FEMINISM MOVEMENT IN PAKISTAN

PRECURSORS:

Education Reform Movement The British replaced the traditional educational systems prevalent

in India with their own, not with the idea of liberating the local population from the shackles of feudal

and traditional arrangements; rather the express purpose was to create a class of loyal Indians schooled

in British traditions who would owe their position in society to the colonial intervention.2

Unsurprisingly, there was resistance against as well as accommodation with the colonial administration

in the sense that certain social classes in India eagerly espoused an English education and English

political ideas, while others resisted it as an imposition of an alien and antagonistic culture.

The Muslims of India were caught between the desire to retain a sense of continuity with the

past and tradition, while simultaneously acquiring modern knowledge in order to compete in the re-

ordered world of politics, commerce and the economy. The contradictory imperatives of preservation of

the old order, while stepping reluctantly into the new one, were reconciled by a strict public/private

division in which women would guard the symbolic frontiers of identity by maintaining tradition and

culture, and the men would enter the fields of politics and commerce where transactions occurred with

the colonial state and competing religious communities.

This tendency was clearly visible in the education reform movements of the time. Modernist

leaders like Sir Syed Ahmad Khan fervently supported the education of Muslim males of the Ashrafiya

(Muslim gentry) while warning against the polluting effects of a secular western education upon Muslim

women.3 For the latter, a traditional education, steeped in religious and domestic values, was

considered appropriate. Similarly, while Nazeer Ahmad favored the education of women in secular

subjects to make them rational, modern and moral mothers and housewives, he was also opposed to
the insertion of western liberal values in the lives of Muslim women.4 The need to maintain patriarchal

control and domination in the home and family, even as the outside world of commerce and politics was

slipping away rapidly, was a measure to ensure continuity with the past while stepping into an uncertain

future created by an ‘other’ or outsider.

In the second half of the 19th century and early decades of the 20th, debates on the issue of

purdah (veiling) raged between modernist and traditional Muslims. For instance, the poet Akbar

Allahabadi in particular wrote a large number of poems on the loss of veiling among Muslim women

which he saw akin to the loss of masculinity among Muslim men.5 He viewed the aggressive

intervention of the masculine colonial state as an emasculation of the Muslim nation which was unable

to protect Muslim women from the gaze of the colonial outsider. One finds similar echoes of nostalgia

for bygone Muslim masculinity in the poetry of Allama Iqbal who lamented the loss of Muslim male of

the past who could defend his ideological and geographical boundaries.

* The woman question was first raised by men in 1886 at the annual meeting of the

Muhammadan Educational Conference (MEC). Shaikh Abdullah of Aligarh was the principal advocate of

women’s right to education but he was opposed by a number of seemingly progressive men. However,

in December 1899 a women’s teacher training school was opened in Calcutta, especially because one

argument used against Muslim women’s education was that there were few women teachers.

The Begum of Bhopal took a keen interest in women’s education and supported the

Mohammadan Girls School of Aligarh started by Sheikh Abdullah. The management of the girls’ school

was looking for an acceptable curriculum, but was hampered by a lack of funds. The Begum of Bhopal

donated generously to develop a curriculum for women’s education. She developed an outline of the

curriculum and presented it in her Presidential address at the women education session of the annual

Muslim Educational Conference on 5th December 1911. She proposed the idea of Home Science in the
curricula of women education to make it more palatable for conservative Muslims. In her visit to Aligarh

in 1915, she inaugurated the Girls School building laid the foundation stone for a girls’ hostel. In 1885,

the Anjuman-e-Himayat-e-Islam opened five girls’ elementary schools in Lahore to preserve Islamic

values and ideals. Gradually, women’s education became acceptable among Muslim communities that

had felt besieged by the imposition of an alien western culture. In 1903, at the annual meeting of the

MEC in Bombay, Chand Begum presented a paper on education. Her paper was read out by a Parsi

woman due to the constraints of veiling. Chand Begum criticized Muslim clerics and argued fervently in

favor of modern education for women. At this session, the MEC passed a resolution for establishing a

Normal School for female teachers which finally opened in Aligarh in 1913. The following year, the first

Urdu journal for women, Khatoon, was published by Shaikh Abdullah. By 1904 the education reform

movement had gained momentum and received the support of Maulana Altaf Hussain Hali.

A newspaper for women’s rights, Huquq-e-Niswan, was started by Syed Mumtaz Ali and his wife

Muhammadi Begum. This newspaper was widely publicized across large parts of India and came to be

known as Rahbare-Niswan, the guiding light for women. A number of girls’ schools were opened

between 1904 and 1911 in Bombay, Calcutta, Aligarh, Lahore, Karachi and Patna. In Lahore, three

newspapers emerged called Akhbare-Niswan, Sharif Bibi and Tahzeeb-e-Niswan. Although most of these

were run by men, women contributed articles and stories. Over time, increasing numbers of women

began to be educated. In 1922, Sultan Begum of Bengal became the first woman to receive her

Master’s degree in law.

Around the same period, the Faizi sisters rose to prominence and went abroad for higher

education. Subsequently, they played significant roles in furthering Muslim women’s rights. In 1924,

women were excluded from the annual session of the MEC. In 1925, Attiya Faizi traveled from Bombay

to Aligarh, gate-crashed the annual MEC meeting and addressed an all-male gathering from behind a
curtain. The presiding officer was so embarrassed that he escorted her to the dais from where she

spoke breaking all the norms and taboos around women’s appearance in public. Women were not

excluded from MEC meetings that followed. The education reform, movement, though conservative in

orientation, provided women with the knowledge and skills needed to speak up for their rights.

Women’s Rights

Between the years 1886 to 1917, ideas regarding women’s roles and status in society were

transformed among Muslim communities in India. The spread of education among the Muslim elite

classes gave further impetus to the breaking of traditional moulds. At that time, the first women’s

organization was born due to the efforts of Sir Muhammad Shafi, who lived in Lahore and was a strong

advocate of women’s rights. He was opposed to veiling and supported the right to inheritance. In 1908,

the Anjuman-e-Khawateen-e-Islam was founded in Lahore for the promotion of the rights of women in

Islam. This organization also carried out social work among the destitute women living in villages.

In 1915, the first All-India Muslim Ladies conference was attended by a few select women from

among the elite. In 1917 this organization passed a resolution against polygamy causing a major stir in

Lahore. The same year, a delegation led by Begum Hasrat Mohani met the Secretary of State Montagu,

demanding increased educational facilities for women along with better health and maternity services.

The delegation also demanded equal franchise for women in the forthcoming MontaguChelmsford

reforms. In 1918, both the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress announced support for

women’s franchise. However, in 1919 when the reforms were instituted, the colonial government

refused arguing that conditions were not conducive in India for women’s franchise and left the matter to

the provinces. In 1921 Madras granted women’s franchise and by 1925 all the provinces except Orissa

and Bihar granted voting rights to propertied persons, men and women.
 In the First Roundtable Conference in 1930-31 a memorandum was presented by Jahanara

Shahnawaz, daughter of Sir Muhammad Shafi. It demanded rights for all, irrespective of religion, caste,

creed or sex. In 1932, the All-India Muslim League expressed its support for women’s demands. The

Government of India Act of 1935 enfranchised six million women and, for the first time, reserved seats

for women were allocated in both the Council of State (six out of one hundred and fifty) and the

February Assembly (nine seats out of two hundred and fifty). The slow awakening and increasing

consciousness which began with the right to education, was by then beginning to transform into a

struggle for women’s political rights.

Pan-Islamist Movement

The national debates of the time revolved around nationalist and religious struggles against a

colonial regime. Women’s consciousness raised over social and educational issues, did not remain

untouched by the larger context within which the debates occurred. The Khilafat Movement of the early

decades of the 20th century (1919-1924), mobilized Muslim identities across vast territories. A pan-

Islamic movement, it called upon the British to protect the caliphate in Turkey, and for Indian Muslims

to unite and hold the British accountable for this purpose. However, the movement ended with a

secular Turkey abolishing the roles of the Sultan and Caliph.

In India, the Ali Brothers, Maulana Muhammad Ali and Shaukat Ali, were in the forefront of the

movement motivating Indian Muslims to support the cause. Large numbers of Muslim women were

mobilized politically for a pan-Islamic cause. Separate meetings were held by women in Delhi and

Lucknow which were addressed by Bi Amma, the mother of the Ali Brothers. The wives and mothers of

prominent men attended the meetings and became aware of the political realities of the time. Bi Amma

addressed meetings across the length and breadth of India and the Muslim women were joined by
Hindu women on several occasions. The women exhorted the men to join the non-cooperation

movement and sought to instill patriotism and religious sentiments among Indians, particularly Muslims.

In 1917, when her son was in prison, Bi Amma addressed the all male meeting of the All-India

Muslim League and spoke from behind the veil. It was the first time that a Muslim woman addressed a

political meeting of men. In 1921, Bi Amma addressed a mass meeting in Lahore and lifted her veil for

the first time, stating that all the men were her brothers and sons and she did not need to use the veil in

front of them. Her age, status and respect protected her against criticism. Furthermore, Bi Amma

belonged to India and was not a product of western influences. This protected her against the charge

which was leveled at other women who appeared to be influenced by an encroaching modernity.

Although, she and her cohorts were not demanding women’s rights, the participation in political action

created a consciousness of justice which she wanted for her son. Men encouraged women’s

involvement in politics for religious and national causes, not for women’s own rights.

While pan-Islamist religious and nationalist movements provided the impetus for women’s

education and led to the early consciousness of rights, such movements were also conservative and

patriarchal. Both religion and nationalism tend to define women in traditional ways believing them to be

the repositories of tradition, culture and custom. Syed Ahmad Khan was staunchly opposed to women’s

education wanting only Muslim males of the Ashrafiya educated in order to compete with Hindus in the

arena of politics and commerce.10 When he realized that women’s education was inevitable, he

proposed to control the content so that it would not deviate from religious instruction and household

functions. Similarly, Nazeer Ahmad, while upholding an education in secular subjects, also emphasized

women’s education toward making them dutiful wives and good Muslim women.11

The Khilafat and nationalist movements were not liberating for women as they invoked cultural

nationalism which reinforces the patriarchal ideas of masculinity and femininity. This cultural
nationalism later fed into the discourse of the two-nation theory based on religion. Such agendas are

ultimately conservative and merely created spaces for women’s participation, which led gradually to an

awareness of their own rights as women.

ROLE OF WOMEN IN PAKISTAN MOVEMENT:

Women were massively mobilized in the Pakistan Movement. As increasing numbers of women

joined the Muslim League, a women’s section was formed. In the famous Lahore session of the Muslim

League in 1940, an unprecedented number of women participated. The same year saw them take out a

procession for the Pakistan Movement. In April 1940, women took out a protest demonstration against

the arrest of Muslim League leaders and the banning of the Khaksar Tehreek. This was the first time that

women took to street politics clad in burqas (veils). Not surprisingly, the press condemned them as

shameless women who would usher in the downfall of Muslims. But the women were not to be

deterred and in June the Khaksar Tehreek women organized another demonstration led by eleven year

old Saeeda Bano from Delhi, an eloquent speaker. On June 18, women joined men in another procession

and the police made arrests when they defied their orders. The men asked the women to return to their

homes but they refused and, for the first time in the history of the sub-continent, women were arrested

for political action.

The nationalist struggle mobilized a large number of educated, upper class women. In 1941, it

was decided that a Muslim Girls Student Federation would be formed and it was launched by Lady Abdul

Qadir, Fatima Begum and Miss M. Qureshi. This group mustered support for the idea of Pakistan. They

received an enthusiastic response and in a few months the Jinnah Islamic College had enrolled a

thousand students for the cause. This organization was pivotal in the formation of the women’s sub-

committee subsequently in the Muslim League, which toured the country garnering support for the

freedom movement. In 1942, Lady Maratab Ali commented that the days had gone when women were
fit only for cooking food and minding children, and the time had come for them to take an equal share

of responsibility with their menfolk in politics.12

In 1942, M.A. Jinnah expressed direct interest in the women’s committees and addressed them.

The women composed songs for the movement and went to the rural areas to gather support for the

Pakistan movement. Jinnah was alive to the women’s social conditions and addressed the issue. As a

result, the Muslim League Central Committee formulated a program for women’s social, economic and

cultural uplift. Over time, the woman question began to receive separate attention from the larger

struggles. The sub-committee passed resolutions on housewives’ problems and food shortages. The

issue of women’s inheritance was also raised. Women’s deep involvement in the national struggle

gradually led to an awareness of their own independent issues. In 1943, when a devastating famine in

Bengal disrupted lives, the Muslim League women organized relief efforts and collected funds and

provisions for the affected families. Poetry recitations meetings were called to raise funds in Lahore.

Over time, the wider struggle for liberation rendered women’s social and political activism acceptable

and respectable. In 1943, five thousand women participated in the All-India Muslim League annual

session in Karachi. The newly-formed Women’s National Guard, which later became Pakistan Girl

Guides, was also present.

In the 1946 elections, two women candidates from the Muslim League, Salma Tassaduque

Hussain and Jahanara Shahnawaz, participated. When the Muslim League was not allowed to form the

government, five hundred women demonstrated in Lahore. As the level of activity increased, the

colonial government banned the Muslim League National Guard. Upon offering resistance, several

League leaders were arrested including Jahanara Shahnawaz, and other women courted arrest in her

support. Begum Kamal-ud-Din Ahmad from the then North Western Frontier Province was taken to a

women’s jail in Lahore. On the following day, a large number of Muslim women came out on the streets
to protest. They were baton-charged and tear-gassed, the first time that such tactics were employed

against women in the Indian sub-continent. Four of the women leaders were arrested by the colonial

state and three girls were injured. As more and more women came out on the streets, they were

arrested. In January 1947, sixteen League leaders including Salma Tassaduque Hussain, were arrested

and Section 144 was imposed which prohibits any public gathering of over four people.

One tactic deployed by the colonial government was that the arrested women would be taken

to various places outside the city and forced to find their own way home. The arrested women were

kept in Gora Barracks, and in February three young burqa-clad girls entered the criminal wards for

women, climbed the building and hoisted the Muslim League flag, all the while chanting slogans of Allah-

o-Akbar. The Superintendant Jails arrived and had them beaten up by other inmates before they were

dragged out of the premises. News of women breaking into jail and facing barricades and batons spread

like wildfire and, towards the end of February, a large number of women marched towards the

Secretariat Building. Thirteen year old Fatima Sughra climbed up the gate, removed the Union Jack and

replaced it with her dopatta fashioned to look like the Muslim League flag. It was for the first time that

the Muslim League ‘flag’ was hoisted on a government building replacing the government one.

In 1947 when the Civil Disobedience movement was launched, women from the North Western

Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) were mobilized by the Khudai Khidmatgar and nationalist

movements. Pathan women marched unveiled in public for the first time and scaled walls to hoist the

Muslim League flag. They went to jails and were tear-gassed and batoncharged. On April 3, 1947 fifteen

hundred Pathan women publicly protested in the form of picketing. They also formed the ‘War Council’

and set up mobile radio stations and an underground radio station called, Pakistan Broadcasting Station,

which operated right up to the time of independence in August 1947. However, the records as well as

schools of the Khudai Khidmatgars were burned soon after the formation of Pakistan.
 AFTER INDEPENDENCE

Post-colonial Re-structuring of State and Society Once freedom was attained from colonial rule,

new forces emerged on the political and global scene which directed the re-structuring of the state and

society. In the early period of Pakistan’s history, the struggle for women’s rights was piecemeal, gradual

and evolutionary. Progressive legislation was often resisted by the clergy, which perceived the steps in

the direction of women’s rights as western and antithetical to religion and culture. Nonetheless, women

belonging to ruling families continued to struggle for inclusion in the political process and rights. The

first legislature of Pakistan had two women representatives, Jahanara Shahnawaz, the Muslim League

veteran who had been elected to the All-India Muslim League Council in 1937; and Shaista Ikramullah

from the Suhrawardy family of East Pakistan

. In 1948, the first attempt was made to secure economic rights for women during the budget

debate. When the Shariat bill was removed from the agenda of the assembly, the women legislators

were furious and took up the issue with the Muslim League Women’s Committee. Thousands of women

marched to the Assembly chambers shouting slogans, led by Jahanara Shahnawaz and other women

leaders and finally the Muslim Personal Law of Shariat (1948) became effective recognizing women’s

right to inherit property. The first piece of legislation may have been for the propertied classes only, but

women took a stand against their male colleagues in the assembly for their own rights as women.

The first Constituent Assembly had several special committees, including the Basic Principles

Committee, Fundamental Rights Committee and Nationality Committee. In each of these, Jahanara

Shahnawaz and Shaista Ikramullah countered male chauvinists and religious ulema. In the Zakat

committee the ulema refused to sit with women members, arguing that only burqa clad women above

the age of fifty should be allowed to sit in the Assembly, a demand that was to be raised again by the
Ansari Commission in the decade of the 1980s. The earliest echoes of contestation and challenge

between the women and the religious lobby had begun to be heard.

The women leaders had begun to make political demands also, for example, they raised issue of

10% reserved seats for women in the legislatures at the Round Table Conference in the 1930s. At that

time, they could only get 3% reserved quota. In September 1954, at the final meeting of the Constituent

Assembly, when the draft bill for the Charter of Women’s Rights prepared by Jahanara Shahnawaz was

discussed, the reserved seats remained at 3% for both the central and provincial assembly.

The other demands in the Charter included equality of status, equality of opportunity, equal pay

for equal work and guarantee of inheritance rights for Muslim women under the Islamic personal law of

Shariat.

In 1955, women’s organizations ran a campaign against Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra’s

second marriage and this was spearheaded by the All-Pakistan Women’s Association (APWA), which was

later to play a major role in legal reform. As a result of the campaign, the United Front for Women’s

Rights was formed under the leadership of Jahanara Shahnawaz.

In the 1956 Constitution, the principle of female suffrage for women’s reserved seats was

accepted on the basis of special women’s territorial constituencies, thus giving dual voting rights to

women for both general and reserved women’s seats. This was a major achievement, given the

conservative lobby that constantly militated against women’s rights. Unfortunately, Ayub Khan’s

takeover and martial law in 1958 led to the abrogation of the constitution of 1956.

The Prime Minister’s wife, Ra’ana Liaquat Ali, was the most outstanding woman who formed a large

number of women’s organizations and attended to many different areas that affect women, especially

welfare and legal reform. In 1948, she started the Women’s Voluntary Service (WVS) which
administered first aid to women, organized food distribution, dealt with health problems and

epidemics, collected clothing for the needy, and provided emotional and moral support. The relief and

welfare work was widely accepted as it was seen as an extension of the nurturing role that women were

traditionally expected to perform. Apart from being seen as a maternal and domestic role, the work of

WVS was voluntary with the result that it did not lead to the kind of threat that women’s paid work

poses. However, the reaction to two other organizations set up by Ra’ana Liaquat Ali is a telling

indication of the deeply patriarchal and gendered nature of society.17 The societal reaction to the

setting up in 1949 of the Pakistan Women’s National Guard and Pakistan Women’s Naval Reserve

differed significantly from the response to the WVS which received support from the government. The

National Guard and Naval Reserve were set up in response to the war with India and were respectively

under the supervision of the army and navy, while Ra’ana Liaquat Ali was the Chief Controller of both.18

This work brought women into contact with unrelated men, so it was not just seen as ‘manly’ but also

threatening.

These two organizations trained women in military tactics including signaling, coding, marksmanship,

use of weapons and defense. Upon criticism by conservatives, a dopatta was added to their uniforms.

However, the training of women for purposes that deviated from the social and traditional norms, and

their empowerment in what were believed to be masculine pursuits, raised many eyebrows. This

violation of the patriarchal public/ masculine and private/feminine division was met with opprobrium

and after Ra’ana Liaquat Ali left the country to serve as ambassador to the Netherlands, these two

outfits fizzled out. Based on the success of the Women’s Voluntary Service and the interest of a large

number of women, in 1949 Ra’ana Liaquat invited a hundred women to a meeting in Karachi and from

this was born the All-Pakistan Women’s Association (APWA) which, in the context of the time, made

invaluable contributions not only to welfare but also in the arena of legal reform.
APWA was a voluntary non-political organization open to all women over sixteen years of age

irrespective of class, caste, color or creed. The objectives were to be welfare organization for Pakistani

women. It focused on creating educational, social and cultural consciousness and improving the

economic participation of women for national development. Urban women from well to do classes

joined and it became an acceptable avenue for women’s activities outside the home. APWA opened

girls’ schools, health centers and industrial homes, and imparted sewing and related skills for

incomegeneration. Most of its activities were concentrated in Karachi, Lahore and Peshawar with district

and divisional headquarters in other parts of the country Apart from welfare and development activities,

APWA made forays into the political and legal arenas. In 1953, APWA recommended ten reserved seats

for women in the National and Provincial Assemblies. In spite of a predominantly non-political and

welfare approach, APWA was not approved by religious clerics who chastised Raana Liaquat and others

for not wearing the veil. The Majlis-e-Ahrar, a right wing orthodox party, labeled them prostitutes. The

Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) also looked upon them with disapproval, despite

having opposed the very formation of Pakistan. The conflict and tension between the right-wing

religious lobbies and women’s rights campaigners goes way back in history, but at that point it did not

become an open battle as it did in later years.

Ra’ana Liaquat Ali, a tireless campaigner, initiated many other organizations and the time period

appears to be rich in terms of the sheer number of organizations of women that were formed. In 1954,

the Karachi Business and Professional Women’s Club was established to bring professional women

together on a platform and later it established branches in Lahore, Peshawar and Rawalpindi. In 1956,

the Federation of University Women was formed for women who did not enter the workforce after

obtaining university degrees. A Degree College for women in Karachi was opened during that rich period

which spawned a number of organizations for women’s education and professional advancement.
Most other organizations were formed with specific objectives including, the Family Planning

Association of Pakistan (FPAP), The Pakistan Child Welfare Council (PCWC), The Pakistan Red Cross, The

Pakistan Nurses Federation (PNF), The Housewives’ Association, Girl Guides Association, and the

International Women’s Club. There was growing social awareness and each of these selected a specific

area of expertise and worked on women’s social and economic issues.

The Democratic Women’s Association (DWA) formed in 1948 was unique in that it organized women at

the political level and was established along Marxist principles. Led by the Marxist activist, Tahira

Mazhar Ali, the DWA worked with working class women in factories and low-income areas, while

focusing on political awareness and the creation of a socialist society. The DWA wanted equal pay for

equal work, educational opportunities for girls and women, hostels and transport facilities for working

women, crèches and nurseries at places of work and expanded employment opportunities for women. It

appealed to working class women concerned for the emancipation of working classes and the creation

of a socialist society. Its work was confined to low-income areas and it did not mobilize many women

from other classes; however it is significant for being the only left wing women’s organization in the

country. The DWA was one of the most prominent organizations that staunchly opposed the military

operation in East Pakistan in 1971, and vociferously campaigned against the mass rape of Bangladeshi

women by the armed forces Some of the other organizations include the United Front for Women’s

Rights (UFWA) which was formed in 1955, and the Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA) that

had been working since 1899. A few of these organizations have survived and are active to this day,

while others fizzled out after brief periods of activity.

Ayub Khan (1958-1968)

APWA’s warm and complementary relationship with the state continued through the era of

Ayub Khan’s military dictatorship. The Muslim Family Laws Ordinance

divorce and registration of marriages and divorces, was passed as a result of APWA’s efforts. It was

basically an attempt to discourage polygamy as the first wife’s written permission became necessary for

a husband’s second marriage. The recommendations of Justice Rashid Commission (mentioned above)

were not all embodied nonetheless some progress was made compared to before. Prior to this, the

Child Marriages Restraint Act of 1929 recommended fourteen years as the marriageable age for girls,

and the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act of 1939 defined the grounds on which women could seek

divorce, for example, cruelty and non-maintenance.

Although the MFLO of 1961 was by no means radical, and the punishment for the second marriage was

minor (an easily ignored small fine) with annulment not being an option, it was nonetheless a small step

in the direction of women’s rights. Such achievements were possible because APWA did not challenge

the military dictatorship which defined itself as benevolent, moderate and modern. Even though the law

was relatively weak, modest and moderate in relation to expectations, it was vehemently opposed by

the Ulema who spoke against it from pulpits and condemned it as tampering with the Qura’an. Women

retaliated by launching a movement in support of the Family Laws Ordinance, and in Lahore Begum

Nasim Jahan led a march against the clerics which ended with the burning of the effigy of Maulana

Abbas Ali Khan, a virulent opponent, in front of the Punjab Assembly.

The absence of a vibrant women’s rights movement or feminist struggle was one of the reasons that

when Fatima Jinnah stood in the elections against Ayub Khan in 1965, he used the Ulema to declare that

a woman could not be the head of state in a Muslim country. Ayub Khan’s accusations that Fatima

Jinnah was an Indian and American agent, and an unfeminine and un-motherly figure were not met with

indignation and anger, unlike the effect of such accusations against Benazir Bhutto decades later, when

they were met with scorn, anger, and uproar. Ironically, in an attempt to remove Ayub Khan and gain
power, the Jamaat-e-Islami supported Fatima Jinnah and radically altered its earlier position that

women could not become heads of state in an Islamic country. There was a proliferation of women’s

organizations in the 1960s and 1970s, some concerned with welfare, others with economic and

professional aims, and still others based on economic empowerment. Some of these include the Behbud

Association formed in 1967 for social welfare and income-generation activities, and the exclusive

Soroptimist Club, also established in 1967, which worked with women in senior managerial and

administrative positions. The women’s organizations worked together co-operatively and many had the

same members on their boards, for example, Miriam Habib, the first recognized woman journalist in

Pakistan, served on the executive boards of many organizations. The shared visions and common

concerns led to a great deal of mutual interaction and collaboration.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1972-77)

Ayub Khan’s regime ended in 1968 after massive street protests against his dictatorship. However,

power was grabbed by another military dictator, Yahya Khan during whose tenure national elections

were held and won convincingly by the Awami League, a party based in East Pakistan. However, the

West Pakistani civil and military rulers failed to transfer power and initiated a military operation in East

Pakistan which ended in 1971 with the secession of the province which became Bangladesh. The

Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) that had won the general election of 1970 in West Pakistan assumed

power in 1972. The transformations in the state and reconfiguration of power did not change the

relationship with women’s groups and the mutual accommodation and collaboration of the Ayub era

continued during the brief period of democracy.

In the 1970 elections, it was widely believed that women, for the first time, voted independently of their

male kin on account of being attracted by Bhutto’s rhetoric of equality and justice for the oppressed.

Nasim Jahan, a founder member of PPP, mobilized educated women in Lahore as in other cities and
spread the PPP ideas in various localities and neighborhoods. Women, who had participated in PPP

election campaigns, became a part of PPP’s mohalla committees. Women from low-income areas as well

as educated middle class were drawn to the dream of a just and socialist society. Nasim Wali Khan was

the first woman to win the election on a general seat but did not take oath as many of the parties

seeking provincial autonomy tual interaction and collaboration of the Ayub era continued during the

brief period of democracy.

In the 1970 elections, it was widely believed that women, for the first time, voted independently of

their male kin on account of being attracted by Bhutto’s rhetoric of equality and justice for the

oppressed. Nasim Jahan, a founder member of PPP, mobilized educated women in Lahore as in other

cities and spread the PPP ideas in various localities and neighborhoods. Women, who had participated in

PPP election campaigns, became a part of PPP’s mohalla committees. Women from low-income areas as

well as educated middle class were drawn to the dream of a just and socialist society. Nasim Wali Khan

was the first woman to win the election on a general seat but did not take oath as many of the parties

seeking provincial autonomy were labeled ‘traitors’ by the PPP government, and the National Awami

Party government in Balochistan was dismissed. In spite of such undemocratic measures, the PPP

government was regarded as more womenfriendly than its predecessors.

In 1972 the PPP formed a constitution-making committee which had two women, Nasim Jahan and

Ashraf Abbasi. The 1973 Constitution gave more rights to women than in the past. Article 25 of rights

declared that every citizen was equal before law and Article 25 (2) said there would be no discrimination

based on sex alone. Article 27 of fundamental stated that there would be no discrimination on the basis

of race, religion, caste or sex for appointment in the service of Pakistan. Article 32 of the Basic Principles

of State Policy guaranteed reservation of seats for women, and article 35 stipulated that the state shall

protect marriage, family and mother and child. The constitution was unanimously ratified in the
Assembly and later Article 228 was amended to accept the principle of at least one woman member on

the proposed Council on Islamic Ideology. In spite of women’s efforts, however, the idea of female

suffrage for reserved seats for women was rejected, both in the constitution committee and the

National Assembly.

In the 1973 constitution women continued to be indirectly elected members of the Assemblies. The PPP

government took other measures to raise women’s status and a cell was set up to evaluate the status of

women. Begum Ra’ana Liaquat Ali was made Governor of Sindh and Kaniz Yousaf was made the Vice-

Chancellor of a university. Begum Ashraf Abbasi was elected as the Deputy Speaker of the National

Assembly and all government services were opened to women through administrative reforms in 1972.

Women could enter the services from which they were hitherto debarred, such as the Foreign Service

and management groups. Women could now be Prime Minister, Governor or Cabinet minister. A

massive induction in the Foreign Service through lateral entry led to 121 entrants and the first ever

women Foreign Service cadre came into being.

In 1975, the International Women’s Year (IWY) was launched. The Prime Minister’s wife, Nusrat Bhutto,

went to Mexico to represent Pakistan and signed the Mexico Declaration. Following this, a semi-

autonomous PakistanWomen’s Institute was set up in Lahore to mark the IWY. In 1976, a thirteen-

member Women’s Rights Committee was set up chaired by Yahya Bakhtiar, the first Attorney General of

Pakistan. It included nine women some of whom had been pressing for a commission to determine the

status of women to make recommendations to improve their situation. This demand was mainly pushed

by Nasim Jahan, Miriam Habib, Rashida Patel and Zari Sarfraz. The commission’s task was to consider

and formulate proposals for law reforms to improve the social and economic conditions of women. It

presented its proposals on law reforms in July 1976 and made recommendations shortly after. However,

it was neither ratified nor implemented and never made public.

women in the philosophy of Marxism and socialism. The women’s wing held elections leading to the

emergence of new leadership from among the middle class and low-income groups. Various trade

unions and students’ organizations emerged and were aligned with the PPP. During the PPP tenure,

APWA continued to work without interference and the United Front for Women’s Rights was revived to

struggle for women’s reserved seats through female suffrage but fizzled out when this endeavor failed.

In the 1970s, women’s organizations such as Shirkat Gah, Aurat Foundation and the Women’s Front

arose. The Women’s Front, based in Lahore, was a small group of aggressive and radical Left-wing

Punjab University students, but it petered out after the students graduated and moved on. This group

contested union elections and won both seats for women and organized chapters in other cities such as

Sargodha and Multan. Their slogan was, ‘women and politics are one.’ Aurat, based in Islamabad, was

composed of Left-wing university teachers and students and worked in lowincome neighborhoods for

the depressed classes. The organization brought out a newsletter which focused on the class struggle

and wrote about male domination. However, lack of funding and human resources meant that it could

not be sustained. Some members of the organization later founded the Aurat Foundation which focused

on a range of women’s issues. Several organizations for women began to emerge in various cities,

however some became pivotal in launching an active and vibrant women’s movement. Shirkat Gah was

also established in the 1970s and became central during subsequent decades as the Women Action

Forum emerged from this organization. The idea arose from the International Women’s Year and in

1976, educated urban middle class women formed Shirkat Gah as a publication and resource center for

women. It promoted the social and economic development of women and carried out research and

‘consciousnessraising’ activities. Shirkat Gah set up a women’s hostel and day-care centers for working

women.
Beginning from the post-partition period to the end of the PPP’s rule in 1977 through a military coup,

the relationship of the women’s movement with the nascent state remained devoid of conflict and

confrontation. The governments, whether civil or military, supported the women’s organizations in so

far as they remained within the confines of traditional norms and engaged in welfare work. The

women’s organizations remained concerned with women’s economic uplift, development and

consciousness-raising and did not offer political resistance. They gained a few rights and concessions

from both the civilian and military governments with which the relationship was characterized by

collaboration and mutual accommodation.

The women’s organizations of the time did not challenge the legitimacy of the military government or its

attitude towards Fatima Jinnah. Similarly, they failed to question or resist the Islamist provisions of the

1973 constitution, the lesser status of non-Muslim citizens, the declaration of Islam as the state religion,

and the forcing out of Ahmadis from the pale of Islam in 1974. These steps and other measures, such as

the banning of alcohol and gambling, the declaration of Friday as the weekly holiday, all done to

appease the religious lobby, set the stage for the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) movement against

Bhutto which culminated with military takeover and aggressive Islamization. The women’s organizations

operating at that time appear to have been quiescent and willing to ignore the larger questions of

democracy and justice as long as women received a few rights. However, the few rights that they

achieved during the Ayub and Bhutto periods were also subjected to continual challenge from the

religious orthodoxy bent upon taking Pakistan in a theocratic direction from its inception. These efforts

gained momentum in the ensuing period of General Zia-ul-Haq’s military rule when the orthodoxy

gained ascendancy thereby rudely awakening women’s groups into mobilizing to defend the few rights

they had won.

The year 1979 was a watershed in the history of Pakistan as well as globally. The orthodox revolution in

neighboring Iran, and the Soviet Union incursion into Afghanistan, foreshadowed massive

reconfigurations of power globally, along with the radical reconstruction of the state in Pakistan.

Pakistan became the frontline state in the Cold War contest between competing imperialisms in

Afghanistan. While the Soviet imperialism was based on a communist perspective, the competing US

one sought an ally in a specific version of Islam to fight against ‘ungodly’ communism.

For the Pakistani military dictator Zia-ul-Haq, who had seized power in an illegal coup in 1977, the Cold

War competing imperialisms provided a perfect opportunity to gain legitimacy by wrapping himself in an

Islamic garb. The Islamization agenda that had been initiated by Bhutto’s ‘Islamic Socialism’ was now

intensified. Zia proceeded straightaway to Islamize Pakistan based on the Deobandi/Wahabi version

derived from Jamaat-eIslami and Saudi Arabian articulations of Islam. Radical changes were made in the

school curricula, educational policies, the media and the judiciary to strengthen the tenuous Islamic

credentials of the regime. Harsh punishments, such as flogging and stoning to death, were borrowed

from the Saudi model and journalists as well as lawyers were not spared in the drive to ‘cleanse’ society

of all the evils of socialism that Bhutto had propagated. Only the economy was exempted from socalled

Islamization as it was based on an international fiscal system in which interest had to be paid. However,

Zakat, Ushr and Islamic banking forms were introduced to justify the resort to religion.

General Zia’s Islamization drive was not confined to the public sphere as he wanted to restructure and

regulate the private one also. Salaat Committees were constituted to ensure that people prayed

regularly and observed other Islamic injunctions. With a relentless focus on piety in the private sphere

and control over the personal lives of citizens, an inordinate amount of attention fell upon women who

were seen as the repositories of culture, religion and tradition. The veil and the four walls were
emphasized, piety in dress codes was imposed by vigilantes operating in the public sphere, and violence

was used to ensure compliance with official measures

The entire legal structure was reconstructed to institutionalize discrimination against women and non-

Muslim citizens. A number of discriminatory laws including the Hudood Ordinance of 1979, the Qisas

and Diyat Ordinance and the Law of Evidence of 1984 were promulgated. The Qisas and Diyat law

privatized the crime of murder and saved the perpetrators of ‘honor killing’. The Law of Evidence

reduced women’s testimony in a court of law to half that of men. In 1983, the Ansari Report of the

Council of Islamic Ideology recommended that women’s participation in politics should be limited to

nominated women over the age of fifty. In 1985, the Shariat Bill (9th Amendment) threatened to

abolish the Family Laws Ordinance of 1961

In the early years, women belonging to various organizations watched with incredulity the spate of laws

and measures to control and order their lives in accordance General Zia’s vision of religion. There were

dress code restrictions, coupled with restrictions on participation in spectator sports, and enhanced

segregation with a proposal for a separate women’s university. By that time, a new generation of

middle class women, which had studied in western universities and was exposed to the feminist

movements in those countries, had entered the workforce in various fields. They were seriously

perturbed over the continuous attacks on a relatively tolerant and diverse culture of previous decades.

Dr. Israr’s lectures on a TV show in which he advocated the exit of women from the economy,

threatened the loss of livelihood of a large number of women who worked at universities and other

places.

However, it was the Fehmida and Allah Bux case, filed under the Zina Ordinance (one of the five

Hudood Ordinances) that motivated women to protect and preserve the few rights they had achieved in

the two previous dispensations. From that point on, the relationship between women and the state
transformed radically from the mutual accommodation of the earlier decades to conflict, confrontation

and contestation

The Zina Ordinance of 1979 conflated adultery with rape and erased the distinction between them. This

law made it virtually impossible to prove rape and, upon failure to prove it, the woman was transformed

into the culprit while the rapist went scot-free. The punishment for adultery was stoning to death. The

harsh punishments in the name of Islam mobilized the women into taking action. Following the year of

its promulgation, a large number of rural and urban women from the economically marginalized groups

were booked under false cases of Hudood and languished in jails for years.

In 1981, a group of women met in Shirkat Gah Karachi and formed the Women Action Forum (WAF). In a

short span of time, there were chapters in Lahore, Islamabad and Peshawar. For the next decade, WAF

became the face of the women’s movement in Pakistan, although the Sindhiani Tehreek in Sindh was a

radical organization which used direct action as a method to fight not only the military regime but also

patriarchy as articulated in interior Sindh.19 WAF used picketing, demonstrations, processions, rallies,

signature campaigns, consciousnessraising, telegrams, writing and other strategies to register protest

and oppose the regime’s draconian measures. Each chapter functioned somewhat differently,

depending upon the local context and ethnic mix, nevertheless WAF fought against the discrimination in

law, spectator sports, educational segregation, media regulations, dress codes, and the steady march

towards a theocratic state.

In 1983, when the Pakistan Women Lawyers gave a call to march to the High Court with a petition

against the then proposed Law of Evidence, a large number of WAF members joined the demonstration

and were batoncharged and tear-gassed on the Mall Lahore. WAF’s profile was raised internationally

and it made headlines in the national press as well as the international media. Subsequently, there was

no turning back and WAF frequently resorted to pickets, demonstrations and protest rallies. The
resistance to military rule and fundamentalism was not mounted only through the traditional methods

of protest but also manifested itself in cultural forms such as poetry, literature, music, dance, theatre,

films, art and painting. Kishwar Naheed’s Hum Gunahgar Aurtain (We Sinful Women) and Fehmida

Riaz’s poem Chaadar Aur Chaardivari (the veil and four walls) became anthems for the movement, along

with Habib Jalib’s famous poem read out at the February 12, 1983 demonstration in Lahore. The work of

Salima Hashmi in painting, Madeeha Gauhar in theatre, Sheema Kirmani in dance and theatre, Sabiha

Sumar in filmmaking, Sherry Rehman in journalism, Attiya Dawood and Azra Abbas in poetry, and Zahida

Hina and Khalida Hussain in Urdu literature testifies to the multi-dimensional nature of the resistance.

However, the success of WAF came with a price in that the differing voices within the WAF platform led

to some of the most seething debates over strategy, aims and goals.20 At one point the debates led to a

split in the Lahore chapter which was resolved after an acrimonious public controversy. The main

debates in the WAF movement were the following: 1) Secular or religious framework; 2) focus on

feminist issues only or larger ones that have an impact upon women; 3) a broad feminist approach or a

narrow one on women’s rights. There were three other debates which were of less import as they had

more to do with functioning and terminology than an ideological disagreement. These include 1)

nonhierarchical functioning versus a hierarchical structure; 2) non-political versus a political orientation,

and 3) Open versus closed membership. It is important to lay out the main contours of these debates

within the socio-political context of the time.

Democracy and the Rise of Neo-liberalism

The decade of the 1990s was a game-changer at both the global and national levels. The last years of the

1980s saw the end of the Cold War and the breaking down of the Berlin wall. The US heralded the New

World Order and the era of neoliberal ideology became ascendant. One of the outcomes of neo-liberal

globalization, and the ascendancy of the Bretton Woods Institutions, was the mass proliferation of non-
governmental organizations funded by western countries, ostensibly for development but also for the

more insidious purpose of rolling back the state for trade liberalization, and opening borders for goods

and services though not for labor. For an understanding of the manner in which states were

restructured and non-governmental organizations created to provide services in place of the state, it is

important to briefly understand the ideology and practices of neoliberal ideology, which is premised

primarily on three major tenets: privatization, trade liberalization and de-regulation.

Neo-liberalism, the State and ‘Civil Society’ The close interrelations between neo-liberalism and the rise

of all kinds of organizations loosely called ‘civil society’ were observed in many countries across the

globe. In the former Soviet republics, as indeed elsewhere, there was a push to create a ‘civil society’ to

diminish the power of allegedly authoritarian states. The idea was extended under the rubric of ‘global

governance’ to become a global civil society. These good governance measures, promoted by the World

Bank, became the political face of economic globalization The idea was to diminish the state, which was

now seen as an impediment to open borders and trade liberalization and, at the same time, to promote

the idea of ‘civil society’ as the motor of development, bypassing the state. Taylor illuminates the

manner in which the notions of transparency, accountability, rule of law and anticorruption, which in

the past were oriented to the citizen as the object of democracy, have now been redirected towards

private interest and the protection of multinational capital. The latter interests, argues Taylor, do not

coincide with those of the dispossessed and ‘the power of the state is being eroded in relation to public

interest…and governance is being marketized and depoliticized under the guise of democracy.’36

Ironically, the powerful global financial powers and institutions that promote the agenda of economic

liberalization and set the terms are not transparent, democratized or open and are not amenable to

the aspirations and needs of the majority of the poor or open to their inclusion.
 The State in Pakistan in the Era of Neo-liberalism In Pakistan

, the ascendance of neoliberal ideology coincided with the revival of parliamentary democracy.

In 1988, General Zia’s plane mercifully crashed and a new era of democratic governance emerged, along

with an increasing number of foreign-funded non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Some NGOs had

been established in the 1970s and 1980s such as Shirkat Gah, Simorgh, ASR and SAHE. However, in the

1990s there was a mushroom growth of NGOs working on various issues ranging from women’s rights to

labor, environment, sustainable development, child rights and so on. A large number of NGOs on

women’s rights were created including Rozan, Bedari, Aurat Foundation among others, and this

contributed to the fragmentation of the women’s movement. The new mantra of the time was

development, in particular human development. During the decade of the 1990s, Pakistan witnessed

rapidly changing elected civilian governments which were repeatedly dismissed by non-elected and

nonrepresentative institutions. Two tenures of Benazir Bhutto and two of Nawaz Sharif were cut down

half way through the terms. At the beginning of the new century, both popular leaders had been forced

into exile The weak and unstable civilian governments were not given much power or room to

maneuver by Pakistan’s powerful establishment nevertheless a few positive steps were taken at that

time.

During Benazir Bhutto’s two stints in government (1988-1990 and 1993-1996) some women-

friendly measures were taken such as the setting up of Women’s Studies Centers in various public sector

universities. Furthermore, the First Women Bank was established in part as a development institution

for women as one of its functions was to provide loans to women entrepreneurs on easy terms.

Separate women’s police stations were set up although it is difficult for women, due to mobility issues,

to reach even the nearest station, let alone one in a central place. Additionally, it is virtually impossible

for women to register the First Information Report (FIR) with most police personnel reluctant to register

complaints. While these modest measures alleviated some of women’s chronic problems, the
government did not have the required majority to amend any of the draconian laws passed by General

Zia as they were protected by the notorious 8th amendment inserted forcibly by him into the

constitution.

However, the big change for Pakistani women was that the general atmosphere in the country

was far more open and liberal compared with the suffocating vigilantism of the Zia era. Women were

not forced to observe a dress code, and could participate in spectator sports as well as move around

freely without being hounded by Zia’s violent vigilantes. During her second stint in power, Benazir

Bhutto represented Pakistan at the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 which led to

Pakistan acceding to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women

(CEDAW). While the government was not given the time or freedom to do much, there were no negative

measures against women’s right to education or work and their rights were reiterated and upheld by the

government even though the parties in parliament could not agree on many issues owing to the

presence of religious and conseNawaz Sharif’s two stints in power (1990-1993 and 1997-1999) were

characterized by the dominance of the religious right, along with a renewed stress on General Zia’s

unfinished agenda of Islamization. Although the government endorsed the National Plan of Action (NPA)

in 1998, it was only in the areas of education and health that there was to be implementation. There

were no major measures taken for the advancement of women even though lip service was paid to the

cause. The discourse of NGO regulation and control became ascendant at the time. It was during Sharif’s

tenure that his minister, Pir Binyamin Rizvi, rabidly attacked ASR, the most avowedly secular and

socialist feminist organization in the country. However, when Sharif attempted to become a ruler with

absolute and unbridled power through the proposed Shariat Bill (15th amendment), women rose up and

knew that if the amendment was passed the government would decide upon their vice and virtue, and

any autonomy or rights attained during other times would dissipate. The abhorrent amendment was

passed in the National Assembly, but before the Senate could pass it, Nawaz Sharif developed
differences with the Chief of Army Staff, Pervez Musharraf, over the Kargil adventure and in October

1999 was removed by the army in a bloodless coup. In the decade of the 1990s, Pakistani women’s

relationship with the state vacillated between co-operation and collaboration with Benazir Bhutto, and

confrontation and contestation during the time of Nawaz Sharif. After the revival of democracy, the

women’s movement became quiescent and seemed to have lost its steam as the steady rvative parties

in the National Assembly and Senate. spate of discriminatory laws and measures stopped, although the

ones passed during the Zia regime were not reversed. During the second stint of Bhutto, women

activists helped the government to write the National Report for the Beijing conference in 1995. The

relationship, characterized by bonhomie and the spirit of mutual accommodation, was strong.

During Nawaz Sharif’s second stint, women’s groups and NGOs were out on the streets in the

hundreds protesting against the proposed 15th amendment. Sharif’s policies were in many ways a

continuation of the era of General Zia. Fauzia Gardezi, in her work on neo-liberalism, Islamization and

state formation, observes that the Zia government’s policies, including the attack on middle class

women and the project of Islamization, along with processes of reforming and responsibilizing the

individual, are deeply inter-linked to denationalization, and to a dismantling of social government

accompanying neo-liberalism.47 Gardezi’s contention is spot on because each time that Nawaz Sharif

has been in government, neo-liberal policies and the agendas of privatization, liberalization and de-

regulation have become hegemonic ideologies accompanied by a conservative religion, although neo-

liberal policies and economic agendas were also pursued by the PPP and General Musharraf

aggressively. Overall, the relationship between the state and women during the decade of the 1990s

may be described as ambivalent – periods of co-optation and collaboration, followed by times of

friction, unease and confrontation with remnants of the Zia era state.
 In 1994, a Commission of Inquiry for Women was constituted by the Government and asked to

review all existing laws with a view to removing discrimination, and to suggest appropriate measures for

improving the status of women in the society. Justice Nasir Aslam Zahid, a Judge of the Supreme Court

of Pakistan, headed the Commission, which had ten other members. The Commission presented its

report in 1997, recommending the repeal of certain discriminatory laws, amendments to others and

setting up institutions for monitoring the enforcement of laws.48 It was also during the time of Benazir

Bhutto that the report prepared by Zari Sarfaraz during the Zia years and suppressed by him, was

released.

Procedural laws and rules in the country have been reviewed, from time to time, and

approprirate recommendations suggested to the government for law reform as well as reform of the

civil and criminal justice system, with a view to ensuring the speedy disposal of cases. The lack of any

action on the recommendations of the Commission shows that successive governments, civilian and

military, were not enthusiastic about accepting or implementing the recommendations of various

commissions to ensure gender equality.

By that 1990s, NGOs had become widespread phenomena globally and in Pakistan. A large

number of donors and NGOs began to talk about gender (gender training, gender sensitization, gender

mainstreaming or gender awareness). Initially a socialist feminist articulation to show how patriarchy

affects both men and women by constructing the ‘masculine’ and the ‘feminine’, ‘gender’ soon became

a buzzword, and no project or program was sanctioned unless it had a strong gender component.

Gradually, and almost imperceptibly, women began to disappear from the discourse and ‘gender’

became a euphemism for women.

The notion of social structure disappeared from the development-oriented discourses. The word

‘gender’ implied that the oppression of men and women was equal and that each one suffered equally
because of the social construction of gender identities. The knowledge that patriarchy is a material and

ideological system in which men and women are not equal, and the former exploits the labor and

reproductive capacities of the latter, disappeared. Politically ‘gender’ became a neutral term bereft of

politics, structure or meaning, unlike patriarchy which addressed the systemic unequal relations

between men and women in the division of labor. Gradually, the discourse has become about ‘men and

women, girls and boys.’

The de-politicizing project succeeded to the extent that it later spawned ‘masculinity studies’

underscoring the injustices committed by the system against men. While critical masculinity studies

played a role in highlighting the position of men within unequal systems, the subject matter of

masculinity had always been an integral part of feminist study. Women came to be subsumed as gender

became a neutered basket category. The NGOs played a major role in this transformation which

equalized oppression, and the narrative of patriarchy as a system that subordinates women was virtually

catapulted out of the discourse. Added to this was the problem that some donors, especially USAID,

were insistent upon speaking about gender equity rather than equality and the program was named

Gender Equity Program. This is especially true in the case of funding for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the

Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and to some degree Balochistan, where misogynists within the

bureaucracies continued to construct a conservative society that wanted equity rather than equality,

even though Pakistan’s constitution refers to equality. There seems to be a displacement of the

women’s movement by ‘gender issues’ from which feminism is excluded. The injection of funding seems

to weaken movements, as was witnessed in the peasant movement for land rights in the Punjab which

split up because of donor funding.

Identities

The September 11, 2001 attacks on the US symbols of military, political and economic might

became a defining moment in world history, changing the way the world thinks about justice, right and

wrong, death and life itself. It was another watershed moment as massive reconfigurations of power

took place globally, and had a significant impact on Pakistan, turning it once again into the frontline

state, this time in the Global War on Terror (GWoT). General Musharraf’s was a time when increased

donor funding became available to women’s organizations, such as Aurat Foundation, for programs to

train newlyelected women councilors under the Women’s Political Participation Project (W3P), which

ran from February 2002 to March 2004. More than 80 percent of elected women councillors from the

local government elections of 2000-2001 were given training under the W3P project. Due to his

eagerness to present himself to the world as an enlightened, liberal and modern leader, Pakistani

women made a few significant gains. In the local government, their representation was a historic 33%

while 17.5% seats were reserved for women in the provincial and national assemblies. For the first time

there were around 60 women on reserved seats in the National Assembly. Furthermore, General

Musharraf appointed Shamshad Akhtar as the first ever Governor of the State Bank of Pakistan. While

WAF remained strongly opposed to a military government, it was relatively muted and ambivalent about

the reforms with the result that one does not find a strong voice of dissent at the time In 2002-2003, the

Gender Reform Action Plan (GRAP) proposed a coherent gender reform agenda to align policies,

structures, policies, programs and projects for enabling governments to implement promises, both

national and international, on gender equality. GRAP was based on the idea of political, administrative,

public sector employment policy and fiscal reforms. A number of major gender equality goals were

achieved under the GRAP. These included the setting up of a Provincial Gender Mainstreaming
Committee in Punjab, amendments in the Rules of Business for Women Development Departments, the

Restructuring of Women Development Departments, Career Development Centers in Universities,

establishment of Gender Mainstreaming in eight departments of the Punjab Secretariat and electronic

and print media campaigns to create awareness about women’s rights. However, GRAP was heavily

critiqued by donors and NGOs, and some donors showed complete disillusionment with its

implementation. It has been alleged that the political will for gender equality among politicians and the

bureaucracy only exists because of international pressure. To many stakeholders, GRAP policies seemed

made for a foreign country and not Pakistan.

In 2003, the National Commission on the Status of Women, constituted as a statutory body in

July 2000, brought out a report recommending the repeal of the Hudood Ordinance as it degraded

women and deprived them of their rights thereby making the law iniquitous.59 The Commission

recommended not only the repeal of the Hudood laws but also the removal of sections of the Penal

Code that carry enabling provisions. The Chairperson, Justice (Retd) Majida Rizvi, along with most of the

other members strongly supported the suggestions with only two members dissenting. One of the

dissenting members was Dr. S.M Zaman from the Council of Islamic Ideology whose task is to ensure

that all laws comply with Islamic provisions, even though there is no agreement over such provisions.

However, right up to 2005 before her term ended Majida Rizvi campaigned for the repeal of the Hudood

Ordinances.

In 2006, the Women Protection Act was passed and the crime of rape was taken out of Hadd

(maximum) punishment and placed in Taazir, Pakistan’s criminal procedure. Rape would now be

investigated in the manner done in other countries and the conflation between rape and adultery would

end. General Musharraf, aiming to reinforce his credentials as an enlightened and moderate leader, thus

proceeded to undo the most grievous harm inflicted on the women of the country by his predecessor,
General Zia. In the Musharraf era, the women’s relationship with the state was once again characterized

by quiescence, silence, frequent collaboration and co-operation. Aside from a condemnatory statement

by WAF, there was hardly a voice to challenge the illegal transfer of power to the military.

By that time, the massive spread of NGOs and the induction of Left-leaning women into lucrative

paid work, had taken the steam out of the women’s movement. WAF had become dormant since the

mid1990s, barring a few press releases and statements. As a result, when the peasant struggle led by

the Anjumane-Mazareen broke out in ten districts of the Punjab, WAF was conspicuous by its absence. A

few organizations and individual women activists supported the movement, especially since peasant

women were at the forefront of the land rights movement, but there was no women’s movement to

take up the cudgels for the peasant women defending their land, produce and men folk. In fact, when

the tenant movement was funded by an INGO, it split up over who would manage the funding. The

peasant struggle was led especially by the strident and forceful women carrying thappas (batons for

washing clothes), fighting with the police and rangers, and challenging the forced eviction orchestrated

by the army. The peasant movement and its legendary women became projects and programs for the

NGOs. The ‘Enlightened Moderate’ Musharraf crushed the movement vigorously using full state force,

but hardly a whisper was heard from the women’s movement General Musharraf’s duality appears to be

evident in another incident of his time involving Jamia Hafsa. In this case, large numbers of women

students, who carried batons, occupied a madrassa and kidnapped allegedly ‘immoral’ women,

threatened those who in their view were committing sins, and indulged in other acts of violence in

Islamabad, all in the name of religion. This violent ‘empowerment’ eventually ended with ‘Operation

Silence’ in July 2007 when the state used unbridled violence of its own to end their siege of the

madrassa. Farida Shaheed, while noting that women do not constitute a homogenous group and are

separated by class and culture, points out that this was seen as empowerment:
 A significant number of women themselves subscribe to the views of religiously defined groups.

Indeed, many women are active proponents of such views. And, as seen in the Al-Hafsa case, a number

of women experience activism that seeks to control women as a group, as a personally empowering

process.61

General Musharraf initially used the Jamia Hafsa incident to persuade his western benefactors

that if he were to be removed, Pakistan would fall to extremists. However, there was tremendous

pressure from the Chinese government to take action as Chinese citizens had been kidnapped by the

students. When the incident became prolonged and got out of hand, Musharraf sensed the danger and

launched Operation Silence in July 2007, murdering the students brutally and mercilessly. By the time

the curtain fell on Pervez Musharraf’s nine-year regime, non-state actors (birthed and nurtured by the

security state), had begun to threaten women’s rights more than the state itself.

By 2007, Musharraf had become widely unpopular and in 2008 he resigned as president and left

the country. The elections of 2008 were won by the Pakistan People’s Party which formed the

government in alliance with the Awami National Party and the Muttahida Qaumi Movement. The

democratic dispensation of Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani and President Asif Ali Zardari inherited the

war-on-terror induced problems of religious extremism and terrorism from their predecessor, General

Parvez Musharraf who, in turn, had inherited these from his predecessors. For Pakistan, terrorism was

not a new phenomenon as the policies pursued during the Afghan war in the 1980s had spawned

militant outfits to carry out Jehad in India and Afghanistan. When democracy returned to Pakistan in

2008, religious terrorism was targeting women and their rights with a renewed ferocity. In one case, the

Taliban kidnapped women after murdering their husbands, and the residents of Upper Dir revolted

against the Taliban when they tried to acquire for themselves the women they had widowed
 In April 2009, a video of a 17 year old girl, Chand Bibi, accused of illicit relations with a neighbor,

surfaced in which she was publicly flogged by the Taliban for allegedly transgressing moral norms

devised by them in the name of religion.63 She was subsequently forcibly married off to the man who

had entered her house to fix an electrical problem. In 2012, Malala Yousafzai was shot in Swat for

claiming her right to education. The lethal combination of an authoritarian state, unscrupulous ruling

classes, ancient tribal customs, and a seriously distorted view of religion, led to untold violence and

perpetual insecurity of citizens as the writ of the state declined in the territory controlled by the Taliban.

The relationship of the women’s movement with the Zardari-led PPP government was also

somewhat ambivalent. Although the PPP-led alliance was primarily considered liberal and secular,

members of parliament from the ruling parties made statements that negated women’s fundamental

rights. For example, Israrullah Zehri, minister for postal affairs, defended the burial alive of five women

in Nasirabad, Balochistan, on the pretext that the practice corresponded to Baloch tradition and culture.

Women’s groups across the country were up in arms against his statement and demanded his removal.

Incredibly, the Interior Minister, Rehman Malik, while explaining the severity of daily target killings in

Karachi, stated that only 30% of the dead were victims of target killings and, investigation had revealed

that 70% of the killings were at the hands of wives and girlfriends.65 The statement left the women’s

groups incredulous and they would have been extremely incensed were it not for the hilarious absurdity

of the statement.

In 2010, the PPP-led government appointed Maulana Muhammad Khan Shirani of JUI (F) as the

head of the Council for Islamic Ideology. The Women’s Action Forum protested against this appointment

as the Maulana had taken strong stands against pro-women legislation. He objected to the law against

sexual harassment on the basis that provocatively dressed and immodest women were themselves

responsible for inviting harassment. Maulana Shirani walked out of the assembly during the passage of
the law. He objected to the domestic violence bill on the grounds that it is not a problem in Pakistan and

has been created by Western-educated women. The Maulana regards domestic violence as a private

family matter and opposes the state’s intervention.66 The Domestic Violence Bill was passed in the

National Assembly in 2009 but fell prey to political bargaining in the Senate.

In December 2010 the Federal Shariat Court declared the Women’s Protection Act of 2006 as

being contrary to Islamic injunctions thus expanding its jurisdiction and reinforcing conservative trends.

Despite a long-standing demand by women’s groups that the parallel Islamic judiciary and the Council

for Islamic Ideology, created by Pakistan’s first dictator to legitimize his agenda should be abolished, the

ruling alliance did not take any steps to do so. Women Action Forum filed a case against the ruling and

awaits verdict to date.

The PPP, ANP, and MQM, were all considered secular and liberal parties and more women-

friendly than any available alternative. Nevertheless, they had no qualms about signing deals with

religious and right-wing parties to limit women’s voting rights and political participation, especially at

the Union Council level. Patriarchal norms, values and practices were thus evident among these parties,

even though their official party positions claimed to be supportive of women’s rights.

The relationship between the women’s groups and the PPP-led ruling alliance since 2008 was

characterized by accommodation and cooperation, but was not always or entirely free of friction. Afiya

Zia contends that while women have been motivated by dictatorship, they have been muted by

democracy.67 She wonders whether democracy, especially as presently constructed in Pakistan, can

deliver on women’s rights given the lethargic and apathetic attitude of the current governments.

some very positive and prowomen legislation was accomplished during the tenure of the PPP-

led alliance, thanks mainly to the Parliamentary Women’s Caucus and the National Assembly Standing

Committee on Women which worked closely and tirelessly with women’s groups to get the laws passed.
Some of these measures include a law against sexual harassment in the workplace (2010).69 There was

a long standing demand by women activists for such a law however, AASHA (Alliance Against Sexual

Harassment), while capitalizing on the support garnered by women’s groups, played the major role in

getting legislation passed. A law was passed against anti-women practices and ensuring inheritance

rights (2011),70 and an act of parliament created the National Commission on the Status of Women

(2012) which is an autonomous body but lacuna persist which affect its functioning.71 In 2012, a

domestic violence bill was passed which will apply only to the Islamabad Capital Territory but serve as a

model for the provinces which can now legislate on women’s issues. With PPP’s Fehmida Mirza as the

Speaker of the National Assembly and strongly vocal women such as Nafisa Shah, Bushra Gohar and

Sherry Rehman as members of the assembly, pro-women legislation was passed despite opposition from

the clergy.

When the Constitutional Reforms Committee was constituted for the proposed 18th

amendment, a major controversy arose regarding the failure to induct a single woman member.

Feminists strongly protested at this blatant and discriminatory omission and sent written

recommendations to the all-male committee insisting upon the repeal of the 8th amendment which

protected all of General Zia’s laws, measures, orders and ordinances. In spite of the majority of

progressive parties in the committee, the 8th amendment remained intact while bargaining with the

religious forces. All discriminatory legislation against women thus remained constitutionally protected.

With the passage of the 18th amendment in 2010, women’s issues became a provincial subject

and the Ministry of Women’s Development at the federal level was devolved to the provinces where

Women’s Development Departments are now responsible for addressing their concerns. However, the

women’s movement raised concerns regarding a minimum universal standard for all provinces to

prevent anti-women legislation being introduced in the name of religion, culture, or ethnicity. The
Federal Human Rights Ministry was made responsible for ensuring that Pakistan’s international

commitments on women are upheld and the federal government does not shirk responsibility in the

name of decentralization.