and not ex-
posure itself. 263
A cryptic opinion in Whalen v. Roe 264 may indicate the Court’s
willingness to recognize privacy interests as independent constitu-
tional rights. At issue was a state’s pervasive regulation of pre-
scription drugs that could be abused, and the centralized record-
keeping through computers of all such prescriptions identifying the
patients. The scheme was attacked on the basis that it invaded pri-
vacy interests against disclosure and privacy interests involving
autonomy of persons in choosing whether to have the medication.
The Court appeared to agree that both interests are protected, but
because the scheme was surrounded with extensive security protec-
tion against disclosure beyond that necessary to achieve the pur-
poses of the program it was not thought to ‘‘pose a sufficiently
260 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
261 Id. at 399.
262 Id. at 401.
263 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 60–82 (1976); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,
601 n.27, 604 n.32 (1977); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 444 n.6 (1976). The
Court continues to reserve the question of the ‘‘[s]pecial problems of privacy which
might be presented by subpoena of a personal diary.’’ Fisher v. United States, 425
U.S. 391, 401 n.7 (1976).
264 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
grievous threat to either interest to establish a constitutional viola-

tion.’’ 265
Not the method of enforcement but the fact of enforcement was
the issue in Roe and Doe. That is, the power of the State to deny
women all access to abortions, the power to proscribe effectuation
of the will and desire of women to terminate pregnancy, was at
issue. Because the Court determined that the will and desire con-
stituted a protected ‘‘liberty,’’ the State was required to justify its
proscription by a compelling interest. Once the question of the
personhood of the fetus was resolved, the Court confronted in effect
only two asserted state interests. Protecting the health of the moth-
er was recognized as a valid interest, the Court thereby departing
from a laissez faire ‘‘free will’’ approach to individual autonomy. A
state interest in morality was mentioned by the Court, not because
the State had raised it, but simply to defer deciding it; however,
the noted morality issue involved not the morality of abortion, but
instead the promotion of sexual morality through making abortion
unavailable. 266
Stanley v. Georgia, 267 holding that government may not make
private possession of obscene materials for private use a crime, ap-
proached a judicial recognition of the autonomy aspect of privacy.
True it is that the possession there was in Stanley’s home, a fact
heavily relied on by the Court, but the police had lawfully invaded
his privacy upon the authority of a valid warrant and a subsidiary
Fourth Amendment issue that was available for decision was
passed over in favor of a broader resolution. Inasmuch as the mate-
rials were obscene, they were outside the scope of First Amend-
ment protection. But the Court premised its decision upon one’s
protected right to receive what information and ideas he wished
and upon one’s protected ‘‘right to be free, except in very limited
circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s
265 Id. at 598–604. The Court cautioned that it had decided nothing about the
privacy implications of the accumulation and disclosure of vast amounts of informa-

tion in data banks. Safeguarding such information from disclosure ‘‘arguably has its
roots in the Constitution,’’ at least ‘‘in some circumstances,’’ the Court seemed to in-
dicate. Id. at 605. Compare id. at 606 (Justice Brennan concurring). What the
Court’s careful circumscription of the privacy issue through balancing does to the
concept is unclear after Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425,
455–65 (1977), but note the dissents. Id. at 504, 525–36 (Chief Justice Burger), and
545 n.1 (Justice Rehnquist).
266 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 148 (1972). Additionally, if the purpose of the
statute was to deter illicit sexual conduct, the law was overbroad since it included
both unmarried and married women. This morality rationale also fell afoul of
overinclusion and underinclusion in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 477–50
(1972).
267 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
privacy.’’ 268 These rights were held superior to the interests Geor-
gia asserted to override them. That is, first, the State was held to
have no authority to protect an individual’s mind from the effects
of obscenity, to promote the moral content of one’s thoughts. Sec-
ond, the State’s assertion that exposure to obscenity may lead to
deviant sexual behavior was rejected on the basis of a lack of em-
pirical support and, more important, on the basis that less intru-
sive deterrents were available. Thus, a right to be free of govern-
mental regulation in this area was clearly recognized.
Stanley was quickly restricted to its facts, to possession of por-
nography in the home. 269 But in its important reconsideration of
and reaffirmation of governmental interests in the control of por-
nography, the Court went beyond this restriction and recognized
governmental interests that included the promotion of public mo-
rality, protection of the individual’s psychological health, and im-
proving the quality of life. ‘‘It is argued that individual ‘free will’
must govern, even in activities beyond the protection of the First
Amendment and other constitutional guarantees of privacy, and
that government cannot legitimately impede an individual’s desire
to see or acquire obscene plays, movies, and books. We do indeed
base our society on certain assumptions that people have the capac-
ity for free choice. Most exercises of individual free choice—those
in politics, religion, and expression of ideas—are explicitly pro-
tected by the Constitution. Totally unlimited play for free will,
however, is not allowed in our or any other society. . . . [Many laws
are enacted] to protect the weak, the uninformed, the unsuspecting,
and the gullible from the exercise of their own volition.’’ Further-
more, continued the Court: ‘‘Our Constitution establishes a broad
range of conditions on the exercise of power by the States, but for
us to say that our Constitution incorporates the proposition that
conduct involving consenting adults is always beyond state regula-
tion is a step we are unable to take. . . . The issue in this context
goes beyond whether someone, or even the majority, considers the
conduct depicted as ‘wrong’ or ‘sinful.’ The States have the power
to make a morally neutral judgment that public exhibition of ob-
scene material, or commerce in such material, has a tendency to in-
jure the community as a whole, to endanger the public safety, or
to jeopardize . . . the States’ ‘right . . . to maintain a decent soci-
ety.’ ’’ 270
268 Id. at 564–65.
269 United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 354–56 (1971); United States v. Thir-
ty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 375–76 (1971).
270 Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57–63, 63–64, 68–69 (1973); and
see id. at 68 n.15.

Stanley was further distinguished in Bowers v. Hardwick as

being ‘‘firmly grounded in the First Amendment.’’ 271 Thus, the
Court held in Bowers, there is no protected right to engage in ho-
mosexual sodomy in the privacy of the home, and Stanley did not
implicitly create protection for ‘‘voluntary sexual conduct [in the
home] between consenting adults.’’ 272
Evidently, then, the fundamental right of privacy that is pro-
tected by the due process clause is one functionally related to ‘‘fam-
ily, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing.’’ 273 Even
so limited, the concept can have numerous significant aspects occa-
sioning major constitutional decisions. Thus, in Carey v. Population
Services International, 274 the Griswold-Baird line of cases was sig-
nificantly extended so as to make the ‘‘decision whether or not to
beget or bear a child’’ a ‘‘constitutionally protected right of privacy’’
interest that government may not forbid or burden without justify-
ing the limitation by a compelling state interest and by a regula-
tion narrowly drawn to express only that interest or interests. This
‘‘constitutional protection of individual autonomy in matters of
childbearing’’ led the Court to invalidate a state statute that
banned the distribution of contraceptives to adults except by li-
censed pharmacists and that forbade any person to sell or distrib-
ute contraceptives to a minor under 16. 275 The limitation of the
number of outlets to adults ‘‘imposes a significant burden on the
right of the individuals to use contraceptives if they choose to do
so’’ and was unjustified by any interest put forward by the State.
The prohibition on sale to minors was judged not by the compelling
state interest test, but instead by inquiring whether the restric-
tions serve ‘‘any significant state interest . . . that is not present
in the case of an adult.’’ This test is ‘‘apparently less rigorous’’ than
the test used with adults, a distinction justified by the greater gov-
ernmental latitude in regulating the conduct of children and the
lesser capability of children in making important decisions. The at-
271 478 U.S. 186, 195 (1986).
272 478 U.S. at 195–96. Dissenting Justice Blackmun challenged the Court’s
characterization of Stanley, suggesting that it had rested as much on the Fourth as
on the First Amendment, and that ‘‘the right of an individual to conduct intimate
relationships in . . . his or her own home [is] at the heart of the Constitution’s pro-
tection of privacy.’’ Id. at at 207–08.
273 Id. at 66 n.13. See also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976).
274 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
275 Id. at 684–91. The opinion of the Court on the general principles drew the
support of Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. Justice

White concurred in the result in the voiding of the ban on access to adults while
not expressing an opinion on the Court’s general principles. Id. at 702. Justice Pow-
ell agreed the ban on access to adults was void but concurred in an opinion signifi-
cantly more restrained than the opinion of the Court. Id. at 703. Chief Justice Burg-
er, id. at 702, and Justice Rehnquist, id. at 717, dissented.
tempted justification for the ban was rejected. Doubting the per-
missibility of a ban on access to contraceptives to deter minors’ sex-
ual activity, the Court even more doubted, because the State pre-
sented no evidence, that limiting access would deter minors from
engaging in sexual activity. 276
In Bowers v. Hardwick, 277 the Court by 5–4 vote roundly re-
jected the suggestion that the privacy cases protecting ‘‘family,
marriage, or procreation’’ extend any protection for private consen-
sual homosexual sodomy, 278 and also rejected the more comprehen-
sive claim that the cases ‘‘stand for the proposition that any kind
of private sexual conduct between consenting adults is constitu-
tionally insulated from state proscription.’’ 279 Moreover, the Court
refused to create any such fundamental right. Justice White’s opin-
ion for the Court in Hardwick sounded the same opposition to ‘‘an-
nouncing rights not readily identifiable in the Constitution’s text’’
that underlay his dissents in the abortion cases. 280 In addition, the
Court concluded that rationales relied upon in the earlier privacy
cases do not extend ‘‘a fundamental right to homosexuals to engage
in acts of consensual sodomy.’’ 281 Heavy reliance was placed on the
fact that prohibitions on sodomy have ‘‘ancient roots,’’ and on the
fact that half of the states still prohibit the practices. 282 The pri-
vacy of the home does not immunize all behavior from state regula-
tion, and the Court was ‘‘unwilling to start down [the] road’’ of im-
276 Id. at 691–99. This portion of the opinion was supported by only Justices
Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun. Justices White, Powell, and Stevens
concurred in the result, id. at 702, 703, 712, each on more narrow grounds than the
plurality. Again, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist dissented. Id. at 702,
717.
277 478 U.S. 186 (1986). The Court’s opinion was written by Justice White, and
joined by Chief Justice Burger and by Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O’Connor.
The Chief Justice and Justice Powell added brief concurring opinions. Justice
Blackmun dissented, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, and Jus-
tice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, added a separate dissenting
opinion.
278 ‘‘[N]one of the rights announced in those cases bears any resemblance to the
claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy.’’ 478 U.S.

at 190–91.
279 Id. at 191. The Court asserted that Carey v. Population Services Int’l, 431
U.S. 678, 694 n.17 (1977), which had reserved decision on the issue, had established
that the privacy right ‘‘did not reach so far.’’
280 478 U.S. at 191.
281 In the Court’s view, homosexual sodomy is neither a fundamental liberty
‘‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’’ nor is it ‘‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition.’’ Id. at at 191–92.
282 Id. Chief Justice Burger’s brief concurring opinion amplified on this theme,
concluding that constitutional protection for ‘‘the act of homosexual sodomy . . .

would . . . cast aside millennia of moral teaching.’’ Id. at at 197. Justice Powell cau-
tioned that Eighth Amendment proportionality principles might limit the severity
with which states can punish the practices (Hardwick had been charged but not
prosecuted, and had initiated the action to have the statute under which he had
been charged declared unconstitutional). Id.
munizing ‘‘voluntary sexual conduct between consenting adults.’’ 283

Justice Blackmun’s dissent was critical of the Court’s phrasing of
the issue as one of homosexual sodomy, 284 and asserted that the
basic issue was the individual’s privacy right ‘‘to be let alone.’’ The
privacy cases are not limited to protection of the family and the
right to procreation, he asserted, but instead stand for the broader
principle of individual autonomy and choice in matters of sexual in-
timacy. 285
Similarly, the extent to which governmental regulation of the
sexual activities of minors is subject to constitutional scrutiny is of
great and continuing importance. 286 Analysis of these questions is
hampered because the Court has not told us what about the par-
ticular facets of human relationships—marriage, family,
procreation—gives rise to a protected liberty and what does not,
and how indeed these factors vary significantly enough from other
human relationships to result in differing constitutional treatment.
The Court’s observation in the abortion cases ‘‘that only personal
rights that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ are included in this guar-
antee of personal privacy,’’ occasioning justification by a ‘‘compel-
ling’’ interest, 287 little elucidates the answers inasmuch as in the
same Term the Court significantly restricted its equal protection
doctrine of ‘‘fundamental’’ interests—‘‘compelling’’ interest justifica-
tion by holding that the ‘‘key’’ to discovering whether an interest
or a relationship is a ‘‘fundamental’’ one is whether it is ‘‘explicitly
or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.’’ 288
Whether an independent, discrete concept of privacy, in either
of its major aspects, emerges from developing judicial doctrines is
largely problematical. There appears to be a tendency to designate
283 The Court voiced concern that ‘‘it would be difficult . . . to limit the claimed
right to homosexual conduct while leaving exposed to prosecution adultery, incest,

and other sexual crimes even though they are committed in the home.’’ Id. at 195–
96. Dissenting Justices Blackmun (id. at 209 n.4) and Stevens (id. at 217–18) sug-
gested that these crimes are readily distinguishable.
284 Id. at 199. The Georgia statute at issue, like most sodomy statutes, prohibits
the practices regardless of the sex or marital status of the participants. See Id. at
188 n.1. Justice Stevens too focused on this aspect, suggesting that the earlier pri-
vacy cases clearly bar a state from prohibiting sodomous acts by married couples,
and that Georgia had not justified selective application to homosexuals. Id. at 219.
285 Id. at 204–06.
286 The Court reserved this question in Carey, 431 U.S., 694 n.17 (plurality
opinion), although Justices White, Powell, and Stevens in concurrence seemed to see
no barrier to state prohibition of sexual relations by minors. Id. at 702, 703, 712.
287 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). The language is quoted in full in
Carey, supra, 431 U.S. 684–85.

288 San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33–34 (1973). That this
restriction is not holding with respect to equal protection analysis or due process
analysis can be discerned easily. Compare Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)
(opinion of Court), with id. at 391 (Justice Stewart concurring), and id. at 396 (Jus-
tice Powell concurring).
as a right of privacy a right or interest which extensions of prece-

dent or applications of logical analysis have led the Court to con-
clude to protect. Because this protection is now settled to be a ‘‘lib-
erty’’ which the due process clause includes, the analytical validity
of denominating the particular right or interest as an element of
privacy rather than as an element of ‘‘liberty’’ seems open to ques-
tion.
Family Relationships.—While the ‘‘privacy’’ basis of auton-
omy seems to be definitionally based, the Court’s drawing on the
line of cases since Meyer and Pierce 289 has ‘‘established that the
Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because
the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation’s his-
tory and tradition.’’ 290 Recognition of the protected ‘‘liberty’’ of the
familial relationship affords the Court a principled and doctrinal
basis of review of governmental regulations that adversely impact
upon the ability to enter into the relationship, to maintain it, to
terminate it, and to resolve conflicts within the relationship. This
liberty, unlike the interest in property which has its source in stat-
utory law, springs from the base of ‘‘intrinsic human rights, as they
have been understood in ‘this Nation’s history and tradition.’ ’’ 291
Being of fundamental importance, the familial relationship is ordi-
narily subject only to regulation that can survive rigorous judicial
scrutiny, although ‘‘reasonable regulations that do not significantly
interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship may
legitimately be imposed.’’ 292 Recent decisions cast light in all areas
of the family relationship.
Because the right to marry is a fundamental right protected by
the due process clause, 293 a state may not deny the right to marry
to someone who has failed to meet a child support obligation, there
being no legitimate state interest compelling enough to justify the
prohibition. 294 There is a constitutional right to live together as a
289 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1928).
290 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality). Con-
tinuing the limitation of the right of privacy to family-related activities is Bowers

v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
291 Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977).
292 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978).
293 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 486 (1965); Cleveland Bd. of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40
(1974); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383–87 (1978).
294 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). The majority of the Court deemed
the statute to fail under equal protection, whereas Justices Stewart and Powell
found the due process clause to be violated. Id. at 391, 396. Compare Califano v.
Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977).
family, 295 one not limited to the nuclear family. Thus, a city ordi-
nance which zoned for single family occupancy and so defined ‘‘fam-
ily’’ as to bar extended family relationships was found to violate the
due process clause as applied to prevent a grandmother from hav-
ing in her household two grandchildren of different children. 296
And the concept of ‘‘family’’ may extend beyond the biological, blood
relationship of extended families to the situation of foster families,
although the Court has acknowledged that such a claim to constitu-
tionally protected liberty interests raises complex and novel ques-
tions. 297 In the conflict between natural and foster families, other
difficult questions inhere and it may well be that a properly con-
stituted process under state law of determining the best interests
of the child will be deferred to. 298 On the other hand, the Court
has held, the presumption of legitimacy accorded to a child born to
a married woman living with her husband is valid even to defeat
the right of the child’s biological father to establish paternity and
visitation rights. 299
The Court has merely touched upon but not dealt definitively
with the complex and novel questions raised by possible conflicts
between parental rights and children’s rights. 300
295 ‘‘If a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over
the objections of the parents and their children, without some showing of unfitness
and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in the children’s best inter-
est, I should have little doubt that the State would have intruded impermissibly on
‘the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.’’’ Smith v. Organiza-
tion of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862–63 (1977) (Justice Stewart concurring),
cited with approval in Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978).
296 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion). The
fifth vote, decisive to the invalidity of the ordinance, was on other grounds. Id. at
513.
297 Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977). The natural
family, the Court observed, did not have its source in statutory law, whereas the
ties that develop between foster parent and foster child have their origins in an ar-
rangement which the State brought about. But some liberty interests do arise from
positive law, although the expectations and entitlements are thereby limited as well
by state law. And such a liberty interest may not be recognized without derogating
from the substantive liberty interests of the natural parents. Thus, the interest of
foster parents must be quite limited and attenuated, but Smith does not define what
it is. Id. at 842–47.
298 See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
299 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). There was no opinion of the
Court. A majority of Justices (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, White) was

willing to recognize that the biological father has a liberty interest in a relationship
with his child, but Justice Stevens voted with the plurality (Scalia, Rehnquist,
O’Connor, Kennedy) because he believed that the statute at issue adequately pro-
tected that interest.
300 The clearest conflict presented to date raised the issue of giving a veto to
parents over their minor children’s right to have an abortion. Planned Parenthood
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791
(1992). See also Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (parental role in commitment
of child for treatment of mental illness).
Liberty Interests of Retarded and Mentally Ill: Commit-

ment and Treatment.—Potentially a major development in sub-
stantive due process is the formulation of a liberty right of those
retarded or handicapped individuals who are involuntarily commit-
ted or who voluntarily seek commitment to public institutions. The
States pursuant to their parens patriae power have a substantial
interest in institutionalizing persons in need of care, both for their
own protection and for the protection of others. 301 Each individual,
on the other hand, has a due process protected interest in freedom
from confinement and personal restraint; an interest in reducing
the degree of confinement continues even for those individuals who
are properly committed. 302 Little controversy has attended the
gradual accretion of case law, now confirmed by the Supreme
Court, that due process guarantees freedom from undue physical
restraint and from unsafe conditions of confinement. 303 Whether it
also guarantees a considerable right to treatment, to ‘‘habili-
tation,’’ 304 is the focus of the cases now being litigated, and while
the right has been strongly recognized by a number of influential
lower court decisions 305 its treatment in the Supreme Court is as
yet tentative. Thus, Youngberg v. Romeo recognized a liberty right
to ‘‘minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure safety and
301 These principles have no application to persons not held in custody by the
state. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Social Servs. Dep’t, 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (no
Due Process violation for failure of state to protect an abused child from his parent,
even when the social service agency had been notified of possible abuse, and possi-
bility had been substantiated through visits by social worker).
302 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314–16 (1982). See Jackson v. Indiana,
406 U.S. 715 (1972); O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Vitek v. Jones,
445 U.S. 480, 491–94 (1980).
303 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314–316 (1982). Thus, personal security
constitutes a ‘‘historic liberty interest’’ protected substantively by the due process

clause. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977) (liberty interest in being free
from undeserved corporal punishment in school); Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal In-
mates, 442 U.S. 1, 18 (1979) (Justice Powell concurring) (‘‘Liberty from bodily re-
straint always has been recognized as the core of the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause from arbitrary governmental actions’’).
304 ‘‘The word ‘habilitation’ is commonly used to refer to programs for the men-
tally retarded because mental retardation is . . . a learning disability and training

impairment rather than an illness. [T]he principal focus of habilitation is upon
training and development of needed skills.’’ Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 309
n.1 (1982) (quoting amicus brief for American Psychiatric Association).
305 In Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972), the Court had said that
‘‘due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some rea-
sonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.’’ Reasoning
that if commitment is for treatment and betterment of individuals, it must be ac-
companied by adequate treatment, several lower courts recognized a due process
right. E.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D.Ala), enforced, 334 F. Supp.
1341 (1971), supplemented, 334 F. Supp. 373 and 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D.Ala. 1972),
aff’d in part, reserved in part, and remanded, sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d
1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Donaldson v. O’Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated
on other grounds, 432 U.S. 563 (1975).
freedom from undue restraint.’’ 306 While the lower court had
passed upon and agreed with plaintiff’s theory of entitlement to
‘‘such treatment as will afford a reasonable opportunity to acquire
and maintain those life skills necessary to cope as effectively as
[his] capacities permit,’’ 307 the Supreme Court thought that before
it plaintiff had reduced his theory to one of ‘‘training related to
safety and freedom from restraint.’’ 308 But the Court’s concern for
federalism, its reluctance to approve judicial activism in super-
vising institutions, its recognition that budgetary constraints inter-
fered with state provision of services caused it to require the lower
federal courts to defer to professional decisionmaking in determin-
ing what care was adequate. Professional decisions are presump-
tively valid and liability can be imposed ‘‘only when the decision by
the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted pro-
fessional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that
the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such
a judgment.’’ 309 Presumably, however, the difference between li-
ability for damages and injunctive relief will still afford federal
courts considerable latitude in enjoining institutions to better their
services in the future, even if they cannot award damages for past
failures. 310
Still other issues await plumbing. The whole area of the rights
of committed individuals will likely be explored under a sub-
306 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319 (1982).
307 Id. at 318 n.23.
308 Id. at 317–18. Concurring, Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and O’Connor, ar-
gued that due process guaranteed patients at least that training necessary to pre-
vent them from losing the skills they entered the institution with and probably
more. Id. at 325. Chief Justice Burger rejected any protected interest in training.
Id. at 329. The Court had also avoided a decision on a right to treatment in O’Con-
nor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573 (1975), vacating and remanding a decision rec-
ognizing the right and thus depriving the decision of precedential value. Chief Jus-
tice Burger expressly rejected the right there also. Id. at 578. But just four days
later the Court denied certiorari to another panel decision from the same circuit re-
lying on its Donaldson decision to establish such a right, leaving the principle alive
in that circuit. Burnham v. Department of Public Health, 503 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1057 (1975). See also Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364,
373 (1986) (dictum that person civilly committed as ‘‘sexually dangerous person’’
might be entitled to protection under the self-incrimination clause if he could show
that his confinement ‘‘is essentially identical to that imposed upon felons with no
need for psychiatric care’’).
309 Id. at 323.
310 E.g., Ohlinger v. Watson, 652 F. 2d 775, 779 (9th Cir. 1980); Welsch v.
Likins, 550 F.2d 1122, 1132 (8th Cir. 1977). Of course, lack of funding will create
problems with respect to injunctive relief as well. Cf. New York State Ass’n for Re-
tarded Children v. Carey, 631 F.2d 162, 163 (2d Cir. 1980). It should be noted that
the Supreme Court has limited the injunctive powers of the federal courts in similar
situations also.
stantive and procedural due process analysis. 311 Additionally, fed-

eral legislation is becoming extensive, 312 and state legislative and
judicial development of law is highly important because the Su-
preme Court looks to this law as one source of the interests which
the due process clause protects. 313
‘‘Right to Die’’.—In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep’t of
Health, 314 the Court upheld Missouri’s requirement that, before
nutrition and hydration may be withdrawn from a person in a per-
sistent vegetative state, it must be demonstrated by ‘‘clear and con-
vincing evidence’’ that such action is consistent with the patient’s
previously manifested wishes. The Due Process Clause does not re-
quire that the state rely on the judgment of the family, the guard-
ian, or ‘‘anyone but the patient herself’’ in making this decision, the
Court concluded. 315 Thus, in the absence of clear and convincing
evidence that the patient herself had expressed an interest not to
be sustained in a persistent vegetative state, or that she had ex-
pressed a desire to have a surrogate make such a decision for her,
the state may refuse to allow withdrawal of nutrition and hydra-
tion. ‘‘A State is entitled to guard against potential abuses’’ that
can occur if family members do not protect a patient’s best inter-
ests, and ‘‘may properly decline to make judgments about the ‘qual-
ity’ of life that a particular individual may enjoy, and [instead] sim-
ply assert an unqualified interest in the preservation of human life
to be weighed against the . . . interests of the individual.’’ 316
The Court’s opinion in Cruzan ‘‘assume[d]’’ that a competent
person has a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving
hydration and nutrition. 317 More important, however, a majority of
Justices separately declared that such a liberty interest exists. 318
Thus, the Court appears committed to the position that the right
311 See Developments in the Law—Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1190 (1974). In Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), the Court had
before it the issue of the due process right of committed mental patients at state
hospitals to refuse administration of antipsychotic drugs. An intervening decision of
the State’s highest court had measurably strengthened the patients’ rights under
both state and federal law and the Court remanded for reconsideration in light of
the state court decision. See also Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981).
312 Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975, Pub. L.
No. 94–103, 89 Stat. 486, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000 et seq., as to which see
Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981); Mental Health
Systems Act, 94 Stat. 1565, 42 U.S.C. § 9401 et seq.
313 See, e.g., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299–300 (1982). And see infra, pp.
1723–32 (procedural due process).

314 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
315 Id. at 286.
316 Id. at 281–82.
317 Id. at 279.
318 See 497 U.S. at 287 (O’Connor, concurring); id. at 304–05 (Brennan, joined
by Marshall and Blackmun, dissenting); id. at 331 (Stevens, dissenting).

to refuse nutrition and hydration is subsumed in the broader right

to refuse medical treatment. Also blurred in the Court’s analysis
was any distinction between terminally ill patients and those
whose condition has stabilized; there was testimony that the pa-
tient in Cruzan could be kept ‘‘alive’’ for about 30 years if nutrition
and hydration were continued.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: CIVIL
Some General Criteria

What due process of law means in the procedural context de-
pends on the circumstances. It varies with the subject matter and
the necessities of the situation. Due process of law is a process
which, following the forms of law, is appropriate to the case and
just to the parties affected. It must be pursued in the ordinary
mode prescribed by law; it must be adapted to the end to be at-
tained; and whenever necessary to the protection of the parties, it
must give them an opportunity to be heard respecting the justice
of the judgment sought. Any legal proceeding enforced by public
authority, whether sanctioned by age or custom or newly devised
in the discretion of the legislative power, which regards and pre-
serves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be
due process of law. 1
Ancient Use and Uniformity.—The requirements of due
process may be ascertained in part by an examination of those set-
tled usages and modes of proceedings existing in the common and
statutory law of England during colonial times, and not unsuited
to the civil and political conditions in this country. A process of law
not otherwise forbidden may be taken to be due process of law if
it has been sanctioned by settled usage both in England and in this
country. In other words, the antiquity of a procedure is a fact of
weight in its behalf. However, it does not follow that a procedure
settled in English law and adopted in this country is, or remains,
an essential element of due process of law. If that were so, the pro-
cedure of the first half of the seventeenth century would be fas-
tened upon American jurisprudence like a strait jacket, only to be
unloosed by constitutional amendment. Fortunately, the States are
not tied down by any provision of the Constitution to the practice
and procedure which existed at the common law, but may avail
1 Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., 111 U.S. 701, 708 (1884); Hurtado v. California,
110 U.S. 516, 537 (1884).

themselves of the wisdom gathered by the experience of the coun-

try to make changes deemed to be necessary. 2
Equality.—If due process is to be secured, the laws must oper-
ate alike upon all and not subject the individual to the arbitrary
exercise of governmental power unrestrained by established prin-
ciples of private rights and distributive justice. Where a litigant
has the benefit of a full and fair trial in the state courts, and his
rights are measured, not by laws made to affect him individually,
but by general provisions of law applicable to all those in like con-
dition, he is not deprived of property without due process of law,
even if he can be regarded as deprived of his property by an ad-
verse result. 3
Due Process, Judicial Process, and Separation of Pow-
ers.—Due process of law does not always mean a proceeding in
court. 4 Proceedings to raise revenue by levying and collecting taxes
are not necessarily judicial, nor are administrative and executive
proceedings, yet their validity is not thereby impaired. 5 Moreover,
the due process clause does not require de novo judicial review of
the factual conclusions of state regulatory agencies. 6
Nor does the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit a State from
conferring upon nonjudicial bodies certain functions that may be
called judicial, or from delegating to a court powers that are legis-
lative in nature. For example, state statutes vesting in a parole
board certain judicial functions, 7 or conferring discretionary power
upon administrative boards to grant or withhold permission to
carry on a trade, 8 or vesting in a probate court authority to ap-
point park commissioners and establish park districts 9 are not in
conflict with the due process clause and present no federal ques-
tion. Whether legislative, executive, and judicial powers of a State
shall be kept altogether distinct and separate, or whether they
should in some particulars be merged, is for the determination of
the State. 10
2 Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172, 175 (1899); Hurtado v. California, 110
U.S. 516, 529 (1884); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 101 (1908); Anderson
Nat’l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 244 (1944).
3 Marchant v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 U.S. 380, 386 (1894).
4 Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 255 (1907); Palmer v. McMahon, 133 U.S.
660, 668 (1890).

6 Railroad Comm’n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 311 U.S. 570 (1941) (oil field
proration order). See also Railroad Comm’n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S.
573 (1940) (courts should not second-guess regulatory commissions in evaluating ex-
pert testimony).
7 Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 83–84 (1902).
8 New York ex rel. Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 562, (1905).
9 Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Park Dist., 281 U.S. 74, 79 (1930).
10 Carfer v. Caldwell, 200 U.S. 293, 297 (1906).
Power of the States to Regulate Procedure

Generally.—The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not control mere forms of procedure in state courts or
regulate practice therein. 11 A State ‘‘is free to regulate procedure
of its courts in accordance with it own conception of policy and fair-
ness unless in so doing it offends some principle of justice so rooted
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental.’’ 12 Pursuant to such power, the States have regulated
the manner in which rights may be enforced and wrongs rem-
edied, 13 and in connection therewith have created courts and en-
dowed them with such jurisdiction as, in the judgment of their leg-
islatures, seemed appropriate. 14 Whether legislative action in such
matters is deemed to be wise or proves efficient, whether it works
a particular hardship on a particular litigant, or perpetuates or
supplants ancient forms of procedure, are issues which can ordi-
narily give rise to no conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment, in-
asmuch as its function is negative rather than affirmative and in
no way obligates the States to adopt specific measures of reform. 15
More recent decisions, however, have imposed some restrictions on
state procedures that require substantial reorientation of proc-
ess. 16
11 Holmes v. Conway, 241 U.S. 624, 631 (1916); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v.
Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230, 236 (1900).

12 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); West v. Louisiana, 194
U.S. 258, 263 (1904); Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897); Jordan
v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912). See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
(1971), for one recent limitation. The power of a State to determine the limits of
the jurisdiction of its courts and the character of the controversies which shall be
heard in them and to deny access to its courts is also subject to restrictions imposed
by the contract, full faith and credit, and privileges and immunities clauses of the
Constitution. Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
13 Insurance Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 158 (1931); Iowa Central Ry. v.
Iowa, 160 U.S. 389, 393 (1896): Honeyman v. Hanan, 302 U.S. 375 (1937). See also
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
14 Cincinnati Street Ry. v. Snell, 193 U.S. 30, 36 (1904).
15 Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 112 (1921). Thus the Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not constrain the States to accept modern doctrines of equity, or adopt
a combined system of law and equity procedure, or dispense with all necessity for
form and method in pleading, or give untrammelled liberty to amend pleadings.
Note that the Supreme Court did once grant review to determine whether due proc-
ess required the States to provide some form of post-conviction remedy to assert fed-
eral constitutional violations, a review which was mooted when the State enacted
such a process. Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336 (1965). When a State, however,
through its legal system exerts a monopoly over the pacific settlement of private dis-
putes, as with the dissolution of marriage, due process may well impose affirmative
obligations on that State. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374–77 (1971).
16 While this statement is more generally true in the context of criminal cases,
in which the appellate process and post-conviction remedial process have been sub-
ject to considerable revision in the treatment of indigents, some requirements have
also been imposed in civil cases. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Lindsey
v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74–79 (1972); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). Re-
Commencement of Actions.—A state may impose certain con-

ditions on the right to institute litigation. Access to the courts has
been denied to persons instituting stockholders’ derivative actions
unless reasonable security for the costs and fees incurred by the
corporation is first tendered. 17 But, at least in those situations in
which the State has monopolized the avenues of settlement of dis-
putes between persons by prescribing judicial resolution, and where
the dispute involves such a fundamental interest as marriage and
its dissolution, no State may deny to those persons unable to pay
its fees access to those judicial avenues. 18 It must be considered,
then, that foreclosure of all access to the courts, at least through
financial barriers and perhaps through other means as well, is sub-
ject to federal constitutional scrutiny and must be justified by ref-
erence to a state interest of suitable importance. In older cases, not
questioned by the more recent ones, it was held that a State, as
the price of opening its tribunals to a nonresident plaintiff, may
exact the condition that the nonresident stand ready to answer all
cross actions filed and accept any in personam judgments obtained
by a resident defendant through service of process or appropriate
pleading upon the plaintiff’s attorney of record. 19 and for similar
reasons, a requirement, without excluding other evidence, of a
chemical analysis as a condition precedent to a suit to recover for
damages resulting to crops from allegedly deficient fertilizers is not
deemed to be arbitrary or unreasonable. 20
Pleas in Abatement.—State legislation which forbids a de-
fendant to come into court and challenge the validity of service
upon him in a personal action without thereby surrendering him-
self to the jurisdiction of the court, but which does not restrain him
from protecting his substantive rights against enforcement of a
judgment rendered without service of process is constitutional and
does not deprive him of property without due process of law. Such
a defendant, if he pleases, may ignore the proceedings as wholly in-
effective, and set up the invalidity of the judgment if and when an
view has, however, been restrained with regard to details. See, e.g., Lindsey v.
Normet, supra, 64–69.
17 Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). Nor was the retroactive
application of this statutory requirement to actions pending at the time of its adop-
tion violative of due process as long as no new liability for expenses incurred before
enactment was imposed thereby and the only effect thereof was to stay such pro-
ceedings until the security was furnished.
18 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). See also Little v. Streater, 452
U.S. 1 (1981) (state-mandated paternity suit); Lassiter v. Department of Social Serv-

ices, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (parental status termination proceeding); Santosky v. Kra-
mer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (permanent termination of parental custody).
19 Young Co. v. McNeal-Edwards Co., 283 U.S. 398 (1931); Adam v. Saenger,
303 U.S. 59 (1938).

20 Jones v. Union Guano Co., 264 U.S. 171 (1924).
attempt is made to take his property thereunder. However, if he

desires to contest the validity of the proceedings in the court in
which it is instituted, so as to avoid even a semblance of a judg-
ment against him, it is within the power of a State to declare that
he shall do this subject to the risk of being obliged to submit to the
jurisdiction of the court to hear and determine the merits, if the
objection raised by him as to its jurisdiction over his person shall
be overruled. 21
Defenses.—Just as a State may condition the right to institute
litigation, so may it establish terms for the interposition of certain
defenses. It may validly provide that one sued in a possessory ac-
tion cannot bring an action to try title until after judgment is ren-
dered and after he has paid that judgment, if it so provides. 22 A
State may limit the defense in an action to evict tenants for
nonpayment of rent to the issue of payment and leave the tenants
to other remedial actions at law on a claim that the landlord had
failed to maintain the premises. 23 A State may also provide that
the doctrines of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and
fellow servant do not bar recovery in certain employment-related
accidents. No person has a vested right in such defenses. 24
Similarly, a nonresident defendant in a suit begun by foreign
attachment, even though he has no resources or credit other than
the property attached, cannot challenge the validity of a statute
which requires him to give bail or security for the discharge of the
seized property before permitting him an opportunity to appear
and defend. 25
Amendments and Continuances.—Amendment of pleadings
is largely within the discretion of the trial court, and unless a gross
abuse of discretion is shown, there is no ground for reversal. Ac-
cordingly, where the defense sought to be interposed is without
merit, a claim that due process would be denied by rendition of a
foreclosure decree without leave to file a supplementary answer is
utterly without foundation. 26
21 York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15 (1890); Kauffman v. Wootters, 138 U.S. 285, 287
(1891).
22 Grant Timber & Mfg. Co. v. Gray, 236 U.S. 133 (1915).
23 Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 64–69 (1972). See also Bianchi v. Morales,
262 U.S. 170 (1923) (upholding mortgage law providing for summary foreclosure of
a mortgage without allowing any defense except payment).
24 Bowersock v. Smith, 243 U.S. 29, 34, (1917); Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Cole,
251 U.S. 54, 55 (1919); Herron v. Southern Pacific Co., 283 U.S. 91 (1931). See also
Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 280–83 (1980) (State interest in fashioning its
own tort law permits it to provide immunity defenses for its employees and thus
defeat recovery).
25 Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
26 Sawyer v. Piper, 189 U.S. 154 (1903).
Costs, Damages, and Penalties.—What costs are allowed by

law is for the court to determine; an erroneous judgment of what
the law allows does not deprive a party of his property without due
process of law. 27 Nor does a statute providing for the recovery of
reasonable attorney’s fees in actions on small claims subject unsuc-
cessful defendants to any unconstitutional deprivation. 28 Congress
may severely restrict attorney’s fees in an effort to keep an admin-
istrative claims proceeding informal. 29 Equally consistent with the
requirements of due process is a statutory procedure whereby a
prosecutor of a case is adjudged liable for costs, and committed to
jail in default of payment thereof, whenever the court or jury, after
according him an opportunity to present evidence of good faith,
finds that he instituted the prosecution without probable cause and
from malicious motives. 30 Also, as a reasonable incentive for
prompt settlement without suit of just demands of a class receiving
special legislative treatment, such as common carriers and insur-
ance companies together with their patrons, a State may permit
harassed litigants to recover penalties in the form of attorney’s fees
or damages. 31 To deter careless destruction of human life, a State
by law may allow punitive damages to be assessed in actions
against employers for deaths caused by the negligence of their em-
ployees, 32 and may also allow punitive damages for fraud per-
petrated by employees. 33 Also constitutional is the traditional com-
mon law approach for measuring punitive damages, granting the
jury wide but not unlimited discretion to consider the gravity of the
offense and the need to deter similar offenses. 34
By virtue of its plenary power to prescribe the character of the
sentence which shall be awarded against those found guilty of
crime, a State may provide that a public officer embezzling public
27 Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 259 (1907).
28 Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. v. Cade, 233 U.S. 642, 650 (1914).
29 Walters v. National Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985) (limita-
tion of attorneys’ fees to $10 in veterans benefit proceedings does not violate claim-
ants’ Fifth Amendment due process rights absent a showing of probability of error
in the proceedings that presence of attorneys would sharply diminish). See also
United States Dep’t of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715 (1990) (upholding regulations
under the Black Lung Benefits Act prohibiting contractual fee arrangements).
30 Lowe v. Kansas, 163 U.S. 81 (1896). Consider, however, the possible bearing
of Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966) (statute allowing jury to impose
costs on acquitted defendant, but containing no standards to guide discretion, vio-
lates due process).
31 Yazoo & Miss. R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217 (1912); Chicago &
Northwestern Ry. v. Nye Schneider Fowler Co., 260 U.S. 35, 43–44 (1922); Hartford
Life Ins. Co. v. Blincoe, 255 U.S. 129, 139 (1921); Life & Casualty Co. v. McCray,
291 U.S. 566 (1934).
32 Pizitz Co. v. Yeldell, 274 U.S. 112, 114 (1927).
33 Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
34 Id. (finding sufficient constraints on jury discretion in jury instructions and
in post-verdict review).
money shall, notwithstanding that he has made restitution, suffer

not only imprisonment but also pay a fine equal to double the
amount embezzled, which shall operate as a judgment for the use
of persons whose money was embezzled. Whatever this fine is
called, whether a penalty, or punishment, or civil judgment, it
comes to the convict as the result of his crime. 35 On the other
hand, when appellant, by its refusal to surrender certain assets,
was adjudged in contempt for frustrating enforcement of a judg-
ment obtained against it, dismissal of its appeal from the first
judgment was not a penalty imposed for the contempt, but merely
a reasonable method for sustaining the effectiveness of the State’s
judicial process. 36
Statutes of Limitation.—A statute of limitations does not de-
prive one of property without due process of law, unless, in its ap-
plication to an existing right of action, it unreasonably limits the
opportunity to enforce the right by suit. By the same token, a State
may shorten an existing period of limitation, provided a reasonable
time is allowed for bringing an action after the passage of the stat-
ute and before the bar takes effect. What is a reasonable period,
however, is dependent on the nature of the right and particular cir-
cumstances. 37
Thus, an interval of only one year is not so unreasonable as
to be wanting in due process when applied to bar actions relative
to the property of an absentee in instances when the receiver for
such property has not been appointed until 13 years after the
former’s disappearance. 38 When a State, by law, suddenly pro-
hibits, unless brought within six months after its passage, all ac-
tions to contest tax deeds which have been of record for two years,
no unconstitutional deprivation is effected. 39 No less valid is a
statute, applicable to wild lands, which provides that when a per-
son has been in possession under a recorded deed continuously for
20 years and had paid taxes thereon during the same, the former
owner in that interval paying nothing, no action to recover such
land shall be entertained unless commenced within 20 years, or be-
fore the expiration of five years following enactment of said provi-
35 Coffey v. Harlan County, 204 U.S. 659, 663, 665 (1907).
36 National Union v. Arnold, 348 U.S. 37 (1954) (the judgment debtor had re-
fused to post a supersedeas bond or to comply with reasonable orders designed to
safeguard the value of the judgment pending decision on appeal).
37 Wheeler v. Jackson, 137 U.S. 245, 258 (1890); Kentucky Union Co. v. Ken-
tucky, 219 U.S. 140, 156 (1911). Cf. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422,
437 (1982) (discussing discretion of States in erecting reasonable procedural require-
ments for triggering or foreclosing the right to an adjudication).
38 Blinn v. Nelson, 222 U.S. 1 (1911).
39 Turner v. New York, 168 U.S. 90, 94 (1897).
sion. 40 Similarly, an amendment to a workmen’s compensation act,

limiting to three years the time within which a case may be re-
opened for readjustment of compensation on account of aggravation
of a disability, does not deny due process to one who sustained his
injury at a time when the statute contained no limitation. A limita-
tion is deemed to affect the remedy only, and the period of its oper-
ation in this instance was viewed as neither arbitrary nor oppres-
sive. 41
Moreover, as long as no agreement of the parties is violated,
a State may extend as well as shorten the time in which suits may
be brought in its courts and may even entirely remove a statutory
bar to the commencement of litigation. As applied to actions for
personal debts, a repeal or extension of a statute of limitations af-
fects no unconstitutional deprivation of property of a debtor-defend-
ant in whose favor such statute had already become a defense. ‘‘A
right to defeat a just debt by the statute of limitation . . . [not
being] a vested right,’’ such as is protected by the Constitution, ac-
cordingly no offense against the Fourteenth Amendment is commit-
ted by revival, through an extension or repeal, of an action on an
implied obligation to pay a child for the use of her property, 42 or
a suit to recover the purchase price of securities sold in violation
of a Blue Sky Law, 43 or a right of an employee to seek, on account
of the aggravation of a former injury, an additional award out of
a state-administered fund. 44 However, as respects suits to recover
real and personal property, when the right of action has been
barred by a statute of limitations and title as well as real owner-
ship have become vested in the defendant, any later act removing
or repealing the bar would be void as attempting an arbitrary
transfer of title. 45 Also unconstitutional is the application of a stat-
ute of limitation to extend a period that parties to a contract have
agreed should limit their right to remedies under the contract.
‘‘When the parties to a contract have expressly agreed upon a time
limit on their obligation, a statute which invalidates . . . [said]
agreement and directs enforcement of the contract after . . . [the
agreed] time has expired’’ unconstitutionally imposes a burden in
excess of that contracted. 46
40 Soper v. Lawrence Brothers, 201 U.S. 359 (1906). Nor is a former owner who
had not been in possession for five years after and fifteen years before said enact-
ment thereby deprived of any property without due process.
41 Mattson v. Department of Labor, 293 U.S. 151, 154 (1934).
42 Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 623, 628 (1885).
43 Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945).
44 Gange Lumber Co. v. Rowley, 326 U.S. 295 (1945).
45 Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 623 (1885). See also Stewart v. Keyes, 295
U.S. 403, 417 (1935).

46 Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 398 (1930).
Evidence and Presumptions.—The establishment of pre-

sumptions and rules respecting the burden of proof is clearly with-
in the domain of the legislative branch of government. 47 Nonethe-
less, the due process clause does impose limitations upon the power
to provide for the deprivation of liberty or property by a standard
of proof too lax to make reasonable assurance of accurate factfind-
ing. Thus, ‘‘[t]he function of a standard of proof, as that concept is
embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfind-
ing, is to ‘instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of con-
fidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of fac-
tual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.’ ’’ 48 Applying
the formula it has worked out for determining what process is due
in a particular situation, 49 the Court has held that in a civil pro-
ceeding to commit an individual involuntarily to a state mental
hospital for an indefinite period, a standard at least as stringent
as clear and convincing evidence is required. 50 Because the inter-
est of parents in retaining custody of their children is fundamental,
the State may not terminate parental rights through reliance on a
standard of preponderance of the evidence—the proof necessary to
award money damages in an ordinary civil action—but must prove
by clear and convincing evidence that the parents are unfit. 51
Unfitness of a parent may not simply be presumed because of some
purported assumption about general characteristics, but must be
established. 52
As long as a presumption is not unreasonable and is not con-
clusive of the rights of the person against whom raised, however,
it does not violate the due process clause. Legislative fiat may not
take the place of fact, though, in the determination of issues involv-
47 Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210, 214 (1917); James-Dickinson Co. v. Harry,
273 U.S. 119, 124 (1927). Congress’ power to provide rules of evidence and stand-
ards of proof in the federal courts stems from its power to create such courts. Vance
v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 264–67 (1980); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428
U.S. 1, 31 (1976). In the absence of congressional guidance, the Court has deter-
mined the evidentiary standard in certain statutory actions. Nishikawa v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 129 (1958); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
48 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (quoting In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Justice Harlan concurring)).

49 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
50 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
51 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). Four Justices dissented, arguing
that considered as a whole the statutory scheme comported with due process. Id.
at 770 (Justices Rehnquist, White, O’Connor, and Chief Justice Burger). Application
of the traditional preponderance of the evidence standard is permissible in paternity
actions. Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574 (1987).
52 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (presumption that unwed fathers are
unfit parents). But see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (statutory pre-
sumption of legitimacy accorded to a child born to a married woman living with her
husband defeats the right of the child’s biological father to establish paternity and
visitation rights).
ing life, liberty, or property, and a statute creating a presumption

which is entirely arbitrary and which operates to deny a fair oppor-
tunity to repel it or to present facts pertinent to one’s defense is
void. 53 On the other hand, if there is a rational connection between
what is proved and what is inferred, legislation declaring that the
proof of one fact or group of facts shall constitute prima facie evi-
dence of a main or ultimate fact will be sustained. 54
For a brief period, the Court utilized what it called the
‘‘irrebuttable presumption doctrine’’ to curb the legislative tendency
to confer a benefit or to impose a detriment, depending for its ap-
plication upon the establishment of certain characteristics from
which the existence of other characteristics are presumed. 55 Thus,
as noted, in Stanley v. Illinois, 56 the Court found invalid a con-
struction of the state statute that presumed illegitimate fathers to
be unfit parents and that prevented them from objecting to state
wardship. Mandatory maternity leave rules of school boards requir-
ing pregnant teachers to take unpaid maternity leave five and four
months respectively prior to the date of the expected births of their
babies were voided as creating a conclusive presumption that every
pregnant teacher who reaches a particular point of pregnancy be-
comes physically incapable of teaching. 57 Major controversy devel-
oped over application of the doctrine in benefits cases. Thus, while
a State may require that nonresidents must pay higher tuition
charges at state colleges than residents, and while the Court as-
sumed that a durational residency requirement would be permis-
sible as a prerequisite to qualify for the lower tuition, it was held
impermissible for the State to presume conclusively that because
53 Presumptions were voided in Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911) (anyone
breaching personal services contract guilty of fraud); Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S.
1 (1929) (every bank insolvency deemed fraudulent); Western & Atlantic R.R. v.
Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 (1929) (collision between train and auto at grade crossing
constitutes negligence by railway company); Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263
(1989) (conclusive presumption of theft and embezzlement upon proof of failure to
return a rental vehicle).
54 Presumptions sustained include Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898)
(person convicted of felony unfit to practice medicine); Hawes v. Georgia, 258 U.S.
1 (1922) (person occupying property presumed to have knowledge of still found on
property); Bandini Co. v. Superior Court, 284 U.S. 8 (1931) (release of natural gas
into the air from well presumed wasteful); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Ford, 287
U.S. 502 (1933) (rebuttable presumption of railroad negligence for accident at grade
crossing). See also Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934).
55 The approach was not unprecedented, some older cases having voided tax leg-
islation that presumed conclusively an ultimate fact. Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270

U.S. 230 (1926) (deeming any gift made by decedent within six years of death to
be a part of estate denies estate’s right to prove gift was not made in contemplation
of death); Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932); Hoeper v. Tax Comm’n, 284 U.S.
206 (1931).
56 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
57 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
the legal address of a student was outside the State at the time of
application or at some point during the preceding year he was a
nonresident as long as he remained a student. The due process
clause required that the student be afforded the opportunity to
show that he is or has become a bona fide resident entitled to the
lower tuition. 58
Moreover, a food stamp program provision making ineligible
any household that contained a member age 18 or over who was
claimed as a dependent for federal income tax purposes the prior
tax year by a person not himself eligible for stamps was voided on
the ground that it created a conclusive presumption that fairly
often could be shown to be false if evidence could be presented. 59
The rule which emerged for subjecting persons to detriment or
qualifying them for benefits was that the legislature may not pre-
sume the existence of the decisive characteristic upon a given set
of facts, unless it can be shown that the defined characteristics do
in fact encompass all persons and only those persons that it was
the purpose of the legislature to reach. The doctrine in effect af-
forded the Court the opportunity to choose between resort to the
equal protection clause or to the due process clause in judging the
validity of certain classifications, 60 and it precluded Congress and
legislatures from making general classifications that avoided the
administrative costs of individualization in many areas.
Utilization of the doctrine was curbed, if not halted, in Wein-
berger v. Salfi, 61 in which the Court upheld the validity of a Social
Security provision requiring as a qualification of receipt of benefits
as a spouse of a covered wage earner that one must have been mar-
ried to the wage earner for at least nine months prior to his death.
Purporting to approve but to distinguish the prior cases in the
line, 62 the Court rather imported traditional equal protection anal-
ysis into considerations of due process challenges to statutory clas-
sifications. 63 ‘‘Extensions’’ of the prior cases to government entitle-
ment classifications, such as the Social Security Act qualification
58 Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
59 Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
60 Thus, on the some day Murry was decided, a similar food stamp qualification
was struck down on equal protection grounds. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,

413 U.S. 528 (1973).
61 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
62 Stanley and LaFleur were distinguished as involving fundamental rights of
family and childbearing, id. at 771, and Murry was distinguished as involving an
irrational classification. Id. at 772. Vlandis, said Justice Rehnquist for the Court,
meant no more than that when a State fixes residency as the qualification it may
not deny to one meeting the test of residency the opportunity so to establish it. Id.
at 771. But see id. at 802–03 (Justice Brennan dissenting).
63 Id. at 768–70, 775–77, 785 (utilizing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
(1970), Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971), and similar cases).

standard before it, would, said the Court, ‘‘turn the doctrine of
those cases into a virtual engine of destruction for countless legisla-
tive judgments which have heretofore been thought wholly consist-
ent with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitu-
tion.’’ 64 Whether the Court will now limit the doctrine to the det-
riment area only, exclusive of benefit programs, whether it will
limit it to those areas which involve fundamental rights or suspect
classifications, in the equal protection sense of those expressions, 65
or whether it will simply permit the doctrine to pass from the scene
remains unsettled, but it is noteworthy that it now rarely appears
on the Court’s docket. 66
Jury Trials.—Trial by jury in civil trials, unlike the case in
criminal trials, has not been deemed essential to due process, and
the Fourteenth Amendment has not been held to restrain the
States in retaining or abolishing civil juries. 67 Thus, abolition of ju-
ries in proceedings to enforce liens, 68 mandamus 69 and quo
warranto 70 actions, and in eminent domain 71 and equity 72 pro-
ceedings has been approved. States are free to adopt innovations
respecting selection and number of jurors. Verdicts rendered by ten
out of twelve jurors may be substituted for the requirement of una-
nimity, 73 and petit juries containing eight rather than the conven-
tional number of twelve members may be established. 74
Appeals.—If a full and fair trial on the merits is provided, due
process does not require a State to provide appellate review. 75 But
64 Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 772 (1975).
65 Vlandis, which was approved but distinguished, is only marginally in this
doctrinal area, involving as it does a right to travel feature, but it is like Salfi and
Murry in its benefit context and order of presumption. The Court has avoided decid-
ing whether to overrule, retain, or further limit Vlandis. Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S.
647, 658–62 (1978).
66 In Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44 (1975), decided
after Salfi, the Court voided under the doctrine a statute making pregnant women
ineligible for unemployment compensation for a period extending from 12 weeks be-
fore the expected birth until six weeks after childbirth. But see Usery v. Turner Elk-
horn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1977) (provision granting benefits to miners
‘‘irrebuttably presumed’’ to be disabled is merely a way of giving benefits to all those
with the condition triggering the presumption); Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282,
284–85 (1979) (Congress must fix general categorization; case-by-case determination
would be prohibitively costly).
67 Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1876); New York Central R.R. v. White, 243
U.S. 188, 208 (1917).

68 Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 226 (1905).
69 In re Delgado, 140 U.S. 586, 588 (1891).
70 Wilson v. North Carolina, 169 U.S. 586 (1898); Foster v. Kansas, 112 U.S.
201, 206 (1884).

71 Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685, 694 (1897).
72 Montana Co. v. St. Louis M. & M. Co., 152 U.S. 160, 171 (1894).
73 See Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912).
74 See Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 602 (1900).
75 Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 77 (1972) (citing cases).
if an appeal is afforded, the State must not so structure it as to

arbitrarily deny to some persons the right or privilege available to
others. 76
Jurisdiction
Generally.—Jurisdiction may be defined as the power to cre-
ate legal interests. In the famous case of Pennoyer v. Neff, 77 the
Court enunciated two principles of jurisdiction respecting the
States in a federal system. First, ‘‘every State possesses exclusive
jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its
territory,’’ and, second, ‘‘no State can exercise direct jurisdiction
and authority over persons or property without its territory.’’ 78 Al-
though these two principles were drawn from the writings of Jo-
seph Story refining the theories of continental jurists, 79 the con-
stitutional basis for them was deemed to be in the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 80 From these beginnings,
the Court developed a complex set of rules defining when jurisdic-
tion—physical power—could be exerted over persons through in
personam actions and over things, generally, through actions in
rem. 81
In proceedings in personam to determine liability of a defend-
ant, no property having been subjected by such litigation to the
control of the court, jurisdiction over the defendant’s person is a
condition prerequisite to the rendering of any effective decree. 82
That condition is fulfilled, that is, a State is deemed capable of ex-
erting jurisdiction over an individual if he is physically present
within the territory of the State, if he is domiciled in the State al-
though temporarily absent therefrom, or if he has consented to the
76 Id. at 74–79 (conditioning appeal in eviction action upon tenant posting bond,
with two sureties, in twice the amount of rent expected to accrue pending appeal,
is invalid when no similar provision is applied to other cases). Cf. Bankers Life &
Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 (1988) (assessment of 15% penalty on party
who unsuccessfully appeals from money judgment meets rational basis test under
equal protection challenge, since it applies to plaintiffs and defendants alike and
does not single out one class of appellants).
77 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
78 Id. at 722.
79 Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. CT. REV.
241, 252–62.
80 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733–35 (1878). The due process clause and the
remainder of the Fourteenth Amendment had not been ratified at the time of the
entry of the state-court judgment giving rise to the case. This inconvenient fact does
not detract from the subsequent settled utilization of this constitutional foundation.
Pennoyer denied full faith and credit to the judgment because the state lacked juris-
diction.
81 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878); Scott v. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34, 64
(1894).
82 National Exchange Bank v. Wiley, 195 U.S. 257, 270 (1904); Iron Cliffs Co.
v. Negaunee Iron Co., 197 U.S. 463, 471 (1905).

exercise of jurisdiction over him. In actions in rem, however, a

State could validly proceed to settle controversies with regard to
rights or claims against property within its borders, notwithstand-
ing that control of the defendant was never obtained. Accordingly,
by reason of its inherent authority over titles to land within its ter-
ritorial confines, a State could proceed through its courts to judg-
ment respecting the ownership of such property, even though it
lacked a constitutional competence to reach claimants of title who
resided beyond its borders. 83 By the same token, probate 84 and
garnishment of foreign attachment 85 proceedings, being in the na-
ture of in rem actions for the disposition of property, or quasi in
rem, might be prosecuted to conclusion without requiring the pres-
ence of all parties in interest. 86
Over a long period of time, the mobility of American society
and the increasing complexity of commerce led to attenuation of
the second principle of Pennoyer, 87 and beginning with Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington, 88 the Court established the mod-
ern standard of obtaining in personam jurisdiction based upon the
nature and the quality of contacts that individuals and corpora-
tions have with a State; this ‘‘minimum contacts’’ test permits the
courts of a State through process to obtain power over out-of-state
defendants. In recent cases, the ‘‘minimum contacts’’ test has been
held applicable to all assertions of jurisdiction, so that in rem and
quasi-in-rem proceedings must now be evaluated in the context of
the defendant’s relationship to the State in which the suit is being
brought. 89
83 Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316, 321 (1890); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385
(1914); Pennington v. Fourth Nat’l Bank, 243 U.S. 269, 271 (1917).
84 Goodrich v. Ferris, 214 U.S. 71, 80 (1909).
85 Pennington v. Fourth Nat’l Bank, 243 U.S. 269, 271 (1917); Harris v. Balk,
198 U.S. 215 (1905).

86 The jurisdictional requirements for rendering a valid divorce decree are con-
sidered under the full faith and credit clause. Supra, pp. 840–50.
87 The first principle, that a State may assert jurisdiction over anyone or any-
thing physically within its borders, no matter how briefly there—the so-called ‘‘tran-
sient’’ rule of jurisdiction—McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917), remains
valid, although in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977), the Court’s dicta ap-
peared to assume it is not.
88 326 U.S. 310 (1945). As the Court explained in McGee v. International Life
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957), ‘‘[w]ith this increasing nationalization of com-
merce has come a great increase in the amount of business conducted by mail across
state lines. At the same time modern transportation and communication have made
it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he
engages in economic activity.’’ See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 293 (1980).
89 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); Kulko v. Su-
perior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
Basis for the territorial concept of jurisdiction promulgated in

Pennoyer and modified over the years is a two-fold construction of
due process: a concern for ‘‘fair play and substantial justice’’ in-
volved in requiring defendants to litigate cases against them far
from their ‘‘home’’ or place of business 90 and, more important, a
concern for the preservation of federalism. 91 The Framers, the
Court has asserted, while intending to tie the States together into
a Nation, ‘‘also intended that the States retain many essential at-
tributes of sovereignty, including, in particular, the sovereign
power to try causes in their courts. The sovereignty of each State,
in turn, implied a limitation on the sovereignty of all its sister
States—a limitation express or implicit in both the original scheme
of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment.’’ 92 Thus, the
federalism principle is preeminent. ‘‘[T]he Due Process Clause ‘does
not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in per-
sonam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the
state has no contacts, ties, or relations.’ . . . Even if the defendant
would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being forced to liti-
gate before the tribunals of another State; even if the forum State
has a strong interest in applying its law to the controversy; even
if the forum State is the most convenient location for litigation, the
Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federal-
ism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render
a valid judgment.’’ 93
In Personam Proceedings Against Individuals.—As has
been noted, presence within the State with service of process is suf-
ficient to create personal jurisdiction over an individual. 94 In the
case of a resident, absence alone will not defeat the processes of
courts in the State of his domicile; domicile alone is deemed to be
sufficient to keep him within reach of the state courts for purposes
of a personal judgment, whether obtained by means of appropriate,
substituted service or by actual personal service on the resident
90 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 317 (1945); Travel-
ers Health Ass’n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm., 339 U.S. 643, 649 (1950);
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).
91 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945); Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).

92 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980).
93 Id. at 294 (internal quotation from International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).

94 McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917). Cf. Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry,
228 U.S. 346 (1913). The rule has been strongly criticized but persists. Ehrenzweig,
The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The ‘‘Power’’ Myth and Forum
Conveniens, 65 YALE L. J. 289 (1956). But in Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S.
604 (1990), the Court held that service of process on a nonresident physically
present within the state satisfies due process regardless of the duration or purpose
of the nonresident’s visit.
outside the State. 95 However, if the defendant, although tech-

nically domiciled therein, has left the State with no intention to re-
turn, service by publication, as compared to a summons left at his
last and usual place of abode where his family continued to reside,
is inadequate, inasmuch as it is not reasonably calculated to give
actual notice of the proceedings and opportunity to be heard. 96
With respect to a nonresident, it is clearly established that no
person can be deprived of property rights by a decree in a case in
which he neither appeared nor was served or effectively made a
party. 97 The early cases held that the process of a court of one
State could not run into another and summon a party there domi-
ciled to respond to proceedings against him, when neither his per-
son nor his property was within the jurisdiction of the court ren-
dering the judgment. 98 The attenuation of the rule proceeded in
steps. Consent was, of course, sufficient to create jurisdiction, even
in the absence of any other connection between the litigation and
the forum, and for example, the appearance of the defendant for
any purpose other than to challenge the jurisdiction of the court
was deemed a voluntary submission to the court’s power, 99 and
even a special appearance may be treated as consensual submis-
sion to the court. 100 Constructive consent, therefore, was seized
upon as a basis for obtaining jurisdiction, and, with the advent of
the automobile, States were permitted, under the fiction of condi-
tioning the use of their highways on receipt of consent to be sued
in state courts for accidents or other transactions arising out of
such use, to designate a state official as a proper person to receive
service of process in such litigation, provided only that the official
receiving notice is obligated to communicate it to the person
sued. 101 Although the Court verbalized the result in consent terms,
the basis was really the State’s power to regulate local acts dan-
gerous to life or property. 102 This extension was necessary in order
95 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
96 McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917).
97 Rees v. Watertown, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 107 (1874); Coe v. Armour Fertilizer
Works, 237 U.S. 413, 423 (1915); Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220 (1946).
98 Sugg v. Thornton, 132 U.S. 524 (1889); Riverside Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S.
189, 193 (1915); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 355 (1927). See also Harkness v.
Hyde, 98 U.S. 476 (1879); Wilson v. Seligman, 144 U.S. 41 (1892).
99 Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230 (1900); Western Loan
& Savings Co. v. Butte & Boston Min. Co., 210 U.S. 368 (1908); Houston v. Ormes,
252 U.S. 469 (1920). See also Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938) (plaintiff suing
defendants deemed to have consented to jurisdiction with respect to counterclaims
asserted against him).
100 York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15 (1890); Kauffman v. Wootters, 138 U.S. 285
(1891); Western Indemnity Co. v. Rupp, 235 U.S. 261 (1914).

101 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927): Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13
(1928); Olberding v. Illinois Central R. Co., 346 U.S. 338, 341 (1953).
102 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356–57 (1927).
to permit States to assume jurisdiction over individuals ‘‘doing

business’’ within the State, inasmuch as the State could not with-
hold from nonresident individuals the right of doing business sub-
ject to consent to be sued. 103 Thus, the Court soon recognized that
‘‘doing business’’ within a State was itself a sufficient basis for ju-
risdiction over a nonresident individual, at least where the busi-
ness done was exceptional enough to create a strong state interest
in regulation, and service could be effectuated within the State on
an agent appointed to carry out the business. 104
Culmination of the trend was, of course, the promulgation in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 105 a corporations case, of the
‘‘minimum contacts’’ test of jurisdiction. In the context of in perso-
nam jurisdiction over individuals, the test is illustrated by Kulko
v. Superior Court, 106 in which the Court held that California could
not obtain personal jurisdiction over a New York resident whose
sole relevant contact with the State was to send his daughter to
live with her mother in California. 107 ‘‘Like any standard that re-
quires a determination of ‘reasonableness,’ the ‘minimum contacts’
test . . . is not susceptible of mechanical application; rather, the
facts of each case must be weighed to determine whether the req-
uisite ‘affiliating circumstances’ are present.’’ 108 Without deciding
that the standard was relevant, the Court noted that the ‘‘effects’’
test of contacts, that Kulko had ‘‘caused an effect’’ in the State by
availing himself of the benefits and protections of California’s laws
and by deriving an economic benefit in the lessened expense of
maintaining the daughter in New York, was not applicable; it was
deemed by the Court to involve wrongful activity outside a State
which causes injury within the State or commercial activity affect-
ing state residents, factors not present in this case. Any economic
benefit to Kulko was derived in New York and not in California. 109
As with many such cases, the decision was narrowly limited to its
facts and does little to clarify the standards applicable to state ju-
risdiction over nonresidents.
103 Id. at 355. See Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289, 293 (1919).
104 Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
105 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
106 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
107 Kulko had visited the State twice, seven and six years respectively before
initiation of the present action, his marriage occurring in California on the second
visit, but neither the visits nor the marriage was sufficient or relevant to jurisdic-
tion. Id. at 92–93.
108 Id. at 92.
109 Id. at 96–98.

Suability of Foreign Corporations.—Because of the curious

status of corporations in American law, 110 the basis of the asser-
tion of jurisdiction of the courts of a State over a foreign corpora-
tion has been even more uncertain than that with respect to indi-
viduals, although the terms have been common. First, it was as-
serted that inasmuch as a corporation could not carry on business
in a State without the State’s permission, the State could condition
its permission upon the corporation’s consent to submit to the juris-
diction of the State’s courts, either by appointment of someone to
receive process or in the absence of such designation. 111 Second,
the corporation by doing business in a State was deemed to be
present there and thus subject to service of process and suit be-
cause it was present. 112 Presence conflicted with the prevailing
idea of corporations as having no existence outside their State of
incorporation, but the theory was nonetheless accepted that a cor-
poration ‘‘doing business’’ in a State to a sufficient degree was
‘‘present’’ for service of process upon its agents in the State who
carried out that business. 113 Generally, with rare exceptions, even
continuous activity of some sort by a foreign corporation within a
State did not suffice to render it amenable to suits therein unre-
lated to that activity. Without the protection of such a rule, it was
maintained, foreign corporations would be exposed to the manifest
hardship and inconvenience of defending, in any State in which
they happened to be carrying on business, suits for torts wherever
committed and claims on contracts wherever made. 114 And if the
corporation stopped doing business in the forum State before suit
against it was commenced, it might well escape jurisdiction alto-
110 Cf. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839) (corporation
has no legal existence outside the boundaries of the State chartering it).
111 Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855); St. Clair v. Cox,
196 U.S. 350 (1882); Commercial Mutual Accident Co. v. Davis, 213 U.S. 245 (1909);
Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U.S. 115 (1915); Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold
Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917).
112 Presence was first independently used to sustain jurisdiction in Inter-
national Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914), although the possibility
was suggested as early as St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882). See also Philadel-
phia & Reading Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917) (Justice Brandeis for
Court).
113 E.g., Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S.
93 (1917); St. Louis S. W. Ry. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1913).

114 E.g., Old Wayne Life Ass’n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8 (1907); Simon v.
Southern Railway, 236 U.S. 115, 129–130 (1915); Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry.,
205 U.S. 530 (1907); Rosenberg Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923); Davis
v. Farmers Co-operative Co., 262 U.S. 312 (1923); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom-
bia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984). Continuous operations were sometimes sufficiently
substantial and of a nature to warrant assertions of jurisdiction. St. Louis S. W. Ry.
v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1913).
gether. 115 The issue of the degree of activity required, in particular

the degree of solicitation necessary to constitute doing business by
a foreign corporation, was much disputed and led to very
particularistic holdings. 116 In the absence of enough activity to
constitute doing business, the mere presence within its territorial
limits of an agent, officer, or stockholder, upon whom service might
readily be had, was not effective to enable a State to acquire juris-
diction over the foreign corporation. 117
The rationales and premises of these cases were swept away
in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 118 although, of course, the
results in many of them would stand on the basis of the ‘‘minimum
contacts’’ analysis there adopted. International Shoe, a foreign cor-
poration, had not been issued a license to do business in the State,
but it systematically and continuously employed a force of sales-
men, residents thereof, to canvass for orders therein, and was held
suable in Washington for unpaid unemployment compensation con-
tributions in respect to such salesmen. Service of the notice of as-
sessment personally upon one of its local sales solicitors plus the
forwarding of a copy thereof by registered mail to the corporation’s
principal office in Missouri was deemed sufficient to apprise the
corporation of the proceeding.
To reach this conclusion the Court not only overturned prior
holdings to the effect that mere solicitation of patronage does not
constitute doing of business in a state sufficient to subject a foreign
corporation to the jurisdiction thereof, 119 but also rejected the
‘‘presence’’ test as begging ‘‘the question to be decided. . . . The
terms ‘present’ or ‘presence,’’’ according to Chief Justice Stone, ‘‘are
used merely to symbolize those activities of the corporation’s agent
within the State which courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy
the demands of due process. . . . Those demands may be met by
115 Robert Mitchell Furn. Co. v. Selden Breck Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 213 (1921):
Chipman, Ltd. v. Thomas B. Jeffery Co., 251 U.S. 373, 379 (1920). On a consent
theory, jurisdiction would continue. Washington ex rel Bond & Goodwin & Tucker
v. Superior Court, 289 U.S. 361, 364 (1933).
116 Solicitation of business alone was inadequate to constitute ‘‘doing business,’’
Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 205 U.S. 530 (1907), but when connected with other
activities would suffice to confer jurisdiction. International Harvester Co. v. Ken-
tucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914). See the survey of cases by Judge Hand in Hutchinson
v. Chase and Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141–42 (2d Cir. 1930).
117 E.g. Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U.S. 518 (1895); Conley v. Mathieson Al-
kali Works, 190 U.S. 406 (1903); Riverside Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189, 195
(1915). But see Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602 (1899).
118 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
119 This departure was recognized by Justice Rutledge subsequently in Nippert
v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 422 (1946). Inasmuch as International Shoe, in
addition to having its agents solicit orders, also permitted them to rent quarters for
the display of merchandise, the Court could have utilized International Harvester
Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914), to find it was ‘‘present’’ in the State.
such contacts of the corporation with the State of the forum as

make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system . . . , to
require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is
brought there; [and] . . . that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’. . . .
An ‘estimate of the inconveniences’ which would result to the cor-
poration from a trial away from its ‘home’ or principal place of
business is relevant in this connection.’’ 120 As to the scope of appli-
cation to be accorded this ‘‘fair play and substantial justice’’ doc-
trine, the Court, at least verbally, concluded that ‘‘so far as . . .
[corporate] obligations arise out of or are connected with activities
within the State, a procedure which requires the corporation to re-
spond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances,
hardly be said to be undue.’’ 121 Read literally, these statements
coupled with the terms of the new doctrine lead to a reversal of
former decisions which: (1) nullified the exercise of jurisdiction by
the forum State over actions arising outside the State and brought
by a resident plaintiff against a foreign corporation doing business
therein without having been legally admitted and without having
consented to service of process of a resident agent; and (2) exempt-
ed a foreign corporation, which has been licensed by the forum
State to do business therein and has consented to the appointment
of a local agent to accept process, from suit on an action not arising
in the forum State and not related to activities pursued therein.
By an extended application of the logic of the position, a major-
ity of the Court ruled that, notwithstanding that it solicited busi-
ness in Virginia solely through recommendations of existing mem-
bers and was represented therein by no agents whatsoever, a for-
eign mail order insurance company had through its policies devel-
oped such contacts and ties with Virginia residents that the State,
by forwarding notice to the company by registered mail only, could
institute enforcement proceedings under its Blue Sky Law leading
to a decree ordering cessation of business pending compliance with
that act. 122 The due process clause was declared not to ‘‘forbid a
State to protect its citizens from such injustice’’ of having to file
suits on their claims at a far distant home office of such company,
120 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945).
121 Id. at 319.
122 Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm’n, 339 U.S. 643
(1950). The decision was 5-to–4 with one of the majority Justices also contributing
a concurring opinion. Id. at 651 (Justice Douglas). The possible significance of the
concurrence is that it appears to disagree with the implication of the majority opin-
ion, id. at 647–48, that a State’s legislative jurisdiction and its judicial jurisdiction
are coextensive. Id. at 652–53 (distinguishing between the use of the State’s judicial
power to enforce its legislative powers and the judicial jurisdiction when a private
party is suing). See id. at 659 (dissent).
especially in view of the fact that such suits could be more conven-
iently tried in Virginia where claims of loss could be inves-
tigated. 123 Likewise, under a California statute, subjecting foreign
mail order insurance companies to suit in California on insurance
contracts with residents thereof, petitioner was enabled to obtain
a valid judgment in a California court against a Texas insurer
served only by registered mail. 124 The contract between the com-
pany and the insured specified that Austin, Texas, was the place
of ‘‘making’’ and the place where liability should be deemed to
arise. The company mailed premium notices to the insured in Cali-
fornia, and he mailed his premium payments to the company in
Texas. Acknowledging that the connection of the company with
California was tenuous—it had no office or agents in the State, no
evidence had been presented that it had solicited anyone other
than this insured for business—the Court sustained jurisdiction on
the basis that the suit was on a contract which had a substantial
connection with California. ‘‘The contract was delivered in Califor-
nia, the premiums were mailed there and the insured was a resi-
dent of that State when he died. It cannot be denied that California
has a manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for
its residents when their insurers refuse to pay claims.’’ 125
‘‘Looking back over the long history of litigation a trend is
clearly discernible toward expanding the permissible scope of state
123 Id. at 647–49. The holding in Minnesota Commercial Men’s Ass’n v. Benn,
261 U.S. 140 (1923), that a similar mail order insurance company could not be
viewed as doing business in the forum State and that the circumstances under
which its contracts with forum State citizens, executed and to be performed in its
State of incorporation, were consummated could not support an implication that the
foreign company had consented to be sued in the forum State, was distinguished
rather than formally overruled. 339 U.S. at 647. In any event, Benn, although
unmentioned in the opinion, could not survive McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220 (1957).
124 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
125 Id. at 223. The Court also noticed the proposition that the insured could not
bear the cost of litigation away from home as well as the insurer. See also Perkins
v. Benguet Consolidating Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), a case too atypical on
its facts to permit much generalization but which does appear to verify the implica-
tion of International Shoe that in personam jurisdiction may attach to a corporation
even where the cause of action does not arise out of the business done by defendant
in the forum State, as well as to state, in dictum, that the mere presence of a cor-
porate official within the State on business of the corporation would suffice to create
jurisdiction if the claim arose out of that business and service were made on him
within the State. Id. at 444–45. The Court held that the State could, but was not
required to, assert jurisdiction over a corporation owning gold and silver mines in
the Philippines but temporarily (because of the Japanese occupation) carrying on a
part of its general business in the forum State, including directors’ meetings, busi-
ness correspondence, banking, and the like, although it owned no mining properties
in the State.
jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents.’’ 126

However, during the same Term, the Court found in personam ju-
risdiction lacking for the first time since International Shoe, and
after a long period of declining to review the exercise of state court
jurisdiction the Court pronounced firm due process limitations.
Thus, in Hanson v. Denckla, 127 the issue was whether Florida
courts obtained through use of ordinary mail and publication juris-
diction over corporate trustees of property the subject of a contest
over a will; the will had been entered into and probated in Florida,
the trustees were resident in Delaware and were indispensable
parties with claimants who were resident in Florida and who had
been personally served. Noting the trend in enlarging the ability of
the States to obtain in personam jurisdiction over absent defend-
ants, the Court denied that the States could exercise nationwide in
personam jurisdiction and said that ‘‘it would be a mistake to as-
sume that this trend heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions
on the personal jurisdiction of state courts.’’ 128 The Court recog-
nized that Florida law was the most appropriate law to be applied
in determining the validity of the will and that the corporate de-
fendants might be little inconvenienced by having to appear in
Florida courts, but it denied that either circumstance satisfied the
due process clause. The due process restrictions did more than
guarantee immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. ‘‘They
are consequences of territorial limitations on the power of the re-
spective States. However minimal the burden of defending in a for-
eign tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do so unless
he has the ‘minimum contacts’ with that State that are a pre-
requisite to its exercise of power over him.’’ The only contacts the
corporate defendants had in Florida consisted of a relationship with
the individual defendants. ‘‘The unilateral activity of those who
claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot sat-
isfy the requirement of contact with the forum State. The applica-
tion of that rule will vary with the quality and nature of the de-
fendant’s activity, but it is essential in each case that there be
some act by which the defendant purposefully avails himself of the
126 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957). An exception
exists with respect to in personam jurisdiction in domestic relations cases, at least

in some instances. E.g., Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957) (holding that
sufficient contacts afforded Nevada in personam jurisdiction over a New York resi-
dent wife for purposes of dissolving the marriage but Nevada did not have jurisdic-
tion to terminate the wife’s claims for support).
127 357 U.S. 235 (1958). The decision was 5-to–4. See id. at 256 (Justice Black
dissenting), 262 (Justice Douglas dissenting).

128 Id. at 251. In dissent, Justice Black observed that ‘‘of course we have not
reached the point where state boundaries are without significance and I do not
mean to suggest such a view here.’’ Id. at 260.
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus in-

voking the benefits and protections of its laws. . . . The settlor’s
execution in Florida of her power of appointment cannot remedy
the absence of such an act in this case.’’ 129
In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 130 the Court ap-
plied its ‘‘minimum contacts’’ test to preclude the assertion of juris-
diction over two foreign corporations that did no business in the
forum State. Plaintiffs sustained personal injuries in Oklahoma in
an accident involving an alleged defect in their automobile, which
they had purchased the previous year in New York, while they
were New York residents, and which they were driving through
Oklahoma on their way to a new residence in Arizona. Defendants
were the automobile retailer and its wholesaler, New York corpora-
tions that did no business in Oklahoma. The Court found no cir-
cumstances justifying assertion by Oklahoma courts of jurisdiction
over defendants. They (1) carried on no activity in Oklahoma, (2)
closed no sales and performed no services there, (3) availed them-
selves of none of the benefits of the State’s laws, (4) solicited no
business there either through salespersons or through advertising
reasonably calculated to reach the State, and (5) sold no cars to
Oklahoma residents or indirectly served or sought to serve the
Oklahoma market. The unilateral action of the purchasers in driv-
ing the car to Oklahoma was insufficient to create the kinds of req-
uisite contacts. While it might have been foreseeable that the auto-
mobile would travel to Oklahoma, foreseeability is relevant only in-
sofar as ‘‘the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum
State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled
into court there.’’ 131 Further, ‘‘whatever marginal revenues peti-
tioners may receive by virtue of the fact that their products are ca-
pable of use in Oklahoma is far too attenuated a contact to justify
that State’s exercise of in personam jurisdiction over them.’’ 132
Thus, a defendant must, as the Court said in Denckla, ‘‘purpose-
fully [avail] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
129 Id. at 251, 253–54. Justice Black argued that the relationship of the non-
resident defendants, of the subject of the litigation to the forum State, upon an anal-
ogy of choice of law and forum non conveniens, made Florida the natural and con-
stitutional basis for asserting jurisdiction. Id. at 258–59. The Court has numerous
times asserted that contacts sufficient for the purpose of designating a particular
State’s law as appropriate may be insufficient for the purpose of asserting jurisdic-
tion. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 215 (1977); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436
U.S. 84, 98 (1978); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294–
95 (1980). On the due process limits on choice of law decisions, see Allstate Insur-
ance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
130 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
131 Id. at 297.
132 Id. at 299.
forum State,’’ 133 if not by carrying on business there within the

constitutional sense, at least by delivering ‘‘its products into the
stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be pur-
chased by consumers in the forum State.’’ 134
The Court has applied International Shoe principles in several
more situations. Circulation of a magazine in the forum state is an
adequate basis for jurisdiction over the corporate magazine pub-
lisher in a libel action; the fact that the plaintiff has no contact
with the forum state is not dispositive since the inquiry focuses on
the relations among the defendant, the forum, and the litiga-
tion. 135 On the other hand, damage done to the plaintiff’s reputa-
tion in his home state caused by circulation of a defamatory maga-
zine article there may justify assertion of jurisdiction that would
otherwise be absent. 136 While there is no per se rule that a con-
tract with an out-of-state party automatically establishes jurisdic-
tion to enforce the contract in the other party’s forum, a franchisee
who has entered into a franchise contract with an out-of-state cor-
poration may be subject to suit in the corporation’s home state
where the overall circumstances (contract terms themselves, course
of dealings) demonstrate a deliberate reaching out to establish con-
tacts with the franchisor in the franchisor’s home state. 137
Actions in Rem: Proceedings Against Land.—The basis of
in rem jurisdiction is the power of a State to determine title to all
property, whether tangible or intangible, located within its bor-
133 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1985), quoted in World-Wide Volks-
wagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).

134 Id. at 298. Of the three dissenters, Justice Brennan argued that the ‘‘mini-
mum contacts’’ test was obsolete and that jurisdiction should be predicated upon the
balancing of the interests of the forum State and plaintiffs against the actual bur-
den imposed on defendant, id. at 299, while Justices Marshall and Blackmun ap-
plied the test and found jurisdiction because of the foreseeability of defendants that
a defective product of theirs might cause injury in a distant State and because the
defendants had entered into an interstate economic network. Id. at 313. The bal-
ancing of interests test was applied in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,
480 U.S. 102 (1987), holding unreasonable exercise of jurisdiction by a California
court over an indemnity action by a Taiwan tire manufacturer against a Japanese
manufacturer of tire valves, the underlying damage action by a California motorist
having been settled.
135 Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770 (1984) (holding as well that the
forum state may apply ‘‘single publication rule’’ making defendant liable for nation-
wide damages).
136 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) (jurisdiction over reporter and editor
responsible for defamatory article which they knew would be circulated in subject’s
home state).
137 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985). But cf. Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) (purchases and training within
state, both unrelated to cause of action, are insufficient to justify general in perso-
nam jurisdiction).
ders. 138 Unlike jurisdiction in personam, a judgment entered by a

court with in rem jurisdiction does not bind the defendant person-
ally but determines the title to or status of only the property in
question. 139 Proceedings brought to register title to land, 140 to con-
demn 141 or confiscate 142 real or personal property, or to admin-
ister a decedent’s estate 143 are typical in rem actions. Due process
is satisfied by seizure of the res and notice to all who have or may
have interests therein. 144 It was formally the case that in in rem
actions a court could acquire jurisdiction over nonresidents by mere
constructive service of process, 145 under the theory that property
was always in possession of its owners and that seizure would af-
ford them notice, inasmuch as they would keep themselves ap-
prised of the state of their property. That this was a fiction not sat-
isfying the requirements of due process has been established and,
whatever the nature of the proceeding, notice must be given in a
manner that actually notifies the person being sought or that has
a reasonable certainty of resulting in such notice. 146
Although the Court’s holding in Shaffer v. Heitner 147 ‘‘that all
assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to
the [‘minimum contacts’] standards set forth in International
Shoe’’ 148 requires an assessment of all decided cases based upon
now disavowed tests, it does not appear that the results will appre-
ciably change for in rem jurisdiction over property. ‘‘[T]he presence
of property in a State may bear on the existence of jurisdiction by
providing contacts among the forum State, the defendant, and the
litigation. For example, when claims to the property itself are the
source of the underlying controversy between the plaintiff and the
defendant, it would be unusual for the State where the property is
located not to have jurisdiction. In such cases, the defendant’s
claim to property located in the State would normally indicate that
138 Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316, 320–21, 323 (1890); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714 (1878).
139 Boswell’s Lessee v. Otis, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 336, 348 (1850).
140 American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47 (1911); Tyler v. Judges of the Court
of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 76, 55 N.E. 812, 814 (Chief Justice Holmes), appeal
dismissed, 179 U.S. 405 (1900).
141 Huling v. Kaw Valley Ry. & Improvement Co., 130 U.S. 559 (1889).
142 The Confiscation Cases, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 92 (1874).
143 Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186 (1900); Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S.
343 (1942).
144 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
145 Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316 (1890); Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241 (1907);
Security Savings Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (1923).

146 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Walker
v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S.
208 (1962); Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 (1972).
147 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
148 Id. at 212.
he expected to benefit from the State’s protection of his interest.

The State’s strong interests in assuring the marketability of prop-
erty within its borders and in providing a procedure for peaceful
resolution of disputes about the possession of that property would
also support jurisdiction, as would the likelihood that important
records and witnesses will be found in the State.’’ 149 Thus, for
‘‘true’’ in rem actions, the old results likely still prevail.
Actions in Rem: Attachment Proceedings.—Although the
practice of attachment goes back to colonial times, Pennoyer v.
Neff 150 was also the most relevant case for a long time respecting
the power of a State to permit an attachment of real and personal
property situated within its borders belonging to a nonresident to
satisfy a debt owed by the nonresident to one of its citizens or to
settle a claim for damages founded upon a wrong inflicted on the
citizen by the nonresident. Being neither present within the State
nor domiciled therein, the nonresident defendant could not be
served personally, and any judgment in money obtained against
him would be unenforceable. The solution was a form of in rem pro-
ceeding, sometimes called ‘‘quasi in rem,’’ involving a levy of a writ
of attachment on the local property of the defendant, of which pro-
ceeding the non-resident need be notified merely by publication, 151
and satisfaction of the judgment from the property attached; if the
attached property was insufficient to satisfy the claim, the plaintiff
could go no further.
This form of proceeding raised many questions. Of course,
there were always instances in which it was fair to subject a per-
son to suit on his property located in the forum State, as where the
property was related to the matter sued over. 152 In others, the
question was more disputed, as in the famous case in which the
property subject to attachment was the obligation of the defend-
ant’s insurance company to defend and pay the judgment. 153 But
149 Id. at 207–08 (footnote citations omitted). The Court also suggested that the
State would usually have jurisdiction in cases such as those arising from injuries
suffered on the property of an absentee owner, where the defendant’s ownership of
the property is conceded but the cause of action is otherwise related to rights and
duties growing out of that controversy. Id.
150 95 U.S. 714 (1878). Cf. Pennington v. Fourth Nat’l Bank, 243 U.S. 269, 271
(1917); Corn Exch. Bank v. Commissioner, 280 U.S. 218, 222 (1930); Endicott Co.
v. Encyclopedia Press, 266 U.S. 285, 288 (1924).
151 This theory of notice was disavowed sooner than the theory of jurisdiction.
Supra, p. 1716.
152 Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P. 2d 960 (1957), appeal dis-
missed, 357 U.S. 569 (1958) (debt seized in California was owed to a New Yorker,
but it had arisen out of transactions in California involving the New Yorker and
the California plaintiff).
153 Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y. 2d 111, 269 N.Y.S. 2d 99, 216 N.E. 2d 312 (1966).
the extension of the principle in Harris v. Balk 154 squarely raised

the issue of fairness and territoriality. The claimant was a Mary-
land resident who was owed a debt by Balk, a North Carolina resi-
dent. Apparently adventitiously, Harris, also a North Carolina resi-
dent and owing Balk an amount of money, was found passing
through Maryland by the Maryland resident and his debt to Balk
was attached to satisfy the debt owed to the Marylander. Balk had
no notice of the action and a default judgment was entered, after
which Harris paid over the judgment to the Marylander. When
Balk later sued Harris in North Carolina to recover on his debt,
Harris defended that he had been relieved of any further obligation
by satisfying the judgment in Maryland, and the Supreme Court
sustained his defense, ruling that jurisdiction had been properly
obtained and the Maryland judgment was thus valid. 155
Harris v. Balk was overruled in Shaffer v. Heitner, 156 in which
the Court held that the ‘‘minimum contacts’’ test of International
Shoe applied to all in rem and quasi in rem actions. The case arose
under a Delaware sequestration statute under which plaintiffs
were authorized to bring actions against nonresident defendants by
attaching their ‘‘property’’ within Delaware, the property consisting
of shares of corporate stock and options to stock in the defendant
corporation, the stock being considered to be in Delaware because
of the incorporation in Delaware, although none of the certificates
representing the seized stocks was physically present in Delaware.
The reason for applying the same test as is applied in in personam
cases, the Court said, ‘‘is simple and straightforward. It is premised
on recognition that ‘[t]he phrase ‘‘judicial jurisdiction over a thing,’’
is a customary elliptical way of referring to jurisdiction over the in-
terests of persons in a thing.’ ’’ 157 Thus, ‘‘[t]he recognition leads to
the conclusion that in order to justify an exercise of jurisdiction in
rem, the basis for jurisdiction must be sufficient to justify exercis-
ing ‘jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing.’ ’’ 158
154 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
155 Compare New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916) (action pur-
portedly against property within State, proceeds of an insurance policy, was really
an in personam action against claimant and, claimant not having been served, the
judgment is void). But see Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71
(1961).
156 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
157 Id. at 207 (internal quotation from RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS 56, Introductory Note (1971)).

158 Id. The characterization of actions in rem as being not actions against a res
but against persons with interests merely reflects Justice Holmes’ insight in Tyler
v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 76–77, 55 N.E., 812, 814, ap-
peal dismissed, 179 U.S. 405 (1900).
A further tightening of jurisdictional standards occurred in

Rush v. Savchuk. 159 The plaintiff was injured in a one-automobile
accident in Indiana while a passenger in an automobile driven by
defendant. Plaintiff later moved to Minnesota and sued defendant,
still resident in Indiana, in state court in Minnesota. There were
no contacts between the defendant and Minnesota, but defendant’s
insurance company did business there and plaintiff garnished the
insurance contract, signed in Indiana, under which the company
was obligated to defend defendant in litigation and indemnify him
to the extent of the policy limits. The Court refused to permit juris-
diction to be grounded on the contract; the contacts justifying juris-
diction must be those of the defendant engaging in purposeful ac-
tivity related to the forum. 160 Rush thus resulted in the demise of
the controversial Seider v. Roth doctrine, which lower courts had
struggled to save after Shaffer v. Heitner. 161
Actions in Rem: Estates, Trusts, Corporations.—Probate
administration, being in the nature of a proceeding in rem, is one
to which all the world is charged with notice. 162 Generally, probate
will be opened in the proper court of the decedent’s domicile, and
as to the assets in that State the probate judgment is in rem and
determinative as to all; insofar as it affects property, land or per-
sonalty, beyond the State, the judgment is in personam and can
bind only parties thereto or their privies. 163 That is, the full faith
and credit clause and statute would not prevent an attack in the
forum of the situs of the property on the first court’s finding of
domicile as a predicate to deciding the disposition of the prop-
erty. 164 The difficulty of characterization of the existence of the res
in a particular jurisdiction is illustrated by the in rem aspects of
159 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
160 Id. 328–30. In dissent, Justices Brennan and Stevens argued that what the
state courts had done was the functional equivalent of direct-action statutes. Id. at
333 (Justice Stevens); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299
(1980) (Justice Brennan). The Court, however, refused so to view the Minnesota gar-
nishment action, saying that ‘‘[t]he State’s ability to exert its power over the ‘nomi-
nal defendant’ is analytically prerequisite to the insurer’s entry into the case as a
garnishee.’’ Id. at 330–31. Presumably, the comment is not meant to undermine the
validity of such direct-action statutes, which was upheld in Watson v. Employers Li-
ability Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954), a choice-of-law case rather than a juris-
diction case.
161 Supra, p. 1718 n.153. See O’Conner v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1034 (1978).

162 Goodrich v. Ferris, 214 U.S. 71, 80 (1909); McCaughey v. Lyall, 224 U.S. 558
(1912).
163 Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U.S. 394 (1917); Riley v. New York Trust
Co., 315 U.S. 343 (1942).

164 Id. at 353.
Hanson v. Denckla. 165 There, the decedent, while a resident of

Pennsylvania, created a trust with a Delaware corporation as trust-
ee. She reserved the power to appoint the remainder, after her re-
served life estate, either by testamentary disposition or by inter
vivos instrument. After she moved to Florida, she executed a new
will and a new power of appointment under the trust, which did
not satisfy the requirements for testamentary disposition under
Florida law. Upon her death, dispute arose as to whether the prop-
erty passed pursuant to the terms of the power of appointment or
in accordance with the residuary clause of the will. While the Flor-
ida courts had in personam jurisdiction over individual defendants,
they attempted to assert in rem jurisdiction over the Delaware cor-
poration. Asserting the old theory that a court’s in rem jurisdiction
‘‘is limited by the extent of its power and by the coordinate author-
ity of sister States,’’ 166 i.e., whether the court has jurisdiction over
the thing, the Court thought it clear that the trust assets that were
the subject of the suit were located in Delaware and thus the Flor-
ida courts had no in rem jurisdiction. The Court did not expressly
consider whether the International Shoe test should apply to such
in rem jurisdiction, as it has now held it generally must, but it did
briefly consider whether Florida’s interests arising from its author-
ity to probate and construe its domiciliary’s will, under which the
foreign assets might pass, were a sufficient basis of in rem jurisdic-
tion and decided they were not. 167 The effort of International Shoe
in this area is still to be discerned.
The old Pennoyer rule, that seizure of property was sufficient
to give notice to nonresident or absent defendants, was likewise ap-
plied in statutory proceedings for the forfeiture of abandoned prop-
erty. Judgments in proceedings to determine succession to property
in escheat were held binding on all when personal service of sum-
mons was made on all known claimants and constructive notice by
publication to all claimants who were unknown or nonresident. 168
But in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 169 the Court
held that the characterization of an action as in rem or in perso-
nam did not determine what process was due in a statutory proce-
165 357 U.S. 235 (1957). The in personam aspect of this decision is considered
supra, p. 1714.
166 Id. at 246.
167 Id. at 247–50. The four dissenters, Justices Black, Burton, Brennan, and
Douglas, believed that the transfer in Florida of $400,000 made by a domiciliary and
affecting beneficiaries, almost all of whom lived in that State, gave rise to a suffi-
cient connection with Florida to support an adjudication by its courts of the effec-
tiveness of the transfer. Id. at 256, 262.
168 Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U.S. 256 (1896); Security Savings Bank v. Califor-
nia, 263 U.S. 282 (1923). See also Voeller v. Neilston Co., 311 U.S. 531 (1941).
169 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
dure whereby a bank managing a common trust fund in favor of

nonresident as well as resident beneficiaries could obtain a judicial
settlement of accounts which was conclusive on all, with the only
notice being publication in a local paper. Such notice by publication
was necessarily sufficient as to beneficiaries whose interests or ad-
dresses were unknown to the bank, the Court held, but as to those,
resident and nonresident alike, whose whereabouts were known, it
was feasible to make serious efforts to notify them at least by mail
to their addresses on record with the bank. The rule has been ap-
plied in the escheat situation, and the Court finding that a ‘‘con-
tacts’’ test would not be workable in this field has held that, inas-
much as due process would prevent more than one State from es-
cheating a given item of property, because of ease of administration
rather than logic and jurisdiction, the State of residence shown by
the last known address on a company’s books would have the au-
thority to take by escheat the uncollected claims against a corpora-
tion located in a particular State. 170
Notice: Service of Process.—It is not enough, however, that
a State be potentially capable of exercising control over persons
and property. Before a State legitimately can exercise such power
to alter private interests, its jurisdiction must be perfected by the
employment of an appropriate mode of serving process deemed ef-
fective to acquaint all parties of the institution of proceedings cal-
culated to affect their rights. 171 ‘‘An elementary and fundamental
requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be ac-
corded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the cir-
cumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the ac-
tion and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’’ 172
Personal service guarantees actual notice of the pendency of a legal
action; it thus presents the ideal circumstance under which to com-
mence legal proceedings against a person, and has traditionally
been deemed necessary in actions styled in personam. 173 But less
rigorous notice procedures have been accepted, in light of history
and of the practical obstacles to providing personal service in every
instance, and these procedures do not carry with them the same
certainty of actual notice that inheres in personal service. 174 But,
whether the action be in rem or in personam, there is a constitu-
170 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (1961); Texas v.
New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674 (1965).

171 ‘‘There . . . must be a basis for the defendant’s amenability to service of
summons. Absent consent, this means there must be authorization for service of
summons on the defendant.’’ Omni Capital Int’l v. Rudolph Wolff & Co., 484 U.S.
97 (1987).
172 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
173 McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 92 (1971).
174 Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 449 (1982).
tional minimum; if it be shown that the notice used was not rea-
sonably calculated to provide the necessary information, its age and
history will not sustain it. 175
The function of mail, indeed, as conveying sufficient notice, has
become quite established, 176 and the development of the ability of
States, quite contrary to the Pennoyer theory, to assert in personam
jurisdiction extraterritorially upon individuals and corporations
having ‘‘minimum contacts’’ with the forum State, resulted in the
passage of ‘‘long-arm’’ jurisdictional statutes under which notice
was practically always by mail. 177 In a class action, due process is
satisfied by notification by mail of out-of-state class members, with
opportunity to ‘‘opt out’’ but with no requirement that inclusion in
the class be contingent upon affirmative response. 178 Other service
devices, and substitutions, have been pursued and show some
promise of further loosening of the concept of territoriality even
while complying with minimum due process standards of notice. 179
The Procedure Which Is Due Process

The Interests Protected: Entitlements and Positivist Rec-
ognition.—‘‘The requirements of procedural due process apply only
to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth
Amendment’s protection of liberty and property. When protected in-
terests are implicated, the right to some kind of prior hearing is
paramount. But the range of interests protected by procedural due
175 In Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982), the Court held that in light of
substantial evidence that notices posted on the doors of apartments in a housing

project in an eviction proceeding were often torn down by children and others before
tenants ever saw them, service by posting did not comport with due process. With-
out requiring it, the Court observed that the mails provided an efficient and inex-
pensive means of communication upon which prudent men could rely and that no-
tice by mail would provide a reasonable assurance of notice. Id. at 455. See also
Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983) (personal service or notice
by mail is required for mortgagee of real property subject to tax sale); Tulsa Profes-
sional Collection Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988) (notice by mail or other appro-
priate means to reasonably ascertainable creditors of probated estate).
176 E.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Travelers
Health Ass’n ex rel. State Corp. Comm’n, 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
177 See, e.g., G.D. Searle & Co. v. Cohn, 455 U.S. 404, 409–12 (1982) (discussing
New Jersey’s ‘‘long-arm’’ rule, under which a plaintiff must make every effort to
serve process upon someone within the State and then only if ‘‘after diligent inquiry
and effort personal service cannot be made’’ within the State, then ‘‘service may be
made by mailing, by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, a copy
of the summons and complaint to a registered agent for service, or to its principal
place of business, or to its registered office.’’). Cf. Velmohos v. Maren Engineering
Corp., 83 N.J. 282, 416 A.2d 372 (1980), vacated and remanded, 455 U.S. 985 (1982).
178 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
179 E.g., Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954) (au-
thorizing direct action against insurance carrier rather than against the insured).
process is not infinite.’’ 180 Whether any procedural protections are

due depends upon an analysis which of ‘‘whether the nature of the
interest is one within the contemplation of the ‘liberty or property’
language of the Fourteenth Amendment.’’ 181 Traditionally, the
Court has accorded due process recognition to one’s ‘‘life, liberty, or
property’’ as determined by reference to common understanding, as
embodied in the development of the common law. One’s right of life
existed independently of any formal guarantee of it and could be
taken away only by the state pursuant to the formal processes of
law for offenses against law deemed by a legislative body to be par-
ticularly heinous. One’s liberty, one’s freedom from bodily restraint,
was a natural right to be forfeited only pursuant to law and strict
formal procedures. One’s ownership of lands, chattels, and other
properties, to be sure, was highly dependent upon legal protections
of rights commonly associated with that ownership, but it was a
concept universally understood in Anglo-American countries.
Expansion of the understanding embodied in the ‘‘liberty and
property’’ aspects of the clause began in the 1960s and followed an
inconsistent path of acceleration and reining-in to the present. It
has previously been noted that the Court’s construction of ‘‘liberty’’
has long been much broader than would be encompassed within
freedom from bodily restraint; while liberty of contract met its de-
mise, the rise of rights of privacy, which included marital and inti-
mate relationships, interests in one’s dignity and reputational con-
cerns, and the like, continues to lead to enlargement of the com-
pass of the doctrine. A widening of the ‘‘property’’ concept in the
1960s occurred with respect to according protection to such public
benefits as welfare assistance and other benefits and privileges
that government conferred and that it could withdraw altogether
for everyone, but as to which individual recipients and claimants
had to be accorded proper procedures before they could lose their
entitlement. Similarly, other kinds of conditional property rights,
such as the interest of an installment buyer of goods in retaining
control until it could be shown he was in default, were accorded
greater protection.
The key to this expansion may be found in the intertwined doc-
trinal strands of jurisprudential theory under which the ‘‘right-
privilege’’ distinction was abandoned and a positivist conception of
entitlements arose. The former principle, discussed previously in
180 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569–70 (1972). Developments under
the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause have been interchangeable. Cf. Arnett v.
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
181 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1982).
the First Amendment context, 182 was pithily summarized by Jus-

tice Holmes years ago in dismissing a suit by a policeman protest-
ing the dismissal from his job. ‘‘The petitioner may have a constitu-
tional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be
a policeman.’’ 183 Most often, the assertion that one had no ‘‘vested
property interest’’ in something was made to justify the taking of
that interest or the disregarding of that interest without sub-
stantive restraints being relevant, but it was also true that it was
said that if something was ‘‘only’’ a privilege, such as government
employment 184 or some form of public assistance, 185 procedural
due process guarantees were also inapplicable. 186 In other words,
if government need not provide something, it could provide it with
any attached conditions it might choose. This line of thought was
always opposed by the ‘‘unconstitutional conditions’’ doctrine, under
which it was said that ‘‘even though a person has no ‘right’ to a
valuable government benefit and even though the government may
deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, it may not do so
on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests—
especially, his interest in freedom of speech.’’ 187 Nonetheless, the
two doctrines coexisted in an unstable relationship, until, in the
1960s and thereafter, the right-privilege distinction was largely
shelved. 188
Concurrently with the virtual demise of the ‘‘right-privilege’’
distinction, there arose the ‘‘entitlement’’ doctrine, under which the
Court erected a barrier of procedural—but not substantive—protec-
tions against erroneous governmental deprivation of something it
might within its discretion have bestowed. 189 Thus, the Court
found protected interests created by positive state enactments or
182 Supra, pp. 1084–90.
183 McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 2d 517, 522
(1892).
184 Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff’d by an equally di-
vided Court, 314 U.S. 918 (1951); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
185 Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
186 Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954).
187 Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). See Speiser v. Randall, 357
U.S. 513 (1958).

188 See William Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968). Much of the old fight had to do
with imposition of conditions on admitting corporations into a State. Cf. Western &
Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 656–68 (1981) (re-
viewing the cases). That the right-privilege distinction is not totally moribund is evi-
dent. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108–09 (1976) (sustaining as qualification
for public financing of campaign agreement to abide by expenditure limitations oth-
erwise unconstitutional); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
189 That is, Congress or a state legislature could simply take away part or all
of the benefit. Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971); United States Railroad Re-
tirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174 (1980); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,
455 U.S. 422, 432–33 (1982).
practices; that is, the source of a right was ascertained not from
tradition or the common law or ‘‘natural rights,’’ but rather a prop-
erty or liberty interest was discerned in the governmental statute
or practice that gave rise to it. Indeed, for a time it appeared that
this positivist conception of rights was going to displace the pre-
vious traditional sources.
That advent of the new doctrine may be placed in Goldberg v.
Kelly. 190 The Court held that, inasmuch as termination of welfare
assistance pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may
deprive an eligible recipient of the means of livelihood, government
must provide a pre-termination evidentiary hearing in which an
initial determination of the validity of the dispensing agency’s
grounds for discontinuance of payment could be made. It was ob-
served that the state agency did ‘‘not contend that procedural due
process is not applicable to the termination of welfare benefits.
Such benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons
qualified to receive them.’’ 191 Provisions for loss of some benefit or
privilege upon the establishing of some ground for taking it away
was perceived as giving the holder a property interest entitling him
to proper procedure before termination or revocation.
Therefore, a wage garnishment statute which failed to provide
for notice to the garnishee and an opportunity for the making of
some form of determination that the garnisher is likely to prevail
before the garnishee is deprived of the use of his money, even tem-
porarily, was held not to accord due process. 192 Similarly voided
was a repleven statute which authorized the authorities to seize
goods simply upon the filing of an ex parte application and the
posting of bond and the allegation that the possessor of the prop-
erty was in arrears on payment on the goods and that they re-
verted to the seller. 193 A state motor vehicle financial responsibil-
ity law which provided that the registration and license of an unin-
sured motorist involved in an accident was to be suspended unless
he posted security for the amount of damages claimed by an ag-
grieved party without affording the driver any opportunity to raise
the issue of liability prior to suspension violated the due process
clause. 194
The Court’s emphasis in these cases upon the importance to
the claimant of retention of the rights led some lower courts to de-
190 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
191 Id.at 261–62. See also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (Social Se-
curity benefits).
192 Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
193 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
194 Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971). Compare Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105
(1977) with Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979).

termine the application of the due process clause by assessing the

weights of the interests involved and the harm done to one who
lost what he was claiming. This approach, the Court held, was in-
appropriate. ‘‘[W]e must look not to the ‘weight’ but to the nature
of the interest at stake. . . . We must look to see if the interest is
within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and prop-
erty.’’ 195 To have a property interest in the constitutional sense,
the Court held, it was not enough that one have an abstract need
or desire for a benefit, that one have only a unilateral expectation.
He must rather ‘‘have a legitimate claim of entitlement’’ to the ben-
efit. ‘‘Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitu-
tion. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by
existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent
source such as state law—rules or understandings that secure cer-
tain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those bene-
fits.’’ 196 Thus, in Roth, the Court held that the refusal to renew a
teacher’s contract upon expiration of his one-year term implicated
no due process values because there was nothing in the public uni-
versity’s contract, regulations, or policies that ‘‘created any legiti-
mate claim’’ to reemployment. 197 On the other hand, in Perry v.
Sindermann, 198 while there was no contract with a tenure provi-
sion nor any statutory assurance of it, the ‘‘existing rules or under-
standings’’ were deemed to provide a legitimate expectation inde-
pendent of any contract provision, so that a professor employed for
several years at a public college, in which the actual practice had
the characteristics of tenure, had a protected interest. A statutory
assurance was found in Arnett v. Kennedy, 199 in which the civil
service laws and regulations made the continued employment sub-
ject to defeasance ‘‘only for such cause as would promote the effi-
ciency of the service.’’ On the other hand, a policeman who was a
‘‘permanent employee’’ under an ordinance which appeared to af-
ford him a continuing position subject to conditions subsequent was
held not to be protected by the due process clause because the fed-
eral district court had interpreted the ordinance as providing only
195 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569–71 (1972).
196 Id. at 577.
197 Id. at 576–78. The Court also held that no liberty interest was implicated,
because in declining to rehire Roth the State had not made any charges against him
or taken any actions that would damage his reputation or stigmatize him. Id. at
572–75. For an instance of protection accorded a claimant on the basis of such an
action, see Codd v. Vegler, 429 U.S. 624 (1977). See also Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S.
341, 347–50 (1976); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491–494 (1980); Board of Curators
v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 82–84 (1978).
198 408 U.S. 593 (1972). See Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438 (1979) (finding no prac-
tice or mutually explicit understanding creating interest).

199 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
employment at the will and pleasure of the city and the Supreme
Court chose not to disturb that interpretation. 200
Beyond employment the Court found ‘‘legitimate entitlements’’
in a variety of situations. Thus, because Ohio included within its
statutes a provision for free education to all residents between five
and 21 years of age and a compulsory-attendance at school require-
ment, the State was deemed to have obligated itself to accord stu-
dents some due process hearing rights prior to suspending them,
even for such a short period as ten days. 201 ‘‘Having chosen to ex-
tend the right to an education to people of appellees’ class gen-
erally, Ohio may not withdraw that right on grounds of mis-
conduct, absent fundamentally fair procedures to determine wheth-
er the misconduct has occurred.’’ 202 The Court is highly deferen-
tial, however, to dismissal decisions based on academic grounds. 203
The most striking application of such due process analysis, to
date, is Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 204 in which a state anti-
discrimination law required the enforcing agency to convene a fact-
finding conference within 120 days of the filing of the complaint.
Inadvertently, the Commission scheduled the hearing after the ex-
piration of the 120 days and the state courts held the requirement
to be jurisdictional, necessitating dismissal of the complaint. The
Court held that Logan had been denied due process. His cause of
action was a property interest; older cases had clearly established
causes of action as property and, in any event, Logan’s claim was
an entitlement grounded in state law and it could be removed only
200 Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976). ‘‘On its face,’’ the Court noted, ‘‘the or-
dinance on which [claimant relied] may fairly be read as conferring’’ both ‘‘a prop-
erty interest in employment . . . [and] an enforceable expectation of continued pub-
lic employment.’’ Id. at 344–45. The district court’s decision had been affirmed by
an equally divided appeals court and the Supreme Court deferred to the presumed
greater expertise of the lower court judges in reading the ordinance. Id. at 345.
201 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). Cf. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978)
(measure of damages for violation of procedural due process in school suspension

context). And see Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978) (whether liberty
or property interest implicated in academic dismissals and discipline, as contrasted
to disciplinary actions).
202 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975). See also Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S.
55 (1979) (horse trainer’s license); O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447
U.S. 773 (1980) (statutory entitlement of nursing home residents protecting them
in the enjoyment of assistance and care.)
203 Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985). Al-
though the Court ‘‘assume[d] the existence of a constitutionally protectible property

interest in . . . continued enrollment’’ in a state university, this limited constitu-
tional right is violated only by a showing that dismissal resulted from ‘‘such a sub-
stantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person
or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment.’’ 474 U.S.
at 225.
204 455 U.S. 422 (1982). A different majority of the Court also found an equal
protection denial. Id. at 438, 443.

‘‘for cause.’’ That property interest existed independently of the

120-day time period and could not simply be taken away by agency
action or inaction. 205 Beyond statutory entitlements, the Court has
looked to state decisional law to find that private utilities may not
terminate service at will but only for cause, for nonpayment of
charges, so that when there was a dispute about payment or the
accuracy of charges, due process required the utility to follow pro-
cedures to resolve the dispute prior to terminating service. 206
With respect to liberty, the Court has followed a somewhat
more meandering path, but it has arrived at the same place. In
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 207 it invalidated a statutory scheme
by which a person, without any opportunity for a hearing and re-
buttal, could be labeled an ‘‘excessive drinker’’ and barred from
places where alcohol was served; without discussing the source of
the entitlement, the Court noted that governmental action was
stigmatizing the individual’s reputation, honor, and integrity. But,
in Paul v. Davis, 208 the Court looked exclusively to positive statu-
tory enactments to determine whether a liberty interest was enti-
tled to protection. Davis involved official defamation of someone—
the police included plaintiff’s photograph and name on a list of ‘‘ac-
tive shoplifters’’ circulated to merchants—but the Court held that
damage to reputation alone did not constitute a deprivation of any
interest that the due process clause protected. 209 ‘‘Kentucky law
does not extend to respondent any legal guarantee of present enjoy-
ment of reputation which has been altered as a result of petition-
ers’ actions. Rather, his interest in reputation is simply one of a
number which the State may protect against injury by virtue of its
tort law, providing a forum for vindication of those interest by
means of damage actions.’’ 210
A number of liberty interest cases involve prisoner rights and
are dealt with in the section on criminal due process. But in terms
of the emphasis upon positive entitlements, it is useful to treat
205 Id. at 428–33.
206 Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
207 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
208 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
209 The Court, id. at 701–10, distinguished Constantineau as being a ‘‘reputa-
tion-plus’’ case. That is, it involved not only the stigmatizing of one posted but it
also ‘‘deprived the individual of a right previously held under state law—the right
to purchase or obtain liquor in common with the rest of the citizenry.’’ Id. at 708.
How the state law positively did this the Court did not explain. But, of course, the
reputation-plus concept is now well-settled. Supra, p. 1727 n.197. And see Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972); Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991).
210 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711–12 (1976). In a subsequent case, the Court
looked to decisional law and the existence of common-law remedies as establishing

a protected property interest. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S.
1, 9–12 (1978).
them briefly here. In Meachum v. Fano, 211 the Court held that a
state prisoner was not entitled to a factfinding hearing when he is
transferred to a different prison in which the conditions were sub-
stantially less favorable to him, because (1) the due process clause
liberty interest by itself is satisfied by the initial valid conviction
which had deprived him of liberty, and (2) no state law guaranteed
him the right to remain in the prison to which he was initially as-
signed, subject to transfer for cause of some sort. Under state law,
a prisoner could be transferred for any reason or for no reason, and
the due process clause did not mandate a different result. The deci-
sion of prison officials, therefore, was not dependent upon any state
of facts that would be found upon a hearing. But in Vitek v.
Jones, 212 a protected entitlement interest was found. The state
statute at issue permitted transfer of a prisoner to a state mental
hospital for treatment, but the transfer could be effectuated only
upon a finding, by a designated physician or psychologist, that the
prisoner ‘‘suffers from a mental disease or defect’’ and ‘‘cannot be
given treatment in that facility.’’ Because the transfer was condi-
tioned upon a ‘‘cause,’’ the establishment of the facts necessary to
show the cause had to be done through fair procedures.
However, the Vitek Court also held that, independent of the
statutory entitlement, the prisoner had a ‘‘residuum of liberty’’ in
being free from the different confinement and from the stigma of
involuntary commitment for mental disease that the due process
clause protected. Thus, the Court has recognized, in this case and
in the cases involving revocation of parole or probation, 213 a liberty
interest that is separate from a positivist entitlement and that can
be taken away only through proper procedures. But with respect to
the possibility of parole or commutation or otherwise more rapid
release, no matter how much the expectancy matters to a prisoner,
in the absence of some form of positive entitlement, the prisoner
may be turned down without observance of procedures. 214 Summa-
rizing its prior holdings, the Court recently concluded that two re-
quirements must be present before a liberty interest is created in
the prison context: the statute or regulation must contain ‘‘sub-
stantive predicates’’ limiting the exercise of discretion, and there
211 427 U.S. 215 (1976). See also Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976).
212 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
213 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778
(1973).
214 Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979); Connecticut Bd.
of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981); Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14
(1981). See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (due process applies to for-
feiture of good-time credits and other positivist granted privileges of prisoners).
must be explicit ‘‘mandatory language’’ requiring a particular out-

come if substantive predicates are found. 215
In Ingraham v. Wright, 216 the Court, unanimously, agreed
that freedom from wrongfully or excessively administered corporal
punishment was a liberty interest of school children protected by
the due process clause irrespective of positive state protection. ‘‘The
liberty preserved from deprivation without due process included
the right ‘generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men.’ . . . Among the historic liberties so protected was a right to
be free from, and to obtain judicial relief for, unjustified intrusions
on personal security.’’ 217
In Arnett v. Kennedy, 218 three Justices sought to qualify the
principle laid down in the entitlement cases and to restore in effect
much of the right-privilege distinction in a new formulation. Deal-
ing with a federal law conferring upon employees the right not to
be discharged except for cause, the Justices acknowledged the prior
formulation that recognized that due process rights could be cre-
ated through statutory grants of entitlements, but they went on to
observe that the same law withheld the procedural provisions now
contended for; in other words, ‘‘the property interest which appellee
had in his employment was itself conditioned by the procedural
limitations which had accompanied the grant of that interest.’’ 219
Congress (and state legislatures) could qualify the conferral of an
interest the due process clause might otherwise require.
But the other six Justices, while disagreeing among themselves
in other respects, rejected this attempt so to formulate the issue.
‘‘This view misconceives the origin of the right to procedural due
process,’’ Justice Powell wrote. ‘‘That right is conferred not by legis-
lative grace but by constitutional guarantee. While the legislature
215 Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 459–63 (1989)
(prison regulations listing categories of visitors who may be excluded, but not creat-
ing a right to have a visitor admitted, contain ‘‘substantive predicates’’ but lack
mandatory language).
216 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
217 Id. at 673. The family-related liberties discussed under substantive due proc-
ess, as well as the associational and privacy ones, no doubt provide a fertile source
of liberty interests for procedural protection. See Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545
(1965) (natural father, with visitation rights, must be given notice and opportunity
to be heard with respect to impending adoption proceedings); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972) (unwed father could not simply be presumed unfit to have custody
of his children because his interest in his children warrants deference and protec-
tion). See also Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977); Little
v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981); Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S.
18 (1981); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
218 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
219 Id. at 155 (Justices Rehnquist and Stewart and Chief Justice Burger).
may elect not to confer a property interest in federal employment,

it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an in-
terest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural safe-
guards.’’ 220 Yet, in Bishop v. Wood, 221 the Court appeared to come
close to adopting the three-Justice Arnett position, the dissenters
accusing the majority of having repudiated the majority position in
Arnett, and in Goss v. Lopez, 222 while the opinion of the Court stat-
ed the expressed formulation of Justice Powell in Arnett, the Jus-
tice himself dissented, using language quite similar to the
Rehnquist Arnett language. More recently, however, first in a lib-
erty interest case and then in a property interest case, the Court
has squarely held that because ‘‘‘minimum [procedural] require-
ments [are] a matter of federal law, they are not diminished by the
fact that the State may have specified its own procedures that it
may deem adequate for determining the preconditions to adverse
action.’ . . . Indeed, any other conclusion would allow the State to
destroy at will virtually any state-created property interest.’’ 223
Substantive entitlements, therefore, may owe their existence to
positive enactment, but the procedural protections are found in the
judiciary’s reading of the due process clause.
Proceedings in Which Procedural Due Process Must Be
Observed.—While due notice and a reasonable opportunity to be
heard to present one’s claim or defense have been declared to be
two fundamental conditions almost universally prescribed in all
systems of law established by civilized countries, 224 there are cer-
tain proceedings appropriate for the determination of various rights
in which the enjoyment of these two conditions has not been
deemed to be constitutionally necessary. Thus, persons adversely
affected by a specific law cannot challenge its validity on the
ground that the legislative body or one of its committees gave no
notice of proposed legislation, held no hearings at which the person
could have presented his arguments, and gave no consideration to
particular points of view. ‘‘Where a rule of conduct applies to more
220 Id. at 167 (Justices Powell and Blackmun concurring). See id. at 177 (Justice
White concurring and dissenting), 203 (Justice Douglas dissenting), 206 (Justices
Marshall, Douglas, and Brennan dissenting).
221 426 U.S. 341 (1976). A five-to-four decision, the opinion was written by Jus-
tice Stevens, replacing Justice Douglas, and was joined by Justice Powell, who had
disagreed with the theory in Arnett. See id. at 350, 353 n.4, 355 (dissenting opin-
ions). The language is ambiguous and appears at different points to adopt both posi-
tions. But see id. at 345, 347.
222 419 U.S. 565, 573–74 (1975). See id. at 584, 586–87 (Justice Powell dissent-
ing).
223 Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432 (1982) (quoting Vitek v.
Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980)).

224 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 110 (1908); Jacob v. Roberts, 223 U.S.
261, 265 (1912).

than a few people it is impracticable that everyone should have a

direct voice in its adoption. The Constitution does not require all
public acts to be done in town meeting or an assembly of the whole.
General statutes within the state power are passed that affect the
person or property of individuals, sometimes to the point of ruin,
without giving them a chance to be heard. Their rights are pro-
tected in the only way that they can be in a complex society, by
their power, immediate or remote, over those who make the
rule.’’ 225 Similarly, when an administrative agency engages in a
legislative function, as, for example, when in pursuance of statu-
tory authorization it drafts regulations of general application af-
fecting an unknown number of persons, it need not, any more than
does a legislative assembly, afford a hearing prior to promulga-
tion. 226 On the other hand, if a regulation, sometimes denominated
an ‘‘order,’’ is of limited application, that is, affects the property or
interests of specific named or nameable individuals or an identifi-
able class of persons, the question whether notice and hearing is
required and, if so, whether it must precede such action becomes
a matter of greater urgency and must be determined by evaluation
of the factors discussed herein. 227
‘‘It is not an indispensable requirement of due process that
every procedure affecting the ownership or disposition of property
be exclusively by judicial proceeding. Statutory proceedings affect-
ing property rights which, by later resort to the courts, secures to
adverse parties an opportunity to be heard, suitable to the occa-
sion, do not deny due process.’’ 228 In one of the initial decisions
construing the due process clause (this of the Fifth Amendment),
the Court upheld the actions of the Secretary of the Treasury, act-
ing pursuant to statute, to obtain from a collector of customs a sub-
stantial amount of money on which it was claimed he was in ar-
rears. The Treasury simply issued a distress warrant and seized
the collector’s property, affording him no opportunity for a hearing,
and remitting him to suit (the statute waiving the immunity of the
United States) for recovery of his property upon proof that he had
not withheld funds from the Treasury. While acknowledging that
history and settled practice required proceedings in which pleas,
225 Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445–
46 (1915). See also Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57, 58 (1919). And cf. Logan v. Zim-
merman Brush Co., 445 U.S. 422, 432–33 (1982).
226 United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
227 Id. at 245 (distinguishing between rule-making, at which legislative facts are
in issue, and adjudication, at which adjudicative facts are at issue, requiring a hear-
ing in latter proceedings but not in the former). See Londoner v. City of Denver,
210 U.S. 373 (1908).
228 Anderson Nat’l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 246–47 (1944).
answers, and trials were requisite before property could be taken,

the Court observed that the distress collection of debts due the
crown had been the exception to the rule in England and was of
long usage in the United States, and was thus sustainable. 229 In
more modern times, the Court upheld a procedure under which a
state banking superintendent, after having taken over a closed
bank and issued notices to stockholders of their assessment, could
issue execution for the amounts due, subject to the right of each
stockholder, by affidavit of illegality, to contest his liability for such
an assessment. The fact that the execution was issued in the first
instance by a governmental officer and not from a court, followed
by personal notice and a right to take the case into court, was seen
as unobjectionable. 230
A State may not, consistent with the due process clause, en-
force a judgment against a party named in the proceeding without
having given him an opportunity to be heard sometime before final
judgment is entered. 231 With regard to the presentation of every
available defense, however, the requirements of due process do not
necessarily entail affording an opportunity to do so before entry of
judgment. The person may be remitted to other actions initiated by
him 232 or an appeal may suffice. Accordingly, a surety company,
objecting to the entry of a judgment against it on a supersedeas
bond, without notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue
of liability, was not denied due process where the state practice
provided the opportunity for such a hearing by an appeal from the
judgment so entered. Nor could the company found its claim of de-
nial of due process upon the fact that it lost this opportunity for
a hearing by inadvertently pursuing the wrong procedure in the
state courts. 233 On the other hand, where a state appellate court
reversed a trial court and entered a final judgment for the defend-
ant, a plaintiff who had never had an opportunity to introduce evi-
dence in rebuttal to certain testimony which the trial court deemed
immaterial but which the appellate court considered material was
229 Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
272 (1856).
230 Coffin Brothers & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928).
231 Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Newport, 247 U.S. 464, 476 (1918); Baker v.
Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U.S. 294, 403 (1917); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v.
Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230, 236 (1900).
232 Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 65–69 (1972). However, if one would suffer
too severe an injury between the doing and the undoing, he may avoid the alter-
native means. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647 (1972).
233 American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156 (1932). Cf. Logan v. Zimmer-
man Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 429–30, 432–33 (1982).

held to have been deprived of his rights without due process of

law. 234
When Is Process Due.—‘‘The extent to which procedural due
process must be afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent
to which he may be ‘condemned to suffer grievous loss,’ . . . and de-
pends upon whether the recipient’s interest in avoiding that loss
outweighs the governmental interest in summary adjudication.’’ 235
‘‘The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible
procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.’’ 236
Due process application, as has been noted, depends upon the na-
ture of the interest; the form of the due process to be applied is de-
termined by the weight of that interest balanced against the oppos-
ing interests. The currently prevailing standard is that formulated
in Mathews v. Eldridge. 237 ‘‘[I]dentification of the specific dictates
of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct fac-
tors: first, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and probable value, if any, of addi-
tional or substitute procedural safeguards; and, finally, the Govern-
ment’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirements would entail.’’
Whereas, in Goldberg v. Kelly, 238 the effect of termination of
welfare benefits could be ‘‘devastating,’’ a matter of loss of food and
shelter, thus mandating a pre-deprivation hearing, the termination
of Social Security benefits would be considerably different, inas-
much as they are not based on financial need and a terminated re-
cipient would be able to apply for welfare if need be. Moreover, the
determination of ineligibility for Social Security benefits more often
turns upon routine and uncomplicated evaluations of data, reduc-
ing the likelihood of error, a likelihood found significant in Gold-
berg. Finally, the administrative burden and other societal costs in-
volved in giving Social Security recipients a pre-termination hear-
ing would be high. Therefore, a post-termination hearing, with full
retroactive restoration of benefits, if the claimant prevails, was
found satisfactory. 239
234 Saunders v. Shaw, 244 U.S. 317 (1917).
235 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262–63 (1970), (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Justice Frankfurter con-
curring)).
236 Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894–95
(1961).
237 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
238 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970).
239 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339–49 (1976).
Application of the standard and other considerations brought

some noteworthy changes to the process accorded debtors and in-
stallment buyers. For example, the previous cases had focused
upon the interests of the holders of the property in not being un-
justly deprived of the goods and funds in their possession, in re-
quiring pre-deprivation hearings. The newer cases looked to the in-
terests of creditors as well. ‘‘The reality is that both seller and
buyer had current, real interests in the property, and the definition
of property rights is a matter of state law. Resolution of the due
process question must take account not only of the interests of the
buyer of the property but those of the seller as well.’’ 240
Thus, Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 241 mandating a pre-
deprivation hearing before wages may be garnished, is apparently
to be limited to instances when wages, and perhaps certain other
basic necessities, are in issue and the consequences of deprivation
would be severe. 242 Fuentes, which extended the Sniadach prin-
ciple to all ‘‘significant property interests’’ and thus mandated pre-
deprivation hearings, has been limited, so that when government
provides certain procedural protections in structuring the ex parte
judicial determinations that seizure should take place and provides
for a prompt and adequate post-deprivation (but pre-judgment)
hearing, the due process clause is satisfied. 243 To be valid, laws au-
thorizing sequestration, garnishment, or other seizure of property
of an alleged defaulting debtor must require that (1) the creditor
furnish adequate security to protect the debtor’s interest, (2) the
creditor make a specific factual showing before a neutral officer or
magistrate, not a clerk or other such functionary, of probable cause
to believe that he is entitled to the relief requested, and (3) an op-
240 Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 604 (1975). See also id. at 623 (Jus-
tice Powell concurring), 629 (Justices Stewart, Douglas, and Marshall dissenting).
Justice White, who wrote Mitchell and included the balancing language in his dis-
sent in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 99–100 (1972), did not repeat it in North
Georgia Finishing v. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. 601 (1975), but it presumably underlies the
reconciliation of Fuentes and Mitchell in the latter case and the application of Di-
Chem.
241 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
242 North Georgia Finishing v. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. 601, 611 n.2 (1975) (Justice
Powell concurring). The majority opinion draws no such express distinction, see id.
at 605–06, rather emphasizing that Sniadach-Fuentes do require observance of some
due process procedural guarantees. But see Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S.
600, 614 (1974) (opinion of the Court by Justice White emphasizing the wages as-
pect of the earlier case).
243 Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); North Georgia Finishing v.
Di-Chem, 419 U.S. 601 (1975). Fuentes was a decision of uncertain viability from
the beginning, inasmuch as it was four-to-three; argument had been heard prior to
the date Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined the Court, hence neither participated
in the decision. See Di-Chem, supra, 616–19 (Justice Blackmun dissenting); Mitchell,
supra, 635–36 (Justice Stewart dissenting).
portunity be assured for an adversary hearing promptly after sei-

zure to determine the merits of the controversy, with the burden
of proof on the creditor. 244 Efforts to litigate challenges to seizures
in actions involving two private parties can be thwarted by findings
of ‘‘no state action,’’ but there often is sufficient participation by
state officials to constitute state action and implicate due proc-
ess. 245
Similarly, applying the tripartite test of Mathews v. Eldridge
in the context of government employment, the Court has held, al-
beit by a combination of divergent opinions, that the interest of the
employee in retaining his job, the governmental interest in the ex-
peditious removal of unsatisfactory employees and the avoidance of
administrative burdens, and the risk of an erroneous termination
require the provision of some minimum pre-termination notice and
opportunity to respond, although there need not be a formal adver-
sary hearing, followed by a full post-termination hearing, complete
with all the procedures normally accorded and back pay if the em-
ployee is successful. 246 In other cases, hearings of even minimum
procedures have been dispensed with when what is to be estab-
244 Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 615–18 (1974), and id. at 623 (Jus-
tice Powell concurring). And see Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 188 (1974) (Jus-
tice White concurring in part and dissenting in part). More recently, the Court has
applied a variant of the Mathews v. Eldridge formula in holding that Connecticut’s
prejudgment attachment statute, which ‘‘fail[ed] to provide a preattachment hearing
without at least requiring a showing of some exigent circumstance,’’ operated to
deny equal protection. Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 18 (1991). ‘‘[T]he relevant
inquiry requires, as in Mathews, first, consideration of the private interest that will
be affected by the prejudgment measure; second, an examination of the risk of erro-
neous deprivation through the procedures under attack and the probable value of
additional or alternative safeguards; and third, in contrast to Mathews, principal at-
tention to the interest of the party seeking the prejudgment remedy, with, nonethe-
less, due regard for any ancillary interest the government may have in providing
the procedure or forgoing the added burden of providing greater protections.’’ Id. at
11.
245 Compare Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (no state action in
warehouseman’s sale of goods for nonpayment of storage, as authorized by state

law), with Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) (state officials’ joint
participation with private party in effecting prejudgment attachment of property);
and Tulsa Professional Collection Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988) (probate court
was sufficiently involved with actions activating time bar in ‘‘nonclaim’’ statute).
246 Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 170–71 (1974) (Justice Powell concurring),
and id. at 195–96 (Justice White concurring in part and dissenting in part); Cleve-
land Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (discharge of state government
employee). In Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979), the Court held that the state in-
terest in assuring the integrity of horse racing carried on under its auspices justified
an interim suspension without a hearing once it established the existence of certain
facts, provided that a prompt judicial or administrative hearing would follow sus-
pension at which the issues could be determined was assured. FDIC v. Mallen, 486
U.S. 230 (1988) (strong public interest in the integrity of the banking industry justi-
fies suspension of indicted bank official with no pre-suspension hearing, and with
90-day delay before decision resulting from post-suspension hearing).
lished is so pro forma or routine that the likelihood of error is very

small. 247 In the case dealing with the negligent state failure to ob-
serve a procedural deadline, the Court held that the claimant was
entitled to a hearing with the agency to pass upon the merits of
his claim prior to dismissal of his action. 248
In Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., a Court plurality applied
similar analysis to governmental regulation of private employment,
determining that a full evidentiary hearing is not required to safe-
guard the interests of an employer prior to the ordered reinstate-
ment of an employee dismissed for cause, but that the employer is
entitled to be informed of the substance of the employee’s charges,
and to have an opportunity for informal rebuttal. 249 The principal
difference with the Mathews v. Eldridge test was that here the
Court acknowledged two conflicting private interests to weigh in
the equation: that of the employer ‘‘in controlling the makeup of its
workforce’’ and that of the employee in not being discharged for
whistleblowing. Whether the case signals a shift away from evi-
dentiary hearing requirements in the context of regulatory adju-
dication will depend on future developments. 250
In another respect, the balancing standard has resulted in an
alteration of previously existing law, requiring neither a pre- nor
post-termination hearing in some instances when the State affords
the claimant an alternative remedy, such as a judicial action for
damages. Thus, passing on the infliction of corporal punishment in
the public schools, a practice which implicated protected liberty in-
terests, the Court held that the existence of common-law tort rem-
edies for wrongful or excessive administration of punishment, plus
the context in which it was administered (i.e., the ability of the
teacher to observe directly the infraction in question, the openness
of the school environment, the visibility of the confrontation to
other students and faculty, and the likelihood of parental reaction
to unreasonableness in punishment), made reasonably assured the
probability that a child would be not punished without cause or ex-
cessively. The Court did not inquire about the availability of judi-
247 E.g., Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977) (when suspension of drivers’ license
is automatic upon conviction of a certain number of offenses, no hearing is required

because there can be no dispute about facts).
248 Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
249 481 U.S. 252 (1987). Justice Marshall’s plurality opinion was joined by Jus-
tices Blackmun, Powell, and O’Connor; Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia
joined Justice White’s opinion taking a somewhat narrower view of due process re-
quirements but supporting the plurality’s general approach. Justices Brennan and
Stevens would have required confrontation and cross-examination.
250 For analysis of the case’s implications, see Rakoff, Brock v. Roadway Ex-
press, Inc., and the New Law of Regulatory Due Process, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 157.
cial remedies for such violation in the State in which the case
arose. 251
More expressly adopting the tort remedy theory, the Court in
Parratt v. Taylor 252 held that the loss of a prisoner’s mail-ordered
goods through the negligence of prison officials constituted a depri-
vation of property, but that the State’s post-deprivation tort-claims
procedure afforded adequate due process. When a state officer or
employee acts negligently, the Court recognized, there is no way
that the State can provide a pre-termination hearing; the real
question, therefore, is what kind of post-deprivation hearing is suf-
ficient. When the action complained of is the result of the unau-
thorized failure of agents to follow established procedures and
there is no contention that the procedures themselves are inad-
equate, the due process clause is satisfied by the provision of a ju-
dicial remedy which the claimant must initiate. 253 Five years later,
however, the Court overruled Parratt, holding that ‘‘the Due Proc-
ess Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official
causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property.’’ 254
Hence, there is no requirement for procedural due process stem-
ming from such negligent acts and no resulting basis for suit under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of rights deriving from the Con-
stitution. Prisoners may resort to state tort law in such cir-
cumstances, but neither the Constitution nor § 1983 provides a fed-
eral remedy.
In Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 255 the Court had distin-
guished between property 256 deprivations resulting from random
and unauthorized acts of state employees and those resulting from
operation of established state procedures, and presumably this dis-
tinction still holds. Post deprivation procedures would not satisfy
251 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 680–82 (1977). In Memphis Light, Gas
& Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 19–22 (1987), involving cutoff of utility service
for non-payment of bills, the Court rejected the argument that common-law rem-
edies were sufficient to obviate the pre-termination hearing requirement.
252 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
253 Id. at 541, 543–44.
254 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (involving negligent acts by
prison officials).
255 455 U.S. 422, 435–36 (1982). The Court also emphasized that a post-depriva-
tion hearing in the context of this case would be inadequate. ‘‘That is particularly
true where, as here, the State’s only post-termination process comes in the form of
an independent tort action. Seeking redress through a tort suit is apt to be a
lengthy and speculative process, which in a situation such as this one will never
make the complainant entirely whole.’’ Id. at 436–37.
256 Parratt was a property loss case and while Ingraham was a liberty case the
holding there was not that, standing alone, a tort remedy was an adequate process.
It is not clear, therefore, that a tort remedy could ever be an adequate substitute
for some kind of hearing in a liberty loss situation.
due process deprivations if it is ‘‘the state system itself that de-

stroys a complainant’s property interest.’’
In ‘‘rare and extraordinary situations,’’ 257 where summary ac-
tion is necessary to prevent imminent harm to the public, and the
private interest infringed is reasonably deemed to be of less impor-
tance, government can take action with no notice and no oppor-
tunity to defend, subject to a full later hearing. Examples are sei-
zure of contaminated foods or drugs or other such commodities to
protect the consumer. 258 Other possibilities are the collection of
governmental revenues 259 and the seizure of enemy property in
wartime. 260 Citing national security interests, the Court upheld an
order, issued without notice and an opportunity to be heard, ex-
cluding a short-order cook employed by a concessionaire from a
Naval Gun Factory, but the basis of the five-to-four decision is un-
clear. 261 On the one hand, the Court was ambivalent about a right-
privilege distinction; 262 on the other hand, it contrasted the limited
interest of the cook—barred from the base, she was still free to
work at a number of the concessionaire’s other premises—with the
Government’s interest in conducting a high-security program. 263
Finally, one may waive his due process rights, though as with
other constitutional rights the waiver must be knowing and vol-
untary. 264
The Requirements of Due Process.—Bearing in mind that
due process tolerates variances in form ‘‘appropriate to the nature
of the case,’’ 265 it is nonetheless possible to indicate generally the
basic requirements. ‘‘[P]rocedural due process rules are shaped by
the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to
the generality of cases.’’ 266 ‘‘Procedural due process rules are
meant to protect persons not from the deprivation, but from the
257 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 n.7 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402
U.S. 535, 542 (1971). See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 538–40 (1981).
258 North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908);
Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U.S. 594 (1950). See also Fahey v. Mallonee,
332 U.S. 245 (1948). Cf. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1979).
259 Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 597 (1931).
260 Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554, 566 (1921). See also
Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944).

261 Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
262 Id. at 894, 895, 896.
263 Id. at 896–98. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 n.10 (1970); Board
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 575 (1972); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 152
(1974) (plurality opinion), and id. at 181–83 (Justice White concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
264 D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972). See also Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 94–96 (1972).

265 Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
266 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976).
mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property.’’ 267

The rules ‘‘minimize substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations’’
by enabling persons to contest the basis upon which a State pro-
poses to deprive them of protected interests. 268 Thus, after the de-
termination of the existence of a protected interest at issue, it must
still be determined what procedure is adequate.
(1) Notice. ‘‘An elementary and fundamental requirement of
due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is no-
tice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections.’’ 269 The notice must be suf-
ficient to enable the recipient to determine what is being proposed
and what he must do to prevent the deprivation of his interest. 270
Ordinarily, service of the notice must be reasonably structured to
assure that the person to whom it is directed receives it. 271
(2) Hearing. ‘‘[S]ome form of hearing is required before an indi-
vidual is finally deprived of a property [or liberty] interest.’’ 272
‘‘Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be
heard.’’ 273 The notice of hearing and the opportunity to be heard
‘‘must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful man-
ner.’’ 274 ‘‘The constitutional right to be heard is a basic aspect of
the duty of government to follow a fair process of decision making
when it acts to deprive a person of his possessions. The purpose of
this requirement is not only to ensure abstract fair play to the indi-
vidual. Its purpose, more particularly, is to protect his use and pos-
session of property from arbitrary encroachment. . . .’’ 275 The
Court has in recent years developed a complex calculus to deter-
mine whether a hearing should precede the deprivation or whether
a prompt post-deprivation hearing would be adequate. Generally,
where the loss, even temporarily, would be severe or catastrophic,
the hearing must come first; 276 where a temporary deprivation
267 Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978).
268 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972). At times, the Court has also
stressed the dignitary importance of procedural rights, the worth of being able to
defend one’s interests even if one cannot change the result. Carey v. Piphus, 435
U.S. 247, 266–67 (1978); Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980).
269 Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
270 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267–68 (1970).
271 Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965); Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409
U.S. 38 (1974); Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982).

272 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
273 Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1863).
274 Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
275 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80–81 (1972). See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170–71 (1951) (Justice Frankfurter concur-
ring).
276 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,
395 U.S. 337 (1969).

would be less severe and the opposing interest is important, the

hearing may come later, 277 so long as it is promptly assured. 278
Too, the nature of what must be shown will be taken into account.
Where the showing to be established is largely formal or subject to
substantial documentary evidence, a post-termination hearing may
suffice, 279 while in cases in which the evidence is largely subjective
and dependent upon the personal appearance of the claimant the
hearing must ordinarily precede the loss and the circumstance may
require a more highly structured proceeding. 280 Sometimes, be-
cause of the nature of the opposing interest and the circumstances
of the determination, the hearing need involve only minimal for-
mality. 281 The hearing requirement does not depend upon an ad-
vance showing that the claimant will prevail at such a hearing. 282
While written presentations may be acceptable in some situations,
in others the issue of veracity may necessitate oral presentation or
oral examination of witnesses, or the petitioner may not have the
ability to present his case in writing. 283
(3) Impartial Tribunal. Just as in criminal and quasi-criminal
cases, 284 ‘‘an impartial decision maker’’ is an ‘‘essential’’ right in
civil proceedings as well. 285 ‘‘The neutrality requirement helps to
guarantee that life, liberty, or property will not be taken on the
basis of an erroneous or distorted conception of the facts or the law.
. . . At the same time, it preserves both the appearance and reality
of fairness . . . by ensuring that no person will be deprived of his
interests in the absence of a proceeding in which he may present
his case with assurance that the arbiter is not predisposed to find
against him.’’ 286 Thus, the conduct of deportation hearings by a
person who, while he had not investigated the case heard, was also
an investigator who must judge the results of others’ investigations
just as one of them would some day judge his, raised a substantial
problem which was resolved through statutory construction. 287 But
277 Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976); Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979).

278 Id. at 66.
279 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343–45 (1976); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant
Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13–17 (1979); Barry v.
Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 65–66 (1979).
280 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
281 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (temporary suspension of student from
school). See also Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978).

282 Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413, 424 (1915).
283 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266–67 (1970); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 343–45 (1976). See also FCC v. WJR, 337 U.S. 265, 275–77 (1949).
284 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
285 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970).
286 Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980); Schweiker v. McClure, 456
U.S. 188, 195 (1982).

287 Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
there is a ‘‘presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving

as adjudicators,’’ 288 so that the burden is on the objecting party to
show a conflict of interest or some other specific reason for dis-
qualification of a specific officer or for disapproval of the system.
It is not, without more, a violation of due process to combine inves-
tigating and adjudicating functions in the same agency, 289 al-
though the question of combination of functions is a substantial one
in administrative law. 290 A showing of bias or of strong implica-
tions of bias was deemed made in a case in which the state optom-
etry board, which was made up only of private practitioners, was
proceeding against other licensed optometrists for unprofessional
conduct, because they were employed by corporations. Since success
in the board’s effort would redound to the personal benefit of pri-
vate practitioners, the Court thought the interest of the board
members to be sufficient to disqualify them. 291 However, the Court
held that school board members did not have such an official or
personal stake in the decision as to disqualify them from making
the decision whether to fire teachers who had engaged in a strike
against the school system in violation of state law. 292 A lesser
standard of impartiality applies to an administrative officer who
acts in a prosecutorial role. 293
(4) Confrontation and Cross-Examination. ‘‘In almost every set-
ting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due proc-
ess requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses.’’ 294 Where the ‘‘evidence consists of the testimony of in-
dividuals whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be
perjurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intoler-
ance, prejudice, or jealously,’’ the individual’s right to show that it
is untrue depends on the rights of confrontation and cross-examina-
tion. ‘‘This Court has been zealous to protect these rights from ero-
288 Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982); Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S.
35, 47 (1975); United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941).
289 Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
290 Id. at 51.
291 Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
292 Hortonville Joint School Dist. v. Hortonville Educ. Ass’n, 426 U.S. 482
(1976). Compare Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 170 n.5 (1974) (Justice Powell),
with id. at 196–99 (Justice White), and 216 (Justice Marshall).
293 Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238, 248–50 (1980) (regional administrator as-
sessing fines for child labor violations, with penalties going into fund to reimburse
cost of system of enforcing child labor laws). But ‘‘traditions of prosecutorial discre-
tion do not immunize from judicial scrutiny cases in which enforcement decisions
of an administrator were motivated by improper factors or were otherwise contrary
to law.’’ Id. at 249.
294 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970). See also ICC v. Louisville &
Nashville R.R., 227 U.S. 88, 93–94 (1913); Willner v. Committee on Character, 373
U.S. 96, 103–04 (1963). Cf. § 7(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 556(d).
sion. It has spoken out not only in criminal cases, . . . but also in
all types of cases where administrative . . . actions were under
scrutiny.’’ 295
(5) Discovery. The Court has never directly confronted this
issue, but in one case it did observe in dictum. ‘‘[W]here govern-
mental action seriously injures an individual, and the reasonable-
ness of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to
prove the Government’s case must be disclosed to the individual so
that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue.’’ 296 Some fed-
eral agencies have adopted discovery rules modeled on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Administrative Conference has
recommended that all do so. 297 There appear to be no cases, how-
ever, holding they must, and there is some authority that they can-
not absent congressional authorization. 298
(6) Decision on the Record. [T]he decisionmaker’s conclusion as
to a recipients’ eligibility must rest solely on the legal rules and
evidence adduced at the hearing. . . . To demonstrate compliance
with this elementary requirement, the decisionmaker should state
the reasons for his determination and indicate the evidence he re-
lied on . . . though his statement need not amount to a full opinion
or even formal findings of fact and conclusions of law.’’ 299
(7) Counsel. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 300 the Court held that an
agency must permit the recipient to be represented by and assisted
by counsel. It did not, however, decide that the agency must pro-
vide counsel for one unable to afford his own and did not decide
that the agency need not do so. In the years since, the right of civil
litigants in court and persons before agencies who could not afford
retained counsel has excited much controversy, and while quite re-
cently the Court has applied its balancing standard to require a
case-by-case determination with respect to the right to appointed
295 Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496–97 (1959). But see Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971) (where authors of documentary evidence are known to
petitioner and he did not subpoena them, he may not complain that agency relied
on that evidence). Cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343–45 (1976).
296 Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959), quoted with approval in Gold-
berg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970).

297 Recommendations and Reports of the Administrative Conference of the Unit-
ed States 571 (1968–1970).

298 FMC v. Anglo-Canadian Shipping Co., 335 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1964);
Fairbank v. Hardin, 429 F.2d 264, 268 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970).
299 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970). The exclusiveness of the record
is fundamental in administrative law. See 7(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act,

5 U.S.C. § 556(e). However, one must show not only that the agency used ex parte
evidence but that he was prejudiced thereby. Market Street Ry. v. Railroad Comm’n,
324 U.S. 548 (1945) (agency decision supported by evidence in record, its decision
sustained, disregarding ex parte evidence).
300 397 U.S. 254, 270–71 (1970).
counsel, the matter seems far from settled. In a case involving a

state proceeding to terminate the parental rights of an indigent
without providing her counsel, the Court recognized as ‘‘an ex-
tremely important one’’ the parent’s interest, but observed that the
State’s interest in protecting the welfare of children was likewise
very important. The interest in correct factfinding was strong on
both sides, but, the Court thought, the proceeding was relatively
simple, no features were present raising a risk of criminal liability,
no expert witnesses were present, and no ‘‘specially troublesome’’
substantive or procedural issues had been raised. 301 But what
tipped the scale in the Court’s decision not to require counsel in
this case was the ‘‘pre-eminent generalization it drew from its
precedents that an indigent has an absolute right to appointed
counsel only where he may lose his physical liberty if he loses the
litigation. 302 Thus, in all other situations when liberty or property
interests are present, the right of an indigent to appointed counsel
is to be determined on a case-by-case basis, initially by the trial
judge, subject to appellate review. 303 In other due process cases in-
volving parental rights, the Court has held that due process re-
quires special state attention to parental rights, 304 and it is to be
supposed that the counsel issue will recur.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS—CRIMINAL
Generally
The Supreme Court’s guardianship of state criminal justice
systems under the due process clause has never been subject to
precise statement of metes and bounds. Rather, the Court in each
case must ask whether the challenged practice or policy violates ‘‘a
fundamental principle of liberty and justice which inheres in the
301 Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981). The decision
was a five-to-four one, Justices Stewart, White, Powell, and Rehnquist and Chief
Justice Burger in the majority, Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens
in dissent. Id. at 35, 59.
302 Id. at 25–27. The Court purported to draw the distinction from Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (no per se right to counsel in probation revocation pro-
ceedings). To introduce this presumption into the balancing, however, appears to
disregard the fact that the first factor of Mathews v. Eldridge, upon which the Court
(and dissent) relied, relates to the importance of the interest to the person claiming
the right, thus, at least in this context, reducing the value of the first Eldridge fac-
tor.
303 Id. at 452 U.S., 31–32. The Mathews v. Eldridge standards were drafted in
the context of the generality of cases and were not intended for case-by-case applica-
tion Cf. 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976).
304 E.g., Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981) (indigent entitled to state-funded
blood testing in a paternity action the State required to be instituted); Santosky v.

Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (imposition of higher standard of proof in case involv-
ing state termination of parental rights).
very idea of a free government and is the inalienable right of a citi-

zen of such government.’’ 1 The question is whether a claimed right
is ‘‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’’ whether it partakes
‘‘of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty.’’ 2 Inevitably,
judgment expresses a determination that certain practices do or do
not ‘‘offend those canons of decency and fairness which express the
notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward those
charged with the most heinous offenses.’’ 3 More recently, the Court
has eschewed as too abstract an inquiry as to whether some proce-
dural safeguard was necessary before a system could be imagined
which would be regarded as civilized without that safeguard. Rath-
er, ‘‘[t]he recent cases . . . have proceeded upon the valid assump-
tion that state criminal processes are not imaginary and theoretical
schemes but actual systems bearing virtually every characteristic
of the common-law system that has been developing contempora-
neously in England and in this country. The question thus is
whether given this kind of system a particular procedure is fun-
damental—whether, that is, a procedure is necessary to an Anglo-
American regime of ordered liberty. . . . [Therefore the limitations
imposed by the Court on the States are] not necessarily fundamen-
tal to fairness in every criminal system that might be imagined but
[are] fundamental in the context of the criminal processes main-
tained by the American States.’’ 4
Applying this analysis the Court in recent years has held that
practically all the criminal procedural guarantees of the Bill of
Rights—the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments—con-
tain limitations which are fundamental to state criminal justice
systems and that the absence of one or the other particular guaran-
tees denies a suspect or a defendant due process of law. 5 However,
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not limited
to those specific guarantees spelled out in the Bill of Rights, 6 but
rather contains protection against practices and policies which may
fall short of fundamental fairness without running afoul of a spe-
cific provision. 7
1 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106 (1908).
2 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
3 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952).
4 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968).
5 Supra, pp. 957–64.
6 Justice Black thought the Fourteenth Amendment should be limited in this re-
gard to the specific guarantees found elsewhere in the Bill of Rights. See, e.g., In
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 377 (1970) (dissenting). For Justice Harlan’s response, see
id. at 372 n.5 (concurring).
7 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), held that, despite the absence of a specific
constitutional provision requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases,

such proof is a due process requirement. For other recurrences to general due proc-
ess reasoning, as distinct from reliance on more specific Bill of Rights provisions,
The Elements of Due Process

Clarity in Criminal Statutes: The Void-for-Vagueness
Doctrine.—‘‘Legislation may run afoul of the Due Process Clause
because it fails to give adequate guidance to those who would be
law-abiding, to advise defendants of the nature of the offense with
which they are charged, or to guide courts in trying those who are
accused.’’ 8 Acts which are made criminal ‘‘must be defined with ap-
propriate definiteness.’’ 9 ‘‘There must be ascertainable standards of
guilt. Men of common intelligence cannot be required to guess at
the meaning of the enactment. The vagueness may be from uncer-
tainty in regard to persons within the scope of the act . . . or in
regard to the applicable tests to ascertain guilt.’’ 10 Statutes which
lack the requisite definiteness or specificity are commonly held
‘‘void for vagueness.’’ Such a statute may be pronounced wholly un-
constitutional (unconstitutional ‘‘on its face’’), 11 or, if the statute
could be applied to both prohibitable and to protected conduct and
its valuable effects outweigh its potential general harm, it could be
held unconstitutional as applied. 12 Generally, a vague statute that
regulates in the area of First Amendment guarantees will be pro-
nounced wholly void, 13 while one that does not reach such pro-
tected conduct will either be upheld because it is applied to clearly
proscribable conduct, or voided as applied when the conduct is mar-
ginal and the proscription is unclear. 14
see, e.g., Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S.
470 (1973); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S.
501 (1976); Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145 (1977); Patterson v. New York, 432
U.S. 197 (1977); Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978); Kentucky v. Whorton, 441
U.S. 786 (1979); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979); Hicks v. Oklahoma,
447 U.S. 343 (1980).
8 Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 97 (1948). ‘‘Vague laws offend several important
values. First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and un-
lawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reason-
able opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague
laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warnings. Second, if arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards
for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters
to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis,
with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory applications.’’ Grayned
v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972), quoted in Village of Hoffman Es-
tates v. The Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982).
9 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940).
10 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515–16 (1948). Cf. Colten v. Kentucky,
407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972).

11 Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Smith v. Goguen,
415 U.S. 566 (1974).

12 Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 (1971); Village of Hoffman Estates v.
The Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 494–95 (1982).

13 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 509–10 (1948); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88 (1940).
14 E.g., United States v. National Dairy Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963).
The Court voided for vagueness a statute providing that any

person not engaged in any lawful occupation, known to be a mem-
ber of any gang consisting of two or more persons, who had been
convicted at least three times of being a disorderly person, or who
had been convicted of any crime in that or any other State, is to
be considered a gangster and subject to fine or imprisonment. The
Court observed that neither at the common law nor by statute are
the words ‘‘gang’’ and ‘‘gangster’’ given definite meaning, that the
enforcing agencies and courts were free to construe the terms
broadly or narrowly, and that the phrase ‘‘known to be a member’’
was ambiguous. The statute was held void on its face, and the
Court refused to allow specification of details in the particular in-
dictment to save it because it was the statute, not the accusation,
that prescribed the rule to govern conduct. 15
Possibly concluding a controversy of long standing with regard
to the validity of vagrancy laws as generally written, 16 a unani-
mous Court in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville 17 struck down
for vagueness an ordinance which punished ‘‘dissolute persons who
go about begging, . . . common night walkers, . . . common railers
and brawlers, persons wandering or strolling around from place to
place without any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafers, . . .
persons neglecting all lawful business and habitually spending
their time by frequenting house of ill fame, gaming houses, or
places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served, persons able to
work but habitually living upon the earnings of their wives or
minor children. . . .’’ The ordinance was invalid, said Justice Doug-
las for the Court, because it did not give fair notice, did not require
specific intent to commit an unlawful act, permitted and encour-
aged arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions, committed too
much discretion to policemen, and criminalized activities which by
modern standards are normally innocent. Similarly, an ordinance
making it a criminal offense for three or more persons to assemble
on a sidewalk and conduct themselves in a manner annoying to
passers-by was impermissibly vague; because it encroached on the
freedom of assembly it was void on its face. 18 But an ordinance
15 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); Edelman v. California, 344 U.S.
357 (1953).
16 E.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 540 (1948) (Justice Frankfurter dis-
senting); Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357, 362 (1953) (Justice Black dissenting);
Hicks v. District of Columbia, 383 U.S. 252 (1966) (Justice Douglas dissenting).
17 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
18 Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971). See also Shuttlesworth v.
City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965). Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347
(1964), voided conviction on trespass charges arising out of a sit-in at a drugstore
lunch counter since the trespass statute did not give fair notice that it was a crime
to refuse to leave private premises after being requested to do so. And see Kolender
punishing ‘‘suspicious persons’’ was void only as applied to a person

engaging in ambiguous conduct which it was possible to fit within
the ordinance’s definition. 19 A statute authorizing conviction for
disorderly conduct of any person who refuses to move on upon po-
lice request and who is intent on causing inconvenience, annoy-
ance, or alarm was upheld against facial challenge and as applied
to one interfering with police ticketing of a car for valid reasons. 20
A state statute imposing severe, cumulative punishments upon
contractors with the State who pay their workmen less than the
‘‘current rate of per diem wages in the locality where the work is
performed’’ was held to be ‘‘so vague that men of common intel-
ligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application.’’ 21 Similarly, a statute which allowed jurors to require
an acquitted defendant to pay the costs of the prosecution, eluci-
dated only by the judge’s instruction to the jury that the defendant
should only have to pay the costs if it thought him guilty of ‘‘some
misconduct’’ though innocent of the crime with which he was
charged, was found to fall short of the requirements of due proc-
ess. 22 But the Court sustained as neither too vague nor indefinite
a state law which provided for commitment of a psychopathic per-
sonality by probate action akin to a lunacy proceeding and which
had been construed by the state court as applying to those persons
who, by habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters, have evi-
denced utter lack of power to control their sexual impulses and are
likely to inflict injury. The underlying conditions—habitual course
of misconduct in sexual matters and lack of power to control im-
pulses and likelihood of attack on others—were viewed as calling
for evidence of past conduct pointing to probable consequences and
as being as susceptible of proof as many of the criteria constantly
applied in criminal proceedings. 23
Other Aspects of Statutory Notice.—Conceptually related to
the problem of definiteness in criminal statutes is the problem of
the requisite notice a person must have that a statute commands
that something not be done or alternatively that unless something
is done criminal liability will result. Ordinarily, it can be said that
ignorance of the law affords no excuse, that everyone is presumed
to know that certain things may not be done. Moreover, in other
v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (requirement that person detained in valid Terry
stop provide ‘‘credible and reliable’’ identification is facially void as encouraging ar-
bitrary enforcement).
19 Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 (1971).
20 Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
21 Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
22 Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966).
23 Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
instances, the subject matter or conduct may be sufficient to alert

one that there are regulatory laws which must be observed. 24 In
still other instances, the requirement of ‘‘scienter’’ may take care
of the problem in that there may be a statutory requirement of in-
tent expressed through some form of the word ‘‘willful,’’ 25 but the
Court has so far failed in dealing with those cases involving strict
liability to develop the implications of the mens rea requirement. 26
There remains the case of Lambert v. California, 27 invalidating a
municipal code that made it a crime for anyone who had ever been
convicted of a felony to remain in the city for more than five days
without registering. Emphasizing that the act of being in the city
was not itself blameworthy, the Court voided the conviction, hold-
ing that the failure to register was quite ‘‘unlike the commission
of acts, or the failure to act under circumstances that should alert
the doer to the consequences of his deed.’’ ‘‘Where a person did not
know of the duty to register and where there was no proof of the
probability of such knowledge, he may not be convicted consistently
with due process. Were it otherwise, the evil would be as great as
it is when the law is written in print too fine to read or in a lan-
guage foreign to the community.’’ 28
Entrapment.—Certain criminal offenses, because they are
consensual actions taken between and among willing parties,
present police with difficult investigative problems. Some of that
difficulty may be alleviated through electronic and other surveil-
lance, which is covered by the search and seizure provisions of the
Fourth Amendment, and in other respects informers may be uti-
lized, which may implicate several constitutional provisions. Some-
times, however, police agents may ‘‘encourage’’ persons to engage
in criminal behavior, by seeking to buy from them or to sell to
them narcotics or contraband or by seeking to determine if public
employees or officers are corrupt by offering them bribes. The
Court has dealt with this issue in terms of the ‘‘entrapment’’ de-
fense, though it is unclear whether the basis of the defense is one
of statutory construction—the legislature would not have intended
to punish conduct induced by police agents—one of supervisory au-
thority of the federal courts to deter wrongful police conduct, or one
of due process command. 29
24 E.g., United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971).
25 E.g., Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952); Colautti v.
Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 (1979). Cf. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101–
03 (1945) (plurality opinion).
26 E.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
27 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
28 Id. at 228, 229–30.
29 For a thorough evaluation of the basis for and the nature of the entrapment
defense, see Seidman, The Supreme Court, Entrapment, and Our Criminal Justice
The Court has employed the so-called ‘‘subjective approach’’ to

evaluating the defense of entrapment. This subjective approach fol-
lows a two-pronged analysis. First, the question is asked whether
the offense was induced by a government agent. Second, if the gov-
ernment has induced the defendant to break the law, ‘‘the prosecu-
tion must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was
disposed to commit the criminal act prior to first being approached
by Government agents.’’ 30 If the defendant can be shown to have
been ready and willing to commit the crime whenever the oppor-
tunity presented itself, the defense of entrapment is unavailing, no
matter the degree of inducement. 31 On the other hand, ‘‘[w]hen the
Government’s quest for conviction leads to the apprehension of an
otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left to his own devices, likely
would never run afoul of the law, the courts should intervene.’’ 32
An ‘‘objective approach,’’ while rejected by the Supreme Court, has
been advocated by some Justices and recommended for codification
Dilemma, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 111. The statutory basis was said to be the ground
in the Court’s first discussion of the issue, Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435,
446–49 (1932), and that basis remains the choice of some Justices. Hampton v. Unit-
ed States, 425 U.S. 484, 488–89 (1976) (plurality opinion of Justices Rehnquist and
White and Chief Justice Burger). The supervisory power basis was argued by Jus-
tice Frankfurter in Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380 (1958) (concurring).
Utilization of that power was rejected in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 490
(1973), and by the plurality in Hampton, supra, 490. The Hampton plurality thought
the due process clause would never be applicable, no matter what conduct govern-
ment agents engaged in, unless they violated some protected right of the defendant,
and that inducement and encouragement could never do that; Justices Powell and
Blackmun, id. at 491, thought that police conduct, even in the case of a predisposed
defendant, could be so outrageous as to violate due process. The Russell and Hamp-
ton dissenters did not clearly differentiate between the supervisory power and due
process but seemed to believe that both were implicated. Id. at 495 (Justices Bren-
nan, Stewart, and Marshall); Russell, supra, 439 (Justices Stewart, Brennan, and
Marshall). The Court again failed to clarify the basis for the defense in Mathews
v. United States, 485 U.S. 58 (1988), holding that a defendant in a federal criminal
case who denies commission of the crime is entitled to assert an ‘‘inconsistent’’ en-
trapment defense where the evidence warrants, and in Jacobson v. United States,
112 S. Ct. 1535, 1540 (1992) (invalidating a conviction under the Child Protection
Act of 1984 because government solicitation induced the defendant to purchase child
pornography).
30 Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1540 (1992). Here the Court held
that the government had failed to prove that the defendant was initially predisposed
to purchase child pornography, even though he had become so predisposed following
solicitation through an undercover ‘‘sting’’ operation. For several years government
agents had sent the defendant mailings soliciting his views on pornography and
child pornography, and urging him to obtain materials in order to fight censorship
and stand up for individual rights.
31 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451–52 (1932); Sherman v. United
States, 356 U.S. 369, 376–78 (1958); Masciale v. United States, 356 U.S. 386, 388
(1958); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432–36 (1973); Hampton v. United
States, 425 U.S. 484, 488–489 (1976) (plurality opinion), and id. at 491 (Justices
Powell and Blackmun concurring).
32 Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1543 (1992).
by Congress and the state legislatures. 33 The objective approach

disregards the defendant’s predisposition and looks to the induce-
ments used by government agents. If the government employed
means of persuasion or inducement creating a substantial risk that
the person tempted will engage in the conduct, the defense is avail-
able. 34 Typically, entrapment cases have risen in the narcotics
area, 35 but more recently, as in the ‘‘Abscam’’ controversy, the
focus has been on public corruption and the offering of bribes to
public officials. 36
Criminal Identification Process.—The conduct by police of
identification processes seeking to identify the perpetrators of
crimes—by lineups, showups, photographic displays, and the like—
can raise due process problems. For postindictment lineups and
showups conducted before June 12, 1967, 37 for preindictment line-
ups and showups, 38 and for identification processes at which the
defendant is not present, 39 the question of the admissibility of an
in-court identification or of testimony about an out-of-court identi-
fication is whether there is ‘‘a very substantial likelihood of
misidentification,’’ and that question must be determined ‘‘on the
totality of the circumstances.’’ 40
‘‘Suggestive confrontations are disapproved because they in-
crease the likelihood of misidentification, and unnecessarily sugges-
tive ones are condemned for the further reason that the increased
33 See American Law Institute, MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (Official Draft, 1962);
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, A PROPOSED NEW

FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 702(2) (Final Draft, 1971).
34 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 458–59 (1932) (separate opinion of
Justice Roberts); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 383 (1958) (Justice
Frankfurter concurring); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 441 (1973) (Justice
Stewart dissenting); Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 496–97 (1976) (Justice
Brennan dissenting).
35 Thus, in Sorrells and Sherman government agents solicited defendants, in
Russell the agents supplied an ingredient, which was commonly available, and in
Hampton the agents supplied an essential and difficult to obtain ingredient.
36 The defense was rejected as to all the ‘‘Abscam’’ defendants. E.g., United
States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1983); United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d
603 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
37 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
38 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
39 United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
40 Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196–201 (1972); Manson v. Brathwaite, 432
U.S. 98, 114–17 (1977). The factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of
misidentification include the opportunity of the witness to view the suspect at the
time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior
description of the suspect, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. See
also Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377
(1968); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1
(1970).
chance of misidentification is gratuitous.’’ 41 But, balancing the fac-

tors that it thought furnished the guidance for decision, the Court
declined to lay down a per se rule of exclusion of an identification
because it was obtained under conditions of unnecessary sugges-
tiveness alone, feeling that the fairness standard of due process
does not require an evidentiary rule of such severity. 42
Initiation of the Prosecution.—Indictment by a grand jury
is not a requirement of due process; a State may proceed instead
by information. 43 Due process does require that, whatever the pro-
cedure, a defendant must be given adequate notice of the offense
charged against him and for which he is to be tried, 44 even aside
from the requirements of the Sixth Amendment. Where, of course,
a grand jury is utilized, it must be fairly constituted and free from
prejudicial influences. 45
Fair Trial.—The provisions of the Bill of Rights now applica-
ble to the States contain basic guarantees of a fair trial—right to
counsel, right to speedy and public trial, right to be free from use
of unlawfully seized evidence and unlawfully obtained confessions,
and the like. But this does not exhaust the requirements of fair-
ness. ‘‘Due process of law requires that the proceedings shall be
fair, but fairness is a relative, not an absolute concept. . . . What
is fair in one set of circumstances may be an act of tyranny in oth-
ers.’’ 46 Conversely, ‘‘as applied to a criminal trial, denial of due
41 Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972).
42 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 107–14 (1977). The evaluative factors
were what the per se rule and the less strict rule contributed to excluding unreliable
eyewitness testimony from jury consideration, to deterrence of suggestive proce-
dures, and to the administration of justice. The possibility of a per se rule in post-
Stovall cases had been left open in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972). Due
process does not require that the in-court hearing to determine whether to exclude
a witness’ identification as arrived at improperly be out of the presence of the jury.
Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341 (1981).
43 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
44 Smith v. O’Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941) (guilty plea of layman unrepresented
by counsel to what prosecution represented as a charge of simple burglary but

which was in fact a charge of ‘‘burglary with explosives’’ carrying a much lengthier
sentence is void). See also Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948) (affirmance by ap-
pellate court of conviction and sentence on ground that evidence showed defendant
guilty under a section of the statute not charged violated due process); In re Ruffalo,
390 U.S. 544 (1968) (disbarment in proceeding on charge which was not made until
after lawyer had testified denied due process); Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313
(1972) (affirmance of obscenity conviction because of the context in which a movie
was shown—grounds neither covered in the statute nor listed in the charge—was
invalid).
45 Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950);
Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475
(1954); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939). See infra, pp. 1854–57. On preju-
dicial publicity, see Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962).
46 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 116, 117 (1934). See also Buchalter v.
New York, 319 U.S. 427, 429 (1943).

process is the failure to observe that fundamental fairness essential

to the very concept of justice. In order to declare a denial of it . . .
[the Court] must find that the absence of that fairness fatally in-
fected the trial; the acts complained of must be of such quality as
necessarily prevents a fair trial.’’ 47
Bias or prejudice either inherent in the structure of the trial
system or as imposed by external events will deny one’s right to
a fair trial. Thus, in Tumey v. Ohio 48 it was held to violate due
process to vest trial of offenders in a judge who received, in addi-
tion to his salary, the costs imposed on a convicted defendant, and
who was also mayor of the municipality which received part of the
money collected in fines. The influence of contemptuous mis-
behavior in court upon the impartiality of the presiding judge who
may cite for contempt and sentence contemnors has divided the
Court. 49 Due process is also violated by the participation of a bi-
ased or otherwise partial juror, but there is no presumption that
jurors who are potentially compromised are in fact prejudiced; ordi-
narily the proper avenue of relief is a hearing at which the juror
may be questioned and the defense afforded an opportunity to
prove actual bias. 50 Exposure to pretrial publicity does not nec-
essarily bias jurors. Thus, a trial judge’s refusal to question poten-
tial jurors about the contents of news reports to which they had
been exposed did not violate the defendant’s right to due process,
it being sufficient that the judge on voir dire asked the jurors
whether they could put aside what they had heard about the case,
listen to the evidence with an open mind, and render an impartial
verdict. 51 It is not a denial of due process for the prosecution to
47 Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
48 273 U.S. 510 (1927). See also Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57
(1972). But see Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61 (1928). Bias or prejudice of an appellate
judge can also deprive a litigant of due process. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. LaVoie, 475
U.S. 813 (1986) (failure of state supreme court judge with pecuniary interest—a
pending suit on an indistinguishable claim—to recuse).
49 E.g., Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155 (1949); Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575
(1964); Holt v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 131 (1965); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S.
455 (1971); Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212 (1971); Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S.
488 (1974). See generally Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970). In the context of al-
leged contempt before a judge acting as a one-man grand jury, the Court reversed
criminal contempt convictions, saying: ‘‘A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic re-
quirement of due process. Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in
the trial of cases. But our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the
probability of unfairness.’’ In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
50 Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982) (juror had job application pending with
prosecutor’s office during trial). See also Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227
(1954) (bribe offer to sitting juror); Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 167–72
(1950) (government employees on jury).
51 Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991). For discussion of the requirements
of jury impartiality about capital punishment, see discussion under Sixth Amend-
ment, supra p. 1415.
call the jury’s attention to the defendant’s prior criminal record

when the object is to enable the jury, which has the sentencing
function as well as the guilt-determination function, once it has de-
termined guilt or innocence and if the former, to increase the sen-
tence which would otherwise be given under a recidivist statute. 52
Mob domination of a trial so as to rob the jury of its judgment
on the evidence presented, is, of course, a classic due process viola-
tion. 53 More recently, concern with the impact of prejudicial public-
ity upon jurors and potential jurors has caused the Court to in-
struct trial courts that they should be vigilant to guard against
such prejudice and to curb both the publicity and the jury’s expo-
sure to it. 54 A state rule permitting the televising of certain trials
was struck down on the grounds that the harmful potential effect
on the jurors was substantial, that the testimony presented at trial
may be distorted by the multifaceted influence of television upon
the conduct of witnesses, that the judge’s ability to preside over the
trial and guarantee fairness is considerably encumbered to the pos-
sible detriment of fairness, and that the defendant is likely to be
harassed by his television exposure. 55 Subsequently, however, in
part because of improvements in technology which caused much
less disruption of the trial process and in part because of the lack
of empirical data showing that the mere presence of the broadcast
media in the courtroom necessarily has an adverse effect on the
process, the Court has held that due process does not altogether
preclude the televising of state criminal trials. 56
It is permissible for the State to require a defendant to give
pretrial notice of an intention to rely on an alibi defense and to fur-
nish the names of supporting witnesses, but due process requires
reciprocal discovery in such circumstances, necessitating that the
State give defendant pretrial notice of its rebuttal evidence on the
alibi issue. 57 Because of the possible impairment of the presump-
tion of innocence in the minds of the jurors, due process is violated
when the accused is compelled to stand trial before a jury while
52 Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967).
53 Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86
(1923).
54 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723
(1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); But see Stroble v. California, 343 U.S.
181 (1952); Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975).
55 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
56 Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981). The decision was unanimous but
Justices Stewart and White concurred on the basis that Estes had established a per
se constitutional rule which had to be overruled, id. at 583, 586, contrary to the
Court’s position. Id. at 570–74.
57 Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973).
dressed in identifiable prison clothes. 58 Ordinary evidentiary rules

of criminal trials may in some instances deny a defendant due
process. Thus, the combination in a trial of two rules (1) that de-
nied defendant the right to cross-examine his own witness, whom
he had called because the prosecution would not, in order to elicit
evidence exculpatory to defendant and (2) that denied defendant
the right to introduce the testimony of witnesses about matters told
them out of court on the ground the testimony would be hearsay,
under all the circumstances, denied defendant his constitutional
right to present his own defense in a meaningful way. 59 Basic to
due process is the right to testify in one’s own defense; this right
may not be restricted, the Court has held, by a state’s per se rule
excluding all hypnotically refreshed testimony. 60 Even though the
burden on defendant is heavy to show that an erroneous instruc-
tion or the failure to give a requested instruction tainted his con-
viction, under some circumstances it is a violation of due process
and reversible error to fail to instruct the jury that the defendant
is entitled to a presumption of innocence. 61 It does not deny a de-
58 Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976). The convicted defendant was denied
habeas relief, however, because of failure to object at trial. But cf. Holbrook v.
Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986) (presence in courtroom of uniformed state troopers serv-
ing as security guards was not the same sort of inherently prejudicial situation).
59 Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). See also Davis v. Alaska, 415
U.S. 786 (1974) (refusal to permit defendant to examine prosecution witness about
his adjudication as juvenile delinquent and status on probation at time, in order to
show possible bias, was due process violation, although general principle of protect-
ing anonymity of juvenile offenders was valid); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683
(1986) (exclusion of testimony as to circumstances of a confession can deprive a de-
fendant of a fair trial when the circumstances bear on the credibility as well as the
voluntariness of the confession).
60 Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
61 Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978). However, an instruction on the pre-
sumption of innocence need not be given in every case, Kentucky v. Whorton, 441
U.S. 786 (1979), the Court reiterating that the totality of the circumstances must
be looked to in order to determine if failure to so instruct denied due process. The
circumstances emphasized in Taylor included the skeletal instruction on burden of
proof combined with the prosecutor’s remarks in his opening and closing statements
inviting the jury to consider the defendant’s prior record and his indictment in the
present case as indicating guilt. See also Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510
(1979) (instructing jury trying person charged with ‘‘purposely or knowingly’’ caus-
ing victim’s death that ‘‘law presumes that a person intends the ordinary con-
sequences of his voluntary acts’’ denied due process because jury could have treated
the presumption as conclusive or as shifting burden of persuasion and in either
event State would not have carried its burden of proving guilt). And see Cupp v.
Naughten, 414 U.S. 141 (1973); Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154–55 (1973).
For other cases applying Sandstrom, see Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985)
(contradictory but ambiguous instruction not clearly explaining state’s burden of
persuasion on intent does not erase Sandstrom error in earlier part of charge); Rose
v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986) (Sandstrom error can in some circumstances constitute
harmless error under principles of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)). Simi-
larly, improper arguments by a prosecutor do not necessarily constitute ‘‘plain
error,’’ and a reviewing court may consider in the context of the entire record of the
fendant due process to subject him initially to trial before a

nonlawyer police court judge when there is a later trial de novo
available under the State’s court system. 62
Guilty Pleas.—A defendant may plead guilty instead of insist-
ing that the prosecution prove him guilty. There are a number of
different reasons why a defendant may be willing to plead guilty,
perhaps because of overwhelming evidence against him, perhaps
because, while the evidence leaves the outcome in doubt, should he
go to trial and be convicted his sentence will be more severe than
if he pleads guilty, perhaps to secure some other advantage. Often
the defendant and his attorney engage in ‘‘plea bargaining’’ with
the prosecution so that he is guaranteed a light sentence or is al-
lowed to plead to a lesser offense. While the government may not
structure its system so as to coerce a guilty plea, 63 a guilty plea
that is entered voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly, even
to obtain an advantage, is sufficient to overcome constitutional ob-
jections. 64 The guilty plea and the often concomitant plea bargain
are important and necessary components of the criminal justice
system, 65 and it is not impermissible for a prosecutor during such
plea bargains to put a defendant to a hard choice, requiring him
to forego his right to go to trial in return for escaping what is likely
to be a much more severe penalty if he does elect to go to trial. 66
trial the trial court’s failure to redress such error in the absence of contemporaneous
objection. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 (1985).
62 North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328 (1976).
63 United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
64 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1971); Parker v. North Carolina, 397
U.S. 790 (1970). See also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). A guilty plea
will ordinarily waive challenges to alleged unconstitutional police practices occur-
ring prior to the plea, unless the defendant can show that the plea resulted from
incompetent counsel. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973); Davis v. United
States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973). But see Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974). The
State can permit pleas of guilty in which the defendant reserves the right to raise
constitutional questions on appeal, and federal habeas courts will honor that ar-
rangement. Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975). Release-dismissal agree-
ments, pursuant to which the prosecution agrees to dismiss criminal charges in ex-
change for the defendant’s agreement to release his right to file a civil action for
alleged police or prosecutorial misconduct, are not per se invalid. Town of Newton
v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987).
65 Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977).
66 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978). Charged with forgery, Hayes
was informed during plea negotiations that if he would plead guilty the prosecutor
would recommend a five-year sentence; if he did not plead guilty, the prosecutor
would also seek an indictment under the habitual criminal statute under which
Hayes, because of two prior felony convictions, would receive a mandatory life sen-
tence if convicted. Hayes refused to plead, was reindicted, and upon conviction was
sentenced to life. Four Justices dissented, id. at 365, 368, contending that the Court
had watered down North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). See also United
States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (1982).
The court must inquire whether the defendant is pleading vol-

untarily, knowingly, and understandingly, 67 and ‘‘the adjudicative
element inherent in accepting a plea of guilty must be attended by
safeguards to insure the defendant what is reasonably due in the
circumstances. Those circumstances will vary, but a constant factor
is that when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise
or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part
of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be ful-
filled.’’ 68
Prosecutorial Misconduct.—When a conviction is obtained
by the presentation of testimony known to the prosecuting authori-
ties to have been perjured, due process is violated. The clause ‘‘can-
not be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice and hearing if a State
has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial which in
truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty
through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the presen-
tation of testimony known to be perjured. Such a contrivance . . .
is as inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice as is
the obtaining of a like result by intimidation.’’ 69 The quoted lan-
guage was dictum in the case in which it was uttered, 70 but the
principle enunciated has been utilized to require state officials to
controvert allegations of convicted persons that knowingly false tes-
67 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). In Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S.
637 (1976), the Court held that a defendant charged with first degree murder who
elected to plead guilty to second degree murder had not voluntarily, in the constitu-
tional sense, entered the plea because neither his counsel nor the trial judge had
informed him that an intent to cause the death of the victim was an essential ele-
ment of guilt in the second degree; consequently no showing was made that he
knowingly was admitting such intent. ‘‘A plea may be involuntary either because
the accused does not understand the nature of the constitutional protections that
he is waiving . . . or because he has such an incomplete understanding of the charge
that his plea cannot stand as an intelligent admission of guilt.’’ Id. at 645 n.13. See
also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977).
68 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). Defendant and a prosecutor
reached agreement on a guilty plea in return for no sentence recommendation by

the prosecution. At the sentencing hearing months later, a different prosecutor rec-
ommended the maximum sentence, and that sentence was imposed. The Court va-
cated the judgment, holding that the prosecutor’s entire staff was bound by the
promise. Prior to the plea, however, the prosecutor may withdraw his first offer, and
a defendant who later pled guilty after accepting a second, less attractive offer has
no right to enforcement of the first agreement. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504
(1984).
69 Mooney v. Holahan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935).
70 The Court dismissed the petitioner’s suit on the ground that adequate process
existed in the state courts to correct any wrong and that petitioner had not availed
himself of it. A state court subsequently appraised the evidence and ruled that the
allegations had not been proved in Ex parte Mooney, 10 Cal. 2d 1, 73 P.2d 554
(1937), cert. denied 305 U.S. 598 (1938).
timony had been used to convict, 71 and to upset convictions found

to have been so procured. 72 Extending the principle, the Court in
Miller v. Pate 73 upset a conviction obtained after the prosecution
had represented to the jury that a pair of men’s shorts found near
the scene of a sex attack belonged to the defendant and that they
were stained with blood; the defendant showed in a habeas corpus
proceeding that no evidence connected him with the shorts and fur-
thermore that the shorts were not in fact bloodstained, and that
the prosecution had known these facts.
Furthermore, in Brady v. Maryland, 74 the Court held ‘‘that the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused
upon request violates due process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or
bad faith of the prosecution.’’ In that case, the prosecution had sup-
pressed an extrajudicial confession of defendant’s accomplice that
he had actually committed the murder; the accomplice’s confession
could have influenced the jury’s determination of punishment but
not its judgment of guilt. But this beginning toward the develop-
ment of criminal discovery was not carried forward, 75 and the
Court has waivered in its application of Brady.
71 Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945).
See also New York ex rel. Whitman v. Wilson, 318 U.S. 688 (1943); Ex parte Hawk,
321 U.S. 114 (1914). But see Hysler v. Florida, 315 U.S. 411 (1942); Lisenba v. Cali-
fornia, 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
72 Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957).
In the former case, the principal prosecution witness was defendant’s accomplice,
and he testified that he had received no promise of consideration in return for his
testimony. In fact, the prosecutor had promised him consideration, but did nothing
to correct the false testimony. See also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972)
(same). In the latter case, involving a husband’s killing of his wife because of her
infidelity, a prosecution witness testified at the habeas corpus hearing that he told
the prosecutor that he had been intimate with the woman but that the prosecutor
had told him to volunteer nothing of it, so that at trial he had testified his relation-
ship with the woman was wholly casual. In both cases, the Court deemed it irrele-
vant that the false testimony had gone only to the credibility of the witness rather
than to the defendant’s guilt. What if the prosecution should become aware of the
perjury of a prosecution witness following the trial? Cf. Durley v. Mayo, 351 U.S.
277 (1956). But see Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 218–21 (1982) (prosecutor’s fail-
ure to disclose that one of the jurors has a job application pending before him, thus
rendering him possibly partial, does not go to fairness of the trial and due process
is not violated).
73 386 U.S. 1 (1967).
74 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). In Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), in
the exercise of its supervisory power over the federal courts, the Court held that
the defense was entitled to obtain, for impeachment purposes, statements which had
been made to government agents by government witnesses during the investigatory
stage. Cf. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 257–58 (1961). A subsequent stat-
ute modified but largely codified the decision and was upheld by the Court. Palermo
v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959), sustaining 18 U.S.C. § 3500.
75 See the division of opinion in Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967).
In finding Brady inapplicable because the evidence withheld

was not material and not exculpatory, the Court in Moore v. Illi-
nois, 76 restated the governing principles. ‘‘The heart of the holding
in Brady is the prosecution’s suppression of evidence, in the face
of a defense production request, where the evidence is favorable to
the accused and is material either to guilt or to punishment. Im-
portant, then, are (a) suppression by the prosecution after a re-
quest by the defense, (b) the evidence’s favorable character for the
defense, and (c) the materiality of the evidence.’’
In United States v. Agurs, 77 the Court summarized and some-
what expanded the prosecutor’s obligation to disclose to the defense
exculpatory evidence in his possession, even in the absence of a re-
quest, or upon a general request, by defendant. The obligation is
expressed in a tripartite test of materiality of the exculpatory evi-
dence in the context of the trial record. First, if the prosecutor
knew or should have known that testimony given to the trial was
perjured, the conviction must be set aside if there is any reasonable
likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judg-
ment of the jury. 78 Second, if the defense specifically requested cer-
tain evidence and the prosecutor withheld it, the conviction must
be set aside if the suppressed evidence might have affected the out-
come of the trial. 79 Third (the new law created in Agurs), if the de-
fense did not make a request at all, or simply asked for ‘‘all Brady
material’’ or for ‘‘anything exculpatory,’’ a duty resides in the pros-
ecution to reveal to the defense obviously exculpatory evidence; if
the prosecutor does not reveal it, reversal of a conviction may be
required, but only if the undisclosed evidence creates a reasonable
doubt as to the defendant’s guilt. 80
A prosecutor does not violate the due process clause when, in
negotiating with a defendant to obtain a guilty plea or some other
action that will lessen the trial burden, such as trial before a judge
76 408 U.S. 786, 794–95 (1972). Joining Justice Blackmun’s opinion were Jus-
tices Brennan, White, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger. Dissenting were Jus-
tices Douglas, Stewart, Marshall, and Powell. Id. at 800.
77 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
78 Id. at 103–04. This situation is the Mooney v. Holohan type of case.
79 Id. at 104–06. This the Brady situation.
80 Id. at 106–14. This was the Agurs fact situation. Similarly, there is no obliga-
tion that law enforcement officials preserve breath samples which have been utilized
in a breath-analysis test; the Agurs materiality standard is met only by evidence
which ‘‘possess[es] an exculpatory value . . . apparent before [it] was destroyed, and
also [is] of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable
evidence by other reasonably available means.’’ California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S.
479, 489 (1984). See also Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) (negligent fail-
ure to refrigerate and otherwise preserve potentially exculpatory physical evidence
from sexual assault kit does not violate a defendant’s due process rights absent bad
faith on the part of the police).
rather than jury, he threatens and carries out the threat to seek
a more severe sentence, either by charging a greater offense or rec-
ommending a longer sentence. 81 But the prosecutor does deny due
process if he penalizes the assertion of a right or privilege by the
defendant by charging more severely or recommending a longer
sentence. 82 The distinction appears to represent very fine line-
drawing, but it appears to be one the Court is committed to.
Proof, Burden of Proof, and Presumptions.—The due proc-
ess clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments ‘‘[protect] the
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he
is charged.’’ 83 ‘‘The reasonable doubt standard plays a vital role in
the American scheme of criminal procedure. It is a prime instru-
ment for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error.
The standard provides concrete substance for the presumption of
innocence—that bedrock ‘axiomatic and elementary’ principle
whose ‘enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of
our criminal law.’ ’’ 84 In many past cases, this standard was as-
sumed to be the required one, 85 but because it was so widely ac-
cepted only recently has the Court had the opportunity to pro-
nounce it guaranteed by due process. 86 The presumption of inno-
81 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978); United States v. Goodwin, 457
U.S. 368 (1982). In the former case, during plea negotiations, the prosecutor told
defendant that if he did not plead guilty to the charges he would bring additional
charges, and he did so upon defendant’s continued refusal. In the latter case, de-
fendant was charged with a misdemeanor and could have been tried before a mag-
istrate; he refused to plead guilty and sought a jury trial in district court. The Gov-
ernment obtained a four-count felony indictment based upon the same conduct and
acquired a conviction.
82 Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974). Defendant was convicted in an infe-
rior court of a misdemeanor. He had a right to a de novo trial in superior court,

but when he exercised the right the prosecutor obtained a felony indictment based
upon the same conduct. The distinction the Court draws between this case and
Bordenkircher and Goodwin is that of pretrial conduct, in which vindictiveness is
not likely, and posttrial conduct, in which vindictiveness is more likely and is not
permitted. Accord, Thigpen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27 (1984).
83 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
84 Id. at 363 (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)). Justice
Harlan’s Winship concurrence, id. at 368, proceeded on the basis that inasmuch as
there is likelihood of error in any system of reconstructing past events, the error
of convicting the innocent should be reduced to the greatest extent possible through
the use of the reasonable doubt standard.
85 Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 (1881); Davis v. United States, 160
U.S. 469, 488 (1895); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 253 (1910); Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525–26 (1958).
86 In addition to Winship, see also Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976);
Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 153 (1977); Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442
U.S. 140, 156 (1979); Sandstorm v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 520–24 (1979). On the
interrelated concepts of the burden of the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt and defendant’s entitlement to a presumption of innocence, see Taylor
cence is valuable in assuring defendants a fair trial, 87 and it oper-

ates to ensure that the jury considers the case solely on the evi-
dence. 88
The Court has long held it would set aside under the due proc-
ess clause convictions that are supported by no evidence at all, 89
but Winship necessitated a reconsideration of whether it should in
reviewing state cases weigh the sufficiency of the evidence. Thus,
in Jackson v. Virginia, 90 it held that federal courts, on direct ap-
peal of federal convictions or collateral review of state convictions,
must satisfy themselves whether the record evidence could reason-
ably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The
question the reviewing court is to ask itself is not whether it be-
lieves the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt, but whether, after viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. 91
Inasmuch as due process requires the prosecution to prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the
crime charged, the Court held in Mullaney v. Wilbur 92 that it was
a denial of this constitutional guarantee to require a defendant
charged with murder to prove that he acted ‘‘in the heat of passion
on sudden provocation’’ in order to reduce the homicide to man-
slaughter. The Court indicated that a balancing of interests test
was to be employed to determine when the due process clause re-
v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483–86 (1978), and Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786
(1979).
87 E.g., Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456, 471 (1961). See also Cage v. Lou-
isiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (per curiam) (jury instruction that explains ‘‘reasonable
doubt’’ as doubt that would give rise to a ‘‘grave uncertainty,’’ as equivalent to a
‘‘substantial doubt,’’ and as requiring ‘‘a moral certainty,’’ suggests a higher degree
of certainty than is required for acquittal, and therefore violates the Due Process
Clause).
88 Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910); Agnew v. United States, 165 U.S.
36 (1897). These cases overturned Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 460 (1895),
in which the Court held that the presumption of innocence was evidence from which
the jury could find a reasonable doubt.
89 Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960); Garner v. Louisiana, 368
U.S. 157 (1961); Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U.S. 154 (1962); Barr v. City of Columbia,
378 U.S. 146 (1964); Johnson v. Florida, 391 U.S. 596 (1968). See also Chessman
v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156 (1957).
90 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
91 Id. at 316, 318–19. On a somewhat related point, the Court has ruled that
a general guilty verdict on a multiple-object conspiracy need not be set aside if the
evidence is inadequate to support conviction as to one of the objects of the conspir-
acy, but is adequate to support conviction as to another. Griffin v. United States,
112 U.S. 466 (1991).
92 421 U.S. 684 (1975). See also Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 520–24
(1979).
quired the prosecution to carry the burden and when some part of
the burden might be shifted to the defendant, but the decision
called into question the practice in many States under which some
burdens of persuasion were borne by the defense, and raised the
prospect that the prosecution must bear all burdens of persuasion,
a significant and weighty task given the large numbers of affirma-
tive defenses.
But the Court soon summarily rejected the argument that
Mullaney means that the prosecution must negate the insanity de-
fense, 93 and in full-scale consideration upheld a state statute that
provided that an intentional killing is murder but permitted the
defendant to assert ‘‘extreme emotional disturbance’’ as an affirma-
tive defense which, if proved by the defense by a preponderance of
the evidence, would reduce the murder offense to manslaughter. 94
According to the Court, the constitutional deficiency in Mullaney
was that the statute made malice an element of the offense but
permitted malice to be presumed upon proof of the other elements
and required the defendant to prove the absence of malice. In Pat-
terson the statute obligated the State to prove each element of the
offense (the death, the intent to kill, and the causation) beyond a
reasonable doubt, but allowed the defendant to present an affirma-
tive defense that would reduce the degree of the offense, and as to
which the defendant bears the burden of persuasion by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. The decisive issue, then, was whether the
statute required the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each
element of the offense. So defined, the distinction and the constitu-
tional mandate are formalistic, and the legislature can shift bur-
dens of persuasion between prosecution and defense easily through
the statutory definitions of the offenses. 95 Also formalistic is the
93 Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877 (1976), dismissing as not presenting a sub-
stantial federal question an appeal from a holding that Mullaney did not prevent
a State from placing on the defendant the burden of proving insanity by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202–05 (1977)
(explaining the import of Rivera). Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger con-
curring in Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 704, 705, had argued that the case did not require
any reconsideration of the holding in Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952), that
the defense may be required to prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt.
94 Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
95 Dissenting in Patterson, Justice Powell argued that the two statutes were
functional equivalents that should be treated alike constitutionally. He would hold

that as to those facts which historically have made a substantial difference in the
punishment and stigma flowing from a criminal act the State always bears the bur-
den of persuasion but that new affirmative defenses may be created and the burden
of establishing them placed on the defendant. Id. at 216. Patterson was followed in
Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987) (state need not disprove defendant acted in self-
defense based on honest belief she was in imminent danger, when offense is aggra-
vated murder, an element of which is ‘‘prior calculation and design’’). Justice Powell,
distinction between elements of the crime and sentencing factors;

a state may treat as a sentencing consideration provable by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence the fact that the defendant ‘‘visibly pos-
sessed a firearm’’ during commission of the offense. 96
Quite closely related is the issue of statutory presumptions;
these generally provide for the proof of the presumed fact, an ele-
ment of a crime, by the establishment of another fact, the basic
fact. 97 In Tot v. United States, 98 the Court held that a statutory
presumption was valid under the due process clause if it met a ‘‘ra-
tional connection’’ test. ‘‘Under our decisions, a statutory presump-
tion cannot be sustained if there be no rational connection between
the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, if the inference of
the one from the proof of the other is arbitrary because of lack of
connection between the two in common experience.’’ In Leary v.
United States, 99 however, the due process test was stiffened to re-
quire that for such a ‘‘rational connection’’ to exist, it must ‘‘at least
be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more
likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made
to depend.’’ Thus, a provision which permitted a jury to infer from
defendant’s possession of marijuana his knowledge of its illegal im-
portation was voided. A lengthy canvass of factual materials estab-
lished to the Court’s satisfaction that while the greater part of
marijuana consumed here is of foreign origin there was still a good
amount produced domestically and there was thus no way to as-
sure that the majority of those possessing marijuana have any rea-
son to know their marijuana is imported. 100 The Court left open
the question whether a presumption which survived the ‘‘rational
connection’’ test ‘‘must also satisfy the criminal ‘reasonable doubt’
again dissenting, urged a distinction between defenses that negate an element of the
crime and those that do not. Id. at 236, 240.
96 McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (the finding increased the mini-
mum sentence that could be imposed but did not affect the maximum sentence).
97 See, e.g., Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925) (upholding statute
that proscribed possession of smoking opium that had been illegally imported and
authorized jury to presume illegal importation from fact of possession); Manley v.
Georgia, 279 U.S. 1 (1929) (invalidating statutory presumption that every insolvency
of a bank shall be deemed fraudulent).
98 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943) (voiding presumption of transportation of firearm in
interstate commerce from possession). Compare United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S.
63 (1965) (upholding presumption from presence at site of illegal still that defendant
was ‘‘carrying on’’ or aiding in ‘‘carrying on’’ its operation), with United States v.
Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965) (voiding presumption from presence at site of illegal
still that defendant had possession, custody, or control of still).
99 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969).
100 Id. at 37–54. While some of the reasoning in Yee Hem, supra n.97, was dis-
approved, it was factually distinguished as involving users of ‘‘hard’’ narcotics.

standard if proof of the crime charged or an essential element

thereof depends upon its use.’’ 101
In its most recent case, a closely divided Court drew a distinc-
tion between mandatory presumptions, which a jury must accept,
and permissive presumptions, which may be presented to the jury
as part of all the evidence to be considered. With respect to manda-
tory presumptions, ‘‘since the prosecution bears the burden of es-
tablishing guilt, it may not rest its case entirely on a presumption,
unless the fact proved is sufficient to support the inference of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ But, with respect to permissive pre-
sumptions, ‘‘the prosecution may rely on all of the evidence in the
record to meet the reasonable doubt standard. There is no more
reason to require a permissive statutory presumption to meet a
reasonable-doubt standard before it may be permitted to play any
part in a trial than there is to require that degree of probative
force for other relevant evidence before it may be admitted.’’ 102
Thus, because the jury was told it had to believe in defendants’
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that it could consider the in-
ference, due process was not violated by the application of the stat-
utory presumption that the presence of a firearm in an automobile
is presumptive evidence of its illegal possession by all persons then
occupying the vehicle. 103
The division of the Court in these cases and in the Mullaney
v. Wilbur line of cases clearly shows the unsettled doctrinal nature
of the issues.
Sentencing.—In Townsend v. Burke 104 the Court overturned
a sentence imposed on an uncounseled defendant by a judge who
101 Id. at 36 n.64. The matter was also left open in Turner v. United States, 396
U.S. 398 (1970) (judged by either ‘‘rational connection’’ or ‘‘reasonable doubt,’’ a pre-
sumption that the possessor of heroin knew it was illegally imported was valid, but
the same presumption with regard to cocaine was invalid under the ‘‘rational con-
nection’’ test because a great deal of the substance was produced domestically), and
in Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973) (under either test a presumption
that possession of recently stolen property, if not satisfactorily explained, is grounds
for inferring possessor knew it was stolen satisfies due process).
102 Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 166–67 (1979).
103 The majority thought that possession was more likely than not the case from
the circumstances, while the four dissenters disagreed. Id. at 168 (Justices Powell,
Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall). See also Estelle v. McGuire, 112 S. Ct. 475 (1991)
(upholding a jury instruction that, to dissenting Justices O’Connor and Stevens, id.
at 484, seemed to direct the jury to draw the inference that evidence that a child
had been ‘‘battered’’ in the past meant that the defendant, the child’s father, had
necessarily done the battering).
104 334 U.S. 736, 740–41 (1948). In Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343 (1980), the
jury had been charged in accordance with an habitual offender statute that if it
found defendant guilty of the offense charged, which would be a third felony convic-
tion, it should assess punishment at 40 years imprisonment. The jury convicted and
gave defendant 40 years. Subsequently, in another case, the habitual offender under
in reciting defendant’s record from the bench made several errors

and facetious comments. ‘‘[W]hile disadvantaged by lack of counsel,
this prisoner was sentenced on the basis of assumptions concerning
his criminal record which were materially untrue. Such a result,
whether caused by carelessness or design, is inconsistent with due
process of law, and such a conviction cannot stand.’’ But in the ab-
sence of revelations of errors by the sentencing judge, the content
of procedural due process at sentencing is vague.
Williams v. New York 105 upheld the imposition of the death
penalty although the jury in convicting had recommended mercy,
the judge indicating that he was disregarding the recommendation
because of information in the presentence report prepared by a pro-
bation officer and not shown to the defendant or his counsel. The
Court viewed as highly undesirable the restriction of judicial dis-
cretion in sentencing by requiring adherence to rules of evidence
which would exclude highly relevant and informative material;
similarly, disclosure of such information to the defense could well
dry up sources which feared retribution or embarrassment. Thus,
hearsay and rumors would be considered and there would be no op-
portunity of rebuttal. Still in the context of capital cases, the Court
has now, although by no consistent rationale, limited Williams. In
Gardner v. Florida, 106 the jury had recommended a life sentence
upon convicting defendant of murder, but the trial judge sentenced
the defendant to death, relying in part on a confidential
presentence report which he did not characterize or make available
to defense or prosecution. Three Justices found that because death
was significantly different from other punishments and because
sentencing procedures were subject to higher due process standards
than when Williams was decided, the report must be made part of
the record for review so that the factors motivating imposition of
the death penalty may be known, and ordinarily must be made
available to the defense. All but one of the other Justices joined the
result on various other bases. 107 On the other hand, in United
which Hicks had been sentenced was declared unconstitutional, but Hicks’ convic-
tion was affirmed on the basis that his sentence was still within the permissible
range open to the jury. The Supreme Court reversed. Hicks was denied due process
because he was statutorily entitled to the exercise of the jury’s discretion and could
have been given a sentence as low as ten years. That the jury might still have given
the stiffer sentence was only conjectural. On other due process restrictions on the
determination of the applicability of recidivist statutes to convicted defendants, see
Chewing v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962);
and Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967). On Eighth Amendment relevance, see
supra, pp. 1495–96.
105 337 U.S. 241 (1949). See also Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576 (1959).
106 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
107 Only Justices Stevens, Stewart, and Powell took the position described in the
text. Id. at 357–61. Justice Brennan without elaboration thought the result com-
States v. Grayson, 108 a noncapital case, the Court relied heavily on

Williams in holding that a sentencing judge may properly consider
his belief that the defendant was untruthful in his trial testimony
in deciding to impose a more severe sentence than he would other-
wise have imposed. Under the current scheme of individualized in-
determinate sentencing, the Court declared, the judge must be free
to consider the broadest range of information in assessing the de-
fendant’s prospects for rehabilitation; defendant’s truthfulness, as
assessed by the trial judge from his own observations, is relevant
information. 109
In Specht v. Patterson, 110 the Court specifically reaffirmed Wil-
liams, but declined to apply it, finding that due process had been
denied under circumstances significantly different from those of
Williams. Specht had been convicted of taking indecent liberties,
which carried a maximum sentence of ten years, but was sentenced
under a sex offenders statute to an indefinite term of one day to
life. The sex offenders law, the Court observed, did not make the
commission of the particular offense the basis for sentencing. In-
stead, by triggering a new hearing to determine whether the con-
victed person was a public threat, an habitual offender, or mentally
ill, the law in effect constituted a new charge that must be accom-
panied by procedural safeguards. Mempa v. Rhay 111 held that
when sentencing is deferred subject to probation and the terms of
probation are allegedly violated so that the convicted defendant is
returned for sentencing, he must then be represented by counsel,
inasmuch as it is a point in the process where substantial rights
of the defendant may be affected. Moreover, in Kent v. United
States 112 the Court required that before a juvenile court decided to
waive jurisdiction and transfer a juvenile to an adult court it must
hold a hearing and permit defense counsel to examine the proba-
tion officer’s report which formed the basis for the court’s decision.
pelled by due process, id. at 364, Justices White and Blackmun thought the result
necessitated by the Eighth Amendment, id. at 362, 364, as did Justice Marshall in
a different manner. Id. at 365. Chief Justice Burger concurred only in the result,
id. at 362, and Justice Rehnquist dissented. Id. at 371. See also Lankford v. Idaho,
500 U.S. 110 (1991) (due process denied where judge sentenced defendant to death
after judge’s and prosecutor’s actions misled defendant and counsel into believing
that death penalty would not be at issue in sentencing hearing).
108 438 U.S. 41 (1978).
109 See also United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972); Chaffin v.
Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 32 (1973). Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3577.

110 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
111 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
112 383 U.S. 541, 554, 561, 563 (1966). Kent was ambiguous whether it was
based on statutory interpretation or constitutional analysis; In re Gault, 387 U.S.

1 (1967), appears to have constitutionalized the language.
It is a denial of due process for a judge to sentence a convicted

defendant on retrial to a longer sentence than he received after the
first trial if the object of the sentence is to punish the defendant
for having successfully appealed his first conviction or to discour-
age similar appeals by others. 113 If the judge does impose a longer
sentence the second time, he must justify it on the record by show-
ing, for example, the existence of new information meriting a
longer sentence. 114
Because the possibility of vindictiveness in resentencing is de
minimis when it is the jury that sentences, Pearce’s requirement
that a judge resentencing on a subsequent trial must justify a more
severe sentence is inapplicable to jury sentencing, at least in the
absence of a showing that the jury knew of the prior vacated sen-
tence. The Court concluded that the possibility of vindictiveness
was so low because normally the jury would not know of the result
of the prior trial nor the sentence imposed, nor would it feel either
the personal or institutional interests of judges leading to efforts to
discourage the seeking of new trials. 115 The presumption of vindic-
tiveness is also inapplicable if the first sentence was imposed fol-
lowing a guilty plea. Here the Court reasoned that a trial may well
afford the court insights into the nature of the crime and the char-
acter of the defendant that were not available following the initial
guilty plea. 116
Due process does not impose any limitation upon the sentence
that a legislature may affix to any offense; that function is in the
Eighth Amendment. 117
113 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). Pearce was held to be
nonretroactive in Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47 (1973). When a State provides a

two-tier court system in which one may have an expeditious and somewhat informal
trial in an inferior court with an absolute right to trial de novo in a court of general
criminal jurisdiction if convicted, the second court is not bound by the rule in
Pearce, inasmuch as the potential for vindictiveness and inclination to deter is not
present. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972). But see Blackledge v. Perry, 417
U.S. 21 (1974), discussed supra, p. 1761.
114 An intervening conviction on other charges for acts committed prior to the
first sentencing may justify imposition of an increased sentence following a second

trial. Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559 (1984).
115 Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973). Justices Stewart, Brennan, and
Marshall thought the principle was applicable to jury sentencing and that prophy-
lactic limitations appropriate to the problem should be developed. Id. at 35, 38. Jus-
tice Douglas dissented on other grounds. Id. at 35. The Pearce presumption that an
increased, judge-imposed second sentence represents vindictiveness also is inap-
plicable if the second trial came about because the trial judge herself concluded that
a retrial was necessary due to prosecutorial misconduct before the jury in the first
trial. Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134 (1986).
116 Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989).
117 Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 586–87 (1959). See also Collins v. John-
ston, 237 U.S. 502 (1915). On recidivist statutes, see Graham v. West Virginia, 224
The Problem of the Incompetent or Insane Defendant or

Convict.—It is a denial of due process to try or sentence a defend-
ant who is insane or incompetent to stand trial. 118 When it be-
comes evident during the trial that a defendant is or has become
insane, or incompetent to stand trial, the court on its own initiative
must conduct a hearing on the issue. 119 What the state must do
is to provide the defendant with a chance to prove that he is incom-
petent to stand trial; there is no further constitutional requirement
that the state assume the burden of proving the defendant com-
petent. Due process is not offended, therefore, by a statutory pre-
sumption that a criminal defendant is competent to stand trial, or
by a requirement that the defendant bear the burden of proving in-
competence by a preponderance of the evidence. 120 When a State
determines that a person charged with a criminal offense is incom-
petent to stand trial he cannot be committed indefinitely for that
reason. The court’s power is to commit him to a period no longer
than is necessary to determine whether there is a substantial prob-
ability that he will attain his capacity in the foreseeable future. If
it is determined that this is not the case, then the State must ei-
ther release the defendant or institute the customary civil commit-
ment proceeding that would be required to commit any other citi-
zen. 121
Commitment to a mental hospital of a criminal defendant ac-
quitted by reason of insanity does not offend due process, and the
period of confinement may extend beyond the period for which the
person could have been sentenced if convicted. 122 The purpose of
the confinement is not punishment, but treatment, and the Court
explained that the length of a possible criminal sentence ‘‘therefore
is irrelevant to the purposes of . . . commitment.’’ 123 Thus, the in-
U.S. 616, 623 (1912); Ughbanks v. Armstrong, 208 U.S. 481, 488 (1908), and, under
the Eighth Amendment, Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
118 Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966) (citing Bishop v. United States,
350 U.S. 961 (1956)).

119 Id. For treatment of the circumstances when a trial court should inquire into
the mental competency of the defendant, see Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
Also, an indigent who makes a preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of
his offense will be a substantial factor in his trial is entitled to a court-appointed
psychiatrist to assist in presenting the defense. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68
(1985).
120 Medina v. California, 112 S. Ct. 2572 (1992).
121 Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
122 Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983). The fact that the affirmative
defense of insanity need only be established by a preponderance of the evidence,

while civil commitment requires the higher standard of clear and convincing evi-
dence, does not render the former invalid; proof beyond a reasonable doubt of com-
mission of a criminal act establishes dangerousness justifying confinement and
eliminates the risk of confinement for mere idiosyncratic behavior.
123 463 U.S. at 368.
sanity acquittee may be confined for treatment ‘‘until such time as

he has regained his sanity or is no longer a danger to himself or
society.’’ 124 It follows, however, that a state may not indefinitely
confine an insanity acquittee who is no longer mentally ill but who
has an untreatable personality disorder that may lead to criminal
conduct. 125
The Court held in Ford v. Wainwright that the Eighth Amend-
ment prohibits the state from carrying out the death penalty on an
individual who is insane, and that properly raised issues of pre-
execution sanity must be determined in a proceeding satisfying the
minimum requirements of due process. 126 Those minimum stand-
ards are not met when the decision on sanity is left to the unfet-
tered discretion of the governor; rather, due process requires the
opportunity to be heard before an impartial officer or board. 127
Corrective Process: Appeals and Other Remedies.—‘‘An
appeal from a judgment of conviction is not a matter of absolute
right, independently of constitutional or statutory provisions allow-
ing such appeal. A review by an appellate court of the final judg-
ment in a criminal case, however grave the offense of which the ac-
cused is convicted, was not at common law and is not now a nec-
essary element of due process of law. It is wholly within the discre-
tion of the state to allow or not to allow such a review.’’ 128 This
holding has been recently reaffirmed 129 although the Court has
also held that when a State does provide appellate process it may
not so condition the privilege as to deny it irrationally to some per-
sons, such as indigents. 130 But it is not the case that a State is
124 Id. at 370.
125 Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992).
126 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
127 There was no opinion of the Court on the issue of procedural requirements.
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, would hold
that ‘‘the ascertainment of a prisoner’s sanity calls for no less stringent standards
than those demanded in any other aspect of a capital proceeding.’’ 477 U.S. at 411–
12. Concurring Justice Powell thought that due process might be met by a proceed-
ing ‘‘far less formal than a trial,’’ that the state ‘‘should provide an impartial officer
or board that can receive evidence and argument from the prisoner’s counsel.’’ Id.
at 427. Concurring Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice White, emphasized Florida’s
denial of the opportunity to be heard, and did not express an opinion on whether
the state could designate the governor as decisionmaker. Thus Justice Powell’s opin-
ion, requiring the opportunity to be heard before an impartial officer or board, sets
forth the Court’s holding.
128 McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894). See also Andrews v. Swartz,
156 U.S. 272, 275 (1895); Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177 U.S. 155, 158 (1900); Reetz
v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505, 508 (1903).
129 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956); id. at 21 (Justice Frankfurter con-
curring), 27 (dissenting opinion); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).

130 The line of cases begins with Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), in which
it was deemed to violate both the due process and the equal protection clauses for
a State to deny to indigent defendants free transcripts of the trial proceedings,
free to have no corrective process at all in which defendants may

pursue remedies for federal constitutional violations. In Frank v.
Mangum, 131 the Court asserted that a conviction obtained in a
mob-dominated trial was contrary to due process: ‘‘if the State, sup-
plying no corrective process, carries into execution a judgment of
death or imprisonment based upon a verdict thus produced by mob
domination, the State deprives the accused of his life or liberty
without due process of law.’’ Consequently, it has been stated nu-
merous times that the absence of some form of corrective process
when the convicted defendant alleges a federal constitutional viola-
tion contravenes the Fourteenth Amendment, 132 and it has been
held that to burden this process, such as limiting the right to peti-
tion for habeas corpus, is to deny the convicted defendant his con-
stitutional rights. 133
The mode by which federal constitutional rights are to be vin-
dicated after conviction is for the government concerned to deter-
mine. ‘‘Wide discretion must be left to the States for the manner
of adjudicating a claim that a conviction is unconstitutional. States
are free to devise their own systems of review in criminal cases. A
State may decide whether to have direct appeals in such cases, and
if so under what circumstances. . . . In respecting the duty laid
upon them . . . States have a wide choice of remedies. A State may
provide that the protection of rights granted by the Federal Con-
stitution be sought through the writ of habeas corpus or coram
nobis. It may use each of these ancient writs in its common law
scope, or it may put them to new uses; or it may afford remedy by
a simple motion brought either in the court of original conviction
or at a place of detention. . . . So long as the rights under the Unit-
ed States Constitution may be pursued, it is for a State and not
for this Court to define the mode by which they may be vindi-
cated.’’ 134 If a State provides a mode of redress, a defendant must
first exhaust that mode, and if unsuccessful may seek relief in fed-
eral court; if there is no adquate remedy in state court, the defend-
ant may petition a federal court for relief through a writ of habeas
corpus. 135
which would enable them adequately to prosecute appeals from convictions. See
infra, pp. 1916–20.
131 237 U.S. 309, 335 (1915).
132 Moore v. Dempsey, 261, U.S. 86, 90, 91 (1923); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S.
103, 113 (1935); New York ex rel. Whitman v. Wilson, 318, U.S. 688, 690 (1943);
Young v. Ragan, 337 U.S. 235, 238–39 (1949).
133 Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945).
134 Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 175–76 (1946).
135 Supra, pp. 811–12. Note that in Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336 (1965), the
Court had taken for review a case which raised the issue whether a State could sim-
ply omit any corrective process for hearing and determining claims of federal con-
When appellate or other corrective process is made available,

inasmuch as it is no less a part of the process of law under which
a defendant is held in custody, it becomes subject to scrutiny for
any alleged unconstitutional deprivation of life or liberty. At first,
the Court seemed content to assume that when a state appellate
process formally appeared to be sufficient to correct constitutional
errors committed by the trial court, the conclusion by the appellate
court that the trial court’s sentence of execution should be affirmed
was ample assurance that life would not be forfeited without due
process of law. 136 But in Moore v. Dempsey, 137 while insisting that
it was not departing from precedent, the Court directed a federal
district court in which petitioners had sought a writ of habeas cor-
pus to make an independent investigation of the facts alleged by
the petitioners—mob domination of their trial—notwithstanding
that the state appellate court had ruled against the legal suffi-
ciency of these same allegations. Indubitably, Moore marked the
abandonment of the Supreme Court’s deference, founded upon con-
siderations of comity, to decisions of state appellate tribunals on is-
sues of constitutionality, and the proclamation of its intention no
longer to treat as virtually conclusive pronouncements by the latter
that proceedings in a trial court were fair, an abandonment soon
made even clearer in Brown v. Mississippi 138 and now taken for
granted.
Rights of Prisoners.—Until relatively recently the view pre-
vailed that a prisoner ‘‘has, as a consequence of his crime, not only
forfeited his liberty, but all his personal rights except those which
the law in its humanity accords to him. He is for the time being
the slave of the state.’’ 139 This view is not now the law, and may
never have been wholly correct. 140 In 1948 the Court declared that
‘‘[l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or
limitation of many privileges and rights’’; 141 ‘‘many,’’ indicated less
than ‘‘all,’’ and it was clear that the due process and equal protec-
tion clauses to some extent do apply to prisoners. 142 More direct
acknowledgment of constitutional protection came in 1972:
‘‘[f]ederal courts sit not to supervise prisons but to enforce the con-
stitutional rights of all ‘persons,’ which include prisoners. We are
stitutional violations, but it dismissed the case when the State in the interim en-
acted provisions for such process.
136 Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
137 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
138 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
139 Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. 790, 796 (1871).
140 Cf. In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242 (1894).
141 Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
142 ‘‘There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons
of this country.’’ Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555–56 (1974).

not unmindful that prison officials must be accorded latitude in the

administration of prison affairs, and that prisoners necessarily are
subject to appropriate rules and regulations. But persons in prison,
like other individuals, have the right to petition the Government
for redress of grievances. . . .’’ 143 However, while the Court af-
firmed that federal courts have the responsibility to scrutinize pris-
on practices alleged to violate the Constitution, at the same time
concerns of federalism and of judicial restraint caused the Court to
emphasize the necessity of deference to the judgments of prison of-
ficials and others with responsibility for administering such sys-
tems. 144
Save for challenges to conditions of confinement of pretrial de-
tainees, 145 the Court has generally treated challenges to prison
conditions as a whole under the cruel and unusual punishments
clause of the Eighth Amendment, 146 and challenges to particular
incidents and practices under the due process clause 147 as well as
under more specific provisions, such as the First Amendment
speech and religion clauses. 148 Prior to formulating its current ap-
proach, the Court recognized several rights of prisoners. Prisoners
have a right to be free of racial segregation in prisons, except for
the necessities of prison security and discipline. 149 They have the
right to petition for redress of grievances, which includes access to
the courts for purposes of presenting their complaints, 150 and to
bring actions in federal courts to recover for damages wrongfully
143 Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972). See also Procunier v. Martinez, 416
U.S. 396, 404–05 (1974) (invalidating state prison mail censorship regulations).
144 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545–548, 551, 555, 562 (1979) (federal prison);
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 351–352 (1981).

145 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). Persons not yet convicted of a crime
may be detained by government upon the appropriate determination of probable

cause and the detention may be effectuated through subjection of the prisoner to
the restrictions and conditions of the detention facility. But a detainee may not be
punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.
Therefore, unconvicted detainees may not be subjected to conditions and restrictions
that amount to punishment. However, the Court limited its concept of punishment
to practices intentionally inflicted by prison authorities and to practices which were
arbitrary or purposeless and unrelated to legitimate institutional objectives.
146 Supra, pp. 1497–99.
147 E.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425
U.S. 308 (1976); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980); Washington v. Harper, 494
U.S. 210 (1990) (prison inmate has liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted admin-
istration of antipsychotic drugs).
148 E.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974); Jones v. North Carolina
Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977). On religious practices and ceremonies,
see Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972).
149 Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
150 Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945).
Prisoners must have reasonable access to a law library or to persons trained in the
law. Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1978).
done them by prison administrators. 151 And they have a right, cir-
cumscribed by legitimate prison administration considerations, to
fair and regular treatment during their incarceration.
In Turner v. Safley, 152 the Court announced a general stand-
ard for measuring prisoners’ claims of deprivation of constitutional
rights. ‘‘[W]hen a regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional
rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legiti-
mate penological interests.’’ 153 Several considerations, the Court
indicated, are appropriate in determining reasonableness of a pris-
on regulation. First, there must be a rational relation to a legiti-
mate, content-neutral objective, such as prison security, broadly de-
fined. Availability of other avenues for exercise of the inmate right
suggests reasonableness. A further indicium of reasonableness is
present if accommodation would have a negative effect on liberty
or safety of guards or other inmates. On the other hand, an alter-
native to regulation ‘‘that fully accommodated the prisoner’s rights
at de minimis cost to valid penological interests’’ suggests
unreasonableness. 154
Fourth Amendment protection is incompatible with ‘‘the con-
cept of incarceration and the needs and objectives of penal institu-
tions,’’ hence a prisoner has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
his prison cell protecting him from ‘‘shakedown’’ searches designed
to root out weapons, drugs, and other contraband. 155 Avenues of
redress ‘‘for calculated harassment unrelated to prison needs’’ are
not totally blocked, the Court indicated; inmates may still seek pro-
tection in the Eighth Amendment or in state tort law. 156 Existence
of ‘‘a meaningful postdeprivation remedy’’ for unauthorized, inten-
tional deprivation of an inmate’s property by prison personnel pro-
tects the inmate’s due process rights. 157 Due process is not impli-
151 Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475
(1973).
152 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (upholding a Missouri rule barring inmate-to-inmate cor-
respondence, but striking down a prohibition on inmate marriages absent compel-

ling reason such as pregnancy or birth of a child).
153 482 U.S. at 89.
154 Id. at 91.
155 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984); Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S.
576 (1984) (holding also that prison security needs support a rule prohibiting pre-
trial detainees contact visits with spouses, children, relatives, and friends).
156 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984).
157 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (holding that state tort law pro-
vided adequate postdeprivation remedies). But see Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113
(1990) (availability of postdeprivation remedy is inadequate when deprivation is
foreseeable, predeprivation process was possible, and official conduct was not ‘‘unau-
thorized’’).
cated at all by negligent deprivation of life, liberty, or property by

prison officials. 158
In Wolff v. McDonnell, 159 the Court promulgated due process
standards to govern the imposition of discipline upon prisoners.
Due process applies, but since prison disciplinary proceedings are
not part of a criminal prosecution the full panoply of rights of a de-
fendant is not available. Rather, the analysis must proceed on a
basis of identifying the interest in ‘‘liberty’’ which the clause pro-
tects.
Where the state provides for good-time credit or other privi-
leges and further provides for forfeiture of these privileges only for
serious misconduct, the interest of the prisoner in this degree of
‘‘liberty’’ entitles him to those minimum procedures appropriate
under the circumstances. 160 What the minimum procedures consist
of is to be determined by balancing the prisoner’s interest against
the valid interest of the prison in maintaining security and order
in the institution, in protecting guards and prisoners against retal-
iation by other prisoners, and in reducing prison tensions. The
Court held in Wolff that the prison must afford the subject of a dis-
ciplinary proceeding advance written notice of the claimed violation
and a written statement of the factfindings as to the evidence re-
lied upon and the reasons for the action taken; also, the inmate
should be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evi-
dence in defense when permitting him to do so will not hazard the
institution’s interests. 161 Confrontation and cross-examination of
adverse witnesses is not required inasmuch as these would no
doubt hazard valid institutional interests. Ordinarily, an inmate
has no right to representation by retained or appointed counsel. Fi-
nally, only a partial right to an impartial tribunal was recognized,
the Court ruling that limitations imposed on the discretion of a
committee of prison officials sufficed for this purpose. 162 Revoca-
tion of good time credits, the Court later ruled, must be supported
by ‘‘some evidence in the record,’’ but an amount that ‘‘might be
characterized as meager’’ is constitutionally sufficient. 163
158 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344
(1986).
159 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
160 Id. at 557. This analysis, of course tracks the interest analysis discussed
supra, pp. 1723–32.
161 However, the Court later ruled, reasons for denying an inmate’s request to
call witnesses need not be disclosed until the issue is raised in court. Ponte v. Real,
471 U.S. 491 (1985).
162 Id. at 418 U.S., 561–72. The Court continues to adhere to its refusal to re-
quire appointment of counsel. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 496–97 (1980), and id.
at 497–500 (Justice Powell concurring); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
163 Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454, 457 (1985).
Determination whether due process requires a hearing before

a prisoner is transferred from one institution to another requires
a close analysis of the applicable statutes and regulations as well
as a consideration of the particular harm suffered by the trans-
feree. On the one hand, the Court found that no hearing need be
held prior to the transfer from one prison to another prison in
which the conditions were substantially less favorable. Since the
State had not conferred any right to remain in the facility to which
the prisoner was first assigned, defeasible upon the commission of
acts for which transfer is a punishment, prison officials had unfet-
tered discretion to transfer any prisoner for any reason or for no
reason at all; consequently, there was nothing to hold a hearing
about. 164 The same principles govern interstate prison trans-
fers. 165 On the other hand, transfer of a prisoner to a mental hos-
pital pursuant to a statute authorizing transfer if the inmate suf-
fers from a ‘‘mental disease or defect’’ must be preceded by a hear-
ing for two alternative reasons. First, the statute gave the inmate
a liberty interest since it presumed he would not be moved absent
a finding he was suffering from a mental disease or defect. Second,
unlike transfers from one prison to another, transfer to a mental
institution was not within the range of confinement covered by the
prisoner’s sentence, and, moreover, imposed a stigma constituting
a deprivation of a liberty interest. 166
What kind of a hearing is required before a state may force a
mentally ill prisoner to take antipsychotic drugs against his will
was at issue in Washington v. Harper. 167 There the Court held
that a judicial hearing was not required. Instead, the inmate’s sub-
stantive liberty interest (derived from the Due Process Clause as
well as from state law) was adequately protected by an administra-
tive hearing before independent medical professionals, at which
hearing the inmate has the right to a lay advisor but not an attor-
ney.
Probation and Parole.—Sometimes convicted defendants are
not sentenced to jail, but instead are placed on probation subject
to incarceration upon violation of the conditions which are imposed;
others who are jailed may subsequently qualify for release on pa-
role before completing their sentence, and are subject to
reincarceration upon violation of imposed conditions. Because both
of these dispositions are statutory privileges granted by the govern-
164 Meacham v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236
(1976).
165 Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983).
166 Vitekv. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
167 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
mental authority, 168 it was long assumed that the administrators

of the systems did not have to accord procedural due process either
in the granting stage or in the revocation stage. Now, both grant-
ing and revocation are subject to due process analysis, although the
results tend to be disparate. Thus, in Mempa v. Rhay, 169 the trial
judge had deferred sentencing and placed the convicted defendant
on probation; when facts subsequently developed which indicated a
violation of the conditions of probation, he was summoned and
summarily sentenced to prison. The Court held that he had been
entitled to counsel at the deferred sentencing hearing.
In Morrissey v. Brewer 170 a unanimous Court held that parole
revocations must be accompanied by the usual due process hearing
and notice requirements. ‘‘[T]he revocation of parole is not part of
a criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a de-
fendant in such a proceeding does not apply to parole revocation
. . . [But] the liberty of a parolee, although indeterminate, includes
many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its termination
inflicts a ‘grievous loss’ on the parolee and often on others. It is
hardly useful any longer to try to deal with this problem in terms
of whether the parolee’s liberty is a ‘right’ or a ‘privilege.’ By what-
ever name, the liberty is valuable and must be seen as within the
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. Its termination calls for
some orderly process, however informal.’’ 171 What process is due,
then, turned upon the State’s interests. Its principal interest was
that having once convicted a defendant, imprisoned him, and re-
leased him for rehabilitation purposes at some risk, it should ‘‘be
able to return the individual to imprisonment without the burden
of a new adversary criminal trial if in fact he has failed to abide
by the conditions of his parole.’’ But the State has no interest in
revoking parole without some informal procedural guarantees, in-
asmuch as this will not interfere with its reasonable interest. 172
Minimal due process, the Court held, requires that at both
stages of the revocation process—the arrest of the parolee and the
168 Ughbanks v. Armstrong, 208 U.S. 481 (1908), held that parole is not a con-
stitutional right but instead is a ‘‘present’’ from government to the prisoner. In

Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935), the Court’s premise was that as a matter of
grace the parolee was being granted a privilege and that he should neither expect
nor seek due process. Then-Judge Burger in Hyser v. Reed, 318 F. 2d 225 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963), reasoned that due process was inapplicable
because the parole board’s function was to assist the prisoner’s rehabilitation and
restoration to society and that there was no adversary relationship between the
board and the parolee.
169 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
170 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
171 Id. at 480, 482.
172 Id. at 483–84.
formal revocation—the parolee is entitled to certain rights. Prompt-

ly following arrest of the parolee, there should be an informal hear-
ing to determine whether reasonable grounds exist for revocation
of parole; this preliminary hearing should be conducted at or rea-
sonably near the place of the alleged parole violation or arrest and
as promptly as convenient after arrest while information is fresh
and sources are available, and should be conducted by someone not
directly involved in the case, though he need not be a judicial offi-
cer. The parolee should be given adequate notice that the hearing
will take place and what violations are alleged, he should be able
to appear and speak in his own behalf and produce other evidence,
and he should be allowed to examine those who have given adverse
evidence against him unless it is determined that the identity of
such informant should not be revealed. Also, the hearing officer
should prepare a digest of the hearing and base his decision upon
the evidence adduced at the hearing. 173
Prior to the final decision on revocation, there should be a
more formal revocation hearing at which there would be a final
evaluation of any contested relevant facts and consideration wheth-
er the facts as determined warrant revocation. The hearing must
take place within a reasonable time after the parolee is taken into
custody and he must be enabled to controvert the allegations or
offer evidence in mitigation. The procedural details of such hear-
ings are for the States to develop but the Court specified minimum
requirements of due process. ‘‘They include (a) written notice of the
claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of evi-
dence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to
present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing
officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation);
(e) a ‘neutral and detached’ hearing body such as a traditional pa-
role board, members of which need not be judicial officers or law-
yers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evi-
dence relied on and the reasons for revoking parole.’’ 174 Ordinarily
the written statement need not indicate that the sentencing court
or review board considered alternatives to incarceration, 175 but a
sentencing court must consider such alternatives if the probation
violation consists of the failure of an indigent probationer, through
no fault of his own, to pay a fine or restitution. 176
173 Id.at 484–87.
174 Id.at 487–89.
175 Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606 (1985).
176 Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983).
The Court has applied a flexible due process standard to the

provision of counsel. Counsel is not invariably required in parole or
probation revocation proceedings. The State should, however, pro-
vide the assistance of counsel where an indigent person may have
difficulty in presenting his version of disputed facts without cross-
examination of witnesses or presentation of complicated documen-
tary evidence. Presumptively, counsel should be provided where the
person requests counsel, based on a timely and colorable claim that
he has not committed the alleged violation, or if that issue be
uncontested, there are reasons in justification or mitigation that
might make revocation inappropriate. 177
With respect to the granting of parole, the Court’s analysis of
the due process clause’s meaning in Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal
Inmates 178 is much more problematical. Rejected was the theory
that the mere establishment of the possibility of parole was suffi-
cient to create a liberty interest entitling any prisoner meeting the
general standards of eligibility to a due process protected expecta-
tion of being dealt with in any particular way. On the other hand,
the Court did recognize in the particular statute before it the cre-
ation of some expectancy of release that was entitled to some meas-
ure of constitutional protection, while cautioning that only by a
case-by-case analysis could it be said whether other parole statutes
similarly created such expectancy. 179 In any event, the Court con-
sidered the nature of the decisions that parole authorities must
make to hold that the full panoply of due process guarantees is not
required; procedures designed to elicit specific facts are inappropri-
ate under the circumstances. Rather, minimizing the risk of error
is the prime consideration, and that goal was achieved by the
board’s largely informal methods; the lower court erred, therefore,
in imposing requirements of formal hearings, notice, and specifica-
tion of particular evidence in the record. The inmate was afforded
an opportunity to be heard and when parole was denied he was in-
formed in what respects he fell short of qualifying. That afforded
the process that was due.
Where, however, government by its statutes and regulations
creates no obligation of the pardoning authority and thus creates
177 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
178 442 U.S. 1 (1979). Justice Powell thought that creation of a parole system
did create a legitimate expectancy of fair procedure protected by due process, but,
save in one respect, he agreed with the Court that the procedure followed was ade-
quate. Id. at 18. Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens argued in dissent that
the Court’s analysis of the liberty interest was faulty and that due process required
more than the board provided. Id. at 22.
179 Following Greenholtz, the Court held in Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S.
369 (1987), that a liberty interest was created by a Montana statute providing that
a prisoner ‘‘shall’’ be released upon certain findings by a parole board.
no legitimate expectancy of release, the prisoner may not by show-

ing the favorable exercise of the authority in the great number of
cases demonstrate such a legitimate expectancy. The mere exist-
ence of purely discretionary authority and the frequent exercise of
it creates no entitlement. 180
The Problem of the Juvenile Offender.—All of the States of
the Union and the District of Columbia make provision for dealing
with juvenile offenders outside of the criminal system for adult of-
fenders. 181 These juvenile justice systems apply both to offenses
that would be criminal if committed by an adult and to delinquent
behavior not recognizable under laws dealing with adults, such as
habitual truancy, deportment endangering the morals or health of
the juvenile or others, or disobedience making the juvenile uncon-
trollable by his parents. The reforms of the early part of this cen-
tury provided not only for segregating juveniles from adult offend-
ers in the adjudication, detention, and correctional facilities, but
they also dispensed with the substantive and procedural rules sur-
rounding criminal trials which were mandated by due process. Jus-
tification for this abandonment of constitutional guarantees was of-
fered by describing juvenile courts as civil not criminal and as not
dispensing criminal punishment, and offering the theory that the
state was acting as parens patriae for the juvenile offender and was
in no sense his adversary. 182 Disillusionment with the results of
juvenile reforms coupled with judicial emphasis on constitutional
protection of the accused led in the 1960s to a substantial restric-
tion of these elements of juvenile jurisprudence.
After tracing in much detail this history of juvenile courts, the
Court held in In re Gault 183 that the application of due process to
juvenile proceedings would not endanger the good intentions vested
in the system nor diminish the features of the system which were
deemed desirable—emphasis upon rehabilitation rather than pun-
180 Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981); Jago v. Van
Curen, 454 U.S. 14 (1981). The former case involved not parole but commutation
of a life sentence, commutation being mecessary to become eligible for parole. The
statute gave the Board total discretion to commute, but in at least 75% of the cases
prisoner received a favorable action and virtually all of the prisoners who had their
sentences commuted were promptly paroled. In Van Curen, the Court made express
what had been implicit in Dumschat; the ‘‘mutually explicit understandings’’ concept
under which some property interests are found protected does not apply to liberty
interests. Van Curen is also interesting because there the parole board had granted
the petition for parole but within days revoked it before the prisoner was released,
upon being told that he had lied at the hearing before the board.
181 For analysis of the state laws as well as application of constitutional prin-
ciples to juveniles, see SAMUEL M. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES: THE JUVENILE JUS-
TICE SYSTEM (2d ed. 1989).
182 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 12–29 (1967).
183 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
ishment, a measure of informality, avoidance of the stigma of

criminal conviction, the low visibility of the process—but that the
consequences of the absence of due process standards made their
application necessary. ‘‘Ultimately, however, we confront the reality
of that portion of the juvenile court process with which we deal in
this case. A boy is charged with misconduct. The boy is committed
to an institution where he may be restrained of liberty for years.
It is of no constitutional consequence—and of limited practical
meaning—that the institution to which he is committed is called an
Industrial School. The fact of the matter is that, however euphe-
mistic the title, a ‘receiving home’ or an ‘industrial school’ for juve-
niles is an institution of confinement in which the child is incarcer-
ated for a greater or lesser time. His world becomes ‘a building
with whitewashed walls, regimented routine and institutional
hours. . . .’ Instead of mother and father and sisters and brothers
and friends and classmates, his world is peopled by guards,
custodians, state employees, and ‘delinquents’ confined with him
for anything from waywardness to rape and homicide. ‘‘In view of
this, it would be extraordinary if our Constitution did not require
the procedural regularity and the exercise of care implied in the
phrase ‘due process.’ Under our Constitution, the condition of being
a boy does not justify a kangaroo court.’’ 184
Thus, the Court in Gault required that notice of charges be
given in time for the juvenile to prepare a defense, required a hear-
ing in which the juvenile could be represented by retained or ap-
pointed counsel, required observance of the rights of confrontation
and cross-examination, and required that the juvenile be protected
against self-incrimination. 185 It did not pass upon the right of ap-
peal or the failure to make transcripts of hearings. Earlier, the
Court had held that before a juvenile could be ‘‘waived’’ to an adult
court for trial, there had to be a hearing and findings of reasons,
a result based on statutory interpretation but apparently
constitutionalized in Gault. 186 Subsequently, it was held that the
‘‘essentials of due process and fair treatment’’ required that a juve-
nile could be adjudged delinquent only on evidence beyond a rea-
sonable doubt when the offense charged would be a crime if com-
184 Id. at 27–28.
185 Id. at 31–35. Justice Harlan concurred in part and dissented in part, id. at
65, agreeing on the applicability of due process but disagreeing with the standards
of the Court. Justice Stewart dissented wholly, arguing that the application of proce-
dures developed for adversary criminal proceedings to juvenile proceedings would
endanger their objectives and contending that the decision was a backward step to-
ward undoing the reforms instituted in the past. Id. at 78.
186 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), noted on this point in In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1967).

mitted by an adult, 187 but still later the Court held that jury trials
were not constitutionally required in juvenile trials. 188
On a few occasions the Court has considered whether rights ac-
corded to adults during investigation of crime are to be accorded
juveniles. In one such case the Court ruled that a juvenile under-
going custodial interrogation by police had not invoked a Miranda
right to remain silent by requesting permission to consult with his
probation officer, since a probation officer could not be equated
with an attorney, but indicated as well that a juvenile’s waiver of
Miranda rights was to be evaluated under the same totality-of-the-
circumstances approach applicable to adults. That approach ‘‘per-
mits—indeed it mandates—inquiry into all the circumstances sur-
rounding the interrogation . . . includ[ing] evaluation of the juve-
nile’s age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and
into whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given
him. . . .’’ 189 In another case the Court ruled that, while the
Fourth Amendment applies to searches of students by public school
authorities, neither the warrant requirement nor the probable
cause standard is appropriate. 190 Instead, a simple reasonableness
187 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart
dissented, following essentially the Stewart reasoning in Gault. ‘‘The Court’s opinion
today rests entirely on the assumption that all juvenile proceedings are ‘criminal
prosecutions,’ hence subject to constitutional limitation. . . . What the juvenile court
systems need is not more but less of the trappings of legal procedure and judicial
formalism; the juvenile system requires breathing room and flexibility in order to
survive, if it can survive the repeated assaults from this Court.’’ Id. at 375, 376. Jus-
tice Black dissented because he did not think the reasonable doubt standard a con-
stitutional requirement at all. Id. at 377.
188 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). No opinion was concurred
in by a majority of the Justices. Justice Blackmun’s opinion of the Court, which was
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and White, reasoned that a ju-
venile proceeding was not ‘‘a criminal prosecution’’ within the terms of the Sixth
Amendment, so that jury trials were not automatically required; instead, the prior
cases had proceeded on a ‘‘fundamental fairness’’ approach and in that regard a jury
was not a necessary component of fair factfinding and its use would have serious
repercussions on the rehabilitative and protection functions of the juvenile court.
Justice White also submitted a brief concurrence emphasizing the differences be-
tween adult criminal trials and juvenile adjudications. Id. at 551. Justice Brennan
concurred in one case and dissented in another because in his view open proceedings
would operate to protect juveniles from oppression in much the same way as a jury
would. Id. at 553. Justice Harlan concurred because he did not believe jury trials
were constitutionally mandated in state courts. Id. at 557. Justices Douglas, Black,
and Marshall dissented. Id. at 557.
189 Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979).
190 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (upholding the search of a stu-
dent’s purse to determine whether the student possessed cigarettes in violation of
schoool rule; evidence of drug activity held admissible in a prosecution under the
juvenile laws).
standard governs all searches of students’ persons and effects by

school authorities. 191
The Court ruled in Schall v. Martin 192 that preventive deten-
tion of juveniles does not offend due process when it serves the le-
gitimate state purpose of protecting society and the juvenile from
potential consequences of pretrial crime, when the terms of confine-
ment serve those legitimate purposes and are nonpunitive, and
when procedures provide sufficient protection against erroneous
and unnecessary detentions. A statute authorizing pretrial deten-
tion of accused juvenile delinquents on a finding of ‘‘serious risk’’
that the juvenile would commit crimes prior to trial, providing for
expedited hearings (the maximum possible detention was 17 days),
and guaranteeing a formal, adversarial probable cause hearing
within that period, was found to satisfy these requirements.
Each state has a procedure by which juveniles may be tried as
adults. 193 With the Court having clarified the consitutional re-
quirements for imposition of capital punishment, it was only a mat-
ter of time before the Court would have to determine whether
states may subject juveniles to capital punishment. In Stanford v.
Kentucky, 194 the Court held that the Eighth Amendment does not
categorically prohibit imposition of the death penalty for individ-
uals who commit crimes at age 16 or 17; earlier the Court had in-
validated a statutory scheme permitting capital punishment for
crimes committed before age 16. 195 In weighing validity under the
Eighth Amendment, the Court has looked to state practice to deter-
mine whether a consensus against execution exists. 196
Still to be considered by the Court are such questions as the
substantive and procedural guarantees to be applied in proceedings
when the matter at issue is non-criminal delinquent behavior.
The Problem of Civil Commitment.—As is the case with ju-
venile offenders, several other classes of persons are subject to con-
finement by processes and in courts deemed civil rather than crimi-
nal. Within this category of ‘‘protective commitment’’ are involun-
tary commitments for treatment of insanity and other degrees of
mental incompetence, retardation, alcoholism, narcotics addiction,
191 This single rule, the Court explained, will permit school authorities ‘‘to regu-
late their conduct according to the dictates of reason and common sense.’’ 469 U.S.
at 343. Rejecting the suggestion of dissenting Justice Stevens, the Court was ‘‘un-
willing to adopt a standard under which the legality of a search is dependent upon
a judge’s evaluation of the relative importance of various school rules.’’ Id. at n.9.
192 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
193 See SAMUEL M. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYS-
TEM, ch. 4, ‘‘Waiver of Jurisdiction’’ (2d ed. 1989).

194 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
195 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
196 See analysis of Eighth Amendment principles, supra pp. 1491–92.
sexual psychopathy, and the like. Inasmuch as the deprivation of

liberty is as severe as that experienced by juveniles adjudged delin-
quent, and in addition is accompanied with harm to reputation, it
is surprising that the Court has only recently dealt with the
issue. 197
In O’Connor v. Donaldson, 198 bypassing ‘‘the difficult issues of
constitutional law’’ raised by the lower courts’ resolution of the
case, 199 the Court held that ‘‘a State cannot constitutionally con-
fine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of sur-
viving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and
responsible family members or friends.’’ 200 The trial jury had found
that Donaldson was not dangerous to himself or to others, and the
Court ruled that he had been unconstitutionally confined. 201 Left
to resolution another day were such questions as ‘‘when, or by what
procedures, a mentally ill person may be confined by the State on
any of the grounds which, under contemporary statutes, are gen-
erally advanced to justify involuntary confinement of such a per-
son—to prevent injury to the public, to ensure his own survival or
safety, or to alleviate or cure his illness’’ 202 and the right, if any,
to receive treatment for the confined person’s illness. To conform
to due process requirements, procedures for voluntary admission
should recognize the possibility that persons in need of treatment
may not be competent to give informed consent; this is not a situa-
tion where availability of a meaningful postdeprivation remedy can
cure the due process violation. 203
Procedurally, it is clear that an individual’s liberty interest in
being free from unjustifiable confinement and from the adverse so-
cial consequences of being labeled mentally ill requires government
to assume a greater share of the risk of error in proving the exist-
197 Only in Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940), did
the Court earlier approach consideration of the problem. Other cases reflected the
Court’s concern with the rights of convicted criminal defendants and generally re-
quired due process procedures or that the commitment of convicted criminal defend-
ants follow the procedures required for civil commitments. Specht v. Patterson, 386
U.S. 605 (1967); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966); Lynch v. Overholser, 369
U.S. 705 (1962); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana, 406
U.S. 715 (1972); McNeil v. Director, 407 U.S. 245 (1972). Cf. Murel v. Baltimore City
Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355 (1972).
198 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
199 That is, the right to treatment of the involuntarily committed. Supra, pp.
1690–92.
200 422 U.S. at 576.
201 Id. at 576–77. The Court remanded to allow the trial court to determine
whether Donaldson should recover personally from his doctors and others for his
confinement, under standards formulated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
202 O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573 (1975).
203 Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990).
ence of such illness as a precondition to confinement. Thus, the evi-

dentiary standard of a preponderance, normally used in litigation
between private parties, is constitutionally inadequate in commit-
ment proceedings. On the other hand, the criminal standard of be-
yond a reasonable doubt is not necessary because the state’s aim
is not punitive and because some or even much of the consequence
of an erroneous decision not to commit may fall upon the individ-
ual. Moreover, the criminal standard addresses an essentially fac-
tual question, whereas interpretative and predictive determinations
must also be made in reaching a conclusion on commitment. The
Court therefore imposed a standard of ‘‘clear and convincing’’ evi-
dence. 204
Difficult questions of what due process may require in the con-
text of commitment of allegedly mentally ill and mentally retarded
children by their parents or by the State when such children are
wards of the State were confronted in Parham v. J.R. 205 Under the
challenged laws there were no formal preadmission hearings, but
psychiatric and social workers did interview parents and children
and reached some form of independent determination that commit-
ment was called for. The Court acknowledged the potential for
abuse but balanced this against such factors as the responsibility
of parents for the care and nurture of their children and the legal
presumption that parents usually act in behalf of their children’s
welfare, the independent role of medical professionals in deciding
to accept the children for admission, and the real possibility that
the institution of an adversary proceeding would both deter parents
from acting in good faith to institutionalize children needing such
care and interfere with the ability of parents to assist with the care
of institutionalized children. 206 Similarly, the same concerns, re-
flected in the statutory obligation of the State to care for children
in its custody, caused the Court to apply the same standards to in-
voluntary commitment by the Government. 207 Left to future reso-
lution was the question of the due process requirements for
postadmission review of the necessity for continued confine-
ment. 208
204 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). See also Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S.
480 (1980) (transfer of prison inmate to mental hospital).

205 442 U.S. 584 (1979). See also Secretary of Public Welfare v. Institutionalized
Juveniles, 442 U.S. 640 (1979).

206 442 U.S. at 598–617. The dissenters agreed on this point. Id. at 626–37.
207 Id. at 617–20. The dissenters would have required a preconfinement hearing.
Id. at 637–38.
208 Id. at 617. The dissent would have mandated a formal postadmission hear-
ing. Id. at 625–26.

EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS

Scope and Application
State Action.—‘‘[T]he action inhibited by the first section of
the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be
said to be that of the States. That Amendment erects no shield
against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrong-
ful.’’ 1 The Amendment by its express terms provides that ‘‘[n]o
State . . .’’ and ‘‘nor shall any State . . .’’ engage in the proscribed
conduct. ‘‘It is State action of a particular character that is prohib-
ited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject mat-
ter of the amendment. It has a deeper and broader scope. It nul-
lifies and makes void all State legislation, and State action of every
kind, which impairs the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States, or which injures them in life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, or which denies to any of them the
equal protection of the laws.’’ 2 While the state action doctrine is
equally applicable to denials of privileges or immunities, due proc-
ess, and equal protection, it is actually only with the last great
right of the Fourteenth Amendment that the doctrine is invariably
associated. 3
‘‘The vital requirement is State responsibility,’’ Justice Frank-
furter once wrote, ‘‘that somewhere, somehow, to some extent,
there be an infusion of conduct by officials, panoplied with State
power, into any scheme’’ to deny protected rights. 4 Certainly, state
legislation commanding a discriminatory result is state action con-
demned by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, and is
void. 5 But the difficulty for the Court has begun when the conduct
1 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). Similarly, the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment, with its equal protection component, limits only federal
governmental action and not that of private parties, as is true of each of the provi-
sions of the Bill of Rights. The scope and reach of the ‘‘state action’’ doctrine is thus
the same whether a State or the National Government is concerned. See CBS v.
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
2 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). With regard to the principal issue
in this decision, the limitation of the state action requirement on Congress’ enforce-
ment powers, see infra, pp. 1929–33.
3 Recently, however, because of broadening due process conceptions and the re-
sulting litigation, issues of state action have been raised with respect to the due
process clause. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974);
Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830
(1982); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457
U.S. 991 (1982).
4 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 473 (1953) (concurring). The Justice was speak-
ing of the state action requirement of the Fifteenth Amendment. The Nineteenth
and Twenty-sixth Amendments also hinge on state action; the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, banning slavery and involuntary servitude, does not.
5 United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 25 (1960). A prime example is the statu-
tory requirement of racially segregated schools condemned in Brown v. Board of

complained of is not so clearly the action of a State but is, perhaps,

the action of a minor state official not authorized or perhaps forbid-
den by state law so to act, or is, perhaps on the other hand, the
action of a private party who nonetheless has some relationship
with governmental authority.
The continuum of state action ranges from obvious legislated
denial of equal protection to private action that is no longer so sig-
nificantly related to or brigaded with state action that the Amend-
ment applies. The prohibitions of the Amendment ‘‘have reference
to actions of the political body denominated by a State, by what-
ever instruments or in whatever modes that action may be taken.
A State acts by its legislative, its executive, or its judicial authori-
ties. It can act in no other way. The constitutional provision, there-
fore, must mean that no agency of the State, or of the officers or
agents by whom its powers are exerted, shall deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Whoever, by
virtue of public position under a State government, deprives an-
other of property, life, or liberty, without due process of law, or de-
nies or takes away the equal protection of the laws, violates the
constitutional inhibition; and as he acts in the name and for the
State, and is clothed with the State’s power, his act is that of the
State.’’ 6
‘‘Careful adherence to the ‘state action’ requirement preserves
an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law
and federal judicial power. It also avoids imposing on the State, its
agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which they can-
not fairly be blamed. A major consequence is to require the courts
to respect the limits of their own power as directed against state
governments and private interests. Whether this is good or bad pol-
icy, it is a fundamental fact of our political order.’’ 7 That the doc-
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). And see Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244
(1963), holding that trespass convictions of African Americans ‘‘sitting-in’’ at a lunch
counter over the objection of the manager cannot stand because of a local ordinance
commanding such separation, irrespective of the manager’s probable attitude if no
such ordinance existed.
6 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346–47 (1880).
7 Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936–37 (1982). ‘‘Freedom of the in-
dividual to choose his associates or his neighbors, to use and dispose of his property
as he sees fit, to be irrational, arbitrary, capricious, even unjust in his personal rela-
tions are things all entitled to a large measure of protection from governmental in-
terference. This liberty would be overridden in the name of equality, if the struc-
tures of the amendment were applied to governmental and private action without
distinction. Also inherent in the concept of state action are values of federalism, a
recognition that there are areas of private rights upon which federal power should
not lay a heavy hand and which should properly be left to the more precise instru-
ments of local authority.’’ Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 250 (1963)
(Justice Harlan concurring).
trine serves certain values and disserves others is not a criticism

of it but a recognition that in formulating and applying the several
tests by which the presence of ‘‘state action’’ is discerned, 8 the
Court has considerable discretion and the weights of the opposing
values and interests will lead to substantially different applications
of the tests. Thus, following the Civil War, when the Court sought
to reassert federalism values, it imposed a rather rigid state action
standard. During the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s,
when almost all state action contentions were raised in a racial
context, the Court generally found the presence of state action. As
it grew more sympathetic to federalism concerns in the late 1970s
and 1980s, the Court began to reassert a strengthened state action
doctrine, primarily but hardly exclusively in nonracial cases.
Operation of the state action doctrine was critical in determin-
ing whether school systems were segregated unconstitutionally by
race. The original Brown cases and subsequent ones arose in the
context of statutorily mandated separation of the races and occa-
sioned therefore no controversy in finding state action. 9 The after-
math in the South involved not so much state action as the deter-
mination of the remedies necessary to achieve a unitary system. 10
But if racial segregation is not the result of state action in some
aspect, then its existence is not subject to constitutional remedy. 11
Distinguishing between the two situations has occasioned much
controversy.
Confronting in a case arising from Denver, Colorado, the issue
of a school system in which no statutory dual system had ever been
imposed, the Court restated the obvious principle that racial seg-
regation caused by ‘‘intentionally segregative school board actions’’
is de jure and not de facto, just as if it had been mandated by stat-
ute. ‘‘[T]he differentiating factor between de jure segregation and
so-called de facto segregation . . . is purpose or intent to seg-
regate.’’ 12 Where it is proved that a meaningful portion of a school
system is segregated as a result of official action, the official agency
must bear the burden of proving that other school segregation
within the system is adventitious and not the result of official ac-
tion. It is not the responsibility of complainants to show that each
8 ‘‘Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involve-
ment of the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance.’’ Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
9 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10 Infra, pp. 1843–47.
11 Compare Washington v. Seattle School Dist., 458 U.S. 457 (1982), with
Crawford v. Los Angeles Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982).

12 Keyes v. Denver School District, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973) (emphasis by
Court). See also Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 457 n.5 (1979).
school in a system is de jure segregated to be entitled to a system-

wide desegregation plan. 13 Moreover, the Court has also appar-
ently adopted a rule to the effect that if it can be proved that at
some time in the past a school board has purposefully maintained
a racially separated system, a continuing obligation to dismantle
that system can be said to have devolved upon the agency at that
earlier point so that its subsequent actions can be held to a stand-
ard of having promoted desegregation or of not having promoted it,
so that facially neutral or ambiguous school board policies can form
the basis for a judicial finding of intentional discrimination. 14
Different results, however, follow when inter-district segrega-
tion is an issue. Disregard of district lines is permissible by a fed-
eral court in formulating a desegregation plan only when it finds
an inter-district violation. ‘‘Before the boundaries of separate and
autonomous school districts may be set aside by consolidating the
separate units for remedial purposes by imposing a cross-district
remedy, it must first be shown that there has been a constitutional
violation within one district that produces a significant segregative
effect in another district. Specifically it must be shown that racially
discriminatory acts of the state or local school districts, or of a sin-
gle school district, have been a substantive cause of inter-district
segregation.’’ 15 The de jure/de facto distinction is thus well estab-
lished in school cases and is firmly grounded upon the ‘‘state ac-
tion’’ language of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It has long been established that the actions of state officers
and agents are attributable to the State. Thus, application of a fed-
eral statute imposing a criminal penalty on a state judge who ex-
cluded African Americans from jury duty was upheld as within con-
gressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment; the judge’s ac-
tion constituted state action even though state law did not author-
ize him to select the jury in a racially discriminatory manner. 16
13 Id. at 208–213. The continuing validity of the Keyes shifting-of-the-burden
principle, after Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and Dayton Bd. of Educ.
v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977), was asserted in Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick,
443 U.S. 449, 455–458 & n.7, 467–68 (1979), and Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman,
443 U.S. 526, 540–42 (1979).
14 Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 458–61 (1979); Dayton Bd.
of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 534–40 (1979).

15 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744–45 (1974).
16 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880). Similarly, the acts of a state governor
are state actions, Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1958); Sterling v. Constantin,
287 U.S. 378, 393 (1932), as are the acts of prosecuting attorneys, Mooney v.
Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112, 113 (1935), state and local election officials, United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), and law enforcement officials. Griffin v.
Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Screws v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). One need not be an employee of the State to act
The fact that the ‘‘state action’’ category is not limited to situations
in which state law affirmatively authorizes discriminatory action
was made clearer in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 17 in which the Court
found unconstitutional state action in the discriminatory adminis-
tration of an ordinance fair and non-discriminatory on its face. Not
even the fact that the actions of the state agents are illegal under
state law makes the action nonattributable to the State for pur-
poses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 18 ‘‘Misuse of power, possessed
by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrong-
doer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken
‘under color of’ state law.’’ 19 When the denial of equal protection
is not commanded by law or by administrative regulation but is
nonetheless accomplished through police enforcement of ‘‘custom’’ 20
or through hortatory admonitions by public officials to private par-
ties to act in a discriminatory manner, 21 the action is state action.
When a State clothes a private party with official authority, he
may not engage in conduct forbidden the State. 22
Beyond this point we enter the area in which the discrimina-
tory intent is that of a private individual and the question is
whether a State has encouraged the effort or has impermissibly
aided it. 23 Of notable importance and a subject of controversy since
‘‘under color of’’ state law; he may merely participate in an act with state officers.
United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
17 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
18 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); Williams v. United States, 341
U.S. 97 (1951); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966). See also United States
v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 25 (1960). As Justice Brandeis noted in Iowa-Des Moines
National Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239, 246 (1931), ‘‘acts done ‘by virtue of public
position under a State government . . . and . . . in the name and for the State’ . . .
are not to be treated as if they were the acts of private individuals, although in
doing them the official acted contrary to an express command of the state law.’’ Note
that for purposes of being amenable to suit in federal court, however, the immunity
of the States does not shield state officers who are alleged to be engaging in illegal
or unconstitutional action. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), supra, pp. 1537–
44. Cf. Screws v. United States, supra, 147–48.
19 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941).
20 Cf. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
21 Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963). No statute or ordinance man-
dated segregation at lunch counters but both the mayor and the chief of police had
recently issued statements announcing their intention to maintain the existing pol-
icy of separation. Thus, the conviction of African Americans for trespass because
they refused to leave a segregated lunch counter was voided.
22 Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964). Guard at private entertainment
ground was also deputy sheriff; he could not execute the racially discriminatory poli-
cies of his private employer. See also Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951).
23 Examples already alluded to include Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267
(1963), in which certain officials had advocated continued segregation, Peterson v.

City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963), in which there were segregation-requiring
ordinances and customs of separation, and Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964),
in which health regulations required separate restroom facilities in any establish-
ment serving both races.
it was decided is Shelley v. Kraemer. 24 There, property owners

brought suit to enforce a racially restrictive covenant, seeking to
enjoin the sale of a home by white sellers to black buyers. The cov-
enants standing alone, Chief Justice Vinson said, violated no rights
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. ‘‘So long as the purposes
of those agreements are effectuated by voluntary adherence to their
terms, it would appear clear that there has been no action by the
State and the provisions of the Amendment have not been vio-
lated.’’ However, that was not all. ‘‘These are cases in which the
purposes of the agreements were secured only by judicial enforce-
ment by state courts of the restrictive terms of the agreements.’’ 25
Establishing that the precedents were to the effect that judicial ac-
tion of state courts was state action, the Court continued to find
that judicial enforcement of these covenants was forbidden. ‘‘The
undisputed facts disclose that petitioners were willing purchasers
of properties upon which they desire to establish homes. The own-
ers of the properties were willing sellers; and contracts of sale were
accordingly consummated. . . .’’
‘‘These are not cases . . . in which the States have merely ab-
stained from action, leaving private individuals free to impose such
discriminations as they see fit. Rather, these are cases in which the
States have made available to such individuals the full coercive
power of government to deny to petitioners, on the grounds of race
or color, the enjoyment of property rights in premises which peti-
tioners are willing and financially able to acquire and which the
grantors are willing to sell.’’ 26
Arguments about the scope of Shelley began immediately. Did
the rationale mean that no private decision to discriminate could
be effectuated in any manner by action of the State, as by enforce-
ment of trespass laws or judicial enforcement of discrimination in
wills? Or did it rather forbid the action of the State in interfering
with the willingness of two private parties to deal with each other?
Disposition of several early cases possibly governed by Shelley left
this issue unanswered. 27 But the Court has experienced no dif-
24 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
25 Id. at 13–14.
26 Id. at 19. In Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948), the Court outlawed judicial
enforcement of restrictive covenants in the District of Columbia as violative of civil

rights legislation and public policy. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), held
that damage actions for violations of racially restrictive covenants would not be judi-
cially entertained.
27 Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 245 Iowa 147, 60 N.W. 2d 110
(1953), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 348 U.S. 880 (1954), rehearing granted,
judgment vacated & certiorari dismissed, 349 U.S. 70 (1955); Black v. Cutter Lab-
oratories, 351 U.S. 292 (1956). The central issue in the ‘‘sit-in’’ cases, whether state
enforcement of trespass laws at the behest of private parties acting on the basis of
ficulty in finding that state court enforcement of common-law rules

in a way that has an impact upon speech and press rights is state
action and triggers the application of constitutional rules. 28 It may
be that the substantive rule that is being enforced is the dispositive
issue, rather than the mere existence of state action. Thus, in
Evans v. Abney, 29 a state court, asked to enforce a discriminatory
stipulation in a will that property devised to a city for use as a
public park should never be used by African Americans, ruled that
the city could not operate the park in a segregated fashion; instead
of striking the segregation requirement from the will, the court or-
dered return of the property to the decedent’s heirs, inasmuch as
the trust had failed. The Supreme Court held the decision permis-
sible, inasmuch as the state court had merely carried out the tes-
tator’s intent with no racial motivation itself, and distinguished
Shelley on the basis that African Americans were not discriminated
against by the reversion, because everyone was deprived of use of
the park. 30
Similar to Shelley in controversy and the indefiniteness of its
rationale, the latter element of which appears to have undergone
a modifying rationalization, is Reitman v. Mulkey, 31 in which, fol-
lowing enactment of an ‘‘open housing’’ law by the California legis-
lature, an initiative and referendum measure was passed that re-
pealed the law and amended the state constitution to prevent any
agency of the State or of local government from henceforth forbid-
ding racial discrimination in private housing. Upholding a state
court invalidation of this amendment, the Court appeared to
ground its decision on two lines of reasoning, either on the state
court’s premise that passage of the provision encouraged private
racial discrimination impermissibly or on the basis that the provi-
sion made discriminatory racial practices immune from the ordi-
their own discriminatory motivations, was evaded by the Court, in finding some
other form of state action and reversing all convictions. Individual Justices did
elaborate, however. Compare Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 255–60 (1964) (opinion
of Justice Douglas), with id. at 326 (Justices Black, Harlan, and White dissenting).
28 In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and progeny, defa-
mation actions based on common-law rules were found to implicate First Amend-
ment rights and the Court imposed varying limiting rules on such rules of law. See
id. at 265 (finding state action). Similarly, in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,
458 U.S. 886 (1982), a civil lawsuit between private parties, the application of state
common-law rules to assess damages for actions in a boycott and picketing was
found to constitute state action. Id. at 916 n.51.
29 396 U.S. 435 (1970). The matter had previously been before the Court in
Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).

30 Id. at 445. Note the use of the same rationale in another context in Palmer
v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 226 (1971). On a different result in the ‘‘Girard College’’
will case, see infra, p. 1689 n.14.
31 387 U.S. 369 (1967). The decision was 5-to–4, Justices Harlan, Black, Clark,
and Stewart dissenting. Id. at 387.

nary legislative process, while not so limiting other processes, and

thus impermissibly burdened minorities in the achievement of le-
gitimate aims in a way other classes of persons were not bur-
dened. 32 In a subsequent case, the latter rationale was utilized in
a unanimous decision voiding an Akron ordinance, which sus-
pended an ‘‘open housing’’ ordinance and provided that any future
ordinance regulating transactions in real property ‘‘on the basis of
race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry’’ must be submitted
to a vote of the people before it could become effective, while any
other ordinance would become effective when passed, except that it
could be petitioned to referendum. 33
That Mulkey and Hunter stand for the proposition that impos-
ing a barrier to racial amelioration legislation is the decisive and
condemning factor is evident from two recent decisions with respect
to state referendum decisions on busing for integration. 34 Both
cases agree that ‘‘the simple repeal or modification of desegregation
or antidiscrimination laws, without more, never has been viewed as
embodying a presumptively invalid racial classification.’’ 35 It is
thus not impermissible to overturn a previous governmental deci-
sion, or to defeat the effort initially to arrive at such a decision,
simply because the state action may conceivably encourage private
discrimination.
In other instances in which the discrimination is being prac-
ticed by private parties, the question essentially is whether there
has been sufficient state involvement to bring the Fourteenth
Amendment into play; that is, the private discrimination is not con-
stitutionally forbidden ‘‘unless to some significant extent the State
in any of its manifestations has been found to have become in-
32 See, e.g., id. at 377 (language suggesting both lines of reasoning).
33 Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969). In Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710
(W.D.N.Y. 1970), aff’d, 402 U.S. 935 (1971), New York enacted a statute prohibiting
the assignment of students or the establishment of school districts for the purpose
of achieving racial balance in attendance, unless with the express approval of a lo-
cally elected school board or with the consent of the parents, a measure designed
to restrict the state education commissioner’s program to ameliorate de facto seg-
regation. The federal court held the law void, holding in reliance on Mulkey that
the statute encouraged racial discrimination and that by treating educational mat-
ters involving racial criteria differently than it treated other educational matters it
made more difficult a resolution of the de facto segregation problem.
34 Washington v. Seattle School Dist., 458 U.S. 457 (1982); Crawford v. Los An-
geles Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982). A five-to-four majority in Seattle found the
fault to be a racially-based structuring of the political process making it more dif-
ficult to undertake actions designed to improve racial conditions than to undertake
any other educational action. An 8-to–1 majority in Crawford found that repeal of
a measure to bus to undo de facto segregation, without imposing any barrier to
other remedial devices, was permissible.
35 Crawford, 458 U.S. at 539, quoted in Seattle, 458 U.S. at 483. See also Dayton
Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 414 (1977).

volved in it.’’ 36 There is no clear formula. ‘‘Only by sifting facts and

weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the
State in private conduct be attributed its true significance.’’ 37 State
action was found in a number of circumstances. The ‘‘White Pri-
mary’’ was outlawed by the Court not because the party’s discrimi-
nation was commanded by statute but because the party operated
under the authority of the State and it in fact controlled the out-
come of elections. 38 Although the City of Philadelphia was acting
as trustee in administering and carrying out the will of someone
who had left money for a college, admission to which was stipu-
lated to be for white boys only, the city was held to be engaged in
forbidden state action in discriminating against African Americans
in admission. 39 When state courts on petition of interested parties
removed the City of Macon as trustees of a segregated park left in
trust for such use in a will and appointed new trustees in order to
keep the park segregated, the Court reversed, finding that the City
was still inextricably involved in the maintenance and operation of
the park. 40 In a significant case in which the Court explored a
lengthy list of contacts between the State and a private corpora-
tion, it held that the lessee of property within an off-street parking
building owned and operated by a municipality could not exclude
African Americans from its restaurant. It was emphasized that the
building was publicly built and owned, that the restaurant was an
integral part of the complex, that the restaurant and the parking
facilities complemented each other, that the parking authority had
regulatory power over the lessee and had made stipulations but
nothing related to racial discrimination, and that the financial suc-
cess of the restaurant benefited the governmental agency; ‘‘the de-
gree of state participation and involvement in discriminatory ac-
tion’’ was sufficient to condemn it. 41
The question arose, then, what degree of state participation
was ‘‘significant’’? Would licensing of a business clothe the actions
of that business with sufficient state involvement? Would regula-
tion? Or provision of police and fire protection? Would enforcement
36 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
37 Id.at 722.
38 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
39 Pennsylvania v. Board of Trustees, 353 U.S. 230 (1957). On remand, the state
courts substituted private persons as trustees to carry out the will. In re Girard Col-
lege Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A. 2d 844, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 570 (1958). This
expedient was, however, ultimately held unconstitutional. Brown v. Pennsylvania,
392 F.2d 120 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 921 (1968).
40 Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966). Justices Black, Harlan, and Stewart
dissented. Id. at 312, 315. For the subsequent ruling in this case, see Evans v.
Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970), considered supra, p. 1686.
41 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
of state trespass laws be invalid if it effectuated discrimination?

The ‘‘sit-in’’ cases of the early 1960’s presented all these questions
and more but did not resolve them. 42 The basics of an answer
came in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 43 in which the Court held
that the fact that a private club was required to have a liquor li-
cense to serve alcoholic drinks and did have such a license did not
bar it from discriminating against African Americans. It denied
that private discrimination became constitutionally impermissible
‘‘if the private entity receives any sort of benefit or service at all
from the State, or if it is subject to state regulation in any degree
whatever,’’ since any such rule would eviscerate the state action
doctrine. Rather, ‘‘where the impetus for the discrimination is pri-
vate, the State must have ‘significantly involved itself with invidi-
ous discrimination.’ ’’ 44 Moreover, while the State had extensive
powers to regulate in detail the liquor dealings of its licensees, ‘‘it
cannot be said to in any way foster or encourage racial discrimina-
tion. Nor can it be said to make the State in any realistic sense
a partner or even a joint venturer in the club’s enterprise.’’ 45 And
there was nothing in the licensing relationship here that ap-
proached ‘‘the symbiotic relationship between lessor and lessee’’
which the Court had found in Burton. 46
The Court subsequently made clear that governmental involve-
ment with private persons or private corporations is not the critical
factor in determining the existence of ‘‘state action.’’ Rather, ‘‘the
inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between
the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that
the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State
itself.’’ 47 Or, to quote Judge Friendly, who first enunciated the test
this way, the ‘‘essential point’’ is ‘‘that the state must be involved
not simply with some activity of the institution alleged to have in-
flicted injury upon a plaintiff but with the activity that caused the
injury. Putting the point another way, the state action, not the pri-
vate, must be the subject of the complaint.’’ 48 Therefore, the Court
42 See, e.g., the various opinions in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
43 407 U.S. 163 (1972). One provision of the state law was, however, held uncon-
stitutional. That provision required a licensee to observe all its by-laws and there-
fore mandated the Moose Lodge to follow the discrimination provision of its by-laws.
Id. at 177–79.
44 Id. at 173.
45 Id. at 176–77.
46 Id. at 174–75.
47 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) (under the due
process clause).
48 Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d. 73, 81 (2d Cir. 1968). See also NCAA v. Tarkanian,
488 U.S. 179 (1988) (college athletic association’s application of rules leading to a
state university’s suspension of its basketball coach did not constitute state action
on the part of the association).
found no such nexus between the State and a public utility’s action
in terminating service to a customer. Neither the fact that the busi-
ness was subject to state regulation, nor that the State had con-
ferred in effect a monopoly status upon the utility, nor that in re-
viewing the company’s tariff schedules the regulatory commission
had in effect approved the termination provision included therein
(but had not required the practice, had ‘‘not put its own weight on
the side of the proposed practice by ordering it’’) 49 operated to
make the utility’s action the State’s action. 50 Significantly tighten-
ing the standard further against a finding of ‘‘state action,’’ the
Court asserted that plaintiffs must establish not only that a private
party ‘‘acted under color of the challenged statute, but also that its
actions are properly attributable to the State. . . .’’ 51 And the ac-
tions are to be attributable to the State apparently only if the State
compelled the actions and not if the State merely established the
process through statute or regulation under which the private
party acted. Thus, when a private party, having someone’s goods
in his possession and seeking to recover the charges owned on stor-
age of the goods, acts under a permissive state statue to sell the
goods and retain out of the proceeds his charges, his actions are
not governmental action and need not follow the dictates of the due
process clause. 52 In the context of regulated nursing home situa-
tions, in which the homes were closely regulated and state officials
reduced or withdrew Medicaid benefits paid to patients when they
were discharged or transferred to institutions providing a lower
level of care, the Court found that the actions of the homes in dis-
charging or transferring were not thereby rendered the actions of
the government. 53
In a few cases, the Court has indicated that discriminatory ac-
tion by private parties may be precluded by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment if the particular party involved is exercising a ‘‘public func-
49 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357 (1974). In dissent, Jus-
tice Marshall protested that the quoted language marked ‘‘a sharp departure’’ from
precedent, ‘‘that state authorization and approval of ‘private’ conduct has been held
to support a finding of state action.’’ Id. at 369. Note that in Cantor v. Detroit Edi-
son Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976), the plurality opinion used much the same analysis to
deny antitrust immunity to a utility practice merely approved but not required by
the regulating commission, but most of the Justices were on different sides of the
same question in the two cases.
50 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351–58 (1974). On the due
process limitations on the conduct of public utilities, see Memphis Light, Gas &
Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
51 Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978) (due process).
52 Id. at 164–66. If, however, a state officer acts with the private party in secur-
ing the property in dispute, that is sufficient to create the requisite state action and
the private party may be subjected to suit if the seizure does not comport with due
process. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
53 Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
tion.’’ This rationale is one of those which emerges from the various
opinions in Terry v. Adams. 54 In Marsh v. Alabama, 55 a Jehovah’s
Witness had been convicted of trespass after passing out literature
on the streets of a company-owned town and the Court reversed.
It is not at all clear from the opinion of the Court what it was that
made the privately-owned town one to which the Constitution ap-
plied. In essence, it appears to have been that the town ‘‘had all
the characteristics of any other American town,’’ that it was ‘‘like’’
a State. ‘‘The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his prop-
erty for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become
circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those
who use it.’’ 56 Subsequent efforts to expand upon Marsh were at
first successful and then turned back, and the ‘‘public function’’
theory in the context of privately-owned shopping centers was
sharply curtailed. 57
Attempts to apply such a theory to other kinds of private con-
duct, such as to private utilities, 58 to private utilization of permis-
sive state laws to secure property claimed to belong to creditors, 59
to the operation of schools for ‘‘problem’’ children referred by public
institutions, 60 and to the operations of nursing homes the patients
of which are practically all funded by public resources, 61 proved
unavailing. The ‘‘public function’’ doctrine is to be limited to a dele-
gation of ‘‘a power ‘traditionally exclusively reserved to the
State.’ ’’ 62 Therefore, the question is not ‘‘whether a private group
is serving a ‘public function.’. . . That a private entity performs a
function which serves the public does not make its acts state ac-
tion.’’ 63 Public function did play an important part, however, in the
Court’s finding state action in exercise of peremptory challenges in
jury selection by non-governmental parties.
In finding state action in the racially discriminatory use of pe-
remptory challenges by a private party during voir dire in a civil
case, 64 the Court applied tests developed in an earlier case involv-
54 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
55 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
56 Id. at 506.
57 See Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308
(1968), limited in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), and overruled in
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). The Marsh principle is good only when pri-
vate property has taken on all the attributes of a municipality. Id. at 516–17.
58 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974).
59 Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157–159 (1978).
60 Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982).
61 Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1011–1012 (1982).
62 Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157 (1978) (quoting Jackson v. Metropoli-
tan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974)).

63 Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982).
64 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
ing garnishment and attachment. 65 The Court first asks ‘‘whether

the claimed constitutional deprivation resulted from the exercise of
a right or privilege having its source in state authority,’’ and then
‘‘whether the private party charged with the deprivation could be
described in all fairness as a state actor.’’ In answering the second
question, the Court considers three factors: ‘‘the extent to which
the actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits, whether
the actor is performing a traditional governmental function, and
whether the injury caused is aggravated in a unique way by the
incidents of governmental authority.’’ 66 There was no question that
exercise of peremptory challenges derives from governmental au-
thority (either state or federal, as the case may be); exercise of pe-
remptory challenges is authorized by law, and the number is lim-
ited. Similarly, the Court easily concluded that private parties ex-
ercise peremptory challenges with the ‘‘overt’’ and ‘‘significant’’ as-
sistance of the court. So too, jury selection is the performance of a
traditional governmental function: the jury ‘‘is a quintessential gov-
ernmental body, having no attributes of a private actor,’’ and it fol-
lowed, so the Court majority believed, that selection of individuals
to serve on that body is also a governmental function whether or
not it is delegated to or shared with private individuals. 67 Finally,
the Court concluded that ‘‘the injury caused by the discrimination
is made more severe because the government permits it to occur
within the courthouse itself.’’ 68 Dissenting Justice O’Connor com-
plained that the Court was wiping away centuries of adversary
practice in which ‘‘unrestrained private choice’’ has been recognized
in exercise of peremptory challenges; ‘‘[i]t is antithetical to the na-
ture of our adversarial process,’’ the Justice contended, ‘‘to say that
a private attorney acting on behalf of a private client represents
the government for constitutional purposes.’’ 69
Even though in a criminal case it is the government and the
defendant who are adversaries, rather than two private parties, as
is ordinarily the case in civil actions, the Court soon applied these
same principles to hold that exercise of peremptory challenges by
the defense in a criminal case also constitutes state action. 70 The
same generalities apply with at least equal force: there is overt and
significant governmental assistance in creating and structuring the
65 Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Corp., 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
66 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620–22 (1991) (citations
omitted).
67 Id. at 624, 625.
68 Id. at 628.
69 Id. at 639, 643.
70 Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992). It was, of course, beyond dis-
pute that a prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges constitutes state action.

See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
process, a criminal jury serves an important governmental function

and its selection is also important, and the courtroom setting inten-
sifies harmful effects of discriminatory actions. An earlier case 71
holding that a public defender was not a state actor when engaged
in general representation of a criminal defendant was distin-
guished, the Court emphasizing that ‘‘exercise of a peremptory
challenge differs significantly from other actions taken in support
of a defendant’s defense,’’ since it involves selection of persons to
wield governmental power. 72
The rules developed by the Court for business regulation are
that (1) the ‘‘mere fact that a business is subject to state regulation
does not by itself convert its action into that of the State for pur-
poses of the Fourteenth Amendment,’’ 73 and (2) ‘‘a State normally
can be held responsible for a private decision only when it has ex-
ercised coercive power or has provided such significant encourage-
ment, either overt or covert, that the choice must be deemed to be
that of the State.’’ 74
Previously, the Court’s decisions with respect to state ‘‘involve-
ment’’ in the private activities of individuals and entities raised the
question whether financial assistance and tax benefits provided to
private parties would so clothe them with state action that dis-
crimination by them and other conduct would be subjected to con-
stitutional constraints. Many lower courts had held state action to
exist in such circumstances. 75 However the question might have
71 Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 512 (1981).
72 112 U.S. at 2356. Justice O’Connor, again dissenting, pointed out that the
Court’s distinction was inconsistent with Dodson’s declaration that public defenders
are not vested with state authority ‘‘when performing a lawyer’s traditional func-
tions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.’’ Id. at 2362. Justice Scalia,
also dissenting again, decried reduction of Edmonson ‘‘to the terminally absurd: A
criminal defendant, in the process of defending himself against the state, is held to
be acting on behalf of the state.’’ Id. at 2364. Chief Justice Rehnquist, who had dis-
sented in Edmonson, concurred in McCollum in the belief that it was controlled by
Edmonson, and Justice Thomas, who had not participated in Edmonson, expressed
similar views in a concurrence.
73 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974); Blum v.
Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982). Cf. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163
(1972).
74 Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982); Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S.
149, 166 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357 (1974).
75 On funding, see Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964); Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149
F.2d 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945); Christhilf v. Annapolis Emer-
gency Hosp. Ass’n, 496 F.2d 174 (4th Cir. 1974). But cf. Greco v. Orange Mem.
Hosp. Corp., 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1000 (1975). On tax
benfits, see Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.) (three-judge court), aff’d.
sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971); McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp.
448 (D.D.C. 1972); Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1974). But
cf. New York City Jaycees v. United States Jaycees, 512 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1976);
been answered under the older cases, it is evident that a negative

answer flows from the premises of the more recent cases. In
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 76 the private school received ‘‘problem’’ stu-
dents referred to it by public institutions, it was heavily regulated,
and it received between 90 and 99% of its operating budget from
public funds. In Blum v. Yaretsky, 77 the nursing home had prac-
tically all of its operating and capital costs subsidized by public
funds and more than 90% of its residents had their medical ex-
penses paid from public funds; in setting reimbursement rates, the
State included a formula to assure the home a profit. Nevertheless,
in both cases the Court found that the entities remained private,
and required plaintiffs to show that as to the complained of actions
the State was involved, either through coercion or encouragement.
‘‘That programs undertaken by the State result in substantial fund-
ing of the activities of a private entity is no more persuasive than
the fact of regulation of such an entity in demonstrating that the
State is responsible for decisions made by the entity in the course
of its business.’’ 78
In the social welfare area, the Court has drawn a sharp dis-
tinction between governmental action subject to substantive due
process requirements, and governmental inaction, not so con-
strained. There being ‘‘no affirmative right to governmental aid,’’
the Court announced in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Social
Services Department 79 that ‘‘as a general matter, . . . a State’s fail-
ure to protect an individual against private violence simply does
not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause.’’ Before there
can be state involvement creating an affirmative duty to protect an
individual, the Court explained, the state must have taken a per-
son into its custody and held him there against his will so as to
restrict his freedom to act on his own behalf. Thus, while the Court
had recognized due process violations for failure to provide ade-
quate medical care to incarcerated prisoners, 80 and for failure to
ensure reasonable safety for involuntarily committed mental pa-
tients, 81 no such affirmative duty arose from the failure of social
services agents to protect an abused child from further abuse from
his parent. Even though possible abuse had been reported to the
agency and confirmed and monitored by the agency, and the agency
Greenya v. George Washington Univ., 512 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 995 (1975).
76 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
77 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
78 Id. at 1011.
79 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989).
80 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
81 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
had done nothing to protect the child, the Court emphasized that
the actual injury was inflicted by the parent and ‘‘did not occur
while [the child] was in the State’s custody.’’ 82 While the State
may have incurred liability in tort through the negligence of its so-
cial workers, ‘‘[not] every tort committed by a state actor [is] a con-
stitutional violation.’’ 83 ‘‘[I]t is well to remember . . . that the harm
was inflicted not by the State of Wisconsin, but by [the child’s] fa-
ther.’’ 84
Judicial inquiry into the existence of ‘‘state action’’ may be di-
rected toward the implementation of either of two remedies, and
this may well lead to some difference in the search. In the cases
considered here suits were against a private actor to compel him
to halt his discriminatory action, to enjoin him to admit blacks to
a lunch counter, for example. But one could just as readily bring
suit against the government to compel it to cease aiding the private
actor in his discriminatory conduct. Recurrence to the latter rem-
edy might well avoid constitutional issues that an order directed to
the private party would raise. 85 In any event, it must be deter-
mined whether the governmental involvement is sufficient to give
rise to a constitutional remedy; in a suit against the private party
it must be determined whether he is so involved with the govern-
ment as to be subject to constitutional restraints, while in a suit
against the government agency it must be determined whether the
government’s action ‘‘impermissibly fostered’’ the private conduct.
Thus, in Norwood v. Harrison, 86 the Court struck down the
provision of free textbooks by the State to private schools set up
as racially segregated institutions to avoid desegregated public
schools, even though the textbook program predated the establish-
ment of these schools. ‘‘[A]ny tangible state assistance, outside the
generalized services government might provide to private seg-
regated schools in common with other schools, and with all citizens,
is constitutionally prohibited if it has ‘a significant tendency to fa-
cilitate, reinforce, and support private discrimination.’. . . The con-
stitutional obligation of the State requires it to steer clear, not only
of operating the old dual system of racially segregated schools, but
also of giving significant aid to institutions that practice racial or
82 489 U.S. at 201.
83 Id. at 202.
84 Id. at 203.
85 For example, rights of association protected by the First Amendment. See
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179–80 (1972) (Justice Douglas dissent-
ing); Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 575 (1974); Norwood v. Harrison,
413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973). The right can be implicated as well by affirmative legisla-
tive action barring discrimination in private organizations. See Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U.S. 160, 175–79 (1976).
86 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
other invidious discriminations.’’ 87 And in a subsequent case, the

Court approved a lower court order that barred the city from per-
mitting exclusive temporary use of public recreational facilities by
segregated private schools because that interfered with an out-
standing order mandating public school desegregation. But it re-
manded for further factfinding with respect to permitting
nonexclusive use of public recreational facilities and general gov-
ernment services by segregated private schools so that the district
court could determine whether such uses ‘‘involve government so
directly in the actions of those users as to warrant court interven-
tion on constitutional grounds.’’ 88 Unlike the situation in which
private club discrimination is attacked directly, ‘‘the question of the
existence of state action centers in the extent of the city’s involve-
ment in discriminatory actions by private agencies using public fa-
cilities. . . .’’ Receipt of just any sort of benefit or service at all does
not by the mere provision—electricity, water, and police and fire
protection, access generally to municipal recreational facilities—
constitute a showing of state involvement in discrimination and the
lower court’s order was too broad because not predicated upon a
proper finding of state action. ‘‘If, however, the city or other govern-
mental entity rations otherwise freely accessible recreational facili-
ties, the case for state action will naturally be stronger than if the
facilities are simply available to all comers without condition or
reservation.’’ The lower court was directed to sift facts and weigh
circumstances on a case-by-case basis in making determinations. 89
It should be noted, however, that the Court has interposed,
without mentioning these cases, a potentially significant barrier to
utilization of the principle set out in them. In a 1976 decision,
which it has expanded since, it held that plaintiffs, seeking
disallowal of governmental tax benefits accorded to institutions
that allegedly discriminated against complainants and thus in-
volved the government in their actions, must in order to bring the
suit show that revocation of the benefit would cause the institu-
tions to cease the complained-of conduct. 90
‘‘Persons’’.—In the case in which it was first called upon to in-
terpret this clause, the Court doubted whether ‘‘any action of a
87 Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 568–69 (1974) (quoting Nor-
wood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 466, 467 (1973)).

88 Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 570 (1974).
89 Id. at 573–74. In Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982), plaintiffs, objecting
to decisions of the nursing home in discharging or transferring patients, sued public

officials, but they objected to the discharges and transfers, not to the changes in
Medicaid benefits made by the officials.
90 Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
See id. at 46, 63–64 (Justice Brennan concurring and dissenting).

State not directed by way of discrimination against the [N]egroes

as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come
within the purview of this provision.’’ 91 Nonetheless, in deciding
the Granger Cases shortly thereafter, the Justices seemingly enter-
tained no doubt that the railroad corporations were entitled to in-
voke the protection of the clause. 92 Nine years later, Chief Justice
Waite announced from the bench that the Court would not hear ar-
gument on the question whether the equal protection clause ap-
plied to corporations. ‘‘We are all of the opinion that it does.’’ 93 The
word has been given the broadest possible meaning. ‘‘These provi-
sions are universal in their application, to all persons within the
territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of
color, or of nationality. . .’’ 94 The only qualification is that a mu-
nicipal corporation cannot invoke the clause against its State. 95
‘‘Within Its Jurisdiction’’.—Persons ‘‘within its jurisdiction’’
are entitled to equal protection from a State. Largely because Arti-
cle IV, § 2, has from the beginning guaranteed the privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several States, the Court has rarely
construed the phrase in relation to natural persons. 96 It was first
held that a foreign corporation not doing business in a State under
conditions that subjected it to process issuing from the courts of
that State was not ‘‘within the jurisdiction’’ and could not complain
of the preferences granted resident creditors in the distribution of
assets of an insolvent corporation, 97 but this holding was subse-
quently qualified, the Court holding that a foreign corporation
which sued in a court of a State in which it was not licensed to
91 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873). Cf. Weber v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 177 (1972) (Justice Rehnquist dissenting).
92 Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Iowa, 94 U.S. 155 (1877); Peik v. Chicago & Nw.
Ry., 94 U.S. 164 (1877); Chicago, M. & St. P. R.R. v. Ackley, 94 U.S. 179 (1877);
Winona & St. Peter R.R. v. Blake, 94 U.S. 180 (1877).
93 Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886). The
background and developments from this utterance are treated in H. GRAHAM,

EVERYMAN’S CONSTITUTION—HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT,
THE ‘‘CONSPIRACY THEORY,’’ AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1968), chs. 9, 10,
and pp. 566–84. Justice Black, in Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303
U.S. 77, 85 (1938), and Justice Douglas, in Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337
U.S. 562, 576 (1949), have disagreed that corporations are persons for equal protec-
tion purposes.
94 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). For modern examples, see Levy
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371
(1971).
95 City of Newark v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 192 (1923); Williams v. Mayor of Bal-
timore, 289 U.S. 36 (1933).

96 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210–16 (1982) (explicating meaning of the
phrase in the context of holding that aliens illegally present in a State are ‘‘within
its jurisdiction’’ and may thus raise equal protection claims).
97 Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 261 (1898); Sully v. American Nat’l Bank,
178 U.S. 289 (1900).

do business to recover possession of property wrongfully taken from

it in another State was ‘‘within the jurisdiction’’ and could not be
subjected to unequal burdens in the maintenance of the suit. 98 The
test of amenability to service of process within the State was ig-
nored in a later case dealing with discriminatory assessment of
property belonging to a nonresident individual. 99 When a State has
admitted a foreign corporation to do business within its borders,
that corporation is entitled to equal protection of the laws but not
necessarily to identical treatment with domestic corporations. 100
Equal Protection: Judging Classifications by Law
A guarantee of equal protection of the laws was contained in
every draft leading up to the final version of § 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 101 Immediately pressing to its sponsors was the de-
sire to provide a firm constitutional basis for already-enacted civil
rights legislation, 102 and, by amending the Constitution, to place
repeal beyond the accomplishment of a simple majority in a future
Congress. 103 No doubt there were conflicting interpretations of the
phrase ‘‘equal protection’’ among sponsors and supporters and the
legislative history does little to clarify whether any sort of consen-
sus was accomplished and if so what it was. 104 While the Court
early recognized that African Americans were the primary intended
beneficiaries of the protections thus adopted, 105 the spare language
was majestically unconfined to so limited a class or to so limited
a purpose. Thus, as will be seen, the equal protection standard
98 Kentucky Finance Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exchange Corp., 262 U.S. 544
(1923).
99 Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620 (1946).
100 Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562 (1949); Hanover Ins. Co. v.
Harding, 272 U.S. 494 (1926). See also Philadelphia Fire Ass’n v. New York, 119
U.S. 110 (1886).
101 The story is recounted in J. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1956). See also JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RE-
CONSTRUCTION (B. Kendrick, ed. 1914). The floor debates are collected in 1 STATU-
TORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES—CIVIL RIGHTS 181 (B. Schwartz, ed. 1970).
102 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, now in part 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,
1982. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 422–37 (1968).
103 As in fact much of the legislation which survived challenge in the courts was
repealed in 1894 and 1909. 28 Stat. 36; 35 Stat. 1088. See R. CARR, FEDERAL PRO-
TECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS: QUEST FOR A SWORD 45–46 (1947).
104 TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW (rev. ed. 1965); Frank & Munro, The Origi-
nal Understanding of ‘‘Equal Protection of the Laws,’’ 50 COLUM. L. REV. 131 (1950);
Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV.
1 (1955); and see the essays collected in H. GRAHAM, EVERYMAN’S CONSTITUTION—
HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, THE ‘‘CONSPIRACY THEORY,’’
AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1968). In calling for reargument in Brown v.
Board of Education, 345 U.S. 972 (1952), the Court asked for and received extensive
analysis of the legislative history of the Amendment with no conclusive results.
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 489–90 (1954).
105 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873).
came to be applicable to all classifications by legislative and other

official bodies, though not with much initial success, 106 until now
the equal protection clause in the fields of civil rights and fun-
damental liberties looms large as a constitutional text affording the
federal and state courts extensive powers of review with regard to
differential treatment of persons and classes.
The Traditional Standard: Restrained Review.—The tra-
ditional standard of review of equal protection challenges of classi-
fications developed largely though not entirely in the context of eco-
nomic regulation. 107 It is still most validly applied there, although
it appears in many other contexts as well. A more active review
has been developed for classifications based on a ‘‘suspect’’ indicium
or affecting a ‘‘fundamental’’ interest.
‘‘The Fourteenth Amendment enjoins ‘the equal protection of
the laws,’ and laws are not abstract propositions.’’ Justice Frank-
furter once wrote. ‘‘They do not relate to abstract units, A, B, and
C, but are expressions of policy arising out of specific difficulties,
addressed to the attainment of specific ends by the use of specific
remedies. The Constitution does not require things which are dif-
ferent in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were
the same.’’ 108 The mere fact of classification will not void legisla-
tion, 109 then, because in the exercise of its powers a legislature has
considerable discretion in recognizing the differences between and
among persons and situations. 110 ‘‘Class legislation, discriminating
against some and favoring others, is prohibited; but legislation
which, in carrying out a public purpose, is limited in its applica-
tion, if within the sphere of its operation it affects alike all persons
similarly situated, is not within the amendment.’’ 111 Or, more suc-
cinctly, ‘‘statutes create many classifications which do not deny
equal protection; it is only ‘invidious discrimination’ which offends
the Constitution.’’ 112
106 In Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927), Justice Holmes characterized the
equal protection clause as ‘‘the last resort of constitutional arguments.’’

107 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (discrimination against Chinese
on the West Coast).

108 Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1980).
109 Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96, 106 (1899). See also from
the same period, Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 557 (1869); Bachtel v. Wilson,
204 U.S. 36 (1907); Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173 (1910), and later cases. Kotch
v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm’rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335
U.S. 464 (1948); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Schilb v. Kuebel, 404
U.S. 357 (1971); Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); Schweiker
v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981).
110 Barrett v. Indiana, 229 U.S. 26 (1913).
111 Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 32 (1885).
112 Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,
348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).

How then is the line between permissible and invidious classi-

fication to be determined? In Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas
Co., 113 the Court summarized one version of the rules still prevail-
ing. ‘‘1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
does not take from the State the power to classify in the adoption
of police laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discre-
tion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is with-
out any reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A
classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against
that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety
or because in practice it results in some inequality. 3. When the
classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of
facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the exist-
ence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must
be assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such a law
must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any
reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.’’ Especially because of
the emphasis upon the necessity for total arbitrariness, utter irra-
tionality, and the fact that the Court will strain to conceive of a
set of facts that will justify the classification, the test is extremely
lenient and, assuming the existence of a constitutionally permis-
sible goal, no classification will ever be upset. But, contempora-
neously with this test, the Court also pronounced another lenient
standard which did leave to the courts a judgmental role. In this
test, ‘‘the classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must
rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike.’’ 114 Use of the latter standard
did in fact result in some invalidations. 115
But then, coincident with the demise of substantive due proc-
ess in the area of economic regulation, 116 the Court reverted to the
113 220 U.S. 61, 78–79 (1911), quoted in full in Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457,
463–64 (1957). Classifications which are purposefully discriminatory fall before the
equal protection clause without more. E.g., Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 30
(1885); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886). Cf. New York City Transit
Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 593 n.40 (1979). Explicit in all the formulations is
that a legislature must have had a permissible purpose, a requirement which is sel-
dom failed, given the leniency of judicial review. But see Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S.
55, 63–64 (1982), and id. at 65 (Justice Brennan concurring).
114 F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). See also
Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U.S. 563, 573 (1910).

115 E.g., F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920); Stewart Dry
Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U.S. 550 (1935); Mayflower Farms v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S.
266 (1936).
116 In Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934), speaking of the limits of
the due process clause, the Court observed that ‘‘in the absence of other constitu-
tional restrictions, a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably
be deemed to promote public welfare.’’
former standard, deferring to the legislative judgment on questions

of economics and related matters; even when an impermissible pur-
pose could have been attributed to the classifiers it was usually
possible to conceive of a reason that would justify the classifica-
tion. 117 Strengthening the deference was the recognition of discre-
tion in the legislature not to try to deal with an evil or a class of
evils all within the scope of one enactment but to approach the
problem piecemeal, to learn from experience, and to ameliorate the
harmful results of two evils differently, resulting in permissible
over- and under-inclusive classifications. 118
In recent years, the Court has been remarkably inconsistent in
setting forth the standard which it is using, and the results have
reflected this. It has upheld economic classifications that suggested
impermissible intention to discriminate, reciting at length the
Lindsley standard, complete with the conceiving-of-a-basis and the
one-step-at-a-time rationale, 119 and it has applied this relaxed
standard to social welfare regulations. 120 In other cases, it has uti-
lized the Royster Guano standard and has looked to the actual goal
articulated by the legislature in determining whether the classifica-
tion had a reasonable relationship to that goal, 121 although it has
usually ended up upholding the classification. Finally, purportedly
applying the rational basis test, the Court has invalidated some
117 E.g., Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot
Comm’rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Railway Ex-
press Agency v. City of New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961).
118 Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955); McDonald v. Board
of Election Comm’rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969); Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 364–
65 (1971); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976); Minnesota v.
Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981).
119 City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303–04 (1976); City of Pittsburg
v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369 (1974).

120 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485–86 (1970); Jefferson v. Hackney,
406 U.S. 535, 549 (1972). See also New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S.
568, 587–94 (1979).
121 E.g., McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270–77 (1973); Johnson v. Robison,
415 U.S. 361, 374–83 (1974); City of Charlotte v. International Ass’n of Firefighters,
426 U.S. 283, 286–89 (1976). It is significant that these opinions were written by
Justices who subsequently dissented from more relaxed standard of review cases
and urged adherence to at least a standard requiring articulation of the goals
sought to be achieved and an evaluation of the ‘‘fit’’ of the relationship between goal
and classification. Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 182 (1980) (Jus-
tices Brennan and Marshall dissenting); Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 239
(1981) (Justices Powell, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissenting). See also New
York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 594 (1979) (Justice Powell concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part), and id. at 597, 602 (Justices White and Mar-
shall dissenting).
classifications in the areas traditionally most subject to total def-

erence. 122
Attempts to develop a consistent principle have so far been un-
successful. In Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 123 the Court ac-
knowledged that ‘‘[t]he most arrogant legal scholar would not claim
that all of these cases cited applied a uniform or consistent test
under equal protection principles,’’ but then went on to note the
differences between Lindsley and Royster Guano and chose the
former. But, shortly, in Schweiker v. Wilson, 124 in an opinion writ-
ten by a different Justice, 125 the Court sustained another classi-
fication, using the Royster Guano standard to evaluate whether the
classification bore a substantial relationship to the goal actually
chosen and articulated by Congress. In between these decisions,
the Court approved a state classification after satisfying itself that
the legislature had pursued a permissible goal, but setting aside
the decision of the state court that the classification would not pro-
mote that goal; the Court announced that it was irrelevant whether
in fact the goal would be promoted, the question instead being
whether the legislature ‘‘could rationally have decided’’ that it
would. 126
122 E.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74–79 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Department of Agriculture
v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473
U.S. 432 (1985) (rejecting various justifications offered for exclusion of a home for
the mentally retarded in an area where boarding homes, nursing and convalescent
homes, and fraternity or sorority houses were permitted). The Court in Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971), utilized the Royster Guano formulation and purported
to strike down a sex classification on the rational basis standard, but, whether the
standard was actually used or not, the case was the beginning of the decisions ap-
plying a higher standard to sex classifications.
123 449 U.S. 166, 174–79 (1980). The quotation is id. at 176–77 n.10. The extent
of deference is notable, inasmuch as the legislative history seemed clearly to estab-

lish that the purpose the Court purported to discern as the basis for the classifica-
tion was not the congressional purpose at all. Id. at 186–97 (Justice Brennan dis-
senting). The Court observed, however, that it was ‘‘constitutionally irrelevant’’
whether the plausible basis was in fact within Congress’ reasoning, inasmuch as the
Court has never required a legislature to articulate its reasons for enactng a stat-
ute. Id. at 179. For a continuation of the debate over actual purpose and conceivable
justification, see Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 680–85
(1981) (Justice Brennan concurring), and id. at 702–06 (Justice Rehnquist dissent-
ing). Cf. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 243–45 (1981) (Justice Powell dissent-
ing).
124 450 U.S. 221, 230–39 (1981). Nonetheless, the four dissenters thought that
the purpose discerned by the Court was not the actual purpose, that it had in fact
no purpose in mind, and that the classification was not rational. Id. at 239.
125 Justice Blackmun wrote the Court’s opinion in Wilson, Justice Rehnquist in
Fritz.
126 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461–70 (1981). The
quoted phrase is at 466.

In short, it is uncertain which formulation of the rational basis

standard the Court will adhere to. 127 In the main, the issues in re-
cent years have not involved the validity of classifications, but
rather the care with which the Court has reviewed the facts and
the legislation with its legislative history to uphold the challenged
classifications. The recent decisions voiding classifications have not
clearly set out which standard they have been using. 128 Deter-
mination in this area, then, must await presentation to the Court
of a classification which it would sustain under the Lindsley stand-
ard and invalidate under Royster Guano.
The New Standards: Active Review.—When government leg-
islates or acts either on the basis of a ‘‘suspect’’ classification or
with regard to a ‘‘fundamental’’ interest, the traditional standard
of equal protection review is abandoned, and the Court exercises a
‘‘strict scrutiny.’’ Under this standard government must dem-
onstrate a high degree of need, and usually little or no presumption
favoring the classification is to be expected. After much initial con-
troversy within the Court, it has now created a third category, find-
ing several classifications to be worthy of a degree of ‘‘intermedi-
ate’’ scrutiny requiring a showing of important governmental pur-
poses and a close fit between the classification and the purposes.
Paradigmatic of ‘‘suspect’’ categories is classification by race.
First in the line of cases dealing with this issue is Korematsu v.
United States, 129 concerning the wartime evacuation of Japanese-
Americans from the West Coast, in which the Court said that be-
cause only a single ethnic-racial group was involved the measure
was ‘‘immediately suspect’’ and subject to ‘‘rigid scrutiny.’’ The
school segregation cases 130 purported to enunciate no per se rule,
however, although subsequent summary treatment of a host of seg-
regation measures may have implicitly done so, until in striking
down state laws prohibiting interracial marriage or cohabitation
the Court declared that racial classifications ‘‘bear a far heavier
burden of justification’’ than other classifications and were invalid
127 In City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, 455 U.S. 283, 294 (1982), the Court
observed that it was not clear whether it would apply Royster Guano to the classi-
fication at issue, citing Fritz as well as Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), an in-
termediate standard case involving gender. Justice Powell denied that Royster
Guano or Reed v. Reed had ever been rejected. Id. at 301 n.6 (dissenting). See also
id. at 296–97 (Justice White).
128 The exception is Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), which, though it pur-
ported to apply Royster Guano, may have applied heightened scrutiny. See Zobel v.
Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 61–63 (1982), in which it found the classifications not ration-
ally related to the goals, without discussing which standard it was using.
129 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). In applying ‘‘rigid scrutiny,’’ however, the Court
was deferential to the judgment of military authorities, and to congressional judg-

ment in exercising its war powers.
130 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
because no ‘‘overriding statutory purpose’’ 131 was shown and they

were not necessary to some ‘‘legitimate overriding purpose.’’ 132 ‘‘A
racial classification, regardless of purported motivation, is pre-
sumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon an extraordinary
justification.’’ 133 Remedial racial classifications, that is, the devel-
opment of ‘‘affirmative action’’ or similar programs that classify on
the basis of race for the purpose of ameliorating conditions result-
ing from past discrimination, are subject to more than traditional
review scrutiny, but whether the highest or some intermediate
standard is the applicable test is uncertain. 134 A measure which
does not draw a distinction explicitly on race but which does draw
a line between those who seek to use the law to do away with or
modify racial discrimination and those who oppose such efforts
does in fact create an explicit racial classification and is constitu-
tionally suspect. 135
Toward the end of the Warren Court, there emerged a trend
to treat classifications on the basis of nationality or alienage as
suspect, 136 to accord sex classifications a somewhat heightened tra-
ditional review while hinting that a higher standard might be ap-
propriate if such classifications passed lenient review, 137 and to
pass on statutory and administrative treatments of illegitimates in-
consistently. 138 Language in a number of opinions appeared to sug-
gest that poverty was a suspect condition, so that treating the poor
adversely might call for heightened equal protection review. 139
131 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192, 194 (1964).
132 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). In Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S.
333 (1968), it was indicated that preservation of discipline and order in a jail might
justify racial segregation there if shown to be necessary.
133 Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979), quoted in
Washington v. Seattle School Dist., 458 U.S. 457, 485 (1982).

134 Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287–20 (1978)
(Justice Powell announcing judgment of Court) (suspect), and id. at 355–79 (Justices
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(intermediate scrutiny); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 491–92 (1980) (Chief
Justice Burger announcing judgment of Court) (‘‘a most searching examination’’ but
not choosing a particular analysis), and id. at 495 (Justice Powell concurring), 523
(Justice Stewart dissenting) (suspect), 548 (Justice Stevens dissenting) (searching
scrutiny).
135 Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Washington v. Seattle School Dist.,
458 U.S. 457 (1982).

136 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971).
137 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); for the hint, see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438, 447 n.7 (1972).

138 See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (strict review); Labine v. Vincent,
401 U.S. 532 (1971) (lenient review); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406
U.S. 164 (1972) (modified strict review).
139 Cf. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm’rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969); Bul-
lock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972). See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658–
59 (1969) (Justice Harlan dissenting). But cf. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
However, in a major evaluation of equal protection analysis

early in this period, Justice Powell for the Court utilized solely the
two-tier approach, determining that because the interests involved
did not occasion strict scrutiny the Court would thus decide the
case on minimum rationality standards. 140 Decisively rejected was
the contention that a de facto wealth classification, with an adverse
impact on the poor, was either a suspect classification or merited
some scrutiny other than the traditional basis, 141 a holding that
has several times been strongly reaffirmed by the Court. 142 But
the Court’s rejection of some form of intermediate scrutiny did not
long survive.
Without extended consideration of the issue of standards, the
Court more recently adopted an intermediate level of scrutiny, per-
haps one encompassing several degrees of intermediate scrutiny.
Thus, gender classifications must, in order to withstand constitu-
tional challenge, ‘‘serve important governmental objectives and
must be substantially related to achievement of those objec-
tives.’’ 143 And classifications that disadvantage illegitimates are
140 San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
141 Id. at 44–45. The Court asserted that only when there is an absolute depri-
vation of some right or interest because of inability to pay will there be strict scru-
tiny. Id. at 20.
142 E.g., United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).

143 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). Justice Powell noted that he agreed
the precedents made clear that gender classifications are subjected to more critical
examination than when ‘‘fundamental’’ rights and ‘‘suspect classes’’ are absent, id.
at 210 (concurring), and added: ‘‘As is evident from our opinions, the Court has had
difficulty in agreeing upon a standard of equal protection analysis that can be ap-
plied consistently to the wide variety of legislative classifications. There are valid
reasons for dissatisfaction with the ‘two-tier’ approach that has been prominent in
the Court’s decisions in the past decade. Although viewed by many as a result-ori-
ented substitute for more critical analysis, that approach—with its narrowly limited
‘upper tier’—now has substantial precedential support. As has been true of Reed and
its progeny, our decision today will be viewed by some as a ‘middle-tier’ approach.
While I would not endorse that characterization and would not welcome a further
subdividing of equal protection analysis, candor compels the recognition that the rel-
atively deferential ‘rational basis’ standard of review normally applied takes on a
sharper focus when we address a gender-based classification. So much is clear from
our recent cases.’’ Id. at 210, n.*. Justice Stevens wrote that in his view the two-
tiered analysis does not describe a method of deciding cases ‘‘but rather is a method
the Court has employed to explain decisions that actually apply a single standard
in a reasonably consistent fashion.’’ Id. at 211, 212. Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist would employ the rational basis test for gender classification. Id. at 215,
217 (dissenting). Occasionally, because of the particular subject matter, the Court
has appeared to apply a rational basis standard in fact if not in doctrine, E.g.,
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (military); Michael M. v. Superior Court,
450 U.S. 464 (1981) (application of statutory rape prohibition to boys but not to
girls). Four Justices in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–87 (1973), were
prepared to find sex a suspect classification, and in Mississippi Univ. for Women
v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 n. 9 (1982), the Court appeared to leave open the possi-
bility that at least some sex classifications may be deemed suspect.
subject to a similar though less exacting scrutiny of purpose and

fit. 144 This period also saw a withdrawal of the Court from the
principle that alienage is always a suspect classification, so that
some discriminations against aliens based on the nature of the po-
litical order, rather than economics or social interests, need pass
only the lenient review standard. 145
Expansion of the characteristics which when used as a basis
for classification must be justified by a higher showing than ordi-
nary economic classifications has so far been resisted, the Court
holding, for example, that age classifications are neither suspect
nor entitled to intermediate scrutiny. 146 While resisting creation of
new suspect or ‘‘quasi-suspect’’ classifications, however, the Court
may nonetheless apply the Royster Guano rather than the Lindsley
standard of rationality. 147
The other phase of active review of classifications holds that
when certain fundamental liberties and interests are involved, gov-
ernment classifications which adversely affect them must be justi-
fied by a showing of a compelling interest necessitating the classi-
fication and by a showing that the distinctions are required to fur-
ther the governmental purpose. The effect of applying the test, as
in the other branch of active review, is to deny to legislative judg-
ments the deference usually accorded them and to dispense with
the general presumption of constitutionality usually given state
classifications. 148
144 Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347
(1979); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
In Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976), it was said that ‘‘discrimination
against illegitimates has never approached the severity or pervasiveness of the his-
toric legal and political discrimination against women and Negroes.’’ Lucas sus-
tained a statutory scheme virtually identical to the one struck down in Califano v.
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977), except that the latter involved sex while the former
involved illegitimacy.
145 Applying strict scrutiny, see, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973);
Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977). Applying lenient scrutiny in cases involving
restrictions on alien entry into the political community, see Foley v. Connelie, 435
U.S. 291 (1978); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979); Cabell v. Chavez-Salido,
454 U.S. 432 (1982). See also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
146 Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (upholding
mandatory retirement at age 50 for state police); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93
(1979) (mandatory retirement at age 60 for foreign service officers); Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991) (mandatory retirement at age 70 for state judges).
See also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985) (hold-
ing that a lower court ‘‘erred in holding mental retardation a quasi-suspect classi-
fication calling for a more exacting standard of judicial review than is normally ac-
corded economic and social legislation’’).
147 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985); See discus-
sion supra pp. 1805–09.

148 Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).

It is thought 149 that the ‘‘fundamental right’’ theory had its

origins in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 150 in which the
Court subjected to ‘‘strict scrutiny’’ a state statute providing for
compulsory sterilization of habitual criminals, such scrutiny being
thought necessary because the law affected ‘‘one of the basic civil
rights.’’ In the apportionment decisions, Chief Justice Warren ob-
served that ‘‘since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and
unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political
rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote
must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.’’ 151 A stiffening of
the traditional test could be noted in the opinion of the Court strik-
ing down certain restrictions on voting eligibility 152 and the phrase
‘‘compelling state interest’’ was used several times in Justice Bren-
nan’s opinion in Shapiro v. Thompson. 153 Thereafter, the phrase
was used in several voting cases in which restrictions were voided,
and the doctrine was asserted in other cases. 154
While no opinion of the Court attempted to delineate the proc-
ess by which certain ‘‘fundamental’’ rights were differentiated from
others, 155 it was evident from the cases that the right to vote, 156
the right of interstate travel, 157 the right to be free of wealth dis-
tinctions in the criminal process, 158 and the right of procreation 159
were at least some of those interests that triggered active review
when de jure or de facto official distinctions were made with re-
spect to them. This branch of active review the Court also sought
to rationalize and restrict in Rodriguez, 160 which involved both a
claim of de facto wealth classifications being suspect and a claim
that education was a fundamental interest so that affording less of
it to people because they were poor activated the compelling state
interest standard. The Court readily agreed that education was an
important value in our society. ‘‘But the importance of a service
performed by the State does not determine whether it must be re-
149 Id.at 660 (Justice Harlan dissenting).
150 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
151 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
152 Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663 (1966); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).

153 394 U.S. 618, 627, 634, 638 (1969).
154 Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Cipriano v. City of
Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970);
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
155 This indefiniteness has been a recurring theme in dissents. E.g., Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 655 (1969) (Justice Harlan); Weber v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 177 (1972) (Justice Rehnquist).
156 E.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
157 E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
158 E.g., Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
159 Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
160 San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
garded as fundamental for purposes of examination under the

Equal Protection Clause. . . . [T]he answer lies in assessing wheth-
er there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed
by the Constitution.’’ 161 A right to education is not expressly pro-
tected by the Constitution, continued the Court, and it was unwill-
ing to find an implied right because of its undoubted importance.
But just as Rodriguez was unable to prevent the Court’s adop-
tion of a ‘‘three-tier’’ or ‘‘sliding-tier’’ standard of review in the first
phase of the active-review doctrine, so it did not by stressing the
requirement that an interest be expressly or impliedly protected by
the Constitution prevent the addition of other interests to the list
of ‘‘fundamental’’ interests. The difficulty was that the Court deci-
sions on the right to vote, the right to travel, the right to procreate,
as well as others, premise the constitutional violation to be of the
equal protection clause, which does not itself guarantee the right
but prevents the differential governmental treatment of those at-
tempting to exercise the right. 162 Thus, state limitation on the
entry into marriage was soon denominated an incursion on a fun-
damental right which required a compelling justification. 163 While
denials of public funding of abortions were held to implicate no fun-
damental interest—abortion being a fundamental interest—and no
suspect classification—because only poor women needed public
funding 164—other denials of public assistance because of illegit-
imacy, alienage, or sex have been deemed governed by the same
standard of review as affirmative harms imposed on those
grounds. 165 And in Plyler v. Doe, 166 the complete denial of edu-
cation to the children of illegal aliens was found subject to inter-
mediate scrutiny and invalidated.
Thus, the nature of active review in equal protection jurispru-
dence remains in flux, subject to shifting majorities and varying de-
grees of concern about judicial activism and judicial restraint. But
the cases, more fully reviewed hereafter, clearly indicate that a
sliding scale of review is a fact of the Court’s cases, however much
its doctrinal explanation lags behind.
161 Id. at 30, 33–34. But see id. at 62 (Justice Brennan dissenting), 70, 110–17
(Justices Marshall and Douglas dissenting).

162 Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60 & n.6 (1982), and id. at 66–68 (Justice
Brennan concurring), 78–80 (Justice O’Connor concurring) (travel).

163 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
164 Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
165 E.g., Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (illegitimacy); Nyquist v.
Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977) (alienage); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977)
(sex).
166 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
Testing Facially Neutral Classifications Which Impact on

Minorities
A classification expressly upon the basis of race triggers strict
scrutiny and ordinarily results in its invalidation; similarly, a clas-
sification that facially makes a distinction on the basis of sex, or
alienage, or illegitimacy triggers the level of scrutiny appropriate
to it. A classification that is ostensibly neutral but is an obvious
pretext for racial discrimination or for discrimination on some
other forbidden basis is subject to heightened scrutiny and ordi-
narily invalidation. 167 But when it is contended that a law, which
is in effect neutral, has a disproportionately adverse effect upon a
racial minority or upon another group particularly entitled to the
protection of the equal protection clause, a much more difficult case
is presented.
It is necessary that one claiming harm through the disparate
or disproportionate impact of a facially neutral law prove intent or
motive to discriminate. ‘‘[A] law, neutral on its face and serving
ends otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is not
invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may
affect a greater proportion of one race than of another.’’ 168 In reli-
ance upon a prior Supreme Court decision that had seemed to es-
chew motive or intent and to pinpoint effect as the key to a con-
stitutional violation 169 and upon the Court’s decisions reading con-
gressional civil rights enactments as providing that when employ-
ment practices disqualifying disproportionate numbers of blacks
are challenged, discriminatory purpose need not be proved, and
167 See e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Guinn v. United States,
238 U.S. 347 (1915); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U.S. 339 (1960). Government may make a racial classification that, for example,
does not separate whites from blacks but that by focussing on an issue of racial im-
port creates a classification that is suspect. Washington v. Seattle School Dist., 458
U.S. 457, 467–74 (1982).
168 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). A classification having a dif-
ferential impact, absent a showing of discriminatory purpose, is subject to review

under the lenient, rationality standard. Id. at 247–48; Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S.
613, 617 n.5 (1982). The Court has applied the same standard to a claim of selective
prosecution allegedly penalizing exercise of First Amendment rights. Wayte v. Unit-
ed States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985) (no discriminatory purpose shown). And see
Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986) (existence of single-race, state-sponsored
4-H Clubs is permissible, given wholly voluntary nature of membership).
169 The principal case was Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), in which
a 5-to–4 majority refused to order a city to reopen its swimming pools closed alleg-
edly to avoid complying with a court order to desegregate them. The majority opin-
ion strongly warned against voiding governmental action upon an assessment of offi-
cial motive, id. at 224–26, but it also, and the Davis Court so read it as actually
deciding, drew the conclusion that since the pools were closed for both whites and
blacks there was no discrimination. The city’s avowed reason for closing the pools—
to avoid violence and economic loss—could not be impeached by allegations of a ra-
cial motive. See also Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
that it is an insufficient response to demonstrate some rational

basis for the challenged practices, 170 a number of lower federal
courts had developed in constitutional litigation a ‘‘disproportionate
impact’’ analysis under which a violation could be established upon
a showing that a statute or practice adversely affected a class with-
out regard to discriminatory purpose, absent some justification
going substantially beyond what would be necessary to validate
most other classifications. 171 These cases were disapproved in
Davis; but the Court did note that ‘‘an invidious discriminatory
purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant
facts, including the fact, if it be true, that the law bears more heav-
ily on one race than another. It is also not infrequently true that
the discriminatory impact . . . may for all practical purposes dem-
onstrate unconstitutionality because in various circumstances the
discrimination is very difficult to explain on nonracial grounds.’’ 172
Both elucidation and not a little confusion followed upon appli-
cation of Davis in the following Terms. Looking to a challenged
zoning decision of a local board which had a harsher impact upon
blacks and low-income persons than on others, the Court explained
170 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). The Davis Court adhered to this reading of Title VII,
merely refusing to import the statutory standard into the constitutional standard.
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238–39, 246–48 (1976). Subsequent cases involv-
ing gender discrimination raised the question of the vitality of Griggs, General Elec-
tric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136
(1977), but the disagreement among the Justices appears to be whether Griggs ap-
plies to each section of the antidiscrimination provision of Title VII. See Dothard
v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Furnco Const. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
But see General Building Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982)
(unlike Title VII, under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
proof of discriminatory intent is required).
171 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244 n.12 (1976) (listing and dis-
approving cases). Cases not cited by the Court included the Fifth Circuit’s wrestling
with the de facto/de jure segregation distinction. In Cisneros v. Corpus Christi
Indep. School Dist., 467 F.2d 142, 148–50 (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc), cert. denied, 413
U.S. 920 (1973), the court held that motive and purpose were irrelevant and the ‘‘de
facto and de jure nomenclature’’ to be ‘‘meaningless.’’ After the distinction was reit-
erated in Keyes v. Denver School District, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), the Fifth Circuit
adopted the position that a decisionmaker must be presumed to have intended the
probable, natural, or foreseeable consequences of his decision and thus that a school
board decision, whatever its facial motivation, that results in segregation is inten-
tional in the constitutional sense. United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 532 F.2d
380 (5th Cir.), vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Washington v.
Davis, 429 U.S. 990 (1976), modified and adhered to, 564 F.2d 162, reh. denied, 579
F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1977–78), cert denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979). See also United States
v. Texas Educ. Agency, 600 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1979). This form of analysis was,
however, substantially cabined in Massachusetts Personnel Adm’r v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256, 278–80 (1979), although foreseeability as one kind of proof was acknowl-
edged by Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464–65 (1979).
172 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
in some detail how inquiry into motivation would work. 173 First,
a plaintiff is not required to prove that an action rested solely on
discriminatory purpose; establishing ‘‘a discriminatory purpose’’
among permissible purposes shifts the burden to the defendant to
show that the same decision would have resulted absent the imper-
missible motive. 174 Second, determining whether a discriminatory
purpose was a motivating factor ‘‘demands a sensitive inquiry into
such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be avail-
able.’’ Impact provides a starting point and ‘‘[s]ometimes a clear
pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from
the effect of the state action even when the governing legislation
appears neutral on its face,’’ but this is a rare case. 175 In the ab-
sence of such a stark pattern, a court will look to such factors as
the ‘‘historical background of the decision,’’ especially if there is a
series of official discriminatory actions. The specific sequence of
events may shed light on purpose, as would departures from nor-
mal procedural sequences or from substantive considerations usu-
ally relied on in the past to guide official actions. Contemporary
statements of decisionmakers may be examined, and ‘‘[i]n some ex-
traordinary instances the members might be called to the stand at
trial to testify concerning the purpose of the official action, al-
though even then such testimony frequently will be barred by privi-
lege.’’ 176 In most circumstances, a court is to look to the totality
of the circumstances to ascertain intent.
Strengthening of the intent standard was evidenced in a deci-
sion sustaining against sex discrimination challenge a state law
giving an absolute preference in civil service hiring to veterans.
Veterans who obtain at least a passing grade on the relevant exam-
ination may exercise the preference at any time and as many times
as they wish and are ranked ahead of all nonveterans, no matter
what their score. The lower court observed that the statutory and
administrative exclusion of women from the armed forces until the
recent past meant that virtually all women were excluded from
state civil service positions and held that results so clearly foreseen
173 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977).
174 Id. at 265–66, 270 n.21. See also Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274, 284–87 (1977) (once plaintiff shows defendant acted from impermissible
motive in not rehiring him, burden shifts to defendant to show result would have
been same in the absence of that motive; constitutional violation not established
merely by showing of wrongful motive); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985)
(circumstances of enactment made it clear that state constitutional amendment re-
quiring disenfranchisement for crimes involving moral turpitude had been adopted
for purpose of racial discrimination, even though it was realized that some poor
whites would also be disenfranchised thereby).
175 Arlington Heights, supra, at 266.
176 Id. at 267–68.
could not be said to be unintended. Reversing, the Supreme Court

found that the veterans preference law was not overtly or covertly
gender based; too many men are nonveterans to permit such a con-
clusion and there are women veterans. That the preference implic-
itly incorporated past official discrimination against women was
held not to detract from the fact that rewarding veterans for their
service to their country was a legitimate public purpose. Acknowl-
edging that the consequences of the preference were foreseeable,
the Court pronounced this fact insufficient to make the requisite
showing of intent. ‘‘‘Discriminatory purpose’ . . . implies more than
intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. . . . It
implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a par-
ticular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in
spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.’’ 177
Moreover, in City of Mobile v. Bolden 178 a plurality of the
Court apparently attempted to do away with the totality of cir-
cumstances test and to evaluate standing on its own each of the
factors offered to show a discriminatory intent. At issue was the
constitutionality of the use of multi-member electoral districts to
select the city commission. A prior decision had invalidated a
multi-member districting system as discriminatory against blacks
and Hispanics, without considering whether its ruling was pre-
mised on discriminatory purpose or adverse impact but listing and
weighing a series of factors the totality of which caused the Court
to find invidious discrimination. 179 But in the plurality opinion in
Mobile, each of the factors, viewed ‘‘alone,’’ was deemed insufficient
to show purposeful discrimination. 180 Moreover, the plurality sug-
gested that some of the factors thought to be derived from its
precedents and forming part of the totality test in opinions of the
177 Massachusetts Personnel Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). This
case clearly established the application of Davis and Arlington Heights to all
nonracial classifications attacked under the equal protection clause. But compare
Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979), and Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979), in the context of the quotation in the text. These
cases found the Davis standard satisfied on a showing of past discrimination cou-
pled with foreseeable impact in the school segregation area.
178 446 U.S. 55 (1980). Also decided by the plurality was that discriminatory
purpose is a requisite showing to establish a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment

and of the equal protection clause in the ‘‘fundamental interest’’ context, vote dilu-
tion, rather than just in the suspect classification context.
179 White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1972), was the prior case. See also
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971). Justice White, the author of Register, dis-
sented in Mobile, supra, 446 U.S. 94, on the basis that ‘‘the totality of the facts re-
lied upon by the District Court to support its inference of purposeful discrimination
is even more compelling than that present in White v. Register.’’ Justice Blackmun,
id. at 80, and Justices Brennan and Marshall, agreed with him as alternate hold-
ings, id. at 94, 103.
180 Id. at 65–74.
lower federal courts—such as minority access to the candidate se-

lection process, governmental responsiveness to minority interests,
and the history of past discrimination—were of quite limited sig-
nificance in determining discriminatory intent. 181 But, contem-
poraneously with Congress’ statutory rejection of the Mobile plural-
ity standards, 182 the Court, in Rogers v. Lodge, 183 appeared to dis-
avow much of Mobile and to permit the federal courts to find dis-
criminatory purpose on the basis of ‘‘circumstantial evidence’’ 184
that is more reminiscent of pre- Washington v. Davis cases than of
the more recent decisions.
Rogers v. Lodge was also a multimember electoral district case
brought under the equal protection clause 185 and the Fifteenth
Amendment. The fact that the system operated to cancel out or di-
lute black voting strength, standing alone, was insufficient to con-
demn it; discriminatory intent in creating or maintaining the sys-
tem was necessary. But direct proof of such intent is not required.
‘‘[A]n invidious purpose may often be inferred from the totality of
the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law
bears more heavily on one race than another.’’ 186 Turning to the
lower court’s enunciation of standards, the Court approved the
Zimmer formulation. The fact that no black had ever been elected
in the county, in which blacks were a majority of the population
but a minority of registered voters, was ‘‘important evidence of pur-
poseful exclusion.’’ 187 Standing alone this fact was not sufficient,
but a historical showing of past discrimination, of systemic exclu-
sion of blacks from the political process as well as educational seg-
181 Id. at 73–74. The principal formulation of the test was in Zimmer v.
McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973), aff’d on other grounds sub nom.
East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976), and its components
are thus frequently referred to as the Zimmer factors.
182 By the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, P.L. 97–205, 96 Stat. 131,
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (as amended), see S. Rep. No. 417, 97th Congress, 2d sess. 27–28
(1982), Congress proscribed a variety of electoral practices ‘‘which results’’ in a de-
nial or abridgment of the right to vote, and spelled out in essence the Zimmer fac-
tors as elements of a ‘‘totality of the circumstances’’ test.
183 458 U.S. 613 (1982). The decision, handed down within days of final congres-
sional passage of the Voting Rights Act Amendments, was written by Justice White
and joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and
O’Connor. Justices Powell and Rehnquist dissented, id. at 628, as did Justice Ste-
vens. Id. at 631.
184 Id. at 618–22 (describing and disagreeing with the Mobile plurality, which
had used the phrase at 446 U.S. 74). The Lodge Court approved the prior reference
that motive analysis required an analysis of ‘‘such circumstantial and direct evi-
dence’’ as was available. Id., 618 (quoting Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266).
185 The Court confirmed the Mobile analysis that the ‘‘fundamental interest’’
side of heightened equal protection analysis requires a showing of intent when the
criteria of classification are neutral and did not reach the Fifteenth Amendment
issue in this case. Id. at 619 n. 6.
186 Id. at 618 (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)).
187 Id. at 623–24.
regation and discrimination, combined with continued unrespon-

siveness of elected officials to the needs of the black community, in-
dicated the presence of discriminatory motivation. The Court also
looked to the ‘‘depressed socio-economic status’’ of the black popu-
lation as being both a result of past discrimination and a barrier
to black access to voting power. 188 As for the district court’s appli-
cation of the test, the Court reviewed it under the deferential
‘‘clearly erroneous’’ standard and affirmed it.
The Court in a jury discrimination case has also seemed to
allow what it had said in Davis and Arlington Heights it would not
permit. 189 Noting that disproportion alone is insufficient to estab-
lish a violation, the Court nonetheless held that plaintiff’s showing
that 79 percent of the county’s population was Spanish-surnamed
while jurors selected in recent years ranged from 39 to 50 percent
Spanish-surnamed was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination. Several factors probably account for the difference.
First, the Court has long recognized that discrimination in jury se-
lection can be inferred from less of a disproportion than is needed
to show other discriminations, in major part because if jury selec-
tion is truly random any substantial disproportion reveals the pres-
ence of an impermissible factor, whereas most official decisions are
not random. 190 Second, the jury selection process was ‘‘highly sub-
jective’’ and thus easily manipulated for discriminatory purposes,
unlike the process in Davis and Arlington Heights which was regu-
larized and open to inspection. 191 Thus, jury cases are likely to
continue to be special cases and in the usual fact situation, at least
where the process is open, plaintiffs will bear a heavy and substan-
tial burden in showing discriminatory racial and other animus.
188 Id. at 624–627. The Court also noted the existence of other factors showing
the tendency of the system to minimize the voting strength of blacks, including the
large size of the jurisdiction and the maintenance of majority vote and single-seat
requirements and the absence of residency requirements.
189 Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977). The decision was 5-to–4, Justice
Blackmun writing the opinion of the Court and Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Stewart, Powell, and Rehnquist dissenting. Id. at 504–507.
190 Id. at 493–94. This had been recognized in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 241 (1976), and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 n.13 (1977).
191 Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494, 497–99 (1977).
TRADITIONAL EQUAL PROTECTION:

ECONOMIC REGULATION AND RELATED
EXERCISES OF THE POLICE POWER
Taxation
At the outset, the Court did not regard the equal protection
clause as having any bearing on taxation. 192 It soon, however, took
jurisdiction of cases assailing specific tax laws under this provi-
sion, 193 and in 1890 it cautiously conceded that ‘‘clear and hostile
discriminations against particular persons and classes, especially
such as are of an unusual character, unknown to the practice of
our government, might be obnoxious to the constitutional prohibi-
tion.’’ 194 But it observed that the equal protection clause ‘‘was not
intended to compel the States to adopt an iron rule of equal tax-
ation’’ and propounded some conclusions valid today. 195 In succeed-
ing years the clause has been invoked but sparingly to invalidate
state levies. In the field of property taxation, inequality has been
condemned only in two classes of cases: (1) discrimination in as-
sessments, and (2) discrimination against foreign corporations. In
addition, there are a handful of cases invalidating, because of in-
equality, state laws imposing income, gross receipts, sales and li-
cense taxes.
Classification for Purpose of Taxation.—The power of the
State to classify for purposes of taxation is ‘‘of wide range and flexi-
bility.’’ 196 A State may adjust its taxing system in such a way as
192 Davidson v. City of New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 106 (1878).
193 Philadelphia Fire Ass’n v. New York, 119 U.S. 110 (1886); Santa Clara
County v. Southern Pacific R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
194 Bell’s Gap R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 237 (1890) (emphasis sup-
plied).
195 Id. The State ‘‘may, if it chooses, exempt certain classes of property from any
taxation at all, such as churches, libraries, and the property of charitable institu-
tions. It may impose different specific taxes upon various trades and professions,
and may vary the rates of excise upon various products; it may tax real estate and
personal property in a different manner; it may tax visible property only, and not
tax securities for payment of money; it may allow deductions for indebtedness, or
not allow them. All such regulations, and those of like character, so long as they
proceed within reasonable limits and general usage, are within the discretion of the
state legislature, or the people of the State in framing their Constitution.’’ See
Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973); Kahn v. Shevin,
416 U.S. 351 (1974); and City of Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369
(1974).
196 Louisville Gas Co. v. Coleman, 227 U.S. 32, 37 (1928). Classifications for
purpose of taxation have been held valid in the following situations:

Banks: a heavier tax on banks which make loans mainly from money of deposi-
tors than on other financial institutions which make loans mainly from money sup-
plied otherwise than by deposits. First Nat’l Bank v. Tax Comm’n, 289 U.S. 60
(1933).
Bank deposits: a tax of 50 cents per $100 on deposits in banks outside a State
in contrast with a rate of 10 cents per $100 on deposits in the State. Madden v.
Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940).
Coal: a tax of 2 1/2 percent on anthracite but not on bituminous coal. Heisler
v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922). Gasoline: a graduated severance tax
on oils sold primarily for their gasoline content, measured by resort to Baume grav-
ity. Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U.S. 146 (1930); Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S.
176 (1983) (prohibition on pass-through to consumers of oil and gas severance tax).
Chain stores: a privilege tax graduated according to the number of stores main-
tained, Tax Comm’rs v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527 (1931); Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294
U.S. 87 (1935); a license tax based on the number of stores both within and without
the State, Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412 (1937) (distin-
guishing Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933)).
Electricity: municipal systems may be exempted, Puget Sound Co. v. Seattle,
291 U.S. 619 (1934); that portion of electricity produced which is used for pumping
water for irrigating lands may be exempted, Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286
U.S. 165 (1932).
Insurance companies: license tax measured by gross receipts upon domestic life
insurance companies from which fraternal societies having lodge organizations and
insuring lives of members only are exempt, and similar foreign corporations are sub-
ject to a fixed and comparatively slight fee for the privilege of doing local business
of the same kind. Northwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 247 U.S. 132 (1918).
Oleomargarine: classified separately from butter. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292
U.S. 40 (1934).
Peddlers: classified separately from other vendors. Caskey Baking Co. v. Vir-
ginia, 313 U.S. 117 (1941).
Public utilities: a gross receipts tax at a higher rate for railroads than for other
public utilities, Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U.S. 576 (1914); a gasoline storage tax which
places a heavier burden upon railroads than upon common carriers by bus, Nash-
ville C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933); a tax on railroads measured
by gross earnings from local operations, as applied to a railroad which received a
larger net income than others from the local activity of renting, and borrowing cars,
Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Minnesota, 309 U.S. 157 (1940); a gross receipts tax applicable
only to public utilities, including carriers, the proceeds of which are used for reliev-
ing the unemployed, New York Rapid Transit Corp. v. New York, 303 U.S. 573
(1938).
Wine: exemption of wine from grapes grown in the State while in the hands of
the producer, Cox v. Texas, 202 U.S. 446 (1906).
Laws imposing miscellaneous license fees have been upheld as follows:
Cigarette dealers: taxing retailers and not wholesalers. Cook v. Marshall Coun-
ty, 196 U.S. 261 (1905).
Commission merchants: requirements that dealers in farm products on commis-
sion procure a license, Payne v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 112 (1918).
Elevators and warehouses: license limited to certain elevators and warehouses
on right-of-way of railroad, Cargill Co. v. Minnesota, 180 U.S. 452 (1901); a license
tax applicable only to commercial warehouses where no other commercial
warehousing facilities in township subject to tax, Independent Warehouses v.
Scheele, 331 U.S. 70 (1947).
Laundries: exemption from license tax of steam laundries and women engaged
in the laundry business where not more than two women are employed. Quong
Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U.S. 59 (1912).
Merchants: exemption from license tax measured by amount of purchases, of
manufacturers within the State selling their own product. Armour & Co. v. Virginia,
246 U.S. 1 (1918).
Sugar refineries: exemption from license applicable to refiners of sugar and mo-
lasses of planters and farmers grinding and refining their own sugar and molasses.
American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89 (1900).
Theaters: license graded according to price of admission. Metropolis Theatre Co.
v. Chicago, 228 U.S. 61 (1913).
Wholesalers of oil: occupation tax on wholesalers in oil not applicable to whole-
salers in other products. Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas, 217 U.S. 114 (1910).
to favor certain industries or forms of industry 197 and may tax dif-
ferent types of taxpayers differently, despite the fact that they com-
pete. 198 It does not follow, however, that because ‘‘some degree of
inequality from the nature of things must be permitted, gross in-
equality must also be allowed.’’ 199 Classification may not be arbi-
trary. It must be based on a real and substantial difference 200 and
the difference need not be great or conspicuous, 201 but there must
be no discrimination in favor of one as against another of the same
class. 202 Also, discriminations of an unusual character are scruti-
nized with special care. 203 A gross sales tax graduated at increas-
ing rates with the volume of sales, 204 a heavier license tax on each
unit in a chain of stores where the owner has stores located in
more than one county, 205 and a gross receipts tax levied on cor-
porations operating taxicabs, but not on individuals, 206 have been
held to be a repugnant to the equal protection clause. But it is not
the function of the Court to consider the propriety or justness of
the tax, to seek for the motives and criticize the public policy which
prompted the adoption of the statute. 207 If the evident intent and
general operation of the tax legislation is to adjust the burden with
a fair and reasonable degree of equality, the constitutional require-
ment is satisfied. 208
One not within the class claimed to be discriminated against
cannot raise the question of constitutionality of a statute on the
ground that it denies equal protection of the law. 209 If a tax ap-
plies to a class which may be separately taxed, those within the
class may not complain because the class might have been more
197 Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U.S. 59, 62 (1912). See also Hammond Pack-
ing Co. v. Montana, 233 U.S. 331 (1914); Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S.
522 (1959).
198 Puget Sound Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 619, 625 (1934). See City of Pittsburgh
v. Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369 (1974).

199 Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 422 (1935).
200 Southern Ry. v. Greene Co., 216 U.S. 400, 417 (1910); Quaker City Cab Co.
v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389, 400 (1928).

201 Keeney v. New York, 222 U.S. 525, 536 (1912); Tax Comm’rs v. Jackson, 283
U.S. 527, 538 (1931).

202 Giozza v. Tierman, 148 U.S. 657, 662 (1893).
203 Louisville Gas Co. v. Coleman, 227 U.S. 32, 37 (1928). See also Bell’s Gap
R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 237 (1890).

204 Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U.S. 550 (1935). See also Valentine v.
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 299 U.S. 32 (1936).

205 Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933).
206 Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389 (1928). This case was
formally overruled in Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356
(1973).
207 Tax Comm’rs v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 537 (1931).
208 Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 422 (1935).
209 Darnell v. Indiana, 226 U.S. 390, 398 (1912); Farmers Bank v. Minnesota,
232 U.S. 516, 531 (1914).

aptly defined nor because others, not of the class, are taxed im-
properly. 210
Foreign Corporations and Nonresidents.—The equal pro-
tection clause does not require identical taxes upon all foreign and
domestic corporations in every case. 211 In 1886, a Pennsylvania
corporation previously licensed to do business in New York chal-
lenged an increased annual license tax imposed by that State in re-
taliation for a like tax levied by Pennsylvania against New York
corporations. This tax was held valid on the ground that the State,
having power to exclude entirely, could change the conditions of ad-
mission for the future and could demand the payment of a new or
further tax as a license fee. 212 Later cases whittled down this rule
considerably. The Court decided that ‘‘after its admission, the for-
eign corporation stands equal and is to be classified with domestic
corporations of the same kind,’’ 213 and that where it has acquired
property of a fixed and permanent nature in a State, it cannot be
subjected to a more onerous tax for the privilege of doing business
than is imposed on domestic corporations. 214 A state statute taxing
foreign corporations writing fire, marine, inland navigation and
casualty insurance on net receipts, including receipts from casualty
business, was held invalid under the equal protection clause where
foreign companies writing only casualty insurance were not subject
to a similar tax. 215 Later, the doctrine of Philadelphia Fire Asso-
ciation v. New York was revived to sustain an increased tax on
gross premiums which was exacted as an annual license fee from
foreign but not from domestic corporations. 216 Even though the
right of a foreign corporation to do business in a State rests on a
license, yet the equal protection clause is held to insure it equality
of treatment, at least so far as ad valorem taxation is concerned. 217
The Court, in WHYY v. Glassboro 218 held that a foreign nonprofit
corporation licensed to do business in the taxing State is denied
equal treatment in violation of the equal protection clause where
an exemption from state property taxes granted to domestic cor-
210 Morf v. Bingaman, 298 U.S. 407, 413 (1936).
211 Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U.S. 68, 88 (1913). See also Cheney
Brothers Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 147, 157 (1918).
212 Philadelphia Fire Ass’n v. New York, 119 U.S. 110, 119 (1886).
213 Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U.S. 494, 511 (1926).
214 Southern Ry. v. Green, 216 U.S. 400, 418 (1910).
215 Concordia Ins. Co. v. Illinois, 292 U.S. 535 (1934).
216 Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 325 U.S. 673 (1945). This decision was
described as ‘‘an anachronism’’ in Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. Of
Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 667 (1981), the Court reaffirming the rule that taxes
discriminating against foreign corporations must bear a rational relation to a legiti-
mate state purpose.
217 Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 571, 572 (1949).
218 393 U.S. 117 (1968).
porations is denied to a foreign corporation solely because it was

organized under the laws of a sister State and where there is no
greater administrative burden in evaluating a foreign corporation
than a domestic corporation in the taxing State.
State taxation of insurance companies, insulated from Com-
merce Clause attack by the McCarran-Ferguson Act, must pass
similar hurdles under the Equal Protection Clause. In Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 219 the Court concluded that taxation favoring
domestic over foreign corporations ‘‘constitutes the very sort of pa-
rochial discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause was in-
tended to prevent.’’ Rejecting the assertion that it was merely im-
posing ‘‘Commerce Clause rhetoric in equal protection clothing,’’ the
Court explained that the emphasis is different even though the re-
sult in some cases will be the same: the Commerce Clause meas-
ures the effects which otherwise valid state enactments have on
interstate commerce, while the Equal Protection Clause merely re-
quires a rational relation to a valid state purpose. 220 However, the
Court’s holding that the discriminatory purpose was invalid under
equal protection analysis would also be a basis for invalidation
under a different strand of Commerce Clause analysis. 221
Income Taxes.—A state law which taxes the entire income of
domestic corporations which do business in the State, including
that derived within the State, while exempting entirely the income
received outside the State by domestic corporations which do no
local business, is arbitrary and invalid. 222 In taxing the income of
a nonresident, there is no denial of equal protection in limiting the
deduction of losses to those sustained within the State, although
residents are permitted to deduct all losses, wherever incurred. 223
A retroactive statute imposing a graduated tax at rates different
from those in the general income tax law, on dividends received in
219 470 U.S. 869, 878 (1985). The vote was 5–4, with Justice Powell’s opinion
for the Court being joined by Chief Justice Burger and by Justices White,
Blackmun, and Stevens. Justice O’Connor’s dissent was joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Rehnquist.
220 470 U.S. at 880.
221 The first level of the Court’s ‘‘two-tiered’’ analysis of state statutes affecting
commerce tests for virtual per se invalidity. ‘‘When a state statute directly regulates
or discriminates against interstate commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state
economic interests over out-of-state interests, we have generally struck down the
statute without further inquiry.’’ Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State
Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986).
222 F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920). See also Walters
v. City of St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231 (1954), sustaining municipal income tax imposed
on gross wages of employed persons but only on net profits of business men and
self-employed.
223 Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 56, 57 (1920); Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg.
Co., 252 U.S. 60, 75, 76 (1920).

a prior year which were deductible from gross income under the
law in effect when they were received, does not violate the equal
protection clause. 224
Inheritance Taxes.—There is no denial of equal protection in
prescribing different treatment for lineal relations, collateral kin-
dred and unrelated persons, or in increasing the proportionate bur-
den of the tax progressively as the amount of the benefit in-
creases. 225 A tax on life estates where the remainder passes to lin-
eal heirs is valid despite the exemption of life estates where the re-
mainder passes to collateral heirs. 226 There is no arbitrary classi-
fication in taxing the transmission of property to a brother or sis-
ter, while exempting that to a son-in-law or daughter-in-law. 227
Vested and contingent remainders may be treated differently. 228
The exemption of property bequeathed to charitable or educational
institutions may be limited to those within the State. 229 In com-
puting the tax collectible from a nonresident decedent’s property
within the State, a State may apply the pertinent rates to the
whole estate wherever located and take that proportion thereof
which the property within the State bears to the total; the fact that
a greater tax may result than would be assessed on an equal
amount of property if owned by a resident, does not invalidate the
result. 230
Motor Vehicle Taxes.—In demanding compensation for the
use of highways, a State may exempt certain types of vehicles, ac-
cording to the purpose for which they are used, from a mileage tax
on carriers. 231 A state maintenance tax act, which taxes vehicle
property carriers for hire at greater rates than similar vehicles car-
rying property not for hire is reasonable, since the use of roads by
one hauling not for hire generally is limited to transportation of his
own property as an incident to his occupation and is substantially
less than that of one engaged in business as a common carrier. 232
A property tax on motor vehicles used in operating a stage line
that makes constant and unusual use of the highways may be
measured by gross receipts and be assessed at a higher rate than
taxes on property not so employed. 233 Common motor carriers of
freight operating over regular routes between fixed termini may be
224 Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134 (1938).
225 Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U.S. 283, 288, 300 (1898).
226 Billings v. Illinois, 188 U.S. 97 (1903).
227 Campbell v. California, 200 U.S. 87 (1906).
228 Salomon v. State Tax Comm’n, 278 U.S. 484 (1929).
229 Board of Educ. v. Illinois, 203 U.S. 553 (1906).
230 Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U.S. 525 (1919).
231 Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U.S. 352 (1932).
232 Dixie Ohio Express Co. v. State Revenue Comm’n, 306 U.S. 72, 78 (1939).
233 Alward v. Johnson, 282 U.S. 509 (1931).
taxed at higher rates than other carriers, common and private. 234
A fee for the privilege of transporting motor vehicles on their own
wheels over the highways of the State for purpose of sale does not
violate the equal protection clause as applied to cars moving in
caravans. 235 The exemption from a tax for a permit to bring cars
into the State in caravans of cars moved for sale between zones in
the State is not an unconstitutional discrimination where it ap-
pears that the traffic subject to the tax places a much more serious
burden on the highways than that which is exempt. 236 Also sus-
tained as valid have been exemptions of vehicles weighing less
than 3000 pounds from graduated registration fees imposed on car-
riers for hire, notwithstanding that the exempt vehicles, when load-
ed, may outweigh those taxed; 237 and exemptions from vehicle li-
cense taxes levied on private motor carriers of persons whose vehi-
cles haul passengers and farm products between points not having
railroad facilities or farm and dairy products for producers there-
of. 238
Property Taxes.—The State’s latitude of discretion is notably
wide in the classification of property for purposes of taxation and
the granting of partial or total exemption on the grounds of pol-
icy, 239 whether the exemption results from the terms of the statute
itself or the conduct of a state official implementing state policy. 240
A provision for the forfeiture of land for nonpayment of taxes is not
invalid because the conditions to which it applies exist only in a
part of the State. 241 Also, differences in the basis of assessment
are not invalid where the person or property affected might prop-
erly be placed in a separate class for purposes of taxation. 242 Early
cases drew the distinction between intentional and systematic dis-
criminatory action by state officials in undervaluing some property
while taxing at full value other property in the same class—an ac-
tion that could be invalidated under the equal protection clause—
and mere errors in judgment resulting in unequal valuation or
undervaluation—actions that did not support a claim of discrimina-
234 Bekins Van Lines v. Riley, 280 U.S. 80 (1929).
235 Morf v. Bingaman, 298 U.S. 407 (1936).
236 Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939).
237 Carley & Hamilton v. Snook, 281 U.S. 66 (1930).
238 Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Public Serv. Comm’n, 295 U.S. 285
(1935).
239 F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
240 Missouri v. Dockery, 191 U.S. 165 (1903).
241 Kentucky Union Co. v. Kentucky, 219 U.S. 140, 161 (1911).
242 Charleston Fed. S. & L. Ass’n v. Alderson, 324 U.S. 182 (1945); Nashville
C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1940).

tion. 243 More recently, however, the Court in Allegheny Pittsburgh

Coal Co. v. Webster County Commission, 244 found a denial of equal
protection to property owners whose assessments, based on recent
purchase prices, ranged from 8 to 35 times higher than comparable
neighboring property for which the assessor failed over a 10-year
period to readjust appraisals. Then, only a few years later, the
Court upheld a California ballot initiative that imposed a quite
similar result: property that is sold is appraised at purchase price,
while assessments on property that has stayed in the same hands
since 1976 may rise no more that 2% per year. 245 Allegheny Pitts-
burgh was distinguished, the disparity in assessments being said
to result from administrative failure to implement state policy
rather than from implementation of a coherent state policy. 246
California’s acquisition-value system favoring those who hold on to
property over those who purchase and sell property was viewed as
furthering rational state interests in promoting ‘‘local neighborhood
preservation, continuity, and stability,’’ and in protecting reason-
able reliance interests of existing homeowners. 247
An owner aggrieved by discrimination is entitled to have his
assessment reduced to the common level. 248 Equal protection is de-
nied if a State does not itself remove the discrimination; it cannot
impose upon the person against whom the discrimination is di-
rected the burden of seeking an upward revision of the assessment
of other members of the class. 249 A corporation whose valuations
were accepted by the assessing commission cannot complain that it
was taxed disproportionately, as compared with others, if the com-
mission did not act fraudulently. 250
Special Assessment.—A special assessment is not discrimina-
tory because apportioned on an ad valorem basis, nor does its va-
lidity depend upon the receipt of some special benefit as distin-
guished from the general benefit to the community. 251 Railroad
property may not be burdened for local improvements upon a basis
so wholly different from that used for ascertaining the contribution
demanded of individual owners as necessarily to produce manifest
243 Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350 (1918); Raymond v. Chi-
cago Traction Co., 207 U.S. 20, 35, 37 (1907); Coutler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.,
196 U.S. 599 (1905). See also Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585 (1907).
244 488 U.S. 336 (1989).
245 Nordlinger v. Hahn, 112 S. Ct. 2326 (1992).
246 Id. at 2334–35.
247 Id. at 2333.
248 Sioux City Bridge v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 446 (1923).
249 Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 623 (1946); Allegheny Pittsburgh
Coal Co. v. Webster County Comm’n, 488 U.S. 336 (1989).

250 St. Louis-San Francisco Ry v. Middlekamp, 256 U.S. 226, 230 (1921).
251 Memphis & Charleston Ry. v. Pace, 282 U.S. 241 (1931).
inequality. 252 A special highway assessment against railroads

based on real property, rolling stock, and other personal property
is unjustly discriminatory when other assessments for the same im-
provement are based on real property alone. 253 A law requiring the
franchise of a railroad to be considered in valuing its property for
apportionment of a special assessment is not invalid where the
franchises were not added as a separate personal property value to
the assessment of the real property. 254 In taxing railroads within
a levee district on a mileage basis, it is not necessarily arbitrary
to fix a lower rate per mile for those having less than 25 miles of
main line within the district than for those having more. 255
Police Power Regulation
Classification.—Justice Holmes’ characterization of the equal
protection clause as the ‘‘usual last refuge of constitutional argu-
ments’’ 256 was no doubt made with the practice in mind of contest-
ants tacking on an equal protection argument to a due process
challenge of state economic regulation. Few police regulations have
been held unconstitutional on this ground.
‘‘[T]he Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope
of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens
differently than others. The constitutional safeguard is offended
only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the
achievement of the State’s objective. State legislatures are pre-
sumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the
fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statu-
tory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reason-
ably may be conceived to justify it.’’ 257 The Court has made it clear
that only the totally irrational classification in the economic field
will be struck down, 258 and it has held that legislative classifica-
252 Kansas City So. Ry. v. Road Imp. Dist. No. 6, 256 U.S. 658 (1921); Thomas
v. Kansas City So. Ry., 261 U.S. 481 (1923).

253 Road Imp. Dist. v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 274 U.S. 188 (1927).
254 Branson v. Bush, 251 U.S. 182 (1919).
255 Columbus & Greenville Ry. v. Miller, 283 U.S. 96 (1931).
256 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
257 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425–26 (1961).
258 City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976). Upholding an ordinance
that banned all pushcart vendors from the French Quarter, except those in continu-
ous operation for more than eight years, the Court summarized its method of deci-
sion here. ‘‘When local economic regulation is challenged solely as violating the
Equal Protection Clause, this Court consistently defers to legislative determinations
as to the desirability of particular statutory discriminations. . . . Unless a classifica-
tion trammels fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect dis-
tinctions such as race, religion, or alienage, our decisions presume the constitu-
tionality of the statutory discriminations and require only that the classification
challenged be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. States are accorded
wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers,
tions that impact severely upon some businesses and quite favor-
ably upon others may be saved through stringent deference to leg-
islative judgment. 259 So deferential is the classification that it de-
nies the challenging party any right to offer evidence to seek to
prove that the legislature is wrong in its conclusion that its classi-
fication will serve the purpose it has in mind, so long as the ques-
tion is at least debatable and the legislature ‘‘could rationally have
decided’’ that its classification would foster its goal. 260
and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical
exactitude. Legislatures may implement their program step-by-step . . . in such eco-
nomic areas, adopting regulations that only partially ameliorate a perceived evil and
deferring complete elimination of the evil to future regulations. . . . In short, the
judiciary may not sit as a super-legislature to judge the wisdom or undesirability
of legislative policy determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental
rights nor proceed along suspect lines . . . ; in the local economic sphere, it is only
the invidious discrimination, the wholly arbitrary act, which cannot stand consist-
ently with the Fourteenth Amendment.’’ Id. at 303–04.
259 The ‘‘grandfather’’ clause upheld in Dukes preserved the operations of two
concerns that had operated in the Quarter for 20 years. The classification was sus-
tained on the basis of (1) the City Council proceeding step-by-step and eliminating
vendors of more recent vintage, (2) the Council deciding that newer businesses were
less likely to have built up substantial reliance interests in continued operation in
the Quarter, and (3) the Council believing that both ‘‘grandfathered’’ vending inter-
ests had themselves become part of the distinctive character and charm of the Quar-
ter. Id. 305–06. See also Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1979); United
States v. Maryland Savings-Share Ins. Corp., 400 U.S. 4, 6 (1970).
260 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461–70 (1981). The
quoted phrase is at 466 (emphasis by Court). Purporting to promote the purposes

of resource conservation, easing solid waste disposal problems, and conserving en-
ergy, the legislature had banned plastic nonreturnable milk cartons but permitted
all other nonplastic nonreturnable containers, such as paperboard cartons. The state
court had thought the distinction irrational, but the Supreme Court thought the leg-
islature could have believed a basis for the distinction existed. Courts will receive
evidence that a distinction is wholly irrational. United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153–54 (1938).
Classifications under police regulations have been held valid as follows:
Advertising: discrimination between billboard and newpaper advertising of ciga-
rettes, Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932); prohibition of advertising signs
on motor vehicles, except when used in the usual business of the owner and not
used mainly for advertising, Fifth Ave. Coach Co. v. New York, 221 U.S. 467 (1911);
prohibition of advertising on motor vehicles except notices or advertising of products
of the owner, Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); prohibition
against sale of articles on which there is a representation of the flag for advertising
purposes, except newspapers, periodicals and books, Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S.
34 (1907).
Amusement: prohibition against keeping billiard halls for hire, except in case
of hotels having twenty-five or more rooms for use of regular guests. Murphy v.
California, 225 U.S. 623 (1912).
Attorneys: Kansas law and court regulations requiring resident of Kansas, li-
censed to practice in Kansas and Missouri and maintaining law offices in both
States, but who practices regularly in Missouri, to obtain local associate counsel as
a condition of appearing in a Kansas court. Martin v. Walton, 368 U.S. 25 (1961).
Two dissenters, Justices Douglas and Black, would sustain the requirement, if lim-
ited in application to an attorney who practiced only in Missouri.
Cattle: a classification of sheep, as distinguished from cattle, in a regulation re-

stricting the use of public lands for grazing. Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311 (1907).
See also Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343 (1918).
Cotton gins: in a State where cotton gins are held to be public utilities and their
rates regulated, the granting of a license to a cooperative association distributing
profits ratably to members and nonmembers does not deny other persons operating
gins equal protection when there is nothing in the laws to forbid them to distribute
their net earnings among their patrons. Corporation Comm’n v. Lowe, 281 U.S. 431
(1930).
Debt adjustment business: operation only as incident to legitimate practice of
law. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
Eye glasses: law exempting sellers of ready-to-wear glasses from regulations for-
bidding opticians to fit or replace lenses without prescriptions from ophthalmologist
or optometrist and from restrictions on solicitation of sale of eye glasses by use of
advertising matter. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
Fish processing: stricter regulation of reduction of fish to flour or meal than of
canning. Bayside Fish Co. v. Gentry, 297 U.S. 422 (1936).
Food: bread sold in loaves must be of prescribed standard sizes, Schmidinger
v. Chicago, 226 U.S. 578 (1913); food preservatives containing boric acid may not
be sold, Price v. Illinois, 238 U.S. 446 (1915); lard not sold in bulk must be put up
in containers holding one, three or five pounds or some whole multiple thereof, Ar-
mour & Co. v. North Dakota, 240 U.S. 510 (1916); milk industry may be placed in
a special class for regulation, Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552 (1906); ven-
dors producing milk outside city may be classified separately, Adams v. Milwaukee,
228 U.S. 572 (1913); producing and nonproducing vendors may be distinguished in
milk regulations, St. John v. New York, 201 U.S. 633 (1906); different minimum and
maximum milk prices may be fixed for distributors and storekeepers, Nebbia v. New
York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); price differential may be granted for sellers of milk not
having a well advertised trade name, Borden’s Farm Products Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297
U.S. 251 (1936); oleomargarine colored to resemble butter may be prohibited, Cap-
ital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio, 183 U.S. 238 (1902); table syrups may be required to
be so labeled and disclose identity and proportion of ingredients, Corn Products Rfg.
Co. v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427 (1919).
Geographical discriminations: legislation limited in application to a particular
geographical or political subdivision of a State, Ft. Smith Co. v. Paving Dist., 274
U.S. 387, 391 (1927); ordinance prohibiting a particular business in certain sections
of a municipality, Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); statute authorizing
a municipal commission to limit the height of buildings in commercial districts to
125 feet and in other districts to 80 to 100 feet, Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91
(1909); ordinance prescribing limits in city outside of which no woman of lewd char-
acter shall dwell, L’Hote v. New Orleans, 177 U.S. 587, 595 (1900). And see North
v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328, 338 (1976).
Hotels: requirement that keepers of hotels having over fifty guests employ night
watchmen. Miller v. Strahl, 239 U.S. 426 (1915).
Insurance companies: regulation of fire insurance rates with exemption for
farmers mutuals, German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U.S. 389 (1914); different
requirements imposed upon reciprocal insurance associations than upon mutual
companies, Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313 (1943); prohibition
against life insurance companies or agents engaging in undertaking business, Dan-
iel v. Family Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949).
Intoxicating liquors: exception of druggist or manufacturers from regulation.
Lloyd v. Dollison, 194 U.S. 445 (1904); Eberle v. Michigan, 232 U.S. 700 (1914).
Landlord-tenant: requiring trial no later than six days after service of complaint
and limiting triable issues to the tenant’s default, provisions applicable in no other
legal action, under procedure allowing landlord to sue to evict tenants for
nonpayment of rent, inasmuch as prompt and peaceful resolution of the dispute is
proper objective and tenants have other means to pursue other relief. Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
Lodging houses: requirement that sprinkler systems be installed in buildings of

nonfireproof construction is valid as applied to such a building which is safeguarded
by a fire alarm system, constant watchman service and other safety arrangements.
Queenside Hills Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80 (1946).
Markets: prohibition against operation of private market within six squares of
public market. Natal v. Louisiana, 139 U.S. 621 (1891).
Medicine: a uniform standard of professional attainment and conduct for all
physicians, Hurwitz v. North, 271 U.S. 40 (1926); reasonable exemptions from medi-
cal registration law. Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173 (1910); exemption of persons
who heal by prayer from regulations applicable to drugless physicians, Crane v.
Johnson, 242 U.S 339 (1917); exclusion of osteopathic physicians from public hos-
pitals, Hayman v. Galveston, 273 U.S. 414 (1927); requirement that persons who
treat eyes without use of drugs be licensed as optometrists with exception for per-
sons treating eyes by use of drugs, who are regulated under a different statute,
McNaughton v. Johnson, 242 U.S. 344 (1917); a prohibition against advertising by
dentists, not applicable to other professions, Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294 U.S.
608 (1935).
Motor vehicles: guest passenger regulation applicable to automobiles but not to
other classes of vehicles, Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929); exemption of vehicles
from other States from registration requirement, Storaasli v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
57 (1931); classification of driverless automobiles for hire as public vehicles, which
are required to procure a license and to carry liability insurance, Hodge Co. v. Cin-
cinnati, 284 U.S. 335 (1932); exemption from limitations on hours of labor for driv-
ers of motor vehicles of carriers of property for hire, of those not principally engaged
in transport of property for hire, and carriers operating wholly in metropolitan
areas, Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79 (1939); exemption of busses and
temporary movements of farm implements and machinery and trucks making short
hauls from common carriers from limitations in net load and length of trucks,
Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374 (1932); prohibition against operation of uncertified
carriers, Bradley v. Public Utility Comm’n, 289 U.S. 92 (1933); exemption from regu-
lations affecting carriers for hire, of persons whose chief business is farming and
dairying, but who occasionally haul farm and dairy products for compensation,
Hicklin v. Coney, 290 U.S. 169 (1933); exemption of private vehicles, street cars and
omnibuses from insurance requirements applicable to taxicabs, Packard v. Banton,
264 U.S. 140 (1924).
Peddlers and solicitors: a State may classify and regulate itinerant vendors and
peddlers, Emert v. Missouri, 156 U.S. 296 (1895); may forbid the sale by them of
drugs and medicines, Baccus v. Louisiana, 232 U.S. 334 (1914); prohibit drumming
or soliciting on trains for business for hotels, medical practitioners, and the like,
Williams v. Arkansas, 217 U.S. 79 (1910); or solicitation of employment to prosecute
or collect claims, McCloskey v. Tobin, 252 U.S. 107 (1920). And a municipality may
prohibit canvassers or peddlers from calling at private residences unless requested
or invited by the occupant to do so. Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622
(1951).
Property destruction: destruction of cedar trees to protect apple orchards from
cedar rust, Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
Railroads: prohibition on operation on a certain street, Railroad Co. v. Rich-
mond, 96 U.S. 521 (1878); requirement that fences and cattle guards and allow re-
covery of multiple damages for failure to comply, Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Humes, 115
U.S. 512 (1885); Minneapolis Ry. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1889); Minneapolis &
St. Louis Ry. v. Emmons, 149 U.S. 364 (1893); assessing railroads with entire ex-
pense of altering a grade crossing, New York & N.E. R.R. v. Bristol, 151 U.S. 556
(1894); liability for fire communicated by locomotive engines, St. Louis & S. F. Ry.
v. Mathews, 165 U.S. 1 (1897); required weed cutting; Missouri, Kan., & Tex. Ry.
v. May, 194 U.S. 267 (1904); presumption against a railroad failing to give pre-
scribed warning signals, Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Ford, 287 U.S. 502 (1933); re-
quired use of locomotive headlights of a specified form and power, Atlantic Coast
Line Ry. v. Georgia, 234 U.S. 280 (1914); presumption that railroads are liable for
The Court has condemned a variety of statutory classifications

as failing to survive the rational basis test, although some of the
cases are of doubtful vitality today and some have been questioned.
Thus, the Court invalidated a statute which forbade stock insur-
ance companies to act through agents who were their salaried em-
ployees but permitted mutual companies to operate in this man-
ner. 261 A law which required private motor vehicle carriers to ob-
tain certificates of convenience and necessity and to furnish secu-
rity for the protection of the public was held invalid because of the
exemption of carriers of fish, farm, and dairy products. 262 The
same result befell a statute which permitted mill dealers without
well advertised trade names the benefit of a price differential but
which restricted this benefit to such dealers entering the business
before a certain date. 263 In a decision since overruled, the Court
damage caused by operation of their locomotives, Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Watson,
287 U.S. 86 (1932); required sprinkling of streets between tracks to lay the dust,
Pacific Gas Co. v. Police Court, 251 U.S. 22 (1919). State ‘‘full-crew’’ laws do not
violate the equal protection clause by singling out the railroads for regulation and
by making no provision for minimum crews on any other segment of the transpor-
tation industry, Firemen v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 393 U.S. 129 (1968).
Sales in bulk: requirement of notice of bulk sales applicable only to retail deal-
ers. Lemieux v. Young, 211 U.S. 489 (1909).
Secret societies: regulations applied only to one class of oath-bound associations,
having a membership of 20 or more persons, where the class regulated has a tend-
ency to make the secrecy of its purpose and membership a cloak for conduct inimical
to the personal rights of others and to the public welfare. New York ex rel. Bryant
v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928).
Securities: a prohibition on the sale of capital stock on margin or for future de-
livery which is not applicable to other objects of speculation, e.g., cotton, grain. Otis
v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606 (1903).
Sunday closing law: notwithstanding that they prohibit the sale of certain com-
modities and services while permitting the vending of others not markedly different,
and, even as to the latter, frequently restrict their distribution to small retailers as
distinguished from large establishments handling salable as well as nonsalable
items, such laws have been upheld. Despite the desirability of having a required day
of rest, a certain measure of mercantile activity must necessarily continue on that
day and in terms of requiring the smallest number of employees to forego their day
of rest and minimizing traffic congestion, it is preferable to limit this activity to re-
tailers employing the smallest number of workers; also, it curbs evasion to refuse
to permit stores dealing in both salable and nonsalable items to be open at all.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown v.
McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Gallagher
v. Crown Kosher Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961). See also Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113
U.S. 703 (1885); Petit v. Minnesota, 177 U.S. 164 (1900).
Telegraph companies: a statute prohibiting stipulation against liability for neg-
ligence in the delivery of interstate messages, which did not forbid express compa-
nies and other common carriers to limit their liability by contract. Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Milling Co., 218 U.S. 406 (1910).
261 Hartford Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 301 U.S. 459 (1937).
262 Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931).
263 Mayflower Farms v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266 (1936). See United States v.
Maryland Savings-Share Ins. Corp., 400 U.S. 4, 7 n.2 (1970) (reserving question of
case’s validity, but interpreting it as standing for the proposition that no showing
of a valid legislative purpose had been made).
struck down a law which exempted by name the American Express

Company from the terms pertaining to the licensing, bonding, regu-
lation, and inspection of ‘‘currency exchanges’’ engaged in the sale
of money orders. 264
Other Business and Employment Relations
Labor Relations.—Objections to labor legislation on the
ground that the limitation of particular regulations to specified in-
dustries was obnoxious to the equal protection clause have been
consistently overruled. Statutes limiting hours of labor for employ-
ees in mines, smelters, 265 mills, factories, 266 or on public works 267
have been sustained. And a statute forbidding persons engaged in
mining and manufacturing to issue orders for payment of labor un-
less redeemable at face value in cash was similarly held
unobjectionable. 268 The exemption of mines employing less than
ten persons from a law pertaining to measurement of coal to deter-
mine a miner’s wages is not unreasonable. 269 All corporations 270
or public service corporations 271 may be required to issue to em-
ployees who leave their service letters stating the nature of the
service and the cause of leaving even though other employers are
not so required.
Industries may be classified in a workmen’s compensation act
according to the respective hazards of each, 272 and the exemption
of farm laborers and domestic servants does not render such an act
invalid. 273 A statute providing that no person shall be denied op-
portunity for employment because he is not a member of a labor
union does not offend the equal protection clause. 274 At a time
264 Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), overruled by City of New Orleans v.
Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976), where the exemption of one concern had been by precise
description rather than by name.
265 Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1988).
266 Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917).
267 Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207 (1903).
268 Keokee Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U.S. 224 (1914). See also Knoxville Iron Co.
v. Harbison, 183 U.S. 13 (1901).

269 McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539 (1909).
270 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530 (1922).
271 Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Perry, 259 U.S. 548 (1922).
272 Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917).
273 New York Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917); Middletown v. Texas
Power & Light Co., 249 U.S. 152 (1919); Ward & Gow v. Krinsky, 259 U.S. 503
(1922).
274 Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525
(1949). Neither is it a denial of equal protection for a city to refuse to withhold from
its employees’ paychecks dues owing their union, although it withholds for taxes,
retirement-insurance programs, saving programs, and certain charities, because its
offered justification that its practice of allowing withholding only when it benefits
all city or department employees is a legitimate method to avoid the burden of with-
holding money for all persons or organizations that request a checkoff. City of Char-
lotte v. Firefighters, 426 U.S. 283 (1976).
when protective labor legislation generally was falling under ‘‘lib-

erty of contract’’ applications of the due process clause, the Court
generally approved protective legislation directed solely to women
workers 275 and this solicitude continued into present times in the
approval of laws which were more questionable, 276 but passage of
the sex discrimination provision of the 1964 Civil Rights Act has
generally called into question all such protective legislation ad-
dressed solely to women. 277
Monopolies and Unfair Trade Practices.—On the principle
that the law may hit the evil where it is most felt, state antitrust
laws applicable to corporations but not to individuals, 278 or to ven-
dors of commodities but not to vendors of labor, 279 have been
upheld. Contrary to its earlier view, the Court now holds that an
antitrust act which exempts agricultural products in the hands of
the producer is valid. 280 Diversity with respect to penalties also
has been sustained. Corporations violating the law may be pro-
ceeded against by bill in equity, while individuals are indicted and
tried. 281 A provision, superimposed upon the general antitrust law,
for revocation of the licenses of fire insurance companies that enter
into illegal combinations, does not violate the equal protection
clause. 282 A grant of monopoly privileges, if otherwise an appro-
priate exercise of the police power, is immune to attack under that
clause. 283 Likewise, enforcement of an unfair sales act, whereby
merchants are privileged to give trading stamps, worth two and
one-half percent of the price, with goods sold at or near statutory
cost, while a competing merchant, not issuing stamps, is precluded
from making an equivalent price reduction, effects no discrimina-
tion. There is a reasonable basis for concluding that destructive,
deceptive competition results from selective loss-leader selling
whereas such abuses do not attend issuance of trading stamps
‘‘across the board,’’ as a discount for payment in cash. 284
Administrative Discretion.—A municipal ordinance which
vests in supervisory authorities a naked and arbitrary power to
grant or withhold consent to the operation of laundries in wooden
275 E.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
276 Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
277 Title VII, 78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. On sex discrimination generally,
see infra, pp. 1875–86.

278 Mallinckrodt Works v. St. Louis, 238 U.S. 41 (1915).
279 International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U.S. 199 (1914).
280 Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940) (overruling Connolly v. Union Sewer
Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1902)).

281 Standard Oil Co. v. Tennessee, 217 U.S. 413 (1910).
282 Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 199 U.S. 401 (1905).
283 Pacific States Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935); see also Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873): Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 529 (1934).
284 Safeway Stores v. Oklahoma Grocers, 360 U.S. 334, 339–41 (1959).
buildings, without consideration of the circumstances of individual

cases, constitutes a denial of equal protection of the law when con-
sent is withheld from certain persons solely on the basis of nation-
ality. 285 But a city council may reserve to itself the power to make
exceptions from a ban on the operation of a dairy within the
city, 286 or from building line restrictions. 287 Written permission of
the mayor or president of the city council may be required before
any person shall move a building on a street. 288 The mayor may
be empowered to determine whether an applicant has a good char-
acter and reputation and is a suitable person to receive a license
for the sale of cigarettes. 289 In a later case, 290 the Court held that
the unfettered discretion of river pilots to select their apprentices,
which was almost invariably exercised in favor of their relatives
and friends, was not a denial of equal protection to persons not se-
lected despite the fact that such apprenticeship was requisite for
appointment as a pilot.
Social Welfare.—The traditional ‘‘reasonable basis’’ standard
of equal protection adjudication developed in the main in cases in-
volving state regulation of business and industry. ‘‘The administra-
tion of public welfare assistance, by contrast, involves the most
basic economic needs of impoverished human beings. We recognize
the dramatically real factual difference between the cited cases and
this one, but we can find no basis for applying a different constitu-
tional standard.’’ 291 Thus, a formula for dispensing aid to depend-
ent children which imposed an upper limit on the amount one fam-
ily could receive, regardless of the number of children in the family,
so that the more children in a family the less money per child was
received, was found to be rationally related to the legitimate state
interest in encouraging employment and in maintaining an equi-
table balance between welfare families and the families of the
working poor. 292 Similarly, a state welfare assistance formula
which, after calculation of individual need, provided less of the de-
termined amount to families with dependent children than to those
285 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
286 Fischer v. St. Louis, 194 U.S. 361 (1904).
287 Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927).
288 Wilson v. Eureka City, 173 U.S. 32 (1899).
289 Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U.S. 183 (1900).
290 Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm’rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
291 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). Decisions respecting the
rights of the indigent in the criminal process and dicta in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 627 (1969), had raised the prospect that because of the importance of
‘‘food, shelter, and other necessities of life,’’ classifications with an adverse or per-
haps severe impact on the poor and needy would be subjected to a higher scrutiny.
Dandridge was a rejection of this approach, which was more fully elaborated in an-
other context in San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18–29 (1973).
292 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 483–87 (1970).
persons in the aged and infirm categories did not violate equal pro-
tection because a State could reasonably believe that the aged and
infirm are the least able to bear the hardships of an inadequate
standard of living, and that the apportionment of limited funds was
therefore rational. 293 While reiterating that this standard of re-
view is ‘‘not a toothless one,’’ the Court has nonetheless sustained
a variety of distinctions on the basis that Congress could rationally
have believed them justified, 294 acting to invalidate a provision
only once and then on the premise that Congress was actuated by
an improper purpose. 295
Similarly, the Court has rejected the contention that access to
housing, despite its great importance, is of any fundamental inter-
est which would place a bar upon the legislature’s giving landlords
a much more favorable and summary process of judicially-con-
trolled eviction actions than was available in other kinds of litiga-
tion. 296
However, a statute which prohibited the dispensing of contra-
ceptive devices to single persons for birth control but not for dis-
ease prevention purposes and which contained no limitation on dis-
pensation to married persons was held to violate the equal protec-
tion clause on several grounds. On the basis of the right infringed
by the limitation, the Court saw no rational basis for the State to
distinguish between married and unmarried persons. Similarly, the
exemption from the prohibition for purposes of disease prevention
nullified the argument that the rational basis for the law was the
deterrence of fornication, the rationality of which the Court doubt-
ed in any case. 297 Also denying equal protection was a law afford-
293 Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972). See also Richardson v. Belcher,
404 U.S. 78 (1971) (sustaining Social Security provision reducing disability benefits
by amount received from worker’s compensation but not that received from private
insurance).
294 E.g., Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181 (1976) (provision giving benefits
to married woman under 62 with dependent children in her care whose husband re-
tires or becomes disabled but denying benefits to divorced woman under 62 with de-
pendents represents rational judgment with respect to likely dependency of married
but not divorced women); Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979) (limitation of bene-
fits to widows and divorced wives of wage earners does not deny equal protection
to mother of illegitimate child of wage earner who was never married to wage earn-
er).
295 Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (also questioning
rationality).
296 Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972). The Court did invalidate one provi-
sion of the law requiring tenants against whom an eviction judgment had been en-
tered after a trial to post a bond in double the amout of rent to become due by the
determination of the appeal, because it bore no reasonable relationship to any valid
state objective and arbitrarily distinguished between defendants in eviction actions
and defendants in other actions. Id. at 74–79.
297 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
ing married parents, divorced parents, and unmarried mothers an

opportunity to be heard with regard to the issue of their fitness to
continue or to take custody of their children, an opportunity the
Court decided was mandated by due process, but presuming the
unfitness of the unmarried father and giving him no hearing. 298
Punishment of Crime.—Equality of protection under the law
implies that in the administration of criminal justice no person
shall be subject to any greater or different punishment than an-
other in similar circumstances. 299 Comparative gravity of criminal
offenses is, however, largely a matter of state discretion, and the
fact that some offenses are punished with less severity than others
does not deny equal protection. 300 Heavier penalties may be im-
posed upon habitual criminals for like offenses, 301 even after a par-
don for an earlier offense, 302 and such persons may be made ineli-
gible for parole. 303 A state law doubling the sentence on prisoners
attempting to escape does not deny equal protection by subjecting
prisoners who attempt to escape together to different sentences de-
pending on their original sentences. 304
A statute denying state prisoners good time credit for
presentence incarceration but permitting those prisoners who ob-
tain bail or other release immediately to receive good time credit
for the entire period which they ultimately spend in custody, good
time counting toward the date of eligibility for parole, does not
deny the prisoners incarcerated in local jails equal protection inas-
much as the distinction is rationally justified by the fact that good
time credit is designed to encourage prisoners to engage in reha-
bilitation courses and activities which exist only in state prisons
and not in local jails. 305
298 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972).
299 Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883). See Salzburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S.
545 (1954), sustaining law rendering illegally seized evidence inadmissible in pros-
ecutions in state courts for misdemeanors but permitting use of such evidence in
one county in prosecutions for certain gambling misdemeanors. Distinctions based
on county areas were deemed reasonable. In North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328 (1976),
the Court sustained the provision of law-trained judges for some police courts and
lay judges for others, depending upon the state constitutional classification of cities
according to population, since as long as all people within each classified area are
treated equally, the different classifications within the court system are justifiable.
300 Collins v. Johnston, 237 U.S. 502, 510 (1915); Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302
U.S. 51 (1937).
301 McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311 (1901); Moore v. Missouri, 159
U.S. 673 (1895); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912).
302 Carlesi v. New York, 233 U.S. 51 (1914).
303 Ughbanks v. Armstrong, 208 U.S. 481 (1908).
304 Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51 (1937).
305 McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973). Cf. Hurtado v. United States, 410
U.S. 578 (1973).

The equal protection clause does, however, render invalid a

statute requiring the sterilization of persons convicted of various
offenses when the statute draws a line between like offenses, such
as between larceny by fraud and embezzlement. 306 A statute which
provided that convicted defendants sentenced to imprisonment
must reimburse the State for the furnishing of free transcripts of
their trial by having amounts deducted from prison pay denied
such persons equal protection when it did not require reimburse-
ment of those fined, given suspended sentences, or placed on proba-
tion. 307 Similarly, a statute enabling the State to recover the costs
of such transcripts and other legal defense fees by a civil action
was defective under the equal protection clause because indigent
defendants against whom judgment was entered under the statute
did not have the benefit of exemptions and benefits afforded other
civil judgment debtors. 308 But a bail reform statute which provided
for liberalized forms of release and which imposed the costs of oper-
ating the system upon one category of released defendants, gen-
erally those most indigent, was not invalid because the classifica-
tion was rational and because the measure was in any event a sub-
stantial improvement upon the old bail system. 309 The Court in
the last several years has applied the clause strictly to prohibit nu-
merous de jure and de facto distinctions based on wealth or
indigency. 310
EQUAL PROTECTION AND RACE
Overview
The Fourteenth Amendment ‘‘is one of a series of constitutional
provisions having a common purpose; namely, securing to a race re-
cently emancipated, a race that through many generations had
been held in slavery, all the civil rights that the superior race
enjoy. The true spirit and meaning of the amendments . . . cannot
be understood without keeping in view the history of the times
when they were adopted, and the general objects they plainly
sought to accomplish. At the time when they were incorporated
into the Constitution, it required little knowledge of human nature
to anticipate that those who had long been regarded as an inferior
and subject race would, when suddenly raised to the rank of citi-
306 Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
307 Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966). But see Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S.
40 (1974) (imposition of reimbursement obligation for state-provided defense assist-
ance upon convicted defendants but not upon those acquitted or whose convictions
are reversed is objectively rational).
308 James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972).
309 Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971).
310 Infra, pp. 1916–25.
zenship, be looked upon with jealousy and positive dislike, and that
State laws might be enacted or enforced to perpetuate the distinc-
tions that had before existed. . . . [The Fourteenth Amendment]
was designed to assure to the colored race the enjoyment of all the
civil rights that under the law are enjoyed by white persons, and
to give to that race the protection of the general government in
that enjoyment, whenever it should be denied by the States. It not
only gave citizenship and the privileges of citizenship to persons of
color, but it denied to any State the power to withhold from them
the equal protection of the laws, and authorized Congress to en-
force its provision by appropriate legislation.’’ 1 Thus, a state law
which on its face worked a discrimination against African Ameri-
cans was void. 2 In addition, ‘‘[t]hough the law itself be fair on its
face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and adminis-
tered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand,
so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations be-
tween persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights,
the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Con-
stitution.’’ 3
Education
Development and Application of ‘‘Separate But Equal’’.—
Cases decided soon after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment
may be read as precluding any state-imposed distinction based on
race, 4 but the Court in Plessy v. Ferguson 5 adopted a principle
first propounded in litigation attacking racial segregation in the
schools of Boston, Massachusetts. 6 Plessy concerned not schools but
a state law requiring the furnishing of ‘‘equal but separate’’ facili-
ties for rail transportation and requiring the separation of ‘‘white
1 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306–07 (1880).
2 Id. (law providing for jury service specified white males). Moreover it will not
do to argue that a law that segregates the races or prohibits contacts between them
discriminates equally against both races. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917)
(ordinance prohibiting blacks from occupying houses in blocks where whites were
predominant and whites from occupying houses in blocks where blacks were pre-
dominant). Compare Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883) (sustaining conviction
under statute that imposed a greater penalty for adultery or fornication between a
white person and an African American than was imposed for similar conduct by
members of the same race, using ‘‘equal application’’ theory), with McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 188 (1964), and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967) (re-
jecting theory).
3 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886) (discrimination against Chi-
nese).
4 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 67–72 (1873); Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307–08 (1880); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880);
Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 344–45 (1880).
5 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
6 Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. 198, 206 (1849).
and colored’’ passengers. ‘‘The object of the [Fourteenth]

[A]mendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of
the two races before the law, but in the nature of things it could
not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or
to enforce social, as distinguished from political, equality, or a com-
mingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.
Laws permitting, and even requiring their separation in places
where they are liable to be brought into contact do not necessarily
imply the inferiority of either race to the other, and have been gen-
erally, if not universally, recognized as within the competency of
the state legislatures in exercise of their police power.’’ 7 The Court
observed that a common instance of this type of law was the sepa-
ration by race of children in school, which had been upheld, it was
noted, ‘‘even by courts of states where the political rights of the col-
ored race have been longest and most earnestly enforced.’’ 8
Subsequent cases following Plessy that actually concerned
school segregation did not expressly question the doctrine and the
Court’s decisions assumed its validity. It held, for example, that a
Chinese student was not denied equal protection by being classified
with African Americans and sent to school with them rather than
with whites, 9 and it upheld the refusal of an injunction to require
a school board to close a white high school until it opened a high
school for African Americans. 10 And no violation of the equal pro-
tection clause was found when a state law prohibited a private col-
lege from teaching whites and African Americans together. 11
In 1938, the Court began to move away from ‘‘separate but
equal.’’ It then held that a State which operated a law school open
to whites only and which did not operate any law school open to
African Americans violated an applicant’s right to equal protection,
even though the State offered to pay his tuition at an out-of-state
law school. The requirement of the clause was for equal facilities
7 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 543–44 (1896). ‘‘We consider the underlying
fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced sep-
aration of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this
be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored
race chooses to put that construction upon it.’’ Id. at 552, 559.
8 Id. at 544–45. The act of Congress in providing for separate schools in the Dis-
trict of Columbia was specifically noted. Justice Harlan’s well-known dissent con-
tended that the purpose and effect of the law in question was discriminatory and
stamped African Americans with a badge of inferiority. ‘‘[I]n view of the Constitu-
tion, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling
class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.’’ Id. at 552, 559.
9 Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
10 Cummings v. Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
11 Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
within the State. 12 When Texas established a law school for Afri-
can Americans after the plaintiff had applied and been denied ad-
mission to the school maintained for whites, the Court held the ac-
tion to be inadequate, finding that the nature of law schools and
the associations possible in the white school necessarily meant that
the separate school was unequal. 13 Equally objectionable was the
fact that when Oklahoma admitted an African American law stu-
dent to its only law school it required him to remain physically sep-
arate from the other students. 14
Brown v. Board of Education.—‘‘Separate but equal’’ was
formally abandoned in Brown v. Board of Education, 15 involving
challenges to segregation per se in the schools of four States in
which the lower courts had found that the schools provided were
equalized or were in the process of being equalized. Though the
Court had asked for argument on the intent of the framers, exten-
sive research had proved inconclusive, and the Court asserted that
it could not ‘‘turn the clock back to 1867. . . or even to 1896,’’ but
must rather consider the issue in the context of the vital impor-
tance of education in 1954. The Court reasoned that denial of op-
portunity for an adequate education would often be a denial of the
opportunity to succeed in life, that separation of the races in the
schools solely on the basis of race must necessarily generate feel-
ings of inferiority in the disfavored race adversely affecting edu-
cation as well as other matters, and therefore that the equal pro-
tection clause was violated by such separation. ‘‘We conclude that
in the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’
has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently un-
equal.’’ 16
After hearing argument on what remedial order should issue,
the Court remanded the cases to the lower courts to adjust the ef-
fectuation of its mandate to the particularities of each school dis-
trict. ‘‘At stake is the personal interest of the plaintiffs in admis-
sion to public schools as soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory
basis.’’ The lower courts were directed to ‘‘require that the defend-
ants make a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance,’’
although ‘‘[o]nce such a start has been made,’’ some additional time
would be needed because of problems arising in the course of com-
12 Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). See also Sipuel v.
Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948).

13 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
14 McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
15 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Segregation in the schools of the District of Columbia
was held to violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment in Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
16 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 489–90, 492–95 (1954).
pliance and the lower courts were to allow it if on inquiry delay

were found to be ‘‘in the public interest and [to be] consistent with
good faith compliance . . . to effectuate a transition to a racially
nondiscriminatory school system.’’ But in any event the lower
courts were to require compliance ‘‘with all deliberate speed.’’ 17
Brown’s Aftermath.—For the next several years, the Court
declined to interfere with the administration of its mandate, ruling
only in those years on the efforts of Arkansas to block desegrega-
tion of schools in Little Rock. 18 In the main, these years were
taken up with enactment and administration of ‘‘pupil placement
laws’’ by which officials assigned each student individually to a
school on the basis of formally nondiscriminatory criteria, and
which required the exhaustion of state administrative remedies be-
fore each pupil seeking reassignment could bring individual litiga-
tion. 19 The lower courts eventually began voiding these laws for
discriminatory application, permitting class actions, 20 and the Su-
preme Court voided the exhaustion of state remedies require-
ment. 21 In the early 1960’s, various state practices—school clos-
ings, 22 minority transfer plans, 23 zoning, 24 and the like—were
ruled impermissible, and the Court indicated that the time was
running out for full implementation of the Brown mandate. 25
17 Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 300–01 (1955).
18 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
19 E.g., Covington v. Edwards, 264 F.2d 780 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 840
(1959); Holt v. Raleigh City Bd. of Educ., 265 F.2d 95 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 818 (1959); Dove v. Parham, 271 F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1959).
20 E.g., McCoy v. Greensboro City Bd. of Educ., 283 F.2d 667 (4th Cir. 1960);
Green v. School Board of Roanoke, 304 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1962); Gibson v. Board
of Pub. Instruction of Dade County, 272 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1959); Northcross v.
Board of Educ. of Memphis, 302 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 944
(1962).
21 McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
22 Griffin v. Board of Supervisors of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964)
(holding that ‘‘under the circumstances’’ the closing by a county of its schools while
all the other schools in the State were open denied equal protection, the cir-
cumstances apparently being the state permission and authority for the closing and
the existence of state and county tuition grant/tax credit programs making an offi-
cial connection with the ‘‘private’’ schools operating in the county and holding that
a federal court is empowered to direct the appropriate officials to raise and expend
money to operate schools). On school closing legislation in another State, see Bush
v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 187 F. Supp. 42, 188 F. Supp. 916 (E.D. La. 1960),
aff’d, 365 U.S. 569 (1961); Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649
(E.D. La. 1961), aff’d, 368 U.S. 515 (1962).
23 Goss v. Board of Educ. of City of Knoxville, 373 U.S. 683 (1963). Such plans
permitted as of right a student assigned to a school in which students of his race

were a minority to transfer to a school where the student majority was of his race.
24 Northcross v. Board of Educ. of Memphis, 333 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1964).
25 The first comment appeared in dictum in a nonschool case, Watson v. City
of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 530 (1963), and was implied in Goss v. Board of Educ.
of City of Knoxville, 373 U.S. 683, 689 (1963). In Bradley v. School Bd. of City of
Richmond, 382 U.S. 103, 105 (1965), the Court announced that ‘‘[d]elays in deseg-
About this time, ‘‘freedom of choice’’ plans were promulgated

under which each child in the school district could choose each year
which school he wished to attend, and, subject to space limitations,
he could attend that school. These were first approved by the lower
courts as acceptable means to implement desegregation, subject to
the reservation that they be fairly administered. 26 Enactment of
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and HEW enforcement in
a manner as to require effective implementation of affirmative ac-
tions to desegregate 27 led to a change of attitude in the lower
courts and the Supreme Court. In Green v. School Board of New
Kent County, 28 the Court posited the principle that the only deseg-
regation plan permissible is one which actually results in the aboli-
tion of the dual school, and charged school officials with an affirma-
tive obligation to achieve it. School boards must present to the dis-
trict courts ‘‘a plan that promises realistically to work and promises
realistically to work now,’’ in such a manner as ‘‘to convert prompt-
ly to a system without a ‘white’ school and a ‘Negro’ school, but just
schools.’’ 29 Furthermore, as the Court and lower courts had by
then made clear, school desegregation encompassed not only the
abolition of dual attendance systems for students, but also the
regating school systems are no longer tolerable.’’ A grade-a-year plan was implicitly
disapproved in Calhoun v. Latimer, 377 U.S. 263 (1964), vacating and remanding
321 F.2d 302 (5th Cir. 1963). See Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School
Dist., 355 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1966).
26 E.g., Bradley v. School Bd. of City of Richmond, 345 F.2d 310 (4th Cir.), rev’d
on other grounds, 382 U.S. 103 (1965); Bowman v. School Bd. of Charles City Coun-
ty, 382 F.2d 326 (4th Cir. 1967).
27 Pub. L. 88–352, 78 Stat. 252, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. (prohibiting discrimi-
nation in federally assisted programs). HEW guidelines were designed to afford

guidance to state-local officials in interpretations of the law and were accepted as
authoritative by the courts and utilized. Davis v. Board of School Comm’rs of Mobile
County, 364 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1966); Kemp v. Beasley, 352 F.2d 14 (8th Cir. 1965).
28 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Raney v. Board of Educ. of Gould School Dist., 391 U.S.
443 (1968). These cases had been preceded by a circuit-wide promulgation of similar
standards in United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir.
1966), modified & aff’d. en banc, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840
(1967).
29 Green, 391 U.S. at 439, 442 (1968). ‘‘Brown II was a call for the dismantling
of well-entrenched dual systems tempered by an awareness that complex and

multifaceted problems would arise which would require time and flexibility for a
successful resolution. School boards such as the respondent then operating state-
compelled dual systems were nevertheless clearly charged with the affirmative duty
to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which
racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch.’’ Id. at 437–38. The case
laid to rest the dictum of Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955),
that the Constitution ‘‘does not require integration’’ but ‘‘merely forbids discrimina-
tion.’’ Green and Raney v. Board of Educ. of Gould School Dist., 391 U.S. 443 (1968),
found ‘‘freedom of choice’’ plans inadequate, and Monroe v. Board of Comm’rs of City
of Jackson, 391 U.S. 450 (1968), found a ‘‘free transfer’’ plan inadequate.
merging into one system of faculty, 30 staff, and services, so that no

school could be marked as either a ‘‘black’’ or a ‘‘white’’ school. 31
Implementation of School Desegregation.—In the after-
math of Green, the various Courts of Appeals held inadequate an
increasing number of school board plans based on ‘‘freedom of
choice,’’ on zoning which followed traditional residential patterns,
or on some combination of the two. 32 The Supreme Court’s next op-
portunity to speak on the subject came when HEW sought to with-
draw desegregation plans it had submitted at court request and
asked for a postponement of a court-imposed deadline, which was
reluctantly granted by the Fifth Circuit. The Court unanimously
reversed and announced that ‘‘continued operation of segregated
schools under a standard of allowing ‘all deliberate speed’ for de-
segregation is no longer constitutionally permissible. Under explicit
holdings of this Court the obligation of every school district is to
terminate dual school systems at once and to operate now and
hereafter only unitary schools.’’ 33
In the October 1970 Term the Court in Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education 34 undertook to elaborate the re-
quirements for achieving a unitary school system and delineating
the methods which could or must be used to achieve it, and at the
same time struck down state inhibitions on the process. 35 The
opinion in Swann emphasized that the goal since Brown was the
dismantling of an officially-imposed dual school system. ‘‘Independ-
ent of student assignment, where it is possible to identify a ‘white
school’ or a ‘Negro school’ simply by reference to the racial composi-
tion of teachers and staff, the quality of school buildings and equip-
ment, or the organization of sports activities, a prima facie case of
30 Bradley v. School Bd. of City of Richmond, 382 U.S. 103 (1965) (faculty deseg-
regation is integral part of any pupil desegregation plan); United States v. Mont-
gomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225 (1969) (upholding district court order re-
quiring assignment of faculty and staff on a ratio based on racial population of dis-
trict).
31 United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966),
mod. & aff’d en banc, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
32 Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Bd., 417 F.2d 801 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 904 (1969); Henry v. Clarksdale Mun. Separate School Dist., 409 F.2d 682
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 940 (1969); Brewer v. School Bd. of City of Norfolk,
397 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1968); Clark v. Board of Educ. of City of Little Rock, 426 F.2d
1035 (8th Cir. 1970).
33 Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969). The Court
summarily reiterated its point several times in the Term. Carter v. West Fana Par-
ish School Board, 396 U.S. 290 (1970); Northcross v. Board of Educ. of Memphis,
397 U.S. 232 (1970); Dowell v. Bd. of Educ. of Oklahoma City, 396 U.S. 269 (1969).
34 402 U.S. 1 (1971); see also Davis v. Board of School Comm’rs of Mobile Coun-
ty, 402 U.S. 33 (1971).

35 McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971); North Carolina State Bd. of Educ.
v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971).

violation of substantive constitutional rights under the Equal Pro-

tection Clause is shown.’’ 36 While ‘‘the existence of some small
number of one-race, or virtually one-race, schools within a district
is not in and of itself the mark of a system that still practices seg-
regation by law,’’ any such situation must be closely scrutinized by
the lower courts, and school officials have a heavy burden to prove
that the situation is not the result of state-fostered segregation.
Any desegregation plan which contemplates such a situation must
before a court accepts it be shown not to be affected by present or
past discriminatory action on the part of state and local officials. 37
When a federal court has to develop a remedial desegregation plan,
it must start with an appreciation of the mathematics of the racial
composition of the school district population; its plan may rely to
some extent on mathematical ratios but it should exercise care that
this use is only a starting point. 38
Because current attendance patterns may be attributable to
past discriminatory actions in site selection and location of school
buildings, the Court in Swann determined that it is permissible,
and may be required, to resort to altering of attendance boundaries
and grouping or pairing schools in noncontiguous fashion in order
to promote desegregation and undo past official action; in this re-
medial process, conscious assignment of students and drawing of
boundaries on the basis of race is permissible. 39 Transportation of
students—busing—is a permissible tool of educational and desegre-
gation policy, inasmuch as a neighborhood attendance policy may
be inadequate due to past discrimination. The soundness of any
busing plan must be weighed on the basis of many factors, includ-
ing the age of the students; when the time or distance of travel is
so great as to risk the health of children or significantly impinge
on the educational process, the weight shifts. 40 Finally, the Court
indicated, once a unitary system has been established, no affirma-
tive obligation rests on school boards to adjust attendance year by
year to reflect changes in composition of neighborhoods so long as
the change is solely attributable to private action. 41
36 402 U.S. at 18.
37 Id. at 25–27.
38 Id. at 22–25.
39 Id. at 27–29.
40 Id. at 29–31.
41 Id. at 31–32. In Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976),
the Court held that after a school board has complied with a judicially-imposed de-
segregation plan in student assignments and thus undone the existing segregation,
it is beyond the district court’s power to order it subsequently to implement a new
plan to undo the segregative effects of shifting residential patterns. The Court
agreed with the dissenters, Justices Marshall and Brennan, id., 436, 441, that the
school board had not complied in other respects, such as in staff hiring and pro-
Northern Schools: Inter- and Intradistrict Desegrega-

tion.—The appearance in the Court of school cases from large met-
ropolitan areas in which the separation of the races was not man-
dated by law but allegedly by official connivance through zoning of
school boundaries, pupil and teacher assignment policies, and site
selections, required the development of standards for determining
when segregation was de jure and what remedies should be im-
posed when such official separation was found. 42
Accepting the findings of lower courts that the actions of local
school officials and the state school board were responsible in part
for the racial segregation existing within the school system of the
City of Detroit, the Court in Milliken v. Bradley 43 set aside a de-
segregation order which required the formulation of a plan for a
metropolitan area including the City and 53 adjacent suburban
school districts. The basic holding of the Court was that such a
remedy could be implemented only to cure an inter-district con-
stitutional violation, a finding that the actions of state officials and
of the suburban school districts were responsible, at least in part,
for the interdistrict segregation, through either discriminatory ac-
tions within those jurisdictions or constitutional violations within
one district that had produced a significant segregative effect in an-
other district. 44 The permissible scope of an inter-district order,
however, would have to be considered in light of the Court’s lan-
guage regarding the value placed upon local educational units. ‘‘No
single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local
control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been
thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern
and support for public schools and to quality of the educational
process.’’ 45 Too, the complexity of formulating and overseeing the
implementation of a plan that would effect a de facto consolidation
of multiple school districts, the Court indicated, would impose a
task which few, if any, judges are qualified to perform and one
motion, but it thought that was irrelevant to the issue of neutral student assign-
ments.
42 The presence or absence of a statute mandating separation provides no talis-
man indicating the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation. Columbus
Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 457 n.5 (1979). As early as Ex parte Virginia,
100 U.S. 339, 347 (1880), it was said that ‘‘no agency of the State, or of the officers
or agents by whom its powers are exerted, shall deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws. Whoever, by virtue of public position under
a State government, . . . denies or takes away the equal protection of the laws . . .
violates the constitutional inhibition: and as he acts in the name and for the State,
and is clothed with the State’s power, his act is that of the State.’’ The significance
of a statute is that it simplifies in the extreme a complainant’s proof.
43 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
44 Id. at 745.
45 Id. at 741–42.
which would deprive the people of control of their schools through

elected representatives. 46 ‘‘The constitutional right of the Negro re-
spondents residing in Detroit is to attend a unitary school system
in that district.’’ 47
‘‘The controlling principle consistently expounded in our hold-
ings,’’ said the Court in the Detroit case, ‘‘is that the scope of the
remedy is determined by the nature and extent of the constitu-
tional violation.’’ 48 While this axiom caused little problem when
the violation consisted of statutorily mandated separation, 49 it has
required a considerable expenditure of judicial effort and parsing of
opinions to work out in the context of systems in which the official
practice was nondiscriminatory but official action operated to the
contrary. At first, the difficulty was obscured through the creation
of presumptions that eased the burden of proof on plaintiffs, but
later the Court had appeared to stiffen the requirements on plain-
tiffs.
Determination of the existence of a constitutional violation and
the formulation of remedies, within one district, first was presented
to the Court in a northern setting in Keyes v. Denver School Dis-
trict. 50 The lower courts had found the school segregation existing
within one part of the City to be attributable to official action, but
as to the central city they found the separation not to be the result
46 Id. at 742–43. This theme has been sounded in a number of cases in suits
seeking remedial actions in particularly intractable areas. Mayor of Philadelphia v.

Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 615 (1974); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414
U.S. 488, 500–02 (1974). In Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 293 (1976), the Court
wrote that it had rejected the metropolitan order because of ‘‘fundamental limita-
tions on the remedial powers of the federal courts to restructure the operation of
local and state governmental entities. . . .’’ In other places, the Court stressed the
absence of interdistrict violations, id., 294, and in still others paired the two rea-
sons. Id. at 296.
47 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974). The four dissenters argued both
that state involvement was so pervasive that an inter-district order was permissible
and that such an order was mandated because it was the State’s obligation to estab-
lish a unitary system, an obligation which could not be met without an inter-district
order. Id. at 757, 762, 781.
48 Id. at 744. See Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 294 n.11 (1976) (‘‘[T]he
Court’s decision in Milliken was premised on a controlling principle governing the

permissible scope of federal judicial power.’’); Austin Indep. School Dist. v. United
States, 429 U.S. 990, 991 (1976) (Justice Powell concurring) (‘‘a core principle of de-
segregation cases’’ is that set out in Milliken).
49 When an entire school system has been separated into white and black
schools by law, disestablishment of the system and integration of the entire system
is required. ‘‘Having once found a violation, the district judge or school authorities
should make every effort to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegrega-
tion, taking into account the practicalities of the situation. . . . The measure of any
desegregation plan is its effectiveness.’’ Davis v. Board of School Comm’rs, 402 U.S.
33, 37 (1971). See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25
(1971).
50 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
of official action and refused to impose a remedy for those schools.

The Supreme Court found this latter holding to be error, holding
that when it is proved that a significant portion of a system is offi-
cially segregated, the presumption arises that segregation in the
remainder or other portions of the system is also similarly con-
trived. The burden the shifts to the school board or other officials
to rebut the presumption by proving, for example, that geographi-
cal structure or natural boundaries have caused the dividing of a
district into separate identifiable and unrelated units. Thus, a find-
ing that one significant portion of a school system is officially seg-
regated may well be the predicate for finding that the entire sys-
tem is a dual one, necessitating the imposition upon the school au-
thorities of the affirmative obligation to create a unitary system
throughout. 51
Keyes then was consistent with earlier cases requiring a show-
ing of official complicity in segregation and limiting the remedy to
the violation found; by creating presumptions Keyes simply afforded
plaintiffs a way to surmount the barriers imposed by strict applica-
tion of the requirements. Following the enunciation in the Detroit
inter-district case, however, of the ‘‘controlling principle’’ of school
desegregation cases, the Court appeared to move away from the
Keyes approach. 52 First, the Court held that federal equity power
was lacking to impose orders to correct demographic shifts ‘‘not at-
tributed to any segregative actions on the part of the defend-
ants.’’ 53 A district court that had ordered implementation of a stu-
dent assignment plan that resulted in a racially neutral system ex-
ceeded its authority, the Court held, by ordering annual readjust-
ments to offset the demographic changes. 54
Second, in the first Dayton case the lower courts had found
three constitutional violations that had resulted in some pupil seg-
51 Id. at 207–211. Justice Rehnquist argued that imposition of a district-wide
segregation order should not proceed from a finding of segregative intent and effect
in only one portion, that in effect the Court was imposing an affirmative obligation
to integrate without first finding a constitutional violation. Id. at 254 (dissenting).
Justice Powell cautioned district courts against imposing disruptive desegregation
plans, especially substantial busing in large metropolitan areas, and stressed the re-
sponsibility to proceed with reason, flexibility, and balance. Id. at 217, 236 (concur-
ring and dissenting). See his opinion in Austin Indep. School Dist. v. United States,
429 U.S. 990, 991 (1976) (concurring).
52 Of significance was the disallowance of the disproportionate impact analysis
in constitutional interpretation and the adoption of an apparently strengthened in-

tent requirement. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp ., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Massachusetts
Personnel Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). This principle applies in the school
area. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 419 (1977).
53 Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
54 Id. at 436.
regation, and, based on these three, viewed as ‘‘cumulative viola-

tions,’’ a district-wide transportation plan had been imposed. Re-
versing, the Supreme Court reiterated that the remedial powers of
the federal courts are called forth by violations and are limited by
the scope of those violations. ‘‘Once a constitutional violation is
found, a federal court is required to tailor ‘the scope of the remedy’
to fit ‘the nature and extent of the constitutional violation.’ ’’ 55 The
goal is to restore the plaintiffs to the position they would have oc-
cupied had they not been subject to unconstitutional action. Lower
courts ‘‘must determine how much incremental segregative effect
these violations had on the racial distribution of the Dayton school
population as presently constituted, when that distribution is com-
pared to what it would have been in the absence of such constitu-
tional violations. The remedy must be designed to redress that dif-
ference, and only if there has been a systemwide impact may there
be a systemwide remedy.’’ 56 The Court then sent the case back to
the district court for the taking of evidence, the finding of the na-
ture of the violations, and the development of an appropriate rem-
edy.
Surprisingly, however, Keyes was reaffirmed and broadly ap-
plied in subsequent appeals of the Dayton case after remand and
in an appeal from Columbus, Ohio. 57 Following the Supreme Court
standards, the Dayton district court held that the plaintiffs had
failed to prove official segregative intent, but was reversed by the
appeals court. The Columbus district court had found and had been
affirmed in finding racially discriminatory conduct and had ordered
extensive busing. The Supreme Court held that the evidence ad-
duced in both district courts showed that the school boards had
carried out segregating actions affecting a substantial portion of
each school system prior to and contemporaneously with the 1954
decision in Brown v. Board of Education. The Keyes presumption
therefore required the school boards to show that systemwide dis-
crimination had not existed, and they failed to do so. Because each
system was a dual one in 1954, it was subject to an ‘‘affirmative
duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a uni-
tary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated
55 Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 420 (1977) (quoting Hills v.
Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 294 (1976)).

56 Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 420 (1977). The Court did
not discuss the presumptions that had been permitted by Keyes. Justice Brennan,
the author of Keyes, concurred on the basis that the violations found did not justify
the remedy imposed, asserting that the methods of proof utilized in Keyes were still
valid. Id. at 421.
57 Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ.
v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979).

root and branch.’’ 58 Following 1954, segregated schools continued

to exist and the school boards had in fact taken actions which had
the effect of increasing segregation. In the context of the on-going
affirmative duty to desegregate, the foreseeable impact of the ac-
tions of the boards could be utilized to infer segregative intent,
thus satisfying the Davis-Arlington Heights standards. 59 The Court
further affirmed the district-wide remedies, holding that its earlier
Dayton ruling had been premised upon the evidence of only a few
isolated discriminatory practices; here, because systemwide impact
had been found, systemwide remedies were appropriate. 60
Reaffirmation of the breadth of federal judicial remedial pow-
ers came when, in a second appeal of the Detroit case, the Court
unanimously upheld the order of a district court mandating com-
pensatory or remedial educational programs for school children
who had been subjected to past acts of de jure segregation. So long
as the remedy is related to the condition found to violate the Con-
stitution, so long as it is remedial, and so long as it takes into ac-
count the interests of state and local authorities in managing their
own affairs, federal courts have broad and flexible powers to rem-
edy past wrongs. 61
The broad scope of federal courts’ remedial powers was more
recently reaffirmed in Missouri v. Jenkins. 62 There the Court ruled
that a federal district court has the power to order local authorities
to impose a tax increase in order to pay to remedy a constitutional
violation, and if necessary may enjoin operation of state laws pro-
hibiting such tax increases. However, the Court also held, the dis-
trict court had abused its discretion by itself imposing an increase
in property taxes without first affording local officials ‘‘the oppor-
tunity to devise their own solutions.’’ 63
58 Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 459 (1979) (quoting Green v.
School Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 437–38 (1968)). Contrast the Court’s
more recent decision in Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986) (per curiam), hold-
ing that adoption of ‘‘a wholly neutral admissions policy’’ for voluntary membership
in state-sponsored 4-H Clubs was sufficient even though single race clubs continued
to exist under that policy. There is no constitutional requirement that states in all
circumstances pursue affirmative remedies to overcome past discrimination, the
Court concluded; the voluntary nature of the clubs, unrestricted by state definition
of attendance zones or other decisions affecting membership, presented a ‘‘wholly
different milieu’’ from public schools. Id. at 408 (concurring opinion of Justice White,
endorsed by the Court’s per curiam opinion).
59 Id. at 461–65.
60 Id. at 465–67.
61 Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977). The Court also affirmed that part
of the order directing the State of Michigan to pay one-half the costs of the man-
dated programs. Id. at 288–91.
62 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
63 Id. at 52. Similarly, the Court held in Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265
(1990), that a district court had abused its discretion in imposing contempt sanc-
Efforts to Curb Busing and Other Desegregation Rem-

edies.—Especially during the 1970s, courts and Congress grappled
with the appropriateness of various remedies for de jure racial sep-
aration in the public schools, both North and South. Busing of
school children created the greatest amount of controversy. Swann,
of course, sanctioned an order requiring fairly extensive busing, as
did the more recent Dayton and Columbus cases, but the earlier
case cautioned as well that courts must observe limits occasioned
by the nature of the educational process and the well-being of chil-
dren, 64 and subsequent cases declared the principle that the rem-
edy must be no more extensive than the violation found. 65 Con-
gress has enacted several provisions of law, either permanent stat-
utes or annual appropriations limits, that purport to restrict the
power of federal courts and administrative agencies to order or to
require busing, but these, either because of drafting infelicities or
because of modifications required to obtain passage, have been
largely ineffectual. 66 Stronger proposals, for statutes or for con-
stitutional amendments, were introduced in Congress, but none
passed both Houses. 67
Of considerable importance to the possible validity of any sub-
stantial congressional restriction on judicial provision of remedies
for de jure segregation violations are two decisions contrastingly
dealing with referenda-approved restrictions on busing and other
tions directly on members of a city council for refusing to vote to implement a con-
sent decree designed to remedy housing discrimination. Instead, the court should
have proceeded first against the city alone, and should have proceeded against indi-
vidual council members only if the sanctions against the city failed to produce com-
pliance.
64 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 30–31
(1971).
65 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744 (1974).
66 E.g., § 407(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 248, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c–
6, construed to cover only de facto segregation in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg

Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1971); § 803 of the Education Amendments of 1972,
86 Stat. 372, 20 U.S.C. § 1653 (expired), interpreted in Drummond v. Acree, 409
U.S. 1228 (1972) (Justice Powell in Chambers), and the Equal Educational Opportu-
nities and Transportation of Students Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 514 (1974), 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1701–1757, see especially § 1714, interpreted in Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d
401, 411–15 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 995 (1976), and United States v. Texas
Education Agency, 532 F.2d 380, 394 n.18 (5th Cir.), vacated on other grounds sub
nom. Austin Indep. School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976); and a series
of annual appropriations riders, first passed as riders to the 1976 and 1977 Labor-
HEW bills, § 108, 90 Stat. 1434 (1976), and § 101, 91 Stat. 1460, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d,
upheld against facial attack in Brown v. Califano, 627 F.2d 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
67 See, e.g., The 14th Amendment and School Busing, Hearings before the Senate
Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, 97th Congress, 1st Sess. (1981); and
School Desegregation, Hearings before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil
and Constitutional Rights, 97th Congress, 1st Sess. (1981).
remedies in Washington State and California. 68 Voters in Wash-

ington, following a decision by the school board in Seattle to under-
take a mandatory busing program, approved an initiative that pro-
hibited school boards from assigning students to any but the near-
est or next nearest school that offered the students’ course of study;
there were so many exceptions, however, that the prohibition in ef-
fect applied only to busing for racial purposes. In California the
state courts had interpreted the state constitution to require school
systems to eliminate both de jure and de facto segregation. The vot-
ers approved an initiative that prohibited state courts from order-
ing busing unless the segregation was in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment, and a federal judge would be empowered to
order it under United States Supreme Court precedents.
By a narrow division, the Court held unconstitutional the
Washington measure, and with near unanimity of result if not of
reasoning it sustained the California measure. The constitutional
flaw in the Washington measure, the Court held, was that it had
chosen a racial classification—busing for desegregation—and im-
posed more severe burdens upon those seeking to obtain such a pol-
icy than it imposed with respect to any other policy. Local school
boards could make education policy on anything but busing. By sin-
gling out busing and making it more difficult than anything else,
the voters had expressly and knowingly enacted a law that had an
intentional impact on a minority. 69 The Court discerned no such
impediment in the California measure, a simple repeal of a remedy
that had been within the government’s discretion to provide. More-
over, the State continued under an obligation to alleviate de facto
segregation by every other feasible means. The initiative had mere-
ly foreclosed one particular remedy—court-ordered mandatory bus-
ing—as inappropriate. 70
Termination of Court Supervision.—With most school de-
segregation decrees having been entered decades ago, the issue has
arisen as to what showing of compliance is necessary for a school
district to free itself of continuing court supervision. The Court
grappled with the issue, first in a case involving Oklahoma City
68 Washington v. Seattle School Dist., 458 U.S. 457 (1982); Crawford v. Los An-
geles Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982). The decisions were in essence an application
of Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
69 Washington v. Seattle School Dist., 458 U.S. 457, 470–82 (1982). Justice
Blackmun wrote the opinion of the Court and was joined by Justices Brennan,
White, Marshall, and Stevens. Dissenting were Justices Powell, Rehnquist, O’Con-
nor, and Chief Justice Burger. Id. at 488. The dissent essentially argued that be-
cause the State was ultimately entirely responsible for all educational decisions, its
choice to take back part of the power it had delegated did not raise the issues the
majority thought it did.
70 Crawford v. Los Angeles Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 535–40 (1982).
public schools, then in a case involving the University of Mis-

sissippi college system. A desegregation decree may be lifted, the
Court said in Oklahoma City Board of Education v. Dowell, 71 upon
a showing that the purposes of the litigation have been ‘‘fully
achieved,’’—i.e., that the school district is being operated ‘‘in com-
pliance with the commands of the Equal Protection Clause,’’ that
it has been so operated ‘‘for a reasonable period of time,’’ and that
it is ‘‘unlikely’’ that the school board would return to its former vio-
lations. On remand, the trial court was directed to determine
‘‘whether the Board had complied in good faith with the desegrega-
tion decree since it was entered, and whether the vestiges of past
[de jure] discrimination had been eliminated to the extent prac-
ticable.’’ 72 In United States v. Fordice, 73 the Court determined that
the State of Mississippi had not, by adopting and implementing
race-neutral policies, eliminated all vestiges of its prior de jure, ra-
cially segregated, ‘‘dual’’ system of higher education. The State
must also, to the extent practicable and consistent with sound edu-
cational practices, eradicate policies and practices that are trace-
able to the dual system and that continue to have segregative ef-
fects. The Court identified several surviving aspects of Mississippi’s
prior dual system which are constitutionally suspect, and which
must be justified or eliminated. The State’s admissions policy, re-
quiring higher test scores for admission to the five historically
white institutions than for admission to the three historically black
institutions, is suspect because it originated as a means of preserv-
ing segregation. Also suspect are the widespread duplication of pro-
grams, a possible remnant of the dual ‘‘separate-but-equal’’ system;
institutional mission classifications making three historically white
schools the flagship ‘‘comprehensive’’ universities; and the retention
and operation of all eight schools rather than the possible merger
of some.
Juries
It has been established since Strauder v. West Virginia 74 that
exclusion of an identifiable racial or ethnic group from a grand
71 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
72 Id.at 249–50.
73 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992).
74 100 U.S. 303 (1880). Cf. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880). Discrimination
on the basis of race, color, or previous condition of servitude in jury selection has
also been statutorily illegal since enactment of § 4 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875,
18 Stat. 335, 18 U.S.C. § 243. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880). In Hernan-
dez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954), the Court found jury discrimination against Mexi-
can-Americans to be a denial of equal protection, a ruling it reiterated in Castaneda
v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977), finding proof of discrimination by statistical dispari-
jury 75 which indicts a defendant or a petit jury 76 which tries him,

or from both, 77 denies a defendant of the excluded race equal pro-
tection and necessitates reversal of his conviction or dismissal of
his indictment. 78 Even if the defendant’s race differs from that of
the excluded jurors, the Court has recently held, the defendant has
third party standing to assert the rights of jurors excluded on the
basis of race. 79 ‘‘Defendants in criminal proceedings do not have
the only cognizable legal interest in nondiscriminatory jury selec-
tion. People excluded from juries because of their race are as much
aggrieved as those indicted and tried by juries chosen under a sys-
tem of racial exclusion.’’ 80 Thus, persons may bring actions seeking
affirmative relief to outlaw discrimination in jury selection, instead
of depending on defendants to raise the issue. 81
A prima facie case of deliberate and systematic exclusion is
made when it is shown that no African Americans have served on
juries for a period of years 82 or when it is shown that the number
of African Americans who served was grossly disproportionate to
the percentage of African Americans in the population and eligible
ties, even though Mexican-surnamed individuals constituted a governing majority of

the county and a majority of the selecting officials were Mexican-American.
75 Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1883); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900);
Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226 (1904); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939);
Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Cassell v.
Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955); Eubanks v. Louisi-
ana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958); Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 (1964); Alexander
v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972).
76 Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295 U.S. 394 (1935); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559
(1953).
77 Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881); Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316 (1906);
Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613 (1938); Pat-
ton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947); Coleman v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 129 (1964);
Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967); Jones v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 24 (1967); Sims
v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538 (1967).
78 Even if there is no discrimination in the selection of the petit jury which con-
victed him, a defendant who shows discrimination in the selection of the grand jury
which indicted him is entitled to a reversal of his conviction. Cassell v. Texas, 339
U.S. 282 (1950); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972); Vasquez v. Hillery,
474 U.S. 254 (1986) (habeas corpus remedy).
79 Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1373 (1991). See also Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S.
493 (1972) (defendant entitled to have his conviction or indictment set aside if he
proves such exclusion). The Court in 1972 was substantially divided with respect to
the reason for rejecting the ‘‘same class’’ rule—that the defendant be of the excluded
class—but in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), involving a male defendant
and exclusion of women, the Court ascribed the result to the fair-cross-section re-
quirement of the Sixth Amendment, which would have application across-the—
board.
80 Carter v. Jury Comm’n of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320, 329 (1970).
81 Id.; Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970).
82 Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463
(1947); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942).

for jury service. 83 Once this prima facie showing has been made,
the burden is upon the jurisdiction to prove that discrimination
was not practiced; it is not adequate that jury selection officials tes-
tify under oath that they did not discriminate. 84 Although the
Court in connection with a showing of great disparities in the ra-
cial makeup of jurors called has voided certain practices which
made discrimination easy to accomplish, 85 it has not outlawed dis-
cretionary selection pursuant to general standards of educational
attainment and character which can be administered fairly. 86
Similarly, it declined to rule that African Americans must be in-
cluded on all-white jury commissions which administer the jury se-
lection laws in some States. 87
In Swain v. Alabama, 88 African Americans regularly appeared
on jury venires but no African American had actually served on a
jury. It appeared that the absence was attributable to the action
of the prosecutor in peremptorily challenging all potential African
American jurors, but the Court refused to set aside the conviction.
The use of peremptory challenges to exclude the African Americans
in the particular case was permissible, the Court held, regardless
of the prosecutor’s motive, although it was indicated the consistent
use of such challenges to remove African Americans would be un-
constitutional. Because the record did not disclose that the prosecu-
tion was responsible solely for the fact that no African American
had ever served on a jury and that some exclusions were not the
result of defense peremptory challenges, defendant’s claims were
rejected.
The Swain holding as to the evidentiary standard was over-
ruled in Batson v. Kentucky, the Court ruling that ‘‘a defendant
may establish a prima facie case of purposeful [racial] discrimina-
tion in selection of the petit jury solely on evidence concerning the
prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant’s
[own] trial.’’ To rebut this showing, the prosecutor ‘‘must articulate
83 Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282
(1950); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545
(1967); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972). For an elaborate discussion of
statistical proof, see Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
84 Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Eubanks v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545
(1967); Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404 (1967); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 360–
361 (1970).
85 Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953) (names of whites and African Ameri-
cans listed on differently colored paper for drawing for jury duty); Whitus v. Geor-
gia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967) (jurors selected from county tax books, in which names of
African Americans were marked with a ‘‘c’’).
86 Carter v. Jury Comm’n of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320, 331–37 (1970), and
cases cited.
87 Id. at 340–41.
88 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
a neutral explanation related to the particular case,’’ but the expla-

nation ‘‘need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge
for cause.’’ 89 The Court has also extended Batson to apply to ra-
cially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by private liti-
gants in civil litigation, 90 and by a defendant in a criminal case, 91
the principal issue in these cases being the presence of state action,
not the invalidity of purposeful racial discrimination.
Discrimination in the selection of grand jury foremen presents
a closer question, answer to which depends in part on the respon-
sibilities of a foreman in the particular system challenged. Thus
the Court had ‘‘assumed without deciding’’ that discrimination in
selection of foremen for state grand juries would violate equal pro-
tection in a system in which the judge selected a foreman to serve
as a thirteenth voting juror, and that foreman exercised significant
powers. 92 That situation was distinguished, however, in a due
process challenge to the federal system, where the foreman’s re-
sponsibilities are ‘‘essentially clerical’’ and where the selection is
from among the members of an already-chosen jury. 93
Capital Punishment
In McCleskey v. Kemp 94 the Court rejected an equal protection
claim of a black defendant who received a death sentence following
conviction for murder of a white victim, even though a statistical
study showed that blacks charged with murdering whites were
89 476 U.S. 79, 96, 98 (1986). The principles were applied in Trevino v. Texas,
112 S. Ct. 1547 (1991), holding that a criminal defendant’s allegation of a state’s
pattern of historical and habitual use of peremptory challenges to exclude members
of racial minorities was sufficient to raise an equal protection claim under Swain
as well as Batson. In Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991), a prosecutor
was held to have sustained his burden of providing a race-neutral explanation for
using peremptory challenges to strike bilingual Latino jurors; the prosecutor had ex-
plained that, based on the answers and demeanor of the prospective jurors, he had
doubted whether they would accept the interpreter’s official translation of trial testi-
mony by Spanish-speaking witnesses. The Batson ruling applies to cases pending on
direct review or not yet final when Batson was decided, Griffith v. Kentucky, 479
U.S. 314 (1987), but does not apply to a case on federal habeas corpus review, Allen
v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255 (1986).
90 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
91 Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
92 Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 551 n.4 (1979).
93 Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 339 (1984). Note also that in this limited
context where injury to the defendant was largely conjectural, the Court seemingly
revived the same class rule, holding that a white defendant challenging on due proc-
ess grounds exclusion of blacks as grand jury foremen could not rely on equal pro-
tection principles protecting blacks defendants from ‘‘the injuries of stigmatization
and prejudice’’ associated with discrimination. Id. at 347.
94 481 U.S. 279 (1987). The decision was 5–4, with Justice Powell’s opinion of
the Court being joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and by Justices White, O’Connor,
and Scalia, and with Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Stevens, and Marshall dissent-
ing.
more than four times as likely to receive a death sentence in the

state than were defendants charged with killing blacks. The Court
distinguished Batson v. Kentucky by characterizing capital sentenc-
ing as ‘‘fundamentally different’’ from jury venire selection; con-
sequently, reliance on statistical proof of discrimination is less
rather than more appropriate. 95 ‘‘Because discretion is essential to
the criminal justice process, we would demand exceptionally clear
proof before we would infer that the discretion has been abused.’’ 96
Also, the Court noted, there is not the same opportunity to rebut
a statistical inference of discrimination; jurors may not be required
to testify as to their motives, and for the most part prosecutors are
similarly immune from inquiry. 97
Housing
Buchanan v. Warley 98 invalidated an ordinance which prohib-
ited blacks from occupying houses in blocks where the greater
number of houses were occupied by whites and which prohibited
whites from doing so where the greater number of houses were oc-
cupied by blacks. Although racially restrictive covenants do not
themselves violate the equal protection clause, the judicial enforce-
ment of them, either by injunctive relief or through entertaining
damage actions, does violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 99 Ref-
erendum passage of a constitutional amendment repealing a ‘‘fair
housing’’ law and prohibiting further state or local action in that
direction was held unconstitutional in Reitman v. Mulkey, 100
though on somewhat ambiguous grounds, while a state constitu-
tional requirement that decisions of local authorities to build low-
rent housing projects in an area must first be submitted to referen-
dum, although other similar decisions were not so limited, was
95 481 U.S. at 294. Dissenting Justices Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens chal-
lenged this position as inconsistent with the Court’s usual approach to capital pun-
ishment, in which greater scrutiny is required. Id. at 340, 347–48, 366.
96 Id. at 297. Discretion is especially important to the role of a capital sentenc-
ing jury, which must be allowed to consider any mitigating factor relating to the
defendant’s background or character, or to the nature of the offense; the Court also
cited the ‘‘traditionally ‘wide discretion’’’ accorded decisions of prosecutors. Id. at
296.
97 The Court distinguished Batson by suggesting that the death penalty chal-
lenge would require a prosecutor ‘‘to rebut a study that analyzes the past conduct
of scores of prosecutors’’ whereas the peremptory challenge inquiry would focus only
on the prosecutor’s own acts. 481 U.S. at 296 n.17.
98 245 U.S. 60 (1917). See also Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668 (1927); Richmond
v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704 (1930).

99 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948);
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). Cf. Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323
(1926).
100 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
found to accord with the equal protection clause. 101 Private racial
discrimination in the sale or rental of housing is subject to two fed-
eral laws prohibiting most such discrimination. 102 Provision of
publicly assisted housing, of course, must be on a nondiscrim-
inatory basis. 103
Other Areas of Discrimination
Transportation.—The ‘‘separate but equal’’ doctrine won Su-
preme Court endorsement in the transportation context, 104 and its
passing in the education field did not long predate its demise in
transportation as well. 105 During the interval, the Court held in-
valid a state statute which permitted carriers to provide sleeping
and dining cars for white persons only, 106 held that a carrier’s pro-
vision of unequal, or nonexistent, first class accommodations to Af-
rican Americans violated the Interstate Commerce Act, 107 and
voided both state-required and privately imposed segregation of the
races on interstate carriers as burdens on commerce. 108 Boynton v.
Virginia 109 voided a trespass conviction of an interstate African
American bus passenger who had refused to leave a restaurant
which the Court viewed as an integral part of the facilities devoted
to interstate commerce and therefore subject to the Interstate Com-
merce Act.
Public Facilities.—In the aftermath of Brown v. Board of
Education, the Court in a lengthy series of per curiam opinions es-
tablished the invalidity of segregation in publicly provided or sup-
ported facilities and of required segregation in any facility or func-
tion. 110 A municipality could not operate a racially-segregated park
101 James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). The Court did not perceive that ei-
ther on its face or as applied the provision was other than racially neutral. Justices
Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun dissented. Id. at 143.
102 Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, 42 U.S.C. § 1982, see Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), and Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,
82 Stat. 73, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.
103 See Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
104 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
105 Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956), aff’g 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala.)
(statute requiring segregation on buses is unconstitutional). ‘‘We have settled be-

yond question that no State may require racial segregation of interstate transpor-
tation facilities. . . . This question is no longer open; it is foreclosed as a litigable
issue.’’ Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 33 (1962).
106 McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151 (1914).
107 Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941).
108 Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946); Henderson v. United States, 339
U.S. 816 (1950).

109 364 U.S. 454 (1960).
110 E.g., Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955)
(public beaches and bathhouses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955)
(municipal golf courses); Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass’n, 347 U.S. 971
(1954) (city lease of park facilities); New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass’n v.
pursuant to a will which left the property for that purpose and
which specified that only whites could use the park, 111 but it was
permissible for the state courts to hold that the trust had failed
and to imply a reverter to the decedent’s heirs. 112 A municipality
under court order to desegregate its publicly-owned swimming
pools was held to be entitled to close the pools instead, so long as
it entirely ceased operation of them. 113
Marriage.—Statutes which forbid the contracting of marriage
between persons of different races are unconstitutional 114 as are
statutes which penalize interracial cohabitation. 115 Similarly, a
court may not deny custody of a child based on a parent’s remar-
riage to a person of another race and the presumed ‘‘best interests
of the child’’ to be free from the prejudice and stigmatization that
might result. 116
Judicial System.—Segregation in courtrooms is unlawful and
may not be enforced through contempt citations for disobedience 117
or through other means. Treatment of parties to or witnesses in ju-
dicial actions based on their race is impermissible. 118 Jail inmates
have a right not to be segregated by race unless there is some over-
riding necessity arising out of the process of keeping order. 119
Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (public parks and golf courses); State Athletic Comm’n
v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533 (1959) (statute requiring segregated athletic contests); Turn-
er v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (administrative regulation requiring seg-
regation in airport restaurant); Schiro v. Bynum, 375 U.S. 395 (1964) (ordinance re-
quiring segregation in municipal auditorium).
111 Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966). State courts had removed the city as
trustee but the Court thought the city was still inextricably bound up in the oper-
ation and maintenance of the park. Justices Black, Harlan, and Stewart dissented
because they thought the removal of the city as trustee removed the element of
state action. Id. at 312, 315.
112 Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970). The Court thought that in effectuating
the testator’s intent in the fashion best permitted by the Fourteenth Amendment,
the state courts engaged in no action violating the equal protection clause. Justices
Douglas and Brennan dissented. Id. at 448, 450.
113 Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971). The Court found that there was
no official encouragement of discrimination through the act of closing the pools and
that inasmuch as both white and black citizens were deprived of the use of the pools
there was no unlawful discrimination. Justices White, Brennan, and Marshall dis-
sented, arguing that state action taken solely in opposition to desegregation was im-
permissible, both in defiance of the lower court order and because it penalized Afri-
can Americans for asserting their rights. Id. at 240. Justice Douglas also dissented.
Id. 231.
114 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
115 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
116 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
117 Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963).
118 Hamilton v. Alabama, 376 U.S. 650 (1964) (reversing contempt conviction of
witness who refused to answer questions so long as prosecutor addressed her by her
first name).
119 Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968); Wilson v. Kelley, 294 F. Supp. 1005
(N.D.Ga.), aff’d, 393 U.S. 266 (1968).

Public Designation.—It is unconstitutional to designate can-

didates on the ballot by race 120 and apparently any sort of designa-
tion by race on public records is suspect although not necessarily
unlawful. 121
Public Accommodations.—Whether or not discrimination
practiced by operators of retail selling and service establishments
gave rise to a denial of constitutional rights occupied the Court’s
attention considerably in the early 1960’s, but it avoided finally de-
ciding one way or the other, generally finding forbidden state ac-
tion in some aspect of the situation. 122 Passage of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act obviated any necessity to resolve the issue. 123
Elections.—While, of course, the denial of the franchise on the
basis of race or color violates the Fifteenth Amendment and a se-
ries of implementing statutes enacted by Congress, 124 the adminis-
tration of election statutes so as to treat white and black voters or
candidates differently can constitute a denial of equal protection as
well. 125 Additionally, cases of gerrymandering of electoral districts
and the creation or maintenance of electoral practices that dilute
and weaken black and other minority voting strength is subject to
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment and statutory attack. 126
Permissible Remedial Utilizations of Racial Classifications

Of critical importance in equal protection litigation is the de-
gree to which government is permitted to take race or another sus-
pect classification into account in order to formulate and implement
a remedy to overcome the effects of past discrimination against the
class. Often the issue is framed in terms of ‘‘reverse discrimina-
tion,’’ inasmuch as the governmental action deliberately favors
members of the class and may simultaneously impact adversely
120 Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964).
121 Tancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964) (summarily affirming lower court rulings
sustaining law requiring that every divorce decree indicate race of husband and
wife, but voiding laws requiring separate lists of whites and African Americans in
voting, tax and property records).
122 E.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Turner
v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S.
244 (1963); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963); Robinson v. Florida, 378
U.S. 153 (1964).
123 Title II, 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a to 2000a–6. See Hamm v. City of
Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964). On the various positions of the Justices on the con-
stitutional issue, see the opinions in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
124 See infra, pp. 1946–50.
125 E.g., Hadnott v. Amos, 394 U.S. 358 (1971); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S.
222 (1985) (disenfranchisement for crimes involving moral turpitude adopted for
purpose of racial discrimination).
126 E.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); United Jewish Orgs. v.
Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982).
upon nonmembers of the class. 127 While the Court in prior cases
had accepted both the use of race and other suspect criteria as
valid factors in formulating remedies to overcome discrmination 128
and the according of preferences to class members when the class
had previously been the object of discrimination, 129 it had never
until recently given plenary review to programs that expressly used
race as the prime consideration in the awarding of some public
benefit. 130
In United Jewish Organizations v. Carey 131 the State, in order
to comply with the Voting Rights Act and to obtain the United
States Attorney General’s approval for a redistricting law, had
drawn a plan which consciously used racial criteria to create a cer-
tain number of districts with nonwhite populations large enough to
permit the election of nonwhite candidates in spite of the lower vot-
ing turnout of nonwhites. In the process a Hasidic Jewish commu-
nity previously located entirely within one senate and one assembly
district was divided between two senate and two assembly districts,
and members of that community sued, alleging that the value of
their votes had been diluted solely for the purpose of achieving a
racial quota. The Supreme Court approved the districting, although
the fragmented majority of seven concurred in no majority opinion.
Justice White, delivering the judgment of the Court, based the
result on alternative grounds. First, because the redistricting took
127 While the emphasis is upon governmental action, private affirmative actions
may implicate statutory bars to uses of race. E.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976), held, not in the context of an affirmative action
program, that whites were as entitled as any group to protection of federal laws
banning racial discrimination in employment. The Court emphasized that it was not
passing at all on the permissibility of affirmative action programs. Id. at 280 n.8.
In United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), the Court held that title VII
did not prevent employers from instituting voluntary, race-conscious affirmative ac-
tion plans. Accord, Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987). Nor does
title VII prohibit a court from approving a consent decree providing broader relief
than the court would be permitted to award. Local 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v.
City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986). And, court-ordered relief pursuant to title
VII may benefit persons not themselves the victims of discrimination. Local 28 of
the Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
128 E.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 22–
25 (1971).
129 Programs to overcome past societal discriminations against women have
been approved, Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419
U.S. 498 (1975); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977), but gender classifications
are not as suspect as racial ones. Preferential treatment for American Indians was
approved, Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), but on the basis that the classi-
fication was political rather than racial.
130 The constitutionality of a law school admissions program in which minority
applicants were preferred for a number of positions was before the Court in DeFunis
v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974), but the merits were not reached.
131 430 U.S. 144 (1977). Chief Justice Burger dissented, id., 180, and Justice
Marshall did not participate.

place pursuant to the administration of the Voting Rights Act, the

Justice argued that compliance with the Act necessarily required
States to be race conscious in the drawing of lines so as not to di-
lute minority voting strength, that this requirement was not de-
pendent upon a showing of past discrimination, and that the States
retained discretion to determine just what strength minority voters
needed in electoral districts in order to assure their proportional
representation. Moreover, the creation of the certain number of dis-
tricts in which minorities were in the majority was reasonable
under the circumstances. 132
Second, Justice White wrote that, irrespective of what the Vot-
ing Rights Act may have required, what the State had done did not
violate either the Fourteenth or the Fifteenth Amendment. This
was so because the plan, even though it used race in a purposeful
manner, represented no racial slur or stigma with respect to whites
or any other race; the plan did not operate to minimize or unfairly
cancel out white voting strength because as a class whites would
be represented in the legislature in accordance with their propor-
tion of the population in the jurisdiction. 133
With the Court so divided, light on the constitutionality of af-
firmative action was anticipated in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, 134 but again the Court fragmented. The Davis
campus medical school each year admitted 100 students; the school
set aside 16 of those seats for disadvantaged minority students,
who were qualified but not necessarily as qualified as those win-
ning admission to the other 84 places. Twice denied admission,
Bakke sued, arguing that had not the 16 positions been set aside
he could have been admitted. The state court ordered him admitted
and ordered the school not to consider race in admissions. By two
5-to–4 votes, the Supreme Court affirmed the order admitting
Bakke but set aside the order forbidding the consideration of race
in admissions.
132 Id. at 155–65. Joining this part of the opinion were Justices Brennan,
Blackmun, and Stevens.

133 Id. at 165–68. Joining this part of the opinion were Justices Stevens and
Rehnquist. In a separate opinion, Justice Brennan noted that preferential race poli-
cies were subject to several substantial arguments: (1) they may disguise a policy
that perpetuates disadvantageous treatment; (2) they may serve to stimulate soci-
ety’s latent race consciousness; (3) they may stigmatize recipient groups as much
as overtly discriminatory practices against them do; (4) they may be perceived by
many as unjust. The presence of the Voting Rights Act and the Attorney General’s
supervision made the difference to him in this case. Id. at 168. Justices Stewart and
Powell concurred, agreeing with Justice White that there was no showing of a pur-
pose on the legislature’s part to discriminate against white voters and that the effect
of the plan was insufficient to invalidate it. Id. at 179.
134 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
Four Justices did not reach the constitutional question. In

their view, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 135 outlawed the
college’s program and made unnecessary any consideration of the
Constitution. They thus would admit Bakke and bar use of race in
admissions. 136 The remaining five Justices agreed among them-
selves that Title VI, on its face and in light of its legislative his-
tory, proscribed only what the equal protection clause pro-
scribed. 137 They thus reached the constitutional issue but resolved
it differently. Four Justices, in an opinion by Justice Brennan, ar-
gued that racial classifications designed to further remedial pur-
poses were not foreclosed by the Constitution under appropriate
circumstances. Even ostensibly benign racial classifications could
be misused and produce stigmatizing effects; therefore, they must
be searchingly scrutinized by courts to ferret out these instances.
But benign racial preferences, unlike invidious discriminations,
need not be subjected to strict scrutiny; instead, an intermediate
scrutiny would do. As applied, then, this review would enable the
Court to strike down any remedial racial classification that stig-
matized any group, that singled out those least well represented in
the political process to bear the brunt of the program, or that was
not justified by an important and articulated purpose. 138
Justice Powell argued that all racial classifications are suspect
and require strict scrutiny. Since none of the justifications asserted
by the college met this high standard of review, he would have in-
validated the program. But he did perceive justifications for a less
rigid consideration of race as one factor among many in an admis-
sions program; diversity of student body was an important and pro-
tected interest of an academy and would justify an admissions set
of standards that made affirmative use of race. Ameliorating the ef-
fects of past discrimination would justify the remedial use of race,
the Justice thought, when the entity itself had been found by ap-
propriate authority to have discriminated, but the college could not
inflict harm upon other groups in order to remedy past societal dis-
crimination. 139 Justice Powell thus joined the first group in agree-
135 78 Stat. 252, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d to 2000d–7. The Act bars discrimination on
the ground of race, color, or national origin by any recipient of federal financial as-
sistance.
136 438 U.S. at 408–21 (Justices Stevens, Stewart, and Rehnquist and Chief Jus-
tice Burger).
137 Id. at 284–87 (Justice Powell), 328–55 (Justices Brennan, White, Marshall,
and Blackmun).
138 Id. at 355–79 (Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun). The inter-
mediate standard of review adopted by the four Justices is that formulated for gen-
der cases. ‘‘Racial classifications designed to further remedial purposes ‘must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achieve-
ment of those objectives.’’’ Id. at 359.
139 Id. at 287–320.
ing that Bakke should be admitted, but he joined the second group
in permitting the college to consider race to some degree in its ad-
missions. 140
Finally, in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 141 the Court resolved most of
the outstanding constitutional question regarding the validity of
race-conscious affirmative action programs. Although again there
was no majority opinion of the Court, the series of opinions by the
six Justices voting to uphold a congressional provision requiring
that at least ten percent of public works funds be set aside for mi-
nority business enterprises all recognized that alleviation and re-
mediation of past societal discrimination was a legitimate goal and
that race was a permissible classification to use in remedying the
present effects of past discrimination. Judgment of the Court was
issued by Chief Justice Burger, who emphasized Congress’ pre-
eminent role under the Commerce clause and under the Fourteenth
Amendment to find as a fact the existence of past discrimination
and its continuing effects and to implement remedies which were
race conscious in order to cure those effects. 142 The principal con-
curring opinion by Justice Marshall applied the Brennan analysis
in Bakke, utilizing middle-tier scrutiny to hold that the race con-
scious set-aside was ‘‘substantially related to the achievement of
the important and congressionally articulated goal of remedying
the present effects of past discrimination.’’ 143
Taken together, the opinions recognize that at least in Con-
gress there resides the clear power to make the findings that will
form the basis for a judgment of the necessity to use racial classi-
fications in an affirmative way; these findings need not be exten-
sive or express and may be collected in many ways. Whether fed-
eral agencies or state legislatures and state agencies have the same
breadth and leeway to make findings and formulate remedies was
left unsettled but that they have some such power seems evi-
dent. 144 Further, while the opinions emphasized the limited dura-
tion and magnitude of the set-aside program, they appeared to at-
140 See id., 319–320 (Justice Powell).
141 448 U.S. 448 (1980). Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented
in one opinion, id. at 522, while Justice Stevens dissented in another. Id. at 532.
142 Id. at 456–92. Justices White and Powell joined this opinion. Justice Powell
also concurred in a separate opinion, id. at 495, which qualified to some extent his
agreement with the Chief Justice.
143 Id. at 517.
144 Id. at 473–480. The program was an exercise of Congress’ spending power,
but the constitutional objections raised had not been previously resolved in that con-
text. The plurality therefore turned to Congress’ regulatory powers, which in this
case undergirded the spending power, and found the power to repose in the com-
merce clause with respect to private contractors and in § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment with respect to state agencies. The Marshall plurality appeared to at-
tach no significance in this regard to the fact that Congress was the acting party.
tach no constitutional significance to these limitations, thus leaving

the way open for programs of a scope sufficient to remedy all the
identified effects of past discrimination. 145 But the most important
part of these opinions rests in the clear sustaining of race classi-
fications as permissible in remedies and in the approving of some
forms of racial quotas. Rejected were the arguments that a stigma
attaches to those minority beneficiaries of such programs, that bur-
dens are placed on innocent third parties, and that the program is
overinclusive, benefitting some minority members who had suffered
no discrimination. 146
The Court remains divided in ruling on constitutional chal-
lenges 147 to affirmative action plans. As a general matter, author-
ity to apply racial classifications is at its greatest when Congress
is acting pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment or
other of its powers, or when a court is acting to remedy proven dis-
crimination. But impact on disadvantaged non-minorities can also
be important. Two recent cases illustrate the latter point. In
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 148 the Court invalidated a
provision of a collective bargaining agreement giving minority
teachers a preferential protection from layoffs; in United States v.
Paradise, 149 the Court upheld as a remedy for past discrimination
a court-ordered racial quota in promotions. Justice White, concur-
ring in Wygant, emphasized the harsh, direct effect of layoffs on af-
fected non-minority employees. 150 By contrast, a plurality of Jus-
tices in Paradise viewed the remedy in that case as affecting non-
minorities less harshly than did the layoffs in Wygant, since the
145 Id. at 484–85, 489 (Chief Justice Burger), 513–15 (Justice Powell).
146 Id. at 484–489 (Chief Justice Burger), 514–515 (Justice Powell), 520–521
(Justice Marshall).
147 Guidance on constitutional issues is not necessarily afforded by cases arising
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Court having asserted that ‘‘the statutory
prohibition with which the employer must contend was not intended to extend as
far as that of the Constitution,’’ and that ‘‘voluntary employer action can play a cru-
cial role in furthering Title VII’s purpose of eliminating the effects of discrimination
in the workplace.’’ Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 628 n.6, 630
(1987) (upholding a local governmental agency’s voluntary affirmative action plan
predicated upon underrepresentation of women rather than upon past discrimina-
tory practices by that agency) (emphasis original). The constitutionality of the agen-
cy’s plan was not challenged. See id. at 620 n.2.
148 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
149 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
150 476 U.S. at 294. A plurality of Justices in Wygant thought that past societal
discrimination alone is insufficient to justify racial classifications; they would re-

quire some convincing evidence of past discrimination by the governmental unit in-
volved. 476 U.S. at 274–76 (opinion of Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger
and by Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor).
promotion quota would merely delay promotions of those affected,

rather than cause the loss of their jobs. 151
A clear distinction has been drawn between federal and state
power to apply racial classifications. In City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 152 the Court invalidated a minority set-aside require-
ment that holders of construction contracts with the city sub-
contract at least 30% of the dollar amount to minority business en-
terprises. Applying strict scrutiny, the Court found Richmond’s pro-
gram to be deficient because it was not tied to evidence of past dis-
crimination in the city’s construction industry. By contrast, the
Court in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC 153 applied a more lenient
standard of review in upholding two racial preference policies used
by the FCC in the award of radio and television broadcast licenses.
The FCC policies, the Court explained, are ‘‘benign, race-conscious
measures’’ that are ‘‘substantially related’’ to the achievement of an
‘‘important’’ governmental objective of broadcast diversity. 154
In Croson, the Court ruled that the city had failed to establish
a ‘‘compelling’’ interest in the racial quota system because it failed
to identify past discrimination in its construction industry. Mere
recitation of a ‘‘benign’’ or remedial purpose will not suffice, the
Court concluded, nor will reliance on the disparity between the
number of contracts awarded to minority firms and the minority
population of the city. ‘‘[W]here special qualifications are necessary,
the relevant statistical pool for purposes of demonstrating exclusion
must be the number of minorities qualified to undertake the par-
ticular task.’’ 155 The overinclusive definition of minorities, includ-
ing U.S. citizens who are ‘‘Blacks, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, In-
dians, Eskimos, or Aleuts,’’ also ‘‘impugn[ed] the city’s claim of re-
medial motivation,’’ there having been ‘‘no evidence’’ of any past
151 480 U.S. at 182–83 (opinion of Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall,
Blackmun, and Powell). A majority of Justices emphasized that the egregious nature
of the past discrimination by the governmental unit justified the ordered relief. 480
U.S. at 153 (opinion of Justice Brennan), id. at 189 (Justice Stevens).
152 488 U.S. 469 (1989). Croson was decided by a 6–3 vote. The portions of Jus-
tice O’Connor’s opinion adopted as the opinion of the Court were joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and by Justices White, Stevens, and Kennedy. The latter two Jus-
tices joined only part of Justice O’Connor’s opinion; each added a separate concur-
ring opinion. Justice Scalia concurred separately; Justices Marshall, Brennan, and
Blackmun dissented.
153 497 U.S. 547 (1990). This was a 5–4 decision, Justice Brennan’s opinion of
the Court being joined by Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. Justice
O’Connor wrote a dissenting opinion joined by the Chief Justice and by Justices
Scalia and Kennedy, and Justice Kennedy added a separate dissenting opinion
joined by Justice Scalia.
154 497 U.S. at 564–65.
155 488 U.S. at 501–02.
discrimination against non-Blacks in the Richmond construction in-

dustry. 156
It followed that Richmond’s set-aside program also was not
‘‘narrowly tailored’’ to remedy the effects of past discrimination in
the city: an individualized waiver procedure made the quota ap-
proach unnecessary, and a minority entrepreneur ‘‘from anywhere
in the country’’ could obtain an absolute racial preference. 157
At issue in Metro Broadcasting were two minority preference
policies of the FCC, one recognizing an ‘‘enhancement’’ for minority
ownership and participation in management when the FCC consid-
ers competing license applications, and the other authorizing a
‘‘distress sale’’ transfer of a broadcast license to a minority enter-
prise. These racial preferences—unlike the set-asides at issue in
Fullilove—originated as administrative policies rather than statu-
tory mandates. Because Congress later endorsed these policies,
however, the Court was able to conclude that they bore ‘‘the impri-
matur of longstanding congressional support and direction.’’ 158
Metro Broadcasting is noteworthy for several other reasons as
well. The Court rejected the dissent’s argument—seemingly accept-
ed by a Croson majority—that Congress’s more extensive authority
to adopt racial classifications must trace to section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment, and instead ruled that Congress also may rely
on race-conscious measures in exercise of its commerce and spend-
ing powers. 159 This meant that the governmental interest
furthered by a race-conscious policy need not be remedial, but could
be a less focused interest such as broadcast diversity. Secondly, as
noted above, the Court eschewed strict scrutiny analysis: the gov-
ernmental interest need only be ‘‘important’’ rather than ‘‘compel-
ling,’’ and the means adopted need only be ‘‘substantially related’’
rather than ‘‘narrowly tailored’’ to furthering the interest. This
means that, for the time being, at least, federal legislation impos-
ing racial preferences need pass a lower hurdle than state and local
legislation regardless of whether the federal legislation is an exer-
cise of section 5 power. 160
156 Id. at 506.
157 Id. at 508.
158 497 U.S. at 600. Justice O’Connor’s dissenting opinion contended that the
case ‘‘does not present ‘a considered decision of the Congress and the President.’’’
Id. at 607 (quoting Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 473).
159 497 U.S. at 563 & n.11. For the dissenting views of Justice O’Connor see id.
at 606–07. See also Croson, 488 U.S. at 504 (opinion of Court).

160 Because Justice Brennan, who authored the Court’s opinion in Metro Broad-
casting, retired at the end of the 1989–90 Term, the continuing vitality of the opin-
ion bears watching.
THE NEW EQUAL PROTECTION

Classifications Meriting Close Scrutiny
Alienage and Nationality.—‘‘It has long been settled . . .
that the term ‘person’ [in the equal protection clause] encompasses
lawfully admitted resident aliens as well as citizens of the United
States and entitles both citizens and aliens to the equal protection
of the laws of the State in which they reside.’’ 1 Thus, one of the
earliest equal protection decisions struck down the administration
of a facially-lawful licensing ordinance which was being applied to
discriminate against Chinese. 2 But the Court in many cases there-
after recognized a permissible state interest in distinguishing be-
tween its citizens and aliens by restricting enjoyment of resources
and public employment to its own citizens. 3 But in Hirabayashi v.
United States, 4 it was announced that ‘‘[d]istinctions between citi-
zens solely because of their ancestry’’ was ‘‘odius to a free people
whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.’’ And
in Korematsu v. United States, 5 classifications based upon race and
nationality were said to be suspect and subject to the ‘‘most rigid
scrutiny.’’ These dicta resulted in a 1948 decision which appeared
1 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971). See also Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39 (1915); Takahashi v. Fish
& Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948). Aliens, even unlawful aliens, are ‘‘per-
sons’’ to whom the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments apply. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 210–16 (1982). The Federal Government may not discriminate invidiously
against aliens, Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976). However, because of the
plenary power delegated by the Constitution to the national government to deal
with aliens and naturalization, federal classifications are judged by less demanding
standards than are those of the States, and many classifications which would fail
if attempted by the States have been sustained because Congress has made them.
Id. at 78–84; Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977). Additionally, state discrimination
against aliens may fail because it imposes burdens not permitted or contemplated
by Congress in its regulations of admission and conditions of admission. Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941); Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982). Such state dis-
crimination may also violate treaty obligations and be void under the supremacy
clause, Askura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924), and some federal civil rights
statutes, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1981, protect resident aliens as well as citizens. Gra-
ham v. Richardson, supra, at 376–80.
2 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
3 McGready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1877); Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S.
138 (1914) (limiting aliens’ rights to develop natural resources); Hauenstein v.

Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1880); Blythe v. Hinckley, 180 U.S. 333 (1901) (restriction
of devolution of property to aliens); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923);
Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923); Webb v. O’Brien, 263 U.S. 313 (1923);
Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923) (denial of right to own and acquire land); Heim
v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915); People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 108 N.E. 427, aff’d,
239 U.S. 195 (1915) (barring public employment to aliens); Ohio ex rel. Clarke v.
Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927) (prohibiting aliens from operating poolrooms). The
Court struck down a statute restricting the employment of aliens by private employ-
ers, however. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
4 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
5 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
to call into question the rationale of the ‘‘particular interest’’ doc-

trine under which earlier discriminations had been justified. There
the Court held void a statute barring issuance of commerical fish-
ing licenses to persons ‘‘ineligible to citizenship,’’ which in effect
meant resident alien Japanese. 6 ‘‘The Fourteenth Amendment and
the laws adopted under its authority thus embody a general policy
that all persons lawfully in this country shall abide ‘in any state’
on an equality of legal privileges with all citizens under non-
discriminatory laws.’’ Justice Black said for the Court that ‘‘the
power of a state to apply its laws exclusively to its alien inhab-
itants as a class is confined within narrow limits.’’ 7
Announcing ‘‘that classifications based on alienage . . . are in-
herently suspect and subject to close scrutiny,’’ the Court struck
down state statutes which either wholly disqualified resident aliens
for welfare assistance or imposed a lengthy durational residency re-
quirement on eligibility. 8 Thereafter, in a series of decisions, the
Court adhered to its conclusion that alienage was a suspect classi-
fication and voided a variety of restrictions. More recently, how-
ever, it has created a major ‘‘political function’’ exception to strict
scrutiny review, which shows some potential of displacing the pre-
vious analysis almost entirely.
In Sugarman v. Dougall, 9 the Court voided the total exclusion
of aliens from a State’s competitive civil service. A State’s power ‘‘to
preserve the basic conception of a political community’’ enables it
to prescribe the qualifications of its officers and voters, 10 the Court
held, and this power would extend ‘‘also to persons holding state
elective or important nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial
positions, for officers who participate directly in the formulation,
execution, or review of broad public policy perform functions that
go to the heart of representative government.’’ 11 But a flat ban
upon much of the State’s career public service, both of policy-mak-
ing and non-policy-making jobs, ran afoul of the requirement that
in achieving a valid interest through the use of a suspect classifica-
6 Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
7 Id. at 420. The decision was preceded by Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633
(1948), which was also susceptible to being read as questioning the premise of the
earlier cases.
8 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
9 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
10 Id. at 647–49. See also Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296 (1978). Aliens can
be excluded from voting, Skatfe v. Rorex, 553 P.2d 830 (Colo. 1976), appeal dis-
missed for lack of substantial federal question, 430 U.S. 961 (1977), and can be ex-
cluded from service on juries. Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134 (D.Md. 1974) (3-
judge court), aff’d, 426 U.S. 913 (1976).
11 Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973). Such state restrictions are
‘‘not wholly immune from scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.’’ Id. at 648.
tion the State must employ means that are precisely drawn in light
of the valid purpose. 12
State bars against the admission of aliens to the practice of
law were also struck down, the Court holding that the State had
not met the ‘‘heavy burden’’ of showing that its denial of admission
to aliens was necessary to accomplish a constitutionally permissible
and substantial interest. The State’s admitted interest in assuring
the requisite qualifications of persons licensed to practice law could
be adequately served by judging applicants on a case-by-case basis
and in no sense could the fact that a lawyer is considered to be an
officer of the court serve as a valid justification for a flat prohibi-
tion. 13 Nor could Puerto Rico offer a justification for excluding
aliens from one of the ‘‘common occupations of the community,’’
hence its bar on licensing aliens as civil engineers was voided. 14
In Nyquist v. Mauclet, 15 the Court seemed to expand the doc-
trine. Challenged was a statute that restricted the receipt of schol-
arships and similar financial support to citizens or to aliens who
were applying for citizenship or who filed a statement affirming
their intent to apply as soon as they became eligible. Therefore,
since any alien could escape the limitation by a voluntary act, the
disqualification was not aimed at aliens as a class, nor was it based
on an immutable characteristic possessed by a ‘‘discrete and insu-
lar minority’’—the classification that had been the basis for declar-
ing alienage a suspect category in the first place. But the Court
voided the statute. ‘‘The important points are that § 661(3) is di-
rected at aliens and that only aliens are harmed by it. The fact
that the statute is not an absolute bar does not mean that it does
not discriminate against the class.’’ 16 Two proffered justifications
12 Justice Rehnquist dissented. Id. at 649. In the course of the opinion, the
Court held inapplicable the doctrine of ‘‘special public interest,’’ the idea that a
State’s concern with the restriction of the resources of the State to the advancement
and profit of its citizens is a valid basis for discrimination against out-of-state citi-
zens and aliens generally, but it did not declare the doctrine invalid. Id. at 643–
45. The ‘‘political function’’ exception is inapplicable to notaries public, who do not
perform functions going to the heart of representative government. Bernal v. Faint-
er, 467 U.S. 216 (1984).
13 In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973). Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist dissented. Id. at 730, and 649 (Sugarman dissent also applicable to Grif-
fiths).
14 Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976). Since the jurisdic-
tion was Puerto Rico, the Court was not sure whether the requirement should be
governed by the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment but deemed the question immate-
rial since the same result would be achieved. The quoted expression is from Truax
v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915).
15 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
16 Id. at 9. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Stewart
dissented. Id. at 12, 15, 17. Justice Rehnquist’s dissent argued that the nature of
the disqualification precluded it from being considered suspect.
were held insufficient to meet the high burden imposed by the

strict scrutiny doctrine.
However, in the following Term, the Court denied that every
exclusion of aliens was subject to strict scrutiny, ‘‘because to do so
would ‘obliterate all the distinctions between citizens and aliens,
and thus deprecate the historic values of citizenship.’ ’’ 17 Upholding
a state restriction against aliens qualifying as state policemen, the
Court reasoned that the permissible distinction between citizen and
alien is that the former ‘‘is entitled to participate in the processes
of democratic decisionmaking. Accordingly, we have recognized ‘a
State’s historic power to exclude aliens from participation in its
democratic political institutions,’ . . . as part of the sovereign’s obli-
gation ‘‘‘to preserve the basic conception of a political commu-
nity.’ ’’ 18 When a State acts thusly by classifying against aliens, its
action is not subject to strict scrutiny but rather need only meet
the rational basis test. It is therefore permissible to reserve to citi-
zens offices having the ‘‘most important policy responsibilities,’’ a
reservation drawn from Sugarman, but the critical factor in this
case is the analysis finding that the police function is ‘‘one of the
basic functions of government.’’ ‘‘The execution of the broad powers
vested’’ in police officers ‘‘affects members of the public significantly
and often in the most sensitive areas of daily life. . . . Clearly the
exercise of police authority calls for a very high degree of judgment
and discretion, the abuse or misuse of which can have serious im-
pact on individuals. The office of a policeman is in no sense one of
‘the common occupations of the community’. . . .’’ 19
Continuing to enlarge the exception, the Court in Ambach v.
Norwick 20 upheld a bar to qualifying as a public school teacher for
17 Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295 (1978). The opinion was by Chief Justice
Burger and the quoted phrase was from his dissent in Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S.
1, 14 (1977). Justices Marshall, Stevens, and Brennan dissented. Id. at 302, 307.
18 Id.at 295–96. Formally following Sugarman v. Dougall, supra, the opinion
considerably enlarged the exception noted in that case; see also Nyquist v. Mauclet,
432 U.S. 1, 11 (1977) (emphasizing the ‘‘narrowness of the exception’’). Concurring
in Foley, supra, 300, Justice Stewart observed that ‘‘it is difficult if not impossible
to reconcile the Court’s judgment in this case with the full sweep of the reasoning
and authority of some of our past decisions. It is only because I have become in-
creasingly doubtful about the validity of those decisions (in at least some of which
I concurred) that I join the opinion of the Court in this case.’’ On the other hand,
Justice Blackmun, who had written several of the past decisions, including Mauclet,
concurred also, finding the case consistent. Id.
19 Id. at 297–98. In Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), barring patronage dis-
missals of police officers, the Court had nonetheless recognized an exception for pol-
icymaking officers which it did not extend to the police.
20 441 U.S. 68 (1979). The opinion, by Justice Powell, was joined by Chief Jus-
tice Burger and Justices Stewart, White, and Rehnquist. Dissenting were Justices
Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens. The disqualification standard was of
resident aliens who have not manifested an intention to apply for

citizenship. The ‘‘governmental function’’ test took on added signifi-
cance, the Court saying that the ‘‘distinction between citizens and
aliens, though ordinarily irrelevant to private activity, is fun-
damental to the definition and government of a State.’’ 21 Thus,
‘‘governmental entities, when exercising the functions of govern-
ment, have wider latitude in limiting the participation of
noncitizens.’’ 22 Teachers, the Court thought, because of the role of
public education in inculcating civic values and in preparing chil-
dren for participation in society as citizens and because of the re-
sponsibility and discretion they have in fulfilling that role, perform
a task that ‘‘go[es] to the heart of representative government.’’ 23
The citizenship requirement need only bear a rational relationship
to the state interest, and the Court concluded it clearly did so.
Then, in Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 24 the Court sustained a
state law imposing a citizenship requirement upon all positions
designated as ‘‘peace officers,’’ upholding in context that eligibility
prerequisite for probation officers. First, the Court held that the ex-
tension of the requirement to an enormous range of people who
were variously classified as ‘‘peace officers’’ did not reach so far nor
was it so broad and haphazard as to belie the claim that the State
was attempting to ensure that an important function of govern-
ment be in the hands of those having a bond of citizenship. ‘‘[T]he
classifications used need not be precise; there need only be a sub-
stantial fit.’’ 25 As to the particular positions, the Court held that
‘‘they, like the state troopers involved in Foley, sufficiently partake
of the sovereign’s power to exercise coercive force over the individ-
ual that they may be limited to citizens.’’ 26
Thus, the Court so far has drawn a tripartite differentiation
with respect to governmental restrictions on aliens. First, it has
disapproved the earlier line of cases and now would foreclose at-
tempts by the States to retain certain economic benefits, primarily
employment and opportunities for livelihood, exclusively for citi-
zens. Second, when government exercises principally its spending
functions, such as those with respect to public employment gen-
course, that held invalid as a disqualification for receipt of educational assistance

in Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
21 Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 75 (1979).
22 Id.
23 Id. at 75–80. The quotation, id. at 76, is from Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S.
634, 647 (1973).

24 454 U.S. 432 (1982). Joining the opinion of the Court were Justices White,
Powell, Rehnquist, O’Connor, and Chief Justice Burger. Dissenting were Justices
Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens. Id. at 447.
25 Id. at 442.
26 Id. at 445.
erally and to eligibility for public benefits, its classifications with

an adverse impact on aliens will be strictly scrutinized and usually
fail. Third, when government acts in its sovereign capacity, when
it acts within its constitutional prerogatives and responsibilities to
establish and operate its own government, its decisions with re-
spect to the citizenship qualifications of an appropriately des-
ignated class of public office holders will be subject only to tradi-
tional rational basis scrutiny. 27 However, the ‘‘political function’’
standard is elastic, and so long as disqualifications are attached to
specific occupations 28 rather than to the civil service in general, as
in Sugarman, the concept seems capable of encompassing the ex-
clusion.
When confronted with a state statute that authorized local
school boards to exclude from public schools alien children who
were not legally admitted to the United States, the Court deter-
mined that an intermediate level of scrutiny was appropriate and
found that the proffered justifications did not sustain the classifica-
tion. 29 Inasmuch as it was clear that the undocumented status of
the children was not irrelevant to valid government goals and inas-
much as the Court had previously held that access to education
was not a ‘‘fundamental interest’’ which triggered strict scrutiny of
governmental distinctions relating to education, 30 the Court’s deci-
sion to accord intermediate review was based upon an amalgam of
at least three factors. First, alienage was a characteristic that pro-
vokes special judicial protection when used as a basis for discrimi-
nation. Second, the children were innocent parties who were having
a particular onus imposed on them because of the misconduct of
their parents. Third, the total denial of an education to these chil-
27 Id. at 438–39
28 Thus, the statute in Chavez-Salido applied to such positions as toll-service
employees, cemetery sextons, fish and game wardens, and furniture and bedding in-
spectors, and yet the overall classification was deemed not so ill-fitting as to require
its voiding.
29 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 432 (1982). Joining the opinion of the Court were Jus-
tices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens. Dissenting were Chief
Justice Burger and Justices White, Rehnquist, and O’Connor. Id. at 242.
30 In San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), while holding
that education is not a fundamental interest, the Court expressly reserved the ques-
tion whether a total denial of education to a class of children would infringe upon
a fundamental interest. Id.at 18, 25 n.60, 37. The Plyler Court’s emphasis upon the
total denial of education and the generally suspect nature of alienage classifications
left ambiguous whether the state discrimination would have been subjected to strict
scrutiny if it had survived intermediate scrutiny. Justice Powell thought the Court
had rejected strict scrutiny, 457 U.S. at 238 n.2 (concurring), while Justice
Blackmun thought it had not reached the question, id. at 235 n.3 (concurring). In-
deed, their concurring opinions seem directed more toward the disability visited
upon innocent children than the broader complex of factors set out in the opinion
of the Court. Id.at 231, 236.
dren would stamp them with an ‘‘enduring disability’’ that would

harm both them and the State all their lives. 31 The Court evalu-
ated each of the State’s attempted justifications and found none of
them satisfying the level of review demanded. 32 It seems evident
that Plyler v. Doe is a unique case and that whatever it may doc-
trinally stand for, a sufficiently similar factual situation calling for
application of its standards is unlikely to be replicated.
Sex.—Shortly after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the refusal of Illinois to license a woman to practice law was chal-
lenged before the Supreme Court, and the Court rejected the chal-
lenge in tones which prevailed well into the twentieth century.
‘‘The civil law, as well as nature itself, has always recognized a
wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and
woman. Man is, or should be, woman’s protector and defender. The
natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the fe-
male sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life.
The constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the
divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the
domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and
functions of womanhood.’’ 33 On the same premise, a statute re-
stricting the franchise to men was sustained. 34
The greater number of cases have involved legislation aimed to
protect women from oppressive working conditions, as by prescrib-
31 Id. at 223–24.
32 Rejectedstate interests included preserving limited resources for its lawful
residents, deterring an influx of illegal aliens, avoiding the special burden caused
by these children, and serving children who were more likely to remain in the State
and contribute to its welfare. Id. at 227–30.
33 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873). The cases involving
alleged discrimination against women contain large numbers of quaint quotations

from unlikely sources. Upholding a law which imposed a fee upon all persons en-
gaged in the laundry business, but excepting businesses employing not more than
two women, Justice Holmes said: ‘‘If Montana deems it advisable to put a lighter
burden upon women than upon men with regard to an employment that our people
commonly regard as more appropriate for the former, the Fourteenth Amendment
does not interfere by creating a fictitious equality where there is a real difference.’’
Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U.S. 59, 63 (1912). And upholding a law prohibiting
most women from tending bar, Justice Frankfurter said: ‘‘The fact that women may
now have achieved the virtues that men have long claimed as their prerogatives and
now indulge in vices that men have long practiced, does not preclude the States
from drawing a sharp line between the sexes, certainly in such matters as the regu-
lation of the liquor traffic. . . . The Constitution does not require legislatures to re-
flect sociological insight, or shifting social standards, any more than it requires
them to keep abreast of the latest scientific standards.’’ Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S.
464, 466 (1948).
34 Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875) (privileges and immuni-
ties).
ing maximum hours 35 or minimum wages 36 or by restricting some

of the things women could be required to do. 37 A 1961 decision
upheld a state law which required jury service of men but which
gave women the option of serving or not. ‘‘We cannot say that it
is constitutionally impermissible for a State acting in pursuit of the
general welfare, to conclude that a woman should be relieved from
the civic duty of jury service unless she herself determines that
such service is consistent with her own special responsibilities.’’ 38
Another type of protective legislation for women that was sustained
by the Court is that premised on protection of morals, as by forbid-
ding the sale of liquor to women. 39 In a highly controversial ruling,
the Court sustained a state law which forbade the licensing of any
female bartender, except for the wives or daughters of male own-
ers. The Court purported to view the law as one for the protection
of the health and morals of women generally, with the exception
being justified by the consideration that such women would be
under the eyes of a protective male. 40
A wide variety of sex discriminations by governmental and pri-
vate parties, including the protective labor legislation previously
sustained, is now subjected to federal statutory proscription, ban-
ning, for instance, sex discrimination in employment and requiring
equal pay for equal work. 41 Some states have followed suit. 42
35 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Dominion Hotel v. Arizona, 249 U.S.
265 (1919).
36 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
37 E.g., Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924) (prohibiting night work by
women in restaurants). A similar restriction set a maximum weight that women

could be required to lift.
38 Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961).
39 Cronin v. Adams, 192 U.S. 108 (1904).
40 Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
41 Thus, title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 80 Stat. 662, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
et seq., bans discrimination against either sex in employment. See, e.g., Phillips v.
Martin-Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321
(1977); Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978); Ari-
zona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983) (ac-
tuarially based lower monthly retirement benefits for women employees violates
Title VII); Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (‘‘hostile environ-
ment’’ sex harassment claim is actionable). Reversing rulings that pregnancy dis-
crimination is not reached by the statutory bar on sex discrimination, General Elec-
tric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136
(1977), Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. 95–555 (1978),
92 Stat. 2076, amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. The Equal Pay Act, 77 Stat. 56 (1963),
amending the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), generally applies to
wages paid for work requiring ‘‘equal skill, effort, and responsibility.’’ See Corning
Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974). On the controversial issue of ‘‘com-
parable worth’’ and the interrelationship of title VII and the Equal Pay Act, see
County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
42 See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (state prohibi-
tion on gender discrimination in aspects of public accommodation, as applied to

membership in a civic organization, is justified by compelling state interest).
While the proposed Equal Rights Amendment pended before the

States and ultimately failed of ratification, 43 the Supreme Court
undertook a major evaluation of sex classification doctrine, first ap-
plying a ‘‘heightened’’ traditional standard of review (with bite) to
void a discrimination and then, after coming within a vote of mak-
ing sex a suspect classification, settling upon an intermediate
standard. These standards continue, with some uncertainties of ap-
plication and some tendencies among the Justices both to lessen
and to increase the burden of governmental justification, to provide
the analysis for evaluation of sex classifications.
In Reed v. Reed, 44 the Court held invalid a state probate law
which gave males preference over females when both were equally
entitled to administer an estate. Because the statute ‘‘provides that
different treatment be accorded to the applicants on the basis of
their sex,’’ Chief Justice Burger wrote, ‘‘it thus establishes a classi-
fication subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.’’ The
Court proceeded to hold that under traditional equal protection
standards—requiring a classification to be reasonable and not arbi-
trarily related to a lawful objective—the classification made was an
arbitrary way to achieve the objective the State advanced in de-
fense of the law, that is, to reduce the area of controversy between
otherwise equally qualified applicants for administration. Thus, the
Court used traditional analysis but the holding seems to go some-
what further to say that not all lawful interests of a State may be
advanced by a classification based solely on sex. 45
It is now established that sex classifications, in order to with-
stand equal protection scrutiny, ‘‘must serve important govern-
mental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement
of those objectives.’’ 46 Thus, after several years in which sex dis-
43 On the Equal Rights Amendment, see supra, pp. 904–06, 913.
44 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
45 Id.at 75–77. Cf. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 n.7 (1972). A statute
similar to that in Reed was before the Court in Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455
(1981) (invalidating statute giving husband unilateral right to dispose of jointly
owned community property without wife’s consent).
46 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199,
210–11 (1977) (plurality opinion); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316–317
(1977); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,
388 (1979); Massachusetts Personnel Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979);
Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 85 (1979); Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co.,
446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981); Mis-
sissippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723–24 (1982). But see Michael
M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 468–69 (1981) (plurality opinion); id. at 483
(Justice Blackmun concurring); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 69–72 (1981). The
test is the same whether women or men are disadvantaged by the classification, Orr
v. Orr, supra, at 279; Caban v. Mohammed, supra, at 394; Mississippi Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, supra at 724, although Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burg-
er strongly argued that when males are disadvantaged only the rational basis test
tinctions were more often voided than sustained without a clear

statement of the standard of review, 47 a majority of the Court has
arrived at the intermediate standard which many had thought it
was applying in any event. 48 The Court first examines the statu-
tory or administrative scheme to determine if the purpose or objec-
tive is permissible and, if it is, whether it is important. Then, hav-
ing ascertained the actual motivation of the classification, the
Court engages in a balancing test to determine how well the classi-
fication serves the end and whether a less discriminatory one
would serve that end without substantial loss to the government. 49
Some sex distinctions were seen to be based solely upon ‘‘old
notions,’’ no longer valid if ever they were, about the respective
roles of the sexes in society, and those distinctions failed to survive
even traditional scrutiny. Thus, a state law defining the age of ma-
jority as 18 for females and 21 for males, entitling the male child
to support by his divorced father for three years longer than the
female child, was deemed merely irrational, grounded as it was in
the assumption of the male as the breadwinner, needing longer to
prepare, and the female as suited for wife and mother. 50 Similarly,
is appropriate. Craig v. Boren, supra, 217, 218–21; Califano v. Goldfarb, supra, at

224. That adoption of a standard has not eliminated difficulty in deciding such cases
should be evident by perusal of the cases following.
47 In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), four Justices were prepared
to hold that sex classifications are inherently suspect and must therefore be sub-
jected to strict scrutiny. Id.at 684–87 (Justices Brennan, Douglas, White, and Mar-
shall). Three Justices, reaching the same result, thought the statute failed the tradi-
tional test and declined for the moment to consider whether sex was a suspect clas-
sification, finding that inappropriate while the Equal Rights Amendment was pend-
ing. Id. at 691 (Justices Powell and Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger). Justice
Stewart found the statute void under traditional scrutiny and Justice Rehnquist dis-
sented. Id. at 691. In Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 n.9
(1982), Justice O’Connor for the Court expressly reserved decision whether a classi-
fication that survived intermediate scrutiny would be subject to strict scrutiny.
48 While their concurrences in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210, 211 (1976), in-
dicate some reticence about express reliance on intermediate scrutiny, Justices Pow-
ell and Stevens have since joined or written opinions stating the test and applying
it. E.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388 (1979) (Justice Powell writing the
opinion of the Court); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 359 (1979) (Justice Powell
concurring); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 217 (1977) (Justice Stevens concur-
ring); Caban v. Mohammed, supra, at 401 (Justice Stevens dissenting). Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquist have not clearly stated a test, although their def-
erence to legislative judgment approaches the traditional scrutiny test. But see
Califano v. Westcott, supra, at 93 (joining Court on substantive decision). And cf.
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 734–35 (1982) (Justice
Blackmun dissenting).
49 The test is thus the same as is applied to illegitimacy classifications, although
with apparently more rigor when sex is involved.

50 Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975). See also Stanton v. Stanton, 429 U.S.
501 (1977). Assumptions about the traditional roles of the sexes afford no basis for
support of classifications under the intermediate scrutiny standard. E.g., Orr v. Orr,
440 U.S. 268, 279–80 (1979); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 355 (1979);
Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981). Justice Stevens in particular has been
a state jury system that in effect excluded almost all women was
deemed to be based upon an overbroad generalization about the
role of women as a class in society, and the administrative conven-
ience served could not justify it. 51
Assumptions about the relative positions of the sexes, however,
are not without some basis in fact, and sex may sometimes be a
reliable proxy for the characteristic, such as need, with which it is
the legislature’s actual intention to deal. But heightened scrutiny
requires evidence of the existence of the distinguishing fact and its
close correspondence with the condition for which sex stands as
proxy. Thus, in the case which first expressly announced the inter-
mediate scrutiny standard, the Court struck down a state statute
that prohibited the sale of ‘‘non-intoxicating’’ 3.2 beer to males
under 21 and to females under 18. 52 Accepting the argument that
traffic safety was an important governmental objective, the Court
emphasized that sex is an often inaccurate proxy for other, more
germane classifications. Taking the statistics offered by the State
as of value, while cautioning that statistical analysis is a ‘‘dubious’’
business that is in tension with the ‘‘normative philosophy that
underlies the Equal Protection Clause,’’ the Court thought the cor-
relation between males and females arrested for drunk driving
showed an unduly tenuous fit to allow the use of sex as a distinc-
tion. 53
Invalidating an Alabama law imposing alimony obligations
upon males but not upon females, the Court acknowledged that as-
sisting needy spouses was a legitimate and important govern-
mental objective and would then have turned to ascertaining
whether sex was a sufficiently accurate proxy for dependency, so it
could be said that the classification was substantially related to
achievement of the objective. 54 However, the Court observed that
the State already conducted individualized hearings with respect to
the need of the wife, so that with little additional burden needy
males could be identified and helped. The use of the sex standard
concerned whether legislative classifications by sex simply reflect traditional ways

of thinking or are the result of a reasoned attempt to reach some neutral goal, e.g.,
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 222–23 (1978) (concurring), and he will sustain
some otherwise impermissible distinctions if he finds the legislative reasoning to ap-
proximate the latter approach. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 401 (1979) (dis-
senting).
51 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). The precise basis of the decision was
the Sixth Amendment right to a representative cross section of the community, but
the Court dealt with and disapproved the reasoning in Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57
(1961), in which a similar jury selection process was upheld against due process and
equal protection challenge.
52 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
53 Id.at 198, 199–200, 201–04.
54 Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
as a proxy, therefore, was not justified because it needlessly bur-

dened needy men and advantaged financially secure women whose
husbands were in need. 55
Discrimination between unwed mothers and unwed fathers re-
ceived different treatments through the Court’s perception of the
justifications and presumptions underlying each. A New York law
permitted the unwed mother but not the unwed father of an illegit-
imate child to block his adoption by withholding consent. Acting in
the instance of one who acknowledged his parenthood and who had
maintained a close relationship with his child over the years, the
Court could discern no substantial relationship between the classi-
fication and some important state interest. Promotion of adoption
of illegitimates and their consequent legitimation was important,
but the assumption that all unwed fathers either stood in a dif-
ferent relationship to their children than did the unwed mother or
that the difficulty of finding the fathers would unreasonably bur-
den the adoption process was overbroad, as the facts of the case re-
vealed. No barrier existed to the State dispensing with consent
when the father or his location is unknown, but disqualification of
all unwed fathers may not be used as a shorthand for that step. 56
On the other hand, the Court sustained a Georgia statute which
permitted the mother of an illegitimate child to sue for the wrong-
ful death of the child but which allowed the father to sue only if
he had legitimated the child and there is no mother. 57 There was
no opinion of the Court, but both opinions making up the result
emphasized that the objective of the State, the avoidance of dif-
55 Id. at 280–83. An administrative convenience justification was not available,
therefore. Id. at 281 & n.12. While such an argument has been accepted as a suffi-
cient justification in at least some illegitimacy cases, Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S.
495, 509 (1976), it has neither wholly been ruled out nor accepted in sex cases. In
Lucas, supra, 509–10, the Court interpreted Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973), as having required a showing at least that for every dollar lost to a recipient
not meeting the general purpose qualification a dollar is saved in administrative ex-
pense. In Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 152 (1980), the Court
said that ‘‘[i]t may be that there are levels of administrative convenience that will
justify discriminations that are subject to heightened scrutiny . . . , but the req-
uisite showing has not been made here by the mere claim that it would be inconven-
ient to individualize determinations about widows as well as widowers.’’ Justice Ste-
vens apparently would demand a factual showing of substantial savings. Califano
v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 219 (1977) (concurring).
56 Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). Four Justices dissented. Id. at 394
(Justice Stewart), 401 (Justices Stevens and Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger).
For the conceptually different problem of classification between different groups of
women on the basis of marriage or absence of marriage to a wage earner, see
Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979).
57 Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979). Justices White, Brennan, Marshall,
and Blackmun, who had been in the majority in Caban, dissented. Id. at 361.
ficulties in proving paternity, was an important one which was ad-

vanced by the classification. 58
As in the instance of illegitimacy classifications, the issue of
sex qualifications for the receipt of governmental financial benefits
has divided the Court and occasioned close distinctions. A statutory
scheme under which a serviceman could claim his spouse as a ‘‘de-
pendent’’ for allowances while a servicewoman’s spouse was not
considered a ‘‘dependent’’ unless he was shown in fact to be de-
pendent upon her for more than one half of his support was held
an invalid dissimilar treatment of similarly situated men and
women, not justified by the administrative convenience rationale. 59
In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 60 the Court struck down a Social Se-
curity provision that gave survivor’s benefits based on the insured’s
earnings to the widow and minor children but gave such benefits
only to the children and not to the widower of a deceased woman
worker. Focusing not only upon the discrimination against the wid-
ower but primarily upon the discrimination visited upon the
woman worker whose earnings did not provide the same support
for her family that a male worker’s did, the Court saw the basis
for the distinction resting upon the generalization that a woman
would stay home and take care of the children while a man would
not. Since the Court perceived the purpose of the provision to be
to enable the surviving parent to choose to remain at home to care
for minor children, the sex classification ill fitted the end and was
invidiously discriminatory.
But when in Califano v. Goldfarb 61 the Court was confronted
with a Social Security provision structured much as the benefit sec-
tions struck down in Frontiero and Wiesenfeld, even in the light of
an express heightened scrutiny, no majority of the Court could be
58 The plurality opinion determined that the statute did not invidiously dis-
criminate against men as a class; it was no overbroad generalization but proceeded

from the fact that only men could legitimate children by unilateral action. The sexes
were not similarly situated, therefore, and the classification recognized that. As a
result, all that was required was that the means be a rational way of dealing with
the problem of proving paternity. Id. at 353–58. Justice Powell found the statute
valid because the sex-based classification was substantially related to the objective
of avoiding problems of proof in proving paternity. He also emphasized that the fa-
ther had it within his power to remove the bar by legitimating the child. Id. at 359.
59 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
60 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
61 430 U.S. 199 (1977). The dissent argued that whatever the classification uti-
lized, social insurance programs should not automatically be subjected to heightened

scrutiny but rather only to traditional rationality review. Id. at 224 (Justice
Rehnquist with Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Blackmun). In
Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980), voiding a state workers’
compensation provision identical to that voided in Goldfarb, only Justice Rehnquist
continued to adhere to this view, although the others may have yielded only to
precedent.
obtained for the reason for striking down the statute. The section
provided that a widow was entitled to receive survivors’ benefits
based on the earnings of her deceased husband, regardless of de-
pendency, but payments were to go to the widower of a deceased
wife only upon proof that he had been receiving at least half of his
support from her. The plurality opinion treated the discrimination
as consisting of disparate treatment of women wage-earners whose
tax payments did not earn the same family protection as male
wage earners’ taxes. Looking to the purpose of the benefits provi-
sion, the plurality perceived it to be protection of the familial unit
rather than of the individual widow or widower and to be keyed to
dependency rather than need. The sex classification was thus found
to be based on an assumption of female dependency which ill-
served the purpose of the statute and was an ill-chosen proxy for
the underlying qualification. Administrative convenience could not
justify use of such a questionable proxy. 62 Justice Stevens, concur-
ring, accepted most of the analysis of the dissent but nonetheless
came to the conclusion of invalidity. His argument was essentially
that while either administrative convenience or a desire to remedy
discrimination against female spouses could justify use of a sex
classification, neither purpose was served by the sex classification
actually used in this statute. 63
Again, the Court divided closely when it sustained two in-
stances of classifications claimed to constitute sex discrimination.
In Rostker v. Goldberg, 64 rejecting presidential recommendations,
Congress provided for registration only of males for a possible fu-
ture military draft, excluding women altogether. The Court dis-
cussed but did not explicitly choose among proffered equal protec-
tion standards, but it apparently applied the intermediate test of
Craig v. Boren. However, it did so in the context of its often-stated
62 Id. at 430 U.S. 204–09, 212–17 (Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Pow-
ell). Congress responded by eliminating the dependency requirement but by adding

a pension offset provision reducing spousal benefits by the amount of various other
pensions received. Continuation in this context of the Goldfarb gender-based de-
pendency classification for a five-year ‘‘grace period’’ was upheld in Heckler v.
Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984), as directly and substantially related to the important
governmental interest in protecting against the effects of the pension offset the re-
tirement plans of individuals who had based their plans on unreduced pre-Goldfarb
payment levels.
63 Id. at 217. Justice Stevens adhered to this view in Wengler v. Druggists Mu-
tual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 154 (1980). Note the unanimity of the Court on the sub-
stantive issue, although it was divided on remedy, in voiding in Califano v. West-
cott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979), a Social Security provision giving benefits to families with
dependent children who have been deprived of parental support because of the un-
employment of the father but giving no benefits when the mother is unemployed.
64 453 U.S. 57 (1981). Joining the opinion of the Court were Justices Rehnquist,
Stewart, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, and Chief Justice Burger. Dissenting were
Justices White, Marshall, and Brennan. Id. at 83, 86.
preference for extreme deference to military decisions and to con-

gressional resolution of military decisions. Evaluating the congres-
sional determination, the Court found that it has not been ‘‘un-
thinking’’ or ‘‘reflexively’’ based upon traditional notions of the dif-
ferences between men and women; rather, Congress had exten-
sively deliberated over its decision. It had found, the Court as-
serted, that the purpose of registration was the creation of a pool
from which to draw combat troops when needed, an important and
indeed compelling governmental interest, and the exclusion of
women was not only ‘‘sufficiently but closely’’ related to that pur-
pose because they were ill-suited for combat, could be excluded
from combat, and registering them would be too burdensome to the
military system. 65
In Michael M. v. Superior Court, 66 the Court did expressly
adopt the Craig v. Boren intermediate standard, but its application
of the test appeared to represent a departure in several respects
from prior cases in which it had struck down sex classifications.
Michael M. involved the constitutionality of a statute that punished
males, but not females, for having sexual intercourse with a
nonspousal person under 18 years of age. The plurality and the
concurrence generally agreed, but with some difference of empha-
sis, that while the law was founded on a clear sex distinction it was
justified because it did serve an important governmental interest,
the prevention of teenage pregnancies. Inasmuch as women may
become pregnant and men may not, women would be better de-
terred by that biological fact, and men needed the additional legal
deterrence of a criminal penalty. Thus, the law recognized that for
purposes of this classification men and women were not similarly
situated, and the statute did not deny equal protection. 67
Cases of ‘‘benign’’ discrimination, that is, statutory classifica-
tions that benefit women and disadvantage men in order to over-
come the effects of past societal discrimination against women,
65 Id. at 69–72, 78–83. The dissent argued that registered persons would fill
noncombat positions as well as combat ones and that drafting women would add to
women volunteers providing support for combat personnel and would free up men
in other positions for combat duty. Both dissents assumed without deciding that ex-
clusion of women from combat served important governmental interests. Id. at 83,
93. The majority’s reliance on an administrative convenience argument, it should be
noted, id., 81, was contrary to recent precedent. Supra, p. 1880 n.55.
66 450 U.S. 464 (1981). Joining the opinion of the Court were Justices
Rehnquist, Stewart, and Powell, and Chief Justice Burger, constituting only a plu-
rality. Justice Blackmun concurred in a somewhat more limited opinion. Id. at 481.
Dissenting were Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens. Id. at 488, 496.
67 Id. at 470–74, 481. The dissents questioned both whether the pregnancy de-
terrence rationale was the purpose underlying the distinction and whether, if it was,
the classification was substantially related to achievement of the goal. Id. at 488,
496.
have presented the Court with some difficulty. Although the first
two cases were reviewed under apparently traditional rational
basis scrutiny, the more recent cases appear to subject these classi-
fications to the same intermediate standard as any other sex classi-
fication. Kahn v. Shevin 68 upheld a state property tax exemption
allowing widows but not widowers a $500 exemption. In justifica-
tion, the State had presented extensive statistical data showing the
substantial economic and employment disabilities of women in rela-
tion to men. The provision, the Court found, was ‘‘reasonably de-
signed to further the state policy of cushioning the financial impact
of spousal loss upon the sex for whom that loss imposes a dis-
proportionately heavy burden.’’ 69 And in Schlesinger v. Ballard, 70
the Court sustained a provision requiring the mandatory discharge
from the Navy of a male officer who has twice failed of promotion
to certain levels, which in Ballard’s case meant discharge after nine
years of service, whereas women officers were entitled to 13 years
of service before mandatory discharge for want of promotion. The
difference was held to be a rational recognition of the fact that
male and female officers were dissimilarly situated and that
women had far fewer promotional opportunities than men had.
Although in each of these cases the Court accepted the prof-
fered justification of remedial purpose without searching inquiry,
later cases caution that ‘‘the mere recitation of a benign, compen-
satory purpose is not an automatic shield which protects against
any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory
scheme.’’ 71 Rather, after specifically citing the heightened scrutiny
that all sex classifications are subjected to, the Court looks to the
statute and to its legislative history to ascertain that the scheme
does not actually penalize women, that it was actually enacted to
compensate for past discrimination, and that it does not reflect
merely ‘‘archaic and overbroad generalizations’’ about women in its
moving force. But where a statute is ‘‘deliberately enacted to com-
pensate for particular economic disabilities suffered by women,’’ it
68 416 U.S. 351 (1974).

69 Id. at 355.
70 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
71 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430
U.S. 199, 209 n.8 (1977); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 280–82 (1979); Wengler v. Drug-
gists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150–52 (1980). In light of the stiffened stand-
ard, Justice Stevens has called for overruling Kahn, Califano v. Goldfarb, supra,
223–24, but Justice Blackmun would preserve that case. Orr v. Orr, supra, at 284.
Cf. Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 302–03 (1978) (Justice
Powell; less stringent standard of review for benign sex classifications).
serves an important governmental objective and will be sustained

if it is substantially related to achievement of that objective. 72
Many of these lines of cases converged in Mississippi Univer-
sity for Women v. Hogan, 73 in which the Court stiffened and ap-
plied its standards for evaluating claimed benign distinctions bene-
fiting women and additionally appeared to apply the intermediate
standard itself more strictly. The case involved a male nurse who
wished to attend a female-only nursing school located in the city
in which he lived and worked; if he could not attend this particular
school he would have had to commute 147 miles to another nursing
school which did accept men, and he would have had difficulty
doing so and retaining his job. The State defended on the basis
that the female-only policy was justified as providing ‘‘educational
affirmative action for females.’’ Recitation of a benign purpose, the
Court said, was not alone sufficient. ‘‘[A] State can evoke a compen-
satory purpose to justify an otherwise discriminatory classification
only if members of the gender benefited by the classification actu-
ally suffer a disadvantage related to the classification.’’ 74 But
women did not lack opportunities to obtain training in nursing; in-
stead they dominated the field. In the Court’s view, the state policy
did not compensate for discriminatory barriers facing women, but
it perpetuated the stereotype of nursing as a woman’s job.
‘‘[A]lthough the State recited a ‘benign, compensatory purpose,’ it
failed to establish that the alleged objective is the actual purpose
underlying the discriminatory classification.’’ 75 Even if the classi-
fication was premised on the proffered basis, the Court concluded,
it did not substantially and directly relate to the objective, because
the school permitted men to audit the nursing classes and women
could still be adversely affected by the presence of men. 76
72 Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316–18, 320 (1977). There was no doubt
that the provision sustained in Webster had been adopted expressly to relieve past
societal discrimination. The four Goldfarb dissenters concurred specially, finding no
difference between the two provisions. Id. at 321.
73 458 U.S. 718 (1982). Joining the opinion of the Court were Justices O’Connor,
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens. Dissenting were Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist. Id. at 733, 735.
74 Id. at 728.
75 Id. at 730. In addition to obligating the State to show that in fact there was
existing discrimination or effects from past discrimination, the Court also appeared
to take the substantial step of requiring the State ‘‘to establish that the legislature
intended the single-sex policy to compensate for any perceived discrimination.’’ Id.
at 730 n.16. A requirement that the proffered purpose be the actual one and that
it must be shown that the legislature actually had that purpose in mind would be
a notable stiffening of equal protection standards.
76 In the major dissent, Justice Powell argued that only a rational basis stand-
ard ought to be applied to sex classifications that would ‘‘expand women’s choices,’’
but that the exclusion here satisfied intermediate review because it promoted diver-
sity of educational opportunity and was premised on the belief that single-sex col-
Another area presenting some difficulty is that of the relation-

ship of pregnancy classifications to gender discrimination. In Cleve-
land Board of Education v. LaFluer, 77 a case decided upon due
process grounds, two school systems requiring pregnant school
teachers to leave work four and five months respectively before the
expected childbirths were found to have acted arbitrarily and irra-
tionally in establishing rules not supported by anything more
weighty than administrative convenience buttressed with some pos-
sible embarrassment of the school boards in the face of pregnancy.
On the other hand, the exclusion of pregnancy from a state fi-
nanced program of payments to persons disabled from employment
was upheld against equal protection attack as supportable by legiti-
mate state interests in the maintenance of a self-sustaining pro-
gram with rates low enough to permit the participation of low-in-
come workers at affordable levels. 78 The absence of supportable
reasons in one case and their presence in the other may well have
made the significant difference.
Illegitimacy.—After wrestling in a number of cases with the
question of the permissibility of governmental classifications
disadvantaging illegitimates and the standard for determining
which classifications are sustainable, the Court arrived at a stand-
ard difficult to state and even more difficult to apply. 79 Although
leges offer ‘‘distinctive benefits’’ to society. Id. at 735, 740 (emphasis by Justice),
743. The Court noted that because the State maintained no other single-sex public
university or college, the case did not present ‘‘the question of whether States can
provide ‘separate but equal’ undergraduate institutions for males and females,’’ id.
at 720 n.1, although Justice Powell thought the decision did preclude such institu-
tions. Id. at 742–44. See Vorchheimer v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 532 F. 2d 880
(3d Cir. 1976) (finding no equal protection violation in maintenance of two single-
sex high schools of equal educational offerings, one for males, one for females), aff’d
by an equally divided Court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977) (Justice Rehnquist not participat-
ing).
77 414 U.S. 632 (1974). Justice Powell concurred on equal protection grounds. Id.
at 651. See also Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44 (1975).
78 Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). The Court denied that the classifica-
tion was based upon ‘‘gender as such.’’ Classification was on the basis of pregnancy,
and while only women can become pregnant, that fact alone was not determinative.
‘‘The program divides potential recipients into two groups—pregnant woman and
nonpregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively female, the second in-
cludes members of both sexes.’’ Id. at 496 n.20. For a rejection of a similar at-
tempted distinction, see Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 9 (1977); and Trimble v.
Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 774 (1977). See also Phillips v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 400
U.S. 542 (1971). For the transmutation of Geduldig into statutory interpretation
and Congress’ response, see supra, p. 1876 n.41.
79 The first cases set the stage for the lack of consistency. Compare Levy v. Lou-
isiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), and Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S.
73 (1968), invalidating laws which precluded wrongful death actions in cases involv-
ing the child or the mother when the child was illegitimate, in which scrutiny was
strict, with Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971), involving intestate succession,
in which scrutiny was rational basis, and Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
‘‘illegitimacy is analogous in many respects to the personal charac-

teristics that have been held to be suspect when used as the basis
of statutory differentiations,’’ the analogy is ‘‘not sufficient to re-
quire ‘our most exacting scrutiny.’’’ The scrutiny to which it is enti-
tled is intermediate, ‘‘not a toothless [scrutiny],’’ but somewhere be-
tween that accorded race and that accorded ordinary economic clas-
sifications. Basically, the standard requires a determination of a le-
gitimate legislative aim and a careful review of how well the classi-
fication serves, or ‘‘fits,’’ the aim. 80 The common rationale of all the
illegitimacy cases is not clear, is in many respects not wholly con-
sistent, 81 but the theme that seems to be imposed on them by the
more recent cases is that so long as the challenged statute does not
so structure its conferral of rights, benefits, or detriments that
some illegitimates who would otherwise qualify in terms of the
statute’s legitimate purposes are disabled from participation, the
imposition of greater burdens upon illegitimates or some classes of
illegitimates than upon legitimates is permissible. 82
Intestate succession rights for illegitimates has divided the
Court over the entire period. At first adverting to the broad power
of the States over descent of real property, the Court employed re-
406 U.S. 164 (1972), involving a workmen’s compensation statute distinguishing be-
tween legitimates and illegitimates, in which scrutiny was intermediate.
80 Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 503–06 (1976); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S.
762, 766–67 (1977); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978). Scrutiny in previous
cases had ranged from negligible, Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971), to some-
thing approaching strictness, Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 631–632 (1974).
Mathews itself illustrates the uncertainty of statement, suggesting at one point that
the Labine standard may be appropriate, supra, at 506, and at another that the
standard appropriate to sex classifications is to be used, id. at 510, while observing
a few pages earlier that illegitimacy is entitled to less exacting scrutiny than either
race or sex. Id. at 506. Trimble settles on intermediate scrutiny but does not assess
the relationship between its standard and the sex classification standard. See
Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979), and Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380
(1979) (both cases involving classifications reflecting both sex and illegitimacy inter-
ests).
81 The major inconsistency arises from three 5-to–4 decisions. Labine v. Vincent,
401 U.S. 532 (1971), was largely overruled by Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762
(1977), which itself was substantially limited by Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
Justice Powell was the swing vote for different disposition of the latter two cases.
Thus, while four Justices argued for stricter scrutiny and usually invalidation of
such classifications, Lalli v. Lalli, supra, at 277 (Justices Brennan, White, Marshall,
and Stevens dissenting), and four favor relaxed scrutiny and usually sustaining the
classifications, Trimble v. Gordon, supra, 776, 777 (Chief Justice Burger and Jus-
tices Stewart, Blackmun, and Rehnquist dissenting), Justice Powell applied his own
intermediate scrutiny and selectively voided and sustained. See Lalli v. Lalli, supra,
(plurality opinion by Justice Powell).
82 A classification that absolutely distinguishes between legitimates and
illegitimates is not alone subject to such review; one that distinguishes among class-
es of illegitimates is also subject to it, Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 774 (1977),
as indeed are classifications based on other factors. E.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432
U.S. 1, 9 (1977) (alienage).
laxed scrutiny to sustain a law denying illegitimates the right to

share equally with legitimates in the estate of their common father,
who had acknowledged the illegitimates but who had died intes-
tate. 83 Labine was strongly disapproved, however, and virtually
overruled in Trimble v. Gordon, 84 which found an equal protection
violation in a statute allowing illegitimate children to inherit by in-
testate succession from their mothers but from their fathers only
if the father had ‘‘acknowledged’’ the child and the child had been
legitimated by the marriage of the parents. The father in Trimble
had not acknowledged his child, and had not married the mother,
but a court had determined that he was in fact the father and had
ordered that he pay child support. Carefully assessing the purposes
asserted to be the basis of the statutory scheme, the Court found
all but one to be impermissible or inapplicable and that one not
served closely enough by the restriction. First, it was impermissible
to attempt to influence the conduct of adults not to engage in illicit
sexual activities by visiting the consequences upon the offspring. 85
Second, the assertion that the statute mirrored the assumed intent
of decedents, in that, knowing of the statute’s operation, they
would have acted to counteract it through a will or otherwise, was
rejected as unproved and unlikely. 86 Third, the argument that the
law presented no insurmountable barrier to illegitimates inheriting
since a decedent could have left a will, married the mother, or
taken steps to legitimate the child, was rejected as inapposite. 87
Fourth, the statute did address a substantial problem, a permis-
sible state interest, presented by the difficulties of proving pater-
83 Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971). Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 406 U.S. 164, 170 (1972), had confined the analysis of Labine to the area of
state inheritance laws in expanding review of illegitimacy classifications.
84 430 U.S. 762 (1977). Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun,
and Rehnquist dissented, finding the statute ‘‘constitutionally indistinguishable’’

from the one sustained in Labine. Id. at 776. Justice Rehnquist also dissented sepa-
rately. Id. at 777.
85 Id. at 768–70. While this purpose had been alluded to in Labine v. Vincent,
401 U.S. 532, 538 (1971), it was rejected as a justification in Weber v. Aetna Cas-
ualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173, 175 (1972). Visiting consequences upon the
parent appears to be permissible. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 352–53 (1979).
86 Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 774–76 (1977). The Court cited the failure
of the state court to rely on this purpose and its own examination of the statute.
87 Id. at 773–74. This justification had been prominent in Labine v. Vincent, 401
U.S. 532, 539 (1971), and its absence had been deemed critical in Weber v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 170–71 (1972). The Trimble Court thought
this approach ‘‘somewhat of an analytical anomaly’’ and disapproved it. However,
the degree to which one could conform to the statute’s requirements and the reason-
ableness of those requirements in relation to a legitimate purpose are prominent in
Justice Powell’s reasoning in subsequent cases. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 266–74
(1978); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 359 (1979) (concurring). See also Nyquist
v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977) (alienage); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718, 723 n.8 (1982) (sex); and compare id. at 736 (Justice Powell dissenting).
nity and avoiding spurious claims. However, the court thought the
means adopted, total exclusion, did not approach the ‘‘fit’’ necessary
between means and ends to survive the scrutiny appropriate to this
classification. The state court was criticized for failing ‘‘to consider
the possibility of a middle ground between the extremes of com-
plete exclusion and case-by-case determination of paternity. For at
least some significant categories of illegitimate children of intestate
men, inheritance rights can be recognized without jeopardizing the
orderly settlement of estates or the dependability of titles to prop-
erty passing under intestacy laws.’’ 88 Because the state law did not
follow a reasonable middle ground, it was invalidated.
A reasonable middle ground was discerned, at least by Justice
Powell, in Lalli v. Lalli, 89 concerning a statute which permitted le-
gitimate children to inherit automatically from both their parents,
while illegitmates could inherit automatically only from their moth-
ers, and could inherit from their intestate fathers only if a court
of competent jurisdiction had, during the father’s lifetime, entered
an order declaring paternity. The child tendered evidence of pater-
nity, including a notarized document in which the putative father,
in consenting to his marriage, referred to him as ‘‘my son’’ and sev-
eral affidavits by persons who stated that the elder Lalli had open-
ly and frequently acknowledged that the younger Lalli was his
child. In the prevailing view, the single requirement of entry of a
court order during the father’s lifetime declaring the child as his
met the ‘‘middle ground’’ requirement of Trimble; it was addressed
closely and precisely to the substantial state interest of seeing to
the orderly disposition of property at death by establishing proof of
paternity of illegitimate children and avoiding spurious claims
against intestate estates. To be sure, some illegitimates who were
unquestionably established as children of the decreased would be
disqualified because of failure of compliance, but individual fair-
ness is not the test. The test rather is whether the requirement is
closely enough related to the interests served to meet the standard
88 Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770–73 (1977). The result is in effect a bal-
ancing one, the means-ends relationship must be a substantial one in terms of the
advantages of the classification as compared to the harms of the classification
means. Justice Rehnquist’s dissent is especially critical of this approach. Id. at 777,
781–86. Also not interfering with orderly administration of estates is application of
Trimble in a probate proceeding ongoing at the time Trimble was decided; the fact
that the death had occurred prior to Trimble was irrelevant. Reed v. Campbell, 476
U.S. 852 (1986).
89 439 U.S. 259 (1978). The four Trimble dissenters joined Justice Powell in the
result, although only two joined his opinion. Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist con-
curred because they thought Trimble wrongly decided and ripe for overruling. Id.
at 276. The four dissenters, who had joined the Trimble majority with Justice Pow-
ell, thought the two cases were indistinguishable. Id. at 277.
of rationality imposed. Also, no doubt the State’s interest could

have been served by permitting other kinds of proof, but that too
is not the test of the statute’s validity. Hence, the balancing neces-
sitated by the Court’s promulgation of standards in such cases
caused it to come to different results on closely related fact pat-
terns, making predictability quite difficult but perhaps manage-
able. 90
The Court’s difficulty in arriving at predictable results has ex-
tended outside the area of descent of property. Thus, a Texas child
support law affording legitimate children a right to judicial action
to obtain support from their fathers while not affording the right
to illegitimate children denied the latter equal protection. ‘‘A State
may not invidiously discriminate against illegitimate children by
denying them substantial benefits accorded children generally. We
therefore hold that once a State posits a judicially enforceable right
on behalf of children to needed support from their natural fathers
there is no constitutionally sufficient justification for denying such
an essential right to a child simply because its natural father has
not married its mother.’’ 91
Similarly, a federal Social Security provision was held invalid
which made eligible for benefits, because of an insured parent’s dis-
90 Illustrating the difficulty are two cases in which the fathers of illegitimate
children challenged statutes treating them differently than mothers of such children
were treated. In Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979), the majority viewed the
distinction as a gender-based one rather than as an illegitimacy classification and
sustained a bar to a wrongful death action by the father of an illegitimate child who
had not legitimated him; in Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1980), again view-
ing the distinction as a gender-based one, the majority voided a state law permitting
the mother but not the father of an illegitimate child to block his adoption by refus-
ing to consent. Both decisions were 5-to–4.
91 Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1978) (emphasis supplied). Following the
decision, Texas authorized illegitimate children to obtain support from their fathers.
But the legislature required as a first step that paternity must be judicially deter-
mined, and imposed a limitations period within which suit must be brought of one
year from birth of the child. If suit is not brought within that period the child could
never obtain support at any age from his father. No limitation was imposed on the
opportunity of a natural child to seek support, up to age 18. In Mills v. Habluetzel,
456 U.S. 91 (1982), the Court invalidated the one-year limitation. While a State has
an interest in avoiding stale or fraudulent claims, the limit must not be so brief as
to deny such children a reasonable opportunity to show paternity. Similarly, a 2-
year statute of limitations on paternity and support actions was held to deny equal
protection to illegitimates in Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983), and a 6-year limit
was struck down in Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988). In both cases the Court
pointed to the fact that increasingly sophisticated genetic tests are minimizing the
‘‘lurking problems with respect to proof of paternity’’ referred to in Gomez, 409 U.S.
at 538. Also, the state’s interest in imposing the 2-year limit was undercut by excep-
tions (e.g., for illegitimates receiving public assistance), and by different treatment
for minors generally; similarly, the importance of imposing a 6-year limit was belied
by that state’s more recent enactment of a non-retroactive 18-year limit for pater-
nity and support actions.
ability, all legitimate children as well as those illegitimate children

capable of inheriting personal property under state intestacy law
and those children who were illegitimate only because of a
nonobvious defect in their parents’ marriage, regardless of whether
they were born after the onset of the disability, but which made all
other illegitimate children eligible only if they were born prior to
the onset of disability and if they were dependent upon the parent
prior to the onset of disability. The Court deemed the purpose of
the benefits to be to aid all children and rejected the argument that
the burden on illigitimates was necessary to avoid fraud. 92
However, in a second case, an almost identical program, pro-
viding benefits to children of a deceased insured, was sustained be-
cause its purpose was found to be to give benefits to children who
were dependent upon the deceased parent and the classifications
served that purpose. Presumed dependent were all legitimate chil-
dren as well as those illegitimate children who were able to inherit
under state intestacy laws, who were illegitimate only because of
the technical invalidity of the parent’s marriage, who had been ac-
knowledged in writing by the father, who had been declared to be
the father’s by a court decision, or who had been held entitled to
the father’s support by a court. Illegitimate children not covered by
these presumptions had to establish that they were living with the
insured parent or were being supported by him when the parent
died. According to the Court, all the presumptions constituted an
administrative convenience which was a permissible device because
those illegitimate children who were entitled to benefits because
they were in fact dependent would receive benefits upon proof of
the fact and it was irrelevant that other children not dependent in
fact also received benefits. 93
92 Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974). But cf. Califano v. Boles, 443
U.S. 282 (1979). See also New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619
(1973) (limiting welfare assistance to households in which parents are ceremonially
married and the children are legitimate or adopted denied illegitimate children
equal protection); Richardson v. Davis, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972), aff’g 342 F. Supp. 588
(D. Conn.) (3-judge court), and Richardson v. Griffin, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972), aff’g 346
F. Supp. 1226 (D. Md.) (3-judge court) (Social Security provision entitling illegit-
imate children to monthly benefit payments only to extent that payments to widow
and legitimate children do not exhaust benefits allowed by law denies illegitimates
equal protection).
93 Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976). It can be seen that the only difference
between Jiminez and Lucas is that in the former the Court viewed the benefits as
owing to all children and not just to dependents, while in the latter the benefits
were viewed as owing only to dependents and not to all children. But it is not clear
that in either case the purpose determined to underlie the provision of benefits was
compelled by either statutory language or legislative history. For a particularly good
illustration of the difference such a determination of purpose can make and the way
the majority and dissent in a 5-to–4 decision read the purpose differently, see
Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979).
Fundamental Interests: The Political Process

‘‘The States have long been held to have broad powers to deter-
mine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be exer-
cised. . . , absent of course the discrimination which the Constitu-
tion condemns.’’ 94 The Constitution provides that the qualifications
of electors in congressional elections are to be determined by ref-
erence to the qualifications prescribed in the States for the electors
of the most numerous branch of the legislature, and the States are
authorized to determine the manner in which presidential electors
are selected. 95 The second section of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides for a proportionate reduction in a State’s representation in
the House when it denies the franchise to its qualified male citi-
zens 96 and specific discriminations on the basis of race, sex, and
age are addressed in other Amendments. ‘‘We do not suggest that
any standards which a State desires to adopt may be required of
voters. But there is wide scope for exercise of its jurisdiction. Resi-
dence requirements, age, previous criminal record . . . are obvious
examples indicating factors which a State may take into consider-
ation in determining the qualification of voters. The ability to read
and write likewise has some relation to standards designed to pro-
mote intelligent use of the ballot.’’ 97
The perspective of this 1959 opinion by Justice Douglas has
now been revolutionized. ‘‘Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a
fundamental matter in a free and democratic society. Especially
since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired
manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any
alleged infringement of the rights of citizens to vote must be care-
fully and meticulously scrutinized.’’ 98 ‘‘Any unjustified discrimina-
tion in determining who may participate in political affairs or in
the selection of public officials undermines the legitimacy of rep-
resentative government. . . . Statutes granting the franchise to
residents on a selective basis always pose the danger of denying
94 Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50–51 (1959).
95 Article I, § 2, cl. 1 (House of Representatives); Seventeenth Amendment (Sen-
ators); Article II, § 1, cl. 2 (presidential electors). See Article I, § 4, cl. 1 and discus-
sion supra, pp. 118–21.
96 Fourteenth Amendment, § 2. Justice Harlan argued that the inclusion of this
provision impliedly permitted the States to discriminate with only the prescribed
penalty in consequence and that therefore the equal protection clause was wholly
inapplicable to state election laws. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589 (1964) (dis-
senting); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 97 (1965) (dissenting); Oregon v. Mitchell,
400 U.S. 112, 152 (1970) (concurring and dissenting). Justice Brennan undertook a
rebuttal of this position in Oregon v. Mitchell, supra at 229, 250 (concurring and
dissenting). But see Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974), where § 2 was rel-
evant in precluding an equal protection challenge.
97 Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959).
98 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964).
some citizens any effective voice in the governmental affairs which

substantially affect their lives. Therefore, if a challenged state stat-
ute grants the right to vote to some bona fide residents of requisite
age and citizenship and denies the franchise to others, the Court
must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a
compelling state interest.
‘‘And, for these reasons, the deference usually given to the
judgment of legislators does not extend to decisions concerning
which resident citizens may participate in the election of legislators
and other public officials. . . . [W]hen we are reviewing statutes
which deny some residents the right to vote, the general presump-
tion of constitutionality afforded state statutes and the traditional
approval given state classifications if the Court can conceive of a
‘rational basis’ for the distinctions made are not applicable.’’ 99
Using this analytical approach, the Court has established a regime
of close review of a vast range of state restrictions on the eligibility
to vote, on access to the ballot by candidates and parties, and on
the weighing of votes cast through the devices of apportionment
and districting. Changes in Court membership over the years has
led to some relaxation in the application of principles, but even as
the Court has drawn back in other areas it has tended to preserve,
both doctrinally and in fact, the election cases. 100
Voter Qualifications.—A State may require residency as a
qualification to vote but since durational residency requirements
impermissibly restrict the right to vote and penalize the assertion
of the constitutional right to travel they are invalid. 101 The Court
indicated that the States have a justified interest in preventing
fraud and in facilitating determination of the eligibility of potential
99 Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626–28 (1969). See also Hill
v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 297 (1975). But cf. Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa,
439 U.S. 60 (1978).
100 Thus, in San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34–35 nn.74 &
78 (1973), a major doctrinal effort to curb the ‘‘fundamental interest’’ side of the
‘‘new’’ equal protection, the Court acknowledged that the right to vote did not come
within its prescription that rights to be deemed fundamental must be explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution. Nontheless, citizens have a ‘‘constitu-
tionally protected right to participate in elections’’ which is protected by the equal
protection clause. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972). The franchise is the
guardian of all other rights. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
101 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). Justice Blackmun concurred spe-
cially, id. at 360, Chief Justice Burger dissented, id. at 363, and Justices Powell and
Rehnquist did not participate. The voided statute imposed a requirement of one year
in the State and three months in the county. The Court did not indicate what dura-
tion less than ninety days would be permissible, although it should be noted that
in the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, 84 Stat. 316, 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa–
1, Congress prescribed a thirty-day period for purposes of voting in presidential elec-
tions. Note also that it does not matter whether one travels interstate or intrastate.
Hadnott v. Amos, 320 F. Supp. 107 (M.D. Ala. 1970), aff’d, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
registrants and granted that durational residency requirements

furthered these interests, but, it said, the State had not shown that
the requirements were ‘‘necessary,’’ that is that the interests could
not be furthered by means which imposed a lesser burden on the
right to vote. Other asserted interests—knowledgeability of voters,
common interests, intelligent voting—were said either not to be
served by the requirements or to be impermissible interests.
A 50-day durational residency requirement was sustained in
the context of the closing of the registration process at 50 days
prior to elections and of the mechanics of the State’s registration
process. The period, the Court found, was necessary to achieve the
State’s legitimate goals. 102
A State that exercised general criminal, taxing, and other ju-
risdiction over persons on certain federal enclaves within the State,
the Court held, could not treat these persons as nonresidents for
voting purposes. 103 A statute which provided that anyone who en-
tered military service outside the State could not establish voting
residence in the State so long as he remained in the military was
held to deny to such a person the opportunity such as all non-mili-
tary persons enjoyed of showing that he had established resi-
dence. 104 Restricting the suffrage to those persons who had paid a
poll tax was an invidious discrimination because it introduced a
‘‘capricious or irrelevant factor’’ of wealth or ability to pay into an
area in which it had no place. 105 Extending this ruling, the Court
held that the eligibility to vote in local school elections may not be
limited to persons owning property in the district or who have chil-
dren in school, 106 and denied States the right to restrict the vote
102 Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973). Registration was by volunteer work-
ers who made statistically significant errors requiring corrections by county record-
ers before certification. Primary elections were held in the fall, thus occupying the
time of the recorders, so that a backlog of registrations had to be processed before
the election. A period of 50 days rather than 30, the Court thought, was justifiable.
However, the same period was upheld for another State on the authority of Marston
in the absence of such justification, but it appeared that plaintiffs had not con-
troverted the State’s justifying evidence. Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973). Jus-
tices Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall dissented in both cases. Id. at 682, 688.
103 Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970).
104 Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
105 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). Justices Black, Har-
lan, and Stewart dissented. Id. at 670, 680. Poll tax qualifications had previously
been upheld in Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937); and Butler v. Thompson,
341 U.S. 937 (1951).
106 Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969). The Court assumed
without deciding that the franchise in some circumstances could be limited to those
‘‘primarily interested’’ or ‘‘primarily affected’’ by the outcome, but found that the re-
striction permitted some persons with no interest to vote and disqualified others
with an interest. Justices Stewart, Black, and Harlan dissented. Id. at 594.
to property owners in elections on the issuance of revenue bonds 107

or general obligation bonds. 108
However, the Court held that because the activities of a water
storage district fell so disproportionately on landowners as a group,
a limitation of the franchise in elections for the district’s board of
directors to landowners, whether resident or not and whether natu-
ral persons or not, excluding non-landowning residents and lessees
of land, and weighing the votes granted according to assessed valu-
ation of land, comported with equal protection standards. 109
Adverting to the reservation in prior local governmental unit elec-
tion cases 110 that some functions of such units might be so special-
ized as to permit deviation from the usual rules, the Court then
proceeded to assess the franchise restrictions according to the tra-
ditional standards of equal protection rather than by those of strict
scrutiny. 111 Also narrowly approached was the issue of the effect
of the District’s activities, the Court focusing upon the assessments
against landowners as the sole means of paying expenses rather
than additionally noting the impact upon lessees and non-
landowning residents of such functions as flood control. The ap-
proach taken in this case seems different in great degree from that
in prior cases and could in the future alter the results in other
local government cases. These cases were extended somewhat in
Ball v. James, 112 in which the Court sustained a system in which
voting eligibility was limited to landowners and votes were allo-
cated to these voters on the basis of the number of acres they
owned. The entity was a water reclamation district which stores
and delivers water to 236,000 acres of land in the State and sub-
sidizes its water operations by selling electricity to hundreds of
thousands of consumers in a nearby metropolitan area. The entity’s
107 Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969). Justices Black, Harlan, and
Stewart concurred specially. Id. at 707.

108 City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970). Justice Stewart and
Chief Justice Burger dissented. Id. at 215. In Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975),
the Court struck down a limitation on the right to vote on a general obligation bond
issue to persons who have ‘‘rendered’’ or listed real, mixed, or personal property for
taxation in the election district. It was not a ‘‘special interest’’ election since a gen-
eral obligation bond issue is a matter of general interest.
109 Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973). See also
Associated Enterprises v. Toltec Watershed Improv. Dist., 410 U.S. 743 (1973) (limi-
tation of franchise to property owners in the creation and maintenance of district
upheld). Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall dissented in both cases. Id. at
735, 745.
110 410 U.S. at 727–28.
111 Id. at 730, 732. Thus, the Court posited reasons that might have moved the
legislature to adopt the exclusions.

112 451 U.S. 355 (1981). Joining the opinion of the Court were Justices Stewart,
Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, and Chief Justice Burger. Dissenting were Justices
White, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. Id. at 374.
board of directors was elected through a system in which the eligi-

bility to vote was as described above. The Court thought the entity
was a specialized and limited form to which its general franchise
rulings did not apply. 113
Finding that prevention of ‘‘raiding’’—the practice whereby vot-
ers in sympathy with one party vote in another’s primary election
in order to distort that election’s results—is a legitimate and valid
state goal, as one element in the preservation of the integrity of the
electoral process, the Court sustained a state law requiring those
voters eligible at that time to register to enroll in the party of their
choice at least 30 days before the general election in order to be
eligible to vote in the party’s next primary election, 8 to 11 months
hence. The law did not impose a prohibition upon voting but mere-
ly imposed a time deadline for enrollment, the Court held, and it
was because of the plaintiffs’ voluntary failure to register that they
did not meet the deadline. 114 But a law which prohibited a person
from voting in the primary election of a political party if he has
voted in the primary election of any other party within the preced-
ing 23 months was subjected to strict scrutiny and was voided, in-
asmuch as it constituted a severe restriction upon a voter’s right
to associate with the party of his choice by requiring him to forgo
participation in at least one primary election in order to change
parties. 115 A less restrictive ‘‘closed primary’’ system was also in-
validated, the Court finding insufficient justification for a state’s
preventing a political party from allowing independents to vote in
its primary. 116
It must not be forgotten, however, that it is only when a State
extends the franchise to some and denies it to others that a ‘‘right
to vote’’ arises and is protected by the equal protection clause. If
a State chooses to fill an office by means other than through an
election, neither the equal protection clause nor any other constitu-
tional provision prevents it from doing so. Thus, in Rodriguez v.
113 The water district cases were distinguished in Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95,
109 (1989), the Court holding that a ‘‘board of freeholders’’ appointed to recommend
a reorganization of local government had a mandate ‘‘far more encompassing’’ than
land use issues, since its recommendations ‘‘affect[] all citizens . . . regardless of
land ownership.’’
114 Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973). Justices Powell, Douglas, Bren-
nan, and Marshall dissented. Id. at 763.

115 Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973). Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist
dissented. Id. at 61, 65.

116 Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208 (1986). Although
independents were allowed to register in a party on the day before a primary, the
state’s justifications for ‘‘protect[ing] the integrity of the Party against the Party it-
self’’ were deemed insubstantial. Id. at 224.
Popular Democratic Party, 117 the Court unanimously sustained a

Puerto Rico statute which authorized the political party to which
an incumbent legislator belonged to designate his successor in of-
fice until the next general election upon his death or resignation.
Neither the fact that the seat was filled by appointment nor the
fact that the appointment was by the party, rather than by the
Governor or some other official, raised a constitutional question.
The right of unconvicted jail inmates and convicted
misdemeanants (who typically are under no disability) to vote by
absentee ballot remains unsettled. In an early case applying ration-
al basis scrutiny, the Court held that the failure of a State to pro-
vide for absentee balloting by unconvicted jail inmates, when ab-
sentee ballots were available to other classes of voters, did not deny
equal protection when it was not shown that the inmates could not
vote in any other way. 118 Subsequently, the Court held unconstitu-
tional a statute denying absentee registration and voting rights to
persons confined awaiting trial or serving misdemeanor sentences,
but it is unclear whether the basis was the fact that persons con-
fined in jails outside the county of their residences could register
and vote absentee while those confined in the counties of their resi-
dences could not, or whether the statute’s jumbled distinctions
among categories of qualified voters on no rational standard made
it wholly arbitrary. 119
Access to the Ballot.—The equal protection clause applies to
state specification of qualifications for elective and appointive of-
fice. While one may ‘‘have no right’’ to be elected or appointed to
an office, all persons ‘‘do have a federal constitutional right to be
considered for public service without the burden of invidiously dis-
criminatory disqualification. The State may not deny to some the
privilege of holding public office that it extends to others on the
basis of distinctions that violate federal constitutional guaran-
117 457 U.S. 1 (1982). See also Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231 (1966) (legisla-
ture could select Governor from two candidates having highest number of votes cast
when no candidate received majority); Sailors v. Board of Elections, 387 U.S. 105
(1967) (appointment rather than election of county school board); Valenti v. Rocke-
feller, 292 F. Supp. 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (three-judge court), aff’d, 393 U.S. 405
(1969) (gubernatorial appointment to fill United States Senate vacancy).
118 McDonald v. Board of Election Comm’rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969). But see Goosby
v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512 (1973) (McDonald does not preclude challenge to absolute
prohibition on voting).
119 O’Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1974). See American Party of Texas v.
White, 415 U.S. 767, 794–95 (1974).

tees.’’ 120 In Bullock v. Carter, 121 the Court utilized a somewhat

modified form of the strict test in passing upon a filing fee system
for primary election candidates which imposed the cost of the elec-
tion wholly on the candidates and which made no alternative provi-
sion for candidates unable to pay the fees; the reason for applica-
tion of the standard, however, was that the fee system deprived
some classes of voters of the opportunity to vote for certain can-
didates and it worked its classifications along lines of wealth. The
system itself was voided because it was not reasonably connected
with the State’s interest in regulating the ballot and did not serve
that interest and because the cost of the election could be met out
of the state treasury, thus avoiding the discrimination. 122
Recognizing the state interest in maintaining a ballot of rea-
sonable length in order to promote rational voter choice, the Court
observed nonetheless that filing fees alone do not test the genuine-
ness of a candidacy or the extent of voter support for an aspirant.
Therefore, effectuation of the legitimate state interest must be
achieved by means that do not unfairly or unnecessarily burden the
party’s or the candidate’s ‘‘important interest in the continued
availability of political opportunity. The interests involved are not
merely those of parties or individual candidates; the voters can as-
sert their preferences only through candidates or parties or both
and it is this broad interest that must be weighed in the balance.’’
‘‘[T]he process of qualifying candidates for a place on the ballot
may not constitutionally be measured solely in dollars.’’ 123 In the
absence of reasonable alternative means of ballot access, the Court
held, a State may not disqualify an indigent candidate unable to
pay filing fees. 124
In Clements v. Fashing, 125 the Court sustained two provisions
of state law, one that barred certain officeholders from seeking
120 Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362–63 (1970) (voiding a property qualifica-
tion for appointment to local school board). See also Chappelle v. Greater Baton
Rouge Airport Dist., 431 U.S. 159 (1977) (voiding a qualification for appointment as
airport commissioner of ownership of real or personal property that is assessed for
taxes in the jurisdiction in which airport is located); Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95
(1989) (voiding property ownership requirement for appointment to board author-
ized to propose reorganization of local government). Cf. Snowden v. Hughes, 321
U.S. 1 (1944).
121 405 U.S. 134, 142–44 (1972).
122 Id. at 144–49.
123 Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974).
124 Concurring, Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist suggested that a reasonable
alternative would be to permit indigents to seek write-in votes without paying a fil-
ing fee, id. at 722, but the Court indicated this would be inadequate. Id. at 719 n.5.
125 457 U.S. 957 (1982). A plurality of four contended that save in two cir-
cumstances—ballot access classifications based on wealth and ballot access classi-

fications imposing burdens on new or small political parties or independent can-
didates—limitations on candidate access to the ballot merit only traditional rational
election to the legislature during the term of office for which they
had been elected or appointed, but that did not reach other office-
holders whose terms of office expired with the legislators’ terms
and did not bar legislators from seeking other offices during their
terms, and the other that automatically terminated the terms of
certain officeholders who announced for election to other offices,
but that did not apply to other officeholders who could run for an-
other office while continuing to serve. The Court was splintered in
such a way, however, that it is not possible to derive a principle
from the decision applicable to other fact situations.
In Williams v. Rhodes, 126 a complex statutory structure which
had the effect of keeping off the ballot all but the candidates of the
two major parties was struck down under the strict test because it
deprived the voters of the opportunity of voting for independent
and third-party candidates and because it seriously impeded the
exercise of the right to associate for political purposes. Similarly,
a requirement that an independent candidate for office in order to
obtain a ballot position must obtain 25,000 signatures, including
200 signatures from each of at least 50 of the State’s 102 counties,
was held to discriminate against the political rights of the inhab-
itants of the most populous counties, when it was shown that
93.4% of the registered voters lived in the 49 most populous coun-
ties. 127 But to provide that the candidates of any political organiza-
tion obtaining 20% or more of the vote in the last gubernatorial or
presidential election may obtain a ballot position simply by win-
ning the party’s primary election while requiring candidates of
other parties or independent candidates to obtain the signatures of
less than five percent of those eligible to vote at the last election
for the office sought is not to discriminate unlawfully, inasmuch as
basis scrutiny, because candidacy is not a fundamental right. The plurality found
both classifications met the standard. Id. at 962–73 (Justices Rehnquist, Powell,
O’Connor, and Chief Justice Burger). Justice Stevens concurred, rejecting the plu-
rality’s standard, but finding that inasmuch as the disparate treatment was based
solely on the State’s classification of the different offices involved, and not on the
characteristics of the persons who occupy them or seek them, the action did not vio-
late the equal protection clause. Id. at 973. The dissent primarily focused on the
First Amendment but asserted that the classifications failed even a rational basis
test. Id. at 976 (Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun).
126 393 U.S. 23 (1968). ‘‘[T]he totality of the Ohio restrictive laws taken as a
whole imposes a burden on voting and associational rights which we hold is an in-
vidious discrimination, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.’’ Id. at 34. Jus-
tices Douglas and Harlan would have relied solely on the First Amendment, id. at
35, 41, while Justices Stewart and White and Chief Justice Warren dissented. Id.
at 48, 61, 63.
127 Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969) (overruling MacDougall v. Green, 335
U.S. 281 (1948)).

the State placed no barriers of any sort in the way of obtaining sig-
natures and since write-in votes were also freely permitted. 128
Reviewing under the strict test the requirements for qualifica-
tion of new parties and independent candidates for ballot positions,
the Court recognized as valid objectives and compelling interests
the protection of the integrity of the nominating and electing proc-
ess, the promotion of party stability, and the assurance of a modi-
cum of order in regulating the size of the ballot by requiring a
showing of some degree of support for independents and new par-
ties before they can get on the ballot. 129 ‘‘[T]o comply with the
First and Fourteenth Amendments the State must provide a fea-
sible opportunity for new political organizations and their can-
didates to appear on the ballot.’’ 130 Decision whether or not a state
statutory structure affords a feasible opportunity is a matter of de-
gree, ‘‘very much a matter of ‘consider[ing] the facts and cir-
cumstances behind the law, the interest which the State claims to
be protecting, and the interest of those who are disadvantaged by
the classification.’ ’’ 131
Thus, in order to assure that parties seeking ballot space com-
mand a significant, measurable quantum of community support,
Texas was upheld in treating different parties in ways rationally
constructed to achieve this objective. Candidates of parties whose
gubernatorial choice polled more than 200,000 votes in the last
general election had to be nominated by primary elections and
went on the ballot automatically, because the prior vote adequately
demonstrated support. Candidates whose parties polled less than
200,000 but more than 2 percent could be nominated in primary
elections or in conventions. Candidates of parties not coming within
either of the first two categories had to be nominated in conven-
tions and could obtain ballot space only if the notarized list of par-
ticipants at the conventions totalled at least one percent of the
total votes cast for governor in the last preceding general election
or, failing this, if in the 55 succeeding days a requisite number of
qualified voters signed petitions to bring the total up to one percent
of the gubernatorial vote. [W]hat is demanded may not be so
exessive or impractical as to be in reality a mere device to always,
128 Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
129 Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); American Party of Texas v. White, 415
U.S. 767 (1974); Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S.
173 (1979). And see Indiana Communist Party v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441 (1974)
(impermissible to condition ballot access upon a political party’s willingness to sub-
scribe to oath that party ‘‘does not advocate the overthrow of local, state or national
government by force or violence,’’ opinion of Court based on First Amendment, four
Justices concurring on equal protection grounds).
130 Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 746 (1974).
131 Id. at 730 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968)).
or almost always, exclude parties with significant support from the

ballot,’’ but the Court thought that one percent, or 22,000 signa-
tures in 1972, ‘‘falls within the outer boundaries of support the
State may require.’’ 132 Similarly, independent candidates can be
required to obtain a certain number of signatures as a condition to
obtain ballot space. 133 A State may validly require that each voter
participate only once in each year’s nominating process and it may
therefore disqualify any person who votes in a primary election
from signing nominating or supporting petitions for independent
parties or candidates. 134 Equally valid is a state requirement that
a candidate for elective office, as an independent or in a regular
party, must not have been affiliated with a political party, or with
one other than the one of which he seeks its nomination, within
one year prior to the primary election at which nominations for the
general election are made. 135 So too, a state may limit access to
the general election ballot to candidates who received at least 1%
of the primary votes cast for the particular office. 136 But it is im-
permissible to print the names of the candidates of the two major
parties only on the absentee ballots, leaving off independents and
other parties. 137 Also invalidated was a requirement that inde-
pendent candidates for President and Vice-President file nominat-
ing petitions by March 20 in order to qualify for the November bal-
lot. 138
132 American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 783 (1974). In Storer v.
Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 738–40 (1974), the Court remanded so that the district court
could determine whether the burden imposed on an independent party was too se-
vere, it being required in 24 days in 1972 to gather 325,000 signatures from a pool
of qualified voters who had not voted in that year’s partisan primary elections. See
also Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979)
(voiding provision that required a larger number of signatures to get on ballot in
subdivisions than statewide).
133 American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 788–91 (1974). The percent-
ages varied with the office but no more than 500 signatures were needed in any
event.
134 Id. at 785–87.
135 Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 728–37 (1974). Dissenting, Justices Brennan,
Douglas and Marshall thought the state interest could be adequately served by a
shorter time period than a year before the primary election, which meant in effect
17 months before the general election. Id. at 755.
136 Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986).
137 American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 794–95 (1974). Upheld,
however, was state financing of the primary election expenses that excluded conven-
tion expenses of the small parties. Id. at 791–94. But the major parties had to hold
conventions simultaneously with the primary elections the cost of which they had
to bear. For consideration of similar contentions in the context of federal financing
of presidential elections, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93–97 (1976).
138 Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983). State interests in assuring
voter education, treating all candidates equally (candidates participating in a party

primary also had to declare candidacy in March), and preserving political stability,
were deemed insufficient to justify the substantial impediment to independent can-
didates and their supporters.
Apportionment and Districting.—Prior to 1962, attacks in

federal courts on the drawing of boundaries for congressional and
legislative election districts or the apportionment of seats to pre-
viously existing units ran afoul of the ‘‘political question’’ doc-
trine. 139 But Baker v. Carr 140 reinterpreted the doctrine in consid-
erable degree and opened the federal courts to voter complaints
founded on unequally populated voting districts. Wesberry v. Sand-
ers 141 found in Article I, § 2, of the Constitution a command that
in the election of Members of the House of Representatives districts
were to be made up of substantially equal numbers of persons. In
six decisions handed down on June 15, 1964, the Court required
the alteration of the election districts for practically all the legisla-
tive bodies in the United States. 142
‘‘We hold that, as a basic constitutional standard, the Equal
Protection Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a bi-
cameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population
basis. Simply stated, an individual’s right to vote for state legisla-
tors is unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in a substan-
tial fashion diluted when compared with the votes of citizens living
in other parts of the State.’’ 143 What was required was that each
139 Supra, pp. 687–98. Applicability of the doctrine to cases of this nature was
left unresolved in Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932), and Wood v. Broom, 287
U.S. 1 (1932), was supported by only a plurality in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S.
549 (1946), but became the position of the Court in subsequent cases. Cook v.
Fortson, 329 U.S. 675 (1946); Colegrove v. Barrett, 330 U.S. 804 (1947); MacDougall
v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948); South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950); Hartsfield v.
Sloan, 357 U.S. 916 (1958).
140 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
141 376 U.S. 1 (1964). Supra, pp. 106–08. Striking down a county unit system
of electing a governor, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Douglas, had already

coined a variant phrase of the more popular ‘‘one man, one vote.’’ ‘‘The conception
of political equality from the Declaration of Independence to Lincoln’s Gettysburg
Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only
one thing—one person, one vote.’’ Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963).
142 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S.
633 (1964); Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964);
Donis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); Lucas
v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713 (1964). In the last case,
the Court held that approval of the apportionment plan in a vote of the people was
insufficient to preserve it from constitutional attack. ‘‘An individual’s constitu-
tionally protected right to cast an equally weighed vote cannot be denied even by
a vote of a majority of a State’s electorate, if the apportionment scheme adopted by
the voters fails to measure up to the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause.’’
Id. at 736. Justice Harlan dissented wholly, denying that the equal protection clause
had any application at all to apportionment and districting and contending that the
decisions were actually the result of a ‘‘reformist’’ nonjudicial attitude on the part
of the Court. 377 U.S. at 589. Justices Stewart and Clark dissented in two and con-
curred in four cases on the basis of their view that the equal protection clause was
satisfied by a plan that was rational and that did not systematically frustrate the
majority will. 377 U.S., 741, 744.
143 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
State ‘‘make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts,

in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as
is practicable. We realize that it is a practical impossibility to ar-
range legislative districts so that each one has an identical number
of residents, or citizens, or voters. Mathematical exactness or preci-
sion is hardly a workable constitutional requirement.’’ 144
Among the principal issues raised by these decisions were
which units were covered by the principle, to what degree of
exactness population equality had to be achieved, and to what
other elements of the apportionment and districting process the
equal protection clause extended.
The first issue has largely been resolved, although some few
problem areas persist. It has been held that a school board the
members of which were appointed by boards elected in units of dis-
parate populations and which exercised only administrative powers
rather than legislative powers was not subject to the principle of
the apportionment ruling. 145 Avery v. Midland County 146 held that
when a State delegates lawmaking power to local government and
provides for the election by district of the officials to whom the
power is delegated, the districts must be established of substan-
tially equal populations. But in Hadley v. Junior College Dis-
trict, 147 the Court abandoned much of the limitation which was ex-
plicit in these two decisions and held that whenever a State choos-
es to vest ‘‘governmental functions’’ in a body and to elect the mem-
bers of that body from districts, the districts must have substan-
tially equal populations. The ‘‘governmental functions’’ should not
be characterized as ‘‘legislative’’ or ‘‘administrative’’ or necessarily
important or unimportant; it is the fact that members of the body
are elected from districts which triggers the application. 148
144 Id. at 577.
145 Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105 (1967).
146 390 U.S. 474 (1968). Justice Harlan continued his dissent from the Reynolds
line of cases, id. at 486, while Justices Fortas and Stewart called for a more discern-
ing application and would not have applied the principle to the county council here.
Id. at 495, 509.
147 397 U.S. 50 (1970). The governmental body here was the board of trustees
of a junior college district. Justices Harlan and Stewart and Chief Justice Burger
dissented. Id. at 59, 70.
148 The Court observed that there might be instances ‘‘in which a State elects
certain functionaries whose duties are so far removed from normal governmental ac-
tivities and so disproportionately affect different groups that a popular election in
compliance with Reynolds supra, might not be required. . . .’’ Id. at 56. For cases
involving such units, see Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S.
719 (1973); Associated Enterprises v. Toltec Watershed Imp. Dist., 410 U.S. 743
(1973); Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981). Judicial districts need not comply with
Reynolds. Wells v. Edwards, 347 F. Supp. 453 (M.D. La. 1972) (three-judge court),
aff’d. per curiam, 409 U.S. 1095 (1973).
The second issue has been largely but not precisely resolved.
In Swann v. Adams, 149 the Court set aside a lower court ruling
‘‘for the failure of the State to present or the District Court to ar-
ticulate acceptable reasons for the variations among the popu-
lations of the various legislative districts. . . . De minimis devi-
ations are unavoidable, but variations of 30% among senate dis-
tricts and 40% among house districts can hardly be deemed de
minimis and none of our cases suggests that differences of this
magnitude will be approved without a satisfactory explanation
grounded on acceptable state policy.’’ Two congressional district
cases were disposed of on the basis of Swann, 150 but when the
Court ruled that no congressional districting could be approved
without a ‘‘good-faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equal-
ity’’ or the justification of ‘‘each variance, no matter how small, 151
it did not then purport to utilize this standard in judging legisla-
tive apportionment and districting. 152 And in Abate v. Mundt 153
the Court approved a plan for apportioning a county governing
body which permitted a substantial population disparity, explain-
ing that in the absence of a built-in bias tending to favor any par-
ticular area or interest, a plan could take account of localized fac-
tors in justifying deviations from equality which might in other cir-
cumstances cause the invalidation of a plan. 154 The total popu-
lation deviation allowed in Abate was 11.9%; the Court refused,
149 385 U.S. 440, 443–44 (1967). See also Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967).
150 Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 385 U.S. 450 (1967); Duddleston v. Grills, 385 U.S.
455 (1967).
151 Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530–31 (1969); Wells v. Rockefeller,
394 U.S. 542 (1969). Supra, pp. 107–08. The Court has continued to adhere to this
strict standard for congressional districting, voiding a plan in which the maximum
deviation between largest and smallest district was 0.7%, or 3,674 persons. Karcher
v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983) (rejecting assertion that deviations less than esti-
mated census error are necessarily permissible).
152 The Court relied on Swann in disapproving of only slightly smaller devi-
ations (roughly 28% and 25%) in Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 161–63 (1971).
In Connor v. Williams, 404 U.S. 549, 550 (1972), the Court said of plaintiffs’ reliance
on Preisler and Wells that ‘‘these decisions do not squarely control the instant ap-
peal since they do not concern state legislative apportionment, but they do raise
substantial questions concerning the constitutionality of the District Court’s plan as
a design for permanent apportionment.’’
153 403 U.S. 182 (1971).
154 It should also be noted that while the Court has used total population fig-
ures for purposes of computing variations between districts, it did approve in Burns
v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966), the use of eligible voter population as the basis
for apportioning in the context of a State with a large transient military population,
but with the caution that such a basis would be permissible only so long as the re-
sults did not diverge substantially from that obtained by using a total population
base. Merely discounting for military populations was disapproved in Davis v.
Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 691 (1964), but whether some more precise way of distinguish-
ing between resident and nonresident population would be constitutionally permis-
sible is unclear. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 534 (1969); Hadley v. Junior
College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 57 n.9 (1970).
however, to extend Abate to approve a total deviation of 78% re-

sulting from an apportionment plan providing for representation of
each of New York City’s five boroughs on the New York City Board
of Estimate. 155
Nine years after Reynolds v. Sims, the Court reexamined the
population equality requirement of the apportionment cases. Rely-
ing upon language in prior decisions that distinguished legislative
apportionment from congressional districting as possibly justifying
different standards of permissible deviations from equality, the
Court held that more flexibility is constitutionally permissible with
respect to the former than to the latter. 156 But it was in determin-
ing how much greater flexibility was permissible that the Court
moved in new directions. First, applying the traditional standard
of rationality rather than the strict test of compelling necessity, the
Court held that a maximum 16.4% deviation from equality of popu-
lation was justified by the State’s policy of maintaining the integ-
rity of political subdivision lines, or according representation to
subdivisions qua subdivisions, because the legislature was respon-
sible for much local legislation. 157 Second, just as the first case
‘‘demonstrates, population deviations among districts may be suffi-
ciently large to require justification but nonetheless be justified
and legally sustainable. It is now time to recognize . . . that minor
deviations from mathematical equality among state legislative dis-
tricts are insufficient to make out a prima facie case of invidious
155 New York City Bd. of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989). Under the
plan each of the City’s five boroughs was represented on the board by its president
and each of these members had one vote; three citywide elected officials (the mayor,
the comptroller, and the president of the city council) were also placed on the board
and given two votes apiece (except that the mayor had no vote on the acceptance
or modification of his budget proposal). The Court also ruled that, when measuring
population deviation for a plan that mixes at-large and district representation, the
at-large representation must be taken into account. Id. at 699–701.
156 Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 320–25 (1973).
157 Id. at 325–30. The Court indicated that a 16.4% deviation ‘‘may well ap-
proach tolerable limits.’’ Id. at 329. Dissenting, Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Mar-
shall would have voided the plan; additionally, they thought the deviation was actu-
ally 23.6% and that the plan discriminated geographically against one section of the
State, an issue not addressed by the Court. In Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 21–
26 (1975), holding that a 20% variation in a court-developed plan was not justified,
the Court indicated that such a deviation in a legislatively-produced plan would be
quite difficult to justify. See also Summers v. Cenarrusa, 413 U.S. 906 (1973)
(vacating and remanding for further consideration the approval of a 19.4% devi-
ation). In Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983), the Court held that a consistent
state policy assuring each county at least one representative can justify substantial
deviation from population equality when only the marginal impact of representation
for the state’s least populous county was challenged (the effect on plaintiffs, voters
in larger districts, was that they would elect 28 of 64 members rather than 28 of
63), but there was indication in Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion that a broad-
er-based challenge to the plan, which contained a 16% average deviation and an
89% maximum deviation, could have succeeded.
discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment so as to require

justification by the State.’’ 158 This recognition of a de minimis devi-
ation, below which no justification was necessary, was mandated,
the Court felt, by the margin of error in census statistics, by the
population change over the ten-year life of an apportionment, and
by the relief it afforded federal courts able thus to avoid over-in-
volvement in essentially a political process. The ‘‘goal of fair and
effective representation’’ is furthered by eliminating gross popu-
lation variations among districts, but it is not achieved by mathe-
matical equality solely. Other relevant factors are to be taken into
account. 159 But when a judicially-imposed plan is to be formulated
upon state default, it ‘‘must ordinarily achieve the goal of popu-
lation equality with little more than de minimis variation’’ and de-
viations from approximate population equality must be supported
by enunciation of historically significant state policy or unique fea-
tures. 160
Gerrymandering and the permissible use of multimember dis-
tricts present examples of the third major issue. It is clear that ra-
cially based gerrymandering is unconstitutional under the Fif-
teenth Amendment, at least when it is accomplished through the
manipulation of district lines. 161 Partisan gerrymandering raised
more difficult issues. Several lower courts ruled that the issue was
beyond judicial cognizance, 162 and the Supreme Court itself, up-
holding an apportionment plan frankly admitted to have been
drawn with the intent to achieve a rough approximation of the
158 Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 745 (1973). The maximum deviation
was 7.83%. The Court did not precisely indicate at what point a deviation had to
be justified, but it applied the de minimis standard in White v. Regester, 412 U.S.
755 (1973), in which the maximum deviation was 9.9%. ‘‘Very likely, larger dif-
ferences between districts would not be tolerable without justifications.’’ Id. at 764.
Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall dissented. See also Brown v. Thomson,
462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983): ‘‘Our decisions have established, as a general matter, that
an apportionment plan with a maximum population deviation under 10% falls with-
in [the] category of minor deviations [insufficient to make out a prima facie case].’’
159 Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 748 (1973). By contrast, the Court has
held that estimated margin of error for census statistics does not justify deviation
from population equality in congressional districting. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S.
725 (1983).
160 Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 21–27 (1975). The Court did say that court-
ordered reapportionment of a state legislature need not attain the mathematical

preciseness required for congressional redistricting. Id. at 27 n.19. Apparently,
therefore, the Court’s reference to both ‘‘de minimis’’ variations and ‘‘approximate
population equality’’ must be read as referring to some range approximating the
Gaffney principle. See also Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977).
161 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S.
52 (1964); Sims v. Baggett, 247 F. Supp. 96 (M.D. Ala. 1965) (three-judge court).
162 E.g., WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 238 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (three-judge
court), aff’d, 382 U.S. 4 (1965); Sincock v. Gately, 262 F. Supp. 739 (D. Del. 1967)
(three-judge court).
statewide political strengths of the two parties, recognized the goal

as legitimate and observed that, while the manipulation of appor-
tionment and districting is not wholly immune from judicial scru-
tiny, ‘‘we have not ventured far or attempted the impossible task
of extirpating politics from what are the essentially political proc-
esses of the sovereign States.’’ 163
More recently, however, in a decision of potentially major im-
port reminiscent of Baker v. Carr, the Court in Davis v.
Bandemer 164 ruled that partisan gerrymandering in state legisla-
tive redistricting is justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause.
But although the vote was 6 to 3 in favor of justiciability, a major-
ity of Justices could not agree on the proper test for determining
whether particular gerrymandering is unconstitutional, and the
lower court’s holding of unconstitutionality was reversed by vote of
7 to 2. 165 Thus, while courthouse doors are now ajar for claims of
partisan gerrymandering, it is unclear what it will take to succeed
on the merits. On the justiciability issue, the Court viewed the ‘‘po-
litical question’’ criteria as no more applicable than they had been
in Baker v. Carr. Because Reynolds v. Sims had declared ‘‘fair and
effective representation for all citizens’’ 166 to be ‘‘the basic aim of
legislative apportionment,’’ and because racial gerrymandering is-
sues had been treated as justiciable, the Court viewed the rep-
resentational issues raised by partisan gerrymandering as indistin-
guishable. Agreement as to the existence of ‘‘judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving’’ gerrymandering issues,
however, did not result in a consensus as to what those standards
are. 167 While a majority of Justices agreed that discriminatory ef-
163 Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 751, 754 (1973).
164 478 U.S. 109 (1986). The vote on justiciability was 6–3, with Justice White’s
opinion of the Court being joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell,
and Stevens. This represented an apparent change of view by 3 of the majority Jus-
tices, who just 2 years earlier had denied that ‘‘the existence of noncompact or ger-
rymandered districts is by itself a constitutional violation.’’ Karcher v. Daggett, 466
U.S. 910, 917 (1983) (Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White and Marshall, dis-
senting from denial of stay in challenge to district court’s rejection of a remedial dis-
tricting plan on the basis that it contained ‘‘an intentional gerrymander’’).
165 Only Justices Powell and Stevens thought the Indiana redistricting plan
void; Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, thought
the record inadequate to demonstrate continuing discriminatory impact, and Justice
O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Burger and by Justice Rehnquist, would have
ruled that partisan gerrymandering is nonjusticiable as constituting a political ques-
tion not susceptible to manageable judicial standards.
166 377 U.S. 533, 565–66 (1964). This phrase has had a life of its own in the
commentary. See D. Alfange, Jr., Gerrymandering and the Constitution: Into the
Thorns of the Thicket at Last, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 175, and sources cited therein.
It is not clear from its original context, however, that the phrase was coined with
such broad application in mind.
167 The quotation is from the Baker v. Carr measure for existence of a political
question, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).

fect as well as discriminatory intent must be shown, there was sig-

nificant disagreement as to what constitutes discriminatory effect.
Justice White’s plurality opinion suggested that there need be ‘‘evi-
dence of continued frustration of the will of a majority of the voters
or effective denial to a minority of voters of a fair chance to influ-
ence the political process.’’ 168 Moreover, continued frustration of
the chance to influence the political process can not be dem-
onstrated by the results of only one election; there must be a his-
tory of disproportionate results or a finding that such results will
continue. Justice Powell, joined by Justice Stevens, did not formu-
late a strict test, but suggested that ‘‘a heavy burden of proof’’
should be required, and that courts should look to a variety of fac-
tors as they relate to ‘‘the fairness of a redistricting plan’’ in deter-
mining whether it contains invalid gerrymandering. Among these
factors are the shapes of the districts, adherence to established
subdivision lines, statistics relating to vote dilution, the nature of
the legislative process by which the plan was formulated, and evi-
dence of intent revealed in legislative history. 169
It had been thought that the use of multimember districts to
submerge racial, ethnic, and political minorities might be treated
differently, 170 but in Whitcomb v. Chavis 171 the Court, while deal-
ing with the issue on the merits, so enveloped it in strict standards
of proof and definitional analysis as to raise the possibility that it
might be beyond judicial review.
In Chavis the Court held that inasmuch as the multimember
districting represented a state policy of more than 100 years ob-
servance and could not therefore be said to be motivated by racial
or political bias, only an actual showing that the multimember del-
egation in fact inadequately represented the allegedly submerged
minority would suffice to raise a constitutional question. But the
Court also rejected as impermissible the argument that any inter-
est group had any sort of right to be represented in a legislative
body, in proportion to its members’ numbers or on some other
basis, so that the failure of that group to elect anyone merely
meant that alone or in combination with other groups it simply
lacked the strength to obtain enough votes, whether the election be
168 478 U.S. at 133. Joining in this part of the opinion were Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun.

169 478 U.S. at 173. A similar approach had been proposed in Justice Stevens’
concurring opinion in Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 744 (1983).

170 Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S.
73, 88–89 (1965); Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120, 125 n.3 (1967).
171 403 U.S. 124 (1971). Justice Harlan concurred specially, id. at 165, and Jus-
tices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, dissented, finding racial discrimination in

the operation of the system. Id. at 171.
in single-member or in multimember districts. That fact of life was

not of constitutional dimension, whether the group was composed
of blacks, or Republicans or Democrats, or some other category of
persons. Thus, the submerging argument was rejected, as was the
argument of a voter in another county that the Court should re-
quire uniform single-member districting in populous counties be-
cause voters in counties which elected large delegations in blocs
had in effect greater voting power than voters in other districts;
this argument the Court found too theoretical and too far removed
from the actualities of political life.
Subsequently, and surprisingly in light of Chavis, the Court in
White v. Regester 172 affirmed a district court invalidation of the use
of multimember districts in two Texas counties on the ground that,
when considered in the totality of the circumstances of discrimina-
tion in registration and voting and in access to other political op-
portunities, such use denied African Americans and Mexican Amer-
icans the opportunity to participate in the election process in a reli-
able and meaningful manner. 173
Doubt was cast on the continuing vitality of White v. Regester,
however, by the badly split opinion of the Court in City of Mobile
v. Bolden. 174 A plurality undermined the earlier case in two re-
spects, although it is not at all clear that a majority of the Court
had been or could be assembled on either point. First, the plurality
argued that an intent to discriminate on the part of the redistrict-
ing body must be shown before multimember districting can be
held to violate the equal protection clause. 175 Second, the plurality
read White v. Regester as being consistent with this principle and
the various factors developed in that case to demonstrate the exist-
ence of unconstitutional discrimination to be in fact indicia of in-
tent; however, the plurality seemingly disregarded the totality of
172 412 U.S. 755, 765–70 (1973).
173 ‘‘To sustain such claims, it is not enough that the racial group allegedly dis-
criminated against has not had legislative seats in proportion to its voting potential.
The plaintiffs’ burden is to produce evidence to support findings that the political
processes leading to nomination and election were not equally open to participation
by the group in question—that its members had less opportunity than did other
residents in the district to participate in the political processes and to elect legisla-
tors of their choice.’’ Id. at 765–66.
174 446 U.S. 55 (1980). On Congress’ response to the case, see supra, pp. 1818–
19; infra, p. 1936.

175 Id. at 65–68 (Justices Stewart, Powell, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger).
On intent versus impact analysis, see supra, pp. 1815–20. Justices Blackmun and
Stevens concurred on other grounds, id. at 80, 83, and Justices White, Brennan, and
Marshall dissented. Id. at 94, 103. Justice White agreed that purposeful discrimina-
tion must be found, id. at 101, while finding it to have been shown, Justice
Blackmun assumed that intent was required, and Justices Stevens, Brennan, and
Marshall would not so hold.
circumstances test utilized in Regester and evaluated instead

whether each factor alone was sufficient proof of intent. 176
Again switching course, the Court in Rogers v. Lodge 177 ap-
proved the findings of the lower courts that a multimember elec-
toral system for electing a county board of commissioners was
being maintained for a racially discriminatory purpose, although it
had not been instituted for that purpose. Applying a totality of the
circumstances test, and deferring to lower court factfinding, the
Court, in an opinion by one of the Mobile dissenters, canvassed a
range of factors which it held could combine to show a discrimina-
tory motive, and largely overturned the limitations which the Mo-
bile plurality had attempted to impose in this area. With the enact-
ment of federal legislation specifically addressed to the issue of
multimember districting and dilution of the votes of racial minori-
ties, however, it may be that the Court will have little further op-
portunity to develop the matter in the context of constitutional liti-
gation. 178 In Thornburg v. Gingles, 179 the Court held that
multimember districting violates § 2 of the Voting Rights Act by di-
luting the voting power of a racial minority when that minority is
‘‘sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a ma-
jority in a single-member district,’’ when it is politically cohesive,
and when block voting by the majority ‘‘usually’’ defeats preferred
candidates of the minority.
Finally, it should be said that the Court has approved the dis-
cretionary exercise of equity powers by the lower federal courts in
drawing district boundaries and granting other relief in districting
and apportionment cases, 180 although that power is bounded by
176 Id. at 68–74. Four Justices rejected this view of the plurality, while Justice
Stevens also appeared to do so but followed a mode of analysis significantly different

than that of any other Justice.
177 458 U.S. 613 (1982). Joining the opinion of the Court were Justices White,
Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, O’Connor, and Chief Justice Burger. Dissenting were
Justices Powell and Rehnquist, id. at 628, and Justice Stevens. Id. at 631.
178 On the legislation, see supra, pp. 1818–19; infra, p. 1936.
179 478 U.S. 30, 50–51 (1986). Use of multimember districting for purposes of
political gerrymandering was at issue in Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986),
decided the same day as Gingles, but there was no agreement as to the appropriate
constitutional standard. A plurality led by Justice White relied on the Whitcomb v.
Chavis reasoning, suggesting that proof that multimember districts were con-
structed for the advantage of one political party falls short of the necessary showing
of deprivation of opportunity to participate in the electoral process. 478 U.S. at 136–
37. Two Justices thought the proof sufficient for a holding of invalidity, the minority
party having won 46% of the vote but only 3 of 21 seats from the multimember dis-
tricts, and ‘‘the only discernible pattern [being] the appearance of these districts in
areas where their winner-take-all aspects can best be employed to debase [one par-
ty’s] voting strength,’’ (id. at at 179–80, Justices Powell and Stevens), and three Jus-
tices thought political gerrymandering claims to be nonjusticiable.
180 E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586–87 (1964); Sixty-Seventh Min-
nesota State Senate v. Beens, 406 U.S. 187, 195–200 (1972); White v. Weiser, 412
the constitutional violations found, so that courts do not have carte

blanche, and they should ordinarily respect the structural decisions
made by state legislatures and the state constitutions. 181
Weighing of Votes.—It is not the weighing of votes but the
manner in which it is done which brings the equal protection
clause into play. Gray v. Sanders 182 struck down the Georgia coun-
ty unit system under which each county was allocated either two,
four, or six votes in statewide elections and the candidate carrying
the county received those votes. Since there were a few very popu-
lous counties and scores of poorly-populated ones, the rural coun-
ties in effect dominated statewide elections and candidates with
popular majorities statewide could be and were defeated. But Gor-
don v. Lance 183 approved a provision requiring a 60 percent affirm-
ative vote in a referendum election before constitutionally pre-
scribed limits on bonded indebtedness or tax rates could be ex-
ceeded. The Court acknowledged that the provision departed from
strict majority rule but stated that the Constitution did not pre-
scribe majority rule; it instead proscribed discrimination through
dilution of voting power or denial of the franchise because of some
class characteristic—race, urban residency, or the like—while the
provision in issue was neither directed to nor affected any identifi-
able class.
The Right to Travel

Durational Residency Requirements.—A durational resi-
dency requirement creates two classes of persons: those who have
been within the State for the prescribed period and those who have
not been. 1 But persons who have moved recently, at least from
U.S. 783, 794–95 (1973); Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 41–42 (1982). When courts
draw their own plans, the court is held to tighter standards than is a legislature
and has to observe smaller population deviations and utilize single-member districts
more than multimember ones. Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690, 692 (1971); Chap-
man v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 14–21 (1975); Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 540 (1978).
Cf. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 333 (1973).
181 E.g., Sixty-Seventh Minnesota State Senate v. Beens, 406 U.S. 187 (1972)
(reduction of numbers of members); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 160–61

(1971) (disregard of policy of multimember districts not found unconstitutional);
White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 794–95 (1973); Upham v. Seamon, 406 U.S. 37
(1982). But see Karcher v. Daggett, 466 U.S. 910 (1983) (denying cert. over dissent’s
suggestion that court-adopted congressional districting plan had strayed too far from
the structural framework of the legislature’s invalidated plan).
182 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
183 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
1 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 334 (1972). Inasmuch as the right to travel
is implicated by state distinctions between residents and nonresidents, the relevant

constitutional provision is the privileges and immunities clause, Article IV, § 2, cl.
1.
State to State, 2 have exercised a right protected by the Constitu-

tion of the United States, and the durational residency classifica-
tion either deters the exercise of the right or penalizes those who
have exercised the right. 3 Any such classification is invalid ‘‘unless
shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental inter-
est.’’ 4 The constitutional right to travel has long been recognized, 5
but it is only relatively recently that the strict standard of equal
protection review has been applied to nullify those durational resi-
dency provisions which have been brought before the Court.
Thus, in Shapiro v. Thompson, 6 durational residency require-
ments conditioning eligibility for welfare assistance on one year’s
residence in the State 7 were voided. If the purpose of the require-
ments was to inhibit migration by needy persons into the State or
to bar the entry of those who came from low-paying States to high-
er-paying ones in order to collect greater benefits, the Court said,
the purpose was impermissible. 8 If on the other hand the purpose
was to serve certain administrative and related governmental ob-
jectives—the facilitation of the planning of budgets, the provision
of an objective test of residency, minimization of opportunity for
fraud, and encouragement of early entry of new residents into the
labor force—the requirements were rationally related to the pur-
2 Intrastate travel is protected to the extent that the classification fails to meet
equal protection standards in some respect. Compare Hadnott v. Amos, 320 F. Supp.
107 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (three-judge court), aff’d. per curiam, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972),
with Arlington County Bd. v. Richards, 434 U.S. 5 (1977). The same principle ap-
plies in the commerce clause cases, in which discrimination may run against in-
state as well as out-of-state concerns. Cf. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S.
349 (1951).
3 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629–31, 638 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 U.S. 330, 338–42 (1972); Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250
(1974); Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 420–21 (1981). See also Oregon v. Mitchell,
400 U.S. 112, 236–39 (1970) (Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall), and id. at
285–92 (Justices Stewart and Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger).
4 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (emphasis by Court); Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375–76 (1971).

5 Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868); Edwards v. California, 314
U.S. 160 (1941) (both cases in context of direct restrictions on travel). The source
of the right to travel and the reasons for reliance on the equal protection clause are
questions puzzled over and unresolved by the Court. United States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745, 758, 759 (1966), and id. at 763–64 (Justice Harlan concurring and dissent-
ing), id. at 777 n.3 (Justice Brennan concurring and dissenting); Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618, 629–31 (1969), and id. at 671 (Justice Harlan dissenting); San
Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 31–32 (1973); Jones v. Helms, 452
U.S. 412, 417–19 (1981); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60 & n.6 (1982), and id.
at 66–68 (Justice Brennan concurring), 78–81 (Justice O’Connor concurring).
6 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
7 The durational residency provision established by Congress for the District of
Columbia was also voided. Id. at 641–42.

8 Id. at 627–33. Gaddis v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 717 (N.D.N.Y. 1969), aff’d sub
nom. Wyman v. Bowens, 397 U.S. 49 (1970), struck down a provision construed so
as to bar only persons who came into the State solely to obtain welfare assistance.
pose but they were not compelling enough to justify a classification

which infringed on a fundamental interest. 9 Similarly, in Dunn v.
Blumstein, 10 where the durational residency requirements denied
the franchise to newcomers, the assertion of such administrative
justifications was constitutionally insufficient to justify the classi-
fication.
However, a state one-year durational residency requirement
for the initiation of a divorce proceeding was sustained in Sosna v.
Iowa. 11 While it is not clear what the precise basis of the ruling
is, it appears that the Court found that the State’s interest in re-
quiring that those who seek a divorce from its courts be genuinely
attached to the State and its desire to insulate divorce decrees from
the likelihood of collateral attack justified the requirement. 12 Simi-
larly, durational residency requirements for lower in-state tuition
at public colleges have been held constitutionally justifiable, again,
however, without a clear statement of reason. 13
A state scheme for returning to its residents a portion of the
income earned from the vast oil deposits discovered within Alaska
foundered upon the formula for allocating the dividends; that is,
each adult resident received one unit of return for each year of resi-
dency subsequent to 1959, the first year of Alaska’s statehood. The
law thus created fixed, permanent distinctions between an ever-in-
9 394 U.S. at 633–38. Shapiro was reaffirmed in Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365 (1971) (striking down durational residency requirements for aliens apply-
ing for welfare assistance), and in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S.
250 (1974) (voiding requirement of one year’s residency in county as condition to
indigent’s receiving nonemergency hospitalization or medical care at county’s ex-
pense). When Connecticut and New York reinstituted the requirements, pleading a
financial emergency as the compelling state interest, they were summarily rebuffed.
Rivera v. Dunn, 329 F. Supp. 554 (D. Conn. 1971), aff’d per curiam, 404 U.S. 1054
(1972); Lopez v. Wyman, Civ. No. 1971–308 (W.D.N.Y. 1971), aff’d per curiam, 404
U.S. 1055 (1972). The source of the funds, state or federal, is irrelevant to applica-
tion of the principle. Pease v. Hansen, 404 U.S. 70 (1971).
10 405 U.S. 330 (1972). But see Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973), and
Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973). Durational residency requirements of five
and seven years respectively for candidates for elective office were sustained in
Kanapaux v. Ellisor, 419 U.S. 891 (1974), and Sununu v. Stark, 420 U.S. 958 (1975).
11 419 U.S. 393 (1975). Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented on the merits.
Id. at 418.
12 Id. at 409. But the Court also indicated that the plaintiff was not absolutely
barred from the state courts, but merely required to wait for access (which was true
in the prior cases as well and there held immaterial), and that possibly the state
interests in marriage and divorce were more exclusive and thus more immune from
federal constitutional attack than were the matters at issue in the previous cases.
The Court also did not indicate whether it was using strict or traditional scrutiny.
13 Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D.Minn. 1970), aff’d per curiam, 401
U.S. 985 (1971). Cf. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 & n.9 (1973), and id. at
456, 464, 467 (dicta). In Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 256
(1974), the Court, noting the results, stated that ‘‘some waiting periods . . . may not
be penalties’’ and thus would be valid.
creasing number of classes of bona fide residents based on how long

they had been in the State. The differences between the durational
residency cases previously decided did not alter the bearing of the
right to travel principle upon the distribution scheme, but the
Court’s decision went off on the absence of any permissible purpose
underlying the apportionment classification and it thus failed even
the rational basis test. 14
Unresolved still are issues such as durational residency re-
quirements for occupational licenses and other purposes. 15 Too, it
should be noted that this line of cases does not apply to state resi-
dency requirements themselves, as distinguished from durational
provisions, 16 and the cases do not inhibit the States when, having
reasons for doing so, they bar travel by certain persons. 17
Marriage and Familial Relations
In Zablocki v. Redhail, 18 importing into equal protection anal-
ysis the doctrines developed in substantive due process, the Court
identified the right to marry as a ‘‘fundamental interest’’ that ne-
cessitates ‘‘critical examination’’ of governmental restrictions which
‘‘interfere directly and substantially’’ with the right. 19 Struck down
was a statute that prohibited any resident under an obligation to
support minor children from marrying without a court order; such
order could only be obtained upon a showing that the support obli-
gation had been and was being complied with and that the children
were not and were not likely to become public charges. The plain-
tiff was an indigent wishing to marry but prevented from doing so
because he was not complying with a court order to pay support to
an illegitimate child he had fathered, and because the child was re-
14 Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982). Somewhat similar was the Court’s in-
validation on equal protection grounds of a veterans preference for state employ-

ment limited to persons who were state residents when they entered military serv-
ice; four Justices also thought the preference penalized the right to travel. Attorney
General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986).
15 La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S. 465 (1919), upholding a two-year residence
requirement to become an insurance broker, must be considered of questionable va-

lidity. Durational periods for admission to the practice of law or medicine or other
professions have evoked differing responses by lower courts.
16 E.g., McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Comm’n, 424 U.S. 645 (1976) (or-
dinance requiring city employees to be and to remain city residents upheld). See Me-
morial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 255 (1974). See also Martinez
v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983) (bona fide residency requirement for free tuition to
public schools).
17 Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412 (1981) (statute made it a misdemeanor to aban-
don a dependent child but a felony to commit the offense and then leave the State).
18 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
19 Although the Court’s due process decisions have broadly defined a protected
liberty interest in marriage and family, no previous case had held marriage to be
a fundamental right occasioning strict scrutiny. Id. at 396, 397 (Justice Powell con-
curring).
ceiving public assistance. Applying ‘‘critical examination,’’ the

Court observed that the statutory prohibition could not be sus-
tained unless it was justified by sufficiently important state inter-
ests and was closely tailored to effectuate only those interests. 20
Two interests were offered that the Court was willing to accept as
legitimate and substantial: requiring permission under the cir-
cumstances furnished an opportunity to counsel applicants on the
necessity of fulfilling support obligations, and the process protected
the welfare of children who needed support, either by providing an
incentive to make support payments or by preventing applicants
from incurring new obligations through marriage. The first interest
was not served, the Court found, there being no provision for coun-
seling and no authorization of permission to marry once counseling
had taken place. The second interest was found not to be effec-
tuated by the means. Alternative devices to collect support existed,
the process simply prevented marriage without delivering any
money to the children, and it singled out obligations incurred
through marriage without reaching any other obligations.
Other restrictions that relate to the incidents of or pre-
requisites for marriage were carefully distinguished by the Court
as neither entitled to rigorous scrutiny nor put in jeopardy by the
decision. 21 For example, in Califano v. Jobst, 22 a unanimous Court
sustained a Social Security provision that revoked disabled depend-
ents’ benefits of any person who married, except when the person
married someone who was also entitled to receive disabled depend-
ents’ benefits. Plaintiff, a recipient of such benefits, married some-
one who was also disabled but not qualified for the benefits, and
his benefits were terminated. He sued, alleging that distinguishing
between classes of persons who married eligible persons and who
married ineligible persons infringed upon his right to marry. The
Court rejected the argument, finding that benefit entitlement was
not based upon need but rather upon actual dependency upon the
insured wage earner; marriage, Congress could have assumed, gen-
erally terminates the dependency upon a parent-wage earner.
Therefore, it was permissible as an administrative convenience to
make marriage the terminating point but to make an exception
20 Id. at 388. Although the passage is not phrased in the usual compelling inter-
est terms, the concurrence and the dissent so viewed it without evoking disagree-
ment from the Court. Id. at 396 (Justice Powell), 403 (Justice Stevens), 407 (Justice
Rehnquist). Justices Powell and Stevens would have applied intermediate scrutiny
to void the statute, both for its effect on the ability to marry and for its impact upon
indigents. Id. at 400, 406 n.10.
21 Id. at 386–87. Chief Justice Burger thought the interference here was ‘‘inten-
tional and substantial,’’ whereas the provision in Jobst was neither. Id. at 391 (con-
curring).
22 434 U.S. 47 (1977).
when both marriage partners were receiving benefits, as a means

of lessening hardship and recognizing that dependency was likely
to continue. The marriage rule was therefore not to be strictly scru-
tinized or invalidated ‘‘simply because some persons who might
otherwise have married were deterred by the rule or because some
who did marry were burdened thereby.’’ 23
It seems obvious, therefore, that the determination of marriage
and familial relationships as fundamental will be a fruitful begin-
ning of litigation in the equal protection area. 24
Poverty and Fundamental Interests: The Intersection of Due
Process and Equal Protection
Generally.—Whatever may be the status of wealth distinc-
tions per se as a suspect classification, 25 there is no doubt that
when the classification affects some area characterized as or con-
sidered to be fundamental in nature in the structure of our polity—
the ability of criminal defendants to obtain fair treatment through-
out the system, the right to vote, to name two examples—then the
classifying body bears a substantial burden in justifying what it
has done. The cases begin with Griffin v. Illinois, 26 surely one of
the most seminal cases in modern constitutional law. There, the
State conditioned full direct appellate review, review as to which
all convicted defendants were entitled, on the furnishing of a bill
of exceptions or report of the trial proceedings, in the preparation
of which the stenographic transcript of the trial was usually essen-
tial. Only indigent defendants sentenced to death were furnished
free transcripts; all other convicted defendants had to pay a fee to
obtain them. ‘‘In criminal trials,’’ Justice Black wrote in the plural-
ity opinion, ‘‘a State can no more discriminate on account of pov-
23 Id. at 54. See also Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181 (1976) (provision giv-
ing benefits to a married woman under 62 with dependent children in her care
whose husband retires or becomes disabled but denying them to a divorced woman
under 62 with dependents represents a rational judgment by Congress with respect
to likely dependency of married but not divorced women and does not deny equal
protection); Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979) (limitation of certain Social Secu-
rity benefits to widows and divorced wives of wage earners does not deprive mother
of illegitimate child who was never married to wage earner of equal protection).
24 See, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (State’s giving to father of
legitimate child who is divorced or separated from mother while denying to father
of illegitimate child a veto over the adoption of the child by another does not under
the circumstances deny equal protection. The circumstances were that the father
never exercised custody over the child or shouldered responsibility for his super-
vision, education, protection, or care, although he had made some support payments
and given him presents). Accord, Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
25 San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
26 351 U.S. 12 (1956). The opinion of the court was joined by Justices Black,
Douglas, and Clark, and Chief Justice Warren. Justice Frankfurter concurred. Id.
at 20. Justices Burton, Minton, Reed, and Harlan dissented. Id. at 26, 29.
erty than on account of religion, race, or color.’’ While the State

was not obligated to provide an appeal at all, when it does so it
may not structure its system ‘‘in a way that discriminates against
some convicted defendants on account of their poverty.’’ The sys-
tem’s fault was that it treated defendants with money differently
than it treated defendants without money. ‘‘There can be no equal
justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount
of money he has.’’ 27
The principle of Griffin was extended in Douglas v. Califor-
nia, 28 in which the court held to be a denial of due process and
equal protection a system whereby in the first appeal as of right
from a conviction counsel was appointed to represent indigents only
if the appellate court first examined the record and determined
that counsel would be of advantage to the appellant. ‘‘There is lack-
ing that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment where
the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of coun-
sel’s examination into the record, research of the law, and marshal-
ling of arguments on his behalf, while the indigent, already bur-
dened by a preliminary determination that his case is without
merit, is forced to shift for himself.’’ 29
From the beginning, Justice Harlan opposed reliance on the
equal protection clause at all, arguing that a due process analysis
was the proper criterion to follow. ‘‘It is said that a State cannot
discriminate between the ‘rich’ and the ‘poor’ in its system of crimi-
nal appeals. That statement of course commands support, but it
hardly sheds light on the true character of the problem confronting
us here. . . . All that Illinois has done is to fail to alleviate the con-
sequences of differences in economic circumstances that exist whol-
ly apart from any state action.’’ A fee system neutral on its face
was not a classification forbidden by the equal protection clause.
27 Id. at 17, 18, 19. Although Justice Black was not explicit, it seems clear that
the system was found to violate both the due process and the equal protection
clauses. Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence dealt more expressly with the premise of
the Black opinion. ‘‘It does not face actuality to suggest that Illinois affords every
convicted person, financially competent or not, the opportunity to take an appeal,
and that it is not Illinois that is responsible for disparity in material circumstances.
Of course, a State need not equalize economic conditions. . . . But when a State
deems it wise and just that convictions be susceptible to review by an appellate
court, it cannot by force of its exactions draw a line which precludes convicted indi-
gent persons, forsooth erroneously convicted, from securing such a review merely by
disabling them from bringing to the notice of an appellate tribunal errors of the trial
court which would upset the conviction were practical opportunity for review not
foreclosed.’’ Id. at 23.
28 372 U.S. 353 (1963). Justice Clark dissented, protesting the Court’s ‘‘new fet-
ish for indigency,’’ id. at 358, 359, and Justices Harlan and Stewart dissented. Id.
at 360.
29 Id. at 357–58.
‘‘[N]o economic burden attendant upon the exercise of a privilege

bears equally upon all, and in other circumstances the resulting
differentiation is not treated as an invidious classification by the
State, even though discrimination against ‘indigents’ by name
would be unconstitutional.’’ 30 As he protested in Douglas: ‘‘The
States, of course, are prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause
from discriminating between ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ as such in the formu-
lation and application of their laws. But it is a far different thing
to suggest that this provision prevents the State from adopting a
law of general applicability that may affect the poor more harshly
than it does the rich, or, on the other hand, from making some ef-
fort to redress economic imbalances while not eliminating them en-
tirely.’’ 31
Due process furnished the standard, Justice Harlan felt, for de-
termining whether fundamental fairness had been denied. Where
an appeal was barred altogether by the imposition of a fee, the line
might have been crossed to unfairness, but on the whole he did not
see that a system which merely recognized differences between and
among economic classes, which as in Douglas made an effort to
ameliorate the fact of the differences by providing appellate scru-
tiny of cases of right, was a system which denied due process. 32
The Court has reiterated that both due process and equal pro-
tection concerns are implicated by restrictions on indigents’ exer-
cise of the right of appeal. ‘‘In cases like Griffin and Douglas, due
process concerns were involved because the States involved had set
up a system of appeals as of right but had refused to offer each de-
fendant a fair opportunity to obtain an adjudication on the merits
of his appeal. Equal protection concerns were involved because the
State treated a class of defendants—indigent ones—differently for
purposes of offering them a meaningful appeal.’’ 33
Criminal Procedure.—‘‘[I]t is now fundamental that, once es-
tablished . . . avenues [of appellate review] must be kept free of
unreasoned distinctions that can only impede open and equal ac-
cess to the courts.’’ 34 ‘‘In all cases the duty of the State is to pro-
vide the indigent as adequate and effective an appellate review as
that given appellants with funds. . . .’’ 35 No State may condition
the right to appeal 36 or the right to file a petition for habeas cor-
30 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 34, 35 (1956).
31 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 361 (1963).
32 Id. at 363–67.
33 Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 405 (1985) (holding that due process requires
that counsel provided for appeals as of right must be effective).

34 Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966).
35 Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 496 (1963).
36 Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959); Douglas v. Green, 363 U.S. 192 (1960).
pus 37 or other form of postconviction relief upon the payment of a

docketing fee or some other type of fee when the petitioner has no
means to pay. Similarly, although the States are not required to
furnish full and complete transcripts of their trials to indigents
when exerpted versions or some other adequate substitute is avail-
able, if a transcript is necessary to adequate review of a conviction,
either on appeal or through procedures for postconviction relief, the
transcript must be provided to indigent defendants or to others un-
able to pay. 38 This right may not be denied by drawing a felony-
misdemeanor distinction or by limiting it to those cases in which
confinement is the penalty. 39 A defendant’s right to counsel is to
be protected as well as the similar right of the defendant with
funds. 40 The right to counsel on appeal necessarily means the right
to effective assistance of counsel. 41
But, deciding a point left unresolved in Douglas, the Court
held that neither the due process nor the equal protection clause
required a State to furnish counsel to a convicted defendant seek-
ing, after he had exhausted his appeals of right, to obtain discre-
tionary review of his case in the State’s higher courts or in the
United States Supreme Court. Due process fairness does not re-
37 Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961).
38 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of
Prison Terms & Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958) (unconstitutional to condition free
transcript upon trial judge’s certification that ‘‘justice will thereby be promoted’’);
Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963) (unconstitutional to condition free tran-
script upon judge’s certification that the allegations of error were not ‘‘frivolous’’);
Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963) (unconstitutional to deny free transcript upon
determination of public defender that appeal was in vain); Long v. District Court,
385 U.S. 192 (1966) (indigent prisoner entitled to free transcript of his habeas cor-
pus proceeding for use on appeal of adverse decision therein); Gardner v. California,
393 U.S. 367 (1969) (on filing of new habeas corpus petition in appellate court upon
an adverse nonappealable habeas ruling in a lower court where transcript was need-
ed, one must be provided an indigent prisoner). See also Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S.
305 (1966). For instances in which a transcript was held not to be needed, see Britt
v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 266 (1971); United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317
(1976).
39 Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458 (1969); Mayer v. City of Chicago,
404 U.S. 189 (1971).

40 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Swenson v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258
(1967); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748
(1967). A rule requiring a court-appointed appellate counsel to file a brief explaining
reasons why he concludes that a client’s appeal is frivolous does not violate the cli-
ent’s right to assistance of counsel on appeal. McCoy v. Court of Appeals, 486 U.S.
429 (1988). The right is violated if the court allows counsel to withdraw by merely
certifying that the appeal is ‘‘meritless’’ without also filing an Anders brief support-
ing the certification. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988). On the other hand, since
there is no constitutional right to counsel for indigent prisoners seeking
postconviction collateral relief, there is no requirement that withdrawal be justified
in an Anders brief if a state has provided counsel for postconviction proceedings.
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987) (counsel advised the court that there
were no arguable bases for collateral relief).
41 Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985).
quire that after an appeal has been provided the State must always
provide counsel to indigents at every stage. ‘‘Unfairness results
only if indigents are singled out by the State and denied meaning-
ful access to that system because of their poverty.’’ That essentially
equal protection issue was decided against the defendant in the
context of an appellate system in which one appeal could be taken
as of right to an intermediate court, with counsel provided if nec-
essary, and in which further appeals might be granted not pri-
marily upon any conclusion about the result below but upon consid-
erations of significant importance. 42 Not even death row inmates
have a constitutional right to an attorney to prepare a petition for
collateral relief in state court. 43
This right to legal assistance, especially in the context of the
constitutional right to the writ of habeas corpus, means that in the
absence of other adequate assistance, as through a functioning pub-
lic defender system, a State may not deny prisoners legal assist-
ance of another inmate 44 and it must make available certain mini-
mal legal materials. 45
The Criminal Sentence.—A convicted defendant may not be
imprisoned solely because of his indigency. Williams v. Illinois 46
held that it was a denial of equal protection for a State to extend
the term of imprisonment of a convicted defendant beyond the stat-
utory maximum provided because he was unable to pay the fine
which was also levied upon conviction. And Tate v. Short 47 held
that in situations in which no term of confinement is prescribed for
an offense but only a fine, the court may not jail persons who can-
not pay the fine, unless it is impossible to develop an alternative,
such as installment payments or fines scaled to ability to pay. Will-
ful refusal to pay may, however, be punished by confinement.
42 Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974). See also Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40
(1974) (statute providing, under circumscribed conditions, that indigent defendant,

who receives state-compensated counsel and other assistance for his defense, who
is convicted, and who subsequently becomes able to repay costs, must reimburse
State for costs of his defense in no way operates to deny him assistance of counsel
or the equal protection of the laws).
43 Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989) (upholding Virginia’s system under
which ‘‘unit attorneys’’ assigned to prisons are available for some advice prior to the
filing of a claim, and a personal attorney is assigned if an inmate succeeds in filing
a petition with at least one non-frivolous claim).
44 Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
45 Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817
(1977).
46 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
47 401 U.S. 395 (1971). The Court has not yet treated a case in which the per-
missible sentence is ‘‘$30 or 30 days’’ or some similar form where either confinement
or a fine will satisfy the State’s penal policy.
Voting.—Treatment of indigency in a civil type of ‘‘fundamen-

tal interest’’ analysis came in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elec-
tions, 48 in which it was held that ‘‘a State violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause . . . whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or
payment of any fee an electoral standard. Voter qualifications have
no relation to wealth nor to paying or not paying this or any other
tax.’’ The Court emphasized both the fundamental interest in the
right to vote and the suspect character of wealth classifications.
‘‘[W]e must remember that the interest of the State, when it comes
to voting, is limited to the power to fix qualifications. Wealth, like
race, creed, or color, is not germane to one’s ability to participate
intelligently in the electoral process. Lines drawn on the basis of
wealth or property, like those of race . . . are traditionally
disfavored.’’ 49
The two factors—classification in effect along wealth lines and
adverse effect upon the exercise of the franchise—were tied to-
gether in Bullock v. Carter 50 in which the setting of high filing fees
for certain offices was struck down upon analysis by a stricter
standard than the traditional equal protection standard but appar-
ently a somewhat lesser standard than the compelling state inter-
est test. The Court held that the high filing fees were not rationally
related to the State’s interest in allowing only serious candidates
on the ballot since some serious candidates could not pay the fees
while some frivolous candidates could and that the State could not
finance the costs of holding the elections from the fees when the
voters were thereby deprived of their opportunity to vote for can-
didates of their preferences.
Extending Bullock, the Court has held it impermissible for a
State to deny indigents, and presumably other persons unable to
pay filing fees, a place on the ballot for failure to pay filing fees,
however reasonable in the abstract the fees may be. A State must
provide such persons a reasonable alternative for getting on the
ballot. 51 Similarly, a sentencing court in revoking probation must
consider alternatives to incarceration if the reason for revocation is
the inability of the indigent to pay a fine or restitution. 52
48 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966). The poll tax required to be paid as a condition of
voting was $1.50 annually. Justices Black, Harlan, and Stewart dissented. Id. at
670, 680.
49 Id. at 668. The Court observed that ‘‘the right to vote is too precious, too fun-
damental to be so burdened or conditioned.’’ Id. at 670.

50 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
51 Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974). Note that the Court indicated that Bul-
lock was decided on the basis of restrained review. Id. at 715.

52 Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
Access to Courts.—In Boddie v. Connecticut, 53 Justice Harlan

carried a majority of the Court with him in utilizing a due process
analysis to evaluate the constitutionality of a State’s filing fees in
divorce actions which a group of welfare assistance recipients at-
tacked as preventing them from obtaining divorces. The Court
found that when the State monopolized the avenues to a pacific
settlement of a dispute over a fundamental matter such as mar-
riage—only the State could terminate the marital status—then it
denied due process by inflexibly imposing fees which kept some
persons from using that avenue. Justice Harlan’s opinion averred
that a facially neutral law or policy which did in fact deprive an
individual of a protected right would be held invalid even though
as a general proposition its enforcement served a legitimate gov-
ernmental interest. The opinion concluded with a cautioning obser-
vation that the case was not to be taken as establishing a general
right to access to the courts.
The Boddie opinion left unsettled whether a litigant’s interest
in judicial access to effect a pacific settlement of some dispute was
an interest entitled to some measure of constitutional protection as
a value of independent worth or whether a litigant must be seeking
to resolve a matter involving a fundamental interest in the only
forum in which any resolution was possible. Subsequent decisions
established that the latter answer was the choice of the Court. In
United States v. Kras, 54 the Court held that the imposition of filing
fees which blocked the access of an indigent to a discharge of his
debts in bankruptcy denied the indigent neither due process nor
equal protection. The marital relationship in Boddie was a fun-
damental interest, the Court said, and upon its dissolution de-
pended associational interests of great importance; however, an in-
terest in the elimination of the burden of debt and in obtaining a
new start in life, while important, did not rise to the same constitu-
tional level as marriage. Moreover, a debtor’s access to relief in
bankruptcy had not been monopolized by the government to the
same degree as dissolution of a marriage; one may, ‘‘in theory, and
often in actuality,’’ manage to resolve the issue of his debts by
some other means, such as negotiation. While the alternatives in
many cases, such as Kras, seem barely likely of successful pursuit,
the Court seemed to be suggesting that absolute preclusion was a
necessary element before a right of access could be considered. 55
53 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
54 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
55 Id. at 443–46. The equal protection argument was rejected by utilizing the
traditional standard of review, bankruptcy legislation being placed in the area of ec-
onomics and social welfare, and the use of fees to create a self-sustaining bank-
ruptcy system being considered to be a rational basis. Dissenting, Justice Stewart
Subsequently, on the initial appeal papers and without hearing

oral argument, the Court summarily upheld the application to
indigents of filing fees that in effect precluded them from appealing
decisions of a state administrative agency reducing or terminating
public assistance. 56
Educational Opportunity.—Making even clearer its ap-
proach in de facto wealth classification cases, the Court in San An-
tonio School District v. Rodriguez 57 rebuffed an intensive effort
with widespread support in lower court decisions to invalidate the
system prevalent in 49 of the 50 States of financing schools pri-
marily out of property taxes, with the consequent effect that the
funds available to local school boards within each state were widely
divergent. Plaintiffs had sought to bring their case within the strict
scrutiny—compelling state interest doctrine of equal protection re-
view by claiming that under the tax system there resulted a de
facto wealth classification that was ‘‘suspect’’ or that education was
a ‘‘fundamental’’ right and the disparity in educational financing
could not therefore be justified. The Court held, however, that
there was neither a suspect classification nor a fundamental inter-
est involved, that the system must be judged by the traditional re-
strained standard, and that the system was rationally related to
the State’s interest in protecting and promoting local control of
education. 58
Important as the result of the case is, the doctrinal implica-
tions are far more important. The attempted denomination of
wealth as a suspect classification failed on two levels. First, the
Court noted that plaintiffs had not identified the ‘‘class of dis-
argued that Boddie required a different result, denied that absolute preclusion of
alternatives was necessary, and would have evaluated the importance of an interest
asserted rather than providing that it need be fundamental. Id. at 451. Justice Mar-
shall’s dissent was premised on an asserted constitutional right to be heard in court,
a constitutional right of access regardless of the interest involved. Id. at 458. Jus-
tices Douglas and Brennan concurred in Justice Stewart’s dissent, as indeed did
Justice Marshall.
56 Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973). The division was the same 5-to–4
that prevailed in Kras. See also Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972). But cases
involving the Boddie principle do continue to arise. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1
(1981) (in paternity suit that State required complainant to initiate, indigent de-
fendant entitled to have State pay for essential blood grouping test); Lassiter v. De-
partment of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (recognizing general right of ap-
pointed counsel in indigent parents when State seeks to terminate parental status,
but using balancing test to determine that right was not present in this case).
57 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The opinion by Justice Powell was concurred in by the
Chief Justice and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Rehnquist. Justices Douglas,
Brennan, White, and Marshall dissented. Id. at 62, 63, 70.
58 Id. at 44–55. Applying the rational justification test, Justice White would
have found that the system did not use means rationally related to the end sought
to be achieved. Id. at 63.
advantaged ‘poor’’’ in such a manner as to further their argument.

That is, the Court found that the existence of a class of poor per-
sons, however defined, did not correlate with property-tax-poor dis-
tricts; neither as an absolute nor as a relative consideration did it
appear that tax-poor districts contained greater numbers of poor
persons than did property-rich districts, except in random in-
stances. Second, the Court held, there must be an absolute depriva-
tion of some right or interest rather than merely a relative one be-
fore the deprivation because of inability to pay will bring into play
strict scrutiny. ‘‘The individuals, or groups of individuals, who con-
stituted the class discriminated against in our prior cases shared
two distinguishing characteristics: because of their impecunity they
were completely unable to pay for some desired benefit, and as a
consequence, they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaning-
ful opportunity to enjoy that benefit.’’ 59 No such class had been
identified here and more importantly no one was being absolutely
denied an education; the argument was that it was a lower quality
education than that available in other districts. Even assuming
that to be the case, however, it did not create a suspect classifica-
tion.
Education is an important value in our society, the Court
agreed, being essential to the effective exercise of freedom of ex-
pression and intelligent utilization of the right to vote. But a right
to education is not expressly protected by the Constitution, contin-
ued the Court, nor should it be implied simply because of its un-
doubted importance. The quality of education increases the effec-
tiveness of speech or the ability to make informed electoral choice
but the judiciary is unable to determine what level of quality would
be sufficient. Moreover, the system under attack did not deny edu-
cational opportunity to any child, whatever the result in that case
might be; it was attacked for providing relative differences in
spending and those differences could not be correlated with dif-
ferences in educational quality. 60
Rodriguez clearly promised judicial restraint in evaluating
challenges to the provision of governmental benefits when the ef-
fect is relatively different because of the wealth of some of the re-
cipients or potential recipients and when the results, what is ob-
tained, vary in relative degrees. Wealth or indigency is not a per
se suspect classification but it must be related to some interest that
is fundamental, and Rodriguez doctrinally imposed a considerable
59 Id. at 20. But see id. at 70, 117–24 (Justices Marshall and Douglas dissent-
ing).
60 Id. at 29–39. But see id. at 62 (Justice Brennan dissenting), 70, 110–17 (Jus-
tices Marshall and Douglas dissenting).

barrier to the discovery or creation of additional fundamental inter-

ests. As the decisions reviewed earlier with respect to marriage and
the family reveal, that barrier has not held entirely firm, but with-
in a range of interests, such as education, 61 the case remains
strongly viable. Relying on Rodriguez and distinguishing Plyler, the
Court in Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools 62 rejected an indi-
gent student’s equal protection challenge to a state statute permit-
ting school districts to charge a fee for school bus service, in the
process rejecting arguments that either ‘‘strict’’ or ‘‘heightened’’
scrutiny is appropriate. Moreover, the Court concluded, there is no
constitutional obligation to provide bus transportation, or to pro-
vide it for free if it is provided at all. 63
Abortion.—Rodriguez furnished the principal analytical basis
for the Court’s subsequent decision in Maher v. Roe, 64 holding that
a State’s refusal to provide public assistance for abortions that
were not medically necessary under a program that subsidized all
medical expenses otherwise associated with pregnancy and child-
birth did not deny to indigent pregnant women equal protection of
the laws. As in Rodriguez, it was held that the indigent are not a
suspect class. 65 Again, as in Rodriguez and in Kras, it was held
that when the State has not monopolized the avenues for relief and
the burden is only relative rather than absolute, a governmental
failure to offer assistance, while funding alternative actions, is not
undue governmental interference with a fundamental right. 66 Ex-
pansion of this area of the law of equal protection seems especially
limited.
SECTION 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the

several States according to their respective numbers, counting
61 Cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). The case is also noted for its propo-
sition that there were only two equal protection standards of review, a proposition
even the author of the opinion has now abandoned.
62 487 U.S. 450 (1988). This was a 5–4 decision, with Justice O’Connor’s opinion
of the Court being joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, and
Kennedy, and with Justices Marshall, Brennan, Stevens, and Blackmun dissenting.
63 487 U.S. at 462. The plaintiff child nonetheless continued to attend school,
so the requirement was reviewed as an additional burden but not a complete obsta-
cle to her education.
64 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
65 Id. at 470–71.
66 Id. at 471–74. See also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322–23 (1980). Total
deprivation was the theme of Boddie and was the basis of concurrences by Justices
Stewart and Powell in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 391, 396 (1978), in that
the State imposed a condition indigents could not meet and made no exception for
them. The case also emphasized that Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970),
imposed a rational basis standard in equal protection challenges to social welfare
cases. But see Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977), where the majority rejected
the dissent’s argument that this should always be the same.
the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians

not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the
choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial
officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof,
is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being
twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or
in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or
other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be re-
duced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens
shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one
years of age in such State.
APPORTIONMENT OF REPRESENTATION
With the abolition of slavery by the Thirteenth Amendment,
the African Americans formerly counted as three-fifths of persons
would be fully counted in the apportionment of seats in the House
of Representatives, increasing as well the electoral vote, there ap-
peared the prospect that politically the readmitted Southern States
would gain the advantage in Congress when combined with Demo-
crats from the North. Inasmuch as the South was adamantly op-
posed to African American suffrage, all the congressmen would be
elected by whites. Many wished to provide for the enfranchisement
of the African American and proposals to this effect were voted on
in both the House and the Senate, but only a few Northern States
permitted African Americans to vote and a series of referenda on
the question in Northern States revealed substantial white hos-
tility to the proposal. Therefore, a compromise was worked out, to
effect a reduction in the representation of any State which dis-
criminated against males in the franchise. 67
No serious effort was ever made in Congress to effectuate § 2,
and the only judicial attempt was rebuffed. 68 With subsequent con-
stitutional amendments adopted and the utilization of federal coer-
67 See generally J. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
(1956).
68 Saunders v. Wilkins, 152 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 870
(1946).
cive powers to enfranchise persons, the section is little more than

an historical curiosity. 69
However, in Richardson v. Ramirez, 70 the Court relied upon
the implied approval of disqualification upon conviction of crime to
uphold a state law disqualifying convicted felons for the franchise
even after the service of their terms. It declined to assess the state
interests involved and to evaluate the necessity of the rule, holding
rather that because of § 2 the equal protection clause was simply
inapplicable.
SECTION 3. No Person shall be a Senator or Representative

in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold
any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under
any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member
of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a mem-
ber of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial offi-
cer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United
States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against
the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But
congress may by a vote of two thirds of each House, remove
such disability.
SECTION 4. The validity of the public debt of the United
States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment
of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrec-
tion or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the Unit-
ed States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obliga-
69 The section did furnish a basis to Justice Harlan to argue that inasmuch as
§ 2 recognized a privilege to discriminate subject only to the penalty provided, the

Court was in error in applying § 1 to questions relating to the franchise. Compare
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 152 (1970) (Justice Harlan concurring and dissent-
ing), with id. at 229, 250 (Justice Brennan concurring and dissenting). The language
of the section recognizing 21 as the usual minimum voting age no doubt played
some part in the Court’s decision in Oregon v. Mitchell as well. It should also be
noted that the provision relating to ‘‘Indians not taxed’’ is apparently obsolete now
in light of an Attorney General ruling that all Indians are subject to taxation. 39
Op. Att’y Gen. 518 (1940).
70 418 U.S. 24 (1974). Justices Marshall, Douglas, and Brennan dissented. Id.
at 56, 86.
tion incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the

United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any
slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held
illegal and void.
DISQUALIFICATION AND PUBLIC DEBT
The right to remove disabilities imposed by this section was ex-
ercised by Congress at different times on behalf of enumerated in-
dividuals. 71 In 1872, the disabilities were removed, by a blanket
act, from all persons ‘‘except Senators and Representatives of the
Thirty-sixth and Thirty-seventh Congresses, officers in the judicial,
military and naval service of the United States, heads of depart-
ments, and foreign ministers of the United States.’’ 72 Twenty-six
years later, Congress enacted that ‘‘the disability imposed by sec-
tion 3 . . . incurred heretofore, is hereby removed.’’ 73
Although § 4 ‘‘was undoubtedly inspired by the desire to put
beyond question the obligations of the Government issued during
the Civil War, its language indicates a broader connotation. . . .
‘[T]he validity of the public debt’. . . [embraces] whatever concerns
the integrity of the public obligations,’’ and applies to government
bonds issued after as well as before adoption of the Amendment. 74
SECTION 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by

appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
ENFORCEMENT
Generally.—In the aftermath of the Civil War, Congress, in
addition to proposing to the States the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
71 E.g., and notably, the Private Act of December 14, 1869, ch.1, 16 Stat. 607.
72 Ch. 193, 17 Stat. 142.
73 Act of June 6, 1898, ch. 389, 30 Stat. 432. Legislation by Congress providing
for removal was necessary to give effect to the prohibition of § 3, and until removed
in pursuance of such legislation persons in office before promulgation of the Four-
teenth Amendment continued to exercise their functions lawfully. Griffin’s Case, 11
Fed. Cas. 7 (C.C.D.Va. 1869) (No. 5815). Nor were persons who had taken part in
the Civil War and had been pardoned by the President before the adoption of this
Amendment precluded by this section from again holding office under the United
States. 18 Op. Att’y Gen. 149 (1885). On the construction of ‘‘engaged in rebellion,’’
see United States v. Powell, 27 Fed. Cas. 605 (C.C.D.N.C. 1871) (No. 16,079).
74 Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 354 (1935), in which the Court con-
cluded that the Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933, insofar as it attempted to override
the gold-clause obligation in a Fourth Liberty Loan Gold Bond ‘‘went beyond the
congressional power.’’ On a Confederate bond problem, see Branch v. Haas, 16 F.
53 (C.C.M.D. Ala. 1883) (citing Hanauer v. Woodruff, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 439 (1873),
and Thorington v. Smith, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 1 (1869)). See also The Pietro
Campanella, 73 F. Supp. 18 (D. Md. 1947).
Fifteenth Amendments, enacted seven statutes designed in a vari-

ety of ways to implement the provisions of these Amendments. 75
Several of these laws were general civil rights statutes which
broadly attacked racial and other discrimination on the part of pri-
vate individuals and groups as well as by the States, but the Su-
preme Court declared unconstitutional or rendered ineffective prac-
tically all of these laws over the course of several years. 76 In the
end, Reconstruction was abandoned and with rare exceptions no
cases were brought under the remaining statutes until fairly re-
cently. 77 Beginning with the Civil Rights Act of 1957, however,
Congress generally acted pursuant to its powers under the com-
merce clause 78 until Supreme Court decisions indicated an expan-
sive concept of congressional power under the Civil War Amend-
ments, 79 which culminated in broad provisions against private in-
terference with civil rights in the 1968 legislation. 80 The story of
these years is largely an account of the ‘‘state action’’ doctrine in
terms of its limitation on congressional powers; 81 lately, it is the
still-unfolding history of the lessening of the doctrine combined
with a judicial vesting of discretion in Congress to reinterpret the
scope and content of the rights guaranteed in these three constitu-
tional amendments.
State Action.—In enforcing by appropriate legislation the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees against state denials, Congress
75 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27; the Enforcement Act of 1870,
ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140; Act of February 28, 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433; the Ku Klux
Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13; Civil Rights Act of 1875; 18 Stat. 335. The
modern provisions surviving of these statutes are 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981–83, 1985–1986, and 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Two lesser statutes were the Slave
Kidnapping Act of 1866, ch. 86, 14 Stat. 50, and the Peonage Abolition Act, ch. 187,
14 Stat. 546, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581–88, and 42 U.S.C. § 1994.
76 See generally R. CARR, FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS: QUEST FOR A
SWORD (1947).
77 For cases under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 in their previous codifications, see
United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915); United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S.
476 (1917); United States v. Bathgate, 246 U.S. 220 (1918); United States v. Wheel-
er, 254 U.S. 281 (1920). The resurgence of the use of these statutes began with
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), and Screws v. United States, 325 U.S.
91 (1945).
78 The 1957 and 1960 Acts primarily concerned voting; the public accommoda-
tions provisions of the 1964 Act and the housing provisions of the 1968 Act were
premised on the commerce power.
79 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641 (1966). The development of congressional enforcement powers in these cases

was paralleled by a similar expansion of the enforcement powers of Congress with
regard to the Thirteenth Amendment, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409
(1968), supra, pp. 1554–55, and the Fifteenth Amendment. South Carolina v. Katz-
enbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), infra, pp. 1946–50.
80 82 Stat. 73, 18 U.S.C. § 245. The statute has yet to receive its constitutional
testing.
81 On the ‘‘state action’’ doctrine in the context of the direct application of 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, see supra, pp. 1786–1802.

has the discretion to adopt remedial measures, such as authorizing

persons being denied their civil rights in state courts to remove
their cases to federal courts, 82 and to provide criminal 83 and
civil 84 liability for state officials and agents 85 or persons associated
with them 86 who violate protected rights. These statutory meas-
ures designed to eliminate discrimination ‘‘under color of law’’ 87
present no problems of constitutional foundation, although there
may well be other problems of application. 88 But the Reconstruc-
tion Congresses did not stop with statutory implementation of
rights guaranteed against state infringement, moving as well
against private interference.
Thus, in the Civil Rights Act of 1875 89 Congress had pro-
scribed private racial discrimination in the admission to and use of
inns, public conveyances, theaters, and other places of public
amusement. The Civil Rights Cases 90 found this enactment to be
beyond Congress’ power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. It
was observed that § 1 was prohibitory only upon the States and did
not reach private conduct. Therefore, Congress’ power under § 5 to
enforce § 1 by appropriate legislation was held to be similarly lim-
ited. ‘‘It does not invest Congress with power to legislate upon sub-
jects which are within the domain of State legislation; but to pro-
vide modes of relief against State legislation, or State action, of the
kind referred to. It does not authorize Congress to create a code of
82 Section 3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, 28 U.S.C. § 1443. See
Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1880). The statute is of limited utility because of the interpretation placed on it al-
most from the beginning. Compare Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966), with City
of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966).
83 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); Wil-
liams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745
(1966); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966); United States v. Johnson, 390
U.S. 563 (1968).
84 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3), construed in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971).

85 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
86 United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
87 Both 18 U.S.C. § 242 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contain language restricting appli-
cation to deprivations under color of state law, whereas 18 U.S.C. § 241 lacks such
language. The newest statute, 18 U.S.C. § 245, contains, of course, no such language.
On the meaning of ‘‘custom’’ as used in the ‘‘under color of’’ phrase, see Adickes v.
S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
88 E.g., the problem of ‘‘specific intent’’ in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91
(1945), and Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951), and the problem of what
‘‘right or privilege’’ is ‘‘secured’’ to a person by the Constitution and laws of the
United States, which divided the Court in United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70
(1951), and which was resolved in United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
89 18 Stat. 335, §§ 1, 2.
90 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The Court also rejected the Thirteenth Amendment founda-
tion for the statute, a foundation revived by Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409 (1968).
municipal law for the regulation of private rights; but to provide

modes of redress against the operation of State laws, and the ac-
tion of State officers executive or judicial, when these are subver-
sive of the fundamental rights specified in the amendment.’’ 91 The
holding in this case had already been preceded by United States v.
Cruikshank 92 and by United States v. Harris 93 in which the Fed-
eral Government had prosecuted individuals for killing and injur-
ing African Americans. The Amendment did not increase the power
of the Federal Government vis-a-vis individuals, the Court held,
only with regard to the States themselves. 94
Cruikshank did, however, recognize a small category of federal
rights which Congress could protect against private deprivation,
rights which the Court viewed as deriving particularly from one’s
status as a citizen of the United States and which Congress had
a general police power to protect. 95 These rights included the right
to vote in federal elections, general and primary, 96 the right to fed-
eral protection while in the custody of federal officers, 97 and the
right to inform federal officials of violations of federal law. 98 The
right of interstate travel is a basic right derived from the Federal
Constitution which Congress may protect. 99 In United States v.
Williams, 100 in the context of state action, the Court divided four-
to-four over whether the predecessor of 18 U.S.C. § 241 in its ref-
erence to a ‘‘right or privilege secured . . . by the Constitution or
laws of the United States’’ encompassed rights guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment, or was restricted to those rights ‘‘which
Congress can beyond doubt constitutionally secure against inter-
91 109 U.S. at 11. Justice Harlan’s dissent reasoned that Congress had the
power to protect rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment against invasion by

both state and private action, but also viewed places of public accommodation as
serving a quasi-public function which satisfied the state action requirement in any
event. Id. at 46–48, 56–57.
92 92 U.S. 542 (1876). The action was pursuant to § 6 of the 1870 Enforcement
Act, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140, the predecessor of 18 U.S.C. § 241.

93 106 U.S. 629 (1883). The case held unconstitutional a provision of § 2 of the
1871 Act, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13.

94 See also Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678 (1887); Hodges v. United States,
203 U.S. 1 (1906); United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 (1920). Under the Fif-
teenth Amendment, see James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903).
95 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552–53, 556 (1876). The rights
which the Court assumed the United States could protect against private inter-
ference were the right to petition Congress for a redress of grievances and the right
to vote free of interference on racial grounds in a federal election.
96 Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S.
299 (1941).
97 Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892).
98 In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532 (1895). See also United States v. Waddell, 112
U.S. 76 (1884) (right to homestead).

99 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S.
88 (1971).
100 341 U.S. 70 (1951).
ference by private individuals.’’ This issue was again reached in

United States v. Price 101 and United States v. Guest, 102 again in
the context of state action, in which the Court concluded that the
statute included within its scope rights guaranteed by the due
process and equal protection clauses.
Inasmuch as both Price and Guest concerned conduct which the
Court found implicated with sufficient state action, it did not then
have to reach the question of § 241’s constitutionality when applied
to private action interfering with rights not the subject of a general
police power. But Justice Brennan, responding to what he appar-
ently intepreted as language in the opinion of the Court construing
Congress’ power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to be lim-
ited by the state action requirement, appended a lengthy state-
ment, which a majority of the Justices joined, arguing that Con-
gress’ power was broader. 103 ‘‘Although the Fourteenth Amend-
ment itself . . . ‘speaks to the State or to those acting under the
color of its authority,’ legislation protecting rights created by that
Amendment, such as the right to equal utilization of state facilities,
need not be confined to punishing conspiracies in which state offi-
cers participate. Rather, § 5 authorizes Congress to make laws that
it concludes are reasonably necessary to protect a right created by
and arising under that Amendment; and Congress is thus fully em-
powered to determine that punishment of private conspiracies
interfering with the exercise of such a right is necessary to its full
protection.’’ 104 The Justice throughout the opinion refers to ‘‘Four-
teenth Amendment rights,’’ by which he meant rights which, in the
words of 18 U.S.C. § 241, are ‘‘secured . . . by the Constitution,’’
i.e., by the Fourteenth Amendment through prohibitory words ad-
dressed only to governmental officers. Thus, the equal protection
clause commands that all ‘‘public facilities owned or operated by or
on behalf of the State,’’ be available equally to all persons; that ac-
101 383 U.S. 787 (1966) (due process clause).
102 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (equal protection clause).
103 Justice Brennan’s opinion, id. at 774, was joined by Chief Justice Warren
and Justice Douglas. His statement that ‘‘[a] majority of the members of the Court
expresses the view today that § 5 empowers Congress to enact laws punishing all
conspiracies to interfere with the exercise of Fourteenth Amendment rights, whether
or not state officers or others acting under the color of state law are implicated in
the conspiracy,’’ id. at 782 (emphasis by the Justice), was based upon the language
of Justice Clark, joined by Justices Black and Fortas, id. at 761, that inasmuch as
Justice Brennan reached the issue the three Justices were also of the view ‘‘that
there now can be no doubt that the specific language of § 5 empowers the Congress
to enact laws punishing all conspiracies—with or without state action—that inter-
fere with Fourteenth Amendment rights.’’ Id. at 762. In the opinion of the Court,
Justice Stewart disclaimed any intention of speaking of Congress’ power under § 5.
Id. at 755.
104 Id. at 782.
cess is a right granted by the Constitution, and § 5 is viewed ‘‘as

a positive grant of legislative power, authorizing Congress to exer-
cise its discretion in fashioning remedies to achieve civil and politi-
cal equality for all citizens.’’ Within this discretion is the ‘‘power to
determine that in order adequately to protect the right to equal uti-
lization of state facilities, it is also appropriate to punish other in-
dividuals’’ who would deny such access. 105
It is not clear, following changes in Court personnel and in the
absence of definitive adjudication, whether this expansion of Con-
gress’ power still commands a majority of the Court. 106 If the
Court adheres to the expansion, it is not clear what the limits and
potentialities of the expansion are, whether it is only with regard
to ‘‘state facilities’’ that Congress may reach private interfering
conduct, and what ‘‘rights’’ are reasonably and properly encom-
passed within the concept of ‘‘Fourteenth Amendment rights.’’
Congressional Definition of Fourteenth Amendment
Rights.—In the Civil Rights Cases, 107 the Court observed that
‘‘the legislation which Congress is authorized to adopt in this be-
half is not general legislation upon the rights of the citizen, but
corrective legislation,’’ that is, laws to counteract and overrule
those state laws which § 1 forbade the States to adopt. And the
Court was quite clear that under its responsibilities of judicial re-
105 Id. at 777–79, 784.
106 The civil statute paralleling the criminal statute held unconstitutional in
United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883), is 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), similarly de-
rived from § 2 of the 1871 Act, 17 Stat. 13, and it too lacks a ‘‘color of law’’ require-
ment. This provision was read into it in Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951),
to avoid what the Court then saw as a substantial constitutional problem. In Griffin
v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), ‘‘color of law’’ was read out of the statute. While
it might be ‘‘difficult to conceive of what might constitute a deprivation of the equal
protection of the laws by private persons . . . there is nothing inherent in the
phrase that requires the action working the deprivation to come from the State.’’
Id. at 97. What the language actually required, said the unanimous Court, was an
‘‘intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities, means
that there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously dis-
criminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action. The conspiracy, in other words,
must aim at a deprivation of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law to
all.’’ Id. at 102. As so construed, the statute was held constitutional as applied in
the complaint before the Court on the basis of the Thirteenth Amendment and the
right to travel; there was no necessity therefore, to consider Congress’ § 5 powers.
Id. at 107.
The lower courts are quite divided with respect to what constitutes a nonrace,
class-based animus within the requisite for § 1985(3) coverage and whether a pri-
vate conspiracy may be reached. See, e.g., Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir.
1971); Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972); Great American Fed.
S. & L. Ass’n v. Novotny, 584 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1978) (en banc), rev’d, 442 U.S.
366 (1979); Scott v. Moore, 680 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc). The Supreme
Court’s Novotny decision was based solely on statutory interpretation and avoided
both questions, although both Justices Powell and Stevens would require a showing
of state action. 442 U.S. at 378, 381 (concurring).
107 109 U.S. 3, 13–14 (1883).
view, it was the body which would determine that a state law was
impermissible and that a federal law passed pursuant to § 5 was
necessary and proper to enforce § 1. 108 But in United States v.
Guest, 109 Justice Brennan protested that this view ‘‘attributes a far
too limited objective to the Amendment’s sponsors, that in fact ‘‘the
primary purpose of the Amendment was to augment the power of
Congress, not the judiciary.’’
In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 110 Justice Brennan, this time speak-
ing for the Court, in effect overrode the limiting view and posited
a doctrine by which Congress was to define the substance of what
the legislation enacted pursuant to § 5 must be appropriate to. That
is, in upholding the constitutionality of a provision of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 111 barring the application of English literacy
requirements to a certain class of voters, the Court rejected a state
argument ‘‘that an exercise of congressional power under § 5 . . .
that prohibits the enforcement of a state law can only be sustained
if the judicial branch determines that the state law is prohibited
by the provisions of the Amendment that Congress sought to en-
force.’’ 112 Inasmuch as the Court had previously upheld an English
literacy requirement under equal protection challenge, 113 accept-
ance of the argument would have doomed the federal law. But, said
Justice Brennan, Congress itself might have questioned the jus-
tifications put forward by the State in defense of its law and might
have concluded that instead of being supported by acceptable rea-
sons the requirements were unrelated to those justifications and
discriminatory in intent and effect. The Court would not evaluate
the competing considerations which might have led Congress to its
conclusion; since Congress ‘‘brought a specially informed legislative
competence’’ to an appraisal of voting requirements, ‘‘it was Con-
gress’ prerogative to weigh’’ the considerations and the Court would
sustain the conclusion if ‘‘we perceive a basis upon which Congress
108 Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137 (1803).
109 383 U.S. 745, 783 and n.7 (1966) (concurring and dissenting).
110 384 U.S. 641 (1966). Besides the ground of decision discussed here, Morgan
also advanced an alternative ground for upholding the statute. That is, Congress
might have overridden the state law not because the law itself violated the equal
protection clause but because being without the vote meant the class of persons was
subject to discriminatory state and local treatment and giving these people the bal-
lot would afford a means of correcting that situation. The statute therefore was an
appropriate means to enforce the equal protection clause under ‘‘necessary and prop-
er’’ standards. Id. at 652–653. A similar ‘‘necessary and proper’’ approach underlay
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), under the Fifteenth Amend-
ment’s enforcement clause.
111 79 Stat. 439, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e).
112 384 U.S. at 648.
113 Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
might predicate a judgment’’ that the requirements constituted in-

vidious discrimination. 114
In dissent, Justice Harlan protested that ‘‘[i]n effect the Court
reads § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as giving Congress the
power to define the substantive scope of the Amendment. If that in-
deed be the true reach of § 5, then I do not see why Congress
should not be able as well to exercise its § 5 ‘discretion’ by enacting
statutes so as in effect to dilute equal protection and due process
decisions of this Court.’’ 115 Justice Brennan rejected this reason-
ing. ‘‘We emphasize that Congress’ power under § 5 is limited to
adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment;
§ 5 grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these
guarantees.’’ 116 Congress responded, however, in both fashions. On
the one hand, in the 1968 Civil Rights Act it relied on Morgan in
expanding federal powers to deal with private violence that is ra-
cially motivated, and to some degree in outlawing most private
housing discrimination; 117 on the other hand, it enacted provisions
of law purporting to overrule the Court’s expansion of the self-in-
crimination and right-to-counsel clauses of the Bill of Rights, ex-
pressly invoking Morgan. 118
Congress’ power under Morgan returned to the Court’s consid-
eration when several States challenged congressional legislation 119
lowering the voting age in all elections to 18 and prescribing resi-
dency and absentee voting requirements for the conduct of presi-
dential elections. In upholding the latter provision and in dividing
over the former, the Court revealed that Morgan’s vitality was in
some considerable doubt, at least with regard to the reach which
many observers had previously seen. 120 Four Justices accepted
Morgan in full, 121 while one Justice rejected it totally 122 and an-
114 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653–56 (1966).
115 Id. at 668. Justice Stewart joined this dissent.
116 Id. at 651 n.10. Justice O’Connor for the Court quoted and reiterated Justice
Brennan’s language in Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 731–
33 (1982).
117 82 Stat. 73, 18 U.S.C. § 245. See S. Rep. No. 721, 90th Congress, 1st Sess.
6–7 (1967). See also 82 Stat. 81, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.

118 Title II, Omnibus Safe Streets and Crime Control Act, 82 Stat. 210, 18
U.S.C. §§ 3501, 3502. See S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Congress, 2d Sess. 53–63 (1968).
The cases which were subjects of the legislation were Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966), and United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), insofar as federal crimi-
nal trials were concerned.
119 Titles II and III of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, 84 Stat. 316,
42 U.S.C. §§ 1973aa–1, 1973bb.

120 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
121 Id. at 229, 278–81 (Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall), 135, 141–44
(Justice Douglas).
122 Id. at 152, 204–09 (Justice Harlan).
other would have limited it to racial cases. 123 The other three Jus-
tices seemingly restricted Morgan to its alternate rationale in pass-
ing on the age reduction provision but the manner in which they
dealt with the residency and absentee voting provision afforded
Congress some degree of discretion in making substantive decisions
about what state action is discriminatory above and beyond the ju-
dicial view of the matter. 124
More recent decisions read broadly Congress’ power to make
determinations that appear to be substantive decisions with respect
to constitutional violations. 125 Acting under both the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments, Congress has acted to reach state elec-
toral practices that ‘‘result’’ in diluting the voting power of minori-
ties, although the Court apparently requires that it be shown that
electoral procedures must have been created or maintained with a
discriminatory animus before they may be invalidated under the
two Amendments. 126 Moreover, movements have been initiated in
Congress by opponents of certain of the Court’s decisions, notably
the abortion rulings, to utilize § 5 powers to curtail the rights the
Court has derived from the due process clause and other provisions
of the Constitution. 127
123 Id. at 119, 126–31 (Justice Black).

124 The age reduction provision could be sustained ‘‘only if Congress has the
power not only to provide the means of eradicating situations that amount to a vio-
lation of the Equal Protection Clause, but also to determine as a matter of sub-
stantive constitutional law what situations fall within the ambit of the clause, and
what state interests are ‘compelling.’’’ Id. at 296 (Justices Stewart and Blackmun
and Chief Justice Burger). In their view, Congress did not have that power and
Morgan did not confer it. But in voting to uphold the residency and absentee provi-
sion, the Justices concluded that ‘‘Congress could rationally conclude that the impo-
sition of durational residency requirements unreasonably burdens and sanctions the
privilege of taking up residence in another State’’ without reaching an independent
determination of their own that the requirements did in fact have that effect. Id.
at 286.
125 See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 173–83 (1980), under the
Fifteenth Amendment. Infra, pp. 1948–50. See also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
448, 476–78 (1980) (plurality opinion by Chief Justice Burger), and id. at 500–02
(Justice Powell concurring).
126 The Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. 97–205, 96 Stat. 131,
amending 42 U.S.C. § 1973, were designed to overturn City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446
U.S. 55 (1980). A substantial change of direction in Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613
(1982), handed down coextensively with congressional enactment, seems to have
brought Congress and the Court into essential alignment, thus avoiding a possible
constitutional conflict.
127 See The Human Life Bill, Hearings before the Senate Judiciary Subcommit-
tee on Separation of Powers, 97th Congress, lst sess. (1981). An elaborate constitu-
tional analysis of the bill appears in Estreicher, Congressional Power and Constitu-
tional Rights: Reflections on Proposed ‘‘Human Life’’ Legislation, 68 VA. L. REV. 333
(1982).
Page 369 TITLE 18—CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1514A
est possible time and takes precedence over all EFFECTIVE DATE OF 2009 AMENDMENT
matters except older matters of the same char- Amendment by Pub. L. 111–16 effective Dec. 1, 2009,
acter, and when such motion comes on for hear- see section 7 of Pub. L. 111–16, set out as a note under
ing, if the attorney for the Government does not section 109 of Title 11, Bankruptcy.
proceed with the application for a protective EFFECTIVE DATE
order, the court shall dissolve the temporary re-
Section effective Oct. 12, 1982, see section 9(a) of Pub.
straining order.
L. 97–291, set out as a note under section 1512 of this
(E) If on two days notice to the attorney for title.
the Government, excluding intermediate week-
ends and holidays, or on such shorter notice as § 1514A. Civil action to protect against retalia-
the court may prescribe, the adverse party ap- tion in fraud cases
pears and moves to dissolve or modify the tem- (a) WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION FOR EMPLOY-
porary restraining order, the court shall proceed EES OF PUBLICLY TRADED COMPANIES.—No com-
to hear and determine such motion as expedi- pany with a class of securities registered under
tiously as the ends of justice require. section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(F) A temporary restraining order shall set (15 U.S.C. 78l), or that is required to file reports
forth the reasons for the issuance of such order, under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
be specific in terms, and describe in reasonable Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o(d)) including any sub-
detail (and not by reference to the complaint or sidiary or affiliate whose financial information
other document) the act or acts being reis included in the consolidated financial state-
strained. ments of such company, or nationally recog-
(b)(1) A United States district court, upon mo- nized statistical rating organization (as defined
tion of the attorney for the Government, shall in section 3(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
issue a protective order prohibiting harassment 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c),1 or any officer, employee,
of a victim or witness in a Federal criminal case contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such com-
if the court, after a hearing, finds by a prepon- pany or nationally recognized statistical rating
derance of the evidence that harassment of an organization, may discharge, demote, suspend,
identified victim or witness in a Federal crimi- threaten, harass, or in any other manner dis-
nal case exists or that such order is necessary to criminate against an employee in the terms and
prevent and restrain an offense under section conditions of employment because of any lawful
1512 of this title, other than an offense consist- act done by the employee—
ing of misleading conduct, or under section 1513 (1) to provide information, cause informa-
of this title. tion to be provided, or otherwise assist in an
(2) At the hearing referred to in paragraph (1) investigation regarding any conduct which the
of this subsection, any adverse party named in employee reasonably believes constitutes a
the complaint shall have the right to present violation of section 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348, any
evidence and cross-examine witnesses. rule or regulation of the Securities and Ex-
(3) A protective order shall set forth the rea- change Commission, or any provision of Fed-
sons for the issuance of such order, be specific in eral law relating to fraud against sharehold-
terms, describe in reasonable detail (and not by ers, when the information or assistance is pro-
reference to the complaint or other document) vided to or the investigation is conducted by—
the act or acts being restrained. (A) a Federal regulatory or law enforce-
(4) The court shall set the duration of effect of ment agency;
the protective order for such period as the court (B) any Member of Congress or any com-
determines necessary to prevent harassment of mittee of Congress; or
the victim or witness but in no case for a period (C) a person with supervisory authority
in excess of three years from the date of such or- over the employee (or such other person
der’s issuance. The attorney for the Government working for the employer who has the au-
may, at any time within ninety days before the thority to investigate, discover, or termi-
expiration of such order, apply for a new protec- nate misconduct); or
tive order under this section.
(2) to file, cause to be filed, testify, partici-
(c) As used in this section—
pate in, or otherwise assist in a proceeding
(1) the term ‘‘harassment’’ means a course of
filed or about to be filed (with any knowledge
conduct directed at a specific person that—
of the employer) relating to an alleged viola-
(A) causes substantial emotional distress
tion of section 1341, 1343, 1344, or 1348, any rule
in such person; and
or regulation of the Securities and Exchange
(B) serves no legitimate purpose; and
Commission, or any provision of Federal law
(2) the term ‘‘course of conduct’’ means a se- relating to fraud against shareholders.
ries of acts over a period of time, however (b) ENFORCEMENT ACTION.—
short, indicating a continuity of purpose. (1) IN GENERAL.—A person who alleges dis-
(Added Pub. L. 97–291, § 4(a), Oct. 12, 1982, 96 Stat. charge or other discrimination by any person
1250; amended Pub. L. 111–16, § 3(2), (3), May 7, in violation of subsection (a) may seek relief
2009, 123 Stat. 1607.) under subsection (c), by—
(A) filing a complaint with the Secretary
AMENDMENTS of Labor; or
2009—Subsec. (a)(2)(C). Pub. L. 111–16, § 3(2), sub- (B) if the Secretary has not issued a final
stituted ‘‘14 days’’ for ‘‘10 days’’ in two places. decision within 180 days of the filing of the
Subsec. (a)(2)(E). Pub. L. 111–16, § 3(3), inserted
‘‘, excluding intermediate weekends and holidays,’’ 1 So in original. Another closing parenthesis probably should
after ‘‘the Government’’. precede the comma.

§ 1515 TITLE 18—CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Page 370
complaint and there is no showing that such affiliate whose financial information is included in the
delay is due to the bad faith of the claimant, consolidated financial statements of such company’’
bringing an action at law or equity for de after ‘‘the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
78o(d))’’.
novo review in the appropriate district court
Pub. L. 111–203, § 922(b), in introductory provisions, in-
of the United States, which shall have juris- serted ‘‘or nationally recognized statistical rating or-
diction over such an action without regard ganization (as defined in section 3(a) of the Securities
to the amount in controversy. Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c),’’ before ‘‘or any of-
(2) PROCEDURE.— ficer,’’ and ‘‘or nationally recognized statistical rating
(A) IN GENERAL.—An action under para- organization’’ before ‘‘, may discharge,’’.
Subsec. (b)(2)(D). Pub. L. 111–203, § 922(c)(1)(A), sub-
graph (1)(A) shall be governed under the
stituted ‘‘180’’ for ‘‘90’’ and inserted ‘‘, or after the date
rules and procedures set forth in section on which the employee became aware of the violation’’
42121(b) of title 49, United States Code. before period at end.
(B) EXCEPTION.—Notification made under Subsec. (b)(2)(E). Pub. L. 111–203, § 922(c)(1)(B), added
section 42121(b)(1) of title 49, United States subpar. (E).
Code, shall be made to the person named in Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 111–203, § 922(c)(2), added subsec.
the complaint and to the employer. (e).
(C) BURDENS OF PROOF.—An action brought
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 2010 AMENDMENT
under paragraph (1)(B) shall be governed by
the legal burdens of proof set forth in sec- Amendment by Pub. L. 111–203 effective 1 day after
tion 42121(b) of title 49, United States Code. July 21, 2010, except as otherwise provided, see section
(D) STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.—An action 4 of Pub. L. 111–203, set out as an Effective Date note
under paragraph (1) shall be commenced not under section 5301 of Title 12, Banks and Banking.
later than 180 days after the date on which § 1515. Definitions for certain provisions; general
the violation occurs, or after the date on provision
which the employee became aware of the
violation. (a) As used in sections 1512 and 1513 of this
(E) JURY TRIAL.—A party to an action title and in this section—
brought under paragraph (1)(B) shall be enti- (1) the term ‘‘official proceeding’’ means—
tled to trial by jury. (A) a proceeding before a judge or court of
(c) REMEDIES.— the United States, a United States mag-
(1) IN GENERAL.—An employee prevailing in istrate judge, a bankruptcy judge, a judge of
any action under subsection (b)(1) shall be en- the United States Tax Court, a special trial
titled to all relief necessary to make the em- judge of the Tax Court, a judge of the United
ployee whole. States Court of Federal Claims, or a Federal
(2) COMPENSATORY DAMAGES.—Relief for any grand jury;
action under paragraph (1) shall include— (B) a proceeding before the Congress;
(A) reinstatement with the same seniority (C) a proceeding before a Federal Govern-
status that the employee would have had, ment agency which is authorized by law; or
but for the discrimination; (D) a proceeding involving the business of
(B) the amount of back pay, with interest; insurance whose activities affect interstate
and commerce before any insurance regulatory
(C) compensation for any special damages official or agency or any agent or examiner
sustained as a result of the discrimination, appointed by such official or agency to ex-
including litigation costs, expert witness amine the affairs of any person engaged in
fees, and reasonable attorney fees. the business of insurance whose activities
(d) RIGHTS RETAINED BY EMPLOYEE.—Nothing affect interstate commerce;
in this section shall be deemed to diminish the (2) the term ‘‘physical force’’ means physical
rights, privileges, or remedies of any employee action against another, and includes confine-
under any Federal or State law, or under any ment;
collective bargaining agreement. (3) the term ‘‘misleading conduct’’ means—
(e) NONENFORCEABILITY OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS (A) knowingly making a false statement;
WAIVING RIGHTS AND REMEDIES OR REQUIRING AR- (B) intentionally omitting information
BITRATION OF DISPUTES.— from a statement and thereby causing a por-
(1) WAIVER OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES.—The tion of such statement to be misleading, or
rights and remedies provided for in this sec- intentionally concealing a material fact, and
tion may not be waived by any agreement, pol- thereby creating a false impression by such
icy form, or condition of employment, includ- statement;
ing by a predispute arbitration agreement. (C) with intent to mislead, knowingly sub-
(2) PREDISPUTE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS.— mitting or inviting reliance on a writing or
No predispute arbitration agreement shall be recording that is false, forged, altered, or
valid or enforceable, if the agreement requires otherwise lacking in authenticity;
arbitration of a dispute arising under this sec- (D) with intent to mislead, knowingly sub-
tion. mitting or inviting reliance on a sample,
(Added Pub. L. 107–204, title VIII, § 806(a), July specimen, map, photograph, boundary mark,
30, 2002, 116 Stat. 802; amended Pub. L. 111–203, or other object that is misleading in a mate-
title IX, §§ 922(b), (c), 929A, July 21, 2010, 124 Stat. rial respect; or
1848, 1852.) (E) knowingly using a trick, scheme, or de-
AMENDMENTS vice with intent to mislead;
2010—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 111–203, § 929A, in introduc- (4) the term ‘‘law enforcement officer’’
tory provisions, inserted ‘‘including any subsidiary or means an officer or employee of the Federal
Page 467 TITLE 28—JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE § 2072
to prescribe complete and uniform modes of procedure, provisions set out as notes below, amending Rule 4 of
and alleviate, at least in part, the necessity of search- the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, set out in the Ap-
ing in two places, namely in the Acts of Congress and pendix to this title, adding Form 18–A in the Appendix
in the rules of the courts, for procedural requisites. of Forms, and amending section 951 of Title 18, Crimes
Former Attorney General Cummings recently said: and Criminal Procedure] shall take effect 45 days after
‘‘Legislative bodies have neither the time to inquire the enactment of this Act [Jan. 12, 1983].’’
objectively into the details of judicial procedure nor
the opportunity to determine the necessity for amend- SHORT TITLE OF 1983 AMENDMENT
ment or change. Frequently such legislation has been Pub. L. 97–462, § 1, Jan. 12, 1983, 96 Stat. 2527, provided:
enacted for the purpose of meeting particular problems ‘‘That this Act [enacting provisions set out as notes
or supposed difficulties, but the results have usually below, amending Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil
been confusing or otherwise unsatisfactory. Compre- Procedure, set out in the Appendix to this title, adding
hensive action has been lacking for the obvious reason Form 18–A in the Appendix of Forms, and amending
that the professional nature of the task would leave the section 951 of Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure]
legislature little time for matters of substance and may be cited as the ‘Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
statesmanship. It often happened that an admitted Amendments Act of 1982’.’’
need for change, even in limited areas, could not be se-
cured.’’—The New Criminal Rules—Another Triumph of SAVINGS PROVISION
the Democratic Process. American Bar Association
Section 406 of title IV of Pub. L. 100–702 provided
Journal, May 1945.
Provisions of sections 263 and 296 of title 28, U.S.C., that: ‘‘The rules prescribed in accordance with law be-
1940 ed., authorizing the Court of Claims and Customs fore the effective date of this title [Dec. 1, 1988] and in
Court to punish for contempt, were omitted as covered effect on the date of such effective date shall remain in
by H. R. 1600, § 401, 80th Congress, for revision of the force until changed pursuant to the law as amended by
Criminal Code. this title [see Effective Date of 1988 Amendment note
Provisions of section 1111 of title 26, U.S.C., 1940 ed., above].’’
making applicable to Tax Court Proceedings ‘‘the rules RULEMAKING AUTHORITY OF SUPREME COURT AND
of evidence applicable in the courts of the District of JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
Columbia in the type of proceeding which, prior to
Sept. 16, 1938, were within the jurisdiction of the courts Pub. L. 109–2, § 8, Feb. 18, 2005, 119 Stat. 14, provided
of equity of said District,’’ were omitted as unneces- that: ‘‘Nothing in this Act [see Short Title of 2005
sary and inconsistent with other provisions of law re- Amendments note set out under section 1 of this title]
lating to the Federal courts. The rules of evidence in shall restrict in any way the authority of the Judicial
Tax Court proceedings are the same as those which Conference and the Supreme Court to propose and pre-
apply to civil procedure in other courts. See Dempster scribe general rules of practice and procedure under
Mill. Mfg. Co. v. Burnet, 1931, 46 F.2d 604, 60 App.D.C. 23. chapter 131 of title 28, United States Code.’’
For rule-making power of the Supreme Court in copy-
right infringement actions, see section 25(e) of title 17, TAX COURT RULEMAKING NOT AFFECTED
U.S.C., 1940 ed., Copyrights. See, also, section 205(a) of Section 405 of title IV of Pub. L. 100–702 provided
title 11, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Bankruptcy, authorizing the that: ‘‘The amendments made by this title [see Effec-
Supreme Court to promulgate rules relating to service tive Date of 1988 Amendment note above] shall not af-
of process in railroad reorganization proceedings. fect the authority of the Tax Court to prescribe rules
SENATE REVISION AMENDMENT under section 7453 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
[26 U.S.C. 7453].’’
By Senate amendment, all provisions relating to the
Tax Court were eliminated. Therefore, section 1111 of ADMIRALTY RULES
Title 26, U.S.C., Internal Revenue Code, was not one of
The Rules of Practice in Admiralty and Maritime
the sources of this section as finally enacted. However,
Cases, promulgated by the Supreme Court on Dec. 20,
no change in the text of this section was necessary. See
1920, effective Mar. 7, 1921, as revised, amended, and
80th Congress Senate Report No. 1559.
supplemented, were rescinded, effective July 1, 1966, in
1949 ACT accordance with the general unification of civil and ad-
miralty procedure which became effective July 1, 1966.
This amendment clarifies section 2071 of title 28,
Provision for certain distinctly maritime remedies
U.S.C., by giving express recognition to the power of
were preserved however in the Supplemental Rules for
the Supreme Court to prescribe its own rules and by
Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, rules A to F,
giving a better description of its procedural rules.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Appendix to this
AMENDMENTS title.
1988—Pub. L. 100–702 designated existing provisions as
subsec. (a), substituted ‘‘under section 2072 of this § 2072. Rules of procedure and evidence; power
title’’ for ‘‘by the Supreme Court’’, and added subsecs. to prescribe
(b) to (f).
1949—Act May 24, 1949, expressed recognition to the
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to
Supreme Court’s power to prescribe its own rules and prescribe general rules of practice and procedure
give a better description of its procedural rules. and rules of evidence for cases in the United
States district courts (including proceedings be-
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1988 AMENDMENT
fore magistrate judges thereof) and courts of ap-
Section 407 of title IV of Pub. L. 100–702 provided peals.
that: ‘‘This title [enacting sections 2072 to 2074 of this (b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or
title, amending this section, sections 331, 332, 372, 604,
modify any substantive right. All laws in con-
636, and 2077 of this title, section 460n–8 of Title 16, Con-
servation, and section 3402 of Title 18, Crimes and flict with such rules shall be of no further force
Criminal Procedure, repealing former section 2072 and or effect after such rules have taken effect.
section 2076 of this title and sections 3771 and 3772 of (c) Such rules may define when a ruling of a
Title 18, and enacting provisions set out as notes under district court is final for the purposes of appeal
this section] shall take effect on December 1, 1988.’’ under section 1291 of this title.
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1983 AMENDMENT (Added Pub. L. 100–702, title IV, § 401(a), Nov. 19,
Pub. L. 97–462, § 4, Jan. 12, 1983, 96 Stat. 2530, provided 1988, 102 Stat. 4648; amended Pub. L. 101–650, title
that: ‘‘The amendments made by this Act [enacting III, §§ 315, 321, Dec. 1, 1990, 104 Stat. 5115, 5117.)
§ 2073 TITLE 28—JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE Page 468
PRIOR PROVISIONS day shall be closed to the public, and states the
A prior section 2072, acts June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 reason for so closing the meeting. Minutes of
Stat. 961; May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 103, 63 Stat. 104; July each meeting for the transaction of business
18, 1949, ch. 343, § 2, 63 Stat. 446; May 10, 1950, ch. 174, § 2, under this chapter shall be maintained by the
64 Stat. 158; July 7, 1958, Pub. L. 85–508, § 12(m), 72 Stat. committee and made available to the public, ex-
348; Nov. 6, 1966, Pub. L. 89–773, § 1, 80 Stat. 1323, author- cept that any portion of such minutes, relating
ized the Supreme Court to prescribe rules of civil pro- to a closed meeting and made available to the
cedure, prior to repeal by Pub. L. 100–702, §§ 401(a), 407,
public, may contain such deletions as may be
effective Dec. 1, 1988.
necessary to avoid frustrating the purposes of
AMENDMENTS closing the meeting.
1990—Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 101–650 added subsec. (c). (2) Any meeting for the transaction of business
under this chapter, by a committee appointed
CHANGE OF NAME under this section, shall be preceded by suffi-
Words ‘‘magistrate judges’’ substituted for ‘‘mag- cient notice to enable all interested persons to
istrates’’ in subsec. (a) pursuant to section 321 of Pub. attend.
L. 101–650, set out as a note under section 631 of this (d) In making a recommendation under this
title. section or under section 2072 or 2075, the body
EFFECTIVE DATE making that recommendation shall provide a
proposed rule, an explanatory note on the rule,
Section effective Dec. 1, 1988, see section 407 of Pub.
and a written report explaining the body’s ac-
L. 100–702, set out as an Effective Date of 1988 Amend-
ment note under section 2071 of this title. tion, including any minority or other separate
views.
APPLICABILITY TO VIRGIN ISLANDS (e) Failure to comply with this section does
Rules of civil procedure promulgated under this sec- not invalidate a rule prescribed under section
tion as applicable to the District Court of the Virgin Is- 2072 or 2075 of this title.
lands, see section 1615 of Title 48, Territories and Insu-
(Added Pub. L. 100–702, title IV, § 401(a), Nov. 19,
lar Possessions.
1988, 102 Stat. 4649; amended Pub. L. 103–394, title
ADMIRALTY RULES I, § 104(e), Oct. 22, 1994, 108 Stat. 4110.)
The Rules of Practice in Admiralty and Maritime PRIOR PROVISIONS
Cases, promulgated by the Supreme Court on Dec. 20,
A prior section 2073, acts June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62
1920, effective Mar. 7, 1921, as revised, amended, and
Stat. 961; May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 104, 63 Stat. 104; May 10,
supplemented, were rescinded, effective July 1, 1966, in
1950, ch. 174, § 3, 64 Stat. 158, empowered the Supreme
accordance with the general unification of civil and ad-
Court to prescribe, by general rules, the practice and
miralty procedure which became effective July 1, 1966.
procedure in admiralty and maritime cases in the dis-
Provision for certain distinctly maritime remedies
trict courts, prior to repeal by Pub. L. 89–773, § 2, Nov.
were preserved however, in the Supplemental Rules for
6, 1966, 80 Stat. 1323.
Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, Rules A to F,
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Appendix to this AMENDMENTS
title.
1994—Subsec. (a)(2). Pub. L. 103–394, § 104(e)(1), sub-
§ 2073. Rules of procedure and evidence; method stituted ‘‘sections 2072 and 2075’’ for ‘‘section 2072’’.
Subsecs. (d), (e). Pub. L. 103–394, § 104(e)(2), inserted
of prescribing ‘‘or 2075’’ after ‘‘2072’’.
(a)(1) The Judicial Conference shall prescribe EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1994 AMENDMENT
and publish the procedures for the consideration
Amendment by Pub. L. 103–394 effective Oct. 22, 1994,
of proposed rules under this section. and not applicable with respect to cases commenced
(2) The Judicial Conference may authorize the under Title 11, Bankruptcy, before Oct. 22, 1994, see sec-
appointment of committees to assist the Con- tion 702 of Pub. L. 103–394, set out as a note under sec-
ference by recommending rules to be prescribed tion 101 of Title 11.
under sections 2072 and 2075 of this title. Each
EFFECTIVE DATE
such committee shall consist of members of the
bench and the professional bar, and trial and ap- Section effective Dec. 1, 1988, see section 407 of Pub.
pellate judges. L. 100–702, set out as an Effective Date of 1988 Amend-
ment note under section 2071 of this title.
(b) The Judicial Conference shall authorize the
appointment of a standing committee on rules MORE COMPLETE INFORMATION REGARDING ASSETS OF
of practice, procedure, and evidence under sub- THE ESTATE
section (a) of this section. Such standing com- Pub. L. 109–8, title IV, § 419, Apr. 20, 2005, 119 Stat. 109,
mittee shall review each recommendation of any provided that:
other committees so appointed and recommend ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—
‘‘(1) DISCLOSURE.—The Judicial Conference of the
to the Judicial Conference rules of practice, pro-
United States, in accordance with section 2075 of title
cedure, and evidence and such changes in rules 28 of the United States Code and after consideration
proposed by a committee appointed under sub- of the views of the Director of the Executive Office
section (a)(2) of this section as may be necessary for United States Trustees, shall propose amended
to maintain consistency and otherwise promote Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and in ac-
the interest of justice. cordance with rule 9009 of the Federal Rules of Bank-
(c)(1) Each meeting for the transaction of busi- ruptcy Procedure [11 U.S.C. App.] shall prescribe offi-
ness under this chapter by any committee ap- cial bankruptcy forms directing debtors under chap-
pointed under this section shall be open to the ter 11 of title 11 of United States Code, to disclose the
information described in paragraph (2) by filing and
public, except when the committee so meeting, serving periodic financial and other reports designed
in open session and with a majority present, de- to provide such information.
termines that it is in the public interest that all ‘‘(2) INFORMATION.—The information referred to in
or part of the remainder of the meeting on that paragraph (1) is the value, operations, and profit-
Occupational Safety and Health Admin., Labor § 1980.110
that protected behavior or conduct was § 1980.110 Decision and orders of the
a contributing factor in the unfavor- Administrative Review Board.
able personnel action alleged in the (a) Any party desiring to seek review,
complaint. Relief may not be ordered if including judicial review, of a decision
the named person demonstrates by of the administrative law judge, or a
clear and convincing evidence that it named person alleging that the com-
would have taken the same unfavorable plaint was frivolous or brought in bad
personnel action in the absence of any faith who seeks an award of attorney’s
protected behavior. Neither the Assist- fees, must file a written petition for re-
ant Secretary’s determination to dis- view with the Administrative Review
miss a complaint without completing Board (’’the Board’’), which has been
an investigation pursuant to delegated the authority to act for the
§ 1980.104(b) nor the Assistant Sec- Secretary and issue final decisions
retary’s determination to proceed with under this part. The decision of the ad-
an investigation is subject to review by ministrative law judge will become the
the administrative law judge, and a final order of the Secretary unless, pur-
complaint may not be remanded for the suant to this section, a petition for re-
completion of an investigation or for view is timely filed with the Board.
additional findings on the basis that a The petition for review must specifi-
determination to dismiss was made in cally identify the findings, conclusions
error. Rather, if there otherwise is ju- or orders to which exception is taken.
risdiction, the administrative law Any exception not specifically urged
judge will hear the case on the merits. ordinarily will be deemed to have been
waived by the parties. To be effective,
(b) If the administrative law judge
a petition must be filed within 10 busi-
concludes that the party charged has
ness days of the date of the decision of
violated the law, the order will provide
the administrative law judge. The date
all relief necessary to make the em-
of the postmark, facsimile transmittal,
ployee whole, including reinstatement or e-mail communication will be con-
of the complainant to that person’s sidered to be the date of filing; if the
former position with the seniority sta- petition is filed in person, by hand-de-
tus that the complainant would have livery or other means, the petition is
had but for the discrimination, back considered filed upon receipt. The peti-
pay with interest, and compensation tion must be served on all parties and
for any special damages sustained as a on the Chief Administrative Law Judge
result of the discrimination, including at the time it is filed with the Board.
litigation costs, expert witness fees, Copies of the petition for review and all
and reasonable attorney’s fees. If, upon briefs must be served on the Assistant
the request of the named person, the Secretary, Occupational Safety and
administrative law judge determines Health Administration, and on the As-
that a complaint was frivolous or was sociate Solicitor, Division of Fair
brought in bad faith, the judge may Labor Standards, U.S. Department of
award to the named person a reason- Labor, Washington, DC 20210.
able attorney’s fee, not exceeding (b) If a timely petition for review is
$1,000. filed pursuant to paragraph (a) of this
(c) The decision will be served upon section, the decision of the administra-
all parties to the proceeding. Any ad- tive law judge will become the final
ministrative law judge’s decision re- order of the Secretary unless the
quiring reinstatement or lifting an Board, within 30 days of the filing of
order of reinstatement by the Assist- the petition, issues an order notifying
ant Secretary will be effective imme- the parties that the case has been ac-
diately upon receipt of the decision by cepted for review. If a case is accepted
the named person, and will not be for review, the decision of the adminis-
stayed. All other portions of the trative law judge will be inoperative
judge’s order will be effective 10 busi- unless and until the Board issues an
cprice-sewell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with CFR
ness days after the date of the decision order adopting the decision, except
unless a timely petition for review has that a preliminary order of reinstate-
been filed with the Administrative Re- ment will be effective while review is
view Board. conducted by the Board, unless the
241
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§ 1980.111 29 CFR Ch. XVII (7–1–09 Edition)
Board grants a motion to stay the Subpart C—Miscellaneous

order. The Board will specify the terms Provisions
under which any briefs are to be filed.
The Board will review the factual de- § 1980.111 Withdrawal of complaints,
terminations of the administrative law objections, and findings; settlement.
judge under the substantial evidence (a) At any time prior to the filing of
standard. objections to the findings or prelimi-
(c) The final decision of the Board nary order, a complainant may with-
shall be issued within 120 days of the draw his or her complaint under the
conclusion of the hearing, which will Act by filing a written withdrawal with
be deemed to be the conclusion of all the Assistant Secretary. The Assistant
proceedings before the administrative Secretary will then determine whether
law judge—i.e., 10 business days after to approve the withdrawal. The Assist-
the date of the decision of the adminis- ant Secretary will notify the named
person of the approval of any with-
trative law judge unless a motion for
drawal. If the complaint is withdrawn
reconsideration has been filed with the because of settlement, the settlement
administrative law judge in the in- will be approved in accordance with
terim. The decision will be served upon paragraph (d) of this section.
all parties and the Chief Administra- (b) The Assistant Secretary may
tive Law Judge by mail to the last withdraw his or her findings or a pre-
known address. The final decision will liminary order at any time before the
also be served on the Assistant Sec- expiration of the 30-day objection pe-
retary, Occupational Safety and Health riod described in § 1980.106, provided
Administration, and on the Associate that no objection has yet been filed,
Solicitor, Division of Fair Labor and substitute new findings or prelimi-
Standards, U.S. Department of Labor, nary order. The date of the receipt of
Washington, DC 20210, even if the As- the substituted findings or order will
sistant Secretary is not a party. begin a new 30-day objection period.
(d) If the Board concludes that the (c) At any time before the findings or
party charged has violated the law, the order become final, a party may with-
final order will order the party charged draw his or her objections to the find-
to provide all relief necessary to make ings or order by filing a written with-
drawal with the administrative law
the employee whole, including rein-
judge or, if the case is on review, with
statement of the complainant to that
the Board. The judge or the Board, as
person’s former position with the se-
the case may be, will determine wheth-
niority status that the complainant er to approve the withdrawal. If the ob-
would have had but for the discrimina- jections are withdrawn because of set-
tion, back pay with interest, and com- tlement, the settlement will be ap-
pensation for any special damages sus- proved in accordance with paragraph
tained as a result of the discrimina- (d) of this section.
tion, including litigation costs, expert (d)(1) Investigative settlements. At any
witness fees, and reasonable attorney’s time after the filing of a complaint,
fees. and before the findings and/or order are
(e) If the Board determines that the objected to or become a final order by
named person has not violated the law, operation of law, the case may be set-
an order will be issued denying the tled if the Assistant Secretary, the
complaint. If, upon the request of the complainant and the named person
named person, the Board determines agree to a settlement.
that a complaint was frivolous or was (2) Adjudicatory settlements. At any
brought in bad faith, the Board may time after the filing of objections to
award to the named person a reason- the Assistant Secretary’s findings and/
able attorney’s fee, not exceeding or order, the case may be settled if the
participating parties agree to a settle-
cprice-sewell on DSKDVH8Z91PROD with CFR
$1,000.
ment and the settlement is approved
by the administrative law judge if the
case is before the judge, or by the
Board if a timely petition for review
242
VerDate Nov<24>2008 11:41 Aug 18, 2009 Jkt 217117 PO 00000 Frm 00252 Fmt 8010 Sfmt 8010 Y:\SGML\217117.XXX 217117

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§ 703 TITLE 5—GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYEES Page 112

denied on the ground that it is against the § 704. Actions reviewable

Section 1. Rights Guaranteed—Continued

Section 1. Rights Guaranteed—Continued

Equal Protection of the Laws—Continued

The New Equal Protection—Continued

of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 4 set aside the Dred Scott

from the Government of the United States the power to expatriate

PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

right to enter public lands, 22 the right to be protected against vio-

at 285–87 (Justices Stewart and Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger).

forth in any of the enumerations as one of the privileges protected

DUE PROCESS OF LAW

State Law to secure attendance of witnesses from within or without a State in

Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U.S. 324, 328 (1901).

state legislation regulating the rates charged for the transportation

those which are not, no more useful construction could be furnished

to demonstrate the impropriety of leaving to the state legislatures

particular, became synonymous with governmental hands-off in the

namely, health, morals, or safety. For appraising state legislation

whether of congressional or state legislative efforts to structure and accommodate

‘‘Persons’’ Defined.—Notwithstanding the historical con-

deemed adequate to enable him to invoke the protection of the

through appropriate regard to the subject matter of the exercise of

stead Ass’n, 297 U.S. 189, 197 (1936).

‘‘Liberty’’.—The ‘‘liberty’’ guaranteed by the due process clause

struck down or arbitrarily interfered with, there is a substantial

doctrine to conclude in Lochner v. New York 85 that a law restrict-

espousal of the conflicting doctrines of judicial notice by the former

employer’s liberty of contract and recognize a correlative liberty of

a protection against flood in case of abandonment, 100 and that

McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539 (1909).

ployment are not beyond alteration by legislation in the public in-

v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917).

at 38 (Justice Powell concurring).

Contracts limiting liability for injuries, consummated in ad-

265 U.S. 379 (1924).

prived of property or their liberty of contract by restriction imposed by the State

Collective Bargaining.—During the 1930s, liberty, as trans-

denial of freedom of speech and constitute therefore a deprivation of liberty without

curring, declared that ‘‘the insistence by individuals of their private prejudices . . .,

property and intimidation of other employees by threats.’’ 136 Fi-

Regulation of Business Enterprises: Rates, Charges, and

In contrast to the speed with which the Court arrived at those

Co. v. Hyde, 275 U.S. 440 (1928).

were deemed to be not so affected, were state statutes fixing the

the determination of prices by ‘‘natural forces,’’ 150 the majority was

Judicial Review of Publicly Determined Rates and Charges

Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 603 (1942).

missible governmental fixing of prices, the Court in Nebbia 155 de-

power and became one of eminent domain. Nevertheless, even the

Court not only obliterated the distinction between confiscatory and

in the context of federal ratemaking, appears to be equally applicable to judicial re-

Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Garrett, 166 in which it declared that

Shepard), 230 U.S. 352, 433 (1913).

interference should never occur unless the case presents, clearly

452, 470 (1910).

ough, 176 as being no longer sufficient to satisfy the requirements

required as a matter of constitutional law, may continue to be used by state commis-