(Modern+) The War of Desperation, Lebanon 1982-85 PDF

Published in 1985 by
Osprey Publishing Ltd

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Copyright 1985 John Lafrin
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Publication Data
Laffin, John
The War of Desperation: Lebanon
1982-85
1. Lebanon—History—Israeli
intervention, 1982-
I. Title
956.92'044 DS87.53
ISBN 0 85045 603 7
Editor: Martin Windrow

Filmset and printed in Great Britain
Contents
Author's Note 6
Introduction 7
1 The Roots of War 9
2 The Combatants and the Arena 28
3 Another Six-Day War 53
4 The Siege 89
5 Post Mortem 109
6 Testimony 131
7 The Media War 148
8 Reluctant Peace-Keepers, Eager Martyrs 167
9 And it Came to Pass 191
Appendices:
1: Palestinian Military and Para-Military Forces 205
2: The Scout Remote-Piloted Vehicle 207
3: The Merkava 209
Index 214
Author's Note
I must acknowledge my wife's assistance in the preparation of this book.
She has known Lebanon for many years, and she observed 'the war of
desperation' as I did, on the ground and from both sides. She went to a
war at an age when most women do not wish to move far from five-star
comfort. Her trained memory was helpful at times when it was not
possible to take notes; and she was able to do what no man could: talk to
Arab women. Apart from all that, she typed and retyped this book - as
she has my nearly 100 other titles.
I am grateful to several people and organisations for permission to
reproduce photographs: Hirsh Goodman, the Jerusalem Post, the Israel
Defence Forces, the US Marine Corps Division of Public Affairs, the
Service d'Information et de Relations Publiques des Armées, the
Military Attache's office of the Italian Embassy in London, and the
British Army's Lebanese Force HQ. Where photographs are not
attributed the photographer is not known, or does not wish to be
identified. I am also grateful to Dennis Baldry, Will Fowler,
Christopher Foss, Sam Katz and Steven Zaloga for their help with some
aspects of the book.
My thanks to David Sharvit for his superb driving in Lebanon, where
motoring has more risks than in London, Paris, Amsterdam, Lisbon,
Istanbul and Tel Aviv combined. On one occasion, within a mile, he
drove coolly past levelled rifles at checkpoints manned respectively by
Israeli soldiers, Lebanese Forces (Phalangists), Amal Muslims and
unidentified patrols.
John Laffin
6
Introduction
In the summer of 1982 Israel fought a war in southern Lebanon against

the Palestine Liberation Organisation, and in eastern Lebanon against
the PLO and its military allies, the Syrians. Initially called Operation
'Peace for Galilee', this conflict became one of the most momentous and
most controversial of modern times. While it was simple enough in its
causes, strategy, tactics and consequences, the fact that it took place in
Lebanon made it appear confusing to people not familiar with the
Byzantine politics of that unhappy country.
A small army of correspondents covered the war for the world's press,
radio and television; but too often - for reasons which I give in this book
- I believe that some of them succeeded only in compounding the
confusion. This book is an attempt to clarify that war by describing the
tensions which produced it, the campaign as a military event, and its
regional and international consequences.
My sources are many and varied - Israeli, Syrian and PLO included -
and I have leant heavily on my own close-up observation of several
phases and aspects of the war. I know the region of combat well, in
contrast to many reporters who were seeing it for the first time. I
encountered at Tyre an American television crew who were making a
film of what they told me was 'damage caused by shelling from Israeli
warships'. In fact, the 'wrecked buildings' they were filming were early
Roman ruins. A major aspect of the war was the media's ignorance
about Lebanon, historically and currently. In Nabatiye, south-east
Lebanon, my wife and I were in the company of a reporter from Illinois.
As usual, the crowded streets of that Arab city were choked with cars
and every driver, also as usual, was continually blasting his horn. 'My
God!' said the wide-eyed Illinois man, 'this sure is a major political
demonstration. What are they angry about?'
'They're not angry at all,' we told him. 'They always drive this way.
It's normal.' Nevertheless, he proposed to report the din as a protest,
against what or whom we never did find out.
7
THE WAR OF DESPERATION
Wars are always tragic, so lighter episodes tend to stand out in the
memory. One day we were driving through a mountain village near
Jezzine and were slowed down by traffic; the weather was hot and our
windows were wound down. From the window of a car passing slowly in
the opposite direction something was thrown at us, and for an instant we
expected a grenade. Then a bright red rose landed on my wife's lap, and
we saw the occupants of the other car smiling at us and making hand-
clapping motions. The car we were using carried an Israeli number-
plate; the Lebanese had taken us for Israelis, and were welcoming us.
There are grimmer personal memories. At Damour, near the great
tunnels in which the PLO had stored vast quantities of munitions, we
came across the remains of a uniformed PLO fighter. He had been dead
for a long time, since long before this particular war, killed perhaps in
some inter-PLO feud or shot by a vengeful Christian or Shi'a Muslim.
The point that struck us forcibly was not that he had been killed, but
that he had lain so long unburied. Death had become so commonplace
in Lebanon since 1975 that corpses roused little interest.
Heaps of human bones, the telltale remains of massacres, can be
found among the rocks in the stony hills. We found such a heap,
bleached by the hot sun, in the Shouf Mountains south of Beirut. Each
skull had a bullet hole in the back, evidence of 'execution'. One skeleton
still wore a Christian cross on a silver chain around the neck.
Another day, lost somewhere east of Beirut, I approached an Israeli
tank largely concealed among rocks with its gun pointing towards PLO
positions. All was quiet that day, and as I approached to ask the way I
saw the crew sprawled on the ground in the deep sleep which follows
combat. One soldier, the sentry, sat against the tank with his Uzi sub-
machine gun across his thighs. His eyes were bloodshot with exhaustion
as he squinted at me in the bright sun and said something in Hebrew.
'Where's the war?' I said.
'I'm the bloody war,' he replied, switching to English spoken with a
Canadian accent. 'Come back again next year - I'll still be the bloody
war. How do we get the bloody bastards to leave us alone? I mean, what
do we have to do?'
And he fell asleep. Just like that.
How the exhausted Israeli soldier came to be leaning against his tank
near Beirut, why the mummified PLO fighter lay unburied at Damour,
and what the red rose signified makes quite a story.
8
1 The Roots of War
OPERATION 'Peace for Galilee' in 1982 was the direct result of Jordan's
war against the PLO in 1970. King Hussein used his Bedouin army to
drive out the PLO when its terrorist activities threatened his crown.
Because Egypt and Syria had already imposed restrictions on terrorist
activity from their territory, it became vital for the PLO's leaders to
establish an independent base in Lebanon, where many Palestinians
already lived.
In fact, the PLO had begun to set up bases there in 1968. The
government, urged by other Arab states, agreed to allow the PLO to
operate within a defined area of southern Lebanon close to the Israeli
border. Within weeks the PLO broke its agreements, and clashes with
the Lebanese Army ensued. Backing the PLO, Syria closed its border
with Lebanon and infiltrated terrorists and arms across it; Iraq imposed
economic sanctions against Lebanon; and President Nasser of Egypt
coerced the Lebanese into signing the Cairo Agreement of 1969. This
granted the PLO extra-territorial rights within the Palestinian refugee
camps, and freedom to conduct operations against Israel from Lebanese
territory.
As the armed PLO presence grew in the Lebanese towns and villages
so harassment of the local population increased. The government tried
to limit the PLO's activities, and further clashes with the Lebanese
Army resulted. Syria sent its own units of the Saiqa terrorist faction into
Lebanon, and the Lebanese government was forced to back down. By
giving a semblance of legitimacy to the expansion of the PLO's extra-
territorial rights, the agreements developed the PLO 'state-within-a-
state'.
The PLO created an extensive network of relationships among the
local communities - primarily with leftist groups - resulting in the
establishment, in 1972, of the 'Arab Resistance Front' headed by Kamal
Jumblatt. Concurrently, the PLO formed local leftist groups of its own
to serve as front organisations. Such local support enhanced the status
9
of the PLO in Lebanon. This PLO-leftist coalition upset the delicate

balance of power by increasing the influence of the Left and radicalising
the Muslim population. At the same time the PLO began training and
arming local leftist groups. Segments of the Muslim community saw the
PLO as potential allies against the Christians in an attempt to end
Christian dominance and to concentrate all authority in the hands of a
Muslim-PLO coalition.
The Christian community felt its existence threatened by increasing
Muslim-leftist power and militancy, the expansion of PLO control over
Lebanese territory, and the growing impotence of the Lebanese
government.
In May 1973 Arab pressure forced the government to sign the
Melkart Agreement, giving the PLO even greater freedom than that
granted by the Cairo Agreement of 1969. Alarmed by this development,
the Christian community organised its own armed militia.
On 13 April 1975 the veteran Christian leader Pierre Gemayel and his
bodyguards were attacked in East Beirut; four of his entourage were
killed. Gemayel's supporters retaliated, killing 22 PLO members.
Sporadic violence grew into a civil war in which 80,000 people were
killed during the following year and a half. The Christian forces, which
at first fought the P L O and its allies alone, were later joined by units of
the Lebanese Army. The P L O remained the dominant element in the
PLO-leftist alliance throughout the fighting, and gradually expanded
the borders of its 'state', which encroached upon the Christian
heartland. The plight of the Christians became desperate, and the
danger of their complete subjugation became increasingly imminent.
Syria had been backing the P L O , but subsequently realised that its own
interests would be endangered if the P L O were to dominate Lebanon.
This led to the entry of Syrian troops into Lebanon in June 1976, and to
bloody clashes between them and the P L O . By this invasion Syria was
PLO guerrillas go over an obstacle course in a Lebanese training

camp; the left-hand man carries the launcher of the RPG-7, the
ubiquitous Soviet-made rocket-propelled grenade which is widely
used as 'shoulder artillery' by all sides in the Middle East wars.
His instructor, right background, wears a local copy of Egyptian
paratrooper's uniform; the shots from his Kalashnikov assault
rifle, and the smoke of burning tyres, are supposed to add realism
to the training. Undisciplined use of live ammunition causes very
frequent casualties in these training camps.
10
advancing a long-standing ambition of extending its hegemony over

Lebanon, which it has always considered (with some historical
justification) to be a part of 'Greater Syria'.
When the fighting ended - temporarily - in the autumn of 1976,
Lebanon had ceased to exist as a unified national entity. The P L O had
gained control over most of southern Lebanon, and even larger areas
were dominated by the Syrians. Conditions in Lebanon were described
by the Lebanese Ambassador to the United Nations, Edouard Ghorra,
when he protested to the UN General Assembly on 14 October 1976
that the Palestinians had:
. . . transformed most - if not all - of the refugee camps into military bastions
around our major cities. . . . Moreover, common-law criminals fleeing from
Lebanese justice found shelter and protection in the camps. . . . Palestinian
elements belonging to various splinter organisations resorted to kidnapping
Lebanese, and sometimes foreigners; holding them prisoners, questioning
them, and even sometimes killing them.. . . They committed all sorts of crimes
in Lebanon, and also escaped Lebanese justice in the protection of the camps.
They smuggled goods into Lebanon, and openly sold them on our streets.
They went so far as to demand protection money from many individuals and
owners of buildings and factories situated in the vicinity of their camps.
Fighting never really ceased. Rival Arab and Muslim groups used
devastated Lebanon as the arena for their private wars. Iraqi- and
Syrian-backed militias traded bombings, assassinations and street
attacks in Tripoli, Beirut and southern Lebanon. In 1980, during the
months preceding the Iran-Iraq war, about 200 people were killed in
street fighting between those two countries' proxy groups in Lebanon.
Frightened members of all the religious groups armed themselves, and
hundreds of thousands fled their homes. The main beneficiaries of the
resulting chaos were Syria and the P L O .
Official Lebanese statistics published in An-Nahar (4 January 1982)
show 1,498 killed in 1981. On 2 June 1982 the same newspaper reported
that 155 people had been killed during May 1982 alone. Given the
Lebanese government's lack of access to most parts of the country, it is
reasonable to suppose that the real figures were even higher.
Syria began its occupation in Lebanon by fighting the P L O , but
relations between the two improved as the Egyptian-Israeli peace
process progressed from 1978 onwards. The 'threat' of peace, which
would deprive the P L O of its raison d'etre, brought the P L O and the
12
THE ROOTS OF WAR
Syrians together in a rejectionist alliance. From that time, Syria

abandoned its efforts to reduce P L O control over Lebanon and helped
that organisation to entrench itself even further. When Syria withdrew
in January 1980 from the coastal strip between Beirut and Sidon, it
transferred control to the P L O rather than to the Lebanese Army. It
supplied the P L O with dozens of tanks and, in April 1982, entered into
a co-operation agreement with the Fatah, that faction of the P L O
directly controlled by Yasser Arafat.
The de facto P L O state extended from West Beirut in the north to the
Tyre bulge in the south, and from the Mediterranean Sea in the west to
the Syrian border in the east. Within this area the P L O operated as a
sovereign power, disregarding the Lebanese authorities and rejecting
Lebanese jurisdiction. Its independent control was demonstrated in
many ways.
The PLO maintained in Lebanon a well-organised force of 15,000
men, heavily armed with a variety of weapons - including tanks and
Girl members of the PLO receive instruction, on the beach at

Beirut, in the use of the RPD; this is the standard Soviet bloc
squad light machine gun, with an optimum effective range of
350—400 yards, and very popular among the PLO. For this
particular session, the students' families and friends were invited
to a demonstration of the progress they were making.
artillery - which it received mainly from the Soviet Union, Syria and
Libya. Its chief source of financial support was Saudi Arabia.
Within its area of occupation the P L O replaced the existing legal
system with its own network of courts. On 28 June 1980 Reuters
reported that a 'convicted' man had been publicly executed in southern
Lebanon 'as a warning and an example' for 'inflicting harm on the
masses'.
The P L O turned United Nations refugee operations in Lebanon into
bases for terrorist activity. It operated a radio station in West Beirut
which reported on its activities, and regularly broadcast coded messages
to its members in the field. The P L O also established in West Beirut -
which served as the 'capital' of the de facto state - numerous
headquarters where it produced its publications, held meetings and
issued official directives and statements.
The old Russian nickname 'Katyusha' is now used generically for

several different versions of these devastating high-explosive, long-
range salvo rockets. This particular batch, found at Nabatiye, are
North Korean-made 122 mm rockets of the type fired from the
'long Katyusha' launcher. (IDF)
THE ROOTS OF WAR
The PLO invited individuals and groups into Lebanon without

clearance from the Lebanese government. In April 1980, for example, a
delegation of 40 parliamentarians from Brazil was invited by the PLO
in contravention of government directives. Similarly, in January 1980,
the PLO helped Ayatollah Muhammad Montezari and a group of
Iranian volunteers to circumvent the barriers set up by the Lebanese
authorities to prevent their entry into the country, despite widespread
public opposition to their visit. The PLO also turned its domain in
southern Lebanon into a centre of international terror, training
members of subversive groups from all over the world.
In inter-Arab forums, the PLO conducted itself as if it were the
legitimate ruler of southern Lebanon. On 6 September Radio Beirut
reported that the Lebanese government had submitted a protest to the
Arab League against a PLO initiative to convene a meeting of the Arab
Defence Council to discuss the situation in southern Lebanon.
With Syrian assistance, the PLO controlled most news reports from
Beirut, the communications centre for international media coverage of
the Arab world. A favourable portrayal of the PLO image abroad by
resident and visiting correspondents was achieved by providing tours to
newsworthy sites guided by PLO spokesmen, and PLO 'protection'
from intimidation and assassination. For example, early in 1981 five
American newsmen - two New York Times staff journalists, one from
The Washington Post, another from Newsweek and an AP photographer
- were abducted and held by gunmen belonging to the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (a component of the
PLO). They were released after threats to their lives, and only on
condition that their employers did not report their kidnappings - which
for six months they did not. In July 1981, a London Observer
correspondent (as reported in the London Daily Telegraph, 15 July
1981), a journalist from the Lebanese newspaper A'Liwa'a (AP, 30 July
1981), and Sean Toolan - an ABC-TV staff correspondent who had
helped prepare a special broadcast on PLO terrorism - were murdered
in Beirut. These killings followed the earlier assassinations of Salim A-
Luzi, of the London-based Lebanese newspaper Al-Hawadeth, and
Riyadh Taha, chairman of the Lebanese Journalists' Association.
By isolating the Christian community and distorting its image and
goals, the PLO overcame Christian threats to its status in Lebanon.
15
Damage caused to
children's quarters
during a terrorist
attack in April
1980 on kibbutz
Misgav Am in
northern Israel.
Despite the cease-
fire negotiated
with the PLO over
the Lebanese
border by Philip
Habib in late July
1981, the next ten
months saw 290
separate attacks on
Israel, Israelis
abroad, the West
Bank, and Maj.
Haddad's enclaves.
Given that these
caused 29 deaths
and 271 injuries,
mostly to helpless
civilians, Israeli
public opinion
increasingly
demanded a
military response.
The Christians were branded as isolationists, traitors, rightists, fascists,

anti-Arab and Israeli collaborators.
The PLO for years suppressed opposition from the Lebanese
Muslim population by bribery, blackmail, threats and violence. Among
the Sunni Muslims opposition was frequently expressed through
strikes and calls for a return of Lebanese authority. Armed Sunni
groups clashed with pro-Syrian leftist groups in Tripoli, resulting in
scores of dead and wounded.
The Shi'a community - the largest Muslim group in Lebanon, which
had suffered the most under the PLO occupation - moved earlier than
the Sunnis from passive to active resistance. They strengthened their
Amal military organisation, and clashes with the PLO became a daily
occurrence. The shift to active resistance among the Shi'as was
prompted by the Khomeini take-over in Iran, which gave them greater
16
THE ROOTS OF WAR
pride and self-confidence. Attempts to enlist the active support of Iran

against the PLO failed, however, because of Iran's wish to preserve its
close ties with the PLO, one of its few allies in the Arab world.
During the 1970s about 300,000 Shi'as were forced by PLO action to
fee their homes and jobs in southern Lebanon. They crowded into the
Muslim areas of Beirut, where they were once more subjected to
harassment and intimidation by gunmen operating from PLO
strongholds in the capital. Shi'a leaders pleaded with the PLO not to
use their towns and villages for attacks against Israel, with whom they
had no quarrel.
In the autumn of 1981, fighting between the two groups intensified
right across southern Lebanon. Shi'a disillusionment was profound,
and Kamal As'ad, Shi'a Speaker of the Lebanese parliament, told
Lebanese Television on 16 February 1982 that there was no longer any
justification for continued adherence to the 1969 Cairo Agreement; the
PLO's military presence in the south had to be ended.
Strife continued, and on 16 May 1982, according to a 21 May report
by AP correspondent Nicholas Tatro, a single battle in Sidon resulted
in the destruction of 57 shops and the damaging of 30 others, totalling
S20 million in property damage. Late in May 1982 the PLO-Amal
clashes spread to Beirut. In the worst fighting seen in the city for a year,
according to an 18 May report by The New York Times correspondent
John Kifner, 'a night of artillery and rocket barrages left some 50 people
dead'.
Meanwhile, a former Lebanese Army officer, Major Sa'ad Haddad,
had formed a militia which he called Army for Liberation of the South,
later known as the Free Lebanese Army. The purpose of this 'army' - it
had only a few thousand members - was to protect the towns and
villages of southern Lebanon against PLO attacks. It has been
described as a Christian army, but in fact a large number of its soldiers
were Shi'a Muslims. Supported and supplied by Israel, Haddad also
tried to stop PLO terrorist attacks into Israel; but his units, being
widely scattered, were not entirely successful.
In May 1970 nine Israeli children and three of their teachers were
murdered in a school bus near Kibbutz Bar'am. The attacks and
infiltration attempts multiplied in the years that followed, especially
with the lull in the Lebanese internal conflict towards the end of 1976,
which enabled the PLO to turn its full attention back to the Israeli
border. Intensified Israeli border patrols thwarted most of these efforts,

but the small number that succeeded took a heavy toll, including the
Ma'alot attack of May 1974, in which 24 civilians -mostly pupils in the
local school - were killed and 19 wounded, and the coastal road
massacre early in 1978, in which 35 civilians died.
Terrorist attacks grew in intensity, and in March 1978 the
government of Israel mounted Operation 'Litani' - a military
expedition into the south of Lebanon. Its aim was to wipe out the PLO
bases in that area and to restore security and normal life to Israel's
northern district.
Following this operation, the UN Security Council decided on 19
March 1978 to set up the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
(UNIFIL). This force had a three-fold mandate:
1 'Of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Southern
Lebanon.'
2 'Of restoring international peace and security and assisting the
Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective
authority in the area.'
3 'To ensure that its (UNIFIL's) area of operation is not utilised for
hostile activities of any kind.'
Only the first goal was achieved. Israel, which had no territorial designs
on Lebanon, withdrew in June 1978. When Israel handed over to
UNIFIL, the area in southern Lebanon from which its forces had
withdrawn was clear of PLO terrorists. Israel believed that they would
not be permitted to return, and that U N I F I L would prevent hostile
activities against Israel from this borderland.
Reality fell short of expectations. The terrorists soon re-established
themselves in the area, and U N I F I L was powerless to cope with them.
On 3 May 1978, an armed clash occurred between PLO terrorists and
UNIFIL's French contingent near the port city of Tyre. Three
U N I F I L soldiers were killed and ten wounded, including the
commander of the French battalion. After this show of PLO strength
U N I F I L stayed out of the Tyre area, which remained under PLO
control.
PLO terrorists gradually infiltrated the area nominally controlled by
UNIFIL, taking advantage of its reluctance to become involved in
armed clashes. Once established, the terrorists' presence was
18
THE ROOTS OF WAR
sanctioned by retro-active agreement with U N I F I L . More than 700

terrorists were deployed throughout the U N I F I L zone; U N I F I L
soldiers were barred from approaching within 500 metres of some PLO
posts, and even provided escorts for PLO supply convoys arriving in
the zone from the north. PLO bands passed through the U N I F I L zone
to pursue their terror operations against Israel. The most tragic of such
incidents occurred in April 1980, with the attack on the children's home
in Kibbutz Misgav Am, on the Lebanese border; three children,
including a baby, were killed. (The PLO claimed responsibility for this
attack in its own newspaper on 29 April 1980.)
Scores of other attempts were foiled by the I D F or by Major
Haddad's forces. Armed terrorist squads were often intercepted by
U N I F I L guards - about 30 a month, according to UN Secretary-
General Kurt Waldheim - but when this happened they were simply
disarmed, escorted out of the U N I F I L zone and released. Their arms
were later handed over to the PLO 'liaison officer' in Tyre. Between
June and December 1980 alone there were 69 successful infiltrations by
terrorists through the U N I F I L zone.
Apart from the Katyusha, both the Syrian Army and the PLO also
made use, for their bombardment of targets inside Israel and in
the Christian areas of Lebanon, of the Soviet 130 mm gun. With a
crew of around a dozen, this long-barrelled weapon can fire five or
six times a minute, out to ranges of around 27 kilometres.
(Author's photo)
The U N I F I L zone became a sanctuary from pursuit and IDF

reactions. According to members of a terrorist squad captured on 15
December 1980 near the Israeli village of Zar'it on the Lebanese border,
they had been instructed to surrender to U N I F I L personnel at the end
of their mission so as to secure a safe retreat to their base. The PLO
achieved an important victory when it managed to institutionalise its
relations with U N I F I L , thus gaining the status of a legitimate party to
the conflict in southern Lebanon. This enhanced the prestige of the
PLO at the UN, and in those countries whose contingents comprised
the U N I F I L force.
Frustrated by the difficulty of penetrating the Israeli border, the
PLO directed more and more of its activities against the area under
Major Haddad's control. The zone was a threat to the PLO because of
its close ties with Israel and the harmonious relations between the
Christian minority and the Shi'a majority.
Libya, Syria and the Soviet Union were sending heavy arms to the
PLO, including long-range 130 mm guns; BM-21 mobile rocket
launchers, capable of firing rapid salvoes of up to 40 'Katyusha' rockets
at targets 20 km away; SA-7 anti-aircraft missiles, and tanks. As this
build-up continued the Syrians were increasing their pressure on the
Christians further north. On 21 April 1981 they and PLO gunners
began a protracted shelling of Christian East Beirut; 400 people were
killed within a few days. Syrian troops laid siege to the Greek Catholic
city of Zahle in the Bekaa Valley, and moved SA-6 missiles into the area.
On 15 May 1981 the PLO shelled Israeli villages and settlements along
the northern border - 1,230 salvoes at 26 settlements. Considerable
damage was done, six civilians were killed and 59 were wounded.
During the early part of July 1981 Israel fought what was generally
known as the 'Two-Week War' against the PLO. This ended on 24 July
when the US envoy, Philip Habib, arranged a truce along the border,
though Israel still felt itself at risk. Two days later Yasser Arafat
announced in an interview with ABC: 'The PLO has not undertaken to
stop its attacks on the West Bank and in the Gaza strip; it accepted a
ceasefire only across the Lebanese border.'
The Israeli Minister of Defence, Ariel Sharon, visited the United
States that month; and at a dinner in Washington on 22 May he
announced that sooner or later Israel would have no choice but to 'take
decisive military action' against the PLO in Lebanon. 'Nearly all
20
THE ROOTS OF WAR
Palestinian terrorist attacks against Israel begin in Lebanon,' he said,

'and the PLO and its various splinter groups are based there. That is
where the operations are planned, and Israel will have to go to this
source.'
Sharon had already been to 'the source', but he did not disclose this
state secret at the Washington dinner. On 12 January 1982 he had made
a secret visit to Jounieh to sound out Bashir Gemayel, the Phalangist
leader, on the idea of a joint campaign against the PLO. He made it clear
to Gemayel that Israel did not want to provoke the Syrians, and he even
hoped that they might withdraw from Lebanon if the campaign which
he had in mind succeeded in driving out the PLO. Gemayel's part in the
campaign was to liberate Beirut with his 15,000-strong Phalangist
militia, the 'Lebanese Forces' (no connection with the Lebanese Army).
Israel did not want to commit its army to fighting in the Lebanese
capital, but Sharon realised that Israeli troops would probably have to
cut off Beirut and the coastal road from the Syrians, thus taking
pressure off the Phalangists. He did not tell Gemayel this: he simply
said, 'Beirut is your problem.'
The Prime Minister of Israel, Menachem Begin, and his cabinet
faced a dilemma more serious than any which had confronted Israeli
decision-makers since the Yom Kippur War of 1973. The decision
before them was simple enough: to attack the PLO in Lebanon, or not
to do so. But the factors involved in making the decision were complex.
Proof of this is that four times already the Israeli Army had been readied
for invasion, and each time had been pulled back.
In the first place, Israeli military casualties were bound to be heavy:
the PLO units were well armed, in good defensive positions, and
determined to fight. In the small, tightly-knit Israeli family community
war casualties have a traumatic effect on the whole of society. Begin and
Sharon had to balance the certainty of casualties against the possibility
of finishing the PLO as a fighting force.
A major part of the campaign would be fought along the heavily
populated coastal strip of Lebanon and through some large Palestinian
refugee camps, such as Ein el-Hilwe. These contained known PLO
training camps, but many civilians lived there as well. The civilians had
to be given every chance to flee before the fighting started - but every
moment allowed them was another minute for the PLO fighters to
prepare their defences. The timing would have to be exact.
21
Yet another factor was the humanitarian obligation which the Israeli
government felt towards the Lebanese, who were being maltreated by
the occupying P L O . Information from refugees who had sought
sanctuary in Israel showed that torture, rape, kidnapping and brutal
execution, as well as blackmail and extortion, were commonplace. The
vast majority of these people had in no way helped Israel, so the Israeli
government had no direct obligation to come to their aid; but once the
P L O had been driven out the Lebanese would become Israel's
neighbours, and their goodwill was vital. In any case, there was genuine
compassion in Israel for the Lebanese, and several unofficial groups had
been set up to help them. 'Nobody abroad seemed sympathetic towards
the Lebanese,' one of the organisers, the author Aharon Amir, told us
in 1981; 'so it was up to Israelis to do something.'
Then there was the problem of presenting to the world the Israeli
reason for going to war against the P L O . As an army, the P L O was no
threat to Israel because it was neither strong enough for open invasion
nor organised for such an attack. Its units were trained for guerrilla
actions, with the supplementary role of being ready to support any Arab
national army which might attack Israel. Would the world, and
particularly the USA, understand that the P L O posed a serious enough
threat to warrant a war against it?
The Syrians, also, were not likely to invade Israel; they had no need to
do so, since in the Bekaa Valley they had missiles capable of hitting
Israeli targets. If the Syrians came to the aid of the P L O then Israel
would be forced to fight them. Would the world then see the Israelis as
the aggressors?
For the Israeli cabinet P L O provocation was intolerable. The P L O
had interpreted the ceasefire agreement of 1981 as giving it a free hand
to continue the armed struggle in all sectors, even across the
Lebanese-Israeli border - though to a lesser extent than before. The
Israeli Intelligence had long suspected that the PLO were using
Beirut's sports stadium as a base and an arms storage area. In the
aftermath of the Argov shooting the Israeli Defence Force/Air
Force raided the stadium with some precision. The western range
of stands were more or less destroyed; the Hebrew word linked to
the ringed areas is 'hits'. Note, by comparison, that the civilian
buildings around the stadium have not been damaged. The Israelis
have sophisticated photo interpretation techniques, which can even
pinpoint the position of underground tunnels. (IDF)
22
significant factor was that the P L O was building up its military strength
and perpetrating acts of terror without Israel being able to take pre-
emptive action.
The people of the coastal resort town of Nahariya were always aware
of the dangers. We once asked a local schoolboy the distance from the
border. 'Forty-five seconds' missile time,' he said - or as the crow flies,
five miles. Even infants in the kindergartens became adept in
recognising different detonations. 'Katyusha,' we heard a five-year-old
say upon hearing an explosion. 'No, it's just a plane breaking the sound
barrier,' another child said. After an attack the drawings made by
children in these schools were usually of victims and ruined buildings.
Generally, increased P L O activity was quickly detected and sirens
warned the public to go to the shelters.
On 4 June 1982 the cabinet studied terrorist statistics for the period
since 24 July 1981. The P L O had made 290 attacks, attempted attacks,
and firings along Israel's borders, within Israel proper, within the
occupied West Bank, abroad, and against the population of Major
Haddad's enclaves in Lebanon. Attacks had been made against Israeli
and Jewish targets in Rome, Vienna, Paris, London, Athens, Antwerp,
West Berlin, Istanbul and Limassol:
In the West Bank and Gaza no incidents
In the Lebanese sector 99 incidents
In Israel 57 incidents
In the Jericho-Dead Sea sector 4 incidents
Abroad 20 incidents
In the course of these acts, 29 people died: four I D F soldiers; one
border patrolman; one Israeli citizen; 11 residents of the West Bank and
Gaza; two Jews residing abroad; four non-Jews abroad; three tourists;
and three of Major Haddad's men. Another 271 had been injured: 16
The tragedy of Lebanon's internal hatreds could hardly be more

eloquently illustrated than by this five-year-old boy photographed
in Marjayoun during the civil war. His plaything is not unusual in
the world in which he is being raised: a heavy, large-calibre
military automatic pistol, powerful enough literally to blow his
little playmate's head off. One clip is in position in the butt; and -
chillingly - another fully loaded clip is carried ready in his chubby
right hand. (Hirsh Goodman)
24
IDF soldiers; 25 Israeli citizens; 25 tourists in Israel; 37 residents of the

West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem; seven Jews residing
abroad; 154 non-Jews abroad.
Despite their nagging doubts about the wisdom of going to war, the
Israeli planners were clear on some points. They were not invading
Lebanon as a sovereign state. It had ceased to exist as a state, in all but
the formal sense, when it was de facto partitioned by the Syrians and the
PLO, and it was now a country under occupation. There was also the
consolation of knowing that the Lebanese Christians would welcome
the Israeli attack against the PLO, as would many of the Shi'a
population of the south. The Israelis were counting on the Phalange
militia as active allies during the fighting.
Throughout the discussions one theme recurred: 'How much longer
must we endure terrorist attacks? We have suffered from them since
1948 and their frequency and severity has increased year by year.
Another massacre of Israeli civilians and foreign visitors is virtually
inevitable.'
Public feeling over PLO terrorism was running high in 1982,
especially in Galilee, the region most vulnerable to cross-border rockets
and shells. As we found on several visits, the people here were most
tense during the quiet periods; quiet was abnormal, and led to a
suspicion that attacks against them were being prepared.
Tension increased dramatically in June 1982. On 3 June terrorists in
London tried to murder the Israeli ambassador, Shlomo Argov. He was
critically wounded and disabled for life. The following day Israeli
planes, in a swift precision attack, destroyed the PLO training camp at
Bourg el-Barajna, and in the Beirut sports stadium they bombed and
blew up large quantities of ammunition stored underground1.
Yasser Arafat himself indicated that an Israeli invasion was likely, but
on 4 June he ordered a two-day artillery barrage against Israeli
settlements. He did not consider that he was running any greater risk by
doing this because he believed that the USA, in response to Saudi
pressure, would prevent Israel from attacking. If the Israelis did attack,
then Arafat believed that their campaign would be limited - 'restrained'
was the word he used - in the way that the 1978 Operation 'Litani' had
'Ironically, Argov's attackers were not members of the PLO proper, but of Abu Nidal's
'Rejectionist Front', a group which regarded Arafat's supporters as treacherously 'soft-line'.
26
THE ROOTS OF WAR
been. All the PLO leaders clung to the fundamental belief that any
major Middle East war would in the end bring about the PLO's main
political objectives, even if Israel achieved military gains.
The Syrian government also believed that no Israeli invasion would
get far before the USA intervened to stop it. They based this belief on
signals which the Israeli government had sent them, through the
Americans, to the effect that any attack which might be made was not
aimed at Syria. The Syrians construed this to mean that the Israeli
government was really asking the Americans to check the invasion. This
assessment was erroneous.
On 5 June Israeli gunners fired return salvoes against PLO positions,
and by noon a fierce artillery duel was in progress. Israeli aircraft
methodically attacked PLO gun positions, ammunition dumps and
supply routes. Gunfire increased steadily throughout the night of 5/6
June. The scene was set for war - an Israeli invasion of Lebanon against
PLO occupation.
27
2 The Combatants and
the Arena
The PLO
IN mid-1982 the PLO was in a transitional state. It had lost the
flexibility which is properly part of a guerrilla-terrorist organisation;
but it had not yet developed conventional military formations, though
its training had improved and Fatah, the main component of the PLO,
had units organised in battalions and brigades.
By building up a regular army the PLO planned to acquire three extra
capabilities. First, within two years it would have a defensive strength
that would make it much more difficult for Israel to destroy the PLO
militarily in Lebanon. The strategy was for the PLO to slow down an
Israeli attack, thus enabling other Arab forces to come to its aid, and
allowing international pressures to build up against Israel. Second,
regular forces would make the PLO stronger in relation to the armed
Christian militias. Third, the PLO could play a real auxiliary role
against Israel when Syria went on the offensive - as it planned to do
within two years.
A stream of Intelligence reports reaching Israel Defence Forces
Headquarters in Tel Aviv showed that the PLO was strengthening its
bases to a startling extent. Large bunkers and tunnels had been dug and
provided with massive concrete and steel protection that made them
impervious to air attack. Ammunition was stockpiled with such
strategic skill that the Israeli General Staff believed that Soviet
specialists were directing the PLO. Artillery batteries were sited close
to civilian centres - a tactic to deter the Israelis from firing on them -
and command posts with excellent radio and telephone com-
munications were established in Tyre, Sidon, Nabatiye, in Beaufort
Castle on the mountains overlooking the Litani River, and in the
refugee camps of Ein el-Hilwe and Rachidiye.
The PLO had about 15,000 men under arms; this force included
1,500 men in the Tyre region, 700 in the coastal district between the
Litani and Zaharani Rivers, 1,500 in the Sidon sector, 1,500 in
28
THE COMBATANTS AND THE ARENA
Yasser Arafat
presides over a
press conference in
1982. During the
Lebanon war he
increasingly
affected military
fatigues rather than
the checkered
shemagh which had
become his
'trademark' in the
earlier years of
PLO activity. This
perhaps paralleled
the assembly of
PLO guerrillas into
conventional
'brigades'.
'Fatahland' in south-east Lebanon, 1,000 in the Nabatiye region, 500 in

the Achiye-Rihane district and 700 in the U N I F I L zone. These latter
were deployed in 25 to 30 strongpoints which were a constant worry to
U N I F I L commanders. The PLO troops in southern Lebanon were
organised as the Kastel Brigade; those in 'Fatahland' as the Karameh
Brigade; and those in the coastal area as the Yarmouk Brigade.
In addition, about 6,000 PLO men were in the Beirut-Damour area,
and reinforcements could be brought from the PLO training camps in
the north. PLO 'naval bases' were dotted along the coast from Tripoli
29
in the north to Tyre in the south; these were training centres, storage
depots and entry ports for military supplies.
The PLO were no longer just a crowd of guerrillas armed with sub-
machine guns and grenades. They could field a considerable armoury of
heavy weapons, including about 60 old T-34 85 and about 20 more
modern T-54 or T-55 tanks (mostly 'dug in' as static gun positions,
where they represented more of a threat than if they had tried to meet
Israel's highly trained tank crews in mobile combat). The PLO's
formidable artillery included some 90 heavy guns of 130 mm and 155
mm calibre, and 80 'Katyusha' BM-21 multiple 122 mm rocket
launchers, as well as some 200 heavy mortars of 120 mm and 160 mm.
They had about 150 anti-tank guns of 57 mm and 85 mm, and perhaps
200 anti-tank missile launchers - mostly 'Sagger', but including some
'Milan'. Anti-aircraft firepower included some examples of the
dangerous four-barrelled, radar-guided ZSU-4 mounted on vehicles;
and larger numbers of towed or vehicle-mounted 37 mm cannon. They
were liberally equipped with SA-7 'Strela' one-man shoulder-fired
anti-aircraft missile launchers; and had many hundreds of heavy
machine guns.
Small arms were in lavish supply, including the latest types from both
Western and Soviet bloc countries. Apart from the standard rifles,
assault rifles, sub-machine guns and squad machine guns, they had
many thousands of rocket-propelled grenade launchers, mainly the
ubiquitous RPG-7.
In June 1982 all Palestinian military and para-military forces except
the Abu Nidal faction were nominally subordinate to the Executive
Committee of the PLO; the chairman of this committee was Yasser
Arafat, who also headed Fatah, the largest constituent organisation.
The PLO attempted to co-ordinate the activities of its member factions,
but it lacked full operational control; the military forces of the different
organisations were responsible, in practice, only to their own
leadership.
Sometimes leaders of the various groups had fierce arguments over
which of them had the 'rights' to a certain mountain pass, old crusader
castle or natural ambush point. Not infrequently as many as three
groups, each owing allegiance to a different chief, would take up
positions at the same place, and often they obstructed one another's field
of fire.
30
Palestinian forces fell naturally into four categories:

The regular Palestine Liberation Army (PLA).
Quasi-regular units of the various organisations.
Militias which occasionally supplemented the quasi-regular units.
Terror squads.
Russian and Syrian advisers told Arafat that an Israeli attack was
imminent, and stressed the need to inflict heavy casualties upon the
Israelis. President Assad sent a senior officer to Beirut to advise Arafat
that holding military positions was very much a minor priority; if their
forces suffered heavy casualties, Arafat was told, the Israeli public
would stop the war. It is doubtful if Arafat needed this lesson from
Assad, but he duly passed it on to his principal subordinates at a meeting
in Beirut on the night of 5 June.
Almost all of them saw the wisdom of this strategy, and several ideas
were put forward. George Habash, leader of the Popular Front for the
A PLO team photographed before setting off on a terrorist raid

into Israel, and a sketch map showing their objective and route.
They killed several Israelis before dying in a shoot-out with IDF
soldiers. The Arabic caption reads: 'Map showing position of
Misgav-Am' - a settlement near Metulla. The photo is captioned:
'From the Martyr Kamal Kaush Group' and it was taken in 1980.
31
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) said that 'in no circumstances' should

PLO units attempt to hold a position. When Israeli fire became direct
the men should creep away and take up another position, to cause
further casualties by sniper fire and ambush.
In conversation with the author a person who was present at this
meeting recalled that Issam Qadi, leader of the Syrian-supported Saiqa
group, suggested greater use of the Ashbal - the young Palestinian boys
who had been given commando training. Arafat retorted that he needed
no advice on how to use the 'Lion Cubs'. This was true; they had been
taught how to use rocket-propelled grenades against tanks and
armoured personnel carriers, and much was expected from them. The
thinking was that the Israelis would be reluctant to fire on children, even
when they were aiming weapons.
The PLO small-unit leaders knew their battle areas thoroughly and
had practised ambushes many times; for them the eve-of-battle
instruction to cause casualties was superfluous.
The Syrians sent Arafat another late instruction: he should use small,
mobile units to prevent the Christian Lebanese from linking with the
Israelis. Again, open confrontation was to be avoided; Maronite
militiamen probing forward through PLO positions in an attempt to
make contact with the advancing Israelis should be shot from the rear.
This would demoralise them, the Syrians advised - hardly a profound
military insight.
Belatedly, Russian advisers in Syria urged the Syrian Chief-of-Staff,
General Hikmat Shihabi, to instruct the PLO to adopt 'the living
shield principle'. Shihabi took no action on this signal because he knew
that the PLO leaders had been practising this principle for many years.
It amounted to nothing more than firing from behind civilians, whether
Palestinian or Lebanese. Anti-aircraft guns had long since been
established on the upper floors of apartment blocks, and anti-tank guns
on the ground floors. Arms, ammunition and petrol dumps were sited in
refugee camps, hospitals and schools.
The Syrian and PLO planners both shared the conviction that if
Israel could be prevented from winning a quick victory then it would
not win at all. The Arab nations would be drawn into the conflict, with
arms and money as well as diplomatic and economic pressure, and the
superpowers would impose a peace which would be psychologically
favourable to the PLO. 'Stop the Israelis from winning in six days,'
32
President Assad is said to have told Arafat in a telephone call on the

morning of 6 June, 'and your prestige will be very high.' Arafat was
delighted with the challenge, observers said later. In six days in June
1967 the Israelis had broken the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian forces;
for the PLO to hold out longer would indeed be a victory.
The PLO had been fighting a terrorist war against Israel for many
years; but this would be its first more or less conventional war, and the
organisation's leaders needed to show their financial backers - notably
the Saudis, Libyans, Algerians and Kuwaitis - that they were worthy of
their investment.
The Syrians
The commander-in-chief of the Syrian Armed Forces was President
Assad, and unlike many a uniformed president he was no mere nominal
chief. A former Air Force general, Assad had considerable military
knowledge; but quite apart from this, his regime viewed the armed
forces as its greatest strength - and its greatest potential threat. He
ensured the forces' loyalty by placing officers from his own sect, the
Alawites, in key positions. In addition to Army, Air Force and
government Intelligence bodies, a Ba'athist party-controlled security
system kept all ranks under surveillance. A combat-ready armoured
division commanded by the president's brother, Rifaat, was per-
manently stationed near Damascus to protect the regime against a
possible coup.
Assad's deputy was the Minister of Defence, Mustafa Tlas, who had
three deputy ministers - one for each of the services. The Chief-of-
Staff, General Hikmat Shihabi, was responsible for co-ordinating the
various branches and directorates of the General Staff, but he was
subordinate to Assad. Also reporting direct to the president as
commander-in-chief were the commanders of the Navy and Air Force.
Even senior administrative and personnel officers reported not to the
Chief-of-Staff but directly to Assad.
The Syrian Army had no formation above divisional level - this is, no
corps or army groups. There were six divisions: four armoured and two
mechanised. (The difference is mainly one of emphasis: both types of
formation have tanks, armoured infantry carriers, artillery, etc.
Armoured divisions have tank units as their main 'punch', with the best
types of tank, while mechanised divisions are mainly composed of
33
armoured infantry with a smaller allocation of sometimes older tanks

acting in support.) Specialist back-up units of anti-tank troops,
commandos and so forth were allocated by the General Staff to
individual divisions as required. The General Staff also directly
controlled the ground-to-ground missile 'brigades'.
In materiel, the Syrian forces had improved tremendously since the
Yom Kippur War of 1973.
The armoured divisions had an available total of about 2,650 tanks,
compared with about 1,260 in 1973; they were now the dominant factor
in the ground forces rather than a support echelon for the infantry. The
T-72 had replaced the T-62 as the spearhead main battle tank, giving
better firepower and mobility, although only about 250 of the new tank
were available. Some 900 T-62S remained in service, providing the bulk
of the tank strength of the armoured and mechanised units. Some 1,500
Soldiers of the Palestine Liberation Army under instruction in the

use of the mortar. The PLA had two brigades and some smaller
units in Syria and Syrian-occupied Lebanon. These are regular
troops, for all practical purposes part of the Syrian Army, and are
not available to the PLO for operations independent of Syria.
of the more elderly T-54 and T-55 series were in reserve, together with
between 200 and 300 of the ancient T-34/85 and PT-76 (though the
latter designs were not to be taken seriously on a modern battlefield).
Thousands of tank-ramps and dug-in positions had been prepared in
advance, in deep lines of defence. The tank ammunition stocks built up
by the Syrians in 1982 contained a high proportion of armour-piercing
anti-tank shells at the expense of general purpose high explosive
rounds. The armoured units were now supported by self-propelled, as
opposed to towed or truck-mounted artillery, giving better mobility and
the potential for more effective close support for the tanks.
The Syrian infantry within these divisions had been equipped with
the BMP-1 fully tracked armoured personnel carrier - or more
properly, 'mechanised infantry combat vehicle', since it was designed to
allow the infantry squad it carries to fight on the move. It mounts its
own 73 mm gun, as well as a 'Sagger' anti-tank missile launcher.
Indeed, this provision of anti-tank weapons down to infantry squad
level was among the most significant of the improvements enjoyed by
the Syrians; the 'Saggers' mounted on their armoured carriers were
backed up by Milan, HOT and 'Swatter' missile systems. In all, the
Syrians could field about 1,600 armoured personnel carriers1.
Syrian artillery had become more mobile and flexible, with an
improvement in the standard of gunnery largely due to the acquisition
of Western fire control computers. The mechanised divisions had larger
allocations of the BM-21 multiple rocket launcher. The number of
commando units had grown sevenfold since 1973, and the 34 battalions
now in service could call upon 100 Mi-8 troop-carrying helicopters.
The Air Force had enjoyed a general up-grading and modernisation
of its equipment. Of about 650 combat aircraft, some 130 were
advanced MiG-23 and Sukhoi Su-22 fighter-bombers; and another
300, the older but still serviceable MiG-21s and Sukhoi Su-7s. The
number of assault helicopters had doubled in the past two years, with
emphasis on attack and anti-tank types such as the French Gazelle and
Soviet Mi-24 'Hind'. Scores of these anti-tank helicopters were in
service, and they posed a serious threat to Israeli armour; this is a
branch of military technology to which all the major powers are
1
According to Soviet sources, the Syrians lost confidence in the BMP-1 after the 1982 war revealed
its indifferent protective capability.
35
currently paying close attention1. There had been a large increase in the
number of anti-aircraft missile batteries, from 34 to more than 100,
including some 30 batteries of the formidable SA-6 with its tracked,
self-propelled triple launcher.
The Navy had tripled its fleet, and had improved its maintenance by
the acquisition of a Polish-made floating dock. Coastal defence had
been improved by the addition of gun batteries and modern radar
installations.
Since 1976 Syrian forces equivalent to a division had been based in
Lebanon; but in the weeks immediately before 6 June 1982, infantry
and armoured brigades, commando units, artillery regiments and SAM
batteries were all pushed into the Bekaa Valley. The total Syrian
strength inside Lebanon at the outbreak of war was about 30,000 men
and 712 tanks, divided between two main areas of deployment. The
major formation in the Bekaa Valley was the 1st Armoured Division,
comprising the 91st and 76th Tank Brigades (with 160 tanks each), and
the 58th Mechanised Brigade (40 tanks). Also in this area was the 62nd
Independent Brigade, which included 32 tanks in its order of battle.
Around Beirut, in the Shouf Mountains and along the Beirut to
Damascus highway were the 68th Tank Brigade (160 tanks); the 85th
(Mechanised or Infantry - sources differ) Brigade with 32 tanks; and
one other unidentified brigade, basically infantry, with 32 tanks. The
forces in the Bekaa included ten commando battalions; those along the
Beirut-Damascus axis, 20 commando battalions. The pattern of
permanent deployment of formations within Syria enabled the Syrian
command to use all its offensive or defensive strength against Israel
within two days at most.
1
In 1982 Syria had 45 French-built Gazelle helicopters, mainly fitted for the anti-tank role with up
to six HOT guided weapons, two pods of 36 mm rockets and two machine guns. They saw action
for the first time in Lebanon, and destroyed a number of Israeli tanks; but the French believe that
they would have been more effective if the Syrian pilots had flown lower. It seems that the officers
of the commando units, in conjunction with which they operated, did not always understand the
tactical use of such helicopters. Several were shot down, and others captured on the ground.
Israel also used anti-tank helicopters in 1982, notably the Hughes Defender, fitted with TOW
guided weapons. The Defender's quiet engine allowed highly trained Israeli pilots to make
'stealth' attacks on unsuspecting Syrian armour dispersed in rocky terrain; many enemy tanks were
destroyed in this way. Infantry units co-operated closely with the helicopters; on one occasion a
helicopter captured a Syrian tank and its crew without firing a shot, then summoned an army team
to collect them.
In the event, Syrian commanders seem to have been reluctant to commit the formidable 'Hind'
to combat, and it appeared only intermittently.
36
Syrian doctrine was based upon Russian principles without following

them dogmatically. Defence was based on massive firepower, with a
profusion of anti-tank units and weapons, and intensive fortification in
great depth. Continuous defence systems made use of natural obstacles,
and reached back from the front for up to 30 or 40 kilometres. In the
attack, Syria proposed to use a multi-echelon assault force commanding
great firepower, and combined arms operations. Whether in attack or
defence, the Syrians believed that the answer to Israeli tactics was
saturation air defence of the combat zone by SAMs, anti-aircraft
artillery and interceptor aircraft.
The Syrians did not intend to heed Israel's warning that they should
stay out of the impending conflict; and they were confident that they
could destroy many Israeli aircraft and tanks.
The Israelis
Against the combined force of the PLO, strong in its training, weapons
and positions, and the Syrians, with their massive and advanced
weaponry, Israel fielded a basically militia-type army, though the Air
Force and Navy were almost entirely manned by regular full-time
personnel.
Under the Israeli system the Chief-of-Staff is subordinate to the
Defence Minister; but the minister's authority is not an operational or
command authority, even in wartime. The Chief-of-Staff is the senior
military officer, and air and naval chiefs report to him. There is no
separate ground forces command, and the General Staff functions as
headquarters for the Army, as well as for the general service corps such
as pioneer and medical troops. The General Staff has five branches - the
general staff branch itself, manpower, quartermaster, Intelligence, and
planning - the training department has only slightly less status than a
branch.
Once partial or full mobilisation is declared the IDF is capable of
deploying the bulk of its combat forces on the battlefield within 48
hours; some reserve units can join the battle in 16 hours. The basic unit
in the Israeli system is the ugda (division), an independent mixed-arms
formation designed to achieve tactical battlefield objectives. The
division has its own fire support, engineering and maintenance units,
and if these are at any time inadequate, reinforcing units are released by
regional commands.
37
Israel's combat doctrine has been tested through many wars, and in
June 1982 it was based on these principles:
1 Multiple roles for all units and formations in all forms of combat.
2 Flexibility and adaptability through rapid grouping and regrouping of
units at all levels.
3 High mobility and willingness to cross the most difficult terrain.
4 Rapid concentration of force in key sectors.
5 Readiness to take risks by simply 'holding' secondary sectors.
6 Instant shift from defence to offence to decide a battle.
7 Attacking the enemy in the rear as a major priority at an early stage of any
action.
8 Deep penetration into enemy defences even at the risk of bypassing some
forward strongholds.
9 Use of airpower to decide the land battle.
10 In built-up areas armour must first surround, isolate, fire upon and besiege
the enemy before the breakthrough.
For the campaign against the P L O points 3, 4, 6, 7, 9 and 10 were
expected to be the most important.
The Chief-of-Staff has great authority and influence in the Israeli
system and a forceful officer can make the Army 'his own'. Apart from
Moshe Dayan, 'Raful' Eitan was Israel's longest-serving Chief-of-
Staff, and he had made his mark on the Army by 1982. His first
initiatives had led to some amusement in the ranks - for instance, he had
ordered soldiers to wear berets and hats at all times in public. Women
soldiers were told to cut their hair and not to wear lipstick. Eitan
expected his orders to be obeyed: in one period of 24 hours in 1979 no
fewer than 509 soldiers were arrested and charged with being
improperly dressed. Eitan himself made headlines. Spotting a recruit
without a hat in the street, he yelled at him to put it on, and when the
startled soldier ran away Eitan chased him and slammed the hat on to his
head.
Eitan was decisive, in the Montgomery tradition. After a training
accident at Sharm el-Sheikh he sacked the commander of the Army's
elite frogman unit - though the officer himself was on leave at the time.
By such determined methods Eitan reduced training accidents by 40 per
cent. He took away from colonels and more senior ranks a private beach
which they had enjoyed for a long time, and handed it back to the public.
Eitan's fundamental demand was for discipline: though not, he
stressed, at the expense of loss of initiative. He wanted an efficient,
38
President Assad of Syria (second from left) is briefed by one of his
officers in a reserve trench. The bemedalled general next to him is
the Defence Minister, Mustafa Tlas; next to Tlas is Rifaat Assad,
the president's brother, who commanded Syria's 1st Armoured
Division at that time.
physically tough army. He maintained that any kind of waste was soft
and inefficient, so commanders were required to account for every cent.
Regarded by some people as anti-intellectual or boorish, Eitan was
certainly a man of great personal courage, and the men respected him.
When a particular brigade lost its morale during the battle for Beirut (to
the extent that, according to some Israeli defence correspondents, it was
on the verge of Israel's first mutiny) Eitan turned up in person, climbed
on to a tank and talked calmly to the men. His basic message was that
they had the personal right to political dissent, but not in the Army. A
group of men arguing about the acceptability of their orders were no
longer soldiers, but a collection of individuals without trust in one
another. The unit buckled down to the job in hand - the taking of West
Beirut - even though they disapproved of it.
39
Under Eitan the IDF had learned lessons from the 1973 war, and in
Lebanon it produced some surprises - including 'reactive' armour for
its Centurion and M60 tanks1, a new round for the 105 mm tank gun,
and the combat debut of the Merkava tank. Tank crews were equipped
with fire-retardant coveralls which all but eliminated burns of the kind
that posed the most serious threat to their lives in 1967 and 1973.
The Lebanese Christians

The Syrians and the PLO had each other for allies, but Israel had no real
war ally. The Lebanese Army had virtually ceased to exist after the civil
war of 1975-76; but the Israelis were counting on some help from the
'Lebanese Front' - also known as 'Lebanese Forces' - which was based
mainly on the Maronite Christian sect and the Kataeb (or Phalange) led
by the Gemayel family. The National Liberal Party's fighters (the
'Tigers'), those of the 'Guardians of the Cedars' and of other groups
were linked with the Kataeb. Maronite fighting men numbered about
8,000 and those fielded by other groups about 7,000.
The Front had its own artillery, including some French 155 mm
guns, but mainly relied upon heavy mortars. It also possessed about 60
elderly T-54 and ancient Sherman tanks, and a few APCs, either seized
from the Lebanese Army or supplied by Israel. Nevertheless, it relied
mainly on small arms, from the 5.56 mm M16 A1 rifle to the 12.5 mm
(0.5 in.) Browning M2 heavy machine gun. These weapons always
looked well cared for in Lebanese hands.
The Israeli Defence Minister might have urged Bashir Gemayel to
induce his men to fight in their own defence, but IDF officers who knew
them well were sceptical about their willingness and ability. (Several
had told the author over a period of years that the Christians expected
the Israelis 'to take all the risks and make all the sacrifices'.)
In fact, the Lebanese Front had sufficient will and strength to protect
the Christian enclaves, but they had proved incapable of bringing about
a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon or of winning an all-out fight against
the PLO. They were as desperate about internal PLO terrorism as
Israel was about cross-border raids, and in this mood they were
prepared to promise the Israelis anything.
1
The 'Blazer' system involves the mounting of special explosive slabs on the outside of hull and
turret armour. These detonate when struck by a 'shaped charge' anti-tank projectile or RPG,
destroying it before the armour is penetrated. There are disadvantages to this system, but it seems
to have proved valuable in 1982.
40
Israel has some 310,000 reservists in addition to about 130,000
regular soldiers and conscripts serving their three-year military
service. Some reserve units can be on the battlefield within 16
hours of receiving their mobilisation orders; the bulk of the IDF
can be assembled, equipped and in action within 48 hours of the
call. As is obvious from this photograph of a rather grizzled APC
crewman, the reserve commitment lasts many years: first-line
reservists are between 21 and 39, second-line between 39 and 44,
and in emergencies the upper age limit rises to 55. Reservists
report for one month's service - active service - each year.
(Author's photo)
The Arena
The Lebanese arena, much fought over throughout history, is one of
rocky hills and steep gorges. It has given problems to military
commanders since ancient times, and all have found that it is much
easier to hold than to capture; every natural advantage lies with the
defenders.
The difficult terrain presented serious problems for Israel's high
command staff officers. There are two north-south mountain chains -
the Lebanon Range, reaching a height of 2,046 metres south of Beirut;
41
and the Anti-Lebanon, which reaches 2,814 metres at Mount Hermon.

These ranges divide the west-to-east width of the country naturally into
four parallel zones - the coastal plain, the Lebanon ridge, the Bekaa
Valley and the Anti-Lebanon ridge. Because of these separated zones
assault operations were difficult to co-ordinate, while the mountains
gave the PLO excellent positions for defence, and imposed serious
limitations on Israeli deployment and on use of armour. The PLO
could easily block the coastal route from flanking positions all along the
western slopes of the mountains.
For military purposes the theatre of operations was divided into three
sectors. The first - the territory in which U N I F I L and Major
Haddad's militia were based - lies immediately across the Israeli
border, and has a low, rugged, hilly terrain with its main features in
layers from east to west. Only a few paved roads lead north, and most
secondary routes run east-west to link with the coastal road running
from Naqoura to Beirut. The most important feature of the region is the
Litani River, which has its source in the Bekaa Valley to the east; it
makes a sharp turn a few kilometres north of Metulla on the Israeli
border and flows through a gorge to the Mediterranean, just north of
Tyre. The Litani is a formidable military obstacle along its entire
length.
North of the Litani is the second region, where the coastal plain
alternately narrows and widens according to the river beds as they lead
to the sea. Just north of Naqoura the rocky hills reach right to the beach,
but the plain widens out near Tyre and along the Litani estuary, to
narrow again closer to Beirut; here the hills close in again on the coastal
road. In the wider spaces orange and banana groves restrict movement
off the road and provide excellent hiding places for defenders.
The third region is the most difficult. The low hills, covered with
olive trees, climb up to a rugged mountain plateau reaching heights of
more than 2,000 metres. On the east side of the Lebanon crest the
mountains fall sharply into a wide valley - the Bekaa, a continuation of
the Hule and Jordan Valleys along the 'Asia-African Rift'. East of the
valley is the Hermon complex of mountains, towering almost 3,000
metres over the Bekaa, with the Syrian capital, Damascus, just over the
other side. To the north, along the mountain ridges, is the
Beirut-Damascus highway and an old railway line, the only major
communication between the two capitals. South of this road narrow
42
43
mountain roads are dominated by hilltops which make military

movement dangerous.
The Bekaa Valley is widest near the town of Zahle, where the main
road winds steeply up the mountain towards Beirut; the valley then
descends to the artificial Lake Qaraoun, and narrows north of
Marjayoun as the two mountain ridges converge to leave only a steep,
narrow passage for the Litani River.
The rugged mountains and hillside villages make splendid defensive
positions with long-range observation. The coastal strip and its
townships, with their narrow streets and high buildings, make street
fighting difficult for the attacker. The rambling refugee camps, much
favoured by the PLO as strongpoints, are also hazardous for an
advancing army worried about the presence of unarmed civilians and
not wishing to cause casualties among them.
The Count-down
The count-down to Operation 'Peace for Galilee' began on 5 June, a
Saturday - the Jewish shabbat - when Israel was at rest. Sabbath
violation is rare in Israel, so the people knew that something serious was
happening when army trucks called very early at suburban homes to
collect the citizen soldiers who lived there. In one Jerusalem street the
plumber, the supermarket manager and the sons of many immigrant
families were all called up.
A housewife, Mrs Helen Davis, told the author how she comforted
her Moroccan cleaning lady, Sara, whose two sons and four brothers
had been drafted. 'It was her fifth war,' Mrs Davis said, 'and she dreads
each news broadcast. But a heroine of sorts is this mother who cannot
read or write. "Pray for my sons," she asked Mrs Davis, "but not only
for them. For all our sons; we are one family."' (All Sara's menfolk
survived the war.)
Many personal decisions had to be made: like that faced by Yitzhak, a
young American at the end of a five-year course which combines Army
training with religious instruction. Called to his tank unit, he wondered
whether to tell his elderly parents that he was going to war. His five
sisters insisted that he did so, even though he felt that he could be back
home before they even noticed that he had gone.
On Sunday 6 June, a normal working day in Israel, children arrived at
school to find that some of their teachers were absent. Banks' clients
44
One transitional response to the threat of anti-tank weapons such
as the man-portable 'Sagger', which did such execution in 1973, is
the 'Blazer' reactive armour system of externally-mounted
explosive blocks, as fitted to this IDF M60 tank. A drawback to
reactive armour systems is the threat they pose to exposed turret
crew members and nearby friendly infantry. (Christopher Foss)
found that familiar faces among the cashiers had disappeared. Many a
wife was left without the family car in which her husband had driven to
the assembly point.
Israel has only small regular forces backed by young men doing their
three years of compulsory military service; in time of crisis the 'real
Army' comes into being as the reservists gather. The mobilisation
process is so efficient that within a few days a large, combat-ready force
is in being. They report from kibbutzim and moshavim, from the
boulevards of cosmopolitan Tel Aviv and the almost cloistered
communities of Orthodox religious folk, from desert farms and city
apartments alike.
Some of the reservists do not look much like soldiers to European
eyes, and wear their olive drab fatigues awkwardly; but at some time
they have all had a full three years' training sharpened by a month's
refresher course each year, and they remain liable for military service
45
until the age of 55. The month's annual service might well be spent in
the Jordan Valley patrolling against terrorist incursion or on the
dangerous northern border, so it is virtually war service. Israeli
reservists do not go to war unprepared: this is Israel, reluctantly at war
since 1948, and nobody is unprepared. An army Chief-of-Staff is said to
have commented, 'Every Israeli citizen is a soldier on 11 months leave a
year.'
But war is not regarded as an adventure. Most Israelis reacted to the
news of imminent conflict on 6 June with, 'Oh God, not again!' Those
who had lived through the strains of the 1960s and 1970s sighed and
said, 'Well, it was inevitable. The situation is desperate. Sooner or later
we had to fight the PLO, if only to protect all those people living in
northern Israel.'
The exact timing of the invasion was a well-kept secret. Lieutenant -
General William Callaghan, the Irish commander of UNIFIL, was
astonished (as he later told the author) when he walked into the forward
headquarters of the Israeli Northern Command in Zefat on Sunday
Lt.Gen. 'Raful' Eitan,

Chief-of-Staff of the
IDF during the 1982
campaign, exerted his
powerful, if somewhat
dour personality at all
levels in the aftermath
of the Yom Kippur
War. His uniform tells
the story of his lifelong
service in Israel's wars.
His paratrooper's wings
are worn on the red
backing recalling the
combat jump at Mitla
Pass in 1956. His
ribbons are the
Ot Haoz, Israel's second
highest gallantry
decoration, and the
campaign ribbons of the
1948, 1956, 1967 and
1973 wars. (IDF)
46
morning, 6 June. He had come to discuss a UN Security Council

resolution calling for an end to the PLO-Israeli barrages across the
border; but in the HQ he unexpectedly encountered General Eitan,
who looked at his watch and said, 'We will invade Lebanon against the
PLO in 28 minutes.'
The operation began at 11 am on Sunday 6 June with a combined land
and sea assault. It was 15 years to the day since the Six-Day War had
begun in 1967; and it was 41 years since an Australian-British-Free
French expedition travelled the same roads on 7 June 1941 to liberate
Lebanon and Syria from the troops of Vichy France.
There was an epic quality about the procession across the 63-mile-
long frontier: huge Centurion tanks, M113 armoured personnel
carriers, jeeps armed with machine guns, all displaying red cloth panels
to identify them as 'friendlies' to Israeli aircraft. Just a little to the rear
of the spearhead fighting troops came the combat engineers with Gillois
motorised bridges, tank-towed bridges, M60 AVLB and MTU-55
bridging tanks. They would be much needed in the rugged ravine
country ahead.
Behind these fighting vehicles came communications vans, supply
trucks and ambulances, and then the giant 175 mm guns which would
pound targets 23 miles ahead of the war caravan. Some infantry plodded
along the border roads on foot but at this point most were in trucks.
Overhead chattered scout helicopters and the heavier attack helicopters,
Cobras and Defenders. The cavalcade was still rolling long after dark.
At several places close to the border car parks were established in the
shade of trees, where soldiers reporting to their units could leave their
private vehicles. Near Kiryat Shemona the author saw one such war-
duty car park packed with about 300 cars. Many a wife accompanied her
husband to his border assembly point, and then drove home alone with
her thoughts.
Everybody involved understood the overall aim of the operation as
stated in the government's directive: '. . . to put all settlements in
Galilee out of reach of terrorist artillery . . . positioned in Lebanon'.
The government declared that the army would proceed no further than
40 or 50 kilometres from the border; but this distance was manifestly not
sufficient to protect Galilee from modern enemy artillery and missiles.
The Chief-of-Staff had formed three separate task forces of armour,
mobile infantry and supporting units: total strengths of anything
47
Throughout the years of PLO occupation of southern Lebanon, and
even during the 1982 war, the American Christian radio station
The Voice of Hope broadcast regularly from its transmitter in
'Fatahland'. Announcers, such as Selma Jones, were often
threatened, and even fired upon - one was killed - but never
abandoned their post. (David Rubinger)
between 60,000 and 78,000 men have been mentioned, but the
discrepancy probably stems from imprecise definition - i.e., which
figure includes only ground troops, and which includes the air and naval
personnel mobilised in support.
Task Force West (Major-General Yekutiel Adam) would drive north
up the Mediterranean coast; it was based upon Brigadier-General
Yitzhak Mordechai's Division 91. Task Force Centre (Lieutenant -
General Amir Drori), which would move along the ridge and upper
48
Bassam Nairn, aged 13, had already been serving in one of the
Lebanese Christian militias against the PLO for two years when he
was photographed returning from a patrol on the Tel Shreifa in
an M113 armoured personnel carrier. (Hirsh Goodman)
western slopes of the Lebanon Range, was built around Divisions 36

and 162. Task Force East (Major-General Avigdor Ben Gal) was
responsible for taking the Bekaa Valley and the slopes of the Hermon
Range. In this sector it would be vital to make swift progress to prevent
Syrian reinforcement of their deployments in Lebanon; in addition to
Divisions 90 and 252, this task force included two major ad hoc
formations: 'Vardi Force', led by Brigadier-General Danni Vardi, and
the 'Special Manoeuvre Force' led by Brigadier-General Yossi Peled.
49
This last was made up of two brigades of paratroopers and infantry

specially configured for anti-tank fighting, and its task was to cut the
road from Damascus. In all, the Israeli forces fielded some 1,240 tanks
and 1,500 armoured personnel carriers, in a group of formations
roughly equivalent to six and a half divisions. Other forces were held
back, particularly in the Golan Heights area, to deter any Syrian strike
at the base of the Israeli advance.
(To put these forces into perspective, it may be useful to add an
estimate of Israel's total ground resources. These amount to
approximately 130,000 regular soldiers and three-year national
servicemen, and another 310,000 reservists. The Army could field 11
armoured divisions, 15 independent infantry brigades and five airborne
brigades. Israel's massive armour inventory includes some 1,300 Patton
tanks of M60, M60A1 and M60A3 models; about 1,100 Centurions;
about 600 M48A5 Pattons; and some 200 Merkavas. In addition, they
had about 150 T-62S and 250 T-55S captured from Arab armies in
previous wars and adapted for Israeli use. As well as this impressive
total of some 3,600 tanks, the I D F has about 8,000 armoured personnel
carriers and armoured engineer vehicles. The forces committed to the
Lebanon invasion thus represented roughly half of Israel's first-line
combat potential.)
Eitan wanted a swift advance in depth, with the separated columns
cutting off all the P L O forces and bases from their Lebanese and Syrian
rear; pockets of resistance would be bypassed, regardless of the threat
they posed, and dealt with later. As the columns reached their
objectives, they would converge. This simple but brilliant tactic would
produce a continuous front, and prevent P L O reinforcements sent from
northern Lebanon from infiltrating between the columns. The
convergence would also form a net to prevent retreating P L O fighters
and Syrians from escaping into the north. Importantly, the link-up
meant that any one part of the force could quickly be reinforced from
another part.
(Until the Anglo-Australian invasion of 1941 no campaign in
Lebanon had been conducted on two or more lines. Even General
Wilson, the commander in 1941, did not attempt a convergence of
forces between his three columns; and his third column was used not in
Lebanon itself, but far off on the Kuneitra-Damascus line.)
A crucial advantage of war denied to General Eitan in Operation
50
'Peace for Galilee' was surprise in timing and in the general directions of
advance. The P L O and the Syrians knew that the Israelis were coming.
They also knew the routes by which they must come; Lebanon's terrain
dictated those routes.
Any surprise therefore had to be achieved by method. This was
accomplished by development of means to knock out the missiles which
were the basis of the enemy's air defence, and by skills which enabled
armour to move in terrain considered impassable for tanks.
The I D F had long since evolved a close-knit system of air support for
integrated armour and infantry teams. In battle the success of the
system depended on rapid flexibility and on superior firepower. On the
ground, a mixed combat team acting as a holding force would pin down
the defenders of any strongly held position while another combat team
worked its way around the enemy's flank, possibly to his rear. There was
Israeli Defence Minister Ariel Sharon, the enthusiastic architect of

Operation 'Peace for Galilee', briefs journalists near Gesher Haziv
kibbutz in northern Israel. His audacious attack across the Suez
Canal helped turn disaster into victory in the 1973 war, and he
enjoys great political support among an important section of
Israeli society. In 1982 he had the trust and loyalty of Prime
Minister Menachem Begin; and despite all that has happened
since, he is still a major force in Israeli public life.
nothing new in this classic tactic; but the composition of the flanking
team gave it a new dimension.
An important part of this force was the combat engineer unit,
equipped with heavy, armoured equipment; it was the job of the combat
engineers to break tracks and roads into territory otherwise not
negotiable by armoured and wheeled vehicles. The PLO and Syrians
had assumed that the ravines, wadis and river beds on which they based
their defences would be uncrossable. To their surprise the Israeli
vehicles both crossed them and moved along them as the combat
engineers erected their special bridging equipment.
The system of combat teams backed up at short notice by heliborne
infantry, combat engineers and artillery could not have worked without
good communications - and this the Signal Corps provided. Radio
equipment was of high standard, and the network procedure so well
devised that time was rarely wasted in making contact. As the task forces
entered built-up areas and ventured along the winding mountain tracks
control tended to be more and more difficult; short-range FM radios
were masked by buildings and steep cliffs, but these technical problems
were rapidly solved. Senior commanders were at all times in touch with
their units and could call in supporting fire from air, artillery and naval
units.
Junior commanders on the spot had authority to call for close air
support from fighter-bombers and combat helicopters. There was no
instance where a small unit called for help in vain.
General Eitan, through his unit commanders, had issued two
important supplementary orders. Soldiers in situations of close-quarter
fighting - e.g. as in built-up areas - were to take risks rather than injure
innocent civilians; and all possible precautions had to be taken against
needlessly tearing up tobacco fields, vineyards, banana plantations,
orchards and olive trees. Such areas were taken into account by the staff
in movement planning, and field commanders told their men that wilful
damage would be punished.
52
3 Another Six-Day War
Day One - 6 June

AS the operation opened at 11 am along a 63-mile front, three brigades of
Mordechai's Ugda 91 led the way across the border on the western
coastal sector. Preceded by supporting air and artillery strikes, the
Centurion tanks and paratroopers riding in M113 'Zelda' APCs pushed
northwards as fast as possible. Limited to a single road, however, the
units of Task Force West were hampered both by traffic jams, and by
determined, though unco-ordinated resistance from PLO fighters
making use of thick cover in the roadside olive groves.
Although there was some heavy fighting on the outskirts of Tyre,
where one Israeli unit took significant casualties in a PLO ambush, the
leading Brigade 211 succeeded in isolating the city and its nearby el-
Baas and Rachidiye refugee camps after just nine hours. At nightfall,
half-way between Tyre and Sidon, the spearhead of Task Force West
went into 'laager' for all-round defence. As they snatched what rest they
could, other Israeli paratroopers and armour crewmen were passing
them in the darkness to the west - several miles out to sea. The IDF
were about to make their largest ever amphibious landing: the Israeli
Navy had been training for such an operation for years, but had never
carried it out in war.
The mixed landing brigade from Ugda 96 was built around the 50th
Paratroop Battalion from 35th Parachute Brigade. Commanded by
Brigadier-General Amos Yaron, the head of the IDF's Paratroop and
Infantry Branch, the brigade also included armoured combat vehicles
and their support and ammunition vehicles - some 400 vehicles in all.
The early stages of the voyage had had something of a Mediterranean
cruise atmosphere; but hours later, as patrol boats, missile boats and
landing craft turned towards the dark enemy shore, this gave way to
pre-battle tension. The landing was carried out at about 11 pm on 6
June, over beaches previously reconnoitred by Navy frogmen in the
estuary of the Awali River three miles north of Sidon, with its major
53
PLO strongholds. The first party, in amphibious APCs, reached the

beach unseen, set up a forward command post, and prepared ambushes
for any PLO forces who might investigate. The noise of the landing
craft engines alerted the PLO, and Katyusha rockets whooshed
seawards; but this was unaimed fire, and none of the blacked-out vessels
were hit.
One para platoon took the bridges over the Awali River, and another
scrambled to the ridges overlooking Sidon. On 7 June the landing force
would break out of its beachhead, linking up with the Israeli ground
columns converging on Sidon from south and south-east. PLO
resistance was brave and determined at several points, but noticeably
unco-ordinated. The commander of the PLO's Karameh Brigade,
responsible for this coastal sector, fled to Syrian lines in the Bekaa
Valley, with the command's safe, in an ambulance; on his arrival he
reported his unit's destruction by the US Sixth Fleet. . . . Many other
officers seem to have abandoned their men, leaving them to perish in
small, hopeless battles. Others, shocked by the surprise of the seaborne
attack, surrendered without resistance.
The Israeli Navy also landed commandos at Qasmiya near the mouth
of the Litani, and these troops moved on Tyre from the north. PLO
strongholds at Qlaile, Ras el-Ain, Rachidiye, Ein el-Kantar and
Bourghlike were partly captured, partly bypassed.
In the central sector, paratroopers and a mobile force took the Aqiya
bridge over the deep Litani gorge, while infantry stormed the Arnoun
Heights and reached the Nabatiye area. Two companies of the Golani
Brigade1 were rushed east to assault Beaufort Castle. Infantry in
armoured carriers captured the Hardale bridge, the only other bridge
across the Litani south of Lake Qaraoun, bypassed the Achiye positions
and started an advance along the mountain road.
Task Force East, with M60 Patton tanks leading mechanised
infantry, left from Metulla and struck into 'Fatahland'. East of
Marjayoun the passages between the steep hills become narrow gorges,
easily defended from the heights. Operating along winding mountain
tracks, the task force moved slowly and cautiously, first because of
harassing PLO fire and later because of heavy Syrian artillery and anti-
1
The battalions of the Golani Brigade are the only IDF infantry units which are neither airborne
nor assigned to armoured formations.
54
ANOTHER SIX-DAY WAR
tank fire. This encouraged small P L O tank-killer teams to attack with

rocket-propelled grenades and light mortars.
By the end of Day One the Israeli pattern of attack was set - decisive
encirclement where possible, night assaults by infantry in line, capture
of vital points by armoured infantry before the tanks moved up.
Artillery was used only to shell the PLO's forward lines; in the rocky
hills even heavy bombardment could have no decisive effect. Instead,
artillery was mainly used to pound lines of communication, dumps and
depots in the more open country to the rear.
For the first time the I D F used the 160 mm LAR, a free-flight, fin-
stabilised, ground-to-ground light artillery rocket. With a range of 30
km and a warhead of 50 kg, the LAR-160 can be brought into action
very quickly - a battery with six launchers can saturate a target in 30
Column of IDF 'Zeldas' - M113 armoured personnel carriers -

soon after crossing the Lebanese border in the central sector on 6
June. There was no danger of Syrian air attack at this stage,
otherwise the vehicles would be much more widely dispersed. The
IDF, with some 6,000 M113s in its total inventory, is the second
largest user of the type after the USA. Israeli modifications
include the fitting of external rear fuel tanks; in 1973 penetration
of the original fuel tanks caused some catastrophic internal fires.
seconds. I D F artillery had another advantage in the M25 and M131

electronic proximity fuses. The M25 was fitted to 81 mm, 120 mm and
160 mm mortar bombs and the Mi31 to all shells from 76 mm to 203
mm. These fuses can be used to explode a bomb at a predetermined
optimum height above the target, or can be set to burst near the surface.
Some of the actions fought during this phase were classic infantry
operations reminiscent of battles of the Korean War, and they were
certainly similar to those carried out by the Australians against the
Vichy French on the same battlefield in 1941. One of the most notable
was the attack on the P L O positions in Beaufort Castle, a 10th-century
Crusader fortress at the eastern end of the Arnoun Ridge. Surrounded
by steep rocky cliffs on every side but the north, Beaufort is 717 metres
high; whoever holds it controls the roads to Damascus, Tyre and Sidon.
Strategically, in 1982 it dominated the Christian enclave in southern
Lebanon and the north-south strip of Israeli territory known as the
Galilee Panhandle.
An Israeli M113 APC crew rest near Tyre; their bedrolls and
kitbags almost cover the outside of the vehicle. Israeli doctrine
does not call for APC-borne infantry to fire on the move, but to
dismount to engage the enemy in classic fashion; so this heavy
external stowage does not hamper efficiency, though it may lead to
minor fires if the vehicle is hit.
ANOTHER SIX-DAY WAR
The PLO used the time-worn remains of the castle as an advanced

observation post; it faced towards Israeli territory and was a superb
vantage point for artillery spotters directing fire against the Israeli
settlements. In June 1982 it was held by about 75 Fatah men who were
convinced of its impregnability. Air attacks could do little damage; a
tank attack was out of the question unless the Israeli armour could
somehow encircle the heights and attack from the rear; and infantry
would have to scale sheer rock walls. In case attackers did manage to
capture the old stone walls, the Fatah men had dug an internal trench
system from which they could pick off the Israelis. Ancient cellars and
dungeons had been made into fortified dugouts where immense stocks
of ammunition were held. The walls sheltered a mobile com-
munications centre from which the garrison could make contact with
their Supreme Military HQ in Beirut.
Two companies of the elite Golani Brigade were detailed for the
assault on Beaufort. Led (after the unit commander became a casualty)
by 26-year-old Major Guni Harnick, the tough Golanis scaled the
heights by night and took the positions in a fire-and-movement
operation. The Fatah men fought fiercely, and Harnick was among the
Israelis they killed1. But the Palestinians had relied too heavily on their
defences, and their trenches, dugouts and walls made regrouping and
manoeuvre difficult in the darkness. The Golanis, adept at night-
fighting, kept up their momentum of attack, and the Palestinians died in
their trenches in hand-to-hand fighting. The final assault was made by
men of the Golani reconnaissance squadron - Sayeret Golani.
The amount of broken personal equipment and the quantity of
cartridge cases which the author found when he visited Beaufort
indicated the fierceness of combat. Many rounds had been hit and
exploded by other rounds, another sign of intense machine gun fire.
One of Guni Harnick's men said later, 'The capture of Beaufort was
Guni's, there's no two ways about it. I just don't want to think of what
would have happened after the unit commander got hit, without Guni.
It was a mess. And the minute Guni came up everything tightened up.
We knew there was someone to follow, and we did. He saved the
situation.'
1
Guni Harnick was one of a class of 34 in high school; 32 became IDF officers, including three
pilots. After eight years in the army, he would have retired on 9 June; he was killed on 6 June.
57
Fitted with a winch in the armoured recovery role, a 'Zelda' comes
ashore from Israeli landing craft on the Lebanese coast north of
Tyre. A powerful armoured/infantry force based on a battalion
from the IDF's 35th Parachute Brigade, and led in person by
Brig.Gen. Yaron, chief of the IDF Paratroop and Infantry Branch,
landed at the mouth of the Awali River on the first night of the
war, and later linked up with Task Force West troops fighting
their way up the coastal road. (Author's photo)
Day Two - 7 June

On Day Two Israeli tanks and APC-borne infantry made their first
contact with Syrian forces at Jezzine, where the Syrians were
supporting a Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) brigade. The Israelis
were under orders not to initiate fire, but when attacked by artillery and
armour they quickly responded. The Syrians had the winding
mountain roads ranged and they caused some casualties, but Task Force
East HQ landed paratroops from helicopters to outflank Syrian guns
and tanks. A series of deadly fights ensued, and many Syrians pulled out
before they could be overrun.
58
ANOTHER SIX-DAY WAR
On that day, too, the Syrians in the Bekaa fired missiles at Israeli
warplanes, an action which the IDF saw as dangerous; any serious
losses of Israeli planes could hinder the ground advance.
In the west on Day Two, the Israelis isolated Tyre. Before attacking
the PLO positions they sent loudspeaker vans close to the city to warn
civilians to leave and make for the beach where they would be safe.
Skirmishing infantry captured the outskirts of Tyre, but progress was
slow because the men were under orders not to use 'preventive' fire -
that is, they could not throw grenades into a building before storming it
because noncombatants might be sheltering inside.
Further north the Navy landed more commandos, and gave them
covering fire with their 76 mm guns for the advance on Sidon. By
nightfall the troops from Kahalani's Ugda 36 on the central front, who
had moved up the previous day from Aqiya bridge and from the Arnoun
Heights through Doueir, had joined the force assembling to capture
Sidon.
It was also on 7 June that the first Israeli troops entered the sprawling
Ein el-Hilwe refugee camp and PLO stronghold outside Sidon. The
Golanis made good progress by day, but were forced to withdraw at
nightfall.
Day Three - 8 June

The Task Force East commander brought up reinforcements,
including heavy armoured bulldozers, and pressed on into the
mountains. The Syrians stayed to fight - and they fought well.
Courageous PLO fighters, who knew the ground intimately, made
many attacks and blew up some of the bridges. Other bridges, never
designed to carry 60-ton tanks, fell to pieces. The gallant bulldozer
drivers then went into action and pushed and rammed rocks, soil and
trees into deviation roads.
Reaching plateau country, the advancing Israeli troops ran into
Syrian T-62 tanks. Well dug in and concealed, they opened fire from
short range. When Israeli tank commanders could not locate them they
called in combat helicopters, a threat the Syrians met with their own
anti-tank helicopters.
The mobile spearhead of Central Task Force, leaving the capture of
the Jezzine sector to the combat teams, pressed on to the heights above
the Damour es-Safa River, which formed the main southern and south-
59
60
ANOTHER SIX-DAY WAR
eastern chain of the natural defence for Beirut and the Beirut-Damascus
highway. Parts of the spearhead reached the edge of the towns of Beit
ed-Dine and Ain Dara. This advance of more than 20 km was beginning
to threaten from the flank the Syrians' hold over Beirut, as well as to
endanger Syrian positions in the Lake Qaraoun area. At the same time
their positions around Jezzine came under aerial and artillery attack.
The Syrians therefore fell back from Jezzine and the Nabatiye area.
That day Major Sa'ad Haddad rode to Beaufort Castle from his
native town of Marjayoun. Sitting behind the machine gun of an
armoured personnel carrier, he waved to cheering local people in the
streets of Kfar Tibnit; children and adults ran after his vehicle shouting
his name. About 40 villagers jumped into cars and followed the Haddad
entourage. At the castle he made a short speech in Arabic, and raised a
large Free Lebanon flag beside the already-fluttering Star of David.
In the coastal sector that morning Israeli planes shot down two Syrian
MiGs after a brief dogfight south-east of Beirut. Tyre was captured
from the PLO street by street. Lebanese refugees reaching the Israeli
lines reported that civilians were being forcibly held in PLO
strongholds to deter the Israelis from opening fire. Small patrols were
sent in to try to pick off the PLO fighters without harming their
hostages - at some cost in Israeli casualties.
Sidon was now besieged, and Task Force West paused to consider
Intelligence reports about PLO dispositions. Lebanese refugees said
that the PLO had turned the main square into a 'fortress ambush'.
Apparently the local PLO commander, Colonel Hajj Ismail, hoped to
lure thousands of Israeli infantry into the square and then open fire with
everything he had.
Fighting continued in Ein el-Hilwe camp, but the Israelis held back
from making a general assault. A hard core of PLO fighters of the Kastel
Brigade were solidly installed in the camp, and were clearly determined
to sell their lives dearly, whatever the consequent cost in civilian lives.
The troops who had landed north of Sidon pushed on towards
Damour, which had become a PLO stronghold after the terrorists had
captured it from its Christian inhabitants in 1975. PLO sub-units had
set up ambushes along the coastal road, but most were knocked out by
naval gunfire. Throughout the coastal campaign the Army was never
short of supplies, as the Navy repeatedly landed stores close behind the
advancing troops.
61
Day Four - 9 June

As Tyre was being cleared of the PLO an advance Israeli relief column
reached the town to restore the water supply, repair electricity lines and
distribute food and medicine to the population. While this was going
on, Sidon, further north, was the scene of heavy fighting. The Israeli
troops had not walked into the PLO ambush in the town square, but
engaged the enemy positions with medium-range fire before entering.
The only major damage to buildings in Sidon occurred in the square.
All arms had been given strict orders concerning avoiding damage to
churches, and no mosque was hit.
Pinpoint attacks were made against gun emplacements. A PLO gun
was located in the corner room of a six-storey building; a single shot
from an Israeli gun knocked off the corner and brought the gun crashing
to the ground. The building was otherwise undamaged.
After the fighting ended in Sidon local medical facilities began to
function again, but hundreds of civilians continued to turn up at the
IDF surgical unit which had been set up at the mouth of the Zaharani
River. This IDF unit treated about 250 civilians in the first two weeks.
Attacker's view of Beaufort Castle, from the south or Israeli side.

At a height of 717 metres it commands most of south-east
Lebanon, and was considered impregnable by its PLO defenders.
ANOTHER SIX-DAY WAR
Maj. Sa'ad Haddad (third from left, in fatigue cap) reached

Beaufort on 7 June, to accept the position from the IDF after its
capture in a brief but savage assault by Sayeret Golani, the Golani
Brigade's reconnaissance commando. Riding in an APC flying
both Israeli and Free Lebanese flags, Haddad is greeted
enthusiastically by local villagers. It should be noted that he had
insisted on recruiting both Christians and Shi'ite Muslims for his
militia, even at the cost of incurring the hatred of the Phalangists.
In the central-east sector a fierce battle took place at the villages of el-
Hilweh (not to be confused with Ein el-Hilwe refugee camp) and Kfar
Seit, 1,200 metres up a western ridge of the Bekaa near Joub Jannine.
A combined Syrian and P L O force held well-concealed positions in
thick scrub, and were supported by tank guns on commanding ridges.
As the vanguard of the Israeli task force approached the villages the
Syrians and Palestinians opened heavy fire. The Centurions roared on,
firing to protect the infantry who were following in armoured personnel
carriers. An APC was hit by a 'Sagger' missile. A shell from a Centurion
then destroyed the 'Sagger' post; but the area was alive with other
'Sagger' teams, some of them in Land Rovers. 'Saggers' hit a
63
Centurion, and then an armoured Medevac carrier as it moved in to pick

up casualties. Another M113 infantry carrier was hit, and blew up.
Israeli infantry meanwhile captured the main village buildings.
Artillery observers, dangerously exposed on a roof, called in fire from
M109 self-propelled guns; supporting mortars also opened up as targets
became identifiable. A well-sited anti-tank ambush was spotted just as
the Israeli Centurions were heading in its direction. The vanguard
commander, who was by now on the spot, planned and put into effect a
multi-pronged attack which broke up the ambush.
As casualties mounted the medical teams established a dressing
station and carried out a score of operations; a surgeon was among the
wounded. Under cover of darkness Medevac helicopters lifted the two
dead and 40 wounded from the village battlefield, which was secured the
next day. The Syrians and PLO left behind 30 dead and several badly
wounded men. The Israeli medical teams treated them, and they were
airlifted out with the Israeli wounded.
An Israeli soldier told a Financial Times journalist about the ambush:
'Visibly reliving the moment, he described how guerrillas kept
appearing everywhere with rockets and how his unit had to swivel its
weapons from side to side as they tried to locate and destroy the sources
of fire.'
Despite the intensive fighting in which its ground forces were
engaged, Syria had not yet embarked on all-out war; but in Damascus,
President Assad was facing the kind of dilemma which had confronted
the Israeli cabinet on 4 June. His army of occupation in Lebanon was
faring badly against the Israelis; the Syrian units in Beirut were on the
verge of being cut off, and Syria might well lose all of Lebanon. Assad
and his advisers considered what sort of war to fight. His brother Rifaat
urged him to send more surface-to-air missile batteries to Zahle in the
Bekaa - a move opposed by the Defence Minister, Tlas, whose
Intelligence reports indicated that the Israelis could knock out the
batteries. Nevertheless, Assad sent 19 extra SA-2, SA-3 and SA-6
batteries to Zahle.
The American envoy Philip Habib was at that moment in Damascus
for talks with the Syrians; he was trying to induce them and the Israelis
to agree to accept the status quo in Lebanon. The Israeli cabinet
considered that the Syrians' strengthening of their missile batteries in
the Bekaa could only indicate aggressive intentions; and in the early
64
ANOTHER SIX-DAY WAR
Israeli infantry in action around El Baas, the large Palestinian

refugee camp and PLO base outside Tyre. The leading man is
armed with a Glilon, the shortened version of the Galil rifle; the
patrol also carry a radio and a folding stretcher. Every Israeli
soldier is trained to use at least one other weapon or item of
equipment apart from his personal weapon. These men came
under fire moments after this picture was taken.
hours of 9 June they authorised the elimination of the SAMs at Zahle.

They recognised that this decision was likely to cause friction with the
USA, but considered the military necessity to be of overriding urgency.
The destruction of the batteries, and the associated air battles, provide
one of the most dramatic and technically instructive episodes of this, or
indeed of any other recent war.
Unknown to the Syrians, almost every military move they made was
observed by the high-magnification cameras mounted in Israeli
'drones' - 'RPVs' or 'remote-piloted vehicles' - in the shape of pilotless
aircraft only 12 feet long. Clear pictures were relayed back to ground
commanders, who studied Syrian moves on a screen and on overlaid
65
maps. The Israeli-built Scout and Mastiff RPVs gave forward air
controllers the capability of observing targets, and guiding Israeli attack
aircraft to their objectives, without risking lives in piloted observer
aircraft. The electronic wizardry in the RPVs gave Israeli commanders
virtual control of the target area. Apart from their reconnaissance role,
however, the RPVs also had another capability which was to contribute
greatly to the success of the Israeli strikes on the Syrian SAM batteries.
The attack on the missile system1 went in at 2 pm on 9 June; and the
first Israeli aircraft to approach the Bekaa were the pilotless RPVs.
Simulating actual attack aircraft closing on the Syrian positions, they
obliged the Syrians to turn on the fire control radars of their missile
batteries. In the deadly game of electronic hide-and-seek, this was the
equivalent of a man turning on a torch to search for an enemy in a
darkened room - it revealed the hunter's position as clearly as it revealed
his intended prey.
Waiting for the information which the RPVs forced the Syrians to
reveal were the human and electronic analysts carried by the E-2C
1
The Syrians used at least five different SAM systems in Lebanon, integrated to provide what the
high command hoped would be 'impenetrable air space'. All were Soviet-supplied.
The SA-2 'Guideline', which has seen more active service than any other Russian SAM, has a
range of up to 28 km, and a high altitude capability. The missile weighs 130 kg. Since 1968 the
Syrian batteries have been linked to 'Fan Song F' radar equipment.
The 60 kg SA-3 'Goa' is intended for low and medium altitude use in conjunction with
'Guideline', and is linked to 'Squat Eye' and 'Flat Face' radar systems.
The SA-6 'Gainful', linked to a tracked 'Straight Flush' radar vehicle, can 'kill' as low as 30 m
and as high as 18 km. Its triple launcher is mounted on a tracked vehicle. Warheads weigh 80 kg.
The IDF AF made SA-6 sites its major target on 9 June.
The SA-8 'Gecko', firing two missiles from a wheeled launcher linked to 'Roll' radar equipment
on a six-wheel amphibious vehicle, is effective between altitudes of 45 m and 12 km. In Soviet
service since 1974, it had its first combat test in Lebanon. The IDF AF destroyed at least four
launchers.
The SA-9 'Gaskin' fires four missiles from two containers mounted on a BRDM-2 vehicle. The
single-stage missile is effective as low as 20 m and as high as 5 km. First taken into Lebanon in 1979
by a Libyan contingent, 'Gaskin' was the least common system, but examples are known to have
been knocked out by the IDF AF in 1981 and again in 1982.
Most of these SAMs are guided to their target by various types of radio-command device from
the ground, linked to radar systems. 'Gaskin' is guided by 'Gun Dish' radar, of the type associated
with the deadly Soviet ZSU-23-4 quad-23 mm tracked anti-aircraft cannon; but final homing is by
infra-red heat-seeking. All these radar systems arc vulnerable to jamming; and the heat-seeking
homer is vulnerable to decoy flares, routinely dropped by Israeli aircraft as they commence
attacking runs.
Although not strictly relevant to this section, the ubiquitous SA-7 'Grail' may be mentioned
here. This 15 kg missile is man-portable and shoulder-fired, homing by IR heat-seeking. Used in
its thousands by the PLO and Syrian troops in Lebanon, it only succeeded in hitting one Israeli
aircraft; although it is theoretically effective from 23 m to more than 4 km, it has a notoriously
unreliable guidance system.
66
ANOTHER SIX-DAY WAR
Merkava tank crewmen at prayer during a lull in the fighting on

the eastern sector of the front. The brigade with which these men
served was composed almost entirely of yeshiva (religious college)
students; they had a reputation for hard fighting and hard
praying.
67
IDF Merkava tanks in action on the coastal front. Note the oddly-
shaped turret, which incorporates massive frontal protection for
68
ANOTHER SIX-DAY WAR
the commander and gun crew. In the foreground an infantry

'MAGist' fires a Belgian-made FN-MAG machine gun.
69
Maj.Gen. Yekutiel
Adam, GOC Task
Force West, was
killed in his field
headquarters by
PLO artillery fire on
9 June 1982, the
fourth day of the
war. (IDF)
Hawkeye, an American 'Airborne Early Warning' type, of which the

Israelis had acquired four. The Hawkeye's extraordinary capabilities
are mainly directed towards the detection of enemy aircraft and the
control of friendly interceptors; but its passive defence systems can
detect electromagnetic emitters on the ground. Information gathered
directly by the Hawkeyes, or fed to them by other Israeli detection
systems in the air or on the ground, quickly enabled the Israeli
specialists to analyse and pinpoint the Syrian radars, providing them
with the information necessary both to 'blind' them and to find and
destroy them.
This information was also available to Israeli ground forces, who
opened up an accurate artillery bombardment of those SAM positions
shown to be within their range, and launched Israeli-built 'Wolf
surface-to-surface missiles to home in on the Syrian radar emissions.
Meanwhile, directed by the Hawkeyes and under the overall control
of a Boeing 707 modified for electronic intelligence gathering and
command tasks, 96 Israeli Defence Force/Air Force F-4E Phantoms,
70
ANOTHER SIX-DAY WAR
F-15 Eagles, F-16 Falcons and Kfir C-2S were sweeping over the Bekaa.
Many of these aircraft, and of the RPVs which were still active in the
area, were equipped with highly sophisticated Israeli-built electronic
counter-measures devices to jam, deceive and manipulate the Syrian
radars. While the missile batteries, dependent upon their radars, tried
vainly to engage the Israeli aircraft, they were destroyed one by one.
The weapons used included 'smart' bombs, which are guided to their
targets by pinpoint beams of laser light (the targets being 'sparkled'
with the laser by special forces personnel inserted on the ground); TV-
guided Walleye bombs; Maverick missiles, which can be guided either
by TV, by infra-red detection, or by homing on enemy radar emissions;
Shrike missiles, which are radar-homers exclusively; and even by
conventional 'iron bombs'.
The Syrians were faced with a dilemma by the flexibility of Israeli
tactics and by the speed of their execution. If the radars were left
switched on, they were destroyed by the various types of air- and
ground-launched radar-homing ordnance. If they were switched off,
the batteries were still vulnerable to attack by TV-guided, infra-red, or
laser-designated weapons. Attempts to operate the radars in
intermittent bursts were not successful, since they were unable to
perform their tasks against the constant background of Israeli jamming
and other counter-measures - which reached an intensity which can
only be described as a radar operator's nightmare.
A second wave of 92 IDF/AF aircraft now appeared and joined the
attack. They were still in peril from the 700-odd Syrian anti-aircraft
guns which supported the SAM batteries; but these were brought
under fire by Israeli artillery. This incoming fire from several directions
created yet more confusion among the Syrians, as did the smokescreens
which they released in an attempt to conceal their batteries and the
movement of mobile SAMs. In practice, the spirals of smoke did more
to help the Israelis pinpoint targets than to conceal them. Within little
more than an hour, the IDF/AF and Israeli ground fire had destroyed
17 out of 19 SAM batteries, and damaged the two survivors.
At about the same time as the second wave of Israeli aircraft
appeared, the Syrian Air Force was committed in strength in an attempt
to save the missile batteries. The Israelis had, of course, anticipated
this, and the nimble F-15S were flying top cover for the strike aircraft.
Vectored on to the approaching MiG-2is, -23s, -25s and Sukhoi Su-7s
71
Mixed formation of IDF/AF F-16 Falcons and F-4E Phantom.

The F-16 is a highly versatile type, equally effective as a ground-
attack aircraft and an 'air superiority' fighter; it is believed that
one Falcon pilot, at least, may have shot down five Syrian fighters
over Lebanon, and the F-16s played a major part in the
destruction of the SAM sites on 9 June. Although elderly by
'superpower' standards, the Phantom is still a formidable ground
attack fighter; and some which operated over the Bekaa were
specially fitted as highly sophisticated electronic counter-measures
aircraft, jamming and manipulating Syrian radar.
by the ever-watchful Hawkeyes, the Israeli fighters tore into the attack.
The F-15S were the only Israeli aircraft assigned exclusively to air-to-
air combat, but other types also took part in the dog-fights which now
built up to great intensity over the Bekaa Valley.
The Syrian fighter pilots had earned the respect of the Israelis for
their courage over the Golan Heights in the 1973 Yom Kippur War; but
in this encounter they suffered from serious handicaps. The religious
application of Soviet training methods had left Syrian aircrew generally
able to operate efficiently only if they stuck to absolutely rigid
procedures. They were trained to make interceptions under control
ANOTHER SIX-DAY WAR
from the ground, as part of a tightly integrated air defence system,

including the SAMs in a mix of types to cover every range and altitude.
These tidy conditions no longer existed in the howling skies over the
Bekaa. The SAMs were deaf, blind, and rapidly being wiped off the
map; and the vital ground control electronics, upon which the Syrian
pilots depended to find their enemy and shape up for an attack, were
being suppressed and jammed by the sophisticated Israeli ECM.
Soon so many aircraft - up to 200 at a time - were criss-crossing the
sky over the valley that the Syrian anti-aircraft gunners had to cease fire
IDF/AF F-15 Eagle, the outstanding 'air superiority' fighter

which probably achieved most of Israel's air-to-air victories over
the Bekaa Valley. Operating in conjunction with the Hawkeye E-2C
AEW aircraft, the F-15 is practically unbeatable. Its own radar is
capable of tracking multiple targets simultaneously, of
discriminating individual aircraft in a formation, and of
automatically computing the best missile tracking solution on the
target posing the greatest threat. By the end of the battles of 9
June the IDF/AF had shot down 41 Syrian aircraft for no losses.
for fear of hitting their own planes. The pilots had the same difficulty.
The author spoke to an Israeli flier who said that 'the air was full of
tension, due to the large number of enemy aircraft. . . . We had to
differentiate between our own aircraft and the Syrian planes - and at
high speed, that's not always easy.'
That day the Israelis shot down 29 MiGs in the first encounter; and
by nightfall on Day Four they would claim no fewer than 41 Syrian
aircraft, for no Israeli losses, in three distinct air battles. The Israelis
claim to have downed a total of 90 Syrian combat aircraft over the three
days of the air war, a figure which the Syrians do not dispute. No Israeli
aircraft was shot down in air-to-air combat. Not since the Second
World War had so many aircraft been lost in a single action; and in no
other battle in the history of air warfare has such a loss been borne
entirely by one side in an engagement. Most of the Israelis' kills were
achieved with Sidewinder missiles; the I D F / A F operated both the
latest American Sidewinder AIM-9L (which was, simultaneously,
making a reputation for itself over the Falklands); and the Israeli
modifications of the Sidewinder code-named Shafir 2 and Python 3,
Male and female maintenance crew complete the arming and

servicing of an IDF/AF A-4 Skyhawk; despite its age, the
Skyhawk is still an effective ground-attack aircraft, and Israel has
perhaps 150 in service. A Skyhawk, an F-4E (S) Phantom and a
Kfir, all shot down by ground fire, were the only Israeli jets lost
during the war.
ANOTHER SIX-DAY WAR
The Kfir C-2, an Israeli redesign of the Dassault Mirage V, is the

result of Israel's desire to become self-sufficient in jet fighters.
Powered by the 'embargo-proof American General Electric J79
turbojet engine, and with many refinements which improve its
range, performance and capabilities over those of the original
French design, it is a potent fighter-bomber and 'dog-fighter'. In
1982 the Kfir carried the main burden of close air support
missions. (IAI)
which have been improved and adapted in the light of combat

experience over Lebanon since 1976. There were reports of some 'gun'
kills, achieved solely with the Israeli fighters' cannon; this is an
unimaginably more difficult procedure than cannon dog-fighting of the
Second World War era; and to achieve it in order to save expensive
missiles attracts considerable kudos - besides demonstrating a
superiority over the enemy which is almost insulting.
(In terms of air-to-air weaponry and guidance systems, the I D F / A F
is much better equipped than the Syrians. Their Soviet missiles - even
the very latest 'Advanced Atoll' and 'Aphid' - can 'lock on' to a target
only over a much smaller 'envelope' than the comparable Western
75
missiles; and even displayed reluctance to lock on to an Israeli fighter on

the rare occasions when a Syrian pilot managed to get into the perfect
firing position, dead astern.)
On the coast the infantry, supported by the Navy, captured Damour
after heavy fighting. The Israelis lost General Adam, killed in his HQ
by artillery fire, and with him Colonel Moshe Sela, a senior staff officer.
Entry into the sprawling refugee camp of Ein el-Hilwe, with its terrorist
training centres, was postponed in order to enable non-combatants to
leave.
In the central sector, tank battles were developing as the Israeli
armour sought to establish itself further on the heights of Ain Dara
above the Beirut-Damascus Highway. Task Force East penetrated the
area east of Lake Qaraoun in a running battle with the PLO and the
Syrian 1st Armoured Division, commanded by the President's brother
Rifaat Assad.
LEFT A PLO fighter

manning a heavy
machine gun during
fighting near
Khalde.
RIGHT An Israeli APC

advances through a
southern Lebanese
village. Even the
most hostile foreign
observers admit that
at this stage the
Shi'ite community
greeted the IDF
soldiers with smiles,
applause, and
flowers. (Author's
photo)
76
ANOTHER SIX-DAY WAR
Day Five - 10 June

The PLO men were fighting well and often held their positions with
stubborn courage. Their training had made them adept at ambush, and
they sometimes caught Israeli tanks and armoured personnel carriers on
narrow roads and in defiles. The PLO's 'Lion Cubs' were now in
action. These boys had been told to approach Israeli armour with
concealed rocket-propelled grenade launchers and then to make a
surprise attack. The Israelis were soon calling these attackers 'the RPG
kids', and tried to take them prisoner rather than shoot them. Some
turned out to be no older than twelve.
Inevitably, a few were shot. Somewhere near Rachidiye we met an
Israeli infantryman in tears after he had badly wounded a teenage
enemy. 'This RPG kid had fired one grenade at a tank,' he said, 'and he
was aiming another when I shouted at him to drop it. He knew what I
was saying because I used Arabic. He took no notice and swung the
77
launcher at me, and I had to fire.' Some Israelis did not fire at ' R P G
kids' - and lost their own lives.
Day Five was eventful on all fronts. Task Force West reached the
outskirts of Khalde, near the airport, and was now only 10 km from the
heart of Beirut. High Command detached the column's forward units
and sent them in an outflanking movement towards the east. This
manoeuvre was also intended to cut off Beirut and the P L O forces in the
western and southern outskirts from the east and the Damascus road.
In the central combat zone at Sultan Yakoub, north of Jezzine, the
Syrian command had set up a strong ambush force of the 1st
Commando Battalion supported by tanks and anti-tank guns of the 58th
Mechanised Brigade to cover the route which the Israeli tanks must
take.
One of the many Ashbal or 'RPG kids' employed by the PLO

during the Israeli invasion. They would emerge from the shelter
of caves to fire rocket-propelled grenades at Israeli vehicles before
running for cover. Some relied upon the IDF soldiers' self-
restraint to an astonishing degree, surrendering immediately after
firing their rockets. (IDF)
78
ANOTHER SIX-DAY WAR
A fresh Israeli battle group of M6o Patton tanks had been brought
forward and was in the lead. Most soldiers of this reserve unit were from
the Orthodox religious community, and they had a reputation for hard
praying and hard fighting.
The Syrians had been shelling the roads during the day, so the Israeli
tanks were sent forward by night. It was very dark, and the clouds of
dust churned up by the tanks' tracks made visibility even worse for the
commanders standing in the open turret hatches. All were apprehensive
about ramming the tank in front. Progress was so slow that the
commanding officer, himself well forward, radioed for greater speed.
When the Israeli unit reached a point about eight miles south of Ein
Zhalta on the road from Moukhtara the Syrian guns opened up. Shells
fell around the tanks and on the road, and a rain of rocks and metal
cascaded over them. The commanders ducked inside and slammed shut
the hatches, but even with their sophisticated target-spotting optics
they could not locate the enemy guns. In their desperate need for
visibility they opened their hatches - and some were sniped through the
head.
The radio network went wild with calls for help and direction, but the
CO quickly made his authority felt and calmed his men. 'Look for the
guns firing at the tanks in front of you and behind you,' he said. 'You'll
see them better than the guns firing at you.'
The Syrian commandos came in very close, some to within a few
metres of the tanks. The noise was tremendous and several tanks caught
fire. Tank crews choked in the smoke and fumes as they tried to rescue
wounded comrades. Wounded and rescuers alike were picked off by the
Syrian commandos. Some Pattons, trying to manoeuvre in the confined
space, ran into other tanks. Ammunition was running short and help
was far off; Israeli aircraft could not help until dawn.
The Task Force artillery commander broke into the radio network.
'Give me your precise bearings,' he told the tank brigade leader, 'and
I'll lay down a covering barrage to give you a chance to get yourself out
of there.'
The carefully calculated barrage hit the Syrian positions with
devastating force. But these elite, disciplined troops held their ground
despite casualties, and their commander brought up T-62 tanks for a
final assault on the trapped Israeli column. Dawn was now breaking,
and he had to annihilate the Israelis before their warplanes could
79
intervene. The commandos ran in with anti-tank grenades and actually

clambered on to the Pattons to make sure of their kills.
The Israeli artillery commander, miles away, understood the critical
situation, and ordered over the radios, 'Close down! Sit tight!' His guns
then dropped anti-personnel shells right on top of their own tanks,
blowing away the storming Syrian commandos. Gradually the Pattons
edged backwards as the Israeli gunners changed their pattern of fire
once more, this time to give the Pattons a safe corridor out.
With the coming of broad daylight on 11 June Israeli planes strafed
the Syrian tanks and gun positions until another IDF tank column
came into action. The Syrians rushed reinforcements along the
Damascus-Beirut road, but Israeli fighters caught them while they
were still on their transporters on the winding highway, and blew up
bridges to prevent retreat. The Syrians brought in Mi-24 Hind and
tank-killer Gazelle helicopters, but lost four of them to ground and air
fire. About half the Syrian 1st Armoured Division was destroyed that
day around Lake Qaraoun. The surviving Syrian tanks withdrew, and
the Israelis consolidated along the Bekaa-Joub Jannine line. The battle
had lasted seven or eight hours, and both sides had lost heavily.
Other Israeli mechanised units had followed the mountain roads to
Kfar Qouq and Bekaa, each less than five kilometres from the Syrian
border, in the rugged country to the rear of 'Fatahland'. This severed
PLO territory from its Syrian support as completely as the difficult
terrain permitted.
Many small-scale encounters took place. Shmuel Yitzhaky, a 27-
year-old medic, spoke of one of them. He was attached to a group of five
armoured personnel carriers which were the first to reach the village of
Bir Shmali, just outside Tyre. The APCs had been accompanied by
tanks and artillery but had somehow become separated from them. The
young officer in command of the APCs decided to go in all the same.
'We didn't find much resistance at first,' Yitzhaky said, 'but then we
were hit by rocket-propelled grenades. The PLO boys were very brave.
There were only three or four of them, but they held us off all night. We
were lucky that they had not been better trained; with the type of
weapons they had they could have finished us off. A shell ripped into our
Zelda. It was the kind that gets very hot before it explodes. I felt the heat
and tried to get out.'
He almost made it; but the shell exploded, and steel fragments ripped
80
ANOTHER SIX-DAY WAR
into his leg. He was evacuated to the edge of the village. When daylight
came tanks and infantry went in and ended the night-long resistance.
One of the PLO fighters, hit in the chest, was taken with Yitzhaky and
other wounded Israelis to Rothschild Hospital in Haifa.
Air combats continued, and another 11 MiGs were brought down.
Day Six - 11 June

That morning Israeli Merkava tanks ambushed a Syrian unit of the
82nd Armoured Brigade, equipped with the T-72 tank, in the Bekaa
Valley: nine of them went up in flames. The T-72 was the latest and
most powerful of the Russian-made tanks supplied to the Syrian Army,
and had been considered virtually invincible. Major-General Avigdor
Ben Gal said of this action, 'To our great satisfaction, we saw that the
T-72S burn just like any other tank.' The damaged T-72S lay in no-
man's-land, and the Syrians tried hard to prevent the Israelis from
An IDF M109 155 mm self-propelled howitzer in action against the

Syrian Army on the eastern front.
removing any of the hulks. Nobody in the West had yet examined a T-
72, and one was badly needed for evaluation. A specimen was later
retrieved.
The Merkavas, in this action and others, performed well against
T-55S, T-62S and T-72S. Some Merkavas were hit, but no Merkava
crewman was killed in action, due both to its massive frontal protection,
and to the design feature which allows men to leave a damaged tank
through a rear door instead of by the always vulnerable top hatch. The
Merkava demonstrated a 'survivability' superior to any other current
tank design 1 .
The Syrians, who had previously resisted Philip Habib's efforts to
bring about a ceasefire, were shaken by their losses, and now accepted an
agreement. At noon the I D F ceased fire on all fronts against Syrian
troops; but the Israeli government excluded the P L O from any such
agreement. It repeated its intention to continue 'all operations
necessary to destroy the P L O on Lebanese soil'. The I D F took up
positions in the Christian parts of East and North Beirut. The
remaining Syrian units in Lebanon were concentrated in the Zahle-
Chtaura area, where they began to receive reinforcements.
In less than six days the I D F had liberated 4,500 square kilometres of
southern Lebanon; had broken the PLO's major defence system, and
captured most of its arsenal. Convoy after convoy of trucks were already
ferrying this war booty back to Israel.
The I D F ' s chief education officer sent a letter to the troops that day,
11 June. It is an interesting document because, except in its essential
message, it is unlike anything which might appear in general orders in
other armies. The fact that it came from the chief education officer
rather than the Chief-of-Staff is also unusual. It reads in part:
Now that the aims of Operation 'Peace for Galilee' to guarantee safety to our
citizens in the north have been achieved, Israel has initiated a ceasefire. Israel
has called upon Syria to adhere to the conditions of the ceasefire in order to
stabilise the situation in Lebanon.
The IDF is now situated over extensive areas of Lebanon; soldiers are
coming into contact with a large, diversified civilian population. This contact
presents you with a challenge - to behave in a humane, Jewish and IDF
fashion.
1
See Appendix 3.
82
ANOTHER SIX-DAY WAR
Syrian Army T-62 tanks advance over a rocky plateau in the

south-east Bekaa Valley.
The chief military prosecutor has published binding instructions to ensure

such behaviour:
It is absolutely forbidden to take spoils from any source whatsoever. Anyone
violating this order can expect a trial and a maximum sentence of ten years in
prison.
Roadblocks have been placed on all exit roads from southern Lebanon;
everyone leaving the area will be checked. The peaceful civilian population
must not be harmed; in particular, respect for women must not be violated.
All IDF soldiers must refrain from harming sites of cultural value, including
archaeological sites, museums and the like.
It is forbidden to harm the holy sites of any religion.
The IDF must not act according to the standard accepted by our enemies;
we must not allow feelings of revenge to guide our behaviour towards the
civilian population in Lebanon. . . . A deterioration of the rules of moral
conduct in the IDF, which is a 'people's army', will hurt you as a man and a
citizen, and will have its effect on the moral level of Israeli society and on its
quality of life.
The maintenance of the rules of fitting behaviour during your stay in
Lebanon will also help Israel in its political and public opinion campaigns. Part
of the civilian population in Lebanon has shown itself ready to co-operate with
Israel. One of the goals of Operation 'Peace for Galilee' was 'the hope that a
peace treaty will be signed with an independent Lebanon, its territorial
integrity preserved'. This is why the initial contact between IDF personnel
83
ANOTHER SIX-DAY WAR
and the citizens of Lebanon is so important. This contact is what will determine
the character of future relations between two good neighbours.
The eyes of the world are now on our region. Many journalists and foreign
correspondents are now in the combat zone.
Acts of looting, or damage to property, holy places, cultural sites or natural
or scenic areas will play into the hands of our enemies. You must see yourselves
as having personal responsibility for the image of the IDF and of the State of
Israel in the eyes of the citizens of Lebanon and of world public opinion.
The principles of morality are basic to the Jewish heritage. Even in wartime,
it must be remembered that to his fellow man, a human being is a human being.
The letter concluded with a long extract from Joshua VII, 19-25. (It
should be noted that the chief education officer makes no mention of the
evils of strong drink. This is because the Israeli armed forces are teetotal
on and off duty. There is no alcohol in messes, canteens or recreation
centres.)
The Israeli Army has always been efficient; but I have never seen it
look so good as during the 1982 campaign in Lebanon. Its combat
equipment was in excellent condition and well serviced; salvage and
repair depots were in position almost before armour was in action. I saw
few breakdowns, and much evidence that soldiers were taking more care
of vehicles than in other wars. Soldiers going forward were thoroughly
kitted out, and their new webbing equipment was carefully adjusted for
fit. Artillery was well dug in and completely camouflaged, and it
operated with greater speed and precision than in the Yom Kippur War.
The most impressive aspect of the Israeli Army at war was its logistical
support. Whenever I saw tanks and M109A1 self-propelled guns, their
Alpha ammunition carriers were close by. Dumps of petrol,
ammunition and other supplies were well sited and clearly marked.
Lebanon's roads are narrow, rough and vulnerable to blockage, and
wherever possible, the Q staff used naval vessels, transport aircraft and
helicopters to move supplies up to forward units and to key dumps. As
far as I could tell, at no time was any fighting unit short of ammunition,
weapons or water.
Three Syrian T-62S and a truck, knocked out by Israeli tanks and
artillery in the mountains of the central sector. The fierceness of
the night action in which they were destroyed may be judged by
the way these wrecks are bunched - this probably represents an
entire troop knocked out almost simultaneously. (Author's photo)
85
The Israelis made many of their more important assaults under cover
of darkness. Arabs generally do not like night-fighting, while the
Israelis are well trained in this form of warfare.
In its first war the first Israeli-designed and Israeli-built tank, the
Merkava (Hebrew for 'Chariot'), proved itself to be one of the best tanks
in the world. Apparently designed specifically for rocky terrain, the
Merkava was subjected to immense stress on the mountain roads and
barren ridges but few broke down.
The medical services operated with crisp efficiency. Medevac teams
were as close to the front line as were British Forward Surgical Teams in
the Falklands. Sometimes a soldier wounded in action was in an
operating theatre in Israel itself within an hour of being hit. The I D F
went to much trouble to avoid civilian casualties, as we personally
witnessed. In a strictly military sense they went to dangerous lengths.
By taking the time to call on civilians to leave a battle area they sacrificed
surprise and increased their own casualties.
Israeli aircraft made low-altitude bombing runs, at great risk to the
pilots, in order to avoid the civilian casualties which would be caused by
less accurate high-level bombing. Later, Israeli planes used careful pin-
point bombing techniques so sophisticated that a single building
housing a P L O headquarters could be hit without damage to buildings
on either side.
From their relatively protected positions at sea the Navy's guns
provided an additional and unexpected angle of attack, and played an
important part in ensuring a speedy advance of the main armoured and
infantry body along the dangerous coast road.
The quantity and quality of material found in P L O dumps surprised
even Israeli Intelligence. The author examined several large storage
depots, notably that at Damour operated by the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine. All kinds of munitions were kept in elaborately
fitted concrete caverns, ten metres high and nearly as wide, running
literally for miles under the hills. In all, 5,000 tons of weapons and
Any soldier can find a small boy to, pose with, if told by an Army
PR officer to project a kindly image; but pictures such as this
cannot be dismissed so lightly if seen in conjunction with the
long, specific, and minatory orders issued to all IDF personnel on
the subject of respect for Lebanese civilians and property, quoted
at length in this chapter. (IDF)
86
ammunition were taken from these caverns, which were garrisoned.

The most prized find were many SA-9 anti-aircraft missiles.
Much of this war materiel had reached Lebanon in crates marked
with the Red Cross or Red Crescent - obviously, without the knowledge
of those organisations. The author saw crates of grenades stencilled
'Medical Equipment'. Katyusha rockets travelled in boxes marked
'Tractor Spares'. In the Damour tunnels the author saw weapons and
ammunition made in the United States, Soviet Union, Poland,
Czechoslovakia, France, North Korea, Hungary, East Germany,
Britain and Italy.
At times most of the traffic from Lebanon to Israel consisted of trucks
laden with captured materiel. The author personally found an
abandoned Soviet 130 mm gun with piles of shells in a grove near
Nabatiye and aimed at the Christian town of Marjayoun; the gunners
had left so quickly they did not even booby-trap it. In Tyre and Sidon
the author saw the cellars of inhabited apartment buildings turned into
storage rooms for ammunition and weapons. In many apartments were
weapon emplacements, observation posts and command posts.
While pockets of resistance took days and even weeks to eliminate, the
Israelis were conscious of an impressive victory, despite murmurs of
criticism in Israel that the IDF had advanced too far north. Israel
intended to secure its objectives quickly in order to forestall possible
American and Soviet intervention - and in this it succeeded. However,
not all the objectives had yet been achieved. The PLO was still present
in force in Beirut; and Syrian commando and tank units around Ain-
Dara - between Chtaura and Ein-Sofar - prevented an Israeli armoured
division from reaching the main highway before the ceasefire came into
effect. This was a significant Syrian accomplishment in view of Israel's
air superiority.
88
4 The Siege
The ceasefire between Israel and Syria was precarious, but it held for ten
days. In that time the Israelis and the PLO were in continual conflict.
On 13 June the PLO and Israel did arrange a ceasefire but it held for
only an hour or so; large numbers of PLO fighters either did not receive
the information from their HQ, or ignored it. From then on fighting
between Palestinians and Israelis was continual. On that day, 13 June,
Israeli units took the presidential palace at Baabda during a 14-hour
battle.
For more than a week the Israeli cabinet and the military leadership
had been worried about what action to take concerning the large refugee
camp of Ein el-Hilwe, home of thousands of Palestinian refugees. It was
also the largest PLO stronghold in southern Lebanon. The many
buildings, some of them large and well built, and the miles of narrow
streets and paths were ideal for defenders and hazardous for attackers.
The Palestinians had created a thick line of bunkers, underground
command posts, ammunition dumps, machine gun posts and mortar
pits.
For six days Israeli loudspeakers urged the civilians to leave the
camp, and some did. PLO fighters shot in the back one man who tried to
escape, and then tied him to a pole until he died, as a warning to others
who were thinking about fleeing1.
On five occasions delegations of Lebanese dignitaries from Sidon
went to the camp to ask the PLO leaders as well as senior Palestinian
citizens to come out for talks. The dignitaries themselves were not
allowed close enough to talk, but they shouted to the PLO fighters to at
least allow the civilians to come out. They also promised that any PLO
man who came out without arms would not be harmed.
The PLO men inside the camp responded by firing at the delegation
and yelling, 'Victory or death!' Many of them had been trained in this
1
Testimony from Abbas al-Haf, 55, a neighbour of the victim.
89
camp and they were confident that they could hold it. They expected the
Israelis to make a creeping, house-by-house advance. Since this would
have meant a protracted operation with many casualties, the Israeli
generals chose to storm the camp in the hope that the shock of such an
attack would bring about rapid surrender.
The attack went in on 14 June. Tanks were used against the stronger
areas but armoured bulldozers were the spearhead elsewhere: fewer
people on both sides would be killed, the Israeli command reasoned, if
buildings were demolished quickly, thus depriving the defenders of
sniping positions.
About 50 older people and mothers with children were lying on the
floor of a mosque for protection when PLO fighters barricaded
themselves into it and fired at the Israeli troops. As the Israelis
approached some of the terrorists forced the sheltering civilians to their
Jeep crews of the reconnaissance unit of an IDF motorised brigade.

The soldiers had been in action - or under the expectation of action
- for about 60 hours, without sleep, when this photograph was
taken.
THE SIEGE
feet and told them to walk towards the Israelis. If they refused, the
terrorists said, they would be killed in the mosque. The civilians
fearfully did as they were ordered while the terrorists, using them as a
shield, fired at the Israelis. Terrified, the cluster of people lay down.
The terrorists yelled at them, and then shot some of them before the
Israelis captured the mosque1.
Some close-quarter fighting took place, but as the Israeli armour
ground on and the unoccupied area of the camp shrank many PLO men
saw the futility of a last-ditch stand, and surrendered after much of the
town had been destroyed.
Two Israeli units held back from engaging Palestinians deployed near
the hospital until the patients could be evacuated. After two days of
negotiations the 20 patients, mostly PLO fighters, were evacuated and
treated at an Israeli medical post set up near the camp. From here they
were sent on to a local hospital.
On 16 June a specially trained Phalange commando unit captured
from the PLO the six-storey Lebanese University Sciences Faculty
building overlooking the airport, and a large suburban area in South
Beirut. This was the militia's only significant combat mission in Beirut
while Bashir Gemayel was alive. (Much later they fought the Druse in
the hills, and lost several hundred men killed.)
A new Syrian-Israeli ceasefire arrangement made on 16 June broke
down on the 21st. On 22 June the IDF moved against a Syrian enclave
on the Beirut-Damascus road. The Syrian forces' position stretched
from their stronghold at Bekaa/Dahr al-Baidar down through the
Bhamdoun area to Aley and close to Baabda; here the Syrians and the
PLO were separated by only a thin Israeli-held strip of mountainous
terrain. Israeli artillery bombarded Syrian positions at Bhamdoun,
Zufar, Majdal Bana, Suq el-Arab, Kahle and Aley, where the Syrians
had their headquarters. SAM sites were hit and destroyed, and two
MiG-23s were shot down.
The Golani Brigade, supported by tanks, advanced that day and the
next against Syrian commandos. The Syrian units withdrew through an
escape route deliberately left open by the Israelis. By 26 June the IDF
held the entire area from Zufar to eastern Beirut and 22 km of the
1
Testimony of Sa'ad Milhem, a 78-year-old resident of Ein el-Hilwe, whose home was destroyed
in the fighting.
91
Beirut-Damascus road, thus cutting off the PLO from Syrian supplies.
Finally, the Israeli units linked with those of the Christian Lebanese to
the north of the city. West Beirut was now effectively under siege.
Meanwhile the Christians of East and North Beirut were giving the
Israeli soldiers an ecstatic welcome. In a despatch from Beirut on 20
June Colin Smith of The Observer painted an intriguing picture of the
troops' reception:
There were scenes reminiscent of those old newsreels of the liberation of Paris
. . . after eight terrible years Pax Israelia had arrived. Young women and not-
so-young women planted kisses on the unshaven cheeks of weary Israeli
paratroopers. . . . Near the presidential palace at Baabda a green Peugeot
disgorged a bow-legged madame pursued by her grandson who announced in
English, 'She wants to kiss you.' As the full horror of their situation dawned the
Israelis retreated into their armoured personnel carrier.
By now many hundreds of unofficial volunteers from Iran, Libya and

elsewhere had arrived in Damascus and Tripoli (Lebanon) and were
rushing south and west to support the Syrian and PLO forces. Syrian
and PLO officers found this support embarrassing, since the Libyans
(and even more, the Iranians) wanted to take command at local level.
The Iranians demanded the right to make 'martyr's missions' - suicide
attacks - against the Israelis, and a few were shot by PLO men to prevent
them from provoking the massive Israeli reprisals which were sure to
follow such attacks.
By the end of June the PLO believed that up to 700 Israeli tanks were
deployed around the western part of the city, together with 1,000
armoured personnel carriers and 210 guns of 155 mm and 175 mm
calibre. The true figure was not much less.
Israeli aircraft were dropping leaflets printed on pink and green
paper, and carrying this warning:
The Israeli Defence Force is continuing its war against the terrorists and has
not yet used its full force. The IDF is concerned not to hurt innocent civilians
and anyone who doesn't fight against it.
Residents of Beirut, make use of the ceasefire and save your lives. You have
the following exits:
(a) through the IDF forces to the east on the Beirut-Damascus road. (b)
northward towards Tripoli.
Save your life and those of your loved ones.
The Commander of the IDF.
92
M109 howitzers in the Israeli lines south of Beirut during the siege.
(Author's photo)
Many civilians wanted to leave; but the Palestinian fighters and their
allies of the leftist Lebanese militias reacted to the leaflets by closing the
remaining crossing points between East and West Beirut, thus sealing
themselves - and the civilian population - into the four square miles of
encircled West Beirut.
By now there was that stillness about the city that comes with the
expectation of momentous events. The electricity was off in some areas
and other quarters were without water. The telephone system had
almost collapsed, bread was scarce and few petrol stations were open.
When Israeli planes bombed Beirut they had information from
Intelligence which permitted accurate attacks. The London Times
correspondent in Beirut, Robert Fisk, commented on 5 July:
Israeli aircraft have unerringly hit PLO offices in West Beirut. They have
destroyed the headquarters building of Salah Khalaf, who under the nom de
guerre of Abu Iyad runs Yasser Arafat's security service. They have razed the
offices of Khalil Wazzir (Abu Jihad) who commands Arafat's military
operations. Israeli Phantom fighter-bombers destroyed Ibrahim Quleilat's
Nasserite Murabitoun militia in Tarik Jdedeh. . . . The Israelis appear to be
aware of Arafat's every movement [in Beirut]. In one period he moved his base
three times in two days and on each occasion Israeli planes attacked the three
buildings in which he had been staying.
93
For a week following the Aley-Bhamdoun battles the I D F continued

mopping-up operations in an effort to eliminate enemy pockets of
resistance and to gather all combat materiel which had been left behind.
The weapons collected by the end of June were sufficient to equip
30,000 men. In mid-July the I D F ' s quartermaster general announced
that his supply, recovery and salvage units had located 413 arms and
ammunition caches, though not all had been cleared out. His men had
gathered 4,170 tons of ammunition - enough to fill 1,500 trucks; 764
vehicles and combat vehicles, including tanks and personnel carriers;
26,900 light weapons and 424 heavy weapons (artillery and rocket
launchers); 1,295 communications devices, and 1,404 periscopes and
field-glasses.
Released from battle at last, an Israeli tank crew luxuriate in an

improvised shower somewhere in the hills of the central sector.
Two can be seen to wear chains round one ankle; these secure
identity tags. Tank crews no longer wear tags round their necks: in
1973 so many tank fatalities had their heads blown off that this is
considered a more practical method of ensuring the identification
of the dead. (Author's photo)
94
THE SIEGE
Throughout the second half of June and the early part of July PLO
fighters still at large in the wild regions of southern Lebanon made hit-
and-run attacks on Israeli units. On 28 June a PLO squad fired a rocket-
propelled grenade at an army truck east of Damour and wounded three
soldiers. Here and there they mined roads or sniped Israeli Army camps
at long range. From 16 July onward the PLO garrison in Beirut was
active on many parts of the perimeter, firing shells, missiles and small
arms at IDF positions.
The Israeli cabinet had been agonising about the IDF's presence in
Beirut and its future role - and in this debate they were joined by large
numbers of the Israeli public. The IDF had gone much further than its
original stated intention and, for the first time, Israeli troops had
entered an Arab capital. Generals, politicians and intellectuals had
insisted, ever since Israel had first been forced into war in 1948, that
their army should never attack an Arab capital. Such an attack would
give credence to the accusation that the Israelis were expansionist
imperialists. This was also the first time that Israeli armed forces had
attacked built-up areas, with consequent danger to civilians.
The Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, and Defence Minister Ariel
Sharon favoured attack on the grounds that the job of defeating the
PLO had to be finished; if the PLO were not driven from Beirut then
before long they would return to the south of Lebanon. In any case, they
argued, Beirut was no longer a normal capital but an occupied city
without effective government.
Other members of the cabinet were worried about American opinion,
Soviet reaction and dissent in Israel. Some soldiers objected to any
continuation of the war and a few had refused duty in Lebanon. Despite
these misgivings, the decision to drive the PLO from Beirut was taken.
Loudspeakers as well as leaflets dropped from the air urged the
civilian population to get out of Beirut. The PLO did now allow some
families to leave, and we saw them lining up in battered, overladen cars
and utilities at the crossing points. 'They're crazy in there,' a bearded
Lebanese Muslim student told me, pointing back into the ghetto of
West Beirut. 'The PLO have a death wish and they all want to be
martyrs.' His girlfriend added, 'And they want the Lebanese to be
martyrs as well.'
'What about the Palestinian families?' we asked.
'They all want to be victims,' the student said.
95
The girl objected to this. 'Not the women,' she said. 'The men want
to make the women into victims. They believe all that propaganda about
fighting to the last Palestinian.'
On 22 July the Israeli Air Force commenced a seven-day
bombardment of military targets. Bombing was limited to precision
strikes on positively identified targets, as in Beirut Forest and the
Ramlet el-Baida area, where there was little or no settlement. In the
Fahakani area, south of Metropolitan Beirut, isolated targets such as
PLO headquarters were hit. Pilots on a mission over Beirut or any other
built-up area were assigned a single target and forbidden to bomb
alternative targets. They were told to return to base with bombs
undropped if they could not identify their primary target.
Simultaneously, the IDF made a surprise attack on Syrian positions
in the eastern sector; in an air and artillery assault dozens of Syrian
tanks, as well as support vehicles, guns and supply dumps, were
destroyed. The Syrian command brought up from Syria three SA-8
missile launchers which were located and destroyed on 24 July before
they could get into action. An SA-6 hit an Israeli Phantom on
reconnaissance and it went down in flames.
The contrast between life in Christian East Beirut and PLO-
occupied West Beirut was almost grotesque. In East Beirut we sat one
day under a sunshade at a streetside cafe, and were served ice-cream by a
white-coated waiter while we listened to gunfire from West Beirut a
quarter of a mile away. The contrast between life in Beirut and in
Jounieh, six miles north on the coast, was even more stark. At the beach
young Christian men, taking a few hours off from fighting, showed off
their prowess as water-skiers to bikini-clad lovelies lounging on the
sand. At night people gathered on villa verandahs to watch the
'fireworks' in Beirut while sipping cocktails.
The Christians' disregard for the siege of West Beirut was so
complete that the Lebanese state radio regularly advised about the
dangers of traffic jams for all those people heading for the beaches.
Several people from West Beirut, including Muslims, told us that only
on the beach could they 'get away from the noise'. They meant the din of
guns and rocket-launchers.
By chance, we were in Damour on the day when a large number of the
former Christian inhabitants returned to the town. It looked much like
the French town of Oradour-sur-Glane, destroyed by Nazi SS troops in
96
THE SIEGE
Yasser Arafat
photographed during
the siege of West
Beirut. His dislike of
small children is well
known, but he has
always been astute in
his dealings with the
foreign press, and
was easily persuaded
to pose for
photographs like
this.
1944 as a reprisal for alleged Resistance activity. The French have

preserved the ruins of Oradour as a national monument; the Christian
Lebanese would like to do the same in at least part of Damour.
The ruined houses still contained a few personal things left behind by
those who survived massacre by the PLO in 1976. We found pictures on
the walls, pots on the stoves, even a piece of work half-finished in a
sewing machine. One house had beautifully crocheted curtains at the
windows. Under some rubble I found a photograph album full of some
family's snapshots: a family long gone and quite possibly murdered. It
was difficult to tell which effects had belonged to Palestinians and which
to the Lebanese Christians they had driven out.
A volunteer working party had cleaned up the mess which the PLO
had left in the church on the western side of the town. The place where
the cross had hung was pockmarked by bullets. Below, where the altar
once stood, lay a pile of greasy engine casings and spare parts; oil stains
spotted the floor of the church, which had been turned into a garage.
Next door, in a row of dimly lit stone chambers that once served as a
monastery, metal bunks lay overturned amid piles of clothing, cooking
utensils and various personal belongings. PLO slogans and posters
covered the walls.
97
Nayef Hawatmeh,
leader of the
Democratic Front
for the Liberation of
Palestine, was also
induced to pose with
a child during the
siege. Such images
are not easily
reconciled with the
PLO leaders'
declared
determination to
hold on to their
positions whatever
the cost to Lebanese
civilians trapped on
the urban battlefield.
In another part of town the large St Elias church was in similar

disarray; the now-departed P L O men had found a use for this church as
well - a volleyball net was stretched between two pillars. This large new
church, left unfinished by the fleeing Maronites in 1976, now bore many
spray-painted P L O slogans. On the inside wall where the altar was to
have stood two targets had been painted, and the stone all around them
was roughened by bullet holes. Above them, where a cross should have
hung, a triangular P L O symbol was painted in the Palestinian
nationalist colours of red, green, black and white, framing a silhouette of
a rifle and hammer.
A mass was being held in St Elias church to celebrate the Christians'
return to Damour, and many people present were openly overcome by
emotion. The Phalangists were taking no chances, however: helmeted
young soldiers were posted in the bell tower and at every other vantage
point to ensure safety from any P L O attack. Most of them had an image
of the Virgin Mary stuck or taped to the butts of their automatic rifles.
They saw nothing incongruous about this; they were fighting for their
religion, they said.
While tension grew among the P L O men trapped in West Beirut, the
Israeli troops, under less pressure than the Palestinians except when
98
THE SIEGE
actually on the perimeter, were relaxing. Late in July we attended an

open-air Army concert near Damour at which the compere was the
well-known actor Shlomo Eitan. In the background were many tanks,
their great guns poking into the night sky. Like soldiers anywhere, the
men clapped and cheered and laughed at the sometimes feeble but never
bawdy jokes - the IDF frowns on blue humour. Eitan told a story about
a Jew who had gone on a skiing trip in Switzerland and had become lost.
Eventually, when he was in a bad way from exposure and hunger, a
rescue team found him. 'We're from the Red Cross,' they told him. 'I've
donated already,' the skier said.
Two girl singers sat on a Merkava tank to deliver their number, but
other performers used a makeshift stage. The Ronnie Weiss five-man
band included a man with large prominent teeth who was known, Eitan
told the audience, as 'the teeth of the State'. The troops roared with
laughter. The most popular performers seemed to be a group called
'Benzine' who sang 'Rock around the clock tonight', and the American
dance team known as the 'Broadway Dance Marathon' who contributed
an energetic Charleston and highly professional tap-dancing.
A male singer sang a gentle ballad about getting out of the Army, with
the chorus line 'Perhaps we'll meet again in the Reserve', which the
troops picked up and sang enthusiastically. They were quieter when the
blonde Miri Aloni, a well-known singer, gave them a number about a
quiet Saturday morning in camp when nothing was happening except
mending. As an encore she sang 'How beautiful are the nights in the
land of Canaan . . . your eyes are like two lights in the sky talking to me
. . . what are they saying?' The troops, packed tightly together in places,
swayed slightly to the tune of this love song.
The compere led the troops in community singing. They gave the
greatest volume to 'When the saints go marching in', sung in English,
and the greatest feeling to 'When peace comes', sung in Hebrew.
A few girl soldiers were present. The first 20 Army girls had been sent
into Lebanon on 20 July. All unarmed, they were kept well away from
the front line and served only in well-fortified command posts, relieving
men from clerical work. The Army was taking no chances: the girls were
forbidden to swim off the Lebanese beaches, and had to be accompanied
by at least two male soldiers whenever they went outside their posts.
Next day, in the hills near Aley, we met a soldier who said he had been
deep in Israel only an hour before. So how had he reached the front so
99
quickly, we asked him. 'I hitched a lift in a passing helicopter,' he said

casually. He had waved to a low-flying scout helicopter, jerked his
thumb towards the front, and the pilot had come down for him. 'The car
broke down and my wife couldn't bring me to the border,' he explained
to us.
In the hills where we met the heli-hitching soldier the war sometimes
seemed unreal. In a now-deserted school near Baabda we met Colonel
Paul Kedar, the IDF's chief spokesman at the front. Kedar, who in
more peaceful days had created Israel's principal zoo, was a large, calm
and personable reservist officer. His job was to give journalists and
official visitors an account of the latest fighting and political situation.
Just outside his office we stood on a lip of the hills and looked down on
Beirut, spread out on the coastal plain like a gigantic model. It was easy
to pick out every landmark: the Corniche Mazraa boulevard, the airport
with a crippled airliner sprawled on the runway, the refugee camps,
schools and universities, the port, the major hotels - gutted during the
civil war of 1975-76 -and various other buildings. Military Intelligence
knew precisely what each one was being used for. We could also see
Israeli tanks and other positions, which would have been out of sight to
the PLO men in Beirut. 'It's quite a pretty view, isn't it?' Kedar said.
'You wouldn't believe that it's a time bomb waiting to go off.'
While the time bomb was ticking it was possible to dine at Wakim's in
the Ashrafiya quarter bordering the Green Line which separated
Christian East Beirut from the PLO-Muslim West. We did this one
A young Muslim girl shot

down by a PLO fighter
when she tried to escape
from West Beirut without
permission.
100
THE SIEGE
night, dining on asparagus soup, lamb kebab and rich mixed salads and
finishing with café blanc (hot rose-water). Then we strolled through the
darkened and semi-lit streets with some Lebanese we had known for a
long time. 'Do you suppose that any of your friends at home will believe
you when you tell them that you took a quiet walk through Ashrafiya
just a few blocks from the P L O positions?' one of the Lebanese said. Put
like that, we admitted that it was unlikely.
The Lebanese Prime Minister, Shafik Wazzan, a Muslim, sometimes
went down from the hills to negotiate with Yasser Arafat in West Beirut.
His journey was tricky because the PM could not be seen to be passing
through a checkpoint manned by Israeli and Christian Phalangist
troops; in any case, according to a diplomatic fiction, Israeli troops were
not in Beirut. The solution was simple. When the Israelis and
Phalangists were notified that the PM was on his way they tactfully
disappeared, and a Lebanese Army squad took over at the crossing
point. When the PM had come out of the West Beirut labyrinth again
the Israeli and Christian soldiers quietly reappeared.
The meetings which Wazzan attended were usually acrimonious, and
little was accomplished. The P L O leaders often made fierce public
statements from which it was difficult to back away when negotiations
took place. For instance, on 23 July Arafat said in a telegram to bereaved
Palestinian families:
The Palestinian revolution will not surrender to American-Israeli conditions,
will not lay down its arms and will continue its armed struggle to achieve the
right of the Palestinian people to return, to self-determination and the
establishment of an independent state on the land of Palestine.
On the same day Arafat's lieutenant Salah Khalaf said in an interview
with Al Khaley, a United Arab Emirates newspaper:
The PLO will never recognise Israel's existence. Any person talking about
recognition of the enemy should have his tongue and head cut off.
George Habash suggested making Beirut the PLO's Stalingrad or its
Hanoi - a notion which not surprisingly infuriated many Lebanese,
since it was not Habash's city to turn into rubble. The Lebanese also
criticised Arafat for his comment, when asked if he proposed to leave
Beirut: 'Did Churchill leave London during the blitz?' Beirut, the
Lebanese said, was their capital; it did not belong to the Palestinians.
His self-comparison with Churchill merely aroused derision.
101
In a despatch published in The Times on 24 July Robert Fisk

observed:
The State of Lebanon turned out to be worth less to the Palestinians than the
unborn state of Palestine. . . . A few nights ago a young armed Palestinian
walked up to me in the street, an intelligent, brave man whom I have known for
some years. He was troubled by reports of negotiations for a PLO withdrawal.
'We will never withdraw,' he said firmly, 'and if the Israelis come into West
Beirut we shall destroy it with them. If necessary we shall destroy all Lebanon.'
Arafat made his intention clear to Sa'ad Sayil (Abu al-Walid), the
military commander of the P L O forces during the siege of Beirut. Sayil,
a capable officer, was the only member of Fatah who, without being one
of its founders, had become one of its most prominent leaders. He had
joined Fatah in 1970 after serving in the Jordanian Army, and
contributed a good deal of military knowledge to the organisation. Not
that his ideas were always accepted: some of his colleagues were jealous
of his educated military background 1 .
During the siege snipers were a constant hazard. Women were shot
while queueing for bread and children while playing in the street; some
people were hit while trying to retrieve belongings from abandoned
homes. We knew of a Christian woman who became a sniper's victim
when she returned to her old home in West Beirut - most Christians had
long before been forced out of that sector of the city - to get a suitcase
full of clothing.
The snipers were a strange and vicious breed, and many simply fired
at movement without waiting to check the sex, age or 'status' of a target
(they used the word 'status' to refer to political and religious affiliation).
They included 'volunteers' from Iran, Pakistan and Bangladesh.
Journalists met a couple of members of the IRA; and at least one
American negro, Isa Abdullah Ali, a Vietnam veteran from
Washington.
A convert to the Shi'a faith, Ali told Bill Branigin of The Washington
Post that he wanted to die in battle for his religion. He had already tried
to do this in Afghanistan and in Iran. In Beirut he dressed in US Army
combat fatigues, wore Airborne and Ranger badges and carried an M16
1
Sayil was killed, reportedly by a Syrian assassination squad, in the Bekaa Valley in late September
1982.
102
THE SIEGE
A Lebanese Christian militiaman returns to a Damour church

desecrated by the PLO during their occupation of this once-
Christian town. (R. Nowitz)
103
Smoke rises from a PLO headquarters building in West Beirut
after an Israeli airstrike. These attacks were carried out with great
precision to avoid damage to surrounding buildings, and the pilots
operated under very strict control. (Author's photo)
assault rifle. He claimed, by mid-August, to have killed nine Israeli

soldiers with this weapon, using a 500-metre telescopic sight. He was
equally ready to shoot a Christian, or anybody else pointed out to him as
'an enemy'. Ali identified with Khomeini's cause, so even Iraqis who
had come to Lebanon to fight against the Christian Lebanese and the
Israelis were also among his victims. He told Branigin that he was sure
that sooner or later he was going to be killed, and we heard later that he
was: according to a report he was shot by an Iranian, of all people, who
because of the uniform he wore mistook him for an American.
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Beirut - already sufficiently
provided with its own killers - attracted numbers of psychopaths eager
for any opportunity to live out their dark fantasies.
In a sense the bogging down of the I D F outside Beirut was a result of
the unpopularity of the P L O in the Arab world. No Arab country had
104
THE SIEGE
come forward to give unconditional refuge to the PLO; all had attached
conditions about numbers, arms, political activities and movement.
On 28 July Arafat ordered a massive bombardment - 'Use everything
that will fire,' the PLO were told - of Israeli positions. This was
designed to show the Israeli government that Arafat was negotiating
from strength. The barrage destroyed a number of vehicles and caused
31 Israeli casualties, three of them fatal.
On Friday 30 July Israeli guns heavily shelled PLO positions at
Beirut airport. The following night parts of the Barak Armoured
Brigade and the Golani Infantry Brigade were put on alert for an attack
to capture the airport and then move on against enemy strongpoints at
el-Ouzaai and Bourg el-Barajna. These moves were part of what officers
were calling 'tightening the noose' around areas held by the PLO and
Syrians.
On Sunday 1 August the airport was taken in very heavy fighting, and
PLO positions were again shelled. The Barak and Golani units
advanced from there, on 3 August, on to ground overlooking Bourg el-
Barajna. Other units meanwhile took el-Ouzaai and Hai e-Saloum.
The Barak and Golani soldiers strengthened their positions by piling
up earth ramparts around their tanks and armoured personnel carriers.
Their position was hazardous, and they were constantly in danger from
snipers, anti-tank missiles and shells. To bring their main guns to bear
on the enemy the Israelis had to drive their tanks up the ramps of the
embankments, which made them vulnerable to Sagger missiles.
The men in these positions were so shaken by the barrage that at 4 pm
they were relieved by fresh troops from their own brigades. The
replacements had hardly arrived when the shelling increased in
intensity and accuracy. The position became an inferno. Amid the
blazing tanks and troop carriers some men died trying to help wounded
comrades - and the wounded themselves were hit again and killed.
Israeli gunners opened fire on the PLO and Syrians but could not
silence them. An hour later fighter-bombers knocked out the enemy
guns. By that time 13 Israeli soldiers were dead, 19 were wounded and
six were out of action through 'shell shock' - psychiatric wounds.
While the battle for el-Ouzaai was in progress the IDF captured,
against resolute resistance, PLO positions around the Lebanese
National Museum and the Hippodrome, both in the centre of the city
and on the border between the Christian and Muslim quarters.
105
On 4 August Israeli gunners bombarded West Beirut, and cluster

bombs were dropped. Some Western correspondents in Beirut at the
time said that civilians were terrified. The Hotel Commodore, the
Western press centre, came under fire for the first time. The battle and
bombardment ended on 5 August.
The Israeli purpose - and Sharon's personal intention - seemed to be
to sap the will of the P L O leadership to continue the struggle. It was
certainly weakened, but Arafat clung to the hope that superpower
pressure would force an Israeli withdrawal. He and his lieutenants
repeatedly conferred on ways to save face and to get the best possible
terms for a pull-out. They also wanted time to make the best
arrangements for the transfer of their operations abroad.
During 10-12 August the I D F tightened its grip on Beirut, and on
the 12th bombarded the P L O quarters for 11 hours with artillery, naval
Under the watchful eye of an Italian airborne infantryman of the

Multi-National Force, civilians stock up with food after the
withdrawal of the PLO and the restoration of a deceptive and
short-lived 'normality' in the streets of Beirut.
THE SIEGE
guns and air strikes. That evening, as the firing ceased, the P L O leaders
decided not to make further shows of strength and sent a message that
they would withdraw on Israeli conditions. A ceasefire was arranged;
and it was agreed that a multi-national force should supervise the
withdrawal of the P L O , without their heavy weapons, partly by sea to
various Arab countries and partly by road to Syria.
The P L O began its withdrawal on 21 August. The next day Shaun
Usher reported in The Mail on Sunday:
They gathered at sunrise in West Beirut's municipal soccer stadium, a dusty,

war-battered arena stinking of rancid garbage and human waste. Though the
setting was squalidly inglorious they were high on the Arafat version. . . .
Nobody mentioned that helpless civilians had been the new super armour
making the 'victory' possible. Some soldiers arrived by stolen Mercedes Benz.
Beirut is lousy with Mercs, many stolen in Europe . . . A wife in flowing robes
captured the loudspeakers and half-chanted, half-sang a message of pride and
grief soaring up into that chilling, ululating Arab cry, a fiendish yodel that was
answered by the men's savage approval.
The Multi-National Force took up position. In the port the 2nd

Parachute Regiment of the French Foreign Legion was in charge, later
to be relieved by the US 32nd Marine Amphibious Unit. An Italian
contingent of Marines and Bersaglieri took up position along the Green
Line. Two days later Bashir Gemayel was elected as Lebanon's new
president, succeeding President Sarkis. On 30 August the Syrian 85th
Brigade withdrew from Beirut along the main road. By now half the
P L O force had withdrawn and left for Arab countries.
In the eastern sector - the Bekaa region - the Syrians greatly
strengthened their forces while the Israelis withdrew some reserve units
back to Israel. The Lebanese Army, such as it was, entered West Beirut
for the first time in eight years.
As the P L O men left Beirut they repeatedly loosed off their
automatic rifles and machine guns into the air in gestures of defiance and
anger. All these thousands of bullets had to come down somewhere -
they killed 17 Palestinian and Lebanese civilians and wounded 42. This
lunatic shooting remains my most vivid memory of the P L O fighters'
departure from Beirut.
Over a loudspeaker truck came a message that was more an
exhortation: 'Tell the Arabs of your heroic resistance in Beirut and ask
them where their MiGs and Mirages were. Ask them why they
107
abandoned us. Tell them you fought the Israeli Army with your
Kalashnikovs and RPGs and dynamite sticks.'
Seeking reasons for their defeat, the PLO blamed betrayal by
renegades and the work of Israeli spies. Israeli Military Intelligence was
efficient - but not as good as the PLO believed, nor as cunning as some
Western correspondents wanted to make out.
There were rumours that Israeli Military Intelligence had long since
infiltrated the PLO's political and military command structure. This is
possible, though it is even more likely that Palestinians themselves sold
information to Israeli agents. Some spy stories were dramatic but - in
the author's opinion - dubious: Robert Fisk of The Times published one
on 5 July 1982. According to Fisk's informants, there had been a
Palestinian commander, 'a friendly, capable man with a stubbly beard',
who was revered by the PLO men for his soldierly qualities. He had
often briefed foreign correspondents on the struggle of the Palestinian
revolution. Soon after the Israeli army fought its way into Tyre the
Palestinian officer was observed standing on the pavement watching the
Israeli tanks driving past when some Israeli officers drove up in a jeep.
They appeared to recognise the Palestinian but 'they did not try to
arrest him - they saluted'.
Fisk is a first-rate reporter, but on several grounds the story he was
given by his informants is hard to credit. If this man was an Israeli
posing as a Palestinian he would not wait around to be recognised - spies
do not want recognition. If it were to become known that he was an
Israeli spy posing as a Palestinian he was in immediate danger of getting
a bullet in the head, or worse. Israeli officers would not be so stupid as to
salute a man they knew to be an undercover agent. And finally, Israeli
soldiers of any rank never salute on active service; they are very bad at
saluting at the best of times. Just possibly the 'spy' was a Palestinian
traitor; one story says that he was later found in an orchard with the back
of his head blown off. But a traitor would have been even more wary
than an Israeli of being recognised by his Israeli friends.
5 Post Mortem
THAT the invasion was a military success for Israel is evident. The IDF
took only six days to advance 60 miles across difficult terrain, a rate
which compares favourably with that of any other mountain campaign
in history. The PLO was broken, its stores were captured, it lost
thousands of prisoners, and those not captured were forced to flee. The
Syrians lost large numbers of planes and tanks, suffered heavy
casualties and had their self-confidence damaged. The threat to Israel's
northern region was removed, and the PLO was deprived of its last
contiguous border with Israel.
The political victory was less obvious, if only because the PLO was
not eliminated from Middle East politics. However, the fact that no
Arab nation in any way helped the PLO throughout its military action
against Israel was an indication of the PLO's decreased status in the
Arab world. Despite his military reverses at the hands first of the
Israelis and later of the Syrians, Arafat did not suffer political eclipse.
He was received by the Pope soon after his first retreat from Lebanon,
and he continued to be regarded as the leader of the PLO even though
half of it was no longer under his control.
Within Israel some criticisms were expressed. Martin van Crefeld, a
professor of history at the University of Jerusalem, said, 'There exists
the distinct impression that the Israeli Air Force's successes in Lebanon
were achieved by dint of technological superiority and by concentrating
on specific threats, but only at the cost of almost losing sight of what
airpower is all about. By virtue of its very success the IAF's war in the
air resembled a kind of pinball game that was almost unrelated, and
sometimes detrimental, to the conduct of the campaign as a whole.'
The author differs from Dr van Crefeld's apparent opinion of 'what
airpower is all about'. It is not solely concerned with protecting the land
forces from enemy air attack and making an advance easier for them;
and demoralisation of the enemy is only one of airpower's functions.
Another is accumulation of technological intelligence in anticipation
109
An Israeli armoured corps crewman, painfully but not seriously

wounded, is treated by medics after an action on the central front.
Since the Yom Kippur War, when the IDF suffered unacceptably
high casualties among highly-trained tank crews, there has been a
major study of ways to protect these important personnel from
serious injury and death: one result has been the unusual design of
the Merkava tank. (IDF)
110
POST MORTEM
of war. In this the IAF excels. For several years it had flown
reconnaissance missions over enemy territory with RPVs and manned
aircraft. Occasionally pilots engaged the missiles to learn all that could
be learned about the way they work. Knowing just what they were up
against, they were able to develop specific countermeasures. In some
ways the IAF's war was unrelated to the rest of the campaign, because it
did not always need to be related.
Van Crefeld argues that the combination of quantity with
technological sophistication 'made it possible to avoid any kind of
military thought, a tendency that was particularly evident in regular as
opposed to reserve units'. The IDF in Lebanon, he said, 'piled tank
upon tank and gun upon gun. A command and control system superior
to anything previously employed made it possible to achieve good
interarm co-operation and, above all, to spew forth vast amounts of
ammunition.'
He misses the point that this was the military thought which he claims
was lacking. The thinking had already been done, so that there was less
need for tactical changes of mind and of direction once battle was joined.
The speed of advance was proof of the military thought that had gone
into the campaign. Using many tanks, guns and a lot of ammunition is
one way of achieving a quick victory with few casualties for the attacker.
It is necessary when the enemy has strong positions, and it helps to
compensate for lack of surprise. Tactical originality, always the forte of
Israeli commanders at all levels, was not so necessary in this war.
Israeli quality had not declined, but Syrian quality had improved
markedly and the PLO had fought better than expected. This might
lead to a claim that the Israeli performance was somehow less
impressive than in previous wars; but it is hard to understand how this
claim can be pressed, given the physical facts of the Israelis' victory on
the ground.
Van Crefeld and some others say that the IDF's morale in Lebanon
was lower than during any other Israeli campaign. They base this claim
on public dissent among servicemen when on leave or on their return
from the front. In Israel, of all places, the level of morale cannot be
measured by dissent. Vincent Hanna, a BBC reporter, said, 'Israel is a
society more free and democratic than our own . . . there is open debate
and political conflict at every level1.'
1
Journalist, July August 1982.
111
An isolated instance when this freedom to comment does seem to

have reached the point of damaging morale and combat readiness was
the so-called 'Geva Affair', which attracted passionate comment in
Israel. During the siege of Beirut an officer named Col. Eli Geva, who
had proved his courage and competence when his Brigade 211 had led
the advance of Mordechai's division up the coast road, refused an order
to attack the city, and resigned his command. He stated the belief that it
was no part of his duty to interfere to such an extent in the internal
affairs of Lebanon, or to risk killing her citizens on the streets of her
capital. He took the honourable position that he was entirely willing to
serve on in the ranks of his brigade as a private soldier; but this request
was refused, and he was dismissed the service. His brigade was shaken
by these events, and — as mentioned in an earlier chapter — was only
pulled together by a personal appeal from Chief-of-Staff Eitan.
We heard some soldiers express their dislike of the war; but then we
have heard similar expressions in other armies in other wars. We neither
saw nor heard of any instances of the classic results of low morale - e.g.
insubordination, suicide, self-inflicted wounds, desertion, throwing
away equipment, or general military slackness. Morale was higher for at
Israeli medics
tend a captured
PLO fighter with
several wounds,
including eye
burns.
112
POST MORTEM
least one good reason: lightly wounded men, who in previous wars
would have been treated at a unit medical centre and returned to duty,
were evacuated to the rear.
Casualties were heavy on both sides. Between 6 June and 28 October
the Israelis had 368 dead, 2,383 wounded. (Losses by rank: one major-
general, one colonel, two lieutenant-colonels, 19 majors, 28 captains, 46
lieutenants, 132 sergeants, 90 corporals, 49 privates.) Two pilots and a
soldier were taken prisoner. The loss of so many officers and NCOs
indicates the Israeli Army's principle of leadership from the front.
Figures released in February 1983 showed that 466 Israeli
servicemen had been killed, and by May 1984 3,500 had been wounded.
Of these 400 finished treatment with a 50 per cent disability or more.
Five were blind, and more than 30 had suffered brain damage and
paralysis. Six soldiers lost both legs and 17 men were paralysed and
would spend many years in wheelchairs. Some of the serious casualties
were caused by RPG rockets fired from close range in urban areas.
Many men suffering from head wounds had been hit when in tanks or
armoured personnel carriers - though it is significant that Merkava
crews were not wounded1.
Six hundred of the wounded were classed as psychiatric casualties.
This was about 25 per cent of the total number, and twice as high as the
percentage recorded in the 1973 war. While 47 per cent of the total
number of injured in Lebanon were reservist soldiers the number of
reservists among those who suffered psychiatric damage amounted to
78 per cent.
Up to the 1967 war the IDF barely recognised the existence of
psychiatric casualties. The large number in 1973 came as a shock and
found the IDF unprepared. Casualties were flown out to a camp near
Tel Aviv and put under the care of psychiatrists. Some have still not
recovered from the trauma of that war. Steps were taken to deal more
efficiently with psychiatric casualties the next time, and in 1982 the
Army was ready. Mobile teams of psychologists, psychiatrists and
social workers were in being. Their job was to identify psychiatric
casualties at the medical evacuation centres and to treat them close to
the front. If they responded they were quickly returned to their units,
1
Israel had approximately 140 tanks knocked out, of which about 40 were total losses and the rest
were salvageable. APC total losses were about 135.
113
Simha Holzberg, a well-known Israeli 'character', helps a tank

crewman under treatment in hospital for severe burns. Holzberg
is not a member of the IDF, but has attached himself to it to help
the wounded in several of Israel's campaigns. (IDF)
since this in itself was part of the treatment. Those who did not respond
to psychiatric first aid were evacuated to a camp near Netanya for
psychiatric treatment in a military atmosphere; for instance, all patients
had daily periods of physical exercises. These methods were successful,
and most casualties made a quick and full recovery.
Some observers have wondered why a fairly large number of men
became psychiatric casualties during a war that was 'relatively easy'.
Victory was assured, these observers say; Israeli control of the skies was
absolute, and many units did not fire a combat shot. In this kind of war
why should an army have more than a few psychiatric casualties?
Such casualties can indicate a lack of unit supportiveness, and no
doubt this was a contributory factor in Lebanon. The more obvious
reason is that even before the war began the Israeli citizen-soldiers were
sick at heart at the prospect of yet another conflict. The tank soldier who
had said to us in a desperate voice, 'Why don't they leave us alone?' was
voicing this sentiment. There was also the bitter feeling, expressed to us
several times, that Israel was being internationally vilified for doing that
114
POST MORTEM
most natural of things, defending itself. In the author's view, the basis
of psychiatric wounding was desperation - the desperation that makes a
man say to himself, 'There's no end to Arab hostility.'
Some Israeli soldiers asked us why the outside world was so upset
about PLO casualties during the liberation of Lebanon when the
Syrians, only months before, had butchered thousands of its own
people and destroyed entire suburbs in Hama without a word of protest
from abroad.
Another factor must be taken into account. Medical science in 1982
was better able to identify a psychiatric wound than in 1973 or 1967, so
the statistics appeared higher even though the number of sufferers was
probably no greater than in the earlier wars.
Again, the IDF had not previously fought a war of ambush on narrow
trails and in village streets; such a form of warfare produces a greater
degree of tension than open warfare in that anticipation of attack is more
acute for much longer.
Yet another factor tending to produce stress - in this war as never
before - was the intense anxiety many soldiers felt about the risk of
harming innocent civilians, Lebanese and Palestinians, in a friendly
country. As mentioned above, the troops were under orders to take risks
rather than put civilians in danger1. Nevertheless civilians were killed
or wounded, and soldiers were often deeply distressed about this.
Syrian Military Leadership

An analysis of the Syrian performance during the war in Lebanon
reveals confusion and distrust among the members of the high
command. In addition, the Syrian leaders were unsure of their strategic
policy. Generally the intention was to cause Israel as much difficulty as
possible without actually going to war. While they wanted to provoke
the Israelis to the point where the world would regard Israel, and not the
Syrians and PLO, as the aggressors in Lebanon, they did not want an
Israeli invasion of Syria itself.
Rifaat Assad suggested that the Israeli Army should be drawn into
the Bekaa Valley and there trapped and annihilated. This simplistic idea
' In contrast, the Americans in Vietnam, the UN forces in Korea, and the Allies in Europe from D-
Day onwards, killed large numbers of civilians and saw it as a regrettable but inevitable evil of war.
I know of no instance in these wars when a commander gave the order 'Take risks rather than kill
civilians'.
115
from an earlier age of warfare was opposed by the Defence Minister,

Mustafa Tlas, who had the backing of Military Intelligence officers.
The leaders were united only in the belief that the air defences
protecting their positions in Lebanon were impregnable. The massive
and complex web of radar and missiles could not be breached, and the
Israeli Air Force would suffer heavy losses.
President Assad was prepared for a limited war - one that would give
the Syrians a chance to recover the Golan area lost to the Israelis in the
1973 war. But while he had a strategic concept to achieve this end he had
no realistic tactics. He was confident, however, that should a great tank
battle be fought in this war his T-72 tanks could wear down the Israeli
armour.
From the outset of the war the Syrian high command was in disarray
because of the conflicting interests and theories of powerful
personalities. On paper the chain of command was clear enough. The
president, Hafez Assad, was commander-in-chief, with Mustafa Tlas as
Defence Minister and Hikmat Shihabi as Chief-of-Staff. Below them
came General Shafik Fayad, commander of the Syrian Third Army;
General Ali Duba, chief of the Intelligence services; and General Rifaat
Assad, the president's brother, commander of the 'Defence Brigades'
which included at one time during the war the 1st Armoured Division.
The Prime Minister, Abd Qasim, also had certain military
responsibilities.
From the first day of the war, 6 June, there was confusion about who
made the tactical decisions. On that day and others several leaders made
contradictory decisions. Shihabi gave orders which were later
countermanded by Tlas and Rifaat Assad; and on at least two occasions
General Duba moved large units though it was not within his authority
to do this.
Duba's Military Intelligence system was reputed to be highly
efficient but it failed to inform the high command about the Israeli
'spies in the sky' - the RPVs. An Intelligence report also said of the
Merkava tank: 'It is a good tank but it cannot be considered a true main
battle tank because it is too light. Also, it does not carry enough
ammunition to sustain a long battle.' In fact, the heavily protected
Merkava has a loaded weight of 62 tons; and carries 83 rounds for its
105 mm gun, compared with the Syrian T-62's 40 rounds. Again,
the Syrians did not know the range of the Merkava's gun; and even
116
Some of the 500 or so armoured vehicles lost by the Syrian Army
in the 1982 war. These T-62S are among about 200 AFVs which
were recovered in salvageable condition by the Israelis. If past
wars are any guide, many of them will be put back into fighting
condition; modified by the substitution of some Israeli
components; and placed in reserve in Israel's own tank armoury.
Some of the older, simpler T-54 and T-55 tanks captured at
various times have been passed on to the 'South Lebanese Army'
led by Haddad and, since his death, by Lahad.
more seriously, they underestimated Israeli ammunition. The Israeli

Military Industries M111 105 mm APFSDS-T anti-tank round
actually punched a hole in the gun barrel of one T-62: despite the very
low angle of impact, the barrel's rounded surface and its extremely hard
material, the projectile did not glance off but penetrated the bore. Such
damage to their tanks shocked the Syrian commanders.
The loss of some 500 armoured vehicles in the Lebanon battles was a
tremendous blow to Syrian military confidence1. Much of the blame
must rest on faulty Intelligence which put the tanks in the wrong place
at the wrong time. Senior Syrian officers were also stubbornly reluctant
1
Israeli sources list Syrian armour losses as 200 T-62, 125 T-54 and T-55, nine T-72 and about 140
APCs. The numbers of Syrian and PLO tanks captured intact or salvageable cannot be established
exactly, but were apparently significant - in excess of 200.
117
to admit to a tactical mistake in positioning troops, guns and armour,

and thus extremely slow to redeploy. The Syrian tanks were generally
not in good battle order. Training of maintenance crews had been
neglected, despite Soviet advice that the Army should have more
technical schools. Repair facilities were rarely available close to the
battle; tanks had to be transported back to Damascus and beyond.
Personal interests sometimes influenced professional military
decisions. Rifaat Assad is one of the biggest narcotics dealers in the
Middle East, and his major base of operations is in the Shouf
Mountains. Much of his military planning was based on the need to
hold the Shouf, to prevent any disturbance of his lucrative traffic in
drugs - which meant backing the Druse against the Lebanese
Christians, both of whom had enclaves in the Shouf1.
The Syrian officer corps, though better than it had been in 1973, was
still deficient in leadership qualities. Mostly drawn from upper class
families, the officers considered their own survival more important than
the victory of their unit in combat; leadership from the front was
consequently fairly rare. Some Syrian prisoners told their Israeli
captors that junior officers fired on their own men from the rear to keep
them going forward. This statement is to some extent corroborated by
Russian observers who reported (in transparent 'Socialist double-
speak') that 'battalion officers took positive action to maintain
momentum in the assault'.
The best field leadership came from the older non-commissioned
officers. The quality of the ordinary soldiers was often better than their
own officers knew; the Israelis found them determined in attack and
stubborn in defence. Syrian troops were particularly courageous during
the fighting for Ein Zhalta, a Lebanese mountain resort held by the
Syrians. The commandos holding Bhamdoun also fought well during
the battles of 22-23 June.
On 14 June the Syrian 85th Mechanised Brigade, with T-55 tanks
and BTR-60 and BMP APCs, attacked Israeli armour south-east of
Beirut and closed to within 100 and even 50 metres. They fought so
1
The leading American columnist Jack Anderson stated in The Washington Post of 21 March 1983:
'. . . the list of officers enriching themselves from drug traffic is a veritable Who's Who of the Syrian
Army. . . . The most senior man involved is Rifaat Assad.' Time Magazine estimated, on 2 April
1984, that Rifaat Assad had amassed a personal fortune of $100 million from drug trafficking and
other activities. Chief Inspector Clevé Marquise of Interpol confirmed to the author that Assad
makes no secret of his narcotics distribution business.
118
POST MORTEM
stubbornly that they lost all their tanks and other vehicles. This did not
say much for their leadership, but proved the ability of Syrian troops to
stand up to pitched battle.
Overall, the Syrian Army was weak in two aspects: fire discipline, and
night-fighting ability. The men fired too much and too often, even when
they knew that fresh supplies could not quickly reach them. The Israelis
also used ammunition at a brisk rate in this war, but they knew that their
armoured ammunition carriers would get through with more. The
Syrian Army, like many Arab and African armies, appears to equate
volume and rate of fire with effectiveness. Soviet advisers have noted
that the Syrians seem to gain confidence from the noise of their own
Yasser Arafat with his bodyguard in West Beirut during the siege,
shouting 'To Victory!' A charismatic leader, Arafat has little
understanding of military realities, and sometimes gives the
impression of believing the wild rhetoric with which he encourages
his followers. Many PLO fighters showed great courage and
determination; their officers were less impressive, and often
abandoned them.
119
Although officially against the Geneva Convention, shotguns are

widely used as close-combat weapons by some modern armies.
This American-made Model 10 short-barrelled type is obviously
an ideal weapon for killing human beings - and almost useless
to a sportsman. It is a type used by the PLO in street fighting; one
PLO man, who had been using such a weapon against Christian
civilians, told the author that 'nothing clears a house faster'.
weapons. The senior Russian training officer in Syria had warned

General Shihabi that wasteful fire in combat is a primary cause of
defeat; the Chief-of-Staff had passed relevant orders on to the Army
commanders, but without significant result.
In all their wars against Israel the Arab armies have demonstrated a
dislike for night-fighting. Night-fighting schools have been established
in Syria with Soviet assistance, but they have not markedly increased
efficiency. Soviet observers with Syrian units in Lebanon reported that
all ranks were unable to keep direction at night, that units lost cohesion
and that morale was low. Nevertheless, there were occasions when some
units, notably commandos, fought well in the darkness.
The Russians also reported that Syrian infantry reconnaissance
patrols sent out by night returned with little useful information - in
contrast to their Palestinian allies, who were often successful. In the
mountainous central and eastern sectors Syrian patrols lost their way
and had to wait for dawn to get their bearings.
Syrian logistics were often faulty, even though their lines of supply
and communication were short; Damascus itself, with its vast military
stores, was less than 20 miles away from most units. Extra ammunition
and other supplies was frequently slow to arrive. The Soviet officers
observing this aspect of the Syrian war machine commented that the
120
POST MORTEM
Syrian staff officers lacked 'a sense of anticipation'. They waited for a
request for ammunition, petrol or other vital supplies to arrive, instead
of foreseeing the need and sending resupply towards the front.
Some Syrian units surrendered when they ran out of ammunition.
Also, small arms ammunition - 9 mm, 7.62 mm and 12.7 mm - was
sometimes defective. The author found rounds which had been struck -
i.e. the base cap had been hit by the firing pin of the weapon - but which
had not fired. Some ammunition for the Syrian Army is bought abroad,
but as all this imported material is marked with Syrian headstamps it is
not easy to identify ammunition as of Syrian or foreign manufacture.
The Syrian Army did not have an effective medical corps, partly
because of a traditional attitude to casualties: a wounded man is a
liability to those still functioning, and no other man's life should be
risked to save him. Some brigade and battalion commanders made clear
to their men that they did not want fit men to abandon their duties just
to take wounded to the rear. Those wounded men who did manage to
reach safety were cared for and taken back to base hospitals, but the
Western notion of rescuing men under fire is alien to the Syrian Army.
Helicopters are too valuable to be used on such missions. Not
infrequently Israeli medics found themselves treating Syrian and PLO
wounded - under fire - who would otherwise have died of their wounds
or of thirst. The Soviet military observers with the Syrian Army
reported that the Syrians often did not even search their knocked-out
tanks for wounded crewmen who might be trapped inside.
This does not necessarily indicate any unusual callousness; according
to Arab Islamic thinking, a person is responsible for his own
misfortunes, and cannot logically expect anybody else to extricate him
from them. If this should happen, then he has been fortunate. The
Arabs' respect for strength is an associated factor: the wounded man is
no longer strong, and while one may sympathise with him, any respect
for him is nevertheless diminished1.
The Syrian Army published no casualty figures. Unofficial but
reliable sources suggest that 650 were killed and 3,800 wounded
between 6 June and 30 September 1982; and the Israelis captured 149
Syrian personnel. After an action the Syrians often did not bother to
collect and bury their dead, even when it was safe for them to do so.
1
Neither the Syrians nor the PLO appear to provide treatment for combat stress.
121
Arafat and the PLO

Yasser Arafat was not merely chairman of the Palestine Liberation
Organisation. He was, in effect, its military commander-in-chief, the
supremo. His colleague Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad) was nominally the
PLO's field commander, but the PLO regarded Arafat as the
organisation's strategist and to a large extent as its principal tactician.
He claimed to have much military knowledge, and it certainly went back
a long way - to his days with the Egyptian Army in the 1950s.
His principal quality as a commander-in-chief was that he was an
inspirational figure to most of his men until the retreat from Beirut, and
to many of them even after that debacle. He energetically moved around
his units and gave them encouraging talks, and he was conscientious
about bestowing praise on his fighters. His public relations work was
also efficient; he was generally available to the media, and he had a good
line with journalists meeting him for the first time.
Over the years he had consulted American, British, West German
and Soviet publicity experts about his television 'image' and he had
become a professional interviewee. One of his techniques was to evade a
question by asking another. In November 1983 he was asked, 'Why do
you continue to support terrorism, Mr Arafat?' He replied, 'Have you
asked President Reagan why he uses the big guns of the USS New Jersey
to terrorise the ordinary people in the mountains?'
Arafat had organised the PLO competently for administrative
purposes, but because he always saw war in terms of terrorist activity
and guerrilla ambushes he did not plan his fixed defences in depth.
Some foreign experts had advised him to do so, as had some of the
former regular Jordanian Army officers who had joined the PLO.
Cutaway examples of
shotgun ammunition
used by the PLO; the
single, huge slugs
make appalling and
usually fatal wounds.
(IDF)
122
POST MORTEM
After 1976 the PLO adopted traditional military forms, structures

and armaments - which is why the Israelis had become even more
alarmed about the organisation's intentions. But the PLO leaders paid
little attention to the strategy and tactics which were required for a
conventional army. The Cubans and East Germans, always eager to
cause more disruption in the Middle East, told Arafat and his
lieutenants that elite special units would be more appropriate for the
PLO than the use of large formations and weapons, but the advice was
ignored.
In June 1982 President Assad sent one of his senior officers to Arafat
to urge him to co-ordinate his defence; the Syrian high command feared
that the Israelis would break the PLO front and that Arafat had no
second echelon defence at the likely breakthrough points. Their worry
was justified.
Arafat did not understand the capabilities and limitations of the
weapons in his arsenal. His interest in a shell or rocket was restricted to
its explosive effectiveness. To any arms salesman trying to sell him a
new projectile he said, 'How many Israelis will it kill?' On one occasion
he said, 'If you will guarantee that your grenade will kill President
Reagan we will buy one million of them!'
His rhetoric irritated and sometimes infuriated foreign journalists,
especially when he - and all other PLO spokesmen - claimed every
military defeat as a victory. Several times during the war he announced
to press conferences that victory was only a day away. Jonathan Randal
wrote of '. . . the PLO's infuriating habit of portraying defeats as
victories'.
In late June he claimed that with 2,000 rocket-propelled grenade
launchers he could knock out 200 Israeli tanks and kill their crews. He
presented this information as if the attack was about to happen, when
the journalists present knew that most of his vast stock of launchers had
already been captured by the Israelis.
Arafat's worst failure as a military commander was that he had never
studied his enemies; he seemed to have no knowledge of what made the
Israelis fight, just as he had no knowledge of Israel as a society. When
Arab journalists asked him about his plans to deal with an Israeli attack
he laughed and said, 'I leave such things to my brother Abu Jihad.'
Abu Jihad's tactics were direct enough: he believed in causing
casualties. This showed that he had studied the Israelis, and knew that
123
PLO booby traps disarmed in Lebanon. The can of tomato juice

has a hole in the bottom for the wire of the anti-lifting device
which would explode it if anyone picked it up. The matchboxes
exploded when opened, and contained enough PE to blow off an
arm. Much use was made of food containers for booby-trapping,
often using simple but effective trigger devices based on cheap
plastic surgical syringes. Tragically, the kind of items which the
PLO rigged in this way were exactly the kind liable to attract
hungry civilians and scavenging refugees. (Author's photos)
casualties have a traumatic effect on the Israeli community. 'If we can

kill enough Israeli soldiers,' he told an Algerian journalist on 7 June,
'the Israeli public will stop the war.'
The senior PLO leaders had a casual attitude to the study of war.
Each leader of a faction had his own ideas about military action, and
genuine co-operation was rare. Sometimes during the 1982 war two or
more factions insisted on operating at the one place and independently
of the others. On at least two occasions groups fought over the right to
engage the advancing Israelis at a particular spot. The leaders had never
bothered, despite vast amounts of money at their disposal, to build up a
logistic and technical infrastructure to maintain the heavier weapons
and to redeploy them.
The senior leaders also failed to induce junior officers to set an
example and lead from the front. The rank and file PLO men were often
124
POST MORTEM
left virtually leaderless, but fought bravely. Arafat seemed to be

ignorant or heedless of the effect that poor junior leadership had on his
men. Indeed, this neglect was a major cause of the mutiny which later
split the PLO. Arafat appointed to higher command two officers who
had run away during the fighting. Many ordinary PLO men resented
this and refused to accept the two as their superiors. They particularly
disliked Colonel Hajj Ismail, commander in the Sidon sector, who was
alleged to have abandoned his post on the first day. (Ismail was shot and
seriously wounded in Algiers in January 1984.)
The training which so many PLO leaders at all levels had received in
the Soviet bloc countries, in North Korea and in Vietnam had improved
their efficiency in some ways. On 6 June 1982 it quickly became clear
that they had become masters of ambush in the Russian style. Except
where it was necessary to set up a trap quickly, the PLO ambushes were
complex: that is, they had two or three movements, and they made use
of tactical delay.
The author saw the site of an ambush in the hills east of Beirut where a
PLO leader had mined a road which Israeli armour had to use. The
mine damaged the lead tank badly enough to stop it, and instantly the
other Israeli tanks and their following infantry put down massive small
arms fire on the scrub-covered hillsides - the traditional and effective
'mad minute' tactic adopted by the US Army in Vietnam. When there
was no answering fire the Israelis relaxed, and after a while exposed
themselves fairly freely as engineers cleared the road. It was then that
the PLO unit sprang the second part of the ambush, opening fire with
automatic weapons and RPGs. They caused few casualties only because
their fire discipline was poor: they then retreated quickly and probably
suffered few casualties themselves.
Sometimes the PLO units set double ambushes. The first, perhaps at
a bend in the road, would be cleared by the Israelis, who moved on
confidently - only to be hit again less than 100 metres further on. At
other times the fire came from two or three different directions, to throw
the ambushed unit into confusion. The Russians and other Communist
instructors had succeeded in getting the PLO fighters to hold their fire
until the enemy was at relatively close range - a sign of the discipline
which comes only from much training under competent leaders; but
they had failed to stop them from 'spraying' their fire in an
indiscriminate way rather than firing controlled, carefully aimed bursts.
125
Given that the booby trap is a standard item in the guerrilla and
terrorist arsenal, it is unsurprising that Lebanon produced an
interesting and deadly array of such devices. Most of those used by the
PLO were based upon Soviet models, but some were locally created.
They deserve a brief digression.
Two major types were encountered, which may be called the
'military' and the 'casual'. The PLO used conventional road mines
camouflaged to look like lumps of earth or cattle dung, in accordance
with Soviet training; the Yugoslav 3-PMA and the French M59 were
the most common types. Irregularly shaped and painted brown, these
mines are almost impossible to detect, and have the added advantage
that they can quickly be planted over a wide area without digging. Other
'military' booby traps were planted in discarded items such as weapons,
magazines, ammunition pouches, slabs of explosive, helmets, and other
pieces of military debris which might attract the attention of soldiers.
The 'casual' booby traps were devices hidden in everyday objects such
as cigarette packets, mess tins, food cans, chocolate bars, biscuit tins and
household electric fuse boxes. The Israelis were infuriated to find stocks
of booby-trapped dolls made in Pakistan. There is no evidence that
these caused, or were intended to cause, any Israeli military casualties;
they were apparently meant for use against children during terrorist
incursions into Israel.
The more conventional devices, as used by most of the world's
armies, included grenades attached to trip-wires or concealed pressure
switches. Scattered booby-trapped objects, both 'military' and 'casual',
were activated by movement, which caused an electrical circuit to close.
Trigger mechanisms often made use of a simple surgical syringe. One
type featured an iron ball in the barrel of a syringe, with the bared wires
of the circuit fixed inside one end; movement sent the ball rolling down
the barrel on to the wires, completing the circuit. The syringe could also
be used, with its plunger spring-loaded, as either a 'pressure' or a
'release' trigger, its movement either up or down the barrel bringing
bared wires into contact. A more sophisticated version of the rolling-
iron-ball mechanism used an ampoule of mercury. A commercial device
designed for the automatic control of lighting systems was modified by
the PLO into an explosive trigger, which was set off when movement of
the black plastic box in which it was assembled allowed mercury to flow
over the ends of two bared wires simultaneously to complete a circuit.
126
POST MORTEM
One 'military' booby trap which certainly caused casualties was the
doctored Kalashnikov magazine. Pairs of these magazines, taped
together in 'duplex' style for quick reloading of the AK-47 assault rifle,
were filled with plastic explosive and fitted with an electrical trigger,
hidden and made 'safe' by five rounds of ammunition in the ends of the
magazines. The Kalashnikov is an efficient weapon, and the Israelis
have captured huge stocks of them for their own use. An unwary soldier
would naturally thumb out the visible rounds to find out how many
there were - and in so doing he closed a circuit and triggered the
explosive.
Slabs of explosive were booby-trapped in two ways. Those left lying
around without concealment were hollowed out and fitted with an
internal trigger mechanism and detonator set off by movement. Others
were wrapped in styrofoam together with large numbers of nails, and
The PLO lost virtually all its heavy weaponry in 1982. The ancient
T-34/85 tank, one of perhaps 60 in PLO hands, is long outdated in
armoured combat; but is still an effective support weapon if dug
in as a static 'pillbox'. This one was camouflaged inside a building
on the central sector — the debris of the structure lies around its
blackened hulk.
POST MORTEM
The quadruple 23 mm anti-aircraft cannon, a Soviet ZSU-23-4,

was a formidable weapon. With a range of 8,000 metres, these
cannon were used extensively against IDF/AF aircraft, though
with little success; as a support weapon in ground combat they can
also do appalling damage. The 12-tube 107 mm rocket launcher,
made in the Soviet Union or North Korea, resembles the old
German Nebelwerfer so hated by Allied troops in 1944-45. It is used
in towed batteries, and can lay down a devastating barrage on
such targets as enemy-used roads, mountain passes, and lines of
infantry advance. (Author's photos)
covered with plaster shaped and coloured to look like a stone; they were
set off when movement triggered a surgical syringe 'release' mechanism
concealed on the underside of the 'stone'.
The combination of plastic explosive, nails for shrapnel and a syringe
release trigger was also used in empty food cans. Cigarette packets filled
with plastic explosive were fitted with a trigger which activated when
the packet was opened - although a danger warning was sometimes
given by dark stains caused by the explosive on the paper of the packet.
While they were responsible for relatively few Israeli casualties,
129
booby traps did occasionally slow down an advance: soldiers who

discover mines or booby traps in their path are obliged to treat
everything they see as suspicious, and this takes time. Such devices tend
to be counter-productive in the long term, since they put soldiers on
their guard and encourage them to 'shoot first and ask questions
afterwards'. It goes without saying that the 'casual' traps killed many
more Lebanese and Palestinian civilians than Israeli soldiers. They
were planted in exactly the kind of items which would most attract an
unsophisticated civilian caught in the middle of a war and cut off from
normal sources of supply.
(The Israelis did not use booby traps, but they did air-drop some
anti-personnel cluster bombs on PLO positions. The outer casing of
this weapon resembles that of a normal high explosive bomb; but it
strips off in mid-air, releasing about 200 small 'bomblets' over an area as
big as a football pitch. Some explode on impact with the ground; others
are fitted with delayed action fuses, for the good military reason that the
known presence of unexploded bombs tends to discourage immediate
repair of airfields and fortifications. To this extent they are a form of
booby trap, and it cannot be denied that they may have caused innocent
casualties.)
It is impossible to say with certainty how many PLO fighters were
killed. At times during the war PLO propagandists wildly exaggerated
casualties in an attempt to gain world sympathy. At other times, for
military reasons, they claimed to have suffered few or no casualties in
various actions. From various sources, the author's estimate of PLO
dead is around 2,000, but some PLO leaders would put the figure at
3,000. It is known that only two officers of any rank were killed, both of
them the equivalent of majors. (The tendency of more senior ranks to
desert their men in action has already been remarked upon.) PLO
prisoners numbered 9,000; most were later released, including the
4,800 freed on 24 November 1983 in exchange for six Israeli soldiers
held in Tripoli by Arafat's forces. Virtually all the PLO's armour and
heavy weapons were either knocked out or captured.
130
6 Testimony
THE contents of the first part of this chapter come from the Lebanese
people who live in the southern region which, until June 1982, had been
dominated by the PLO. As the Palestinian fighters were pushed back on
Beirut and finally bottled up there, tens of thousands of Lebanese who
had fled from the south in the years between 1970 and 1982 returned to
their homes. Others had travelled north so as not to be caught between
the advancing Israelis and the Palestinian fighters, and they now
returned to the south.
Journalists were able to move more freely around southern Lebanon,
and for the first time in years they found the people of town and village
willing to talk. Those of us who had been in the area between 1975 and
1982 had found the local people frightened into silence; on the rare
occasions when they did talk their stories were coloured by the presence
of whoever happened to be listening. If Fatah men were around the
locals would praise them and damn the soldiers of Haddad's Free
Lebanese Army.
Now the repressed truth came bubbling out. We were in the
Christian village of Achiye, south of Jezzine, on the day when its
surviving inhabitants returned. Father John Nasser, the local priest,
told us what had happened on 19 October 1976. About 1,000 armed
terrorists raided the village because its inhabitants had 'co-operated'
with the Israelis - though what they could possibly have done to help
Israel was not clear. The raiders broke into the houses, rounded up
about 100 families and drove them into the church where they were
locked up. Sixty-five of the inhabitants were kept outside, and over the
next few hours the imprisoned villagers heard the sound of gunfire.
After two days the terrorists released the prisoners, who came out to
find the 65 men, women and children lying murdered; the youngest
victim was an infant in arms. Father Nasser lost two brothers and 15
cousins among the victims. As the survivors wept over their dead the
PLO men blew up their church; it was rubble when we saw it, and
131
Father Nasser said the village proposed to keep it that way - 'as a way of
remembering'.
As we sat in the shade of a verandah we heard the story repeated by a
grandmother, by a young woman and by 35-year-old George Aoun, one
of the villagers with authority who was now trying to encourage the
others to believe that life really would be different and that the PLO
would not return. We also spoke to a tough-looking red-headed man in
green military fatigues and combat boots, who cradled a Kalashnikov in
his right arm. As with all the Christian Lebanese fighters, he had two
magazines taped together 'duplex fashion'; when one was empty he
could replace it in a moment with the full one. Not too reluctantly, he
allowed the others to talk him into showing us his wound scars; the
largest was in his stomach, ripped open by a shell fragment. His face was
that of a seasoned soldier of 30; in fact he was 17, and he had been a
fighting man from the age of 11.
Since the author never accepts an atrocity story uncritically, we asked
what had happened to the bodies: and George Aoun showed us. The
terrified survivors had had no time to bury their dead - they were in a
hurry to run before the terrorists came back, and 65 graves take time to
dig - so they had piled the corpses into two brick sheds. Their remains
were still in the sheds in July 1982. In the clothing of some of them the
author could pick out the multiple holes made by automatic fire. We
would not swear to 65 corpses, but we personally counted at least 50.
According to Aoun the shootings were a punishment because the young
men of the village had refused to join the terrorists in their attacks
against Israel.
As with the Achiye massacre, there was always corroborative
evidence for atrocities. Some was provided by highly responsible
people.
Dr Ghassan Hamud, proprietor and director of the Hamud Hospital,
the largest and most modern of Sidon's 11 hospitals, said that many
parents brought their daughters, some of them children, for a virginity
check. In many cases, he said, it was clear that the girl had been raped.
The PLO used Dr Hamud's hospital for their injured members.
'They always presented themselves as national heroes,' the doctor said,
'and boasted how they had spilt their blood in battle against the Zionist
enemy, in the holy Arab cause of the liberation of Palestine. The truth is
that more than 90 per cent of their injuries were incurred during in-
132
TESTIMONY
fighting between the various factions. The terrorists would arrive at the
hospital in a long convoy of cars. They started behaving badly in the
parking lot, forcing us to remove our cars to make way for them. Once
my brother, the hospital administrator, refused to move his car, and
they rode over it with a heavy military vehicle and crushed it. . . . The
PLO patients and their escorts spread terror throughout the hospital. A
sick or wounded terrorist kept his arms beside him. Whenever he
wanted to call a medical attendant to his bedside he shot at the ceiling.'
Imam Sayid-a-Din Badr from the village of Haruf said that PLO
men had tried to force him to give a sermon in praise of the PLO, but he
refused. On his return home from prayer he found that his young son
was missing. Some days later the boy's mutilated body was brought in
by a shepherd who had found it in the field. The murder and mutilation
of the Imam's son caused such hostility towards the PLO throughout
the area that Yasser Arafat himself had to come to Haruf. On his orders,
thousands of residents were brought to the reception in the village
A family returning to their home in southern Lebanon from which

they had been driven by the PLO occupation.
These Lebanese children, and their parents, became refugees
during the PLO occupation of the south. When the family returned
to their house they found that their cellar had been used as a PLO
munitions store. Among the ordnance visible here are 122 mm and
155 mm shells. (IDF)
square. As a dramatic gesture to the crowd, Arafat gave his personal

revolver to the eldest brother of the murdered boy, saying, 'Take my
gun and go revenge your brother's blood, shed by the Zionists.'
The young man could do nothing but hand the weapon back to
Arafat.
In 1980 another religious leader, Sheikh Mahmoud al-Masri, a Shi'a
Muslim of Ansar, resisted the entry of the P L O into his village. In a
strong sermon he declared that it was the moral and religious duty of
Muslims to oppose the P L O , who had imposed a reign of terror on
towns and villages. 'I told the people', Sheikh al-Masri said, 'that the
P L O abused and humiliated our brethren, raped our wives and
daughters, looted our property. We set up two roadblocks at the gates of
the village and armed men were posted there. Under cover of night, the
134
TESTIMONY
terrorists stormed Ansar in force. They subjected the village to heavy

fire in order to teach its inhabitants a lesson. They then turned first to
my house, burst in and tied me and my wife up. After they raped my
daughter before our eyes, they shot her, leaving her naked body with the
breasts cut off on the threshold of the house.'
Salah Safro, mukhtar of Burj-Bahal, a village near Tyre, was in Sidon
on a business trip on the day that the Fatah branch of the P L O was to
execute a Lebanese. He was accused of having collaborated with the
Israelis, the 'proof being a pair of Israeli-made shoes found in his
house. As a warning to others, the execution took place in the city's
central square. The victim's arms and legs were chained to the bumpers
of four cars. At the signal of a pistol-shot fired by a Fatah officer the four
cars started up. . . . Safro said that some people in the crowd collapsed
in shocked horror.
The P L O 'executed' many Lebanese allegedly guilty of betraying the
Palestinian fighters. One teenage girl accused of 'spying for the Zionist
enemy' was spreadeagled screaming against a wall in Tyre and shot by a
firing squad.
Miriam and Diana Fakhr-a-Din, teenage girls from Sidon, said that
they dared not go out at night for fear of the P L O . 'We knew that they
killed people and sometimes mutilated them and cut their limbs off.
Once they raped a girl in our school and then they slaughtered her. We
were prohibited from leaving the house in case we were raped too. The
terrorists did many filthy things. We did not even dare to go to the beach
because they molested us. They roamed the streets in jeeps and made
fun of people and girls.'
David Shipler, of The International Herald Tribune, reported several
incidents concerning the PLO (27/28 July 1982):
The rank-and-file of the guerrillas seemed to come from the lowest strata and
often, therefore, the PLO's armed muscle blended with a bitter material greed.
The Lebanese found themselves helpless. . . . The head of the public works
department in Southern Lebanon said the guerrillas made his life miserable by
stealing his equipment and limiting his authority over the workers. 'We
couldn't do anything,' he said. 'If I tried to make them work, I was afraid . . .
they would shoot you and nobody would ever know.'
Youssef Sayed, a 25-year-old student from Ein el-Hilwe, told Shipler,

'When a student is called up for military service with the P L O he is
135
obliged to go. Otherwise he won't be accepted next year in the

UNRWA school . . . the UNRWA personnel are in the PLO 1 .
Mrs Dolly Read, a Lebanese woman who lived near Sidon, said,
'Before the PLO we used to be pro-Palestinian. They were poor, we
should help them. . . . In 1976 they stopped a bus and said that those
who were Christian should come down. My cousin stepped down and
was killed. When we saw the Palestinians were killing us and
threatening us and having barricades and shooting innocent people,
then came the hatred. . . .'
'They set themselves above the law, they terrorised, extorted and
inflicted their own summary punishments,' wrote John Bulloch in the
London Daily Telegraph on 20 August.
The catalogue of PLO crimes against the Lebanese is long. A
committee of 'concerned Lebanese' collected evidence of murders,
rapes, beatings, arson, theft, blackmail, extortion and numerous other
crimes. The group claims to have evidence of 15,000 such incidents.
Some of the worst crimes were committed against young Palestinian
women who were induced to join the PLO groups as fighters. Very few
of these girls were 'natural' terrorists, so their instructors set out to
crush their softer feminine instincts. In Rachidiye camp and other
places they told us2 how they had been subjected to brutal and perverse
sexual assault and various other indignities designed to turn them into
terrorists. All this information helped to explain why women hijackers
have been more ruthless than their male counterparts. Women have
carried out cold-blooded killings and, puzzlingly, have been more
brutal to other women and to children than the men have been. We were
sorry for these PLO girls because, in assuming a male role as fighters,
they had renounced all hope of marriage and a normal life. Not all of
them are brutalised, and in the aftermath of the 1982 war they were
bewildered and worried; the PLO had been their security and now it
had gone.
As details of the Palestinians' reign of terror came to light so too did
'The foreign UNRWA personnel were not members of the PLO, and nor were all Palestinian
UNRWA employees; but it appears to be true that some students were threatened with the
termination of their UNRWA schooling if they did not join up as fighters. Mahmoud Alloud, a
deputy mayor of Ein el-Hilwe, told the author that his son had been so threatened by a Palestinian
UNRWA official.
2
They spoke to my wife; what they had to say could not be said to a man.
136
TESTIMONY
A Lebanese accused of 'betraying the PLO' is dragged to death

behind a car in the streets of Sidon, pour encourager les autres.
information about their organisation. Tons of documents were seized

by the Israelis from headquarters and offices in Tyre, Sidon, Nabatiye
and Beirut.
From a foreign point of view (rather than that of the Israelis) the great
interest of the documents is the close relationship they reveal between
the PLO and the Communist bloc. In the documents all Communist
countries are represented in one way or another in the PLO network of
political and military ties. The unifying theme behind the support given
by this variety of nations and cultures to the PLO is 'revolution'.
Among the documents were many graduation diplomas of PLO
personnel who had been given military training in Communist
137
countries. For instance, the Soviet Ministry of Defence issued a

diploma to Zyad Ibrahim Sharkas when he completed a course for
infantry platoon commanders in July 1981. Another was given to
Muhammad Mabry Hussain on completion of a course for electrical
technicians at Odessa Military School. A Hungarian Military Academy
diploma went to Muhammad Farlin Kador to record his course in T-34
tank driving.
Some courses were for senior officers. The Soviet Ministry of
Defence put Colonel Rashad Ahmad 'Abd-al-Aziz through three
months training for armoured battalion commanders and awarded him
a diploma. In many cases the diplomas carried a photograph of the PLO
member concerned, invaluable material for Israeli Military In-
telligence.
Other papers listed the names of PLO men sent on air defence
courses in Vietnam, armour courses in Hungary and a company
commanders' course in Bulgaria. One of the company commanders,
Lieutenant Mahmoud Muhammad al-Rawai, was reported for
PLO officers with a Russian instructor (left background) during a

training course in the Soviet Union. (PLO)
138
TESTIMONY
'misbehaviour', and attached to the report is his letter of apology in

which he pleads to be allowed to finish the course. Another 12 company
commanders underwent training in China, while Major Awd-allah
Umar abu-Leil, commander of the Galilee Battalion in Fatah, attended
a course in Yugoslavia.
On 11 January 1982 a signal from Fatah HQ asked all units to send
candidates for a three-year course for Army engineers in East Germany,
at the end of which they would be appointed second lieutenants. In
Sidon a captured hand-written document recorded a list of courses
taken in Eastern bloc countries by officers and NCOs of the September
Martyrs Battalion of the Kastel Brigade.
One of the most interesting documents was a report by Colonel
Rashad Ahmed, commander of a party of 194 P L O men sent to the
Soviet Union for training, addressed to Yasser Arafat. We quote it in
full, because behind the stifling jargon it provides much information
about military training and attitudes:
The brother, head of the PLO Executive Committee, the General Commander
of the Palestinian Revolutionary Forces, the brother Yasser Arafat, may Allah
protect him!
Subject: Report on the Palestinian delegation to the Soviet Union
Date of Report: 22 January 1981
On 1 September 1980 the delegation arrived in Simferopol in the Soviet
Union, where it had been decided to hold the courses. The delegation
numbered 194 officers and NCOs. Courses were given for the following posts:
1 Tank battalion commander
2 Tank company commander
3 Infantry company commander
4 Reconnaissance company commander
5 Infantry platoon commander
6 Anti-tank platoon commander
7 Sagger missile platoon commander
8 Anti-aircraft platoon commander
Factions of the Resistance [movement] as follows:
1 The Palestinian National Liberation Movement - Fatah
2 The Palestine Liberation Army
3 The Armed Struggle
4 The Popular Front
5 The Democratic Front
6 The General Command
139
7 Saiqa
8 The Arab Front
9 The Popular Struggle Front
10 The Palestine Liberation Front
Studies began in all the courses in a regular fashion, according to the
programme which had been prepared. The delegation command studied the
programme for each course and made comments, which were taken into
account as far as possible, especially in connection with theoretical issues which
suit our conditions and combat procedures in towns, mountains, and coastal
plain defence.
After classroom studies were completed in the various courses attended by
the delegation, the time arrived for final manoeuvres, in which all members of
the delegation participated. The exercise included:
1 Command and staff exercise (work on maps)
2 Tactical exercise
When discussing the exercise, the delegation command proposed that the
command and staff exercise involve the entire delegation, in accordance with
the specialisation in each course and its role in the battle; the tactical exercise
would then follow. However, the college commanders pointed out that the
method which the delegation command wanted to use was not feasible, due to
its heavy demand on resources which the college was unable to provide under
the circumstances. In the end, the delegation command accepted the college's
opinion, and the exercise was carried out in the following way:
1 Command and staff exercise at brigade level:
The battalion commander students comprised the brigade command in the
exercise. The brigade staff was made up of students from other courses.
Altogether 17 officers participated. Work on the map lasted for three
consecutive days. The result was excellent according to the officers who
supervised on behalf of the college. The work was done under the daily and
personal supervision of the college commander. The command and staff
exercise included the following stages:
a) Advance when expecting an encounter battle; carrying out an encounter
battle
b) Attack in direct contact
c) Defence
2 On the fourth day of manoeuvres, the tactical exercise was begun by
members of the delegation - an infantry company reinforced by a tank
company in a direct contact attack. All types of organic and attached weapons
were used in the exercise imitating a real battle. The exercise was carried out in
earnest by the Palestinian combatants despite the difficult weather conditions.
The exercise was a success; it earned the praise of teachers, observers, and other
delegations at the college.
140
TESTIMONY
Achievements of the delegation:

1 In instruction
a) The subject matter was picked up very well. The teachers saw that the
Palestinian delegation was the best in rapid learning, compared with the
other delegations.
b) The anti-tank course teachers noticed that trainees prepared their guns and
took up firing positions in less than the required time.
c) Teachers who accompanied anti-aircraft course trainees on their trip to the
firing range reported that they performed very well.
d) The delegation did well in discussion on political topics in the framework of
the political lessons; the Soviet comrades deem such lessons very important
and concentrate on them.
2 Ties (between nationalities at the school)
a) Creation of good ties with instructors and workers at the college.
b) Familiarisation with the customs and traditions of the peoples of the host
country.
c) Explanation of the Palestinian cause, the role of the PLO as the only
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and the Palestinian
revolution until the realisation of victory and the establishment of an
independent state.
d) Getting to know the other delegations and liberation movements, and
establishing good ties while explaining our case, whether during personal
meetings or in the framework of official meetings.
The commander of the delegation from South Africa showed full
understanding for our revolution cause, so much so, that during the closing
ceremony for his delegation, he spoke in front of all the delegations and the
Soviet comrades about the Palestinian revolution and Yasser Arafat more than
about himself and the host country.
Negative aspects of the mission:
1 From the point of view of the college
a) Shortage of Arabic interpreters. At first the delegation command had many
difficulties concerning this matter. Because of the constant request, the college
was compelled to supply interpreters, but they did not succeed in rendering
exact military translations. In the end, in co-operation with trainees of the
other courses and with the new interpreters, they overcame the problem, but
not without great difficulty.
b) Shortage of audio-visual material.
c) The training period for the anti-tank, missile and anti-aircraft courses
ended 15 days before the departure date, forcing the college to repeat many of
the lessons and subjects.
d) Due to the size of the Palestinian delegation and the presence of other
delegations, a third of the members of the delegation had to sleep ten to a room.
This caused difficulties, which were only overcome by a joint effort.
141
Among captured PLO documents were found these certificates of

graduation from various military training courses. One, with a
photo of the presentation ceremony and a facsimile translation,
marks the success of Hassan Hussein Taher in an artillery and
mortar officer's course in the Soviet Union. Abdulla Mahomed
Hamza apparently completed a T-34 tank crew course in Hungary.
Mahmud Abdul Fattan Zeidan was trained even further afield, in
North Vietnam. (IDF)
142
TESTIMONY
143
2 From the point of view of the delegation

a) The participants in the courses did not correctly understand the political
aspects of sending military delegations abroad. As a result, the upper echelon of
the delegation, namely the participants in the battalion officer course, refused
to study and asked to return, using all sorts of illogical excuses. If this is
considered according to the correct military criterion, and despite the
possibility of overcoming these difficulties very simply - if each one of them
had remembered the orders he received during his meeting with the
commander of the struggle before the trip, the situation would have been
entirely different. This was noted by the delegation command in the report
which was sent to Your Excellency through the representative of the
organisation in Moscow, Colonel al-Sha'ar, on 22 September 1980.
b) Those responsible in most of the organisations were not careful in choosing
candidates for the course and the delegation command was forced to send a few
of them home. Following are the names of the people sent home, and the
reasons for their return:
First Batch:
1 Ra'ad Ahmed Razaq al-Madani - from the PLA - was sent on a
reconnaissance company commander course. He asked to be transferred to
the course for tank battalion commanders. When the delegation command
and PLO representative objected, he asked to return on the grounds that
there was no point in keeping him there.
2 Haydar Jawad Safa - from the Democratic Front - tried to create an
organisational problem between the Democratic Front and the Popular
Struggle Front, together with comrade 'Afif al-Masri of the Popular
Struggle Front.
3 Hassan Radha Bakr - from Saiqa - asked to return on the grounds that his
state of health did not allow him to continue his studies. This was agreed
upon in the presence of the delegation command and a representative of the
organisation.
4 Muhammad Radha Mahrar — from Saiqa - asked to return because his state
of health did not allow him to continue his studies. This was agreed upon
in the presence of the delegation command, a representative of the
organisation, and the trainees' escort.
5 Sahil al-Bitr - from the PLA - asked to return because his state of health did
not allow him to continue his studies. This was agreed upon in the presence
of the delegation command and a representative of the organisation.
6 Lieutenant Ibrhim al-Mahdun - from the PLA - asked to return because his
state of health did not allow him to continue his studies. When the Bulgarian
'brother' came there together with Ra'ad Tamarzi, the commander of his
unit, he tried to persuade him (to stay) but to no avail.
144
TESTIMONY
Second Batch:
1 Ali Ahsan al-Najar - Palestinian Liberation Front - failed in commanding
the missile course, and was a bad example in military discipline because he
used to jump from the college wall, in contravention of orders. The
delegation command also found out that he was connected with the
smuggling of counterfeit dollars.
2 'Afif Muhammad al-Masri - Struggle Front - did not behave himself outside
the college. He spent his time with one of the girls of doubtful character and
accompanied her home. His clothes were later taken by a man who claimed to
be the girl's brother. He left her home without his clothes and reported the
incident to the militia, which returned his clothes.
3 Fawzi al-Asadi - Struggle Front - spoke with the representative of the
organisation, Colonel al-Sha'ar, in an unbecoming manner.
4 Darwish Dhib Sa'ad - Arab Liberation Front - is indecent and a pervert. He
got mixed up with a girl of doubtful character. He claimed that she took his
money together with a report for the delegation command. The commander
of the delegation himself brought him from the city, blind drunk.
5 Ahmad al-Sharqi - Saiqa - testified to the Simferopol inspector-general
during the investigation of a claim made by one of the members of the
delegation, Hassan Qassem Hussein, that the militia and unidentified people
had beaten him and taken his money. In the course of this evidence, al-
Sharqi attacked the commander of the college, and threatened the college in
the name of the members of the delegation that if his friend's money was not
returned, 'something would happen'.
6 Salim Samir Asbar - PLA - irregularities in training and malingering
despite the warnings given him.
7 Mahmud Nimr Shaqiqat - Fatah - returned on his own request. He
incorrectly claimed that he had problems with the Soviet comrades. We
talked with him in order to prevent his return, but he stuck to his position.
To His Honour the General Commander (Arafat)

The return of the first and second batch has been completed in the hope that
this will deter those whose behaviour is bad, or those who were mistakenly
chosen. In spite of this, mistakes have been repeated. If the delegation
command had to return people and withhold certificates according to orders,
half the delegation would have had to return. However, in the interest of our
revolution and our people, the delegation command invested all its efforts in
absorbing as many as possible up to the last moment and this will be attested to
by Colonel Abu Majdi himself, and those who accompany him.
For example, one of the members of the Popular Front, whose name is Sa'id
Razaq, came back late from leave and arrived at the college at 04:30 in the
morning. On the next day they celebrated the end of the course and the
commander of the college decided to hold back his certificate. We all agreed to
this, including Abu Majdi. However, after the certificates were distributed, the
145
commander of the college went back on his decision and gave the man his
certificate.
Going by my experience in command of this large delegation, I ask your
permission, Commander of the Struggle, to submit to you a number of simple
proposals and I request that you study their usefulness, for the sake of the good
name of the revolution and our people in foreign countries.
Following are the proposals:
1 The opening of a training course for those who are to be sent abroad before
their departure, in which they will study the latest developments in the
Palestinian problem and the aims behind the dispatch of military
delegations abroad, over and above the studies themselves.
2 The conducting of early checks, by the instruction administration, of those
intended to participate in courses as regards their suitability, and the
dispatch of only those who pass the checks.
The PLO was generously funded by various Arab states, and did
not rely solely upon Soviet bloc sources of arms supply. The latest
weapons from European and other manufacturers were purchased
on the world market through purely commercial channels. Among
this captured selection is at least one interesting anomaly. Various
models of the ubiquitous Kalashnikov AK-47/AKM family are
unsurprising, as are the older Simonovs, and even the rack of
Brens. But the left man holds an M16/M203 rifle/grenade
launcher, an intriguing find since it is a US government weapon of
recent issue. (Author's photo)
TESTIMONY
3 The subordination of the officers to the course command so that their

personal ability as commanders can be checked without taking into account
the considerations of organisations or preferences according to former
opinions.
4 Choice of people of high quality, who are capable of representing us
outside, will be the responsibility of the direct commander.
5 Explanation, before the trip, to candidates for courses abroad with regard to
arrangements and rules in the absorbing college.
6 Lowering the level of the courses abroad to those which cannot be
conducted within the training directorate.
7 If the need arises to send people to courses of all types and specialities, it is
preferable to lower the number in order not to harm the quality and to allow
a better selection.
8 If a large number of courses are chosen, it is advisable to appoint a
delegation commander who is not connected with any course, so that this
will be his only function. It is also advisable to use officers who have already
participated in a course at the same college and who know its rules.
9 The military delegation in foreign countries must be equipped with a large
number of books in foreign languages, especially in the language of the host
country - in political, historical and cultural subjects. They should also
have PLO stickers and slogans in booklets and publications, etc.
10 Similar material should also be sent by post.
Sir, the Supreme Commander, may God protect him, I am sending this report
on behalf of the PLO delegation to the Soviet Union, and pledge our adherence
to wise behaviour which will guide us to victory and the establishment of our
independent state; long live the PLO under your leadership, the sole legal
representative of the Palestinian people.
Signed
Colonel Rashad Ahmed
Commander of the Delegation.
Not surprisingly, the PLO trainees in Communist countries had
lessons in Communism. In the case of those from the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine and the Popular Democratic Front for the
Liberation of Palestine the lessons were requested by the leaders,
George Habash and Nayef Hawatmeh respectively, who are Marxists.
The PLO generally assisted - and was prepared to assist - groups of
every political persuasion. Captured documents also showed that it had
connections with neo-Nazi and other Fascist groups.
147
7 The Media War
THE author is aware that this chapter may be dismissed by some people as
'pro-Israeli'. It is not intended to be pro- or and- either side. Had the news
media treated the PLO unfairly I would say so. The simple fact is that the
Israelis got a raw deal, and it is an historian's task to explain why and to put
the record straight1. Quite apart from this, the difficulties experienced by
journalists in covering this unusual war need to be described as part of the
history of war reporting. In modern times the reporting of a war can have
results as important as the war itself - as Vietnam, Afghanistan, the
Falklands, Grenada and Lebanon have shown.
Israel's war against the PLO in Lebanon was notable for more
different reasons than is usually the case with armed conflict. It was, for
instance, the first real testing ground of modern electronic cameras in
battle. And, arguably, the reporting of the war was more controversial
than in any other war this century.
Since the author and his wife were studying the war for the purpose of
writing about it for a quarterly magazine and for a book, we were not
subject to the pressures imposed on journalists who had to produce
something for the next edition of a daily paper or for nightly television
news bulletins. We were therefore in a position to observe the observers.
This meant, in the author's case, watching them do a job for which he
himself was qualified and experienced. He found the experience
instructive.
Operating from the Israeli side of the battle was simple. A journalist
presented himself to the government press office on arrival in Tel Aviv
1
Other analysts have investigated the reporting of the Lebanon war in much more detail - and in
more forthright terms - than is possible here. The most thorough analyses are: Misreporting
Lebanon by Joshua Muravchik, for the Heritage Foundation, Washington, 66 pp, No. 23 Policy
Review, Winter 1983. Media Coverage: the War in Lebanon by Frank Gervasi for the Center for
International Security, Washington, 36 pp, October 1983. The Journalists' War Against Lebanon -
Techniques of Distortion, Disorientation and Disinformation by Edward Alexander, 12 pp article in
Encounter Magazine, September 1982.' The Times' Goes to War by Melvin J. Lasky, 5 pp article in
Encounter Magazine, October 1982.
148
THE MEDIA WAR
and received a yellow card. Then he might go north to stay either as a

paying guest at the kibbutz of Gesher Haziv, near the Lebanese border
on the western side of Israel, or at Metulla, right on the border on the
eastern side. The great majority chose Gesher Haziv. Here the
journalist was assigned an Israeli military press officer equipped with
Uzi sub-machine gun, a helmet and a flak jacket. (Reporters could also
have a helmet and jacket if they asked for them.)
Gesher Haziv, with its five-star comfort for the paying guests, was the
place to be. Here journalists encountered confreres they might not have
met for years; and each night the professionals returned to the kibbutz
and exchanged adventure stories. During the first days of the war one
woman press agency photographer hid in the backs of cars, and even
disguised herself as a man, because the Israeli Army would not allow
women into Lebanon: it was 'too dangerous for a woman'. A journalist
For the great

majority of Lebanese
civilians - like
ordinary people
everywhere - the
hope of some degree
of day-to-day safety
is far more
important than any
political
consideration. If
Israeli, or even
Syrian troops make
it possible for them
to go about their
daily lives relatively
free of the fears
aroused by
indiscriminate
killing in the streets,
temporary
occupation is a price
they can bear to pay.
This Israeli reservist
was photographed
while guarding shops
in Bhamdoun.
149
from the Israeli publication Yediot Aharanot threatened to complain to

the High Court when she was kept out; the Army then changed its
policy and allowed in those women who qualified for press cards
(including the author's wife).
Another hive of press activity was the Arazim Hotel in Metulla.
Normally a tranquil place, the Arazim became the northern HQ of the
Army Spokesman - Captain Yitzhak, on our visits - and the base for
about 60 journalists covering the eastern flank of the campaign. It was a
chaos of media equipment and personal gear, as reporters and
cameramen sought information, advice and help from the Army
Spokesman and his staff. Yitzhak was in a difficult position: he just did
not have solid answers to many of their questions, and he knew that
whatever he said would be flashed around the world within hours.
During 'no-go' periods some of the veteran war correspondents
sneaked across the border anyway, and made their way to the battle
fronts in cars rented at enormous cost. One TV crew lost three rented
Israeli flour being unloaded for distribution to civilians in Sidon in

June 1982. In this city, reported by so many journalists as
'flattened', there was relatively little war damage, and except for
one period of 48 hours the city functioned normally.
THE MEDIA WAR
cars - one to a direct hit while the men were in a nearby house, the
second run over by a tank, and the third by driving it into a ditch. No
vehicle could be insured for driving in Lebanon, but this did not worry
the American TV men; they paid four times the real price of the lost cars
without complaint.
Those journalists operating from Beirut faced greater hazards than
those with the Israelis. Neither a foreign press card nor any other
credential meant much in Beirut; over the years the PLO and the
Syrians had murdered several journalists for filing critical copy.
Various factions issued press permits, but these were not necessarily
recognised by other factions.
The pass that mattered most was probably that of the Palestinian
Press Agency, WAFA. This carried the bearer's photograph, a
duplicate of which was retained in the WAFA office. Without this pass
it was dangerous, if not impossible, to circulate in West Beirut. A
journalist caught taking photographs or making notes would be
immediately arrested, if not shot at. Kenneth Timmerman, an
American journalist based in Paris, spent three weeks in a PLO prison
in Beirut after being unable to identify himself to their satisfaction.
All 15 groups of the PLO in Beirut had their own prisons. Many
journalists were aware of the existence of these prisons, but the author
has been unable to trace any mention of them in the Western press.
Timmerman, after release from prison, approached a wire service with
news of the prisons. 'I was coldly received,' he said, 'and dismissed with
the assurance that they would report nothing. They still had people in
West Beirut and could not put them in jeopardy1.'
Timmerman has pointed out that there were no journalists
unfriendly to the PLO operating in the besieged part of Beirut, because
no newspaper or other news organisation would make the error of
sending into West Beirut somebody who had adversely reported on the
PLO in the past. Thus a first selection of journalists was made by the
PLO; in Timmerman's words, 'When it came to muzzling the press, the
PLO had things worked out to a fine science.' The three basic 'tools'
were exemplary terror, intimidation and silence.
Later in the war it became possible to cover both sides - Israeli and
PLO - on the same day: a rare opportunity in the history of war
1
Commentary Magazine, January 1983.
151
A hospital roof in Sidon: the framework is part of a PLO rocket

launcher, emplaced on this vulnerable target for the most cynical
reasons. It was knocked out with a few precisely aimed shots,
which caused no internal damage to the hospital and no casualties
among the patients. (IDF)
journalism. A reporter could hire a taxi, drive to Israeli HQ just outside

Beirut, and talk to officers about intentions and strategy; then, in the
same taxi, he could drive down into the city, produce the appropriate
press passes, and be at PLO headquarters in less than an hour.
It should be stressed that few journalists of any nationality were in the
field with the Syrian Army, though some reported from Damascus. The
Syrian Army turned away those journalists who sought to report the
war from their side.
The television crews in West Beirut hired a taxi service to collect their
video-tapes and make a run each evening to Damascus, from where they
were sent off to the world's networks. The American television
networks for some time chartered a high-speed motor cruiser to make
the trip from Jounieh to Cyprus carrying their video cassettes. By the
end of the siege ten companies were sharing this service. The owner of
the cruiser, a Greek millionaire from Athens, charged $80,000 dollars a
month.
152
THE MEDIA WAR
There were two centres for foreign press people in Beirut: the
Commodore Hotel in the West, and the Alexander in the East. It was at
the Commodore that the PLO held its daily press conferences and
where all official PLO guests were housed. It was never a relaxed hotel
at which to stay, and there were eyes everywhere. Guests' luggage was
frequently searched, generally in a clumsy way. A room cost $100 and
dinner was $50.
Most of the television coverage of the siege was filmed from the
rooftops of the Alexander and Commodore. Despite an occasional shell
they were the safest places to be while still within reasonable view of the
fighting. The Alexander received several hits from Palestinian positions
on 12 July, and was damaged by a car bomb in August. The
Commodore was hit by a single Israeli bomb on 4 August, the day of the
heaviest fighting of the siege.
Some journalists reporting from Beirut had been staff cor-
respondents there for years, and had good contacts with the PLO and
with the Maronite Christian leaders. This did not necessarily make
their professional task any easier for, with the PLO especially, they had
to stay on reasonably good terms with men for whom violence was a way
of life while trying to maintain their standards of journalistic
objectivity. Still, their experience of Beirut had taught them how to
move around, which gave them an advantage over the newcomers who
reached Lebanon by boat from Cyprus to the Christian port of Jounieh.
All journalists learned that it was important to remember the current
password. The reporter who forgot it was living dangerously, especially
when challenged by a teenage sentry from the PLO, Christian Phalange
or Shi'a militia cradling his Kalashnikov and eager for an excuse to use
it.
From both sides - the south, and within Beirut - some reporting was
oddly uninformed, to say the least. For instance, Marvin Howe of The
New York Times referred to some people who had been made refugees
'when the Israelis invaded Damour, a Palestinian settlement south of
Beirut' (18 July). In fact, Damour was a famous centre of Lebanese
Christendom until it was largely destroyed and seized by the PLO in the
1975-76 Lebanese civil war. Those of its residents who were not killed
on that occasion fled for their lives. Without reference to the events of
1975-76, Howe's story was open to misinterpretation.
As with Britain during the Falklands war, which was being fought at
153
the same time, Israel did herself much harm by tight censorship
practices, especially during the first week of the operation. These
practices were militarily justified; but they prevented Israel's side of the
story from being well reported. They also made the press suspicious and
angry. 'What are they trying to hide?' and 'They can't do this to us!'
were two themes which often appeared just beneath the surface of the
media coverage of Israel's actions.
Israeli TV had sent experienced camera crews and reporters to the
front, but because a trade union dispute made it impossible to use
electronic cameras the Israelis shot the war in black and white. These
films, though professionally superb, were useless to the American
networks, which in a few days had about 20 electronic crews on the job.
Operating from Gesher Haziv, these crews raced north under escort
each day, frantically filming 'war incidents' on the way. Arriving in the
Israeli-held suburbs of Beirut at about noon, they focused their cameras
on the puffs of smoke which indicated shells bursting. By a certain time
all crews had to finish filming and hand their cassettes to a messenger,
who rushed them to Tel Aviv to be transmitted by satellite - 'birded', in
TV jargon - to New York or London.
Television became a victim of its own creation: the public appetite for
bloody pictures. The TV crews shot tens of thousands of feet of film,
and they got some colourful material. Some of it was breathtakingly
false, as in the case of the American crew filming the results of
'indiscriminate Israeli bombardment from the sea' - Roman ruins.
The TV crews were under intense pressure, and rarely had time to
interview anybody in depth. The author was present on several
occasions when a cameraman or presenter grabbed any Lebanese or
Palestinian civilian who happened to be around - perhaps under-
standably, they could not tell the difference between them - and then
encouraged their subject to sift through wreckage, or to hold a cloth to
their eyes as if weeping, while the camera turned. One day the author
and his wife heard an American TV reporter giving instructions to a
middle-aged Lebanese woman. 'Look all chewed up, ma'am,' he said
encouragingly. When she gave him a blank look he said to the crew,
'Goddamit, she doesn't even know English! Cry, baby, will you!' He
mimed some anguish for her, and, with a laugh, she obliged.
The author was more interested in the many Lebanese families
having picnics on the beach; but nobody filmed them.
154
THE MEDIA WAR
A convoy of IDF M113s heading north on the coastal road for

Beirut, passing a queue of civilian vehicles heading south. Most
Lebanese roads have been in a deplorable condition for ten years,
since the beginning of the civil war; this highway suffered very
little war damage in 1982.
155
In their dash for news and their equally hurried return trip to Israel to
send it (for there were no telex or even telephone facilities in Lebanon)
the journalists gained impressions. Much war reporting is inevitably a
matter of impressions; but truth was not well served when these
impressionistic reports reached the home office, to be made even more
dramatic by sub-editors, especially those on newspapers which
favoured short, stark headlines - SIDON FLATTENED, for example. At
Gesher Haziv we met a German reporter who told us an interesting
story. He had sent to his paper what he considered to be a thoughtful
piece in which he mentioned that he was writing it just after eating a
pleasant lunch in a Sidon hotel. When he next made telephone contact
his editor said, 'What's this crazy stuff about lunching in a hotel in
Sidon?'
'What's wrong with that?' the reporter asked.
'We ran a story that Sidon is flattened,' the editor replied. 'Why do
you have to invent a hotel lunch there?'
The reporter could have lunched at any one of a dozen hotels; some of
them did not close even on the few days when fighting took place. About
five per cent of Sidon's dwellings had been severely damaged, while a
number of other office buildings and houses suffered minor damage.
Most were intact and untouched. The city itself was teeming with life:
thousands of people were shopping at stores full of goods, cinemas were
open and the traffic was as bad as a London rush hour.
Another problem was that many of the journalists who flocked to the
war had no background knowledge of recent Lebanese history. Some of
them readily admitted that they knew nothing of the civil war of
1975-76 and of the hostility between Christians and Muslims. When
badly briefed reporters saw the city of Damour, wrecked in 1976, some
of them assumed the damage to be days or hours old. Even so, they
hardly needed a knowledge of history to make a deduction from the fact
that the rubble in Damour had weeds growing out of it.
The author read reports which described in dramatic terms the rough
road between the border and Beirut. It was, they said, 'scarred by
shellholes and bomb craters and chewed up by tank tracks'. For as long
as I could remember that road had been hazardous, with potholes,
crumbling edges, ruts and protruding stones; the Lebanese have done
no real work on it for decades. Military traffic had not improved its
deplorable surface, but it bore no obvious shellholes or craters.
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THE MEDIA WAR
Frank Gervasi, a veteran American war correspondent, later studied

media coverage of the war 1 , and found television to be the chief offender
in terms of distortion and incompetent reporting: 'All the major
American networks showed Israeli tanks and artillery rolling past the
ruins of Tyre, Sidon and Damour - cities which had already been
heavily damaged by the P L O - [thus] creating the impression that what
viewers were seeing was the result of Israeli military action. Little
attempt was made by anchormen or commentators to explain that the
battered homes, churches and shattered public buildings so dramati-
cally portrayed in full colour on TV screens were at least as much the
result of previous P L O depredations as they were the consequence of
Israeli combat action.'
It would be interesting to know the basis for a claim, made in a full-
page advertisement in The New York Times on 20 June 1982, that the
'death and devastation' wrought by the Israelis in Lebanon had caused
'40,000 killed and wounded' and made '700,000 homeless'. About 200
more or less prominent intellectuals were induced to sign this
advertisement. The author is aware of only one major piece of research
into casualties in Lebanon. It was carried out by Frank Gervasi, who
spent weeks canvassing hospitals in the coastal cities where there had
been heavy fighting. By mid-July he had his statistics.
In Tyre, 56 people had been killed and 95 wounded; 20 were still in
hospital. In populous Sidon the official count was 265 dead and about
1,000 wounded, including 300 who did not need hospital treatment.
The casualties in the two camps of Ein el-Hilwe and Rachidiye were
put, by local mukhtars, at between 1,000 and 1,200. 'Too many from a
humanitarian point of view,' Gervasi observes, 'but far fewer than the
P L O propagandists claimed.' At Nabatiye the mayor told Gervasi that
ten people had been killed and 15 wounded during the fighting.
For several days running - 7 to 12 June - the French television
channel Antenne 2 showed footage of a girl whose head was hanging
limply, ostensibly dead, being carried in the arms of an Arab. The film
had been taken in Damour in 1976. Shots of the same girl lifting her
head, very much alive, were omitted. This material was repeatedly used
as the background picture for reports on the current fighting in
Lebanon, until challenged in Le Monde and Paris Match.
'See note at beginning of this chapter.
157
News about the death of a French TV correspondent, Pierre Creole,

was also broadcast repeatedly in France; the reporting implied that he
had died in an 'indiscriminate' Israeli air raid. Israel was quick to
express regrets over his death. Only afterwards, when the film in his
camera was developed did it become clear that he was not killed in an air
raid but as a result of being too close to a large PLO arms dump, which
blew up.
The author saw a European newspaper photographer pose a group of
Lebanese children in a burnt-out car south of Beirut. They had been
walking along the seafront, but were persuaded to pose amid the
wreckage so that the photographer could dramatise his pictures of
'Israeli devastation'.
A few weeks after the battle for Beaufort Castle we were in the
countryside north of the castle in the company of an American professor
of journalism. He was intrigued by the number of white flags of
surrender fluttering from several houses. 'They wanted to make sure
Rocket-propelled grenades delivered to the PLO in Lebanon

packed in crates marked with the Red Crescent - the Muslim
equivalent of the Red Cross. (Author's photo)
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THE MEDIA WAR
that the Israelis didn't fire at their homes,' he said. In fact, families in
that region hang out a white cloth to indicate that a girl of marriageable
age lives there. Cameramen from many countries had filmed the
symbols of this pleasant custom as 'white flags of surrender'.
Where some pro-PLO European journalists may have fixed solely
upon havoc in Lebanon in order to condemn Israel, American
journalists - and especially network TV - did it in order to satisfy the
professional and material requirements of their news organisations.
Newsweek's, 'special report' (21 June), covering the first week of the
war, contained this key-note passage:
After the first waves of terror bombing and indiscriminate shelling no one
could count the bodies buried in the rubble of Lebanon's coastal cities.
Hundreds of thousands of refugees huddled on open beaches and scavenged for
food and water.
Although much dispute remains about Israeli targeting during the siege
of Beirut, especially its last days, there was no 'terror bombing' or
'indiscriminate shelling' during the first week of fighting. Refugees,
who never did number hundreds of thousands, did not stay on the
beaches after the fighting ended, but returned to their homes, most of
which were intact; and they were never forced to 'scavenge'. All this is
now accepted.
Newsweek was not the only publication to report 'indiscriminate'
firing. The fact is that artillery fire often appears to be indiscriminate to
a reporter not close enough to see a strike; and fire control officers are
often acting on information to which a reporter is not privy. For
instance, the author saw a field gun firing at the base of an apartment
building in an incident which some civilian observers might well have
labelled 'indiscriminate'. Ten minutes later we reached that building -
and saw a P L O multiple-barrel rocket-launcher which the Israeli
shelling had knocked out.
There was little reporting on the following major aspects of the war:
The significance of the vast quantities of arms found in P L O bunkers
and tunnels.
The rapidity with which the Lebanese were able to resume normal
life as they returned to their homes in the liberated areas.
The benefits at that date to Lebanon itself, and to Western influence
in the Middle East of the Israeli military action.
159
Large-calibre
rockets, made in
North Korea and
shipped into
Lebanon for the
PLO in crates with
the kind of
markings which had
become a black joke
long before
Lebanon hit the
world's headlines:
'Parts of tractor'. . .
The realities of the P L O as an instrument of international terrorism,

revealed in the tons of captured documents.
The extent of Israeli help in the relief and rehabilitation of the
Lebanese population, including its large Palestinian Arab minority.
During the siege another factor was at work: the natural sympathy of
foreign journalists for people with whom they share adverse
circumstances. This shared suffering tended to make journalists
identify with the people of West Beirut - a condition well known in war.
It was inevitable that media coverage of the war from PLO-held West
Beirut was sometimes highly selective, or intensely emotional, or even
poetic in its imaginative use of language. We should not be too surprised
about this. Much of the problem lay in the dangerous nature of the
journalist's job. John Kifner wrote in The New York Times:
To work here as a journalist is to carry fear with you as faithfully as your
notebook. It is the constant knowledge that there is nothing that you can do to
160
THE MEDIA WAR
protect yourself and that nothing has ever happened to an assassin. In this
atmosphere a journalist must often weigh when, how, and sometimes even
whether to record a story. In the Middle East facts are always somewhat
elusive. But there is a pervasive belief among the Beirut press corps that
correspondents should be extremely wary . . .
They needed to be wary, not only of incurring the wrath of the P L O or

the Syrians, but simply in moving about. With apparently limitless
ammunition, the Palestinian fighters constantly loosed off sprays of
automatic fire. Men posted in buildings as snipers fired at anything that
moved.
The main source of information in West Beirut was the P L O
spokesman's office, where highly professional and articulate publicists
gave the 'latest figures' for casualties and assessments of war damage.
Most Western newspapers accepted from the P L O a figure of 'up to
600,000' for Palestinian casualties to 10 June. This exceeded the entire
population of southern Lebanon. That the figure was later revised to
10,000 - a reduction of more than 98 per cent - was not widely reported.
Cooped up within West Beirut, the foreign journalists had no way of
verifying anything the P L O leaders told them. Of course, they
occasionally saw a building damaged by bombs or shells, and some
streets were little more than rubble. And they saw casualties - always a
distressing experience. In this environment many developed the
'rubble syndrome', a condition of anxiety and stress which led them to
see nothing but hopelessness and destruction.
Mike McCourt of the American Broadcasting Company (ABC)
vividly reported on 28 June:
As they [historians] have written about Stalingrad and Berlin they will write of
the siege of Beirut in 1982. Two square miles of West Beirut are now dust and
mortar. The rest of the city, nearly all of it, resembles some ancient ruin. The
Israeli siege has made most of West Beirut a ghost town.
McCourt's surprising comparisons with Stalingrad and Berlin may

perhaps be excused as generous literary licence; but the author can only
affirm that he did not come across 'two square miles of dust and mortar'.
In fact, when one went up to the heights behind the city it was difficult
to see any ruins; and it was possible to walk through miles of streets
without coming across any damage beyond the scars of the seven-year
conflict before 1982.
161
The author read a description1 of the aerial bombing of Ein el-Hilwe

in which a foreign observer told two reporters of 'carpet bombing'
which 'continued for ten days without respite'. 'Carpet bombing' is an
imprecise and unmilitary phrase, but if it means anything, it means
systematic, yard-by-yard saturation bombing. According to the
observer, waves of bombers saturated one segment of the camp after
another, returning day after day. Had a bombing of this type actually
taken place, a single raid would have been enough to wipe out most of
Ein el-Hilwe; ten days of it would have reduced it to dust. But the
observer's description made good copy, and under the circumstances it
was easy for reporters without knowledge of the realities of war to accept
it.
Sometimes the PLO propagandists simply conned the media. In
August, United Press International distributed a photograph which
showed a nurse in a Beirut hospital feeding a seven-month-old baby
who was said to have lost both arms after being burned in a bombing. A
photograph of an injured child will always get into a newspaper, and this
particular infant made hundreds of front pages all over the world.
President Reagan even kept a picture of the child on his desk in the Oval
Office; thus she became known as 'Reagan's Little Girl'.
The Israeli Health Minister, Eliezer Shostock, sent a special team to
Lebanon to find the baby; and the mother and child - a baby boy, and
not a girl as reported by UPI - were traced to a Lebanese village.
Professor Baruch Modan, the ministry's director-general, found the
infant in good health; he had suffered some burns, but neither arm had
been amputated, though one was strapped to his side because of a
fracture. A closer examination of the original photograph showed that
an apparent arm stump was the top of a milk bottle from which the nurse
had been feeding the child. When all this became public knowledge,
UPI confirmed its error (on 24 August). The original picture was used
by The Washington Post on page one; the corrected story, on page 14.
US News and World Report (2 August) showed a woman mourning
at a graveside in Beirut, and explained that her son was a victim of the
Israeli invasion. To those who could read Arabic the tomb inscription
revealed that this was the grave of Halad Belaty who had died on 29
1
New Society, 19 August 1982.
162
THE MEDIA WAR
Ramadan 1400 - that is, on 10 August 1980, two years before the Israeli
invasion.
Sometimes newspapers and magazines published a photograph of a
single badly damaged building with a caption which indicated that it
was typical of an entire area. More often than not the buildings on either
side were completely undamaged; but then, the picture value of an
undamaged building is nil.
Favourable coverage by the media, particularly television, en-
couraged Arafat and the P L O to stay on in Beirut day after day. Arafat
and his lieutenants hoped that the massive propaganda stream going out
of Beirut might induce the Americans to force the Israeli Army to
withdraw. He had much advice from his brother, Dr Fathi Arafat, chief
of the PLO's Red Crescent organisation (the Muslim Red Cross
equivalent). It was Fathi who gave out casualty figures, and he urged the
other P L O propagandists to work on a 'human interest' publicity
campaign.
Photographs appeared showing Arafat with babies in his arms outside
the entrance to one of his bunkers. He actually dislikes small children,
but the cameramen convinced him that 'kiddies in colour sell dog food',
as the author heard one of them say - that the advertisers on television
like children in news films.
Some correspondents became aware of the shortcomings of the
electronic media. Bill Moyers, appearing on CBS Evening News on 23
August, succinctly expressed his disquiet:
Watching scenes of the Beirut evacuation I was struck by how it is possible for
the cameras to magnify a lie. These Palestinian troops left town as if they had
just won a great victory. Arafat, they praised as a conquering hero. In fact, they
are leaving town in defeat. And in fact, Arafat led them to this cul-de-sac where
they made their last stand behind the skirts of women and among the
playgrounds of children. . . .
A far-ranging analysis of the news media's handling of the war was

carried out by Colonel Trevor Dupuy, a retired American army officer
who is president and executive director of the Historical Evaluation and
Research Organisation based in New York. Dupuy went to Lebanon to
observe the war as a conflict; but he became even more interested in the
way it was being reported. In a long article entitled Behind the Lies in
Lebanon, which was syndicated in the United States, Dupuy was
163
bluntly critical of the media. His organisation sent printed copies of this
report to 3,500 major newspapers in the US A; from none of them did he
receive a single complaint of unfair criticism, let alone any hint of more
robust measures. The report, which is to be expanded into a book in
1986, carries considerable weight: Dupuy, author of 80 books on
military matters, is regarded as an open-minded historian by defence
ministries and military headquarters around the world. His conclusion:
I am disgusted by the many false and irresponsible media reports by those who
have a moral responsibility to present facts truthfully and objectively. Tales of
wanton destruction and devastation of such cities as Tyre, Sidon, Damour and
Nabatiye are not only inconsistent with my own combat experience and the
various studies I have made on the nature of urban destruction in past wars, but
were obviously contrary to what I saw in those cities.
Among Dupuy's examples of incompetent reporting were accounts of
the bombing of West Beirut on 12 August:
According to headlines all over the world, on that day the Israeli Air Force
launched its most intensive and devastating attack of the war on West Beirut. It
was reported that hundreds of buildings were destroyed and nearly 1,000
people killed or wounded.
On that day I spent about five hours observing this bombardment. During
that time, it was apparent from my observation that no more than 150 bombs,
probably 200 to 500 kilograms each, were dropped on Beirut. As far as artillery
bombardment was concerned, [from] the many Israeli positions I visited in
and around East Beirut, I saw fewer shell bursts than bomb explosions during
the time I was there.
It must have been extremely unpleasant for people in West Beirut during
that time, and the refugees I saw streaming through the Galerie Samaan
checkpoint were obviously happy to be out. However, to any veteran who has
been under air or artillery attack in 'normal' combat situations, this was
relatively modest harassment.
Therefore I was surprised to learn from a BBC broadcast that night [12
August] that bombardment was so intensive that President Reagan telephoned
Prime Minister Begin to express 'outrage'.
My surprise turned to astonishment when I read in the 14 August issue of the
International Herald Tribune, quoting PLO communiques, that the warplanes
dropped 44,000 bombs and that 700 houses collapsed. The article did not
comment on these statistics or present any differing assessment. So the reader
could only conclude that the Herald Tribune believed these figures.
I later discovered that The Washington Post of 13 August reported, again
without comment, a statement made by the PLO representative in New York
that 1,600 bombs and rockets were dropped and 42,000 shells fired.
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THE MEDIA WAR
Distribution of Israeli military ration packs to Lebanese children

in Sidon.
Let's suppose that I am not a very good observer, that instead of 150 bombs,
2,000 were dropped during the five hours I was there watching. This means
that 42,000 bombs would have had to be dropped in the remaining six of the 11
hours during which the attack was reported to have taken place.
That means 7,000 bombs per hour, or more than 100 per minute. No air
force in the world could drop 42,000 substantial bombs on one target the size of
Beirut in six hours, or drop 44,000 bombs - 4,000 per hour or 70 per minute - in
11 hours.
The Israeli Air Force has fewer than 600 combat aircraft. In a maximum
effort, it might be able to commit 300 of these to such a mission, and these could
probably fly three combat sorties each during 11 hours. That is a maximum
potential of 900 sorties; and if each plane carried four bombs on each sortie, that
would be an absolute maximum of 3,600 bombs, less than one-tenth of the
number that the Herald Tribune reported.
But I stick to my on-the-spot observation that the actual intensity was
probably about one-tenth of that theoretical maximum and thus less than one-
hundredth of the reported intensity.
As to the Washington Post report, the figure of 1,600 bombs was theoretically
possible, but suggests an intensity at least four times greater than what I saw.
165
The reported 42,000 rounds of artillery fire would have required a

bombardment averaging nearly 4,000 shells per hour. On the basis of what I
saw, this could not possibly be true.
How could responsible reporters present such figures without a word of
comment?
Several Israeli scholars, distressed by the media coverage of the war,
have been working ever since on a voluminous study to account for what
they consider was a 'word war' against them.
It should be said, finally, that a good many reporters showed bias to
neither side. In his Misreporting Lebanon Muravchik says that on the
whole the work of The New York Times was of a higher standard than
that of other news outlets. He also praised the TV company CBS for its
'care in avoiding tendentious and loaded wording'.
166
8 Reluctant Peace-Keepers,
Eager Martyrs
ON 23 August 1982 Bashir Gemayel had been elected president of
Lebanon and was waiting for his official investiture. The 34-year-old
Gemayel was part-politician, part-storm trooper, and he had already
shown that he would use whatever means were necessary to achieve his
nationalist goals. To his Phalangist followers he projected the personal
magnetism of a combat leader who had fought and suffered with them
on the battlefield. He fervently believed, as he told the author, that the
departure of all foreign forces was a prerequisite to solving his country's
problems and forging national unity. He was particularly anxious to see
the Palestinians go; some people who had known him for years said that
he was obsessed with the Palestinians.
Jonathan Randal of The Washington Post has written1 that the
Lebanese and Palestinians had something in common: 'a natural affinity
for the dangerous rhythms of street fighting, as graceful and courageous
as bullfighters in their long courtship with violence'.
This extravagantly poetic description has some truth in it; but what
the Christian Lebanese and the Palestinians had more markedly in
common was their mutual hatred. The Palestinians wanted to see
Gemayel dead - as did rival Maronite Christian factions, and various
Shi'a Muslim groups.
Randal also noted (as we too observed) that the Christian militiamen
looked down on the Israelis as soldiers. This oddly patronising attitude
was the result of equating soldierly qualities with soldierly appearance -
the Israelis were scruffy, bearded, and wore crumpled uniforms. The
Christians were always immaculately turned out, clean-shaven and with
their boots polished; but they were, in Randal's assessment, 'timorous
and unwilling to take risks'.
Gemayel himself had to take risks, because he had incurred so much
enmity. In March 1979 a bomb in his car had been defused. In February
'In The Tragedy of Lebanon, Chatto & Windus, 1983.
167
1980 a car bomb killed his 18-month-old daughter and three

bodyguards. Afterwards he still insisted on driving around alone,
although he changed cars as many as ten times a day.
Gemayel wanted the Lebanese Army - weak, demoralised and under-
armed though it was - to take on the peace-keeping burden, although he
knew it would have to cope with setbacks. In the meantime the presence
of the US Marines, 800 French troops and 500 Italians did something to
give the people confidence.
By the time the P L O evacuation from Beirut was complete on 1
September more than 11,000 Palestinians had sailed from the port and
3,625 Syrian soldiers had been moved by convoy from West Beirut to
the Bekaa Valley. When US Marine HQ in Beirut was informed that the
last chartered ship, Mediterranean Sun, had received clearance from the
Israeli Navy to sail for the Syrian port of Tartus with 700 Palestinians,
the Marine radio operator said, 'OK, well done. Now let's go home.'
The American defence secretary, Caspar Weinberger, announced in
Beirut that the 800 Marines would be leaving the capital in a few days.
Israeli Merkava tanks in 'harbour', safe beneath a skyline. The IDF

ended 1982 still in the positions they had captured in July; but by
that time their government and high command were anxiously
seeking a formula which would allow them to pull out. (IDF)
RELUCTANT PEACE-KEEPERS, EAGER MARTYRS
That day Israeli Prime Minister Begin, acting on information that the
P L O had probably left between 2,000 and 3,000 men in West Beirut,
asked the Lebanese Army to move into that part of the city to keep
order. He and his cabinet feared that in the political vacuum which now
existed this delayed-action P L O force would restart the war. The
Lebanese Army's senior officer on the spot, Colonel Qun, told the
Lebanese Prime Minister, Shafik Wazzan, that he would not allow his
units to enter West Beirut on the grounds that it was 'too dangerous'; so
the I D F was ordered in.
The I D F turned its attention to the Syrians, too, because they had
made it clear that they were still aggressive. Over several days Israeli
aircraft destroyed Syrian ground-to-air batteries in the Bekaa, where
Syria by now had three divisions of troops. A further series of attacks
blew up the strategic Damascus-Beirut road west of Chtaura,
effectively cutting off Syrian troops west of the central mountain chain
from reinforcements and supplies.
The US Marines left on 9 September, with a cheerful marine holding
up for the photographers a sign that read 'Mission Accomplished'. Time
Magazine ended its report about Lebanon for that week with the same
two words.
In fact, other than the evacuation of the P L O , little had been
accomplished despite the statement by Lebanese Prime Minister on 9
September that 'As of today there is no East Beirut and no West Beirut.
We have reached the end of our sorrows.'
Of course there were two Beiruts - one Christian and one Muslim.
Each had scores to settle with the other, and snipers were active in
several parts of the city. The Syrians were still occupying large parts of
Lebanon, and, in consequence, so was the Israeli Army.
Certainly there were some hopeful signs. The French Foreign Legion
began to lift mines from the main approach roads to Beirut. Prime
Minister Wazzan opened the Sodeco crossing point between East and
West Beirut, and it was hoped that before long Beirut Airport would re-
open. Electricity supply and telephone service were resumed.
Then, on 14 September, the Phalangists suffered a shattering loss -
Bashir Gemayel was assassinated. A member of the Syrian Socialist
National Party, Habib Chatouni, had hidden a Japanese-made
electronically triggered bomb behind a panel in a wall. Set off from 200
metres away, it killed 20 other people as well as Gemayel. (Chatouni was
169
quickly caught, tortured for information, and killed.) Very soon,

Christians and Muslims were fighting each other yet again.
Two days later Sabra and Shatila entered the media vocabulary.
Sabra and Shatila were Palestinian refugee camps in southern Beirut -
though suburbs would be a better description. Because of the departure
of the PLO fighters the camps' population was mostly made up of older
men, women and children. Phalangist raiders went into the camps at
about 6 pm on the night of 16 September on a mission of murder.
The killers belonged to an 'Intelligence unit' of the Phalangist army
led by Elie Hobeika, aged 29. Hobeika, who habitually carried a pistol, a
knife and a hand grenade on his belt, was - as Lebanese, Palestinians
and Israelis have all told the author - the most feared Phalangist in
Lebanon. It had been his duty to protect Bashir Gemayel; he had failed,
and he wanted to take out his frustrations on somebody.
His unit was considered specially trained in discovering terrorists
who tried to hide among the civilian population. In an orgy of killing
that lasted 38 hours the Phalangists slaughtered up to 800 people,
methodically rounding up and killing everybody they could find. It was
butchery of a kind the civilised mind cannot comprehend. Some victims
were shot in the head at point blank range, others had their throats cut.
Some had their hands tied behind their backs before being murdered.
One young man was castrated. A Phalangist threw a hand grenade at
four doctors who tried to leave Acca Hospital under a white flag; three of
them were killed.
No Phalangist concerned in the massacre has ever made a statement,
but we know that the killings were regarded as revenge for the murder of
Bashir Gemayel and for various massacres of Christians by the PLO
and other Muslims, and as a way of driving the Palestinians from
Lebanon.
The killings shocked the Israeli people. Israeli troops had been
positioned around the outside of the camps, and the Phalangists'
'terrorist hunt' had gone in with Israeli agreement. There were claims
that during the prolonged massacre warning of what seemed to be going
on had been passed to a high level of the Israeli command structure, but
had not been acted upon. Press and public demanded an explanation
from Prime Minister Begin and Defence Minister Sharon. Sharon
insisted that the Israeli military commanders had told the Christian
leaders time and again that any military action must be limited to the
170
Lebanese President-
Elect Bashir
Gemayel, in the
uniform of his
Phalangist 'Lebanese
Forces' militia. Israel
pinned great hopes
on his leading a stable,
relatively friendly
regime; but he was
by no means a co-
operative tool of
Israeli foreign policy.
Aged only 34, he had
fought and intrigued
his way to the
leadership of the
Phalangists in a
series of bloody gang
wars. His assassination
by Habib Chatouni
on 14 September 1982
led directly to the
Sabra and Shatila
massacres. (Al
Masira)
terrorists still hidden in West Beirut, and that civilians must not be ill-
treated. This statement of general principles did nothing to mitigate the
Israelis' sense of shock and guilt over the specific events at Sabra and
Shatila.
Massive demonstrations in Israel against the Begin-Sharon
government aroused world interest. Many Israelis believed that their
leaders should have anticipated the Christian attack on the Palestinians.
They felt that after the Gemayel assassination it had been predictable
that the Christians, who had lost tens of thousands of their men, women
and children during the years of PLO occupation, would seek revenge:
cycles of ever more barbarous revenge were, after all, one of the few
constant factors in Lebanese politics.
The Israeli government ordered a commission of inquiry into alleged
complicity by Israeli Army officers. The chairman was the president of
the supreme court, Yitzhak Kahan, and the members were Justice
Aharon Barak and Major-General Yona Efret. Their judgement, in
171
February 1983, made clear that no Israelis were involved in the killings;
but it found blameworthy Defence Minister Sharon; the Chief-of-
Staff, Lieutenant-General Raphael Eitan; the head of Military
Intelligence, Major-General Yoshua Saguy; the commander in
Lebanon, Lieutenant-General Amir Drori; and the commander in the
Beirut sector, Brigadier-General Amos Yaron. In essence, the
commission made these criticisms:
Sharon: Blameworthy for deciding that the Phalangists should enter the
camps, disregarding the danger of acts of vengeance and bloodshed.
Eitan: Blameworthy for his lack of foresight in failing to take
appropriate measures to prevent the massacre.
Saguy: Blameworthy for 'indifference and a conspicuous lack of
concern, of shutting of eyes and ears to a matter regarding which it was
incumbent on the director of the Intelligence arm to open his eyes and
listen well to all that was discussed and decided'.
Drori: Blameworthy for his 'breach of duty' in failing to tell the Chief-
of-Staff that there were at least suspicions of a massacre.
Yaron: Blameworthy for 'thoroughly mistaken judgement' and 'grave
error'.
Sharon and Saguy lost their posts, but no penalty was imposed on Eitan
as he was due to retire in two months' time. Drori, too, was not
penalised, but Yaron was barred from holding a field command for
three years.
Eitan issued an order of the day which declared that the Israeli Army
would not only accept the government's decision concerning the Sabra-
Shatila events, but would learn the lessons of the Kahan Commission's
findings. 'The I D F will prove that it has the ability to withstand
criticism and draw painful conclusions,' he wrote.
Phalangist 'Special Forces', armed with Swiss assault rifles and

fashionably arrayed in the camouflage clothing which is de rigeur
for militiamen - whatever its practical uselessness in street
fighting - confer with Israeli soldiers in August 1982. Israel's hopes
of stability in Lebanon foundered as much upon the Phalangists'
refusal to give up their vicious local feuds as upon the
radicalisation of the Shi'a community in the south. The Gemayel
faction even refused to co-operate with Haddad's 'South Lebanese
Army' in the border area.
172
Israeli Maj.Gen.
Amir Drori was the
commander in
Lebanon in
September 1982. He
was criticised in the
Kahan Report for
failing to pass on to
Eitan reported
suspicions of a
massacre in progress
in Sabra and Shatila.
(IDF)
The Times commented that the commission of inquiry had reported

on the events in Sabra and Shatila 'in unsurpassed detail and with
painful frankness'. Perhaps for this very reason Israel was thrown into
political disarray, and Israeli was set vehemently against Israeli.
In a way the Kahan Report was anti-climax. Long before it was
published Israel was already in turmoil, because the massacres had
heightened the conviction of many Israelis that the war had been
unnecessary in the first place; others considered that the IDF should
never have pushed through to Beirut.
The objective outsider can see that the war was the inevitable
consequence of 14 years' provocation; and that for the Army to continue
to Beirut and crush the PLO was military logic. To have stopped short
of expelling the PLO from Beirut would have been to declare the
conflict a draw; such an indecisive result would have been an invitation
to the PLO to continue their attacks on Israel.
The Army's problem was that in entering Beirut it had unwittingly
become involved in the savage feuds of Palestinians, Christians,
174
Muslims and Druse in their various factions. The democratic Israelis

were out of their depth in the Byzantine complexities of Lebanese
politics.
The dissent expressed by a large section of the Israeli public against
the war was a remarkable manifestation of democracy. Weeks before the
massacre, massive demonstrations had taken place in Tel Aviv and large
ones in Jerusalem. Even soldiers in uniform took part in these
demonstrations; some of them, including a brigade commander,
refused service in Lebanon. This serious decision could only result in
military disgrace and the end of a service career. Various servicemen's
groups were organised, notably Soldiers Against Silence; they
demanded that 'the truth about Lebanon' should be made known.
A major truth about Lebanon was that the Israeli leaders did not
understand the depths of enmity within Lebanese society. Nor did they
comprehend the centuries-old revenge mentality which afflicted
Christians as well as Muslims; they believed that Christians generally
were humble and forgiving. 'What sort of Christians are these people?'
an Israeli professor asked the author soon after the massacres. 'I never
expected that any other Christians could be as vicious as the Nazis.'
What had begun as Operation 'Peace for Galilee' in June 1982 took on
a still wider dimension in October 1982 when a multi-national peace-
keeping force (MNF) reached Beirut. It was made up of Marines from
the USA; paratroops and Foreign Legionnaires from France; a wide
range of units from Italy; and 100 men of the Blues and Royals with
armoured cars from Britain. The Israeli campaign against the PLO
might have concluded, but the war was continuing - and becoming
wider in its strategic implications.
The MNF was entering an arena which its political masters only
dimly understood. This may seem paradoxical, since Britain and
France had vast experience of Middle Eastern involvement to draw
upon. Italy, too, had possessed a Muslim empire, and its leaders should
have known something of the powerful forces which constantly cause
friction in this region. But Britain and France had moved out of the
eastern Mediterranean decades before - France from Syria Lebanon in
1941, and Britain from Palestine in 1948. At that time the force of Islam
was still dormant, the Soviet Union's influence was negligible, the arms
held by subversive groups were primitive, the prestige of the imperial
powers was great, and the people of the region were politically
175
unsophisticated. All this had since changed and British and French
expertise was out of date.
The Americans were simply innocent - if that is not too euphemistic a
word. They were committing troops to the most politically complex
region in the world without any clear political objective beyond the
general aim - laudable in itself - of maintaining peace.
In the Middle East conflict attracts conflict, and instability attracts
extremists. Almost simultaneously with the departure of the P L O
another group was moving in to fill the vacuum. This time it was made
up of Iranian Revolutionary Guards sent by Ayatollah Khomeini to
form a strong outpost for his jihad or holy war against the West, and
particularly against the United States.
An Italian marine of the 'San Marco' Battalion on duty in a

Palestinian area of Beirut. Italian MNF troops established a
trusting relationship with the Palestinians, and were spared the
kind of major attacks which fell upon the French and American
contingents; but they still lost two men killed.
Led by Hussein Mussawi, they established themselves at Baalbek

under Syrian sponsorship and looked for ways to exploit Lebanon's
instability. In north Lebanon many PLO men remained in place; they,
too, wanted to wage another war against Israel, the Phalangists, and
anybody else who aided their enemies. In eastern Lebanon the Syrians
hastily regrouped their battered forces and asked the Soviet Union for
urgent tank and aircraft replacements, as well as more advanced anti-
aircraft defences. Within Beirut and in southern Lebanon Shi'a Muslim
groups also saw an opportunity to increase their political strength by the
use of force.
On 1 September as the PLO was leaving Beirut, President Reagan
had proposed a peace plan based on self-government by the Palestinians
on the West Bank and Gazans in Gaza, a freeze on Israeli settlements in
occupied territories, guarantees for the security of Israel and an
undivided Jerusalem. The Israeli government rejected the initiative on
the grounds that it was contrary to the Camp David accords. The Arab
League summit in Fez did not comment on it, and Syria opposed it.
King Hussein of Jordan preferred the concept of a joint
Palestinian-Jordanian committee as a step towards a future formal
relationship between the West Bank and Jordan. The Arab League
summit then proposed an eight-point peace plan which made no more
progress than the Reagan plan.
By the end of 1982 Israeli forces were still deployed where they had
been when the war of movement ended in July. As long as they
remained there Israel could assure the security of its own northern
frontier and prevent the re-investment of Beirut by Syria and the PLO.
It remained to find a political formula that would permit Israel to
withdraw without risking these gains.
The complications involved in a prolonged presence in Lebanon led
some Israelis to wonder whether they were trapped in a quagmire.
Israel, against its will, found itself implicated in various controversies
such as the standard of shelters to be provided for the refugees in
southern Lebanon, and the Druse-Maronite clashes in the Shouf
Mountains and the region around the hill town of Aley. This latter was a
bloody and vicious little chapter of the war, and it was to continue for
months.
For a while in mid-1982 the Christians and Druse had been allies,
united by their common delight in the Israeli victory over the hated
177
178
Syrians. On at least one occasion the two groups came together on the
Beirut-Damascus highway for a kind of macabre ritual. Christians and
Druse piled up the bodies of Syrian soldiers killed in a clash with the
Israeli Army, like so many logs of wood, and burned them - still in their
boots, helmets and personal gear. Around the makeshift pyre they
mingled together in back-slapping triumph.
When we had been in Aley in July it was a lively place, full of people
shopping, talking and sightseeing - Christians and Druse alike. Now
the coffee tables were deserted and Aley was like a ghost town, with that
peculiar air of tension that invests a place where violence erupts
intermittently and irrationally.
Often the violence was 'a mistake', as both Christians and Druse
explained. On one occasion a Druse patrol fired an R P G into the back of
a jeep because they thought it was carrying Phalange fighters. Instead,
they killed four soldiers of the Lebanese Army, with which - at that time
- the Druse had no particular quarrel.
Schooling had been abandoned because snipers were shooting at
school buses. The Shouf was without water and electricity because the
Phalangists had blown up the district generator and the Druse had
destroyed the pumping station. The daily death toll was about ten, with
perhaps 30 wounded, but in one period of 24 hours 17 people were
killed. The automatic rifles and machine guns were hardly ever quiet,
and shell explosions were frequent.
Caught in the middle of this savage feuding was the Israeli Army. Its
officers tried to mediate between the warring factions, and though they
had no wish to be policemen they had to impose curfews, control
important road junctions and patrol the streets. The I D F posted guards
over the homes of those people thought to be particularly at risk. At one
time a local Israeli commander held in custody the representatives of
both sides, and threatened to keep them until they worked out a
LEFT A US Marine sentry in Beirut; the magazine has been

removed from his rifle. This kind of gesture, intended to underline
the 'non-confrontational' role of the Marines, was lost on the
fanatical Muslim guerrillas.
OVERLEAF This French para, on guard duty in Beirut in July 1983,
illustrates a rather more bellicose style. They never used their
AA 52 machine guns, but the impression that they would be willing
to do so had a pronounced peace-keeping effect. (ECPA)
179
ceasefire. After 36 hours they agreed; then left the Israeli camp, and
promptly went back to shooting.
Several men had an interest in provoking fighting between the Druse
and Christians. One was Rifaat Assad, brother of the Syrian president,
who wanted to protect his Shouf-based drug-smuggling ring and to
prevent the Christians from swamping Druse autonomy. Ahmed
Jibril's Marxist faction within the PLO also wanted to ensure that the
Shouf did not fall under Phalangist control; the Druse had made the
Shouf a safe haven for Jibril's men.
The Americans were in greater danger than they realised; and on 18
April 1983 a car bomb destroyed the US Embassy in Beirut with the
loss of 66 lives. The Americans persisted in their peacemaking efforts,
and chaired a series of talks between Israeli and Lebanese negotiators,
with the Saudi Arabians taking a strong but discreet interest. On 17
May 1983 an agreement was signed which provided for the withdrawal
of Israeli forces from Lebanon provided Syria also withdrew its troops.
Relations between Israel and Lebanon were to be 'normalised', a
desirable state of affairs for both countries.
On 2 November 1982 the Director General of Israel's Foreign
Ministry, David Kimche, had said: 'By removing the power of the PLO
and by restoring full sovereignty and independence to Lebanon, Israel
has set in train a new process in the Middle East which we hope will lead
eventually to peace.' Now, seven months later, it seemed that peace
might indeed be possible.
Syria refused to co-operate. President Assad was in a strong position
since he knew that Israeli public opinion, alarmed by IDF casualties,
would not tolerate further military action on a large scale. In the Bekaa
Valley he also had 10,000 PLO fighters, virtually leaderless since
Arafat's withdrawal from Beirut; Syria planned to take over these forces
and use them against Israel and the Lebanese Phalange.
By the beginning of the third week in May 1983, at about the time
Israel and Lebanon were signing a peace agreement, it was clear that
many of the PLO fighters who had been evacuated from Beirut had
returned to Lebanon and were stationed behind the Syrian lines in the
eastern valleys. A bitter conflict developed between pro- and anti-
Arafat factions, and the Fatah commander in the Bekaa, Musa Awad
(Abu Musa), proclaimed a mutiny against Arafat's leadership.
Supported by about half the PLO fighters, he was recognised by Syria.
182
Paras of the French 11eDP are briefed beside their VAB armoured
personnel carriers. They carry the full armament of a combat
section: FAMAS assault rifles, FR F1 sniper's rifles, AA 52
machine guns, and 89 mm rocket launchers. Despite their wariness
and obvious combat readiness, the French had no more effective
defence against suicide car-bombers than the US contingent.
(ECPA)
After his retreat from Beirut Arafat had gone on to a spectacular

propaganda triumph, being received in audience by Pope John-Paul II.
This coup was the result of several years' work in the Vatican by Farouk
Khaddoumi, the PLO's 'foreign minister'. It supported Arafat's claim
to have won a political victory against Israel. He enjoyed no such victory
in Syria; and as the PLO mutiny developed into savage fighting he sent
telegrams to Arab heads of state accusing Syria and Libya of stirring up
inter-PLO fighting in the Bekaa. As tension increased the Syrian
authorities asked Arafat to leave Damascus; while the Mufti of
Jerusalem, supporting Arafat, offered dispensation to anyone who
183
murdered President Assad1. Assad was too well guarded to be in serious

danger, but a car bomb in Baalbek, Lebanon, killed 36 people, mostly
Iranians.
Sporadic fighting continued, and in September 1983 the IDF
withdrew from Beirut and established a front line at the Awali River in
southern Lebanon. Phalangist militiamen and their families had moved
into the Shouf area - traditionally under Druse control - soon after the
Israeli advance had made it safe for them to do so; but with the Israeli
withdrawal the Phalangists were without protection. The Lebanese
Army, which had been re-formed, re-armed and trained by American
instructors, was still not strong enough to take over the Israeli positions.
The Druse at once attacked both the Phalangist enclaves and the
Lebanese Army. The Americans, fearing that the loss of the key centre
of Souk al-Gharb would increase the threat to the MNF, supported the
Army with heavy gun fire from the USS New Jersey.
In the hills the war had become essentially anti-Christian, with
Muslims slaughtering Christian non-combatants in many towns. A
comprehensive list of massacres between 31 August and 13 September
reads as follows:
31 August 1983 36 Christians had their throats cut in Bmariam
7 September 1983 100 people massacred or 'disappeared' in Bhamdoun
10 September 1983 64 victims in Bireh
10 September 1983 30 victims in Ras el-Metn
11 September 1983 15 victims in Maasser Beit ed-Dine
11 September 1983 36 victims in Chartoun
12 September 1983 3 victims in Ain el-Hour
12 September 1983 12 victims in Bourjayne
12 September 1983 11 victims in Fawara
13 September 1983 84 victims in Maasser el-Shouf
Throat-slitting, as at Bmariam, is notoriously the 'signature' of a Druse
massacre. The Palestinians habitually use their guns, but they do not go
in for cutting throats. At Bireh several victims were executed in the
village church, some of them on the altar.
By 11 September the French Comité d'aide aux chrétiens du Liban
estimated that 42 villages in the Shouf had lost all their Christian
inhabitants and all Christian houses had been wrecked and burned. On
that day the Druse leader Walid Jumblatt announced his policy while
1
In the leading Arabic West Bank newspaper Al Quds, 2 June 1983.
making a speech in Damascus: 'With the help of our Syrian allies we

have removed the Christians and only Druse villages will remain from
now on. Such is our objective.'
Throughout the summer of 1983 Syrian-Iranian links had become
stronger, and more Iranian revolutionaries arrived at Baalbek.
Fanatically dedicated to the Islamic Revolution, they were repeatedly
harangued by the mullahs who had accompanied them. Their main
enemies, they were told, were the Israelis, the Americans, the French
and the Lebanese Christians. Khomeini had declared Islamic jihad or
holy war against these 'enemies of Allah' who had offended 'Allah's
representative on earth' - Khomeini himself. It was the duty of
Muslims faithful to the Koran to kill these infidels.
Early in October 1983 a European journalist with extensive
Britain's tiny 100-man contingent with the MNF comprised a weak

squadron of Ferret armoured cars, here crewed by 1st Queen's
Dragoon Guards. Their primary mission was guarding the
building in 'no man's land' used for inter-faction negotiations.
They suffered no serious attacks, and no casualties. (Crown
copyright)
connections in Lebanon telephoned an official of the American

Embassy in London to warn him that Islamic fanatics were planning to
attack the American Marines' position in Beirut.
'Our boys can handle it,' the official said.
'Probably,' the journalist conceded, 'but only if they are told of the
danger. I'm not speculating about an attack - it has been planned.'
'What kind of attack?' the American asked, still not convinced.
'That I don't know, but it may be with a kamikaze glider. The
Iranians are experimenting with these things in the Bekaa.'
'Nobody can be sure of hitting a target with a glider,' the American
replied. 'Anyway, why now}'
'Because it's the martyrdom season,' he was told.
'Chrissake!' exclaimed the American diplomat. 'What's that?'
Muharram, the first month of the Muhammadan year, is an
emotional month for Shi'a Muslims. They perform 'passion plays' and
take part in mass processions and demonstrations that have no parallel
in the Sunni Muslim world. Tens of thousands of young men rake their
backs with hooks on the end of chains as a symbol of their fidelity to Ali,
Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law, whom they regard as the
Prophet's successor. Ali was killed in AD 661 (year 61 of the Muslim
calendar) and in 680 the same fate befell his second son Husain. Their
violent deaths instilled in the Shi'as an admiration for these 'martyrs'
and a passionate desire to emulate them. This was explained to the
American at the London Embassy, but he seemed unable to credit what
he heard.
That the marines were not warned of imminent attack was obvious -
the sentries on duty at the gate to their headquarters carried unloaded
rifles, and no substantial barriers had been erected to stop an attack by
vehicle. The various factions who have fought in Lebanon never carry
weapons just for show. Every firearm is loaded at all times and the
owner is prepared to use it without hesitation. When it was later
disclosed that the Marine sentries on duty had empty firearms the
belligerents in Lebanon would not at first believe it. 'An unloaded
weapon is just a toy,' a Druse told the author. 'A soldier is not a soldier
unless he can shoot - he is a corpse.'
On 23 October a holy war warrior rammed a truck laden with 2,000
lbs of explosives into the building which housed the headquarters of the
US Marine Corps in Beirut. The explosion destroyed the building and
186
killed 241 Marines. Minutes later another suicide truck bomber crashed
into one of the French paratroops' bases and 58 died. On 4 November a
similar attack was made on the Israel Border Police HQ in Tyre and 60
people, 28 of them Israelis, were crushed to death.
President Reagan and President Mitterand threatened retaliation
against the planners of the ram-bomb attacks - the Free Islamic
Revolutionary Movement and another group, both backed by Syria and
Iran. But they could find no tactics to counter this new kind of suicidal
warfare, and the MNF's sphere of operations was restricted to a small
part of Beirut.
The Americans continued to use naval guns to support the hard-
pressed Lebanese Army in its battles with the Druse in the Shouf
Mountains, but the huge one-ton shells from the USS New Jersey did
little damage to actual military targets in the hills. French carrier-based
aircraft bombed a suspected Shi'a terrorist base near Baalbek, but this
raid, too, had limited military value.
On 29 November 1983 the USA and Israel agreed to establish a joint
political-military committee to strengthen strategic co-operation
between the two countries in the face of the 'Soviet threat'; this was
certainly a long-term worry, but the American administration was even
more concerned about its lack of a power-base in the area. It was clear,
said President Reagan, that without Israel the USA had no reliable
strategic partner in the Middle East. The announcement of this
agreement - desirable though it was - finally buried any faint hope of
presenting America as a genuinely even-handed mediator in the region:
now her troops were seen merely as one more armed faction.
Meanwhile, Fatah troops loyal to Yasser Arafat were fighting those
now under Syrian control. Brigadier-General Tariq Khadra, com-
mander of the Palestine Liberation Army, also turned against Arafat
and said he would accept orders from the breakaway faction. Arafat and
his supporters were besieged in Tripoli, where they came under heavy
attack from PLO mutineers backed by Syrian armour and artillery. The
internecine fighting was some of the most savage seen in Lebanon, and
many Lebanese civilians were killed or wounded when caught in the
cross-fire. After numerous ceasefires had broken down Arafat's 4,000
fighters were evacuated from Tripoli during 17-20 December in Greek
freighters escorted by French warships.
The countries providing MNF contingents were reluctant to
187
The US Marines' huge Patton tanks were a potent symbol of the
unsuitability of this kind of unit for 'peace-keeping' in a
murderously complex situation like Beirut in 1983. Restrictions on
their operations limited them more or less to the role of sitting
ducks for any Iranian-inspired fanatic who sought martyrdom in a
blow against 'the Great Satan'.
withdraw them because of the inevitable damage to their prestige, but it

was obvious that they could achieve little more; the troops were nothing
more than targets waiting for the next shell, rocket or ram-bomb attack.
If they were to move out of Beirut and into the hills to fight their
attackers they would no longer be a 'peace-keeping' force, and they
would risk even more casualties in unfamiliar country.
Finally, on 22 February 1984, the last American Marines pulled out -
or 'redeployed', as the US administration described this retreat. And
quite soon the M N F ceased to exist. Some of the best-trained troops in
188
the world, with some of the best equipment, had been forced out by a
relative handful of primitives whose principal weapons were fanaticism
and a desire for martyrdom.
The numbers of men involved in this concluding phase of the
Lebanon war were few, but the M N F ' s withdrawal from Beirut was a
decisive political defeat. It showed that the West has neither a viable
strategy nor workable tactics when confronting jihadic warriors.
The M N F failed in Lebanon because neither their political nor
military leaders had comprehended the nature of 'peace-keeping' or of
warfare in this area. They were not necessarily the best troops for the
job. Marine, Paratroop, and Foreign Legion training fits men for
aggressive, 'keep-going' attack, not for the patient diplomacy and static
defence which was the only possible stance in Beirut. They suffered
from another disadvantage: they believed that their 'gung-ho'
reputation would deter attack.
The impotence of the M N F , with its conventional approach to
defensive peace-keeping tactics, was starkly apparent when confronted
by dedicated and fanatical terrorists eager to die in battle. The very
senior American, British, French and Italian officers who were sent to
Beirut to study the situation could suggest no solution. Their
helplessness vindicated the Israeli tactics of a hard-hitting all-out
combined-forces assault against a strong guerrilla force which was a
threat to peace. More significantly, it was clear that the Israeli decision
to mount its operation before the PLO became even stronger was
militarily a sound one. In fact the Israelis had delayed too long; their
large number of war dead - 583 to the end of June 1984 - proved this.
The Israeli mistake lay not in going to war, but in going to war too late.
They had allowed their P L O enemies to become too strong.
Israel could not afford the luxury of 'redeployment'. A military
withdrawal from Lebanon would be interpreted by the Arabs as retreat
or defeat, at the very least as a serious erosion of Israel's overall
deterrent stance. Such an Arab perception would affect the
Lebanon-Israel peace agreement and would seriously damage future
peace prospects with Jordan. The Arabs would focus on war, not
diplomacy, if they perceived a 'weak' and defeated Israel.
Some Israeli experts claimed that Israel's deterrent stance could best
be restored by getting out of Lebanon, so that the I D F could devote its
energies to the kind of training and reconstruction of its fighting forces
189
which would ensure Israel's deterrent capabilities - and ensure that the
Arab states appreciated them.
But by 1984 history had moved on, and the enemy in southern
Lebanon was no longer the PLO. It was Shi'a fundamentalism,
inspired, incited and armed by Iran and Syria. By March 1984 70 per
cent of anti-Israeli terrorist activity in the south was Shi'a, not
Palestinian. This activity was aimed at Israel, but as the ram-bomb
attacks in Beirut showed, the Western world was the longer-term target.
After the Italians, British and Americans left Beirut, the French,
determined to show that they were not being forced to retreat, stayed on
for a time; but this brave defiance deceived nobody. The retreat of the
MNF, and particularly of its American backbone, did not only mark the
end of a particular phase of the war which had begun in June 1982. It
also ended American, and by association Western prestige in the region.
The Syrians, Lebanese, PLO and much of the Arab world now knew
that the Western powers were impotent in the Middle East.
190
9 And it Came to Pass
IN September 1984 Shimon Peres took office as Prime Minister of Israel
following an election which produced no clear victory either for his
Labour party, or for the Likud coalition. He had campaigned on a
promise that he would withdraw Israeli soldiers from Lebanon as soon
as possible - a policy which reflected public opinion, which could no
longer tolerate the price the troops were paying.
It was not possible simply to order the Army to pull out.
Disengagements are always dangerous; and apart from the need to
devise a practical future security policy, Israel had a responsibility to
keep the peace in areas under its control. Army officers warned that
when the IDF moved out a dangerous vacuum would be created;
Palestinian refugees would become the victims of Shi'a murder squads,
and Christian villages in southern Lebanon would also be vulnerable to
Shi'a hostility. Sidon was a particular headache, with 80,000 Shi'as,
45,000 Sunnis, 20,000 Christians and 80,000 Palestinians living in and
around the city. Since all these groups were swearing tribal vengeance
on one another, the Israelis could not arrange any form of assured
protection.
Yet again, the Americans were reminded of the difficulty of providing
effective defence against the threat posed by fanatical suicide bombers.
Just before noon on 27 September 1984 a van with diplomatic plates
pulled up at a checkpoint outside the American Embassy complex.
When Lebanese security guards ordered the driver to halt, he drew a
pistol and opened fire; then, racing his engine, he zig-zagged through
the concrete 'dragon's teeth'. A British security guard accompanying
the British Ambassador, who was visiting his American counterpart,
opened fire on the van. The driver fell sideways, pulling on the wheel,
and the van veered to the right. It hit a parked car 30 feet from the
Embassy, but the explosion which followed was still powerful enough to
bring down the facade of the building. That only 12 people were killed
and 35 wounded - and not hundreds - was due to the British guard's
accurate shooting.
191
192
193
On 30 January 1985 Yitzhak Shamir, the Foreign Minister (and

former Prime Minister), had foreign diplomats in Israel briefed about
the likelihood that various sectarian militias were planning to attack
rival civil communities when the Israeli troops moved out. This
situation had been created by the refusal or inability of the Lebanese
Government to put its army into the areas to be evacuated by Israel, and
by the Syrian veto on a UN military presence in the area. The Israeli
Foreign Ministry spokesman, Avi Pazner, said 'We are, unfortunately,
acquainted with the sad, murderous reality in Lebanon, and certain
events are bound to follow.'
Psychologically, there was a stronger reason for a slow and steady
PREVIOUS PAGE Sunday 23 October 1982 taught the world what

1,000 lbs of high explosives will do when detonated below a nine-
storey block of apartments. The remains of 'Drakkar', the French
HQ in West Beirut, where at least 70 people died - most of them
young French conscripts who had voluntarily extended their tour
to serve in Beirut. (An Nahar/Gamma)
BELOW US Marine Patton tank photographed during the

evacuation from Beirut. The name 'Psycho' was applied to the gun
barrel during the crew's tour of duty in Lebanon; the Marines said
that it was an appropriate choice, in 'that crazy killing country'.
(USMC)
194
AND IT CAME TO PASS
withdrawal rather than a rapid disengagement. The PLO, the Syrians

and the Shi'a of the south would present a rapid pull-back as a military
defeat. For the sake of its future security Israel could not afford to lose
military prestige. In any case, time was needed to strengthen Israel's
northern defences against possible attack. Having achieved security by
invasion and defeat of the PLO, it was necessary to keep it.
Despite the deliberately steady pace of the withdrawal the Shi'as and
their allies did claim that the Israelis were fleeing. Typical headlines, in
a pro-Syrian Beirut newspaper, were LEBANESE RESISTANCE TRIUMPHS
and ENEMY DECIDES TO RUN AWAY.
In southern Lebanese villages a call was frequently broadcast from
mosques, 'Kill the Israelis! Death to the invaders!' It was a symptom of
the dangerous politico-religious forces which were overheating the
Shi'a community of perhaps 400,000 people in southern Lebanon. The
Shi'as had welcomed the Israelis as saviours in 1982, and had accepted
the Israeli military presence as a necessary inconvenience. But they are a
volatile and easily aroused people; and agents provocateur sent by the
Syrian Army, the Druse leaders and the Iranian fundamentalists in
Baalbek succeeded in turning them against the Israelis. Relatively few
Lebanese Shi'as actively fought against the Israeli troops; but those
who did had the passive support of the population, who gave them
shelter and allowed them to hide weapons and explosives in their
homes.
The Iranians in particular - many of them religious leaders - were
preaching jihad or holy war and calling for martyrs to fight the Jews and
Christians. The Shi'a villagers were told that the Americans and French
had already been attacked and pushed out of Lebanon; it was now time
to kill Israelis. To those who pointed out that the Israelis were already
leaving Lebanon the mullahs' reply was invariably the same: 'That is all
the more reason for killing them - so that they will not come back.'
Foreign Ministry spokesman Pazner had warned diplomats of
'certain events'. His prediction came bloodily true on 10 March. A Shi'a
suicide bomber drove a pick-up truck loaded with 220 lbs of explosive
into a lorry packed with Israeli soldiers going home: 12 of them died in
the explosion. At times during the withdrawal attacks on Israeli troops
reached ten or 12 a day.
The Israelis retaliated with what the Defence Minister, Yitzhak
Rabin, called 'the Iron Fist' policy. When the Shi'as attacked an Israeli
195
Army unit the IDF responded by blowing up buildings in which arms

caches were found, and by relentlessly tracking down the terrorists.
Fundamentalist Muslims, consumed by the fervour of holy war, almost
welcomed such retaliation; they considered it proof of the effectiveness
of their campaigns.
For more than two years Shi'a extremists had been training young
women as suicide attackers at Melli and Shiraz universities in Iran.
During 1984 they recruited some Lebanese Shi'a girls, and among them
was Sana Mhaydali, a pretty 16-year-old. She could not drive a car, but
her recruiters gave her an elementary lesson in putting a vehicle into
gear and steering it. In April 1985, having rigged a car as a bomb on
wheels, they push-started it for Sana's last journey. She succeeded in
ramming an Israeli vehicle, killing two Israeli soldiers and herself.
Thanks to a propaganda video tape which she recorded before her
mission, this unfortunate girl became an instant celebrity, and is
immortalised in death as 'Queen (or 'Bride') of the South'. The Cyprus-
published Middle East Times commented: 'What did Sana's Shi'a
mentors tell her? Did they have no reservations in telling her that a fiery
death in an exploding car was better than a life of friendship, family and
love? Clearly they were happy to have such a beautiful martyr. But in
this case the Shi'a use of religious images and promises of heaven is truly
corrupt. . . . The grim fact is that Sana was lured to her death by those
older than her whom she trusted, but who were willing to use her life for
their own sake.'
During a visit to Lebanon in the summer of 1985 the author found out
more about Sana Mhaydali. The daughter of a customs officer, Sana
was born at Unkun in the Saida district and was the youngest of a family
of four. After a period of education at a Christian school, she finished
her studies in 1982, at the age of 14, and began work in a video shop near
her home. She became pregnant by a local boy. Because her father
might well have killed her for 'dishonouring' the family, Sana left her
home and her job, on 23 March 1985, and fell under the influence of the
local agent of the Syrian Popular Party, Abd el-Trzi, and other men.
Trzi recruited her as a prospective suicide attacker and, according to her
friends, exploited her despair at being pregnant. 'Sana didn't really
want to be a martyr,' the author was told, 'but the men talked her into it.
It was Trzi's idea to make a film about Sana's "holy mission" and to call
her "Bride of the South".'
196
AND IT CAME TO PASS
An exhausted Israeli soldier asleep behind his machine gun in the

hills near Jezzine. The aftermath of the 1982 invasion has caused
much self-questioning and anguish in the IDF, which in all Israel's
previous campaigns has been able to pride itself on the 'purity' of
its mission of national self-defence. These doubts are shared by a
section of the Israeli public; and, since political argument is the
lifeblood of Israeli society, they are voiced loudly and repeatedly.
The war finished the career of Menachem Begin, and - it seemed
at one stage - of Ariel Sharon, though this judgement may well be
premature. But though enthusiasm for adventures beyond Israel's
borders may have evaporated, the determination to continue to
defend Israeli soil and lives is unblunted.
197
The IDF buries its dead in a new military cemetery near
Jerusalem. The Lebanon war has cost Israel more than 650 dead,
losses which are felt particularly keenly in Israel's small and
closely-knit population. (IDF)
Another 16-year-old Lebanese Shi'a, Muhammad Mahmoud Burro,

was captured during an Israeli Army raid on a southern village. In an
interview with The New York Times (16 April 1985) this trained suicide
car bomber said that he had been blackmailed into volunteering for
martyrdom. Abu Hassan, security chief for the Amal organisation in
Beirut, had threatened to make a lot of trouble for the Burro family, who
were already deep in financial and other difficulties.
That the Shi'as attacked the Israeli troops so fiercely is richly ironic.
Ever since modern Lebanon came into being the Shi'a people had felt
that they were the 'slaves' of the much wealthier Christians and Sunni
Muslims. The Israeli occupation freed the Shi'as from this inferior
status, and they became much more self-confident. Without Syrian and
Iranian incitement the Lebanese Shi'as might have remained as
friendly to Israel as they were when we saw them welcome the Israeli
soldiers as 'saviours' in 1982.
198
AND IT CAME TO PASS
While Lebanon once more fell to pieces President Amin Gemayel,

elder brother of Bashir, was isolated in his palace near Baabda, Beirut.
He tried desperately to show that he was a credible president - and
failed. He had no viable national army1; and the 'Lebanese Forces'
militia, now commanded by Samir Geagea in succession to Fadi Frem,
had turned against him. They saw him as a mere tool of the Syrians, and
they were, in any case, almost exclusively concerned with preserving the
Christian community of the Lebanese heartland north and north-east of
Beirut.
In mid-April 1985 Christian artillery east of Sidon shelled Lebanese
Muslim and Palestinian areas of the city; Muslim gunners responded,
and fighting went on for two weeks. But the bloodiest fighting of all
occurred in Beirut, especially for control of the square of Sakiet el-
Janzir, through which many roads run down to the seaside Corniche.
This battle was first fought between the Murabitoun - a Nasserite
group, and the only militia of the Sunni Muslim community - and the
Shi'a Amal movement led by Nabih Berri.
During ten hours on the night of 16 April 1985 the whole of West
Beirut became, yet again, a battlefield. Just before midnight the Druse
militia entered the battle on the side of Amal, and by mid-morning on
the 17th the Murabitoun had been crushed. Hundreds of houses were
looted, and several families were found massacred in their homes. The
Syrians were directly responsible for the fierceness of the combined
Amal-Druse assault on the Murabitoun, as Ghassan Seblani, a Druse
leader, admitted: the fighting was 'pre-arranged and planned', he said.
Once again the Syrian factor was showing itself to be dominant in the
dismemberment of Lebanon. The Syrian leaders had good reason, from
their own point of view, to stage manage the latest battle for West
Beirut. Since April 1984 PLO fighters loyal to Yasser Arafat had been
trickling back into West Beirut; simultaneously, Arafat's aides in charge
of logistics had been channelling money and arms to the Murabitoun.
Arafat and the Murabitoun leaders planned an alliance which would
give them the strength to survive the threat posed by the Shi'a-Druse
1
Although re-equipped and to some extent re-trained by the United States, the Lebanese Army
still suffered from the fatal weakness of being organised in separate Muslim and Christian
battalions. This guaranteed its uselessness as an effective arm of impartial national authority, and
the polarisation of factional feeling in one unit or another with every new turn of events. The
situation was further aggravated by the fact that Muslim units were still commanded by Christian
officers.
199
The Lebanese Army's organisation in segregated units drawn from
the different communities in the country ensured its
disintegration during the civil war of the 1970s. Re-equipped and
partly re-trained by the Americans, it fell apart again, for the
same reasons, in 1984-85. It is bitterly ironic that in May 1985 the
largely Shi'a Muslim 6th Brigade was fighting side by side with the
Shi'a Amal militia to expel PLO fighters from the Sabra and
Shatila camps. At the time of writing it seems possible that the
death-toll may approach that inflicted on the camps by the
Maronites in September 1982, which was presented to the world as
indirectly the responsibility of Israel. In Lebanon, the only
constant factor is killing. (Laurent Maous/Gamma)
combination. The Syrian leadership, implacably opposed to Arafat as

leader of the PLO, had to crush the PLO-Murabitoun union before it
could become an effective military and political force. It is also true that
the Syrian command has no confidence in the Lebanese Sunni
community as fighters, and sees no future in trying to make them into a
military force. The defeat inflicted on the Murabitoun was designed to
show the Sunnis that they had better concentrate on that to which they
are best suited by temperament and tradition - that is, commerce.
Meanwhile, the Israeli withdrawal went ahead competently under
the command of General Ori Orr. Computers determined the number
of trucks and man-hours needed for the massive operation, which took
place in stages. Brigadier-General Chaim Erez, in charge of certain
phases of the evacuation, faced enormous problems in getting heavy
200
AND IT CAME TO PASS
equipment and static installations dismantled and returned to Israel.

Whatever could not be moved was destroyed and ploughed into the
ground. Deep tunnels built by the PLO in the mountains east of Sidon,
and other bunker and trench complexes, were demolished to make it
more difficult for the PLO to return to their former territory.
The most difficult aspect of the evacuation was providing security for
the long, heavy convoys moving along roads through guerrilla-infested
countryside. Security was tight; numbers of jeeps armed with two heavy
machine guns guarded each convoy, while foot patrols in flak jackets
searched the sides of the roads for bombs and land mines -not without
paying a price in lives and limbs. All intersections were sealed off with
concertina barbed wire and armed half-tracks as convoys passed. As
they left, the Israelis distributed leaflets warning the Shi'as against
terrorist acts and threatening retaliation.
Throughout the Israeli withdrawal and the inevitable manoeuvres
which preceded it the role of U N I F I L was ambiguous. By April 1985
officers at the headquarters of the 5,800-strong force were saying that
the UN should pull U N I F I L out. For seven years it had failed to carry
out the duties laid down for it by the Security Council. Between 1982
and 1985 U N I F I L soldiers could do little more than provide
'protection and humanitarian assistance to the civilian population', as
the UN Secretary-General described their function. This was greatly
appreciated by the people of southern Lebanon; but in an area where
every man and boy goes around armed and is ready to shoot on the
slightest provocation or suspicion, U N I F I L has always been an
anomaly. Its troops are under orders not to shoot except in direct self
defence, and they are not supposed to get killed in combat1.
In February the fundamentalist pro-Iranian Hezbollah (Party of
Allah movement) threatened to 'take action' against those countries
whose troops serve with U N I F I L , because they were 'interfering with
the will of Allah and because no foreigners should remain in Lebanon'.
The countries concerned were France, Norway, Ireland, Sweden,
Ghana, Nepal, Fiji, Finland, the Netherlands and Italy.
In view of UNIFIL's previous history of ineffectiveness in
controlling the movements of PLO terrorists, the Israeli Army left it
out of account when planning its defences along the Lebanese border.
1
During the period 1978-85 40 UN troops were killed in action, and another 60 died in Lebanon
from other causes.
201
The security plan is based on a buffer zone between a mile and a half and
ten miles in depth, patrolled by the South Lebanese Army under
Major-General Antoine Lahad, successor to Major Haddad. On the
Lebanese side of the border Israeli engineers dug an anti-vehicle ditch,
though not a continuous one, for a length of 55 miles; it was designed to
'swallow up' any suicide attacker and his car-bomb. Watchtowers,
electronic warning devices and powerful floodlights cover the entire
border, and well-trained regular soldiers from elite units man the
border defences.
Long before these defences were complete it had become clear that
most of the leaders of the various Shi'a factions were slowly retreating
from their policy of terror against Israel following the IDF's
withdrawal from Lebanon. Yitzhak Rabin's policy, though resolute and
retaliatory in style, was to encourage the relatively moderate members
of the Shi'a community to withdraw from the extremist stance which
they had been incited to adopt. It had been demonstrated that every
attack the Shi'as made would cost them dearly; and Rabin's
uncompromising realism, though providing no instant remedy, was
having its effect. In May 1985, with Israeli withdrawal proceeding on
schedule, there came signs that the Shi'a leaders were taking a rather
longer view. Explicit warnings began to be issued against any attempt
by the PLO to return to the south to resume attacks on Israel under
cover of the Shi'a community.
Nevertheless, the PLO did make occasional attempts to break
through and re-establish themselves in the south and to bypass Israeli
land defences. On 22 April the Israeli Navy intercepted and sank a ship
carrying 28 PLO gunmen along the northern coast of Israel; 20 were
drowned and the other eight were captured.
Three years after the start of Israel's 1982 war against the PLO in
Lebanon, it is clear that Palestinian militancy has suffered a severe
defeat. Thousands of PLO fighters have died; thousands more are
scattered, impotently, in refuges far from Israel's borders; and much of
the remaining armed strength of the PLO in Lebanon has been brought
firmly under control of Damascus, as a tool of Syrian policy. Under the
stress of defeat the factional tensions within the PLO have broken out in
open warfare. Yasser Arafat's authority and freedom of manoeuvre have
been seriously compromised. Although it would be a mistake to put too
much weight on his words, it is hardly conceivable that, before the June
202
Street scene, Beirut, 1984: a bullet-scarred apartment block, a
white Mercedes, shoppers profiting from a relatively calm period,
and a proudly decorated militia barricade. . . . The forces let loose
among the Lebanese population stretch back far beyond the Israeli
intervention, and will stalk the streets long after the last IDF
soldier has crossed the border southwards. (Azar/Gamma)
1982 invasion, he would have stated publicly, if through a third party,

that under certain conditions he would be prepared to accept UN
Security Council Resolution 242, explicitly recognising Israel's right to
exist as a sovereign state (interview with The Washington Post, 15 May
1985).
As for tortured Lebanon herself, her future defies prediction. The
Americans, French, Italians and British have long gone from Beirut,
and so have the Israelis. The Lebanese Army is fragmented, badly led,
and afraid to move decisively. Although he is still the nominal president
of a nominally sovereign nation, Amin Gemayel's humiliating
dependence on Syria, as the only power with the will and resources to
dictate events in Lebanon, has reduced his standing even within his own
Maronite community. The 'Lebanese Forces' militia are prepared to
act only to safeguard their own small Maronite areas; and pressure from
Damascus has played a part in the removal of Samir Geagea from
203
command. Ironically, the man who has replaced him - and who in May
1985 was issuing placatory statements about the legitimacy of Syria's
interests in Lebanon - is none other than Elie Hobeika, last encountered
in these pages amid the carnage of Sabra and Shatila. (It is not too
surprising that Hobeika was acceptable to the Syrians, as he is reputed
to be a discreet partner in Rifaat Assad's business enterprises.) In the
south, Lahad's Southern Lebanese Army militia is installed in the
buffer zone along the Israeli frontier; it has continuing Israeli support
but is understrength.
When the author was in Lebanon in June 1985 no fewer than seven
distinct and separate armed feuds were raging - with all the bloody
savagery which has become so depressingly familiar to an appalled
world - between various Shi'a, Sunni, Druse, Christian, PLO and
Syrian factions.
The major conflict was being fought between Shi'a Amal and PLO
gunmen in the wrecked Sabra, Shatila and Bourg el-Barajna camps, for
the PLO had not heeded the Shi'a warning to keep out of Beirut and the
south. It was not possible for observers to enter the sprawling, battered
districts, but it seemed likely that in weeks of fighting another major
massacre took place - the number of dead might well have equalled the
Palestinians killed by the 'Lebanese Forces' in 1982. The Shi'a gunmen
were so ruthless that they tore off the bandages of men under treatment
in hospitals to see if they had combat wounds: if so, they were shot dead.
Numerous women and children were also among the victims.
The only beneficiary of all this desperate conflict was Syria. Having
divided and sub-divided the many groups opposed to Syrian
domination of Lebanon, the Syrian leaders had ensured that no
combination of potential enemies would be strong enough to defy them.
(The 'Lebanese Forces' of the Maronites comprised a mere 2,000
regulars.) After more than ten years of effort the Syrians could feel
confident that they controlled Lebanon; military occupation was an
irrelevance, since all the Lebanese leaders were dependent on
Damascus.
Having suffered more than 650 battle deaths, the Israelis are left,
alone, to hold a front line against Islamic fundamentalism, Syrian and
Iranian expansionism, and international terror - and, behind them, the
opportunist ambitions of the Soviet Union.
204
Appendix 1
Palestinian Military and
Para-Military Forces
All Palestinian military and para-military forces (except the Abu Nidal
faction) are nominally subordinate to the Executive Committee of the
Palestine Liberation Organisation, under its Chairman, Yasser Arafat.
Arafat also heads Fatah, the largest PLO constituent organisation. The
PLO attempts to co-ordinate the activities of its member organisations;
but it lacks full operational control, and the military forces of the
different organisations are in practice responsible only to their own
leadership.
Palestinian forces fall into four categories: (a) the regular Palestine
Liberation Army - PLA; (b) quasi-regular units of the various
organisations; (c) militias, supplementary to the various quasi-regular
units; and (d) terror squads.
The Palestine Liberation Army is based in Syria, Lebanon, and
Jordan. In Syria and Syrian-occupied Lebanon it deploys two brigades,
an independent battalion, and other independent units. In Jordan it has
a third brigade. Total strength is about 4,000 men.
Salah Khalaf, better known

under the nom de guerre of
'Abu Iyad', headed Arafat's
'security service'. His West
Beirut headquarters were
pinpointed and destroyed by
the Israelis during the siege,
but he escaped.
205
Quasi-Regular Forces:
Organisation Commander Armed
personnel
Al-Fatah Yasser Arafat 13,0001
Popular Front for the Liberation Dr George Habash I,IOO 2
of Palestine (PFLP)
PFLP-General Command Ahmad Jibril 60
(PFLP-GC)
Saiqa Dr Issam al-Qadi 2,1003
Democratic Front for the Nayef Hawatmeh 1,3504
Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)
Arab Liberation Front (ALF) Abd al-Rahim Ahmad 450
Palestine Popular Struggle Front Bahjat Abu Gharbiyya 300
(PPSF) and Dr Samir Ghusha
Palestine Liberation Front/ Mahmud al-Zaidan, 450
Abu Abbas faction alias Abu Abbas
Palestine Liberation Front/ Sabri al-Bana, 600
Abu Nidal faction ('Black June') alias Abu Nidal
Others, totalling c. 3,000
Notes
1
Supposedly divided into four brigades. Three, each of 2,000 to 2,500 men, fought in Lebanon in
1982: the Kastel, Karameh and Yarmouk Brigades.
2
Supposedly divided into four 'battalions', though these would only field about 275 men each.
3
Supposedly divided into three battalions, which at about 700 men would be of conventional size.
4
More typical of the deliberately misleading and inflated unit titling practice of most underground
organisations, D F L P claims eight 'battalions', each of which could only field less than 200 men.
The para-military militias of the various organisations total about

20,000 personnel.
The terror squads total about 200 personnel.
The total strength of the armed membership of the various
Palestinian forces and organisations is thus about 43,000 men and
women.
206
Appendix 2
The Scout Remote-Piloted
Vehicle
Under modern battlefield conditions there is a vital need for 'real-time
information' - accurate information on the enemy's status and
movements, with minimum delay. But gathering such information
conventionally, under the threat of sophisticated weapons, involves
great risk to human life and expensive equipment. One solution to the
problem has been provided by Israel Aircraft Industries, who
developed the Scout RPV.
The Scout is a 'miniplane', just over 12 feet long and with a wingspan
of just over 16 feet. It is catapulted into flight from a ramp that can be
The Israeli Scout RPV - note the clear perspex camera cupola
under the centre section. Only 12 feet long, and with a 22 hp
engine, it operates at about 100 mph at an altitude of 15,000 feet,
and is thus almost undetectable to human eyes and ears.
207
fitted to any truck. Its 22 hp two-cylinder engine can keep it airborne for
as long as seven hours if necessary - in military terms, an extraordinarily
useful 'loiter time' - and it can then be brought back under remote
control for retrieval. This is by flying it into a vertical net, but
conventional landings are also possible. A typical Scout field unit
consists of four to six RPVs, a control station and a take-off and landing
unit; the whole operation is handled by ten men.
Before the flight the ground station gives the Scout a computerised
check-out; and uses the same equipment to calculate target co-
ordinates. The Scout carries television cameras covering the entire
'hemisphere' below the vehicle; their magnification is so powerful that
they can detect individual people, and the details necessary for the
identification of all types of vehicles and equipment. These pictures are
automatically transmitted back to the control truck, where operators
analyse them. The flight path is traced continuously on a map by a
plotter. If required, the information transmitted by the RPV can be
received by several ground stations simultaneously, so that various
commanders can monitor continuously what the camera in the sky is
filming.
The Scout is remarkably easy to operate and maintain; and its makers
claim that - with an operating altitude of about 15,000 ft and a cruising
speed of around 100 mph - it is almost undetectable. There is no record
of an RPV being spotted by Syrian or PLO personnel in Lebanon: the
Scout's cameras would have picked up their reaction had they noticed it.
208
Appendix 3
The Merkava
From the viewpoint of the professional defence community, the combat
debut of the Merkava is one of the most interesting aspects of the
Lebanon war, and for this reason the tank is worth describing in detail.
Tank designers have several major factors to consider: protection and
'survivability' - i.e. the ability of the essential components and the crew
to survive enemy hits; firepower; mobility; versatility; and ease of
maintenance. In most of these categories the Merkava has proved
extremely successful. Its one ostensible handicap - mobility - must be
set against the very specific requirements of the IDF.
The 'Chariot' was developed largely due to the efforts of General
Israel Tal, a famous tank general of the 1967 war and later commander
of Israel's Armoured Corps. Tal's priority was 'survivability'. The
author touched elsewhere in this book on the traumatic effect of battle
casualties on the small, tightly-knit Israeli population; and from a coldly
practical point of view, losses among technically skilled personnel such
as tank crews are especially damaging. The protection enjoyed by the
Merkava crew is outstanding; it has been achieved by unconventional
methods; and its price in terms of mobility has clearly been felt worth
paying, in view of the IDF's special requirements.
In the past Israel has faced challenges on two very different fronts:
the empty sands of the Sinai Desert, where mobility was a major
advantage; and the rocky hills of the Golan, where ruggedness was of
more practical importance. The design of the Merkava suggests that the
conditions on the Syrian front took precedence. It must also be noted
that Israel has only produced some 200 Merkavas, out of a total tank
strength of more than 2,500. It is clear that Merkava is not intended to
take over the role already performed successfully by the Centurion and
the various models of the Patton series. It is a tool for a particular job;
and by all accounts, it performs that job admirably.
209
The most obvious novelty is the placing of the engine in the front
rather than the rear of the hull. Together with the very sharply sloped
armour on the hull and turret front, which increases the effective
armour thickness against flat trajectory hits, this gives massive frontal
protection. Even if the engine is penetrated and knocked out, the crew
survive, and the main armament remains operational. The armour itself
is made up not of a single thick plate, but of layers of thinner plates with
space between; this configuration has proved effective in dissipating the
super-heated tongue of gas which a modern HEAT shaped-charge
anti-tank projectile punches through armour.
Apart from the effective design and sloping of the armour itself,
further protection has been achieved in unusual ways. Anything which
gets in the way of a modern anti-tank shell or missile, and delays or
slows its impact, gives the main armour of a tank a better chance of
stopping it. Many of the items which are normally carried inside a tank -
e.g. batteries, machine gun ammunition, searchlights, tools and various
spare components - are stowed outside the Merkava in armoured
compartments, thus increasing the 'stand-off protection. Even more
unusual is the use of fuel as protection, which may appear a
contradiction in terms. In fact, it has been established that four inches of
fuel gives the same protection as one inch of armour plate. Panniers
fitted with flexible, self-sealing fuel tanks are mounted over the tracks
on each side of the Merkava, and another over a foot thick is placed in
front of the turret. With non-volatile diesel fuel, which does not burn
nearly as readily as petrol, and with efficient fire-suppression systems,
this arrangement gives useful added protection.
In Lebanon the Merkava formed the spearhead of many armoured
columns. They were inevitably hit many times by all kinds of ordnance:
by shaped-charge HEAT rounds and missiles, and by APFSDS tank-
fired armour-piercing rounds, which rely for their effect not upon the
tongue of gas emitted by a shaped explosive charge but upon a hyper-
velocity rod of a super-dense metal such as tungsten carbide. Some
projectiles partly penetrated the armour, and some tanks were disabled;
but the IDF is adamant that no Merkava crewman was killed, and that
most damage was quickly repaired by field maintenance crews. (The
PLO did set one on fire near Khalde, but photographs suggest that this
was posed for the photographers - petrol was poured over the outside of
an abandoned tank and set ablaze for the benefit of the cameras.)
210
APPENDIX 3
Merkava in the hills near Aley; the tank is seen here from the rear,
with its gun traversed to 'nine o'clock'. Note the large hatches in
the rear hull, which allow both rapid loading with palletised
ammunition, and also access for the crew, for casualty evacuation
cases, or for any other soldier who needs a well-protected ride in
the front line of battle. (Author's photo)
The propellant used in modern tank ammunition burns far more

easily than any fuel, and is harder to put out; so the main danger of
catastrophic internal fires and explosions when a tank is penetrated
comes from the tank's own stored shells. It is therefore a further
important advantage that the Merkava's front-engine design allows an
armoured compartment for ammunition, further protected by fire-
suppression systems, to be located in the rear of the hull - an angle from
which tanks are rarely fired upon. Very little ammunition is carried in
the turret 'ready racks' in combat. Replenishment is also much easier,
quicker and safer than with conventional designs, because pallets ready-
loaded with shells can be inserted from the outside through two
armoured, rapid-action doors in the rear hull.
This rear ammunition compartment is the key to another unique
strength of the Merkava: its ability to carry extra men in action. If part
of the normal load of 85 rounds of ammunition is unloaded, or passed
forward for temporary stowage inside the turret, soldiers can enter from
the rear through a central door (in relative safety, as they are usually
covered by the bulk of the tank). Infantry squads can be taken forward
for special missions under the heaviest fire; there are varying claims as to
211
the number who can be accommodated, but it may be as many as ten.

The pinned-down crews of abandoned tanks can be picked up under
fire; and on several occasions during the Lebanon fighting the Merkava
was used as a field ambulance to evacuate nearby infantry casualties
from positions where no other vehicle could have survived. It has been
claimed that in extreme emergency as many as 15 casualties were
crammed into a Merkava under fire. Finally, the unusual layout allowed
senior officers to use the Merkava as a forward command post on some
occasions, enjoying heavy armour protection and good com-
munications.
The Merkava has a conventional four-man crew: driver, gunner,
loader, and commander. The driver sits on the left side of the engine,
which is isolated from the main fighting compartment by an armoured
bulkhead. The fighting compartment extends for the full width of the
hull, and incorporates - in the usual manner - the 'turret basket' or
'turntable': the assembly holding the armament, turret crew positions
and other equipment, which extends from the bottom of the visible part
of the turret down to the hull floor, and which swivels with the turret.
The gunner's position is on the right of the gun breech, with the
commander behind and above him; the loader/radio operator's station
is on the left of the gun.
The main armament is the 105 mm M68 gun, firing mainly HEAT
(high explosive/anti-tank) and APFSDS (armour-piercing fin-
stabilised discarding sabot) rounds; there are also HESH (high
explosive squash-head) and White Phosphorous incendiary rounds for
this weapon. A 60 mm mortar is also fitted, a useful secondary weapon
which allows 'soft' targets to be engaged without using up main gun
ammunition. There is one 7.62 mm machine gun mounted co-axially
with the main gun; and two more are mounted externally, by the
commander's and loader's turret hatches, for use in close combat and
against aircraft.
The Merkava's engine is an American model AVDS-1790-6A 12-
cylinder air-cooled diesel, with an output of 900 bhp at full load;
together with the CD-850-6BX automatic transmission, this is the
largest single item among the foreign-made and imported components,
which represent about 43 per cent of the total cost - the engine and
transmission alone represent about 25 per cent of the total cost. The
combat weight of the Merkava is about 62 tons, and it is generally
212
APPENDIX 3
accepted that it is under-powered. Its top road speed of 24 mph, and its
range of about 150 miles, compare unfavourably with the 45 mph and
310 miles achieved by the current American main battle tank, the M1
Abrams. But the Merkava is not intended to be a general purpose tank
for open-terrain operations where speed and range are paramount.
Crew comfort is a serious factor in Middle Eastern conditions; heat
exhaustion can degrade the combat performance of a tank crew
catastrophically. The Merkava provides air conditioning by controlled
airflow from the engine air intake; and cooled drinking water is piped
into the fighting compartment from a rear container.
In its primary role as a tank destroyer the Merkava, with its low
silhouette and sharply sloped armour, has proved very effective. The
commander has all-round vision and aiming visibility even with his
hatch 'buttoned down'. The fire control system, incorporating Israeli-
made Elbit computer components, is extremely accurate. In Lebanon
Merkavas successfully engaged Syrian tanks at ranges of around 1,500
metres, and on occasion at up to 2,000 metres. This ability to engage at
long range, which gave the Israelis the 'first strike' capability so vital in a
tank battle, was backed up by the accuracy and penetrating power of the
new Israeli M111 APFSDS-T kinetic energy round, which turned
'first strike' into 'first kill'. The armour of both the T-62 and the much-
improved T-72 was penetrated. On 11 June 1982 Merkavas of the
Israeli 7th Armoured Brigade encountered T-72MS of the Syrian 82nd
Tank Brigade, 3rd Armoured Division in the Bekaa Valley, and within
moments they knocked out nine of these formidable tanks.
Since the end of the Lebanon war the IDF has introduced the
Merkava Mk 2, of which about a dozen have been built so far. Details
are shrouded in secrecy, but it is believed that they include a more
powerful engine; fire control improvements to give better night-
fighting capability; improved suspension; and improved armour. The
substitution of a 120 mm gun for the 105 mm M68 is believed to be
planned for a future Mk 3 version.
213
Index
A-4 Skyhawk aircraft, 74 105, 106, 109, 119, 122, Bekaa Valley, 20, 22, 36, 42,
Abu-Leil, Maj. Awd-allah 123, 133, 139, 141, 163, 44, 49, 54, 59, 64, 66, 72,
Umar, 139 182, 183, 187, 199, 200, 80, 81, 102, 107, 115, 168,
Abu Nidal ('Rejectionist 202, 205, 206 182, 183, 213
Front'), 26, 30 Arazim Hotel, 150 Belaty, Halad, 162
Acca Hospital, 170 Argov, Shlomo, 22, 26 Berri, Nabih, 199
Adiye, 29, 131, 132 'Army for Liberation of the Bhamdoun, 91, 94, 118,
Adam, Maj.Gen. Yekutiel, South', 17 149, 184
48, 70, 76 Arnoun, 54, 56, 59 Bireh, 184
'Advanced Atoll' missile, 75 As'ad, Kamal, 17 Bir Shmali, 80
Afghanistan, 102 Asadi, Fawzi al-, 145 Bitr, Sahil al-, 144
Ahmad, Abd al-Rahim, 206 Ashbal ('Lion Cubs', 'RPG 'Blazer' tank armour, 40, 45
Ahmad, Col. Rashad 'Abd kids'), 32, 77, 78 Bmariam, 184
al-Aziz, 138, 139, 147 Ashrafiya, 100, 101 BTR-60 APC, 118
Ain Dara, 61, 76, 88 Assad, President Hafiz al-, BMP APC, 35, 118
Ain el-Hour, 184 of Syria, 31, 33, 39, 64, Boeing 707, 70
Alawite Muslim 116, 123, 182, 184 booby traps, 126-130
community, 33 Assad, Rifaat, 33, 39, 64, Bourg el-Barajna, 26, 105,
Alexander, Edward, 148 76, 115, 116, 118, 182, 204 204
Alexander Hotel, 153 Associated Press (AP), 15, Bourghlike, 54
Aley, 91, 94, 99, I79, 211 17 Bourjayne, 184
Algeria, 33 Athens, 24 Branigin, Bill, 102, 104
Al-Hawadeth, 15 Awali River, 53, 54, 58, 184 Brazil, 15
Ali, Isa Abdullah, 102 Britain, 88
A'Liwa'a, 15 Baabda, 89, 91, 92, 100, 199 British troops, 175, 185
Allied operations in Baalbek, 177, 184, 187, 195 Bulgaria, 138, 144
Lebanon (1941), 47, 50 el-Baas, 53, 65 Bulloch, John, 136
Alloud, Mahmoud, 136 Ba'ath party, 33 Burj-Bahal, 135
Al-Khaley, 101 Badr, Imam Sayid-a-Din, Burro, Muhammad
Aloni, Miri, 99 133 Mahmoud, 198
Al-Quds, 184 Bakr, Hassan Radha, 144
Amal militia, 16, 17, 200, Bana, Sabri al- ('Abu Cairo Agreement (1969), 9,
204 Nidal"), 205, 206 17
American Broadcasting Bangladesh, 102 Callaghan, Lt.Gen. William,
Corporation (ABC), 15, 20, Barak, Aharon, 171 46
161 BBC, i n , 164 Camp David, 177
Amir, Aharon, 22 Beaufort Castle, 28, 54, 56, Centurion tank, 40, 47, 50,
Anderson, Jack, 118 61-63, 158 53, 63, 64, 209
An-Nahar, 12 Begin, Menachem, Prime Chartoun, 184
Ansar, 134 Minister of Israel, 21, 51, Chatouni, Habib, 169, 171
Anti-Lebanon mountain 95, 164, 169, 170, 171, China, 139
range, 42 184, 186, 187, 188, 197, Christian community, 8, 10,
Antwerp, 24 199 15, 20, 26, 96, 97, 98, 118,
Aoun, George, 132 Beirut, 10, 12, 13, 14, 17, 167, 175, 177, 179, 182,
'Aphid' missile, 75 20, 21, 26, 29, 36, 41, 42, 191, 198, 199, 204;
Aqiya bridge, 54, 59 61, 64, 78, 82, 88, 92, 95, welcomes Israeli troops,
Arab Defence Council, 15 96, 100, 102, 106, 107, 92; militias, 28, 32, 40, 49
Arab League, 15, 177 i n , 122, 125, 131, 137, Chtaura, 82, 88, 169
'Arab Resistance Front', 9 151, 158-161, 163-165, civil war, Lebanese,
Arab Liberation Front 168-170, 174, 177 1975-82, 10, 12
(ALF), 140, 145, 206 Beirut-Damascus highway, cluster bombs, 106, 130
Arafat, Dr Fathi, 163 36, 42, 50, 61, 76, 91, 92, Cobra helicopter, 47
Arafat, Yasser, 13, 20, 26, 169, 179 Columbia Broadcasting
29, 30, 32, 33, 93, 97, 101, Beit ed-Dine, 61 Systems (CBS), 163, 166
214
INDEX
Commentary Magazine, 151 Fayad, Gen. Shafik, 116 Hezbollah ('Party of Allah'
Commodore Hotel, 106, 153 Fez, 177 movement), 201
Corniche Mazraa, 100 Fiji, 201 Hippodrome, Beirut, 105
Crefeld, Dr Martin van, Finland, 201 Historical Evaluation and
109, 111 Fisk, Robert, 93, 102, 108 Research Organisation, 163
Creole, Pierre, 158 France, 88, 175, 201 Hobeika, Elie, 170, 204
Cyprus, 152, 153 'Free Lebanese Army' ' H O T ' missile, 35
Czechoslovakia, 88 ('South Lebanese Army'), Howe, Marvin, 153
17. 204 Hule Valley, 42
Dahr al-Baidar, 91 Free Islamic Revolutionary Hungary, 8*8, 138, 142
Daily Telegraph (London), Movement, 187 Hussain, Muhammad
15, 136 Frem, Fadi, 199 Mabry, 138
Damascus, 33, 42, 50, 56, French Foreign Legion, Hussein, Hassan Qassem, 145
64, 80, 92, 118, 120, 152, 107, 169, 175, 189 Hussein, King of Jordan, 9,
183, 185, 203 French troops, 168, 180, 177
Damour, 8, 29, 61, 88, 95, 183, 187, 194
96, 97, 99, 103, I53> 156. Iraq, 9, 12
157, 164 Gal, Maj.Gen. Avigdor Ismail, Col. Hajj, 61, 125
Damour es-Safa River, 59 Ben, 48, 81 Israel, public attitudes to
Davis, Mrs Helen, 44 Galilee, 47, 56 war in, 95, 170—175, 182
Dayan, Moshe, 38 Gaza Strip, 20, 24, 177 Israeli Air Force
Defender helicopter, 47 Gazelle helicopter, 35, 80 (IDF AF), 22, 27, 52, 80,
Democratic Front for the Geagea, Samir, 199, 203 109, 111; over Bekaa
Liberation of Palestine Gemayel, President Amin, Valley, 65-75; over Beirut,
(DFLP), 98, 139, 144, 147, of Lebanon, 199, 203 93, 96, 104, 105, 106,
206 Gemayel, President-Elect 164-165
Doueir, 59 Bashir, 21, 40, 91, 107, Israel Defence Forces
Drori, Lt.Gen. Amir, 48, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171 (IDF): monitor PLO
172, 174 Gemayel, Pierre, 10 activity, 28; Chief-of-
Druse community, 91, 118, Gemayel family, 40 Staff, 37; strength and
175, 177, 179, 182, 184, Gervasi, Frank, 148, 157 organisation, 37, 50;
187, 195, 204 Gesher Haziv, 51, 149, 154, tactics, 38, 51, 55; reserve
Duba, Gen. Ali, 116 156 mobilisation, 41, 45-46;
Dupuy, Col. Trevor, 163, 'Geva affair", 39, 112 dispositions for Operation
164 Geva, Col. Eli, 112 'Peace for Galilee', 47-52;
Ghana, 201 attitude to Lebanese
East Germany, 88, 139 Gharbiyya, Bahjat Abu, 206 civilians, 82-86, 92, 115;
E-2C Hawkeye aircraft, 70, Ghorra, Edouard, 12 medical treatment, 86;
72, 73 Ghusha, Dr Samir, 206 servicewomen, 99; and
Efret, Maj.Gen. Yona, 171 Gillois bridges, 47 infiltration of PLO, 108;
Egypt, 9 Golan Heights, 50, 72 morale, 39, 111-115;
Ein el-Hilwe, 21, 28, 59, 61, Greek Catholic community, casualties, 21, 113, 189,
76, 89-91, 135, 136, 157, 20 198, 204; tank losses, 113;
162 'Guardians of the Cedars', and media, 148-149, 154;
Ein el-Kantar, 54 40 in occupation of Lebanon,
Ein-Sofar, 88 179, 182-184, 191; phased
Ein Zhalta, 79, 118 Habash, Dr George, 31, withdrawal, 194-195,
Eitan, Lt.Gen. 'Raful', 38, 101, 147, 206 200—201; reprisals against
46, 50, 52, 112, 172; Habib, Philip, 16, 20, 64, 82 Shi'a community,
character and philosophy, Haddad, Maj. Sa'ad, 16, 17, 195-196.
and Geva affair, 39 19, 20, 24, 42, 61, 63, 131, Units: Task Force East,
Eitan, Shlomo, 99 172, 202 49, 54. 58-59, 76; Task
cl-Hilweh, 63 Hai e-Saloum, 105 Force Centre, 48, 59; Task
Encounter Magazine, 148 Haifa, 81 Force West, 48, 53, 58,
Erez, Brig.Gen. Chaim, 200 Hama, 115 61, 78; Division 36, 49;
Hamud Hospital, Sidon, Div. 90, 49; Div. 91, 48,
F-4E Phantom aircraft, 70, 132 53; Div. 96, 53; Div. 162,
72, 74, 93, 96 Hamza, Abdulla Mahomed, 49; Div. 252, 49; Barak
F-15 Eagle aircraft, 71, 72, 142 Armd.Bde., 105; Golani
73 Hanna, Vincent, 111 Bde., 54, 57, 59, 91, 105;
F-16 Falcon aircraft 71, 72 Hardale bridge, 54 Parachute Bde. 35, 53, 58;
Fahakani, 96 Harnick, Maj. Guni, 57 Bde. 211, 53, 112; Vardi
Fakhr-a-Din, Miriam and Haruf, 133 Force, 49; Special
Diana, 135 Hassan, Abu, 198 Manoeuvre Force, 49;
Falklands war, 153 Hawatmeh, Nayef, 98, 147, Para Bn. 50, 53; Sayeret
'Fatahland', 29, 48, 54, 80 206 Golani, 57, 63
215
INDEX
Israeli Navy, 59, 76, 86, Lake Qaraoun, 44, 54, 61, Modan, Prof. Baruch,
168, 202; amphibious 76, 80 162
operations, 53-54, 58; LAR-160 rocket, 55 Montezari, Ayatollah
frogmen, 38, 53 Lasky, Melvin J., 148 Muhammad, 15
Italy, 88, 201; Italian Lebanese Army, 10, 13, 21, Mordechai, Brig.Gen.
troops, 106, 107, 168, 175, 40, 107, 168, 169, 179, Yitzhak, 48, 53, 112
176 184, 187, 199, 200, 203 Moscow, 144
'Lebanese Forces', 21, 199, Moukhtara, 79
Jericho, 24 203, 204 Mount Hermon, 42, 49
Jerusalem, 177, 198; Mufti 'Lebanese Front', 40 Movers, Bill, 163
of, 183 Lebanese Journalists' Multi-National Peace-
Jezzine, 8, 58, 59, 61, 78, Association, 15 Keeping Force (MNF),
I31, 197 Lebanese National 106, 107, 175, 184,
Jibril, Ahmed, 182, 206 Museum, 105 187-190
Jones, Selma, 48 Lebanese Television, 17 Murabitoun militia, 93, 199,
Jordan, 111 Lebanese University 200
Jordan Valley, 42 Sciences Faculty, 91 Muravchik, Joshua, 148,
Jordanian Army, 102, 122 Lebanon mountain range, 166
Joub Jannine, 63, 80 41, 49 Mussawi, Hussein, 177
Jounieh, 21, 96, 152-153 Le Monde, 157 Mi-8 helicopter, 35
Journalist, 111 Libya, 14, 20, 33, 92, 183 Mi-24 'Hind' helicopter, 35,
journalists in Lebanon, Likud coalition (Israeli), 80
148-166; and Israeli 191 MiG-21 aircraft, 35, 71
accreditation, 149; killed Limassol, 24 MiG-23 aircraft, 35, 71, 91
or seized by PLO, 15, 151; Litani River, 28, 42, 44, 54 MiG-25 aircraft, 71
intimidation of, 151, London, 24, 154 Mi Abrams tank, 213
160-161; and 'rubble A-Luzi, Salim, 15 M48A5 Patton tank, 50
syndrome', 161; women M60 Patton tank series, 40,
journalists, 149-150 Ma'alot, 18 45. 47, 50, 54, 79, 188,
Jumblatt, Kamal, 9 Maasser Beit ed-Dine, 184 194, 209
Jumblatt, Walid, 184 Maasser el-Shouf, 184 M109 self-propelled gun,
Madani, Ra'ad Ahmed 64, 81, 85, 93
Kador, Muhammad Farlin, Razaq, 144 Mi 13 'Zelda' APC, 47, 49,
138 Maudun, Lt. Ibrahim al-, 53, 55, 56, 58, 155
Kahan, Yitzhak, 171 144 MTU-55 tank, 47
Kahan Commission, 172, Mahrar, Muhammad
174 Radha, 144 Nabatiye, 7, 14, 28, 29, 54,
Kahle, 91 The Mail on Sunday 61, 88, 137, 157, 164
'Katyusha' (BM-21) rocket (London), 107 Nahariya, 24
launcher, 14, 19, 20, 24, Majdal Bana, 91 Nairn, Bassam, 49
30, 35, 54, 88 Majdi, Col. Abu, 145 Najr, Ali Ahsan al-, 145
Kedar, Col. Paul, 100 Marjayoun, 24, 44, 54, 61, Naqoura, 42
Kfar Qouq, 80 Nasser, Father John, 131,
Kfar Seit, 63 Marquise, Chief Insp. 132
Kfar Tibnit, 61 Cleve, 118 Nasser, President Gamal
Kfir C-2 aircraft, 71, 74, 75 Masri, Afif Muhammad al-, Abdel, of Egypt, 9
Khaddoumi, Farouk, 183 144, 145 National Liberal Party
Khadra, Brig.Gen. Tariq, Masri, Sheikh Mahmoud al-, 'Tigers', 40
187 134 New Society, 162
Khalde, 76, 78, 210 massacres, 8, 131, 132; see Newsweek, 15, 159
Khalaf, Salah ('Abu Iyad'), also Sabra Shatila New York Times, 15, 17,
J
93, 205 Maverick missile, 71 53, J 57, 160, 166, 198
Khomeini, Ayatollah, 16, McCourt, Mike, 161 New York, 154, 163
104, 176, 185 Melli University, 196 Nepal, 201
Kibbutz Bar'am, 17 Melkart Agreement (1973), Netanya, 114
Kibbutz Misgav Am, 16, 10 Netherlands, 201
I9> 31 Merkava tank, 40, 50, 67, night-fighting, 86, 120
Kifner, John, 17, 160 68, 81, 82, 86, 99, n o , North Korea, 14, 88, 129,
Kimche, David, 182 113, 116, 168, 209-213 160
Kiryat Shemona, 47 Metulla, 31, 42, 54, 149, Norway, 201
Kuneitra, 50 150
Kuwait, 33 Mhayadali, Sara, 196 Observer (London), 15
'Milan' missile, 30, 35 Odessa, 138
Labour party (Israeli), 191 Middle East Times, 196 Operation 'Litani', 18, 26
Lahad, Gen. Antoine, 202, Mitla Pass, 46 Orr, Gen. Ori, 200
204 Mittcrand, President, 187 el-Ouzaai, 105
216
INDEX
Pakistan, 102, 126 Phalange movement Sarkis, President, 107

Palestine Liberation Army (Kataeb), 21, 26, 40, 63, Saudi Arabia, 14, 26, 33,
(PLA), 31, 34, 58, 144, ' 177, 179, 182; militia, 91, 182
145, 187, 205 98, 101, 167, 170-172, 184 Sayed, Youssef, 135
Palestine Liberation Poland, 88 Sayil, Sa'ad ('Abu al-
Organisation (PLO), 16, Pope John Paul II, 183 Walid'), 102
21, 92, 97, 98, 109, 122, Popular Democratic Front Seblani, Ghassan, 199
123, 131, 134, 136, 141, for the Liberation of Sela, Col. Moshe, 76
147, 148, 151, 152, 157, Palestine, see D F L P Sha'ar, Col. al-, 144, 145
189, 195, 200, 201, 204, Popular Front for the Shafir 2 missile, 74
205; establishment of Liberation of Palestine Shamir, Yitzhak, 194
Lebanese bases, 7, 9; and (PFLP), 15,31, 139, 147, Sharkas, Zyad Ibrahim, 138
Lebanese leftists, 10, 93; 206 Sharm el-Sheikh, 38
treatment of Lebanese PFLP-General Command, Sharon, Ariel, 20, 21, 51,
civilians, 12, 22, 89, 91, 93, 139, 206 95, 106, 170, 171, 172,
95, 97, 98, 101, 102, PT-76 tank, 35 186, 197
131-136, 137, 139, 145; Python 3 missile, 74 Shaqiqat, Mahmud Nimr,
courts, 14; and 145
international terrorism, 15, Qasim, Alod, 116 Sharqi, Ahmad al-, 145
160; and media, 15, 151, Qlaile, 54 Shatila camp, 170, 171, 200,
153, 162, 163; trains Quadi, Dr Issam al-, 32, 204
overseas, 125, 137-147; 206 Sherman tank, 40
attacks on Israel, 9, 19, 20, Quasmiya, 54 Shi'a Muslim community,
24, 26, 174; internal Quleilat, Ibrahim, 93 16, 17, 20, 26, 63, 134,
quarrels, 30, 124; and Qun, Col., 169 167, 175, 191, 195, 204;
Shi'ite Amal militia, 17, welcomes Israeli troops, 8,
198, 199, 204; strength Rabin, Yitzhak, 195, 202 76; incitement against
(1982), 13, 28, 30, 206; Rachidiye, 28, 53, 54, 77, IDF, 190, 198; attacks on
Executive Committee, 30; 136, 157 I D F slacken, 202; attacks
tactics, 32, 55, 125; in Radio Beirut, 15 on PLO, 204
eastern sector, 59, 63; in Ramlet el-Baida, 96 Shihabi, Gen. Hikmat, 32,
western sector, 61; at Tyre, Randal, Jonathan, 123, 167 33. 120
53, 61, 80; at Beaufort Ras el-Ain, 54 Shipler, David, 135
Castle, 57; at Sidon, 54, Ras el-Metn, 184 Shiraz University, 196
62; munitions dumps, 86, Rawai, Lt. Mahmoud Shostock, Eliezer, 162
94, 158; fights on after Muhammad al-, 138 Shouf Mountains, 8, 36,
Syrian ceasefire, 89, 95; Razdq, Sa'id, 145 118, 177, 179, 182, 184,
Arab reluctance to offer Read, Mrs Dolly, 136 187
refuge, 105; withdraws Reagan, President Ronald, Shrike missile, 71
from West Beirut, 107, 122, 162, 164, 177, 187 Sidewinder AIM-9L
168; tactical weaknesses, Red Crescent, 88, 158, 163 missile, 74
124-125; casualties, 130, Red Cross, 88, 99 Sidon, 13, 17, 28, 53, 54,
161; in northern Lebanon, Remote-piloted vehicles 56, 61, 62, 88, 125, 132,
177, 182; mutinies against (RPVs), 65, 66, 71, i n , 135, 136, 137, 139, 150,
Arafat, 183; returns to 116, 125, 207-208 152, 156, 157, 164, 165,
West Beirut, 199; Fatah Rihane, 29 191, 199
faction, 13, 28, 30, 57, 102, Rome, 24 Simteropol, 139
131, 182, 187, 205-206; Six-Day War, 47
Saiqa faction, 9, 32, 140, Sa'ad, Darwish Dhib, 145 'Smart bomb', 71
144, 145, 206; Karameh Sabra camp, 170, 171, 200, snipers, 102, 169
Bde., 29, 54, 206; Kastel 204 Sodeco, 169
Bde., 29, 61, 206; Yarmouk Sabra Shatila massacres, 'Soldiers Against Silence',
Bde., 29, 206; Galilee Bn., 170, 172, 174, 204 175
139; September Martyrs Safa, Haydar Jawad, 144 Souk al-Gharb, 184
Bn., 139; Kamal Kaush Safro, Salah, 135 South Africa, 141
Gp., 31 'Sagger' missile, 30, 35, 45, 'South Lebanese Army',
Palestine Liberation Front 63, 139 172, 202, 204
(PLF), 140, 145, 206 Saglus, Maj.Gen. Yoshua, Soviet Union, 14, 20, 88,
Palestine Popular Struggle 172 129, 138, 139, 175, 204;
Front (PPSF), 140, 144, Saida, 196 observers in Lebanon, 118,
145, 206 Sakiet el Janzir, 199 120-121
Paris, 24 SAMs (surface-to-air Suez Canal, 51
Paris Match, 157 missiles), 20, 30, 36, 37, suicide bombers, 92, 186,
Pazner, Ari, 194, 195 64-73, 88, 91, 96, 169 191, 195, 202
Peled, Brig.Gen. Yossi, Samaan, Galerie, 164 Sukhoi Su-7 aircraft, 35,
49 Samir, Salim, 145 71
217
INDEX
Sukhoi Su-22 aircraft, Tal, Gen. Israel, 209 United States of America,
35 Taha, Riyadh, 15 26, 27, 65, 88, 95, 163, 176
Sultan Yakoub, 78 Taher, Hassan Hussein, 142 US Marines, 107, 168, 169,
Sunni Muslim community, Tamarzi, Ka'ad, 144 175, 179, 186, 188, 194
16, 186, 191, 198, 199, Tarik Jdedeh, 93 US Sixth Fleet, 54
200, 204 Tartus, 168 USS \'ezv Jersey, 122, 184, 187
Suq el-Arab, 91 Tatro, Nicholas, 17 Usher, Shaun, 107
'Swatter' missile, 35 Tel Aviv, 45, 113, 148, 154,
Sweden, 201 175 Vardi, Brig.Gen. Danni, 49
Syria, 14, 20-22, 27, 28, 47, Television crews and Vienna, 24
89, 115, 177, 182, 183, coverage, 7, 150-154, 159, Vietnam, 138, 143
187, 190, 195, 199, 200, 163, 166 'Voice of Hope', 48
204, 205; closes Lebanese Time Magazine, 169
border (1968), 9; sends The Times (London), 93, WAFA Press Agency, 151
troops into Lebanon 102, 108, 174 Wakim's cafe, 100
(1976), 10; supports PLO, Timmerman, Kenneth, 151 Waldheim, Kurt, UN
10, 13; 'Greater Syria' Tlas, Gen. Mustafa, 33, 39, Secretary-General, 19
concept, 12; and 64, 116 'Walleye' bomb, 71
judgement of Israeli Toolan, Sean, 15 Washington, 20, 102
intentions, 27; and Tripoli, 12, 29, 92, 187 Washington Post, 15, 102,
ceasefire (11 June 1982), Trzi, Abd el-, 196 162, 164, 165, 167, 203
82; resumes fighting, 91; 'Two-Week War', 20 Wazzan, Shafik, 101, 169
and PLO mutiny, 183; Tyre, 7, 13, 18, 19, 28, 30, Wazzir, Khalil ('Abu
dominates Lebanese 42, 53, 54, 56, 59, 62, 65, Jihad';, 93, 122, 123
Christian and Muslim 80, 88, 135, 137, 157, 164, Weinberger, Caspar, 168
factions, 203-204 187 West Bank, 16, 20, 24, 177
Syrian Air Force, 71-75 T-34 85 tank, 30, 35, 127, West Berlin, 24
Syrian armed forces: 138 Wilson, Gen., 50
organisation and strength, T-54. T-55 tanks, 30, 35, 'Wolf missile, 70
33-37, 50; operations in 40, 50, 82, 117, 118
Lebanon (1982), 58, 59, T-62 tank, 34, 50, 59, 79, Yaron, Brig.Gen. Amos, 53,
61, 63, 64, 79-82; 82, 83, 85, 116, 117 58, 172
casualties, 121; tank losses, T-72 tank, 34, 81, 117, 213 Yediot Aharanol, 150
117; strengths and Yitzhaky, Shmuel, 80, 81
weaknesses, 119-121; United Nations, 12, 14, 18, Yitzhak, Capt., 150
withdrawal from Beirut, 47, 203 Yom Kippur War (1973),
168; and journalists, 152 United Nations Interim 21, 34, 46, 72, 85, n o
Units: 1st Armd.Div., 36, Force in Lebanon Yugoslavia, 139
39, 76, 80; 3rd Armd.Div., (UNIFIL), 18, 19, 20, 29,
213; 58th Mech.Bde., 36, 42, 46, 201 Zaharani River, 28, 62
78; 62nd Ind.Bde., 36; United Press International Zahle, 20, 44, 64, 65, 82
68th Tank Bde., 36; 76th (UPI), 162 Zaidan, Mahmud al- ('Abu
Tank Bde., 36; 82nd Tank UNRWA school, 136 Abbas'), 206
Bde., 81, 213; 85th Unkun, 196 Zefat, 46
Mech.Bde., 36, 107, 118; US Embassy, 182, 191 Zeidan, Mahmud Abdul
commando battalions, 36, US News and World Fattan, 142
78, 79, 118 Report, 162 Zufar, 91
218

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Published in 1985 by

Osprey Publishing Ltd

British Library Cataloguing in

ISBN 0 85045 603 7

Editor: Martin Windrow

In the summer of 1982 Israel fought a war in southern Lebanon against

of the PLO in Lebanon. This PLO-leftist coalition upset the delicate

PLO guerrillas go over an obstacle course in a Lebanese training

advancing a long-standing ambition of extending its hegemony over

Syrians together in a rejectionist alliance. From that time, Syria

Girl members of the PLO receive instruction, on the beach at

The old Russian nickname 'Katyusha' is now used generically for

The PLO invited individuals and groups into Lebanon without

The Christians were branded as isolationists, traitors, rightists, fascists,

pride and self-confidence. Attempts to enlist the active support of Iran

border. Intensified Israeli border patrols thwarted most of these efforts,

sanctioned by retro-active agreement with U N I F I L . More than 700

The U N I F I L zone became a sanctuary from pursuit and IDF

Palestinian terrorist attacks against Israel begin in Lebanon,' he said,

The tragedy of Lebanon's internal hatreds could hardly be more

IDF soldiers; 25 Israeli citizens; 25 tourists in Israel; 37 residents of the

'Fatahland' in south-east Lebanon, 1,000 in the Nabatiye region, 500 in

Palestinian forces fell naturally into four categories:

A PLO team photographed before setting off on a terrorist raid

Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) said that 'in no circumstances' should

President Assad is said to have told Arafat in a telephone call on the

armoured infantry with a smaller allocation of sometimes older tanks

Soldiers of the Palestine Liberation Army under instruction in the

Syrian doctrine was based upon Russian principles without following

The Lebanese Christians

and the Anti-Lebanon, which reaches 2,814 metres at Mount Hermon.

mountain roads are dominated by hilltops which make military

Lt.Gen. 'Raful' Eitan,

morning, 6 June. He had come to discuss a UN Security Council

western slopes of the Lebanon Range, was built around Divisions 36

This last was made up of two brigades of paratroopers and infantry

Israeli Defence Minister Ariel Sharon, the enthusiastic architect of

Day One - 6 June

PLO strongholds. The first party, in amphibious APCs, reached the

tank fire. This encouraged small P L O tank-killer teams to attack with

Column of IDF 'Zeldas' - M113 armoured personnel carriers -

seconds. I D F artillery had another advantage in the M25 and M131

The PLO used the time-worn remains of the castle as an advanced

Day Two - 7 June

Day Three - 8 June

Day Four - 9 June

Attacker's view of Beaufort Castle, from the south or Israeli side.

Maj. Sa'ad Haddad (third from left, in fatigue cap) reached

Centurion, and then an armoured Medevac carrier as it moved in to pick

Israeli infantry in action around El Baas, the large Palestinian

hours of 9 June they authorised the elimination of the SAMs at Zahle.

Merkava tank crewmen at prayer during a lull in the fighting on

the commander and gun crew. In the foreground an infantry

Hawkeye, an American 'Airborne Early Warning' type, of which the

Mixed formation of IDF/AF F-16 Falcons and F-4E Phantom.