FT CR
FT CR
FT CR
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
For review in this case is a decision 1 of the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA
GR. 28684-SP dated November 26, 1993 setting aside a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 95). chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On August 3, 1984, petitioner Prosperity Credit Resources, Inc. gave a loan to private
respondent Metropolitan Fabrics, Inc. 2 To secure the payment of the loan, private
respondent mortgaged to petitioner seven parcels of land located at 685 Tandang Sora
Avenue, Bo. Banlat, Quezon City. 3 The lots comprise a commercial compound with
Tandang Sora Avenue as the nearest public road.
By October 27, 1987, private respondent’s loan amounted to P10.5 million. 4 As private
respondent defaulted in the payment of the loan, petitioner foreclosed the mortgage
and, in the ensuing public bidding, became the highest bidder and purchaser of the
seven (7) lots subject of the mortgage.
Later, private respondent negotiated with petitioner for the redemption of three lots
covered by TCT Nos. 317705, 317706, and 317707, 5 all located on the southern and
middle portions of the compound. As the reacquisition of these three lots by private
respondent would leave the remaining four lots on the northwestern side without access
to Tandang Sora Avenue, petitioner acceded to private respondent’s request on the
condition that petitioner be given a right of way on the existing private road which
forms part of the area to be redeemed by private Respondent. The parties’ agreement
was embodied in a Memorandum of Undertaking, dated September 18, 1987, the full
text of which reads: 6
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERTAKING KNOW ALL MEN THESE PRESENTS: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
That METROPOLITAN FABRICS, INC. is the registered owner of that certain land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 317709, more particularly described as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A parcel of land (Lot 11 (Existing Road) of the consolidation-subd. plan (LRC) Pcs-
27706, approved as a non-subdn. project, being a portion of the consolidation of Lots
373-E, (LRC) Psd-16383; 377-B, Fls-2163-D; 377-C-1, 2, 3, & 4 (LRC) Psd-5025; 377-
C-5-A, & B, (LRC) Psd-9474; 384-A & 387-B-1, (LRC) Psd-254813; 388-A & C, Psd-
30663; 388-B-1, 2, 3, 4 & 5, Psd-54827; 389-A-1, 2 & 3, 389-B-1 (LRC) Psd-10087;
and 389-B-2-C, (LRC) Psd-18842; LRC (GLRO) Rec. No. 5975) situated in the Bo. of
Banlat, Quezon City, Metro Manila, Is. of Luzon . . . containing of an area of FIVE
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SIXTY SEVEN (5,367) SQUARE METERS, more or less.
That the above-described lot, being an existing private road, will remain open to ingress
and egress for whatever kind of passage in favor of PROSPERITY FINANCIAL
RESOURCES, INC. or its successors-in-interest, the mortgagee of Lots 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
and 9 of the consolidation-subdivision plan, Pcs-27706 of Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. 317699, 317702, 317703, 317704, 317705, 317706 & 317707, respectively, in
the name of METROPOLITAN FABRICS, INC.
On November 7, 1991, petitioner filed an injunctive suit in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City (Branch 95). Petitioner alleged that, in violation of the terms of the
Memorandum of Agreement, private respondent refused to allow petitioner to make
excavations on one side of the access road for the installation of water pipes; that it
banned entry of petitioner’s trucks and those of its tenants between 11:30 A.M. to 1:00
P.M. and 10:00 P.M. to 7:00 A.M.; and that it subjected the vehicles to unnecessary
searches. Petitioner sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
requiring private respondent "to allow [petitioner] to proceed with the MWSS
installation project over the road lot in question, to allow [petitioner’s] and [its]
tenants’ delivery trucks and other vehicles access to the same at any time and without
undergoing unnecessary searches, and to otherwise recognize [petitioner’s] right of
way over the said lot." 7 Petitioner prayed that, after trial, the writ be made final.
On December 21, 1991, private respondent filed an answer with counterclaim, alleging
that petitioner’s right to undertake excavations on the access road was not provided for
in the Memorandum of Undertaking. 8 As counterclaim, private respondent alleged that
it was petitioner which caused damage to private respondent’s tenants by undertaking,
without its consent, construction works on the access road which raised its level to
about a meter and caused serious flooding of the nearby buildings whenever it rained;
9 and that, as a result, its tenants demanded compensation for damage to their
merchandise and equipment occasioned by the flooding. Private respondent prayed for
P2.1 million as counterclaim. 10
The trial court required the parties to submit position papers in connection with
petitioner’s prayer for a preliminary mandatory injunction. 11 After the parties had
done so, the trial court granted, on February 14, 1992, petitioner’s prayer for a
preliminary writ, conditioned upon the filing by petitioner of a bond in the amount of
P500,000.00. The trial court said in part:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . [T]he court finds that to deny plaintiff’s application for a preliminary mandatory
injunction writ would be to disregard its right of way in respect of the road lot in
question, a right clearly set forth in defendant’s memorandum of undertaking of
September 18, 1987; indeed, no cogent reason appears to warrant treating the terms
"for whatever kind of passage" contained therein as nothing more than a useless,
meaningless redundancy . . .
ACCORDINGLY, plaintiff’s subject application is hereby granted and the Court hereby
directs that upon the filing and approval of the corresponding injunction bond in the
sum of P500,000.00, . . . let corresponding preliminary mandatory injunction writ be
issued directing defendant to allow plaintiff to proceed with its MWSS installation
project over the road lot in question, to allow plaintiff’s and its tenant’s delivery trucks
and other vehicles access to the same at any time and without undergoing unnecessary
searches, and to otherwise recognize plaintiff’s right of way over the said road lot,
pending the termination of this litigation and/or unless a contrary order is issued by this
Court . . . 12
On March 2, 1992, the trial court issued the writ upon filing of the required bond by
petitioner. 13 Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the orders
granting injunction which the trial court denied. 14 However, it increased the injunction
bond to P2.1 million. 15
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT DECIDED THE MERITS OF THE
MAIN CASE IN A CERTIORARI PROCEEDING PRACTICALLY RENDERING ACADEMIC THE
HEARING PROPER YET TO BE CONDUCTED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT.
The right of the complainant must be clear and unmistakable because, unlike an
ordinary preliminary injunction, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction requires
the performance of a particular act or acts 19 and thus tends to do more than maintain
the status quo. 20 In the case at bar, petitioner anchors its alleged right to the
preliminary mandatory injunction on the Memorandum of Undertaking, dated
September 18, 1987, which provides that: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
[T]he above-described lot, being an existing private road, will remain open to ingress
and egress for whatever kind of passage in favor of PROSPERITY FINANCIAL
RESOURCES, INC. or its successors-in-interest.
There is no question as to the meaning of the terms "ingress" and "egress." They give
petitioner the right to use the private road as a means of entry into and exit from its
property on the northwestern side of the compound. The question concerns the
meaning of the phrase "for whatever kind of passage." The trial court read this phrase
to mean that petitioner had the right to make excavations on the side of the access
road in order to install a network of water pipes. The word "passage" does not,
however, "clearly and unmistakably" convey a meaning that includes a right to install
water pipes on the access road. The ordinary meaning of the word, as defined in
Webster’s Dictionary, is that it is "the act or action of passing: movement or
transference from one place or point to another." 21 Its legal meaning is not different.
It means, according to Black’s Law Dictionary, the "act of passing; transit; transition."
22 To achieve a meaning such as that which petitioner proposes requires the
consideration of evidence showing the parties’ intention in using the word which can
only be done during trial on the merits. Until such time, petitioner cannot claim to have
a "clear and unmistakable" right justifying the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction in this case. Thus, the trial court should have observed caution
and denied petitioner’s application for the preliminary writ.
Petitioner contends that resort should be made to facts surrounding the execution of
the Memorandum of Undertaking which, according to it, shows the intention of the
parties to give petitioner the right to install water pipes along the side of the access
road. 23 It cites Rule 130 §11 24 of the 1964 Rules of Court, which provides: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
That is precisely what we are saying. The recourse petitioner proposes must await the
presentation of the parties’ evidence during trial and the determination of their
intention must be made by the trial court, not by this Court. Petitioner cannot
circumvent the process by asking this Court to determine the facts surrounding the
execution of their agreement. Indeed, for us to undertake such inquiry would be to
expand the scope of the present review and intrude into the domain of the trial court.
Petitioner will have ample opportunity to substantiate its allegations on this point during
the trial of the case. Rule 130 §11, which petitioner invokes, is actually a rule for
interpretation of documentary evidence formally offered at the trial. It does not apply to
preliminary proceedings concerning the issuance of ancillary remedies.
Anent petitioner’s contention that the writ of certiorari does not lie because the error
sought to be corrected is an error of judgment, suffice it to say that the lower court
acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction despite the doubt on petitioner’s right to it.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 26, 1993, and its
resolution, dated February 28, 1994, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary