5 Munsalud V NHA
5 Munsalud V NHA
5 Munsalud V NHA
DECISION
REYES, R.T. , J : p
When Bulado died, petitioner Winnie assumed the obligation to pay the monthly
amortizations. Respondent NHA recognized petitioner spouses' assumption of
obligations as their names were re ected in the receipts. They were allowed to occupy
the lot up to the present. To prove their occupancy over the lot, petitioners offered as
evidence the following documents, viz.:
1. Tag Card No. 77-02830-03 issued by then Pasay City Mayor Pablo Cuneta
and then NHA General Manager Gaudencio Tobias;
2. Application and Contract for Water Services No. 295319 in the name of
Bulado but the same was signed by petitioner Winnie; TcHCIS
3. Tax Declaration No. B-007-27566 over the land issued by the Assessor's
O ce of Pasay City in the name of defendant recognizing its bene cial
use in favor of petitioners;
SO ORDERED. 5
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but they did not succeed. Thus, petitioners
seasonably appealed to the CA.
CA Disposition
On August 23, 2004, the CA a rmed the RTC dismissal of the mandamus
petition.
WHEREFORE , the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly,
the assailed Order of Dismissal is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 6
In agreeing with the court a quo, the appellate court rationalized as follows:
It is essential to the issuance of the writ of mandamus that the petitioner
should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the
imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. It is a command
to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.
IaAScD
It well settled that the legal right of petitioner to the performance of the
particular act which is sought to be compelled must be clear and complete. A
clear legal right within the meaning of the rule means a right which is clearly
founded in, or granted by law; a right which is inferable as a matter of law.
Likewise, mandamus refers only to acts enjoined by law to be done. The duties
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to be enforced must be such as are clearly peremptorily enjoined by law or by
reason of o cial station. However, appellants failed to point out in their petition
the speci c law by which defendant is duty bound to perform the act sought to
be performed, as well as the law which would grant them the clear legal right to
the issuance of the writ of mandamus.
Foregoing discussed, we nd no error on the part of the court a quo in
dismissing the petition for mandamus filed by plaintiffs-appellants. TESICD
On September 20, 2004, petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied
by the CA on February 22, 2005. Hence, the present recourse.
Issues
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE ORDERS OF THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
QUEZON CITY DATED APRIL 22, 2003 AND SEPTEMBER 25, 2003 WHERE THE
LATTER COURT — RELYING UPON THE APPELLATION AND/OR LABEL THAT
PETITIONERS GAVE THEIR COMPLAINT (I.E., MANDAMUS) IN CIVIL CASE NO.
Q-03-492 — DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT THEREIN PURPORTEDLY BECAUSE
THE SAID COMPLAINT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 3, RULE 65 OF THE
1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DENYING PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ITS DECISION
DATED AUGUST 23, 2004. 7 (Underscoring supplied)
Poring over the arguments presented, the focal issue is whether in giving due
course to an action, the court is fenced within the parameters of the title given by
plaintiff to the case without regard to the averments of the pleading. aDATHC
Elsewise stated, does the trial court have absolute discretion to dismiss an
action on the ground that it is insu cient in form and substance based alone on its
designation when, from the body and the relief prayed for, it could stand as an action
sufficient in form and substance?
Our Ruling
Petitioners' action designated as mandamus was dismissed by the trial court on
the ground that it is insu cient in form and substance. This begs the question: when is
an action sufficient in form and when is it sufficient in substance? DaEcTC
To begin with, form is the methodology used to express rules of practice and
procedure. 8 It is the order or method of legal proceedings. 9 It relates to technical
details. 1 0 It is ordinarily the antithesis of substance. 1 1 It is an established method of
expression or practice. It is a fixed or formal way of proceeding. 1 2
A pleading is sufficient in form when it contains the following:
1. A Caption, setting forth the name of the court, the title of the action
indicating the names of the parties, and the docket number which is
usually left in blank, as the Clerk of Court has to assign yet a docket
number; SacTCA
2. The Body, reflecting the designation, the allegations of the party's claims or
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defenses, the relief prayed for, and the date of the pleading;
3. The Signature and Address of the party or counsel; 1 3
Likewise, for all other pleadings, not initiatory in nature, there must be:
A Proof of Service, which consists in the written admission of the party
served, or the o cial return of the server, or the a davit of the party serving,
containing a full statement of the date, place and manner of service. If the
service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist of an a davit of the
person mailing. If service is by registered mail, proof shall be made by such
affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. 1 7 TADCSE
In the case at bench, a naked perusal of the complaint docketed as Civil Case No.
Q03-49278 designated by petitioners as mandamus reveals that it is su cient in form.
It has the caption with the name of the court, the name of the parties, and the docket
number. The complaint contains allegations of petitioners' claims. It has a prayer and
the date when it was prepared. The signature page shows the signature and name of
petitioners' counsel, the counsel's IBP, PTR and Roll of Attorney's Numbers. The
complaint was also veri ed and accompanied by a certi cate of non-forum shopping
and signed by petitioners as plaintiffs. It was led personally with the o ce of the clerk
of court. aEcSIH
The court a quo anchored the dismissal of petitioners' complaint on the basis of
Rule 65, Section 3 2 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It found that there was no
reference to any law which respondent NHA, by reason of its o ce, trust or station, is
speci cally enjoined as a duty to perform. It declared that there was no allegation in the
petition below that respondent is unlawfully excluding petitioners from using or
enjoying any right or office which said petitioners are entitled to.
Although the complaint was captioned as Mandamus, petitioners' averments, as
well as the relief sought, called for an action for speci c performance. Pertinent
portions of the complaint for mandamus provide:
3. Plaintiff Winnie Munsalud is the daughter of the late Lourdes
Bulado, and as such is one of Bulado's compulsory heirs. . . .;
4. During the lifetime of Bulado, she was awarded a parcel of land at
a "land for the landless" program of the defendant;
A plain reading of the allegations of the complaint reveals that petitioner Winnie
Munsalud assumed the obligations of her deceased mother, the original awardee of
respondent's "Land for the Landless Program". One of the obligations of an awardee is
to pay the monthly amortizations. Petitioners complied with said obligation and
religiously paid the amortizations until these were fully paid.
Indeed, petitioners have complied with what is incumbent upon them under the
program. Hence, it is now the turn of respondent to comply with what is incumbent
upon it.
In a letter dated February 21, 2003, 2 7 respondent informed petitioners' counsel
that per its records, the name of petitioner Winnie Munsalud does not appear as a
bene ciary. For the guidance of respondent, Winnie Munsalud is not actually a
bene ciary. The bene ciary of its program is Lourdes Bulado, her deceased mother.
This fact was made known to respondent when another letter dated March 6, 2003 2 8
was sent by the counsel of the heirs of Lourdes Bulado. In the same letter, respondent
was informed that petitioner Winnie is representing her deceased mother, Lourdes
Bulado, viz.:
In view of the contents of that letter, we would like to notify you that Ms.
Munsalud is actually representing her deceased mother, Lourdes Bulado , who,
on September 14, 1989 completed her payment for Lot 12, Block 79 of the
Maricaban Estate. A copy of the receipt evidencing that completed is attached
hereto as Annex B for your easy reference. ECISAD
In view thereof, may we reiterate our request for the issuance of the title
over the aforesaid property in the name of Lourdes Bulado. 2 9 (Underscoring
supplied)
The letter was received by respondent on March 12, 2003. On account of this
second letter, respondent could have easily veri ed if the name of Lourdes Bulado
appears as a bene ciary and awardee of its "Land for the Landless Program". However,
respondent never responded to the second letter. This left petitioners with no recourse
but to bring the action to the trial court.
Evidently, the action commenced by petitioners before the trial court, although
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designated as mandamus, is in reality an action to perform a speci c act. The
averments of the complaint are clear. The essential facts are su ciently alleged as to
apprise the court of the nature of the case. The relief sought to be obtained aims to
compel respondent to issue a deed of sale and the corresponding title over the
property awarded to Bulado. Thus, the Court nds the complaint su cient in
substance. IHCacT
There is no need to make reference to any law which respondent by reason of its
o ce is enjoined as a duty to perform. Respondent's duty arose from its contractual
obligation under the "Land for the Landless Program".
The trial court is reminded that the caption of the complaint is not determinative
of the nature of the action. 3 2 The caption of the pleading should not be the governing
factor, but rather the allegations in it should determine the nature of the action, because
even without the prayer for a speci c remedy, the courts may nevertheless grant the
proper relief as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and the
evidence introduced. 3 3
All told, whether or not petitioner Winnie, in her capacity as a compulsory heir of
the awardee, becomes a bene ciary of the program is a question best ventilated during
trial on the merits. The conditions, terms, and provisions of the program in case an
awardee dies are evidentiary and should be presented for determination of the court.
Even the effect and the consequence of the assumption of obligation of the awardee as
well as the presence of other compulsory heirs are issues that should be addressed for
the court's evaluation on the basis of the evidence to be laid down before its eyes. ACaDTH
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The case is
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court which is ORDERED to reinstate the case and to
conduct trial on the merits with dispatch.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario and Nachura, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
2. Records, p. 19. Dated April 22, 2003. Penned by Judge Rogelio M. Pizarro, RTC, Br. 222,
Quezon City.
4. Rollo, p. 5.
5. Id. at 39.
6. Id. at 29-30.
7. Id. at 8.
8. Words and Phrases, Vol. 17, permanent ed., p. 546, citing Juneau Spruce Corporation v.
International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, D.C. Hawaii, 131 F. Supp.
866, 869.
9. Id. at 548, citing The Princess Sophia, D.C. Wash., 36 F. 2d 591, 593.
10. Id. at 549, citing J.D. Loizeaux Lumber Co. v. Davis, 124 A. 2d 593, 41 N.J. Super. 231.
SCHTac
11. Id., citing Wilson v. Wagner, Tex. Civ. App., 211 SW 2d 241, 244.
12. Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1993), unabridged.
13. See Rules of Civil Procedure (1997), Rule 7, Secs. 1-3.
14. Clavecilla v. Quitain, G.R. No. 147989, February 20, 2006, 482 SCRA 623; Mamaril v.
Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 164929, April 10, 2006, 487 SCRA 65; Torres v.
Specialized Packaging Development Corporation, G.R. No. 149634, July 6, 2004, 433
SCRA 455.
20. Words and Phrases, Vol. 40, permanent ed., p. 754, citing United States v. Johnston,
D.C. Wash., 292 F. 491, 495; State v. Burgdoerfer, 17 SW 646, 649, 107 Mo. 1, 14 L.R.A.
846. cCaSHA
21. Id. at 752, citing State v. Lowe, 224 P. 991, 992, 27 Okl. Cr. 104.
22. Id. at 752, citing State on Inf. of Murphy v. Brooks, 1 So. 2d 370, 371, 241 Ala. 55.
23. Id. at 754, citing Rose v. Osborne, Me., 1 A. 2d 225, 226.
24. Id., citing Hogan v. Aluminum Lock Shingle Corp., 329 P. 2d 271, 273, 214 Or. 218. TIaDHE
31. Hernudd v. Lofgren, G.R. No. 140337, September 27, 2007, 534 SCRA 205, citing
Sumulong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108817, May 10, 1994, 232 SCRA 372.
32. Bokingo v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161739, May 4, 2006, 489 SCRA
521; Rivero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141273, May 17, 2005, 458 SCRA 714.
33. Evangelista v. Santiago, G.R. No. 157447, April 29, 2005, 457 SCRA 744, citing Chacon
Enterprises v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-46418, September 29, 1983, 124 SCRA 784. AHSaTI