133 - Battle For The Falklands (1) - Land Forces PDF
133 - Battle For The Falklands (1) - Land Forces PDF
133 - Battle For The Falklands (1) - Land Forces PDF
ISBN 0-85045-482-4
Filmset in England by
Tameside Filmsetting Limited,
Ashton-under-Lyne, Lancashire
Author's note:
The author wishes to record his gratitude to the following
for their generous help in the preparation of this book;
Public Relations Dept., Ministry of Defence; Globe and
Laurel; Gunner; The Royal United Services Institute;
The Sunday Times; The Daily Telegraph; Time
Magazine; Peter Abbott; John Chappell; Geoff Cornish;
Simon Dunstan; Adrian English; Paul Haley; Lee
Russell; and Digby Smith. Under the circumstances the
publishers feel it may be desirable to note that a donation
has been made to the South Atlantic Fund.
HMS Endurance, and various other marks of the Argentine flag at Government House; and had
apparent inattention, prompted the current declared the islands and their population to be
military Junta in Buenos Aires to suppose that a Argentine.
military grab would be allowed to succeed without
more than token resistance. Such an adventure was
attractive as a distraction for the Argentine public
at a time of soaring inflation and political unease.
A causus belli was engineered by the planting of a
The Invasion
party of supposed 'scrap merchants' on South In fact, local indications gave the tiny RM garrison
Georgia, whose ostensibly innocent presence was a couple of days' warning. The arrival of Maj. Mike
compromised by the raising of the Argentine flag, Norman's detachment to relieve the 1980-81
and the tiny Royal Marine force despatched 22 men detachment of Maj. Gary Noott gave the islands'
to South Georgia's port of Grytviken to keep an eye governor, Mr. Rex Hunt, a total force of 67 men
on the Argentine party at Leith. It was at this point armed with infantry weapons, including the
in what seemed a trivial dispute that, on the night of General Purpose Machine Gun, the 66mm anti-
1/2 April 1982, the Junta led by Gen. Leopoldo tank rocket launcher, and the 84mm Carl Gustav
Galtieri made its move. On 3 April British Prime anti-tank weapon. Maj. Norman assumed
Minister Mrs. Margaret Thatcher faced an command on 1 April, and deployed his men at key
appalled and furious House of Commons to points.
announce that Argentine armed forces had landed The airfield is on a headland east of the town of
on British sovereign territory; had captured the men Stanley, joined to it by a narrow isthmus along
of Royal Marine detachment NP8901; had run up which runs a surfaced road. While the airfield had
5
been obstructed, two beaches north of it were the destroyers Hercules, Segui and Comodoro Py, the
considered likely landing points; and it was along landing ship Cabo San Antonio, and three transports.
the enemy's only axis of advance from this direction The force they carried was reported as 600 Marines
that four of the sections were deployed, with orders and 279 Army and Air Force personnel, a battalion
to delay that advance and to withdraw when the of amphibious APCs, and Marine Commando
pressure became too great. No.5 Section (Cpl. Duff) special forces including frogmen.
was south of the airfield, with a GPMG team Argentine sources place the first landing at Cape
covering the beach. At Hookers Point on the Pembroke, where frogmen landing from assault
isthmus was No. 1 Section (Cpl. Armour); behind craft secured the lighthouse and its small RM
them were N0.2 (Cpl. Brown) on the old airstrip, observation post. The first landing recorded by the
and N0.3 (Cpl. Johnson) near the immobilised British was by a heli-borne force of 150 Marines
VOR directional beacon. near Mullet Creek, tasked with neutralising any
No. 4 Section (Cpl. York) were placed at the defenders of the Moody Brook RM barracks and
narrow harbour entrance with a Gemini assault then moving on to capture the governor. They were
boat, and ordered to resist any naval attempt to shortly afterwards reinforced by another 70 men, all
enter the harbour. The MV Forrest was put on radar being landed by Sea Kings from the carrier. At
watch in Port William, the outer harbour. No.6 between 0530 and 0605—sources differ — they
Section covered the south of the town from Murray reached the empty barracks, and proceeded to clear
Heights, with an OP on Sapper Hill. Main HQ it with automatic fire and white phosphorous
were at Government House, on the west of the grenades: odd tactics for troops who would later be
town, where Maj. Noott assisted Mr. Hunt; Maj. claimed to have 'used blank ammunition to save
Norman, in overall command, was at Look Out lives'. The noise of this attack alerted the men
Rocks. Mr. Hunt had ordered that there should be around Government House. Both sides agree that
no fighting in the town itself, to safeguard civilian the firefight there began at 0615.
lives. It was to last for three hours, while the dawn
In the early hours of 2 April Forrest reported broke and brightened. Argentine figures for
contacts off Mengary Point and Cape Pembroke, casualties were one killed and two wounded. Royal
and helicopters were heard near Port Harriet. Marine estimates were rather higher, but could not
Argentine accounts would later identify these be confirmed: five dead and 17 wounded.
contacts as the aircraft carrier Veinticinco de Mayo, Even in the grimmest moments there can be
humour, as when the section covering the harbour
2 Para personnel test-fire GPMG and SLRs over the stern of the called in that it had three targets to engage with its
Norland ferry during the voyage south. At this stage a rather GPMG, and asked, 'What are the priorities?'
light-hearted attitude prevailed, as few believed the Task
Force would be sent into battle in earnest. (MoD) 'What are the targets?', came the reply from HQ.
'Target No. 1 is an aircraft carrier, Target No.2 is
a cruiser, Target. . .', at which point the line went
dead. The harbour section in fact managed to
evade capture for four days after the invasion.
Lt. C. W. Trollope, with Sgt. Sheppard, was at
the old airfield with No. 2 Section, and at 0630
reported ships to the south. Moments later he heard
tracked vehicles, and was soon able to count 16
LVTP-7S of the Argentine Marines 1st Amphibious
Vehicles Bn. coming over the ridge from York Bay.
As the section withdrew in the face of these
formidable vehicles, which have a turret-mounted
12.7mm machine gun, Marine Gibbs stopped the
lead APC with a 66mm hit on the passenger
compartment, while Marines Brown and Best put a
6
round of 84mm through the front. 'No one was seen 'temporary military governor of the Malvinas', and
to surface . . .' The other APCs deployed to open Adm. Carlos Busser, commander of the Marine
fire, and the section fell back again. Corps. Mustering his full diplomatic dignity, he was
By 0830, with Argentine troops clearly ashore in driven off to the airfield for evacuation to the
great numbers, Maj. Norman and Mr. Hunt looked United Kingdom via Montevideo, complete with
at the options. These included an attempt at escape plumed hat and sword. The Royal Marines were to
and evasion into the interior, where the governor follow the same route rather later.
could set up an alternative seat of government; or a It was to prove a Pyrrhic victory for Argentina.
firefight that would be 'determined, unrelenting, The photos of the young Royal Marines, tired faces
but relatively short-lived'. The governor, who was smeared with camouflage cream, being disarmed
Commander-in-Chief under the Emergency Powers and marched off by an equally young but rather
Ordnance of 1939, decided on the depressing option officious Argentine Commando caused great public
of surrender to save civilian lives. anger in Britain. Rightly or wrongly, the British
For the Argentine forces it was a moment of public finds the image of British troops with their
triumph. The sky blue and white national flag was hands up inflaming. It was this rather forlorn image
run up on every pole in sight. An Iwo Jima-style which made the Task Force politically
scenario of Marines grouped around a flag pole at acceptable—even inevitable.
dawn was followed by a more formal parade for the
cameras, with Marine Commandos in their knitted South Georgia
caps and quilted jackets forming one side of a hollow Under normal circumstances a lieutenant is never
square, and others in camouflage uniforms facing likely to have a wholly independent command—let
them. alone the scrutiny of the world while he exercises it.
Mr. Hunt declined to join these ceremonies, or Lt. Keith Mills, OC the 22-man RM detachment
even to shake hands with Gen. Oswaldo Garcia, aboard the ice patrol vessel HMS Endurance, was
summoned by Capt. N. J. Barker on 31 March and time, reading this back using an HF net which
ordered to (a) be a military presence on the island of allowed the Royal Navy and BAS call signs to hear
South Georgia; (b) protect the British Antarctic as well. The Argentines called on the defenders to
Survey party at Grytviken in the event of an assemble on the beach to surrender. By now the
emergency; and (c) to maintain surveillance over frigate Granville had entered the bay, and a
the Argentine 'scrap merchants' at Leith, a derelict helicopter was overhead. The Bahia Paraiso was
whaling station. informed that there was a British military presence
Radio transmissions from Stanley left them in no on the island, with orders to resist a landing. A
doubt that they would be next. The Argentine further attempt at stalling failed, and a second
vessel Bahia Paraiso, with its own Marine helicopter appeared. The frigate headed for the
detachment, was known to be in the area. Lt. Mills open sea again; one of the helicopters landed, and
selected a position at King Edward Point covering eight Argentine Marines jumped out 40 yards from
approaches to Grytviken; he also picked a Lt. Mills. One of them took aim, and Mills returned
withdrawal route, along which the Marines stashed to his defensive position. The Argentines opened
their 'E and E' kits and rucksacks. They wired the fire, and another helicopter dropped troops on the
beach, and booby-trapped the jetty and the far side of the bay, who opened up with machine
approaches to their position. guns. The Royal Marines now returned fire.
At 1230 on 2 April the Bahia Paraiso made a Their automatic bursts ripped into the Puma
fleeting appearance. Next day she returned, helicopter, which lurched across the bay trailing
sending a message announcing the surrender of the smoke, and crash-landed on the far side; nobody
'Malvinas' and the dependencies. Mills played for emerged. Two Alouette helicopters which landed
troops across the bay were engaged, and one of
them was hit, landing heavily and taking no further
As tracers rise into the dusk sky, soldiers man an improvised part in the action. This was already a respectable
.50cal. MG position on a cargo container lashed to the deck of
the Canberra. (Paul Haley, 'Soldier' Magazine) engagement; but the Royal Marines were now to
8
achieve a success unique in the campaign. The
frigate headed back to shore and began to give fire
support to the Argentine troops; she had a 3.9in.
gun, but seems to have used her twin 40mm on this
occasion. Lt. Mills ordered his men to hold fire until
she was well within the bay, with less chance of
taking swift evasive action; and then hit her with the
84mm anti-tank weapon.
Fired by Marine Dave Combes, the Carl Gustav
round hit the water about ten yards short of the ship
and ricochetted into the hull, holing it close to the
waterline. The frigate turned to avoid further fire,
and while it did so it was raked with MG and rifle
fire, more than 1,000 hits being reported later by an Men of 42 Commando, Royal Marines at Grytviken. M
Company-'The Mighty Munch'-recaptured South Georgia
Argentine officer. At least two 66mm LAW rounds alongside men of D Sqn., 22 SAS Regt. on 25 April. (MoD)
hit near the forward turret, jamming its elevation
mechanism; and, according to one report, a second Country, part Midland, but wholly British. The
84mm round may have struck the Exocet launchers thought of their misfortune had a powerful impact.
abaft the funnel, which fortunately for the crew did Some voices of dissent were heard from the extreme
not explode. Rapidly retreating beyond small arms Left as the Task Force was prepared, but these were
range, the Granville continued to fire in support of confined to an entirely predictable quarter, and the
the troops who were closing in to outflank the degree of publicity they attracted—particularly in
British position. Buenos Aires—was quite unrepresentative of
After causing a number of casualties, and with national feeling. It is hard to imagine any other
retreat cut off except down the steep cliffs, Lt. Mills issue which could attract more than 80 per cent
took the initiative to parley with an enemy officer. unanimous support for government action in
He pointed out that since each side had the other opinion polls.
pinned down, both would inevitably suffer heavily The recall of the men of the Royal Marines and 3
if the action continued; to avoid this he was pre- Para came as something of a surprise. Dramatic
pared to surrender. He had a wounded man, and he announcements and chalked signs aroused the
had achieved his aim of forcing the invaders to use
force. He had also guaranteed good treatment for Lt.Cdr. Alfredo Astiz of the Argentine Navy, wearing Marines
camouflage clothing and the blue-grey winter SD cap of a naval
his men. They had a long sea journey to an officer, signs the surrender of the enemy garrison on South
Argentine base, and a further four days' confine- Georgia on board HMS Plymouth, watched by Capt. N. J. Barker
of HMS Endurance (right) and Capt. D. Pentreath of Plymouth (far
ment, before being flown to Montevideo and on to right). (MoD)
Britain, with the section from Stanley harbour
who had avoided capture on 2 April. Lt. Mills was
later awarded the DSC.
10
themselves to peak efficiency, using live equipment could locate a transmitter after it had
ammunition and live air attacks. It was hoped that been on the air for a matter of seconds.
the notoriously rainy weather in the area would Particularly ironic was one Argentine claim, in
simulate the Falklands climate as closely as possible.the aftermath of defeat, that British night-fighting
On cue, central Wales obliged with a minor aids were of unprecedented sophistication. The aids
heatwave. used by Argentine troops were a generation ahead
The QE2, converted to take helicopters, sailed on of British equipment. Testing a captured set of the
12 May. She nosed out of Southampton on a sunny 'goggles', which could be worn with ease by a foot
Wednesday; families and friends, many of the soldier, an officer of 2 Para was able to identify by
women in tears, waved to the soldiers lining the name a man looking through a house window—
decks. The intensely moving occasion was slightly whose glass degrades vision—across 30 metres of
deflated when one serviceman's wife brought a street and through a second window, at night. The
delighted roar from the troops by stripping to the night sights for the Argentine FN rifles were lighter
waist, and her bra was swung aboard the stately and more compact than British equivalents, and the
liner to yells of approval. scale of issue meant that more were available to an
Argentine platoon.
To cover against air and sea attack the garrison
The preparation and despatch of the Task Force had Westinghouse AN/TPS-43 mobile radar sets
came as a surprise to the Argentine Junta. In that valued at around £6 million, and land-based
male-dominated society Mrs. Thatcher's response versions of the French Exocet anti-ship missile.
was seen as a typically female overreaction. While Light armour was provided by 12 French Panhard
US Secretary of State Haig pursued his exhausting AML armoured cars with 90mm guns; these
shuttle diplomacy, the Argentine enjoyed a surge of wheeled vehicles were reckoned to be more suitable
national pride. Although there were many, both in after the Marines' APCs had cut up Stanley's roads,
Buenos Aires and Britain, who could not believe but in fact they played little or no part in the
that the Task Force would be used in earnest, the fighting. Most, perhaps all of the LVTP-7S seem to
Junta took the precaution of reinforcing the islands. have left the islands before the liberation, but when
After their defeat they were to claim that they had Stanley fell the Task Force captured about 150
been beaten by a high-technology nation: trucks and jeeps.
examination of their weapons and equipment
showed almost the opposite.
A photograph that for many people summed up the essential
With military men heading the government, the point of the campaign; above the San Carlos landing beaches,
RSM Laurie Ashbridge of 3 Para enjoys a cup of tea with
forces were subject to fewer financial constraints delighted local families. (MoD)
than their opposite numbers. They had shopped
well in Europe and the USA, and though some of
their warships were old the armour, artillery and
infantry weapons were good. The garrison had 30
105mm and four 155mm guns, of Italian and
French origins respectively. Their mortars included
81mm and heavy 120mm types. They had
excellent Swiss 35mm and German 20mm twin AA
cannon mountings, some at least with Skyguard
radar; AA missile launchers included the French
Roland and British Tigercat, and the British
Blowpipe man-portable system. It came as a nasty
surprise to the men of the Task Force to discover
that not only was much of the electronic equipment
superior to their own—but some of the better pieces
were British-built. One piece of Direction Finding
II
With their numerous grass strips for private origins, but soldiers who have been on the receiving
aircraft and the 'flying doctor', the Falklands were end said that they functioned effectively. Although
ideal for helicopters and STOL aircraft. The one elegant dress sword was captured at San Carlos,
enemy air forces flew in at least twelve Pumas, the officers' normal sidearm was the 9mm Browning
two Chinooks, nine Bell 'Hueys' and two Agusta pistol.
A109 gunships. Up to two dozen turbo-prop The British Task Force was described as 'a well
Pucara COIN aircraft were dispersed at Stanley, balanced force", but the same could also be said of
Goose Green and Pebble Island; with its good the Argentine garrison pouring into the Falklands.
STOL performance and mix of cannon and under- As the heavy equipment was put ashore at the
wing ordnance, it was a formidable battlefield harbour the troops were flown into Stanley, and
support machine. plodded off to their temporary accommodation —
At the individual level the troops were armed mostly pup-tents—laden with packs, kit bags and
with the FN rifle, some with a folding stock, and all weapons. They were a mixture of conscripts, some
with a burst or automatic capability. The machine of whom were reported to be only beginning their
guns were the FN/MAG, almost identical to the service, and more experienced soldiers. The Press
British GPMG, and, at squad level, the heavy- stories about 15 year-olds in the ranks should be
barrel FN. Hand grenades were from a number of weighed against the fact that the most recent call-up
12
category were 19 year-olds of the 1962/63 register. Royal Marines dug in to cover the San Carlos beachhead; the
GPMG is mounted on a sustained fire tripod, although its butt
(Most Task Force soldiers were aged between 18 has not been removed as is normal in the SF role. Two boxes of
ammunition are stowed as part of the parapet. Under the
and 25 years.) threat of shellfire, overhead cover is taken seriously, but the
The engineers began a vast obstacle construction machine gunner clearly maintains a fairly optimistic
attitude: sharper prints of this picture show a Snoopy
operation to deny the British routes out from their mascot attached to his sights! (MoD)
likely landing areas. The Argentine assessment was
that the British would go for Stanley in a coup de main garrison commander, clearly made an effort not to
which would ensure the fall of the islands. There fall into this error. He was assisted in his planning by
were two axes which could be followed. One was an intelligence brief prepared in Buenos Aires by
straight in over the beaches to the east; these were Gen. de Bda. Alfredo Sotero, Jefe II/Inteligencia.
obstructed with anti-tank and anti-personnel mines Fifteen copies of this secret brief were prepared,
(waterproof plastic types) as well as wire, and copies 02 to 13 being sent to the Military Governor
pebble-filled oil drums. The kelp itself was a useful of the Malvinas. This secret document contained a
barrier at many points. The second axis, most mix of information. At the back were pictures of
favoured in that it offered good landing sites close to ships and equipment likely to be in the Task Force,
the capital, was north and east to Stanley from the with technical details. There was more interesting
Fitzroy inlets on the south coast. Working on this material at the beginning, however.
anticipation of enemy aims, the garrison laid The role and structure of special forces were
minefields to block the possible routes inland. They explained, as well as the structure of conventional
also held back stocks of mines which were later used forces; moreover, between pages 5 and 14 the
to thicken up local defences, and to block ground intelligence officers looked at British options. The
not otherwise covered. A rough total of 12,000 two options examined were the direct attack on
mines has been reported. Stanley, against which Menendez was to prepare;
It is an ancient military axiom that he who and the less obvious choice of a landing in a remote
defends everything ends up defending nothing. area which would provide a base for building up
Gen. Mario Benjamin Menendez, the governor and pressure on the Argentine garrison.
13
Some of the 1,200-odd Argentine prisoners taken at Goose 'Special operations by members of the SBS and
Green are marched off to the 'cage', 29 May; their winter
parkas, made in Israel, gave inferior protection to the range of SAS, especially on the night before the principal
layered clothing worn by the Task Force, and some probably
came from northern areas and so had great difficulty amphibious landing.'
acclimatising to the freezing Falklands winter. (MoD) Having blocked the likely routes around Stanley,
Menendez covered the beaches and high ground
The conclusions drawn by Sotero's staff were with OPs which could report movement and
that the main threat was from night attacks; and landings. Larger settlements like Pebble Island, and
that helicopters, the key to mobility, were therefore Fox Bay on West Falkland, received their own self-
a priority target. They were able to say (on 17 April) contained garrisons. The spine of high ground,
that the helicopters would be carried aboard a running from San Carlos through Mt. Usborne,
container ship. They felt that the direct assault Wickham Heights, and eastwards to Mts.
option would be too costly in lives; and that the Challenger and Kent was picketed with OPs;
indirect approach would be too slow, as the USA although the men dug in on the high ground (only
and USSR would put a stop to the fighting by 705m at its highest) were not artillery spotters, they
political pressure. However, their assessment of the were to do their job effectively, and had good radio
pre-landing operations was entirely correct: communications with Stanley. When they saw
'Amphibious reconnaissance by the SBS landed major movement or landings they would call in,
from one or more submarines ahead of the main and the mobile reserve could be heli-lifted in to seal
body of the Task Force. off a landing and launch a counter-attack.
'Isolation of the zone selected for the amphibious On the Falkland Islands the population was
assault by the Task Force, and establishment of air having to live with occupation. To confirm his
superiority over the zone. standing, Gen. Galtieri flew into Stanley to swear in
'Clearing of any minefields laid on the stretch of Gen. Menendez as governor. To the delight of the
coast selected for the landing. locals and the horror of Argentine soldiers the flag,
'Final reconnaissance by the SBS and eventually straining in the winter wind, was suddenly tumbled
by the SAS. to the mud as the flag pole snapped—just at the
14
moment when Menendez was taking his oath. SAS Regiment, on the Fortuna Glacier. Tasked
At first the Argentine soldiers tried to make with reconnoitring the enemy garrison, they found
friendly contact with the civilians; but the true conditions on the glacier impossible; 100mph winds
character of the Argentine regime was revealed swept away their shelters, and 'environmental
when the head of the local police was replaced by an casualties' were imminent. The Wessex 5 helicopter
Argentine intelligence officer named Maj. Patricio sent to extract them from RFA Tidespring crashed
Dowling. Dowling—part Irish, part Argentine, and on take-off from the glacier in appalling 'white-out'
nicknamed 'the Gauleiter' because of his Alsatian conditions; so did the second Wessex which
dogs and 'cold, creepy manner'—revealed that attempted the mission. Eventually the Wessex 3
Buenos Aires had some 500 dossiers on inhabitants from HMS Antrim, flown by Lt.Cdr. Ian Stanley on
of the islands. his seventh mission in two days, managed to lift out
There was, however, a lighter note to the the SAS and the stranded aircrew—a gross
occupation. As part of their inept 'hearts and minds' overload of 17 passengers—in a feat of airmanship
programme the Argentines offered the islanders which earned Lt.Cdr. Stanley the DSO. Within
television sets on which they would be able to watch hours another team was ready to land, this time
the World Gup, for a modest down-payment of £10 using Gemini inflatable assault boats.
each and easy terms thereafter. The 'kelpers' still The 30kw (40hp) outboard engines of the
have their TVs, with 140 more instalment Geminis are temperamental even under training
payments to go—but the debt collector has been
shipped home . . .
Cheerful soldiers of 2 Para after the enemy surrender at Goose
Green. Note new fibre helmets, with and without camouflage;
and first field dressings taped to webbing, along with smoke
grenades. (MoD)
17
A Sea King lifts heavy equipment in the background as Automatic fire from the covering party, and
Guardsmen of 5 Bde. move inland through comrades digging
in. (Paul Haley, 'Soldier' Magazine) 4.5m. shells called in at a rate of one every two
seconds by the NGSFO, kept many of the enemy in
the Argentine mainland, whose cargo could be off- their trenches. The demolition men would have
loaded there for onward shipment by smaller carried in their rucksacks handy-sized charges of
aircraft or the small ships which operated around plastic explosive, which is both stable and
the coasts. A cynic might also suggest that there was waterproof, with short lengths of safety fuse to allow
a need for good news after the loss of HMS Sheffield; them time to withdraw. They probably placed all
despite the claim that the Task Force had a free their charges in the cockpits of the Pucaras, to
hand, there were moments when it seemed as if the destroy the instruments and to prevent the
Cabinet was asking them to deliver some good cannibalisation of one aircraft to repair another. In
news. all they destroyed six Pucaras, a Short Skyvan and
On the night of 11 May eight SAS men—two five other light aircraft (variously reported as being
'sticks'—had landed on West Falkland opposite Puma helicopters or Aermacchis); as well as the
Pebble Island, and on the 13th they crossed to radar set and an ammunition dump.
establish OPs on the rolling ground directly east During the withdrawal they were attacked by the
of the objective. On the night of 14/15 May Argentine garrison, but this interference ended
they marked a landing zone for helicopters to land when the officer who was urging his men forward
45 men and a naval gunfire expert on the island. was spotted and shot. The only British casualties
The SAS are quick to claim that the NGSFO was were two men slightly wounded.
the first man ashore. The party was split into an Apart from its material effects, the raid was useful
assault group and a cover party, the former to in that it worried the Argentine garrisons, and gave
attack the targets and the latter to keep the garrison them a pattern to expect when more raids took
occupied. The landing was late, and a night march place—a situation which would be exploited during
across the island left only half an hour for the attack; the landings at San Carlos. Dates are not available,
for this reason a plan to contact the civilians in the but it is known that SAS reconnaissance parties
little community was abandoned. landed during the campaign at Weddell, Port
18
Stephen, Fox Bay, Chartres, Dunnose Head, Port A Scimitar of the Blues and Royals, complete with a neat
'basha' for the crew, in position at Bluff Cove. The 30mm
Howard, Warrah House, Mt. Robinson, Mt. Rarden cannon proved effective in the infantry support role.
The 'CVR(T)30' Scimitar has a ground pressure of only .35kg
Rosalie, and Byron Heights, all on West Falkland; per square inch, giving excellent floatation on the soft ground
at Carcass Island, Keppel Island, Sea Lion Island encountered along the northern axis of advance on East
Falkland. The passive night vision equipment for commander,
and Lively Island; and, on East Falkland, in the gunner and driver came in extremely useful during the final
Middle Bay area*, San Carlos, Camilla House*, night battles before Stanley. (Paul Haley, 'Soldier' Magazine)
Douglas, Teal Inlet, Rincon Grande, Port Louis,
Diamond Mt., Kydney Island, Mt. Low*, Mt. enemy troops. As part of the deception plan, which
Kent* and Stanley*( * = contact with the enemy). involved naval shelling of targets near Bluff Cove
and Fitzroy, the SAS put in a major raid on the
garrison at Darwin and Goose Green; this was both
to mislead enemy intelligence officers as to British
intentions, and to keep the garrisons tied up and
SanCarlosandAfter unable to intervene at San Carlos. About 40 SAS
men made a night approach march—later
The landings on the Falklands began with a disaster described by one trooper as 'the toughest hike I've
on the night of 18 May when a Sea King helicopter ever done with the SAS'—laden with a mix of
ferrying men of 22 SAS Regt. from a briefing lost weapons which were to be used to give the
power on take-off and crashed in the sea— impression of a full battalion attack. The attack
apparently as a result of birdstrike. In the crash 19 achieved all it set out to do: automatic fire, mortar
men of this small and hand-picked unit were lost; all bombs and anti-tank missiles kept the Argentine
casualties are tragic, but these were men of forces quiet. The 80-lb. loads carried by each man
exceptional skills. on the outward leg were considerably lightened by
As the main landing force approached the the time they withdrew. It is probable that a
beaches at San Carlos, the guides who had been number of the other raids listed above also occurred
ashore since 1 May moved down to mark the on this night, 20/21 May.
landing sites, having checked the area for mines and Back at San Carlos, the LCMs were moving
19
morning nine 'cold, wet and miserable' enemy
prisoners were taken, but ground resistance was
brief. The air attacks began in earnest at about
1030 hrs, however, and went on for the next four
days with some frequency; it is thought that some
enemy aircrew made up to three sorties daily.
As the air defences around San Carlos were
improved, the Blowpipes were supplemented by
Rapier SAMs, by the CAP Sea Harriers operating
well out to sea, and by the 'gun line' of warships
with their shipboard systems. The Press aboard the
Task Force ships christened San Carlos Water and
the northern reaches of Falkland Sound 'Bomb
Alley', as the duel between the FAA's Mirages,
Daggers and Skyhawks on the one hand, and the
Army and Royal Navy SAM and gun crews on the
other, grew ever more savage.
For the Rapier crews, operations were unlike
anything they had experienced on ranges or
simulators. 'The broad, U-shaped valleys meant
angle-of-depression problems for the ridge sites, not
to mention mist and low cloud; while the valley
bottoms severely limited arcs and coverage. Fast jets
at 50 feet and travelling at speeds up to and in excess
of 500 knots are difficult enough; but add frequent
obscuration behind pimples of land, multiple
weapons systems all firing at flat trajectories, and
Gurkhas prepare to take off from Darwin to clear enemy OPs in the majority of targets being acquired at ranges of
the hills, 5 June. Four soldiers rode in each Scout, with feet
braced on the skid. (Paul Haley, 'Soldier' Magazine) 3km or less—and you have something not catered
for either in the training films or at the Hebrides.'
through the darkness from HMS Intrepid and The new tactics were learned, however, and 40 per
Fearless while the guns of the frigates and destroyers cent of the total hits were achieved by 'tail-chaser'
began to soften up targets ashore. On Fanning missiles.
Head a troop of Argentines were routed by the One lieutenant in 2 Para watched an Argentine
SBS in a fierce firefight. The LCMs beached, and pilot switch on his afterburner as a heat-seeking
the Scorpions and Scimitars of the Blues and Royals missile nosed towards his aircraft. The massive
were first down the ramps to give supporting fire. thermal signature immediately attracted the
By 0730 the landings by 40 Cdo. and 2 Para on Blue missile, and the pilot's desperate attempt to achieve
Beaches 1 and 2 were complete. As the dawn rose 45 escape by speed was his death warrant. The first
Cdo. came ashore at Red Beach in Ajax Bay, and 3 kills credited to Rapier came when '33 Charlie' of T
Para, followed by 42 Cdo. in reserve, at Green Bty. (Shah Sujah's Troop), commanded by Sgt. G.
Beaches 1 and 2 close to San Carlos Settlement. J. 'Taff' Morgan, took two Skyhawks.
First casualties were three aircrew of two Gazelle The problems besetting the SAM crews were
helicopters of 3 Cdo.Bde. Air Squadron shot down similar to those facing the enemy pilots. The shape
by the retreating Argentines, apparently with small of San Carlos Water gave incoming aircraft little
arms fire. At least one Argentine Pucara of time to fix a target, whereas the longer approaches
two or three shot down that day was destroyed by along Falkland Sound gave them a clearer run at
SAS troops—who enjoyed a wider choice of the Royal Navy's 'gun line'. It was on 23 May that
weapons—with a US-made Stinger SAM. That the FAA, after a day's absence, returned in
20
strength. They lost six to eight jets; but succeeded in the ghastly problems thrown in by Directing Staff
hitting HMS Antelope, and that night her dramatic in the late stages of an exercise. With Atlantic Con-
end lit up the sky and the hills around San Carlos veyor the Task Force lost stores, RE vehicles, but
Water. worst of all, three Chinook and eight Wessex heli-
The forces ashore now comprised all three Royal copters. It was this loss which obliged the Royal
Marine Commandos and both Para battalions, Marines and 3 Para to make their epic 'yomp' along
with a Tactical Brigade Headquarters. Support the northern route across East Falkland, a feat of
arms from the invaluable Commando Logistic old-fashioned infantry stamina which the enemy
Regt. were ashore, including the RN Surgical had not considered possible.
Support Team, which took over the derelict Orders for the move out from San Carlos were
refrigeration plant at Ajax Bay for lack of anything issued on 26 May. It was hardly a 'breakout', since
better. They performed miracles in this dank ruin, the Argentines had not pressed the beachhead. On
christened by the piratical Surgeon Cdr. 'Rick' the northern route, 3 Para would move to Teal Inlet
Jolly as 'The Red and Green Life Machine'. For the and 45 Cdo. to Douglas Settlement, with 42 Cdo. in
next few days the main task was to offload stores and reserve, while 40 Cdo. covered the beachhead;
ammunition. The loss of Atlantic Conveyor on 25 May meanwhile 2 Para would move south to Camilla
brutally changed Brig. Julian Thompson's plans for Creek House by 27 May, and would attack Goose
\ an airmobile advance, with a shock reminiscent of Green and Darwin the day after.
Men of 40 Cdo. captured an officer of Argentine
81mm mortar crew of 42 Cdo.RM on Mt. Kent. Elements of 42 Marines on the 27th in the vicinity of San Carlos;
Cdo. were heli-lifted forward 60km in blizzard conditions, to later that day an air attack hit a British ammunition
an LZ on which the SAS and enemy troops were still fighting;
and stayed there for six days in temperatures of — 12 C, for the dump, and the men around San Carlos had a
first two nights without their sleeping bags. They brought disturbed night as it continued to explode.
down fire on anything that moved, until finally relieved by 45
Cdo. (MoD) Meanwhile enemy OPs on high ground overlooking
21
positions were often linear, as opposed to the all-
round positions taught in the British Army; but they
chose their ground well, and the trenches had
excellent visibility. Machine gun positions
sometimes had two guns on sustained fire mounts,
positioned to give 360° cover.
It was a line of such trenches that Lt.Col. H.
Jones, CO of 2 Para, attacked with men of HQ Coy.
when it was holding up the advance of his
battalion. His death from wounds did not
slacken the impetus of 2 Para's attack; but
afterwards there was time to remember an officer
who wished, in the best traditions of The Parachute
Regiment, to lead from the front. A posthumous
award of the Victoria Cross was later announced.
Darwin was taken by mid-morning on the 28th,
and Goose Green airfield by the afternoon. The
community was surrounded at last light, and the
surrender took place on the following morning.
During this fighting the Paras found their 81mm
mortars most effective against enemy positions;
they also brought their Milan anti-tank missiles
into action. Designed to penetrate inches of tank
armour, and with a range of anything between 25
and 2,000 metres, they proved both accurate and
devastating, and became the infantry's own
A Royal Marine, impressively clean-shaven, photographed in portable artillery.
blowing snow during the final phase of operations before
Stanley. Note first field dressings taped to both SLR butt and The enemy surrender at Goose Green was
belt—all bullets have an exit as well as an entry hole . . . Hoods
were only worn up when out of the line and in danger of achieved through a remarkable piece of diplomacy
frostbite: in action they are bad for the hearing, which can be by Maj. Chris Keeble, acting CO of 2 Para, and the
fatal. (Paul Haley, 'Soldier' Magazine)
Spanish-speaking Capt. Rod Bell RM. Keeble sent
2 Para's route reported their movement, and two captured Argentine NCOs forward under a
Menendez heli-lifted his reserves from Mt. flag of truce with an appeal to Air Cdre. Wilson
Challenger down to Goose Green and Darwin. Pedrozo, the enemy commander, that as a Catholic
Suddenly the garrison, estimated at 500 men mostly he should spare the lives of his men. (It should be
from the Air Force, was swollen to 1,400, good noted that, whether through confusion or intent,
troops, dug in and alert. a flag of truce had not been honoured by the
enemy earlier in this engagement.) Keeble's
Goose Green preoccupation with securing an agreement which
The battle which followed lasted throughout the would safeguard the lives of civilians in the settle-
day and night of 28 May. It was fought over very ment proved to be irrelevant: Pedrozo seemed
open ground, and against an enemy who withdrew far more concerned that he should have an
slowly through fixed positions prepared in depth, opportunity to parade and address his men. Having
supported by three 105mm guns, mortars, and established their priorities, both sides carried on.
20mm and 35mm twin AA mountings firing in the The parade, speech, and surrender took place; the
ground role. The Paras were supported by three Paras released the civilians, who had been locked
105mm light guns of 8 Bty., 29 Cdo.Regt. RA, in a single building for a month—and discovered
which had received a total of 800 tons of that they had fought and won a battle at odds of
ammunition. The British found that the Argentine two to one against.
22
The photographs of long lines of prisoners with The bleak battlefield west of Stanley, seen from Goat Ridge
looking east. Left background. Tumbledown; right back-
one or two guards dotted among the columns, ground, Mt. William. The terribly exposed terrain, across
reminiscent of North Africa in the Second World which the British advanced against enemy who had had weeks
to dig in on the dominating features, is shown clearly here.
War, were a major boost to British morale; and a (Paul Haley, 'Soldier' Magazine)
blow to the Argentines, who had put in good troops
in strength, and lost. The casualty figures showed commander of the land forces now that they
how the training and motivation of 2 Para had paid exceeded one brigade with the arrival of 5 Inf.Bde.
off: they had lost 13 killed and 34 wounded, against at San Carlos, took over the direction of the
250 enemy dead and missing and about 150 campaign. The arrival of the Guards and Gurkhas,
wounded. Among the British dead were the crew of who had transferred from QE2 to Canberra at South
a Scout helicopter piloted by Lt. Dick Nunn RM. Georgia, was not publicly announced for some
Blowpipe claimed its first kill for the British with the days.
shooting down of a Pucara by 3 Cdo.Bde. Air On 31 May men of K Coy., 42 Cdo. were heli-
Defence Troop. lifted 30km out in advance of the British forward
On 30 May 45 Cdo. reached Douglas, and 3 Para troops to occupy Mt. Kent, a key position outside
Teal Inlet. They had crossed terrain which is Stanley. It had already been aggressively
difficult even in good weather, and had done it in reconnoitred by a squadron of 22 SAS Regt., who
hail, rain squalls and icy winds. Leg and ankle had harassed the garrison and established that it
injuries were numerous, since the 'going' was either was not large—the bulk of this unit had been lost at
rock, marsh, or rough highland grassland. The men Goose Green and Darwin. The Royal Marines were
were carrying all their own kit, as well as weapons reinforced by two 81mm mortars and three 105mm
and ammunition, and some loads weighed 120lb. or light guns. Meanwhile 3 Para moved from Teal
Inlet to Estancia House, and then to high ground to
even more.
On the same day Maj.Gen. Jeremy Moore RM, the west. The rest of 42 Cdo. were moved up to
24
A
B
c
D
E
F
G
H
reinforce K Coy., consolidating on Mts. Kent and As 2nd Bn. The Scots Guards dig in on the open ground, and a
Wessex lifts away on its tireless shuttle back and forth with
Challenger. The eight AFVs of the Blues and Royals, more men and supplies, the Gazelle of 5 Bde. commander Brig.
Tony Wilson lands on Goat Ridge. Note the modification which
who had followed the northern route, moved south- sends the exhaust heat upwards, a counter to enemy heat-
east towards Kent and Challenger; they had seeking SAMs, and the rocket pods mounted on the transverse
bar through the fuselage. Details will be found in MAA 135, 'Air
survived some very hard terrain, and had proved Forces'. (Paul Haley, 'Soldier' Magazine)
the worth of their design concept.
With the Marines and Paras on Kent and
Challenger, a busy time followed while PoWs were phone-call to Reg Binney, the farm manager at
moved back from Goose Green and the men and Fitzroy. This call on 3 June established that the
equipment of 5 Bde. were brought forward; one Argentines had pulled out the day before. Men of 2
priority was to bring 7, 8 and 79 Btys. of 29 Cdo. Para were hastily lifted forward by helicopter to
Regt. RA forward with 1,000 rounds per gun—a secure the area; this coup saved a slow advance to
task which stretched the reduced heli-lift capacity. contact, and also saved 5 Bde. from the problem
Movement was by air, weather permitting, but the presented by the bridge at Fitzroy, which is hard to
LSLs were also used. The long winter nights gave bypass.
cover from air attack and observation alike. On 4 The Gurkhas of 1/7GR took over at Goose Green
June the LSL Sir Tristram, and LCMs from HMS from 2 Para; led by their new CO, Lt.Col. David
Intrepid, moved 2nd Scots Guards around the Chaundler, who had made a water jump from a
southern coast to the Bluff Cove area. When they C-130 to join them, the Paras now came under
landed after their freezing and exhausting journey command of 5 Brigade. The Gurkhas made a
the Guards were revitalised by a Falklands succession of airborne attacks on suspected enemy
housewife who opened up her deep-freeze and positions which had been left behind the forward
cooked chops all round. edge of the battle area. The Press called it 'mopping
These landings at Fitzroy had become possible up'; if the domestic analogy is retained, it was more
after Maj. John Crosland of 2 Para made a discreet like a series of sharp squirts of insecticide bringing
25
Enemy shells fall among 2nd Scots Guards as they dig in below
Fitzroy
Goat Ridge; the white burst is phosphorus. (Paul Haley,
'Soldier' Magazine) The cycle of triumph and tragedy which had
become the rhythm of 'Corporate' hit a tragically
low note on 8 June, when Argentine jets suc-
down troublesome flies. With four men riding each cessfully bombed the LSLs Sir Tristram and Sir
Scout helicopter, the Gurkhas would put in parties of Galahad at Fitzroy. Although the former had almost
about a dozen men to attack suspected OPs, covered completed off-loading by 1700hrs, large numbers
by Gazelles with SNEB rockets. This efficient of men from 1st Bn. The Welsh Guards were still
technique netted an enemy party from West aboard Sir Galahad when she was hit. In the
Falkland armed with SAM-7 missiles. explosions and raging fire which followed, 41 Welsh
As men and ammunition were being moved up Guardsmen and two Sappers died, and another 46
to the perimeter around Stanley by sea and air, Guardsmen were wounded, some of them very
patrols were going out nightly to dominate no- severely; total casualties from the raid were 146, of
man's-land and to examine minefields and which 63 died.
defences. The SAS and SBS were active on both As the lifeboats and rafts reached the shore,
East and West Falkland. One journalist watched an soldiers waded into the freezing water to assist the
SAS 'stick' report the details of a fighting patrol survivors. Helicopters flew straight into the
near Stanley, and was impressed by the matter-of- blinding smoke-pall above the deck, where
fact phrases preferred by the SAS to the rather more ammunition was exploding, to snatch other men off
flamboyant 'zapping' and 'wasting' of Paras and the ship; and used the down-draught of their rotors
Marines: 'Took two, wounded two, killed three.' It to push life rafts away from blazing oil on the water.
is ironic that after their surrender the Argentines When the casualties had been moved off the beach,
were to complain about superior night-fighting somebody made the welcome discovery that
aids: it was not the equipment, but rather the men lifeboats contain emergency rations, including
who were in their element by night. various high-energy items. That night some soldiers
A Harrier strip had now been completed at Port supplemented combat rations with condensed milk
San Carlos—after a delay caused by loss of metal and other prizes.
matting on Atlantic Conveyor—and aircraft operating There was a further air raid on the beach that
from it were now called in against 155mm gun evening, but by now missile batteries and automatic
positions which had been shelling 3 Cdo.Bde. weapons had been set up, and four out of five
troops. Skyhawks were reported knocked down. One
26
soldier watched others engage the aircraft with targets. During the fighting on the night of 11/12
small arms—a technique taught in the British Army June 3,000 rounds would be fired, some on targets
since its successful use by the Vietcong. He saw one 50 metres from the forward friendly positions.
aircraft start its bombing run, and then: 'You could When the fighting was over the announcement
almost see the pilot thinking "Oh, no!" and roll through MoD in London spoke of Argentine
away', as the sky above the bay filled up with red soldiers being 'surprised in their sleeping bags'.
tracer—and with the four unseen ball rounds They may have started off like that, but the night
which accompanied each tracer round. That was was to see heavy fighting on all positions.
one A-4 which did not make it home, although On Mt. Longdon, 3 Para fought a fierce battle
others sank an LCM that day, with the loss of four with the Argentine 7th Inf.Regt., who had dug
Marines and two RN ratings. themselves in among the crags and who used their
The Argentine estimates of the losses caused at night snipers very effectively. The capture of the
Fitzroy were greatly inflated, and the Ministry of feature cost 3 Para 17 dead and 40 wounded. During
Defence and the commanders on the spot realised this action Sgt. Ian McKay took command of his
that it would benefit their plans if Menendez were platoon when his officer had been shot in both legs,
led to believe that the British capability to launch and went forward to destroy three Argentine
an attack had been disrupted. machine gun positions with hand grenades. He
received a posthumous VC. On Two Sisters 45 Cdo.
The Final Battles were faced by a reinforced company of the 4th Inf.
On 10 June Brig. Thompson gave orders for the Regt., with .50cal. machine guns in strong positions;
capture of Mt. Longdon, Two Sisters, Mt. Harriet 45 Cdo. lost four dead and eight wounded.
and Goat Ridge. Many of these features resemble The remainder of 4th Inf.Regt. were on Mt.
the Dartmoor Tors: outcrops of rock at the top of Harriet. The Welsh Guards Recce Platoon 'shot in'
long, exposed hillsides, some of them linked by a diversionary attack on the west side of the feature
saddles of high ground but—in clear weather— using Milan, while 42 Cdo. hooked round to the
giving the defenders excellent visibility. The troops south and assaulted it from the rear. The Argentines
to be used were 42 Cdo., 45 Cdo., 3 Para, 1st Welsh were taken by surprise in this classic infantry attack,
Guards (one company, with two companies 40 and the Royal Marines took their objective for one
Cdo.), and 2 Para under command and in support.
The men of 3 Para were to assault and capture Mortar Platoon, 1st/7th Gurkha Rifles take a break after firing
Mt. Longdon, and 2 Para would move so as to be all night during the battle for Tumbledown and Mt. William on
13/14 June. They wear olive green rainproofs, CW caps and '43
able to support them. To their south, 45 Cdo. was to pattern steel helmets. (Paul Haley, 'Soldier' Magazine)
take Two Sisters. South again, 1st Welsh Guards
with two companies of 40 Cdo. under command
would secure a start line for an attack on Mt.
Harriet, from which 42 Cdo. would then assault
and capture that feature while the composite
battalion remained in reserve. Although there was
to be no unusual artillery preparation, and the
attack was to go in as silently as possible in the initial
stages, there was considerable gunfire support laid
on for the subsequent stages. Five batteries of 29
Cdo. Regt. RA, two of them in support from 5
Inf.Bde., were supplemented by four RN warships:
HMS Avenger for 3 Para, Glamorgan for 45 Cdo.,
Yarmouth for 42 Cdo., and Arrow for an SAS
squadron making a simultaneous assault on Murrel
Heights. The CO of 29 Cdo.Regt. RA co-ordinated
the fire support, and had an 'on call' list of 47
27
killed and 13 wounded. During this series of attacks minefield reconnaissance was extremely testing,
some Argentine soldiers came in to surrender from and one sergeant went out three nights in
adjoining positions not under direct attack; the succession—on the third night on his own, after his
sight of the incoming fire, and the prospect of a first two patrols had suffered casualties.
similar fate sooner or later, were apparently At 0030hrs on the night of 13/14 June, 2nd Scots
sufficient to overcome the inadequate leadership of Guards put in a diversionary attack on a position
their officers and NCOs and the poor motivation of 2km south of their main objective on Tumbledown.
these conscripted defenders of the 'Malvinas'. The attack ran into an enemy platoon and took
It was while giving NGS to 45 Cdo. in this night casualties, but it allowed G Coy. to get a lodgement
battle that HMS Glamorgan was hit and damaged by on the objective.
a land-launched Exocet missile. The Scots Guards attack was part of a Brigade
In the original plan the attack would have been plan including subsequent attacks on Mt. William
pressed the following night, with 2 Para assaulting and Sapper Hill by the 1st/7th Gurkha Rifles and
Wireless Ridge under command of 3 Cdo.Bde., 1st Welsh Guards. The Scots Guards had HMS
while 2nd Scots Guards attacked Mt. Tumbledown Yarmouth and Phoebe on call, and the guns of 4 Field
and the Gurkhas went for Mt. William. In the event Regt. and 7 Bty., 29 Cdo.Regt. at priority call and
the attack was postponed for 24 hours. In the under the control of Maj. R. T. Gwynn with 2SG;
meantime artillery fire was exchanged with the when they started firing they did not let up for more
enemy 105mm and 155mm guns around Stanley, than three minutes at a time for the next 14 hours.
and the airport runway was brought under fire. In addition, the 'Jocks' had three mortar platoons
By this stage in the campaign artillery fire had and a platoon of Browning .50cal. machine guns in
shown itself to be very effective. Though Argentine support. The battalion was committed to a three-
soldiers might not be killed in great numbers, the phase assault consisting of company attacks on
constant pounding of British 105mm shells forced different parts of the feature.
them underground and sapped their morale. As Left Flank Coy. moved forward from the G
Some officers watched their young conscript Coy. position it took casualties from enemy mortars,
soldiers reduced to silent immobility by the shelling: machine guns and snipers; there was also some
'they were stunned'. During the nights of 10 to 13 shelling of G Coy. and battalion headquarters. Left
June helicopters brought forward over 400 rounds Flank were caught in a difficult position, with high
per gun; by the end of the fighting it was reported rocks on each side and only a 50-metre wide valley
that some guns were down to six rounds, and that in front. Capt. W. D. Nicol, the RA FOO with the
over 2,400 rounds had been fired in the final lead company, brought down heavy fire on the
advance. enemy—a task made difficult by the fact that the
The enemy gunners returned this fire, and one two sides were only 100 metres apart in pitch
Para officer remarked afterwards that 'steady darkness. For the gunners there were also the
shelling by 155s eventually makes you rather problems of clearing a crest line and co-ordinating
shaky'. He recalled how many non-smokers had illuminating rounds. Left Flank remained pinned
taken to tobacco, and not as tentative schoolboy down until, following this heavy bombardment,
smokers might, but as veteran 40-a-day men. Even they put in a vigorous company attack and secured
3 Cdo.Bde. HQ was not spared surprises; A-4S their objective by o82ohrs; it was during this action
dropped retard bombs on its position at Bluff Peak that the Guardsmen made a very effective assault
near Mt. Kent, although fortunately there were no with fixed bayonets, a tactic normally held to be
casualties. One Marine officer remarked: 'You can anachronistic in these days but which still has its
get used to shelling, but no man gets used to uses. Afterwards they discovered that their enemy
bombing!' had been the Argentine 5th Marine Infantry
Patrols were still going out to establish the Battalion. Scots Guards casualties were nine dead
position of Argentine minefields. These operations and 41 wounded; enemy casualties were about 100,
require patience, and a quiet courage that makes and the 27 prisoners included the battalion
demands upon even the strongest soldier. The commander.
28
The Gurkhas were tasked to move round the Casevac on the morning of 14 June: 'walking wounded' Scots
Guards make their way to a Scout. In fact the Guardsman with
northern flank of Tumbledown when it had been the bandaged head was severely injured, and his mates carry
his kit. At right, carelessly caught by the camera, a Marine of
secured. As they advanced they came under M & AW Cadre, identified by his M16, only carried by special
observed artillery fire, suffering ten casualties. Their forces. Other tell-tale indicators, we are told, were the
superior Gortex rainproofs worn by some SAS men; and the
troubles were increased by reports of a minefield load-carrying jerkins, similar to the old 1943 Battle Jerkin,
stretching north from Tumbledown, but by great worn by some SBS Marines in preference to webbing equip-
ment. (Paul Haley, 'Soldier' Magazine)
good fortune they passed its southern boundary.
While the Gurkhas were moving across their start see the Argentine soldiers leaving their trenches and
line the Welsh Guards were advancing in the south, streaming back into Stanley. The gunners hastened
and here they ran into minefields laid to cover this this retreat, as FOOs watched and corrected the fire
axis, two Marines having their feet blown off. It on the tiny, stumbling figures showing dark against
was slow work feeling a way forward through the the white ground. 'It was a most pathetic sight, and
minefield in the dark; an RA sergeant working as one which I never wish to see again', recalled the
assistant to the battery commander attached to CO of 4 Field Regt.RA.
1 WG said later that he had never in his life followed It was rime for Gen. Moore to use discretion as
so closely in the footsteps of his BC. well as strength. Brig. Thompson called off a cluster-
By dawn the Gurkhas were on Mt. William, and bomb attack on Sapper Hill by Harriers from Ajax
to the north 2 Para were on Wireless Ridge. Apart Bay when the jets were only three minutes from
from NGS the Paras had enjoyed direct support weapons release. (The Harriers had already used
from the Blues and Royals, the rapid-fire 30mm laser-guided bombs against Argentine AA positions
Rarden cannon of the Scimitar proving very with great effect that morning.) Contact had been
effective. They lost three dead and 11 wounded. made with the Argentines through a Spanish-
From the newly captured features the British speaking Royal Marines officer, Capt. Rod Bell,
troops, squinting in an icy, snow-laden wind, could who was based on HMS Fearless. The word was
29
takes the form of a florid passage of blank verse; at
one point it contains the lines: '. . . What are these
British, anyway? Low-born mercenaries, who do
not know what they are fighting for!' In an
interview shortly after his victory Gen. Moore
answered for his men:
'The basic difference was that they were fighting
for the islands; we were fighting for the islanders'.
Conclusion
9 June, between Bluff Cove and Fitzroy: a 105mm light gun
crew of C Sub., 29 'Corunna' Bty., 4 Field Regt.RA prepare to General Moore was to quote Wellington after
send on its way to Sapper Hill one of the 2,400 rounds fired Waterloo when he described the victory as a 'near-
during the final advance on Stanley. (Paul Haley, 'Soldier'
Magazine) run thing'. As at Waterloo, the military facts had
pointed to a victory for the enemy. In both actions it
passed via a civilian doctor in Stanley, and a was the British soldier who won, and his strength of
meeting was arranged with Menendez. White flags character and belief in what he was fighting for—
began to appear all over Stanley. mostly, the close bond which ties a military unit
The men of 2 Para had reached the race course together—which saw him through.
when they were ordered to halt, much to their It is a military axiom that one of the keys to
chagrin. Troops of J Coy., 42 Cdo. moved through success is selection and maintenance of aim. The
them into the town; it was they who would later aim was to get the Argentine forces off the islands,
enjoy a personal triumph when they ran up a and the best way to do this was to get to Stanley. In
Falklands Islands Union flag on the mast at pursuing this aim the Task Force was blessed with a
Government House. It was the flag they had kept government that did not waver—probably the first
ever since the firefight with Argentine Marines on 2 one since 1945.
April—these were the men of NP8901, returned via Crucially, the difference was between the officers
the UK after their repatriation by the Argentines. and soldiers on the two sides. When I asked a young
The Argentine surrender was not filmed or Para officer what he saw as the worst and best
photographed, in contrast to the Argentine features of the enemy, he said without a moment';
coverage of a victory considerably less hard-won. pause, 'The relationship between the officers and
Even the Instrument of Surrender was a curiously- men—neither respected the other'; and then, after a
muted document: a simple sheet of typewritten pause for thought, 'They dug good positions'.
paper. The surrender became effective at 2359hrs This relationship was exemplified when a
Zulu on 14 June, 2059hrs local time. Menendez journalist watched a British battalion commander
made an alteration before signing, crossing out the check the list of his men killed and wounded after an
words 'unconditional' and 'Lafonia' for the sake of attack. He knew their family backgrounds and
his self-respect. characters, their skills, even their favourite sports.
A signal was sent to London via the SAS link with General Menendez did not know how many men
Hereford. In it Maj.Gen. Moore allowed himself a were in and around Stanley when he surrendered—
modest flourish for posterity: 'The Falkland Islands he was mistaken by a margin of thousands.
are once more under the government desired by British troops and journalists found to their
their inhabitants. God Save the Queen. Signed: surprise that the Argentine Army issued two
J.J.Moore'. distinctly different ration packs: an assault ration,
An Argentine poster torn from a wall in Stanley and a large 'GS' type pack which contained more
and brought home by a member of the Task Force food, of better quality, extra comforts, and an issue
30
of cigarettes and whisky. When in the field British can be good soldiers when they are well led and
officers use identical 24-hour ration packs to their trained. The poor leadership suffered by most of the
men, and if feeding is done centrally it is a tradition Argentines led to fantastic rumours growing
that they wait until all their men have been fed among them—such as the story that Gurkhas killed
before joining the queue. The religious and political their own wounded and ate their prisoners, and that
tracts stuffed in every Argentine ration pack are British special forces were mingling with the
unlikely to have made up for the way officers defenders dressed in Argentine uniform and
generally 'acquired' the larger pack. speaking perfect Spanish. The military historian
Reports published in Buenos Aires reinforced this hears echoes of the Battle of the Bulge in one
impression of deficient leadership. Conscripts were Argentine soldier's report that 'There was so much
punished by being forced to stand in the open in fear we tried to find questions to ask them that an
freezing rain without gloves, boots or headgear; and Argentine would know easily, but that an English
this punishment was for deserting their posts to go in commando would not know, even if he spoke
search of food. No army can allow its men to perfect Spanish'.
straggle off looking for food—and no army should In training British officer cadets learn one lesson
oblige them to do so. There were moments when Very early: 'There is no such thing as a bad soldier,
rations did not reach British units on the Falklands, only a bad officer'. The relationships between
but the men knew that this was not because of a officers and men of both sides in the Falklands
policy of giving them the least, last. The Argentines campaign, and the results which flowed from them,
had food available in Stanley, but it was not have borne out this lesson yet again.
brought forward to outlying positions.
The soldiers who invaded the Falklands were
Scots Guards bring in Argentine prisoners from
capturing an island and an idea; the men who Tumbledown; note the bulk of the IWS—individual weapon
liberated them were less concerned with the country weresight—a passive night vision device. Argentine equivalents
smaller, lighter, and handier. (Paul Haley, 'Soldier5
than with the people, and the principle. Conscripts Magazine)
31
'It's all over!' Jocks of 7 Platoon, G Coy., 2SG hear the news of of epaulettes. There are two patterns: the 'RM
victory on 14 June. This battle-stained group display an
amazing miscellany of clothing and equipment: second right pattern" with a wire-stiffened hood, and 'epaul-
wears the quilted trousers worn under the CW suit; beside him ettes' for rank slides on the chest and back; and
is a soldier—a piper?—in a Glengarry; behind him is the
GPMG number with IWS fitted, probably the most effective what might be termed the 'SAS pattern', with no
use for this device. (Paul Haley, 'Soldier' Magazine)
rank slide straps and an unstiffened hood. Both
have velcro fastening at cuff and ankle. The official
nomenclature is 'Arctic windproof combat smock
and trousers'. The colour is the usual British
The Plates DPM camouflage of light green, yellow, light
red-brown, and black.
(Research by Michael Chappell . 2. 'Cold Weather' (CW) suits of parka and over-
and Martin Windrow) trousers, both with quilted liner garments
sometimes seen worn exposed—a dark green
The haste with which the British were forced to sleeveless waistcoat and trousers. These were issued
mount a winter campaign in the South Atlantic led to 5th Inf.Bde., and are occasionally seen worn by
to the use of a variety of combat clothing. Apart paratroopers. Identifying features are epaulettes, a
from personally-acquired civilian items, stiffened hood, 'patch' pockets on the chest,
surprisingly often seen in photos of the campaign, 'bellows' pockets on the skirt, and a strap-fastened
the main outfits were as follows: parka cuff. Also in DPM. Note that both the
1. Windproof suits. Developed from the Second windproof and CW suits have oversize buttons, and
World War smock and over-trousers popularly 'bellows' pockets on both thighs of the trousers.
associated with the SAS, these suits were worn by Foul-weather clothing—basically, thin rain-
men of the RM 3rd Cdo.Bde., 2 and 3 Para, and — proofs— appeared in at least three varieties:
presumably—the SAS and RM SBS sections. DPM rainproof smocks and over-trousers (5 Bde.);
Identifying features are 'bellows' smock pockets, a similar items in olive green (5 Bde.); and a curious
yoke seam where the hood is attached, and absence olive green waterproof smock which appears to
32
have a white inner lining—reversible?—seen in infantryman who can march, dig and shoot better
both the Commandos and the Para battalions. In than his enemy.
addition, ponchos were seen being worn from time
to time, a most unusual sight in the British Army. A2: Brigadier Julian Thompson RM
Headgear included at least five varieties of The commander of 3rd Commando Brigade wears
helmet, mostly worn covered by layers of sacking, the windproof smock and DPM field cap, '58
scrim nets, etc.: the new paratroopers' fibre, the old Pattern webbing belt and pistol holster. His rank, in
paratroopers' steel, the 1943 steel, the RAC steel black cut-out form, is displayed both on the chest of
worn by RN and some RM personnel, and the AFV the smock and—apparently a Royal Marine
crews' fibre. Pile-lined CW caps in DPM peculiarity—on the cap front. (Brig. Tony Wilson
camouflage were widely worn, as were unit berets, of 5th Inf.Bde. wore the maroon Para beret with the
DPM field caps, knitted cap-comforters, etc. Where gold lion cap badge of his rank; and a parachute
metal badges were worn they were normally dulled. smock of current pattern with the parachute brevet
Footwear included the standard 'boots DMS', and the maroon 'DZ patch' of 1 Para on the right
the 'Northern Ireland', and an amazing collec- sleeve, and the battalion's maroon lanyard at the
tion of civilian fell boots scattered among the issue right shoulder.)
Arctic footwear of the Marines. Rubber calf-
length 'galoshes' or over-boots were issued in A3: Royal Marine, Naval Party 8901
quantity, but a variety of civilian waterproof Cradling his 84mm anti-tank weapon, this 'Booty'
leggings were also seen. Photos indicate that most wears the temperate climate combat dress of the
troops who made the 'long tab' across the north of Royal Marines, in which the tiny garrison was
East Falkland finished it in standard boots DMS photographed after its capture: green Commando
and ankle puttees. beret with darkened globe-and-laurel badge; DPM
Equipment was basically the issue 1958 pattern combat smock and olive green trousers, DMS boots
in all its variations, but with the addition of a and puttees; and '58 Pattern fighting order, usually
variety of rucksacks. Notable are the olive supplemented with drab khaki bandoliers.
nylon GS, SAS and Paratroop issues; the webbing
'Bergen'; and a job lot of civilian rucksacks which B1: Lieutenant-Colonel H. Jones, 2nd Bn. The Parachute
seem to have been bought up from a well-known Regiment
chain of sports and working clothes suppliers at It is our sincere hope that it will not be felt in poor
short notice, some in most unmilitary colours! A taste to record in this book the appearance of this
final point is that this campaign did not seem to gallant officer, as he led his battalion in the attack at
involve the display of 'festoons' of belted GPMG Goose Green which cost him his life, but which
ammunition, most of which seems to have been added an impressive chapter to the record of The
carried in pouches or bandoliers. Parachute Regiment. An eyewitness reports that
Lt.Col. Jones paused to change the magazine of his
A1: Private, 3rd Bn. The Parachute Regiment Sterling SMG before moving on to tackle a further
Apart from the new fibre paratroopers' helmet, this Argentine MG position, and shortly after this was
soldier could belong to any battallion or commando hit twice in the back, dying of his wounds some
which served in the Falklands. He wears the hours later. We have depicted him wearing the full
windproof parka and over-trousers, DMS boots suit of windproof clothing of 'RM pattern', with his
and puttees. His equipment is standard '58 Pattern ranking—on the light blue backing of the
with '44 Pattern waterbottle, NBC gear, and toggle regiment—on the chest tab. The maroon
rope; the rucksack is the Para issue, with poncho regimental beret has the dulled cap badge; the
roll and lightweight shovel attached. His weapon is equipment is '58 Pattern Combat Equipment
the standard SLR with Trilux SUIT sight Fighting Order (CEFO) with NBC gear.
attached. He is a living, aching reminder that in the
days of shoulder-fired missiles and massive B2: Sergeant, 2nd Bn. The Parachute Regiment
supporting firepower, wars are still won by the This NCO, getting off a 'double tap' with his SLR
(from which the Trilux sight has been removed for introduced in 1915. The modified No.4 rifle is now
close quarter fighting, but which retains the sight designated Sniper Rifle L4A1; the sight Telescope,
bracket), wears the standard DPM parachute Sighting, L1A1. The high standard of camouflage is
smock: the windproof parka has been removed and matched by high standards of marksmanship and
stowed behind his shovel, but he retains the over- fieldcraft.
trousers. On the right sleeve of the smock is the
parachute brevet, above the blue 'DZ patch' of 2 C1: GPMG number, 3rd Bn. The Parachute Regiment
Para, above rank chevrons. The current pattern The standard section MG is the General Purpose
fibre helmet has a DPM cover; padded black Machine Gun, 7.62mm, normally issued three per
leather 'Northern Ireland' gloves are worn. platoon, giving a total of between 50 and 60 per
infantry battalion. (In the Falklands 2 Para, at
B3: Sniper, 2nd Bn. The Parachute Regiment least, had six per platoon.) The paratrooper who
The Paras, at least, took their snipers to the wields it wears the regimental beret, and the green
Falklands, as shown by photographic evidence; this -white 'smock, combat, reversible' seen in many
sniper has worked forward of the assault groups, photos of the campaign. Under it his DPM para-
and now settles down to shoot at the target he has chute smock would bear on the right sleeve the green
stalked. 'DZ patch' of this battalion. He has the Para
Though hardly visible, our sniper wears the old rucksack, '58 Pattern CEFO with NBC equipment,
steel paratroops' helmet and the home-made sniper and the steel helmet.
smock: a very oversize combat smock stitched all
over with yards of scrim and hessian, which is still as C2: LMG number, Royal Marine Commandos
excellent a form of camouflage as when first The excellent and much-loved Bren LMG of the
Second World War has not entirely disappeared
Marines of 45 Cdo., leaning into the weight of their packs,
march into Stanley at the end of the long 'yomp'. Carrying the from the British forces. In its modified 7.62mm
SLR in this way, with magazine and pistol grip trapped against form, and rechristened 'L4A2', it still has a role as a
the belly with both hands and arms braced on pouches,
spreads the weight across both forearms. (MoD) lighter and handier section weapon than the belt-
34
fed GPMG, and is issued particularly for tropical
service. Photos show that it was used in the
Falklands; note that the change to the NATO
7.62mm round caused the adoption of a straight
magazine compatible with SLR magazines in place
of the old 'banana'. The Marine wears the
windproof parka, olive green trousers, and olive
green waterproof leggings.
36
F2: Surgeon Commander, Royal Navy Surgical Support Welsh Guards, Blues & Royals (on midnight blue);
Team right, top to bottom: 22 SAS Regiment, Royal
Specialists such as medical personnel, engineers, Artillery (on midnight blue), Scots Guards, 7th
etc., serving alongside the three Royal Marine Gurkha Rifles; centre, Army Air Corps. Only space
Commandos wear the cap badge of their parent prevents us from including the badges of those
service or organisation on the green beret which supporting units and organisations whose
signifies success in the Commando course. The personnel faced the same dangers, and without
Marines have Royal Navy doctors; and one, whose efforts the Task Force would have failed. .
Surgeon Commander 'Rick' Jolly RN, became a
widely-known 'face' after he had appeared in front G1: Cabo, Argentine infantry
of an audience of millions on the TV screen, being This junior NCO is identified by the thin-above-
interviewed outside the derelict refrigeration plant thick shallow chevrons worn in black above the left
at Ajax Bay in which the medical team were forced breast pocket. Other insignia were one thick
to carry out more than 100 major operations in the chevron (Dragoneante, private); two thin above
days and nights following the landings. Under one thick (Cabo 1°, senior corporal); one thin above
unavoidable conditions of cold, filth, and danger two thick (Sargento, sergeant); and one thin bar
the teams achieved the remarkable success of above one thick bar (Sargento 1°, senior sergeant).
'sending out alive anyone who came in alive'; this, Unit and formation insignia do not seem to have
with two unexploded Argentine bombs lodged in been worn on combat clothing by the vast majority
the building only feet from the operating tables, and of troops. One prisoner photo shows a small group
under intermittent air attack which blew up an at Stanley wearing on the left shoulder a square
ammunition dump nearby, and obliged the white patch with an unidentifiable device, but these
surgeons to operate wearing steel helmets. The may not even be Army personnel. One, out of
officer wears his Royal Navy cap badge on the several score colour photos in the Argentine Press
Commando beret, and his commander's shoulder examined while preparing this book, seems to show
ranking in gold, divided by the surgeon's red stripes, men wearing in the same position a mid-green
on the front tab of the windproof parka. shield shape. On service dress the infantry units
wear such a patch, edged gold and with gold crossed
F3: Corporal, 1st Bn., 7th Duke of Edinburgh's Own rifles in the centre; the photo referred to showed no
Gurkha Rifles gold, though it was of poor quality and if a black
The Gurkha wears the DPM combat smock with field version of the insignia was worn it might not
the similarly patterned over-trousers of the CW suit, have shown up—but this is pure speculation. On
a knitted cap comforter, 'galoshes', and 'NI gloves'. the padded parka (Plate H2) a very few troops wore
The '58 CEFO equipment includes the lightweight Some of the enemy Panhard armoured cars, which seem to
pick, and a Gurkha peculiarity: a DPM cover for have remained parked in the street near Stanley waterfront
throughout the battle. Foreground, the RA badge on a green
the kukri knife at the right hip. Rank chevrons are beret identifies a gunner of 29 Cdo.Regt., Royal Artillery;
background, one of 3 Cdo.Bde.'s Sno-Cat tracked vehicles.
worn on the right sleeve only, in the traditional (Paul Haley, 'Soldier' Magazine)
Rifles colours of black on green common to all
Gurkha units. The black shoulder patches are
indicators of the battalion (triangle, right shoulder)
and company (circle, 'C Coy., left shoulder); others
are a square for 'B' Coy., a cross for HQ etc.
F4 is a detail view of the maroon beret of the two
battalions of The Parachute Regiment which
served in the Falklands; F5, the pile-lined, DPM
cloth CW cap. The cap badges of the major units
which served in the campaign are presented against
a narrow backing of their beret colours: left, top to
bottom: Royal Marines, Parachute Regiment,
37
the knitted toque worn round face and neck. Men
carrying the heavy-barrel FN/FAL with bipod, as
the section light machine gun, usually wore four or
even six pouches around the belt. The belt was
sometimes brown, as here. The light 'assault pack'
in the foreground attached to the slits in the rear of
the shoulder harness; it seems to be a folded shelter-
half strapped up with a blanket, and the spade—
often the old German Wehrmacht type—was thrust
under the straps. A frequent alternative was a
horse-shoe blanket roll round the body. In the
background are men with the US 3.5m. rocket
With an expressive gesture of disgust, an Argentine prisoner launcher, fitted with a folding bipod; and a carrying
hurls down his rifle. The faces of his comrades tell their own
story. (MoD) vest for rifle grenade rounds, with four across the
a small rectangular patch of the Argentine tricolour back and one each side of the chest.
flag mid-way between left shoulder and elbow.
The US steel helmet is fitted with one of two H1: General de Brigada Mario Benjamin Menendez
identified camouflage covers, this one in a streaky The Argentine commander of the 'Islas Malvinas'
'fernleaf pattern of drab green and brown over wears a stiffened olive field cap with a small enamel
ochre. The goggles, almost universally worn, were cockade in the national colours of pale blue and
sometimes clear but usually had amber or pink white. His field jacket, similar to that of his men but
lenses—an aid to acquiring night vision at dusk? of better quality, bears gold general officer's leaves
The field dressing was normally worn under the on both collar points. This is exposed in the open
goggle strap at the rear; figure G2, whose slung neck of a type of drab tan quilted, hooded jacket
helmet has the more usual string netting, displays with knit cuffs seen in photos of some Argentine
the common first field dressing, in white with a officers. He wears wash-leather gloves, and carries a
blue panel and a red cross in the corner. helmet with the 'fernleaf camouflage cover held by
The olive drab fatigues have exposed buttons; a narrow black band. The jacket has flapped side
many jackets did not have shoulder straps. High pockets; and on the left breast is a cloth strip bearing
black combat boots were universal. The equipment his rank insignia—a single gold 'sun' of elaborate
harness was usually in this grey-green painted design, embroidered on a red felt disc.
leather; most riflemen wore two pouches, a bayonet
frogged on the left hip, a canteen in a simple olive H2: Cabo Primero, Bn.Inf. de Marina 5
cloth cover on the rear (usually olive plastic, The standard protective clothing throughout the
sometimes the old aluminium US type), and a small garrison was this padded, hooded parka with a
pack on the right hip. This had a 'window' for name zipped front covered by a snap-fastened fly, and
and number—see G2 — and may have held field knitted cuffs. The red rank chevrons are speculative;
rations, respirator and NBC kit. The wash-leather a few photos definitely show red instead of the usual
gloves were widely issued. The grenade is black, but we have been unable to find a photo
unidentified but may be Italian. The 'prong' tying this feature in with other identified unit
bayonet shown here only fitted the solid-butt features. Since the chevrons worn on the Marine
version of the FN rifle—the more common folding- service uniform are red, we show them, tentatively,
butt type is shown in the background. There was on this Marine figure. The Marine beret, in blue-
some use of the old US 'walkie-talkie' radio. grey, and the gold badge of crossed cannons and
anchor with the Argentine national crest
G2: Argentine infantryman superimposed, are shown in photos. For some
Some troops wore the US M.56 combat jacket, unexplained reason some personnel wore it pulled
identifiable by its fly front and shoulder straps. The right, but most pulled it to the left as illustrated.
field cap with pile-lined flaps was common, as was Equipment is otherwise as for the infantry. The
38
folding-stock FN rifle has a grenade in place, and Mountain and Arctic Warfare cadre (an elite sub-
another is slung on the harness; the red tabs are unit) spotted a helicopter-inserted team of 16 men
probably a safety feature removed before firing. of Argentine Marine Commando Company 602
Note drab khaki bandolier. operating from a building known as Top Malo
House near Mt. Simon. As Harrier strikes were
H3 & H4: Teniente and enlisted man, Marine not available, they 'took out' the enemy in a
Commandos classic infantry attack. Nineteen Royal Marines
Two companies are known to have served on the attacked the 16 Argentine Marines, driving them
Falklands, numbered 601 (the normal code for out of the cover of the house with 66mm rockets
Army troops) and 602. The first is a permanent and then engaging them in the open. The result
unit, trained to US Ranger standards; the second is was three dead, seven wounded and six un-
thought to have been a newly-raised company wounded prisoners, for British casualties of three
assembled for the campaign from men who had wounded.
qualified as commandos but were then serving with
other units. A unit commander is mentioned in the H5: Argentine Marine Commando, Stanley, 2 April
enemy Press, Lt.Col. Ali Mohamed Seineldin Sources differ over whether the spearhead of the
('Turco'), but whether he commanded both invasion was provided by 601 or 602 Company of
companies collectively is not certain. Pre-war this organisation; the former seems more likely.
photos from Argentina show this camouflage Much photographed during the searching of the
uniform—similar but not identical to British men of NP8901, the men of the first sub-units to
pattern—worn with a dark green beret. Photos attack key points wore this outfit and a set of
from the Falklands during the campaign show the webbing quite different from the normal issue,
uniform as illustrated here. Camouflage clothing resembling US and French models. Magazines
is only worn by these special forces, making them for the silenced Sterling 9mm SMG were carried
easy to identify on the battlefield. in double leather pouches painted grey-green,
The officer wears a rank patch on his left breast but brown pistol holsters were worn. Note goggles
pocket, as is normal throughout the land forces. The hanging round neck.
insignia of this rank are one silver and one gold star. Persistent rumours that British troops met in
Other ranks wear one silver (Alferez, ensign); three battle 'US mercenaries' probably sprang from
silver (Capitan, captain); and one, two and three incidents when Commandos made this claim in
more elaborate gold 'suns' for the field ranks. The the (apparently mistaken) belief that it would save
photo we copy in this plate shows a moulded their lives in the heat of action. Enquiries in US
rubber/plastic composition version of the officers'
parachute brevet, in yellow, blue and white. In the sea of discarded and rapidly rusting enemy weapons,
one FN displays the kind of religious postcard issued in
Leather equipment is light brown. Both Browning Argentine ration packs. Many of the troops wore rosaries
9mm and Colt .45 pistols were used by the pinned Magazine)
to their combat jackets. (Paul Haley, 'Soldier'
Argentines.
The soldier wears the same uniform, with a
combat jerkin in place of equipment harness. This
has two grenade pockets high on the chest, with
elasticated loops above; below these are two
magazine pockets on each side, vertically arranged;
and a small pack is built into the rear of the jerkin.
The archaic sword-bayonet is incompatible with
the FN rifle, but was definitely carried by at least
some of these troops.
The Commandos were among the few troops to
distinguish themselves. Late in May, during the
advance across the island, an OP of 3 Cdo.Bde.'s
39
mercenary circles fail to produce any corroboration accented English; some certainly wear the
for an inherently unlikely story. American-trained, 'different equipment' mentioned by British wit-
some of the Commandos probably speak American- nesses to some of these incidents: see H4 and above.
40