3rd Recitation Rule 110 Prosecution of Offenses

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 169711, February 08, 2010 ]

HEIRS OF SARAH MARIE PALMA BURGOS, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT
OF APPEALS AND JOHNNY CO Y YU, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
ABAD, J.Serapio
This case is about the legal standing of the offended parties in a criminal case to seek, in
their personal capacities and without the Solicitor General's intervention, reversal of the
trial court's order granting bail to the accused on the ground of absence of strong
evidence of guilt.
The Facts and the Case
On January 7, 1992 a number of assailants attacked the household of Sarah Marie Palma
Burgos while all were asleep, killing Sarah and her uncle Erasmo Palma (Erasmo).
Another uncle, Victor Palma (Victor), and a friend, Benigno Oquendo (Oquendo),
survived the attack. The theory of the police was that a land transaction gone sour
between Sarah's live-in partner, David So (David), and respondent Johnny Co (Co)
motivated the assault.
Four months after the incident, the police arrested Cresencio Aman (Aman) and Romeo
Martin (Martin) who executed confessions, allegedly admitting their part in the attack.
They pointed to two others who helped them, namely, Artemio "Pong" Bergonia and
Danilo Say, and to respondent Co who allegedly masterminded the whole thing. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 51, tried the case against Aman and
Martin in Criminal Cases 92-104918-21. The three others remained at large. After trial,
the RTC acquitted them both.
After 10 years or on September 5, 2002 respondent Co surrendered to the National

Bureau of Investigation. The prosecution charged him with two counts of murder for the
deaths of Sarah[1] and Erasmo[2] and two counts of frustrated murder committed against
Oquendo[3] and Victor.[4] Upon arraignment, Co pleaded not guilty to the charges.
On September 25, 2002 respondent Co filed a petition for admission to bail.[5] After

hearing or on April 14, 2004, the RTC[6] granted bail on the ground that the evidence of
guilt of respondent Co was not strong. The RTC summarized the prosecution's evidence
as follows:
1. Aman and Martin's extrajudicial confessions that pointed to Co as the one who hired
them to kill David and his family.
2. David's testimony as alleged witness to the killing of Sarah. Aman supposedly told
David later when they met that it was Co who ordered the massacre.
3. Police officer Leopoldo Vasquez, assistant leader of the police team that investigated
the case, said that his team conducted two operations to take Co into custody. The first
was in a restaurant where they waited for him. But Co got suspicious and when he saw
the police, he immediately left the restaurant, got into his car, and sped away. The police
also tried to arrest Co at his residence but the police did not find him there. Co also
offered to settle the case.
The RTC had a low estimate, however, of the above evidence. First, the extrajudicial
confessions of Aman and Martin, apart from having been irregularly executed, merely
proved their participation in the killing. Neither, however, claimed conspiracy with
respondent Co. Further, the prosecution did not present Aman or Martin during the bail
hearing, reportedly because Aman was already dead and Martin could not be located. To
admit their sworn statements in evidence would deprive Co of his constitutional right to
cross-examine them.
Second, David's narrations were, to the RTC, contradictory, uncorroborated, and self-
serving, thus lacking in evidentiary weight.
Third, police officer Vasquez's story was likewise uncorroborated. Besides, while flight is
often indicative of guilt, it requires a clear showing of the identity of the offender and his
evasion of arrest. Here, said the RTC, the prosecution failed to establish Co's identity as
the assailant and his reason for fleeing from the police.
Fourth, the prosecution failed to prove that the offer of settlement came from Co.
Petitioner heirs of Sarah moved for reconsideration[7] but the RTC, now presided over by
another judge,[8] denied the same in its Order of May 18, 2005.[9] This prompted the
victim's heirs to file a special civil action of certiorari with prayer for a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction[10] before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP 90028.
The CA dismissed the petition,[11] however, for having been filed without involving the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in violation of jurisprudence[12] and the law,
specifically, Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code which
states that:
Sec. 35. Powers and Functions.--The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent
the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials
and agents in any litigation, proceedings, investigation or matter requiring the
services of lawyers. When authorized by the President or head of the office
concerned, it shall also represent government-owned or controlled corporations.
The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government
and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers. It shall have
the following specific powers and functions:
xxxx
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all
criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme
Court, Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and
special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official
capacity is a party.
Petitioner heirs of Sarah moved for reconsideration[13] but the CA denied it for lack of
merit in its Resolution of September 16, 2005,[14] hence, the heirs' recourse to this Court.
The Issue
The case raises one issue: whether or not the CA correctly dismissed the special civil
action of certiorari, which questioned the RTC's grant of bail to respondent Co, for
having been filed in the name of the offended parties and without the OSG's intervention.
The Court's Ruling
Generally, a criminal case has two aspects, the civil and the criminal. The civil aspect is
borne of the principle that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable.[15]
The civil action, in which the offended party is the plaintiff and the accused is the
defendant,[16] is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.[17]
The law allows the merger of the criminal and the civil actions to avoid multiplicity of
suits.[18] Thus, when the state succeeds in prosecuting the offense, the offended party
benefits from such result and is able to collect the damages awarded to him.
But, when the trial court acquits the accused[19] or dismisses the case[20] on the ground of
lack of evidence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the civil
action is not automatically extinguished since liability under such an action can be
determined based on mere preponderance of evidence. The offended party may peel off
from the terminated criminal action and appeal from the implied dismissal of his claim
for civil liability.[21]
The purpose of a criminal action, in its purest sense, is to determine the penal liability of
the accused for having outraged the state with his crime and, if he be found guilty, to
punish him for it. In this sense, the parties to the action are the People of the Philippines
and the accused.[22] The offended party is regarded merely as a witness for the state.
[23]
Also in this wise, only the state, through its appellate counsel, the OSG, [24] has the sole
right and authority to institute proceedings before the CA or the Supreme Court.[25]
As a general rule, the mandate or authority to represent the state lies only in the OSG.
Thus--
It is patent that the intent of the lawmaker was to give the designated official, the
Solicitor General, in this case, the unequivocal mandate to appear for the
government in legal proceedings. Spread out in the laws creating the office is the
discernible intent which may be gathered from the term "shall" x x x.
xxxx
The Court is firmly convinced that considering the spirit and the letter of the law,
there can be no other logical interpretation of Sec. 35 of the Administrative Code
than that it is, indeed, mandatory upon the OSG to "represent the Government of
the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer.[26]
For the above reason, actions essentially involving the interest of the state, if not initiated
by the Solicitor General, are, as a rule,[27] summarily dismissed.[28]
Here, the question of granting bail to the accused is but an aspect of the criminal action,
preventing him from eluding punishment in the event of conviction. The grant of bail or
its denial has no impact on the civil liability of the accused that depends on conviction by
final judgment. Here, respondent Co has already been arraigned. Trial and judgment, with
award for civil liability when warranted, could proceed even in his absence.
In Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz,[29] this Court allowed the offended party to challenge

before it the trial court's order granting bail. But in that case, the trial court gravely
abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting bail without conducting
any hearing at all. Thus, to disallow the appeal on the basis of lack of intervention of the
OSG would "leave the private complainant without any recourse to rectify the public
injustice."[30] It is not the case here. The trial court took time to hear the parade of
witnesses that the prosecution presented before reaching the conclusion that the evidence
of guilt of respondent Co was not strong.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals

Decision in CA-G.R. SP 90028 dated June 29, 2005 and its Resolution dated September
16, 2005.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 189754, October 24, 2012 ]
LITO BAUTISTA AND JIMMY ALCANTARA, PETITIONERS, VS. SHARON
G. CUNETA-PANGILINAN, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the
Decision[1] dated May 19, 2009 and Resolution[2] dated September 28, 2009 of the Court
of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 104885, entitled Sharon G. Cuneta-Pangilinan v.
Hon. Rizalina T. Capco-Umali, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court in Mandaluyong City, Branch 212, Lito Bautista, and Jimmy Alcantara, which
granted the petition for certiorari of respondent Sharon G. Cuneta-Pangilinan. The CA
Decision reversed and set aside the Order[3] dated April 25, 2008 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 212, Mandaluyong City, but only insofar as it pertains to the
granting of the Demurrer to Evidence filed by petitioners Lito Bautista (Bautista) and
Jimmy Alcantara (Alcantara), and also ordered that the case be remanded to the trial court
for reception of petitioners' evidence.
The antecedents are as follows:
On February 19, 2002, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City filed two
(2) informations, both dated February 4, 2002, with the RTC, Branch 212, Mandaluyong
City, against Pete G. Ampoloquio, Jr. (Ampoloquio), and petitioners Bautista and
Alcantara, for the crime of libel, committed by publishing defamatory articles against
respondent Sharon Cuneta-Pangilinan in the tabloid Bandera.
In Criminal Case No. MC02-4872, the Information dated February 4, 2002 reads:
That on or about the 24th day of April, 2001, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together with Jane/John Does unknown directors/officer[s]
of Bandera Publishing Corporation, publisher of Bandera, whose true identities are
unknown, and mutually helping and aiding one another, with deliberate intent to bring
SHARON G. CUNETA-PANGILINAN into public dishonor, shame and contempt, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with malice and ridicule, cause to
publish in Bandera (tabloid), with circulation in Metro Manila, which among others have
the following insulting and slanderous remarks, to wit:
MAGTIGIL KA, SHARON!
Sharon Cuneta, the mega-taba singer-actress, I’d like to believe, is really brain-dead.
Mukhang totoo yata yung sinasabi ng kaibigan ni Pettizou Tayag na ganyan siya.
Hayan at buong ingat na sinulat namin yung interview sa kaibigan ng may-ari ng

Central Institute of Technology at ni isang side comment ay wala kaming ginawa and all
throughout the article, we’ve maintained our objectivity, pero sa interview sa aparadoric
singer-actress in connection with an album launching, ay buong ningning na sinabi
nitong she’s supposedly looking into the item that we’ve written and most probably
would take some legal action.
xxx
Magsalita ka, Missed Cuneta, at sabihin mong hindi ito totoo.
Ang hindi lang namin nagustuhan ay ang pagbintangan kaming palagi naman daw
namin siyang sinisiraan, kaya hindi lang daw niya kami pinapansin, believing na part
raw siguro yun ng aming trabaho.
Dios mio perdon, what she gets to see are those purportedly biting commentaries about
her katabaan and kaplastikan but she has simply refused to acknowledge the good
reviews we’ve done on her.
xxx
Going back to this seemingly disoriented actress who’s desperately trying to sing even if
she truly can’t, itanggi mo na hindi mo kilala si Pettizou Tayag gayung nagkasama raw
kayo ng tatlong araw sa mother's house ng mga Aboitiz sa Cebu more than a month ago,
in connection with one of those political campaigns of your husband.
xxx
thereby casting publicly upon complainant, malicious contemptuous imputations of a

vice, condition or defect, which tend to cause complainant her dishonor, discredit or
contempt.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
That on or about the 27th day of March, 2001, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
and confederating together with Jane/John Does unknown directors/officers
of Bandera Publishing Corporation, publisher of Bandera, whose true identities are
unknown, and mutually helping, and aiding one another, with deliberate intent to bring
SHARON G. CUNETA-PANGILINAN into public dishonor, shame and contempt did,
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with malice and ridicule, cause to
publish in Bandera (tabloid), with circulation in Metro Manila, which, among others,
have the following insulting and slanderous remarks, to wit:
NABURYONG SA KAPLASTIKAN NI SHARON ANG MILYONARY[A]NG

SUPPORTER NI KIKO!
FREAKOUT pala kay Sharon Cuneta ang isa sa mga loyal supporters ni Kiko
Pangilinan na si Pettizou Tayag, a multi-millionaire who owns Central Institute of
Technology College in Sampaloc, Manila (it is also one of the biggest schools in Paniqui,
Tarlac).
xxx
Which in a way, she did. Bagama't busy siya (she was having a meeting with some
business associates), she went out of her way to give Sharon security.
So, ang ginawa daw ni Ms. Tayag ay tinext nito si Sha[ron] para mabigyan ito ng
instructions para kumportable itong makarating sa Bulacan.
She was most caring and solicitous, pero tipong na-offend daw ang megastar at nagtext
pang “You don’t need to produce an emergency SOS for me, I’ll be fine.”
Now, nang makara[t]ing na raw sa Bulacan si Mega nagtatarang daw ito at binadmouth
si Pettizou. Kesyo ang kulit-kulit daw nito, atribida, mapapel at kung anu-ano pang mga
derogatory words na nakarating siyempre sa kinauukulan.
Anyhow, if it’s true that Ms. Pettizou has been most financially supportive of Kiko, how
come Sharon seems not to approve of her?
“She doesn’t want kasi her husband to win as a senator because when that happens,
mawawalan siya ng hold sa kanya,” our caller opines.
Pettizou is really sad that Sharon is treating her husband like a wimp.
“In public,” our source goes on tartly, “pa kiss-kiss siya. Pa-embrace-embrace pero
kung silang dalawa [na] lang parang kung sinong sampid kung i-treat niya si Kiko.”
My God Pete, Harvard graduate si Kiko. He’s really intelligent as compared to Sharon
who appears to be brain dead most of the time.
Yung text message niyang “You don’t need to produce an emergency SOS for me,” hindi
ba’t she was being redundant?
Another thing, I guess it’s high time that she goes on a diet [again]. Jesus, she looks
6’11 crosswise!
xxx
Kunsabagay, she was only being most consistent. Yang si Sharon daw ay talagang mega-
brat, mega-sungit. But who does she think she is? Her wealth, dear, would pale in
comparison with the Tayag’s millions. Kunsabagay, she’s brain dead most of the time.
xxx
thereby casting publicly upon complainant, malicious contemptuous imputation of a vice,

condition or defect, which tend to cause complainant her dishonor, discredit or contempt.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
Upon arraignment, petitioners, together with their co-accused Ampoloquio, each entered
a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, a joint pre-trial and trial of the case ensued.[6]
Respondent’s undated Complaint-Affidavit[7] alleged that Bautista and Alcantara were

Editor and Associate Editor, respectively, of the publication Bandera, and their co-
accused, Ampoloquio, was the author of the alleged libelous articles which were
published therein, and subject of the two informations. According to respondent, in April
2001, she and her family were shocked to learn about an article dated March 27, 2001,
featured on page 7 of Bandera (Vol. 11, No. 156), in the column Usapang Censored of
Ampoloquio, entitled Naburyong sa Kaplastikan ni Sharon ang Milyonaryang Supporter
ni Kiko, that described her as plastic (hypocrite), ingrate, mega-brat, mega-sungit, and
brain dead, which were the subject of Criminal Case No. MC02-4875.[8] Another article,
with the same title and similar text, also featured on the same date, appeared on page 6 of
Saksi Ngayon, in the column Banatan of Ampoloquio.[9] Moreover, respondent averred
that on April 24, 2001, Ampoloquio wrote two follow-up articles, one appeared in his
column Usapang Censored, entitled Magtigil Ka, Sharon!, stating that she bad-mouthed
one Pettizou Tayag by calling the latter kulit-kulit (annoyingly
persistent), atribida (presumptuous), mapapel (officious or self-important), and other
derogatory words; that she humiliated Tayag during a meeting by calling the
latter bobo (stupid); that she exhibited offensive behavior towards Tayag; and that she
was a dishonest person with questionable credibility, which were the subject of Criminal
Case No. MC02-4872.[10] Another article, entitled Magtigil Ka, Sharon Cuneta!!!!, also
featured on the same date with similar text, and appeared on page 7 of Saksi Ngayon
(Vol. 3, No. 285), in the column Banatan of Ampoloquio,[11] with the headline in bold
letters, Sharon Cuneta, May Sira? on the front page of the said issue.[12] Respondent
added that Ampoloquio’s articles impugned her character as a woman and wife, as they
depicted her to be a domineering wife to a browbeaten husband. According to
Ampoloquio, respondent did not want her husband (Senator Francis Pangilinan) to win
(as Senator) because that would mean losing hold over him, and that she would treat him
like a wimp and sampid (hanger-on) privately, but she appeared to be a loving wife to
him in public. Respondent denied that Tayag contributed millions to her husband’s
campaign fund. She clarified that Tayag assisted during the campaign and was one of the
volunteers of her husband’s Kilos Ko Movement, being the first cousin of one Atty.
Joaquinito Harvey B. Ringler (her husband’s partner in Franco Pangilinan Law Office);
however, it was Atty. Ringler who asked Tayag to resign from the movement due to
difficulty in dealing with her.
After presenting respondent on the witness stand, the prosecution filed its Formal Offer
of Documentary Exhibits dated October 11, 2006, which included her undated
Complaint-Affidavit.[13]
On November 14, 2006, petitioners filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File the
Attached Demurrer to Evidence.[14] In their Demurrer to Evidence,[15] which was
appended to the said Motion, Bautista and Alcantara alleged that the prosecution's
evidence failed to establish their participation as Editor and Associate Editor,
respectively, of the publication Bandera; that they were not properly identified by
respondent herself during her testimony; and that the subject articles written by
Ampoloquio were not libelous due to absence of malice.
On April 25, 2008, the RTC issued an Order[16] granting petitioners’ Demurrer to

Evidence and dismissed Criminal Case Nos. MCO2-4872 and MCO2-4875. The trial
court opined, among others, that since the prosecution did not submit its
Comment/Opposition to the petitioners' Demurrer to Evidence, the averments therein thus
became unrebutted; that the testimonial and documentary evidence adduced by the
prosecution failed to prove the participation of petitioners as conspirators of the crime
charged; and that during the direct examination on July 27, 2004 and cross-examination
on August 1, 2006, respondent neither identified them, nor was there any mention about
their actual participation.
As a consequence, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit[17] dated May 29, 2008, with
the attached Comment ([to] Accused Lito Bautista and Jimmy Alcantara's Demurrer to
Evidence)[18] dated March 24, 2008, stating that during the pendency of the trial court's
resolution on the petitioners' Motion for Leave of Court to File the Attached Demurrer to
Evidence, with the attached Demurrer to Evidence, the prosecution intended to file its
Comment, by serving copies thereof, through registered mail, upon counsels for the
petitioners, including the other accused, and the respondent; however, said Comment was
not actually filed with the trial court due to oversight on the part of the staff of the State
Prosecutor handling the case.[19] Claiming that it was deprived of due process, the
prosecution prayed that its Comment be admitted and that the same be treated as a
reconsideration of the trial court's Order dated April 25, 2008.
In an Order dated June 3, 2008, the RTC granted the prosecutions' Motion to Admit, with
the attached Comment, and ruled that its Comment be admitted to form part of the court
records.
On August 19, 2008, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, seeking to
set aside the RTC Orders dated April 25, 2008 (which granted petitioners' Demurrer to
Evidence and ordered the dismissal of the cases against them) and June 3, 2008 (which
noted and admitted respondent's Comment to form part of the records of the case).
In a Decision dated May 19, 2009, the CA granted respondent's petition, thereby
reversing and setting aside the RTC Order dated April 25, 2008, but only insofar as it
pertains to the grant of petitioners' Demurrer to Evidence, and ordered that the case be
remanded to the trial court for reception of petitioners' evidence.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2009 which,
however, was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated September 28, 2009.
Hence, petitioners filed this present petition, raising the following arguments:
I.
[RESPONDENT'S] PETITION FOR CERTIORARI BEFORE THE COURT OF

APPEALS IS BARRED BY THE PETITIONERS' RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE
JEOPARDY.
II.
[RESPONDENT'S] PETITION FOR CERTIORARI BEFORE THE COURT OF

APPEALS DOES NOT LIE TO CORRECT ALLEGED ERRORS OF JUDGMENT
COMMITTED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT

COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN GRANTING PETITONERS'
DEMURRER [TO] EVIDENCE.
Petitioners allege that the Order of the RTC, dated April 25, 2008, granting the Demurrer
to Evidence was tantamount to an acquittal. As such, the prosecution can no longer
interpose an appeal to the CA, as it would place them in double jeopardy. Petitioners
contend that respondent's petition for certiorari with the CA should not have prospered,
because the allegations therein, in effect, assailed the trial court's judgment, not its
jurisdiction. In other words, petitioners posit that the said Order was in the nature of an
error of judgment rendered, which was not correctible by a petition for certiorari with the
CA.
Petitioners aver that although the CA correctly ruled that the prosecution had not been
denied due process, however, it erred in ruling that the trial court committed grave abuse
of discretion in granting petitioners' Demurrer to Evidence, on the basis that the
prosecution failed to prove that they acted in conspiracy with Ampoloquio, the author of
the questioned articles. They added that what the prosecution proved was merely their
designations as Editor and Associate Editor of the publication Bandera, but not the fact
that they had either control over the articles to be published or actually edited the subject
articles.
Respondent counters that petitioners failed to show special and important reasons to
justify their invocation of the Court's power to review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. She avers that the acquittal of petitioners does not preclude their further
prosecution if the judgment acquitting them is void for lack of jurisdiction. Further, she
points out that contrary to petitioners’ contention, the principle of double jeopardy does
not attach in cases where the court's judgment acquitting the accused or dismissing the
case is void, either for having disregarded the State's right to due process or for having
been rendered by the trial court with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and not merely errors of judgment.
Respondent also avers that even if the prosecution was deemed to have waived its right to
file a Comment on the petitioners’ Motion for Leave of Court to File the Attached
Demurrer to Evidence, this did not give the trial court any reason to deprive the
prosecution of its right to file a Comment on the petitioners’ Demurrer to Evidence itself,
which was a clear violation of the due process requirement. By reason of the foregoing,
respondent insists that petitioners cannot invoke violation of their right against double
jeopardy.
The petition is impressed with merit.
At the onset, it should be noted that respondent took a procedural misstep, and the view
she is advancing is erroneous. The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal
cases before the Supreme Court and the CA is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG). Section 35 (1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code explicitly provides that the OSG shall represent the Government of
litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. It shall
have specific powers and functions to represent the Government and its officers in the
Supreme Court and the CA, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and
special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official
capacity is a party.[20] The OSG is the law office of the Government.[21]
To be sure, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case
against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State.
The private complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal
only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned. In a catena of cases, this
view has been time and again espoused and maintained by the Court. In Rodriguez v.
Gadiane,[22] it was categorically stated that if the criminal case is dismissed by the trial
court or if there is an acquittal, the appeal on the criminal aspect of the case must be
instituted by the Solicitor General in behalf of the State. The capability of the private
complainant to question such dismissal or acquittal is limited only to the civil aspect of
the case. The same determination was also arrived at by the Court in Metropolitan Bank
and Trust Company v. Veridiano II.[23] In the recent case of Bangayan, Jr. v. Bangayan,
[24]
the Court again upheld this guiding principle.
Worthy of note is the case of People v. Santiago,[25] wherein the Court had the occasion to
bring this issue to rest. The Court elucidated:
It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest
of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability.
Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a
witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is
an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the
State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People
of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not take
such appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect
despite the acquittal of the accused.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition
may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and
the private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil
aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or
action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should
not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be
prosecuted in name of said complainant.[26]
Thus, the Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which the offended party
is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited
to the civil liability arising therefrom. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or
if there is an acquittal, an appeal of the criminal aspect may be undertaken, whenever
legally feasible, only by the State through the solicitor general. As a rule, only the
Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private
offended party or complainant may not undertake such appeal.[27]
In the case at bar, the petition filed by the respondent before the CA essentially
questioned the criminal aspect of the Order of the RTC, not the civil aspect of the case.
Consequently, the petition should have been filed by the State through the OSG. Since
the petition for certiorari filed in the CA was not at the instance of the OSG, the same
should have been outrightly dismissed by the CA. Respondent lacked the personality or
legal standing to question the trial court’s order because it is only the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), who can bring actions on behalf of the State in criminal
proceedings, before the Supreme Court and the CA.[28] Thus, the CA should have denied
the petition outright.
Moreover, not only did the CA materially err in entertaining the petition, it should be
stressed that the granting of petitioners’ Demurrer to Evidence already amounted to a
dismissal of the case on the merits and a review of the order granting the demurrer to
evidence will place the accused in double jeopardy. Consequently, the Court disagrees
with the CA’s ruling reversing the trial court’s order dismissing the criminal cases against
petitioners.
Under Section 23,[29] Rule 119 of the Rules of Court on Demurrer to Evidence, after the
prosecution terminates the presentation of evidence and rests its case, the trial court may
dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence upon the filing of a Demurrer
to Evidence by the accused with or without leave of court. If the accused files a
Demurrer to Evidence with prior leave of court and the same is denied, he may adduce
evidence in his defense. However, if the Demurrer to Evidence is filed by the accused
without prior leave of court and the same is denied, he waives his right to present
evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the
prosecution.
Corollarily, after the prosecution rests its case, and the accused files a Demurrer to
Evidence, the trial court is required to evaluate whether the evidence presented by the
prosecution is sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. If the trial court finds that the prosecution evidence is not sufficient
and grants the accused's Demurrer to Evidence, the ruling is an adjudication on the merits
of the case which is tantamount to an acquittal and may no longer be appealed. Any
further prosecution of the accused after an acquittal would, thus, violate the constitutional
proscription on double jeopardy.[30]
Anent the prosecution’s claim of denial of due process. As correctly found by the CA,
the prosecution was not denied due process. Suffice it to state that the prosecution had
actively participated in the trial and already rested its case, and upon petitioners' filing of
their Demurrer to Evidence, was given the opportunity to file its Comment or Opposition
and, in fact, actually filed its Comment thereto, albeit belatedly. The CA emphasized that
the word “may” was used in Section 23 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which states that if leave of court is granted, and the accused has filed the
Demurrer to Evidence within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice, the
prosecution “may” oppose the Demurrer to Evidence within a similar period from its
receipt. In this regard, the CA added that the filing of a Comment or Opposition by
respondent is merely directory, not a mandatory or jurisdictional requirement, and that in
fact the trial court may even proceed with the resolution of the petitioners' Demurrer to
Evidence even without the prosecution's Comment.
One final note. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code specifies the persons that can be
held liable for libel. It provides:
ART. 360. Persons responsible. — Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the
publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be
responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily
newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamation
contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.[31]
From the foregoing, not only is the person who published, exhibited or caused the
publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing shall be responsible for the same,
all other persons who participated in its publication are liable, including the editor or
business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, who shall be
equally responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were
the author thereof. The liability which attaches to petitioners is, thus, statutory in nature.
In Fermin v. People,[32] therein petitioner argued that to sustain a conviction for libel

under Article 360 of the Code, it is mandatory that the publisher knowingly participated
in or consented to the preparation and publication of the libelous article. She also averred
that she had adduced ample evidence to show that she had no hand in the preparation and
publication of the offending article, nor in the review, editing, examination, and approval
of the articles published in Gossip Tabloid. The Court struck down her erroneous theory
and ruled that therein petitioner, who was not only the Publisher of Gossip Tabloid but
also its President and Chairperson, could not escape liability by claiming lack of
participation in the preparation and publication of the libelous article.
Similarly, in Tulfo v. People,[33] therein petitioners, who were Managing Editor, National

Editor of Remate publication, President of Carlo Publishing House, and one who does
typesetting, editing, and layout of the page, claim that they had no participation in the
editing or writing of the subject articles which will hold them liable for the crime of libel
and, thus, should be acquitted. In debunking this argument, the Court stressed that an
editor or manager of a newspaper, who has active charge and control over the
publication, is held equally liable with the author of the libelous article. This is because it
is the duty of the editor or manager to know and control the contents of the paper, and
interposing the defense of lack of knowledge or consent as to the contents of the articles
or publication definitely will not prosper.
The rationale for the criminal culpability of those persons enumerated in Article 360 was
already elucidated as early as in the case of U.S. v. Ocampo,[34] to wit:
According to the legal doctrines and jurisprudence of the United States, the printer of a
publication containing libelous matter is liable for the same by reason of his direct
connection therewith and his cognizance of the contents thereof. With regard to a
publication in which a libel is printed, not only is the publisher but also all other persons
who in any way participate in or have any connection with its publication are liable as
publishers.[35]
Accordingly, Article 360 would have made petitioners Bautista and Alcantara, being the
Editor and Assistant Editor, respectively, of Bandera Publishing Corporation,
answerable with Ampoloquio, for the latter’s alleged defamatory writing, as if they were
the authors thereof. Indeed, as aptly concluded by the court a quo:
The aforestated provision is clear and unambiguous. It equally applies to an editor of a

publication in which a libelous article was published and states that the editor of the same
shall be responsible for the defamation in writing as if he were the author thereof.
Indeed, when an alleged libelous article is published in a newspaper, such fact alone
sufficient evidence to charge the editor or business manager with the guilt of its
publication. This sharing of liability with the author of said article is based on the
principle that editors and associate editors, by the nature of their positions, edit, control
and approve the materials which are to be published in a newspaper. This means that,
without their nod of approbation, any article alleged to be libelous would not be
published. Hence, by virtue of their position and the authority which they exercise,
newspaper editors and associate editors are as much critical part in the publication of any
defamatory material as the writer or author thereof.[36]
Nevertheless, petitioners could no longer be held liable in view of the procedural

infirmity that the petition for certiorari was not undertaken by the OSG, but instead by
respondent in her personal capacity. Although the conclusion of the trial court may be
wrong, to reverse and set aside the Order granting the demurrer to evidence would violate
petitioners’ constitutionally-enshrined right against double jeopardy. Had it not been for
this procedural defect, the Court could have seriously considered the arguments advanced
by the respondent in seeking the reversal of the Order of the RTC.
The granting of a demurrer to evidence should, therefore, be exercised with caution,

taking into consideration not only the rights of the accused, but also the right of the
private offended party to be vindicated of the wrongdoing done against him, for if it is
granted, the accused is acquitted and the private complainant is generally left with no
more remedy. In such instances, although the decision of the court may be wrong, the
accused can invoke his right against double jeopardy. Thus, judges are reminded to be
more diligent and circumspect in the performance of their duties as members of the
Bench, always bearing in mind that their decisions affect the lives of the accused and the
individuals who come to the courts to seek redress of grievances, which decision could be
possibly used by the aggrieved party as basis for the filing of the appropriate actions
against them.
Perforce, the Order dated April 25, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 212,
Mandaluyong City, in Criminal Case Nos. MC02-4872 and MC02-4875, which
dismissed the actions as against petitioners Lito Bautista and Jimmy Alcantara, should be
reinstated.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 19, 2009 and
Resolution dated September 28, 2009 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No.
104885, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The portion of the Order dated April 25,
2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 212, Mandaluyong City, in Criminal Case Nos.
MC02-4872 and MC02-4875, which dismissed the actions as against petitioners Lito
Bautista and Jimmy Alcantara, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
V
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 102342, July 03, 1992 ]
LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., IN
HIS CAPACITY AS ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, FOURTH JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 76, SAN MATEO,
RIZAL, AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
The Court is asked to determine the applicable law specifying the prescriptive period for
violations of municipal ordinances.
The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's
permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez,
in the Province of Rizal.
The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990. The referral-complaint of the
[1]
police was received by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990.
The corresponding information was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez
[2]
on October 2, 1990. [3]
The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had
prescribed, but the motion was denied. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Rizal,
the denial was sustained by the respondent judge. [4]
In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner first argues that the charge
against her is governed by the following provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure:
Section 1. Scope. -- This rule shall govern the procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases:
xxx
B. Criminal Cases:
1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
2. Violations of rental law;
3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
4. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense
charged does not exceed six months imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos
(P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or
of the civil liability arising therefrom. x x x" (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx
Section 9. How commenced. – The prosecution of criminal cases falling within the scope
of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by information filed directly in court without
need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation: Provided, however,
That in Metropolitan Manila and chartered cities, such cases shall be commenced only by
information; Provided, further, That when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the
corresponding complaint shall be signed and sworn to before the fiscal by the offended
party.
She then invokes Act No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of
Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to
Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run," reading as follows:
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such
acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: x x x Violations penalized by
municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months.
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation
of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.
Section 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and penalizing
violations of law not included in the Penal Code." (Emphasis supplied)
Her conclusion is that as the information was filed way beyond the two-month statutory
period from the date of the alleged commission of the offense, the charge against her
should have been dismissed on the ground of prescription.
For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the
filing of the complaint against her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Agreeing
with the respondent judge, the Solicitor General also invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, providing as follows:
Section 1. How Instituted - For offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in
special cases, the institution of criminal action shall be as follows:
a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, by filing
the complaint with the appropriate officer for the purpose of conducting the requisite
preliminary investigation therein;
b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, by filing the complaint directly with the said courts, or a
complaint with the fiscals office. However, in Metropolitan Manila and other chartered
cities, the complaint may be filed only with the office of the fiscal.
In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Emphasis is laid on the last paragraph. The respondent maintains that the filing of the
complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor comes under the phrase "such
institution" and that the phrase "in all cases" applies to all cases, without distinction,
including those falling under the Rule on Summary Procedure.
The said paragraph, according to the respondent, was an adoption of the following dictum
in Francisco v. Court of Appeals: [5]
In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench and
Bar, this Court has re-examined the question and, after mature consideration, has arrived
at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one established by the
decisions holding that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be
merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does,
interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where
the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits. Several reasons
buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in
declaring that the period of prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information" without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the
court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits.
Second, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to
investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings
against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain
vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the
offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.
It is important to note that this decision was promulgated on May 30, 1983, two months
before the promulgation of the Rule on Summary Procedure on August 1, 1983. On the
other hand, Section 1 of Rule 110 is new, having been incorporated therein with the
revision of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on January 1, 1985, except for the last
paragraph, which was added on October 1, 1988.
That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule on
summary procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies that the section does not
apply to offenses which are subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in all cases"
appearing in the last paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section, that
is, those offenses not governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. This interpretation
conforms to the canon that words in a statute should be read in relation to and not
isolation from the rest of the measure, to discover the true legislative intent.
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it
covers are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge
against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is
governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction
of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference
is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not
exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or
both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however, That in
offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand
pesos.
These offenses are not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall
be filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary
investigation." Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor
[6]
from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be
deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides
to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive
period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date
before that.
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that
the period of prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the
guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings,"
contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General that they include administrative
proceedings. His contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does not
distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.
At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary
Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former
should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and
Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this
Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution.
Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right.
[7]
Going back to the Francisco case, we find it not irrelevant to observe that the decision
would have been conformable to Section 1, Rule 110, as the offense involved was grave
oral defamation punishable under the Revised Penal Code with arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period. By contrast, the
prosecution in the instant case is for violation of a municipal ordinance, for which the
penalty cannot exceed six months, and is thus covered by the Rule on Summary
[8]
Procedure.
The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the
complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he
delays the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until its too late. However,
that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their
obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a
distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here
sought to be corrected.
Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner
commenced from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months
thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not
interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on
May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could
have interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the Municipal Trial
Court of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had
already prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the challenged Order dated October 2,
1991 is SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 90-089 in the Municipal Trial Court of
Rodriguez, Rizal, is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of prescription. It is so ordered.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 168662, February 19, 2008 ]
SANRIO COMPANY LIMITED, vs. EDGAR C. LIM, doing business as
ORIGNAMURA TRADING, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari[1] seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 74660[2] and its resolution[3] denying reconsideration.
Petitioner Sanrio Company Limited, a Japanese corporation, owns the copyright of

various animated characters such as “Hello Kitty,” “Little Twin Stars,” “My Melody,”
“Tuxedo Sam” and “Zashikibuta” among others.[4] While it is not engaged in business in
the Philippines, its products are sold locally by its exclusive distributor, Gift Gate
Incorporated (GGI).[5]
As such exclusive distributor, GGI entered into licensing agreements with JC Lucas
Creative Products, Inc., Paper Line Graphics, Inc. and Melawares Manufacturing
Corporation.[6] These local entities were allowed to manufacture certain products
(bearing petitioner's copyrighted animated characters) for the local market.
Sometime in 2001, due to the deluge of counterfeit Sanrio products, GGI asked IP Manila
Associates (IPMA) to conduct a market research. The research's objective was to identify
those factories, department stores and retail outlets manufacturing and/or selling fake
Sanrio items.[7] After conducting several test-buys in various commercial areas, IPMA
confirmed that respondent's Orignamura Trading in Tutuban Center, Manila was selling
imitations of petitioner's products.[8]
Consequently, on May 29, 2000, IPMA agents Lea A. Carmona and Arnel P. Dausan
executed a joint affidavit attesting to the aforementioned facts.[9] IPMA forwarded the
said affidavit to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which thereafter filed an
application for the issuance of a search warrant in the office of the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila.[10]
After conducting the requisite searching inquiry, the executive judge issued a search
warrant on May 30, 2000.[11] On the same day, agents of the NBI searched the premises
of Orignamura Trading. As a result thereof, they were able to seize various Sanrio
products.[12]
On April 4, 2002, petitioner, through its attorney-in-fact Teodoro Y. Kalaw IV of the

Quisumbing Torres law firm, filed a complaint-affidavit[13] with the Task-Force on Anti-
Intellectual Property Piracy (TAPP) of the Department of Justice (DOJ) against
respondent for violation of Section 217 (in relation to Sections 177[14] and 178[15]) of the
Intellectual Property Code (IPC) which states:
Section 217. Criminal Penalties. — 217.1. Any person infringing any right secured by
provisions of Part IV of this Act or aiding or abetting such infringement shall be guilty of
a crime punishable by:
(a) Imprisonment of one (1) year to three (3) years plus a fine ranging from Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000) to One hundred fifty thousand pesos (P150,000) for the first
offense.
(b) Imprisonment of three (3) years and one (1) day to six (6) years plus a fine ranging
from One hundred fifty thousand pesos (P150,000) to Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000) for the second offense.
(c) Imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to nine (9) years plus a fine ranging
from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000) to One million five hundred thousand
pesos (P1,500,000) for the third and subsequent offenses.
(d) In all cases, subsidiary imprisonment in cases of insolvency.
217.2. In determining the number of years of imprisonment and the amount of fine, the
court shall consider the value of the infringing materials that the defendant has produced
or manufactured and the damage that the copyright owner has suffered by reason of
infringement.
217.3. Any person who at the time when copyright subsists in a work has in his
possession an article which he knows, or ought to know, to be an infringing copy of
the work for the purpose of:
(a) Selling, letting for hire, or by way of trade offering or exposing for sale, or hire,
the article;
(b) Distributing the article for purpose of trade or any other purpose to an extent
that will prejudice the rights of the copyright of the owner in the work; or
(c) Trade exhibit of the article in public, shall be guilty of an offense and shall be liable
on conviction to imprisonment and fine as above mentioned. (emphasis supplied)
Respondent asserted in his counter-affidavit[16] that he committed no violation of the
provisions of the IPC because he was only a retailer.[17] Respondent neither reproduced
nor manufactured any of petitioner's copyrighted item; thus, he did not transgress the
economic rights of petitioner.[18] Moreover, he obtained his merchandise from authorized
manufacturers of petitioner's products.[19]
On September 25, 2002, the TAPP found that:

Evidence on record would show that respondent bought his merchandise from legitimate
sources, as shown by official receipts issued by JC Lucas Creative Products, Inc., Paper
Line Graphics, Inc. and Melawares Manufacturing Corporation. In fact, in her letter
dated May 23, 2002, Ms. Ma. Angela S. Garcia certified that JC Lucas Creative Products,
Inc., Paper Line Graphics, Inc. and Melawares Manufacturing Corporation are authorized
to produce certain Sanrio products. While it appears that some of the items seized
during the search are not among those products which [GGI] authorized these
establishments to produce, the fact remains that respondent bought these from the
abovecited legitimate sources. At this juncture, it bears stressing that respondent relied
on the representations of these manufacturers and distributors that the items they
sold were genuine. As such, it is not incumbent upon respondent to verify from these
sources what items [GGI] only authorized them to produce. Thus, as far as respondent
is concerned, the items in his possession are not infringing copies of the
original [petitioner's] products. (emphasis supplied)[20]
Thus, in a resolution dated September 25, 2002, it dismissed the complaint due to
insufficiency of evidence.[21]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.[22] Hence, it filed a petition for
review in the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor of the DOJ.[23] In a resolution dated
August 29, 2003,[24] the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor affirmed the TAPP
resolution. The petition was dismissed for lack of reversible error.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the CA. On May 3, 2005, the
appellate court dismissed the petition on the ground of prescription. It based its action on
Act 3326 which states:
acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) after a year for offenses
punished only by a fine or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both;
(b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month,
but less than two years; (c) after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for
two years or more, but less than six years; and (d) after twelve years for any other
offense punished by imprisonment for six years or more, except the crime of treason,
which shall prescribe after twenty years; Provided, however, That all offenses against any
law or part of law administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue shall prescribe after
five years. Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two
months.
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same may not be known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the

guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons
not constituting jeopardy. (emphasis supplied)
According to the CA, because no complaint was filed in court within two years after the
commission of the alleged violation, the offense had already prescribed. [25]
On the merits of the case, the CA concluded that the DOJ did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the petition for review.[26] To be criminally liable for violation of
Section 217.3 of the IPC, the following requisites must be present:
1. possession of the infringing copy and
2. knowledge or suspicion that the copy is an infringement of the genuine article.

The CA agreed with the DOJ that petitioner failed to prove that respondent knew that the
merchandise he sold was counterfeit. Respondent, on the other hand, was able to show
that he obtained these goods from legitimate sources.[27]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner now essentially avers that the CA erred in concluding that the alleged
violations of the IPC had prescribed. Recent jurisprudence holds that the pendency of a
preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period.[28] Moreover,
the CA erred in finding that the DOJ did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the complaint. Respondent is liable for copyright infringement (even if he
obtained his merchandise from legitimate sources) because he sold counterfeit goods. [29]
Although we do not agree wholly with the CA, we deny the petition.
FILING OF THE COMPLAINT IN THE DOJ TOLLED THE PRESCRIPTIVE

PERIOD
Section 2 of Act 3326 provides that the prescriptive period for violation of special laws
starts on the day such offense was committed and is interrupted by the institution of
proceedings against respondent (i.e., the accused).
Petitioner in this instance filed its complaint-affidavit on April 4, 2002 or one year, ten
months and four days after the NBI searched respondent's premises and seized Sanrio
merchandise therefrom. Although no information was immediately filed in court,
respondent's alleged violation had not yet prescribed.[30]
In the recent case of Brillantes v. Court of Appeals,[31] we affirmed that the filing of the
complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation interrupts the period of prescription
of criminal responsibility.[32] Thus, the prescriptive period for the prosecution of the
alleged violation of the IPC was tolled by petitioner's timely filing of the complaint-
affidavit before the TAPP.
IN THE ABSENCE OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, THE FACTUAL

FINDINGS
OF THE DOJ IN PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS WILL NOT BE
DISTURBED
In a preliminary investigation, a public prosecutor determines whether a crime has been

committed and whether there is probable cause that the accused is guilty thereof.
[33]
Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances that will engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial.[34] Because a public prosecutor is the one conducting
a preliminary investigation, he determines the existence of probable cause. [35]
Consequently, the decision to file a criminal information in court or to dismiss a
complaint depends on his sound discretion.[36]
As a general rule, a public prosecutor is afforded a wide latitude of discretion in the

conduct of a preliminary investigation. For this reason, courts generally do not interfere
with the results of such proceedings. A prosecutor alone determines the sufficiency of
evidence that will establish probable cause justifying the filing of a criminal information
against the respondent.[37] By way of exception, however, judicial review is allowed
where respondent has clearly established that the prosecutor committed grave abuse of
discretion.[38] Otherwise stated, such review is appropriate only when the prosecutor has
exercised his discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough to amount to an evasion
of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.[39]
The prosecutors in this case consistently found that no probable cause existed against
respondent for violation of the IPC. They were in the best position to determine whether
or not there was probable cause. We find that they arrived at their findings after carefully
evaluating the respective evidence of petitioner and respondent. Their conclusion was
not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 167571, November 25, 2008 ]
LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., PETITIONER, VS. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
RAMON C. TONGSON AND RODRIGO G. CAWILI, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review[1] of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29
October 2004 and 21 March 2005 in CA G.R. SP No. 87119, which dismissed Luis
Panaguiton, Jr.'s (petitioner's) petition for certiorari and his subsequent motion for
reconsideration.[2]
The facts, as culled from the records, follow.
In 1992, Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed various sums of money amounting to

P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business associate,
Ramon C. Tongson (Tongson), jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in
payment of the said loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both
Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were
dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner
made formal demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and
upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail.[3]
On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson[4] for

violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22)[5] before the Quezon City Prosecutor's
Office. During the preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his
counter-affidavit.[6] Tongson claimed that he had been unjustly included as party-
respondent in the case since petitioner had lent money to Cawili in the latter's personal
capacity. Moreover, like petitioner, he had lent various sums to Cawili and in
appreciation of his services, he was offered to be an officer of Roma Oil Corporation. He
averred that he was not Cawili's business associate; in fact, he himself had filed several
criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied that he had
issued the bounced checks and pointed out that his signatures on the said checks had been
falsified.
To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's

signatures, which were purportedly the same as the those appearing on the checks. [7] He
also showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had
claimed to be Cawili's business associate.[8]
In a resolution dated 6 December 1995,[9] City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found

probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner
filed a partial appeal before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even while the case against
Cawili was filed before the proper court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997,
[10]
after finding that it was possible for Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that
he had deliberately altered his signature in the pleadings submitted during the preliminary
investigation, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño directed the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer the
questioned signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for
lack of merit.
On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga)
dismissed the complaint against Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the
Chief State Prosecutor's resolution. In her resolution,[11] ACP Sampaga held that the case
had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended,[12] which provides that
violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years. In this case, the
four (4)-year period started on the date the checks were dishonored, or on 20 January
1993 and 18 March 1993. The filing of the complaint before the Quezon City Prosecutor
on 24 August 1995 did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period, as the law
contemplates judicial, and not administrative proceedings. Thus, considering that from
1993 to 1998, more than four (4) years had already elapsed and no information had as yet
been filed against Tongson, the alleged violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to him had
already prescribed.[13] Moreover, ACP Sampaga stated that the order of the Chief State
Prosecutor to refer the matter to the NBI could no longer be sanctioned under Section 3,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure because the initiative should come from
petitioner himself and not the investigating prosecutor.[14] Finally, ACP Sampaga found
that Tongson had no dealings with petitioner.[15]
Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J.
Teehankee, dismissed the same, stating that the offense had already prescribed pursuant
to Act No. 3326.[16] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution.
On 3 April 2003,[17] the DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N.
Gutierrez, ruled in his favor and declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the
filing of the complaint with the prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the
prescriptive period citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan.[18] Thus, the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City was directed to file three (3) separate informations against
Tongson for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.[19] On 8 July 2003, the City Prosecutor's Office
filed an information[20] charging petitioner with three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg.
22.[21]
However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004,[22] the DOJ, presumably acting on a

motion for reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had already
prescribed and ordered "the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22" against Tongson. In justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act
No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period
for the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not provide for the
prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not
Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription of offenses penalized
thereunder.[23] The DOJ also cited the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.,[24] wherein the
Supreme Court ruled that the proceedings referred to in Act No. 3326, as amended, are
judicial proceedings, and not the one before the prosecutor's office.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari[25] before the Court of Appeals assailing the 9
August 2004 resolution of the DOJ. The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals
in view of petitioner's failure to attach a proper verification and certification of non-
forum shopping. The Court of Appeals also noted that the 3 April 2003 resolution of the
DOJ attached to the petition is a mere photocopy.[26] Petitioner moved for the
reconsideration of the appellate court's resolution, attaching to said motion an amended
Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.[27] Still, the Court of Appeals denied
petitioner's motion, stating that subsequent compliance with the formal requirements
would not per se warrant a reconsideration of its resolution. Besides, the Court of
Appeals added, the petition is patently without merit and the questions raised therein are
too unsubstantial to require consideration.[28]
In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave error
in dismissing his petition on technical grounds and in ruling that the petition before it was
patently without merit and the questions are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
The DOJ, in its comment,[29] states that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the
petition for non-compliance with the Rules of Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a
complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not interrupt the
running of the prescriptive period for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P.
Blg. 22, a special law which does not provide for its own prescriptive period, offenses
prescribe in four (4) years in accordance with Act No. 3326.
Cawili and Tongson submitted their comment, arguing that the Court of Appeals did not
err in dismissing the petition for certiorari. They claim that the offense of violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 has already prescribed per Act No. 3326. In addition, they claim that the
long delay, attributable to petitioner and the State, violated their constitutional right to
speedy disposition of cases.[30]
The petition is meritorious.
First on the technical issues.
Petitioner submits that the verification attached to his petition before the Court of
Appeals substantially complies with the rules, the verification being intended simply to
secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not a
product of the imagination or a matter of speculation. He points out that this Court has
held in a number of cases that a deficiency in the verification can be excused or dispensed
with, the defect being neither jurisdictional nor always fatal.[31]
Indeed, the verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance

that matters which are alleged are true and correct--the court may simply order the
correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with the
rules in order that the ends of justice may be served,[32] as in the instant case. In the case
at bar, we find that by attaching the pertinent verification to his motion for
reconsideration, petitioner sufficiently complied with the verification requirement.
Petitioner also submits that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition on the
ground that there was failure to attach a certified true copy or duplicate original of the 3
April 2003 resolution of the DOJ. We agree. A plain reading of the petition before the
Court of Appeals shows that it seeks the annulment of the DOJ resolution dated 9 August
2004,[33] a certified true copy of which was attached as Annex "A."[34] Obviously, the
Court of Appeals committed a grievous mistake.
Now, on the substantive aspects.
Petitioner assails the DOJ's reliance on Zaldivia v. Reyes,[35] a case involving the violation
of a municipal ordinance, in declaring that the prescriptive period is tolled only upon
filing of the information in court. According to petitioner, what is applicable in this case
is Ingco v. Sandiganbayan,[36] wherein this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint
with the fiscal's office for preliminary investigation suspends the running of the
prescriptive period. Petitioner also notes that the Ingco case similarly involved the
violation of a special law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, petitioner notes.[37] He argues that sustaining the DOJ's
and the Court of Appeals' pronouncements would result in grave injustice to him since
the delays in the present case were clearly beyond his control. [38]
There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to Establish

Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide
When Prescription Shall Begin, is the law applicable to offenses under special laws
which do not provide their own prescriptive periods. The pertinent provisions read:
acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) x x x; (b) after four years for
those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) x x
x
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under
B.P. Blg. 22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not
more than one year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22
prescribes in four (4) years from the commission of the offense or, if the same be not
known at the time, from the discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the
position that only the filing of a case in court can toll the running of the prescriptive
period.
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926,
preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace,
thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
and punishment,"[39] and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed
with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense
is halted.[40]
The historical perspective on the application of Act No. 3326 is illuminating.[41] Act No.
3226 was approved on 4 December 1926 at a time when the function of conducting the
preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was vested in the justices of the peace.
Thus, the prevailing rule at the time, as shown in the cases of U.S. v.
Lazada[42] and People v. Joson,[43] is that the prescription of the offense is tolled once a
complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation inasmuch as
the filing of the complaint signifies the institution of the criminal proceedings against the
accused.[44] These cases were followed by our declaration in People v. Parao and
Parao[45] that the first step taken in the investigation or examination of offenses partakes
the nature of a judicial proceeding which suspends the prescription of the offense. [46]
Subsequently, in People v. Olarte,[47] we held that the filing of the complaint in the
Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or
investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal
responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the
case on the merits. In addition, even if the court where the complaint or information is
filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial
step of the proceedings against the offender,[48] and hence, the prescriptive period should
be interrupted.
In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan[49] and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,[50] which involved

violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the
Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293), which are both special laws, the Court ruled
that the prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary
investigation against the accused. In the more recent case of Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et al.,[51] the Court ruled that the nature
and purpose of the investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission
on violations of the Revised Securities Act,[52] another special law, is equivalent to the
preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus effectively
interrupts the prescriptive period.
The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case[53] is instructive, thus:
While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326
appears before "investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent change
in set-up whereby the investigation of the charge for purposes of prosecution has become
the exclusive function of the executive branch, the term "proceedings" should now be
understood either executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the
investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. With this
clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty person
which may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription.[54]
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication
on account of delays that are not under his control.[55] A clear example would be this case,
wherein petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit on 24 August 1995, well within the four
(4)-year prescriptive period. He likewise timely filed his appeals and his motions for
reconsideration on the dismissal of the charges against
Tongson. He went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However,
from the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City
Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an
aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's
control. After all, he had already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24
August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and
its misapplication of Act No. 3326. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep
on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer
unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the
accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.
We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner's filing of his
complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified
the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus
effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged
under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable cause, with the
debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of
the information against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals

dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
resolution of the Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE the information
against the petitioner.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 135808, October 06, 2008 ]
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, PETITIONER, VS.
INTERPORT RESOURCES CORPORATION, MANUEL S. RECTO, RENE S.
VILLARICA, PELAGIO RICALDE, ANTONIO REINA, FRANCISCO
ANONUEVO, JOSEPH SY AND SANTIAGO TANCHAN, JR.,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,

assailing the Decision,[1] dated 20 August 1998, rendered by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-
G.R. SP No. 37036, enjoining petitioner Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) from
taking cognizance of or initiating any action against the respondent corporation
Interport Resources Corporation (IRC) and members of its board of directors,
respondents Manuel S. Recto, Rene S. Villarica, Pelagio Ricalde, Antonio Reina, Francisco
Anonuevo, Joseph Sy and Santiago Tanchan, Jr., with respect to Sections 8, 30 and 36 of
the Revised Securities Act. In the same Decision of the appellate court, all the
proceedings taken against the respondents, including the assailed SEC Omnibus Orders
of 25 January 1995 and 30 March 1995, were declared void.
The antecedent facts of the present case are as follows.
On 6 August 1994, the Board of Directors of IRC approved a Memorandum of

Agreement with Ganda Holdings Berhad (GHB). Under the Memorandum of Agreement,
IRC acquired 100% or the entire capital stock of Ganda Energy Holdings, Inc. (GEHI),
[2]
which would own and operate a 102 megawatt (MW) gas turbine power-generating
barge. The agreement also stipulates that GEHI would assume a five-year power
purchase contract with National Power Corporation. At that time, GEHI's power-
generating barge was 97% complete and would go on-line by mid-September of 1994.
In exchange, IRC will issue to GHB 55% of the expanded capital stock of IRC amounting
to 40.88 billion shares which had a total par value of P488.44 million. [3]
On the side, IRC would acquire 67% of the entire capital stock of Philippine Racing Club,
Inc. (PRCI). PRCI owns 25.724 hectares of real estate property in Makati. Under the
Agreement, GHB, a member of the Westmont Group of Companies in Malaysia, shall
extend or arrange a loan required to pay for the proposed acquisition by IRC of PRCI. [4]
IRC alleged that on 8 August 1994, a press release announcing the approval of the
agreement was sent through facsimile transmission to the Philippine Stock Exchange
and the SEC, but that the facsimile machine of the SEC could not receive it. Upon the
advice of the SEC, the IRC sent the press release on the morning of 9 August 1994. [5]
The SEC averred that it received reports that IRC failed to make timely public disclosures
of its negotiations with GHB and that some of its directors, respondents herein, heavily
traded IRC shares utilizing this material insider information. On 16 August 1994, the SEC
Chairman issued a directive requiring IRC to submit to the SEC a copy of its aforesaid
Memorandum of Agreement with GHB. The SEC Chairman further directed all principal
officers of IRC to appear at a hearing before the Brokers and Exchanges Department
(BED) of the SEC to explain IRC's failure to immediately disclose the information as
required by the Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts. [6]
In compliance with the SEC Chairman's directive, the IRC sent a letter dated 16 August
1994 to the SEC, attaching thereto copies of the Memorandum of Agreement. Its
directors, Manuel Recto, Rene Villarica and Pelagio Ricalde, also appeared before the
SEC on 22 August 1994 to explain IRC's alleged failure to immediately disclose material
information as required under the Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts. [7]
On 19 September 1994, the SEC Chairman issued an Order finding that IRC violated the
Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts, in connection with the Old Securities Act of 1936,
when it failed to make timely disclosure of its negotiations with GHB. In addition, the
SEC pronounced that some of the officers and directors of IRC entered into transactions
involving IRC shares in violation of Section 30, in relation to Section 36, of the Revised
Securities Act.[8]
Respondents filed an Omnibus Motion, dated 21 September 1994, which was
superseded by an Amended Omnibus Motion, filed on 18 October 1994, alleging that
the SEC had no authority to investigate the subject matter, since under Section 8 of
Presidential Decree No. 902-A,[9] as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1758,
jurisdiction was conferred upon the Prosecution and Enforcement Department (PED) of
the SEC. Respondents also claimed that the SEC violated their right to due process when
it ordered that the respondents appear before the SEC and "show cause why no
administrative, civil or criminal sanctions should be imposed on them," and, thus,
shifted the burden of proof to the respondents. Lastly, they sought to have their cases
tried jointly given the identical factual situations surrounding the alleged violation
committed by the respondents.[10]
Respondents also filed a Motion for Continuance of Proceedings on 24 October 1994,

wherein they moved for discontinuance of the investigations and the proceedings
before the SEC until the undue publicity had abated and the investigating officials had
become reasonably free from prejudice and public pressure. [11]
No formal hearings were conducted in connection with the aforementioned motions,

but on 25 January 1995, the SEC issued an Omnibus Order which thus disposed of the
same in this wise:[12]
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing considerations, the Commission resolves
and hereby rules:
1. To create a special investigating panel to hear and decide the instant case in
accordance with the Rules of Practice and Procedure Before the Prosecution and
Enforcement Department (PED), Securities and Exchange Commission, to be
composed of Attys. James K. Abugan, Medardo Devera (Prosecution and
Enforcement Department), and Jose Aquino (Brokers and Exchanges
Department), which is hereby directed to expeditiously resolve the case by
conducting continuous hearings, if possible.
2. To recall the show cause orders dated September 19, 1994 requiring the
respondents to appear and show cause why no administrative, civil or criminal
sanctions should be imposed on them.
3. To deny the Motion for Continuance for lack of merit.

Respondents filed an Omnibus Motion for Partial Reconsideration, [13] questioning the
creation of the special investigating panel to hear the case and the denial of the Motion
for Continuance. The SEC denied reconsideration in its Omnibus Order dated 30 March
1995.[14]
The respondents filed a petition before the Court of Appeals docketed as C.A.-G.R. SP
No. 37036, questioning the Omnibus Orders dated 25 January 1995 and 30 March 1995.
[15]
During the proceedings before the Court of Appeals, respondents filed a
Supplemental Motion[16] dated 16 May 1995, wherein they prayed for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the SEC and its agents from investigating and
proceeding with the hearing of the case against respondents herein. On 5 May 1995,
the Court of Appeals granted their motion and issued a writ of preliminary injunction,
which effectively enjoined the SEC from filing any criminal, civil or administrative case
against the respondents herein.[17]
On 23 October 1995, the SEC filed a Motion for Leave to Quash SEC Omnibus Orders so
that the case may be investigated by the PED in accordance with the SEC Rules and
Presidential Decree No. 902-A, and not by the special body whose creation the SEC had
earlier ordered.[18]
The Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision[19] on 20 August 1998. It determined that

there were no implementing rules and regulations regarding disclosure, insider trading,
or any of the provisions of the Revised Securities Acts which the respondents allegedly
violated. The Court of Appeals likewise noted that it found no statutory authority for
the SEC to initiate and file any suit for civil liability under Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the
Revised Securities Act. Thus, it ruled that no civil, criminal or administrative proceedings
may possibly be held against the respondents without violating their rights to due
process and equal protection. It further resolved that absent any implementing rules,
the SEC cannot be allowed to quash the assailed Omnibus Orders for the sole purpose of
re-filing the same case against the respondents. [20]
The Court of Appeals further decided that the Rules of Practice and Procedure Before
the PED, which took effect on 14 April 1990, did not comply with the statutory
requirements contained in the Administrative Code of 1997. Section 8, Rule V of the
Rules of Practice and Procedure Before the PED affords a party the right to be present
but without the right to cross-examine witnesses presented against him, in violation of
Section 12(3), Chapter 3, Book VII of the Administrative Code. [21]
In the dispositive portion of its Decision, dated 20 August 1998, the Court of Appeals
ruled that[22]:
WHEREFORE, [herein petitioner SEC's] Motion for Leave to Quash SEC Omnibus
Orders is hereby DENIED. The petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is
GRANTED. Consequently, all proceedings taken against [herein respondents] in this
case, including the Omnibus Orders of January 25, 1995 and March 30, 1995 are
declared null and void. The writ of preliminary injunction is hereby made permanent
and, accordingly, [SEC] is hereby prohibited from taking cognizance or initiating any
action, be they civil, criminal, or administrative against [respondents] with respect to
Sections 8 (Procedure for Registration), 30 (Insider's duty to disclose when trading) and
36 (Directors, Officers and Principal Stockholders) in relation to Sections 46
(Administrative sanctions) 56 (Penalties) 44 (Liabilities of Controlling persons) and 45
(Investigations, injunctions and prosecution of offenses) of the Revised Securities Act
and Section 144 (Violations of the Code) of the Corporation Code. (Emphasis provided.)
The SEC filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in
a Resolution[23] issued on 30 September 1998.
Hence, the present petition, which relies on the following grounds [24]:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
QUASH THE ASSAILED SEC OMNIBUS ORDERS DATED JANUARY 25 AND MARCH 30,
1995.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE IS NO STATUTORY

AUTHORITY WHATSOEVER FOR PETITIONER SEC TO INITIATE AND FILE ANY SUIT BE THEY
CIVIL, CRIMINAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE AGAINST RESPONDENT CORPORATION AND ITS
DIRECTORS WITH RESPECT TO SECTION 30 (INSIDER'S DUTY TO DISCOLSED [sic] WHEN
TRADING) AND 36 (DIRECTORS OFFICERS AND PRINCIPAL STOCKHOLDERS) OF THE
REVISED SECURITIES ACT; AND
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROSECUTION BEFORE THE PED AND THE SICD RULES OF PROCEDURE ON
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS/PROCEEDINGS[25] ARE INVALID AS THEY FAIL TO COMPLY
WITH THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS CONTAINED IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF
1987.
Before discussing the merits of this case, it should be noted that while this case was
pending in this Court, Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as the Securities
Regulation Code, took effect on 8 August 2000. Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 902-
A, as amended, which created the PED, was already repealed as provided for in Section
76 of the Securities Regulation Code:
SEC. 76. Repealing Clause. - The Revised Securities Act (Batas Pambansa Blg. 178),
as amended, in its entirety, and Sections 2, 4 and 8 of Presidential Decree 902-A, as
amended, are hereby repealed. All other laws, orders, rules and regulations, or parts
thereof, inconsistent with any provision of this Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
Thus, under the new law, the PED has been abolished, and the Securities
Regulation Code has taken the place of the Revised Securities Act.
The Court now proceeds with a discussion of the present case.
I. Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act do not require the enactment of
implementing rules to make them binding and effective.
The Court of Appeals ruled that absent any implementing rules for Sections 8, 30 and 36
of the Revised Securities Act, no civil, criminal or administrative actions can possibly be
had against the respondents without violating their right to due process and equal
protection, citing as its basis the case Yick Wo v. Hopkins.[26] This is untenable.
In the absence of any constitutional or statutory infirmity, which may concern Sections
30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, this Court upholds these provisions as legal and
binding. It is well settled that every law has in its favor the presumption of validity.
Unless and until a specific provision of the law is declared invalid and unconstitutional,
the same is valid and binding for all intents and purposes. [27] The mere absence of
implementing rules cannot effectively invalidate provisions of law, where a reasonable
construction that will support the law may be given. In People v. Rosenthal,[28] this Court
ruled that:
In this connection we cannot pretermit reference to the rule that "legislation
should not be held invalid on the ground of uncertainty if susceptible of any reasonable
construction that will support and give it effect. An Act will not be declared inoperative
and ineffectual on the ground that it furnishes no adequate means to secure the
purpose for which it is passed, if men of common sense and reason can devise and
provide the means, and all the instrumentalities necessary for its execution are within
the reach of those intrusted therewith." (25 R.C.L., pp. 810, 811)
In Garcia v. Executive Secretary,[29] the Court underlined the importance of the
presumption of validity of laws and the careful consideration with which the judiciary
strikes down as invalid acts of the legislature:
The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to
presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear
and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption is
based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a
becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the joint
act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied
and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally
enacted.
The necessity for vesting administrative authorities with power to make rules and
regulations is based on the impracticability of lawmakers' providing general regulations
for various and varying details of management. [30] To rule that the absence of
implementing rules can render ineffective an act of Congress, such as the Revised
Securities Act, would empower the administrative bodies to defeat the legislative will by
delaying the implementing rules. To assert that a law is less than a law, because it is
made to depend on a future event or act, is to rob the Legislature of the power to act
wisely for the public welfare whenever a law is passed relating to a state of affairs not
yet developed, or to things future and impossible to fully know. [31] It is well established
that administrative authorities have the power to promulgate rules and regulations to
implement a given statute and to effectuate its policies, provided such rules and
regulations conform to the terms and standards prescribed by the statute as well as
purport to carry into effect its general policies. Nevertheless, it is undisputable that the
rules and regulations cannot assert for themselves a more extensive prerogative or
deviate from the mandate of the statute.[32] Moreover, where the statute contains
sufficient standards and an unmistakable intent, as in the case of Sections 30 and 36 of
the Revised Securities Act, there should be no impediment to its implementation.
The reliance placed by the Court of Appeals in Yick Wo v. Hopkins[33] shows a glaring

error. In the cited case, this Court found unconstitutional an ordinance which gave the
board of supervisors authority to refuse permission to carry on laundries located in
buildings that were not made of brick and stone, because it violated the equal
protection clause and was highly discriminatory and hostile to Chinese residents and not
because the standards provided therein were vague or ambiguous.
This Court does not discern any vagueness or ambiguity in Sections 30 and 36 of the
Revised Securities Act, such that the acts proscribed and/or required would not be
understood by a person of ordinary intelligence.
Section 30 of the Revised Securities Act
Section 30 of the Revised Securities Act reads:

Sec. 30. Insider's duty to disclose when trading. - (a) It shall be unlawful for an
insider to sell or buy a security of the issuer, if he knows a fact of special significance
with respect to the issuer or the security that is not generally available, unless (1) the
insider proves that the fact is generally available or (2) if the other party to the
transaction (or his agent) is identified, (a) the insider proves that the other party knows
it, or (b) that other party in fact knows it from the insider or otherwise.
(b) "Insider" means (1) the issuer, (2) a director or officer of, or a person controlling,
controlled by, or under common control with, the issuer, (3) a person whose
relationship or former relationship to the issuer gives or gave him access to a fact of
special significance about the issuer or the security that is not generally available, or (4)
a person who learns such a fact from any of the foregoing insiders as defined in this
subsection, with knowledge that the person from whom he learns the fact is such an
insider.
(c) A fact is "of special significance" if (a) in addition to being material it would be likely,
on being made generally available, to affect the market price of a security to a
significant extent, or (b) a reasonable person would consider it especially important
under the circumstances in determining his course of action in the light of such factors
as the degree of its specificity, the extent of its difference from information generally
available previously, and its nature and reliability.
(d) This section shall apply to an insider as defined in subsection (b) (3) hereof only to
the extent that he knows of a fact of special significance by virtue of his being an insider.
The provision explains in simple terms that the insider's misuse of nonpublic and
undisclosed information is the gravamen of illegal conduct. The intent of the law is the
protection of investors against fraud, committed when an insider, using secret
information, takes advantage of an uninformed investor. Insiders are obligated to
disclose material information to the other party or abstain from trading the shares of his
corporation. This duty to disclose or abstain is based on two factors: first, the existence
of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be
available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone; and
second, the inherent unfairness involved when a party takes advantage of such
information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing. [34]
In the United States (U.S.), the obligation to disclose or abstain has been traditionally
imposed on corporate "insiders," particularly officers, directors, or controlling
stockholders, but that definition has since been expanded. [35] The term "insiders" now
includes persons whose relationship or former relationship to the issuer gives or gave
them access to a fact of special significance about the issuer or the security that is not
generally available, and one who learns such a fact from an insider knowing that the
person from whom he learns the fact is such an insider. Insiders have the duty to
disclose material facts which are known to them by virtue of their position but which
are not known to persons with whom they deal and which, if known, would affect their
investment judgment. In some cases, however, there may be valid corporate reasons
for the nondisclosure of material information. Where such reasons exist, an issuer's
decision not to make any public disclosures is not ordinarily considered as a violation of
insider trading. At the same time, the undisclosed information should not be improperly
used for non-corporate purposes, particularly to disadvantage other persons with whom
an insider might transact, and therefore the insider must abstain from entering into
transactions involving such securities.[36]
Respondents further aver that under Section 30 of the Revised Securities Act, the SEC
still needed to define the following terms: "material fact," "reasonable person,"
"nature and reliability" and "generally available."[37] In determining whether or not
these terms are vague, these terms must be evaluated in the context of Section 30 of
the Revised Securties Act. To fully understand how the terms were used in the
aforementioned provision, a discussion of what the law recognizes as a fact of special
significance is required, since the duty to disclose such fact or to abstain from any
transaction is imposed on the insider only in connection with a fact of special
significance.
Under the law, what is required to be disclosed is a fact of "special significance" which

may be (a) a material fact which would be likely, on being made generally available, to
affect the market price of a security to a significant extent, or (b) one which a
reasonable person would consider especially important in determining his course of
action with regard to the shares of stock.
(a) Material Fact - The concept of a "material fact" is not a new one. As early as 1973,
the Rules Requiring Disclosure of Material Facts by Corporations Whose Securities Are
Listed In Any Stock Exchange or Registered/Licensed Under the Securities Act, issued by
the SEC on 29 January 1973, explained that "[a] fact is material if it induces or tends to
induce or otherwise affect the sale or purchase of its securities." Thus, Section 30 of the
Revised Securities Act provides that if a fact affects the sale or purchase of securities, as
well as its price, then the insider would be required to disclose such information to the
other party to the transaction involving the securities. This is the first definition given to
a "fact of special significance."
(b.1) Reasonable Person - The second definition given to a fact of special significance

involves the judgment of a "reasonable person." Contrary to the allegations of the
respondents, a "reasonable person" is not a problematic legal concept that needs to be
clarified for the purpose of giving effect to a statute; rather, it is the standard on which
most of our legal doctrines stand. The doctrine on negligence uses the discretion of the
"reasonable man" as the standard. [38] A purchaser in good faith must also take into
account facts which put a "reasonable man" on his guard. [39] In addition, it is the belief
of the reasonable and prudent man that an offense was committed that sets the criteria
for probable cause for a warrant of arrest.[40] This Court, in such cases, differentiated
the reasonable and prudent man from "a person with training in the law such as a
prosecutor or a judge," and identified him as "the average man on the street," who
weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our technical
rules of evidence of which his knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of
common sense of which all reasonable men have in abundance. [41] In the same vein, the
U.S. Supreme Court similarly determined its standards by the actual significance in the
deliberations of a "reasonable investor," when it ruled in TSC Industries, Inc. v.
Northway, Inc.,[42] that the determination of materiality "requires delicate assessments
of the inferences a `reasonable shareholder' would draw from a given set of facts and
the significance of those inferences to him."
(b.2) Nature and Reliability - The factors affecting the second definition of a "fact of
special significance," which is of such importance that it is expected to affect the
judgment of a reasonable man, were substantially lifted from a test of materiality
pronounced in the case In the Matter of Investors Management Co., Inc.[43]:
Among the factors to be considered in determining whether information is
material under this test are the degree of its specificity, the extent to which it differs
from information previously publicly disseminated, and its reliability in light of its nature
and source and the circumstances under which it was received.
It can be deduced from the foregoing that the "nature and reliability" of a
significant fact in determining the course of action a reasonable person takes regarding
securities must be clearly viewed in connection with the particular circumstances of a
case. To enumerate all circumstances that would render the "nature and reliability" of a
fact to be of special significance is close to impossible. Nevertheless, the proper
adjudicative body would undoubtedly be able to determine if facts of a certain "nature
and reliability" can influence a reasonable person's decision to retain, sell or buy
securities, and thereafter explain and justify its factual findings in its decision.
(c) Materiality Concept - A discussion of the "materiality concept" would be relevant to

both a material fact which would affect the market price of a security to a significant
extent and/or a fact which a reasonable person would consider in determining his or her
cause of action with regard to the shares of stock. Significantly, what is referred to in
our laws as a fact of special significance is referred to in the U.S. as the "materiality
concept" and the latter is similarly not provided with a precise definition. In Basic v.
Levinson,[44] the U.S. Supreme Court cautioned against confining materiality to a rigid
formula, stating thus:
A bright-line rule indeed is easier to follow than a standard that requires the
exercise of judgment in the light of all the circumstances. But ease of application alone
is not an excuse for ignoring the purposes of the Securities Act and Congress' policy
decisions. Any approach that designates a single fact or occurrence as always
determinative of an inherently fact-specific finding such as materiality, must necessarily
be overinclusive or underinclusive.
Moreover, materiality "will depend at any given time upon a balancing of both
the indicated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the
event in light of the totality of the company activity." [45] In drafting the Securities Act of
1934, the U.S. Congress put emphasis on the limitations to the definition of materiality:
Although the Committee believes that ideally it would be desirable to have
absolute certainty in the application of the materiality concept, it is its view that such a
goal is illusory and unrealistic. The materiality concept is judgmental in nature and it is
not possible to translate this into a numerical formula. The Committee's advice to the
[SEC] is to avoid this quest for certainty and to continue consideration of materiality
on a case-by-case basis as disclosure problems are identified." House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Report of the Advisory Committee on Corporate
Disclosure to the Securities and Exchange Commission, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 327
(Comm.Print 1977). (Emphasis provided.)[46]
(d) Generally Available - Section 30 of the Revised Securities Act allows the
insider the defense that in a transaction of securities, where the insider is in possession
of facts of special significance, such information is "generally available" to the public.
Whether information found in a newspaper, a specialized magazine, or any cyberspace
media be sufficient for the term "generally available" is a matter which may be adjudged
given the particular circumstances of the case. The standards cannot remain at a
standstill. A medium, which is widely used today was, at some previous point in time,
inaccessible to most. Furthermore, it would be difficult to approximate how the rules
may be applied to the instant case, where investigation has not even been started.
Respondents failed to allege that the negotiations of their agreement with GHB were
made known to the public through any form of media for there to be a proper
appreciation of the issue presented.
Section 36(a) of the Revised Securities Act
As regards Section 36(a) of the Revised Securities Act, respondents claim that the term
"beneficial ownership" is vague and that it requires implementing rules to give effect to
the law. Section 36(a) of the Revised Securities Act is a straightforward provision that
imposes upon (1) a beneficial owner of more than ten percent of any class of any equity
security or (2) a director or any officer of the issuer of such security, the obligation to
submit a statement indicating his or her ownership of the issuer's securities and such
changes in his or her ownership thereof. The said provision reads:
Sec. 36. Directors, officers and principal stockholders. - (a) Every person who is
directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than ten per centum of any [class] of
any equity security which is registered pursuant to this Act, or who is [a] director or an
officer of the issuer of such security, shall file, at the time of the registration of such
security on a securities exchange or by the effective date of a registration statement or
within ten days after he becomes such a beneficial owner, director or officer, a
statement with the Commission and, if such security is registered on a securities
exchange, also with the exchange, of the amount of all equity securities of such issuer of
which he is the beneficial owner, and within ten days after the close of each calendar
month thereafter, if there has been a change in such ownership during such month,
shall file with the Commission, and if such security is registered on a securities
exchange, shall also file with the exchange, a statement indicating his ownership at the
close of the calendar month and such changes in his ownership as have occurred during
such calendar month. (Emphasis provided.)
Section 36(a) refers to the "beneficial owner." Beneficial owner has been defined
in the following manner:
[F]irst, to indicate the interest of a beneficiary in trust property (also called
"equitable ownership"); and second, to refer to the power of a corporate shareholder to
buy or sell the shares, though the shareholder is not registered in the corporation's
books as the owner. Usually, beneficial ownership is distinguished from naked
ownership, which is the enjoyment of all the benefits and privileges of ownership, as
against possession of the bare title to property.[47]
Even assuming that the term "beneficial ownership" was vague, it would not
affect respondents' case, where the respondents are directors and/or officers of the
corporation, who are specifically required to comply with the reportorial requirements
under Section 36(a) of the Revised Securities Act. The validity of a statute may be
contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement. [48]
Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act were enacted to promote full disclosure
in the securities market and prevent unscrupulous individuals, who by their positions
obtain non-public information, from taking advantage of an uninformed public. No
individual would invest in a market which can be manipulated by a limited number of
corporate insiders. Such reaction would stifle, if not stunt, the growth of the securities
market. To avert the occurrence of such an event, Section 30 of the Revised Securities
Act prevented the unfair use of non-public information in securities transactions, while
Section 36 allowed the SEC to monitor the transactions entered into by corporate
officers and directors as regards the securities of their companies.
In the case In the Matter of Investor's Management Co., [49] it was cautioned that "the
broad language of the anti-fraud provisions," which include the provisions on insider
trading, should not be "circumscribed by fine distinctions and rigid classifications." The
ambit of anti-fraud provisions is necessarily broad so as to embrace the infinite variety
of deceptive conduct.[50]
In Tatad v. Secretary of Department of Energy,[51] this Court brushed aside a contention,

similar to that made by the respondents in this case, that certain words or phrases used
in a statute do not set determinate standards, declaring that:
Petitioners contend that the words "as far as practicable," "declining" and
"stable" should have been defined in R.A. No. 8180 as they do not set determinate and
determinable standards. This stubborn submission deserves scant consideration. The
dictionary meanings of these words are well settled and cannot confuse men of
reasonable intelligence. x x x. The fear of petitioners that these words will result in the
exercise of executive discretion that will run riot is thus groundless. To be sure, the
Court has sustained the validity of similar, if not more general standards in other cases.
Among the words or phrases that this Court upheld as valid standards were
"simplicity and dignity,"[52] "public interest,"[53] and "interests of law and order."[54]
The Revised Securities Act was approved on 23 February 1982. The fact that the Full
Disclosure Rules were promulgated by the SEC only on 24 July 1996 does not render
ineffective in the meantime Section 36 of the Revised Securities Act. It is already
unequivocal that the Revised Securities Act requires full disclosure and the Full
Disclosure Rules were issued to make the enforcement of the law more consistent,
efficient and effective. It is equally reasonable to state that the disclosure forms later
provided by the SEC, do not, in any way imply that no compliance was required before
the forms were provided. The effectivity of a statute which imposes reportorial
requirements cannot be suspended by the issuance of specified forms, especially where
compliance therewith may be made even without such forms. The forms merely made
more efficient the processing of requirements already identified by the statute.
For the same reason, the Court of Appeals made an evident mistake when it ruled that
no civil, criminal or administrative actions can possibly be had against the respondents
in connection with Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act due to the
absence of implementing rules. These provisions are sufficiently clear and complete by
themselves. Their requirements are specifically set out, and the acts which are enjoined
are determinable. In particular, Section 8[55] of the Revised Securities Act is a
straightforward enumeration of the procedure for the registration of securities and the
particular matters which need to be reported in the registration statement thereof. The
Decision, dated 20 August 1998, provides no valid reason to exempt the respondent IRC
from such requirements. The lack of implementing rules cannot suspend the effectivity
of these provisions. Thus, this Court cannot find any cogent reason to prevent the SEC
from exercising its authority to investigate respondents for violation of Section 8 of the
Revised Securities Act.
II. The right to cross-examination is not absolute and cannot be demanded during
investigative proceedings before the PED.
In its assailed Decision dated 20 August 1998, the Court of Appeals pronounced that the
PED Rules of Practice and Procedure was invalid since Section 8, Rule V [56] thereof failed
to provide for the parties' right to cross-examination, in violation of the Administrative
Code of 1987 particularly Section 12(3), Chapter 3, Book VII thereof. This ruling is
incorrect.
Firstly, Section 4, Rule I of the PED Rules of Practice and Procedure, categorically stated
that the proceedings before the PED are summary in nature:
Section 4. Nature of Proceedings - Subject to the requirements of due process,
proceedings before the "PED" shall be summary in nature not necessarily adhering to or
following the technical rules of evidence obtaining in the courts of law. The Rules of
Court may apply in said proceedings in suppletory character whenever practicable.
Rule V of the PED Rules of Practice and Procedure further specified that:
Section 5. Submission of Documents - During the preliminary
conference/hearing, or immediately thereafter, the Hearing Officer may require the
parties to simultaneously submit their respective verified position papers accompanied
by all supporting documents and the affidavits of their witnesses, if any which shall take
the place of their direct testimony. The parties shall furnish each other with copies of
the position papers together with the supporting affidavits and documents submitted by
them.
Section 6. Determination of necessity of hearing. - Immediately after the submission by

the parties of their position papers and supporting documents, the Hearing Officer shall
determine whether there is a need for a formal hearing. At this stage, he may, in his
discretion, and for the purpose of making such determination, elicit pertinent facts or
information, including documentary evidence, if any, from any party or witness to
complete, as far as possible, the facts of the case. Facts or information so elicited may
serve as basis for his clarification or simplifications of the issues in the case. Admissions
and stipulation of facts to abbreviate the proceedings shall be encouraged.
Section 7. Disposition of Case. If the Hearing Officer finds no necessity of further
hearing after the parties have submitted their position papers and supporting
documents, he shall so inform the parties stating the reasons therefor and shall ask
them to acknowledge the fact that they were so informed by signing the minutes of the
hearing and the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution.
As such, the PED Rules provided that the Hearing Officer may require the parties
to submit their respective verified position papers, together with all supporting
documents and affidavits of witnesses. A formal hearing was not mandatory; it was
within the discretion of the Hearing Officer to determine whether there was a need for a
formal hearing. Since, according to the foregoing rules, the holding of a hearing before
the PED is discretionary, then the right to cross-examination could not have been
demanded by either party.
Secondly, it must be pointed out that Chapter 3, Book VII of the Administrative Code,
entitled "Adjudication," does not affect the investigatory functions of the agencies. The
law creating the PED, Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A, as amended, defines
the authority granted to the PED, thus:
SEC. 8. The Prosecution and Enforcement Department shall have, subject to the
Commission's control and supervision, the exclusive authority to investigate, on
complaint or motu proprio, any act or omission of the Board of Directors/Trustees of
corporations, or of partnerships, or of other associations, or of their stockholders,
officers or partners, including any fraudulent devices, schemes or representations, in
violation of any law or rules and regulations administered and enforced by the
Commission; to file and prosecute in accordance with law and rules and regulations
issued by the Commission and in appropriate cases, the corresponding criminal or civil
case before the Commission or the proper court or body upon prima facie finding of
violation of any laws or rules and regulations administered and enforced by the
Commission; and to perform such other powers and functions as may be provided by
law or duly delegated to it by the Commission. (Emphasis provided.)
The law creating PED empowers it to investigate violations of the rules and
regulations promulgated by the SEC and to file and prosecute such cases. It fails to
mention any adjudicatory functions insofar as the PED is concerned. Thus, the PED
Rules of Practice and Procedure need not comply with the provisions of the
Administrative Code on adjudication, particularly Section 12(3), Chapter 3, Book VII.
In Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights,[57] this Court sets out the distinction between
investigative and adjudicative functions, thus:
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or
delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to
observe or study closely; inquire into systematically: "to search or inquire into" xx to
subject to an official probe xx: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of an
investigation, of course is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information.
Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a
controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts
established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by
patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire
into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of
evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in
turn described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not
require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; xx an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the
discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge,

decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle
finally (the rights and duties of parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: xx
to pass judgment on: settle judicially: xx act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide
or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: xx to award or grant
judicially in a case of controversy x x x."
In a legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To
determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge"
means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle, or decree, or to sentence or condemn. x
x x Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."
There is no merit to the respondent's averment that the sections under Chapter
3, Book VII of the Administrative Code, do not distinguish between investigative and
adjudicatory functions. Chapter 3, Book VII of the Administrative Code, is unequivocally
entitled "Adjudication."
Respondents insist that the PED performs adjudicative functions, as enumerated under
Section 1(h) and (j), Rule II; and Section 2(4), Rule VII of the PED Rules of Practice and
Procedure:
Section 1. Authority of the Prosecution and Enforcement Department - Pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 902-A, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1758, the
Prosecution and Enforcement Department is primarily charged with the following:
x x x x
(h) Suspends or revokes, after proper notice and hearing in accordance with these Rules,
the franchise or certificate of registration of corporations, partnerships or associations,
upon any of the following grounds:
1. Fraud in procuring its certificate of registration;
2. Serious misrepresentation as to what the corporation can do or is doing to the

great prejudice of or damage to the general public;
3. Refusal to comply or defiance of any lawful order of the Commission restraining

commission of acts which would amount to a grave violation of its franchise;
x x x x
(j) Imposes charges, fines and fees, which by law, it is authorized to collect;
x x x x
Section 2. Powers of the Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer shall have the following
powers:
xxxx
4. To cite and/or declare any person in direct or indirect contempt in accordance

with pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court.
Even assuming that these are adjudicative functions, the PED, in the instant case,
exercised its investigative powers; thus, respondents do not have the requisite standing
to assail the validity of the rules on adjudication. A valid source of a statute or a rule can
only be contested by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement.
[58]
In the instant case, respondents are only being investigated by the PED for their
alleged failure to disclose their negotiations with GHB and the transactions entered into
by its directors involving IRC shares. The respondents have not shown themselves to be
under any imminent danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the exercise
of adjudicative functions by the SEC. They are not being or about to be subjected by the
PED to charges, fees or fines; to citations for contempt; or to the cancellation of their
certificate of registration under Section 1(h), Rule II of the PED Rules of Practice and
Procedure.
To repeat, the only powers which the PED was likely to exercise over the respondents
were investigative in nature, to wit:
Section 1. Authority of the Prosecution and Enforcement Department - Pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 902-A, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1758, the
xxxx
Initiates proper investigation of corporations and partnerships or persons, their books,
. records and other properties and assets, involving their business transactions, in coordination with
the operating department involved;
xxxx
Files and prosecutes civil or criminal cases before the Commission and other courts of
. justice involving violations of laws and decrees enforced by the Commission and the rules and
regulations promulgated thereunder;
Prosecutes erring directors, officers and stockholders of corporations and partnerships,
. commercial paper issuers or persons in accordance with the pertinent rules on procedures;
The authority granted to the PED under Section 1(b), (e), and (f), Rule II of the
PED Rules of Practice and Procedure, need not comply with Section 12, Chapter 3, Rule
VII of the Administrative Code, which affects only the adjudicatory functions of
administrative bodies. Thus, the PED would still be able to investigate the respondents
under its rules for their alleged failure to disclose their negotiations with GHB and the
transactions entered into by its directors involving IRC shares.
This is not to say that administrative bodies performing adjudicative functions are
required to strictly comply with the requirements of Chapter 3, Rule VII of the
Administrative Code, particularly, the right to cross-examination. It should be noted that
under Section 2.2 of Executive Order No. 26, issued on 7 October 1992, abbreviated
proceedings are prescribed in the disposition of administrative cases:
2. Abbreviation of Proceedings. All administrative agencies are hereby directed to

adopt and include in their respective Rules of Procedure the following provisions:
xxxx
2.2 Rules adopting, unless otherwise provided by special laws and without
prejudice to Section 12, Chapter 3, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987, the
mandatory use of affidavits in lieu of direct testimonies and the preferred use of
depositions whenever practicable and convenient.
As a consequence, in proceedings before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies,
such as the National Labor Relations Commission and the Philippine Overseas
Employment Agency, created under laws which authorize summary proceedings,
decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers or other documentary
evidence only. They are not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence. [59] In
fact, the hearings before such agencies do not connote full adversarial proceedings.
[60]
Thus, it is not necessary for the rules to require affiants to appear and testify and to
be cross-examined by the counsel of the adverse party. To require otherwise would
negate the summary nature of the administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings.
[61]
In Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v. Factoran, Jr.,[62] this
Court stated that:
[I]t is sufficient that administrative findings of fact are supported by evidence, or
negatively stated, it is sufficient that findings of fact are not shown to be unsupported
by evidence. Substantial evidence is all that is needed to support an administrative
finding of fact, and substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
In order to comply with the requirements of due process, what is required,
among other things, is that every litigant be given reasonable opportunity to appear and
defend his right and to introduce relevant evidence in his favor. [63]
III. The Securities Regulations Code did not repeal Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised
Securities Act since said provisions were reenacted in the new law.
The Securities Regulations Code absolutely repealed the Revised Securities Act. While
the absolute repeal of a law generally deprives a court of its authority to penalize the
person charged with the violation of the old law prior to its appeal, an exception to this
rule comes about when the repealing law punishes the act previously penalized under
the old law. The Court, in Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, sets down the rules in such
instances:[64]
As a rule, an absolute repeal of a penal law has the effect of depriving the court
of its authority to punish a person charged with violation of the old law prior to its
repeal. This is because an unqualified repeal of a penal law constitutes a legislative act
of rendering legal what had been previously declared as illegal, such that the offense no
longer exists and it is as if the person who committed it never did so. There are,
however, exceptions to the rule. One is the inclusion of a saving clause in the repealing
statute that provides that the repeal shall have no effect on pending actions. Another
exception is where the repealing act reenacts the former statute and punishes the act
previously penalized under the old law. In such instance, the act committed before the
reenactment continues to be an offense in the statute books and pending cases are not
affected, regardless of whether the new penalty to be imposed is more favorable to the
accused. (Emphasis provided.)
In the present case, a criminal case may still be filed against the respondents
despite the repeal, since Sections 8, [65] 12,[66] 26,[67] 27[68] and 23[69] of the Securities
Regulations Code impose duties that are substantially similar to Sections 8, 30 and 36 of
the repealed Revised Securities Act.
Section 8 of the Revised Securities Act, which previously provided for the registration of
securities and the information that needs to be included in the registration statements,
was expanded under Section 12, in connection with Section 8 of the Securities
Regulations Code. Further details of the information required to be disclosed by the
registrant are explained in the Amended Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
Securities Regulations Code, issued on 30 December 2003, particularly Sections 8 and 12
thereof.
Section 30 of the Revised Securities Act has been reenacted as Section 27 of the
Securities Regulations Code, still penalizing an insider's misuse of material and non-
public information about the issuer, for the purpose of protecting public investors.
Section 26 of the Securities Regulations Code even widens the coverage of punishable
acts, which intend to defraud public investors through various devices, misinformation
and omissions.
Section 23 of the Securities Regulations Code was practically lifted from Section 36(a) of
the Revised Securities Act. Both provisions impose upon (1) a beneficial owner of more
than ten percent of any class of any equity security or (2) a director or any officer of the
issuer of such security, the obligation to submit a statement indicating his or her
ownership of the issuer's securities and such changes in his or her ownership thereof.
Clearly, the legislature had not intended to deprive the courts of their authority to
punish a person charged with violation of the old law that was repealed; in this case, the
IV. The SEC retained the jurisdiction to investigate violations of the Revised Securities
Act,
reenacted in the Securities Regulations Code, despite the abolition of the PED.
Section 53 of the Securities Regulations Code clearly provides that criminal complaints
for violations of rules and regulations enforced or administered by the SEC shall be
referred to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for preliminary investigation, while the SEC
nevertheless retains limited investigatory powers. [70] Additionally, the SEC may still
impose the appropriate administrative sanctions under Section 54 of the
aforementioned law.[71]
In Morato v. Court of Appeals,[72] the cases therein were still pending before the PED for
investigation and the SEC for resolution when the Securities Regulations Code was
enacted. The case before the SEC involved an intra-corporate dispute, while the subject
matter of the other case investigated by the PED involved the schemes, devices, and
violations of pertinent rules and laws of the company's board of directors. The
enactment of the Securities Regulations Code did not result in the dismissal of the cases;
rather, this Court ordered the transfer of one case to the proper regional trial court and
the SEC to continue with the investigation of the other case.
The case at bar is comparable to the aforecited case. In this case, the SEC already
commenced the investigative proceedings against respondents as early as 1994.
Respondents were called to appear before the SEC and explain their failure to disclose
pertinent information on 14 August 1994. Thereafter, the SEC Chairman, having already
made initial findings that respondents failed to make timely disclosures of their
negotiations with GHB, ordered a special investigating panel to hear the case. The
investigative proceedings were interrupted only by the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the Court of Appeals, which became permanent by virtue of the Decision,
dated 20 August 1998, in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 37036. During the pendency of this case, the
Securities Regulations Code repealed the Revised Securities Act. As in Morato v. Court
of Appeals, the repeal cannot deprive SEC of its jurisdiction to continue investigating the
case; or the regional trial court, to hear any case which may later be filed against the
respondents.
V. The instant case has not yet prescribed.

Respondents have taken the position that this case is moot and academic, since any
criminal complaint that may be filed against them resulting from the SEC's investigation
of this case has already prescribed.[73] They point out that the prescription period
applicable to offenses punished under special laws, such as violations of the Revised
Securities Act, is twelve years under Section 1 of Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No.
3585 and Act No. 3763, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for
Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When
Prescription Shall Begin to Act." [74] Since the offense was committed in 1994, they
reasoned that prescription set in as early as 2006 and rendered this case moot. Such
position, however, is incongruent with the factual circumstances of this case, as well as
the applicable laws and jurisprudence.
It is an established doctrine that a preliminary investigation interrupts the prescription

period.[75] A preliminary investigation is essentially a determination whether an offense
has been committed, and whether there is probable cause for the accused to have
committed an offense:
A preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it is often the only means
of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the
fiscal to prepare the complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits
and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed or
whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. [76]
Under Section 45 of the Revised Securities Act, which is entitled Investigations,
Injunctions and Prosecution of Offenses, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) has
the authority to "make such investigations as it deems necessary to determine whether
any person has violated or is about to violate any provision of this Act XXX." After a
finding that a person has violated the Revised Securities Act, the SEC may refer the case
to the DOJ for preliminary investigation and prosecution.
While the SEC investigation serves the same purpose and entails substantially similar
duties as the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ, this process cannot simply
be disregarded. In Baviera v. Paglinawan,[77] this Court enunciated that a criminal
complaint is first filed with the SEC, which determines the existence of probable cause,
before a preliminary investigation can be commenced by the DOJ. In the aforecited
case, the complaint filed directly with the DOJ was dismissed on the ground that it
should have been filed first with the SEC. Similarly, the offense was a violation of the
Securities Regulations Code, wherein the procedure for criminal prosecution was
reproduced from Section 45 of the Revised Securities Act. [78] This Court affirmed the
dismissal, which it explained thus:
The Court of Appeals held that under the above provision, a criminal complaint
for violation of any law or rule administered by the SEC must first be filed with the
latter. If the Commission finds that there is probable cause, then it should refer the case
to the DOJ. Since petitioner failed to comply with the foregoing procedural requirement,
the DOJ did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing his complaint in I.S. No. 2004-
229.
A criminal charge for violation of the Securities Regulation Code is a specialized dispute.
Hence, it must first be referred to an administrative agency of special competence, i.e.,
the SEC. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts will not determine a
controversy involving a question within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal,
where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring
the specialized knowledge and expertise of said administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact. The Securities Regulation Code is a special law. Its
enforcement is particularly vested in the SEC. Hence, all complaints for any violation of
the Code and its implementing rules and regulations should be filed with the SEC.
Where the complaint is criminal in nature, the SEC shall indorse the complaint to the
DOJ for preliminary investigation and prosecution as provided in Section 53.1 earlier
quoted.
We thus agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner committed a fatal procedural
lapse when he filed his criminal complaint directly with the DOJ. Verily, no grave abuse
of discretion can be ascribed to the DOJ in dismissing petitioner's complaint.
The said case puts in perspective the nature of the investigation undertaken by
the SEC, which is a requisite before a criminal case may be referred to the DOJ. The
Court declared that it is imperative that the criminal prosecution be initiated before the
SEC, the administrative agency with the special competence.
It should be noted that the SEC started investigative proceedings against the
respondents as early as 1994. This investigation effectively interrupted the prescription
period. However, said proceedings were disrupted by a preliminary injunction issued by
the Court of Appeals on 5 May 1995, which effectively enjoined the SEC from filing any
criminal, civil, or administrative case against the respondents herein. [79] Thereafter, on
20 August 1998, the appellate court issued the assailed Decision in C.A. G.R. SP. No.
37036 ordering that the writ of injunction be made permanent and prohibiting the SEC
from taking cognizance of and initiating any action against herein respondents. The SEC
was bound to comply with the aforementioned writ of preliminary injunction and writ of
injunction issued by the Court of Appeals enjoining it from continuing with the
investigation of respondents for 12 years. Any deviation by the SEC from the injunctive
writs would be sufficient ground for contempt. Moreover, any step the SEC takes in
defiance of such orders will be considered void for having been taken against an order
issued by a court of competent jurisdiction.
An investigation of the case by any other administrative or judicial body would likewise
be impossible pending the injunctive writs issued by the Court of Appeals. Given the
ruling of this Court in Baviera v. Paglinawan,[80] the DOJ itself could not have taken
cognizance of the case and conducted its preliminary investigation without a prior
determination of probable cause by the SEC. Thus, even presuming that the DOJ was
not enjoined by the Court of Appeals from conducting a preliminary investigation, any
preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ would have been a futile effort since the
SEC had only started with its investigation when respondents themselves applied for
and were granted an injunction by the Court of Appeals.
Moreover, the DOJ could not have conducted a preliminary investigation or filed a
criminal case against the respondents during the time that issues on the effectivity of
Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act and the PED Rules of Practice and
Procedure were still pending before the Court of Appeals. After the Court of Appeals
declared the aforementioned statutory and regulatory provisions invalid and, thus, no
civil, criminal or administrative case may be filed against the respondents for violations
thereof, the DOJ would have been at a loss, as there was no statutory provision which
respondents could be accused of violating.
Accordingly, it is only after this Court corrects the erroneous ruling of the Court of
Appeals in its Decision dated 20 August 1998 that either the SEC or DOJ may properly
conduct any kind of investigation against the respondents for violations of Sections 8, 30
and 36 of the Revised Securities Act. Until then, the prescription period is deemed
interrupted.
To reiterate, the SEC must first conduct its investigations and make a finding of probable
cause in accordance with the doctrine pronounced in Baviera v. Paglinawan.[81] In this
case, the DOJ was precluded from initiating a preliminary investigation since the SEC
was halted by the Court of Appeals from continuing with its investigation. Such a
situation leaves the prosecution of the case at a standstill, and neither the SEC nor the
DOJ can conduct any investigation against the respondents, who, in the first place,
sought the injunction to prevent their prosecution. All that the SEC could do in order to
break the impasse was to have the Decision of the Court of Appeals overturned, as it
had done at the earliest opportunity in this case. Therefore, the period during which
the SEC was prevented from continuing with its investigation should not be counted
against it. The law on the prescription period was never intended to put the prosecuting
bodies in an impossible bind in which the prosecution of a case would be placed way
beyond their control; for even if they avail themselves of the proper remedy, they would
still be barred from investigating and prosecuting the case.
Indubitably, the prescription period is interrupted by commencing the proceedings for

the prosecution of the accused. In criminal cases, this is accomplished by initiating the
preliminary investigation. The prosecution of offenses punishable under the Revised
Securities Act and the Securities Regulations Code is initiated by the filing of a complaint
with the SEC or by an investigation conducted by the SEC motu proprio. Only after a
finding of probable cause is made by the SEC can the DOJ instigate a preliminary
investigation. Thus, the investigation that was commenced by the SEC in 1995, soon
after it discovered the questionable acts of the respondents, effectively interrupted the
prescription period. Given the nature and purpose of the investigation conducted by
the SEC, which is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in
criminal cases, such investigation would surely interrupt the prescription period.
VI. The Court of Appeals was justified in denying SEC's Motion for Leave to Quash SEC
Omnibus Orders dated 23 October 1995
The SEC avers that the Court of Appeals erred when it denied its Motion for Leave to
Quash SEC Omnibus Orders, dated 23 October 1995, in the light of its admission that the
PED had the sole authority to investigate the present case. On this matter, this Court
cannot agree with the SEC.
In the assailed decision, the Court of Appeals denied the SEC's Motion for Leave to
Quash SEC Omnibus Orders, since it found other issues that were more important than
whether or not the PED was the proper body to investigate the matter. Its refusal was
premised on its earlier finding that no criminal, civil, or administrative case may be filed
against the respondents under Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, due
to the absence of any implementing rules and regulations. Moreover, the validity of the
PED Rules on Practice and Procedure was also raised as an issue. The Court of Appeals,
thus, reasoned that if the quashal of the orders was granted, then it would be deprived
of the opportunity to determine the validity of the aforementioned rules and statutory
provisions. In addition, the SEC would merely pursue the same case without the Court of
Appeals having determined whether or not it may do so in accordance with due process
requirements. Absent a determination of whether the SEC may file a case against the
respondents based on the assailed provisions of the Revised Securities Act, it would
have been improper for the Court of Appeals to grant the SEC's Motion for Leave to
Quash SEC Omnibus Orders.
In all, this Court rules that no implementing rules were needed to render effective
Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act; nor was the PED Rules of Practice
and Procedure invalid, prior to the enactment of the Securities Regulations Code, for
failure to provide parties with the right to cross-examine the witnesses presented
against them. Thus, the respondents may be investigated by the appropriate authority
under the proper rules of procedure of the Securities Regulations Code for violations of
Sections 8, 30, and 36 of the Revised Securities Act. [82]
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is GRANTED. This Court

hereby REVERSES the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 20
August 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 37036 and LIFTS the permanent injunction issued
pursuant thereto. This Court further DECLARES that the investigation of the
respondents for violations of Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act may be
undertaken by the proper authorities in accordance with the Securities Regulations
Code. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 152662, June 13, 2012 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. MA. THERESA
PANGILINAN, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed this petition for certiorari [1] under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, praying for
the nullification and setting aside of the Decision [2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 66936, entitled “Ma. Theresa Pangilinan vs. People of the Philippines and
Private Complainant Virginia C. Malolos.”
The fallo of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision

of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 218, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153 against petitioner Ma. Theresa Pangilinan are
hereby ordered DISMISSED.[3]
Culled from the record are the following undisputed facts:
On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos (private complainant) filed an affidavit-

complaint for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 against Ma. Theresa
Pangilinan (respondent) with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The
complaint alleges that respondent issued nine (9) checks with an aggregate amount of
Nine Million Six Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos
(P9,658,592.00) in favor of private complainant which were dishonored upon
presentment for payment.
On 5 December 1997, respondent filed a civil case for accounting, recovery of

commercial documents, enforceability and effectivity of contract and specific
performance against private complainant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Valenzuela City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1429-V-97.
Five days thereafter or on 10 December 1997, respondent filed a “Petition to Suspend

Proceedings on the Ground of Prejudicial Question” before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City, citing as basis the pendency of the civil action she filed with
the RTC of Valenzuela City.
On 2 March 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay recommended the

suspension of the criminal proceedings pending the outcome of the civil action
respondent filed against private complainant with the RTC of Valenzuela City. The
recommendation was approved by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
Aggrieved, private complainant raised the matter before the Department of Justice
(DOJ).
On 5 January 1999, then Secretary of Justice Serafin P. Cuevas reversed the resolution of
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and ordered the filing of informations for violation of
BP Blg. 22 against respondent in connection with her issuance of City Trust Check No.
127219 in the amount of P4,129,400.00 and RCBC Check No. 423773 in the amount of
P4,475,000.00, both checks totaling the amount of P8,604,000.00. The estafa and
violation of BP Blg. 22 charges involving the seven other checks included in the affidavit-
complaint filed on 16 September 1997 were, however, dismissed.
Consequently, two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, both dated 18 November 1999,
were filed against respondent Ma.Theresa Pangilinan on 3 February 2000 before the
Office of the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Quezon City. These cases
were raffled to MeTC, Branch 31on 7 June 2000.
On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an “Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and
to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest” before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City. She
alleged that her criminal liability has been extinguished by reason of prescription.
The presiding judge of MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City granted the motion in an Order
dated 5 October 2000.
On 26 October 2000, private complainant filed a notice of appeal. The criminal cases
were raffled to RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City.
In a Decision dated 27 July 2001, the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City
reversed the 5 October 2000 Order of the MeTC. The pertinent portion of the decision
reads:
xxx Inasmuch as the informations in this case were filed on 03 February 2000
with the Clerk of Court although received by the Court itself only on 07 June 2000, they
are covered by the Rule as it was worded before the latest amendment. The criminal
action on two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, had, therefore, not yet prescribed when
the same was filed with the court a quo considering the appropriate complaint that
started the proceedings having been filed with the Office of the Prosecutor on 16
September 1997 yet.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Order dated 05 October 2000 is hereby REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. The Court a quo is hereby directed to proceed with the hearing of Criminal Cases
Nos. 89152 and 89153.[4]
Dissatisfied with the RTC Decision, respondent filed with the Supreme Court a petition
for review[5] on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This was docketed as G.R.
Nos. 149486-87.
In a resolution[6] dated 24 September 2000, this Court referred the petition to the CA for
appropriate action.
On 26 October 2001, the CA gave due course to the petition by requiring respondent
and private complainant to comment on the petition.
In a Decision dated 12 March 2002, the CA reversed the 27 July 2001 Decision of RTC,
Branch 218, Quezon City, thereby dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 89152 and 89153 for
the reason that the cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 had already prescribed.
In reversing the RTC Decision, the appellate court ratiocinated that:

xxx this Court reckons the commencement of the period of prescription for
violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 imputed to [respondent] sometime in the latter
part of 1995, as it was within this period that the [respondent] was notified by the
private [complainant] of the fact of dishonor of the subject checks and, the five (5) days
grace period granted by law had elapsed. The private respondent then had, pursuant to
Section 1 of Act 3326, as amended, four years therefrom or until the latter part of 1999
to file her complaint or information against the petitioner before the proper court.
The informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89152(sic) against the
petitioner having been filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City only on 03
February 2000, the said cases had therefore, clearly prescribed.
xxx
Pursuant to Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, prescription shall be interrupted when

proceedings are instituted against the guilty person.
In the case of Zaldivia vs. Reyes [7] the Supreme Court held that the proceedings referred
to in Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, are ‘judicial proceedings’, which means the
filing of the complaint or information with the proper court. Otherwise stated, the
running of the prescriptive period shall be stayed on the date the case is actually filed in
court and not on any date before that, which is in consonance with Section 2 of Act
3326, as amended.
While the aforesaid case involved a violation of a municipal ordinance, this Court,
considering that Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, governs the computation of the
prescriptive period of both ordinances and special laws, finds that the ruling of the
Supreme Court in Zaldivia v. Reyes[8] likewise applies to special laws, such as Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22.[9]
The OSG sought relief to this Court in the instant petition for review. According to the
OSG, while it admits that Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3585 and further
amended by Act No. 3763 dated 23 November 1930, governs the period of prescription
for violations of special laws, it is the institution of criminal actions, whether filed with
the court or with the Office of the City Prosecutor, that interrupts the period of
prescription of the offense charged. [10] It submits that the filing of the complaint-affidavit
by private complainant Virginia C. Malolos on 16 September 1997 with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City effectively interrupted the running of the prescriptive
period of the subject BP Blg. 22 cases.
Petitioner further submits that the CA erred in its decision when it relied on the doctrine
laid down by this Court in the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.[11] that the filing of the
complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor is not the “judicial proceeding” that
could have interrupted the period of prescription. In relying on Zaldivia,[12] the CA
allegedly failed to consider the subsequent jurisprudence superseding the aforesaid
ruling.
Petitioner contends that in a catena of cases, [13] the Supreme Court ruled that the filing
of a complaint with the Fiscal’s Office for preliminary investigation suspends the running
of the prescriptive period. It therefore concluded that the filing of the informations with
the MeTC of Quezon City on 3 February 2000 was still within the allowable period of
four years within which to file the criminal cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 in accordance
with Act No. 3326, as amended.
In her comment-opposition dated 26 July 2002, respondent avers that the petition of
the OSG should be dismissed outright for its failure to comply with the mandatory
requirements on the submission of a certified true copy of the decision of the CA and
the required proof of service. Such procedural lapses are allegedly fatal to the cause of
the petitioner.
Respondent reiterates the ruling of the CA that the filing of the complaint before the
City Prosecutor’s Office did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period
considering that the offense charged is a violation of a special law.
Respondent contends that the arguments advanced by petitioner are anchored on

erroneous premises. She claims that the cases relied upon by petitioner involved
felonies punishable under the Revised Penal Code and are therefore covered by Article
91 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) [14] and Section 1, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure.[15] Respondent pointed out that the crime imputed against her is for
violation of BP Blg. 22, which is indisputably a special law and as such, is governed by
Act No. 3326, as amended. She submits that a distinction should thus be made between
offenses covered by municipal ordinances or special laws, as in this case, and offenses
covered by the RPC.
The key issue raised in this petition is whether the filing of the affidavit-complaint for
estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16 September 1997 interrupted the period of prescription
of such offense.
We find merit in this petition.
Initially, we see that the respondent’s claim that the OSG failed to attach to the petition
a duplicate original or certified true copy of the 12 March 2002 decision of the CA and
the required proof of service is refuted by the record. A perusal of the record reveals
that attached to the original copy of the petition is a certified true copy of the CA
decision. It was also observed that annexed to the petition was the proof of service
undertaken by the Docket Division of the OSG.
With regard to the main issue of the petition, we find that the CA reversively erred in
ruling that the offense committed by respondent had already prescribed. Indeed, Act
No. 3326 entitled “An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and
Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin,” as amended, is the
law applicable to BP Blg. 22 cases. Appositely, the law reads:
SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in

such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) xxx; (b) after four years
for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years;
(c) xxx.
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than
thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefor
prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the aforecited law. The running of the
prescriptive period, however, should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings
against the guilty person.
In the old but oft-cited case of People v. Olarte,[16] this Court ruled that the filing of the
complaint in the Municipal Court even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary
examination or investigation, should, and thus, interrupt the period of prescription of
the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed
cannot try the case on the merits. This ruling was broadened by the Court in the case
of Francisco, et.al. v. Court of Appeals, et. al. [17] when it held that the filing of the
complaint with the Fiscal’s Office also suspends the running of the prescriptive period of
a criminal offense.
Respondent’s contention that a different rule should be applied to cases involving

special laws is bereft of merit. There is no more distinction between cases under the RPC
and those covered by special laws with respect to the interruption of the period of
prescription. The ruling in Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.[18] is not controlling in special laws.
In Llenes v. Dicdican,[19] Ingco, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, [20] Brillante v. CA,[21] and Sanrio
Company Limited v. Lim,[22] cases involving special laws, this Court held that the
institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused interrupts
the period of prescription. In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources
Corporation, et. al.,[23] the Court even ruled that investigations conducted by the
Securities and Exchange Commission for violations of the Revised Securities Act and the
Securities Regulations Code effectively interrupts the prescription period because it is
equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases.
In fact, in the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice,[24] which is in all fours with
the instant case, this Court categorically ruled that commencement of the proceedings
for the prosecution of the accused before the Office of the City Prosecutor effectively
interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under BP
Blg. 22. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively
pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply
because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused’s delaying tactics or the
delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.
We follow the factual finding of the CA that “sometime in the latter part of 1995” is the
reckoning date of the commencement of presumption for violations of BP Blg. 22, such
being the period within which herein respondent was notified by private complainant of
the fact of dishonor of the checks and the five-day grace period granted by law elapsed.
The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against respondent on 16

September 1997. The cases reached the MeTC of Quezon City only on 13 February 2000
because in the meanwhile, respondent filed a civil case for accounting followed by a
petition before the City Prosecutor for suspension of proceedings on the ground of
“prejudicial question”. The matter was raised before the Secretary of Justice after the
City Prosecutor approved the petition to suspend proceedings. It was only after the
Secretary of Justice so ordered that the informations for the violation of BP Blg. 22 were
filed with the MeTC of Quezon City.
Clearly, it was respondent’s own motion for the suspension of the criminal proceedings,
which motion she predicated on her civil case for accounting, that caused the filing in
court of the 1997 initiated proceedings only in 2000.
As laid down in Olarte,[25] it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain
vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. The only thing the
offended must do to initiate the prosecution of the offender is to file the requisite
complaint.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The 12 March 2002
Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Department of
Justice is ORDERED to re-file the informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against the
respondent.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. Nos. 169823-24, September 11, 2013 ]
HERMINIO T. DISINI, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN,
FIRST DIVISION, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. Nos. 174764-65]
HERMINIO T. DISINI, PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST

DIVISION, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction over the criminal action involving
petitioner notwithstanding that he is a private individual considering that his criminal
prosecution is intimately related to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their
immediate family, subordinates and close associates.
The Case
Petitioner Herminio T. Disini assails via petition for certiorari the resolutions

promulgated by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No.
28002, both entitled People v. Herminio T. Disini, on January 17, 2005 (denying his
motion to quash the informations)[1] and August 10, 2005 (denying his motion for
reconsideration of the denial of his motion to quash),[2] alleging that the Sandiganbayan
(First Division) thereby committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.
Antecedents
The Office of the Ombudsman filed two informations dated June 30, 2004 charging
Disini in the Sandiganbayan with corruption of public officials, penalized under Article
212 in relation to Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code (Criminal Case No. 28001), and
with a violation of Section 4(a) of Republic Act 3019 (R.A. No. 3019), also known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Criminal Case No. 28002).
The accusatory portions of the informations read as follows:

Criminal Case No. 28001
That during the period from 1974 to February 1986, in Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused HERMINIO T. DISINI, conspiring
together and confederating with the then President of the Philippines Ferdinand E.
Marcos, did then and there, wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously offer, promise and
give gifts and presents to said Ferdinand E. Marcos, consisting of accused DISINI’s
ownership of two billion and five hundred (2.5 billion) shares of stock in Vulcan
Industrial and Mining Corporation and four billion (4 billion) shares of stock in The
Energy Corporation, with both shares of stock having then a book value of P100.00 per
share of stock, and subcontracts, to Engineering and Construction Company of Asia,
owned and controlled by said Ferdinand E. Marcos, on the mechanical and electrical
construction work on the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant Project (“Project”) of the
National Power Corporation at Morong, Bataan, all for and in consideration of accused
Disini seeking and obtaining for Burns and Roe and Westinghouse Electrical Corporation
(Westinghouse), the contracts to do the engineering and architectural design and to
construct, respectively, the Project, as in fact said Ferdinand E. Marcos, taking undue
advantage of his position and committing the offense in relation to his office and in
consideration of the aforesaid gifts and presents, did award or cause to be awarded to said
Burns and Roe and Westinghouse, the contracts to do the engineering and architectural
design and to construct the Project, respectively, which acts constitute the crime
of corruption of public officials.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
That during the period 1974 to February 1986, in Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, accused HERMINIO T. DISINI, conspiring together
and confederating with the then President of the Philippines, Ferdinand E. Marcos, being
then the close personal friend and golfing partner of said Ferdinand E. Marcos, and being
further the husband of Paciencia Escolin-Disini who was the first cousin of then First
Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos and family physician of the Marcos family, taking
advantage of such close personal relation, intimacy and free access, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and criminally, in connection with the Philippine Nuclear Power
Plant (PNPP) Project (“PROJECT”) of the National Power Corporation (NPC) at
Morong, Bataan, request and receive from Burns and Roe, a foreign consultant, the total
amount of One Million U.S. Dollars ($1,000,000.00), more or less, and also from
Westinghouse Electric Corporation (WESTINGHOUSE), the total amount of Seventeen
Million U.S. Dollars ($17,000,000.00), more or less, both of which entities were then
having business, transaction, and application with the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, all for and in consideration of accused DISINI securing and obtaining, as
accused Disini did secure and obtain, the contract for the said Burns and Roe and
Westinghouse to do the engineering and architectural design, and construct, respectively,
the said PROJECT, and subsequently, request and receive subcontracts for Power
Contractors, Inc. owned by accused DISINI, and Engineering and Construction Company
of Asia (ECCO-Asia), owned and controlled by said Ferdinand E. Marcos, which stated
amounts and subcontracts constituted kickbacks, commissions and gifts as material or
pecuniary advantages, for securing and obtaining, as accused DISINI did secure and
obtain, through the direct intervention of said Ferdinand E. Marcos, for Burns and Roe
the engineering and architectural contract, and for Westinghouse the construction
contract, for the PROJECT.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
On August 2, 2004, Disini filed a motion to quash,[5] alleging that the criminal actions had
been extinguished by prescription, and that the informations did not conform to the
prescribed form. The Prosecution opposed the motion to quash.[6]
On September 16, 2004, Disini voluntarily submitted himself for arraignment to obtain
the Sandiganbayan’s favorable action on his motion for permission to travel abroad. [7] He
then entered a plea of not guilty to both informations.
As stated, on January 17, 2005, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated its first
assailed resolution denying the motion to quash.[8]
Disini moved for the reconsideration of the resolution dated January 17, 2005,[9] but the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied his motion on August 10, 2005 through the second
assailed resolution.[10]
Issues
Undaunted, Disini commenced this special civil action for certiorari, alleging that:
A. THE RESPONDENT COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE

OFFENSES CHARGED.
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED

THAT SECTION 4, PARAGRAPHS (A) AND (B) OF REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 8249 DO NOT APPLY SINCE THE INFORMATIONS WERE
“FILED PURSUANT TO E.O. NOS. 1, 2, 14 AND 14-A”.
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT ASSUMED

JURISDICTION WITHOUT HAVING MET THE REQUISITE UNDER
SECTION 4 OF R.A. 8249 THAT THE ACCUSED MUST BE A PUBLIC
OFFICER.
B. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH SUCH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT EFFECTIVELY IGNORED, DISREGARDED, AND
DENIED PETITIONER’S CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHT TO
PRESCRIPTION.
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DETERMINING

THE APPLICABLE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.

THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.

THE POINT OF INTERRUPTION OF THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.
C. BY MERELY ASSUMING THE PRESENCE OF GLARINGLY ABSENT

ELEMENTS IN THE OFFENSES CHARGED TO UPHOLD THE
‘SUFFICIENCY’ OF THE INFORMATIONS IN CRIMINAL CASE NOS. 28001
AND 28002, THE RESPONDENT COURT DEMONSTRATED ITS
PREJUDGMENT OVER THE SUBJECT CASES AND ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF ITS DISCRETION.
D. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO QUASH THE INFORMATIONS DESPITE
THEIR UTTER FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE PRESCRIBED FORM,
THUS EFFECTIVELY DENYING THE ACCUSED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
AND STATUTORY RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND
CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM.[11]
Ruling
The petition for certiorari has no merit.
1.
Preliminary Considerations
To properly resolve this case, reference is made to the ruling of the Court in G.R. No.
175730 entitled Herminio Disini v. Sandiganbayan,[12] which involved the civil action for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages (Civil Case No. 0013
entitled Republic v. Herminio T. Disini, et al.) filed by the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) against Disini and others.[13] The amended complaint in Civil
Case No. 0013 alleged that Disini had acted in unlawful concert with his co-defendants in
acquiring and accumulating ill-gotten wealth through the misappropriation of public
funds, plunder of the nation’s wealth, extortion, embezzlement, and other acts of
corruption,[14] as follows:
4. Defendant HERMINIO T. DISINI is a close associate of defendant Ferdinand E.
Marcos and the husband of the first cousin of Defendant Imelda R. Marcos. By reason of
this relationship x xx defendant Herminio Disini obtained staggering commissions from
the Westinghouse in exchange for securing the nuclear power plant contract from the
Philippine government.
xxxx
13. Defendants Herminio T. Disini and Rodolfo Jacob, by themselves and/or in unlawful
concert, active collaboration and willing participation of defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos
and Imelda R. Marcos, and taking undue advantage of their association and influence
with the latter defendant spouses in order to prevent disclosure and recovery of ill-gotten
assets, engaged in devices, schemes, and stratagems such as:
xxxx
(c) unlawfully utilizing the Herdis Group of Companies and Asia Industries, Inc. as
conduits through which defendants received, kept, and/or invested improper payments
such as unconscionably large commissions from foreign corporations like the
Westinghouse Corporation;
(d) secured special concessions, privileges and/or benefits from defendants Ferdinand E.
Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, such as a contract awarded to Westinghouse Corporation
which built an inoperable nuclear facility in the country for a scandalously exorbitant
amount that included defendant’s staggering commissions – defendant Rodolfo Jacob
executed for HGI the contract for the aforesaid nuclear plant;[15]
Through its letter dated April 8, 1991,[16] the PCGG transmitted the records of Criminal
Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 to then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez
for appropriate action, to wit:
In line with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr.
versus the PCGG (G.R. Nos. 92319–92320) dated October 2, 1990, we are hereby
transmitting to your Office for appropriate action the records of the attached criminal case
which we believe is similar to the said Cojuangco case in certain aspects, such as: (i)
some parts or elements are also parts of the causes of action in the civil complaints[-]
filed with the Sandiganbayan; (ii) some properties or assets of the respondents have been
sequestered; (iii) some of the respondents are also party defendants in the civil cases.
Although the authority of the PCGG has been upheld by the Supreme Court, we are
constrained to refer to you for proper action the herein-attached case in view of the
suspicion that the PCGG cannot conduct an impartial investigation in cases similar to that
of the Cojuangco case. x x x
Ostensibly, the PCGG’s letter of transmittal was adverting to the ruling in Cojuangco, Jr.
v. Presidential Commission on Good Government (Cojuangco, Jr.),[17] viz:
x x x [T]he PCGG and the Solicitor General finding a prima facie basis filed a civil
complaint against petitioner and intervenors alleging substantially the same illegal or
criminal acts subject of the subsequent criminal complaints the Solicitor General filed
with the PCGG for preliminary investigation. x x x.
Moreover, when the PCGG issued the sequestration and freeze orders against petitioner’s
properties, it was on the basis of a prima facie finding that the same were ill-gotten
and/or were acquired in relation to the illegal disposition of coconut levy funds. Thus,
the Court finds that the PCGG cannot possibly conduct the preliminary
investigation of said criminal complaints with the “cold neutrality of an impartial
judge,”as it has prejudged the matter. x x x[18]
xxxx
The Court finds that under the circumstances of the case, the PCGG cannot inspire
belief that it could be impartial in the conduct of the preliminary investigation of the
aforesaid complaints against petitioner and intervenors. It cannot possibly preside
in the said preliminary investigation with an even hand.
The Court holds that a just and fair administration of justice can be promoted if the
PCGG would be prohibited from conducting the preliminary investigation of the
complaints subject of this petition and the petition for intervention and that the
records of the same should be forwarded to the Ombudsman, who as an
independent constitutional officer has primary jurisdiction over cases of this nature,
to conduct such preliminary investigation and take appropriate action.[19] (Bold
emphasis supplied)
It appears that the resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman, following its conduct of
the preliminary investigation on the criminal complaints thus transmitted by the PCGG,
were reversed and set aside by the Court in Presidential Commission on Good
Government v. Desierto,[20] with the Court requiring the Office of the Ombudsman to file
the informations that became the subject of Disini’s motion to quash in Criminal Case
No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002.
2.
Sandiganbayan has exclusive and original jurisdiction over the offenses charged
Disini challenges the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the offenses charged in
Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002. He contends that: (1) the
informations did not allege that the charges were being filed pursuant to and in
connection with Executive Order (E.O.) Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A; (2) the offenses charged
were not of the nature contemplated by E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A because the
allegations in the informations neither pertained to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, nor
involved sequestration cases; (3) the cases were filed by the Office of the Ombudsman
instead of by the PCGG; and (4) being a private individual not charged as a co-principal,
accomplice or accessory of a public officer, he should be prosecuted in the regular courts
instead of in the Sandiganbayan.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the offenses charged because Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal
Case No. 28002 were filed within the purview of Section 4(c) of R.A. No. 8249; and that
both cases stemmed from the criminal complaints initially filed by the PCGG pursuant to
its mandate under E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A to investigate and file the appropriate civil
or criminal cases to recover ill-gotten wealth not only of the Marcoses and their
immediately family but also of their relatives, subordinates and close associates.
We hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 28001 and
Criminal Case No. 28002.
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 was the law that established the Sandiganbayan and
defined its jurisdiction. The law was amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249.
Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan was vested with original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
xxxx
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed
by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in
relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. (Bold emphasis supplied)
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade
‘27’ or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military or PNP
officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court and municipal
circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided
in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
xxxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with
the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees
in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
xxxx
It is underscored that it was the PCGG that had initially filed the criminal complaints in
the Sandiganbayan, with the Office of the Ombudsman taking over the investigation of
Disini only after the Court issued in Cojuangco, Jr. the directive to the PCGG to refer the
criminal cases to the Office of the Ombudsman on the ground that the PCGG would not
be an impartial office following its finding of a prima facie case being established against
Disini to sustain the institution of Civil Case No. 0013.
Also underscored is that the complaint in Civil Case No. 0013 and the informations in
Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 involved the same transaction,
specifically the contracts awarded through the intervention of Disini and President
Marcos in favor of Burns & Roe to do the engineering and architectural design, and
Westinghouse to do the construction of the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant Project
(PNPPP). Given their sameness in subject matter, to still expressly aver in Criminal Case
No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 that the charges involved the recovery of ill-
gotten wealth was no longer necessary.[21] With Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal
Case No. 28002 being intertwined with Civil Case No. 0013, the PCGG had the authority
to institute the criminal prosecutions against Disini pursuant to E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-
A.
That Disini was a private individual did not remove the offenses charged from the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Section 2 of E.O. No. 1, which tasked the PCGG with
assisting the President in “[t]he recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or
sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during
his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their
public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship,”
expressly granted the authority of the PCGG to recover ill-gotten wealth covered
President Marcos’ immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, without
distinction as to their private or public status.
Contrary to Disini’s argument, too, the qualifying clause found in Section 4 of R.A. No.
8249[22] applied only to the cases listed in Subsection 4a and Subsection 4b of R.A. No.
8249, the full text of which follows:
xxxx
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and

provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors engineers and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial
director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in
the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -controlled

corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade ‘27’ and up under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the

provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed

by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in
relation to their office. (bold emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Unquestionably, public officials occupying positions classified as Grade 27 or higher are
mentioned only in Subsection 4a and Subsection 4b, signifying the plain legislative intent
of limiting the qualifying clause to such public officials. To include within the ambit of
the qualifying clause the persons covered by Subsection 4c would contravene the
exclusive mandate of the PCGG to bring the civil and criminal cases pursuant to and in
connection with E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. In view of this, the Sandiganbayan properly
took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 despite
Disini’s being a private individual, and despite the lack of any allegation of his being the
co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public official in the commission of the
offenses charged.
3.
The offenses charged in the informations have not yet prescribed
In resolving the issue of prescription, the following must be considered, namely: (1) the
period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time when the period of
prescription starts to run; and (3) the time when the prescriptive period is interrupted.[23]
The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleged that Disini had offered, promised
and given gifts and presents to Ferdinand E. Marcos; that said gifts were in consideration
of Disini obtaining for Burns & Roe and Westinghouse Electrical Corporation
(Westinghouse) the contracts, respectively, to do the engineering and architectural design
of and to construct the PNPPP; and that President Marcos did award or cause to be
awarded the respective contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse, which acts
constituted the crime of corruption of public officials.[24]
The crime of corruption of public officials charged in Criminal Case No. 28001 is

punished by Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code with the “same penalties imposed
upon the officer corrupted.”[25] Under the second paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised
Penal Code (direct bribery),[26] if the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of
the execution of an act that does not constitute a crime, and the officer executes the act,
he shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and minimum periods and a
fine of not less than three times the value of the gift. Conformably with Article 90 of
the Revised Penal Code,[27] the period of prescription for this specie of corruption of
public officials charged against Disini is 15 years.
As for Criminal Case No. 28002, Disini was charged with a violation of Section 4(a) of
R.A. No. 3019. By express provision of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended
by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, the offenses committed under R.A. No. 3019 shall
prescribe in 15 years. Prior to the amendment, the prescriptive period was only 10 years.
It became settled in People v. Pacificador,[28] however, that the longer prescriptive period
of 15 years would not apply to crimes committed prior to the effectivity of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 195, which was approved on March 16, 1982, because the longer period
could not be given retroactive effect for not being favorable to the accused. With the
information alleging the period from 1974 to February 1986 as the time of the
commission of the crime charged, the applicable prescriptive period is 10 years in order
to accord with People v. Pacificador.
For crimes punishable by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof provides that
prescription starts to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities, or their agents. As to offenses punishable by R.A. No. 3019,
Section 2 of R.A. No. 3326[29] states:
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation
of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
constituting double jeopardy.
The ruling on the issue of prescription in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee
on Behest Loans v. Desierto[30] is also enlightening, viz:
Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the crime is
committed. That an aggrieved person “entitled to an action has no knowledge of his right
to sue or of the facts out of which his right arises,” does not prevent the running of the
prescriptive period. An exception to this rule is the “blameless ignorance” doctrine,
incorporated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326. Under this doctrine, “the statute of limitations
runs only upon discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which will support a cause
of action. In other words, the courts would decline to apply the statute of limitations
where the plaintiff does not know or has no reasonable means of knowing the existence
of a cause of action.” It was in this accord that the Court confronted the question on the
running of the prescriptive period in People v. Duque which became the cornerstone of
our 1999 Decision in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto (G.R. No. 130149), and the subsequent cases which Ombudsman Desierto
dismissed, emphatically, on the ground of prescription too. Thus, we held in a catena of
cases, that if the violation of the special law was not known at the time of its commission,
the prescription begins to run only from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the
unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts.
Corollary, it is safe to conclude that the prescriptive period for the crime which is the
subject herein, commenced from the date of its discovery in 1992 after the Committee
made an exhaustive investigation. When the complaint was filed in 1997, only five years
have elapsed, and, hence, prescription has not yet set in. The rationale for this was
succinctly discussed in the 1999 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans, that “it was well-high impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known
these crimes committed prior to the 1986 EDSA Revolution, because of the alleged
connivance and conspiracy among involved public officials and the beneficiaries of the
loans.” In yet another pronouncement, in the 2001 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130817), the Court held that during
the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to question the legality of these
transactions. (Citations omitted)[31]
Accordingly, we are not persuaded to hold here that the prescriptive period began to run
from 1974, the time when the contracts for the PNPP Project were awarded to Burns &
Roe and Westinghouse. Although the criminal cases were the offshoot of the
sequestration case to recover ill-gotten wealth instead of behest loans like in Presidential
Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, the connivance and
conspiracy among the public officials involved and the beneficiaries of the favors
illegally extended rendered it similarly well-nigh impossible for the State, as the
aggrieved party, to have known of the commission of the crimes charged prior to the
EDSA Revolution in 1986. Notwithstanding the highly publicized and widely-known
nature of the PNPPP, the unlawful acts or transactions in relation to it were discovered
only through the PCGG’s exhaustive investigation, resulting in the establishment of
a prima facie case sufficient for the PCGG to institute Civil Case No. 0013 against
Disini. Before the discovery, the PNPPP contracts, which partook of a public character,
enjoyed the presumption of their execution having been regularly done in the course of
official functions.[32] Considering further that during the Marcos regime, no person would
have dared to assail the legality of the transactions, it would be unreasonable to expect
that the discovery of the unlawful transactions was possible prior to 1986.
We note, too, that the criminal complaints were filed and their records transmitted by the
PCGG to the Office of the Ombudsman on April 8, 1991 for the conduct the preliminary
investigation.[33] In accordance with Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code[34] and the
ruling in Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice,[35] the filing of the criminal complaints
in the Office of the Ombudsman effectively interrupted the running of the period of
prescription. According to Panaguiton:[36]
In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, which involved
violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the
Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293), which are both special laws, the Court ruled
that the prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary
investigation against the accused. In the more recent case of Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, the Court ruled that the nature and
purpose of the investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on
violations of the Revised Securities Act, another special law, is equivalent to the
preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus effectively
interrupts the prescriptive period.
The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case is instructive, thus:

While it may be observed that the term “judicial proceedings” in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326
appears before “investigation and punishment” in the old law, with the subsequent
change in set-up whereby the investigation of the charge for purposes of prosecution has
become the exclusive function of the executive branch, the term “proceedings” should
now be understood either executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves
the investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. With
this clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty person
which may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription.
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication
on account of delays that are not under his control.
The prevailing rule is, therefore, that irrespective of whether the offense charged is
punishable by the Revised Penal Code or by a special law, it is the filing of the complaint
or information in the office of the public prosecutor for purposes of the preliminary
investigation that interrupts the period of prescription. Consequently, prescription did not
yet set in because only five years elapsed from 1986, the time of the discovery of the
offenses charged, up to April 1991, the time of the filing of the criminal complaints in the
Office of the Ombudsman.
4.
The informations were sufficient in form and substance
It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state every single fact necessary to
constitute the offense charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss or to quash on the ground
that the complaint or information charges no offense may be properly sustained. The
fundamental test in determining whether a motion to quash may be sustained based on
this ground is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, will establish the
essential elements of the offense as defined in the law.[37] Extrinsic matters or
evidence aliunde are not considered.[38] The test does not require absolute certainty as to
the presence of the elements of the offense; otherwise, there would no longer be any need
for the Prosecution to proceed to trial.
The informations in Criminal Case No. 28001 (corruption of public officials) and
Criminal Case No. 28002 (violation of Section 4(a) of RA No. 3019) have sufficiently
complied with the requirements of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint or information is
sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the
statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place
where the offense was committed.
When the offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in
the complaint or information.
The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleging corruption of public
officers specifically put forth that Disini, in the period from 1974 to February 1986 in
Manila, Philippines, conspiring and confederating with then President Marcos, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously offered, promised and gave gifts and presents to President
Marcos, who, by taking undue advantage of his position as President, committed the
offense in relation to his office, and in consideration of the gifts and presents offered,
promised and given by Disini, President Marcos caused to be awarded to Burns & Roe
and Westinghouse the respective contracts to do the engineering and architectural design
of and to construct the PNPPP. The felonious act consisted of causing the contracts for
the PNPPP to be awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse by reason of the gifts and
promises offered by Disini to President Marcos.
The elements of corruption of public officials under Article 212 of the Revised Penal

Code are:
1. That the offender makes offers or promises, or gives gifts or presents to a public
officer; and
2. That the offers or promises are made or the gifts or presents are given to a public
officer under circumstances that will make the public officer liable for direct
bribery or indirect bribery.
The allegations in the information for corruption of public officials, if hypothetically

admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime. The information stated that:
(1) Disini made an offer and promise, and gave gifts to President Marcos, a public
officer; and (2) in consideration of the offers, promises and gifts, President Marcos, in
causing the award of the contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse by taking
advantage of his position and in committing said act in relation to his office, was placed
under circumstances that would make him liable for direct bribery.[39] The second
element of corruption of public officers simply required the public officer to be placed
under circumstances, not absolute certainty, that would make him liable
for direct or indirect bribery. Thus, even without alleging that President Marcos received
or accepted Disini’s offers, promises and gifts – an essential element in direct bribery –
the allegation that President Marcos caused the award of the contracts to Burns & Roe
and Westinghouse sufficed to place him under circumstances of being liable for direct
bribery.
The sufficiency of the allegations in the information charging the violation of Section
4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 is similarly upheld. The elements of the offense under Section 4(a)
of R.A. No. 3019 are:
1. That the offender has family or close personal relation with a public official;
2. That he capitalizes or exploits or takes advantage of such family or close personal
relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift, material
or pecuniary advantage from any person having some business, transaction,
application, request, or contract with the government;
3. That the public official with whom the offender has family or close personal
relation has to intervene in the business transaction, application, request, or
contract with the government.
The allegations in the information charging the violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No.
3019, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the elements of the offense, considering
that: (1) Disini, being the husband of Paciencia Escolin-Disini, the first cousin of First
Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, and at the same time the family physician of the
Marcoses, had close personal relations and intimacy with and free access to President
Marcos, a public official; (2) Disini, taking advantage of such family and close personal
relations, requested and received $1,000,000.00 from Burns & Roe and $17,000,000.00
from Westinghouse, the entities then having business, transaction, and application with
the Government in connection with the PNPPP; (3) President Marcos, the public officer
with whom Disini had family or close personal relations, intervened to secure and obtain
for Burns & Roe the engineering and architectural contract, and for Westinghouse the
construction of the PNPPP.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for certiorari; AFFIRMS the

resolutions promulgated on January 17, 2005 and August 16, 2005 by the Sandiganbayan
(First Division) in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002;
and DIRECTS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 138596, October 12, 2000 ]
SR. FIDELIS ARAMBULO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. HILARION LAQUI, SR.
HELEN OJARIO AND SR. BERNADINE JUAREZ, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision [1] of the Court of
Appeals[2] in CA-G.R. SP No. 47089 promulgated on March 01, 1999 and the subsequent
Resolution[3] dated May 11, 1999 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts of the case, as summarized by the appellate court, are as follows:
"On February 2, 1994, private respondents filed a joint complaint-affidavit for
libel against petitioners before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City alleging
that the latter circulated on December 21, 1993 a letter containing malicious
imputations against them.
An information for libel then was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City on May 18, 1994.
After the prosecution presented its evidence, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence.
Without resolving the incident, the Metropolitan Trial Court in its Order dated
November 9, 1996 ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the case as the same falls under
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, and ordered that the
case be forwarded to the RTC for further proceedings.
On November 29, 1996, the case was forwarded to branch 215 Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-6870.
On January 3, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of

jurisdiction and prescription of the offense of Libel. The RTC dismissed the case in an
Order dated April 2, 1997 but, stating that the offense had not yet prescribed, ordered
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to re-file the Information for Libel with the RTC.
On April 27, 1997, the Information for Libel was re-filed with respondent court docketed
as Criminal Case No. Q-97-70948.
On June 17, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to quash on the ground of prescription. The
motion was denied in the assailed Resolution dated October 3, 1997.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was also denied in the other Assailed Order
dated December 4, 1997."[4]
Not satisfied with the Resolution and Order of the trial court, herein petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals raising the issue of "whether or not public respondent
committed grave abuse of discretion or grossly erred in holding that the offense of libel
in the instant case has not yet prescribed." [5] The Court of Appeals, in its decision dated
March 01, 1999, upheld the contention of the trial court that the offense of libel had not
yet prescribed and consequently, dismissed the said petition. The appellate court
likewise denied herein petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution dated
May 11, 1999.[6]
Petitioner is now before this Court seeking a reversal of the decision of the Court of
Appeals and contending that -
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME OF LIBEL HAS NOT YET
PRESCRIBED.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER HAS NOT BEEN DENIED
HER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL.[7]
Under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the crime of libel
prescribes in one (1) year, to wit:
"ART. 90. Prescription of crime.- Crimes punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or reclusion temporal shall prescribe in twenty years.
Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years.
Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in 10 years; with the

exception of those punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in five years.
The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year." (underscoring
supplied)
The said prescriptive period is computed under Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code, as follows:
"Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. - The period of prescription
shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information, and shall proceed to run again when such proceedings
terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably
stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine
Archipelago."
In the case at bench, the offense of libel allegedly occurred on December 21,
1993 when petitioner circulated a letter containing allegedly malicious imputations
against private respondents Srs. Helen Ojario and Bernadine Juarez. At this point, the
period of prescription for the alleged crime had already started to run.
The one-year period of prescription for the crime was interrupted on February 2, 1994
when respondents filed a joint complaint-affidavit [8] for libel against petitioner before
the Office of the city Prosecutor in Quezon city. At this point, the prescription period
had already run for forty-two (42) days.
A preliminary investigation by the Office of the City prosecutor was thus conducted. On
April 27, 1994, Asst. City Prosecutor Ma. Aurora Escasa-Ramos issued a Resolution
stating that probable cause exists against petitioner and recommended the filing of an
information for libel against her. Consequently, an information[9] for libel was filed
against petitioner on May 18, 1994 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 32[10]
Despite the fact that the Metropolitan Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the crime of
libel, the said court proceeded to conduct trial on the merits. After the prosecution had
rested, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence dated September 18, 1996. However,
instead of acting on the said demurrer, the Metropolitan Trial court, on November 08,
1996, issued an Order[11] ruling that it had no jurisdiction over the crime of libel as the
same falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Instead of
dismissing the case outright, the MTC ordered the forwarding of the records of the case
to the Regional Trial Court for further proceedings. The case was eventually raffled off to
Branch 215 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City [12]
On the basis of a Motion to Dismiss[13] filed by petitioner, Branch 215 of the Regional

Trial Court dismissed the case on April 2, 1997 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as
the information against petitioner should have been re-filed anew. The court ruled,
however, that the crime had not yet prescribed and ordered the re-filling of the case [14].
On April 27, 1997, the Office of the City Prosecutor re-filed the case with the Regional
Trial Court and eventually the same was raffled to Branch 218 of the said court [15].
Petitioner tried to have this case dismissed on the ground of prescription but her motion
to quash[16] the information was denied by Branch 218 of the Quezon City Regional Trial
Court in a Resolution[17] dated October 3, 1997. The denial by the Regional Trial Court of
petitioner's motion to quash was subsequently upheld by the Court of Appeals.
It is the contention of petitioner that the prescription period for the crime of libel
charged against her commenced to run again when the Assistant City prosecutor
recommended the filing of the information for libel. Petitioner further argues that the
prescriptive period could have been interrupted again had the information been filed
with the Regional Trial Court, the court with the proper jurisdiction to try the case for
libel. Considering however that the case was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court,
which under the law does not have jurisdiction over the crime of libel, the period of
prescription continued to run its course. Consequently, petitioner concludes that when
the information for libel was finally filed with the Regional Trial Court, the crime had
already prescribed and the State can no longer pursue the case against her.
In support of her arguments, petitioner questions the reliance made by the Regional
Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in the landmark case of People vs.
Olarte[18] Petitioner submits that the adherence to the Olarte case must be examined
considering that in the said case, the principal issue was whether or not the filing of a
complaint in the Municipal Trial Court for purposes of preliminary investigation,
interrupts the period of prescription of a crime. Petitioner argues that the cited case is
inapplicable as it is not disputed in the case at bench that the period of prescription was
interrupted during the process of preliminary investigation.
We are not persuaded.
In the landmark case of People vs. Olarte, this Court speaking through Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, finally resolved the then conflicting views as to whether or not the filing of a
complaint with the Municipal Trial Court for purposes of preliminary investigation
suspends the running of the prescriptive period for the crime. The Court restated the
correct and prevailing doctrine, as follows:
"In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for the
Bench and Bar, this Court has reexamined the question and, after mature consideration,
has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one
established by the decisions holding that the filing of the complaint with the Municipal
Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation,
should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even
if the court where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on the
merits. Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the
Revised Penal code, in declaring that the period of prescription `shall be interrupted by
the filing of the complaint or information' without distinguishing whether the complaint
is filed in the court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on
the merits. Second , even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may
only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of
the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party the
right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that
the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the
requisite complaint.
And it is no argument that Article 91 also expresses that the interrupted prescription
`shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused
being convicted or acquitted', thereby indicating that the court in which the complaint
or information is filed must have the power to convict or acquit the accused. Precisely,
the trial on the merits usually terminates in conviction or acquittal, not otherwise. But it
is in the court conducting a preliminary investigation where the proceedings may
terminate without conviction or acquittal, if the court should discharge the accused
because no prima facie case had been shown."
Subsequently, this Court, in Francisco vs. Court of Appeals[19], broadened the
scope of Olarte by holding that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office also
suspends the running of the prescriptive period.
Petitioner insists that the ruling in Olarte with respect to the interruption of the
prescriptive period is not applicable. In the case at bench, the fact that the period of
prescription was interrupted by the filing of private respondents' joint affidavit with the
Quezon City Prosecutor's Office is not disputed. The Olarte case, however, makes
several other pronouncements that are determinative of the issues raised by petitioner.
It is clear from the Olarte case that the filing of the complaint or information for
purposes of preliminary investigation represents the initial step of the proceedings
against the offender. This is one of the reasons why such filing is deemed as having
interrupted the period of prescription for the prosecution of a crime. This period of
prescription commences to run again when the proceedings terminate without
conviction or acquittal, "if the court (or prosecutor) should discharge the accused
because no prima facie case has been shown."[20]
It is thus evident that petitioner's first premise that the period of prescription
commenced to run again when the Quezon City prosecutor's Office recommended the
filing of a criminal complaint against her is incorrect. When the City Prosecutor
recommended the filing of libel charges against petitioner, the proceedings against her
were not terminated, precisely because a prima facie case for libel was found against
her. Instead of terminating the proceedings against petitioner, the resolution of the city
prosecutor actually directed the continuation of the proceedings against the petitioner
by the filing of the appropriate information against her and by the holding of trial on the
merits. As such, when the information for libel was filed with the Metropolitan Trial
Court, the period of prescription for the crime was still suspended.
Another important teaching in Olarte is that "it is unjust to deprive the injured party of
the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control." This
is because in criminal prosecutions, the only thing that the victim of the offense may do
on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.
In the case at bench, private respondents were not remiss in their right to seek
grievance against respondent as they filed their complaint before the city prosecutor
forty-two days after the alleged crime of libel occurred. It was the Office of the City
Prosecutor that committed an error when it filed the complaint with the Metropolitan
Trial Court.
The error was probably due to the confusion as to the proper venue for the crime of
libel brought about by the passage of R.A. 7691 [21] which took effect on April 15, 1994.
Under Section 2 of the said Republic Act, the jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts was expanded to include all
offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years. However, libel,
which is punishable by imprisonment ranging from six months and one day to four
years[22] is not covered as the said law excludes from its coverage cases within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts [23]. Under Article 360 of the Revised
Penal Code, the information for libel should be filed with the Court of First Instance,
now the Regional Trial Court. The confusion was cleared up when this Court issued
Administrative Order No. 104-96 dated October 21, 1996 which categorically stated that
"LIBEL CASES SHALL BE TRIED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVING JURISDICTION
OVER THEM TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL
COURTS."[24]
Evidently, branch 215 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City was not spared the
confusion brought about by R.A. 7691, as its dismissal of the case then pending before it
was made only on November 8, 1996 or more than two years after it had taken
cognizance of the case. Notably, the dismissal by the Metropolitan Trial Court took place
a mere eighteen (18) days after the issuance of S.C. Administrative Order No. 104-96.
The mistake of the Office of the City Prosecutor in filing the complaint and of the
Metropolitan Trial Court in taking cognizance of the case was thus understandable. The
error was immediately rectified by the said court upon realizing its mistake when it
ruled it was the Regional Trial Court which had the proper jurisdiction over the case.
This mistake should not operate to prejudice the interest of the state to prosecute
criminal offenses and, more importantly, the right of the offended party to obtain
grievance.
Moreover, the doctrine in People vs. Olarte, as applied in later cases, was not meant to
apply solely to cases where the filing of the complaint with the municipal trial court or
the prosecutor's office operates to interrupt the prescription period for the prosecution
of a crime.
In People vs. Galano[25], an information was filed with the Batangas Regional Trial Court
even though the evidence of both the prosecution and defense shows that the crime
was committed in Manila. This Court, applying People vs. Olarte, held that it was only
when the trial court dismissed the case due to lack of jurisdiction that "the proceedings
therein terminated without conviction and acquittal and it was only then that the
prescriptive period (which was interrupted during the during the pendency of the case
in the Batangas Court) commenced to run again."
In People vs. Enrile[26], informations were filed against civilians before military tribunals
which had no jurisdiction over the persons of these civilians. These civilians questioned
the re-filing of the cases against them before the civil courts raising, among others, that
the crimes for which they are being charged have already prescribed. This Court,
applying by analogy the ruling in the Olarte case, threw out the defense of prescription
and held that "the filing of the first indictments suspended the running of the
prescriptive period, and the prosecutions under the informations to be filed should be
regarded as mere continuations of the previous proceedings." At the very least, the
Court ruled, "the filing of the first charges should be considered as having interrupted
the prescriptive period notwithstanding the lack of jurisdiction of the military tribunal in
which they were filed."
More recently, in the case of Reodica vs. Court of Appeals [27], an information for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property with slight physical injuries was filed with
the Regional Trial Court even though the offense was within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the municipal trial court. The Court, even as it dismissed the cases pending before the
Regional Trial Court for lack of jurisdiction, disregarded the defense of prescription
raised by the accused. The Court, citing Olarte and the subsequent cases of Francisco vs.
Court of Appeals[28] and People vs. Cuaresma[29], ruled that "the prescriptive period for
the quasi offenses in question was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the
fiscal's office three days after the vehicular mishap and remained tolled pending the
termination of the case."
From these cases, it is clear that the Apellate Court committed no reversible error in
ruling that the offense of libel charged against petitioner had not yet prescribed. The
period of prescription for the crime was interrupted when the complaint was lodged
with the Office of the City Prosecutor and remained tolled pending the termination of
the case against petitioner. Branch 218 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
therefore, correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case of petitioner as the offense of
libel for which she was being charged has not yet prescribed.
Petitioner's other argument that she has been denied her right to a speedy trial
deserves scant consideration. Well-established is the doctrine that the right to a speedy
trial is violated only where there is an unreasonable, vexatious and oppressive delay
without participation or fault of the accused, or when unjustified postponements are
sought which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time [30]. In the case at
bench, besides the filing of the petitions before the Court of Appeals and this Court,
petitioner had likewise filed a Motion to Quash and a Motion for Reconsideration with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 218. As such, it is clear that petitioner is
not without fault in the delay in the prosecution of the case against her.
Wherefore, the petition is hereby DENIED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated May 1, 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 174899, September 11, 2008 ]
RAMON L. UY, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari which seeks to set aside the

Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 28581 dated 2 March 2006 which
affirmed with modification the Decision [2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City, Branch 64, in Criminal Case No. 98-1065, finding petitioner Ramon L. Uy guilty of
Estafa as defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
Code, and its Resolution[3] dated 9 October 2006 denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.
On 19 May 1998, petitioner was charged before the RTC of Makati City with Estafa
under Article 315, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, allegedly committed as follows:
That sometime in November 1995, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Mr. Eugene Yu,
as follows, to wit: The said accused under false and fraudulent representations which he
made to said Eugene Yu convinced said Eugene Yu to invest in the said low cost housing
project in the amount of P3,500,000.00 and by means of other similar deceit, which
representations he well knew were false and fraudulent and were only made to induce
the aforementioned Eugene Yu to give and deliver as in fact the said Eugene Yu gave
and delivered the said amount of P3,500,000.00 to the accused, to the damage and
prejudice of said Mr. Eugene Yu in the said amount of P3,500,000.00, Philippine
Currency.[4]
On the same date, the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-1065 and
raffled to Branch 64. Finding reasonable ground to believe that a criminal act had been
committed and that petitioner was probably guilty thereof, the trial court issued a
warrant for his arrest.[5] On 31 August 1998, considering that the warrant of arrest had
been returned unserved, the case was archived and an alias warrant of arrest was
issued.[6]
On 27 June 2000, petitioner submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court and
filed a bailbond for his provisional liberty. [7]
When arraigned on 4 June 2000, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de parte,
pleaded "not guilty" to the crime charged. [8]
For failure of petitioner to appear in the scheduled pre-trial on 7 September 2000

despite notice, his bailbond was cancelled and an order of arrest was issued against him.
[9]
On 28 September 2000, the trial court, upon motion of private complainant Eugene Yu,
issued a Hold Departure Order against accused-appellant. [10]
On 16 November 2000, the pre-trial conference of the case proceeded without the
presence of the petitioner or his counsel de parte. A counsel de oficio was appointed
only for the purpose of pre-trial. [11]
On 12 December 2000, the trial court, upon motion of petitioner, lifted the order of
arrest and confiscation of bailbond. [12]
The prosecution presented the following witnesses, namely: (1) private complainant
Eugene Yu;[13] (2) Patricia L. Yu, spouse of private complainant; [14] and (3) Atty. Wilfredo I.
Imperial, Director, Executive Services Group, Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB).[15]
The version of the prosecution is as follows:
Private complainant Eugene Yu first met petitioner Ramon L. Uy in Bacolod City in 1993
during a convention of the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders' Association, Inc.
(CREBA, INC.), of which they were both members. Petitioner represented himself as a
businessman and developer of low-cost housing and President of Trans-Builders
Resources and Development Corporation. Becoming friends, petitioner and private
complainant entered into a business venture in 1995 involving a project in Parañaque
City, with the former as developer and the latter as exclusive marketer.
Thereafter, petitioner proposed to private complainant a plan to develop low-cost

housing in Cagayan de Oro. Initially, petitioner attempted to convince private
complainant to agree to jointly develop the project, but the proposed scheme did not
materialize. Eventually, however, petitioner was able to get private complainant to
agree to an investment portfolio, whereby private complainant was to give the amount
of P3,500,000.00 to petitioner who, in turn, would pay private complainant the amount
of P4,500,000.00 by the end of May 1996. The additional P1,000,000.00 was the interest
on his investment.
Petitioner proposed to come up with an investment agreement. Private complainant

requested his lawyer, Atty. Dennis Perez, to prepare an investment agreement
containing the suggestions of petitioner. [16] On 28 October 1995, in the office of Atty.
Perez, private complainant and petitioner signed an undated Investment Agreement.
[17]
Before signing the document, petitioner went over the same thoroughly. The
agreement contained, among other provisions, the following:
WHEREAS, FIRST PARTY is the registered owner and developer of parcel of land
located at Agusan, Cagayan de Oro City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
61746 issued by the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro and which is more particularly
described as follows:
x x x x
WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY wishes to develop the above parcel [of] land into a low-cost
housing subdivision;
WHEREAS, the SECOND PARTY is willing to invest in the development of the above
parcel of land;
WHEREAS, the parties desire to execute this Investment Agreement for the purpose of
investing in the development of the above parcel of land;
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises and the mutual
covenants and stipulations hereinafter set forth, the parties hereto have agreed, and as
they hereby agree, as follows:
Section 1. The FIRST PARTY shall develop the above parcel of land in a low-cost housing
subdivision;
Section 2. The SECOND PARTY agrees to invest the amount of Three Million Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P3,500,000.00), Philippine Currency, in the construction and
development costs of the FIRST PARTY, which amount shall be remitted to it
immediately upon the signing of this Investment Agreement;
Section 3. For and in consideration of the investment referred to in Section 2, the FIRST
PARTY shall pay the amount of Four Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P4,500,000.00), Philippine Currency to the SECOND PARTY payable after six (6) months
from the execution of this Investment Agreement. For this purpose, the FIRST PARTY
shall issue post-dated check no. CD00371579951 drawn on Metrobank, Cagayan de Oro
Branch in favor of the SECOND PARTY;
In the event that the amount due the SECOND PARTY or any part thereof is unpaid, the
FIRST PARTY shall pay compounded interest at the rate of six percent (6%) on such
amount or balance. The SECOND PARTY shall also have the option to acquire a
portion(s) of the low-cost housing subdivision in lieu of payment of any unpaid amount
or balance. Should the SECOND PARTY choose this option, the FIRST PARTY shall convey
to the SECOND PARTY that portion which he chooses.
Section 4. It is hereby understood by the parties that Transfer Certificate of Title No.
61746, the Site Development Plan, House Plans and the Special Power of Attorney
executed by Patricio Quisumbing, copies of which are hereto attached as Annexes "A",
"B", "C" and "D", shall form integral parts of this Investment Agreement.
The signing was witnessed, among others, by Patricia Yu, wife of private
complainant, and Atty. Perez. Simultaneous with the signing of the agreement, private
complainant issued Asiatrust Bank Check No. 087918 dated 30 October 1995 payable to
Trans-Builders Resources and Development Corporation in the amount of
P3,500,000.00.[18] Petitioner, in turn, issued in favor of private complainant Metrobank
Check No. 0371579951 dated "30 May 1995" in the amount of P4,500,000.00. [19]
The amount of P3,500,000.00 covered by Asiatrust Bank Check No. 087918 was debited
against the account of private complainant and credited to the account of Trans-
Builders Resources and Development Corporation. When private complainant deposited
petitioner's Metrobank check to his savings account with Asiatrust Bank, the check was
dishonored because it was "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds (DAIF)." [20] It was at this
time that private complainant noticed that the check issued to him was dated 30 May
1995 instead of 30 May 1996.
From that time on, petitioner could no longer be located, and he ignored private
complainant's efforts to collect on his investment. On 16 October 1996, private
complainant, through his lawyer, sent a demand letter to petitioner to make good on his
bounced check.[21]
Upon inquiry from the HLURB, private complainant learned that Trans-Builders
Resources and Development Corporation had no ongoing low-cost housing project in
Agusan, Cagayan de Oro City, as represented by petitioner and contained in the
Investment Agreement. Atty. Wilfredo I. Imperial, Director, Executive Services Group of
the HLURB, said that Trans-Builders Resources and Development Corporation had only
three projects in Region 10, namely: (1) Transville Oroquieta 1- Oroquieta City, Misamis
Occidental; (2) Transville Oroquieta 2 - Oroquieta City, Misamis Occidental; and (3)
Transville Homes - Quezon, Bukidnon. [22]
Patricia Yu testified on the circumstances regarding the execution of the Investment

Agreement and the issuance of the checks by private complainant and petitioner. She
corroborated the statements of private complainant on these matters. Atty. Wilfredo I.
Imperial testified that Trans-Builders Resources and Development Corporation did not
have any ongoing low-cost housing project in Agusan, Cagayan de Oro City.
On 30 April 2002, the prosecution made its Formal Offer of Exhibits (with Motion for
Additional Time to File HLURB Certification) consisting of Exhibits "A" to "G," inclusive,
with sub-markings.[23] The trial court noted the offer and granted the motion. [24] On 24
May 2002, the prosecution made a Supplemental Offer of Evidence consisting of the
HLURB certification which was marked Exhibit "H."[25] The trial court admitted the
exhibits offered on 5 July 2002. [26]
For the defense, petitioner[27] took the stand.
Petitioner testified that his first business transaction with private complainant involved
real property development in Parañaque in the middle of 1995, he being the developer
and private complainant the exclusive marketer. In the middle of the planning of the
Parañaque project, he, being in need of funds, offered private complainant a joint-
venture agreement for his project in Cagayan de Oro. Nothing came out of this proposal.
Petitioner likewise sought rediscounting of his check by private complainant, but the
same did not materialize. Instead, private complainant made a counter-proposal
wherein he would finance the P3,500,000.00 petitioner needed, payable within six to
seven months with P1,000,000.00 interest.
Private complainant instructed his Makati-based lawyer to draft an agreement whereby

he was to give petitioner the amount of P3,500,000.00 in exchange for the check he had
earlier received from petitioner in the amount of P4,500,000.00, to be deposited at least
six (6) months after petitioner had already encashed the P3,500,000.00 check given to
him by private complainant on 28 October 2005.
Petitioner went to the law office of private complainant's lawyer in Makati and signed
the Investment Agreement.[28] Before signing said document, petitioner told private
complainant: "Pare utang lang ito, I issued a check, bakit kailangan pa natin
itong investment agreement."[29] Private complainant replied that the document was
just a formality.
Six months after the delivery of private complainant's Asiatrust check for P3,500,000.00
to petitioner, private complainant deposited the latter's Metrobank check for
P4,500,000.00, which he had received in exchange for private complainant's Asiatrust
check. The P4,500,000.00 Metrobank check deposited in private complainant's account
was dishonored. Petitioner denied having received a demand letter from private
complainant's lawyer.[30]
Petitioner declared that the contract between him and private complainant was a
simple loan to finance his project in Mindanao. [31]
On 23 September 2003, the defense formally offered its evidence [32] consisting of

Exhibits "1" to "5." On 9 October 2003, the prosecution formally offered petitioner's
counter-affidavit as Exhibit I, with sub-markings. On 29 October 2003, the trial court
admitted all the exhibits of the defense as well as the additional exhibit of the
prosecution.[33]
On 17 June 2004, the trial court promulgated its decision convicting petitioner of the
crime charged. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding accused RAMON UY GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate
imprisonment of TEN (10) YEARS prision mayor medium, as minimum, to TWENTY (20)
YEARS of prision temporal, as maximum.
The accused is ordered to pay complainant Eugene Yu the sum of P4,500,000 and plus
twelve percent (12%) interest per annum from May 30, 1996 until payment is made, and
to pay the cost of suit.[34]
In convicting petitioner, the trial court explained:
The fact remains that the complainant and the accused signed an agreement
which they denominated as "Investment Agreement." The Agreement, having been
signed by complainant and the accused is evidence of what is contained therein (Exh. A).
The document speaks for itself. x x x.
x x x x
Complainant Eugene Yu would not have agreed to part with his money or investment
were it not for the representation of accused that Trans-Builders Resources and
Development Corporation of which the accused is the President, has a low-cost housing
project at Barrio Agusan, Cagayan de Oro City. The complainant's investment is
therefore for a specific purpose which is "to develop a low cost housing project in Barrio
Agusan, Cagayan de Oro City over a property owned and registered in the name of
Trans-Builders under Transfer Certificate of Title no. 61746 issued by the Register of
Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City."
The complainant gave to accused his investment thru ASIATRUST Check no. 087918
P3,500,000. He received from the accused the latter's check, Metrobank check no.
CDO0371579951 in the amount of P4,500,000. Simultaneously with the exchange of the
checks, the accused and complainant signed the Investment Agreement.
In sum, complainant Eugene Yu would not have agreed to part with his money or
investment were it not for the following false pretenses and misrepresentations:
a) He represented that the 3.5 Million pesos will be invested in a low-cost
housing project in Barrio Agusan, Cagayan de Oro.
b) He promised to pay the private complainant 4.5 Million pesos after six months from
the execution of the investment agreement.
c) He promised that in the event that the 4.5. Million pesos is not paid, he shall pay the
private complainant compounded interest at the rate of six percent (6%) on such
amount. He also gave the private complainant the option to acquire a portion(s) of the
low-cost housing in lieu of payment of any unpaid amount or balance.
d) He issued in favor of the private complainant Metrobank check no. CDO0371579951
worth 4.5 million pesos.
As the events would later on disclose, the accused or his company Trans Builders
had no low cost housing project in Barrio Agusan Cagayan de Oro (Exhs. "G" and "H").
Likewise, at the appointed time, the accused failed to return the investment of
complainant. Neither was the accused able to pay complainant the "compounded
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) on such amount or balance," nor did he allow
complainant "to acquire a portion(s) of the low cost housing subdivision in lieu of
payment of any unpaid amount or balance" . . . . (Sec. 3 Investment Agreement, Exhibit
A).
The check which the accused issued to complainant turned out to be a bum check
because it was dishonored when presented for payment for the reason drawn against
insufficient fund (DAIF).
x x x x
From the foregoing, this court finds that the accused employed deceit upon
complainant who relied upon said deceitful representations, and which deceitful acts
occurred prior and/or simultaneous to the damage.
Thus, the accused Ramon Uy is GUILTY of ESTAFA as defined under Article 315 par. 2(a).
[35]
On 21 June 2004, petitioner filed a Motion to Admit Bail [36] and a Notice of

Appeal.[37]
The trial court approved the surety bond posted by petitioner and directed the latter's
release from custody unless further detention was warranted in any other case. [38]
On 23 June 2004, the trial court ordered the transmittal of the records of the case to the
Court of Appeals.[39]
On 2 March 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision upholding petitioner's
conviction, but reduced the minimum of the indeterminate sentence imposed on him.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED but
with MODIFICATION on the minimum of the indeterminate sentence imposed which is
hereby reduced to two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional.[40]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision, but the appellate
court denied it in its resolution dated 9 October 2006.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
As required by the Court, respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, and
private complainant filed their comments on 19 March 2007 and 12 March 2007,
respectively.[41] As directed, petitioner filed his consolidated reply to the comments. [42]
On 23 July 2007, the Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to
submit their respective memoranda. [43] All the parties filed their respective memoranda.
[44]
Petitioner raises the following issues:

I. Whether or not (the) Court of Appeals erred in finding the petitioner-appellant
guilty of the crime of estafa punishable under Art. 315, Par 2(a) of the Revised Penal
Code instead of violation of B.P. Blg. 22;
II. Whether or not the Court of Appeals (erred) in not finding that the true nature of the
Agreement between petitioner-appellant and the private complainant was that of a
simple loan;
III. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in giving credence to the private
complainant's version of why the check issued by the petitioner-appellant was dated
May 1995 instead of May 1996.
We first rule on the issue of whether or not the contract between petitioner and
private complainant was one of loan. Private complainant maintains that what they
entered into was an Investment Agreement, while petitioner claims that the contract
between them was a contract of loan.
After going over the records and testimonies of the witnesses, we are convinced that
the transaction that was entered into was an Investment Agreement and not a simple
loan.
It is very clear from the document [45] signed by both petitioner and private complainant
that private complainant shall invest P3,500,000.00 in the development of parcel of land
(owned by petitioner and located at Agusan, Cagayan de Oro City covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 61746) into a low-cost housing subdivision to be undertaken by
petitioner. It is apparent from the face of the document that the land to be developed is
located in Agusan, Cagayan de Oro.
Petitioner tries to alter or contradict their agreement by claiming that their true
intention was to have a simple loan agreement. He alleged that before signing the
document, he even told private complainant: "Pare utang lang ito, I issued a check,
bakit kailangan pa natin itong investment agreement."[46] Private complainant then
replied that the document was just a formality.
We do not give credence to petitioner's allegations. He is thus denying entering into an

investment agreement. His denial will not prevail over the clear and unequivocal
provisions of the investment contract. As testified to by private complainant, it was
petitioner who had proposed the investment agreement and the document contained
the latter's suggestions. Because they have reduced their agreement into writing,
whatever previous or contemporaneous agreements they had, whether verbal or in
writing, are merged in said written agreement.
Petitioner argues that the appellate court erred in convicting him of estafa, punishable
under Article 315, par. 2(a), instead of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. [47] He claims
that only the fourth element of the crime charged - damage - may have been
established.
Estafa, under Article 315, par. 2, of the Revised Penal Code, is committed by any person
who defrauds another by using a fictitious name; or falsely pretends to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or
by means of similar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of
fraud.[48] Under this class of estafa, the element of deceit is indispensable. [49]
The elements of Estafa by means of deceit as defined under Article 315(2)(a) of the
Revised Penal Code are as follows: (1) there must be false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means; (2) such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be
made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (3) the
offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent
means, that is, he must have been induced to part with his money or property because
of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and (4) as a result thereof, the
offended party suffered damage.[50]
Fraud, in its general sense, is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive,

including all acts, omissions and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable
duty, trust or confidence justly reposed, resulting in damage to another; or by which
another is unduly and unconscientiously taken advantage of another. It is a generic term
embracing all multifarious means which human ingenuity can device, and which are
resorted to by one individual to secure an advantage over another by false suggestions
or by suppression of truth; and includes all forms of surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling
and any other unfair way by which another is cheated. Deceit is a species of fraud.
[51]
And deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or
conduct, by false or misleading allegations; or by concealment of that which should have
been disclosed, which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act
upon it, to his legal injury. The false pretense or fraudulent act must be committed prior
to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, it being essential that such false
statement or representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive which
induces the offended party to part with his money. [52] In the absence of such requisite,
any subsequent act of the accused, however fraudulent and suspicious it might appear,
cannot serve as basis for prosecution for estafa under the said provision. [53]
The prosecution has established the presence of all the elements of the offense.
Petitioner falsely represented to private complainant that he had an on going low-cost
housing project in Agusan, Cagayan de Oro. Relying on petitioner's fraudulent
misrepresentations, private complainant invested P3,500,000.00 in said project. Said
amount was given by means of a check and handed over to petitioner simultaneously
with the signing of the Investment Agreement. As it turned out, per certification from
the HLURB, petitioner did not have any low-cost housing project in Agusan, Cagayan de
Oro. Private complainant indeed suffered damage. He did not get his return of
investment because the check he received from petitioner in the amount of
P4,500,000.00 was dishonored. Moreover, petitioner neither paid private complainant
the 6% compounded interest on said amount or balance thereon, nor did he allow
private complainant to acquire a portion or portions of the low-cost housing subdivision
in lieu of the payment of any unpaid amount or balance. To date, the amount private
complainant invested in said low-cost housing has not been returned. Without a doubt,
petitioner is guilty of estafa.
Petitioner contends he was denied due process of law when he was convicted of estafa
instead of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. An examination of the private
complainant's demand letter, he said, indicates that the demand was for alleged
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
We find his contention untenable.
Under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, criminal actions
shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecutor. In the case
before us, the prosecutor, after going over the complaint found probable cause to
charge him with estafa. This was the prosecutor's prerogative, considering that he was
the one who would prosecute the case. The prosecuting attorney cannot be compelled
to file a particular criminal information.[54] The fact that the demand letter may suggest a
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 cannot control his action as to what charge he will
file, if he sees evidence showing probable cause to charge an accused for another crime.
It is the prosecutor's assessment of the evidence before him which will prevail, and not
what is contained in a demand letter.
Moreover, there can be no denial of due process because petitioner was informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him when he was arraigned. He was
charged with estafa, and he pleaded not guilty thereto. He was given the opportunity to
disprove the evidence against him. The fact that he was arraigned and was tried
according to the rules of court undeniably shows he was accorded due process.
Petitioner asserts that the Investment Agreement upon which his conviction seemed to
have been anchored should not have been considered because said document is a
contract of adhesion.
Such assertion will not exonerate him.
A contract of adhesion is so-called because its terms are prepared by only one party,
while the other party merely affixes his signature signifying his adhesion thereto. [55] A
contract of adhesion is just as binding as ordinary contracts. It is true that we have, on
occasion, struck down such contracts as void when the weaker party is imposed upon in
dealing with the dominant bargaining party and is reduced to the alternative of taking it
or leaving it, completely deprived of the opportunity to bargain on equal footing.
Nevertheless, contracts of adhesion are not invalid per se; they are not entirely
prohibited. The one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to reject it entirely; if
he adheres, he gives his consent. [56]
In the case at bar, we find the Investment Agreement entered into by petitioner and
private complainant valid. Although the Investment Agreement was prepared by private
complainant's lawyer, this circumstance will not invalidate it. The document was
prepared with the suggestions of petitioner being considered. We find it far-fetched to
presume that petitioner did not know anything about the preparation of said document
considering that the details contained therein are informations known only to the
owner of the property to be developed. Furthermore, as a businessman who is engaged
in real estate development, we have no doubt that he knew what he was doing when he
signed the Investment Agreement.
Petitioner argues that his Metrobank check was dated May 1995 instead of 1996,
because the same was not issued in relation to the Investment Agreement.
His argument does not persuade. It is clear from the document itself that the check was
issued in consideration of the investment made by private complainant. Section 3 of
said document provides:
Section 3. For and in consideration of the investment referred to in Section 2, the
FIRST PARTY shall pay the amount of Four Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P4,500,000.00), Philippine Currency to the SECOND PARTY payable after six (6) months
from the execution of this Investment Agreement. For this purpose, the FIRST PARTY
shall issue post-dated check no. CD00371579951 drawn on Metrobank, Cagayan de Oro
Branch in favor of the SECOND PARTY.[57]
Moreover, we agree with the trial court's reasoning why petitioner's check was
dated 30 May 1995, to wit:
It could not have been the intention of the parties in the Investment Agreement
(Exh. "A") that the repayment of the investment, which was made on October 30, 1995
and payable with interest after six (6) months from date of execution of the Agreement
as stipulated in the agreement be done by way of a check drawn five (5) months earlier.
Obviously, the intention is to postdate the check. This circumstance should not
adversely affect the cause of action of complainant because as regard the complainant,
the check he received from the accused in exchange [for] the check he gave the latter, is
due six months from the signing of the Investment Agreement. [58]
Finally, petitioner claims private complainant committed a violation of the
provisions of the Anti-Usury Law.
We do not agree. First, petitioner failed to specify which provision of said law was
violated by private complainant. Second, the effectivity of the Usury Law has been
suspended by Central Bank Circular No. 905, s. 1982 effective 1 January 1983. [59]
We now go to the penalty.
The trial court sentenced petitioner to suffer the indeterminate penalty "of ten (10)
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years as prision (sic) temporal, as
maximum."[60] It also ordered petitioner to pay the private complainant the amount of
P4,500,000.00 plus twelve percent (12%) interest per annum from 30 May 1996 until
fully paid, and to pay the costs of suit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction but
modified the penalty imposed, more particularly the minimum of the indeterminate
sentence, which was reduced to two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
correccional.
The penalty for estafa by means of deceit is provided in Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in
its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not
exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided
in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed
twenty years. In such case, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
Under this paragraph, the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its minimum period is the imposable penalty if the amount
defrauded is over P12,000.00 but not over P22,000.00. If the amount defrauded exceeds
P22,000.00, the penalty provided shall be imposed in its maximum period, with one year
added for each additional P10,000.00. The total penalty, however, shall not exceed
twenty years.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty shall be "that
which in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed" under the
Revised Penal Code and the minimum shall be "within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed" for the offense.
The range of the penalty provided for in Article 315 is composed of only two periods,
thus, to get the maximum period of the indeterminate sentence, the total number of
years included in the two periods should be divided into three. Article 65 of the same
code requires the division of the time included in the prescribed penalty into three
equal periods of time, forming one period for each of the three portions. The maximum,
medium and minimum periods of the prescribed penalty are therefore:
Minimum period - 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 5 years, 5 months and 10 days
Medium period - 5 years, 5 months and 11 days to 6 years, 8 months and 20 days
Maximum period - 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years

The amount defrauded being in excess of P22,000.00, the penalty imposable
should be the maximum period of six years, eight months, and twenty-one days to eight
years of prision mayor. However, Art. 315 also provides that an additional one year shall
be imposed for each additional P10,000.00. The penalty should be termed as prision
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. Here, considering that the total
amount of the fraud is P3,500,000.00, the corresponding penalty obviously reaches the
twenty-year limit. Thus, the correct imposable maximum penalty is twenty years
of reclusion temporal.
The minimum period of the indeterminate sentence, on the other hand, should be
within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by Article 315(2)(a),
Revised Penal Code, for the crime committed. The penalty next lower than prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum is prision correccional minimum (six
months and one day to two years and four months) to prision correccional medium
(two years, four months and one day to four years and two months).
The Court of Appeals thus correctly reduced the minimum of the indeterminate penalty
imposed on petitioner.
We agree with both lower courts that petitioner should be ordered to pay private
complainant the amount of P4,500,000.00 as actual damages representing private
complainant's investment and unrealized profit pursuant to the Investment Agreement.
The 12 % interest per annum on said amount as imposed by the lower courts from 30
May 1996 should be reduced to 6% per annum in accordance with the Investment
Agreement. After this decision has become final, the interest thereon shall be 12% per
annum.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR

No. 28581 dated 2 March 2006 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the interest
on the amount of P4,500,000.00 shall be 6% per annum computed from 30 May 1996.
Upon the finality of this decision, the interest on said amount shall be 12% per annum.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 163797, April 24, 2007 ]
WILSON CHUA, RENITA CHUA, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND
THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF LUCENA CITY, PETITIONERS, VS.
RODRIGO PADILLO AND MARIETTA PADILLO, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
Amended Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated May 15, 2003 reversing its
Decision[2] dated January 24, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 62401, entitled "Rodrigo Padillo and
Marietta Padillo, Complainants-Petitioners, versus The Secretary of Justice, et al.,
Respondents."
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are:
Rodrigo Padillo and Marietta Padillo, respondents, are the owners of Padillo Lending
Investor engaged in the money lending business in Lucena City. Their niece, Marissa
Padillo-Chua, served as the firm's manager. Marissa is married to Wilson Chua, brother
of Renita Chua, herein petitioners.
One of Marissa's functions was to evaluate and recommend loan applications for
approval by respondents. Once a loan application had been approved, respondents
would authorize the release of a check signed by them or their authorized signatory, a
certain Mila Manalo.
Sometime in September 1999, a post-audit was conducted. It was found that Marissa
was engaged in illegal activities. Some of the borrowers whose loan applications she
recommended for approval were fictitious and their signatures on the checks were
spurious. Marissa's modus operandi was to alter the name of the payee appearing on
the check by adding another name as an alternative payee. This alternative payee would
then personally encash the check with the drawee bank. The cash amounts received
were turned over to Marissa or her husband Wilson for deposit in their personal
accounts. To facilitate encashment, Marissa would sign the check to signify to the bank
that she personally knew the alternative payee. The alternative payees included
employees of Wilson or his friends. The total amount embezzled reached P7 million.
Respondents filed complaints against petitioners and several others with the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Lucena City. In turn, the NBI forwarded their complaints
to the Office of the City Prosecutor, same city, for preliminary investigation, docketed as
I.S. Nos. 98-1487, 98-1621, 98-1629, and 98-1605.
In a Resolution dated March 18, 1999, Lucena City Prosecutor Romeo A. Datu (now
retired), disposed of the complaints as follows:
WHEREFORE, after preliminary investigation, finding sufficient evidence to
warrant a finding of a prima facie case of Estafa Thru Falsification of Commercial
Documents, let an Information be filed against Marissa Padillo-Chua, Wilson Chua,
Renita Chua, and several John Does, the same to be filed with the Regional Trial Court.
The case against the other respondents, namely, Perla Correa, Giovani Guia, Emmanuel
Garcia, Zenaida Nantes, Cherrylyn Mendoza, Rosalie Mazo, Fernando Loreto, Cesar
Salamat, Antonio Bana, Isidro Manalo, Jr., Ramon Villanueva, Alexander Asiado, Peter
Tan, Jun Tan, Flaviano Evaso, Edgar Sebastian, Crisencio Asi, Roberto Ong and Gregorio
Flancia is provisionally dismissed.
Forthwith, the City Prosecutor filed an Information for estafa against Marissa,
Wilson, and Renita with the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, docketed therein as
Criminal Cse No. 99-182. It was raffled of to Branch 59.
Believing that a more serious offense should have been charged against petitioners,
respondents interposed an appeal to the Secretary of Justice who issued a Resolution
dated January 3, 2000, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed resolution is modified. The City Prosecution Office of
Lucena City is hereby directed to file the Information of the complex crime
of estafa through falsification of commercial documents defined and penalized under
Article 315 par. 1(b) in relation to Articles 171 and 172 (58 counts) against respondent
Marissa Padillo-Chua and to cause the withdrawal of the Information of estafa through
falsification of commercial documents against respondents Wilson Chua and Renita
Chua. Report to us the action taken within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
The Secretary of Justice found that the participation of Wilson Chua in the
commission of the crime was not clearly established by the evidence. There was no
showing that he abused the trust and confidence of respondents when two (2) of the
questioned checks were deposited in his bank account. As to Renita Chua, the Secretary
of Justice found no proof of conspiracy between her and Marissa.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied with finality by the
Secretary of Justice on November 6, 2000.
Respondents then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 62401. They alleged that in issuing the Resolution dated January 3, 2000
directing the Prosecutor's Office of Lucena City to file the corresponding Information
only against Marissa, the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion. They
prayed that the Court of Appeals order the Lucena City Prosecutor to withdraw the
Information in Criminal Case No. 99-182 and instead, file several Informations against
petitioners.
On January 24, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petition,
holding that there was no conspiracy among the petitioners.
Respondents seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration. Revisiting its Decision, the
Court of Appeals, on May 15, 2003, promulgated its Amended Decision granting
respondents' motion, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court orders the DOJ, City Prosecutor, Lucena City to include Wilson
Chua and Renita Chua as accused in the said case.
SO ORDERED.
In reversing itself, the Court of Appeals found that it overlooked certain facts and
circumstances which, if considered, would establish probable cause against Wilson and
Renita. The Court of Appeals identified these facts to be: (1) Marissa's consistent
practice of depositing checks with altered names of payees to the respective accounts of
Wilson Chua and Renita Chua; (2) considering that Wilson and Marissa are husband and
wife, it can be inferred that one knows the transactions of the other; and (3) Wilson had
full knowledge of the unlawful activities of Marissa. This is supported by the affidavit of
Ernesto Alcantara dated November 26, 1998.
Wilson Chua and Renita Chua filed their motion for reconsideration of the Amended
Decision, but the Court of Appeals denied the same on May 28, 2004.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in
compelling the Secretary of Justice to include in the Information Wilson and Renita.
Section 5, Rule 110 of the 200 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, partly provides
that "All criminal actions either commenced by a complaint or information shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor." The rationale for
this rule is that since a criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereignty of the State, it
necessarily follows that a representative of the State shall direct and control the
prosecution thereof.[3] In Suarez v. Platon,[4] this Court described the prosecuting officer
as:
[T]he representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to
govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall
win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite
sense a servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or
innocence suffer.
Having been vested by law with the control of the prosecution of criminal cases,
the public prosecutor, in the exercise of his functions, has the power and discretion to:
(a) determine whether a prima facie case exists;[5] (b) decide which of the conflicting
testimonies should be believed free from the interference or control of the offended
party;[6] and (c) subject only to the right against self-incrimination, determine which
witnesses to present in court.[7] Given his discretionary powers, a public prosecutor
cannot be compelled to file an Information where he is not convinced that the evidence
before him would warrant the filing of an action in court. For while he is bound by his
oath of office to prosecute persons who, according to complainant's evidence, are
shown to be guilty of a crime, he is likewise duty-bound to protect innocent persons
from groundless, false, or malicious prosecution. [8]
We must stress, however, that the public prosecutor's exercise of his discretionary
powers is not absolute.
First, the resolution of the investigating prosecutor is subject to appeal to the Secretary

of Justice who, under the Administrative Code of 1987, as amended, exercises control
and supervision over the investigating prosecutor. Thus, the Secretary of Justice may
affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the ruling of said prosecutor." In special cases, the
public prosecutor's decision may even be reversed or modified by the Office of the
President.[9]
Second, the Court of Appeals may review the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
on the ground that he committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction.[10]
Here, we note that the Court of Appeals, on motion for reconsideration by respondents,
ruled that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in resolving that
only Marissa should be charged.
We agree.
Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.[11] We have carefully examined the Resolution of the
Secretary of Justice dated January 3, 2000 wherein he ruled that there was no probable
cause to hold Wilson Chua and Renita Chua for estafa through falsification of
commercial documents. As found by the Court of Appeals, the Secretary of Justice either
overlooked or patently ignored the following circumstances: (1) Marissa's practice of
depositing checks, with altered names of payees, in the respective accounts of Wilson
and Renita Chua; (2) the fact that Wilson and Marissa are husband and wife makes it
difficult to believe that one has no idea of the transactions entered into by the other;
and (3) the affidavit of Ernesto Alcantara dated November 26, 1998 confirming that
Wilson had knowledge of Marissa's illegal activities.
Indeed, as we ruled in Sanchez v. Demetriou,[12] not even the Supreme Court can order
the prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient
evidence to support at least a prima facie case. The only possible exception to this rule
is where there is an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the prosecutor, as in this case.
Verily, the Court of Appeals did not err in directing the City Prosecutor of Lucena City to
include Wilson and Renita Chua in the Information for the complex crime
of estafa through falsification of commercial documents.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Amended Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62401. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 168380, February 08, 2007 ]
MANUEL V. BAVIERA, PETITIONER, VS. ESPERANZA PAGLINAWAN, IN
HER CAPACITY AS DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE STATE PROSECUTOR;
LEAH C. TANODRA-ARMAMENTO, IN HER CAPACITY AS ASSISTANT
CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR AND CHAIRWOMAN OF TASK FORCE ON
BUSINESS SCAM; JOVENCITO R. ZUNO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR; STANDARD
CHARTERED BANK, PAUL SIMON MORRIS, AJAY KANWAL, SRIDHAR
RAMAN, MARIVEL GONZALES, CHONA REYES, MARIA ELLEN
VICTOR, AND ZENAIDA IGLESIA, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. NO. 170602]
MANUEL V. BAVIERA, PETITIONER, VS. STANDARD CHARTERED

BANK, BRYAN K. SANDERSON, THE RIGHT HONORABLE LORD
STEWARTBY, EVAN MERVYN DAVIES, MICHAEL BERNARD DENOMA,
CHRISTOPHER AVEDIS KELJIK, RICHARD HENRY MEDDINGS, KAI
NARGOLWALA, PETER ALEXANDER SANDS, RONNIE CHI CHUNG
CHAN, SIR CK CHOW, BARRY CLARE, HO KWON PING, RUDOLPH
HAROLD PETER ARKHAM, DAVID GEORGE MOIR, HIGH EDWARD
NORTON, SIR RALPH HARRY ROBINS, ANTHONY WILLIAM PAUL
STENHAM (STANDARD CHARTERED BANK CHAIRMAN, DEPUTY
CHAIRMAN, AND MEMBERS OF THE BOARD), SHERAZAM MAZARI
(GROUP REGIONAL HEAD FOR CONSUMER BANKING), PAUL SIMON
MORRIS, AJAY KANWAL, SRIDHAR RAMAN, MARIVEL GONZALES,
CHONA REYES, ELLEN VICTOR, RAMONA H. BERNAD, DOMINGO
CARBONELL, JR., AND ZENAIDA IGLESIAS (STANDARD CHARTERED
BANK-PHILIPPINES BRANCH HEADS/OFFICERS), RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
Before us are two consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decisions
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87328[1] and in CA-G.R. SP No. 85078.[2]
The common factual antecedents of these cases as shown by the records are:
Manuel Baviera, petitioner in these cases, was the former head of the HR Service
Delivery and Industrial Relations of Standard Chartered Bank-Philippines (SCB), one of
herein respondents. SCB is a foreign banking corporation duly licensed to engage in
banking, trust, and other fiduciary business in the Philippines. Pursuant to Resolution No.
1142 dated December 3, 1992 of the Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP), the conduct of SCB's business in this jurisdiction is subject to the
following conditions:
1. At the end of a one-year period from the date the SCB starts its trust functions, at
least 25% of its trust accounts must be for the account of non-residents of the
Philippines and that actual foreign exchange had been remitted into the Philippines
to fund such accounts or that the establishment of such accounts had reduced the
indebtedness of residents (individuals or corporations or government agencies) of
the Philippines to non-residents. At the end of the second year, the above ratio
shall be 50%, which ratio must be observed continuously thereafter;
2. The trust operations of SCB shall be subject to all existing laws, rules and
regulations applicable to trust services, particularly the creation of a Trust
Committee; and
3. The bank shall inform the appropriate supervising and examining department of
the BSP at the start of its operations.
Apparently, SCB did not comply with the above conditions. Instead, as early as 1996, it
acted as a stock broker, soliciting from local residents foreign securities called
"GLOBAL THIRD PARTY MUTUAL FUNDS" (GTPMF), denominated in US dollars.
These securities were not registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). These were then remitted outwardly to SCB-Hong Kong and SCB-Singapore.
SCB's counsel, Romulo Mabanta Buenaventura Sayoc and Delos Angeles Law Office,
advised the bank to proceed with the selling of the foreign securities although
unregistered with the SEC, under the guise of a "custodianship agreement;" and should it
be questioned, it shall invoke Section 72[3] of the General Banking Act (Republic Act
No.337).[4] In sum, SCB was able to sell GTPMF securities worth around P6 billion to
some 645 investors.
However, SCB's operations did not remain unchallenged. On July 18, 1997, the
Investment Capital Association of the Philippines (ICAP) filed with the SEC a complaint
alleging that SCB violated the Revised Securities Act,[5] particularly the provision
prohibiting the selling of securities without prior registration with the SEC; and that its
actions are potentially damaging to the local mutual fund industry.
In its answer, SCB denied offering and selling securities, contending that it has been
performing a "purely informational function" without solicitations for any of its
investment outlets abroad; that it has a trust license and the services it renders under the
"Custodianship Agreement" for offshore investments are authorized by Section 72 [6] of
the General Banking Act; that its clients were the ones who took the initiative to invest in
securities; and it has been acting merely as an agent or "passive order taker" for them.
On September 2, 1997, the SEC issued a Cease and Desist Order against SCB, holding
that its services violated Sections 4(a)[7] and 19[8] of the Revised Securities Act.
Meantime, the SEC indorsed ICAP's complaint and its supporting documents to the BSP.
On October 31, 1997, the SEC informed the Secretary of Finance that it withdrew
GTPMF securities from the market and that it will not sell the same without the necessary
clearances from the regulatory authorities.
Meanwhile, on August 17, 1998, the BSP directed SCB not to include investments in
global mutual funds issued abroad in its trust investments portfolio without prior
registration with the SEC.
On August 31, 1998, SCB sent a letter to the BSP confirming that it will withdraw third-
party fund products which could be directly purchased by investors.
However, notwithstanding its commitment and the BSP directive, SCB continued to offer
and sell GTPMF securities in this country. This prompted petitioner to enter into an
Investment Trust Agreement with SCB wherein he purchased US$8,000.00 worth of
securities upon the bank's promise of 40% return on his investment and a guarantee that
his money is safe. After six (6) months, however, petitioner learned that the value of his
investment went down to US$7,000.00. He tried to withdraw his investment but was
persuaded by Antonette de los Reyes of SCB to hold on to it for another six (6) months in
view of the possibility that the market would pick up.
Meanwhile, on November 27, 2000, the BSP found that SCB failed to comply with its
directive of August 17, 1998. Consequently, it was fined in the amount of P30,000.00.
The trend in the securities market, however, was bearish and the worth of petitioner's
investment went down further to only US$3,000.00.
On October 26, 2001, petitioner learned from Marivel Gonzales, head of the SCB Legal
and Compliance Department, that the latter had been prohibited by the BSP to sell
GPTMF securities. Petitioner then filed with the BSP a letter-complaint demanding
compensation for his lost investment. But SCB denied his demand on the ground that his
investment is "regular."
On July 15, 2003, petitioner filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ), represented
herein by its prosecutors, public respondents, a complaint charging the above-named
officers and members of the SCB Board of Directors and other SCB officials, private
respondents, with syndicated estafa, docketed as I.S. No. 2003-1059.
For their part, private respondents filed the following as counter-charges against
petitioner: (1) blackmail and extortion, docketed as I.S. No. 2003-1059-A; and blackmail
and perjury, docketed as I.S. No. 2003-1278.
On September 29, 2003, petitioner also filed a complaint for perjury against private
respondents Paul Simon Morris and Marivel Gonzales, docketed as I.S. No. 2003-1278-
A.
On December 4, 2003, the SEC issued a Cease and Desist Order against SCB restraining
it from further offering, soliciting, or otherwise selling its securities to the public until
these have been registered with the SEC.
Subsequently, the SEC and SCB reached an amicable settlement.
On January 20, 2004, the SEC lifted its Cease and Desist Order and approved the P7
million settlement offered by SCB. Thereupon, SCB made a commitment not to offer or
sell securities without prior compliance with the requirements of the SEC.
On February 7, 2004, petitioner filed with the DOJ a complaint for violation of Section
8.1[9] of the Securities Regulation Code against private respondents, docketed as I.S. No.
2004-229.
On February 23, 2004, the DOJ rendered its Joint Resolution[10] dismissing petitioner's
complaint for syndicated estafa in I.S. No. 2003-1059; private respondents' complaint for
blackmail and extortion in I.S. No. 2003-1059-A; private respondents' complaint for
blackmail and perjury in I.S. No. 2003-1278; and petitioner's complaint for perjury
against private respondents Morris and Gonzales in I.S. No. 2003-1278-A.
Meanwhile, in a Resolution[11] dated April 4, 2004, the DOJ dismissed petitioner's

complaint in I.S. No. 2004-229 (violation of Securities Regulation Code), holding that it
should have been filed with the SEC.
Petitioner's motions to dismiss his complaints were denied by the DOJ. Thus, he filed
with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85078.
He alleged that the DOJ acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in dismissing his complaint for syndicated estafa.
He also filed with the Court of Appeals a separate petition for certiorari assailing the DOJ
Resolution dismissing I.S. No. 2004-229 for violation of the Securities Regulation Code.
This petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 87328. Petitioner claimed that the DOJ
acted with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
holding that the complaint should have been filed with the SEC.
On January 7, 2005, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision dismissing the
petition. It sustained the ruling of the DOJ that the case should have been filed initially
with the SEC.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution dated May
27, 2005.
Meanwhile, on February 21, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision in CA-
G.R. SP No. 85078 (involving petitioner's charges and respondents' counter charges)
dismissing the petition on the ground that the purpose of a petition for certiorari is not to
evaluate and weigh the parties' evidence but to determine whether the assailed Resolution
of the DOJ was issued with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.
Again, petitioner moved for a reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution of
November 22, 2005.
Hence, the instant petitions for review on certiorari.
For our resolution is the fundamental issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in
concluding that the DOJ did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
petitioner's complaint in I.S. 2004-229 for violation of Securities Regulation Code and his
complaint in I.S. No. 2003-1059 for syndicated estafa.
G.R. No 168380
Re: I.S. No. 2004-229
For violation of the Securities Regulation Code
Section 53.1 of the Securities Regulation Code provides:

SEC. 53. Investigations, Injunctions and Prosecution of Offenses. -
53. 1. The Commission may, in its discretion, make such investigation as it deems
necessary to determine whether any person has violated or is about to violate any
provision of this Code, any rule, regulation or order thereunder, or any rule of an
Exchange, registered securities association, clearing agency, other self-regulatory
organization, and may require or permit any person to file with it a statement in writing,
under oath or otherwise, as the Commission shall determine, as to all facts and
circumstances concerning the matter to be investigated. The Commission may publish
information concerning any such violations and to investigate any fact, condition,
practice or matter which it may deem necessary or proper to aid in the enforcement of the
provisions of this Code, in the prescribing of rules and regulations thereunder, or in
securing information to serve as a basis for recommending further legislation concerning
the matters to which this Code relates: Provided, however, That any person requested or
subpoenaed to produce documents or testify in any investigation shall simultaneously be
notified in writing of the purpose of such investigation: Provided, further, That all
criminal complaints for violations of this Code and the implementing rules and
regulations enforced or administered by the Commission shall be referred to the
Department of Justice for preliminary investigation and prosecution before the
proper court: Provided, furthermore, That in instances where the law allows
independent civil or criminal proceedings of violations arising from the act, the
Commission shall take appropriate action to implement the same: Provided, finally; That
the investigation, prosecution, and trial of such cases shall be given priority.
The Court of Appeals held that under the above provision, a criminal complaint for
violation of any law or rule administered by the SEC must first be filed with the latter. If
the Commission finds that there is probable cause, then it should refer the case to the
DOJ. Since petitioner failed to comply with the foregoing procedural requirement, the
DOJ did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing his complaint in I.S. No. 2004-229.
where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the
specialized knowledge and expertise of said administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact.[12] The Securities Regulation Code is a special law.
Its enforcement is particularly vested in the SEC. Hence, all complaints for any violation
of the Code and its implementing rules and regulations should be filed with the SEC.
Where the complaint is criminal in nature, the SEC shall indorse the complaint to the
DOJ for preliminary investigation and prosecution as provided in Section 53.1 earlier
quoted.
G.R. No. 170602

Re: I.S. No. 2003-1059 for
Syndicated Estafa
Section 5, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides that
all criminal actions, commenced by either a complaint or an information, shall be
prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor. This mandate is
founded on the theory that a crime is a breach of the security and peace of the people at
large, an outrage against the very sovereignty of the State. It follows that a representative
of the State shall direct and control the prosecution of the offense.[13] This representative
of the State is the public prosecutor, whom this Court described in the old case of Suarez
v. Platon, [14] as:
[T]he representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense a servant of the
law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffers.
Concomitant with his authority and power to control the prosecution of criminal offenses,
the public prosecutor is vested with the discretionary power to determine whether
a prima facie case exists or not. [15] This is done through a preliminary investigation
designed to secure the respondent from hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution. A
preliminary investigation is essentially an inquiry to determine whether (a) a crime has
been committed; and (b) whether there is probable cause that the accused is guilty
thereof. [16] In Pontejos v. Office of the Ombudsman, [17] probable cause is defined as
such facts and circumstances that would engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for
trial. It is the public prosecutor who determines during the preliminary investigation
whether probable cause exists. Thus, the decision whether or not to dismiss the criminal
complaint against the accused depends on the sound discretion of the prosecutor.
Given this latitude and authority granted by law to the investigating prosecutor, the rule
in this jurisdiction is that courts will not interfere with the conduct of preliminary
investigations or reinvestigations or in the determination of what constitutes
sufficient probable cause for the filing of the corresponding information against an
offender.[18] Courts are not empowered to substitute their own judgment for that of the
executive branch.[19] Differently stated, as the matter of whether to prosecute or not is
purely discretionary on his part, courts cannot compel a public prosecutor to file the
corresponding information, upon a complaint, where he finds the evidence before him
insufficient to warrant the filing of an action in court. In sum, the prosecutor's findings
on the existence of probable cause are not subject to review by the courts, unless
these are patently shown to have been made with grave abuse of discretion.[20]
Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the
part of the public officer concerned which is equivalent to an excess or lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be as patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act
at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.[21]
In determining whether the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion, it is expedient to

know if the findings of fact of herein public prosecutors were reached in an arbitrary or
despotic manner.
The Court of Appeals held that petitioner's evidence is insufficient to establish probable
cause for syndicated estafa. There is no showing from the record that private respondents
herein did induce petitioner by false representations to invest in the GTPMF securities.
Nor did they act as a syndicate to misappropriate his money for their own benefit. Rather,
they invested it in accordance with his written instructions. That he lost his investment is
not their fault since it was highly speculative.
Records show that public respondents examined petitioner's evidence with care, well
aware of their duty to prevent material damage to his constitutional right to liberty and
fair play. In Suarez previously cited, this Court made it clear that a public prosecutor's
duty is two-fold. On one hand, he is bound by his oath of office to prosecute persons
where the complainant's evidence is ample and sufficient to show prima facie guilt of a
crime. Yet, on the other hand, he is likewise duty-bound to protect innocent persons from
groundless, false, or malicious prosecution.[22]
Hence, we hold that the Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing the petition for
review against private respondents and in concluding that the DOJ did not act with grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
On petitioner's complaint for violation of the Securities Regulation Code, suffice it to

state that, as aptly declared by the Court of Appeals, he should have filed it with the SEC,
not the DOJ. Again, there is no indication here that in dismissing petitioner's complaint,
the DOJ acted capriciously or arbitrarily.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitions and AFFIRM the assailed Decisions of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87328 and in CA-G.R. SP No. 85078.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 164904, October 19, 2007 ]
JOSE ANTONIO U. GONZALEZ, PETITIONER, VS. HONGKONG &
SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as

amended, petitioner Jose Antonio U. Gonzalez (Gonzalez) seeks; 1) the reversal of the 13
January 2004 Decision,[2] and 6 August 2004 Resolution,[3] both of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 75469; and 2) the dismissal of the complaint[4] for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 115, otherwise known as the “Trust Receipts Law,” in relation to
Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code, filed by respondent Hongkong & Shanghai
Banking Corporation (HSBC) against him before the City Prosecutor of Makati and
docketed as I.S. No. 00-G-24734-35.
The Court of Appeals, in its assailed decision and resolution, found no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Secretary and the succeeding Acting Secretary, both of the
Department of Justice (DOJ), in their denial of petitioner Gonzalez’s petition for review
and motion for reconsideration, respectively. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed
the 17 October 2002,[5] and 14 January 2003[6] twin resolutions of the DOJ, which in turn
affirmed the 13 September 2000 Resolution,[7] of the City Prosecutor of Makati,
recommending the filing of an Information for violation of Presidential Decree No. 115,
in relation to Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner Gonzalez.
The case stemmed from a complaint filed by respondent HSBC against petitioner
Gonzalez for estafa, more particularly, the violation of Presidential Decree No. 115, in
relation to Art. 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
The antecedents of the present petition are beyond dispute. They are:
At the time of the incident subject of the case at bar, petitioner Gonzalez was the
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Mondragon Leisure and Resorts Corporation
(MLRC). MLRC is the owner, developer and operator of Mimosa Leisure
Estate[8] located at the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ), Clark Field, Pampanga. On
1 August 1997, petitioner Gonzalez, for and in behalf of MLRC, acknowledged receipt of
various golfing equipments and assorted Walt Disney items, and signed the
corresponding two Trust Receipt agreements, i.e., Trust Receipt No. 001-016310-205,
[9]
covering the various golfing equipments, and Trust Receipt No. 001-016310-206,
[10]
covering the assorted Walt Disney items, both in favor of respondent HSBC.
The due date for Trust Receipt No. 001-016310-205, for the value of HK$85,540.00, was
on 1 September 1997, while that of Trust Receipt No. 001-016310-206, for the value of
HK$143,993.90, was on 28 January 1998.
When the due dates of subject Trust Receipts came and went without word from MLRC,
respondent HSBC, through Paula L. Felipe (Felipe), Vice-President of respondent
HSBC’s Credit Control Department, in a letter[11] dated 28 March 2000, demanded from
MLRC the turnover of the proceeds of the sale of the assorted goods covered by the Trust
Receipts or the return of said goods. Despite demand, however, MLRC failed to return
the assorted goods or their value. Consequently, Felipe, for respondent HSBC, filed a
criminal complaint for estafa, i.e., for violation of Presidential Decree No. 115, the “Trust
Receipts Law,” in relation to Art. No. 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code against
petitioner Gonzalez before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati, docketed as I.S.
No. 00-G-24734-35. The complaint-affidavit contained the following allegations:
4. On August 1, 1997, Mr. Antonio U. Gonzalez, Chairman and Chief Executive of

Mondragon, executed in favor of the Bank Trust Receipt No. 001-016310-205, by
virtue of which he acknowledged receipt from the Bank of “(Sporting Goods) Golf
Equipments” (sic) with the value of HK$85,540.00. Under this trust receipt, Mr.
Gonzalez bound himself to turn over to the Bank the proceeds of the sale of the
goods or to return them in case of non-sale on January 28, 1998.
xxxx
5. On August 1, 1997, Mr. Gonzalez executed in favor of the Bank Trust Receipt No.
001-016310-206, by virtue of which he acknowledged receipt from the Bank of
“Assorted Disney Items” with the value of HK$143,993.90. Under this trust
receipt, Mr. Gonzalez bound himself to turn over to the Bank the proceeds of the
sale of the goods or to return them in case of non-sale on September 1, 1997.
xxxx
6. All the abovementioned trust receipts x x x executed by the respondents (sic)

contain the following provisions:
‘1. The Document and the goods and/or proceeds to which they relate (“The
Goods”) will be held for your [HSBC] benefit and the entrustee will receive the
Documents and take delivery of the Good exclusively for the purpose of selling
the Goods unless you [HSBC] shall direct otherwise.
2. The Documents, the Goods and the proceeds of their sale are and will be held
by the entrustee in trust for you [HSBC] as entruster and solely to your [HSBC]
order and the entrustee shall pay the proceeds to you [HSBC], immediately on
receipt thereof or of each portion thereof, as the case may be, without set-off or
any deduction. The records of the entrustee shall properly record your [HSBC]
interest in the Goods.
xxxx
10. This Trust Receipt shall be governed and construed in all respects in
accordance with P.D. 115 otherwise known as Trust Receipts Law.’
7. Despite repeated oral and written demands upon respondent, respondent has not
turned over to the Bank a single centavo of the proceeds of the sale of the
abovementioned goods covered by the Trust Receipts, or returned any of the
goods.[12]
In his defense, petitioner Gonzalez countered that:
2. At the outset, it must be stressed that the transactions subject of the instant
Complaint are between the complainant bank and Mondragon Leisure and Resorts
Corporation (“MLRC”) and that the officers of the latter, including respondent
herein, in all of their official acts and transactions, are not acting in their own
personal capacity but, rather, are merely acting on behalf of the corporation and
performing a valid corporate act pursuant to a validly enacted resolution of the
Board of Directors.
3. Moreover, it is clear that I cannot be held criminally responsible for alleged

violation of the Trust Receipts subject hereof. The aforesaid transactions, while
reportedly denominated as “Trust Receipts” were not really intended by the parties
to be trust receipt transaction within the purview of P.D. 115. At best, they are
loan transactions, for which the respondent cannot be held criminally liable.
xxxx
6. x x x respondent, who merely performed a valid corporate act may not be held
personally and criminally liable therefore (sic), absent a clear showing of fault or
negligence on his part x x x.
7. x x x it is required that the person charged with estafa pursuant to a trust receipt
transaction must be proved to have misappropriated, misused or converted to his
own personal use to the damage of the entruster, the proceeds of the goods covered
by the trust receipts. Thus, mere failure to pay the amounts covered by the trust
receipts does not conclusively constitute estafa as defined under P.D. 115 and the
Revised Penal Code.
8. x x x. [W]hile respondent may have failed on behalf of MLRC (which is actually

the debtor) to make payments on the due dates, such failure is neither attributable
to respondent or due to his wrongdoing or fault but on account of circumstances
concerning the corporation x x x.
xxxx
13. x x x there was a tacit agreement among the parties that defendant, being a stable
company with good credit standing, would be accorded leniency and given enough
leeway in the settlement of its obligations.
xxxx
17. x x x the unlawful closure of the Casino by CDC and PAGCOR, coupled with the
Asian economic crisis, severely affected its ability to pay its creditors, including
complainant bank herein, which have an aggregate exposure of about P5.3 Billion
in Mondragon. These events rendered it impossible for MLRC to duly comply
with its financial obligations. These events barred plaintiff bank from declaring
MLRC’s obligation due and demandable, and consequently from declaring
MLRC in default. Thus, since MLRC is not in default, respondents herein cannot
be charged for estafa as the obligations on the basis of which they are being
charged are not yet due and demandable.[13]
Following the requisite preliminary investigation, in a Resolution dated 13 September

2000, the City Prosecutor found probable cause to hold petitioner Gonzalez liable for two
counts of estafa, more specifically, the violation of Presidential Decree No. 115, in
relation to Art. 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code. The City Prosecutor recommended
that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Jose
Antonio U. Gonzalez be indicted with two (2) counts of Violation of P.D. 115 and that
the attached Information for that purpose be approved for filing in court.[14]
In finding probable cause to prosecute petitioner Gonzalez for the crime supposedly
committed, the City Prosecutor held that:
After study, assessment and thorough evaluation of the evidence obtaining in this case at
bar, the undersigned finds probable cause to warrant respondent’s indictment with the
offense charge (sic) all the elements of which are obtaining under the aforementioned
circumstances. This is so because respondent admitted having executed the trust receipts
subject matter of the case in point. The defense raised by the respondent though it appears
to be meritorious are (sic) matters of defense best left for the court to consider and
appreciate during trial of the case. As shown above, the failure of the
entrustee/respondent to account for the goods covered by the two (2) Trust Receipts
which he received after notice and demand caused him to be liable for two (2) counts of
violation of P.D. 115.[15]
On 24 October 2000, petitioner Gonzalez appealed the foregoing resolution of the City
Prosecutor to the DOJ by means of a petition for review.
In a Resolution dated 17 October 2002, Honorable Hernando B. Perez, then Secretary of
the DOJ, denied said petition. In affirming the resolution of the City Prosecutor of
Makati, the Secretary held that:
The gravamen of violation of PD 115 is the failure to account, upon demand, for fund or
property held in trust by virtue of a trust receipt x x x. This failure, being clearly present
in the instant case, prima facie evidence of misappropriation lies. A fortiori, the charges
of dishonesty and abuse of confidence will hold.[16]
Further, the Secretary ruled that:
The allegation of respondent that he cannot be made liable for the offense as he was just
performing a valid corporate act is untenable x x x. The respondent being the Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer and the person who signed the trust receipts, there can be no
doubt that there is no other person who can be considered as more responsible than him.
He appears to be the most responsible person contemplated under the aforesaid provision
of P.D. 115.
Finally, we agree with the Prosecutor’s findings that the other defenses raised by the
respondent are evidentiary in nature and best left to the sound appreciation of the court in
the course of the trial.[17]
The dispositive of the resolution provides:
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution is hereby AFFIRMED and consequently, the
petition is DENIED.[18]
Subsequently, on 14 January 2003, Hon. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, then Acting Secretary
of the DOJ, denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner Gonzalez.
Undaunted, petitioner Gonzalez went to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review
under Rule 43[19] of the Rules of Court, as amended.
On 13 January 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision denying petitioner
Gonzalez’s recourse for lack of merit.
The appellate court, notwithstanding the procedural infirmity, as the petition filed under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, as amended, was the wrong mode of appeal, took
cognizance of and proceeded to resolve the petition based on substantive grounds. In
holding that no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
tainted the actions of the Secretary as well as the Acting Secretary of the DOJ in denying
petitioner Gonzalez’s petition, the decision explained that:
In the case at bar, it is decisively clear that petitioner executed the trust receipts in behalf
of MLRC and that there was a failure to turn over the proceeds from the goods sold and
the goods themselves subject of the trust receipts despite demand from the respondent
bank. Such failure to account or turn over the proceeds or to return the goods subject of
the trust receipts gives rise to the crime punished under the Trust Receipts Law. [Citation
omitted.] Petitioner is ventilating before us the merits of his causes or defenses, but this is
not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of evidence. The presence or absence
of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and shall be passed upon after a full-
blown trial on the merits. Petitioner’s defenses are matters best left to the discretion of the
court during trial.[20]
The fallo of the preceding decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.[21]
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in a Resolution dated 6
August 2004.
Hence, the present petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
In the present petition, petitioner Gonzalez fundamentally seeks to reverse the ruling of
the Court of Appeals on the following grounds:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN

NOT FINDING THAT FOR A VALID INDICTMENT UNDER PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE NO. 115 TO LIE, THE SAID LAW MUST BE READ IN CONJUNCTION
WITH ARTICLE 315, PARAGRAPH 1 (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
WHICH REQUIRES THAT THE PERSON CHARGED WITH ESTAFA PURSUANT
TO A TRUST RECEIPT TRANSACTION MUST BE PROVED TO HAVE
MISAPPROPRIATED, MISUSED OR CONVERTED TO HIS PERSONAL USE THE
PROCEEDS OF THE GOODS COVERED BY THE TRUST RECEIPTS TO THE
DAMAGE OF THE ENTRUSTER; and
II.
NO PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS TO WARRANT THE INDICTMENT OF

PETITIONER FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 13 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 115.
[22]
On the whole, the basic issue presented before this Court in this petition is, given the
facts of the case, whether or not there is probable cause to hold petitioner Gonzalez liable
to stand trial for violation of Presidential Decree No. 115, in relation to Art. 315(1)(b) of
the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner Gonzalez contends that the Court of Appeals committed manifest error in
ruling, that, probable cause existed to hold him liable to stand trial merely on the basis of
“his admission that he executed the trust receipts subject matter of the case below and his
failure to account for the goods covered by the same.”[23] He argues that the City
Prosecutor of Makati and the DOJ failed to appreciate two important facts: 1) that the real
transaction that led to the present controversy was in fact a loan agreement; and 2) that
MLRC simply extended to Best Price PX, Inc., the owner and operator of Mimosa Mart
at the CESZ, its credit line with respondent HSBC, such that Best Price was the actual
debtor of respondent bank. Paradoxically, he maintains that “the fact that (he) held a high
position in MLRC was not sufficient reason to charge him for alleged violation of trust
receipts.”[24] He insists further that he is not the person responsible for the offense
allegedly committed because of the absence of “a clear showing of fault or negligence on
his part.” According to petitioner Gonzalez, “President (sic) Decree No. 115 must be read
in conjunction with Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code x x x under
both x x x it is required that the person charged with estafa pursuant to a trust receipt
transaction must be proved to have misappropriated, misused or converted to his own
personal use the proceeds of the goods covered by the trust receipts to the damage of the
entruster.” Thus, petitioner concludes that “mere failure to pay the amounts covered by
the trust receipts does not conclusively constitute estafa as defined under Presidential
Decree No. 115 and Article 315, paragraph 1(b).”
Respondent HSBC, on the other hand, contends that “petitioner is criminally liable since
he signed the trust receipts x x x;”[25] and, that, “[f]raud is not necessary for conviction for
violation of the Trust Receipts Law,”[26] the latter being in the nature of a malum
prohibitum decree. On the issue of company reverses, Asian currency crisis and the
closure of the Mimosa Regency Casino, respondent HSBC counters that “[t]hey do not
excuse petitioner for his failure to comply with his obligations under the trust
receipts,”[27] because unlike “motor vehicles or parcels of land, which are frequently
purchased on credit or on installment basis,”[28] the goods covered by the two trust
receipts, i.e., assorted Disney items and various golfing equipments, are usually paid for
in cash upon receipt by buyers; and if not sold, the merchandise should still be with
MLRC. Hence, there was no reason for petitioner Gonzalez’s failure to comply with his
obligation under the two Trust Receipts – to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the
goods or to return the goods if they remained unsold.
We find no merit in the petition.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction marred the assailed resolutions of the DOJ.
Herein, petitioner Gonzalez questions the finding of probable cause by the City
Prosecutor to hold him liable to stand trial for the crime complained of. Probable cause
has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the
belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor,
that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. [29] A
finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a
pronouncement of guilt.[30]
To determine the existence of probable cause, there is a need to conduct preliminary

investigation. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry to determine whether (a) a crime
has been committed; and (b) whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is
guilty thereof. Such investigation is designed to secure the (accused) against hasty,
malicious and oppressive prosecution, the conduct of which is executive in nature. [31]
The executive department of the government is accountable for the prosecution of crimes,
its principal obligation being the faithful execution of the laws of the land. A necessary
component of the power to execute the laws is the right to prosecute their violators.
[32]
Corollary to this, the right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of
discretion, the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which
depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors. [33]
Having said the foregoing, this Court consistently adheres to the policy of non-
interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to leave to the investigating
prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes
sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of an information
against the supposed offender,[34] courts can only review whether or not the executive
determination of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction resulting
from grave abuse of discretion. Thus, although it is entirely possible that the
investigating prosecutor may erroneously exercise the discretion lodged in him by law,
this does not render his act amenable to correction and annulment by the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction.[35]
And for courts of law to grant the extraordinary writ of certiorari, so as to justify the
reversal of the finding on the existence of probable cause to file an information, the one
seeking the writ must be able to establish that the investigating prosecutor exercised his
power in an arbitrary and despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, and
it must be patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. Grave abuse of discretion is
not enough.[36] Excess of jurisdiction signifies that he had jurisdiction over the case but
has transcended the same or acted without authority.[37]
Try as we might, this Court cannot find substantiation that the executive determination of
probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction resulting from grave abuse
of discretion, when the City Prosecutor resolved to recommend the filing of the
Information for two counts of violation of Presidential Decree No. 115 against petitioner
Gonzalez. Similarly, there is absolutely no showing that the DOJ, in the exercise of its
power to review on appeal the findings of the City Prosecutor of Makati, acted in an
arbitrary or despotic manner that amounted to an excess or lack of jurisdiction.
In the case at bar, petitioner Gonzalez is charged by respondent HSBC with violating
Presidential Decree No. 115. Section 4 of the “Trust Receipts Law” defines a trust receipt
transaction as –
Section 4. What constitutes a trust receipts transaction. – A trust receipt transaction,
within the meaning of this Decree, is any transaction by and between a person referred to
in this Decree as the entruster, and another person referred to in this Decree as entrustee,
whereby the entruster, who owns or holds absolute title or security interests over certain
specified goods, documents or instruments, releases the same to the possession of the
entrustee upon the latter’s execution and delivery to the entruster of a signed document
called a “trust receipt” wherein the entrustee binds himself to hold the designated goods,
documents or instruments in trust for the entruster and to sell or otherwise dispose of the
goods, documents or instruments with the obligation to turn over to the entruster the
proceeds thereof to the extent of the amount owing to the entruster or as appears in the
trust receipt or the goods, documents or instruments themselves if they are unsold or not
otherwise disposed of, in accordance with the terms and conditions specified in the trust
receipt, or for other purposes substantially equivalent to any of the following:
1. In the case of goods or documents: (a) to sell the goods or procure their sale; or (b)
to manufacture or process the goods with the purpose of ultimate sale: Provided,
That, in the case of goods delivered under trust receipt for the purpose of
manufacturing or processing before its ultimate sale, the entruster shall retain its
title over the goods whether in its original or processed form until the entrustee has
complied fully with his obligation under the trust receipt; or (c) to load, unload,
ship or transship or otherwise deal with them in a manner preliminary or necessary
to their sale; or
2. In the case of instruments: (a) to sell or procure their sale or exchange; or (b) to
deliver them to a principal; or (c) to effect the consummation of some transactions
involving delivery to a depository or register; or (d) to effect their presentation,
collection or renewal.
The sale of good, documents or instruments by a person in the business of selling goods,
documents or instruments for profit who, at the outset of transaction, has, as against the
buyer, general property rights in such goods, documents or instruments, or who sells the
same to the buyer on credit, retaining title or other interest as security for the payment of
the purchase price, does not constitute a trust receipt transaction and is outside the
purview and coverage of this Decree.
In general, a trust receipt transaction imposes upon the entrustee the obligation to deliver
to the entruster the price of the sale, or if the merchandise is not sold, to return the same
to the entruster. There are thus two obligations in a trust receipt transaction: the first,
refers to money received under the obligation involving the duty to turn it over
(entregarla) to the owner of the merchandise sold,[38] while the second refers to
merchandise received under the obligation to “return” it (devolvera) to the owner.[39] A
violation of any of these undertakings constitutes estafa defined under Art. 315(1)(b) of
the Revised Penal Code, as provided by Sec. 13 of Presidential Decree 115, viz:
Section 13. Penalty clause. – The failure of an entrustee to turn over the proceeds of the
sale of the goods, documents or instruments covered by a trust receipt to the extent of the
amount owing to the entruster or as appears in the trust receipt or to return said goods,
documents or instruments if they were not sold or disposed of in accordance with the
terms of the trust receipt shall constitute the crime of estafa, punishable under the
provisions of Article Three Hundred and Fifteen, paragraph one (b) of Act Numbered
Three Thousand Eight Hundred and fifteen, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised
Penal Code. If the violation or offense is committed by a corporation, partnership,
association or other juridical entities, the penalty provided for in this Decree shall be
imposed upon the directors, officers, employees or other officials or persons therein
responsible for the offense, without prejudice to the civil liabilities arising from the
criminal offense.
Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code punishes estafa committed as follows:
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
xxxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other
personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration,
or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same,
even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying
having received such money, goods, or other property.
As found in the complaint-affidavit of respondent HSBC’s representative, petitioner
Gonzalez is charged with failing to turn over “to the Bank a single centavo of the
proceeds of the sale of the (assorted) goods covered by the Trust Receipts, or x x x” [40] or
to return any of the assorted goods. From the evidence adduced before the City
Prosecutor of Makati i.e., 1) the two Trust Receipts bearing the acknowledgment
signature of petitioner Gonzalez; 2) the official documents concerning the transaction
between MLRC and respondent HSBC; 3) the demand letter of respondent HSBC; and,
significantly, 4) the counter-affidavit of petitioner Gonzalez containing his initial
admission that on behalf of MLRC, he entered into a trust receipt transaction with
respondent HSBC – the investigating officer determined that there existed probable cause
to hold petitioner Gonzalez for trial for the crime charged. Time and again, this Court
has stated that probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of
guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and, definitely, not
on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt; but it certainly demands more than
bare suspicion and can never be left to presupposition, conjecture, or even convincing
logic.[41] In the present case, there being sufficient evidence to support the finding of
probable cause by the City Prosecutor of Makati, the same cannot be said to have resulted
from bare suspicion, presupposition, conjecture or logical deduction.
That petitioner Gonzalez neither had the intent to defraud respondent HSBC nor
personally misused/misappropriated the goods subject of the trust receipts is of no
moment. The offense punished under Presidential Decree No. 115 is in the nature
of malum prohibitum. A mere failure to deliver the proceeds of the sale or the goods if
not sold, constitutes a criminal offense that causes prejudice not only to another, but more
to the public interest.[42] This is a matter of public policy as declared by the legislative
authority. Moreover, this Court already held previously that failure of the entrustee to
turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods, covered by the trust receipt, to the
entruster or to return said goods if they were not disposed of in accordance with the terms
of the trust receipt shall be punishable as estafa under Art. 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal
Code without need of proving intent to defraud.[43]
As a last ditch effort to exculpate himself from the offense charged, petitioner Gonzalez
posits that, “the fact that (he) held a high position in MLRC was not sufficient reason to
charge him for alleged violation of trust receipts.”[44] Unfortunately, it is but a futile
attempt. Though petitioner Gonzalez signed the Trust Receipts merely as a corporate
officer of MLRC and had no physical possession of the goods subject of such receipts, he
cannot avoid responsibility for violation of Presidential Decree No. 115 for two
unpretentious reasons: first, that the last sentence of Section 13 of the “Trust Receipts
Law,” explicitly imposes the penalty provided therein upon “directors, officers,
employees or other officials or persons therein responsible for the offense, without
prejudice to the civil liabilities arising from the criminal offense,” of a corporation,
partnership, association or other juridical entities found to have violated the obligation
imposed under the law. The rationale for making such officers and employees
responsible for the offense is that they are vested with the authority and responsibility to
devise means necessary to ensure compliance with the law and, if they fail to do so, are
held criminally accountable; thus, they have a responsible share in the violations of the
law.[45] And second, a corporation or other juridical entity cannot be arrested and
imprisoned; hence, cannot be penalized for a crime punishable by imprisonment. [46]
Petitioner Gonzalez’s allegation that Best Price PX, Inc. is the real party in the trust
receipt transaction and his assertion that the real transaction between respondent HSBC
and MLRC is a loan agreement, are matters of defense best left to the trial court’s
deliberation and contemplation after conducting the trial of the criminal case. To
reiterate, a preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the existence of
probable cause is not part of the trial. A full and exhaustive presentation of the parties’
evidence is not required, but only such as may engender a well-grounded belief that an
offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. [47]
In fine, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error when it ruled that there was
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary and Acting Secretary of the DOJ
in directing the filing of the Information against petitioner Gonzalez for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 115 in relation to Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
The assailed 13 January 2004 Decision and 6 August 2004 Resolution, both of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75469 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 177566 [Formerly G.R. No. 164433], March 26,
2008 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. ROSALINDA
TRAPAGO TAN A.K.A. KAYE SUAREZ PALINO, MARIA EL FELASOL
FLORES, A.K.A. MAE FELASOL FLORES, ARMANDO PANAGUITON DE
LUNA, BENITO FEOLOG FELAZOL, EDUARDO FRONDOZO FELAZOL,
ANGELITO ANG DIEGO AND ROBERTO TOLENTINO, APPELLANTS.
DECISION
TINGA, J,:
On appeal by way of automatic review is the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01988, affirming with modification the Judgment[2] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), convicting appellants Rosalinda Trapago Tan (Rosalinda), Mae Felasol
Flores (Mae), Armando Panaguiton De Luna (Armando), Benito Feolog Felazol (Benito),
Eduardo Frondozo Felazol (Eduardo), Angelito Ang Diego (Angelito), and Roberto
Tolentino (Roberto) for the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom.
The facts as narrated by prosecution witnesses follow.
At about 8:30 p.m. of 8 September 1997, Ruiz Saez Co (Ruiz) was taking his meal in a
store located just outside his company's premises in Barrio Mamatid, Cabuyao, Laguna.
He noticed three vehicles parked in front of the store - a green Nissan Sentra car, a black
Honda Civic car and a red L-300 van. Suddenly, a man alighted from the Nissan Sentra
car and aimed a gun at him. He tried to escape and started running towards the
company plant when two (2) armed men alighted from the L-300 van and blocked his
way. Ruiz was then forcibly boarded into the black Honda Civic car. Inside the car, he
was handcuffed and made to stoop down. After driving for about an hour, Ruiz was led
out of the car, brought inside a house, and locked into a room. A certain Ka Rudy told
him that he had just been kidnapped in exchange for P40 Million for his freedom. [3]
Meanwhile, at around 9:00 p.m. of the same day, Mrs. Sonia Co (Sonia) received a call
from the vice mayor of Cabuyao, Laguna that her son had been kidnapped. She
immediately called then Vice-President Joseph Estrada to seek assistance. The latter
referred the matter to General Panfilo Lacson (Lacson) who in turn instructed Police
Officer Senior Superintendent Cesar Mancao (Mancao) to dispatch teams to monitor the
alleged kidnappers.[4]
At 2:30 a.m. of the following day, Sonia finally received a call from the alleged kidnapper
who identified himself as Ka Rudy. The latter confirmed that Ruiz was in his custody. On
his second call, Ka Rudy asked for a P40 Million ransom, which amount was lowered to
P1.2 Million after negotiations.[5]
During Ruiz's captivity, he was also blindfolded and handcuffed but was allowed to go to
the bathroom accompanied by his kidnappers. On 14 September 1997, Mancao received
a tip from an anonymous female caller that the persons responsible for the kidnapping
of Ruiz were the caller's husband and the latter's girlfriend; and that Ruiz was being kept
in a house somewhere in Palmera Homes Subdivision, Taytay, Rizal.
A team was dispatched to said area the following morning and surveillance was
thereafter conducted.[6] In the morning of his eighth day in captivity, Ruiz heard shouts
and rapid gunshots outside the room. He quickly removed his blindfold. After a while, a
man forced open the door and introduced himself as a member of the SWAT. Ruiz was
then secured and taken out of the house. On his way towards the police van, Ruiz saw
two (2) persons lying on their back, another two (2) squatting with their hands tied at
the back of their heads, and two (2) women embracing each other. Ruiz later identified
the women as Mae and Rosalinda, and one of the men with hands tied at the back as
Eduardo.[7]
Mancao recounted that seven (7) persons were arrested - five (5) males and two (2)
females. In addition to those already identified by Ruiz, the other persons were
identified by Mancao as Roberto, Benito and Armando. Several high-powered firearms
were recovered from the house. [8] At 7:00 a.m. of 16 September 1997, Sonia received a
call from Lacson who related that Ruiz son had already been rescued. [9]
Appellants, who came from various locations in Metro Manila, [10] testified for the
defense and presented their respective alibis.
Benito claimed that on 15 September 1997, he, together with Roberto, went to a house
owned by a certain Sgt. Salazar, located at 421 Thatch Palm Street, Palmera Hills,
Taytay, Rizal, to repair a motor vehicle. They were met by Nympha Salazar (Nympha),
the wife of Sgt. Salazar. At around 4:00 p.m., Eduardo, Benito's cousin, arrived. They
finished the repair work at 6:00 p.m. While waiting for Sgt. Salazar to come home for
their pay, Nympha brought them one case of beer. They then started drinking together
with two guests of the Salazar whom they only knew to be "Toto" and "Ariston." By
10:00 p.m., Benito stopped drinking and fell asleep in the sala. He was awakened in the
morning by a firefight. He was shot in the inner thigh and was taken in by the police.
[11]
Roberto and Eduardo corroborated his testimony.
Armando explained that he was renting the extension house of the Salazars with his
live-in partner, Mae. At around 7:30 p.m. on 15 September 1997, he came home to find
several persons drinking under the mango tree. A few minutes later, Angelito came
knocking at his door looking for Mae so he could give his payment for the perfume he
purchased from her. Armando then invited Angelito for dinner. At 10:30 p.m., Armando
accompanied Angelito to the gate and were invited to join the drinking spree. The
following morning, they were awakened by gunshots. [12]
Mae related that upon hearing the gunshots, she and Armando also heard someone
shouting at them to stand up. They embraced each other. Some armed men then
entered their house and told them to get out. Mae denied knowing Eduardo, Benito,
Rosalinda and Roberto.[13] She averred that she only came to know Angelito through the
latter's wife.
Rosalinda, for her part, alleged that Sgt. Salazar was a regular customer of the
establishment where she used to work. Nympha, the wife of Sgt. Salazar, called her
through cellphone and asked her to meet with her. At around 11:00 p.m. on 15
September 1997, they met at Grand Central Mall in Monumento. They boarded a taxi
and proceeded to 421 Thatch Palm Street, Taytay, Rizal at 12:00 midnight. Upon arrival
at said address, Rosalinda was informed by Nympha that Sgt. Salazar was already dead.
Nympha then went out and did not come back. Rosalinda decided to sleep in the room
of Mae.[14]
On 17 September 1997, appellants were charged with the crime of kidnapping for
ransom in an Information the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about September 8, 1997 in the evening of Barangay Mamatid,
Cabuyao, Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named
accused conspiring, confederating, mutually helping one another and grouping
themselves together, did then and there, by force and intimidation, and use of high
powered firearms, wifully, unlawfully, feloniously take, carry away, and deprive Ruiz
Saez-Co y Lim of his liberty against his will for purposes of extorting money as in fact a
demand for money was made as a condition for his release but before any ransom can
be paid, the victim was rescued after eight (8) days in captivity.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[15]
On arraignment, appellants entered their plea of not guilty. Trial ensued.
On 5 April 2002, the trial court rendered judgment finding appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and sentenced each of them to
suffer the penalty of death. [16]
The records of this case were originally elevated to this Court for automatic review.
Conformably with our ruling in People v. Mateo[17] however, the case was referred to the
Court of Appeals for intermediate review.
Appellants maintained that among the circumstances allegedly established by the

prosecution's evidence, the only link to the accused is that they were all arrested at the
place where the kidnap victim was rescued. Appellants argued that the circumstantial
evidence presented by the prosecution failed to prove that they conspired and actually
participated in the kidnapping of the victim. Furthermore, appellants contended that
mere presence at the crime scene cannot be considered as proof of conspiracy. All told,
appellants proffered that their guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt;
hence, they must be acquitted. [18]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for its part recommended that appellants be
held guilty of serious illegal detention instead of kidnapping for failure of the
prosecution to prove that appellants were the ones who abducted Ruiz on 8 September
1997, forced him to board the black Honda Civic, and brought him to the place where he
was rescued eight days later. Likewise, the prosecution failed to prove that demands for
ransom had been made by any, some or all of the appellants. [19]
In a Decision dated 27 November 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the
trial court with the following modification:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the April 5, 2002 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 24, in Criminal Case No. 9984-B, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that in view of the passage of R.A. No. 9346, the
accused-appellants are suffered to serve the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with the
accessory penalties prescribed under Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code in lieu of the
Death Penalty.[20]
The appellate court rejected appellants' defense of denial and held that it cannot
prevail over the ample amount of circumstantial evidence proffered by the prosecution
which tends to prove their involvement in the crime.
The appellate court likewise sustained the trial court's finding that demands for ransom
had been actually made by appellants.
On 22 August 2007, this Court required the parties to simultaneously file their
respective supplemental briefs.[21] However, on 10 and 15 October 2007, the OSG and
appellants respectively manifested that they were adopting their brief earlier filed
before the Court of Appeals. [22]
The fundamental issue to be resolved is whether the guilt of the appellants has been
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
For the accused to be convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable
doubt all the elements of the crime, namely: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2)
he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the
act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense
any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for
more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c) serious
physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill
him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped and kept in detained is a minor, the duration
of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained
for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention is immaterial. [23]
Based on the victim's account, the ordeal he had gone through can be divided into three
distinct segments, namely: (1) the forcible taking, (2) the asportation, and (3) the
protracted detention. The first segment was the Mamatid (in Cabuyao, Laguna) episode
where he was held by armed men at gunpoint and forcibly boarded in a car. The second
segment covered the entire forced journey of the victim from Mamatid to the detention
house in Taytay, Rizal. And the third segment was the Taytay episode. It covered the full
length of the victim's involuntary confinement spanning eight (8) days until his stirring
rescue. There is no doubt that the victim was deprived of his liberty throughout all the
episodes. But the question is: was the criminal liability of the appellants in each and
every episode established beyond reasonable doubt?
We agree with the OSG that the participation of the appellants in the forcible taking and
journey of the victim was not clearly established. There were no eyewitnesses who
testified on the abduction. While the victim testified on the three episodes, he failed to
see and identify any of his captors until he was rescued as he was blindfolded most of
the time during his captivity. He did not see the face of the persons who abducted him
in Mamatid and those who formed the entourage which brought him to Taytay. To
conclude that those who were captured during the rescue operation were also
participants in the forcible taking and asportation is to lower the level of evidence
required for conviction.
Parenthetically, the public prosecutor was not allowed by the trial court judge to
question the victim although he asked for leave to ask additional questions after the
private prosecutor was done with his questions on direct examination. Instead of
granting the requested leave outright, the trial judge consulted the defense counsel and
the private prosecutor who both manifested that whatever questions the public
prosecutor had in mind should be coursed through and asked by the private prosecutor.
Thus, the trial judge directed the private prosecutor to propound whatever questions
the public prosecutor would suggest. [24] At this juncture, we find it necessary to remind
trial court judges that under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, all
criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the public
prosecutor. The public prosecutor may turn over the actual prosecution of the criminal
case to the private prosecutor, in the exercise of his discretion, but he may, at any time,
take over the actual conduct of the trial. [25]
The third episode, however, is different. The criminal participation of the appellants
therein was proven beyond reasonable doubt. The OSG correctly recommended that
they should be held liable therefor.
A surveillance operation was conducted before the rescue of the victim, resulting in the
determination that the victim was locked in a small room of a house in Palmera Hills,
Taytay, Rizal. The victim's description of the house where he was kept "as small because
the door of the room was adjacent to the comfort room" [26] corresponds to the
description given at the subject house by the members of the Presidential Anti-
Organized Crime Task Force.
The seven (7) appellants were all apprehended in the house or in the premises where
the victim was detained. Ruiz identified three (3) of them as present and alive during the
raid resulting to his rescue, including the two (2) women - Mae and Rosalinda. [27] Two
(2) other accused were caught hiding in the ceiling, upon the tip given by Ruiz.
[28]
Angelito was the last to be apprehended as he hid among the grass outside the house
for seven (7) hours, only to be caught later by police officers from Antipolo. [29]
The unexplained presence of appellants in the house where the victim was held captive
leads to no other conclusion than that they participated in his illegal detention. Not a
single appellant could convincingly explain his presence at the crime scene. As aptly
observed by the trial court:
Accused Benito and Eduardo both surnamed Felazol and Robert Tolentino
claimed that they were at the place where Co was rescued because their group repaired
the car of Sgt. Salazar. However, the Court cannot give much weight and credit to the
defense of these three (3) accused considering that if it is true that Sgt. Salazar's car has
to be repaired, he should have brought his car to an auto repair shop. Sgt. Salazar has
no reason to request accused Benito Felazol to repair his car, it appearing that the latter
is a driver and not a mechanic, hence, he has no technical know-how to repair a car.
Furthermore, it is unbelievable that Nympha Salazar, the wife of Sgt. Salazar would
allow these persons to sleep in their house considering that these persons are not
personally known to their family, because as testified to by Benito Felazol, he came to
know Sgt. Salazar only when he sidesw[iped] the car of the latter.
As regards the defense of accused Angelito Ang Diego, the Court sees no reason to
believe his testimony that he was at the crime scene because he remitted collection for
some merchandise his wife obtained from Mae Felasol Flores and thereafter, he drank
with the three (3) persons whom he does not know under the mango tree. The Court is
not inclined to believe his story as it is against human experience for a person to drink
with some individuals unknown to him until the wee hours of the morning.
Furthermore, accused Ang Diego testified that during the raid, at around 5:00 a.m., he
jumped over the fence and hides himself in the grasses outside the compound.
However, when he gets out from the grasses at around 12:00 noontime, the policemen
from Antipolo apprehended him. At this juncture, the Court could not see any reason
why accused Ang Diego has to hide himself in the grasses outside the compound for
almost seven (7) hours if it is really true that he has nothing to do with the kidnapping of
Ruiz Saez-Co for an innocent person is bold as a lion.
As to the defense of accused Armando Panaguiton de Luna and Mae Felasol Flores that
they were in the safe house because they were live-in partners and that they were
renting an extension house in the compound, the Court believes and so holds that such
contention is unworthy of belief and credit because of some inconsistencies in their
testimonies. Accused Armando Panaguiton de Luna when asked on direct examination
stated that her live-in partner, Mae Flores was a saleslady at Manuela Crossing.
x x x
However, when Mae Flores was asked on direct examination, she stated that she was a
vendor at Edsa Central Crossing. x x x
Such inconsistencies in the testimonies of de Luna and Flores created a serious doubt in
the mind of the Court as to the truthfulness of their statements considering that if it is
really true that they have been living together, each of them know the place of work of
one another and for how many years they have been living together as husband and
wife.
With respect to the claim of accused Rosalinda Trapago Tan that she was at the said
place because Nympha Estoquia fetched her at Monumento, such defense is unworthy
of belief and credit.
It is implausible that accused Tan would go with a person whom she does not know
personally, as she admitted that she only knew Nympha thru the telephone. Moreover,
it is unbelievable that a woman would go with a stranger for an undisclosed reason at an
undisclosed place in that late hour of the night (11:00 p.m.).
Likewise, the Court is not inclined to believe the story of accused Tan that she will agree
to be left by Nympha in the house owned by the latter when she is not even personally
known to Nympha and without any sufficient justification.
x x x
All the accused admitted that they were at the safe house when Ruiz Saez-Co was
rescued on September 16, 1997, although all of them deny having involvement in the
kidnapping of the victim. Their being present together in a questionable place, during a
questionable hour of the night, only for simple reasons given by each of them, gave
doubt to the mind of the Court, that they are telling the truth. [30]
Under the circumstances, the fact that appellants came from different parts of
Metro Manila and offered no plausible reason for their presence at the enclosed estate
where the victim was rescued speaks tomes of their culpability.
Unfortunately, the owners of the house, Sgt. Salazar and Nympha, who could have
corroborated appellants' alibis, were not presented in court. Sgt. Salazar was already
dead on 15 September 1997. Strangely, only Rosalinda knew of this fact when she was
allegedly told by Nympha. The other appellants, who admitted their presence in
Salazars' house, were not aware or even had the slightest knowledge of Sgt. Salazar's
death. Nympha, whose presence in the house was affirmed by all of the appellants, was
not presented as a witness by the defense.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a crime and decide to commit it. It may be proved by direct or
circumstantial evidence consisting of acts, words or conduct of the alleged conspirators
before, during and after the commission of the felony to achieve a common design or
purpose.[31] That the appellants conspired to detain Ruiz was evident in their collective
and concerted acts before, during and after the illegal detention. In the instant case, the
following circumstances prove the existence of conspiracy among appellants: (1) the
nine (9) persons present in the house during the captivity of Ruiz were all accounted for
after the raid; (2) the recovery of high-powered firearms signified that appellants were
united in their design to restrain the victim of his liberty; and (3) the exchange of gunfire
resulting in the death of two kidnappers and wounding of one of the appellants
demonstrated their resistance to the arresting team.
The primary element of the crime of kidnapping is actual confinement, detention and
restraint of the victim. There must be a showing of actual confinement or restriction of
the victim, and that such deprivation was the intention of the malefactor. [32] Hence,
having proven that detention was perpetrated by appellants, it is sufficient to convict
them of the crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
However, the demand for ransom was not clearly attributed to any of the appellants.
Ruiz divulged that the demand for ransom was intimated to him by a certain Ka Rudy.
Sonia, in her testimony, corroborated this fact, when she declared that they were able
to negotiate the amount of ransom from P40 Million to P1.2 Million in a
series of calls made by Ka Rudy and a female caller. [33] But the duo was never
ascertained to be any of the appellants. Thus, we are constrained to reverse the
judgment of the trial court and appellate court judgment in convicting appellants of
kidnapping for ransom.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is MODIFIED in that appellants Rosalinda Trapago

Tan a.k.a. Kaye Suarez Palino, Maria El Felasol Flores a.k.a. Mae Felasol Flores, Armando
Panaguiton De Luna, Benito Feolog Felazol, Eduardo Frondozo Felazol, Angelito Ang
Diego, and Roberto Tolentino are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention. By virtue of this modification, and not Republic Act No.
9346, the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua on each of the appellants in
the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
STATE PROSECUTOR RINGCAR A.M. No. RTJ-05-1944

B. PINOTE,
[Formerly OCA I.P.I. No.
Petitioner , 05-2189-RTJ]

-versus- Present:

PANGANIBAN, Chairman,
JUDGE ROBERTO L. AYCO, SANDOVAL- GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
Respondent
. CARPIO MORALES, and
GARCIA, JJ.
Promulgated:
December 13, 2005
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - -
--x

DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On August 13 and 20, 2004, Judge Roberto L. Ayco of Branch 26, Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of South Cotabato allowed the defense in Criminal Case No. 1771 TB,
'People v. Vice Mayor Salvador Ramos, et al., for violation of Section 3 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, to present evidence consisting of the
testimony of two witnesses, even in the absence of State Prosecutor Ringcar B.
Pinote who was prosecuting the case.
State Prosecutor Pinote was on August 13 and 20, 2004 undergoing medical
treatment at the Philippine Heart Center in Quezon City, hence, his absence during
the proceedings on the said dates.
On the subsequent scheduled hearings of the criminal case on August 27, October
1, 15 and 29, 2004, State Prosecutor Pinote refused to cross-examine the two
defense witnesses, despite being ordered by Judge Ayco, he maintaining that the
proceedings conducted on August 13 and 20, 2004 in his absence were void.
State Prosecutor Pinote subsequently filed a Manifestation on November 12, 2004

before the trial court, he restating why he was not present on August 13 and 20,
2004, and reiterating his position that Judge Ayco's act of allowing the defense to
present evidence in his absence was erroneous and highly irregular. He thus prayed
that he should not be 'coerced to cross-examine those two defense witnesses and
that their testimonies be stricken off the record.

By Order issued also on November 12, 2004, Judge Ayco, glossing over the
Manifestation, considered the prosecution to have waived its right to cross-examine
the two defense witnesses.
Hence, arose the present administrative complaint lodged by State Prosecutor

Pinote (complainant) against Judge Ayco (respondent), for 'Gross Ignorance of the
Law, Grave Abuse of Authority and Serious Misconduct.
By Comment dated March 18, 2005, respondent proffers that complainant filed the
complaint 'to save his face and cover up for his incompetence and lackadaisical
handling of the prosecution of the criminal case as in fact complainant was, on the
request of the Provincial Governor of South Cotabato, relieved as prosecutor in the
case by the Secretary of Justice.
And respondent informs that even after complainant was already relieved as the
prosecutor in the case, he filed a motion for his inhibition without setting it for
hearing.
On the above-said Manifestation filed by complainant before the trial court on

November 12, 2004, respondent brands the same as 'misleading and 'highly
questionable, complainant's having undergone medical treatment at the Philippine
Heart Center on August 13 and 20, 2004 having been relayed to the trial court only
on said date.
On his Order considering the prosecution to have waived presenting evidence,

respondent justifies the same on complainant's failure to formally offer the evidence
for the prosecution despite several extensions of time granted for the purpose.

Finally, respondent proffers that no substantial prejudice was suffered by the
prosecution for complainant was permitted to cross examine the two defense
witnesses but he refused to do so.
By way of counter-complaint, respondent charges complainant with 'Contempt of

Court and 'Grave Misconduct and/or 'Conduct Unbecoming of a Member of the Bar
and as an Officer of the Court.
On evaluation of the case, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), citing
Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rule on Criminal Procedure, finds respondent to
have breached said rule and accordingly recommends that he be reprimanded
therefor, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with
more severely.
Rule 110, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
Sec. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. - All

criminal actions commenced by a complaint or
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and
control of the prosecutor. In case of heavy work schedule
or in the event of lack of public prosecutors, the private
prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of
the Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecution
Office to prosecute the case subject to the approval of
the Court. Once so authorized to prosecute the criminal
action, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute
the case up to the end of the trial even in the absence of
a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or
otherwise withdrawn.

x x x (Underscoring supplied)

Thus, as a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the control
and direction of the public prosecutor.
If the schedule of the public prosecutor does not permit, however, or in case there
are no public prosecutors, a private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the
Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecution Office to prosecute
the case, subject to the approval of the court. Once so authorized, the private
prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case until the termination of the trial
even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or
otherwise withdrawn.
Violation of criminal laws is an affront to the People of the Philippines as a whole

and not merely to the person directly prejudiced, he being merely the complaining
witness. [1] It is on this account that the presence of a public prosecutor in the trial
of criminal cases is necessary to protect vital state interests, foremost of which is
its interest to vindicate the rule of law, the bedrock of peace of the people. [2]
Respondent's act of allowing the presentation of the defense witnesses in the

absence of complainant public prosecutor or a private prosecutor designated for the
purpose is thus a clear transgression of the Rules which could not be rectified by
subsequently giving the prosecution a chance to cross-examine the witnesses.
Respondent's intention to uphold the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of

the case, no matter how noble it may be, cannot justify a breach of the Rules. If
the accused is entitled to due process, so is the State.

Respondent's lament about complainant's failure to inform the court of his inability
to attend the August 13 and 20, 2004 hearings or to file a motion for postponement
thereof or to subsequently file a motion for reconsideration of his Orders allowing
the defense to present its two witnesses on said dates may be mitigating. It does
not absolve respondent of his utter disregard of the Rules.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Roberto L. Ayco is hereby ordered to pay a fine

FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) with warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Respecting the counter-complaint against complainant State Prosecutor Ringcar B.

Pinote, respondent is advised that the same should be lodged before the Secretary
of Justice.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 193681, August 06, 2014 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF,
MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. AND HELEN Y. DEE, PRIVATE

COMPLAINANTS-PETITIONERS, VS. PHILIP PICCIO, MIA
GATMAYTAN, MA. ANNABELLA RELOVA SANTOS, JOHN JOSEPH
GUTIERREZ, JOCELYN UPANO, JOSE DIZON, ROLANDO PAREJA,
WONINA BONIFACIO, ELVIRA CRUZ, CORNELIO ZAFRA, VICENTE
ORTUOSTE, VICTORIA GOMEZ JACINTO, JUVENCIO PERECHE, JR.,
RICARDO LORAYES, PETER SUCHIANCO, AND TRENNIE MONSOD,
RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] is the Resolution[2] dated

September 15, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31549 which granted
respondents’ motion for reconsideration of the Resolution [3] dated January 21, 2009,
thereby dismissing petitioners’ notice of appeal [4] from the dismissal of Criminal Case
No. 06-875[5] for libel on the ground that petitioners had no personality to appear for
the State and appeal the criminal aspect of a case because the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) did not give its conformity to the same. Assailed further is the
Resolution[6] dated September 2, 2010 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration
of the September 15, 2009 Resolution of the CA for lack of merit.
The Facts
On October 18, 2005, Jessie John P. Gimenez, President of the Philippine Integrated
Advertising Agency – the advertising arm of the Yuchengco Group of Companies, to
which Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. is a corporate member – filed a Complaint-
Affidavit for libel before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City against a group
called the Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI) for posting on the website
www.pepcoalition.com on August 25, 2005 an article entitled “Back to the Trenches: A
Call to Arms, AY/HELEN Chose the War Dance with Coalition.” As alleged in the
complaint, such publication was highly defamatory and libelous against the Yuchengco
family and the Yuchengco Group of Companies, particularly petitioners Malayan
Insurance Co., Inc. and Helen Y. Dee (petitioners). [7]
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City[8] found probable cause to indict 16
trustees, officers and/or members of PEPCI, namely, respondents Philip Piccio, Mia
Gatmaytan, Ma. Annabella Relova Santos, John Joseph Gutierrez, Jocelyn Upano
(Upano), Jose Dizon, Rolando Pareja, Wonina Bonifacio (Bonifacio), Elvira Cruz, Cornelio
Zafra, Vicente Ortuoste (Ortuoste), Victoria Gomez Jacinto, Juvencio Pereche, Jr.
(Pereche, Jr.), Ricardo Lorayes, Peter Suchianco, and Trennie Monsod (respondents) for
13 counts of libel.[9]
The criminal information in I.S. No. 1-11-11995 was soon after raffled to the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 (RTC) and was docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-
875. Upon motion of respondents Bonifacio, Upano, Ortuoste, and Pereche, Jr., the RTC,
in an Order dated May 23, 2007, quashed the criminal information for libel and
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, [10] holding that the criminal information failed
to allege where the article was printed and first published or where the offended parties
reside.[11] It subsequently denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in an Order
dated February 11, 2008.[12]
On February 29, 2008, the People of the Philippines (People), through the private
prosecutors, and with the conformity of public prosecutor Benjamin S. Vermug, Jr., filed
a Notice of Appeal.[13] Soon after, petitioners filed the Brief for the Private
Complainants-Appellants[14] as directed by the CA. The OSG, for its part, however, sought
suspension of the period to file the required brief pending information and
endorsement from the Department of Justice (DOJ) on whether it is the People or the
private complainant that should file the same.[15]
Subsequently, the OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion[16] dated October 20, 2008
stating that it had received an advisory from the DOJ that the latter had no information
about the case and, thus, prayed that it be excused from filing the appellant’s brief.
Meanwhile, respondents Bonifacio, Upano, Ortuoste, and Pereche, Jr. filed a Motion to
Dismiss Appeal,[17] citing as grounds for dismissal the fact that the Brief for the Private
Complainants-Appellants filed by petitioners did not carry the conforme of the OSG and
that ordinary appeal was not the appropriate remedy. In a Resolution [18] dated January
21, 2009 the CA denied the said motion and directed respondents to file their appellee’s
brief.[19]
Instead of filing the required appellee’s brief, respondents moved for the
reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution, prompting petitioners and the OSG to file
their respective comments.[20]
In their Comment/ Opposition[21] to the said motion for reconsideration, petitioners

insisted that the trial court’s order of dismissal was a final order from which an appeal
was available; that the notice of appeal was signed by the public prosecutor and
therefore valid; and that jurisprudence shows that the conformity of the OSG is not
required when grave errors are committed by the trial court or where there is lack of
due process.
In its Comment,[22] the OSG concurred in the propriety of the remedy of an appeal

against the assailed order, but nonetheless, asserted that the appeal, without its
conformity, must fail because under the law it is only the OSG that should represent the
People in criminal cases.
The CA Ruling
In a Resolution dated September 15, 2009, the CA dismissed the appeal on the ground
that the OSG had not given its conformity to the said appeal. [23]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration[24] but the same was denied by the CA in a
Resolution[25] dated September 2, 2010, hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue in this case is whether or not petitioners, being mere private
complainants, may appeal an order of the trial court dismissing a criminal case even
without the OSG’s conformity.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
The CA correctly dismissed the notice of appeal interposed by petitioners against the
May 23, 2007 Order of the RTC because they, being mere private complainants, lacked
the legal personality to appeal the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 06-875 (resulting from
the quashal of the information therein on the ground of lack of jurisdiction).
To expound, it is well-settled that the authority to represent the State in appeals of

criminal cases before the Court and the CA is vested solely in the OSG [26] which is the law
office of the Government whose specific powers and functions include that of
representing the Republic and/or the people before any court in any action which
affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require. [27] Explicitly, Section
35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code [28] provides that:
SECTION 35. Powers and Functions. — The Office of the Solicitor General shall
represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its
officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the
services of lawyers. x x x. It shall have the following specific powers and functions:
criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special
proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a
party. (Emphases supplied)
Accordingly, jurisprudence holds that if there is a dismissal of a criminal case by the trial
court or if there is an acquittal of the accused, it is only the OSG that may bring an
appeal on the criminal aspect representing the People. [29] The rationale therefor is
rooted in the principle that the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal action is
the People and not the petitioners who are mere complaining witnesses. For this
reason, the People are therefore deemed as the real parties in interest in the criminal
case and, therefore, only the OSG can represent them in criminal proceedings pending
in the CA or in this Court.[30] In view of the corollary principle that every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of
the suit,[31] an appeal of the criminal case not filed by the People as represented by the
OSG is perforce dismissible. The private complainant or the offended party may,
however, file an appeal without the intervention of the OSG but only insofar as the civil
liability of the accused is concerned.[32] He may also file a special civil action
for certiorari even without the intervention of the OSG, but only to the end of
preserving his interest in the civil aspect of the case. [33]
Here, it is clear that petitioners did not file their appeal merely to preserve their interest
in the civil aspect of the case. Rather, by seeking the reversal of the RTC’s quashal of the
information in Criminal Case No. 06-875 and thereby seeking that the said court be
directed to set the case for arraignment and to proceed with trial, [34] it is sufficiently
clear that they sought the reinstatement of the criminal prosecution of respondents for
libel. Being an obvious attempt to meddle into the criminal aspect of the case without
the conformity of the OSG, their recourse, in view of the above-discussed principles,
must necessarily fail. To repeat, the right to prosecute criminal cases pertains
exclusively to the People, which is therefore the proper party to bring the appeal
through the representation of the OSG. Petitioners have no personality or legal standing
to interpose an appeal in a criminal proceeding. Since the OSG had expressly withheld
its conformity and endorsement in the instant case, the CA, therefore, correctly
dismissed the appeal. It must, however, be clarified that the aforesaid dismissal is
without prejudice to their filing of the appropriate action to preserve their interests but
only with respect to the civil aspect of the libel case following the parameters of Rule
111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions dated September 15, 2009 and
September 2, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31549 dismissing
petitioners’ appeal from the dismissal of the criminal case for libel are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 178607, December 05, 2012 ]
DANTE LA. JIMENEZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND
REPRESENTATIVE OF UNLAD SHIPPING & MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. HON. EDWIN SORONGON (IN HIS
CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 214 OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MANDALUYONG CITY), SOCRATES ANTZOULATOS,
CARMEN ALAMIL, MARCELI GAZA AND MARKOS AVGOUSTIS,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari[1] filed by Dante La. Jimenez

(petitioner) to challenge the twin resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
November 23, 2006[2] and June 28, 2007[3] in CA-G.R. SP No. 96584, which dismissed the
petitioner’s petition for certiorari and denied his motion for reconsideration,
respectively.
The Factual Antecedents
The petitioner is the president of Unlad Shipping & Management Corporation, a local
manning agency, while Socrates Antzoulatos, Carmen Alamil, Marceli Gaza, and Markos
Avgoustis (respondents) are some of the listed incorporators of Tsakos Maritime
Services, Inc. (TMSI), another local manning agency.
On August 19, 2003, the petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit [4] with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City against the respondents for syndicated and large
scale illegal recruitment.[5] The petitioner alleged that the respondents falsely
represented their stockholdings in TMSI’s articles of incorporation [6] to secure a license
to operate as a recruitment agency from the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency
(POEA).
On October 9, 2003, respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their joint counter-affidavit
denying the complaint-affidavit’s allegations.[7] Respondents Avgoustis and Alamil did
not submit any counter-affidavit.
In a May 4, 2004 resolution,[8] the 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor recommended the filing
of an information for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment against the
respondents. The City Prosecutor approved his recommendation and filed the
corresponding criminal information with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong
City (docketed as Criminal Case No. MC04-8514 and raffled to Branch 212) presided by
Judge Rizalina T. Capco-Umali.
Subsequently, in a December 14, 2004 resolution, the City Prosecutor reconsidered the
May 4, 2004 resolution and filed a motion with the RTC to withdraw the information.
[9]
The petitioner and respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their opposition [10] and
comment to the opposition, respectively.
In an August 1, 2005 resolution,[11] the RTC denied the motion to withdraw information

as it found the existence of probable cause to hold the respondents for trial. [12] Thus, the
RTC ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against the respondents.
On August 26, 2005, respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed an omnibus motion for
reconsideration and for deferred enforcement of the warrants of arrest. [13] In a
September 2, 2005 order,[14] the RTC denied the omnibus motion, reiterating that the
trial court is the sole judge on whether a criminal case should be dismissed or not.
On September 26, 2005, respondent Alamil filed a motion for judicial determination of
probable cause with a request to defer enforcement of the warrants of arrest. [15]
On September 29, 2005, the petitioner filed his opposition with motion to expunge,
contending that respondent Alamil, being a fugitive from justice, had no standing to
seek any relief and that the RTC, in the August 1, 2005 resolution, already found
probable cause to hold the respondents for trial.[16]
In a September 30, 2005 order,[17] the RTC denied respondent Alamil’s motion for being
moot and academic; it ruled that it had already found probable cause against the
respondents in the August 1, 2005 resolution, which it affirmed in the September 2,
2005 order.
On October 10, 2005, respondent Alamil moved for reconsideration and for the
inhibition of Judge Capco-Umali, for being biased or partial. [18] On October 25, 2005, the
petitioner filed an opposition with a motion to expunge, reiterating that respondent
Alamil had no standing to seek relief from the RTC.[19]
In a January 4, 2006 order,[20] Judge Capco-Umali voluntarily inhibited herself from the

case and did not resolve respondent Alamil’s motion for reconsideration and the
petitioner’s motion to expunge. The case was later re-raffled to Branch 214, presided by
Judge Edwin D. Sorongon.
The RTC Rulings
In its March 8, 2006 order,[21] the RTC granted respondent Alamil’s motion for
reconsideration. It treated respondent Alamil’s motion for judicial determination as a
motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause. It found: (1) no evidence on record to
indicate that the respondents gave any false information to secure a license to operate
as a recruitment agency from the POEA; and (2) that respondent Alamil voluntarily
submitted to the RTC’s jurisdiction through the filing of pleadings seeking affirmative
relief. Thus, the RTC dismissed the case, and set aside the earlier issued warrants of
arrest.
On April 3, 2006, the petitioner moved for reconsideration, stressing the existence of
probable cause to prosecute the respondents and that respondent Alamil had no
standing to seek any relief from the RTC.[22]
On April 26, 2006, respondent Alamil moved to expunge the motion for being a
prohibited pleading since the motion did not have the public prosecutor’s conformity. [23]
In its May 10, 2006 order,[24] the RTC denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration,
finding that the petitioner merely reiterated arguments in issues that had been finally
decided. The RTC ordered the motion expunged from the records since the motion did
not have the public prosecutor’s conformity.
On May 19, 2006, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal.[25]
On May 30, 2006, respondent Alamil moved to expunge the petitioner’s notice of appeal
since the public prosecutor did not authorize the appeal and the petitioner had no civil
interest in the case.[26]
On June 27, 2006, the petitioner filed his comment to the motion to expunge, claiming
that, as the offended party, he has the right to appeal the RTC order dismissing the case;
the respondents’ fraudulent acts in forming TMSI greatly prejudiced him. [27]
In its August 7, 2006 joint order,[28] the RTC denied the petitioner’s notice of appeal since
the petitioner filed it without the conformity of the Solicitor General, who is mandated
to represent the People of the Philippines in criminal actions appealed to the CA. Thus,
the RTC ordered the notice of appeal expunged from the records.
On October 18, 2006, the petitioner elevated his case to the CA via a Rule 65 petition
for certiorari assailing the RTC’s March 8, 2006, May 10, 2006, and August 7, 2006
orders.
The CA Ruling
In its November 23, 2006 resolution,[29] the CA dismissed outright the petitioner’s Rule
65 petition for lack of legal personality to file the petition on behalf of the People of the
Philippines. It noted that only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) has the legal
personality to represent the People, under Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of
the 1987 Administrative Code. It also held that the petitioner was not the real party in
interest to institute the case, him not being a victim of the crime charged to the
respondents, but a mere competitor in their recruitment business. The CA denied [30] the
motion for reconsideration[31] that followed.
The Petition
The petitioner argues that he has a legal standing to assail the dismissal of the criminal
case since he is the private complainant and a real party in interest who had been
directly damaged and prejudiced by the respondents’ illegal acts; respondent Alamil has
no legal standing to seek any relief from the RTC since she is a fugitive from justice.
The Case for the Respondents
The respondents[32] submit that the petitioner lacks a legal standing to assail the
dismissal of the criminal case since the power to prosecute lies solely with the State,
acting through a public prosecutor; the petitioner acted independently and without the
authority of a public prosecutor in the prosecution and appeal of the case.
The Issue
The case presents to us the issue of whether the CA committed a reversible error in
dismissing outright the petitioner’s Rule 65 petition for certiorari for lack of legal
personality to file the petition on behalf of the People of the Philippines.
Our Ruling
The petitioner has no legal personality to

assail the dismissal of the criminal case
It is well-settled that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest[,]” “who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the suit.” [33] Interest means material interest
or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved. [34] By real interest is meant a
present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future,
contingent, subordinate or consequential interest.[35] When the plaintiff or the
defendant is not a real party in interest, the suit is dismissible. [36]
Procedural law basically mandates that “[a]ll criminal actions commenced by complaint
or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public
prosecutor.”[37] In appeals of criminal cases before the CA and before this Court, the OSG
is the appellate counsel of the People, pursuant to Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III,
Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code. This section explicitly provides:
SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. — The Office of the Solicitor General shall
services of lawyers. . . . It shall have the following specific powers and functions:
criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court
and Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special
party. (emphasis added)
The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the OSG can represent
the People in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court. This ruling has
been repeatedly stressed in several cases[38]and continues to be the controlling doctrine.
While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to pursue
the criminal action on his own behalf [39] (as when there is a denial of due process), this
exceptional circumstance does not apply in the present case.
In this case, the petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal
case since the main issue raised by the petitioner involved the criminal aspect of the
case, i.e., the existence of probable cause. The petitioner did not appeal to protect his
alleged pecuniary interest as an offended party of the crime, but to cause the
reinstatement of the criminal action against the respondents. This involves the right to
prosecute which pertains exclusively to the People, as represented by the OSG. [40]
Respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted

to the RTC’s jurisdiction
Contrary to the petitioner’s submission, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of
respondent Alamil.
As a rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court. Filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary
appearance, and the consequent jurisdiction of one’s person to the jurisdiction of the
court.[41]
Thus, by filing several motions before the RTC seeking the dismissal of the criminal case,
respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC. Custody of the
law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail. [42]
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the appeal. The twin resolutions of the Court of Appeals

dated November 23, 2006 and June 28, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 96584 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 201644, September 24, 2014 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. JOSE C. GO AND AIDA
C. DELA ROSA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated

September 28, 2011 and the Resolution [3] dated April 17, 2012 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 108319 which reversed and set aside the Orders dated December
10, 2008[4] and February 12, 2009[5] of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42
(RTC) in Crim. Case Nos. 00-186069-75, and dismissed the charges against respondents
Jose C. Go (Go) and Aida C. Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa) on the ground that their constitutional
right to speedy trial has been violated.
The Facts
On September 28, 2000, seven (7) Informations – stemming from a criminal complaint
instituted by private complainant Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) –
were filed before the RTC against various accused, including Go and Dela Rosa
(respondents),[6] charging them of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial
Documents for allegedly defrauding Orient Commercial Banking Corporation of the
amount of P159,000,000.00.[7] After numerous postponements, respondents were
finally arraigned on November 13, 2001 and trial on the merits then ensued. [8]
However, the trial of the case was marred by a series of postponements/cancellation of

hearings caused mainly by the prosecution,[9] resulting in its inability to finish its
presentation of evidence despite the lapse of almost five (5) years. [10] This prompted
respondents to file, on December 11, 2007, a Motion to Dismiss[11] for failure to
prosecute and for violation of their right to speedy trial,[12] claiming that the
prosecution was afforded all the opportunity to complete and terminate its case, but
still to no avail.
The RTC Ruling
In an Omnibus Order[13] dated January 9, 2008, the RTC dismissed the criminal cases,
ruling that the respondents’ right to speedy trial was violated as they were compelled to
wait for five (5) years without the prosecution completing its presentation of evidence
due to its neglect.[14]
Dissatisfied, the prosecution moved for reconsideration [15] which, in an Order[16] dated
December 10, 2008, was granted by the RTC in the interest of justice, thus resulting in
the reinstatement of the criminal cases against respondents.
This time, it was the respondents who moved for reconsideration [17] which was,
however, denied by the RTC in an Order[18] dated February 12, 2009. This prompted
them to file a petition for certiorari[19] before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
108319. A copy of said petition was served, however, only on the private
complainant, i.e., the PDIC,[20] and not the People of the Philippines (the People),
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as it was not even impleaded as
party to the case.[21]
The Proceedings Before the CA
In a Decision[22] dated September 28, 2011, the CA, without first ordering the
respondents to implead the People, annulled and set aside the assailed orders of the
RTC, and consequently dismissed the criminal cases against respondents. [23]
It ruled that the prosecution’s prolonged delay in presenting its witnesses and exhibits,
and in filing its formal offer of evidence was vexatious, capricious, and oppressive to
respondents,[24] thereby violating their right to speedy trial. It further held that double
jeopardy had already attached in favor of respondents, considering that the criminal
cases against them were dismissed due to violation of the right to speedy trial. [25]
Aggrieved, the PDIC moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied by the CA in
a Resolution[26] dated April 17, 2012.
On May 2, 2012, the PDIC transmitted copies of the aforesaid CA Decision and
Resolution to the OSG.[27] Thereafter, or on June 18, 2012, the OSG filed the instant
petition,[28] imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA in giving due course
to respondents’ certiorari petition and proceeding to decide the case. It contends,
among others, that the People – the petitioner in this case – was neither impleaded nor
served a copy of said petition, thereby violating its right to due process of law and
rendering the CA without any authority or jurisdiction to promulgate its issuances
reversing the RTC Orders and dismissing the criminal cases pending before it. [29]
The central issue to resolve is whether or not the criminal cases against respondents
were properly dismissed by the CA on certiorari, without the People, as represented by
the OSG, having been impleaded.
Respondents’ certiorari petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 108319 that sought the dismissal of

the criminal cases against them should not have been resolved by the CA, without the
People, as represented by the OSG, having first been impleaded. This stems from the
recognition that the People is an indispensable party to the proceedings.
In Vda. de Manguerra v. Risos, where the petition for certiorari filed with the [CA] failed
to implead the People of the Philippines as an indispensable party, the Court held:
It is undisputed that in their petition for certiorari before the CA, respondents

failed to implead the People of the Philippines as a party thereto. Because of this, the
petition was obviously defective. As provided in Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, all criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and
control of the public prosecutor. Therefore, it behooved the petitioners (respondents
herein) to implead the People of the Philippines as respondent in the CA case to enable
the Solicitor General to comment on the petition.[30]
While the failure to implead an indispensable party is not per se a ground for the
dismissal of an action, considering that said party may still be added by order of the
court, on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or
such times as are just,[31] it remains essential – as it is jurisdictional – that any
indispensable party be impleaded in the proceedings before the court renders
judgment. This is because the absence of such indispensable party renders all
subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to
the absent parties but even as to those present. As explained in Lotte Phil. Co., Inc. v.
Dela Cruz:[32]
An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or
defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence of
indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is “the
authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case.” Thus, without the
presence of indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding, judgment of a court cannot
attain real finality. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions
of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties
but even as to those present.[33]
In this case, it is evident that the CA proceeded to render judgment, i.e., the September
28, 2011 Decision and April 17, 2012 Resolution, without an indispensable party, i.e.,
the People, having been impleaded. Thus, in light of the foregoing discussion, these
issuances should be set aside and the case be remanded to the said court.
Consequently, the CA is directed to (a) reinstate respondents’ certiorari petition, and (b)
order said respondents to implead the People as a party to the proceedings and thereby
furnish its counsel, the OSG, a copy of the aforementioned pleading. That being said,
there would be no need to touch on the other issues herein raised.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 28, 2011 and the
Resolution dated April 17, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 108319
are hereby SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the CA under the parameters above-
stated.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 182157, August 17, 2015 ]
ANLUD METAL RECYCLING CORPORATION, AS REPRESENTED BY
ALFREDO A. DY, PETITIONER, VS. JOAQUIN ANG, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
We resolve the Petition for Review [1] filed by petitioner Anlud Metal Recycling
Corporation, which assails the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 97124.[2] The CA affirmed the Decision and Order of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 12691-2004-C [3] dismissing the charge of estafa against
respondent Joaquin Ang;[4]
The antecedent facts are as follows:
San Miguel Packaging Products-Metal Closures Lithography Plant (SMC-MCLP) allegedly

awarded petitioner an exclusive contract to purchase its aluminum- and tin-based scrap
materials from 20 March 2003 to 31 January 2004. However, on 23 January 2004, the
President of Anlud Metal Recycling Corporation found that SMC-MCLP's employee
Conrado Alday had allowed Nenita B. dela Cruz to load scrap materials in two truck,
owned by respondent Ang, which were then operated by his truck drivers Edjanel Jose
Paniergo and Renato Bagaua.
Based on the narration of petitioner, Dela Cruz pretended to be an agent of Anlud Metal
Recycling Corporation when she arranged for the transport of the scrap materials. She
had allegedly coordinated the hauling with Alday, who was then working for SMC-MCLP.
Alday purportedly allowed the trucks driven by Paniergo and Bagaua to enter the plant
and load the scrap materials in the cargoes based on a false representation that the
transaction was authorized by petitioner. Fortunately, the two trucks was not able to
leave the premises of SMC-MCLP.
Petitioner lodged a Complaint for attempted estafa through falsification of

commercial/private document against Alday, Dela Cruz, Paniergo, Bagaua, and
respondent Ang. Subsequently, the Investigating Prosecutor caused the filing with the
RTC of an Information for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal
Code, which reads as follows:[5]
That on or about January 23, 2004 at Brgy. Canlubang, in the City of Calamba and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to defraud by means of
fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud,
did then there unlawfully, willfully and feloniously pretend to possess business or
imaginary transactions by claiming that he has the authority from complainant Anlud
Metal Recycling Corporation to withdraw from San Miguel Corp Metal Closure
Lithography Plant (SMC MCLP), when in truth and in fact they were not and as a
consequence, they were able to withdraw thirty (30) metric tons of Aluminum Scraps
from the said SMC-MCLP estimated at more than P500,000 using the name of Anlud
Metal Recycling Corporation (ANLUD), which was charged to the latter's account, to its
damage and prejudice in the amount of P500,000.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The RTC issued a Warrant of Arrest [6] on 26 October 2004 against Ang and his co-
accused. Thereafter, respondent filed a Petition for Reinvestigation and a Motion for
Preliminary Investigation before the City Prosecutor's Office. He also filed with the RTC
an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings Pending Reinvestigation and to Recall Order
of Arrest Against Accused Movant Joaquin Ang. [7]
In its Order dated 20 January 2005,[8 ]the RTC denied the motion filed by Ang. It ruled
that his allegations were not supported by evidence; and that based on the facts of the
case, there was a reasonable ground to engender a well-founded belief that he had
committed estafa.
In contrast, on 3 February 2005, the City Prosecutor's Office issued its Resolution on
Reconsideration[9] absolving respondent from the offense charged. It discussed that
although he owned the trucks that carried the scrap materials, the theory of conspiracy
had no foundation absent any proof that he had performed any overt act of estafa. It
also highlighted the fact that he was not present at the time of the incident. As a result,
the City Prosecutor's Office filed an Amended Information, [10] which no longer included
him as an accused.
Petitioner bewailed the dropping of respondent from the charge. Thus, it filed with the
Department of Justice (DOJ) a Petition for Review, which the latter granted. [11] According
to the DOJ, respondent could not be considered innocent of estafa, since (1) his denial
was self-serving; (2) he owned the trucks used in loading the scrap materials; (3) he
failed to adduce exculpatory evidence showing that it was Dela Cruz who had
commanded the use of his trucks; (4) the drivers of the trucks were respondent's own;
and (5) it can be inferred from the action of the truck drivers that they received
instructions from him.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but to no avail. [12] Thus, a Second

Amended Information[13] was filed with the RTC, which already named Ang as one of the
accused.
On 16 June 2006, respondent sought judicial relief by filing an Omnibus Motion to

Determine Probable Cause and to Defer Issuance of Warrant of Arrest Until
Determination of Probable Cause Is Completed (Omnibus Motion). [14] Petitioner filed its
Comment/Opposition[15] thereto on 7 July 2006.
This time around, the court took a different stance. In its Decision dated 18 September
2006, the RTC dismissed the case against respondent for want of probable cause. It
explained that mere ownership of the trucks did not make respondent a co-conspirator
for estafa. For conspiracy to be appreciated against Ang, the trial court required proof
showing that he knew of the crime, consented to its commission, or performed any of
its elements.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration [16] and a Motion for Inhibition,[17] but both
were denied through the RTC Order dated 3 October 2006. [18] The court reiterated in its
ruling that "in the resolution of the judicial determination of probable cause, the court is
not bound and cannot be bound by the findings of the Secretary of Justice in the
existence of probable cause and hold the accused for trial." [19]
Unrelenting, petitioner questioned the dismissal of Ang's criminal case before the CA. In
its Decision dated 4 December 2007, and subsequent Resolution dated 13 March 2008,
the CA gave due course to the Petition for Certiorari [20] notwithstanding that Anlud
Metal Recycling Corporation had appealed without the participation of the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), which was supposed to act on behalf of the People of the
Philippines.
However, the petition failed on the merits. Petitioner had argued before the CA that the
RTC should not have entertained respondent's Omnibus Motion, because its Notice of
Hearing was addressed only to the public prosecutor and not to petitioner. The CA
rejected this argument and ruled that the "absence of a notice to a private prosecutor
although the public prosecutor has been notified is a matter that is for a trial judge to
consider in his sound discretion." [21]
Petitioner also failed to dispute the RTC's ruling to exclude Ang as an accused in the
crime of estafa. According to the CA, since the trial court had conducted an independent
evaluation, the fact alone that the latter reversed its earlier finding of probable cause
did not amount to grave abuse of discretion; and any error of the RTC was an error of
judgment not correctible by certiorari.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition before this Court and raised the following
contentions: ( 1) the RTC had no jurisdiction to determine probable cause; (2) it abused
its discretion when it entertained respondent's Omnibus Motion for determination of
probable cause despite a defective Notice of Hearing; and (3) it erred in dismissing the
charge of estafa against Ang. In tum, respondent filed a Comment, [22] which included the
issue of petitioner's standing to file this appeal without the participation of the OSG.
Petitioner submitted its Reply[23] to refute the allegations of respondent.
RULING OF THE COURT
Petitioner has no personality to appeal

the dismissal of the criminal case
for estafa before this Court.
Before the Court proceeds with the substantive issues in this case, the procedural issue
of petitioner's personality to appeal the dismissal of the criminal case merits preliminary
attention.
Petitioner argues that since theCA has already ruled upon this issue, without respondent
filing a partial appeal, then the latter has already lost its right to question the standing of
Anlud Metal Recycling Corporation. This argument is unmeritorious. In the past, the
Court has motu proprio ascertained the standing of a private offended party to appeal
the dismissal of a criminal case.[24]
In any event, respondent cannot be considered to have waived its argument regarding
the personality of petitioner to file the instant appeal. In his Comment, respondent
cites Republic v. Partisala[25] and asserts that petitioner has no right to appeal the
dismissal of the criminal case absent the participation of the OSG. In its Reply, petitioner
responds by quoting the ruling of the CA, viz:[26]
As argued by petitioner, citing the case of Perez v. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc., the
petitioner, as private complainant, has legal personality to impugn the dismissal of the
criminal case against the private respondent under Rule 65. As private offended party,
the petitioner has an interest in the civil aspect of the case; thus, it may file a special
civil action for certiorari and prosecute the same in its own name without making the
People of the Philippines a party. While it is only the Solicitor General who may bring or
defend actions in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or
State in criminal proceedings pending in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals,
the private offended party retains the right to bring a special civil action for certiorari in
his own name in criminal proceedings before the courts of law.
Notably, both positions taken by the parties are supported by jurisprudence. It is then
proper for this Court to clarify the standing of a private offended party - in this case,
petitioner - to appeal the dismissal of the criminal case against the accused, who in this
case is respondent.
The real party in interest in a criminal case is the People of the Philippines. Hence, if the
criminal case is dismissed by the trial court, the criminal aspect of the case must be
instituted by the Solicitor General on behalf of the State. [27]
As a qualification, however, this Court recognizes that the private offended party has an
interest in the civil aspect of the case.[28] Logically, the capability of the private
complainant to question the dismissal of the criminal proceedings is limited only to
questions relating to the civil aspect of the case.[29] It should ideally be along this thin
framework that we may entertain questions regarding the dismissals of criminal cases
instituted by private offended parties. Enlarging this scope may result in wanton
disregard of the OSG's personality, as well as the clogging of our dockets, which this
Court is keen to avoid.
Therefore, the litmus test in ascertaining the personality of herein petitioner lies in
whether or not the substance of the certiorari action it instituted in theCA referred to
the civil aspect of the case.[30]
Here in this Rule 45 petition, petitioner argues that the RTC erred when it concluded
that "there is no evidence of conspiracy against private respondent Ang." Petitioner
goes on to enumerate circumstances that collectively amount to a finding that based on
probable cause, respondent conspired with the accused in defrauding Anlud Metal
Recycling Corporation.[31]
Clearly, petitioner mainly disputes the RTC's finding of want of probable cause to indict
Ang as an accused for estafa. This dispute refers, though, to the criminal, and not the
civil, aspect of the case. In Jimenez v. Sorongon[32] we similarly ruled:
In this case, the petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the
criminal case since the main issue raised by the petitioner involved the criminal aspect
of the case, i.e., the existence of probable cause. The petitioner did not appeal to
protect his alleged pecuniary interest as an offended party of the crime, but to cause
the reinstatement of the criminal action against the respondents. This involves the right
to prosecute which pertains exclusively to the People, as represented by the OSG.
(Emphasis supplied)
Given that nowhere in the pleadings did petitioner even briefly discuss the civil liability
of respondent, this Court holds that Anlud Metal Recycling Corporation lacks the
requisite legal standing to appeal the discharge of respondent Ang from the Information
for estafa. On this ground alone, the petition already fails. [33]
Nonetheless, this Court has already acknowledged the interest of substantial justice,
grave error committed by the judge, and lack of due process as veritable grounds to
allow appeals to prosper despite the non-participation of the OSG.[34] But as will be
discussed below, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the petition falls under any of
these exceptions.
The RTC may conduct a judicial
determination of probable cause.
Petitioner explains that there are two determinations of probable cause: the first is for
the purpose of filing a criminal information in the court, and the second is for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioner submits that since the first kind is executive in
nature, then the RTC had absolutely no jurisdiction to determine the existence of
probable cause to hold respondent as an accused in the crime of estafa.
Hence, for petitioner, the RTC grievously erred when it gave due course to the Omnibus
Motion of respondent, which questioned the determination of probable cause by the
prosecutor. Respondent counters this argument by alleging that the RTC may resolve
issues brought before it pursuant to the power of the court to administer justice.
Petitioner's interpretation of the rules on the determination of probable cause is

inaccurate. Although courts must respect the executive determination of probable
cause,[35] the trial courts may still independently determine probable cause. They are not
irrevocably bound to the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor and the
DOJ.[36]
The trial court actually has the following options upon the filing of a criminal
information: (1) immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3)
order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice in case
of doubt as to the existence of probable cause. [37] These options are provided in Rule
112, Section 6 (a) of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SECTION 6. When warrant of arrest may issue.-" (a) By the Regional Trial Court.-" Within
ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally
evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He
may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a
commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant
issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint
or information was filed pursuant to Section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the
existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court
within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint of information. (Emphasis
supplied)
Indeed, the RTC is allowed to dismiss the charge of estafa against Ang notwithstanding
the executive determination of probable cause by the prosecutor. If we were to
construe otherwise, we would be contradicting the basic principle that "once an
information is filed in RTC, any disposition of the case rests already in the sound
discretion of the court."[38]
Rule 15, Section 5 of the Rules of

Court was substantially complied with.
Citing Rule 15, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, petitioner regards the Notice of Hearing
appended to respondent's Omnibus Motion as defective. This is because the notice was
addressed only to the public prosecutor and the clerk of court, and not to the private
offended party- petitioner herein.[39]
By having a defective Notice of Hearing, petitioner concludes that the Omnibus Motion
was a mere scrap of paper, which the RTC should have instantly disregarded. Thus,
when the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, gave due course to the motion, petitioner believes
that its right to due process was oppressed.
Petitioner correctly argues that a notice of hearing must be addressed to all the parties
concerned;[40] and that failure to comply with this directive results in a motion that
should be treated as a mere scrap of paper. [41]
However, this general requirement of a valid notice of hearing is one of those

procedural rules that admit of various exceptions. [42]
In Jehan Shipping Corporation v. National Food Authority,[43] the Court considered the

defect in the notice of hearing as cured, since the adverse party had the opportunity to
be heard and had filed pleadings in opposition to the motion. In particular, the adverse
party was able to argue the procedural defects and even ventilate substantial
arguments.
This same application has already been echoed in our past decisions. [44] In those cases,
the Court observes that the real purpose behind the requirement of notice of hearing is
to afford the adverse parties a chance to be heard before a motion is resolved by the
court.[45] The test is the presence of the opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time
to study the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is
based.[46] Considering the circumstances of the present case, we believe that procedural
due process has substantially been complied with.
Petitioner filed a Comment/Opposition on 7 July 2006 specifically to oppose the

supposedly defective Omnibus Motion filed by respondent on 16 June 2006. In that
pleading, petitioner raised the incompleteness of the Notice of Hearing and likewise
argued about the substantive merits - that probable cause existed to indict Ang as an
accused. Thereafter, the RTC scheduled the hearing for the judicial determination of
probable cause on 16 August 2006, but the hearing was later rescheduled on 30 August
2006.[47] Only after these proceedings had transpired did the trial court issue its assailed
Decision on 18 September 2006 finding a want of probable cause to hold Ang for trial
for the crime of estafa. Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 2
October 2006, which the RTC denied in its Order dated 3 October 2006.
Based on the sequence of events mentioned above, it is clear that petitioner was given
an opportunity to be heard. It advanced its opposition to the Omnibus Motion when it
filed its Comment/Opposition on 7 July 2006 and later on in its Motion for
Reconsideration dated 2 October 2006. From these facts, we conclude that Rule 15,
Section 5 of the Rules of Court on notice of hearing was substantially complied with.
Consequently, this Court cannot agree with petitioner that the latter's right to due
process has been denied.
In any event, petitioner cannot anchor the reversal of the finding of want of probable
cause on the mere pretext that the Omnibus Motion filed by respondent was just a
scrap of paper as it contained a defective Notice of Hearing. The judicial determination
of probable cause may proceed even if the accused does not file a pertinent motion. As
adverted to earlier, the RTC may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause. [48]
The RTC did not exceed its

jurisdiction when it dismissed the charge
of estafa against respondent for want
of probable cause.
In the main, petitioner questions the ruling of the CA, which dismissed its Petition for
Certiorari. The CA held that the RTC did not commit an error of jurisdiction when the
latter ruled that the prosecution failed to establish probable cause against respondent.
Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. [49] We
emphasize that the viewpoint we follow must conform to the nature of reviewing a CA
decision, which was rendered under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In Hao v. People,[50] we explained that in this situation, the Court is confronted with the
question of whether the CA correctly determined the presence or absence of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, and not on the basis of whether the
latter's assessment of the incidents before it was strictly legally correct. To recall, grave
abuse of discretion exists when there is an arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due
to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or a whimsical, arbitrary or capricious
exercise of power that amounts to an evasion of or a refusal to perform a positive duty
enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. [51]
In this case, the CA no longer dealt with the particular exhibits relied upon by the RTC to
conclude the absence of probable cause to indict Ang as an accused in the case
for estafa. In its rulings, the RTC reasoned as follows:[52]
The fact that the accused is the owner of the truck that carried the objects of the
crime cannot make him a co-conspirator in the execution of the crime of estafa. An
affirmation of this supposition (sic) open a floodgate for charges against people, whose
only fault was being owners of vehicle used in the commission of the crime.
x x x x
Upon review and examination of the prosecution evidence in the judicial determination
of probable cause, there is total absence of any prosecution evidence in their
documents (Annexes "A-1" to "A-9") and witnesses' affidavits (Exhibits "A" &
"B") where this Court can logically surmised nor inferred (sic) from any of the proven
acts of any of the other accused that Accused Joaquin Ang was in conspiracy with the
other accused in their common criminal unity and intent to defraud Anlud.
There was nothing from these documents and affidavits that Accused Joaquin Ang
committed, executed or implied any act leading to a conclusion that he knew the
commission of the crime or performed any of the elements of the offense to establish
that he acted in unison with the other accused.
There was no proof that he benefitted from the effects of the crime. There was no proof
that he gave his consent to the commission of the alleged crime.
In view of this (sic) findings, this Court agrees with the observation of the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Calamba City in their Resolution on Reconsideration dated 22
September 2004 that absolved Accused Joaquin Ang. To quote their logic and ratio:
The bone of movant's contention dwells on the theory of conspiracy which was
the basis of his inclusion as one of the accused. Indubitably, accused Renato Bagaua and
Edjanel Jose were the assigned drivers of his trucks with plate number UUG 787 and TJL
632 that were chanced upon by the complainant loading scrap materials inside the
premises of San Miguel Corporation-Metal Closure Lithography Plant (SMC-MCLP)
sometime in January 23, 2004. A careful perusal of the evidence adduced by the parties
will clearly show that movant was not around at the premises of SMC MCLP during the
time that the other respondents were loading scrap materials on his truck Neither that
he executed any act leading to a conclusion that he has knowledge thereof or
performed any of the elements of the offense charged to show that he acted in unison
with the accused. There is also no proof that he benefited, in any manner, from the
effects of the crime nor gave his consent to the commission thereof.
Based on the explanation of the RTC, this Court holds that the CA was correct in not
finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. In referring to the extant
facts, the arguments of the parties, as well as logic and law, the RTC did not whimsically,
arbitrarily, or capriciously ascertain the absence of probable cause.
Probable cause, albeit requiring less evidence than that which would justify a conviction,
nevertheless implies the probability of guilt and requires more than bare suspicion.
[53]
Given that Ang was implicated in the conspiracy, the trial court correctly looked into
whether respondent performed any overt act as direct or indirect contribution to the
execution of the crime planned to be committed. [54]
As held by the RTC, apart from owning the trucks, no other link has been established by
the prosecution to hold respondent as a conspirator in the hauling of the scrap
materials. Even in the instant petition,[55] petitioner harps only on Ang being engaged in
scrap trading, owning the trucks, and employing the accused as his truck drivers.
Without more, none of these depicts any overt act of respondent connected to the
accomplishment of estafa.
Petitioner relies on the Memorandum submitted by Ang before the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Calamba, Laguna, on 25 September 2004 to argue that
respondent admitted his complicity in the transaction. He purportedly admitted to the
crime when he pleaded:[56]
Worse, Alfredo (petitioner's representative) went beyond the bounds of fairness

and good faith by maliciously and recklessly accusing the poor truck drivers Edjanel and
Renata of the crime when all they did was to drive the truck for their employer who had
negotiated with San Miguel for the purchase of the scrap material.
This issue was already raised by petitioner in the proceedings below. Unfortunately,
neither the RTC nor the CA discussed this matter.
Based on our own appreciation then, we find that nowhere in the above-quoted
passage is it indicated that respondent specifically made a factual admission that he had
instructed his drivers to go to the plant, misrepresent that they were from Anlud Metal
Recycling Corporation, and coordinate the hauling of the scrap materials with Alday and
Dela Cruz. An admission must be clear; and in this instance, it must take into account
the unwavering position of Ang that he did not conspire with any of the accused
in their alleged scheme to haul scrap materials with the use of his trucks. [57]
All told, we are not inclined to disturb the conclusions of the RTC, as these are based on
the evidence on record. Neither are we in disagreement with the CA, which remarked
that the dismissal of the criminal action against Ang is "not fatal to the cause of the
public prosecution because such quashal appears to have been issued at the initial stage
of the criminal trial process."[58] Considering the foregoing, we rule to sustain the
judgments of the courts a quo.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review filed by Anlud Metal Recycling Corporation
is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 4 December 2007 and subsequent
Resolution dated 13 March 2008 in CA G.R. SP. No. 97124, affirming the Regional Trial
Court Decision dated 18 September 2006 and Order dated 3 October 2006 in Criminal
Case No. 12691-04-C are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 189754, October 24, 2012 ]
LITO BAUTISTA AND JIMMY ALCANTARA, PETITIONERS, VS. SHARON
G. CUNETA-PANGILINAN, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the
Decision[1] dated May 19, 2009 and Resolution[2] dated September 28, 2009 of the Court
of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 104885, entitled Sharon G. Cuneta-Pangilinan v. Hon.
Rizalina T. Capco-Umali, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court in
Mandaluyong City, Branch 212, Lito Bautista, and Jimmy Alcantara, which granted the
petition for certiorari of respondent Sharon G. Cuneta-Pangilinan. The CA Decision
reversed and set aside the Order[3] dated April 25, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 212, Mandaluyong City, but only insofar as it pertains to the granting of the
Demurrer to Evidence filed by petitioners Lito Bautista (Bautista) and Jimmy Alcantara
(Alcantara), and also ordered that the case be remanded to the trial court for reception
of petitioners' evidence.
The antecedents are as follows:
On February 19, 2002, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City filed two
(2) informations, both dated February 4, 2002, with the RTC, Branch 212, Mandaluyong
City, against Pete G. Ampoloquio, Jr. (Ampoloquio), and petitioners Bautista and
Alcantara, for the crime of libel, committed by publishing defamatory articles against
respondent Sharon Cuneta-Pangilinan in the tabloid Bandera.
That on or about the 24th day of April, 2001, in the City of Mandaluyong,

Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together with Jane/John Does unknown
directors/officer[s] of Bandera Publishing Corporation, publisher of Bandera, whose true
identities are unknown, and mutually helping and aiding one another, with deliberate
intent to bring SHARON G. CUNETA-PANGILINAN into public dishonor, shame and
contempt, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with malice and
ridicule, cause to publish in Bandera (tabloid), with circulation in Metro Manila, which
among others have the following insulting and slanderous remarks, to wit:
MAGTIGIL KA, SHARON!
Sharon Cuneta, the mega-taba singer-actress, I’d like to believe, is really brain-dead.
Mukhang totoo yata yung sinasabi ng kaibigan ni Pettizou Tayag na ganyan siya.
Hayan at buong ingat na sinulat namin yung interview sa kaibigan ng may-ari ng

Central Institute of Technology at ni isang side comment ay wala kaming ginawa and all
throughout the article, we’ve maintained our objectivity, pero sa interview sa aparadoric
singer-actress in connection with an album launching, ay buong ningning na sinabi
nitong she’s supposedly looking into the item that we’ve written and most probably
would take some legal action.
xxx
Magsalita ka, Missed Cuneta, at sabihin mong hindi ito totoo.

Ang hindi lang namin nagustuhan ay ang pagbintangan kaming palagi naman daw
namin siyang sinisiraan, kaya hindi lang daw niya kami pinapansin, believing na part
raw siguro yun ng aming trabaho.
Dios mio perdon, what she gets to see are those purportedly biting commentaries about
her katabaan and kaplastikan but she has simply refused to acknowledge the good
reviews we’ve done on her.
xxx
Going back to this seemingly disoriented actress who’s desperately trying to sing even if
she truly can’t, itanggi mo na hindi mo kilala si Pettizou Tayag gayung nagkasama raw
kayo ng tatlong araw sa mother's house ng mga Aboitiz sa Cebu more than a month
ago, in connection with one of those political campaigns of your husband.
xxx
thereby casting publicly upon complainant, malicious contemptuous imputations of a

contempt.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
That on or about the 27th day of March, 2001, in the City of Mandaluyong,
accused, conspiring and confederating together with Jane/John Does unknown
directors/officers of Bandera Publishing Corporation, publisher of Bandera, whose true
identities are unknown, and mutually helping, and aiding one another, with deliberate
intent to bring SHARON G. CUNETA-PANGILINAN into public dishonor, shame and
contempt did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with malice and
ridicule, cause to publish in Bandera (tabloid), with circulation in Metro Manila, which,
among others, have the following insulting and slanderous remarks, to wit:
NABURYONG SA KAPLASTIKAN NI SHARON ANG MILYONARY[A]NG SUPPORTER NI
KIKO!
FREAKOUT pala kay Sharon Cuneta ang isa sa mga loyal supporters ni Kiko Pangilinan na
si Pettizou Tayag, a multi-millionaire who owns Central Institute of Technology College in
Sampaloc, Manila (it is also one of the biggest schools in Paniqui, Tarlac).
xxx
Which in a way, she did. Bagama't busy siya (she was having a meeting with some
business associates), she went out of her way to give Sharon security.
So, ang ginawa daw ni Ms. Tayag ay tinext nito si Sha[ron] para mabigyan ito ng
instructions para kumportable itong makarating sa Bulacan.
She was most caring and solicitous, pero tipong na-offend daw ang megastar at nagtext
pang “You don’t need to produce an emergency SOS for me, I’ll be fine.”
Now, nang makara[t]ing na raw sa Bulacan si Mega nagtatarang daw ito at

binadmouth si Pettizou. Kesyo ang kulit-kulit daw nito, atribida, mapapel at kung anu-
ano pang mga derogatory words na nakarating siyempre sa kinauukulan.
Anyhow, if it’s true that Ms. Pettizou has been most financially supportive of Kiko, how
come Sharon seems not to approve of her?
“She doesn’t want kasi her husband to win as a senator because when that happens,
mawawalan siya ng hold sa kanya,” our caller opines.
Pettizou is really sad that Sharon is treating her husband like a wimp.
“In public,” our source goes on tartly, “pa kiss-kiss siya. Pa-embrace-embrace pero kung
silang dalawa [na] lang parang kung sinong sampid kung i-treat niya si Kiko.”
My God Pete, Harvard graduate si Kiko. He’s really intelligent as compared to Sharon
who appears to be brain dead most of the time.
Yung text message niyang “You don’t need to produce an emergency SOS for me,” hindi
ba’t she was being redundant?
Another thing, I guess it’s high time that she goes on a diet [again]. Jesus, she looks
6’11 crosswise!
xxx
Kunsabagay, she was only being most consistent. Yang si Sharon daw ay talagang
mega-brat, mega-sungit. But who does she think she is? Her wealth, dear, would pale
in comparison with the Tayag’s millions. Kunsabagay, she’s brain dead most of the time.
xxx
thereby casting publicly upon complainant, malicious contemptuous imputation of a

contempt.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
Upon arraignment, petitioners, together with their co-accused Ampoloquio, each

entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, a joint pre-trial and trial of the case ensued. [6]
Respondent’s undated Complaint-Affidavit[7] alleged that Bautista and Alcantara were

Editor and Associate Editor, respectively, of the publication Bandera, and their co-
accused, Ampoloquio, was the author of the alleged libelous articles which were
published therein, and subject of the two informations. According to respondent, in
April 2001, she and her family were shocked to learn about an article dated March 27,
2001, featured on page 7 of Bandera (Vol. 11, No. 156), in the column Usapang
Censored of Ampoloquio, entitled Naburyong sa Kaplastikan ni Sharon ang
Milyonaryang Supporter ni Kiko, that described her as plastic (hypocrite), ingrate, mega-
brat, mega-sungit, and brain dead, which were the subject of Criminal Case No. MC02-
4875.[8] Another article, with the same title and similar text, also featured on the same
date, appeared on page 6 of Saksi Ngayon, in the column Banatan of Ampoloquio.[9]
Moreover, respondent averred that on April 24, 2001, Ampoloquio wrote two follow-up
articles, one appeared in his column Usapang Censored, entitled Magtigil Ka, Sharon!,
stating that she bad-mouthed one Pettizou Tayag by calling the latter kulit-
kulit (annoyingly persistent), atribida (presumptuous), mapapel (officious or self-
important), and other derogatory words; that she humiliated Tayag during a meeting by
calling the latter bobo (stupid); that she exhibited offensive behavior towards Tayag; and
that she was a dishonest person with questionable credibility, which were the subject of
Criminal Case No. MC02-4872.[10] Another article, entitled Magtigil Ka, Sharon
Cuneta!!!!, also featured on the same date with similar text, and appeared on page 7 of
Saksi Ngayon (Vol. 3, No. 285), in the column Banatan of Ampoloquio, [11] with the
headline in bold letters, Sharon Cuneta, May Sira? on the front page of the said issue.[12]
Respondent added that Ampoloquio’s articles impugned her character as a woman and
wife, as they depicted her to be a domineering wife to a browbeaten husband.
According to Ampoloquio, respondent did not want her husband (Senator Francis
Pangilinan) to win (as Senator) because that would mean losing hold over him, and that
she would treat him like a wimp and sampid (hanger-on) privately, but she appeared to
be a loving wife to him in public. Respondent denied that Tayag contributed millions to
her husband’s campaign fund. She clarified that Tayag assisted during the campaign and
was one of the volunteers of her husband’s Kilos Ko Movement, being the first cousin of
one Atty. Joaquinito Harvey B. Ringler (her husband’s partner in Franco Pangilinan Law
Office); however, it was Atty. Ringler who asked Tayag to resign from the movement due
to difficulty in dealing with her.
After presenting respondent on the witness stand, the prosecution filed its Formal Offer
of Documentary Exhibits dated October 11, 2006, which included her undated
Complaint-Affidavit.[13]
On November 14, 2006, petitioners filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File the
Attached Demurrer to Evidence.[14] In their Demurrer to Evidence,[15] which was
appended to the said Motion, Bautista and Alcantara alleged that the prosecution's
evidence failed to establish their participation as Editor and Associate Editor,
respectively, of the publication Bandera; that they were not properly identified by
respondent herself during her testimony; and that the subject articles written by
Ampoloquio were not libelous due to absence of malice.
On April 25, 2008, the RTC issued an Order [16] granting petitioners’ Demurrer to Evidence
and dismissed Criminal Case Nos. MCO2-4872 and MCO2-4875. The trial court opined,
among others, that since the prosecution did not submit its Comment/Opposition to the
petitioners' Demurrer to Evidence, the averments therein thus became unrebutted; that
the testimonial and documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution failed to prove
the participation of petitioners as conspirators of the crime charged; and that during the
direct examination on July 27, 2004 and cross-examination on August 1, 2006,
respondent neither identified them, nor was there any mention about their actual
participation.
As a consequence, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit [17] dated May 29, 2008, with
the attached Comment ([to] Accused Lito Bautista and Jimmy Alcantara's Demurrer to
Evidence)[18] dated March 24, 2008, stating that during the pendency of the trial court's
resolution on the petitioners' Motion for Leave of Court to File the Attached Demurrer
to Evidence, with the attached Demurrer to Evidence, the prosecution intended to file
its Comment, by serving copies thereof, through registered mail, upon counsels for the
petitioners, including the other accused, and the respondent; however, said Comment
was not actually filed with the trial court due to oversight on the part of the staff of the
State Prosecutor handling the case.[19] Claiming that it was deprived of due process, the
prosecution prayed that its Comment be admitted and that the same be treated as a
reconsideration of the trial court's Order dated April 25, 2008.
In an Order dated June 3, 2008, the RTC granted the prosecutions' Motion to Admit,
with the attached Comment, and ruled that its Comment be admitted to form part of
the court records.
On August 19, 2008, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, seeking to set
aside the RTC Orders dated April 25, 2008 (which granted petitioners' Demurrer to
Evidence and ordered the dismissal of the cases against them) and June 3, 2008 (which
noted and admitted respondent's Comment to form part of the records of the case).
In a Decision dated May 19, 2009, the CA granted respondent's petition, thereby
reversing and setting aside the RTC Order dated April 25, 2008, but only insofar as it
pertains to the grant of petitioners' Demurrer to Evidence, and ordered that the case be
remanded to the trial court for reception of petitioners' evidence.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2009 which,
however, was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated September 28, 2009.
Hence, petitioners filed this present petition, raising the following arguments:
I.
[RESPONDENT'S] PETITION FOR CERTIORARI BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS IS BARRED

BY THE PETITIONERS' RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
II.
[RESPONDENT'S] PETITION FOR CERTIORARI BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT

LIE TO CORRECT ALLEGED ERRORS OF JUDGMENT COMMITTED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN GRANTING PETITONERS' DEMURRER [TO] EVIDENCE.
Petitioners allege that the Order of the RTC, dated April 25, 2008, granting the Demurrer
to Evidence was tantamount to an acquittal. As such, the prosecution can no longer
interpose an appeal to the CA, as it would place them in double jeopardy. Petitioners
contend that respondent's petition for certiorari with the CA should not have
prospered, because the allegations therein, in effect, assailed the trial court's judgment,
not its jurisdiction. In other words, petitioners posit that the said Order was in the
nature of an error of judgment rendered, which was not correctible by a petition
for certiorari with the CA.
Petitioners aver that although the CA correctly ruled that the prosecution had not been
denied due process, however, it erred in ruling that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion in granting petitioners' Demurrer to Evidence, on the basis that the
prosecution failed to prove that they acted in conspiracy with Ampoloquio, the author
of the questioned articles. They added that what the prosecution proved was merely
their designations as Editor and Associate Editor of the publication Bandera, but not the
fact that they had either control over the articles to be published or actually edited the
subject articles.
Respondent counters that petitioners failed to show special and important reasons to
justify their invocation of the Court's power to review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. She avers that the acquittal of petitioners does not preclude their further
prosecution if the judgment acquitting them is void for lack of jurisdiction. Further, she
points out that contrary to petitioners’ contention, the principle of double jeopardy
does not attach in cases where the court's judgment acquitting the accused or
dismissing the case is void, either for having disregarded the State's right to due process
or for having been rendered by the trial court with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and not merely errors of judgment.
Respondent also avers that even if the prosecution was deemed to have waived its right
to file a Comment on the petitioners’ Motion for Leave of Court to File the Attached
Demurrer to Evidence, this did not give the trial court any reason to deprive the
prosecution of its right to file a Comment on the petitioners’ Demurrer to Evidence
itself, which was a clear violation of the due process requirement. By reason of the
foregoing, respondent insists that petitioners cannot invoke violation of their right
against double jeopardy.
At the onset, it should be noted that respondent took a procedural misstep, and the
view she is advancing is erroneous. The authority to represent the State in appeals of
criminal cases before the Supreme Court and the CA is solely vested in the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG). Section 35 (1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code explicitly provides that the OSG shall represent the Government of
litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. It shall
have specific powers and functions to represent the Government and its officers in the
Supreme Court and the CA, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special
party.[20] The OSG is the law office of the Government. [21]
To be sure, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case
The private complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal
only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned. In a catena of cases, this
view has been time and again espoused and maintained by the Court. In Rodriguez v.
Gadiane,[22] it was categorically stated that if the criminal case is dismissed by the trial
court or if there is an acquittal, the appeal on the criminal aspect of the case must be
instituted by the Solicitor General in behalf of the State. The capability of the private
complainant to question such dismissal or acquittal is limited only to the civil aspect of
the case. The same determination was also arrived at by the Court in Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Company v. Veridiano II.[23] In the recent case of Bangayan, Jr. v.
Bangayan,[24] the Court again upheld this guiding principle.
Worthy of note is the case of People v. Santiago,[25] wherein the Court had the occasion
to bring this issue to rest. The Court elucidated:
It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the
interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil
liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that
of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if
there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken
only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent
the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may
not take such appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal the
civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.
wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that
the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are
the State and the private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an
interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action questioning
the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing,
complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines.
The action may be prosecuted in name of said complainant.[26]
Thus, the Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which the offended party
is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is
limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial
court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal of the criminal aspect may be undertaken,
whenever legally feasible, only by the State through the solicitor general. As a rule, only
the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private
offended party or complainant may not undertake such appeal.[27]
In the case at bar, the petition filed by the respondent before the CA essentially
questioned the criminal aspect of the Order of the RTC, not the civil aspect of the case.
Consequently, the petition should have been filed by the State through the OSG. Since
the petition for certiorari filed in the CA was not at the instance of the OSG, the same
should have been outrightly dismissed by the CA. Respondent lacked the personality or
legal standing to question the trial court’s order because it is only the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), who can bring actions on behalf of the State in criminal
proceedings, before the Supreme Court and the CA. [28] Thus, the CA should have denied
the petition outright.
Moreover, not only did the CA materially err in entertaining the petition, it should be
stressed that the granting of petitioners’ Demurrer to Evidence already amounted to a
dismissal of the case on the merits and a review of the order granting the demurrer to
evidence will place the accused in double jeopardy. Consequently, the Court disagrees
with the CA’s ruling reversing the trial court’s order dismissing the criminal cases against
petitioners.
Under Section 23,[29] Rule 119 of the Rules of Court on Demurrer to Evidence, after the
prosecution terminates the presentation of evidence and rests its case, the trial court
may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence upon the filing of a
Demurrer to Evidence by the accused with or without leave of court. If the accused files
a Demurrer to Evidence with prior leave of court and the same is denied, he may adduce
evidence in his defense. However, if the Demurrer to Evidence is filed by the accused
without prior leave of court and the same is denied, he waives his right to present
evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the
prosecution.
Corollarily, after the prosecution rests its case, and the accused files a Demurrer to
Evidence, the trial court is required to evaluate whether the evidence presented by the
prosecution is sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. If the trial court finds that the prosecution evidence is not sufficient
and grants the accused's Demurrer to Evidence, the ruling is an adjudication on the
merits of the case which is tantamount to an acquittal and may no longer be appealed.
Any further prosecution of the accused after an acquittal would, thus, violate the
constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. [30]
Anent the prosecution’s claim of denial of due process. As correctly found by the CA,
the prosecution was not denied due process. Suffice it to state that the prosecution had
actively participated in the trial and already rested its case, and upon petitioners' filing
of their Demurrer to Evidence, was given the opportunity to file its Comment or
Opposition and, in fact, actually filed its Comment thereto, albeit belatedly. The CA
emphasized that the word “may” was used in Section 23 of Rule 119 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states that if leave of court is granted, and the
accused has filed the Demurrer to Evidence within a non-extendible period of ten (10)
days from notice, the prosecution “may” oppose the Demurrer to Evidence within a
similar period from its receipt. In this regard, the CA added that the filing of a Comment
or Opposition by respondent is merely directory, not a mandatory or jurisdictional
requirement, and that in fact the trial court may even proceed with the resolution of the
petitioners' Demurrer to Evidence even without the prosecution's Comment.
One final note. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code specifies the persons that can be
held liable for libel. It provides:
ART. 360. Persons responsible. — Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause
the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be
newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamation
contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.[31]
From the foregoing, not only is the person who published, exhibited or caused the
publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing shall be responsible for the same,
all other persons who participated in its publication are liable, including the editor or
business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, who shall be
equally responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he
were the author thereof. The liability which attaches to petitioners is, thus, statutory in
nature.
In Fermin v. People,[32] therein petitioner argued that to sustain a conviction for libel

under Article 360 of the Code, it is mandatory that the publisher knowingly participated
in or consented to the preparation and publication of the libelous article. She also
averred that she had adduced ample evidence to show that she had no hand in the
preparation and publication of the offending article, nor in the review, editing,
examination, and approval of the articles published in Gossip Tabloid. The Court struck
down her erroneous theory and ruled that therein petitioner, who was not only the
Publisher of Gossip Tabloid but also its President and Chairperson, could not escape
liability by claiming lack of participation in the preparation and publication of the
libelous article.
Similarly, in Tulfo v. People,[33] therein petitioners, who were Managing Editor, National

Editor of Remate publication, President of Carlo Publishing House, and one who does
typesetting, editing, and layout of the page, claim that they had no participation in the
editing or writing of the subject articles which will hold them liable for the crime of libel
and, thus, should be acquitted. In debunking this argument, the Court stressed that an
editor or manager of a newspaper, who has active charge and control over the
publication, is held equally liable with the author of the libelous article. This is because
it is the duty of the editor or manager to know and control the contents of the paper,
and interposing the defense of lack of knowledge or consent as to the contents of the
articles or publication definitely will not prosper.
The rationale for the criminal culpability of those persons enumerated in Article 360 was
already elucidated as early as in the case of U.S. v. Ocampo,[34] to wit:
According to the legal doctrines and jurisprudence of the United States, the
printer of a publication containing libelous matter is liable for the same by reason of his
direct connection therewith and his cognizance of the contents thereof. With regard to
a publication in which a libel is printed, not only is the publisher but also all other
persons who in any way participate in or have any connection with its publication are
liable as publishers.[35]
Accordingly, Article 360 would have made petitioners Bautista and Alcantara, being the
Editor and Assistant Editor, respectively, of Bandera Publishing Corporation, answerable
with Ampoloquio, for the latter’s alleged defamatory writing, as if they were the authors
thereof. Indeed, as aptly concluded by the court a quo:
The aforestated provision is clear and unambiguous. It equally applies to an

editor of a publication in which a libelous article was published and states that the
editor of the same shall be responsible for the defamation in writing as if he were the
author thereof. Indeed, when an alleged libelous article is published in a newspaper,
such fact alone sufficient evidence to charge the editor or business manager with the
guilt of its publication. This sharing of liability with the author of said article is based on
the principle that editors and associate editors, by the nature of their positions, edit,
control and approve the materials which are to be published in a newspaper. This
means that, without their nod of approbation, any article alleged to be libelous would
not be published. Hence, by virtue of their position and the authority which they
exercise, newspaper editors and associate editors are as much critical part in the
publication of any defamatory material as the writer or author thereof. [36]
Nevertheless, petitioners could no longer be held liable in view of the procedural

infirmity that the petition for certiorari was not undertaken by the OSG, but instead by
respondent in her personal capacity. Although the conclusion of the trial court may be
wrong, to reverse and set aside the Order granting the demurrer to evidence would
violate petitioners’ constitutionally-enshrined right against double jeopardy. Had it not
been for this procedural defect, the Court could have seriously considered the
arguments advanced by the respondent in seeking the reversal of the Order of the RTC.
The granting of a demurrer to evidence should, therefore, be exercised with caution,

taking into consideration not only the rights of the accused, but also the right of the
private offended party to be vindicated of the wrongdoing done against him, for if it is
granted, the accused is acquitted and the private complainant is generally left with no
more remedy. In such instances, although the decision of the court may be wrong, the
accused can invoke his right against double jeopardy. Thus, judges are reminded to be
more diligent and circumspect in the performance of their duties as members of the
Bench, always bearing in mind that their decisions affect the lives of the accused and the
individuals who come to the courts to seek redress of grievances, which decision could
be possibly used by the aggrieved party as basis for the filing of the appropriate actions
against them.
Perforce, the Order dated April 25, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 212,
Mandaluyong City, in Criminal Case Nos. MC02-4872 and MC02-4875, which dismissed
the actions as against petitioners Lito Bautista and Jimmy Alcantara, should be
reinstated.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 19, 2009 and
Resolution dated September 28, 2009 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 104885,
are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The portion of the Order dated April 25, 2008 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 212, Mandaluyong City, in Criminal Case Nos. MC02-4872
and MC02-4875, which dismissed the actions as against petitioners Lito Bautista and
Jimmy Alcantara, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 123340, August 29, 2002 ]
LUTGARDA CRUZ, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE HEIRS OF ESTANISLAWA C.
REYES, REPRESENTED BY MIGUEL C. REYES, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to reverse
the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 31, 1995[1] and its Resolution dated
December 1, 1995.[2] The Court of Appeals dismissed for being insufficient in substance
the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, which sought to nullify two orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 53, dated April 18, 1994 and May 6, 1994.
The Antecedent Facts

The City Prosecutor of Manila charged petitioner with the crime of “Estafa thru
Falsification of Public Document” before the Manila Regional Trial Court.[3] Petitioner
executed before a Notary Public in the City of Manila an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication
of a parcel of land stating that she was the sole surviving heir of the registered owner
when in fact she knew there were other surviving heirs. Since the offended party did not
reserve the right to file a separate civil action arising from the criminal offense, the civil
action was deemed instituted in the criminal case.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its decision dated January 17, 1994
acquitting petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt. In the same decision, the trial
court rendered judgment on the civil aspect of the case, ordering the return to the
surviving heirs of the parcel of land located in Bulacan.[4]
On January 28, 1994, petitioner received a copy of the decision.
On February 10, 1994, petitioner filed by registered mail a motion for reconsideration
dated February 7, 1994, assailing the trial court’s ruling on the civil aspect of the criminal
case. Petitioner furnished the City Prosecutor a copy of the motion by registered mail.
On April 18, 1994, the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration stating:
“Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration dated February 7, 1994, filed by the accused
through counsel and considering that there is nothing to show that the Office of the City
Prosecutor was actually furnished or served with a copy of the said Motion for
Reconsideration within the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days from receipt by the
accused on January 28, 1994 of a copy of the Court’s decision dated January 17, 1994, so
that the same is already final and executory, let the Motion for Reconsideration be
Denied for lack of merit.”[5]
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the trial court’s order of April 18, 1994. The
trial court denied the same in an order dated May 6, 1994, to wit:
“Under the Interim Rules, no party shall be allowed a second motion for reconsideration
of a final order or judgment (Sec. 4). The motion of accused dated 22 April 1994 is a
violation of this rule.
WHEREFORE, said motion is DENIED.”[6]
Left with no recourse, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the
Court of Appeals to nullify the two assailed orders of the trial court. Petitioner also asked
the Court of Appeals to compel the trial court to resolve her motion for reconsideration of
the decision dated February 7, 1994.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On March 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals denied due course to the petition and dismissed
the case for being insufficient in substance.
The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court’s order of April 18, 1994 denying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals declared in part:
“Section 10, Rule 13, Rules of Court, provides as follows:
“SEC. 10. Proof of Service. – Proof of personal service shall consist of a written

admission of the party served, or the affidavit of the party serving, containing a full
statement of the date, place and manner of service. If the service is by ordinary mail,
proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing
compliance with Section 5 of this rule. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall
be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The
registry return card shall be filed immediately upon receipt thereof by the sender, or in
lieu thereof the letter unclaimed together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice
given by the postmaster to the addressee.”
Patent from the language of the said section is that in case service is made by registered
mail, proof of service shall be made by (a) affidavit of the person mailing and (b) the
registry receipt issued by the mailing office. Both must concur. In the case at bench, there
was no such affidavit or registry receipt when the motion was considered. Thus,
respondent Judge cannot be said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction, in ruling in the manner he did.”[7]
The Court of Appeals also affirmed the trial court’s order of May 6, 1994 denying the
subsequent motion for reconsideration, as follows:
“xxx, while there is merit in petitioner’s submission that the motion for reconsideration
dated April 22, 1994 was not a second motion for reconsideration of a final order or
judgment, as contemplated in the Interim Rules because the motion sought to impugn the
order dated 18 April 1994 not on the basis of the issues raised in the motion for
reconsideration dated 07 February 1994 but on the erroneous legal conclusion of the
order dated May 6, 1994,[8] this is already academic. The decision dated January 7, 1994
had long become final when the second motion for reconsideration was filed on 03 May
1994. Hence, the pairing Judge who issued the order on 06 May 1994 had no more legal
competence to promulgate the same.”[9]
Finally, the Court of Appeals upheld the assailed decision of the trial court on the civil
aspect of the case, to wit:
“x x x, the institution of a criminal action carries with it the civil action for the recovery
of the civil liability arising from the offense charged. There was neither reservation nor
waiver of the right to file the civil action separately nor has one been instituted to the
criminal action. Hence, the civil action for the civil liability has been impliedly instituted
with the filing of the criminal case before respondent Judge. This is the law on the matter.
The proposition submitted by petitioner that the court presided by respondent Judge had
no jurisdiction over the property because it is located in Bulacan - outside the territorial
jurisdiction of said court -does not hold water. Being a civil liability arising from the
offense charged, the governing law is the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the civil
procedure rules which pertain to civil action arising from the initiatory pleading that
gives rise to the suit.”[10]
In the dispositive portion of its assailed decision, the Court of Appeals declared:
“WHEREFORE, the instant petition not being sufficient in substance is hereby DENIED
DUE COURSE and the case DISMISSED.” [11]
In a resolution dated December 1, 1995, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration.[12]
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:
1. “WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT

THE PROSECUTION WAS DULY FURNISHED WITH COPY OF THE
PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WITH RESPECT TO
THE DECISION ON THE CIVIL ASPECT OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. 87-54773
(SIC) OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 53.”
2. “WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA HAD JURISDICTION TO RENDER
JUDGMENT ON THE CIVIL ASPECT OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. 87-57743
FOR FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT, INVOLVING A
PROPERTY LOCATED IN BULACAN.”
3. “WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
THE PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS WHEN THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 53, RENDERED DECISION ON THE
CIVIL ASPECT OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. 87-57743.”[13]
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.

When the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but is adjudged civilly liable, his
motion for reconsideration of the civil aspect must be served not only on the prosecution,
also on the offended party if the latter is not represented by a private counsel. Moreover,
if the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the accused, and the
crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction, it necessarily exercises jurisdiction
over all matters that the law requires the court to resolve. This includes the power to
order the restitution to the offended party of real property located in another province.
Absence of Proof of Service
The first issue is whether petitioner’s motion for reconsideration dated February 7, 1994
complied with the mandatory requirements of Section 6, Rule 15 on proof of service.
Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial court’s finding
that the City Prosecutor was not duly and timely furnished with petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration of February 7, 1994.
Petitioner asserts that both copies of the motion for reconsideration were sent to the trial
court and the City Prosecutor by registered mail on February 10, 1994. Petitioner relies
on jurisprudence that the date of mailing is the date of filing, arguing that the date of
mailing of both motions was on February 10, 1994. Petitioner maintains that the motion
was properly filed within the 15-day period, citing the registry return card which shows
actual receipt on February 22, 1994 by the City Prosecutor of a copy of the motion.
The Court of Appeals, noting that petitioner received a copy of the decision on January
28, 1994, stated that petitioner had until February 12, 1994 to appeal the decision or file a
motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner, by filing a motion
for reconsideration without any proof of service, merely filed a scrap of paper and not a
motion for reconsideration. Hence, the reglementary period of petitioner to appeal
continued to run and lapsed after the 15-day period, making the trial court’s decision final
and executory.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner patently failed to comply with the
mandatory requirements on proof of service insofar as the public prosecutor is concerned.
The Court has stressed time and again that non-compliance with Sections 4, 5 and 6 of
Rule 15 is a fatal defect. The well-settled rule is that a motion which fails to comply with
Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 is a useless piece of paper. If filed, such motion is not
entitled to judicial cognizance and does not stop the running of the reglementary period
for filing the requisite pleading.[14]
Section 6 of Rule 15 reads:
“SEC. 6. - Proof of service to be filed with motions. – No motion shall be acted upon by
the court, without proof of service of the notice thereof.”[15] (Emphasis supplied)
From the language of the rule, proof of service is mandatory. Without such proof of
service to the adverse party, a motion is nothing but an empty formality deserving no
judicial cognizance.
Section 13 of Rule 13 further requires that:
“SEC. 13. Proof of Service. – x x x. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall be

made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry
return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the
unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the
postmaster to the addressee.”[16] (Emphasis supplied)
If service is by registered mail, proof of service consists of the affidavit of the person

mailing and the registry receipt, both of which must be appended to the motion. Absent
one or the other, or worse both, there is no proof of service.
In the instant case, an examination of the record shows that petitioner received a copy of
the trial court’s decision of January 17, 1994 on January 28, 1994. Within the
reglementary period to appeal, petitioner filed on February 10, 1994, by registered mail, a
motion for reconsideration. However, petitioner failed to attach both the affidavit and the
registry receipt to the motion for reconsideration as required by the Rules.
The defect of the motion is apparent on its face. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
was a mere scrap of paper as it did not contain the required proof of service.
However, petitioner is contesting that part of the decision of the trial court finding him
civilly liable even as he is acquitted from the criminal charge on reasonable doubt. This
raises the issue of whether the public prosecutor is the only proper party to be served with
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. The present Rules do not require the accused to
serve a copy of his motion for reconsideration on the offended party who may not be
represented by a private counsel. The Rules require service only on the public prosecutor
if the offended party is not represented by a private counsel.
A judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory and the prosecution cannot
appeal the acquittal because of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
However, either the offended party or the accused may appeal the civil aspect of the
judgment despite the acquittal of the accused. The public prosecutor has generally no
interest in appealing the civil aspect of a decision acquitting the accused.
The acquittal ends the work of the public prosecutor and the case is terminated as far as
he is concerned.
The real parties in interest in the civil aspect of a decision are the offended party and the
accused. Thus, any appeal or motion for reconsideration of the civil aspect of a decision
in a criminal case must be served on the other real party in interest. If the offended party
appeals or moves for reconsideration, the accused is necessarily served a copy of the
pleading through his counsel.
If the accused appeals or moves for reconsideration, a lacuna arises if the offended party
is not represented by a private counsel. In such a situation, under the present Rules only
the public prosecutor is served the notice of appeal or a copy of the motion for
reconsideration. To fill in this lacuna in the present Rules, we require that henceforth if
the accused appeals or moves for reconsideration, he should serve a copy of his pleading
on the offended party himself if the latter is not represented by a private counsel. This is
in addition to service on the public prosecutor who is the counsel of record of the State.
In the instant case, the Court notes that petitioner did not serve a copy of her motion for
reconsideration on the offended party who was not represented by a private counsel in the
trial court. In the interest of justice, and considering that the present Rules are silent on
the matter, it is only fair to give petitioner a period of five days from receipt of this
decision within which to serve a copy of her motion for reconsideration on the offended
party.
Trial court’s jurisdiction over the civil aspect.
Petitioner maintains that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the trial court had
jurisdiction to render judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case. Petitioner asserts
that the Manila trial court had no jurisdiction over the parcel of land in Bulacan which is
outside the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction.
In upholding the trial court’s jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals held:
“Being a civil liability arising from the offense charged, the governing law is the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, not the civil procedure rules which pertain to civil action arising
from the initiatory pleading that gives rise to the suit.”[17]
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner asserts that the location of the subject property outside the court’s territorial
jurisdiction deprived the trial court of jurisdiction over the civil aspect of the criminal
case. This argument is contrary to the law and the rules.
There are three important requisites which must be present before a court can acquire
criminal jurisdiction. First, the court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Second, the court must have jurisdiction over the territory where the offense was
committed. Third, the court must have jurisdiction over the person of the accused. [18] In
the instant case, the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter as the law has
conferred on the court the power to hear and decide cases involving estafa through
falsification of a public document. The trial court also had jurisdiction over the offense
charged since the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction. The trial court
also acquired jurisdiction over the person of accused-petitioner because she voluntarily
submitted to the court’s authority.
Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the
accused, and the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction, the court
necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues that the law requires the court to resolve.
One of the issues in a criminal case is the civil liability of the accused arising from the
crime. Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code provides that “[E]very person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable.” Article 104 of the same Code states that “civil
liability x x x includes restitution.”
The action for recovery of civil liability is deemed instituted in the criminal action unless
reserved by the offended party.[19] In the instant case, the offended party did not reserve
the civil action and the civil action was deemed instituted in the criminal action.
Although the trial court acquitted petitioner of the crime charged, the acquittal, grounded
on reasonable doubt, did not extinguish the civil liability.[20] Thus, the Manila trial court
had jurisdiction to decide the civil aspect of the instant case - ordering restitution even if
the parcel of land is located in Bulacan.
Consequently, while we find no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals as
to proof of service and the trial court’s jurisdiction on the civil aspect, we remand this
case for further proceedings in the interest of justice.
WHEREFORE, petitioner is given five (5) days from receipt of this decision within
which to serve a copy of her motion for reconsideration on the offended party. Let this
case be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 171175, October 09, 2009 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. ARTURO F. DUCA,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure which seeks to set aside and annul the Decision [1] dated November 23,
2005 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 28312.
The CA decision reversed the decision [2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan
City, Branch 44, in Criminal Case No. 2003-0194-D [3] which affirmed an earlier
decision[4] of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan,
convicting respondent Arturo Duca of the crime of falsification under Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The facts as found by the CA are quoted as follows:
It appears that Arturo Duca, together with his mother, Cecilia Duca, were charged
of the crime of Falsification of Official Document defined and penalized under Article
172, in relation to Article 171, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code in an Information
which reads:
"That on or about December 10, 2001 in the Municipality of San Fabian, Province
of Pangasinan, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused confederating together and mutually abiding each other, with intent to cause
damage, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cause the preparation
of a Declaration of Real Property over a bungalow type residential house covered by
Property Index No. 013-32-027-01-116131 of the Municipal Assessor's Office of San
Fabian, Pangasinan by making it appear that the signature appearing on the sworn
statement of owner is that of Aldrin F. Duca when the truth of the matter is not because
the latter was abroad at that time having arrived in the Philippines only on December
12, 2001, and it was accused Arturo F. Duca who affixed his own signature thereon to
the damage and prejudice of the undersigned private complainant Pedro Calanayan."
Upon being arraigned, both the accused pleaded `not guilty'. Then trial on the merits
ensued.
The evidence for the prosecution shows that sometime in 1999, Pedro Calanayan
(hereinafter "Calanayan"), private complainant herein, filed an action for ejectment and
damages against Cecilia F. Duca, Ruel F. Duca, Arsenio F. Duca and Vangie F. Duca before
the 4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan,
docketed as Civil Case No. 960 (SF-99). The case was decided in favor of Calanayan.
There being no appeal interposed by the aforesaid defendants, the said decision
became final and executory. On November 22, 1999, a writ of execution was issued by
the MCTC to enforce the decision. On February 29, 2000, the money judgment was
likewise satisfied with the public auction of the lot owned by Cecilia Duca covered by
TCT No. 233647. On March 1, 2000, a certificate of sale was issued in favor of Jocelyn
Barque, the highest bidder in the auction sale.
On October 19, 2001, Cecilia Duca filed an action for the Declaration of Nullity of
Execution and Damages with prayer for Writ of Injunction and Temporary Restraining
order against Sheriff IV Vinez Hortaleza and Police Officers Roberto Vical, Alejandre
Arevalo, Emilio Austria, Victor Quitales, Crisostomo Bonavente and Calanayan. The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. 2000-0304-D.
When the said case was heard, Cecilia Duca testified to the effect that the house erected
on the lot subject of the ejectment case is owned by her son Aldrin Duca. In support of
such claim she presented Property Index No. 013-32-027-01-116131 (Exhibit "B"). At the
back of the said exhibit is a sworn statement showing that the current and fair market
value of the property, which is a bungalow, is P70,000.00 with the signature affixed on
top of the typewritten name Aldrin F. Duca and subscribed and sworn to before Engr.
Reynante Baltazar, the Municipal Assessor of San Fabian, Pangasinan, on December 10,
2001. The signature on top of the typewritten name Aldrin F. Duca is that of Arturo
Duca. According to the prosecution, Arturo made it appear that the signature is that of
his brother Aldrin who was out of the country at that time. Aldrin arrived in the
Philippines only on December 12, 2001, as evidenced by a certification from the Bureau
of Immigration, Manila. Arturo even made it appear that his Community Tax Certificate
(CTC) No. 03841661 issued on December 10, 2001 is that of his brother Aldrin. That
because of the misrepresentation, Cecilia and Arturo were able to mislead the RTC such
that they were able to get a TRO against Sheriff Hortaleza and the policemen ordering
them to stop from evicting the plaintiffs from the property in question.
Both accused denied that they falsified the signature of Aldrin Duca. Cecilia testified that
she had no participation in the execution as she was in Manila at that time.
On the other hand, Arturo testified that the signature atop the name Aldrin Duca was
his. However, he intersposed the defense that he was duly authorized by the latter to
procure the said tax declaration.
On April 3, 2003, the MCTC of San Fabian-San Jacinto rendered a decision, dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Arturo F. Duca guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification defined and penalized under Article 171 of
the Revised Penal Code and hereby imposes upon said accused a prison term of two
years, four months and one day to six (6) years of Prision Correccional and a fine of
P2,000.00. Accused Cecilia is acquitted for lack of evidence.
The accused Arturo F. Duca is hereby ordered to pay to the complaining witness actual
damages in the amount of P60,000.00 moral damages of P150,000.00 plus exemplary
damages in the amount of P100,000.00 plus cost.
SO ORDERED."
Dissatisfied with the decision, Arturo Duca appealed. On March 24, 2004, the RTC of
Dagupan City, Branch 44, rendered a decision, disposing the case as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the decision dated April 3, 2003 of the 4 th Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan convicting accused Arturo F. Duca of the
crime of Falsification defined and penalized under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code
and imposing upon said accused an imprisonment of two years, four months and one
day to six (6) years of Prision Correccional and a fine of P2,000.00, and ordering him to
pay to the complaining witness actual damages in the amount of P60,000.00, moral
damages in the amount of P150,000.00 plus exemplary damages in the amount of
P100,000.00 plus cost, is AFFIRMED.
x x x.
SO ORDERED."[5]
Aggrieved with the ruling of the RTC, Duca elevated the case to the CA via a petition for
review. On November 23, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed decision acquitting
Duca of the crime charged and reversing the RTC decision. The CA held:
However, the prosecution failed to establish the fact that Arturo was not duly
authorized by Aldrin in procuring the tax declaration. On the contrary, the defense was
able to establish that Arturo Duca was duly authorized by his brother Aldrin to secure a
tax declaration on the house erected on the land registered under their mother's name.
xxx xxx xxx
From the foregoing testimony, it can be deduced that Arturo could not have falsified the
Tax Declaration of Real Property under Property Index No. 013-32-027-01-116B1
(Exhibit "B") by making it appear that Aldrin Duca, his brother, participated in the
accomplishment of the said document since he was actually acting for and in behalf of
the latter. It must be noted that as early as June 2001, Arturo has already been
authorized by Aldrin; albeit verbally, to register the house in the latter's name as he
cannot do it personally as he was abroad. This authority of Arturo was confirmed by the
latter's execution of an Affidavit dated January 19, 2002 confirming the procurement of
the said tax declaration (Exhibit "6") as well as a Special Power of attorney executed on
June 17, 2002 (Exhibit "7"). Thus, what appeared to be defective from the beginning had
already been cured so much so that the said document became valid and binding as an
official act of Arturo.
If Arturo did not state in the Tax Declaration in what capacity he was signing, this
deficiency was cured by Aldrin's subsequent execution of Exhibits "6" and "7".
The RTC's conclusion that the special power of attorney executed by Aldrin was a mere
afterthought designed to extricate Arturo from any criminal liability has no basis since
from the very start, it has been duly established by the defense that Aldrin had verbally
instructed Arturo to cause the execution of Exhibit "B" for the purpose of registering his
house constructed on his mother's lot for taxation purposes. [6]
Hence, the instant petition anchored on this sole ground:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND
HAD ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION WHEN IT RESOLVED PRIVATE RESPONDENT
ARTURO F. DUCA'S APPEAL WITHOUT GIVING THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
THROUGH THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD
THEREON.[7]
Petitioner argues that the prosecution was denied due process when the CA resolved
the respondent's appeal without notifying the People of the Philippines, through the
Solicitor General, of the pendency of the same and without requiring the Solicitor
General to file his comment. Petitioner contends that once the case is elevated to the
CA or this Court, it is only the Solicitor General who is authorized to bring or defend
actions on behalf of the People. Thus, the CA gravely abused its discretion when it acted
on respondent's appeal without affording the prosecution the opportunity to be heard.
Consequently, the decision of the CA acquitting respondent should be considered void
for being violative of due process.
In his Comment,[8] respondent argues that there was no denial of due process because
the prosecution was properly represented by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor and
a private prosecutor who handled the presentation of evidence under the control and
supervision of the Provincial Prosecutor. Since the control and supervision conferred on
the private prosecutor by the Provincial Prosecutor had not been withdrawn, the
Solicitor General could not claim that the prosecution was not afforded a chance to be
heard in the CA. According to the respondent, he should not be prejudiced by the
Provincial Prosecutor's failure to inform the Solicitor General of the pendency of the
appeal.
The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the CA and the
Supreme Court is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Section
35(1), Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code explicitly
provides, viz.:
SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. - The Office of the Solicitor General shall
services of lawyers. x x x It shall have the following specific powers and functions:
party. (emphasis supplied)
Jurisprudence has been consistent on this point. In the recent case of Cariño v. De
Castro,[9] it was held:
In criminal proceedings on appeal in the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme

Court, the authority to represent the People is vested solely in the Solicitor General.
Under Presidential Decree No. 478, among the specific powers and functions of the OSG
was to "represent the government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all
criminal proceedings." This provision has been carried over to the Revised
Administrative Code particularly in Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12 thereof. Without doubt,
the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines in all criminal cases. [10]
Likewise, in City Fiscal of Tacloban v. Espina,[11] the Court made the following

pronouncement:
Under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court all criminal actions commenced
by complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the
fiscal. The fiscal represents the People of the Philippines in the prosecution of offenses
before the trial courts at the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts, municipal
circuit trial courts and the regional trial courts. However, when such criminal actions are
brought to the Court of Appeals or this Court, it is the Solicitor General who must
represent the People of the Philippines not the fiscal. [12]
And in Labaro v. Panay,[13] the Court held:
The OSG is the law office of the Government authorized by law to represent the
Government or the People of the Philippines before us and before the Court of Appeals
in all criminal proceedings, or before any court, tribunal, body, or commission in any
matter, action, or proceeding which, in the opinion of the Solicitor General, affects the
welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require. [14]
Indeed, in criminal cases, as in the instant case, the Solicitor General is regarded as the
appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines and as such, should have been given
the opportunity to be heard on behalf of the People. The records show that the CA
failed to require the Solicitor General to file his Comment on Duca's petition. A copy of
the CA Resolution[15] dated May 26, 2004 which required the filing of Comment was
served upon Atty. Jaime Dojillo, Sr. (counsel for Duca), Atty. Villamor Tolete (counsel for
private complainant Calanayan) and RTC Judge Crispin Laron. Nowhere was it shown
that the Solicitor General had ever been furnished a copy of the said Resolution. The
failure of the CA to require the Solicitor General to file his Comment deprived the
prosecution of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case.
Pertinently, Saldana v. Court of Appeals, et al.[16] ruled as follows:
When the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its
case, its right to due process is thereby violated (Uy vs. Genato, L-37399, 57 SCRA 123
[May 29, 1974]; Serino vs. Zoa, L-33116, 40 SCRA 433 [Aug. 31, 1971]; People vs. Gomez,
L-22345, 20 SCRA 293 [May 29, 1967]; People vs. Balisacan, L-26376, 17 SCRA 1119
[Aug. 31, 1966]).
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights,
courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due
process raises a serious jurisdiction issue (Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of
Prisons, L-300026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan. 30, 1971]) which cannot be glossed over or
disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is
apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction
(Aducayen vs. Flores, L-30370, [May 25, 1973] 51 SCRA 78; Shell Co. vs. Enage, L-30111-
12, 49 SCRA 416 [Feb. 27, 1973]). Any judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding
such violation may be regarded as a `lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw
and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head' (Aducayen vs. Flores, supra).
[17]
The State, like the accused, is entitled to due process in criminal cases, that is, it must be
given the opportunity to present its evidence in support of the charge. The doctrine
consistently adhered to by this Court is that a decision rendered without due process is
void ab initio and may be attacked directly or collaterally. A decision is void for lack of
due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the opportunity to be heard. [18]
The assailed decision of the CA acquitting the respondent without giving the Solicitor
General the chance to file his comment on the petition for review clearly deprived the
State of its right to refute the material allegations of the said petition filed before the
CA. The said decision is, therefore, a nullity. In Dimatulac v. Villon,[19] we held:
Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be
dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of society and the offended parties which
have been wronged must be equally considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not
necessarily a denial of justice; and an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice;
for, to the society offended and the party wronged, it could also mean injustice. Justice
then must be rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one hand, and the State
and offended party, on the other.[20]
Further, the CA should have been guided by the following provisions of Sections 1 and 3
of Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Court:
Sec. 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. - A party desiring to appeal from a
decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
may file a verified petition for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the same time
to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket and other lawful fees, depositing the
amount of P500.00 for costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse
party with a copy of the petition. The petition shall be filed and served within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of
petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after judgment.
Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful
fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the
Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to
file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most
compelling reason and in no case to extend fifteen (15) days.
Sec. 3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. - The failure of the petitioner to
comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket
and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the
contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient
ground for the dismissal thereof. (emphasis supplied)
Respondent appealed to the CA from the decision of the RTC via a petition for review
under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Court. The respondent was mandated under Section
1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court to serve copies of his petition for review upon the
adverse party, in this case, the People of the Philippines through the OSG. Respondent
failed to serve a copy of his petition on the OSG and instead served a copy upon the
Assistant City Prosecutor of Dagupan City.[21] The service of a copy of the petition on the
People of the Philippines, through the Prosecutor would be inefficacious for the reason
that the Solicitor General is the sole representative of the People of the Philippines in
appeals before the CA and the Supreme Court. The respondent's failure to have a copy
of his petition served on the People of the Philippines, through the OSG, is a sufficient
ground for the dismissal of the petition as provided in Section 3, Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court. Thus, the CA has no other recourse but to dismiss the petition. However, the CA,
instead of dismissing respondent's petition, proceeded to resolve the petition and even
acquitted respondent without the Solicitor General's comment. We, thus, find that the
CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
rendering its assailed decision.
On a procedural matter, the Court notes that petitioner filed the instant petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 without filing a motion for reconsideration with the CA. It is
settled that the writ of certiorari lies only when petitioner has no other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Thus, a motion for reconsideration,
as a general rule, must be filed before the tribunal, board, or officer against whom the
writ of certiorari is sought. Ordinarily, certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless
a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the respondent tribunal, to allow it an
opportunity to correct its assigned errors. [22] This rule, however, is not without
exceptions. In National Housing v. Court of Appeals,[23] we held:
However, in Progressive Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we held

that while generally a motion for reconsideration must first be filed before resorting to
certiorari in order to give the lower court an opportunity to rectify its errors, this rule
admits of exceptions and is not intended to be applied without considering the
circumstances of the case. The filing of a motion for reconsideration is not a
condition sine qua non when the issue raised is purely one of law, or where the error is
patent or the disputed order is void, or the questions raised on certiorari are the same
as those already squarely presented to and passed upon by the lower court.
[24]
(emphasis supplied)
The CA decision being void for lack of due process, the filing of the instant petition for
certiorari without a motion for reconsideration is justified.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of the

CA in CA-G.R. CR No. 28312 is hereby SET ASIDE and the case is REMANDED to the CA
for further proceedings. The CA is ordered to decide the case with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 176084, April 30, 2008 ]
CARMENCITA G. CARIÑO, Petitioner, vs. MERLIN DE CASTRO,
Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SATIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the August 18, 2006
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29523 dismissing the petition as
well as the December 29, 2006 Resolution[2] denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner Carmencita G. Cariño filed a complaint-affidavit for violation of Batas

Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22) against respondent Merlin de Castro before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Manila. After conducting preliminary investigation, Assistant City
Prosecutor Manuel B. Sta. Cruz, Jr., issued a Resolution finding prima facie evidence and
recommending respondent's indictment. Accordingly, respondent was charged with five
(5) counts of violation of BP 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch
13.
During arraignment, respondent manifested her intention to file a Motion for Preliminary
Determination of Existence of Probable Cause which was granted. Accordingly,
respondent's arraignment was deferred. Petitioner was required to file comment on the
Motion for Preliminary Determination of Existence of Probable Cause. However, instead
of a comment, petitioner filed a motion for extension which was denied for being a
prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary Procedure.
In an Order[3] dated August 30, 2004, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 13
found that the checks were issued by respondent without valuable consideration; that
petitioner was not authorized to collect rental payments from respondent; and that
consequently, respondent can legally refuse payment on the ground that said checks were
issued without valuable and legal consideration. The dispositive portion of the Order
reads:
WHEREFORE, finding no probable cause against the accused for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22, the instant cases are DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[4]
Petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court. In a Decision[5] dated February 28, 2005,
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 40, affirmed the Decision of the court a
quo and dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. It held that petitioner failed to controvert
the Joint-Affidavit executed by the owners of the property that they did not authorize
petitioner to lease their property and to collect rentals thereon. Hence, the checks were
issued for a non-existing account or without legal and valuable consideration.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the Regional Trial Court
in an Order[6] dated August 15, 2005.
Thereafter, petitioner, through counsel and with the conformity of Asst. City Prosecutor,
Sawadjaan Issan, filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals. However, in the
assailed Decision dated August 18, 2006, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition
because it was filed only by the private prosecutor and not by the Office of the Solicitor
General as mandated by law. The appellate court ruled thus:
We note that the instant petition for review suffers from a basic infirmity of having been
filed merely by the private prosecutor or counsel of the private complainant, though with
the conformity of the Assistant City Prosecutor, and not by the authorized representative
of the People of the Philippines - the Solicitor General. Hence, it is dismissible on said
ground alone.
We emphasize that the authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor
General. Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code
explicitly provides, viz.:
"SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. - The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and
agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of
lawyers. x x x It shall have the following specific powers and functions:
party."
Jurisprudence has been consistent on this point so much so that in the City Fiscal of
Tacloban vs. Espina, it was held:
"Under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court all criminal actions commenced by
complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal.
The fiscal represents the People of the Philippines in the prosecution of offenses before
the trial courts at the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts, municipal circuit
trial courts and the regional trial courts. However, when such criminal actions are brought
to the Court of Appeals or (to) this Court, it is the Solicitor General who must represent
the People of the Philippines not the fiscal.
As succinctly observed by the Solicitor General, petitioner has no authority to file the
petition in this Court. It is only the Solicitor General who can bring or defend such
actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines or the People of the Philippines. And
such actions not initiated by the Solicitor General should be summarily dismissed."[7]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On October 3, 2006, the Court of Appeals
required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file comment.[8]
In its Comment,[9] the OSG noted thus:
1. A thorough examination of petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and an

assiduous re-evaluation of the records and the applicable laws and jurisprudence
reveal that there is no basis, in fact or in law, there being no new and substantial
matter not already considered and ruled upon by this Honorable Court is pleaded
that would warrant a re-examination, much less, the modification or reversal of the
Decision dated August 18, 2006 of this Honorable Court which dismissed
petitioner's petition for review dated August 31, 2005. Said petition was filed
merely by the private prosecutor, and not by the authorized representative of the
People of the Philippines - the Office of the Solicitor General which is solely
vested with the authority to represent the People in appeals of criminal cases
before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, pursuant to Section 35(1),
Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code.
2. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration is just a reiteration and rehash of the errors
assigned and discussed in the petition for review dated August 31, 2005, which
were already resolved in the Decision sought to be reconsidered. It would be a
useless ritual of this Honorable Court to reiterate itself.
3. Considering that this Honorable Court had carefully scrutinized and studied the
records as well as weighed and assessed the arguments of both parties before
rendering the assailed Decision, petitioner's motion has no leg to stand on. Hence,
this Honorable Court is correct in dismissing the petition.[10]
On December 29, 2006, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration;
hence, the instant petition raising the following issues:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ISSUING THE DECISION PROMULGATED

ON AUGUST 18, 2006 AND THE RESOLUTION PROMULGATED ON DECEMBER
29, 2006 IN NOT RECTIFYING THE ERROR OF LAW COMMITTED BY THE
BRANCH 40 REGIONAL TRIAL OF MANILA AND BRANCH 13 OF THE
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF MANILA.
II.
THE ABOVE-MENTIONED DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE COURT OF

APPEALS ARE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND APPLICABLE
JURISPRUDENCE OF THIS MOST HONORABLE COURT. [11]
In criminal proceedings on appeal in the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme Court, the
authority to represent the People is vested solely in the Solicitor General. Under
Presidential Decree No. 478, among the specific powers and functions of the OSG was to
"represent the government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings." This provision has been carried over to the Revised Administrative Code
particularly in Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12 thereof.[12] Without doubt, the OSG is the
appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines in all criminal cases.[13]
Although the petition for review before the Court of Appeals was filed with the
conformity of the Assistant City Prosecutor, such conformity is insufficient, as the rules
and jurisprudence mandate that the same should be filed by the Solicitor General.
While a private prosecutor may be allowed to intervene in criminal proceedings on

appeal in the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, his participation is subordinate to
the interest of the People, hence, he cannot be permitted to adopt a position contrary to
that of the Solicitor General. To do so would be tantamount to giving the private
prosecutor the direction and control of the criminal proceeding, contrary to the provisions
of law.[14]
In the instant case, the Solicitor General opined that petitioner had no legal standing to
file the petition for review and that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition.
As such, the Assistant City Prosecutor or the private prosecutor cannot take a contrary
view.
We are cognizant of our ruling in the cases of Perez v. Hagonoy,[15] Mobilia Products,

Inc. v. Umezawa,[16] People v. Santiago,[17] and Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz,[18] where we
held that only the OSG can bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic or represent
the People or state in criminal proceedings pending in the Supreme Court and the Court
of Appeals. At the same time, we acknowledged in those cases that a private offended
party, in the interest of substantial justice, and where there appears to be a grave error
committed by the judge, or where there is lack of due process, may allow and give due
course to the petition filed. However, the special circumstances prevailing in the
abovementioned cases are not present in the instant case. In those cases, the petitioners
availed of petition for certiorari under Rule 65. In the instant case, the petition was filed
under Rule 45. Moreover, both the Metropolitan Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court
found that petitioner was not duly authorized by the owner of the subject property to
collect and receive rentals thereon. Thus, not only were the checks without valuable
consideration; they were also issued for a non-existing account. With these undisputed
findings, we cannot reconcile petitioner's allegation that she is the aggrieved party.
Finally, petitioner cannot validly claim that she was denied due process considering that
she availed of every opportunity to present her case. Thus, we find no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the lower courts in dismissing the complaints.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated August 18, 2006 dismissing the petition as well as the Resolution dated
December 29, 2006 denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 188165, December 11, 2013 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON.
SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION & THIRD DIVISION, HERNANDO
BENITO PEREZ, ROSARIO PEREZ, RAMON ARCEO AND ERNEST
ESCALER, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 189063]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON.

SANDIGANBAYAN, SECOND DIVISION, HERNANDO BENITO PEREZ,
ROSARIO SALVADOR PEREZ, ERNEST DE LEON ESCALER AND
RAMON CASTILLO ARCEO, JR., RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The guarantee of the speedy disposition of cases under Section 16 of Article III of the
Constitution applies to all cases pending before all judicial, quasi-judicial or
administrative bodies. Thus, the fact-finding investigation should not be deemed separate
from the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman if the
aggregate time spent for both constitutes inordinate and oppressive delay in the
disposition of any case.
The Case
The Court resolves the petitions for certiorari the State instituted to assail and nullify, in
G.R. No. 188165, the Sandiganbayan’s dismissal of Criminal Case SB-08-CRM-0265
entitled People of the Philippine v. Hernando Benito Perez, Rosario S. Perez, Ernest
Escaler, and Ramon A. Arceo, for violation of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended; and, in G.R. No. 189063, the Sandiganbayan’s dismissal of SB-08-CRM-0266
entitled People of the Philippine v. Hernando Benito Perez, Rosario S. Perez, Ernest
Escaler, and Ramon A. Arceo, for robbery under Article 293, in relation to Article 294, of
Common Factual and Procedural Antecedents
On November 12, 2002, Congressman Wilfrido B. Villarama of Bulacan (Cong.

Villarama) delivered a privilege speech in the House of Representatives denouncing acts
of bribery allegedly committed by a high ranking government official whom he then
called the “2 Million Dollar Man.”[1] In reaction, the Office of the President directed the
Presidential Anti-Graft and Commission (PAGC) to conduct an inquiry on the exposé of
Cong. Villarama. PAGC sent written communications to Cong. Villarama, Cong. Mark
Jimenez, Senator Panfilo Lacson and respondent Secretary of Justice Hernando B. Perez
inviting them to provide information and documents on the alleged bribery subject of the
exposé.[2] On November 18, 2002, Cong. Villarama responded by letter to PAGC’s
invitation by confirming that Secretary Perez was the government official who “ha[d]
knowledge or connection with the bribery subject of his expose.”[3] In his own letter of
November 18, 2002, however, Secretary Perez denied being the Million-Dollar Man
referred to in Cong. Villarama’s privilege speech.[4] On November 25, 2002, Cong.
Jimenez delivered a privilege speech in the House of Representatives confirming Cong.
Villarama’s exposé, and accusing Secretary Perez of extorting US$2 Million from him in
February 2001.[5]
On November 25, 2002, then Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo requested PAGC to submit
documents relevant to the exposé.[6] On November 26, 2002, Ombudsman Marcelo
formally requested Cong. Jimenez to submit a sworn statement on his exposé. [7] Cong.
Jimenez complied on December 23, 2002 by submitting his complaint-affidavit to the
Office of the Ombudsman. The complaint-affidavit was initially docketed as CPL-C-02-
1992. On the same day, the Special Action Team of the Fact Finding and Intelligence
Research Office (FIRO) of the Office of the Ombudsman referred Cong. Jimenez’s
complaint-affidavit to the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau and to the
Administrative Adjudication Board, both of the Office of the Ombudsman, for
preliminary investigation and administrative adjudication, respectively.[8]
The complaint-affidavit of Jimenez was re-docketed as OMB-C-C-02-0857L, for the

criminal case in which the respondents were Secretary Perez, Ernest L. Escaler and
Ramon C. Arceo, Jr.; and as OMB-C-A-02-0631L, for the administrative case involving
only Secretary Perez as respondent.[9]
On January 2, 2003, a Special Panel composed of Atty. Evelyn Baliton, Atty. Mary Susan
Guillermo and Atty. Jose de Jesus was created to evaluate and conduct an investigation of
CPL-C-02-1992.
On even date, Secretary Perez, through counsel, requested Ombudsman Marcelo that the
Office of the Ombudsman itself directly verify from the Coutt’s Bank whether he
(Secretary Perez) had ever held any account in that bank to which the sum of US$2
Million had been remitted by Cong. Jimenez.[10]
On January 15, 2003, Ombudsman Marcelo approved the recommendation of the Special
Panel to refer the complaint of Cong. Jimenez to FIRO for a full-blown fact-finding
investigation.[11]
On June 4, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman received the letter dated May 30, 2003
from the counsel of Cong. Jimenez, submitting the supplemental complaint-affidavit
dated April 4, 2003 of Cong. Jimenez.
In his letter dated July 3, 2003, Secretary Perez, through counsel, sought the dismissal of
the complaint for lack of probable cause.[12]
On July 17, 2003, Assistant Ombudsman Pelagio S. Apostol informed Secretary Perez
about the letter from Coutts Bank stating that “Hernando B. Perez” had no account with
it, and assured that the letter would be considered in the final resolution of the case. [13]
On August 22, 2005, Ombudsman Marcelo created a new Special Panel to evaluate CPL-
C-02-1992, and, if warranted, to conduct administrative and preliminary investigations,
thereby superseding the creation of the Special Panel formed on January 2, 2003. [14]
On November 14, 2005, the Field Investigation Office (FIO) completed its fact-finding
investigation and filed complaints against the following individuals, namely:
A. Former Justice Secretary Hernando B. Perez, Rosario S. Perez, Ernesto L. Escaler,

Ramon C. Arceo and John Does for violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019;
B. Former Justice Secretary Hernando B. Perez for violation of the following: Section
8 in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713, Article 183 (Perjury) of the Revised
Penal Code, and Article 171, par. 4 (Falsification) of the RPC; and
C. Former Justice Secretary Hernando B. Perez, Rosario S. Perez, Ernest L. Escaler,

Ramon C. Arceo and John Does for violation of the provisions of R.A. 1379.[15]
On November 23, 2005, the Special Panel directed Secretary Perez (who had meanwhile
resigned from office), his wife Rosario S. Perez (Mrs. Perez), Escaler and Arceo to
submit their counter-affidavits in OMB-C-C-02-0857-L, OMB-C-C-05-0633-K, OMB-C-
C-05-0634-K and OMB-C-C-05-0635-K (criminal cases). In another order of the same
date, the Special Panel directed former Secretary Perez to file his counter-affidavit in
OMB-C-A-02-0631-L (administrative case).[16]
On November 29, 2005, the respondents filed an urgent motion for extension of time to
file their counter-affidavits.
On December 2, 2005, the counsel for Escaler entered his appearance and sought the
extension of the time to file Escaler’s counter-affidavit.[17]
On December 5, 2005, the Special Panel ordered the respondents to file their counter-
affidavits within ten days from December 4, 2005, or until December 14, 2005. [18]
On December 7, 2005, Asst. Ombudsman Apostol issued PAMO Office Order No. 22,
Series of 2005, creating a new team of investigators to assist in the preliminary
investigation and administrative adjudication of OMB-C-C-02-0857L, OMB-C-A-02-
0631L (administrative case), OMB-C-C-05-0633K to OMB-C-C-0635K (forfeiture
proceedings under Republic Act No. 1379). The office order cancelled and superseded
PAMO Office Order No. 01-2003, Series of 2003.[19]
On December 12, 2005, former Secretary Perez, Mrs. Perez and Arceo filed an urgent
motion to be furnished copies of the complaints.[20] On December 13, 2005, they
submitted a consolidated joint counter-affidavit dated December 12, 2005.[21]
On December 15, 2005, the respondents filed a manifestation to which they attached the
affidavit of Atty. Chona Dimayuga.[22]
On December 20, 2005, Escaler, instead of filing his counter-affidavit, moved to

disqualify the Office of the Ombudsman from conducting the preliminary investigation,
and to require the Special Panel to turn over the investigation to the Department of
Justice (DOJ).[23]
On December 22, 2005, the respondents submitted the affidavit of Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencito Zuño.[24]
On December 29, 2005, the Special Panel denied the motion to disqualify the Office of
the Ombudsman from conducting the preliminary investigation, and ordered Escaler to
submit his counter-affidavit within five days from notice.[25]
On January 4, 2006, Cong. Jimenez filed an urgent motion for extension of the period to
file his opposition to the motion earlier filed by Escaler, and to be granted a new period to
reply to the consolidated joint counter-affidavit of the Perezes and Arceo.[26]
Between January 9, 2006 and February 10, 2006, Cong. Jimenez filed urgent motions for
time to file his opposition, the last of them seeking an extension until February 10, 2006.
[27]
On February 21, 2006, the Perezes and Arceo reiterated their urgent motion to be
furnished copies of the complaints.[28]
On February 22, 2006, Cong. Jimenez opposed Escaler’s motion to disqualify the Office
of the Ombudsman.[29] On the same date, Escaler asked for at least 20 days from February
17, 2006 (or until March 9, 2006) within which to reply to Cong. Jimenez’s opposition to
his motion.[30] On March 9, 2006, Escaler replied to Cong. Jimenez’s opposition.[31] On
March 28, 2006, Cong. Jimenez sought leave to file a rejoinder to Escaler’s reply. [32]
On May 15, 2006, Escaler moved for the reconsideration of the order of December 29,
2005.[33]
On May 25, 2006, the Special Panel denied Escaler’s motion for reconsideration; directed
the FIO “to let respondent Escaler examine, compare, copy and obtain any and all
documentary evidence described, attached to and forming part of the complaints” of the
cases; and granted Escaler an extension of five days within which to submit his counter-
affidavit.[34]
After Escaler failed to submit his counter-affidavit despite the lapse of the five day period
given to him, the preliminary investigation was terminated.[35]
On August 23, 2006, Escaler commenced in this Court a special civil action
for certiorari with application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) docketed as G.R.
No. 173967-71.[36] On September 4, 2006, the Court required the Office of the
Ombudsman to comment on the petition of Escaler.[37]
On November 6, 2006, the Special Panel issued a joint resolution, finding probable cause
and recommending that criminal informations be filed against the respondents, as
follows:
1) Former Secretary Hernando B. Perez, Rosario S. Perez, Ernest L. Escaler and Ramon S.
Arceo, Jr. for Extortion (Robbery) under par. 5 of Article 294 in relation to Article 293 of
the Revised Penal Code;
2) Former Secretary Hernando B. Perez, Rosario S. Perez, Ernest L. Escaler and Ramon S.
Arceo, Jr. for violation of Section 3 (b) of Rep. Act. 3019.
3) Former Secretary Hernando B. Perez for Falsification of Public Documents under Article
171 par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
4) Former Secretary Hernando B. Perez for violation of Sec. 7, R.A. 3019 in relation to Section
8 of R.A. 6713.[38]
On January 5, 2007, Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez (Ombudsman Gutierrez),
who had meanwhile replaced the resigned Ombudsman Marcelo, approved the joint
resolution of the Special Panel.[39]
On January 11, 2007, the Perezes and Arceo sought the reconsideration of the joint
resolution,[40] and supplemented their motion for that purpose with additional arguments
on January 15, 2007.[41]
On January 17, 2007, Arceo filed an ex parte motion for leave to admit attached
supplemental motion for reconsideration.[42]
On January 24, 2007, the Perezes and Arceo filed an urgent motion to suspend
proceedings. On February 6, 2007, Escaler also filed a motion to suspend proceedings ex
abundanti ad cautelam.[43]
On March 15, 2007, Cong. Jimenez asked for time to comment on the respondents’
motion for reconsideration. He filed another motion for extension of the time to comment
on April 27, 2007.[44]
On September 18, 2007, the Perezes prayed that the proceedings be held in abeyance to
await the ruling on their application for intervention in Escaler’s action in the Court. On
October 1, 2007, they filed a motion to dismiss.[45]
On October 2, 2007, Cong. Jimenez submitted his affidavit of desistance. [46] Thus, on

October 4, 2007, the Perezes filed an ex parte motion for resolution on the basis of the
desistance by Cong. Jimenez.[47]
On January 25, 2008, the Special Panel issued an omnibus resolution denying the original
and supplemental motions for reconsideration of the Perezes and Arceo; their motion to
suspend the proceedings; Escaler’s motion to suspend proceedings ex abundanti ad
cautelam; and the Perezes’ motion to dismiss.[48]
On April 18, 2008, the Perezes brought a petition for certiorari with an application for a
writ of preliminary injunction in this Court (G.R. No. 182360-63).[49] In due time, the
Court required the respondents in G.R. No. 182360-63 to file their comments on the
petition.[50]
On April 18, 2008, the Office of the Ombudsman filed in the Sandiganbayan four
informations against respondents, namely:
1. for violation of Sec. 3 (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended;
2. for Robbery (Art. 293, in relation to Art. 294, Revised Penal Code;
3. for Falsification of Public/Official Document under Art. 171 of the Revised Penal
Code; and
4. for violation of Section 7, Rep. Act 3019, as amended, in relation to Section 8,

Rep. Act 6713.[51]
Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0265

[Violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019]
The information alleging the violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, which
was docketed as Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0265 entitled People v. Hernando
Benito Perez, et. al., and was raffled to the First Division of the Sandiganbayan,
[52]
averred:
That during the month of February, 2001 and sometime prior or subsequent thereto in the
City of Makati, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Hernando B. Perez, a high ranking public officer, being then the Secretary of the
Department of Justice, while in the performance of his official function, committing the
offense in relation to his office and taking advantage thereof, conspiring, confabulating
and confederating with accused Ernest L. Escaler, Rosario S. Perez and Ramon C. Arceo,
all private individuals, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally request and
demand the amount of US TWO MILLION DOLLARS ($2,000,000.00) for himself
and/or other persons from Mark Jimenez a.k.a. Mario B. Crespo, and thereafter
succeeded in receiving from the latter the sum of US$1,999,965.00 in consideration of
accused Hernando S. Perez’s desisting from pressuring Mark Jimenez to execute
affidavits implicating target personalities involved in the plunder case against former
President Joseph ‘Erap’ Estrada and in connection with the pending application of Mark
Jimenez for admission into the Witness Protection Program of the government, over
which transaction accused Hernando S. Perez had to intervene in his official capacity
under the law, to the damage and prejudice of Mark Jimenez.
On May 8, 2008, the Perezes moved to quash the information.[54] Escaler presented a
similar motion to quash ex abundanti ad cautelam on May 12, 2008,[55] while Arceo
adopted the motions of the Perezes and Escaler on May 13, 2008.[56] On June 4, 2008, the
Office of the Ombudsman countered with a consolidated opposition.[57]
On July 17, 2008, the First Division of the Sandiganbayan promulgated its resolution
denying the motions to quash,[58] disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion to Quash of accused Hernando B.
Perez and Rosario S. Perez and the urgent Ex-Abudanti Ad Cautelam Motion to Quash of
accused Ernest Escaler are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, let the arraignment of the accused herein proceed on July 18, 2008 at 8:30
in the morning as previously set by the Court.
SO ORDERED.
Respondents separately sought the reconsideration of the resolution of denial of their
motions to quash.
On November 13, 2008, the Sandiganbayan First Division granted the motions for
reconsideration,[59] rendering the following ratiocination, to wit:
xxxx
After a second hard look on the respective contentions of the parties, the Court is inclined
to grant the Motions for Reconsideration of the accused and perforce grant their motion
to quash the Information filed against them in this case.
It is axiomatic that as a general rule prerequisite, a motion to quash on the ground that the
Information does not constitute the offense charged, or any offense for that matter, should
be resolved on the basis of the factual allegations therein whose truth and veracity are
hypothetically admitted; and on additional facts admitted or not denied by the
prosecution. If the facts in the Information do not constitute an offense, the complaint or
information should be quashed by the court.
xxxx
It is clear that the ambit of Section 3 (b) of RA 3019 is specific. It is limited only to
contracts or transaction involving monetary consideration where the public officer has
authority to intervene under the law. Thus, the requesting or demanding of any gift,
present, share, percentage, or benefit covered by said Section 3(b) must be in connection
with a “contract or transaction” involving “monetary consideration” with the government
wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law. In this
regard, the Supreme Court in Soriano, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan construed the term
“contract” or “transaction” covered by Section 3(b) of RA 3019, as follows –
“It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was not a contract.
Neither was it a transaction because this term must be construed as analogous to the
terms which precedes it. A transaction like a contract, is one which involves some
consideration as in credit transactions and this element (consideration) is absent in
the investigation conducted by the petitioner.” (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, applying the above construction of the Supreme Court in the case at bench, the
Court believes and so holds that the alleged desistance of accused Hernando B. Perez
“from pressuring Mark Jimenez to execute affidavits implicating target personalities
involved in the plunder case against former President Joseph ‘Erap’ Estrada and in
connection with the pending application of Mark Jimenez for admission into the WPP of
the government”, cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be considered as“contract” or
“transaction” as defined within the ambit of the fourth element of the offense under
Section 3(b) of RA 3019 because no “monetary consideration” as in credit transaction is
involved.
The Court finds untenable the prosecution’s contention that the execution by Mark
Jimenez of the affidavits in connection with his pending application for admission in the
WPP (and not the alleged desistance of accused Hernando B. Perez from pressuring Mark
Jimenez to execute affidavits implicating target personalities involved in the plunder case
against President Estrada) is the very contract or transaction required by the offense
charged in this case; and that all the elements of a contract contemplated therein are
present as there is allegedly consent between the government and Mark Jimenez, object
or subject matter which is the execution of affidavits in connection with his application
for admission in the WPP, and a cause or consideration which consists of security and
monetary benefits to be given by the government to Mark Jimenez in exchange for his
participation as a witness under the WPP.
For even assuming for the sake of argument that the pending application of Mark Jimenez
for admission in the WPP can be considered as a contract or transaction, it bears stressing
that the principal consideration for the said application of Mark Jimenez is the latter’s
obligation to testify as a witness under the WPP on one hand and his entitlement to the
protection granted to a witness in the WPP on the other hand and as such, does not entail
any money consideration. Certainly, this is not the (monetary) consideration which is
essential or involved in credit transactions. Any pecuniary or monetary expense that may
be incurred by the Government as a result of the implementation of the program in favour
of Mark Jimenez is purely incidental. Such alleged monetary benefit is definitely not the
reason that impelled Mark Jimenez to allegedly avail of the WPP of the government.
More precisely, however, what appears as the main consideration of the alleged demand
or receipt of accused Hernando B. Perez of the sum of US$2,000,000.00 from Mark
Jimenez is the former’s alleged desistance from pressuring the latter to execute affidavits
implicating targeted personalities in the plunder case against former President Estrada. In
the light of the ruling of the Supreme Court in Soriano vs. Sandiganbayan, supra, such
alleged desistance of accused Hernando B. Perez (and even the application of Mark
Jimenez for admission into the WPP as argued by the prosecution) can hardly be
considered as a “contract” or “transaction” that is contemplated in Section 3(b) of RA
3019, as amended.
Moreover, the Court takes note of the admission made by the prosecution in its
Memorandum that the transaction involving Mark Jimenez’s execution of affidavits for
his admission to the WPP is not yet a perfected contract between the Government and
Mark Jimenez since it is still in its “negotiation phase” because of the refusal of Mark
Jimenez to execute the affidavits against certain individuals. This admission is another
indication that there is indeed no contract or transaction to speak of that is covered under
the fourth element of the offense of violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019.
Finally, it may be argued that while the material allegations in the subject information
may not constitute the offense of violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019, as amended, the
same material/factual allegations nevertheless constitute Direct Bribery or another felony
which is necessarily included in the offense charged herein so that the subject
information in this case should not be quashed. It is believed, however, that the filing of
the Information charging the accused with Robbery in SB-08-CRM-00266 pending
before the Second Division of this Court on the basis of the same acts complained of in
this case, constitutes a bar against the information for said lesser felony as it would result
into two differently charged felonies from a single act and thus, would unnecessarily or
unjustifiably expose the accused to the danger of suffering two penalties for a single
offense if the subject information is not quashed. If a single act results into two or more
offenses, they should not be charged and/or punished separately unless the other offense
with different elements is penalized under a special law. To do so would violate, if not
the principle of double jeopardy, the rule against splitting a single act into various
charges. It is settled that a defendant should not be harassed with various prosecutions
upon the same act by splitting the same into various charges, all emanating from the same
law violated, when the prosecution could easily and well embody them in a single
information because such splitting of the action would work unnecessary inconvenience
to the administration of justice in general and to the accused in particular, for it would
require the presentation of substantially the same evidence before different courts.
All told, with the absence of the fourth element, the Court finds that the factual/material
allegations in the subject Information do not constitute the offense of violation of Section
3(b) of RA 3019, as amended, and therefore, It is constrained to quash the said
Information. In this regard, the Court deems it unnecessary to discuss/resolve the other
issues raised in the subject motions for reconsideration of the herein accused and/or
disturb the other findings contained in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered.
WHEREFORE, the instant Motions for Reconsideration of the herein accused are
resolved accordingly and the subject Information for violation of Section 3(b) of R.A.
3019, as amended, is hereby QUASHED.
SO ORDERED.
The State moved for the reconsideration of the resolution quashing the information in
Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0265.
During the pendency of the State’s motion for reconsideration, Criminal Case No. SB-08-
CRM-0265 was re-raffled to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan.
On April 21, 2009, the Third Division denied the Ombudsman’s motion for
reconsideration,[60] holding thusly:
xxxx
The core issue raised in the submission of the parties relates to the meaning of the word
“transaction” as it is used in Sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019 to constitute an element of the
offense. More particularly, has the meaning of the term “transaction” as enunciated in the
Soriano case been modified by subsequent rulings of the Supreme Court?
The meaning of “transaction” in Sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019 was enunciated in the Soriano
case when the Supreme Court stated:
As stated above, the principal issue is whether or not the investigation conducted by the
petitioner can be regarded as a “contract or transaction” within the purview of Sec. 3 (b)
of R.A. No. 3019. On this issue the petition is highly impressed with merit.
The afore-mentioned provision reads as follows:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public

officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(a) …
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit,
for himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between
the Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has
to intervene under the law.
The petitioner states:
Assuming in gratia argumenti, petitioner’s guilt, the facts make out a case of Direct
Bribery defined and penalized under the provision of Article 210 of the Revised Penal
Code and not a violation of Section 3, subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended.
The evidence for the prosecution clearly and undoubtedly support, if at all the offense of
Direct Bribery, which is not the offense charged and is not likewise included in or is
necessarily included in the offense charged, which is for violation of Section 3,
subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended. The prosecution showed that: the
accused is a public officer; in consideration of P4,000.00 which was allegedly solicited,
P2,000.00 of which was allegedly received, the petitioner undertook or promised to
dismiss a criminal complaint pending preliminary investigation before him, which may or
may not constitute a crime; that the act of dismissing the criminal complaint pending
before petitioner was related to the exercise of the function of his office. Therefore, it is
with pristine clarity that the offense proved, if at all is Direct Bribery. (Petition, p. 5.)
Upon the other hand, the respondents claim:
A reading of the above-quoted provision would show that the term ‘transaction’ as used
thereof is not limited in its scope or meaning to a commercial or business transaction but
includes all kinds of transaction, whether commercial, civil or administrative in nature,
pending with the government. This must be so, otherwise, the Act would have so stated in
the “Definition of Terms”, Section 2 thereof. But it did not, perforce leaving no other
interpretation than that the expressed purpose and object is to embrace all kinds of
transaction between the government and other party wherein the public officer would
intervene under the law. (Comment, p. 8.)
It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was not a contract.
term which precedes it. A transaction, like a contract, is one which involves some
consideration as in credit transactions and this element (consideration) is absent in
the investigation conducted by the petitioner. (Emphasis Supplied)
The argument of the Prosecution that the interpretation of the term “transaction” defined
in the Soriano case has been modified by the Mejia, Pelegrino and Chang cases does not
persuade.
A review of the Mejia, Peligrino and Chang cases reveals that the main issue adjudicated
in those cases involved an interpretation of the element of Sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019, namely:
the right to intervene of the public officer in the contract or transaction and not the
element of what is a contract or transaction with the government.
Thus, in the Mejia case, the Supreme Court ruled:

Under the sixth assigned error petitioner alleges that she does not intervene in the setting
of the hearing of cases and she does not formulate resolutions thereof. The branch clerk
of court is the administrative assistant of the presiding judge whose duty is to assist in the
management of the calendar of the court and in all other matters not involving the
exercise of discretion or judgment of the judge. It is this special relation of the petitioner
with the judge who presumably has reposed confidence in her which appears to have
been taken advantage of by the petitioner in persuading the complainants to give her
money in consideration of a promise to get a favorable resolution of their cases.
In the Peligrino case, the Supreme Court ruled:
Petitioner is a BIR Examiner assigned to the Special Project Committee tasked “xxx to
undertake verification of tax liabilities of various professionals particularly doctors within
the jurisdiction of Revenue Region 4-A, Manila xxx”
Since the subject transaction involved the reassessment of taxes due from private
complainant, the right of petitioner to intervene in his official capacity is undisputed.
Therefore, elements (1), (4) and (5) of the offense are present. (Emphasis Supplied)
In the Chang case, the Supreme Court ruled:

San Mateo’s justification behind such refusal- that he had no authority to accept an
amount less than the assessment amount- is too shallow to merit belief, he being the
Chief Operations, Business Revenue Examination, Audit Division of the Treasurer’s
Office, who had, on those various meetings, gone out of his way to negotiate the
settlement of the assessed deficiency tax.
In the recent case of Merencillo vs. People, the Supreme Court identified the issues raised
in the Petition as follows: (1) the Sandiganbayan’s refusal to believe petitioner’s evidence
over that of the prosecution and (2) the Sandiganbayan’s failure to recognize that
Petitioner was placed in double jeopardy.
In addressing the second issue, the Supreme Court ruled:

Clearly, the violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 is neither identical nor necessarily
inclusive of direct bribery. While they have common elements, not all the essential
elements of one offense are included among or form part of those enumerated in the
other. Whereas the mere request or demand of a gift, present, share, percentage or benefit
is enough to constitute a violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019, acceptance of a promise or
offer or receipt of a gift or present is required in direct bribery. Moreover, the ambit of
Section 3(b) of RA 3019 is specific. It is limited only to contracts or transactions
involving monetary consideration where the public officer has the authority to
intervene under the law. Direct bribery, on the other hand, has a wider and more general
scope: (a) performance of an act constituting a crime; (b) execution of an unjust act
which does not constitute a crime and (c) agreeing to refrain or refraining from doing an
act which is his official duty to do. Although the two charges against petitioner stemmed
from the same transaction, the same act gave rise to two separate and distinct offenses.
No double jeopardy attached since there was a variance between the elements of the
offenses charged. The constitutional protection against double jeopardy proceeds from a
second prosecution for the same offense, not for a different one. (Emphasis Supplied)
Prosecution’s argument that the statement of the Supreme Court above-quoted is
an obiter dictum is specious.
An obiter dictum is a “judicial comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but
one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential
(although it may be considered persuasive).” In the Merencillo case, one issue raised by
Petitioner was precisely the issue of double jeopardy which the Supreme Court resolved
by distinguishing the elements of violation of Sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019 and Direct Bribery.
As one of the elements of the offense of violation of Sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019, the Court
adopted the meaning given to the term “transaction” in the Soriano case. The above-
quoted resolution was not a mere obiter dictum but the ratio decidendi which is defined
as:
“1. the principle or rule of law on which a court’s decision is founded; 2. The rule of law
on which a later court thinks that a previous court founded its decision xx”
The Prosecution argued that it is a maxim in statutory construction that a law must be
read in its entirety and no single provision should be interpreted in isolation with respect
to the other provisions of the law. The Prosecution further argued that a close
examination of RA 3019 in its entirety would show that the term “transaction” appears
several times and was never confined to transactions involving monetary consideration.
Suffice it to say that a maxim in statutory construction cannot be superior to an express
interpretation of the law made by the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the provisions in RA
3019 cited by Prosecution constitute different offenses with their own different elements,
with their own different modalities of commission.
The reference to the Congressional record by the Prosecution does not disprove the fact
that for violation of Sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019, the transaction must involve monetary
consideration. As pointed out earlier, no less than the Supreme Court has interpreted the
meaning of the term “transaction” as an element of violation of the said section.
Likewise, as admitted by the Prosecution, the reference to the deliberations of Congress
which it cited involved deliberations on Sec. 5 of RA 3019 and not on Sec. 3 (b) of RA
3019. The two sections, i.e. Sec. 5 and Sec. 3 (b) of RA 3019 are different offenses with
their own different elements.
Having resolved the core issue in the Motion For Reconsideration of the Prosecution,
there is no further need to discuss the other arguments of the Prosecution in its Motion.
WHEREFORE, Prosecution’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of the First

Division dated November 13, 2008 is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
On June 22, 2009, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) assailed in this Court via
petition for certiorari the resolution of the Sandiganbayan promulgated on July 17, 2008
quashing the information in Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0265 and the resolution
promulgated on April 21, 2009 denying the State’s motion for reconsideration.
On November 18, 2009, the Court denied the Perezes’ urgent motion for leave to file a
motion to dismiss for being a prohibited pleading, and instead required the respondents to
comment on the petition, among other things.[61]
Criminal Case SB-08-CRM-0266

[Robbery under Art. 293, in relation to Art. 294, Revised Penal Code]
The information charging robbery under Article 293, in relation to Article 294, Revised
Penal Code was raffled to the Second Division (Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266).
[62]
On May 6, 2008, Escaler filed a motion to quash ex abundanti ad cautelam, alleging that
the facts charged did not constitute an offense.[63] On May 2, 2008, the Perezes filed their
own motion to quash the information.[64] On May 6, 2008, Arceo filed an ex parte motion
to adopt the Perezes motion as well as Escaler’s motion to quash.[65]
On June 26, 2008, the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the respective
motions to quash of respondents.[66]
On June 30, 2008, Escaler moved to reconsider the denial.[67] On July 10, 2008, Arceo
also moved to reconsider the denial.[68] The Perezes filed their own motion for
reconsideration on July 11, 2008.[69]
On November 20, 2008, the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan granted the motions
for reconsideration, quashed the information charging respondents with robbery, and
dismissed Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266,[70] holding as follows:
xxxx
The Court after a careful perusal of the issue and the record on hand, is persuaded. Extant
in the record and which the prosecution admits or at least does not deny are the
following:
1. The alleged Robbery (extortion) was committed on February 13, 2001 (Joint

Resolution signed by members of the Special Panel composed of Orlando Ines,
Adoracion Agbada, Mary Susan Geronimo, Jose de Jesus Jr., signed by Asst.
Ombudsman Pelagio Apostol, and approved by Ombudsman Mr. (sic) Merceditas
N. Gutierrez.) (pp. 4-69, Vol. 1, Records; pp. 70-88, Complaint-Affidavit of Mark
Jimenez, Vol. 1, Records)
2. On February 23, 2001 the amount of US $1,999,965.00 was transferred to Coutts

Bank Hongkong in favour of the beneficiary of Account No. HO 13706, from
Trade and Commerce Bank, Cayman Island through the Chase Manhattan Bank in
New York. Subsequently from March 6, 2001 to May 23, 2001 funds were
transferred from Coutts Bank to other accounts, among them a $250,000.00 bank
draft/cheque issued to Ramon C. Arceo (pp. 10-11 Records).
3. On December 23, 2002 Congressman Mark Jimenez filed his complaint with the
Ombudsman charging Hernando Perez, Ernest Escaler, Ramon Arceo and several
John Does (Mrs. Rosario Perez was not among those charged) with criminal
offenses of Plunder, Extortion, Graft and Corruption, Obstruction of Justice,
Violation of the Penal Provision of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
R.A. 6713, and Administrative Offenses of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct,
Oppression, Committing acts Punishable under the Anti-Graft Law, Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the service, and Violation of Section 5 (2) of
R.A. 6713. It was subscribed and sworn to on (the ) 23rd day of December 2002
(Complaint-Affidavit of Mario Mark (MJ) Jimenez B. Crespo – pp. 70-88
Records).
4. On December 23, 2002, the FIRO (Fact Finding and Intelligence Research Office)
recommended that the case be referred to the Evaluation and Preliminary
Investigation Bureau and the Administrative Adjudication Bureau (p. 6 of the
Records)
5. The information was filed with this Court only on April 18, 2008.
Having established, or at least as claimed by Complainant Mark Jimenez, that the

Robbery (extortion) took place on February 13, 2001, the Ombudsman should have
demanded a reasonable explanation from the complainant who was then a Congressman,
wealthy and influential and in whose house the alleged intimidation took place, why he
was filing the complaint only on December 23, 2002 a matter of more than eighteen (18)
months. This should have cautioned the Ombudsman as to the possible motive in filing
the complaint.
At any rate, the Field Investigation Office (FIO) of the office of the Ombudsman as
nominal complainant filed a complaint with the Ombudsman on November 14, 2005
charging Hernando Benito Perez, Rosario Salvador Perez, Ernest L. Escaler, Ramon
Antonio C. Arceo Jr. and John Does with Violation of Sec. 3(b) R.A. 3019, Sec. 8 in
relation to Sec. 11 of R.A. 6713, Perjury (Art. 183 RPC) and Art. 171 par. 4 Falsification,
RPC and violation of R.A. 1379. (Pp. 132 to 170 of Records) Robbery is NOT one of the
charges.
With the Ombudsman’s finding that the extortion (intimidation) was perpetrated on
February 13, 2001 and that there was transfer of Mark Jimenez US $1,999,965.00 to
Coutts Bank Account HO 133706 on February 23, 2001 in favour of the accused, there is
no reason why within a reasonable period from these dates, the complaint should not be
resolved. The act of intimidation was there, the asportation was complete as of February
23, 2001 why was the information filed only on April 18, 2008. For such a simple charge
of Robbery there is nothing more to consider and all the facts and circumstances upon
which to anchor a resolution whether to give due course to the complaint or to dismiss it
are on hand. The case is more than ripe for resolution. Failure to act on the same is a clear
transgression of the constitutional rights of the accused. A healthy respect for the
constitutional prerogative of the accused should have prodded the Ombudsman to act
within a reasonable time.
The long wait of the accused is without valid cause or justifiable motive and has
unnecessarily trampled upon their constitutional prerogatives to a speedy disposition of
the case. This is an impermissible course of action that our fundamental law loathes.
As Justice Laurel said, the government should be the last to set an example of delay and
oppression in the administration of justice. It is the moral and legal obligation of the
Court to see that criminal proceedings come to an end (People vs. Calamba 63 Phil 496).
The Constitution of the Philippines provides:
Art. 3 Sec. 16: All persons shall have a right to a speedy disposition of their cases before
all judicial(,) quasi-judicial or administrative bodies.
Thus under our present fundamental law, all persons are entitled to a speedy resolution of
their cases be it civil, administrative or criminal cases. It is, in criminal cases however
where the need to a speedy disposition of their cases is more pronounced. It is so, because
in criminal cases, it is not only the honor and reputation but even the liberty of the
accused (even life itself before the enactment of R.A. 9346) is at stake.
The charge is a simple case for Robbery. Certainly it does not involve complicated and
factual issues that would necessitate painstaking and gruelling scrutiny and perusal on the
part of the Ombudsman. It may have its novel, and to it, valid reason for departing from
the established procedure and rules, but virtually in doing so, it has failed to discharge its
duty as mandated by the Constitution to promptly act on complaints filed in any form or
manner against public officers and employees.
The totality of the facts and the surrounding circumstances bears unmistakably the
earmarks of inordinate delay, making the applicability of the doctrine enunciated in
Anchangco Jr. and Duterte cases cited in the parties’ pleadings irrefragable.
Accordingly, there being a clear violation of the constitutional right of the accused, the
prosecution is ousted of any authority to file the information and we hereby order the
quashing of the information and the consequent dismissal of this case.
While the ground upon which the Court banked and relied this dismissal order was not
invoked in the motions for reconsideration of accused Escaler and Arceo, since they are
similarly situated with their co-accused spouses Perez, this resolution applies to them
with equal force and effect.
On the basis of the foregoing disquisition, We hereby consider the Motion for
Reconsideration of our resolution denying the motion for consolidation moot and
academic; even as, We rule that the said motion lacks persuasiveness considering that,
per Manifestation of accused Escaler he is not in any way a party to all the cases pending,
the accused in each of the cases were charged with different offenses, and the different
cases are already at different stages of the proceedings, and considering the argument of
the prosecution that the different offenses in the four (4) cases consist of different
elements necessitating presentation of different proofs and evidence for each case.
Accused’(s) bonds are ordered cancelled and the Hold-Departure Order issued against
them in this case is lifted and set aside.
So ordered.
The State moved to reconsider the resolution of November 20, 2008,[71] but the Second
Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for reconsideration on June 19, 2009,
[72]
stating thusly:
This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration of the People of the Philippines dated
December 8, 2008 seeking to reconsider the Resolution of this Court promulgated on
November 20, 2008 dismissing the case, as well as accused-spouses Perez Opposition
dated December 22, 2008, accused Arceo’s Comment/Opposition of even date, and the
Opposition dated January 5, 2009 of accused Ernest L. Escaler.
On record too, are the Plaintiff’s Consolidated Reply dated January 19, 2009 to the three
(3) Opposition/Comment of the accused, the three (3) Rejoinders of the accused of
different dates, the plaintiff’s sub-rejoinder dated February 9, 2009, accused Perezes(‘)
Manifestation and Plaintiff’s Comment dated February 16, 2009 to Perezes(‘)
Manifestation.
All these shall be considered and taken up by the Court in seriatim.
The first issue brought up by the accused is a supposed procedural lapse of the plaintiff’s
motion for reconsideration in that the same was filed in violation of Sec. 4 Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court which provides in substance that in every written motion required to be
heard, the notice of hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its
receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing.
Of course, it is not disputed that the accused-spouses received through registered mail
their copy of plaintiff’s motion only on December 16, 2008 while it set the date of
hearing on December 12, 2007 thus the motion was set for hearing before the other party
received it. Accused Ramon Arceo received his copy of the motion only on December 17,
2008 while accused Ernest Escaler received his copy after December 18, 2008 giving the
same situation as accused Perezes. It must be taken note of that the Court set the hearing
of the plaintiff’s motion on December 18, 2008, as on December 12, 2008 the date
specified on plaintiff’s motion, no accused has received his copy of the said motion.
Considering thus, the situation, there seems plausibility for the accused claim of
transgression of the aforecited provision of the Rules of Court.
Nonetheless, considering the transfer of the date of hearing, and that all the parties were
given ample time to file and submit their respective pleadings which at the time the issue
was to be resolved had grown voluminous, the Court is not inclined to give due
consideration for this procedural impropriety.
The Court takes note however that the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was filed
only on December 8, 2008 beyond the fifteenth day period within which it should be
filed, since it received a copy of the Resolution of this Court on November 21, 2008.
Thus, the fifteenth day fell on December 6, 2008 after which the said Resolution has
become final and executory. The Resolution in question therefore which finally disposes
of the case is not only final but executory as well which is virtually beyond the reach of
the motion for reconsideration belatedly filed.
We will now tackle the merits of the grounds invoked by the People.
The first ground cited in the People’s motion was that the filing of complaint against
former secretary Hernando B. Perez was not attended by ill motive since it reasoned out
that it was the intimation of the Court when it stated in its Resolution the Ombudsman
xxx “should have demanded a reasonable explanation from the complainant who was
then a congressman, wealthy and influential and in whose house the alleged intimidation
took place, why he was filing the complaint only on December 23, 2002 a matter of more
than eighteen (18) months. This should have cautioned the Ombudsman as to the possible
motive in filing the complaint. xxx “We take note of the response of the prosecution
“Jimenez thought that after the pay-off, Secretary Perez would stop threatening him and
would leave him in peace for good. This was the reason why Jimenez did not
immediately file a complaint against Secretary Perez and his co-accused.”
The first and foremost impression We can gather is that the alleged about two million
dollars which supposedly was the result of accused Perez’ alleged extortion was delivered
already to the accused. All along therefore, if the claim of the prosecution is to be
believed, Robbery has long been committed that was on or about February 2001 as
alleged in the information. With or without ill-motive, the Ombudsman should have acted
within a reasonable time. Certainly eighteen (18) long months from the filing of the
complaint can not be considered within a reasonable time.
The movant then argued that the filing of the information only on April 18, 2008 were
due to legal impediments which were beyond the control of the office of the
Ombudsman.
The Court can not understand those alleged “legal impediments” in the prosecution for
Robbery. Here is the prosecution claiming strongly that the filing of the complaint was
not attended by ill-motive and that after the pay-off even if a crime has been committed
against complaint Congressman Mark Jimenez, the latter delayed his filing of the
complaint because he thought the accused would leave him in peace. This is the only
impediment we can think of, and this definitely is not a legal impediment; certainly too
this is not beyond the control of the Office of the Ombudsman.
But the Court shall keep track of the movant’s argument about this supposed legal
impediment. Admitting that the asportation was complete on February 23, 2001, the
prosecution reasoned out that the case can not be filed in Court at that time due to
insufficiency of evidence. As averred in the Opposition of accused Ernest Escaler, “xxx
the plaintiff’s duty is to determine whether there exists probable cause to hold the
accused for trial for simple robbery”, and those documents which the prosecution so
capitalized it exerted so much offer to obtain, are mere evidentiary matters. This is even
admitted in the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration.
Consider these facts all explicitly admitted by the prosecution:

On February 13, 2001 accused former Justice Secretary Hernando Perez accompanied by
accused Ernest Escaler supposedly threatened complainant Congressman Mark Jimenez
to send him to jail where he will die of boil (Putang ina mo, sinasalsal mo lang ako.
Hindot ka. Ipakukulong kita sa Quezon City Jail. Doon mamamatay ka sa pigsa). On
February 23, 2001 the amount of US $1,999,965 owned by Congressman Mark Jimenez
was transferred to Coutts Bank, Hongkong in favour of Account Number 13706 in the
name of Ernest Escaler (confirmed by Trade and Commerce Bank Payment Detail Report
dated February 23, 2001)
Congressman Mark Jimenez did not file my complaint against the accused in any Court
or prosecutor office. This, despite his claim in his counter-affidavit that:
“12. Meanwhile, Pres. Estrada stepped down as President after the Armed Forces of the
Philippines withdrew its support to him, and the Arroyo Administration was installed on
January 19, 2001. The new Secretary of Justice, Hernando B. Perez, was appointed by
Pres. Arroyo. Soon after his appointment. Sec. Perez sent feelers that I am his first target
for inclusion in the criminal cases that he will file against Pres. Estrada. He also
threatened and intimidated me and my family with bodily harm and incarceration in a city
jail with hardened criminals and drug addicts unless I execute damaging affidavits against
Pres. Estrada and his cronies and associates. Because of the intense pressure upon me and
my family, I was forced to come across with US $2.0 Million. (Page 73 of the Records)
It was only on December 23, 2002 as stated in our Resolution that Congressman Mark
Jimenez filed his complaint with the Ombudsman, even if the said offense was alleged to
have been committed on Feb. 13, 2001 and it was only on April 18, 2008 that the
Ombudsman presented the information with this Court.
The complainant had hesitated into filing his complaint for about eighteen (18) months
while the Ombudsman with double hesitation dilly-dallied for about six (6) years. All in
all, the delay from the supposed commission of such a simple offense of Robbery took
more than seven years – that is from February 13, 2001 to April 18, 2008. It is clear the
so-called legal impediments are but empty assertion to belatedly justify an impermissible
action.
Taking exception to our ruling that the totality of facts and surrounding circumstances
bear unmistakably the earmarks of inordinate delay, the movant made a comparison of
those cases dismissed by the Supreme Court for violation of the Constitutional right of
the accused to speedy disposition of cases, and this case, and wrongfully conclude there
was no delay in their handling of the case at bar.
We have already resolved and passed upon rather adequately this issue in our Resolution
with the observation that not anyone of the cases cited involved the charge of Robbery.
The movant’s discussion asserted no new and substantial reason and argument to
persuade us to reverse or modify our considered opinion. We however pose this question
to the prosecution. If Asst. Ombudsman Pelagio Apostol recommended the filing of the
information against the accused on November 7, 2006 why did it take the Ombudsman
only on January 5, 2007 to approve the recommendation. And if, on January 11, 2007 the
accused submitted their Motion for Reconsideration, why did it take the Ombudsman up
to April 15, 2008 – a matter of about fifteen (15) months to resolve the same when there
was NO OPPOSITION nor comment from the other party?
The argument that “the authority of the Ombudsman is not divested by the claimed delay
in filing the information as this authority is vested by law” is a reckless reasoning that
only shows that while admitting there was undue delay in the disposition of the case, it
could still proceed with its information to charge the accused.
The prosecution need not be reminded of the uniform ruling of the Honorable Supreme
Court dismissing the cases of Tatad, Angchangco, Duterte and other cases for
transgressing the constitutional rights of the accused to a speedy disposition of cases. To
argue “that the authority of the Ombudsman is not divested by the claimed delay in filing
the information xxx” is to limit the power of the Court to act on blatant transgression of
the constitution.
As to fact-finding investigation, the Court finds it so baseless for the movant to capitalize
on what it supposedly did in the process of the fact-finding stance; and then reasoning out
as if clutching on straws that the sequences of events should excuse it from lately filing
the information. But it took the movant six (6) years to conduct the said fact-finding
investigation, and then unabashedly it argues that is not part of the preliminary
investigation.
Determining probable cause should usually take no more than ninety (90) days precisely
because it only involves finding out whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that
the persons charged could be held for trial or not. It does not require sifting through and
meticulously examining every piece of evidence to ascertain that they are enough to
convict the persons involved beyond reasonable doubt. That is already the function of the
Courts.
As argued by accused Ramon Arceo, the claim of the movant that the preliminary
investigation of the instant case commenced only on November 14, 2005 when the Field
Investigation Office (FIO) filed its complaint, and not on December 23, 2002 when Mark
Jimenez filed his complaint-affidavit, is rather specious and does not hold water as
Robbery was not among the offenses included in the charge of the FIO. As such, it is not
correct to say that the counting of the period for delay should commence only in
November 2005.
The conclusion thus, that the long waiting of six (6) years for the Office of the
Ombudsman to resolve the simple case of Robbery is clearly an inordinate delay,
blatantly intolerable, and grossly prejudicial to the constitutional right of speedy
disposition of cases, easily commands assent. This Court, it must be made clear, is not
making nor indulging in mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved.
In its sixth ground the movant argued that the First, Third and Fourth Divisions all junked
the claimed inordinate delay of the accused and asked that the Second Division should
“xxx co-exist not work on cross-purposes with the other Court’s Division xxx”. The
argument begs the question! Suppose if and when the incident reaches the Supreme
Court, the highest Court of the land ruled that it is the Second Division which is correct,
and the other Divisions in error, what would happen now to the argument of the movant
that “xxx there is rhyme or reason for the Sandiganbayan, Second Division to co-exist
xxx with the other Court’s Division xxx”.
Moreover, the information in the first division charges the accused of Violation of Sec. 3
(b) of R.A. 3019, in the third division the accusation was for Falsification of Public
Document under Art. 171 of the Revised Penal Code, while the accused have been
indicted for violating Sec. 7 R.A. 3019 in relation to Sec. 8 of R.A. 6713 before the
Fourth Division. The Court can not say whether there is need for paper trail or monitoring
of documents in those cases, as the Divisions concerned can competently resolve and
pass upon it but certainly in this instant case of Robbery, to indulge in a prolonged fact-
finding process is not a boon but a bane on the part of the prosecution
In a distasteful exhibition of unsavoury language, bordering on derision and contempt,

the prosecution argued that “xxx the assailed resolution is a wanton display of arrogance,
contemptuous and outright illegal for it mooted the same issue of inordinate delay
pending with the Honorable Supreme Court xxx”. This only goes to show that the
prosecution is totally ignorant of the hierarchy of Courts in our judicial system.
xxx It must be remembered that delay in instituting prosecutions is not only productive of
expense to the State, but of peril to public justice in the attenuation and distortion, even
by mere natural lapse of memory, of testimony. It is the policy of the law that
prosecutions should be prompt, and that statutes, enforcing such promptitude should be
vigorously maintained. They are not merely acts of grace, but checks imposed by the
State upon itself, to exact vigilant activity from its subalterns, and to secure for criminal
trials the best evidence that can be obtained.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the prosecution’s Motion for Reconsideration dated

December 8, 2008 is denied for lack of merit.
So ordered.
On August 24, 2009, the State assailed the resolutions of the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan in this Court (G.R. No. 189063).[73]
Consolidation of the petitions
On October 26, 2009, the Court directed that G.R. No. 189063 be consolidated with G.R.
No. 182360-63 (entitled Hernando B. Perez and Rosario S. Perez v. The Ombudsman,
Field Investigation Officer of the Ombudsman and Mario B. Crespo a.k.a. Mark Jimenez)
and G.R. No. 173967-71 (Ernest B. Escaler v. The Office of the Ombudsman, et al.).[74]
On April 7, 2010, the Court consolidated G.R. No. 188165 with G.R. Nos. 173967-71,
G.R. Nos. 182360-63 and G.R. No. 189063 (People of the Philippines v. Hon.
Sandiganbayan, 2nd Division, et al.).[75]
G.R. No. 173967-71 and G.R. No. 182360-63 were special civil actions for certiorari to
prevent the filing of the criminal informations against the respondents.
Deconsolidation and dismissal of G.R. No. 173967-71 and G.R. No. 182360-63 on the
ground of their intervening mootness
On February 11, 2013, the Court deconsolidated G.R. No. 173967-71 and G.R. No.
182360-63 from G.R. No. 188165 and G.R. No. 189063 on the ground that the
intervening filing of the informations in Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0265 and
Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266 had rendered the petitions in G.R. No. 173967-71
and G.R. No. 182360-63 moot.[76]
Issues
In G.R. No. 188165, the State raises the following issues:

I.
WHETHER RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
QUASHING THE INFORMATION IN CRIMINAL CASE SB-08-CRM-265, BY
CONFINING THE DEFINITION OF THE WORD “TRANSACTION” IN SECTION
3(B) OF R.A. 3019 AS TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING MONETARY
CONSIDERATION.
II.

RELYING SOLELY ON THE CASE OF SORIANO, JR. VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
AND DISREGARDED JURISPRUDENCE THAT SHOWS SECTION 3 (B) OF RA
3019 EXTENDS TO ANY DEALING WITH THE GOVERNMENT.
III.

DISCRETION WHEN IT RESOLVED THE MOTIONS TO QUASH (ON THE
GROUND THAT THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE INFORMATION DO NOT
CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE) BY GOING BEYOND THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE
INFORMATION AND CONSIDERING SUPPOSED FACTS WITHOUT ANY BASIS.
[77]
In G.R. No. 189063, the State submits the following issues:
A. WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED

WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN QUASHING THE INFORMATION IN
CRIMINAL CASE SB-08-CRM-0266 BY HOLDING THAT “THERE BEING A
CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE
ACCUSED, THE PROSECUTION IS OUSTED OF ANY AUTHORITY TO
FILE THE INFORMATION.”
B. WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED

WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THE TOTALITY OF THE FACTS
AND THE SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES BEARS UNMISTAKABLY
THE EARMARKS OF INORDINATE DELAY, MAKING THE
APPLICABILITY OF THE DOCTRINE ENUNCIATED IN ANGCHONGCO
JR. AND DUTERTE CASES CITED IN THE PARTIES’ PLEADINGS
IRREFRAGABLE.[78]
The foregoing issues are restated thuswise:

I.
Whether or not it was the Office of the Solicitor General, not the Office of the
Ombudsman, that had the authority to file the petitions to assail the Sandiganbayan
resolutions.
II.
Whether the State, as the petitioner in G.R. No. 188165 and G.R. No. 189063, resorted to
the wrong remedy in assailing the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dismissing the
criminal charges against the respondents through petitions for certiorari instead of
petitions for review on certiorari.
Specific Issue in G.R. No. 188165
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to

lack or in excess of jurisdiction in quashing the information by applying the definition
of transaction in Soriano, Jr. v Sandiganbayan, 131 SCRA 188.
Specific Issue in G.R. No. 189063
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to

lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the criminal case due to the inordinate
delay of the Office of the Ombudsman in bringing the criminal action against respondents
as to violate their constitutional right to the speedy disposition of cases.
Ruling
The petitions for certiorari are devoid of merit.
I.
The Office of the Ombudsman is empowered to file an appeal or certiorari from the
Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court.
Respondents contend that the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority to file the
petitions for certiorari because only the Solicitor General could file the petitions in this
Court pursuant to Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative
Code as amended by E.O. No. 292 , which pertinently states:
Section 35. Powers and Functions.—The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent
the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and
agents in any litigation, proceedings, investigation or matter requiring the services of a
lawyer. When authorized by the President or head of the office concerned, it shall also
represent government-owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor
General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge
duties requiring the services of a lawyer. It shall have the following specific powers and
functions:

(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in
which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.
xxxx
The contention of the respondents is grossly erroneous.
That only the Solicitor General may represent the People on appeal or certiorari in the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings is the general rule,
[79]
but the rule admits the exception concerning “all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan
and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman,
through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in
cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.” More
specifically, Section 4(c) of Republic Act No. 8249 authorizes the exception, viz:
xxxx
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
xxxx
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules
that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to
appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions
for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan
and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman,
through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in
cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. (Bold
emphasis provided)
xxxx
Consequently, the filing of the petitions in these cases by the Office of the Ombudsman,
through the OSP, was authorized by law.
II.
Petitioner did not establish grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Sandiganbayan
The petitions for certiorari brought by the State must nonetheless be dismissed for failure
to show any grave abuse of discretion on the part of Sandiganbayan in issuing the
assailed resolutions.
A special civil action for certiorari is an independent action based on the specific

grounds provided in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and can prosper only the
jurisdictional error, or the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction committed by the inferior court or judge is alleged and proved to exist.
In De los Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company,[80] the Court has expounded
on the nature and reach of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, to wit:
We remind that the writ of certiorari – being a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in
character, whose purpose is to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction,
or to prevent an inferior court from committing such grave abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction, or to relieve parties from arbitrary acts of courts (i.e., acts that
courts have no power or authority in law to perform) – is not a general utility tool in the
legal workshop, and cannot be issued to correct every error committed by a lower court.
In the common law, from which the remedy of certiorari evolved, the writ certiorari was
issued out of Chancery, or the King’s Bench, commanding agents or officers of the
inferior courts to return the record of a cause pending before them, so as to give the party
more sure and speedy justice, for the writ would enable the superior court to determine
from an inspection of the record whether the inferior court’s judgment was rendered
without authority. The errors were of such a nature that, if allowed to stand, they would
result in a substantial injury to the petitioner to whom no other remedy was available. If
the inferior court acted without authority, the record was then revised and corrected in
matters of law. The writ of certiorari was limited to cases in which the inferior court was
said to be exceeding its jurisdiction or was not proceeding according to essential
requirements of law and would lie only to review judicial or quasi-judicial acts.
The concept of the remedy of certiorari in our judicial system remains much the same as
it has been in the common law. In this jurisdiction, however, the exercise of the power to
issue the writ of certiorari is largely regulated by laying down the instances or situations
in the Rules of Court in which a superior court may issue the writ of certiorari to an
inferior court or officer. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court compellingly provides
the requirements for that purpose, viz:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third
paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (1a)
Pursuant to Section 1, supra, the petitioner must show that, one, the tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and, two, there is neither an appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law for the purpose of amending or nullifying the proceeding.
Considering that the requisites must concurrently be attendant, the herein petitioners’
stance that a writ of certiorari should have been issued even if the CA found no showing
of grave abuse of discretion is absurd. The commission of grave abuse of discretion was a
fundamental requisite for the writ of certiorari to issue against the RTC. Without their
strong showing either of the RTC’s lack or excess of jurisdiction, or of grave abuse of
discretion by the RTC amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the writ
of certiorari would not issue for being bereft of legal and factual bases. We need to
emphasize, too, that with certiorari being an extraordinary remedy, they must strictly
observe the rules laid down by law for granting the relief sought.
The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which
includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In
this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ.
The abuse of discretion must be grave, which means either that the judicial or quasi-
judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty,
or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such
as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in
a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. (citations
omitted)
Did the petitioner show grave abuse of discretion that would warrant the issuance of the
writ of certiorari prayed for?
A.
G.R. No. 188165
The Sandiganbayan correctly applied the restrictive meaning of the term

transaction as used in Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019 adopted in Soriano, Jr.
v. Sandiganbayan
In its questioned resolution dismissing Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0265, the

Sandiganbayan relied on the ruling in Soriano, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,[81] in which the
principal issue was whether or not the preliminary investigation of a criminal complaint
conducted by petitioner Soriano, Jr., then a Fiscal, was a “contract or transaction” as to
bring the complaint within the ambit of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, which
punished any public officer for “[d]irectly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift,
present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection
with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein
the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.” The Soriano,
Jr. Court ruled in the negative, and pronounced:
It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was not a contract.
term which precedes it. A transaction, like a contract, is one which involves some
consideration as in credit transactions and this element (consideration) is absent in the
investigation conducted by the petitioner.
In the light of the foregoing, We agree with the petitioner that it was error for the
Sandiganbayan to have convicted him of violating Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019.
(Emphasis supplied)
The State now argues, however, that the Sandiganbayan thereby committed grave abuse
of discretion resulting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction for applying the interpretation of
the term transaction in Soriano, Jr. considering that the term transaction should be
construed more liberally, and positing that Soriano, Jr. was already abandoned by the
Court, citing for that purpose the rulings in Mejia v. Pamaran,[82] Peligrino v. People,
[83]
and Chang v. People.[84]
We disagree with the petitioner, and find for the respondents.
First of all, the interpretation in Soriano, Jr. of the term transaction as used in Section
3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 has not been overturned by the Court.
In Mejia v. Pamaran, decided en banc on April 15, 1988, Mejia had demanded and
received money from some persons involved in certain cases in a trial court where Mejia
was then serving as the branch clerk of court in consideration of a promise that she would
help in getting a favorable judgment for them. The issue was whether or not Mejia could
be convicted under the information that alleged that she had demanded a certain amount,
although the Sandiganbayan found that the amount was different from that charged in the
information. The Court dismissed her petition, and ruled that “[i]n a prosecution under
the foregoing provision of the Anti-Graft Law the value of the gift, money or present, etc.
is immaterial xxx [w]hat is penalized is the receipt of any gift, present, share, percentage,
or benefit by a public officer in connection with a contract or transaction with the
Government, wherein the public officer has to intervene in his official capacity.” The
Court nowhere ruled on the proper interpretation of the term transaction.
In Peligrino v. People, decided on August 13, 2001, Peligrino, an examiner of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, was convicted of violating Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019
for demanding the amount of P200,000.00 from the complainant in connection with the
latter’s tax liabilities. Peligrino’s defense was that he did not “demand” the money, but
the money was just given to him. He argued that he had only informed the complainant of
his tax deficiencies, and that the complainant had then requested the reduction of the
amount claimed as his tax deficiencies. The Court found no merit in Peligrino’s
argument. The ruling had nothing to do with the interpretation of the term transaction.
Chang v. People, decided on July 21, 2006, was a case in which two persons – Chang and
San Mateo – were convicted of violating Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 after
being found to have received P125,000.00 in consideration of their issuance of a
Certificate of Examination to the effect that the complainant had “no tax liability” in
favour of the municipality, notwithstanding that it had not settled with them on their
assessed deficiency tax of P494,000.00. Chang and San Mateo contended that the charge
had resulted from an involuntary contact whereby complainant Magat had simply tossed
to them the brown envelope; that there had been no conspiracy between them; and that
what had transpired had been an instigation, not an entrapment. In affirming their
conviction, the Court did not touch on the proper interpretation of the term transaction as
used in Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019.
The three rulings the State has cited here did not overturn the interpretation made
in Soriano, Jr. of the term transaction as used in Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019
because the proper interpretation of the term was clearly not decisive in those cases. On
the contrary, in the later ruling in Merencillo v. People,[85] promulgated in 2007, the Court
reiterated the restrictive interpretation given in Soriano, Jr. to the term transaction as
used in Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 in connection with a differentiation
between bribery under the Revised Penal Code and the violation of Section 3(b) of
Republic Act No. 3019 by holding that the latter is “limited only to contracts or
transactions involving monetary consideration where the public officer has the authority
to intervene under the law.”
And, secondly, it does not help the State any that the term transaction as used in Section
3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019 is susceptible of being interpreted both restrictively and
liberally, considering that laws creating, defining or punishing crimes and laws imposing
penalties and forfeitures are to be construed strictly against the State or against the party
seeking to enforce them, and liberally against the party sought to be charged. [86]
Clearly, the Sandiganbayan did not arbitrarily, or whimsically, or capriciously quash the
information for failing to properly state the fourth element of the violation of Section 3(b)
of Republic Act No. 3019.
B.
G.R. No. 189063
The Sandiganbayan did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in finding that
there had been an inordinate delay in the resolution against respondents of the
charge in Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266
Upon its finding that the Office of the Ombudsman had incurred inordinate delay in
resolving the complaint Cong. Jimenez had brought against the respondents, the
Sandiganbayan dismissed Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266 mainly to uphold their
constitutional right to the speedy disposition of their case.
But now comes the State contending that the delay in the resolution of the case against
the respondents was neither inordinate nor solely attributable to the Office of the
Ombudsman. Citing Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan,[87] in which the Court held that
speedy disposition of cases was also consistent with reasonable delays, the State
supported its contention by listing the various incidents that had caused the delay in the
investigation, and then laying part of the blame on the respondents themselves.
The right to the speedy disposition of cases is enshrined in Article III of the Constitution,
which declares:
Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before
all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused in
criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and
administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial
hearings.[88] While the concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible, such that a
mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient,[89] the right to the
speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated when the
proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when
unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or when without cause or
justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his
case tried.[90]
According to Angchonco, Jr. v. Ombudsman,[91] inordinate delay in resolving a criminal

complaint, being violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and to
the speedy disposition of cases, warrants the dismissal of the criminal case. [92]
Was the delay on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive?
We answer in the affirmative.
The acts of the respondents that the Office of the Ombudsman investigated had
supposedly occurred in the period from February 13, 2001 to February 23, 2001. Yet, the
criminal complaint came to be initiated only on November 25, 2002 when Ombudsman
Marcelo requested PAGC to provide his office with the documents relevant to the exposé
of Cong. Villarama. Subsequently, on December 23, 2002, Cong. Jimenez submitted his
complaint-affidavit to the Office of the Ombudsman. It was only on November 6, 2006,
however, when the Special Panel created to investigate Cong. Jimenez’s criminal
complaint issued the Joint Resolution recommending that the criminal informations be
filed against the respondents. Ombudsman Gutierrez approved the Joint Resolution only
on January 5, 2007.[93] The Special Panel issued the second Joint Resolution denying the
respondents’ motion for reconsideration on January 25, 2008, and Ombudsman Gutierrez
approved this resolution only on April 15, 2008. Ultimately, the informations charging
the respondents with four different crimes based on the complaint of Cong. Jimenez were
all filed on April 15, 2008, thereby leading to the commencement of Criminal Case No.
SB-08-CRM-0265 and Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0266. In sum, the fact-finding
investigation and preliminary investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman lasted nearly
five years and five months.
It is clear from the foregoing that the Office of the Ombudsman had taken an unusually
long period of time just to investigate the criminal complaint and to determine whether to
criminally charge the respondents in the Sandiganbayan. Such long delay was inordinate
and oppressive, and constituted under the peculiar circumstances of the case an outright
violation of the respondents’ right under the Constitution to the speedy disposition of
their cases. If, in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,[94] the Court ruled that a delay of almost three
years in the conduct of the preliminary investigation constituted a violation of the
constitutional rights of the accused to due process and to the speedy disposition of his
case, taking into account the following, namely: (a) the complaint had been resurrected
only after the accused had a falling out with former President Marcos, indicating that
political motivations had played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial
process; (b) the Tanodbayan had blatantly departed from the established procedure
prescribed by law for the conduct of preliminary investigation; and (c) the simple factual
and legal issues involved did not justify the delay, there is a greater reason for us to hold
so in the respondents’ case.
To emphasize, it is incumbent for the State to prove that the delay was reasonable, or that
the delay was not attributable to it. In both regards, the State miserably failed.
For one, the State explains that the criminal cases could not be immediately filed in court
primarily because of the insufficiency of the evidence to establish probable cause, like
not having a document showing that the funds (worth US$1,999,965.00 as averred in the
complaint of Cong. Jimenez) had reached Secretary Perez;[95] and that it could not obtain
the document, and to enable it to obtain the document and other evidence it needed to
await the ratification of the Agreement Concerning Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal
Matters with the Hongkong Special Administrative Region (RP-HKSAR Agreement),
[96]
and the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Republic
of the Philippines and the Swiss Confederation (RP-Swiss MLAT).[97]
To us, however, the State’s dependence on the ratification of the two treaties was not a
sufficient justification for the delay. The fact-finding investigation had extended from
January 15, 2003, when Ombudsman Marcelo approved the recommendation of the
Special Panel and referred the complaint of Cong. Jimenez for fact-finding investigation,
until November 14, 2005, when the FIO completed its fact-finding investigation. That
period accounted for a total of two years and 10 months. In addition, the FIO submitted
its report only on November 14, 2005, which was after the Department of Justice had
received on September 8, 2005 the letter from Wayne Walsh, the Deputy Government
Counsel of the Hongkong Special Administrative Region in response to the request for
assistance dated June 23, 2005,[98] and the reply of the Office of Justice of Switzerland
dated February 10, 2005 and a subsequent letter dated February 21, 2005 from Liza
Favre, the Ambassador of Switzerland, to Atty. Melchor Arthur Carandang, Acting
Assistant Ombudsman, FIO, together with documents pertaining to the bank accounts
relevant to the investigation.[99] For the Office of the Ombudsman to mark time until the
HKSAR Agreement and the Swiss-RP MLAT were ratified by the Senate before it would
proceed with the preliminary investigation was oppressive, capricious and vexatious,
because the respondents were thereby subjected to a long and unfair delay.
We should frown on the reason for the inordinate delay because the State would thereby
deliberately gain an advantage over the respondents during the preliminary investigation.
At no time should the progress and success of the preliminary investigation of a criminal
case be made dependent upon the ratification of a treaty by the Senate that would provide
to the prosecutorial arm of the State, already powerful and overwhelming in terms of its
resources, an undue advantage unavailable at the time of the investigation. To allow the
delay under those terms would definitely violate fair play and nullify due process of law
– fair play, because the field of contest between the accuser and the accused should at all
times be level; and due process of law, because no less that our Constitution guarantees
the speedy disposition of the case.
The State further argues that the fact-finding investigation should not be considered a part
of the preliminary investigation because the former was only preparatory in relation to
the latter;[100] and that the period spent in the former should not be factored in the
computation of the period devoted to the preliminary investigation.
The argument cannot pass fair scrutiny.
The guarantee of speedy disposition under Section 16 of Article III of the Constitution
applies to all cases pending before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies.
The guarantee would be defeated or rendered inutile if the hair-splitting distinction by the
State is accepted. Whether or not the fact-finding investigation was separate from the
preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman should not matter
for purposes of determining if the respondents’ right to the speedy disposition of their
cases had been violated.
There was really no sufficient justification tendered by the State for the long delay of
more than five years in bringing the charges against the respondents before the proper
court. On the charge of robbery under Article 293 in relation to Article 294 of
the Revised Penal Code, the preliminary investigation would not require more than five
years to ascertain the relevant factual and legal matters. The basic elements of the
offense, that is, the intimidation or pressure allegedly exerted on Cong. Jimenez, the
manner by which the money extorted had been delivered, and the respondents had been
identified as the perpetrators, had been adequately bared before the Office of the
Ombudsman. The obtention of the bank documents was not indispensable to establish
probable cause to charge them with the offense. We thus agree with the following
observation of the Sandiganbayan, viz:
With the Ombudsman’s finding that the extortion (intimidation) was perpetrated on
February 13, 2001 and that there was transfer of Mark Jimenez US $1,999,965.00 to
Coutts Bank Account HO 133706 on February 23, 2001 in favor of the accused, there is
no reason why within a reasonable period from these dates, the complaint should not be
resolved. The act of intimidation was there, the asportation was complete as of February
23, 2001 why was the information filed only on April 18, 2008. For such a simple charge
of Robbery there is nothing more to consider and all the facts and circumstances upon
which to anchor a resolution whether to give due course to the complaint or dismiss it are
on hand. The case is more than ripe for resolution. Failure to act on the same is a clear
transgression of the constitutional rights of the accused. A healthy respect for the
constitutional prerogative of the accused should have prodded the Ombudsman to act
within reasonable time.[101]
In fine, the Office of the Ombudsman transgressed the respondents’ right to due process
as well as their right to the speedy disposition of their case.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petitions for certiorari for their lack of

merit.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 135808, October 06, 2008 ]
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, PETITIONER, VS.
INTERPORT RESOURCES CORPORATION, MANUEL S. RECTO, RENE S.
VILLARICA, PELAGIO RICALDE, ANTONIO REINA, FRANCISCO
ANONUEVO, JOSEPH SY AND SANTIAGO TANCHAN, JR.,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the Decision,[1] dated 20 August 1998, rendered by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP
No. 37036, enjoining petitioner Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) from taking
cognizance of or initiating any action against the respondent corporation Interport
Resources Corporation (IRC) and members of its board of directors, respondents Manuel
S. Recto, Rene S. Villarica, Pelagio Ricalde, Antonio Reina, Francisco Anonuevo, Joseph
Sy and Santiago Tanchan, Jr., with respect to Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised
Securities Act. In the same Decision of the appellate court, all the proceedings taken
against the respondents, including the assailed SEC Omnibus Orders of 25 January 1995
and 30 March 1995, were declared void.
The antecedent facts of the present case are as follows.
On 6 August 1994, the Board of Directors of IRC approved a Memorandum of

Agreement with Ganda Holdings Berhad (GHB). Under the Memorandum of
Agreement, IRC acquired 100% or the entire capital stock of Ganda Energy Holdings,
Inc. (GEHI),[2] which would own and operate a 102 megawatt (MW) gas turbine power-
generating barge. The agreement also stipulates that GEHI would assume a five-year
power purchase contract with National Power Corporation. At that time, GEHI's power-
generating barge was 97% complete and would go on-line by mid-September of 1994. In
exchange, IRC will issue to GHB 55% of the expanded capital stock of IRC amounting to
40.88 billion shares which had a total par value of P488.44 million.[3]
On the side, IRC would acquire 67% of the entire capital stock of Philippine Racing
Club, Inc. (PRCI). PRCI owns 25.724 hectares of real estate property in Makati. Under
the Agreement, GHB, a member of the Westmont Group of Companies in Malaysia, shall
extend or arrange a loan required to pay for the proposed acquisition by IRC of PRCI. [4]
IRC alleged that on 8 August 1994, a press release announcing the approval of the
agreement was sent through facsimile transmission to the Philippine Stock Exchange and
the SEC, but that the facsimile machine of the SEC could not receive it. Upon the advice
of the SEC, the IRC sent the press release on the morning of 9 August 1994. [5]
The SEC averred that it received reports that IRC failed to make timely public disclosures
of its negotiations with GHB and that some of its directors, respondents herein, heavily
traded IRC shares utilizing this material insider information. On 16 August 1994, the
SEC Chairman issued a directive requiring IRC to submit to the SEC a copy of its
aforesaid Memorandum of Agreement with GHB. The SEC Chairman further directed all
principal officers of IRC to appear at a hearing before the Brokers and Exchanges
Department (BED) of the SEC to explain IRC's failure to immediately disclose the
information as required by the Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts. [6]
In compliance with the SEC Chairman's directive, the IRC sent a letter dated 16 August
1994 to the SEC, attaching thereto copies of the Memorandum of Agreement. Its
directors, Manuel Recto, Rene Villarica and Pelagio Ricalde, also appeared before the
SEC on 22 August 1994 to explain IRC's alleged failure to immediately disclose material
information as required under the Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts. [7]
On 19 September 1994, the SEC Chairman issued an Order finding that IRC violated the
Rules on Disclosure of Material Facts, in connection with the Old Securities Act of 1936,
when it failed to make timely disclosure of its negotiations with GHB. In addition, the
SEC pronounced that some of the officers and directors of IRC entered into transactions
involving IRC shares in violation of Section 30, in relation to Section 36, of the Revised
Securities Act.[8]
Respondents filed an Omnibus Motion, dated 21 September 1994, which was superseded
by an Amended Omnibus Motion, filed on 18 October 1994, alleging that the SEC had no
authority to investigate the subject matter, since under Section 8 of Presidential Decree
No. 902-A,[9] as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1758, jurisdiction was conferred
upon the Prosecution and Enforcement Department (PED) of the SEC. Respondents also
claimed that the SEC violated their right to due process when it ordered that the
respondents appear before the SEC and "show cause why no administrative, civil or
criminal sanctions should be imposed on them," and, thus, shifted the burden of proof to
the respondents. Lastly, they sought to have their cases tried jointly given the identical
factual situations surrounding the alleged violation committed by the respondents.[10]
Respondents also filed a Motion for Continuance of Proceedings on 24 October 1994,

wherein they moved for discontinuance of the investigations and the proceedings before
the SEC until the undue publicity had abated and the investigating officials had become
reasonably free from prejudice and public pressure.[11]
No formal hearings were conducted in connection with the aforementioned motions, but
on 25 January 1995, the SEC issued an Omnibus Order which thus disposed of the same
in this wise:[12]
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing considerations, the Commission resolves and
hereby rules:
1. To create a special investigating panel to hear and decide the instant case in
accordance with the Rules of Practice and Procedure Before the Prosecution and
Enforcement Department (PED), Securities and Exchange Commission, to be
composed of Attys. James K. Abugan, Medardo Devera (Prosecution and
Enforcement Department), and Jose Aquino (Brokers and Exchanges Department),
which is hereby directed to expeditiously resolve the case by conducting
continuous hearings, if possible.
2. To recall the show cause orders dated September 19, 1994 requiring the
respondents to appear and show cause why no administrative, civil or criminal
sanctions should be imposed on them.
3. To deny the Motion for Continuance for lack of merit.
Respondents filed an Omnibus Motion for Partial Reconsideration,[13] questioning the

creation of the special investigating panel to hear the case and the denial of the Motion
for Continuance. The SEC denied reconsideration in its Omnibus Order dated 30 March
1995.[14]
The respondents filed a petition before the Court of Appeals docketed as C.A.-G.R. SP
No. 37036, questioning the Omnibus Orders dated 25 January 1995 and 30 March 1995.
[15]
During the proceedings before the Court of Appeals, respondents filed a
Supplemental Motion[16] dated 16 May 1995, wherein they prayed for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the SEC and its agents from investigating and
proceeding with the hearing of the case against respondents herein. On 5 May 1995, the
Court of Appeals granted their motion and issued a writ of preliminary injunction, which
effectively enjoined the SEC from filing any criminal, civil or administrative case against
the respondents herein.[17]
On 23 October 1995, the SEC filed a Motion for Leave to Quash SEC Omnibus Orders
so that the case may be investigated by the PED in accordance with the SEC Rules and
Presidential Decree No. 902-A, and not by the special body whose creation the SEC had
earlier ordered.[18]
The Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision[19] on 20 August 1998. It determined that

there were no implementing rules and regulations regarding disclosure, insider trading, or
any of the provisions of the Revised Securities Acts which the respondents allegedly
violated. The Court of Appeals likewise noted that it found no statutory authority for the
SEC to initiate and file any suit for civil liability under Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the
Revised Securities Act. Thus, it ruled that no civil, criminal or administrative
proceedings may possibly be held against the respondents without violating their rights to
due process and equal protection. It further resolved that absent any implementing rules,
the SEC cannot be allowed to quash the assailed Omnibus Orders for the sole purpose of
re-filing the same case against the respondents.[20]
The Court of Appeals further decided that the Rules of Practice and Procedure Before the
PED, which took effect on 14 April 1990, did not comply with the statutory requirements
contained in the Administrative Code of 1997. Section 8, Rule V of the Rules of Practice
and Procedure Before the PED affords a party the right to be present but without the right
to cross-examine witnesses presented against him, in violation of Section 12(3), Chapter
3, Book VII of the Administrative Code.[21]
In the dispositive portion of its Decision, dated 20 August 1998, the Court of Appeals
ruled that[22]:
WHEREFORE, [herein petitioner SEC's] Motion for Leave to Quash SEC Omnibus
Orders is hereby DENIED. The petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is
GRANTED. Consequently, all proceedings taken against [herein respondents] in this
case, including the Omnibus Orders of January 25, 1995 and March 30, 1995 are declared
null and void. The writ of preliminary injunction is hereby made permanent and,
accordingly, [SEC] is hereby prohibited from taking cognizance or initiating any
action, be they civil, criminal, or administrative against [respondents] with respect to
Sections 8 (Procedure for Registration), 30 (Insider's duty to disclose when trading) and
36 (Directors, Officers and Principal Stockholders) in relation to Sections 46
(Administrative sanctions) 56 (Penalties) 44 (Liabilities of Controlling persons) and 45
(Investigations, injunctions and prosecution of offenses) of the Revised Securities Act
and Section 144 (Violations of the Code) of the Corporation Code. (Emphasis provided.)
The SEC filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in a
Resolution[23] issued on 30 September 1998.
Hence, the present petition, which relies on the following grounds[24]:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONER'S MOTION

FOR LEAVE TO QUASH THE ASSAILED SEC OMNIBUS ORDERS DATED
JANUARY 25 AND MARCH 30, 1995.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE IS NO

STATUTORY AUTHORITY WHATSOEVER FOR PETITIONER SEC TO INITIATE
AND FILE ANY SUIT BE THEY CIVIL, CRIMINAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE
AGAINST RESPONDENT CORPORATION AND ITS DIRECTORS WITH RESPECT
TO SECTION 30 (INSIDER'S DUTY TO DISCOLSED [sic] WHEN TRADING) AND
36 (DIRECTORS OFFICERS AND PRINCIPAL STOCKHOLDERS) OF THE
REVISED SECURITIES ACT; AND
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT RULES OF

PRACTICE AND PROSECUTION BEFORE THE PED AND THE SICD RULES OF
PROCEDURE ON ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS/PROCEEDINGS [25] ARE INVALID
AS THEY FAIL TO COMPLY WITH THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
CONTAINED IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987.
Before discussing the merits of this case, it should be noted that while this case was
pending in this Court, Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as the Securities
Regulation Code, took effect on 8 August 2000. Section 8 of Presidential Decree No.
902-A, as amended, which created the PED, was already repealed as provided for in
Section 76 of the Securities Regulation Code:
SEC. 76. Repealing Clause. - The Revised Securities Act (Batas Pambansa Blg. 178), as
amended, in its entirety, and Sections 2, 4 and 8 of Presidential Decree 902-A, as
amended, are hereby repealed. All other laws, orders, rules and regulations, or parts
thereof, inconsistent with any provision of this Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
Thus, under the new law, the PED has been abolished, and the Securities Regulation
Code has taken the place of the Revised Securities Act.
The Court now proceeds with a discussion of the present case.
I. Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act do not require the enactment of
implementing rules to make them binding and effective.
The Court of Appeals ruled that absent any implementing rules for Sections 8, 30 and 36
of the Revised Securities Act, no civil, criminal or administrative actions can possibly be
had against the respondents without violating their right to due process and equal
protection, citing as its basis the case Yick Wo v. Hopkins.[26] This is untenable.
In the absence of any constitutional or statutory infirmity, which may concern Sections
30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, this Court upholds these provisions as legal and
binding. It is well settled that every law has in its favor the presumption of validity.
Unless and until a specific provision of the law is declared invalid and unconstitutional,
the same is valid and binding for all intents and purposes.[27] The mere absence of
implementing rules cannot effectively invalidate provisions of law, where a reasonable
construction that will support the law may be given. In People v. Rosenthal,[28] this Court
ruled that:
In this connection we cannot pretermit reference to the rule that "legislation should not be
held invalid on the ground of uncertainty if susceptible of any reasonable construction
that will support and give it effect. An Act will not be declared inoperative and
ineffectual on the ground that it furnishes no adequate means to secure the purpose for
which it is passed, if men of common sense and reason can devise and provide the means,
and all the instrumentalities necessary for its execution are within the reach of those
intrusted therewith." (25 R.C.L., pp. 810, 811)
In Garcia v. Executive Secretary,[29] the Court underlined the importance of the
presumption of validity of laws and the careful consideration with which the judiciary
strikes down as invalid acts of the legislature:
The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that
the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable
showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the
doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect
for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and
the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied and determined to be in
accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted.
The necessity for vesting administrative authorities with power to make rules and
regulations is based on the impracticability of lawmakers' providing general regulations
for various and varying details of management.[30] To rule that the absence of
implementing rules can render ineffective an act of Congress, such as the Revised
Securities Act, would empower the administrative bodies to defeat the legislative will by
delaying the implementing rules. To assert that a law is less than a law, because it is
made to depend on a future event or act, is to rob the Legislature of the power to act
wisely for the public welfare whenever a law is passed relating to a state of affairs not yet
developed, or to things future and impossible to fully know.[31] It is well established that
administrative authorities have the power to promulgate rules and regulations to
implement a given statute and to effectuate its policies, provided such rules and
regulations conform to the terms and standards prescribed by the statute as well as
purport to carry into effect its general policies. Nevertheless, it is undisputable that the
rules and regulations cannot assert for themselves a more extensive prerogative or deviate
from the mandate of the statute.[32] Moreover, where the statute contains sufficient
standards and an unmistakable intent, as in the case of Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised
Securities Act, there should be no impediment to its implementation.
The reliance placed by the Court of Appeals in Yick Wo v. Hopkins[33] shows a glaring

error. In the cited case, this Court found unconstitutional an ordinance which gave the
board of supervisors authority to refuse permission to carry on laundries located in
buildings that were not made of brick and stone, because it violated the equal protection
clause and was highly discriminatory and hostile to Chinese residents and not because the
standards provided therein were vague or ambiguous.
This Court does not discern any vagueness or ambiguity in Sections 30 and 36 of the
Revised Securities Act, such that the acts proscribed and/or required would not be
understood by a person of ordinary intelligence.
Section 30 of the Revised Securities Act
Section 30 of the Revised Securities Act reads:

Sec. 30. Insider's duty to disclose when trading. - (a) It shall be unlawful for an insider
to sell or buy a security of the issuer, if he knows a fact of special significance with
respect to the issuer or the security that is not generally available, unless (1) the insider
proves that the fact is generally available or (2) if the other party to the transaction (or his
agent) is identified, (a) the insider proves that the other party knows it, or (b) that other
party in fact knows it from the insider or otherwise.
(b) "Insider" means (1) the issuer, (2) a director or officer of, or a person controlling,
controlled by, or under common control with, the issuer, (3) a person whose relationship
or former relationship to the issuer gives or gave him access to a fact of special
significance about the issuer or the security that is not generally available, or (4) a person
who learns such a fact from any of the foregoing insiders as defined in this subsection,
with knowledge that the person from whom he learns the fact is such an insider.
(c) A fact is "of special significance" if (a) in addition to being material it would be
likely, on being made generally available, to affect the market price of a security to a
significant extent, or (b) a reasonable person would consider it especially important under
the circumstances in determining his course of action in the light of such factors as the
degree of its specificity, the extent of its difference from information generally available
previously, and its nature and reliability.
(d) This section shall apply to an insider as defined in subsection (b) (3) hereof only to
the extent that he knows of a fact of special significance by virtue of his being an insider.
The provision explains in simple terms that the insider's misuse of nonpublic and
undisclosed information is the gravamen of illegal conduct. The intent of the law is the
protection of investors against fraud, committed when an insider, using secret
information, takes advantage of an uninformed investor. Insiders are obligated to disclose
material information to the other party or abstain from trading the shares of his
corporation. This duty to disclose or abstain is based on two factors: first, the existence
of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be
available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone; and
second, the inherent unfairness involved when a party takes advantage of such
information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.[34]
In the United States (U.S.), the obligation to disclose or abstain has been traditionally
imposed on corporate "insiders," particularly officers, directors, or controlling
stockholders, but that definition has since been expanded.[35] The term "insiders" now
includes persons whose relationship or former relationship to the issuer gives or gave
them access to a fact of special significance about the issuer or the security that is not
generally available, and one who learns such a fact from an insider knowing that the
person from whom he learns the fact is such an insider. Insiders have the duty to disclose
material facts which are known to them by virtue of their position but which are not
known to persons with whom they deal and which, if known, would affect their
investment judgment. In some cases, however, there may be valid corporate reasons for
the nondisclosure of material information. Where such reasons exist, an issuer's decision
not to make any public disclosures is not ordinarily considered as a violation of insider
trading. At the same time, the undisclosed information should not be improperly used for
non-corporate purposes, particularly to disadvantage other persons with whom an insider
might transact, and therefore the insider must abstain from entering into transactions
involving such securities.[36]
Respondents further aver that under Section 30 of the Revised Securities Act, the SEC
still needed to define the following terms: "material fact," "reasonable person,"
"nature and reliability" and "generally available."[37] In determining whether or not
these terms are vague, these terms must be evaluated in the context of Section 30 of the
Revised Securties Act. To fully understand how the terms were used in the
aforementioned provision, a discussion of what the law recognizes as a fact of special
significance is required, since the duty to disclose such fact or to abstain from any
transaction is imposed on the insider only in connection with a fact of special
significance.
Under the law, what is required to be disclosed is a fact of "special significance" which

may be (a) a material fact which would be likely, on being made generally available, to
affect the market price of a security to a significant extent, or (b) one which a reasonable
person would consider especially important in determining his course of action with
regard to the shares of stock.
(a) Material Fact - The concept of a "material fact" is not a new one. As early as 1973,
the Rules Requiring Disclosure of Material Facts by Corporations Whose Securities Are
Listed In Any Stock Exchange or Registered/Licensed Under the Securities Act, issued
by the SEC on 29 January 1973, explained that "[a] fact is material if it induces or tends
to induce or otherwise affect the sale or purchase of its securities." Thus, Section 30 of
the Revised Securities Act provides that if a fact affects the sale or purchase of securities,
as well as its price, then the insider would be required to disclose such information to the
other party to the transaction involving the securities. This is the first definition given to
a "fact of special significance."
(b.1) Reasonable Person - The second definition given to a fact of special significance

involves the judgment of a "reasonable person." Contrary to the allegations of the
respondents, a "reasonable person" is not a problematic legal concept that needs to be
clarified for the purpose of giving effect to a statute; rather, it is the standard on which
most of our legal doctrines stand. The doctrine on negligence uses the discretion of the
"reasonable man" as the standard.[38] A purchaser in good faith must also take into
account facts which put a "reasonable man" on his guard.[39] In addition, it is the belief of
the reasonable and prudent man that an offense was committed that sets the criteria for
probable cause for a warrant of arrest.[40] This Court, in such cases, differentiated the
reasonable and prudent man from "a person with training in the law such as a prosecutor
or a judge," and identified him as "the average man on the street," who weighs facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our technical rules of evidence of
which his knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense of which
all reasonable men have in abundance.[41] In the same vein, the U.S. Supreme Court
similarly determined its standards by the actual significance in the deliberations of a
"reasonable investor," when it ruled in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,[42] that the
determination of materiality "requires delicate assessments of the inferences a `reasonable
shareholder' would draw from a given set of facts and the significance of those inferences
to him."
(b.2) Nature and Reliability - The factors affecting the second definition of a "fact of
special significance," which is of such importance that it is expected to affect the
judgment of a reasonable man, were substantially lifted from a test of materiality
pronounced in the case In the Matter of Investors Management Co., Inc.[43]:
Among the factors to be considered in determining whether information is material under
this test are the degree of its specificity, the extent to which it differs from information
previously publicly disseminated, and its reliability in light of its nature and source and
the circumstances under which it was received.
It can be deduced from the foregoing that the "nature and reliability" of a significant fact
in determining the course of action a reasonable person takes regarding securities must be
clearly viewed in connection with the particular circumstances of a case. To enumerate
all circumstances that would render the "nature and reliability" of a fact to be of special
significance is close to impossible. Nevertheless, the proper adjudicative body would
undoubtedly be able to determine if facts of a certain "nature and reliability" can
influence a reasonable person's decision to retain, sell or buy securities, and thereafter
explain and justify its factual findings in its decision.
(c) Materiality Concept - A discussion of the "materiality concept" would be relevant to

both a material fact which would affect the market price of a security to a significant
extent and/or a fact which a reasonable person would consider in determining his or her
cause of action with regard to the shares of stock. Significantly, what is referred to in our
laws as a fact of special significance is referred to in the U.S. as the "materiality concept"
and the latter is similarly not provided with a precise definition. In Basic v. Levinson,
[44]
the U.S. Supreme Court cautioned against confining materiality to a rigid formula,
stating thus:
A bright-line rule indeed is easier to follow than a standard that requires the exercise of
judgment in the light of all the circumstances. But ease of application alone is not an
excuse for ignoring the purposes of the Securities Act and Congress' policy decisions.
Any approach that designates a single fact or occurrence as always determinative of an
inherently fact-specific finding such as materiality, must necessarily be overinclusive or
underinclusive.
Moreover, materiality "will depend at any given time upon a balancing of both the
indicated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event
in light of the totality of the company activity."[45] In drafting the Securities Act of 1934,
the U.S. Congress put emphasis on the limitations to the definition of materiality:
Although the Committee believes that ideally it would be desirable to have absolute
certainty in the application of the materiality concept, it is its view that such a goal is
illusory and unrealistic. The materiality concept is judgmental in nature and it is not
possible to translate this into a numerical formula. The Committee's advice to the
[SEC] is to avoid this quest for certainty and to continue consideration of
materiality on a case-by-case basis as disclosure problems are identified." House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Report of the Advisory Committee on
Corporate Disclosure to the Securities and Exchange Commission, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.,
327 (Comm.Print 1977). (Emphasis provided.)[46]
(d) Generally Available - Section 30 of the Revised Securities Act allows the insider the
defense that in a transaction of securities, where the insider is in possession of facts of
special significance, such information is "generally available" to the public. Whether
information found in a newspaper, a specialized magazine, or any cyberspace media be
sufficient for the term "generally available" is a matter which may be adjudged given the
particular circumstances of the case. The standards cannot remain at a standstill. A
medium, which is widely used today was, at some previous point in time, inaccessible to
most. Furthermore, it would be difficult to approximate how the rules may be applied to
the instant case, where investigation has not even been started. Respondents failed to
allege that the negotiations of their agreement with GHB were made known to the public
through any form of media for there to be a proper appreciation of the issue presented.
Section 36(a) of the Revised Securities Act
As regards Section 36(a) of the Revised Securities Act, respondents claim that the term
"beneficial ownership" is vague and that it requires implementing rules to give effect to
the law. Section 36(a) of the Revised Securities Act is a straightforward provision that
imposes upon (1) a beneficial owner of more than ten percent of any class of any equity
security or (2) a director or any officer of the issuer of such security, the obligation to
submit a statement indicating his or her ownership of the issuer's securities and such
changes in his or her ownership thereof. The said provision reads:
Sec. 36. Directors, officers and principal stockholders. - (a) Every person who is
directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than ten per centum of any [class] of
any equity security which is registered pursuant to this Act, or who is [a] director or an
officer of the issuer of such security, shall file, at the time of the registration of such
security on a securities exchange or by the effective date of a registration statement or
within ten days after he becomes such a beneficial owner, director or officer, a statement
with the Commission and, if such security is registered on a securities exchange, also
with the exchange, of the amount of all equity securities of such issuer of which he is the
beneficial owner, and within ten days after the close of each calendar month thereafter, if
there has been a change in such ownership during such month, shall file with the
Commission, and if such security is registered on a securities exchange, shall also file
with the exchange, a statement indicating his ownership at the close of the calendar
month and such changes in his ownership as have occurred during such calendar month.
(Emphasis provided.)
Section 36(a) refers to the "beneficial owner." Beneficial owner has been defined in the
following manner:
[F]irst, to indicate the interest of a beneficiary in trust property (also called "equitable
ownership"); and second, to refer to the power of a corporate shareholder to buy or sell
the shares, though the shareholder is not registered in the corporation's books as the
owner. Usually, beneficial ownership is distinguished from naked ownership, which is
the enjoyment of all the benefits and privileges of ownership, as against possession of the
bare title to property.[47]
Even assuming that the term "beneficial ownership" was vague, it would not affect
respondents' case, where the respondents are directors and/or officers of the corporation,
who are specifically required to comply with the reportorial requirements under Section
36(a) of the Revised Securities Act. The validity of a statute may be contested only by
one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement.[48]
Sections 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act were enacted to promote full disclosure
in the securities market and prevent unscrupulous individuals, who by their positions
obtain non-public information, from taking advantage of an uninformed public. No
individual would invest in a market which can be manipulated by a limited number of
corporate insiders. Such reaction would stifle, if not stunt, the growth of the securities
market. To avert the occurrence of such an event, Section 30 of the Revised Securities
Act prevented the unfair use of non-public information in securities transactions, while
Section 36 allowed the SEC to monitor the transactions entered into by corporate officers
and directors as regards the securities of their companies.
In the case In the Matter of Investor's Management Co.,[49] it was cautioned that "the
broad language of the anti-fraud provisions," which include the provisions on insider
trading, should not be "circumscribed by fine distinctions and rigid classifications." The
ambit of anti-fraud provisions is necessarily broad so as to embrace the infinite variety of
deceptive conduct.[50]
In Tatad v. Secretary of Department of Energy,[51] this Court brushed aside a contention,

similar to that made by the respondents in this case, that certain words or phrases used in
a statute do not set determinate standards, declaring that:
Petitioners contend that the words "as far as practicable," "declining" and "stable" should
have been defined in R.A. No. 8180 as they do not set determinate and determinable
standards. This stubborn submission deserves scant consideration. The dictionary
meanings of these words are well settled and cannot confuse men of reasonable
intelligence. x x x. The fear of petitioners that these words will result in the exercise of
executive discretion that will run riot is thus groundless. To be sure, the Court has
sustained the validity of similar, if not more general standards in other cases.
Among the words or phrases that this Court upheld as valid standards were "simplicity
and dignity,"[52] "public interest,"[53] and "interests of law and order."[54]
The Revised Securities Act was approved on 23 February 1982. The fact that the Full
Disclosure Rules were promulgated by the SEC only on 24 July 1996 does not render
ineffective in the meantime Section 36 of the Revised Securities Act. It is already
unequivocal that the Revised Securities Act requires full disclosure and the Full
Disclosure Rules were issued to make the enforcement of the law more consistent,
efficient and effective. It is equally reasonable to state that the disclosure forms later
provided by the SEC, do not, in any way imply that no compliance was required before
the forms were provided. The effectivity of a statute which imposes reportorial
requirements cannot be suspended by the issuance of specified forms, especially where
compliance therewith may be made even without such forms. The forms merely made
more efficient the processing of requirements already identified by the statute.
For the same reason, the Court of Appeals made an evident mistake when it ruled that no
civil, criminal or administrative actions can possibly be had against the respondents in
connection with Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act due to the absence of
implementing rules. These provisions are sufficiently clear and complete by themselves.
Their requirements are specifically set out, and the acts which are enjoined are
determinable. In particular, Section 8[55] of the Revised Securities Act is a
straightforward enumeration of the procedure for the registration of securities and the
particular matters which need to be reported in the registration statement thereof. The
Decision, dated 20 August 1998, provides no valid reason to exempt the respondent IRC
from such requirements. The lack of implementing rules cannot suspend the effectivity of
these provisions. Thus, this Court cannot find any cogent reason to prevent the SEC from
exercising its authority to investigate respondents for violation of Section 8 of the
II. The right to cross-examination is not absolute and cannot be demanded during
investigative proceedings before the PED.
In its assailed Decision dated 20 August 1998, the Court of Appeals pronounced that the
PED Rules of Practice and Procedure was invalid since Section 8, Rule V[56] thereof
failed to provide for the parties' right to cross-examination, in violation of the
Administrative Code of 1987 particularly Section 12(3), Chapter 3, Book VII thereof.
This ruling is incorrect.
Firstly, Section 4, Rule I of the PED Rules of Practice and Procedure, categorically stated
that the proceedings before the PED are summary in nature:
Section 4. Nature of Proceedings - Subject to the requirements of due process,
proceedings before the "PED" shall be summary in nature not necessarily adhering to or
following the technical rules of evidence obtaining in the courts of law. The Rules of
Court may apply in said proceedings in suppletory character whenever practicable.
Rule V of the PED Rules of Practice and Procedure further specified that:
Section 5. Submission of Documents - During the preliminary conference/hearing, or
immediately thereafter, the Hearing Officer may require the parties to simultaneously
submit their respective verified position papers accompanied by all supporting documents
and the affidavits of their witnesses, if any which shall take the place of their direct
testimony. The parties shall furnish each other with copies of the position papers
together with the supporting affidavits and documents submitted by them.
Section 6. Determination of necessity of hearing. - Immediately after the submission by

the parties of their position papers and supporting documents, the Hearing Officer shall
determine whether there is a need for a formal hearing. At this stage, he may, in his
discretion, and for the purpose of making such determination, elicit pertinent facts or
information, including documentary evidence, if any, from any party or witness to
complete, as far as possible, the facts of the case. Facts or information so elicited may
serve as basis for his clarification or simplifications of the issues in the case. Admissions
and stipulation of facts to abbreviate the proceedings shall be encouraged.
Section 7. Disposition of Case. If the Hearing Officer finds no necessity of further
hearing after the parties have submitted their position papers and supporting documents,
he shall so inform the parties stating the reasons therefor and shall ask them to
acknowledge the fact that they were so informed by signing the minutes of the hearing
and the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution.
As such, the PED Rules provided that the Hearing Officer may require the parties to
submit their respective verified position papers, together with all supporting documents
and affidavits of witnesses. A formal hearing was not mandatory; it was within the
discretion of the Hearing Officer to determine whether there was a need for a formal
hearing. Since, according to the foregoing rules, the holding of a hearing before the PED
is discretionary, then the right to cross-examination could not have been demanded by
either party.
Secondly, it must be pointed out that Chapter 3, Book VII of the Administrative Code,
entitled "Adjudication," does not affect the investigatory functions of the agencies. The
law creating the PED, Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A, as amended, defines
the authority granted to the PED, thus:
SEC. 8. The Prosecution and Enforcement Department shall have, subject to the
Commission's control and supervision, the exclusive authority to investigate, on
complaint or motu proprio, any act or omission of the Board of Directors/Trustees of
corporations, or of partnerships, or of other associations, or of their stockholders, officers
or partners, including any fraudulent devices, schemes or representations, in violation of
any law or rules and regulations administered and enforced by the Commission; to file
and prosecute in accordance with law and rules and regulations issued by the
Commission and in appropriate cases, the corresponding criminal or civil case before the
Commission or the proper court or body upon prima facie finding of violation of any
laws or rules and regulations administered and enforced by the Commission; and to
perform such other powers and functions as may be provided by law or duly delegated to
it by the Commission. (Emphasis provided.)
The law creating PED empowers it to investigate violations of the rules and regulations
promulgated by the SEC and to file and prosecute such cases. It fails to mention any
adjudicatory functions insofar as the PED is concerned. Thus, the PED Rules of Practice
and Procedure need not comply with the provisions of the Administrative Code on
adjudication, particularly Section 12(3), Chapter 3, Book VII.
In Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights,[57] this Court sets out the distinction between
investigative and adjudicative functions, thus:
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or
probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or
study closely; inquire into systematically: "to search or inquire into" xx to subject to an
official probe xx: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of an investigation, of
course is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or
intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the
facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by
patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire
into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of
evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in
turn described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not
require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; xx an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the
discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge,

decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle
finally (the rights and duties of parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: xx to
pass judgment on: settle judicially: xx act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or
rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: xx to award or grant
judicially in a case of controversy x x x."
In a legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To
determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge"
means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle, or decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x
x Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."
There is no merit to the respondent's averment that the sections under Chapter 3, Book
VII of the Administrative Code, do not distinguish between investigative and
adjudicatory functions. Chapter 3, Book VII of the Administrative Code, is
unequivocally entitled "Adjudication."
Respondents insist that the PED performs adjudicative functions, as enumerated under
Section 1(h) and (j), Rule II; and Section 2(4), Rule VII of the PED Rules of Practice and
Procedure:
Section 1. Authority of the Prosecution and Enforcement Department - Pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 902-A, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1758, the
xxxx
(h) Suspends or revokes, after proper notice and hearing in accordance with these Rules,
the franchise or certificate of registration of corporations, partnerships or associations,
upon any of the following grounds:
1. Fraud in procuring its certificate of registration;
2. Serious misrepresentation as to what the corporation can do or is doing to the great

prejudice of or damage to the general public;
3. Refusal to comply or defiance of any lawful order of the Commission restraining
commission of acts which would amount to a grave violation of its franchise;
xxxx
(j) Imposes charges, fines and fees, which by law, it is authorized to collect;
xxxx
Section 2. Powers of the Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer shall have the following
powers:
xxxx
4. To cite and/or declare any person in direct or indirect contempt in accordance with
pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court.
Even assuming that these are adjudicative functions, the PED, in the instant case,
exercised its investigative powers; thus, respondents do not have the requisite standing to
assail the validity of the rules on adjudication. A valid source of a statute or a rule can
only be contested by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement.
[58]
In the instant case, respondents are only being investigated by the PED for their
alleged failure to disclose their negotiations with GHB and the transactions entered into
by its directors involving IRC shares. The respondents have not shown themselves to be
under any imminent danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the exercise
of adjudicative functions by the SEC. They are not being or about to be subjected by the
PED to charges, fees or fines; to citations for contempt; or to the cancellation of their
certificate of registration under Section 1(h), Rule II of the PED Rules of Practice and
Procedure.
To repeat, the only powers which the PED was likely to exercise over the respondents
were investigative in nature, to wit:
Section 1. Authority of the Prosecution and Enforcement Department - Pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 902-A, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1758, the
xxxx
b. Initiates proper investigation of corporations and partnerships or persons, their books,
records and other properties and assets, involving their business transactions, in
coordination with the operating department involved;
xxxx
e. Files and prosecutes civil or criminal cases before the Commission and other courts of
justice involving violations of laws and decrees enforced by the Commission and the rules
and regulations promulgated thereunder;
f. Prosecutes erring directors, officers and stockholders of corporations and partnerships,
commercial paper issuers or persons in accordance with the pertinent rules on procedures;
The authority granted to the PED under Section 1(b), (e), and (f), Rule II of the PED
Rules of Practice and Procedure, need not comply with Section 12, Chapter 3, Rule VII
of the Administrative Code, which affects only the adjudicatory functions of
administrative bodies. Thus, the PED would still be able to investigate the respondents
under its rules for their alleged failure to disclose their negotiations with GHB and the
transactions entered into by its directors involving IRC shares.
This is not to say that administrative bodies performing adjudicative functions are
required to strictly comply with the requirements of Chapter 3, Rule VII of the
Administrative Code, particularly, the right to cross-examination. It should be noted that
under Section 2.2 of Executive Order No. 26, issued on 7 October 1992, abbreviated
proceedings are prescribed in the disposition of administrative cases:
2. Abbreviation of Proceedings. All administrative agencies are hereby directed to

adopt and include in their respective Rules of Procedure the following provisions:
xxxx
2.2 Rules adopting, unless otherwise provided by special laws and without prejudice to
Section 12, Chapter 3, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987, the mandatory use
of affidavits in lieu of direct testimonies and the preferred use of depositions whenever
practicable and convenient.
As a consequence, in proceedings before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, such as
the National Labor Relations Commission and the Philippine Overseas Employment
Agency, created under laws which authorize summary proceedings, decisions may be
reached on the basis of position papers or other documentary evidence only. They are not
bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence.[59] In fact, the hearings before such
agencies do not connote full adversarial proceedings.[60] Thus, it is not necessary for the
rules to require affiants to appear and testify and to be cross-examined by the counsel of
the adverse party. To require otherwise would negate the summary nature of the
administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings.[61] In Atlas Consolidated Mining and
Development Corporation v. Factoran, Jr.,[62] this Court stated that:
[I]t is sufficient that administrative findings of fact are supported by evidence, or
negatively stated, it is sufficient that findings of fact are not shown to be unsupported by
evidence. Substantial evidence is all that is needed to support an administrative finding
of fact, and substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
In order to comply with the requirements of due process, what is required, among other
things, is that every litigant be given reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his
right and to introduce relevant evidence in his favor.[63]
III. The Securities Regulations Code did not repeal Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the
Revised
Securities Act since said provisions were reenacted in the new law.
The Securities Regulations Code absolutely repealed the Revised Securities Act. While
the absolute repeal of a law generally deprives a court of its authority to penalize the
person charged with the violation of the old law prior to its appeal, an exception to this
rule comes about when the repealing law punishes the act previously penalized under the
old law. The Court, in Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, sets down the rules in such
instances:[64]
As a rule, an absolute repeal of a penal law has the effect of depriving the court of its
authority to punish a person charged with violation of the old law prior to its repeal. This
is because an unqualified repeal of a penal law constitutes a legislative act of rendering
legal what had been previously declared as illegal, such that the offense no longer exists
and it is as if the person who committed it never did so. There are,
however, exceptions to the rule. One is the inclusion of a saving clause in the repealing
statute that provides that the repeal shall have no effect on pending actions. Another
exception is where the repealing act reenacts the former statute and punishes the act
previously penalized under the old law. In such instance, the act committed before the
reenactment continues to be an offense in the statute books and pending cases are not
affected, regardless of whether the new penalty to be imposed is more favorable to the
accused. (Emphasis provided.)
In the present case, a criminal case may still be filed against the respondents despite the
repeal, since Sections 8,[65] 12,[66] 26,[67] 27[68] and 23[69] of the Securities Regulations Code
impose duties that are substantially similar to Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the repealed
Section 8 of the Revised Securities Act, which previously provided for the registration of
securities and the information that needs to be included in the registration statements, was
expanded under Section 12, in connection with Section 8 of the Securities Regulations
Code. Further details of the information required to be disclosed by the registrant are
explained in the Amended Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Securities
Regulations Code, issued on 30 December 2003, particularly Sections 8 and 12 thereof.
Section 30 of the Revised Securities Act has been reenacted as Section 27 of the
Securities Regulations Code, still penalizing an insider's misuse of material and non-
public information about the issuer, for the purpose of protecting public investors.
Section 26 of the Securities Regulations Code even widens the coverage of punishable
acts, which intend to defraud public investors through various devices, misinformation
and omissions.
Section 23 of the Securities Regulations Code was practically lifted from Section 36(a) of
the Revised Securities Act. Both provisions impose upon (1) a beneficial owner of more
than ten percent of any class of any equity security or (2) a director or any officer of the
issuer of such security, the obligation to submit a statement indicating his or her
ownership of the issuer's securities and such changes in his or her ownership thereof.
Clearly, the legislature had not intended to deprive the courts of their authority to punish
a person charged with violation of the old law that was repealed; in this case, the Revised
Securities Act.
IV. The SEC retained the jurisdiction to investigate violations of the Revised Securities
Act,
reenacted in the Securities Regulations Code, despite the abolition of the PED.
Section 53 of the Securities Regulations Code clearly provides that criminal complaints
for violations of rules and regulations enforced or administered by the SEC shall be
referred to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for preliminary investigation, while the SEC
nevertheless retains limited investigatory powers.[70] Additionally, the SEC may still
impose the appropriate administrative sanctions under Section 54 of the aforementioned
law.[71]
In Morato v. Court of Appeals,[72] the cases therein were still pending before the PED for
investigation and the SEC for resolution when the Securities Regulations Code was
enacted. The case before the SEC involved an intra-corporate dispute, while the subject
matter of the other case investigated by the PED involved the schemes, devices, and
violations of pertinent rules and laws of the company's board of directors. The enactment
of the Securities Regulations Code did not result in the dismissal of the cases; rather, this
Court ordered the transfer of one case to the proper regional trial court and the SEC to
continue with the investigation of the other case.
The case at bar is comparable to the aforecited case. In this case, the SEC already
commenced the investigative proceedings against respondents as early as 1994.
Respondents were called to appear before the SEC and explain their failure to disclose
pertinent information on 14 August 1994. Thereafter, the SEC Chairman, having already
made initial findings that respondents failed to make timely disclosures of their
negotiations with GHB, ordered a special investigating panel to hear the case. The
investigative proceedings were interrupted only by the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the Court of Appeals, which became permanent by virtue of the Decision, dated
20 August 1998, in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 37036. During the pendency of this case, the
Securities Regulations Code repealed the Revised Securities Act. As in Morato v. Court
of Appeals, the repeal cannot deprive SEC of its jurisdiction to continue investigating the
case; or the regional trial court, to hear any case which may later be filed against the
respondents.
V. The instant case has not yet prescribed.

Respondents have taken the position that this case is moot and academic, since any
criminal complaint that may be filed against them resulting from the SEC's investigation
of this case has already prescribed.[73] They point out that the prescription period
applicable to offenses punished under special laws, such as violations of the Revised
Securities Act, is twelve years under Section 1 of Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No.
3585 and Act No. 3763, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for
Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When
Prescription Shall Begin to Act."[74] Since the offense was committed in 1994, they
reasoned that prescription set in as early as 2006 and rendered this case moot. Such
position, however, is incongruent with the factual circumstances of this case, as well as
the applicable laws and jurisprudence.
It is an established doctrine that a preliminary investigation interrupts the prescription

period.[75] A preliminary investigation is essentially a determination whether an offense
has been committed, and whether there is probable cause for the accused to have
committed an offense:
A preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of
discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal
to prepare the complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has
no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed or whether
there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. [76]
Under Section 45 of the Revised Securities Act, which is entitled Investigations,
Injunctions and Prosecution of Offenses, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) has
the authority to "make such investigations as it deems necessary to determine whether
any person has violated or is about to violate any provision of this Act XXX." After a
finding that a person has violated the Revised Securities Act, the SEC may refer the case
to the DOJ for preliminary investigation and prosecution.
While the SEC investigation serves the same purpose and entails substantially similar
duties as the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ, this process cannot simply
be disregarded. In Baviera v. Paglinawan,[77] this Court enunciated that a criminal
complaint is first filed with the SEC, which determines the existence of probable cause,
before a preliminary investigation can be commenced by the DOJ. In the aforecited case,
the complaint filed directly with the DOJ was dismissed on the ground that it should have
been filed first with the SEC. Similarly, the offense was a violation of the Securities
Regulations Code, wherein the procedure for criminal prosecution was reproduced from
Section 45 of the Revised Securities Act. [78] This Court affirmed the dismissal, which it
explained thus:
The Court of Appeals held that under the above provision, a criminal complaint for
violation of any law or rule administered by the SEC must first be filed with the latter. If
the Commission finds that there is probable cause, then it should refer the case to the
DOJ. Since petitioner failed to comply with the foregoing procedural requirement, the
DOJ did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing his complaint in I.S. No. 2004-229.
where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the
specialized knowledge and expertise of said administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact. The Securities Regulation Code is a special law. Its
enforcement is particularly vested in the SEC. Hence, all complaints for any violation of
the Code and its implementing rules and regulations should be filed with the SEC. Where
the complaint is criminal in nature, the SEC shall indorse the complaint to the DOJ for
preliminary investigation and prosecution as provided in Section 53.1 earlier quoted.
The said case puts in perspective the nature of the investigation undertaken by the SEC,
which is a requisite before a criminal case may be referred to the DOJ. The Court
declared that it is imperative that the criminal prosecution be initiated before the SEC, the
administrative agency with the special competence.
It should be noted that the SEC started investigative proceedings against the respondents
as early as 1994. This investigation effectively interrupted the prescription period.
However, said proceedings were disrupted by a preliminary injunction issued by the
Court of Appeals on 5 May 1995, which effectively enjoined the SEC from filing any
criminal, civil, or administrative case against the respondents herein.[79] Thereafter, on 20
August 1998, the appellate court issued the assailed Decision in C.A. G.R. SP. No. 37036
ordering that the writ of injunction be made permanent and prohibiting the SEC from
taking cognizance of and initiating any action against herein respondents. The SEC was
bound to comply with the aforementioned writ of preliminary injunction and writ of
injunction issued by the Court of Appeals enjoining it from continuing with the
investigation of respondents for 12 years. Any deviation by the SEC from the injunctive
writs would be sufficient ground for contempt. Moreover, any step the SEC takes in
defiance of such orders will be considered void for having been taken against an order
issued by a court of competent jurisdiction.
An investigation of the case by any other administrative or judicial body would likewise
be impossible pending the injunctive writs issued by the Court of Appeals. Given the
ruling of this Court in Baviera v. Paglinawan,[80] the DOJ itself could not have taken
cognizance of the case and conducted its preliminary investigation without a prior
determination of probable cause by the SEC. Thus, even presuming that the DOJ was not
enjoined by the Court of Appeals from conducting a preliminary investigation, any
preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ would have been a futile effort since the
SEC had only started with its investigation when respondents themselves applied for and
were granted an injunction by the Court of Appeals.
Moreover, the DOJ could not have conducted a preliminary investigation or filed a
criminal case against the respondents during the time that issues on the effectivity of
Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act and the PED Rules of Practice and
Procedure were still pending before the Court of Appeals. After the Court of Appeals
declared the aforementioned statutory and regulatory provisions invalid and, thus, no
civil, criminal or administrative case may be filed against the respondents for violations
thereof, the DOJ would have been at a loss, as there was no statutory provision which
respondents could be accused of violating.
Accordingly, it is only after this Court corrects the erroneous ruling of the Court of
Appeals in its Decision dated 20 August 1998 that either the SEC or DOJ may properly
conduct any kind of investigation against the respondents for violations of Sections 8, 30
and 36 of the Revised Securities Act. Until then, the prescription period is deemed
interrupted.
To reiterate, the SEC must first conduct its investigations and make a finding of probable
cause in accordance with the doctrine pronounced in Baviera v. Paglinawan.[81] In this
case, the DOJ was precluded from initiating a preliminary investigation since the SEC
was halted by the Court of Appeals from continuing with its investigation. Such a
situation leaves the prosecution of the case at a standstill, and neither the SEC nor the
DOJ can conduct any investigation against the respondents, who, in the first place, sought
the injunction to prevent their prosecution. All that the SEC could do in order to break
the impasse was to have the Decision of the Court of Appeals overturned, as it had done
at the earliest opportunity in this case. Therefore, the period during which the SEC was
prevented from continuing with its investigation should not be counted against it. The
law on the prescription period was never intended to put the prosecuting bodies in an
impossible bind in which the prosecution of a case would be placed way beyond their
control; for even if they avail themselves of the proper remedy, they would still be barred
from investigating and prosecuting the case.
Indubitably, the prescription period is interrupted by commencing the proceedings for the
prosecution of the accused. In criminal cases, this is accomplished by initiating the
preliminary investigation. The prosecution of offenses punishable under the Revised
Securities Act and the Securities Regulations Code is initiated by the filing of a complaint
with the SEC or by an investigation conducted by the SEC motu proprio. Only after a
finding of probable cause is made by the SEC can the DOJ instigate a preliminary
investigation. Thus, the investigation that was commenced by the SEC in 1995, soon
after it discovered the questionable acts of the respondents, effectively interrupted the
prescription period. Given the nature and purpose of the investigation conducted by the
SEC, which is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in
criminal cases, such investigation would surely interrupt the prescription period.
VI. The Court of Appeals was justified in denying SEC's Motion for Leave to Quash
SEC
Omnibus Orders dated 23 October 1995
The SEC avers that the Court of Appeals erred when it denied its Motion for Leave to
Quash SEC Omnibus Orders, dated 23 October 1995, in the light of its admission that the
PED had the sole authority to investigate the present case. On this matter, this Court
cannot agree with the SEC.
In the assailed decision, the Court of Appeals denied the SEC's Motion for Leave to
Quash SEC Omnibus Orders, since it found other issues that were more important than
whether or not the PED was the proper body to investigate the matter. Its refusal was
premised on its earlier finding that no criminal, civil, or administrative case may be filed
against the respondents under Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act, due to
the absence of any implementing rules and regulations. Moreover, the validity of the PED
Rules on Practice and Procedure was also raised as an issue. The Court of Appeals, thus,
reasoned that if the quashal of the orders was granted, then it would be deprived of the
opportunity to determine the validity of the aforementioned rules and statutory
provisions. In addition, the SEC would merely pursue the same case without the Court of
Appeals having determined whether or not it may do so in accordance with due process
requirements. Absent a determination of whether the SEC may file a case against the
respondents based on the assailed provisions of the Revised Securities Act, it would have
been improper for the Court of Appeals to grant the SEC's Motion for Leave to Quash
SEC Omnibus Orders.
In all, this Court rules that no implementing rules were needed to render effective
Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act; nor was the PED Rules of Practice
and Procedure invalid, prior to the enactment of the Securities Regulations Code, for
failure to provide parties with the right to cross-examine the witnesses presented against
them. Thus, the respondents may be investigated by the appropriate authority under the
proper rules of procedure of the Securities Regulations Code for violations of Sections 8,
30, and 36 of the Revised Securities Act.[82]
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is GRANTED. This Court

hereby REVERSES the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 20
August 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 37036 and LIFTS the permanent injunction issued
pursuant thereto. This Court further DECLARES that the investigation of the
respondents for violations of Sections 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act may be
undertaken by the proper authorities in accordance with the Securities Regulations Code.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 190487, April 13, 2011 ]
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, PETITIONER, VS. PETER SHERMAN, MICHAEL
WHELAN, TEODORO B. LINGAN, ATTY. OFELIA B. CAJIGAL AND THE
COURT OF TAX APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Mark Sensing Philippines, Inc. (MSPI) caused the importation of 255, 870,000
pieces of finished bet slips and 205, 200 rolls of finished thermal papers from June 2005
to January 2007. MSPI facilitated the release of the shipment from the Clark Special
Economic Zone (CSEZ), where it was brought, to the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office (PCSO) for its lotto operations in Luzon. MSPI did not pay duties or taxes,
however, prompting the Bureau of Customs (petitioner) to file, under its Run After The
Smugglers (RATS) Program, a criminal complaint before the Department of Justice
against herein respondents MSPI Chairman Peter Sherman, Managing Director Michael
Whelan, Country Manager Atty. Ofelia B. Cajigal and Finance Manager and Corporate
Secretary Teodoro B. Lingan, along with Erick B. Ariarte and Ricardo J. Ebuna and
Eugenio Pasco, licensed customs broker who acted as agents of MSPI, for violation of
Section 3601[1] vis-à-vis Sections 2530 (f) and (l) 5[2] and 101 (f)[3] of the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines, as amended and Republic Act No. 7916. [4]
State Prosecutor Rohaira Lao-Tamano, by Resolution of March 25, 2008, [5] found

probable cause against respondents and accordingly recommended the filing of
Information against them.
Respondents filed a petition for review [6] before the Secretary of Justice during the
pendency of which the Information was filed on April 11, 2009 before the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA),[7] the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about June 2005 to December 2007, in Manila City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, in conspiracy with one
another, made forty (40) unlawful importations of 255, 870 pieces of finished printed
bet slips and 205, 200 rolls of finished thermal papers from Australia valued at
approximately One Million Two Hundred Forty Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty US
Dollars & Fourteen Cents (US$1,240,880.14), and caused the removal of said imported
articles from the Clark Special Economic Zone and delivery thereof to the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Offices without payment of its corresponding duties and taxes
estimated at around Fifteen Million Nine Hundred Seventeen Thousand Six Hundred
Eleven Pesos and Eighty Three Cents (Php15,917,611.83) in violation of Section 3601 in
relation to Sections 2530 and 101 paragraph (f) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines to the damage and prejudice of herein complainant.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
Only respondents Cajigal and Lingan were served warrants of arrest following which
they posted cash bail bonds.
By Resolution of March 20, 2009,[9] the Secretary of Justice reversed the State

Prosecutor's Resolution and accordingly directed the withdrawal of the Information.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied by Resolution of April 29,
2009,[10] it elevated the case by certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA
GR SP No. 10-9431.[11]
In the meantime, Prosecutor Lao-Tamano filed before the CTA a Motion to Withdraw
Information with Leave of Court [12] to which petitioner filed an Opposition. [13]
Respondents, on their part, moved for the dismissal of the Information.
The CTA, by the herein assailed Resolution of September 3, 2009, [14] granted the
withdrawal of, and accordingly dismissed the Information.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration filed on September 22, 2009 [15] was Noted
Without Action by the CTA by Resolution of October 14, 2009, viz:
Considering that an Entry of Judgment was already issued in this case on

September 23, 2009, no Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated September
3, 2009 having been filed by State Prosecutor Rohairah Lao-Tamano of the Department
of Justice; the "Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 3 September 2009"
filed on September 22, 2009 by Atty. Christopher F.C. Bolastig of the Bureau of Customs
is NOTED, without action.
SO ORDERED.[16] (emphasis partly in the original and partly supplied)
Hence, petitioner's present petition for certiorari. [17]
The petition is bereft of merit.
It is well-settled that prosecution of crimes pertains to the executive department of the

government whose principal power and responsibility is to insure that laws are faithfully
executed. Corollary to this power is the right to prosecute violators. [18]
All criminal actions commenced by complaint or information are prosecuted under the
direction and control of public prosecutors. [19] In the prosecution of special laws, the
exigencies of public service sometimes require the designation of special prosecutors
from different government agencies to assist the public prosecutor. The designation
does not, however, detract from the public prosecutor having control and supervision
over the case.
As stated in the above-quoted ratio of the October 14, 2009 Resolution of the CTA, it
noted without action petitioner's motion for reconsideration, entry of judgment having
been made as no Motion for Execution was filed by the State Prosecutor.
By merely noting without action petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the CTA did not
gravely abuse its discretion. For, as stated earlier, a public prosecutor has control and
supervision over the cases. The participation in the case of a private complainant, like
petitioner, is limited to that of a witness, both in the criminal and civil aspect of the
case.
Parenthetically, petitioner is not represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
in instituting the present petition, which contravenes established doctrine [20] that "the
OSG shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation,
or matter requiring the services of lawyers." [21]
IN FINE, as petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the challenged CTA Resolution did
not bear the imprimatur of the public prosecutor to which the control of the
prosecution of the case belongs, the present petition fails.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 181658, August 07, 2013 ]
LEE PUE LIONG A.K.A. PAUL LEE, PETITIONER, VS. CHUA PUE CHIN
LEE, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a petition [1] for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking the reversal of the May 31, 2007
Decision[2] and the January 31, 2008 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 81510. The CA affirmed the Orders [4] dated August 15, 2003 and November 5,
2003 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila denying (a) the Omnibus
Motion[5] for the exclusion of a private prosecutor in the two criminal cases for perjury
pending before the MeTC, and (b) the Motion for Reconsideration [6] of the said order
denying the Omnibus Motion, respectively.
The facts follow:
Petitioner Lee Pue Liong, a.k.a. Paul Lee, is the President of Centillion Holdings, Inc.
(CHI), a company affiliated with the CKC Group of Companies (CKC Group) which
includes the pioneer company Clothman Knitting Corporation (CKC). The CKC Group is
the subject of intra-corporate disputes between petitioner and his siblings, including
herein respondent Chua Pue Chin Lee, a majority stockholder and Treasurer of CHI.
On July 19, 1999, petitioner’s siblings including respondent and some unidentified
persons took over and barricaded themselves inside the premises of a factory owned by
CKC. Petitioner and other factory employees were unable to enter the factory premises.
This incident led to the filing of Criminal Case Nos. 971-V-99, 55503 to 55505 against
Nixon Lee and 972-V-99 against Nixon Lee, Andy Lee, Chua Kipsi a.k.a. Jensen Chua and
respondent, which are now pending in different courts in Valenzuela City. [7]
On June 14, 1999, petitioner on behalf of CHI (as per the Secretary’s Certificate [8] issued
by Virginia Lee on even date) caused the filing of a verified Petition [9] for the Issuance of
an Owner’s Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 232238 [10] which
covers a property owned by CHI. The case was docketed as LRC Record No. 4004 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 4. Petitioner submitted before the said
court an Affidavit of Loss[11] stating that: (1) by virtue of his position as President of CHI,
he had in his custody and possession the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 232238
issued by the Register of Deeds for Manila; (2) that said owner’s copy of TCT No. 232238
was inadvertently lost or misplaced from his files and he discovered such loss in May
1999; (3) he exerted diligent efforts in locating the said title but it had not been found
and is already beyond recovery; and (4) said title had not been the subject of mortgage
or used as collateral for the payment of any obligation with any person, credit or
banking institution. Petitioner likewise testified in support of the foregoing averments
during an ex-parte proceeding. In its Order[12] dated September 17, 1999, the RTC
granted the petition and directed the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue a new
Owner’s Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 232238 in lieu of the lost one.
Respondent, joined by her brother Nixon Lee, filed an Omnibus Motion praying, among
others, that the September 17, 1999 Order be set aside claiming that petitioner knew
fully well that respondent was in possession of the said Owner’s Duplicate Copy, the
latter being the Corporate Treasurer and custodian of vital documents of CHI.
Respondent added that petitioner merely needs to have another copy of the title
because he planned to mortgage the same with the Planters Development Bank.
Respondent even produced the Owner’s Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 232238 in open
court. Thus, on November 12, 1999, the RTC recalled and set aside its September 17,
1999 Order.[13]
In a Complaint-Affidavit[14] dated May 9, 2000 filed before the City Prosecutor of Manila,

respondent alleged the following:
1. I am a stockholder, Board Member, and duly elected treasurer of Centillion
Holdings, Inc. (CHI), which corporation is duly organized and existing under Philippine
laws.
2. As duly elected treasurer of CHI, I was tasked with the custody and safekeeping of all
vital financial documents including bank accounts, securities, and land titles.
3. Among the land titles in my custody was the Owner’s Duplicate copy of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 232238 registered in the name of CHI.
4. On June 14, 1999, Lee Pue Liong, a.k.a. Paul Lee, filed a VERIFIED PETITION for the
issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of the aforementioned certificate claiming
under oath that said duplicate copy was in his custody but was lost.
x x x x
5. Paul Lee likewise executed an affidavit of loss stating the same fact of loss, which
affidavit he used and presented as exhibit “D”.
x x x x
6. On August 18, 1999, Paul Lee testified under oath that TCT No. 232238 was
inadvertently lost and misplaced from his files.
x x x x
7. Paul Lee made a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood in his verified petition,
affidavit and testimony, as he perfectly knew that I was in possession of the owner’s
duplicate copy of TCT No. 232238.
8. I and my brother Nixon Lee opposed the petition of Paul Lee and even produced in
open court the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 232238.
Such fact was contained in the Order of Branch 4, RTC, Manila, dated November 12,
1999, x x x.
9. I and Paul Lee are involved in an intra-corporate dispute, which dispute is now
pending with the SEC.
10. Paul Lee needed to have a new owner’s duplicate of the aforementioned TCT so that
he could mortgage the property covered thereby with the Planters Development Bank,
even without my knowledge and consent as well as the consent and knowledge of my
brother Nixon Lee who is likewise a shareholder, board member and officer of CHI.
11. If not for the timely discovery of the petition of Paul Lee, with his perjurious
misrepresentation, a new owner’s duplicate could have been issued.
x x x x[15] (Italics supplied.)
On June 7, 2000, respondent executed a Supplemental Affidavit [16] to clarify that
she was accusing petitioner of perjury allegedly committed on the following occasions:
(1) by declaring in the VERIFICATION the veracity of the contents in his petition filed
with the RTC of Manila concerning his claim that TCT No. 232238 was in his possession
but was lost; (2) by declaring under oath in his affidavit of loss that said TCT was lost;
and (3) by testifying under oath that the said TCT was inadvertently lost from his files.
The Investigating Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the case. However, in the
Review Resolution[17] dated December 1, 2000 issued by First Assistant City Prosecutor
Eufrosino A. Sulla, the recommendation to dismiss the case was set aside. Thereafter,
said City Prosecutor filed the Informations [18] docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 352270-71
CR for perjury, punishable under Article 183[19] of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
against petitioner before the MeTC of Manila, Branch 28.
At the trial, Atty. Augusto M. Macam appeared as counsel for respondent and as private
prosecutor with the consent and under the control and supervision of the public
prosecutor. After the prosecution’s presentation of its first witness in the person of Atty.
Ronaldo Viesca, Jr.,[20] a lawyer from the Land Registration Authority, petitioner’s
counsel moved in open court that respondent and her lawyer in this case should be
excluded from participating in the case since perjury is a public offense. Said motion was
vehemently opposed by Atty. Macam. [21] In its Order[22] dated May 7, 2003, the MeTC
gave both the defense and the prosecution the opportunity to submit their motion and
comment respectively as regards the issue raised by petitioner’s counsel.
Complying with the MeTC’s directive, petitioner filed the aforementioned Omnibus
Motion[23] asserting that in the crime of perjury punishable under Article 183 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, there is no mention of any private offended party.
As such, a private prosecutor cannot intervene for the prosecution in this case.
Petitioner argued that perjury is a crime against public interest as provided under
Section 2, Chapter 2, Title IV, Book 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, where the
offended party is the State alone. Petitioner posited that there being no allegation of
damage to private interests, a private prosecutor is not needed. On the other hand, the
Prosecution filed its Opposition[24] to petitioner’s Omnibus Motion.
The MeTC denied the Omnibus Motion in the Order [25] dated August 15, 2003, as
follows:
[W]hile criminal actions, as a rule, are prosecuted under the direction and control
of the public prosecutor, however, an offended party may intervene in the proceeding,
personally or by attorney, especially in cases of offenses which cannot be prosecuted
except at the instance of the offended party. The only exception to this rule is when the
offended party waives his right to [file the] civil action or expressly reserves his right to
institute it after the termination of the case, in which case he loses his right to intervene
upon the theory that he is deemed to have lost his interest in its prosecution. And, in
any event, whenever an offended party intervenes in the prosecution of a criminal
action, his intervention must always be subject to the direction and control of the public
prosecutor. (Lim Tek Goan vs. Yatco, 94 Phil. 197).
Apparently, the law makes no distinction between cases that are public in nature and
those that can only be prosecuted at the instance of the offended party. In either case,
the law gives to the offended party the right to intervene, personally or by counsel, and
he is deprived of such right only when he waives the civil action or reserves his right to
institute one. Such is not the situation in this case. The case at bar involves a public
crime and the private prosecution has asserted its right to intervene in the proceedings,
subject to the direction and control of the public prosecutor. [26]
The MeTC also denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. [27]
Petitioner sought relief from the CA via a petition [28] for certiorari with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Petitioner
prayed, among others, for the CA to enjoin the MeTC and respondent from enforcing
the MeTC Orders dated August 15, 2003 and November 5, 2003, and likewise to enjoin
the MeTC and respondent from further allowing the private prosecutor to participate in
the proceedings below while the instant case is pending.
By Decision[29] dated May 31, 2007, the CA ruled in favor of respondent, holding that the
presence of the private prosecutor who was under the control and supervision of the
public prosecutor during the criminal proceedings of the two perjury cases is not
proscribed by the rules. The CA ratiocinated that respondent is no stranger to the
perjury cases as she is the private complainant therein, hence, an aggrieved party.
[30]
Reiterating the MeTC’s invocation of our ruling in Lim Tek Goan v. Yatco[31] as cited by
former Supreme Court Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado in his Remedial Law
Compendium,[32] the CA ruled that “the offended party, who has neither reserved,
waived, nor instituted the civil action may intervene, and such right to intervene exists
even when no civil liability is involved.” [33]
Without passing upon the merits of the perjury cases, the CA declared that respondent’s
property rights and interests as the treasurer and a stockholder of CHI were disturbed
and/or threatened by the alleged acts of petitioner. Further, the CA opined that
petitioner’s right to a fair trial is not violated because the presence of the private
prosecutor in these cases does not exclude the presence of the public prosecutor who
remains to have the prosecuting authority, subjecting the private prosecutor to his
control and supervision.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration [34] but the CA denied it under
Resolution[35] dated January 31, 2008.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR

WHEN IT UPHELD THE RESOLUTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT THAT THERE
IS A PRIVATE OFFENDED PARTY IN THE CRIME OF PERJURY, A CRIME AGAINST PUBLIC
INTEREST; AND
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT UPHELD THE
RESOLUTIONS OF THE LOWER COURT WHICH IN TURN UPHELD THE RIGHT OF
RESPONDENT, AN ALLEGED STOCKHOLDER OF CHI, TO INTERVENE IN THE CRIMINAL
CASE FOR PERJURY AS PRIVATE COMPLAINANT ON BEHALF OF THE CORPORATION
WITHOUT ITS AUTHORITY.[36]
Petitioner claims that the crime of perjury, a crime against public interest, does
not offend any private party but is a crime which only offends the public interest in the
fair and orderly administration of laws. He opines that perjury is a felony where no civil
liability arises on the part of the offender because there are no damages to be
compensated and that there is no private person injured by the crime.
Petitioner argues that the CA’s invocation of our pronouncement in Lim Tek Goan, cited
by Justice Regalado in his book, is inaccurate since the private offended party must have
a civil interest in the criminal case in order to intervene through a private prosecutor.
Dissecting Lim Tek Goan, petitioner points out that said case involved the crime of grave
threats where Lim Tek Goan himself was one of the offended parties. Thus, even if the
crime of grave threats did not have any civil liability to be satisfied, petitioner claims
that Lim Tek Goan, as a matter of right, may still intervene because he was one of the
offended parties.
Petitioner submits that the MeTC erred in allowing the private prosecutor to represent
respondent in this case despite the fact that the latter was not the offended party and
did not suffer any damage as she herself did not allege nor claim in her Complaint-
Affidavit and Supplemental Affidavit that she or CHI suffered any damage that may be
satisfied through restitution,[37] reparation for the damage caused[38] and indemnification
for consequential damages.[39] Lastly, petitioner asserts that respondent is not the
proper offended party that may intervene in this case as she was not authorized by CHI.
Thus, he prayed, among others, that Atty. Macam or any private prosecutor for that
matter be excluded from the prosecution of the criminal cases, and that all proceedings
undertaken wherein Atty. Macam intervened be set aside and that the same be taken
anew by the public prosecutor alone. [40]
On the other hand, respondent counters that the presence and intervention of the
private prosecutor in the perjury cases are not prohibited by the rules, stressing that she
is, in fact, an aggrieved party, being a stockholder, an officer and the treasurer of CHI
and the private complainant. Thus, she submits that pursuant to our ruling in Lim Tek
Goan she has the right to intervene even if no civil liability exists in this case. [41]
The petition has no merit.
Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate of
our law that “[e]very person criminally liable x x x is also civilly liable.”[42] Underlying this
legal principle is the traditional theory that when a person commits a crime, he offends
two entities, namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity, called the
State, whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose
person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or damaged by
the same punishable act or omission. [43]
Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.—(a) When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
For the recovery of civil liability in the criminal action, the appearance of a private
prosecutor is allowed under Section 16 of Rule 110:
SEC. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action.—Where the civil
action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule
111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense.
Section 12, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended,
defines an offended party as “the person against whom or against whose property the
offense was committed.” In Garcia v. Court of Appeals,[44] this Court rejected petitioner’s
theory that it is only the State which is the offended party in public offenses like bigamy.
We explained that from the language of Section 12, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, it is
reasonable to assume that the offended party in the commission of a crime, public or
private, is the party to whom the offender is civilly liable, and therefore the private
individual to whom the offender is civilly liable is the offended party.
In Ramiscal, Jr. v. Hon. Sandiganbayan,[45] we also held that

Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
offended party may also be a private individual whose person, right, house, liberty or
property was actually or directly injured by the same punishable act or omission of the
accused, or that corporate entity which is damaged or injured by the delictual acts
complained of. Such party must be one who has a legal right; a substantial interest in
the subject matter of the action as will entitle him to recourse under the substantive
law, to recourse if the evidence is sufficient or that he has the legal right to the demand
and the accused will be protected by the satisfaction of his civil liabilities. Such interest
must not be a mere expectancy, subordinate or inconsequential. The interest of the
party must be personal; and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional
right of some third and unrelated party.[46] (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the statement of petitioner regarding his custody of TCT No. 232238
covering CHI’s property and its loss through inadvertence, if found to be perjured is,
without doubt, injurious to respondent’s personal credibility and reputation insofar as
her faithful performance of the duties and responsibilities of a Board Member and
Treasurer of CHI. The potential injury to the corporation itself is likewise undeniable as
the court-ordered issuance of a new owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 232238 was only
averted by respondent’s timely discovery of the case filed by petitioner in the RTC.
Even assuming that no civil liability was alleged or proved in the perjury case being tried
in the MeTC, this Court declared in the early case of Lim Tek Goan v. Yatco,[47] cited by
both MeTC and CA, that whether public or private crimes are involved, it is erroneous
for the trial court to consider the intervention of the offended party by counsel as
merely a matter of tolerance. Thus, where the private prosecution has asserted its right
to intervene in the proceedings, that right must be respected. The right reserved by the
Rules to the offended party is that of intervening for the sole purpose of enforcing the
civil liability born of the criminal act and not of demanding punishment of the accused.
Such intervention, moreover, is always subject to the direction and control of the public
prosecutor.[48]
In Chua v. Court of Appeals,[49] as a result of the complaint-affidavit filed by private

respondent who is also the corporation’s Treasurer, four counts of falsification of public
documents (Minutes of Annual Stockholder’s Meeting) was instituted by the City
Prosecutor against petitioner and his wife. After private respondent’s testimony was
heard during the trial, petitioner moved to exclude her counsels as private prosecutors
on the ground that she failed to allege and prove any civil liability in the case. The MeTC
granted the motion and ordered the exclusion of said private prosecutors. On certiorari
to the RTC, said court reversed the MeTC and ordered the latter to allow the private
prosecutors in the prosecution of the civil aspect of the criminal case. Petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari in the CA which dismissed his petition and affirmed the assailed
RTC ruling.
When the case was elevated to this Court, we sustained the CA in allowing the private
prosecutors to actively participate in the trial of the criminal case. Thus:
Petitioner cites the case of Tan, Jr. v. Gallardo, holding that where from the
nature of the offense or where the law defining and punishing the offense charged does
not provide for an indemnity, the offended party may not intervene in the prosecution
of the offense.
Petitioner’s contention lacks merit. Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from
crime is the fundamental postulate that every man criminally liable is also civilly liable.
When a person commits a crime he offends two entities namely (1) the society in which
he lives in or the political entity called the State whose law he has violated; and (2) the
individual member of the society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property has
been actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission. An
act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability
not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to
another. Additionally, what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the
moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by
reason of his own act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently. The
indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty
imposed by law for the commission of the crime. The civil action involves the civil
liability arising from the offense charged which includes restitution, reparation of the
damage caused, and indemnification for consequential damages.
Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the
criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in
the prosecution of the offense. Rule 111(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that, “[w]hen a criminal action is instituted, the civil action arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.”
Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right to
institute it separately, nor institute the civil action for damages arising from the
offense charged. Thus, we find that the private prosecutors can intervene in the trial of
the criminal action.
Petitioner avers, however, that respondent’s testimony in the inferior court did not
establish nor prove any damages personally sustained by her as a result of petitioner’s
alleged acts of falsification. Petitioner adds that since no personal damages were
proven therein, then the participation of her counsel as private prosecutors, who were
supposed to pursue the civil aspect of a criminal case, is not necessary and is without
basis.
When the civil action is instituted with the criminal action, evidence should be taken of
the damages claimed and the court should determine who are the persons entitled to
such indemnity. The civil liability arising from the crime may be determined in the
criminal proceedings if the offended party does not waive to have it adjudged or does
not reserve the right to institute a separate civil action against the defendant.
Accordingly, if there is no waiver or reservation of civil liability, evidence should be
allowed to establish the extent of injuries suffered.
In the case before us, there was neither a waiver nor a reservation made; nor did the
offended party institute a separate civil action. It follows that evidence should be
allowed in the criminal proceedings to establish the civil liability arising from the
offense committed, and the private offended party has the right to intervene through
the private prosecutors.[50] (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
In the light of the foregoing, we hold that the CA did not err in holding that the
MeTC committed no grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner’s motion to
exclude Atty. Macam as private prosecutor in Crim. Case Nos. 352270-71 CR.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated May
31, 2007 and the Resolution dated January 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 81510 are hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. Nos. 140576-99, December 13, 2004 ]
JOSE S. RAMISCAL, JR., PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION), ALBANO & ASSOCIATES AND
THE ASSOCIATION OF GENERALS & FLAG OFFICERS, INC.,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, of
the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, dated June 9, 1999 in Criminal Cases Nos. 25122
to 25145, and its Resolution dated October 22, 1999, denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof.
The Antecedents
The Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-
RSBS) was established in December 1973 and started its actual operations in 1976.
Created under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 361, as amended, the AFP-RSBS was
designed to establish a separate fund to guarantee continuous financial support to the
AFP military retirement system as provided for in Republic Act No. 340.[1] Under the
decree, the AFP-RSBS was to be funded from three principal sources: (a) congressional
appropriations and compulsory contributions from members of the AFP; (2) donations,
gifts, legacies, bequests and others to the system; and (3) all earnings of the system which
shall not be subject to any tax whatsoever.[2] AFP-RSBS is a government-owned or
controlled corporation (GOCC) under Rep. Act No. 9182, otherwise known as “The
Special Purpose Vehicle Act of 2002.” It is administered by the Chief of Staff of the AFP
through a Board of Trustees and Management Group.[3] Its funds are in the nature of
public funds.[4]
On December 18, 1997, Luwalhati R. Antonino, then a member of the House of

Representatives representing the First District of the Province of South Cotabato, filed a
“Complaint-Affidavit”[5] with the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao. She alleged
that anomalous real estate transactions involving the Magsaysay Park at General Santos
City and questionable payments of transfer taxes prejudicial to the government had been
entertained into between certain parties. She then requested the Ombudsman to
investigate the petitioner, Retired Brig. Gen. Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr., then President of the
AFP-RSBS,[6] together with twenty-seven (27) other persons[7] for conspiracy in
misappropriating AFP-RSBS funds and in defrauding the government millions of pesos
in capital gains and documentary stamp taxes.[8]
On January 28, 1999, after the requisite preliminary investigation, Special Prosecutor Joy
C. Rubillar-Arao filed twenty-four (24) separate Informations with the Sandiganbayan
against the petitioner and several other accused. The filing of the Informations was duly
approved by then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto. The first twelve (12) Informations
were for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 25122 to 25133. [9] All
were similarly worded, except for the names of the other accused, the dates of the
commission of the offense, and the property involved. Representative of the said
Informations is that filed in Criminal Case No. 25122, the inculpatory portion of which
reads:
That sometime on September 24, 1997, and prior, or subsequent thereto, in General
Santos City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., a high ranking public official being then the President, and
WILFREDO PABALAN, a low ranking public officer being the Project Director, both of
the AFP-RSBS, while in the performance of their official duties, taking advantage of
their official positions and committing the offense in relation to their offices, conspiring
together and confederating with NILO FLAVIANO and ALEX GUAYBAR, both private
individuals, did, there and then, willfully, unlawfully and criminally execute and/or cause
the execution of a falsified Deed of Sale covering Lot-X-4, a real property located at
General Santos City, by making it appear therein that the purchase price of the said lot is
only TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY-SEVEN THOUSAND
(P2,997,000.00) PESOS at P3,000.00 per square meter, when in truth and in fact, as all
the accused very well knew and, in fact, agreed, that the same was sold for P10,500.00
per square meter or a total of TEN MILLION FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY-NINE
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P10,489,500.00) PESOS, and use the said falsified
Deed of Sale as basis for payment of capital gains and documentary stamp taxes relative
to the sale of the subject lot in the amount of only P299,700.00 and P89,910.00,
respectively, when the capital gains, and documentary stamp and other taxes should have
been P524,475.00 and P157,342.50, respectively, thereby short-changing and causing
undue injury to the government through evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the
total amount of TWO HUNDRED NINETY-TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
SEVEN and 50/100 PESOS (P292,207.50), more or less.
On the other hand, twelve (12) other separate Informations indicted the accused for
Falsification of Public Documents, defined and penalized under paragraph 4, Article 171
of the Revised Penal Code, docketed therein as Criminal Cases Nos. 25134 to 25145.
[11]
Save with respect to the names of the other accused, the dates of the commission of
the felonies, and the property involved in each case, the Informations were, likewise,
similarly worded, representative of which is that in Criminal Case No. 25134. The
accusatory portion reads:
That on or about September 24, 1997, and sometime prior, or subsequent thereto, in
General Santos City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., a high-ranking public official being then the President,
and WILFREDO PABALAN, a low-ranking public officer being the Project Director,
both of the AFP-RSBS, while in the performance of their duties, taking advantage of their
official positions and committing the offense in relation to their offices, conspiring and
confederating with each other and with accused NILO FLAVIANO and JACK
GUIWAN, both private individuals, acting with unfaithfulness and with malicious intent,
did, there and then, willfully, unlawfully and criminally falsify a public document by
executing and/or causing to be executed a Deed of Sale for a 999-sq. m. property
particularly identified as Lot-X-5 located at General Santos City and stating therein a
purchase price of only P3,000.00 per square meter or a total of TWO MILLION NINE
HUNDRED NINETY-SEVEN THOUSAND (P2,997,000.00) PESOS when in truth and
in fact, as all the accused very well knew and, in fact, agreed, the purchase price of said
lot is P10,500.00 per square meter or a total of TEN MILLION FOUR HUNDRED
EIGHTY-NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P10,489,500.00) PESOS, thereby
perverting the truth.
On February 2, 1999, the petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss the Informations
and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest, alleging want of jurisdiction. [13] He,
likewise, filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Suspend Proceedings[14] on
February 16, 1999, because of the pendency of his motion for reinvestigation with the
Office of the Ombudsman. The Office of the Special Prosecutor opposed the said
motions.[15]
Meanwhile, pending resolution of the aforementioned motions, the law firm of Albano &
Associates filed a “Notice of Appearance”[16] as private prosecutors in all the
aforementioned cases for the Association of Generals and Flag Officers, Inc. (AGFOI)
[17]
on March 9, 1999. The notice of appearance was apparently made conformably to the
letter-request of Retired Commodore Ismael Aparri and Retired Brig. Gen. Pedro
Navarro, who are members thereof.
In a Resolution[18] dated April 5, 1999, the Sandiganbayan denied the earlier motions filed
by the petitioner for lack of merit. Consequently, a warrant of arrest against him was
issued.[19] He posted a cash bail bond for his provisional liberty.[20]
On April 6, 1999, the petitioner opposed the appearance of the law firm of Albano &
Associates as private prosecutors, contending that the charges brought against him were
purely public crimes which did not involve damage or injury to any private party; thus,
no civil liability had arisen.[21] He argued that under Section 16 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, “an offended party may be allowed to intervene through a special prosecutor
only in those cases where there is civil liability arising from the criminal offense
charged.”[22] He maintained that if the prosecution were to be allowed to prove damages,
the prosecution would thereby be proving another crime, in violation of his constitutional
right to be informed of the nature of the charge against him.
In its comment, the law firm contended that its clients, Commodore Aparri and Brig.
Gen. Navarro, were members of the AGFOI and contributors of AFP-RSBS. It alleged
that as such members-contributors, they “have been disadvantaged or deprived of their
lawful investments and residual interest at the AFP-RSBS” through the criminal acts of
the petitioner and his cohorts. It posited that its clients, not having waived the civil aspect
of the cases involved, have all the right to intervene pursuant to Section 16, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court. Moreover, the law firm averred that its appearance was in
collaboration with the Office of the Ombudsman, and that their intervention in any event,
was subject to the direction and control of the Office of the Special Prosecutor. [23]
Replying to the comment, the petitioner refuted the allegation of AGFOI that he had civil
interest in the criminal cases involved. He posited that AGFOI was neither a member nor
a beneficiary of the AFP-RSBS. Moreover, considering that it was funded partly by the
national government and individual soldiers by way of salary deductions, the AGFOI
never contributed a single centavo to the funds of the AFP-RSBS. He further averred that
AGFOI, as an organization, has a distinct personality of its own, apart from the individual
members who compose it.[24] Hence, it is of no moment if some members of AGFOI are
or have been members and beneficiaries of the AFP-RSBS.
Meanwhile, on June 6, 1999, the petitioner filed a “Motion for Reinvestigation”[25] with

the Sandiganbayan, mentioning therein his unresolved motion for reconsideration with
the Office of the Ombudsman. He prayed that the proceeding be suspended and his
arraignment deferred pending the resolution of the reinvestigation.
The Sandiganbayan granted the motion in its Order dated June 11, 1999. The fallo of the
said resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution is given 60 days from today within which to elevate its
evidence and to do whatever is appropriate on the Motion for Reconsideration dated
February 12, 1999 and supplemental motion thereof dated May 28, 1999 of accused Jose
Ramiscal, Jr. and to inform this Court within the said period as to its findings and
recommendations together with the action thereon of the Ombudsman.
As prayed for in open court by Pros. Monteroso, this authority from the Court for the
prosecution to evaluate its evidence and take such appropriate action as regards accused
Ramiscal’s subject motion shall also include the case regarding all the accused.
SO ORDERED.[26]
In the meantime, in a Resolution[27] dated June 9, 1999, the Sandiganbayan made short
shrift of the petitioner’s opposition and denied his plea for the denial of the appearance of
the law firm.[28] In justifying its resolution, the Sandiganbayan declared as follows:
Considering that the offended parties are members of the AFP-RSBS, as represented by
the two (2) flag officers, and their right may be affected by the action of the Court
resolving the criminal and civil aspects of the cases, there appears a strong legal
presumption that their appearance should not be disturbed. After all, their appearance is
subject to the direct supervision and control of the public prosecutor.[29]
The petitioner moved for a reconsideration[30] of the Sandiganbayan’s Resolution of June
9, 1999, which was opposed[31] by the prosecution. The Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution[32] denying the same on October 22, 1999.
The petitioner filed the instant petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, for
the nullification of the June 9, 1999 and October 22, 1999 Resolutions of the graft court,
and raised the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT, BY NATURE, THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL INDICTMENTS

FOR VIOLATIONS OF SECTION 3(E), REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019 AND ARTICLE
172, IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 171, OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE GIVE
RISE TO CIVIL LIABILITY IN FAVOR OF ANY PRIVATE PARTY.
II
WHETHER OR NOT AGFOI AS REPRESENTED BY ALBANO & ASSOCIATES

ARE PRIVATE INJURED PARTIES ENTITLED TO INTERVENE AS THE PRIVATE
PROSECUTOR IN THE SUBJECT CASES.[33]
In support of his petition, the petitioner reiterated the same arguments he put forth before
the Sandiganbayan.
The Special Prosecutor, for his part, avers that the remedy resorted to by the petitioner
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure was improper since the assailed
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are interlocutory in nature and not final; hence, the
remedy of the petitioner was to file a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court. He also argues that the petition is premature because the
reinvestigation of the cases had not yet been completed. On the merits of the petition, he
posits that the AGFOI is a member of the AFP-RSBS, and that its rights may be affected
by the outcome of the cases. He further alleged that the appearance of the private
prosecutor was subject to the direct supervision and control of the public prosecutor.
The petitioner, however, asserts, by way of reply, that the assailed orders of the
Sandiganbayan are final orders; hence, his recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure was proper.
The Assailed Resolutions

of the Sandiganbayan are
Interlocutory in Nature
The word interlocutory refers to something intervening between the commencement and

the end of a suit which decides some point or matter but is not a final decision of the
whole controversy. The Court distinguished a final order or resolution from an
interlocutory one in Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[34] as follows:
… A “final” judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing
more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which,
on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights
and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order
that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res adjudicata or prescription.
Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or
determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains
to be done by the Court except to await the parties’ next move (which, among others,
may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an
appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes
“final” or, to use the established and more distinctive term, “final and executory.” [35]
…
Conversely, an order that does not finally disposes of the case, and does not end the
Court’s task of adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their rights and
liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be
done by the Court, is “interlocutory,” e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under
Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a motion for extension of time to file a pleading, or
authorizing amendment thereof, or granting or denying applications for postponement, or
production or inspection of documents or things, etc. Unlike a “final” judgment or order,
which is appealable, as above pointed out, an “interlocutory” order may not be
questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from
the final judgment rendered in this case.[36]
The rule is founded on considerations of orderly procedure, to forestall useless appeals
and avoid undue inconvenience to the appealing party by having to assail orders as they
are promulgated by the court, when all such orders may be contested in a single appeal. [37]
Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only final judgments, orders or
resolutions of the Court of Appeals or Sandiganbayan may be assailed therein. The
remedy is a mode of appeal on questions of law only.[38]
In the present case, the Sandiganbayan merely resolved to allow the appearance of the
law firm of Albano & Associates as private prosecutors, on its finding that the AGFOI,
represented by Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro who were, likewise,
investors/members of the AFP-RSBS, is the offended party whose rights may be affected
by the prosecution of the criminal and civil aspects of the cases and the outcome thereof.
Furthermore, the private prosecutor is subject to the direct supervision and control of the
public prosecutor. The Sandiganbayan did not dispose of the cases on their merits, more
specifically, the guilt or innocence of the petitioner or the civil liabilities attendant to the
commission of the crimes charged. Assuming that the Ombudsman would maintain the
finding of probable cause against the petitioner after the reinvestigation of the cases, and,
thereafter, the Sandiganbayan would sustain the finding of probable cause against the
petitioner and issue warrants for his arrest, the graft court would then have to proceed to
trial, receive the evidence of the parties and render judgment on the basis thereof. The
petitioner would then have the following options: (a) to proceed to trial, and, if convicted,
file a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to this Court; or (b) to file a
petition for certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to nullify the resolutions of
the Sandiganbayan on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction in issuing the said resolutions and decision.
Nevertheless, in the interest of substantial justice, we shall treat the petition as one filed
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Dismissal of appeal purely on technical grounds is
frowned upon where the policy of the courts is to encourage hearings of appeal on their
merits. The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid technical sense, as
they are used only to help secure, not override substantial justice. If a technical and rigid
enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would be defeated. Consequently, in the
interest of justice, the instant petition for review may be treated as a special civil action
on certiorari.[39] As we held in Salinas v. NLRC,[40] a petition which should have been
brought under Rule 65 and not under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, is not an inflexible
rule. The strict application of procedural technicalities should not hinder the speedy
disposition of the case on the merits.[41]
Although there is no allegation in the petition at bar that the Sandiganbayan committed
grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, nonetheless, the
petitioner made the following averments: that the graft court arbitrarily declared the
AGFOI to be the offended party despite the plain language of the Informations and the
nature of the crimes charged; and that the graft court blatantly violated basic procedural
rules, thereby eschewing the speedy and orderly trial in the above cases. He, likewise,
averred that the Sandiganbayan had no authority to allow the entry of a party, through a
private prosecutor, which has no right to the civil liabilities of the accused arising from
the crimes charged, or where the accused has no civil liabilities at all based on the nature
of said crimes. The petitioner also faulted the Sandiganbayan for rejecting his opposition
thereto, in gross violation of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Revised
Penal Code. Indeed, such allegations are sufficient to qualify the petition as one under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. As we held in People v. Court of Appeals:[42]
The public respondent acts without jurisdiction if it does not have the legal power to
determine the case; there is excess of jurisdiction where the respondent, being clothed
with the power to determine the case, oversteps its authority as determined by law. There
is grave abuse of discretion where the public respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical,
arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be said to be equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction.[43]
Besides, unless we resolve the present petition on its merits, other parties, like the private
respondents herein, may, likewise, enter their appearance as offended parties and
participate in criminal proceedings before the Sandiganbayan.
The Appearance of
the Law Firm Albano
& Associates
The respondent law firm entered its appearance as private prosecutor for AGFOI,
purportedly upon the request of Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro,
quoted infra:
Atty. Antonio Albano
Practicing Lawyer
Albano-Irao Law Offices
Dear Atty. Albano:
We represent a number of Retired Generals and other Star Rank Officers who rightfully
claim to have been disadvantaged or deprived of our lawful investments and residual
interest at the Retirement Separation Benefit System, AFP because of alleged plunder of
the System’s Funds, Large Scale Estafa and Falsification of Public Documents.
We are requesting that you appear in our behalf as private prosecutor of our case.
Thank you very much.
(Sgd.) COMMO. ISMAEL D. APARRI

(RET)
(Sgd.) BGEN. PEDRO I. NAVARRO
(RET)[44]
As gleaned from the letter-request, the legal services of the respondent law firm were not
engaged by the AGFOI itself; it was Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro who did
so, for and in behalf of the other retired generals and star rank officers claiming to have
residual interests in or to be investors of the AFP-RSBS, the vendee of the lots subject of
the Informations against the petitioner. Moreover, there is no showing in the records that
the Board of Directors of the AGFOI, authorized them to engage the services of the
respondent law firm to represent it as private prosecutor in the above cases. Neither is
there any resolution on record issued by the Board of Directors of the AGFOI authorizing
Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro to secure the services of the respondent law
firm to represent it as the private prosecutor in said cases. If at all, the respondent law
firm is the counsel of Aparri and Navarro only.
The AGFOI and/or Commodore

Aparri and/or Brig. Gen.
Navarro Are Not the Offended
Parties in the Informations filed
Before the Sandiganbayan
The petitioner avers that the crimes charged are public offenses and, by their very nature,
do not give rise to criminal liabilities in favor of any private party. He asserts that, as
gleaned from the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 25122 to 25133 for violation of
Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, the offended party is the government because based
on the deeds of sale executed in favor of the AFP-RSBS, as vendee, it was deprived of
capital gains and the documentary stamp taxes. He contends that the Informations in
Criminal Cases Nos. 25134 to 25145, for falsification of public document under
paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, do not contain any allegation that the
AGFOI or any private party sustained any damage caused by the said falsifications. The
petitioner further argues that absent any civil liability arising from the crimes charged in
favor of AGFOI, the latter cannot be considered the offended party entitled to participate
in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. According to the petitioner, this view
conforms to Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
reads:
SEC. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action.— Where the civil action
for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the
offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense.
The petitioner posits that the AGFOI is not a member, beneficiary or contributor of the
AFP-RSBS, and that even if it were so, it would not sustain a direct and material damage
by an adverse outcome of the cases. Allowing the AGFOI to intervene would open the
floodgates to any person similarly situated to intervene in the proceedings and, thus,
frustrate the speedy, efficient and inexpensive disposition of the cases.
In his Comment, the Special Prosecutor avers that the AGFOI is entitled to intervene in
the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan because it is a member of the AFP-RSBS, whose
rights may be affected by the outcome of the cases.
The AGFOI and the respondent law firm contend that the latter has a right to intervene,
considering that such intervention would enable the members of AGFOI to assert their
rights to information and access to the official records, documents, and papers, a right
granted by no less than paragraph 7, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution. Furthermore,
the funds of the AFP-RSBS are impressed with public character because the government
provided for its initial funds, augmented from time to time by the salary contributions of
the incumbent AFP soldiers and officers.
We agree with the contention of the petitioner that the AGFOI, and even Commodore
Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro, are not the offended parties envisaged in Section 16, Rule
110, in relation to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Under Section 5, Rule 110[45] of the Rules, all criminal actions covered by a complaint or
information shall be prosecuted under the direct supervision and control of the public
prosecutor. Thus, even if the felonies or delictual acts of the accused result in damage or
injury to another, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability based on the said
criminal acts is impliedly instituted[46] and the offended party has not waived the civil
action, reserved the right to institute it separately or instituted the civil action prior to the
criminal action, the prosecution of the action inclusive of the civil action remains under
the control and supervision of the public prosecutor.[47] The prosecution of offenses is a
public function.[48] Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
offended party may intervene in the criminal action personally or by counsel, who will
act as private prosecutor for the protection of his interests and in the interest of the speedy
and inexpensive administration of justice. A separate action for the purpose would only
prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and further delay the
final disposition of the case. The multiplicity of suits must be avoided.[49] With the
implied institution of the civil action in the criminal action, the two actions are merged
into one composite proceeding, with the criminal action predominating the civil. The
prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and
others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform
and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order.
On the other hand, the sole purpose of the civil action is for the resolution, reparation or
indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by
reason of the delictual or felonious act of the accused.[50] Under Article 104 of the
Revised Penal Code, the following are the civil liabilities of the accused:
ART. 104. What is included in civil liability. – The civil liability established in Articles
100, 101, 102 and 103 of this Code includes:
1. Restitution;
2. Reparation of the damage caused;
3. Indemnification for consequential damages.
Thus, when the offended party, through counsel, has asserted his right to intervene in the
proceedings, it is error to consider his appearance merely as a matter of tolerance.[51]
The offended party may be the State or any of its instrumentalities, including local
governments or government-owned or controlled corporations, such as the AFP-RSBS,
which, under substantive laws, are entitled to restitution of their properties or funds,
reparation, or indemnification. For instance, in malversation of public funds or property
under Article 217[52] of the Revised Penal Code, frauds under Article 213[53] of the
Revised Penal Code, and violations of the Forestry Code of the Philippines, P.D. No. 705,
as amended, to mention a few, the government is the offended party entitled to the civil
liabilities of the accused. For violations of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, [54] any
party, including the government, may be the offended party if such party sustains undue
injury caused by the delictual acts of the accused. In such cases, the government is to be
represented by the public prosecutor for the recovery of the civil liability of the accused.
Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended
party may also be a private individual whose person, right, house, liberty or property
was actually or directly injured by the same punishable act or omission of the accused,
[55]
or that corporate entity which is damaged or injured by the delictual acts complained
of. Such party must be one who has a legal right; a substantial interest in the subject
matter of the action as will entitle him to recourse under the substantive law, to recourse
if the evidence is sufficient or that he has the legal right to the demand and the accused
will be protected by the satisfaction of his civil liabilities. Such interest must not be a
mere expectancy, subordinate or inconsequential. The interest of the party must be
personal; and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third
and unrelated party.[56]
Hence, even if the members of AGFOI may also be members or beneficiaries of the AFP-
RSBS, the respondent AGFOI does not have a legal right to intervene in the criminal
cases merely and solely to enforce and/or protect the constitutional right of such members
to have access to the records of AFP-RSBS. Neither are such members entitled to
intervene therein simply because the funds of the AFP-RSBS are public or government
funds. It must be stressed that any interest of the members of the AFP-RSBS over its
funds or property is merely inchoate and incidental. Such funds belong to the AFP-RSBS
which has a juridical personality separate and independent of its members/beneficiaries.
As gleaned from the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 25122 to 25133 for violation of
Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, the offended party is the government, which was
allegedly deprived by the petitioner and the other accused of the capital gains and
documentary stamp taxes, based on the actual and correct purchase price of the property
stated therein in favor of the AFP-RSBS. The AGFOI was not involved whatsoever in the
sales subject of the crimes charged; neither was it prejudiced by the said transactions, nor
is it entitled to the civil liability of the petitioner for said cases. Thus, it is not the
offended party in the said cases.
We agree with the petitioner that the AGFOI is not even the offended party in Criminal
Cases Nos. 25134 to 25145 for falsification of public documents under paragraph 4, Sec.
1, Article 171, of the Revised Penal Code. It bears stressing that in the felony of
falsification of public document, the existence of any prejudice caused to third person or
the intent to cause damage, at the very least, becomes immaterial. The controlling
consideration is the public character of a document and the violation of the public faith
and the destruction of truth therein solemnly proclaimed. The offender does not, in any
way, have civil liability to a third person.[57]
However, if, in a deed of sale, the real property covered thereby is underpriced by a
public officer and his co-conspirators to conceal the correct amount of capital gains and
documentary stamp taxes due on the sale causing undue injury to the government, the
offenders thereby commit two crimes – (a) falsification of public document defined in
paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code; and (b) violation of Section 3(e) of
Rep. Act No. 3019, a special penal law. The offender incurs civil liability to the
government as the offended party for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, but
not for falsification of public document under paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code.
On the other hand, if, under the deed of sale, the AFP-RSBS was made liable for the
payment of the capital gains and documentary stamp taxes and, thereafter, gave the
correct amount thereof to the petitioner to be paid to the government, and the petitioner
and his co-accused pocketed the difference between the correct amount of taxes and the
amount entrusted for payment, then the AFP-RSBS may be considered the offended party
entitled to intervene in the above criminal cases, through the Government Corporate
Counsel.[58]
In fine, the AGFOI is not the offended party entitled to intervene in said cases.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed

Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 196508, September 24, 2014 ]
LEONARDO A. VILLALON AND ERLINDA TALDE-VILLALON,
PETITIONERS, VS. AMELIA CHAN, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review in this petition for review on certiorari[1] the July 30, 2010 decision[2] and
April 8, 2011 resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 93807. The
CA annulled and set aside the March 3, 2006 resolution[4] and September 5, 2006
order[5] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 74, Antipolo City, which disallowed
the private offended party’s counsel from participating in the prosecution of the
petitioners for bigamy and dismissed the bigamy case filed against the petitioners,
respectively.
Factual Antecedents
On May 6, 1954, the respondent Amelia Chan married Leon Basilio Chua in a civil
ceremony solemnized by then Judge Cancio C. Garcia of the City Court of Caloocan.
The respondent claimed that her husband Leon Basilio Chua and the present petitioner,
Leonardo A. Villalon, are one and the same person.
During the subsistence of his marriage to Amelia, Leon Basilio Chua, this time under the
name of Leonardo A. Villalon, allegedly contracted a second marriage with Erlinda Talde
that took place on June 2, 1993. This marriage was solemnized by Judge Ruth C. Santos
of the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal.
Amelia, who was then living in the United States and could not personally file a case for
bigamy in the Philippines, requested Benito Yao Chua and Wilson Go to commence the
criminal proceedings against the petitioners. On September 13, 2003, a verified
complaint-affidavit[6] alleging the commission of the crime of bigamy was filed with the
Office of the City Prosecutor in Antipolo. Consequently, an Information[7] was filed with
the RTC, docketed as Criminal Case No. 05-30485. On arraignment, the petitioners
pleaded not guilty.
During the pre-trial (or on February 6, 2006), Atty. Apollo V. Atencia appeared in behalf
of Amelia, the private offended party. On February 20, 2006, Atty. Atencia formally
filed his entry of appearance[8] as private prosecutor, with the conformity and under the
control and supervision of Assistant City Prosecutor Gerardo P. Barot.
Leonardo filed an omnibus motion[9] with the RTC seeking to disqualify Atty. Atencia.
He argued that Amelia could not be represented in the bigamy case because she was not a
party to the case, as she did not file the complaint-affidavit. He also argued that Amelia
had already waived her right to file a civil and criminal case against him and his co-
defendant Erlinda. Amelia opposed the omnibus motion,[10] while the public prosecutor
joined the petitioners in disqualifying Atty. Atencia from appearing in the case. [11]
In a resolution[12] dated March 3, 2006, the RTC granted Leonardo’s omnibus motion.

Trial of the case ensued thereafter.
On March 27, 2006, Amelia filed a petition[13] for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer

for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, with the CA. In a resolution[14] dated April 19, 2006, the CA issued a
TRO enjoining further proceedings on the case.
Despite the TRO issued by the CA, trial of the bigamy case proceeded with the
presentation of the prosecution’s evidence, to which Leonardo filed a demurrer to
evidence. In an order[15] dated September 5, 2006, the RTC dismissed the bigamy case
for failure of the prosecution to prove the petitioners’ guilt.
Petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA
In her petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA, Amelia alleged grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the RTC when it issued its March 3, 2006 resolution and
proceeded with the bigamy case without permitting the participation of Atty. Atencia as
private prosecutor.
In a decision[16] dated July 30, 2010, the CA granted Amelia’s petition and annulled the
RTC’s March 3, 2006 resolution disqualifying Atty. Atencia from participation in the
case, and its September 5, 2006 order that dismissed the bigamy case against the
petitioners. The CA ruled that the crime of bigamy, being public in nature, can be
denounced by anyone, not only by the offended party, before the prosecuting authorities
without the offended party losing her right to recover damages. Thus, the CA concluded
that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it did not allow Atty.
Atencia to intervene and represent Amelia in the bigamy case and that the trial court
denied Amelia her right to due process.
Also, the CA ruled that the offended party could be deprived of the right to intervene in
the criminal case only when he or she expressly waives the civil action or reserves the
right to institute one. The CA found no such waiver from Amelia and held that Atty.
Atencia’s appearance as private prosecutor was proof enough of Amelia’s determination
to enforce her claim for damages in the bigamy case.
The CA disposed of the certiorari petition under these terms:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution dated 3 March 2006

disqualifying Petitioner’s counsel to intervene and the Order dated 5 September 2006
dismissing Criminal Case No. 05-30485 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Public
respondent is hereby inhibited from further hearing the case. This case is therefore
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City for RE-RAFFLE to another
branch and for further proceedings. The trial court and public prosecutor are ORDERED
to allow the private prosecutor subject to the latter’s control and supervision to intervene
in the proceedings in order to protect the interests of Petitioner as a complaining witness.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Petition for review on certiorari with this Court
With the denial of their motion for reconsideration[18] before the CA, the petitioners filed
the present petition for review on certiorari before this Court and raised the following
arguments:
A. The Decision of the Court of Appeals gravely transgresses the petitioners’

constitutional right to due process of law, apart from being violative of the legal
proscription against double jeopardy.
B. The Court of Appeals grossly erred in granting the petition for certiorari insofar as
the Resolution, dated 3 March 2006, of therein respondent Judge was concerned.
C. The petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 93907 is fatally defective in that, among other
things, it failed to implead the People of the Philippines as a party-respondent in
that case, hence, the same should have been dismissed outright.[19]
Our Ruling
We find no merit in the petitioners’ arguments.
First, the petitioners argue that the RTC’s September 5, 2006 order dismissing the
bigamy case against them had already become final because it was not assailed by the
respondent in her petition for certiorari before the CA. The petitioners point out that the
respondent only particularly assailed the RTC’s March 3, 2006 resolution and failed to
file a separate or amended petition for certiorari to include the September 5, 2006 order
as one of the assailed orders of the RTC. Based on this assertion, the petitioners contend
that the CA, in ordering the remand and re-raffle of the bigamy case to another RTC
branch, violates their right against double jeopardy.
The petitioners are mistaken. The review by the CA on whether the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion encompassed, not only the issuance of the March 3, 2006
resolution, but all proceedings in the bigamy case thereafter. This is apparent from the
words used by the respondent in her certiorari petition before the CA where she raised
the following supporting grounds:
1. THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

ISSUING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION DATED 03 MARCH 2006 IN
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 05-30485 WHICH HELD THAT NO CLAIM FOR
CIVIL LIABILITY WAS DEEMED INSTITUTED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE,
AND CONSEQUENTLY DISQUALIFYING THE OFFENDED PARTY’S
COUNSEL FROM PARTICIPATING IN THE TRIAL OF THE CASE;
2. THE HEARINGS OF THE BIGAMY CASE WHEREIN THE

PARTICIPATION OF THE PRIVATE PROSECUTOR IS EXPRESSLY
PROHIBITED ARE WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.[20] (Emphasis
ours)
Evidently, the CA’s review is not limited to the RTC’s March 3, 2006 resolution but also
included the September 5, 2006 order that was issued by the RTC in the course of the
proceedings on the bigamy case. Thus, the RTC’s September 5, 2006 order, which is still
the subject of review by this Court, has not attained finality and the CA’s assailed order
of remanding and re-raffling the bigamy case to another trial court would not violate the
petitioners’ right against double jeopardy.
Also, we emphasize that the RTC issued its September 5, 2006 order in defiance of the
TRO issued by the CA. The records show that the CA had issued a TRO on April 19,
2006, which should have prohibited the RTC from further proceeding on the case. But the
RTC, instead, continued with the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence and issued
the assailed September 5, 2006 order.
Under this circumstance, the RTC’s September 5, 2006 order was actually without force
and effect and would not serve as basis for the petitioners to claim that their right against
double jeopardy had been violated. The RTC, clearly, acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing its September 5, 2006 order in view of the earlier TRO issued by the
CA.
Second, the petitioners argue that the CA gravely erred when it ruled that: the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its March 3, 2006 resolution disqualifying
Atty. Atencia as private prosecutor, and that Atty. Atencia’s disqualification violated the
respondent’s rights to intervene and be heard in the bigamy case. They contend that,
even with Atty. Atencia’s disqualification, the respondent was never denied her right to
participate in the proceedings and was even called to stand as a witness but the
respondent never appeared before the court because she was out of the country during the
whole proceedings on the bigamy case.
Section 16[21] of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure[22] expressly allows
an offended party to intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense for the
recovery of civil liability where the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged is instituted with the criminal action. The civil action shall be
deemed instituted with the criminal action, except when the offended party waives the
civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action.[23]
In this case, the CA found no such waiver from or reservation made by the respondent.
The fact that the respondent, who was already based abroad, had secured the services of
an attorney in the Philippines reveals her willingness and interest to participate in the
prosecution of the bigamy case and to recover civil liability from the petitioners. Thus,
the RTC should have allowed, and should not have disqualified, Atty. Atencia from
intervening in the bigamy case as the respondent, being the offended party, is afforded by
law the right to participate through counsel in the prosecution of the offense with respect
to the civil aspect of the case.
Lastly, the petitioners argue that the respondent’s certiorari petition before the CA should
have been dismissed outright because it failed to implead the “People of the Philippines”
as a party-respondent.
The respondent’s failure to implead the “People of the Philippines” as a party-respondent

is not a fatal defect warranting the outright dismissal of her petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the CA because: (1) a petition for certiorari and prohibition under
Rule 65 is directed against any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions alleged to have acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;[24] and (2) the
petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the respondent is a special civil action
separate and independent from the bigamy case filed against the petitioners. For these
reasons, the “People of the Philippines” need not be impleaded as a party in a petition
for certiorari and prohibition.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we DENY the present petition for review

on certiorari due to lack of merit, and hereby AFFIRM the decision dated July 30, 2010
and resolution dated April 8, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93807.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 147703, April 14, 2004 ]
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted out becomes
final and executory. The employer cannot defeat the finality of the judgment by filing a
notice of appeal on its own behalf in the guise of asking for a review of its subsidiary
civil liability. Both the primary civil liability of the accused-employee and the subsidiary
civil liability of the employer are carried in one single decision that has become final and
executory.
The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the March 29, 2000[2] and the March 27, 2001[3] Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-GR CV No. 59390. Petitioner’s appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case No. 2535 was dismissed in the
first Resolution as follows:
“WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED and the
appeal is ordered DISMISSED.”[4]
The second Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.[5]
The Facts
The facts of the case are summarized by the CA in this wise:

“On July 27, 1994, accused [Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang] was found guilty and
convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple
physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of four
(4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days to six (6) years, and to pay damages as
follows:
‘a. to pay the heirs of JUSTINO TORRES the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death,
plus the sum of P25,383.00, for funeral expenses, his unearned income for one year at
P2,500.00 a month, P50,000.00 as indemnity for the support of Renato Torres, and the
further sum of P300,000.00 as moral damages;
‘b. to the heirs of ESTRELLA VELERO, the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death, the
sum of P237,323.75 for funeral expenses, her unearned income for three years at
P45,000.00 per annum, and the further sum of P1,000,000.00 as moral damages and
P200,000.00 as attorney’s fees[;]
‘c. to the heirs of LORNA ANCHETA, the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death, the
sum of P22,838.00 as funeral expenses, the sum of P20,544.94 as medical expenses and her
loss of income for 30 years at P1,000.00 per month, and the further sum of P100,000.00 for
moral damages;
‘d. to MAUREEN BRENNAN, the sum of P229,654.00 as hospital expenses, doctor’s fees of
P170,000.00 for the orthopedic surgeon, P22,500.00 for the [n]eurologist, an additional
indemnity [of] at least P150,000.00 to cover future correction of deformity of her limbs, and
moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00;
‘e. to ROSIE BALAJO, the sum of P3,561.46 as medical expenses, P2,000.00 as loss of
income, and P25,000.00 as moral damages;
‘f. to TERESITA TAMONDONG, the sum of P19,800.47 as medical expenses, P800.00 for
loss of income, and P25,000.00 as moral damages;
‘g. to JULIANA TABTAB, the amount of P580.81 as medical expenses, P4,600.00 as actual
damages and her loss earnings of P1,400.00 as well as moral damages in the amount of
P10,000.00;
‘h. to MIGUEL ARQUITOLA, the sum of P12,473.82 as hospital expenses, P14,530.00 as
doctor’s fees, P1,000.00 for medicines and P50,000.00 as moral damages;
‘i. to CLARITA CABANBAN, the sum of P155.00 for medical expenses, P87.00 for
medicines, P1,710.00 as actual damages and P5,000.00 as moral damages;
‘j. to MARIANO CABANBAN, the sum of P1,395.00 for hospital bills, P500.00 for medicine,
P2,100.00 as actual damages, P1,200.00 for loss of income and P5,000.00 as moral
damages;
‘k. to La Union Electric Company as the registered owner of the Toyota Hi-Ace Van, the
amount of P250,000.00 as actual damages for the cost of the totally wrecked vehicle; to the
owner of the jeepney, the amount of P22,698.38 as actual damages;’
“The court further ruled that [petitioner], in the event of the insolvency of accused, shall
be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused
had become final and executory.
“Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. It is worth mention[ing]
that Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of appeal when
appellant jumps bail. Counsel for accused, also admittedly hired and provided by
[petitioner], filed a notice of appeal which was denied by the trial court. We affirmed the
denial of the notice of appeal filed in behalf of accused.
“Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, [petitioner] filed its notice of appeal from the
judgment of the trial court. On April 29, 1997, the trial court gave due course to
[petitioner’s] notice of appeal. On December 8, 1998, [petitioner] filed its brief. On
December 9, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General received [a] copy of [petitioner’s]
brief. On January 8, 1999, the OSG moved to be excused from filing [respondents’] brief
on the ground that the OSG’s authority to represent People is confined to criminal cases
on appeal. The motion was however denied per Our resolution of May 31, 1999. On
March 2, 1999, [respondent]/private prosecutor filed the instant motion to
dismiss.”[6] (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil
action arising from the offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case against the
accused-employee, the employer’s subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of
the Revised Penal Code becomes conclusive and enforceable.
The appellate court further held that to allow an employer to dispute independently the
civil liability fixed in the criminal case against the accused-employee would be to amend,
nullify or defeat a final judgment. Since the notice of appeal filed by the accused had
already been dismissed by the CA, then the judgment of conviction and the award of civil
liability became final and executory. Included in the civil liability of the accused was the
employer’s subsidiary liability.
Hence, this Petition.[7]
The Issues
Petitioner states the issues of this case as follows:
“A. Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-
employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused.
“B. Whether or not the doctrines of Alvarez v. Court of Appeals (158 SCRA 57)
and Yusay v. Adil (164 SCRA 494) apply to the instant case.”[8]
There is really only one issue. Item B above is merely an adjunct to Item A.
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Propriety of Appeal by the Employer
Pointing out that it had seasonably filed a notice of appeal from the RTC Decision,
petitioner contends that the judgment of conviction against the accused-employee has not
attained finality. The former insists that its appeal stayed the finality, notwithstanding the
fact that the latter had jumped bail. In effect, petitioner argues that its appeal takes the
place of that of the accused-employee.
We are not persuaded.
Appeals in Criminal Cases
Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states thus:
“Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed
in double jeopardy.”
Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a criminal case, but the
government may do so only if the accused would not thereby be placed in double
jeopardy.[9] Furthermore, the prosecution cannot appeal on the ground that the accused
should have been given a more severe penalty.[10] On the other hand, the offended parties
may also appeal the judgment with respect to their right to civil liability. If the accused
has the right to appeal the judgment of conviction, the offended parties should have the
same right to appeal as much of the judgment as is prejudicial to them. [11]
Appeal by the Accused

Who Jumps Bail
Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle that the appellate court may, upon
motion or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail.
The second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 124 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:
“The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss
the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a
foreign country during the pendency of the appeal.”[12]
This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in court when they
abscond. Unless they surrender or submit to the court’s jurisdiction, they are deemed to
have waived their right to seek judicial relief.[13]
Moreover, this doctrine applies not only to the accused who jumps bail during the appeal,
but also to one who does so during the trial. Justice Florenz D. Regalado succinctly
explains the principle in this wise:
“x x x. When, as in this case, the accused escaped after his arraignment and during the
trial, but the trial in absentia proceeded resulting in the promulgation of a judgment
against him and his counsel appealed, since he nonetheless remained at large his appeal
must be dismissed by analogy with the aforesaid provision of this Rule [Rule 124, §8 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure]. x x x”[14]
The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they voluntarily submit to the
jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of the
judgment against them.[15] While at large, they cannot seek relief from the court, as they
are deemed to have waived the appeal.[16]
Finality of a Decision
in a Criminal Case
As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is explained in Section 7 of Rule 120

of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which we quote:
“A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside
before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is
imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal,
or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused
has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation.”
In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the
proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the
judgment against him has become final and executory.[17]
Liability of an Employer
in a Finding of Guilt
Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil liabilities of innkeepers,
as follows:
“In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other
persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their
establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or
special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.
“Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft
within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for payment of the value thereof,
provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the
person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall
furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may
have given them with respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall
attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons unless
committed by the innkeeper’s employees.”
Moreover, the foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers, according to Article
103 which reads:
“The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to
employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for
felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the
discharge of their duties.”
Having laid all these basic rules and principles, we now address the main issue raised by
petitioner.
Civil Liability Deemed Instituted

in the Criminal Prosecution
At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified
what civil actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

“When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
“x x x x x x x x x”
Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly
instituted in a criminal action, that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action.
[18]
Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction
meted out to the employee.[19]
It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving independent civil
actions and allowed these to proceed separately from criminal actions. Thus, the civil
actions referred to in Articles 32,[20] 33,[21]34[22] and 2176[23] of the Civil Code shall remain
“separate, distinct and independent” of any criminal prosecution based on the same act.
Here are some direct consequences of such revision and omission:
1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need not be
reserved in the criminal prosecution, since they are not deemed included therein.
2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil action arising from
the crime charged does not extinguish the right to bring such action.
3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than once for
the same act or omission.[24]
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from
the crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities arising from
quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately,
the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party
may --subject to the control of the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action, in
order to protect the remaining civil interest therein.[25]
This discussion is completely in accord with the Revised Penal Code, which states that
“[e]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.”[26]
Petitioner argues that, as an employer, it is considered a party to the criminal case and is
conclusively bound by the outcome thereof. Consequently, petitioner must be accorded
the right to pursue the case to its logical conclusion -- including the appeal.
The argument has no merit. Undisputedly, petitioner is not a direct party to the criminal
case, which was filed solely against Napoleon M. Roman, its employee.
In its Memorandum, petitioner cited a comprehensive list of cases dealing with the
subsidiary liability of employers. Thereafter, it noted that none can be applied to it,
because “in all th[o]se cases, the accused’s employer did not interpose an
appeal.”[27] Indeed, petitioner cannot cite any single case in which the employer appealed,
precisely because an appeal in such circumstances is not possible.
The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that,
strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their
employees.[28] Although in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact
should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. While they may assist their
employees to the extent of supplying the latter’s lawyers, as in the present case, the
former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.
Waiver of Constitutional Safeguard

Against Double Jeopardy
Petitioner’s appeal obviously aims to have the accused-employee absolved of his criminal
responsibility and the judgment reviewed as a whole. These intentions are apparent from
its Appellant’s Brief[29] filed with the CA and from its Petition[30] before us, both of which
claim that the trial court’s finding of guilt “is not supported by competent evidence.”[31]
An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver of the constitutional
safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to a review by the
appellate court. The latter is then called upon to render judgment as law and justice
dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the appellant.[32] This is the risk involved
when the accused decides to appeal a sentence of conviction. [33] Indeed, appellate courts
have the power to reverse, affirm or modify the judgment of the lower court and to
increase or reduce the penalty it imposed.[34]
If the present appeal is given course, the whole case against the accused-employee
becomes open to review. It thus follows that a penalty higher than that which has already
been imposed by the trial court may be meted out to him. Petitioner’s appeal would thus
violate his right against double jeopardy, since the judgment against him could become
subject to modification without his consent.
We are not in a position to second-guess the reason why the accused effectively waived
his right to appeal by jumping bail. It is clear, though, that petitioner may not appeal
without violating his right against double jeopardy.
Effect of Absconding
on the Appeal Process
Moreover, within the meaning of the principles governing the prevailing criminal
procedure, the accused impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping bail and thereby made
the judgment of the court below final.[35] Having been a fugitive from justice for a long
period of time, he is deemed to have waived his right to appeal. Thus, his conviction is
now final and executory. The Court in People v. Ang Gioc[36] ruled:
“There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused
himself, but the right of appeal is not one of them. This right is granted solely for the
benefit of the accused. He may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either
expressly or by implication. When the accused flees after the case has been submitted to
the court for decision, he will be deemed to have waived his right to appeal from the
judgment rendered against him. x x x.”[37]
By fleeing, the herein accused exhibited contempt of the authority of the court and placed
himself in a position to speculate on his chances for a reversal. In the process, he kept
himself out of the reach of justice, but hoped to render the judgment nugatory at his
option.[38] Such conduct is intolerable and does not invite leniency on the part of the
appellate court.[39]
Consequently, the judgment against an appellant who escapes and who refuses to
surrender to the proper authorities becomes final and executory.[40]
Thus far, we have clarified that petitioner has no right to appeal the criminal case against
the accused-employee; that by jumping bail, he has waived his right to appeal; and that
the judgment in the criminal case against him is now final.
Subsidiary Liability Upon

Finality of Judgment
As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Petitioner argues
that the rulings of this Court in Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc.,[41] Alvarez v.
CA[42] and Yusay v. Adil[43] do not apply to the present case, because it has followed the
Court’s directive to the employers in these cases to take part in the criminal cases against
their employees. By participating in the defense of its employee, herein petitioner tries to
shield itself from the undisputed rulings laid down in these leading cases.
Such posturing is untenable. In dissecting these cases on subsidiary liability, petitioner

lost track of the most basic tenet they have laid down -- that an employer’s liability in a
finding of guilt against its accused-employee is subsidiary.
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the
adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the latter’s insolvency.
[44]
The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability -- Articles 102 and
103 -- are deemed written into the judgments in the cases to which they are applicable.
[45]
Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly
pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer.
In the absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the offended party,
the judgment of conviction should bind the person who is subsidiarily liable.[46] In effect
and implication, the stigma of a criminal conviction surpasses mere civil liability.[47]
To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable
them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court.[48] By
the same token, to allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of their employees
without the latter’s consent would also result in improperly amending, nullifying or
defeating the judgment.
The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon
the employer not only with regard to the former’s civil liability, but also with regard to its
amount. The liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the employee.[49]
Before the employers’ subsidiary liability is exacted, however, there must be adequate
evidence establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of the convicted employees;
(2) that the former are engaged in some kind of industry; (3) that the crime was
committed by the employees in the discharge of their duties; and (4) that the execution
against the latter has not been satisfied due to insolvency.[50]
The resolution of these issues need not be done in a separate civil action. But the
determination must be based on the evidence that the offended party and the employer
may fully and freely present. Such determination may be done in the same criminal
action in which the employee’s liability, criminal and civil, has been pronounced;[51] and
in a hearing set for that precise purpose, with due notice to the employer, as part of the
proceedings for the execution of the judgment.
Just because the present petitioner participated in the defense of its accused-employee
does not mean that its liability has transformed its nature; its liability remains subsidiary.
Neither will its participation erase its subsidiary liability. The fact remains that since the
accused-employee’s conviction has attained finality, then the subsidiary liability of the
employer ipso facto attaches.
According to the argument of petitioner, fairness dictates that while the finality of
conviction could be the proper sanction to be imposed upon the accused for jumping bail,
the same sanction should not affect it. In effect, petitioner-employer splits this case into
two: first, for itself; and second, for its accused-employee.
The untenability of this argument is clearly evident. There is only one criminal case
against the accused-employee. A finding of guilt has both criminal and civil aspects. It is
the height of absurdity for this single case to be final as to the accused who jumped bail,
but not as to an entity whose liability is dependent upon the conviction of the former.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil
liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final
and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the former’s subsidiary civil liability has also
become immediately enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of
subsidiary liability is highly contingent on the imposition of the primary civil liability.
No Deprivation
of Due Process
As to the argument that petitioner was deprived of due process, we reiterate that what is
sought to be enforced is the subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon the
employee’s criminal negligence. In other words, the employer becomes ipso
facto subsidiarily liable upon the conviction of the employee and upon proof of the
latter’s insolvency, in the same way that acquittal wipes out not only his primary civil
liability, but also his employer’s subsidiary liability for his criminal negligence.[52]
It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due
process.[53] It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin, a remedy that may be
exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing such
exercise.[54] Hence, the legal requirements must be strictly complied with.[55]
It would be incorrect to consider the requirements of the rules on appeal as merely

harmless and trivial technicalities that can be discarded.[56] Indeed, deviations from the
rules cannot be tolerated.[57] In these times when court dockets are clogged with numerous
litigations, such rules have to be followed by parties with greater fidelity, so as to
facilitate the orderly disposition of those cases.[58]
After a judgment has become final, vested rights are acquired by the winning party. If the
proper losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, then the
former has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case.[59]
In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accused-employee, it participated in the

proceedings before the RTC; thus, it cannot be said that the employer was deprived of
due process. It might have lost its right to appeal, but it was not denied its day in court.
[60]
In fact, it can be said that by jumping bail, the accused-employee, not the court,
deprived petitioner of the right to appeal.
All told, what is left to be done is to execute the RTC Decision against the accused. It
should be clear that only after proof of his insolvency may the subsidiary liability of
petitioner be enforced. It has been sufficiently proven that there exists an employer-
employee relationship; that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry; and that
the employee has been adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed
the offense in the discharge of his duties. The proof is clear from the admissions of
petitioner that “[o]n 26 August 1990, while on its regular trip from Laoag to Manila, a
passenger bus owned by petitioner, being then operated by petitioner’s driver, Napoleon
Roman, figured in an accident in San Juan, La Union x x x.”[61] Neither does petitioner
dispute that there was already a finding of guilt against the accused while he was in the
discharge of his duties.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed

Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 58595, October 10, 1983 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. RICARDO M.
ILARDE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, CFI OF ILOILO, BR.
V, CECILE SANTIBAÑEZ AND AVELINO T. JAVELLANA,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
ESCOLIN, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari of the order of the then Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Iloilo, Branch V, presided by the respondent Judge Ricardo
M. Ilarde, granting the motion to quash the information in Criminal Case No. 13086,
entitled, "People of the Philippines, plaintiff, versus
Cecile Santibañez and Avelino T. Javellana, accused."
The information in Criminal Case No. 13086 was filed on March 4, 1981 by City Fiscal
Ricardo P. Galvez. It reads:
"The undersigned City Fiscal upon sworn complaint originally filed by the
offended party Efraim Santibañez, copies of which are thereto attached as Annexes 'A'
and 'B’ hereby accused CECILE SANTIBAÑEZ and AVELINO T. JAVELLANA of the crime of
adultery, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 3rd day of November, 1980, in the City of Iloilo, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused Cecile Santibañez being lawfully
married to Efraim Santibañez, which marriage at that time has not been legally
dissolved, with deliberate intent, did then and there wilfully, maliciously and criminally
have sexual intercourse with her co-accused Avelino T. Javellana, a man not her
husband and who in turn knowing fully well that his co-accused was then lawfully
married to Efraim Santibañez, did then and there wilfully, maliciously and criminally
have sexual intercourse with her.
"CONTRARY TO LAW. [1]
Annex "A" referred to in the information is the sworn complaint for adultery filed
by Efraim Santibañez against herein private respondents,
Cecile Santibañez and Avelino T. Javellana, with the Integrated National Police, Iloilo
Metro Police District, Iloilo City, on November 4, 1980, which complaint was
immediately forwarded to the Office of the City Fiscal for preliminary investigation. Said
complaint reads:
"C O M P L A I N T
"The undersigned accuses ATTY. AVELINO JAVELLANA, a resident of CPU

Compound, Jaro, Iloilo City, and Cecile Santibañez, a resident
of Candido Subdivision, Iloilo City, for the crime of adultery x x x
xxx xxx xxx
(Sgd.) EFRAIM SANTIBAÑEZ
(Signature of complainant)
"SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 4th day of November, 1980 in the
City of Iloilo.
(Sgd.) RICARDO P. GALVEZ
City Fiscal"
Annex "B" of the information is the affidavit-complaint dated November 6,

1980 executed by Efraim Santibañez, sworn to and filed before City
Fiscal Galvez on November 7, 1980, wherein Santibañez recounted in detail the
antecedents which brought about the apprehension in flagrante of private respondents.
The same is quoted as follows:
"I, EFRAIM SANTIBAÑEZ, of age, married, and a resident of Fundidor, Molo, Iloilo

City, after having been duly sworn to according to law depose and say:
"That I am legally married to Cecile Sorianosos in a Civil Marriage solemnized by
Judge Vicente Santos, City Court of Pasay City on March 22, 1974 but subsequently
remarried in a religious ceremony before Rev. Panfilo T. Brasil at the Parish Church of La
Paz, Iloilo City on July 18, 1974, xerox copies of the aforesaid marriage contracts are
hereto attached as Annexes 'A' and 'B', forming integral parts of this affidavit;
"After our marriage, I built a house for our permanent residence and as our
conjugal home in Fundidor, Molo, Iloilo City and furnished it with all the comforts well
within my means;
"At the start of our marriage, I was led to believe by my wife of her total concern,
love and devotion to me and in turn I lavished her with all the material comfort at my
command and even tried to build up her social status by sending her as a delegate to
the Zonta World Conference at Washington, D.C. last July, 1980 without my company.
As a token of my love and unfailing trust we went sight-seeing and on our second
honeymoon to Hongkong only last month.
"Sometime during the last week of October, 1980, while I went on my normal
work routine to Passi Sugar Millsite in Passi, Iloilo, my son Edmund took me aside in
confidence and told me that he has some very delicate matters to take up with me
which may be misinterpreted by me or may be taken by me in a wrong light; however,
he said that the honor and dignity of the family is at stake and I have to know it
whatever be the consequence. After I gave him the go signal, he narrated to me that my
wife Cecile Sorianosos has been unfaithful to me and has been having illicit relationship
with another man. Of course, I was taken aback and stunned so I asked him for the
source of his information. He informed me that our maid Elsa Barios and our driver
Loreto Reales had been aware of the illicit relationship and the man usually went to my
house and even slept there whenever I was in Manila. I got angry and blamed our maid
and the driver for not telling me but Edmund told me that they were afraid to tell
because they were threatened. After I have calmed down, I commented that if I
confront my wife about her illicit relationship, she will surely deny it. So I thought that
the best way was to catch her red-handed in the act of infidelity so that she could not
deny it anymore. I suggested to Edmund to think of a plan so we can catch my wife red-
handed.
"After several days of planning we agreed to put our plan of action in operation
on November 3, 1980 since I will be leaving for Manila in the morning of that day. Our
problem was how to catch my wife in the very act of having sexual intercourse with her
lover considering the fact that our master's room was air-conditioned with all windows
framed by glass jalousies closed and covered by curtains. At first we thought of breaking
down the main door with a sledge hammer so we could take them by surprise, later we
abandoned the idea because of legal complications.
"Finally, I thought of removing a glass of the jalousy so the inside of the bedroom
can be seen from the outside once the curtain can be brushed aside by means of a thin
wire and the persons on bed could be seen clearly since the bed is on the same level as
the opening of the window. After several experiments whenever my wife was out, I
found out that my wife cannot notice the removal of the glass jalousy since our windows
are screened from the inside of our room.
"As pre-arranged, I removed one jalousy glass of the window of our master room
so that the people inside our room could be seen actually from the outside and the
moment my wife and her lover is seen in the act of sexual intercourse.
"Having completed all the plans to effect our plan of operation, I told my wife
that I was leaving in the morning of November 3, 1980 for Manila and actually I took the
plane for Manila on that day. I instructed my son Edmund to inform me immediately of
the result of the plan of action as soon as possible.
"Almost midnight of November 3, 1980, I was informed by my daughter-in-law
Rebecca that the operation was successful and resulted in the arrest of my wife and
Atty. Bob Javellana inside our bedroom.
"I know Atty. Bob Javellana for quite a time and we have been close friends. As a
friend he has come to our house at Molo, Iloilo City oftentimes to discuss matters about
the court case between the Iloilo City Government and St. Therese Memorial Chapel
which is a business which I have given to my wife Cecile. Atty. Javellana knew that
Cecile Sorianosos is my legally married wife.
"When I returned to Iloilo City from Manila on November 4, 1980, I was shown
the photographs taken inside our master bedroom and I am attaching hereto the
photographs which are marked as Annexes "C", "D", "E", "F", "G", "H", "I" and "J".
"That I am formally charging my wife, Cecile Sorianosos and Atty. Bob Javellana of
the crime of adultery and would request that this affidavit be considered as a formal
complaint against them" (pp. 4-5, Original Records).
Sometime in January 1981, i.e., before the conclusion of the preliminary investigation
then being conducted by the Fiscal's Office, Efraim Santibañez learned that he was sick
of cancer and decided to leave for the United States for medical treatment. Before his
departure, he executed a holographic will, dated January 10, 1981, a portion of which
provided:
"I do hereby disinherit my second wife, Cecilia Sorianosos of any and all

inheritance she is entitled under the law as my wife on the ground that she had given
cause for legal separation by committing acts of adultery with Atty. Bob Javellana in the
evening of November 3, 1980 in my conjugal abode at Candido Subdivision and as a
result of which I charged her and Atty. Bob Javellana for adultery with the Fiscal's Office
and I filed a case of legal separation against her in Civil Case No. SP-11-309 of the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court in Iloilo City for which act of infidelity, I can never
forgive her."[2]
On January 15, 1981, after several requests for postponement, private respondents
submitted their memorandum to the Fiscal's Office; and on February 19, 1981,
Fiscal Galvez issued a resolution finding the existence of a prima facie case for adultery
against private respondents.
On February 26, 1981, Fiscal Galvez was informed by relatives of Efraim Santibañez that

the latter had died in the United States on February 16, 1981. This notwithstanding, he
prepared the information in question on March 3, 1981, and on the following day, filed
the same with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo.
Private respondents filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the offense charged, as the offended party had not filed
the required complaint pursuant to the provisions of Article 344 of the Revised Penal
Code and Section 4, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court to the effect that "the crimes of
adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the
offended spouse."
Finding merit in the position taken by private respondents, respondent judge granted the
motion and dismissed the case. The city fiscal moved for a reconsideration, but the same
was denied. Hence, the present recourse.
The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not there has been compliance with the
requirement of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, reiterated in Section 4, Rule 110
of the Rules of Court, that "the crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be
prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party."
We rule in the affirmative.
We are aware that in a long line of decisions, this Court has maintained strict adherence
[3]
to the requirement imposed by Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code.
It must be borne in mind, however, that this legal requirement was imposed "out of
consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence
rather than go through the scandal of a public trial." Thus, the law leaves it to the option
[4]
of the aggrieved spouse to seek judicial redress for the affront committed by the erring
spouse. And this, to Our mind, should be the overriding consideration in determining the
issue of whether or not the condition precedent prescribed by said Article 344 has been
complied with. For needless to state, this Court should be guided by the spirit, rather than
the letter, of the law.
In the case at bar, the desire of the offended party, Efraim Santibañez, to bring his wife
and her alleged paramour to justice is only too evident. Such determination of purpose on
his part is amply demonstrated in the dispatch by which he filed his complaint with the
police [Annex 'A', supra]; the strong and unequivocal statement contained in the affidavit
filed with the Fiscal's Office that "I am formally charging my wife Cecile Sorianosos and
Atty. Bob Javellana of the crime of adultery and would request that this affidavit be
considered as a formal complaint against them" [Annex 'B', supra]; his filing of a
complaint for legal separation against Cecile Santibañez with the local Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court; and finally, in disinheriting his wife in his Last Will and
Testament dated January 10, 1981.
In quashing the information, respondent judge relied upon Our decision in People vs.
Santos to the effect that a "salaysay"' or sworn statement of the offended party, which
[5]
prompted the fiscal to conduct a preliminary investigation and then to file an information

in court, was not the complaint required by Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code.
The ruling in Santos is not applicable to the case at bar. In that case, the "salaysay"
executed by complainant Bansuelo was not considered the complaint contemplated by
Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code because it was a mere narration of how the crime
of rape was committed against her. However, in the affidavit-complaint submitted
by Efraim Santibañez, the latter not only narrated the facts and circumstances constituting
the crime of adultery, but he also explicitly and categorically charged private respondents
with the said offense. Thus -
"That I am formally charging my wife Cecile Sorianosos and Atty. Bob Javellana of

the crime of adultery and would request that this affidavit be considered as a formal
complaint against them."
Moreover, in Santos, this Court noted that the information filed by Rizal Provincial
Fiscal Nicanor P. Nicolas "commenced with the statement 'the undersigned fiscal
accuses Engracio Santos with the crime of rape,' the offended party not having been
mentioned at all as one of the accusers." In the instant case, however, the information
filed by the city fiscal of Iloilo reads as follows:
"The undersigned city fiscal upon sworn statement originally filed by the
offended party Efraim Santibañez, xerox copies of which are hereto attached as Annexes
'A' and 'B' x x x."
Undoubtedly, the complaint-affidavit filed by Santibañez contains all the elements of a

valid complaint, as "it states the names of the defendants, the designation of the offense
by the statute, the acts or omission complained of as constituting the offense; the name of
the offended party, the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place
wherein the offense was committed." [6]
What is more, said complaint-affidavit was attached to the information as an integral part
thereof, and duly filed with the court. As held in Fernandez vs. Lantin, the filing in court
[7]
of such affidavit or sworn statement of the offended party, if it contains all the allegations
required of a criminal complaint under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules
of Court, constitutes sufficient compliance of the law. Thus:
"x x x in a case where the Fiscal filed an Information charging the accused with
'telling some people in the neighborhood that said Fausta Bravo (a married woman) was
a paramour of one Sangalang, a man not her husband', and Fausta Bravo did not
subscribe to the complaint, this Court held that the trial court had no jurisdiction over
the case. It ruled that since the accused imputed to Fausta Bravo the commission of
adultery, a crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the Information filed by the
Fiscal cannot confer jurisdiction upon the court of origin.
"It must be noted, however, that this error could be corrected without sustaining
the motion to quash and dismissing the case. Pursuant to section 1 of paragraph (a) of
Presidential Decree No. 77, under which the Assistant City Fiscal conducted the
preliminary investigation, the statement of the complainant was sworn to before the
aforesaid Investigating Fiscal. Assuming that the recitals in said sworn statement contain
all those required of a complaint under the rules, a copy of said verified statement of
the complainant should be filed with respondent Court in order to comply with the
requirements of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code; otherwise, the respondent Fiscal
should file with said court a verified complaint of the offended party."
Upon these premises, We cannot but conclude that the adultery charge against private
respondents is being prosecuted "upon complaint filed by the offended party."
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The orders of the Court of First Instance
of Iloilo, Branch V, in Criminal Case No. 13086, dated May 21 and September 14, 1981,
are hereby set aside, and respondent judge is directed to proceed with the trial of the case
on the merits. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 182336, December 23, 2009 ]
ELVIRA O. ONG, PETITIONER, VS. JOSE CASIM GENIO, RESPONDENT.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA)
Resolution[2] dated January 7, 2008.
Petitioner Elvira O. Ong (petitioner) filed a criminal complaint against respondent Jose
Casim Genio (respondent) for Robbery which was dismissed by the City Prosecutor of
Makati City. However, pursuant to the Resolutions dated September 15, 2006 [3] and
October 30, 2006[4] of the Department of Justice, respondent was charged with the
crime of Robbery in an Information[5] which reads:
That in or about and sometime the month of January, 2003, in the City of Makati,
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, divest and carry
away kitchen and canteen equipment as well as her personal things valued at Php
700,000.00, belonging to complainant, ELVIRA O. ONG, to the damage and prejudice of
the said owner in the aforementioned amount of Php 700,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On November 21, 2006, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Case for Lack of
Probable Cause Pursuant to Sec. 6(a),[6] Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and, in View of
Compelling Grounds for the Dismissal of the Case to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of
the Warrant of Arrest[7] (Motion to Dismiss). Petitioner filed an Opposition [8] dated
December 11, 2006 to respondent's Motion to Dismiss.
In its Order[9] of December 15, 2006, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 56, dismissed the case because the other elements of
the crime of Robbery, specifically the elements of intent to gain, and either
violence against or intimidation of any person or force upon things, were not specifically
alleged in the Information filed against respondent.
Despite the dismissal of the case, respondent filed a Partial Motion for
Reconsideration[10] dated January 2, 2007, reiterating that the Information should be
dismissed in its entirety for lack of probable cause. Petitioner filed her Opposition [11] to
this motion on February 15, 2007.
In its Order[12] dated February 12, 2007, the RTC granted respondent's Partial Motion for
Reconsideration and dismissed the case for lack of probable cause pursuant to Section
6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The RTC held that the
evidence on record failed to establish probable cause to charge respondent with the
crime of Robbery.
On March 6, 2007, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration, [13] claiming that the
RTC erred in relying on Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, since the said provision relates to the issuance of a warrant of arrest, and it
does not cover the determination of probable cause for the filing of the Information
against respondent, which is executive in nature, a power primarily vested in the Public
Prosecutor.
In its Order[14] dated June 1, 2007, the RTC denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration, holding that the aforementioned provision authorizes
the RTC to evaluate not only the resolution of the prosecutor who conducted the
preliminary investigation and eventually filed the Information in court, but also the
evidence upon which the resolution was based. In the event that the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause, the RTC may dismiss the case.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus[15] before the CA on

August 28, 2007. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss [16] the petition, raising the issue
of lack of personality of petitioner to appeal the dismissal of the criminal case, because
the authority to do so lies exclusively with the State as represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG). In its Resolution [17] dated September 10, 2007, the CA observed
that the People of the Philippines was impleaded as petitioner without showing,
however, the OSG's participation. Thus, the CA ordered petitioner to furnish the OSG
with a copy of the Petition, and the latter to comment thereon.
On October 22, 2007, the OSG filed its Comment, [18] taking the stand of respondent that
only the Solicitor General can bring or defend actions on behalf of the People of the
Philippines filed before the CA or the Supreme Court. The OSG submitted that, for being
fatally defective, the said Petition should be dismissed insofar as the criminal aspect was
concerned, without prejudice to the right of petitioner to pursue the civil aspect of the
case.
On January 7, 2008, the CA rendered its Resolution, [19] dismissing the case without
prejudice to the filing of a petition on the civil aspect thereof on the basis of the
arguments raised by both respondent and the OSG. Undaunted, petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration[20] which the CA denied in its Resolution [21] dated March 27,
2008.
Hence this Petition raising the following issues:
A.
WHETHER THE PETITIONER AS THE PRIVATE OFFENDED PARTY IN A CRIMINAL CASE HAS
NO PERSONALITY TO ELEVATE THE CASE TO THE COURT OF APPEALS WITHOUT THE
COMFORMITY OF THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL EVEN BEFORE THE ACCUSED
IS ARRAIGNED
B.
WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO DISMISS THE INFORMATION
ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
C.
WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS THE AUTHORITY TO DISMISS THE
INFORMATION ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE WHEN IT HAS
PREVIOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT THE SAME INFORMATION IS DEFECTIVE[.][22]
The instant Petition is bereft of merit.

Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987 states
that the OSG shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation,
or matter requiring the services of lawyers. Likewise, the Solicitor General shall
represent the Government in this Court and the CA in all criminal proceedings, thus:
SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. -- The Office of the Solicitor General shall
services of lawyers. When authorized by the President or head of the office concerned,
it shall also represent government owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the
Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall
discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers. It shall have the following specific
powers and functions:
criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special
party.
This doctrine is laid down in our ruling in Heirs of Federico C. Delgado and Annalisa
Pesico v. Luisito Q. Gonzalez and Antonio T. Buenaflor,[23] Cariño v. de Castro,[24] Mobilia
Products, Inc. v. Umezawa,[25] Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz,[26] Perez v. Hagonoy Rural
Bank, Inc.,[27] and People v. Santiago,[28] where we held that only the OSG can bring or
defend actions on behalf of the Republic or represent the People or the State in criminal
proceedings pending in this Court and the CA.
While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to pursue
the criminal action on his own behalf,[29] as when there is a denial of due process, this
exceptional circumstance does not obtain in the instant case.
Before the CA, the OSG itself opined that the petition therein was fatally defective for
having been filed without the OSG's participation. Before this Court, petitioner failed to
advance any justification or excuse why she failed to seek the assistance of the OSG
when she sought relief from the CA, other than the personal belief that the OSG was
burdened with so many cases. Thus, we find no reversible error to disturb the CA's
ruling.
Petitioner, however, is not without any recourse. In Rodriguez v. Gadiane,[30] we held:
liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to
that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or
if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken
not take such appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal
the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.
wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that
the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are
the State and the private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an
interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action
questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds.
In so doing, complainant
should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action
may be prosecuted in name of said complainant.[31]
On this ground alone, the instant Petition fails. Even on the issue of the RTC's dismissal
of the case, the Petition ought to be denied.
Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure clearly provides:
SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. -- (a) By the Regional Trial Court. --
Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall
personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He
may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a
commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant
issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint
or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the
existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court
within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information. [32]
Pursuant to the aforementioned provision, the RTC judge, upon the filing of an
Information, has the following options: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record
clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) if he or she finds probable cause, issue a
warrant of arrest; and (3) in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause, order
the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice, the issue to
be resolved by the court within thirty days from the filing of the information. [33]
It bears stressing that the judge is required to personally evaluate the resolution of the
prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the
evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause.[34] This, the RTC judge clearly complied with in this case.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
January 7, 2008 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 186460, December 04, 2009 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.
GUALBERTO CINCO Y SOYOSA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For review is the Decision[1] dated 30 January 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 01537 which affirmed in toto the Decision, dated 14 July 2005, of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 106, Quezon City, in Criminal Cases No. Q-98-79944,
No. Q-99-89097 and No. Q-89098,[2] finding accused-appellant Gualberto Cinco y Soyosa
guilty of two counts of simple rape.
The facts gathered from the records are as follows:
In November 1998, an information [3] was filed before the RTC accusing appellant of acts
of lasciviousness, thus:
Criminal Case No. Q-98-79944
That on or about the 30th day of November 1998, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused with lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
commit an act of sexual abuse upon the person of AAA, [4] a minor, 14 years old, by then
and there touching her body and mashing her breast, against her will and without her
consent which act debases, degrades, or demeans the intrinsic worth and human dignity
of said complainant as a human being, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended
party.
Subsequently, on 18 August 1999, two separate informations [5] were filed with the RTC
charging appellant with rape. The accusatory portions of the informations read:
That on or about the month of November, 1998 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, by means of force and intimidation, to wit: by then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously undressed [AAA], a minor, 14 years of age, inside her room of
the house located at XXX, and thereafter have carnal knowledge with [AAA] against her
will and without her consent.

That on or about the 1st day of November, 1998 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, by means of force and intimidation, to wit: by then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously undressed [AAA], a minor, 14 years of age, in the sala of their
house located at XXX, and thereafter have carnal knowledge with [AAA] against her will
and without her consent.
Thereafter, the aforementioned cases were consolidated. When arraigned on 7

February 2000, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded "not guilty" to the
charges. Trial on the merits followed.
The prosecution presented as witnesses Dr. Mariella Castillo and AAA. Their testimonies,
woven together, bear the following:
Herein private complainant, AAA, was born on 21 August 1984 in the province of YYY.
When she was 12 years old, her aunt, BBB, took her from the custody of her paternal
grandmother and brought her to BBB's residence located at XXX. Since then, AAA lived
in the said house with BBB and herein appellant (BBB's common-law spouse/live-in
partner).
On 1 November 1998, at around 6:00 p.m., AAA, then 14 years old, was inside the house
watching television. Appellant entered the house and proceeded to the kitchen. He took
a knife therefrom and poked it at AAA. He told her not to shout or he would kill her. He
tied her two hands at the back of her head and removed her skirt and panty. She began
to cry, but he told her to stop doing so. He went on top of her, spread her thighs, and
inserted his penis into her vagina. He then made push and pull movements. As she felt
pain in her vagina, she tried to push him away but to no avail. He pinched her breast
which was very painful. After satisfying his lust, he untied her hands, put on his shorts
and left her. She then stood up and put on her clothes. She went to the comfort room
and saw her panty stained with blood.
In the latter part of November 1998, at about 4:00 p.m., AAA was inside the house while
appellant was drinking with friends outside. Later, appellant, then armed with a knife,
entered AAA's room and approached AAA. He pointed the knife at her neck and told her
not to make noise. He covered her mouth with a handkerchief and tied her hands with a
nylon rope. He then removed his pants and brief, stripped her of her shorts and panty,
and went on top of her. He inserted his penis into her vagina and made up and down
movements. Before leaving her, he warned her not to tell anyone of the incidents or he
would kill her.
Subsequently, AAA went to the barangay hall to report the incidents. However, upon

arriving thereat, she told the barangay officials that she was merely "touched" and not
raped by appellant. She was forced to make such statement because appellant's
siblings, namely, Sonia and Roel, threatened to kill her if she would divulge the truth.
Appellant was eventually arrested and detained. She then filed with the Office of the
Prosecutor, Quezon City, a complaint for acts of lasciviousness against appellant.
Thereafter, AAA confided to BBB that appellant raped her. BBB accompanied AAA to the
office of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Marilac Hills,
Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thereupon, AAA disclosed to a social worker that she was raped
by appellant. After the interview, the social worker and BBB accompanied AAA to Camp
Crame where the latter underwent physical and genital examination, which was
conducted by Dr. Mariella Castillo (Dr. Castillo). In the said genital examination, Dr.
Castillo found that AAA had an estrogenized hymen with healed laceration at the 6:00
o'clock and 8:00 o'clock positions. The deep notches, being in the posterior part of the
hymen, indicate that the same had been lacerated before, but were now healed. The
notches were caused by penetration injuries or by an object being inserted through the
hymen opening to the vaginal canal.
Afterwards, appellant was charged with two counts of rape. [6]
The prosecution also proffered documentary evidence to buttress the testimonies of its
witness, to wit: (1) provisional medical certificate of AAA issued by Dr. Castillo (Exhibit
A);[7] (2) final medical certificate of AAA issued by Dr. Castillo (Exhibit B); [8] (3) sworn
statement of AAA (Exhibit C);[9] and (4) AAA's birth certificate (Exhibit D).[10]
For its part, the defense presented the testimonies of appellant, Gregorio Frias and Roel
Cinco to refute the foregoing accusations. No documentary evidence was adduced.
Appellant denied any liability and interposed an alibi.
Appellant claimed that he was not in the house when the alleged incidents occurred. He
testified that from 8:00 a.m. to midnight of 1 November 1998, he sold ice cream in
Cubao, Quezon City. He went home in the morning of the following day, 2 November
1998. Also, during the latter part of November 1998, he sold ice cream for the whole
day in the same place and went home in the morning of the following day. He alleged
that AAA had ill motive to fabricate the rape charges, because he caught her several
times stealing money from his box inside the house. [11]
Gregorio Frias, friend of appellant, narrated that on 1 November 1998, he and appellant
were selling ice cream in Cubao, Quezon City. At about 5:00 p.m. of the same day, he
went to appellant's house and upon arriving therein, he noticed that the people inside
were arguing about the loss of money. On 30 November 1998, he and appellant were
selling ice cream in Cubao, Quezon City. [12]
Roel Cinco, brother of appellant, stated that on 1 November 1998, he was watching
television inside appellant's house. At around 6:00 p.m., appellant arrived at the house.
Later that evening, appellant quarreled with BBB because AAA had several times stolen
money from him.[13]
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision convicting appellant of rape in Criminal Case
Nos. Q-99-89097 and Q-89098. Appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua in both
cases. He was also ordered to pay AAA in each of the cases the amount of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
With respect to Criminal Case No. Q-98-79944 for acts of lasciviousness, appellant was
acquitted therein for failure of the prosecution to establish said charge. Appellant
appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On 30 January 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming in toto the
RTC Decision. Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 12 February 2008. [14]
In his Brief, appellant assigns a lone error, thus:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE INFORMATIONS UNDER
CRIMINAL CASE NOS. Q-99-89097 AND Q-99-89098 AS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION FOR THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO STATE WITH
PARTICULARITY THE APPROXIMATE DATES OF THE COMMISSION OF THE ALLEGED
RAPES.[15]
Appellant maintains that the approximate times and dates of the commission of the
offense must be stated in the informations; that the informations in the instant cases do
not state the approximate times and dates of the alleged rapes; that although AAA
testified that the first rape occurred nearly before All Saints Day of 1998, the
information in Criminal Case No. Q-89098, nonetheless, states that such incident
transpired on 1 November 1998; that the informations are fatally defective; that the
times and dates of the alleged rapes are so indefinite, thereby depriving appellant of the
opportunity to prepare for his defense; that appellant's constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated; and that
by reason of the foregoing, appellant is entitled to an acquittal. [16]
An information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed

by the prosecutor and filed with the court. [17] To be considered as valid and sufficient, an
information must state the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by
the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name
of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the
place where the offense was committed. [18] The purpose of the requirement for the
information's validity and sufficiency is to enable the accused to suitably prepare for his
defense, since he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that
constitute the offense.[19]
With respect to the date of the commission of the offense, Section 11, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically provides that it is not necessary to state
in the information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a
material ingredient of the offense, and that the offense may be alleged to have been
committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission.
In rape cases, failure to specify the exact dates or times when the rapes occurred does
not ipso facto make the information defective on its face. The reason is obvious. The
date or time of the commission of rape is not a material ingredient of the said crime
because the gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman through force and
intimidation. The precise time when the rape took place has no substantial bearing on
its commission. As such, the date or time need not be stated with absolute accuracy. It
is sufficient that the complaint or information states that the crime has been committed
at any time as near as possible to the date of its actual commission. [20] In sustaining the
view that the exact date of commission of the rape is immaterial, we ruled in People v.
Purazo[21] that:
We have ruled, time and again, that the date is not an essential element of the
crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. As such,
the time or place of commission in rape cases need not be accurately stated. As early as
1908, we already held that where the time or place or any other fact alleged is not an
essential element of the crime charged, conviction may be had on proof of the
commission of the crime, even if it appears that the crime was not committed at the
precise time or place alleged, or if the proof fails to sustain the existence of some
immaterial fact set out in the complaint, provided it appears that the specific crime
charged was in fact committed prior to the date of the filing of the complaint or
information within the period of the statute of limitations and at a place within the
jurisdiction of the court.
This Court has upheld complaints and informations in prosecutions for rape which
merely alleged the month and year of its commission.[22] There is no cogent reason to
deviate from these precedents, especially so when the prosecution has established the
fact that the rape under Criminal Case No. Q-99-89097 was committed prior to the date
of the filing of the information in the said case. Hence, the allegation in the information
under Criminal Case No. Q-99-89097, which states that the rape was committed on or
about November 1998, is sufficient to affirm the conviction of appellant in the said case.
Appellant's allegation of variance between the date of the commission of rape in

Criminal Case No. Q-99-89098 and that established by the evidence during the trial is
erroneous. AAA categorically testified that she was raped by appellant on 1 November
1998.[23] This is consistent with the allegation in the information under Criminal Case No.
Q-99-89098 that appellant raped AAA on 1 November 1998.
Since the sole issue raised by appellant was resolved by this Court in favor of the validity
of the informations filed against him, then the subsequent trial court proceedings and
the resulting judgment of conviction against appellant should likewise be affirmed, there
being no other questions raised by appellant as to them. We further uphold the penalty
imposed on appellant by the RTC and the Court of Appeals.
Republic Act No. 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, was the law
pertinent to the rapes committed on 1 November 1998 and in the latter part of
November 1998. The law states that the death penalty shall be imposed if the rape
victim is a minor, and the offender is the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim.[24] The qualifying circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship
with the offender must be alleged in the complaint or information and proved during
the trial to warrant the imposition of the death penalty. [25]
The informations in Criminal Case No. Q-99-89097 and Q-99-89098 allege that AAA was
a minor at the time she was raped. However, there is no allegation therein that the
offender, herein appellant, is the common-law spouse of AAA's parent. Thus, the
qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship cannot be properly appreciated. In
the absence of such qualifying circumstances, the rapes in the instant cases are treated
as simple rapes. Under Republic Act No. 8353, the penalty for simple rape is reclusion
perpetua.
We also sustain the RTC and the Court of Appeals' award of civil indemnity in the
amount of P50,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 to AAA,
pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.[26] Nonetheless, the award of exemplary damages
in the amount of P25,000.00 should be deleted, as no aggravating circumstance in the
commission of rapes was proven. [27]
WHEREFORE, the Decision, dated 30 January 2008, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 01537, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of
exemplary damages is deleted.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 202243, August 07, 2013 ]
ROMULO L. NERI, PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH
DIVISION) AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
VELASCO JR., J.:
The Case
Assailed and sought to be nullified in this Petition for Certiorari Prohibition and
Mandamus under Rule 65, With application tor preliminary injunction and a temporary
restraining order, are the Resolution[1] dated February 3, 2012 of the Fifth Division of the
Sandiganbayan in SB-10-CRM-0099 entitled People of the Philippines v. Romulo L.
Neri, as well as its Resolution[2] of April 26, 2012 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The Facts
Petitioner Romulo L. Neri (Neri) served as Director General of the National Economic
and Development Authority (NEDA) during the administration of former President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
In connection with what had been played up as the botched Philippine-ZTE [3] National
Broadband Network (NBN) Project, the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), on May 28,
2010, tiled with the Sandiganbayan two (2) criminal Informations, the first against
Benjamin Abalos, for violation of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, docketed as SB-
10-CRM-0098 (People v. Abalos), and eventually raffled to the Fourth Division of that
court. The second Information against Neri, also for violation of Sec. 3(h), RA 3019, in
relation to Sec. 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, was docketed as SB-10-CRM-
0099 (People v. Neri) and raffled to the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan. Vis-à-vis
the same project, the Ombudsman would also later file an information against
Macapagal-Arroyo and another information against her and several others[4] docketed as
SB-11-CRM-0467 and SB-11-CRM-0468 to 0469, respectively, all of which ended up,
like SB-10-CRM-0098, in the anti-graft court’s 4th Division.
The accusatory portion of the Information against Neri reads as follows:

That during the period from September 2006 to April 2007, or thereabout in Metro
Manila x x x and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused x x x being the then Director General of the [NEDA], a Cabinet position and as
such, is prohibited by Sec. 13 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution [from being
financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted
by the Government] but in spite of [said provision], petitioner, while acting as such, x x x
directly or indirectly have financial or pecuniary interest in the business transaction
between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Zhing Xing
Telecommunications Equipment, Inc., a Chinese corporation x x x for the implementation
of the Philippine x x x (NBN) Project, which requires the review, consideration and
approval of the NEDA, x x x by then and there, meeting, having lunch and playing golf
with representatives and/or officials of the ZTE and meeting with the COMELEC
Chairman Benjamin Abalos and sending his emissary/representative in the person of
Engineer Rodolfo Noel Lozada to meet Chairman Abalos and Jose De Venecia III,
President/General Manager of Amsterdam Holdings, Inc. (AHI) another proponent to
implement the NBN Project and discuss matters with them. (Rollo, pp. 48-50.)
In the ensuing trial in the Neri case following the arraignment and pre- trial proceedings,
six (6) individuals took the witness stand on separate dates[5] to testify for the prosecution.
Thereafter, the prosecution twice moved for and secured continuance for the initial stated
reason that the prosecution is still verifying the exact address of its next intended witness
and then that such witness cannot be located at his given address. [6]
In the meantime, a pre-trial conference was conducted in the Abalos case following

which the Fourth Division issued on September 17, 2010 a Pre-Trial Order[7] containing,
among other things, a list of witnesses and documents the prosecution intended to
present. On October 27, 2010, Neri, whose name appeared high on the list, took the
witness stand against Abalos in the Abalos case.[8]
On January 3, 2012, in SB-10-CRM-0099, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP),

OMB, citing Sec. 22, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court in relation to Sec. 2 of the
Sandiganbayan Revised Internal Rules, moved for its consolidation with SB-10-CRM-
0098 (People v. Abalos), SB-11-CRM-0467 (People v. Arroyo, et al.) and SB-11-0468 to
469 (People v. Arroyo). The stated reason proffered: to promote a more expeditious and
less expensive resolution of the controversy of cases involving the same business
transaction. And in this regard, the prosecution would later manifest that it would be
presenting Yu Yong and Fan Yang, then president and finance officer, respectively, of
ZTE, as witnesses all in said cases which would entail a substantive expense on the part
of government if their testimonies are given separately.[9]
Neri opposed and argued against consolidation, and, as he would later reiterate,
contended, among other things that: (a) SB-10-CRM-0099, on one hand, and the other
cases, on the other, involve different issues and facts; (b) the desired consolidation is
oppressive and violates his rights as an accused; (c) consolidation would unduly put him
at risk as he does not actually belong to the Abalos group which had been negotiating
with the ZTE officials about the NBN Project; (d) he is the principal witness and, in fact,
already finished testifying, in the Abalos case; (e) the trial in the Neri and Abalos cases
are both in the advanced stages already; and (f) the motion is but a ploy to further delay
the prosecution of SB-10-CRM-0099, considering the prosecution’s failure to present any
more witnesses during the last two (2) scheduled hearings.
To the opposition, the prosecution interposed a reply basically advancing the same
practical and economic reasons why a consolidation order should issue.
By Resolution dated February 3, 2012, the Sandiganbayan Fifth Division, agreeing with
the position thus taken by the OSP, granted the consolidation of SB-10-CRM-0099 with
SB-10-CRM-0098, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution’s Motion to Consolidate is hereby GRANTED. The
instant case (SB-10-CRM-0099) is now ordered consolidated with SB-10-CRM-0098, the
case with the lower court docket number pending before the Fourth Division of this
Court, subject to the conformity of the said Division.[10] (Emphasis added.)
According to the Fifth Division, citing Domdom v. Sandiganbayan,[11] consolidation is
proper inasmuch as the subject matter of the charges in both the Abalos and Neri cases
revolved around the same ZTE-NBN Project. And following the movant’s line, the anti-
graft court stated that consolidation would allow the government to save unnecessary
expenses, avoid multiplicity of suits, prevent delay, clear congested dockets, and simplify
the work of the trial court without violating the parties’ rights.
Neri sought a reconsideration, but the Fifth Division denied it in its equally assailed April
26, 2012 Resolution.
The Issues
Petitioner Neri is now before the Court on the submission that the assailed consolidation
order is void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. Specifically,
petitioners allege that respondent court gravely erred:
[A] x x x in ordering a consolidation of the subject criminal cases when the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure does not allow a consolidation of criminal cases, only a consolidation of
trials or joint trials in appropriate instances.
[B] x x x in ordering the consolidation because petitioner will now be tried for a crime not
charged in the information in x x x SB-10- CRM-0099 and this is violative of his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Worse, conspiracy was not even charged or alleged in that criminal information.
[C] x x x in ordering the consolidation for it would surely prejudice the rights of petitioner as an
accused in x x x SB-10-CRM-0099 because he does not actually belong to the Abalos
Group which had been negotiating with the ZTE Officials about the NBN Project.
[D] x x x in ordering the consolidation for it would just delay the trial of the case against the
petitioner, as well as that against Abalos, because these cases are already in the advanced
stages of the trial. Worse, in the Abalos case, the prosecution has listed 50 witnesses and it
has still to present 33 more witnesses while in the case against the petitioner the prosecution
(after presenting six witnesses) has no more witnesses to present and is now about to
terminate its evidence in chief. Clearly, a consolidation of trial of these two (2) cases would
unreasonably and unduly delay the trial of the case against the petitioner in violation of his
right to a speedy trial.
[E] x x x in not finding that the proposed consolidation was just a ploy by the prosecution to
further delay the prosecution of x x x SB-10- CRM-0099 because during the last two (2)
hearings it has failed to present any more prosecution witnesses and there appears to be no
more willing witnesses to testify against the petitioner. x x x
[F] x x x in not finding that it would be incongruous or absurd to allow consolidation because
petitioner was the principal witness (as he already finished testifying there) against Abalos
in x x x SB-10- CRM-0098.[12]
The petition is meritorious, owing for one on the occurrence of a supervening event in the
Sandiganbayan itself. As may be recalled, the assailed resolution of the Sandiganbayan
Fifth Division ordering the consolidation of SB-10-CRM-0099 (the Neri case) with SB-
10-CRM-0098 (the Abalos case) pending with the Fourth Division, was subject to the
“conformity of the said (4th) Division.” On October 19, 2012, the Fourth Division, on the
premise that consolidation is addressed to the sound discretion of both the transferring
and receiving courts, but more importantly the latter as the same transferred case would
be an added workload, issued a Resolution[13] refusing to accept the Neri case, thus:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Fourth Division
RESPECTFULLY DECLINES to accept SB-10-CRM-0099 (Neri case) for consolidation
with SB-10-CRM-00998 (Abalos case) pending before it.
The Sandiganbayan Fourth Division wrote to justify, in part, its action:
The Fourth Division already heard accused Neri testify against the accused in the Abalos
case, and in the course of the presentation of his testimony (on direct examination, on
cross-examination and based on his reply to the questions from the Court), the individual
members of the Fourth Division, based on accused Neri’s answers as well as his
demeanor on the dock, had already formed their respective individual opinions on the
matter of his credibility. Fundamental is the rule x x x that an accused is entitled to
nothing less that the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. This Court would not want
accused Neri to entertain any doubt in his mind that such formed opinions might impact
on the proper disposition of the Neri case where he stands accused himself. [14]
While it could very well write finis to this case on the ground of mootness, the actual
justiciable controversy requirement for judicial review having ceased to exist with the
supervening action of the Fourth Division, the Court has nonetheless opted to address the
issue with its constitutional law component tendered in this recourse.
The unyielding rule is that courts generally decline jurisdiction over cases on the ground
of mootness. But as exceptions to this general norm, courts will resolve an issue,
otherwise moot and academic, when, inter alia, a compelling legal or constitutional issue
raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and
the public[15] or when, as here, the case is capable of repetition yet evading judicial
review.[16] Demetria v. Alba added the following related reason:
But there are also times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it
nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice demands that we act then, not only for the
vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a
restraint upon the future.[17]
The interrelated assignment of errors converged on the propriety, under the premises, of
the consolidation of SB-10-CRM-0099 with SB-10- CRM-0098.
Consolidation is a procedural device granted to the court as an aid in deciding how cases
in its docket are to be tried so that the business of the court may be dispatched
expeditiously while providing justice to the parties.[18] Toward this end, consolidation and
a single trial of several cases in the court’s docket or consolidation of issues within those
cases are permitted by the rules.
As held in Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), citing American jurisprudence,

the term “consolidation” is used in three (3) different senses or concepts, thus:
(1) Where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried, in which case the
judgment [in one] trial is conclusive as to the others. This is not actually consolidation but is
referred to as such. (quasi consolidation)
(2) Where several actions are combined into one, lose their separate identity, and become a
single action in which a single judgment is rendered. This is illustrated by a situation where
several actions are pending between the same parties stating claims which might have been
set out originally in one complaint. (actual consolidation)
(3) Where several actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its separate character
and requires the entry of a separate judgment. This type of consolidation does not merge the
suits into a single action, or cause the parties to one action to be parties to the other.
(consolidation for trial)[19] (citations and emphasis omitted; italicization in the original.)
To be sure, consolidation, as taken in the above senses, is allowed, as Rule 31 of the
Rules of Court is entitled “Consolidation or Severance.” And Sec. 1 of Rule 31 provides:
Section 1. Consolidation. – When actions involving a common question of law or fact are
pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in
issue in the actions; it may order all actions consolidated; and it may make such orders
concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
The counterpart, but narrowed, rule for criminal cases is found in Sec. 22, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court stating:
Sec. 22. Consolidation of trials of related offenses. - Charges for offenses founded on the
same facts or forming part of a series of offenses of similar character may be tried
jointly at the discretion of the court. (Emphasis added.)
as complemented by Rule XII, Sec. 2 of the Sandiganbayan Revised Internal Rules which
states:
Section 2. Consolidation of Cases. – Cases arising from the same incident or series of
incidents, or involving common questions of fact and law, may be consolidated in the
Division to which the case bearing the lowest docket number is raffled.
Whether as a procedural tool to aid the court in dispatching its official business in
criminal or civil cases, the rule allowing consolidation–– in whatsoever sense it is taken,
be it as a merger of several causes of actions/cases, in the sense of actual consolidation,
or merely joint trial––is designed, among other reasons, to avoid multiplicity of suits,
guard against oppression and abuse, attain justice with the least expense and vexation to
the litigants.[20]
While the assailed resolution is silent as to the resultant effect/s of the consolidation it
approved, there is nothing in the records to show that what the prosecution vied for and
what the Fifth Division approved went beyond consolidation for trial or joint trial. This
conclusion may be deduced from the underscored portion of the following excerpts of the
resolution in question, thus:
In its reply, the prosecution asserted that the rationale behind consolidation of cases is to
promote expeditious and less expensive resolution of a controversy than if they
were heard independently and separately. It is claimed that the [OMB] and [DOJ] have
already requested the participation in the hearing of these cases of the ZTE executives,
which will entail huge expenses if they will be presented separately for each case. x x x
We agree with the prosecution.[21] (Emphasis added.)

Not to be overlooked is the fact that the prosecution anchored its motion for consolidation
partly on the aforequoted Sec. 22 of Rule 119 which indubitably speaks of a joint trial.
Given the above perspective, petitioner should now disabuse himself of the unfounded
notion that what the Fifth Division intended was a fusion into one criminal proceedings
of the Abalos and Neri cases, where one is unidentifiable from the other, or worse, where
he will be tried as co-accused in the Abalos case.
This thus brings us to the question of whether a consolidation of trial, under the factual
and legal milieu it was ordered, is proper.
Jurisprudence has laid down the requisites for consolidation of trial. As held in Caños v.
Peralta,[22] joint trial is permissible “where the [actions] arise from the same act, event or
transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or substantially on the
same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction over the cases to be consolidated
and that a joint trial will not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice the
substantial rights of any of the parties.” More elaborately, joint trial is proper
where the offenses charged are similar, related, or connected, or are of the same or
similar character or class, or involve or arose out of the same or related or connected acts,
occurrences, transactions, series of events, or chain of circumstances, or are based on acts
or transactions constituting parts of a common scheme or plan, or are of the same pattern
and committed in the same manner, or where there is a common element of substantial
importance in their commission, or where the same, or much the same, evidence will be
competent and admissible or required in their prosecution, and if not joined for trial the
repetition or reproduction of substantially the same testimony will be required on each
trial.[23]
In terms of its effects on the prompt disposition of cases, consolidation could cut both
ways. It may expedite trial or it could cause delays. Cognizant of this dichotomy, the
Court, in Dacanay v. People,[24] stated the dictum that “the resulting inconvenience and
expense on the part of the government cannot not be given preference over the right to a
speedy trial and the protection of a person’s life, liberty or property.” Indeed, the right to
a speedy resolution of cases can also be affected by consolidation. As we intoned
in People v. Sandiganbayan, a case involving the denial by the anti-graft court of the
prosecution’s motion to consolidate a criminal case for indirect bribery with another case
for plunder, consolidation should be refused if it will unduly expose a party, private
respondent in that instance, to totally unrelated testimonies, delay the resolution of the
indirect bribery case, muddle the issues, and expose him to the inconveniences of a
lengthy and complicated legal battle in the plunder case. Consolidation, the Court added,
has also been rendered inadvisable by supervening events––in particular, if the
testimonies sought to be introduced in the joint trial had already been heard in the earlier
case.[25]
So it must be here.
Criminal prosecutions primarily revolve around proving beyond reasonable doubt the
existence of the elements of the crime charged. As such, they mainly involve questions of
fact. There is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises from the truth or the
falsity of the allegations of facts. Put a bit differently, it exists when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the inquiry invites
calibration of the whole gamut of evidence considering mainly the credibility of the
witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as
their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.[26]
Since conviction or acquittal in a criminal case hinges heavily on proof that the overt acts
constituting, or the elements, of the crime were indeed committed or are present,
allegations in the information are crucial to the success or failure of a criminal
prosecution. It is for this reason that the information is considered the battle ground in
criminal prosecutions. As stressed in Matrido v. People:
From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused
what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him
in a defense on the merits. That to which his attention should be directed, and in which
he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real
question is not did he commit the crime given in the law in some technical and specific
name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the
manner therein set forth.[27] (Emphasis supplied.)
The overt acts ascribed to the two accused which formed the basis of their indictments
under the separate criminal charge sheets can be summarized as follows:
People v. Neri (For Violation of Section 3[h] RA 3019)[28]

1. Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in the business
transaction between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and
ZTE for the implementation of the NBN Project, which requires the review,
consideration and approval by the accused, as then NEDA Director General;
2. Meeting, having lunch and playing golf with representatives and/or officials of the
ZTE;
3. Meeting with then COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos; and
4. Sending his emissary/representative, Engr. Rodolfo Noel Lozada, to meet Abalos

and Jose de Venecia III, President/General Manager of Amsterdam Holdings Inc.
(AHI), another proponent to implement the NBN Project and discuss matters with
them.
People v. Abalos (For Violation of Section 3[h], RA 3019)
1. Having financial or pecuniary interest in the business transaction between the GRP
and the ZTE for the implementation of the Philippines’ NBN;
2. Attending conferences, lunch meetings and golf games with said ZTE officials in
China, all expenses paid by them and socializing with them in China and
whenever they were here in the Philippines;
3. Offering bribes to petitioner in the amount of PhP 200,000,000 and to Jose de

Venecia III President and General Manager of AHI in the amount of USD
10,000,000, being also another proponent to implement said NBN Project of the
Government; and
4. Arranging meetings with Secretary Leandro Mendoza of the Department of

Transportation and Communications (DOTC).[29]
As can be gleaned from the above summary of charges, the inculpatory acts complained
of, the particulars and specifications for each of the cases are dissimilar, even though they
were allegedly done in connection with the negotiations for and the implementation of
the NBN Project. Due to this variance, the prosecution witnesses listed in the pre-trial
order in the Neri case are also different from the list of the people’s witnesses lined up to
testify in the Abalos case, albeit some names appear in both the pre-trial orders. This can
be easily seen by a simple comparison of the list of witnesses to be presented in the cases
consolidated. The witnesses common to both cases are underscored. Thus:
In People v. Neri, the following are named as witnesses,[30] viz:

1. Benjamin Abalos
2. Jose de Venecia Jr.
3. Jose de Venecia III
4. Rodolfo Noel “Jun” Lozada
5. Dante Madriaga
6. Jarius Bondoc
7. Leo San Miguel
8. Sec. Margarito Teves
9. Representative of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation;
10. Employees of the Wack Wack Golf and Country Club
11. Airline Representatives (2)
12. Raquel Desiderio – DOTC, Asec. Administrative and Legal Affairs
13. Atty. Frederick Fern Belandres, DOTC
14. Atty. Geronimo Quintos
15. Nilo Colinares
16. Elmer Soneja
17. Lorenzo Formoso
18. Records Custodian, DOTC
19. Senate Secretary or any of her duly authorized representative
20. Director General of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee or any of his duly authorized
representative
21. Representative of NEDA;
22. ZTE Officials

23. Ramon Sales
24. Hon. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
25. Atty. Jose Miguel Arroyo
26. Others.
In People v. Abalos, the following are the listed witnesses,[31] to wit:
1. Atty. Oliver Lozano
2. Mr. Jose De Venecia III
3. Engr. Rodolfo Noel Lozada
4. Engr. Dante Madriaga
5. Secretary Romulo L. Neri
6. Mr. Jarius Bondoc
7. Speaker Jose De Venecia, Jr.
8. Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco
9. Congresswoman Ana Theresa H. Baraquel
10. TESDA Chairman Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva
11. Mr. Leo San Miguel
12. Secretary Margarito Teves
13. Atty. Raquel T. Desiderio
14. Atty. Frederick Fern M. Belandres
15. Atty. Geronimo V. Quintos
16. Mr. Nilo Colinares
17. Mr. Elmer A. Soneja
18. Asst. Secretary Lorenzo Formoso

19. Atty. Harry L. Roque
20. Vice-President Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.
21. Dr. Ma. Dominga B. Padilla
22. Fr. Jose P. Dizon
23. Mr. Roel Garcia
24. Mr. Bebu Bulchand
25. Mr. Renato Constantino, Jr.
26. Mr. Ferdinand R. Gaite
27. Mr. Guillermo Cunanan
28. Mr. Amado Gat Inciong
29. Mr. Rafael V. Mariano
30. Ms. Consuelo J. Paz
31. Atty. Roberto Rafael J. Pulido
32. Antonia P. Barrios, Director III, Senate Legislative Records & Archives Services
33. The Personnel Officer, Human Resource Management Office, Commission on

Elections (COMELEC)
34. Representative/s from the Wack-Wack Golf and Country Club, Mandaluyong City
35. Representative/s from the Philippine Airlines (PAL)
36. Representative/s from Cathay Pacific Airways
37. Representative/s from the Cebu Pacific Airlines
38. Representative/s from the COMELEC
39. Representative/s from the National Economic & Development Authority (NEDA)
40. Representative/s from the Board of Investments
41. Representative/s from the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)
42. Representative/s from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
43. Representative/s from the Bureau of Immigration
44. Representative/s from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
45. Representative/s from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
46. Representative/s from the National Statistics Office (NSO)
47. Representative/s from the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China to the
Philippines
48. Representative/s from the Central Records Division, Office of the Ombudsman
49. Representative/s from the Department of Transportation and Communications

(DOTC)
50. Representative/s from the Philippine Senate

The names thus listed in the pre-trial order in the Abalos case do not yet include, as aptly
observed by the Fourth Division in its adverted October 19, 2012 Resolution,
[32]
additional names allowed under a subsequent resolution. In all, a total of at least 66
warm bodies were lined up to testify for the prosecution.
It can thus be easily seen that veritably the very situation, the same mischief sought to be
avoided in People v. Sandiganbayan[33] which justified the non-consolidation of the cases
involved therein, would virtually be present should the assailed consolidation be upheld.
Applying the lessons of People v. Sandiganbayan to the instant case, a consolidation of
the Neri case to that of Abalos would expose petitioner Neri to testimonies which have no
relation whatsoever in the case against him and the lengthening of the legal dispute
thereby delaying the resolution of his case. And as in People v. Sandiganbayan,
consolidation here would force petitioner to await the conclusion of testimonies against
Abalos, however irrelevant or immaterial as to him (Neri) before the case against the
latter may be resolved––a needless, hence, oppressive delay in the resolution of the
criminal case against him.
What is more, there is a significant difference in the number of witnesses to be presented

in the two cases. In fact, the number of prosecution witnesses in the Neri case is just half
of that in Abalos. Awaiting the completion in due course of the presentation of the
witnesses in Abalos would doubtless stall the disposition of the case against petitioner as
there are more or less thirty-five (35) prosecution witnesses listed in People v.
Abalos who are not so listed in People v. Neri. In the concrete, this means, in the
minimum, awaiting the completion of the testimonies of thirty-five (35) additional
witnesses, whose testimonies are unrelated to the charges against him, before the case
against petitioner may finally be disposed of, one way or another. Also, petitioner will be
exposed to an extra thirty-five (35) irrelevant testimonies which even exceed those
relating to his case, since the prosecution only has roughly about twenty-six (26)
witnesses for his case. Further still, any delay in the presentation of any of the witnesses
in People v. Abalos would certainly affect the speedy disposition of the case against
petitioner. At the end of the day, the assailed consolidation, instead of contributing to the
swift dispensation of justice and affording the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of their cases, would achieve the exact opposite.
Before the Sandigabayan and this Court, petitioner has harped and rued on the possible
infringement of his right to speedy trial should consolidation push through, noting in this
regard that the Neri case is on its advanced stage but with the prosecution unable to
continue further with its case after presenting six witnesses.
Petitioner's point is well-taken. In Dacanay, a case involving a request for separate trial
instead of a joint trial, the Court upheld an accused's right to a speedy trial, guaranteed by
Sec. 14 (2), Art. III of the Constitution, over the claim of the prosecution that a joint trial
would make the resolution of the case less expensive.[34] In Dacanay, Dacanay moved for
immediate and separate trial, which the People opposed on the ground that a separate
trial, if approved, would entail a repetitive presentation of the same evidence instead of
having to present evidence against Dacanay and his coaccused only once at the joint trial.
According to the respondent therein, th will result in inconvenience and expense on the
part of the Government,[35] the very same reasons given by the prosecution in the case at
hand. There as later in People v. Sandiganbayan,[36] We held that the rights of an accused
take precedence over minimizing the cost incidental to the resolution of the controversies
in question.
Clearly then, consolidation, assuming it to be proper owing to the existence of the

element of commonality of the lineage of the otTenses charged contemplated in Sec. 22
of Rule 119, should be ordered to achieve all the objects and purposes underlying the rule
on consolidation, foremost of which, to stress, is the swift dispensation of justice with the
least expense and vexation to the parties. It should, however. be denied if it subverts any
of the aims of consolidation. And Dacanay and People v. Sandiganbayan are one in
saying, albeit implicitly, that ordering consolidation-likely to delay the resolution of one
of the cases, expose a patty to the rigors of a lengthy litigation and in the process
undermine the accused's right to speedy disposition of cases--constitutes grave abuse of
discretion. Not lost on the Court of course and certainly not on the Sandiganbayan's
Fourth Division is the resulting absurdity arising from the consolidation of trial where the
accused (Neri) in one case would be the prosecution's main witness in the other case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan

Fifth Division dated February 3, 2012 in Criminal Case No. SB-1 0-CRM-0099 and its
Resolution dated April 26, 2012 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let Criminal
Case No. SB-1 0-CRM-0098 and Criminal Case No. SB-1 0-CRM-0099 proceed
independently and be resolved with dispatch by the Divisions of the Sandiganbayan to
which each was originally raffled.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ A.M. No. RTJ-04-1837, March 23, 2004 ]
VISITACION L. ESTODILLO, ET AL., COMPLAINANTS, VS. JUDGE
TEOFILO D. BALUMA, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
In a verified complaint dated December 26, 2002, Jovelyn Estudillo (Jovelyn)

assisted by her mother, Visitacion L. Estodillo, charges Judge Teofilo D. Baluma with
Gross and Inexcusable Ignorance of the Law.
Complainant alleges that her administrative complaint arose from the dismissal of
Criminal Case No. 11627 for Other Acts of Child Abuse [1] entitled “People of the
Philippines, Plaintiff vs. Fredie Cirilo Nocos y Urot” by respondent Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol, Branch 1, a Family Court.
The criminal case was originally filed for preliminary investigation with the
2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tubigon-Clarin, Bohol. After the requisite
preliminary investigation, Judge James Stewart E. Himalaloan found that there was
sufficient ground to hold the herein accused for trial for the offense of Other Acts of
Child Abuse defined in Sec. 10 (1), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610. [2] The record of
the case was transmitted to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor where, after a review
by Third Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, Macario I. Delusa, he failed an Information
dated October 28, 2002[3].
Respondent dismissed the Information in an Order dated November 21,

2002[4] ratiocinating, thus:
EXAMINING the Information, the two (2) copies of the same forming parts of the
Records in this case appearing in pages 28 and 30, the court finds that the same is not
subscribed and sworn to by the prosecutor.
A CAREFUL EXAMINATION on the four corners of the Information will readily show
that the information had not been subscribed by the prosecutor and this will militate
against the validity of the information and towards nullity and total worthlessness of the
same. Since the Information is defective, the Court is left without any alternative except
to dismiss this case. Any other act by the Court will tantamount to validating the
defective information. The Court can act in this case only when a correct information is
filed, which is beyond procedure for the Court to order.
The prosecution through Prosecutor Delusa filed a Motion for Reconsideration and
Revival[5] on December 12, 2002 alleging that there was no necessity for the Information
to be under oath since he merely concurred with the resolution of the investigating judge
and that he “has properly subscribed and signed the Information with the approval of the
Provincial Prosecutor”.
On January 10, 2003, respondent issued an Order[6] granting the motion for

reconsideration, reinstating and reviving the case but at the same time requiring the
public prosecutor to file a new information “incorporating the formalities called for under
Rule 112, Section 4 and the circular of its department implementing the pertinent laws on
the matter, within ten (10) days from notice hereof.”
On January 30, 2003, the prosecution filed an ex parte motion to increase the bail bond
of the accused[7] but respondent refused to act on it because the prosecution had not yet
complied with his order to file a new information.[1]
On January 31, 2003, the prosecution filed a “Manifestation” [9] stating that it “will not file
a new information as ordered, the same being contrary to law and jurisprudence and is
unprocedural.”
Complainant, therefore, seeks the assistance of the Court to investigate this impasse
considering that the bond of the accused had been cancelled earlier.
Complainant also alleges that previously, respondent judge had dismissed Criminal Case
No. 11514 against a certain Eduardo Vedra for Unjust Vexation on the same ground. The
prosecution, in a motion for reconsideration, explained that what is required to be under
oath is a complaint, not an information where the Rules merely require that it be
subscribed. Respondent granted the motion and revived the case without requiring the
filing of a new information.
Complainant wonders why respondent did not require the filing of a new information in
the Vedra case, but insisted on the filing of such new information in the present case.
This, according to the complainant, is clearly gross ignorance of the law.
In his Comment, respondent avers: The complaint did not comply with Rule 7, Section 5,
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which required a certification of non-forum
shopping. He denies that he stood pat on his original order because he had already issued
an Order dated 27 February 2003 which found probable cause to warrant the placing of
the accused, Fredie Cirilo Nocos, under custody in order to stand trial and fixed his bond
at P60,000.00. The complainant, including Prosecutor Eric M. Ucat, the trial prosecutor
who instigated the filing of herein administrative complaint and Atty. Esther Gertrude
Biliran, who notarized and obviously prepared the complaint, were mentally dishonest for
not mentioning the fact that before herein complaint was filed on March 8, 2003, he had
already issued the aforecited Order dated February 27, 2003. Prosecutor Ucat and Atty.
Biliran had evil motives when they instigated the filing of the complaint against him even
before he had issued the new order and for continuing with it after he issued the Order of
27 February 2003.
Respondent maintains that he had efficiently discharged his duties as judge although his
Branch is one of the most heavily burdened branches in the Tagbilaran City area and that
to cope with this heavy load, he works even at night and on Sundays and holidays,
writing decisions and drafting orders.
Respondent included in his Comment a “Counter-complaint” against Prosecutor Eric M.

Ucat and Atty. Esther Gertrude D. Biliran an administrative case for disbarment or for
disciplinary sanction for gross violation of the canons under the Code of Professional
conduct and for deceit, dishonesty, failure to exercise candor, fairness, good faith, doing
falsehood or consenting to its doing and abuse of procedures.
Prosecutor Eric M. Ucat filed a “Rejoinder”[10] stating that he is in quandary why the

respondent tagged him as the trial prosecutor when in fact the record shows that
Prosecutor Helen T. Cabatos was the one who handled the subject criminal case
(Criminal Case No. 11627) and Prosecutor Macario I. Delusa was the one who filed the
Information. He asserts that the only thing he did was to administer the oath of the
complainant in the original letter-complaint subject matter of the herein administrative
case. He points out that it was in another case, Criminal Case No. 11514 for Unjust
Vexation entitled “The People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Vedra, a.k.a. Eddie” that he
acted as the prosecutor. That case was dismissed by respondent in an Order dated
November 25, 2002 on the same ground that the Information was not subscribed by the
prosecutor. Upon a Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer For Revival of the Case,
respondent granted it in an Order[11] dated January 2, 2003. He likewise answered point
by point all the accusations hurled by respondent in the latter’s counter-complaint.
Atty. Esther Gertrude D. Biliran also filed a “Rejoinder” [12] wherein she denied having
participated in the filing of the complaint except to take the oath of the complainant. She
avers that at the time herein administrative case was filed on March 8, 2003,
complainants have not yet received the February 27, 2003 Order issued by respondent
judge which found probable cause to warrant the placing of the accused, Fredie Cirilo
Nocos under custody in order to stand trial and fixed his bond at P60,000.00. Likewise,
she denied the accusations of the respondent judge and proferred her defenses against it.
Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. recommends that: 1) this case be re-
docketed as a regular administrative matter; and 2) respondent be reprimanded with a
stern warning that a repetition of the offense will merit a more drastic action of the Court.
Section 4, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 4. Information defined. — An information is an accusation in writing charging a

person with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the court.
There is no requirement that the information be sworn to. Otherwise, the rules would
have so provided as it does in a complaint which is defined as a ”sworn written statement
charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer, or
other public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated”. [13] In a case, we
ruled that the information need not be under oath, the reason therefore being principally
that the prosecuting officer filing it is charged with the special duty in regard thereto and
is acting under the special responsibility of his oath of office. [14] Clearly, respondent had
confused an information from a complaint.
A perusal of the subject Information shows that it was subscribed or signed by Prosecutor
Macario I. Delusa. It is thus clear that respondent erred in dismissing the subject
Information on the ground that it was not under oath.
As aptly observed by the Court Administrator in the evaluation submitted by him:
It is clear that respondent erred in dismissing the information filed by Prosecutor Eric M.
Ucat on the ground that it was not sworn to. The Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly
defines an information as “an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense,
subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the court” (Section 4, Rule 110). The Rules
do not require that it be under oath for otherwise, it would have provided so. On the other
hand, a complaint is defined as “a sworn statement charging a person with an offense,
subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer, or other public officer charged with
the enforcement of the law violated” (Section 5, Rule 110).
Evidently, respondent was of the belief, albeit erroneous, that both a complaint and an
information need to be under oath. But the oath is not required when it is a public
prosecutor who files the information because he does so under the oath he took when he
qualified for his position. The position of the public prosecutor was that the preliminary
investigation had been conducted by the municipal circuit trial judge of Tubigon-Clarin
and the latter’s resolution was concurred in by the prosecutors.
It appears from the record that the respondent corrected himself by issuing his Order of
27 February 2003 where he found that “the complaint, the affidavit of Alberto V.
Estudillo, father of the victim, the affidavit of Jovelyn L. Estudillo, the victim executed
with the assistance of Visitacion Estudillo, her mother, the medico-legal certificate issued
by Isidro Fermites, Jr., on Jovelyn Estudillo, the certification of the facts of birth of
Jovelyn L. Estudillo, the records of the proceedings during the preliminary examination
at the First Level Court, its Order dated September 6, 2002 and the Resolution dated
September 19, 2002, this court finds probable cause to warrant that the accused be placed
in the custody of the law to stand trial.”
The error of the respondent is not a serious one. He, however, must be reminded that as
judge he must be conversant with the rules and laws that it is his office of apply. He
deserves a reprimand for his failure to understand an elementary rule of law. [15]
We agree with Court Administrator Velasco.
The records disclose that respondent, in effect, apparently rectified his error when he
issued an Order dated February 27, 2003, portions of which read as follows:
EXAMINING the complaint, the affidavit of Alberto V. Estodillo, father of the victim,
the affidavit of Juvelyn L. Estodillo, the victim executed with the assistance of
Visitacion-Estodillo her mother, the medico legal certificate issued by Isidro Permites,
Jr., M.D., on Juvelyn L. Estodillo, the certification on the facts of birth of Juvelyn L.
Estodillo, the records of the proceedings during the preliminary examination at the First
Level Court, its Order dated September 6, 2002 and the Resolution dated September 19,
2002, this Court finds probable cause to warrant that the accused be placed in the custody
of the law to stand trial.[16]
However, it is noted that said Order did not have any reference at all nor did it attempt to
reconcile the previous Orders he issued on which bases the herein administrative
complaint was based, namely: the Order dated November 21, 2002 dismissing the
Information, the Order dated January 10, 2003 reinstating and reviving the case but
requiring the prosecution to file a new information, and the Order dated January 30, 2003
refusing to act on the prosecution’s ex-parte motion to increase amount of bail until the
filing of a new information, thus resulting in the grievance submitted by complainant
which could have been easily averted had respondent been more meticulous in the
performance of his duties as presiding judge of a regional trial court.
Canon 3, Rule 3.01, Code of Judicial Conduct mandates judges to “be faithful to the law
and maintain professional competence”. It is imperative that judges must be conversant
with basic legal principles[17]. Judges are called to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws. [18] They are not common men and
women, whose errors, men and women forgive and time forgets [19]. Judges sit as the
embodiment of the people’s sense of justice, their last recourse where all other
institutions have failed”.[20]
As to the counter-complaint of respondent Judge against Prosecutor Eric M. Ucat and

Atty. Esther Gertrude D. Biliran, the same should be dismissed for failure of respondent
to refute their respective “rejoinders”, dated June 11, 2003 and June 6, 2003.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Teofilo D. Baluma is found guilty of violation of

Canon 3, Rule 3.01, Code of Judicial Conduct and REPRIMANDED with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
The counter-complaint of Judge Teofilo D. Baluma against Prosecutor Eric M. Ucat and
Atty. Esther Gertrude D. Biliran is dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 110315, January 16, 1998 ]
RENATO CUDIA, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE
HON.CARLOS D. RUSTIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH LVI, ANGELES CITY,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Petitioner assails the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated May 14, 1993 dismissing
his petition and finding that he had not been placed in double jeopardy by the filing of a
second information against him, although a first information charging the same offense
had been previously dismissed, over petitioner’s vigorous opposition.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
On June 28, 1989, petitioner was arrested in Purok 6, Barangay Santa Inez, Mabalacat, [2]
Pampanga, by members of the then 174th PC Company, allegedly for possessing an
unlicensed revolver. He was brought to Camp Pepito, Sto. Domingo, Angeles City, where
he was detained. A preliminary investigation was thereafter conducted by an
investigating panel of prosecutors. As a result thereof, the City Prosecutor of Angeles
City filed an information against him for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 11542, which reads as follows:
“That on or about the 28th day of June, 1989, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his control
one (1) .38 Cal. Revolver (paltik) without any Serial Number with six (6) live
ammunitions, which he carried outside of his residence without having the necessary
authority and permit to carry the same.
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW.”[3] (Emphasis petitioner’s.)

The case was raffled to Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City (hereafter
the Angeles City RTC). Upon his arraignment on August 14, 1989, petitioner pleaded
“not guilty” to the charges. During the ensuing pre-trial, the court called the attention of
the parties to the fact that, contrary to the information, petitioner had committed the
offense in Mabalacat, and not in Angeles City. Inasmuch as there was an existing
arrangement among the judges of the Angeles City RTCs as to who would handle cases
involving crimes committed outside of Angeles City, the judge ordered the re-raffling of
the case to a branch assigned to criminal cases involving crimes committed outside of the
city. Thereafter, the case was assigned to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC.
On October 31, 1989 however, the provincial prosecutor of Pampanga also filed an
information charging petitioner with the same crime of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition, docketed as Criminal Case No. 11987. The case was likewise raffled to
Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC. This prompted the prosecutor in Criminal Case No.
11542 to file a Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw the Information, stating “that thru
inadvertence and oversight, the Investigating Panel was misled into hastily filing the
Information in this case, it appearing that the apprehension of the accused in connection
with the illegal possession of unlicensed firearm and ammunition was made in Bgy. Sta.
Inez, Mabalacat, Pampanga, within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Pampanga”[4] and that the Provincial Prosecutor had filed its own information against the
accused, as a result of which two separate informations for the same offense had been
filed against petitioner. The latter filed his opposition to the motion, but the trial court
nonetheless, granted said motion to dismiss in its order dated April 3, 1990.
On May 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash Criminal Case No. 11987 on the
ground that his continued prosecution for the offense of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition — for which he had been arraigned in Criminal Case No. 11542, and which
had been dismissed despite his opposition — would violate his right not to be put twice in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The trial court denied the motion to quash;
hence, petitioner raised the issue to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, stating that
there was no double jeopardy, dismissed the same on the ground that the petitioner could
not have been convicted under the first information as the same was defective.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this appeal.
Petitioner points out the following as errors of the Court of Appeals:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT THE CITY

PROSECUTOR OF ANGELES CITY DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO
FILE THE FIRST INFORMATION.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE FIRST

JEOPARDY DID NOT ATTACH BECAUSE THE FIRST INFORMATION
FILED AGAINST THE ACCUSED WAS NOT VALID.
We shall discuss the assigned errors jointly as they are closely related.
Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that “(n)o person shall be twice
put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense x x x.” Pursuant to this provision,
Section 7 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides in part that “(w)hen an accused has
been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint
or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of
the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the
offense charged, x x x.”
In order to successfully invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites
must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first
jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the
same offense or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or a frustration
thereof.[5]
In determining when the first jeopardy may be said to have attached, it is necessary to
prove the existence of the following:
(a) Court of competent jurisdiction

(b) Valid complaint or information
(c) Arraignment
(d) Valid plea
(e) The defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent
of the accused.[6]
It is undisputed that petitioner was arraigned in Criminal Case No. 11542, that he pleaded
“not guilty” therein, and that the same was dismissed without his express consent, nay,
over his opposition even. We may thus limit the discussion to determining whether the
first two requisites have been met.
As to the first requisite, it is necessary that there be a court of competent jurisdiction, for
jurisdiction to try the case is essential to place an accused in jeopardy. The Court of
Appeals and the Solicitor General agreed that Branch 60, which originally had
cognizance of Criminal Case No. 11542, had no jurisdiction over the case. In the words
of the Solicitor General:
“The first jeopardy did not also attach because Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of
Angeles City was not the proper venue for hearing the case. Venue in criminal cases is
jurisdictional, being an essential element of jurisdiction (Agbayani vs. Sayo, 89 SCRA
699). In all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of
the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or any one of the
essential ingredients thereof took place (People vs. Tomio, 202 SCRA 77). Although both
Branches 60 and 56 are sitting in Angeles City, it is Branch 56 which has jurisdiction to
try offenses committed in Mabalacat, Pampanga. Petitioner was arraigned before Branch
60, not Branch 56.”[7]
It must be borne in mind that the question of jurisdiction of a court over cases filed before
it must be resolved on the basis of the law or statute providing for or defining its
jurisdiction. Administrative Order No. 7, Series of 1983 provides that:
“Pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980, and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 864 of the President of the
Philippines, dated January 17, 1983, the territorial areas of the Regional Trial Courts in
Region One to Twelve are hereby defined as follows:
x x x x x x x x x
PAMPANGA
x x x x x x x x x
1. Branches LVI to LXII, inclusive, with seats at Angeles City – comprising
ANGELES CITY and the municipalities of Mabalacat, Magalang, and Porac as well as
part of Clark Field U.S. Airbase.
x x x x x x x x x."
Clearly, Branches 56 to 62 had jurisdiction over the respective territories as apportioned.
Consequently, notwithstanding the internal arrangement of the judges of the Angeles City
RTCs, Branch 60 indubitably had jurisdiction over instant case. Writ large in lawbooks is
the doctrine that jurisdiction is conferred by law and not by mere administrative policy of
any trial court.
With respect to the second requisite, however, it is plainly apparent that the City
Prosecutor of Angeles City had no authority to file the first information, the offense
having been committed in the Municipality of Mabalacat, which is beyond his
jurisdiction. Presidential Decree No. 1275, in relation to Section 9 of the Administrative
Code of 1987, pertinently provides that:
“Section 11. The provincial or the city fiscal shall:

xxxxxxxxx

b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes,
misdemeanors and violations of all penal laws and ordinances within their
respective jurisdictions and have the necessary information or complaint
prepared or made against the persons accused. In the conduct of such
investigations he or his assistants shall receive the sworn statements or take
oral evidence of witnesses summoned by subpoena for the purpose.

x x x x x x x x x.” (Emphasis supplied)
It is thus the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor, who should
prepare informations for offenses committed within Pampanga but outside of Angeles
City. An information, when required to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be
filed by another.[8] It must be exhibited or presented by the prosecuting attorney or
someone authorized by law. If not, the court does not acquire jurisdiction.[9]
Petitioner, however, insists that his failure to assert the lack of authority of the City
Prosecutor in filing the information in question is deemed a waiver thereof.[10] As
correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, petitioner’s plea to an information before
he filed a motion to quash may be a waiver of all objections to it insofar as formal
objections to the pleadings are concerned. But by clear implication, if not by express
provision of the Rules of Court, and by a long line of uniform decisions,[11] questions
relating to want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding. It is a valid
information signed by a competent officer which, among other requisites, confers
jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused (herein petitioner) and the subject
matter of the accusation. In consonance with this view, an infirmity in the information,
such as lack of authority of the officer signing it, cannot be cured by silence,
acquiescence, or even by express consent.[12]
In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the
former prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint or information was insufficient because it
was so defective in form or substance that the conviction upon it could not have been
sustained, its dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot be pleaded. As the
fiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of the first information would
not be a bar to petitioner’s subsequent prosecution. Jeopardy does not attach where a
defendant pleads guilty to a defective indictment that is voluntarily dismissed by the
prosecution.[13]
Petitioner next claims that the lack of authority of the City Prosecutor was the error of the
investigating panel and the same should not be used to prejudice and penalize him. It is
an all too familiar maxim that the State is not bound or estopped by the mistakes or
inadvertence of its officials and employees.[14] To rule otherwise could very well result in
setting felons free, deny proper protection to the community, and give rise to the
possibility of connivance between the prosecutor and the accused.
Finally, petitioner avers that an amendment of the first information, and not its dismissal,
should have been the remedy sought by the prosecution. Suffice it to say that this Court,
in Galvez vs. Court of Appeals[15] has ruled that even if amendment is proper, pursuant to
Section 14 of Rule 110, it is also quite plausible under the same provision that, instead of
an amendment, an information may be dismissed to give way to the filing of a new
information.
In light of the foregoing principles, there is thus no breach of the constitutional

prohibition against twice putting an accused in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense for the simple reason that the absence of authority of the City Prosecutor to file
the first information meant that petitioner could never have been convicted on the
strength thereof.
As the first information was fatally defective for lack of authority of the officer filing it,
the instant petition must fail for failure to comply with all the requisites necessary to
invoke double jeopardy.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 24958 is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 188322, April 11, 2012 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JOSEPH
ASILAN Y TABORNAL, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
This is an appeal filed by the accused-appellant Joseph Asilan y Tabornal (Asilan) to

challenge the February 25, 2009 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 02686, which affirmed in toto his Murder conviction, rendered by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20 of the City of Manila on January 8, 2007, in Criminal
Case No. 06-243060.
On March 31, 2006, Asilan was charged with the complex crime of Direct Assault with
Murder in an Information,[2] the pertinent portion of which reads:
That on or about March 27, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring, and confederating with another whose true name, real identity and present
whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping each other, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon the
person of PO1 RANDY ADOVAS y PE-CAAT, a member of the Philippine National
Police assigned at Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig, MM, duly qualified, appointed,
and acting as such, and therefore an agent of a person in authority, which fact was known
to the said accused, while PO1 RANDY ADOVAS y PE-CAAT was in the performance
of his official duty, that is, while handcuffing the at-large co-conspirator for illegal
possession of deadly weapon, herein accused suddenly appeared and with intent to kill,
treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault, and use personal violence upon said
police officer by then and there repeatedly stabbing the latter with a fan knife then
grabbing his service firearm and shooting him, thereby inflicting upon the said PO1
RANDY ADOVAS y PE-CAAT mortal stab and gunshot wounds which were the direct
and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
Asilan pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment[3] on April 10, 2006. Pre-Trial
Conference followed on April 26, 2006, where the counsels agreed to stipulate that
Asilan, who was at that time present in the RTC, was the same Asilan named in the
Information, and that the victim, Police Officer 1 (PO1) Randy Adovas y Pe-caat
(Adovas), was a police officer in active duty at the time of his death. [4] Trial on the merits
ensued after the termination of the pre-trial conference.
Below is the prosecution’s version, as succinctly summarized by the Office of the

Solicitor General (OSG) from the testimony of Joselito Binosa (Binosa)[5]:
In the evening of March 27, 2006, around 10:00 o’clock, Joselito Binosa, a jeepney
barker/carwash boy while chatting with his friends at the El Niño Bakery along Teresa
Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, heard a gunshot nearby. He then went to the place where the
sound came and from where he was standing which was about three (3) to four (4) meters
away, he saw a uniformed policeman, who seemed to be arresting someone and ordering
the latter to lay on the ground.
The police officer pushed the man to the wall, poked the gun on him and was about to
handcuff the latter when another man, herein appellant Asilan arrived, drew something
from his back and stabbed the police officer on his back several times until the latter fell
to the ground.
The man who was being arrested by the police officer held the latter’s hand while he was
being stabbed repeatedly by [Asilan]. The man who was being arrested then took the
officer’s gun and shot the latter with it.
The fellow barker of Joselito Binosa then threw stones at the malefactors who
subsequently left the place.
Joselito Binosa secretly followed [Asilan] and his companion who walked towards the
railroad track taking Teresa St., Sta. Mesa, Manila. [Asilan] entered an alley and
thereafter returned to the place of the incident. The other man walked on to the tracks.
At that moment, a policeman passed by and Binosa pointed [Asilan] to him. [Asilan] was
arrested and the knife which was used in the
stabbing was confiscated by the policeman.[6] (Citations omitted.)
The above narration of events was largely corroborated by Pol Justine San Diego (San
Diego), a student, who also witnessed the events that transpired on March 27, 2006. [7]
The prosecution also submitted as evidence Medico Legal Report No. M-219-06,
[8]
accomplished and testified to by Dr. Vladimir V. Villaseñor. The pertinent portion of
the Medico Legal Report states:
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
Cadaver of Randy Pe-caat Adovas, 29 y/o male, married, a policeman, 167 cm in height
and a resident of 19 West Bank Road, Floodway, Rosario Pasig City.
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
To determine the cause of death.
FINDINGS:
Body belongs to a fairly nourished, fairly developed male cadaver in rigor mortis with
postmortem lividity at the dependent portions of the body. Conjunctivae, lips and
nailbeds are pale. With exploratory laparotomy incision at the anterior abdominal wall,
measuring 29 cm long, along the anterior midline.
Trunk & Upper Extremity:
1) Stab wound, right axillary region, measuring 6 x 4 cm, 16 cm from the anterior
midline.
2) Stab wound, right hypochondriac region, measuring 2.3 x 0.7 cm, 2cm right of the
anterior midline, 9 cm deep, directed posteriorwards, downwards & medialwards,
lacerating the right lobe of the liver.
-over-
CONCLUSION:
Cause of death is MULTIPLE STAB WOUNDS & GUNSHOT WOUND OF THE

TRUNK AND UPPER EXTREMITIES.
Meanwhile, Asilan, in his Appellants’ Brief,[9] summed up his defense as follows:
On March 27, 2006, at around 10:00 o’clock p.m. JOSEPH ASILAN [Asilan] was on

board a passenger jeepney on his way to Mandaluyong. As he had to transfer to another
jeepney, [Asilan] alighted at Old Sta. Mesa and waited for a jeep bound for Pasig City.
Suddenly, three (3) motorcycles stopped in front of him, the passengers of which
approached and frisked him. He was thereafter brought to the police station and in a
small room, he was forced to admit to the stabbing of a police officer. Thereafter, he was
brought to a nearby hospital and was medically examined. Then he was again taken to
the police station where he was confronted with the knife which was allegedly used in
stabbing PO1 Adovas. He was mauled for refusing to confess to the stabbing of the said
policeman. Afterwards, he was presented to alleged eyewitnesses. However, the
supposed eyewitnesses were not the ones presented by the prosecution in court. [10]
The RTC convicted Asilan of Murder in its Decision[11] dated January 8, 2007, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the Prosecution to have failed to
establish and prove beyond reasonable doubt the offense of direct assault. Where a
complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to support the charge as to one of the
component, the accused can be convicted of the other (People v. Roma, 374 SCRA 457).
WHEREFORE, his guilt having been proven beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
murder with the qualifying circumstance of treachery, judgment is hereby rendered
finding accused Joseph Asilan y Tabornal GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder and is hereby imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is hereby
ordered to pay the heirs of PO1 Randy Adovas y Pe-Caat the sum of P84,224.00 as actual
damages, P25,000.00 for moral damages and P50,000.00 civil indemnity.[12]
The RTC, in acquitting Asilan of Direct Assault, held that while it was confirmed that
Adovas was in his police uniform at the time of his death, the prosecution failed to
establish convincingly that he was in the performance of his duty when he was assaulted
by Asilan. The RTC explained that there was no evidence to show that Adovas was
arresting somebody at the time Asilan stabbed him.[13] The RTC added:
What the framers of the law wanted was to know the reason of the assault upon a person
in authority or his agents. The prosecution failed to show why the victim was pushing
the man on the wall or why he poked his gun at the latter. That the victim was assaulted
while in the performance of his duty or by reason thereof was not conclusively proven. [14]
In convicting Asilan of Murder, the RTC held that his defense of denial could not be
“accorded more weight than the categorical assertions of the witnesses who positively
identified him as the man who suddenly appeared from behind [Adovas] and stabbed the
latter repeatedly.”[15] Moreover, Asilan admitted that he was at the scene of the crime
when he was arrested, that he could not give any reason for the witnesses to falsely testify
against him, and that he did not know them.
Anent the aggravating circumstances, the RTC found that the killing of Adovas was
proven to be attended with treachery since Adovas was attacked from behind, depriving
him of the opportunity to defend himself.[16] However, the RTC declared that the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation “could not be appreciated x x x absent
evidence that [Asilan] planned or prepared to kill [Adovas] or of the time when the plot
was conceived.”[17]
As to the damages, the RTC found the prosecution’s evidence, which consisted of
Adovas’s wife’s testimony, and the receipts of the expenses she incurred in Adovas’s
hospitalization, wake, and burial, sufficient to award moral and actual damages.
On January 19, 2007, Asilan appealed[18] his conviction to the Court of Appeals, mainly
on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He
subsequently filed a Motion to Litigate as a Pauper, [19] which on February 28, 2007, was
granted in an Order[20] by the RTC.
On February 25, 2009, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision, affirming in toto the
RTC’s ruling.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 08 January 2007 of

the Court a quo in Criminal Case No. 06-243060, finding Accused-Appellant JOSEPH
ASILAN Y TABORNAL guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder, is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.[21]
The Court of Appeals rejected Asilan’s arguments and averred that his denial and bare
attempt at exculpation by trying to destroy the credibility of the candid, categorical, and
trustworthy testimonies of the witnesses must fail.
Aggrieved, Asilan is now appealing[22] his case to this Court, with the same assignment of
errors he posited before the Court of Appeals:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED BY
RELYING ON THE INCONSISTENT AND UNNATURAL TESTIMONY OF THE
ALLEGED EYEWITNESS.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY.[23]
Discussion
Asilan was convicted of the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code:
Art. 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246
shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men,
or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or
afford impunity;
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise;
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel,

derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, by means of motor
vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin;
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of

an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic, or any other
public calamity;
5. With evident premeditation;
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the

victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
Asilan claims that the testimonies of the witnesses were not only filled with
inconsistencies, they were also incredible for being contrary to the common experience
and observation that mankind can approve as probable under the circumstance. [24]
Asilan insists that the testimony of Binosa should not be given credence as he was
selective in his recollection of the events. Asilan claimed that Binosa seemed to have
recalled more details on cross-examination, thus “improving” on the version he gave
during his direct examination. Asilan further claims that Binosa’s suggestion that Asilan
returned to the scene of the crime after he committed the alleged crime is very unlikely.
Asilan avers that San Diego’s testimony was likewise not credible as it was clearly only a
more refined version of Binosa’s account of the events. Moreover, Asilan says that San
Diego’s testimony is too good to be true as he is unlikely to have a detailed recollection
of an event, which according to him happened within a span of two minutes. [25]
Credibility of Witnesses
It is a well-settled rule that the assessment of the trial court regarding the credibility of
witnesses will generally not be disturbed on appeal. The rationale for this doctrine is that
the trial court is in a better position to decide the issue, as it heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.[26]
The only exceptions to this rule are the following:
1. When patent inconsistencies in the statements of witnesses are ignored by the trial
court; or
2. When the conclusions arrived at are clearly unsupported by the evidence. [27]
This Court sees no reason to apply the above exceptions and disturb the findings of the
RTC, which were affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Our perusal of the records showed that the RTC was vigilant in its duty to ascertain the
truth. The RTC itself propounded clarificatory questions to Binosa and San Diego while
they were testifying. At the end of the trial, the RTC found these witnesses credible, and
believed their eyewitness accounts because they were categorical in their identification of
Asilan as one of Adovas’s assailants. The RTC also pointed out that it could not find any
dubious reason for Binosa and San Diego to falsely implicate Asilan in a heinous crime.
[28]
Alleged Inconsistencies
The alleged inconsistency in Binosa’s testimony does not render his testimony fictitious.
The fact that he was able to provide more details of the events only during cross-
examination is not unusual, and on the contrary tends to buttress, rather than weaken, his
credibility, since it shows that he was neither coached nor were his answers contrived. [29]
After all, “[w]itnesses are not expected to remember every single detail of an incident
with perfect or total recall.”[30]
As for San Diego’s testimony, it is not unnatural for him to have a detailed recollection of
the incident. “Different persons have different reactions to similar situations. There is no
typical reaction to a sudden occurrence.”[31] It is worthy to note that San Diego was only
sixteen years old when he witnessed the stabbing of Adovas. It was his first time to
witness a person being stabbed right before his very eyes. He testified that three months
after that night, the events were still vividly imprinted in his mind.[32] It is thus not
improbable that he could, with certainty, identify Asilan as the man who stabbed Adovas
that fateful night.
Likewise, our scrutiny of the so-called inconsistencies relied upon by Asilan showed that
they only referred to minor details, which did not affect the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses.[33] In People v. Albarido,[34] this Court said:
It is elementary in the rule of evidence that inconsistencies in the testimonies of

prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect
the substance of their declaration nor the veracity or weight of their testimony. In fact,
these minor inconsistencies enhance the credibility of the witnesses, for they remove any
suspicion that their testimonies were contrived or rehearsed. In People vs. Maglente, this
Court ruled that inconsistencies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the
crime are not grounds for acquittal. x x x.[35]
Credibility of the evidence
Asilan further asseverates that it is perplexing how none of the witnesses, who were
present during the incident, warned Adovas of the impending danger to his life. He
contends that “for evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness, but must be credible in itself such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstance.”[36]
This Court would like to reiterate that no standard form of behavior is expected of an
individual who witnesses something shocking or gruesome like murder. This is
especially true when the assailant is near. It is not unusual that some people would feel
reluctant in getting involved in a criminal incident.[37]
In the same manner, it is also not surprising that Asilan returned to the scene of the crime
after stabbing Adovas. His “failure to flee and the apparent normalcy of his behavior
subsequent to the commission of the crime do not imply his innocence.”[38] This Court,
elucidating on this point, declared:
Flight is indicative of guilt, but its converse is not necessarily true. Culprits behave
differently and even erratically in externalizing and manifesting their guilt. Some may
escape or flee -- a circumstance strongly illustrative of guilt -- while others may remain in
the same vicinity so as to create a semblance of regularity, thereby avoiding suspicion
from other members of the community.[39]
Defense of Denial
Unfortunately, Asilan’s bare denial, when juxtaposed with the prosecution witnesses’
positive declarations, is not worthy of credence. Denial, which is the usual refuge of
offenders, is an inherently weak defense, and must be buttressed by other persuasive
evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. The defense of denial fails even more
when the assailant, as in this case, was positively identified by credible witnesses, against
whom no ulterior motive could be ascribed.[40]
Asilan not only admitted that he was at the scene of the crime when he was arrested by
the police authorities, he also admitted that he did not know any of the prosecution
witnesses prior to his trial. Moreover, he had filed no case against the police officers
whom he accused of mauling him to make him admit to the stabbing of Adovas. Asilan’s
“self-serving statements deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary
value over the testimony of the witnesses who testified on positive points.” [41]
Qualifying Circumstance of Treachery
Asilan pleads that treachery cannot be appreciated in the present case as the prosecution
failed to establish that he had consciously or deliberately adopted or chosen the mode of
attack employed upon Adovas to deprive him of an opportunity to defend himself or
retaliate. Asilan argues that mere suddenness of the attack is not enough to constitute
treachery. He further posits that while it may be true that he allegedly came from behind,
the “mode of attack could have occurred in a spur of the moment.”[42]
The RTC correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery in the killing of
Adovas.
The prosecution was able to sufficiently establish the attendance of treachery in the case
at bar. “It is basic in our penal law that treachery is present when the offender employs
means, methods or forms which tend directly and especially to insure the execution of the
crime, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.”[43] In People v. Tan,[44] this Court expounded on the concept of treachery as
follows:
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, without the slightest
provocation on the part of the person attacked. Treachery is present when the offender
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof, which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk
arising from the defense which the offended party might make. In the case at bar, the
attack on Magdalino Olos was treacherous, because he was caught off guard and was
therefore unable to defend himself, as testified to by the prosecution witnesses and as
indicated by the wounds inflicted on him.[45]
Both eyewitnesses testified on how Asilan attacked Adovas from behind. Adovas could
not have defended himself because Asilan stabbed him at his back
repeatedly sans provocation or warning. The deciding factor is that Asilan’s execution of
his attack made it impossible for Adovas to defend himself or retaliate. [46]
Sufficiency of the Information
Asilan also claims that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against him was infringed when he was convicted for Murder, since the
manner by which he carried out the killing with the qualifying circumstance of treachery
was not alleged in the Information against him. Thus, he asserts, he was effectively only
charged with Homicide.[47]
This Court does not find merit in Asilan’s contention that he cannot be convicted of
murder because his acts of treachery were not alleged with specificity in the Information.
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states:
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint or information is sufficient

if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts
or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party;
the approximate time of the commission of the offense; and the place wherein the offense
was committed.
This Court held that “[u]nder Section 6, the Information is sufficient if it contains the full
name of the accused, the designation of the offense given by the statute, the acts or
omissions constituting the offense, the name of the offended party, the approximate date,
and the place of the offense.”[48] The Information herein complied with these conditions.
Contrary to Asilan’s contention, the qualifying circumstance of “treachery” was
specifically alleged in the Information. “The rule is that qualifying circumstances must
be properly pleaded in the Information in order not to violate the accused’s constitutional
right to be properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.” [49]
Asilan never claimed that he was deprived of his right to be fully apprised of the nature
of the charges against him due to the insufficiency of the Information.
This Court completely agrees with the Court of Appeals’ pronouncement that “since
treachery was correctly alleged in the Information and duly established by the
prosecution, x x x [Asilan]’s conviction for the crime of murder is proper.”[50]
In any case, it is now too late for Asilan to assail the sufficiency of the Information on the
ground that there was failure to specifically allege therein how treachery was carried out.
Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor.- The failure of the
accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or
information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same
in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the
grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of this Rule.
Moreover, in People v. Candaza,[51] this Court held that “[a]n Information which lacks
essential allegations may still sustain a conviction when the accused fails to object to its
sufficiency during the trial, and the deficiency was cured by competent evidence
presented therein.”[52] In this case, Asilan not only failed to question the sufficiency of
the Information at any time during the pendency of his case before the RTC, he also
allowed the prosecution to present evidence, proving the elements of treachery in the
commission of the offense. Asilan is thus deemed to have waived any objections against
the sufficiency of the Information.[53]
Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence,[54] this Court is increasing the award of civil

indemnity from Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(P75,000.00), and the moral damages from Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) to
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00). Moreover, in view of the presence of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery, an additional award of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00),
as exemplary damages, in accordance with Article 2230 of the Civil Code, [55] should be
awarded to the heirs of Adovas.[56]
As to actual damages, Adovas’s widow, Irene Adovas, presented the receipts showing
that she paid P25,224.00 to Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital, Inc., as hospital expenses,
[57]
P35,000.00 to Marulas Memorial Homes,[58] and P20,000.00 to Funeraria Saranay as
funeral expenses,[59] or a total of P80,224.00.
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals failed to consider that under Article 2206 of the
Civil Code, Asilan is also liable for the loss of the earning capacity of Adovas, and such
indemnity should be paid to his heirs[60]:
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at
least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances.
In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and
the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be
assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical
disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
Irene Adovas testified[61] on the amount her husband received as police officer and
presented documentary evidence to show that Adovas, who was only 29 years old when
he died, [62] earned P8,605.00 a month[63] at the time of his death.
The following are the factors in computing the amount of damages recoverable for the
loss of earning capacity of the deceased:
1) The number of years on the basis of which the damages shall be computed. This is
based on the formula (2/3 x 80 – age of the deceased at the time of his death = life
expectancy), which is adopted from the American Expectancy Table of Mortality; and
2) The rate at which the losses sustained by the heirs of the deceased should be fixed. [64]
Net income is arrived at by deducting the amount of the victim’s living expenses from the
amount of his gross income.[65] The loss of earning capacity of Asilan is thus computed
as follows:
Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy x [gross annual income – living expenses][66]
= 2/3 [80-age at time of death] x [gross annual income – 50% of gross annual income]
= 2/3 [80-29] x [P103,260.00 – P51,630.00]
= 34 x P51,630.00
= P1,755,420.00
WHEREFORE, the decision dated February 25, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02686 is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as it found accused-appellant
Joseph Asilan y Tabornal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER and sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with MODIFICATION as to the damages.
Asilan is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of Randy Adovas y Pe-caat the following:
(a) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P50,000.00 as moral damages; (c) P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages; (d) P80,224.00 as actual damages; (e) P1,755,420.00 as loss of
earning capacity; and (f) interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 6% per
annum from the date of finality of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 189343, July 10, 2013 ]
BENILDA N. BACASMAS, PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. NO. 189369]
ALAN C. GAVIOLA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

RESPONDENT.
[G.R. NO. 189553]
EUSTAQUIO B. CESA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

RESPONDENT.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
Before us are three consolidated cases: (1) Petition for Review on Certiorari [1] dated 16
September 2009 (G.R. No. 189343), (2) Petition for Review on Certiorari[2] dated 15
September 2009 (G.R. No. 189369), and (3) Petition for Review on Certiorari[3] dated 12
October 2009 (G.R. No. 189553). All assail the Decision[4] in Crim. Case No. 26914
dated 7 May 2009 of the Sandiganbayan, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, accused Alan C. Gaviola (“Gaviola”), Eustaquio B. Cesa

(“Cesa”), Benilda N. Bacasmas (“Bacasmas”) and Edna J. Jaca (“Jaca”) are
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act
No. 3019 and are sentenced to suffer in prison the penalty of 12 years and 1 month to 15
years. They also have to suffer perpetual disqualification from holding any public office
and to indemnify jointly and severally the City Government of Cebu the amount of Nine
Million Eight Hundred Ten Thousand, Seven Hundred Fifty-two and 60/100 Pesos (Php
9,810,752.60).[5] (Emphases in the original)
The Petitions also question the Resolution[6] dated 27 August 2009 denying the Motions
for Reconsideration[7] of the Decision dated 7 May 2009.
Antecedent Facts
All the petitioners work for the City Government of Cebu.[8] Benilda B. Bacasmas
(Bacasmas), the Cash Division Chief, is the petitioner in G.R. No. 189343.[9] Alan C.
Gaviola (Gaviola), the City Administrator, is the petitioner in G.R. No. 189369.[10]
Eustaquio B. Cesa (Cesa), the City Treasurer, is the petitioner in G.R. No. 189553. [11]
By virtue of their positions, they are involved in the process of approving and releasing
cash advances for the City. The procedure is as follows:
A written request for a cash advance is made by paymaster Luz Gonzales (Gonzales),
who then submits it to Cash Division Chief Bacasmas for approval. Once the latter
approves the request, she affixes her initials to the voucher, which she forwards to City
Treasurer Cesa for his signature in the same box. By signing, Bacasmas and Cesa certify
that the expense or cash advance is necessary, lawful, and incurred under their direct
supervision.[12]
Thereafter, the voucher is forwarded to City Accountant Edna C. Jaca (Jaca) for
processing and pre-audit. She also signs the voucher to certify that there is adequate
available funding/budgetary allotment; that the expenditures are properly certified and
supported by documents; and that previous cash advances have been liquidated and
accounted for. She then prepares an Accountant’s Advice (Advice).[13]
This Advice is returned with the voucher to the Chief Cashier for the preparation of the
check. After it has been prepared, she affixes her initials to the check, which Cesa then
signs. Afterwards, City Administrator Gaviola approves the voucher and countersigns
the check.[14]
The voucher, the Advice, and the check are then returned to the Cash Division, where
Gonzales signs the receipt portion of the voucher, as well as the Check Register to
acknowledge receipt of the check for encashment.[15]
Upon receipt of the check, Gonzales encashes it at the bank, signs the voucher, and
records the cash advance in her Individual Paymaster Cashbook. She then liquidates it
within five days after payment.[16]
A report of those cash advances liquidated by Gonzales is called a Report of

Disbursement (RD). An RD must contain the audit voucher number, the names of the
local government employees who were paid using the money from the cash advance, the
amount for each employee, as well as the receipts. The RDs are examined and verified
by the City Auditor and are thereafter submitted to the Cash Division for recording in the
official cash book.[17]
On 4 March 1998, COA issued Office Order No. 98-001 creating a team to conduct an
examination of the cash and accounts of the accountable officers of the Cash Division,
City Treasurer’s Office of Cebu City.[18]
This team conducted a surprise cash count on 5 March 1998.[19] The examination
revealed an accumulated shortage of ?9,810,752.60 from 20 September 1995 to 5
March 1998 from the cash and accounts of Gonzales.[20] The team found that Bacasmas,
Gaviola, Cesa, and Jaca failed to follow the above-mentioned procedure, thus facilitating
the loss of more than nine million pesos on the part of the city government. Specifically,
the team said in its report that there were irregularities in the grant, utilization, and
liquidation of cash advances; shortages were concealed; and inaccurate and misleading
pieces of information were included in the financial statements.[21] These irregularities
were manifested in the following: additional cash advances were granted even if previous
cash advances had not yet been liquidated, cash advance vouchers for salaries were not
supported by payrolls or lists of payees, and cash advances for salaries and wages were
not liquidated within five days after each 15th day or end-of-the-month pay period.[22]
The report stated that Bacasmas, Gaviola, Cesa, and Jaca not only signed, certified, and
approved the cash advance vouchers, but also signed and countersigned the checks
despite the deficiencies, which amounted to a violation of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7160;
Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1445; and the circulars issued by the Commission on
Audit (COA), specifically COA Circular Nos. 90-331, 92-382 and 97-002. [23] According
to the COA, the violation of the foregoing laws, rules, and regulations facilitated the loss
of a huge amount of public funds at the hands of Gonzales.[24]
Hence, an Information[25] was filed with the Sandiganbayan on 30 July 2001 against

Bacasmas, Gaviola, Cesa, and Jaca, to wit:
That on or about the 5th day of March 1998, and for sometime prior and subsequent
thereto, at Cebu City, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, above-named accused, ALAN C. GAVIOLA, EUSTAQUIO B. CESA,
BENILDA N. BACASMAS and EDNA J. JACA, public officers, being then the City
Administrator, City Treasurer, Cash Division Chief and City Accountant, respectively, of
the Cebu City Government, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to
Office, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with each other [sic],
with deliberate intent, with manifest partiality, evident bad faith and with gross
inexcusable negligence, did then and there allow LUZ M. GONZALES, Accountant I,
Disbursing Officer-Designate of the Cebu City Government, to obtain cash advances
despite the fact that she has previous unliquidated cash advances, thus allowing LUZ M.
GONZALES to accumulate Cash Advances amounting to NINE MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED TEN THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO PESOS AND 60/100
(?9,810,752.60), PHILIPPINE CURRENCY, which remains unliquidated, thus accused
in the performance of their official functions, had given unwarranted benefits to LUZ M.
GONZALES and themselves, to the damage and prejudice of the government,
particularly the Cebu City Government.[26]
The prosecution presented the testimonies of the COA Auditors who had conducted the
examination on the cash and accounts of Gonzales: Cecilia Chan, Jovita Gabison,
Sulpicio Quijada, Jr., Villanilo Ando, Jr., and Rosemarie Picson.[27] The COA Narrative
Report[28] on the results of the examination of the cash and accounts of Gonzales covering
the period 20 September 1995 to 05 March 1998 was also introduced as evidence.[29]
Bacasmas testified in her own defense. She said that she could not be held liable,
because it was not her responsibility to examine the cash book. She pointed to Jaca and
the City Auditor as the ones responsible for determining whether the paymaster had
existing unliquidated cash advances. Bacasmas further testified that she allowed the
figures to be rounded off to the nearest million without totalling the net payroll, because
it was customary to round off the cash advance to the nearest amount.[30]
Cesa averred that Jaca was the approving authority in granting cash advances. Hence,
when he signed the vouchers, he merely relied on Jaca’s certification that Gonzales had
already liquidated her cash advances. Besides, he said, he had already delegated the
function of determining whether the amount stated in the disbursement voucher was
equal to the net pay, because it was humanly impossible for him to supervise all the
personnel of his department.[31]
Jaca admitted that cash advances were granted even if there were no liquidations, so that
salaries could be paid on time, because cash advances usually overlapped with the
previous one. Additionally, she acknowledged that when she affixed her signatures to the
vouchers despite the non-attachment of the payrolls, she was aware that Gonzales still
had unliquidated cash advances.[32]
Lastly, Gaviola claimed that when he affixed his signatures, he was not aware of any
anomaly. Allegedly, he only signed on the basis of the signatures of Cesa and Jaca. [33]
The Sandiganbayan, in its Decision dated 7 May 2009, did not give credence to the
defense of the accused, but instead afforded significant weight to the COA Narrative
Report submitted in evidence. It found that the accused, as public officers, had acted
with gross inexcusable negligence by religiously disregarding the instructions for
preparing a disbursement voucher and by being totally remiss in their respective duties
and functions under the Local Government Code of 1991.[34] Their gross inexcusable
negligence amounted to bad faith, because they still continued with the illegal practice
even if they admittedly had knowledge of the relevant law and COA rules and
regulations.[35] The Sandiganbayan held that the acts of the accused had caused not only
undue injury to the government because of the P9,810,752.60 shortage, but also gave
unwarranted benefit to Gonzales by allowing her to obtain cash advances to which she
was not entitled.[36] Lastly, it found conspiracy to be present in the acts and omissions of
the accused showing that they had confederated, connived with, and mutually helped one
another in causing undue injury to the government through the loss of public money.[37]
Gaviola, Cesa, Bacasmas, and Jaca individually filed their Motions for Reconsideration
of the 7 May 2009 Decision.[38] Their motions impugned the sufficiency of the
Information and the finding of gross inexcusable negligence, undue injury, and
unwarranted benefit.[39] To support their innocence, they invoked the cases of Arias v.
Sandiganbayan,[40] Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan,[41] Sistoza v. Desierto,[42] Alejandro v.
People,[43] and Albert v. Gangan,[44] in which we held that the heads of office may rely to
a reasonable extent on their subordinates.[45] The Motion for Reconsideration of Jaca also
averred that her criminal and civil liabilities had been extinguished by her death on 24
May 2009.[46]
The Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution[47] promulgated 27 August 2009 denied the Motions

for Reconsideration of the accused. It ruled that the Information was sufficient, because
the three modes of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 commonly involved willful,
intentional, and conscious acts or omissions when there is a duty to act on the part of the
public official or employee.[48] Furthermore, the three modes may all be alleged in one
Information.[49] The Sandiganbayan held that the accused were all guilty of gross
inexcusable negligence. Claiming that it was the practice in their office, they admittedly
disregarded the observance of the law and COA rules and regulations on the approval and
grant of cash advances.[50] The anti-graft court also stated that the undue injury to the
government was unquestionable because of the shortage amounting to P9,810,752.60. [51]
It further declared that the aforementioned cases cited by the accused were inapplicable,
because there was paucity of evidence of conspiracy in these cases. [52] Here, conspiracy
was duly proven in that the silence and inaction of the accused - albeit ostensibly separate
and distinct - indicate, if taken collectively, that they are vital pieces of a common design.
[53]
Finally, the Sandiganbayan decided that although the criminal liability of Jaca was
extinguished upon her death, her civil liability remained.[54] Hence, the Motions for
Reconsideration were denied.[55]
Thus, Bacasmas, Gaviola, and Cesa filed their respective Petitions for Review on
Certiorari, in which they rehashed the arguments they had put forward in their Motions
for Reconsideration previously filed with the Sandiganbayan.
We resolved to consolidate the three Petitions on 23 November 2009.[56] The Office of

the Special Prosecutor was required to comment on the three Petitions,[57] after which
petitioners were instructed to file a Reply,[58] which they did.[59]
Petitioners, through their respective Petitions for Review on Certiorari and Comments,
bring these two main issues before us:
I. Whether the Information was sufficient; and
II. Whether petitioners are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e)
of Republic Act No. 3019
We deny the Petitions.
I.
The Information specified when the crime was committed,
and it named all of the accused and their alleged acts or
omissions constituting the offense charged.
An information is deemed sufficient if it contains the following: (a) the name of all the
accused; (b) the designation of the offense as given in the statute; (c) the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; (d) the name of the offended party;
(e) the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and (f) the place where the
offense was committed.
Cesa and Gaviola question the sufficiency of the Information on three grounds: first, it
did not specify a reasonable time frame within which the offense was committed, in
violation of their right to be informed of the charge against them; second, not all of the
accused were named, as Gonzales was not charged in the Information; and third, the
Information did not specify an offense, because negligence and conspiracy cannot co-
exist in a crime.
The Sandiganbayan earlier held that the Information was sufficient in that it contained no
inherent contradiction and properly charged an offense. We uphold its ruling for the
following reasons:
First, it is not necessary to state the precise date when the offense was committed, except
when it is a material ingredient thereof.[60] The offense may be alleged to have been
committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. [61] Here, the
date is not a material ingredient of the crime, not having been committed on one day
alone, but rather within a period of time ranging from 20 September 1995 to 5 March
1998. Hence, stating the exact dates of the commission of the crime is not only
unnecessary, but impossible as well. That the Information alleged a date and a period
during which the crime was committed was sufficient, because it duly informed
petitioners that before and until 5 March 1998, over nine million pesos had been taken by
Gonzales as a result of petitioners’ acts. These acts caused undue injury to the
government and unwarranted benefits to the said paymaster.
Second, the Information charges petitioners with violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, to
wit:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public

of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful.
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence.
Cesa contends that Gonzales should have been included in the Information, because the
latter incurred cash shortages and allegedly had unliquidated cash advances. [62] Cesa is
wrong. The Information seeks to hold petitioners accountable for their actions, which
allowed Gonzales to obtain cash advances, and paved the way for her to incur cash
shortages, leading to a loss of over nine million pesos. Thus, the Information correctly
excluded her because her alleged acts did not fall under the crime charged in the
Information.
Third and last, the Information sufficiently specified the offense that violated Section 3(e)
of R.A. 3019, the essential elements of which are as follows:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or

official functions;
2. The accused must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence; and
3. The action of the accused caused undue injury to any party, including the
government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of the functions of the accused.[63]
The Information is sufficient, because it adequately describes the nature and cause of the
accusation against petitioners,[64] namely the violation of the aforementioned law. The
use of the three phrases – “manifest partiality,” “evident bad faith” and “inexcusable
negligence” - in the same Information does not mean that three distinct offenses were
thereby charged but only implied that the offense charged may have been committed
through any of the modes provided by the law.[65] In addition, there was no inconsistency
in alleging both the presence of conspiracy and gross inexcusable negligence, because the
latter was not simple negligence. Rather, the negligence involved a willful, intentional,
and conscious indifference to the consequences of one’s actions or omissions. [66]
II.
Petitioners’ gross negligence amounting to bad faith,
the undue injury to the government, and the unwarranted
benefits given to Gonzales, were all proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Petitioners do not controvert the first element of the offense but assail the
Sandiganbayan’s finding of gross inexcusable negligence, undue injury and unwarranted
benefit. Nevertheless, their contention must fail.
Petitioners committed gross negligence amounting

to bad faith when they approved and disbursed the
cash advances in violation of law and rules and
regulations.
Petitioners - being the Cash Division Chief, City Treasurer and City Administrator - have
to comply with R.A. 7160, P.D. 1445, and COA Circulars 90-331, 92-382, and 97-002 on
the proper procedure for the approval and grant of cash advances. These laws and rules
and regulations state that cash advances can only be disbursed for a legally authorized
specific purpose and cannot be given to officials whose previous cash advances have not
been settled or properly accounted for.[67] Cash advances should also be equal to the net
amount of the payroll for a certain pay period, and they should be supported by the
payroll or list of payees and their net payments.[68]
However, petitioners failed to observe the foregoing. We quote hereunder the findings of
the COA team as contained in its Narrative Report:
A. Granting, Utilization and Liquidation of cash advances:
1. During the period, September 20, 1995 to March 5, 1998, records and
verification documents show that additional cash advances were granted
(Annex 13), even if the previous cash advances were not yet liquidated.
It resulted in excessive granting of cash advances, which created the

opportunity to misappropriate public funds since excess or idle funds were
placed in the hands of the paymaster under her total control and disposal.
This is in violation of Section 89, PD 1445; Section 339, RA 7160 and
paragraph 4.1.2 of COA Circular No. 97-002.
2. The amounts of cash advances for salary payments were not equal to

the net amount of the payroll for a pay period in violation of par. 4.2.1.
COA Circular No. 90-331. Section 48 (g), COA Circular No. 92-382
and par. 4.2.1, COA Circular No. 97-002. In fact, all cash advance
vouchers for salaries were not supported by payrolls or list of payees to
determine the amount of the cash advance to be granted, and that the
face of the disbursement voucher (sample voucher marked as Annex
14) did not indicate the specific office/ department and period covered
for which the cash advance was granted in violation of par. 4.1.5 COA
Cir. No. 90-331, Section 48(e) COA Cir. 92-382 and par. 4.1.7 and 4.2.2
COA Cir No. 97-002. The amount of the cash advance could therefore be
in excess of the required amount of the payroll to be paid since it can not be
determined which payroll, pay period and department employees are going
to be paid by the amount drawn. Consequently, the liquidations which were
made later, cannot identify which particular cash advances are liquidated,
considering that there are other previous cash advances not yet liquidated,
thus resulting in the failure to control cash on hand.
3. Cash advances for salaries and wages were not liquidated within 5 days
after each 15 day/end of the month pay period in violation of par. 5.1.1
COA Cir. 90-331 and 97-002 and Section 48 (k) of COA Cir No. 92-382.
In fact, the balance of unliquidated cash advance as of December 31,
1997 per audit, amounted to P 10,602,527.90 consisting of
P6,388,147.94, P3,205,373.16 and P 1,009,006.80 for General, SEF and
Trust Fund (Annex 15) respectively, in violation of Par. 5.8 COA Cir
Nos. 90-331 and 97-002 and Section 48 (o) COA Cir. No. 92-
382. However, the balance shown was understated as of December 31,
1997 by P2,395,517.08 as discussed in items D.2 pages 15 & 16.
Records showed that part of the total cash advances of P12,000,000.00

appears to have been used to liquidate partially the previous year’s
unliquidated cash advance/balance of P10,602,527.90 since the
accountable officer liquidated her cash advance by way of cash
refunds/returns from January 8-14, 1998 in the total amount of
P8,076,382.36 (Annex 15 E) in violation of par. 4.1.5 COA Cir. 90-331,
Section 48 of COA Cir 92-382 and par. 4.1.7 of COA Cir. 97-002.
The concerned City Officials (refer to Part III of this report) signed,
certified and approved the disbursements/cash advance vouchers, and
signed and countersigned the corresponding checks despite the deficiencies
which are violations of laws, rules and regulations mentioned in the
preceding paragraphs.
The accountable officer was able to accumulate excess or idle funds

within her total control and disposal, resulting in the loss of public
funds, due to the flagrant violations by the concerned city officials of
the abovementioned laws, rules and regulations.
On the other hand, the verification and reconciliation of the

paymaster’s accountability cannot be determined immediately because
the submission of financial reports and its supporting schedules and
vouchers/payrolls by the Accounting Division was very much delayed
(Annex 16), in violation of Section 122, PD 1445, despite several
communications from the Auditor to submit said reports, latest of which is
attached as Annex 16.a.
xxxx
D. The following practices of the Office of the City Accountant resulted in

inaccurate and misleading information in the financial statements including the
balance of unliquidated cash advances in violation of Section 111 and 112 of PD
1445:
1. Cash returns made on January 8 to 14, 1998 were recorded in the accounting
records as credits to Mrs. Gonzales accountability in December 1997 amounting to
P8,075,382.36 as shown in the subsidiary ledger (Annex 20. 1-4) and as evidenced
by the official receipts (Annex 20a. 1-6) as follows:
xxxx
2. Some liquidations/ disbursements in January 1998 were included as credits to

accountability or a reduction of the paymaster's accountability as of December
1997 amounting to P2,395,517.08.
xxxx
3. Verification of accounting records maintained in the Accounting Division revealed

that the index cards (Annex 21) as a control device in the processing of cash
advance voucher recorded only cash advances granted to Paymaster. It failed to
show the liquidations/ disposition of public funds. Hence, unliquidated balance of
cash advances can not be determined at a glance when a cash advance voucher is
being processed by the accounting personnel.
E. Other Deficiencies:
1. There were two claimants who alleged that they did not receive the financial aid
intended for them as fire victims. However, payroll showed that there were
initials/signatures indicated therein acknowledging receipt of said claim.
2. There were two (2) cash advance vouchers (Annex 22b. 1-2) which bear no
approval of proper official in BOX marked as “C” hereof, yet checks were issued
in violation of Section 4.5 of PD 1445 which provide that disbursement or
disposition of government funds of property shall invariably bear the approval of
the proper officials. x x x
3. Accounting records showed that JV #354 under Trust Fund in the amount of
P147,200.00 was a liquidation on December 31, 1997. x x x one payroll
supporting the JV was signed by only one (1) person x x x. The other two payrolls
supporting the JV were not signed/ approved by the concerned officials, which
means that the payrolls were not valid disbursements.[69] (Emphases supplied)
The above findings of the COA cannot be any clearer in thoroughly describing the illegal
and anomalous practices of the accused which led to the loss of P9,810,752.60 in
people’s money.
When he testified before the anti-graft court, Bacasmas admitted that she did not consider
the net pay, which was lower than the amount requested, when she affixed her signature
to the vouchers, because it was supposedly common practice for the paymaster to round
off the figures.[70] Furthermore, she signed the vouchers after relying on the
representation of Jaca, Cesa, and Gaviola.[71]
During his direct and cross-examination, Gaviola admitted that he had affixed his
signature to the vouchers, because they had already been signed by Bacasmas, Cesa, and
Jaca despite the incompleteness thereof - the periods covered by the vouchers were not
stated; the employees who were to be paid by the cash advance were not specified; no
supporting documents were attached to the cash advances requested; and there was no
determination of whether the amounts requested were equivalent to the net pay. [72]
Cesa said that because it was impossible for him to supervise all the personnel, he
instructed Bacasmas to examine and check the documents before signing them. [73] Thus,
once Cesa saw the signature of Bacasmas, he immediately assumed that the documents
were in order, and he then signed the vouchers.[74]
These facts show that petitioners failed to act in accordance with their respective duties in
the grant of cash advances. Moreover they repeatedly failed to do so. Bacasmas signed
294 requests for cash advance, 11 disbursement vouchers, and 7 checks. Cesa signed
cash advance requests and 299 disbursement vouchers. Gaviola approved 303
disbursement vouchers and signed 355 checks.
All these acts demonstrate that petitioners, as correctly found by the Sandiganbayan, were
guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith. Gross and inexcusable negligence is
characterized by a want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation
in which there is a duty to act - not inadvertently, but wilfully and intentionally, with
conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons are affected. [75] Bad faith
does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence.[76] It imports a dishonest
purpose or some moral obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known
duty due to some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud.[77]
Petitioners were well aware of their responsibilities before they affixed their signatures
on the cash advance vouchers. Yet, they still chose to disregard the requirements laid
down by law and rules and regulations by approving the vouchers despite the incomplete
information therein, the previous unliquidated cash advances, the absence of payroll to
support the cash requested, and the disparity between the requested cash advances and the
total net pay. What is worse is that they continue to plead their innocence, allegedly for
the reason that it was “common practice” in their office not to follow the law and rules
and regulations to the letter. For them to resort to that defense is preposterous,
considering that as public employees they are required to perform and discharge their
duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill. [78]
The law and the rules are clear and do not provide for exceptions.
Petitioners’ acts show that they were unified
in illegally approving irregular cash advance
vouchers in order to defraud the government.
As found by the Sandiganbayan, petitioners’ acts not only show gross negligence
amounting to bad faith, but, when taken together, also show that there was conspiracy in
their willful noncompliance with their duties in order to defraud the government.
In order to establish the existence of conspiracy, unity of purpose and unity in the
execution of an unlawful objective by the accused must be proven.[79] Direct proof is not
essential to show conspiracy.[80] It is enough that there be proof that two or more persons
acted towards the accomplishment of a common unlawful objective through a chain of
circumstances, even if there was no actual meeting among them. [81]
A cash advance request cannot be approved and disbursed without passing through
several offices, including those of petitioners. It is outrageous that they would have us
believe that they were not in conspiracy when over hundreds of vouchers were signed and
approved by them in a course of 30 months, without their noticing irregularities therein
that should have prompted them to refuse to sign the vouchers. Clearly, they were in
cahoots in granting the cash advances to Gonzales. By these acts, petitioners defrauded
the government of such a large sum of money that should not have been disbursed in the
first place, had they been circumspect in performing their functions.
Not only were petitioners unified in defrauding the government, but they were also
unified in not reporting the negligence of their cohorts because of their own negligence.
Cesa himself admitted knowing that Gonzales had unliquidated cash advances, yet he
signed the vouchers. He also failed to inform the other officials that they should not sign
the vouchers and tolerated their negligence when they affixed their signatures thereto.
Petitioners, through their admissions before the Sandiganbayan, all knew that there were
irregularities in the vouchers; still they failed to correct one another, because they
themselves signed the vouchers despite the glaring irregularities therein.
Petitioners cannot hide behind our declaration in Arias v. Sandiganbayan[82] that heads of

offices cannot be convicted of a conspiracy charge just because they did not personally
examine every single detail before they, as the final approving authorities, affixed their
signatures to certain documents. The Court explained in that case that conspiracy was
not adequately proven, contrary to the case at bar in which petitioners’ unity of purpose
and unity in the execution of an unlawful objective were sufficiently established. Also,
unlike in Arias, where there were no reasons for the heads of offices to further examine
each voucher in detail, petitioners herein, by virtue of the duty given to them by law as
well as by rules and regulations, had the responsibility to examine each voucher to
ascertain whether it was proper to sign it in order to approve and disburse the cash
advance.
Petitioners wrongly approved Gonzales’ cash

advance vouchers, thereby causing a loss to
the government in the amount of P9,810,752.60.
The third element of the offense is that the action of the offender caused undue injury to
any party, including the government; or gave any party any unwarranted benefit,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his or her functions. Here, the
Sandiganbayan found that petitioners both brought about undue injury to the government
and gave unwarranted benefit to Gonzales. It is not mistaken.
Undue injury means actual damage.[83] It must be established by evidence[84] and must

have been caused by the questioned conduct of the offenders.[85] On the other hand,
unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference means giving a gain of any kind without
justification or adequate reasons.[86]
When a cash examination is conducted, the paymaster should present her cashbook, cash,
and cash items for examination.[87] Upon assessment thereof in the instant case, it was
discovered that P9,810,752.60 was missing, as plainly evidenced by the COA Narrative
Report, from which we quote:
Balance last cash examination, September 20, 1995 P 2,685,719.78

Add: Cash Advances received – September 20, 1995 to March 5,
1998
Gen. Fund 193,320,350.00
SEF 107,400,600.00
Trust Fund 3,989,783.00 304,710,733.00
Total: P 307,396,452.78
Less: Liquidations – September 20, 1995 to March 5, 1998
Gen. Fund 187,290,452.66
SEF 105,243,526.99
Trust Fund 2,750,722.51 295,284,752.16
Balance of Accountability, March 5, 1998 P 12,111,700.62
Less: Inventory of Cash and Cash Items Allowed 2,300,948.02
Shortage P 9,810,752.60[88]
(Emphasis supplied)
It is beside the point that no one complained about not receiving any salary from the city
government. The fact remains that more than nine million pesos was missing – public
funds lost, to the detriment of the government.
This undue injury was brought about by petitioners’ act of approving the cash advance
vouchers of Gonzales even if they lacked the requirements prescribed by law and rules
and regulations, and even if Gonzales had failed to liquidate her previous cash advances,
thereby clearly giving her an unwarranted benefit.
No less than the Constitution declares that public office is a public trust. [89] Public
officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people and serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency.[90] Petitioners, by
intentionally approving deficient cash advance vouchers, have manifestly failed to live up
to this constitutional standard.
III.
The indeterminate penalty of 12 years and one
month as minimum to 15 years as maximum is fully justified.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the offense is punished by a special law such
as R.A. 3019, the trial court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by this law, and the
minimum term shall not be less than the minimum prescribed by the same law. The
penalty for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 is “imprisonment for not less than six
years and one month nor more than fifteen years, perpetual disqualification from public
office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any prohibited
interest and unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other
lawful income.” Hence, the indeterminate penalty of 12 years and 1 month as minimum
to 15 years as maximum imposed by the Sandiganbayan in the present case is within the
range fixed by law.
However, we are aware that if the range of imposable penalty under the law were to be
divided into three tiers based on the length of imprisonment, the penalty imposed in this
case would be on the highest tier. Hence, the Sandiganbayan should have explained the
reason behind its imposed penalty, for while Section 9 of R.A. 3019 seems to grant it
discretion over the indeterminate penalty to be prescribed for violation of Section 3(e),
this Court finds it only proper that the anti-graft court justify the latter’s imposition of the
highest possible penalty. Otherwise, the exercise of this discretion would appear to be
whimsical – something that this Court will not tolerate. After all, it is our duty to be
vigilant in ensuring the correctness and justness of the ultimate adjudication of cases
before us.
Nevertheless, we find the imposition of the highest range of imposable penalty in this
case to be fully justified. In Jaca v. People of the Philippines,[91] promulgated on 28
January 2013, the Court convicted the very same petitioners herein of exactly the same
kinds of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 as those in the present case and imposed
therein the indeterminate penalty of 12 years and 1 month as minimum to 15 years as
maximum. The violations in that case arose from acts of gross inexcusable
negligence similar in all respects to those committed in this case, except for the amount
of cash shortages involved and the identity of the paymaster who benefitted from the acts
of petitioners. Even the period covered by the COA audit in Jaca – 20 September 1995 to
5 March 1998 – is exactly the same as that in the present case. It is therefore clear that the
Court has previously determined these identical acts to be so perverse as to justify the
penalty of imprisonment of 12 years and 1 month as minimum to 15 years as maximum.
Hence, we adopt the same penalty in this case.
Indeed, the penalty imposed is justified, considering the extent of the negligent acts
involved in this case in terms of the number of statutory laws and regulations violated by
petitioners and the number of positive duties neglected. The Court emphasizes that
petitioners violated not just one but several provisions of various regulations and laws
namely: Sections 89 and 122 of P.D. 1445, Section 339 of R.A. 7160, paragraphs 4.1.2,
4.1.7, 4.2.1, 4.2.2, and 5.1.1 of COA Circular No. 97-002, paragraphs 4.2.1, 4.1.5, and
5.1.1 of COA Circular No. 90-331, and Section 48 (g), (e), and (k) of COA Circular No.
92-382. Worse, they admitted being aware of these regulations. These circumstances,
coupled with the number of times such instances of violations and negligence were
wantonly and systematically repeated, show that their acts bordered on malice. Hence, we
are convinced that the penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan is warranted.
Furthermore, we take judicial notice of the need to stop these corrupt practices that drain
local government coffers of millions of pesos in taxpayers’ money, which could have
been utilized for sorely needed services. In fact, as discussed in its Narrative Report, the
COA team found instances where fire victims alleged that they did not receive the
financial aid intended for them and yet the payroll showed that there were
initials/signatures indicated therein acknowledging receipt of said claim. This diversion
of people’s money from their intended use has to end.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the 07 May 2009 Decision and 27 August
2009 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case No. 26914 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 166414, October 22, 2014 ]
GODOFREDO ENRILE AND DR. FREDERICK ENRILE, PETITIONERS,
VS. HON. DANILO A. MANALASTAS (AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MALOLOS BULACAN, BR. VII), HON. ERANIO G.
CEDILLO, SR., (AS PRESIDING JUDGE, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF
MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN, BR. 1) AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The remedy against the denial of a motion to quash is for the movant accused to
enter a plea, go to trial, and should the decision be adverse, reiterate on appeal from
the final judgment and assign as error the denial of the motion to quash. The denial,
being an interlocutory order, is not appealable, and may not be the subject of a petition
for certiorari because of the availability of other remedies in the ordinary course of law.
Antecedents
Petitioners Godofredo Enrile and Dr. Frederick Enrile come to the Court on appeal,
seeking to reverse and undo the adverse resolutions promulgated on August 31,
2004[1] and December 21, 2004,[2] whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) respectively
dismissed their petition for certiorari and prohibition (assailing the dismissal of their
petition for certiorari by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7, in Malolos, Bulacan,
presided by RTC Judge Danilo A. Manalastas, to assail the denial of their motions to
quash the two informations charging them with less serious physical injuries by the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Meycauayan, Bulacan), and denied their motion for
reconsideration anent such dismissal.
The mauling incident involving neighbors that transpired on January 18, 2003 outside
the house of the petitioners in St. Francis Subdivision, Barangay Pandayan, Meycauayan
Bulacan gave rise to the issue subject of this appeal. Claiming themselves to be the
victims in that mauling, Josefina Guinto Morano,[3] Rommel Morano and Perla Beltran
Morano charged the petitioners and one Alfredo Enrile[4] in the MTC with frustrated
homicide (victim being Rommel) in Criminal Case No. 03-275; with less serious physical
injuries (victim being Josefina) in Criminal Case No. 03-276; and with less serious
physical injuries (victim being Perla) in Criminal Case No. 03-277, all of the MTC of
Meycauayan, Bulacan on August 8, 2003 after the parties submitted their respective
affidavits, the MTC issued its joint resolution,[5] whereby it found probable cause against
the petitioners for less serious physical injuries in Criminal Case No. 03-276 and Criminal
Case No. 03-277, and set their arraignment on September 8, 2003. On August 19, 2003,
the petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the joint resolution, arguing that the
complainants had not presented proof of their having been given medical attention
lasting 10 days or longer, thereby rendering their charges of less serious physical injuries
dismissible; and that the two cases for less serious physical injuries, being necessarily
related to the case of frustrated homicide still pending in the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor, should not be governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure. [6] On
November 11, 2003, the MTC denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration
because the grounds of the motion had already been discussed and passed upon in the
resolution sought to be reconsidered; and because the cases were governed by the
Rules on Summary Procedure, which prohibited the motion for reconsideration.
[7]
Thereafter, the petitioners presented a manifestation with motion to quash and a
motion for the deferment of the arraignment.[8]
On February 11, 2004, the MTC denied the motion to quash, and ruled that the cases for
less serious physical injuries were covered by the rules on ordinary procedure; and
reiterated the arraignment previously scheduled on March 15, 2004. [9] It explained its
denial of the motion to quash in the following terms, to wit:
x x x x
As to the Motion to Quash, this Court cannot give due course to said motion. A perusal
of the records shows that the grounds and/or issues raised therein are matters of
defense that can be fully ventilated in a full blown trial on the merits.
Accordingly, Criminal Cases Nos. 03-276 and 03-277 both for Less Serious Physical
Injuries are hereby ordered tried under the ordinary procedure.
The Motion to Quash is hereby DENIED for reasons aforestated.
Meanwhile, set these cases for arraignment on March 15, 2004 as previously scheduled.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Still, the petitioners sought reconsideration of the denial of the motion to quash, but the
MTC denied their motion on March 25, 2004. [11]
Unsatisfied, the petitioners commenced a special civil action for certiorari assailing the
order dated February 11, 2004 denying their motion to quash, and the order dated
March 25, 2004 denying their motion for reconsideration. The special civil action
for certiorari was assigned to Branch 7, presided by RTC Judge Manalastas.
On May 25, 2004, the RTC Judge Manalastas dismissed the petition
for certiorari because:
As could be gleaned from the order of the public respondent dated February 11,
2004, the issues raised in the motion to quash are matters of defense that could only be
threshed out in a full blown trial on the merits. Indeed, proof of the actual healing
period of the alleged injuries of the private complainants could only be established in
the trial of the cases filed against herein petitioners by means of competent evidence x x
x. On the other hand, this court is likewise not in a position, not being a trier of fact
insofar as the instant petition is concerned, to rule on the issue as to whether or not
there was probable cause to prosecute the petitioners for the alleged less physical
injuries with which they stand charged. x x x.
All things considered, it would be premature to dismiss, the subject criminal cases filed
against the herein petitioners when the basis thereof could be determined only after
trial on the merits. x x x.[12]
The petitioners moved for the reconsideration, but the RTC denied their motion on July
9, 2004.[13]
The petitioners next went to the CA via a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify
the orders issued by the RTC on May 25, 2004 and July 9, 2004, averring grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC. They urged
the dismissal of the criminal cases on the same grounds they advanced in the RTC.
However, on August 31, 2004, the CA promulgated its assailed resolution dismissing the
petition for certiorari and prohibition for being the wrong remedy, the proper remedy
being an appeal; and ruling that they should have filed their notice of appeal on or
before August 18, 2004 due to their receiving the order of July 9, 2004 on August 3,
2004.[14]
On December 21, 2004, the CA denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. [15]
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioners submit that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE TRIAL COURTS’ RULING
DENYING THE PETITIONERS' MOTION TO QUASH THE COMPLAINTS DESPITE THE CLEAR
AND PATENT SHOWING THAT BOTH COMPLAINTS, ON THEIR FACE, LACKED ONE OF THE
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE ALLEGED CRIME OF LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE INJURIES
SUSTAINED BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS WERE NOT PERPETRATED BY THE
PETITIONERS.[16]
Ruling of the Court
The CA did not commit any reversible errors.
Firstly, considering that the certiorari case in the RTC was an original action, the
dismissal of the petition for certiorari on May 25, 2004, and the denial of the motion for
reconsideration on July 9, 2004, were in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. As such,
the orders were final by reason of their completely disposing of the case, leaving
nothing more to be done by the RTC.[17] The proper recourse for the petitioners should
be an appeal by notice of appeal,[18] taken within 15 days from notice of the denial of the
motion for reconsideration.[19]
Yet, the petitioners chose to assail the dismissal by the RTC through petitions
for certiorari and prohibition in the CA, instead of appealing by notice of appeal. Such
choice was patently erroneous and impermissible, because certiorari and prohibition,
being extraordinary reliefs to address jurisdictional errors of a lower court, were not
available to them. Worthy to stress is that the RTC dismissed the petition
for certiorari upon its finding that the MTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in
denying the petitioners’ motion to quash. In its view, the RTC considered the denial of
the motion to quash correct, for it would be premature and unfounded for the MTC to
dismiss the criminal cases against the petitioners upon the supposed failure by the
complainants to prove the period of their incapacity or of the medical attendance for
them. Indeed, the time and the occasion to establish the duration of the incapacity or
medical attendance would only be at the trial on the merits.
Secondly, the motion to quash is the mode by which an accused, before entering his
plea, challenges the complaint or information for insufficiency on its face in point of law,
or for defects apparent on its face.[20] Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court enumerates the grounds for the quashal of the complaint or information, as
follows: (a) the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (b) the court trying the case
has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) the court trying the case has no
jurisdiction over the person of the accused; (d) the officer who filed the information had
no authority to do so; (e) the complaint or information does not conform substantially
to the prescribed form; (f) more than one offense is charged except when a single
punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law; (g) the criminal action or liability
has been extinguished; (h) the complaint or information contains averments which, if
true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and (i) the accused has been
previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
According to Section 6,[21] Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the complaint or information is

sufficient if it states the names of the accused; the designation of the offense given by
the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of
the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the
place where the offense was committed. The fundamental test in determining the
sufficiency of the averments in a complaint or information is, therefore, whether the
facts alleged therein, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of the offense.
[22]
By alleging in their motion to quash that both complaints should be dismissed for lack of
one of the essential elements of less serious physical injuries, the petitioners were
averring that the facts charged did not constitute offenses. To meet the test of
sufficiency, therefore, it is necessary to refer to the law defining the offense charged,
which, in this case, is Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code, which pertinently states:
Article 265. Less serious physical injuries – Any person who shall inflict upon
another physical injuries x x x which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor for
ten days or more, or shall require medical assistance for the same period, shall be
guilty of less serious physical injuries and shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor.
x x x x.
Based on the law, the elements of the crime of less serious physical injuries are, namely:
(1) that the offender inflicted physical injuries upon another; and (2) that the physical
injuries inflicted either incapacitated the victim for labor for 10 days or more, or the
injuries required medical assistance for more than 10 days.
Were the elements of the crime sufficiently averred in the complaints? To answer this
query, the Court refers to the averments of the complaints themselves, to wit:
Criminal Case No. 03-276
That on the 18th day of January 2003, at around 7:30 in the evening more or less, in
Brgy. Pandayan (St. Francis Subd.), Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan,
Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
named accused motivated by anger by conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
with another did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
strike the face of one JOSEFINA GUINTO MORAÑO, thereby inflicting upon his (sic)
physical injuries that will require a period of 10 to 12 days barring healing and will
incapacitate his customary labor for the same period of time attached Medical
Certificate (sic).
That on the 18th day of January 2003, at around 7:30 in the evening more or less, in
Brgy. Pandayan (St. Francis Subd.), Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan,
Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above
named accused MOTIVATED by anger did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and right and give hitting her head against pavement of one
PERLA BELTRAN MORAÑO inflicting the latter physical injuries and will require Medical
Attendance for a period of 12 to 15 days barring unforeseen complication as per
Medical Certificate hereto attached.
The aforequoted complaints bear out that the elements of less serious physical injuries
were specifically averred therein. The complaint in Criminal Case No. 03-276 stated that:
(a) the petitioners “wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and strike the face
of one JOSEFINA GUINTO MORAÑO;” and (b) the petitioners inflicted physical injuries
upon the complainant “that will require a period of 10 to 12 days barring healing and
will incapacitate his customary labor for the same period of time;” while that in Criminal
Case No. 03-277 alleged that: (a) the petitioners “wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and right and give hitting her head against pavement of one PERLA
BELTRAN MORAÑO;” and (b) the petitioners inflicted upon the complainant “physical
injuries [that] will require Medical Attendance for a period of 12 to 15 days barring
unforeseen complication.”
In the context of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,[25] the complaints sufficiently

charged the petitioners with less serious physical injuries. Indeed, the complaints only
needed to aver the ultimate facts constituting the offense, not the details of why and
how the illegal acts allegedly amounted to undue injury or damage, for such matters,
being evidentiary, were appropriate for the trial. Hence, the complaints were not
quashable.
In challenging the sufficiency of the complaints, the petitioners insist that the
“complaints do not provide any evidence/s that would tend to establish and to show
that the medical attendance rendered on private complainants actually and in fact
lasted for a period exceeding ten (10) days;” and the medical certificates attached
merely stated that “the probable disability period of healing is 10 to 12 days, for
Josefina G. Morano, and, 12-15 days, for Perla B. Morano, hence, the findings of the
healing periods were merely speculations, surmises and conjectures.” They insist that
the “private complainants should have presented medical certificates that would show
the number of days rendered for medication considering that they filed their complaint
on March 15, 2003 or about two (2) months after the alleged incident.” [26]
The petitioners’ insistence is utterly bereft of merit.
As the MTC and RTC rightly held, the presentation of the medical certificates to prove
the duration of the victims’ need for medical attendance or of their incapacity should
take place only at the trial, not before or during the preliminary investigation. According
to Cinco v. Sandiganbayan,[27] the preliminary investigation, which is the occasion for the
submission of the parties’ respective affidavits, counter-affidavits and evidence to
buttress their separate allegations, is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of
discovering whether a person may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the
prosecutor to prepare the information. [28] It is not yet a trial on the merits, for its only
purpose is to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is
probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. [29] The scope of the
investigation does not approximate that of a trial before the court; hence, what is
required is only that the evidence be sufficient to establish probable cause that the
accused committed the crime charged, not that all reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
accused be removed.[30]
We further agree with the RTC’s observation that “the issues raised in the motion to
quash are matters of defense that could only be threshed out in a full blown trial on the
merits. Indeed, proof of actual healing period of the alleged injuries of the private
complainant could only be established in the trial of the cases filed against herein
petitioners by means of competent evidence, and to grant the main prayer of the
instant petition for the dismissal of the criminal cases against them for less serious
physical injuries is to prevent the trial court to hear and receive evidence in connection
with said cases and to render judgments thereon. x x x All things considered, it would be
premature to dismiss the subject criminal cases filed against the herein petitioners when
the basis thereof could be determined only after trial of the merits.” [31]
And, lastly, in opting to still assail the denial of the motion to quash by the MTC by
bringing the special civil action for certiorari in the RTC, the petitioners deliberately
disregarded the fundamental conditions for initiating the special civil action
for certiorari. These conditions were, firstly, the petitioners must show that the
respondent trial court lacked jurisdiction or exceeded it, or gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and, secondly, because the denial was
interlocutory, they must show that there was no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.[32]
The petitioners’ disregard of the fundamental conditions precluded the success of their
recourse. To start with, the petitioners did not show that the MTC had no jurisdiction, or
exceeded its jurisdiction in denying the motion to quash, or gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in its denial. That showing was the door that
would have opened the way to their success with the recourse. Yet, the door remained
unopened to them because the denial by the MTC of the motion to quash was
procedurally and substantively correct because the duration of the physical incapacity
or medical attendance should be dealt with only during the trial on the merits, not at
the early stage of dealing with and resolving the motion to quash. As to the second
condition, the fact that the denial was interlocutory, not a final order, signified that the
MTC did not yet completely terminate its proceedings in the criminal cases. The proper
recourse of the petitioners was to enter their pleas as the accused, go to trial in the
MTC, and should the decision of the MTC be adverse to them in the end, reiterate the
issue on their appeal from the judgment and assign as error the unwarranted denial of
their motion to quash. [33] Certiorari was not available to them in the RTC because they
had an appeal, or another plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the

resolutions promulgated on August 31, 2004 and December 21, 2004; and ORDERS the
petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 180122, March 13, 2009 ]
FELICISIMO F. LAZARTE, JR., PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
(FIRST DIVISION) AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari[1] under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
assailing the Resolution[2] dated 2 March 2007 of the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26583 entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Robert
P. Balao, et al.," which denied petitioner Felicisimo F. Lazarte, Jr.'s Motion to Quash.
The Resolution[3] dated 18 October 2007 of said court denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration is likewise challenged in this petition.
The antecedents follow.
In June 1990, the National Housing Authority (NHA) awarded the original contract for
the infrastructure works on the Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project, Phase 1 in Bacolod
City to A.C. Cruz Construction. The project, with a contract cost of P7,666,507.55, was
funded by the World Bank under the Project Loan Agreement forged on 10 June 1983
between the Philippine Government and the IBRD-World Bank.[4]
A.C. Cruz Construction commenced the infrastructure works on 1 August 1990.[5] In

April 1991, the complainant Candido M. Fajutag, Jr.(Fajutag, Jr.) was designated Project
Engineer of the project.
A Variation/Extra Work Order No. 1 was approved for the excavation of unsuitable
materials and road filling works. As a consequence, Arceo Cruz of A.C. Cruz
Construction submitted the fourth billing and Report of Physical Accomplishments on 6
May 1991. Fajutag, Jr., however, discovered certain deficiencies. As a result, he
issued Work Instruction No. 1 requiring some supporting documents, such as: (1) copy of
approved concrete pouring; (2) survey results of original ground and finished leaks; (3)
volume calculation of earth fill actually rendered on site; (4) test results as to the quality
of materials and compaction; and (5) copy of work instructions attesting to the
demolished concrete structures.[6]
The contractor failed to comply with the work instruction. Upon Fajutag, Jr.'s further
verification, it was established that there was no actual excavation and road filling works
undertaken by A.C. Cruz Construction. Fajutag, Jr.'s findings are summarized as follows:
1. No topographic map was appended, even if the same is necessary in land

development works; a discarded drawing sheet: "Spot Elevations and Existing
Gradelines" of the project site was found, but this contrasted significantly with the
alleged joint-survey results in support of the Variation/Extra Work Order No. 1;
2. No laboratory tests were conducted to ascertain unsuitability of materials, even if

the same should have been required as essential basis thereof;
3. There were no records of the excavation and disposal of unsuitable materials and
of road filling works having been made by the previous engineers, Rodolfo de los
Santos and Noel Lobrido at the time said activities were allegedly executed;
4. The excavation of unsuitable materials and road filling works were overestimated
to the prejudice of the government:
a. in a 10.00 meter right-of-way (ROW) road, the entire width of 10.00 meters
was used in calculating the volume of cut of unsuitable materials when the
undisturbed natural grounds on both sides of the road was only 6.00 meters;
b. the mathematical calculation in determining the volume of cut of unsuitable

materials are contrary to the contract's technical specifications which
provides for cut measurements, i.e.[,] by end-area method;
c. in a 10.00 ROW road, an effective width of 8.70 meters was used in

calculating the volume of road fill when the undisturbed natural grounds on
both sides of the road was only 6.00 meters apart;
d. the mathematical calculations in determining the volume of roadfill are

contrary to the contract's technical specifications, specifically Section 3.11
thereof, i.e., by end-area method.
5. No laboratory test was made to ascertain the quality of imported road fill
materials.[7]
In a Memorandum dated 27 June 1991, the Project Office recommended the termination
of the infrastructure contract with A.C. Construction.[8]
In its Report dated 12 August 1991, the Inventory and Acceptance Committee determined
the total accomplishment of the contractor at 40.89%, representing P3,433,713.10 out of
the total revised contract amount of P8,397,225.09 inclusive of Variation Order No. 1 in
the amount of P710,717.54. Thereafter, said Committee recommended that the temporary
project suspension imposed by the contractor, which incurred delays in the project
completion, be referred to the Legal Department for appropriate action.[9]
On 19 August 1991, the Manager of the Legal Department issued a Memorandum

addressed to the General Manager of NHA endorsing approval of the Regional Projects
Department's (RPD's) recommendation. The NHA General Manager through a letter
dated 29 August 1991 informed the contractor of the rescission of his contract for the
development of the said project upon his receipt thereof without prejudice to NHA's
enforcing its right under the contract in view of the contractor's unilateral and
unauthorized suspension of the contract works amounting to abandonment of the project.
Despite the rescission notice issued by the NHA per letter dated 29 August 1991, the
contractor continued working intermittently with very minimal workforce until such time
as the award of remaining infrastructure works is effected by NHA to another contractor.
[10]
In March 1992, the NHA Board of Directors, per Resolution No. 2453, approved the
mutual termination of the A.C. Cruz Construction contract and awarded the remaining
work to Triad Construction and Development Corporation (Triad). The contract amount
for the remaining work was P9,554,837.32.[11] Thereafter, representatives from A.C.
Cruz Construction, Triad and NHA-Bacolod conducted a joint measurement at the site to
determine the total accomplishment of A.C. Cruz Construction inclusive of
accomplishments after NHA inventory.
The Project Office was subsequently informed by the Central Office that the
accomplishments made by A.C. Cruz Construction after the NHA inventory would be
paid directly to said contractor by Triad. As of 27 March 1992, Triad had issued checks
in favor of A.C. Cruz Construction amounting to One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00)
which were received by Arceo M. Cruz per Official Receipt No. 3003. [12]
In its Memorandum dated 22 June 1992, the Regional Projects Department recommended
to the General Manager that the fund settlement to A.C. Cruz Construction be effected. [13]
Thereafter, Triad discovered that certain work items that had been in under the inventory
report as accomplished and acceptable were in fact non-existent. Fajutag, Jr. brought
these irregularities to the attention of the Commission on Audit (COA).
After its special audit investigation, the COA uncovered some anomalies, among which,
are ghost activities, specifically the excavation of unsuitable materials and road filling
works and substandard, defective workmanship. Laboratory tests confirmed the
irregularities.[14]
Further, according to the COA, while it is true that the fourth billing of A.C. Cruz
Construction had not been paid its accomplishments after the August 1991 inventory
found acceptable by NHA amounting to P896,177.08 were paid directly by Triad.
Effectively, A.C. Cruz Construction had been overpaid by as much as P232,628.35,
which amount is more than the net payment due per the computation of the unpaid fourth
billing.[15]
Consequently, petitioner, as manager of the Regional Projects Department and Chairman

of the Inventory and Acceptance Committee, and other NHA officials were charged in an
Information[16] dated 5 March 2001, worded as follows:
INFORMATION
The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor II of the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas,

accuses ROBERT P. BALAO, FELICISIMO F. LAZARTE, JR., VIRGILIO V.
DACALOS, JOSEPHINE O. ANGSICO, JOSEPHINE T. ESPINOSA, NOEL H.
LOBRIDO AND ARCEO C. CRUZ for VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (e) of
REPUBLIC ACT No. 3019, AS AMENDED (THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT), committed as follows:
That in or about the month of March, 1992 at Bacolod City, Province of Negros
Occidental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named
accused, ROBERT P. BALAO, JOSEPHINE C. ANGSICO, VIRGILIO V. DACALOS,
FELICISIMO F. LAZARTE, JR., JOSEPHINE T. ESPINOSA, and NOEL H.
LOBRIDO, Public Officers, being the General Manager, Team Head, Visayas Mgt.
Office, Division Manager (Visayas), Manager, RPD, Project Mgt. Officer A and
Supervising Engineer, Diliman, Quezon City, in such capacity and committing the
offense in relation to office and while in the performance of their official functions,
conniving, confederating and mutually helping with each other and with accused ARCEO
C. CRUZ, a private individual and General Manager of A.C. Cruz Construction with
address at 7486 Bagtikan Street, Makati City with deliberate intent, with manifest
partiality and evident bad faith, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
cause to be paid to A.C. Construction public funds in the amount of TWO HUNDRED
THIRTY TWO THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT PESOS and THIRTY
FIVE CENTAVOS (P232,628.35) PHILIPPINE CURRENCY, supposedly for the
excavation and roadfilling works on the Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project in Bacolod
City despite the fact no such works were undertaken by A.C. Construction as revealed by
the Special Audit conducted by the Commission on Audit, thus accused public officials in
the performance of their official functions had given unwarranted benefits, advantage and
preference to accused Arceo C. Cruz and A.C. Construction and themselves to the
damage and prejudice of the government.
On 2 October 2006, petitioner filed a motion to quash the Information raising the
following grounds: (1) the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense;
(2) the information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form; (3) the
constitutional rights of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusations against them have been violated by the inadequacy of the information; and
(4) the prosecution failed to determine the individual participation of all the accused in
the information in disobedience with the Resolution dated 27 March 2005.[18]
On 2 March 2007, the Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution denying
petitioner's motion to quash. We quote the said resolution in part:
Among the accused-movants, the public officer whose participation in the alleged offense
is specifically mentioned in the May 30, 2006 Memorandum is accused Felicisimo
Lazarte, Jr., the Chairman of the Inventory and Acceptance Committee (IAC), which
undertook the inventory and final quantification of the accomplishment of A.C. Cruz
Construction. The allegations of Lazarte that the IAC, due to certain constraints,
allegedly had to rely on the reports of the field engineers and/or the Project Office as to
which materials were actually installed; and that he supposedly affixed his signature to
the IAC Physical Inventory Report and Memoranda dated August 12, 1991 despite his
not being able to attend the actual inspection because he allegedly saw that all the
members of the Committee had already signed are matters of defense which he can
address in the course of the trial. Hence, the quashal of the information with respect to
accused Lazarte is denied for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby resolves as follows:
(1) Accused Robert Balao, Josephine Angsico and Virgilio Dacalos' Motion to Admit
Motion to Quash dated October 4, 2006 is GRANTED; the Motion to Quash dated
October 4, 2006 attached thereto, is GRANTED. Accordingly, the case is
hereby DISMISSED insofar as the said accused-movants are concerned.
(2) The Motion to Quash dated October 2, 2006 of accused
Engr. Felicisimo F. Lazarte, Jr. is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Let the arraignment
of the accused proceed as scheduled on March 13, 2007.
SO ORDERED. [19]
Subsequently, the Sandiganbayan issued the second assailed resolution denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Pertinently, it held:
The Motion for Reconsideration of accused Lazarte, Jr. merely reiterated the grounds and
arguments which had been duly considered and passed upon in the assailed Resolution.
Nonetheless, after a careful review of the same, the Court still finds no cogent reason to
disturb the finding of probable cause of the Office of the Ombudsman to indict accused
Lazarte, Jr., Espinosa, Lobrido and Cruz of the offense charged. In its Memorandum
dated July 27, 2004 and May 30, 2006, the prosecution was able to show with sufficient
particularity the respective participation of the aforementioned accused in the
commission of the offense charged. The rest of the factual issues by accused Lazarte, Jr.
would require the presentation of evidence in the course of the trial of this case.
The Court also maintains the validity and sufficiency of the information against accused
Lazarte, Jr., Espinosa, Lobrido and Cruz. The information has particularly alleged the
ultimate facts constituting the essential elements of the offense charged which are as
follows:
1. that accused Lazarte, Jr., Espinosa, and Lobrido are public officers being the
Department Manager, Project Management Officer A, and Supervising Engineer
of the NHA during the time material in the criminal information; and
2. that the said accused, in their respective official capacities and in conspiracy with
accused Cruz, a private individual and the General manager of A.C. Cruz
Construction, have acted with manifest partiality or evident bad faith and have
given unwarranted benefits, preference, and advantage to Arceo C. Cruz and A.C.
Cruz Construction or have caused damage and prejudice to the government, by
"[causing] to be paid A.C. Cruz Construction public funds in the amount of Two
Hundred Thirty Two Thousand Six Hundred Twenty Eight Pesos and Thirty Five
Centavos (P232,628.35) supposedly for the excavation and roadfilling works on
the Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project in Bacolod City despite the fact that no
such works were undertaken by A.C. Cruz Construction as revealed by the Special
Audit conducted by the Commission on Audit."
The other factual details which accused Lazarte, Jr. cited are matters of evidence best
threshed out in the course of the trial.[20]
Hence, the instant petition which is a reiteration of petitioner's submissions. Petitioner
ascribes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to the
Sandiganbayan in: (1) upholding the validity and sufficiency of the Information despite
its failure to make out an offense and conform to the prescribed form; (2) denying his
motion to quash considering that the remaining averments in the Information have been
rendered unintelligible by the dismissal of the charges against some of his co-accused;
and (3) using as bases the Prosecution's Memoranda dated 27 July 2004 and 30 May
2006 to supplement the inadequacies of the Information. In addition, petitioner avers that
his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him had been violated for failure of the Information to specify his participation in the
commission of the offense. Petitioner also argues that the facts charged in the Information
do not constitute an offense as no damage or injury had been made or caused to any party
or to the government. Finally, petitioner maintains that the Sandiganbayan lost its
jurisdiction over him upon the dismissal of the charges against his co-accused as the
remaining accused are public officers whose salary grade is below 27.
In its Comment[21] dated 21 December 2007, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the
Office of the Special Prosecutor, counters that separate allegations of individual acts
perpetrated by the conspirators are not required in an Information and neither should they
be covered by evidence submitted to establish the existence of probable cause.
Allegations regarding the nature and extent of petitioner's participation and justification
for his acts which constitute the offense charged are evidentiary matters which are more
properly addressed during trial. The Ombudsman reiterates our ruling in Ingco v.
Sandiganbayan[22] that the fundamental test in reflecting on the viability of a motion to
quash is the sufficiency of the averments in the information that is, whether the facts
asseverated, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the
crime defined by law. And relying on the case of Domingo v. Sandiganbayan,[23] the
Ombudsman states that informations need only state the ultimate facts; the reasons
therefor are to be proved during the trial.[24] The Ombudsman moreover maintains that
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over petitioner. The Ombudsman argues that it is of
no moment that petitioner's position is classified as salary grade 26 as he is a manager
within the legal contemplation of paragraph 1(g), Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 8249.
[25]
In his Reply[26] dated 9 October 2008, petitioner strongly asseverates that, according to
the Constitution, in a conspiracy indictment the participation of each accused in the so-
called conspiracy theory should be detailed in order to apprise the accused of the nature
of the accusation against them in relation to the participation of the other accused. A
general statement that all the accused conspired with each other without stating the
participation of each runs afoul of the Constitution.[27] Petitioner adds that the ultimate
facts intended by law refer to determinate facts and circumstances which should become
the basis of the cause of action; statement of facts which would be in complete accord
with the constitutional requirement of giving the accused sufficient information about the
nature and the cause of the accusation against him.[28] Petitioner also avers that the
Ombudsman's reliance on and citation of the cases of Ingco v. Sandiganbayan[29]
and Domingo v. Sandiganbayan[30] is misplaced and misleading.
Petitioner's main argument is that the Information filed before the Sandiganbayan
insufficiently averred the essential elements of the crime charged as it failed to specify
the individual participation of all the accused.
The Court is not persuaded. The Court affirms the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
At the outset, it should be stressed that the denial of a motion to quash is not correctible
by certiorari. Well-established is the rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal case
is denied, the remedy is not a petition for certiorari but for petitioners to go to trial
without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to quash.
Remedial measures as regards interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash, are
frowned upon and often dismissed. The evident reason for this rule is to avoid
multiplicity of appeals in a single court.[31]
This general rule, however, is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the
motion to dismiss or motion to quash acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies.[32] And in the case at bar, the
Court does not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed grave abuse of discretion.
The fundamental test in reflecting on the viability of a motion to quash on the ground that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense is whether or not the facts asseverated, if
hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined in
law.[33] Matters aliunde will not be considered.[34]
Corollarily, Section 6 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court states that:

SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.--A complaint or information is sufficient
if it states the name of the accused, the designation of the offense by the statute, the acts
the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense
was committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in
The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be
charged and enable the court to know the proper judgment. The Information must allege
clearly and accurately the elements of the crime charged. What facts and circumstances
are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definition and
elements of the specific crimes.[35]
The test is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as
to apprise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged. The raison
d'etre of the rule is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. [36] Another
purpose is to enable accused, if found guilty, to plead his conviction in a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense. The use of derivatives or synonyms or allegations of
basic facts constituting the offense charged is sufficient.[37]
Pertinently, Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, reads:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.--In addition to acts or omissions of public
xxx
or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.[38]
The essential elements for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 are as follows:
1. The accused is a public officer or private person charged in conspiracy with him;
2. Said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his
official duties or in relation to his public position;
3. He causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or private party;
4. Such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or

preference to such parties; and
5. The public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.[39]
The Court finds that the Information in this case alleges the essential elements of
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The Information specifically alleges that
petitioner, Espinosa and Lobrido are public officers being then the Department Manager,
Project Management Officer A and Supervising Engineer of the NHA respectively; in
such capacity and committing the offense in relation to the office and while in the
performance of their official functions, connived, confederated and mutually helped each
other and with accused Arceo C. Cruz, with deliberate intent through manifest partiality
and evident bad faith gave unwarranted benefits to the latter, A.C. Cruz Construction and
to themselves, to the damage and prejudice of the government. The felonious act
consisted of causing to be paid to A.C. Cruz Construction public funds in the amount of
P232,628.35 supposedly for excavation and road filling works on the Pahanocoy Sites
and Services Project in Bacolod City despite the fact that no such works were undertaken
by said construction company as revealed by the Special Audit conducted by COA.
On the contention that the Information did not detail the individual participation of the
accused in the allegation of conspiracy in the Information, the Court underscores the fact
that under Philippine law, conspiracy should be understood on two levels. Conspiracy
can be a mode of committing a crime or it may be constitutive of the crime itself.
Generally, conspiracy is not a crime in our jurisdiction. It is punished as a crime only
when the law fixes a penalty for its commission such as in conspiracy to commit treason,
rebellion and sedition.[40]
When conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all the elements of said
crime must be set forth in the complaint or information. But when conspiracy is not
charged as a crime in itself but only as the mode of committing the crime as in the case at
bar, there is less necessity of reciting its particularities in the Information because
conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense charged. The conspiracy is significant only
because it changes the criminal liability of all the accused in the conspiracy and makes
them answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their participation in the
crime. The liability of the conspirators is collective and each participant will be equally
responsible for the acts of others, for the act of one is the act of all. [41]
Notably, in People v. Quitlong,[42] as pointed out by respondent, the Court ruled on how
conspiracy as a mode of committing the offense should be alleged in the Information, viz:
x x x Where conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated, the individual acts done to
perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary importance, the act of one being imputable to
all the others. Verily, an accused must know from the information whether he faces a
criminal responsibility not only for his acts but also for the acts of his co-accused as well.
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or
allege all the details thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have performed,
the evidence proving the common design or the facts connecting all the accused with one
another in the web of the conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to describe conspiracy with
the same degree of particularity required in describing a substantive offense. It is enough
that the indictment contains a statement of facts relied upon to be constitutive of the
offense in ordinary and concise language, with as much certainty as the nature of the case
will admit, in a manner that can enable a person of common understanding to know what
is intended, and with such precision that the accused may plead his acquittal or
conviction to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts. It is said, generally, that
an indictment may be held sufficient "if it follows the words of the statute and reasonably
informs the accused of the character of the offense he is charged with conspiring to
commit, or, following the language of the statute, contains a sufficient statement of an
overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy, or alleges both the conspiracy and the
contemplated crime in the language of the respective statutes defining them (15A C.J.S.
842-844).
x x x Conspiracy arises when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy comes to life at the very
instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith to
actually pursue it. Verily, the information must state that the accused have confederated
to commit the crime or that there has been a community of design, a unity of purpose or
an agreement to commit the felony among the accused. Such an allegation, in the
absence of the usual usage of the words "conspired" or "confederated" or the phrase
"acting in conspiracy," must aptly appear in the information in the form of definitive acts
constituting conspiracy. In fine, the agreement to commit the crime, the unity of purpose
or the community of design among the accused must be conveyed such as either by the
use of the term "conspire" or its derivatives and synonyms or by allegations of basic facts
constituting the conspiracy. Conspiracy must be alleged, not just inferred, in the
information on which basis an accused can aptly enter his plea, a matter that is not to be
confused with or likened to the adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it. In
establishing conspiracy when properly alleged, the evidence to support it need not
necessarily be shown by direct proof but may be inferred from shown acts and conduct of
the accused.[43]
In addition, the allegation of conspiracy in the Information should not be confused with
the adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it. A conspiracy is proved by
evidence of actual cooperation; of acts indicative of an agreement, a common purpose or
design, a concerted action or concurrence of sentiments to commit the felony and actually
pursue it. A statement of the evidence on the conspiracy is not necessary in the
Information.[44]
The other details cited by petitioner, such as the absence of any damage or injury caused
to any party or the government, likewise are matters of evidence best raised during trial.
As to the contention that the residual averments in the Information have been rendered
unintelligible by the dismissal of the charges against some of his co-accused, the Court
finds that the Information sufficiently makes out a case against petitioner and the
remaining accused.
With regard to the alleged irregular use by the Sandiganbayan of the Prosecution's
Memoranda dated 27 July 2004 and 30 May 2006 to supplement the inadequacies of the
Information, the Court finds adequate its explanation in the first assailed resolution, to
wit:
It may be recalled that a reinvestigation of the case was ordered by this Court because the
prosecution failed to satisfactorily comply with an earlier directive of the former
Chairperson and Members of the First Division, after noting the inadequacy of the
information, to clarify the participation of each of the accused. In ordering the
reinvestigation, the Court noted that the prosecution's July 27, 2004 Memorandum did not
address the apprehensions of the former Chairperson and Members of the First Division
as to the inadequacy of the allegations in the information.
This time, despite a reinvestigation, the prosecution's Memorandum dated May 30, 2006
still failed to specify the participation of accused-movants Balao, Angsico and Dacalos.
The most recent findings of the prosecution still do not address the deficiency found by
the Court in the information. The prosecution avers that pursuant to Section 3, Rule 117
of the Rules of Court, in determining the viability of a motion to quash based on the
ground of "facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense," the test must be
whether or not the facts asseverated, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the
essential elements of the crime as defined by law. The prosecution contends that
matter aliunde should not be considered. However, in the instant case, the Court has
found the information itself to be inadequate, as it does not satisfy the requirements of
particularly alleging the acts or omissions of the said accused-movants, which served as
the basis of the allegation of conspiracy between the aforementioned accused-movants
and the other accused, in the commission of the offense charged in the information. [45]
Finally, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction to hear the case. As correctly
pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, it is of no moment that petitioner does not occupy a
position with Salary Grade 27 as he was a department manager of the NHA, a
government-owned or controlled corporation, at the time of the commission of the
offense, which position falls within the ambit of its jurisdiction. Apropos, the Court held
in the case of Geduspan v. People[46] which involved a regional Manager/Director of
Region VI of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth) with salary grade
26, to wit:
It is of no moment that the position of petitioner is merely classified as salary grade 26.
While the first part of the above-quoted provision covers only officials of the executive
branch with the salary grade 27 and higher, the second part thereof "specifically includes"
other executive officials whose positions may not be of grade 27 and higher but who are
by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court.
Hence, respondent court is vested with jurisdiction over petitioner together with
Farahmand, a private individual charged together with her.
The position of manager in a government-owned or controlled corporation, as in the case

of Philhealth, is within the jurisdiction of respondent court. It is the position that
petitioner holds, not her salary grade, that determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
This Court in Lacson v. Executive Secretary, et al. ruled:
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the
offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII, book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), (d)
Executive Order Nos. 1,2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), or (e) other
offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender
committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee
holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of section 4; and (3) the offense
committed is in relation to the office.
To recapitulate, petitioner is a public officer, being a department manager of Philhealth, a

government-owned and controlled corporation. The position of manager is one of those
mentioned in paragraph a, Section 4 of RA 8249 and the offense for which she was
charged was committed in relation to her office as department manager of Philhealth.
Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over her person as well as the subject
matter of the case.[47]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The
Resolutionsdated2 March 2007 and 18 October 2007 of the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 104611, November 10, 1993 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. FELIMON
JAVA Y MERCADO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
NOCON, J.:
Convicted of the crime of robbery with homicide in Criminal Case No. 88372 before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch CIII, accused Felimon Java y Mercado
interposed this present appeal. Enumerating eight (8) errors which the trial court
allegedly committed, he dutifully discussed each of them and insisted on his innocence.
Sequentially, we will analyze the merit of each of the said errors, to wit:
"I
"X X X IN HOLDING THAT SALVADOR CAMBAYA POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED ACCUSED-

APPELLANT AS A PRINCIPAL ACTOR IN THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME AT BAR.
"II
"X X X IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT COMMITTED ROBBERY AGAINST

THE PERSONS OF MICHAEL VALDEZ AND VIRGINIA VALDEZ.
"III
"X X X IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF PASTOR VALDEZ IN SPITE THE

FACT THAT HIS TESTIMONY WAS NOT FORMALLY OFFERED BY THE PROSECUTION.
"IV
"X X X IN HOLDING THAT VIRGINIA VALDEZ POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED ACCUSED-

APPELLANT AS A PRINCIPAL ACTOR IN THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME AT BAR.
"V
"X X X IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY

WITH HOMICIDE.
"VI
"X X X IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY

WITH HOMICIDE BASED ON EVIDENCE NOT ON RECORD.
"VII
"X X X IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF COL. RODOLFO GARCIA

AND OTHER DEFENSE WITNESSES.
"VIII
"X X X IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI OF ACCUSED-

APPELLANT." [1]
The facts upon which the trial court based its decision convicting the accused are as
follows:
At about 3:00 p.m. on March 19, 1988, at the V. Valdez Trading, a gavel and sand
establishment located at P. Tuazon Street, Cubao, Quezon City, two men appearing to be
customers, arrived. One of them proceeded to the office building while the other
approached Salvador Cambaya, a truck helper, while the latter was weighing cement in
front of the establishment. This man poked a gun at Cambaya, announced a hold-up,
divested him of his P20.00 and ordered him to enter the office building where he and
other employees and a customer were gathered in front of the counter by the man
identified later as accused Felimon Java. The other man ransacked the drawers and found
some money which he took. Then he proceeded to the room where Michael Valdez, the
son of the owner of the establishment was. Michael was heard as saying "Wala sa akin
ang susi" and "walang pera diyan." The employees gathered in front of the counter also
heard something being destroyed and after a while, saw the man rush out holding a brown
envelope. The two men hurriedly left.
Meanwhile, Virginia Cabate Valdez, the mother of Michael Valdez, was at the beauty
parlor in front of their establishment. She was informed by the owner of the parlor that a
commotion was going on at their place. She rushed out and was informed by her son
Michael, that they had just been robbed of P50,000.00. Since Michael decided to run after
the holduppers and he could not be stopped from doing so, she boarded the car of
Michael, a Toyota, and went with him. They drove along 20th Avenue and turned left at
Boni Serrano where Michael saw and pointed to the get-away vehicle of the holduppers,
which was a maroon-colored passenger jeepney. Michael bumped the jeepney several
times and turned left at Katipunan Road. However, the holduppers followed them and
bumped their car several times at the rear and sides. Somewhere further along the
Katipunan Road, one of the holduppers fired a gun hitting the rear glass of Michael's car.
While the jeepney was side by side with their car, he fired more shots at them hitting
Michael on the torso and on the left side of his body. As a result, Michael died. The
holduppers sped away towards Quirino Labor Hospital.
Salvador Cambaya described to the Quezon City cartographer the physical characteristics
of the man who accosted him as follows: "5'5" ang taas, mga 28-30 ang edad, maitim,
mabilog ang katawan, kulot na medyo maikli ang buhok, pabilog din ang mukha." [2]
On the other hand, Mrs. Valdez described the man who killed her son as:
"Bilog ang mukha, maitim, bilog ang katawan, mga 35-40 ang edad, kulot ang
buhok." [3]
On August 25, 1988 at around 11:00 a.m., Pat. Zaragosa, a police operative, went to see
Mrs. Valdez and asked her whether she would be able to recognize the man who killed
her son if she saw him again. Answering in the affirmative, she was brought to Quezon
City Hall and advised to be observant. When they were on a street near the office of the
Metro Manila Commission, she saw a man inside the building which was 20 to 25 meters
away. She could see him from the neck up as the latter was facing the window. She
positively declared that he was the gunman and could not be wrong because she could not
forget the face, especially the eyes of the man who shot her son.
As a result of such identification, accused was arrested on August 26, 1988 and on
August 29, 1988, an information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
charging him with the crime of Robbery with Homicide, which read as follows:
"That on or about the 19th day of March, 1988, in Quezon City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent of gain, with violence
and/or intimidation of person, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
(sic) VIRGINIA VALDEZ y CABOTE and MICHAEL VALDEZ y CABOTE, mother and son
respectively, by then and there, pointing their respective firearms at them and
thereafter take, rob and divested the victims' collection for the day amounting to
P50,000.00, Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner thereof
in the total sum; that on the occasion of the said robbery, the said accused, conspiring
together, confederating with and mutually helping one another with intent to kill attack,
assault and employ personal violence against Michael Valdez y Cabote, by then and
there shooting him with a .38 cal. revolver marked Smith and Wesson, hitting him on his
left breast, thereby inflicting him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said
Michael Valdez in such amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil
Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW." [4]
At the trial of the case, Salvador Cambaya and Mrs. Valdez recounted the aforesaid facts.
Mrs. Valdez testified further that her family spent P13,833.20 for the Manila Memorial
Park lot, P55,000.00 for the funeral services and P20,000.00 for the wake or a total of
P48,833.20.
Pastor Valdez, Michael's father testified that his establishment lost P50,000.00 to the
robbers. He explained that Michael had collected P40,000.00 from a customer in Taguig,
Rizal and the P10,000.00 came from the proceeds of the sale of construction materials
that day. He handed the P10,000.00 to Michael to be placed together with the P40,000.00
in the cabinet.
The defense evidence consisted, among others, of the testimony of accused Felimon Java
and his witnesses, namely: Col. Rodolfo Garcia, Patrolman Jose Malasa and Pfc. Mario
Almariego. All their testimonies evinced the theory that accused could not have
committed the crime charged as he was at the office of Colonel Rodolfo Garcia, who was
then the Station Commander of the Quezon City Police Force at the precise time and
date as that of the commission of the offense.
Felimon Java testified that he was a former Quezon City policeman; that he was
dismissed from the service on April 24, 1987 in view of an administrative case against
him for violation of domicile; that when he was separated from the service, he bought a
tricycle to earn a living; that in the month of July, 1988, he was a member of the Quezon
City People's Patrol serving as security guard for Sonny Pumarada; and that from August
1, 1988 up to the time of his arrest, he was working as civilian agent of Western Sector
Command, Malacañang Park, Metro Manila. On August 26, 1988, he was at Quezon City
Hall particularly at the Metro Manila Commission Compound, together with one Sgt.
Caingles, conducting a surveillance, when he was apprehended by Patrolman Zaragosa
and brought to the office of one Major Rosales at Kamuning, EDSA. He claimed that
Major Rosales, being the Supreme of the Guardians Chapter and Pat. Zaragosa, a member
thereof, had both an ax to grind against him because on January 13, 1987, he shot dead
two marines who were members of the Guardians who attacked their headquarters at
Kamuning, Quezon City during the coup attempt. He was then a sentinel at the said
police headquarters.
On March 19, 1988, from 2:30 to 4:00 p.m., he was at the office of Col. Rodolfo M.
Garcia asking for a letter of recommendation to Col. Guillermo Domondon for his
reinstatement to the service. He presented to the court said letter of recommendation
dated March 19, 1993, quoted herein as follows:
"Col. Guillermo Domondon

C, CI Division
Camp Crame, Q.C.
Dear Sir:
Please help bearer, Pat. Felimon Java in this reinstatement.
Regards,
Rudy”
[5]
He brought the letter of recommendation to Col. Domondon but was informed by one
Sgt. Rodriguez that the latter was out of town and that anyway, he already had a
recommendation from Colonel Jaro, an aide of then Gen. Fidel Ramos. He didn't know
about that Jaro recommendation but remembered that he had previously sought Col. Jaro
to accompany him to see Col. Domondon when he was with the People's Patrol.
Pfc. Mario Almariego and Patrolman Jose Malasa corroborated his claim that he was at
the office of Col. Garcia between 2:00 to 4:00 o'clock p.m. of March 19, 1988 for the
purpose of securing a recommendation and that he lingered for some more time after
getting the same.
Col. Rodolfo M. Garcia likewise confirmed the visit of the accused but also admitted that
his office is swarmed with visitors everyday and he cannot memorize the names of people
who see him.
He also said that the accused visited him again after he gave that note of recommendation
asking for assistance to get employed. He remembered recommending him to a certain
Sonny Pumarada who works at the Quezon City Hall.
After trial, accused was convicted of the offense charged, the dispositive portion of which
read as follows:
"ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding FELIMON JAVA Y MERCADO
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal for the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
Said Felimon Java is hereby sentenced to suffer a jail term of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
On the civil aspect said accused Felimon Java is hereby ordered to pay the
spouses Pastor and Virginia Valdez the sum of P50,000.00 in relation to the robbery at
bar, the sum of P50,000.00 as actual damages for the death of their son Michael Valdez,
the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages and another P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages. No costs.
SO ORDERED." [6]
Going through the eight assignments of errors allegedly committed by the trial court we
note that the thrust of the defense particularly in the first assignment of error, is centered
on the want of positive identification of the perpetrator of the crime. The accused-
appellant harped on the disparity in the cartographs of the supposed suspects, Exhibits
"E" and "C," based on the descriptions given by the prosecution witnesses Salvador
Cambaya and Virginia Valdez, respectively.
While conceding that the cartographs do not portray the same person, a comparison,
however, of the descriptions given by said prosecution witnesses in their respective
sworn statements previously quoted herein shows that except for the age range of the
accused-appellant, all the details agree and point to one and the same person. Both
descriptions speak of a person with a circular face, stocky physique and curly hair. Thus,
it is not the witnesses' fault if the cartographs came up with slightly different drawings of
the accused-appellant. The cartographer could have perceived their declarations along
different lines. Nevertheless, the important factor is that both witnesses identified the
accused-appellant in court when they came face to face with him and pinpointed to him
respectively as one of the robbers and the gunman.
While evidence as to the identity of the accused-appellant as the person who committed
the crime should be carefully analyzed, the Court has consistently held that where
conditions of visibility are favorable and the witness does not appear to be biased against
the man on the dock, his or her assertions as to the identity of the malefactor should be
normally accepted. [7]
The witnesses in this case, particularly Mrs. Valdez, had a clear recollection of the
identity of the assailant of her son. She categorically declared that she had a good look at
him and could not forget his face, particularly his eyes. She was not the kind of person
that would perjure herself just to get a man into trouble. She had no motive for filing the
case against the accused-appellant other than to seek redress not so much for the loss of
the earnings of their establishment but more so for the death of her son. In the face of her
clear and positive testimony regarding the accused-appellant's role as the gunman of her
son, as well as Cambaya's positive identification of the same person as the man who
accosted him, there is no mistaking that accused-appellant is one of the perpetrators of
the crime.
Accused-appellant next claims in his second and third assignments of errors, that the
prosecution failed to establish the fact of robbery because only two witnesses testified to
the same, namely: Cambaya, who declared that accused-appellant got his P20.00, and
Pastor Valdez, whose testimony was not offered by the prosecution at the time he
testified in court on November 14, 1989 and hence cannot be considered pursuant to
Sections 34 and 35 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Indeed, Section 34, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court requires that for evidence to
be considered, it should be formally offered and the purpose specified. This is necessary
because a judge has to rest his findings of fact and his judgment only upon the evidence
offered by the parties at the trial.
[8]
Under the new procedure as spelled out in Section 35 of the said rule which became
effective on July 1, 1989, the offer of the testimony of a witness must be made at the time
the witness is called to testify. The previous practice was to offer the testimonial evidence
at the end of the trial after all the witnesses had testified. With the innovation, the court is
put on notice whether the witness to be presented is a material witness and should be
heard, or a witness who would be testifying on irrelevant matter or on facts already
testified to by other witnesses and should therefore, be stopped from testifying further.
In the case at bar, we note that Pastor Valdez was not one of the witnesses originally
intended to be presented by the prosecution. He was merely called to the witness stand at
the latter part of the presentation of the prosecution's evidence. There was no mention
why his testimony was being presented. However, notwithstanding that his testimony was
not formally offered, its presentation was not objected to either. Section 36 of the
aforementioned Rule requires that an objection in the course of the oral examination of a
witness should be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably
apparent. Since no objection to the admissibility of evidence was made in the court
below, an objection raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered. [9]
Besides, even if the testimony of Pastor Valdez were not admitted, the robbery was
established by the testimony of Cambaya who not only stated that his P20.00 was taken at
the point of a gun but that accused-appellant's companion ransacked their office, found
and fled away with some money. He was not sure only of the exact amount taken. At any
rate, the amount stolen came to be known, when Mrs. Valdez who rushed to their office,
after being informed of a commotion therein, testified to being informed by her son,
Michael, that they have been robbed of P50,000.00. This statement is admissible as part
of the res gestae, having been made immediately after a startling occurrence and before
the declarant had time to concoct matters so that his utterance at that time was merely a
reflex product of his immediate sensual impression. Said statement is admissible in
evidence as one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule on the ground of trustworthiness and
necessity.
Zeroing in on Mrs. Valdez' identification of her son's assailant, subject of the fourth
assignment of error, accused-appellant pointed out that at the time of the car chase, Mrs.
Valdez was so tense, nervous and excited, continually hugging her son until the time that
he was shot, so that her attention must have been focused on her son and not on the
assailant. On top of that, Mrs. Valdez who was wearing eyeglasses admitted that she was
crying at that time, so much so that the accused-appellant surmised that her glasses must
have misted and blocked her vision.
Accused-appellant’s conjectures have no basis in fact and collide with Mrs. Valdez'
testimony that she had a good look at the assailant in the passenger jeep. Indeed some
circumstances do not always produce the same effects as accused-appellant would want
us to believe. Considering the relative positions of the passenger jeepney where the
accused-appellant was riding in and the Toyota car driven by the victim with his mother
as passenger, which were running side by side at high speed when the shooting occurred,
we find it impossible for the assailant not to be seen and identified by Mrs. Valdez. A
witness usually strive to remember the uncovered face of the assailant. This, Mrs.
[10]
Valdez must have done.
Accused-appellant's fifth and sixth assigned errors center on the alleged failure of the
prosecution to prove that those who committed the robbery and those who killed the
victim are one and the same persons as to establish the crime of robbery with homicide.
Not only are these arguments fallacious but have no leg to stand on. Prosecution witness
Salvador Cambaya positively identified the accused-appellant as one of those who held
him up as well as the establishment where he works. While Mrs. Valdez identified the
same accused-appellant as the jeep passenger who shot and killed his son. Hence, the
connection between the robbery and the homicide was sufficiently established.
True, the robbers in the case at bar had already fled with their loot when the shooting of
the victim took place during his hot pursuit of the culprits. It is settled that where the
deceased attacked and stopped the robbers when they had already come out of the store
where the robbery was committed and got killed in the process, it cannot be denied that
the act of killing was done in order to repel an aggression which, had it been effective,
would have endangered the whole success of the robbery committed. It was done, in the
final analysis, in order to defend the possession of the stolen property. It was therefore an
act which tended to insure the successful termination of the robbery and secure to the
robbers the possession and enjoyment of the goods taken. [11]
It has also been held that where the deceased followed the robbers after he had been
robbed and by reason thereof, he was fired upon by one of the robbers, the crime is
robbery with homicide. [12]
The same is true even if the murder was perpetrated at a place different from that of the
robbery and after an appreciable interval of time. [13]
As to the accused-appellant's defense of alibi, subject of the seventh and eighth

assignments of errors, accused-appellant contends that the same is supported by the
testimony of no less than Colonel Rodolfo M. Garcia, Station Commander, QCPS, now
Central Police District, who would have not sacrificed his name and integrity by
testifying in his favor if it were not true that he was in the colonel's office at the time of
the commission of the offense. While it may be true that accused-appellant indeed sought
Col. Garcia's recommendation for reinstatement to the service on the date in question as
borne out by the letter of recommendation itself, which is dated March 19, 1988, such
fact does not conclusively prove that accused-appellant was at the colonel's office on said
date and time as that of the commission of the offense charged. There was no logbook
which recorded his visit nor the date and time thereof; nor was the letter of
recommendation recorded as having been issued by the colonel's office on said date.
Hence, there is no independent proof showing that Col. Garcia issued said letter on
March 19, 1988. The good Col. Garcia even admitted that he could not remember the
other people who visited him on the said day or on any day for that matter. Likewise, the
trial judge noted that accused-appellant presented this defense only long after the case has
gone to trial and more importantly, he noticed that the testimony of accused-appellant
himself provided the clue that indicated that his defense predicated on alibi has been
merely contrived. Said the Judge in his decision:
"1. The centerpiece of the defense theory is the note of recommendation of Col.
Rodolfo Garcia for Felimon Java dated March 19, 1988. On the date the accused by his
own testimony, was still a tricycle driver as he joined the Quezon City People's Patrol
only on July 1988 upon the recommendation of Col. Garcia.
"The testimony of Col. Garcia is that he recommended the accused to Mr.
Pumarada of the Quezon City People's Patrol after that March 19, 1988 visit made by
Java to him. But according to Java, when he went to the office of Col. Domondon to
present the note of recommendation issued by Col. Garcia, a sergeant Rodriguez there
told him that the Garcia note is unnecessary already because he already has the Jaro
Letter attached to Java's record. Consequently, the Col. Jaro note must have preceded
the Col. Garcia note- which is what the defense wanted to convey. Yet, in the latter part
of Java's narration in court he stated that he was already with the People's Patrol when
Col. Jaro accompanied him to Col. Domondon. Inasmuch as (the) Col. Jaro note came
ahead of (the) Col. Garcia note and by the time the Col. Jaro note was given the accused
was already in the Quezon City People's Patrol, then the Col. Garcia note could not have
been issued on March 19, 1988 when Java was still a tricycle driver." [14]
Thus, notwithstanding the stature of accused-appellant's witnesses, their testimonies may

be disregarded in the light of the other defense evidence at hand. Testimony to be
believed must not only proceed from a credible witness but must be credible in itself and
be able to stand the test of scrutiny along with the other testimonies. Thus, the accused-
appellant's invocation of alibi is unavailing not only by reason of its inherent weakness
but also because of the circumstances pointing to its contrived nature and his positive
identification by the prosecution witnesses as one of the persons who participated in the
robbery and shot the victim.
In recapitulation, not even one of the eight arguments of accused-appellant in support of

his appeal proved its worth as an error. Not a tinge of doubt was created on the guilt of
the accused-appellant. On the other hand, the prosecution evidence showed that the
positive identification made of him by no less than two prosecution witnesses was direct,
clear and positive.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto being in

accordance with law and the established facts of the case.
SO ORDERED.
SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION

[ GR. No. 196735, August 03, 2016 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. DANILO
FELICIANO, JR., JULIUS VICTOR MEDALLA, CHRISTOPHER SOLIVA,
WARREN L. ZINGAPAN, AND ROBERT MICHAEL BELTRAN
PROMULGATED: ALVIR, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
Even as the judiciary strives to bring justice to victims of fraternity-related
violence, the violence continues to thrive in universities across the country. Mere weeks
after our Decision dated May 5, 2014 was promulgated, various news agencies reported
the death of an 18-year-old student of De La Salle-College of St. Benilde. [1] The death
was allegedly caused by hazing.
While this Court is powerless to end this madness, it can, at the very least, put an end to
its impunity.
This resolves the separate Motions for Reconsideration of our Decision dated May 5,
2014, which were filed by accused-appellants Christopher Soliva (Soliva), [2] Warren L.
Zingapan (Zingapan),[3] and Robert Michael Beltran Alvir (Alvir). [4]
To recall, we affirmed the Court of Appeals Decision [5] dated November 26, 2010 finding
accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the murder of Dennis Venturina.
However, we modified its finding that accused-appellants were only guilty of slight
physical injuries in relation to private complainants Leandro Lachica, Cristobal Gaston,
Jr., and Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. Instead, we upheld the trial court's Decision [6] dated
February 28, 2002, which found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the attempted murder of private complainants Leandro Lachica (Lachica), Arnel Fortes
(Fortes), Mervin Natalicio (Natalicio), Cristobal Gaston, Jr. (Gaston), and Cesar
Mangrobang, Jr. (Mangrobang, Jr.).
Alvir, Zingapan, and Soliva separately filed their Motions for Reconsideration on-July 1,
2014, July 2, 2014, and July 9, 2014, respectively. The Office of the Solicitor General was
directed to file a Consolidated Comment on these Motions. [7]
Atty. Estelito Mendoza, counsel for Zingapan, through a letter [8] dated May 22, 2014,
requested information on the composition of the Division trying this case. At that time,
our May 5, 2014 Decision was not yet published in the Supreme Court website. Atty.
Estelito Mendoza's request was denied[9] under Rule 7, Section 3 of the Internal Rules of
the Supreme Court,[10] which mandates that results of a raffle, including the composition
of the Division, are confidential in eriminal cases where the trial court imposes capital
punishment.
Undaunted, Zingapan moved to elevate the case to this Court En Bane. [11] The Motion
was denied for lack of merit. [12]
On November 10, 2014, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Consolidated
Comment[13] on the Motions for Reconsideration.
Meanwhile, Alvir moved for modification of judgment, [14] arguing on his innocence and
praying for his acquittal.
The only issue to be resolved is whether accused-appellants presented substantial

arguments in their Motions for Reconsideration as to warrant the reversal of this Court's
May 5, 2014 Decision.
Soliva argues that his conviction was merely based on private complainant Natalicio's
sole testimony, which he alleges was doubtful and inconsistent. [15] He points out that
prosecution witness Ernesto Paolo Tan (Tan) was able to witness the attack on Natalicio,
but was unable to identify him as the attacker.[16]
The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that Natalicio's testimony
was sufficient to identify Soliva.[17] It argues that Tan's testimony did not contradict
Natalicio's testimony since Tan was able to state that he saw the assailants who were
not masked, though he did not know their names.[18]
The testimony of a single witness, as long as it is credible and positive, is enough to

prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt.[19]
Soliva argues that Natalicio was not able to identify his attackers since he was seen by
Tan" lying face down as he was being attacked. On the contrary, Natalicio's and Tan's
testimonies were consistent as to Natalicio's position during the attack. Natalicio
testified:
With respect to the first group that attacked you, Mr. Natalicio, while they were beating
you up, what else if anything happened?

I was able to recognize two (2) among those [sic] first group of attackers.

COURT
What group, first group?

....

While I was parrying their blows, two (2) of these attackers had no mask, they had no mask
anymore.

....

So, Mr. Natalicio, who were these two (2) men that you recognized?

They were Warren Zingapan and Christopher Soliva. [20]

Cross-examination

Imagine, Mr. Witness, there were ten (10) people ganging up on you, you stood up, faced
them, just like that?

Yes.

You did not cover your head with your arms as they were pounding on you?

Not yet. When I was standing up, no. I was parrying their blows. I covered my head when I
fell down already, because I was defenseless already.

And there were people [who] attacked you from behind?

When I was standing up, none.

All of them were in froRt of you?

Front, yes.[21]
Natalicio explained that he was attacked twice. During the first attack, he tried to
stand up and was able to identify two (2) of his attackers. He fell to the ground when he
was attacked the second time. This is consistent with Tan's testimony, where he stated:
During the second waive [sic], your honor, [Natalicio] tried to get up but immediately after
the first waive [sic] another group of persons attacked, your honor.
COURT
When he tried to get up, he was still facing the ground?
A He was a bit tilted, your honor. He was no longer lying face down or "nakadapa, " your
honor.[22] (Emphasis supplied)
Soliva also misconstrues Tan's testimony that he could not identify Natalicio's
attackers. Tan testified:
You stated that while you were inside the beach house canteen observing the events
outside thru the door and in that couple of seconds, you could not establish the identity of
persons, is it not?

I could see them although I do not know their names. [23] (Emphasis supplied)
Tan failed to identify the attackers only because he did not know their names. His
testimony corroborates Natalicio's testimony that some of the attackers were masked
and some were not,[24] although Tan could not identify them because he was not familiar
with their names.
Tan was a fourth year student of the University of the Philippines College of Business
Administration at the time of the incident. He was not part of the Sigma Rho Fraternity
and was merely one of the students eating at Beach House Canteen on December 8,
1994.[25]
Another witness, Darwin Asuncion (Asuncion), was a third year student at the University
of the Philippines and was also at Beach House Canteen during the incident. [26] He
testified that some attackers were wearing masks while some were not. [27] On cross-
examination, he stated:
And many of these people who were in beach house canteen who were there to probably
eat or probably lining up to eat were not wearing mask? [sic]
Yes sir.
And there is a great possibility that you could have mistaken the unmasked people as part
of the attacking group?
No sir.
Why?
Because they were carrying lead pipes and baseball bats sir. [28] (Emphasis supplied)
Asuncion's testimony corroborates that of defense witness Frisco Capilo, who
testified that before the incident, the attackers were wearing masks, but after the
incident, he saw some wearing masks and some who did not. [29]
Alvir argues that Lachica's identification of him was "uncorroborated and hazy." [30] He
argues that Lachica admitted that while he was attacked, he covered his head with his
forearms, which created doubt that he was able to see his attackers. He argues that
Lachica's statement that he was still able to raise his head while parrying blows was
impossible. Alvir also argues that when Lachica ran away and looked back at the scene
of the crime, Lachica was only able to identify Julius Victor Medalla (Medalla) and
Zingapan.[31]
It is in line with human experience that even while Lachica was parrying the blows, he
would strive to identify his attackers. As has been previously stated by this Court:
It is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to see the
looks and faces of their assailants and observe the manner in which the crime was
committed. Most often the face of the assailant and body movements thereof, create a
lasting impression which cannot be easily erased from their memory. [32]
Lachica clearly and categorically identified Alvir as one of his attackers:
And during these attacks of these five (5) men and according to you, you were parrying
their blows, what happened?

At that time, one of the mask [sic] of those who attacked us fell off and I was able to
recognize one of them.

Who did you recognize whose mask fell?

He was Mike Alvir.[33]
Alvir also misinterprets Lachica's testimony that Lachica was unable to see Alvir
as he was running away. Lachica testified:
What happened after as you said you parried the blows of the men who attacked you and
you recognized one of them to be Mike Alvir. What happened next?
As I said, I was able to elude these five armed men and run towards the College of
Education and prior to reaching the College of Education, I tried to look back.
And what happened when you looked back?
I was able to see also, identify two more of them. Two of the attackers.
Who are these persons?
Warren Zingapan and Victor Medalla.[34] (Emphasis supplied)

Lachica testified that he was able to identify Alvir while he was being attacked.
When Lachica ran away and looked back at the scene of the crime, he was also able to
identify two (2) more of the attackers, Zingapan and Medalla. He did not deny seeing
Alvir, but only added that he was able to identify two (2) more people. U
Accused-appellants were positively identified by private complainants. Private

complainants' testimonies were clear and categorical. On this issue, we find no cogent
reason to reverse our May 5, 2014 Decision.
II
Zingapan's main argument hinges on the sufficiency of the Information filed against him,
which, he argues, violated his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.[35] His arguments, however, have already been
sufficiently addressed in our May 5, 2014 Decision.
For an information to be sufficient, Rule 110, Section 6 of the Rules of Criminal

Procedure requires that it state:
the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the
The purpose of alleging all the circumstances attending a crime, including any
circumstance that may aggravate the accused's liability, is for the accused to be able to
adequately prepare for his or her defense:
To discharge its burden of informing him of the charge, the State must specify in
the information the details of the crime and any circumstance that aggravates his
liability for the crime. The requirement of sufficient factual averments is meant to inform
the accused of the nature and cause of the charge against him in order to enable him to
prepare his defense. It emanates from the presumption of innocence in his favor,
pursuant to which he is always presumed to have no independent knowledge of the
details of the crime he is being charged with. To have the facts stated in the body of the
information determine the crime of which he stands charged and for which he must be
tried thoroughly accords with common sense and with the requirements of plain
justice[.][36] (Emphasis supplied)
Here, the aggravating circumstance of "masks and/or other forms of
disguise"[37] was alleged in the Informations to enable the prosecution to establish that
the attackers intended to conceal their identities. Once this is established, the
prosecution needed to prove how the witnesses were able to ft identify the attackers
despite the concealment of identity. In our May 5, X 2014 Decision:
In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because, like nighttime,
it allows the accused to remain anonymous and unidentifiable as he carries out his
crimes.
The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to prove that the
accused were masked but the masks fell off does not prevent them from including
disguise as an aggravating circumstance. What is important in alleging disguise as an
aggravating circumstance is that there was a concealment of identity by the accused.
The inclusion of disguise in the information was, therefore, enough to sufficiently
apprise the accused that in the commission of the offense they were being charged
with, they tried to conceal their identity.[38] (Emphasis in the original)
To recall, the Information for murder filed against accused-appellants reads:
That on or about the 8th day of December 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise, conspiring,
confederating with other persons whose true names, identities and whereabouts have
not as yet been ascertained, and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill,
qualified with treachery, and with evident premeditation, taking advantage of superior
strength, armed with baseball bats, lead pipes, and cutters, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person
of DENNIS F. VENTURINA, by then and there hitting him on the head and clubbing him
on different parts of his body thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal injuries
which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice
of the heirs of said DENNIS F. VENTURINA.[39]
Zingapan was sufficiently informed that he was being charged with the death of
Dennis Venturina, committed through the circumstances provided.
Based on this Information, Zingapan's counsel was able to formulate his defense, which
was that of alibi. He was able to allege that he was not at Beach House Canteen at the
time of the incident because he was having lunch with his cousin's husband in
Kamuning.[40] His defense had nothing to do with whether he might or might not have
been wearing a mask during the December 8, 1994 incident since his main defense was
that he was not there at all.
Zingapan's right to be informed of the cause or nature of the accusation against him was
not violated. The inclusion of the aggravating circumstance of disguise in the
Informations did not prevent him from presenting his defense of alibi.
III
Accused-appellants argue that the testimony of University of the Philippines Police

Officers Romeo Cabrera (Cabrera) and Oscar Salvador (Salvador) and Dr. Carmen
Mislang (Dr. Mislang) from the University of the Philippines Infirmary should have been
given credibility by this Court.[41] They also insist that the victims' delay in reporting the
incident casts doubt in their credibility as witnesses. [42] Unfortunately, these arguments
fail to persuade.
Natalicio testified that he was unable to answer the queries of Cabrera and Salvador
since he was more concerned with his injuries and the injuries of his companions. [43] He
also denied that Dr. Mislang questioned him on the identity of his attackers. [44]
Even if it were true that Natalicio denied knowing his attackers when he was
interviewed by Cabrera, Salvador, and Dr. Mislang, it did not cast doubt on accused-
appellants' guilt. The conditions prevailing within the campus at the time of the incident
must also be taken into account.
At the time of the incident, the University of the Philippines-Diliman had an existing
policy that all students involved in fraternity rumbles would be expelled. [45] Cabrera,
Salvador, and Dr. Mislang were employees of the University. [46] Reporting the incident as
a fraternity rumble was risking expulsion.[47]
The investigation conducted by the University of the Philippines Police was met with the
same difficulty, since the witnesses interviewed were reluctant to speak on fraternity
matters:
As of this date, operatives of the UP Diliman Police have already interviewed sixty
(60) persons, twenty five (25) of them mostly students, refused to comment or to give
their names. Most of those who refused to comment said that they don't want to get
involved in fraternity matters[.][48] (Emphasis supplied)
Under these circumstances, private complainants chose to report the matter to
the National Bureau of Investigation as an ordinary crime rather than to report it to
school authorities. The University would have treated the matter as a fraternity-related
campus incident where all parties involved, including private complainants who were
also fraternity members, risk academic sanctions. At that time, private complainants
decided that reporting to the National Bureau of Investigation, rather than to university
officials, was the more prudent course of action.
The alleged delay in reporting the crime also does not cast doubt on private
complainants' credibility. The trial court stated:
[O]n the evening of December 8, 1994, the victims, upon the advice of their
senior fraternity brothers, had agreed that the NBI would handle the investigation. This
was reached during the fellowship of the Sigma Rho brothers in a racetrack in Makati
which Lachica and Gaston attended. Lachica preferred the NBI because he wanted a
thorough investigation in view of the gravity of the offense.
So, on the very next day, December 9, 1994, the Vice Grand Archon, Redentor Guerrero,
went to the NBI and inquired about the procedure in filing a complaint. Thereafter, their
then Grand Archon Jovy Bernabe, with Redentor Guerrero, informed them that they
would be going to the NBI together. They were advised to rest and told that they would
just be informed when they would go to the NBI. On the 11th, the two informed them
that they would go to the NBI the next day and they did. [49]
The incident happened on a Thursday. On the evening of the incident, private
complainants agreed that they would report the matter to the National Bureau of
Investigation. On Friday, December 9, 1994, they were advised by their senior fraternity
brothers to recuperate first from their injuries while their Grand Archon and Vice Grand
Archon went to the National Bureau of Investigation to inquire on the procedure. They
could not report the incident on December 10 and 11, 1994 because this was a Saturday
and a Sunday. They were able to report to the National Bureau of Investigation on
December 12, 1994, the Monday following the incident. [50]
The alleged delay in reporting was caused by the gravity of private complainants'
injuries, their desire to report to the proper authorities, and the weekend. These
circumstances are not enough to disprove their credibility as witnesses.
Soliva also takes exception to this Court's characterization that the University of the
Philippines Police have become desensitized to fraternity-related violence. [51]
It is not disputed that the University of the Philippines has served as a common
battleground for fraternity-related violence. In 2007, GMA News compiled a list of
casualties of fraternity-related violence at the University of the Philippines. [52] Six (6)
students were reported to have died from fraternity-related violence before the
December 8, 1994 incident at Beach House Canteen.
Even after the promulgation of our May 5, 2014 Decision, fraternity-related violence
remained prevalent within the University. On July 4, 2014, the Office of the Chancellor
issued a statement confirming another fraternity-related incident involving students of
the University.[53] Another fraternity rumble was reported to have occurred on university
grounds.[54] Although no casualties were reported in both incidents, these incidents only
amplify the reality that fraternity-related violence continues to be rampant within the
University.
The presence of the University of the Philippines Police or the severe sanctions imposed
by university officials have done little to deter these crimes. The frequency of these
incidents has become the University's cultural norm, where its students—and even
university employees—simply regard it as part of university life.
IV
Alvir argues that this Court erred in finding conspiracy among all the accused since the
trial court acquitted those who were identified by Mangrobang, Jr. [55] This argument,
however, is non sequitur.
The trial court, in acquitting the other accused, stated:

The foregoing should not be misinterpreted to mean that the testimony of
Mangrobang was an absolute fabrication. The Court is not inclined to make such a
declaration. The four accused were exonerated merely because they were afforded the
benefit of the doubt as their identification by Mangrobang, under tumultuous and
chaotic circumstances were not corroborated and their alibis, not refuted. [56]
In contrast, Lachica's identification of Alvir was given credibility by the trial court.
[57]
Alvir's alibi was also found to be weak. [58]
Conspiracy does not require that all persons charged in the information be found guilty.
It only requires that those who were found guilty conspired in committing the crime.
The acquittal of some of the accused does not necessarily preclude the presence of
conspiracy.
Of the 10 accused in the Informations, four [59] (4) were acquitted. The trial court was
convinced that they were not present during the commission of the crime. Conspiracy
cannot attach to those who were not properly identified.
However, Alvir, Zingapan, Soliva, Medalla, and Danilo Feliciano, Jr. (Feliciano) were
positively identified by eyewitnesses before the trial court. The prosecution's evidence
was enough to convince the trial court, the Court of Appeals, and this Court that they
were present during the December 8, 1994 incident and that they committed the crime
charged in the Informations. We have also exhaustively examined the evidence on hand,
as well as the assessments of the trial court and of the Court of Appeals, to determine
that all five (5) of them conspired to commit the crimes with which they were charged.
The trial court's acquittal of some of those charged in the Informations has no bearing
on our finding that Alvir, Zingapan, Soliva, Feliciano, and Medalla are guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
Soliva, however, argues that our May 5, 2014 Decision did not apply to those who did
not appeal to this Court, namely: Feliciano and Medalla. [60] At this point, a re-
examination of the rules of appeal in criminal cases may be in order.
To recall the procedural incidents in this case, the trial court's Decision [61] dated
February 28, 2002 found Alvir, Zingapan, Soliva, Feliciano, and Medalla guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the murder of Dennis Venturina and the attempted murder of
Lachica, Fortes, Natalicio,
Gaston, and Mangrobang, Jr.[62] They were meted the death penalty, and the case was
brought to this Court on automatic review.[63]
In view, however, of People v. Mateo[64] and the Amended Rules to Govern Review of

Death Penalty Cases,[65] this Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals for review. A
notice of appeal in this instance was unnecessary. Rule 122, Sections 3(d) and 10 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, state:
RULE 122
APPEAL
SEC. 3. How appeal taken.—
....
(d) No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the Regional Trial Court imposed the
death penalty. The Court of Appeals shall automatically review the judgment as
provided in Section 10 of this Rule. (3a)
SEC. 10. Transmission of records in case of death penalty. —In all cases where the death
penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records shall be forwarded to the Court of
Appeals for automatic review and judgment within twenty days but not earlier than
fifteen days from the promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of a motion for
new trial or reconsideration. The transcript shall also be forwarded within ten days after
the filing thereof by the stenographic reporter. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court of Appeals was mandated to review the case with regard to all five (5)
of the accused, now referred to as accused-appellants, regardless of whether they filed
a notice of appeal. The review is considered automatic.
During the pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, Congress enacted
Republic Act No. 9346,[66] which prohibited courts from imposing the death penalty. In
its November 26, 2010 Decision,[67] the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's finding
that accused-appellants were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the murder of Dennis
Venturina. In view of the proscription on death penalty, the Court of Appeals modified
the imposable penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.[68]
However, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court's finding that accused-
appellants were likewise guilty of attempted murder with regards Lachica, Mangrobang,
Jr., and Gaston.[69] It stated that the gravity of their injuries was not indicative of
accused-appellants' intent to kill. [70] Instead, the Court of Appeals modified the offense
to slight physical injuries.[71] In other words, it found accused-appellants guilty of the
murder of Dennis Venturina, the attempted murder of Fortes and Natalicio, and the
slight physical injuries of Lachica, Mangrobang, Jr., and Gaston. [72]
Only three (3)—namely: Soliva, Alvir, and Zingapan—of the five (5) accused-appellants
filed their respective Notices of Appeal before this Court. The Court of Appeals
forwarded the records of the case to this Court, and the entire case was again opened
for review under Rule 124, Section 13(b) and (c) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure:
RULE 124
SEC. 13. Certification or appeal of case to the Supreme Court.—
(b) Where the judgment also imposes a lesser penalty for offenses committed on the
same occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more
severe offense for which the penalty of death is imposed, and the accused appeals, the
appeal shall be included in the case certified for review to, the Supreme Court.
(c) In cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or
a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The
judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Court
of Appeals. (Emphasis supplied)
In our May 5, 2014 Decision,[73] we reversed the Court of Appeals' modification of
the offense from attempted murder to slight physical injuries. [74] We explained that the
liabilities of accused-appellants arose from a single incident where the intent to kill was
already evident from the first swing of the bat, and that intent was shared by all when
the presence of conspiracy was proven. In effect, we affirmed the trial court's ruling that
accused-appellants were guilty of the attempted murder of Lachica, Fortes, Natalicio,
Gaston, and Mangrobang, Jr.[75]
According to Article 248[76] in relation to Article 51[77] of the Revised Penal Code,
attempted murder is punishable by prision mayor. Slight physical injuries, on the other
hand, is punishable by arresto menor. The Court of Appeals, in modifying the offenses
with regard to victims Lachica, Gaston, and Mangrobang, Jr., lowered some of the
imposable penalties of accused-appellants. On appeal to this Court, however, we
reverted to the findings of the trial court and brought back the higher offense of
attempted murder. In this instance, the application of the higher penalty to accused-
appellants becomes problematic when only three (3) of them actually appealed to this
Court.
The problem lies with the effect of the prohibition of death penalty on the current rules
on appeal in the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The amendments introduced in the
Amended Rules to Govern Review of Death Penalty Cases still stand even if, as this Court
has previously mentioned, "death penalty cases are no longer operational." [78]
In People v. Rocha,[79] this Court encountered a similar problem. The issue for resolution
was whether the accused's Motion to Withdraw Appeal before this Court could be
granted if the Court of Appeals imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetual[80] The People
were of the opinion that the appeal could not be withdrawn since this Court was
mandated by the Constitution to review all cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or higher.[81]
However, this Court ruled that the appeal could still be withdrawn as cases where the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher is not subject to this Court's mandatory
review. Thus:
The confusion in the case at bar seems to stem from the effects of the Decision of
this Court in People v. Mateo. In Mateo, as quoted by plaintiff-appellee, it was stated
that "[w]hile the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court
of cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death,
nowhere, however, has it proscribed an intermediate review." A closer study of Mateo,
however, reveals that the inclusion in the foregoing statement of cases where the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment was only for the purpose of
including these cases within the ambit of the intermediate review of the Court of
Appeals: "[this] Court now deems it wise and compelling to provide in these cases [cases
where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death] review by
the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court."
We had not intended to pronounce in Mateo that cases where the penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment are subject to the mandatory review of this
Court. In Mateo, these cases were grouped together with death penalty cases because,
prior to Mateo, it was this Court which had jurisdiction to directly review reclusion
perpetua, life imprisonment and death penalty cases alike. The mode of review,
however, was different. Reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment cases were brought
before this Court via a notice of appeal, while death penalty cases were reviewed by this
Court on automatic review.
. . . .
After the promulgation of Mateo on 7 June 2004, this Court promptly caused the
amendment of the foregoing provisions, but retained the distinction of requiring a
notice of appeal for reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment cases and automatically
reviewing death penalty cases. .
Neither does the Constitution require a mandatory review by this Court of cases where
the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. The constitutional
provision quoted in Mateo merely gives this Court jurisdiction over such cases[.]
. . . .
Since the case of accused-appellants is not subject to the mandatory review of this
Court, the rule that neither the accused nor the courts can waive a mandatory review is
not applicable. Consequently, accused-appellants' separate motions to withdraw appeal
may be validly granted.[82] (Emphasis supplied)
Here, the trial court's ruling mandated an automatic review and the case was
forwarded to the Court of Appeals per Mateo and the Amended Rules to Govern Review
of Death Penalty Cases. As the death penalty was abolished during the pendency of the
appeal before the Court of Appeals, the highest penalty the Court of Appeals could
impose was reclusion perpetua. Any review of the Court of Appeals Decision by this
Court will never be mandatory or automatic.
In effect, while we can review the case in its entirety and examine its merits, we cannot
disturb the penalties imposed by the Court of Appeals on those who did not appeal,
namely, Feliciano and Medalla. This is consistent with Rule 122, Section 1 l(a) of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure:
RULE 122
APPEAL
SEC. 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. —
(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not
appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable
to the latter[.]
As our May 5, 2014 Decision was unfavorable to accused-appellants, those who
did not appeal must not be affected by our judgment. The penalty of arresto
menor imposed by the Court of Appeals on Feliciano and Medalla in Criminal Case Nos.
Q95-61134, Q95-61135, and Q95-61136 stands.
In view, however, of People v. Jugueta[83] the damages previously awarded must also be

increased. In Jugueta, we stated that "civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a
fine; hence, it can be increased by [this] Court when appropriate." [84] We also explained
that the Civil Code did not fix the amount of moral damages, exemplary damages, and
temperate damages that may be awarded; thus, the amount is within this Court's
discretion to determine.[85]
In Criminal Case No. Q95-61133, the award of civil indemnity, moral damages, and
exemplary damages are increased to P100,000.00, [86] respectively. The amount of
temperate damages to be awarded is increased to P50,000.00. [87] In Criminal Cases Nos.
Q95-61134, Q95-61135, Q95-61136, O95-61137, and Q95-61138, the award of moral
damages and exemplary damages are increased to P50,000.00, [88] respectively.
Soliva takes exception to this Court's statements on fraternity culture and argued that
these have no basis on facts or evidence. [89] Unfortunately, our May 5, 2014 Decision
was not the first time that this Court expressed its sentiments on the issue of fraternity-
related violence.
In Villareal v. People,[90] this Court found five (5) promising young men guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of reckless impudence resulting in homicide for the death of Lenny
Villa, an Ateneo law student and a neophyte of Aquila Legis Fraternity. This Court could
only lament on accused-appellants' fate and the senseless loss of life in the name of a
so-called "brotherhood," stating:
It is truly astonishing how men would wittingly — or unwittingly — impose the
misery of hazing and employ appalling rituals in the name of brotherhood. There must
be a better way to establish "kinship." A neophyte admitted that he joined the fraternity
to have more friends and to avail himself of the benefits it offered, such as tips during
bar examinations. Another initiate did not give up, because he feared being looked
down upon as a quitter, and because he felt he did not have a choice. Thus, for Lenny
Villa and the other neophytes, joining the Aquila Fraternity entailed a leap in the
dark. By giving consent under the circumstances, they left their fates in the hands of the
fraternity members. Unfortunately, the hands to which lives were entrusted were
barbaric as they were reckless.[91] (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, the blind loyalty held by fraternity members to their "brothers" defies
logic or reason.
In People v. Colana,[92] an innocent college student, Librado De la Vega (De la Vega),

became collateral damage between two rival fraternities in Far Eastern University.
When De la Vega passed Phi Lambda Epsilon officer Leonardo Colana's (Colana) group
on his way to school, the head of Colana's fraternity told him that De la Vega was a
member of Alpha Kappa Rho, their rival fraternity. The group approached De la Vega as
Colana, armed with an ice pick, stabbed De la Vega repeatedly. They left De la Vega on
the street to die.
On appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court's finding that Colana was guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder, stating that "[m]otive for the killing was revenge. On a
prior occasion some members of the Epsilon fraternity were beaten allegedly by
members of the Alpha fraternity."[93]
This Court likewise briefly mentioned the senselessness of De la Vega's death:

What is lamentable is that De la Vega was not an FEU student, much less a
member of the Alpha fraternity. He used to be an engineering student at the Feati
University. At the time of his death, he was studying typing. [94]
Death or injuries caused by fraternity rumbles are not treated as separate or
distinct crimes, unlike deaths or injuries as a result of hazing. They are punishable as
ordinary crimes of murder, homicide, or physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code.
The prosecution of fraternity-related violence, however, is harder than the prosecution

of ordinary crimes. Most of the time, the evidence is merely circumstantial. The reason
is obvious: loyalty to the fraternity dictates that brods do not turn on their brods. A
crime can go unprosecuted for as long as the brotherhood remains silent.
Perhaps the best person to explain fraternity culture is one of its own. Raymund Narag
was among those charged in this case but was eventually acquitted by the trial court. In
2009, he wrote a blog entry outlining the culture and practices of a fraternity, referring
to the fraternity system as "a big black hole that sucks these young promising men to
their graves."[95] This, of course, is merely his personal opinion on the matter. However,
it is illuminating to see a glimpse of how a fraternity member views his disillusionment
of an organization with which he voluntarily associated. In particular, he writes that:
The fraternities anchor their strength on secrecy. Like the Sicilian code of omerta,
fraternity members are bound to keep the secrets from the non-members. They have
codes and symbols the frat members alone can understand. They know if there are
problems in campus by mere signs posted in conspicuous places. They have a different
set [sic] of communicating, like inverting the spelling of words, so that ordinary
conversations cannot be decoded by non-members.
It takes a lot of acculturation in order for frat members to imbibe the code of silence.
The members have to be a mainstay of the tambayan to know the latest developments
about new members and the activities of other frats. Secrets are even denied to some
members who are not really in to [sic] the system. They have to earn a reputation to be
part of the inner sanctum. It is a form of giving premium to become the "true blue
member".
The code of silence reinforces the feeling of elitism. The fraternities are worlds of their
own. They are sovereign in their existence. They have their own myths,
conceptualization of themselves and worldviews. Save perhaps to their alumni
association, they do not recognize any authority aside from the head of the fraternity. [96]
The secrecy that surrounds the traditions and practices of a fraternity becomes
problematic on an evidentiary level as there are no set standards from which a
fraternity-related crime could be measured. In People v. Gilbert Peralta,[97] this Court
could not consider a fraternity member's testimony biased without any prior testimony
on fraternity behavior:
Esguerra testified that as a fraternity brother he would do anything and
everything for the victim. A witness may be said to be biased when his relation to the
cause or to the parties is such that he has an incentive to exaggerate or give false color
or pervert the truth, or to state what is false. To impeach a biased witness, the counsel
must lay the proper foundation of the bias by asking the witness the facts constituting
the bias. In the case at bar, there was no proper impeachment by bias of the three (3)
prosecution witnesses. Esguerra's testimony that he would do anything for his fellow
brothers was too broad and general so as to constitute a motive to lie before the trial
court. Counsel for the defense failed to propound questions regarding the tenets of the
fraternity that espouse absolute fealty of the members to each other. The question was
phrased so as to ask only for Esguerra's personal conviction[.][98] (Emphasis supplied)
The inherent difficulty in the prosecution of fraternity-related violence forces the
judiciary to be more exacting in examining all the evidence on hand, with due regard to
the peculiarities of the circumstances. In this instance, we have thoroughly reviewed the
arguments presented by accused-appellants in their Motions for Reconsideration and
have weighed them against the evidence on hand. Unfortunately, their Motions have
not given us cause to reconsider our May 5, 2014 Decision.
WHEREFORE, this Court resolves to DENY with FINALITY the Motions for

Reconsideration, both dated July 1, 2014, of accused-appellants Robert Michael Beltran
Alvir and Warren L. Zingapan. The Motion for Modification of Judgment dated October
30, 2014 filed by accused-appellant Robert Michael Beltran Alvir is DENIED.
The Motion for Reconsideration of accused-appellant Christopher Soliva, however,

is PARTLY GRANTED. Judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
In Criminal Case No. Q95-61133, accused-appellants Robert Michael Beltran Alvir, Danilo
1) Feliciano, Jr., Christopher Soliva, Julius Victor Medalla, and Warren L. Zingapan are found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of murder and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, without parole.

In addition, the accused-appellants are ordered to jointly and severally pay the heirs of
Dennis Venturina the following amounts:

P100,000.00 as civil indemnity;
a)
PI39,642.70 as actual damages;
b)
P5 0,000.00 as temperate damages;
c)
P100,000.00 as moral damages; and
d)
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
e)

In Criminal Cases No. Q95-61134, Q95-61135, Q95-61136, Q95-61137, and Q95-61138,
2) accused-appellants Robert Michael Beltran Alvir, Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Christopher Soliva, Julius
Victor Medalla, and Warren L. Zingapan are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of attempted
murder.
Accused-appellants Robert Michael Beltran Alvir, Christopher Soliva, and Warren
L. Zingapan are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, six (6)
months, and one (1) day of prision correctional as minimum and twelve (12) years
of prision mayor as maximum. A
Danilo Feliciano, Jr. and Julius Victor Medalla are sentenced to suffer arresto menor, or
thirty (30) days of imprisonment.
In addition, all accused-appellants are ordered to jointly and severally pay private
complainants Leonardo Lachica, Cesar Mangrobang-Jr., Cristobal Gaston, Jr., Mervin
Natalicio, and Arnel Fortes the following amounts:
(a) P50,000.00 as moral damages; and
(b) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
L. Zingapan are additionally ordered to jointly and severally pay private complainant
Mervin Natalicio P820.50 as actual damages.
All awards of damages shall earn 6% legal interest per annum from the finality of this
judgment until its full satisfaction.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 160619, September 09, 2015 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
(FOURTH DIVISION), JESSIE CASTILLO, MELENCIO ARCIAGA AND
EMERENCIANO ARCIAGA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
The purpose of an Information is to afford an accused his right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. It is in pursuit of this purpose that the
Rules of Court require that the Information allege the ultimate facts constituting the
elements of the crime charged. Details that do not go into the core of the crime need not
be included in the Information, but may be presented during trial. The rule that evidence
must be presented to establish the existence of the elements of a crime to the point of
moral certainty is only for purposes of conviction. It finds no application in the
determination of whether or not an Information is sufficient to warrant the trial of an
accused.
The Case
Before us is a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the People of the
Philippines ("the People") through the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Office
of the Ombudsman. The petition seeks the reversal of the Resolutions dated January 9,
2002[1] and November 3, 2003[2] issued by public respondent Sandiganbayan, granting
private respondent Jessie B. Castillo's Supplemental Motion to Dismiss the Information
filed against him and denying the People's subsequent Motion for Reconsideration,
respectively.
The Facts
Jessie B. Castillo (Castillo) was elected mayor of the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite in
the May 1998 elections. On September 19, 2000, an Information was filed against
Castillo charging him with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019,[3] in
relation to the alleged illegal operation of the Villa Esperanza dumpsite located in
Molino, Bacoor, Cavite. According to the Information, Castillo, while in the performance
of his official functions as Mayor of Bacoor, gave unwarranted benefits to his co-accused
Melencio and Emerenciano Arciaga by allowing the latter to operate the Villa Esperanza
dumpsite without the requisite Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) and permit
from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB).[4]
An administrative complaint for Simple Misconduct had previously been filed against
Castillo also in relation to the illegal operation of the dumpsite. The Office of the
Ombudsman found Castillo guilty of the administrative charge and imposed the penalty
of one (1) month and one (1) day suspension. On appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside
the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman and ordered the dismissal of the
administrative complaint against Castillo.[5] The Court of Appeals held:
Xxx [Castillo] did not violate the DENR notice which was issued way back in 1998 yet,
or before his actual assumption of office. Quite the contrary, while already a mayor,
[Castillo], upon being informed of the notice, immediately took steps in resolving the
municipality's aged-long garbage problem. True, the solution was a long-term one, but
the end results were just the same, i.e., what was once a mountainous pile of trash
covering a 2-hectare piece of property has been remarkably reduced and what was left
was a considerable area used as a segregation and transfer station of garbage prior to their
eventual dumping at the San Mateo landfill.
Doubtless, in finding [Castillo] guilty of simple misconduct and penalizing him therefor,
the respondent Office of the Ombudsman, in clear abuse of discretion, ignored and did
not take into account the foregoing reports, including no less the letter of commendation
of [DENR] Secretary Cerilles.
It is thus unfortunate that even as [Castillo] had taken concrete steps to address a problem
that was not of his own doing or tolerance but merely inherited by him, he was instead
rewarded by an administrative penalty even as the very government agency (DENR)
which issued the Notice of Violation commended him for his efforts. If this is not a
travesty of justice, then We know not what it is.[6]
After arraignment and pre-trial, Castillo, on August 21, 2001, filed with the
Sandiganbayan a Motion to Dismiss or Terminate Proceedings.[7] He argued that the case
against him had been decriminalized by Section 37 of Republic Act No. 9003 [8] and
invoked the decision of the Court of Appeals absolving him of administrative liability.
His motion was initially denied by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution dated September 6,
2001.[9]
On September 21, 2001, Castillo filed a Supplemental Motion to Quash the Information
on the ground that the same does not charge an offense.[10] He claimed that a public
officer may only be held liable for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 if he caused
undue injury to the government or any private person. Thus, Castillo argued that the
undue injury must not only be mentioned in the Information, its extent must be specified.
Invoking the ruling of this Court in Llorente, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,[11] Castillo asserted
that the claim of undue injury must be "specified, quantified and proven to the point of
moral certainty."
The Sandiganbayan Fourth Division failed to decide unanimously on the Supplemental

Motion. Thus, a special division (composed of five Justices of the Sandiganbayan) was
constituted.[12] Voting 3 to 2,[13] this Special Division, in its challenged Resolution dated
January 9, 2002, granted Castillo's Supplemental Motion:
Going over the elements of the crime vis-a-vis the allegations of the information, the
court agrees with the contention of movant that the allegations of the information fail to
measure up to the requirements of the law. While the information charges Castillo with
violation of Section 3[e] of R.A. 3019 for "giving unwarranted benefits to his co-accused
Melencio and Emerenciano Arciaga, by allowing the operation of the dumpsite at Villa
Esperanza, Molino, Bacoor, Cavite" and "thereby causing undue injury to the residents
and students in the area who had to endure the stench, flies, rats and mosquitoes
emanating from the dumpsite" the court notes the failure of the information to
quantify the alleged unwarranted benefits supposedly given by movant to his co-
accused as well as the undue injury caused to the residents and students of the area
affected by the dumpsite.
In the case of Alejandro vs. People, the Supreme Court had ruled that undue injury
requires proof of actual injury or damage. Thus, in Llorente, it was held that undue injury
in Sec. 3[e] cannot be presumed even after a wrong or a violation of a right has been
established. Its existence must be proven as one of the elements of the crime. In fact, the
causing of undue injury or the giving of unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence constitutes
the very act punished under this section. Thus, it is required that the undue injury be
specified, quantified and proven to the point of moral certainty.
Anent the allegation of unwarranted benefits given to the Arciagas, the court likewise
notes the failure of the information to specify and quantify the same. Whereas the
Ombudsman's resolution finding prima facie evidence against the herein accused
made mention of the amount of P250.00 to P300.00 allegedly collected from each
garbage truck from companies and factories allowed to dump garbage at the Villa
Esperanza dumpsite, the same was not alleged in the information which charged
Castillo with having given unwarranted benefits to his co-accused.[14]
[15]
The Special Division also resolved, on November 3, 2003, to deny the motion for
reconsideration subsequently filed by the People.
The Issue
The case before us raises the question of what ultimate facts are required to be stated in
an Information charging an accused with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
Specifically, we are called to resolve whether an Information alleging the grant of
unwarranted benefits and existence of undue injury must state the precise amount of the
alleged benefit unduly granted as well as identify, specify, and prove the alleged injury to
the point of moral certainty.
Ruling of the Court
The main purpose of an Information is to ensure that an accused is formally informed of

the facts and the acts constituting the offense charged.[16] Where insufficient, an accused
in a criminal case can file a motion to have the Information against him quashed and/or
dismissed before he enters his plea.[17] A motion to quash challenges the efficacy of an
Information[18] and compels the court to determine whether the Information suffices to
require an accused to endure the rigors of a trial. Where the Information is insufficient
and thus cannot be the basis of any valid conviction, the court must drop the case
immediately and save an accused from the anxiety and convenience of a useless trial. [19]
A motion to quash an Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute
an offense should be resolved on the basis of the allegations in the Information whose
truth and veracity are hypothetically admitted.[20] The question that must be answered is
whether such allegations are sufficient to establish the elements of the crime charged
without considering matters aliunde.[21] In proceeding to resolve this issue, courts must
look into three matters: (1) what must be alleged in a valid Information; (2) what the
elements of the crime charged are; and (3) whether these elements are sufficiently stated
in the Information.
Sufficiency of Complaint or Information
Sections 6 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court are relevant. They state -
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. - A complaint or information is sufficient
if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the
statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of
the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place
xxx
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. - The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and
concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the
court to pronounce judgment.
This Court, in Lazarte v. Sandiganbayan[22] explained the two important purposes
underlying the rule. First, it enables the accused to suitably prepare his defense.
[23]
Second, it allows the accused, if found guilty, to plead his conviction in a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense.[24] Thus, this Court held that the true test in ascertaining
the validity and sufficiency of an Information is "whether the crime is described in
intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise the accused, with reasonable
certainty, of the offense charged."[25]
Castillo is charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the elements of which
are as follows:

official functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; and
3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or
giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his functions.[26]
The subject Information filed against Castillo, on the other hand, reads to wit:
That in or about 1998, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of
Bacoor, Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Jessie B. Castillo, a public officer, being the incumbent Mayor of
Bacoor, Cavite, while in the performance of his official and administrative function,
acting in evident bad faith and manifest partiality, conspiring and confederating with
accused Melencio A. Arciaga and Emerenciano A. Arciaga, caretakers of Villa
Esperanza, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted
benefits to his co-accused Melencio A. Arciaga and Emerenciano A. Arciaga, by
allowing the operation of the dump site located at Villa Esperanza, Molino, Bacoor,
Cavite, notwithstanding the fact that no Environmental Compliance Certificate
(ECC) or any permit has been issued by the Environmental Management Bureau
(EMB), Department of Environment and Natural Resources to any person or entity
for such purpose, and despite cease and desist orders issued by the DENR, thereby
causing undue injury to the residents and students in the area who had to endure the
stench, Hies, rats and mosquitoes emanating from the dumpsite.[27]
Information filed against Castillo and his co-accused is sufficient
We find that the foregoing Information sufficiently alleges the essential elements of a
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The Information specifically alleged that
Castillo is the Mayor of Bacoor, Cavite who, in such official capacity, with evident bad
faith and manifest partiality, and conspiring with the Arciagas, wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally gave unwarranted benefits to the latter, by allowing the illegal operation of the
Villa Esperanza dumpsite, to the undue injury of the residents and students in the area
who had to endure the ill-effects of the dumpsite's operation.
The Sandiganbayan, however, allowed the quashal of the Information due to the
prosecution's failure to (1) allege, with precision, the exact amount of benefits granted by
Castillo to the Arciagas and (2) specify, quantify and prove "to the point of moral
certainty" the undue injury caused to the people of Molino. According to the
Sandiganbayan:
xxx the court deems it to be an exercise in futility to proceed to trial when the
information that was filed failed to inform the accused of the quantity of injury caused by
Castillo to the residents of Villa Esperanza and the amount of unwarranted benefits given
to the Arciagas as a result of the operation of the dumpsite. Such failure is fatal to the
prosecution's cause considering that the public prosecutor is barred from presenting
evidence on a matter not alleged in the information. Otherwise, if the prosecution
would be allowed to present evidence to quantify the element of undue injury or
unwarranted benefits, the same would violate the right of the accused to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.[28]
We disagree.
For as long as the ultimate facts constituting the offense have been alleged, an

Information charging a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 need not state, to the
point of specificity, the exact amount of unwarranted benefit granted nor specify,
quantify or prove, to the point of moral certainty, the undue injury caused. We have
consistently and repeatedly held in a number of cases that an Information need only state
the ultimate facts constituting the offense and not the finer details of why and how the
crime was committed.[29]
As alleged in the Information, the unwarranted benefit was the privilege granted by
Castillo to the Arciagas to operate the dumpsite without the need to comply with the
applicable laws, rules, and regulations; the undue injury being residents and students
were made to endure the ill-effects of the illegal operation. The details required by the
Sandiganbayan (such as the specific peso amount actually received by the Arciagas as a
consequence of the illegal operation of the subject dumpsite or the specific extent of
damage caused to the residents and students) are matters of evidence best raised during
the trial; they need not be stated in the Information. For purposes of informing the
accused of the crime charged, the allegation on the existence of unwarranted benefits and
undue injury under the Information suffices.
Moreover, the rationale for the ultimate facts requirement becomes clearer when one
considers the period when a motion to quash is filed, that is, before the accused's
arraignment and the parties' presentation of their evidence. It would be illogical, if not
procedurally infirm, to require specific peso amount allegations of the unwarranted
benefit and proof of undue injury - to the point of moral certainty, no less — at this stage
of the criminal proceedings.
Application of Llorente ruling is misplaced
The Sandiganbayan's application of the Llorente ruling in this case is misplaced.
Indeed, this Court held in Llorente that the "undue injury must be specified, quantified
and proven to the point of moral certainty."[30] The validity and sufficiency of the
Information, however, was not an issue in Llorente. The import of the ruling therein is
that proof of undue injury must be established by the prosecution during the trial and
not when the Information is filed. Nowhere in Llorente did we require that undue injury
be specified, quantified and proved to the point of moral certainty at the time of the filing
of the Information. Such an interpretation would effectively require the prosecution to
include all the relevant evidence in the Information and to present such evidence of undue
injury even prior to arraignment. Moreover, under the Sandiganbayan's interpretation
of Llorente, the accused would be required to face (and even rebut) the evidence as soon
as the Information is filed and even before he pleads. This runs counter to the function of
a motion to quash as a remedy afforded an accused before he proceeds to trial.
Further, such an interpretation would undermine the value of the Information as a tool for
an accused to understand the crime for which he is being charged as it requires that the
Information already contain a long and detailed list of other matters not necessary in
informing the accused of the charge. It will also be prejudicial to the prosecution who
will then be forced to present evidence even before the trial proper. This interpretation
cannot be countenanced.
Outright quashal of the Information not proper
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the Information was defective on the ground
that the facts charged therein do not constitute an offense, outright quashal of the
Information is not the proper course of action.
Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court gives clear guidance on this matter. It provides
-
Sec. 4. Amendment of complaint or information. - If the motion to quash is based on an
alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the
court shall order that an amendment be made.
If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the
prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by
amendment. The motion shall be granted if the prosecution fails to make the
amendment, or the complaint or information still suffers from the same defect despite the
amendment.
When a motion to quash is filed challenging the validity and sufficiency of an
Information, and the defect may be cured by amendment, courts must deny the motion to
quash and order the prosecution to file an amended Information.[31] Generally, a defect
pertaining to the failure of an Information to charge facts constituting an offense is one
that may be corrected by an amendment.[32] In such instances, courts are mandated not to
automatically quash the Information; rather, it should grant the prosecution the
opportunity to cure the defect through an amendment.[33] This rule allows a case to
proceed without undue delay. By allowing the defect to be cured by simple amendment,
unnecessary appeals based on technical grounds, which only result to prolonging the
proceedings, are avoided.
More than this practical consideration, however, is the due process underpinnings of this
rule. As explained by this Court in People v. Andrade,[34] the State, just like any other
litigant, is entitled to its day in court. Thus, a court's refusal to grant the prosecution the
opportunity to amend an Information, where such right is expressly granted under the
Rules of Court and affirmed time and again in a string of Supreme Court decisions,
effectively curtails the State's right to due process.
Hence, even assuming that the Information was defective, the Sandiganbayan should
have first ordered its amendment and not its quashal. Doing so would have saved the
parties from resorting to an appeal to this Court and this case from remaining in the
docket of the Sandiganbayan for a long period.
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The

Sandiganbayan's Resolutions dated January 9, 2002 and November 3, 2003
are REVERSED and the Information charging Castillo and the Arciagas with violation
of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 is ordered REINSTATED. As this case has been
pending for almost fifteen years, the Sandiganbayan is directed to resolve the case with
dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 172035, July 04, 2012 ]
FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65[1] filed by Fernando Q. Miguel

(petitioner), assailing the January 25, 2006 and March 27, 2006 resolutions[2] of the
Sandiganbayan. These resolutions (i) ordered the petitioner’s suspension from public
office and (ii) denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the suspension order.
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
On May 29, 1996, then Vice Mayor Mercelita M. Lucido and other local officials [3] of
Koronadal City, South Cotabato filed a letter-complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao (Ombudsman)[4] charging the petitioner, among others,[5] with
violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, in connection with the consultancy services
for the architectural aspect, the engineering design, and the construction supervision and
management of the proposed Koronadal City public market (project).[6]
In a June 27, 1996 order, the Ombudsman directed the petitioner, among others, to submit
his counter-affidavit. On October 23, 1996, after moving for an extension, the petitioner
filed his counter-affidavit.[7] In its July 29, 1999 resolution, the Ombudsman found
probable cause against the petitioner and some private individuals for violation of R.A.
No. 3019 and against the petitioner alone for Falsification of Public Document under
Article 171, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code.[8]
On March 1, 2000, the Ombudsman filed the corresponding informations with the
Sandiganbayan.[9] The information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 reads:
That on 10 January 1995 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of

Koronadal, South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the [petitioner], a high ranking public officer in his capacity as former Municipal
Mayor of Koronadal, South Cotabato, and as such while in the performance of his official
functions, committing the offense in relation to his office, taking advantage of his
official position, conspiring and confederating with the private [individuals] xxx acting
with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and criminally give unwarranted benefits and advantages to said [accused], by inviting
them to participate in the prequalification of consultants to provide the Detailed
Architectural & Engineering Design and Construction Supervision and Management of
the proposed Koronadal Public Market, without causing the publication of said invitation
in a newspaper of general circulation, thereby excluding other consultants from
participating in said prequalification.[10] (Emphases and underscoring added)
On motions separately filed by two of the petitioner’s co-accused,[11] the Sandiganbayan

ordered the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) to conduct a reinvestigation. On
August 21, 2000, the petitioner, through counsel, followed suit and orally moved for a
reinvestigation, which the Sandiganbayan likewise granted. The Sandiganbayan gave the
petitioner ten (10) days within which to file his counter-affidavit with the OSP. [12]
Instead of submitting his counter-affidavit, the petitioner asked[13] the Sandiganbayan for

a thirty-day extension to submit his counter-affidavit. Shortly before the expiry of the
extension requested, the petitioner asked[14] the OSP for an additional thirty-day period to
file his counter-affidavit. Despite the two extensions asked and granted, the petitioner
asked the OSP anew for a twenty-day extension period.[15]
Despite the extension period asked and given, the petitioner failed to file his counter-
affidavit, prompting Prosecutor Norberto B. Ruiz to declare that the petitioner had
waived his right to submit countervailing evidence (April 25, 2001 resolution). On July
31, 2001, then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto approved the resolution.[16]
On August 7, 2001, Prosecutor Ruiz asked the Sandiganbayan for the arraignment and
trial of the petitioner and of the other accused private individuals.[17]
On August 6, 2002, after several extensions sought and granted, the petitioner filed a
Motion to Quash and/or Reinvestigation for the criminal cases against him. On February
18, 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner’s motion because of the pending OSP
reinvestigation – this, despite the OSP’s earlier termination of the reinvestigation for the
petitioner’s continuous failure to submit his counter-affidavit.[18] The petitioner did not
question the denial of his motion.
On November 3, 2004, the petitioner was arraigned; he pleaded not guilty in both
criminal cases.[19]
On April 28, 2005, the OSP filed a Motion to Suspend [the petitioner] Pendente Lite. On
June 27, 2005, the petitioner filed his “Vigorous Opposition” based on the “obvious and
fatal defect of the [i]nformation” in failing to allege that the giving of unwarranted
benefits and advantages was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.[20]
On January 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed

resolution[21] suspending the petitioner pendente lite –
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Prosecution’s Motion is GRANTED.

As prayed for, the Court hereby orders the suspension of [the petitioner] from his position
as City Mayor, Koronadal City, South Cotabato, and from any other public position he
now holds. His suspension shall be for a period of ninety (90) days only. [22]
On February 2, 2006, the petitioner moved for reconsideration of his suspension order
and demanded for a pre-suspension hearing.[23] The Sandiganbayan denied his motion,
[24]
prompting him to file this certiorari petition to challenge the validity of his suspension
order.
THE PETITION
The petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ordering his
suspension despite the failure of the information to allege that the giving of unwarranted
benefits and advantages by the petitioner was made through “manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.” He alleges that the phrases “evident bad faith”
and “manifest partiality” actually refers not to him, but to his co-accused, [25] rendering the
information fatally defective.
The petitioner bewails the lack of hearing before the issuance of his suspension order.
Citing Luciano, et al. v. Hon. Mariano, etc., et al.,[26] he claims that “[n]owhere in the
records of the [case] can [one] see any order or resolution requiring the [p]etitioner to
show cause at a specific date of hearing why he should not be ordered suspended.” [27] For
the petitioner, the requirement of a pre-suspension hearing can only be satisfied if the
Sandiganbayan ordered an actual hearing to settle the “defect” in the information.
THE OSP’S COMMENT
The OSP argues for the sufficiency of the information since all the elements of the
offense under Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 are specifically pleaded by way of ultimate
facts. These elements are:
1. The petitioner was the Municipal Mayor of Koronadal, South Cotabato at the time
material to the acts complained of;
2. The petitioner acted with manifest partiality and evident bad faith when he invited
only his co-accused private individuals to participate in the prequalification of
consultants for the project instead of publishing it in a newspaper of general
circulation; and
3. The petitioner’s actions, performed in relation to his office, gave unwarranted

benefits and advantages to his co-accused.[28]
The OSP faults the petitioner for his attempt to mislead the Court on the sufficiency of
the allegations in the information, by conveniently failing to cite the phrase “acting with
evident bad faith and manifest partiality” when the petitioner quoted the “relevant”
portions of the information in his petition.
Citing Juan v. People,[29] the OSP argues that while no actual pre-suspension hearing was
conducted, the events preceding the issuance of the suspension order already satisfied the
purpose of conducting a pre-suspension hearing – i.e., basically, to determine the validity
of the information. Here, the petitioner was afforded his right to preliminary investigation
both by the Ombudsman and by the OSP (when the petitioner moved for a reinvestigation
with the Sandiganbayan); the acts for which the petitioner was charged constitute a
violation of R.A. No. 3019 and Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code; and the
petitioner already moved to quash the information, although unsuccessfully, after he had
been declared to have waived his right to submit countervailing evidence in the
reinvestigation by the OSP.[30]
ISSUES
There are only two issues presented for our resolution:
1. Whether the information, charging the petitioner with violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019, is valid; and
2. If it is valid, whether the absence of an actual pre-suspension hearing renders

invalid the suspension order against the petitioner.
THE COURT’S RULING
We dismiss the petition for failure to establish any grave abuse of discretion in the
issuance of the assailed resolutions.
The information for violation of R.A. No. 3019 is valid
In deference to the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and the
cause of the accusation against him,[31] Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure (Rules)[32] requires, inter alia, that the information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute and the acts or omissions imputed which
constitute the offense charged. Additionally, the Rules requires that these acts or
omissions and its attendant circumstances “must be stated in ordinary and concise
language” and “in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know
what offense is being charged x x x and for the court to pronounce judgment.”[33]
The test of the information’s sufficiency is whether the crime is described in intelligible
terms and with such particularity with reasonable certainty so that the accused is duly
informed of the offense charged. In particular, whether an information validly charges an
offense depends on whether the material facts alleged in the complaint or information
shall establish the essential elements of the offense charged as defined in the law.
The raison d’etre of the requirement in the Rules is to enable the accused to suitably
prepare his defense.[34]
In arguing against the validity of the information, the petitioner appears to go beyond the
standard of a “person of common understanding” in appreciating the import of the phrase
“acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality.” A reading of the information
clearly reveals that the phrase “acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality” was
merely a continuation of the prior allegation of the acts of the petitioner, and that he
ultimately acted with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in giving unwarranted
benefits and advantages to his co-accused private individuals. This is what a plain and
non-legalistic reading of the information would yield.
Notably, in his petition, the petitioner would have us believe that this elemental phrase
was actually omitted in the information[35] when, in his reaction to the OSP’s comment,
what the petitioner actually disputes is simply the clarity of the phrase’s position, in
relation with the other averments in the information. Given the supposed ambiguity of the
subject being qualified by the phrase “acting with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality,” the remedy of the petitioner, if at all, is merely to move for a bill of particulars
and not for the quashal of an information which sufficiently alleges the elements of the
offense charged.[36]
The pre-suspension order is valid
Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 reads:
Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer against whom any
criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.
Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits
under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the
salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime
administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
While the suspension of a public officer under this provision is mandatory,[37] the

suspension requires a prior hearing to determine “the validity of the information”[38] filed
against him, “taking into account the serious and far reaching consequences of a
suspension of an elective public official even before his conviction.” [39] The accused
public official’s right to challenge the validity of the information before a suspension
order may be issued includes the right to challenge the (i) validity of the criminal
proceeding leading to the filing of an information against him, and (ii) propriety of his
prosecution on the ground that the acts charged do not constitute a violation of R.A. No.
3019 or of the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code.[40]
In Luciano v. Mariano[41] that the petitioner relied upon, the Court required, “by way of
broad guidelines for the lower courts in the exercise of the power of suspension,” that –
(c) …upon the filing of such information, the trial court should issue an order with
proper notice requiring the accused officer to show cause at a specific date of hearing
why he should not be ordered suspended from office pursuant to the cited mandatory
provisions of the Act. Where either the prosecution seasonably files a motion for an
order of suspension or the accused in turn files a motion to quash the information or
challenges the validity thereof, such show-cause order of the trial court would no
longer be necessary. What is indispensable is that the trial court duly hear the parties at a
hearing held for determining the validity of the information, and thereafter hand down its
ruling, issuing the corresponding order of suspension should it uphold the validity of the
information or withholding such suspension in the contrary case.
(d) No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to
state that the accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to
challenge the validity of the criminal proceedings against him, e.g. that he has not been
afforded the right of due preliminary investigation; that the acts for which he stands
charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or of the
bribery provisions of the Revised Penal Code which would warrant his mandatory
suspension from office under section 13 of the Act; or he may present a motion to quash
the information on any of the grounds provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
(Emphasis supplied)
The petitioner questions the absence of any show cause order issued by the
Sandiganbayan before his suspension in office was ordered. As clear as the day,
however, Luciano considered it unnecessary for the trial court to issue a show cause order
when the motion, seeking the suspension of the accused pendente lite, has been submitted
by the prosecution, as in the present case.
The purpose of the law in requiring a pre-suspension hearing is to determine the validity
of the information so that the trial court can have a basis to either suspend the accused
and proceed with the trial on the merits of the case, withhold the suspension and dismiss
the case, or correct any part of the proceedings that impairs its validity. That hearing is
similar to a challenge to the validity of the information by way of a motion to quash.[42]
While a pre-suspension hearing is aimed at securing for the accused fair and adequate
opportunity to challenge the validity of the information or the regularity of the
proceedings against him,[43] Luciano likewise emphasizes that no hard and fast rule exists
in regulating its conduct.[44] With the purpose of a pre-suspension hearing in mind, the
absence of an actual hearing alone cannot be determinative of the validity of a suspension
order.
In Bedruz v. Sandiganbayan,[45] the Court considered the opposition of the accused (to the
prosecution’s motion to suspend pendente lite) as sufficient to dispense with the need to
actually set the prosecution’s motion for hearing. The same conclusion was reached
in Juan v. People,[46] where the Court ruled:
In the case at bar, while there was no pre-suspension hearing held to determine the
validity of the Informations that had been filed against petitioners, we believe that the
numerous pleadings filed for and against them have achieved the goal of this procedure.
The right to due process is satisfied nor just by an oral hearing but by the filing and the
consideration by the court of the parties' pleadings, memoranda and other position papers.
Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due process requirement, when an accused

public official is given an adequate opportunity to be heard on his possible defenses
against the mandatory suspension under R.A. No. 3019, then an accused would have no
reason to complain that no actual hearing was conducted.[47] It is well settled that “to be
heard” does not only mean oral arguments in court; one may be heard also through
pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, has
been accorded, no denial of procedural due process exists.[48]
In the present case, the petitioner (i) filed his Vigorous Opposition (to the OSP’s Motion
to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite), and after receiving an adverse ruling from the
Sandiganbayan, (ii) moved for reconsideration of the suspension order issued against
him, and (iii) filed a Reply to the OSP’s Opposition to his plea for reconsideration.[49]
Given this opportunity, we find that the petitioner’s continued demand for the conduct of
an actual pre-suspension hearing – based on the same alleged “defect in the
information,”[50] which we have found wanting – has legally nothing to anchor itself on.
Another reason that militates against the petitioner’s position relates to the nature of
Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019; it is not a penal provision that would call for a liberal
interpretation in favor of the accused public official and a strict construction against the
State.[51] The suspension required under this provision is not a penalty, as it is not
imposed as a result of judicial proceedings; in fact, if acquitted, the accused official shall
be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive
during his suspension.[52]
Rather, the suspension under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 is a mere preventive

measure[53] that arises from the legal presumption that unless the accused is suspended,
he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or do both, in the
same way that upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, the law requires the judge to
issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused.[54]
Suspension under R.A. No. 3019 being a mere preventive measure whose duration shall
in no case exceed ninety (90) days,[55] the adequacy of the opportunity to contest the
validity of the information and of the proceedings that preceded its filing vis-à-vis the
merits of the defenses of the accused cannot be measured alone by the absence or
presence of an actual hearing. An opportunity to be heard on one’s defenses, however
unmeritorious it may be, against the suspension mandated by law equally and sufficiently
serves both the due process right of the accused and the mandatory nature of the
suspension required by law.
Lest it be forgotten, Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 reinforces the principle enshrined in the
Constitution that a public office is a public trust.[56] In light of the constitutional principle
underlying the imposition of preventive suspension of a public officer charged under a
valid information and the nature of this suspension, the petitioner’s demand for a trial-
type hearing in the present case would only overwhelmingly frustrate, rather than
promote, the orderly and speedy dispensation of justice.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 194445, March 12, 2012 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF, VS. ROGER POSADAY
URBANO AND EMILY POSADAY SARMIENTO, ACCUSED.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
As we decide this appeal involving a couple who allegedly violated Republic Act
No. 9165 (R.A. 9165), otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, we should bear in mind the words emanating from the pen of former Justice
Isagani A. Cruz:
We need only add that the active support of everyone is needed to bolster the
campaign of the government against the evil of drug addiction. The merchants of all
prohibited drugs, from the rich and powerful syndicates to the individual street
"pushers," must be hounded relentlessly and punished to the full extent of the law,
subject only to the inhibitions of the Bill of Rights. [1]
The Case
Accused-appellants Roger Posada (Roger) and Emily Posada (Emily) were convicted by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43, Virac, Catanduanes, in Criminal Case No. 3490
for selling twelve (12) pieces of transparent sealed plastic sachet, containing
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu with a total weight of 0.4578 grams, in
violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.[2]
Roger was also convicted by the same RTC in Criminal Case No. 3489 for possession of
one piece of torn plastic sachet, containing residue of a crystalline substance
(allegedly shabu), a piece of small aluminum foil, a pair of small scissors, and fifteen (15)
pieces of used lighter - all of which are intended to be used for smoking or introducing
dangerous drugs into the body of a person, in violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165.[3]
Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, the accused-appellants filed an appeal before the Court
of Appeals (CA) which, via a Decision4 dated June 17, 2010, affirmed the RTC Decision as
to the accused-appellants' conviction in Criminal Case No. 3490 but acquitted Roger in
Criminal Case No. 3489 on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Now, the accused-appellants ask this Court for a complete exoneration from the offense
charged in Criminal Case No. 3490 on the ground that the prosecution failed to establish
the chain of custody and integrity of the seized illegal items and to prove their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
Antecedent Facts
According to the evidence of the prosecution, P/CI Gil Francis Tria (P/CI Tria), the Chief
of Police of Virac Municipal Police Station and representative of the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA), ordered surveillance on the activities of the accused-
appellants and a certain Johnjohn Urbano (Urbano).[5] As a result of the said surveillance,
POl Roldan Area (POl Area) was able to buy one sachet of shabu from Emily for P250.00
on August 2, 2005.[6]
Consequently, after the August 2, 2005 test-buy yielded positive result, P/CI Tria applied
for a search warrant, which the Honorable Jaime E. Contreras granted. [7] Thus, at
noontime of August 3, 2005, P/CI Tria and his team proceeded to Barangay Concepcion
and coordinated with Punong Barangay Antonio Asuncion, Jr. (Asuncion) in the
operation against the accused-appellants.[8]
When the team of P/CI Tria reached the place of operation, they found Emily standing in
front of her house. PO1 Area, who was the poseur-buyer, called her and when she came
near him, he told her that he would buy shabu. PO1 Area then handed to Emily P250.00,
consisting of two pieces of P100.00 bill and one piece of P50.00 bill. After receiving the
money from POl Area, Emily immediately went to her house and got a coin purse. When
she returned at the scene of the operation, Emily gave PO1 Area one sachet of shabu,
which she got from the coin purse. Subsequently, Roger appeared and handed to Emily
12 plastic sachets of shabu which Emily placed inside the coin purse. At this point, PO1
Area identified himself as a police officer while giving the signal to his team that the buy-
bust turned positive. He arrested Emily while Roger ran away and went inside their
house. PO1 Area informed Emily of her constitutional rights, but the latter failed to utter
any word.[9]
While PO1 Area was holding the arm of Emily, who still had in her hands the coin purse
where she got the sachet of shabu and the buy-bust money, P/CI Tria took pictures of
the incident using his cellphone while the official photographer was also taking pictures.
After the search, a coin purse containing sachets of shabu and a bundle of money was
found in Emily's possession.[10] PO1 Area then prepared a Receipt for Property Seized
(RPS).[11] Asuncion, Kagawad Eva Sarmiento (Sarmiento) and a certain Robert Vargas
(Vargas) witnessed the preparation of the said receipt.[12]
Meanwhile, when Roger left Emily at the scene of the buy-bust operation, he went
inside his house and closed the door. Armed with the search warrant, SPO1 Salvador
Aldave, Jr. (SPO1 Aldave) forced the door open. SPO1 Aldave was the first person to
enter the house, followed by the barangay officials and his fellow officers, SPO1 Roger
Masagca (SPO1 Masagca) and PO1 Ronnie Valeza (PO1 Valeza). The search warrant was
shown to Roger. In his presence and in the presence of Kagawad Jena Arcilla (Arcilla),
the raiding team recovered one piece of aluminum foil, one plastic sachet containing
residue of white crystalline substance, and one small pair of green scissors beside the
bed inside a room, and 15 pieces of used lighters from an improvised altar on top of a
wooden table. A search of Roger's pocket yielded two pieces of P50.00 bill and one
piece of PI 00.00 bill. SPO1 Aldave as the seizing officer prepared and signed an RPS.
Asuncion, Arcilla and Barangay Tanod Juan Gonzales (Gonzales) witnessed the
preparation and signing of the said RPS. Roger, however, refused to sign the same. The
couple was then brought to the police station.[13]
At the Virac Police Station, a body search on Emily resulted in the seizure of bills of
different denominations, totaling P2,720.00. Some of these bills were identified as those
bills photocopied and submitted to the Provincial Prosecution Office. [14]
On August 4, 2005, immediately after the operation and the execution of the search
warrant, P/CI Tria requested for a laboratory examination of a piece of small size heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachet, containing white crystalline substance marked with
initial "R"; 12 pieces of small size heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets, containing
white crystalline substance with sub-markings "R-1l" to "R-12"; and one small size
crumpled aluminum foil and small size plastic sachet. The request of P/CI Tria for
laboratory examination dated August 4, 2005 was received by a certain PO2 Abanio
[Abano] and Police Inspector Sta. Cruz, J. (P/Insp. Sta. Cruz). The sachet with the initial
"R" was the sachet of shabu sold to PO1 Area during the buy bust operation while the
sachets of shabu marked as "R-l" to "R-12" were the sachets of shabu which Roger
handed to Emily and which were found in the possession of Emily after PO1 Area
identified himself as a police officer.[15]
Subsequently, witness Police Senior Inspector Josephine Macura Clemen (PSI Clemen),
the forensic expert, received personally from the receiving clerk (PO2 Abanio) the
above-mentioned marked pieces of evidence. She then immediately conducted
laboratory examination, yielding a result that the 12 pieces of plastic sachets (with
markings "R-1" to "R-12"), the one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with marking
"R", the one aluminum foil strip, and a small size plastic sachet contained
methamphetamine hydrochloride.[16]
The accused-appellants were subsequently charged in two separate Informations,

[17]
both dated August 5, 2005, with violation of Sections 5, 11 and 12, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165, which were respectively docketed as Criminal Case No. 3490 and Criminal
Case No. 3489. The Informations state as follows:
The undersigned Provincial Prosecutor accuses Roger Posada y Urbano and Emily
Posada y Sarmiento of Violation of R.A. 9165 defined and penalized under Section 5 of
said Law, committed as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of August 2005 at noontime along Imelda Blvd. in barangay
Concepcion, municipality (sic) of Virac, [PJrovince of Catanduanes, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused without the
authority of law, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to another 12
pieces of transparent sealed plastic sachet containing Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride[,] locally known as shabu[,] with a total weight of 0.9 gram [-] a
prohibited drug[,] and several marked money bills. [18] [Emphasis supplied]
The undersigned Provincial Prosecutor accuses Roger Posada y Urbano of Violation of

R.A. 9165 defined and penalized under Section 12 of said law, committed as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of August 2005 in the afternoon in Barangay Concepcion,
municipality (sic) of Virac, province (sic) of Catanduanes, Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused without the authority of law did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess and in control of one (1)
piece of teared plastic sachet containing residue of a crystalline substancef,] locally
known as shabu, (1) piece small aluminum foil, (1) piece small scissors (sic) and 15
pieces of used lighter[,] which paraphernalia are (sic) fit or intended for smoking or
introducing any dangerous drug into the body of a person. [19]
However, the Information for Criminal Case No. 3490 was later amended, [20] to reflect a
change in the weight of the seized drugs from 0.9 gram to 0.4578 gram.
Meanwhile, on the part of the accused-appellants, they simply denied the accusations
against them. Roger claimed that on April 3, 2005 (which was even a misleading date
since the event happened on August 3, 2005), at around 12 noon, he was putting his
three year-old child to sleep inside their house, while his wife Emily was washing their
clothes at his parents' house. He peeped through the window jalousies when he heard
his wife calling out his name. He saw a policeman, later identified as PO1 Area, pulling
Emily towards the road. Roger claimed that PO1 Valeza later poked a gun at him,
preventing him to move from the window. Thereafter, the door of Roger's house was
forced open, allowing SPO1 Aldave, SPO1 Masagca, PO1 Valeza and Barangay Tanod Vic
Vargas (Vargas) to enter his house. Inside the house, PO1 Valeza allegedly took down
the jackets hanging on the wall and searched them; SPO1 Aldave took pictures while
Vargas and SPO1 Masagca went inside the room and searched the cabinets where toys
were kept. Roger further claims that nothing was found in his house. After the search,
Roger was brought to the patrol car where his wife Emily was taken. [21]
Meanwhile, Emily testified that on that fateful day of August 3, 2005, she was washing
clothes at her mother-in-law's house when a man, whom she could not identify,
approached her and asked her if she was Emily Posada. She alleged that the man
immediately held her hands, shouting "Police! Police!" after which police officers Tria
and Aldave arrived. Her picture was taken. Subsequently, she was brought to the patrol
car where her husband Roger later joined her. Both Roger and Emily were then
transported to the police station. Roger was placed behind bars while Emily was placed
at the detention cell of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP). [22]
The couple claimed that the police officers did not inform them why they were brought
to the police station and subsequently detained. Emily
denied that a buy-bust operation was conducted against her, but she was aware of the
search conducted in their house because her husband informed her at the police
station. Meanwhile, Roger also denied that the police officers presented to him a search
warrant. Likewise, both alleged that the money taken from Emily's wallet were the
proceeds of the sale of their chickens, which Roger gave to Emily. The said money
amounted to more or less P3,000.00.[23]
Issues
Considering that the accused-appellants did not file a supplemental brief and that
appellee People of the Philippines adopted its brief before the CA, we now rule on the
matter based on the issues[24] which the accused-appellants raised in their brief before
the CA, to wit:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS

NOTWITHSTANDING THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THE CHAIN OF
CUSTODY AND INTEGRITY OF THE ALLEGED SEIZED ILLEGAL ITEMS.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELANTS DESPITE

THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[25]
Our Ruling
While we give due credence to the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses
absent any showing that the elements of the crime have been overlooked,
misapprehended, or misapplied, we will take pains in taking a second hard look on the
issues the accused-appellants raised, considering they are husband and wife whose
imprisonment will greatly affect the children they will leave behind once they are
declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Now, we are going to discuss the case following the issues the accused-appellants
raised.
The prosecution has established the chain

of custody and integrity of the seized illegal
items.
The accused-appellants alleged that the prosecution failed to establish the chain of
custody and integrity of the seized illegal items because:
(1) The apprehending officers allegedly failed to submit the seized illegal items to
the PNP Crime Laboratory Service for a qualitative and quantitative examination within
the mandatory 24-hour period from confiscation; and
(2) There is an alleged discrepancy as to the number of plastic sachets recovered from
the accused-appellants and those submitted to forensic chemist PSI Clemen.
On the first factual issue, we find that the records of the case and the testimonies of
witnesses belie the accused-appellants' contention.
Based on the records, the buy-bust operation, the arrest of the accused-appellants and
the confiscation of the illegal items happened at around 12 noon of August 3, 2005.
[26]
PO1 Area received from Emily one sachet of shabu and after PO1 Area introduced
himself and arrested Emily, 12 more sachets of shabu were found in the possession of
Emily. The said 12 sachets of shabu were inside a coin purse, with a bundle of money.
[27]
PO1 Area prepared on the same day an RPS [28] in the presence of
Asuncion, Kagawad Sarmiento and Vargas.[29] On August 4, 2005, P/CI Tria requested for
a laboratory examination of a piece of small size heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet,
containing white crystalline substance marked with initial "R"; 12 pieces of small size
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets, containing white crystalline substance with sub-
markings "R-1" to "R-12"; and one small size crumpled aluminum foil and small size
plastic sachet. The request of P/CI Tria for laboratory examination dated August 4, 2005
was received by PO2 Abanio and P/Insp. Sta. Cruz on the same date. [30]
The accused-appellants wanted us to believe that a day had lapsed before P/CI Tria
submitted the illegal drugs to PNP Crime Laboratory Service, contrary to the mandate of
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. They even cited the testimony of P/CI Tria where the latter
allegedly admitted submitting the subject seized items on August 4, 2005. However, a
close look at the testimony of P/CI Tria [31] will reveal that nothing in it would show that
he submitted the alleged illegal drugs beyond the 24-hour reglementary period. In fact,
even the Laboratory Examination Request dated August 4, 2005 does not indicate
violation of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. [32] Clearly, from the foregoing, the accused-
appellants failed to adduce any evidence to prove their contention. The age-old but
familiar rule that he who alleges must prove his allegation applies [33] in this case. The
accused-appellants' failure to show evidence that the police officers did not comply with
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 gives us no other recourse but to respect the findings of trial
court and of the CA.
Furthermore, the CA is correct in giving credence to the testimonies of the police
officers as regards the timely submission of the subject illegal drugs since they are
presumed to have regularly performed their duties, unless there is evidence suggesting
ill-motive on the part of the police officers. [34] In this case, the accused-appellants failed
to contradict the presumption. What goes against the accused-appellants is the fact that
they have not offered any evidence of ill-motive against the police officers. Emily even
admitted that she did not know PO1 Area, the poseur-buyer. [35] Considering that there
was no existing relationship between the police officers and the accused-appellants, the
former could not be accused of improper motive to falsely testify against the accused-
appellants. In People v. Dumangay,[36] we upheld the findings of the lower court on the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties because there was no
proof of ill-motive. Therein, the accused-appellant's self-serving and uncorroborated
defenses did not prevail over the trial court's findings on the credibility of witnesses.
The same may be said in the present case.
Finding the accused-appellants' arguments without a leg to stand on, the apprehending
police officers are presumed to have timely submitted the seized illegal items to the PNP
Crime Laboratory Service for a qualitative and quantitative examination within the
mandatory 24-hour period from confiscation.
On the second factual issue, we find the accused-appellants' claim not supported by

evidence.
The accused-appellants alleged that the integrity of the seized illegal items was
compromised and their evidentiary value diminished because of the alleged discrepancy
between the number of plastic sachets recovered from the accused-appellants and
those submitted to forensic chemist PSI Clemen. They insisted that based on the
Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 3489 and 3490 and the testimonies of witnesses
Asuncion[37] and SPO1 Aldave,[38] only fourteen (14) plastic sachets were recovered from
the accused-appellants, while PSI Clemen allegedly testified that a total of 15 sachets
were submitted for examination.[39]
However, a review of the defense-quoted testimony of PSI Clemen would show that she
received one piece of small size heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with marking "R",
[40]
12 pieces small size heat-sealed marked as "R-l" to "R-12" [41] and one small size
crumpled aluminum foil and small size plastic sachet [42] — totaling to 15 items. PSI
Clemen's testimony tallies with the Laboratory Examination Request (Exhibit "J") of P/CI
Tria. We reproduce Exhibit "J" below, to wit:
Republic of the Philippines

NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
Virac Municipal Police Station
Virac, Catanduanes
MEMORANDUM:
FOR The Chief

PNP Crime Laboratory Service Camp Gen Simeon A Ola Legaspi
City
SUBJECT Laboratory Examination request for
DATE 04 August 2005
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Request conduct laboratory examination on the accompanying specimen to
determine whether the white crystalline granules inside Thirteen (13) pcs small size
transparent heat seald (sic) plastic sachets are Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or
SHABU and also whether the one (1) pc small size crumpled aluminum foil and small size
transparent plastic sachet contains residue or granules of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride or Shabu.
EXHIBI QUANTITY/ DESCRIPTION

T
"A" One (1) pc small size heat sealed transparent plastic sachet sachet (sic)
containing white crystalline substance with marking initial "R" the initial of PO1 ROLDAN
AREA who acted as posuer (sic) buyer during the drug buy bust operation.
"B" Twelve (12) pcs small size heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance with markings R1-R12 found/confiscated from the suspect during
drug buy bust operation.
"C" One (1) small size crumpled aluminum foil and small size plastic sachet
confiscated/found in the possession of suspect during the execution of search warrant
number 37 issued by Hon[.] Judge Jaime E[.] Contreras of RTC Branch 43.
SUSPE Roger Posada y Urbano
CT/S
Emily Posada y Sarmiento
John-John Bryan Urbano y Zafe
COMP Officer-in-Charge
LAINANT
Virac MPS
FACTS OF THE CASE: Evidence submitted for laboratory examination was bought and
others were confiscated by the PNP team of Virac during Buy Bust (sic) operation and
the effect/execution of search warrant number 37 on August 3, 2005 in [BJarangay
Concepcion Virac, Catanduanes.
2. Request acknowledge reciept (sic) and furnish this office Laboratory examination
result as soon as possible for subsequent submission/filing same in court as supporting
documents to this case.
GIL FRANCIS G[.] TRIA

Po1 Chief Inspector
Officer-in-Charge[43]
Based on the cited exhibit, we find that in Exhibit "A" we have the first item, marked
with "R". Under Exhibit "B", we have the next 12 items marked as "R-l" to "R-12". Under
Exhibit "C", we have the remaining two items submitted to the crime laboratory, namely
one small size crumpled aluminum foil and small size plastic sachet confiscated and
found in the possession of Roger. All these items total to 15 items - consistent with the
testimony of PSI Clemen. Thus, evidence shows no discrepancy as to the number of
plastic sachets recovered from the accused-appellants and those submitted to forensic
chemist PSI Clemen.
Finally, we say that the prosecution has established the chain of custody and integrity of
the seized illegal items.
After PO1 Area arrested Emily and confiscated the 13 sachets of shabu (one bought by
PO1 Area from Emily and 12 found in Emily's coin purse after she received the same
from her husband Roger),[44] P/CI Tria took pictures of the incident using his cellphone
while the official photographer was also taking pictures. [45] Then PO1 Area prepared an
RPS,[46] which Asuncion, Sarmiento and Vargas witnessed.[47] Meanwhile, SPO1 Aldave,
seizing officer went inside the house of the accused-appellants, prepared and signed an
RPS after the raiding team found a piece of aluminum foil, one plastic sachet containing
residue of white crystalline substance, one small pair of green scissors beside the bed
inside a room, 15 pieces of used lighters, and two pieces of P50.00 bill and one piece of
P100.00 bill. Asuncion, Arcilla and Gonzales witnessed the preparation and signing of
the said RPS.[48] Thereafter, on August 4, 2005, P/CI Tria requested for a laboratory
examination of a piece of small size heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet, containing
white crystalline substance marked with initial "R"; 12 pieces of small size heat sealed
transparent plastic sachets, containing white crystalline substance with sub-markings
"R-l" to "R-12"; and one small size crumpled aluminum foil and small size plastic sachet.
The request of P/CI Tria for laboratory examination dated August 4, 2005 was received
by a certain PO2 Abanio and P/Insp. Sta. Cruz.[49] Subsequently, witness PSI Clemen, the
forensic expert, received personally from PO2 Abanio the above-mentioned marked
pieces of evidence. She then immediately conducted a laboratory examination, yielding
a result that the 12 pieces of plastic sachets (with markings "R-l" to "R-12"), the one
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with marking "R" and the one aluminum foil strip
contained methamphetamine hydrochloride. [50] In open court, the above-mentioned
pieces of evidence were identified and marked.[51]
From the foregoing, the prosecution, without an iota of doubt, has established the chain
of custody and integrity of the seized illegal items. The Supreme Court in People v.
Sanchez,[52] clearly discussed how chain of custody should be proven, to wit:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that

the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that
the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony
about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it
is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit
would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received
and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These
witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been
no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the
chain to have possession of the same.[53]
In the instant case, the prosecution was able to present, not only the corpus delicti, but
the testimonies of the people involved in each link in the chain of custody.
The prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused-appellants
sold 12 sachets of shabu, but it has proven the accused-appellants' guilt beyond
reasonable doubt of possession of the same number of shabu in violation of Section
11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
Before we proceed in discussing the guilt of the couple, we must first take into account
a discrepancy in the Information for Criminal Case No. 3490. In the said information, the
accused-appellants were charged for selling 12 pieces of transparent sealed plastic
sachet of shabu. However, based on the evidence which the prosecution adduced, Emily
sold to PO1 Area one sachet of shabu, which was worth P250.00. Then, after she handed
the one sachet of shabu to the poseur-buyer, Emily received additional 12 sachets
of shabu from her husband Roger and when PO1 Area informed the couple of the buy-
bust, Emily had in her possession the 12 sachets of shabu.[54] Subsequently, the
confiscated sachets of shabu were marked. The one sold to PO1 Area was marked with
"R", while the 12 sachets of shabu Roger handed to Emily before their arrest were
marked as "R-l" to "R-12".[55]
The unfortunate fact of this case is that rather than separately charging Emily for the
sale of the one sachet of shabu and charging both Emily and Roger for possession of the
12 sachets of shabu, the public prosecutor lumped the charges together to sale of 12
sachets of shabu. This is wrong. The Information is defective for charging the accused-
appellants of selling 12 sachets of shabu when, in fact, they should have been charged
of selling one sachet of shabu and possessing 12 sachets of shabu. From the evidence
adduced, Emily and Roger never sold the 12 sachets of shabu. They possessed them.
Thus, they should have not been convicted for selling the 12 sachets of shabu. However,
this was exactly what was done both by the trial court and the CA. Without basis in fact,
they convicted the couple for selling the 12 sachets of shabu.
Indeed, it must be pointed out that the prosecution filed a defective Information. An
Information is fatally defective when it is clear that it does
not really charge an offense[56] or when an essential element of the crime has not been
sufficiently alleged.[57] In the instant case, while the prosecution was able to allege the
identity of the buyer and the seller, it failed to particularly allege or identify in the
Information the subject matter of the sale or the corpus delicti. We must remember that
one of the essential elements to convict a person of sale of prohibited drugs is to
identify with certainty the corpus delicti. Here, the prosecution took the liberty to lump
together two sets of corpora delicti when it should have separated the two in two
different informations. To allow the prosecution to do this is to deprive the accused-
appellants of their right to be informed, not only of the nature of the offense being
charged, but of the essential element of the offense charged; and in this case, the
very corpus delicti of the crime.
Furthermore, when ambiguity exists in the complaint or information, the court has no
other recourse but to resolve the ambiguity in favor of the accused. [58] Here, since there
exists ambiguity as to the identity of corpus delicti, an essential element of the offense
charged, it follows that such ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the accused-
appellants. Thus, from the foregoing discussion, we have no other choice but to acquit
the accused-appellants of sale of 12 sachets of shabu.
Truly, both the trial court and the CA were wrong in convicting the couple for selling 12
sachets of shabu because the prosecution failed to show that the husband and wife had
indeed sold the 12 sachets of shabu. Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 provides:
SEC. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and

Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five
hundred thousand pesos ([P]500,000.00) to Ten million pesos ([P] 10,000,000.00) shall
be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade,
administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless
of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
More, jurisprudence holds that the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs can
only be successful when the following elements are established, namely:
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and consideration of the
sale; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefore. [59]
To our minds, while there was indeed a transaction between Emily and POl Area, the
prosecution failed to show that the subject matter of the sale to POl Area was the 12
sachets of shabu. Based on the testimony of POl Area, the 12 sachets of shabu were the
sachets of shabu which Roger handed to his wife Emily and were not sold, but which
PO1 Area found in her possession after the latter identified himself as a police officer.
In People v. Paloma,[60] we acquitted the accused for the prosecution's failure to prove
the crime of illegal sale of drugs, and we have set the standard in proving the same, to
wit:
Under the "objective" test set by the Court in People v. Doria, the prosecution
must clearly and adequately show the details of the purported sale, namely, the initial
contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise
or payment of the consideration, and, finally, the accused's delivery of the illegal drug to
the buyer, whether the latter be the informant alone or the police officer. This proof is
essential to ensure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit the
offense.[61]
In the instant case, PO1 Area's testimony showed no evidence that the transaction as to
the sale of the 12 sachets of shabu ever happened. Rather, PO1 Area adequately
testified on the fact that accused-appellant Roger handed the 12 sachets of shabu to
Emily who kept them in a coin purse. And after PO1 Area identified himself as a police
operative, he found the 12 sachets of shabu in Emily's possession.[62] From the
foregoing, while the prosecution was able to prove the sale of one sachet of shabu, it is
patently clear that it never established with moral certainty all the elements of illegal
sale of the 12 sachets of shabu. And failure to show that indeed there was sale means
failure to prove the guilt of the accused for illegal sale of drugs, because what matters in
the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is to show proof that the sale actually
happened, coupled with the presentation in court of corpus delicti.[63] Here, the
prosecution failed to prove the existence of the sale of the 12 sachets of shabu and also
to prove that the 12 sachets of shabu presented in court were truly the subject matter
of the sale between the accused-appellants and PO1 Area.
Notwithstanding the above-discussion, we convict both Roger and Emily of illegal

possession of prohibited drugs despite the fact that they were charged for the sale of
illegal drugs, because possession is necessarily included in sale of illegal drugs.
Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. - When there
is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that
proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense
proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the
offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
Since sale of dangerous drugs necessarily includes possession of the same, the accused-
appellants should be convicted of possession. We have consistently ruled that
possession of prohibited or dangerous drugs is absorbed in the sale thereof. [64] Then
Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban logically and clearly explained the rationale
behind this ruling, to wit:
The prevailing doctrine is that possession of marijuana is absorbed in the sale

thereof, except where the seller is further apprehended in possession of another
quantity of the prohibited drugs not covered by or included in the sale and which are
probably intended for some future dealings or use by the seller.
Possession is a necessary element in a prosecution for illegal sale of prohibited drugs. It

is indispensable that the prohibited drug subject of the sale be identified and presented
in court. That the corpus delicti of illegal sale could not be established without a showing
that the accused possessed, sold and delivered a prohibited drug clearly indicates that
possession is an element of the former. The same rule is applicable in cases of delivery
of prohibited drugs and giving them away to another.[65 ](Citations omitted)
For prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs to prosper, the following

essential elements must be proven, namely: "(1) the accused is in possession of an item
or object that is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized
by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possess the said drug." [66]
All these elements are obtaining and duly established in this case and we will discuss
them thoroughly below, since we are not ready to altogether exonerate the couple.
On Emily's Liability
To our minds, the testimony of PO1 Area is sufficient to establish concurrence of all the
elements necessary to convict Emily of violating Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
PO1 Area vividly narrated the
details of the buy-bust operation. He recounted how on August 3, 2005 at around 12
noon, he acted as the poseur-buyer of shabu. He approached Emily, who was then
standing in front of their house, and told her that he would like to buy shabu, and then
gave her the P250.00. Emily then returned to her house and got a coin purse. Upon
returning, Emily handed to POl Area a piece of sachet containing shabu. After receiving
the sachet of shabu, POl Area saw Roger hand the 12 sachets of shabu to Emily who
kept them in a coin purse. After paying for and receiving the sachet of shabu from Emily,
POl Area arrested the latter and found in her possession the 12 sachets of shabu.
[67]
From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the prosecution established with moral
certainty all the elements of illegal possession of shabu, that is: POl Area found in
Emily's physical and actual possession the 12 sachets of shabu; such possession of the
12 sachets of shabu was not authorized; and since Emily put the 12 sachets of shabu in
the purse after receiving them from her husband, she possessed the same freely and
consciously.
Furthermore, POl Area's testimony was corroborated by the testimonies of the

following: (a) Barangay Kagawad Sarmiento who witnessed how POl Area caught Emily
doing the illegal act; (b) Barangay Captain Asuncion, Jr. who testified that he was with
the raiding team when the latter conducted the buy-bust operation and that he
witnessed how money changed hands; (c) P/CI Tria who witnessed the buy-bust
operation and was one of the arresting officers; (d) SPO1 Aldave who executed the
search warrant; and (e) Barangay Kagawad Arcilla who also accompanied the raiding
team in the search of the accused-appellants' house. All these witnesses completed all
the angles of the buy-bust operation and the search on Emily's person up to the finding
that she possessed the 12 sachets of shabu. Indeed, considering all of the above-findings
of facts, we cannot have other conclusion but to find Emily guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for possession of prohibited drugs.
Indeed, every accused deserves a second look before conviction. This is the essence of
the constitutional presumption of innocence. In the present case, we did not only take a
second look at the facts and laws of this case because the accused-appellants are both
parents. We take a third, a fourth up to a seventh look to ensure that no child will be left
unattended because his parents were imprisoned based on false accusations. Thus, after
reviewing this case, the bare truth is Emily was found in possession of 12 sachets
of shabu on August 3, 2005.
On Roger's Liability
As to Roger, can we also convict him of possession of the same 12 sachets

of shabu considering that same had been found in the possession of his wife Emily?
We resolve in the affirmative.
In United States v. Juan,[68] we have clarified the meaning of the words "having
possession of. We said that the said phrase included constructive possession, that is,
"the relation between the owner of the drug and the drug itself when the owner is not
in actual physical possession, but when it is still under his control and management and
subject to his disposition."[69] In other words, in that case, we recognized the fact that a
person remains to be in possession of the prohibited drugs although he may not have or
may have lost physical possession of the same.
To elucidate, we must go back to the circumstances surrounding the Juan case. A

Chinaman named Lee See arrived at the Bay of Calbayog, Samar through the
steamer Ton-Yek. Upon disembarking, he went to the house of therein appellant Chan
Guy Juan, who was living in the town of Calbayog. Lee See and Chan Guy Juan had a
lengthy conversation. Chan Guy Juan then hired a certain Isidro Cabinico (Cabinico) to
go alongside of the steamer with his baroto, to carry and deliver to him a sack which
appellant Chan Guy Juan alleged was sugar. Cabinico went to Lee See to get the said
sack. However, on his way to the house of Chan Guy Juan, Cabinico was arrested by the
local authorities. Found in his possessions were a small amount of sugar and 28 cans of
opium. The opium was confiscated and separate criminal charges were instituted
against the two Chinamen and Cabinico. After a thorough investigation, the provincial
fiscal dismissed the case against Cabinico because he had no knowledge of the content
of the sack, while the two Chinamen were eventually convicted. Chan Guy Juan
appealed his conviction arguing that he did not have actual physical possession or
control of the 28 cans of opium. But we held that both Chinese had constructive
possession of the opium and that they were both guilty as principals. [70]
Our ruling in Juan applies to the present case. Admittedly, the 12 sachets of shabu were
found in the possession of Emily. But POl Area saw Roger hand the same 12 sachets
of shabu to Emily. While Roger had lost physical possession of the said 12 sachets
of shabu, he had constructive possession of the same because they remain to be under
his control and management. In the Juan case, Lee See gave the physical possession of
the opium to Cabinico while Chan Guy Juan had not yet received the same opium from
Lee See, but both were held guilty of illegal possession of opium. Thus, we can liken the
instant case to that of Juan because while Roger had lost physical possession of the 12
sachets of shabu to Emily, he maintained constructive possession of the same.
Convicting both Emily and Roger of possession of illegal drugs deprives their children of
parents. But if we have to take care of our children and the family where each of us
belongs, we are obligated to put in jail all those, including fathers and mothers, who
peddle illegal drugs.
Finally, we cannot let this case pass us by without emphasizing the need for the public
prosecutor to properly evaluate all the pieces of evidence and file the proper
information to serve the ends of justice. The public prosecutor must exert all efforts so
as not to deny the People a remedy against those who sell prohibited drugs to the
detriment of the community and its children. Many drug cases are dismissed because of
the prosecutor's sloppy work and failure to file airtight cases. If only the prosecution
properly files the Information and prosecutes the same with precision, guilty drug
pushers would be punished to the extent allowed under the law, as in this case.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 17, 2010 is MODIFIED.
Accused-appellants ROGER POSADA and EMILY POSADA ARE FOUND GUILTY OF
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF TWELVE (12) SACHETS OF METHAMPETAMINE
HYDROCHOLORIDE OR SHABU, WITH A NET WEIGHT OF 0.4578 GRAMS AND ARE
HEREBY SENTENCED TO THE INDETERMINATE PENALTY OF TWELVE (12) YEARS AND
ONE (1) DAY, AS MINIMUM, TO FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS, AS
MAXIMUM AND A FINE OF P300,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 192785, February 04, 2015 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JOMER
BUTIAL, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The prosecution’s evidence must establish that the illegal drug presented in court is the
same illegal drug actually recovered from appellant.[1]
This is an appeal from the February 26, 2010 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03170 which affirmed in toto the December 3, 2007 Decision[3] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tabaco City, Branch 17 in Criminal Case No. T-3864
finding Jomer Butial (appellant) guilty of violating Section 5,[4] Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Factual Antecedents
On December 16, 2002, an Information[5] was filed against appellant, the accusatory

portion of which reads as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of October, 2002, at 10:35 o’clock in the morning, more or
less, at Purok 4, Barangay Sto. Cristo, Tabaco City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to
violate the law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, knowingly and criminally sell,
deliver and give away to a poseur-buyer, METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE
otherwise known as “SHABU”, contained in two (2) transparent plastic sachets each
weighing approximately 0.1 gm., without the necessary government authority, to the
detriment of public welfare.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
After appellant pleaded “not guilty” to the charge, pre-trial and trial ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented as witnesses Gilbert Borlagdan (Borlagdan), PO2 Roy

Martirez (PO2 Martirez), SPO4 Rosalino Bonavente (SPO4 Bonavente), SPO4 Benito
Bognaloc and SPO1 Carlos H. Desuasido (SPO1 Desuasido).[7] From their testimonies,
the following version emerged:
The Chief of Police of Tabaco City instructed PO2 Martirez and SPO4 Bonavente to
conduct a buy-bust operation on appellant after receiving information that he was selling
illegal drugs. Thus, on October 21, 2002, PO2 Martirez arranged for Borlagdan, a police
asset, to act as a poseur-buyer and gave him four P100 bills as marked money. PO2
Martirez, SPO4 Bonavente and Borlagdan proceeded to Purok 4, Sto. Cristo, Tabaco City
to entrap appellant.
Upon their arrival, Borlagdan walked towards a house which is under construction. PO2
Martirez and SPO4 Bonavente, on the other hand, hid behind houses which were about
seven meters away from where Borlagdan was. Borlagdan approached appellant who
was then working at the construction site and asked if he could purchase shabu. When an
agreement was reached, Borlagdan handed over the marked money to the appellant while
the latter, in turn, gave him two plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance.
After the transaction, Borlagdan walked towards the place where PO2 Martirez and SPO4
Bonavente were hiding. When he passed by them, Borlagdan nodded his head as a signal
that the sale was already consummated and gave the sachets to PO2 Martirez.
Thereupon, the police officers came out of hiding. They immediately approached
appellant who threw something on the ground. PO2 Martirez arrested appellant and
brought him to the police station. SPO4 Bonavente who was left behind searched the
place where he saw appellant throw something and found therein a plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance. He also summoned for the owner of the house
being constructed and asked for appellant’s belongings. He was given a backpack which
he brought to the police station.
Meanwhile at the police station, PO2 Martirez ordered appellant to empty his pockets and
recovered from him one of the four P100 bills used as marked money. PO2 Martirez then
turned over the said marked money and the two plastic sachets to the police investigator.
When SPO4 Bonavente arrived, he likewise gave appellant’s backpack to the police
investigator, who, in turn, searched the same. Found therein were more sachets
containing white crystalline substance.
Two days later, five sachets with white crystalline substance were referred and delivered
to the crime laboratory for examination which all tested positive for shabu, viz:
xxxx
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
Five (5) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets marked as “A” through “E” each with
white crystalline substance having the following markings and recorded net weights:
A = 3.7240 gram[s] B = 0.8642 gram C = 0.0513 gram[8]

D = 0.0336 gram E = 0.0313 gram
Version of the Defense
Appellant and two others, namely, Lourdes Benavides and Elsa San Buenaventura, both
residents of Purok 4, Sto. Cristo, Tabaco who claimed to have witnessed appellant’s
arrest, testified for the defense. Their version of the incident is as follows:
While appellant was working at the construction site, Robert Sierra (Sierra) arrived and
asked if there is a vacancy. When appellant said that he had to ask the owner first, Sierra
departed. A few minutes later, PO2 Martirez and SPO4 Bonavente arrived and arrested
appellant. They took him to the police station. Thereat, PO2 Martirez opened appellant’s
bag which was brought to the station by SPO4 Bonavente. After asking him to identify
the same, PO2 Martirez placed something inside the bag and then closed it. Appellant
was then ordered to open the bag. When he complied, pictures of him holding the bag
and the plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance were taken. PO2 Martirez
also inserted a P100 bill into the back pocket of his pants and thereafter presented him to
the Chief of Police.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses. It convicted
appellant of the offense charged and disposed of the case in its December 3, 2007
Decision[9] as follows:
WHEREFORE, from the foregoing, accused Jomer Butial is hereby found GUILTY of
Violation of Section 5, Article II, Republic Act [No.] 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. Costs against accused.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Appellant filed a notice of appeal,[11] which was approved by the RTC.[12] Hence, the
records of the case were transmitted to the CA where the appeal was docketed as CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03170.

Finding the RTC’s conviction of appellant to be well-supported by evidence, the CA, in
its February 26, 2010 Decision,[13] ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the challenged
Decision dated December 3, 2007 in Criminal Case No. T-3864 is AFFIRMED in TOTO.
SO ORDERED.[14]
Hence, this appeal.
Issues
For the first time in this appeal, appellant questions his warrantless arrest. He posits that
his arrest was illegal since he was not arrested in flagrante delicto. The police officers
did not have personal knowledge that he was committing a crime as they were hiding
behind houses seven meters away from the place where the alleged transaction took place
and did not actually see the whole incident. This being the case, the sachets allegedly
seized from him cannot be used in evidence against him being “fruits of a poisonous
tree.” Appellant also contends that the prosecution was unable to prove all the elements
of the offense of illegal sale of drugs. He likewise points to the failure of the police
officers to properly observe the procedure outlined in Section 21, RA 9165 and argues
that the same constitutes a break in the chain of custody.
Our Ruling
The appeal must be granted.
The prosecution failed to show that the

identity and integrity of the corpus delicti
have been preserved.
There is merit in appellant’s contention that not all elements of the offense of illegal sale
of shabu were proven and that there were unexplained gaps and irregularities in the chain
of custody of the seized items.
In a successful prosecution for the illegal sale of drugs, there must be evidence of the
following elements: “(1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.”[15] The
evidence of corpus delicti must also be established beyond doubt. In this case,
the shabu “constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and in sustaining a
conviction under [RA 9165], the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti must
definitely be shown to have been preserved.”[16] “The chain of custody requirement
performs this function in buy-bust operations as it ensures that doubts concerning the
identity of the evidence are removed.”[17]
The initial link in the chain of custody starts with the seizure of the plastic sachets from
appellant and their marking by the apprehending officer. “Marking after seizure is the
starting point in the custodial link, thus it is vital that the seized contraband is
immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings
as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from
the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the
accused until they are disposed at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching,
‘planting,’ or contamination of evidence.”[18] A review of the records, however, reveals
that the confiscated sachets subject of the illegal sale of shabu were not marked. PO2
Martirez, himself, admitted that he did not put any markings on the two plastic sachets
that were handed to him by Borlagdan after the latter’s purchase of the same from
appellant.[19] While he mentioned that the police investigator to whom he turned over the
items wrote something down or made some initials thereon, he nevertheless could not
remember who wrote the initials.[20] And albeit later, PO2 Martirez identified the police
investigator as SPO1 Desuasido,[21] the latter, however, when called to the witness stand,
did not testify that he made any markings on the said sachets or, at the very least, that he
received the same from PO2 Martirez. His testimony merely focused on the fact that he
prepared the affidavit of a certain Baltazar.[22]
While SPO4 Bonavente testified that he put markings on several sachets

of shabu allegedly seized from appellant, it cannot be gathered from his testimony that
the ones he marked were those sachets subject of this case. Instead, what it suggests is
that those he marked were the sachets belonging to appellant which he subsequently
recovered, i.e., the one allegedly thrown away by appellant and picked up by SPO4
Bonavente from the ground, and those found inside appellant’s bag, viz:
[PROS. At that time[,] how was the buy-bust operation carried out?
BROTAMONTE]-
[SPO4 Bonavente]- During that time we were in Sto. Cristo. When our asset got in the house
and came out he sent positive sign that he already bought the prohibited
drugs. So I and Roy Martirez immediately got inside the house.
Q- What happened next?
A- Upon seeing us[,] this Butial tried to escape and Roy Martirez grabbed
him and they grappled with each other. I saw Butial throw pieces of
sachets and I picked up said sachets which contained shabu.
Q- How many sachets?
A- Only one.
xxxx
Q- What happened next?
A- After two minutes[,] the owner of the house arrived. I asked him [for]
the belongings of Butial and he picked up the bag in the corner and
handed it to me.
xxxx
Q- Upon arrival at the Tabaco Police Station[,] what happened there
particularly, insofar as the bag was concerned?
A- I presented the bag to the desk officer for record purposes and to the
duty investigator.
Q- What did you do with the bag after that?
A- The duty investigator searched the bag.
Q- Where were you when the bag was searched.
A- I was outside the investigation room and I was only informed that they
found another sachet inside the bag.
xxxx
Q- Tell us if you actually witnessed the procedure of the search?
A- No. Sir. I just saw the sachet already on the table when I was informed
by the desk officer.
Q- Having seen the evidence already on the table[,] what did you do, if any?
A- I told the desk officer to prepare the papers to preserve the items.
Q- To preserve the integrity and identity of the supposed items[,] what else
did you undertake, if any?
A- I remember, I put my initials [on] the sachets.
Q- Can you still recall what items were those where you put your initials?
A- The sachets, sir.
Q- Can you still recall how many sachets were those?
A- I cannot recall.
Q- Those sachets that bear your initials, if the same will be shown to you
again, will you be able to identify them by way of your markings or
initials?
A- Yes, sir.
Q- I have here several sachets containing crystalline substance [e]ncased in
two bigger transparent sachets which were turned over by the PNP
Crime No. 5[,] please look at [these] and tell us if you could recognize
[them]?
A- Yes, sir, I recognize [them].
xxxx
Q- I am showing to you the contents of one bigger transparent plastic
packet consisting of two small sachets with crystalline substance in
[them]. Please look at [them] and tell us if you are familiar with [them].
A- (Witness examining the very small sachets containing a very small
amount of white crystalline substance).
This is not my initial.
Q- There is a marking which is not of the witness and said witness looking
at the bigger transparent packet from which these two plastic sachets
came from. Look at [them] and tell us if you could recognize [them].
A- (Witness looking and examining the bigger plastic and recogniz[ing] the
initials as [those] of Martirez).
Q- How about [the other] marking?
A- I do not know.
Q- How about these three other plastic sachets containing crystalline
substance which I just took out from the previously sealed plastic
container?
A- [These are] my initials.
COURT Witness acknowledging that it is his signature and also his marking on
INTERPRETER: the other bigger one. Two small and one bigger sachets. Smaller sachet
with D-325-02 marked “A” with initial of Bonavente. Smaller sachet D-
325-02 marked “B” with initial of Bonavente. Smallest sachet D-325-02
marked “C.”[23] (Emphases supplied)
Moreover, the Request for Laboratory Examination[24] of the items seized suggests that
the seized items were improperly handled. As may be recalled, the police officers
submitted five sachets of shabu for laboratory examination. Aside from those three
sachets marked by SPO4 Bonavente, the two other sachets were listed and described as
follows in the said request:
x xxx
2. Evidence/Documents submitted:
xxxx
a. Two (2) transparent plastic packets containing white crystalline suspected to be

Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu), approximately 0.1 gm. each, and One
(1) P100.00 with SN ES684504, all placed in a heat-sealed transparent plastic
with marking [letter] “I” on both sides;[25] (Emphasis supplied)
Notably, the portion “and One (1) P100.00 with SN ES684504, all placed in a heat-
sealed transparent plastic with marking [letter] “I” on both sides” was obliterated by
pen markings and the erasure was initialed by SPO1 Desuasido. But even without the
said erasure, the two transparent plastic packets containing white crystalline substance
appear to have no markings at all. Only the heat-sealed transparent plastic supposedly
containing them has the marking letter “I,” which holds no significance as the making of
the said marking is also not supported by any testimony during trial.
Clearly, the absence of markings creates an uncertainty that the two sachets seized during
the buy-bust operation were part of the five sachets submitted to the police crime
laboratory. The prosecution’s evidence failed to establish the marking of the two sachets
of shabu subject of this case, which is the first link in the chain of custody and which
would have shown that the shabu presented in evidence was the same specimen bought
from appellant during the buy-bust operation. The lack of certainty therefore on a crucial
element of the crime i.e., the identity of the corpus delicti, warrants the reversal of the
judgment of conviction.[26]
The failure of the prosecution to identify the corpus delicti is more glaring after
considering that none of the five sachets submitted to the police crime laboratory for
qualitative examination and turned out positive for shabu weighed close to the two plastic
sachets that had an approximate weight of 0.1 gram each as stated in the Information. As
previously mentioned, the police officers sent five sachets that were marked and given
corresponding weights, viz:
A = 3.7240 gram[s] B = 0.8642 gram C = 0.0513 gram[8]

D = 0.0336 gram E = 0.0313 gram
It therefore appears that the sachets of shabu confiscated during the buy-bust operation
are totally different from the sachets forwarded to the police crime laboratory and
thereafter presented in evidence.
As a final note, it does not escape the Court’s attention that there was also no testimony
from the police officers that they conducted a physical inventory and took photographs of
the sachets of shabu confiscated from appellant pursuant to Section 21(1)[27] of Article II
of RA 9165. Their sworn statements did not mention any inventory-taking or
photographing of the same. They also did not bother to offer any justification for this
omission.[28] At this point, it is apt to restate the Court’s pronouncement in People v.
Pepino-Consulta:[29]
[T]he Court cannot emphasize enough that zealousness on the part of law enforcement
agencies in the pursuit of drug peddlers is indeed laudable. However, it is of paramount
importance that the procedures laid down by law be complied with, especially those that
involve the chain of custody of the illegal drugs. This is necessary in order to dispel even
the most infinitesimal of doubts on the outcome of arrests any buy-bust operations, so as
not to render naught the efforts and the resources put forth in the apprehension and
prosecution of violators of our drug laws.[30]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The February 26, 2010 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03170 affirming the December 3, 2007
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tabaco City, Branch 17, in Criminal Case No. T-
3864, finding appellant Jomer Butial guilty of Violating Section 5, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is
entered ACQUITTING him of the charge. Criminal Case No. T-3864 is DISMISSED.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to immediately release appellant

Jomer Butial from detention, unless he is confined for another lawful cause, and to report
to this Court compliance within five days from receipt of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 212160, February 04, 2015 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. DENNIS
SUMILI, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal [1] assailing the Decision[2] dated January 29,
2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01075, which affirmed in
toto the Decision[3] dated August 10, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City,
Branch 3 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. 12595 finding accused-appellant Dennis Sumili (Sumili)
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5,[4] Article II of Republic Act No.
(RA) 9165,[5] otherwise known as the “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.”
The Facts
On June 30, 2006, an Information[6] was filed before the RTC charging Sumili of violating
Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, viz.:
Crim. Case No. 12595
That, on or about June 7, 2006, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, without having been authorized
by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell one (1) sachet of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug commonly known as Shabu for the
amount of P200.00.
Contrary to and in violation of Sec. 5, ART. II, RA 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
City of Iligan, June 30, 2006.
According to the prosecution, on June 7, 2006, the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
Iligan City Sub-Office received a report from a confidential informant that Sumili was
selling shabu. Acting on the same, SPO2 Edgardo Englatiera [7] (SPO2 Englatiera)
dispatched SPO2 Diosdado Cabahug (SPO2 Cabahug) to conduct surveillance on Sumili,
which confirmed the truth and veracity of the aforesaid report. Consequently, SPO2
Englatiera organized a team divided into two (2) groups and briefed them on the buy-
bust operation. He also prepared the marked money, consisting of one (1) two hundred
peso (P200.00) bill, with serial number L507313. [8]
At around 5:10 in the afternoon of the same day, the buy-bust team headed to the
target area. Upon arrival, the poseur-buyer approached Sumili’s house to buy shabu.
After Sumili let the poseur-buyer in, the latter gave the pre-arranged signal that the sale
has been consummated. Almost immediately, the buy-bust team stormed the house but
Sumili escaped by jumping through the window, throwing the marked money at the roof
beside his house. The poseur-buyer turned over the sachet of suspected shabu to SPO2
Englatiera, who marked the same with “DC-1,” representing the initials of SPO2
Cabahug.[9] SPO2 Englatiera then prepared a request for laboratory examination and
instructed Non-Uniform Personnel CarlitoOng (NUP Ong) to bring the sachet together
with the request to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. However, NUP Ong
failed to do so on the same day as the PNP Crime Laboratory was already closed. [10] It
was only on June 9, 2006, or two (2) days after the buy-bust operation, that NUP Ong
was able to bring and turn-over the seized sachet to the PNP Crime Laboratory. [11] Upon
examination, it was confirmed that said sachet contained 0.32 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.[12]
In his defense, Sumili denied selling shabu. He and his daughter claimed that he was a
fishball vendor, and that on the date and time of the incident, he was at the market
buying ingredients. When he returned to his residence, his wife told him that policemen
were looking for him.[13]
The RTC Ruling

In a Decision[14] dated August 10, 2009, the RTC found Sumili guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 and accordingly, sentenced him to life
imprisonment, and ordered him to pay a fine in the amount of P500,000.00. [15]
The RTC found that a buy-bust operation indeed occurred where Sumili sold the seized
sachet to the poseur-buyer. In this regard, it gave credence to the straightforward and
categorical testimonies of prosecution witnesses detailing how the police officers
received information that Sumili was selling shabu, investigated and confirmed that he
indeed was selling shabu, conducted the buy-bust operation, recovered, marked, and
transmitted the seized item from Sumili to the PNP Crime Laboratory, and that the
laboratory results yielded positive for shabu. Conversely, it did not give weight to the
defense testimonies which merely denied the existence of the buy-bust operation and
insisted that Sumili was not selling drugs. [16]
Dissatisfied, Sumili appealed[17] his conviction to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[18] dated January 29, 2014, the CA affirmed Sumili’s conviction in toto.[19] It

agreed with the RTC’s finding that a buy-bust operation actually occurred, resulting in
the seizure of a sachet containing shabu.[20] Further, the CA also held that despite the
police officers’ non-compliance with the procedure enshrined in Section 21, Article II of
RA 9165, the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti, or the seized drug itself, was
nevertheless preserved and, thus, Sumili’s conviction must be sustained. [21]
Finally, the CA opined that Sumili failed to rebut by clear and convincing evidence the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties enjoyed by the police
officers involved in the buy-bust operation.[22]
Aggrieved, Sumili filed the instant appeal. [23]
The issue for the Court’s resolution is whether Sumili’s conviction for violation of Section
5, Article II of RA 9165 should be upheld.
The appeal is meritorious.
In order to convict an accused for violation of RA 9165, or the crime of sale of dangerous
drugs, the prosecution must establish the concurrence of the following elements: (a) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment.[24] Note that what remains material for
conviction is the proof that the transaction actually took place, coupled with the
presentation before the court of the corpus delicti.[25] It is also important that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items be preserved. Simply put, the
dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against an accused must be the same as
that seized from him. The chain of custody requirement removes any unnecessary
doubts regarding the identity of the evidence.[26] As held in People v. Viterbo:[27]
In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II
of RA 9165, the following elements must concur: (a) the identities of the buyer and the
seller, object, and consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the
corresponding payment for it. As the dangerous drug itself forms an integral and key
part of the corpus delictiof the crime, it is therefore essential that the identity of the
prohibited drugbe established beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the prosecution must
be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug, from
the moment it was seized from the accused up to the time it was presented in court as
proof of the corpus delicti. Elucidating on the custodial chain process, the Court, in the
case of People v. Cervantes [(600 Phil. 819, 836 [2009])], held:
As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. In context, this would ideally
include testimony about every link in the chain, from the seizure of the prohibited
drug up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that everyone who
touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was
and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it
was received, and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
x x x.
The chain of custody requirement “ensures that unnecessary doubts respecting the
identity of the evidence are minimized if not altogether removed.” [28] (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
To expand, Section 21[29] of RA 9165 provides the “chain of custody rule” outlining the
procedure that the apprehending officers should follow in handling the seized drugs, in
order to preserve its integrity and evidentiary value. It requires, inter alia, that: (a) the
apprehending team that has initial custody over the seized drugs immediately conduct
an inventory and take photographs of the same in the presence of the accused or the
person from whom such items were seized, or the accused’s or the person’s
representative or counsel, a representative from the media, the Department of Justice,
and any elected public official who shall then sign the copies of the inventory; and ( b)
the seized drugs be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within 24 hours from its
confiscation for examination purposes. While the “chain of custody rule” demands
utmost compliance from the aforesaid officers, Section 21 of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165, [30] as well as jurisprudence nevertheless provide that
non-compliance with the requirements of this rule will not automatically render the
seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, so long as: (a) there is a justifiable
ground for such non-compliance; AND (b) the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved. Hence, any divergence from the prescribed procedure must be
justified and should not affect the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated
items.[31]
After a judicious review of the records, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to
establish the identity of the substance allegedly confiscated from Sumili due to
unjustified gaps in the chain of custody, thus, militating against a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
As may be gleaned from the established facts, the buy-bust operation was conducted on
June 7, 2006. When SPO2 Englatiera seized the sachet from Sumili, he marked the same
with the initials “DC-1” and, later, he returned to the police station to prepare the
request for the examination of the sachet’s contents. Thereafter, he ordered NUP Ong
to bring the sachet as well as the request to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.
However, NUP Ong failed to do so within 24 hours after the buy-bust operation as he
only delivered the sachet to the PNP Crime Laboratory on June 9, 2006, or two (2) days
after the buy-bust operation. No other than SPO2 Englatiera and NUP Ong attested to
these facts in their respective testimonies, to wit: [32]
Prosecutor Celso Sarsaba (Pros. Sarsaba): Who prepared this request for
laboratory examination?
SPO2 Englatiera: I myself, sir.
Q: What did you do with the request for the laboratory examination together with the
one sachet of shabu?
A: I instructed [NUP Ong] to turn-over the evidence and bring for laboratory
examination (sic).
Q: Was [NUP Ong] able to bring the request for laboratory examination together with
the sachet of shabu to the crime laboratory on that same day?
A: The following day.
Q: Why?
A: Because it was already 5:00 o’clock (sic) sir I think it was Friday sir, the laboratory was
already closed.
xxxx
As for NUP Ong:[33]
Pros. Sarsaba: And how about the one sachet of shabu allegedly bought from the
accused, who was in possession of that shabu at that time?
NUP Ong: SPO2 [Englatiera] placed it inside the cellophane attached together with the
request.
Q: And who was supposed to bring that request for laboratory [examination] and the
one sachet of shabu allegedly purchased from the accused to the PNP crime laboratory?
A: No, it was already late at night so we agreed to do it on the following day.
Q: So June 7, 2006, do you recall what day was that?
A: I think it was [a] Friday.
Q: And when did you bring this request for laboratory [examination] to the [PNP] crime
laboratory, on what date?
A: It was delivered on June 9, 2006.
xxxx
To justify the delay in the turn-over of the corpus delicti, SPO2 Englatiera and NUP Ong
insist that the PNP Crime Laboratory was already closed on June 7, 2006, and since it
was a Friday, the delivery of the seized sachet was only done on June 9, 2006. However,
contrary to their claims, June 7, 2006 is not a Friday, but a Wednesday. [34] Thus, if the
PNP Crime Laboratory was indeed closed on June 7, 2006, the delivery of the seized
sachet could have easily been done on the next day, or on June 8, 2006, instead of doing
it two (2) days after the buy-bust operation. This glaring fact, coupled with the absence
in the records as to who among the apprehending officers had actual custody of the
seized sachet from the time it was prepared for turn-over until its delivery to the PNP
Crime Laboratory, presents a substantial and unexplained gap in the chain of custody of
the alleged shabu seized from Sumili. Undoubtedly, the integrity and evidentiary value
of the corpus delicti had been compromised.
It must be emphasized that in criminal prosecutions involving illegal drugs, the

presentation of the drugs which constitute the corpus delicti of the crime calls for the
necessity of proving with moral certainty that they are the same seized items. [35] Failing
in which, the acquittal of the accused on the ground of reasonable doubt becomes a
matter of right,[36] as in this case.
In sum, since the identity of the prohibited drugs had not been established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt, Sumili’s conviction must be immediately set aside.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 29, 2014 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01075 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
accordingly, accused-appellant Dennis Sumili is ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is
ordered to cause his immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held for any other
reason.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 172372, December 04, 2009 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.
ROMAR TEODORO Y VALLEJO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review in this appeal the January 19, 2006 decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00752, [1] affirming in toto the February 19, 2001 decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Batangas City.[2] The RTC decision found
appellant Romar Teodoro (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts
of statutory rape, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
each count.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
The prosecution charged the appellant before the RTC of the crime of rape under three
separate Informations that read:
That on or about the 18th day of June, 1995, in the morning thereof, at Barangay Pook ni
Banal, Municipality of San Pascual, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie with and have
carnal knowledge with the said [AAA] who is below twelve (12) years old, against her
will and consent.
Contrary to law.[3]
That sometime in the first week of July 1995, in the morning thereof, at Barangay Pook
ni Banal, Municipality of San Pascual, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie with and have
carnal knowledge with the said [AAA], who is below twelve (12) years old, against her
will and consent.
Contrary to law.[4]
That on or about the 30th day of March, 1996, at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening,
at Barangay Pook ni Banal, Municipality of San Pascual, Province of Batangas,
accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously lie with and have carnal knowledge with the said [AAA], who is a twelve (12)
year old minor, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.[5]
The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges laid. [6] The prosecution presented the
following witnesses in the trial on the merits that followed: Dr. Rosalina Caraan-
Mendoza (Dr. Mendoza); Donna Catapang (Donna); and AAA. The appellant took the
witness stand for the defense.
Dr. Mendoza, the Municipal Health Officer of San Pascual, Batangas, testified that she
conducted a medical examination of AAA on March 31, 1996,[7] and made the following
findings:
MEDICO-LEGAL CERTIFICATE
x x x x
- External genitalia - normal looking with 2 points of skin abrasions noted over the lower
third of the (L) labia majora.
- Labia majora gaping
- (+) defloration of the hymen, with edges rounded noncoaptible hymenal border and
edges retracted compatible with healed lacerations
x x x
- Positive for presence of sperm cells[8]
Dr. Mendoza stated that she conducted a physical examination of AAA at the request of
the police,[9] and that the healed laceration on AAA's private part was the result of
previous sexual intercourse.[10]
Donna, a medical technologist at the Bauan Pathology Center, testified that Dr.
Mendoza requested her to conduct a laboratory examination on the vaginal smear
taken from AAA.[11] She found the vaginal smear positive for the presence of sperm cells.
[12]
AAA declared on the witness stand that she was born on July 21, 1983. She knew the
appellant since 1993 because the latter was an employee of her parents. [13] AAA recalled
that on June 18, 1995, while her parents were at the sugarcane plantation, the appellant
went to the bathroom and kissed her on the face and neck. The appellant then removed
her clothes, pants and panty.[14] Thereafter, the appellant took off his pants and inserted
his penis into her vagina. AAA struggled and pushed the appellant; the latter threatened
to kill AAA if she told her parents about the incident. Afterwards, the appellant left. [15]
AAA likewise recalled that during the first week of July 1995, the appellant again "raped"
her in the bathroom. According to AAA, the appellant first removed her shirt and pants,
but she cried and pushed him. The appellant inserted his penis into her vagina after
removing her panty.[16] The appellant threatened to kill her if she reported the incident
to her parents. Thereafter, the appellant went to the field. [17]
AAA further testified that at around 10:00 p.m. of March 30, 1996, while her parents
were asleep, the appellant dragged her to the bathroom. [18] She repeatedly struck the
appellant with her hand, but the appellant succeeded in bringing her to the bathroom.
The appellant removed AAA's shorts and panty, and, while they were in a standing
position, inserted his penis into her vagina. [19] AAA's brother saw the incident and
reported it to their mother. [20]
On cross examination, AAA stated that she knew the appellant prior to March 30, 1996
because the latter had been staying in their house for three years. [21] AAA explained that
their house had three bedrooms; and that the appellant slept with her (AAA's) brothers.
[22]
She maintained that one of her brothers saw the March 30, 1996 rape and reported
this incident to their mother. AAA was confronted by her mother the next day. [23]
The appellant presented a different version of the events and claimed that AAA had
been his sweetheart since June 22, 1996. [24] He denied using force on AAA and claimed
that the sexual intercourse between them on March 30, 1996 was consensual. He
recalled that on March 30, 1996, while he was lying beside AAA's brother at the sala,
AAA gave him a signal to follow her to the bathroom. The appellant followed AAA to the
bathroom, where they had sex. [25] After 20 minutes, he went out of the bathroom and
went back to his bed.[26] He likewise denied having raped AAA on June 18, 1995 and on
the first week of July 1995. [27]
The RTC convicted the appellant of two (2) counts of statutory rape in its decision of
February 19, 2001. The dispositive portion of this decision provides:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court finds the accused Romar
Teodoro y Vallejo in Criminal Case No. 8538 and Criminal Case No. 8539 guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty,
in each case, of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the complainant [AAA] in the amount
of P50,000.00 or a total of P100,000.00, and to pay the cost.
The accused, however, is acquitted in Criminal Case No. 8540, as this Court finds him
innocent of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.[28]
The records of this case were originally transmitted to this Court on appeal. Pursuant to
our ruling in People v. Mateo,[29] we endorsed the case and the records to the CA for
appropriate action and disposition.
The CA, in its decision dated January 19, 2006, affirmed the RTC decision in toto. The CA
dismissed the appellant's argument that the Information in Criminal Case No. 8539 was
vague and insufficient because the exact date of the crime was not stated. The CA
reasoned out that Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure merely
requires that the Information contain the approximate time, and not the exact time, of
the commission of the offense.
The CA likewise believed AAA's testimony which it found credible. It held that the court
may convict the accused based solely on the victim's testimony provided it is credible,
natural and convincing.
In his brief,[30] the appellant argued that the lower courts erred in convicting him of two
(2) counts of statutory rape despite the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. He claimed that the victim's testimony was full of inconsistencies. He
likewise contended that the Information in Criminal Case No. 8539 was defective for
failure to state the exact date of the commission of the crime.
THE COURT'S RULING
We resolve to deny the appeal for lack of merit, but we modify the amount of the
awarded indemnities.
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence

Rape is defined and penalized under Article 335[31] of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended,[32] which provides:
ARTICLE 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having

carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
xxxx
Rape under paragraph 3 of this article is termed statutory rape as it departs from the
usual modes of committing rape. What the law punishes in statutory rape is carnal
knowledge of a woman below twelve (12) years old. Thus, force, intimidation and
physical evidence of injury are not relevant considerations; the only subject of inquiry is
the age of the woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. [33] The law presumes
that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender
years; the child's consent is immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to discern
good from evil.[34]
AAA, while recounting her unfortunate ordeal, positively identified the appellant as the
perpetrator of the June 18, 1995 rape; she never wavered in this identification. To
directly quote from the records:
ATTY. EUGENIO MENDOZA:

Q: Do you know the accused in this case in the person of Romar Teodoro y Vallejo alias
Boyet?
[AAA]:
A: Yes, sir.
Q: If he is present in court, will you be able to point to him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Please do so.
(Witness pointing to a man and when asked of his name identified himself as Romar Teodoro).
x
xx
Q: On the 18th of June 1995 in the morning thereof, do you remember anything unusual?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that?
A: I was abused, sir.
Q: By "pinagsamantalahan," what do you mean?
A: I was raped, sir, by him.
Q: When you refer to the pronoun him, to whom are you referring?
A: Romar Teodoro, sir.
Q: Where in particular were you raped and/or abused by Romar Teodoro on the
th
18 day of June 1995 in the morning thereof?
A: In our bathroom, sir.
xxxx
Q: According to you, you were abused and/or raped in your bathroom by Romar
Teodoro, tell us how were you raped by Romar Teodoro?
A: He kissed me and took off my clothes.
xxx
Q: Where did he kiss you?
A: On my face, sir.
Q: Where else?
A: On my neck, sir.
x
xx
Q: According to you he removed your dress, was he able to remove your T-shirt?
A: No, sir.
Q: How about your pants?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: After the pants you were wearing then was removed, were you still wearing
anything?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What is it?
A: My panty, sir.
Q: How about that panty, was that likewise removed?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: After the pants and the panty were removed by Romar Teodoro, what did he do to
you, if any?
A: He also took off his pants, sir.
Q: And after he took off his pants, what did he do, if any?
A: He inserted his penis in my vagina, sir.
Q: What were you doing when he was then to insert his penis into your vagina?
A: I was pushing him, sir.
Q: Did you tell him anything at that time?
A: None, sir.
Q: How about Romar Teodoro, did he tell you anything at that time?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did he tell you?
A: He told me not to tell it to my parents because he will kill me sir.
Q: Other than pushing him away, what else did you do, if you did any?
A: I was struggling, sir.
xxx
Q: By the way, according to you he was able to insert his penis [in] your vagina, will
you please tell us what did you feel, if any, at that time?
A: "Masakit po." It was painful, sir.
x x x[35] [Emphasis supplied]
AAA likewise positively identified the appellant as the one who raped her during
the first week of July 1995. Her testimony dated November 6, 1997 was clear and
straightforward; she was consistent in her recollection of her defloration. To directly
quote from the records:
ATTY. EUGENIO MENDOZA:

Q: x x x My question to you is, if as testified to by you, you were raped on June 18,
1995, will you please tell us again as to when was the second time that you were raped by
herein accused Romar Teodoro?
[AAA]:
A: First week of July, sir.
Q: What year?
A: 1995, sir.
Q: Whereat?
A: Inside our house, sir.
Q: Which particular portion of your house?
A: Inside the bathroom, sir.
Q: What time was it on the first week of July, 1995 when you were raped by Romar
Teodoro?
A: Ten o'clock in the morning, sir.
Q: And what was done to you by Romar Teodoro on that date and time?
A: He raped me, sir.
Q: Will you please narrate before the Honorable Court how you were raped by Romar
Teodoro on the first week of July, 1995 at around 10:00 o'clock in the morning in your
bathroom?
A: He removed my clothes, sir.
Q: What clothes were you then wearing at that time?
A: T-shirt, sir.
Q: What else?
A: Short pants, sir.
x
xx
Q: While Romar Teodoro was then in the act of removing your short pants, what were
you doing then?
A: I was pushing him, sir.
Q: Will you please tell us if other than pushing you did anything else?
A: I was crying, sir.
Q: Why were you crying at the time?
A: Because he was raping me, sir.
Q: Was he able to remove your short pants?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: After the short pants, was there anything else that you were wearing then at the
time?
A: Yes, sir, my panties, sir.
Q: How about the panties, what happened to the same?
A: He also removed my panties, sir.
x
xx
Q: After the removal of the same wearing apparel, what happened next?
A: His penis was inserted to [sic] my vagina, sir.
x x x[36] [Emphasis ours]
We view this testimony to be clear, convincing and credible considering especially the
corroboration it received from the medico-legal report and testimony of Dr. Mendoza.
We additionally do not see from the records any indication that AAA's testimony should
be seen in a suspicious light. We emphasize that the appellant had been staying in the
victim's house for more or less 3 years; he dined with AAA's family and slept with her
brothers. There is no plausible reason why AAA would falsely testify against the
appellant, imputing on him a crime as grave as rape if the sexual incident did not
happen. We have held time and again that the testimonies of rape victims who are
young and immature, as in this case, deserve full credence considering that no woman,
especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow the
examination of her private parts, and subject herself to a public trial if she had not been
motivated by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her. [37]
The prosecution positively established the elements of rape required under Article
335. First, the appellant succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the victim on June
18, 1995 and during the first week of July 1995. AAA was steadfast in her assertion that
the appellant raped her on both occasions; and that the appellant succeeded in
inserting his penis into her private part, as a result of which she felt pain. As earlier
stated, AAA's testimony was corroborated by the medical findings of Dr. Mendoza.
Second, the prosecution established AAA's minority during the trial through the
presentation of her birth certificate showing that she was born on July 21, 1983. AAA
herself, in fact, testified regarding her age. Hence, when the appellant raped AAA on
June 18, 1995 and on the first week of July 1995, she was not yet 12 years old. As we
stated above, when the victim is below 12 years of age, violence or intimidation is not
an element to be considered; the only subject of inquiry is whether carnal knowledge
took place. The law conclusively presumes the absence of consent when the victim is
below the age of 12. Thus, we held in People v. Valenzuela:[38]
What the law punishes in statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below
twelve (12) years old. Thus, force, intimidation, and physical evidence of injury are
immaterial; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal
knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a
will of her own on account of her tender years; the child's consent is immaterial because
of her presumed incapacity to discern evil from good.
The Appellant's Defenses
In his defense, the appellant invoked denial. He denied raping the victim on June 18,
1995 and on the first week of July 1995, but admitted having a consensual sexual
intercourse with AAA on March 30, 1996. We shall only discuss the incidents of June 18,
1995 and of the first week of July 1995 (subject of Criminal Case Nos. 8538 and 8539), as
the appellant had already been acquitted in Criminal Case No. 8540.
It is settled that denial is an inherently weak defense. It cannot prevail over positive
identification, unless supported by strong evidence of lack of guilt. In the context of this
case, the appellant's mere denial, unsupported by any other evidence, cannot overcome
the child-victim's positive declaration on the identity and involvement of the appellant
in the crime attributed to him. [39]
The appellant further argues that the Information in Criminal Case No. 8539 is defective
because it failed to state the exact date of the commission of the crime.
The contention lacks merit.
An information, under Section 6, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, is deemed sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of
the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of
the offense; and the place where the offense was committed. Section 11 of the same
Rule also provides that it is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the
precise date the offense was committed, except when the date of commission is a
material element of the offense. The offense may thus be alleged to have been
committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. At the
minimum, an indictment must contain all the essential elements of the offense charged
to enable the accused to properly meet the charge and duly prepare for his defense.[40]
In the present case, the Information in Criminal Case No. 8539 states that the offense
was committed "in the first week of July 1995"; it likewise alleged that the victim was
"below 12 years old" at the time of the incident. These allegations sufficiently informed
the appellant that he was being charged of rape of a child who was below 12 years of
age. Afforded adequate opportunity to prepare his defense, he cannot now complain
that he was deprived of his right to be informed of the nature of the accusation against
him.
We have repeatedly held that the date of the commission of rape is not an essential
element of the crime.[41] It is not necessary to state the precise time when the offense
was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense. In statutory
rape, time is not an essential element except to prove that the victim was a minor below
twelve years of age at the time of the commission of the offense. Given the victim's
established date of birth, she was definitely short of 12 years under the allegations of
the Information and on the basis of the evidence adduced.
Moreover, objections relating to the form of the complaint or information cannot be

made for the first time on appeal. If the appellant had found the Information
insufficient, he should have moved before arraignment either for a bill of particulars, for
him to be properly informed of the exact date of the alleged rape, or for the quashal of
the Information, on the ground that it did not conform with the prescribed form. Failing
to pursue either remedy, he is deemed to have waived objection to any formal defect in
the Information.[42]
The Proper Penalty
The applicable provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, covering the crime of
rape is Article 335 which provides:
ARTICLE 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having
x x x x
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxxx
The lower courts, therefore, are correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua on
the appellant.
Proper Indemnity
The award of civil indemnity to the rape victim is mandatory when rape is found to have
been committed. Thus, this Court affirms the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
based on prevailing jurisprudence. [43]
The award of moral damages also finds full justification in this case. Moral damages are
awarded to rape victims without need of proof other than the fact of rape on the
assumption that the victim suffered moral injuries from the experience she underwent.
[44]
Pursuant to current rules, we award P50,000.00 as moral damages to AAA. [45]
In addition, we award exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00. [46] The award of

exemplary damages is justified under Article 2229 of the Civil Code to set a public
example and serve as deterrent against elders who abuse and corrupt the youth. [47]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we AFFIRM the January 19, 2006 decision of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00752 with the modification that the appellant
is further ORDERED to PAY the victim the amounts of P50,000.00 and P30,000.00 as
moral damages and exemplary damages, respectively, for each count of statutory rape.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 179497, January 25, 2012 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. RENANDANG
MAMARUNCAS, PIAGAPO, LANAO DEL SUR; PENDATUM AMPUAN,
PIAGAPO, LANAO DEL SUR; APPELLANTS, BAGINDA PALAO (AT
LARGE) ALIAS &LDQUO;ABDUL WAHID SULTAN&RDQUO;, ACCUSED.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The assessment of the credibility of witnesses by the trial court is the center of this
controversy. The well-known rule, though subject to certain recognized exceptions, is
that findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses are matters best left to the
trial court. Hence, “[u]nless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which,
if considered, might affect the result of the case, the trial court’s assessment must be
respected.”[1]
Assailed in the present appeal is the June 30, 2006 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00196 which affirmed with modification the July 19,
1999 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iligan City, Branch 06 in Criminal
Case No. 06-6150 convicting Renandang Mamaruncas (Mamaruncas) and Pendatum
Ampuan (Ampuan) (appellants) of the crime of murder.
On February 9, 1996, the following Information[4] for murder was filed against

Mamaruncas, Baginda Palao (Palao) alias Abdul Wahid Sultan and Ampuan. [5]
That on or about February 1, 1996, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, except for others whose cases are
still under preliminary investigation, conspiring with and confederating together and
mutually helping each other, armed with deadly weapon, to wit: a caliber .45 pistol, by
means of treachery and evident premeditation, and with intent to kill, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, shoot and wound one Baudelio R. Batoon,
thereby inflicting upon him the following physical injuries, to wit:
- Cardio respiratory arrest
- Hypovolemic shock
- Multiple gunshot wound
which caused his death.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code with the
aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation.
Only Mamaruncas and Ampuan appeared at the scheduled arraignment on May 20, 1996.
Their co-accused, Palao alias Abdul Wahid Sultan (Abdul), remains at large. Appellants
pleaded not guilty[6] and trial proceeded against them.
Factual Antecedents
The facts of the case, as summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in its
brief and substantiated by the transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings, are as
follows:
Around noontime on February 1, 1996, Baudelio Batoon, Richard Batoon, Juanito

Gepayo and a certain “Nito” were working on vehicles inside Baudelio Batoon’s auto
repair shop situated along the highway in Tubod, Baraas, Iligan City.
Baginda Palao then entered the shop accompanied by appellants Renandang Mamaruncas
and Pendatum Ampuan. Baginda Palao wore desert camouflage fatigues; while his two
(2) companions wore Philippine Army tropical green fatigues. Baginda Palao showed
Baudelio Batoon an arrest warrant and told the latter he was serving it against Batoon.
The arrival of Baginda Palao’s group prompted Juanito Gepayo and Richard Batoon to
stop their work and observe what was happening.
Baudelio Batoon told Baginda Palao to just wait awhile, as they would settle the matter
after he [Batoon] [finishes] tuning-up an engine he had been working on.
Baginda Palao reacted by slapping the victim’s stomach and pointing a .45 caliber pistol
at him. Baudelio Batoon then tried to grab Palao’s gun, causing the two of them to
grapple for the same. As these two wrestled for control of the gun, Renandang
Mamaruncas, who was behind Baudelio Batoon, shot from behind Batoon’s right thigh
with a .38 cal. homemade gun. Pendatum Ampuan, who was also standing behind
Baudelio Batoon, followed up by shooting Batoon’s left arm pit with a .45 cal.
[homemade] pistol. Baudelio Batoon fell to the ground and Baginda Palao finished [him
off] with a single .45 cal. shot to the back. Juanito Gepayo and Richard Batoon saw the
entire scene, stunned and unable to do anything. From their vantage points three (3) to
four (4) meters away, these witnesses had a clear and unobstructed view of the entire
incident.
Meanwhile, Police Inspector Graciano Mijares, then Commanding Officer of the Iligan
City PNP Mobile Force Company, was riding a civilian car along the highway, heading
towards Iligan City proper. He was accompanied by his driver, SPO3 William Yee, and
SPO3 George Alejo. They heard the gunshots emanating from the auto repair shop at
Baraas, prompting Inspector Mijares to order his driver to stop the car. They alighted and
proceeded to the source of the gunshots. At the repair shop, they saw three (3) men in
camouflage gear with guns drawn and pointed at a person already lying on the ground.
Inspector Mijares’ group shouted at the camouflaged gunmen to stop what they were
doing and to drop their firearms, at the same time announcing that they (Mijares’ group)
were policemen.
The camouflaged gunmen reacted by firing at the policemen. The latter fired back.
During the exchange of gunfire, Baginda Palao ran behind the Batoon house, while
Renandang Mamaruncas and Pendatum Ampuan ran towards the road and a nearby car.
Inspector Mijares was able to hit Mamaruncas and Ampuan, while SPO3 Yee likewise hit
Ampuan. Mamaruncas, who managed to get inside the car, and Ampuan were then
captured by the policemen. The lawmen also gave chase to Baginda Palao; but he
escaped.
Other responding policemen brought Mamaruncas and Ampuan to the hospital for
treatment and they were eventually placed under detention. Baudelio Batoon was
brought to the hospital by his wife; but he was pronounced dead on arrival.
Based on the necropsy examination of the victim’s body, Dr. Leonardo Labanen
established that the three (3) gunshot wounds found on the body of Baudelio Batoon (i.e.,
at the right thigh, left armpit and back) were inflicted at close range due to the presence,
or at least traces, of gunpowder burns.[7]
Only appellants testified for their defense. Their testimonies, as narrated by the trial
court, are as follows:
Accused Renandang Mamaruncas testified that he is 34 years old, married, carpenter and
a resident of Piagapo, Lanao del Sur. On the morning of February 1, 1996, he was in
Marawi City. He decided to come down to Iligan City to see a movie. He left Marawi at
7:00 a.m. and upon arrival at the Tambacan terminal in Iligan City, he went to the house
of his cousin. Later, he changed his mind about going to a movie and returned to the
Tambacan terminal in order to go back to Marawi City. At about 11:30 a.m., Abdul
Wahid Sultan arrived with Pendatum Ampuan on board a car driven by Aminola. Abdul
Wahid invited him to go with them because he will collect some money and afterwards
they will have some enjoyment. He agreed and sat at the rear seat behind the driver.
Abdul Wahid was at the front seat with Pendatum behind at the back seat. They drove to
Baraas. They stopped at a crossing and Abdul Wahid and Pendatum Ampuan alighted.
Before walking away, Abdul Wahid handed to Renandang a .38 cal[.] revolver with
instructions to remain in the car and [keep] watch. At first he refused but Abdul Wahid
insisted so he accepted the gun. Abdul Wahid and Pendatum walked to the shop leaving
the rear right door open. About ten minutes later, he heard three gunshots. He moved to
the rear seat where the door was open and saw policemen, who arrived and surrounded
the car. He placed the gun on the seat and raised his hands as a sign of surrender. Then
with his right hand, he closed the car door. Just as the door closed, the policemen shot
him on the forearm and chest below the right nipple. He lost consciousness and regained
it only at the hospital.
He further testified that Abdul Wahid Sultan is an old friend. He is also known as
Baginda Palao. Pendatum Ampuan is not known as Abdul Wahid Sultan.
He also declared that the statement of Juanito Gepayo that only Abdul Wahid Sultan and
Pendatum Ampuan entered the shop and shot Baudelio Batoon is true and that the
testimony of P/Insp. Mijares that he also shot the victim is not true. He denied any part in
the shooting to death of Baudelio Batoon.
Accused Pendatum Ampuan testified that he is 20 years old, single, student and a resident
of Piagapo, Lanao del Sur. On January 31, 1996 at about 6:00 a.m., he left Marawi City
for Iligan City on board a passenger Armak jeepney. He alighted at the terminal behind
the Gaisano Superstore and at exactly 7:00 a.m., he entered the store and went to the
upper storey to shop. When he came out, he met a friend name[d] Bessah. Together they
walked to the Maharlika Theater but then Bessah expressed the intention to go home to
Marawi City. He accompanied Bessah to the Tambacan terminal. Then he proceeded to
the house of his Uncle Ali in Cabaro. (This is a place North of the city and at the opposite
side from Tambacan which is South of the city). He arrived there at noon. He stayed
overnight at his Uncle Ali’s house. At about 9:00 a.m., the following day, February 1,
1996, he left the house of his uncle. Outside, he met Baginda Palao, who was looking for
a certain Baser, a policeman. He wanted the latter to help him collect a debt. They went
to the terminal at the back of Gaisano store but did not find Baser. Baginda told him to
wait while he will look for Baser inside the Gaisano store. Baginda returned without
having found Baser and once again he told him to wait while Baginda will look for a car.
A little later, Baginda returned on board a car driven by one Aminola Basar. They went to
the Tambacan terminal but again did not find Baser. Instead, they saw Renandang
Mamaruncas. Baginda invited the latter to go with them to Baraas to collect a debt.
Renandang entered the car and they proceeded to Baraas. The car stopped at a place near
a shop. Baginda instructed him and Renandang to remain in the car because he was going
out to collect the debt. Baginda left the car and entered the shop. About ten minutes later,
he heard shouting followed by gunfire. He stepped out of the car to verify and saw
Baginda Palao [shoot] the victim. He retreated to the car as the police led by Capt.
Mijares arrived. They confiscated the car key and arrested them except Baginda Palao
who escaped. They were taken to the hospital due to injuries. In his case, the sustained
wounds when mauled by the children of the victim but in another breath he admitted that
his injury was a gunshot wound when he was caught in the cross fire as the police shot
Renandang Mamaruncas. He was inside the car when he was hit. He further admitted that
Baginda Palao is known as Abdul Wahid Sultan. He denied shooting Baudelio Batoon. [8]
The RTC debunked appellants’ defense of denial and held them guilty as principals by
direct participation in the killing of Baudelio Batoon (Baudelio). It gave full faith and
credence to the evidence of the prosecution especially on the presence of conspiracy
among the malefactors and rendered a verdict of conviction, thus:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Renandang Mamaruncas and Pendatum
Ampuan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of murder
qualified by treachery defined and penalized in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended, without the presence of any other aggravating circumstances and hereby
sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA with the
corresponding accessory penalties attached thereto by law and to indemnify the Heirs of
Baudelio Batoon the sums of:
1. P10,200,000.00 for and as loss of support;

2. P66,904.00 for and as actual damages;
3. P50,000.00 as death indemnity and
4. P100,000.00 for and as moral damages
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Cost against the accused.
Having been under preventive detention since February 1, 1996, the period of such
detention shall be credited in full in favor of said accused in the service of their respective
sentences.
SO ORDERED.[9]
In view of the Notice of Appeal[10] filed by the appellants, the RTC forwarded the records
of the case to this Court. By Resolution[11] dated January 31, 2000, the Court resolved to
accept the appeal. In view thereof, appellants were required to file their brief.
[12]
Appellants thus filed their brief on November 20, 2000[13] while the OSG submitted
the Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee[14] on May 2, 2001. Later, however, consonant with
this Court’s pronouncement in People v. Mateo[15] the case was transferred to the CA for
appropriate action and disposition.[16]
By Decision[17] promulgated on June 30, 2006, the appeals court affirmed with

modification the RTC Decision. Said court ruled that the inconsistencies in the
prosecution witnesses’ testimonies pointed out by the appellants pertain only to minor
and collateral matters which do not dilute the probative weight of said testimonies.
Regarding the erroneous designation of appellant Ampuan’s name in the Information, the
court went on to hold that such error was only a formal defect and the proper correction
of which was duly made without any objection on the part of the defense. The CA
likewise held that treachery attended the commission of the crime.
The decretal portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the

questioned Judgment dated July 19, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Appellants Renandang Mamaruncas and Pendatum Ampuan are
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of murder as defined in Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 and are hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The appellants are to pay, jointly and severally,
the heirs of Baudelio Batoon the amount of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and P66,904.00 as
actual damages.
SO ORDERED.[18]
Disgruntled, appellants are now again before this Court in view of their Notice of
Appeal[19] from the Decision of the CA.
By Resolution[20] dated November 19, 2007, this Court notified the parties that they may
file their respective supplemental briefs within 30 days from notice. In their respective
manifestations, the parties opted to adopt the briefs they earlier filed as their
supplemental briefs.[21]
In their brief, appellants assign the following errors:
I. That the trial court erred in convicting [them] when they should have been
acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt;
and
II. The information filed before the trial court was substantially defective.[22]
The basic thrust of appellants’ first assignment of error is the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses. Appellants contend that the trial court anchored its finding and
conclusion on the testimonies of witnesses Juanito Gepayo (Gepayo), Richard Batoon
(Batoon) and P/Sr. Insp. Graciano Mijares (Mijares), who appear to be inconsistent in
their stand and whose credibility is therefore assailable. They question the prosecution
witnesses’ identification of Abdul and Ampuan as one and the same person and aver that
the same only leads to the logical conclusion that said witnesses were perjured witnesses.
They argue that Ampuan failed to grasp the information read to him as he was arraigned
as “Abdul Wahid Sultan alias Pendatum Ampuan”.
On the other hand, the OSG in praying for the affirmance of the appealed Decision,
opines that inconsistencies on minor and collateral matters in the testimony of a
prosecution eyewitness do not affect his credibility. It also contends that whatever defect
the information subject of appellant Ampuan’s arraignment has had been cured with the
latter’s consent during the trial.
Our Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
In support of their quest for acquittal, appellants tried to cast doubt on the credibility of
witness Gepayo anchored on the following grounds: (1) there was serious inconsistency
in his testimony on whether he knew Ampuan before the incident; (2) his actuation of just
watching the incident without giving any assistance to his fallen employer as well as his
immediate return to work thereafter is contrary to human nature and experience; (3) while
he testified that appellant Mamaruncas was one of the wounded suspects during the
encounter, he failed to identify him in court; and, (4) in his affidavit, he identified Abdul
and Ampuan as one and the same person but later on testified to the contrary.
Credibility of witnesses not affected

by minor inconsistencies.
The perceived inconsistency on whether Gepayo knows Ampuan even before the incident
is inconsequential as to discredit the credibility of Gepayo’s testimony. The
inconsistency pointed out by appellants pertains only to collateral or trivial matters and
has no substantial effect on the nature of the offense. In fact, it even signifies that the
witness was neither coached nor was lying on the witness stand. What matters is that
there is no inconsistency in Gepayo’s complete and vivid narration as far as the principal
occurrence and the positive identification of Ampuan as one of the principal assailants
are concerned.[23] “The Court has held that although there may be inconsistencies in the
testimonies of witnesses on minor details, they do not impair their credibility where there
is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the
assailant.”[24]
It could be true that Gepayo did not retreat to a safer place during the shooting incident
and did not render assistance to his wounded employer. To appellants, this reaction is
contrary to human nature. We believe otherwise. This imputed omission, to our mind,
does not necessarily diminish the plausibility of Gepayo’s story let alone destroy his
credibility. To us, his reaction is within the bounds of expected human behavior. Surely,
he was afraid that they might kill him because the malefactors were then armed with
guns.[25] Thus, he would not dare attempt to stop them and stake his life in the process. At
any rate, it is settled “that different people react differently to a given situation or type of
situation, and there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is
confronted with a strange or startling or frightful experience. Witnessing a crime is an
unusual experience which elicits different reactions from the witnesses and for which no
clear-cut standard form of behavior can be drawn.”[26]
The failure of Gepayo to identify Mamaruncas in court does not bolster appellants’
cause. As the CA correctly pointed out:
x x x We agree with the prosecution’s observation that although he did not positively
identify appellant Mamaruncas as one of the shooters, he was however, able to point out
that there was a third person who accompanied assailants Palao and Ampuan in
approaching the victim during the incident. This is also bolstered by Insp. Mijares[’]
testimony that he saw three assailants pointing their guns at the victim who was already
lying prostrate on the ground.[27]
In any event, even without Gepayo’s identification of Mamaruncas, the unrebutted

testimony of another prosecution eyewitness, Batoon, clearly points to Mamaruncas as
one of the assailants. Thus:
Q: After these three persons rather Abdul Wahid together with two companions, presented
the warrant of arrest to your father, what happened thereafter?
A: They pulled their guns and pointed [them at] my father.
Q: Who pulled out .45 caliber gun [and pointed it at] your father?
A: Abdul Wahid, Sir
Q: And what happened after the .45 pistol [was] pointed [at] your father?
A: My father tried to [grab] the .45 caliber from Abdul Wahid, Sir.
Q: What happened after?
A: My father was shot by one of his companion[s], Sir.
Q: Who [first shot] your father?
A: (Witness pointing to a person. [W]hen he was asked x x x his name[,] he answered that
he is Renandang Mamaruncas)
xxxx
Q: After this Renandang Mamaruncas shot your father, what happened thereafter?
A: The other companion fired the next shot (witness pointing to a person sitting at the
bench inside the Courtroom and when he was asked x x x his name, he answered that
he is Pendatum [Ampuan].)[28]
Undoubtedly, the testimonies of eyewitnesses Gepayo and Batoon on material details are
straightforward and consistent with each other. They personally saw appellants at the
scene of the crime at the time it was committed. Their combined declarations established
beyond reasonable doubt the identities of both appellants, along with their co-accused
Abdul, as the perpetrators of the crime.
As to the contention that Gepayo referred to Abdul Wahid Sultan and Pendatum Ampuan
as one and the same person in his affidavit[29] and yet later on testified to the contrary, this
Court finds the same inconsequential and will not outrightly justify the acquittal of an
accused. In a very recent case,[30] this Court reiterated that as between an affidavit
executed outside the court and a testimony given in open court, the latter almost always
prevails. It emphasized therein that:
Discrepancies between a sworn statement and testimony in court do not outrightly justify
the acquittal of an accused. Such discrepancies do not necessarily discredit the witness
since ex parte affidavits are often incomplete. They do not purport to contain a complete
compendium of the details of the event narrated by the affiant. Thus, our rulings
generally consider sworn statements taken out of court to be inferior to in court testimony
(citation omitted).
The evidence at hand, moreover, clearly points out that it was the police officers who
supplied the names of the suspects in Gepayo’s affidavit.[31]
Any alleged defect in the Information deemed waived.
Anent the second assigned error, appellants aver that the Information filed before the trial
court was substantially defective considering that it accuses Abdul and Ampuan as one
and the same person when in fact they were identified as different persons. As such,
Ampuan was not able to comprehend the Information read to him.
The Court cannot accord merit to this argument. It is well to note that appellants failed to
raise the issue of the defective Information before the trial court through a motion for bill
of particulars or a motion to quash the information. Their failure to object to the alleged
defect before entering their pleas of not guilty amounted to a waiver of the defect in the
Information. “Objections as to matters of form or substance in the [I]nformation cannot
be made for the first time on appeal.”[32] Records even show that the Information was
accordingly amended during trial to rectify this alleged defect but appellants did not
comment thereon, viz:
FISCAL ROBERTO ALBULARIO:

Per manifestation and admission of this witness, the Information be amended from
[Renandang] Mamaruncas and the word and, it should be Bagindo [sic] Palao alias Abdul
Wahid Sultan and the alias Pendatum Ampuan be erased as corrected.
COURT:
Any comment from the accused.
ATTY. FIDEL MACAUYAG:
No comment, Your Honor.[33]
Treachery correctly appreciated.
From the evidence and as found by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court, the
facts sufficiently prove that treachery was employed by appellants. The attack on
Baudelio was so swift and unexpected, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting
victim no opportunity to resist or defend himself. As ruled by the trial court:
In the above situation, treachery was considered to exist. More so in this case when the
victim was completely without any weapon from the inception of the assault. At the
moment when Pendatum Ampuan and Renandang Mamaruncas shot him, Baudelio
Batoon was not in any position to defend himself. And when Abdul Wahid shot him
while lying wounded on the ground, he was utterly defenseless.[34]
Hence, both lower courts correctly found appellants guilty of murder in view of the
presence of treachery.
Conspiracy was duly proven.
We also sustain the finding of conspiracy. Conspiracy exists “when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary x x x [as it] may
be shown through circumstantial evidence, deduced from the mode and manner in which
the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when
such lead to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.” [35]
In this case, conspiracy was clearly established. All three accused entered the shop of
Baudelio at the same time. Ampuan shot Baudelio from behind, hitting the latter at his
left armpit while Mamaruncas shot Baudelio on the thigh. When Baudelio fell to the
ground face down, Abdul shot him at the back. These consecutive acts undoubtedly
showed appellants’ unanimity in design, intent and execution. They performed specific
acts with such closeness and coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose
and design in the commission of the crime.
The Court thus sees no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the RTC and the CA
considering that they are based on existing evidence and reasonable conclusions drawn
therefrom. It has been held time and again that factual findings of the trial court, its
assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies
and the conclusions based on these factual findings are to be given the highest respect.
As a rule, the Court will not weigh anew the evidence already passed on by the trial court
and affirmed by the CA.[36] Though the rule is subject to exceptions, no such exceptional
grounds obtain in this case.
Against the damning evidence adduced by the prosecution, appellants could only muster
mere denial. As ruled in various cases by the Court, denial, if unsubstantiated by clear
and convincing evidence is inherently a weak defense as it is negative and self-serving.
“As between the categorical testimony that rings of truth on one hand, and a bare denial
on the other, the former is generally held to prevail.”[37]
The Penalty
Undoubtedly, the crime committed is murder in view of the attending aggravating

circumstance of treachery. Murder, as defined under Article 248[38] of the Revised Penal
Code as amended, is the unlawful killing of a person which is not parricide or infanticide,
provided that treachery, inter alia, attended the killing. The presence of any one of the
enumerated circumstances under the aforesaid Article is enough to qualify a killing as
murder punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Since only the qualifying
circumstance of treachery is found to be present, both the RTC and the CA properly
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code. Moreover, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346[39] provides:
Section 3. Persons convicted of offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or whose

sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible
for parole under Act No. 4103 otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as
amended.
Pursuant to the above provision, appellants are therefore not eligible for parole.
Awards of Damages
The Court modifies the award of civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00. In line
with prevailing jurisprudence,[40] said award is increased to P75,000.00. Anent the award
of moral damages, the CA correctly imposed the amount of P50,000.00.[41] These “awards
are mandatory without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim,
owing to the fact of the commission of murder or homicide.”[42]
Anent the award of actual damages, the victim’s widow testified that the family spent a
total of P66,904.00 relative to the wake and burial of the victim. However, the claim for
said amount is supported merely by a list of expenses[43] personally prepared by the
widow instead of official receipts. To be entitled to an award of actual damages, “it is
necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty,
premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable x x x.”[44] “A list of
expenses cannot replace receipts when the latter should have been issued as a matter of
course in business transactions.”[45] Thus the Court deletes the lower courts’ award of
actual damages. Nonetheless, since entitlement of the same is shown under the facts of
the case, temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00[46] should be awarded in lieu of
actual damages to the heirs of the victim pursuant to Article 2224 of the Civil Code
which provides that temperate damages “may be recovered when the court finds that
pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be
proved with certainty.”
The CA correctly deleted the indemnity for loss of earning capacity awarded by the trial
court. Such indemnity cannot be awarded in the absence of documentary evidence except
where the victim was either self-employed or a daily wage worker earning less than the
minimum wage under current labor laws.
As testified to by the widow, Florenda Batoon, the victim was earning a monthly income
of P20,000.00 and P90,000.00 as an auto repair shop and a six-wheeler truck operator,
respectively. The trial court made a conservative estimate of P500.00 a day as the net
income from the truck alone after making reasonable deductions from its operation.
Thus, ranged against the daily minimum wage then prevailing in Region X which is
P137.00 per day pursuant to Wage Order No. RX-03, this case undoubtedly does not fall
under the exceptions where indemnity for loss of earning capacity can be given despite
the lack of documentary evidence.
The Court sustains the award of exemplary damages in view of the proven qualifying
circumstance of treachery. The CA however awarded exemplary damages to the heirs of
the victim in the amount of P25,000.00. To conform with prevailing jurisprudence, the
Court increases this amount to P30,000.00.[47]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the June 30, 2006 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00196 which found appellants Renandang
Mamaruncas and Pendatum Ampuan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder
is AFFIRMED with further MODIFICATIONS as follows:
1. Appellants are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility

for parole;
2. The award of civil indemnity is increased to P75,000.00;
3. The award of P66,904.00 as actual damages is deleted;
4. P25,000.00 as temperate damages is awarded in lieu of actual damages;
5. The award of exemplary damages is increased to P30,000.00; and
6. Appellants are further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim interest on all damages
awarded at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 171437, October 04, 2007 ]
HERMES E. FRIAS, SR.* PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari[1] seeks to set aside the decision[2] of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26321 and its resolution[3] denying reconsideration.
Petitioner Hermes E. Frias, Sr. was charged with violation of Article 218 of the Revised
Penal Code[4] under the following Information:
That on or about December 18, 1997 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the
municipality of Capas, province of Tarlac, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused HERMES E. FRIAS, SR., an accountable officer, being then the
Municipal Mayor of Capas, Tarlac, after being required by the Commission on Audit to
settle his disallowed cash advances under Voucher Nos. 101-97-09-878 and 101-97-11-
1156 for the amounts of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000) and NINE HUNDRED
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P950,000), respectively, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously fail to render accounts for a period of two months after such
accounts should have been rendered, to the damage and prejudice of the government in
the aforestated amounts.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
Petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment. After pre-trial, trial on the merits
followed.
The prosecution presented Tarlac provincial auditor Lualhati C. Abesamis of the

Commission on Audit (COA) as its sole witness.[6] Abesamis testified that she and her
team, in the course of their audit examination,[7] discovered that petitioner, on behalf of
the Municipality of Capas, made cash advances amounting to P50,000[8] and
P950,000[9] (or a total of P1,000,000). These cash advances were allocated for the
maintenance of economic enterprises[10] and the augmentation of the general fund,
[11]
respectively. Abesamis and her team, however, found these purposes too vague. Thus,
they disallowed the cash advances due to petitioner's failure to indicate a specific legal
purpose.[12]
On December 18, 1997, Abesamis notified petitioner, municipal treasurer Norma R.
Panganiban and municipal accountant Rolando T. Domingo of the disallowance of the
municipality's cash advances and directed them to settle the P1,000,000 immediately.
[13]
Neither Panganiban nor Domingo returned the amount. Hence, Abesamis requested
petitioner to settle the disallowed cash advances. Petitioner, however, refused for the
reason that he gave the proceeds of the cash advances to Panganiban. [14]
Abesamis, mindful of petitioner's predicament, pointed out that the cash advances were
made under his (petitioner's) authority. Moreover, the checks were payable to him (as
payee) and he admitted receipt thereof.[15] For this reason, even if he gave the proceeds to
Panganiban, he was still required to return the P1,000,000.[16]
Notwithstanding Abesamis' demand, petitioner did not account for the cash advance.
Thus, Abesamis recommended the filing of this criminal complaint against petitioner.[17]
In his defense, petitioner argued that he was not liable for the cash advances because he
did not derive any benefit from them.[18] Panganiban alone benefited from the cash
advances as she used the P1,000,000 to settle her existing deficiencies with the
Commission on Audit (COA).[19] Petitioner pointed out that the COA, upon Abesamis'
recommendation, also filed a criminal complaint against Panganiban.[20]
On December 6, 2005, the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan found petitioner guilty
as charged due to the concurrence of the following elements:
1. petitioner was a public officer;
2. he was an officer accountable for public funds or property;
3. he was required by law or regulation to render accounts to the COA or provincial

auditor and
4. he failed to render an account for the period of two months after such accounts
should have been rendered.[21]
According to the Sandiganbayan, in spite of the fact that Panganiban alone benefited
from the disallowed cash advances, petitioner, as municipal mayor, was responsible and
accountable for it.[22] Moreover, petitioner was liable to return the proceeds to the
Government in view of his failure to account for the cash advances.[23]
WHEREFORE, proceeding from the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding
accused HERMES E. FRIAS, Sr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of any attendant modifying
circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to:
(a) suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a minimum of eight (8) months and eleven (11)
days to a maximum of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days; (b) suffer all
the appropriate accessory penalties consequent thereto; (c) indemnify the Government in
the amount of One Million Pesos (Php1,000,000.00); and (d) pay the costs.[24]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Thus, this petition.
Petitioner asserts that he was deprived of due process because the Information against
him failed to identify his acts or omissions which constituted a violation of Article 218 of
the Revised Penal Code.[25] Moreover, the Sandiganbayan failed to establish that he, a
municipal mayor, was an accountable officer[26] and to identify the particular law or
regulation which required him to render an account.[27] Lastly, he assailed the restitution
of P1,000,000 to the Government for lack of legal basis.[28]
We affirm the decision of the Sandiganbayan, with modification.
ACCUSED WAS NOT DEPRIVED

O F D U E P R O C E S S
We note that it is only now that petitioner is questioning the sufficiency of the
Information against him. It is too late.
The right to question the sufficiency of an Information is not absolute. An accused is

deemed to have waived this right if he fails to object upon his arraignment[29] or during
trial.[30] In either case, evidence presented during trial can cure the defect in the
Information.[31] Petitioner waived his right to assail the sufficiency of the Information
when he voluntarily entered a plea when arraigned and participated in the trial. At any
rate, the Information (quoted above) adequately informed petitioner of the charges
against him. It clearly stated the elements which constituted the violation of Article 218
of the Revised Penal Code.
PETITIONER IS AN ACCOUNTABLE
P U B L I C O F F I C E R
Under the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, an accountable public officer is
a public officer who, by reason of his office, is accountable for public funds or property.
[32]
The Local Government Code expanded this definition with regard to local
government officials. Section 340 thereof provides:
Section 340. Persons Accountable for Local Government Funds. -- Any officer of the
local government unit whose duty permits or requires the possession or custody of
local government funds shall be accountable and responsible for the safekeeping
thereof in conformity with the provisions of this title. Other local officials, though not
accountable by the nature of their duties, may likewise be similarly held accountable
and responsible for local government funds through their participation in the use or
application thereof. (emphasis supplied)
Local government officials become accountable public officers either (1) because of the
nature of their functions or (2) on account of their participation in the use or application
of public funds.
Of primordial interest in this case is whether petitioner, a municipal mayor, is an

accountable public officer.
According to the Local Government Code, municipal mayors are chief executives of their
respective municipalities.[33] Section 102 of the Government Auditing Code of the
Philippines provides:
Section 102. Primary and secondary responsibility. - (1) The head of any agency of the
government is immediately and primarily responsible for all government funds and
property pertaining to his agency.
(2) Persons entrusted with the possession or custody of the funds or property under the
agency head shall be immediately responsible to him, without prejudice to the liability of
either party to the government. (emphasis supplied)
In Barriga v. Sandiganbayan,[34] we held that public officers are accountable if they, as
part of their duties, receive public funds or property which they are bound to account for
but fail to do so.[35]
Petitioner never denied that he received the checks representing the disallowed cash
advances. He in fact admitted that the disallowed cash advances were made under his
authority, that he was the payee of the checks and that he received them. Thus, it is clear
that he, as municipal mayor, received and had possession of (and consequently was
accountable for) the cash advances. Petitioner was undeniably an accountable officer.
SECTION 347 OF THE LOCAL

GOVERNMENT CODE AND SECTION 5
OF COA-CIRCULAR 97-002 REQUIRE
ACCOUNTABLE OFFICERS TO RENDER
AN ACCOUNT
Because petitioner was an accountable officer, he was obliged to liquidate the cash
advances. However, considering that the cash advances were disallowed, petitioner was
bound to return the P1,000,000 to the Government. Section 347 of the Local Government
Code provides:
Section 347. Rendition of Accounts. - Local treasurers, accountants and other local
accountable officers shall render their accounts within such time, in such form,
style, and content and under such regulations as the COA may prescribe. [36]
Province, city, and municipal auditors shall certify the balances arising in the accounts
settled by them to the Chairman of the COA and to the local treasurer, accountant, and
other accountable officers. Copies of the certification shall be prepared and furnished
other local officers who may be held jointly and severally liable for any loss or illegal,
improper or unauthorized use or misappropriation of local funds or property. (emphasis
supplied)
Likewise, Section 5 of COA Circular 97-002 provides:
5. LIQUIDATION OF CASH ADVANCES

5.1. The accountable officer shall liquidate his cash advance as follows:
xxx xxx xxx

5.1.2.Petty Operating Expenses and Field Operating Expenses-- within twenty (20) days
after the end of the year; subject to replishment as frequently as necessary during the
year.[37]

xxx xxx xxx

5.4. Within thirty (30) days from receipt of their report and supporting documents from the
Accountants, the Auditor shall complete the audit. He shall issue the corresponding Credit
Notice to the accountable officer to inform the latter of the amount allowed in audit and
any suspension and/or disallowances made. In case of disallowance, a copy of the Credit
Notice shall be furnished the Accountant who shall record the restoration of the cash
advance for the amount allowed in audit by the Auditor as contained in the Credit
Notice shall be deemed to have been settled.

xxx xxx xxx

5.8. All cash advances shall be fully liquidated at the end of each year. Except for petty cash
funds, the accountable officer shall refund any unexpended balance to the
Cashier/Collecting Officer who will issue the necessary official receipt. (emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner had until January 20, 1998[38] to settle the disallowed cash advances. To escape
liability for violating Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code, despite his failure to timely
return the P1,000,000, petitioner should have settled the cash advances on or before
March 20, 1998.[39]
When Abesamis demanded an accounting of the cash advances from petitioner, he could
have compelled Panganiban to render the necessary accounting or he could have simply
prepared it himself. Petitioner, however, did neither. When asked why he did not
liquidate the P1,000,000, petitioner nonchalantly gave the excuse that he was too busy
preparing for the forthcoming elections[40] and for his defense in a murder case.[41] He
never settled the disallowed cash advances. Consequently, he was guilty of violating
Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code.
PETITIONER IS LIABLE TO RETURN

P1,000,000 TO THE GOVERNMENT
Inasmuch as the cash advances were disallowed and petitioner failed to return the
P1,000,000 within the allowable period, the funds were deemed illegally or improperly
used or applied. Section 342 of the Local Government Code states:
Section 342. Liability for Acts Done Upon the Direction of Superior Officers; or Upon
Participation of Other Department Heads or Officers of Equivalent Rank. Unless he
registers his objection in writing, the local treasurer, accountant, budget officer or other
accountable officer shall not be relieved of liability for illegal or improper use or
application or deposit of government funds or property by reason of his having acted
upon the direction of a superior officer, elective or appointive, or upon participation of
other department heads or officers of equivalent rank. The superior directing, or the
department head participating in such illegal or improper use or application or
deposit of government funds or property shall be jointly and severally liable with
the local treasurer, accountant, budget officer, or other accountable officer for the
sum or property so illegally and improperly used, applied or deposited. (emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner is liable to restitute the P1,000,000 to the Government without prejudice,
however, to his right to recover it from persons who were solidarily liable with him. [42]
IMPOSABLE PENALTY
We modify the penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty should be that which, in
view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal
Code. In the absence of modifying circumstances, the penalty should be imposed in its
medium period; in this case, the medium of prisión correccional in its minimum period
(i.e., 1 year, 1 month and 11 days to 1 year, 8 months and 20 days).[43] The minimum term
of the indeterminate penalty should be taken from the minimum period of the penalty
next lower in degree (i.e., arresto mayor in its maximum period, from four months and
one day to six months). The maximum term, on the other hand, should be taken from the
medium of prisión correccional in its minimum period.
In addition, petitioner is sentenced to pay a fine of P6,000.[44]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26321 finding
petitioner Hermes E. Frias, Sr. GUILTY of violating Article 218 of the Revised Penal
Code is hereby AFFIRMED. He is hereby sentenced to a minimum of six months
of arresto mayor in its maximum period to a maximum of one year, eight months and 20
days of the medium of prisión correccional in its minimum period and all appropriate
accessory penalties consequent thereto.[45] He is further ORDERED to pay a FINE of
P6,000 and to indemnify the Government in the amount of P1,000,000.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 189833, February 05, 2014 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JAVIER
MORILLA Y AVELLANO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
Before us is an appeal filed by accused-appellant Javier Morilla y Avellano

(Morilla) from the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals which affirmed his conviction and
that of his co-accused Ronnie Mitra y Tena (Mayor Mitra) by the trial court, sentencing
them[2] to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000,000.00
each.
The Regional Trial Court Judgment
On 15 October 2001, Morilla, Mayor Mitra, Willie Yang y Yao (Yang) and Ruel Dequilla y
Regodan (Dequilla) were charged in a criminal information as follows:
That on or about October 13, 2001, in Barangay Kiloloran, Municipality of Real,
Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, one of them an incumbent mayor of the Municipality of
Panukulan, Quezon Province, who all belong to an organized/syndicate crime group as
they all help one another, for purposes of gain in the transport of illegal drugs, and in
fact, conspiring and confederating together and mutually aiding and abetting one
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously transport by means of
two (2) motor vehicles, namely a Starex van bearing plate number RWT-888 with
commemorative plate to read “Mayor” and a municipal ambulance of Panukulan,
Quezon Province, methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug which is
commonly known as shabu, and with an approximate weight of five hundred three point
sixty eight (503.68) kilos, without authority whatsoever. [3]
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City [4] on 1 August 2007 convicted
Morilla and his co-accused Mayor Mitra, then incumbent Mayor of Panukulan, Quezon,
of illegal transport[5] of methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu,
with an approximate weight of five hundred three point sixty eight (503.68) kilos.
However, it absolved Dequilla and Yang due to the prosecution’s failure to present
sufficient evidence to convict them of the offense charged. The dispositive of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
Ronnie Mitra y Tena and Javier Morilla y Avellana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense charged. Accordingly, both accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000,000.00 each. Accused Willie
Yang y Yao and Ruel Dequilla y Regodan are hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the
prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt and are ordered immediately
released from custody unless held for some other lawful cause.
The methamphetamine hydrochloride ordered retained by the Court as representative

sample which is still in the custody of the PNP Crime Laboratory is ordered turned over
to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for proper disposition. [6]
The trial court found valid the search conducted by police officers on the vehicles
driven by Mayor Mitra and Morilla, one with control number 888 and the other an
ambulance with plate number SFK-372, as the police officers have already acquired prior
knowledge that the said vehicles were suspected to be used for transportation of
dangerous drugs. During the checkpoint in Real, Quezon, the information turned out to
be accurate and indeed, the two accused had in their motor vehicles more than five
hundred kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride.[7]
The trial court dismissed the arguments of Mayor Mitra that he was without any
knowledge of the contents of the sacks and that he was merely requested to transport
them to Manila on board his Starex van. He explained that he only accommodated the
request of a certain Ben Tan because the latter bought his fishing boat. It likewise
dismissed the defense of ambulance driver Morilla of lack of knowledge of the illegality
of the contents. Morilla insisted that he thought that he was just transporting wooden
tiles and electronic spare parts together with Dequilla. The other passenger of the
ambulance, Yang, in his defense, did not bother to inquire about the contents of the
vehicle as he was merely an accommodated passenger of the ambulance.
The court rejected the defenses presented by Morilla and Mayor Mitra as they were
caught in flagrante delicto of transporting dangerous drugs in two vehicles driven by
each of them. Absent any convincing circumstance to corroborate their explanations,
the validity of their apprehension was sustained. [8]
The ruling of conspiracy between Mayor Mitra and Morilla was based on the
testimonies of the four accused themselves. It was found by the trial court that the two
vehicles, the Starex van driven by Mayor Mitra and the ambulance van driven by
Morilla, left Infanta, Quezon en route to Manila. The Starex van which was ahead of the
ambulance was able to pass the checkpoint set up by the police officers. However, the
ambulance driven by Morilla was stopped by police officers. Through the untinted
window, one of the police officers noticed several sacks inside the van. Upon inquiry of
the contents, Morilla replied that the sacks contained narra wooden tiles. Unconvinced,
the police officers requested Morilla to open the rear door of the car for further
inspection. When it was opened, the operatives noticed that white crystalline granules
were scattered on the floor, prompting them to request Morilla to open the sacks. At
this moment, Morilla told the police officers that he was with Mayor Mitra in an attempt
to persuade them to let him pass.[9] His request was rejected by the police officers and
upon inspection, the contents of the sacks turned out to be sacks of methamphetamine
hydrochloride.[10] This discovery prompted the operatives to chase the Starex van of
Mayor Mitra. The police officers were able to overtake the van and Mayor Mitra was
asked to stop. They then inquired if the mayor knew Morilla. On plain view, the
operatives noticed that his van was also loaded with sacks like the ones found in the
ambulance. Thus, Mayor Mitra was also requested to open the door of the vehicle for
inspection. At this instance, Mayor Mitra offered to settle the matter but the same was
rejected. Upon examination, the contents of the sacks were likewise found to contain
sacks of methamphetamine hydrochloride.[11]
The two other accused in this case, Dequilla and Yang, were acquitted by the trial court
for failure on the part of the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. The court ruled that Dequilla’s and Yang’s mere presence inside the vehicle as
passengers was inadequate to prove that they were also conspirators of Mayor Mitra
and Morilla.[12]
The Court of Appeals Decision
On 13 July 2009, the appellate court affirmed the ruling of the trial court. It upheld the
finding of conspiracy between Mayor Mitra and Morilla in their common intent to
transport several sacks containing methamphetamine hydrochloride on board their
respective vehicles. The singularity of their intent to illegally
transport methamphetamine hydrochloride was readily shown when Morilla agreed to
drive the ambulance van from Infanta, Quezon to Manila together with Mayor Mitra,
who drove the lead vehicle, the Starex van. [13]
The appellate court likewise dismissed the argument of lack of knowledge of the illegal
contents of the sacks. The claim that the sacks were loaded with wooden tiles was
implausible due to the obvious disparity of texture and volume. [14]
Court’s Ruling
We affirm the ruling but modify the penalty imposed.
In his supplemental brief, Morilla raised the issues: (1) whether he may be convicted for
conspiracy to commit the offense charged sans allegation of conspiracy in the
Information, and (2) whether the prosecution was able to prove his culpability as alleged
in the Information.[15]
We dismiss his arguments.
Morilla primarily cites the provision on Sec. 1(b), Rule 115 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure[16] to substantiate his argument that he should have been informed first of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. He pointed out that the Information
itself failed to state the word conspiracy but instead, the statement “the above-named
accused, one of them an incumbent mayor of the Municipality of Panukulan, Quezon
Province, who all belong to an organized/syndicated crime group as they all help one
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously transport x x x.” He
argued that conspiracy was only inferred from the words used in the Information. [17]
Even assuming that his assertion is correct, the issue of defect in the information, at this
point, is deemed to have been waived due to Morilla’s failure to assert it as a ground in
a motion to quash before entering his plea. [18]
Further, it must be noted that accused Morilla participated and presented his defenses
to contradict the allegation of conspiracy before the trial and appellate courts. His
failure or neglect to assert a right within a reasonable time warrants a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.[19]
The finding of conspiracy by both courts is correct.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.[20] To determine conspiracy, there must
be a common design to commit a felony.[21]
Morilla argues that the mere act of driving the ambulance on the date he was
apprehended is not sufficient to prove that he was part of a syndicated group involved
in the illegal transportation of dangerous drugs.
This argument is misplaced.
In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed
in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The assent of the minds
may be and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and
circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are parts of some complete
whole.[22] In this case, the totality of the factual circumstances leads to a conclusion that
Morilla conspired with Mayor Mitra in a common desire to transport the dangerous
drugs. Both vehicles loaded with several sacks of dangerous drugs, were on convoy from
Quezon to Manila. Mayor Mitra was able to drive through the checkpoint set up by the
police operatives. When it was Morilla’s turn to pass through the checkpoint, he was
requested to open the rear door for a routinary check. Noticing white granules scattered
on the floor, the police officers requested Morilla to open the sacks. If indeed he was
not involved in conspiracy with Mayor Mitra, he would not have told the police officers
that he was with the mayor.
His insistence that he was without any knowledge of the contents of the sacks and he
just obeyed the instruction of his immediate superior Mayor Mitra in driving the said
vehicle likewise bears no merit.
Here, Morilla and Mayor Mitra were caught in flagrante delicto in the act of transporting
the dangerous drugs on board their vehicles. “Transport” as used under the Dangerous
Drugs Act means “to carry or convey from one place to another.” [23] It was well
established during trial that Morilla was driving the ambulance following the lead of
Mayor Mitra, who was driving a Starex van going to Manila. The very act of
transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride is malum prohibitum since it is punished
as an offense under a special law. The fact of transportation of the sacks containing
dangerous drugs need not be accompanied by proof of criminal intent, motive or
knowledge.[24]
In a similar case of People v. Libnao,[25] this Court upheld the conviction for illegal
transportation of marijuana of Libnao and Nunga, who were caught carrying a bag full
of marijuana leaves when they were flagged down on board a passing tricycle at a
checkpoint.
However, we modify the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
Originally, under Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6425,[26] the penalty for illegal
transportation of methamphetamine hydrochloride was imprisonment ranging from six
years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve
thousand pesos. Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1683, [27] the penalty was amended
to life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty to thirty thousand pesos.
The penalty was further amended in Republic Act No. 7659,[28] where the penalty was
changed to reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand
pesos to ten million pesos.
From the foregoing, we sustain the imposed penalty of fine of P10,000,00.00 to be paid
by each of the accused but amend the penalty to reclusion perpetua following the
provisions of Republic Act No. 7659 and the principle of retroactive application of lighter
penalty. Reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years after
which the convict becomes eligible for pardon. It also carries with it accessory penalties,
namely: perpetual special disqualification, etc. Life imprisonment, on the other hand,
does not appear to have any definite extent or duration and carries no accessory
penalties.[29]
The full particulars are in Ho Wai Pang v. People,[30] thus:

As to the penalties imposed by the trial court and as affirmed by the appellate
court, we find the same in accord with law and jurisprudence. It should be recalled that
at the time of the commission of the crime on September 6, 1991, Section 15 of R.A. No.
6425 was already amended by Presidential Decree No. 1683. The decree provided that
for violation of said Section 15, the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00 shall be imposed. Subsequently, however, R.A.
No. 7659 further introduced new amendments to Section 15, Article III and Section 20,
Article IV of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. Under the new amendments, the penalty
prescribed in Section 15 was changed from “life imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00” to “reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from P500,000.00 to P10 million.” On the other hand, Section 17 of R.A. No.
7659 amended Section 20, Article IV of R.A. No. 6425 in that the new penalty provided
by the amendatory law shall be applied depending on the quantity of the dangerous
drugs involved.
The trial court, in this case, imposed on petitioner the penalty of reclusion
perpetua under R.A. No. 7659 rather than life imprisonment ratiocinating that R.A. No.
7659 could be given retroactive application, it being more favorable to the petitioner in
view of its having a less stricter punishment.
We agree. In People v. Doroja, we held:

“In People v. Martin Simon (G.R. No. 93028, 29 July 1994) this Court ruled (a) that
the amendatory law, being more lenient and favorable to the accused than the original
provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Act, should be accorded retroactive application, x x
x.”
And, since “reclusion perpetua is a lighter penalty than life imprisonment, and
considering the rule that criminal statutes with a favorable effect to the accused, have,
as to him, a retroactive effect,” the penalty imposed by the trial court upon petitioner is
proper. Consequently, the Court sustains the penalty of imprisonment, which
is reclusion perpetua, as well as the amount of fine imposed by the trial court upon
petitioner, the same being more favorable to him.[31]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the assailed 13
July 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 02967 is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION with respect to the penalty to be imposed as Reclusion Perpetua instead
of Life Imprisonment and payment of fine of P10,000,000.00 by each of the accused.
SO ORDERED.
SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 175602, February 13, 2013 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. P02
EDUARDO VALDEZ AND EDWIN VALDEZ, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The two accused were tried for three counts of murder by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 86, in Quezon City. On January 20, 2005, after trial, the RTC
convicted them as charged, prescribed on each of them the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count, and ordered them to pay to the heirs of each victim
P93,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 as moral
damages.
The Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the RTC on July 18, 2006, subject to the modification
that each of the accused pay to the heirs of each victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages, and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages, plus costs of suit.
The two accused then came to the Court on final appeal, but on May 9, 2007, Edwin
Valdez filed a motion to withdraw appeal, which the Court granted on October 10, 2007,
thereby deeming Edwin’s appeal closed and terminated. [1]
On January 18, 2012, the Court promulgated its judgment on the appeal of PO2 Eduardo
Valdez, finding him guilty of three counts of homicide, instead of three counts of
murder, and meting on him for each count of homicide the indeterminate sentence of
10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum,
[2]
to wit:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on July 18, 2006
is MODIFIED by finding PO2 Eduardo Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three
counts of HOMICIDE, and sentencing him to suffer for each count the indeterminate
sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as
maximum; and to pay to the respective heirs of the late Ferdinand Sayson, Moises
Sayson, Jr., and Joselito Sayson the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Subsequently, Edwin sent to the Court Administrator a self- explanatory letter [3] dated
March 12, 2012, where he pleaded for the application to him of the judgment
promulgated on January 18, 2012 on the ground that the judgment would be beneficial
to him as an accused. The letter reads as follows:
HON. MIDAS MARQUEZ

Court Administrator
Office of the Court Administrator
Supreme Court of the Philippines Manila
SUBJECT: Re. Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of Rules of Court, Request for.
Your honor,
The undersigned most respectfully requesting through your Honorable office, assistance
on the subject mentioned above.
I, Edwin and Eduardo, both surnamed Valdez were both charged before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 86, Quezon City for the entitled Crime of Murder in Criminal Case
Nos. Q-00-90718 to Q-0090720, which convicted us to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua for each of the three (3) offense.
Then after the decision of the RTC Branch 86, the same was appealed to the Court of
Appeals with CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00876 and again on July 18, 2006 the Honorable Court
of appeals Ninth Division issued a Decision AFFIRMED the questioned Decision with
MODIFICATION.
Only my Co-principal Accused EDUARDO V. VALDEZ enterposed appealed (sic) the

Affirmatory Decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals to the Highest Tribunal with G.R.
Nos. 175602. On my part, I decided to withdraw my appeal, because I believe that there
is no more hope for me, but I was wrong when I read the Decision of the First Division of
the Supreme Court, dated January 18, 2012 signed by the Chief Justice Honorable
Renato C. Corona and finally I found hope.
And now I come to your Honorable Office through this letter to seek help and assistance
that the Decision of the Supreme Court to my Brother Eduardo V. Valdez may also
benefitted (sic) the undersigned through Section 11 (a) , Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.
“(a) An Appeal taken by [the] one or more of several accused shall not affect those who
did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the Appellate Court is favorable and
applicable to the latter: x x x”
Favorable Humanitarian consideration on this matter. Thank you very much and more
power, God Bless. Respectfully yours
EDWIN V. VALDEZ
Through a comment filed on September 25, 2012, [4] the Solicitor General interposed no
opposition to the plea for the reduction of Edwin’s sentences for being in full accord
with the Rules of Court and pertinent jurisprudence.
We grant the plea for reduction of Edwin’s sentences.
The final judgment promulgated on January 18, 2012 downgraded the crimes
committed by Eduardo from three counts of murder to three counts of homicide, and
consequently prescribed lighter penalties in the form of indeterminate sentences. As a
result, Eduardo would serve only an indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision
mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum, under which he can
qualify for parole in due course by virtue of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, instead of
suffering the indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.
The Court rationalized the result as follows:
x x x The records show that the version of PO2 Valdez was contrary to the
established facts and circumstances showing that he and Edwin, then armed with
short firearms, had gone to the jai alai betting station of Moises to confront Jonathan
Rubio, the teller of the betting booth then busily attending to bettors inside the booth;
that because the accused were calling to Rubio to come out of the booth, Moises
approached to pacify them, but one of them threatened Moises; Gusto mo unahin na
kita?; that immediately after Moises replied: Huwag!, PO2 Valdez fired several shots
at Moises, causing him to fall to the ground; that PO2 Valdez continued firing at the
fallen Moises; that Ferdinand (another victim) rushed to aid Moises, his brother, but
Edwin shot Ferdinand in the head, spilling his brains; that somebody shouted to
Joselito (the third victim) to run; that Edwin also shot Joselito twice in the back; and
that Joselito fell on a burger machine. The shots fired at the three victims were
apparently fired from short distances.
The testimonial accounts of the State’s witnesses entirely jibed with the physical
evidence. Specifically, the medico-legal evidence showed that Ferdinand had a gunshot
wound in the head; that two gunshot wounds entered Joselito’s back and the right side
of his neck; and that Moises suffered a gunshot wound in the head and four gunshot
wounds in the chest. Also, Dr. Wilfredo Tierra of the NBI Medico-Legal Office opined
that the presence of marginal abrasions at the points of entry indicated that the
gunshot wounds were inflicted at close range. Given that physical evidence was of the
highest order and spoke the truth more eloquently than all witnesses put together, the
congruence between the testimonial recollections and the physical evidence rendered
the findings adverse to PO2 Valdez and Edwin conclusive.
Thirdly, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit the felony. Proof of the actual
agreement to commit the crime need not be direct because conspiracy may be implied
or inferred from their acts. Herein, both lower courts deduced the conspiracy between
the accused from the mode and manner in which they perpetrated the killings. We are
satisfied that their deduction was warranted.
Based on the foregoing, PO2 Valdez cannot now avoid criminal responsibility for the
fatal shooting by Edwin of Ferdinand and Joselito. Both accused were convincingly
shown to have acted in concert to achieve a common purpose of assaulting their
unarmed victims with their guns. Their acting in concert was manifest not only from
their going together to the betting station on board a single motorcycle, but also from
their joint attack that PO2 Valdez commenced by firing successive shots at Moises and
immediately followed by Edwin’s shooting of Ferdinand and Joselito one after the
other. It was also significant that they fled together on board the same motorcycle as
soon as they had achieved their common purpose.
To be a conspirator, one did not have to participate in every detail of the execution;
neither did he have to know the exact part performed by his co-conspirator in the
execution of the criminal acts. Accordingly, the existence of the conspiracy between
PO2 Valdez and Edwin was properly inferred and proved through their acts that were
indicative of their common purpose and community of interest.
And, fourthly, it is unavoidable for the Court to pronounce PO2 Valdez guilty of three
homicides, instead of three murders, on account of the informations not sufficiently
alleging the attendance of treachery.
Treachery is the employment of means, methods or forms in the execution of any of the
crimes against persons which tend to directly and specially insure its execution, without
risk to the offending party arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. It encompasses a wide variety of actions and attendant circumstances, the
appreciation of which is particular to a crime committed. Corollarily, the defense against
the appreciation of a circumstance as aggravating or qualifying is also varied and
dependent on each particular instance. Such variety generates the actual need for the
state to specifically aver the factual circumstances or particular acts that constitute the
criminal conduct or that qualify or aggravate the liability for the crime in the interest of
affording the accused sufficient notice to defend himself.
It cannot be otherwise, for, indeed, the real nature of the criminal charge is
determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.
In People v. Dimaano, the Court elaborated:
For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the

accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense
was committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation
of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these
being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime
charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of
must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to
pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not
accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the
offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are
necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions
and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a
crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation
against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is
that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense. [emphasis supplied]
The averments of the informations to the effect that the two accused “with intent to
kill, qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength
did x x x assault, attack and employ personal violence upon” the victims “by then and
there shooting [them] with a gun, hitting [them]” on various parts of their bodies
“which [were] the direct and immediate cause of [their] death[s]” did not sufficiently
set forth the facts and circumstances describing how treachery attended each of the
killings. It should not be difficult to see that merely averring the killing of a person by
shooting him with a gun, without more, did not show how the execution of the crime
was directly and specially ensured without risk to the accused from the defense that
the victim might make. Indeed, the use of the gun as an instrument to kill was not per
se treachery, for there are other instruments that could serve the same lethal
purpose. Nor did the use of the term treachery constitute a sufficient averment, for
that term, standing alone, was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment of a
fact. In short, the particular acts and circumstances constituting treachery as an
attendant circumstance in murder were missing from the informations.
x x x. The requirement of sufficient factual averments is meant to inform the accused

of the nature and cause of the charge against him in order to enable him to prepare
his defense. This requirement accords with the presumption of innocence in his favor,
details of the crime he is being charged with. To have the facts stated in the body of
the information determine the crime of which he stands charged and for which he
must be tried thoroughly accords with common sense and with the requirements of
plain justice, x x x.
x x x x
x x x. There being no circumstances modifying criminal liability, the penalty is applied in

its medium period (ie., 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months). Under
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence is taken
from prision mayor, and the maximum from the medium period of reclusion
temporal. Hence, the Court imposes the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision
mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum for each count of
homicide.
SO ORDERED.[5] (Emphasis supplied)
On his part, Edwin cannot be barred from seeking the application to him of the
downgrading of the crimes committed (and the resultant lighter penalties) despite the
finality of his convictions for three counts of murder due to his withdrawal of his appeal.
The downgrading of the crimes committed would definitely be favorable to him. Worth
pointing out is that to deny to him the benefit of the lessened criminal responsibilities
would be highly unfair, considering that this Court had found the two accused to have
acted in concert in their deadly assault against the victims, warranting their equal liabiliy
under the principle of conspiracy.
We grant Edwin’s plea based on Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which
relevantly provides:
Section 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. – (a) An appeal taken by

one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except
insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.
xxxx
In this connection, the Court has pronounced in Lim v. Court of Appeals[6] that the
benefits of this provision extended to all the accused, regardless of whether they
appealed or not, to wit:
As earlier stated, both petitioner and the OSG laterally argue that in the event of
Guingguing’s acquittal, petitioner should likewise be acquitted, based on Rule 122,
Section 11(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, which states:
SEC. 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused.-
to the latter.
Private respondent however, contends that said provision is not applicable to petitioner
inasmuch as he appealed from his conviction, and the provision states that a favorable
judgment shall be applicable only to those who did not appeal.
A literal interpretation of the phrase “did not appeal,” as espoused by private

respondent, will not give justice to the purpose of the provision.
It should be read in its entirety and should not be myopically construed so as to defeat
its reason, i.e., to benefit an accused who did not join in the appeal of his co-accused in
case where the appellate judgment is favorable. In fact, several cases rendered by the
Court applied the foregoing provision without regard as to the filing or non-filing of an
appeal by a co- accused, so long as the judgment was favorable to him.
In People v. Artellero, the Court extended the acquittal of Rodriguez’s co-accused to him
despite the withdrawal of his appeal, applying the Rule 122, Section 11(a), and
considering that the evidence against both are inextricably linked, to wit:
Although it is only appellant who persisted with the present appeal, the well-
established rule is that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open
for review of all its aspects, including those not raised by the parties. The records show
that Rodriguez had withdrawn his appeal due to financial reasons. However, Section 11
(a) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that “[a]n appeal taken by one or more
[of] several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the
judgment of the appellant court is favorable and applicable to the latter.” As we have
elucidated, the evidence against and the conviction of both appellant and Rodriguez are
inextricably linked. Hence, appellant’s acquittal, which is favorable and applicable to
Rodriguez, should benefit the latter.
In People v. Arondain, the Court found accused Arondain guilty only of homicide. Such
verdict was applied to his co-accused, Jose Precioso, who was previously found guilty by
the trial court of robbery with homicide, despite the fact that Precioso appealed but
failed to file an appellant’s brief. The Court also modified Precioso’s civil liability
although the additional monetary award imposed on Arondain was not extended to
Precioso since it was not favorable to him and he did not pursue the appeal before the
Court.
In People v. De Lara, Eduardo Villas, together with several co- accused, were found by
the trial court guilty of forcible abduction. During pendency of the review before the
Court, Villas withdrew his appeal, hence his conviction became final and executory.
Thereafter, the Court found Villas’ co-accused guilty only of grave coercion. Applying
Rule 122, Section 11(a), the Court also found Villas guilty of the lesser offense of grave
coercion since it is beneficial to him.
In People v. Escaño, the Court granted a motion filed by accused Julian Deen Escaño,
praying that the Court’s Decision dated January 28, 2000, acquitting his co-accused
Virgilio T. Usana and Jerry C. Lopez in Criminal Case No. 95-936 for violation of Section 4,
Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, be applied to him. Escaño originally filed
a Notice of Appeal with the trial court but later withdrew the same.
In the foregoing cases, all the accused appealed from their judgments of conviction but
for one reason or another, the conviction became final and executory. Nevertheless, the
Court still applied to them the favorable judgment in favor of their co-accused. The
Court notes that the Decision dated September 30, 2005 in G.R. No. 128959 stated, ''the
verdict of guilt with respect to Lim fherein petitioner] had already become final and
executory." In any event, the Court cannot see why a different treatment should be
given to petitioner, given that the judgment is favorable to him and considering further
that the Court's tinding in its Decision dated September 30, 2005 specifically stated that
"the publication of the subject advertisement by petitioner and Lim cannot be deemed
by this Court to have been done with actual malice."[7]
ACCORDINGLY, the Court GRANTS the plea of EDWIN VALDEZ for the application to him

of the judgment promulgated on January 18, 2012 finding P02 EDUARDO VALDEZ guilty
of three counts of homicide, and sentencing him to suffer for each count the
indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years
of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay to the respective heirs of the late
Ferdinand Sayson, the late Moises Sayson, Jr., and the late Joselito Sayson the amounts
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as
temperate damages for each count.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 188217, July 03, 2013 ]
FERNANDO M. ESPINO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
This is a Rule 45 Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision[1] dated 24 February 2009 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31106, which affirmed the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision[2] in Criminal Case Nos. 02-01226 to 31 convicting the
accused of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a); and the CA Resolution [3] dated 25
May 2009 denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the accused in the same case.
The RTC decided on the basis of the following facts:
The accused was a senior sales executive in charge of liaising with import coordinators
of the company Kuehne and Nagel, Inc. (KN Inc.). [4] His duties included the delivery of its
commissions to the import coordinators. [5]
On 14 October 2002, the Fiscal’s Office of Paranaque charged the accused with six (6)
counts of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) for allegedly rediscounting checks
that were meant to be paid to the company’s import coordinators. [6]
During trial, the prosecution presented witnesses who testified to the fact that the
endorsements of the payee on six checks were forged, [7] and that the checks were
rediscounted by the accused’s aunt-in-law. [8] She later testified to her participation in
the rediscounting and encashment of the checks. [9]
The accused testified for himself, claiming that what precipitated the charges was his
employer’s discontent after he had allegedly lost an account for the company. [10] He was
eventually forced to resign and asked to settle some special arrangements with
complainant.[11] Alongside being made to submit the resignation, he was also asked to
sign a sheet of paper that only had numbers written on it. [12] He complied with these
demands under duress, as pressure was exerted upon him by complainants. [13] Later on,
he filed a case for illegal dismissal, [14] in which he denied having forged the signature of
Mr. Banaag at the dorsal portion of the checks. [15]
In rebuttal, the prosecution presented the testimony of the aunt-in-law of the accused,
to prove that the accused had called her to ask if she could rediscount some checks, and
that she agreed to do so upon his assurance that he knew the owner of those checks. [16]
After trial, the RTC convicted the accused of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a).
[17]
In response, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration, [18] arguing that the trial court
committed a grave error in convicting him of estafa under paragraph 2(a), which was
different from paragraph 1(b) of Article 315 under which he had been charged. He also
alleged that there was no evidence to support his conviction.[19] Thus, he contended that
his right to due process of law was thereby violated. [20]
In turn, the prosecution argued that jurisprudence had established that the nature and
character of the crime charged are determined by the facts alleged in the information,
and not by a reference to any particular section of the law. [21] Subsequently, the RTC
denied the Motion.[22]
The accused then elevated the case to the CA [23] on the same grounds that he cited in his
Motion, but it denied his appeal, [24] stating that the alleged facts sufficiently comprise
the elements of estafa as enumerated in Article 315, paragraph 2(a). [25] His subsequent
Motion for Reconsideration was likewise dismissed.
The accused thus filed this Petition for Review under Rule 45.
In the present Petition, the accused raises his right to due process. [26] Specifically, he
claims that he was denied due process when he was convicted of estafa under Article
315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) despite being charged
with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b). [27] He argues that the elements
constituting both modes of estafa are different, and that this difference should be
reflected in the Information.[28] According to him, a charge under paragraph 1(b) would
not merit a conviction under paragraph 2(a). [29] Thus, he emphasizes the alleged failure
to inform him of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. [30]
The issue that must be determined is whether a conviction for estafa under a different

paragraph from the one charged is legally permissible.
Article 3, Section 14, paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution, requires the accused to be
“informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him” in order to adequately
and responsively prepare his defense. The prosecutor is not required, however, to be
absolutely accurate in designating the offense by its formal name in the law. As
explained by the Court in People v. Manalili:
It is hornbook doctrine, however, that “what determines the real nature and

cause of the accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the
information or complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or
complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated,
they being conclusions of law.” x x x. (Emphasis supplied) [31]
This doctrine negates the due process argument of the accused, because he was
sufficiently apprised of the facts that pertained to the charge and conviction for estafa.
First, while the fiscal mentioned Article 315 and specified paragraph 1(b), the controlling
words of the Information are found in its body. Accordingly, the Court explained the
doctrine in Flores v. Layosa as follows:
The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that an information shall be

deemed sufficient if it states, among others, the designation of the offense given by the
statute and the acts of omissions complained of as constituting the offense. However,
the Court has clarified in several cases that the designation of the offense, by making
reference to the section or subsection of the statute punishing, it [sic] is not
controlling; what actually determines the nature and character of the crime charged
are the facts alleged in the information. The Court’s ruling in U.S. v. Lim San is
instructive:
x x x Notwithstanding the apparent contradiction between caption and body, we believe
that we ought to say and hold that the characterization of the crime by the fiscal in the
caption of the information is immaterial and purposeless, and that the facts stated in
the body of the pleading must determine the crime of which the defendant stands
charged and for which he must be tried. The establishment of this doctrine is
permitted by the Code of Criminal Procedure, and is thoroughly in accord with common
sense and with the requirements of plain justice x x x. (Emphases supplied)[32]
Clearly, the fiscal’s statement in the Informations specifying the charges as estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC,[33] did not bind the trial court insofar as the
characterization of the nature of the accusation was concerned. The statement never
limited the RTC’s discretion to read the Information in the context of the facts alleged.
The Court further explains the rationale behind this discretion in this manner:
From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the
accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no
way aids him in a defense on the merits. Whatever its purpose may be, its result is to
enable the accused to vex the court and embarrass the administration of justice by
setting up the technical defense that the crime set forth in the body of the information
and proved in the trial is not the crime characterized by the fiscal in the caption of the
information. That to which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above all
things else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not
did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he
perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set
forth. If he did, it is of no consequence to him, either as a matter of procedure or of
substantive right, how the law denominates the crime which those acts constitute. The
designation of the crime by name in the caption of the information from the facts
alleged in the body of that pleading is a conclusion of law made by the fiscal. In the
designation of the crime the accused never has a real interest until the trial has ended.
For his full and complete defense he need not know the name of the crime at all. It is of
no consequence whatever for the protection of his substantial rights... If he performed
the acts alleged, in the manner, stated, the law determines what the name of the crime
is and fixes the penalty therefore. It is the province of the court alone to say what the
crime is or what it is named x x x. (Emphases supplied)[34]
Any doubt regarding the matter should end with the Court’s conclusion:
Thus, notwithstanding the discrepancy between the mode of commission of the
estafa as alleged in the Information (which states that petitioners committed estafa
under Article 315), or as claimed by the People in their Comment (that petitioners
committed estafa under Article 318) and the absence of the words “fraud” or “deceit” in
the Information, the Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan and the RTC that the factual
allegations therein sufficiently inform petitioners of the acts constituting their purported
offense and satisfactorily allege the elements of estafa in general committed through
the offense of falsification of public document. As the Sandiganbayan correctly held:
Every element of which the offense is composed must be alleged in the complaint or
information by making reference to the definition and the essentials of the specific
crimes. This is so in order to fully apprise the accused of the charge against him and for
him to suitably prepare his defense since he is presumed to have no independent
knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. It is not necessary, however, that
the imputations be in the language of the statute. What is important is that the crime is
described in intelligible and reasonable certainty. (Emphasis supplied)[35]
Moreover, the Court declared that in an information for estafa, the use of certain

technical and legal words such as “fraud” or “deceit,” is not necessary to make a proper
allegation thereof.[36]
Thus, the only important question left to be answered is whether the facts in the
Information do indeed constitute the crime of which the accused was convicted. In
other words, was the RTC correct in convicting him of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a) instead of paragraph 1(b)? The answer to this question, however,
requires further reflection.
The crime charged was estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal
Code. Its elements are as follows: (1) that money, goods, or other personal properties
are received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same; (2)
that there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
offender or a denial of the receipt thereof; (3) that the misappropriation or conversion
or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) that there is a demand made by the
offended party on the offender. [37]
However, the crime the accused was convicted of was estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a). The elements of this crime are as follows: (1) that there is a false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; (2) that the false pretense, fraudulent act
or fraudulent means is made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud; (3) that the offended party relies on the false pretense,
fraudulent act, or fraudulent means, that is, he is induced to part with his money or
property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and (4) that
as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. [38]
The six Informations are all similar in content except in the amounts and the check
numbers. One of them reads as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of July, 2000, in the City of Paranaque, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being
then the Senior Sales Executive of the complainant Kuehne and Nagel Inc. herein
represented by Honesto Raquipiso, tasked with liasoning with the import coordinators
of the complainant’s various clients including the delivery of their commissions, said
accused received in trust from the complainant Metrobank check no. 1640443816 in the
amount of P12,675.00 payable to Mr. Florante Banaag, import coordinator of Europlay,
with the obligation to deliver the same but said accused failed to deliver said check in
the amount of P12,675.00 and instead, once in possession of the same, forged the
signature of Mr. Banaag and had the check rediscounted and far from complying with
his obligation, despite demands to account and/or remit the same, with unfaithfulness
and/or abuse of confidence, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate, misapply and convert the proceeds thereof to his own personal use and
benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said complainant, in the amount of
P12,675.00.[39]
Are the elements of estafa under paragraph 2(a) present in the above-quoted

Information? Arguably so, because the accused represented to the injured party that he
would be delivering the commission to Mr. Banaag; and because of this representation,
KN Inc. turned over checks payable to Mr. Banaag to the accused. In turn, the accused
rediscounted the checks for money, to the detriment of both Mr. Banaag and KN Inc.
However, this set of facts seems to miss the precision required of a criminal conviction.
Estafa under paragraph 2(a) is swindling by means of false pretense, and the words of
the law bear this out:
Article 315.
x x x x
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to
or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,

qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means
of other similar deceits. x x x.
In this case, there was no use of a fictitious name, or a false pretense of power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, or business. At the most, the situation
could be likened to an imaginary transaction, although the accused was already trusted
with the authority to deliver commissions to Mr. Banaag. The pretense was in
representing to the injured party that there was a deliverable commission to Mr.
Banaag, when in fact there was none.
Instead of unduly stretching this point, the Court deems it wiser to give the offense its
true, formal name – that of estafa through abuse of confidence under paragraph 1(b).
Paragraph 1(b) provides liability for estafa committed by misappropriating or converting

to the prejudice of another money, goods, or any other personal property received by
the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though
that obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having
received such money, goods, or other property. This at least, is very clearly shown by
the factual allegations of the Informations.
First, personal property in the form of the checks was received by the offender in trust
or on commission, with the duty to deliver it to Mr. Banaag. Even though the accused
misrepresented the existence of a deliverable commission, it is a fact that he was
obliged by KN Inc., the injured party, to deliver the check and account for it. Second, the
accused rediscounted the checks to his aunt-in-law. Third, this rediscounting resulted in
the wrongful encashment of the checks by someone who was not the payee and
therefore not lawfully authorized to do so. Finally, this wrongful encashment prejudiced
KN Inc., which lost the proceeds of the check. When accounting was demanded from the
accused, he could not conjure any justifiable excuse.
His series of acts precisely constitutes estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b).
Nevertheless, this Court need not make such a detailed and narrow analysis. In Ilagan v.
Court of Appeals, it stated that estafa can be committed by means of both modes of
commission in the following way:
x x x[E]stafa can be committed with the attendance of both modes of

commission, that is, abuse of confidence and deceit employed against the same victim
and causing damage to him. Thus, where an agent deliberately misrepresented to the
landowner the real position of the prospective buyer of the land in order to induce said
owner to agree to a lower price and, thereafter, the agent sold the land for the higher
amount which was actually agreed upon by him and the buyer, and he then
clandestinely misappropriated the excess, the crime of estafa was committed under
both modes and he could be charged under either. (Emphases supplied)[40]
The above discussion leads to the conclusion that the Information in this case may be
interpreted as charging the accused with both estafa under paragraph 1(b)
and estafa under paragraph 2(a). It is a basic and fundamental principle of criminal law
that one act can give rise to two offenses, [41] all the more when a single offense has
multiple modes of commission. Hence, the present Petition cannot withstand the tests
for review as provided by jurisprudential precedent. While the designation of the
circumstances attending the conviction for estafa could have been more precise, there
is no reason for this Court to review the findings when both the appellate and the trial
courts agree on the facts. We therefore adopt the factual findings of the lower courts in
totality, bearing in mind the credence lent to their appreciation of the evidence.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed

Decision dated 24 February 2009 and Resolution dated 25 May 2009 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31106 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 175750-51, April 02, 2014 ]
SILVERINA E. CONSIGNA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND
EMERLINA MOLETA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
For review on certiorari is the Decision[1] of the Honorable Sandiganbayan dated 12

December 2006, finding Silverina E. Consigna (petitioner) guilty for violation of Section
3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, and Estafa, as defined and penalized under Article 315 (2)(a) of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The facts as culled from the records are as follows:
On or about 14 June 1994, petitioner, the Municipal Treasurer of General Luna, Surigao
del Norte, together with Jose Herasmio, obtained as loan from private respondent
Hermelina Moleta (Moleta), the sum of P320,000.00, to pay for the salaries of the
employees of the municipality and to construct the municipal gymnasium as the
municipality’s Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) had not yet arrived. As payment,
petitioner issued three (3) Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) checks signed by Jaime
Rusillon (Rusillon), the incumbent mayor of the Municipality of General Luna: (1) Check
No. 11281104 for P130,000.00 dated 14 June 1994; (2) Check No. 9660500 for
P130,000.00 dated 14 June 1994; and (3) Check No. 9660439 for P60,000.00 dated 11
July 1994.
Between 15 June 1994 and 18 August 1994, in several attempts on different occasions,
Moleta demanded payment from petitioner and Rusillon, but to no avail.
Thus, on 18 August 1994, Moleta deposited the three (3) LBP checks to her account in
Metrobank-Surigao Branch. Upon presentation for payment, Metrobank returned the
checks to Moleta as the checks had no funds. The following day, Moleta again deposited
the checks. This time, however, she deposited the checks to her LBP account. Upon
presentation for payment, the checks were again returned for the reason, “Signature Not
on File.” Upon verification, LBP informed Moleta that the municipality’s account was
already closed and transferred to Development Bank of the Philippines, and that
petitioner, the municipal treasurer, has been relieved from her position.
Hence, Moleta filed with the Sandiganbayan two (2) sets of Information against
petitioner, in the latter’s capacity as Municipal Treasurer and Rusillon, in his capacity as
Municipal Mayor of General Luna, Surigao del Norte, to wit:
(1) Criminal Case No. 24182 - Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act:
That on or about 15 June 1994, or sometime after said date, at the General Luna, Surigao
del Norte, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court accused Municipal
Treasurer Silverina Consigna (with Salary Grade below 27), and Municipal Mayor Jaime
Rusillon (with Salary Grace 27) did then and there, willfully and unlawfully, with evident
bad faith, in cooperation with each other, and taking advantage of their official positions
and in the discharge for the functions as such, borrow the amount of P320,000.00 from
one Emerlina Moleta to whom they misrepresented to be for the municipality of General
Luna, when in fact the same is not; and fail to pay back said amount thereby causing
undue injury to said Emerlina Moleta in the amount of P320,000.00.[2]
(2) Criminal Case No. 24183 – Art. 315 of the RPC, otherwise known as Estafa:
That on or about 15 June 1994, or sometime after said date, at the General Luna, Surigao
del Norte, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Municipal
Treasurer Silverina Consigna (with Salary Grade below 27), and Municipal Mayor Jaime
Rusillon (with Salary Grade 27), did then and there, willfully and unlawfully, with
evident bad faith, in cooperation with each other, representing themselves to be
transacting in behalf of the [M]unicipality of Gen. Luna, in truth and in fact they are not,
contract a loan from one Emerlina Moleta in the amount of P320,000.00 for which they
issued three (3) checks: LBP Check No. 11281104 dated 14 June 1994 in the amount of
P130,000.00, LBP Check No. 9660500 dated 14 June 1994 in the amount of
P130,000.00, and LBP Check no. 9660439 dated 11 July 1994 in the amount of
P60,000.00, all in favor of said Emerlina Moleta, knowing fully well that the account
belongs to the Municipality of the (sic) Gen. Luna, and that they have no personal funds
[of] the same account such that upon presentation of the said checks to the bank, the same
were dishonored and refused payment, to the damage and prejudice of said Emerlina
Moleta in the amount of P320,000.00.[3]
As defense, petitioner argued that the court a quo has no jurisdiction because (1) the
crime as charged did not specify the provision of law allegedly violated, i.e., the specific
type of Estafa; and (2) Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 does not fall within the jurisdiction of the
court a quo because the offense as charged can stand independently of public office and
public office is not an element of the crime.[4]
The court a quo admitted that the Information for violation of Estafa did not specify the
provision of law allegedly violated.[5] However, based on the allegations of deceit and
misrepresentation, the court a quo allowed the prosecution to indict petitioner and
Rusillon under Art. 315 (2)(a) of the RPC.
On the charge of graft and corruption, petitioner argued that, “[w]hen allegations in the
information do not show that the official position of the [petitioner] was connected with
the offense charged, the accused is not charged with an offense in relation to her official
functions”.[6] Petitioner, citing Lacson v. The Executive Secretary,[7] further argued:
x x x [M]ere allegation in the information “that the offense was committed by the
accused public officer in relation to his office is not sufficient. That phrase is a mere
conclusion of law not a factual averment that would show the close intimacy between the
offense charged and the discharge of accused’s official duties.”[8]
Petitioner also contends that there was no fraud or misrepresentation. By demanding

payment from Rusillon, Moleta attested that there exists no fraud or misrepresentation.
In petitioner’s words, “… why will she [Moleta] insist payment from [Rusillon] if she has
no knowledge that the money loaned have reached him?”[9]
On the other hand, Rusillon maintained that he had no participation in the acts committed
by petitioner. Based on his testimony, he signed the three (3) checks to pay the
following: (1) payroll of the following day; (2) daily expenses of the municipal building;
(3) construction of the municipal gymnasium; and (4) health office’s medical supplies.
[10]
As found by the court a quo, “the only link of Rusillon to [petitioner] with respect to
the loan transaction is his signature on the three (3) checks which [petitioner] used as
security to Moleta.”[11]
After trial, the Sandiganbayan, on 12 December 2006, found petitioner guilty, but
exonerated Rusillon. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:[12]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 24182, accused SILVERINA E. CONSIGNA is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3(e) of the Republic Act No. 3019, and is
hereby SENTENCED to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1)
month to eight (8) years.
Accused JAIME RUSILLON is ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove his
guilt with moral certainty.
(2) In Criminal Case No. 24183, accused SILVERINA E. CONSIGNA is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa under Article 315 (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, and
is hereby SENTENCED to the indeterminate prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as MINIMUM, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as MAXIMUM.
Accused JAIME RUSILLON is ACQUITTED as his guilt was not proven with moral
certainty.
(3) Accused SILVERIA E. CONSIGNA is ordered to pay private complainant Emerlina F.
Moleta the amount of PhP368,739.20 by way of actual damages; PhP30,000.00 as moral
damages, and the costs of suit; and
(4) The hold departure order against accused JAIME RUSILLON in connection with these
cases is hereby LIFTED.
Hence, this Petition.
Noticeably, the petitioner formulated its arguments, thus:
a. The court a quo committed grave abuse of discretion in making its finding of facts
which amounts to lack of jurisdiction.
xxxx
b. The court a quo committed grave abuse of discretion when it convicted the accused on
“false pretense, fraudulent act or means” made or executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of fraud.
xxxx
c. The court a quo committed grave abuse of discretion when it made a conclusion that
the petitioner acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence
to justify its conclusion that all the elements of violations of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 are
present.”[13]
Preliminarily, We here note a common disorder in petitions that mingle the concepts
involved in a Petition for Review under Rule 45 and in the special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65, as a prevalent practice of litigants to cure a lapsed appeal.
We shall discuss the distinction.
With regard to the period to file a petition, in Rule 45, the period within which to file is
fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from.
[14]
In contrast to Rule 65, the petition should be filed not later than sixty (60) days from
notice of the judgment, order or resolution.[15]
Regarding the subject matter, a review on certiorari under Rule 45 is generally limited to

the review of legal issues; the Court only resolves questions of law which have been
properly raised by the parties during the appeal and in the petition.[16] A Rule 65 review,
on the other hand, is strictly confined to the determination of the propriety of the trial
court’s jurisdiction — whether it has jurisdiction over the case and if so, whether the
exercise of its jurisdiction has or has not been attended by grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[17] Otherwise stated, errors of judgment are
the proper subjects of a Rule 45 petition; errors of jurisdiction are addressed in a Rule 65
petition.
The special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to only in the absence of
appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. [18] So
when appeal, or a petition for review is available, certiorari cannot be resorted
to; certiorari is not a substitute for a lapsed or lost appeal.[19] A Rule
65 certiorari petition cannot be a substitute for a Rule 45 petition so as to excuse the
belatedness in filing the correct petition. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not
prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion.[20]
Grave abuse of discretion means “such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.[21]
Petitioner was correct when she filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45. However,
instead of raising errors of judgment as a proper subject of a petition for review under
Rule 45, the petition formulated jurisdictional errors purportedly committed by the
court a quo, i.e., whether or not the court a quo committed grave abuse of discretion,
[22]
which is the proper subject of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. Noticeably, the
petition does not allege any bias, partiality or bad faith by the court a quo in its
proceedings;[23] and the petition does not raise a denial of due process in the proceedings
before the Sandiganbayan.[24]
Importantly, however, the petition followed the period specified in Rule 45. It was timely
filed. For that reason, we excuse the repeated referral to the supposed grave abuse of
discretion of the Sandiganbayan and treat the petition as, nonetheless, one for review of
the questioned decision. We thus recast the arguments as:
I. Whether or not the court a quo committed a reversible error for finding petitioner
guilty of estafa, based on information which does not specifically designate the
provision allegedly violated.
II. Whether or not petitioner is guilty of estafa as penalized under Art. 315 (2)(a) of
the RPC.
III. Whether or not petitioner is guilty of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019.

The Petition must fail.
1. On the first issue, petitioner insists that even if the court a quo already admitted that
the Information failed to specifically identify the mode or manner by which estafa was
committed by petitioner, it nonetheless went on to convict her by relying on the
allegation in the Information of deceit and misrepresentation and applying par. (2)(a),
Art. 315 of the RPC.
Entrenched in jurisprudence is the dictum that the real nature of the criminal charge is
determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification
of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law,
but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information.[25] As held in People
v. Dimaano:[26]
For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the
commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. What is
controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charge
or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions
of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the
particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged
in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment.
No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege
the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the
information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be
determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The
requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the
accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare
his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the
facts that constitute the offense. (Emphasis supplied)
As early in United States v. Lim San,[27] this Court has determined that:
what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids
him in a defense on the merits. x x x. That to which his attention should be directed, and
in which he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The
real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and
specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in
the manner therein set forth. If he did, it is of no consequence to him, either as a
matter of procedure or of substantive right, how the law denominates the crime
which those acts constitute. The designation of the crime by name in the caption of
the information from the facts alleged in the body of that pleading is a conclusion of
law made by the fiscal. In the designation of the crime the accused never has a real
interest until the trial has ended. For his full and complete defense he need not
know the name of the crime at all. It is of no consequence whatever for the
protection of his substantial rights. The real and important question to him is, “Did
you perform the acts alleged in the manner alleged?” not “Did you commit a crime
named murder.” If he performed the acts alleged, in the manner stated, the law
determines what the name of the crime is and fixes the penalty therefor. It is the
province of the court alone to say what the name of the crime is or what it is named.
x x x. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioner’s argument is as outdated as it is erroneous. The averments in the two (2) sets
of Information against petitioner and Rusillon clearly stated facts and circumstances
constituting the elements of the crime of estafa as to duly inform them of the nature and
cause of the accusation, sufficient to prepare their respective defenses.
2. Contrary to the submission of petitioner, false pretense and fraudulent acts attended
her transaction with Moleta. The law explicitly provides that in the prosecution for Estafa
under par. (2)(a), Art. 315 of the RPC, it is indispensable that the element of deceit,
consisting in the false statement or fraudulent representation of the accused, be made
prior to, or at least simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, it being essential
that such false statement or representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive
which induced the offended party to part with his money. Paragraph 2(a), Art. 315 of the
RPC provides:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow x x x:
xxxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to
or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
xxxx
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,

qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means
of other similar deceits.
xxxx
The elements of estafa by means of deceit, whether committed by false pretenses or
concealment, are the following: (a) there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means; (b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be
made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) the
offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means,
that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense,
fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and (d) as a result thereof, the offended party
suffered damage.[28]
As borne by the records, petitioner’s representations were outright distortions of the truth
perpetrated for the sole purpose of inducing Moleta to hand to her the amount of
P320,000.00 purportedly for the Municipality of General Luna. Being the Municipal
Treasurer, there was reason for Moleta to rely on petitioner’s representations that money
is needed for the payment of the employees’ salary as well as for the construction of the
gymnasium. There was also a ring of truth to the deception that the share of the
municipality from the IRA is forthcoming. Added to this, petitioner’s representations
were even supported by the issuance of three (3) LBP checks to guarantee payment taken
from the account of the municipality and signed by no less than the municipal mayor,
giving the impression that the loaned amount would indeed be utilized for public
purposes.
As the court a quo correctly observed:
It is undisputed that Consigna obtained a loan from Moleta for the reason that the
municipality lacked funds for the June 15, 1994 payroll of the employees and materials of
the gymnasium. However, several circumstances point to the fact that Consigna’s
representation has no basis. She contradicted her own testimony that at the time she
borrowed from Moleta on June 14, 1994, the municipality suffered a shortage of funds,
with her admission that when she was relieved as a municipal treasurer, the Municipality
had more than 1 million in Land Bank from the IRA of P600,000.00 a month for the past
three months x x x. This means that when she left her post before the second week of
July x x x, the municipality had money from the April to June 1994 IRA, enough to meet
the need of P320,000.00. x x x[29]
The circumstances and the reason behind the issuance of the three (3) checks given to
Moleta by petitioner was testified to by Rusillon:
He was the incumbent mayor of the Municipality of General Luna, Surigao del Norte, in
1994. In the morning of June 14, 1994, he received the amount of P268,800.00 from
accused Consigna, as evidenced by a voucher (Exh. 1) signed by him on the same day.
The money was to be used for the purchase of materials for the gymnasium of the
municipality which construction started in 1992. After signing the voucher, he ordered
Consigna to prepare a check for P130,000.00 (Exh. 2) for the June 15, 1994 payroll of the
municipality’s employees. After the check was prepared, he again ordered Consigna to
make another two checks, one for P130,000.00 (Exh. 3) dated June 14, 1994 intended for
the expenses of the municipal building and for the daily transactions of the municipality
in the following days, and the other check was for P60,000.00 (Exh. 4) dated July 11,
1994 for the purchase of medicines for the municipality’s health office. The latter check
was postdated to July because it would be charged against the IRA in the 3rd quarter of
1994 since they bought medicines at that time on a quarterly basis as the budget allowed
only P240,000.00 per year for such expenditure.”[30]
3. Anent the issue on the alleged grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction committed by the court a quo when it took cognizance of Criminal Case No.
24182, charging petitioner for “taking advantage of her official position and the discharge
of the functions as such,” petitioner averred that the charge was erroneous because
borrowing of money is not a function of a Municipal Treasurer under the Local
Government Code. Petitioner asserts that the last sentence of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019
cannot cover her.
We find such reasoning misplaced.
The following are the essential elements of violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official
functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable
negligence; and
3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or
giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his functions.[31]
There is no doubt that petitioner, being a municipal treasurer, was a public officer
discharging official functions when she misused such position to be able to take out a
loan from Moleta, who was misled into the belief that petitioner, as municipal treasurer,
was acting on behalf of the municipality.
In Montilla v. Hilario,[32] this Court described the "offense committed in relation to the
office" as:
[T]he relation between the crime and the office contemplated by the Constitution is, in
our opinion, direct and not accidental. To fall into the intent of the Constitution, the
relation has to be such that, in the legal sense, the offense cannot exist without the office.
In other words, the office must be a constituent element of the crime as defined in the
statute, such as, for instance, the crimes defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six,
Title Seven, of the Revised Penal Code.
Public office is not of the essence of murder. The taking of human life is either murder or
homicide whether done by a private citizen or public servant, and the penalty is the same
except when the perpetrator, being a public functionary took advantage of his office, as
alleged in this case, in which event the penalty is increased.
But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element; and even as an
aggravating circumstance, its materiality arises not from the allegations but on the
proof, not from the fact that the criminals are public officials but from the manner
of the commission of the crime. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, it was not only alleged in the Information, but was proved with certainty
during trial that the manner by which petitioner perpetrated the crime necessarily relates
to her official function as a municipal treasurer. Petitioner’s official function created in
her favor an impression of authority to transact business with Moleta involving
government financial concerns. There is, therefore, a direct relation between the
commission of the crime and petitioner’s office – the latter being the very reason or
consideration that led to the unwarranted benefit she gained from Moleta, for which the
latter suffered damages in the amount of P320,000.00. It was just fortunate that Rusillon
instructed the bank to stop payment of the checks issued by petitioner, lest, the victim
could have been the Municipality of General Luna.
As regards the two other elements, the Court explained in Cabrera v.

Sandiganbayan[33] that there are two (2) ways by which a public official violates Sec. 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019 in the performance of his functions, namely: (a) by causing undue
injury to any party, including the Government; or (b) by giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference. The accused may be charged under either
mode or under both.[34] This was reiterated in Quibal v. Sandiganbayan,[35] where the
Court held that the use of the disjunctive term “or” connotes that either act qualifies as a
violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
In this case, petitioner was charged of violating Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 under the
alternative mode of “causing undue injury” to Moleta committed with evident bad faith,
for which she was correctly found guilty. “Evident bad faith” connotes not only bad
judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral
obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. “Evident bad
faith” contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with
some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes,[36] which manifested in
petitioner’s actuations and representation.
The inevitable conclusion is that petitioner capitalized on her official function to commit
the crimes charged. Without her position, petitioner would not have induced Moleta to
part with her money. In the same vein, petitioner could not have orchestrated a scheme of
issuing postdated checks meddling with the municipality’s coffers and defiling the
mayor’s signature. As correctly found by the court a quo:
x x x Likewise worthy of stress is [petitioner’s] failure to establish that the amount she
disbursed to Rusillon came from the money she loaned from Moleta. If indeed the
P268,800.00 advanced to Rusillon was charged against the loan, then, this should have
been reflected in the municipality’s books of accounts. The same is true with the
P320,000.00 and the P32,000.00 given to Moleta if the proceeds of the loan really went
to the municipality’s treasury. It is a standard accounting procedure that every transaction
must be properly entered in the books of accounts of the municipality. A cash that comes
in is a debit to the asset account and every loan incurred is a credit to the liability
account.[37]
Given the above disquisition, it becomes superfluous to dwell further on the issue raised
by petitioner that Sec. 3(e) applies only to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or other concessions.
Nonetheless, to finally settle the issue, the last sentence of the said provision is not a
restrictive requirement which limits the application or extent of its coverage. This has
long been settled in our ruling in Mejorada v. Sandiganbayan,[38] where we categorically
declared that a prosecution for violation of Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law will lie
regardless of whether or not the accused public officer is “charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.” Quoted hereunder is an excerpt
from Mejorada:[39]
Section 3 cited above enumerates in eleven subsections the corrupt practices of any
public officers (sic) declared unlawful. Its reference to “any public officer” is without
distinction or qualification and it specifies the acts declared unlawful. We agree with the
view adopted by the Solicitor General that the last sentence of paragraph [Section 3] (e)
is intended to make clear the inclusion of officers and employees of officers (sic) or
government corporations which, under the ordinary concept of “public officers” may not
come within the term. It is a strained construction of the provision to read it as
applying exclusively to public officers charged with the duty of granting licenses or
permits or other concessions. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The above pronouncement was reiterated in Cruz v. Sandiganbayan,[40] where the Court

affirmed the Mejorada ruling that finally puts to rest any erroneous interpretation of the
last sentence of Sec. 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law.
All the elements of the crimes as charged are present in the case at bar. All told, this
Court finds no justification to depart from the findings of the lower court. Petitioner
failed to present any cogent reason that would warrant a reversal of the Decision assailed
in this petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan in

Criminal Case No. 24182-83 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[ G.R. Nos. 164068-69, November 19, 2013 ]
ROLANDO P. DE LA CUESTA, PETITIONER, VS. THE SANDIGANBAYAN,
FIRST DIVISION AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. NOS. 166305-06]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. EDUARDO M.

COJUANGCO, JR., HERMENEGILDO ** C. ZAYCO, SALVADOR
ESCUDERO III, VICENTE B. VALDEPEÑAS, JR., ROLANDO P. DE LA
CUESTA AND THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION),
RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. NOS. 166487-88]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. THE

SANDIGANBAYAN AND EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., ROLANDO P.
DE LA CUESTA, HERMINIGILDO C. ZAYCO, JOSE R. ELEAZAR, JR.,
FELIX V. DUEÑAS, JR., SALVADOR ESCUDERO III, AND VICENTE B.
VALDEPEÑAS, JR., RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
These cases refer to a government agency’s grant of financial assistance to a

private non-profit organization representing the community whose interests such
agency serves.
On February 9, 1995 the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) filed two separate
informations against former members of the Governing Board of the Philippine Coconut
Administration (PCA), including its chairman, accused Rolando P. De La Cuesta, and a
member, Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases 22017
and 22018. They were charged with granting financial assistance of P2 million in
1984[1] and P6 million in 1985[2] to the Philippine Coconut Producers Federation
(COCOFED), a nationwide association of coconut farmers, in violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act 3019 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
The criminal Informations read:
In Criminal Case 22017
That on or about December 19, 1985, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in

Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, all public officers, accused MARIA CLARA L. LOBREGAT, ROLANDO P. DE
LA CUESTA, HERMENEGILDO C. ZAYCO, JOSE R. ELEAZAR, JR., SALVADOR ESCUDERO III
and VICENTE B. VALDEPEÑAS, JR., being then Members of the Board of Directors and
FELIX J. DUEÑAS, JR., being then the Administrator, all of the Philippine Coconut
Authority, committing the crime herein charged in relation to, while in the performance
and taking advantage of their official functions, with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality, and all conspiring and confederating with each other, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and criminally donate and/or extend financial assistance to the
Philippine Coconut Producers Federation (COCOFED), a private entity, the total amount
of Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00) which sum was taken from the Special Funds of the
Philippine Coconut Authority, said accused knowing fully well that COCOFED is a private
entity and that the same amount was not included in the budget Fund 503, thereby
giving unwarranted benefit in favor of the Philippine Coconut Producers Federation
(COCOFED) and, consequently, causing undue injury to the Government in the
aforestated amount.
In Criminal Case 22018
That on or about January 18, 1984, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named
accused, all public officers, accused EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., MARIA CLARA L.
LOBREGAT, ROLANDO P. DE LA CUESTA, HERMENEGILDO C. ZAYCO, and JOSE R.
ELEAZAR, JR., being then the members of the Board of Directors and FELIX J. DUEÑAS,
JR., being then the Administrator, all of the Philippine Coconut Authority, committing
the crime herein charged in relation to, while in the performance and taking advantage
of their official functions, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, and all
conspiring and confederating with each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and criminally donate and/or extend financial assistance to the Philippine Coconut
Producers Federation (COCOFED), a private entity, the total amount of Two Million
Pesos (P2,000,000.00) which sum was taken from the Special Funds of the Philippine
Coconut Authority, said accused knowing fully well that COCOFED is a private entity and
that the same amount was not included in the budget of Fund 503, thereby giving
unwarranted benefit in favor of the Philippine Coconut Producers Federation
(COCOFED) and, consequently, causing undue injury to the Government in the
aforestated amount.
Claiming that the informations were prematurely filed as they were not notified of the
June 2, 1992 Resolution, a requirement provided for by law, [3] the Sandiganbayan
granted the accused leave to seek reconsideration of such Resolution from the Office of
the Special Prosecutor (OSP),[4] the prosecution arm of the OMB. The court gave the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) the chance to comment. [5]
On December 6, 1996 the OMB submitted to the Sandiganbayan [6] the October 22, 1996
Memorandum of Special Prosecution Officer III Victorio U. Tabanguil, bearing the
November 15, 1996 approval of Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto [7] recommending the
dismissal of the cases. This prompted the accused to file their respective motions to
dismiss.[8]
Meantime, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed with the OMB a motion for
reconsideration of the adverse position that it had taken in the cases. [9] On learning of
the OSG’s action, the Sandiganbayan directly ordered it to comment on the
prosecution’s motion to withdraw the Informations and the accused to reply in turn.
[10]
Both complied.[11] On February 4, 1997 the Sandiganbayan ordered the OSG and the
PCGG to appear before it on February 17. Further, it required the PCGG to respond to
the OSG’s claim that the exhibits needed to prove the existence of probable cause
remained with the PCGG.[12]
At the February 17 hearing of the withdrawal issue, the OSG told the court that, as it
turned out, the documents needed to show probable cause had already been submitted
to the OMB at the preliminary investigation but were simply not adequately explained
and, therefore, not fully appreciated. With this development, the Sandiganbayan gave
the OSG time to submit to the OSP a catalogue of the documents mentioned with the
accompanying explanation of their significance, after which the latter was to inform the
court whether it was maintaining its position or changing it. [13]
These documents are as follows:
(a) The PCA Administrator’s separate 1984 and 1985 memoranda to the PCA
Governing Board recommending the financial grants of P2 million and P6 million,
respectively, for COCOFED’s use and providing justifications for the same; [14]
(b) Minutes of the PCA Board Meetings of January 18, 1984 and December 19,
1985[15] during which the PCA Governing Board approved the grants under Resolutions
009-84 and 128-85, respectively;
(c) The PCA Governing Board Resolutions 009-84 and 128-85; [16]
(d) The Disbursement Vouchers showing PCA’s release of P2 million and P6 million (the
latter in two equal payments) grants to COCOFED pursuant to the above Resolutions. [17]
(e) The PNB check and the corresponding COCOFED official receipt covering the P2
million PCA “financial assistance” to COCOFED under Board Resolution 009-84. [18]
(f) The PNB check and the corresponding COCOFED official receipt covering the first P3
million of the P6 million PCA “financial assistance” to COCOFED under Board Resolution
128-85.[19]
(g) The PNB check and the corresponding COCOFED official receipt covering the second
P3 million of the P6 million PCA “financial assistance” to COCOFED under Board
Resolution 128-85.[20]
(h) The letter dated 31 July 1986[21] of PCA Corporate Auditor Archimedes S. Sitjar to
the PCA Administrator, disallowing the P2 million “financial assistance” to COCOFED
paid out of the PCA Special Funds on the ground that this was not included in Fund 503
of that agency for the year 1984;
(i) The letter bearing receipt dated October 6,1986 [22] of PCA Auditor Sitjar to the PCA
Administrator, disallowing the P6 million “financial assistance” to COCOFED paid out of
the National Coconut Productivity Program (NCPP) fund on the ground that this was not
included in the NCPP budget of that agency;
(j) The letter dated December 29, 1986 of the PCA Office of the Auditor to the PCA
Administrator,[23] disallowing the P6 million “financial assistance” to COCOFED on the
further ground of failure to secure the approval of the Chief Executive/President as
provided for in Section 2 of P.D. 1997.[24]
On March 17, 1997 the OSP informed the Sandiganbayan that, even with the above
documents, it still found no new evidence sufficient to overturn its earlier findings that
no probable cause existed against the accused. [25]
Four years later on October 31, 2001 the Sandiganbayan ruled that probable cause
existed to warrant the prosecution of the accused. It said:
Admittedly, the recipient of these donations was the COCOFED, a private

corporation. When government funds are “donated” to private entities—which is
against laws and regulations unless otherwise authorized by law—there is, at least at
first blush, an apparent undue injury to the government and a corresponding
unwarranted benefit to the private party favored with the donation. These make out
prima facie the third and fourth elements above, or conversion for misuse of public
funds, or some other offense which would be adequately covered by the present
Informations.[26]
Petitioners Dela Cuesta and Cojuangco moved for reconsideration on December 7 [27] and
December 10, 2001,[28] respectively. Meantime, Special Prosecutor Raymundo Julio A.
Olaguer replaced Special Prosecutor Tabanguil who retired and on October 17, 2002
Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo took over the OMB, [29] signalling a change in its
position. On January 9, 2003 Special Prosecutor Olaguer recommended to Ombudsman
Marcelo the adoption of the OSG’s position, which he approved. [30] Subsequently, the
Special Prosecutor conveyed this change of position to the Sandiganbayan. [31]
On July 23, 2004, following accused De La Cuesta’s filing of a petition before this Court
in G.R. 164068-69, complaining of alleged denial of his right to speedy trial, [32] the
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution [33] granting the accused’s motions for
reconsideration of its October 31, 2001 Resolution. The Sandiganbayan thus dismissed
the cases against them for lack of probable cause, specifically since it found no prima
facie evidence that evident bad faith, manifest partiality, or gross inexcusable
negligence attended the PCA financial assistance to COCOFED.
The Sandiganbayan said that, based on the OSG-submitted documents, the grant of
assistance to COCOFED followed a correct course: the PCA Administrator’s proposal
outlined the justification for the grants and the law that allowed these; the Board of
Directors adopted the proposal upon an assumption that funds were indeed available
and that the grants were allowed by law and the PCA charter; the required checks were
supported by approved disbursement vouchers that were passed in audit; and COCOFED
received the checks in due time. While the payments were disallowed in post audit, this
was not because the grants were irregular but because of the absence of certifications
of availability of funds and a prior approval by the President.
The Sandiganbayan observed, however, that these omissions only gave rise to possible
administrative or civil liability, given that the grants did not appear to be patently illegal.
At best, said that court, such omissions were mere errors in management discretion or
bad judgment. That court concluded that, in the absence of prima facie evidence of
evident bad faith, manifest partiality or gross inexcusable negligence, no case for
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019 exists.
Further, the Sandiganbayan did not agree with the prosecution that the accused may be
indicted for technical malversation, using the same informations without violating their
right to know what they were accused of. The charges were for the violation of a special
law, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a malum prohibitum, which did not
embrace or cover any other offense. Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 did not cover technical
malversation or misuse of public funds under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code,
a malum in se offense the elements of which were distinct from Section 3(e) of R.A.
3019.
The OSP and OSG filed their respective motions for reconsideration [34] that the accused
opposed.[35] On December 15, 2004 the Sandiganbayan denied the motion, prompting
the OSP and the OSG to file separate petitions with this Court in G.R. 166305-06 and
166487-88, respectively. Subsequently, this Court ordered the two petitions
consolidated with the earlier petition in G.R. 164068-69.[36]
The Issues Presented
These cases present the following issues:
1. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in not holding that it was bound by the
findings and recommendations of the Ombudsman concerning the existence of
probable cause in the two cases;
2. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing for lack of probable cause the
twin criminal informations against accused Rolando P. De La Cuesta, Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr., and the others with them for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019
covering the financial assistance that the PCA gave COCOFED in 1984 (P2 million) and
1985 (P6 million);
3. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in failing to hold that the accused may be
held for trial, using the same criminal informations, for the crime of technical
malversation under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code; and
4. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in declining to dismiss the criminal actions
against the accused on the ground of denial of their right to speedy trial.
The Court’s Rulings
To simplify discussion, the Court will refer to the OSP and the OSG collectively as the
prosecution.
1. The prosecution points out that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the subject
cases for lack of probable cause, given that the Ombudsman, who has the primary
authority on the matter, found probable cause that warrants the filing of the
informations against the accused.
But while it is true that the prosecution has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine
whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court, once the case is filed, any
disposition the prosecutor may afterwards deem proper should be addressed to the
court for its consideration and approval.[37] It is the court’s bounden duty to assess
independently the merits of the same.[38] The only qualification is that the action of the
court must not impair the substantial right of the accused or the right of the People to
due process of law.[39] This has not happened in the cases below.
2. There is probable cause when the evidence at hand will persuade a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that the accused committed the offense of which
he is charged. Only common sense, not the technical rules for weighing evidence, is
required. But, although less than the evidence that would justify conviction is needed,
probable cause demands more than bare suspicion.[40]
The corrupt practice committed by a public officer under Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019
consists in his “causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.”
It will be recalled that, following a reinvestigation of the subject cases, the OSP reversed
its previous position and informed the Sandiganbayan that no probable cause existed
against the accused. But the OSG, as general counsel for the government, disagreed. It
claimed that the documents before the OMB showed otherwise. To settle the issue, the
Sandiganbayan let the OSG catalogue the documents mentioned and show how these
could prove probable cause that the accused violated Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.
Two of those documents, the PCA Administrator’s separate memoranda to the Board of
Governors in 1984 and 1985 that recommended the financial grants to COCOFED, do
not on their faces show some semblance of corruption. The January 17, 1984
Memorandum which recommended the P2 million grant to COCOFED informed the
Board that the grant was meant to help COCOFED stave off an anticipated scaling down
of its 992 chapters nationwide which were essential channels for the dissemination of
information on the advances in coconut technology and other programs of the coconut
industry. COCOFED, a non-profit organization, had a vast national membership of
coconut farmers and it had consistently helped the PCA implement its programs for
their industry. COCOFED was PCA’s indispensable link to farmers.[41]
Similarly, the December 16, 1985 Memorandum recommending the P6 million grant to
COCOFED adequately explained that it was made to augment the resources of COCOFED
due to the lifting of government funding to ensure the effective implementation of the
national coconut replanting program which was carried out with its active assistance
and participation.[42]
Notably, the prosecution does not dare diminish or malign COCOFED’s above role. Nor
does it deny that the PCA has been working in partnership with COCOFED towards the
attainment of the policy established by law for the industry. Consequently, it cannot be
said that, in granting financial assistance to COCOFED, the accused PCA Governing Board
members gave it “unwarranted benefits x x x through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence.” The grant was not for any dishonest purpose.
COCOFED’s role in the coconut industry began with the enactment of R.A. 6260 [43] in
1971. The law created a Coconut Investment Fund, initially capitalized by the
government, but eventually supported by a levy on the farmers’ sale of their copra.
Further, it directed the PCA to prescribe rules for the collection of the levy in
consultation with “the recognized national association of coconut producers with the
largest number of membership as determined by”[44] the PCA.
COCOFED quickly qualified to that position on account of its large membership and no
one had disputed its credentials. Notably, recognizing the organization’s importance,
R.A. 6260 set aside P0.02 out of every P0.55 levied on farmers “for the maintenance and
operation of its principal office which shall be responsible for continuing liaison with the
different sectors of the industries, the government and its own mass base.” [45] Relating
to this, the financial grants that the PCA Board gave appear to serve a public purpose.
Furthermore, Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1972,[46] and Executive Order (E.O.)

1064[47] required the PCA to undertake a coconut replanting program “with the active
assistance and participation of the recognized organization of the coconut farmers
pursuant to the provisions of R.A. 6260.”[48] This meant COCOFED.[49] Without this
organization, the PCA would forfeit its important link to the coconut farmers that it
primarily served, hampering the attainment of its objectives. [50] Although the Coconut
Investment Fund was scrapped in 1982, the PCA continued to work with COCOFED in its
programs for coconut farmers; hence, the recommendation to grant the organization
financial assistance so it could maintain its useful function.
Actually, the Sandiganbayan noted that, in charging the accused with violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3018, the prosecution completely relied on the COA disallowance of
the disbursements upon post audit. But the post audits disallowed the twin financial
assistance to COCOFED, not because government funds were used for something
unrelated to the objectives of the PCA but because: a) the P2 million was not included in
its budget for Fund 503[51] and b) the P6 million was not included in the NCPP budget
and had not been approved by the President.[52]
The prosecution points out that the P2 million grant was supposed to be taken from
Fund 503 or the PCA Special Funds; yet, nothing in the laws that mandated the
collection of fees for the PCA Special Funds authorized the PCA to grant assistance out
of the same in COCOFED’s favor.[53] But this is not altogether accurate. Sections 1 and 2
of P.D. 1854 grant the PCA Governing Board the authority to draw up its own budgetary
requirements out of the earmarked collections. Thus:
Section 1. The PCA fee imposed and collected pursuant to the provisions of R.A.
No. 1145 and Sec. 3(k), Article II of P.D. 1468, is hereby increased to three centavos per
kilo of copra or husked nuts or their equivalent in other coconut products delivered to
and/or purchased by copra exporters, oil millers, desiccators and other end-users of
coconut products. The fee shall be collected under such rules that PCA may promulgate,
and shall be paid by said copra exporters, oil millers, desiccators, and other end-users of
coconut products, receipt of which shall be remitted to the National Treasury on a
quarterly basis.
Section 2. The receipt and process of all collections pursuant to Section 1 hereof, shall
be utilized exclusively for the operations of the Philippine Coconut Authority and shall
be released automatically by the National Treasury upon approval by the PCA Governing
Board of its budgetary requirements, as an exception to P.D. 1234 and the budgetary
processes provided in P.D. 1177, as amended.
The above vested in the PCA Governing Board the authority to allocate and disburse
PCA funds by board resolution without the need for presidential approval. The above of
course provides that the PCA Special Funds are to be used “exclusively” for its
operations. But this restriction was evidently intended to prevent the use of the money
for other than the implementation of PCA plans and programs for the coconut industry.
It bars the hands of other government agencies from dipping into those funds. As
pointed out above, the initial P2 million grant to COCOFED was actually in furtherance of
PCA’s operations, its partnership with that organization being an integral part of such
operations.
The prosecution also claimed that the National Coconut Productivity Fund budget from
which it was sourced did not include the grant of P6 million to COCOFED and, therefore,
the PCA Board’s approval of the same on December 16, 1985 without the President’s
approval was illegal.
But President Marcos indirectly authorized such expenditure. On January 14, 1985 he
issued a Memorandum addressed to Prime Minister Cesar E.A. Virata, Budget and
Management Minister Manuel S. Alba, and PCA Chairman Rolando P. De La Cuesta
ordering the release of P118.7 million from the coconut productivity program and
authorizing the PCA to implement the government’s long-term productivity program
and its major components. Thus, the President said:
Further to my Memorandum dated September 19, 1984 directing the adoption

and implementation of a long-term Coconut Productivity Program and providing for the
utilization of a portion of the export tax on coconut products to finance the same,
please be guided as follows:
1. The special budget of the Coconut Productivity Program of the Philippine Coconut
Authority (PCA) for 1985 in the total amount of P118.7 million is hereby approved as a
priority developmental project under the Special Activities Fund.
2. To cover the herein-approved special budget, the Office of the Budget and
Management is hereby directed to set aside the amount as may be necessary from out
of the Special Productivity Fund to augment the funds earlier made available from out of
the export tax on coconut products to finance the program.
3. In order to hasten the implementation of the program, the amount of P60 million
shall be immediately released to PCA not later than January 31, 1985, and the balance of
P58.7 million not later than June 30, 1985 any provision of Letter of Instructions No.
1408 to the contrary notwithstanding.
4. The PCA is hereby directed to start the full-scale implementation of the program
effective on January 1, 1985 with priority given to coconut-producing areas recently
affected by the recent typhoons and calamities. For this purpose and in order to ensure
the success of the program, the PCA is authorized to purchase equipment/motor
vehicles, to create positions and to hire new, and effect necessary movement of,
personnel, and to undertake such other activities that may be required in the
implementation of the program and its major components, as an exception to Letter of
Implementation No. 146.[54]
Clearly, the President had approved the use of money out of the Special Activities Funds
to finance and implement the PCA coconut productivity program. Further to this, on
November 13, 1985 President Marcos issued E.O. 1064, Section 1 of which directed the
PCA to immediately implement the government’s accelerated coconut hybrid planting
and replanting program specifically “with the active assistance and participation of the
recognized organization of coconut farmers pursuant to the provisions of R.A. 6260,”
which was no other than COCOFED. Section 1 provides:
Section 1. The Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) is hereby directed to

immediately formulate and implement an accelerated coconut hybrid planting and
replanting program (the Program) aimed at increasing farm productivity. The annual
program (January-December) shall be prepared by the PCA Board in consultation with
the private sector and reviewed by the Cabinet and shall be effective upon approval of
the President and 30 days after publication of the same in newspapers of general
circulation. The Program shall include the rehabilitation of existing coconut trees as well
as intercropping of areas planted to coconut with suitable crops and the replanting
shall, together with the project(s) as hereinafter defined involve approximately 30,000
hectares per annum. PCA shall implement the Program with the active assistance and
participation of the recognized organization of coconut farmers pursuant to the
provisions of RA 6260 and shall service the requirements of small coconut farmers
owning not more than twenty-four (24) hectares who volunteer to participate in the
Program. Initially, the devastated areas in Visayas and Mindanao shall be given priority.
(Emphasis supplied)
But, as stated above, COCOFED was in danger of disintegrating with the unwitting
removal of the financial subsidy it was getting from the former Coconut Investment
Fund. Consequently, in order to successfully carry out the President’s order under E.O.
1064 dated November 13, 1985 to pursue the government’s planting and replanting
program,[55] it was essential that PCA grant financial assistance to COCOFED.
3. Apparently conscious that its charge of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 against
the accused had not been strong, the prosecution claims that the latter may
alternatively be prosecuted and tried under the same informations for two counts of
technical malversation under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code.
The rule of course is that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not by the
caption of the information or the citation of the law allegedly violated but by the actual
recital of facts in that information.[56] Consequently, the issue is whether the facts
alleged in the informations in the subject criminal cases make out a case for the crime of
technical malversation.
Compare the facts alleged in the information and the elements of the crime of technical
malversation:

Factual Allegations The Crime of
In the Information Technical Malversation
The accused as members of the PCA Board The crime is committed by a public officer
of Directors, acting in conspiracy with each other who administers public fund or property that has
and with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, been appropriated by law but he applies the same
gave financial assistance to COCOFED, a private to a public use other than that for which such fund
entity, without an appropriate budget, giving or property has been appropriated.[57]
unwarranted benefit to the same and causing
undue injury to the Government.
The element in the crime of technical malversation that public fund be appropriated for
a public use requires an earmarking of the fund or property for a specific project. [58] For
instance there is no earmarking if money was part of the municipality’s “general fund,”
intended by internal arrangement for use in paving a particular road but applied instead
to the payrolls of different barangay workers in the municipality. That portion of the
general fund was not considered appropriated since it had not been earmarked by law
or ordinance for a specific expenditure. Here, there is no allegation in the informations
that the P2 million and P6 million grants to COCOFED had been earmarked for some
specific expenditures.
What is more, the informations in question do not allege that the subject P2 million and
P6 million were applied to a public use other than that for which such sums had been
appropriated. Quite the contrary, those informations allege that those sums were
unlawfully donated to “a private entity,” not applied to some public use. Clearly, the
constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the crimes with which they are
charged would be violated if they are tried for technical malversation under criminal
informations for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 filed against them.
4. With the Court’s affirmation of the Sandiganbayan’s Resolution dismissing the

criminal informations against the accused De La Cuesta and Cojuangco, there is no point
in resolving the question of whether or not they are entitled to dismissal on ground of
denial of their right to speedy trial.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitions in G.R. 166305-06, People v. Eduardo

Cojuangco, Jr., et al., and G.R. 166487-88, Republic v. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., et al., for
lack of merit and AFFIRMS the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated July 23, 2004
and December 15, 2004 in Criminal Cases 22017 and 22018.
The Court further DENIES the petition in G.R. 164068-69, Rolando P. De La Cuesta v.

Sandiganbayan, on ground of mootness.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 176744, June 05, 2009 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ADELADO
ANGUAC Y RAGADAO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
VELASCO JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision dated August 29, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02012 entitled People of the Philippines v. Adelado
Anguac which affirmed with modification the Decision dated January 23, 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 69 in Iba, Zambales in Criminal Case Nos. RTC
2756-I and RTC 2757-I. The RTC convicted accused-appellant Adelado Anguac of rape
and violation of Section 5(a), Republic Act No. (RA) 7610 or the Special Protection of
Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.
The records disclose the following facts:
Accused-appellant Anguac is the common-law spouse of BBB, the mother of AAA.

[1]
They reside in a hut in Palauig, Zambales. At around 9:00 p.m. of March 28, 1998,
AAA, then 17 years old, while asleep with her siblings in a room at their residence, found
herself suddenly awakened by Anguac who poked a knife at her with the threat, "Huwag
kang maingay kundi papatayin ko kayong lahat (Do not make any noise or else, I will kill
you all)." Thereafter, Anguac succeeded in removing the underwear of the struggling
AAA and then sexually forced himself on AAA while pointing the knife just below her
ear. After satisfying his lust, Anguac again threatened AAA with bodily harm should she
disclose what had just occurred. The sexual assault on AAA was to be repeated five (5)
more times: in April 1998, May 1998, twice in January 1999, and once in February 1999.
Sometime in July 1999, AAA, when queried by her aunts, admitted to her being pregnant
as a result of the dastardly acts of Anguac. Thereafter, the concerned aunts accompanied
their pregnant niece to the police to file a complaint against Anguac. On October 4,
1999, AAA gave birth to a baby boy.[2]
On November 26, 1999, two (2) separate informations were filed charging Anguac with
rape and violation of RA 7610, respectively, as follows:
Crim. Case No. RTC-2756-I
That on or about the 28th day of March 1998, in Brgy. [XXX], municipality of Palauig,
province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of [the RTC], the said
accused, with lewd design and by means of force, threats and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with and carnal
knowledge of [AAA], a minor 17 years old, said accused then the common-law spouse of
the mother of the minor [AAA], without the latter's consent and against her will, to her
damage and prejudice.
Crim. Case No. RTC-2757-I
That in or about the period from April 1998 to February 1999, in Brgy. [XXX],
municipality of Palauig, province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
[the RTC], the said accused, actuated by lust, and due to said accused's coercion and/or
influence and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have sexual intercourse with and carnal knowledge of [AAA], a minor 17
years old, with said accused being then the common-law spouse of [AAA's] mother,
without the latter's consent and against her will, to her damage and prejudice. [3]
When arraigned, Anguac pleaded not guilty to both charges. In the ensuing trial, he
denied committing the crimes imputed to him, claiming that AAA was away staying and
working with her aunt during the months the alleged molestation took place. He
described AAA to be a problem child, often cutting classes, and was always in the
company of boys. BBB, AAA's mother, corroborated his testimony about AAA being
away with her aunt from March 22, 1998 to March 1999. She also testified that Anguac
treated AAA like his very own daughter.
The RTC, finding AAA to be a credible witness without improper motive to falsely
accuse and testify against Anguac, rendered on January 23, 2002 a Decision finding
Anguac guilty as charged and sentencing him accordingly. The dispositive portion of the
RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, JUDGMENT is hereby

rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. RTC 2756-I for the crime of rape, the accused is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime provided under the Revised Penal
Code and is sentenced to suffer the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua
and to pay moral damages in the sum of SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P75,000.00);
2. In Criminal Case No. RTC 2757-I, the accused is pronounced guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime committed [which] is punishable under Republic
Act No. 7610, Section 5(a) and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
temporal in its medium period of 14 years as imprisonment. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, by reason of Section 1, Act No. 4103, as amended
by Act No. 4225, that x x x "if the offense is punished by any other law, the court
shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of
which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not
be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same" and which minimum
penalty hereof imposed on the accused is, therefore, 12 years imprisonment and
for the accused to pay further the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P30,000.00) as moral damages; and
3. The accused is credited for the period covered by his preventive imprisonment, for
purposes of the service of his sentences.
The Provincial Warden of Iba, Zambales is ordered to commit the living body of the
accused to [the] National Penitentiary to serve his sentences within a period of ten days
upon receipt of this Decision.
Therefrom, Anguac appealed to this Court, claiming that the RTC erred in: (1) giving
undue credence to the testimonies of the prosecution's witness; (2) finding the charges
sufficiently established by evidence; and (3) finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crimes charged.
Per Resolution[5] dated August 31, 2005, the Court, in line with its ruling in People v.
Mateo,[6] transferred the case to the CA for its disposition, whereat it was docketed as
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02012.
In a Decision dated August 29, 2006, the CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC. It,
however, treated the crime of rape charged in Criminal Case No. RTC 2757-I as a
violation of Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610 instead of Sec. 5(a) as found by the trial court, pursuant
to the dictum "the real nature of the crime charged is determined by the facts alleged in
the Information and not by the title or designation of the offense contained in the caption
of the Information."[7] Monetary awards were likewise modified. The case was disposed
of as follows:
WHEREFORE, the assailed January 23, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, in Criminal Case Nos. RTC 2756-I and RTC 2757-I is hereby
MODIFIED to read as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, JUDGMENT is hereby
rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. RTC-2756-I, the accused is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Rape and is sentenced to suffer the single indivisible penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua and to pay civil indemnity in the sum of SEVENTY FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P75,000.00); moral damages in the sum of SEVENTY FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS; and exemplary damages in the sum of TWENTY FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000.00);
2. In Criminal Case No. RTC-2757-I, the accused is pronounced guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime committed [which] is punishable under Republic Act No.
7610, Section 5(b) and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal in its
medium period of 14 years as imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
by reason of Section 1, Act No. 4103, as amended by Act No. 4225, that x x x "if the
offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused of an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed
by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the
same" and which minimum penalty hereof imposed on the accused is, therefore, 12 years
imprisonment and for the accused to pay further the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P30,000.00) as moral damages; and,
3. The accused is credited for the period covered by his preventive imprisonment, for
purposes of the service of his sentence.
The Provincial Warden of Iba, Zambales is ordered to commit the living body of the
accused to the National Penitentiary to serve his sentences within the period of ten days
upon receipt of this Decision.
IT IS SO ORDERED."
SO ORDERED.[8]
The case is now again with this Court for review of the CA's affirmatory decision. On
September 3, 2007, this Court required the parties to submit supplemental briefs if they
so desired. The parties manifested their willingness to submit the case for resolution on
the basis of the records already submitted.
On the basis of the assignment of errors earlier made by Anguac, we find the issues to be:
(1) the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution; and (2) the sufficiency of the
prosecution's evidence.
As it was in the CA, Anguac assails the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution,
particularly that of AAA. In a bid to discredit AAA's testimony, Anguac alleges that
AAA has an axe to grind against him and BBB, AAA's mother, for sending her away to
work at her aunt's house to pay off a big loan they incurred. He also urges us to note that
on the night of March 28, 1998, when the first alleged rape incident occurred, AAA was
in a room sleeping with her younger half-sisters and brothers lying beside or very close to
her. To Anguac, it was well-nigh impossible for the alleged rape to have transpired
without rousing AAA's siblings from their sleep.
The appeal of Anguac has no merit.
Anguac's allegation that AAA resented being made to work off her mother's debts has
nothing to support itself. The appellate court found no sufficient basis to back Anguac's
contention about AAA being asked to work to pay off her mother's obligation as a result
of which she harbored a grudge against him and her mother. Moreover, the resentment
angle, even if true, does not prove any ill motive on AAA's part to falsely accuse Anguac
of rape or necessarily detract from her credibility as witness. Motives, such as those
arising from family feuds, resentment, or revenge, have not prevented the Court from
giving, if proper, full credence to the testimony of minor complainants[9] who remained
steadfast throughout their direct and cross-examination.[10]
The categorical conclusion of the CA, confirmatory of that of the trial court, was that
Anguac raped AAA on March 28, 1998 and five (5) more times thereafter. Both the trial
and appellate courts found AAA to be categorical and unfaltering in her testimony on
those unforgettable occasions. Both courts' assessments of AAA's credibility,
particularly those of the trial court which had the advantage of observing her demeanor
while in the witness box, carry great weight. Unless it is shown that the trial court
overlooked, misapplied, or misunderstood some fact or circumstance of substance that
would otherwise affect the result of the case, its findings will remain undisturbed on
appeal.[11] After carefully reading the records of the case, we find no compelling reason
now to depart from the rule.
Anguac's claim that it is impossible for AAA's young siblings sleeping beside or near her
not to be awakened while she was allegedly being rape is untenable. Lust, being a very
powerful human urge, is, to borrow from People v. Bernabe, "no respecter of time and
place."[12] Rape can be committed in even the unlikeliest places and circumstances, and,
as recent jurisprudence shows, by the most unlikely persons. The fact that AAA's
siblings were not awakened at the time she was ravished is not improbable. We have
observed in more than one occasion that rape could take place in the same room where
other members of the family were sleeping;[13] that it is not impossible to commit rape in a
small room even if there are several persons in it.[14] We have taken judicial notice of the
fact that among poor couples with big families cramped in small quarters, copulation
does not seem to be a problem despite the presence of other persons. [15]
Anguac has failed to disprove the allegations of AAA with his mere denial of the charges
against him. The rule is that denials are self-serving negative evidence which cannot
prevail over the positive, straightforward, and unequivocal testimony of the victim.[16] We
have ruled time and again that the sole testimony of a rape victim, if credible, suffices to
convict.[17]
The Court affirms the CA's modification of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. RTC
2757-I. The RTC erroneously convicted accused-appellant based on the crime designated
in the information for that criminal case. While the Information pertaining to that
criminal case charged accused-appellant with violation of Sec. 5(a) of RA 7610, the facts
alleged in it constitute elements of a violation of Sec. 5(b) of the same law:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse.—Children, whether male or

female, who, for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be

imposed upon the following:
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That when the
victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under
Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the
Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That
the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall
be reclusion temporal in its medium period; x x x
As the Court has previously held, the character of the crime is determined neither by the
caption or preamble of the information nor by the specification of the provision of law
alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the recital of the
ultimate facts and circumstances in the information.[18] Consequently, even if the
designation of the crime in the information of Criminal Case No. RTC 2757-I was
defective, what is controlling is the allegation of the facts in the information that
comprises a crime and adequately describes the nature and cause of the accusation against
the accused.
Sec. 5(a) of RA 7610 refers to engaging in or promoting, facilitating, or inducing child

prostitution. Sec. 5(b), on the other hand, relates to offenders who commit the act of
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject
to other sexual abuse. The informations charged accused-appellant with having sexual
congress with AAA through force, threats, and intimidation. These allegations more
properly fall under a charge under Sec. 5(b). The appellate court was, thus, correct in
modifying the RTC's disposition of the case with regard to the violation under RA 7610.
Anent the award of exemplary damages to AAA in Criminal Case No. RTC-2756-I, it is
increased from PhP 25,000 to PhP 30,000 in accordance with our ruling in People v.
Layco, Sr.[19]
On the matter of civil liability, we increase the award of moral damages in Criminal Case
No. RTC-2757-I (violation of Sec. 5[b] of RA 7610) to PhP 50,000 pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence.[20] We affirm the rest of the monetary awards.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The August 29, 2006 Decision of the CA in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02012, finding accused-appellant Adelado Anguac guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape and violation of Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610,
is AFFIRMED with the modifications that in Criminal Case No. RTC-2756-I for rape,
accused-appellant is ordered to pay PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages, while in Criminal
Case No. RTC-2757-I for violation of Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610, accused-appellant is ordered
to pay moral damages in the sum of PhP 50,000.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 174065, February 18, 2009 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROLLY
CANARES Y ALMANARES, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review in this petition for review on certiorari[1] the decision (dated May 31, 2006)
[2]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01263 that affirmed with
modification the decision (dated March 17, 2003)[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 18, Tagaytay City in Criminal Case No. TG-3255-99. The RTC found the
accused-appellant, Rolly Canares y Almanares (Canares), guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of statutory rape.
Canares was charged in two separate Informations for rape and attempted rape in relation
with Republic Act No. 7610 (the Child Abuse Law). These Informations respectively
state:
Criminal Case No. TG-3255-99
That sometimes (sic) between the year 1992 to 1995 at Barangay Sabutan, Municipality
of Silang, Province of Cavite, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with lewd designs, by means of force, violence and intimidation
and taking advantage of his superior strength over the person of the victim who was then
nine (9) years old, did, then and there, willfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously, have
carnal knowledge of one AAA[4], against her will and consent, to her damage and
prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
Criminal Case No. SC-3261-00
That on or about the 25th day of March, 1999, at Brgy. Sabutan, Municipality of Silang,
Province of Cavite, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with lewd designs by means of force, violence and intimidation and taking
advantage of his superior strength over the person of the victim who was sixteen (16)
years old, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attempt to have carnal
knowledge of one AAA, against her will and consent, the above-named accused, having
thus commenced the commission of the crime of Rape directly by overt acts but which
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes other than accused own spontaneous
desistance, that is, by reason of the timely arrival of BBB who hit the head of herein
accused with a base (sic) thereby preventing him from further consummating the crime,
to the damage and prejudice of said AAA.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
Canares, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to both charges.
[7]
The trial court ordered a joint trial since the same parties and similar subject matters
and antecedent events were involved. At pre-trial, the parties made no admission or
stipulation of facts.[8] The prosecution marked its documentary evidence with the
reservation to present additional evidence in the course of the trial.[9] The defense did not
mark any documentary evidence.
At the trial proper, the prosecution presented the following as witnesses: AAA (the
alleged victim), BBB (the victim's aunt), and Dr. Bernadette Madrid (the Director of the
Philippine General Hospital [PGH] Child Protection Unit). The defense relied on the sole
testimony of Canares who simply denied any sexual intercourse with AAA.
The Background Facts & Developments
AAA was born on September 8, 1982 and was only about 9 or 10 years old when
Canares, a helper in AAA's grandmother's house at Barangay Sabutan, Silang, Cavite,
allegedly first sexually abused her. Living with AAA and her grandmother in the house
were her uncle and 7 younger cousins. The sexual intercourse took place at around
midnight sometime in 1992; AAA could no longer recall the exact date. AAA and her
cousins were then the only occupants in their grandmother's house and were in bed
sleeping. AAA awoke and found Canares lying beside them. Canares undressed her,
removed her shorts and panty, and then had sexual intercourse with her by inserting his
penis into her genital organ. AAA felt pain and bled but kept the incident to herself
because Canares threatened to kill her.[10]
Canares allegedly repeated the sexual abuse more than ten times between the first
incident in 1992 and 1995. He stopped from 1996-1999.[11] AAA attributed the gap to the
lack of opportunity on Canares' part; her uncle was then always at home. [12] Canares also
began working as a tricycle driver and subsequently went to the province where he
temporarily stayed.[13] Except for the sexual abuse in 1992, AAA could no longer
remember the details of the other incidents. She was certain, however, that there was
penile penetration in every incident.[14]
The last incident that immediately gave rise to the present charges occurred on March 25,
1999. AAA met Canares at the stairs of her grandmother's house as Canares was on his
way to the bodega of the house which he used as his sleeping quarters. He told AAA that
he had something to tell her and pulled her towards the bodega. Inside, Canares embraced
her and pulled down her shorts. AAA resisted and pushed against Canares as she also
shouted for help. BBB - AAA's aunt - came to her rescue and hit Canares on the head
with a flower vase.[15] Triggered by this incident, AAA disclosed to her mother and
relatives the sexual abuse she had long suffered in the hands of Canares. [16]
On March 26, 2000, AAA went to the PGH Child Protection Unit for medical
examination. The findings showed that she had a healed laceration at the 6:00 position of
her hymen indicating previous penetration.[17] On March 27, 2000, AAA and BBB
executed their respective Sinumpaang Salaysay about Canares' sexual abuses before the
police authorities. After the Joint Preliminary Examination conducted before the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Silang-Amadeo, Cavite on April 26, 1999, AAA lodged
a formal complaint for rape and attempted rape against Canares.[18]
Canares denied the accusations against him.[19] He claimed that the charges were filed
against him at the instance of AAA's grandmother and uncle because of the nonpayment
of his salary as a farm hand and as a tricycle driver. AAA's uncle also allegedly failed to
pay him a previous loan of P10,000.[20] He also claimed that it was impossible for him to
rape AAA because she came to live at her grandmother's house only in 1997. [21] He
argued that the rape could not have possibly occurred considering the number of people
staying in the house; a shout from someone being assaulted could easily be heard in the
house.[22]
The RTC gave greater credence to the prosecution's evidence, particularly, the testimony
of AAA which it found to be straightforward, truthful, and convincing.[23] The trial court
observed that AAA's young age and gender rendered it unlikely that she would concoct a
story of defloration that would subject her to public trial and ridicule.[24] At the same time,
the RTC rejected Canares' unsubstantiated denial and held that it cannot prevail over
credible positive testimony.[25] The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of the accused ROLLY CANARES Y ALMARANES to
be beyond reasonable doubt, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment of
RECLUSION PERPETUA. Accused is also ordered to indemnify
the victim Catherine Amodente the sum of Php100,000.00 as moral damages. Costs
against the accused.
SO ORDERED.[26]
The RTC acquitted Canares of the crime of attempted rape for the prosecution's failure to
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt:
...From the preponderance of evidence presented, the prosecution failed to prove the guilt
of the accused in this case beyond reasonable doubt. The court therefore ACQUITS the
accused Rolly Canares of the crime of "Attempted Rape" and the case against him is
DISMISSED.[27]
The CA affirmed with modification Canares' rape conviction, ruling as follows:[28]
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated March 17, 2003 of the RTC, Branch 18,
Tagaytay City, in Criminal Case No. TG-3255-99,
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, by reducing the award of moral damages from
Php 100,000.00 to Php 50,000.00, and ordering the accused-appellant to pay AAA the
amount of Php 50,000.00 as civil indemnity, in addition to moral damages.
SO ORDERED.[29]
In his Appeal Brief,[30] Canares raises the lone issue:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF RAPE DESPITE THE INSUFFICIENCY
OF EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION.
Canares contends that he should not have been convicted of rape because the Information
was defective: it failed to specify with certainty when the alleged rape was committed.
He argues that the allegation that the rape was committed "sometime between the year
1992 to 1995" is very broad, considering particularly AAA's testimony that she was raped
more than 10 times. He posits that since the specific incident of rape for which he was
convicted is uncertain, the doubt should be resolved in favor of his acquittal.
In their Brief,[31] the People maintain that Canares' rape conviction is backed by the
evidence on record. The argument that the Information was defective should also fail
because the allegation of the exact date and time of the rape is not a material point in
charging the accused of rape. In any case, this alleged defect was cured when AAA
testified that Canares raped her "in one evening of 1992."[32]
The Court's Ruling
We find no reason to overturn the conviction of Canares and hereby confirm his guilt for
the crime of statutory rape committed against AAA sometime in 1992.
The Procedural Issue
The argument that the Information in Criminal Case No. TG-3255-99 is defective for the
prosecution's failure to allege the date and time of the rape is far from novel. We have
repeatedly met and debunked this line of argument in rape cases.
An information, under Section 6, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, is deemed sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the
offense; and the place where the offense was committed. Section 11 of the same Rule
also provides that it is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise
date the offense was committed except when the date of commission is a material
element of the offense. The offense may thus be alleged to have been committed on a
date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. At the minimum, an
indictment must contain all the essential elements of the offense charged to enable the
accused to properly meet the charge and duly prepare for his defense. [33]
Following these principles, we held in People v. Bugayong[34] that when the time given in
the information is not the essence of the offense, such time does not need to be proven as
alleged; the complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the offense was
committed at any time within the period of the statute of limitations and before the
commencement of the action. We again emphasized this doctrine in the case of People v.
Rafon,[35] when we held it unnecessary to state in the information the precise date when
the offense was committed, except when it is an essential element of the offense.
People v. Lizada, [36] specifically involving the charge of rape, followed the above general
principle; we stated that an information for rape is not rendered defective for failure to
specify the exact date when the rape was committed. The reason for this is plain: the
precise date of the commission
of the rape is not an essential element of the crime.[37] The gravamen of the crime of
rape is carnal knowledge of the woman under any of the circumstances provided by
law.[38]
Thus, we have ruled that allegations of rape in the information committed, "sometime in
the year 1991 and the days thereafter,"[39] "on or about and sometime in the year
1988,"[40] or "from November 1990 up to July 21, 1994,"[41] "sometime in the year 1982
and dates subsequent thereto," and "sometime in the year 1995 and subsequent
thereto,"[42] all constitute sufficient compliance with Section 11 of Rule 110. In People v.
Salalima, we also ruled that the allegation that the sexual assaults were committed,
"sometime during the month of March 1996 or thereabout," or "sometime during the
month of April 1996 or thereabout," and also, "sometime during the month of May 1996
or thereabout" substantially informed the accused of the crimes charged since all the
elements of rape were stated in the informations. [43]
The situation in the present case can be directly compared with People

v. Bugayong[44] where the information charged that the accused committed multiple rapes
"before and until October 15, 1994." We found this allegation sufficient to convict the
accused of rape committed in 1993 on account of the categorical statement in the private
complainant's sworn affidavit of the year when the rape was committed. The Court found
that this allegation substantially cured the perceived vagueness in the criminal charge and
ruled that the accused has been sufficiently informed under the circumstances. [45]
In this regard, AAA unequivocally and repeatedly stated that the first sexual intercourse
Canares had with her occurred sometime in 1992.[46] Following Bugayong, this statement
removes from Canares any reason to complain that he was not adequately informed of the
charge against him before he was arraigned. The Information referred to a rape that
started in 1992 and this first incident was sufficiently narrated in AAA's statements
before and after arraignment. Canares never raised this argument in any motion filed with
the trial court before his arraignment. He likewise fully participated in the trial on the
merits without raising this argument; he cross-examined the prosecution witnesses and
formally objected to the prosecution's offer of evidence. Raised for the first time in this
appeal, we can only label the argument as a desperation move that is too late in the day
for the defense to make.[47]
We add that while AAA testified that Canares had raped her more than 10 times, Canares
was not charged for all ten rapes. The Information only sought to hold him liable for a
single count of rape committed "sometime between 1992 to 1995." The Information is
very specific, too, that the victim was then nine (9) years old so that the rape referred to
was the incident on or about 1992, given that AAA was born in September 1982. In
her Sinumpaang Salaysay that became the basis for the Information,[48] AAA clearly
stated that Canares raped her when she was 9 years old, but did not report it to her parents
because she was scared.[49] (AAA would have been 9 years old if the rape occurred before
September 8, 1992.) At the trial, on the other hand, AAA was firm and categorical about
the fact of rape and of Canares' identity as the perpetrator.[50] Thus, AAA clearly referred
to the first incident of rape that happened around midnight in 1992.[51] Following People
v. Gianan[52] that the Office of the Solicitor General cited, her testimony substantially
cured any defect posed by the date stated in the Information.[53] In Gianan, we held:
In any event, even if the information failed to allege with certainty the time of the
commission of the rapes, the defect, if any, was cured by the evidence presented during
the trial and any objection based on this ground must be deemed waived as a result of
accused-appellant's failure to object before arraignment.[54]
Substantive Issue
Statutory rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman below 12 years of age
regardless of her consent to the act or lack of it.[55] Proof of force, intimidation or consent
is unnecessary; force is not an element of statutory rape and the absence of free consent
is conclusively presumed when the complainant is below the age of twelve. [56] The law
presumes that a woman below this age does not possess discernment and is incapable of
giving intelligent consent to the sexual act.[57]
To convict an accused of the crime of statutory rape, the prosecution must

prove: first, the age of the complainant; second, the identity of the accused; and last but
not the least, the carnal knowledge between the accused and the complainant. [58]
The first and second elements have been established by the presentation of a Certification
from the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Silang, Cavite dated April 21, 1999
stating that AAA was born on September 8, 1982.[59] Hence, she was only 9, or at most
10, years old when the rape was committed in 1992. In and out of court, she consistently
identified Canares as her rapist.[60]
Carnal knowledge is proven by proof of the entry or introduction of the male organ into
the female organ; the "touching" or "entry" of the penis into the labia majora or the labia
minora of the pudendum of the victim's genitalia constitutes consummated rape.[61] The
prosecution proved this element when AAA narrated during the trial the details of her
rape, committed sometime in 1992, as follows:
Q: What did he do exactly to you?
A: He touched my breasts and he inserted his private organ into mine, sir.
Q: Was he able to insert his organ into yours?
A: Yes, sir.
FISCAL VELASCO, JR.:
Q: Considering, as you said, that (sic) was the first time, how did you feel?
WITNESS:
A: It was painful, sir.[62]
xxx
xxx
COURT:
...
Q: How many times were you abused on that evening?
WITNESS:
A: Once, your Honor.
Q: Was he able to penetrate your private organ on that first night?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You mean he was able to insert his penis into your vagina?
A: Yes, sir.[63]
Parenthetically, the pain that AAA said she suffered is, in itself, an indicator of the
commission of rape. We so held in People v. Tampos[64] and People v. Borromeo.
[65]
There is the added element, too, that AAA's testimony is supported by physical and
supporting testimonial evidence. There was the healed laceration found in her hymen
which is remarkably compatible with her claim of sexual molestation. Dr. Madrid, in
testifying on the healed laceration, stated that it could have been caused by a penis. [66]
Both the RTC and CA found the above testimony straightforward, truthful and
convincing.[67] AAA's identification of Canares as the culprit was positive,
categorical and consistent and devoid of any showing of ill-motive on her part.[68] We
find no reason to disturb these findings. Courts usually give greater weight to the
testimony of a female victim of sexual assault, especially a minor, because no woman
would willingly undergo a public trial and put up with the shame, humiliation and
dishonor of exposing her own degradation except to condemn the injustice done and to
secure the offender's apprehension and punishment.[69] Testimonies of youthful rape
victims are, as a general rule, given full faith and credit, considering that when a girl says
she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed
committed.[70] In this case, she could not have come up with a detailed narration of what
she suffered if the rape, in fact, did not really happen.
Canares mainly interposed the defense of denial, an inherently weak defense that must be
buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility.[71] As negative
evidence, it pales in comparison with a positive testimony that asserts the commission of
a crime and the identification of the accused as its culprit. We find that the facts in this
case do not present any exceptional circumstance warranting a deviation from these
established rules.
Canares likewise claimed before the RTC that the rape as alleged did not take place since
AAA was not living at her grandmother's house from 1992 up to 1995. We find this
argument untenable. AAA refuted this claim during her direct examination when she
stated that she was already living at her grandmother's house as early as 1991. [72] The
defense utterly failed to disprove this testimony when AAA was cross-examined.
Canares, for his part, made inconsistent statements about this claim during his own cross-
examination. Under this evidentiary situation, we give weight to what AAA had declared.
A last defense was the imputation of ill motives on AAA by making it appear that the
criminal cases were filed for monetary reasons. We find this argument contrary to human
experience. We find it inconceivable that a child's future and a family's reputation would
be placed at risk and exposed to possible humiliation and dishonor for the trifling reasons
Canares gave. If Canares had not really been paid his salaries, then he, not AAA and her
family, would have the motivation to carry a grudge. Furthermore, the imputation lacks
corroboration as it is supported only by Canares' self-serving testimony. For these
reasons, it does not merit any evidentiary value.
The Penalty
The Information for statutory rape immediately tells us that the crime

charged was committed prior to the passage of the law imposing death for rape
cases[73] and the new rape law.[74] Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, the law then in
place, provided:
Article 335. When and how rape is committed. â”€ Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age ...
xxx
Considering that AAA's minority was sufficiently alleged and proven during trial without
objection on the part of the defense, both the RTC and CA correctly imposed the proper
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
We affirm the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages the lower courts imposed.
These awards are consistent with prevailing jurisprudence.[75]
Civil indemnity is awarded on the finding that rape was committed.[76] Similarly, moral
damages are awarded to rape complainants without need of pleading or proof of their
basis; it is assumed that a rape complainant actually suffered moral injuries entitling her
to this award.[77]
In addition, we also award exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000. The award of
exemplary damages is justified under Article 2229 of the Civil Code to set a public
example and serve as deterrent against elders who abuse and corrupt the youth. [78] The
commission of the crime in AAA's grandmother's dwelling, although not alleged in the
Information (as now required by Sections 8 and 9, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure[79]), was duly proven and can also serve as basis for the award of
exemplary damages under Article 2230 of the Civil Code as we ruled in People v.
Blancaflor[80] and People v. Catubig.[81] We held in Catubig that the retroactive
application of procedural rules cannot adversely affect the rights of the private offended
party that have become vested prior to its effectivity.[82] We reiterated this doctrine
in People v. Victor[83] and People v. Legaspi.[84]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the

decision dated May 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01263
finding Rolly Canares y Almanares GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of statutory rape. In addition to the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages, he is
further ordered to pay P25,000 as exemplary damages to AAA.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 170863, March 20, 2013 ]
ENGR. ANTHONY V. ZAPANTA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari[1] filed by petitioner Engr.

Anthony V. Zapanta, challenging the June 27, 2005 decision [2] and the November 24,
2005 resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 28369. The CA decision
affirmed the January 12, 2004 decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City,
Branch 3, in Criminal Case No. 20109-R, convicting the petitioner of the crime of
qualified theft. The CA resolution denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The Factual Antecedents
An April 26, 2002 Information filed with the RTC charged the petitioner, together with
Concordia 0. Loyao, Jr., with the crime of qualified theft, committed as follows:
That sometime in the month of October, 2001, in the City of Baguio, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of [the] Honorable Court, xxx accused ANTHONY V. ZAPANTA,
being then the Project Manager of the Porta Vaga Building Construction, a project being
undertaken then by the Construction Firm, ANMAR, Inc. under sub-contract with A.
Mojica Construction and General Services, with the duty to manage and implement the
fabrication and erection of the structural steel framing of the Porta Varga building
including the receipt, audit and checking of all construction materials delivered at the
job site – a position of full trust and confidence, and CONCORDIO O. LOYAO, JR., alias
“JUN”, a telescopic crane operator of ANMAR, Inc., conspiring, confederating, and
mutually aiding one another, with grave abuse of confidence and with intent of gain, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away from the
Porta Vaga project site along Session road, Baguio City, wide flange steel beams of
different sizes with a total value of P2,269,731.69 without the knowledge and consent
of the owner ANMAR, Inc., represented by its General Manager LORNA LEVA
MARIGONDON, to the damage and prejudice of ANMAR, Inc., in the aforementioned
sum of P2,269,731.69, Philippine Currency.[5]
Arraigned on November 12, 2002, the petitioner entered a plea of “not guilty.” [6] Loyao
remains at-large.
In the ensuing trial, the prosecution offered in evidence the oral testimonies of Danilo
Bernardo, Edgardo Cano, Roberto Buen, Efren Marcelo, private complainant Engr. Lorna
Marigondon, and Apolinaria de Jesus, [7] as well as documentary evidence consisting of a
security logbook entry, delivery receipts, photographs, letters, and sworn affidavits. The
prosecution’s pieces of evidence, taken together, established the facts recited below.
In 2001, A. Mojica Construction and General Services (AMCGS) undertook the Porta
Vaga building construction in Session Road, Baguio City. AMCGS subcontracted the
fabrication and erection of the building’s structural and steel framing to Anmar, owned
by the Marigondon family. Anmar ordered its construction materials from Linton
Commercial in Pasig City. It hired Junio Trucking to deliver the construction materials to
its project site in Baguio City. It assigned the petitioner as project manager with general
managerial duties, including the receiving, custody, and checking of all building
construction materials.[8]
On two occasions in October 2001, the petitioner instructed Bernardo, Junio Trucking’s
truck driver, and about 10 Anmar welders, including Cano and Buen, to unload about 10
to 15 pieces of 20 feet long wide flange steel beams at Anmar’s alleged new contract
project along Marcos Highway, Baguio City. Sometime in November 2001, the petitioner
again instructed Bernardo and several welders, including Cano and Buen, to unload
about 5 to 16 pieces of 5 meters and 40 feet long wide flange steel beams along Marcos
Highway, as well as on Mabini Street, Baguio City. [9]
Sometime in January 2002, Engr. Nella Aquino, AMCGS’ project manager, informed
Engr. Marigondon that several wide flange steel beams had been returned to Anmar’s
warehouse on October 12, 19, and 26, 2001, as reflected in the security guard’s logbook.
Engr. Marigondon contacted the petitioner to explain the return, but the latter simply
denied that the reported return took place. Engr. Marigondon requested Marcelo, her
warehouseman, to conduct an inventory of the construction materials at the project
site. Marcelo learned from Cano that several wide flange steel beams had been
unloaded along Marcos Highway. There, Marcelo found and took pictures of some of
the missing steel beams. He reported the matter to the Baguio City police headquarters
and contacted Anmar to send a truck to retrieve the steel beams, but the truck came
weeks later and, by then, the steel beams could no longer be found. The stolen steel
beams amounted to P2,269,731.69.[10]
In his defense, the petitioner vehemently denied the charge against him. He claimed
that AMCGS, not Anmar, employed him, and his plan to build his own company had
been Engr. Marigondon’s motive in falsely accusing him of stealing construction
materials.[11]
The RTC’s Ruling
In its January 12, 2004 decision,[12] the RTC convicted the petitioner of qualified theft. It
gave credence to the prosecution witnesses’ straightforward and consistent testimonies
and rejected the petitioner’s bare denial. It sentenced the petitioner to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment from 10 years and 3 months, as minimum, to 20 years, as
maximum, to indemnify Anmar P2,269,731.69, with legal interest from November 2001
until full payment, and to pay Engr. Marigondon P100,000.00 as moral damages.
The CA’s Ruling
On appeal, the petitioner assailed the inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses’

statements, and reiterated his status as an AMCGS employee. [13]
In its June 27, 2005 decision,[14] the CA brushed aside the petitioner’s arguments and
affirmed the RTC’s decision convicting the petitioner of qualified theft. It found that the
prosecution witnesses’ testimonies deserve full credence in the absence of any
improper motive to testify falsely against the petitioner. It noted that the petitioner
admitted his status as Anmar’s employee and his receipt of salary from Anmar, not
AMCGS. It rejected the petitioner’s defense of denial for being self-serving. It, however,
deleted the award of moral damages to Engr. Marigondon for lack of justification.
When the CA denied[15] the motion for reconsideration[16] that followed, the petitioner

filed the present Rule 45 petition.
The Petition
The petitioner submits that, while the information charged him for acts committed
“sometime in the month of October, 2001,” he was convicted for acts not covered by the
information, i.e., November 2001, thus depriving him of his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. He further argues that
the prosecution failed to establish the fact of the loss of the steel beams since
the corpus delicti was never identified and offered in evidence.
The Case for the Respondent
The respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
counters that the issues raised by the petitioner in the petition pertain to the
correctness of the calibration of the evidence by the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, which
are issues of fact, not of law, and beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition. In any case,
the respondent contends that the evidence on record indubitably shows the petitioner’s
liability for qualified theft.
The Issue
The case presents to us the issue of whether the CA committed a reversible error in
affirming the RTC’s decision convicting the petitioner of the crime of qualified theft.
Our Ruling
Sufficiency of the allegation of date

of the commission of the crime
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which lays down the guidelines
in determining the sufficiency of a complaint or information, provides:
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. - A complaint or information is

sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by
the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name
of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the
place where the offense was committed.
the complaint or information. (italics supplied; emphasis ours)
As to the sufficiency of the allegation of the date of the commission of the offense,
Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure adds:
Section 11. Date of commission of the offense. - It is not necessary to state in the

complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is
a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been
committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. [italics
supplied; emphasis ours]
Conformably with these provisions, when the date given in the complaint is not of the
essence of the offense, it need not be proven as alleged; thus, the complaint will be
sustained if the proof shows that the offense was committed at any date within the
period of the statute of limitations and before the commencement of the action.
In this case, the petitioner had been fully apprised of the charge of qualified theft since
the information stated the approximate date of the commission of the offense through
the words “sometime in the month of October, 2001.” The petitioner could reasonably
deduce the nature of the criminal act with which he was charged from a reading of the
contents of the information, as well as gather by such reading whatever he needed to
know about the charge to enable him to prepare his defense.
We stress that the information did not have to state the precise date when the offense
was committed, as to be inclusive of the month of “November 2001” since the date was
not a material element of the offense. As such, the offense of qualified theft could be
alleged to be committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its
commission.[17] Clearly, the month of November is the month right after October.
The crime of qualified theft was

committed with grave abuse of discretion
The elements of qualified theft, punishable under Article 310 in relation to Articles 308
and 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), are: (a) the taking of personal property; (b) the
said property belongs to another; (c) the said taking be done with intent to gain; (d) it be
done without the owner's consent; (e) it be accomplished without the use of violence or
intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things; and (f) it be done under any of
the circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of
confidence.[18]
All these elements are present in this case. The prosecution’s evidence proved, through
the prosecution’s eyewitnesses, that upon the petitioner’s instruction, several pieces of
wide flange steel beams had been delivered, twice in October 2001 and once in
November 2001, along Marcos Highway and Mabini Street, Baguio City; the petitioner
betrayed the trust and confidence reposed on him when he, as project manager,
repeatedly took construction materials from the project site, without the authority and
consent of Engr. Marigondon, the owner of the construction materials.
Corpus delicti is the fact of the

commission of the crime
The petitioner argues that his conviction was improper because the alleged stolen
beams or corpus delicti had not been established. He asserts that the failure to present
the alleged stolen beams in court was fatal to the prosecution’s cause.
The petitioner’s argument fails to persuade us.
“Corpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime charged or to the body
or substance of the crime. In its legal sense, it does not refer to the ransom money in
the crime of kidnapping for ransom or to the body of the person murdered” or, in this
case, to the stolen steel beams. “Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of
the crime, this Court has ruled that even a single witness' uncorroborated testimony, if
credible, may suffice to prove it and warrant a conviction therefor. Corpus delicti may
even be established by circumstantial evidence.”[19] “[I]n theft, corpus delicti has two
elements, namely: (1) that the property was lost by the owner, and (2) that it was lost
by felonious taking.”[20]
In this case, the testimonial and documentary evidence on record fully established
the corpus delicti. The positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly
Bernardo, Cano and Buen, stating that the petitioner directed them to unload the steel
beams along Marcos Highway and Mabini Street on the pretext of a new Anmar project,
were crucial to the petitioner’s conviction. The security logbook entry, delivery receipts
and photographs proved the existence and the unloading of the steel beams to a
different location other than the project site.
Proper Penalty
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, sentenced the petitioner to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment from 10 years and three months, as minimum, to 20 years, as maximum,
and to indemnify Anmar P2,269,731.69, with legal interest from November 2001 until
full payment. Apparently, the RTC erred in failing to specify the appropriate name of the
penalty imposed on the petitioner.
We reiterate the rule that it is necessary for the courts to employ the proper legal
terminology in the imposition of penalties because of the substantial difference in their
corresponding legal effects and accessory penalties. The appropriate name of the
penalty must be specified as under the scheme of penalties in the RPC, the principal
penalty for a felony has its own specific duration and corresponding accessory penalties.
[21]
Thus, the courts must employ the proper nomenclature specified in the RPC, such as
“reclusion perpetua” not “life imprisonment,” or “ten days of arresto menor” not “ten
days of imprisonment.” In qualified theft, the appropriate penalty is reclusion
perpetua based on Article 310 of the RPC which provides that “[t]he crime of [qualified]
theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those
respectively specified in [Article 309].” [22]
To compute the penalty, we begin with the value of the stolen steel beams, which is
P2,269,731.69. Based on Article 309 of the RPC, since the value of the items exceeds
P22,000.00, the basic penalty is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, to
be imposed in the maximum period, which is eight years, eight months and one day to
10 years of prision mayor.
To determine the additional years of imprisonment, we deduct P22,000.00 from

P2,269,731.69, which gives us P2,247,731.69. This resulting figure should then be
divided by PlO,OOO.OO, disregarding any amount less than PlO,OOO.OO. We now have
224 years that should be added to the basic penalty. However, the imposable penalty
for simple theft should not exceed a total of 20 years. Therefore, had petitioner
committed simple theft, the penalty would be 20 years of reclusion temporal. As the
penalty for qualified theft is two degrees higher, the correct imposable penalty
is reclusion perpetua.
The petitioner should thus be convicted of qualified theft with the corresponding
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the appeal. The June 27. 2005 decision and the
November 24, 2005 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 28369
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Engr. Anthony V. Zapanta is sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 189343, July 10, 2013 ]
BENILDA N. BACASMAS, PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN AND
[G.R. NO. 189369]
ALAN C. GAVIOLA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

RESPONDENT.
[G.R. NO. 189553]
EUSTAQUIO B. CESA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

RESPONDENT.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
Before us are three consolidated cases: (1) Petition for Review on Certiorari [1] dated 16
September 2009 (G.R. No. 189343), (2) Petition for Review on Certiorari[2] dated 15
September 2009 (G.R. No. 189369), and (3) Petition for Review on Certiorari[3] dated 12
October 2009 (G.R. No. 189553). All assail the Decision[4] in Crim. Case No. 26914
dated 7 May 2009 of the Sandiganbayan, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, accused Alan C. Gaviola (“Gaviola”), Eustaquio B. Cesa

(“Cesa”), Benilda N. Bacasmas (“Bacasmas”) and Edna J. Jaca (“Jaca”) are
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act
No. 3019 and are sentenced to suffer in prison the penalty of 12 years and 1 month to 15
years. They also have to suffer perpetual disqualification from holding any public office
and to indemnify jointly and severally the City Government of Cebu the amount of Nine
Million Eight Hundred Ten Thousand, Seven Hundred Fifty-two and 60/100 Pesos (Php
9,810,752.60).[5] (Emphases in the original)
The Petitions also question the Resolution[6] dated 27 August 2009 denying the Motions
for Reconsideration[7] of the Decision dated 7 May 2009.
Antecedent Facts
All the petitioners work for the City Government of Cebu.[8] Benilda B. Bacasmas
(Bacasmas), the Cash Division Chief, is the petitioner in G.R. No. 189343.[9] Alan C.
Gaviola (Gaviola), the City Administrator, is the petitioner in G.R. No. 189369.[10]
Eustaquio B. Cesa (Cesa), the City Treasurer, is the petitioner in G.R. No. 189553. [11]
By virtue of their positions, they are involved in the process of approving and releasing
cash advances for the City. The procedure is as follows:
A written request for a cash advance is made by paymaster Luz Gonzales (Gonzales),
who then submits it to Cash Division Chief Bacasmas for approval. Once the latter
approves the request, she affixes her initials to the voucher, which she forwards to City
Treasurer Cesa for his signature in the same box. By signing, Bacasmas and Cesa certify
that the expense or cash advance is necessary, lawful, and incurred under their direct
supervision.[12]
Thereafter, the voucher is forwarded to City Accountant Edna C. Jaca (Jaca) for
processing and pre-audit. She also signs the voucher to certify that there is adequate
available funding/budgetary allotment; that the expenditures are properly certified and
supported by documents; and that previous cash advances have been liquidated and
accounted for. She then prepares an Accountant’s Advice (Advice).[13]
This Advice is returned with the voucher to the Chief Cashier for the preparation of the
check. After it has been prepared, she affixes her initials to the check, which Cesa then
signs. Afterwards, City Administrator Gaviola approves the voucher and countersigns
the check.[14]
The voucher, the Advice, and the check are then returned to the Cash Division, where
Gonzales signs the receipt portion of the voucher, as well as the Check Register to
acknowledge receipt of the check for encashment.[15]
Upon receipt of the check, Gonzales encashes it at the bank, signs the voucher, and
records the cash advance in her Individual Paymaster Cashbook. She then liquidates it
within five days after payment.[16]
A report of those cash advances liquidated by Gonzales is called a Report of

Disbursement (RD). An RD must contain the audit voucher number, the names of the
local government employees who were paid using the money from the cash advance, the
amount for each employee, as well as the receipts. The RDs are examined and verified
by the City Auditor and are thereafter submitted to the Cash Division for recording in the
official cash book.[17]
On 4 March 1998, COA issued Office Order No. 98-001 creating a team to conduct an
examination of the cash and accounts of the accountable officers of the Cash Division,
City Treasurer’s Office of Cebu City.[18]
This team conducted a surprise cash count on 5 March 1998.[19] The examination
revealed an accumulated shortage of ?9,810,752.60 from 20 September 1995 to 5
March 1998 from the cash and accounts of Gonzales.[20] The team found that Bacasmas,
Gaviola, Cesa, and Jaca failed to follow the above-mentioned procedure, thus facilitating
the loss of more than nine million pesos on the part of the city government. Specifically,
the team said in its report that there were irregularities in the grant, utilization, and
liquidation of cash advances; shortages were concealed; and inaccurate and misleading
pieces of information were included in the financial statements.[21] These irregularities
were manifested in the following: additional cash advances were granted even if previous
cash advances had not yet been liquidated, cash advance vouchers for salaries were not
supported by payrolls or lists of payees, and cash advances for salaries and wages were
not liquidated within five days after each 15th day or end-of-the-month pay period.[22]
The report stated that Bacasmas, Gaviola, Cesa, and Jaca not only signed, certified, and
approved the cash advance vouchers, but also signed and countersigned the checks
despite the deficiencies, which amounted to a violation of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7160;
Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1445; and the circulars issued by the Commission on
Audit (COA), specifically COA Circular Nos. 90-331, 92-382 and 97-002. [23] According
to the COA, the violation of the foregoing laws, rules, and regulations facilitated the loss
of a huge amount of public funds at the hands of Gonzales.[24]
Hence, an Information[25] was filed with the Sandiganbayan on 30 July 2001 against

Bacasmas, Gaviola, Cesa, and Jaca, to wit:
That on or about the 5th day of March 1998, and for sometime prior and subsequent
thereto, at Cebu City, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, above-named accused, ALAN C. GAVIOLA, EUSTAQUIO B. CESA,
BENILDA N. BACASMAS and EDNA J. JACA, public officers, being then the City
Administrator, City Treasurer, Cash Division Chief and City Accountant, respectively, of
the Cebu City Government, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to
Office, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with each other [sic],
with deliberate intent, with manifest partiality, evident bad faith and with gross
inexcusable negligence, did then and there allow LUZ M. GONZALES, Accountant I,
Disbursing Officer-Designate of the Cebu City Government, to obtain cash advances
despite the fact that she has previous unliquidated cash advances, thus allowing LUZ M.
GONZALES to accumulate Cash Advances amounting to NINE MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED TEN THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO PESOS AND 60/100
(?9,810,752.60), PHILIPPINE CURRENCY, which remains unliquidated, thus accused
in the performance of their official functions, had given unwarranted benefits to LUZ M.
GONZALES and themselves, to the damage and prejudice of the government,
particularly the Cebu City Government.[26]
The prosecution presented the testimonies of the COA Auditors who had conducted the
examination on the cash and accounts of Gonzales: Cecilia Chan, Jovita Gabison,
Sulpicio Quijada, Jr., Villanilo Ando, Jr., and Rosemarie Picson.[27] The COA Narrative
Report[28] on the results of the examination of the cash and accounts of Gonzales covering
the period 20 September 1995 to 05 March 1998 was also introduced as evidence.[29]
Bacasmas testified in her own defense. She said that she could not be held liable,
because it was not her responsibility to examine the cash book. She pointed to Jaca and
the City Auditor as the ones responsible for determining whether the paymaster had
existing unliquidated cash advances. Bacasmas further testified that she allowed the
figures to be rounded off to the nearest million without totalling the net payroll, because
it was customary to round off the cash advance to the nearest amount.[30]
Cesa averred that Jaca was the approving authority in granting cash advances. Hence,
when he signed the vouchers, he merely relied on Jaca’s certification that Gonzales had
already liquidated her cash advances. Besides, he said, he had already delegated the
function of determining whether the amount stated in the disbursement voucher was
equal to the net pay, because it was humanly impossible for him to supervise all the
personnel of his department.[31]
Jaca admitted that cash advances were granted even if there were no liquidations, so that
salaries could be paid on time, because cash advances usually overlapped with the
previous one. Additionally, she acknowledged that when she affixed her signatures to the
vouchers despite the non-attachment of the payrolls, she was aware that Gonzales still
had unliquidated cash advances.[32]
Lastly, Gaviola claimed that when he affixed his signatures, he was not aware of any
anomaly. Allegedly, he only signed on the basis of the signatures of Cesa and Jaca. [33]
The Sandiganbayan, in its Decision dated 7 May 2009, did not give credence to the
defense of the accused, but instead afforded significant weight to the COA Narrative
Report submitted in evidence. It found that the accused, as public officers, had acted
with gross inexcusable negligence by religiously disregarding the instructions for
preparing a disbursement voucher and by being totally remiss in their respective duties
and functions under the Local Government Code of 1991.[34] Their gross inexcusable
negligence amounted to bad faith, because they still continued with the illegal practice
even if they admittedly had knowledge of the relevant law and COA rules and
regulations.[35] The Sandiganbayan held that the acts of the accused had caused not only
undue injury to the government because of the P9,810,752.60 shortage, but also gave
unwarranted benefit to Gonzales by allowing her to obtain cash advances to which she
was not entitled.[36] Lastly, it found conspiracy to be present in the acts and omissions of
the accused showing that they had confederated, connived with, and mutually helped one
another in causing undue injury to the government through the loss of public money.[37]
Gaviola, Cesa, Bacasmas, and Jaca individually filed their Motions for Reconsideration
of the 7 May 2009 Decision.[38] Their motions impugned the sufficiency of the
Information and the finding of gross inexcusable negligence, undue injury, and
unwarranted benefit.[39] To support their innocence, they invoked the cases of Arias v.
Sandiganbayan,[40] Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan,[41] Sistoza v. Desierto,[42] Alejandro v.
People,[43] and Albert v. Gangan,[44] in which we held that the heads of office may rely to
a reasonable extent on their subordinates.[45] The Motion for Reconsideration of Jaca also
averred that her criminal and civil liabilities had been extinguished by her death on 24
May 2009.[46]
The Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution[47] promulgated 27 August 2009 denied the Motions

for Reconsideration of the accused. It ruled that the Information was sufficient, because
the three modes of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 commonly involved willful,
intentional, and conscious acts or omissions when there is a duty to act on the part of the
public official or employee.[48] Furthermore, the three modes may all be alleged in one
Information.[49] The Sandiganbayan held that the accused were all guilty of gross
inexcusable negligence. Claiming that it was the practice in their office, they admittedly
disregarded the observance of the law and COA rules and regulations on the approval and
grant of cash advances.[50] The anti-graft court also stated that the undue injury to the
government was unquestionable because of the shortage amounting to P9,810,752.60. [51]
It further declared that the aforementioned cases cited by the accused were inapplicable,
because there was paucity of evidence of conspiracy in these cases. [52] Here, conspiracy
was duly proven in that the silence and inaction of the accused - albeit ostensibly separate
and distinct - indicate, if taken collectively, that they are vital pieces of a common design.
[53]
Finally, the Sandiganbayan decided that although the criminal liability of Jaca was
extinguished upon her death, her civil liability remained.[54] Hence, the Motions for
Reconsideration were denied.[55]
Thus, Bacasmas, Gaviola, and Cesa filed their respective Petitions for Review on
Certiorari, in which they rehashed the arguments they had put forward in their Motions
for Reconsideration previously filed with the Sandiganbayan.
We resolved to consolidate the three Petitions on 23 November 2009.[56] The Office of

the Special Prosecutor was required to comment on the three Petitions,[57] after which
petitioners were instructed to file a Reply,[58] which they did.[59]
Petitioners, through their respective Petitions for Review on Certiorari and Comments,
bring these two main issues before us:
I. Whether the Information was sufficient; and
II. Whether petitioners are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e)
of Republic Act No. 3019
We deny the Petitions.
I.
The Information specified when the crime was committed,
and it named all of the accused and their alleged acts or
omissions constituting the offense charged.
An information is deemed sufficient if it contains the following: (a) the name of all the
accused; (b) the designation of the offense as given in the statute; (c) the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; (d) the name of the offended party;
(e) the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and (f) the place where the
Cesa and Gaviola question the sufficiency of the Information on three grounds: first, it
did not specify a reasonable time frame within which the offense was committed, in
violation of their right to be informed of the charge against them; second, not all of the
accused were named, as Gonzales was not charged in the Information; and third, the
Information did not specify an offense, because negligence and conspiracy cannot co-
exist in a crime.
The Sandiganbayan earlier held that the Information was sufficient in that it contained no
inherent contradiction and properly charged an offense. We uphold its ruling for the
following reasons:
First, it is not necessary to state the precise date when the offense was committed, except
when it is a material ingredient thereof.[60] The offense may be alleged to have been
committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. [61] Here, the
date is not a material ingredient of the crime, not having been committed on one day
alone, but rather within a period of time ranging from 20 September 1995 to 5 March
1998. Hence, stating the exact dates of the commission of the crime is not only
unnecessary, but impossible as well. That the Information alleged a date and a period
during which the crime was committed was sufficient, because it duly informed
petitioners that before and until 5 March 1998, over nine million pesos had been taken by
Gonzales as a result of petitioners’ acts. These acts caused undue injury to the
government and unwarranted benefits to the said paymaster.
Second, the Information charges petitioners with violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, to
wit:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public

of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful.
xxxx
or gross inexcusable negligence.
Cesa contends that Gonzales should have been included in the Information, because the
latter incurred cash shortages and allegedly had unliquidated cash advances. [62] Cesa is
wrong. The Information seeks to hold petitioners accountable for their actions, which
allowed Gonzales to obtain cash advances, and paved the way for her to incur cash
shortages, leading to a loss of over nine million pesos. Thus, the Information correctly
excluded her because her alleged acts did not fall under the crime charged in the
Information.
Third and last, the Information sufficiently specified the offense that violated Section 3(e)
of R.A. 3019, the essential elements of which are as follows:

official functions;
2. The accused must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
3. The action of the accused caused undue injury to any party, including the
government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of the functions of the accused.[63]
The Information is sufficient, because it adequately describes the nature and cause of the
accusation against petitioners,[64] namely the violation of the aforementioned law. The
use of the three phrases – “manifest partiality,” “evident bad faith” and “inexcusable
negligence” - in the same Information does not mean that three distinct offenses were
thereby charged but only implied that the offense charged may have been committed
through any of the modes provided by the law.[65] In addition, there was no inconsistency
in alleging both the presence of conspiracy and gross inexcusable negligence, because the
latter was not simple negligence. Rather, the negligence involved a willful, intentional,
and conscious indifference to the consequences of one’s actions or omissions. [66]
II.
Petitioners’ gross negligence amounting to bad faith,
the undue injury to the government, and the unwarranted
benefits given to Gonzales, were all proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Petitioners do not controvert the first element of the offense but assail the
Sandiganbayan’s finding of gross inexcusable negligence, undue injury and unwarranted
benefit. Nevertheless, their contention must fail.
Petitioners committed gross negligence amounting

to bad faith when they approved and disbursed the
cash advances in violation of law and rules and
regulations.
Petitioners - being the Cash Division Chief, City Treasurer and City Administrator - have
to comply with R.A. 7160, P.D. 1445, and COA Circulars 90-331, 92-382, and 97-002 on
the proper procedure for the approval and grant of cash advances. These laws and rules
and regulations state that cash advances can only be disbursed for a legally authorized
specific purpose and cannot be given to officials whose previous cash advances have not
been settled or properly accounted for.[67] Cash advances should also be equal to the net
amount of the payroll for a certain pay period, and they should be supported by the
payroll or list of payees and their net payments.[68]
However, petitioners failed to observe the foregoing. We quote hereunder the findings of
the COA team as contained in its Narrative Report:
A. Granting, Utilization and Liquidation of cash advances:
1. During the period, September 20, 1995 to March 5, 1998, records and
verification documents show that additional cash advances were granted
(Annex 13), even if the previous cash advances were not yet liquidated.
It resulted in excessive granting of cash advances, which created the

opportunity to misappropriate public funds since excess or idle funds were
placed in the hands of the paymaster under her total control and disposal.
This is in violation of Section 89, PD 1445; Section 339, RA 7160 and
paragraph 4.1.2 of COA Circular No. 97-002.
2. The amounts of cash advances for salary payments were not equal to

the net amount of the payroll for a pay period in violation of par. 4.2.1.
COA Circular No. 90-331. Section 48 (g), COA Circular No. 92-382
and par. 4.2.1, COA Circular No. 97-002. In fact, all cash advance
vouchers for salaries were not supported by payrolls or list of payees to
determine the amount of the cash advance to be granted, and that the
face of the disbursement voucher (sample voucher marked as Annex
14) did not indicate the specific office/ department and period covered
for which the cash advance was granted in violation of par. 4.1.5 COA
Cir. No. 90-331, Section 48(e) COA Cir. 92-382 and par. 4.1.7 and 4.2.2
COA Cir No. 97-002. The amount of the cash advance could therefore be
in excess of the required amount of the payroll to be paid since it can not be
determined which payroll, pay period and department employees are going
to be paid by the amount drawn. Consequently, the liquidations which were
made later, cannot identify which particular cash advances are liquidated,
considering that there are other previous cash advances not yet liquidated,
thus resulting in the failure to control cash on hand.
3. Cash advances for salaries and wages were not liquidated within 5 days
after each 15 day/end of the month pay period in violation of par. 5.1.1
COA Cir. 90-331 and 97-002 and Section 48 (k) of COA Cir No. 92-382.
In fact, the balance of unliquidated cash advance as of December 31,
1997 per audit, amounted to P 10,602,527.90 consisting of
P6,388,147.94, P3,205,373.16 and P 1,009,006.80 for General, SEF and
Trust Fund (Annex 15) respectively, in violation of Par. 5.8 COA Cir
Nos. 90-331 and 97-002 and Section 48 (o) COA Cir. No. 92-
382. However, the balance shown was understated as of December 31,
1997 by P2,395,517.08 as discussed in items D.2 pages 15 & 16.
Records showed that part of the total cash advances of P12,000,000.00

appears to have been used to liquidate partially the previous year’s
unliquidated cash advance/balance of P10,602,527.90 since the
accountable officer liquidated her cash advance by way of cash
refunds/returns from January 8-14, 1998 in the total amount of
P8,076,382.36 (Annex 15 E) in violation of par. 4.1.5 COA Cir. 90-331,
Section 48 of COA Cir 92-382 and par. 4.1.7 of COA Cir. 97-002.
The concerned City Officials (refer to Part III of this report) signed,
certified and approved the disbursements/cash advance vouchers, and
signed and countersigned the corresponding checks despite the deficiencies
which are violations of laws, rules and regulations mentioned in the
preceding paragraphs.
The accountable officer was able to accumulate excess or idle funds

within her total control and disposal, resulting in the loss of public
funds, due to the flagrant violations by the concerned city officials of
the abovementioned laws, rules and regulations.
On the other hand, the verification and reconciliation of the

paymaster’s accountability cannot be determined immediately because
the submission of financial reports and its supporting schedules and
vouchers/payrolls by the Accounting Division was very much delayed
(Annex 16), in violation of Section 122, PD 1445, despite several
communications from the Auditor to submit said reports, latest of which is
attached as Annex 16.a.
xxxx
D. The following practices of the Office of the City Accountant resulted in

inaccurate and misleading information in the financial statements including the
balance of unliquidated cash advances in violation of Section 111 and 112 of PD
1445:
1. Cash returns made on January 8 to 14, 1998 were recorded in the accounting
records as credits to Mrs. Gonzales accountability in December 1997 amounting to
P8,075,382.36 as shown in the subsidiary ledger (Annex 20. 1-4) and as evidenced
by the official receipts (Annex 20a. 1-6) as follows:
xxxx
2. Some liquidations/ disbursements in January 1998 were included as credits to

accountability or a reduction of the paymaster's accountability as of December
1997 amounting to P2,395,517.08.
xxxx
3. Verification of accounting records maintained in the Accounting Division revealed

that the index cards (Annex 21) as a control device in the processing of cash
advance voucher recorded only cash advances granted to Paymaster. It failed to
show the liquidations/ disposition of public funds. Hence, unliquidated balance of
cash advances can not be determined at a glance when a cash advance voucher is
being processed by the accounting personnel.
E. Other Deficiencies:
1. There were two claimants who alleged that they did not receive the financial aid
intended for them as fire victims. However, payroll showed that there were
initials/signatures indicated therein acknowledging receipt of said claim.
2. There were two (2) cash advance vouchers (Annex 22b. 1-2) which bear no
approval of proper official in BOX marked as “C” hereof, yet checks were issued
in violation of Section 4.5 of PD 1445 which provide that disbursement or
disposition of government funds of property shall invariably bear the approval of
the proper officials. x x x
3. Accounting records showed that JV #354 under Trust Fund in the amount of
P147,200.00 was a liquidation on December 31, 1997. x x x one payroll
supporting the JV was signed by only one (1) person x x x. The other two payrolls
supporting the JV were not signed/ approved by the concerned officials, which
means that the payrolls were not valid disbursements.[69] (Emphases supplied)
The above findings of the COA cannot be any clearer in thoroughly describing the illegal
and anomalous practices of the accused which led to the loss of P9,810,752.60 in
people’s money.
When he testified before the anti-graft court, Bacasmas admitted that she did not consider
the net pay, which was lower than the amount requested, when she affixed her signature
to the vouchers, because it was supposedly common practice for the paymaster to round
off the figures.[70] Furthermore, she signed the vouchers after relying on the
representation of Jaca, Cesa, and Gaviola.[71]
During his direct and cross-examination, Gaviola admitted that he had affixed his
signature to the vouchers, because they had already been signed by Bacasmas, Cesa, and
Jaca despite the incompleteness thereof - the periods covered by the vouchers were not
stated; the employees who were to be paid by the cash advance were not specified; no
supporting documents were attached to the cash advances requested; and there was no
determination of whether the amounts requested were equivalent to the net pay. [72]
Cesa said that because it was impossible for him to supervise all the personnel, he
instructed Bacasmas to examine and check the documents before signing them. [73] Thus,
once Cesa saw the signature of Bacasmas, he immediately assumed that the documents
were in order, and he then signed the vouchers.[74]
These facts show that petitioners failed to act in accordance with their respective duties in
the grant of cash advances. Moreover they repeatedly failed to do so. Bacasmas signed
294 requests for cash advance, 11 disbursement vouchers, and 7 checks. Cesa signed
cash advance requests and 299 disbursement vouchers. Gaviola approved 303
disbursement vouchers and signed 355 checks.
All these acts demonstrate that petitioners, as correctly found by the Sandiganbayan, were
guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith. Gross and inexcusable negligence is
characterized by a want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation
in which there is a duty to act - not inadvertently, but wilfully and intentionally, with
conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons are affected. [75] Bad faith
does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence.[76] It imports a dishonest
purpose or some moral obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known
duty due to some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud.[77]
Petitioners were well aware of their responsibilities before they affixed their signatures
on the cash advance vouchers. Yet, they still chose to disregard the requirements laid
down by law and rules and regulations by approving the vouchers despite the incomplete
information therein, the previous unliquidated cash advances, the absence of payroll to
support the cash requested, and the disparity between the requested cash advances and the
total net pay. What is worse is that they continue to plead their innocence, allegedly for
the reason that it was “common practice” in their office not to follow the law and rules
and regulations to the letter. For them to resort to that defense is preposterous,
considering that as public employees they are required to perform and discharge their
duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill. [78]
The law and the rules are clear and do not provide for exceptions.
Petitioners’ acts show that they were unified
in illegally approving irregular cash advance
vouchers in order to defraud the government.
As found by the Sandiganbayan, petitioners’ acts not only show gross negligence
amounting to bad faith, but, when taken together, also show that there was conspiracy in
their willful noncompliance with their duties in order to defraud the government.
In order to establish the existence of conspiracy, unity of purpose and unity in the
execution of an unlawful objective by the accused must be proven.[79] Direct proof is not
essential to show conspiracy.[80] It is enough that there be proof that two or more persons
acted towards the accomplishment of a common unlawful objective through a chain of
circumstances, even if there was no actual meeting among them. [81]
A cash advance request cannot be approved and disbursed without passing through
several offices, including those of petitioners. It is outrageous that they would have us
believe that they were not in conspiracy when over hundreds of vouchers were signed and
approved by them in a course of 30 months, without their noticing irregularities therein
that should have prompted them to refuse to sign the vouchers. Clearly, they were in
cahoots in granting the cash advances to Gonzales. By these acts, petitioners defrauded
the government of such a large sum of money that should not have been disbursed in the
first place, had they been circumspect in performing their functions.
Not only were petitioners unified in defrauding the government, but they were also
unified in not reporting the negligence of their cohorts because of their own negligence.
Cesa himself admitted knowing that Gonzales had unliquidated cash advances, yet he
signed the vouchers. He also failed to inform the other officials that they should not sign
the vouchers and tolerated their negligence when they affixed their signatures thereto.
Petitioners, through their admissions before the Sandiganbayan, all knew that there were
irregularities in the vouchers; still they failed to correct one another, because they
themselves signed the vouchers despite the glaring irregularities therein.
Petitioners cannot hide behind our declaration in Arias v. Sandiganbayan[82] that heads of

offices cannot be convicted of a conspiracy charge just because they did not personally
examine every single detail before they, as the final approving authorities, affixed their
signatures to certain documents. The Court explained in that case that conspiracy was
not adequately proven, contrary to the case at bar in which petitioners’ unity of purpose
and unity in the execution of an unlawful objective were sufficiently established. Also,
unlike in Arias, where there were no reasons for the heads of offices to further examine
each voucher in detail, petitioners herein, by virtue of the duty given to them by law as
well as by rules and regulations, had the responsibility to examine each voucher to
ascertain whether it was proper to sign it in order to approve and disburse the cash
advance.
Petitioners wrongly approved Gonzales’ cash

advance vouchers, thereby causing a loss to
the government in the amount of P9,810,752.60.
The third element of the offense is that the action of the offender caused undue injury to
any party, including the government; or gave any party any unwarranted benefit,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his or her functions. Here, the
Sandiganbayan found that petitioners both brought about undue injury to the government
and gave unwarranted benefit to Gonzales. It is not mistaken.
Undue injury means actual damage.[83] It must be established by evidence[84] and must

have been caused by the questioned conduct of the offenders.[85] On the other hand,
unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference means giving a gain of any kind without
justification or adequate reasons.[86]
When a cash examination is conducted, the paymaster should present her cashbook, cash,
and cash items for examination.[87] Upon assessment thereof in the instant case, it was
discovered that P9,810,752.60 was missing, as plainly evidenced by the COA Narrative
Report, from which we quote:
Balance last cash examination, September 20, 1995 P 2,685,719.78

Add: Cash Advances received – September 20, 1995 to March 5,
1998
Gen. Fund 193,320,350.00
SEF 107,400,600.00
Trust Fund 3,989,783.00 304,710,733.00
Total: P 307,396,452.78
Less: Liquidations – September 20, 1995 to March 5, 1998
Gen. Fund 187,290,452.66
SEF 105,243,526.99
Trust Fund 2,750,722.51 295,284,752.16
Balance of Accountability, March 5, 1998 P 12,111,700.62
Less: Inventory of Cash and Cash Items Allowed 2,300,948.02
Shortage P 9,810,752.60[88]
(Emphasis supplied)
It is beside the point that no one complained about not receiving any salary from the city
government. The fact remains that more than nine million pesos was missing – public
funds lost, to the detriment of the government.
This undue injury was brought about by petitioners’ act of approving the cash advance
vouchers of Gonzales even if they lacked the requirements prescribed by law and rules
and regulations, and even if Gonzales had failed to liquidate her previous cash advances,
thereby clearly giving her an unwarranted benefit.
No less than the Constitution declares that public office is a public trust. [89] Public
officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people and serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency.[90] Petitioners, by
intentionally approving deficient cash advance vouchers, have manifestly failed to live up
to this constitutional standard.
III.
The indeterminate penalty of 12 years and one
month as minimum to 15 years as maximum is fully justified.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the offense is punished by a special law such
as R.A. 3019, the trial court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by this law, and the
minimum term shall not be less than the minimum prescribed by the same law. The
penalty for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 is “imprisonment for not less than six
years and one month nor more than fifteen years, perpetual disqualification from public
office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any prohibited
interest and unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other
lawful income.” Hence, the indeterminate penalty of 12 years and 1 month as minimum
to 15 years as maximum imposed by the Sandiganbayan in the present case is within the
range fixed by law.
However, we are aware that if the range of imposable penalty under the law were to be
divided into three tiers based on the length of imprisonment, the penalty imposed in this
case would be on the highest tier. Hence, the Sandiganbayan should have explained the
reason behind its imposed penalty, for while Section 9 of R.A. 3019 seems to grant it
discretion over the indeterminate penalty to be prescribed for violation of Section 3(e),
this Court finds it only proper that the anti-graft court justify the latter’s imposition of the
highest possible penalty. Otherwise, the exercise of this discretion would appear to be
whimsical – something that this Court will not tolerate. After all, it is our duty to be
vigilant in ensuring the correctness and justness of the ultimate adjudication of cases
before us.
Nevertheless, we find the imposition of the highest range of imposable penalty in this
case to be fully justified. In Jaca v. People of the Philippines,[91] promulgated on 28
January 2013, the Court convicted the very same petitioners herein of exactly the same
kinds of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 as those in the present case and imposed
therein the indeterminate penalty of 12 years and 1 month as minimum to 15 years as
maximum. The violations in that case arose from acts of gross inexcusable
negligence similar in all respects to those committed in this case, except for the amount
of cash shortages involved and the identity of the paymaster who benefitted from the acts
of petitioners. Even the period covered by the COA audit in Jaca – 20 September 1995 to
5 March 1998 – is exactly the same as that in the present case. It is therefore clear that the
Court has previously determined these identical acts to be so perverse as to justify the
penalty of imprisonment of 12 years and 1 month as minimum to 15 years as maximum.
Hence, we adopt the same penalty in this case.
Indeed, the penalty imposed is justified, considering the extent of the negligent acts
involved in this case in terms of the number of statutory laws and regulations violated by
petitioners and the number of positive duties neglected. The Court emphasizes that
petitioners violated not just one but several provisions of various regulations and laws
namely: Sections 89 and 122 of P.D. 1445, Section 339 of R.A. 7160, paragraphs 4.1.2,
4.1.7, 4.2.1, 4.2.2, and 5.1.1 of COA Circular No. 97-002, paragraphs 4.2.1, 4.1.5, and
5.1.1 of COA Circular No. 90-331, and Section 48 (g), (e), and (k) of COA Circular No.
92-382. Worse, they admitted being aware of these regulations. These circumstances,
coupled with the number of times such instances of violations and negligence were
wantonly and systematically repeated, show that their acts bordered on malice. Hence, we
are convinced that the penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan is warranted.
Furthermore, we take judicial notice of the need to stop these corrupt practices that drain
local government coffers of millions of pesos in taxpayers’ money, which could have
been utilized for sorely needed services. In fact, as discussed in its Narrative Report, the
COA team found instances where fire victims alleged that they did not receive the
financial aid intended for them and yet the payroll showed that there were
initials/signatures indicated therein acknowledging receipt of said claim. This diversion
of people’s money from their intended use has to end.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the 07 May 2009 Decision and 27 August
2009 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case No. 26914 are AFFIRMED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 159450, March 30, 2011 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. OLIVIA
ALETH GARCIA CRISTOBAL, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Although a waiver of the right to present evidence by the accused is not a trivial matter to
be lightly regarded by the trial court, the filing of the demurrer to evidence without
express leave of court operates as a waiver that binds the accused pursuant to the express
provision of the Rules of Court.
Under challenge in this appeal is the decision promulgated on July 31, 2003 in C.A.-G.R.
CR No. 24556, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction for qualified
theft of the accused, a teller of complainant Prudential Bank, and punished her
with reclusion perpetua,[1] thereby modifying the decision dated May 26, 2000 rendered
by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, in Angeles City (RTC),[2] imposing an
indeterminate sentence from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum
to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Antecedents
The information charged the accused with qualified theft, alleging:
That on or about the 2nd of January, 1996, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, OLIVIA ALETH
GARCIA CRISTOBAL, being then the teller of Prudential Bank, Angeles Main Branch,
Sto. Rosario Street, Angeles City, and as such is entrusted with cash and other
accountabilities, with grave abuse of trust and confidence reposed upon her by her
employer, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner
thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry
away cash money amounting to $10,000.00, belonging to the Prudential Bank, Angeles
Main Branch, represented by its Branch Manager, EDGARDO PANLILIO, to the
damage and prejudice of Prudential Bank, Angeles Main Branch, in the aforementioned
amount of TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($10,000.00) or its equivalent of TWO
HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS (P260,000.00), Philippine Currency and parity
rate.
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
After the accused pleaded not guilty at arraignment, the State presented four witnesses,
namely: Prudential Bank Branch Manager Edgardo Panlilio, Sr., Bank Auditor Virgilio
Frias, Bank Cashier Noel Cunanan, and account holder Apolinario Tayag.
The summary of the evidence of the State rendered in the assailed decision of the CA
follows:[4]
xxx
Among the six tellers in the Angeles City main branch of Prudential Bank, accused-
appellant (hereafter "appellant") was the only teller assigned to handle dollar deposits and
withdrawals.
On January 2, 1996, an internal spot-audit team headed by Prudential Bank's senior audit
examiner Virgilio Frias ("Frias"), inventoried the cash accountabilities of the said branch
by manually counting the money in each of the tellers' cash boxes. While the books of the
branch showed that appellant had a cash accountability of $15,040.52, the money in her
cash box was only $5,040.52.
Asked about the shortage of $10,000.00, appellant explained that there was a withdrawal
of $10,000.00 on December 29, 1995 after the cutoff time which would be treated as a
withdrawal on January 2, 1996. Appellant then presented to Frias a withdrawal memo
dated January 2, 1996 showing a withdrawal of $10,000.00 from Dollar Savings Account
No. FX-836 ("FX-836") of Adoracion Tayag and her co-signatory, Apolinario Tayag.
On January 3, 1996, appellant showed the aforesaid withdrawal memo to the branch
cashier, Noel Cunanan ("Cunanan"). Noticing that the said withdrawal memo did not
contain the required signatures of two bank officers, Cunanan asked appellant what the
nature of the transaction was. Appellant replied that the depositor, Apolinario Tayag, had
instructed her to withdraw $10,000.00 from his account on January 3, 1996, through his
driver whom he had sent to the bank. Cunanan, however, did not notice that while the
withdrawal was supposed to have been made on January 3, 1996, the withdrawal memo
was dated January 2, 1996. Cunanan then instructed appellant to have the withdrawal
posted in the corresponding ledger and to bring the withdrawal memo back to him so he
and the branch manager, Edgardo Panlilio, could affix their signatures.
Meanwhile, Frias checked the account ledger of FX-836, and found a "hold jacket"
indicating that no withdrawal from the said account should be allowed to reduce its
balance below $35,000.00. The supposed withdrawal of $10,000.00 had reduced the
account balance of FX-836 to $26,077.51.
From the account ledger, Frias also discovered that a deposit of $10,000.00 was made on
January 2, 1996. He found the deposit memo on file. Thereafter, Frias compared the
signature on the withdrawal memo with the specimen signatures of the depositors in their
signature card. Finding a "big difference" in the signatures, he referred the matter to the
branch manager, Edgardo Panlilio ("Panlilio").
Asked by Panlilio to explain, appellant reiterated that the withdrawal was made after the
cut-off time on December 29, 1995. Doubting her explanation, Frias conducted another
cash count. At that time, appellant's accountability based on the books of the bank was
$21,778.86, but the money in her cash box was only $11,778.86, thus, short of
US$10,000.00. When Panlilio again asked appellant to explain, the latter started to cry
and said she would explain to the bank president.
The next day, January 4, 1996, appellant told Panlilio that she gave the $10,000.00 to a
person on December 29, 1995 because her family was being threatened.
In her letter to the bank president dated January 4, 1996, appellant apologized and
explained her shortage of $10,000.00 and another shortage of P2.2 Million which the
audit team had also discovered. She wrote:
... Sometime in the month of September, a man approached me at my counter and handed
me a note demanding me (sic) to give him a big amount of money of P600,000. I looked
at him and told him I don't have any. He told me to get at my drawer and not to tell
anybody because their companions are at the nearby of my house (sic) and threatened me
that something will happened (sic) to my kids. That time he looked back and I also saw
another man w/ radio at his waist, who stood up and went out. I nervously handed him
the money. While doing this, I tried to pull the alarm at my counter but it was out of
order. This alarm was out of order for quite sometime but I was still hoping it might
work. Since that day, time and again, he kept on coming back and I could'nt do anything
but to give in to his request. His second, he demanded for (sic) another P600,000 but I
gave him only P530,000. The 3rd & 4th was P550,000 each. Last December 29, 1995 at
around 3:00 pm, I was surprised to see him at my counter, again, he was asking for
money. I was balancing my dollar transaction. But that time, I had delivered my peso
cash box to our cashier. He saw the bundle of $10,000 which was on top of my desk
because I was writing the breakdown on my cash count. He wanted me to give it to him
& this time he pointed a gun at me and I got so nervous & gave him the dollars.
During this time, in order for me to be balance with (sic) my transactions, I cash out
checks (suppose to be for late deposit) & included them in today's clearing. The
following day, I validated the deposit slips as cash deposit. . .
Apolinario Tayag denied withdrawing $10,000.00 from FX-836 either on December 29,
1995 or on January 2, 1996 when he was in Baguio City. He said he was not familiar with
the withdrawal and deposit memos showing the withdrawal of $10,000.00 from the said
account and the subsequent deposit of the same amount therein. He also denied the
signatures thereon as his or his mother's.
xxx
Upon the State resting its case against the accused, her counsel filed a Demurrer to
Evidence and Motion to Defer Defense Evidence,[5] praying for the dismissal of the
charge on the ground that the evidence of the State did not suffice to establish her guilt
However, the RTC denied the Demurrer to Evidence and Motion to Defer Defense
Evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision on the basis that her filing her
demurrer to evidence without express leave of court as required by Section 15, Rule 119,
of the Rules of Court had waived her right to present evidence, viz:[6]
WHEREFORE, the Demurer to Evidence filed by the accused is hereby denied for lack
of merit.
Reviewing further the records of this case, there is evidence and proof that the
Demurrer to Evidence fifed by the accused Cristobal is without express leave of
court hence, under Section 15 par. 2 of Rule 119, accused Cristobal has waived her
right to present evidence and submit the case for judgment on the basis of the
evidence for the prosecution.
In view thereof, this case filed against accused Cristobal is hereby submitted for decision.
SO ORDERED.
On May 26, 2000, therefore, the RTC rendered its decision finding and pronouncing the
accused guilty of qualified theft,[7] disposing:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Olivia Aleth Cristobal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Qualified Theft and hereby sentences her to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Accused Cristobal is also ordered to pay Prudential Bank, the amount of US $10,000.00,
representing the amount that was lost, plus interest.
SO ORDERED.
The accused appealed, but the CA affirmed her conviction on July 31, 2003, albeit
modifying the penalty,[8] finding and ruling as follows:
The following circumstances as established by the prosecution's evidence, show beyond

reasonable doubt that appellant stole US$10,000.00 from Prudential Bank:
1. Appellant was the only teller in the Angeles City main branch of Prudential Bank
assigned to handle dollar transactions. Thus, it was only she who had access to the
subject account for purposes of dollar deposits and withdrawals;
2. She admitted having transacted or processed the supposed withdrawal of
US$10,000.00 from dollar savings account no. FX-836;
3. It was she who presented to the head auditor, Rolando Frias, the withdrawal memo for
US$10,000.00 supposedly withdrawn from dollar savings account no. FX-836, saying
that it was withdrawn on December 29, 1995 after the cut-off time and would be
considered a withdrawal on January 2, 1996;
4. The said withdrawal memo did not contain the required signatures of two bank
officers;
5. The supposed withdrawal of $10,000.00 from dollar savings account no. FX-836
reduced the balance thereof to 826,077.51, violating the "hold jacket" or instruction in the
account ledger which disallowed any withdrawal from the said account that would reduce
the balance thereof below P35,000.00;
6. The discrepancy in the signature on the withdrawal memo and the specimen signatures
in the depositors' signature card;
7. Asked to explain the shortage of $10,000.00 revealed by the second cash count,
following the discovery of the aforesaid "hold jacket" in the account ledger and
discrepancy in the signatures, appellant began to cry, saying she would just explain to the
bank president;
8. The depositor, Apolinario Tayag, denied withdrawing money from dollar savings
account no. FX-836 either on December 29, 1995, when appellant claimed the
withdrawal was made, or on January 2, 1996, the date of the withdrawal memo, at which
time he was in Baguio City. He was not familiar with the withdrawal and deposit memos
showing the withdrawal of $10,000.00 from the said account and the subsequent deposit
of the same amount therein. He also denied that the signatures thereon belong to him or
his mother, Adoracion Tayag, with whom he shares the account as co-signatory;
9. In her letter to the bank president, she admitted appropriating US$10,000.00 and P2.2
Million, and explained how she covered it up;
10. Appellant gave different and inconsistent explanations for her shortage of
US$10,000.00. She explained to the auditors that the said amount was withdrawn on
December 29, 1995 after the cut-off time, hence, would be considered as a withdrawal on
January 2, 1996. To the branch cashier, Noel Cunanan, she said that Apolinario Tayag
had instructed her to withdraw $10,000.00 from his account on January 3, 1996, through
his driver whom he had sent to the bank. Later, she told Panlilio and the bank president
that she gave the $10,000.00 to a person on December 29, 1995 because he had
threatened her family; and
11. In her letter to the bank president, she mentioned five instances when the unidentified
man supposedly threatened her and demanded money from her. However, she never
reported any of these incidents to any of the bank officers or the police authorities.
Even without an eyewitness, the foregoing circumstances indicate that appellant

committed the crime, to the exclusion of all others.
In the absence of an eyewitness, reliance on circumstantial evidence becomes inevitable.

Circumstantial evidence is defined as that which indirectly proves a fact in issue through
an inference which the factfinder draws from the evidence established. Resort thereto is
essential when the lack of direct testimony would, in many cases, result in setting a felon
free and denying proper protection to the community. In order that circumstantial
evidence may be sufficient to convict, the same must comply with these essential
requisites, viz., (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
As hereinbefore shown, there is more than one circumstance or indication of appellant's

guilt. Moreover, the said circumstances, from which the act of taking could be inferred,
had been established by the prosecution's evidence. And the combination of the said
circumstances is clearly sufficient to convict the appellant of qualified theft beyond
reasonable doubt.
In conclusion, We hold that the totality of the evidence points to no other conclusion than
that accused-appellant is guilty of the crime charged. Evidence is weighed not counted.
When facts or circumstances which are proved are not only consistent with the guilt of
the accused but also inconsistent with his innocence, such evidence, in its weight and
probative force, may surpass direct evidence in its effect upon the court. This is how it is
in this case.
xxx
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision convicting the accused-appellant of Qualified Theft

is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua and the accessory penalties of death under Article 40 of the Revised Penal
Code, and accused-appellant shall pay Prudential Bank US$10,000.00, without interest.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
In her appeal, the accused submits that the CA gravely erred:

1. xxx in affirming the conviction of the accused on the basis of an information for
qualified theft that charges the accused to have taken $10,000.00 on January 2,
1996 when the evidence on record based on various admissions of the
prosecution's witnesses reveal that the accused did not and cannot take away
$10,000.00 on January 2, 1996.
2. xxx in affirming the conviction of the accused based on an extra-judicial

admission that was made without assistance of counsel and hearsay evidence as
testified by the next most possible suspects to the loss.
3. xxx in affirming the conviction of the accused when the facts and evidence on
record do not satisfy the elements of the crime as charged.
4. xxx in affirming the conviction of the accused when the very procedure employed
by the trial court in the case at bench showed leniency to the prosecution and
strictness to the defense in violation of the constitutional and statutory rights of the
accused.
5. xxx in affirming the ruling of the trial court that the accused had waived her right
to present evidence-in-chief despite the expressed motion to defer its presentation
when the demurrer to evidence was filed.[9]
The assigned errors are restated thuswise:
(a) Whether the information filed against the accused was fatally defective;
(b) Whether the RTC correctly found that the accused had waived her right to present
evidence in her defense; and
(c) Whether the extrajudicial admission of taking the amount involved contained in the
letter of the accused to the President of Prudential Bank was admissible under the rules
and jurisprudence.
Ruling
We deny the petition for review and affirm the CA's decision.
1.
Findings of CA and RTC are affirmed
due to being based on the evidence
There is no question about the findings of fact being based on the evidence adduced by
the Prosecution. The decisions of both lower courts are remarkable for their
thoroughness and completeness. In fact, the accused did not impugn the findings of fact,
and confined herself only to the validity of the information and the legality of her letter
due to its being held admissible as evidence against her. Although she decried her failure
to present her evidence on account of her having demurred without express leave of
court, that, too, was not an obstacle to the correctness of the findings of fact against her.
Thus, we sustain the findings of fact, for findings of the CA upon factual matters are
conclusive and ought not to be disturbed unless they are shown to be contrary to the
evidence on record.[10]
2.
Information was sufficient and valid
The petitioner submits that the information charged her with qualified theft that allegedly
transpired on December 29, 1995, but the evidence at trial could not be the basis of her
conviction because it actually proved that the taking had transpired on January 2, 1996;
and that the discrepancy would unduly prejudice her rights as an accused to be informed
of the charges as to enable her to prepare for her defense. To bolster her submission, she
cites the testimony of Virgilio Frias[11] to the effect that she was cleared of her
accountability upon her turning her cash box over to the bank cashier on December 29,
1995, thereby negating the accusation that she had taken the money on December 29,
1995.
The petitioner's submission is untenable.
The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set forth in the
information is to enable the accused to adequately prepare her defense. [12] As to the
sufficiency of the allegation of the time or date of the commission of the offense, Section
6 and Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, the rules applicable,[13] provide:
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. - A complaint or information is

sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute;
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense; and the place wherein
the offense was committed.
the complaint or information. (5a)
Section 11. Time of the commission of the offense. - It is not necessary to state in the
complaint or information the precise time at which the offense was committed
except when time is a material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged
to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense
was committed as the information or complaint will permit. (10)
Conformably with these rules, the information was sufficient because it stated
the approximate time of the commission of the offense through the words "on or about
the 2nd of January, 1996," and the accused could reasonably deduce the nature of the
criminal act with which she was charged from a reading of its contents as well as gather
by such reading whatever she needed to know about the charge to enable her to prepare
her defense.
The information herein did not have to state the precise date when the offense was
committed, considering that the date was not a material ingredient of the offense. As
such, the offense of qualified theft could be alleged to be committed on a date as near as
possible to the actual date of its commission.[14] Verily, December 29, 1995 and January
2, 1996 were dates only four days apart.
With the information herein conforming to the standard erected by the Revised Rules of
Court and pertinent judicial pronouncements, the accused was fully apprised of the
charge of qualified theft involving the US$10,000.00 belonging to her employer on or
about January 2, 1996.
3.
CA and RTC did not err in deeming petitioner
to have waived her right to present evidence
The accused contended that:
xxx
(2) The trial court denied accused (sic) 'Demurrer To Evidence and Motion To Defer
Defense Evidence' and ruled that the accused is considered to have waived her evidence
(for alleged lack of leave of court). Although the accused is not principally relying on
this error (because the prosecution's own evidence show that she is not guilty), still it was
error for the trial court to deprive the accused of her day in court because the demurrer
was at the same time, as stated in the title thereof, also a motion to defer defense
evidence.[15]
The CA rejected her contention in the following manner:[16]
As to whether or not the Trial Court correctly ruled that appellant waived the presentation
of her evidence when she filed her "Demurrer To Evidence and Motion to Defer
Evidence" without prior leave of court, We rule in the affirmative.
Appellant's theory that prior leave of court had been requested because her demurrer was,
at the same time, also a motion to defer defense evidence, cannot be sustained. A motion
to defer evidence does not constitute a request for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. In
fact, such motion indicates that appellant wanted the Trial Court to consider the demurrer
before proceeding to hear her evidence. Furthermore, there is nothing in appellant's
Demurrer from which it can be inferred that appellant was asking the Trial Court
permission to move for the dismissal of the case.
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Sec. 15. Demurrer to Evidence. - After the prosecution has rested its case, the court may
dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its own initiative after
giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused filed
with prior leave of court.
If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his
defense. When the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court,
he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis
of the evidence for the prosecution. (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, when the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court, he
waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the
evidence for the prosecution. In such a case, the waiver of the right to present defense
evidence is unqualified.
Unavoidably, Our attention is drawn to the apparent negligence of appellant's counsel in

failing to secure prior leave of court before filing her Demurrer to Evidence. However,
We cannot lose sight of the fact that in law, the negligence of appellant's counsel binds
her. Indeed, jurisprudence teems with pronouncements that a client is bound by the
conduct, negligence and mistakes of his counsel.
The CA did not thereby err.
The rule in point is Section 15, Rule 119, of the Revised Rules of Court, viz:
Section 15. Demurrer to evidence. - After the prosecution has rested its case, the court
may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its own initiative
after giving the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused
filed with prior leave of court.
If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his
defense. When the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of
court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on
the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. (n)
Under the rule, the RTC properly declared the accused to have waived her right to present
evidence because she did not obtain the express leave of court for her demurrer to
evidence, thereby reflecting her voluntary and knowing waiver of her right to present
evidence. The RTC did not need to inquire into the voluntariness and intelligence of the
waiver, for her opting to file her demurrer to evidence without first obtaining express
leave of court effectively waived her right to present her evidence.
It is true that the Court has frequently deemed the failure of the trial courts to conduct an
inquiry into the voluntariness and intelligence of the waiver to be a sufficient cause to
remand cases to the trial courts for the purpose of ascertaining whether the accused truly
intended to waive their constitutional right to be heard, and whether they understood the
consequences of their waivers.[17] In People v. Bodoso,[18] a prosecution for a capital
offense, we leaned towards the protection of the accused's constitutional right to due
process by outlining the proper steps to be taken before deeming the right to present
evidence as waived, thus:
Henceforth, to protect the constitutional right to due process of every accused in a capital
offense and to avoid any confusion about the proper steps to be taken when a trial court
comes face to face with an accused or his counsel who wants to waive his client's right to
present evidence and be heard, it shall be the unequivocal duty of the trial court to
observe, as a prerequisite to the validity of such waiver, a procedure akin to a "searching
inquiry" as specified in People v. Aranzado when an accused pleads guilty, particularly -
1. The trial court shall hear both the prosecution and the accused with their respective
counsel on the desire or manifestation of the accused to waive the right to present
evidence and be heard.
2. The trial court shall ensure the attendance of the prosecution and especially the
accused with their respective counsel in the hearing which must be recorded. Their
presence must be duly entered in the minutes of the proceedings.
3. During the hearing, it shall be the task of the trial court to -
a. ask the defense counsel a series of question to determine whether he had
conferred with and completely explained to the accused that he had the right to
present evidence and be heard as well as its meaning and consequences, together
with the significance and outcome of the waiver of such right. If the lawyer for the
accused has not done so, the trial court shall give the latter enough time to fulfill
this professional obligation.
b. inquire from the defense counsel with conformity of the accused whether he
wants to present evidence or submit a memorandum elucidating on the
contradictions and insufficiency of the prosecution evidence, if any, or in default
theory, file a demurrer to evidence with prior leave of court, if he so believes that
the prosecution evidence is so weak that it need not even be rebutted. If there is a
desire to do so, the trial court shall give the defense enough time to this purpose.
c. elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age,
socio-economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a
trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed waiver.
d. all questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and
understood by the latter, hence, the record must state the language used for this
purpose as well as reflect the corresponding translation thereof in English.
In passing, trial courts may also abide by the foregoing criminal procedure when the
waiver of the right to be present and be heard is made in criminal cases involving non-
capital offenses. After all, in whatever action or forum the accused is situated, the waiver
that he makes if it is to be binding and effective must still be exhibited in the case records
to have been validly undertaken, that is, it was done voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences. As a matter of good court practice, the trial court would have to rely upon
the most convenient, if not primary, evidence of the validity of the waiver which would
amount to the same thing as showing its adherence to the step-by-step process outlined
above.
Also, in Rivera v. People,[19] which involved an accused charged with a non-capital

offense who filed a demurrer to evidence without leave of court, the Court, citing People
v. Bodoso, supra, remanded the case to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings upon
finding that the accused had not been asked whether he had understood the consequences
of filing the demurrer to evidence without leave of court.
Yet, the accused cannot be extended the benefit of People v. Bodoso and Rivera v.

People. The factual milieus that warranted the safeguards in said criminal cases had
nothing in common with the factual milieu in which the RTC deemed the herein accused
to have waived her right to present evidence. The accused in People v. Bodoso, without
filing a demurrer to evidence, expressly waived the right to present evidence. The Court
felt that the trial court ought to have followed the steps outlined therein. The accused
in Rivera v. People filed a demurrer to evidence without having to obtain an express
leave of court, considering that the Sandiganbayan itself had told him to file the demurrer
to evidence. Thus, after the demurrer to evidence was denied, the accused was held to be
still entitled to present his evidence.
The accused and her counsel should not have ignored the potentially prejudicial
consequence of the filing of a demurrer to evidence without the leave of court required in
Section 15, Rule 119, of the Revised Rules of Court.[20] They were well aware of the risk
of a denial of the demurrer being high, for by demurring the accused impliedly admitted
the facts adduced by the State and the proper inferences therefrom.[21] We cannot step in
now to alleviate her self-inflicted plight, for which she had no one to blame but herself;
otherwise, we may unduly diminish the essence of the rule that gave her the alternative
option to waive presenting her own evidence.
4.
Petitioner's handwritten letter
is admissible in evidence
The next issue concerns the admissibility of the accused's letter dated January 4, 1996 to
Prudential Bank's President explaining the shortage of her dollar collection as bank teller,
[22]
the relevant portion of which follows:
xxx Sometime in the month of September, a man approached me at my counter and

handed me a note demanding me (sic) to give him a big amount of money of P600,000. I
looked at him and told him I don't have any. He told me to get at my drawer and not to
tell anybody because their companions are at the nearby of my house (sic) and threatened
me that something will happened (sic) to my kids. That time he looked back and I also
saw another man w/ radio at his waist, who stood up and went out. I nervously handed
him the money. While doing this, I tried to pull the alarm at my counter but it was out of
order. This alarm was out of order for quite sometime but I was still hoping it might
work. Since that day, time and again, he kept on coming back and I could'nt do anything
but to give in to his request. His second, he demanded for (sic) another P600,000 but I
gave him only P530,000. The 3rd & 4th was P550,000 each. Last December 29, 1995 at
around 3:00 pm, I was surprised to see him at my counter, again, he was asking for
money. I was balancing my dollar transaction. But that time, I had delivered my peso
cash box to our cashier. He saw the bundle of $10,000 which was on top of my desk
because I was writing the breakdown on my cash count. He wanted me to give it to him
& this time he pointed a gun at me and I got so nervous & gave him the dollars.
During this time, in order for me to be balance with (sic) my transactions, I cash out
checks (suppose to be for late deposit) & included them in today's clearing. The
following day, I validated the deposit slips as cash deposit xxx.
The accused submits that the letter was inadmissible for being in reality an uncounselled
extrajudicial confession, and for not being executed under oath.
The submission lacks persuasion.
The letter was not an extrajudicial confession whose validity depended on its being
executed with the assistance of counsel and its being under oath, but a voluntary party
admission under Section 26,[23] Rule 130 of the Rules of Court that was admissible against
her. An admission, if voluntary, is admissible against the admitter for the reason that it is
fair to presume that the admission corresponds with the truth, and it is the admitter's fault
if the admission does not.[24] By virtue of its being made by the party himself, an
admission is competent primary evidence against the admitter.[25]
Worth pointing out is that the letter was not a confession due to its not expressly
acknowledging the guilt of the accused for qualified theft. Under Section 30, [26] Rule 130
of the Rules of Court, a confession is a declaration of an accused acknowledging guilt for
the offense charged, or for any offense necessarily included therein.
Nonetheless, there was no need for a counsel to have assisted the accused when she wrote
the letter because she spontaneously made it while not under custodial investigation. Her
insistence on the assistance of a counsel might be valid and better appreciated had she
made the letter while under arrest, or during custodial investigation, or under coercion by
the investigating authorities of the Government. The distinction of her situation from that
of a person arrested or detained and under custodial investigation for the commission of
an offense derived from the clear intent of insulating the latter from police coercion or
intimidation underlying Section 12 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides:
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services
of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the
free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado,
or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall
be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as
well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and
their families.
To reiterate, the rights under Section 12, supra, are available to "any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense." The phrase does not cover all kinds of
investigations, but contemplates only a situation wherein "a person is already in custody
as a suspect, or if the person is the suspect, even if he is not yet deprived in any
significant way of his liberty."[27] The situation of the accused was not similar to that of a
person already in custody as a suspect, or if the person is the suspect, even if she is not
yet deprived in any significant way of his liberty.
5.
Penalty was correctly determined
We quote and adopt with approval the CA's discourse on why the penalty of reclusion
perpetua was appropriate for the offense committed by the accused, to wit:
The foregoing considered, appellant's conviction must perforce be affirmed. The sentence
imposed by the Trial Court should, however, be modified.
The Trial Court sentenced the appellant to imprisonment of ten (10) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. The correct penalty, however, should be reclusion perpetua with the
accessory penalties of death under Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code.
Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code provides that qualified theft shall be punished by
the penalties next higher by two degrees than those specified in Article 309 of the
Revised Penal Code. Paragraph (1) of Article 309 states that if the value of the thing
stolen exceeds P22,000, the penalty shall be the maximum period of prision mayor in its
minimum and medium periods, and one year for each P10,000.00 in excess of
P22,000.00, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years (or reclusion temporal).
Appellant stole US$10,000.00 or P262,140.00 computed based on the exchange rate on

December 29, 1995 when the appropriation took place.
Under Article 309, the basic penalty is prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods to be imposed in the maximum period since the amount stolen exceeded
P22,000.00. To determine the additional years of imprisonment prescribed in Article 309
(1), the amount of P22,000.00 should be deducted from P262,140.00, thus, leaving the
amount of P240,140.00. The net amount should then be divided by P10,000.00,
disregarding any amount below P10,000.00. The result is the incremental penalty of
twenty-four (24) years which must then be added to the basic penalty of the maximum
period of prision mayor minimum and medium periods. The penalty of prision mayor in
its minimum and medium periods has a range of six years (6) and one (1) day to ten (10)
years. Its maximum period is eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to ten (10)
years, and the incremental penalty is twenty-four (24) years. Had appellant committed
simple theft, the penalty should have been twenty years of reclusion temporal, the
maximum penalty allowable under Article 309, subject to the Indeterminate Sentence
Law.
Considering that the theft is qualified by grave abuse of confidence, the penalty is two
degrees higher than that specified under Article 309. Under Article 25 of the Revised
Penal Code, two degrees higher than reclusion temporal is death. However, Article 74 of
the same Code provides that in cases in which the law prescribes a penalty higher than
another given penalty, without specifically designating the name of the former, and if
such higher penalty should be that of death, the same penalty and the accessory penalties
of Article 40, shall be considered as the next higher penalty.
The Supreme Court held that in such a case, the accused should be meted the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for forty years with the accessory penalties of death under Article
40 of the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, we deny the petition for review on certiorari, and affirm the decision
promulgated on July 31, 2003 in CA-G.R. CR No. 24556.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 192232, December 10, 2014 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JOSE
ESTALIN PRODENCIADO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
On appeal is the February 4, 2010 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 02861 affirming with modification the May 25, 2007 Decision[2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13, Malolos, Bulacan, in Criminal Case Nos. 3206-
M-2000 to 3209-M-2000 which found appellant Jose Estalin Prodenciado (Prodenciado)
guilty of two counts of Statutory Rape and two counts of Simple Rape.
Factual Antecedents
Prodenciado was charged with two counts each of Statutory Rape and Simple Rape
committed against his own daughter, “AAA.”[3] The Informations for the charges narrate:
Crim. Case No. 3208-M-2000 for Statutory Rape
That in or about the year 1993, in the municipality of Baliuag, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a bolo, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by
means of threats, force and intimidation and with lewd designs, have carnal knowledge of
his daughter “AAA,” a girl 8 years of age, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.[4]
Crim. Case No. 3209-M-2000 for Statutory Rape
That in or about the year 1995, in the municipality of Baliuag, province of Bulacan,
accused, armed with a bolo, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by
means of threats, force and intimidation and with lewd designs, have carnal knowledge of
his daughter “AAA,” below 12 years old, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.[5]
Crim. Case No. 3206-M-2000 for Simple Rape
That on or about the 13th day of August, 2000 at about 11:00 o’clock in the morning, in
the municipality of Baliuag, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bolo, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of threats, force and intimidation and
with lewd designs, have carnal knowledge of his daughter “AAA,” a girl 14 years of age,
against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.[6]
Crim. Case No. 3207-M-2000 for Simple Rape
That on or about the 13th day of August 2000 at about 11:30 in the morning, in the
municipality of Baliuag, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the Jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bolo, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of threats, force and intimidation and
with lewd designs, have carnal knowledge of his daughter “AAA,” a girl 14 years of age,
against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.[7]
Upon arraignment, Prodenciado, assisted by counsel, entered separate pleas of not guilty
to the crimes charged.
The Prosecution’s Case

As summarized in the Appellee’s Brief,[8] the prosecution’s case is premised on the
following facts:
“AAA” was born on December 13, 1985[9] to common[-]law spouses “BBB”, a
housewife, and Jose E. Prodenciado (a.k.a. Rommel), a fisherman. The couple has five
(5) children[,] with “AAA” being the eldest. At the time the rape incidents took place,
appellant and “AAA” resided at Sta. Barbara, Baliuag, Bulacan.
xxxx
Sometime in 1993[,] at around noon, “AAA” brought food for appellant at the hut by the
river where her father usually rests after fishing. Suddenly, appellant pulled out a knife,
poked it at her and told her to go up the hut with him. As soon as they reached the hut,
appellant removed both their clothes and told “AAA” to lie down on the floor. Appellant
lowered himself atop “AAA” and inserted his penis into her vagina.
After satiating his lust, appellant dressed and warned “AAA” not to tell anybody what
happened[,] or else[,] he would kill her mother. At that time, “AAA” was only eight (8)
years old.
xxxx
The incident was repeated sometime in 1995 when “AAA” was then [10] years old and
was in Grade III.
While appellant was fishing near their place in Sta. Barbara, Baliuag, Bulacan, he told
“AAA” to go with him to the hut. “AAA” obeyed and once there, she was instructed to
take off her clothes. She was made to lie down on the floor and while [in] that position,
appellant [laid] on top of her. Appellant then inserted his penis inside her vagina and
raped her. There were no other people in the hut that day.
Afterwards, appellant told her to put on her clothes and go home. “AAA” did as she was
told and upon reaching their house, she prepared to go to school. She did not report the
incident to her mother. She could not recall the exact date when she was raped the second
time.
xxxx
On August 13, 2000, appellant repeated his dastardly acts. This time, “AAA” was
sexually violated not once but twice that same day.
At around 11:00 o’clock in the morning, “AAA,” was doing the laundry by the river
while appellant was sharpening his bolo nearby. Suddenly, appellant, clutching his bolo,
approached “AAA” and dragged her towards the hut. At that time, the victim’s mother[,]
“BBB,” who was then cooking by their stove outside the house about two (2) meters
away[,] and two younger siblings saw appellant pulling “AAA” towards the house. As
appellant climbed the stairs, he warned “BBB” not to follow them.
Inside the hut, appellant raised “AAA’s” blouse and forcibly took off her shorts and
underwear. Appellant kissed “AAA’s” lips and breasts then mounted her and
consummated his bestial desires. After satisfying his lust, appellant told “AAA” to dress
up and go downstairs. “AAA” did as she was told and resumed doing her laundry chores.
A few minutes thereafter, or at around 11:30 o’clock that same day, appellant, still
holding his bolo, called “AAA” and told her to go upstairs again to fix the clothes.
“AAA” obeyed and, once again, she was sexually ravished by her father.
On both times that “AAA” went down the hut with appellant, “BBB” noticed her
daughter to be crying. At that point, “BBB” suspected that “AAA” was being sexually
abused by appellant. “BBB” wanted to ask her daughter what appellant did to her, but she
could not since they were constantly being watched by appellant who was always armed
with a bolo.
When Edwin, a neighbor, dropped by their place and talked with appellant, “BBB” took
advantage of the opportunity and advised “AAA” to report the incidents to the police.
Subsequently, “BBB” devised a plan to report the matter to the police authorities. “BBB”
asked appellant’s permission to leave the house on the pretext of buying medicines.
Before she left, appellant warned her not to do anything behind his back (“walang
traiduran”). “BBB” then immediately proceeded to the police station where she and the
police officers plotted appellant’s arrest.
The following day, appellant was fishing by the river when the policemen arrived.
“BBB” guided the police towards the river and on their way thereto, she destroyed the
fence so that the police would be able to pass by without being noticed by appellant.
“BBB” called out [to] her husband and told him to come over as there was a snake.
Knowing that “BBB” was scared of snakes, appellant rushed to her side. The police
immediately closed in on appellant and effected his arrest.
Thereafter, “AAA” and “BBB” executed a complaint and caused the investigation of the
rapes committed against the victim. The victim was referred to the Bulacan Provincial
Crime Laboratory Office, Philippine National Police (PNP) in Malolos, Bulacan. Police
Senior Inspector Ivan Richard A. Viray, a Medico-Legal Officer, performed a physical
examination on the victim. His Medico-Legal Report No. MR-146-2000 disclosed his
findings, thus:
GENERAL AND

EXTRAGENITAL:

PHYSICAL BUILT - Light built
PHYSICAL STATUS - Coherent female subject
Are conical in shape with light brown areola and nipples from
BREAST[S] -
which no secretion could be pressed out
ABDOMEN - Is flat/soft
PHYSICAL INJURIES - No external signs of application of any form of trauma

GENITAL:

PUBIC HAIR - Scanty growth
LABIA MAJORA - Are full, convex and coaptated
LABIA MINORA - In between labia majora, pinkish brown in color
Elastic fl[e]shy type with the presence of deep healed laceration
HYMEN -
at 2 and 3 o’clock positions
POSTERIOR
- V-shaped or sharp
FOURCHETTE
EXTERNAL VAGINAL
- Offers strong resistance to the examining index finger
ORIFICE
VAGINAL CANAL - Narrow with prominent rugosities
CERVIX - Is firm/close[d]
PERI-URETHRAL &
Are negative for spermatozoa and negative for gram (-)
PERI-VAGINAL -
diplococci.
SMEARS
During the trial, [Dr.] Viray elucidated on the procedures he undertook in examining the
child and gave his impressions on his findings, viz: (1) subject is in non-virgin state
physically; and (2) there are no external signs of application of any form of trauma. [10]
Appellant’s Defense
As set forth in his Accused-Appellant’s Brief,[11] Prodenciado alleged that he could not

have committed the rape in 1993 as he was then a construction worker with a project in
Pulilan, Bulacan and that the nipa hut where the alleged rape took place was built only in
1994. Anent the alleged rape in 1995, he contended that “AAA” and “BBB” lived with
his mother-in-law during that year and that “AAA” never visited him in the nipa hut by
the river at any time then. With regard the alleged rape on August 13, 2000, Prodenciado
averred that “AAA” was already working in a factory at that time and she likewise did
not pay him any visit during that period.
Prodenciado asserted that “AAA” must have been impelled by anger in filing the cases
against him as he used to scold her for accepting suitors at a very young age. There were
even occasions that he hit her for coming home late. However, as “AAA” later on
admitted to him that the suitors were not hers but her mother’s, Prodenciado likewise
surmised that his wife wanted to get rid of him so she can live-in with one of her suitors.
In fact, immediately upon his detention, “BBB” already started living-in with another
man.
On May 25, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds [the] accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Statutory Rape thru carnal knowledge on two (2) counts
in Crim. Case Nos. 3208-M-2000 and 3209-M-2000, and hereby sentences him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, for each count (Total: Two (2) reclusion perpetua).
The accused is likewise directed to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
P100,000.00 for each count (Total: P200,000.00).
The Court likewise finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Rape thru carnal knowledge on two (2) counts in Crim. Case Nos. 3206-M-2000 and
3207-M-2000, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
each count (Total: Two (2) reclusion perpetua).
The accused is likewise directed to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
P50,000.00 for each count (Total: P100,000.00).
SO ORDERED.[12]
On appeal, the CA issued the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is DISMISSED. The appealed
decision is AFFIRMED but MODIFIED by reducing the amount of civil liability from
P100,000.00 to P75,000.00 for each count in Criminal Case Nos. 3208-M-2000 and
3209-M-2000, increasing the civil liability from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00 for each count
in Criminal Case Nos. 3206-M-2000 and 3207-M-2000; and for appellant to pay private
complainant the sums of P75,000.00 and P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages,
respectively[,] for each count of rape against her.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Issues
Thus, this appeal. Both parties manifested that they were adopting the briefs they filed
with the CA.[14] Hence, the Court shall resolve the assigned errors contained in
Prodenciado’s Accused-Appellant’s Brief, to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING [PRODENCIADO] GUILTY

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME[S] CHARGED. [15]
Our Ruling
We sustain Prodenciado’s conviction.
“AAA’s” testimony deserves full weight and credence.
In People v. Sanchez,[16] we reiterated the guidelines laid down by this Court in

addressing the issue of credibility of witnesses on appeal, viz:
First, the Court gives the highest respect to the RTC’s evaluation of the testimony of the
witnesses, considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness
on the stand. From its vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to determine the
truthfulness of witnesses.
Second, absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the RTC’s
assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower court’s
findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances, affecting the outcome
of the case, are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded.
And third, the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred with the RTC. [17]
Here, the trial court found “AAA’s” testimony to be credible as it was made in a simple
and consistent manner. Notably, the CA agreed with the RTC on this point and saw no
reason to overturn the same. And upon perusal of the records of this case, this Court
likewise sees no reason to depart from the lower courts’ assessment of “AAA’s”
testimony. Indeed, her statements pertaining to the identity of Prodenciado as her violator
and the perverse acts he visited upon her were straightforward and categorical. Moreover,
“[t]estimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a
girl, particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that
is necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of
tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what
transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she
would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity
are generally badges of truth and sincerity.”[18]
In rape cases, the date of commission is not an essential element of the offense.
Prodenciado, however, makes much of “AAA’s” failure to pinpoint the dates when she
was raped. According to him, this does not only render “AAA’s” credibility suspect, but
likewise deprived him of the full opportunity to defend himself thereby violating his right
to due process.
Time and again, the Court has repeatedly held that it is not incumbent upon the victim to
establish the date when she was raped for purposes of convicting the perpetrator. This is
because “[i]n rape cases, the date of commission is not an essential element of the
offense; what is material is its occurrence,”[19] which in this case, was sufficiently
established by “AAA.”
Moreover, Prodenciado’s assertion that he was deprived of the full opportunity to defend
himself by reason of “AAA’s” failure to disclose when the alleged rapes were committed
was raised only during his appeal. In People v. Aboganda,[20] the Court declared that:
[I]f the accused really believed in the allegedly defective information and the prejudice to
his rights, he should have filed a motion for bill of particulars before his arraignment.
We, thus, also rule in the instant case that it is too late for accused-appellant to protest the
[unspecified] dates found in the informations against him.[21]
What is telling here instead is that despite his insistence that his right to due process was
violated, Prodenciado entered pleas of not guilty, went on to deny raping “AAA” and, in
the process, even offered a number of excuses to extricate himself from the consequences
of his transgressions.
It is understandable that “AAA” has no clear memory on when the alleged rapes were
committed as she was still a minor when the incidents occurred and when she took the
witness stand to testify against her father. Yet, despite her age, and as the Court likewise
found in the similar case of People v. Dominguez,[22] she was “able to narrate the
incidents, albeit not exactly with the same coherence as a fully capacitated adult witness
would.”[23] Thus, just as in the said case, “[l]eeway should be given to witnesses who are
minors, especially when they are relating past incidents of abuse.” [24]
“AAA’s” failure to immediately report the rape incidents does not detract from the fact
that they were committed; neither does “AAA’s” resumption of a normal life after the
incidents negate rape.
Prodenciado also finds fault in AAA’s failure to report the alleged rape incidents. He
avers that if “AAA” was indeed sexually abused, she should have wasted no time in
reporting the matter to her mother, brothers and sisters, other relatives and/or to the police
considering that she was neither pushed against the wall nor under Prodenciado’s watch
24 hours a day.
The Court notes, however, that “AAA” was able to satisfactorily explain why she kept
silent about the rapes for years and why, even if she had the chance, she did not run away
or shout for help. She testified, viz:
Q: x x x [A]ccording to you, appearing on page 5 of the transcript, [o]n August 13, 2000[,]
allegedly the accused in this case raped you at 11:00 in the morning?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you still recall where you proceeded after 11:00 in the morning of that date?
A: Yes, sir. I just remained there.
Q: You did not go anywhere?
A: [No], sir.
Q: As a matter of fact, you did not leave the house because, according to you, at 11:30[,] you
were again raped, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: There is a difference of 30 minutes. Do you want to impress to this Honorable Court that
after the first incident you just stayed there and waited for the other incident to occur?
A: No, sir, because he did not allow us to proceed to my lola’s house, sir.
Q: You made mention of the word “us[.]” When you mentioned the word “us[,]” you were with
somebody then and you were not alone?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: As a matter of fact, on that very date of August 13, 2000[,] you were with a person name[d]
[BBB]?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And this [BBB] is your mother
A: Yes, sir.[25]
xxxx
Q: Do you want to impress before this Honorable Court that the incident occurred in 1993 and
you k[ept] quiet about [it] until the year 2000?
A: Because the accused kept on telling me that if I report the matter he would kill me and my
mother, sir.
Q: Do you want to impress before this Honorable Court that in the year 2000 the accused did
not threaten you anymore because you already went to the police authorities and you were
not afraid anymore?
A: He warned me not to report the incident, sir.
Q: But you still reported the same?
A: Yes, sir.[26]
xxxx
Q: x x x [Y]ou will agree with me when I say that you had all the time to run away from the
hut?
xxxx
A: I was nervous at that time, sir.
xxxx
I was afraid to run, sir.[27]
xxxx
Q: The only reason why[,] according to you[,] you did not shout in your answer[,] and I quote
[from page] 10, [of the February 21, 2002 transcript], “even [if I] shout[,] nobody can hear
me,” am I correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Nobody can hear you considering the fact that your mother was there?
A: My mother can hear me, sir, but [she] cannot do anything.[28]
xxxx
Q: Ms. Witness, x x x you said that when you were raped by your father your mother was
around and you said you did not ask for help because your mother could not do anything,
what do you mean by that?
A: Because (referring to the accused) he was armed with [a] bolo (itak), sir.
Q: Are you afraid of itak?
A: I am afraid “baka patayin po ako[,”] sir.[29]
Clearly, “AAA” did not reveal to anyone what Prodenciado was doing to her out of fear
that he might make good his threats to kill her and her family. Indeed, in one case, we
have recognized that “[t]he fear of [the victim] that her father would kill her and the other
members of her family, should she report the incident to her mother or the police, is not
so unbelievable nor is it contrary to human experience.”[30] Besides, “the failure of the
victim to immediately report the rape is not an indication of a fabricated charge and does
not detract from the fact that rape was committed.”[31]
Prodenciado also questions the facility whereby “AAA” was able to resume her life
despite the supposed rape incidents. He avers, viz:
Not only did “AAA” fail to mention what ought to have been a traumatic experience to
her older sister, brothers and to her mother much earlier than she did, but she had
apparently been able to resume her life, as well as her role as the obedient daughter
to the accused-appellant, despite the alleged rape. Most notable was her revelation
during her direct testimony on February 21, 2002, about the alleged rape that happened in
1995.
“AAA” recalled that after she was allegedly sexually molested by the accused, she was in
fact sent home, to which she obeyed and even mustered the courage to go to school
after what could have been a harrowing experience. x x x[32] (Emphases supplied)
This hardly convinces. It has been held that “different people react differently to different
situations and there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is
confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience,”[33] such as rape. Verily, some
victims choose to suffer in silence; while others may be moved to action out of a need to
seek justice for what was done to them. Then there are those who opt not to dwell on
their experience and try to live as though it never happened. To the Court’s mind, this is
how “AAA” tried to cope with the harrowing experience that befell her. Moreover, since
she was just a young girl when all these rapes were committed against her, “AAA”
simply knew no other way of life than what she was accustomed to.
A medical report is merely corroborative to a claim of rape.
Prodenciado also points out that the result[34] of the medical examination done on “AAA”
merely confirms the fact that she had already engaged in sexual intercourse and this does
not necessarily mean that it was with him.
While it is true that the result of “AAA’s” medical examination only supports the fact
that “AAA” has already had sexual intercourse and does not by itself establish that it was
her father, Prodenciado, with whom she had sex, this does not divest the results of
medical examination of any relevance. In People v. Cial[35] it was explained that:
[T]he examining physician was presented to testify only on the fact that he examined
the victim and on the results of such examination. He is thus expected to testify on
the nature, extent and location of the wounds. Dr. Arnulfo Imperial (Dr. Imperial)
found, among others, that “AAA” suffered hymenal lacerations. This refers to the
location and nature of the wounds suffered by the victim. Dr. Imperial could not be
expected to establish the cause of such lacerations with particularity because he has
no personal knowledge of how these hymenal lacerations were inflicted on
“AAA.” He could only surmise that the lacerations could have been caused “by activities
like cycling, horseback riding x x x or the insertion of a hard object into the vagina of the
victim x x x such as the penis.”[36] (Emphases supplied)
Clearly, the result of the medical examination and the testimony of the examining
physician thereon are essential to establish only the nature, extent and locations of the
wounds and not the cause thereof. Verily, “AAA’s” medical certificate reveals that she
sustained hymenal lacerations. The examining physician, Dr. Viray, testified as to the
location and nature of the same. However, Dr. Viray did not state on the said medical
certificate or in his testimony the exact cause of said lacerations as he has no personal
knowledge as to how they were inflicted on “AAA.” He could only theorize that they
may have been caused by the insertion of a hard object, such as an erected penis. [37] It is
only “AAA” herself who can positively state the source of her hymenal lacerations. And
as shown by the overwhelming evidence for the prosecution, she has sufficiently
demonstrated that it was her own father, Prodenciado, who caused the same when he
repeatedly raped her.
In any case, this Court has already concluded that a medical report is not even material
for purposes of proving rape as it is merely corroborative in character and, thus, can be
dispensed with accordingly.[38] In fact, the Court has consistently maintained that:
x x x The medical report is by no means controlling. This Court has repeatedly held that a
medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in the prosecution for rape, and no
law requires a medical examination for the successful prosecution thereof. The medical
examination of the victim or the presentation of the medical certificate is not essential to
prove the commission of rape as the testimony of the victim alone, if credible, is
sufficient to convict the accused of the crime. The medical examination of the victim
as well as the medical certificate is merely corroborative in character.[39] (Emphasis
supplied)
Prodenciado’s defenses of denial and alibi do not deserve credence.
Prodenciado would also have this Court believe that “AAA” and “BBB” had an axe to
grind against him, thus, the filing of the rape cases. He claims “AAA” may have harbored
ill-feelings against him for his having hit her (“napagbuhatan ng kamay”) a number of
times for entertaining suitors at a young age and for coming home late at night. “BBB,”
on the other hand, wanted him incarcerated as she wanted to live-in with another man.
The Court, however, finds Prodenciado’s theory not only flimsy but also unsupported by
any proof, and, thus, unworthy of credence.
In People v. Amistoso,[40] the Court had the opportunity to discuss that:

Alleged motives of family feuds, resentment, or revenge are not uncommon defenses,
and have never swayed the Court from lending full credence to the testimony of a
complainant who remained steadfast throughout her direct and cross-examinations,
especially a minor as in this case.
Moreover, the Court finds it difficult to believe that a young girl would fabricate a
rape charge against her own father as revenge for previous maltreatment, ruling
in People v. Canoy as follows:
We must brush aside as flimsy the appellant[‘]s insistence that the charges were merely
concocted by his daughter to punish him for bringing in his illegitimate daughters to live
with them and for maltreating her. It is unthinkable for a daughter to accuse her own
father, to submit herself for examination of her most intimate parts, put her life to public
scrutiny and expose herself, along with her family, to shame, pity or even ridicule not just
for a simple offense but for a crime so serious that could mean the death sentence to the
very person to whom she owes her life, had she really not have been aggrieved. Nor do
we believe that the victim would fabricate a story of rape simply because she wanted to
exact revenge against her father, appellant herein, for allegedly scolding and maltreating
her. (Citations omitted.)
Neither is the Court convinced that BBB would use and manipulate her own daughter,
“AAA,” to wrongfully accuse Amistoso, her husband and “AAA’s” father, of rape, just to
cover-up her alleged affair with another man. It is unthinkable that a mother would
sacrifice her daughter[‘]s honor to satisfy her grudge, knowing fully well that such an
experience would certainly damage her daughter’s psyche and mar her entire life. A
mother would not subject her daughter to a public trial with its accompanying stigma on
her as the victim of rape, if said charges were not true. (Emphases supplied)
On the contrary, more telling is the fact that Prodenciado, in his testimony before the trial
court, first stated that he never hit the victim. Later and in an apparent effort to discredit
“AAA” by imputing that she was unduly resentful of him, he admitted that he hit
her several times for returning home late.[41]
Anent Prodenciado’s other averments, i.e., that the nipa hut where he allegedly raped

“AAA” in 1993 was built only in 1994; that in 1995, “AAA” and “BBB” lived with the
latter’s mother and the former never visited him in the hut; and, that “AAA” was already
working at a factory on August 13, 2000 and did not pay him any visit during the said
period, suffice it to say that these are mere allegations without proof. Moreover, it has
been held that the defense of denial is inherently weak and self-serving, especially if
uncorroborated.[42]
Neither does Prodenciado’s alibi hold water. In order for the Court to consider the
defense of alibi, it must be shown that “it was physically impossible for him to have been
at the scene of the crime when it was committed.”[43] A perusal of Prodenciado’s
testimony would show that despite his adamant position that he could not have
committed the rape in 1993 as he was then employed as a construction worker in Pulilan,
Bulacan, he was, however, unable to demonstrate that it was physically impossible for
him to have been present at the scene of the crime when the rape incidents occurred.
Consequently, Prodenciado’s defense of alibi must fail. Moreover, alibi “cannot prevail
over [“AAA’s”] positive identification of [Prodenciado] as the perpetrator of the
crime.”[44]
Appellant is liable for one count of statutory rape and three counts of qualified rape.
Coming now to the proper designation of the crimes committed, we are mindful of the
fact that “AAA” was born on December 13, 1985. Thus, she was only 8 years old when
she was first raped by her father in 1993; 10 years of age during the second rape which
took place in 1995; and 14 years old when the last two rapes were committed in the year
2000. It must also be pointed out that different laws on rape are applicable to the rape
cases subject of this appeal.
During the commission of the rape in 1993 (first rape), Article 335(3) of the RPC was the
prevailing statute for the crime of rape, viz:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
As such, the CA was correct in upholding Prodenciado’s conviction for
statutory rape and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.[45] However, in
view of Republic Act No. 9346[46] (RA 9346), he is not eligible for parole.
For the rape in 1995 (second rape), Article 335 of the RPC as amended by RA 7659 was
already the pertinent law in rape cases. The relevant portions thereof provide:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal
xxxx
The death penalty shall x x x be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of
the following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim
x x x x[47] (Emphases supplied)
Here, the Information for the second rape subject of Criminal Case No. 3209-M-2000
alleges that the rape was committed by appellant upon his own minor daughter “AAA,”
who was then 10 years old. These were eventually proved during trial. Thus, it was
correct for the trial court to hold Prodenciado liable for rape under Article 335(3) of the
RPC, albeit with the modification that it is qualified by the attendant circumstances of
minority and relationship[48] which, as mentioned, were sufficiently alleged in the
Information and ultimately proved by the prosecution in the course of the proceedings
below. Accordingly, and in view of RA 9346,[49] we impose upon appellant the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, in lieu of the death penalty, without eligibility for parole.
Similarly, in the last two rape cases committed in 2000, the prosecution properly alleged
in their corresponding Informations and duly proved during trial that they were
committed through force and intimidation; that the victim “AAA” is a minor; and, that
appellant as the offender is the victim’s father. Hence, the trial court should have also
found Prodenciado guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape, not simple rape,
under the now prevailing provisions on rape cases which is Article 266-A of the RPC, in
relation to Article 266-B thereof. Pertinent portions of which provide:
Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
xxxx
Article 266-B. Penalty. - x x x
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any
of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
l) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;
x x x x (Emphases supplied)
As such, his penalty therefor shall also be reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole for each of the two counts of qualified rape.
Damages awarded
For the statutory rape committed by Prodenciado against “AAA,” we affirm the CA’s
award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity. However, the award of moral damages must be
reduced to P50,000.00 while the award of exemplary damages must be increased to
P30,000.00.
As regards the three counts of qualified rape, “AAA” is entitled to the following awards:
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity for each count; P100,000.00 as moral damages for each
count; and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count.[50]
Finally, all damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of
finality of this judgment until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the February 4, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-

HC No. 02861 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that appellant Jose Estalin
Prodenciado is: (1) hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one count
of STATUTORY RAPE and three counts of QUALIFIED RAPE; (2) sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole, for the statutory
rape and for each count of qualified rape; (3) ordered to pay the victim “AAA”
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, in addition to
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, in Criminal Case No. 3208-M-2000 (statutory rape), and
(4) ordered to pay “AAA” P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral
damages, and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count of qualified rape in
Criminal Case Nos. 3209-M-2000, 3206-M-2000 and 3207-M-2000 (qualified rape).
Appellant is also ordered to pay interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on all damages
awarded from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 209587, September 23, 2015 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JOEL
"ANJOY" BUCA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
On appeal is the June 17, 2013 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 00888-MIN convicting accused-appellant Joel "Anjoy" Buca of the crime of
rape.
We state the antecedents as summarized by the CA[2]:

On December 24, 2002 at around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon AAA,[3] a seven (7) year
old girl, together with her younger siblings CCC, DDD and EEE were in their house at
Taal 2, Royal Valley, Bangkal, Davao City. Accused-appellant Joel "Anjoy" Buca (Anjoy
for brevity), a neighbor of their family, entered the house and ordered AAA's siblings to
go to another room to sleep. When Anjoy and AAA were all alone, Anjoy placed AAA
on his lap, pulled down her panties and forcibly inserted his penis into her vagina. He
began to have sex with AAA. CCC, the younger brother, who was at that time hiding
below a bench, saw what was happening. CCC came out and pulled AAA away from
Anjoy. Then, Anjoy warned AAA not to tell anyone of what he did or else he will kill her
parents.
BBB, the mother of AAA[,] came home after buying food. CCC met her at the door and
told her, "Mie, Mie, si Ate (referring to AAA) gani no ky gibastos ni Anjoy". BBB
pretended to ignore the information relayed by CCC as Anjoy was still inside their house.
BBB was scared that Anjoy might notice her reaction. About ten minutes after, Anjoy left
their house. AAA then disclosed that Anjoy did the same thing to her many times
already.
On the same day, AAA and her mother BBB reported the incident to the police. They
also went to a physician to have her examined. The medical examination revealed thus:
PROVISIONAL MEDICAL CERTIFICATE[4]
xxxx
ANOGENITAL EXAM
Genitalia (+) Erythema, perihymenal area

(+) Whitish and yellowish discharge
Anus Normal
CONCLUSION
1. Genital findings are suspicious for sexual abuse

On January 7, 2003, BBB executed an Affidavit-Complaint. Three (3) Informations were

filed against accused-appellant Anjoy. The accusatory portions of the three (3)
Informations state:
I. In Criminal Case No. 52,260-2003:
"That sometime in the months prior to December 2002, in the City of Davao,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
mentioned [accused], by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, had carnal knowledge of the child AAA,
seven (7) years old, by forcibly inserting his penis into her vagina.
CONTRARY TO LAW";
II. In Criminal Case No. 52,261-2003
"The undersigned accuses the above-named accused of the crime of Rape under
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code as Amended by R.A. 8353, committed as
follows:
That sometime before December 24, 2002, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, by
means of force and intimidation, did there and then willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, had carnal knowledge of the child AAA, seven (7) years old, by
forcibly inserting his penis into her vagina.
CONTRARY TO LAW"; and
III. In Criminal Case No. 52, 262-2003
"That sometime in the months after December 25, 2002, in the City of Davao,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
mentioned accused, by means of force and intimidation, did there and then
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, had carnal knowledge of the child AAA,
seven (7) years old, by forcibly inserting his penis into her vagina.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
On August 24, 2004, accused-appellant was arraigned and entered his pleas of not guilty.
Thereafter, trial ensued.
As regards Criminal Case No. 52,260-2003, the trial court dismissed it during the trial on
May 28, 2007 after Prosecutor Dayanghirang manifested that the prosecution will not
present evidence because "during his interview with the witness, she could not recall the
dates x x x it was between 2001 and 2002 but she could not recall, so [the prosecution]
will not anymore present"[5].
During his examination, accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusations against

him. He insisted that on December 24, 2002 at about 5:45 in the morning, he passed by
AAA's house. AAA called him as Uncle Joel and requested that he look after her younger
brother who was crying. When asked where their mother was, AAA answered that she
left to buy food. When he was about to leave, AAA called him again because her younger
sibling was crying and she requested if he could watch over them. Accused-appellant
declined as he was about to go to his work. He further testified that there was no unusual
incident that happened on the day of December 24, 2002. Furthermore, he insisted that he
has no knowledge whatsoever of the other accusations of AAA and BBB against him.
In a Judgment[6] dated November 11, 2010, the [Regional Trial Court (RTC)] found
accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 52,261-2003, the
dispositive portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to present evidence in Criminal Case No.
52,260-2003, the said Criminal Case is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
As to Criminal Case [N]o. 52,262-2003, for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt
of the Accused beyond reasonable doubt, the said case is hereby ordered DISMISSED
and the ACCUSED is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged in the Information.
As to Criminal Case [N]o. 52,261-2003, the Court finds Accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape defined and penalized under Article 266-A and
266-B of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences the said Accused to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay AAA, the sum of SEVENTY-FIVE
THOUSAND (P75,000.00) PESOS, as civil indemnity and FIFTY THOUSAND
(P50,000.00) PESOS as moral damages.
Under Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, the Accused, who is detained, is hereby
entitled to full credit of his preventive imprisonment if he agreed voluntarily in writing to
abide by the rules and regulation[s] imposed upon convicted prisoners. If he did not
agree, he shall be entitled to 4/5 of his preventive imprisonment.
SO ORDERED.
Accused-appellant appealed. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling and agreed that the
testimony of AAA was sufficient to establish the crime. The fallo of the appealed CA
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Judgment dated November 11, 2010 of the RTC, Branch 12, Davao
City is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Joel "Anjoy"
Buca is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without the benefit of parole.
Accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay AAA the amount of P75,000.00 as civil

indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages and
interest on all damages at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of
judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Hence, this appeal.
The issues for our consideration are:
1. Whether or not accused-appellant is guilty of rape; and
2. Whether accused-appellant may be convicted of rape despite the failure to allege

the exact date of the commission of the crime in the Information.
We affirm the conviction of accused-appellant.
Accused-appellant is guilty of rape.
Accused-appellant contends that his guilt was not proved as the credibility of AAA and
CCC, whose testimonies were utilized to establish the elements of rape, is in serious
doubt due to their lack of candor and forthrightness in testifying. Accused-appellant
further points out that there are inconsistencies in the narrations of the prosecution's
witnesses that cast doubt on their statements.
We do not agree.
Article 266-A, paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, defines the crime
of rape:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is committed -
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a. Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
In the case at bar, the lower courts found that the element of carnal knowledge was
established by the testimony of the victim, AAA, to wit:
PROS. DAYANGHIRANG III:

This time we go to Crim. Case No. 52,261-03
Q: On December 24, 2002, at around one o'clock in the afternoon, where were you at that
time, Miss Witness, if you can recall?
[AAA]
A: In our house.
Q: Who were with you in your house, at that time?
A: My siblings and younger brothers.
Q: You are referring to your younger brothers named what?
A: [CCC, DDD and EEE.]
Q: Aside from you, the three other siblings, who else were there and in your house at that
time?
A: No more... Anjoy.
Q: You mean, the accused was also in your house at that time?
A: Yes.
COURT:
Q: Do you know why he was in your house?
A: I don't know.
xxxx
Q: According to you, you and your three siblings were there in your house at that time
together with the accused, and your mother left to buy viand. Tell us, what happened?
A: He again cuddled me and put me on his lap and pulled down my panty.
Q: Who at that time again cuddled you? Where were your other siblings?
A: He ordered my other siblings to go inside the room and put them to sleep.
xxxx
Q: Now, according to you, the accused pulled down your panty and cuddled you. What
did he do next?
A: He inserted his penis on (sic) my vagina.
Q: What did he do next after he inserted his penis on (sic) your vagina?
A: He was pumping again.
Q: What did you feel?
A: Pain.
Q: What part of your body was painful?
A: My vagina.
Q: That incident of sexual abuse and molestation happened in what part of the house?
A: Near, at the door.
Q: What happened next?
A: One of my brothers saw it and he pulled me.[8]
We find the testimony of AAA sufficient to establish the element of carnal knowledge.
We note that the RTC described the testimony of AAA as positive, credible, natural and
convincing.[9] The Court has held time and again that testimonies of rape victims who are
young and immature deserve full credence, considering that no young woman, especially
of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private
parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being subject to a public trial, if she was not
motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her.
Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth. It is highly improbable that a girl of
tender years, one not yet exposed to the ways of the world, would impute to any man a
crime so serious as rape if what she claims is not true.[10]
Further, it is doctrinally settled that factual findings of the trial court, especially on the
credibility of the rape victim, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal.[11] The Court observes restraint in interfering with the trial court's
assessment of the witnesses' credibility, absent any indication or showing that the trial
court overlooked some material facts or gravely abused its discretion, more so, when the
CA sustained such assessment, as in this case, where it affirmed the trial court's findings
of fact, the veracity of the testimonies of the witnesses, the determination of physical
evidence and conclusions.[12]
Furthermore, the narration of AAA is even more convincing as her testimony coincided
with that of CCC, who witnessed the crime.[13] We note that the RTC also observed
CCC's testimony to be positive, credible, natural and convincing.[14]
As to the alleged inconsistency in the testimony of AAA and that of her brother CCC,
accused-appellant points out that AAA testified that her brother pulled her away from
accused-appellant while CCC narrated that she was released by accused-appellant.
In People v. Laog,[15] the Court clarified that minor inconsistencies are not enough to
sustain the acquittal of an accused, to wit:
xxx Nonetheless, this matter raised by appellant is a minor detail which had nothing to
do with the elements of the crime of rape. Discrepancies referring only to minor details
and collateral matters - not to the central fact of the crime - do not affect the veracity or
detract from the essential credibility of witnesses' declarations, as long as these are
coherent and intrinsically believable on the whole. For a discrepancy or inconsistency
in the testimony of a witness to serve as a basis for acquittal, it must establish
beyond doubt the innocence of the appellant for the crime charged. It cannot be
overemphasized that the credibility of a rape victim is not diminished, let alone impaired,
by minor inconsistencies in her testimony. (Emphasis supplied)
The minor inconsistency in this case is how AAA was released by accused-appellant
which is not an element of rape. Such fact not being an element of the crime will not put
to doubt the prosecution witnesses' testimony establishing the crime.
As to the element that the victim is under 12 years of age, the presentation of her birth
certificate[16] confirming that she was indeed seven years old at the time the crime was
committed on December 24, 2002 sufficiently established the second element of rape in
this case.
In sum, we agree with the RTC and CA that the elements of rape were duly established.
The conviction of accused-appellant

based on the Information stating that the
crime was committed sometime before
December 24, 2002, despite the fact that
the crime was committed on
December 24, 2002, is valid.
Accused-appellant argues that the statement in the Information [17] that the rape occurred
sometime before December 24, 2002 despite the fact that the prosecution established that
the crime was committed on December 24, 2002 violates Section 11,[18] Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, on the requirement of stating the
date of the commission of the offense and the right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.
We do not agree.
The Court has already addressed this issue in People v. Lizada,[19] to
wit:
The Court does not agree with accused-appellant. It bears stressing that the precise
date of the commission of the crime of rape is not an essential element of the crime.
Failure to specify the exact date when the rape was committed does not render the
Information defective. The reason for this is that the gravamen of the crime of rape is
carnal knowledge of the private complainant under any of the circumstances enumerated
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, x x x Moreover, in People vs.
Salalima,[20] this Court held that:
Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes occurred does not ipso
facto make the information defective on its face. The reason is obvious. The precise date
or time when the victim was raped is not an element of the offense. The gravamen of the
crime is the fact of carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. As long as it is alleged that the offense was
committed at any time as near to the actual date when the offense was committed an
information is sufficient. In previous cases, we ruled that allegations that rapes were
committed "before and until October 15, 1994," "sometime in the year 1991 and the
days thereafter," "sometime in November 1995 and some occasions prior and/or
subsequent thereto" and "on or about and sometime in the year 1988" constitute
sufficient compliance with Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. (Emphasis supplied)
Notably, Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended,
states that it is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the
offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. Such
requirement is not applicable to the crime of rape where the date of the commission of the
offense is not an essential element. Also, said Section 11 expressly permits that a crime
may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of
its commission. The information charging accused-appellant of rape sometime before
December 24, 2002 when the crime was committed exactly on December 24, 2002 is
sufficiently compliant with said Section 11. In addition, as correctly pointed out by the
CA, the Information is valid as under Section 6, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, an information is deemed sufficient if it states the name of the
approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.[21]
The Court has also discussed the essence of the right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of accusation against him in Andaya v. People,[22] to wit:
It is fundamental that every element constituting the offense must be alleged in the
information. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set
out in the information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense
because he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that
constitute the offense,
x x x (Emphasis supplied)
It is evident in this case that accused-appellant was able to testify about the incident on
December 24, 2002[23] because the date alleged was not vague or covering an
unreasonable period as to deprive him the opportunity to prepare his defense which is the
essence of the right allegedly violated. It is worthy to note that the records are bereft of
any objection by the accused-appellant about the date of the commission of the crime at
the time of arraignment,[24] during the formal offer of exhibits[25] and at the time the
prosecution put AAA on the witness stand[26] to establish the rape committed on
December 24, 2002. In People v. Gianan,[27] the Court held that an accused-appellant's
failure to raise a timely objection that the time difference alleged in the information
covered a broad period constitutes a waiver of his right to object. We further observe that
accused-appellant did not even disavow knowledge of the incident on that date but, in
fact, admitted that he spoke with AAA at their house on December 24, 2002[28] and even
entered AAA's house.[29] The testimony of accused-appellant leads us to conclude that the
allegation was sufficient to inform him of the date the crime charged occurred which
enabled him to prepare his defense. Thus, we find the allegations in the Information and
the subsequent conviction of accused-appellant by the lower courts valid and lawful
under the circumstances.
Proper use of the phrase "without

eligibility for parole" in indivisible
penalties.
The CA, in the dispositive portion of its Decision, sentenced accused-appellant to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without the benefit of parole.[30] A.M. No. 15-08-02-
SC31 is instructive on the matter of using the phrase without eligibility for parole to
qualify indivisible penalties, to wit:
II.
In these lights, the following guidelines shall be observed in the imposition of penalties
and in the use of the phrase "without eligibility for parole":
II.
(1) In cases where the death penalty is not warranted, there is no need to use the
phrase "without eligibility for parole" to qualify the penalty of reclusion perpetua; it
is understood that convicted persons penalized with an indivisible penalty are not eligible
for parole; and
(2) When circumstances are present warranting the imposition of the death penalty, but
this penalty is not imposed because of R.A. 9346, the qualification of "without eligibility
for parole" shall be used to qualify reclusion perpetua in order to emphasize that the
accused should have been sentenced to suffer the death penalty had it not been for R.A.
No. 9346.
In the instant case, since the accused-appellant committed simple rape, a crime penalized
by reclusion perpetua only, the dispositive portion of this decision should plainly state
that he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without any qualification.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The

Decision dated June 17, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00888-
MIN is AFFIRMED with a clarification that the accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 201572, July 09, 2014 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. RAEL DELFIN,
APPELLANT.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is an appeal[1] assailing the Decision[2] dated 29 April 2011 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04160. In the said Decision, the CA affirmed, with
modification, the conviction of herein appellant Rael Delfin for murder under Article
248(1) of Act No. 3815 or the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The antecedents:
On the night of 27 September 2000, one Emilio Enriquez (Emilio)—a 51-year-old

fisherman from Navotas City—was killed after being gunned down at a store just across
his home.
Suspected of killing Emilio was the appellant. On 13 March 2001, the appellant was
formally charged with the murder of Emilio before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malabon.[3] The information reads:
That on or about the 27th day of November 2000, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a gun,
with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said weapon one EMILIO
ENRIQUEZ, hitting the victim on his chest, thereby inflicting upon the victim gunshot
wound, which caused his immediate death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
When arraigned, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued.
During trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of one Joan Cruz (Joan) and a
certain Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez (Dr. Marquez).
Joan is an eyewitness to the gunning of Emilio. She is also the live-in partner of the
victim. The substance of her testimony is as follows:[5]
1. At about 10:45 p.m. of 27 September 2000, Joan was standing outside Emilio’s
house at R. Domingo St., Tangos, Navotas City. From there, Joan was able to see
Emilio talking over the telephone at a store just across his house. Also at the store
during that time was the appellant who was seated on a bench to the left of Emilio.
2. Joan then went inside Emilio’s house. Almost immediately after going inside the
house, Joan heard the sound of a gunshot. Joan rushed outside of the house and
saw Emilio shot in the head and sprawled on the ground. Joan then saw the
appellant, now holding a gun, firing another shot at Emilio.
3. Joan said that she was not aware of any previous misunderstanding between
Emilio and the appellant; neither did she observe any altercation brewing nor hear
any word spoken between Emilio and appellant prior to the shooting.
Dr. Marquez, on the other hand, is a Philippine National Police physician who
examined post mortem the corpse of Emilio. He issued Medico-Legal Report No. M-608-
00,[6] which revealed that Emilio died as a consequence of two (2) gunshot wounds: one
that penetrated the left side of his head and another that penetrated his chest. Dr.
Marquez testified to affirm the contents of his report.
The defense, for its part, relied on the testimonies of the appellant[7] and a certain Rene
Villanueva (Rene).[8]
Appellant offered the alibi that he was fishing on the seas of Bataan on the date and time
of the supposed shooting. According to the appellant, he left for the seas at about 3:00
p.m. of 27 September 2000 and only returned at around 4:00 a.m. of the next day.
Appellant also testified that he was accompanied on this fishing trip by three (3) other
individuals—one of which was Rene.
Rene initially corroborated on all points the testimony of appellant. However, Rene later
admitted that he, the appellant and their other companions actually left for their fishing
trip at 3:00 p.m. of 26 September 2000—not the 27th; and returned to shore at 4:00 p.m.
of 27 September 2000—not the 28th. Thus, at the date and time of the supposed shooting,
Rene and the appellant were already in Navotas City.
On 20 July 2009, the RTC rendered a Decision[9] finding appellant guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the offense of murder under Article 248(1) of the RPC.[10] Based on
its assessment and evaluation of the evidence on record, the RTC was convinced that it
was the appellant who killed Emilio and who did so with the use of treachery.
Accordingly, the RTC sentenced the appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and another P50,000.00 as
consequential damages.
Aggrieved, appellant appealed the RTC decision with the CA.
On 29 April 2012, the CA rendered a Decision affirming the conviction of the appellant.
The CA, however, deleted the award of P50,000.00 consequential damages and replaced
it with an award of P50,000.00 moral damages.[11] Hence, this appeal.
In this appeal, appellant assails the validity of the information under which he was tried
and convicted. He specifically points out to the discrepancy between the date of the
commission of the murder as alleged in the information i.e., “on or about the 27th day of
November 2000” and the one actually established during the trial i.e., 27 September
2000. Appellant protests that the failure of the information to accurately allege the date
of the commission of the murder violated his right to be properly informed of the charge
against him and consequently impaired his ability to prepare an intelligent defense
thereon.
Appellant also insists on the credibility of his alibi over and above the version of the
prosecution.
Lastly, appellant questions the appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of treachery

against him.
OUR RULING
We deny the appeal.
Variance In the Date of the

Commission of the Murder as Alleged
in the Information and as Established
During the Trial Does Not Invalidate
the Information
We sustain the validity of the information under which the appellant was tried, and
convicted, notwithstanding the variance in the date of the commission of the crime as
alleged in the information and as established during the trial.
In crimes where the date of commission is not a material element, like murder, it is not
necessary to allege such date with absolute specificity or certainty in the information.
The Rules of Court merely requires, for the sake of properly informing an accused, that
the date of commission be approximated:[12]
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint or information is

sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the
statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place
Sec. 11. Date of commission of the offense. - It is not necessary to state in the

complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except when it
is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been
committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission.
(Emphasis supplied).
Since the date of commission of the offense is not required with exactitude, the allegation
in an information of a date of commission different from the one eventually established
during the trial would not, as a rule, be considered as an error fatal to prosecution.[13] In
such cases, the erroneous allegation in the information is just deemed supplanted by the
evidence presented during the trial[14] or may even be corrected by a formal amendment of
the information.[15]
The foregoing rule, however, is concededly not absolute. Variance in the date of
commission of the offense as alleged in the information and as established in evidence
becomes fatal when such discrepancy is so great that it induces the perception that the
information and the evidence are no longer pertaining to one and the same offense. In
this event, the defective allegation in the information is not deemed supplanted by the
evidence nor can it be amended but must be struck down for being violative of the right
of the accused to be informed of the specific charge against him. Such was this Court’s
ruling in the case of People v. Opemia.[16]
In Opemia, an information for theft of large cattle committed on 18 June 1952 was filed
against four (4) accused. After all of the accused entered a plea of not guilty and during
trial, the prosecution adduced evidence to the effect that the purported theft was
committed in July of 1947. The prosecution thereafter moved for the amendment of the
information to make it conform to the evidence with respect to the date of theft. The trial
court rejected the motion and instead dismissed the information altogether. The dispute
reaching us in due course, we sustained the trial court’s dismissal of the information:
The amendment proposed in the present case consists in changing the date of the
commission of the crime charged from June 18, 1952 to July, 1947. In not permitting the
amendment the learned trial Judge said:
“It is a cardinal rule in criminal procedure that the precise time at which an offense was
committed need not be alleged in the complaint or information, but it is required that the
act be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the
offense was committed as the information or complaint would permit (Rule 106, section
10). The reason for this rule is obvious. It is to apprise the accused of the approximate
date when the offense charged was committed in order to enable him to prepare his
defense and thus avoid a surprise. In the case at bar, the proof shows that the carabao was
lost on July 25, 1947 and not on June 18, 1952 as alleged in the information. The period
of almost five years between 1947 and 1952 covers such a long stretch of time that
one cannot help but be led to believe that another theft different from that
committed by the Defendants in 1952 was also perpetrated by them in 1947. Under
this impression the accused, who came to court prepared to face a charge of theft of
large cattle allegedly committed by them in 1952, were certainly caught by sudden
surprise upon being confronted by evidence tending to prove a similar offense
committed in 1947. The variance is certainly unfair to them, for it violates their
constitutional right to be informed before the trial of the specific charge against
them and deprives them of the opportunity to defend themselves. Moreover, they
cannot be convicted of an offense with which they are not charged.
“It is also a cardinal rule in criminal procedure that after the Defendant has entered his
plea, the information or complaint may be amended only as to all matters of form when
the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the Defendant (Rule 196, section
13). An amendment that would change the date of the commission of the offense
from 1947 to 1952 is certainly not a matter of form. The difference in date could not
be attributed to a clerical error, because the possibility of such an error is ruled out
by the fact that the difference is not only in the year, but also in the month and in
the last two digits of the year. It is apparent that the proposed amendment concerns with
material facts constituting the offense, and consequently it would be prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the Defendants.”
His Honor has we think adduced good reasons for considering the amendment as
referring to substance and not merely to form. But even supposing it to be the contrary,
its allowance, after the Defendants had pleaded, was discretionary with the court and
would be proper only if it would not prejudice their rights. We are not prepare to say
that the court did not make good use of that discretion in disallowing the
amendment, considering that the variance sought to be introduced thereby would
appear to be really unfair to the Defendants, for as clearly explained by the court “it
violates their constitutional right to be informed before the trial of the specific
charge against them and deprives them of the opportunity to defend
themselves.”[17] (Emphasis supplied).
In this case, however, we find applicable, not the exception in Opemia, but the general
rule.
Despite their disparity as to the date of the alleged murder, we believe that there is no
mistaking that both the information and the evidence of the prosecution but pertain to one
and the same offense i.e., the murder of Emilio. We find implausible the likelihood that
the accused may have been caught off-guard or surprised by the introduction of evidence
pointing to commission of the murder on 27 September 2000, considering that all
documentary attachments to the information (such as the Resolution[18] of the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Malabon-Navotas sub-station and the Sworn Statement[19] of Joan)
all referred to the murder as having been committed on that date. Indeed, appellant never
objected to such evidence during the trial and was even able to concoct an
intelligent alibi in direct refutation thereof.
What clearly appears to this Court, on the other hand, is that the inaccurate allegation in
the information is simply the product of a mere clerical error. This is obvious from the
fact that, while all its supporting documents point to the murder as having been
committed on the 27th of September 2000, the information’s mistake is limited only to
the month when the crime was committed.[20] Such an error is evidently not fatal; it is
deemed supplanted by the evidence presented by the prosecution.
Hence, we sustain the information for murder, under which the appellant was tried and
convicted, as valid.
Appellant’s Defense of Alibi

Unavailing; Appellant Properly
Convicted of Murder
We also find unavailing the appellant’s insistence on the credibility of his alibi. On this
point, we quote with approval the following discourse of the CA, which we find to be
consistent with time-honored jurisprudence:[21]
Time and again, it has been stressed that the factual findings of the trial court, its
calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its assessment of their probative
weight is given high respect, if not conclusive effect, unless it is ignored, misconstrued,
misunderstood, or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if
considered, will alter the outcome of the case.[22]
As correctly found by the trial court, the testimony of prosecution witness, Joan, was
clear, candid, straightforward, positive and credible, as against the denial and alibi of the
[appellant]. She positively identified the [appellant] as the perpetrator of the crime. x x
x.
It should be emphasized that the testimony of a single eye-witness, if positive and

credible, is sufficient to support a conviction even in a charge of murder.[23] Considering
that Joan’s account of how the [appellant] killed [Emilio] was clear, credible, and
positive, there is, thus, no compelling reason to disturb the trial court’s reliance on her
testimony.
As to the [appellant’s] defense of denial and alibi, the same are unavailing and worthless
in the face of the positive identification by the prosecution’s witness x x x.
x x x. Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be proven that the [accused]
was at some other place at the time the crime was committed and that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time [the offense was committed].
[24]
x x x.
At bench, the [appellant] has not shown the impossibility of his committing the crime as
even, Rene, the witness who was supposed to corroborate his alibi, admitted that they
went back home at 4:00 o’clock in the morning of September 27, 2000 and were already
at Navotas City at the time the incident occurred. Thus, it was certainly possible for him
to be present at the crime scene despite his allegations to the contrary. Hence, based on
all the foregoing evidence, he is, without a doubt, the perpetrator of the crime.
Anent the appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of treachery against the appellant,
we find it to be fully justified by the evidence on record. Again, we approve of the CA’s
observations on this matter:
Concededly, the [appellant’s] attack on the unarmed [Emilio] was sudden, unprovoked,
unexpected and deliberate. Before the attack was made, [Emilio] was merely conversing
with another on the phone. He was undoubtedly in no position and without any means to
defend himself. By all indications, [Emilio] was left with no opportunity to evade the
gunshots, to defend himself, or to retaliate. For this reason, the [RTC] correctly
appreciated treachery as a circumstance to qualify the offense as Murder. [25]
All in all, we find no error in the conviction of the appellant.
Recoverable Damages
In line with prevailing jurisprudence,[26] we increase the amount of civil indemnity and
moral damages payable by the appellant from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00.
In addition to the foregoing, we require the appellant to also pay exemplary damages in
the amount P30,000.00.[27]
The civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages payable by the appellant are
subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this
decision until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 29 August 2012 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04160 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS: (1) that the amount of civil indemnity is increased from
P50,000.00 to P75,000.00; and (2) that appellant must pay, in addition to civil indemnity
and moral damages, exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00. The civil
indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages payable by the appellant are subject
to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this decision until
fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 202122, January 15, 2014 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BERNABE
PAREJA Y CRUZ, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
D EC I S I O N
The accused-appellant Bernabe Pareja y Cruz (Pareja) is appealing the January 19,

2012 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03794, which affirmed
in toto the conviction for Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness meted out by Branch 113,
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City in Criminal Case Nos. 04-1556-CFM and 04-1557-
CFM.[2]
On May 5, 2004, Pareja was charged with two counts of Rape and one Attempted Rape.
The Informations for the three charges read as follows:
I. For the two counts of Rape:

Criminal Case No. 04-1556-CFM
That on or about and sometime in the month of February, 2004, in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, Bernabe Pareja y Cruz, being the common law spouse of the minor
victim’s mother, through force, threats and intimidation, did then and there wil[l]fully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit an act of sexual assault upon the person of [AAA [3]], a
minor 13 years of age, by then and there mashing her breast and inserting his finger
inside her vagina against her will.[4]
That on or about and sometime in the month of December, 2003, in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, Bernabe Pareja y Cruz, being the stepfather of [AAA], a minor 13 years
of age, through force, threats and intimidation, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge of said minor against her will. [5]
II. For the charge of Attempted Rape:
That on or about the 27th day of March, 2004, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, BERNABE
PAREJA Y CRUZ, being the common law spouse of minor victim’s mother by means of
force, threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
commence the commission of the crime of Rape against the person of minor, [AAA], a
13 years old minor by then and there crawling towards her direction where she was
sleeping, putting off her skirt, but did not perform all the acts of execution which would
have produce[d] the crime of rape for the reason other than his own spontaneous
desistance, that is the timely arrival of minor victim’s mother who confronted the
accused, and which acts of child abuse debased, degraded and demeaned the intrinsic
worth and dignity of said minor complainant as a human being. [6]
On June 17, 2004, Pareja, during his arraignment, pleaded not guilty to the charges filed
against him.[7] After the completion of the pre-trial conference on September 16, 2004,
[8]
trial on the merits ensued.
The antecedents of this case, as narrated by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
AAA was thirteen (13) years of age when the alleged acts of lasciviousness and
sexual abuse took place on three (3) different dates, particularly [in December 2003],
February 2004, and March 27, 2004.
AAA’s parents separated when she was [only eight years old [9]]. At the time of the
commission of the aforementioned crimes, AAA was living with her mother and with
herein accused-appellant Bernabe Pareja who, by then, was cohabiting with her mother,
together with three (3) of their children, aged twelve (12), eleven (11) and nine (9), in x
x x, Pasay City.
The first incident took place [i]n December 2003 [the December 2003 incident]. AAA’s
mother was not in the house and was with her relatives in Laguna. Taking advantage of
the situation, [Pareja], while AAA was asleep, placed himself on top of [her]. Then,
[Pareja], who was already naked, begun to undress AAA. [Pareja] then started to suck
the breasts of [AAA]. Not satisfied, [Pareja] likewise inserted his penis into AAA’s anus.
Because of the excruciating pain that she felt, AAA immediately stood up and rushed
outside of their house.
Despite such traumatic experience, AAA never told anyone about the [December 2003]
incident for fear that [Pareja] might kill her. [Pareja] threatened to kill AAA in the event
that she would expose the incident to anyone.
AAA further narrated that the [December 2003] incident had happened more than
once. According to AAA, [i]n February 2004 [the February 2004 incident], she had again
been molested by [Pareja]. Under the same circumstances as the [December 2003
incident], with her mother not around while she and her half-siblings were asleep,
[Pareja] again laid on top of her and started to suck her breasts. But this time, [Pareja]
caressed [her] and held her vagina and inserted his finger [i]n it.
With regard to the last incident, on March 27, 2004 [the March 2004 incident], it was
AAA’s mother who saw [Pareja] in the act of lifting the skirt of her daughter AAA while
the latter was asleep. Outraged, AAA’s mother immediately brought AAA to the
barangay officers to report the said incident. AAA then narrated to the barangay
officials that she had been sexually abused by [Pareja] x x x many times x x x.
Subsequently, AAA, together with her mother, proceeded to the Child Protection Unit of
the Philippine General Hospital for a medical and genital examination. On March 29,
2004, Dr. Tan issued Provisional Medico-Legal Report Number 2004-03-0091. Her
medico-legal report stated the following conclusion:
Hymen: Tanner Stage 3, hymenal remnant from 5-7 o’clock area, Type of
hymen: Crescentic
x x x x
Genital findings show Clear Evidence of Blunt Force or Penetrating Trauma.

After the results of the medico-legal report confirmed that AAA was indeed
raped, AAA’s mother then filed a complaint for rape before the Pasay City Police Station.
To exculpate himself from liability, [Pareja] offered both denial and ill motive of AAA
against him as his defense. He denied raping [AAA] but admitted that he knew her as
she is the daughter of his live-in partner and that they all stay in the same house.
Contrary to AAA’s allegations, [Pareja] averred that it would have been impossible that
the alleged incidents happened. To justify the same, [Pareja] described the layout of
their house and argued that there was no way that the alleged sexual abuses could have
happened.
According to [Pareja], the house was made of wood, only about four (4) meters wide by
ten (10) meters, and was so small that they all have to sit to be able to fit inside the
house. Further, the vicinity where their house is located was thickly populated with
houses constructed side by side. Allegedly, AAA also had no choice but to sleep beside
her siblings.
All taken into account, [Pareja] asseverated that it was hard to imagine how he could
possibly still go about with his plan without AAA’s siblings nor their neighbors noticing
the same.
Verily, [Pareja] was adamant and claimed innocence as to the imputations hurled
against him by AAA. He contended that AAA filed these charges against him only as an
act of revenge because AAA was mad at [him] for being the reason behind her parents’
separation.[10]
Ruling of the RTC
On January 16, 2009, the RTC acquitted Pareja from the charge of attempted rape but
convicted him of the crimes of rape and acts of lasciviousness in the December 2003 and
February 2004 incidents, respectively. The dispositive portion of the Decision[11] reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the herein accused Bernabe Pareja y Cruz is hereby acquitted from

the charge of attempted rape in Crim. Case No. 04-1558, for want of evidence.
In Crim. Case No. 04-1556, the said accused is CONVICTED with Acts of Lasciviousness
and he is meted out the penalty of imprisonment, ranging from 2 years, 4 months and 1
day as minimum to 4 years and 2 months of prision [correccional] as maximum.
In Crim. Case No. 04-1557, the said accused is CONVICTED as charged with rape, and he
is meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The accused shall be credited in full for the period of his preventive imprisonment.
The accused is ordered to indemnify the offended party [AAA], the sum of P50,000.00,
without subsidiary imprisonment, in case of insolvency. [12]
The RTC, in convicting Pareja of the crime of Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness, gave more
weight to the prosecution’s evidence as against Pareja’s baseless denial and imputation
of ill motive. However, due to the failure of the prosecution to present AAA’s mother to
testify about what she had witnessed in March 2004, the RTC had to acquit Pareja of the
crime of Attempted Rape in the March 2004 incident for lack of evidence. The RTC
could not convict Pareja on the basis of AAA’s testimony for being hearsay evidence as
she had no personal knowledge of what happened on March 27, 2004 because she was
sleeping at that time.
Wanting to reverse his two convictions, Pareja appealed[13] to the Court of Appeals,
which on January 19, 2012, affirmed in toto the judgment of the RTC in Criminal Case
Nos. 04-1556 and 04-1557, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is hereby

DENIED and, consequently, DISMISSED. The appealed Decisions rendered by Branch
113 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region in Pasay City on
January 16, 2009 in Criminal Cases Nos. 04-1556 to 04-1557 are hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.[14]
Issues
Aggrieved, Pareja elevated his case to this Court [15] and posited before us the following
errors as he did before the Court of Appeals:
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING [PAREJA] OF THE CRIMES CHARGED
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT HIS GUILT HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING [PAREJA] BASED SOLELY ON THE
PROSECUTION WITNESS’ TESTIMONY.[16]
In his Supplemental Brief[17] Pareja added the following argument:
The private complainant’s actuations after the incident negate the possibility that
she was raped.[18]
Pareja’s main bone of contention is the reliance of the lower courts on the testimony of
AAA in convicting him for rape and acts of lasciviousness. Simply put, Pareja is attacking
the credibility of AAA for being inconsistent. Moreover, he claimed, AAA acted as if
nothing happened after the alleged sexual abuse.
Ruling of this Court
This Court finds no reason to reverse Pareja’s conviction.
Core Issue: Credibility of AAA
Pareja claims that AAA’s testimony cannot be the lone basis of his conviction as it was
riddled with inconsistencies.[19]
We find such argument untenable.

When the issue of credibility of witnesses is presented before this Court, we follow
certain guidelines that have overtime been established in jurisprudence. In People v.
Sanchez,[20] we enumerated them as follows:
First, the Court gives the highest respect to the RTC’s evaluation of the testimony
of the witnesses, considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a
witness on the stand. From its vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to
determine the truthfulness of witnesses.
Second, absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the RTC’s
assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower
court’s findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances, affecting the
outcome of the case, are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded.
And third, the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred with the RTC.
(Citations omitted.)
The recognized rule in this jurisdiction is that the “assessment of the credibility of
witnesses is a domain best left to the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity
to observe their deportment and demeanor on the witness stand; a vantage point
denied appellate courts-and when his findings have been affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court.” [21] While there are
recognized exceptions to the rule, this Court has found no substantial reason to
overturn the identical conclusions of the trial and appellate courts on the matter of
AAA’s credibility.
Besides, inaccuracies and inconsistencies in a rape victim’s testimony are generally

expected.[22] As this Court stated in People v. Saludo[23]:
Rape is a painful experience which is oftentimes not remembered in detail. For

such an offense is not analogous to a person’s achievement or accomplishment as to be
worth recalling or reliving; rather, it is something which causes deep psychological
wounds and casts a stigma upon the victim, scarring her psyche for life and which her
conscious and subconscious mind would opt to forget. Thus, a rape victim cannot be
expected to mechanically keep and then give an accurate account of the traumatic and
horrifying experience she had undergone. (Citation omitted.)
Since human memory is fickle and prone to the stresses of emotions, accuracy in a
testimonial account has never been used as a standard in testing the credibility of a
witness.[24] The inconsistencies mentioned by Pareja are trivial and non-consequential
matters that merely caused AAA confusion when she was being questioned. The
inconsistency regarding the year of the December incident is not even a matter
pertaining to AAA’s ordeal.[25] The date and time of the commission of the crime of rape
becomes important only when it creates serious doubt as to the commission of the rape
itself or the sufficiency of the evidence for purposes of conviction. In other words, the
“date of the commission of the rape becomes relevant only when the accuracy and
truthfulness of the complainant’s narration practically hinge on the date of the
commission of the crime.”[26] Moreover, the date of the commission of the rape is not
an essential element of the crime. [27]
In this connection, Pareja repeatedly invokes our ruling in People v. Ladrillo,[28] implying

that our rulings therein are applicable to his case. However, the factual circumstances
in Ladrillo are prominently missing in Pareja’s case. In particular, the main factor for
Ladrillo’s acquittal in that case was because his constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated when the Information
against him only stated that the crime was committed “on or about the year 1992.” We
said:
The peculiar designation of time in the Information clearly violates Sec. 11, Rule
110, of the Rules Court which requires that the time of the commission of the offense
must be alleged as near to the actual date as the information or complaint will permit.
More importantly, it runs afoul of the constitutionally protected right of the accused to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The Information is
not sufficiently explicit and certain as to time to inform accused-appellant of the date on
which the criminal act is alleged to have been committed.
The phrase “on or about the year 1992” encompasses not only the twelve (12 ) months
of 1992 but includes the years prior and subsequent to 1992, e.g., 1991 and 1993, for
which accused-appellant has to virtually account for his whereabouts. Hence, the
failure of the prosecution to allege with particularity the date of the commission of the
offense and, worse, its failure to prove during the trial the date of the commission of the
offense as alleged in the Information, deprived accused-appellant of his right to
intelligently prepare for his defense and convincingly refute the charges against him. At
most, accused-appellant could only establish his place of residence in the year indicated
in the Information and not for the particular time he supposedly committed the rape.
x x x x
Indeed, the failure of the prosecution to prove its allegation in the Information that
accused-appellant raped complainant in 1992 manifestly shows that the date of the
commission of the offense as alleged was based merely on speculation and conjecture,
and a conviction anchored mainly thereon cannot satisfy the quantum of evidence
required for a pronouncement of guilt, that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt that the
crime was committed on the date and place indicated in the Information. [29] (Citation
omitted.)
In this case, although the dates of the December 2003 and February 2004 incidents
were not specified, the period of time Pareja had to account for was fairly short, unlike
“on or about the year 1992.” Moreover, Ladrillo was able to prove that he had only
moved in the house where the rape supposedly happened, in 1993, therefore negating
the allegation that he raped the victim in that house in 1992. [30]
While it may be true that the inconsistencies in the testimony of the victim
in Ladrillo contributed to his eventual acquittal, this Court said that they alone were not
enough to reverse Ladrillo’s conviction, viz:
Moreover, there are discernible defects in the complaining witness’ testimony

that militates heavily against its being accorded the full credit it was given by the trial
court. Considered independently, the defects might not suffice to overturn the trial
court’s judgment of conviction, but assessed and weighed in its totality, and in relation
to the testimonies of other witnesses, as logic and fairness dictate, they exert a
powerful compulsion towards reversal of the assailed judgment. [31] (Emphasis supplied.)
It is worthy to note that Ladrillo also offered more than just a mere denial of the crime
charged against him to exculpate him from liability. He also had an alibi, which,
together with the other evidence, produced reasonable doubt that he committed the
crime as charged. In contrast, Pareja merely denied the accusations against him and
even imputed ill motive on AAA.
As regards Pareja’s concern about AAA’s lone testimony being the basis of his
conviction, this Court has held:
Furthermore, settled is the rule that the testimony of a single witness may be
sufficient to produce a conviction, if the same appears to be trustworthy and reliable. If
credible and convincing, that alone would be sufficient to convict the accused. No law
or rule requires the corroboration of the testimony of a single witness in a rape case. [32]
(Citations omitted.)
Improbability of sexual abuse

in their small house and in the
presence of AAA’s sleeping siblings
Pareja argues that it was improbable for him to have sexually abused AAA, considering
that their house was so small that they had to sleep beside each other, that in fact,
when the alleged incidents happened, AAA was sleeping beside her younger siblings,
who would have noticed if anything unusual was happening. [33]
This Court is not convinced. Pareja’s living conditions could have prevented him from
acting out on his beastly desires, but they did not. This Court has observed that many of
the rape cases appealed to us were not always committed in seclusion. Lust is no
respecter of time or place, [34] and rape defies constraints of time and space. In People v.
Sangil, Sr.,[35] we expounded on such occurrence in this wise:
In People v. Ignacio, we took judicial notice of the interesting fact that among
poor couples with big families living in small quarters, copulation does not seem to be a
problem despite the presence of other persons around them. Considering the cramped
space and meager room for privacy, couples perhaps have gotten used to quick and less
disturbing modes of sexual congresses which elude the attention of family members;
otherwise, under the circumstances, it would be almost impossible to copulate with
them around even when asleep. It is also not impossible nor incredible for the family
members to be in deep slumber and not be awakened while the sexual assault is being
committed. One may also suppose that growing children sleep more soundly than
grown-ups and are not easily awakened by adult exertions and suspirations in the night.
There is no merit in appellant’s contention that there can be no rape in a room where
other people are present. There is no rule that rape can be committed only in
seclusion. We have repeatedly declared that “lust is no respecter of time and place,”
and rape can be committed in even the unlikeliest of places. (Citations omitted.)
Demeanor of AAA
as a rape victim
Pareja asseverates that AAA’s demeanor and conduct belie her claim that she was
raped. He said that “the ordinary Filipina [would have summoned] every ounce of her
strength and courage to thwart any attempt to besmirch her honor and blemish her
purity.” Pareja pointed out that they lived in a thickly populated area such that any
commotion inside their house would have been easily heard by the neighbors, thus,
giving AAA the perfect opportunity to seek their help. [36] Moreover, Pareja said, AAA’s
delay in reporting the incidents to her mother or the authorities negates the possibility
that he indeed committed the crimes. AAA’s belated confession, he claimed, “cannot be
dismissed as trivial as it puts into serious doubt her credibility.” [37]
A person accused of a serious crime such as rape will tend to escape liability by shifting
the blame on the victim for failing to manifest resistance to sexual abuse. However, this
Court has recognized the fact that no clear-cut behavior can be expected of a person
being raped or has been raped. It is a settled rule that failure of the victim to shout or
seek help do not negate rape. Even lack of resistance will not imply that the victim has
consented to the sexual act, especially when that person was intimidated into
submission by the accused. In cases where the rape is committed by a relative such as a
father, stepfather, uncle, or common law spouse, moral influence or ascendancy takes
the place of violence.[38] In this case, AAA’s lack of resistance was brought about by her
fear that Pareja would make good on his threat to kill her if she ever spoke of the
incident.
AAA’s conduct, i.e., acting like nothing happened, after being sexually abused by Pareja
is also not enough to discredit her. Victims of a crime as heinous as rape, cannot be
expected to act within reason or in accordance with society’s expectations. It is
unreasonable to demand a standard rational reaction to an irrational experience,
especially from a young victim. One cannot be expected to act as usual in an unfamiliar
situation as it is impossible to predict the workings of a human mind placed under
emotional stress. Moreover, it is wrong to say that there is a standard reaction or
behavior among victims of the crime of rape since each of them had to cope with
different circumstances. [39]
Likewise, AAA’s delay in reporting the incidents to her mother or the proper authorities
is insignificant and does not affect the veracity of her charges. It should be remembered
that Pareja threatened to kill her if she told anyone of the incidents. In People v.
Ogarte,[40] we explained why a rape victim’s deferral in reporting the crime does not
equate to falsification of the accusation, to wit:
The failure of complainant to disclose her defilement without loss of time to

persons close to her or to report the matter to the authorities does not perforce
warrant the conclusion that she was not sexually molested and that her charges against
the accused are all baseless, untrue and fabricated. Delay in prosecuting the offense is
not an indication of a fabricated charge. Many victims of rape never complain or file
criminal charges against the rapists. They prefer to bear the ignominy and pain, rather
than reveal their shame to the world or risk the offenders’ making good their threats to
kill or hurt their victims. (Citation omitted.)
Medical examination
not indispensable
Pareja avers that the Medico-Legal Report indicating that there is evidence of blunt
force or penetrating trauma upon examination of AAA’s hymen, “cannot be given any
significance, as it failed to indicate how and when the said signs of physical trauma were
inflicted.” Furthermore, Pareja said, the findings that AAA’s hymen sustained trauma
cannot be utilized as evidence against him as the alleged sexual abuse that occurred in
December, was not by penetration of the vagina. [41]
This Court has time and again held that an accused can be convicted of rape on the basis
of the sole testimony of the victim. In People v. Colorado,[42] we said:
[A] medical certificate is not necessary to prove the commission of rape, as even
a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape.
Expert testimony is merely corroborative in character and not essential to conviction. x x
x.
Therefore, the absence of testimony or medical certificate on the state of AAA’s anus at
the time she was examined is of no consequence. On the contrary, the medical
examination actually bolsters AAA’s claim of being raped by Pareja on more than one
occasion, and not just by anal penetration. However, as the prosecution failed to
capitalize on such evidence and prove the incidence of carnal knowledge, Pareja cannot
be convicted of rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.
In People v. Perez,[43] this Court aptly held:
This Court has held time and again that testimonies of rape victims who are
young and immature deserve full credence, considering that no young woman,
especially of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of
her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being subject to a public trial, if she
was not motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed
against her. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth. It is highly improbable
that a girl of tender years, one not yet exposed to the ways of the world, would impute
to any man a crime so serious as rape if what she claims is not true. (Citations omitted.)
Criminal Case No. 04-1557-CFM:

The December 2003 Incident
In Criminal Case No. 04-1557-CFM or the December 2003 incident, Pareja was charged
and convicted of the crime of rape by sexual assault. The enactment of Republic Act No.
8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, revolutionized the concept of rape with the
recognition of sexual violence on “sex-related” orifices other than a woman’s organ is
included in the crime of rape; and the crime’s expansion to cover gender-free rape.
“The transformation mainly consisted of the reclassification of rape as a crime against
persons and the introduction of rape by ‘sexual assault’ as differentiated from the
traditional ‘rape through carnal knowledge’ or ‘rape through sexual intercourse.’” [44]
Republic Act No. 8353 amended Article 335, the provision on rape in the Revised Penal
Code and incorporated therein Article 266-A which reads:
Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –

By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
) circumstances:

Through force, threat or intimidation;
)
When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious,
)
By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
)
When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
) though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present;

By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
) commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice,
or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Thus, under the new provision, rape can be committed in two ways:
1. Article 266-A paragraph 1 refers to Rape through sexual intercourse, also known as
“organ rape” or “penile rape.” [45] The central element in rape through sexual
intercourse is carnal knowledge, which must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. [46]
2. Article 266-A paragraph 2 refers to rape by sexual assault, also called “instrument or
object rape,” or “gender-free rape.”[47] It must be attended by any of the circumstances
enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 1. [48]
In People v. Abulon,[49] this Court differentiated the two modes of committing rape as

follows:

In the first mode, the offender is always a man, while in the second, the offender may be a
1) man or a woman;
In the first mode, the offended party is always a woman, while in the second, the offended
2) party may be a man or a woman;
In the first mode, rape is committed through penile penetration of the vagina, while the
3) second is committed by inserting the penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person; and
The penalty for rape under the first mode is higher than that under the second.
4)
Under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, rape by sexual
assault is “[b]y any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph
1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal
orifice of another person.”
AAA positively and consistently stated that Pareja, in December 2003, inserted his penis
into her anus. While she may not have been certain about the details of the February
2004 incident, she was positive that Pareja had anal sex with her in December 2003,
thus, clearly establishing the occurrence of rape by sexual assault. In other words, her
testimony on this account was, as the Court of Appeals found, clear, positive, and
probable.[50]
However, since the charge in the Information for the December 2003 incident is rape
through carnal knowledge, Pareja cannot be found guilty of rape by sexual assault even
though it was proven during trial. This is due to the material differences and substantial
distinctions between the two modes of rape; thus, the first mode is not necessarily
included in the second, and vice-versa. Consequently, to convict Pareja of rape by
sexual assault when what he was charged with was rape through carnal knowledge,
would be to violate his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.[51]
Nevertheless, Pareja may be convicted of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness under
the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure,[52] to wit:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. – When there
is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that
proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense
proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the
offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. – An offense charged

necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the
latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the
essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the
latter.
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 336. Acts of lasciviousness. — Any person who shall commit any act of
lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances
mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished by prisión correccional.
The elements of the above crime are as follows:
That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;

1)

That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
2)

By using force or intimidation; or
.

When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
.

When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and
.

That the offended party is another person of either sex. [53] (Citation omitted.)
3)
Clearly, the above-mentioned elements are present in the December 2003

incident, and were sufficiently established during trial. Thus, even though the crime
charged against Pareja was for rape through carnal knowledge, he can be convicted of
the crime of acts of lasciviousness without violating any of his constitutional rights
because said crime is included in the crime of rape. [54]
Nonetheless, the Court takes this case as an opportunity to remind the State, the People
of the Philippines, as represented by the public prosecutor, to exert more diligence in
crafting the Information, which contains the charge against an accused. The primary
duty of a lawyer in public prosecution is to see that justice is done [55] – to the State, that
its penal laws are not broken and order maintained; to the victim, that his or her rights
are vindicated; and to the offender, that he is justly punished for his crime. A faulty and
defective Information, such as that in Criminal Case No. 04-1556-CFM, does not render
full justice to the State, the offended party, and even the offender. Thus, the public
prosecutor should always see to it that the Information is accurate and appropriate.
Criminal Case No. 04-1556-CFM:

The February 2004 Incident
It is manifest that the RTC carefully weighed all the evidence presented by the
prosecution against Pareja, especially AAA’s testimony. In its scrutiny, the RTC found
AAA’s declaration on the rape in the December 2003 incident credible enough to result
in a conviction, albeit this Court had to modify it as explained above. However, it did
not find that the same level of proof, i.e., beyond reasonable doubt, was fully satisfied
by the prosecution in its charge of attempted rape and a second count of rape against
Pareja. In Criminal Case No. 04-1556-CFM, or the February 2004 incident, the RTC
considered AAA’s confusion as to whether or not she was actually penetrated by Pareja,
and eventually resolved the matter in Pareja’s favor.
This Court agrees with such findings. AAA, in her Sinumpaang Salaysay,[56] stated that
aside from sucking her breasts, Pareja also inserted his finger in her vagina. However,
she was not able to give a clear and convincing account of such insertion during her
testimony. Despite being repeatedly asked by the prosecutor as to what followed after
her breasts were sucked, AAA failed to testify, in open court, that Pareja also inserted
his finger in her vagina. Moreover, later on, she added that Pareja inserted his penis in
her vagina during that incident. Thus, because of the material omissions and
inconsistencies, Pareja cannot be convicted of rape in the February 2004 incident.
Nonetheless, Pareja’s acts of placing himself on top of AAA and sucking her breasts, fall
under the crime of acts of lasciviousness, which, as we have discussed above, is included
in the crime of rape.
Verily, AAA was again positive and consistent in her account of how Pareja sucked both
her breasts in the February 2004 incident. Thus, Pareja was correctly convicted by the
courts a quo of the crime of acts of lasciviousness.
Defense of Denial
and Improper Motive
Pareja sought to escape liability by denying the charges against him, coupled with the
attribution of ill motive against AAA. He claims that AAA filed these cases against him
because she was angry that he caused her parents’ separation. Pareja added that these
cases were initiated by AAA’s father, as revenge against him. [57]
Such contention is untenable. “AAA’s credibility cannot be diminished or tainted by

such imputation of ill motives. It is highly unthinkable for the victim to falsely accuse
her father solely by reason of ill motives or grudge.” [58] Furthermore, motives such as
resentment, hatred or revenge have never swayed this Court from giving full credence
to the testimony of a minor rape victim.[59] In People v. Manuel,[60] we held:
Evidently, no woman, least of all a child, would concoct a story of defloration,

allow examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she
has not, in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done
to her being. It is settled jurisprudence that testimonies of child-victims are given full
weight and credit, since when a woman or a girl-child says that she has been raped, she
says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed.
Liability for Acts of Lasciviousness
The penalty for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code
is prisión correccional in its full range. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, [61] the
minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the full range of the penalty
next lower in degree,[62] i.e., arresto mayor, which ranges from 1 month and 1 day to 6
months.[63] The maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall come from the proper
penalty[64] that could be imposed under the Revised Penal Code for Acts of
Lasciviousness,[65] which, in this case, absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance,
is the medium period of prisión correccional, ranging from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day
to 4 years and 2 months.[66]
In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court modifies the award of damages as
follows: P20,000.00 as civil indemnity; [67] P30,000.00 as moral damages; and P10,000.00
as exemplary damages,[68] for each count of acts of lasciviousness. All amounts shall
bear legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this
judgment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 03794 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We find accused-appellant
Bernabe Pareja y Cruz GUILTY of two counts of Acts of Lasciviousness, defined and
penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. He is sentenced to
two (2) indeterminate prison terms of 6 months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 4
years and 2 months of prisión correccional, as maximum; and is ORDERED to pay the
victim, AAA, P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages, and
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count of acts of lasciviousness, all with
interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 208170, August 20, 2014 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. PETRUS
YAU A.K.A. “JOHN” AND “RICKY” AND SUSANA YAU Y SUMOGBA
A.K.A. “SUSAN”, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the September 7, 2012 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA), in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03446, which affirmed the December 14, 2007 Decision [2] of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 214, Mandaluyong City (RTC), in Criminal Case No. MC-
04-7923.
The RTC found accused-appellant Petrus Yau (Petrus) guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principal of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention, as defined
and penalized in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659, (R.A. No. 7659), and convicted accused-appellant Susana Yau y Sumogba
(Susana) as an accomplice to the commission of the same crime.
The Facts
Petrus and Susana were charged with the crime of Kidnapping For Ransom in the
Information,[3] dated February 13, 2004, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about January 20, 2004, at around 2:00 P.M. in the vicinity of
Shoemart Mega Mall, Mandaluyong City, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with the use of a sleeping substance,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and take away ALASTAIR
JOSEPH ONGLINGSWAM in the following manner, to wit: while said ALASTAIR JOSEPH
ONGLINGSWAM was on board a white Toyota taxi cab with plate number PVD-115
being driven by the above-named accused Petrus Yau a.k.a. “John” and “Ricky” and the
taxi cab was travelling along Epifanio Delos Santos (EDSA) Avenue, he suddenly fell
unconscious and upon regaining consciousness he was already handcuffed and in chains
inside a house located at B23, L2, Ponsettia St., Camilla Sorrento Homes, Panapaan IV,
Bacoor, Cavite, where he was kept for twenty two (22) days, which house is owned by
accused Susana Yau y Sumogba and while therein he was maltreated; that ransom in the
amount of SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS (US$600,000.00) and TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (Php20,000.00) for each day of detention was demanded in exchange
for his safe release until he was finally rescued on February 11, 2004, by PACER
operatives of the Philippine National Police.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In the Appellee’s Brief,[4] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presented the
following narration of the kidnapping:
On January 20, 2004, at around 1:30 in the afternoon, private complainant

Alastair Onglingswam, who is a practicing lawyer and businessman from the United
States, went out of Makati Shangrila Hotel, where he was billeted, and hailed a white
Toyota taxi cab with plate number PVD-115 to take him from the said hotel to Virra Mall
Shopping Center in San Juan, Metro Manila. While the said taxicab was plying along
EDSA, and within the vicinity of SM Megamall, private complainant received a phone call
from his associate Kelly Wei in Hong Kong. He noted that while he was on the phone
conversing with his associate, appellant Petrus Yau, whom he noted to have short black
hair, a moustache and gold framed eyeglasses, would from time to time turn to him and
talk as if he was also being spoken to. Thereafter, he felt groggy and decided to hang-up
his phone. He no longer knew what transpired except that when he woke up lying down,
his head was already covered with a plastic bag and he was handcuffed and chained.
When private complainant complained that the handcuffs were too tight, a man who
was wearing a red mask and introduced himself as “John” approached him and removed
the plastic bag from his head and loosened his handcuff. John informed him that he was
being kidnapped for ransom and that he will be allowed to make phone calls to his
family and friends. Hours later, John returned with telephony equipment, tape recorder,
phone and a special antennae cap for the cellphone. With these equipment, private
complainant was allowed to call his girlfriend and father and asked them for the PIN of
his ATM cards and for money, however, with instructions not to inform them that he
was kidnapped. A day after, he was told by his captor to call his girlfriend and father to
tell them that he was still alive as well as to reveal to them that he was kidnapped for
ransom and his kidnappers were demanding Six Hundred Thousand Dollars
(US$600,000.00) as ransom and Twenty Thousand Pesos (Php20,000.00) a day as room
and board fee.
The private complainant’s family, girlfriend (Iris Chau) and friends received a text
message purportedly from the former informing them that he was kidnapped and
ransom for his liberty was demanded.
On January 21, 2004, the family of the victim informed the United States Embassy in
Manila about the situation and a meeting with the representatives of the Philippine
National Police was arranged.
Subsequently, Chau received an email from the purported kidnapper demanding

US$2,000.00. Chau then wired US$1,000.00, upon instructions, to Ong Kwai Ping thru
Metro Bank and Trust Company. Likewise, private complainant’s brother Aaron
Onglingswam made eight (8) deposits to Ong Kwai Ping’s account in Metro Bank,
amounting to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php200,000.00), to ensure his brother’s
safety and eventual release.
During private complainant’s twenty-two (22) days of captivity, while he was allowed to
communicate with his family almost daily to prove that he was still alive and was served
with meals almost five times a day either by John or the other accused Susan Yau, he
was also maltreated i.e. beaten with sticks, made to lay-down biting a piece of wood
which was made as target for a rifle.
On February 10, 2004, the PACER received information that a taxi with plate number
PVD 115 plying along Bacoor was victimizing passengers. Upon instructions of P/Supt.
Isagani Nerez, members of the Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response Task Force
(PACER) were ordered to proceed to Bacoor, Cavite to look for Toyota Corolla White
Taxicab with Plate No. PVD 115.
On February 11, 2004, at around 4:00 o’clock in the morning, the PACER group
proceeded to Bacoor and positioned themselves along Aguinaldo Highway under the
overpass fronting SM Bacoor. Not having caught sight of the taxi, after three hours, the
group moved to a different location along the Aguinaldo Highway where they were able
to chance upon the said vehicle. Thus, they followed it, then flagged it down and
approached the driver. The driver was asked to scroll down his window and was told
that the vehicle was being used to victimize foreign nationals. Appellant did not offer to
make any comment. Hence, this prompted the officers to ask for his name and since he
answered that he was Petrus Yau, a British national, they asked him for his driver’s
license and car registration but appellant was not able to produce any. Since he could
not produce any driver’s license and car registration, they were supposed to bring him
to the police station for investigation, however, when shown a picture of private
complainant and asked if he knew him, he answered that the man is being kept in his
house. He was immediately informed that he was being placed under arrest for
kidnapping private complainant Alastair Onglingswam after being informed of his
constitutional rights. Thereafter, appellant’s cellphones, a QTEK Palmtop and Sony
Erickson were confiscated. Upon instructions of P/Supt. Nerez, [appellant] was brought
to the parking lot of SM City Bacoor for a possible rescue operations of the victim.
Appellant led the team to his house and after opening the gate of his residence, he was
led back to the police car. The rest of the members of PACER proceeded inside the
house and found a man sitting on the floor chained and handcuffed. The man later
identified himself as Alastair Onglingswam.
During the trial of the case, private complainant positively identified Petrus Yau as his
captor and the taxi driver. Test conducted by the United States Federal Bureau of
Investigation reveals that the DNA found in the mask used by private complainant’s
captor matched that of appellant Petrus Yau. [5]
Petrus and Susana denied the accusation, and stated the following in their Brief [6] to
substantiate their claim of innocence:
Accused Petrus Yau denied having committed the crime. He averred that the
supposed kidnap victim coordinated with the police to set up the subject case against
him and his family. He is a British national. He had been in the Philippines for many
times since he was 14 years old. He came to the country in July 2001 for a vacation and
had not left since then. On September 2001, he got married to Susana Yau. Prior
thereto, he was in Singapore running some businesses.
On January 20, 2004, at around 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon (the date and time the
victim was kidnapped), Petrus Yau was at home sleeping.
On February 11, 2004 (the date the victim was allegedly rescued) at around 8:30 – 9:00
o’clock in the morning, he went to his wife Susana in her shop and got money to be
deposited to the Asia Trust Bank. He parked his car outside the bank. After he alighted
from his car, three (3) men bigger than him held his hands: one (1) of them held his
neck. They pushed him inside their van. They tied his hands with packing tape, covered
his eyes with the same tape, and his head with a plastic bag. They kicked and beat him
until he became unconscious.
When he regained consciousness, he was inside an air-conditioned room. His hands

were handcuffed and he felt very cold because his body was wet. His head was still
being covered. He shouted asking where he was. People came in and he heard them
talking in Tagalog. They kicked him for about twenty (20) seconds. Later, he was made
to sit, as he was lying on the floor. He said that he could not see anything, thus,
someone removed the cover of his head. They accused him of being a kidnapper, to
which he replied that he was not. He pleaded to them to allow him to make a call to the
British Embassy, his friends and his wife, but to no avail.
When he was taken into custody, he had his wedding ring, watch and a waist bag
containing his British passport, alien certificate, driver’s license, Asia Trust bankbook in
the name of Susana Yau, ATM Cards (in his name) of Metrobank, PCI Equitable Bank and
Banco de Oro, VISA Card, and some cash given to him by his wife . He lost those
personal properties.
After four (4) to five (5) hours, he was transferred to another room without a window.
The following day, he was brought to and detained at the PACER Custodial Center.
Petrus Yau can speak English but he is better in the Chinese language, both Mandarin
and Cantonese. He bought the taxi he was driving in August 2003 for Eighty Five
Thousand Pesos (Php85,000.00) for personal use and/or for resale. It had a defective
engine (usually overheats), without an aircon and cannot travel for long journey. He
does not drive a taxi to earn a living. He had police friends who told him that he cannot
drive a taxi as an occupation since his driver’s license is non-professional.
Sometime on June 2003, he and his wife Susana had a heated argument over his
womanizing. Hence, she decided to live separately from him (though she was pregnant
at that time) and moved to another house (Block 5, Lot 4, Tulip Street, Andrea Village,
Bacoor, Cavite). Sometimes, she would visit him.
Petrus claimed that his house does not have a basement, contrary to the victim’s
testimony that he was placed in the basement. He was not in his house when the police
officers allegedly rescued the kidnapped victim. He left his house in good condition in
the morning before his arrest. The white Toyota Corolla taxi he was driving had
markings of faded grey, not black, as claimed by Alastair.
During the inquest proceedings, Petrus Yau was not assisted by a counsel and was not
informed of his constitutional rights.
Susana Sumogba Yau denied the accusation that she was in the company of the
kidnapper every time the latter served Alastair’s food (lunch and dinner). She is legally
married to Petrus Yau. They have two (2) children named Charlie and Vivian. On
February 11, 2004, she lived at Block 5, Lot 4, Tulips Street, Andrea Village, Bacoor,
Cavite, while Petrus Yau lived at Block 23, Lot 2, Ponsettia Street, Sorrento Town Homes,
Bacoor, Cavite, with his girlfriend. Susana and Petrus were separated since June 2003.
On February 11, 2004, she called him to pick up the amount of Php7,000.00 (earnings of
her sari-sari store) and to deposit it in her account at Asia Trust Bank. She would request
Petrus to do such errand for her as she does not trust her househelp. Petrus came to her
at around 7:00 o’clock in the morning. At around 11:00 o’clock a.m. of the same day,
four (4) to five (5) policemen arrived at her residence and told her to come with them to
the hospital where Petrus was brought because he met a vehicular accident along
Aguinaldo Highway.
Susana, together with her children and helpers, went with them, and rode in their van.
They, however, were not brought to the hospital but to an office. Thereat, Susana saw
her husband (almost dead) inside a small room with a one-way mirror. She was not able
to talk to him. She, together with her children and helpers, were detained for three (3)
days inside a small room. After three (3) days, her children and helpers were released
and they went home. At that time, she was not provided with the assistance of a
counsel.
Susana stated that her husband’s name is Petrus Yau. He is not known either as John or
Ong Kwai Ping. He is engaged in the business of buying cars for resale. They owned
three (3) houses and lots, all registered in her name. At the time she was taken into
custody by the police, she had with her Five Thousand Pesos cash, Allied Bank passbook
and ATM Cards (Allied Bank and Asia Trust Bank), VISA card, passport, wedding ring,
necklace and cellphone, which were taken away by persons whom she does not know. [7]
The Ruling of the RTC
In its judgment, dated December 14, 2007, the RTC convicted Petrus Yau, as principal, of
the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention, and Susana Yau, as an
accomplice to the commission thereof. The RTC found the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses credible and sufficient, with their versions of the incident
dovetailing with each other even on minor details. It observed that Petrus failed to
rebut his positive identification by the victim, Alastair and his brother Aaron John
Onglingswam (Aaron John), with whom he talked for several times over the phone. It
stated that the circumstantial evidence proffered by the prosecution had adequately
reinforced its theory that Petrus was the perpetrator of the heinous act.
With respect to Susana, the RTC wrote that she was positively identified by Alastair as
the Filipino woman who fed him or accompanied Petrus in bringing him food during his
22 days of captivity and, for said reason, should be held liable as an accomplice.
The RTC rejected the twin defenses of alibi and frame-up submitted by Petrus and
Susana because the same were unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The
dispositive portion of the said decision states:
WHEREFORE, this court renders judgment finding the accused Petrus Yau GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as principal of the crime of kidnapping for ransom and
serious illegal detention and pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, he is hereby sentenced
to suffer the prison term of RECLUSION PERPETUA. The court also finds the accused
Susana Yau GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as accomplice to the commission of
the crime of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention and applying to her the
benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law wherein her minimum penalty shall be taken
from the penalty next lower in degree of the imposable penalty of RECLUSION
TEMPORAL which is prision mayor, she is hereby therefore sentenced to suffer the
prison term of EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of PRISION MAYOR MINIMUM AS
MINIMUM to TWELVE (12) YEARS and TEN (10) MONTHS of RECLUSION TEMPORAL
MINIMUM AS MAXIMUM. Accused are credited in full of the preventive imprisonment
they have already served in confinement.
Further, both accused are sentenced to pay, jointly and severally, the victim ALASTAIR
JOSEPH ONGLINGSWAM actual damages of Two Hundred Seventy Three Thousand and
One Hundred Thirty Two Pesos (P273, 132.00) plus interest from the filing of the
information until full payment, moral damages of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00),
and exemplary damages of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00).
SO ORDERED.[8]
Unfazed, Petrus and Susana appealed the RTC judgment of conviction before the CA.
The Ruling of the CA
The CA affirmed the conviction of Petrus and Susana. [9] The appellate court likewise lent
credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, who were able to establish
with certitude the commission of the crime and the identities of the culprits thereof.
Hence, this appeal.
ASSIGNED ERRORS:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
WAS ILLEGALLY ARRESTED AND AS SUCH, THE PIECES OF OBJECT EVIDENCE ALLEGEDLY
SEIZED ARE INADMISSIBLE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS POSITIVE
IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS THE ALLEGED KIDNAPPER.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.[10]
Susana insisted that the trial court erred: 1] in not giving credence to her claim that she
was living separately with her husband, Petrus Yau; 2] in not considering that she was
not mentioned in the sworn statement executed by Alastair, dated February 12, 2004,
even when said victim was asked if there was another person assisting Petrus in the
perpetration of the crime; 3] in not considering the Resolution of the Department of
Justice, dated February 13, 2004, finding probable cause against her because she is the
registered owner of the house where Alastair was held captive and not because she
served food on the victim; and 4] in convicting her as an accomplice. [11]
On September 11, 2013, the Court issued a resolution [12] notifying the parties that they
could file their respective supplemental briefs if they so desire. The People of the
Philippines, represented by the OSG, opted not to file any supplemental brief,
maintaining its positions and arguments in its brief earlier filed in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
03446.[13] Petrus filed his Supplemental Brief[14] on December 27, 2013 in amplification of
his arguments raised in his brief filed before the CA.
The appeal is bereft of merit.
Encapsulated, the issues herein focus on: (a) the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses; (b) the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence to prove the commission of
kidnapping for ransom and the identity of the culprits thereof; and (c) the degree of
responsibility of each accused-appellant for the crime of kidnapping for ransom.
Worth reiterating on the issue of the credibility of the witnesses is the ruling of the
Court in People v. Maxion[15] that:
The issue raised by accused-appellant involves the credibility of witness, which is

best addressed by the trial court, it being in a better position to decide such question,
having heard the witness and observed his demeanor, conduct, and attitude under
grueling examination. These are the most significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of
witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies.
Through its observations during the entire proceedings, the trial court can be expected
to determine, with reasonable discretion, whose testimony to accept and which witness
to believe. Verily, findings of the trial court on such matters will not be disturbed on
appeal unless some facts or circumstances of weight have been overlooked,
misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially affect the disposition of the case.
[16]
It has been an established rule in appellate review that the trial court’s factual findings,
such as its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, the probative weight of their
testimonies, and the conclusions drawn from the factual findings, are accorded great
respect and have even conclusive effect. Such factual findings and conclusions assume
even greater weight when they are affirmed by the CA. [17]
In the case at bench, the RTC gave more weight and credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses compared to those of the accused-appellants. After a judicious
review of the evidence on record, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the
factual findings of the RTC and the CA, and their respective assessment and calibration
of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
In every criminal case, the task of the prosecution is always two-fold, that is, (1) to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged; and (2) to establish
with the same quantum of proof the identity of the person or persons responsible
therefor, because, even if the commission of the crime is a given, there can be no
conviction without the identity of the malefactor being likewise clearly ascertained.
[18]
Here, the prosecution was able to satisfactorily discharge this burden.
Victim Alastair positively identified Petrus as the driver of the white Toyota Corolla
taxicab with Plate No. PVD 115 which he boarded before he lost consciousness on the
afternoon of January 20, 2004. He claimed that while he was conversing with his
business associate Kelly Wei over his phone inside the taxicab, Petrus would turn his
face towards him, from time to time, and would talk as if he was being spoken to.
Alastair claimed that he had a good look and an ample opportunity to remember the
facial features of the driver as to be able to recognize and identify him in court. It is the
most natural reaction for victims of crimes to strive to remember the faces of their
accosters and the manner in which the craven acts are committed. [19]
Alastair also recognized the voice behind the red mask used by his kidnapper as
belonging to Petrus. It was established that from the first to the twentieth day of
Alastair’s captivity, his kidnapper would meet him five times a day and would talk to him
for an hour, thus, enabling him to remember the culprit’s voice which had a unique tone
and noticeable Chinese accent. Alastair declared with certainty that it was the voice of
Petrus. Witness Aaron John insisted that the person who introduced himself as Ong
Kwai Ping and with whom he had talked over the phone for three weeks, demanding
necessity money and ransom for the release of his brother Alastair, was Petrus because
of the distinct tone of his voice with Chinese accent. There was no showing that Alastair
and Aaron John had any ill motive to falsely testify against Petrus. As a rule, absent any
evidence showing any reason or motive for prosecution witnesses to perjure, the logical
conclusion is that no such improper motive exists, and their testimonies are, thus,
worthy of full faith and credit. [20]
Further, the prosecution presented credible and sufficient pieces of circumstantial

evidence that led to the inescapable and reasonable conclusion that Petrus committed
the crime charged. The settled rule is that a judgment of conviction based on
circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the following requisites concur: (1) there is
more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[21] The corollary rule is that the circumstances
proven must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. [22]
The combination of the following established facts and circumstances affirm the findings
of guilt by the RTC and the CA:
1] The victim was rescued by the police inside the house owned by Petrus and
Susana, located at Block 23, Lot 2, Ponsettia St., Camella Sorrento Homes, Bacoor,
Cavite;
2] The Toyota Corolla white taxicab bearing Plate No. PVD 115, which the victim recalled
boarding in going to Virra Mall Greenhills Shopping Center on the afternoon of January
20, 2004 and where he lost consciousness, was found in the possession of the accused-
appellant Petrus on February 11, 2004;
3] The driver’s license of Petrus and an ATM card in the name of Ong Kwai Ping were
recovered inside the Toyota Corolla taxicab of Petrus Yau;
4] In the house where the victim was rescued, the following evidence were found: one
(1) chain with padlock; handcuffs; short broken chain; checkered pajama; black blazer;
one (1) Onesimus black coat; two (2) video camera cartridges, one showing the victim in
lying down position and family footages, and the other one labeled “sex scandal”; eight
(8) pieces of cellphones; notebook; two (2) Talk n Tex SIM cards; Globe SIM card; two (2)
Transfer Certificates of Title for two pieces of land in Bacoor, Cavite, under the name of
Susana Sumogba; original copy of the Official Receipts and Certificate of Registration of
a Suzuki 1993 motorcycle bearing Plate No. 2M9748; business license and mayor’s
permit issued to Susana Yau; marriage contract of Petrus Yau and Susana Yau; birth
certificate of Susana Sumogba; birth certificates of their children; ACR of Petrus Yau;
Meralco bills; Asia Trust deposit slips; five ATM deposit slips; and PLDT bills;
5] Two (2) cellphones, a QTEK Palmtop and a Sony Erickson were found in the
possession of Petrus. Incidentally, it was reported that the owner of the QTEK Palmtop
cellphone was a certain Jasper Beltran, also a kidnapped victim whose whereabouts had
not been known yet; and
6] The DNA examination on the red mask worn by the kidnapper that was recovered
inside the house and on the buccal swab taken from Petrus showed that both DNA
profiles matched.[23]
The Court agrees with the findings of the RTC and the CA that the foregoing pieces of
circumstantial evidence, when analyzed and taken together, definitely lead to no other
conclusion than that Petrus was the author of the kidnapping for ransom. When viewed
as a whole, the prosecution evidence effectively established his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
The elements of Kidnapping For Ransom under Article 267 of the RPC, as amended by
R.A. No. 7659, are as follows: (a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim
of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and (c) motive of the
accused, which is extorting ransom for the release of the victim. [24]
All of the foregoing elements were duly established by the testimonial and documentary
evidences for the prosecution in the case at bench. First, Petrus is a private individual.
Second, Petrus kidnapped Alastair by using sleeping substance which rendered the latter
unconscious while inside a taxicab driven by the said accused-appellant. Third, Petrus
took and detained Alastair inside the house owned by him and Susana Yau in Bacoor,
Cavite, where said victim was handcuffed and chained, and hence, deprived of his
liberty. Fourth, Alastair was taken against his will. And fifth, Petrus made demands for
the delivery of a ransom in the amount of US$600,000.00 for the release of the victim.
Anent the criminal liability of each accused-appellant, there is no doubt that Petrus is
liable as principal of the crime of kidnapping for ransom. Susana, on the other hand, is
liable only as an accomplice to the crime as correctly found by the lower courts. It must
be emphasized that there was no evidence indubitably proving that Susana participated
in the decision to commit the criminal act. The only evidence the prosecution had
against her was the testimony of Alastair to the effect that he remembered her as the
woman who gave food to him or who accompanied his kidnapper whenever he would
bring food to him every breakfast, lunch and dinner.
Jurisprudence[25] is instructive of the elements required, in accordance with Article 18 of

the RPC, in order that a person may be considered an accomplice, namely, (1) that there
be a community of design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) that he cooperates in the
execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material or
moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (3) that there be a
relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person
charged as accomplice.
In the case at bench, Susana knew of the criminal design of her husband, Petrus, but she
kept quiet and never reported the incident to the police authorities. Instead, she stayed
with Petrus inside the house and gave food to the victim or accompanied her husband
when he brought food to the victim. Susana not only countenanced Petrus’ illegal act,
but also supplied him with material and moral aid. It has been held that being present
and giving moral support when a crime is being committed make a person responsible
as an accomplice in the crime committed. [26] As keenly observed by the RTC, the act of
giving food by Susana to the victim was not essential and indispensable for the
perpetration of the crime of kidnapping for ransom but merely an expression of
sympathy or feeling of support to her husband. [27] Moreover, this Court is guided by the
ruling in People v. De Vera,[28] where it was stressed that in case of doubt, the
participation of the offender will be considered as that of an accomplice rather than that
of a principal.
Alastair’s positive identification of Susana is not in any bit prejudiced by his failure to
mention her name in his sworn statement, dated February 12, 2004. It is well-settled
that affidavits, being ex parte, are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, but
do not really detract from the credibility of witnesses. [29] Oftentimes, the allegations
contained in affidavits involved mere passive mention of details anchored entirely on
the investigator’s questions. The discrepancies between a sworn statement and a
testimony in court do not outrightly justify the acquittal of an accused, as testimonial
evidence carries more weight than an affidavit. [30] Testimonies given during the trial are
more exact and elaborate. Besides, sworn statements are often executed when an
affiant’s mental faculties are not in such a state as to afford the affiant a fair opportunity
of narrating in full the incident which transpired. [31]
Given the overwhelming picture of their complicity in the crime, this Court cannot
accept the defenses of alibi and frame-up interposed by the accused-appellants. Alibi is
the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to contrive and difficult to prove. Alibi must be
proven by the accused with clear and convincing evidence; otherwise it cannot prevail
over the positive testimonies of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters. [32] The defense of frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by this Court
with disfavor, for it can easily be concocted but is difficult to prove. In order to prosper,
the defense of frame-up must be proven by the accused with clear and convincing
evidence.[33] Apart from their bare allegations, no competent and independent evidence
was adduced by the accused-appellants to substantiate their twin defenses of alibi and
frame-up and, thus, remain self-serving and do not merit any evidentiary value. More
importantly, nowhere in the records does it show of any dubious reasons or improper
motive that could have impelled the prosecution witnesses, particularly victim Alastair
Onglingswam, to falsely testify and fabricate documentary or object evidence just to
implicate accused-appellants in such a heinous crime as kidnapping for ransom. Their
only motive was to see to it that the kidnapper be brought to justice and sentenced with
the appropriate penalty.
As a last-ditch effort to exculpate themselves from any criminal culpability, the accused-
appellants questioned the legality of their warrantless arrests. This too must fail.
Any objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the acquisition by a court of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be opportunely raised before he enters
his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. [34] The accused-appellants never
objected to or questioned the legality of their warrantless arrests or the acquisition of
jurisdiction by the RTC over their persons before they entered their respective pleas to
the kidnapping for ransom charge. Considering this lapse and coupled with their full and
active participation in the trial of the case, accused-appellants were deemed to have
waived any objection to their warrantless arrests. The accused-appellants voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC thereby curing whatever defects that might
have attended their arrest. It bears stressing that the legality of the arrest affects only
the jurisdiction of the court over their persons. [35] Their warrantless arrests cannot, by
themselves, be the bases of their acquittal.
Even assuming arguendo that the accused-appellants made a timely objection to their
warrantless arrests, jurisprudence is replete with rulings that support the view that their
conviction was proper despite being illegally arrested without a warrant. In People v.
Manlulu,[36] the Court ruled that the illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot deprive
the State of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record point to their
culpability. Indeed, the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient cause for setting
aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error.
[37]
With respect to the penalty, the Court finds that the RTC was correct in imposing the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole against Petrus as principal in
the charge of kidnapping for ransom in view of R.A. No. 9346, prohibiting the death
penalty. Also, the Court finds that the penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and ten (10) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, meted out against Susana, an accomplice, to be proper.
The Court also sustains the RTC in awarding actual damages in the amount of
P273,132.00 plus interest committed from the filing of the information until fully paid.
As regards the moral damages against the accused-appellants, the Court finds the award
of P1,000,000.00 to be exorbitant. Hence, the same is being reduced to P200,000.00, as
the reasonable compensation for the ignominy and sufferings that Alastair and his
family endured because of the accused-appellants’ inhumane acts of detaining him in
handcuffs and chains, and mentally torturing him and his family to raise the ransom
money. The fact that they suffered the trauma from mental, physical and psychological
ordeal which constitutes the basis for moral damages under Article 2219 of the Civil
Code is too obvious to still require its recital at the trial through the superfluity of a
testimonial charade. The Court also finds the award of exemplary damages to be in
order in view of the presence of the qualifying circumstance of demand for ransom, and
to serve as an example and deterrence for the public good. The Court, however, reduces
the amount from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence. [38]
The RTC, however, erred in ruling that Susana was solidarily liable with Petrus for the
payment of damages. This is an erroneous apportionment of the damages awarded
because it does not take into account the difference in the nature and degree of
participation between the principal, Petrus, and the accomplice, Susana. The ruling of
this Court in People v. Montesclaros[39] is instructive on the apportionment of civil
liabilities among all the accused-appellants. The entire amount of the civil liabilities
should be apportioned among all those who cooperated in the commission of the crime
according to the degrees of their liability, respective responsibilities and actual
participation. Accordingly, Petrus should shoulder a greater share in the total amount of
damages than Susana who was adjudged only as an accomplice.
In fine, the accused-appellants are ordered to pay the victim, Alastair Onglingswam
actual damages in the amount of P273,132.00; moral damages in the amount of
P200,000.00; and exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00, or a total amount
of P573,132.00. Taking into consideration the degree of their participation, the principal,
Petrus, should be liable for two-thirds (2/3) of the total amount of the damages
(P573,132.00 x 2/3) or P382,088.00; and the accomplice, Susana, should be ordered to
pay the remaining one-third (1/3) or P191,044.00. Specifically, Petrus shall be liable for
actual damages in the amount of P182,088.00; moral damages in the amount of
P133,333.33; and exemplary damages in the amount of P66,666.67; and Susana for the
amount of P91,044.00 as actual damages; P66,666.67 as moral damages; and
WHEREFORE, the September 7, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.

No. 03446 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-appellants Petrus Yau and
Susana Yau y Sumogba are ordered to pay the victim Alastair Joseph Onglingswam
moral damages in the amount of P200,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of
P100,000.00. The award of actual damages in the amount of P273,132.00 is maintained.
The civil liabilities of the accused-appellants shall be apportioned as follows:
1] Petrus Yau is directed to pay actual damages in the amount of P182,088.00;

moral damages in the amount of P133,333.33; and exemplary damages in the amount
of P66,666.67; and
2] Susana Yau y Sumogba is directed to pay actual damages in the amount of

P91,044.00, moral damages in the amount of ?66,666.67 and exemplary damages in the
amount of P33,333.33.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 173791, April 07, 2009 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. PABLO
AMODIA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review in this appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals[1] (CA) affirming with
modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 38, Makati City in
Criminal Case No. 97-289. The RTC found the accused-appellant Pablo Amodia (Pablo)
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the corresponding civil liabilities to the heirs of
the victim.
Pablo was indicted, together with three other accused, under the
following Information:[2]
That on or about the 26th day of November 1996, in the City of Makati, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another,
while armed with a piece of wood and bladed weapon, taking advantage of their superior
strength [sic] and employing means to weaken the defense, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon one FELIX
OLANDRIA y BERGAÑO, by beating him on the head with a piece of wood and
stabbing him repeatedly on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him
mortal/fatal stab wounds which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
The Information, dated February 21, 1997, was filed with the court on February 28, 1997.
Pablo was arrested on June 5, 1998 and was thereafter prosecuted. The other accused
remained at large.[4] Pablo moved to quash the Information on the ground of mistaken
identity and the staleness of the warrant of arrest issued on March 4, 1997. The RTC
denied his motion.[5]
Pablo entered a plea of "not guilty" to the charge when arraigned on August 3, 1998. [6]
The Prosecution's Version
The prosecution presented evidence, both documentary[7] and testimonial,[8] to establish

that Pablo was one of the four assailants who, by their concerted efforts, killed Felix
Olandria y Bergaño (victim).[9] Acting together, they hit him on the head and stabbed him.
The records show that Romildo Ceno (Romildo) was a resident of Zone 17, Pembo,
Makati City and lived in the house of Freda Elnar (Freda).[10] At around 12:05 a.m. of
November 26, 1996, he, Mario Bitco (Mario),[11] and Freda were talking and watching
television at their house[12] when he heard a noise coming somewhere below the C-5
bridge, located some forty (40) to fifty (50) meters away from their house; he also heard
somebody shout "may away doon."[13] Curious, he and Mario went to the bridge[14] and
saw five persons whom he identified as the victim, Pablo, Arnold Partosa (Arnold),
George Palacio (George),[15] and Damaso Amodia (Damaso). He knew these men; the
victim was his neighbor, while Pablo, Arnold, George and Damaso were residents of
Scorpion Street, Zone 17 Pembo, Makati City.[16]
When Romildo was about three arms-length away from the place of the commotion, then
illuminated by light coming from a Meralco post located some five (5) to six (6) meters
from the scene, he saw the victim being held on his right hand by Pablo, while the other
hand was held by Arnold.[17] George was positioned at the victim's back and clubbed the
victim on the head; Damaso was in front of the victim and stabbed him three times. [18]
Luther Caberte (Luther), who happened to be passing by the C-5 Bridge at the time, also
saw what happened. He testified that he saw men fighting under the C-5 Bridge which
was illuminated by a light coming from a lamppost located some ten (10) meters away.
[19]
From his vantage point (about 15 meters away from the fight), he saw Pablo, Damaso,
George and Arnold ganging up (pinagtulung-tulungan) on the victim.[20] He saw Pablo
holding the victim's hand while Damaso was stabbing him. He also confirmed that
George was positioned behind the victim.[21] He personally knew both Pablo and the
victim; they have been neighbors since 1986.[22]
Both eyewitnesses left the scene after the stabbing; Romildo was chased away by George
and Damaso, while Luther went home immediately. Both were shaken and shocked with
what they had seen.[23]
At 3:00 a.m. of the same day, the CID Homicide received a report of an unidentified
body found in a road along Comembo Bridge, Barangay Pembo.[24] SPO2 Romeo Ubana
(SPO2 Ubana), a police investigator assigned to the CID Homicide, and a police
photographer went to the place and saw the body of a dead male person with three stab
wounds whom they subsequently identified as the victim.[25] He prepared a Final
Investigation Report of the incident.[26]
After the spot investigation, the victim's body was taken to the Veronica Memorial
Chapel where Dr. Antonio Bertido (Dr. Bertido), a National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) Medico Legal Officer, subjected it to a post-mortem examination.[27] The autopsy
yielded the following findings:
Pallor, intergument and nailbeds.
Stab wounds.
1. Elongated 4.5. cms. Edges are clean cut, medial border is sharp, lateral border is
blunt. Located at the chest, anterior, left side, 6.0 cms. From the anterior median
line. Directed backwards, upwards and medially involving the skin and underlying
soft tissues, into the thoracic cavity, perforating the pericardial sac, into the
pericardial cavity, penetrating the heart with an approximate depth of 10.0 cms.
2. Elongated, 3.5 cms edges are clean cut, medial border is blunt, lateral border is
sharp. Located at the anterior abdominal wall, left side, 6.5 cms. From the anterior
median line. Directed backwards, upwards and medially involving the skin and
underlying soft tissues, perforating the stomach with an approximate depth of 14.0
cms.
3. Elongated, 3.0 cms, edges are clean-cut, medial border is blunt, lateral border is
sharp. Located at the anterior abdominal wall, right side. 2.0 cms. From the
anterior median line. Directed backwards, upwards and laterally involving the skin
and underlying soft tissues, penetrating the head of the pancreas with an
approximate depth of 12.0 cms.[28]
Dr. Bertido stated that the victim was stabbed three times on the body by a single-bladed
sharp-pointed instrument.[29] Through the use of an anatomic diagram, Dr. Bertido
showed that the victim was stabbed on his left chest and over his right and left
abdominals.[30] He also stated that of the three stab wounds, the wound on the victim's
chest was the most fatal because it was near his heart, while the other wounds involved
the victim's stomach and pancreas.[31] Dr. Bertido declared that no other wound, aside
from the three stab wounds, was found on the victim's body.[32] He later on executed
a Certificate of Post-Mortem Examination showing the cause of death as hemorrhage,
secondary to stab wounds.[33]
Dr. Bertido admitted that while he could not specifically determine the position of the
victim at the time he was stabbed, he was certain that the stab wounds were inflicted
when the victim and his assailant were facing each other.[34] He also disclosed that the
sizes of the wounds were different from each other.[35]
The prosecution also presented Claudio Olandria,[36] the victim's father, who took the
witness stand and testified on the expenses that he and his family incurred by reason of
his son's death.
The Defense's Version
The defense relied on the defense of alibi, submitting testimonial and documentary
evidence[37] to support Pablo's claim that he was in another place at the time of the
stabbing.
Pablo averred that his name is Pablito Amodia and stated that at the time of the incident,
he lived in the house of Elma Amodia Romero (Elma), his sister, located at Zone 13,
Ilocos Street, Barangay Rizal, Makati City.[38] He has lived there since 1994. He claimed
that he was at home in the evening of November 25, 1996, until the early morning of the
next day.[39] At around 10:00 of that evening, his brother - Elias Amodia (Elias) - who
lived next door, awakened him[40] and told him that his (Elias') wife, then pregnant, had
started having labor pains.[41] He went back to sleep only to be awakened by Elias at past
12:00 midnight. Elias then requested him to take care of his house.[42]
Pablo related that it was at this time that Damaso (another brother), George, Arnold, and
another person he did not know, came to Elma's house.[43] He noticed that Damaso was in
a hurry and was packing his clothes; the latter told him that they (Damaso and his
companions) encountered trouble.[44] Damaso and his companions left past midnight; on
the other hand, he went to Elias' house to take care of the latter's children, while Elias and
his wife went to a lying-in clinic.[45] While at Elias' house, Elma visited him to check on
him and the children.[46] He stayed there until 9:00 a.m. of November 26, 1996 when he
went back to Elma's house; he went to school later in the day.[47]
Pablo also alleged that it was only after returning from school that he came to know of
the victim's death; he only knew the victim by name and even went to the victim's wake
the first night.[48]
He further alleged that he stopped schooling for lack of funds and went to Zamboanga del
Norte in January 1997.[49] He went back to Manila on May 22, 1998 to continue his
education, but was arrested on June 5, 1998.[50]
Elma and Elias corroborated Pablo's story.[51] Elma stated that Pablo lived with her in
their brother's house together with her husband, their children, and Damaso. [52] She added
that Damaso told her that they were in trouble (atraso) because of a fight, and that he and
his companions were on their way to Cebu.[53] Elma declared that Pablo was with her
when Damaso came to the house to pack his clothes.[54] Pablo and Damaso left at 12:30,
but for different destinations.[55] She knew that Pablo went to Elias' house because she
went to check on him and the children around 1 a.m. and then again at 2 a.m. [56] Elias'
wife gave birth to a baby girl at 2:50 p.m. of November 26, 1996.[57]
After some prodding, Elma admitted that she knew that cases have been filed against
Pablo and Damaso as early as December 1996.[58] The defense thereafter rested its case.
Prosecution's Rebuttal Evidence
The prosecution presented Amelita Sagarino, a resident of Scorpion Street, Zone 17 since
1989, as a rebuttal witness.[59] She testified that she knew the victim and the accused who
were all her neighbors.[60] She stated that she served food at the victim's wake from seven
in the evening up to six in the morning and that she never saw Pablo there.[61] She also
heard from her neighbors that the people responsible for the victim's death were George,
Arnold, Damaso, Pabling and Pablito Amodia.[62] She clarified that Pabling and Pablito
Amodia are one and the same person.[63]
Subsequently, she stated that Pablito Amodia also attended the wake of the victim. [64]
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC convicted Pablo of murder after finding sufficient evidence of his identity, role
in the crime as principal by direct participation, and conspiracy between him and the
other accused who used their superior strength to weaken the victim. The RTC relied on
the testimonies of eyewitnesses Romildo and Luther, the autopsy results conducted on the
body of the victim, and the lack of physical impossibility on the part of Pablo to be at the
crime scene. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Pablo guilty of having committed the crime of
murder as principal by conspiracy. Considering that there are no aggravating or
mitigating circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime, pursuant to Article 64
(1) of the Revised Penal Code, accused is sentenced to suffer imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua. He is further sentence to pay the heirs of the deceased Felix Olandria the
amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and to reimburse said heirs of the amount of
P23,568.00 for expenses incurred for the funeral service, burial and incidental expenses.
SO ORDERED.[65]
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the CA agreed with the RTC's findings and affirmed Pablo's conviction.
[66]
The CA, however, corrected the RTC's ruling on the applicable provision of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended (Code), and modified the award of actual damages, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed
Decision dated July 19, 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in accordance with Rule
63(2) of the Revised Penal Code. He is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the victim,
P23,268.00, as actual damages, P50,000 as civil indemnity and P25,000.00, as exemplary
damages, in addition to the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
The Issues
In his Brief before this Court,[67] Pablo assigns the following errors committed by both the
RTC and CA:
(1) In finding that his guilt for the crime charged has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
(2) In finding the existence of conspiracy.

Pablo argues that the lower courts erred in failing to give evidentiary weight to
his alibi, thus disregarding the constitutional presumption of innocence in his favor.[68] He
emphasizes that his alibi was corroborated by defense witness Elma who confirmed that
he was at Elias's house at the time of the stabbing.[69]
He alternatively argues that granting that he was a part of Damaso's group and that this
group killed the victim, the prosecution failed to prove the conspiracy among them; there
was no evidence adduced to establish how the incident that led to the stabbing began.
Any doubt that he acted as a principal should have been resolved in his favor. [70]
In their Brief,[71] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) representing the People,

maintain that no reversible error was committed by the lower courts. The OSG avers that
the prosecution's evidence has satisfactorily proven all the elements of the crime.
Similarly, the conspiracy between Pablo and the three accused was proven by the autopsy
report which corroborated the categorical testimonies of Romildo and Luther on how the
accused and the others acted, clearly showing a unity of purpose in the accomplishment
of their criminal objective.[72] The testimonies of these two eyewitnesses also reveal that
the killing was attended by the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength,
and the employment of means to weaken the defense of the victim. These circumstances
qualify the killing to murder.
The Court's Ruling

We affirm Pablo's conviction.
The appeal essentially attacks the soundness of the factual findings of the RTC and CA
that, according to Pablo, are not in accord with the totality of the evidence in the case. He
emphasizes that the RTC and CA disregarded his alibi and the lack of evidence
establishing a conspiracy to kill the victim.
A review of the records fails to persuade us to overturn Pablo's judgment of conviction.

We have emphasized often enough that the factual findings of the trial court, its
calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its assessment of their probative
weight are given high respect, if not conclusive effect, unless cogent facts and
circumstances of substance were ignored, misconstrued or misinterpreted, which, if
considered, would alter the outcome of the case.[73] Under the circumstances, we find no
exceptional reason to warrant a deviation from this rule.
The records show that both the RTC and CA convicted Pablo of murder based on the
positive identification by Romildo and Luther and their eyewitness accounts of the actual
killing, showing the existence of a conspiracy among Pablo's group to kill the victim. The
CA decision clearly reflects these findings and reasoning:
The evidence on record gives the picture of the incident at the time when Felix Olandria
was already being held on both hands by accused Pablo Amodia and Arnold Pantosa. It
was while in this position that accused Damaso Amodia delivered three (3) stab blows
which proved to be fatal . . .[74]
Both courts gathered, too, from these testimonies that the killing was qualified by the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, demonstrated by the concerted
efforts of Pablo's group to overpower the victim's strength with their own in carrying out
their criminal plan:
... the nature of the evidence presented, there are sufficient reasons to conclude and
consider as having been established beyond reasonable doubt, the existence of conspiracy
and the qualifying aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength and
employment of means to weaken the defense. These are: first, the convergence of four (4)
accused; x x x second, the time when the four (4) accused were seen together which is
about 12:05 in the early morning of November 26, 1997; x x x third, the place where they
were seen together which is below the bridge of C-5; fourth, possession by accused
Damaso Amodia of a knife his occupation being that of a painter; fifth, absence of any
other injuries in other parts of the body of the victim Felix Olandria x x x; sixth, the
location of the three stab wounds all of which were directed against delicate parts of the
body indicating intent to kill... The foregoing circumstances clearly proven by the
prosecution evidence, when taken together with the fact that death ensued indicate that
there was conspiracy on the part of the accused that they abused their superior strength
and employed means to weaken the defense. The act of one is to be considered therefore
the act of the other.[75]
The Eyewitnesses Testimonies.
The RTC and CA found the identification made by Romildo and Luther to
be clear, categorical, and consistent.[76] We observed that in accepting the truth of the
identification and the account of how the stabbing took place, the RTC and CA
considered the witnesses' proximity to the victim and his assailants at the time of the
stabbing - they were about three arms length away and 15 meters away, respectively; the
well-lighted condition of the crime scene; and the familiarity of these eyewitnesses with
the victim and his assailants - they were all residents of the same area. Similarly, we also
note that no evidence was presented to establish that these eyewitnesses harbored any ill-
will against Pablo and had no reason to fabricate their testimonies. The weight of
jurisprudence is to accept these kinds of testimonies as true for being consistent with the
natural order of events, human nature and the presumption of good faith.[77]
Aside from these, we additionally note that Romildo and Luther never wavered, despite
the contrary efforts of the defense, in their positive identification of Pablo as one of the
assailants of the victim. The records glaringly show the defense counsel's vain efforts to
prove that these eyewitnesses committed a mistake in identifying Pablo as one of the
assailants since his name was allegedly Pablito Amadio, and not Pablo.
We state in this regard that positive identification pertains essentially to proof of

identity and not necessarily to the name of the assailant. A mistake in the name of the
accused is not equivalent, and does not necessarily amount to, a mistake in the identity of
the accused especially when sufficient evidence is adduced to show that the accused is
pointed to as one of the perpetrators of the crime. In this case, the defense's line of
argument is negated by the undisputed fact that the accused's identity was known to both
the eyewitnesses. On the one hand, we have Romildo's testimony stating that Pablo lived
across Scorpion Street from where he lived.[78] He also stated that he had known Pablo for
more than a year.[79] On the other hand, Luther testified that he had known Pablo since
1986 because they were neighbors and that he even played basketball with him. [80] We
stress that Pablo never denied these allegations.
In People v. Ducabo, we took notice of the human trait that once a person knows another
through association, identification becomes an easy task even from a considerable
distance; most often, the face and body movements of the person identified has created a
lasting impression on the identifier's mind that cannot easily be erased.[81]
The association the eyewitnesses cited - specifically, being neighbors and even basketball
game mates - rendered them familiar with Pablo, making it highly unlikely that they
could have committed a mistake in identifying him as one of the assailants. Their
identification came at the first opportunity (i.e., when they revealed) what they knew of
the killing, and culminated with their courtroom identification of Pablo as among those
who assaulted the victim.[82]
Two reasons settle the argument about Pablo's name against his favor. It strikes us that
this argument is a line of defense that came only as the defense's turn to present evidence
neared. We have on record that prior to the defense's presentation of evidence, Pablo
referred to himself as Pablo Amodia when the court asked him his name.[83] We likewise
find no competent evidence, other than his assertion and those of his siblings, showing
that his true name is really Pablito Amodia. We therefore conclude that any uncertainty
on the name by which the accused is or should be known is an extraneous matter that in
no way renders his identification as a participant in the stabbing uncertain.
We find nothing irregular, unusual, or inherently unbelievable, in the eyewitnesses'

testimonies that would affect their credibility. Their narratives are remarkably compatible
with the physical evidence on hand; likewise, their accounts are also consistent with each
other. More importantly, the narration of these eyewitnesses are in full accord with the
human experience of individuals who are exposed to a startling event and their initial
reluctance to involve themselves in the criminal matters especially those involving
violent crimes committed by individuals known to them.
The Defense of Alibi
Pablo argues that his alibi should have been given greater evidentiary weight because it
was corroborated by his sister, Elma. As reproduced by Pablo in his Brief, the substance
of Elma's testimony is as follows:
Q: Mrs. Witness while you were sleeping which you said you start sleeping at 10:00 o'clock in
the evening of November 25, 1996, while you were sleeping, what transpired, if any, was
there any unusual incident that transpired? [sic]
A: Pumunta po ang isang kapatid ko, si Elias Amodia dahil naglalabor daw and hipag ko at
manganganak at dadalhin niya sa lying-in, eh malayo po at siya ang pinagbabantay sa mga
pamangking kong maliliit, sir.
Q: Could you tell the Honorable Court what time did your brother Elias Amodia wake up Pablo
Amodia?
A: 12:00 midnight, sir.
xxx
Q: When Pablo woke up, what if any did Pablo Amodia do?
A: Pumunta po siya sa bahay ng kapatid ko, sir?
Q: And where was that house of your brother Elias located?
A: Malapit lang po sa amin.
Q: How far is your house to his house?
A: Tatlong (3) dipa po ang layo, sir.[84]
Alibi is a defense that comes with various jurisprudentially-established limitations. A first
limitation fully applicable to this case is that alibi cannot overcome positive
identification.[85] For the defense of alibi to prosper, evidence other than the testimony of
the accused must be adduced. Evidence referred to in this respect does not merely relate
to any piece of evidence that would support the alibi; rather, there must be sufficient
evidence to show the physical impossibility (as to time and place) that the accused could
have committed or participated in the commission of the crime. For alibi to be given
evidentiary value, there must be clear and convincing evidence showing that at the time
of the commission of the crime, it was physically impossible for the accused to have been
at the situs criminis.[86]
As we have discussed at length, Pablo was positively identified by Romildo and Luther
as one of the victim's assailants. We find no reason to doubt the accuracy of the
identification made.
Pablo's alibi does not also meet the requirements of physical impossibility of time and
place. A scrutiny of the entire testimony of Elma failed to show that it was physically
impossible for Pablo to be at the crime scene when the stabbing took place. We note that
although Elma testified that Pablo was at Elias' house at the time of the stabbing, she
nonetheless admitted that her house (which was located beside Elias' house) and the
bridge where the crime was committed is a 10-minute walking distance away from each
other.[87] She further testified that after Pablo left for Elias' house, she only saw him again
at around 1:00 a.m. and at 2:00 a.m at their brother's house. [88] Hence, it was possible that
Pablo could have gone out of Elias' house to join Damaso, George, and Arnold in
assaulting the victim, and afterwards returned to his brother's house without Elma
knowing that he was ever gone.
We scrutinize Elma's version of the events with utmost care considering that she is
Pablo's sister. This is not the first time that this Court has encountered a case
where alibi is provided by a close kin; we have recognized that in these situations, it may
come naturally to some to give more weight to blood ties and close relationship than to
the objective truth;[89] thus, our strict scrutiny.
We find that the time frame in Elma's version of events shows a pattern of inconsistency
that renders its truthfulness suspect. The testimony is inconsistent on the time Pablo slept
and was awakened by Elias - details that, to our mind, are material to show his
whereabouts on that fateful night.[90]
Elma initially stated that Pablo slept at 9:00 p.m. and was awakened by Elias at 12:00
midnight.[91] Thereafter, she claimed that Pablo was also awakened by Elias at 9:00 p.m.
(the same time that Pablo slept) that evening, and that Pablo went to Elias's house around
12:30 p.m.[92] Subsequently, she averred that Pablo was awakened at 10:00 p.m. but went
back to sleep then awakened again at 12:00 p.m.[93]
These conflicting statements are not rendered any more believable by their conflict with
the time frames claimed in Pablo's version of events.[94] Similarly, Elma's version
of what occurred when is likewise inconsistent with Elias' version of events.[95]
Finally, even granting that a semblance of truth exists in the defense's narration of events,
the inconsistencies and contradictions in its witnesses' testimonies render their evidence
uncertain. In the final analysis, even their version does not preclude Pablo from being
physically present at the crime scene when the killing took place. Thus, the defense and
prosecution's evidence taken together, render Pablo guilty of the crime charged beyond
reasonable doubt.
Conspiracy
As an alternative argument, Pablo puts into issue the failure of the prosecution's evidence
to establish the conspiracy between him and his other co-accused to make him liable
for murder. He emphasizes that the evidence, as testified to by the eyewitnesses, only
relate to events during, and not prior to, the assault and the stabbing of the victim. He
argues that no evidence was adduced to show that the accused all agreed to kill the
victim.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.[96] It arises on the very instant the
plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to
pursue it.[97] It may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence.[98]
Direct proof of conspiracy is rarely found; circumstantial evidence is often resorted to in

order to prove its existence.[99] Absent of any direct proof, as in the present case,
conspiracy may be deduced from the mode, method, and manner the offense was
perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves, when such acts point to a
joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest.[100] An accused
participates as a conspirator if he or she has performed some overt act as a direct or
indirect contribution in the execution of the crime planned to be committed.[101] The
overt act may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself,
or it may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the
commission of the crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators.
[102] Stated otherwise, it is not essential that there be proof of the previous agreement
and decision to commit the crime; it is sufficient that the malefactors acted in concert
pursuant to the same objective.[103]
Although there was no evidence in the present case showing a prior agreement among
Pablo, Arnold, George, and Damaso, the following chain of events however show their
commonality of purpose in killing the victim: first, the accused surrounded the victim on
all sides: Damaso at the front, George at the victim's rear, while Pablo and Arnold
flanked the victim on each side; second, Pablo then wrested the right arm of the victim
and restrained his movement, while Arnold did the same to the left arm of the
victim; third, George then hit the victim's head with a piece of wood; and fourth, Damaso
stabbed the victim three times.
In People v. Elijorde,[104] we said:
The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly or intentionally
rendered which cannot exist without previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to
be executed. It is therefore required in order to be liable either as a principal by
indispensable cooperation or as an accomplice that the accused must unite with the
criminal design of the principal by direct participation.
In People v. Manalo,[105] we declared that the act of the appellant in holding the victim's
right hand while the latter was being stabbed constituted sufficient proof of conspiracy:
Indeed, the act of the appellant of holding the victim's right hand while the victim was
being stabbed by Dennis shows that he concurred in the criminal design of the actual
killer. If such act were separate from the stabbing, appellant's natural reaction should
have been to immediately let go of the victim and flee as soon as the first stab was
inflicted. But appellant continued to restrain the deceased until Dennis completed his
attack.
Tested against these, the existence of conspiracy among the four accused is clear; their
acts were aimed at the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing their
respective parts in the series of acts that, although appearing independent from one
another, indicated a concurrence of sentiment and intent to kill the victim. Following the
reasoning in Manalo, if there was in fact no unity of purpose among Pablo and the three
other accused, Pablo's reaction would have been to let go of the victim and flee after the
first stabbing by Damaso. The evidence reveals, however, that after the first stabbing,
Pablo still continued to hold the right arm of the victim, rendering him immobile and
exposed to further attack.
Where there is conspiracy, a person may be convicted for the criminal act of another.
[106]
Where there is conspiracy, the act of one is deemed the act of all. [107]
The Crime
Murder is committed by killing a person under any of the qualifying circumstances

enumerated by Article 248 of the Code not falling within the provisions of Article 246
(on parricide), Article 249 (on homicide), and Article 255 (on infanticide) of the said
Code.
With Pablo's participation in the killing duly established beyond reasonable doubt, what
is left to examine is whether or not the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength, which qualifies the crime to murder, is present under the circumstances.
To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of
proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked.[108] Taking advantage
of superior strength does not mean that the victim was completely defenseless. [109]
In People v. Ventura, we opined that there are no fixed and invariable rules in
considering abuse of superior strength or employing means to weaken the defense of the
victim.[110] Superiority does not always mean numerical superiority. Abuse of superiority
depends upon the relative strength of the aggressor vis-à-vis the victim.[111] Abuse of
superiority is determined by the excess of the aggressor's natural strength over that of the
victim, considering the position of both, and the employment of the means to weaken the
defense, although not annulling it.[112] The aggressor must have advantage of his natural
strength to ensure the commission of the crime.[113]
In the present case, we find that there was abuse of superior strength employed by Pablo,
Arnold, George and Damaso in committing the killing. The evidence shows that the
victim was unarmed when he was attacked. In the attack, two assailants held his arms on
either side, while the other two, on the victim's front and back, each armed with a knife
and a piece of wood that they later used on the victim. Against this onslaught, the victim's
reaction was graphically described by the prosecution eyewitness, Luther, when he
testified:
Q: Which came first, by the way, was the victim or what was the victim doing then when the
fight took place?
A: Wala siyang nagawa kase hinawakan siya, gusto niyang makawala pero wala siyang
magawa hinawakan siya sa leeg, sir.[114] [Emphasis supplied]
Under these circumstances, no doubt exists that there was gross inequality of forces
between the victim and the four accused and that the victim was overwhelmed by forces
he could not match. The RTC and CA therefore correctly appreciated the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength which qualified the killing to the crime
of murder.
The Penalty
The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Code is reclusion perpetua to death.
Article 63 (2) of the same Code states that when the law prescribes a penalty consisting
of two indivisible penalties and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances in the commission of the crime, the lesser penalty shall be imposed. Since
the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength already qualified the killing to
murder, it can no longer be used to increase the imposable penalty. We note that while
another aggravating circumstance, i.e., employing means to weaken the defense of the
victim, was alleged in the Information, the prosecution failed to adduce evidence to
support the presence of this circumstance. Hence, the RTC and CA correctly imposed the
Likewise, the CA correctly awarded P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000 as

exemplary to the heirs of the victim consistent with prevailing jurisprudence.[115]
However, in line with recent jurisprudence, the award of civil indemnity shall be
increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00.[116]
Further, the CA erred in awarding actual damages in the amount of P23,268.00.
In People v. Villanueva, we held that when actual damages proven by receipts during the
trial amount to less than P25,000.00, the award of temperate damages for P25,000.00 is
justified in lieu of actual damages of a lesser amount.[117] We reiterated this ruling in the
recent cases of People v. Casta[118] and People v. Ballesteros[119] where we awarded
temperate damages,
in lieu of actual damages, in the amount of P25,000.00.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals

decision dated May 4, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01764 finding accused-appellant
Pablo Amodia GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, with
the MODIFICATION that:
(1) The award of civil indemnity shall be increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00;
(2) The award of actual damages in the amount of P23,268.00 is hereby DELETED; and
(3) In lieu thereof, accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay P25,000.00 as temperate

damages.
The other portions of the appealed decision are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 128002, October 10, 2000 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.
BIENVENIDO BONITO Y BEDAÑA @ "BINDOY", EDILBERTO
(ROBERTO) CANDELARIA @ "BENTONG" AND DOMINGO BUIZA,
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Accused Bienvenido Bonito, Edilberto (Roberto) Candelaria and Domingo Buiza were
convicted of the crime of Murder by the Regional Trial Court[1] of Tabaco, Albay, for the
violent death of FLORA BANAWON. They were sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000 as
civil indemnity, P10,000.00 as actual damages, P20,000.00 for lost earnings of the
victim, P30,000.00 for moral damages, and to pay the costs.
Appellants were charged with the crime of murder that was allegedly committed as
follows:[2]
"That on or about the 24th day of June 1994 at 10:00 o'clock in the evening, more or less,
at Sitio Pinarik, Barangay Canaway, Municipality of Malilipot, Province of Albay,
accused, together with a still unidentified person, with intent to kill, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, with evident premeditation, treachery, abuse of
superior strength and cruelty, did then and there wilfully, (sic) unlawfully and
feloniously assault and attack FLORA BANAWON, thereby causing various injuries on
the vital parts of the body and not contented forcibly insert and thrust cassava stalk to the
vagina of the offended party, which caused her death, to the damage and prejudice of her
heirs." (emphasis ours)
The accused were arraigned on April 18, 1995. They pled "not guilty."[3] Trial ensued.
The prosecution evidence came chiefly from the testimonies of the following witnesses:
(1) Santos Banawon, the surviving spouse of the victim, (2) Dr. Arsenia Mañosca-Moran,
the Municipal Health Officer of Malilipot, Albay, (3) Nelson Volante, the eyewitness,
and (4) Benjamin Brusola, a neighbor of the Banawons and the accused.
Santos Banawon, 62 years old, husband of victim Flora Banawon, testified that on June
24, 1994, at about 6:00 p.m., the victim left for Datag, Malilipot, Albay, to pray the
novena. Datag is approximately 5 kilometers away from their residence in Pinaric,
Canaway, Malilipot, Albay. That evening, she did not return home.[4]
The next day, Santos searched for his missing wife. He proceeded to lower Pinaric and
saw a crowd looking at the lifeless body of his wife. She was badly beaten and a cassava
trunk was jabbed in her genitalia. The police brought his wife's body to the Rural Health
Center for autopsy.[5]
On August 15, 1994, Santos reported the incident to the National Bureau of Investigation
to assist the local police in resolving the case of his wife.[6]
Santos declared that he spent a total amount of P10,000.00 for his wife's embalment,
coffin, wake, internment, tombstone, and funeral car. He received donations in the
amount of P4,000.00, more or less. During her lifetime, his wife earned P400.00 weekly
by weaving mats for other people. He lost his job as a carpenter because he was deeply
troubled by his wife's death. His monthly income then was P2,000.00. For the five
months he failed to work while seeking justice for the death of his wife, the total income
he allegedly lost was P10,000.00.[7]
Dr. Arsenia Mañosca-Moran, Municipal Health Officer of Malilipot, Albay conducted
an autopsy on the victim on June 25, 1994. She noted the following injuries sustained by
the victim:[8]
"HEAD: pallore swollen face; with moving maggots on the buccal opening; lips blue,
swollen tongue, completely fractured mandibular bone (R) side inwardly and
upwardly dislocated & (L) side outward and upwardly dislocated; with imprint
abrasion (bite mark) at (L) maxillomandibular region; 1.9 cm. Lacerated wound at
(L) lower chin; (L) eye partially opened with constricted pupil; (R) eye, closed
with purplish periorbital hematoma and 0.4 cm. lacerated wound at nasal side of
infraorbital region; ear with purplish subcutaneous hematoma at (L) helix.
NECK: with redness and ecchymotic friction abrasion and slight desquamation of the
epidermis at the (L) lateromedial aspect middle 3rd of the neck and neck flexed
on the opposite side (R).
EXTREMITIES - Upper: firm clenched hands with purple fingernails.
Lower: with reddish brown multiple abrasion at posterior aspect of the proximal 3rd of the
lower extremities, bilateral & (L) post. side of the knee.
GENITALIA:with cassava branch inserted 4 cm. Deep intravaginally with abundant yellowish
maggot on the vaginal entroetus and in thigh and upon removal of the branch,
admits 2 fingers with ease, no lacerations noted.
VAGINAL SMEAR FOR SPERM CELL: ( - ) neg. June 27, 1994
CAUSE OF DEATH: Asphyxia 2° to occluded windy
: Neurogic shock."
(Emphasis supplied)
Dr. Moran explained that at the time of the examination, the victim had been dead for
more than 12 hours. The victim's face was swollen and pale which could be due to
strangulation. Her lips were blue and the tongue was swollen. The right and left sides of
the lower bones of the mouth (jaws) were dislocated, probably due to a strong impact.
There was a bite mark on the left cheek caused by human teeth and a 1.9 cm. wound on
the lower chin. The left eye was slightly protruding (medyo nakalabas) while the right
eye was closed and appeared bluish (parang latay), indicating that the victim received a
fist blow. The lacerated wound on the nasal side indicated that whoever hit the victim had
a metal or ring on his finger. The crack on the left ear, outer lobe, could be due to an
impact against a hard object or due to a fist blow. The abrasions on the neck showed
crossing imprints that were not caused by hand or rope but by a hard object pressed
against the victim. The injuries on the thigh near the buttocks indicated that the victim
was pushed or pressured down to the ground. Her genitalia had a branch of cassava
inserted inside, about 4 cms. deep.[9]
Dr. Moran concluded that, from the nature of the injuries sustained by the victim, it was
possible that more than one person attacked her and that she put up a fight against her
assailants. The victim died primarily due to strangulation.[10]
Nelson Volante, 46 years old, gave an eyewitness account of the crime. He testified that
on the evening of June 24, 1994, he watched television shows in the house of a certain
Bonifacio Borjal. He left at about 10:00 p.m. It was a moonlit night.
On his way home, he passed by the trail leading to his house. After about one kilometer,
he heard someone moaning. Curious, he followed where the sound emanated. As he
peeped though the foliage some three meters away from the trail, he saw three men
standing near a woman who was lying on the ground face up ("nakatihaya"). Another
man whom he failed to recognize was standing beneath a banana tree about ten meters
away from the accused and the woman. He identified the three men as accused
Bienvenido Bonito, Roberto Candelaria[11] and Domingo Buiza. Accused Bonito was
holding a cassava trunk. Without much ado, Bonito inserted the cassava trunk in the
private part of the woman while Buiza and Candelaria held her hands and feet
respectively. Volante was just five meters away from the three accused. Shocked by what
he saw, he hurriedly left and headed for home. He did not tell his wife about the incident
because he was afraid to get involved. He hardly slept that night.[12]
The following morning, Volante went to the farm as usual. When he returned home in the
afternoon, he learned from a certain Sergia and Paño Binaday that the body of Flora
Banawon was found with a cassava trunk inserted in her private part. He then realized
who the victim was.
More than five months after the incident, Volante finally heeded his conscience and told
Santos Banawon what transpired that tragic night. Santos Banawon accompanied him to
the NBI office in Legazpi. Atty. Carlos Carrillo took his sworn statement on December 9,
1994.[13]
After Volante had executed his affidavit and before the three accused were arrested, [14] his
house was stoned on two occasions. Fearful for his family's safety, he and his family
moved to Sta. Elena, Malinao, Albay.
Benjamin Brusola, 67 years old, testified that at about 8:00 p.m. of June 26, 1994, he
went to the house of Santos Banawon for the wake of the victim. He overheard that
"Bindoy" (accused Bonito) also attended the wake to ask forgiveness from the victim
because he could not sleep for three consecutive nights. Bonito briefly glanced at the
coffin but he did not ask for forgiveness. Instead, Bonito sat on a bench and conversed
with a certain Luis Cabalis and co-accused Domingo Buiza. Brusola overheard Bonito
saying it was nice to have "fun" with an old woman ("paitok-itokan"), then Bonito
exchanged "high-fives" with Buiza.
The defense was anchored on denial and alibi.
Essentially, accused Candelaria and Buiza claimed that they were sleeping in their
respective houses on the night Flora Banawon was brutally murdered. Accused Bonito,
on the other hand, did not take the witness stand. Their witnesses claimed that the last
person they saw following Flora Banawon as she was heading for home that fateful night
was eyewitness Nelson Volante.
Blas Bongalos, 75 years old, testified that at about 6:30 p.m., on June 24, 1994, Volante
dropped by his house and asked for something to drink. Bongalos gave him a bottle of
gin (lapad). Clemente Buiza, father of accused Domingo Buiza, happened to be there.
Clemente told Volante to entrust to him his (Volante's) bolo if he would like to drink
liquor. Volante obediently gave the bolo to Clemente for temporary safekeeping. Volante
consumed the gin after more than twenty minutes. Thereafter, he got his bolo back from
Clemente and left.[15]
Alfredo Brutas, 45 years old, a "barangay kagawad," testified that Volante used to work
for him in his farm in Canaway, Malilipot, Albay, before the latter transferred his
residence to Malinao in February 1995. On June 24, 1994, there was a drinking spree in
his house because his son had just arrived from abroad. Volante arrived at about 7:00
p.m. to retrieve the bolo that he (Brutas) confiscated from Volante when the latter got
drunk on another occasion. Brutas refused to give back the bolo because Volante
appeared inebriated again. Volante got peeved at him. Brutas then told him to leave his
house. Volante left at 8:00 p.m.
Brutas claimed that he did not talk to anyone prior to his appearance in court. Allegedly,
he happened to be in court to visit Fiscal Narciso Berango when he saw the court's
calendar posted on the bulletin board. He volunteered to testify for the accused.
Ricardo Banaobra, 30 years old, testified that in the evening of June 24, 1994, he was
one of the guests of Alfredo Brutas. They were celebrating the arrival of Brutas' son.
Volante passed by at 7:00 p.m. He had a bolo with him and he was very talkative. He
noticed that Volante was a bit intoxicated. Brutas took the bolo from Volante. At past
9:00 p.m., the victim passed by. After awhile, Volante left the group. [16]
Jose Belenzo, 64 years old, testified that he had known eyewitness Nelson Volante, the
Banawons and accused Bienvenido Bonito and Roberto (Edilberto) Candelaria for many
years because they were residents of Canaway. He also knew accused Domingo Buiza
because he married a girl from Canaway. Between 9:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. of June 24,
1994, he was in his store doing some chores. Volante arrived at 9:00 p.m. He noticed that
Volante was a bit tipsy. Volante asked for cigarettes. After an hour, the victim passed by
his store and momentarily stopped to ask for the time. After he told her that it was already
10:00 p.m., she went home. Volante followed her. In the afternoon of the next day,
Belenzo learned that somebody died. He had not seen Volante since then. [17]
On cross-examination, Belenzo testified that he attended all the hearings of the case but
he never went to the NBI to shed light on the incident. Roberto Candelaria and Edilberto
Candelaria refer to the same person but the real name of Roberto is Edilberto. When
Volante passed by his store in the evening of June 24, 1994, he was not carrying any
bolo. According to Belenzo, he had seen the victim pass by the trail near his store for
several years. That night, however, was the first time that she dropped by the store solely
to ask him what the time was.[18]
Accused Domingo Buiza, 33 years old, testified that at 9:00 a.m. of June 24, 1994, he
was in Sto. Cristo, Tabaco, Albay to help his aunt Nelia prepare for the town's fiesta. He
stayed there the whole day and went home only at 7:00 p.m. When he reached home, he
immediately went to bed because he had a few drinks in his aunt's house. He woke up late
the following day. It was already Sunday morning when he learned from an uncle that his
aunt, Flora Banawon,[19] was killed. He went to her wake twice. After the internment, his
uncle, Santos Banawon, went to his house and requested him to testify against Volante.
He told his uncle that he could not help him because he did not know anything about the
killing. He claimed he had a good relationship with the victim when she was still alive.
She requested him to take care of one of her piglets.
On cross-examination, Buiza testified that he did not ask Santos why he had to testify
against Volante. Santos also did not tell him how the victim died. Even during the wake,
he claimed that he had no idea how the victim died. He informed his parents that Santos
Banawon wanted him to testify about the case.[20]
Clemente Buiza, 54 years old, father of accused Domingo Buiza, testified that Delfin, a
brother of the victim, requested him to help in convincing his son, Domingo Buiza, to
testify against Volante. He relayed the message to his son. Domingo declined the request
because he did not know anything about the incident. On another occasion, Delfin
fetched him and Domingo and accompanied them to the house of Santos. Again,
Domingo denied any knowledge of the incident. Clemente surmised that Domingo was
prosecuted because he refused to testify against Volante.
On cross-examination, he testified that after the internment of the victim, Delfin came to
see him and told him that Santos would like to talk to him and his son in the house of
Dionisio Cielo, a brother of Delfin and the victim. Santos allegedly told him, "Ano kaya
kun patistigoson mo si Domingo digdi? (How about letting Domingo testify in this
case?)" Without asking Santos why the latter was insisting that Domingo should testify in
the murder case, he replied that that would be impossible because his son knew nothing
about the case. However, he never asked Santos what would be the nature of his
testimony.[21]
Amelita Buiza, 28 years old, wife of Domingo Buiza, testified that she and her husband
were in the house of Clemente Buiza in Comun, Tabaco on June 24, 1994. Her husband
spent the whole day in Sto. Cristo, Tabaco, and went home in the evening at about 7:00
p.m. They had supper at 8:00 p.m. After dinner, her husband went to bed. She slept at
11:00 p.m. because she had to attend to the needs of their six (6) children. She claimed
that it was impossible for her husband to commit the crime charged against him because
he was with her that night, sleeping, and he woke up at about noontime the next day.
Besides, the victim was her husband's aunt and the two had a pleasant relationship with
each other when the victim was still alive.[22]
On cross-examination, she testified that she woke up at noontime the next day, June 25,
1994. She slept continuously from 11:00 p.m. of June 24, 1994, until 11:00 a.m. of June
25, 1994.
Accused Roberto Candelaria, 40 years old, claimed he was in his house on the material

date and time. He also clarified that his real name is Edilberto Candelaria and not
Roberto Candelaria. He denied any knowledge about the incident. He also did not know
why Volante implicated him in the crime.[23]
Filomena Candelaria, 39 years old, wife of accused Candelaria, testified that in the
evening of June 24, 1994, she and her husband were in their house. They slept at 8:00
p.m. She woke up at about 10:00 p.m. and nursed her 3-month old child. Her husband
was still asleep. She woke up at 5:00 a.m. the following morning. She admitted that
the locus criminis was not far from their house.
On rebuttal, Volante denied that he went to the store of Jose Belenzo or to the house of
Alfredo Brutas in the evening of June 24, 1994. He also denied carrying a bolo at that
time. He further testified that Belenzo is related by affinity to accused Bonito and
Candelaria. The mother of Bonito's wife is the sister of Jose Belenzo's wife, while the
mother-in-law of Candelaria is the sister of Belenzo's wife.[24]
On sur-rebuttal, Bonifacio Borjal, 76 years old, testified that in the evening of June 24,

1994, he was in his house in Purok 5, Canaway, Malilipot, Albay. He denied that Volante
was in his house to watch T.V. shows. Allegedly, his granddaughter was the only one
who knew how to operate their T.V., but she was in Daraga, Albay, that evening. He
admitted that he came to court to testify upon the request of the wife of one of the
accused.
The trial court convicted accused Bonito, Candelaria and Buiza of murder. Hence, the
appeal.
Appellants Bonito and Candelaria contend that:

"I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ACCORDING UNDUE CREDENCE AND WEIGHT

TO THE TESTIMONY OF NELSON VOLANTE, THE PROSECUTION'S LONE
EYEWITNESS, INSPITE (SIC) OF HIS GLARING LACK OF CREDIBILITY.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY

OF THE CRIME OF MURDER CONSIDERING THAT THE PROSECUTION
FAILED TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF SAID OFFENSE AS ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION.
III.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN HOLDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS

RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH OF FLORA BANAWON DESPITE ITS FINDING
THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO LINK THEM TO SUCH KILLING.
IV.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SENTENCING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS TO

PAY THE HEIRS OF FLORA BANAWON JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY DAMAGES
WHICH THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE."
For his part, appellant Buiza contends that:
"THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK AND IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION GRAVELY ERRED
IN FINDING ALL THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED."
The crucial issue is whether the guilt of the accused was established beyond reasonable
doubt by the prosecution.
The judgment is affirmed with modification.
Volante positively identified the appellants as the authors of the beastly crime. He
testified as follows:[25]
"PROSECUTOR VILLAMIN:
Q: On June 24, 1994, at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, could you recall where were you?
(NELSON VOLANTE):
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where were you then?
A: I was at the house of Bonifacio Borjal watching television, sir.
Q: What time did you leave that place?
A: I left for home, sir.
Q: Were you able directly to go to your house?
A: No, sir.
Q: Why?
A: Because I heard somebody moaning while I was on the way home, sir.
Q: At what particular place did you hear that sound?
A: About a kilometer away from Bonifacio's house, sir.
Q: What did you do when you heard that sound?
A: I kept on walking for about ten (10) meters. Then I heard a sigh. Thru a foliage I took a
look.
Q: What did you observe?
A: I was able to see these three accused with a woman who was lying on the ground.
Q: Who were those three persons whom you saw?
A: Domingo Buiza, Bienvenido Bonito and Roberto Candelaria and another one.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: What else did you observe?
A: I saw Bienvenido Bonito standing and at the same time holding a piece of cassava trunk.
A: I also saw Domingo Buiza holding the hand of the woman while Candelaria was near her
feet.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: Aside from seeing Bienvenido Bonito holding the cassava trunk, what else did you observe
of Bienvenido?
A: He was the one who inserted the cassava trunk into the private part of the woman.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: At that time of the insertion, did you still hear her moaning?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: While that was being done by Bienvenido Bonito, what were the other two doing?
A: They were holding the victim, sir.
Q: You said that you saw three men. Could you tell us if there were other persons present
there?
A: Yes, sir, there was somebody whom I saw beneath a banana tree, about ten meters away.
Q: What was he doing there?
A: He was standing, sir.
Q: Could you tell us why you were able to identify these three persons inspite (sic) being
nighttime?
A: Because it was a moonlit night, sir.
Q: Could you tell us your distance from these three men?
A: About five meters away from them, sir.
A: That was all, sir. They were holding the victim.
Q: Thereafter, what else did you do?
A: I stepped back about five meters away. Then I left and passed by the farm lot of Salvador
Bobiles.
Q: How did you fell (sic) about what you have see(n)?
A: I could not sleep, sir."
The trial court found Volante credible. We respect its finding. We give the trial court the
wide latitude of assigning values to the declarations of witnesses on the stand because of
its unique opportunity to observe them as they testify. It is aided by various indicia that
could not be readily seen on record. The witness' candid answer, the hesitant pause, the
nervous voice, the undertone, the befuddled look, the honest gaze, the modest blush, or
the guilty blanch - these reveal if the witness is telling the gospel truth or weaving a web
of lies. Thus, unless any fact or circumstance of weight and influence has been
overlooked or the significance of which has been misconstrued as to impeach the findings
of the trial court, its findings on the credibility of witnesses should not be interfered with.
[26]
None exists in the case before us.
The trial court was correct in believing Volante. His account of the incident was
consistent and candid. He did not waver even on cross-examination, indicating that he
told the truth. He further testified as follows:[27]
"ATTY. BROMANTE:
Q: And as you have alleged, you actually witnessed the incident?
(NELSON VOLANTE):
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Also that you have seen and recognized these accused and the victim during the incident?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Will you agree with me that during the time that you witnessed the incident, you have
already recognized the victim to be Flora Banawon, am I right?
A: Not yet, sir.
Q: Why? What was then the position of the victim? Was she facing the ground?
A: She was facing up, sir.
Q: And her face was covered?
A: The view of her face was blocked by Domingo Buiza, sir.
Q: Why, what was then the position of Domingo Buiza?
A: Domingo Buiza croached (sic) near the head of Flora Volante (sic), sir.
Q: How far were you then from the place of the incident?
A: About five meters away, sir.
Q: And from that position, how long have you stayed?
A: About a minute, sir.
Q: And during that one-minute period, Domingo Buiza, one of the accused stayed immobile?
A: No, sir, he did not.
Q: And that is the reason when you declared awhile ago that this Domingo Buiza was doing
something to the victim?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that?
A: He was holding the arm of Flora Banawon, sir.
Q: And when you arrived near the scene of the incident, Domingo Buiza was then about to
hold the hand of the victim?
A: I saw him holding already the hand of Flora Banawon.
Q: When you left the place, Domingo Buiza already released his hold of the hands of Flora
Banawon?
A: Not yet, sir.
Q: Despite witnessing the gruesome incident, you never made any opportunity (sic) to at least
take a good look of the face of the victim?
A: I did not, sir.
Q: Why, What was your reason why you never took a look of the victim?
A: Because Domingo Buiza's body was blocking the face of the victim."
Appellants contend that Volante's "unnatural reactions" during and after the crime was
committed were enough to destroy his credibility. For instance, he did not try to discover
who the victim was at that time he witnessed the incident. As a married man himself,
Volante should have ascertained first who the victim was because she could have been
his own wife. They contend, further, that Volante should have returned to the crime scene
to help the victim or, at the very least, to satisfy his curiosity. Instead, he mysteriously
changed his residence and kept the incident to himself for five months.
We are not persuaded by appellants' contentions.
Different people may react differently to a given situation and there is no standard form
of behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange or startling or frightful
experience.[28] In Volante's case, he was overpowered with fright. His reaction was
understandable. He witnessed a gruesome murder. At least three men participated therein.
Outnumbered, he chose to retreat instead of playing hero. We cannot fault him for that.
There was also nothing unnatural about Volante's failure to initially recognize the victim.
He satisfactorily explained that he could not see the victim's face from where he was
standing because appellant Buiza was blocking his view. Besides, he was at the crime
scene for barely a minute, thus giving him little time to take a good look at the victim
who was then surrounded by the appellants. At any rate, he learned the next day that the
victim was Flora Banawon because she was found in the same spot where he saw the
crime and a cassava trunk was found inside her private part just like the lady victim he
saw that fateful night.
True, Volante took awhile before he finally told anyone about the tragic fate of Flora
Banawon. Such delay did not erode his credibility. We have held that delay in revealing
the identity of the malefactors does not necessarily impair the credibility of a witness,
especially where such witness gives sufficient explanation therefor. [29] Volante has
satisfactorily explained that he feared for his and his family's safety. We take judicial
notice of the natural reluctance of a witness to get involved in a criminal case and to
provide information to the authorities.[30] More so when townmates are involved in the
commission of crime. Further, we could not dismiss lightly the natural tendency of a
witness of a gruesome killing, as in this case, to fear for his safety.[31]
Appellants also claim that there was no evidence that could link them to the killing. The
claim is preposterous. Volante may not have seen the actual killing of the victim, but the
totality of the evidence adduced by the prosecution point to the appellants as the persons
who may have been responsible for the commission of the crime to the exclusion of any
other person. The eye-ball account of Volante reveal that the victim was lying on the
ground, her face badly mangled from the beatings she received from her assailants, she
could barely move and all she had mustered to do was moan. The three appellants
surrounded her. One of them held her hands, another held her feet, and still another
inserted a cassava trunk in her genitalia. The combination of these circumstances leads us
to a reasonable conclusion that they were responsible for her death and warrants a finding
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Volante could not have committed a mistake in pointing to the appellants as the
malefactors. It was a moonlit night, appellants have been his neighbors for years before
the incident and he witnessed the incident at a very close range, a distance of about five
(5) meters.
We agree with the trial court that the testimony of Volante should prevail over the
defense of denial and alibi proffered by appellants. It must be stressed that there is no
showing that Volante has ill motive to implicate the appellants in a grievous offense such
as the case at bar. It is settled that in the absence of any improper motive on the part of a
witness to falsely testify against the accused, his testimony deserves credence. Besides,
alibi is the weakest of all defenses as it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove, and it
is practically worthless in the face of positive identification.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.7659, provides:

"Art. 248. Murder.- Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246,
shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder, and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed

men, or employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure
or afford impunity;
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise;
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel,

derailment of or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, by means of motor
vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin;
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of

an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic, or other
public calamity;
5. With evident premeditation;
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the

victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse."
The Information charged that the killing was attended by the following circumstances:
evident premeditation, treachery, abuse of superior strength and cruelty.
The trial court found the appellants guilty of murder and sentenced them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without discussing the attending circumstance that
qualified the killing to murder. The decision was also silent as to the presence of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance. Section 1, Rule 20 of the Revised Rules of Court
requires that after an adjudication of guilt by the court, it should impose the proper
penalty and civil liability provided for by law. Further, Section 2 of the same Rule
mandates that the judgment of conviction should state, among others, the aggravating or
mitigating circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime, if there are any. The
appreciation of these attending circumstances is crucial for they determine whether the
penalty should be increased or decreased. Judges who faithfully observe this duty
contribute to the orderly administration of justice.[32]
Our perusal of the records reveals that the prosecution failed to establish evident
premeditation, treachery and abuse of superior strength.
Before evident premeditation can be appreciated as a qualifying aggravating

circumstance, these requisites must concur: (1) the time when the accused determined to
commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his
determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution
to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his act.[33] None of these requisites were
established in this case. There was not an iota of evidence that appellants planned,
meditated and reflected on their intention to kill the victim.[34]
Likewise, treachery cannot be considered against the appellants. For treachery to be

present, two conditions must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that
gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the
deliberate and conscious adoption of the means employed. Volante did not see the
inception of the assault on the victim. When he reached the crime scene, the victim was
already sprawled on the ground, face up, moaning and heaving a faint sigh while
appellants were surrounding her. Appellant Bonito was then in the process of inserting
the cassava trunk inside the genitalia of the victim. Absent any particulars as to the
manner in which the aggression commenced or how the act that resulted in the death of
the victim unfolded, treachery cannot be appreciated.[35]
For the same reason, abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated against the
appellants. It must be stressed that this circumstance must be established by clear and
categorical evidence. There must exist proof that the attackers deliberately took
advantage of their superior strength, their apparent superiority in number vis-a-vis that of
the victim, notwithstanding. The records showed no such proof.[36] In the present case, the
lone eyewitness did not see how the aggressors attacked the victim. At the time Volante
reached the locus criminis, the victim was sprawled on the ground. Volante testified that
Buiza held her hands while Candelaria held her feet when Bonito jabbed the cassava
trunk inside her vagina. There was no clear proof as to how appellants took advantage of
their combined strength in committing the crime. We reiterate that what should be
considered, as regards this aggravating circumstance, is not that there were three, four or
more assailants as against one victim, but whether the aggressors took advantage of their
combined strength in order to consummate the offense.[37]
The Solicitor General noted that the crime was committed with cruelty. We agree. There
is cruelty when the culprit deliberately and inhumanly augmented the suffering of the
victim, or outraged or scoffed at his person or corpse.[38] The test in appreciating cruelty
as an aggravating circumstance is whether the accused deliberately and sadistically
augmented the wrong by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission and
inhumanly increased the victim's suffering or outraged or scoffed at his/her person or
corpse.[39] The victim in this case was already weak and almost dying when appellant
Bonito inserted the cassava trunk inside her private organ. What appellant Bonito did to
her was totally unnecessary for the criminal act intended and it undoubtedly inhumanly
increased her suffering. In fine, we hold that cruelty has qualified the killing to murder.
The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. In the absence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, appellants should suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
We now review the award of damages. The trial court made the following awards:
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of Flora Banawon, P10,000.00 as actual
damages, P20,000 for loss of earning capacity of Flora Banawon and P30,000.00 for
moral damages.
When death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to civil
indemnity for the death of the victim without need of proof of damages.[40] We affirm the
civil indemnity of P50,000.00 as it is in accord with current jurisprudence.
Actual or compensatory damages, on the other hand, cannot be presumed but must be
duly proved with reasonable certainty for the court cannot rely on speculation,
conjectures or guesswork as to the fact and the amount of damages. [41] In the case at bar,
the prosecution did not substantiate its claim for actual damages, hence, we cannot allow
the same.[42]
Appellants are, however, liable to pay for the loss earning capacity of the deceased. [43] It
was established that the victim used to earn P400.00 per week by weaving mats for other
people. Santos also testified that she was 54 years old at the time of her death. Applying
the formula for loss of earning capacity, to wit:
life expectancy x
Net earning = -
gross annual living expenses (50% of gross annual income)
capacity (x)
income
appellants should be held liable to pay as follows:
x = 2 (80-54) x [P19200-P9600.00]
3

= 2 (26) x P9600.00
3

= 17.33 x P9600.00

= P166,399.99
As regards the award of moral damages,[44] Santos testified that he cried unabashedly
upon seeing the pitiful condition of his wife. Deeply troubled, he failed to concentrate on
his work as a carpenter and was eventually forced to stop working for some time while
seeking justice for his wife's death. Thus, the award of moral damages is justified to
compensate his wounded feelings for the violent death of his wife.
Parenthetically, one of the appellants, Candelaria, was described in the complaint or

information under the name Roberto Candelaria. Upon arraignment he pleaded "not
guilty" to the charge under his alleged name, Edilberto Candelaria. During the trial, he
presented his alleged birth certificate to prove that his real name is Edilberto. [45] His own
witness[46] testified that Edilberto and Roberto refer to the same person. When the trial
court's judgment was promulgated on November 29, 1996, the real name of Candelaria
was inserted in the case's caption.[47] The correction conforms to our ruling that an error in
the name of an accused is curable at any stage of the proceedings. [48] This is so because
the insertion of the real name of the accused is merely a matter of form. [49] What matters
in the conviction of a person of a particular crime is his identification as the person who
committed the crime, not the name under which he is arrested or complained against.
Despite the correction made, the pleadings filed to this Court on appeal inadvertently
referred to Candelaria as Roberto. To avoid confusion as to the execution of the sentence
against said appellant, the name Edilberto should be inserted vice Roberto.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay,

(Branch XVIII), in Criminal Case No. T-2625, finding herein appellants BIENVENIDO
BONITO, EDILBERTO (ROBERTO) CANDELARIA, and DOMINGO
BUIZA[50] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and sentencing them to reclusion
perpetua is AFFIRMED subject to the following modifications:
1. The award of actual or compensatory damages is set aside for lack of basis;
2. The award of P20,000.00 for lost earnings is set aside and in lieu thereof,
appellants are ordered to pay P166,399.99 for lost earning capacity; and
3. Appellants are ordered to pay the legal heirs of the victim the amount of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P30,000.00 as moral damages.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 191261, March 02, 2011 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. JENNY TUMAMBING Y
TAMAYO, APPELLANT.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about how the credibility of the rape victim's identification of her
attacker often depends on her spontaneous actions and behavior following the rape.
The city prosecutor charged the accused Jenny Tumambing (Tumambing) with rape in
Criminal Case 04-227897 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.
DK,[1] the complainant, testified that at around 2:00 a.m. on June 26, 2004 she went to
sleep, leaving the lights on, at her cousin's rented room. She was startled when
somebody entered the room after she had turned off the lights. The intruder, a man,
poked a knife at DK and threatened to kill her if she made any noise. He removed DK's
clothes and undressed himself. He then succeeded in ravishing her. When the man was
about to leave, DK turned the light on and she saw his face. DK recognized him as the
same person who passed by her cousin's room several times in the afternoon of the
previous day, June 25, 2004. Later, she identified the accused Jenny Tumambing as her
rapist.
On June 27, 2004 the doctor who examined DK found no bruises, hematoma, or any sign
of resistance on her body but found several fresh lacerations on her genitals.
Tumambing denied committing the crime. He claimed that on June 26, 2004 he slept at
the house of his employer, Nestor Ledesma. He went to bed at about 9:00 p.m. and
woke up at 6:00 a.m. Tumambing swore that he never left his employer's house that
night. Ledesma corroborated his story. Barangay officials summoned Tumambing and
he went, thinking that it had something to do with a bloodletting campaign. He was
shocked, however, when he learned that he had been suspected of having committed
rape.
On June 27, 2006 the RTC found Tumambing guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The RTC
also ordered him to indemnify DK of P50,000.00 and pay her P50,000.00 as moral
damages.
On November 12, 2009 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed in CA-G.R. CR-HC 02433 the
decision of the RTC in its entirety, prompting Tumambing to appeal to this Court.
The Issue Presented
The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA and the trial court erred in
finding that accused Tumambing raped DK under the circumstances she mentioned.
A successful prosecution of a criminal action largely depends on proof of two things: the
identification of the author of the crime and his actual commission of the same. An
ample proof that a crime has been committed has no use if the prosecution is unable to
convincingly prove the offender's identity. The constitutional presumption of innocence
that an accused enjoys is not demolished by an identification that is full of uncertainties.
[2]
Here, both the RTC and the CA gave credence to DK's testimony. They maintained that
DK categorically and positively identified her rapist. The CA invoked People v.
Reyes[3] where the Court ruled that it would be easy for a person who has once gained
familiarity with the appearance of another to identify the latter even from a
considerable distance.[4] Ordinarily, the Court would respect the trial court and the CA's
findings regarding the credibility of the witnesses.[5] But the courts mentioned appear to
have overlooked or misinterpreted certain critical evidence in the case. This compels the
Court to take a look at the same.[6]
DK's identification of accused Tumambing as her rapist is far from categorical. The
Court's reading of her testimony shows that she was quite reluctant at the beginning
but eventually pointed to him when it was suggested that it might be him after all.
Several witnesses attested to DK's uncertainties regarding the rapist's identity when
the barangay chairman arranged for her to meet Tumambing. PO2 Crispulo Frondozo,
one of the apprehending officers, testified as follows:
Q: Now in the barangay, do you have any occasion to see whether the complainant
pinpointed accused as the person who abused her person?
A: No, Sir.
Q: What about in any precinct or agency, do you have any occasion to see complainant
positively identified the accused?
A: No, Sir.[7]
Pedrito Yacub, Sr., the Barangay Chairman to whom DK initially reported the incident
testified:
Q: When the accused enter the barangay hall upon invitation, what happened next?
A: Correction Sir. Not at the barangay hall. In my residence.
Q: Then what happened?
A: He was surprised and [I] told him that he is a suspect of rape and his reply was " akala
ko pakukunan niyo ako ng dugo."
Q: What was the reaction of the accused?
A: As we sat down in a table, a confrontation ensued. I assured the complainant. Don't
be afraid. Tell me. I will protect you.
I called her two cousins. Then she stare upon the suspect. I ordered the suspect to
turn left, right and backways.
Q: After you told the suspect to pose left, right and backways, what happened next?
A: The suspect told the complainant "huwag kang magtuturo. Ninenerbyus na ako." So
she could not pinpoint the suspect.
I said, "Iha, [i]to ba?" But she cannot point to.[8] (Underscoring supplied)
DK's above behavior during her initial confrontation with accused Tumambing gives the
Court no confidence that, as she claimed in her testimony, she was familiar with the
looks of her rapist because she saw him on the previous day as he passed by her
cousin's rented room many times. If this were the case, her natural reaction on seeing
Tumambing would have been one of outright fury or some revealing emotion, not
reluctance in pointing to him despite the barangay chairman's assurance that he would
protect her if she identified him. In assessing the testimony of a wronged woman,
evidence of her conduct immediately after the alleged assault is of critical value. [9]
The barangay chairman continued:
Q: As barangay captain who has the duty to enforce law and city ordinances, you came
to know that there were other suspect, what did you do?
A: I invited the suspect.
Q: Do you remember the person whom you invited known as the second suspect?
A: His name is Alvin Quiatcho. For confrontation with the complainant. And
confrontation ensued between her and the suspect. I asked her is this the suspect?
Q: What was her answer?
A: She said, she could not recall. Chairman pa doctor kaya natin siya. It mean[s]
"makunan ng cells."
The complainant told me chairman padoktor natin [sic] na lang natin siya.
Q: Presumably to get some sperm?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: What did you do if any with the suggestion of [DK]?
A: I told the complainant, it would be difficult to do.
Q: After that what happened?
A: So since she could not pinpoint also the other suspect, I released the other suspect.
She could not pinpoint.[10] (Underscoring supplied)
That DK wanted the sperm of Alvin Quiatcho (Quiatcho), the second suspect, tested and
presumably compared with that found in her clearly indicates that she entertained the
possibility that it was Quiatcho, rather than accused Tumambing, who raped her. The
Court cannot thus accept DK's testimony that she had been familiar with the looks of
the man who violated her and that she could not possibly be mistaken in identifying him
as Tumambing.
Crispin Dizon, the executive officer of the same barangay, corroborated

the barangay chairman's testimony:
Q: So what was the question?

A: The question was that, "Is this the person you saw and who rape you?"
Court: Referring to?
Interpreter: Referring to Jenny Tumambing.
Q: What was the reply of the victim, if any?
A: She did not answer, Sir.
Q: What happen next when [DK] did not answer?
A: And [DK] was again asked by the Chairman and told her not to fear and tell who raped
her and point to him.
Q: What was the reply of [DK] if any?
A: She did not reply, Sir.
Q: Now if you remember how many times did the Chairman asked [DK]?
A: Four times, Sir.[11]
The RTC and the CA thought that DK was quite sure it was Tumambing who sexually
attacked her. They pointed out her insistence at the police precinct that it was
Tumambing who really raped her and that she positively identified him in open court.
But this came about much later. The fact is that she did not refute the testimonies given
by neutral witnesses that she could not point to accused Tumambing as her rapist
during their initial confrontation at the barangay chairman's residence. These witnesses
had no motive or reason to fabricate a story for the defense.
By the nature of rape, the court has to, quite often, rely on the sole testimony of the
victim. For this reason, the court is always reminded to subject her testimony to a most
rigid and careful scrutiny. It cannot afford to overlook details that are essential to an
understanding of the truth.[12] Here, as shown above, DK's testimony is anything but
believable and consistent.
Although she categorically said on cross-examination that she saw her attacker enter
the room,[13] she did not shout or raise an alarming call. Nor did she try to escape. [14] She
just lay in bed.[15] In fact, she maintained that position in bed even when her attacker
was standing before her and removing his clothes. [16] She did not shout nor struggle
when he penetrated her.[17]
There is one thing that DK appeared sure of. Her rapist wore a yellow shirt. [18] But this is
inconsistent with her testimony that after the stranger in her room was done raping her,
"bigla na lang po siyang lumabas x x x sinundan ko siya ng tingin."[19] Since DK did not
say that the man put his clothes back on, it seems a certainty that he collected his
clothes and carried this out when he left the room. Since DK then turned on the light for
the first time, she had a chance to see him clearly. But, if this were so and he walked out
naked, why was she so certain that he wore a yellow shirt?
With such serious doubts regarding the true identity of DK's rapist, the Court cannot
affirm the conviction of accused Tumambing.
WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals dated

November 12, 2009 in CA-G.R. CR-HC 02433 as well as the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 27, in Criminal Case 04-227897, and ACQUITS the accused-
appellant Jenny Tumambing y Tamayo of the crime charged on the ground of
reasonable doubt. The Court orders his immediate RELEASE from custody unless he is
being held for some other lawful cause.
The Court further ORDERS the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to implement this
Decision forthwith and to inform this Court, within five days from receipt hereof, of the
date appellant was actually released from confinement. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. NOS. 160929-31, August 16, 2005 ]
RENE P. PONDEVIDA, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN
(THIRD DIVISION) AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
On April 11, 2003, the Sandiganbayan rendered judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. 24375
to 24377 convicting petitioner Rene Pondevida, the Municipal Treasurer of Badiangan,
Iloilo, of three counts of the complex crime of malversation of public funds through
falsification of commercial documents, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and perpetual special disqualification for each count. The fallo of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 24375, the Court hereby finds the accused RENE
P. PONDEVIDA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the complex offense of
Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of commercial document defined and
penalized under Arts. 48, 171 and 217 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences
the said accused to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and PERPETUAL
SPECIAL DISQUALIFICATION in accordance with Art. 31 of the Revised Penal Code
and to pay a fine of P213,700.00 and indemnify the Municipal government of Badiangan
the sum of P213,700.00, with costs.
For insufficiency of evidence and for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, accused DONATO M. AMIGABLE and VICTOR N.
GRANDE are hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged in this case, and their bail
bonds posted for their provisional liberty are hereby ordered cancelled.
In Criminal Case No. 24375, the Court hereby finds the accused RENE P. PONDEVIDA
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the complex offense of Malversation of Public
Funds through Falsification of commercial document defined and penalized under Arts.
48, 171 and 217 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences the said accused to
suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUAL and PERPETUAL SPECIAL
DISQUALIFICATION in accordance with Art. 31 of the Revised Penal Code and to pay
a fine of P503,287.89 and indemnify the Municipal government of Badiangan the sum of
P503,287.89, with costs.
For insufficiency of evidence and for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, accused DONATO M. AMIGABLE is hereby ACQUITTED of the
offense charged in this case, and the bail bond posted for his provisional liberty is hereby
ordered cancelled.
In Criminal Case No. 24377, the Court hereby finds the accused RENE P. PONDEVIDA
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the complex offense of Malversation of Public
Funds thru Falsification of commercial document defined and penalized under Arts. 48,
171 and 217 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences the said accused to suffer
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and PERPETUAL SPECIAL
DISQUALIFICATION in accordance with Art. 31 of the Revised Penal Code and to pay
a fine of P115,153.55 and indemnify the Municipal government of Badiangan the sum of
P115,153.55, with costs.
For insufficiency of evidence and for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, accused DONATO M. AMIGABLE is hereby ACQUITTED of the
offense charged in this case, and the bail bond posted for his provisional liberty is hereby
ordered cancelled.
Considering that accused NORMA B. TIU is still-at-large, let Criminal Case No. 24376
be ARCHIVED until her arrest.[1]
The anti-graft court granted the petitioner an extension of time within which to file a
motion for reconsideration of its decision, until May 10, 2003. The said motion was filed
on May 9, 2003 which the said court resolved to deny on September 5, 2003. The
petitioner received a copy of the said resolution on September 16, 2003, and filed his
Notice of Appeal[2] on September 23, 2003 "pursuant to paragraph (b), Section 1 of Rule
X of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan." In a Resolution[3] dated October
3, 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied due course to the petition for having been filed out of
time, thus:
FROM THE FOREGOING, the Notice of Appeal shall no longer prosper considering
that it was filed out of time and considering further that the Decision rendered in these
cases, promulgated on April 11, 2003, in so far as Rene P. Pondevida is concerned, has
already become final and executory on September 18, 2003.
Atty. Lily V. Biton, the Division Clerk of Court, is ordered to furnish the Director of
Prison, National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa City, a copy of this Resolution for his perusal,
and to issue the corresponding Commitment Order for Rene P. Pondevida's service of
sentence.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, Pondevida had only until September 17, 2003 within which to file
his notice of appeal, but did so only on September 23, 2003; by then, its decision had
become final and executory.
The petitioner received a copy of the said resolution on October 14, 2003. On December
15, 2003, he filed his petition for certiorari before this Court, alleging that -
I
THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DENIED THE
PETITIONER'S NOTICE OF APPEAL BECAUSE THE NOTICE OF APPEAL HAS
BEEN FILED WITHIN THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD.
II
PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS.
III
THE APPEAL IS SUPPORTED BY MERITORIOUS GROUNDS AND THE CASE IS
ENTITLED TO BE REVIEWED BY THE APPELLATE COURT.[4]
On January 10, 2005, this Court resolved to give due course to the petition and required
the Sandiganbayan to elevate the records of the cases.[5] The Sandiganbayan complied
and forthwith elevated the records to this Court.
The petitioner maintains that his notice of appeal was filed on time. He posits that the
Sandiganbayan should have applied Section 1(b), Rule X of its Revised Internal Rules,
instead of Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The petitioner
argues that since Section 1(b), Rule X of the Revised Internal Rules of the
Sandiganbayan does not provide a period within which to appeal a decision or final order
rendered by it, the applicable rule is that provided in Section 1(a) of the said Internal
Rules, in relation to Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The petitioner avers that
under the latter rule, he had fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of the September 5,
2003 Sandiganbayan Resolution (on September 16, 2003), or until October 1, 2003,
within which to file his notice of appeal. Hence, his notice of appeal filed on September
23, 2003 was timely filed.
For its part, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) avers that under Section 1, Rule X
of the Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, in relation to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
an appeal from a Sandiganbayan judgment where the accused is sentenced reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment is via petition for review on certiorari; the period for
appeal is that provided for in Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, thus:
1.c. As aptly stated by petitioner, the method of appeal in this case is by petition for
review on certiorari. This, indeed, is confirmed by Section 1, Rule X of the Revised
Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, i.e., "A party may appeal from a judgment or final
order of the Sandiganbayan imposing or affirming a penalty less than death, life
imprisonment or reclusion perpetua in criminal cases, and in civil cases, by filing with
the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure."[6]
The OSP cited the ruling of this Court in Formilleza v. Sandiganbayan[7] to support its
position.
The petitioner's contention, that the remedy from the Sandiganbayan decision which
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua is via notice of appeal under Section 1(b), Rule X of
the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, is correct. The rule reads:
(b) Exception. - Where the judgment or final order of the Sandiganbayan, in the exercise of
its original jurisdiction, imposes the penalty of life imprisonment or reclusion
perpetua or where a lesser penalty is imposed involving offenses committed on the
serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment
is imposed, the appeal shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the
Sandiganbayan and serving a copy thereof to the adverse party.
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a petition for review on certiorari to this Court
(from a Sandiganbayan decision) is proper only where, as provided for in Section 1(a),
Rule X of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, the penalty imposed is less
than death, life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua:
(a) In General. - A party may appeal from a judgment or final order of the Sandiganbayan
imposing or affirming a penalty less than death, life imprisonment or reclusion
perpetua in criminal cases, and in civil cases, by filing with the Supreme Court a
petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Since Section 1(b), Rule X of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan does not
provide for a period to appeal, Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure shall apply:
Sec. 6. Rule 122. When appeal to be taken. - An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15)
days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from.
This period for perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for new
trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion has been
served upon the accused or his counsel at which time the balance of the period begins to
run.
This is so because under Section 2, Rule 1 of the Revised Internal Rules of the
Sandiganbayan, the Rules of Court applicable to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and
Court of Appeals (CA) shall, likewise, govern all proceedings in the Sandiganbayan
insofar as applicable:
SEC. 2. Coverage. - These Rules shall apply to the internal operations of the
Sandiganbayan.
The Rules of Court, resolutions, circulars, and other issuances promulgated by the
Supreme Court relating to or affecting the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of
Appeals, insofar as applicable, shall govern all actions and proceedings filed with the
Sandiganbayan.
Under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the petitioner had
only until September 17, 2003 within which to file his notice of appeal, considering that
he received the September 5, 2003 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan on September 16,
2003. However, he filed his notice of appeal only on September 23, 2003, long after the
reglementary period. Hence, the Sandiganbayan acted in accord with its Revised Internal
Rules and the Rules of Criminal Procedure in denying the petitioner's appeal.
The ruling of this Court in Formilleza is not applicable in the case at bar. What was
involved in that case was Presidential Decree No. 1606, under which the decisions of the
Sandiganbayan may be reviewed on petition for certiorari by this Court:
Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, governs the procedure through which cases
originating from the Sandiganbayan are elevated to this Court. Under Section 7 thereof,
the decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan are subject to review on certiorari by
the Supreme Court in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This Court has
ruled that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45,
subject to certain rare exceptions. Simply stated, one way through which a decision or
final order of the Sandiganbayan can be elevated to the Supreme Court is a Petition
for certiorari under Rule 45 and, as a general rule, only questions of law may be raised
therein. The Solicitor General cites the case of Peñaverde v. Sandiganbayan in support of
this view.[8]
The petitioner, however, pleads that even if he filed his notice of appeal beyond the
period therefor, the Sandiganbayan should have subordinated the rigid application of
procedural rules to the attainment of substantial justice; hence, his appeal should have
been given due course. After all, he submits, the Court has allowed appeals even if there
were delays of four, six and even seven days.[9] The appeal should not be dismissed
simply because he followed, in good faith, Section 1(b), Rule X of the Internal Rules of
the Sandiganbayan, in relation to Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The petitioner argues that he was sentenced to suffer three counts of reclusion perpetua;
it would be the apex of injustice if he would be deprived of his right to appeal and suffer
the penalty, considering that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. He pleads for the Court to determine whether his appeal has prima facie merit, so
as to avoid a travesty of justice.
The petitioner avers that in the face of the records, he is not criminally liable for
malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code because (a) the prosecution
failed to prove that, before he was charged with malversation complexed with
falsification of commercial documents in the Office of the Ombudsman, the Office of the
Provincial Auditor had demanded the refund of the amounts of the three checks; and (b)
the Sandiganbayan ignored the cash deposit slips issued by the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP)[10] showing that he deposited P1,533,050.26 on June 15, 1995 which
increased to P2,286,550.26 when he made an additional deposit on June 21, 1995, as
stated in his letter to the Provincial Auditor, dated June 21, 1995, which included the total
amount of the three checks.[11]
The petitioner further avers that the charges against him were barred by the decision [12] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City in Criminal Case No. 48093 promulgated
on April 5, 2002, convicting him of malversation of P1,176,580.59; the P893,890.87,
which is the total amount of the three checks subject of the cases before the
Sandiganbayan, is included in the P1,176,580.59 he had deposited with the LBP. The
petitioner appended to his petition a copy of the decision of the RTC.
Elaborating further, the petitioner avers that it was incumbent on the prosecution to prove
that he misappropriated, took away or embezzled the P893,890.87 of the municipality for
his own personal use and benefit. He asserts that the prosecution failed to prove that he
used the said amount for his personal benefit. The petitioner posits that had the
prosecution proved that he received a demand to account for or refund the said amounts,
the burden could have shifted on him to prove that he did not misappropriate or take
away the said amounts for his personal use or benefit. Indeed, the petitioner notes, Ely
Navarro, the leader of the audit team who investigated the matter of the three checks,
admitted that the Office of the Provincial Auditor made no such demand. He avers that
Navarro even admitted that it was only in the Office of the Ombudsman that such
demand was made on him by the team of auditors.
The OSP, on the other hand, avers that the perfection of the appeal in the manner and
within the period provided by law is not only mandatory, but is also jurisdictional; since
the petitioner failed to appeal within the reglementary period, the decision had become
final and executory and can no longer be nullified or reversed. On the substantive issues,
the OSP avers that demand is not an essential element of malversation. Moreover, the
prosecution adduced evidence that the petitioner consented to the taking of municipal
funds. The OSP maintains that the petitioner committed the felony of malversation upon
the delivery of the checks to the three payees and their encashment of the said checks,
and that the refund of the amounts of the checks is not a ground for his acquittal of the
crimes charged. Moreover, the petitioner failed to adduce evidence that the total amount
of the three checks was part of the P1,108,741.00 he deposited with the LBP on June 15,
1995. The OSP concludes that the decision of the Sandiganbayan is in accord with the
evidence and the law.
On the timeliness of the petitioner's appeal, the Court agrees with the public respondent's
contention that, as a rule, the aggrieved party must perfect his appeal within the period as
provided for by law. The rule is mandatory in character. A party's failure to comply with
the law will result in the decision becoming final and executory, and, as such, can no
longer be modified or reversed. Indeed, the rule admits of exceptions, thus:
In the interest of substantial justice, procedural rules of the most mandatory character in
terms of compliance, may be relaxed. In other words, if strict adherence to the letter of
the law would result in absurdity and manifest injustice or where the merit of a party's
cause is apparent and outweighs consideration of non-compliance with certain formal
requirements, procedural rules should definitely be liberally construed. A party-litigant is
to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense
rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on mere technicalities. We,
therefore, withhold legal approbation on the RTC decision at bar for its palpable failure
to comply with the constitutional and legal mandates thereby denying YAO of his day in
court. We also remind all magistrates to heed the demand of Section 14, Article VIII of
the Constitution. It is their solemn and paramount duty to uphold the Constitution and the
principles enshrined therein, lest they be lost in the nitty-gritty of their everyday judicial
work.[13]
Considering that the petitioner was sentenced to suffer three counts of reclusion
perpetua, the Court ordered the Sandiganbayan to elevate the records of the cases for the
Court to ascertain, based on the records, whether the appeal of the petitioner has prima
facie merit, or is only an exercise in futility. After all, the petitioner enumerated in his
petition the grounds for his appeal from the decision of the Sandiganbayan, and
elaborated his arguments in support thereof; the OSP, likewise, submitted its refutation of
the petitioner's submissions.
The Court has meticulously reviewed the records and finds that the petitioner failed to
show that his appeal from the decision of the Sandiganbayan is prima facie meritorious.
There is no dispute that State Auditors Helen G. Gamboa and Orlino A. Llauderes
conducted an audit of the petitioner's cash and accounts for the period ending June 1,
1995. In the course of the said examination, the petitioner submitted the Cash Production
Notice and Cash Account Sheet covering the General and Special Education Trust Funds
up to the said date. Based on the submitted cashbook, the auditors discovered that the
petitioner had a shortage of P2,264,820.92. The petitioner was notified of the said
findings on June 1, 1995.
On June 19, 1995, the auditors wrote the petitioner, demanding that the latter refund the
amount of P2,264,820.92 within 72 hours from notice, and submit an explanation why he
incurred the shortage. In response to the letter, the petitioner wrote the Provincial Auditor
of Iloilo on June 21, 1995, as follows:
June 21, 1995
The Provincial Auditor

Province of Iloilo
Iloilo City
S i r:
In compliance with the Memorandum dated June 19, 1995 of the audit team headed by
Mrs. Helen Gamboa, State Auditor II of the Provincial Auditor's Office in Badiangan,
Iloilo hereunder are my justifications/explanation:
1. That the amount of P722,809.26 was outright deposited with the Land Bank of the
Philippines, Iloilo Branch, on June 5, 1995;
2. That there was also a deposit made on June 15, 1995 amounting to P1,108,741.00;
3. That another deposit was done on June 21, 1995 amounting to P455,000.00.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, the delay of my deposit was caused to the late
posting of all transaction in the cash book. Another factor is that I was not able to
reconcile my bank statement against general ledger accounts.
Very truly yours,

(Sgd.)
RENE PONDEVIDA
Municipal Treasurer[14]
On the same day, the State Auditors submitted their report to the Provincial Auditor on
their examination of the petitioner's cash and accounts. Acting on the said report, Ely
Navarro, then Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Provincial Auditor, wrote the
Regional Director of the Department of Finance on June 22, 1995, recommending the
petitioner's relief, and the designation of the Assistant Municipal Treasurer as his
temporary replacement. The Regional Director approved the recommendation and
relieved the petitioner of his duties as Municipal Treasurer.
On July 18, 1995, the petitioner wrote the Provincial Auditor, stating that he had already
deposited the amount of P2,264,820.92 with the LBP, appending thereto the deposit slips
for the said amount.
On August 9, 1995, Provincial Auditor Dominador Tersol issued a Memorandum to

Auditors Navarro and Llauderes to verify whether the P2,264,820.92 had, indeed, been
refunded to the municipality as the petitioner claimed in his Letter of June 21, 1995. They
were, likewise, directed -
... to conduct an examination on the cash and accounts of accused Pondevida ... to
establish his accountability from 2 June 1995 to 23 June 1995, as a result of his relief as
Municipal Treasurer of the said Municipality on June 23, 1995 brought about by his
incurrence of a shortage, amounting to P2,264,820.92 as reported by Mrs. Helen Gamboa
and Mr. Orlino A. Llauderes in their report dated June 1, 1995.[15]
The auditors were also directed to examine the petitioner's check issuances from June 2,
1995 to June 23, 1995, and to determine whether the said payments were covered by
legitimate transactions and supported by proper documentation.
In the meantime, Gamboa and Llauderes submitted their report on their audit examination
of the petitioner's cash and accounts, appending thereto the deposit slips referred to in the
petitioner's June 21, 1995 letter to the Provincial Auditor.
In compliance with the Memorandum of the Provincial Auditor, Navarro and Llauderes
conducted an examination and verification of the petitioner's claim that he had already
refunded the amount of P2,264,820.92. They concluded that the shortage in the
petitioner's cash and accounts was only P1,176,580.59. They also examined the check
disbursements, and discovered that the petitioner had issued against the municipal funds
three checks countersigned by Municipal Mayor Donato Amigable, with the following
particulars:
Check No. Date Payee Amount

051750 6/14/95 Roben Mill &
Mining
Supply, Iloilo City P213,700.00
051751 6/14/95 Glenn Celis
Construction,
Iloilo City 503,287.89
051752 6/14/95 V.N. Grace
Enterprises,
Iloilo City 176,902.78
Total P893,890.67[16]
==========
The auditors also noted that the checks were indorsed and encashed with the LBP, Iloilo
City Branch Office, under Current Account No. 0032-1094-20 of the Municipality of
Badiangan, Iloilo, and that Check Nos. 051751 and 051752 were encashed on June 14,
1995, while Check No. 051750 was encashed on June 15, 1995.[17]
On August 23, 1995, Navarro and Llauderes sent a Memorandum[18] to Mayor Amigable,
informing him that such checks were issued without the corresponding disbursement
vouchers and supporting documents; and that Glenn Celis, the proprietor of Glenn Celis
Construction, executed an affidavit, stating that he has no transaction with the
Municipality of Badiangan, Iloilo, corresponding to the amount of P503,287.89. The
mayor was also furnished copies of the three checks. The auditors requested the mayor
and the petitioner to comment thereon within five days from notice thereof. However, the
auditors did not receive any response from the two.
In a Memorandum[19] to the Provincial Auditor dated November 14, 1995, Navarro and
Llauderes made the following recommendations on the petitioner's check disbursements:
For defrauding the government, Rene P. Pondevida, Donato M. Amigable and Olivia K.
Grande, shall be jointly and severally held liable for malversation of public funds
pursuant to Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines. For having erred
through omission which caused them injury to the government, Norma B. Tiu and Glenn
Celis may be held liable for the same offense.
The annexes hereto attached shall be considered to form part of this report. [20]
The reports of the auditors were filed with the Ombudsman. After the requisite
preliminary investigation, an Information was filed against the petitioner in the RTC of
Iloilo City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 48093, for malversation of public funds on the
P1,176,580.59 shortage. The inculpatory portion of the Information reads:
That in or about the month of June 1995, and for sometime prior thereto, at the
Municipality of Badiangan, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then the
Municipal Treasurer of Badiangan, Iloilo, and, as such, was in possession and custody of
public funds in the amount of P9,962,401.68, Philippine currency, for which he is
accountable by reason of the duties of his office, in such capacity and committing the
offense in relation to office, with deliberate intent, with intent to defraud and of gain, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously appropriate, take, misappropriate,
embezzle and convert to his own personal use and benefit from the said public funds the
amount of One Million One Hundred Seventy-Six Thousand Five Hundred Eighty Pesos
and Fifty-Nine Centavos (P1,176,580.59) and despite notice and demands made upon
him to account for said public funds, he has failed and up to the present time still fails to
do so, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the amount aforestated. [21]
On November 24, 1997, three Informations for malversation of public funds through
falsification of commercial documents relating to the checks disbursements were filed in
the Sandiganbayan against Mayor Amigable, the petitioner, and three private individuals,
namely, Victor Grande, Norma Tiu and Glenn Celis. The cases were docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 24375 to 24377. The inculpatory averments of the Information in
Criminal Case No. 24375 read:
That on or about the 14th day of June 1995, or for sometime subsequent thereto, in the
Municipality of Badiangan, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, above-named accused DONATO AMIGABLE and RENE
PONDEVIDA, public officers, being then the Municipal Mayor and Municipal Treasurer,
respectively, of the municipality of Badiangan, Iloilo, in such capacity and committing
the offense in relation to office, taking advantage of their official positions, conniving,
confederating and mutually helping with each other and with one VICTOR GRANDE, a
private individual and proprietor of V.N. Grande Enterprises, Iloilo City, with deliberate
intent, with intent to defraud and to falsify, did then and there, falsify a commercial
document consisting of a check of LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Iloilo City
Branch, bearing Serial No. 051752 dated June 14, 1995, in the amount of P176,902.78,
Philippine Currency, with V.N. Grande Enterprises as the payee, by making it appear
therein that the municipality of Badiangan has some accounts payable to V.N. Grande
Enterprises for some purchases made in the total amount of P176,902.78, Philippine
Currency, thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when, in truth and
in fact, as accused very well knew that while there were purchases made at V.N. Grande
Enterprises; hence, the municipality of Badiangan has some monetary obligation to said
establishment, the same amounted only to P63,659.00 and not P176,902.78, and that such
scheme was resorted to by herein accused to be able to obtain the amount of P113,243.78,
the difference thereof, once the said documents was falsified, said accused encashed the
said LBP check, and with deliberate intent, with intent of gain, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously appropriate, misappropriate, take away, embezzle
and convert to their own personal use and benefit the amount of P113,243.78, Philippine
Currency, and despite notice and demands made upon said accused to account for said
public funds, they have failed to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the government. [22]
The material averments of the two other Informations are similarly worded, except for the
particulars of the checks and the dates of the alleged commission of the crimes.
On April 5, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. 48093 finding the
petitioner guilty of malversation. The dispositive part of the judgment reads:
Based on the foregoing, We hereby decree that the Prosecution established the guilt of
the accused Rene P. Pondevida beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Article 217 of
We hereby order that accused Rene P. Pondevida suffers the penalty of imprisonment
ranging from 16 years, 5 months and 11 days to 18 years, 2 months and 20 days
of Reclusion Temporal pursuant to Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to
paragraph 1, Article 64, RPC, and in further relation to the Indeterminate Sentence Law
(Act No. 4225).
Accused Rene P. Pondevida is ordered to be perpetually disqualified to be employed in

the government of the Republic of the Philippines or any of its agencies or
instrumentalities for a position that requires handling and/or disposition of public funds
pursuant to Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
Likewise, pursuant to Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to the
Indeterminate Sentence Law a fine equivalent to one-half of the amount he malversed or
P588,190.295 is ordered imposed upon the accused Rene P. Pondevida without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED.[23]
As gleaned from the evidence of the prosecution before the Sandiganbayan, Norma Tiu
encashed LBP Check No. 051750 on June 15, 1995, but when she realized that she had
no legitimate transaction with the municipality, she turned over P213,700.00 to the
petitioner on the said date. Glenn Celis encashed LBP Check No. 051751 on June 14,
1995 but gave the P503,287.89 to the petitioner when the latter demanded that the
amount be turned over to him, on his claim that there was "an erroneous application for
payment."[24] Victor Grande endorsed LBP Check No. 051752 but his godson, Engr. Jesus
Violeta, Jr., returned P115,153.55 to the petitioner on June 14, 1995 and applied the
difference of P61,745.78 to the payment of materials supplied to the municipality.[25]
It also appears, based on the evidence of Mayor Amigable, that the petitioner inveigled
him into signing the three checks. This can also be gleaned from the petitioner's affidavit:
That I further attest that then Mayor DONATO AMIGABLE is completely innocent of
the charges against him considering that the three (3) checks which I asked Ex-Mayor
Amigable to sign were intended to pay for the salaries and wages of the employees of the
Municipality of Badiangan for the period until June 30, 1995 at which time Ex-Mayor
Amigable will step down from office;
As Ex-Mayor Donato Amigable was then winding up his term of office after having
served as Mayor for 13½ years, I requested him to sign the three (3) checks now subject
matter of this case with my guarantee that the three (3) checks will be used for the
salaries and wages of Municipal employees;
That Ex-Mayor Donato Amigable had nothing to do with the transactions I made with the
three (3) suppliers and I hereby confirm that Ex-Mayor Amigable has not profited a
single centavo from the said three (3) checks or the transactions which arose out of the
said checks.
That I hereby further confirm the innocence of Ex-Mayor Donato Amigable to the
charges which were filed against him.[26]
Malversation is defined and penalized in Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, which
reads:
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property - Presumption of malversation. - Any
public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or
property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or
through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public
funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall, otherwise, be guilty of the
misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the
amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed 200
pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount
involved is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its
minimum period, if the amount involved is more than 6,000 pesos but is less than
12,000 pesos.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods, if the
amount involved is more than 12,000 pesos but is less than 22,000 pesos. If the
amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual
special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to
the total value of the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with
which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima
facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses.
Malversation may be committed by appropriating public funds or property; by taking or
misappropriating the same; by consenting, or through abandonment or negligence, by
permitting any other person to take such public funds or property; or by being otherwise
guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property.
The essential elements common to all acts of malversation under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code are the following:
(a) That the offender be a public officer.

(b) That he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his
office.
(c) That those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was
accountable.
(d) That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or
negligence, permitted another person to take them.
A public officer may be liable for malversation even if he does not use public property or
funds under his custody for his personal benefit, but consents to the taking thereof by
another person, or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted such taking.
The prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt, either by direct or

circumstantial evidence, that the public officer appropriated, misappropriated or
consented or through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take public
property or public funds under his custody. Absent such evidence, the public officer
cannot be held criminally liable for malversation.[27] Mere absence of funds is not
sufficient proof of conversion; neither is the mere failure of the public officer to turn over
the funds at any given time sufficient to make even the prima facie case. In fine,
conversion must be proved.[28] However, an accountable officer may be convicted of
malversation even in the absence of direct proof of misappropriation so long as there is
evidence of shortage in his account which he is unable to explain. [29]
Demand to produce public funds under a public officer's custody is not an essential
element of the felony. The law creates a prima facie presumption of connivance if the
public officer fails to produce public funds under his custody upon demand therefor.[30]
However, the presumption may be rebutted by evidence that the public officer had fully
accounted for the alleged cash shortage.
In the present case, the petitioner does not dispute the fact that, by his overt acts of
drawing and issuing the checks to the order of Victor Grande, Glenn Celis and Norma
Tiu, they were able to encash the checks. Even if the petitioner received P893,860.67
from them on June 15, 1997, a day after the checks were encashed, by then, the felonies
of malversation had already been consummated. Case law has it that the individuals'
taking of funds is completed and is consummated even if the severance of the funds from
the possession was only for an instant.[31] Restitution of the said amount after the
consummation of the crimes is not a ground for acquittal of the said crimes.
On the petitioner's claim that he deposited the amount of P893,890.67 with the LBP on
June 15, 1995 as evidenced by the deposit slips,[32] the Sandiganbayan declared:
Accused Pondevida asserted that he had deposited these amounts in the account of the
Municipality of Badiangan with the bank. But this assertion of the accused is without
evidentiary support of any kind. No document or paper such as deposit slip or certificate
of deposit from the bank has been presented by the accused.[33]
The Sandiganbayan is correct. The petitioner was burdened to prove that the said amount
was part of the deposit he made with the LBP on June 15, 1997, but he failed to do so.
Indeed, instead of buttressing his petition, the decision of the RTC in Criminal Case No.
48093 militates against his case. It appears that on June 15, 1995, the petitioner deposited
P1,108,741.00 in cash.[34] However, there is no indication whatsoever in the deposit slips
that the P893,890.67 refunded by Grande, Celis and Tiu on the same day was part of the
P1,108,741.00. Moreover, the three checks issued by the petitioner were drawn against
Account No. 0032-1094-20, that of the municipality and relating to its general fund.
However, of the P1,108,741.00 the petitioner deposited on June 15, 1995, P192,000.00
was deposited in the municipality's general fund, and the rest in the special education
fund. This is gleaned from the decision of the RTC in Criminal Case No. 48093, which
was, in turn, based on the petitioner's explanation to the finding of Gamboa and Llauderes
that the petitioner had a P2,264,820.92 shortage:
Mr. Pondevida submitted an explanation of his shortage together with the deposit slips on
the deposit he made with the Land Bank of the Philippines, Iloilo City, totalling
P2,288,550.26 itemized as follows:
Date Deposited Fund LBP Account No. Amount

6/5/95 General Fund R0032-1094-20 P722,809.26
6/15/95 General Fund 0032-1094-20 192,800.00
6/15/95 SEF 0032-1251-74 176,902.78
6/21/95 SEF 0032-1251-74 455,000.00
6/15/95 Trust Fund 0032-1251-74 685,141.00
Total Deposits P2,286,550.26[35]
===========
In fine, it was the petitioner's position in Criminal Case No. 48093 that the total deposit
of P2,286,550.26 on June 5, 15 and 21, 1995 with the LBP was to be credited to him, that
is, against the P2,264,820.92 shortage on his cash and account. This is also gleaned from
the petitioner's letter to the Provincial Auditor dated June 21, 1995, in reply to Gamboa's
and Llauderes's Memorandum of June 14, 1995, requiring him to explain the
P2,264,820.92 shortage. The petitioner did not claim in the said letter that the said deposit
should be credited to his check disbursements of P893,890.67.
Indeed, as of June 15, 1995, the petitioner was not yet subject to audit examination for his
check disbursements. It was only on August 23, 1995 that the Provincial Auditor ordered
Navarro and Llauderes to conduct an examination of the said check disbursements.
On the petitioner's claim that the charges against him in the court a quo were barred by
the RTC decision in Criminal Case No. 48093, the same is belied by no less than the said
ruling. The trial court declared that the P1,176,580.59 shortage subject matter of the said
case was different from the petitioner's check disbursements subject matter of the cases in
the Sandiganbayan:
The evidence further showed that the three Land Bank checks issued by the accused
Pondevida to V.N. Grande Enterprises, Iloilo City, Check No. 051752 dated 14 June
1995 P176,902.98, Exhibit "X"; Glen Celis Construction, Iloilo City, Check No. 051751
dated 14 June 1995 P503,287.89, Exhibit "X-1"; Roben Mill and Mining Supply, Check
No. 05[1]750 14 June 1995 P213,700.00, were all issued without the prescribed
supporting documents. These aforesaid exhibits are now the subject of a criminal case
before the Sandiganbayan - Criminal Case No. 243-75-76-77 for Malversation of Public
Funds thru Falsification of Commercial Documents captioned People of the Philippines
versus Rene P. Pondevida and Donato Amigable pending at the Third Division,
Sandiganbayan.[36]
Hence, the judgment of the RTC in Criminal Case No. 48093 is not a bar to the
petitioner's prosecution and conviction in the Sandiganbayan.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
The assailed Resolution dated October 3, 2003 and Decision dated April 11, 2003
are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 51745, October 28, 1988 ]
RAMON F. SAYSON, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
AND THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CORTES, J.:
Petitioner seeks the reversal of the Court of Appeals decision finding him guilty of
attempted estafa.
On March 25, 1972, an information for the crime of Estafa through Falsification of a
Commercial Document was filed against the herein petitioner, Ramon F. Sayson, before
the Court of First Instance of Manila, the pertinent portion of which reads:
. . . the said accused having come in possession of a blank US dollar check
#605908142, with intent to defraud Ernesto Rufino, Sr. and/or Bank of America, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously forge and falsify or cause to be forged
and falsified the said check, by then and there writing or filling or causing to be written
or filled up the following words and figures: "March 10, 1975", "Atty. Norberto S. Perez,"
"2,250.00" and forging the signature of the Asst. Cashier, Manager of the Bank of
America, Dania Branch, making it appear, as it did appear, that the said check was duly
issued by the Bank of America, when in truth and in fact, as the accused well knew, the
said check was never issued nor authorized by the said bank; that thereafter, said
accused wrote or affixed the signature "Norberto Perez" on the back of said check as
indorser; that once the said check had been forged and falsified in the manner above
described, the said accused by means of false manifestations and fraudulent
representations which he made to Ernesto Rufino, Sr. that he is "Atty. Norberto Perez"
who is the payee of the said Check, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and
succeeded in inducing the said Ernesto, Rufino, Sr. to change said dollar check, as in fact,
said Ernesto Rufino, Sr. issued Manufacturer's Bank Check No. 87586 dated March 22,
1972 payable to "Norberto Perez" in the amount of "P14,850.00" in exchange for said
dollar check; . . . [Rollo, pp. 23?24.]
Arraigned on December 8, 1972, petitioner pleaded not guilty. On October 9,
1974, after several postponements, the prosecution rested its case. At the hearing of
December 9, 1974, when the defense was scheduled to present its evidence, only the
petitioner appeared. He said that his counsel had another case in a different court. In
the morning of the said day, his lawyer also sent a telegram to the court requesting
cancellation of the nearing because he was sick. The court denied the motion for
postponement and the case was considered submitted for decision without petitioner's
evidence.
The trial court rendered judgment on January 30, 1975, finding the accused guilty of the
crime charged and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty of 2 years, 4 months and
1 day to 6 years of prision correccional, to pay a fine of P2,000.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment and to pay the costs. The Court of Appeals affirmed but modified the
penalty by imposing six months of arresto mayor and eliminating the fine. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari.
The background facts as found by the appellate court as well as its conclusions thereon
follow:
On March 22, 1972, appellant Ramon Sayson y Fernandez was introduced by
Vicente Jaucian, a former employee of the Luzon Theatres, Inc. to Anselmo Aquiling,
private secretary to Ernesto Rufino, Sr., General Manager of the corporation. Vicente
Jaucian had known appellant as “Fiscal Perez” who wanted to exchange dollars for
pesos, having been introduced to him in that capacity by his (Jaucian's) cousin. Thinking
that Rufino might be interested in dollars, Jaucian accompanied appellant to the offices
of the Luzon Theatres, Inc. and Mever Films, Inc. at the Avenue Hotel on Rizal Avenue,
Manila. Upon being introduced to Anselmo Aquiling, appellant showed the latter an
identification card indicating that he was Norberto S. Perez, a Prosecuting Attorney from
Angeles City. After making the introduction, Jaucian left. Mr. Rufino said that he was not
personally interested in dollars but suggested to his secretary to inquire if Mever Films,
Inc. needed dollars.
Mr. Rufino was also Chairman of the Board of the aforesaid corporation; and when told
that Mever Films needed dollars, he authorized the transaction. Appellant then
presented to Edgar Mangona, the assistant accountant of Mevers Films, a Bank of
America check in the amount of $2,250.00 payable to the order of Atty. Norberto S.
Perez, a xerox copy of which was introduced in evidence as Exhibit E. Actually, Exhibit E
appears to be a bill of exchange or draft drawn by the Dania, Florida Branch of the Bank
of America on its San Francisco Branch in favor of said payee and bears serial number
605908142. Edgar Mangona prepared a check of the Manufacturer's Bank and Trust
Company in the amount of P14,850.00 at the exchange rate of P6.60 to a dollar (Exh. B).
He then walked over to the office of Mrs. Teresita Rufino Litton whom he asked to sign
the check; and thereafter Mangona asked Mr. Rufino to countersign it. Finally, the check
was exchanged with appellant's Bank of America draft and the latter signed the voucher
for the peso check.
On the same day, March 22, 1972, appellant repaired to the Tayuman Branch of the
Banco Filipino and informed its Branch Manager, Mrs. Maria Fe Relova that he wanted
to open a savings account. He was given an application form which he filled up with the
name Norberto S. Perez as the applicant, among other things. Appellant then presented
the Manufacturer's Bank check Exhibit B, payable to the order of Norberto S. Perez, and
after endorsing the same, it was posted in the passbook issued to him. Unknown to
appellant, however, Mrs. Relova, an astute woman had been suspicious of the former's
actuations. So that after he left, she called up the office of the PLDT and inquired if the
telephone number which appellant had unsolicitedly given her was listed in Perez'
name. She was told that the number referred to had not yet been issued by PLDT. She
then telephoned the office of Mevers Films, Inc., the drawer of the check, and inquired
if the check was in fact issued by it and she was answered in the affirmative. Despite this
assurance, she tested her suspicions further by sending out a bank employee to deliver
a brochure to the address given by appellant and the messenger returned without
locating the place.
Within a short time, the officials of the Mevers Films, Inc. became doubtful of the
genuineness of the Bank of America draft. And on March 24, 1972, two days after the
issuance of the Manufacturer's Bank check and one day after the check was cleared with
the Central Bank, Mevers Films which was convinced that the draft was spurious
ordered its payment stopped (Exhibit D). On the same day, Vicente Jaucian who had
introduced appellant to Anselmo Aquiling and the latter himself went to the office of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and there gave written statements on what they
knew about appellant (Exhibits F and G). Also on the same day, the Assistant Manager of
the Bank of America, Manila Branch, who must have been informed of the transaction
involving the draft, addressed a letter to the NBI authorities (Exh. B) which reads:
Gentlemen:
This is to certify that U.S. Dollar draft No. 605908142 drawn on the Bank of
America NT & SA, San Francisco, in favor of Atty. Norberto S. Perez for $2,250.00 and
dated March 10, 1972, is one of the blank drafts surreptitiously taken from a shipment
sent to us by our San Francisco Headquarters sometime in the latter part of 1970.
Issuance of the above-mentioned draft was not authorized by this bank.

Jose R. Lopez, the abovementioned assistant manager who issued the
aforestated certification, testified that the draft in question was one of the 900 blank
drafts which were missing from a shipment received from their head office in the United
States sometime in 1971. He declared that the words "Dania Branch" and "Dania,
Florida" appearing on the face of the draft were superimposed so as to make it appear
that the draft was drawn by the Dania, Florida Branch of the Bank of America on the San
Francisco Branch, when in fact the blank draft was for the exclusive use of the Manila
Branch, as revealed by the first four code figures of the draft's serial number.
We are satisfied with Lopez’ testimony that the draft in question was a forgery. Since
the same was a blank draft appertaining to the Manila Branch of the Bank of America, of
which he was the Assistant Manager, Lopez was competent to state whether or not the
draft was a forgery. And the fact that appellant had openly and falsely represented
himself to be Atty. Norberto S. Perez indicated in the forged draft as the payee, is a
strong circumstantial evidence that he was instrumental in its forgery. [Rollo, p. 25-30.]
xxx xxx xxx
The appellant has raised the issue of due process, alleging denial of his right to be heard
and to present evidence. This requires inquiry into the extent of the rights accorded an
accused in a criminal case and whether the accused-appellant has been denied the
rights to which he is entitled.
The right to be heard by himself and counsel is one of the constitutional rights of the
accused. But while the accused has the right to be heard by himself and counsel and to
present evidence for his defense by direct constitutional grant, such right is not exempt
from the rule on waiver as long as the waiver is not contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by
law [Article 6, Civil Code.] There is nothing in the Constitution nor in any law prohibiting
such waiver. Accordingly, denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a
valid waiver of rights has been made, as in this case.
Petitioner claims though that he was not waiving such right; on the contrary, he was
vigorously asserting his right to be heard by counsel and to present evidence in his
verbal motion for postponement due to absence of his counsel de parte. He thus assails
the denial of his motion as it in effect deprived him of his day in court.
It is too well established to require citation of authorities that the grant or refusal of an
application for continuance or postponement of the trial lies within the sound discretion
of the court. Justice Malcolm, in a 1919 decision, expounded on such judicial discretion
as follows:
Applications for continuances are addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
In this respect, it may be said that the discretion which the trial court exercises must be
judicial and not arbitrary. It is the guardian of the rights of the accused as well as those
of the people at large, and should not unduly force him to trial nor for light causes
jeopardize the rights and interests of the public. Where he conceives it to be necessary
for the more perfect attainment of justice, it has the power upon the motion of either
party to continue the case. But a party charged with a crime has no natural or
inalienable right to a continuance.
The ruling of the court will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of
discretion. When the discretion of the court is exercised with a reasonable degree of
judicial acumen and fairness, it is one which the higher court is loathe to review or
disturb. The trial judge must be to a certain extent free to secure speedy and
expeditious trials when such speed and expedition are not inconsistent with
fairness. Since the court trying the case is, from personal observation, familiar with all
the attendant circumstances, and has the best opportunity of forming a correct opinion
upon the case presented, the presumption will be in favor of its action. It would take an
extreme case of abuse of discretion to make the action of the trial court a denial of due
process. [Underscoring supplied; U.S. v. Ramirez, 39 Phil. 738 (1919).]
The factual background of the case penned by Justice Malcolm, which was
quoted with approval in the case of People v. Mendez (G.R. No. L-27348, July 29, 1969,
28 SCRA 880], is very similar to that of the case at bar. In the instant case, the
information was filed on March 25, 1972 and arraignment was held on December 8,
1973. The prosecution started presenting its evidence on March 12, 1973 and after 1
year, 10 months and 1 day from the day of arraignment, it rested its case. During this
time, petitioner had already secured seven postponements, which it admitted in its brief
filed with the Court of Appeals [Rollo, p. 20] thus prompting the trial judge to remark
that "this is a notoriously postponed case" and that "the defense had abused the rules"
[TSN, December 12, 1973, pp. 2-3.] Since the judge's comments were borne out by the
record regarding the postponements which were admitted by petitioner himself in his
brief filed before the Court of Appeals, petitioner cannot rightfully cast aspersion on the
integrity of said judge by attributing to him a non?existent attitude of bias and hatred
towards the petitioner-accused.
No grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner's motion for postponement can
be imputed the trial court. First, the petitioner's motion was not seasonably filed as the
three-day notice required by the rules (Rule 15, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court)
was not complied with. Moreover, it was not accompanied by an affidavit nor a medical
certificate to support the alleged illness of counsel, contrary to what Rule 22, Section 5
of the Revised Rules of Court mandates:
Sec. 5. Requisites of motion to postpone trial for illness of party or counsel. - A motion
to postpone trial on the ground of illness of a party or counsel may be granted if it
appears upon affidavit that the presence of such party or counsel at the trial is
indispensable and that the character of his illness is such as to render his non-
attendance excusable.
Besides, when petitioner himself sought postponement of the case during the
December 9 hearing, he claimed that his counsel had another case in a different court.
Certainly, the conflicting stories advanced by petitioner and his counsel only indicate the
lack of a good cause for the postponement.
Petitioner's lament that "at least, in the name of justice and fair play, the trial court
should have warned accused that no further postponements shall be entertained by the
court" [Rollo, p. 97] is baseless. As he was aware that the case had already been
postponed seven times at his initiative, he had no right to assume that his motion would
be granted; rather, he should have foreseen that any further motions for postponement
might not be met with approval by the trial court. Besides, the record of the case clearly
shows that the accused had repeatedly appeared in court without his counsel, seeking
postponements which were liberally granted by the court with an order directing his
counsel to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for repeated failure to
appear at the trial of the case. In fact, the court, in its Order dated August 12, 1974,
categorically declared: "In the meantime, let the trial of this case be DEFINITELY
POSTPONED FOR THE LAST TIME to August 14, 1974 at 8:30 a.m. as previously
scheduled, with the warning to the accused to be ready with his present counsel or
another counsel on said date as the court will not entertain any further delays in the
proceedings in this case and shall proceed with the trial of this case with or without his
counsel." [Original Records, p. 430.] This, certainly, was enough warning.
Finally, the motion for postponement was properly denied inasmuch as the defendant
failed to present any meritorious defense. This Court's pronouncement -- that in
incidents of this nature before the trial court, two circumstances should be taken into
account, namely, 1) the reasonableness of the postponement and 2) the merits of the
case of the movant -- should not be lightly ignored [Udan v. Amon, G.R. No. L-24288,
May 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 837]. There may be an accident, surprise or excusable neglect
justifying postponement or reconsideration but if the movant does not present a
meritorious claim or defense, denial of his motion for postponement may not be
considered as an abuse of the discretion of the court [De Cases v. Peyer, G.R. No. L-
18564, August 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 1165.]
Absent any meritorious case in defendant's favor, his motion for postponement was
properly denied. His invocation of his right to counsel and to present evidence was an
empty gesture revealing his dilatory scheme. Under the circumstances, the petitioner
must be deemed to have waived his rights and to have been extended the protection of
due process.
Moreover, the petitioner in negotiating the check presented himself as a lawyer; he was
addressed in the Notice of the Order dated September 11, 1972 as "Atty. Ramon Sayson
y Fernandez" [Original Records, p. 38] and he himself filed the Motion to Quash [Original
Records, p. 22] and a pleading captioned "Compliance" dated December 2, 1972
[Original Records, p. 41.] These facts indicate that he was capable of defending himself.
That he himself was allowed to file pleadings clearly negatives the alleged deprivation of
his right to due process of law. Consequently, there being no abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court, its order will not be disturbed.
The Court finds the petitioner's plea that it was incumbent upon the trial judge to
appoint a counsel de oficio for him when he appeared without his counsel utterly
without legal basis. The duty of the court to appoint a counsel de oficio when the
accused has no counsel of choice and desires to employ the services of one is
mandatory only at the time of arraignment [Rule 116, Section 6, Revised Rules of Court.]
This is no longer so where the accused has proceeded with the arraignment and the trial
with a counsel of his choice but when the time for the presentation of the evidence for
the defense has arrived, he appears by himself alone and the absence of his counsel was
inexcusable. This Court's holding in a previous case that there is no deprivation of the
right to counsel in such a case is squarely applicable:
As the appellant was represented by counsel of his choice at the arraignment,
trial and in the incidental motions to dismiss and to postpone the resumption of the trial
of the case, the trial court was not in duty bound to appoint a counsel de oficio to assist
him in his defense. His failure to appear with counsel of his choice at the hearing of the
case, notwithstanding repeated postponements and warnings that failure to so appear
would be deemed a waiver on the part of the appellant to present his evidence and the
case would be deemed submitted for decision upon the evidence presented by the
prosecution, was sufficient legal justification for the trial court to proceed and render
judgment upon the evidence before it. Taking into consideration all the steps taken by
the trial court to safeguard the rights of the appellant, the latter cannot pretend that he
was deprived of his right to be assisted by counsel and to present evidence in his behalf.
Moreover, the repeated failure of the appellant to appear with counsel at the
resumptions of the trial of the case may be taken as a deliberate attempt on his part to
delay the proceedings. [People v. Angco, 103 Phil. 33, 39 (1958).]
At the most, the appointment of a counsel de oficio in situations like the present
case is discretionary with the trial court, which discretion will not be interfered with in
the absence of abuse. Here, the trial court had been liberal in granting the
postponements secured by the petitioner himself, at the same time admonishing the
latter to be ready with his present counsel or another counsel [Original Records, p. 430.]
Notwithstanding this admonition, the petitioner kept on attending the hearings without
securing another lawyer to substitute his present counsel who was constantly absent
during the hearings. Still, as admitted by petitioner in his memorandum, the trial court,
at the December 9, 1974 hearing, allowed him to look for a lawyer but no one was
available at the time [Rollo, p. 94.] These steps undertaken by the trial court removes
any doubt that its order was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
The last issue to be resolved dwells on the effect of the alleged variance between the
prosecution's allegation and proof.
The petitioner vigorously maintains that he cannot be justifiably convicted under the
information charging him of attempting to defraud Ernesto Rufino, Sr. and/or Bank of
America because the totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution show very
clearly that the accused allegedly attempted to defraud Mever Films, Inc., a corporate
entity entirely separate and distinct from Ernesto Rufino, Sr. He firmly asserts that his
conviction was in gross violation of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.
Petitioner's claim is unavailing. The rule in this jurisdiction is that "variance between the
allegations of the information and the evidence offered by the prosecution in support
thereof does not of itself entitle the accused to an acquittal. [People v. Catli, G.R. No. L-
11641, November 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 642.]
The rules on criminal procedure require the complaint or information to state the name
and surname of the person against whom or against whose property the offense was
committed or any appellation or nickname by which such person has been or is known
and if there is no better way of identifying him, he must be described under a fictitious
name [Rule 110, Section 11, Revised Rules of Court; now Rule 110, Section 12 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.] In case of offenses against property, the designation
of the name of the offended party is not absolutely indispensable for as long as the
criminal act charged in the complaint or information can be properly identified. Thus,
Rule 110, Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Section 11. Name of the offended party. -?
xxx xxx xxx

(a) In cases of offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is
unknown, the property, subject matter of the offense, must be described with such
particularity as to properly identify the particular offense charged.
(b) If in the course of the trial, the true name of the person against whom or against
whose property the offense was committed is disclosed or ascertained, the court must
cause the true name to be inserted in the complaint or information or record.
xxx xxx xxx
In U.S. v. Kepner, [1 Phil. 519 (1902)], this Court laid down the rule that when an offense
shall have been described in the complaint with sufficient certainty as to identify the
act, an erroneous allegation as to the person injured shall be deemed immaterial as the
same is a mere formal defect which did not tend to prejudice any substantial right of the
defendant. Accordingly, in the aforementioned case, which had a factual backdrop
similar to the instant case, where the defendant was charged with estafa for the
misappropriation of the proceeds of a warrant which he had cashed without authority,
the erroneous allegation in the complaint to the effect that the unlawful act was to the
prejudice of the owner of the cheque, when in reality the bank which cashed it was the
one which suffered a loss, was held to be immaterial on the ground that the subject
matter of the estafa, the warrant, was described in the complaint with such particularity
as to properly identify the particular offense charged. In the instant suit for estafa which
is a crime against property under the Revised Penal Code, since the check, which was
the subject-matter of the offense, was described with such particularity as to properly
identify the offense charged, it becomes immaterial, for purposes of convicting the
accused, that it was established during the trial that the offended party was actually
Mever Films and not Ernesto Rufino, Sr. nor Bank of America as alleged in the
information.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the petition is hereby DENIED and the

decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto with costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 160451, February 09, 2007 ]
EDUARDO G. RICARZE, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS,
PEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES, CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC., PHILIPPINE
COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK (PCIBANK), RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68492, and its Resolution[2] which denied the Motion for
Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration thereof.
The Antecedents
Petitioner Eduardo G. Ricarze was employed as a collector-messenger by City Service

Corporation, a domestic corporation engaged in messengerial services. He was assigned
to the main office of Caltex Philippines, Inc. (Caltex) in Makati City. His primary task
was to collect checks payable to Caltex and deliver them to the cashier. He also delivered
invoices to Caltex's customers.[3]
On November 6, 1997, Caltex, through its Banking and Insurance Department Manager
Ramon Romano, filed a criminal complaint against petitioner before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Makati City for estafa through falsification of commercial documents.
Romano alleged that, on October 16, 1997, while his department was conducting a daily
electronic report from Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank (PCIB) Dela Rosa,
Makati Branch, one of its depositary banks, it was discovered that unknown to the
department, a company check, Check No. 74001 dated October 13, 1997 in the amount of
P5,790,570.25 payable to Dante R. Gutierrez, had been cleared through PCIB on October
15, 1997. An investigation also revealed that two other checks (Check Nos. 73999 and
74000) were also missing and that in Check No. 74001, his signature and that of another
signatory, Victor S. Goquinco, were forgeries. Another check, Check No. 72922 dated
September 15, 1997 in the amount of P1,790,757.25 likewise payable to Dante R.
Gutierrez, was also cleared through the same bank on September 24, 1997; this check
was likewise not issued by Caltex, and the signatures appearing thereon had also been
forged. Upon verification, it was uncovered that Check Nos. 74001 and 72922 were
deposited at the Banco de Oro's SM Makati Branch under Savings Account No. S/A
2004-0047245-7, in the name of a regular customer of Caltex, Dante R. Gutierrez.
Gutierrez, however, disowned the savings account as well as his signatures on the dorsal
portions thereof. He also denied having withdrawn any amount from said savings
account. Further investigation revealed that said savings account had actually been
opened by petitioner; the forged checks were deposited and endorsed by him under
Gutierrez's name. A bank teller from the Banco de Oro, Winnie P. Donable Dela Cruz,
positively identified petitioner as the person who opened the savings account using
Gutierrez's name.[4]
In the meantime, the PCIB credited the amount of P581,229.00 to Caltex on March 29,
1998. However, the City Prosecutor of Makati City was not informed of this
development. After the requisite preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor filed two
(2) Informations for estafa through falsification of commercial documents on June 29,
1998 against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63.
The Informations are worded as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of September 1997 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
accused, a private individual, with intent to defraud and intent to gain, without the
knowledge and consent of Caltex Philippines, Inc. through its duly authorized
officers/representatives, and by means of falsification of commercial document, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Caltex Phils., Inc., in the
following manner, to wit: said accused, having obtained possession of PCIBank check
no. 72922 dated September 15, 1997 payable to Dante R. Gutierrez, in the amount of
Php1,790,757.50 with intent to defraud or cause damage to complainant Caltex Phils.,
Inc., willfully, unlawfully and feloniously affixed or caused to be affixed signatures
purporting to be those of Ramon Romano and Victor Goquingco, Caltex authorized
officers/signatories, and of payee Dante R. Gutierrez, causing it to appear that Ramon
Romano and Victor Goquingco have participated in the issuance of PCIBank check no.
72922 and that Dante R. Gutierrez had endorsed it, when in truth and in fact, as said
accused well knew, such was not the case, since said check previously stolen from
Payables Section of CALTEX, was neither duly signed by Ramon Romano and Victor
Goquingco nor endorsed by Dante R. Gutierrez, after the check, a commercial document,
was falsified in the manner above set forth, the said accused purporting himself to be the
payee, Dante R. Gutierrez, deposited the check with Banco De Oro under Account No.
2004-0047245-7, thereby appropriating the proceeds of the falsified but cleared check, to
the damage and prejudice of complainant herein represented by Ramon Romano, in the
amount of Php1,790,757.50.
That on or about the 15th day of October 1997 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
no. 74001 dated October 13, 1997 payable to Dante R. Gutierrez, in the amount of
amount of Php5,790,570.25.[5]
Petitioner was arraigned on August 18, 1998, and pleaded not guilty to both charges.
[6]
Pre-trial ensued and the cases were jointly tried. The prosecution presented its
witnesses, after which the Siguion Reyna, Montecillio and Ongsiako Law Offices
(SRMO) as private prosecutor filed a Formal Offer of Evidence.[7] Petitioner opposed the
pleading, contending that the private complainant was represented by the ACCRA Law
Offices and the Balgos and Perez Law Office during trial, and it was only after the
prosecution had rested its case that SRMO entered its appearance as private prosecutor
representing the PCIB. Since the ACCRA and Balgos and Perez Law Offices had not
withdrawn their appearance, SRMO had no personality to appear as private prosecutor.
Under the Informations, the private complainant is Caltex and not PCIB; hence, the
Formal Offer of Evidence filed by SRMO should be stricken from the records.
Petitioner further averred that unless the Informations were amended to change the
private complainant to PCIB, his right as accused would be prejudiced. He pointed out,
however, that the Informations can no longer be amended because he had already been
arraigned under the original Informations.[8] He insisted that the amendments of the
Informations to substitute PCIB as the offended party for Caltex would place him in
double jeopardy.
PCIB, through SRMO, opposed the motion. It contended that the PCIB had re-credited
the amount to Caltex to the extent of the indemnity; hence, the PCIB had been subrogated
to the rights and interests of Caltex as private complainant. Consequently, the PCIB is
entitled to receive any civil indemnity which the trial court would adjudge against the
accused. Moreover, the re-credited amount was brought out on cross-examination by
Ramon Romano who testified for the Prosecution. PCIB pointed out that petitioner had
marked in evidence the letter of the ACCRA Law Office to PCIBank dated October 10,
1997 and the credit memo sent by PCIB to Caltex.[9]
Petitioner filed a Motion to Expunge the Opposition of SRMO.[10] In his Rejoinder, he

averred that the substitution of PCIB as private complainant cannot be made by mere oral
motion; the Information must be amended to allege that the private complainant was
PCIB and not Caltex after the preliminary investigation of the appropriate complaint of
PCIB before the Makati City Prosecutor.
In response, the PCIB, through SRMO, averred that as provided in Section 2, Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the erroneous designation of the name of the
offended party is a mere formal defect which can be cured by inserting the name of the
offended party in the Information. To support its claim, PCIB cited the ruling of this
Court in Sayson v. People.[11]
On July 18, 2001, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion of the private prosecutor
for the substitution of PCIB as private complainant for Caltex. It however denied
petitioner's motion to have the formal offer of evidence of SRMO expunged from the
record.[12] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied on
November 14, 2001.[13]
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with Urgent
Application for Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals (CA,) praying
for the annulment of the RTC's Orders of July 18, 2001 and November 14, 2001. The
petitioner averred that:
I
RESPONDENT JUDGE GRIEVEOUSLY (SIC) ERRED IN RENDERING ITS ORDER
ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF
OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION BY ALLOWING THE SUBSTITUTION OF
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT, AFTER THE ACUSED WAS ALREADY ARRAIGNED
AND PROSECUTION HAS ALREADY TERMINATED PRESENTING ITS
EVIDENCE THEREBY PATENTLY VIOLATING THE STRICT CONDITION
IMPOSED UPON BY RULE 110 SEC. 14 RULES ON CRIMINAL ROCEDURE.
II
AND AS A COROLLARY GROUND RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN RENDERING AN
ORDER RECOGNIZING THE APPEARANCE OF A NEW PROSECUTOR
WITHOUT WRITTEN OR EVEN ORAL WITHDRAWAL OF THE COUNSEL ON
RECORD.[14]
According to petitioner, damage or injury to the offended party is an essential element of
estafa. The amendment of the Informations substituting the PCIBank for Caltex as the
offended party would prejudice his rights since he is deprived of a defense available
before the amendment, and which would be unavailable if the Informations are amended.
Petitioner further insisted that the ruling in the Sayson case did not apply to this case.
On November 5, 2002, the appellate court rendered judgment dismissing the petition.
The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition to annul the orders dated July 18, 2001
and November 14, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Makati City in Criminal
Case Nos. 98-1611 and 98-1612 is hereby DENIED and consequently DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[15]
The appellate court declared that when PCIB restored the amount of the checks to Caltex,
it was subrogated to the latter's right against petitioner. It further declared that in offenses
against property, the designation of the name of the offended party is not absolutely
indispensable for as long as the criminal act charged in the complaint or information can
be properly identified. The appellate court cited the rulings of this Court in People v.
Ho[16] and People v. Reyes.[17]
On October 17, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.[18]
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition which is anchored on the following grounds:
I. THE PEOPLE V. YU CHAI HO 53 PHILIPPINES 874 IS INAPPLICABLE TO

THE CASE AT BAR CONSIDERING THE PACTS ARE SUBSTANTIALLY
DIFFERENT.
II. LIKEWISE, THE CASE OF PEOPLE VS. REYES CA, 50 (2) OG 665,
NOVEMBER 11, 1953 HAS NO MATERIAL BEARING TO THE PRESENT
CASE.
III. THE SUBSTITUTION OF PCIBANK WILL SUBSTANTIALLY PREJUDICE

THE RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER HENCE, IT IS PROHIBITED BY SEC. 14
OF RULE 110.
IV. THERE IS NO VALID SUBROGATION BETWEEN CALTEX AND
PCIBANK. ASSUMING THERE IS, THE CIVIL CASE SHOULD BE
DISMISSED TO PROSECUTE.
V. THE TWIN INFORMATIONS UPON WHICH PETITIONER WAS INDICTED,

ARRAIGNED, PRE-TRIAL HELD AND PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
TERMINATED THE PRESENTATION OF ITS EVIDENCE IN CHIEF ARE
DEFECTIVE AND VOID, HENCE THE DISMISSAL IS IN ORDER.
VI. PETITIONER TIMELY OBJECTED TO THE APPEARANCE OF PRIVATE

PROSECUTOR FOR PCIBANK.
VII. THE FINDINGS OF MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT SUPORTED BY THE

RECORD NOR EVIDENCE AND BASED ON MISAPPRECIATION OF
FACTS.
VIII. PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DID

NOT VIOLATE THE OMNIBUS MOTION RULE UNDER SEC. 8, RULE 15
OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.[19]
The Court's Ruling
Petitioner argues that the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complainant at this
late stage of the trial is prejudicial to his defense. He argues that the substitution is
tantamount to a substantial amendment of the Informations which is prohibited under
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
Under Section 5, Rule 110[20] of the Revised Rules of Rules, all criminal actions covered
by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direct supervision and
control of the public prosecutor. Thus, even if the felonies or delictual acts of the
accused result in damage or injury to another, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability based on the said criminal acts is impliedly instituted, and the offended party has
not waived the civil action, reserved the right to institute it separately or instituted the
civil action prior to the criminal action, the prosecution of the action (including the civil)
remains under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor. The prosecution of
offenses is a public function. Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the offended party may intervene in the criminal action personally or by
counsel, who will act as private prosecutor for the protection of his interests and in the
interest of the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice. A separate action for the
purpose would only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties
and further delay the final disposition of the case. The multiplicity of suits must be
avoided. With the implied institution of the civil action in the criminal action, the two
actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the criminal action
predominating the civil. The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the
offender in order to deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to
isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social
order.[21]
ART. 104. What is included in civil liability. - The civil liability established in Articles
1. Restitution;
On the other hand, Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
states:
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. - A complaint or information may be amended,
in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his
plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with
leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the
accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense
charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only
upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court.
The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be
furnished all parties, especially the offended party.
Thus, before the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the
complaint or information may be made without leave of court. After the entry of a plea,
only a formal amendment may be made but with leave of court and if it does not
prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment, a substantial amendment is
proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused.[23]
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged
and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form.
[24]
The following have been held to be mere formal amendments: (1) new allegations
which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of
conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct
from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the
prosecution's theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form
of defense he has or will assume; (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any
substantial right of the accused; and (5) an amendment that merely adds specifications to
eliminate vagueness in the information and not to introduce new and material facts, and
merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in the
original information and which adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime
charged.[25]
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense

under the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is
made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the
information in the one form as in the other. An amendment to an information which does
not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the
offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new
averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance. [26]
In the case at bar, the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complaint is not a
substantial amendment. The substitution did not alter the basis of the charge in both
Informations, nor did it result in any prejudice to petitioner. The documentary evidence in
the form of the forged checks remained the same, and all such evidence was available to
petitioner well before the trial. Thus, he cannot claim any surprise by virtue of the
substitution.
Petitioner next argues that in no way was PCIB subrogated to the rights of Caltex,
considering that he has no knowledge of the subrogation much less gave his consent to it.
Alternatively, he posits that if subrogation was proper, then the charges against him
should be dismissed, the two Informations being "defective and void due to false
allegations."
Petitioner was charged of the crime of estafa complex with falsification document. In
estafa one of the essential elements "to prejudice of another" as mandated by article 315
of the Revise Penal Code.
The element of "to the prejudice of another" being as essential element of the felony
should be clearly indicated and charged in the information with TRUTH AND LEGAL
PRECISION.
This is not so in the case of petitioner, the twin information filed against him alleged the
felony committed " to the damage and prejudice of Caltex." This allegation is UNTRUE
and FALSE for there is no question that as early as March 24, 1998 or THREE (3)
LONG MONTHS before the twin information were filed on June 29, 1998, the prejudice
party is already PCIBank since the latter Re-Credit the value of the checks to Caltex as
early as March 24, 1998. In effect, assuming there is valid subrogation as the subject
decision concluded, the subrogation took place an occurred on March 24, 1998 THREE
(3) MONTHS before the twin information were filed.
The phrase "to the prejudice to another" as element of the felony is limited to the person
DEFRAUDED in the very act of embezzlement. It should not be expanded to other
persons which the loss may ultimately fall as a result of a contract which contract herein
petitioner is total stranger.
In this case, there is no question that the very act of commission of the offense of
September 24, 1997 and October 15, 1997 respectively, Caltex was the one defrauded by
the act of the felony.
In the light of these facts, petitioner submits that the twin information are DEFECTIVE
AND VOID due to the FALSE ALLEGATIONS that the offense was committed to the
prejudice of Caltex when it truth and in fact the one prejudiced here was PCIBank.
The twin information being DEFECTIVE AND VOID, the same should be dismissed
without prejudice to the filing of another information which should state the offense was
committed to the prejudice of PCIBank if it still legally possible without prejudicing
substantial and statutory rights of the petitioner.[27]
Petitioner's argument on subrogation is misplaced. The Court agrees with respondent
PCIB's comment that petitioner failed to make a distinction between legal and
conventional subrogation. Subrogation is the transfer of all the rights of the creditor to a
third person, who substitutes him in all his rights.[28] It may either be legal or
conventional. Legal subrogation is that which takes place without agreement but by
operation of law because of certain acts.[29] Instances of legal subrogation are those
provided in Article 1302[30] of the Civil Code. Conventional subrogation, on the other
hand, is that which takes place by agreement of the parties. [31] Thus, petitioner's
acquiescence is not necessary for subrogation to take place because the instant case is
one of legal subrogation that occurs by operation of law, and without need of the debtor's
knowledge.
Contrary to petitioner's asseverations, the case of People v. Yu Chai Ho[32] relied upon by

the appellate court is in point. The Court declared -
We do not however, think that the fiscal erred in alleging that the commission of the
crime resulted to the prejudice of Wm. H. Anderson & Co. It is true that originally the
International Banking Corporation was the prejudiced party, but Wm. H. Anderson & Co.
compensated it for its loss and thus became subrogated to all its rights against the
defendant (article 1839, Civil Code). Wm. H. Anderson & Co., therefore, stood exactly in
the shoes of the International Banking Corporation in relation to the defendant's acts, and
the commission of the crime resulted to the prejudice of the firm previously to the filing
of the information in the case. The loss suffered by the firm was the ultimate result of the
defendant's unlawful acts, and we see no valid reason why this fact should not be stated
in the information; it stands to reason that, in the crime of estafa, the damage resulting
therefrom need not necessarily occur simultaneously with the acts constituting the other
essential elements of the crime.
Thus, being subrogated to the right of Caltex, PCIB, through counsel, has the right to
intervene in the proceedings, and under substantive laws is entitled to restitution of its
properties or funds, reparation, or indemnification.
Petitioner's gripe that the charges against him should be dismissed because the allegations
in both Informations failed to name PCIB as true offended party does not hold water.

Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. - A complaint or information is
party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense; and the place wherein the
On the other hand, Section 12 of the same Rule provides:
Section. 12. Name of the offended party. - The complaint or information must state the
name and surname of the person against whom or against whose property the offense was
committed, or any appellation or nickname by which such person has been or is known.
If there is no better way of identifying him, he must be described under a fictitious name.
(a) In offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is unknown, the
property must be described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense
charged.
(b) If the true name of the person against whom or against whose property the offense
was committed is thereafter disclosed or ascertained, the court must cause such true name
to be inserted in the complaint or information and the record.
(c) If the offended party is a juridical person, it is sufficient to state its name, or any name
or designation by which it is known or by which it may be identified, without need of
averring that it is a juridical person or that it is organized in accordance with law. (12a)
In Sayson v. People,[33] the Court held that in case of offenses against property, the
designation of the name of the offended party is not absolutely indispensable for as long
as the criminal act charged in the complaint or information can be properly identified:
and if there is no better way of Identifying him, he must be described under a fictitious
name (Rule 110, Section 11, Revised Rules of Court; now Rule 110, Section 12 of the
Section 11. Name of the offended party-

...
(a) In cases of offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is unknown,
the property, subject matter of the offense, must be described with such particularity as to
properly Identify the particular offense charged.
...
In U.S. v. Kepner [1 Phil. 519 (1902)], this Court laid down the rule that when an offense
shall have been described in the complaint with sufficient certainty as to Identify the act,
an erroneous allegation as to the person injured shall be deemed immaterial as the same is
a mere formal defect which did not tend to prejudice any substantial right of the
defendant. Accordingly, in the aforementioned case, which had a factual backdrop similar
to the instant case, where the defendant was charged with estafa for the misappropriation
of the proceeds of a warrant which he had cashed without authority, the erroneous
allegation in the complaint to the effect that the unlawful act was to the prejudice of the
owner of the cheque, when in reality the bank which cashed it was the one which suffered
a loss, was held to be immaterial on the ground that the subject matter of the estafa, the
warrant, was described in the complaint with such particularity as to properly Identify the
particular offense charged. In the instant suit for estafa which is a crime against property
under the Revised Penal Code, since the check, which was the subject-matter of the
offense, was described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged,
it becomes immaterial, for purposes of convicting the accused, that it was established
during the trial that the offended party was actually Mever Films and not Ernesto Rufino,
Sr. nor Bank of America as alleged in the information.
Lastly, on petitioner's claim that he timely objected to the appearance of SRMO [34] as
private prosecutor for PCIB, the Court agrees with the observation of the CA that
contrary to his claim, petitioner did not question the said entry of appearance even as the
RTC acknowledged the same on October 8, 1999.[35] Thus, petitioner cannot feign
ignorance or surprise of the incident, which are "all water under the bridge for [his]
failure to make a timely objection thereto."[36]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of the

Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. This case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 63, for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 201620, March 06, 2013 ]
RAMONCITA O. SENADOR, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND CYNTHIA JAIME, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
VELASCO JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking the reversal of
the May 17, 2011 Decision[1] and March 30, 2012 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 00952
In an Information dated August 5, 2002, petitioner Ramoncita O. Senador (Senador) was

charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32 in Dumaguete City with the
crime of Estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code,[3] viz:
That on or about the 10th day of September 2000 in the City of Dumaguete,

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, having
obtained and received from one Cynthia Jaime various kinds of jewelry valued in the
total amount of P705,685.00 for the purpose of selling the same on consignment basis
with express obligation to account for and remit the entire proceeds of the sale if sold or
to return the same if unsold within an agreed period of time and despite repeated
demands therefor, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to remit
proceeds of the sale of said items or to return any of the items that may have been
unsold to said Cynthia Jaime but instead has willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriated, misapplied and converted the same to his/her own use and benefit to
the damage and prejudice of said Cynthia Jaime in the aforementioned amount of
P705,685.00.[4] (Emphasis supplied.)
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded “not guilty.” Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued.
The prosecution’s evidence sought to prove the following facts: Rita Jaime (Rita) and her
daughter-in-law, Cynthia Jaime (Cynthia), were engaged in a jewelry business. Sometime
in the first week of September 2000, Senador went to see Rita at her house in
Guadalupe Heights, Cebu City, expressing her interest to see the pieces of jewelry that
the latter was selling. On September 10, 2000, Rita’s daughter-in-law and business
partner, Cynthia, delivered to Senador several pieces of jewelry worth seven hundred
five thousand six hundred eighty five pesos (PhP 705,685). [5]
In the covering Trust Receipt Agreement signed by Cynthia and Senador, the latter
undertook to sell the jewelry thus delivered on commission basis and, thereafter, to
remit the proceeds of the sale, or return the unsold items to Cynthia within fifteen (15)
days from the delivery.[6] However, as events turned out, Senador failed to turn over the
proceeds of the sale or return the unsold jewelry within the given period. [7]
Thus, in a letter dated October 4, 2001, Rita demanded from Senador the return of the
unsold jewelry or the remittance of the proceeds from the sale of jewelry entrusted to
her. The demand fell on deaf ears prompting Rita to file the instant criminal complaint
against Senador.[8]
During the preliminary investigation, Senador tendered to Rita Keppel Bank Check No.
0003603 dated March 31, 2001 for the amount of PhP 705,685, [9] as settlement of her
obligations. Nonetheless, the check was later dishonored as it was drawn against a
closed account.[10]
Senador refused to testify and so failed to refute any of the foregoing evidence of the
prosecution, and instead, she relied on the defense that the facts alleged in the
Information and the facts proven and established during the trial differ. In particular,
Senador asserted that the person named as the offended party in the Information is not
the same person who made the demand and filed the complaint. According to Senador,
the private complainant in the Information went by the name “Cynthia Jaime,” whereas,
during trial, the private complainant turned out to be “Rita Jaime.” Further, Cynthia
Jaime was never presented as witness. Hence, citing People v. Uba,et al. [11] (Uba)
and United States v. Lahoylahoy and Madanlog (Lahoylahoy),[12] Senador would insist on
her acquittal on the postulate that her constitutional right to be informed of the nature
of the accusation against her has been violated.
Despite her argument, the trial court, by Decision dated June 30, 2008, found Senador
guilty as charged and sentenced as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds RAMONCITA SENADOR guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of the crime of ESTAFA under Par. 1 (b), Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years and one (1) day of prision
correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum and to
indemnify the private complainants, RITA JA[I]ME and CYNTHIA JA[I]ME, the following:
1) Actual Damages in the amount of P695,685.00 with interest at the legal rate from the
filing of the Information until fully paid; 2) Exemplary Damages in the amount of
P100,000.00; and 3) the amount of P50,000 as Attorney’s fees.
Senador questioned the RTC Decision before the CA. However, on May 17, 2011, the
appellate court rendered a Decision upholding the finding of the RTC that the
prosecution satisfactorily established the guilt of Senador beyond reasonable doubt. The
CA opined that the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt the
following undisputed facts, to wit: (1) Senador received the pieces of jewelry in trust
under the obligation or duty to return them; (2) Senador misappropriated or converted
the pieces of jewelry to her benefit but to the prejudice of business partners, Rita and
Cynthia; and (3) Senador failed to return the pieces of jewelry despite demand made by
Rita.
Further, the CA––finding that Uba[13] is not applicable since Senador is charged with
estafa, a crime against property and not oral defamation, as in Uba––ruled:
WHEREFORE, the June 30, 2008 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32,
Dumaguete City, in Criminal Case No. 16010, finding accused appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Estafa is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Senador filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution dated
March 30, 2012. Hence, the present petition of Senador.
The sole issue involved in the instant case is whether or not an error in the designation
in the Information of the offended party violates, as petitioner argues, the accused’s
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
her, thus, entitling her to an acquittal.
The petition is without merit.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that variance between the allegations of the
information and the evidence offered by the prosecution does not of itself entitle the
accused to an acquittal,[14] more so if the variance relates to the designation of the
offended party, a mere formal defect, which does not prejudice the substantial rights of
the accused.[15]
As correctly held by the appellate court, Senador’s reliance on Uba is misplaced. In Uba,
the appellant was charged with oral defamation, a crime against honor, wherein the
identity of the person against whom the defamatory words were directed is a material
element. Thus, an erroneous designation of the person injured is material. On the
contrary, in the instant case, Senador was charged with estafa, a crime against property
that does not absolutely require as indispensable the proper designation of the name of
the offended party. Rather, what is absolutely necessary is the correct identification of
the criminal act charged in the information. [16] Thus, in case of an error in the
designation of the offended party in crimes against property, Rule 110, Sec. 12 of the
Rules of Court mandates the correction of the information, not its dismissal:
SEC. 12. Name of the offended party.—The complaint or information must state

the name and surname of the person against whom or against whose property the
offense was committed, or any appellation or nickname by which such person has been
or is known. If there is no better way of identifying him, he must be described under a
fictitious name.
charged.
was committed is thereafter disclosed or ascertained, the court must cause such true
name to be inserted in the complaint or information and the record. x x x (Emphasis
supplied.)
It is clear from the above provision that in offenses against property, the materiality of
the erroneous designation of the offended party would depend on whether or not the
subject matter of the offense was sufficiently described and identified.
Lahoylahoy cited by Senador supports the doctrine that if the subject matter of the
offense is generic or one which is not described with such particularity as to properly
identify the offense charged, then an erroneous designation of the offended party is
material and would result in the violation of the accused’s constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her. Such
error, Lahoylahoy teaches, would result in the acquittal of the accused, viz:
The second sentence of section 7 of General Orders No. 58 declares that when an
offense shall have been described with sufficient certainty to identify the act, an
erroneous allegation as to the person injured shall be deemed immaterial. We are of
the opinion that this provision can have no application to a case where the name of
the person injured is matter of essential description as in the case at bar; and at any
rate, supposing the allegation of ownership to be eliminated, the robbery charged in
this case would not be sufficiently identified. A complaint stating, as does the one now
before us, that the defendants “took and appropriated to themselves with intent of gain
and against the will of the owner thereof the sum of P100” could scarcely be sustained
in any jurisdiction as a sufficient description either of the act of robbery or of the subject
of the robbery. There is a saying to the effect that money has no earmarks; and
generally speaking the only way money, which has been the subject of a robbery, can
be described or identified in a complaint is by connecting it with the individual who
was robbed as its owner or possessor. And clearly, when the offense has been so
identified in the complaint, the proof must correspond upon this point with the
allegation, or there can be no conviction.[17] (Emphasis supplied.)
In Lahoylahoy, the subject matter of the offense was money in the total sum of PhP 100.
Since money is generic and has no earmarks that could properly identify it, the only way
that it (money) could be described and identified in a complaint is by connecting it to
the offended party or the individual who was robbed as its owner or possessor. Thus,
the identity of the offended party is material and necessary for the proper identification
of the offense charged. Corollary, the erroneous designation of the offended party
would also be material, as the subject matter of the offense could no longer be
described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged.
The holdings in United States v. Kepner,[18] Sayson v. People,[19] and Ricarze v. Court of

Appeals[20] support the doctrine that if the subject matter of the offense is specific or
one described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged, then
an erroneous designation of the offended party is not material and would not result in
the violation of the accused’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against her. Such error would not result in the acquittal of the
accused.
In the 1902 case of Kepner, this Court ruled that the erroneous designation of the
person injured by a criminal act is not material for the prosecution of the offense
because the subject matter of the offense, a warrant, was sufficiently identified with
such particularity as to properly identify the particular offense charged. We held, thus:
The allegation of the complaint that the unlawful misappropriation of the

proceeds of the warrant was to the prejudice of Aun Tan may be disregarded by virtue
of section 7 of General Orders, No. 58, which declares that when an offense shall have
been described in the complaint with sufficient certainty to identify the act, an
erroneous allegation as to the person injured shall be deemed immaterial. In any
event the defect, if defect it was, was one of form which did not tend to prejudice any
substantial right of the defendant on the merits, and can not, therefore, under the
provisions of section 10 of the same order, affect the present proceeding. [21] (Emphasis
supplied.)
In Sayson, this Court upheld the conviction of Sayson for attempted estafa, even if there
was an erroneous allegation as to the person injured because the subject matter of the
offense, a check, is specific and sufficiently identified. We held, thus:
In U.S. v. Kepner x x x, this Court laid down the rule that when an offense shall
have been described in the complaint with sufficient certainty as to identify the act, an
erroneous allegation as to the person injured shall be deemed immaterial as the same is
defendant. Accordingly, in the aforementioned case, which had a factual backdrop
similar to the instant case, where the defendant was charged with estafa for the
misappropriation of the proceeds of a warrant which he had cashed without authority,
the erroneous allegation in the complaint to the effect that the unlawful act was to the
prejudice of the owner of the cheque, when in reality the bank which cashed it was the
one which suffered a loss, was held to be immaterial on the ground that the subject
matter of the estafa, the warrant, was described in the complaint with such particularity
as to properly identify the particular offense charged. In the instant suit for estafa
which is a crime against property under the Revised Penal Code, since the check,
which was the subject-matter of the offense, was described with such particularity as
to properly identify the offense charged, it becomes immaterial, for purposes of
convicting the accused, that it was established during the trial that the offended party
was actually Mever Films and not Ernesto Rufino, Sr. nor Bank of America as alleged in
the information.” [22] (Emphasis supplied.)
In Ricarze, We reiterated the doctrine espousing an erroneous designation of the person

injured is not material because the subject matter of the offense, a check, was
sufficiently identified with such particularity as to properly identify the particular offense
charged.[23]
Interpreting the previously discussed cases, We conclude that in offenses against

property, if the subject matter of the offense is generic and not identifiable, such as
the money unlawfully taken as in Lahoylahoy, an error in the designation of the
offended party is fatal and would result in the acquittal of the accused. However, if
the subject matter of the offense is specific and identifiable, such as a warrant, as
in Kepner, or a check, such as in Sayson and Ricarze, an error in the designation of the
offended party is immaterial.
In the present case, the subject matter of the offense does not refer to money or any
other generic property. Instead, the information specified the subject of the offense as
“various kinds of jewelry valued in the total amount of P705,685.00.” The charge was
thereafter sufficiently fleshed out and proved by the Trust Receipt Agreement [24] signed
by Senador and presented during trial, which enumerates these “various kinds of
jewelry valued in the total amount of PhP 705,685,” viz:
Qualit Description
y
1 #1878 1 set rositas w/brills 14 kt. 8.5 grams
1 #2126 1 set w/brills 14 kt. 8.3 grams
1 #1416 1 set tri-color rositas w/brills 14 kt. 4.1 grams
1 #319 1 set creolla w/brills 14 kt. 13.8 grams
1 #1301 1 set creolla 2 colors w/brills 20.8 grams
1 #393 1 set tepero & marquise 14kt. 14 grams
1 #2155 1 yg. Bracelet w brills ruby and blue sapphire 14 kt. 28 grams
1 #1875 1 set yg. w/ choker 14 kt. (oval) 14.6 grams
1 #2141 1 yg. w/ pearl & brills 14 kt. 8.8 grams
1 #206 1 set double sampaloc creolla 14 kt. 14.2 grams

1 # 146 1 set princess cut brills 13.6 grams
1 # 2067 1 pc. brill w/ pearl & brill 14 kt. 2.0 grams
1 #2066 1 pc. earrings w/ pearl & brills 14 kt. 4.5 grams
1 #1306 1 set creolla w/ brills 14 kt. 12.6 grams
1 #1851 1 pc. lady’s ring w/ brills 14 kt. 7.8 grams
1 # 1515 1 set w/ brills 14 kt. 11.8 grams
1 #1881 1 pc yg. ring w/princess cut 14 kt. 4.1 grams
Thus, it is the doctrine elucidated in Kepner, Sayson, and Ricarze that is applicable to the

present case, not the ruling in Uba or Lahoylahoy. The error in the designation of the
offended party in the information is immaterial and did not violate Senador’s
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
her.
Lest it be overlooked, Senador offered to pay her obligations through Keppel Check No.
0003603, which was dishonored because it was drawn against an already closed
account. The offer indicates her receipt of the pieces of jewelry thus described and an
implied admission that she misappropriated the jewelries themselves or the proceeds of
the sale. Rule 130, Section 27 states:
In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or
those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may
be received in evidence as implied admission of guilt. (Emphasis supplied.)
Taken together, the CA did not err in affirming petitioner’s conviction for the crime of
estafa.
In light of current jurisprudence, [25] the Court, however, finds the award of exemplary
damages excessive. Art. 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may
be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. Nevertheless,
“exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another, but to
serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious
actions.”[26] On this basis, the award of exemplary damages in the amount of PhP
100,000 is reduced to PhP 30,000.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated May 17, 2011 and Resolution dated March 30, 2012 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 00952, finding Ramoncita Senador guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of ESTAFA under par. 1(b), Art. 315 of the Revised Penal
Code, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the award of exemplary
damages be reduced to PhP 30,000.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. Nos. 166794-96, March 20, 2009 ]
CESAR P. GUY, PETITIONER, VS. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.
[G.R. NOS. 166880-82]
FELIX T. RIPALDA, CONCEPCION C. ESPERAS, EDUARDO VILLAMOR,

AND ERVIN C. MARTINEZ, PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
[G.R. NOS. 167088-90]
NARCISA A. GREFIEL, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN
AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
These are consolidated petitions for review assailing the decision of the Sandiganbayan
dated 2 September 2004 in Criminal Cases No. 26508-10[1] which found petitioners
guilty of violating Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. No. 3019).
The facts, as culled from the records, follow.
Petitioners Felix T. Ripalda, Concepcion C. Esperas, Eduardo R. Villamor, and Ervin
C. Martinez (Ripalda, et al.) are officers and employees of the City Engineer's Office of
the City of Tacloban.[2] Meanwhile, petitioners Cesar P. Guy (Guy)[3] and Narcisa A.
Grefiel (Grefiel)[4] are the Barangay Chairman and Barangay Treasurer, respectively, of
Barangay 36, Sabang District, Tacloban City (Barangay 36). Said petitioners, together
with Edgar Amago, a private individual, owner and proprietor of Amago Construction
were charged in three (3) separate Informations with violation of Section 3 (e) of R. A.
No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in connection
with the construction of three (3) infrastructure projects in Barangay 36, namely: an
elevated path walk, a basketball court and a day care center.
It appears that an audit investigation was conducted by the Commission on Audit (COA)
in response to a letter-complaint of one Alfredo Alberca regarding the three projects. [5]
The audit team found that the Sangguniang Barangay of Barangay 36, acting as the Pre-
Qualification, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) accepted bid proposals from Amago
Construction and General Services (Amago Construction) without issuing the proper
plans and specifications for the basketball court and day care projects and that the work
programs for the day care center and the elevated path walk were prepared long after the
construction had been completed. Likewise, Guy and Grefiel reported the construction
of the projects to the City Engineer's Office only after they had already been completed;
thus, petitioner employees inspected the projects only after they had already been
accomplished. Petitioner employees approved the accomplishment of the projects despite
the absence of material documents, according to the audit team's report. Finally, the audit
team found material defects in the projects and discovered that the contract cost for the
basketball court and elevated path walk was overpriced.[6]
The Ombudsman Prosecutor (Ombudsman-Visayas) filed the corresponding information

for the offenses, essentially charging petitioners with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019.
Petitioner employees claimed that the participation of the City Engineer's Office of
Tacloban City in the barangay infrastructure projects was only to provide technical
assistance to implementing barangays and that it was the barangay officials who
supervised the construction of the projects. They aver that the City Engineer's Office was
not a member of the PBAC which conducted the bidding process for the subject projects,
and that they did not personally know their co-accused Guy and Grefiel, much more did
they have any association with them prior to the approval of the three projects. It was
Guy and Grefiel who requested the City Engineer's Office to inspect the projects, and that
when the City Engineer's Office conducted the inspection, it found the projects already
completed. Lastly, they found the three projects to be in accordance with the plans and
specifications set for them and there were no anomalies or irregularities in their
construction. They add that the residents of Barangay 36 have benefited from the three
projects.[7]
On the other hand, Guy maintained that the three projects were authorized by resolutions
duly-enacted by the Sangguniang Barangay. He claimed that a public bidding was
conducted before the construction of the projects and that Amago Construction was the
winning bidder. He added that Amago Construction constructed the projects and was
accordingly paid for the work done and the materials supplied by it.[8]
Meanwhile, Grefiel argued that her only participation in the projects was her signing of
the blank disbursement vouchers and blank checks covering the projects, and that it was
Guy who instructed her to affix her signature on the said documents. She added that she
did not participate in the supervision of the construction of the projects nor in the
disbursement of the payment of any amount for the projects to Amago Construction.[9]
On 2 September 2004, the Sandiganbayan decided the case against petitioners.
The Sandiganbayan found that Guy and Grefiel awarded the contracts to Amago
Construction even if there were no plans and specifications for the day care center and
basketball court projects prior to their construction; and that while there was a plan and
specification for the elevated path walk, they tolerated Amago Construction's failure to
abide by the said plan.[10] Furthermore, Guy and Grefiel are also responsible for giving
Amago Construction the check payments even before requests for obligation of
appropriations and disbursement vouchers were made.[11] The graft court also found that
the construction of the projects were reported to petitioner employees after the projects
had already been completed, and that these anomalies notwithstanding, petitioner
employees certified that the projects were made in accordance with the plans and that the
same were 100% completed. Further, the Sandiganbayan found that the quality of the
day care center project was substandard, the program of work was not followed, and
worse, the contract amounts for the basketball court and the elevated path walk exceeded
the allowable project costs.[12] Finally, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the acts of the
petitioners, taken collectively, satisfactorily prove the existence of conspiracy.[13]
Disposing of the graft cases, the Sandiganbayan ruled as follows:

Considering that all the elements of R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3(e) were without doubt
established in these cases and the allegation of conspiracy shown, a moral certainty is
achieved to find the accused liable for the acts they committed.
WHEREFORE, accused FELIX RIPALDA, EDUARDO VILLAMOR,

CONCEPCION ESPERAS, ERVIN MARTINEZ, CESAR GUY and NARCISA
GREFIEL are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having violated R.A. No. 3019,
Sec. 3(e) and are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1)
month as minimum and nine (9) years as maximum for each of the three offenses,
perpetual disqualification from public office and to indemnify jointly and severally the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of eleven thousand eight
hundred ninety (P11, 895.00).
Since the Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of accused EDGAR
AMAGO, let the cases against him be, in the meantime, archived, the same to be revived
upon his arrest. Let an alias warrant of arrest be then issued against accused EDGAR
AMAGO.
SO ORDERED.[14]
Petitioners filed their separate motions for reconsideration of the decision. However, on
25 January 2005, the Sandiganbayan denied all their motions.[15]
Before this Court, petitioners separately raise the following issues, thus:
In 166794-96 (Cesar P. Guy v. People of the Philippines):
1. The SANDIGANBAYAN (Fourth Division) has decided the above

numbered three (3) criminal cases in gross disregard and contrary to the
applicable decision of this Honorable Court in the case of LACSON v.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et al., and thus, committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it rendered
the questioned DECISION and RESOLUTION despite the fact that it had
no jurisdiction over the instant three (3) cases due to the failure to aver "the
specific factual allegations in the INFORMATIONS that would indicate the
close intimacy between the discharge of the accused's official duties and the
commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as having
been committed in relation to public office."
2. GRANTING ARGUENDO that the SANDIGANBAYAN (Fourth
Division) had jurisdiction over these three (3) criminal cases--it further
committed serious errors of law and disregarded applicable jurisprudence of
this Honorable Court and thus, acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of, or in excess of jurisdiction when it rendered the
assailed DECISION convicting herein petitioner and his co-accused and
issued the questioned RESOLUTION denying their MOTIONs FOR
RECONSIDERATION despite the fact that the prosecution evidently failed
to prove the guilt of petitioner and his co-accused beyond reasonable doubt
and further miserably failed to prove the allegation of conspiracy beyond
reasonable doubt.[16]
In G.R. No. 167088-90 ( Narcisa M. Grefiel v. The Hon. Sandiganbayan and the People
of the Philippines):
THE RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN PALPABLY DISREGARDED THE
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF THE PETITIONER TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT
AND, INSTEAD, REVERSED THE PRESUMPTION AND CONVICTED THE
PETITIONER OF VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-GRAFT LAW INSPITE OF THE
CONCEDED FACT THAT PETITIONER HAS NOT DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY
PARTICIPATED IN THE PRE-BIDDING, BIDDING, AWARD, PROSECUTION
AND SUPERVISION OF THE PROJECTS OF THE BARANGAY, THE
CONVICTION RESTING NOT ON THE BASIS OF CONCRETE INCULPATORY
EVIDENCE BUT ON THE SWEEPING DECLARATION THAT SHE WAS ONE OF
THE SIGNATORIES OF THE DISBURSEMENT VOUCHERS AND THE CHECKS
RESULTED IN A DUBIOUS FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER CONSPIRED AND
CONFEDERATED WITH HER CO-ACCUED FOR THE SUBSTANDARD
CONSTRUCTION OF THE BARANGAY PROJECTS. [17]
In G.R. No. 166880-82 (Felix T. Ripalda, Concepcion C. Esperas, Eduardo Villamor, and
Ervin C. Martinez v. People of the Philippines):
GROUNDS FOR THE PETITION
THE COURT A QUO DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE
II
THE ASSAILED DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH

LAW AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT;
III
THE CONCLUSION OF THE COURT A QUO FRINDING THE PETITIONERS

GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED IS GROUNDED ENTIRELY ON ESTIMATES,
SPECULATIONS, SURMISES AND/OR CONJECTURES[18]
In essence, petitioners maintain that the Sandiganbayan had not acquired jurisdiction over
them because the three informations failed to state the specific actual allegations that
would indicate the connection between the discharge of their official duties and the
commission of the offenses charged; or alternatively, assuming that the Sandiganbayan
had actually acquired jurisdiction, the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, as well as the existence of conspiracy.
The People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB),
argues that the averments in the Informations are "complete and wanting of the slightest
vagueness as to denote another interpretation or mislead anyone."[19] Section 6, Rule 110
of the Revised Rules of Court merely require the information to describe the offense with
sufficient particularity as to apprise the accused of what they are being charged with and
to enable the court to pronounce judgment, such that evidentiary matters need not be
alleged in the information. The OMB adds that if it were true that the allegations are
vague or indefinite, petitioners should have filed a motion for a bill of particulars as
provided under Section 9, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court to question the alleged
insufficiency of the informations, or a motion to quash on the ground that the facts
averred do not constitute an offense.
The OMB asserts that the prosecution had satisfactorily proven the existence of the
elements of the offense under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as well as the existence of
conspiracy among the accused.[20]
In addition, the OMB alleges that Grefiel's claim that she was merely constrained to sign
the disbursement vouchers and checks relative to the subject projects is pure sophistry,
since as barangay treasurer she is mandated to disburse funds in accordance with the
Local Government Code. Even Grefiel's claim of miniscule educational attainment
should not excuse her from liability.[21] The OMB posits that petitioners' allegation of
error is "actually designed to lure the Court into re-opening the case on the basis of the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses which, however, on close scrutiny appear to be
credible and substantiated."[22]
The petitions have to be denied.
Petitioners were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, which states:
"SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.--In addition to acts or omissions of public
xxx
or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions."
To hold a person liable under this section, the concurrence of the following elements
must be established, viz:
(1) that the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the
former;
(2) that said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or
her official duties or in relation to his or her public positions;
(3) that he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private
party; and
(4) that the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence."[23]
Petitioners, citing the case of Lacson v. The Executive Secretary,[24] assert that the
informations do not contain the specific factual allegations showing the close intimacy
between the discharge of petitioners' official duties and the commission of the offense
charged to qualify the offense as one committed in relation to public office.
In Lacson, the Court ruled that before the Sandiganbayan may acquire jurisdiction over
the offense charged, the intimate relation between the offense charged and the discharge
of official duties "must be alleged in the information."[25]
Indeed, jurisprudence is replete with cases describing when an offense is deemed

committed "in relation to office." In Montilla and Tobia v. Hilario and Crisologo,[26]
this Court held that for an offense to be committed in relation to the office, the relation
between the crime and the office must be direct and not accidental, such that the offense
cannot exist without the office. In Adaza v. Sandiganbayan,[27] we held that:
It does not thus suffice to merely allege in the information that the crime charged was
committed by the offender in relation to his office or that he took advantage of his
position as these are conclusions of law. The specific factual allegations in the
information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the
offender's official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify
the crime as having been committed in relation to public office, are controlling.[28]
The Court finds that the Informations sufficiently show the close intimacy between
petitioners' discharge of official duties and the commission of the offense charged. We
reproduce the accusatory portions of the Informations in the subject cases, thus:
That in or about the year 1996, and for sometime subsequent thereto, at the City of
Tacloban, Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, above-named accused: FELIX T. RIPALDA, EDUARDO R. VILLAMOR,
CONCEPCION C. ESPERAS and ERVIN C. MARTINEZ, public officers, being the
City Engineer, Project Engineer, Project Inspector and ICD Representative, City
Administrator's Office, respectively, of the City Government of Tacloban, CESAR P.
GUY and NARCISA A. GREFIEL, also public officers, being Barangay Captain and
Barangay Treasurer, respectively, of Barangay 36, Sabang District, Tacloban City, in
such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving, confederating
together and mutually helping with each other and with EDGAR AMAGO, a private
individual, Contractor and Proprietor of Amago Construction and General Services, Inc.,
Tacloban City, with deliberate intent, with manifest partiality and evident bad faith, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously construct and/or cause the
construction of an elevated path walk of Barangay 36, Sabang District, Tacloban City,
with the contract cost of SIXTY-TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P62,000.00), Philippine
Currency without following the approved program of work and drawing plan, in
violation of the DILG Memorandum Circular No. 94-185, dated October 20, 1994,
thereby resulting to (sic) an increase in the project cost by 17.5% or NINE THOUSAND
TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY-FOUR PESOS AND EIGHTY-FOUR CENTAVOS
(P9,274.84), Philippine Currency, thus accused in the course of the performance of their
official functions had given unwarranted benefits to themselves and to accused Edgar
Amago, to the damage and prejudice of the government.
That in or about the year 1996, and for sometime subsequent thereto, the City of
GUY and NARCISA A. GREFIEL, also public officers, being the Barangay Captain and
individual,
Contractor and Proprietor of Amago Construction and General Services, Inc., Tacloban
City, with deliberate intent, with manifest partiality and evident bad faith, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously construct and/or cause the construction of the
Basketball Court of Barangay 36, Sabang District, Tacloban City, without adhering to the
approved program of work and non-preparation of the plans and specifications in
violation of DILG Memorandum Circular No. 94-185, dated October 20, 1994, thus
resulting to (sic) the increase in the contract amount to SIXTY-EIGHT THOUSAND
PESOS (P68,000.00), Philippine Currency, thus accused in the course of the performance
of their official functions had given unwarranted benefits to themselves and to accused
Edgar Amago, to the damage and prejudice of the government.
That in or about the year 1996, and for sometime subsequent thereto, the City of
GUY and NARCISA A. GREFIEL, also public officers, being the Barangay Captain and
individual, Contractor and Proprietor of Amago Construction and General Services, Inc.,
Tacloban City, with deliberate intent, with manifest partiality and evident bad faith, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously construct and/or cause the
construction of the Day Care Center of Barangay 36, Sabang District, Tacloban City,
without plans and specifications, and not in accordance with the approved program of
work, as the said center was constructed and completed before the completion of the
program of work, thereby resulting to (sic) the increase and overpricing of construction
cost, which was originally fixed at FORTY-TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P42,000.00),
Philippine Currency, to NINETY-THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P93,000.00), Philippine
Currency, in violation of the DILG Memorandum Circular No. 94-185, dated October 20,
1994, thus accused in the course of the performance of their official functions had given
unwarranted benefits to themselves and to accused Edgar Amago, to the damage and
prejudice of the government.
The Lacson case is not applicable because in that case there was a failure to show that
the charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of the official
functions of the accused. Specifically, the Court observed:
While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal accused
committed the crime of murder "in relation to their public office,["] there is, however, no
specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused
was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers.
Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and
investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody. [32]
In the case at bar, all the elements of violation of Sec. 3(e) R.A. No. 3019 are indicated
in the Informations. The Informations allege that while in the performance of their
respective functions either as city or barangay officials, petitioners caused the
construction of the subject structures, either without following the approved program of
work and drawing plan, or worse, even without any plans and specifications; and
furthermore, had given unwarranted benefits to themselves and to Edgar Amago, to the
damage and prejudice of the government.
Contrary also to petitioners' assertions, the specific acts of the accused do not have to be
described in detail in the information, as it is enough that the offense be described with
sufficient particularity to make sure the accused fully understand what he is being
charged with. The particularity must be such that a person of ordinary intelligence
immediately knows what the charge is.[33] Moreover, reasonable certainty in the
statement of the crime suffices.[34] It is often difficult to say what is a matter of
evidence, as distinguished from facts necessary to be stated in order to render the
information sufficiently certain to identify the offense. As a general rule, matters of
evidence, as distinguished from facts essential to the description of the offense, need not
be averred.[35] The particular acts of the accused which pertain to "matters of evidence,"
such as how accused city officials prepared the inspection reports despite the absence of a
project plan or how the contractor was able to use substandard materials, do not have to
be indicated in the information.
Petitioners also question the propriety of the guilty verdict handed down by the
Sandiganbayan, alleging that the prosecution failed to prove petitioners' guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. In criminal cases, an appeal throws the whole case wide open for
review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors or even reverse the trial court's
decision on grounds other than those that the parties raise as errors. [36] We have
examined the records of the case and find no cogent reason to disturb the factual findings
of the Sandiganbayan. We find that the evidence on record amply supports the findings
and conclusions of the respondent court. The elements of the offense charged have been
successfully proven by the prosecution.
First, petitioners could not have committed the offense charged were it not for their
official duties or functions as public officials. Their malfeasance or misfeasance in
relation to their duties and functions underlies their violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019. Second, the undue injury caused to the government is evident from the clear
deviation from the material specifications indicated in the project plans such as in the
case of the basketball court and elevated path walk, and in the use of substandard
materials in the case of the day care center. Otherwise stated, "the People did not get the
full worth of their money in terms of the benefits they will derive from the (above) sub-
standard infrastructure projects."[37] Third, unwarranted benefits were accorded to Amago
Construction when the three projects were not inspected and supervised during
construction, allowing it to cut costs and save money by using substandard materials and
deviating from the specific materials and measurements prescribed in the work
programs. Moreover, Amago Construction was able to receive payments for the projects
even before the processing of the disbursement vouchers, thereby preventing the
government from refusing or deferring payment on account of discovered defects of the
said projects. Fourth, it is clear that from the very inception of the construction of the
subject projects up to their completion, petitioners had exhibited manifest partiality for
Amago Construction, and acted with evident bad faith against the government and the
public which they had sworn to serve.
Neither are we inclined to vacate the Sandiganbayan's finding of conspiracy among

petitioners.
Jurisprudence teaches us that "proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence, as
the agreement itself may be inferred from the conduct of the parties disclosing a common
understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense. It is not
necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit
agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal
objective is to be carried out."[38] Therefore, if it is proved that two or more persons
aimed their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a
part so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and
cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of
sentiment, then a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to
concert means is proved.[39] Conspiracy was thus properly appreciated by the
Sandiganbayan because even though there was no direct proof that petitioners agreed to
cause injury to the government and give unwarranted benefits to Amago Construction,
their individual acts when taken together as a whole showed that they were acting in
concert and cooperating to achieve the same unlawful objective. The barangay officials'
award of the contract to Amago Construction without the benefit of specific plans and
specifications, the preparation of work programs only after the constructions had been
completed, the issuance and encashment of checks in favor of Amago Construction even
before any request to obligate the appropriation or to issue a disbursement voucher was
made, and the subsequent inspection and issuance of certificates of completion by
petitioner employees despite the absence of material documents were all geared towards
one purpose--to cause undue injury to the government and unduly favor Amago
Construction.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

The Decision of the Sandiganbayan dated 2 September 2004 in Criminal Case Nos.
26508-10 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 164733, September 21, 2007 ]
MICHAEL JOHN Z. MALTO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Whereas, mankind owes to the child the best it has to give. (Final preambular clause of
the Declaration of the Rights of the Child)
This is a petition for review[1] of the decision[2] dated July 30, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 25925 affirming with modification the decision [3] of
Branch 109 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City in Criminal Case No. 00-0691
which found petitioner Michael John Z. Malto guilty for violation of paragraph 3, Section
5(a), Article III of RA 7610,[4] as amended.
Petitioner was originally charged in an information which read:

The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses MICHAEL JOHN Z. MALTO of
VIOLATION OF SECTION 5(b), ARTICLE III, REPUBLIC ACT 7610, AS
AMENDED, committed as follows:
That on or about and sometime during the month of November 1997 up to 1998, in Pasay
City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, Michael John. Z. Malto, a professor, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously induce and/or seduce his student at Assumption College,
complainant, AAA, a minor of 17 years old, to indulge in sexual intercourse for several
times with him as in fact said accused had carnal knowledge.
Contrary to law.[5]
This was subsequently amended as follows:
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses MICHAEL JOHN Z. MALTO of
VIOLATION OF SECTION 5(a), ARTICLE III, REPUBLIC ACT 7610, AS
AMENDED, committed as follows:
That on or about and sometime during the month of November 1997 up to 1998, in Pasay
City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, Michael John. Z. Malto, a professor, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take advantage and exert influence, relationship and moral
ascendancy and induce and/or seduce his student at Assumption College, complainant,
AAA, a minor of 17 years old, to indulge in sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct for
several times with him as in fact said accused has carnal knowledge.
Contrary to law.[6]
Petitioner did not make a plea when arraigned; hence, the trial court entered for him a
plea of "not guilty." After the mandatory pre-trial, trial on the merits proceeded.
The prosecution established the following:
At the time of the incident, private complainant AAA was 17 years old. [7] She was a
college student at the Assumption College in San Lorenzo Village, Makati City.
Petitioner, then 28, was her professor in her Philosophy II class in the first semester of the
school year 1997 to 1998.
On July 18, 1997, AAA was having lunch with her friends when petitioner joined their
group. He told them to address him simply as "Mike." He handed them his organizer and
asked them to list down their names and contact numbers.
On October 3, 1997, while AAA and her friends were discussing the movie Kama Sutra,
petitioner butted in and bragged that it was nothing compared to his collection of xxx-
rated films. To the shock of AAA's group, he lectured on and demonstrated sexual acts he
had already experienced. He then invited the group to view his collection.
On October 10, 1997, petitioner reiterated his invitation to AAA and her friends to watch
his collection of pornographic films. Afraid of offending petitioner, AAA and two of her
friends went with him. They rode in his car and he brought them to the Anito Lodge on
Harrison St. in Pasay City. They checked in at a "calesa room." Petitioner was
disappointed when he found out there was neither a video cassette player (on which he
could play his video tapes) nor an x-rated show on the closed-circuit television. He
suggested that they just cuddle up together. AAA and her friends ignored him but he
pulled each of them towards him to lie with him in bed. They resisted until he relented.
AAA and her friends regretted having accepted petitioner's invitation. For fear of
embarrassment in case their classmates got wind of what happened, they agreed to keep
things a secret. Meanwhile, petitioner apologized for his actuations.
Thereafter, petitioner started to show AAA amorous attention. He called her on the phone
and paged[8] her romantic messages at least thrice a day. When semestral break came, his
calls and messages became more frequent. Their conversation always started innocently
but he had a way of veering the subject to sex. Young, naive and coming from a broken
family, AAA was soon overwhelmed by petitioner's persistence and slowly got attracted
to him. He was the first person to court her. Soon, they had a "mutual understanding" and
became sweethearts.
When AAA secured her class card in Philosophy II at the start of the second semester,
petitioner told her that he gave her a final grade of "3." She protested, stating that her
mid-term grade was "1.2." He gave her a grade of "1.5" when she promised not to
disclose his intimate messages to her to anyone. He also cautioned her not to tell anyone
about their affair as it could jeopardize his job.
On November 19, 1997, at around 11:00 a.m., AAA agreed to have lunch with petitioner
outside the premises of the college. Since she was not feeling well at that time, he asked
her to lie down in the backseat of his car. She was surprised when he brought her to
Queensland Lodge[9] on Harrison St. in Pasay City. Once inside the motel room, he kissed
her at the back and neck, touched her breasts and placed his hand inside her blouse. She
resisted his advances but he was too strong for her. He stopped only when she got angry
at him.
On November 26, 1997, petitioner asked AAA to come with him so that they could talk
in private. He again brought her to Queensland Lodge. As soon as they were inside the
room, he took off his shirt, lay down in bed and told her, "halika na, dito na tayo mag-
usap." She refused but he dragged her towards the bed, kissed her lips, neck and breasts
and unsnapped her brassiere. She struggled to stop him but he overpowered her. He went
on top of her, lowered her pants and touched her private part. He tried to penetrate her but
she pushed him away forcefully and she sat up in bed. He hugged her tightly saying,
"Sige na, AAA, pumayag ka na, I won't hurt you." She refused and said, "Mike, ayoko."
He angrily stood up saying, "Fine, hindi na tayo mag-uusap. Don't come to the faculty
room anymore. You know I need this and if you will not give in or give it to me, let us
end this." She replied, "Mike, hindi pa ako ready and it was you who said it will be after
my debut" on December 3, 1997. He insisted that there was no difference between having
sex then and after her debut. He told her, "kung hindi ko makukuha ngayon, tapusin na
natin ngayon." Pressured and afraid of his threat to end their relationship, she hesitantly
replied "Fine." On hearing this, he quickly undressed while commenting "ibibigay mo rin
pala, pinahirapan mo pa ako" and laughed. They had sexual intercourse.
In July 1999, AAA ended her relationship with petitioner. She learned that he was either
intimately involved with or was sexually harassing his students in Assumption College
and in other colleges where he taught. In particular, he was dismissed from the De La
Salle University-Aguinaldo for having sexual relations with a student and sexually
harassing three other students. His employment was also terminated by Assumption
College for sexually harassing two of his students. It was then that AAA realized that she
was actually abused by petitioner. Depressed and distressed, she confided all that
happened between her and petitioner to her mother, BBB.
On learning what her daughter underwent in the hands of petitioner, BBB filed an
administrative complaint in Assumption College against him. She also lodged a
complaint in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City which led to the filing of
Criminal Case No. 00-0691.
In his defense, petitioner proffered denial and alibi. He claimed that the alleged incidents
on October 3, 1997 and October 10, 1997 did not happen. He spent October 3, 1997 with
his colleagues Joseph Hipolito and AJ Lagaso while he was busy checking papers and
computing grades on October 10, 1997. The last time he saw AAA during the first
semester was when she submitted her final paper on October 18, 1997.
On November 19, 1997, between 10:30 a.m. and 1:00 p.m., he sorted out conflicts of
class schedules for the second semester at the Assumption College. On November 26,
1997, he was at St. Scholastica's College (where he was also teaching) preparing a faculty
concert slated on December 12, 1997. At lunch time, he attended the birthday treat of a
colleague, Evelyn Bancoro.
On November 29, 1997, he attended AAA's 18th birthday party. That was the last time he
saw her.
According to petitioner, AAA became his sweetheart when she was already 19 years old
and after he was dismissed from Assumption College. On December 27 and 28, 1998,
they spent time together, shared their worries, problems and dreams and kissed each
other. On January 3, 1999, he brought her to Queensland Lodge where they had sexual
intercourse for the first time. It was repeated for at least 20 times from January 1999 until
they broke up in July 1999, some of which were done at either his or her house when no
one was around.
The trial court found the evidence for the prosecution sufficient to sustain petitioner's
conviction. On March 7, 2001, it rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty. [10] The
dispositive portion read:
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Michael John Malto y Zarsadias
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Article III, Section 5(a)[,] paragraph 3 of
RA 7610[,] as amended and hereby sentences him to reclusion temporal in its medium
period or an imprisonment of seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years and to pay civil indemnity in the amount of Php 75,000.00 and moral
and exemplary damages of Php 50,000.00 to minor complainant with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.[11]
Petitioner questioned the trial court's decision in the CA. In a decision dated July 30,
2004,[12] the appellate court affirmed his conviction even if it found that his acts were not
covered by paragraph (a) but by paragraph (b) of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610. It
further observed that the trial court failed to fix the minimum term of indeterminate
sentence imposed on him. It also ruled that the trial court erred in awarding P75,000 civil
indemnity in favor of AAA as it was proper only in a conviction for rape committed
under the circumstances under which the death penalty was authorized by law. [13] Hence,
the CA modified the decision of the trial court as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of conviction is AFFIRMED, with
the MODIFICATION that (1) appellant MICHAEL JOHN MALTO y ZARSADIAS is
hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of Eight (8) Years and One (1) Day
of prision mayor as minimum, to Seventeen (17) Years, Four (4) Months and One (1)
Day of reclusion temporal as maximum; and (2) the sum of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity is DELETED.[14]
Petitioner contends that the CA erred in sustaining his conviction although it found that
he did not rape AAA. For him, he should have been acquitted since there was no rape. He
also claims that he and AAA were sweethearts and their sexual intercourse was
consensual.
Petitioner is wrong.
The Offense Stated in the Information Was

Wrongly Designated
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him.[15] Pursuant thereto, the complaint or information against
him should be sufficient in form and substance. A complaint or information is sufficient
if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts
the approximate date of the commission of the offense and the place where the offense
was committed.[16]
The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the
statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense and specify its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances.[17] If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be
made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.[18] The acts or omissions
constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated
in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute
but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense
is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court
to pronounce judgment.[19]
The designation of the offense in the information against petitioner was changed from
"violation of Section 5(b), Article III" of RA 7610 to "violation of Section 5(a), Article
III" thereof. Paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provide:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or
female, who, for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or

(a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution which include,
but are not limited to, the following:
1. Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;
2. Inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral

advertisements or other similar means;
3. Taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a prostitute;
4. Threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute; or
5. Giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with

intent to engage such child in prostitution.
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a
child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That when
the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under
Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, that
the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall
be reclusion temporal in its medium period; and
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

The elements of paragraph (a) are:
1. the accused engages in, promotes, facilitates or induces child prostitution;
2. the act is done through, but not limited to, the following means:
a. acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;

b. inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or
oral advertisements or other similar means;
c. taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as a

prostitute;
d. threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute

or
e. giving monetary consideration, goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child

with intent to engage such child in prostitution;
3. the child is exploited or intended to be exploited in prostitution and
4. the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

On the other hand, the elements of paragraph (b) are:
1. the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
2. the act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other

sexual abuse and
3. the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
Paragraph (a) essentially punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child prostitution.
It contemplates sexual abuse of a child exploited in prostitution. In other words, under
paragraph (a), the child is abused primarily for profit.
On the other hand, paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not
only with a child exploited in prostitution but also with a child subjected to other sexual
abuse. It covers not only a situation where a child is abused for profit but also one in
which a child, through coercion, intimidation or influence, engages in sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct.[20]
The information against petitioner did not allege anything pertaining to or connected with
child prostitution. It did not aver that AAA was abused for profit. What it charged was
that petitioner had carnal knowledge or committed sexual intercourse and lascivious
conduct with AAA; AAA was induced and/or seduced by petitioner who was her
professor to indulge in sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct and AAA was a 17-year
old minor. These allegations support a charge for violation of paragraph (b), not
paragraph (a), of Section 5, Article III, RA 7610.
The Real Nature of the Offense is

Determined by Facts Alleged in the
Information, Not By the Designation
The designation in the information of the specific statute violated is imperative to avoid
surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense
accordingly. However, the failure to designate the offense by statute,[21] or to mention the
specific provision penalizing the act,[22] or an erroneous specification of the law
violated[23] does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged clearly recite the facts
constituting the crime charged.[24] What controls is not the title of the information or the
designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the information.[25] In other
words, it is the recital of facts of the commission of the offense, not the nomenclature of
the offense, that determines the crime being charged in the information.[26]
The facts stated in the amended information against petitioner correctly made out a
charge for violation of Section 5(b), Article III, RA 7610. Thus, even if the trial and
appellate courts followed the wrong designation of the offense, petitioner could be
convicted of the offense on the basis of the facts recited in the information and duly
proven during trial.
Petitioner violated Section 5(b), Article III

of RA 7610, as amended
The first element of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 pertains to the act or acts
committed by the accused. The second element refers to the state or condition of the
offended party. The third element corresponds to the minority or age of the offended
party.
The first element was present in this case. Petitioner committed lascivious conduct
against and had sexual intercourse with AAA in the following instances: (1) on
November 19, 1997, when he kissed her at the back and neck, touched her breasts and
placed his hand inside her blouse to gratify his lust; (2) on November 26, 1997, when,
with lewd designs, he dragged her towards the bed of the motel room and forcibly kissed
her on the lips, neck and breasts and (3) when he exerted moral influence on her and
pressured her until she surrendered herself to him on November 26, 1997. His acts were
covered by the definitions of sexual abuse and lascivious conduct under Section 2(g) and
(h) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse
Cases promulgated to implement the provisions of RA 7610, particularly on child abuse:
(g) "Sexual abuse" includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement,
enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage
in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or
incest with children;
(h) "Lascivious conduct" means the intentional touching, either directly or through

clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the
introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of
the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse
or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious
exhibition of the genitals or public area of a person. (emphasis supplied)
The second element was likewise present here. The following pronouncement in People
v. Larin[27] is significant:
A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, when
the child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or
any other consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate
or group. (emphasis supplied)
On November 19, 1997, due to the influence of petitioner, AAA indulged in lascivious
acts with or allowed him to commit lascivious acts on her. This was repeated on
November 26, 1997 on which date AAA also indulged in sexual intercourse with
petitioner as a result of the latter's influence and moral ascendancy. Thus, she was
deemed to be a "child subjected to other sexual abuse" as the concept is defined in the
opening paragraph of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 and in Larin.
The third element of the offense was also satisfied. Section 3 (a), Article I of RA 7610
provides:
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. -
(a) "Children" refers [to] persons below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but
are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or
condition; (emphasis supplied)
On November 19, 2007 and November 26, 2007, AAA was a child as she was below 18
years of age. She was therefore within the protective mantle of the law.
Since all three elements of the crime were present, the conviction of petitioner was
proper.
Violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA
7610 and Rape are Separate and Distinct
Crimes
Petitioner was charged and convicted for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA
7610, not rape. The offense for which he was convicted is punished by a special law
while rape is a felony under the Revised Penal Code.[28] They have different elements.
[29]
The two are separate and distinct crimes. Thus, petitioner can be held liable for
violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 despite a finding that he did not commit
rape.
Consent of the Child is Immaterial in

Criminal Cases Involving Violation of
Section 5, Article III of RA 7610
Petitioner claims that AAA welcomed his kisses and touches and consented to have
sexual intercourse with him. They engaged in these acts out of mutual love and affection.
But may the "sweetheart theory" be invoked in cases of child prostitution and other
sexual abuse prosecuted under Section 5, Article III of RA 7610? No.
The sweetheart theory applies in acts of lasciviousness and rape, felonies committed
against or without the consent of the victim. It operates on the theory that the sexual act
was consensual. It requires proof that the accused and the victim were lovers and that she
consented to the sexual relations.[30]
For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under RA
7610, the sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse cannot validly give consent to sexual intercourse with
another person.
The language of the law is clear: it seeks to punish

[t]hose who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.
Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of Section 5,
Article III of RA 7610. The mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing
lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual
abuse constitutes the offense. It is a malum prohibitum, an evil that is proscribed.
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws.[31] This is on the rationale
that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or
knowing the nature or import of her actions. The State, as parens patriae, is under the
obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are as yet
unable to take care of themselves fully.[32] Those of tender years deserve its protection.[33]
The harm which results from a child's bad decision in a sexual encounter may be
infinitely more damaging to her than a bad business deal. Thus, the law should protect
her from the harmful consequences[34] of her attempts at adult sexual behavior.[35] For this
reason, a child should not be deemed to have validly consented to adult sexual activity
and to surrender herself in the act of ultimate physical intimacy under a law which seeks
to afford her special protection against abuse, exploitation and discrimination.
(Otherwise, sexual predators like petitioner will be justified, or even unwittingly tempted
by the law, to view her as fair game and vulnerable prey.) In other words, a child is
presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual
intercourse.[36]
This must be so if we are to be true to the constitutionally enshrined State policy to

promote the physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well-being of the youth.
[37]
This is consistent with the declared policy of the State
[T]o provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation and discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development; provide sanctions for their commission and carry out a program for
prevention and deterrence of and crisis intervention in situations of child abuse,
exploitation, and discrimination.[38] (emphasis supplied)
as well as to
intervene on behalf of the child when the parents, guardian, teacher or person having
care or custody of the child fails or is unable to protect the child against abuse,
exploitation, and discrimination or when such acts against the child are committed by
the said parent, guardian, teacher or person having care and custody of the same.
[39]
(emphasis supplied)
This is also in harmony with the foremost consideration of the child's best interests in all
actions concerning him or her.
The best interest of children shall be the paramount consideration in all actions
concerning them, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions,
courts of law, administrative authorities, and legislative bodies, consistent with the
principles of First Call for Children as enunciated in the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child. Every effort shall be exerted to promote the welfare of
children and enhance their opportunities for a useful and happy life.[40] (emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner May Enjoy the Benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law
The penalty prescribed for violation of the provisions of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610
is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. In the absence of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period, the medium of the penalty prescribed by the law.
[41]
Notwithstanding that RA 7610 is a special law, petitioner may enjoy the benefits of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law.[42] Since the penalty provided in RA 7610 is taken from
the range of penalties in the Revised Penal Code, it is covered by the first clause of
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.[43] Thus, he is entitled to a maximum term
which should be within the range of the proper imposable penalty of reclusion
temporal in its maximum period (ranging from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years)
and a minimum term to be taken within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the law: prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its
minimum period (ranging from 8 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months).
The Award of Damages Should Be

Modified
The trial court awarded AAA P75,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000 as moral and
exemplary damages. The CA deleted the award for civil indemnity. It correctly reasoned
that the award was proper only in a conviction for rape committed under the
circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by law. Consistent, however,
with the objective of RA 7610 to afford children special protection against abuse,
exploitation and discrimination and with the principle that every person who contrary to
law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the
same,[44] civil indemnity to the child is proper in a case involving violation of Section
5(b), Article III of RA 7610. Every person criminally liable is civilly liable.[45] The rule is
that, in crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are
the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. [46] Thus,
P50,000 civil indemnity ex delicto shall be awarded in cases of violation of Section 5(b),
Article III of RA 7610.[47]
Moreover, the CA erred in affirming the grant of P50,000 as "moral and exemplary
damages." The rule is that, in every case, trial courts must specify the award of each item
of damages and make a finding thereon in the body of the decision.[48] Thus, moral
damages and exemplary damages should be separate items of award.
AAA testified that she was "emotionally devastated" and "lost touch of her inner self" as
a result of what petitioner did to her. Because of the mental anxiety and wounded feelings
caused by petitioner to her, she had several sessions with the dean for student
affairs[49] and the guidance counselor of Assumption College as well as with a
psychiatrist. This was corroborated by her mother and the dean of student affairs of
Assumption College. Thus, she is entitled to moral damages of P50,000. However, in the
absence of an aggravating circumstance, the grant of exemplary damages is unwarranted.
[50]
Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED. Petitioner Michael John Z. Malto is hereby

found guilty of violating Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, as amended, for which he
is sentenced to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal as minimum to 20 years
of reclusion temporal as maximum. He is further ordered to pay AAA P50,000 as civil
indemnity and P50,000 for moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 169425, March 04, 2008 ]
ROBERTO LICYAYO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

[1]
Court, petitioner Roberto Licyayo prays for the reversal of the Decision dated 6 May
2005[2] and Resolution dated 12 August 2005 [3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
27359, affirming with modification the Decision[4] dated 20 February 2003 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lagawe, Ifugao, Branch 14, in Criminal Cases No. 819 and
820, convicting petitioner of Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code in
Criminal Case No. 819 while dismissing Criminal Case No. 820 for Direct Assault as
regards him.[5]
The factual antecedents are as follows:
On 1 February 1993, an Information[6] in Criminal Case No. 8a was filed before the RTC
charging petitioner, his brother Aron Licyayo (Aron), Paul Baguilat (Paul) and Oliver
Buyayo (Oliver) with Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code quoted as
follows:
The undersigned Provincial Prosecutor, hereby accuses ROBERTO LICYAYO,
OLIVER BUYAYO, ARON LICYAYO, and PAUL BAGUILAT, of the crime of HOMICIDE and
committed as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of February, 1992, in the Municipality of Kiangan,
Ifugao, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another and with intent to kill, DID
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault one Rufino Guay,
stabbing him with the use of a double bladed weapon, thereby inflicting upon the victim
several stab wounds which directly caused his death.
On 11 May 1993, an Amended Information[7] in Criminal Case No. 820 was filed
before the RTC accusing petitioner of Direct Assault under Article 148 of the Revised
Penal Code, viz:
That on or about the 16th of February 1992, in the Municipality of Kiangan, Ifugao,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, DID then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and assault PO3 Miguel Buyayo
with the use of a bladed weapon while the victim was in the performance of his official
duties as a policeman which fact was known to the accused.
Subsequently, these cases were consolidated for joint trial. In Criminal Case No.
819, petitioner, Aron and Paul pleaded “Not Guilty” to the charge of homicide, [8] while
the other accused, Oliver, was not arraigned. [9] With respect to Criminal Case No. 820,
petitioner was not arraigned.[10] Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented as witnesses three members of the Philippine National Police
(PNP), Kiangan, Ifugao, namely, Joseph Danglay (Officer Danglay), Miguel Buyayo
(Officer Buyayo) and Alfonso Baguilat (Officer Baguilat); and three other persons
namely, Jeffrey Malingan (Jeffrey), Jimmy Guay (Jimmy), and Jose Guay (Jose). Their
testimonies, woven together, bear the following:
On 16 February 1992, victim Rufino Guay (Rufino), along with his friends, Jeffrey and a
certain Joel Dumangeng (Joel) attended a wedding at Mabbalat, Kiangan, Ifugao.
Petitioner, together with his friends, Paul and Oliver, were also present at the same
wedding. After the wedding reception, Rufino, Jeffrey and Joel went to Natama’s Store
at the Kiangan Public Market and ordered two bottles of gin. While the three were
drinking gin at the said store, petitioner, Paul and Oliver arrived and likewise ordered
bottles of gin. Later, petitioner, Paul and Oliver left the store. Subsequently, Rufino,
Jeffrey and Joel likewise adjourned their drinking session and left the store. [11]
Rufino, Jeffrey and Joel dropped by at Famorca’s Store. Petitioner and his brother, Aron,
as well as Paul and Oliver, were also present therein. While Jeffrey was talking to the
store’s owner, Larry Famorca (Larry), a brawl suddenly occurred between Rufino and
Aron. As a consequence thereof, Rufino fell to the ground. Aron thereafter placed
himself on top of Rufino and punched the latter several times. Jeffrey approached the
two and tried to pacify them. Paul entered the scene and punched Jeffrey on the head.
Thereupon, a scuffle followed.[12]
Officers Danglay, Buyayo and Baguilat were on their way home from the Kiangan Police
Station when they heard some individuals calling for police assistance regarding the
commotion. The three officers rushed to the scene. Upon arriving thereat, they saw
petitioner holding a six-inch double-bladed knife and walking towards Rufino and Aron
who were then wrestling with each other. Officer Buyayo, then wearing only civilian
clothes and unarmed, approached petitioner and held the latter’s back collar to prevent
him from joining the fray. Petitioner turned around, faced Officer Buyayo, and tried to
stab the latter but he missed. Officer Buyayo retreated. The officers introduced
themselves to petitioner as policemen and pleaded with him to put down the knife.
Petitioner ignored the officers’ pleas.[13]
Afterwards, petitioner approached Rufino, who was then wrestling with Paul, and
stabbed Rufino in different parts of the body. [14] Officer Baguilat fired a warning shot
while Officer Danglay immediately pounced on petitioner and disarmed the latter.
[15]
Petitioner was brought to the Kiangan Police Station while Rufino was taken to a
nearby hospital where he later died due to stab wounds. [16]
The prosecution also presented documentary and object evidence to bolster the
testimonies of its witnesses, to wit: (1) sworn statements of Officer Danglay, Officer
Buyayo, Officer Baguilat, Jeffrey, Jimmy, Jose and Arsenio; [17] (2) death certificate of
Rufino;[18] (3) certification from the Ifugao General Hospital stating that Rufino sustained
several stab wounds which directly caused his death; [19] and (4) the knife used by the
petitioner in stabbing Rufino.[20]
For its part, the defense proffered the testimonies of petitioner and his corroborating
witnesses -- Daniel Cayong (Daniel), Aron, and Paul -- to refute the foregoing
accusations. Their version of the incident is as follows:
On the morning of 16 February 1992, petitioner attended a wedding at Mabbalat,
Kiangan, Ifugao. After the wedding, petitioner met Paul and they proceeded to the
Kiangan Public Market where they chanced on Oliver, a certain Kimayong and Fernando
who invited them for a drink in one of the stores near the market. Later, Rufino, Jeffrey
and Joel entered the store where petitioner’s group was drinking and occupied a
separate table. Jeffrey and Joel approached petitioner’s group and sat at their table.
Jeffrey shook and pressed hard the hand of Oliver. The storeowner signalled petitioner’s
group to pay its bills and leave. Petitioner brought out his wallet to pay their bills but
Jeffrey, who was still holding and pressing Oliver’s hand, told him to buy another bottle.
Petitioner pleaded with Jeffrey to let go of Oliver’s hand because the latter is his friend.
Jeffrey, however, warned him not to interfere if he did not want to get involved.
Petitioner glanced at the store’s door and saw Rufino standing therein. Thereafter,
Jimmy passed by in front of the store and made a signal to Rufino, Jeffrey and Joel.
Petitioner, Paul and Oliver paid their bills, left the store and proceeded to Sakai Store. [21]
Subsequently, Jeffrey and a companion went to Famorca’s Store and saw Aron and
Daniel seated in one of the benches outside the store. Jeffrey then told his companion
“Can you tackle his brother?” Sensing that he was the brother being referred to by
Jeffrey and a trouble might occur, Aron went inside the store but Jeffrey followed him.
Thus, Aron went outside the store and sat on one of the benches nearby. Afterwards,
Rufino arrived at the store and approached Aron. Rufino held the collar of Aron’s shirt
and punched the latter on the left cheek. Jeffrey also approached Aron and grabbed the
latter’s arm. Aron fought back but he fell to the ground. [22]
Daniel immediately proceeded to Sakai Store and told petitioner that Aron was being
mauled. Petitioner went to the scene and saw Rufino and Jeffrey punching Aron who
was sprawled on the ground. Petitioner pushed Jeffrey away but the latter’s other
companions suddenly arrived and started hitting him. Petitioner fought back but he was
overpowered. Petitioner cannot recall anymore the subsequent events that transpired.
[23]
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision dated 20 February 2003, finding petitioner guilty
of homicide in Criminal Case No. 819. It acquitted Aron and Paul because the
prosecution failed to prove the existence of conspiracy. It did not rule on the liability of
Oliver because he was not arraigned in the said case. Further, it dismissed Criminal Case
No. 820 for direct assault because petitioner was not arraigned therein. [24]
The dispositive portion of the decision in Criminal Case No. 819 reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Roberto Licyayo is hereby found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code. Applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law and
there being no aggravating circumstances, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of 8 years of prision mayor as minimum to 15 years of reclusion temporal medium as
maximum.
Further, accused is hereby ordered to pay the victim’s heirs the amount of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity for the death of Rufino Guay. “Per prevailing jurisprudence, death
indemnity is fixed in the sum of P50,000.00. This kind of civil indemnity is separate and
distinct from other forms of indemnity for damages and is automatically awarded
without need of further proof other than the fact of death and that the accused is
responsible therefore.” (People v. Julius Kinok, G.R. No. 104629, November 13, 2001;
Case Digest of Supreme Court Decisions; vol. 53, No. 2).
Likewise, accused is ordered to pay the victim’s heirs another P50,000.00 as moral
damages. “This award is mandatory and does not require proof other than the death of
the victim.” (People v. Mariano Pascua, Jr., G.R. No. 130963, November 27, 2001; Case
Digest of Supreme Court Decisions; vol. 53, No. 2).
But the Court cannot award actual damages as testified to by the victim’s father, Jose
Guay, in the amount of P12,000.00 since the same were not covered by receipts. The
same goes true with the alleged annual income of the deceased in the amount of
P30,000.00. “Well-entrenched is the doctrine that actual, compensatory and
consequential damages must be proved, and cannot be presumed.” (Ibid.). [25]
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 6 May 2005, the appellate court
promulgated its Decision affirming with modifications the RTC decision. In addition to
the civil indemnity and moral damages awarded by the RTC, the appellate court also
ordered petitioner to pay for the loss of earning capacity of Rufino in the amount of
P580,050.00 and temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00. Thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 14 of Lagawe, Ifugao in Criminal Cases Nos. 819 and 820 is hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION as to the award of damages, in that accused- appellant is also
ordered to pay the victim’s heirs the following:
(a) the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages; and
(b) the amount of P580,050.00 for lost earnings. [26]

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the appellate court denied.
Hence, petitioner elevated the instant case before us on the following grounds:
I.
THE INFORMATION FILED IS NOT SUFFICIENT AS IT DID NOT SPECIFICALLY CHARGED

PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME OF “HOMICIDE” DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER ARTICLE
249 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE; HENCE, PETITIONER COULD NOT BE VALIDLY
CONVICTED FOR SAID CRIME.
II.
GRANTING THAT THE INFORMATION IS SUFFICIENT, PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO THE

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION AND INTOXICATION. [27]
Anent the first issue, petitioner points out that the Information does not
specifically mention the law which he allegedly violated and for which he was charged.
Although the information accuses him of the crime of homicide, it does not categorically
state that he is being charged with homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 249
of the Revised Penal Code. According to him, the information should have been more
explicit by stating that he is being indicted for homicide as defined and penalized under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. He argues that the specification in the information
of the law violated is necessary to enable him to adequately prepare for his defense,
and that to convict him under such defective information would violate his
constitutional and statutory right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.[28]
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that an
information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the
offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
With particular reference to the designation of the offense, Section 8, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure merely directs that the information must state the
designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting
the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances.
The information in the instant case contains the foregoing required statements. The
information mentions the name of petitioner as the accused, the name of Rufino as the
offended party, the date and place of the commission of the crime, and designates the
crime committed by petitioner as homicide. It also alleges the act of petitioner
constituting homicide which is the unlawful stabbing of Rufino with the use of a bladed
weapon.[29]
The fact that the information does not specifically mention Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code as the law which defines and penalizes homicide, does not make it defective.
There is nothing in the afore-quoted Rules which specifically requires that the
information must state the particular law under which the accused is charged in order
for it to be considered sufficient and valid. What the Rules merely require, among other
things, is that the information must designate the offense charged and aver the acts
constituting it, which in this case, were obviously done. People v.
Gatchalian[30] categorically stated that there is no law which requires that in order that
an accused may be convicted, the specific provision which penalizes the act charged be
mentioned in the information.
Besides, it should be stressed that the character of the crime is determined neither by
the caption or preamble of the information nor by the specification of the provision of
law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the recital of
the ultimate facts and circumstances in the information. [31] The sufficiency of an
information is not negated by an incomplete or defective designation of the crime in the
caption or other parts of the information but by the narration of facts and
circumstances which adequately depicts a crime and sufficiently apprises the accused of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. [32]
Although the information herein does not specifically mention Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code as the law which defines and penalizes homicide, it, nonetheless, narrates
that petitioner stabbed Rufino with a bladed weapon during the incident which caused
the latter’s death. The foregoing allegation unmistakably refers to homicide under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code which is the unlawful killing of any person without
any attendant circumstance that will qualify it as murder, parricide or infanticide.
Apropos the second issue, petitioner alleges that Rufino started the scuffle by punching
Aron on the left cheek; that by such act, Rufino had given him sufficient provocation;
and that it was the pitiful sight of Aron lying on the ground and being beaten by Rufino
and Jeffrey which caused him to stab Rufino. [33] Petitioner further claims that he was
intoxicated during the incident; that this fact was affirmed by Officers Danglay and
Baguilat in their court testimonies; that his intoxication was not subsequent to any plan
to commit a felony because the encounter between him and Rufino was merely
accidental and there was no previous agreement to harm Rufino; that prior to the
incident, he met old friends and had a drink with them; that such is a mere custom or
practice among Filipinos; and that his intoxication is not habitual. [34]
Under paragraph 4, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, a criminal liability may be
mitigated if there was sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party which
immediately preceded the act complained of. To avail oneself of this mitigating
circumstance, it must be duly proven that the alleged provocation originated from the
offended party.[35]
The records do not sufficiently establish who between Rufino and Aron started the
brawl which resulted in the stabbing of Rufino by petitioner. What is evident is that
Rufino and Aron suddenly and unexpectedly grappled during the incident. [36] As aptly
observed by the RTC:
From the facts of the case earlier discussed, the fight between Rufino Guay and
Aron Licyayo was so sudden. In his defense, Aron Licyayo in his direct examination
testified though self-serving, that it was victim Rufino Guay who punched him first and
so he fought back.
Nevertheless, this claim of unlawful aggression is belied during his cross-examination:

Q. You claim, Mr.Witness, that on February 16, 1992, you
did not know the late Rufino Guay?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. You therefore cannot imagine why he should assault you
since you did not know each other?

A. None.

Q. You never had any misunderstanding or altercation prior
to February 16, 1992?

A. None.

Q. And all of a sudden, in the afternoon of February 16, 1992
you fought each other and you being bigger than Rufino Guay,
you are on top of him, is that right?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And you delivered several blows when you were on top
of him?

A. No because they were already many and they held me.

Q. How many blows did you deliver when you were on top
of him before the others came?

A. I do not know how many.

Q. Was it more than ten?

A. No.

Q. Was it more than fifteen?

A. I do not know.

Q. Why do you not know, Mr. Witness, were you drunk at
that time?

A. No, I was not. (TSN, pp. 82-83, Crim. Case No. 820).
Granting arguendo that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, it is
obvious that immediately he became the underdog, literally even. He was easily
overpowered by the bigger and sober Aron Licyayo, who unfortunately, does not know
how to count. With this development, the situation changed. The aggressor became the
attacked and the attacked, the aggressor.
But even from the testimonies of both the prosecution and the defense witnesses, the
former (prosecution) prevailed in convincing this Court that unlawful aggression was
not started by any of the protagonists but that a sudden fight was started by Rufino
Guay and accused Aron Licyayo. This is verifiable from the testimony of the fourth
prosecution witness, Jeffrey Malingan.
Defense on the other hand, tried to show that it was the victim who started the
unlawful aggression through witnesses Daniel Cayong and accused Aron Licyayo. They
failed miserably, however, to show this. Daniel Cayong, in his direct examination
narrated that it was not only Rufino Guay who started the trouble but rather he and his
two companions Joel Dumangeng and Jeffrey Malingan took hold of Aron Licyayo and
started punching him. The latter witness, as shown earlier, showed his bias by
inculpating the deceased only to contradict himself that the fight suddenly started when
he and the deceased grappled.[37]
The rule is that the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of
the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its
conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded respect if not conclusive effect. This
is more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court. When the trial court’s
findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding
upon this Court.[38]
Since it was not convincingly shown that the alleged provocation originated from Rufino,
the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation should not be appreciated in favor
of petitioner. We have held that where there is no evidence as to how the quarrel arose,
the accused is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation. [39]
For intoxication to be considered as a mitigating circumstance, it must be shown that

the intoxication impaired the willpower of the accused and that he did not know what
he was doing or could not comprehend the wrongfulness of his acts. [40] The person
pleading intoxication must prove that he took such quantity of alcoholic beverage, prior
to the commission of the crime, as would blur his reason. [41]
In the case at bar, there is no plausible evidence showing that the quantity of liquor
taken by petitioner was of such quantity as to affect his mental faculties. On the
contrary, the fact that petitioner could recall the details that transpired during and after
his drinking session with friends is the best proof that he knew what he was doing
during the incident. His vivid narration that he had a confrontation with Rufino, Jeffrey
and Joel during the drinking session; that Daniel approached and told him that Aron was
being mauled; that he immediately went to the scene and saw Aron being beaten by
Rufino and Jeffrey; that he pushed Jeffrey away from Aron; that he was allegedly beaten
by the companions of Jeffrey; and that he fought back but was allegedly overpowered
--- all point to the conclusion that petitioner had complete control of his mind during the
incident.[42]
Petitioner cannot avail himself of the mitigating circumstance of intoxication merely on

the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that he was drunk during the incident.
[43]
Such testimonies do not warrant a conclusion that the degree of petitioner’s
intoxication had affected his faculties.[44] There must be convincing proof of the nature
and effect of his intoxication which petitioner failed to adduce in the present case. [45]
We now go to the propriety of the sentence imposed on petitioner and the damages
awarded to the heirs of Rufino.
Homicide is punishable by reclusion temporal.[46] There being no mitigating or

aggravating circumstance proven in the case at bar, the penalty should be applied in its
medium period of 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months. [47] Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty will be selected from the above
range, with the minimum penalty being selected from the range of the penalty one
degree lower than reclusion temporal, which is prision mayor (six years and one day to
12 years). We found the indeterminate sentence of eight years of prision mayor as
minimum, to 15 years of reclusion temporal as maximum, imposed by the RTC, and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, sufficient.
The Court of Appeals correctly awarded civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 and
moral damages amounting to P50,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence. [48]
As to actual damages, Jose testified that his family incurred expenses for the
hospitalization and funeral of Rufino. [49] However, since no documentary evidence was
proffered to support this claim, it cannot be awarded. [50] Nonetheless, the award of
P25,000.00 in temperate damages in homicide or murder cases is proper when no
evidence of the said expenses is presented in the trial court. [51] Under Article 2224 of
the Civil Code,[52] temperate damages may be recovered as it cannot be denied that the
heirs of the victim suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved.
[53]
Thus, the award of temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 by the Court of
Appeals is in order.
We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the heirs of Rufino should be indemnified
for loss of earning capacity pursuant to Article 2206 of the New Civil Code [54] in the
amount of P580,050.00. In accordance with current jurisprudence, [55] the formula for the
indemnification for loss of earning capacity is:
Net = Life Expectancy x Gross Annual Income
Earning Capacity (GAI)
– Living Expenses

= 2/3(80 – age of deceased) x (GAI – 50%
of GAI)
Generally, documentary evidence is necessary for the purpose of proving the
victim’s annual income. As an exception, testimonial evidence suffices if the victim was
either: (1) self-employed, earning less than the minimum wage under current labor
laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the victim’s line of work, no
documentary evidence is available; or (2) employed as a daily-wage worker earning less
than the minimum wage under current labor laws. [56]
Rufino falls under these exceptions. Jose testified that Rufino was earning an average
annual gross income of P30,000.00 from gardening and cultivating ricefields. [57] Rufino
was 22 years old at the time of his death. [58]
We have held that in the absence of proof as regards the victim’s living expenses, his net
income is deemed to be 50 percent of his gross income. [59]
Applying the above-stated formula, the indemnity for the loss of earning capacity of
Rufino is P580,050.00, computed as follows:
Net earning = 2/3 (58) x (30,000.00 – P15,000.00)
capacity
= 38.67 x P15,000.00
= P580,050.00
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 6 May 2005 and
Resolution dated 12 August 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 27359 is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 179041, April 01, 2013 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ARNEL
NOCUM,* REY JOHNNY RAMOS, CARLOS JUN POSADAS, PANDAO
POLING PANGANDAG (ALL AT LARGE), ACCUSED, REYNALDO
MALLARI, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This is an appeal from the January 31, 2007 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00930, which dismissed the appeal of appellant Reynaldo Mallari
(Mallari) and affirmed with modification the December 15, 2003 Decision[2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 276, Muntinlupa City in Criminal Case No. 00-551
finding Mallari guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping with
homicide.
Factual Antecedents
On May 25, 2000, an Information[3] was filed charging Mallari and co-accused Arnel
Nocum (Nocum), Rey Johnny Ramos (Ramos), Carlos Jun Posadas (Posadas) and
Pandao Poling Pangandag alias Rex Pangandag (Pangandag) with violation of Republic
Act (RA) No. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended
by RA 7659.[4] The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about September 12, 1998 in Muntinlupa City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain for themselves and without the
consent of the owner, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and
carry away one motor vehicle more particularly described as follows:
Make/Type : - Toyota Tamaraw FX
Motor No. : - 7K-0157101
Chassis No. : - KF52-011609
Plate No. : - PXT- 143
Color : - Med. Grey Net
valued at more or less Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) to the damage and
[prejudice] of its owner, Lourdes Eleccion, in the aforestated amount and in the course of
the commission thereof, Erico Medel, the driver of the said vehicle, was killed.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
When the case was called for arraignment on November 10, 2000, only Mallari appeared
as his co-accused remain at-large. He pleaded “not guilty” to the charge.[6] Thereafter,
trial ensued.
The Prosecution’s Version
The prosecution’s lone witness was Chris Mahilac (Mahilac), a self-confessed member of
“FX gang,” a syndicate notorious for carjacking Toyota FX vehicles. The modus
operandi of the gang is to carnap Toyota FX vehicles, transport them to Mindanao, and
have them registered and sold to prospective buyers there. Together with Mallari and
several others, Mahilac was previously charged with carnapping[7] before the RTC of
Parañaque City but was later on discharged to be a state witness. [8] Consequently,
Mahilac was placed under the Witness Protection Program of the Department of Justice
(DOJ).[9]
Mahilac testified that the “FX gang” was active in Metro Manila and Mindanao. [10]
Nocum led the syndicate’s criminal activities in Metro Manila while Pangandag, who
was the head of the Land Transportation Office in Lanao Del Norte,[11] led the Mindanao
operations.[12] Ramos, Posadas and Mallari were members of the gang.[13]
On September 6, 1998, while in Calamba, Laguna, Mahilac received a call from

Nocum[14] informing him of Pangandag’s arrival in Manila on September 12, 1998.
[15]
Subsequently, Mahilac, Nocum, Pangandag, Ramos, Posadas and Mallari met in
Chowking fastfood restaurant in Poblacion, Muntinlupa City.[16] During the said meeting,
Pangandag demanded that their group deliver two Toyota FX vehicles to him in Lanao
Del Norte by Monday or Tuesday of the following week.[17] Nocum agreed and gave
Mallari P20,000.00 for operating expenses. Mahilac received P3,500.00 and was
instructed to meet the group in Cagayan de Oro City.[18]
As the group was departing from the restaurant, a Toyota FX taxi with plate number
PXT-143 passed-by.[19] Mallari flagged it down, talked to the driver, and boarded the
same together with Ramos and Posadas.[20] They proceeded south.[21]
On September 14, 1998, Mahilac arrived in Cagayan de Oro City and proceeded to
McDonald’s Restaurant on Limketkai Street.[22] Mallari, Ramos and Posadas arrived at
around 4:14 p.m. on board the same Toyota FX taxi that Mallari flagged down in
Muntinlupa City.[23] They agreed to proceed to Iligan City en route to Tubod, Lanao del
Norte, where said vehicle was to be delivered to Pangandag. [24] Mallari told Mahilac not
to board the said vehicle because its back portion reeked of the dried blood of the FX taxi
driver, Erico*** Medel (Medel), who was stabbed to death while resisting the group. [25]
Mallari also informed Mahilac that Medel’s corpse was dumped somewhere in Atimonan,
Quezon.[26] Mahilac thus took a taxi to Iligan City.[27]
Upon their arrival in Iligan City, Pangandag instructed them to take the vehicle to his
residence in Tubod, Lanao del Norte.[28] They arrived at Pangandag’s residence and were
given P250,000.00 as consideration for the vehicle.[29] Mahilac received P20,000.00 as
his share.
The gang continued to engage in this nefarious activity until Mahilac’s arrest by law
enforcement officers.[30]
In the meantime, on September 27, 1999, a cadaver in advance state of decomposition

was found along Zigzag Road, Barangay Malinao Ilaya, Atimonan, Quezon. It was
interred in the municipal cemetery of Atimonan, Quezon but was later on exhumed for
identification.[31] Based on the four extracted teeth and a piece of white “FILA” shoe,
[32]
the mother and the wife of the victim positively identified the cadaver to be that of
Medel.
Appellant’s Version
Mallari denied any knowledge of the carnapping incident.[33] He also denied knowing
Nocum, Ramos and Posadas.[34] He testified that he was with his wife and two children in
their home in Tunasan, Muntinlupa City at the time the alleged carnapping occurred. [35]
He claimed that on June 25, 1999, four men in civilian clothes came to his house and
forced him to board a van[36] where he was blindfolded. He was then taken to Camp
Crame, Quezon City.[37]
According to Mallari, Mahilac was his employer.[38] He was unaware of Mahilac’s reason
for implicating him in the case.[39]
Mallari further testified that while in detention, he was made to sign a document which he
cannot remember.[40] He was taken to the DOJ and told that his case would be studied if
he signs a document the contents of which were duly explained to him.[41] Should he not
sign the same, he will be charged immediately with carnapping with homicide. [42] He
therefore decided to sign the documents without the assistance of a lawyer, but continued
to be detained in Camp Crame, Quezon City.[43]
On December 15, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision[44] finding Mallari guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of carnapping with homicide. The trial court ruled that the testimony of
Mahilac that Mallari participated in the theft of the FX taxi and the killing of its driver,
Medel, cannot be negated by Mallari’s denial and uncorroborated alibi. It also found that
the commission of the crime was a result of a planned operation with Mallari and all the
accused doing their assigned tasks to ensure the consummation of their common criminal
objective.[45]
The trial court further held that Mahilac would not have known about the killing of
Medel if he had not been informed by Mallari. He had no reason to falsely accuse
Mallari and even implicated himself by: (1) admitting his presence during the planned
theft of the FX taxi; (2) admitting his presence in Cagayan De Oro City together with
Mallari; (3) directing Mallari and his co-accused to proceed with him to Pangandag in
Lanao Del Norte; and (4) receiving the sum of P20,000.00 as his share in the criminal
operation.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, Accused Reynaldo Mallari is found guilty beyond

reasonable doubt for the crime of CARNAPPING WITH HOMICIDE and is hereby
sentenced to die by lethal injection.
The Jail Warden of Muntinlupa City is hereby directed to bring Reynaldo Mallari to the
New Bilibid Prison where he may serve his sentence.
It Is SO ORDERED.[46]

On January 31, 2007, the CA rendered its Decision[47] affirming with modification the
ruling of the trial court. The appellate court held that Mahilac’s positive identification of
Mallari as a member of the “FX gang” and his participation in the theft of the FX taxi and
killing of its driver, Medel, sufficiently established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged. The discovery of the remains of Medel in the vicinity mentioned by
Mallari to Mahilac also gave credence to the latter’s testimony.
The CA further held that the trial court’s determination on the credibility of Mahilac must
be given great respect and, as a rule, will not be reversed on appeal in the absence of
cogent reason. The CA also found no ill-motive on the part of Mahilac to testify falsely
against Mallari.
According to the CA, the fact that the prosecution presented Mahilac as its sole witness is
of no moment. His positive and credible testimony is sufficient to convict Mallari,
[48]
whose defense of denial and alibi cannot prevail over the straightforward testimony of
the former.[49]
However, the CA modified the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua pursuant to RA
9346[50] which prohibited the imposition of the death penalty.[51]
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed

December 15, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch
276, in Criminal Case No. 00-551, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in
that the death penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Republic Act
No. 9346, which did away with the imposition of death penalty.
SO ORDERED.[52]
Mallari filed a Notice of Appeal.[53] On October 15, 2007,[54] we accepted the appeal and
notified the parties to file their supplemental briefs. However, Mallari opted not to file a
supplemental brief in the absence of new issues to be raised. For its part, the Office of
the Solicitor General manifested that it is likewise adopting the Appellee’s Brief it filed
with the CA as its Supplemental Brief.[55]
The Assignment of Errors
The errors assigned in the Appellant’s Brief are as follows:
I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT

OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT DESPITE THE LACK OF MATERIAL EVIDENCE
TO JUSTIFY HIS CONVICTION; and
II. GRANTING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT THE ACCUSED- APPELLANT

COMMITTED THE CRIME CHARGED, THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY
ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH DESPITE THE
LACK OF EVIDENCE OTHER THAN THE MERE ALLEGATION BY THE
LONE PROSECUTION WITNESS CHRIS MAHILAC THAT THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT PARTICIPATED IN THE KILLING OF ERIC MEDEL.[56]
Mallari assails the credibility of Mahilac. He contends that as a state witness under the
Witness Protection Program of the DOJ, Mahilac would implicate just any person as his
cohort to justify his inclusion in the program.[57] Mallari also argues that the evidence of
the prosecution is not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[58]
On the other hand, the prosecution maintains that the circumstantial evidence was
sufficient to convict Mallari.[59] Finally, the prosecution sought civil indemnity and moral
damages of P50,000.00 each.[60]
Our Ruling
The appeal is unmeritorious.
Carnapping defined; Burden of the

prosecution in a case for Carnapping
with Homicide.
Section 2 of RA 6539 defines carnapping as “the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor
vehicle belonging to another without the latter’s consent, or by means of violence against
or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.” The crime of carnapping with
homicide is punishable under Section 14[61] of the said law, as amended by Section 20 of
RA 7659. To prove the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there must
be proof not only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original
criminal design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated “in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.” Thus, the prosecution in this
case has the burden of proving that: (1) Mallari took the Toyota FX taxi; (2) his original
criminal design was carnapping; (3) he killed the driver, Medel; and (4) the killing was
perpetrated “in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion
thereof.”[62]
The trial and appellate courts held that the prosecution was able to discharge its burden of
proving that Mallari was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of carnapping with homicide.
These courts ruled that Mallari stole the FX taxi driven by Medel after he agreed to
illegally supply his co-accused with this type of vehicle. The trial and appellate courts
found that Mallari killed Medel in the course of the commission of the carnapping.
We find no reason to deviate from these courts’ evaluation as to Mallari’s culpability.
The crime of carnapping with

homicide, as well as the identity of
Mallari as one of the perpetrators of
the crime, is duly established by
circumstantial evidence.
The culpability of Mallari for the complex crime of carnapping with homicide is duly
established by the confluence of circumstantial evidence. Mahilac testified that he was
present when Mallari and his co-accused, all members of the “FX Gang,” gathered in
Muntinlupa City to plan and conspire to steal vehicles and sell them to unscrupulous
buyers in Mindanao. Immediately after said meeting, Mahilac saw Mallari hail the FX
taxi driven by Medel, talk to him, board it together with two other conspirators, and head
south towards the direction of Quezon province. A few days later, Mallari and his
companions met Mahilac in Cagayan De Oro City on board the same FX taxi they rode in
Muntinlupa City. All these show that Mallari’s original criminal design was to carnap
the taxi and that he accomplished his purpose without the consent of its owner. In
addition, when the vehicle was brought to Cagayan de Oro City, its driver, Medel, was no
longer with them. The vehicle also reeked of dried human blood. Upon inquiry by
Mahilac, Mallari admitted that the dried blood belonged to Medel who had to be killed
for resisting the group. Mallari also told him that Medel’s body was dumped along
Zigzag Road in Atimonan, Quezon. Mallari and his co-accused received P250,000.00
upon delivery of the FX taxi to its final destination. These prove that Medel was killed in
the course of the commission of the carnapping.
The identity of Medel as the driver of the taxi was established by his mother and wife
who both stated that he was the driver of the taxi on the day it was stolen by Mallari and
his co-conspirators.[63] The two later on identified his corpse when it was discovered in
the same vicinity which Mallari told Mahilac to be the place where they dumped the dead
body of Medel.[64]
In fine, all the elements of the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, as
well as the identity of Mallari as one of the perpetrators of the crime, were all proved
beyond reasonable doubt. The foregoing circumstances inevitably lead to the lone, fair
and reasonable conclusion that Mallari participated in stealing the FX taxi driven by
Medel and in killing him.
Mallari’s defense of alibi deserves

no credence.
Mallari’s claim that he was helping his wife with household chores at the time the crime
was committed does not deserve credence. This defense of alibi cannot prevail over the
testimony of Mahilac which, taken in its entirety, leads to the reasonable conclusion that
Mallari participated in the commission of the crime. Moreover, alibi is inherently weak,
unreliable, and can be easily fabricated.[65] Hence, it must be supported by credible
corroboration from disinterested witnesses, and if not, is fatal to the accused. [66] Here,
Mallari could have presented evidence to support his alibi, but oddly, he did not. Thus,
such a defense fails.
The Penalty
Under the last clause of Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 as amended by
Section 20 of RA 7659, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when
the owner or driver of the vehicle is killed in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof.[67] In this case, the trial court considered as
aggravating circumstance the commission of the offense by a member of an organized or
syndicated crime group under Article 62 of the RPC as amended by RA 7659[68] and,
hence, imposed upon Mallari the death penalty.
However, under Rule 110, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, all aggravating and qualifying
circumstances must be alleged in the Information. This new rule took effect on December
1, 2000, but applies retroactively to pending cases since it is favorable to the appellant. [69]
Here, there is no allegation in the Information that Mallari was a member of a syndicate
or that he and his companions “had formed part of a group organized for the general
purpose of committing crimes for gain, which is the essence of a syndicated or organized
crime group.”[70] Hence, the same cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance
against Mallari. Thus, in consonance with Article 63(2) of the RPC, which provides that
in the absence of any aggravating circumstance in the commission of the offense, the
lesser penalty shall be applied. Mallari must, therefore, suffer the lesser penalty
of reclusion perpetua.[71] Mallari is also not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3[72] of
RA 9346.
The Damages
For the killing of Medel, we award to his heirs the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.[73] Said heirs are also entitled to an award
of moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00 as in all cases of murder and homicide,
without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim.[74] We cannot,
however, award actual damages due to the absence of receipts to substantiate the
expenses incurred for Medel’s funeral. The rule is that only duly receipted expenses can
be the basis of actual damages.[75] “Nonetheless, under Article 2224 of the Civil Code,
temperate damages may be recovered as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victim
suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved.”[76] We therefore
award the sum of P25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages to the heirs
of Medel. “In addition, and in conformity with current policy, we also impose on all the
monetary awards for damages an interest at the legal rate of 6% from date of finality of
this Decision until fully paid.”[77]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00930 finding appellant Reynaldo Mallari guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide
is AFFIRMED with the following modifications: (1) appellant Reynaldo Mallari is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole; and,
(2) appellant Reynaldo Mallari is ordered to pay the heirs of Erico Medel the amounts of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate
damages in lieu of actual damages, and interest on all these damages assessed at the legal
rate of 6% from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 175602, February 13, 2013 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. P02
EDUARDO VALDEZ AND EDWIN VALDEZ, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The two accused were tried for three counts of murder by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 86, in Quezon City. On January 20, 2005, after trial, the RTC
convicted them as charged, prescribed on each of them the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count, and ordered them to pay to the heirs of each victim
P93,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 as moral
damages.
The Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the RTC on July 18, 2006, subject to the modification
that each of the accused pay to the heirs of each victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages, and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages, plus costs of suit.
The two accused then came to the Court on final appeal, but on May 9, 2007, Edwin
Valdez filed a motion to withdraw appeal, which the Court granted on October 10, 2007,
thereby deeming Edwin’s appeal closed and terminated. [1]
On January 18, 2012, the Court promulgated its judgment on the appeal of PO2 Eduardo
Valdez, finding him guilty of three counts of homicide, instead of three counts of
murder, and meting on him for each count of homicide the indeterminate sentence of
10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum,
[2]
to wit:
SO ORDERED.
Subsequently, Edwin sent to the Court Administrator a self- explanatory letter [3] dated
March 12, 2012, where he pleaded for the application to him of the judgment
promulgated on January 18, 2012 on the ground that the judgment would be beneficial
to him as an accused. The letter reads as follows:
HON. MIDAS MARQUEZ

Court Administrator
Office of the Court Administrator
Supreme Court of the Philippines Manila
SUBJECT: Re. Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of Rules of Court, Request for.

Your honor,
The undersigned most respectfully requesting through your Honorable office, assistance
on the subject mentioned above.
I, Edwin and Eduardo, both surnamed Valdez were both charged before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 86, Quezon City for the entitled Crime of Murder in Criminal Case
Nos. Q-00-90718 to Q-0090720, which convicted us to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua for each of the three (3) offense.
Then after the decision of the RTC Branch 86, the same was appealed to the Court of
Appeals with CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00876 and again on July 18, 2006 the Honorable Court
of appeals Ninth Division issued a Decision AFFIRMED the questioned Decision with
MODIFICATION.
Only my Co-principal Accused EDUARDO V. VALDEZ enterposed appealed (sic) the

Affirmatory Decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals to the Highest Tribunal with G.R.
Nos. 175602. On my part, I decided to withdraw my appeal, because I believe that there
is no more hope for me, but I was wrong when I read the Decision of the First Division of
the Supreme Court, dated January 18, 2012 signed by the Chief Justice Honorable
Renato C. Corona and finally I found hope.
And now I come to your Honorable Office through this letter to seek help and assistance
that the Decision of the Supreme Court to my Brother Eduardo V. Valdez may also
benefitted (sic) the undersigned through Section 11 (a) , Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.
“(a) An Appeal taken by [the] one or more of several accused shall not affect those who
did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the Appellate Court is favorable and
applicable to the latter: x x x”
Favorable Humanitarian consideration on this matter. Thank you very much and more
power, God Bless. Respectfully yours
EDWIN V. VALDEZ
Through a comment filed on September 25, 2012, [4] the Solicitor General interposed no
opposition to the plea for the reduction of Edwin’s sentences for being in full accord
with the Rules of Court and pertinent jurisprudence.
We grant the plea for reduction of Edwin’s sentences.
The final judgment promulgated on January 18, 2012 downgraded the crimes
committed by Eduardo from three counts of murder to three counts of homicide, and
consequently prescribed lighter penalties in the form of indeterminate sentences. As a
result, Eduardo would serve only an indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision
mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum, under which he can
qualify for parole in due course by virtue of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, instead of
suffering the indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count.
The Court rationalized the result as follows:
x x x The records show that the version of PO2 Valdez was contrary to the
established facts and circumstances showing that he and Edwin, then armed with
short firearms, had gone to the jai alai betting station of Moises to confront Jonathan
Rubio, the teller of the betting booth then busily attending to bettors inside the booth;
that because the accused were calling to Rubio to come out of the booth, Moises
approached to pacify them, but one of them threatened Moises; Gusto mo unahin na
kita?; that immediately after Moises replied: Huwag!, PO2 Valdez fired several shots
at Moises, causing him to fall to the ground; that PO2 Valdez continued firing at the
fallen Moises; that Ferdinand (another victim) rushed to aid Moises, his brother, but
Edwin shot Ferdinand in the head, spilling his brains; that somebody shouted to
Joselito (the third victim) to run; that Edwin also shot Joselito twice in the back; and
that Joselito fell on a burger machine. The shots fired at the three victims were
apparently fired from short distances.
The testimonial accounts of the State’s witnesses entirely jibed with the physical
evidence. Specifically, the medico-legal evidence showed that Ferdinand had a gunshot
wound in the head; that two gunshot wounds entered Joselito’s back and the right side
of his neck; and that Moises suffered a gunshot wound in the head and four gunshot
wounds in the chest. Also, Dr. Wilfredo Tierra of the NBI Medico-Legal Office opined
that the presence of marginal abrasions at the points of entry indicated that the
gunshot wounds were inflicted at close range. Given that physical evidence was of the
highest order and spoke the truth more eloquently than all witnesses put together, the
congruence between the testimonial recollections and the physical evidence rendered
the findings adverse to PO2 Valdez and Edwin conclusive.
Thirdly, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit the felony. Proof of the actual
agreement to commit the crime need not be direct because conspiracy may be implied
or inferred from their acts. Herein, both lower courts deduced the conspiracy between
the accused from the mode and manner in which they perpetrated the killings. We are
satisfied that their deduction was warranted.
Based on the foregoing, PO2 Valdez cannot now avoid criminal responsibility for the
fatal shooting by Edwin of Ferdinand and Joselito. Both accused were convincingly
shown to have acted in concert to achieve a common purpose of assaulting their
unarmed victims with their guns. Their acting in concert was manifest not only from
their going together to the betting station on board a single motorcycle, but also from
their joint attack that PO2 Valdez commenced by firing successive shots at Moises and
immediately followed by Edwin’s shooting of Ferdinand and Joselito one after the
other. It was also significant that they fled together on board the same motorcycle as
soon as they had achieved their common purpose.
To be a conspirator, one did not have to participate in every detail of the execution;
neither did he have to know the exact part performed by his co-conspirator in the
execution of the criminal acts. Accordingly, the existence of the conspiracy between
PO2 Valdez and Edwin was properly inferred and proved through their acts that were
indicative of their common purpose and community of interest.
And, fourthly, it is unavoidable for the Court to pronounce PO2 Valdez guilty of three
homicides, instead of three murders, on account of the informations not sufficiently
alleging the attendance of treachery.
Treachery is the employment of means, methods or forms in the execution of any of the
crimes against persons which tend to directly and specially insure its execution, without
risk to the offending party arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. It encompasses a wide variety of actions and attendant circumstances, the
appreciation of which is particular to a crime committed. Corollarily, the defense against
the appreciation of a circumstance as aggravating or qualifying is also varied and
dependent on each particular instance. Such variety generates the actual need for the
state to specifically aver the factual circumstances or particular acts that constitute the
criminal conduct or that qualify or aggravate the liability for the crime in the interest of
affording the accused sufficient notice to defend himself.
It cannot be otherwise, for, indeed, the real nature of the criminal charge is
determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.
In People v. Dimaano, the Court elaborated:
For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the

approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense
was committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation
of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these
being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime
charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of
must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to
pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not
accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the
offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are
necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions
and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a
crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation
against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is
that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense. [emphasis supplied]
The averments of the informations to the effect that the two accused “with intent to
kill, qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength
did x x x assault, attack and employ personal violence upon” the victims “by then and
there shooting [them] with a gun, hitting [them]” on various parts of their bodies
“which [were] the direct and immediate cause of [their] death[s]” did not sufficiently
set forth the facts and circumstances describing how treachery attended each of the
killings. It should not be difficult to see that merely averring the killing of a person by
shooting him with a gun, without more, did not show how the execution of the crime
was directly and specially ensured without risk to the accused from the defense that
the victim might make. Indeed, the use of the gun as an instrument to kill was not per
se treachery, for there are other instruments that could serve the same lethal
purpose. Nor did the use of the term treachery constitute a sufficient averment, for
that term, standing alone, was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment of a
fact. In short, the particular acts and circumstances constituting treachery as an
attendant circumstance in murder were missing from the informations.
x x x. The requirement of sufficient factual averments is meant to inform the accused

of the nature and cause of the charge against him in order to enable him to prepare
his defense. This requirement accords with the presumption of innocence in his favor,
details of the crime he is being charged with. To have the facts stated in the body of
the information determine the crime of which he stands charged and for which he
must be tried thoroughly accords with common sense and with the requirements of
plain justice, x x x.
x x x x
x x x. There being no circumstances modifying criminal liability, the penalty is applied in

its medium period (ie., 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months). Under
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence is taken
from prision mayor, and the maximum from the medium period of reclusion
temporal. Hence, the Court imposes the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision
mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum for each count of
homicide.
SO ORDERED.[5] (Emphasis supplied)
On his part, Edwin cannot be barred from seeking the application to him of the
downgrading of the crimes committed (and the resultant lighter penalties) despite the
finality of his convictions for three counts of murder due to his withdrawal of his appeal.
The downgrading of the crimes committed would definitely be favorable to him. Worth
pointing out is that to deny to him the benefit of the lessened criminal responsibilities
would be highly unfair, considering that this Court had found the two accused to have
acted in concert in their deadly assault against the victims, warranting their equal liabiliy
under the principle of conspiracy.
We grant Edwin’s plea based on Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which
relevantly provides:
Section 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. – (a) An appeal taken by

one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except
insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.
xxxx
In this connection, the Court has pronounced in Lim v. Court of Appeals[6] that the
benefits of this provision extended to all the accused, regardless of whether they
appealed or not, to wit:
As earlier stated, both petitioner and the OSG laterally argue that in the event of
Guingguing’s acquittal, petitioner should likewise be acquitted, based on Rule 122,
Section 11(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, which states:
SEC. 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused.-
to the latter.
Private respondent however, contends that said provision is not applicable to petitioner
inasmuch as he appealed from his conviction, and the provision states that a favorable
judgment shall be applicable only to those who did not appeal.
A literal interpretation of the phrase “did not appeal,” as espoused by private

respondent, will not give justice to the purpose of the provision.
It should be read in its entirety and should not be myopically construed so as to defeat
its reason, i.e., to benefit an accused who did not join in the appeal of his co-accused in
case where the appellate judgment is favorable. In fact, several cases rendered by the
Court applied the foregoing provision without regard as to the filing or non-filing of an
appeal by a co- accused, so long as the judgment was favorable to him.
In People v. Artellero, the Court extended the acquittal of Rodriguez’s co-accused to him
despite the withdrawal of his appeal, applying the Rule 122, Section 11(a), and
considering that the evidence against both are inextricably linked, to wit:
Although it is only appellant who persisted with the present appeal, the well-
established rule is that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open
for review of all its aspects, including those not raised by the parties. The records show
that Rodriguez had withdrawn his appeal due to financial reasons. However, Section 11
(a) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that “[a]n appeal taken by one or more
[of] several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the
judgment of the appellant court is favorable and applicable to the latter.” As we have
elucidated, the evidence against and the conviction of both appellant and Rodriguez are
inextricably linked. Hence, appellant’s acquittal, which is favorable and applicable to
Rodriguez, should benefit the latter.
In People v. Arondain, the Court found accused Arondain guilty only of homicide. Such
verdict was applied to his co-accused, Jose Precioso, who was previously found guilty by
the trial court of robbery with homicide, despite the fact that Precioso appealed but
failed to file an appellant’s brief. The Court also modified Precioso’s civil liability
although the additional monetary award imposed on Arondain was not extended to
Precioso since it was not favorable to him and he did not pursue the appeal before the
Court.
In People v. De Lara, Eduardo Villas, together with several co- accused, were found by
the trial court guilty of forcible abduction. During pendency of the review before the
Court, Villas withdrew his appeal, hence his conviction became final and executory.
Thereafter, the Court found Villas’ co-accused guilty only of grave coercion. Applying
Rule 122, Section 11(a), the Court also found Villas guilty of the lesser offense of grave
coercion since it is beneficial to him.
In People v. Escaño, the Court granted a motion filed by accused Julian Deen Escaño,
praying that the Court’s Decision dated January 28, 2000, acquitting his co-accused
Virgilio T. Usana and Jerry C. Lopez in Criminal Case No. 95-936 for violation of Section 4,
Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, be applied to him. Escaño originally filed
a Notice of Appeal with the trial court but later withdrew the same.
In the foregoing cases, all the accused appealed from their judgments of conviction but
for one reason or another, the conviction became final and executory. Nevertheless, the
Court still applied to them the favorable judgment in favor of their co-accused. The
Court notes that the Decision dated September 30, 2005 in G.R. No. 128959 stated, ''the
verdict of guilt with respect to Lim fherein petitioner] had already become final and
executory." In any event, the Court cannot see why a different treatment should be
given to petitioner, given that the judgment is favorable to him and considering further
that the Court's tinding in its Decision dated September 30, 2005 specifically stated that
"the publication of the subject advertisement by petitioner and Lim cannot be deemed
by this Court to have been done with actual malice."[7]
ACCORDINGLY, the Court GRANTS the plea of EDWIN VALDEZ for the application to him

of the judgment promulgated on January 18, 2012 finding P02 EDUARDO VALDEZ guilty
of three counts of homicide, and sentencing him to suffer for each count the
indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years
of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay to the respective heirs of the late
Ferdinand Sayson, the late Moises Sayson, Jr., and the late Joselito Sayson the amounts
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as
temperate damages for each count.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 183100, November 28, 2012 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROGELIO
ABRENCILLO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This appeal seeks to undo the conviction of the accused for the rape he had committed
against AAA,[1] the 15-year-old daughter of BBB, his common-law wife. The Regional
Trial Court, Branch 61, in Gumaca, Quezon (RTC) sentenced him to death on March 4,
2002 on the ground that the crime was qualified by his being the step-father of the victim
and her minority under 18 years. By its January 29, 2008 decision rendered in CA-
G.R.CR-HC No. 01123,[2] however, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction
but found the crime to be simple rape, reducing the penalty to reclusion perpetua.
The records show that the accused and BBB started their cohabitation when AAA and
CCC, who were twin sisters, were only about three years of age; that the common-law
partners lived with BBB’s daughters in the same house for the next 12 years; that a
father-daughter relationship developed between the accused and BBB’s daughters, with
AAA and CCC even considering him as their own father and addressing him
as itay (father); that AAA frequently accompanied him when he gathered wood and made
charcoal in a hut in the nearby forest; that on March 1, 1999, BBB left the house early to
sell fish; that AAA was left alone in the house and had lunch by herself because he went
out to chat with neighbors; that after her lunch, AAA took a nap in the house, but his
return to the house awakened her; that taking advantage of AAA being alone in the
house, he took off his pants and laid down beside her; that he embraced her, but she
brushed away his arms; that he then got up and started taking her shorts off; that she
resisted and held on to her shorts; that in frustration, he went to take his bolo and poked
its sharp tip unto her throat while threatening to kill her; that she became petrified with
fear and could not do anything more after that; that he then undress her, went on top of
her, and inserted his penis into her vagina; that the penile insertion caused her pain; that
he then made push and pull motions until he spent himself inside her; that she could only
beg for him to stop but he paid no heed to her pleas; that she cried later on; and that he
left her alone afterwards.
The records further show that once the accused left her alone, she ran to the house of
her Lolo Armin and reported what the accused had just done to her; that Lolo
Armin accompanied her to the police station to report the rape; that she narrated in her
complaint affidavit that the accused had raped her even before that time, when she was
still younger; and that she underwent physical examination by the municipal health
officer, Dra. Constancia Mecija, about two hours after the commission of the rape.
Dra. Mecija rendered the following findings in the medico-legal report relevant to AAA’s
physical examination, viz:
xxxx
Genital Examination:
Pubic hair fully grown, moderate labia majora and minora coaptated, fourchette lax,
Vestibular mucosa pinkish.Hymen, tall, thin with old healed complete laceration at 3:00
o’clock and 9:00 o’clock position; corresponding to the face of a watch. Edges rounded,
Hymenal orifice – admits a tube of 2.5 cm. in diameter with moderate resistance, vaginal
walls tight. Rugosities prominent.
CONCLUSIONS:
1. No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries noted in the body of the subject at
the time of examination.
2. Old healed hymenal laceration, present.[3]
xxxx
The Provincial Prosecutor of Quezon filed in the RTC the information dated March 26,
1999 charging the accused with qualified rape allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of March 1999, at Barangay No. 8 Poblacion, in the
Municipality of Gen. Luna, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bolo, with lewd design,
by means of force, threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of one AAA, his step-daughter, and a minor, 15 years
of age, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
The accused pleaded not guilty to the information on September 6, 2000.
During the trial, the accused denied having sexual intercourse with AAA, although he
admitted being in the house at the alleged time of the rape. He insisted that nobody was in
the house when he returned that afternoon from his chore of gathering wood in the nearby
forest; that upon learning from a neighbor that AAA had left the house with
her kabarkada, he himself did the cooking and waited for her to return home; and that he
scolded her, causing her to run away from home.
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment, convicting the accused for qualified rape and
prescribing the death penalty. It considered AAA’s testimony as credible and reliable
because the medico-legal findings corroborated her accusation. It found that the rape was
qualified by relationship, the accused being her stepfather, and by her minority, she being
15 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime. It ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the Court finds the accused ROGELIO

ABRENCILLO guilty beyond reasonable doubt for rape under Article 266-A and 266-B
of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 8353 and sentencing him the penalty
of DEATH. He is further ordered to pay the amount of P75,000.00 to AAA as indemnity
and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[5]
On intermediate review, the accused claimed that the medico-legal evidence did not
prove recent sexual intercourse in view of the finding of old healed laceration that
indicated the non-virgin state of AAA.
Nonetheless, the CA, upholding the conviction but downgrading the offense to simple
rape because the accused was not AAA’s stepfather due to him and BBB not having been
legally married, disposed thus:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the
modification that the accused shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, in addition to
the indemnity and damages awarded therein.
SO ORDERED.[6]
In his appeal, the accused reiterated his arguments in the CA,[7] still assailing the
credibility of AAA’s accusation of a recent coerced sexual encounter with him.
We affirm the conviction.
Firstly, the findings of the RTC and the CA deserve respect mainly because the RTC as
the trial court was in the best position to observe the demeanor and conduct of AAA
when she incriminated the accused by her recollection of the incident in court. The
personal observation of AAA’s conduct and demeanor enabled the trial judge to discern
whether she was telling the truth or inventing it.[8] The trial judge’s evaluation, which the
CA affirmed, now binds the Court, leaving to the accused the burden to bring to the
Court’s attention facts or circumstances of weight that were overlooked, misapprehended,
or misinterpreted by the lower courts but would materially affect the disposition of the
case differently if duly considered.[9] Alas, the accused made no showing that the RTC, in
the first instance, and the CA, on review, ignored, misapprehended, or misinterpreted any
facts or circumstances supportive of or crucial to his defense.[10]
Secondly, carnal knowledge of AAA as an element of rape was proved although Dra.
Mecija’s findings indicated no physical injuries on the body of AAA.[11] Rather than
disproving the commission of the rape, the absence of a finding of physical injuries on
AAA corroborated her testimony that she became petrified with fear and could not offer
any physical resistance to his sexual assault after he poked the sharp tip of the bolo unto
her neck.
It is relevant to mention that carnal knowledge as an element of rape does not require
penetration. Carnal knowledge is simply the act of a man having sexual bodily
connections with a woman.[12] Indeed, all that is necessary for rape to be consummated,
according to People v. Campuhan,[13] is for the penis of the accused to come into contact
with the lips of the pudendum of the victim. Hence, rape is consummated once the penis
of the accused touches either labia of the pudendum.
Thirdly, we reject the posture of the accused that AAA’s old-healed hymenal lacerations,
as Dra. Mecija found, disproved the recent commission of the rape charged. Proof of the
presence of hymenal laceration in the victim is neither indispensable nor necessary in
order to establish the commission of rape. Hence, whether the hymenal lacerations of
AAA were fresh or healed was not decisive.[14] In this connection, it is timely to remind
that the commission of rape may be proved by evidence other than the physical
manifestations of force being applied on the victim’s genitalia, like the presence of
hymenal laceration. For sure, even the sole testimony of the victim, if found to be
credible, suffices to prove the commission of rape. This rule avoids the situation of letting
the rapist escape punishment and go scot-free should he commit the rape with only
himself and the victim as the witnesses to its commission.
Fourthly, the CA correctly prescribed reclusion perpetua. The rape that was committed
was not qualified rape because the accused and BBB were not legally married to each
other. What the records show, instead, was that they were in a common-law relationship,
which meant that he was not the stepfather of AAA, contrary to the allegation of the
information. Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, rape through force, threat
or intimidation of a woman 12 years or over in age is punished by reclusion perpetua.
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to

death whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon. Although the
information alleged the use by the accused of a deadly weapon (bolo) in the commission
of the rape, the CA still correctly prescribed the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua because the information did not allege the attendance of any aggravating
circumstances. With the intervening revision of the Rules of Criminal Procedure (i.e.,
effective on December 1, 2000) in order to now require the information to state the “acts
or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances xxx in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language
used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstance and for the court to pronounce judgment,”[15] the Prosecution became
precluded from establishing any act or circumstance not specifically alleged in the
information if such act or circumstance would increase the penalty to the maximum
period.[16]
Lastly, the Court reduces the indemnity from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00 in view of the
crime actually proved being simple rape. However, the RTC and the CA did not award
exemplary damages to AAA, despite her being entitled to such damages by reason of her
minority under 18 years at the time of the rape, and because of the use by the accused of
the bolo, a deadly weapon. This recognition of her right accords with the perceptive
pronouncement in People v. Catubig[17] to the effect that exemplary damages were
justified regardless of whether or not the generic or qualifying aggravating circumstances
were alleged in the information because the grant of such damages pursuant to Article
2230 of the Civil Code was intended for the sole benefit of the victim and did not concern
the criminal liability, the exclusive concern of the State. For that purpose, therefore,
exemplary damages of P25,000.00 are hereby fixed.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on January 29, 2008, subject to

the MODIFICATION that Rogelio Abrencillo is ordered to pay AAA the reduced
amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and the further amount of P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages in addition to the moral damages of P50,000.00 awarded by the trial
court.
SO ORDERED.
S
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 182551, July 27, 2011 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROSENDO
REBUCAN Y LAMSIN, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
Assailed before this Court is the Decision[1] dated August 21, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00282, which modified the Decision [2] dated November
3, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Carigara, Leyte, Branch 13, in Criminal Case
No. 4232. In the Decision of the Court of Appeals, the accused-appellant Rosendo
Rebucan y Lamsin was adjudged guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) separate
counts of murder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each
count.
On January 23, 2003, the accused-appellant was charged with the crime of double
murder in an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 6th day of November, 2002, in the Municipality of Carigara,

Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and wound FELIPE LAGERA Y OBERO, 65 years old and
RANIL TAGPIS Y LAGERA, 1 year old, with the use of a long bolo (sundang) which the
accused had provided himself for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon Felipe Lagera:
Hypovolemic shock, massive blood loss and multiple hacking wounds upon Ranil Tagpis:
Hypovolemic shock, massive blood loss and hacking wound, head[,] which wounds
caused the death of Felipe Lagera y Obera and Ranil Tagpis y Lagera, immediately
thereafter.[3]
When arraigned on February 10, 2003, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the
charge.[4] Trial, thereafter, ensued.
The prosecution presented as witnesses: (1) Dr. Ma. Bella V. Profetana, Municipal
Health Officer of Carigara, Leyte; (2) Carmela Tagpis, the 5-year-old granddaughter of
the victim Felipe Lagera and sister of the victim Ranil Tagpis, Jr.; [5] (3) Adoracion Lagera,
the wife of Felipe Lagera; and (4) Alma Tagpis, the daughter of Felipe Lagera and mother
of Ranil Tagpis, Jr.
Dr. Profetana testified that she conducted a post-mortem examination on the body of
the victim Felipe Lagera on November 6, 2002. She stated that Felipe sustained three
hacking wounds, the first of which was located at his right arm and was about 23x2x4
centimeters. The said wound was fatal and could have been caused by a sharp
instrument such as a bolo. The second wound was located at Felipe's "nose maxillary
area,"[6] measuring 13 centimeters, with an inverted C shape. The second wound was
not fatal and could have been caused by a sharp-edged instrument like a bolo. The third
wound was located at Felipe's left arm and was measured as 9x1x1.5 centimeters. The
said wound was fatal and could have likewise been caused by a sharp-edged
instrument. Dr. Profetana concluded that the causes of death of Felipe were
hypovolemic shock, massive blood loss and multiple hacking wounds. She also
conducted a post-mortem examination on the body of Ranil Tagpis, Jr. on the
aforementioned date. The results revealed that Ranil sustained a hacking wound at the
"fronto-temporal area"[7] with a skull fracture. In the case of Ranil, the cause of death
was "hypovolemic shock secondary to massive blood loss secondary to [the] hacking
wound to the head."[8] The instrument that was most likely used was sharp-edged like a
bolo.[9]
Carmela Tagpis testified as an eyewitness to the incident in question. She pointed to

the accused-appellant as the "Bata Endong" [10] (Uncle Endong) who hacked her
grandfather and brother. She stated that Ranil was hit in the forehead, while Felipe was
hit on the face, the left shoulder and the right shoulder. After Felipe was hacked by the
accused-appellant, the former was still able to walk outside of his house, to the
direction of the coconut tree and thereafter fell to the ground. Carmela said that she
saw that a long bolo was used in the killing of Felipe and Ranil. She related that Felipe
also owned a bolo but he was not able to use the same when he was attacked. She was
then inside the house with Felipe and her two younger brothers, Jericho and Bitoy
(Ranil). She was sitting about four meters away when the hacking incident occurred
indoors.[11]
On cross-examination, Carmela stated that at the time of the incident, she was playing
with a toy camera inside the house and she was situated beside a chicken cage, near a
bench. Felipe was also there near the bench and he was carrying Ranil in his right arm.
When asked whether the accused-appellant came inside the house in a sudden manner,
Carmela answered in the affirmative. She insisted that Ranil was indeed carried by
Felipe when the accused-appellant entered the house. She said that no fight or
altercation occurred between Felipe and the accused-appellant. After Felipe was
hacked, he immediately ran outside of the house. Carmela and Jericho then ran to the
back of the house.[12]
Adoracion Lagera testified that at 4:00 p.m. on November 6, 2002, she was at the house
of a certain Justiniano Rance. After arriving there, she was fetched by a little boy who
told her to go home because Felipe had been hacked. She ran towards the direction of
her house. When she got there, she saw the lifeless body of Felipe sprawled on the
ground. She then went inside the house and found her daughter, Alma Tagpis, cuddling
the body of Ranil whose head was wounded. She told Alma to look for a motor vehicle
to bring the child to the hospital. She also found out that the other two children,
Carmela and Jericho, hid when they saw Felipe being hacked. When she asked them
who went to their house, Carmela told her that it was the accused-appellant who
entered their house and hacked the victims.[13]
Alma Tagpis testified that at about 4:00 p.m. on November 6, 2002, she was in Brgy.
Sogod, having their palay (unhusked rice grain) milled. Shortly thereafter, she went
home and proceeded to the house of her father, Felipe, where she left her children. She
then met a person looking for her mother who was about to tell the latter that Felipe
was hacked. When she rushed to Felipe's house, she saw him lying in the grassy place,
wounded and motionless. She asked Felipe who hacked him, but he was not able to
answer anymore. She went inside the house and saw blood on the floor and the feet of
her son Ranil. Thinking that the killer was still inside, she went to the back of the house
and pulled a slot of board on the wall so she could get inside. Upon seeing the body of
Ranil, she took him and ran towards the road. She was able to bring Ranil to the
hospital, but the doctor already pronounced him dead. Her other two children, Carmela
and Jericho, soon arrived at the hospital with the police. When she asked them who
killed Felipe, Carmela answered that it was the accused-appellant. [14]
Thereafter, the prosecution formally offered the following documentary evidence, to

wit: (1) Exhibit A - the Post-mortem Examination Report on Felipe; [15] (2) Exhibit B - the
sketch of the human anatomy indicating the wounds sustained by Felipe; [16] (3) Exhibit C
- the Certificate of Death of Felipe; [17] (4) Exhibit D - the Post-mortem Examination
Report on Ranil;[18] (5) Exhibit E - the sketch of the human anatomy indicating the
wounds sustained by Ranil;[19] and (6) Exhibit F - the Certificate of Death of Ranil. [20]
The defense, on the other hand, presented the following witnesses, namely: (1)
Raymond Rance, the stepson of the accused-appellant; (2) Renerio Arminal,
[21]
the barangay chairperson of Brgy. Canlampay, Carigara, Leyte; (3) Arnulfo Alberca, a
member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed at Carigara, Leyte; and (4) the
accused-appellant Rosendo Rebucan y Lamsin.
Raymond Rance testified that his mother's name is Marites Rance. The accused-
appellant is not his biological father but the former helped in providing for his basic
needs. He narrated that on the night of July 18, 2002, he saw Felipe Lagera inside their
house. Felipe placed himself on top of Raymond's mother, who was lying down.
Raymond and his younger sister, Enda, were then sleeping beside their mother and they
were awakened. His mother kept pushing Felipe away and she eventually succeeded in
driving him out. In the evening of July 20, 2002, at about 11:00 p.m., Raymond
recounted that he saw Felipe's son, Artemio alias Timboy, inside their house. Timboy
was able to go upstairs and kept trying to place himself on top of Raymond's mother.
The latter got mad and pushed Timboy away. She even pushed him down the stairs.
The accused-appellant was working in Manila when the aforesaid incidents happened.
Raymond said that his mother thereafter left for Manila. Subsequently, he saw the
accused-appellant at the house of a certain Bernie, several days after the accused-
appellant arrived in Leyte. He told the accused-appellant about the incidents involving
Felipe and Timboy. On November 6, 2002, Raymond and the accused were already
living in the same house. On the said date, the accused-appellant left their house after
they had lunch and he told Raymond that he was going to call the latter's mother.
Raymond testified that the accused-appellant is a good man and was supportive of his
family. He also stated that the accused-appellant seldom drank liquor and even if he did
get drunk, he did not cause any trouble. [22]
Renerio Arminal testified that on November 6, 2002, the accused-appellant surrendered

to him. The latter came to him alone and told him that he (the accused-appellant)
fought with Felipe Lagera. Arminal then ordered the human rights action officer, Ricky
Irlandez, and the chief tanod, Pedro Oledan, to bring the accused-appellant to the police
station. Afterwards, the police officers came to his place and he accompanied them to
the house of Felipe.[23]
Arnulfo Alberca was likewise called upon to the witness stand to prove that the
voluntary surrender of the accused-appellant was entered into the records of the police
blotter. He was asked to read in open court the Police Blotter Entry No. 5885 dated
November 6, 2002, which recorded the fact of voluntary surrender of the accused-
appellant. His testimony was no longer presented, however, since the prosecution
already admitted the contents of the blotter. [24]
The accused-appellant testified that he arrived in Carigara, Leyte from Manila on August
15, 2002. He went to the house of his elder brother, Hilario, to look for his children.
There, he learned that his wife went to Manila and his brother was taking care of his
two children and his stepson, Raymond. On November 2, 2002, he saw Raymond at the
place of his friend, Bernie Donaldo. He asked Raymond why the latter's mother went to
Manila and he was told that, while he was still in Manila, Felipe and Timboy Lagera went
to their house and tried to place themselves on top of his wife. He then said that he
harbored ill feelings towards the said men but he was able to control the same for the
sake of his children. On November 6, 2002, at about 2:00 p.m., he went to the house
of barangay chairperson Arminal to place a call to his wife who was in Manila. He was
carrying a bolo at that time since he was using the same to cut cassava stems in his
farm. When he talked to his wife, she confirmed that she was sexually molested by
Felipe and Timboy. Thereafter, as the accused-appellant proceeded to go home, it
rained heavily so he first sought shelter at the place of his friend, Enok. The latter was
drinking gin and he was offered a drink. After staying there and drinking for half an
hour, the accused-appellant decided to go home. Afterwards, he remembered that he
had to buy kerosene so he went to the store of Felipe Lagera. [25]
The accused-appellant further testified that when he reached the house of Felipe, the
latter was feeding chickens. When Felipe asked him what was his business in going
there, he confronted Felipe about the alleged sexual abuse of his wife. Felipe allegedly
claimed that the accused-appellant had a bad purpose for being there and that the
latter wanted to start a fight. Accused-appellant denied the accusation and responded
that Felipe should not get angry, as it was he (Felipe) who committed a wrong against
him and his wife. Felipe allegedly got mad and hurled the cover of a chicken cage at
him, but he was able to parry it with his hand. The accused-appellant then drew his long
bolo and hacked Felipe on the left side of the abdomen, as the latter was already turning
and about to run to the house. He also went inside the house since Felipe might get
hold of a weapon. When they were both inside and he was about to deliver a second
hacking blow, Felipe held up and used the child Ranil as a shield. As the second hacking
blow was delivered suddenly, he was not able to withdraw the same anymore such that
the blow landed on Ranil. When he saw that he hit the child, he got angry and delivered
a third hacking blow on Felipe, which landed on the right side of the latter's neck.
Thereafter, Felipe ran outside. He followed Felipe and hacked him again, which blow hit
the victim's upper left arm. At that time, Felipe was already on the yard of his house and
was about to run towards the road. He then left and surrendered to
the barangay chairperson.[26]
During his cross-examination, the accused-appellant said that he was a bit tipsy when he
proceeded to Felipe's house, but he was not drunk. When Felipe ran inside the house
after the first hacking blow, the accused-appellant stated that he had no intention to
back out because he was thinking that the victim might get a gun and use the same
against him. The accused-appellant also asserted that when he was about to deliver the
second hacking blow, Felipe simultaneously took Ranil who was sitting on a sack and
used him to shield the blow. There was a long bolo nearby but Felipe was not able to
take hold of the same because the accused-appellant was chasing him. He admitted
that he had a plan to kill Felipe but claimed that when he arrived at the latter's house on
the day of the attack, he had no intention to kill him. [27]
The defense also presented the following documentary evidence: (1) Exhibit 1 - the
Police Blotter Entry No. 5885 dated November 6, 2002; [28] and (2) Exhibit 2 - the Civil
Marriage Contract of Rosendo Rebucan and Marites Rance. [29]
On November 3, 2003, the RTC rendered a decision, convicting the accused-appellant of

the crime of double murder. The trial court elucidated thus:
[In view of] the vivid portrayal of Raymond on how [the wife of the accused] was
sexually abused by the father and son Lagera, the accused hatched a decision to avenge
his wife's sexual molestation. Days had passed, but this decision to kill Felipe did not
wither, instead it became stronger, that on the 6 th of November 2002, he armed himself
with a sharp long bolo known as "sundang" and went to Brgy. Canlampay, Carigara,
Leyte where the victim live[d]. Fueled by hatred and the spirit of London gin after
consuming one bottle with his compadre "Enok", he decided to execute his evil deeds by
going to the house of Felipe Lagera, in the guise of buying kerosene and once inside the
house hacked and wounded the victim, Felipe Lagera who was then holding in his arm
his grandson, one and half years 1 ½ old, Ramil Tagpis, Jr.
The manner by which the accused adopted in killing the victim, Felipe Lagera, and Ramil
Tagpis, Jr. was a premeditated decision and executed with treachery.
x x x x
There is credence to the testimony of the minor eyewitness Carmela Tagpis that the
victim, Felipe was holding in his arms her younger brother, Ramil Tagpis, Jr. inside his
house, when the accused entered, and without any warning or provocation coming
from the victim, the accused immediately delivered several hacking blows on the
victim giving no regard to the innocent child in the arms of Lagera. With this
precarious situation, the victim who was unarmed has no opportunity to put up his
defense against the unlawful aggression of the accused, moreso, to retaliate.
Moreover, what defense could an innocent 1 1/2 years old Ramil Tagpis, Jr. put up
against the armed and superior strength of the accused, but to leave his fate to God.
The circumstance that the attack was sudden and unexpected and the victims, unarmed,
were caught totally unprepared to defend themselves qualifies the crime committed as
murder. x x x.
After the incident, the accused Rosendo Rebucan immediately went to the house of
Brgy. Chairman, Renerio Arcenal at sitio Palali, Brgy. Canlampay, Carigara, Leyte, to
surrender, because he killed Felipe Lagera and Ramil Tagpis, Jr. The Brgy. Chairman
instructed his Brgy. Human Rights Action Officer, Ricky Irlandez and his Chief Tanod,
Pedro Oledan to bring Rosendo to the Police Authorities of Carigara, Leyte. This fact of
voluntary surrender was corroborated by Police Officer Arnulfo Alberca, who presented
to Court the police blotter, under entry No. 5885, dated November 6, 2002, of the PNP,
Carigara, Leyte.
Clearly, the act of the accused in surrendering to the authorities showed his intent to
submit himself unconditionally to them, to save the authorities from trouble and
expenses that they would incur for his capture. For this reason, he has complied with
the requisites of voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance[.] x x x.
From the circumstances obtaining, the mitigating circumstances of admission and

voluntary surrender credited to the accused are not sufficient to offset the aggravating
circumstances of: a) evident premeditation; b) treachery (alevosia); c) dwelling - the
crime was committed at the house of the victim; d) intoxication - the accused fueled
himself with the spirit of London gin prior to the commission of the crime; e) abuse of
superior strength; and f) minority, in so far as the child victim, Ramil Tagpis, Jr. is
concerned, pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code as amended. x x x.
x x x x
In the mind of the Court, the prosecution has substantially established the quantum of
evidence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. [30]
The RTC, thus, decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, pursuant to Sec. 6, Art. 248 of the Revised

Penal Code, as amended and further amended by R.A. 7659 (The Death Penalty Law),
the Court found accused ROSENDO REBUCAN y LAMSIN, GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of DOUBLE MURDER charged under the information and sentenced
to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH, and to pay civil indemnity to the heirs of
Felipe Lagera and Ramil Tagpis, Jr. in the amount of Seventy-Five Thousand (P75,000.00)
Pesos for each victim and moral damages in the amount of Seventy-Five Thousand
(P75,000.00) Pesos to each; and
Pay the Cost.[31] (Emphases ours.)
The case was originally elevated to this Court on automatic review and the same was
docketed as G.R. No. 161706.[32] The parties, thereafter, submitted their respective
appeal briefs.[33] In our Resolution[34] dated July 19, 2005, we ordered the transfer of the
case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate disposition, pursuant to our ruling
in People v. Mateo.[35] Before the appellate court, the case was docketed as CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 00282.
The Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision on August 21, 2007, modifying
the judgment of the RTC. The appellate court adopted the position of the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) that the felonious acts of the accused-appellant resulted in two
separate crimes of murder as the evidence of the prosecution failed to prove the
existence of a complex crime of double murder. The Court of Appeals subscribed to the
findings of the RTC that the killing of Felipe Lagera was attended by the aggravating
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. With respect to the ensuant
mitigating circumstances, the Court of Appeals credited the circumstance of voluntary
surrender in favor of the accused-appellant, but rejected the appreciation of
intoxication, immediate vindication of a grave offense and voluntary confession. As for
the death of Ranil, the appellate court also ruled that the same was attended by the
aggravating circumstance of treachery and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. Thus, the Court of Appeals disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Decision appealed from is

hereby MODIFIED. As modified, accused-appellant is hereby adjudged guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for two (2) counts of murder for the deaths of Felipe Lagera and Ramil
Tagpis, Jr., and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count of murder he has committed.
The award of civil indemnity is reduced to P50,000.00 for each victim; the award of
moral damages is likewise reduced to P50,000.00 for each victim. Further, exemplary
damages in the amount of P25,000.00 is awarded to the heirs of each victim. [36]
The accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal [37] of the above decision. In a

Resolution[38] dated February 6, 2008, the Court of Appeals ordered that the records of
the case be forwarded to this Court.
On June 18, 2008, we resolved to accept the appeal and required the parties to file their
respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire, within thirty days from notice. [39]
Thereafter, both parties manifested that they were adopting the briefs they filed before
the Court of Appeals and will no longer file their respective supplemental briefs. [40]
The accused-appellant sets forth the following assignment of errors:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR THE CRIME OF MURDER.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE MITIGATING

CIRCUMSTANCE OF IMMEDIATE VINDICATION OF A GRAVE OFFENSE IN FAVOR OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE INTOXICATION AS A

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
IV
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING

CIRCUMSTANCES OF DWELLING, ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH AND MINORITY.[41]
The accused-appellant admits to the killing of Felipe but denies that the crime was
committed with treachery and evident premeditation. He argues that there is doubt as
to the presence of treachery given that there was no eyewitness who categorically
stated that the accused-appellant attacked the victims suddenly, thereby depriving
them of the means to defend themselves. He brushed aside the testimony of Carmela
Tagpis, insisting that she was not in a position to say that there was no altercation
between him and Felipe, which could have put the latter on guard. The prosecution
allegedly failed to prove that the accused-appellant intentionally waited for the time
when Felipe would be defenseless before initiating the attack. The fact that he
voluntarily surrendered to the barangay chairperson and the police and admitted the
killings supposedly showed that it was not intentional and he did not consciously adopt
the method of attack upon the two victims. The accused-appellant similarly rejects the
finding of the RTC that there was evident premeditation on his part since the
prosecution failed to prove that he deliberately planned the killing of Felipe.
The accused-appellant maintains that at the time of the incident, he was still unable to
control his anger as he just recently discovered that his wife was sexually abused by
Felipe and the latter's son, Timboy. He also avers that he was a bit intoxicated when the
crime took place so that he was not in total control of himself. He claims that he is not a
habitual drinker and that he merely consumed the alcohol prior to the incident in order
to appease his friend. He likewise argues that the aggravating circumstance of dwelling
should not have been appreciated inasmuch as the same was not alleged in the
information. Moreover, the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength
cannot be appreciated since he did not deliberately harm or attack Ranil Tagpis, Jr. and
the death of the latter was accidental. The accused-appellant prays that he should only
be found guilty of the crime of homicide with the mitigating circumstances of voluntary
surrender, immediate vindication of a grave offense and intoxication.
The appeal lacks merit.
Basic is the rule that in order to affirm the conviction of an accused person, the
prosecution must establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable
doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces
absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. [42] Ultimately, what the law simply
requires is that any proof against the accused must survive the test of reason for it is
only when the conscience is satisfied that the perpetrator of the crime is the person on
trial should there be a judgment of conviction. [43] A finding of guilt must rest on the
strength of the prosecution's own evidence, not on the weakness or even absence of
evidence for the defense.[44]
In the instant case, the evidence of the prosecution established the fact that the killings
of Felipe and Ranil were attended by treachery, thus qualifying the same to murder.
According to Article 248[45] of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, any person who shall
kill another shall be guilty of murder if the same was committed with the attendant
circumstance of treachery, among other things, and that the situation does not fall
within the provisions of Article 246.[46] There is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk
to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. [47] The
essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack, offering an unarmed and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape. There is treachery even if the
attack is frontal if it is sudden and unexpected, with the victims having no opportunity to
repel it or defend themselves, for what is decisive in treachery is that the execution of
the attack made it impossible for the victims to defend themselves or to retaliate. [48]
In the case at bar, the RTC gave more weight to the testimony of Carmela Tagpis in
establishing the presence of treachery in the manner with which the accused-appellant
carried out the violent killings of Felipe and Ranil. In this regard, we reiterate the
established doctrine articulated in People v. De Guzman[49] that:
In the resolution of the factual issues, the court relies heavily on the trial court
for its evaluation of the witnesses and their credibility. Having the opportunity to
observe them on the stand, the trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin line
between fact and prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused. That line may not be discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal record
by the reviewing court. x x x.[50]
Moreover, we have oftentimes ruled that the Court will not interfere with the judgment
of the trial court in determining the credibility of witnesses unless there appears in the
record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or
the significance of which has been misinterpreted. [51]
Carmela testified as follows:

PROS. TORREVILLAS:
Q: Do you have a brother named Ranil Tagpis, Jr?

A: Yes sir.
Q: Where is he now?

A: He is dead.
Q: Do you know the circumstance of his death?

A: Yes sir.
Q: Why did he die?

A: Because he was hacked by Bata Endong.
Q: Do you know also your grandfather Felipe Lagera, Jr?

A: Yes sir.
Q: Where is he now?
A: He is dead also.
Q: Why did he die?

A: Because he was hacked by Bata Endong.
Q: Is the person your Bata Endong here in the court room who hacked your brother and
your grandfather?
A: Yes sir.
COURT INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to a person when asked of his name identified himself as Rosendo
Rebucan.
xxxx
Q: What instrument did the accused use in killing your [brother and] your grandfather?
A: Long bolo, sundang.
Q: Were you able to see that long bolo?
A: Yes sir.
xxxx
Q: Was your grandfather armed that time?
A: He has his own bolo but he placed it on the holder of the long bolo.
Q: Was that long bolo used by your grandfather?
A: No sir.
xxxx
Q: How far were you to the incident, when this hacking incident happened?
A: (witness indicating a distance of about 4 meters).
xxxx
C
OURT:
Cross.
ATTY. DICO:
Q: You stated awhile ago that your brother Jericho, Bitoy [Ranil] and you and your papo
Felipe were at the house of your papo Felipe?
A: Yes sir.
Q: You mean to say that there were no other persons present in that house other than
you four (4)?
A: Yes sir.
xxxx
Q: So, you were playing that toy camera inside the room of your papo Felipe?
A: No sir, I was playing then at the side of the chicken cage.
Q: Is that chicken cage was inside or outside the house of your papo Felipe's house?

A: Inside the house of my grandfather.
xxxx
Q: Was your brother Ranil carried by your grandfather Felipe?
A: Yes sir.
He was carried by his right arm.
Q: So, you mean to say that your uncle Endo went inside, it was so sudden?
A: Yes sir.

Q: Because it was sudden, you were not able to do anything, what did you do?
A: I then cried at that time.
xxxx
Q: But you are sure that when your uncle Endo entered as you said that your brother
Ramil was carried by your papo Felipe?
A: Yes sir.

Q: Did your uncle Endo and your papo Felipe fight or was there an altercation?
A: No sir.[52]
As can be gleaned from the above testimony, Carmela firmly and categorically pointed
to the accused-appellant as the person who entered the house of Felipe. She clearly
stated that the attack was not preceded by any fight or altercation between the
accused-appellant and Felipe. Without any provocation, the accused-appellant
suddenly delivered fatal hacking blows to Felipe. The abruptness of the unexpected
assault rendered Felipe defenseless and deprived him of any opportunity to repel the
attack and retaliate. As Felipe was carrying his grandson Ranil, the child unfortunately
suffered the same fatal end as that of his grandfather. In the killing of Ranil, the trial
court likewise correctly appreciated the existence of treachery. The said circumstance
may be properly considered, even when the victim of the attack was not the one whom
the defendant intended to kill, if it appears from the evidence that neither of the two
persons could in any manner put up defense against the attack or become aware of it.
[53]
Furthermore, the killing of a child is characterized by treachery even if the manner of
assault is not shown. For the weakness of the victim due to his tender years results in
the absence of any danger to the accused.[54]
Although the accused-appellant painted a contrasting picture on the matter, i.e., that

the attack was preceded by a fight between him and Felipe, the Court is less inclined to
be persuaded by the accused-appellant's version of the events in question. Indeed, the
Court has ruled that the testimony of children of sound mind is "more correct and
truthful than that of older persons" and that "children of sound mind are likely to be
more observant of incidents which take place within their view than older persons, and
their testimonies are likely more correct in detail than that of older persons." [55] In the
instant case, Carmela was cross-examined by the defense counsel but she remained
steadfast and consistent in her statements. Thus, the Court fails to see any reason to
distrust the testimony of Carmela.
Incidentally, the testimony of the accused-appellant not only contradicts that of

Carmela, but some portions thereof do not also conform to the documentary evidence
admitted by the trial court. The testimony of Dr. Profetana and the sketch of the human
anatomy of Felipe, which was marked as Exhibit B for the prosecution, stated that Felipe
sustained three hacking wounds that were found on his right arm, at his "nose maxillary
area"[56] and on his left arm. On the other hand, the accused-appellant testified that he
delivered four hacking blows on Felipe, the three of which landed on the left side of the
victim's abdomen, the right side of his neck and on his upper left arm. When confronted
on the said apparently conflicting statements, the accused-appellant did not offer any
explanation.[57]
Therefore, on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution, we sustain the ruling of
the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the circumstance of treachery qualified the
killings of Felipe and Ranil to murder.
The Court finds erroneous, however, the trial court's and the Court of Appeals'
appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. For evident
premeditation to aggravate a crime, there must be proof, as clear as the evidence of the
crime itself, of the following elements: (1) the time when the offender determined to
commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination;
and (3) sufficient lapse of time, between determination and execution, to allow himself
to reflect upon the consequences of his act. [58] It is not enough that evident
premeditation is suspected or surmised, but criminal intent must be evidenced by
notorious outward acts evidencing determination to commit the crime. In order to be
considered an aggravation of the offense, the circumstance must not merely be
"premeditation"; it must be "evident premeditation." [59] In the case at bar, the evidence
of the prosecution failed to establish any of the elements of evident premeditation since
the testimonies they presented pertained to the period of the actual commission of the
crime and the events that occurred thereafter. The prosecution failed to adduce any
evidence that tended to establish the exact moment when the accused-appellant
devised a plan to kill Felipe, that the latter clung to his determination to carry out the
plan and that a sufficient time had lapsed before he carried out his plan.
Likewise, the trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstances of abuse of
superior strength, dwelling, minority and intoxication. When the circumstance of abuse
of superior strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter. [60] On
the other hand, dwelling, minority and intoxication cannot be appreciated as
aggravating circumstances in the instant case considering that the same were not
alleged and/or specified in the information that was filed on January 23, 2003. Under
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, a
generic aggravating circumstance will not be appreciated by the Court unless alleged in
the information. This requirement is laid down in Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110, to wit:
SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information shall state the
the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no
designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the
statute punishing it.
SEC. 9. Cause of the accusation. - The acts or omissions complained of as constituting

the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary
and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in
terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court
to pronounce judgment.
With regard to the conflicting rulings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals vis-à-vis the
nature of crimes committed, we agree with the appellate court that the accused-
appellant should be held liable for two (2) separate counts of murder, not the complex
crime of double murder.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[w]hen a single act constitutes two
or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same
to be applied in its maximum period." There are, thus, two kinds of complex crimes. The
first is known as compound crime, or when a single act constitutes two or more grave or
less grave felonies. The second is known as complex crime proper, or when an offense is
a necessary means for committing the other.[61]
The Court finds that there is a paucity of evidence to prove that the instant case falls
under any of the two classes of complex crimes. The evidence of the prosecution failed
to clearly and indubitably establish the fact that Felipe and Ranil were killed by a single
fatal hacking blow from the accused-appellant. The eyewitness testimony of Carmela
did not contain any detail as to this material fact. To a greater degree, it was neither
proven that the murder of Felipe was committed as a necessary means for committing
and/or facilitating the murder of Ranil and vice versa. As the factual milieu of the case
at bar excludes the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused-
appellant should be made liable for two separate and distinct acts of murder. In the
past, when two crimes have been improperly designated as a complex crime, this Court
has affirmed the conviction of the accused for the component crimes separately instead
of the complex crime.[62]
In the determination of the penalty to be imposed on the accused-appellant, we uphold

the trial court's ruling that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be
appreciated. For voluntary surrender to mitigate criminal liability, the following
elements must concur: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender
surrenders himself to a person in authority or to the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender
is voluntary.[63] To be sufficient, the surrender must be spontaneous and made in a
manner clearly indicating the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally, either
because they acknowledge their guilt or wish to save the authorities the trouble and the
expense that will necessarily be incurred in searching for and capturing them. [64] The
accused-appellant has duly established in this case that, after the attack on Felipe and
Ranil, he surrendered unconditionally to the barangay chairperson and to the police on
his own volition and before he was actually arrested. The prosecution also admitted this
circumstance of voluntary surrender during trial.
We reject, however, the accused-appellant's contention that the trial court erred in
failing to appreciate the mitigating circumstances of intoxication and immediate
vindication of a grave offense.
The third paragraph of Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the
intoxication of the offender shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating
circumstance when the offender has committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the
same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit said felony; but when the
intoxication is habitual or intentional, it shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance. The Court finds that the accused-appellant is not entitled to the
mitigating circumstance of intoxication since his own testimony failed to substantiate his
claim of drunkenness during the incident in question. During his cross-examination, the
accused-appellant himself positively stated that he was only a bit tipsy but not drunk
when he proceeded to the house of Felipe. [65] He cannot, therefore, be allowed to make
a contrary assertion on appeal and pray for the mitigation of the crimes he committed
on the basis thereof.
As regards the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense, the

same cannot likewise be appreciated in the instant case. Article 13, paragraph 5 of the
Revised Penal Code requires that the act be "committed in the immediate vindication of
a grave offense to the one committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants,
descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity
within the same degrees." The established rule is that there can be no immediate
vindication of a grave offense when the accused had sufficient time to recover his
equanimity.[66] In the case at bar, the accused-appellant points to the alleged attempt of
Felipe and Timboy Lagera on the virtue of his wife as the grave offense for which he
sought immediate vindication. He testified that he learned of the same from his
stepson, Raymond, on November 2, 2002. Four days thereafter, on November 6, 2002,
the accused-appellant carried out the attack that led to the deaths of Felipe and Ranil.
To our mind, a period of four days was sufficient enough a time within which the
accused-appellant could have regained his composure and self-control. Thus, the said
mitigating circumstance cannot be credited in favor of the accused-appellant.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, prescribes the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death for the crime of murder. In this case, apart from the qualifying
circumstance of treachery, the prosecution failed to prove the existence of any other
aggravating circumstance in both the murders of Felipe and Ranil. On the other hand,
as the presence of the lone mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was properly
established in both instances, Article 63, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal
Code[67] mandates that the proper penalty to be imposed on the accused-appellant
is reclusion perpetua for each of the two counts of murder.
Anent the award of damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be
recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or
compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases. [68]
The RTC awarded in favor of the heirs of Felipe and Ranil the amounts of P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity and P75,000.00 as moral damages for each set of heirs. The Court of
Appeals, on the other hand, reduced the aforesaid amounts to P50,000.00 and further
awarded the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages to the heirs of the victim.
Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of
proof other than the commission of the crime. [69] Similarly, moral damages may be
awarded by the court for the mental anguish suffered by the heirs of the victim by
reason of the latter's death. The purpose for making such an award is not to enrich the
heirs of the victim but to compensate them for injuries to their feelings. [70] The award of
exemplary damages, on the other hand, is provided under Articles 2229-2230 of the Civil
Code, viz:
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or

correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages.
Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be
imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.
Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended
party.
In People v. Dalisay,[71] the Court clarified that "[b]eing corrective in nature, exemplary

damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only in the presence of an aggravating
circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the highly
reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. In much the same way as Article
2230 prescribes an instance when exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229,
the main provision, lays down the very basis of the award." [72]
Thus, we affirm the Court of Appeals' award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P50,000.00 as moral damages. The award of exemplary damages is, however, increased
to P30,000.00 in accordance with the prevailing jurisprudence. As held in People v.
Combate,[73] when the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition
of reclusion perpetua only, the proper amounts that should be awarded are P50,000.00
as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In lieu of actual or compensatory damages, the Court further orders the award of
P25,000.00 temperate damages to the heirs of the two victims in this case. The award
of P25,000.00 for temperate damages in homicide or murder cases is proper when no
evidence of burial and funeral expenses is presented in the trial court. Under Article
2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered, as it cannot be denied
that the heirs of the victim suffered pecuniary loss, although the exact amount was not
proven.[74]
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the Decision dated

August 21, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00282. The accused-
appellant Rosendo Rebucan y Lamsin is found GUILTY of two (2) counts of murder for
the deaths of Felipe Lagera and Ranil Tagpis, Jr. and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count. The accused-appellant is further ordered
to indemnify the respective heirs of the victims Felipe Lagera and Ranil Tagpis, Jr. the
amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages and P25,000.00 as temperate damages for each victim, plus legal
interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 6% from the date of the finality of this
decision. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION

[ GR. No. 196735, August 03, 2016 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. DANILO
FELICIANO, JR., JULIUS VICTOR MEDALLA, CHRISTOPHER SOLIVA,
WARREN L. ZINGAPAN, AND ROBERT MICHAEL BELTRAN
PROMULGATED: ALVIR, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
Even as the judiciary strives to bring justice to victims of fraternity-related

violence, the violence continues to thrive in universities across the country. Mere weeks
after our Decision dated May 5, 2014 was promulgated, various news agencies reported
the death of an 18-year-old student of De La Salle-College of St. Benilde. [1] The death
was allegedly caused by hazing.
While this Court is powerless to end this madness, it can, at the very least, put an end to
its impunity.
This resolves the separate Motions for Reconsideration of our Decision dated May 5,
2014, which were filed by accused-appellants Christopher Soliva (Soliva), [2] Warren L.
Zingapan (Zingapan),[3] and Robert Michael Beltran Alvir (Alvir). [4]
To recall, we affirmed the Court of Appeals Decision [5] dated November 26, 2010 finding
accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the murder of Dennis Venturina.
However, we modified its finding that accused-appellants were only guilty of slight
physical injuries in relation to private complainants Leandro Lachica, Cristobal Gaston,
Jr., and Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. Instead, we upheld the trial court's Decision [6] dated
February 28, 2002, which found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the attempted murder of private complainants Leandro Lachica (Lachica), Arnel Fortes
(Fortes), Mervin Natalicio (Natalicio), Cristobal Gaston, Jr. (Gaston), and Cesar
Mangrobang, Jr. (Mangrobang, Jr.).
Alvir, Zingapan, and Soliva separately filed their Motions for Reconsideration on-July 1,
2014, July 2, 2014, and July 9, 2014, respectively. The Office of the Solicitor General was
directed to file a Consolidated Comment on these Motions. [7]
Atty. Estelito Mendoza, counsel for Zingapan, through a letter [8] dated May 22, 2014,
requested information on the composition of the Division trying this case. At that time,
our May 5, 2014 Decision was not yet published in the Supreme Court website. Atty.
Estelito Mendoza's request was denied[9] under Rule 7, Section 3 of the Internal Rules of
the Supreme Court,[10] which mandates that results of a raffle, including the composition
of the Division, are confidential in eriminal cases where the trial court imposes capital
punishment.
Undaunted, Zingapan moved to elevate the case to this Court En Bane. [11] The Motion
was denied for lack of merit. [12]
On November 10, 2014, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Consolidated
Comment[13] on the Motions for Reconsideration.
Meanwhile, Alvir moved for modification of judgment, [14] arguing on his innocence and
praying for his acquittal.
The only issue to be resolved is whether accused-appellants presented substantial

arguments in their Motions for Reconsideration as to warrant the reversal of this Court's
May 5, 2014 Decision.
Soliva argues that his conviction was merely based on private complainant Natalicio's
sole testimony, which he alleges was doubtful and inconsistent. [15] He points out that
prosecution witness Ernesto Paolo Tan (Tan) was able to witness the attack on Natalicio,
but was unable to identify him as the attacker.[16]
The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that Natalicio's testimony
was sufficient to identify Soliva.[17] It argues that Tan's testimony did not contradict
Natalicio's testimony since Tan was able to state that he saw the assailants who were
not masked, though he did not know their names.[18]
The testimony of a single witness, as long as it is credible and positive, is enough to

prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt.[19]
Soliva argues that Natalicio was not able to identify his attackers since he was seen by
Tan" lying face down as he was being attacked. On the contrary, Natalicio's and Tan's
testimonies were consistent as to Natalicio's position during the attack. Natalicio
testified:
With respect to the first group that attacked you, Mr. Natalicio, while they were beating
you up, what else if anything happened?

I was able to recognize two (2) among those [sic] first group of attackers.

COURT
What group, first group?

....

While I was parrying their blows, two (2) of these attackers had no mask, they had no mask
anymore.

....

So, Mr. Natalicio, who were these two (2) men that you recognized?

They were Warren Zingapan and Christopher Soliva. [20]

Cross-examination

Imagine, Mr. Witness, there were ten (10) people ganging up on you, you stood up, faced
them, just like that?

Yes.

You did not cover your head with your arms as they were pounding on you?

Not yet. When I was standing up, no. I was parrying their blows. I covered my head when I
fell down already, because I was defenseless already.

And there were people [who] attacked you from behind?

When I was standing up, none.

All of them were in froRt of you?

Front, yes.[21]
Natalicio explained that he was attacked twice. During the first attack, he tried to
stand up and was able to identify two (2) of his attackers. He fell to the ground when he
was attacked the second time. This is consistent with Tan's testimony, where he stated:
During the second waive [sic], your honor, [Natalicio] tried to get up but immediately after
the first waive [sic] another group of persons attacked, your honor.
COURT
When he tried to get up, he was still facing the ground?
A He was a bit tilted, your honor. He was no longer lying face down or "nakadapa, " your
[22]
honor. (Emphasis supplied)
Soliva also misconstrues Tan's testimony that he could not identify Natalicio's
attackers. Tan testified:
You stated that while you were inside the beach house canteen observing the events
outside thru the door and in that couple of seconds, you could not establish the identity of
persons, is it not?

I could see them although I do not know their names. [23] (Emphasis supplied)
Tan failed to identify the attackers only because he did not know their names. His
testimony corroborates Natalicio's testimony that some of the attackers were masked
and some were not,[24] although Tan could not identify them because he was not familiar
with their names.
Tan was a fourth year student of the University of the Philippines College of Business
Administration at the time of the incident. He was not part of the Sigma Rho Fraternity
and was merely one of the students eating at Beach House Canteen on December 8,
1994.[25]
Another witness, Darwin Asuncion (Asuncion), was a third year student at the University
of the Philippines and was also at Beach House Canteen during the incident. [26] He
testified that some attackers were wearing masks while some were not. [27] On cross-
examination, he stated:
And many of these people who were in beach house canteen who were there to probably
eat or probably lining up to eat were not wearing mask? [sic]
Yes sir.
And there is a great possibility that you could have mistaken the unmasked people as part
of the attacking group?
No sir.
Why?
Because they were carrying lead pipes and baseball bats sir. [28] (Emphasis supplied)
Asuncion's testimony corroborates that of defense witness Frisco Capilo, who
testified that before the incident, the attackers were wearing masks, but after the
incident, he saw some wearing masks and some who did not. [29]
Alvir argues that Lachica's identification of him was "uncorroborated and hazy." [30] He
argues that Lachica admitted that while he was attacked, he covered his head with his
forearms, which created doubt that he was able to see his attackers. He argues that
Lachica's statement that he was still able to raise his head while parrying blows was
impossible. Alvir also argues that when Lachica ran away and looked back at the scene
of the crime, Lachica was only able to identify Julius Victor Medalla (Medalla) and
Zingapan.[31]
It is in line with human experience that even while Lachica was parrying the blows, he
would strive to identify his attackers. As has been previously stated by this Court:
It is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to see the
looks and faces of their assailants and observe the manner in which the crime was
committed. Most often the face of the assailant and body movements thereof, create a
lasting impression which cannot be easily erased from their memory. [32]
Lachica clearly and categorically identified Alvir as one of his attackers:
And during these attacks of these five (5) men and according to you, you were parrying
their blows, what happened?

At that time, one of the mask [sic] of those who attacked us fell off and I was able to
recognize one of them.

Who did you recognize whose mask fell?

He was Mike Alvir.[33]
Alvir also misinterprets Lachica's testimony that Lachica was unable to see Alvir
as he was running away. Lachica testified:
What happened after as you said you parried the blows of the men who attacked you and
you recognized one of them to be Mike Alvir. What happened next?
As I said, I was able to elude these five armed men and run towards the College of
Education and prior to reaching the College of Education, I tried to look back.
And what happened when you looked back?
I was able to see also, identify two more of them. Two of the attackers.
Who are these persons?
Warren Zingapan and Victor Medalla.[34] (Emphasis supplied)

Lachica testified that he was able to identify Alvir while he was being attacked.
When Lachica ran away and looked back at the scene of the crime, he was also able to
identify two (2) more of the attackers, Zingapan and Medalla. He did not deny seeing
Alvir, but only added that he was able to identify two (2) more people. U
Accused-appellants were positively identified by private complainants. Private

complainants' testimonies were clear and categorical. On this issue, we find no cogent
reason to reverse our May 5, 2014 Decision.
II
Zingapan's main argument hinges on the sufficiency of the Information filed against him,
which, he argues, violated his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.[35] His arguments, however, have already been
sufficiently addressed in our May 5, 2014 Decision.
For an information to be sufficient, Rule 110, Section 6 of the Rules of Criminal

Procedure requires that it state:
the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the
The purpose of alleging all the circumstances attending a crime, including any
circumstance that may aggravate the accused's liability, is for the accused to be able to
adequately prepare for his or her defense:
To discharge its burden of informing him of the charge, the State must specify in
the information the details of the crime and any circumstance that aggravates his
liability for the crime. The requirement of sufficient factual averments is meant to inform
the accused of the nature and cause of the charge against him in order to enable him to
prepare his defense. It emanates from the presumption of innocence in his favor,
details of the crime he is being charged with. To have the facts stated in the body of the
information determine the crime of which he stands charged and for which he must be
tried thoroughly accords with common sense and with the requirements of plain
justice[.][36] (Emphasis supplied)
Here, the aggravating circumstance of "masks and/or other forms of
disguise"[37] was alleged in the Informations to enable the prosecution to establish that
the attackers intended to conceal their identities. Once this is established, the
prosecution needed to prove how the witnesses were able to ft identify the attackers
despite the concealment of identity. In our May 5, X 2014 Decision:
In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because, like nighttime,
it allows the accused to remain anonymous and unidentifiable as he carries out his
crimes.
The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to prove that the
accused were masked but the masks fell off does not prevent them from including
disguise as an aggravating circumstance. What is important in alleging disguise as an
aggravating circumstance is that there was a concealment of identity by the accused.
The inclusion of disguise in the information was, therefore, enough to sufficiently
apprise the accused that in the commission of the offense they were being charged
with, they tried to conceal their identity.[38] (Emphasis in the original)
To recall, the Information for murder filed against accused-appellants reads:
That on or about the 8th day of December 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise, conspiring,
confederating with other persons whose true names, identities and whereabouts have
not as yet been ascertained, and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill,
qualified with treachery, and with evident premeditation, taking advantage of superior
strength, armed with baseball bats, lead pipes, and cutters, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person
of DENNIS F. VENTURINA, by then and there hitting him on the head and clubbing him
on different parts of his body thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal injuries
which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice
of the heirs of said DENNIS F. VENTURINA.[39]
Zingapan was sufficiently informed that he was being charged with the death of
Dennis Venturina, committed through the circumstances provided.
Based on this Information, Zingapan's counsel was able to formulate his defense, which
was that of alibi. He was able to allege that he was not at Beach House Canteen at the
time of the incident because he was having lunch with his cousin's husband in
Kamuning.[40] His defense had nothing to do with whether he might or might not have
been wearing a mask during the December 8, 1994 incident since his main defense was
that he was not there at all.
Zingapan's right to be informed of the cause or nature of the accusation against him was
not violated. The inclusion of the aggravating circumstance of disguise in the
Informations did not prevent him from presenting his defense of alibi.
III
Accused-appellants argue that the testimony of University of the Philippines Police

Officers Romeo Cabrera (Cabrera) and Oscar Salvador (Salvador) and Dr. Carmen
Mislang (Dr. Mislang) from the University of the Philippines Infirmary should have been
given credibility by this Court.[41] They also insist that the victims' delay in reporting the
incident casts doubt in their credibility as witnesses. [42] Unfortunately, these arguments
fail to persuade.
Natalicio testified that he was unable to answer the queries of Cabrera and Salvador
since he was more concerned with his injuries and the injuries of his companions. [43] He
also denied that Dr. Mislang questioned him on the identity of his attackers. [44]
Even if it were true that Natalicio denied knowing his attackers when he was
interviewed by Cabrera, Salvador, and Dr. Mislang, it did not cast doubt on accused-
appellants' guilt. The conditions prevailing within the campus at the time of the incident
must also be taken into account.
At the time of the incident, the University of the Philippines-Diliman had an existing
policy that all students involved in fraternity rumbles would be expelled. [45] Cabrera,
Salvador, and Dr. Mislang were employees of the University. [46] Reporting the incident as
a fraternity rumble was risking expulsion.[47]
The investigation conducted by the University of the Philippines Police was met with the
same difficulty, since the witnesses interviewed were reluctant to speak on fraternity
matters:
As of this date, operatives of the UP Diliman Police have already interviewed sixty
(60) persons, twenty five (25) of them mostly students, refused to comment or to give
their names. Most of those who refused to comment said that they don't want to get
involved in fraternity matters[.][48] (Emphasis supplied)
Under these circumstances, private complainants chose to report the matter to
the National Bureau of Investigation as an ordinary crime rather than to report it to
school authorities. The University would have treated the matter as a fraternity-related
campus incident where all parties involved, including private complainants who were
also fraternity members, risk academic sanctions. At that time, private complainants
decided that reporting to the National Bureau of Investigation, rather than to university
officials, was the more prudent course of action.
The alleged delay in reporting the crime also does not cast doubt on private
complainants' credibility. The trial court stated:
[O]n the evening of December 8, 1994, the victims, upon the advice of their
senior fraternity brothers, had agreed that the NBI would handle the investigation. This
was reached during the fellowship of the Sigma Rho brothers in a racetrack in Makati
which Lachica and Gaston attended. Lachica preferred the NBI because he wanted a
thorough investigation in view of the gravity of the offense.
So, on the very next day, December 9, 1994, the Vice Grand Archon, Redentor Guerrero,
went to the NBI and inquired about the procedure in filing a complaint. Thereafter, their
then Grand Archon Jovy Bernabe, with Redentor Guerrero, informed them that they
would be going to the NBI together. They were advised to rest and told that they would
just be informed when they would go to the NBI. On the 11th, the two informed them
that they would go to the NBI the next day and they did. [49]
The incident happened on a Thursday. On the evening of the incident, private
complainants agreed that they would report the matter to the National Bureau of
Investigation. On Friday, December 9, 1994, they were advised by their senior fraternity
brothers to recuperate first from their injuries while their Grand Archon and Vice Grand
Archon went to the National Bureau of Investigation to inquire on the procedure. They
could not report the incident on December 10 and 11, 1994 because this was a Saturday
and a Sunday. They were able to report to the National Bureau of Investigation on
December 12, 1994, the Monday following the incident. [50]
The alleged delay in reporting was caused by the gravity of private complainants'
injuries, their desire to report to the proper authorities, and the weekend. These
circumstances are not enough to disprove their credibility as witnesses.
Soliva also takes exception to this Court's characterization that the University of the
Philippines Police have become desensitized to fraternity-related violence. [51]
It is not disputed that the University of the Philippines has served as a common
battleground for fraternity-related violence. In 2007, GMA News compiled a list of
casualties of fraternity-related violence at the University of the Philippines. [52] Six (6)
students were reported to have died from fraternity-related violence before the
December 8, 1994 incident at Beach House Canteen.
Even after the promulgation of our May 5, 2014 Decision, fraternity-related violence
remained prevalent within the University. On July 4, 2014, the Office of the Chancellor
issued a statement confirming another fraternity-related incident involving students of
the University.[53] Another fraternity rumble was reported to have occurred on university
grounds.[54] Although no casualties were reported in both incidents, these incidents only
amplify the reality that fraternity-related violence continues to be rampant within the
University.
The presence of the University of the Philippines Police or the severe sanctions imposed
by university officials have done little to deter these crimes. The frequency of these
incidents has become the University's cultural norm, where its students—and even
university employees—simply regard it as part of university life.
IV
Alvir argues that this Court erred in finding conspiracy among all the accused since the
trial court acquitted those who were identified by Mangrobang, Jr. [55] This argument,
however, is non sequitur.
The trial court, in acquitting the other accused, stated:

The foregoing should not be misinterpreted to mean that the testimony of
Mangrobang was an absolute fabrication. The Court is not inclined to make such a
declaration. The four accused were exonerated merely because they were afforded the
benefit of the doubt as their identification by Mangrobang, under tumultuous and
chaotic circumstances were not corroborated and their alibis, not refuted. [56]
In contrast, Lachica's identification of Alvir was given credibility by the trial court.
[57]
Alvir's alibi was also found to be weak. [58]
Conspiracy does not require that all persons charged in the information be found guilty.
It only requires that those who were found guilty conspired in committing the crime.
The acquittal of some of the accused does not necessarily preclude the presence of
conspiracy.
Of the 10 accused in the Informations, four [59] (4) were acquitted. The trial court was
convinced that they were not present during the commission of the crime. Conspiracy
cannot attach to those who were not properly identified.
However, Alvir, Zingapan, Soliva, Medalla, and Danilo Feliciano, Jr. (Feliciano) were
positively identified by eyewitnesses before the trial court. The prosecution's evidence
was enough to convince the trial court, the Court of Appeals, and this Court that they
were present during the December 8, 1994 incident and that they committed the crime
charged in the Informations. We have also exhaustively examined the evidence on hand,
as well as the assessments of the trial court and of the Court of Appeals, to determine
that all five (5) of them conspired to commit the crimes with which they were charged.
The trial court's acquittal of some of those charged in the Informations has no bearing
on our finding that Alvir, Zingapan, Soliva, Feliciano, and Medalla are guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
Soliva, however, argues that our May 5, 2014 Decision did not apply to those who did
not appeal to this Court, namely: Feliciano and Medalla. [60] At this point, a re-
examination of the rules of appeal in criminal cases may be in order.
To recall the procedural incidents in this case, the trial court's Decision [61] dated
February 28, 2002 found Alvir, Zingapan, Soliva, Feliciano, and Medalla guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the murder of Dennis Venturina and the attempted murder of
Lachica, Fortes, Natalicio,
Gaston, and Mangrobang, Jr.[62] They were meted the death penalty, and the case was
brought to this Court on automatic review.[63]
In view, however, of People v. Mateo[64] and the Amended Rules to Govern Review of

Death Penalty Cases,[65] this Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals for review. A
notice of appeal in this instance was unnecessary. Rule 122, Sections 3(d) and 10 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, state:
RULE 122
APPEAL
SEC. 3. How appeal taken.—
....
(d) No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the Regional Trial Court imposed the
death penalty. The Court of Appeals shall automatically review the judgment as
provided in Section 10 of this Rule. (3a)
SEC. 10. Transmission of records in case of death penalty. —In all cases where the death
penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records shall be forwarded to the Court of
Appeals for automatic review and judgment within twenty days but not earlier than
fifteen days from the promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of a motion for
new trial or reconsideration. The transcript shall also be forwarded within ten days after
the filing thereof by the stenographic reporter. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court of Appeals was mandated to review the case with regard to all five (5)
of the accused, now referred to as accused-appellants, regardless of whether they filed
a notice of appeal. The review is considered automatic.
During the pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, Congress enacted
Republic Act No. 9346,[66] which prohibited courts from imposing the death penalty. In
its November 26, 2010 Decision,[67] the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's finding
that accused-appellants were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the murder of Dennis
Venturina. In view of the proscription on death penalty, the Court of Appeals modified
the imposable penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.[68]
However, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court's finding that accused-
appellants were likewise guilty of attempted murder with regards Lachica, Mangrobang,
Jr., and Gaston.[69] It stated that the gravity of their injuries was not indicative of
accused-appellants' intent to kill. [70] Instead, the Court of Appeals modified the offense
to slight physical injuries.[71] In other words, it found accused-appellants guilty of the
murder of Dennis Venturina, the attempted murder of Fortes and Natalicio, and the
slight physical injuries of Lachica, Mangrobang, Jr., and Gaston. [72]
Only three (3)—namely: Soliva, Alvir, and Zingapan—of the five (5) accused-appellants
filed their respective Notices of Appeal before this Court. The Court of Appeals
forwarded the records of the case to this Court, and the entire case was again opened
for review under Rule 124, Section 13(b) and (c) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure:
RULE 124
SEC. 13. Certification or appeal of case to the Supreme Court.—
(b) Where the judgment also imposes a lesser penalty for offenses committed on the
severe offense for which the penalty of death is imposed, and the accused appeals, the
appeal shall be included in the case certified for review to, the Supreme Court.
(c) In cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or
a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The
judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Court
of Appeals. (Emphasis supplied)
In our May 5, 2014 Decision,[73] we reversed the Court of Appeals' modification of
the offense from attempted murder to slight physical injuries. [74] We explained that the
liabilities of accused-appellants arose from a single incident where the intent to kill was
already evident from the first swing of the bat, and that intent was shared by all when
the presence of conspiracy was proven. In effect, we affirmed the trial court's ruling that
accused-appellants were guilty of the attempted murder of Lachica, Fortes, Natalicio,
Gaston, and Mangrobang, Jr.[75]
According to Article 248[76] in relation to Article 51[77] of the Revised Penal Code,
attempted murder is punishable by prision mayor. Slight physical injuries, on the other
hand, is punishable by arresto menor. The Court of Appeals, in modifying the offenses
with regard to victims Lachica, Gaston, and Mangrobang, Jr., lowered some of the
imposable penalties of accused-appellants. On appeal to this Court, however, we
reverted to the findings of the trial court and brought back the higher offense of
attempted murder. In this instance, the application of the higher penalty to accused-
appellants becomes problematic when only three (3) of them actually appealed to this
Court.
The problem lies with the effect of the prohibition of death penalty on the current rules
on appeal in the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The amendments introduced in the
Amended Rules to Govern Review of Death Penalty Cases still stand even if, as this Court
has previously mentioned, "death penalty cases are no longer operational." [78]
In People v. Rocha,[79] this Court encountered a similar problem. The issue for resolution
was whether the accused's Motion to Withdraw Appeal before this Court could be
granted if the Court of Appeals imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetual[80] The People
were of the opinion that the appeal could not be withdrawn since this Court was
mandated by the Constitution to review all cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or higher.[81]
However, this Court ruled that the appeal could still be withdrawn as cases where the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher is not subject to this Court's mandatory
review. Thus:
The confusion in the case at bar seems to stem from the effects of the Decision of
this Court in People v. Mateo. In Mateo, as quoted by plaintiff-appellee, it was stated
that "[w]hile the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court
of cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death,
nowhere, however, has it proscribed an intermediate review." A closer study of Mateo,
however, reveals that the inclusion in the foregoing statement of cases where the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment was only for the purpose of
including these cases within the ambit of the intermediate review of the Court of
Appeals: "[this] Court now deems it wise and compelling to provide in these cases [cases
where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death] review by
the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court."
We had not intended to pronounce in Mateo that cases where the penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment are subject to the mandatory review of this
Court. In Mateo, these cases were grouped together with death penalty cases because,
prior to Mateo, it was this Court which had jurisdiction to directly review reclusion
perpetua, life imprisonment and death penalty cases alike. The mode of review,
however, was different. Reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment cases were brought
before this Court via a notice of appeal, while death penalty cases were reviewed by this
Court on automatic review.
. . . .
After the promulgation of Mateo on 7 June 2004, this Court promptly caused the
amendment of the foregoing provisions, but retained the distinction of requiring a
notice of appeal for reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment cases and automatically
reviewing death penalty cases. .
Neither does the Constitution require a mandatory review by this Court of cases where
the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. The constitutional
provision quoted in Mateo merely gives this Court jurisdiction over such cases[.]
. . . .
Since the case of accused-appellants is not subject to the mandatory review of this
Court, the rule that neither the accused nor the courts can waive a mandatory review is
not applicable. Consequently, accused-appellants' separate motions to withdraw appeal
may be validly granted.[82] (Emphasis supplied)
Here, the trial court's ruling mandated an automatic review and the case was
forwarded to the Court of Appeals per Mateo and the Amended Rules to Govern Review
of Death Penalty Cases. As the death penalty was abolished during the pendency of the
appeal before the Court of Appeals, the highest penalty the Court of Appeals could
impose was reclusion perpetua. Any review of the Court of Appeals Decision by this
Court will never be mandatory or automatic.
In effect, while we can review the case in its entirety and examine its merits, we cannot
disturb the penalties imposed by the Court of Appeals on those who did not appeal,
namely, Feliciano and Medalla. This is consistent with Rule 122, Section 1 l(a) of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure:
RULE 122
APPEAL
SEC. 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. —
to the latter[.]
As our May 5, 2014 Decision was unfavorable to accused-appellants, those who
did not appeal must not be affected by our judgment. The penalty of arresto
menor imposed by the Court of Appeals on Feliciano and Medalla in Criminal Case Nos.
Q95-61134, Q95-61135, and Q95-61136 stands.
In view, however, of People v. Jugueta[83] the damages previously awarded must also be

increased. In Jugueta, we stated that "civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a
fine; hence, it can be increased by [this] Court when appropriate." [84] We also explained
that the Civil Code did not fix the amount of moral damages, exemplary damages, and
temperate damages that may be awarded; thus, the amount is within this Court's
discretion to determine.[85]
In Criminal Case No. Q95-61133, the award of civil indemnity, moral damages, and
exemplary damages are increased to P100,000.00, [86] respectively. The amount of
temperate damages to be awarded is increased to P50,000.00. [87] In Criminal Cases Nos.
Q95-61134, Q95-61135, Q95-61136, O95-61137, and Q95-61138, the award of moral
damages and exemplary damages are increased to P50,000.00, [88] respectively.
Soliva takes exception to this Court's statements on fraternity culture and argued that
these have no basis on facts or evidence. [89] Unfortunately, our May 5, 2014 Decision
was not the first time that this Court expressed its sentiments on the issue of fraternity-
related violence.
In Villareal v. People,[90] this Court found five (5) promising young men guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of reckless impudence resulting in homicide for the death of Lenny
Villa, an Ateneo law student and a neophyte of Aquila Legis Fraternity. This Court could
only lament on accused-appellants' fate and the senseless loss of life in the name of a
so-called "brotherhood," stating:
It is truly astonishing how men would wittingly — or unwittingly — impose the
misery of hazing and employ appalling rituals in the name of brotherhood. There must
be a better way to establish "kinship." A neophyte admitted that he joined the fraternity
to have more friends and to avail himself of the benefits it offered, such as tips during
bar examinations. Another initiate did not give up, because he feared being looked
down upon as a quitter, and because he felt he did not have a choice. Thus, for Lenny
Villa and the other neophytes, joining the Aquila Fraternity entailed a leap in the
dark. By giving consent under the circumstances, they left their fates in the hands of the
fraternity members. Unfortunately, the hands to which lives were entrusted were
barbaric as they were reckless.[91] (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, the blind loyalty held by fraternity members to their "brothers" defies
logic or reason.
In People v. Colana,[92] an innocent college student, Librado De la Vega (De la Vega),

became collateral damage between two rival fraternities in Far Eastern University.
When De la Vega passed Phi Lambda Epsilon officer Leonardo Colana's (Colana) group
on his way to school, the head of Colana's fraternity told him that De la Vega was a
member of Alpha Kappa Rho, their rival fraternity. The group approached De la Vega as
Colana, armed with an ice pick, stabbed De la Vega repeatedly. They left De la Vega on
the street to die.
On appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court's finding that Colana was guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder, stating that "[m]otive for the killing was revenge. On a
prior occasion some members of the Epsilon fraternity were beaten allegedly by
members of the Alpha fraternity."[93]
This Court likewise briefly mentioned the senselessness of De la Vega's death:

What is lamentable is that De la Vega was not an FEU student, much less a
member of the Alpha fraternity. He used to be an engineering student at the Feati
University. At the time of his death, he was studying typing. [94]
Death or injuries caused by fraternity rumbles are not treated as separate or
distinct crimes, unlike deaths or injuries as a result of hazing. They are punishable as
ordinary crimes of murder, homicide, or physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code.
The prosecution of fraternity-related violence, however, is harder than the prosecution

of ordinary crimes. Most of the time, the evidence is merely circumstantial. The reason
is obvious: loyalty to the fraternity dictates that brods do not turn on their brods. A
crime can go unprosecuted for as long as the brotherhood remains silent.
Perhaps the best person to explain fraternity culture is one of its own. Raymund Narag
was among those charged in this case but was eventually acquitted by the trial court. In
2009, he wrote a blog entry outlining the culture and practices of a fraternity, referring
to the fraternity system as "a big black hole that sucks these young promising men to
their graves."[95] This, of course, is merely his personal opinion on the matter. However,
it is illuminating to see a glimpse of how a fraternity member views his disillusionment
of an organization with which he voluntarily associated. In particular, he writes that:
The fraternities anchor their strength on secrecy. Like the Sicilian code of omerta,
fraternity members are bound to keep the secrets from the non-members. They have
codes and symbols the frat members alone can understand. They know if there are
problems in campus by mere signs posted in conspicuous places. They have a different
set [sic] of communicating, like inverting the spelling of words, so that ordinary
conversations cannot be decoded by non-members.
It takes a lot of acculturation in order for frat members to imbibe the code of silence.
The members have to be a mainstay of the tambayan to know the latest developments
about new members and the activities of other frats. Secrets are even denied to some
members who are not really in to [sic] the system. They have to earn a reputation to be
part of the inner sanctum. It is a form of giving premium to become the "true blue
member".
The code of silence reinforces the feeling of elitism. The fraternities are worlds of their
own. They are sovereign in their existence. They have their own myths,
conceptualization of themselves and worldviews. Save perhaps to their alumni
association, they do not recognize any authority aside from the head of the fraternity. [96]
The secrecy that surrounds the traditions and practices of a fraternity becomes
problematic on an evidentiary level as there are no set standards from which a
fraternity-related crime could be measured. In People v. Gilbert Peralta,[97] this Court
could not consider a fraternity member's testimony biased without any prior testimony
on fraternity behavior:
Esguerra testified that as a fraternity brother he would do anything and
everything for the victim. A witness may be said to be biased when his relation to the
cause or to the parties is such that he has an incentive to exaggerate or give false color
or pervert the truth, or to state what is false. To impeach a biased witness, the counsel
must lay the proper foundation of the bias by asking the witness the facts constituting
the bias. In the case at bar, there was no proper impeachment by bias of the three (3)
prosecution witnesses. Esguerra's testimony that he would do anything for his fellow
brothers was too broad and general so as to constitute a motive to lie before the trial
court. Counsel for the defense failed to propound questions regarding the tenets of the
fraternity that espouse absolute fealty of the members to each other. The question was
phrased so as to ask only for Esguerra's personal conviction[.][98] (Emphasis supplied)
The inherent difficulty in the prosecution of fraternity-related violence forces the
judiciary to be more exacting in examining all the evidence on hand, with due regard to
the peculiarities of the circumstances. In this instance, we have thoroughly reviewed the
arguments presented by accused-appellants in their Motions for Reconsideration and
have weighed them against the evidence on hand. Unfortunately, their Motions have
not given us cause to reconsider our May 5, 2014 Decision.
WHEREFORE, this Court resolves to DENY with FINALITY the Motions for

Reconsideration, both dated July 1, 2014, of accused-appellants Robert Michael Beltran
Alvir and Warren L. Zingapan. The Motion for Modification of Judgment dated October
30, 2014 filed by accused-appellant Robert Michael Beltran Alvir is DENIED.
The Motion for Reconsideration of accused-appellant Christopher Soliva, however,
is PARTLY GRANTED. Judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
In Criminal Case No. Q95-61133, accused-appellants Robert Michael Beltran Alvir, Danilo
1) Feliciano, Jr., Christopher Soliva, Julius Victor Medalla, and Warren L. Zingapan are found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of murder and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, without parole.

In addition, the accused-appellants are ordered to jointly and severally pay the heirs of
Dennis Venturina the following amounts:

a)
PI39,642.70 as actual damages;
b)
P5 0,000.00 as temperate damages;
c)
P100,000.00 as moral damages; and
d)
e)

In Criminal Cases No. Q95-61134, Q95-61135, Q95-61136, Q95-61137, and Q95-61138,
2) accused-appellants Robert Michael Beltran Alvir, Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Christopher Soliva, Julius
Victor Medalla, and Warren L. Zingapan are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of attempted
murder.
L. Zingapan are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, six (6)
months, and one (1) day of prision correctional as minimum and twelve (12) years
of prision mayor as maximum. A
Danilo Feliciano, Jr. and Julius Victor Medalla are sentenced to suffer arresto menor, or
thirty (30) days of imprisonment.
In addition, all accused-appellants are ordered to jointly and severally pay private
complainants Leonardo Lachica, Cesar Mangrobang-Jr., Cristobal Gaston, Jr., Mervin
Natalicio, and Arnel Fortes the following amounts:
(a) P50,000.00 as moral damages; and
(b) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
L. Zingapan are additionally ordered to jointly and severally pay private complainant
Mervin Natalicio P820.50 as actual damages.
All awards of damages shall earn 6% legal interest per annum from the finality of this
judgment until its full satisfaction.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 163938, March 28, 2008 ]
DANTE BUEBOS AND SARMELITO BUEBOS, PETITIONERS, V.S. THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,RESPONDENT.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
THE law on arson has always been a constant source of confusion not only among
members of the bar, but also among those of the bench. The bewilderment often centers
on what law to apply and what penalty to impose.
In this case, the Court is again tasked to determine whether petitioners are liable for
simple arson or arson of an inhabited house which merits a penalty of up to reclusion
perpetua.
Before the Court is a petition to review on certiorari under Rule 45 the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA), affirming with modification that [2] of the Regional Trial Court in
Tabaco, Albay, finding petitioners Dante Buebos and Sarmelito Buebos guilty of arson.
The Facts
On January 1, 1994 around 3:00 o'clock in the morning, Adelina B. Borbe was in her
house at Hacienda San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay watching over her sick child.[3] She was
lying down when she heard some noise around the house. She got up and looked through
the window and saw the four accused, Rolando Buela, Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos
and Antonio Cornel, Jr. congregating in front of her hut. [4] When she went out, she saw
the roof of her nipa hut already on fire. She shouted for help. Instead of coming to her
immediate succor, the four fled.[5]
At some distance away, Olipiano Berjuela heard Adelina scream for help. Olipiano was
then drinking with Pepito Borbe to celebrate New Year's Eve. Olipiano immediately ran
to the place and saw a number of people jumping over the fence. When he focused his
flashlight on them, he was able to identify Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos and Antonio
Cornel, Jr.[6] He also saw Rolando Buela running away.[7]
On complaint of Adelina, petitioners Dante and Sarmelito Buebos, together with Rolando
Buela and Antonio Cornel, Jr., were indicted for arson in an Information bearing the
following accusations:
That on or about the 1st day of January, 1994 at 3:00 o'clock in the Barangay Hacienda,
Island of San Miguel, Municipality of Tabaco, Province of Albay, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another, with intent to cause damage, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and maliciously set on fire the nipa roof of the house of
ADELINA B. BORBE, to the latter's damage and prejudice.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
The prosecution evidence portraying the foregoing facts was principally supplied by
private complainant Adelina Borbe and Olipiano Berjuela.
Upon the other hand, denial and alibi were the main exculpating line of petitioners and
their co-accused. The trial court summed up the defense evidence in the following tenor:
The defense contended that the accused were at different places at the time of the
incident; Rolando Buela claimed to be at sitio Tugon, Malictay, San Miguel, Tabaco,
Albay as there was a novena prayer at his parents' house on occasion of the death
anniversary of his late grandfather; Dante Buebos also claimed to have been at Romeo
Calleja's having gone there in the evening of December 30, 1993 and left the place at
12:00 o'clock noontime of January 1, 1994; Sarmelito Buebos asserted that he was at his
residence at sitio Malictay, Hacienda, San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay on the day the incident
happened and that he never left his house; Antonio Cornel, Jr. likewise claimed to be at
his residence at Añgas after having visited his in-laws; that he only came to know of the
accusation five (5) days after the incident happened when he visited his parents at
Malictay; witnesses were likewise presented by the accused to corroborate their
testimonies.[9]
RTC and CA Dispositions
On April 7, 1998, the RTC found all of the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
arson. The dispositive part of the judgment of conviction reads:
WHEREFORE, from all the foregoing, this Court finds accused ROLANDO BUELA,
DANTE BUEBOS, SARMELITO BUEBOS and ANTONIO CORNEL, JR. GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged; accordingly, each of the accused is
hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum; and to pay the cost.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Via a notice of appeal, the four accused elevated the matter to the appellate court. In their
appeal, they contended that (1) the trial court erred in finding them guilty of the crime of
arson; (2) that the trial court erred in finding conspiracy; and (3) the trial court erred in
failing to give weight and credence to their defense of denial and alibi.
On November 13, 2003, through an eight-page decision penned by Associate Justice

Eliezer R. de los Santos, the CA disposed of the appeal in this wise:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby

AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Each of the accused-appellant is hereby sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years of prision
correccional as minimum to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.[11]
In downgrading the penalty, the CA opined that the accused could only be convicted of
simple arson, punishable by prision mayor, and not for burning of an inhabited house,
which is punishable by imprisonment ranging from reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua. According to the appellate court, the information failed to allege with
specificity the actual crime committed. Hence, the accused should be found liable only
for arson in its simple form.[12]
Issues
Dissatisfied, Dante and Sarmelito Buebos have resorted to the present recourse. The
following arguments are now raised for the Court's consideration:
I.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING

THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ON THE BASIS OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE;
II.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
CONSPIRACY EXISTED IN THE CASE AT BAR.[13]
Our Ruling
Overview of the law on arson
The confusion surrounding arson has been confounded by the dearth of annotation on this
part of our penal law. Certainly, the law on arson is one of the least commented in this
jurisdiction. For the guidance of the bench and bar, a brief legislative history of the body
of laws on arson is in order.
Previously, arson was defined and penalized under nine different articles of the Revised
Penal Code: Article 320 (destructive arson), Article 321 (other forms of arson), Article
322 (cases of arson not included in the preceding articles), Article 323 (arson of property
of small value), Article 324 (crimes involving destruction), Article 325 (burning one's
own property to commit arson), Article 326 (setting fire to property exclusively owned by
the offender, Article 326-a (in cases where death resulted as a consequence of arson), and
Article 326-b (prima facie evidence of arson).
On March 7, 1979, citing certain inadequacies that impede the successful enforcement
and prosecution of arsonists, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential
Decree (P.D) No. 1613. P.D. 1613 supplanted the penal code provisions on arson. The
pertinent parts of the said presidential issuance read:
SECTION 1. Arson. - Any person who burns or sets fire to the property of another shall
be punished by prision mayor.
The same penalty shall be imposed when a person sets fire to his own property under
circumstances which expose to danger the life or property of another.
SECTION 2. Destructive Arson. - The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum

period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the
following:
1. Any ammunition factory and other establishments where explosives,

inflammable or combustible materials are stored;
2. Any archive, museum, whether public or private, or any edifice devoted to
culture, education or social services;
3. Any church or place of worship or other building where people usually
assemble;
4. Any train, airplane or any aircraft, vessel or watercraft, or conveyance for
transportation of persons or property;
5. Any building where evidence is kept for use in any legislative, judicial,
administrative or other official proceedings;
6. Any hospital, hotel, dormitory, lodging house, housing tenement, shopping
center, public or private market, theater or movie house or any similar place
or building;
7. Any building, whether used as a dwelling or not, situated in a populated or
congested area.
SECTION 3. Other Cases of Arson. - The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion

perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the following:
1. Any building used as offices of the government or any of its agencies;

2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;
3. Any industrial establishment, shipyard, oil well or mine shaft, platform or
tunnel;
4. Any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing crop, grain field, orchard,
bamboo grove or forest;
5. Any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill or mill central; and
6. Any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse.
SECTION 4. Special Aggravating Circumstances in Arson. - The penalty in any case of

arson shall be imposed in its maximum period:
1. If committed with the intent to gain;

2. If committed for the benefit of another;
3. If the offender is motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or
occupant of the property burned;
4. If committed by a syndicate. The offense is committed by a syndicate if it is
planned or carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons.
SECTION 5. Where Death Results from Arson. - If by reason of or on the occasion of

arson death results, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed.
SECTION 6. Prima Facie Evidence of Arson. - Any of the following circumstances shall
constitute prima facie evidence of arson:
1. If the fire started simultaneously in more than one part of the building or
establishment.
2. If substantial amount of flammable substances or materials are stored
within the building not necessary in the business of the offender nor for
household use.
3. If gasoline, kerosene, petroleum or other flammable or combustible
substances or materials soaked therewith or containers thereof, or any
mechanical, electrical, chemical, or electronic contrivance designed to start
a fire, or ashes or traces of any of the foregoing are found in the ruins or
premises of the burned building or property.
4. If the building or property is insured for substantially more than its actual
value at the time of the issuance of the policy.
5. If during the lifetime of the corresponding fire insurance policy more than
two fires have occurred in the same or other premises owned or under the
control of the offender and/or insured.
6. If shortly before the fire, a substantial portion of the effects insured and
stored in a building or property had been withdrawn from the premises
except in the ordinary course of business.
7. If a demand for money or other valuable consideration was made before the
fire in exchange for the desistance of the offender or for the safety of other
person or property of the victim.
SECTION 7. Conspiracy to Commit Arson. - Conspiracy to commit arson shall be

punished by prision mayor in its minimum period.
SECTION 8. Confiscation of Object of Arson. - The building which is the object of arson
including the land on which it is situated shall be confiscated and escheated to the State,
unless the owner thereof can prove that he has no participation in nor knowledge of such
arson despite the exercise of due diligence on his part.
On November 11, 1980, the law on arson was again revisited via P.D. No. 1744. The new
law expanded the definition of destructive arson by way of reinstating Article 320 of the
Revised Penal Code. The amendatory legislation also paved the way for the reimposition
of the capital punishment on destructive arsonists.
When Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659 (An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain
Heinous Crimes) was passed on December 13, 1993, Article 320 again underwent a
revision. As it now stands, Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code is worded, thus:
Art. 320. Destructive Arson. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be

imposed upon any person who shall burn:
1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of

burning, or as a result of simultaneous burnings, committed on several or
different occasions.
2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in
general or where people usually gather or congregate for a definite purpose
such as, but not limited to, official governmental function or business,
private transaction, commerce, trade, workshop, meetings and conferences,
or merely incidental to a definite purpose such as but not limited to hotels,
motels, transient dwellings, public conveyances or stops or terminals,
regardless of whether the offender had knowledge that there are persons in
said building or edifice at the time it is set on fire and regardless also of
whether the building is actually inhabited or not.
3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to
transportation or conveyance, or for public use, entertainment or leisure.
4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any appurtenances
thereto, which are devoted to the service of public utilities.
5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of concealing or
destroying evidence of another violation of law, or for the purpose of
concealing bankruptcy or defrauding creditors or to collect from insurance.
Irrespective of the application of the above enumerated qualifying circumstances, the

penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall likewise be imposed when the arson is
perpetrated or committed by two (2) or more persons or by a group of persons, regardless
of whether their purpose is merely to burn or destroy the building or the burning merely
constitutes an overt act in the commission or another violation of law.
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be imposed upon any person who
shall burn:
1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or fireworks factory,

ordinance, storehouse, archives or general museum of the Government.
2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable or
explosive materials.
If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under this Article,
death results, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.
Of course, with the repeal of the Death Penalty Law on June 24, 2006 through R.A. No.
9346, arson is no longer a capital offense.[14]
We proceed to the crux of the petition.
Circumstantial evidence points to

petitioners' culpability
Petitioners score the CA for convicting them of arson based on circumstantial evidence.
They argue that the inference that they were responsible for the burning of private
complainant's hut was not duly proven by the People.
Circumstantial evidence is defined as that evidence that "indirectly proves a fact in issue
through an inference which the fact-finder draws from the evidence established. Resort
thereto is essential when the lack of direct testimony would result in setting a felon
free."[15]
At the outset, We may well emphasize that direct evidence of the commission of a crime
is not the only basis on which a court draws its finding of guilt. Established facts that
form a chain of circumstances can lead the mind intuitively or impel a conscious process
of reasoning towards a conviction.[16] Verily, resort to circumstantial evidence is
sanctioned by Rule 133, Section 5 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. [17]
The following are the requisites for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient for a
conviction: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances
results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one who
has committed the crime. Thus, to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence,
the combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.[18]
After a careful review of the evidence presented by both parties, We find that the
circumstantial evidence extant in the records is sufficient to identify petitioners as the
authors of the burning of the hut of private complainant Adelina Borbe:
1. Private complainant heard some noise emanating from outside her house at around
3:00 a.m.;
2. When she went out to check the disturbance, private complainant saw petitioners,
together with their two other co-accused, standing in front of the house;
3. Moments later, the roof of her house caught fire;
4. Petitioners and their cohorts absconded while private complainant desperately
shouted for help.
The facts from which the cited circumstances arose have been proved through positive
testimony.[19] Evidently, these circumstances form an unbroken chain of events leading to
one fair conclusion - the culpability of petitioners for the burning of the hut. The Court is
convinced that the circumstances, taken together, leave no doubt that petitioner
perpetrated the arson.
Conspiracy evident from coordinated

action of petitioners
Petitioners next contend that conspiracy was erroneously appreciated by both the trial and
appellate courts. They posit that the finding of conspiracy was premised on speculation
and conjecture.
The rule is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to
commit it. Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence, as the same may be
inferred from the conduct of the parties indicating a common understanding among them
with respect to the commission of the offense. Corollarily, it is not necessary to show that
two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the
details of an unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried
out. The rule is that conviction is proper upon proof that the accused acted in concert,
each of them doing his part to fulfill the common design. In such a case, the act of one
becomes the act of all and each of the accused will thereby be deemed equally guilty of
the crime committed.[20]
In the case at bench, conspiracy was evident from the coordinated movements of
petitioners Dante and Sarmelito Buebos. Both of them stood outside the house of private
complainant Adelina. They were part of the group making boisterous noise in the
vicinity. Petitioners also fled together while the roof of Adelina's house was ablaze.
These acts clearly show their joint purpose and design, and community of interest.
We quote with approval the CA observation along this line:
Accused-appellant's assertion that conspiracy has not been established is belied by the
accounts of the prosecution witness. The manner by which the accused- appellants
behaved after the private complainant shouted for help clearly indicated a confederacy of
purpose and concerted action on the part of the accused-appellants. Even if there is no
direct evidence showing that all of the accused had prior agreement on how to set the roof
of the house on fire, the doctrine is well settled that conspiracy need not be proved by
direct evidence of prior agreement to commit the crime. Very seldom such prior
agreement be demonstrable since, in the nature of things, criminal undertakings are only
rarely documented by agreements in writing.[21]
Crime committed and the penalty
The RTC sentenced all four accused to an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6)
years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. On appeal, the CA reduced the
sentence to six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision
mayor, as maximum. The CA ratiocinated:
The information charges accused-appellants with "violation of P.D. 1613" without

specifying the particular provision breached. The information having failed to allege
whether or not the burnt house is inhabited, and not having been established that the
house is situated in a populated or congested area, accused-appellants should be deemed
to have only been charged with plain arson under Section 1 of the decree. Under Section
1 of the decree, the offense of simple arson committed is punishable by prision mayor .
There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances in the case at bar accused-
appellants should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium
period as provided under Article 321, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, by Presidential Decree No. 1613. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the minimum penalty should be anywhere within the range of prision correccional.[22]
The legal basis of the trial court in convicting petitioners of arson is Section 3, paragraph
2 of P.D. No. 1613. The said provision of law reads:
SECTION 3.Other Cases of Arson. - The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion

perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the following:
xxxx
2.Any inhabited house or dwelling;
The elements of this form of arson are: (a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what is
intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling.[23] Admittedly, there is a
confluence of the foregoing elements here. However, the information failed to allege that
what was intentionally burned was an inhabited house or dwelling. That is fatal.
Sections 8 and 9 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure state:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the
offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. - The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and
concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being
charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances for the court to
pronounce judgment.
Under the new rules, the information or complaint must state the designation of the
offense given by the statute and specify its qualifying and generic aggravating
circumstances. Otherwise stated, the accused will not be convicted of the offense proved
during the trial if it was not properly alleged in the information.[24]
Perusing the information, there was no allegation that the house intentionally burned by
petitioners and their cohorts was inhabited. Rather, the information merely recited that
"accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with intent to cause
damage, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and maliciously set on fire
the nipa roof of the house of ADELINA B. BORBE, to the latter's damage and
prejudice."[25]
Although the rule took effect only on December 1, 2000, while the petitioners were
convicted by the RTC on April 7, 1998, it may be applied retroactively. It is elementary
that rules of criminal procedure are given retroactive application insofar as they benefit
the accused.[26]
In fine, petitioners can be convicted only of simple arson, under Section 1, paragraph 1 of
P.D. No. 1613, punishable by prision mayor.
This is not a case of first impression. This Court has, on a number of occasions, modified
the RTC and CA judgments for having applied the wrong law and penalty on arson.
In People v. Soriano,[27] the accused was found guilty of destructive arson, then a capital
offense. On automatic review, the Court held that he should be held liable only for simple
arson. The explanation:
However, we believe that the applicable provision of law should be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD
1613, which imposes a penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua for other
cases of arson as the properties burned by accused-appellant are specifically described as
houses, contemplating inhabited houses or dwellings under the aforesaid law. The
descriptions as alleged in the second Amended Information particularly refer to the
structures as houses rather than as buildings or edifices. The applicable law should
therefore be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, and not Art. 320, par. 1 of the Penal Code. In case
of ambiguity in construction of penal laws, it is well-settled that such laws shall be
construed strictly against the government, and literally in favor of the accused.
The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 are: (a) there is intentional
burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling.
Incidentally, these elements concur in the case at bar.
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of
perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of
The Revised Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous
crimes "for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their
inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just,
civilized and ordered society." On the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613
constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness
that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates
crimes with less significant social, economic, political and national security implications
than Destructive Arson. However, acts falling under Simple Arson may nevertheless be
converted into Destructive Arson depending on the qualifying circumstances present.
In the present case, the act committed by accused-appellant neither appears to be heinous
nor represents a greater degree of perversity and viciousness as distinguished from those
acts punishable under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code. No qualifying circumstance
was established to convert the offense to Destructive Arson. The special aggravating
circumstance that accused-appellant was "motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner
or occupant of the property burned" cannot be appreciated in the present case where it
appears that he was acting more on impulse, heat of anger or risen temper rather than real
spite or hatred that impelled him to give vent to his wounded ego. Nothing can be worse
than a spurned lover or a disconsolate father under the prevailing circumstances that
surrounded the burning of the Cimagala house. Thus, accused-appellant must be held
guilty of Simple Arson penalized under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 for the act of
intentionally burning an inhabited house or dwelling.[28]
An oversight of the same nature was addressed by this Court in the more recent case
of People v. Malngan.[29] Said the Court in Malngan:
The ultimate query now is which kind of arson is accused-appellant guilty of?
As previously discussed, there are two (2) categories of the crime of arson: 1) destructive
arson, under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659;
and 2) simple arson, under Presidential Decree No. 1613. Said classification is based on
the kind, character and location of the property burned, regardless of the value of the
damage caused, 48 to wit:
Article 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, contemplates the
malicious burning of structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices,
trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or commercial
establishments by any person or group of persons. The classification of this type of
crime is known as Destructive Arson, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
The reason for the law is self-evident: to effectively discourage and deter the commission
of this dastardly crime, to prevent the destruction of properties and protect the lives of
innocent people. Exposure to a brewing conflagration leaves only destruction and despair
in its wake; hence, the State mandates greater retribution to authors of this heinous crime.
The exceptionally severe punishment imposed for this crime takes into consideration the
extreme danger to human lives exposed by the malicious burning of these structures; the
danger to property resulting from the conflagration; the fact that it is normally difficult to
adopt precautions against its commission, and the difficulty in pinpointing the
perpetrators; and, the greater impact on the social, economic, security and political fabric
of the nation. [Emphasis supplied]
If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under Art. 320, death
should result, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.
On the other hand, PD 1613 which repealed Arts. 321 to 326-B of The Revised Penal
Code remains the governing law for Simple Arson. This decree contemplates the
malicious burning of public and private structures, regardless of size, not included in Art.
320, as amended by RA 7659, and classified as other cases of arson. These
include houses, dwellings, government buildings, farms, mills, plantations, railways,
bus stations, airports, wharves and other industrial establishments. Although the
purpose of the law on Simple Arson is to prevent the high incidence of fires and other
crimes involving destruction, protect the national economy and preserve the social,
economic and political stability of the nation, PD 1613 tempers the penalty to be meted to
offenders. This separate classification of Simple Arson recognizes the need to lessen the
severity of punishment commensurate to the act or acts committed, depending on the
particular facts and circumstances of each case. [Emphasis supplied]
To emphasize:
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of
perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of
the Revised Penal Code (as amended) constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as
heinous crimes for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of
their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant
and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just,
civilized and ordered society. On the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613
constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness
that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates
crimes with less significant social, economic, political and national security implications
than Destructive Arson. However, acts falling under Simple Arson may nevertheless be
converted into Destructive Arson depending on the qualifying circumstances present.
[Emphasis supplied.]
Prescinding from the above clarification vis-à-vis the description of the crime as stated in

the accusatory portion of the Information, it is quite evident that accused- appellant was
charged with the crime of Simple Arson - for having "deliberately set fire upon the two-
storey residential house of ROBERTO SEPARA and family x x x knowing the same to be
an inhabited house and situated in a thickly populated place and as a consequence
thereof a conflagration ensued and the said building, together with some seven (7)
adjoining residential houses, were razed by fire." [Emphasis supplied]
The facts of the case at bar is somewhat similar to the facts of the case of People v.
Soriano. The accused in the latter case caused the burning of a particular house.
Unfortunately, the blaze spread and gutted down five (5) neighboring houses. The RTC
therein found the accused guilty of destructive arson under paragraph 1 of Art. 320 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. This Court, through Mr.
Justice Bellosillo, however, declared that:
"x x x [T]he applicable provision of law should be Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613, which
imposes a penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua for other cases of arson as
the properties burned by accused-appellant are specifically described as houses,
contemplating inhabited houses or dwellings under the aforesaid law. The descriptions as
alleged in the second Amended Information particularly refer to the structures as houses
rather than as buildings or edifices.
The applicable law should therefore be Sec. 3, Par. 2, of PD 1613, and not Art. 320, par.
1 of the Penal Code. In case of ambiguity in construction of penal laws, it is well-settled
that such laws shall be construed strictly against the government, and liberally in favor of
the accused.
The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD 1613 are: (a) there is intentional
burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling.
Incidentally, these elements concur in the case at bar."
As stated in the body of the Information, accused-appellant was charged with having
intentionally burned the two-storey residential house of Robert Separa. Said
conflagration likewise spread and destroyed seven (7) adjoining houses. Consequently, if
proved, as it was proved, at the trial, she may be convicted, and sentenced accordingly, of
the crime of simple arson. Such is the case "notwithstanding the error in the designation
of the offense in the information, the information remains effective insofar as it states the
facts constituting the crime alleged therein." "What is controlling is not the title of the
complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof
allegedly violate, x x x but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts
therein recited."
There is, thus, a need to modify the penalty imposed by the RTC as Sec. 5 of PD No.
1613 categorically provides that the penalty to be imposed for simple arson is:
SEC. 5. Where Death Results from Arson. - If by reason of or on the occasion of arson
death results, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed. [Emphasis
supplied]
Accordingly, there being no aggravating circumstance alleged in the Information, the

imposable penalty on accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.[30]
Now, to the penalty. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the
indeterminate penalty should range from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years. Considering that no aggravating or mitigating circumstance attended the
commission of the offense, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period [eight (8)
years and one (1) day to ten (10) years]. The minimum of the indeterminate sentence is
prision correccional, which has a range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years,
to be imposed in any of its periods.
The CA sentence is in accord with law and jurisprudence. We sustain it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed judgment is

AFFIRMED in full.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 188106, November 25, 2009 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. ANTONIO DALISAY Y
DESTRESA, APPELLANT.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
For final review by the Court is the trial court's conviction of appellant Antonio
Dalisay for rape. In the October 23, 2008 Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02836, the appellate court, on intermediate review, affirmed with
modification the April 11, 2007 Decision [2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 88 of
Quezon City in Criminal Case No. Q-03-119026.
The victim in this case was, at the time of the incident, a 16-year-old lass, who, together
with her siblings, stayed with her mother's live-in partner, appellant Dalisay, in a rented
second-floor room in Fairview, Quezon City. Their mother worked as a baby-sitter and
helper in Makati City and only came home at the end of every month. [3]
On that fateful evening of July 10, 2003, the victim was alone playing cards in the
aforesaid rented room, while her siblings were watching television in the common area
on the ground floor. Appellant entered the room to change his clothes. He then laid
himself down on the floor near the young lady, pulled her shirt up, and touched her
breasts and thighs. Bent on satisfying his lust, he forced the girl down on the floor, took
off her shorts and underwear, and placed himself on top of her. The defenseless lass
resisted by kicking his legs and by pleading for him to stop. He, however, remained deaf
to the girl's earnest entreaty, warned her that he would kill her entire family, and
proceeded to bombard the gate to her chastity with his bestial toughness. [4]
Prior to this assault, appellant had already been repeatedly molesting the girl since she
was 13 years old by inserting his finger into her genitalia. [5] However, paralyzed by the
terror that he would make real his threats of annihilating her family, she was compelled
to suffer in silence. Her trepidation was further fueled by her knowledge that appellant
always carried a knife with him. [6]
In the morning of July 11, 2003, the day after the unfortunate incident, the victim and
her sister had a quarrel--a blessing in disguise, so to speak, as it resulted in the latter
running away from their home and disclosing to their aunt, who lived nearby, the sexual
abuse. It appeared that the victim's sister witnessed an incident when appellant thought
that everyone in the rented room was sleeping and pulled off his dastardly act. [7]
Alarmed by her niece's information, their aunt rushed to their home to verify from the
victim the truth of the molestation. They then reported the matter to the authorities,
who lost no time in apprehending appellant. [8] The ano-genital examination of the victim
revealed the presence of abrasion and congestion in the perihymenal area/vestibule
and in the posterior fourchette area. Revealed further were deep healed lacerations at 5
and 7 o'clock positions in the hymen. The examining physician opined that the findings
were definitive evidence of previous and recent blunt penetrating trauma to the genitals
of the victim.[9]
Consequently, an Information for rape in relation to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 was
filed, pertinently reading:
That on or about the 10th day of July 2003 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused, with lewd design[,] with force and intimidation[,] did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one [name withheld],
his stepdaughter[,] 16 years old, a minor[,] against her will and without her consent, to
the damage and prejudice of said offended party.
Appellant, on arraignment, pleaded not guilty, and, for his defense, mainly denied the
accusation. He further claimed that the filing of the charge was only upon the instigation
by the victim's aunt who harbored a grudge against him. [11]
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered the April 11, 2007 Decision [12] convicting
appellant of qualified rape but imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua in light of the
passage of R.A. No. 9346.[13] The RTC further ordered appellant to pay the victim
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages.[14]
On intermediate review, the appellate court affirmed with modification the ruling of the
trial court. The CA convicted the accused not of qualified rape but of simple rape, and
disposed of the case in the following tenor:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the assailed decision finding accused-

appellant guilty of qualified rape is MODIFIED in that accused-appellant Dalisay is
instead found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of SIMPLE RAPE and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The award of damages by the court a quo is
affirmed.
SO ORDERED.[15]
The case having been elevated to this Court, we now finally review the trial and the
appellate courts' uniform findings.
We affirm the conviction of appellant Dalisay for simple rape.
Three principles guide the courts in resolving rape cases: (1) an accusation for rape can
be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the accused, though
innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape in which
only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand
or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of
the evidence for the defense.[16]
In a determination of guilt for the crime of rape, primordial is the credibility of the
complainant's testimony, because, in rape cases, the accused may be convicted solely
on the testimony of the victim, provided it is credible, natural, convincing and consistent
with human nature and the normal course of things. [17] Here, the victim, in the
painstaking and well-nigh degrading public trial, related her painful ordeal that she was
raped by appellant. Her testimony was found by the trial court, which had the
undisputed vantage in the evaluation and appreciation of testimonial evidence, to have
been made in "a simple, straightforward and spontaneous manner." [18]
This eloquent testimony of the victim, coupled with the medical findings attesting to her
non-virgin state, should be enough to confirm the truth of her charges. [19] Further,
deeply entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the findings of the trial court on
the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest respect and are not to be
disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied facts or circumstances of weight and substance which
would have affected the result of the case. [20]
The Court discredits appellant's defense of denial for it is a negative and self-serving
evidence,[21] which pales in comparison to the victim's clear and convincing narration
and positive identification of her assailant. The Court, likewise, does not find merit in
appellant's rather belated assertion that the prosecution failed to establish force or
intimidation and the resistance of the victim to the intrusion. The presence of
intimidation, which is purely subjective, cannot be tested by any hard and fast rule, but
should be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the
commission of the rape.[22] Not all victims react in the same way--some people may cry
out, some may faint, some may be shocked into insensibility, while others may appear
to yield to the intrusion.[23] Here, the records show that the victim was coerced into
submission by her fear that appellant would harm her family. In any event, established
during the trial were that appellant was the live-in partner of the victim's mother, and
that he was the one taking care of the children while the mother worked in Makati City.
[24]
The moral ascendancy and influence of appellant, a father figure to the victim, can
take the place of threat or intimidation. [25]
The Court, therefore, finds appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
simple rape. While it has been proven that appellant was the common-law spouse of
the parent of the victim and the child was a minor at the time of the incident, the Court
cannot convict appellant of qualified rape [26] because the special qualifying
circumstances of minority and relationship were not sufficiently alleged in the
information. To recall, the information here erroneously alleged that appellant was the
stepfather of the victim. Proven during the trial, however, was that appellant was not
married to the victim's mother, but was only the common-law spouse of the latter.
Following settled jurisprudence, [27] appellant is liable only of simple rape punishable
by reclusion perpetua.
As to the amount of damages, the Court finds as correct the award of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages in line with prevailing jurisprudence. [28]
As to the award of exemplary damages, the Court deems it opportune to clarify the
basis for and the amount of the same. Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that--
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or

correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages.
Article 2230 of the same Code further states that--
Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability
may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to
the offended party.
Prior to the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, [29] courts generally
awarded exemplary damages in criminal cases when an aggravating circumstance,
whether ordinary or qualifying, had been proven to have attended the commission of
the crime, even if the same was not alleged in the information. This is in accordance
with the aforesaid Article 2230. However, with the promulgation of the Revised Rules,
courts no longer consider the aggravating circumstances not alleged and proven in the
determination of the penalty and in the award of damages. Thus, even if an aggravating
circumstance has been proven, but was not alleged, courts will not award exemplary
damages.[30] Pertinent are the following sections of Rule 110:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense.--The complaint or information shall state the

the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no
Sec. 9. Cause of accusation.--The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the

offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary
and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in
terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court
to pronounce judgment.
Nevertheless, People v. Catubig[31] laid down the principle that courts may still award
exemplary damages based on the aforementioned Article 2230, even if the aggravating
circumstance has not been alleged, so long as it has been proven, in criminal cases
instituted before the effectivity of the Revised Rules which remained pending
thereafter. Catubig reasoned that the retroactive application of the Revised Rules
should not adversely affect the vested rights of the private offended party. [32]
Thus, we find, in our body of jurisprudence, criminal cases, especially those involving
rape, dichotomized: one awarding exemplary damages, even if an aggravating
circumstance attending the commission of the crime had not been sufficiently alleged
but was consequently proven in the light of Catubig; and another awarding exemplary
damages only if an aggravating circumstance has both been alleged and proven
following the Revised Rules. Among those in the first set are People v. Laciste,[33] People
v. Victor,[34] People v. Orilla,[35] People v. Calongui,[36] People v. Magbanua,[37] People of
the Philippines v. Heracleo Abello y Fortada,[38] People of the Philippines v. Jaime Cadag
Jimenez,[39] and People of the Philippines v. Julio Manalili.[40] And in the second set
are People v. Llave,[41] People of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par,[42] and People of
the Philippines v. Edwin Mejia.[43] Again, the difference between the two sets rests on
when the criminal case was instituted, either before or after the effectivity of the
Revised Rules.
In the instant case, the information for rape was filed in 2003 or after the effectivity of
the Revised Rules. Following the doctrine in the second set of cases, the Court can very
well deny the award of exemplary damages based on Article 2230 because the special
qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship, as mentioned above, were not
sufficiently alleged.
Nevertheless, by focusing only on Article 2230 as the legal basis for the grant of
exemplary damages--taking into account simply the attendance of an aggravating
circumstance in the commission of a crime, courts have lost sight of the very reason why
exemplary damages are awarded. Catubig is enlightening on this point, thus--
Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective

damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a
vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a
punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. These terms are generally, but not
always, used interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use of
exemplary damages when the award is to account for injury to feelings and for the
sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a person as a result of an injury that has
been maliciously and wantonly inflicted, the theory being that there should be
compensation for the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the
defendant--associated with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross
negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud--that intensifies
the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer to those
species of damages that may be awarded against a person to punish him for his
outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in good measure to
deter the wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the future. [44]
Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only in
the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the
case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. In much the
same way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when exemplary damages may be
awarded, Article 2229, the main provision, lays down the very basis of the award. Thus,
in People v. Matrimonio,[45] the Court imposed exemplary damages to deter other
fathers with perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing
their own daughters. Also, in People v. Cristobal,[46] the Court awarded exemplary
damages on account of the moral corruption, perversity and wickedness of the accused
in sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman. Recently, in People of the Philippines
v. Cristino Cañada,[47] People of the Philippines v. Pepito Neverio [48] and The People of the
Philippines v. Lorenzo Layco, Sr.,[49] the Court awarded exemplary damages to set a
public example, to serve as deterrent to elders who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to
protect the latter from sexual abuse.
It must be noted that, in the said cases, the Court used as basis Article 2229, rather than
Article 2230, to justify the award of exemplary damages. Indeed, to borrow Justice
Carpio Morales' words in her separate opinion in People of the Philippines v. Dante
Gragasin y Par,[50] "[t]he application of Article 2230 of the Civil Code strictissimi juris in
such cases, as in the present one, defeats the underlying public policy behind the award
of exemplary damages--to set a public example or correction for the public good."
In this case, finding that appellant, the father figure of the victim, has shown such an
outrageous conduct in sexually abusing his ward, a minor at that, the Court sustains the
award of exemplary damages to discourage and deter such aberrant behavior. However,
the same is increased to P30,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence. [51]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the October 23, 2008 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02836 is AFFIRMED WITH THE MODIFICATION that the
award of exemplary damages is increased to P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 177825, October 24, 2008 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RENE
ROSAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
Assailed before this Court is the decision [1] dated November 29, 2006 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00301 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Kabacan, Cotabato, Branch 22, in Criminal Case No. 98-105, finding
accused-appellant Rene Rosas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
In the court of origin, accused-appellant was charged with the crime of Murder in an
Information[2] dated October 13, 1998. The crime was alleged to have been committed,
as follows:
That on September 15, 1995, in the Municipality of Kabakan, Province of
Cotabato, Philippines, the said accused, armed with a gun, with intent to kill did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and with treachery, attack, assault and shot
NESTOR ESTACIO, thereby hitting and inflicting upon the latter multiple gunshot wounds
on the different parts of his body, which caused his instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned on January 5, 1999, accused-appellant, assisted by counsel de
oficio, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued, in
the course of which the prosecution presented the testimonies of Dr. Crisostomo
Necessario, Jr., Municipal Health Officer of Kabacan, Cotabato; Wilfredo Bataga, mayor
of Kabacan, Cotabato; Antonio Palomar Bataga, Jr.; and Arceli Estacio, widow of the
victim.
For its part, the defense presented accused-appellant himself and his girlfriend, Karen
Nayona.
The prosecution's version of the incident is succinctly summarized by the Office of the
Solicitor General in its Appellee's Brief,[3] to wit:
On September 15, 1995, around eleven o'clock in the morning, Antonio Palomar
Bataga, Jr. was outside the billiard hall along Aglipay Street near the public terminal and
market of Kabacan, Poblacion, Kabacan, Cotabato. Around 15 meters away, he saw
appellant Rene Rosas standing beside the post near a store across the street. Palomar
knew appellant long before, as they were both into gambling. Thereafter, the victim,
Nestor Estacio, arrived alone on board his motorcycle. He stopped in front of the
Salcedo Newsstand to buy a newspaper without switching off his motorcycle's engine.
Before he could drive off, a Weena bus, which was leaving the Bus Terminal about that
time, blocked his way. Then, appellant, who was coming from the left side behind the
victim, shot the latter with a pistol at close range. After the victim fell on the ground,
more gunshots were heard, which gunshots were fired at him to make sure that he was
dead. After the shooting, appellant jumped into a motorcycle and escaped.
Meanwhile, around that same time and fifteen (15) meters away, in a carinderia located
at the Bus Terminal in Poblacion, Kabacan, Cotabato, several gunshots were heard.
Wilfredo Bataga, who was the owner of the said carinderia and also the commanding
officer of the 39th Infantry Batallion assigned in Kabacan, Cotabato, immediately
proceeded to where the gunshots came from. He saw appellant about to run and a dead
body being carried by four persons into a tricycle. Wilfredo upon seeing that appellant
was armed with a 45-caliber pistol, ran after the latter but lost him in the crowd.
On October 27, 1995, Wilfredo was handed with a cartographic sketch of the suspect
made by the National Bureau of Investigation. He indorsed the cartographic sketch to
the police of the Poblacion and reported the incident.
On August 5, 1998, around 5:30 in the afternoon, appellant was spotted a meter away in
front of Wilfredo's house. Wilfredo upon seeing appellant took out his copy of the
cartographic sketch and confronted appellant that it was his picture. Appellant
answered "Siguro ako nga." Appellant was then immediately arrested.
The post-mortem examination conducted by Dr. Crisostomo Necessario, Municipal

Health Officer of Kabacan, Cotabato revealed that the victim sustained multiple gunshot
wounds in the lumbar region (lower back area), a gunshot wound in the epigastric area
(upper mid-portion of the abdomen near the chest) and the mid-left portion of the
hypogastric area (left abdomen). Thereafter, Dr. Necessario issued a Medical Report
attributing the victim's death to hypovolemic shock caused by gunshot wounds.
On the other hand, accused-appellant's version is hinged mainly on denial and
alibi. He testified that in the morning of September 15, 1995, he was at his boarding
house located along USM Avenue, Kabacan, Cotabato. The following day, he went home
to Mintal Relocation in Davao City and came back to Kabacan, Cotabato on August 5,
1998. On that day, while accused-appellant was in a public market, a certain Dodong
Rivera approached and informed him that he should talk to Mayor Wilfredo Bataga
because a group of men was out to kill him. So, accused-appellant proceeded to the
house of Mayor Bataga who showed him a cartographic sketch. When accused-
appellant was asked if it was him on the sketch, he replied, "Siguro, ako nga." He was
then taken to the Kabacan Police Station where he was detained.
Karen Nayona, accused-appellant's girlfriend, merely corroborated his testimony that he

was in the boarding house at USM Avenue, Kabacan, Cotabato in the morning of
September 15, 1995. Then, at around 11 o'clock in the morning, they met and went to a
fastfood restaurant located along USM Avenue. There, she told accused-appellant that
she was two months pregnant with his baby.
In a decision[4] dated February 1, 2001, the trial court rendered its decision convicting
accused-appellant of the crime of murder, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing and finding the accused Rene Rosas alias
Boy Rosal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder qualified by treachery,
judgment is hereby rendered sentencing the accused with penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua and to pay the heirs of Nestor Estacio the sum of P50,000.00 for his death,
P40,000.00 for funeral and burial expenses and P50,000.00 for moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Pursuant to Section 3(c) of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
[5]
accused-appellant appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court via a notice of
appeal.[6]
On February 4, 2002, this Court accepted the appeal and docketed the same as G.R. No.
148879.[7]
On September 22, 2004, conformably with our pronouncement in People v.

Mateo[8] which modified the provisions of the Rules of Court insofar as they provide for
direct appeals from the RTC to this Court in cases where the penalty imposed by the
trial court is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, this Court resolved to refer
the case to the Court of Appeals, whereat it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
00301, for appropriate action and disposition. [9]
In its decision dated November 29, 2006, the Court of Appeals upheld the conviction of
accused-appellant. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification that
the award for actual damages is DELETED for reasons already discussed; in lieu thereof,
an award of temperate damages in the amount of Twenty Five Thousand (P25,000.00)
Pesos is hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
From the Court of Appeals, the case was then elevated to this Court upon filing
by accused-appellant of a notice of appeal on January 2, 2007. [10] In its Resolution[11] of
July 23, 2007, the Court resolved to require both parties to submit their respective
supplemental briefs, if they so desire. The parties, however, opted not to file
supplemental briefs and manifested that they were merely adopting their briefs filed
before the appellate court.
In this appeal, accused-appellant assigns the following errors:

I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF MURDER

WHEN THE LATTER'S GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WITH MURDER

WHEN THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY WAS NOT ALLEGED WITH
SPECIFICITY IN THE INFROMATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 8, RULE 110 OF THE REVISED
RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.[12]
Accused-appellant insists that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. He assails the credibility of the prosecution witnesses whose
testimonies he pictured as inconsistent and fabricated. He also avers that the
prosecution failed to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the crime as nobody
actually saw him shoot the victim.
After a careful consideration of the evidence of this case, we find no reason to reverse
the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the RTC decision in Criminal Case
No. 98-105.
Accused-appellant cites an inconsistency in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses

Wilfredo Bataga and Antonio Palomar Bataga, Jr. While Wilfredo testified that he saw
accused-appellant about to run from the crime scene after the shooting, Antonio, on the
other hand, testified that accused-appellant jumped into a motorcycle and escaped
after the incident. According to accused-appellant, their contradicting testimonies
should not be accorded any weight and credence.
To our mind, the alleged inconsistency in the testimonies of the aforesaid prosecution
witnesses is not sufficient to adversely affect the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses. It merely pertains to accused-appellant's mode of escape, which cannot
overcome the categorical and positive identification of accused-appellant by both
witnesses as the person who shot the victim. It is perfectly natural for different
witnesses testifying on the occurrence of a crime to give varying details as there may be
some details which one witness may notice while the other may not observe or
remember. In fact, jurisprudence even warns against a perfect dovetailing of narration
by different witnesses as it could mean that their testimonies were fabricated and
rehearsed.[13] In the instant case, while prosecution witnesses Antonio and Wilfredo
differ in their narration of minor details, they identified without equivocation the
accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. Antonio declared on the witness
stand:
PROS. DIZON, JR.:
Q. By the way, do you know the accused in this case?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know Rene Rosas?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know the other name of Rene Rosas?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Tell the Court what is the other name or the alias of Rene Rosas?
A. Boy Rosal, sir.
Q. Now, prior to 1995 have you known Rene Rosas?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. For how long did you know Rene Rosas prior to 1995?
A. Long time ago, sir.
Q. How come you know him?
A. Because of our gambling activities.
Q. By the way, do you gamble?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, how about the victim here, Mr. Estacio, do you know him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How come you know him?
A. Because he was an employee of the Municipal Hall, sir.
Q. You said you were outside the Billiard Hall at 11:00 o'clock in the morning, now while
you were there on September 15, 1995, was there any unusual incident that happened?
A. Yes, there was, sir.
Q. Tell the Court, what was that unusual incident that happened?
A. The killing of Nestor Estacio, sir.
Q. Now, did you see the killing of Nestor Estacio?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, you said you saw the killing of Nestor Estacio, what was the weapon used in the
killing of Mr. Estacio?
A. Pistol, sir.
Q. How long was that?
A. Just a short pistol, sir.
Q. Now, you said that Nestor Estacio was killed, did you see who killed Nestor Estacio?
ATTY. BALAGOT:
Your Honor please, leading, Your Honor.
PROS. DIZON, JR.:
He testified already, Your Honor please, that he saw.
COURT:
Yes, he may answer.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Please name him.
A. Rene Rosas, sir.[14]
Antonio Bataga, Jr. could not have made a mistake with respect to accused-
appellant's identity considering that he knew accused-appellant long before he
witnessed the shooting incident in 1995. Antonio who was in the vicinity of the crime
scene would thus be able to unmistakably recognize accused-appellant when the
incident happened at around 11 o'clock in the morning.
Antonio's testimony corroborated that of Wilfredo Bataga, thus:

PROS. DIZON, JR.:
Q. Why were you there, was there any incident of happening that occurred?
A. When I heard several gunbursts, I immediately proceeded to the scene of the crime
and I saw the suspect including the lying victim Nestor Estacio which was brought along by
four (4) persons in loading a tricycle in going to a hospital, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Now, you said you saw Rene Rosas, what was he doing when you saw him?
A. When I saw him, he was already running together with innocent civilians towards the
market, sir.
Q. Now, you said you also saw the dead body of a person, what is the name of that
person who you said is dead?
A. Nestor Estacio, sir.
Q. Now, what did you do upon seeing the dead body?
A. He was carried upon by four persons inside the tricycle for immediate medication, sir.
Q. Now, you said you saw the accused Rene Rosas, what did you do when you saw him?
A. I chased him, sir. I was not able to arrest him due to the thickness of the civilians
running together with him, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. BALAGOT:
Q. You said that on September 15, 1995, at around 11:00 o'clock you were at your
carinderia, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, your carinderia was located that time at the old bus terminal building, is that
right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you said while you were there you heard gunshots?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you went to the site from where the gunshots were heard?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How far was your carinderia from the site where you heard those gunshots?
A. That was more or less 15 meters, sir.
Q. Fifteen (15) if you will pass through the terminal going to that site?
A. In the middle of the terminal, sir.
Q. Now, at that time, Mr. Witness , is it not right that you passed through Jacinto Street
particularly at the back of the old terminal building?
A. I intended to conduct a hamper; a block in front of Ku Kuan so that I could arrest the
suspect and I personally found out and identified the running person to be Rene Rosas @ Boy
Rosas running together with scampered civilians, sir.
Q. But you passed through Jacinto Street, Mr. Witness, is it right?
A. Yes, sir, and I saw him personally.
Q. And if you will pass through Jacinto Street, first the walking distance would be around
15 meters, is that right?
A. I saw him personally this way but I crossed the block, sir.
Q. Now, because at that juncture while you were walking through that Street, you met
this Rene Rosas, is that right?
A. I was not able to see him but when I arrived at the scene of the crime I saw him
personally and I chased him but could not arrest him due to the thickness of the civilians
running together with him.
Q. Now, you claimed that you saw Rene Rosas the accused personally, he was running at
the time when you saw him, is that right?
A. About to run when I reached the scene of the crime, sir.
Q. Also there were other persons who were about to run at that time, is that right?
A. Yes, sir, when I reached the scene to chase him he ran already.
Q. That you choose Rene Rosas because that time he was the bodyguard of Mr. Karutin,
is that right?
A. I was able to identify him when the cartographic sketch of the suspect coming from
the NBI expert and Dr. Sevilla was given to me, sir.
Q. Mr. Witness, on September 15, 1995, why did you chase Rene Rosas?
A. Because I saw in his arm a pistol caliber 45, sir. [15]
Clearly, Wilfredo positively identified appellant as the person running away from
the crime scene towards the public market after shooting the victim. Just like Antonio,
Wilfredo could also not have been mistaken as to accused-appellant's identity
considering that he was just 15 meters away from the crime scene and the crime was
committed in broad daylight.
Verily, the testimonies of Wilfredo and Antonio on material details are coherent,
unequivocal and consistent with each other. Antonio, who was standing just a few
meters away, saw accused-appellant shoot the victim from behind, then board a
motorcycle. On the other hand, Wilfredo saw accused-appellant immediately after the
shooting fleeing from the scene of the crime carrying a 45-caliber pistol. Clearly, both
witnesses personally saw accused-appellant at the scene of the crime at the time it was
committed. Contrary to accused-appellant's assertion, the declarations and testimonies
of Antonio and Wilfredo established beyond reasonable doubt his identity as the author
of the crime.
The trial court gave full faith and credence to the testimonies of Wilfredo and Antonio.
The time-tested doctrine is that a trial court's assessment of the credibility of a witness
is entitled to great weight, and is even conclusive and binding on this Court. The reason
is obvious. The trial court has the unique opportunity to observe at firsthand the
witnesses, particularly their demeanor, conduct and attitude in the course of the trial. [16]
Accused-appellant has not shown any evidence of improper motive on the part of
Wilfredo and Antonio that would have driven them to falsely testify against him. Where
there is nothing to indicate that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by
improper motive, their positive and categorical declarations on the witness stand under
the solemnity of an oath deserve full faith and credence. [17]
There being no fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would otherwise
warrant a different conclusion, the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses must be sustained.
Accused-appellant relies on his alibi that he was in his boarding house located along
USM Avenue, Kabacan, Cotabato the whole morning of September 15, 1995. For alibi to
prosper, however, the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence (a) his
presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (b) the
physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime. [18] Where there is even
the least chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi
will not hold water.[19]
Here, the evidence shows that USM Avenue, Kabacan, Cotabato where accused-
appellant allegedly was on September 15, 1995 is only 1.5 kilometers away from the
public market and terminal in Poblacion, Kabacan, Cotabato where the crime was
committed.[20] According to the trial court, this distance between the crime scene and
the whereabouts of accused-appellant can easily be negotiated by foot within 10 to 15
minutes.[21] In short, accused-appellant failed to establish by clear and convincing
evidence the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime on the date
and time of its commission. Moreover, the defense of alibi crumbles in the face of the
positive identification of accused-appellant by the aforesaid prosecution witnesses as
the perpetrator of the crime.[22]
In his last-ditch effort to relieve him of liability for the crime charged, accused-appellant
argues that he cannot be convicted of murder because the Information failed to state
that treachery was a qualifying circumstance.
Accused-appellant's argument deserves scant consideration. The recent case of People

v. Sayaboc[23] reiterated the pronouncement in People v. Aquino[24] that even after the
recent amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, qualifying circumstances need
not be preceded by descriptive words such as "qualifying" or "qualified by" to properly
qualify an offense. Section 8 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure [25] does not require the
use of such words to refer to the circumstances which raise the category of an offense.
It is not the use of the words "qualifying" or "qualified by" that raises a crime to a higher
category, but the specific allegation of an attendant circumstance which adds the
essential element raising the crime to a higher category. It is sufficient that the
qualifying circumstances be specified in the Information to apprise the accused of the
charges against him to enable him to prepare fully for his defense, thus precluding
surprises during trial.
The Information in this case sufficiently alleged the qualifying circumstance of treachery,
thus:
"xxx, accused armed with a gun, with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously, and with treachery, attack, assault and shot Nestor Esatcio, xxx."
(Emphasis ours)
Not only was treachery sufficiently alleged, it was likewise proven beyond
reasonable doubt by the evidence on record. It is a well-entrenched rule that treachery
is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make. The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without
warning, done in a swift and unexpected attack, affording the hapless, unarmed and
unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. [26]
In the instant case, Nestor Estacio was attacked from behind and assaulted without
warning and provocation. Even when the already wounded Nestor fell on the ground,
accused-appellant mercilessly fired several more shots at him. He obviously wanted to
ensure the execution of the killing, without risk to himself, and deprive Nestor of any
opportunity to retaliate or defend himself. The fact that accused-appellant brought a
gun with him indicated that he made a deliberate and conscious adoption of the means
to kill Nestor. Further, the autopsy conducted by Dr. Necessario revealed multiple
gunshot wounds at the lower back area of the lumbar region of Nestor. This autopsy
indubitably indicates that the shots were fired from behind on the unsuspecting victim.
Clearly then, treachery or alevosia has been sufficiently established.
We, thus, sustain the conviction of Rene Rosas for the crime of murder as well as the
penalty imposed upon him. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for
the crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to death. Accused-appellant was correctly
sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua, the lower of the two indivisible penalties, since
there was no other aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the crime. [27]
We now come to the award of damages.
Conformably with existing jurisprudence, the heirs of Rene Rosas are entitled to civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, which is mandatory and is granted to the heirs
of the victim without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. [28] Likewise,
moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 shall be awarded in favor of the heirs of
the victim. Moral damages are awarded despite the absence of proof of mental and
emotional suffering of the victim's heirs. As borne out by human nature and experience,
a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on
the part of the victim's family. [29] Accused-appellant is also liable to pay exemplary
damages in the sum of P25,000.00 in view of the presence of the qualifying aggravating
circumstance of treachery.[30]
With respect to actual damages, the victim's widow, Arceli Estacio, testified that she
spent a total of P40,000.00 as burial and funeral expenses but she failed to present
receipts to substantiate her claim. In People v. Abrazaldo,[31] we laid down the doctrine
that where the amount of actual damages for funeral expenses cannot be determined
because of the absence of receipts to prove them, temperate damages may be awarded
in the amount of P25,000.00. Thus, in lieu of actual damages, temperate damages in the
amount of P25,000.00 must be awarded to the heirs of Rene Rosas because although
the exact amount was not proved with certainty, it was reasonable to expect that they
incurred expenses for the coffin and burial of the victim.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated November 29, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 00301 is hereby AFFIRMED. Accused-appellant Rene Rosas is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of Nestor
Estacio the following: (a) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P50,000.00 as moral
damages, (c) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (d) P25,000.00 as temperate
damages.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 176349, July 10, 2007 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. ORLANDO UBIÑA Y
AGGALUT, APPELLANT.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For review is the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 00012,
which affirmed with modification the August 6, 2003 Decision [2] of the Regional Trial
Court of Tuao, Cagayan, Branch 11 in Criminal Case No. 895-T, finding appellant Orlando
Ubiña y Aggalut guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
On December 18, 2000, appellant was charged with rape in an Information[3] that reads:
The undersigned 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, Officer-In-Charge hereby
accuses Orlando A. Ubiña of the crime of Rape, defined and penalized under Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659, and Section 2, of Republic
Act 8353, committed as follows:
That on or about October 16, 2000, in the Municipality of Sto. Nino, Province of
Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
[Or]Lando A. Ubiña, uncle of the offended party AAA, thus, have moral ascendancy over
the aforesaid complainant, with lewd design and by the use of force and intimidation,
did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the
offended party, AAA, a minor 15 years of age against her will.
Contrary to law.[4]
Appellant pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. [5]
The facts as culled from the records are as follows:

The series of events that led to the charge of rape started in the morning of
October 9, 2000 when the appellant went to the Tabang Elementary School in Tabang,
Sto. Niño, Cagayan (where AAA was a student) to inform her that her grandfather
("lolo") was in a hospital and needed her there. AAA went with the appellant but was
told while at Tuguegarao that her lolo was in a different hospital. The appellant then
brought her to Allacapan, Cagayan "in a house where the accused stayed when they
were still young."
In a room at that house, the appellant removed AAA's pants and thereafter inserted his
penis into her vagina while AAA was lying down. AAA resisted when she was made to lie
down and cried as the appellant removed her pants. The appellant sexually abused [her]
five (5) times in the seven (7) days they stayed in Allacapan.
From Allacapan, the appellant brought AAA in the afternoon of October 16, 2000 to her
grandfather's house located in a rice field in Campo, Sto. Niño, Cagayan. He molested
[her] twice at that location that same afternoon. Again, AAA cried as the appellant
removed her shorts and panty.
After three (3) days, AAA's grandfather brought her home to San Manuel. With the
appellant's warning not to tell anyone what transpired between them, AAA did not
mention a word regarding the incident to either her grandfather at Sto. Niño, or to [her]
father upon her arrival at home at San Manuel. It was only on the following day that she
told her father about her ordeal. AAA's father reported the matter to the police the next
day.
After initial police investigation, AAA was brought to the Cagayan Valley Medical Center
where Dr. Jeliza Alcantara medically examined her. The examination disclosed several
hymenal lacerations in her genitalia, indicating that she was no longer a virgin. The
Medical Findings state:
"Abdomen " flat, soft, normo active bowel sounds, non-tender
GUT ï¿½ Normal External Genitalia, admits 2 fingers with ease (+) multiple complete and
incomplete old healed hymenal lacerations
xxx
The appellant denied that he raped AAA but admitted that his father-in-law instructed
him on October 9, 2000 to bring AAA home from school because he (the father-in-law
who is also AAA's grandfather) was sick. [She] was summoned because no one else was
available to look after him. After bringing [her] home, he went to his farm to pick up his
wife. The appellant denied that he brought AAA to Allacapan, Cagayan; he had no
reason to go there since he didn't know anybody from that place. He further claimed
that on October 16, 2000, he was at Maguiling, Piat, Cagayan to have his buffalo carabao
vaccinated; he went home by 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that same day.
The appellant claimed that he could not think of any reason why AAA would accuse him
of rape, and surmised that [her] father could be angry at, or at the very least envious of,
him. He narrated that AAA's father did not receive any dowry from his father-in-law
while he and his wife were given a carabao. [6]
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the court finds that the guilt of the
accused Orlando A. Ubiña for the crime of Rape, defined and penalized under Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code has been established beyond reasonable doubt and
hereby sentences the said accused Orlando A. Ubiña to suffer imprisonment of thirty
(30) years of Reclusion Perpetua. He is further sentenced to indemnify the private
complainant AAA the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.[7]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the Decision of the
trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tuao, Cagayan, Branch
11, in Criminal Case No. 895-T, finding the appellant guilty of the crime of rape is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION with respect to penalty and the awarded damages. The
appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the
complainant P50,000.00 as moral damages and, as awarded by the trial court,
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[8]
The appellate court disregarded the aggravating circumstance of craft and the
special qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship of the parties in the
imposition of penalty because it noted that they were not alleged in the information. It
however modified the penalty of 30 years' imprisonment imposed by the trial court and
instead imposed the single and indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. It also awarded
the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
Appellant denies raping AAA. He alleges that after he fetched AAA from school on
October 9, 2000, he went to the farm to fetch his wife; that on October 16, 2000, he had
his carabao vaccinated at Maguiling, Piat, Cagayan; that AAA's father fabricated the
accusation against him out of jealousy because their father-in-law gave him and his wife
a carabao as dowry, while the former and his wife were not given any; that the
testimony of AAA was inconsistent and incredible - AAA cannot recall the place where
the alleged first sexual abuse happened; and AAA's father, unlike other parents of rape
victims, did not immediately report the alleged rape incidents to the police, nor did he
confront him about what he allegedly did to his daughter. Finally, appellant invokes his
right to be presumed innocent considering that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt
The appeal is bereft of merit.
In reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided by three principles: (1) an accusation of
rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even
more difficult for the person accused, although innocent, to disprove; (2) considering
the intrinsic nature of the crime, only two persons being usually involved, the testimony
of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for
the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. [9]
When a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed. Youth and immaturity are
generally badges of truth and sincerity. Also, in a long line of cases, we have held that if
the testimony of the rape victim is accurate and credible, a conviction for rape may issue
upon the sole basis of the victim's testimony because no decent and sensible woman
will publicly admit being a rape victim and thus run the risk of public contempt unless
she is, in fact, a rape victim. [10]
In the instant case, both the trial and appellate courts found AAA's testimony to be
clear, convincing, and credible. In fact, records show that AAA properly identified her
rapist and realistically depicted her harrowing experience in the hands of appellant:
Q Do you know the accused in this case?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you know him?
A My mother and his wife are sisters.
x
xxx
Q Do you recall where were you at around 10:00 O'clock in the morning of October 9,
2000?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where were you?
A At Tabang Elementary School, sir.
Q At that particular date and time, do you still recall if somebody came to you?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who was that person?
A Lando Ubiña, sir.
Q Who is this Lando Ubiña, is he the same accused Lando Ubiña in this case?
A Yes, the same person sir.
Q If he will be shown to you, will you be able to recognize him?
A Yes, sir.
Q If he is now in the court room, will you please point at him?
A There, sir (Witness pointed to a person who was asked his name and he answer [sic]
that he is Lando Ubiña). [11]
x
xxx
FI
SCAL:
Q Did you reach the hospital?
A No, sir.
Q Where did you go then?

A In Allacapan.
x
xxx
Q While in Allacapan, do you recall if something happened to you?
x
xxx
A He removed my short pants.
x
xxx
C
OURT:
Q What did you do when Orlando Ubiña removed your pants?
A None, sir.
Q You did not object or refuse?
A I cried, sir.
FI
SCAL:
Q After the accused removed your shortpants, what happened next or what did he do
next?
A He inserted his penis into my vagina.
x
xxx
Q Did you resist when he made you lie down?
A Yes, sir. [12]
x
xxx
Q On October 16, 2000, do you remember if there was anything unusual that happened
to you?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you tell what happened to you on October 16, 2000 at barrio Campo, Sto. Niño,
Cagayan?
A He again removed my shorts and panty and sexually abused me again.
Q What did you do when the accused removed your shorts and panty?
A I cried again.
Q How many times on October 16, 2000 did the accused sexually abuse you?
ATTY. LIGAS:
Objection, the information allege [sic] only one sexual intercourse.
C
OURT:
Witness may answer.
A Two times, sir.
Q How do you know that the penis of the accused entered into your vagina at barrio
Campo, Sto. Niño, Cagayan?
A I felt the entering of his penis into my vagina.
Q How long did he sexually abuse you at Campo?
A For a long period, sir. [13]
It is well-settled that the evaluation of the witnesses' credibility is a matter best
left to the trial court, because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses
firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude. Findings of the trial court
on such matters are binding and conclusive on the appellate court, unless some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or
misinterpreted.[14] No such facts or circumstances exist in the case at bar.
We find that the prosecution satisfactorily proved beyond reasonable doubt that
appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA through force, threats and intimidation. The
force, violence, or intimidation in rape is a relative term, depending not only on the age,
size, and strength of the parties but also on their relationship with each other.
[15]
Appellant is the husband of the victim's aunt; as such, he is deemed in legal
contemplation to have moral ascendancy over the victim. [16] It is a settled rule that in
rape committed by a close kin, moral ascendancy takes the place of violence and
intimidation.[17]
The alleged inconsistencies in AAA's testimony, i.e., her inability to remember the house

where she was raped and her father's alleged unnatural reaction upon knowing that his
daughter was raped, are inconsequential matters that do not bear upon the elements of
the crime. What is decisive in a prosecution for rape is whether the commission of the
crime has been sufficiently proven. For a discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony
of a witness, to serve as basis for acquittal, must refer to the significant facts vital to the
guilt or innocence of the accused for the crime charged. As the inconsistencies alleged
by appellant had nothing to do with the elements of the crime of rape, they cannot be
used as grounds for his acquittal. [18]
We have said before that the workings of a human mind are unpredictable; people react
differently and there is no standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a
shocking incident.[19] AAA could not be expected to remember all the details surrounding
her harrowing experience with appellant. The emotional trauma she suffered may tend
to make her forget a circumstantial matter such as the house where she was raped. On
the same note, AAA's father cannot be expected to immediately demand justice for his
daughter. His initial shock could have prevented him from doing anything at all. Be that
as it may, the inaction of AAA's father on the day he knew his daughter was raped does
not negate the crime of appellant.
The proposition of appellant that the father of AAA instigated the filing of the criminal
charges against him is a feeble attempt to exonerate himself. Besides, no mother or
father would stoop so low as to subject their daughter to the tribulations and the
embarrassment of a public trial knowing that such a traumatic experience would
damage their daughter's psyche and mar her life if the charge is not true. [20] Moreover,
we held in People v. Viajedor,[21] that family resentment, revenge or feud have never
swayed the Court from giving full credence to the testimony of a complainant for rape,
especially a minor who remained steadfast in her testimony, throughout the direct and
cross-examinations, that she was sexually abused.
Compared with the factual backdrop painted by prosecution witnesses, appellant's

version of what transpired only generates disbelief. Denial and alibi are inherently weak
defenses and constitute self-serving negative evidence which can not be accorded
greater evidentiary weight than the positive declaration of credible witnesses. [22] To be
believed, denial must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability; [23] whereas
for alibi to prosper, it must be proven that during the commission of the crime, the
accused was in another place and that it was physically impossible for him to be at
the locus criminis.[24] In the instant case, it was not shown that it was physically
impossible for appellant to be at the scene of the crime when it was committed.
Moreover, nobody corroborated his alibi.
In People v. Esperanza,[25] we explained that:

The twin circumstances of minority and relationship under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, are in the nature of qualifying
circumstances because they alter the nature of the crime of rape and increase the
penalty. As special qualifying circumstances they must be specifically pleaded or alleged
with certainty in the information; xxx If the offender is merely a relation - not a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, or common law spouse of the mother of the victim -
the specific relationship must be alleged in the information, i.e., that he is "a relative by
consanguinity or affinity [as the case may be] within the third civil degree." [26]
The information in the instant case only mentioned appellant as AAA's uncle,
without specifically stating that he is a relative within the third civil degree, either by
affinity or consanguinity. Even granting that during trial it was proved that the
relationship was within the third civil degree either of consanguinity or affinity, still such
proof cannot be appreciated because appellant would thereby be denied of his right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Appellant cannot be
charged with committing the crime of rape in its simple form and then be tried and
convicted of rape in its qualified form.[27] Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly
disregarded the qualifying circumstance of relationship.
However, the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the minority of AAA because such
was properly alleged in the Information and was proven during trial by the presentation
of a certification of AAA's record of birth duly issued by the office of the municipal civil
registrar of Sto. Niño, Cagayan. [28] Conformably with the Esperanza case,[29] when either
one of the twin special qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority is omitted
or lacking, that which is pleaded in the information and proved by the evidence may be
considered as an aggravating circumstance. As such, complainant's minority may be
considered as an aggravating circumstance. However, it may not serve to raise the
penalty in the instant case because in simple rape, the imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua which is single and indivisible.
Anent the award of damages, the appellate court correctly awarded P50,000.00 as
moral damages in addition to civil indemnity because it is assumed that a rape victim
has actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award. [30] Moral damages are
separate and distinct from civil indemnity; [31] however both are automatically granted
once the fact of rape has been established. [32] In People v. Catubig,[33] we held that the
presence of an aggravating circumstance, such as complainant's minority in the instant
case, entitles her to an award of exemplary damages. The amount of P25,000.00 is
deemed appropriate under the circumstances. [34]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals finding Orlando A. Ubiña guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the victim AAA, the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as civil indemnity ex delicto, and another Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as moral damages, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that appellant is
further ordered to pay the victim Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as
exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 148468, January 28, 2003 ]
ATTY. EDWARD SERAPIO, PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD
DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE DIRECTOR-GENERAL LEANDRO MENDOZA, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. NO. 148769]
EDWARD S. SERAPIO, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE

SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. NO. 149116]

EDWARD S. SERAPIO, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court are two petitions for certiorari filed by petitioner Edward Serapio,
assailing the resolutions of the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan denying his petition
for bail, motion for a reinvestigation and motion to quash, and a petition for habeas
corpus, all in relation to Criminal Case No. 26558 for plunder wherein petitioner is one
of the accused together with former President Joseph E. Estrada, Jose “Jinggoy” P.
Estrada and several others.
The records show that petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and the Legal
Counsel of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, a non-stock, non-profit foundation
established in February 2000 ostensibly for the purpose of providing educational
opportunities for the poor and underprivileged but deserving Muslim youth and students,
and support to research and advance studies of young Muslim educators and scientists.
Sometime in April 2000, petitioner, as trustee of the Foundation, received on its behalf a
donation in the amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200 Million) from Ilocos Sur
Governor Luis “Chavit” Singson through the latter’s assistant Mrs. Yolanda Ricaforte.
Petitioner received the donation and turned over the said amount to the Foundation’s
treasurer who later deposited it in the Foundation’s account with the Equitable PCI Bank.
In the latter part of the year 2000, Gov. Singson publicly accused then President Joseph
E. Estrada and his cohorts of engaging in several illegal activities, including its operation
on the illegal numbers game known as jueteng. This triggered the filing with the Office of
the Ombudsman of several criminal complaints against Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada
and petitioner, together with other persons. Among such complaints were: Volunteers
Against Crime and Corruption, versus Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Edward Serapio, et al.,
docketed as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1754; Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc.,
versus Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Edward Serapio, et al., docketed as OMB Crim. Case
No. 0-00-1755; and Leonardo De Vera, Romeo T. Capulong and Dennis B. Funa, versus
Joseph Estrada, Yolanda Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, Raul De Guzman, Danilo Reyes
and Mila Reforma, docketed as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1757.
Subsequently, petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit dated February 21, 2001. The other
respondents likewise filed their respective counter-affidavits. The Office of the
Ombudsman conducted a preliminary investigation of the complaints and on April 4,
2001, issued a joint resolution recommending, inter alia, that Joseph Estrada, petitioner
and several others be charged with the criminal offense of plunder.
On April 4, 2001, the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan several Informations
against former President Estrada, who earlier had resigned from his post as President of
the Republic of the Philippines. One of these Informations, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 26558, charged Joseph Estrada with plunder. On April 18, 2001, the Ombudsman
filed an amended Information in said case charging Estrada and several co-accused,
including petitioner, with said crime. No bail was recommended for the provisional
release of all the accused, including petitioner. The case was raffled to a special division
which was subsequently created by the Supreme Court. The amended Information reads:
“That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A
PUBLIC OFFICER, BEING THEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with
his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY
AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES
AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS
OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION OR
INFLUENCE, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate
and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount OR TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN
MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY
THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more or
less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT
THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR
A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described
as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES,
MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-
FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL
GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK
OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in
connivance with co-accused CHARLIE ‘ATONG’ ANG, Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada,
Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in
consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL
GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating,
converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR
PERSONAL gain and benefit public fund in the amount of ONE HUNDRED
THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion of
the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS [P200,000,000.00]) tobacco excise tax
share allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF
AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with co-accused Charlie ‘Atong’ Ang, Alma
Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and
Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES;
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND
BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE,
351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security
System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE
BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE
BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDERED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
[P1,102,965,607.50] AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR
MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED
FIFTY PESOS [P744,612,450.00], RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OR MORE
OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE
HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND
FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY COLLECTING OR
RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN
CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR
PERCENTAGES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE
HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
[189,700,000.00] MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION
WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK
UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME “JOSE VELARDE”;
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES,
PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY
BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, the
amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE
MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY
THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P3,233,104,173.17] AND
DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME “JOSE VELARDE”
AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”[1]
On April 5, 2001, petitioner obtained a copy of the Ombudsman’s Joint Resolution
finding probable cause against him for plunder. The next day, April 6, 2001, he filed with
the Office of the Ombudsman a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation.
[2]
Petitioner likewise filed on said date, this time with the Sandiganbayan, an Urgent
Omnibus Motion: (a) To Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and Further
Proceedings; (b) To Conduct a Determination of Probable Cause; (c) For Leave to File
Accused’s Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation; and (d) To Direct the
Ombudsman to Conduct a Reinvestigation of the Charges against accused Edward
Serapio.[3]
On April 10, 2001, the Ombudsman issued an order denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration and/or reinvestigation on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the
amended Information charging petitioner with plunder had already been filed with the
Sandiganbayan.[4]
In a parallel development, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution on April 25, 2001 in

Criminal Case No. 26558 finding probable cause to justify the issuance of warrants of
arrest for the accused, including petitioner. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan issued an
Order on the same date for the arrest of petitioner.[5] When apprised of said order,
petitioner voluntarily surrendered at 9:45 p.m. on the same day to Philippine National
Police Chief Gen. Leandro Mendoza. Petitioner has since been detained at Camp Crame
for said charge.
The Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of the accused, including petitioner, in Criminal
Case No. 26558 on June 27, 2001. In the meantime, on April 27, 2001, petitioner filed
with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Petition for Bail which was set for hearing on May 4,
2001.[6] For his part, petitioner’s co-accused Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada filed on April 20,
2001 a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that he was entitled to bail as a matter of
right.
During the hearing on May 4, 2001 on petitioner’s Urgent Petition for Bail, the
prosecution moved for the resetting of the arraignment of the accused earlier than the
June 27, 2001 schedule. However, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion of the
prosecution and issued an order declaring that the petition for bail can and should be
heard before petitioner’s arraignment on June 27, 2001 and even before the other accused
in Criminal Case No. 26558 filed their respective petitions for bail. Accordingly, the
Sandiganbayan set the hearing for the reception of evidence on petitioner’s petition for
bail on May 21 to 25, 2001.
On May 17, 2001, four days before the hearing on petitioner’s petition for bail, the
Ombudsman filed an urgent motion for early arraignment of Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy
Estrada and petitioner and a motion for joint bail hearings of Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy
Estrada and petitioner. The following day, petitioner filed a manifestation questioning the
propriety of including Joseph Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada in the hearing on his
(petitioner’s) petition for bail.
The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution on May 18, 2001 resetting the hearings on
petitioner’s petition for bail to June 18 to 28, 2001 to enable the court to resolve the
prosecution’s pending motions as well as petitioner’s motion that his petition for bail be
heard as early as possible, which motion the prosecution opposed.
On May 31, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner’s April 6,
2001 Urgent Omnibus Motion. The court ruled that the issues posed by petitioner had
already been resolved in its April 25, 2001 Resolution finding probable cause to hold
petitioner and his co-accused for trial.[7] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of
the said May 31, 2001 Resolution.
On June 1, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution requiring the attendance of
petitioner as well as all the other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 during the hearings
on the petitions for bail under pain of waiver of cross-examination. The Sandiganbayan,
citing its inherent powers to proceed with the trial of the case in the manner it determines
best conducive to orderly proceedings and speedy termination of the case, directed the
other accused to participate in the said bail hearing considering that under Section 8, Rule
114 of the Revised Rules of Court, whatever evidence is adduced during the bail hearing
shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial.[8]
However, instead of proceeding with the bail hearing set by it on June 18, 2001, the
Sandiganbayan issued an Order on June 15, 2001 canceling the said bail hearing due to
pending incidents yet to be resolved and reset anew the hearing to June 26, 2001. [9]
On the eve of said hearing, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration of its May 31, 2001 Resolution. The bail hearing on June 26,
2001 did not again proceed because on said date petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan
a motion to quash the amended Information on the grounds that as against him, the
amended Information does not allege a combination or series of overt or criminal acts
constitutive of plunder; as against him, the amended Information does not allege a pattern
of criminal acts indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy; the money
alleged in paragraph (a) of the amended Information to have been illegally received or
collected does not constitute “ill-gotten wealth” as defined in Section 1(d) of Republic
Act No. 7080; and the amended Information charges him of bribery and illegal gambling.
[10]
By way of riposte, the prosecution objected to the holding of bail hearing until
petitioner agreed to withdraw his motion to quash. The prosecution contended that
petitioner’s motion to quash the amended Information was antithetical to his petition for
bail.
The Sandiganbayan reset the arraignment of accused and the hearing on the petition for
bail of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 26558 for July 10, 2001 to enable it to resolve the
pending incidents and the motion to quash of petitioner. However, even before the
Sandiganbayan could resolve the pending motions of petitioner and the prosecution,
petitioner filed with this Court on June 29, 2001 a Petition for Habeas Corpus and
Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 148468, praying that the Court declare void the
questioned orders, resolutions and actions of the Sandiganbayan on his claim that he was
thereby effectively denied of his right to due process. Petitioner likewise prayed for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus; that the People be declared to have waived their right
to present evidence in opposition to his petition for bail; and, premised on the failure of
the People to adduce strong evidence of petitioner’s guilt of plunder, that he be granted
provisional liberty on bail after due proceedings.[11]
Meanwhile, on June 28, 2001, Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada filed with the Sandiganbayan a
motion praying that said court resolve his motion to fix his bail.
On July 9, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner’s motion to

quash the amended Information. Petitioner, through counsel, received on said date a copy
of said resolution.[12] The motion to fix bail filed by Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada was also
resolved by the Sandiganbayan.
On July 10, 2001, just before his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 26558, petitioner
manifested to the Sandiganbayan that he was going to file a motion for reconsideration of
the July 9, 2001 Resolution denying his motion to quash and for the deferment of his
arraignment. The Sandiganbayan, however, declared that there was no provision in the
Rules of Court or in the Sandiganbayan’s rules granting the right to petitioner to file a
motion for the reconsideration of an interlocutory order issued by it and ordered
petitioner to orally argue his motion for reconsideration. When petitioner refused, the
Sandiganbayan proceeded with his arraignment. Petitioner refused to plead, impelling the
court to enter a plea of not guilty for him.
On July 20, 2001, petitioner filed with the Court a Petition for Certiorari, docketed
as G.R. No. 148769, alleging that the Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in issuing its July 9, 2001 Resolution denying his motion to quash, notwithstanding the
fact that material inculpatory allegations of the amended Information against him do not
constitute the crime of plunder; and that he is charged, under the said amended
Information, for more than one offense. Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada likewise filed petition for
certiorari with the Court docketed as G.R. No. 148965 for the nullification of a resolution
of the Sandiganbayan denying his motion to fix bail.
On August 9, 2001, petitioner filed with the Court another Petition for
Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 149116, assailing the Sandiganbayan’s Resolution dated
31 May 2001 which denied his April 6, 2001 Urgent Omnibus Motion and its June 25,
2001 Resolution denying his motion for reconsideration of its May 31, 2001 Resolution.
Re: G.R. No. 148769
Petitioner avers that:
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION

OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION, IN DENYING PETITIONER SERAPIO’S MOTION TO
QUASH NOTWITHSTANDING THAT –
I
THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE AMENDED INFORMATION AS AGAINST
PETITIONER SERAPIO DO NOT CONSTITUTE THE CRIME OF PLUNDER.
A. The Amended Information, as against petitioner Serapio, does not allege a

combination or series of overt or criminal acts constitutive of plunder.
B. The Amended Information, as against petitioner Serapio, does not allege a pattern

of criminal acts indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
C. The money described in paragraph (a) of the Amended Information and alleged to

have been illegally received or collected does not constitute ‘ill-gotten wealth’ as
defined in Section 1(d), Republic Act No. 7080, as amended.
II
THE AMENDED INFORMATION CHARGES MORE THAN ONE OFFENSE.”[13]

Petitioner asserts that, on the face of the amended Information, he is charged with plunder
only in paragraph (a) which reads:
“(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES,
MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE
MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL
GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR
ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance
with co-accused CHARLIE ‘ATONG’ ANG, Jose ‘Jinggoy’ Estrada, Yolanda T.
Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in
consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;”[14]
Petitioner asserts that there is no allegation in paragraph (a) of the amended Information
of a “combination or series of overt or criminal acts” constituting plunder as described in
Section 1(d) of R.A. 7080 as amended. Neither does the amended Information allege “a
pattern of criminal acts.” He avers that his single act of toleration or protection of illegal
gambling impelled by a single criminal resolution does not constitute the requisite
“combination or series of acts” for plunder. He further claims that the consideration
consisting of gifts, percentages or kickbacks in furtherance of said resolution turned over
to and received by former President Joseph E. Estrada “on several occasions” does not
cure the defect in the amended information. Petitioner insists that on the face of the
amended Information he is charged only with bribery or illegal gambling and not of
plunder.
Petitioner argues that the P540 million which forms part of the P4,097,804,173.17
amassed by former President Joseph E. Estrada in confabulation with his co-accused is
not ill-gotten wealth as defined in Section 1(d) of R.A. 7080.
We do not agree with petitioner. Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that:
“Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint or information is

sufficient if it states the name of the accused, the designation of the offense given by the
statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of
the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place
When the offense was committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included
in the complaint or information.”[15]
The acts or omissions complained or must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to

enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be
charged and enable the court to know the proper judgment. The Information must allege
clearly and accurately the elements of the crime charged. What facts and circumstances
are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definition and
elements of the specific crimes. The purpose of the requirement of alleging all the
elements of the crime in the Information is to inform an accused of the nature of the
accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare for his defense. [16] Another
purpose is to enable accused, if found guilty, to plead his conviction in a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense.[17] The use of derivatives or synonyms or allegations of
basic facts constituting the offense charged is sufficient.[18]
In this case, the amended Information specifically alleges that all the accused, including
petitioner, connived and conspired with former President Joseph E. Estrada to commit
plunder “through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts or similar
schemes or means.” And in paragraph (a) of the amended Information, petitioner and his
co-accused are charged with receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several
instances money in the aggregate amount of P545,000,000.00. In Jose “Jinggoy”
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), et al.,[19] we held that the word “series” is
synonymous with the clause “on several instances”; it refers to a repetition of the same
predicate act in any of the items in Section 1(d) of the law. We further held that the word
“combination” contemplates the commission of at least any two different predicate acts in
any of the said items. We ruled that “plainly, subparagraph (a) of the amended
information charges accused therein, including petitioner, with plunder committed by a
series of the same predicate act under Section 1(d)(2) of the law” and that:
“x x x Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the predicate act of receiving, on several instances,
money from illegal gambling, in consideration of toleration or protection of illegal
gambling, and expressly names petitioner as one of those who conspired with former
President Estrada in committing the offense. This predicate act corresponds with the
offense described in item [2] of the enumeration in Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080. x x
x.”[20]
It is not necessary to allege in the amended Information a pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy because as Section 3 of R.A.
7080 specifically provides, the same is evidentiary and the general rule is that matters of
evidence need not be alleged in the Information.[21]
The Court also ruled in Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan[22] that the aggregate
amount of P4,097,804,173.17 inclusive of the P545 million alleged in paragraph (a) of
the amended information is ill-gotten wealth as contemplated in Section 1, paragraph 1(d)
of Republic Act 7080, as amended, and that all the accused in paragraph (a) to (d) of the
amended information conspired and confederated with former President Estrada to enable
the latter to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of
P4,097,804,173.17.
Under the amended Information, all the accused, including petitioner, are charged of
having conspired and confabulated together in committing plunder. When two or more
persons conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of others. In
contemplation of law, the act of the conspirator is the act of each of them. [23] Conspirators
are one man, they breathe one breath, they speak one voice, they wield one arm and the
law says that the acts, words and declarations of each, while in the pursuit of the common
design, are the acts, words and declarations of all.[24]
Petitioner asserts that he is charged under the amended Information of bribery and illegal
gambling and others. The Sandiganbayan, for its part, held that petitioner is not charged
with the predicate acts of bribery and illegal gambling but is charged only with one crime
that of plunder:
“THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE INFORMATION
CHARGES MORE THAN ONE OFFENSE
According to the accused Estradas and Edward Serapio the information charges more
than one offense, namely, bribery (Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code), malversation
of public funds or property (Article 217, Revised Penal Code) and violations of Sec. 3(e)
of Republic Act (RA No. 3019) and Section 7(d) of RA 6713.
This contention is patently unmeritorious. The acts alleged in the information are not
charged as separate offenses but as predicate acts of the crime of plunder.
It should be stressed that the Anti-Plunder law specifically Section 1(d) thereof does not
make any express reference to any specific provision of laws, other than R.A. No. 7080,
as amended, which coincidentally may penalize as a separate crime any of the overt or
criminal acts enumerated therein. The said acts which form part of the combination or
series of act are described in their generic sense. Thus, aside from ‘malversation’ of
public funds, the law also uses the generic terms ‘misappropriation’, ‘conversion’ or
‘misuse’ of said fund. The fact that the acts involved may likewise be penalized under
other laws is incidental. The said acts are mentioned only as predicate acts of the crime of
plunder and the allegations relative thereto are not to be taken or to be understood as
allegations charging separate criminal offenses punished under the Revised Penal Code,
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees.”[25]
This Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan. It is clear on the face of the amended
Information that petitioner and his co-accused are charged only with one crime of plunder
and not with the predicate acts or crimes of plunder. It bears stressing that the predicate
acts merely constitute acts of plunder and are not crimes separate and independent of the
crime of plunder. Resultantly then, the petition is dismissed.
Re: G.R. No. 149116
Petitioner assails the May 31, 2001 Joint Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his
April 4, 2001 Urgent Omnibus Motion contending that:
“GROUNDS FOR THE PETITION
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION

OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION IN SUMMARILY DENYING PETITIONER
SERAPIO’S URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
(RE: RESOLUTION DATED 31 MAY 2001), NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE
OMBUDSMAN HAD TOTALLY DISREGARDED EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE
AND COMMITTED GRAVE AND MANIFEST ERRORS OF LAW SERIOUSLY
PREJUDICIAL TO THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF PETITIONER SERAPIO,
AND THERE IS NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO SUPPORT AN INDICTMENT FOR
PLUNDER AS AGAINST PETITIONER SERAPIO.”[26]
Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
his omnibus motion to hold in abeyance the issuance of a warrant for his arrest as well as
the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 26558; to conduct a determination of probable
cause; and to direct the Ombudsman to conduct a reinvestigation of the charges him.
Petitioner asseverates that the Ombudsman had totally disregarded exculpatory evidence
and committed grave abuse of discretion in charging him with plunder. He further argues
that there exists no probable cause to support an indictment for plunder as against him. [27]
Petitioner points out that the joint resolution of the Ombudsman does not even mention
him in relation to the collection and receipt of jueteng money which started in
1998[28] and that the Ombudsman inexplicably arrived at the conclusion that the Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation was a money laundering front organization put up by Joseph
Estrada, assisted by petitioner, even though the latter presented evidence that said
Foundation is a bona fide and legitimate private foundation.[29] More importantly, he
claims, said joint resolution does not indicate that he knew that the P200 million he
received for the Foundation came from jueteng.[30]
Petitioner insists that he cannot be charged with plunder since: (1) the P200 million he
received does not constitute “ill-gotten wealth” as defined in Section 1(d) of R.A. No.
7080;[31] (2) there is no evidence linking him to the collection and receipt
of jueteng money;[32] (3) there was no showing that petitioner participated in a pattern of
criminal acts indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, or that his act of receiving the P200 million
constitutes an overt criminal act of plunder.[33]
Petitioner argues further that his motion for reinvestigation is premised on the absolute
lack of evidence to support a finding of probable cause for plunder as against him, [34] and
hence he should be spared from the inconvenience, burden and expense of a public trial.
[35]
Petitioner also avers that the discretion of government prosecutors is not beyond judicial
scrutiny. He asserts that while this Court does not ordinarily look into the existence of
probable cause to charge a person for an offense in a given case, it may do so in
exceptional circumstances, which are present in this case: (1) to afford adequate
protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (2) for the orderly administration of
justice or to avoid oppression; (3) when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of
authority; and (4) where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance.[36] Petitioner claims that he raised proper grounds for a reinvestigation by
asserting that in issuing the questioned joint resolution, the Ombudsman disregarded
evidence exculpating petitioner from the charge of plunder and committed errors of law
or irregularities which have been prejudicial to his interest.[37] He also states that during
the joint preliminary investigations for the various charges against Joseph Estrada and his
associates, of which the plunder charge was only one of the eight charges against
Estrada et al., he was not furnished with copies of the other complaints nor given the
opportunity to refute the evidence presented in relation to the other seven cases, even
though the evidence presented therein were also used against him, although he was only
charged in the plunder case.[38]
The People maintain that the Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioner’s omnibus motion. They assert that since the Ombudsman found
probable cause to charge petitioner with the crime of plunder, the Sandiganbayan is
bound to assume jurisdiction over the case and to proceed to try the same. They further
argue that “a finding of probable cause is merely preliminary and prefatory of the
eventual determination of guilt or innocence of the accused,” and that petitioner still has
the chance to interpose his defenses in a full blown trial where his guilt or innocence may
finally be determined.[39]
The People also point out that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioner’s omnibus motion asking for, among others, a
reinvestigation by the Ombudsman, because his motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsman’s joint resolution did not raise the grounds of either newly discovered
evidence, or errors of law or irregularities, which under Republic Act No. 6770 are the
only grounds upon which a motion for reconsideration may be filed.[40]
The People likewise insist that there exists probable cause to charge petitioner with
plunder as a co-conspirator of Joseph Estrada.[41]
This Court does not agree with petitioner.
Case law has it that the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsman’s discretion in the
conduct of preliminary investigations. Thus, in Raro vs. Sandiganbayan[42], the Court
ruled:
“x x x. In the performance of his task to determine probable cause, the Ombudsman’s
discretion is paramount. Thus, in Camanag vs. Guerrero, this Court said:
‘x x x. (S)uffice it to state that this Court has adopted a policy of non-interference in the
conduct of preliminary investigations, and leaves to the investigating prosecutor
sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of determination of what constitutes
sufficient evidence as will establish ‘probable cause’ for filing of information against the
supposed offender.”
In Cruz, Jr. vs. People,[43] the Court ruled thus:
“Furthermore, the Ombudsman’s findings are essentially factual in nature. Accordingly,
in assailing said findings on the contention that the Ombudsman committed a grave abuse
of discretion in holding that petitioner is liable for estafa through falsification of public
documents, petitioner is clearly raising questions of fact here. His arguments are
anchored on the propriety or error in the Ombudsman’s appreciation of facts. Petitioner
cannot be unaware that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, more so in the
consideration of the extraordinary writ of certiorari where neither question of fact
nor even of law are entertained, but only questions of lack or excess of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion. Insofar as the third issue is concerned, we find that no grave
abuse of discretion has been committed by respondents which would warrant the granting
of the writ of certiorari.”
Petitioner is burdened to allege and establish that the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman
for that matter committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing their resolution and joint
resolution, respectively. Petitioner failed to discharge his burden. Indeed, the Court finds
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman in
finding probable cause against petitioner for plunder. Neither did the Sandiganbayan
abuse its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for reinvestigation of the charges
against him in the amended Information. In its Resolution of April 25, 2001, the
Sandiganbayan affirmed the finding of the Ombudsman that probable cause exists against
petitioner and his co-accused for the crime of plunder, thus:
“In the light of the foregoing and considering the allegations of the Amended Information
dated 18 April 2001 charging the accused with the offense of PLUNDER and examining
carefully the evidence submitted in support thereof consisting of the affidavits and sworn
statements and testimonies of prosecution witnesses and several other pieces of
documentary evidence, as well as the respective counter-affidavits of accused former
President Joseph Estrada dated March 20, 2001, Jose “Jinggoy” Pimentel Estrada dated
February 20, 2001, Yolanda T. Ricaforte dated January 21, 2001 and Edward S. Serapio
dated February 21, 2001, the Court finds and so holds that probable cause for the offense
of PLUNDER exists to justify issuance of warrants of arrest of accused former President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Mayor Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada, Charlie “Atong” Ang, Edward
Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, John Doe. a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio
Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a Delia Rajas.” [44]
Likewise, in its Resolution dated May 31, 2001 of petitioner’s omnibus motion, the
Sandiganbayan noted that a preliminary investigation was fully conducted in accordance
with Rule II, Administrative Order No. 7 of the Office of the Ombudsman, pursuant to
Sections 18, 23 and 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989); and
that all the basic complaints and evidence in support thereof were served upon all the
accused.[45] It was in light of such findings that the Sandiganbayan held that there was no
basis for the allegation that accused therein (including petitioner) were deprived of the
right to seek a reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s Resolution dated April 4, 2001
finding probable cause to charge them with plunder after the conduct of preliminary
investigation in connection therewith. In addition, the Sandiganbayan pointed out that
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s resolution, but failed to
show in his motion that there were newly discovered evidence, or that the preliminary
investigation was tainted by errors of law or irregularities, which are the only grounds for
which a reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s resolution may be granted.[46]
It bears stressing that the right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right,
but is merely a right conferred by statute.[47] The absence of a preliminary investigation
does not impair the validity of the Information or otherwise render the same defective and
neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute a ground for
quashing the Information.[48] If the lack of a preliminary investigation does not render the
Information invalid nor affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case, with more reason
can it be said that the denial of a motion for reinvestigation cannot invalidate the
Information or oust the court of its jurisdiction over the case. Neither can it be said that
petitioner had been deprived of due process. He was afforded the opportunity to refute
the charges against him during the preliminary investigation.
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely to determine whether a crime has

been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the person accused of
the crime is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.[49] As the Court held
in Webb vs. De Leon, “[a] finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the
suspect. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt,
neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on
evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.”[50]
Absent any showing of arbitrariness on the part of the prosecutor or any other officer
authorized to conduct preliminary investigation, courts as a rule must defer to said
officer’s finding and determination of probable cause, since the determination of the
existence of probable cause is the function of the prosecutor.[51] The Court agrees with the
Sandiganbayan that petitioner failed to establish that the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Ombudsman was tainted with irregularity or that its findings stated in
the joint resolution dated April 4, 2001 are not supported by the facts, and that a
reinvestigation was necessary.
Certiorari will not lie to invalidate the Sandiganbayan’s resolution denying petitioner’s
motion for reinvestigation since there is nothing to substantiate petitioner’s claim that it
gravely abused its discretion in ruling that there was no need to conduct a reinvestigation
of the case.[52]
The ruling in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals[53] that an accused shall not be deemed to
have waived his right to ask for a preliminary investigation after he had been arraigned
over his objection and despite his insistence on the conduct of said investigation prior to
trial on the merits does not apply in the instant case because petitioner merely prayed for
a reinvestigation on the ground of a newly-discovered evidence. Irrefragably, a
preliminary investigation had been conducted by the Ombudsman prior to the filing of
the amended Information, and that petitioner had participated therein by filing his
counter-affidavit. Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan had already denied his motion for
reinvestigation as well as his motion for reconsideration thereon prior to his arraignment.
[54]
In sum then, the petition is dismissed.
Re: G.R. No. 148468
As synthesized by the Court from the petition and the pleadings of the parties, the issues
for resolution are: (1) Whether or not petitioner should first be arraigned before hearings
of his petition for bail may be conducted; (2) Whether petitioner may file a motion to
quash the amended Information during the pendency of his petition for bail; (3) Whether
a joint hearing of the petition for bail of petitioner and those of the other accused in
Criminal Case No. 26558 is mandatory; (4) Whether the People waived their right to
adduce evidence in opposition to the petition for bail of petitioner and failed to adduce
strong evidence of guilt of petitioner for the crime charged; and (5) Whether petitioner
was deprived of his right to due process in Criminal Case No. 26558 and should thus be
released from detention via a writ of habeas corpus.
On the first issue, petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of
its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it deferred the hearing of
his petition for bail to July 10, 2001, arraigned him on said date and entered a plea of not
guilty for him when he refused to be arraigned. He insists that the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, does not require that he be arraigned first prior to the conduct of
bail hearings since the latter can stand alone and must, of necessity, be heard
immediately.[55] Petitioner maintains that his arraignment before the bail hearings are set
is not necessary since he would not plead guilty to the offense charged, as is evident in
his earlier statements insisting on his innocence during the Senate investigation of
the jueteng scandal and the preliminary investigation before the Ombudsman.[56] Neither
would the prosecution be prejudiced even if it would present all its evidence before his
arraignment because, under the Revised Penal Code, a voluntary confession of guilt is
mitigating only if made prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution,[57] and
petitioner admitted that he cannot repudiate the evidence or proceedings taken during the
bail hearings because Rule 114, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly
provides that evidence present during bail hearings are automatically reproduced during
the trial.[58] Petitioner likewise assures the prosecution that he is willing to be arraigned
prior to the posting of a bail bond should he be granted bail.[59]
The People insist that arraignment is necessary before bail hearings may be commenced,
because it is only upon arraignment that the issues are joined. The People stress that it is
only when an accused pleads not guilty may he file a petition for bail and if he pleads
guilty to the charge, there would be no more need for him to file said petition. Moreover,
since it is during arraignment that the accused is first informed of the precise charge
against him, he must be arraigned prior to the bail hearings to prevent him from later
assailing the validity of the bail hearings on the ground that he was not properly informed
of the charge against him, especially considering that, under Section 8, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Court, evidence presented during such proceedings are considered
automatically reproduced at the trial.[60] Likewise, the arraignment of accused prior to bail
hearings diminishes the possibility of an accused’s flight from the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan because trial in absentia may be had only if an accused escapes after he
has been arraigned.[61] The People also contend that the conduct of bail hearings prior to
arraignment would extend to an accused the undeserved privilege of being appraised of
the prosecution’s evidence before he pleads guilty for purposes of penalty reduction. [62]
Although petitioner had already been arraigned on July 10, 2001 and a plea of not guilty
had been entered by the Sandiganbayan on his behalf, thereby rendering the issue as to
whether an arraignment is necessary before the conduct of bail hearings in petitioner’s
case moot, the Court takes this opportunity to discuss the controlling precepts thereon
pursuant to its symbolic function of educating the bench and bar.[63]
The contention of petitioner is well-taken. The arraignment of an accused is not a

prerequisite to the conduct of hearings on his petition for bail. A person is allowed to
petition for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary
surrender.[64] An accused need not wait for his arraignment before filing a petition for
bail.
In Lavides vs. Court of Appeals, [65] this Court ruled on the issue of whether an accused
must first be arraigned before he may be granted bail. Lavides involved an accused
charged with violation of Section 5(b) Republic Act No. 7610 (The Special Protection of
Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act), an offense punishable
by reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. The accused therein
assailed, inter alia, the trial court’s imposition of the condition that he should first be
arraigned before he is allowed to post bail. We held therein that “in cases where it is
authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be
precluded from filing a motion to quash.”[66]
However, the foregoing pronouncement should not be taken to mean that the hearing on a
petition for bail should at all times precede arraignment, because the rule is that a person
deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender may apply for bail as
soon as he is deprived of his liberty, even before a complaint or information is filed
against him.[67] The Court’s pronouncement in Lavides should be understood in light of
the fact that the accused in said case filed a petition for bail as well as a motion to quash
the informations filed against him. Hence, we explained therein that to condition the
grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where
he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail
because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and
(2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and
thereafter be released on bail. This would undermine his constitutional right not to be put
on trial except upon a valid complaint or Information sufficient to charge him with a
crime and his right to bail.[68]
It is therefore not necessary that an accused be first arraigned before the conduct of
hearings on his application for bail. For when bail is a matter of right, an accused may
apply for and be granted bail even prior to arraignment. The ruling in Lavides also
implies that an application for bail in a case involving an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death may also be heard even before an accused is arraigned. Further, if the
court finds in such case that the accused is entitled to bail because the evidence against
him is not strong, he may be granted provisional liberty even prior to arraignment; for in
such a situation, bail would be “authorized” under the circumstances. In fine, the
Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction in ordering the arraignment of petitioner before proceeding with the hearing
of his petition for bail.
With respect to the second issue of whether petitioner may file a motion to quash during
the pendency of his petition for bail, petitioner maintains that a motion to quash and a
petition for bail are not inconsistent, and may proceed independently of each other. While
he agrees with the prosecution that a motion to quash may in some instances result in the
termination of the criminal proceedings and in the release of the accused therein, thus
rendering the petition for bail moot and academic, he opines that such is not always the
case; hence, an accused in detention cannot be forced to speculate on the outcome of a
motion to quash and decide whether or not to file a petition for bail or to withdraw one
that has been filed.[69] He also insists that the grant of a motion to quash does not
automatically result in the discharge of an accused from detention nor render moot an
application for bail under Rule 117, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Court.[70]
The Court finds that no such inconsistency exists between an application of an accused
for bail and his filing of a motion to quash. Bail is the security given for the release of a
person in the custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his
appearance before any court as required under the conditions set forth under the Rules of
Court.[71] Its purpose is to obtain the provisional liberty of a person charged with an
offense until his conviction while at the same time securing his appearance at the trial.
[72]
As stated earlier, a person may apply for bail from the moment that he is deprived of
his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender.[73]
On the other hand, a motion to quash an Information is the mode by which an accused
assails the validity of a criminal complaint or Information filed against him for
insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of
the Information.[74] An accused may file a motion to quash the Information, as a general
rule, before arraignment.[75]
These two reliefs have objectives which are not necessarily antithetical to each other.
Certainly, the right of an accused right to seek provisional liberty when charged with an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or when
charged with an offense punishable by such penalties but after due hearing, evidence of
his guilt is found not to be strong, does not preclude his right to assail the validity of the
Information charging him with such offense. It must be conceded, however, that if a
motion to quash a criminal complaint or Information on the ground that the same does
not charge any offense is granted and the case is dismissed and the accused is ordered
released, the petition for bail of an accused may become moot and academic.
We now resolve the issue of whether or not it is mandatory that the hearings on the
petitions for bail of petitioner and accused Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada in Criminal Case No.
26558 and the trial of the said case as against former President Joseph E. Estrada be
heard jointly.
Petitioner argues that the conduct of joint bail hearings would negate his right to have his
petition for bail resolved in a summary proceeding since said hearings might be
converted into a full blown trial on the merits by the prosecution.[76]
For their part, the People claim that joint bail hearings will save the court from having to
hear the same witnesses and the parties from presenting the same evidence where it
would allow separate bail hearings for the accused who are charged as co-conspirators in
the crime of plunder.[77]
In issuing its June 1, 2001 Order directing all accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 to
participate in the bail hearings, the Sandiganbayan explained that the directive was made
was in the interest of the speedy disposition of the case. It stated:
“x x x The obvious fact is, if the rest of the accused other than the accused Serapio were
to be excused from participating in the hearing on the motion for bail of accused Serapio,
under the pretext that the same does not concern them and that they will participate in any
hearing where evidence is presented by the prosecution only if and when they will
already have filed their petitions for bail, or should they decide not to file any, that they
will participate only during the trial proper itself, then everybody will be faced with the
daunting prospects of having to go through the process of introducing the same witness
and pieces of evidence two times, three times or four times, as many times as there are
petitions for bail filed. Obviously, such procedure is not conducive to the speedy
termination of a case. Neither can such procedure be characterized as an orderly
proceeding.”[78]
There is no provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Rules of
Procedure of the Sandiganbayan governing the hearings of two or more petitions for bail
filed by different accused or that a petition for bail of an accused be heard simultaneously
with the trial of the case against the other accused. The matter of whether or not to
conduct a joint hearing of two or more petitions for bail filed by two different accused or
to conduct a hearing of said petition jointly with the trial against another accused is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Unless grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown, the Court will not interfere with the
exercise by the Sandiganbayan of its discretion.
It may be underscored that in the exercise of its discretion, the Sandiganbayan must take
into account not only the convenience of the State, including the prosecution, but also
that of the accused and the witnesses of both the prosecution and the accused and the
right of accused to a speedy trial. The Sandiganbayan must also consider the complexities
of the cases and of the factual and legal issues involving petitioner and the other accused.
After all, if this Court may echo the observation of the United States Supreme Court, the
State has a stake, with every citizen, in his being afforded our historic individual
protections, including those surrounding criminal prosecutions. About them, this Court
dares not become careless or complacent when that fashion has become rampant over the
earth.[79]
It must be borne in mind that in Ocampo vs. Bernabe,[80] this Court held that in a petition
for bail hearing, the court is to conduct only a summary hearing, meaning such brief and
speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and
consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine the weight of
evidence for purposes of bail. The court does not try the merits or enter into any inquiry
as to the weight that ought to be given to the evidence against the accused, nor will it
speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be offered therein.
It may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters,
avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination of
witnesses, and reducing to a reasonable minimum the amount of corroboration
particularly on details that are not essential to the purpose of the hearing.
A joint hearing of two separate petitions for bail by two accused will of course avoid
duplication of time and effort of both the prosecution and the courts and minimizes the
prejudice to the accused, especially so if both movants for bail are charged of having
conspired in the commission of the same crime and the prosecution adduces essentially
the same evident against them. However, in the cases at bar, the joinder of the hearings of
the petition for bail of petitioner with the trial of the case against former President Joseph
E. Estrada is an entirely different matter. For, with the participation of the former
president in the hearing of petitioner’s petition for bail, the proceeding assumes a
completely different dimension. The proceedings will no longer be summary. As against
former President Joseph E. Estrada, the proceedings will be a full-blown trial which is
antithetical to the nature of a bail hearing. Moreover, following our ruling in Jose
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, supra where we stated that Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada can only
be charged with conspiracy to commit the acts alleged in sub-paragraph (a) of the
amended Information since it is not clear from the latter if the accused in sub-paragraphs
(a) to (d) thereof conspired with each other to assist Joseph Estrada to amass ill-gotten
wealth, we hold that petitioner can only be charged with having conspired with the other
co-accused named in sub-paragraph (a) by “receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly,
on several instances, money x x x from illegal gambling, x x x in consideration of
toleration or protection of illegal gambling.”[81] Thus, with respect to petitioner, all that
the prosecution needs to adduce to prove that the evidence against him for the charge of
plunder is strong are those related to the alleged receipt or collection of money from
illegal gambling as described in sub-paragraph (a) of the amended Information. With the
joinder of the hearing of petitioner’s petition for bail and the trial of the former President,
the latter will have the right to cross-examine intensively and extensively the witnesses
for the prosecution in opposition to the petition for bail of petitioner. If petitioner will
adduce evidence in support of his petition after the prosecution shall have concluded its
evidence, the former President may insist on cross-examining petitioner and his
witnesses. The joinder of the hearing of petitioner’s bail petition with the trial of former
President Joseph E. Estrada will be prejudicial to petitioner as it will unduly delay the
determination of the issue of the right of petitioner to obtain provisional liberty and seek
relief from this Court if his petition is denied by the respondent court. The
indispensability of the speedy resolution of an application for bail was succinctly
explained by Cooley in his treatise Constitutional Limitations, thus:
“For, if there were any mode short of confinement which would with reasonable certainty
insure the attendance of the accused to answer the accusation, it would not be justifiable
to inflict upon him that indignity, when the effect is to subject him in a greater or lesser
degree, to the punishment of a guilty person, while as yet it is not determined that he has
not committed any crime.”[82]
While the Sandiganbayan, as the court trying Criminal Case No. 26558, is empowered
“to proceed with the trial of the case in the manner it determines best conducive to
orderly proceedings and speedy termination of the case,”[83] the Court finds that it gravely
abused its discretion in ordering that the petition for bail of petitioner and the trial of
former President Joseph E. Estrada be held jointly. It bears stressing that the
Sandiganbayan itself acknowledged in its May 4, 2001 Order the “pre-eminent position
and superiority of the rights of [petitioner] to have the matter of his provisional liberty
resolved … without unnecessary delay,”[84] only to make a volte face and declare that
after all the hearing of petition for bail of petitioner and Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada and the
trial as against former President Joseph E. Estrada should be held simultaneously. In
ordering that petitioner’s petition for bail to be heard jointly with the trial of the case
against his co-accused former President Joseph E. Estrada, the Sandiganbayan in effect
allowed further and unnecessary delay in the resolution thereof to the prejudice of
petitioner. In fine then, the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its discretion in
ordering a simultaneous hearing of petitioner’s petition for bail with the trial of the case
against former President Joseph E. Estrada on its merits.
With respect to petitioner’s allegations that the prosecution tried to delay the bail
hearings by filing dilatory motions, the People aver that it is petitioner and his co-accused
who caused the delay in the trial of Criminal Case No. 26558 by their filing of numerous
manifestations and pleadings with the Sandiganbayan.[85] They assert that they filed the
motion for joint bail hearing and motion for earlier arraignment around the original
schedule for the bail hearings which was on May 21-25, 2001.[86]
They argue further that bail is not a matter of right in capital offenses.[87] In support
thereof, they cite Article III, Sec 13 of the Constitution, which states that—
“All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right
to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.”[88]
The People also cited Rule 114, Secs. 7 and 4 of the Revised Rules of Court which
provide:
“Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable.—No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonement, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
Sec. 4. Bail, a matter of right, exception.—All persons in custody shall be admitted to

bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as
prescribed by law or this Rule x x x (b) and before conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment.”[89]
Irrefragably, a person charged with a capital offense is not absolutely denied the
opportunity to obtain provisional liberty on bail pending the judgment of his case.
However, as to such person, bail is not a matter of right but is discretionary upon the
court.[90] Had the rule been otherwise, the Rules would not have provided for an
application for bail by a person charged with a capital offense under Rule 114, Section 8
which states:
“Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. — At the hearing of an application for bail
filed by a person who is in custody for the commission of an offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of
showing that the evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail
hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial but, upon motion of
either party, the court may recall any witness for additional examination unless the latter
is dead, outside the Philippines, or otherwise unable to testify.”[91]
Under the foregoing provision, there must be a showing that the evidence of guilt against
a person charged with a capital offense is not strong for the court to grant him bail. Thus,
upon an application for bail by the person charged with a capital offense, a hearing
thereon must be conducted, where the prosecution must be accorded an opportunity to
discharge its burden of proving that the evidence of guilt against an accused is strong.
[92]
The prosecution shall be accorded the opportunity to present all the evidence it may
deems necessary for this purpose.[93] When it is satisfactorily demonstrated that the
evidence of guilt is strong, it is the court’s duty to deny the application for bail. However,
when the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail becomes a matter of right.[94]
In this case, petitioner is not entitled to bail as a matter of right at this stage of the
proceedings. Petitioner’s claim that the prosecution had refused to present evidence to
prove his guilt for purposes of his bail application and that the Sandiganbayan has refused
to grant a hearing thereon is not borne by the records. The prosecution did not waive,
expressly or even impliedly, its right to adduce evidence in opposition to the petition for
bail of petitioner. It must be noted that the Sandiganbayan had already scheduled the
hearing dates for petitioner’s application for bail but the same were reset due to pending
incidents raised in several motions filed by the parties, which incidents had to be resolved
by the court prior to the bail hearings. The bail hearing was eventually scheduled by the
Sandiganbayan on July 10, 2001 but the hearing did not push through due to the filing of
this petition on June 29, 2001.
The delay in the conduct of hearings on petitioner’s application for bail is therefore not
imputable solely to the Sandiganbayan or to the prosecution. Petitioner is also partly to
blame therefor, as is evident from the following list of motions filed by him and by the
prosecution:
Motions filed by petitioner:

 Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated April 6, 2001, for (1) leave to file motion for
reconsideration/reinvestigation and to direct ombudsman to conduct
reinvestigation; (2) conduct a determination of probable cause as would suggest
the issuance of house arrest; (3) hold in abeyance the issuance of warrant of arrest
and other proceedings pending determination of probable cause;
 Motion for Early Resolution, dated May 24, 2001;
 Urgent Motion to Hold in Abeyance Implementation or Service of Warrant of

Arrest for Immediate Grant of bail or For Release on Recognizance, dated April
25, 2001;
 Urgent Motion to allow Accused Serapio to Vote at Obando, Bulacan, dated May
11, 2001;
 Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, dated May 22, 2001, praying for Resolution
of May 18, 2001 be set aside and bail hearings be set at the earliest possible time;
 Urgent Motion for Immediate Release on Bail or Recognizance, dated May 27,
2001;
 Motion for Reconsideration of denial of Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated June 13,
2001, praying that he be allowed to file a Motion for Reinvestigation; and
 Motion to Quash, dated June 26, 2001.[95]
Motions filed by the prosecution:
 Motion for Earlier Arraignment, dated May 8, 2001;[96]
 Motion for Joint Bail Hearings of Accused Joseph Estrada, Jose “Jinggoy” Estrada
and Edward Serapio, dated May 8, 2001;[97]
 Opposition to the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Omnibus Motion to

Adjust Earlier Arraignment, dated May 25, 2001;[98] and
 Omnibus Motion for Examination, Testimony and Transcription in Filipino, dated

June 19, 2001.[99]
The other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 also contributed to the aforesaid delay by
their filing of the following motions:
 Motion to Quash or Suspend, dated April 24, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada,
assailing the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080 and praying that the Amended
Information be quashed;
 Very Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated April 30, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada,
praying that he be (1) excluded from the Amended Information for lack of
probable cause; (2) released from custody; or in the alternative, (3) be allowed to
post bail;
 Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Place on House Arrest, dated April 25, 2001, filed by
Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, praying that they be placed on house arrest during the
pendency of the case;
 Position Paper [re: House Arrest], dated May 2, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy
Estrada;
 Supplemental Position Paper [re: House Arrest], dated May 2, 2001, filed by
Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;
 Omnibus Motion, dated May 7, 2001, filed by Joseph Estrada, praying by

reinvestigation of the case by the Ombudsman or the outright dismissal of the
case;
 Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Extension, dated May 2, 2001, filed by Jinggoy
Estrada, requesting for five (5) within which to respond to the Opposition to
Motion to Quash in view of the holidays and election-related distractions;
 Opposition to Urgent Motion for Earlier Arraignment, dated May 10, 2001, filed
by Joseph Estrada;
 Omnibus Manifestation on voting and custodial arrangement, dated May 11, 2001,
filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, praying that they be placed on house arrest;
 Manifestation regarding house arrest, dated May 6, 2001, filed by Joseph and
Jinggoy Estrada;
 Summation regarding house arrest, dated May 23, 2001, filed by Joseph and
Jinggoy Estrada;
 Urgent Manifestation & Motion, dated May 6, 2001 filed by Jinggoy Estrada;
 Manifestation, dated May 28, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, praying
that they be allowed to be confined in Tanay;
 Motion to charge as Accused Luis “Chavit” Singson, filed by Joseph Estrada;
 Omnibus Motion, dated June 11, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada,
seeking reconsideration of denial of requests for house arrest, for detention in
Tanay or Camp Crame; motion for inhibition of Justice Badoy;
 Urgent Motion to Allow Accused to Clear His Desk as Mayor of San Juan, Metro
Manila, dated June 28, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada;
 Motion for Reconsideration, dated June 9, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy
Estrada, praying that the resolution compelling them to be present at petitioner
Serapio’s hearing for bail be reconsidered;
 Motion to Quash, dated June 7, 2001, filed by Joseph Estrada;
 Still Another Manifestation, dated June 14, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy
Estrada stating that Bishop Teodoro Bacani favors their house arrest;
 Manifestation, dated June 15, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, waiving
their right to be present at the June 18 and 21, 2001 bail hearings and reserving
their right to trial with assessors;
 Omnibus Motion for Instructions: 30-Day House Arrest; Production, Inspection

and Copying of Documents; and Possible Trial with Assessors, dated June 19,
2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;
 Urgent Motion for Additional Time to Wind Up Affairs, dated June 20, 2001, filed
by Jinggoy Estrada;
 Manifestation, dated June 22, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada, asking for free dates
for parties, claiming that denial of bail is cruel and inhuman, reiterating request for
gag order of prosecution witnesses, availing of production, inspection and copying
of documents, requesting for status of alias case; and
 Compliance, dated June 25, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada, requesting for
permission to attend some municipal affairs in San Juan, Metro Manila. [100]
Furthermore, the Court has previously ruled that even in cases where the prosecution
refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to an application for bail by an accused charged
with a capital offense, the trial court is still under duty to conduct a hearing on said
application.[101] The rationale for such requirement was explained in Narciso vs. Sta.
Romana-Cruz (supra), citing Basco vs. Rapatalo:[102]
“When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showing that
the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. However, the determination of
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion,
remains with the judge. This discretion by the very nature of things, may rightly be
exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the
discretion is directed to the weight of the evidence and since evidence cannot
properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious
that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be
submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross-examination and to
introduce his own evidence in rebuttal.”[103]
Accordingly, petitioner cannot be released from detention until the Sandiganbayan
conducts a hearing of his application for bail and resolve the same in his favor. Even
then, there must first be a finding that the evidence against petitioner is not strong before
he may be granted bail.
Anent the issue of the propriety of the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus for petitioner,
he contends that he is entitled to the issuance of said writ because the State, through the
prosecution’s refusal to present evidence and by the Sandiganbayan’s refusal to grant a
bail hearing, has failed to discharge its burden of proving that as against him, evidence of
guilt for the capital offense of plunder is strong. Petitioner contends that the prosecution
launched “a seemingly endless barrage of obstructive and dilatory moves” to prevent the
conduct of bail hearings. Specifically, the prosecution moved for petitioner’s arraignment
before the commencement of bail hearings and insisted on joint bail hearings for
petitioner, Joseph Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada despite the fact that it was only petitioner
who asked for a bail hearing; manifested that it would present its evidence as if it is the
presentation of the evidence in chief, meaning that the bail hearings would be concluded
only after the prosecution presented its entire case upon the accused; and argued that
petitioner’s motion to quash and his petition for bail are inconsistent, and therefore,
petitioner should choose to pursue only one of these two remedies.[104] He further claims
that the Sandiganbayan, through its questioned orders and resolutions postponing the bail
hearings effectively denied him of his right to bail and to due process of law. [105]
Petitioner also maintains that the issuance by the Sandiganbayan of new orders canceling
the bail hearings which it had earlier set did not render moot and academic the petition
for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, since said orders have resulted in a continuing
deprivation of petitioner’s right to bail.[106] He argues further that the fact that he was
arrested and is detained pursuant to valid process does not by itself negate the efficacy of
the remedy of habeas corpus. In support of his contention, petitioner cites Moncupa vs.
Enrile,[107] where the Court held that habeas corpus extends to instances where the
detention, while valid from its inception, has later become arbitrary.[108]
However, the People insist that habeas corpus is not proper because petitioner was
arrested pursuant to the amended information which was earlier filed in court, [109] the
warrant of arrest issuant pursuant thereto was valid, and petitioner voluntarily
surrendered to the authorities.[110]
As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty in custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which
jurisdiction to do so.[111] In exceptional circumstances, habeas corpus may be granted by
the courts even when the person concerned is detained pursuant to a valid arrest or his
voluntary surrender, for this writ of liberty is recognized as “the fundamental instrument
for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action” due to “its
ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes.”[112] Thus, in previous cases,
we issued the writ where the deprivation of liberty, while initially valid under the law,
had later become invalid,[113] and even though the persons praying for its issuance were
not completely deprived of their liberty.[114]
The Court finds no basis for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in favor of petitioner.
The general rule that habeas corpus does not lie where the person alleged to be restrained
of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court which had
jurisdiction to issue the same[115] applies, because petitioner is under detention pursuant to
the order of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan on April 25, 2001 after the filing by the
Ombudsman of the amended information for plunder against petitioner and his co-
accused. Petitioner had in fact voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities on April
25, 2001 upon learning that a warrant for his arrest had been issued.
The ruling in Moncupa vs. Enrile[116] that habeas corpus will lie where the deprivation of
liberty which was initially valid has become arbitrary in view of subsequent
developments finds no application in the present case because the hearing on petitioner’s
application for bail has yet to commence. As stated earlier, the delay in the hearing of
petitioner’s petition for bail cannot be pinned solely on the Sandiganbayan or on the
prosecution for that matter. Petitioner himself is partly to be blamed. Moreover, a petition
for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy for asserting one’s right to bail.[117] It
cannot be availed of where accused is entitled to bail not as a matter of right but on the
discretion of the court and the latter has not abused such discretion in refusing to grant
bail,[118] or has not even exercised said discretion. The proper recourse is to file an
application for bail with the court where the criminal case is pending and to allow
hearings thereon to proceed.
The issuance of a writ of habeas corpus would not only be unjustified but would also
preempt the Sandiganbayan’s resolution of the pending application for bail of petitioner.
The recourse of petitioner is to forthwith proceed with the hearing on his application for
bail.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered as

follows:
1. In G.R. No. 148769 and G.R. No. 149116, the petitions are DISMISSED. The
resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan subject of said petitions
are AFFIRMED; and
2. In G.R. No. 148468, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The resolution of

respondent Sandiganbayan, Annex “L” of the petition, ordering a joint hearing of
petitioner’s petition for bail and the trial of Criminal Case No. 26558 as against
former President Joseph E. Estrada is SET ASIDE; the arraignment of petitioner
on July 10, 2001 is also SET ASIDE.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 180451, October 17, 2008 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. SPO1
ARNULFO A. AURE AND SPO1 MARLON H. FEROL, ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For review is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01127,
dated 29 July 2005, affirming in toto the Decision,[2] dated 5 December 2000, of the
Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 127, in Criminal Cases No. C-58617
and No. C-58693, finding accused-appellants Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Arnulfo A.
Aure and SPO1 Marlon H. Ferol guilty of rape, and imposing upon them the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
The records of the case bear the following facts:
On 20 January 2000, two separate informations[3] for rape were filed with the RTC
charging appellants of rape, thus:
In Criminal Case No. C-58617:
That on or about the 7th day of November, 1999 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
together and mutually helping one another, with lewd design and by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and have sexual
intercourse with one AAA,[4] 45 years old, married, against the latter's will and without
her consent.
In Criminal Case No. C-58693:
That on or about the 7th day of November, 1999 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
together and mutually helping one another, with lewd design and by means of force and
intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and have sexual
intercourse with one AAA, 45 years old, against the latter's will and without her consent.
Subsequently, these cases were consolidated for joint trial. When arraigned on 30 May
2000, appellants, assisted by their respective counsels de parte, pleaded "Not guilty" to
the charges.[5] Trial on the merits thereafter followed.
The prosecution presented as witnesses AAA, Philippine Anti-Organized Crime Task

Force (PAOCTF) Police Chief Inspector Ricardo Dandan (Inspector Dandan), National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Agent Ronald Abulencia (Agent Abulencia), NBI Agent
Antonio Erum, Jr. (Agent Erum), Dr. Nora Leonor Espino (Dr. Espino), Dr. Annabelle
Soliman (Dr. Soliman) and Federico Abesia (Abesia). Their testimonies, woven together,
present the following narrative:
On 7 November 1999, at around 3:00 p.m., AAA slept inside her house located at XXX.
Later, CCC (AAA's son), awakened AAA and told her that several policemen entered the
house. AAA stood up and saw appellant Aure accompanying her housemaid, Maricel
Formentera (Formentera), in walking out of the house. AAA rushed to appellant Aure
and Formentera and tried to pull back Formentera inside the house but she failed to do so.
AAA went out of the house and saw appellant Ferol and a certain SPO4 Honest Gaton
(SPO4 Gaton) holding her two minor housemates, Nerissa Ubay (Ubay) and Judelyn
Borenaga (Borenaga). She also saw several barangay tanods and kibitzers standing
nearby. At this juncture, AAA asked appellant Aure why they were taking the three
young girls and why they entered her house without warrant. Appellant Aure replied that
they are Central Intelligence Service (CIS) agents and were tasked to rescue the three
young girls whom she was keeping and allegedly abusing and exploiting. Appellant Aure
told AAA to explain her side at the Central Intelligence Division Group (CIDG) office.
Thereafter, appellants, SPO4 Gaton and several barangay tanods took AAA and the three
young girls to the XXX barangay hall where the incident was blottered and, afterwards,
to the CIDG office for booking and investigation.[6]
At about 7:00 p.m. of the same day, while still inside the CIDG office for interrogation,
AAA sat on a sofa near the main door of the office. Appellant Aure, who was inside the
computer room of the office, called AAA and instructed her to approach him. When
AAA entered the computer room, appellant Aure told her to sit beside him. AAA
complied. Appellant Aure asked her where she hid the two other minor companions of
Ubay and Borenaga but AAA disclaimed any knowledge thereof. Irked, appellant Aure
accused her of deriving her livelihood from trading the flesh of the children. Thereupon,
appellant Aure placed his hand on her shoulder and gradually massaged her back. She
resisted these moves but appellant Aure told her: "HUWAG KA NANG PUMALAG,
MAGPAKABAIT KA NA LANG." She shouted for help but nobody responded. She tried
to free herself but he punched her thigh and held her shoulder tightly. He pointed a gun at
her side and directed her to stand. She fought back by pulling down his head but he
punched her other thigh. He made her stand by poking a gun at her side. At this point, he
started kissing her from face down to her breast. She shouted and fought back again but
he threatened her "PAPATAYIN KITA, HUWAG KA NG PUMALAG." He forcibly pulled
down her pants which caused her to fall on the floor. Afterwards, he took off his own
pants and placed himself on top of her. She struggled by putting her knees together but he
forcibly separated her legs. He kissed her face, neck and breast and pinned her both arms.
Thereafter, he inserted his penis into her vagina and made pumping motions for less than
five minutes until she felt a warm liquid inside her vagina.[7]
Appellant Aure, who was panting for breath, stayed on top of her for a few minutes.
Later, he stood up and wore his pants. He picked AAA's pants and threw it at her. He told
her to dress up and act as if nothing happened. He peeped through the window of the
computer room and warned her not to tell anyone of what happened or he would kill her.
He then went out of the computer room. After several minutes, he instructed her to get
out of the computer room which she did. She sat on the sofa and saw appellant Aure join
several persons drinking liquor and playing cards inside the office. She saw appellant
Aure talking and drinking liquor with appellant Ferol and some police officers.
Subsequently, appellant Aure left the office while appellant Ferol stayed and continued
drinking liquor with some police officers.[8]
While AAA was sleeping on the sofa inside the office at about 2:00 a.m. of 8 November
1999, appellant Ferol tapped her shoulder and signaled her to proceed to his table. He
gave her coffee and told her to produce P300,000.00 in exchange for the dropping of the
cases they would file against her. She answered that she did not have that amount of
money and would rather be jailed. Disgusted, he remarked "TIGNAN NATIN KUNG
HINDI KA IIYAK BUKAS SA DAMI NG MGA KASONG IPA-FILE NAMIN LABAN SA
IYO." He poked a gun at her temple and back and instructed her to go to the computer
room. While inside the computer room, he ordered her to remove her pants but she was
unable to move due to fear and numbness. He removed her pants and pushed her to the
ground. He placed himself on top of her and kissed her face, neck and breast. He forcibly
separated her legs, pulled up her arms and uttered to her "HUWAG KA NA LANG
PUMALAG PATAPUSIN MO NA LANG AKO KUNG AYAW MONG
MASAKTAN." Thereupon, he inserted his penis into her vagina and made pumping
movements. When he stood up, she saw sperm cell on his organ. He ordered her to dress
up and fix herself. He warned her "WALANG DAPAT MAKAALAM
NITO, TANDAAN MO PAPATAYIN KITA." Later, both of them went out of the
computer room.[9]
At about 8:30 a.m. of the same day, appellants and other CIDG operatives took AAA and
the three young girls to Prosecutor Dionisio Sison (Prosecutor Sison) of the Caloocan
City Prosecutor's Office for inquest proceedings on the charges of Violation of Republic
Act No. 7610 otherwise known as the Anti-Child Abuse Law, Physical Injuries, and
Illegal Recruitment.[10]
After the inquest, appellants and SPO4 Gaton brought AAA to the Ospital ng Kalookan
for medical examination. AAA refused to be examined therein and was constantly crying
and refusing to answer the questions of her attending physician, Dr. Espino. Hence, Dr.
Espino did not push through with the examination and merely indicated in AAA's
medico-legal certificate the following observation: "No visible sign of external physical
injury." Thereafter, appellants and SPO4 Gaton brought AAA to the Caloocan City Jail
where she was detained.[11]
At 6:00 p.m. of the same day, AAA was released from jail pursuant to a Release Order
issued by Prosecutor Sison. BBB, husband of AAA, then immediately brought AAA to
the Ospital ng Kalookan for a second medical examination with Dr. Espino. During the
examination, Dr. Espino found linear abrasions on the forearms of AAA. Dr. Espino
included this finding in AAA's medico-legal certificate.[12]
On 9 November 1999, at around 10:00 a.m., AAA, per advice of Dr. Espino, went back
to the Ospital ng Kalookan for a third medical examination. Dr. Espino discovered the
following injuries on AAA's body: "Old contusions both scapular area; (RT) & (L) arm,
middle 3rd both thighs." Dr. Espino added these observations in AAA's medico-legal
certificate. The over-all findings of Dr. Espino, as stated in AAA's medico-legal
certificate, are as follows:
November 8, 1999 - 11:40 a.m.
- No Visible Sign of External Physical Injury

- Disposition: Back to SPO2 Marlon Ferol
Came back around 7:10 p.m. of November 8, 1999 with the following injuries:
- Linear abrasions forearm posterior aspect bilateral; arm anterior aspect bilateral.
Follow-up OPD - November 9, 1999 - 10:00 a.m. shows:

- Additional findings: Old contusions both scapular area; (RT) & (L) arm, middle
3rd both thighs.
- Disposition: Referred to NBI for OB-GYNE Examination.[13]

During the examination, AAA broke down and confided to Dr. Espino that she was
raped. Dr. Espino handed her a Laboratory Request for OB-GYNE examination. [14]
On 11 November 1999, AAA, per advice of her lawyer, reported the rape incident to the
NBI. The case was assigned to Agent Abulencia and Agent Erum, Jr. before whom AAA
narrated the rape incident. The incident was reduced into AAA's sworn statement. NBI
Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Soliman also conducted a genital examination on AAA. [15] The
findings of Dr. Soliman as stated in AAA's medical certificate are as follows:
CONCLUSIONS:
1. No evident signs of extragenital physical injury was noted on the body of the
subject at the time of the examination.
2. Hymen posteriorly attenuated.
3. Vaginal orifice wide (3.0 cms. in diameter) as to allow complete penetration by an

average-sized adult Filipino male organ in full erection without producing new
hymenal injury.[16]
After investigation, the NBI, through Director Federico Opinion, Jr., submitted a letter-
referral to the Caloocan City Prosecutor's Office recommending the conduct of inquest
proceedings on appellants and the filing of charges against appellants for robbery,
extortion and rape. The letter-referral was studied by Caloocan City Chief Inquest
Prosecutor Oscar Yu (Prosecutor Yu). Prosecutor Yu also conducted a preliminary
examination on AAA. Thereafter, Prosecutor Oscar Yu, Agent Abulencia, Agent Erum, a
certain Agent Sixto Comia, and four other NBI agents proceeded to the CIDG office for
the purpose of inquesting appellants. Upon arriving therein, however, Colonel Edgar C.
Danao (Colonel Danao), Chief of the CIDG office, refused to turn over appellants to
Prosecutor Yu and to the NBI agents for inquest proceedings. Prosecutor Yu and the NBI
agents then left the CIDG office.[17]
Subsequently, a preliminary investigation on the case was conducted but appellants did
not appear during the hearings despite notice. Thereupon, appellants were charged with
rape before the RTC and corresponding warrants for their arrest were issued.
[18]
Appellants then were arrested and detained at the PAOCTF office by Inspector
Dandan and his men.[19]
The prosecution also proffered documentary evidence to bolster the testimonies of its
witnesses, to wit: (1) sworn statement of AAA (Exhibit A)[20]; (2) medico-legal certificate
of AAA issued by Dr. Soliman (Exhibit B)[21]; (3) referral-letter of the NBI to the
Caloocan City Prosecutor's Office (Exhibit C)[22]; (4) joint-affidavit of Agent Abulencia,
Agent Erum and other NBI agents (Exhibit E)[23]; (5) medico-legal certificate of AAA
issued by Dr. Espino (Exhibit G)[24]; (6) release order for AAA (Exhibit H)[25]; (7)
laboratory request for genital examination of AAA (Exhibit J)[26]; (8) resolution of the
Caloocan City Prosecutor's Office dismissing the charges of violation of Republic Act
No. 7610 and Illegal Recruitment against AAA (Exhibit K)[27]; (9) resolution of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) dismissing the charge of physical injuries against AAA
(Exhibit L)[28]; and (10) memorandum from the CIDG-NCR confirming the arrest and
detention of appellants by PAOCTF operatives pursuant to the warrant of arrest issued by
the RTC (Exhibit N).[29]
For its part, the defense presented the testimonies of appellants, SPO2 Jaime Acido,
Virgilio Torres, Ronald Orcullo, Mary Ann Aglibar, Roberto Illut, Juvy Winnie de
Guzman, Colonel Danao, Barangay Chairman Antonio Galgana and Dr. Reymundo Dave
and Ms. Florenda Negre to refute the foregoing accusations. Appellants denied any
liability and interposed the defense of alibi. Appellants' version of the incident, as
corroborated by their witnesses, are as follows:
On 7 November 1999, at around 7:30 a.m., appellants reported for work in the CIDG
office. At about 11:30 in the morning of the same day, a certain Emelita Pajaron
(Pajaron) and Analyn Guinarez (Guinarez) arrived at the office and reported that their
two cousins, Ubay and Borenaga, were being detained and maltreated by AAA at the
latter's house in XXX. After securing the approval of their boss, Colonel Danao,
appellants, together with Pajaron and Guinarez, went to the barangay hall of XXX to
coordinate their rescue operation of Ubay and Borenaga. Thereafter, appellants, Pajaron,
Guinarez and several barangay tanods proceeded to the house of AAA at XXX. Upon
arriving thereat, appellants saw Ubay, Borenaga and Formentera at the gate of AAA's
house. The three young girls were waving at them and crying. AAA went out of the
house and told the three young girls to get inside the house but they refused. AAA
berated and cursed appellants. Appellants then invited AAA to the CIDG office for
investigation to which the latter acceded. Appellants, Ubay, Borenaga, Pajaron, Guinarez
and AAA went first to the barangay hall to blotter the incident and thereafter proceeded
to the CIDG office.[30]
Upon arriving at the CIDG office at about 5:00 p.m., appellants brought the three young
girls to the Ospital ng Kalookan for medical examination of the injuries found on their
bodies. Appellants and the three young girls went back to the CIDG office at 7:00 p.m.
where they were met and interviewed by members of the media namely, Aglibar, Illut
and de Guzman. Later, BBB, CCC, AAA's daughter-in-law, and an unnamed policeman-
friend of AAA, arrived at the office and talked with AAA. At this juncture, appellants
were busy preparing the pertinent documents for the filing of charges against AAA.
Appellants went back and forth to the computer room checking the drafts and having
them typed by their encoder, Torres. The interview of the three young girls by members
of the media and appellants' preparation of relevant documents lasted until 11:30 p.m.
Thereafter, at about 12:00 midnight of 8 November 1999, appellants, Aglibar, Illut, de
Guzman and the three young girls proceeded to Waray Waray Restaurant at Pier 12 to
rescue two more minors allegedly kept by AAA in the said place. Appellants' surveillance
and operation yielded negative results. Thus, appellants and company went back to the
CIDG office arriving therein at about 3:00 a.m. After half an hour, appellant Aure left the
office and proceeded home.[31] Appellant Ferol stayed in the office because he was then
on 24-hour duty. Appellant Ferol slept on his table inside the office until 8:30 in the
morning. Orcullo and a certain Ricky Masangkay, both of whom were errand boys of the
office, also slept inside the office near appellant Ferol.[32]
At about 8:30 a.m., appellant Aure arrived at the office. Subsequently, Colonel Danao
also arrived. Appellants then brought AAA to the Caloocan City Prosecutor's Office for
inquest proceedings. AAA was charged with violation of Republic Act No. 7610,
Physical Injuries and Illegal Recruitment and was detained in Caloocan City Jail. [33]
On 12 November 1999, Prosecutor Yu and several NBI agents swooped down in the
CIDG office to conduct an inquest proceeding on appellants for the rape of AAA.
Colonel Danao refused to turn over appellants because the proceeding was improper as
appellants were not previously arrested.[34]
The defense also adduced documentary and object evidence to bolster the testimonies of
its witnesses, to wit: (a) referral-letter of Colonel Danao to the Caloocan City Prosecutor's
Office requesting inquest of AAA for Violation of Republic Act No. 7610 and for
Physical Injuries (Exhibit 1)[35]; (b) preliminary report of Dr. Soliman (Exhibit 2)[36]; (c)
medico-legal certificate issued by Dr. Soliman (Exhibit 3)[37]; (d) medico-legal certificate
issued by Dr. Espino (Exhibit 4)[38]; (e) Pinagsama-Samang Salaysay of Ubay, Borenaga
and Formentera (Exhibit 5)[39]; (f) joint-affidavit of de Guzman, Aglibar and Illut (Exhibit
6)[40]; (g) a picture showing the entrance to the computer room of the CIDG office
(Exhibit 8)[41]; (h) sketch of the CIDG office (Exhibit 10)[42]; (i) certificate of completion
of the Practical Investigative Techniques issued by the CIDG to appellant Aure (Exhibit
11)[43]; (j) complaint sheet charging AAA of maltreatment of minors, illegal recruitment
and illegal detention (Exhibit 12)[44]; (k) certification issued by Chairman Galgana that
appellants proceeded to the barangay hall before going to the house of AAA (Exhibit 13)
[45]
; and (l) joint-affidavit of appellants (Exhibit 14).[46]
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision on 5 December 2000 convicting appellant Aure
of rape in Criminal Case No. C-58617 and acquitting him of rape in Criminal Case
No. C-58693. On the other hand, appellant Ferol was convicted of rape in Criminal Case
No. C-58693 but was acquitted of rape in Criminal Case No. C-58617. The RTC
explained that in Criminal Case No. C-58617, the prosecution has duly established that
appellant Aure raped AAA on 7 November 1999, at around 7:00 p.m., inside the
computer room of the CIDG office. Nonetheless, the prosecution failed to prove that
appellant Ferol conspired with appellant Aure in raping AAA at such time and, hence,
appellant Ferol is acquitted of rape in Criminal Case No. C-58617. With regard to
Criminal Case No. C-58693, the prosecution had proven that appellant Ferol raped AAA
on 8 November 1999, at 2:00 a.m. inside the computer room of the CIDG office.
However, appellant Aure is acquitted of rape in this instance because there was no
evidence that he conspired with appellant Ferol in committing such rape.
In addition to the penalty of reclusion perpetua, each of the appellants was also ordered
to pay AAA the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P60,000.00 as moral
damages, and P70,000.00 as attorney's fees. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and the prosecution having established to a moral
certainty the guilt of Accused ARNULFO A. AURE and Accused MARLON H. FEROL
in Crim. Case Nos. 58617 and 58693, respectively, of the crime of Rape as defined and
penalized under R.A. 8353, this Court in the absence of any modifying circumstances,
hereby sentences each of the said Accused to suffer the lesser penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua; to each indemnity the Private Complainant the civil indemnity of P50,000; and
to each pay her moral damages of P60,000.00 as well as attorney's fee of P70,000.00
each, and to pay the costs, without any subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Anent the respective criminal liability of Accused MARLON FEROL in Crim. Case No.
58617 and Accused ARNULFO AURE in Crim. Case No. 58693, for failure of the
prosecution to overcome with the required quantum of proof their constitutional
presumption of innocence, they are ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
The preventive imprisonment suffered by both Accused shall be credited in full in the
service of their respective sentences in accordance with Art. 29 of the Revised Penal
Code.[47]
Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration[48] but this was denied.[49]
On 10 February 2002, appellants elevated the instant case to us for review. [50] However,
pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo,[51] we remanded the case to the Court of
Appeals for proper disposition.
On 29 July 2005, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming in toto the

RTC Decision. Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration[52] which was denied.[53]
Before us, appellants assigned the following errors:

I.
THE RTC ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT AURE IN CRIMINAL

CASE NUMBER 58617 WITH RAPE DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER R.A.
8353 COMMITTED ON NOVEMBER 7, 1999 AND AT THE SAME TIME
ACQUITTING HIM IN CRIMINAL CASE NUMBER 58693 OF THE ALLEGED
CRIME OF RAPE DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER R.A. 8353 ALLEGEDLY
COMMITTED ON SAME AND ONE OCCASION/INCIDENT OF RAPE -
NOVEMBER 7, 1999.
II.
THE RTC ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FEROL IN

CRIMINAL CASE 58693 WHICH ACCUSES ACCUSED-APPELLANT FEROL
WITH THE CRIME OF RAPE DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER R.A. 8353
COMMITTED ON NOVEMBER 7, 1999 AND AT THE SAME TIME ACQUITTING
HIM IN CRIMINAL CASE NUMBER 58617 ALSO OF THE CRIME OF RAPE
DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER R.A. 8353 COMMITTED ON NOVEMBER 7,
1999, WORST ACCUSED-APPELLANT FEROL WAS CONVICTED OF THE
CRIME OF RAPE COMMITTED ON NOVEMBER 8, 1999 WITH WHICH HE WAS
NOT BEING CHARGED IN CRIMINAL CASE NUMBER 58693.
III.
THE RTC ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME OF

RAPE DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER R.A. 8353 WHEN THE PROSECUTION
FAILED TO PROVE AND ESTABLISH THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS OF THE COMMISSION AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE
ALLEGED CRIMES OF RAPE DEFINED AND ALLEGED IN THE TWO (2)
INFORMATIONS UNDER CRIMINAL CASE NUMBERS 58167 AND 58693.
IV.
THE RTC ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS EACH OF THE

CRIME OF RAPE WHEN THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE
ALLEGATION AND CHARGE OF CONSPIRACY AND WHEN "RESPONDENT
JUDGE" HERSELF FOUND ABSENCE OF CONSPIRACY.
V.
THE RTC ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TESTIMONIES OF ACCUSED-

APPELLANTS AND WITNESSES ARE BUT ALIBI AND DEFINITELY FALLS
WITHIN THE CATEGORY OF NEGATIVE AND SELF-SERVING EVIDENCE.
VI.
THE RTC ERRED IN DENYING THE REQUEST OF ACCUSED APPPELLANTS
FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE REQUISITE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION.
VII.
THE RTC IN RENDERING AND PROMULGATING THE SUBJECT ASSAILED

DECISION MANIFESTED CLEAR SIGNS OF BIAS, PARTIALITY AND
PREJUDICE AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
VIII.
THE RTC ERRED IN ORDERING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS TO PAY FOR

DAMAGES AND COST IN FAVOR OF "PRIVATE COMPLAINANT."
In reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided by three principles, to wit: (1) an accusation
of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person
accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of
rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must
be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand
or fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for
the defense.[54]
As a result of these guiding principles, credibility of the complainant becomes the single
most important issue. If the testimony of the victim is credible, convincing and consistent
with human nature, and the normal course of things, the accused may be convicted solely
on the basis thereof.[55]
We have carefully examined AAA's court testimony and found it to be credible and
trustworthy. Her positive identification of appellant Aure as the one who ravished her on
7 November 1999 and of appellant Ferol as the one who defiled her 8 November 1999, as
well as her direct account of the bestial acts, are clear and consistent, viz:
ATTY. DIETA TO WITNESS:
xxxx
A [At] 7:00 p.m. [7 November 1999] SPO1 Aure called me to the computer room.
Q After you were brought to the computer room by SPO1 Aure, what happen?
A I was made to sit and he sat beside me.
xxxx
Q After that what transpired next?
A He place his hand on my shoulder.
Q What was your reaction when Aure place his arm to your shoulder?
A Hinahawi ko po iyong kamay niya na nakapatong sa balikat ko. Pero po iyong kamay
niya inihahagod po niya sa may likuran ko.
Q After that what transpired?
A Sabi niya, Huwag ka ng pumalag, magpakabait ka na lang.
Q What was your reaction to the statement of Aure?
A I was shouting for help because of what he was doing.
Q Did anybody respond to your shout for help?
A Wala pong sumaklolo sa akin.
A Pinipilit ko po na alisin and kamay ni SPO1 Aure sa likod ko, nagpipiglas po ako,
bigla po niyang sinuntok ang hita ko.
Q After Aure hit your thigh, what happen next?
A Inakbayan po niya ako ng mahigpit sa balikat, itinutok po niya iyong baril sa tagiliran
ko.
xxxx
Q What was your reaction when Aure poked the gun to your side?
A I was very afraid and do not know what to do.
Q After that what happen?
A He was forcing me to stand by pulling up my shoulder.
A I was trying to release myself from his hold and try to get hold of his head.
Q When you were not able to reach the head of Aure what transpired?
A He got mad and punch me on the other thigh.
xxxx
Q After Aure hit your thigh again what transpired?
A Pilit po niya akong itinatayo. He was forcing me to stand up and went behind my back
and his hand were near my breast.
COURT:
Q To make you stand with his both hands?
A Bale nakatutok po sa may tagiliran ko iyong baril. Iyong kamay po niya iyong isa
nakayakap po dito sa pagitan po ng suso ko.
Q What hand of Aure is holding the gun?
A Right hand holding the gun.
A He was able to make me stand.
Q When you were already on standing position what transpired?
A Pinaghahalikan na po niya ako sa iba-ibang parte ng katawan, nagsisisigaw po ako,
nanlalaban po ako sa kanya.
xxxx
Q For how long did Aure kissed you in different parts of the body?
A Noong nakatayo na po kami, nanlalaban po ako sa kanya. Sinabi niya sa akin,
papatayin kita, huwag ka ng pumalag.
Q What was your reaction when Aure threatened you of death?
A I was very afraid. I almost die.
Q After that what transpired next?
A He told me to take off my pants.
Q Did you do as Aure directed you to take off your pants?
A Sa takot ko po hindi ko po namalayan na sumunod po ako sa kanya. Inalis ko po ang
butones at saka po binaba ko po. [56]
xxxx
Q After that what happened?
A SPO1 Aure pulled my pants down, sir.
Q After SPO1 Aure pulled your pants down, what happened next?
A "Napaupo po ako at bumagsak sa cemento."
xxxx
Q What was SPO1 Aure doing at that time when you were already on the floor?
A Taking off his pants, sir.
Q After he took off his pants, what happened?
A I cringed in fear and trembling, sir.
Q After that what happened next?
A SPO1 Aure approached me and held my knee.
xxxx
Q What was your reaction to the action of SPO1 Aure?
A I was trying to free myself from his hold and made my knees sticked (sic) together.
A "Nag-iiyak po ako sa takot. Nasasaktan po ako sa ginagawa niya."
xxxx
Q Was he able to open your knees?
A Yes, sir.
Q And when SPO1 Aure opened your knees, what happened next?
A "Itinuhod po niya yung tuhod niya sa pagitan ng aking mga hita."
Q After that what did SPO1 Aure do, if any?
A He laid down at (sic) top me, sir.
Q When SPO1 Aure laid down on top of you, was he already naked?
A Yes, no more pants, and brief, sir.
xxxx
xxxx
Q When SPO1 Aure put his knees between your legs, what transpired next after that?
A He laid at (sic) top me and kissed all over my body, sir.
Q What particular parts of your body did SPO1 Aure kiss?
A My face, neck and breast sir.
Q For how long that situation last?
A I tried to fight back as I tried to lift his body from me, and I even hit him on the back.
Q When you were fighting back with SPO1 Aure what was his reaction?
A "Napakalakas niya, yung dalawang braso ko inipit niya sa dalawang kamay niya."
A "Nag-pump na po siya tuloy-tuloy po yung pag-papump niya, pabilis ng pabilis po."
xxxx
Q Do you recall how long SPO1 Aure was pumping above you?
A Seconds only then he kissed my body, sir.
A I felt his foot kicked my pants down until it was taken off, sir.
Q After your pants was taken off, what transpired?
A "Tinutok niya yung ari niya sa aking pagkababae."
ATTY. DIETA:
At this point Your Honor I would like to manifest that the witness is already crying.
xxxx
COURT TO WITNESS:
Q You want to tell this Court that he was able to insert his penis into your private part?
A "Opo."
Q After SPO1 Aure inserted his penis to your private part, what did he do next?
A "Pabilis ng pabilis ang kanyang pagpapump hanggang sa may naramdaman po akong
mainit na likido na pumasok sa aking ari."
Q Do you recall how long did that pumping happen after you felt a warm liquid to your
vagina?
A "Wala pa pong limang minuto."
Q After you felt that liquid discharged from SPO1 Aure, what happened next?
A "Humihingal si SPO1 Aure na bigla na lang po siyang dumagan sa katawan ko,
flat po."
xxxx
A SPO1 Aure stood up and wore his pants.
Q After SPO1 Aure put on his pants, what did he do next?
A "Hinagis po niya ang aking pantalon at sinabi po niya na mag-ayos ako ng aking
sarili na parang walang nangyari."
Q On your part what did you do when SPO1 Aure gave your pants back?
A "Hindi ako makakilos sa takot at hindi ko kaagad naisuot yun."
Q What about SPO1 Aure what did he do?
A He approached me and poked the gun on my face.
Q What was your reaction when SPO1 Aure poked his gun on your face?
A I obeyed him and put on my panty and my pants.
Q After you put on your panty and pants, what happened next after that?
A I sat on a chair and SPO1 Aure went to the door.
Q After that what did SPO1 Aure do?
A He opened the door and peeped outside, sir.
Q After SPO1 Aure opened the door and peeped outside, what happened next?
A "Lumapit po sa kinauupuan ko at sinabi niya na tandaan mo walant dapat
makakaalam nito kundi papatayin kita."
Q What was your reaction to his statement?
A "Umiyak ako ng umiyak, hindi po ako makakilos."
xxxx
Q So it was SPO1 Ferol who approached you and tapped your shoulder at about 2:00 a.m.
of November 8, 1999?
A Yes, sir.
xxxx
A He poked his gun on my temple and told me to enter the computer room.
Q When you were inside the computer room, what transpired, if any?
A "Pinahuhubad niya po sa akin yung pantalon ko."
xxxx
Q While you wee inside the computer room, what happened next?
A He told me to take off my pants, sir.
Q What did you do?
A "Sa pagkakataon pong yun di ako makakilos, namamanhid po yung buong katawan ko
sa nerbiyos."
Q As you mentioned that you were already numb due to fright, what did you do if any?
A I could not move and I felt that he was the one unbuttoning my pants.
Q You mentioned that he was the one unbuttoning your pants, to whom are your referring
to?
A Ferol, sir.
Q Was SPO1 Ferol about to unbutton your pants?
A Yes, up to my thigh.
A He pushed me to the folding bed, sir.
Q After he pushed you to the folding bed, what happened?
A Facing down to the folding bed he pulled me down to the cement floor and my back
hitting the floor first.
xxxx
Q After you were pulled down to the cement, what happened next?
A He approached me and pulled my pants down.
Q After SPO1 Ferol pulled your pants down, what did he do next?
A He hurriedly took off his pants, sir.
Q After SPO1 Ferol took off his pants, what did he do if any?
A "Dinaganan niya po ako sa aking katawan paluhod."
Q That particular moment what were you doing at that time?
A "HINDI NA PO AKO MAKAKILOS SA NERBIYOS."
Q When SPO1 Ferol was already kneeling above your body as you mentioned, what
transpired next?
A He took off his T-shirt, sir.
xxxx
Q After SPO1 Ferol put off his T-shirt, what did he do next?
A He bent down and started kissing me. "Malikot po siya."
Q Will you tell this Court what part of your body was kissed by SPO1 Ferol at that time?
A Face, neck, head, body up to my breast.
xxxx
Q When SPO1 Ferol was kissing you what were you doing at that time?
A I was trying to free myself but he was forcing me to open my legs.
Q Was SPO1 Ferol able to open your legs?
A Yes, sir.
Q After he opened your legs, what did he do next?
A "Nag-pump siya ng nag -pump, ang katawan niya nasa pagitan ng aking mga hita."
Q For how long did SPO1 Ferol make that pumping motion between your legs?
A Due to fright I could not remember anything.
A I tried to hit or box him but he held both my arms and pulled it up.
Q After SPO1 Ferol held your hands, what happened next?
A "Sabi po niya, huwag ka na lang pumalag patapusin mo na lang ako kung ayaw mo
masaktan."
Q What was your reaction to the statement of SPO1 Ferol?
A I was trying to free myself and crying but I could not do so.
Q After you were not able to free yourself from the body of SPO1 Ferol what happened
next?
A Nag-pump po siya ng nag-pump.
COURT: (butts in) TO WITNESS:
xxxx
Q When he was pumping, was his penis inside your private part already?
A Yes, he was able to make his organ entered to (sic) my organ, Your Honor.
Q For how long did SPO1 Ferol make this pumping?
A Only for a short while, all I felt was I could not feel anything except fear.
A He stood up and I saw white sperm in front of him.
Q Where did you see that white sperm?
A Outside of his organ, sir.
Q After that what did you do, if any?
A "Napaluhod po ako, nanginginig po ako sa takot. Inutusan po niya akong magsuot ng
aking panty at pantalon."
Q Were you able to put on your panty and pants?
A I could not move at that time.
xxxx
A He told me to fix myself or else he will kill me and due to fear I crawled to get my
pants.
Q Were you able to put on your panty and pants?
A Yes, sir.
Q After that what did you do next?
A I was crying and he told me "walang dapat makaalam nito, tandaan mo papatayin
kita."[57]
It is settled that the testimony of a married rape victim, such as AAA, is given full weight
and credence because no married woman with a husband and children would place
herself on public trial for rape where she would be subjected to suspicion, morbid
curiosity, malicious imputations, and close scrutiny of her personal life, not to speak of
the humiliation and scandal she and her family would suffer, if she was merely
concocting her charge and would not be able to prove it in court.[58]
It is also significant to note that the RTC gave full credence to the foregoing testimony of
AAA as she relayed her painful ordeal in a candid manner. It found the testimonies of
AAA to be "clear, spontaneous and reliable." Jurisprudence instructs that when the
credibility of a witness is of primordial consideration, as in this case, the findings of the
trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the
probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are
accorded respect if not conclusive effect. This is because the trial court has had the
unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and was in the best position
to discern whether they were telling the truth. When the trial court's findings have been
affirmed by the appellate court, as in the present case, said findings are generally binding
upon this Court.[59]
Further, the abovementioned testimonies are consistent with the documentary evidence
submitted by the prosecution. The RTC and the Court of Appeals found the testimonies
of AAA to be credible.
Appellants, nonetheless, claim in their first, second and fourth assigned errors that the
informations in Criminal Cases No. C-58617 and No. C-58693 both alleged that they
conspired in raping AAA once on 7 November 1999. The RTC, however, found no
conspiracy between appellants in raping AAA. Nonetheless, it held that appellant Aure
alone raped AAA on 7 November 1999 and thus convicted him of rape in Criminal Case
No. C-58617 but acquitted him of rape in Criminal Case No. C-58693; while appellant
Ferol alone raped AAA on 8 November 1999 and, hence, convicted him of rape in
Criminal Case No. C-58693 but acquitted him of rape in Criminal Case No. C-58617.
Appellants maintain that the foregoing findings and rulings of the RTC are inconsistent
with the allegations of conspiracy in the two informations and that the RTC cannot
individually and separately convict appellants of rape because the informations in the two
cases alleged conspiracy between them in raping AAA. Also, appellant Ferol cannot be
convicted in Criminal Case No. C-58693 of rape committed on 8 November 1999
because such fact was not alleged in the informations. Appellants argued that the said
finding and ruling of the RTC violated their constitutional rights to be informed of the
nature of the case against them, to be presumed innocent of the charges, and to due
process.[60]
Although the informations in Criminal Cases No. C-58617 and No. C-58693 both alleged

that appellants conspired in raping AAA, it does not necessarily follow that the RTC
cannot individually and separately convict appellants of rape. The rule is that once a
conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all, and each of the conspirators is
liable for the crimes committed by the other conspirators. It follows then that if the
prosecution fails to prove conspiracy, the alleged conspirators should be held individually
responsible for their own respective acts.[61] In the instant cases, the RTC ruled that the
prosecution failed to establish conspiracy between appellants in raping AAA.
Nevertheless, on the basis of AAA's credible testimony and documentary evidence for the
prosecution, the RTC found that appellant Aure alone raped AAA on 7 November 1999
and that appellant Ferol alone raped AAA on 8 November 1999. Thus, the RTC was
correct in holding appellants individually responsible for their respective acts of rape.
It is true that the information in Criminal Case No. C-58693 alleged that appellants

conspired in raping AAA on 7 November 1999, and that the RTC convicted appellant
Ferol alone in Criminal Case No. C-58693 of raping AAA on 8 November 1999.
Nonetheless, the discrepancy on the actual date of rape does not constitute a serious error
warranting the reversal of appellant Ferol's conviction. The date or time of the
commission of rape is not a material ingredient of the said crime because
the gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman through force and intimidation.
The precise time or date when the rape took place has no substantial bearing on its
commission. As such, the date or time need not be stated with absolute accuracy. It is
sufficient that the information states that the crime has been committed at any time as
near as possible to the date of its actual commission.[62] In sustaining the view that the
exact date of commission of rape is immaterial, we held in People v. Purazo[63] that:
We have ruled, time and again, that the date is not an essential element of the crime of
rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. As such, the time
or place of commission in rape cases need not be accurately stated. As early as 1908, we
already held that where the time or place or any other fact alleged is not an essential
element of the crime charged, conviction may be had on proof of the commission of the
crime, even if it appears that the crime was not committed at the precise time or place
alleged, or if the proof fails to sustain the existence of some immaterial fact set out in the
complaint, provided it appears that the specific crime charged was in fact committed prior
to the date of the filing of the complaint or information within the period of the statute of
limitations and at a place within the jurisdiction of the court.
Further, we have held that even a variance of a few months between the time set out in
the information and that established by the evidence during trial does not to constitute a
serious error warranting the reversal of conviction solely on that ground.[64] In the case at
bar, the difference between date/time of the rape as alleged in Criminal Case No. C-
58693 (7 November 1999) and as testified to by AAA (8 November 1999) was one day
only. Indeed, appellant Ferol's actual commission of rape was not that remote or far with
the date of rape alleged in the information under Criminal Case No. C-58693. Besides, all
the essential elements of rape were stated in the said information and the prosecution had
duly established that appellant Ferol had carnal knowledge of AAA through force and
intimidation on 8 November 1999.
Appellants posit in their third and fifth assigned errors that AAA was motivated by
revenge in charging them with rape because they refused her plea to dismiss the charges
of child abuse, illegal recruitment and physical injuries on her; that AAA's non-disclosure
of the rape incident to Prosecutor Sison during her inquest with the latter for child abuse,
illegal recruitment and physical injuries shows that the rape charges were fabricated; that
it was physically impossible for appellants to rape AAA because the latter was taller and
stronger than them; that AAA's statement in her Sinumpaang Salaysay that she felt pain
in her vagina after the rape incidents was inconsistent with the medical findings of Dr.
Soliman that AAA's "vaginal orifice was wide (3.0 centimeters in diameter) as to allow
complete penetration by an average-sized adult Filipino male organ in full erection
without producing hymenal injury"; and that their corroborating witnesses were credible
and should have been believed by the RTC.[65]
Motives such as resentment, hatred or revenge have never swayed this Court from giving
full credence to the testimony of a rape victim.[66] Also, ill motives become
inconsequential if there is an affirmative and credible declaration from the rape victim
which clearly established the liability of the accused.[67] In the present case, AAA
categorically identified appellants as the one who ravished her. Her recount of the
incidents, as found by the RTC, the Court of Appeals, and by this Court, was sincere and
truthful.
Delay in reporting an incident of rape due to death threats and shame does not affect the
credibility of the complainant nor undermine her charge of rape.[68] The silence of a rape
victim or her failure to disclose her misfortune to the authorities without loss of material
time does not prove that her charge is baseless and fabricated. It is a fact that the victim
would rather privately bear the ignominy and pain of such an experience than reveal her
shame to the world or risk the rapist's making good on his threat to hurt or kill her. [69]
AAA testified that appellants threatened to kill her if she would divulge the sexual attacks
on her.[70] Considering that appellants were police officers and armed, and that AAA was
still under appellants' custody when Prosecutor Sison inquested AAA, the latter's initial
reluctance to report the incidents was understandable. Further, she narrated that she did
not immediately tell the authorities and her husband of the rape incidents because she was
confused and ashamed.[71]
Besides, AAA's delay in reporting the rape incidents was not that unreasonably long. The
rape incidents took place on 7 and 8 November 1999 and AAA reported the matter to the
NBI after three days therefrom, or on 11 November 1999. In several cases we have
decided,[72] the delay in reporting the rape incidents lasted for months and even for years;
nevertheless, the victims were found to be credible.
The fact that AAA was taller and stronger than appellants does not imply that it was
physically impossible for appellants to rape AAA. It should be recalled that appellants
poked a gun at AAA and inflicted physical injuries on the latter during the commission of
rapes. Further, the rapes were committed in the office of appellants. Under these
circumstances, AAA was no match for appellants and could not use her tall and strong
built to resist the advances of appellants.
The alleged inconsistency between AAA's Sinumpaang Salaysay and the medical

findings of Dr. Soliman is immaterial. Whether or not AAA felt pain in her vagina during
the rapes is beside the point since virginity is not an element of rape. Further, rape is
consummated from the moment the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim.[73] Full
penetration of the vagina is not essential; any penetration of the female organ by the male
organ, however slight, is sufficient.[74] AAA testified that appellants inserted their penis
into her vagina through force and intimidation.
Denial is inherently a weak defense as it is negative and self-serving. Corollarily, alibi is

the weakest of all defenses for it is easy to contrive and difficult to prove. For alibi to
prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove that he was somewhere else when the
crime was committed. He must likewise prove that it was physically impossible for him
to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. [75]
Appellant Aure claims he was inside the CIDG office and was constantly in and out of
the computer room at around 7:00 p.m. of 7 November 1999. AAA testified that she was
raped inside the computer room of the CIDG office at the same time and date. On the
other hand, appellant Ferol alleges that he was at Pier 12, Tondo, Manila, at 2:00 a.m. of
8 November 1999 and subsequently slept on his table inside the CIDG office at around
3:00 a.m. of the same date. AAA testified that he was raped by appellant Ferol inside the
computer room of the CIDG office at around 2:00 a.m. of 8 November 1999. It is
apparent from the foregoing that appellants were at or near the crime scene during the
rape incidents and that it was not physically impossible for them to be at the crime scene
during the rape incidents. Having failed to comply with the requirements of the law for an
alibi to prosper, appellants' respective alibis, though corroborated by other defense
witnesses, cannot serve as basis for their acquittal. It should be stressed further that as
between denials and alibi of appellants and positive testimony of AAA, the latter is
accorded greater evidentiary weight.[76]
Appellants maintain in their sixth, seventh and eighth assigned errors that the Caloocan
City Prosecutor's Office did not conduct preliminary investigation prior to the filing of
the present cases; that they did not receive any subpoena as regards the said preliminary
investigation; and that the RTC judge, Judge Myrna Dimaranan Vidal, was bias, partial
and rendered the assailed Decision without any factual and legal basis. [77]
It appears from the records that upon filing of a complaint by AAA for rape against
appellants with the Caloocan City Prosecutor's Office, a preliminary investigation was
scheduled on 3 and 17 December 1999 by Prosecutor Yu.[78] Thereafter, two subpoenas
for the said investigation, dated 22 November 1999 (for the 3 December 1999 schedule)
and 3 December 1999 (for the 17 December 1999 schedule), were sent by Prosecutor Yu
to appellants at the latter's CIDG office.[79] Despite receipt of these subpoenas, appellants
did not appear during the conduct of preliminary investigation. Appellants' claim that
they did not receive said subpoenas in the CIDG office does not inspire belief because
they were active, on-duty police officers at the CIDG during the period of November and
December 1999. In fact, appellant Ferol was the acting Chief of the Warrant Department
of the CIDG office during the period of November and December 1999.[80] The said
department was in charge of receiving subpoenas and warrants from courts and other
offices. It was unbelievable that they did not receive, nor was informed, of the subpoenas.
Mere imputation of bias and partiality against a judge is not enough since bias and
partiality can never be presumed.[81] There was no plausible proof that Judge Vidal was
bias. On the contrary, the records show that Judge Vidal was fair and considerate to both
prosecution and defense. We have examined the RTC Decision and found that it contains
sufficient factual and legal basis. In the said 47-page Decision, Judge Vidal has
thoroughly and extensively discussed the facts and the law on which appellants'
conviction for rape were based.
We shall now determine the propriety of the penalties imposed by the RTC as affirmed
by the Court of Appeals.
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for rape committed
through force and intimidation, as in these cases, is reclusion perpetua. The same
provision also states that the death penalty shall be imposed if the victim was raped while
under the custody of the police authorities, or, when the rape is committed by any
member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) or any law enforcement agency. [82]
In the case under consideration, AAA was raped by appellants while she was under the
custody of the CIDG. Further, appellants were members of the PNP-CIDG at the time
they raped AAA. Nonetheless, these aggravating/qualifying circumstances were not
specifically alleged in the informations. It is settled that the aggravating/qualifying
circumstances be expressly and specifically alleged in the information, otherwise they
cannot be appreciated, even if they are subsequently proved during the trial. [83] Thus, the
RTC was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua on each of the appellants.
The RTC was also correct in holding that each of the appellants is liable for civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 because such award is mandatory upon the
finding of fact of rape.[84] Also, the award of moral damages is proper but the amount
thereof should be reduced from P60,000.00 to P50,000.00 for each of the appellants
pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.[85] Likewise, the award of attorney's fees in the
amount of P70,000.00 is in order[86] because the records show that AAA incurred such
expenses in hiring a private prosecutor for the instant case.[87] However, such attorney's
fees should be paid jointly by appellants and not by each of them as erroneously held by
the RTC. AAA testified that she spent a total amount of P70,000.00 in
prosecuting both Criminal Cases No. C-58671 and No. C-58693.[88]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01127,
dated 29 July 2005, is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the
amount of P60,000.00 imposed on each of the appellants as moral damages is reduced to
P50,000.00; and (2) the amount of P70,000.00 as attorney's fees should be paid jointly by
appellants and not by each of them. Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 181084, June 16, 2009 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.
BARTOLOME TAMPUS[1] AND IDA MONTESCLAROS, DEFENDANTS. IDA
MONTESCLAROS, APPELLANT.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
On appeal is the decision[2] of the Court of Appeals, Visayas Station, dated

September 29, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00215. The Court of Appeals affirmed, with
modification, the decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City in Criminal Case
No. 013324-L, finding appellant Ida Montesclaros (Ida) guilty as an accomplice in the
commission of rape.
The present appeal stems from two criminal cases: (1) Criminal Case No. 013324-L
charging Bartolome Tampus (Tampus) and Ida as conspirators in the rape of ABC [4] on
April 1, 1995 at 4:30 p.m.; and (2) Criminal Case No. 013325-L charging Tampus of raping
ABC on April 4, 1995 at 1:00 a.m.
The Information[5] in each case reads as follows:

CRIM. CASE NO. 013324-L[6]
That on the 1st day of April 1995, at about 4:30 o'clock [sic] in the afternoon, in Looc,
Lapulapu City, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Bartolome Tampus, taking advantage that [ABC] was in deep slumber due to
drunkenness, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with [sic] the latter, who was at that time thirteen (13) years old, against her
will, in conspiracy with the accused Ida Montesclaros who gave permission to Bartolome
Tampus to rape [ABC].
CONTRARY TO LAW.
CRIM. CASE NO. 013325-L[7]
That on the 3rd day of April, 1995,[8] at about 1:00 o'clock [sic] dawn, in Looc, Lapulapu
City, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a wooden club (poras), by means of threat and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with [sic]
[ABC], who was at that time thirteen (13) years old, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The offended party, ABC, is the daughter of appellant Ida, and was 13 years old at the
time of the incident. Ida worked as a waitress in Bayanihan Beer House in Mabini, Cebu
City. On February 19, 1995, Ida and ABC started to rent a room in a house owned by
Tampus, a barangay tanod. On April 1, 1995, about 4:30 p.m., ABC testified that she was
in the house with Ida and Tampus[9] who were both drinking beer at that time. They
forced her to drink beer[10] and after consuming three and one-half (3 1/2) glasses of
beer, she became intoxicated and very sleepy. [11] While ABC was lying on the floor of
their room, she overheard Tampus requesting her mother, Ida, that he be allowed to
"remedyo "[12] or have sexual intercourse with her.[13] Appellant Ida agreed and
instructed Tampus to leave as soon as he finished having sexual intercourse with ABC.
Ida then went to work, leaving Tampus alone with ABC. ABC fell asleep and when she
woke up, she noticed that the gaiter of her panties was loose and rolled down to her
knees. She suffered pain in her head, thighs, buttocks, groin and vagina, and noticed
that her panties and short pants were stained with blood which was coming from her
vagina.[14] When her mother arrived home from work the following morning, she kept on
crying but appellant Ida ignored her. [15]
ABC testified that on April 4, 1995 around 1:00 a.m., she was left alone in the room since
her mother was at work at the beer house. [16] Tampus went inside their room and
threatened to kill her if she would report the previous sexual assault to anyone. [17] He
then forcibly removed her panties. ABC shouted but Tampus covered her mouth and
again threatened to kill her if she shouted. [18] He undressed himself, spread ABC's legs,
put saliva on his right hand and he applied this to her vagina; he then inserted his penis
into ABC's vagina and made a push and pull movement. [19] After consummating the
sexual act, he left the house. When ABC told appellant Ida about the incident, the latter
again ignored her.[20]
On May 4, 1995, after being maltreated by her mother, ABC sought the help of her aunt,
Nellie Montesclaros (Nellie). She told Nellie about the rape and that her mother sold
her.[21] ABC, together with Nellie and Norma Andales, a traffic enforcer, reported the
incident of rape to the police. On May 9, 1995, Nestor A. Sator , M.D. (Dr. Sator), head of
the Medico-Legal Branch of the Philippine National Crime Laboratory Services, Regional
Unit 7, conducted a physical examination of ABC and issued a Medico-Legal Report.
[22]
Dr. Sator testified that the result of his examination of ABC revealed a deep healed
laceration at the seven (7) o'clock position and a shallow healed laceration at the one (1)
o'clock position on ABC's hymen.
On September 22, 1995, ABC filed two Complaints. She accused Tampus of taking
advantage of her by having carnal knowledge of her, against her will, while she was
intoxicated and sleeping on April 1, 1995 at 4:30 p.m. She declared in her Complaint
that this was done in conspiracy with accused Ida who gave permission to Tampus to
rape her. And again, she stated that on April 3, 1995, she was threatened with a
wooden club by Tampus, who then succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her,
against her will.
Tampus denied raping ABC on April 1, 1995. He claimed that at 4:00 p.m. of April 1,
1995, he left the house to go to the public market of Lapu-lapu City. When he arrived
home at 6:00 p.m., ABC and Ida were not there as they usually go to the beer house at
4:00 p.m. or 5:00 p.m.[23] He denied forcing ABC to drink beer. He also denied asking Ida
to allow him to have sexual intercourse with ABC. [24] Appellant Ida also testified that she
and ABC left for the beer house at 4:00 p.m. of April 1, 1995 and they came back at 6:00
a.m. the following day.[25] She said that she always brought her daughter to the beer
house with her and there was never an instance when she left her daughter alone in the
house.[26] She denied forcing ABC to drink beer at 4:30 p.m. of April 1, 1995, and she
denied giving permission to Tampus to have sexual intercourse with ABC. [27]
Tampus also denied raping ABC on April 4, 1995. He testified that he arrived at the
Barangay Tanod Headquarters between 7:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. of April 3, 1995 [28] and
that his actual duty time shift was from midnight to 5:00 a.m. of April 4, 1995. Guillermo
Berdin (Berdin), a defense witness, testified that on April 3, 1995, Tampus reported, for
duty at the police outpost at 8:00 p.m. and left at 5:00 a.m. of April 4, 1995, as reflected
in the attendance logbook. However, on cross-examination, Berdin could not tell
whether the signature appearing on the logbook really belonged to Tampus. It was
noted by the trial court that the handwriting used by Tampus in the logbook entry on
April 2, 1995 is different from his handwriting appearing on April 3, 1995. [29] It was also
revealed that the house of Tampus is just 500 meters away or just a three-minute walk
from the barangay tanod outpost and that the barangay tanod on duty could leave the
outpost unnoticed or without permission. [30]
Agustos B. Costas, M.D.[31] (Dr. Costas), the Head of the Department of Psychiatry of the
Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center, issued a Medical Certification, [32] which showed
that appellant Ida was treated as an outpatient at the Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical
Center Psychiatry Department from November 11, 1994 to January 12, 1995 and was
provisionally diagnosed with Schizophrenia, paranoid type.
The trial court convicted Tampus of two counts of rape, as principal in Criminal Case No.
013324-L and Criminal Case No. 013325-L. Appellant Ida was found guilty as an
accomplice in Criminal Case No. 013324-L. The trial court appreciated in Ida's favor the
mitigating circumstance of illness which would diminish the exercise of will-power
without depriving her of the consciousness of her acts, pursuant to Article 13(9) of the
Revised Penal Code.[33] The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision states, viz.:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds accused
Bartolome Tampus GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of two counts of rape, as
principals [sic], in Criminal Case No. 013324-L and Criminal Case No. 013325-L and he is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua in each of the
aforementioned cases.
The Court also finds accused Ida Montesclaros GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as
an accomplice in Criminal Case No. 013324-L, and she is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years, and eight (8) months
of Reclusion Temporal.
Both accused are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to indemnify the offended
party, [ABC], the sum of P50,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 013324-L.
With costs against the accused. SO ORDERED.[34]
Pending resolution of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, accused Tampus died on
November 16, 2000[33] and his appeal was dismissed by the Third Division of this Court.
[36]
Thus, the appeal before the Court of Appeals dealt only with that of appellant Ida.
The appellate court gave credence to the testimony of ABC and affirmed the trial court's
decision with modification. It appreciated the mitigating circumstance of illness in favor
of Ida, but found that Ida failed to prove that she was completely deprived of
intelligence on April 1, 1995. On the basis of the medical report and the testimony of the
attending physician, Ida's schizophrenia was determined by both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals to have diminished the exercise of her will-power though it did not
deprive her of the consciousness of her acts. The dispositive portion of the decision of
the Court of Appeals states:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed

decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Ida Montesclaros is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as accomplice in the commission of rape and hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty often (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Further, she is ORDERED to pay moral damages in the amount of fifty thousand pesos
(Php 50,000.00) and exemplary damages in the amount of twenty-five thousand pesos
(Php 25,000.00).[37]
We find the findings of the lower courts to be well-taken.

The finding of guilt of Ida as an accomplice in the rape of ABC is dependent on proving
the guilt of the principal accused. Upon examination of the records of the case, we
agree with the ruling of the trial and appellate courts that the testimony of ABC is clear
and straightforward, and is sufficient to conclude that Tampus is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal in the rape of ABC, in Criminal Case No. 013324-L, as well
as to convict appellant Ida as an accomplice in the same criminal case.
The findings of the trial courts carry great weight and respect and, generally, appellate
courts will not overturn said findings unless the trial court overlooked, misunderstood
or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which will alter the
assailed decision or affect the result of the case. [38] The rule finds an even more
stringent application where the said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals. [39]
The trial court has carefully scrutinized the testimony of complainant ABC and has given
full faith and credence to her testimony. Both the trial and appellate courts found that
the rape of ABC by Tampus on April 1, 1995 has been established beyond reasonable
doubt. Indeed, it is highly inconceivable for a young girl to impute the crime of rape,
implicate her own mother in such a vile act, allow an examination of her private parts
and subject herself to public trial if she has not been a victim of rape and was impelled
to seek justice for the defilement of her person. Testimonies of child-victims are
normally given full credit.
Tampus was positively identified by ABC as the person who had carnal knowledge of her
against her will on April 1, 1995. The denial of Tampus cannot prevail over the positive
and direct identification by the victim, ABC. Although ABC was asleep and unconscious
at the time the sexual debasement was committed by Tampus, circumstantial evidence
established beyond doubt that it is Tampus who raped ABC. Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.41 In cases
like the one at bar, the Court takes into consideration the events that transpired before
and after the victim lost consciousness in order to establish the commission of the act of
coitus.[42]
The trial court correctly determined, thus:
The prosecution has clearly established by its evidence that accused Bartolome
Tampus had carnal knowledge of [ABC] on April 1, 1995 under the circumstance set
forth in Article 335 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; that is, when the woman
is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious.
xxxx
The Court cannot accept accused Bartolome Tampus' defense of denial and alibi. His
denial pales in effect against the positive evidence given by [ABC] that he ravished
her [on] two occasions.
xxxx
It is true that in the first incident on April 1, 1995, [ABC] did not see Tampus lie down
with her. What she saw was the aftermath of her deflowering upon waking up.
Nevertheless, the Court has taken note of the following circumstances: (1) The drinking
session where the complainant was forced to drink beer by both accused; (2) The
conversation between the two accused when accused Tampus requested accused Ida
Montesclaros, and was granted by the latter, permission to have sexual intercourse with
the complainant; (3) Accused Tampus and the complainant were the only persons left in
the house when Ida Montesclaros went to work after acceding to the request of
Tampus; (4) The bloodstained pants, the pain and blood in complainant's vagina and the
pain in her head, groin and buttocks; (5) The threat made by accused Tampus on the
complainant in the dawn of April 4, 1995 that he would kill her if she would tell about
the previous incident on April 1, 1995; and (6) The second incident of rape that
immediately ensued. These circumstances form a chain that points to accused
Bartolome Tampus as the person who had carnal knowledge of [ABC] when she was
asleep in an inebriated condition.[43]
After establishing the guilt of Tampus as principal, the trial court then determined the
guilt of Ida. Although Ida was charged as a conspirator, the trial court found her liable as
an accomplice. The trial court ruled that her act of forcing or intimidating ABC to drink
beer and then acceding to the request of co-accused Tampus to be allowed to have
sexual intercourse with ABC did not prove their conspiracy. [44] Hence, it held that,
"[undoubtedly, Ida Montesclaros participated in the commission of the crime by
previous acts but her participation, not being indispensable, was not that of a principal.
She is liable as an accomplice."[45]
In her appeal, appellant Ida argued that it is against human nature for a mother to allow
her daughter to be raped. She maintained that there was no instance when she left ABC
alone in the house. The Court of Appeals dismissed appellant Ida's appeal as it also gave
credence to the testimony of ABC.
In her appeal brief filed before this Court, Ida raises the following assignment of errors:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED BARTOLOME TAMPUS OF THE
CRIMES OF RAPE DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING IDA MONTESCLAROS AS ACCOMPLICE TO THE

CRIME OF RAPE DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HER GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.[46]
We affirm the trial and appellate courts in ruling that Ida is liable as an accomplice in the
rape of her daughter, ABC.
Accomplices are persons who, not being included in Article 17 of the Revised Penal
Code, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.47 The
following requisites must be proved in order that a person can be considered an
accomplice:
community of design, i.e., knowing that criminal design of the principal by direct
a) participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose;
he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts; and,
b)
there must be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to
c) the person charged as accomplice.[48]
The testimony of ABC establishes that Ida cooperated in the execution of the
rape by Tampus when prior to the act of rape by Tampus, she forced ABC to drink beer
and she agreed to Tampus' request for him to have sexual intercourse with ABC. Ida's
acts show that she had knowledge of and even gave her permission to the plan of
Tampus to have sexual intercourse with her daughter.
During the cross-examination by the defense counsel, Atty. Paulito Cabrera, of witness
ABC, she testified that:
Q Before this date, April 1, 1995, did you already usually drink beer?
A No, sir.
Q So, you are telling the Honorable Court that it was only on April 1, 1995 that you first
drank beer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you say, you were forced to drink beer?

A Yes, sir.
Q Who forced you to drink beer in that afternoon of April 1, 1995?

A Bartolome Tampus and "Nanay", my mother. [49]
xxxx
Q By the way, your mother proposed to you to dfink beer?

A Yes, sir.
Q Before you concede to her proposition, did you not complain that you had not been
used to drinking beer and then, why suddenly, she would let you drink beer at that
time?
A No, sir.
Q Did you not tell her that, "I am not used to drinking beer, so, I would not drink beer"?
A Because the beer was mixed with Coke.
Q So, you mean that you also agreed to drink beer at that time?
A I just agreed to the proposal of my mother.
Q But you never voiced any complaint or any refusal to her at that time?
A No, sir because I was afraid that she might maltreat me.
Q At that time when she proposed to you to drink beer, was she already threatening to
maltreat you if you would not drink that beer?
A Not yet.
Q And how were you able to conclude that she might maltreat you if you would not
drink that beer that she proposed for you to drink?
A Because "Nanay" stared at me sharply and she had a wooden stick prepared.
Q Are you sure that she was doing that while she was offering the glass of beer to you?
A Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q While you were drinking beer, your mother and Bartolome went out of the house and
you overheard Bartolome asking or proposing to your mother that he would have sexual
intercourse with you which you term in the Visayan dialect "remedyo", Bartolome would
want to have a "remedyo" with you. When [sic], particular moment did you allegedly hear this
statement, while you were drinking beer or after you had finished drinking beer?
A When I was already lying on the floor of the room we were renting. [51]
xxxx
Q And, of course, as you have stated now, it was you, you were quite sure that it was
you who was being referred by Bartolome Tampus when he said to your mother in the
Visayan dialect that "gusto siya moremedyo nimo", he wants to have sexual intercourse with
you?
A Yes, sir, but I don't know the meaning of "remedyo".
Q At that time, you did not know the meaning of "remedyo"?

A Not yet, sir.
xxxx
Q Was that the very first time that you ever heard of the word "remedyo"?
A Yes, sir
xxxx
Q And when your mother came back from work at about 7:00 o'clock [sic] in the morning
of April 2, 1995, did you not also bother to tell her of what you suspected that something
serious or bad had happened to you in the previous day?
A Because she already knew, sir.
Q How did you know that she already knew?

A Because I heard her telling Omeng, [54] "After you have sexual intercourse with her,
leave her immediately!"[55]
xxxx
Q Considering that you never knew what is the meaning of the word, "remedyo", when
your mother arrived in the morning of April 2, 1995, did you not confront your mother, did
you not tell her that, "Is this what you mean by "remedyo", as what you had agreed with
Bartolome Tampus that he would do something to my genitals?
A No sir, because when she arrived, she kept on laughing. [56]
All the requisites concur in order to find Ida guilty as an accomplice to Tampus in
the rape of ABC. The testimony of ABC shows that there was community of design
between Ida and Tampus to commit the rape of ABC. Ida had knowledge of and
assented to Tampus' intention to have sexual intercourse with her daughter. She forced
ABC to drink beer, and when ABC was already drunk, she left ABC alone with Tampus,
with the knowledge and even with her express consent to Tampus' plan to have sexual
intercourse with her daughter.
It is settled jurisprudence that the previous acts of cooperation by the accomplice

should not be indispensable to the commission of the crime; otherwise, she would be
liable as a principal by indispensable cooperation. The evidence shows that the acts of
cooperation by Ida are not indispensable to the commission of rape by Tampus. First,
because it was both Ida and Tampus who forced ABC to drink beer, and second because
Tampus already had the intention to have sexual intercourse with ABC and he could
have consummated the act even without Ida's consent.
The acts of Ida are closely related to the eventual commission of rape by Tampus. They
both forced ABC to drink beer; when ABC was already drunk, Tampus asked Ida if he
could have sexual intercourse with ABC and Ida gave her consent; and lastly, Ida left ABC
alone with Tampus so that he proceed with his plan to rape ABC.
Circumstances affecting the liability of the Appellant as an Accomplice
We agree with both the trial and appellate courts in their appreciation of the mitigating
circumstance of illness as would diminish the exercise of willpower of Ida without
depriving her of the consciousness of her acts, pursuant to Article 13(9) of the Revised
Penal Code.
Dr. Costas testified that Ida was provisionally treated for schizophrenia a few months
before the incident, from November 11, 1994 to January 12, 1995. Based on his expert
opinion, Ida was not totally deprived of intelligence at the time of the incident; but, she
may have poor judgment. On Direct Examination of Dr. Costas by City Prosecutor Celso
V. Espinosa, he testified as follows:
Q Doctor, taking into consideration your diagnosis, as you said, is provisional, would you
say that the patient [sic] totally deprived of intelligence or reason?
A Not totally.
Q She will be conscious of her acts?

A She may be, that is possible, for certain cause.
Q And there will be loss of intelligence?

A There could be.
Q Now, Doctor, she is charged her [sic] as one of the principals in the commission of the
crime of rape for having given her daughter to be sexually abused by her co-accused, allegedly
convinced by her co-accused on the first day of April, 1995. Now, if she was then under
treatment, Doctor, from November 11, 1994 to January 12, 1995, would you say, Doctor, that
having taken this diagnosis for [sic] schizophrenic patient, at the time, after January 12, 1995,
she must have acted with discernment?
A It is possible because you are this kind of mental illness even with the treatment, and
even without any medication, it may be what we called spontaneous, really it will get back.
Q At that time it will loss the intelligence? [sic]

A I think because it might be back, the treatment should be yearly.
Q Doctor, in your opinion, since our office is very much concern [sic] on this, if a person
is totally deprived of intelligence, he has still discernment, she is unconscious of her act, she
or he may be exempted from any criminal liability, please tell, Doctor, in your personal
opinion for the purpose of this proceedings she may be acting with discernment and with
certain degree of intelligence?
A It is possible but I think of a mother feeding her own daughter to somebody, I think
there is a motive, she wants to gain financial or material things from the daughter if no
material gain, then perhaps it was borne out of her illness. This is my opinion."
xxxx
Q Doctor, is this schizophrenic person can distinguish the right or wrong? [sic]

A If they are in the [sic] state of illness, judgment is impaired to discern between right
or wrong.
Q In the case of this particular accused, what would you say at the state of her ailment?
A When she was brought to the hospital, Your Honor, I think, although the mother
alleged that the sickness could be more than one year duration, it is in acute stage because
she was allegedly destroying everything in the house according to the mother, so she was in
acute stage.
On cross-examination by Atty. Paulito Cabrera, Dr. Costas testified thus:
Q Would you say, Doctor, that that particular ailment of Ida Montesclaros affected her
sense of judgment?
A I think, so.
Q And that being scizophronic [sic] somehow, it has, while in that stage, the patient lost
contact with reality?
A Yes, that is possible.
Q In your opinion, Doctor, granting, for the sake of argument, the alleged accusation
against her is true, being an expert on scizophrania, could you tell the Honorable Court as a
mother, who would allegedly do such an offense to her daughter, is it still in her sound mind
or proper mental sane [sic]?
A I think, as I said, one thing to be considered is the motivation if she want [sic] to gain
some material things, if not, it is because of her judgment.
Q If she would not gain anything from allowing her daughter allegedly to be rubbished
by another person, then there must be something wrong?
A There must be something wrong and it came up from scizpphrania.
A It is the judgment, in the case of the schizophrenic. [59]
We have previously held that Schizophrenia may be considered mitigating under

Art. 13(9) if it diminishes the exercise of the willpower of the accused. [60] In this case, the
testimony of Dr. Costas shows that even though Ida was diagnosed with schizophrenia,
she was not totally deprived of intelligence but her judgment was affected. Thus, on the
basis of the Medical Certification that Ida suffered from and was treated for
schizophrenia a few months prior to the incident, and on the testimony of Dr. Costas,
Ida's schizophrenia could be considered to have diminished the exercise of her
willpower although it did not deprive her of the consciousness of her acts.
We note that in the case at bar, the undisputed fact that Ida is the mother of ABC—who
was 13 years old at the time of the incident—could have been considered as a special
qualifying circumstance which would have increased the imposable penalty to death,
under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, viz.:
ARTICLE 266-B. Penalties.
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of
the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;
xxxx
Both the circumstances of the minority and the relationship of the offender to
the victim, either as the victim's parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim, must be alleged in the information and proved during the trial in
order for them to serve as qualifying circumstances under Article 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code.[61]
In the case at bar, although the victim's minority was alleged and established, her
relationship with the accused as the latter's daughter was not properly alleged in the
Information, and even though this was proven during trial and not refuted by the
accused, it cannot be considered as a special qualifying circumstance that would serve
to increase the penalty of the offender. Under the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which should be given retroactive effect following the rule that statutes governing court
proceedings will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage,[62] every Information must state the qualifying and the aggravating
circumstances attending the commission of the crime for them to be considered in the
imposition of the penalty.[63] Since in the case at bar, the Information in Criminal Case
No. 013324-L did not state that Ida is the mother of ABC, this circumstance could not be
appreciated as a special qualifying circumstance. Ida may only be convicted as an
accomplice in the crime of simple rape, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua. In
any event, Republic Act No. 9346, entitled an "An
Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," which was signed
into law on June 24, 2006 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty.
Civil indemnity imposed against the appellant
The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision ordered Tampus and Ida "jointly and
severally, to indemnify the offended party, [ABC], the sum of P50,000.00 in Criminal
Case No. 013324-L."[64] The Court of Appeals, however, did not award any civil indemnity
to ABC, and only awarded moral and exemplary damages. We deem it necessary and
proper to award ABC civil indemnity of P50,000.00. Civil indemnity ex delicto is
mandatory upon finding of the fact of rape. This is distinct from moral damages
awarded upon such finding without need of further proof, because it is assumed that a
rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling the victim to such award. [65]
Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, the victim in simple rape cases is entitled to an
award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto and another P50,000.00 as moral
damages.[66] However, Tampus' civil indemnity ex delicto has been extinguished by
reason of his death before the final judgment, in accordance with Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code.[67] Thus, the amount of civil indemnity which remains for
accomplice Ida to pay is put at issue.
It becomes relevant to determine the particular amount for which each accused is liable
when they have different degrees of responsibility in the commission of the crime and,
consequently, differing degrees of liability. When a crime is committed by many, each
one has a distinct part in the commission of the crime and though ail the persons who
took part in the commission of the crime are liable, the liability is not equally shared
among them. Hence, an accused may be liable either as principal, accomplice or
accessory.
The particular liability that each accused is responsible for depends on the nature and
degree of his participation in the commission of the crime. The penalty prescribed by
the Revised Penal Code for a particular crime is imposed upon the principal in a
consummated felony.[68] The accomplice is only given the penalty next lower in degree
than that prescribed by the law for the crime committed[69] and an accessory is given the
penalty lower by two degrees.[70] However, a felon is not only criminally liable, he is
likewise civilly liable.[71] Apart from the penalty of imprisonment imposed on him, he is
also ordered to indemnify the victim and to make whole the damage caused by his act
or omission through the payment of civil indemnity and damages.
Civil liability arising from the crime is shared by all the accused. Although, unlike criminal
liability—in which the Revised Penal Code specifically states the corresponding penalty
imposed on the principal, accomplice and accessory—the share of each accused in the
civil liability is not specified in the Revised Penal Code. The courts have the discretion to
determine the apportionment of the civil indemnity which the principal, accomplice and
accessory are respectively liable for, without guidelines with respect to the basis of the
allotment.
Article 109 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[i]f there are two or more persons
civilly liable for a felony, the courts shall determine the amount for which each must
respond." Notwithstanding the determination of the respective liability of the principals,
accomplices and accessories within their respective class, they shall also be subsidiarily
liable for the amount of civil liability adjudged in the other classes. Article 110 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that "[t]he principals, accomplices, and accessories, each
within their respective class, shall be liable severally (in solidum) among themselves for
their quotas, and subsidiarily for those of the other persons liable." [72]
As courts are given a free hand in determining the apportionment of civil liability,
previous decisions dealing with this matter have been grossly inconsistent.
In People v. Galapin,[73] People v. Continente,[74] United States v. Lasada,[75] People v.

Mobe,[76] People v. Irinea,[77] People v. Rillorta,[78] People v. Cagalingan,[79] People v.
Villanueva,[80] People v. Magno,[81] People v. del Rosario,[82] People v. Yrat,[83] People v.
Saul,[84] and People v. Tamayo,[85] the principal and accomplice were ordered to pay
jointly and severally the entire amount of the civil indemnity awarded to the victim.
In People v. Sotto,[86] the accomplice was ordered to pay half of the amount of civil
indemnity imposed by the trial court, while the principal was liable for the other half.
In People v. Toring,[87] the principal, accomplice and the accessory were made jointly and
severally liable for the entire amount of the civil indemnity.
In the cases mentioned above, the principal and accomplice were made to pay equal
shares of the civil indemnity. This makes the accomplice who had less participation in
the commission of the crime equally liable with the principal for the civil indemnity. The
degree of their participation in the crime was not taken into account in the
apportionment of the amount of the civil indemnity. This is contrary to the principle
behind the treble division of persons criminally responsible for felonies, i.e., that the
liability must be commensurate with the degree of participation of the accused in the
crime committed. In such a situation, the accomplice who just cooperated in the
execution of the offense but whose participation is not indispensable to the commission
of the crime is made to pay the same amount of civil indemnity as the principal by direct
participation who took a direct part in the execution of the criminal act. It is an injustice
when the penalty and liability imposed are not commensurate to the actual
responsibility of the offender; for criminal responsibility is individual and not collective,
and each of the participants should be liable only for the acts actually committed by
him. The proportion of this individual liability must be graduated not only according to
the nature of the crime committed and the circumstances attending it, but also the
degree and nature of participation of the individual offender.
In Garces v. People,[89] People v. Flores,[90] People v. Barbosa,[91] People v. Ragundiaz,

[92]
People v. Bato,[93] and People v. Garalde,[94] the accomplice was held to be solidarity
liable with the principal for only one-half (1/2) of the amount adjudged as civil
indemnity. In Garces, the accomplice was held solidarity liable for half of the civil
indemnity ex delicto but was made to pay the moral damages of P50,000.00 separately
from the principal. In Flores, Ragundiaz, Bato, and Garalde, the accomplice was held
solidarily liable for half of the combined amounts of the civil indemnity ex delicto and
moral damages. In Ragundiaz, the accomplice was also made solidarily liable with the
principal for half of the actual damages, and in Garalde the accomplice was also held
solidarily liable with the principal for half of the exemplary damages, aside from the civil
and moral damages.
In these cases, the accomplice was made jointly and severally liable with the principal
for only half of the amount of the civil indemnity and moral damages, only for purposes
of the enforcement of the payment of civil indemnity to the offended party. When the
liability in solidum has been enforced, as when payment has been made, the person by
whom payment has been made shall have a right of action against the other persons
liable for the amount of their respective shares.[95] As against each other, whoever
made the payment may claim from his co-debtors only the share that corresponds to
each, with interest for the payment already made. [96] In these cases, therefore, payment
is made by either the principal or the accomplice, the one who made the payment to
the victim could demand payment of the part of the debt corresponding to his co-
debtor. If for example the principal paid the victim the entire amount of the civil
indemnity, he could go against the accomplice for one-fourth (1/4) of the total amount
of civil indemnity and damages. The principal was primarily liable for only one-half (1/2)
of the total amount of civil indemnity and he was solidarily liable with the accomplice
for the other half. Since the principal paid for the half which the accomplice is solidarily
liable with, he could claim one-half (1/2) of that amount from the accomplice. Thus, the
principal would have become ultimately liable for three-fourths (3/4) of the total
amount of the civil indemnity and damages, while the accomplice would have become
liable for one-fourth (1/4) of such amount.
In People v. Cortes,[97] People v. Budol,[98] People v. Nulla,[99] and People v. Madali,

[100]
the principal was ordered to pay twice the share of the accomplice in the civil
indemnity. In Nulla, the Court determined the respective amounts for which the
principal, accomplice and accessory were liable for. The principal was ordered to pay
P20,000.00, the accomplice was ordered to pay P10,000.00, and the accessory was
ordered to pay P2,000.00. Unlike the cases cited above where the principal and
accomplice were held solidarity liable for the entire amount of the civil indemnity or half
of it, in Nulla, the court particularly determined the amount for which each shall
respond. This is consistent with Article 109 and Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code,
which require that the courts should determine the amount for which the principals,
accomplices and accessories must respond to and upon specifying this amount, the
principals are solidarity liable within their class for their quota, the accomplices are
solidarity liable among themselves for their quota and the accessories are solidarity
liable for their quota. If any one of the classes is unable to pay for its respective quota, it
becomes subsidiarily liable for the quota of the other classes, which shall be enforced
first against the property of the principals; next, against that of the accomplices; and
lastly, against that of the accessories.[101]
There are also cases where the principal was ordered to pay more than double the
amount that the accomplice is liable for. In Lumiguis v. People,[102] the civil liability of
P6,000.00 was apportioned as follows: the sole principal was primarily liable for
P3,000.00, the four accomplices were primarily liable in solidum among themselves for
the other half of the indemnity, or P3,000.00. Thus, each accomplice was answerable for
one-fourth (1/4) of P3,000.00 or one-eighth (1/8) of the entire amount of civil
indemnity, which is P750.00.
Similarly in People v. Bantagan,[103] the principal was required to indemnify the heirs of

the deceased in the amount of P500.00. In case of his insolvency, his three accomplices
should be jointly and severally liable. The three accomplices were jointly and severally
liable for the other P500 and in case of their insolvency the principal was secondarily
liable for such amount.
In People v. Castillo,[104] the accomplice was ordered to pay one-fourth (1/4) of the

amount of the civil indemnity, while the principal was liable for the remaining three-
fourths (3/4).
In People v. Cariaga,[105] the total amount of indemnity and damages due to the heirs of
the victim amounted to P601,000.00. The sole accomplice was ordered to pay
P101,000.00 which is roughly one-sixth (1/6) of the entire civil indemnity, while the two
principals were ordered to pay the rest of the indemnity and damages amounting to
P500,000.00.
The cases cited above demonstrate the ad hoc method by which the ratio of shares of
the civil indemnity and damages among the principal, accomplice and accessory is
determined. Though the responsibility to decide the respective shares of persons liable
for a felony is left to the courts, this does not mean that this amount can be decided
arbitrarily or upon conjecture. The power of the courts to grant indemnity and damages
demands factual, legal and equitable justification, and cannot be left to speculation and
caprice.
The entire amount of the civil indemnity, together with the moral and actual damages,
should be apportioned among the persons who cooperated in the commission of the
crime according to the degree of their liability, respective responsibilities and actual
participation in the criminal act. Salvador Viada, an authority in criminal law, is of the
opinion that there are no fixed rules which are applicable in all cases in order to
determine the apportionment of civil liability among two or more persons civilly liable
for a felony, either because there are different degrees of culpability of offenders, or
because of the inequality of their financial capabilities. [106] On this note, he states in his
commentaries on the 1870 Penal Code of Spain that the law should leave the
determination of the amount of respective liabilities to the discretion of the courts.
[107]
The courts have the competence to determine the exact participation of the
principal, accomplice, and accessory in the commission of the crime relative to the other
classes because they are able to directly consider the evidence presented and the
unique opportunity to observe the witnesses.
We must stress, however, that the courts' discretion should not be untrammelled and
must be guided by the principle behind differing liabilities for persons with varying roles
in the commission of the crime. The person with greater participation in the commission
of the crime should have a greater share in the civil liability than those who played a
minor role in the crime or those who had no participation in the crime but merely
profited from its effects. Each principal should shoulder a greater share in the total
amount of indemnity and damages than every accomplice, and each accomplice should
also be liable for a greater amount as against every accessory. Care should also be taken
in considering the number of principals versus that of accomplices and accessories. If for
instance, there are four principals and only one accomplice and the total of the civil
indemnity and damages is P6,000.00, the court cannot assign two-thirds (2/3) of the
indemnity and damages to the principals and one-third (1/3) to the accomplice. Even
though the principals, as a class, have a greater share in the liability as against the
accomplice-- since one-third (1/3) of P6,000.00 is P2,000.00, while two-thirds (2/3) of
P6,000.00 is P4,000.00— when the civil liability of every person is computed, the share
of the accomplice ends up to be greater than that of each principal. This is so because
the two-thirds (2/3) share of the principals—or P4,000.00—is still divided among all the
four principals, and thus every principal is liable for only P1,000.00.
In the case at bar, the trial court ruled that the accomplice is solidarity liable with the
principal for the entire amount of the civil indemnity of P50,000.00. This is an erroneous
apportionment of the civil indemnity. First, because it does not take into account the
difference in the nature and degree of participation between the principal, Tampus,
versus the accomplice, Ida. Ida's previous acts of cooperation include her acts of forcing
ABC to drink beer and permitting Tampus to have sexual intercourse with her daughter.
But even without these acts, Tampus could have still raped ABC. It was Tampus, the
principal by direct participation, who should have the greater liability, not only in terms
of criminal liability, but also with respect to civil liability. Second, Article 110 of the
Revised Penal Code states that the apportionment should provide for a quota amount
for every class for which members of such class are solidarity liable within their
respective class, and they are only subsidiarily liable for the share of the other classes.
The Revised Penal Code does not provide for solidary liability among the different
classes, as was held by the trial court in the case at bar.
Thus, taking into consideration the difference in participation of the principal and
accomplice, the principal, Tampus, should be liable for two-thirds (2/3) of the total
amount of the civil indemnity and moral damages and appellant Ida should be ordered
to pay one-third (1/3) of the amount. Civil indemnity for simple rape was correctly set.at
P50,000.00 and moral damages at P50,000.00. The total amount of damages to be
divided between Tampus and Ida is P100,000.00, where Tampus is liable for P66,666.67
(which is two-thirds [2/3] of P100,000.00) and Ida is liable for P33,333.33 (which is one-
third [1/3] of P100,000.00). This is broken down into civil indemnity of P16,666.67 and
moral damages of P16,666.67. However, since the principal, Tampus, died while the
case was pending in the Court of Appeals, his liability for civil indemnity ex delicto is
extinguished by reason of his death before the final judgment. [108] His share in the civil
indemnity and damages cannot be passed over to the accomplice, Ida, because Tampus'
share of the civil liability has been extinguished. And even if Tampus were alive upon the
promulgation of this decision, Ida would only have been subsidiarily liable for his share
of the civil indemnity of P66,666.67. However, since Tampus' civil liability ex delicto is
extinguished, Ida's subsidiary liability with respect to this amount is also eliminated,
following the principle that the accessory follows the principal. Tampus' obligation to
pay P66,666.67 — his quota of the civil indemnity — is the principal obligation, for
which Ida is only subsidiarily liable. Upon the extinguishment of the principal obligation,
there is no longer any accessory obligation which could attach to it; thus, the subsidiary
liability of Ida is also extinguished.
On the matter of exemplary damages, we find that exemplary damages were incorrectly
awarded by the Court of Appeals.
In criminal cases, exemplary damages are imposed on the offender as part of the civil
liability when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.
[109]
Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages
are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrongdoings, and as a vindication of
undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for
those guilty of outrageous conduct.[110] Exemplary damages may be awarded only when
one or more aggravating circumstances are alleged in the information and proved
daring the trial.[111]
In the case at bar, no qualifying or aggravating circumstance was appreciated against

Ida. Although, the minority of the victim coupled with the fact that the offender is the
parent of the victim could have served to qualify the crime of rape, the presence of
these concurring circumstances cannot justify the award of exemplary damages since
the relationship of the offender, Ida, to the victim, ABC, was not alleged in the
Information. " The minority of the rape victim and her relationship with the offender
must both be alleged in the information and proved during the trial in order to be
appreciated as an aggravating/qualifying circumstance. While the information in the
instant case alleged that ABC was a minor during the incident, there was no allegation
that Ida was her parent. Since the relationship between ABC and appellant was not duly
established, the award of exemplary damages is not warranted.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, Visayas Station, dated
September 29, 2006, in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00215, finding appellant Ida Montesclaros
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accomplice in the crime of rape and sentencing her
to suffer the indeterminate penalty often (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Ida Montesclaros is ORDERED to pay civil
indemnity in the amount of sixteen thousand, six hundred sixty-six pesos and sixty-
seven centavos (P16,666.67), and moral damages in the amount of sixteen thousand, six
hundred sixty-six pesos and sixty-seven centavos' (P16,666.67). The award of exemplary
damages is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 181246, March 20, 2009 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. REMEIAS BEGINO Y
GRAJO, APPELLANT.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] dated 18 September 2007 of the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the Decision[2] dated 13 December 2005 of the Regional Trial Court of
Labo, Camarines Norte, Branch 64, (RTC-Branch 64) finding appellant Remeias Begino
y Grajo (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, with
modification reducing the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua.
The Facts
Appellant was formally charged on 29 January 1999 in an Information which reads, as

follows:
That sometime in the early afternoon of August 2, 1994 in Sitio WWW, Barangay XXX,
YYY, ZZZ, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being then the stepfather of private complainant AAA, [3] with lewd
design, and by using force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of said AAA, an 8 year old girl, against her consent,
to her damage.[4]
Upon arraignment, appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged.[5] Trial ensued.
The prosecution presented Dr. Virginia Barasona (Dr. Barasona), the Rural Health
Officer in YYY, ZZZ, and Melinda Reyes (Melinda), the social worker of Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) who conducted the social case study on AAA.
At the time she testified, AAA was 14 years old. She testified that she was born on 28
February 1986. AAA stated that in the afternoon of 2 August 1994, she and appellant
were alone in their house. Appellant was sharpening his bolo while her mother, BBB,
was out getting "talapang." She was not aware that appellant had closed the door and
windows of the house. Appellant approached AAA and removed her shirt, panties and
bra. Appellant removed his shorts and briefs and laid AAA down on the bamboo bench.
With the bolo placed on his right side, appellant placed himself on top of AAA and
inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA tried to fight back and resisted but appellant was
too strong. Appellant kissed her and touched her breasts. AAA felt pain and blood oozed
out of her vagina. After satisfying himself, appellant warned AAA that he would kill her
and her mother BBB if she would tell anybody about the incident.[6]
Sometime in November 1998, AAA mustered enough courage to narrate her ordeal to her
mother. AAA claimed appellant raped her four times - when she was still eight years old,
then when she was in Grade III, in Grade IV and in Grade V. BBB brought her daughter
to the DSWD where AAA was interviewed and assisted in executing her sworn statement
before the Philippine National Police of YYY.[7] AAA was later brought to Dr. Barazona
for medical examination which revealed the following:
PHYSICAL FINDINGS:
General Survey: conscious, coherent, ambulatory, not in cardiorespiratory distress,
cooperative
Pertinent findings:
- nipple is pinkish, measures .5 cm. in diameter
- areola is pinkish, 1.8 cm. in diameter
- with developing breasts
- lanugo hair is present
- with hymenal laceration (healed) at 9:00 o'clock
and 6:00 o'clock position (s)
- non-parous introitus
- labia minora is not gaping
- fouchette is v-shaped
- admits tip of finger up to 1 cm. with
resistance.[8]
Dr. Barasona explained that the lacerations on AAA's hymen were caused by penetrations
of an erected and turgid sex organ.[9]
AAA testified that she stopped studying since 1998. She felt ashamed of what happened
to her that she even transferred to Daet because she was scorned by people. [10]
The defense presented appellant himself, Camilo Begino (Camilo) and Reynaldo Esturas
(Reynaldo) as witnesses.
Appellant denied the accusation and asserted that he treated AAA and her siblings as his
own children since he started living with their mother in 1991. He claimed BBB wanted
to get rid of him as she was already romantically linked with the Chief of the Department
of Agrarian Reform in Daet.
Appellant further testified that from 6:00 in the morning of 2 August 1994 until 6:00 in
the afternoon of the same date, he was at the coconut plantation of Apolinario Malaluan
(Apolinario) together with Camilo and Reynaldo husking coconuts. The distance between
his house and the coconut plantation is two kilometers, more or less, and would require a
30-minute walk. There was never a time that he left the workplace since he took his lunch
and snacks there.[11]
Defense witnesses Camilo and Reynaldo substantially corroborated appellant's testimony

that appellant was with them the whole day from sunrise to sunset of 2 August 1994 and
that there was never a time that appellant left the workplace.[12] Camilo and appellant are
first cousins, as their fathers are brothers.[13]
The Ruling of the Trial Court

After trial, the RTC-Branch 64 rendered judgment on 13 December 2005 finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable of the "crime of statutory rape aggravated by the fact
that the victim is below eighteen (18) years old" and that the offender is the common law
husband of BBB. Appellant was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. He was likewise
ordered to pay the victim P75,000 as civil indemnity, P75,000 as moral damages, and
P30,000 as exemplary damages.
The trial court found inconsistencies in the testimonies of the defense witnesses. Camilo
testified that he owned the coconut plantation where appellant worked but he was not
certain as to the exact date appellant went to work at the coconut plantation. Reynaldo
testified that appellant worked at the coconut plantation of Apolinario and not in the
alleged coconut plantation of Camilo.
The trial court further rejected appellant's defense of alibi. The trial court found that it
took only 30 minutes to walk going to appellant's house from the coconut plantation
where he was husking. The trial court ruled that it was not physically impossible for
appellant to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction but reduced the
penalty of death to reclusion perpetua in view of Republic Act No. 9346 (RA 9346)
proscribing the imposition of the death penalty.
The Court of Appeals ruled that denial and alibi could not prevail over the positive
identification by the victim. The Court of Appeals further ruled that the findings of the
trial court on the credibility of witnesses enjoy a badge of respect as the latter is in a
better position to observe the demeanor of witnesses as they testify.
The Court's Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusion of the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate
court, that, as the evidence undoubtedly proved, rape was committed by appellant against
AAA.
The trial court found appellant guilty of "statutory rape aggravated by the fact that the
victim is below eighteen (18) years old" and "the offender is the common law husband"
of the mother of the victim. Thus, it imposed the death penalty pursuant to paragraph 1 of
Article 266-B. The appellate court agreed with the trial court but reduced the penalty
imposed from death to reclusion perpetua. However, we hold that appellant could not be
indicted for qualified rape and penalized under paragraph 1 of Article 266-B.
While the death penalty is no longer imposable in view of RA 9346, the technical flaw
committed by the lower courts is a matter that cannot be ignored.
Article 266-A and Article 266-B provide:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is committed -
circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above is present;
xxx
ART. 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxx
The death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim.
x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Under Article 266-B, paragraph 1, the death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape
is committed when the victim is under 18 years old and the offender is a "parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim." This Court has ruled that
the circumstances that qualify a crime should be alleged and proved beyond reasonable
doubt as the crime itself. These attendant circumstances alter the nature of the crime of
rape and increase the penalty. As such, they are in the nature of qualifying circumstances.
[14]
The age of the victim and her relationship with the offender must be both alleged in
the information and proven during the trial, otherwise, the death penalty cannot be
imposed.[15]
The age of the victim was sufficiently proved. AAA was undeniably below 18 years old
at the time she was raped. Although she claimed she was born on 28 February 1986, her
birth certificate[16] and the Social Case Study Report[17] showed that she was born on 28
March 1986. The rape was committed on 2 August 1994 or when AAA was eight years
and four months old.
However, the Information stated that appellant is the "stepfather" of AAA. A "stepfather"
is the husband of one's mother by virtue of a marriage subsequent to that of which the
person spoken of is the offspring. It presupposes a legitimate relationship between the
appellant and the victim's mother.[18] The evidence adduced by the prosecution showed
that appellant is not the stepfather of AAA but the common law spouse of BBB, mother
of AAA. In fact, the trial court itself, in its decision,[19] found that appellant and BBB
were not married and therefore he is not the stepfather of AAA. During the trial, AAA,
when asked why she kept calling appellant "Tiyo," testified that appellant is the third
husband of her mother and that the name of her real father is CCC, who at that time was
in Manila. She explained that her mother lived separately from CCC since she was eight
months old and on 2 August 1994, her mother was living with appellant.[20] Her birth
certificate and the Social Case Study Report likewise showed that her father is CCC, not
appellant. CCC was married to BBB and appellant was never married to BBB. There was
no proof of marriage between BBB and appellant.
Since appellant is not the stepfather of AAA, the prosecution's failure to prove the
qualifying circumstance bars conviction for rape in its qualified form.[21]
What the prosecution clearly proved was that appellant was the common law spouse of
BBB, but such circumstance was not alleged in the Information. And as we have ruled
in People v. Garcia,[22] qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the
indictment. If the same are not pleaded but proved, they shall be considered only as
aggravating circumstances since the latter admit of proof even if not pleaded. It would be
a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him and
consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged with simple rape and be convicted
of its qualified form, although the attendant circumstance qualifying the offense and
resulting in the capital punishment was not alleged in the indictment on which he was
arraigned.
Consequently, since the qualifying circumstance of "common law spouse" was not
alleged in the Information for rape against appellant, he could not be convicted of rape in
the qualified form as he was not properly informed of the nature and cause of accusation
against him. In a criminal prosecution, it is a fundamental rule that every element of the
crime charged must be alleged in the complaint or information. The main purpose of this
requirement is to enable the accused to properly prepare his defense. He is presumed to
have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.[23]
The qualifying circumstance of relationship not having been properly pleaded, appellant
should be convicted only of statutory rape under paragraph (d) of Article 266-A, for
having carnal knowledge of a woman "under twelve (12) years of age." Statutory rape is
punishable by reclusion perpetua.[24]
As regards the award of damages and in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, AAA
should be awarded P50,000 as civil indemnity, in addition to the award of moral damages
of P50,000 for the immeasurable havoc wrought upon AAA. In view of the peculiar
relationship of the parties, appellant should likewise be made to pay P30,000 as
exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, we find appellant REMEIAS BEGINO y GRAJO guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of statutory rape and sentence him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. He is further ordered to pay the victim P50,000 as civil indemnity,
P50,000 as moral damages, and P30,000 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 121562, July 10, 1998 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RONNIE
QUITLONG Y FRIAS, SALVADOR QUITLONG Y FRIAS AND EMILIO
SENOTO, JR.,Y PASCUA, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 5, [1] disposed of Criminal Case No.
13336-R; thus:
“WHEREFORE, the Court finds and declares the accused RONNIE QUITLONG Y
FRIAS, SALVADOR QUITLONG Y FRIAS and EMILIO SENOTO, JR. Y PASCUA guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as charged and hereby sentences EACH of
them to suffer an indeterminate penalty of TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal,
as minimum, to FORTY (40) YEARS of reclusion perpetua, as maximum; to indemnify,
jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased Jonathan Calpito y Castro in the sums of
P50,000.00 for the latter’s death; P35,700.00 as consequential damages; and
P100,000.00 as moral damages, plus their proportionate shares in the costs.
"In the service of their sentence, the said accused shall be credited with their preventive
imprisonment under the terms and conditions prescribed in Article 29 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended.
"Conformably with Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, the corresponding filing fee for the P100,000.00 moral damages herein
awarded shall constitute a first lien on this judgment.
"The evidence knife, Exhibit `B’, is hereby declared forfeited in favor of the Government.
"Pursuant to Circular No. 4-92-A of the Court Administrator, the Warden of the City Jail
of Baguio is directed to immediately transfer the same accused to the custody of the
Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
"Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Warden of the City Jail of Baguio for his
information and guidance.
"There being no indication that the remaining accused, Jesus Mendoza, and several John
Does could be arrested/identified and arrested shortly, let the case against them be, as
it is hereby, archived without prejudice to its prosecution upon their apprehension.
"SO ORDERED.”[2]
The case was generated by an information for murder filed on 25 October 1994
against accused-appellants Salvador Quitlong, Ronnie Quitlong, Emilio Senoto, Jr., and
several other unidentified persons following the killing of Jonathan Calpito. Accused-
appellants, shortly after the filing of the information, submitted a motion for
reinvestigation alleging that “it was a certain Jesus Mendoza who stabbed the victim
after getting irked when the latter urinated near and in front” [3] of his wife. The trial
court acted favorably on the motion. On 12 December 1994, the City Prosecutor filed a
motion to admit an amended information on the basis of affidavits [4] executed by Nonita
F. delos Reyes, Nicanor Ellamil, Lydia Q. Cultura, as well as accused-appellants Salvador
and Ronnie Quitlong themselves, to the effect that it was Jesus Mendoza who had been
responsible for the death of the victim. The information, as amended, included Jesus
Mendoza among the named accused.[5] Unlike accused-appellants who were
immediately arrested after the commission of the crime, Jesus Mendoza remained at
large. At their arraignment, the detained accused pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.
The evidence of the prosecution has narrated how a simple misunderstanding and
relatively so small a matter could lead to so dastardly and unfortunate an outcome.
At around six o’clock in the evening of 20 October 1994, Lito Adjaro, who had just come
from work as a dispatcher of passenger jeepneys plying the Baguio City-Loakan route,
repaired to a nearby game parlor where he saw 19-year-old University of Baguio
medical technology student Jonathan Calpito playing billiards with Jonathan Gosil.
Adjaro was Calpito’s neighbor and barkada (gangmate) in Loakan. At past eight o’clock,
Calpito decided that it was time to go home. Since at that hour there were no longer
passenger jeepneys bound for Loakan, the three friends decided to walk down to
Harrison Road behind the Melvin Jones grandstand to grab a taxicab. The area was well-
lighted. Wanting to partake of some "fishballs," Calpito and Gosil approached a fishball
vendor about three to four meters away. The two returned with three sticks of fishballs
worth fifteen pesos. When Calpito counted the change for his 100-peso bill, he saw that
he had only been handed back thirty five pesos. Confronted by Calpito and Gosil, the
fishball vendor would not admit that he had short-changed Calpito.
Herbert Soriano, a civil engineer driving a passenger-type jeep on his way to Loakan
from the Dominican Hill, was seen passing by. Adjaro, his neighbor, hailed him. Soriano
positioned his jeep around four or five meters from where Gosil and Calpito were still
having an argument with the fishball vendor. Soriano called out to the two to board the
jeep but they ignored him. Moments later, Soriano saw eight men rushing towards Gosil
and Calpito from the direction of the taxicab-stand behind his jeep. Some of the men
later backed out but four of them pursued Calpito who, meanwhile, had started to
retreat from the group. The four men, however, succeeded in cornering Calpito. Soriano
saw Calpito fall to the ground and thought that the latter had just been weakened by
the men's punches but, when Calpito was carried on board his jeep, Soriano realized
that Calpito had been stabbed.
Adjaro saw no less than eight men approach and aggressively confront Calpito and Gosil.
Seeing that his friends were outnumbered, Adjaro shouted at Calpito and Gosil to run
posthaste. Adjaro promptly boarded Soriano’s jeep. From where he sat, Adjaro could
see appellant Emilio Senoto embracing Calpito from behind and appellants Salvador
Quitlong and Ronnie Quitlong holding Calpito’s right hand and left hand, respectively.
Calpito struggled unsuccessfully to free himself. Suddenly, appellant Ronnie Quitlong
stabbed Calpito at the left side of the body just below the nipple. Once the three men
had released their hold on Calpito, the latter fell to the ground. Despite the condition
that Calpito was already in, his assailants still went on hitting him with their feet.
Police officers Jerry Patacsil, Arthur Viado and Nito Revivis were on foot patrol that
evening. Attracted by the commotion along Harrison Road, the police officers hurriedly
proceeded to the brightly-lighted place and saw Calpito lying on the ground. Three of
the malefactors started to flee upon seeing the approaching police officers but the rest
kept on with their attack on Calpito. Patacsil drew out his service firearm and told the
attackers to freeze. Seeing that the victim had bloodstains on his left chest, Patacsil
advised the victim’s companions to rush him to the hospital. Soriano, Gosil and Adjaro
took Calpito to the Baguio General Hospital on board Soriano’s jeep.
The police officers brought accused-appellants to the police station. SPO1 Gabriel Isican
prepared the complaint assignment sheet [6] before turning them over to the
investigation division. SPO4 Avelino Tolean, officer-in-charge of the police investigation
division on the 4:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight shift, also received a call from the Baguio
General Hospital about the incident. SPO4 Tolean, along with SPO1 Rafael Ortencio, Jr.,
and two "Bombo" radio reporters, went to the hospital where Calpito was by then in the
operating room. The police officers interviewed Adjaro and Gosil at the hospital’s
emergency room and then repaired to the crime scene and searched the area.
Recovered near the flowering plants beside the electric post was a “stainless
knife”[7] with bloodstains on its blade. Adjaro recognized the knife to be the one used in
stabbing Calpito. SPO4 Gerardo Tumbaga prepared Form 1 of the National Crime
Reporting System indicating that accused-appellants were arrested and that a certain
Mendoza escaped and went into hiding. The report also disclosed that Adjaro and Gosil
had a drinking spree with the victim at the Genesis Folkden before the stabbing
incident. SPO4 Tumbaga based his findings on the documents attached to the records of
the case.
That same evening of 20 October 1994, at 8:55, Calpito died at the Baguio General
Hospital. Dr. Kathryna Ayro, the hospital’s medico-legal officer, conducted the autopsy
on the victim upon the request of Dr. Samuel Cosme, the attending surgeon, and of First
Assistant City Prosecutor Herminio Carbonell, with the consent of a brother of Calpito.
[8]
Dr. Ayro found a solitary stab wound that penetrated Calpito’s left thoracic cavity at
the level of the 5th intercostal space that caused a "through and through" laceration of
his anterior pericardium and the apex of the left ventricle of his heart. [9] Dr. Ayro
indicated the cause of Calpito’s death as being one of hypovolemic shock secondary to
stab wound.[10] She opined that a knife, single or double bladed, must have been used in
inflicting the stab wound. Abrasions were also found on different parts of Calpito’s body.
Precy Calpito, the mother of the victim, testified that the family had spent the amount
of P37,500.00[11] for his wake, burial and 9-day prayers. Her youngest son’s death left
her losing hope in life and "feeling very badly."
The defense gave no alibi and admitted the presence of accused-appellants at the
vicinity of the crime scene; however, it interposed denial by appellants of any
participation in the commission of the crime.
Appellant Emilio Senoto, Jr., a taxicab driver, testified that out of curiosity, after parking
his cab to buy some cigarettes and getting attracted by the commotion, went near the
scene and saw the victim lying on the ground beside a cart. He was about to leave the
place when several policemen arrived and arrested him.
Appellant Salvador Quitlong, a food vendor at the Burnham Park and father of five
children, denied having had any participation in the stabbing incident nor having been
acquainted with Jesus Mendoza. He admitted, however, that on the night in question
when he was selling "fishballs" at the park, around eighty meters away from where
Mendoza was selling his wares, the latter’s daughter, who was a classmate of his own
daughter, asked for help yelling that her father was in trouble. He rushed over to
Mendoza’s place (puesto) but barely in time to witness the stabbing of Calpito by
Mendoza.
Appellant Ronnie Quitlong, Salvador Quitlong’s 26-year-old younger brother, was also a
sidewalk vendor at the waiting shed along Harrison Road. He learned of the trouble
Mendoza got himself into when the latter's daughter summoned for help. When he and
his brother responded, Mendoza had by then already stabbed Calpito.
Nonita de los Reyes and Lydia Cultura, both sidewalk vendors, corroborated the story of
the Quitlong brothers. According to Nonita, it was Mendoza who stabbed Calpito. She
witnessed the incident from a distance of ten meters away. Nonita explained that she
did not immediately reveal what she saw to the authorities because of shock. Lydia
Cultura, on her part, said that she saw Jesus Mendoza in the "rumble" with five or six
men who had come from the Genesis Folkden. She saw Mendoza embrace and stab the
man in white t-shirt. Nonita and Alma Balubar followed appellants to the police station
but did not tell the police what she knew because she was busy attending to the crying
pregnant wife of appellant Ronnie Quitlong.
On 21 April 1995, the trial court, following his evaluation of the respective submissions
of the prosecution and the defense, including their rebuttal and sur-rebuttal evidence,
rendered its now assailed decision.
In their assignment of errors, the Quitlong brothers would have it -

“1. That the Honorable Lower Court gravely abused its discretion and/or acted
in excess of or without jurisdiction in finding that conspiracy may readily be inferred
inspite of explicit failure to allege in the information or complaint;
"2. That the Honorable Lower Court gravely abused its discretion and/or acted in
excess of or without jurisdiction in finding that there was conspiracy between and
among the accused-appellants in the commission of the crime;
"3. That the Honorable Lower Court gravely abused its discretion and/or acted in
excess of or without jurisdiction in finding the accused-appellants guilty of the crime of
Murder instead of Homicide.”[12]
In his case, appellant Senoto contends that the trial court has erred in finding
conspiracy among the accused and argues that the crime committed is homicide, not
murder, given the circumstances.
On the particular issue of conspiracy, the trial court had this to say:
“The question is whether or not the herein three accused participated in, and
may be held guilty as co-principals by reason of conspiracy for, the fatal stabbing of the
victim, Calpito, there being no dispute that the latter died due to the solitary stab
inflicted on him.
"But before proceeding any further, the Court takes notice of the lapse committed,
perhaps inadvertently, by the prosecution in drafting the indictment. Both the original
and amended Informations fail to explicitly allege conspiracy. This could have been
timely cured if obeisance had been observed of the admonition, often given, that the
prosecution should not take the arraignment stage for granted but, instead, treat the
notice thereof as a reminder to review the case and determine if the complaint or
information is in due form and the allegations therein contained are sufficient vis-à-vis
the law involved and the evidence on hand. It is fortunate that in the case at bench
conspiracy may readily be inferred from the way the allegation of abuse of superior
strength has been phrased, to wit: `xxx the above-named accused, being then armed
with a knife, with intent to kill xxx and taking advantage of their numerical superiority
and combined strength did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab JONATHAN CALPITO y CASTRO xxx.’”[13]
Citing Balmadrid vs. Sandiganbayan,[14] the trial court has opined that "conspiracy
may be deemed adequately alleged if the averments in the Information logically convey
that several persons (have been) animated with the single purpose of committing the
offense charged and that they (have) acted in concert in pursuance of that
purpose.”[15] Holding that no direct proof is essential and that it suffices that the
existence of a common design to commit the offense charged is shown by the acts of
the malefactors and attendant circumstances, the trial court has concluded:
“In the case on hand, it bears repeating that Ronnie Quitlong and Salvador
Quitlong were admittedly responding to Jesus Mendoza’s call for help through the
latter’s daughter. They must have, therefore, been disposed, out of empathy with a
fellow sidewalk vendor, to lend Mendoza all the assistance the latter needed under the
circumstances. They were joined, according to prosecution witnesses Lito Adjaro and
Herbert Soriano, by no less than six others, including Emilio Senoto, Jr. They came upon
Mendoza engaged in a heated altercation with the victim Calpito. When they reached
Calpito, they pushed him and started beating him up and his companion Jonathan Gosil.
Four to five men manhandled Calpito who kept on retreating and even went around
Soriano’s parked jeep until he was cornered. Senoto then held Calpito’s body from
behind; Ronnie, his left hand; and Salvador, his right hand, and they mauled him. Calpito
struggled to free himself but that proved futile and, instead, Ronnie stabbed him once.
It was only then that he was released and when he fell down on his back, his attackers
still kicked him. Only the arrival of some policemen made some of the assailants stop
and run away. However, Ronnie, Salvador and Senoto, kept on kicking the victim and
they were restrained and arrested.
"Guided by the jurisprudential authorities heretofore cited, it becomes ineluctable for

the Court to conclude that Ronnie, Salvador and Senoto acted in a conspiracy and may
thus be held liable as co-principals for the death of Calpito.”[16]
Overwhelming, such as it may have been thought of by the trial court, evidence
of conspiracy is not enough for an accused to bear and to respond to all its grave legal
consequences; it is equally essential that such accused has been apprised when the
charge is made conformably with prevailing substantive and procedural requirements.
Article III, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution, in particular, mandates that no person
shall be held answerable for a criminal offense without due process of law and that in all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall first be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.[17] The right to be informed of any such indictment is likewise
explicit in procedural rules.[18] The practice and object of informing an accused in writing
of the charges against him has been explained as early as the 1904 decision of the Court
in U.S. vs. Karelsen;[19] viz:
“First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as
will enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction or
acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to
inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in
law to support a conviction, if one should be had. (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.,
542). In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not
conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent; these must be set
forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and
defendant), and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific
allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged.”
An information, in order to ensure that the constitutional right of the accused to
be informed of the nature and cause of his accusation is not violated, must state the
name of the accused; the designation given to the offense by the statute; a statement of
the acts or omissions so complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate time and date of the commission of the offense; and
the place where the offense has been committed. [20] In embodying the essential
elements of the crime charged, the information must set forth the facts and
circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused so that
the accused can properly prepare for and undertake his defense. One such fact or
circumstance in a complaint against two or more accused persons is that of conspiracy.
Quite unlike the omission of an ordinary recital of fact which, if not excepted from or
objected to during trial, may be corrected or supplied by competent proof, an
allegation, however, of conspiracy, or one that would impute criminal liability to an
accused for the act of another or others, is indispensable in order to hold such person,
regardless of the nature and extent of his own participation, equally guilty with the
other or others in the commission of the crime. Where conspiracy exists and can rightly
be appreciated, the individual acts done to perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary
importance, the act of one being imputable to all the others. [21] Verily, an accused must
know from the information whether he faces a criminal responsibility not only for his
acts but also for the acts of his co-accused as well.
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or
allege all the details thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have
performed, the evidence proving the common design or the facts connecting all the
accused with one another in the web of the conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to
describe conspiracy with the same degree of particularity required in describing a
substantive offense. It is enough that the indictment contains a statement of the facts
relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise language, with as
much certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a manner that can enable a
person of common understanding to know what is intended, and with such precision
that the accused may plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment based
on the same facts. It is said, generally, that an indictment may be held sufficient "if it
follows the words of the statute and reasonably informs the accused of the character of
the offense he is charged with conspiring to commit, or, following the language of the
statute, contains a sufficient statement of an overt act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, or alleges both the conspiracy and the contemplated crime in the language
of the respective statutes defining them.” [22]
The information charging herein appellants for the death of Jonathan Calpito, as
amended, has but simply stated:
“That on or about the 20th day of October 1994, in the City of Baguio,
accused, being then armed with a knife, with intent to kill and with treachery and taking
advantage of their numerical superiority and combined strength, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab JONATHAN CALPITO Y
CASTRO suddenly and unexpectedly, without any warning whatsoever, inflicting upon
him a stab wound at the left thorax at the level of the 7th rib, left medclavicular line,
penetrating the pereduum and left ventricle causing left remothones of 700 cc and
hemoperecuduum of 250 cc, which directly caused his death.
"CONTRARY TO LAW.”[23]
The opinion of the trial court to the effect that conspiracy may be inferred from
the allegation of abuse of superior strength and with the aid of armed men, i.e., that “x
x x the above-named accused, being then armed with a knife, with intent to kill xxx and
taking advantage of their numerical superiority and combined strength, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab JONATHAN CALPITO Y
CASTRO x x x”[24] is difficult to accept. Conspiracy arises when two or more persons come
to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
Conspiracy comes to life at the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to
commit the felony and forthwith to actually pursue it. [25] Verily, the information must
state that the accused have confederated to commit the crime or that there has been a
community of design, a unity of purpose or an agreement to commit the felony among
the accused. Such an allegation, in the absence of the usual usage of the words
“conspired” or “confederated” or the phrase “acting in conspiracy,” must aptly appear
in the information in the form of definitive acts constituting conspiracy. In fine, the
agreement to commit the crime, the unity of purpose or the community of design
among the accused must be conveyed such as either by the use of the term “conspire”
or its derivatives and synonyms or by allegations of basic facts constituting the
conspiracy. Conspiracy must be alleged, not just inferred, in the information on which
basis an accused can aptly enter his plea, a matter that is not to be confused with or
likened to the adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it. In establishing
conspiracy when properly alleged, the evidence to support it need not necessarily be
shown by direct proof but may be inferred from shown acts and conduct of the accused.
In the absence of conspiracy, so averred and proved as heretofore explained, an
accused can only be made liable for the acts committed by him alone and this criminal
responsibility is individual and not collective. [26] And so it is that must be so held in this
case. The conflicting claims of the prosecution and the defense on who stabbed the
victim is an issue that ultimately and unavoidably goes into the question of whom to
believe among the witnesses. This issue of credibility requires a determination that is
concededly best left to the trial court with its unique position of having been enabled to
observe that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the deportment of witnesses on
the stand.[27] Findings of the trial court, following that assessment, must be given the
highest degree of respect absent compelling reasons to conclude otherwise. [28]
The Court is not, at this time and in this instance, disposed to deviate from the foregoing
rule. In the first place, Lito Adjaro, the eyewitness in the stabbing of Calpito, has
steadfastly stood by, even on rebuttal, to his story on the commission of the crime. A
witness who testifies in a categorical, straightforward and spontaneous manner, as well
as remains consistent on cross and rebuttal examination, is not likely to be an incredible
witness.[29] Secondly, the defense has failed to establish any ill motive on the part of
Adjaro that would have prompted him to testify wrongly against appellants. Where
there is no evidence to indicate that the prosecution witness has been actuated by any
improper motive, it would be hard to reject the supposition that a person will not
prevaricate and cause damnation to one who has brought him no harm. [30] Finally,
Herbert Soriano and the police, who have testified seeing the already wounded Calpito
lying on the ground and still being attacked, both corroborate Adjaro’s positive
identification of appellants as the persons who did maul Calpito.
After positively pointing to appellants in open court to be the persons who ganged up
on Calpito, Adjaro testified on their respective participations in the commission of the
crime; thus:
“PROSEC
UTOR:
Now, you pointed to Emilio Senoto, Jr. as one of the persons who held the
"Q.
deceased Jonathan Calpito. What part of the body of Jonathan Calpito did he hold?
"A. His body, sir.
"Q. How about Salvador Quitlong whom you also identified in Court. What part of
the body of Jonathan Calpito did he hold?
"A. I saw him hold his hand.
"Q What hand was held by Salvador Quitlong?
"A. Right hand, sir.
"Q. How about Ronnie Quitlong?
"A. His left hand.
After Jonathan Calpito was held by these three persons and other, what
"Q.
happened next?
"A. They mauled (“binugbog”) Jonathan Calpito.
Did you notice what part of the body was hit and boxed by these three
"Q.
persons?
"A. His body and his face.
What did Jonathan Calpito do, if any, when he is being held by these three
"Q.
persons and others?
"A. He was struggling, sir.
"Q. Was he able to free himself from the helds (sic) of these persons?
"A. No more, sir.
"Q. What do you mean no more?
"A. He was not able to free himself.
"Q. Yes, why was he not able to free himself anymore?
"A. They held him tightly, he could not struggle.
"Q. And what happened next when you said he could no longer struggle?
"A. They boxed him and also stabbed him, sir.
"Q. Did you see the person who stabbed him?
"A. I saw, sir.
"Q. Will you be able to identify him?
"A. Yes, sir.
I will request you to again look inside the courtroom and point to the person
"Q.
whom you saw stab Jonathan Calpito?
"WITNES
S:
The person wearing white jacket.
"INTERP
RETER:
Witness pointing to a gentleman inside the courtroom wearing cream jacket
who gave his name as Ronnie Quitlong.”[31]
Appellant Ronnie Quitlong was a principal by his own act of stabbing Calpito that
caused the latter's death.[32] Appellants Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr., were
holding the hands of Calpito at the precise time that Ronnie Quitlong was in the act of
executing his criminal intent. Simultaneity, however, would not itself demonstrate the
concurrence of will or the unity of action and purpose that could be a basis for collective
responsibility of two or more individuals; [33] indeed, from all indications, the incident
would appear to have occurred at the spur of moment. Appellants Salvador Quitlong
and Emilio Senoto, Jr., shall therefore be held to be mere accomplices conformably with
Article 18[34] of the Revised Penal Code.
The crime committed was qualified by abuse of superiority. [35] While superiority in

number would not per se mean superiority in strength, enough proof was adduced,
however, to show that the attackers had cooperated in such a way as to secure
advantage of their superiority in strength certainly out of proportion to the means of
defense available to the person attacked. [36]
Treachery may not be here considered as a generic aggravating circumstance although it

might have ensured the commission of the crime. In order that treachery may be taken
as an aggravating circumstance, there must be proof that the accused has consciously
adopted a mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to
himself, i.e., appellant Ronnie Quitlong in this case. [37] No such proof has been
adequately shown.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of murder is punishable
by reclusion temporal maximum to death. There being neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstances to appropriately appreciate in this case, appellant Ronnie
Quitlong, as principal, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The indeterminate
penalty of twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as minimum to forty (40) years
of reclusion perpetua, as maximum, has been imposed by the trial court on the premise
that reclusion perpetua is a divisible penalty. In the Court's Resolution of 09 January
1995, clarifying its decision[38] in People vs. Lucas,[39] the Court has said that -
“x x x although Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 has fixed the duration of reclusion
perpetua from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years, there was no clear
legislative intent to alter its original classification as an indivisible penalty. It shall then
remain as an indivisible penalty.”[40]
The two accomplices, appellants Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr., shall be
subject to the imposition of the penalty next lower in degree than reclusion
temporal maximum to death or, accordingly, prision mayor in its maximum period
to reclusion temporal in its medium period. Absent any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, the penalty that may be imposed is reclusion temporal minimum.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law to them, each may be held to suffer the
indeterminate sentence of anywhere from prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its medium period, as the minimum penalty, to anywhere within the
range of reclusion temporal minimum, as the maximum penalty.
The trial court correctly imposed the payment of a civil indemnity of P50,000.00 in favor
of the heirs of the victim. The consequential (actual) damages in the amount of
P35,700.00 not having been substantiated, except for the amount P12,000.00 paid to
the memorial chapel, is disallowed. The award of moral damages recoverable under
Article 2219(1), in relation to Article 2206, of the Civil Code is reduced from P100,000.00
to P20,000.00.
WHEREFORE, appellant Ronnie Quitlong is found guilty of the crime of murder for the
killing of Jonathan Calpito and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00, to
reimburse them the actual damages of P12,000.00 and to pay moral damages of
P50,000.00. Appellants Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr., are found guilty as
accomplices in the commission of the crime, and each shall suffer the indeterminate
sentence of nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision mayor minimum period, as
minimum penalty, to thirteen (13) years and nine (9) months and ten (10) days
of reclusion temporal minimum period, as maximum penalty. Appellants Salvador
Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr., are also hereby held solidarily liable with appellant
Ronnie Quitlong in the payment of the damages hereinabove mentioned. Costs against
appellants.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Philippine National Police and the
Department of Justice in order that the other participants in the killing of Jonathan
Calpito, specifically Jesus Mendoza, be arrested and made to face the force of the law.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[ G.R. Nos. 133570-71, January 15, 2002 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. NERIO SUELA Y
HEMBRA, EDGAR SUELA Y HEMBRA AND EDGARDO BATOCAN,
APPELLANTS.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In this Decision, the Court visits and applies existing jurisprudence on the right to
competent and independent counsel of persons under custodial investigation. It also
reiterates the long-standing judicial policy that procedural laws which are favorable to the
accused shall be given retroactive effect. Inasmuch as the aggravating circumstance
of disguise was not alleged in the Information, it cannot now be appreciated to increase
the penalty to death, notwithstanding the fact that the new rule requiring such allegation
was promulgated only after the crime was committed and after the trial court had already
rendered its Decision.
The Case
For automatic review by this Court is the Decision[1] dated January 26, 1998 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, (Branch 95), finding appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide and simple robbery. The decretal portion of
the Decision reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in the following:
“1. In Crim. Cases Nos. Q-96-64616 and Q-96-65071, the Court finds the accused Nerio
Suela y Hembra and Edgar Suela y Hembra and Edgardo Batocan GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide defined in and penalized by
paragraph I, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, and, there
being one aggravating circumstance of disguise (par. 14, Art. 14, Revised Penal Code)
and no mitigating circumstance to offset the same, each of them is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of DEATH and are ordered to indemnify the heirs of the late Geronimo
Gabilo y Hostallero the amount of P50,000.00, as death indemnity; P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages; P125,250.00, as actual and compensatory damages; and P2,8[8]
0,000.00, as loss of earnings based on the formula (2/3 x (80-44) or 24 years life
expectancy by P120,000.00 reasonable average net annual earnings.
“The three accused are further ordered to return to Director Nilo Rosas the three (3)
cameras worth P25,000.00; assorted jewelry worth P120,000.00 and cash money in the
amount of P500,000.00. If the three (3) cameras and the assorted jewelry can no longer
be returned, the three (3) accused are hereby ordered to instead pay the value thereof in
the total amount of P145,000.00;
“2. In Crim. Case No. Q-96-64618, the Court finds the accused Edgar Suela y Hembra
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Robbery defined in and
penalized by paragraph 5, Article 294, of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of from six (6) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional minimum, as the minimum penalty to four (4) years, two (2) months and one
(1) day of prision correccional maximum, as the maximum penalty; and,
“3. In Crim. Cases Nos. Q-96-64617 and Q-96-65072, the Court finds the accused Nerio
Suela y Hembra, Edgar Suela y Hembra and Edgardo Batocan NOT GUILTY of the
Crime of Carnapping as defined in and penalized by Rep. Act. 6539, as amended by Rep.
Act 7659, and hereby ACQUITS them for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
“The Sony TV set (Exh. ‘E’) and the Citizen gold wrist watch (Exh. ‘T-1’) are hereby
ordered returned to Director Nilo Rosas upon the final disposition of the cases.
“The motorcycle (Exh. ‘FF’) under the name of the accused Edgardo Batocan shall be
kept by the Court until the final disposition of the cases.
“All the three (3) accused are ordered to pay the costs.
“IT IS SO ORDERED.”[2]
The Information[3] against Nerio Suela and Edgar Suela in Criminal Case No. Q-96-
64616 reads as follows:
“That on or about the 26th day of July 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating with another person whose true name, identity
and whereabouts have not as yet been ascertained and mutually helping one another, by
means of force upon things, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob
one GERONIMO GABILO Y HOSTALLERO in the following manner, to wit: on the
date and place aforementioned said accused managed to enter the house of complainant
located at No. 95 B-5 A. Melchor St., Xavierville Subd., Loyola Heights, this City, by
barging into the door of said house and once inside took, robbed and carried away the
following, to wit:
one (1) 14” Sony
Trinitron
colored TV 12,000.00
three (3) cameras 25,000.00
assorted jewelries 120,000.00
cash money 500,000.00
all in the total amount of P657,000.00, Philippine Currency, and on the occasion of said
Robbery, the said accused pursuant to their conspiracy, with intent to kill, attacked,
assaulted and employed personal violence upon the person of said GERONIMO
GABILO Y HOSTALLERO, by stabbing him, thereby inflicting upon him serious and
mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Geronimo Gabilo y Hostallero, in the total
amount aforementioned.”
The Information[4] against Edgardo Batocan in Criminal Case No. Q-96-65071 reads as
follows:
“That on or about the 26th day of July, 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused, conspiring and confederating with NERIO SUELA Y HEMBRA and
EDGAR SUELA Y HEMBRA who are being charged with the same offense at Regional
Trial Court Branch 79 and docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-64616, and mutually
helping one another, by means of force upon things, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously rob one NILO ROSAS Y LANETE in the following manner,
to wit: on the date and place afor[e]mentioned said accused entered the house of
complainant located at 95 Melchor St. Xavierville Subd., Loyola Heights, this City, by
barging into the door of said house and inside took, robbed and carried away the
following, to wit:
one (1) 14” Sony Trinitron
colored TV ------------------------ P12,000.00
three (3) cameras ------------------ 25,000.00
assorted jewelries ----------------- 120,000.00
cash money ---------------------- 500,000.00
all in the total amount of P657,000.00, Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice
of Nilo Rosas y Lanete in the aforementioned amount of P657,000.00, and on the
occasion of said Robbery, the said accused pursuant to their conspiracy, with intent to
kill, attacked, assaulted and employed personal violence upon the person of said
GERONIMO GABILO Y HOSTALLERO, by stabbing him, thereby inflicting upon him
serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Geronimo Gabilo y Hostallero.”
The Information[5] against Edgar Suela in Criminal Case No. Q-96-64618 reads as
follows:
“That on or about the 18th day of January 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, with intent to gain, and by means of intimidation against person, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob/extort one NILO ROSAS Y LANETE in
the manner as follows: on the date and place aforementioned, the said accused called up
by phone the Executive Secretary of said complainant and demanded the amount of
P200,000.00, Philippine Currency, in exchange for the information regarding the robbery
case and slaying of Geronimo Gabilo on July 26, 1995, as in fact said accused, took,
robbed and carried away the aforesaid amount of P200,000.00, Philippine Currency, to
the damage and prejudice of the said offended party.”
When arraigned on September 24, 1996, appellants, with the assistance of counsel,
pleaded “not guilty.”[6] In due course, they were tried and found guilty by the court a
quo.
The Facts
The Office of the Solicitor General summarized the evidence for the prosecution in this
wise:[7]
"On July 26, 1995, between 11:00 P.M. and 12:00 midnight, private complainant Director
Nilo L. Rosas was at the master’s bedroom located at the second floor of his townhouse
residence at #95 B-5 A. Melchor Street, Xavierville Subdivision, Loyola Heights,
Quezon City. He was watching television thereat, together with his adopted son, Norman
Rosas, and his former co-teacher and good friend, Geronimo ‘Gerry’ Gabilo, who at that
time was engaged in the real estate business. Suddenly, three persons sporting ski masks,
bonnets and gloves, brandishing handguns and a knife, barged into the room. The tallest
of the three, with a height of about five feet and five inches, reached for the light switch
and turned it off. The three intruders then shouted ‘dapa, dapa.’ So Director Rosas,
Gerry Gabilo, and Norman Rosas dropped to the floor with their faces facing the bed.
Two of the malefactors turned off the television set, and tied their hands at their backs,
with the use of hankies and telephone cord. The room remained illuminated by the light
coming from a walk-in closet and from the lamp post outside fronting the room, and from
the lights of the neighboring townhouses.
“The shortest of the three malefactors, about five feet tall, poked the barrel of his gun on
the chin of Director Rosas, then inside Rosas’ mouth. At the same time, using his free
hand, the same malefactor poked a knife on the right side of Rosas’ neck. The other man,
who was the second to the tallest, with a height of about five feet three inches, while
holding a penlight in one hand, and a gun on the other, threateningly told Rosas,
‘Nakikita mo ba iyan? Nararamdaman mo ba iyan?’, to which Director Rosas replied
‘Opo, opo.’ The two then ordered Rosas to ‘ilabas ang iyong mga pera.’ All that time,
while the two were with Director Rosas, the other man, the tallest of them, stood in front
of the mirror by the side of the door, facing and brandishing a gun towards Norman
Rosas. Director Rosas did not heed the order to bring out the money even though Gabilo
advised him, saying ‘Nilo ilabas mo na.’ However, Gabilo stood up, and even with his
hands tied at the back, went towards the second compartment of the television rack and
reached for an envelope containing his money. He handed the envelope to the shortest of
the three fellows, who, upon seeing the money inside the envelope, closed it. Director
Rosas knew that the envelope contained P200,000.00 as Gabilo had informed him of the
amount earlier that evening. Forced to reveal that his money was in the walk-in closet,
the second tallest of the three malefactors poked a gun on Director Rosas’ neck, forced
him to get up, kicked and pushed him towards the closet. When the fellow could not
open the closet, he asked Rosas for the key. When he was informed that the key was
inside his wallet which was on top of the drawer beside his bed, the fellow opened the
wallet and took all the money he found in it: two (2) $100.00 bills and ten (10)
P1,000.00 bills. With the key, he thereafter opened the closet. He then asked where the
money was. When Director Rosas told him that it was inside his suitcase, the fellow tried
opening it but failed. So he ordered Director Rosas to open it but the latter also failed as
he had difficulty doing so since his hands were still tied at his back. The fellow,
however, subsequently opened the suit case himself and got all the money in it amounting
to P300,000.00. He also took the valuables he found inside the suit case, viz., a gold-
plated Citizen wristwatch engraved at the back with ‘N.L. Rosas’ and some rings and
bracelet valued at P20,000.00, more or less. The malefactors also took with them three
(3) automatic cameras valued at P25,000.00 each, and bottles of cologne costing about
P10,000.00. While leaving Director Rosas lying on the floor near the closet, the second
tallest of the three, together with the shortest fellow, went to Gabilo and dragged and
pushed him. They demanded that Gabilo give them his car key, which he did. They then
dragged Gabilo out of the room and proceeded downstairs. The second tallest fellow
went back to Director Rosas and said ‘Mabait ka, mabait ka’ but warned him not to
follow them downstairs because ‘puputok ang granada sa daanan mo.’ He then placed a
gag inside Director Rosas’ mouth, tying it with a piece of cloth. Upon sensing that the
three were already downstairs, Director Rosas tried to follow them but his adopted son,
Norman Rosas, pleaded ‘Daddy, daddy, huwag kang sumunod, baka patayin ka nila.’
After about two (2) minutes, a long moaning sound was heard coming from downstairs,
which sound resembled Gabilo’s voice. After a while, he heard the engine of Gabilo’s
car, a Nissan Sentra car with plate no. TEB-258, running and he later found out that they
had also carted away his Sony Trinitron colored television set. Sensing that the
malefactors had left, he went downstairs and saw Gabilo slump[ed] on the floor in his
blood. When he saw that Gabilo was motionless, he went back to the second floor and
told his son to rouse their housemaid, Pinky Ma?alac, who was asleep on the third floor
of their townhouse. They then sought help from their neighbors. The first to assist them
was a medical doctor who, upon examining Gabilo, informed them that the latter was
already dead. At the Quezon City Medical Center where Gabilo was subsequently
brought, he was pronounced dead-on-arrival.
“Early morning, the following day, July 27, 1995, upon receiving the report from the
Quezon City Medical Center regarding the stabbing incident which resulted to the death
of Gerry Gabilo, Captain Alejandro Casanova, SPO3 Jesus Patriarca, and SPO2 Reynato
Resurrecion, all of the Quirino District Police Station, Station 9, Anonas Road, Quezon
City, proceeded to the crime scene. SPO3 Jesus Patriarca was assigned as lead
investigator of the case. The autopsy conducted on Gabilo showed that he died of
hemorrhage due to multiple (five) stab wounds. To shed light on the incident, several
persons, including private complainant Director Rosas, his adopted son, Norman Rosas,
his brother, Romulo Rosas, their housemaid, Pinky Ma?alac, William Hostillero, Ruben
Pacuntad, Joven Ma?alac and Rodito Gabilo, were summoned and interviewed by the
police. The same, however, did not result to any breakthrough for the case. When they
were subjected to a lie detector test by the NBI, the results were negative.
“Gabilo’s Nissan Sentra vehicle was recovered by the operatives of the Western Police
District as it was found abandoned at P. Florentino Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. At the back
seat floor of the car, a black bonnet was found.
“After almost five (5) months of no leads towards solving the case, on January 15, 1996,
Araceli Tubaga, Director Rosas’ executive secretary at his DECS office at Misamis
Street, Bago Bantay, Quezon City, received a call from a male person who requested to
speak with Director Rosas. When Tubaga requested to get his message as the director
could not go to the phone, he told her to relay to Rosas that he has information as to the
identity and whereabouts of those responsible for the death of his friend, Gabilo. He told
her that he is willing to give the information in writing in exchange for P200,000.00. He
then said that he will call again for Rosas’ response to his offer. In reaction, Director
Rosas, accompanied by Tubaga, went to the Quirino District Police Station to inform
Capt. Casanova about the call. Capt. Casanova came up with the plan to entrap the
caller. At noon the following day (January 16, 1996), the unidentified caller called
again. When told that Director Rosas was accepting his offer, he instructed Tubaga to
meet him the following day (January 17, 1996) at noon at the Ninoy Aquino Park,
Quezon Avenue, Quezon City. He told her to bring with her the amount of P200,000.00
which should be placed in a plastic bag, and to bring flowers with her so he could easily
identify her. Director Rosas informed Capt. Casanova about the conversation.
“On January 17, 1996, about 10:00 A.M. Tubaga went to the Max’s Restaurant at the
Quezon City Circle and met Capt. Casanova and the other policemen, in preparation for
the entrapment. Carrying with her the boodle money in a Unilane Food Mart plastic bag,
she proceeded to the Ninoy Aquino Park and waited but the caller did not appear. About
5:00 P.M. that afternoon, the caller called her at the office and informed her that he will
meet her the following day (January 18, 1996) at the same time and place. Thus, the
following day, she waited for him at the designated spot. Shortly after, a male person
approached her and asked if she was the one with whom he talked with over the phone.
When she answered in the affirmative, he handed her an envelope while she handed him
the plastic bag containing the boodle money. While he was untying the plastic bag to
check its contents, the police officers who were posted in the vicinity pounced on him
and effected his arrest. He was brought to Police Station 9. This person was later
identified as appellant Edgar Suela.
“While on board the vehicle on their way to the police station, in the presence of
appellant Edgar Suela, Capt. Casanova, and the other policemen, SPO3 Patriarca opened
the envelope which Tubaga had earlier received from appellant Edgar Suela. It contained
a handwritten note which reads:
1. Nerio Suela – ang utak nang pag-paslang
2. TV color and ibedensia nasa bahay niya. Ang tunay na pangalan National ngayon
ay pinalitan nang Panasonic.
3. Ang knife na ginamit nasa bahay niya 8 [sic].
When he asked Edgar Suela who wrote it, he answered ‘Ako po, sir.’ When he further
asked as to who is Nerio Suela, Edgar answered that he is his brother and is the driver of
Director Rosas.
“With that information, appellant Nerio Suela was immediately arrested at Director
Rosas’ office. When Nerio confirmed the contents of his brother Edgar’s letter, Capt.
Casanova directed SPO1 Carlos Nicolas and PO2 Orlin Comia to accompany Nerio to his
residence at Kaibigan Street Street, Kalayaan B, Barangay Batasan Hills, Quezon City.
Thereat, they recovered the Sony Trinitron TV, and a knife with a wooden scabbard.
“While under detention, the Suelas expressed their desire to give an extra-judicial
confession. Hence, on January 19, 1996, between 4:00 to 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon,
SPO3 Patriarca, together with Capt. Casanova and another police officer, brought the
Suelas to the office of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), located at the second
floor, Hall of Justice, Quezon City. When they arrived there, Atty. Confesor Sansano and
Atty. Florimond Rous were manning the IBP office. When the police informed them of
their purpose, Atty. Sansano separately interviewed each of the Suelas first, informed
them of their constitutional rights, insured that they understood the import of their
confession, physically examined them for any sign of maltreatment or force, and after
satisfying himself that the suspects’ intention was voluntary on their part and that it was
his legal assistance that they were willing to secure, he allowed the police to take down
their individual extra-judicial confessions. Atty. Sansano was present all throughout the
time that the Suelas were individually propounded with questions. Thereafter, both were
brought before the Assistant City Prosecutor where they affirmed their confessions under
oath in the presence of Atty. Sansano who assisted them. The following morning,
January 20, 1996, the Suelas were again brought before Assistant City Prosecutor Ibuyan
for inquest investigation where they again affirmed under oath the contents of their extra-
judicial confessions.
“In their extra-judicial confessions, the Suelas mentioned appellant Edgardo Batocan,
their townmate, as a participant in the crime. Thus, his name was included in the
criminal informations, and a warrant of arrest was issued against him.
“Sometime in the second week of March 1996, a team composed of SPO3 Patriarca,
Capt. Nestor Abalos, and SPO2 Jesus Casica, together with the father of the Suela
brothers, went to Jaro, Leyte, to serve the warrant of arrest on appellant Batocan. In
coordination with Sr./Insp. Benjamin Labadia, the Chief of Police in Jaro, Leyte, the
arrest of appellant Batocan was effected. He was immediately brought to Manila and was
detained at the Quezon City Police Station 9. The operatives were able to recover the
gold-plated Citizen watch of Rosas from Batocan’s girlfriend at Barangay San Agustin,
Jaro, Leyte. The brand-new Honda motorcycle registered in appellant Batocan’s name
was shipped from Leyte to Quezon City as Batocan had admitted that he had bought it
sometime in July 1995 with his share from the loot of the robbery. While in police
custody, appellant Batocan also indicated his desire to give an extra-judicial confession.
Thus, on March 31, 1996, about 3:30 P.M., he was brought by SPO2 Reynato
Resurreccion to the same IBP office and gave his confession in the presence and with the
assistant of Atty. Flormind [sic] Rous, which statement he subscribed before an Assistant
City Prosecutor and later re-affirmed before an inquest Fiscal.” (Citations omitted)
On the other hand, the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) summarized appellants’ version
of the incident as follows:[8]
“On July 26, 1995, Edgardo Batocan was in his hometown in Jaro, Leyte where he
worked as a farmer. Sometime in March 1996, and while on board his motorcycle, he
was arrested by the police. He bought the motorcycle from an uncle with the money that
his sister gave him. No citizen gold wristwatch was seized from him upon his arrest.
“After his arrest he was brought to Quezon City and investigated. He had no knowledge
nor any participation in the crime that occurred on July 26, 1995, at the residence of
Director Nilo Rosas. He was forced and threatened by the police officers to admit and
confess to the crimes. He was also forced to sign a typewritten extrajudicial confession,
the contents of which he did not know as he was not allowed to read it nor was it read to
him. No lawyer was present at that time and he only met Atty. Rous for the first time in
court. He recalled however, that during his brief visit at the IBP-Quezon City Chapter
office, in the afternoon of March 13, 1996, he saw, but did not talk to Atty. Rous, the one
who limps, whom he recognized when the latter testified in Court. He was brought
before the Assistant City Prosecutor for inquest but the fiscal did not explain to him the
contents of his written statement. He was not adept at reading because he only reached
first year high school. No copy of his supposed statement was given him. He did not
complain to the fiscal nor to any government agency about the alleged coercion and
threats of the police. He only told his lawyer, Atty. Tabang and his brother Jimmy
Batocan about it. He is not angry at the Suelas for falsely implicating him. In jail, he
confronted the brothers and was told that they were merely forced by the police officers
so that they could be freed. The Suelas had many friends but they pointed to him because
they thought that the police will no longer bother to pursue him because he lived in a very
far place in Leyte. He knew the Suela brothers because they were his barriomates in San
Agustin, Jaro, Leyte. Although he came to Manila in 1992 to work until 1994, he did not
visit the Suelas or any of his friends from his barrio. He could not recall his exact Manila
address.
“Nerio Suela worked as a driver of Director Nilo Rosas at DECS 1993 up to 1995.
Geronimo Gabilo was formerly his co-employee thereat as the latter was the one
responsible for his employment with Director Rosas. In the months of June and July
1995, he was mostly at home because he was recuperating from an operation (for
appendectomy). He was on leave and reported back to work only on July 30, 1995. It
was then that he learned about the untimely demise of Gerry Gabilo. The police and the
NBI did not investigate him, not until after his arrest on January 18, 1996 by the Quezon
City police.
“He had no knowledge nor participation in the killing of Gerry Gabilo nor in the robbery
that occurred at the residence of Director Nilo Rosas on the night of July 26, 1995. After
his arrest, he was brought to Danarra Hotel where he was manhandled and boxed and his
head submerged in the toilet bowl. He was forced to sign a piece of paper. He also met
his brother Edgar at the same hotel. He was not allowed to read the paper which he was
forced to sign. He found out later on that this was the statement or his supposed extra-
judicial confession. From the hotel, he was brought to his house where the police took
away his television set (TV) and a knife with scabbard. Director Rosas gave him the tv
set after Gabilo’s death. At that time, he did not notice why the ‘Sony’ brand name was
scrapped and replaced by the name ‘National’. The next day, he was brought to the City
Hall where he was given a lawyer whom he does not know and whose name he could not
even recall. The lawyer showed him a paper and asked him if the signature thereon was
his. The lawyer did not ask him anything more. The former did not explain to him that
said paper was his alleged admission to the crimes for which he was arrested and
detained. He met Atty. Sansano for the first time in the court room during the hearing of
these cases and not on January 19, 1996. He could not recall if Atty. Sansano was the
same one who was presented to him when he was brought to the City Hall after his
arrest. After this, he was brought before the Assistant City Prosecutor.
“He sustained hematomas (pasa) from the man-handling by his police captors but he did
not show them to the Assistant City Prosecutor or the lawyer at the IBP, Quezon City
office nor did he file any complaint against the police. He recanted his confession in his
counter-affidavit.
“He knew Edgardo Batocan well because they grew up together in the same town in
Leyte. On July 26, 1995, he was at home at Batasan Hills, Quezon City, the whole time.
He was playing chess with his neighbor Mang Tancio during the time of the incident.
“While inside the prison cell, he was convinced by his officemates at the DECS-NCR and
by Capt. Casanova to write Director Rosas a letter on January 31, 1996. The contents of
this letter was merely dictated to him by the police.
“Edgar Suela admits to having called up the office of Director Nilo Rosas and in
proposing a trade off of P200,000.00 in exchange for the information he would give
about the identities and whereabouts of the robbers. He learned from his brother Nerio
that Director Rosas placed a reward money for whoever can provide such an
information. At the agreed time and date of the ‘trade off’, the police apprehended him
and changed the original note he gave with another written note the contents of which,
the police forced and dictated to him. During his investigation, the police employed
threats, intimidation and physical force to make him admit to the crime, and to sign a
statement or confession. Together with his brother, he was brought to the office of the
IBP in Quezon City, a lawyer talked to him and he identified this person in court as Atty.
Sansano. At the IBP office, he was asked to sign his supposed extrajudicial confession.
Later on, he executed a Counter-Affidavit wherein he assailed the voluntariness of his
forced confession and recanted the contents thereof.
“He has no knowledge about the killing of Gerry Gabilo nor about the robbers who
invaded Director Rosas’ house.
“On July 26, 1995, he was on his tour of duty as security guard of Hoctagon Security
Agency at his assigned post at Northridge Elementary School, along Mother Ignacia
Street, Timog Avenue, Quezon City. Edgardo Batocan was his acquaintance since
childhood and the last time he saw the latter was in 1990 at Jaro, Leyte. He did not see
Batocan in his hometown when he got married in November 1995. He did not implicate
Batocan. He learned about the death of Gerry Gabilo when he came back to Manila after
his wedding.
“Joselito Jacinto testified that Nerio Suela wanted him to repair the latter’s television set.
The defect of said tv, pertain only to the channeling. He asked Suela for money to buy
the spare parts. On August 19, 1995, he met Nerio Suela and his boss, Director Rosas at
the SM parking lot. Rosas gave Nerio some money which the latter in turn gave him for
the TV spare parts and repair.
“Dionesio Ador had seen Edgardo Batocan in Jaro, Leyte on July 26, 1995. The
motorbike of Batocan is an old red Honda. He saw Batocan used a new motorbike in
December 1995 in their barrio. He does not know the Suela brothers. Batocan had been
in their barrio all his life and had not left their place.” (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Trial Court
The court a quo ruled that appellants had been assisted by competent and independent
counsel during the execution of their extrajudicial confessions. It gave credence to the
testimonies of Atty. Sansano and the police officers and thus admitted in evidence the
said confessions.
The letter of Nerio Suela addressed to Director Rosas asking for forgiveness, as well as
the discovery of the stolen TV set and knife in the former’s house, further convinced the
trial court of appellants’ guilt. Finding the presence of one aggravating circumstance
(disguise) with no mitigating circumstance to offset it, the trial court sentenced them to
death.
Hence, this automatic review before us.[9]

Assignment of Errors
In his Brief, Appellant Edgardo Batocan ascribes to the trial court the following alleged
errors:[10]
“I. The trial court gravely erred in considering Edgardo Batocan’s extra judicial
confession as admissible evidence against him.

“II. The trial court erred in admitting and appreciating the wristwatch as evidence against
Edgardo Batocan.

“III. The trial court erred in convicting Appellant Batocan of robbery with homicide.”
Appellants Nerio and Edgar Suela, on the other hand, fault the trial court with the
following supposed errors:[11]
“I. The court a quo erred in considering the extr[a]-judicial confessions of Edgar Suela
and Nerio Suel[a] are admissible against them;

“II. The court a quo erred in considering the letter of Nerio Suela to Director Nilo Rosas as
evidence against him;

“III. The court a quo erred in convicting Edgar Suela for simple robbery under Art. 294, no.
5, of the Revised Penal Code.

“IV. The court a quo erred in convicting Edgar Suela and Nerio Suela [of] robbery with
homicide.”
Basically, the assigned errors boil down to four: (1) whether the extrajudicial confessions
of appellants are admissible in evidence; (2) whether the wristwatch and the letter (of
Nerio Suela) are admissible in evidence; (3) whether appellants can be convicted of
robbery with homicide; and (4) whether Edgar Suela is guilty of robbery for demanding
P200,000 as payment for information on the robbery-slay case.
The appeal is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confessions
Section 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

“(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right
to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel,
he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
“(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the
free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incomunicado, or
other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
“(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
“x x x x x x x x x.”

[12]
In People v. Labtan, we explained that “[t]he right to counsel is a fundamental right
and contemplates not a mere presence of the lawyer beside the accused.” Furthermore,
an effective and vigilant counsel “necessarily and logically [requires] that the lawyer be
present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the
first question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial
confession. Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the confession is made
voluntarily and that the person under investigation fully understands the nature and the
consequence of his extrajudicial confession in relation to his constitutional rights. A
contrary rule would undoubtedly be antagonistic to the constitutional rights to remain
silent, to counsel and to be presumed innocent.”[13]
True, counsel does not necessarily have to dissuade the person under investigation from
confessing. But his bounden duty is to properly and fully advise his clients on the nature
and consequences of an extrajudicial confession.
In People v. Deniega,[14] the Court explained:

“The desired role of counsel in the process of custodial investigation is rendered
meaningless if the lawyer merely gives perfunctory advice as opposed to a meaningful
advocacy of the rights of the person undergoing questioning. If the advice given is so
cursory as to be useless, voluntariness is impaired. If the lawyer’s role is reduced to
being that of a mere witness to the signing of a pre-prepared document albeit indicating
therein compliance with the accused’s constitutional rights, the constitutional standard
guaranteed by Article III, Section 12(1) is not met. The process above-described fulfills
the prophylactic purpose of the constitutional provision by avoiding the 'pernicious
practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the
person undergoing interrogation for the commission of the offense' and ensuring that the
accused’s waiver of his right to self incrimination during the investigation is an informed
one in all aspects.”
The modifier competent and independent in the 1987 Constitution is not an empty
rhetoric. It stresses the need to accord the accused, under the uniquely stressful
conditions of a custodial investigation, an informed judgment on the choices explained to
him by a diligent and capable lawyer.[15]
With respect Edgardo Batocan, we hold that his extrajudicial confession was obtained in
violation of his constitutional rights. This appellant did not finish first year high school.
[16]
Yet Atty. Rous, who is touted by the prosecution as a competent and independent
counsel, interviewed Batocan -- before the latter gave his confession -- for only around
“five minutes.”[17] After this initial interview, Atty. Rous just listened nonchalantly to the
questions propounded by the police and to the answers given by Batocan. Counsel was
not even sure that he had explained to appellant the consequences of his extrajudicial
confession. Furthermore, Atty. Rous’ attention was divided while attending the custodial
investigation as he was also looking over another paper work on his desk.[18]
In view of these proven circumstances, we are not convinced that counsel had fully
explained to Batocan his constitutional rights and what they entailed or the nature and the
consequences of an extrajudicial confession -- explanations that would have enabled him
to make an informed judgment on whether to confess; and if so, on what matters. There
is no showing that Atty. Rous properly explained the choices or options open to
appellant, a duty expected of any counsel under the circumstances. In sum, he did not
turn out to be the competent and independent counsel envisioned by the Constitution.
We now go to the extrajudicial confessions of Edgar and Nerio Suela. Atty. Sansano
supposedly stood as counsel for the Suela brothers during their custodial investigation.
He testified on how he discharged his duties as follows:
“Q: Did you also inform them of the nature of the charge against them and the
circumstances s[u]rrounding the taking of their statement?
A: I did not have the opportunity to inform them about the nature of their charge because
at that time, when they introduced to me, I have not yet informed them what they are
going to do and what being took their statement.

Q: In other words, Mr. Witness, you did not inform the[m] that the [imposable] penalty in
this crime is death?
A: Well, during my personal interview as I said, at that time, I don’t even know that they
are charged for Murder and Homicide.

Q: But anyway, Mr. Witness, when this case was brought to you by the police officer,
you really informed that the crime charged was robbery-homicide, Carnapping and
extortion?
A: Nobody informed me about the nature of the charge as they stated. They were just
brought before me there. I was asked to provide the free legal assistance other than
the investigation conducted by the police officer.

Q: Did you not ask the police why these people were brought to you?
A: They told me that they are going to be asked questions, to be investigated in
connection with that incident in Dr. Rosas home.

Q: And did you not ask the police what was that incident?
A: The police told me already that the two boys were going to give statement in
connection with that incident in Dr. Rosas house where one was killed in the house of
Dr. Rosas.[19]

x x x x xx x x x

Q: But, nevertheless, Mr. Witness, it was the policeman who choose you to be the lawyer
to assist?
A: No, sir, the police only thru their duties, to suggest or provide where counsel can be
sought, now, it happened that under our agreement, with the police, if the two boys
were going to give their statement and if the declarant got no lawyer that they will
bring them to the IBP because we even provide the assistance that are needed in order
to be able to conduct an investigation.”[20] (Italics supplied)

x x x x xx x x x
“Q: Anyway, you already knew that the incident of robbery and killing of a person was
involved, is that right?
A: Yes sir, after the investigation.

Q: So when you already knew the possible charge based on the testimony of the two
declarants?
A: Yes sir, it was robbery with homicide.

Q: You said a while ago that your duty as assisting counsel was only to advise the
suspects one of which is to advise them that they can if they do not want to answer
those questions that they would think damaging then they can do that?
A: Yes sir, and the best evidence is the evidence that they gave in their statements.

Q: Now, since you advised them about damaging testimonies, did you not advise them
that to make a confession would be damaging to themselves as assisting counsel?
A: The confession became clearly damaging only after the answers were given following
the question but as I said, at that stage I did not stop the declarant from giving his
answer because if I objected then that would be an obstruction in the investigation
itself.”[21]
Evidently, Atty. Sansano did not understand the exact nature of appellants’ rights to
counsel and to remain silent during their custodial investigations. He viewed a refusal to
answer as an obstruction in the investigation. This shows that he was incapable or
unwilling to advise appellants that remaining silent was a right they could freely exercise
without fear of any untoward consequence. As counsel, he could have stopped his clients
from answering the propounded questions and advised them of their right to remain
silent, if they preferred to do so. That the process of investigation could have been
“obstructed” should not have concerned him because his duty was to his clients and not
to the prosecution or to the police investigators.
Moreover, when he interviewed appellants, he did not even bother to find out the gist of
their proposed statements in order to be able to inform them properly of the nature and
consequences of their extrajudicial confessions. Clearly and sadly, appellants were not
accorded competent and independent counsel whom they could rely on to look after their
interests.
“In People v. dela Cruz, we stated that ‘a confession made in an atmosphere
characterized by deficiencies in informing the accused of all rights to which he is entitled
would be rendered valueless and inadmissible, perforated, as it is, by non-compliance
with the procedural and substantive safeguards to which an accused is entitled under the
Bill of Rights and as now further implemented and ramified by statutory law.’”[22]
Where the prosecution failed to discharge the State’s burden of proving with clear and
convincing evidence that the accused had enjoyed effective and vigilant counsel before
he extrajudicially admitted his guilt, the extrajudicial confession cannot be given any
probative value.[23]
The extrajudicial confessions of all three appellants are thus inadmissible in evidence.
Second Issue:
Admissibility of Wristwatch and Letter
Wristwatch
Edgardo Batocan allegedly confessed in Leyte that the stolen Citizen wristwatch had
been given to his girlfriend. When he rendered this confession, he did not execute any
written waiver of his right to remain silent or of his right to counsel. “Any admission
wrung from the accused in violation of his constitutional rights is inadmissible in
evidence against him.”[24] Therefore, his alleged statement as to the location of the
wristwatch is inadmissible.
Furthermore, the prosecution’s claim that the wristwatch was recovered from his
girlfriend is hearsay and hence, has limited probative value.[25] The prosecution did not
present anyone who had actually witnessed the alleged recovery of the wristwatch from
the girl. S/Insp. Benjamin Labadia recounted the incident in this plainly insufficient
manner:
“Q: Alright Mr. Witness, you said that a wrist watch was also a part of the loot and that
Batocan told your team that it was in the custody of his sweetheart. When so informed
that this wrist watch was in the custody of his sweetheart, what did the police
operatives do?
A: The police operatives together with Edgardo Batocan went to the place and when they
came back, I did not go with them, the wrist watch was already in the possession of
the Quezon City Police operative, Sir.

Q: Did you actually see, Mr. Witness when the team proceeded to the place where the
sweetheart of accused Edgardo Batocan was staying, give this wrist watch to the
Quezon City Police operatives?
A: I said, Sir. I did not accompany them.”[26]
As for the wristwatch itself, we agree with appellant that its seizure, if it was really taken
from Batocan’s girlfriend, was irregular. As succinctly explained in Batocan’s Brief:
“x x x. Clearly, the watch was taken without a search warrant and not as an incident of a
valid arrest. The seizure was irregular. There is also no evidence on record that it was
taken under any of the exempting circumstances where a warrantless seizure is
permissible. It was not shown if the girlfriend voluntarily and validly consented to the
taking x x x. Lacking such evidence, no presumption of regularity can be assumed.
‘Where the search was conducted with irregularity, i.e. without a warrant, the Court
cannot appreciate consent based merely on the presumption of regularity of the
performance of duty.’ (People vs. Encinada, 280 SCRA 72).
“The wristwatch is clearly a fruit of a ‘fruit of a poisonous tree.’ As such, it should not
have been admitted and appreciated against the accused.”[27]
Letter
Nerio Suela also contends that his January 31, 1996 letter to Director Rosas is
inadmissible in evidence. The letter reads as follows:
“Jan-31-96
“Dearest Sir DIR. NILO ROSAS
“Sir matagal kona sana ito ipagtapat sa iyo dahil tuwing kitay nakikita na lumoloha ka
parang hindi ako maka hinga ng sisikip and aking dibdib. Tuwing tayo’y nasa simbahan
homihinge ako ng tawad sa panginoon ang nagawa kong ito nararamdaman ko na
parabang hinde niya tinatanggap.
“Sir napakalaki ng nagawa kong kasalanan sa iyo at sana bigyan mo pa ako ng isang
pagkakataon pagsisihan ko lahat ang pagkakasala sa iyo babagohin ko na ang buhay ko
maglilingkod ako sa diyos.
“Sir nandito ako sa likod ng bakal na rihas halos lahat ng oras ng dadasal ako bigyan mo
pa ako ng isang pagkakataon patawaring mo ako.
“Sir alam ng diyos na hindi ako ang kriminal may kinalaman lang ako inamin ko na lang.
Para naman magkaroon ng lonas yong problima mo hindi narin ako makatiis hindi pa
makatolog. Lalo na nakikita kita na ng hihirap ang inyong katawan lalo na ang in
kalooban sana sir bigyan mo pa ako ng isang pagkakataon patawarin mo ako isa rin ako
na anak ng diyos na naligaw ng langdas ngayon pinagsisihan ko lahat ang nagawa kong
kasalanan sir ayaw ko pang mamatay maliliit ang aking mga anak mahal ako ng aking
asawa.
“Sir. Edgardo Batokan ang pumatay kay Sir JERRY sangayon nandoon siya sa Jaro Leyte
Bo. San Agostin. Sir hinde ko maggawang pomatay ng tao somama lang ako dahil baka
kayo ang patayin nang doon lang ako sa may pito. Yung kapatid ko namana siya ang may
baril siya and nanotok si Edgardo Batokan siya ang komoha ng pira tapos omalis na kami
ako ang ng drive ng kotse. Tapos inewan namin sa Ricto tapos ng hiwalay hiwa na kame
yon tike. Dian ng kapatid ko.
“Sir patawarin mo na ako hinde naman akong masamang tao na pasama lang ako.
“Sana po & sir babaan mo naman ang aking sintinesia ayaw ko pang mamatay.
Nerio Suela
(signed)
Quezon City Jail

Sir. Sagotin mo naman
itong sulat ko,
(signed)”[28]
This letter was properly identified. Nerio was no longer under custodial investigation
when he wrote it. In open court, he admitted having written it. Thus, contrary to his
contention, the fact that he was not assisted by counsel when he wrote it will not make
the letter inadmissible in evidence. Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation
do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the
authorities.[29] Hence, the letter is admissible in evidence.
Third Issue:
Liability for Robbery with Homicide
Without the wristwatch and the uncounseled extrajudicial confessions, are the remaining
pieces of evidence still sufficient to prove appellants’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
Fortunately for the prosecution, our answer is "Yes."
Excluding the wristwatch and the written extrajudicial confessions, the material evidence
on record are as follows:
1) The testimony of the medicolegal officer in conjunction with the medico legal
Report[30] which proved the existence of five stab wounds on the cadaver of Geronimo
Gabilo;

2) The stolen colored Sony television set and the knife used in stabbing Geronimo
Gabilo, which were recovered from the house of Nerio Suela;

3) The handwritten letter of Nerio Suela asking for forgiveness and admitting his
participation in the crime;

4) The handwritten tip on the identity of the malefactors voluntarily handed by Edgar
Suela to Araceli Tubaga, which -- in open court -- he admitted having written. It
states:

‘1. Nerio Suela – ang utak ng pagpaslang
‘2. TV color and evidencia nasa bahay niya ang tunay na pangalan national ngayon
ay pinalitan ng Panasonic
‘3. Ang knife na ginamit nasa bahay niya 8 inc.’

5) The testimony of Director Rosas who narrated how three hooded men brandishing
guns and a knife barged into his room on the night of January 18, 1996, and hogtied
him, Gabilo and Norman.[31] They were then threatened and intimidated into giving
the location of their money and valuables, which the criminals eventually took.[32] The
malefactors then dragged Gabilo downstairs.[33] Shortly, thereafter, he followed them
and found Gabilo in a pool of his own blood.[34] He observed that the height and built
of the three malefactors were the same as those of appellants;[35]

6) The oral admissions made by Nerio Suela and Edgardo Batocan to Director Rosas and
his officemates. Rosas testified as follows:

“Q After Nerio Suela was told that somebody will be talking with him thru the phone,
what happened next, if any?
A Nerio Suela pale faced, admitted the commission of the crime and he was very
apologetic to me and he said: “Sir, patawarin mo po ako sa aking nagawa, nagkamali
lang po ako, tulungan naman po ninyo ako”, those were the statements of Mr. Nerio
Suela as he was being interrogated by Mr. Patriarca.

Q What else did he tell you?
A Those were the only statements that I actually heard from Nerio Suela.[36]

x x x x xx x x x

Q Again, do you know a person by the name of Edgardo Batocan?
A I learned about him only from the letter of Nerio Suela and also when I met him on
March 13, 1996, sir.

Q: Where did you meet this Edgardo Batocan for the first time, Mr. Witness?
A: I met him in the second floor of station 9 along Anonas Street.

Q: Under what circumstances were you able to meet him?
A: Upon his arrest on March 13, 1996 at around 3:00 in the afternoon, I was called by the
Station Commander of Station 9 to meet Mr. Edgardo Batocan and present also during
that time were the relatives of Gerry Gabilo, sir.

Q: What transpired when you met Edgardo Batocan in the office of the Station
Commander of Station 9?
A: We talked about the crime and he mentioned to us that it was Nerio Suela who planned
the whole thing at their place and the plan was hatched three days before the
commission of the crime on July 26, 1995.

Q: What else did he tell you, Mr. Witness, at that time?

x x x x xx x x x

A: He insisted that it was actually Mr. Nerio Suela who masterminded because on the
way down from the second floor, Mr. Gerry Gabilo was pleading with him for them
not to harm him and felt quite remorseful when he was already about to stab my friend
but it was Nerio Suela who pushed him to kill Gerry and then one of my staff even
asked him “how many times did you stab, Mr. Gabilo?”

x x x x xx x x x

Q: What did Edgar Batocan answer to one of your staff?.
A: He answered that he hit him five times, sir

COURT:

Q: You were present when your staff member asked Edgardo about the question?
A: Yes, I was there.

Q: You were also present when Edgardo Batocan gave the answer?
A: Yes, Your Honor.

x x x x xx x x x

Q: Was there any investigation being conducted by the police at that time you were
talking with Edgardo Batocan?
A: There was none, Your Honor.

Q: Or you were alone with Edgardo Batocan together with your staff member?
A: We were left alone at the second floor with some of my staff member together with the
family of Gerry Gabilo, so we were asking him the circumstances on how he did it and
so forth and so on.

Q: Did he ask for forgiveness?
A: No, he did not Your Honor.[37]
Edgardo Batocan’s confession to Rosas who is not a police officer is admissible in
evidence.[38] The Rules state that “the declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt
of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in
evidence against him.”[39] Batocan’s verbal declarations are not covered by Sections 12
(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution,[40] because they were not extracted while he
was under custodial investigation.
In People v. Tawat,[41] the Court declared:

“The rule is that “any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the
confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard is he heard and
understood all of it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such case it
must be given in its substance.”
“Proof of the contents of an oral extrajudicial confession may be made by the testimony
of a person who testifies that he was present, heard, understood, and remembers the
substance of the conversation or statement made by the accused.”
These pieces of evidence sufficiently prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of
the crime of robbery with homicide.
Identities of Appellants
As Malefactors
Edgardo Batocan’s oral admission to Rosas that he stabbed Gabilo five times dovetails on
material points with the letter of Nerio. In turn, Nerio’s letter to Rosas asking for
forgiveness and admitting his participation in the crime, taken together with the recovery
from his house of the stolen TV and knife used in killing Gabilo; plus the oral admission
of Batocan and the written tip of Edgar Suela pointing to him as the mastermind prove
beyond reasonable doubt his identity as one of the malefactors.
The evidence showing the identity of Edgar Suela are circumstantial in character. It is
basic that an accused may be convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence alone,
provided that: (a) there is more than one circumstance, (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven, and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[42] In the present case, all these
requirements are satisfied.
These circumstances may be summarized, thus: (1) Edgar's intimate personal knowledge
of the details of the crime which he wrote down as tips; (2) as a security guard, he
possessed a gun on the night of the incident; (3) he was the brother of one of the
malefactors and a friend of the other; (4) the interlocking admissions to Director Rosas of
Batocan and his brother Nerio point to Edgar as their cohort; (5) Rosas also identified
him as one of the malefactors. These are duly proven circumstances which sufficiently
establish beyond reasonable doubt his identity as one of the malefactors.
Conspiracy
The three malefactors arrived together at the house of Director Rosas. They were all
wearing ski masks and were all sporting weapons. While one was threatening Rosas, the
other was intimidating Gabilo and the third was pointing his weapon on Norman. After
getting the money and valuables of Gabilo and Rosas, all three went downstairs together,
two of them dragging Gabilo with them. Upon the instruction of Nerio, Batocan stabbed
Gabilo five times. They finally left together in the same car, with Nerio driving. These
acts of the three appellants before, during and after the crime clearly indicate a joint
purpose, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. Where the acts of the accused
collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a common design towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident, and all the
perpetrators will be liable as principals.[43]
Hence, although Nerio and Edgar Suela did not themselves stab Gerry Gabilo, they are
still liable for his death as principals because the existence of conspiracy makes the act of
one the act of all.[44] Moreover, whenever the complex crime of robbery with homicide is
proven to have been committed, all those who took part in the robbery are liable as
principals even though they did not actually take part in the killing.[45]
Proper Penalty
The current Rules on Criminal Procedure require that even generic aggravating

circumstances must be alleged in the Information. Thus, Section 9 of new Rule 110
states:
“Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. - The acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary
and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being
charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to
pronounce judgment.
In People v. Mauricio,[46] the Court elucidated:
“The use of the word ‘must’ indicates that the requirement is mandatory, therefore failure
to comply with Sec. 9, Rule 110, means that generic aggravating circumstances, although
proven at the trial, cannot be appreciated against the accused if such circumstances are
not stated in the information. It is a cardinal rule that rules of criminal procedure are
given retroactive application insofar as they benefit the accused.”
In the present case, the aggravating circumstance of disguise which was appreciated by
the court a quo was not alleged in the Informations against appellants. Following the
above-cited new rule and current jurisprudence, we cannot appreciate the aggravating
circumstance of disguise against appellants. The special complex crime of robbery with
homicide carries the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. There being no appreciable
aggravating circumstance, the proper penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua.
Furthermore, in People v. Catubig,[47] we held that while a non-alleged but proven

aggravating circumstance cannot be used to increase the penalty, nonetheless it can be the
source of civil awards. Hence, we retain the trial court’s civil grants in this regard.
Fourth Issue:
Robbery
On the trial court’s sentence of robbery in Criminal Case No. Q-96-64618, we agree with
the recommendation of the Office of the Solicitor General that Edgar Suela should be
acquitted. The OSG explained:
“Simple robbery is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons as
distinguished from the use of force upon things, but the extent of the violence or
intimidation does not fall under pars. 1 to 4 of Article 294 (Revised Penal Code) [p. 175,
Criminal Law, Book II, Vol. IV, Ambrosio Padilla, 1990].
“Unfortunately, in the case at bar, the prosecution failed to prove that appellant Edgar
Suela employed force or intimidation on private complainant Rosas by instilling fear in
his mind so as to compel the latter to cough out the amount of P200,000.00. Instead, what
was established was that he had agreed to give the P200,000.00 in exchange for
information regarding the identity and whereabouts of those who robbed him and killed
his friend (TSN, November 4, 1996, p. 7; TSN, November 5, 1996, pp. 4-9). There was
no showing that appellant Edgar Suela had exerted intimidation on him so as to leave him
no choice but to give the money. Instead, what is clear was that the giving of the money
was done not out of fear but because it was a choice private complainant opted because
he wanted to get the information being offered to him for the consideration of
P200,000.00 (TSN, November 4, 1996, pp. 5-17; ibid., Decision, p. 15). In fact, the
money was delivered not due to fear but for the purpose of possibly having a lead in
solving the case and to possibly bring the culprit to justice (ibid.). As such, the elements
of simple robbery have not been established in the instant case, hence, appellant Edgar
Suela should be acquitted of that charge.”[48]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED and the appealed
Decision MODIFIED. We AFFIRM the judgment insofar as it refers to Criminal Case
Nos. Q-96-64616 and Q-96-65071 but REDUCE the penalty to reclusion perpetua. The
award of civil indemnities is also AFFIRMED. In Criminal Case No. Q-96-64618 for
simple robbery, Edgar Suela y Hembra is ACQUITTED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 131588, March 27, 2001 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. GLENN DE
LOS SANTOS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
DAVIDE JR., C.J.:
One may perhaps easily recall the gruesome and tragic event in Cagayan de Oro City,
reported over print and broadcast media, which claimed the lives of several members of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) who were undergoing an "endurance run" as part of
the Special Counter Insurgency Operation Unit Training. Not much effort was spared for
the search of the one responsible therefor, as herein accused-appellant Glenn de los
Santos (hereafter GLENN) immediately surrendered to local authorities. GLENN was
then charged with the crimes of Multiple Murder, Multiple Frustrated Murder, and
Multiple Attempted Murder in an information filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Cagayan de Oro City. The information reads as follows:
That on or about October 05, 1995, in the early morning, at Maitum Highway, within
Barangay Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, taking
advantage of his driven motor vehicle, an Isuzu Elf, and with treachery, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kill and inflict mortal wounds from ... behind
in a sudden and unexpected manner with the use of said vehicle ... members of the
Philippine National Police (PNP), undergoing a Special Training Course (Scout Class 07-
95), wearing black T-shirts and black short pants, performing an "Endurance Run" of 35
kilometers coming from their camp in Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, heading to Regional
Training Headquarters in Camp Alagar, Cagayan de Oro City, running in a column of 3,
with a distance of two feet, more or less, from one trainee to another, thus forming a [sic]
three lines, with a length of more or less 50 meters from the 1st man to the last man,
unable to defend themselves, because the accused ran or moved his driven vehicle on the
direction of the backs of the PNP joggers in spite of the continuous warning signals made
by six of the joggers, namely: PO1 Allan Tabacon Espana, Waldon Sinda Sacro, Lemuel
Ybanez Pangca, Artemio Jamil Villaflor, Nardo Omasas Collantes and Joselito Buyser
Escartin, who were at the rear echelon of said run, acting as guards, by continuously
waving their hands at the accused for him to take the left lane of the highway, going to
the City proper, from a distance of 100 meters away from the jogger's rear portion, but
which accused failed and refused to heed; instead, he proceeded to operate his driven
vehicle (an Isuzu Elf) on high speed directly towards the joggers, thus forcing the rear
guard[s] to throw themselves to [a] nearby canal, to avoid injuries, then hitting, bumping,
or ramming the first four (4) victims, causing the bodies to be thrown towards the
windshields of said Isuzu Elf, breaking said windshield, and upon being aware that
bodies of the victims flew on the windshield of his driven vehicle, instead of applying his
brake, continued to travel on a high speed, this time putting off its headlights, thus hitting
the succeeding joggers on said 1st line, as a result thereof the following were killed on
the spot:
1. Vincent Labis Rosal 7. Antonio Flores Lasco

2. Allan Amoguis Abis 8. Igmedio Salinas Lituanas
3. Jose Arden M. Atisa 9. Roberto Cabussao Loren
4. Nathaniel Mugot Baculio 10. Raul Plaza Martinez
5. Romil Gosila Legrano 11. Jerry Pedrosa Pajo
6. Arnulfo Limbago Jacutin 12. Rolando Paremcio Pancito
While another trainee/victim, Antonio Palomino Mino, died few days after the incident,
while the following eleven (11) other trainee/victims were seriously wounded, the
accused thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of
Murder as a consequence but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of some cause
other than said accused's spontaneous desistance, that is, by the timely and able medical
assistance rendered on the following victims which prevented their death, to wit:
1. Rey Go Boquis 7. Melchor Hinlo

2. Rene Tuako Calabria 8. Noel Ganzan Oclarit
3. Nonata Ibarra Erno 9. Charito Penza Gepala
4. Rey Tamayo Estofil 10. Victor Malicse Olavo
5. Joel Rey Migue Galendez 11. Bimbo Glabe Polboroza
6. Arman Neri Hernaiz
While the following Police Officers I (POI) sustained minor injuries, to wit:
1. Romanito Andrada 6. Romualdo Cotor Dacera

2. Richard Canoy Caday 7. Ramil Rivas Gaisano
3. Rey Cayusa 8. Dibangkita Magandang
4. Avelino Chua 9. Martin Olivero Pelarion
5. Henry Gadis Coubeta 10. Flordicante Martin Piligro
after which said accused thereafter escaped from the scene of the incident, leaving behind
the victims afore-enumerated helpless.
Contrary to Article 248, in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code.

The evidence for the prosecution disclose that the Special Counter Insurgency Operation
Unit Training held at Camp Damilag, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, started on 1 September
1995 and was to end on 15 October 1995. The last phase of the training was the
"endurance run" from said Camp to Camp Alagar, Cagayan de Oro City. The run on 5
October 1995 started at 2:20 a.m. The PNP trainees were divided into three columns: the
first and second of which had 22 trainees each, and the third had 21. The trainees were
wearing black T-shirts, black short pants, and green and black combat shoes. At the start
of the run, a Hummer vehicle tailed the jogging trainees. When they reached Alae, the
driver of the Hummer vehicle was instructed to dispatch advanced security at strategic
locations in Carmen Hill. Since the jogging trainees were occupying the right lane of the
highway, two rear security guards were assigned to each rear column. Their duty was to
jog backwards facing the oncoming vehicles and give hand signals for other vehicles to
take the left lane.[1]
Prosecution witnesses Lemuel Y. Pangca and Weldon Sacro testified that they were
assigned as rear guards of the first column. They recalled that from Alae to Maitum
Highway, Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, about 20 vehicles passed them, all of which
slowed down and took the left portion of the road when signaled to do so.[2]
While they were negotiating Maitum Highway, they saw an Isuzu Elf truck coming at
high speed towards them. The vehicle lights were in the high beam. At a distance of 100
meters, the rear security guards started waving their hands for the vehicle to take the
other side of the road, but the vehicle just kept its speed, apparently ignoring their signals
and coming closer and closer to them. Realizing that the vehicle would hit them, the rear
guards told their co-trainees to "retract." The guards forthwith jumped in different
directions. Lemuel and Weldon saw their co-trainees being hit by the said vehicle, falling
like dominoes one after the other. Some were thrown, and others were overrun by the
vehicle. The driver did not reduce his speed even after hitting the first and second
columns. The guards then stopped oncoming vehicles to prevent their comrades from
being hit again.[3]
The trial court judge, together with the City Prosecutor, GLENN and his counsel,
conducted an ocular inspection of the place where the incident happened. They then
proceeded to inspect the Isuzu Elf at the police station. The City Prosecutor manifested,
thus:
The vehicle which we are now inspecting at the police station is the same vehicle which
[was] involved in the October 5, 1995 incident, an Isuzu Elf vehicle colored light blue
with strips painting along the side colored orange and yellow as well as in front. We
further manifest that ... the windshield was totally damaged and 2/3 portion of the front
just below the windshield was heavily dented as a consequence of the impact. The lower
portion was likewise damaged more particularly in the radiator guard. The bumper of said
vehicle was likewise heavily damaged in fact there is a cut of the plastic used as a
bumper; that the right side of the headlight was likewise totally damaged. The front
signal light, right side was likewise damaged. The side mirror was likewise totally
damaged. The height of the truck from the ground to the lower portion of the windshield
is 5 ft. and the height of the truck on the front level is 5 ft.[4]
PO3 Jose Cabugwas testified that he was assigned at the Investigation Division at
Precinct 6, Cagayan de Oro City, and that at 4 a.m. of 5 October 1995, several members
of the PNP came to their station and reported that they had been bumped by a certain
vehicle. Immediately after receiving the report, he and two other policemen proceeded to
the traffic scene to conduct an ocular inspection. Only bloodstains and broken particles of
the hit-and-run vehicle remained on the highway. They did not see any brake marks on
the highway, which led him to conclude that the brakes of the vehicle had not been
applied. The policemen measured the bloodstains and found them to be 70 ft. long.[5]
GLENN's version of the events that transpired that evening is as follows:
At about 10:30 p.m. of 4 October 1995, he was asked by his friend Enting Galindez and
the latter's fellow band members to provide them with transportation, if possible an Isuzu
Forward, that would bring their band instruments, band utilities and band members from
Macasandig and Corrales, Cagayan de Oro City, to Balingoan. From there, they were
supposed to be taken to Mambajao, Camiguin, to participate in the San Miguel-sponsored
"Sabado Nights" of the Lanzones Festival from 5-7 October 1995. It was the thirteenth
time that Enting had asked such a favor from him.[6] Since the arrangement was to fetch
Galindez and his group at 4:00 a.m. of 5 October 1995, GLENN immediately went to
Cugman, Cagayan de Oro City, to get his Isuzu Elf truck. After which, he proceeded back
to his house at Bugo, Cagayan de Oro City, and told his wife that he would go to
Bukidnon to get his aunt's Isuzu Forward truck because the twenty band members and
nine utilities and band instruments could not be accommodated in the Isuzu Elf truck.
Three of his friends asked to go along, namely, Roldan Paltonag, Andot Peña, and a
certain Akut.[7]
After leaving GLENN's house, the group decided to stop at Celebrity Plaza Restaurant.
GLENN saw his "kumpare" Danilo Cosin and the latter's wife, and joined them at the
table. GLENN finished three bottles of pale pilsen beer. When the Cosin spouses left,
GLENN joined his travelling companions at their table. The group left at 12:00 midnight
for Bukidnon. The environment was dark and foggy, with occasional rains. It took them
sometime looking for the Isuzu Forward truck. Finally, they saw the truck in Agusan
Canyon. Much to their disappointment, the said truck had mechanical problems. Hence,
GLENN decided to go back to Cagayan de Oro City to tell Enting that they would use the
Isuzu Elf truck instead.[8]
GLENN drove slowly because the road was slippery. The vicinity was dark: there was no
moon or star; neither were there lampposts. From the Alae junction, he and his
companions used the national highway, traversing the right lane going to Cagayan de Oro
City. At the vicinity of Mambatangan junction, as the Elf was negotiating a left curve
going slightly downward, GLENN saw a very bright and glaring light coming from the
opposite direction of the national highway. GLENN blinked his headlights as a signal for
the other driver to switch his headlights from bright to dim. GLENN switched his own
lights from bright to dim and reduced his speed from 80 to 60 kilometers per hour. It was
only when the vehicles were at a distance of 10 to 15 meters from each other that the
other car's headlights were switched from bright to dim. As a result, GLENN found it
extremely hard to adjust from high brightness to sudden darkness.[9]
It was while the truck was still cruising at a speed of 60 km./hr., and immediately after
passing the oncoming vehicle, that GLENN suddenly heard and felt bumping thuds. At
the sound of the first bumping thuds, GLENN put his right foot on the brake pedal. But
the impact was so sudden that he was astonished and afraid. He was trembling and could
not see what were being bumped. At the succeeding bumping thuds, he was not able to
pump the brake, nor did he notice that his foot was pushing the pedal. He returned to his
senses only when one of his companions woke up and said to him: "Gard, it seems we
bumped on something. Just relax, we might all die." Due to its momentum, the Elf
continued on its track and was able to stop only when it was already very near the next
curve.[10]
GLENN could not distinguish in the darkness what he had hit, especially since the right
headlights of the truck had been busted upon the first bumping thuds. In his confusion
and fear, he immediately proceeded home. GLENN did not report the incident to the
Puerto Police Station because he was not aware of what exactly he had hit. It was only
when he reached his house that he noticed that the grill of the truck was broken; the side
mirror and round mirror, missing; and the windshield, splintered. Two hours later, he
heard on Bombo Radyo that an accident had occurred, and he realized that it was the PNP
group that he had hit. GLENN surrendered that same day to Governor Emano. [11]
The defense also presented Crescente Galindez, as well as Shirley Almazan of the PAG-
ASA Office, Cagayan de Oro City. The former testified that when he went to GLENN's
house at about 10:00 p.m. of 4 October 1995, there was heavy rain; and at 12:00
midnight, the rain was moderate. He corroborated GLENN's testimony that he
(Crescente) went to GLENN's house that evening in order to hire a truck that would bring
the band instruments, band utilities and band members from Cagayan de Oro to Camiguin
for the Lanzones Festival.[12] Almazan, on the other hand, testified that based on an
observed weather report within the vicinity of Cagayan de Oro City, there was rain from
8:00 p.m. of October 1995 to 2:00 a.m. the next day; and the sky was overcast from 11:00
p.m. of 4 October 1995 to 5:00 a.m. of 5 October 1995. What she meant by "overcast" is
that there was no break in the sky; and, definitely, the moon and stars could not be seen.
[13]
The prosecution presented rebuttal witness Danilo Olarita whose house was just 100
meters away from the place where the incident occurred. He testified that he was
awakened on that fateful night by a series of loud thuds. Thereafter, a man came to his
house and asked for a glass of water, claiming to have been hit by a vehicle. Danilo
further stated that the weather at the time was fair, and that the soil was dry and not
muddy.[14]
In its decision of 26 August 1997, the trial court convicted GLENN of the complex crime
of multiple murder, multiple frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder, with the
use of motor vehicle as the qualifying circumstance. It sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of death and ordered him to indemnify each group of the heirs of the deceased in
the amount of P75,000; each of the victims of frustrated murder in the amount of
P30,000; and each of the victims of attempted murder in the amount of P10,000.
Hence, this automatic review, wherein GLENN contends that the trial court erred (a) in
finding that he caused the Isuzu Elf truck to hit the trainees even after seeing the rear
guards waving and the PNP trainees jogging; (b) in finding that he caused the truck to run
even faster after noticing the first thuds; and (c) in finding that he could still have avoided
the accident from a distance of 150 meters, despite the bright and glaring light from the
oncoming vehicle.
In convicting GLENN, the trial court found that "the accused out of mischief and dare-
devilness [sic], in the exhilaration of the night breeze and having dr[u]nk at least three
bottles of beer earlier, merely wanted to scare the rear guard[s] and see them scamper
away as they saw him and his vehicle coming at them to ram them down."[15]
Likewise, the OSG posits that "the evil motive of the appellant in injuring the jogging
trainees was probably brought by the fact that he had dr[u]nk a total of three (3) bottles
of beer earlier before the incident."[16]
Not to be outdone, the defense also advances another speculation, i.e., "the possibility
that [GLENN] could have fallen asleep out of sheer fatigue in that unholy hour of 3:30 in
the early morning, and thus was not able to stop his Isuzu Elf truck when the bumping
thuds were occurring in rapid succession; and after he was able to wake up upon hearing
the shout of his companions, it was already too late, as the bumping thuds had already
occurred."[17]
Considering that death penalty is involved, the trial court should have been more
scrupulous in weighing the evidence. If we are to subscribe to the trial court's finding that
GLENN must have merely wanted to scare the rear guards, then intent to kill was
wanting. In the absence of a criminal intent, he cannot be held liable for an intentional
felony. All reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate negligence, and not criminal intent,
should be indulged.[18]
From the convergence of circumstances, we are inclined to believe that the tragic event
was more a product of reckless imprudence than of a malicious intent on GLENN's part.
First, as testified to by prosecution rebuttal witness Danilo Olarita, the place of the
incident was "very dark," as there was no moon. And according to PAG-ASA's observed
weather report within the vicinity of Cagayan de Oro City covering a radius of 50
kilometers, at the time the event took place, the sky was overcast, i.e., there was
absolutely no break in the thick clouds covering the celestial dome globe; hence, there
was no way for the moon and stars to be seen. Neither were there lampposts that
illuminated the highway.
Second, the jogging trainees and the rear guards were all wearing black T-shirts, black
short pants, and black and green combat shoes, which made them hard to make out on
that dark and cloudy night. The rear guards had neither reflectorized vests or gloves nor
flashlights in giving hand signals.
Third, GLENN was driving on the proper side of the road, the right lane. On the other
hand, the jogging trainees were occupying the wrong lane, the same lane as GLENN's
vehicle was traversing. Worse, they were facing the same direction as GLENN's truck
such that their backs were turned towards the oncoming vehicles from behind.
Fourth, no convincing evidence was presented to rebut GLENN's testimony that he had
been momentarily blinded by the very bright and glaring lights of the oncoming vehicle
at the opposite direction as his truck rounded the curve. He must have been still reeling
from the blinding effect of the lights coming from the other vehicle when he plowed into
the group of police trainees.
Indeed, as pointed out by appellant, instinct tells one `to stop or swerve to a safe place the
moment he sees a cow, dog, or cat on the road, in order to avoid bumping or killing the
same"; and more so if the one on the road is a person. It would therefore be inconceivable
for GLENN, then a young college graduate with a pregnant wife and three very young
children who were dependent on him for support, to have deliberately hit the group with
his truck.
The conclusion of the trial court and the OSG that GLENN intentionally rammed and hit
the jogging trainees was premised on the assumption that despite the first bumping thuds,
he continued to accelerate his vehicle instead of applying his brakes, as shown by the
absence of brake marks or skid marks along the traffic scene.
For its part, the defense attributed the continuous movement of GLENN's vehicle to the
confluence of the following factors:
1. The Isuzu Elf truck, a huge vehicle, was moving fast that even if the brakes were
applied the truck would have still proceeded further on account of its momentum,
albeit at a reduced speed, and would have stopped only after a certain distance.
2. The national highway, from Alae to Puerto, Cagayan de Oro City, was made of
fine and smooth asphalt, free from obstructions on the road such as potholes or
excavations. Moreover, the highway was going a little bit downward, more
particularly from the first curve to the place of incident. Hence, it was easier and
faster to traverse a distance of "20 to 25 meters which was the approximate
aggregate distance" from the first elements up to the 22nd or 23rd elements of the
columns.
3. The weight of each of the trainees (the average of which could be 50 kilograms
only) could hardly make an impact on the 3,900 kilograms truck, which was
moving at a speed ranging from 60 to 70 kilometers per hour.
4. Considering that the width of the truck from the right to the left tires was wide and
the under chassis was elevated, the truck could just pass over two persons lying
flat on the ground without its rubber tires running over the bodies. Thus, GLENN
would not notice any destabilization of the rubber tires.
5. Since the police trainees were jogging in the same direction as the truck was
proceeding, the forward movements constituted a force parallel to the momentum
of the forward-moving truck such that there was even much lesser force resisting
the said ongoing momentum.
It is a well-entrenched rule that if the inculpatory facts are capable of two or more
explanations -- one consistent with the innocence or lesser degree of liability of the
accused, and the other consistent with his guilt or graver responsibility -- the Court
should adopt the explanation which is more favorable to the accused. [19]
We are convinced that the incident, tragic though it was in light of the number of persons
killed and seriously injured, was an accident and not an intentional felony. It is significant
to note that there is no shred of evidence that GLENN had an axe to grind against the
police trainees that would drive him into deliberately hitting them with intent to kill.
Although proof of motive is not indispensable to a conviction especially where the

assailant is positively identified, such proof is, nonetheless, important in determining
which of two conflicting theories of the incident is more likely to be true.[20] Thus,
in People v. Godinez,[21] this Court said that the existence of a motive on the part of the
accused becomes decisive in determining the probability or credibility of his version that
the shooting was purely accidental.
Neither is there any showing of "a political angle of a leftist-sponsored massacre of police
elements disguised in a vehicular accident."[22] Even if there be such evidence, i.e., that
the motive of the killing was in furtherance of a rebellion movement, GLENN cannot be
convicted because if such were the case, the proper charge would be rebellion, and not
murder.[23]
GLENN's offense is in failing to apply the brakes, or to swerve his vehicle to the left or to
a safe place the moment he heard and felt the first bumping thuds. Had he done so, many
trainees would have been spared.
We have once said:

A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to
be cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring
punishment. He is responsible for such results as anyone might foresee and for acts which
no one would have performed except through culpable abandon. Otherwise his own
person, rights and property, and those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all
manner of danger and injury.[24]
The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or
damage results to the person or property of another is this: Could a prudent man, in the
position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person
injured as a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the law
imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard
against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence.
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this
prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. [25]
GLENN showed an inexcusable lack of precaution. Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code states that reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or
failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into
consideration (1) his employment or occupation; (2) his degree of intelligence; (4) his
physical condition; and (3) other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
GLENN, being then a young college graduate and an experienced driver, should have
known to apply the brakes or swerve to a safe place immediately upon hearing the first
bumping thuds to avoid further hitting the other trainees. By his own testimony, it was
established that the road was slippery and slightly going downward; and, worse, the place
of the incident was foggy and dark. He should have observed due care in accordance with
the conduct of a reasonably prudent man, such as by slackening his speed, applying his
brakes, or turning to the left side even if it would mean entering the opposite lane (there
being no evidence that a vehicle was coming from the opposite direction). It is highly
probable that he was driving at high speed at the time. And even if he was driving within
the speed limits, this did not mean that he was exercising due care under the existing
circumstances and conditions at the time.
Considering that the incident was not a product of a malicious intent but rather the result
of a single act of reckless driving, GLENN should be held guilty of the complex crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less
serious physical injuries.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same
to be applied in its maximum period. Since Article 48 speaks of felonies, it is applicable
to crimes through negligence in view of the definition of felonies in Article 3 as "acts or
omissions punishable by law" committed either by means of deceit (dolo) or fault
(culpa).[26] In Reodica v. Court of Appeals,[27] we ruled that if a reckless, imprudent, or
negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is
committed. Thus, in Lapuz v. Court of Appeals,[28] the accused was convicted, in
conformity with Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, of the complex crime of
"homicide with serious physical injuries and damage to property through reckless
imprudence," and was sentenced to a single penalty of imprisonment, instead of the two
penalties imposed by the trial court. Also, in Soriao v. Court of Appeals,[29] the accused
was convicted of the complex crime of "multiple homicide with damage to property
through reckless imprudence" for causing a motor boat to capsize, thereby drowning to
death its twenty-eight passengers.
The slight physical injuries caused by GLENN to the ten other victims through reckless
imprudence, would, had they been intentional, have constituted light felonies. Being light
felonies, which are not covered by Article 48, they should be treated and punished as
separate offenses. Separate informations should have, therefore, been filed.
It must be noted that only one information (for multiple murder, multiple frustrated
murder and multiple attempted murder) was filed with the trial court. However, nothing
appears in the record that GLENN objected to the multiplicity of the information in a
motion to quash before his arraignment. Hence, he is deemed to have waived such defect.
[30]
Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, when two or more offenses are
charged in a single complaint or information and the accused fails to object to it before
trial, the court may convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved,
and impose on him the penalty for each of them.
Now, we come to the penalty. Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, any person
who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would
constitute a grave felony shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its medium period; and if it would have constituted a light
felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed. The last
paragraph thereof provides that the penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed upon
the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in his
hand to give. This failure to render assistance to the victim, therefore, constitutes a
qualifying circumstance because the presence thereof raises the penalty by one degree.
[31]
Moreover, the fifth paragraph thereof provides that in the imposition of the penalty,
the court shall exercise its sound discretion without regard to the rules prescribed in
Article 64. Elsewise stated, in felonies through imprudence or negligence, modifying
circumstances need not be considered in the imposition of the penalty. [32]
In the case at bar, it has been alleged in the information and proved during the trial that
GLENN "escaped from the scene of the incident, leaving behind the victims." It being
crystal clear that GLENN failed to render aid to the victims, the penalty provided for
under Article 365 shall be raised by one degree. Hence, for reckless imprudence resulting
in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries, the
penalty would be prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
medium period. Applying Article 48, the maximum of said penalty, which is prision
mayor in its medium period, should be imposed. For the separate offenses of reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, GLENN may be sentenced to suffer, for
each count, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period.
Although it was established through the testimonies of prosecution witness Lemuel

Pangca[33] and of GLENN that the latter surrendered to Governor Emano of Misamis
Oriental, such mitigating circumstance need not be considered pursuant to the aforestated
fifth paragraph of Article 365.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, GLENN may be sentenced to suffer an

indeterminate penalty whose minimum is within the range of the penalty next lower in
degree to that prescribed for the offense, and whose maximum is that which could
properly be imposed taking into account the modifying circumstances. Hence, for the
complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious
physical injuries and less serious physical injuries, qualified by his failure to render
assistance to the victims, he may be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging
from arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period,
as minimum, to prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum. As to the crimes of
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, since the maximum term for
each count is only two months the Indeterminate Sentence Law will not apply.
As far as the award of damages is concerned, we find a necessity to modify the same.
Conformably with current jurisprudence,[34] we reduce the trial court's award of death
indemnity from P75,000 to P50,000 for each group of heirs of the trainees killed.
Likewise, for lack of factual basis, we delete the awards of P30,000 to each of those who
suffered serious physical injuries and of P10,000 to each of those who suffered minor
physical injuries.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro
City, is hereby SET ASIDE, and another one is rendered holding herein accused-
appellant GLENN DE LOS SANTOS guilty beyond reasonable doubt of (1) the complex
crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical
injuries and less serious physical injuries, and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years
of prision mayor, as maximum; and (2) ten (10) counts of reckless imprudence resulting
in slight physical injuries and sentencing him, for each count, to the penalty of two (2)
months of arresto mayor. Furthermore, the awards of death indemnity for each group of
heirs of the trainees killed are reduced to P50,000; and the awards in favor of the other
victims are deleted. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 152644, February 10, 2006 ]
JOHN ERIC LONEY, STEVEN PAUL REID AND PEDRO B. HERNANDEZ,
PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review[1] of the Decision[2] dated 5 November 2001 and the
Resolution dated 14 March 2002 of the Court of Appeals. The 5 November 2001
Decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court, Boac, Marinduque, Branch 94,
in a suit to quash Informations filed against petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul
Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez ("petitioners"). The 14 March 2002 Resolution denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez are the President
and Chief Executive Officer, Senior Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining
Operations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corporation ("Marcopper"), a corporation
engaged in mining in the province of Marinduque
Marcopper had been storing tailings[3] from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian,
Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and
Makalupnit rivers. It appears that Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the tunnel's
end. On 24 March 1994, tailings gushed out of or near the tunnel's end. In a few days,
the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and
Makalupnit rivers.
In August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged petitioners in the

Municipal Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque ("MTC") with violation of Article 91(B),
[4]
sub-paragraphs 5 and 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1067 or the Water Code of the
Philippines ("PD 1067"),[5] Section 8[6] of Presidential Decree No. 984 or the National
Pollution Control Decree of 1976 ("PD 984"),[7] Section 108[8] of Republic Act No. 7942
or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 ("RA 7942"),[9] and Article 365[10] of the Revised
Penal Code ("RPC") for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property. [11]
Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the following grounds: (1) the
Informations were "duplicitous" as the Department of Justice charged more than one
offense for a single act; (2) petitioners John Eric Loney and Steven Paul Reid were not
yet officers of Marcopper when the incident subject of the Informations took place; and
(3) the Informations contain allegations which constitute legal excuse or justification.
The Ruling of the MTC
In its Joint Order of 16 January 1997 ("Joint Order"), the MTC[12] initially deferred ruling
on petitioners' motion for lack of "indubitable ground for the quashing of the
[I]nformations x x x." The MTC scheduled petitioners' arraignment in February 1997.
However, on petitioners' motion, the MTC issued a Consolidated Order on 28 April 1997
("Consolidated Order"), granting partial reconsideration to its Joint Order and quashing
the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. The MTC maintained the
Informations for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC. The MTC held:
[T]he 12 Informations have common allegations of pollutants pointing to "mine tailings"
which were precipitately discharged into the Makulapnit and Boac Rivers due to breach
caused on the Tapian drainage/tunnel due to negligence or failure to institute adequate
measures to prevent pollution and siltation of the Makulapnit and Boac River systems,
the very term and condition required to be undertaken under the Environmental
Compliance Certificate issued on April 1, 1990.
The allegations in the informations point to same set [sic] of evidence required to prove
the single fact of pollution constituting violation of the Water Code and the Pollution
Law which are the same set of evidence necessary to prove the same single fact of
pollution, in proving the elements constituting violation of the conditions of ECC, issued
pursuant to the Philippine Mining Act. In both instances, the terms and conditions of the
Environmental Compliance Certificate were allegedly violated. In other words, the same
set of evidence is required in proving violations of the three (3) special laws.
After carefully analyzing and weighing the contending arguments of the parties and after
taking into consideration the applicable laws and jurisprudence, the Court is convinced
that as far as the three (3) aforesaid laws are concerned, only the Information for
[v]iolation of Philippine Mining Act should be maintained. In other words, the
Informations for [v]iolation of Anti-Pollution Law (PD 984) and the Water Code (PD
1067) should be dismissed/quashed because the elements constituting the aforesaid
violations are absorbed by the same elements which constitute violation of the Philippine
Mining Act (RA 7942).
Therefore, x x x Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-44, 96-45 and 96-46 for [v]iolation of the
Water Code; and Criminal Case[] Nos. 96-47, 96-48 and 96-49 for [v]iolation of the
Anti-Pollution Law x x x are hereby DISMISSED or QUASHED and Criminal Case[]
Nos. 96-50, 96-51 and 96-52 for [v]iolation of the Philippine Mining Act are hereby
retained to be tried on the merits.
The Information for [v]iolation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code should also be
maintained and heard in a full blown trial because the common accusation therein is
reckless imprudence resulting to [sic] damage to property. It is the damage to property
which the law punishes not the negligent act of polluting the water system. The
prosecution for the [v]iolation of Philippine Mining Act is not a bar to the prosecution for
reckless imprudence resulting to [sic] damage to property.[13]
The MTC re-scheduled petitioners' arraignment on the remaining charges on 28 and 29
May 1997. In the hearing of 28 May 1997, petitioners manifested that they were willing
to be arraigned on the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC but not on the
charge for violation of RA 7942 as they intended to appeal the Consolidated Order in so
far as it maintained the Informations for that offense. After making of record petitioners'
manifestation, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and ordered the entry of "not
guilty" pleas on the charges for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC.
Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court,
Boac, Marinduque, assailing that portion of the Consolidated Order maintaining the
Informations for violation of RA 7942. Petitioners' petition was raffled to Branch 94. For
its part, public respondent filed an ordinary appeal with the same court assailing that
portion of the Consolidated Order quashing the Informations for violation of PD 1067
and PD 984. Public respondent's appeal was raffled to Branch 38. On public respondent's
motion, Branch 38 ordered public respondent's appeal consolidated with petitioners'
petition in Branch 94.
The Ruling of Branch 94
In its Resolution[14] of 20 March 1998, Branch 94 granted public respondent's appeal but
denied petitioners' petition. Branch 94 set aside the Consolidated Order in so far as it
quashed the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984 and ordered those charges
reinstated. Branch 94 affirmed the Consolidated Order in all other respects. Branch 94
held:
After a careful perusal of the laws concerned, this court is of the opinion that there can be
no absorption by one offense of the three other offenses, as [the] acts penalized by these
laws are separate and distinct from each other. The elements of proving each violation
are not the same with each other. Concededly, the single act of dumping mine tailings
which resulted in the pollution of the Makulapnit and Boac rivers was the basis for the
information[s] filed against the accused each charging a distinct offense. But it is also a
well-established rule in this jurisdiction that –
"A single act may offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of
law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other
does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not
bar prosecution under the other. x x x."
x x x x
[T]he different laws involve cannot absorb one another as the elements of each crime are
different from one another. Each of these laws require [sic] proof of an additional fact or
element which the other does not although they stemmed from a single act.[15]
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging that Branch 94
acted with grave abuse of discretion because (1) the Informations for violation of PD
1067, PD 984, RA 7942 and the Article 365 of the RPC "proceed from and are based on a
single act or incident of polluting the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine
tailings" and (2) the duplicitous nature of the Informations contravenes the ruling
in People v. Relova.[16] Petitioners further contended that since the acts complained of in
the charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942 are "the very same acts
complained of" in the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC, the latter absorbs
the former. Hence, petitioners should only be prosecuted for violation of Article 365 of
the RPC.[17]
In its Decision of 5 November 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed Branch 94's ruling.
The appellate court held:
The records of the case disclose that petitioners filed a motion to quash the
aforementioned Informations for being duplicitous in nature. Section 3 of Rule 117 of
the Revised Rules of Court specifically provides the grounds upon which an information
may be quashed. x x x
x x x x
[D]uplicity of Informations is not among those included in x x x [Section 3, Rule 117].

x x x x
We now go to petitioners' claim that the resolution of the public respondent contravened
the doctrine laid down in People vs. Relova for being violative of their right against
multiple prosecutions.

In the said case, the Supreme Court found the People's argument with respect to the
variances in the mens rea of the two offenses being charged to be correct. The Court,
however, decided the case in the context of the second sentence of Article IV (22) of the
1973 Constitution (now under Section 21 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution), rather
than the first sentence of the same section. x x x
x x x x
[T]he doctrine laid down in the Relova case does not squarely apply to the case at Bench
since the Informations filed against the petitioners are for violation of four separate and
distinct laws which are national in character.

xxxx
This Court firmly agrees in the public respondent's understanding that the laws by which
the petitioners have been [charged] could not possibly absorb one another as the elements
of each crime are different. Each of these laws require [sic] proof of an additional fact or
element which the other does not, although they stemmed from a single act. x x x
xxxx
[T]his Court finds that there is not even the slightest indicia of evidence that would give
rise to any suspicion that public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in reversing the Municipal Trial Court's
quashal of the Informations against the petitioners for violation of P.D. 1067 and P.D.
984. This Court equally finds no error in the trial court's denial of the petitioner's motion
to quash R.A. 7942 and Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.[18]
Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied their motion in its
Resolution of 14 March 2002.

Petitioners raise the following alleged errors of the Court of Appeals:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A R[E]VERSIBLE ERROR IN

MAINTAINING THE CHARGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE PHILIPPINE
MINING ACT (R.A. 7942) AND REINSTATING THE CHARGES FOR
VIOLATION OF THE WATER CODE (P.D. 1067) AND POLLUTION
CONTROL LAW (P.D. 984), CONSIDERING THAT:
A. THE INFORMATIONS FOR VIOLATION OF THE WATER CODE
(P.D. 1067), THE POLLUTION CONTROL LAW (P.D. 984), THE
PHILIPPINE MINING ACT (R.A. 7942) AND ARTICLE 365 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE PROCEED FROM AND ARE BASED ON A
SINGLE ACT OR INCIDENT OF POLLUTING THE BOAC AND
MAKULAPNIT RIVERS THRU DUMPING OF MINE
TAILINGS.
B. THE PROSECUTION OF PETITIONERS FOR DUPLICITOUS AND

MULTIPLE CHARGES CONTRAVENES THE DOCTRINE LAID
DOWN IN PEOPLE VS. RELOVA, 148 SCRA 292 [1986] THAT "AN
ACCUSED SHOULD NOT BE HARASSED BY MULTIPLE
PROSECUTIONS FOR OFFENSES WHICH THOUGH DIFFERENT
FROM ONE ANOTHER ARE NONETHELESS EACH CONSTITUTED
BY A COMMON SET OR OVERLAPPING SETS OF TECHNICAL
ELEMENTS."

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN

RULING THAT THE ELEMENT OF LACK OF NECESSARY OR
ADEQUATE PRECAUTION, NEGLIGENCE, RECKLESSNESS AND
IMPRUDENCE UNDER ARTICLE 356 [sic] OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE AMBIT OF ANY OF THE ELEMENTS OF
THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE WATER CODE, POLLUTION
CONTROL LAW AND PHILIPPINE MINING ACT CHARGED AGAINST
PETITIONERS[.][19]
The Issues
The petition raises these issues:

(1) Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for
duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage
to Property should stand; and

(2) Whether Branch 94's ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, contravenes People
v. Relova.
No Duplicity of Charges in the Present Case

Duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or information charges more than
one offense, as Section 13 of Rule 110[20] of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly
states:
Duplicity of offense. – A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except
only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various
offenses.
In short, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information
charges more than one offense.[21]
Under Section 3(e), Rule 117[22] of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, duplicity of
offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the Information. The Rules prohibit
the filing of such Information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his defense.
[23]
Here, however, the prosecution charged each petitioner with four offenses, with each
Information charging only one offense. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity
of charges as a ground to quash the Informations. On this score alone, the petition
deserves outright denial.
The Filing of Several Charges is Proper
Petitioners contend that they should be charged with one offense only — Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property — because (1) all the charges filed against
them "proceed from and are based on a single act or incident of polluting the Boac and
Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine tailings" and (2) the charge for violation of
Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs" the other charges since the element of "ack of necessary
or adequate protection, negligence, recklessness and imprudence" is common among
them.
The contention has no merit.
As early as the start of the last century, this Court had ruled that a single act or incident
might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus
justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one offense.[24] The only limit to
this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for "the same offense."[25] In People v. Doriquez,[26] we held that two (or
more) offenses arising from the same act are not "the same" —
x x x if one provision [of law] requires proof of an additional fact or element which the
other does not, x x x. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same
code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution
of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves
some important act which is not an essential element of the other.[27] (Emphasis
supplied)
Here, double jeopardy is not at issue because not all of its elements are present.
[28]
However, for the limited purpose of controverting petitioners' claim that they should
be charged with one offense only, we quote with approval Branch 94's comparative
analysis of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942, and Article 365 of the RPC showing that in each
of these laws on which petitioners were charged, there is one essential element not
required of the others, thus:
In P.D. 1067 (Philippines Water Code), the additional element to be established is the
dumping of mine tailings into the Makulapnit River and the entire Boac River System
without prior permit from the authorities concerned. The gravamen of the offense here is
the absence of the proper permit to dump said mine tailings. This element is not
indispensable in the prosecution for violation of PD 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), [RA] 7942
(Philippine Mining Act) and Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code. One can be validly
prosecuted for violating the Water Code even in the absence of actual pollution, or even
[if] it has complied with the terms of its Environmental Compliance Certificate, or
further, even [if] it did take the necessary precautions to prevent damage to property.
In P.D. 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), the additional fact that must be proved is the existence
of actual pollution. The gravamen is the pollution itself. In the absence of any pollution,
the accused must be exonerated under this law although there was unauthorized dumping
of mine tailings or lack of precaution on its part to prevent damage to property.
In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that must be established is the
willful violation and gross neglect on the part of the accused to abide by the terms and
conditions of the Environmental Compliance Certificate, particularly that the Marcopper
should ensure the containment of run-off and silt materials from reaching the Mogpog
and Boac Rivers. If there was no violation or neglect, and that the accused satisfactorily
proved [sic] that Marcopper had done everything to ensure containment of the run-off
and silt materials, they will not be liable. It does not follow, however, that they cannot be
prosecuted under the Water Code, Anti-Pollution Law and the Revised Penal Code
because violation of the Environmental Compliance Certificate is not an essential
element of these laws.
On the other hand, the additional element that must be established in Art. 365 of the
Revised Penal Code is the lack of necessary or adequate precaution, negligence,
recklessness and imprudence on the part of the accused to prevent damage to property.
This element is not required under the previous laws. Unquestionably, it is different from
dumping of mine tailings without permit, or causing pollution to the Boac river system,
much more from violation or neglect to abide by the terms of the Environmental
Compliance Certificate. Moreover, the offenses punished by special law are mal[a]
prohibita in contrast with those punished by the Revised Penal Code which are mala in
se.[29]
Consequently, the filing of the multiple charges against petitioners, although based on the
same incident, is consistent with settled doctrine.

On petitioners' claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs" the
charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942, suffice it to say that a mala in
se felony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot
absorb mala prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942).
What makes the former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what
makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting them.
People v. Relova not in Point
Petitioners reiterate their contention in the Court of Appeals that their prosecution
contravenes this Court's ruling in People v. Relova. In particular, petitioners cite the
Court's statement in Relova that the law seeks to prevent harassment of the accused by
"multiple prosecutions for offenses which though different from one another are
nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical elements."
This contention is also without merit.
The issue in Relova is whether the act of the Batangas Acting City Fiscal in charging one
Manuel Opulencia ("Opulencia") with theft of electric power under the RPC, after the
latter had been acquitted of violating a City Ordinance penalizing the unauthorized
installation of electrical wiring, violated Opulencia's right against double jeopardy. We
held that it did, not because the offenses punished by those two laws were the same but
because the act giving rise to the charges was punished by an ordinance and a national
statute, thus falling within the proscription against multiple prosecutions for the same act
under the second sentence in Section 22, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, now
Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. We held:
The petitioner concludes that:

"The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance [of Batangas City] is not
the same as theft of electricity [under the Revised Penal Code]; that the second
offense is not an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof and that the second
offense is not necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information."
The above argument[ ] made by the petitioner [is] of course correct. This is clear
both from the express terms of the constitutional provision involved – which reads as
follows:
"No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a
bar to another prosecution for the same act." x x x
and from our case law on this point. The basic difficulty with the petitioner's position
is that it must be examined, not under the terms of the first sentence of Article IV
(22) of the 1973 Constitution, but rather under the second sentence of the same
section. The first sentence of Article IV (22) sets forth the general rule: the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for an
offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution,
although both the first and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts.
The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the general
proposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available
although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense
charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code,
provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. x x
x[30] (Italicization in the original; boldfacing supplied)
Thus, Relova is no authority for petitioners' claim against multiple prosecutions based on
a single act not only because the question of double jeopardy is not at issue here, but also
because, as the Court of Appeals held, petitioners are being prosecuted for an act or
incident punished by four national statutes and not by an ordinance and a national statute.
In short, petitioners, if ever, fall under the first sentence of Section 21, Article III which
prohibits multiple prosecution for the same offense, and not, as in Relova, for offenses
arising from the same incident.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 5 November

2001 and the Resolution dated 14 March 2002 of the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. Nos. 113513-14, August 23, 1995 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JIMMY
CONTE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
A snake! That is how people call a person who bites the hand that feeds him or
who commits a grievous wrong against another to whom he owes a debt of gratitude.
That is probably how Bernardo Crisostomo would call his farm helper, accused-appellant
Jimmy Conte, who allegedly raped the wife and kidnapped and illegally detained the
two children of the former.
Jimmy Conte was charged with serious illegal detention with rape in an information [1] in
Criminal Case No. 9006 and with kidnapping with serious illegal detention in an
information[2] in Criminal Case No. 9007 which were filed on 3 October 1990 with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Palawan in Puerto Princesa City. However, upon prior
leave of court,[3] the information in Criminal Case No. 9006 was replaced by a
complaint[4] only for rape, which was signed by the offended party, Gloria Crisostomo,
and was filed on 15 February 1991. The accusatory portion of the complaint reads as
follows:
That on or about the 17th day of September, 1990, in the evening, at Barangay Jolo,
Municipality of Roxas, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused by means of force, threat and intimidation and
with lewd design, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge for several times with one GLORIA CRISOSTOMO, against her will and
consent, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On the other hand, the following is the accusatory portion of the information in Criminal
Case No. 9007:
That on or about the 17th day of September 1990, in the evening, at Barangay Jolo,
Municipality of Roxas, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, by means of force, threat and intimidation, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and detain MACRIS
CRISOSTOMO and SARAH CRISOSTOMO, both minor children, by bringing them to
Barangay San Pedro, Puerto Princesa City and later transferred to a house at Baltan
Street, Puerto Princesa City for more than five (5) days thereby depriving them of their
liberty until they were retrieved by police authorities last September 24, 1990 at Baltan
Street, Puerto Princesa City.
The cases were assigned to Branch 52 of the court below.

The evidence for the prosecution consisting mainly of the testimonies of Bernardo,
Gloria, and Macris Crisostomo discloses that appellant Jimmy Conte was a prisoner
committed to the Muntinglupa and later transferred to the Iwahig Prison and Penal
Farms in Palawan. Sometime after he was set free, or in July 1990, he went to see
Bernardo Crisostomo in New Buncag, Puerto Princesa City, and pleaded that he be given
some employment. Then and there, Bernardo hired him as a helper in the former's
coconut plantation in Barangay Jolo, Roxas, Palawan. He started working in the
plantation the following day, gathering coconuts and processing them into copra. He
was made to stay together with the other workers in a structure serving as a copra drier
located about twenty meters away from the house of the Crisostomos. [5]
Most of the time, Bernardo was in New Buncag, as he was constructing a house there.
Only his wife, Gloria, and two of their seven children — 7-year old Macris and 5-year old
Sarah — were left in their residence in Jolo. [6]
On 17 September 1990 at around 11:00 p.m., Jimmy went to the house of the
Crisostomos, sneaked into the room where Gloria and her children were sleeping, and
poked a home-made gun close to Gloria's mouth. He then forcibly stripped off Gloria's
dress and panty causing them to be torn. He pushed Gloria to the floor, threatened to
shoot her if she would make any outcry, and laid on top of her. Enveloped with fear,
Gloria could do nothing but cry. Jimmy then removed his brief and forcibly inserted his
penis into her genitalia. After consummating his lustful desires, he got up, sat down
beside Gloria, and kept watch over her and the two children. Macris was then awake,
while Sarah was still asleep. Upon seeing and hearing Macris cry loudly, Jimmy slapped
him and threatened to kill him should he make any noise. [7]
Jimmy repeated his savage act against Gloria at about 1:00 a.m. and at 4:00 a.m. the
next day, 18 September 1990.[8]
Later on that same day, Jimmy declared that somebody whom he had earlier contacted
would come to buy the carabao of the Crisostomos. He remained in the house from
morning till afternoon waiting for the purported buyer. The latter arrived at 4:00 p.m.,
paid the former the sum of P5,000.00, and took the carabao. All the while, Gloria just
kept on crying. At around 9:00 p.m., a cargo truck arrived. Jimmy took Sarah and
threatened to kill her should Gloria refuse to go with him. He then forced her and
Macris to board the vehicle. With Sarah in his arms, he seated himself beside the driver
and made Gloria and Macris sit also in the front seat of the truck. [9]
It was about 1:00 a.m. of 19 September 1990 when the truck reached Barangay San
Pedro, Puerto Princesa City. Upon Jimmy's order, Gloria and Macris alighted from the
truck. Jimmy, who was carrying Sarah, brought the Crisostomos to a place called
Garcellano Picnic Ground. After negotiating with the person on duty therein, he took
the three to a cottage inside the compound. There, he sexually ravished Gloria once in
the early morning, and again, in the evening of that day. [10]
At dusk of 20 September 1990, Jimmy brought the Crisostomos to a house in Baltan

Street, Puerto Princesa City. During their three-day stay there, he had carnal knowledge
with Gloria once in the evening and once at dawn of each day. [11]
For the whole period that they were in the hands of Jimmy, the Crisostomos were
served with meals ordered by him. [12] On 21 September 1990, Gloria managed to have
the boy who had delivered the food bring to a certain Sgt. Pilapil a letter [13] informing
him of their situation and pleading for their rescue. She instructed the boy to send it to
the CAFGU Detachment in Roxas, Palawan, through a passenger jeepney going to that
place.[14]
In the early morning of 23 September 1990, Sgt. Pilapil went to see Bernardo in his
house in New Buncag, Puerto Princesa City, and gave to the latter the aforesaid letter.
After reading the same, Bernardo proceeded to the City Police Station. A certain Sgt.
Crisanto Pantallano volunteered to help him look for his wife and children. Together,
the two went to Baltan Street, which was the address written in the letter. At about
12:00 noon, Bernardo caught sight of Jimmy sitting at the stairs of a house at No. 40
Baltan Street. Sgt. Pantallano forthwith arrested Jimmy and asked him where the
Crisostomos were. Upon being told that the three were in a room at the upper story of
the house, he went to the room and found the Crisostomos there. [15]
Appellant Jimmy Conte presented an entirely different version. He declared that he and
Gloria were lovers and that the latter planned their elopement. According to him,
sometime after he was released from the Iwahig Prison and Penal Farm, he worked as a
helper in the coconut plantation of Bernardo Crisostomo at Roxas, Palawan. He and the
other workers stayed in the copra drier near the Crisostomo's house. Gloria visited him
many times in the copra drier. At first, he did not give any malicious meaning to those
visits. One day, she sent away the three other helpers from the copra drier. In the next
instant, she approached him, undressed herself before him, and embraced him. This
culminated in carnal congress. They had since been doing it thrice each night for eight
months. In the later part of that period, they did it in the residence of the Crisostomos
in the same bed where Gloria's two children were sleeping, for then Gloria had already
been abandoned by her husband. Sometime thereafter, Gloria told him that she was
pregnant and invited him to elope, as she was afraid of her husband. They then eloped
bringing along with them her two children. While waiting for a boat bound for Luzon,
they stayed in the meantime at the Garcellano Picnic Ground at San Pedro, Puerto
Princesa, and later transferred to Baltan Street. They continued having sexual
intercourse in those places. Later, however, he was arrested by a certain Bong Amorao
and his companions, and he was then brought to the police station of Puerto Princesa.
[16]
While he was detained in jail, Gloria visited him. She even wrote him a letter,
[17]
which was handed to him in jail by the daughter of the owner of the house in Baltan
Street where they had stayed. Since he did not know how to read, he let the jail warden
read the letter for him,[18] the full text of which is as follows:
Dear Jimmy Conte,
Iniibig kita Jimmy kahit kailan man hindi kita hihiwalayan. Ikaw lang ang aking mahal
pinabayaan kasi ako ng asawa ko kaya nakagawa ako ng hindi maganda talagang
gusto kong sumama sa iyo. Sana mahalin mo rin ako tulad ng pagmamahal ko sa iyo,
hindi ka kaya magsisisi sa katandaan kong ito? Mahal na mahal kita Jimmy balikan mo
ako dito sa Jolo Roxas talagang disidido na akong sumama sa iyo Jimmy dahil lang sa
asawa kong walanghiya pinabayaan kami.
Hanggang dito na lang Jimmy, I love you!
Ang nagmamahal,
Gloria
Jimmy hindi ko sukat akalain na mahuhuli tayo sa ganong araw ngunit huwag kang
mag-alala wala kang kasalanan sa mga pangyayaring ito na naganap, dahil ito ay
kagustuhan kong lahat ang nangyari sa ating dalawa. Hindi naman kagustuhan mo ang
pangyayari na ito kong di ako ang may kasalanan. Nagawa ko ito dahil pinabayaan na
kami ng aking asawa. Ano man ang mangyari ako ang bahalang managot sa batas at
sa mata ng maykapal.
same
P.S.
Kong tungkol naman sa kalabaw na binibintang sa iyo na ikaw ang nagpabili ay hindi
totoo yon, hindi naman ikaw ang nagbinta eh. Ako naman ang nagbinta ng kalabaw
namin hindi naman ikaw. Ako ang bahalang managot ng kalabaw na bininta ko tutal
amin naman yon. At sa tutoo lang hindi mo alam iyon.
same
To boost his theory, Jimmy presented Ruben Ladines, the owner of the house at Baltan
Street where he and Gloria and her two children had stayed; Rolly Nicanor, a detainee
at the provincial jail of Palawan and a former resident of Jolo, Roxas, Palawan; and
Cipriano Sumagaysay, the jail warden.
Ruben Ladines testified that sometime in September 1990, a woman, who had
introduced herself as Mrs. Gloria Conte, came to his house and asked for a room to
rent. With her then were her two children and a man by the name of Jimmy Conte.
Upon being told that there was a vacant room at the upper story of his house, she
offered to rent it and paid a half-month advance rental. The family stayed there for
about ten days. During that period, he observed Jimmy and Gloria to be affectionate to
each other.[19]
Rolly Nicanor declared that prior to his arrest in Puerto Princesa on 18 March 1991, he
was residing at a house about ten to twenty meters away from that of the Crisostomos
in Jolo, Roxas, Palawan. Sometime in 1986, he accidentally killed a barriomate. After
that incident, he went into hiding. But, for several times, he returned to Jolo, and
during those times he was there he could see Jimmy and Gloria going together to the
coconut plantation, embracing and kissing each other. This they did from 1987 to 1989.
He also saw them elope at about 4:00 p.m. of 17 September 1990. [20]
Cipriano Sumagaysay testified that on 27 September 1990, when he arrived at the
Puerto Princesa Jail, he saw an old woman who was just about to leave the jail. He then
asked Jimmy who that woman was, and the latter replied that she was his visitor, Gloria
Crisostomo. About thirty minutes thereafter, a young lady came and gave Jimmy a
letter. Upon the latter's request, the jail warden read the letter and kept it so that it
could be used as evidence.[21]
After the conclusion of the joint trial of the two cases, the trial court rendered a joint
decision convicting the appellant in Criminal Case No. 9006 of the crime of rape on
eleven counts and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua for each crime and to pay the
complainant an indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, but acquitting him of the
charge of kidnapping with serious illegal detention in Criminal Case No. 9007 on the
ground that "the acts of taking and holding the children hostage only form part of the
threat and intimidation which the accused employed to insure realization of his carnal
designs against their mother."[22]
In this appeal, the appellant faults the trial court for (1) giving weight and credence to
the testimony of the private complainant that she was forcibly raped several times by
him and (2) finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
It is doctrinally entrenched that the trial court's evaluation of the testimony of witnesses
is generally viewed as correct and is accorded great weight on appeal, for that court had
the advantage of observing the demeanor and behavior of the witnesses while
testifying.[23] In the present case, we find no compelling reason to depart from this rule,
for our own assessment of the testimony of the complainant, Gloria Crisostomo,
discloses no fact of substance and value which the trial court overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied which, if considered, might affect the result of this case.
The appellant contends that the guilty verdict cannot be sustained because there is no
clear and convincing proof that he forced the complainant to have sexual intercourse
with him for several times. He further claims that the threat or intimidation that he
would kill the complainant and her two children was not sufficient to prevent the
complainant from putting up some resistance or struggle against his acts or from
shouting in order to get the attention of her neighbors.
We are not persuaded. Under Article 335(1) of the Revised Penal Code, rape is
committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman by using force or intimidation. The
appellant's acts of poking a gun at the complainant, ripping off her dress and
underwear, and pushing her to the floor constitute force. These acts were followed by
an intimidation that he would shoot the complainant should she make any noise. Thus:
Q And when you saw that Jimmy Conte was inside your room, what did you do?
A He poke a homemade gun on me, sir.
Q In what particular portion of your body was [sic] he poke the gun?
A Near my mouth, sir.
Q When he poke that gun on your mouth, what did he do next?
A He pulled my dress and it was torn, sir.
Q What were you wearing, by the way, that evening?
A A duster, sir.
Q When he pulled your duster and the same was torn, what did you do next?
A He pulled also my panty and it was torn, sir.
Q How about you, what did you do when he destroyed your gown and panty?
A I just cried and cried, sir.
xxx
Q You said that this Jimmy Conte pulled your gown and pulled down your panty and it
was also destroyed, what did you do next, after that?
A He pushed me and I fell down, sir.
Q You fell down where?
A On the floor, sir.
Q And when you were down on the floor, what did you do next?
A He took off his brief and then he lay on top of me, sir.
Q And when he went on top of you, what did you do?
A He held his penis and placed inside my vagina, sir.
Q What did you do when he did that?
A I just cried because the gun was beside him and he said if I make noise, he will shoot
[24]
me, sir.
From the aforequoted testimony, there is no shred of doubt that the appellant did rape
the private complainant in the evening of 17 September 1990.
But was the trial court correct in convicting the appellant of eleven counts of rape?
Notably, the single complaint filed by Gloria Crisostomo charges the appellant with
several crimes of rape,[25] in violation of Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which
provides that a complaint or information must charge but one offense. Under Sections
1 and 3(e) of Rule 117, the appellant, before entering his plea, should have moved to
quash the complaint for being duplicitous. For his failure to do so, he is deemed to have
waived the defect.[26] Hence, pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 120, the court could convict
him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for
each and every one of them.
After examining the complainant's testimony in its entirety, our minds are at rest on the
culpability of the appellant for eleven counts of rape. On all the ten other occasions
that he had carnal knowledge of the complainant, there was admittedly neither physical
force employed by the former nor resistance or struggle on the part of the latter. But,
the absence of resistance did not make voluntary the complainant's submission to the
criminal acts of the appellant.[27]
It must be recalled that at the outset, or in the first sexual assault, the appellant
intimidated or threatened with death the complainant, which necessarily produced
reasonable fear in her and deprived her of will and freedom. The intimidation was a
continuing one as shown by his possession of a gun and the threat to kill the children.
Thus, the complainant could not bring herself to scream or resist his sexual assaults.
During the succeeding days, he kept her and her children like virtual prisoners and
effectively implanted fear in the complainant's mind by continually carrying her
youngest child, Sarah, thereby sending the message that if the complainant would
escape or make any outcry he would kill Sarah even as he was prepared to kill the
complainant and Macris. This message was made louder and clearer when he told the
complainant that he had killed a whole family in his place in Pangasinan, which led to his
conviction and service of his sentence at the Iwahig Prison and Penal Farm. These
circumstances were enough to engender a well-founded belief that the appellant was
capable of making good his threats. Her fear was not imagined.
In People vs. Pamor,[28] this Court made this disquisition:
Intimidation in rape cases is not calibrated or governed by hard and fast rules. Since it is
addressed to the mind of the victim and is therefore subjective, it must be viewed in the
light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the
crime. It is enough that it produces fear — fear that if the victim does not yield to the
bestial demands of the accused, something would happen to her at that moment. It
includes the moral kind such as the fear caused by threatening the victim with a knife or
pistol. Where such intimidation exists and the victim is cowed into submission as a
result thereof, thereby rendering resistance futile, it would be extremely unreasonable,
to say the least, to expect the victim to resist with all her might and strength. If
resistance would nevertheless be futile because of a continuing intimidation, then
offering none at all would not mean consent to the assault as to make the victim's
participation in the sexual act voluntary.
The appellant also capitalizes on the admission of the private complainant during her
cross-examination that she could have escaped had she wanted to but she dared not.
He then quotes the following testimony:
Q You mean to say that the truck only pass by your house and Jimmy Conte ask you to
board the truck?
A Yes, sir.
Q And without any protest again you went with Jimmy Conte to board the truck?
A I did not complain anymore because he was carrying my younger child, sir.
Q But while Jimmy Conte was holding your child, you have all the chances to run away if
you like?
A Yes. I have a chance to ask for help but what I was thinking was that my child that he
was holding, sir.
Q So, what you mean, you have all the chances to leave only you were afraid that Jimmy
Conte might kill your child?
A Yes, sir.[29]
It is clear from the complainant's testimony that while she had the chance of running
away, she did not grab it because had she done so her daughter, who was then being
carried by the appellant in his arms, could be killed. She must have been caught in the
twin horns of a wild dilemma. For, equally strong with, or even stronger than her desire
to escape and to protect herself and her honor was her love for or her inflexible sense of
duty to protect her child. She, like most mothers, was liable to put her child before
everything else in the end. Hence, she chose not to escape.
The theory of the appellant that the numerous occasions he had carnal knowledge of
the complainant were impelled by the electricity of mutual love and desire does not
inspire belief. As the trial court observed:
The accused is an unlettered former inmate of the Iwahig Prison and Penal Farms. He is
a helper in the processing of copra in the coconut plantation of Bernardo Crisostomo
and the complainant in the latter's coconut plantation in barangay Jolo, Roxas, Palawan.
He has not appeared to the court to be possessed of the physical attributes and charms
which could make women swoon and attracted to him in expectation of ecstasy in
romance. It would therefore seem rather farfetched that the complainant would be
drawn to him in the manner he had vainly sought to show by evidence for the defense.
The complainant, on the other hand, is a 43-year old mother of seven (7), and the
lawfully-wedded wife of Bernardo Crisostomo. For 30 years of her married life she had
been living with her family in their coconut plantation in barangay Jolo, Roxas, Palawan.
On the basis of her age, the number of children she had brought up and is still bringing
up; the rural environment which, for all those years, must have shaped her norm of
conduct in life, all but make the court skeptical about the trustworthiness of the
characterizations by the accused of the morality of the complainant. Such
characterization run counter to the generally accepted trait of the common Filipino wife
and mother.
It was because of a letter surreptitiously sent by the complainant to the CAGFU

Detachment Commander that the police and her husband subsequently rescued her and
her two children from the accused. If it were true that the complainant had indeed
chosen to forsake her marriage, her children and the man she had been married to and
lived for 30 years, she would not have thwarted the realization of her fantasies by
writing that letter thru which, he sought the assistance of the CAGFU in rescuing her and
her children from the accused.
Furthermore, the testimonies of the accused himself and that of Ruben Ladines with
respect to the other incidents of the case could hardly contribute to the probative worth
of the evidence for the defense. The accused declared that before they eloped to
Puerto Princesa City he had been having sexual conversation with the complainant three
times nightly, for eight (8) months. Aside from the improbability of his capacity for
sexual performance with such frequency he could not have done so for that length of
time as he had been in Jolo, Roxas, Palawan, as helper of the Crisostomos, for only
about two months before they supposedly eloped to Puerto Princesa City.
For his part Ruben Ladines declared, among others, that the accused and Gloria
Crisostomo and her children stayed in the former's house in Baltan Street for almost
two weeks. During that period the couple were said to have comported themselves as
husband and wife, and were observed to have been affectionate to one another. The
truth of what this witness asserted, though, is belied by the impressive and convincing
evidence that the complainant and her children were held hostage in that boarding
house for only three (3) days. [30]
If it were true that the complainant loved the appellant and had illicit sexual relations
with him while her husband was away, then she would not have exerted any effort to
contact Sgt. Pilapil in order to be rescued. Neither would she execute an affidavit
pointing to the appellant as her rapist nor would she file a complaint for rape and
thereafter undergo the expense, trouble, inconvenience, and scandal of a public trial for
rape. On the contrary, she would have preserved the illicit union by whatever means to
ensure endless gratification of her biological needs. In exposing the evil deeds of the
appellant and in facing the ordeal of a public trial, the complainant showed an honest
desire to seek justice.
The alleged letter of the complainant [31] purportedly sent to the appellant while he was
detained in jail does not save the day for him. The trial court "was not impressed by the
integrity and trustworthiness"[32] thereof. Neither are we. Our own examination of the
signature "GLORIA" appearing therein readily discloses that it is conspicuously different
from the signature of complainant Gloria Crisostomo in her complaint and sworn
statement.[33] That letter was not even properly identified. Then too, the circumstances
under which it was purportedly delivered to the appellant do not at all inspire credence.
According to witness Cipriano Sumagaysay, warden of the City Jail of Puerto Princesa
City, the letter was delivered by a 14-year old girl some thirty minutes after an old lady,
who was claimed by the appellant to be the complainant, had visited the appellant. If
indeed the old lady was Gloria Crisostomo, we find neither reason nor rhyme why she
would still send a letter to the appellant a few minutes after she left. Moreover, Gloria
who was then only, 43 years of age cannot be said to be an "old lady." Finally, if
Sumagaysay actually saw the "old lady," he could have, while on the witness stand,
pointed to the complainant as the "old lady" whom he had seen visiting the appellant.
Sumagaysay's testimony was not even corroborated by the visitor's logbook of the city
jail.
All told, the trial court correctly found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape on eleven counts and correctly sentenced him to eleven times
of reclusion perpetua. The service of the said penalties shall not, however, exceed forty
years pursuant to Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by C.A. No. 217. [34]
In view of such convictions, the appellant should, as well, be ordered to pay civil
indemnity in each case, and not just a single indemnity of P50,000.00 in all the cases.
We hold that, consistent with the current policy of the Court, the appellant should be
ordered to indemnify the complainant in the sum of P40,000.00 in each of the eleven
counts of rape.
Whether the trial court correctly acquitted the appellant in Criminal Case No. 9007 is an
entirely different matter which is already beyond our reviewing authority, since a
judgment of acquittal becomes final immediately after promulgation. [35]
WHEREFORE, subject to the above modification on the award of civil indemnity, the
appealed decision of Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan (Puerto Princesa
City) in Criminal Case No. 9006 is hereby AFFIRMED with costs against appellant Jimmy
Conte.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 183652, February 25, 2015 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND AAA, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, 21ST DIVISION, MINDANAO STATION, RAYMUND
CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL OPORTO, AND MOISES ALQUIZOLA,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari questioning the Decision[1] of the

Court of Appeals (CA) dated June 6, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00422-MIN. The CA
reversed and set aside the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kapatagan,
Lanao del Norte, Branch 21, dated February 28, 2006 in Criminal Case No. 21-1211, and
acquitted private respondents Raymund Carampatana, Joefhel Oporto, and Moises
Alquizola of the crime of rape for the prosecution’s failure to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
In a Second Amended Information dated June 23, 2004, private respondents

Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola were charged, together with Christian John Lim,
Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, Jansen Roda, Harold Batoctoy, and Joseph
Villame, for allegedly raping AAA,[3] to wit:
That on or about 10:30 o’clock in the evening of March 25, 2004 at Alson’s
Palace, Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd
designs forcefully drunk AAA, a 16-year-old minor, with an intoxicating liquor and once
intoxicated, brought said AAA at about dawn of March 26, 2004 at Alquizola Lodging
house, Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte and also within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, and once inside said lodging house, accused RAYMUND
CARAMPATANA and JOEPHEL OPORTO took turns in having carnal knowledge against
the will of AAA while accused MOISES ALQUIZOLA, with lewd designs, kissed her against
her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Upon arraignment, accused, assisted by their respective counsels, entered a plea of not
guilty to the offense charged. [5]
Following pre-trial,[6] trial on the merits ensued. Accused Christian John Lim, however,
remains at-large.
The factual antecedents follow:
On March 25, 2004, around 8:00 a.m., AAA attended her high school graduation
ceremony. Afterwards, they had a luncheon party at their house in Maranding, Lala,
Lanao del Norte. AAA then asked permission from her mother to go to the Maranding
Stage Plaza because she and her bandmates had to perform for an election campaign.
She went home at around 4:00 p.m. from the plaza. At about 7:00 p.m., AAA told her
father that she would be attending a graduation dinner party with her friends. AAA,
together with Lim, Oporto, and Carampatana, ate dinner at the house of one Mark
Gemeno at Purok, Bulahan, Maranding. After eating, Lim invited them to go to Alson’s
Palace, which was merely a walking distance away from Gemeno’s house. Outside the
Alson’s Palace, they were greeted by Aldrin Montesco, Junver Alquizola, and Cherry Mae
Fiel. After a while, they went inside and proceeded to a bedroom on the second floor
where they again saw Montesco with Harold Batoctoy, Jansen Roda, Emmanuel dela
Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, a certain Diego, and one Angelo. Rudinas suggested that they
have a drinking session to celebrate their graduation, to which the rest agreed.
They all contributed and it was Joseph Villame who bought the drinks – two (2) bottles
of Emperador Brandy. Then they arranged themselves in a circle for the drinking spree.
Two (2) glasses were being passed around: one glass containing the sweetener (Pepsi)
and the other glass containing the liquor. At first, AAA refused to drink because she had
never tried hard liquor before. During the session, they shared their problems with
each other. When it was AAA’s turn, she became emotional and started crying. It was
then that she took her first shot. The glasses were passed around and she consumed
more or less five (5) glasses of Emperador Brandy.
Thereafter, she felt dizzy so she laid her head down on Oporto’s lap. Oporto then
started kissing her head and they would remove her baseball cap. This angered her so
she told them to stop, and simply tried to hide her face with the cap. But they just
laughed at her. Then, Roda also kissed her. At that time, AAA was already sleepy, but
they still forced her to take another shot. They helped her stand up and make her
drink. She even heard Lim say, “Hubuga na, hubuga na,” (You make her drunk, you
make her drunk). She likewise heard someone say, “You drink it, you drink it.” She
leaned on Oporto’s lap again, then she fell asleep. They woke her up and Lim gave her
the Emperador Brandy bottle to drink the remaining liquor inside. She tried to refuse
but they insisted, so she drank directly from the bottle. Again, she fell asleep.
The next thing she knew, Roda and Batoctoy were carrying her down the stairs, and
then she was asleep again. When she regained consciousness, she saw that she was
already at the Alquizola Lodging House. She recognized that place because she had
been there before. She would thereafter fall back asleep and wake up again. And
during one of the times that she was conscious, she saw Oporto on top of her, kissing
her on different parts of her body, and having intercourse with her. She started crying.
She tried to resist when she felt pain in her genitals. She also saw Carampatana and
Moises Alquizola inside the room, watching as Oporto abused her. At one point, AAA
woke up while Carampatana was inserting his penis into her private organ. She cried
and told him to stop. Alquizola then joined and started to kiss her. For the last time,
she fell unconscious.
When she woke up, it was already 7:00 a.m. of the next day. She was all alone. Her
body felt heavy and exhausted. She found herself with her shirt on but without her
lower garments. The upper half of her body was on top of the bed but her feet were on
the floor. There were also red stains on her shirt. After dressing up, she hailed
a trisikad and went home. When AAA reached their house, her father was waiting for
her and was already furious. When she told them that she was raped, her mother
started hitting her. They brought her to the Lala Police Station to make a report.
Thereafter, they proceeded to the district hospital for her medical examination.
Dr. Cyrus Acusta of the Kapatagan District Hospital examined AAA in the morning of
March 26, 2004, and found an old hymenal laceration at 5 o’clock position and
hyperemia or redness at the posterior fornices. The vaginal smear likewise revealed the
presence of sperm.
On the other hand, accused denied that they raped AAA. According to the defense
witnesses, in the evening of March 25, 2004, Oporto, Carampatana, Lim, and AAA had
dinner at Gemeno’s house. Gemeno then invited Oporto to attend the graduation party
hosted by Montesco at Alson’s Palace, owned by the latter’s family. When they reached
the place, Oporto told Montesco that they had to leave for Barangay Tenazas to fetch
one Arcie Ariola. At about 11:30 p.m., Oporto and Carampatana returned to Alson’s
Palace but could not find AAA and Lim. The party subsequently ended, but the group
agreed to celebrate further. AAA, Rudinas, Dela Cruz, Lim, and Oporto contributed for
two (2) bottles of Emperador Brandy and one (1) liter of Pepsi.
Several persons were in the room at that time: AAA, Carampatana, Oporto, Dela Cruz,
Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, Villame, and Lim. Also present but did not join the drinking
were Gemeno, Montesco, Angelo Ugnabia, Al Jalil Diego, Mohamad Janisah Manalao,
one Caga, and a certain Bantulan. Gemeno told AAA not to drink but the latter did not
listen and instead told him not to tell her aunt. During the drinking session, AAA rested
on Oporto’s lap. She even showed her scorpion tattoo on her buttocks. And when her
legs grazed Batoctoy’s crotch, she remarked, “What was that, penis?” Roda then
approached AAA to kiss her, and the latter kissed him back. Oporto did the same and
AAA also kissed him. After Oporto, Roda and AAA kissed each other again.
Meanwhile, earlier that evening, at around 9:00 p.m., Moises Alquizola was at the
Alquizola Lodging House drinking beer with his cousin, Junver, and Fiel. They stopped
drinking at around midnight. Fiel then requested Alquizola to accompany her to Alson’s
Palace to see her friends there. They proceeded to the second floor and there they saw
AAA lying on Oporto’s lap. Fiel told AAA to go home because her mother might get
angry. AAA could not look her in the eye, just shook her head, and said, “I just stay
here.” Alquizola and Fiel then went back to the lodging house. After thirty minutes,
they went to Alson’s Palace again, and saw AAA and Oporto kissing each other. AAA
was lying on his lap while holding his neck. Subsequently, they went back to the lodging
house to resume drinking.
After drinking, Batoctoy offered to bring AAA home. But she refused and instead
instructed them to take her to the Alquizola Lodging House because she has a big
problem. AAA, Lim, and Carampatana rode a motorcycle to the lodging house. When
they arrived, AAA approached Alquizola and told him, “Kuya, I want to sleep here for the
meantime.” Alquizola then opened Room No. 4 where AAA, Oporto, and Carampatana
stayed. There were two beds inside, a single bed and a double-sized bed. AAA lay down
on the single bed and looked at Carampatana. The latter approached her and they
kissed. He then removed her shirt and AAA voluntarily raised her hands to give way.
Carampatana likewise removed her brassiere. All the while, Oporto was at the foot of
the bed. Thereafter, Oporto also removed her pants. AAA even lifted her buttocks to
make it easier for him to pull her underwear down. Oporto then went to AAA and
kissed her on the lips. Carampatana, on the other hand, placed himself in between
AAA’s legs and had intercourse with her. When he finished, he put on his shorts and
went back to Alson’s Palace to get some sleep. When he left, Oporto and AAA were still
kissing. Alquizola then entered the room. When AAA saw him, she said, “Come Kuya,
embrace me because I have a problem.” Alquizola thus started kissing AAA’s breasts.
Oporto stood up and opened his pants. AAA held his penis and performed fellatio on
him. Then Oporto and Alquizola changed positions. Oporto proceeded to have sexual
intercourse with AAA. During that time, AAA was moaning and calling his name.
Afterwards, Oporto went outside and slept with Alquizola on the carpet. Oporto then
had intercourse with AAA two more times. At 3:00 a.m., he went back to Alson’s Palace
to sleep. At around 6:00 a.m., Oporto and Carampatana went back to the lodging
house. They tried to wake AAA up, but she did not move so they just left and went
home. Alquizola had gone outside but he came back before 7:00 a.m. However, AAA
was no longer there when he arrived.
On February 28, 2006, the RTC found private respondents Carampatana, Oporto and
Alquizola guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. It, however, acquitted
Dela Cruz, Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, and Villame for failure of the prosecution to prove
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby

rendered:
a) Finding accused Raymund Carampatana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the

crime charged, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the indivisible prison term
of reclusion perpetua; to pay AAA the amount of P50,000.00 for and by way of civil
indemnity;
b) Finding accused Joefhel Oporto GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged, and the court hereby sentences him to suffer a prison term of six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years also of prision mayor as
maximum; to pay AAA the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages and another amount of
c) Finding accused Moises Alquizola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as ACCOMPLICE in

the commission of the crime charged, and the court hereby sentences him to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum
to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum; to pay AAA the
amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages and another sum of P30,000.00 for and by way
of civil indemnity;
d) Finding accused Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, Jansen Roda, Harold Batoctoy
and Joseph Villame NOT GUILTY of the crime charged for failure of the prosecution to
prove their guilt therefor beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the Court acquits
them of said charge; and
e) Ordering accused Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola to pay, jointly and severally,
the amount of P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees and expenses of litigations; and the costs of
suit.
The full period of the preventive imprisonment of accused Carampatana, Oporto and
Alquizola shall be credited to them and deducted from their prison terms provided they
comply with the requirements of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accused Raymund Carampatana surrendered voluntarily on 26 March 2004 and

detained since then up to the present. Accused Alquizola also surrendered voluntarily
on 26 March 2004 and detained since then up to this time, while accused Joefhel Oporto
who likewise surrendered voluntarily on 26 March 2004 was ordered released to the
custody of the DSWD, Lala, Lanao del Norte on 31 March 2004, and subsequently posted
cash bond for his provisional liberty on 17 September 2004 duly approved by this court,
thus resulted to an order of even date for his release from the custody of the DSWD.
Let the records of this case be sent to the archive files without prejudice on the
prosecution to prosecute the case against accused Christian John Lim as soon as he is
apprehended.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, private respondents brought the case to the CA. On
June 6, 2008, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision reversing the trial
court’s ruling and, consequently, acquitted private respondents. The decretal portion of
said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding reversible errors therefrom, the Decision on appeal is

hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt, accused-
appellants RAYMUND CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL OPORTO and MOISES ALQUIZOLA are
instead ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.[8]
In sum, the CA found that the prosecution failed to prove private respondents’ guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. It gave more credence to the version of the defense and
ruled that AAA consented to the sexual congress. She was wide awake and aware of
what private respondents were doing before the intercourse. She never showed any
physical resistance, never shouted for help, and never fought against her alleged
ravishers. The appellate court further relied on the medical report which showed the
presence of an old hymenal laceration on AAA’s genitalia, giving the impression that she
has had some carnal knowledge with a man before. The CA also stressed that AAA’s
mother’s unusual reaction of hitting her when she discovered what happened to her
daughter was more consistent with that of a parent who found out that her child just
had premarital sex rather than one who was sexually assaulted.
On July 29, 2008, AAA, through her private counsel, filed a Petition for Certiorari[9] under
Rule 65, questioning the CA Decision which reversed private respondents’ conviction
and ardently contending that the same was made with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Thus, AAA raises this lone issue in her petition:
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN ACQUITTING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.[10]
The private respondents present the following arguments in their Comment dated
November 7, 2008 to assail the petition:
I.
A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL IS IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND THE

PROSECUTION CANNOT APPEAL THE ACQUITTAL BECAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROHIBITION AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
II.
THE PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THAT THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION ON THE PART OF PUBLIC
RESPONDENT.
III.
CERTIORARI WILL NOT LIE UNLESS A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS FIRST FILED.
IV.
THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL IS THE APPELLATE COUNSEL OF THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES IN ALL CRIMINAL CASES.[11]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its own Comment on April 1, 2009. It
assigns the following errors:
I.
THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT MAY VALIDLY APPEAL AN ORDER OF ACQUITTAL AS TO THE

CIVIL ASPECT OF THE CRIME.
II.
THE APPELLATE DECISION OF ACQUITTAL IS NULL AND VOID FOR HAVING BEEN
RENDERED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION, AN EXCEPTION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY. [12]
The Court will first resolve the procedural issues.
At the onset, the Court stresses that rules of procedure are meant to be tools to
facilitate a fair and orderly conduct of proceedings. Strict adherence thereto must not
get in the way of achieving substantial justice. As long as their purpose is sufficiently
met and no violation of due process and fair play takes place, the rules should be
liberally construed.[13] Liberal construction of the rules is the controlling principle to
effect substantial justice. The relaxation or suspension of procedural rules, or the
exemption of a case from their operation, is warranted when compelling reasons exist
or when the purpose of justice requires it. Thus, litigations should, as much as possible,
be decided on their merits and not on sheer technicalities. [14]
As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a
judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal case. The reason is that a
judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory, and the prosecution is barred
from appealing lest the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy be violated.
[15]
Section 21, Article III of the Constitution provides:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under
either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Despite acquittal, however, either the offended party or the accused may appeal, but
only with respect to the civil aspect of the decision. Or, said judgment of acquittal may
be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing
that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors
of judgment, but also exercised grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thereby rendering the assailed judgment null and
void.[16] If there is grave abuse of discretion, granting petitioner’s prayer is not
tantamount to putting private respondents in double jeopardy. [17]
As to the party with the proper legal standing to bring the action, the Court said
in People v. Santiago:[18]
wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules
state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the
aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The
complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special
civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional
grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of the
People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in [the] name of said
complainant.[19]
Private respondents argue that the action should have been filed by the State through
the OSG. True, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case
This is because the authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before
the Supreme Court and the CA is solely vested in the OSG. [20]
Here, AAA filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, albeit at the instance of her
private counsel, primarily imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA when
it acquitted private respondents. As the aggrieved party, AAA clearly has the right to
bring the action in her name and maintain the criminal prosecution. She has an
immense interest in obtaining justice in the case precisely because she is the subject of
the violation. Further, as held in Dela Rosa v. CA,[21] where the Court sustained the
private offended party’s right in a criminal case to file a special civil action
for certiorari to question the validity of the judgment of dismissal and ruled that the
Solicitor General’s intervention was not necessary, the recourse of the complainant to
the Court is proper since it was brought in her own name and not in that of the People
of the Philippines. In any event, the OSG joins petitioner’s cause in its Comment,
[22]
thereby fulfilling the requirement that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under
the direction and control of the public prosecutor. [23]
Private respondents further claim that even assuming, merely for the sake of argument,
that AAA can file the special civil action for certiorari without violating their right
against double jeopardy, still, it must be dismissed for petitioner’s failure to previously
file a motion for reconsideration.
True, a motion for reconsideration is a condicio sine qua non for the filing of a petition
for certiorari. Its purpose is for the court to have an opportunity to correct any actual or
perceived error attributed to it by re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances
of the case. This rule, however, is not absolute and admits well-defined exceptions,
such as: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly
raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed
upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the
question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of
the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the
circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was
deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal
case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial
court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of
due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public
interest is involved.[24]
Here, petitioner’s case amply falls within the exception. AAA raises the same questions
as those raised and passed upon in the lower court, essentially revolving on the guilt of
the private respondents. There is also an urgent necessity to resolve the issues, for any
further delay would prejudice the interests, not only of the petitioner, but likewise that
of the Government. And, as will soon be discussed, the CA decision is a patent nullity
for lack of due process and for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
For the writ of certiorari to issue, the respondent court must be shown to have acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An acquittal is
considered tainted with grave abuse of discretion when it is shown that the
prosecution’s right to due process was violated or that the trial conducted was a sham.
The burden is on the petitioner to clearly demonstrate and establish that the
respondent court blatantly abused its authority such as to deprive itself of its very
power to dispense justice.[25]
AAA claims in her petition that the CA, in evident display of grave abuse of judicial
discretion, totally disregarded her testimony as well as the trial court’s findings of fact,
thereby adopting hook, line, and sinker, the private respondents’ narration of facts.
The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or
tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done
in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law,
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility.[26] There is grave abuse of discretion when the disputed act of the
lower court goes beyond the limits of discretion thus effecting an injustice. [27]
The Court finds that the petitioner has sufficiently discharged the burden of proving that
the respondent appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in acquitting
private respondents.
It appears that in reaching its judgment, the CA merely relied on the evidence presented
by the defense and utterly disregarded that of the prosecution. At first, it may seem
that its narration of the facts [28] of the case was meticulously culled from the evidence of
both parties. But a more careful perusal will reveal that it was simply lifted, if not
altogether parroted, from the testimonies of the accused, especially that of Oporto,
[29]
Carampatana,[30] and Alquizola,[31] the accused-appellants in the case before it. The
appellate court merely echoed the private respondents’ testimonies, particularly those
as to the specific events that transpired during the crucial period - from the dinner at
Gemeno’s house to the following morning at the Alquizola Lodging House. As a result, it
presented the private respondents’ account and allegations as though these were the
established facts of the case, which it later conveniently utilized to support its ruling of
acquittal.
Due process requires that, in reaching a decision, a tribunal must consider the entire
evidence presented, regardless of the party who offered the same. [32] It simply cannot
acknowledge that of one party and turn a blind eye to that of the other. It cannot
appreciate one party’s cause and brush the other aside. This rule becomes particularly
significant in this case because the parties tendered contradicting versions of the
incident. The victim is crying rape but the accused are saying it was a consensual sexual
rendezvous. Thus, the CA’s blatant disregard of material prosecution evidence and
outward bias in favor of that of the defense constitutes grave abuse of discretion
resulting in violation of petitioner’s right to due process. [33]
Moreover, the CA likewise easily swept under the rug the observations of the RTC and
made its own flimsy findings to justify its decision of acquittal.
First, the appellate court held that AAA was, in fact, conscious during the whole ordeal.
The fact that she never showed any physical resistance, never cried out for help, and
never fought against the private respondents, bolsters the claim of the latter that the
sexual acts were indeed consensual.
But the CA seemed to forget that AAA was heavily intoxicated at the time of the assault.
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides:
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed–
circumstances:
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present;
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1
hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s
mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of
another person.
Under the aforecited provision, the elements of rape are: (1) the offender had carnal
knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force or
intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
when the victim is under twelve years of age. [34] Here, the accused intentionally made
AAA consume hard liquor more than she could handle. They still forced her to drink
even when she was already obviously inebriated. They never denied having sexual
intercourse with AAA, but the latter was clearly deprived of reason or unconscious at
the time the private respondents ravished her. The CA, however, readily concluded that
she agreed to the sexual act simply because she did not shout or offer any physical
resistance, disregarding her testimony that she was rendered weak and dizzy by
intoxication, thereby facilitating the commission of the crime. [35] The appellate court
never provided any reason why AAA’s testimony should deserve scant or no weight at
all, or why it cannot be accorded any credence. In reviewing rape cases, the lone
testimony of the victim is and should be, by itself, sufficient to warrant a judgment of
conviction if found to be credible. Also, it has been established that when a woman
declares that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to mean that
she has been raped, and where her testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused
can be convicted on that basis alone. This is because from the nature of the offense, the
sole evidence that can usually be offered to establish the guilt of the accused is the
complainant’s testimony itself.[36] The trial court correctly ruled that if AAA was not
truthful to her accusation, she would not have opened herself to the rough and tumble
of a public trial. AAA was certainly not enjoying the prying eyes of those who were
listening as she narrated her harrowing experience. [37]
AAA positively identified the private respondents as the ones who violated her. She
tried to resist, but because of the presence of alcohol, her assaulters still prevailed. The
RTC found AAA’s testimony simple and candid, indicating that she was telling the truth.
The trial court likewise observed that her answers to the lengthy and humiliating
questions were simple and straightforward, negating the possibility of a rehearsed
testimony.[38] Thus:
Atty. Jesus M. Generalao (on direct):
x x x x
Q: Now, you said also when the Court asked you that you went asleep, when did you
regain your consciousness?
A: They woke me up and wanted me to drink the remaining wine inside the bottle of
Emperador Brandy.
x x x x
Q: What do you mean that they hide you (sic) to drink the remaining contained (sic) of
the bottle of Emperador Brandy?
A: They gave me the bottle, sir, and I was trying to refuse but they insisted.
Q: Who handed over to you that bottle, if you can remember?

A: It was Christian John Lim, sir.
Q: Did you drink that Emperador directly from the bottle?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened after that?

A: I fell asleep again, sir.
Q: When did you regain your consciousness?

A: When somebody was carrying me down to the spiral stairs.
Q: Can you remember the person or persons who was or who were carrying you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who?
A: They were Jansen Roda and Harold Batoctoy.
Q: If you can still remember, how did Jansen Roda and Harold Batoctoy carry you?
A: I placed my hands to their shoulder (sic), sir:
x x x x
Q: After that, what happened, if any?

A: I was already asleep, sir, when we went downstairs.
Q: You mean to say that you cannot remember anymore?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, when again did you regain your consciousness?

A: When we entered the room and the light was switch (sic) on, I was awakened by the
flash of light.
Q: Do you have any idea, where were you when you were awakened that (sic) flash of
light.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where?
A: Alquizola Lodging House, sir.
x x x x
Q: When you regained your consciousness from the flash of light, what happened?
A: I loss (sic) my consciousness again, sir.
Q: So, you fell asleep again?

A: Yes, sir.
x x x x
Q: When did you wake-up (sic) again?

A: When I feel (sic) heavy on top of me, sir.
Q: So you wake-up (sic) again, whom did you see?

A: It was Joefhel Oporto, sir.
Q: He was on top of you?

A: Yes, sir. (Witness is crying while answering)
Q: What was you (sic) reaction when you found that Joefhel Oporto was on top of you?
A: I was starting to cry, sir.
Q: Aside from starting to cry, what else is (sic) your reaction?

A: I was saying don’t because I feel pain my private organ (sic).
Q: What did Joefhel Oporto do, when you (sic) those words?
A: He was kissing on the different part (sic) of my body then he sexually abused me.
ATTY. GENERALAO: We want to make it on record, Your Honor, that the witness is
crying.
x x x x
ATTY. GENERALAO: May I continue, Your Honor.
COURT: Continue.
ATTY. GENERALAO: Aside from Joefhel Oporto was found (sic) on top of you, who else
was there inside that room?
A: Moises Alquizola and Raymund Carampatana, sir.
Q: With respect to Raymund Carampatana, what was he doing?

A: He was at my feet while looking at us.
Q: Was it dress (sic) up or undressed?

A: Dressed up, sir.
Q: What about Moises Alquizola, what was he doing?

A: He was beside us standing and looking at me, sir.
Q: Was he dressed up or undressed?

A: I could not remember, sir.
x x x x
Q: After that, what happened?

A: I went asleep again, sir.
Q: Then, when again did you or when again did you wake up?
A: When I feel (sic) pain something inside my private part (sic), I saw Raymund
Carampatana, sir.
Q: On top of you?
A: No, sir, because he was in between my legs, sir.
Q: What was your reaction?

A: I was starting to cry again, sir, and told him don’t.
Q: At that point, who else was inside that room when you found Raymund
Carampatana?
A: Only the three of them, sir.
Q: Including Moises Alquizola?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was he doing?

A: He was started (sic) to kiss me.
Q: Where in particular?
A: In my face, sir.
Q: Then after that, what happened?

Q: Now, before you went asleep again (sic), what did you feel when you said that you
feel (sic) something in your private part when you saw Raymund Carampatana?
A: He inserted his penis in my private organ, sir.
Q: Then after that you fell asleep again?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: When did you wake-up (sic)?

[39]
A: I woke up at about 7:00 o’clock a.m in the next (sic) day, sir.
On the other hand, the RTC was not convinced with the explanation of the defense. It
noted that their account of the events was seemingly unusual and incredible. [40]
Besides, the defense of consensual copulation was belatedly invoked and seemed to
have been a last ditch effort to avoid culpability. The accused never mentioned about
the same at the pre-trial stage. The trial court only came to know about it when it was
their turn to take the witness stand, catching the court by surprise. [41] More
importantly, it must be emphasized that when the accused in a rape case claims that the
sexual intercourse between him and the complainant was consensual, as in this case,
the burden of evidence shifts to him, such that he is now enjoined to adduce sufficient
evidence to prove the relationship. Being an affirmative defense that needs convincing
proof, it must be established with sufficient evidence that the intercourse was indeed
consensual.[42] Generally, the burden of proof is upon the prosecution to establish each
and every element of the crime and that it is the accused who is responsible for its
commission. This is because in criminal cases, conviction must rest on a moral certainty
of guilt.[43] Burden of evidence is that logical necessity which rests on a party at any
particular time during the trial to create a prima facie case in his favor or to overthrow
one when created against him. A prima facie case arises when the party having the
burden of proof has produced evidence sufficient to support a finding and adjudication
for him of the issue in litigation. [44] However, when the accused alleges consensual
sexual congress, he needs convincing proof such as love notes, mementos, and credible
witnesses attesting to the romantic or sexual relationship between the offender and his
supposed victim. Having admitted to carnal knowledge of the complainant, the burden
now shifts to the accused to prove his defense by substantial evidence. [45]
Here, the accused themselves admitted to having carnal knowledge of AAA but
unfortunately failed to discharge the burden required of them. Carampatana narrated
that upon reaching the room at the lodging house, AAA lay down on the bed and looked
at him. He then approached her and they kissed. He removed her shirt and brassiere.
Thereafter, Oporto also removed AAA’s lower garments and then went to kiss AAA.
Carampatana then placed himself in between AAA’s legs and had intercourse with her.
[46]
On the other hand, Oporto himself testified that he had sexual intercourse with AAA
three times. While Carampatana was removing AAA’s shirt and brassiere, Oporto was
watching at the foot of the bed. Then he removed her pants and underwear, and AAA
even lifted her buttocks to make it easier for him to pull the clothes down. When
Carampatana left after having sexual intercourse with AAA, according to Oporto, he
then stood up, opened his pants, and took out his penis so that AAA could
perform fellatio on him. Then he proceeded to have sexual intercourse with AAA.
Afterwards, Oporto went outside and slept with Alquizola on the carpet. After a few
minutes, he woke up and went back to the room and again had intercourse with AAA.
He went back to sleep and after some time, he woke up to the sound of AAA vomitting.
Shortly thereafter, he made love with AAA for the third and last time. [47] Despite said
shameless admission, however, the accused failed to sufficiently prove that the lack of
any physical resistance on AAA’s part amounts to approval or permission. They failed to
show that AAA had sexual intercourse with them out of her own volition, and not simply
because she was seriously intoxicated at that time, and therefore could not have given a
valid and intelligent consent to the sexual act.
The RTC also noticed that Fiel, one of the defense witnesses, was showy and
exaggerated when testifying, even flashing a thumbs-up to some of the accused after
her testimony, an indication of a rehearsed witness. [48] To be believed, the testimony
must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness; it must be credible in itself
such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable
under the attending circumstances.[49]
When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great weight, and is
even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact
or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full
opportunity to observe directly the witnesses’ deportment and manner of testifying, the
trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to properly evaluate
testimonial evidence.[50] Matters of credibility are addressed basically to the trial judge
who is in a better position than the appellate court to appreciate the weight and
evidentiary value of the testimonies of witnesses who have personally appeared before
him.[51] The appellate courts are far detached from the details and drama during trial
and have to rely solely on the records of the case in its review. On the matter of
credence and credibility of witnesses, therefore, the Court acknowledges said
limitations and recognizes the advantage of the trial court whose findings must be given
due deference.[52] Since the CA and the private respondents failed to show any palpable
error, arbitrariness, or capriciousness on the findings of fact of the trial court, these
findings deserve great weight and are deemed conclusive and binding. [53]
The CA continued, belaboring on the fact that the examining physician found old
hymenal laceration on AAA’s private organ. The lack of a fresh hymenal laceration,
which is expected to be present when the alleged sexual encounter is involuntary, could
mean that AAA actually consented to the fornication. According to Dr. Acusta, when sex
is consensual, the vagina becomes lubricated and the insertion of the penis will not
cause any laceration. It presumed that complainant, therefore, was no longer innocent
considering the presence of old hymenal laceration that could have resulted from her
previous sexual encounters. The defense, however, failed to show that AAA was
sexually promiscuous and known for organizing or even joining sex orgies. It must be
noted that AAA was a minor, barely 17 years old at the time of the incident, having just
graduated from high school on that same day. In a similar case,[54] the Court held:
x x x Indeed, no woman would have consented to have sexual intercourse with

two men — or three, according to Antonio Gallardo — in the presence of each other,
unless she were a prostitute or as morally debased as one. Certainly, the record before
Us contains no indication that Farmacita, a 14-year old, first-year high school student,
can be so characterized. On the contrary, her testimony in court evinced the simplicity
and candor peculiar to her youth. In fact, appellants could not even suggest any reason
why Farmacita would falsely impute to them the commission of the crime charged. [55]
No woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts, and be subjected to public trial and humiliation if her
claim were not true.[56] And even if she were indeed highly promiscuous at such a young
age, the same could still not prove that no rape was actually committed. Even a
complainant who was a woman of loose morals could still be the victim of rape. Even a
prostitute may be a victim of rape. The victim’s moral character in rape is immaterial
where, as in this case, it is shown that the victim was deprived of reason or was
rendered unconscious through intoxication to enable the private respondents to have
sex with her. Moreover, the essence of rape is the carnal knowledge of a woman
against her consent.[57] A freshly broken hymen is not one of its essential elements.
Even if the hymen of the victim was still intact, the possibility of rape cannot be ruled
out. Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the vagina, even without rupture
or laceration of the hymen, is enough to justify a conviction for rape. To repeat, rupture
of the hymen or laceration of any part of the woman’s genitalia is not indispensable to a
conviction for rape.[58]
Neither does AAA’s mother’s act of hitting her after learning about the rape prove
anything. It is a truism that “the workings of the human mind when placed under
emotional stress are unpredictable, and the people react differently.” [59] Different
people react differently to a given type of situation, and there is no standard form of
behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful
experience.[60] At most, it merely indicates the frustration and dismay of a mother upon
learning that her daughter had been defiled after partying late the night before. It is a
settled rule that when there is no showing that private complainant was impelled by
improper motive in making the accusation against the accused, her complaint is entitled
to full faith and credence.[61] So if AAA in fact consented to the sexual act, why did she
still need to immediately tell her parents about it when she could have just kept it to
herself? Why did she ever have to shout rape? She was not caught in the act of making
love with any of the private respondents, [62] nor was she shown to have been in a
relationship with any of them of which her family disapproved. [63] She never became
pregnant as a result of the deed. And if AAA cried rape to save her reputation, why
would she have to drag the private respondents into the case and identify them as her
rapists? Absent any circumstance indicating the contrary, she brought the charge
against the private respondents simply because she was, in fact, violated and she wants
to obtain justice. Her zeal in prosecuting the case, even after the CA had already
acquitted the private respondents, evinces the truth that she merely seeks justice for
her honor that has been debased.[64] Unfortunately, the CA chose to ignore these telling
pieces of evidence. Its findings are against the logic and effect of the facts as presented
by AAA in support of her complaint, [65] contrary to common human experience, and in
utter disregard of the relevant laws and jurisprudence on the crime of rape.
Lastly, the trial court pronounced that Alquizola was not part of the conspiracy because
his participation in the crime was uncertain, [66] citing People v. Lobrigo.[67] It found that
his participation was not in furtherance of the plan, if any, to commit the crime of rape.
[68]
The Court, however, finds that the RTC erred in ruling that Alquizola’s liability is not
of a conspirator, but that of a mere accomplice. To establish conspiracy, it is not
essential that there be proof as to previous agreement to commit a crime, it being
sufficient that the malefactors shall have acted in concert pursuant to the same
objective. Conspiracy is proved if there is convincing evidence to sustain a finding that
the malefactors committed an offense in furtherance of a common objective pursued in
concert.[69] Proof of conspiracy need not even rest on direct evidence, as the same may
be inferred from the collective conduct of the parties before, during or after the
commission of the crime indicating a common understanding among them with respect
to the commission of the offense.[70]
In Lobrigo, the Court declared:
We note that the testimonies of witnesses with respect to Gregorio's and

Dominador's participation in the crime conflict on material points.
Doubt exists as to whether Gregorio and Dominador were carrying weapons during

the mauling and whether they participated in the mauling by more than just boxing the
victim. Noel stated that they did not, Domingo stated that they did.
In conspiracy, evidence as to who administered the fatal blow is not necessary. In this
case, the rule is not applicable because conspiracy with respect to Gregorio and
Dominador is not proven. Their exact participation in the crime is uncertain. [71]
(Emphasis Supplied)
In People v. Dela Torre,[72] the Court upheld the findings of the lower courts that there
was conspiracy:
The RTC held that:
While [it] is true that it was only Leo Amoroso who actually ravished the victim based on
the testimony of the private complainant that Amoroso succeeded in inserting his penis
to her private parts and that Reynaldo dela Torre and Ritchie Bisaya merely kissed her
and fondled her private parts, accused [D]ela Torre can likewise be held liable for the
bestial acts of Amoroso as it is quite apparent that the three of them conspired and
mutually helped one another in raping the young victim.
The Court of Appeals held that:
[W]hile [Dela Torre] did not have carnal knowledge with [AAA], his tacit and
spontaneous participation and cooperation of pulling her towards the parked
jeep, molesting her and doing nothing to prevent the commission of the rape, made
him a co-conspirator. As such, he was properly adjudged as a principal in the
commission of the crime.[73]
Here, unlike in the foregoing case of Lobrigo, Alquizola’s participation in the crime is not
at all uncertain. As the caretaker of the Alquizola Lodging House, he provided a room so
the rape could be accomplished with ease and furtiveness. He was likewise inside the
room, intently watching, while Oporto and Carampatana sexually abused AAA. He did
not do anything to stop the bestial acts of his companions. He even admitted to kissing
AAA’s lips, breasts, and other parts of her body. Indubitably, there was conspiracy
among Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola to sexually abuse AAA. Hence, the act of
any one was the act of all, and each of them, Alquizola including, is equally guilty of the
crime of rape. While it is true that the RTC found Alquizola guilty as mere accomplice,
when he appealed from the decision of the trial court, [74] he waived the constitutional
safeguard against double jeopardy and threw the whole case open to the review of the
appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice
dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the accused-appellant. [75]
Finally, the Court notes that although the prosecution filed only a single Information, it,
however, actually charged the accused of several rapes. As a general rule, a complaint
or information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the same is defective. [76] The
rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or informations is to give
the accused the necessary knowledge of the charge against him and enable him to
sufficiently prepare for his defense. The State should not heap upon the accused two or
more charges which might confuse him in his defense. [77] Non-compliance with this rule
is a ground[78] for quashing the duplicitous complaint or information under Rule 117 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the accused may raise the same in a motion to
quash before he enters his plea, [79] otherwise, the defect is deemed waived. [80] The
accused herein, however, cannot avail of this defense simply because they did not file a
motion to quash questioning the validity of the Information during their arraignment.
Thus, they are deemed to have waived their right to question the same. Also, where the
allegations of the acts imputed to the accused are merely different counts specifying the
acts of perpetration of the same crime, as in the instant case, there is no duplicity to
speak of.[81] There is likewise no violation of the right of the accused to be informed of
the charges against them because the Information, in fact, stated that they “took turns
in having carnal knowledge against the will of AAA” on March 25, 2004. [82] Further,
allegations made and the evidence presented to support the same reveal that AAA was
indeed raped and defiled several times. Here, according to the accused themselves,
after undressing AAA, Carampatana positioned himself in between her legs and had
intercourse with her. On the other hand, Oporto admitted that he had sexual
intercourse with AAA three times. When two or more offenses are charged in a single
complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may
convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose upon him the
proper penalty for each offense.[83] Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola can then be
held liable for more than one crime of rape, or a total of four (4) counts in all, with
conspiracy extant among the three of them during the commission of each of the four
violations. Each of the accused shall thus be held liable for every act of rape committed
by the other. But while Oporto himself testified that he inserted his sexual organ into
AAA’s mouth, the Court cannot convict him of rape through sexual assault therefor
because the same was not included in the Information. This is, however, without
prejudice to the filing of a case of rape through sexual assault as long as prescription has
not yet set in.
Anent the appropriate penalty to be imposed, rape committed by two or more persons
is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under Article 266-B of the RPC. But in view
of the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and the absence
of an aggravating circumstance to offset the same, the lighter penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon them,[84] for each count. With regard to Oporto,
appreciating in his favor the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the proper
imposable penalty upon him is reclusion temporal, being the penalty next lower to
reclusion perpetua to death. Being a divisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law
is applicable. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Oporto can be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty the minimum of which shall be within the range of prision mayor
(the penalty next lower in degree to reclusion temporal) and the maximum of which
shall be within the range of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, there being the
ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and there being no aggravating
circumstance.[85] With that, the Court shall impose the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve
(12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, for each count of rape
committed.[86] However, Oporto shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under
Section 51, R.A. No. 9344,[87] which extends even to one who has exceeded the age limit
of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he committed the crime when he was still a child,
[88]
and provides for the confinement of convicted children as follows: [89]
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other
Training Facilities. – A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon
order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a
regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be
established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with
the DSWD.
Hence, in the proper execution of judgment by the lower court, the foregoing provision
should be taken into consideration by the judge in order to accord children in conflict
with the law, who have already gone beyond twenty-one (21) years of age, the proper
treatment envisioned by law.
As to their civil liability, all of them shall pay AAA the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral damages, in each case. Exemplary damages
of P30,000.00 shall likewise be imposed by way of an example and to deter others from
committing the same bestial acts.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision

dated June 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00422-MIN
is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Court hereby renders judgment:
a) Finding accused-respondent Raymund Carampatana GUILTY beyond reasonable

doubt of four (4) counts of rape, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua in each case;
b) Finding accused-respondent Joefhel Oporto GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of four
(4) counts of rape, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12)
years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, in each case; and
c) Finding accused-respondent Moises Alquizola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
four (4) counts of rape, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua in each case.
The Court hereby ORDERS the accused-respondents to pay AAA, jointly and severally,

the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each of the four (4) counts of rape. The case
is REMANDED to the court of origin for its appropriate action in accordance with Section
51 of Republic Act No. 9344.
Let the records of this case be forwarded to the court of origin for the execution of
judgment.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 111771-77, November 09, 1993 ]
ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE HARRIET
O. DEMETRIOU (IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NCR, BRANCH 70, PASIG), THE
HONORABLE FRANKLIN DRILON (IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY
OF JUSTICE), JOVENCITO R. ZUÑO, LEONARDO C. GUIYAB, JR.,
CARLOS L. DE LEON, RAMONCITO C. MISON, REYNALDO J. LUGTU
AND RODRIGO P. LORENZO, (THE LAST SIX RESPONDENTS IN THEIR
OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS MEMBERS OF THE STATE PROSECUTOR'S
OFFICE), RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
There is probably no more notorious person in the country today than Mayor Antonio L.
Sanchez of Calauan, Laguna, who stands accused of an unspeakable crime. On him, the
verdict has already been rendered by many outraged persons who would immediately
impose on him an angry sentence. Yet, for all the prejudgments against him, he is under
our Constitution presumed innocent as long as the contrary has not been proved. Like any
other person accused of an offense, he is entitled to the full and vigilant protection of the
Bill of Rights.
Sanchez has brought this petition to challenge the order of the respondent judge denying
his motion to quash the informations for rape with homicide filed against him and six
other persons. We shall treat it as we would any other suit filed by any litigant hoping to
obtain a just and impartial judgment from this Court.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On July 28, 1993, the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested the filing of
appropriate charges against several persons, including the petitioner, in connection with
the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez.
Acting on this request, the Panel of State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice
conducted a preliminary investigation on August 9, 1993. Petitioner Sanchez was not
present but was represented by his counsel, Atty. Marciano Brion, Jr..
On August 12, 1993, PNP Commander Rex Piad issued an "invitation" to the petitioner
requesting him to appear for investigation at Camp Vicente Lim in Canlubang, Laguna. It
was served on Sanchez in the morning of August 13, 1993, and he was immediately taken
to the said camp.
At a confrontation that same day, Sanchez was positively identified by Aurelio Centeno
and SPO III Vivencio Malabanan, who both executed extrajudicial confessions
implicating him as a principal in the rape-slay of Sarmenta and the killing of Gomez. The
petitioner was then placed on "arrest status" and taken to the Department of Justice in
Manila.
The respondent prosecutors immediately conducted an inquest upon his arrival, with
Atty. Salvador Panelo as his counsel.
After the hearing, a warrant of arrest was served on Sanchez. This warrant was issued on
August 13, 1993, by Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 7, in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 93-124634 to 93-124637 for violation
of Section 8, in relation to Section 11, of R.A. No. 6713. Sanchez was forthwith taken to
the CIS Detention Center, Camp Crame, where he remains confined.
On August 16, 1993, the respondent prosecutors filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Calamba, Laguna, seven informations charging Antonio L. Sanchez, Luis Corcolon,
Rogelio Corcolon, Pepito Kawit, Baldwin Brion, Jr., George Medialdea and Zoilo Ama
with the rape and killing of Mary Eileen Sarmenta.
On August 26, 1993, Judge Eustaquio P. Sto. Domingo of that court issued a warrant for
the arrest of all the accused, including the petitioner, in connection with the said crime.
The respondent Secretary of Justice subsequently expressed his apprehension that the
trial of the said cases might result in a miscarriage of justice because of the tense and
partisan atmosphere in Laguna in favor of the petitioner and the relationship of an
employee in the trial court with one of the accused. This Court thereupon ordered the
transfer of the venue of the seven cases to Pasig, Metro Manila, where they were raffled
to respondent Judge Harriet Demetriou.
On September 10, 1993, the seven informations were amended to include the killing of
Allan Gomez as an aggravating circumstance.
On that same date, the petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations substantially on
the grounds now raised in this petition. On September 13, 1993, after oral arguments, the
respondent judge denied the motion. Sanchez then filed with this Court the instant
petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order/writ
of injunction.
The petitioner argues that the seven informations filed against him should be quashed
because: 1) he was denied the right to present evidence at the preliminary investigation;
2) only the Ombudsman had the competence to conduct the investigation; 3) his
warrantless arrest is illegal and the court has therefore not acquired jurisdiction over him;
4) he is being charged with seven homicides arising from the death of only two persons;
5) the informations are discriminatory because they do not include Teofilo Alqueza and
Edgardo Lavadia; and 6) as a public officer, he can be tried for the offense only by the
Sandiganbayan.
The respondents submitted a Comment on the petition, to which we required a Reply

from the petitioner within a non-extendible period of five days. The Reply was filed five
[1]
days late. The Court may consider his non-compliance an implied admission of the
[2]
respondents' arguments or a loss of interest in prosecuting his petition, which is a ground

for its dismissal. Nevertheless, we shall disregard this procedural lapse and proceed to
discuss his petition on the basis of the arguments before us.
The Preliminary Investigation
The records of the hearings held on August 9 and 13, 1993, belie the petitioner's
contention that he was not accorded the right to present counter-affidavits.
During the preliminary investigation on August 9, 1993, the petitioner's counsel, Atty.
Marciano Brion, manifested that his client was waiving the presentation of a counter-
affidavit, thus:
Atty. Brion, Jr.:

[W]e manifest that after reviewing them there is nothing to rebut or
countermand all these statements as far as Mayor Sanchez is concerned. We are not
going to submit any counter-affidavit.
ACSP Zuño to Atty. Brion:
xxx
Q. So far, there are no other statements.
A. If there is none then, we will not submit any counter-affidavit because we
believe there is nothing to rebut or countermand with all these statements.
Q. So, you are waiving your submission of counter-affidavit?
A. Yes, your honor, unless there are other witnesses who will come up soon. [3]
Nonetheless, the head of the Panel of Prosecutors, respondent Jovencito Zuño, told Atty.
Brion that he could still file a counter-affidavit up to August 27, 1993. No such counter-
affidavit was filed.
During the hearing on August 13, 1993, respondent Zuño furnished the petitioner's
counsel, this time Atty. Salvador Panelo, with copies of the sworn statements of Centeno
and Malabanan, and told him he could submit counter-affidavits on or before August 27,
1993. The following exchange ensued:
ACSP Zuño:
For the record, we are furnishing to you the sworn statement of witness Aurelio
Centeno y Roxas and the sworn statement of SPO3 Vivencio Malabanan y Angeles.
Do I understand from you that you are again waiving the submission of counter-
affidavit?
Atty. Panelo:
Yes.
ACSP Zuño:
So, in so far as the respondent, Mayor Antonio Sanchez is concerned, this case is
submitted for resolution.[4]
On the other hand, there is no support for the petitioner's subsequent manifestation that
his counsel, Atty. Brion, was not notified of the inquest held on August 13, 1993, and that
he was not furnished with the affidavits sworn to on that date by Vivencio Malabanan
and Aurelio Centeno, or with their supplemental affidavits dated August 15, 1993.
Moreover, the above-quoted excerpt shows that the petitioner's counsel at the hearing
held on August 13, 1993, was not Atty. Brion but Atty. Panelo.
The petitioner was present at that hearing and he never disowned Atty. Panelo as his
counsel. During the entire proceedings, he remained quiet and let this counsel speak and
argue on his behalf. It was only in his tardy Reply that he has suddenly bestirred himself
and would now question his representation by this lawyer as unauthorized and
inofficious.
Section 3, paragraph (d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, provides that if the respondent
cannot be subpoenaed or, if subpoenaed, does not submit counter?affidavits, the
investigating officer shall base his resolution on the evidence presented by the
complainant.
Just as the accused may renounce the right to be present at the preliminary investigation,
so may he waive the right to present counter-affidavits or any other evidence in his
[5]
defense.
At any rate, it is settled that the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the
validity of the information or otherwise render the same defective and neither does it
affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute a ground for quashing the
information.[6]
If no preliminary investigation has been held, or if it is flawed, the trial court may, on
motion of the accused, order an investigation or reinvestigation and hold the proceedings
in the criminal cases in abeyance. In the case at bar, however, the respondent judge saw
[7]
no reason or need for such a step. Finding no arbitrariness in her factual conclusions, we
shall defer to her judgment.
Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
Invoking the case of Deloso v. Domingo, the petitioner submits that the proceedings
[8]
conducted by the Department of Justice are null and void because it had no jurisdiction
over the case. His claim is that it is the Office of the Ombudsman that is vested with the
power to conduct the investigation of all cases involving public officers like him, as the
municipal mayor of Calauan, Laguna.
The Ombudsman is indeed empowered under Section 15, paragraph (1) of R.A. 6770 to
investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official. However, as
we held only two years ago in the case of Aguinaldo v. Domagas, this authority "is not
[9]
an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense
charged."
Petitioners finally assert that the information and amended information filed in
this case needed the approval of the Ombudsman. It is not disputed that the
information and amended information here did not have the approval of the
Ombudsman. However, we do not believe that such approval was necessary at all.
In Deloso v. Domingo, 191 SCRA 545 (1990), the Court held that the Ombudsman has
authority to investigate charges of illegal acts or omissions on the part of any public
official, i.e., any crime imputed to a public official. It must, however, be pointed out that
the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate "any [illegal] act or omission of any
public official" (191 SCRA at 550) is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or
concurrent authority in respect of the offense here charged, i.e., the crime of sedition.
Thus, the non-involvement of the office of the Ombudsman in the present case does not
have any adverse legal consequence upon the authority of the panel of prosecutors to
file and prosecute the information or amended information.
In fact, other investigatory agencies of the government such as the Department of Justice,
in connection with the charge of sedition, and the Presidential Commission on Good
[10]
Government, in ill-gotten wealth cases, may conduct the investigation.

[11]
The Arrest
Was petitioner Sanchez arrested on August 13, 1993?
"Arrest" is defined under Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as the taking of a
person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an
offense. Under Section 2 of the same Rule, an arrest is effected by an actual restraint of
the person to be arrested or by his voluntary submission to the custody of the person
making the arrest.
Application of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint or a formal
declaration of arrest is not required. It is enough that there be an intent on the part of one
of the parties to arrest the other and an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the
belief and impression that submission is necessary. [12]
The petitioner was taken to Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna, by virtue of a letter-
invitation issued by PNP Commander Rex Piad requesting him to appear at the said camp
for investigation.
In Babst v. National Intelligence Board this Court declared:

[13]
Be that as it may, it is not idle to note that ordinarily, an invitation to attend a

hearing and answer some questions, which the person invited may heed or refuse at his
pleasure, is not illegal or constitutionally objectionable. Under certain circumstances,
however, such an invitation can easily assume a different appearance. Thus, where the
invitation comes from a powerful group composed predominantly of ranking military
officers issued at a time when the country has just emerged from martial rule and when
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has not entirely been lifted,
and the designated interrogation site is a military camp, the same can easily be
taken, not as a strictly voluntary invitation which it purports to be, but as an
authoritative command which one can only defy at his peril x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, the invitation came from a high-ranking military official and the
investigation of Sanchez was to be made at a military camp. Although in the guise of a
request, it was obviously a command or an order of arrest that the petitioner could hardly
be expected to defy. In fact, apparently cowed by the "invitation," he went without protest
(and in informal clothes and slippers only) with the officers who had come to fetch him.
It may not be amiss to observe that under R.A. No. 7438, the requisites of a "custodial
investigation" are applicable even to a person not formally arrested but merely "invited"
for questioning.
It should likewise be noted that at Camp Vicente Lim, the petitioner was placed on "arrest
status" after he was pointed to by Centeno and Malabanan as the person who first raped
Mary Eileen Sarmenta. Respondent Zuño himself acknowledged during the August 13,
1993 hearing that, on the basis of the sworn statements of the two state witnesses, the
petitioner had been "arrested."
We agree with the petitioner that his arrest did not come under Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court, providing as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
It is not denied that the arresting officers were not present when the petitioner allegedly
participated in the killing of Allan Gomez and the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta.
Neither did they have any personal knowledge that the petitioner was responsible therefor
because the basis of the arrest was the sworn statements of Centeno and Malabanan.
Moreover, as the rape and killing of Sarmenta allegedly took place on June 28 - June 29,
1993, or forty-six days before the date of the arrest, it cannot be said that the offense had
"in fact just been committed" when the petitioner was arrested.
The original warrantless arrest of the petitioner was doubtless illegal. Nevertheless, the
Regional Trial Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by
virtue of the warrant of arrest it issued on August 26, 1993 against him and the other
accused in connection with the rape-slay cases. It was belated, to be sure, but it was
nonetheless legal.
Even on the assumption that no warrant was issued at all, we find that the trial court still
lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. The rule is that if the
accused objects to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, he may move to quash the
information, but only on that ground. If, as in this case, the accused raises other grounds
in the motion to quash, he is deemed to have waived that objection and to have submitted
his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
[14]
The Court notes that on August 13, 1993, after the petitioner was unlawfully arrested,
Judge Lanzanas issued a warrant of arrest against Antonio L. Sanchez in connection with
Criminal Cases Nos. 93-124634 to 93-124637 for violation of R.A. No. 6713. Pending [15]
the issuance of the warrant of arrest for the rape-slay cases, this first warrant served as the
initial justification for his detention.
The Court also adverts to its uniform ruling that the filing of charges, and the issuance of
the corresponding warrant of arrest, against a person invalidly detained will cure the
defect of that detention or at least deny him the right to be released because of such
defect.* Applicable by analogy to the case at bar is Rule 102 Section 4 of the Rules of
Court that:
Sec. 4. When writ is not allowed or discharge authorized. - If it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process
issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and
that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or
make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ
is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in
the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the
discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines or of a
person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
In one case, the petitioner sued on habeas corpus on the ground that she had been
[16]
arrested by virtue of a John Doe warrant. In their return, the respondents declared that a
new warrant specifically naming her had been issued, thus validating her detention.
While frowning at the tactics of the respondents, the Court said:
The case has, indeed, become moot and academic inasmuch as the new warrant
of arrest complies with the requirements of the Constitution and the Rules of Court
regarding the particular description of the person to be arrested. While the first warrant
was unquestionably void, being a general warrant, release of the petitioner for that
reason will be a futile act as it will be followed by her immediate re-arrest pursuant to
the new and valid warrant, returning her to the same prison she will just have left. This
Court will not participate in such a meaningless charade.
The same doctrine has been consistently followed by the Court, more recently in the
[17]
Umil case. [18]
The Informations
The petitioner submits that the seven informations charging seven separate homicides are
absurd because the two victims in these cases could not have died seven times.
This argument was correctly refuted by the Solicitor General in this wise:
Thus, where there are two or more offenders who commit rape, the homicide
committed on the occasion or by reason of each rape, must be deemed as a constituent
of the special complex crime of rape with homicide. Therefore, there will be as many
crimes of rape with homicide as there are rapes committed.
In effect, the presence of homicide qualifies the crime of rape, thereby raising its
penalty to the highest degree. Thus, homicide committed on the occasion or by reason
of the rape, loses its character as an independent offense, but assumes a new character,
and functions like a qualifying circumstance. However, by fiction of law, it is merged
with rape to constitute a constituent element of a special complex crime of rape with
homicide with a specific penalty which is in the highest degree, i.e., death (reduced
to reclusion perpetua with the suspension of the application of the death penalty by the
Constitution).
It is clearly provided in Rule 110 of the Rules of Court that:
Section 13. Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information must charge but one

offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a simple punishment
for various offenses.
Rape with homicide comes within the exception under R.A. 2632 and R.A. 4111,
amending the Revised Penal Code.
The petitioner and his six co-accused are not charged with only one rape committed by
him in conspiracy with the other six. Each one of the seven accused is charged with
having himself raped Sarmenta instead of simply helping Sanchez in committing only
one rape. In other words, the allegation of the prosecution is that the girl was raped seven
times, with each of the seven accused taking turns in abusing her with the assistance of
the other six. Afterwards, their lust satisfied, all seven of them decided to kill and thus
silence Sarmenta.
Every one of the seven accused is being charged separately for actually raping Sarmenta
and later killing her instead of merely assisting the petitioner in raping and then slaying
her. The separate informations filed against each of them allege that each of the seven
successive rapes is complexed by the subsequent slaying of Sarmenta and aggravated by
the killing of Allan Gomez by her seven attackers. The separate rapes were committed in
succession by the seven accused, culminating in the slaying of Sarmenta.
It is of course absurd to suggest that Mary Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez were killed
seven times, but the informations do not make such a suggestion. It is the petitioner who
does so and is thus hoist by his own petard.
The Alleged Discrimination
The charge of discrimination against the petitioner because of the non-inclusion of

Teofilo Alqueza and Edgardo Lavadia in the informations must also be dismissed.
While the prosecuting officer is required by law to charge all those who, in his opinion,
appear to be guilty, he nevertheless cannot be compelled to include in the information a
person against whom he believes no sufficient evidence of guilt exists. The appreciation
[19]
of the evidence involves the use of discretion on the part of the prosecutor, and we do not
find in the case at bar a clear showing by the petitioner of a grave abuse of such
discretion.
[20]
The decision of the prosecutor may be reversed or modified by the Secretary of Justice or
in special cases by the President of the Philippines. But even this Court cannot order the
[21]
prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to
support at least a prima facie case. The courts try and absolve or convict the accused but
as a rule have no part in the initial decision to prosecute him.
The possible exception is where there is an unmistakable showing of a grave abuse of

discretion that will justify judicial intrusion into the precincts of the executive. But in
such a case the proper remedy to call for such exception is a petition
for mandamus, not certiorari or prohibition. Moreover, before resorting to this relief,
[22]
the party seeking the inclusion of another person as a co-accused in the same case must
first avail itself of other adequate remedies such as the filing of a motion for such
inclusion.
[23]
At any rate, it is a preposterous contention that because no charges have been filed
against Alqueza and Lavadia, the charges against the petitioner and his co-accused should
also be dropped.
Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
The petitioner argued earlier that since most of the accused were incumbent public
officials or employees at the time of the alleged commission of the crimes, the cases
against them should come under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and not of the
regular courts. This contention was withdrawn in his Reply but we shall discuss it just the
same for the guidance of all those concerned.
Section 4, paragraph (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861, provides:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:

a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of
the Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to
their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations,
whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is
higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
The crime of rape with homicide with which the petitioner stands charged obviously does
not fall under paragraph (1), which deals with graft and corruption cases. Neither is it
covered by paragraph (2) because it is not an offense committed in relation to the office
of the petitioner.
In Montilla v. Hilario, this Court described the "offense committed in relation to the
[24]
office" as follows:
[T]he relation between the crime and the office contemplated by the Constitution
is, in our opinion, direct and not accidental. To fall into the intent of the Constitution,
the relation has to be such that, in the legal sense, the offense cannot exist without the
office. In other words, the office must be a constituent element of the crime as defined
in the statute, such as, for instance, the crimes defined and punished in Chapter Two to
Six, Title Seven, of the Revised Penal Code.
Public office is not of the essence of murder. The taking of human life is either
murder or homicide whether done by a private citizen or public servant, and the penalty
is the same except when the perpetrator, being a public functionary, took advantage of
his office, as alleged in this case, in which event the penalty is increased.
But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element; and
even as an aggravating circumstance, its materiality arises, not from the allegations but
on the proof, not from the fact that the criminals are public officials but from the
manner of the commission of the crime.
There is no direct relation between the commission of the crime of rape with homicide
and the petitioner's office as municipal mayor because public office is not an essential
element of the crime charged. The offense can stand independently of the office.
Moreover, it is not even alleged in the information that the commission of the crime
charged was intimately connected with the performance of the petitioner's official
functions to make it fall under the exception laid down in People v. Montejo.[25]
In that case, a city mayor and several detectives were charged with murder for the death
of a suspect as a result of a "third degree" investigation held at a police substation. The
appearance of a senator as their counsel was questioned by the prosecution on the ground
that he was inhibited by the Constitution from representing them because they were
accused of an offense committed in relation to their office. The Court agreed. It held that
even if their position was not an essential ingredient of the offense, there was
nevertheless an intimate connection between the office and the offense, as alleged in the
information, that brought it within the definition of an offense "committed in relation to
the public office."
As Chief Justice Concepcion said:
It is apparent from these allegations that, although public office is not an element
of the crime of murder in abstract, as committed by the main respondents herein,
according to the amended information, the offense therein charged is intimately
connected with their respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the
performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, they had
no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they
not held their aforesaid offices. The co-defendants of respondent Leroy S. Brown,
obeyed his instructions because he was their superior officer, as Mayor of Basilan City.
We have read the informations in the case at bar and find no allegation therein that the
crime of rape with homicide imputed to the petitioner was connected with the discharge
of his functions as municipal mayor or that there is an "intimate connection" between the
offense and his office. It follows that the said crime, being an ordinary offense, is triable
by the regular courts and not the Sandiganbayan.
Conclusion
As above demonstrated, all of the grounds invoked by the petitioner are not supported by
the facts and the applicable law and jurisprudence. They must, therefore, all be rejected.
In consequence, the respondent judge, who has started the trial of the criminal cases
against the petitioner and his co-accused, may proceed therewith without further
hindrance.
It remains to stress that the decision we make today is not a decision on the merits of the
criminal cases being tried below. These will have to be decided by the respondent judge
in accordance with the evidence that is still being received. At this time, there is yet no
basis for judgment, only uninformed conjecture. The Court will caution against such
irrelevant public speculations as they can be based only on imperfect knowledge if not
officious ignorance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The respondent judge is DIRECTED to

continue with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 101141, 101142, 101143, 101144, 101145,
101146 and 101147 and to decide them with deliberate dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
[ G.R. No. L-1477, January 18, 1950 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS.
JULIO GUILLEN Y CORPUS, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This case is before us for review of, and by virtue of appeal from, the judgment rendered
by the Court of First Instance of Manila in case No. 2764, whereby Julio Guillen y
Corpus, or Julio C. Guillen, is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder and multiple frustrated murder, as charged in the information, and is sentenced to
the penalty of death, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Simeon Varela (or Barrela) in
the sum of P2,000,00 and to pay the costs.
Upon arraignment the accused entered a plea of not guilty to the charges contained in the
information.
Then the case was tried in one of the branches of the Court of First Instance of Manila
presided over by the Honorable Buenaventura Ocampo who, after the submission of the
evidence of the prosecution and the defense, rendered judgment as above stated.
In this connection it should be stated that, at the beginning of the trial and before
arraignment, counsel de oficio for the accused moved that the mental condition of Guillen
be examined. The court, notwithstanding that it had found out from the answers of the
accused to questions propounded to him in order to test the soundness of his mind, that he
was not suffering from any mental derangement, ordered that Julio Guillen be confined
for a period of about 8 days in the government Psychopathic Hospital, there to be
examined by medical experts who should report their findings accordingly. This was
done, and, according to the report of the board of medical experts, presided over by Dr.
Fernandez of the National Psychopathic Hospital, Julio Guillen was not insane. Said
report (Exh. "L"), under the heading "Formulation'and Diagnosis," at pages 13 and 14,
reads:
"FORMULATION AND DIAGNOSIS
"Julio C. Guillen was placed under constant observation since admission. There was not a
single moment during his whole 24 hours daily, that he was not under observation.
" The motive behind, the commission of the crime is stated above. The veracity of this
motivation was determined in the Narco-synthesis. That the narco-synthesis was
successful was checked up the day after the test. The narco-synthesis proved not only that
Julio C. Guillen was telling us the truth, but also did not reveal any conflict or complex
that may explain a delusional or hallucinatory motive behind the act.
"Our observation and examination failed to elicit any sign or symptom of insanity in Mr.
Julio C. Guillen. He was found to be intelligent, always able to differentiate right from
wrong, fully aware of the nature of the crime he committed and is equally decided to
suffer for it in any manner or form.
"His version of the circumstances of the crime, his conduct and conversation relative
thereto, the motives, temptations and provocations that preceded the act, were all those of
an individual with a sound mind.
"On the other hand he is a man of strong will and conviction and once arriving at a
decision he executes, irrespective of consequences and as in this ease, the commission of
the act at Plaza Miranda.
"What is of some interest in the personalty of Julio C. Guillen is his commission of some
overt acts. This is seen not only in the present instance, but sometime when an. employee
in La Clementina Cigar Factory he engaged in a boxing bout Mr. Monzano, a Spaniard,
one of the managers of the factory because Mr. Monzano wanted to abuse the women
cigar makers, and felt it his duty to defend them. One time he ran after a policeman with a
knife in hand after being provoked to a fight several times. He even challenged
Congressman Nueno to a fight sometime before when Mr. Uueno was running for a seat
in the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, after hearing him deliver one of his
apparently outspoken speeches.
"All these mean a defect in his personality characterized by a weakness of censorship

especially in relation to rationalization about the consequences of his acts.
"In view of the above findings it is our considered opinion that Julio C Guillen is not
insane "but is an individual with a personality defect which in Psychiatry is termed,
Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority.
"Final Diagnosis
"Not insane: Constitutional Psychopathic Inferiority, without psychosis."
In view of the above-quoted findings of the medical board, and notwithstanding the
contrary opinion of one Dr. Alvarez, who was asked by the defense to give his opinion on
the matter, the court ruled that Guillen, not being insane, could be tried, as he was tried,
for the offenses he committed on the date in question.
THE FACTS
Upon careful perusal of the evidence and the briefs submitted by counsel for the accused,
the Solicitor General and their respective memoranda, We find that there is no
disagreement between the prosecution and the defense, as to the essential facts which
caused the filing of the present criminal case against this accused. Those facts may be
stated as follows:
On the dates mentioned in this decision, Julio Guillen y Corpus, although not affiliated
with any particular political group, had voted for the defeated candidate in the
presidential elections held in 1946, Manuel A. Roxas, the successful candidate, assumed
the office of President of the Commonwealth and subsequently President of the
Philippine Republic. According to Guillen, he became disappointed in President Roxas
for his alleged failure to redeem the pledges and fulfill the promises made by him during
the presidential election campaign; and his disappointment was aggravated when,
according to him, President Roxas, instead of looking after the interest of his country,
sponsored and campaigned for the approval of the so-called "parity" measure. Hence he
determined to assassinate the President.
After he had pondered for some time over the ways and means of assassinating President
Roxas, the opportunity presented itself on the night of March 10, 1947, when at a popular
meeting held by the Liberal Party at Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo, Manila, attended by a big
crowd, President Roxas, accompanied by his wife and daughter and surrounded by a
number of ladies and gentlemen prominent in government and politics, stood on a
platform erected for that purpose and delivered his speech expounding and trying to
convince his thousands of listeners of the advantages to be gained by the Philippines,
should the constitutional amendment granting American citizens the same rights granted
to Filipino nationals be adopted.
Guillen had first intended to use a revolver for the accomplishment of his purpose, but
having lost said firearm, which was duly licensed, he thought of two hand grenades
which were given him by an Anerican soldier in the early days of the liberation of Manila
in exchange for two bottles of whiskey. He had'likewise been weighing the chances of
killing President Roxas, either by going to Malacanan, or following his intended victim in
the latter's trips to the provinces, for instance, to Tayabas (now Quezon) where the
President was scheduled to speak, but having encountered many difficulties, he decided
to carry out his plan at the pro-parity meeting held at Plaza de Miranda on the night of
March 10, 1947.
On the morning of that date he went to the house of Amado Hernandez whom he
requested to prepare for him a document (Exh. "B"), in accordance with their previous
understanding in the preceding afternoon, when they met at the premises of the Manila
Jockey Club on the occasion of an "anti-parity" meeting held there. On account of its
materiality in this case, we deem it proper to quote hereunder the contents of said
document. An English translation (Exh. "B-2") from its original in Tagalog reads:
"FOR THE SAKE OF A FREE PHILIPPINES
"I am the only one responsible for what happened. I conceived it, I planned it, and I
carried it out all by myself alone. It took me many days and nights pondering over this
act, talking to my own conscience, to my God, until I reached my conclusion. It was my
duty.
"I did not expect to live long; I only had one life to spare. And had I expected to live
much longer, had I had several lives to spare, I would not have hesitated either to
sacrifice it for the sake of a principle which was the welfare of the people.
"Thousands have died in Bataan; many more have mourned the loss of their husbands, of
their sons, and there are millions now suffering. Their deeds bore no fruits; their hopes
were frustrated.
"I was told by my conscience and by my God that there was a man to be blamed for all
thiss he had deceived the people, he had astounded them with too many promises with no
other purpose than to entice them; he even went to the extent of risking the heritage of
our future generations. .For these reasons he should not continue any longer. His life
would mean nothing as compared with the welfare of eighteen millions souls. And why
should I not give up my life too if only for the good of those eighteen million souls.
"These are the reasons which impelled me to do what I did and I am willing to bear up
the consequences of my act. It matters not if others will curse me. Time and history will
show, I am sure, that I have only displayed a high degree of patriotism in the performance
of my said act.
"Hurrah for a free Philippines.

"Cheers for the happiness of every Filipino home.
"May God pity on me.
"Amen.
"JULIO C.

GUILLEN"
A copy (Exh. "B-1") of the original in Tagalog (Exhibit B), made at the request of
Guillen by his nephew, was handed to him only at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of
March 10, 1947, for which reason said Exh. "B-1" appears unsigned, because he was in a
hurry for that meeting at Plaza de Miranda.
When he reached Plaza de Miranda, Guillen was carrying two hand grenades concealed
in a paper bag which also contained peanuts. He buried one of the hand grenades (Exh.
"D"), in a plant pot located close to the platform, and when he decided to carry out his
evil purpose he stood on the chair on which he had been sitting and, from a distance of
about seven meters, he hurled the grenade at the President when the latter had just closed
his speech, was being congratulated by .Ambassador Romulo and was about to leave the
platform.
General Castañeda, who was on the platform, saw the smoking, hissing, grenade and,
without losing his presence of mind, kicked it away from the platform, along the
stairway, and towards an open space where the general thought the grenade was likely to
do the least harm; and, covering the President with his body, shouted to the crowd that
everybody should lie down. The grenade fell to the ground and exploded in the middle of
a group of persons who were standing close to the platform. Confusion ensued, and the
crowd dispersed in a panic. It was found that the fragments of the grenade had seriously
injured Simeon Varela (or Barrela)—who died on the following day as a result of mortal
wounds caused by the fragments of the grenade (Exhibits F and "F-1)—Alfredo Eva, Jose
Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang.
Guillen was arrested by members of the Police Department about two hours after the
occurrence. It appears that one Angel Garcia, who was one of the spectators at that
meeting, saw how a person who was standing next to him hurled an object at the platform
and-, after the explosion, ran away towards a barber shop located near the platform at
Plaza de Mirandai Suspecting that that person was the thrower of the object that
exploded, Garcia went after him and had almost succeeded in holding him, but Guillen
offered stiff resistance, got loose from Garcia and managed to escape. Garcia pursued
him, but some detectives, mistaking the former for the real criminal and the author of the
explosion, placed him under arrest. In the meantime, while the City Mayor and some
agents of the Manila Police Department were investigating the affair, one Manuel Robles
volunteered the information that the person with whom Angel Garcia was wrestling was
Julio Guillen; that he (Manuel Robles) was acquainted with Julio Guillen for the previous
ten years and had seen each other in the plaza a few moments previous to the explosion.
The police operatives interrogated Garcia and Robles, and Julio Guillen was, within two
hours after the occurrence, found in his home at 1724 Juan Luna Street, Manila, brought
to the police headquarters and identified by Angel Garcia, as the same person who hurled
towards the platform the object which exploded and -whom Garcia tried to hold when he
was running away.
During the investigation conducted by the police he readily admitted his responsibility,
although at the same time tried to justify his action in throwing the bomb at President
Roxas. He also indicated to his captors the place where he had hidden his so-called last
will quoted above and marked Exhibit B which was then unsigned by him and
subsequently signed at the police headquarters.
Re-enacting the crime (Exhibit C), he pointed out to the police where he had buried
(Exhibit C-1) the other hand grenade (Exhibit D), and, in the presence of witnesses he
signed a statement which contained his answers to questions propounded to him by Major
A. Quintos of the Manila Police, who investigated him soon after his arrest (Exhibit E).
From a perusal of his voluntary statement, we are satisfied that it tallies exactly with the
declarations made by him on the witness stand during the trial of this case.
THE ISSUES
In the brief submitted by counsel de oficio for this appellant, several errors are assigned
allegedly committed by the trial court, namely: first, "in finding the appellant guilty of
murder for the death of Simeon Varela;" second, "in declaring the appellant guilty of the
complex crime of murder and multiple frustrated murder"; third,"in applying sub-section
1 of Article 49 of the Revised Penal Code in determining the penalty to be imposed upon
the accused"; and fourth, "in considering the concurrence of the aggravating
circumstances of nocturnity and of contempt of public authorities in the commission of
the crime."
The evidence for the prosecution, supported by the brazen statements made by the
accused, shows beyond any shadow of doubt that, when Guillen attended that meeting,
carrying with him two hand grenades, to put into execution his preconceived plan to
assassinate President Roxas, he knew fully well that, by throwing one of those two hand
grenades in his possession at President Roxas, and causing it to explode, he could not
prevent the persons who were around his main and intended victim from being killed or
at least injured, due to the highly explosive nature of the bomb employed by him to carry
out his evil purpose.
Guillen, testifying in his own behalf, in answer to questions propounded by the trial judge
(page 96 of transcript) supports our conclusion. He stated that he performed the act
voluntarily; that his purpose was to kill the President, but that it did not make any
difference to him if there were some people around the President when he hurled that
bomb, because the killing of those who surrounded the President was tantamount to
killing the President, in view of the fact that those persons, being loyal to the President,
were identified with the latter. In other words, although it was not his main intention to
kill the persons surrounding the President, he felt no compunction in killing them also in
order to attain his main purpose of killing the President.
The facts do not support the contention of counsel for appellant that the latter is guilty
only of homicide through reckless imprudence in regard to the death of Simeon Varela
and of less serious physical injuries in regard to Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo
and Emilio Maglalang, and that he should be sentenced to the corresponding penalties for
the different felonies committed, the sum total of which shall not exceed three times the
penalty to be imposed for the most serious crime in accordance with article 70 in relation
to article 74 of the Revised Penal Code.
In throwing hand grenade at the President with the intention of killing him, the appellant
acted with malice. He is therefore liable for all the consequences of his wrongful act; for
in accordance with article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by
any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be
unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice.
(People vs. Sara, 55 Phil. 939.) In the words of Viada, "in order that an act may be
qualified as imprudence it is necessary that neither malice nor intention to cause injury
should intervene; where such intention exists, the act should be qualified by the felony it
has produced even though it may not have been the intention of the actor to cause an evil
of such gravity as that produced." (Viada's Comments on the Penal Code, vol. 7, 5th ed.,
p. 7.) And, as was held by this Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is
essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. (People vs. Nanquil, 43
Phil. 232.) Where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the
intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence. (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil.
605).
The case of People vs. Mabug-at, 51 Phil. 967, cited by counsel for appellant does not
support his ..contention. In that case the defendant, with intent to kill his sweetheart, fired
a shot from his revolver which hit not the intended victim but the latter»s niece, who was
seriously wounded. The defendant in that case contended that he was guilty only of
unlawful discharge of firearms with injuries, but this Court held that the act having been
committed with intent to kill and with treachery, defendant was guilty of frustrated
murder.
Squarely on the point raised by counsel is the following decision of the Supreme Court of
Spain:
"Cuestion 62. Se presenta A, a las ocho de la noche, en el estanco de B a comprar tabaco,

y habiendose negado este a darselo al fiado, se retira aquel sin mediar entre ambos
disputa alguna; pero, transcurrido un cuarto de hora, hallandose el estanquero
despachando a C, se oye la detonacion de un arma de fuego disparada por A desde la
calle, quedando muertos en el acto C y el estanquero: supuesta la i no intencion en A de
matar a C, y si solo al estanquero, cabe calificar la muerte de este de homicidio y la de C
de imprudencia temeraria?—La Sala de lo criminal de la Audiencia de Granada lo estirad
asi, y condeno al procesado a catorce años de reclusion por el homicidio y a un ano de
prision correccional por la imprudencia. Aparte de que la muerte del estanquero debio
calificarse de asesinato y no de homicidio, por haberse ejecutado con alevosia, es
evidente que la muerte de C, suponiendo que no se propusiera ejecutarla el procesado, no
pudo calificarse de imprudencia temeraria, sino que tambien debio declararsele
responsable de la misma, a tenor de lo dispuesto en este apartado ultimo del articulo; y
que siendo ambas muertes producidas por un solo hecho, o sea por un solo disparo, debio
imponerse al reo la pena del delito de asesinato en el grado maximo, a tenor de lo
dispuesto en el art. 90 del Codigo, o sea la pena de muerte. Se ve, pues, claramente que
en la antedicha sentencia, aparte de otros articulos del Codigo, se infringio por la Sala la
disposicion de este apartado ultimo del articulo muy principalmente, y asi lo declaro el
Tribunal Supremo en S. de 18 de junio de 1872. (Gaceta de 1. o de agosto.)" (I Viada, 5th
Ed., p. 42.)
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:
"Art. 48. Penalty for Complex Crimes.— When a single act constitutes two or more grave
or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other,
the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period."
We think it is the above-quoted article and not paragraph 1 of article 49 that is applicable.
The ease before us is clearly governed by the first clause of article 49 because by a single
act, that of throwing a highly explosive hand grenade at President Roxas, the accused
committed two grave felonies, namely: (1) murder, of which Simeon Varela was the
victim; and (2) multiple attempted murder, of which President Roxas, Alfredo Eva, Jose
Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang were the injured parties.
The killing of Simeon Varela was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
In the case of People vs. Mabug-at, supra, this court held that the qualifying circumstance
of treachery may be properly considered, even when the victim of the attack was not the
one whom the defendant intended to kill, if it appears from the evidence that neither of
the two persons could in any manner put up defense against the attack, or become aware
of it. In the same case it was held that the qualifying circumstance of premeditation may
not be properly taken into account when the person whom the defendant proposed to kill
was different from the one who became his victim.
There can be no question that the accused attempted to kill President Roxas by throwing
a hand grenade at him with the intention to kill him, thereby commencing the
commission of a felony by overt acts, but he did not succeed in assassinating him "by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance." For the
same reason we qualify the injuries caused on the four other persons already named as
merely attempted and not frustrated murder.
In this connection, it should be stated that, although there is abundant proof that, in
violation of the provisions of Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused Guillen
has committed among others the offense of assault upon a person in authority, for in fact
his efforts were directed towards the execution of his main purpose of eliminating
President Roxas for his failure to redeem his electoral campaign promises, by throwing at
him in his official capacity as the Chief Executive of the nation the hand grenade in
question, yet, in view of the failure of the prosecution to insert in the information the
appropriate allegation charging Guillen with the commission of said offense, we shall
refrain from making a finding to that effect.
The complex crimes of murder and multiple attempted murder committed by the accused
with the single act of throwing a hand grenade at the President, was attended by the
various aggravating circumstances alleged in the information, without any mitigating
circumstance. But we do not deem it necessary to consider said aggravating
circumstances because in any event Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code above-quoted
requires that the penalty for the most serious of said crimes be applied in its maximum
period. The penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death.
(Art. 248) . It is our painful duty to apply the law and mete out to the accused the extreme
penalty provided by it upon the facts and circumstances hereinabove narrated.
The sentence of the trial court being correct, we have no alternative but to affirm it, and
we hereby do so by a unanimous vote. The death sentence shall be executed in
accordance with Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, under authority of the Director of
Prisons, on such working day as the trial court may fix within 30 days from the date the
record shall have been remanded. It is so ordered.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. Nos. 67803-04, July 30, 1990 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. PAT.
RICARTE MADALI AND ANNIE MORTEL MADALI, DEFENDANTS-
APPELLANTS.
DECISION
FERNAN, C.J.:
Husband and wife Patrolman Ricarte Madali and Annie Mortel Madali appeal from a

decision of the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Branch LXXXI finding them guilty
[1]
beyond reasonable doubt of killing father and son Cipriano and Felix Gasang, and

seriously wounding
Agustin Reloj and Cipriano's daughter, Merlinda. The dispositive portion of the decision
states:
"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the guilt of accused Ricarte Madali and

Annie Mortel Madali beyond reasonable doubt of the following offenses and sentences
each of them as follows:
"(1) For the frustrated murder of Agustin Reloj, each accused is meted an
indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional, as minimum to TWELVE
(12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum. (E)ach of them is also
sentenced to suffer all the accessory penalties provided for by law, and each is ordered
to pay in solidum the offended party, Agustin Reloj, the sum of P200.00 as
reimbursement of medical and hospitalization expenses.
“(2) For the murder of Felix Gasang, each accused is sentenced the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and each of them is likewise sentenced to suffer the accessory
penalties provided for by law, and each is also ordered to pay in solidum to the heirs of
Felix Gasang, the sum of P12,000, as death indemnity.
“(3) For the murder of Cipriano Gasang and the mortal (sic) wounding
of Merlinda Gasang (which has been converted into a complex crime of murder with
frustrated murder) each accused is sentenced to the penalty
of reclusion perpetua together with the accessory penalties provided for by law and to
indemnify in solidum the heirs of Cipriano Gasang the sum of P12,000.00 and each is
also ordered to pay in solidum, Merlinda Gasang the sum of P6,000 for reimbursement
of medical and hospitalization expenses.
"Each of the accused is likewise ordered to pay in solidum the heirs of
deceased, Cipriano Gasang and Felix Gasang, the sum of P50,000.00, which amount
represents the value of the loss (sic) earning capacity of deceased Cipriano and Felix,
both surnamed Gasang, and the sum of P30,000.00 as moral damages, and the sum of
"The sentences of reclusion perpetua and the indeterminate penalty imposed
upon each accused should be served successively, with proportionate costs.
"IT IS SO ORDERED." [2]
According to the prosecution, said crimes stemmed from an altercation between the son
of the Madali spouses, Ramon, and the group of Felix Gasang, who was twenty years old
when he was killed. It appears that on October 26, 1979, Felix figured in a fistfight with
[3]
someone who was a friend of Ramon. The latter interceded and mauled Felix with a
"chako". One of Felix's companions then was Agustin Reloj.
[4] [5]
The following day, the police summoned Felix to the municipal building. Felix's
mother, Desamparada Gasang, went with him. At the police station, Ricarte Madali, a
[6]
police officer, angrily scolded Felix and his cousin, Arnaldo Fadriquilan, and told them
that because they were "very brave", he would put them in jail for twelve
hours. Madali added after asking about Felix's age that he would "sow bullets" in the
body of Felix. According to witness policeman Aristeo Fetalino, Madali also uttered,
[7]
"Kailangan sa imo lubongan bala" which means, what you need is a bullet embedded in
you. Madali's father-in-law, Agustin Mortel, who arrived at the police station, agreed
[8]
with Madali that Felix and his group must be "sown with bullets" to eradicate them.
Another group mate of Felix was detained at the municipal jail but Felix was sent home
[9]
with his mother.[10]
At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of October 31, 1979, Felix and

his cousin, Agustin Reloj, went home together from the town plaza. Their houses were
located near each other in sitio Marawi, barangay Cagbo-aya, San Agustin, Romblon.
Felix and Agustin parted ways at the Marawi bridge. Felix dropped by the store

of Coroy Mangao to buy cigarettes while Agustin proceeded home. Around fifteen
meters from the house of Ricarte Madali, the latter accosted him, held him by his arm and
said, "So you are here, you devil, now you are finished. I have been waiting for you. I
have been watching for you for three nights already." Then Madali dragged Agustin
[11]
towards the gate of his (Madali's) house. When Agustin asked Madali why he was

dragging him, Madali said that the reason was because Agustin helped in fighting his son.
As one of Agustin's feet stepped over the knee-high fence at the gate of
the Madali residence, he was clubbed by Annie Madali with a piece of wood. Annie
struck him first on the left shoulder and would have given him another blow had not
Agustin freed himself from Madali's hold. Annie landed that blow on Madali instead. [12]
Agustin was looking back as he ran away when Madali shot him. He was hit below his
right hip. He fell to the ground and did not get up fearing that Madali might shoot him
again. Agustin was still lying down on the ground with his eyes focused on Madali when
Felix Gasang arrived. He saw Annie beamed her flashlight at Felix and she said,
"Here comes another." [13]
Agustin saw Felix raising his hands as Annie focused her flashlight on Felix. Felix
told Madali that he would not fight with him but then Madali shot Felix twice. Felix fell
to the ground. Madali was still near the gate of his house
when Cipriano Gasang arrived. Annie beamed her flashlight at Cipriano and she said,
"Here comes, here comes another, fire upon him." Madali shot Cipriano who fell to the
[14]
ground. Merlinda Gasang, who was with her father Cipriano, clung to the fence nearby
and shouted that she was also hit. Then Desamparada Gasang arrived and shouted for
help. One Romeo Manes came and carried away Merlinda. Agustin slowly stood up and
as he walked towards his house, he saw Roman Galicia (Galicha) and the Madali spouses
who were then entering their gate.[15]
Merlinda Gasang* was at home when she heard an explosion. Her father, Cipriano, was

also at home then but after the second shot, he went out of the house towards the
direction of the source of the gunfire. There was a minute interval between the first and
the second shots but only a second elapsed between the second and the third shots. The
fourth shot came about two minutes later. [16]
Cipriano was "beyond the gate" of the Madali residence when he was shot

by Madali. Merlinda was around three meters from her father. She saw Annie focused
[17]
her flashlight at Cipriano and she heard Annie say, "Yara pa, yara pa, barila" meaning

"Here comes another one, here comes another one, shoot." That was when the fourth
[18]
explosion occurred and Merlinda heard her father exclaim that he was hit. Merlinda felt

that she was also hit. She did not fall to the ground because she was able to take hold of
[19]
the wooden fence. She saw both her brother Felix and Agustin lying flat on the ground
[20]
with the latter's head turned to one side.

[21]
Merlinda shouted for help, Romeo Manes came and brought her to

the Tablas Island Emergency Hospital. She
[22]
did not notice anymore
where Ricarte Madali was at that time because she was looking towards the direction of
their house. She saw her mother running to her. [23]
Desamparada Gasang was washing the dishes after supper when she heard the first
shot. After the fourth shot, she became apprehensive because a policeman was mad at
her family. She proceeded to where she heard the gunbursts and she met her
[24]
daughter Merlinda who informed her that she was shot by Madali and that she saw Annie
focused a flashlight on her. Then Desamparada saw her husband crawling on the
ground. She asked him to stand up but he could not do so. Cipriano told her,
"Ging iwagan ako ni Annie Madali cag ging baril ako ni Ricarte Madali." (Annie focused
a light on me and Ricarte Madali shot me.) She then went back to her daughter and
shouted for help.
The bodies of Cipriano and Felix Gasang were not removed from the road until
around midnight. They were brought to the Gasang residence for autopsy. The rural
[25]
health physician who conducted the postmortem examinations on both Cipriano and Felix

found that Cipriano sustained a gunshot wound at the right lower quadrant of the
abdomen along the mammary line. From that point of entry, the bullet followed an
obliquely downward course penetrating the small and large intestines and the urinary
bladder, and exited at the middle of the left buttock. Cipriano's death was caused by
hemorrhage due to the gunshot wound. [26]
Felix also died of hemorrhage resulting from the gunshot wound at the right
second intercostal space within the midclavicular line of the chest. The bullet veered
backwards towards the left hitting the right lung, its blood vessels and the fourth cervical
vertebra. The second gunshot wound was at the right side of the abdomen at about the
level of the navel and within the right anterior axillary line. The bullet hit the
subcutaneous tissues and exited at the posterior axillary line.
[27]
Merlyn (Merlinda) Gasang sustained a gunshot wound at the anterior upper third portion
of her right leg with no exit wound and which would incapacitate her for ten to fifteen
days. However, she stayed for treatment at the emergency hospital in San Agustin for
[28]
39 days. Later, she was brought to the hospital in Romblon for extraction of the slug

lodged in her leg. For the treatment of her wound, Merlinda spent P6,200.00. She could
not go to school for three months. [29]
Agustin Reloj suffered a gunshot wound at the glutael region of the right thigh. The

bullet entered the lateral aspect of the upper third of the right thigh and exited at the
posterior aspect of the gluteus maximus muscle. The attending physician certified that
Agustin's injury would incapacitate him for seven to nine days. Agustin, who was then a
[30]
laborer, stayed one week at the hospital and spent P200 for the treatment of his
wound. For his pain and anxiety, he stated that he should be compensated in the amount
of P500.00. [31]
Madali voluntarily surrendered to the San Agustin police. He handed his .38 caliber
[32]
service revolver to the policemen who arrived at the scene of the crime and they noted
that there were only two remaining bullets in the revolver. He was placed under
[33]
technical arrest by the provincial commander of the Philippine Constabulary. [34]
After the investigation, on February 1, 1980, two informations were filed against

Patrolman Madali and his wife, Annie Mortel Madali. In Criminal Case No. 981, said
spouses were charged with multiple murder for the killing of Felix
and Cipriano Gasang. The information alleged that they conspired, confederated and
mutually helped each other in killing Felix and Cipriano treacherously, with evident
premeditation and with the use of a.38 caliber revolver.
[35]
In the separate information for multiple frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 982,
conspiracy, treachery and evident premeditation were also alleged as having attended the
felonious assault with the use of a .38 caliber revolver on Merlinda Gasang and
Agustin Reloj which could have resulted in the crime of murder had not timely and able
medical assistance intervened.[36]
At the trial, both Madali and his wife, who had pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged,
testified in their own defense. According to Madali, at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening
of October 31, 1979, he and his family were about to sleep when a stone was hurled at
their house. His wife said that it could have been a stray stone. But then, three other
stones landed on the GI sidings, and the lawanit and bamboo walls of their
house. Madali went to their porch where he noticed a person crouching near
their gabi plants. He could not identify the person because of the fog so he went inside
their room and dressed up in his fatigue trousers and jacket. He went down the house and
noticed that there was no one in the gabi plants anymore.
Madali was behind their kitchen and about to go back to his house when someone hit his
left shoulder. The person struck him again but he was able to catch the club aimed at him
and strike the person with his nightstick. Madali was about to give him another blow
with his nightstick but the person caught it. They tried to get each other's club.
They were in that position when Madali's foot stepped into a low canal, causing him to
fall down flat on his back. The intruder fell with him and landed
on Madali's stomach. The person shouted at someone in the vicinity what the latter was
tarrying about. As Madali tried to get up, he heard his wife call, "Carte, Carte." Just then
he kicked the intruder on the stomach and the latter fell to the ground.
Madali hurriedly stood up, pulled his gun and fired at the intruder. He noticed two other
persons approaching him. One person had a club and the other had what looked like a
knife. He warned them, "This is a policeman. Do not come near." One of the persons
proceeded to strike him and Madali was hit on his forehead by the man with the
club. Madali in turn dealt him with a blow by swinging back his left forearm. The man
with a club fell down.
When the man with the knife was about to stab him, Madali fired his gun at him. As that
man was still closing in on him, Madali shot him again. The man with the knife retreated
to the gate and fell just outside of it.
After firing two shots, Madali turned sideward and saw the man with the club about to
strike him. So, Madali shot him. The man walked away. Madali later identified the man
crouching amidst their gabi plants as Agustin Reloj. [37]
Annie Mortel Madali corroborated her husband's testimony from the stoning of their

house until he dressed up, got his gun and nightstick, and went out of the house. When
she heard Madali opening the door to the stairs, Annie got up and went to their balcony to
peep. She saw her husband going around their house in a clockwise direction. When he
was near their kitchen, Annie saw him grappling with someone over the possession of a
club. Her husband and his protagonist fell into a canal, trampling the gabi plants. She
heard the man say, "Hay, naga tanga pa kamo dira!" meaning "What are you still waiting
for!"
Annie then saw two persons rushing inside their premises. One person was holding a
club while the other one had something which he appeared to thrust forward. Losing her
composure, Annie warned her husband by calling out his name, "Carte, Carte!" Then she
heard a gunshot and the person holding a club who grappled with her husband ran out of
the premises.
Annie heard her husband say, "Pulis ini, ayaw mag-lapit" meaning "This is a policeman
do not come near." After that, she heard three more gunshots. The two who came rushing
inside their premises scampered away and out of their fence. She could not recognize the
three intruders. Madali then walked towards her and asked her to call the police. Annie
went inside their sala and told her daughter Agnes to summon the police. [38]
Policeman Numeriano Galang who heard the gun reports, met Agnes on his way

to sitio Marawi. When he arrived at the Madali residence, he found Madali with his face
and jacket smeared with mud and with a swollen forehead. Galang asked Madali what
[39]
happened but he did not put his investigation in writing. At the yard, he found stones,
[40]
two slippers and a nightstick." He did not find bloodstains in the yard because it was
[41]
drizzling. Neither did he find bloodstains outside the yard because he inspected only the
[42]
areas surrounding the Madali house. [43]
Policeman Antonio Morales arrived at the scene of the crime with two other
policemen. He found Felix Gasang lying flat on his belly about one foot from the gate.
To identify him, they turned Felix's body face up and found that his right hand was
[44]
holding a knife. Later, that knife was turned over to police investigator Pfc. Ernesto
[45]
Solano. The other victim (Cipriano) was found about five to six meters from the body of
[46]
Felix. Like Galang, Morales saw pieces of stones which were different from the stones
[47]
found in Madali's yard which were mere corals or "boga", two pairs of slippers and
the gabi plants which appeared to have been trampled upon. [48]
To prove aggression on the part of his victims, Madali presented a medical certificate

stating that on November 1, 1979, he was examined at
the Tablas Island Emergency Hospital for a vertical contusion (hematoma) on his left
forehead and another contusion on the left deltoid region.[49]
The lower court gave full faith and credit to the evidence of the prosecution, especially
the testimonies of eyewitnesses-victims Agustin Reloj and Merlinda Gasang. It found
that the concerted acts of Madali and his wife while committing the crimes proved
conspiracy between them thereby making their criminal responsibility collective. While
finding that the prosecution failed to prove evident premeditation, the lower court
positively appreciated treachery to qualify as murder the killing of both Cipriano and
Felix Gasang. It noted, however, that the prosecution erred in charging as the separate
crimes of murder and frustrated murder the killing of Cipriano and the wounding
of Merlinda. Observing that only one bullet hit Cipriano and his daughter, Merlinda, the
lower court concluded that the Madali spouses should have been charged with the
complex crime of murder and frustrated murder. Accordingly, it imposed the penalties
set out above for the crimes of frustrated murder, murder and the complex crime of
murder and frustrated murder.
In this appeal, the Madali spouses pray for their acquittal arguing that the lower court
erred in: [a] finding Annie Mortel Madali guilty as principal by direct participation; [b]
not finding that the Gasangs and their kins were motivated by revenge; [c] not finding
that Ricarte Madali acted in self-defense; and [d] in giving credence and/or adopting the
theory of the prosecution instead of that of the defense.
The prosecution of these cases was highlighted by notable developments. Firstly, before

the defense could present its evidence, on September 6, 1980, the capitol building
of Romblon was razed to the ground. All court records were lost. The records of
Criminal Cases Nos. 981 and 982 were, however, reconstituted and the accused arraigned
anew. Secondly, prosecution eyewitness, Roman Galicia recanted his testimony and
[50]
appeared for the defense claiming that he did not see the gunwielder. He alleged that he
[51]
testified for the prosecution for fear that the special prosecutor would revive the rape case
against him. The lower court thereafter disregarded his entire testimony inasmuch as
[52]
only the transcript of his cross-examination as prosecution witness could be reproduced.

Thirdly, only the testimony of Ricarte Madali was heard by the ponente below as the
[53]
previous presiding judge was transferred to another sala. [54]
In view of the disqualification of Roman Galicia as a witness, the issue of the credibility
of the eyewitnesses has gained importance in this case. Significantly, it is the word of the
accused Madali spouses as against that of the surviving victims,
Agustin Reloj and Merlinda Gasang. Both prosecution and defense failed to present
corroborative witnesses to buttress their testimonies.
Matters of credibility are ordinarily addressed to the discretion and discernment of the
trial court which is presumed to have observed the demeanor of the witnesses at the
stand. While the ponente of the decision below was able to hear only the testimony of
accused Ricarte Madali, the Court sees no reason for not giving sufficient weight to his
factual findings considering that he took pains in thoroughly studying the case even to the
extent of conducting an ocular inspection of the scene of the crimes and hearing part of
the cross-examination of Madali thereat. [55]
The defense is anchored on the justifying circumstance of self-defense. In order that such
plea can prosper, it must be positively shown that there was a previous unlawful and
unprovoked attack that placed the defendant's life in danger and forced him to inflict
more or less severe wounds upon his assailant, employing therefor reasonable means to
resist the said attack.
[56]
The defense miserably failed to pass said test. Its allegation that the Madali residence
was hurled with stones before Madali confronted the Gasang group, was not credibly
established. No one was able to positively identify the stone-throwers. Not
even Madali and his wife, Annie. There is no proof that the stones found in
the Madali yard were indeed the stones thrown at their house. It is interesting to note that
even defense witness Antonio Morales, a fellow policeman of Madali, testified that he
did not have personal knowledge on where the stones were discovered because he was
only informed by Galang (another policeman) "who in turn was only told by Ricarte that
the latter was stoned." [57]
Indeed, the defense story is riddled with contradictions and loopholes which the
appellants failed to rectify. At the trial, Agustin Reloj sketched a map of the
neighborhood and placed Felix Gasang's body on a spot across the road from
the Madali gate. The defense tried to discredit Reloj's sketch and his testimony thereon
[58]
by presenting policemen Morales and Galang who testified that Felix's body was found
close to the gate of the Madali residence. However, the testimonies of said policemen
clashed with each other. Morales testified that both the two dead bodies were found close
to the gate while Galang swore that while one body was near the gate, the other body was
five meters away from the Madali fence. It should be noted that ten days after the
[59]
alleged commission of the crime, police investigator Fetalino found blood stains in the

middle of the street indicating that a blood-drenched body had been dragged across the
street.[60]
If it were really true that both Agustin and Cipriano were armed with clubs, at
least Cipriano's club would have been found as he died on the spot. The nightstick found
by the police could not have been the one used by any of the victims. According to
defense witness policeman Galang, the nightstick was similar to that of a policeman.
Hence, it could have been the same nightstick which Madali admittedly used in striking
[61]
one of the intruders. [62]
Granting that Agustin Reloj and Felix and Cipriano Gasang were armed with clubs and a

knife, Madali's means of resisting them was unreasonable under the
circumstance. Having known that an interloper was inside his yard, Madali, being a
policeman, should have first fired a warning shot to deter said intruder from executing
whatever vicious plans he had. As it were, he fired directly at his victims and all four
shots hit their targets.
Moreover, if Agustin, Felix and Cipriano were the intruders, then they should be credited
for their extraordinary bravery in entering the Madali yard. They were neighbors and
they must have known that as a policeman, Madali possessed a service revolver. The
lower court, which saw for itself the Madali yard considered it "rather inconceivable" for
people like the victims to ever dare go inside the premises armed only with a knife and
clubs. [63]
The lower court is correct in characterizing the felonious assault on Agustin Reloj as

frustrated murder. While Agustin Reloj was hit only below his right hip, Madali's act of
shooting was plainly attended by an intent to kill. This is evidenced by the revealing
statements of Madali while accosting Agustin Reloj some fifteen (15) meters
from Madali's house, thus: "So you are here, you devil, now you are finished. I have
been waiting for you. I have been waiting for you for three nights already." The [64]
statements "now you are finished" and "I have been waiting for you for three nights
already" sufficiently show that Madali not only intended to do away with
Agustin Reloj but also that the crime had been premeditated. They satisfactorily prove
that Madali had formed a determination to commit the crime prior to the moment of its
execution; that he had clung to his determination and that there was sufficient interval of
time between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect
upon the consequences of his act. [65]
Moreover, after uttering those damaging statements, Madali dragged Reloj towards his

gate. Annie then clubbed Reloj who, however, succeeded in freeing himself
from Madali's hold. Reloj was running away when Madali shot him, hitting him below
the right hip.
[66]
Indeed, firing at his fleeing victim and subsequently shooting to death two (2) other
persons on the same occasion, to our mind, evince quite clearly the intent to kill being
then entertained by Madali.
There is likewise no doubt that Madali committed murder when he shot

Felix Gasang twice in the body. Treachery qualified the killing to murder punishable
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. There was treachery because of the
suddenness of the attack. Felix was raising his hands, and saying that he would not
[67]
fight back when Madali feloniously fired at him twice. Annie Madali's uttering "Here

comes another" before Madali shot Felix may not be considered sufficient warning so as
to rule out suddenness of the attack. However, no generic aggravating circumstance has
[68]
been sufficiently proven.
We agree with the trial court that with respect to the killing of Cipriano Gasang and the
wounding of Merlinda Gasang, the crime committed was the complex crime of murder
with frustrated murder inasmuch as a single shot hit them both. It is immaterial
[69]
that Merlinda Gasang was wounded on the leg and not on a vital part of her body. What
is of primordial consideration is the fact that the criminal act which killed Cipriano also
caused Merlinda's injury. As in the killing of Felix, treachery qualified the killing
[70]
of Cipriano to murder because of the suddenness of the attack.
Annie Mortel Madali's defense strategy is to deny participation in the commission of the

crimes and to interpose an alibi. She insists that like any other wife, her natural reaction
to situations which involve risk is "to stay away, meditate and to shout and warn her
husband of the intruders rushing towards him." She bewails the fact that the prosecution
[71]
has pictured her as "a brave, pugnacious and aggressive wife like the heroine of the pre-
war movie 'Annie of the Indies'." Indeed, Annie's role in the commission of the crimes
[72]
may appear to be straight out of an action picture were it not for the fact that her denials
and uncorroborated alibi cannot stand against the categorical declarations of prosecution
eyewitnesses Agustin Reloj and Merlinda Gasang on her participation therein. She [73]
should have presented witnesses to support her story. As she herself admitted, she and
her husband were not alone in their house when they were allegedly stoned. Six of their
children were home then. Some of them must have been within the age of discernment
[74]
inasmuch as their eldest child was 21 years old and therefore, any one of them could have
corroborated her story.
Nevertheless, the Court finds that proof beyond reasonable doubt has not been
established as to the existence of conspiracy between the Madali spouses. While direct
proof is not essential to prove conspiracy as it may be shown by acts and circumstances
from which may logically be inferred the existence of a common design among the
accused to commit the offense(s) charged, the evidence to prove the same must be
positive and convincing considering that conspiracy is a facile devise by which an
accused may be ensnared and kept within the penal fold. With this and the principle that
[75]
in criminal prosecution, doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused, as guides, the
Court rules that the liability of Annie Mortel Madali with respect to the crimes committed
herein, is only that of an accomplice.
Annie's participation in the shooting of the victims consisted of beaming her flashlight at
them and warning her husband of the presence of other persons in the vicinity. By
beaming her flashlight at a victim, Annie assisted her husband in taking a good
aim. However, such assistance merely facilitated the commission of the felonious acts of
shooting. Considering that, according to both of the Madali spouses, "it was not so
dark nor too bright" that night or that "brightness and darkness were equally of the same
[76]
intensity," Ricarte Madali could have nevertheless accomplished his criminal acts

[77]
without Annie's cooperation and assistance.
Neither may Annie's shouts of "here comes, here comes another, shoot" be considered as
having incited Ricarte to fire at the victims to make Annie a principal by
inducement. There is no proof that those inciting words had great dominance and
influence over Madali as to become the determining cause of the crimes. The rapidity
[78]
with which Madali admittedly fired the shots eliminated the necessity of encouraging

[79]
words such as those uttered by Annie.
The fact that Annie dealt a blow on Agustin while he was being dragged by Madali to
their yard does not make her a principal by direct participation. Annie's act, being
previous to Madali's act of shooting Agustin, was actually not indispensable to the crime
committed against Agustin. [80]
Proof of motive is unnecessary where there is a clear identification of the accused. More
[81]
so in this case where the principal accused does not deny having fired the fatal shots. But
the Madali spouses must have harbored a deep resentment against the Gasang family to
put into action Madali's threat of "sowing bullets" on them. What makes Madali's crimes
even more reprehensible is the fact that he claims to have committed them in the pursuit
of his task as a peace officer. He even went to the extent of wearing his fatigue jacket
and trousers to create a facade of performance of an official function. Sadly, he misused
his authority and his wife, harboring an improper sense of connubial cooperation, did not
even try to dissuade him.
Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for a complex crime shall be the
maximum period of the penalty for the most serious crime. The death penalty being the
maximum period of the penalty for murder of reclusion temporal maximum to death
under Article 248 of the same Code, the death penalty should be imposed for the complex
crime of murder with frustrated murder considering that under Article 63, an indivisible
penalty cannot be affected by the presence of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance. It should be noted that under the ruling in People v. Muñoz, L-38968-70,
February 9, 1989, Article III, Section 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution does not change the
period of the penalty for murder except only insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the
death penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua. Hence, the lower court correctly
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on Ricarte Madali for said complex crime.
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender which was proven but not
appreciated in favor of Ricarte Madali by the trial court, should be considered in
imposing on him the penalty for the murder of Felix Gasang. The presence of this
mitigating circumstance without any aggravating circumstance to offset the same justified
the imposition of the minimum period of the penalty for murder pursuant to Article 64(2)
of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, the proper penalty should be the indeterminate
sentence of not less than ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum and
not more than twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum. [82]
The same mitigating circumstance should be considered in the imposition of the penalty
on Ricarte Madali for the crime of frustrated murder committed against
Agustin Reloj. The penalty for frustrated murder in accordance with Article 50 in
relation to Article 248 is prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its
medium period. Taking into consideration the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposed
on Ricarte Madali is four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day
of prision correctional as minimum to 12 years of prision mayor as maximum.
As an accomplice, Annie Mortel Madali should be imposed the penalty next lower in

degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated felonies. For the complex
[83]
crime of murder and frustrated murder, like her husband, she shall be imposed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, considering
[84]
that the penalty prescribed by law
for Ricarte Madali is the death penalty. For the murder of Felix Gasang, the penalty
imposable on her is prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium, and there[85]
being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the penalty should be reclusion

temporal minimum. Applying
[86]
the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
Annie Mortel Madali should therefore be meted the penalty of six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months
of reclusion temporal as maximum. For the crime of frustrated murder committed against
Agustin Reloj, Annie Mortel Madali shall be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
from six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
Ricarte Madali and Annie Mortel Madali shall also be liable to the heirs of Cipriano and

Felix Gasang for indemnity in the total amount of sixty thousand pesos (P60,000) in the
proportion of 2:1 (2 shares for Ricarte Madali as principal and 1 share for
Annie Mortel Madali as accomplice), with each accused-appellant
being subsidiarily liable for the other in case of insolvency. The Court sees no reason to
disturb the lower court's findings on the reimbursement of hospitalization and medical
expenses in favor of Merlinda Gasang and Agustin Reloj as well as the award of
damages, except to clarify that payment thereof shall likewise be in the proportion of 2:1
as above stated and with each accused being subsidiarily liable for the other in case of
insolvency.
WHEREFORE, except as hereinabove modified, the decision of the lower court is

hereby affirmed. Costs against the appellants.
SO ORDERED.
[ G.R. No. 43120, July 27, 1935 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND
APPELLEE, VS. BASILIO SILVALLANA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
DECISION
VICKERS, J.:
The appellant was tried in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan on a plea of not
guilty to an information alleging:
"Que en o hacia el mes de julio de 1934, en el Municipio de Btfguey, Provincia de
Cagayan, Islas Filipinas, el referido acusado Basilio Silvallana siendo assistant postmaster
de dicho Municipio de Buguey, y como tal tenia el deber de recibir, abrir y despachar
todas las balijas de correspondencias que se entregan a el y como en efecto recibio en
dicho mes varias correspondencias de entre eilas im sobre dirigido al postmaster de
Ganzaga, Cagayan, que contenia el cheque No. 131703 por valor de P30 expedido por el
Banco Postal de Ahorros de las Islas Filipinas a favor de Francisco P. Peralta pero una vez
en su poder este sobre, y abusando de su cargo, en vez de enviarlo a su destinatario,
voluntaria, ilegal y criminalmente lo abno y se apodero del cheque y con el proposito de
apropiarse para su uso propio no solamente de la cantidad de P30 que es el importe de
dicho cheque sino de la cantidad de P230, falsified el mencionado cheaue raspando las
palabras 'thirty .only' y en su lugar escribio las palabras 'Two hundred and Thirty only'
asi como tambien en los guarismos P30 anadio anteponiendo el guarismo '2' entre el
signo de 'P' y la cantidad de P30, alterando de este modo el valor del cheque de P30 a
P230, despues lo firmo fingiendo la firma de 'Francisco P. Peralta' que es la persona a
favor de quien estaba expedido dicho cheque, asi como tambien firmo el nombre de un
tal 'Pedro Siggaoat' como endosatario que es un nombre ficticio, habiendose por este
motivo supuesto en el acto la intervention de personas que no la han tenido y hecho en
un documento verdadero mediante dicha alteracion, un documento falso y despues hizo
efectivo dicho cheque en la recaudacion quo tenfa como assistant postmaster,
apropiandose del importe del mismo, o sea, la cantidad de P230 en perjuicio del
Gobierno entregando mas tarde el cheque como parto de su recaudacion a su
coassistant postmaster Pascual Baclig, quien a su vez canjeo al tesorero municipal de
Buguey."
The trial judge found the appellant guilty of the complex crime of malversation of
public funds through the falsification of a public document and sentenced him to suffer
ten years and one day of prision mayor, with the accessories of the law, to pay a fine of
P500, to suffer perpetual special disqualification, and to pay the costs; and. for the
purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law the minimum penalty was fixed at four
years, two months, and one day of prision correctional, with the accessories of the law,
the payment of a fine of P500, with subsidiary imprisonment which should not exceed
one-third of the principal penalty, perpetual special disqualification, and payment of the
costs.
Appellant's attorney alleges that the trial court erred:

"(a) In holding that the accused has altered and falsified treasury warrant A-
131703, Exhibit B of the prosecution, and appropriated to his own personal use its
import in the amount of P230;
"(b) In holding that the alteration of the check, Exhibit B, can be seen or noted with
facility;
"(c) In not giving credit to the testimony of the accused which was corroborated in all its
material points by eyewitnesses who saw that the check, Exhibit B, was actually cashed
by one Pedro Siggaoat, who actually received from the accused its import in the amount
of P230;
"(d) In not absolving the accused from the crime charged in the information on the
ground of reasonable doubt."
The appellant was the assistant postmaster of Buguey, Cagayan Province, and
during the period from July 1st to July 23rd, 1934 acted as postmaster. Francisco P.
Peralta, a resident of the municipality of Gonzaga, Cagayan Province, had a savings
account with the Philippine Postal Savings Bank. In June, 1934, he applied for the
withdrawal of P30, and on July 5th the Philippine Postal Savings Bank mailed Treasury
Warrant A-131703 for P30, payable to Francisco P. Peralta or order, to the postmaster
of Gonzaga for delivery to the payee upon the production of his deposit book and the
making of the corresponding entry therein, but the treasury warrant in question. Exhibit
B, never reached the postmaster at Gonzaga or Peralta.
When the defendant's accounts were examined on July 22, 1934, the treasury warrant
in question was found in his possession. It then purported to be for the amount of f^230
and to be indorsed by Francisco P. Peralta and Pedro Siggaoat. Giving to the treasury
warrant the value of P230, the examiner found that the defendant had on hand a
surplus of P38.50. The defendant explained this surplus by saying that he had used
P38.50 of his personal funds to cash the treasury warrant for Pedro Siggaoat, because as
acting postmaster he did not have enough public funds on hand to cash the warrant. On
July 24,1934, the defendant delivered the funds in his possession, including the treasury
warrant in question, to Pascual Baclig, who acted as postmaster at Buguey from July 24
to July 28. Baclig cashed the warrant in the office of the municipal treasurer of Buguey,
Conrado Ligot, who later delivered it, together with other collections, to Bernardino
Pagalilauan, a deputy of the provincial treasurer.
On July 24, 1934, Pagalilauan noticed the alterations on the treasury warrant, and made
inquiries in Manila as to the amount for which it had been issued. The Director of Posts
and the Insular Auditor replied that the amount for which the warrant was drawn was
P30. The defendant was then investigated. He stated that the warrant in question was
presented to him on July 15, 1934 by a man whom he knew by sight, who told him that
the postmaster of Gonzaga did not have enough money on hand to cash the warrant.
Defendant admitted that the warrant shows that it has been altered as to the amount,
but claimed that he did not notice the alterations when he cashed it; that when it was
presented to him it was already indorsed by Francisco P. Peralta; that as Francisco P.
Peralta was an old acquaintance of his and he knew by sight the bearer of the warrant,
he consented to cash it; that the bearer signed the name of Pedro Siggaoat under that
of Francisco P. Peralta, and the defendant delivered to him P230, making use of P38.50
of his personal funds for that purpose. The investigator then required the defendant to
produce Pedro Siggaoat, who according to the defendant lived in the municipality of
Gonzaga, but nobody of that name could be found. Soon afterwards the defendant
repaid to the government the sum of P230.
At the trial the defendant contended that he received the warrant in question from
Pedro Siggaoat and paid over to him P230. The defendant presented several witnesses
to prove that he made the alleged payment.
Francisco P. Peralta testified that he never received the warrant in question, and it is
evident that the signature on the warrant reading "Francisco P. Peralta" is not the same
as the signature of Francisco P. Peralta appearing in nig deposit book. Appellant's
attorney contends that the postmaster at Gonzaga, who was not presented as a witness,
might have misappropriated the warrant in question after forging the name of the
payee thereon. The evidence shows, however, that the defendant had an opportunity to
take possession of the warrant in question because the mail for Gonzaga goes through
the post office at Buguey, and the envelope in which the warrant was1 enclosed showed
that it was from the Philippine Postal Savings Bank. Furthermore, there was found in the
possession of the defendant a piece of paper, Exhibit H, on which there had been
written "Francisco P. Peralta", "For Francisco P. Peralta', and "Pedro Siggaoat".
Defendant admitted to the provincial auditor that these names were written by him. A
comparison of these signatures with the signatures appearing on the warrant shows
such similarities as to justify us in concluding that they were probably written by the
same person. Defendant tried to explain this fact by stating that he copied the
signatures on the back of the warrant for the purpose of comparing the signature
reading "Francisco P. Peralta" with the genuine signature of the payee, but this
explanation is not worthy of credit. At the trial the defendant denied having written the
names on Exhibit H, but when he was investigated he was required to write the names,
Francisco P. Peralta and Pedro Siggaoat, five times (Exhibit I). After comparing Exhibits H
and I, we are of the opinion that they were both written by the same person. The theory
of the prosecution that the defendant wrote the names in question on Exhibit H before
writing them on the warrant is more credible.
The treasury warrant in question was stolen, and the amount of it was raised from P30
to P230. The warrant was found in the possession of the defendant, and the burden was
on him to show that he came into possession of it lawfully. His explanation that he
cashed the warrant without noticing that it had been altered, and paid Pedro Siggaoat
P230 is incredible, in view of the fact that the alteration is evident, and the defendant
did not know the signature of the payee, Francisco P. Peralta, and had casually seen the
person in possession of the warrant only once before. Defendant was unable to find
anybody by the name of Pedro Siggaoat, and the testimony of the witnesses presented
by the defendant to prove that he paid Pedro Siggaoat P230 on July 15, 1934, is of no
probative value.
According to the contention of the defendant, he had a surplus of P38.50 on hand when
his accounts were examined on July 22, 1934, which he explained by stating that he had
advanced that amount of his personal funds. We cannot accept this explanation of the
defendant. It is improbable that he would make use of his personal funds, if he had such
funds available, to accommodate a man he had seen only once before. He says that the
man purporting to be Pedro Siggaoat told him that the postmaster at Gonzaga did not
have sufficient money on hand to cash the warrant. That statement ought to have
aroused the suspicion of the defendant, because he must have known that the
municipal treasurer of Gonzaga was able to cash the warrant, even if the postmaster
was not.
We agree with the lower court that the defendant is guilty of the complex crime of
malversation of public funds through the falsification of a public document, because the
amount of the warrant was altered and the signature of the payee was forged for the
purpose of enabling the defendant to misappropriate the sum in question with less risk
of being discovered. In accordance with article 48 of the Revised Penal Code the penalty
for the more serious crime, which is the falsification, must be applied in its maximum
period. The penalty applicable in accordance with article 171 is therefore prision
mayor in its maximum period and a fine not to exceed P5,000. The penalty next lower in
degree to prision mayor in its maximum period is prision mayor in its medium period.
(People vs. Co Pao, 58 Phil, 545.) The appellant is therefore sentenced to suffer ten
years, eight months, and one day of prision mayor, and to pay a fine of P500, and for the
purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum sentence to be served by
the defendant is fixed at eight years and one day of prision mayor.
The defendant must suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification,
not because article 217 of the Revised Penal Code provides that in all cases persons
guilty of malversation shall suffer perpetual special disqualification in addition to the
principal penalty, but as a consequence of the penalty of prision mayor provided in
article 171. In accordance with article 42 of the Revised Penal Code the penalty
of prision mayor carries with it that of temporary absolute disqualification and that of
perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, and article 32 provides that
during the period of his disqualification the offender shall not be permitted to hold any
public office. Moreover, article 73 of the Revised Penal Code provides that whenever
the courts shall impose a penalty which, by provision of law, carries with it other
penalties, according tothe provisions of articles 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, and 45 of the Revised
Penal Code, it must be understood that the accessory penalties are also imposed upon
the convict. It is therefore unnecessary to express the accessory penalties in the
sentence.
Modified as hereinabove stated as to the penalty, the decision appealed from is

affirmed, with the costs against the appellant.
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. L-57841, July 30, 1982 ]
BERNARDO GALLEGO AND FELIX AGONCILLO, PETITIONERS, VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
RELOVA, J.:
In this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, petitioners seek to set
aside in toto the Sandiganbayan's resolution promulgated on August 27, 1981 in
Criminal Case No. 2940, entitled: People of the Philippines vs. Ramon Deseo, et al.; to
restrain the Sandiganbayan from further proceeding with said Criminal Case No. 2940;
and to quash the information in said case.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
An information was filed in the Sandiganbayan by Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor

Mariflor Punzalan-Castillo against Ramon Deseo, Bernardo Gallego, Herminio Erorita
and Felix Agoncillo, for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which reads:
"That on or about the period from May to September, 1979, 4n Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the following accused:
RAMON DESEO, Chairman of the Board for Marine Engine Officers in the May 28-30,
1979 examinations, in checking Test Paper No. 839 in the subject Steam Boiler, Engines,
Turbines, Internal Combustion and Machine Shop, gave a rating of 18% out of a total of
20% to Test II thereof, the answer of the examinee being a recital of the prayer ‘Hail
Mary’ and in Test III of the same Test Paper, gave a rating of 18% out of 20%, the
answer of the examinee being the prayer 'Our Father'; BERNARDO GALLEGO,
Member of the Board for Marine Engine Officers, acting as Second Corrector to Ramon
Deseo, affirmed the ratings given by the latter to Test Paper No. 839; FELIX
AGONCILLO, Member of the Board for Marine Deck Officers in the May 28-30, 1979
examinations, in checking Test Paper No. 144, in the subject Meteorology and
Electronics, gave a rating of 19% out of 20% to Test I A and B thereof, the answer of the
examinee to Test I A being a long love letter; and HERMINIO ERORITA, Member of
the Board for Marine Deck Officers, acting as Second Corrector to Felix Agoncillo,
affirmed the ratings given by the latter to Test Paper No. 144, the above acts of all the
accused resulting in the passing of Examinee No. 839 in the Board for Marine Engine
Officers and Examinee No. 144 in the Board for Marine Deck Officers, thereby giving
unwarranted benefits to the said examinees in the discharge of their official and/or
administrative functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence."
Petitioners Bernardo Gallego and Felix Agoncillo filed a motion to quash the information
against them on the following grounds:
1. the facts alleged do not constitute an offense; or, in the alternative,
2. the information charges more than one offense.

Petitioners claim that the information concludes that the ratings given by the accused to
particular examinees constituted the giving to them of "unwarranted benefits"; that the
statutory provision defines as a corrupt practice of the public officer "the giving to any
private party any unwarranted benefits in the discharge of his official, administrative or
judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence"; that Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is null and void
because it is unconstitutionally vague and therefore cannot be a basis of any criminal
prosecution; that even if said Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
were to be sustained as definite, "still the allegations of the information are not
sufficiently definite to charge an offense to which the accused may be required to plead."
Further, petitioners allege that the term "unwarranted" is a "highly imprecise and elastic
term which has no common law meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or
administrative precedents"; that for its vagueness, said Section 3(e) violates due process
in that it does not give fair warning or sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize.
Finally, petitioners claim that the information charges the accused with three (3) distinct
offenses, to wit: "(a) the giving of 'unwarranted' benefits through manifest partiality; (b)
the giving of 'unwarranted' benefits through evident bad faith; and (c) the giving of
'unwarranted' benefits through gross inexcusable negligence" while in the discharge of
their official and/or administrative functions; that the right of the accused to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against them is violated because they are left to
guess which of the three, if not all, offenses they are being prosecuted.
The motion to quash was opposed by the prosecution alleging that the term
"unwarranted"' in Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 is clear, unambiguous and
unequivocal and is presumed to have been used in its primary and general acceptation;
that the objection by petitioners on the clarity of the term "unwarranted" does not suffice
for the courts to declare said section unconstitutional; that said Section 3(e) of Republic
Act 3019 is valid unless otherwise held by final judgment of a competent court.
With respect to petitioners’ allegation that the information charges more than one
offense, the prosecution avers that what is charged in the information "is the giving of
unwarranted benefits to the owners of Test Booklets Nos. 839 and 144, while manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence are only the means of
commission."
Respondent Sandiganbayan sustained the prosecution and denied the motion to quash.
We hold that Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer
from the constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest partiality," "evident
bad faith" and "gross inexcusable negligence" merely describe the different modes by
which the offense penalized in Section 3(e) of the statute may be committed, and the use
of all these phrases in the same information does not mean that the indictment charges
three distinct offenses.
The information definitely states the names of the parties, the time, place, manner of
commission and designation of the offense. The argument that failure in the information
to state the reasons why the benefits bestowed are unwarranted renders it defective is
without merit. Informations need only state the ultimate facts; the reasons therefor could
be proved during the trial. As aptly observed by respondent Sandiganbayan in its
resolution dated August 27 1981:
"The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It means lacking adequate or official support;
unjustified; unauthorized (Webster, Third New International Dictionary, p. 2514); or
without justification or adequate reason. (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc: vs. U.S. Dept.
of Justice, C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition,
Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, p. 19.)
"The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act considers a corrupt
practice and makes unlawful the act of a public officer in:
"x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in
the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, x x x." (Section 3(e), Rep.
Act 3019, as amended.)
"It is not all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal provision penalizes
is the act of a public officer, in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions, in giving any private party benefits, advantage or preference which are
unjustified, unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason, through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence."
Neither is the information defective. As held in the case of People vs. Buenviaje, 47 Phil.
536, where the defendant was charged with violation of the Medical Law and the
information charged both illegal practice of medicine and illegally advertising oneself as
a doctor, it was held that "the information was not bad for duplicity inasmuch as the acts
charged were merely different means of committing the same offense, notwithstanding
the fact that they are prohibited by separate sections of the statute."
ACCORDINGLY, for lack of merit, instant petition is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 129670, February 01, 2000 ]
MANOLET O. LAVIDES, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS; HON. ROSALINA L. LUNA PISON, JUDGE PRESIDING OVER
BRANCH 107, RTC, QUEZON CITY; AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Manolet Lavides was arrested on April 3, 1997 for child abuse under R.A. No.
7610 (an act providing for stronger deterrence and special protection against child abuse,
exploitation and discrimination, providing penalties for its violation, and other purposes).
His arrest was made without a warrant as a result of an entrapment conducted by the
police. It appears that on April 3, 1997, the parents of complainant Lorelie San Miguel
reported to the police that their daughter, then 16 years old, had been contacted by
petitioner for an assignation that night at petitioner’s room at the Metropolitan Hotel in
Diliman, Quezon City. Apparently, this was not the first time the police received reports
of petitioner’s activities. An entrapment operation was therefore set in motion. At around
8:20 in the evening of April 3, 1997, the police knocked at the door of Room 308 of the
Metropolitan Hotel where petitioner was staying. When petitioner opened the door, the
police saw him with Lorelie, who was wearing only a t-shirt and an underwear,
whereupon they arrested him. Based on the sworn statement of complainant and the
affidavits of the arresting officers, which were submitted at the inquest, an information
for violation of Art. III, §5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 was filed on April 7, 1997 against
petitioner in the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, where it was docketed as Criminal
Case No. Q-97-70550.
On April 10, 1997, petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion (1) For Judicial Determination of
Probable Cause; (2) For the Immediate Release of the Accused Unlawfully Detained on
an Unlawful Warrantless Arrest; and (3) In the Event of Adverse Resolution of the Above
Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail as a Matter of Right under the Law on
Which He is Charged."[1]
On April 29, 1997, nine more informations for child abuse were filed against petitioner
by the same complainant, Lorelie San Miguel, and by three other minor children, Mary
Ann Tardesilla, Jennifer Catarman, and Annalyn Talingting. The cases were docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. Q-97-70866 to Q-97-70874. In all the cases, it was alleged that, on
various dates mentioned in the informations, petitioner had sexual intercourse with
complainants who had been "exploited in prostitution and . . . given money [by
petitioner] as payment for the said [acts of] sexual intercourse."
No bail was recommended. Nonetheless, petitioner filed separate applications for bail in
the nine cases.
On May 16, 1997, the trial court issued an order resolving petitioner’s Omnibus Motion,
as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds that:
1. In Crim. Case No. Q-97-70550, there is probable cause to hold the accused
under detention, his arrest having been made in accordance with the Rules.
He must therefore remain under detention until further order of this Court;
2. The accused is entitled to bail in all the above-entitled case. He is hereby

granted the right to post bail in the amount of P80,000.00 for each case or a
total of P800,000.00 for all the cases under the following conditions:
a) The accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during the trial of these cases.
He shall and must always be present at the hearings of these cases;
b) In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall be automatically cancelled
and forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be immediately issued and the cases shall proceed
to trial in absentia;
c) The hold-departure Order of this Court dated April 10, 1997 stands; and
d) Approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the arraignment to enable this Court to
immediately acquire jurisdiction over the accused;
3. Let these cases be set for arraignment on May 23, 1997 at 8:30 o’clock in
the morning.[2]
On May 20, 1997, petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations against him, except
those filed in Criminal Case No. Q-97-70550 or Q-97-70866. Pending resolution of his
motion, he asked the trial court to suspend the arraignment scheduled on May 23, 1997.
[3]
Then on May 22, 1997, he filed a motion in which he prayed that the amounts of bail
bonds be reduced to P40,000.00 for each case and that the same be done prior to his
arraignment.[4]
On May 23, 1997, the trial court, in separate orders, denied petitioner’s motions to reduce
bail bonds, to quash the informations, and to suspend arraignment. Accordingly,
petitioner was arraigned during which he pleaded not guilty to the charges against him
and then ordered him released upon posting bail bonds in the total amount of
P800,000.00, subject to the conditions in the May 16, 1997 order and the "hold-
departure" order of April 10, 1997. The pre-trial conference was set on June 7, 1997.
On June 2, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 44316) in the
Court of Appeals, assailing the trial court’s order, dated May 16, 1997, and its two orders,
dated May 23, 1997, denying his motion to quash and maintaining the conditions set forth
in its order of May 16, 1997, respectively.
While the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, two more informations were filed
against petitioner, bringing the total number of cases against him to 12, which were all
consolidated.
On June 30, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, considering that the conditions imposed under Nos. 2-a) and 2-b), [5] of
the May 23 (should be May 16), 1997 Order, are separable, and would not affect the cash
bond which petitioner posted for his provisional liberty, with the sole modification that
those aforesaid conditions are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, the May 16, May
23 and May 23, 1997 Orders are MAINTAINED in all other respects.[6]
The appellate court invalidated the first two conditions imposed in the May 16, 1997
order for the grant of bail to petitioner but ruled that the issue concerning the validity of
the condition making arraignment a prerequisite for the approval of petitioner’s bail
bonds to be moot and academic. It noted "that petitioner has posted the cash bonds; that
when arraigned, represented by lawyers, he pleaded not guilty to each offense; and that
he has already been released from detention." The Court of Appeals thought that the
aforesaid conditions in the May 16, 1997 order were contrary to Art. III, §14(2) of the
Constitution which provides that "[a]fter arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding
the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to
appear is unjustifiable."
With respect to the denial of petitioner’s motion to quash the informations against him,
the appellate court held that petitioner could not question the same in a petition for
certiorari before it, but what he must do was to go to trial and to reiterate the grounds of
his motion to quash on appeal should the decision be adverse to him.
Hence this petition. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred[7] __
1. In ruling that the condition imposed by respondent Judge that the approval of
petitioner’s bail bonds "shall be made only after his arraignment" is of no moment
and has been rendered moot and academic by the fact that he had already posted
the bail bonds and had pleaded not guilty to all the offenses;
2. In not resolving the submission that the arraignment was void not only because it
was made under compelling circumstance which left petitioner no option to
question the respondent Judge’s arbitrary action but also because it emanated from
a void Order;
3. In ruling that the denial of petitioner’s motion to quash may not be impugned in a
petition for certiorari; and
4. In not resolving the legal issue of whether or not petitioner may be validly charged
for violation of Section 5(b) of RA No. 7610 under several informations
corresponding to the number of alleged acts of child abuse allegedly committed
against each private complainant by the petitioner.
We will deal with each of these contentions although not in the order in which they are
stated by petitioner.
First. As already stated, the trial court’s order, dated May 16, 1997, imposed four
conditions for the grant of bail to petitioner:
a) The accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during the trial of these cases.
He shall and must always be present at the hearings of these cases;
b) In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall be automatically cancelled
and forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be immediately issued and the cases shall proceed
to trial in absentia;
c) The hold-departure Order of this Court dated April 10, 1997 stands; and
d) Approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the arraignment to enable this Court to
immediately acquire jurisdiction over the accused;
The Court of Appeals declared conditions (a) and (b) invalid but declined to pass upon
the validity of condition (d) on the ground that the issue had become moot and academic.
Petitioner takes issue with the Court of Appeals with respect to its treatment of condition
(d) of the May 16, 1997 order of the trial court which makes petitioner’s arraignment a
prerequisite to the approval of his bail bonds. His contention is that this condition is void
and that his arraignment was also invalid because it was held pursuant to such invalid
condition.
We agree with petitioner that the appellate court should have determined the validity of
the conditions imposed in the trial court’s order of May 16, 1997 for the grant of bail
because petitioner’s contention is that his arraignment was held in pursuance of these
conditions for bail.
In requiring that petitioner be first arraigned before he could be granted bail, the trial
court apprehended that if petitioner were released on bail he could, by being absent,
prevent his early arraignment and thereby delay his trial until the complainants got tired
and lost interest in their cases. Hence, to ensure his presence at the arraignment, approval
of petitioner’s bail bonds should be deferred until he could be arraigned. After that, even
if petitioner does not appear, trial can proceed as long as he is notified of the date of
hearing and his failure to appear is unjustified, since under Art. III, §14(2) of the
Constitution, trial in absentia is authorized. This seems to be the theory of the trial court
in its May 16, 1997 order conditioning the grant of bail to petitioner on his arraignment.
This theory is mistaken. In the first place, as the trial court itself acknowledged, in cases
where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused
may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the information is quashed and the
case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the arraignment of the accused. In the
second place, the trial court could ensure the presence of petitioner at the arraignment
precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence at any stage of the proceedings, such
as arraignment. Under Rule 114, §2(b) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, one of the
conditions of bail is that "the accused shall appear before the proper court whenever so
required by the court or these Rules," while under Rule 116, §1(b) the presence of the
accused at the arraignment is required.
On the other hand, to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would
be to place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash
and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his
arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he
can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These scenarios certainly
undermine the accused’s constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon valid
complaint or information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail.[8]
It is the condition in the May 16, 1997 order of the trial court that "approval of the bail
bonds shall be made only after arraignment," which the Court of Appeals should instead
have declared void. The condition imposed in the trial court’s order of May 16, 1997 that
the accused cannot waive his appearance at the trial but that he must be present at the
hearings of the case is valid and is in accordance with Rule 114. For another condition of
bail under Rule 114, §2(c) is that "The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without
justification despite due notice to him or his bondsman shall be deemed an express
waiver of his right to be present on the date specified in the notice. In such case, trial
shall proceed in absentia."
Art. III, §14(2) of the Constitution authorizing trials in absentia allows the accused to be
absent at the trial but not at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment
and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt,[9] (b) during trial whenever necessary for
identification purposes,[10] and (c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light
offense, in which case the accused may appear by counsel or representative. [11] At such
stages of the proceedings, his presence is required and cannot be waived. As pointed out
in Borja v. Mendoza,[12] in an opinion by Justice, later Chief Justice, Enrique Fernando,
there can be no trial in absentia unless the accused has been arraigned.
Undoubtedly, the trial court knew this. Petitioner could delay the proceedings by
absenting himself from the arraignment. But once he is arraigned, trial could proceed
even in his absence. So it thought that to ensure petitioner’s presence at the arraignment,
petitioner should be denied bail in the meantime. The fly in the ointment, however, is that
such court strategy violates petitioner’s constitutional rights.
Second. Although this condition is invalid, it does not follow that the arraignment of
petitioner on May 23, 1997 was also invalid. Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the
arraignment did not emanate from the invalid condition that "approval of the bail bonds
shall be made only after the arraignment." Even without such a condition, the
arraignment of petitioner could not be omitted. In sum, although the condition for the
grant of bail to petitioner is invalid, his arraignment and the subsequent proceedings
against him are valid.
Third. Petitioner concedes that the rule is that the remedy of an accused whose motion to
quash is denied is not to file a petition for certiorari but to proceed to trial without
prejudice to his right to reiterate the grounds invoked in his motion to quash during trial
on the merits or on appeal if an adverse judgment is rendered against him. However, he
argues that this case should be treated as an exception. He contends that the Court of
Appeals should not have evaded the issue of whether he should be charged under several
informations corresponding to the number of acts of child abuse allegedly committed by
him against each of the complainants.
In Tano v. Salvador,[13] the Court, while holding that certiorari will not lie from a denial
of a motion to quash, nevertheless recognized that there may be cases where there are
special circumstances clearly demonstrating the inadequacy of an appeal. In such cases,
the accused may resort to the appellate court to raise the issue decided against him. This
is such a case. Whether petitioner is liable for just one crime regardless of the number of
sexual acts allegedly committed by him and the number of children with whom he had
sexual intercourse, or whether each act of intercourse constitutes one crime is a question
that bears on the presentation of evidence by either party. It is important to petitioner as
well as to the prosecution how many crimes there are. For instance, if there is only one
offense of sexual abuse regardless of the number of children involved, it will not matter
much to the prosecution whether it is able to present only one of the complainants. On the
other hand, if each act of sexual intercourse with a child constitutes a separate offense, it
will matter whether the other children are presented during the trial.
The issue then should have been decided by the Court of Appeals. However, instead of
remanding this case to the appellate court for a determination of this issue, we will decide
the issue now so that the trial in the court below can proceed without further delay.
Petitioner’s contention is that the 12 informations filed against him allege only one
offense of child abuse, regardless of the number of alleged victims (four) and the number
of acts of sexual intercourse committed with them (twelve). He argues that the act of
sexual intercourse is only a means of committing the offense so that the acts of sexual
intercourse/lasciviousness with minors attributed to him should not be subject of separate
informations. He cites the affidavits of the alleged victims which show that their
involvement with him constitutes an "unbroken chain of events," i.e., the first victim was
the one who introduced the second to petitioner and so on. Petitioner says that child abuse
is similar to the crime of large-scale illegal recruitment where there is only a single
offense regardless of the number of workers illegally recruited on different occasions. In
the alternative, he contends that, at the most, only four informations, corresponding to the
number of alleged child victims, can be filed against him.
Art. III, §5 of R.A. No. 7160 under which petitioner is being prosecuted, provides:
Sec. 5 Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. — Children, whether male or female,
who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of
any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are
deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

....
b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited
in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.
The elements of the offense are as follows: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) that said act is performed with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child,[14] whether male or
female, is or is deemed under 18 years of age. Exploitation in prostitution or other sexual
abuse occurs when the child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for
money, profit, or any other consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any
adult, syndicate, or group.
Each incident of sexual intercourse and lascivious act with a child under the
circumstances mentioned in Art. III, §5 of R.A. No. 7160 is thus a separate and distinct
offense. The offense is similar to rape or act of lasciviousness under the Revised Penal
Code in which each act of rape or lascivious conduct should be the subject of a separate
information. This conclusion is confirmed by Art. III, §5(b) of R.A. No. 7160, which
provides:
[t]hat when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be
prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as
amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may
be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve
(12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period;
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and another one is
RENDERED declaring the orders dated May 16, 1997 and May 23, 1997 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City to be valid, with the exception of condition (d) in
the second paragraph of the order of May 16, 1997 (making arraignment a prerequisite to
the grant of bail to petitioner), which is hereby declared void.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 109266, December 02, 1993 ]
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JUSTICE
FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) AND
DECISION
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set
aside: (a) the Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) and to declare Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena of
the Sandiganbayan, disqualified from acting in said criminal case; and (b) the
Resolution of said court promulgated on March 14, 1993, which deemed as "filed" the
32 Amended Informations against petitioner (Rollo, pp. 2-35 and pp. 36-94).
On May 1, 1991, petitioner was charged in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the
Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly committed by her favoring
"unqualified" aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program (Rollo, p. 36).
On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with us a petition for certiorari and prohibition,
docketed as G.R. No. 99289-99290 (Santiago v. Vasquez, 205 SCRA 162 [1992]), to
enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 on the
ground that said case was intended solely to harass her as she was then a presidential
candidate. She alleged that this was in violation of Section 10, Article IX-C of the
Constitution which provides that "(b)ona fide candidates for any public office shall be
free from any form of harassment and discrimination." The petition was dismissed on
January 13, 1992.
On October 16, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for inhibition of Presiding Justice
Garchitorena, which motion was set for hearing on November 13, 1992 at 8:00 A.M.
(Rollo, pp. 38-41).
On October 27, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division), of which Presiding
Justice Garchitorena is a member, set the criminal case for arraignment on November
13, 1992 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, p. 42)
On November 6, 1992, petitioner moved to defer the arraignment on the grounds
that there was a pending motion for inhibition, and that petitioner intended to file a
motion for a bill of particulars (Rollo, pp. 43-44).
On November 9, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied the motion to
defer the arraignment (Rollo, p. 45).
On November 10, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for a bill of particulars (Rollo, pp.
47-48). The motion stated that while the information alleged that petitioner had
approved the application for legalization of "aliens" and gave them indirect benefits and
advantages it lacked a list of the favored aliens. According to petitioner, unless she was
furnished with the names and identities of the aliens, she could not properly plead and
prepare for trial.
On November 12, 1992 and upon motion of petitioner in G.R. No. 107598 (Miriam
Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al.), we directed the Sandiganbayan (First
Division) to reset the arraignment to a later date and to dispose of the two incidents
pending before it (Re: disqualification of Presiding Justice Garchitorena and the motion
for bill of particulars).
At the hearing on November 13, 1992 on the motion for a bill of particulars, the
prosecution stated categorically that they would file only one amended information
against petitioner.
However, on December 8, 1992, the prosecution filed a motion to admit the 32
Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402; Rollo, pp. 61-126).
On March 3, 1993, Presiding Justice Garchitorena issued the questioned Resolution
dated March 11, 1993, denying the motion for his disqualification (Rollo, pp. 151-164).
On March 14, 1993, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated a resolution,
admitting the 32 Amended Informations and ordering petitioner to post
the corresponding bail bonds within ten days from notice (Rollo, pp. 165-185).
Petitioner's arraignment on the 32 Amended Informations was set for April 12, 1993 at
8:00 A.M. (Rollo, p. 186).
Hence, the filing of the instant petition.
Acting on the petition for the issuance of a restraining order, we issued the
Resolution dated March 25, 1993, ordering Presiding Justice Garchitorena "to CEASE
and DESIST from sitting in the case until the question of his disqualification is finally
resolved by this Court and from enforcing the resolution dated March 11, 1993, ordering
petitioner to post bail bonds for the 32 Amended Informations and from proceeding with
the arraignment on April 12, 1993" (Rollo, p. 194).
Re: Disqualification of the Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice
The petition for the disqualification of Presiding Justice Garchitorena is based on

the publication of his letter in the July 29, 1992 issue of the Philippine Star, which to
petitioner "prejudged" the validity of the information filed against her. Petitioner claims
that Presiding Justice Garchitorena "cannot be expected to change the conclusions he
has subconsciously drawn in his public statements x x x when he sits in judgment on
the merits of the case x x x" (Rollo, pp. 16-17).
The letter in question was written in response to an item in Teodoro Benigno's
column in the July 22, 1992 issue of the Philippine Star, criticizing the Sandiganbayan
for issuing on July 11, 1992 a hold-departure order against petitioner. Benigno wrote
that said order reflected a "perverse morality" of the Sandiganbayan and the lack of
"legal morality" of its Presiding Justice, thus:
"I cannot, for example accept the legal morality of Sandiganbayan Justice Francis
Garchitorena who would stop Miriam Defensor Santiago from going abroad for a
Harvard scholarship because of graft charges against her. Some of the most
perfidious Filipinos I know have come and gone, left and returned to these shores
without Mr. Garchitorena kicking any kind of rumpus. Compared to the peccadilloes of
this country's outstanding felons, what Miriam is accused of is kindergarten stuff. The
Sandiganbayan Supremo got a lot of headlines for stopping Miriam but I contend this is
the kind of perverse morality we can do without" (Rollo, p. 156).
The portion of the letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, which petitioner finds
objectionable, reads as follows:
"(c) Mrs. Santiago has never informed any court where her cases are pending of
her intention to travel, whether the Regional Trial Court where she is charged with
soliciting donations from people transacting with her office at Immigration or before the
Sandiganbayan where she is charged with having favored unqualified aliens with the
benefits of the Alien Legalization Program nor even the Supreme Court where her
petition is still pending" (Rollo, p. 158).
In particular, petitioner considered as prejudgment the statement of Presiding
Justice Garchitorena that petitioner had been charged before the Sandiganbayan "with
having favored unqualified aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program."
The statement complained of was just a restatement of the Information filed against
petitioner in Criminal Case No. 16698 in connection with which the hold-departure order
was issued. Said Information specified the act constituting the offense charged, thus:
"That on or about October 17, 1988, or for sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago, being then the Commissioner of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the application for legalization of
aliens who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive Order
No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which does not allow the legalization of the same, thereby
causing undue injury to the government and giving unwarranted benefits and
advantages to said aliens in the discharge of the official and administrative functions of
said accused" (Rollo, p. 36).
It appears that petitioner tried to leave the country without first securing the
permission of the Sandiganbayan, prompting it to issue the hold-departure order which
Benigno viewed as uncalled for. The letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, written in
defense of the dignity and integrity of the Sandiganbayan, merely stated that all persons
facing criminal charges in court, with no exception, have to secure permission to leave
the country. Nowhere in the letter is the merit of the charge against petitioner ever
touched. Certainly, there would have been no occasion for the letter had Benigno not
written his diatribe, unfair at that, against the Sandiganbayan.
Notwithstanding petitioner's misgiving, it should be taken into consideration that the
Sandiganbayan sits in three divisions with three justices in each division. Unanimity
among the three members is mandatory for arriving at any decision of a division (P.D.
No. 1606, Sec. 5). The collegiate character of the Sandiganbayan thus renders
baseless petitioner's fear of prejudice and bias on the part of Presiding Justice
Garchitorena (Paredes v. Gopengco, 29 SCRA 688 [1969]).
Re: Claim of denial of due process
Petitioner cannot complain that her constitutional rights to due process were
violated by reason of the delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation.
According to her, while the offense was allegedly committed "on or before October 17,
1988", the information was filed only on May 9, 1991 and the amended informations on
December 8, 1992 (Rollo, p. 14).
Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 [1988] is inapplicable to petitioner's case.
In Tatad, there indeed was an unexplained inaction on the part of the public prosecutors
inspite of the simplicity of the legal and factual issues involved therein.
In the case at bench, there was a continuum of the investigatory process but it got
snarled because of the complexity of the issues involved. The act complained of in the
original information came to the attention of the Ombudsman only when it was first
reported in the January 10, 1989 issue of the Manila Standard. Immediately thereafter,
the investigatory process was set in motion. The investigation was first assigned to
Special Prosecutor Gualberto dela Llana but on request of petitioner herself the
investigation was re-assigned to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. The
case was handled by a panel of four prosecutors, who submitted a draft resolution for
the filing of the charges on March 29, 1990. The draft resolution had to undergo the
hierarchy of review, normal for a draft resolution with a dissenting vote, until it reached
the Ombudsman in March 1991.
We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before us involving
Criminal Case No. 16698 (G.R. Nos. 99289-99290; G.R. No. 107598). Petitioner has
not explained why she failed to raise the issue of the delay in the preliminary
investigation and the filing of the information against her in those petitions. A piece-meal
presentation of issues, like the splitting of causes of action, is self-defeating.
Petitioner next claims that the Amended Informations did not charge any offense
punishable under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 because the official acts complained of
therein were authorized under Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board of
Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation adopted the policy of approving
applications for legalization of spouses and unmarried, minor children of "qualified
aliens" even though they had arrived in the Philippines after December 31, 1983. She
concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her motion to quash the
informations (Rollo, pp. 25-31).
In a motion to quash, the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact in the
information (People v. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963]). Therefore, petitioner admitted
hypothetically in her motion that:
(1) She was a public officer;
(2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who arrived in
the Philippines after January 1, 1984;
(3) Those aliens were disqualified;
(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and
(5) She acted in "evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of her
official functions."
The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the offense defined in
Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.
The claims that the acts complained of were indeed authorized under Executive
Order No. 324, that petitioner merely followed in good faith the policy adopted by the
Board of Commissioners and that the aliens were spouses or unmarried minor children
of persons qualified for legalization of stay, are matters of defense which she can
establish at the trial.
Anent petitioner's claim that the Amended Informations did not allege that she had
caused "undue injury to any party, including the Government," there are two ways of
violating Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. These are: (a) by causing any undue injury to
any party, including the Government; and (b) by giving any private party any
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference.
In Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100334, December 5, 1991, we held:
"The use of the distinctive term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a
violation of Section 3 (a). In other words the act of giving any private party any
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference is not an indispensable element of the
offense of 'causing any undue injury to any party' as claimed by petitioners although
there may be instances where both elements concur."
Re: Delito Continuado
Be that as it may, our attention was attracted by the allegation in the petition that the
public prosecutors filed 32 Amended Informations against petitioner, after manifesting to
the Sandiganbayan that they would only file one amended information (Rollo, pp. 6-61).
We also noted that petitioner questioned in her opposition to the motion to admit the 32
Amended Informations, the splitting of the original information (Rollo, pp. 127-129). In
the furtherance of justice, we therefore proceed to inquire deeper into the validity of said
plaint, which petitioner failed to pursue with vigor in her petition.
We find that, technically, there was only one crime that was committed in
petitioner's case, and hence, there should only be one information to be filed against
her.
The 32 Amended Informations charge what is known as delito continuado or
"continued crime" and sometimes referred to as "continuous crime."
In fairness to the Ombudsman's Office of the Special Prosecutor, it should be borne
in mind that the concept of delito continuado has been a vexing problem in Criminal Law
– difficult as it is to define and more difficult to apply.
According to Cuello Calon, for delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality
of acts performed during a period of time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of
criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal
provisions are united in one and the same intent or resolution leading to the perpetration
of the same criminal purpose or aim (II Derecho Penal, p. 520; I Aquino, Revised Penal
Code, 630, 1987 ed).
According to Guevarra, in appearance, a delito continuado consists of several
crimes but in reality there is only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator
(Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 1957 ed., p. 102; Penal Science and
Philippine Criminal Law, p. 152).
Padilla views such offense as consisting of a series of acts arising from one criminal
intent or resolution (Criminal Law, 1988 ed. pp. 53-54).
Applying the concept of delito continuado, we treated as constituting only one
offense the following cases:
(1) The theft of 13 cows belonging to two different owners committed by the
accused at the same place and at the same period of time (People v. Tumlos, 67 Phil.
320 [1939]).
(2) The theft of six roosters belonging to two different owners from the same coop
and at the same period of time (People v. Jaranillo, 55 SCRA 563 [1974]).
(3) The theft of two roosters in the same place and on the same occasion (People v.
De Leon, 49 Phil. 437 [1926]).
(4) The illegal charging of fees for services rendered by a lawyer every time he
collects veteran's benefits on behalf of a client, who agreed that the attorney's fees shall
be paid out of said benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964]). The collections of
the legal fees were impelled by the same motive, that of collecting fees for services
rendered, and all acts of collection were made under the same criminal impulse (People
v. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975 [1955]).
On other hand, we declined to apply the concept to the following cases:
(1) Two estafa cases, one of which was committed during the period from January
19 to December 1955 and the other from January 1956 to July 1956 (People v.
Dichupa, 113 Phil. 306 [1961]). The said acts were committed on two different
occasions.
(2) Several malversations committed in May, June and July, 1936, and falsifications
to conceal the said offenses committed in August and October 1936. The malversations
and falsifications "were not the result of only one purpose or of only one resolution to
embezzle and falsify x x x" (People v. Cid, 66 Phil. 354 [1938]).
(3) Two estafa cases, one committed in December 1963 involving the failure of the
collector to turn over the installments for a radio and the other in June 1964 involving
the pocketing of the installments for a sewing machine (People v. Ledesma, 73 SCRA
77 [1976]
(4) 75 estafa cases committed by the conversion by the agent of collections from
customers of the employer made on different dates (Gamboa v. Court of Appeals, 68
SCRA 308 [1975]).
The concept of delito continuado, although an outcrop of the Spanish Penal Code,
has been applied to crimes penalized under special laws, e.g. violation of R.A. No. 145
penalizing the charging of fees for services rendered following up claims for war
veteran's benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964]).
Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be supplementary to
special laws, unless the latter provide the contrary. Hence, legal principles developed
from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished
under special laws.
The question of whether a series of criminal acts over a period of time creates a
single offense or separate offenses has troubled also American Criminal Law
and perplexed American courts as shown by the several theories that have evolved in
theft cases.
The trend in theft cases is to follow the so-called "single larceny" doctrine, that is,
the taking of several things, whether belonging to the same or different owners, at the
same time and place constitutes but one larceny. Many courts have abandoned the
"separate larceny doctrine," under which there was a distinct larceny as to the property
of each victim. Also abandoned was the doctrine that the government has the discretion
to prosecute the accused for one offense or for as many distinct offenses as there are
victims (Annotation, 37 ALR 3rd 1407, 1410-1414).
The American courts following the "single larceny" rule, look at the commission of
the different criminal acts as but one continuous act involving the same "transaction" or
as done on the same "occasion" (State v. Sampson, 157 Iowa 257, 138 NW 473;
People v. Johnson, 81 Mich. 573, 45 NW 1119; State v. Larson, 85 Iowa 659, 52 NW
539).
An American court held that a contrary rule would violate the constitutional
guarantee against putting a man in jeopardy twice for the same offense (Annotation, 28
ALR 2d 1179). Another court observed that the doctrine is a humane rule, since if a
separate charge could be filed for each act, the accused may be sentenced to the
penitentiary for the rest of his life (Annotation, 28 ALR 2d 1179).
In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with performing a
single criminal act - that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens not
qualified under the law to enjoy such privilege.
The original information also averred that the criminal act: (i) committed by
petitioner was in violation of a law - Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988, (ii)
caused an undue injury to one offended party, the Government, and (iii) was done on a
single day, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988.
The 32 Amended Informations reproduced verbatim the allegation of the original
information, except that instead of the word "aliens" in the original information each
amended information states the name of the individual whose stay was legalized.
At the hearing of the motion for a bill of particulars, the public prosecutors
manifested that they would file only one amended information embodying the
legalization of stay of the 32 aliens. As stated in the Order dated November 12, 1992 of
the Sandiganbayan (First Division):
"On the matter of the Bill of Particulars, the prosecution has conceded
categorically that the accusation against Miriam Defensor Santiago consists of one
violation of law represented by the approval of the applications of 32 foreign nationals
for availment (sic) of the Alien Legalization Program. In this respect, and responding
directly to the concerns of the accused through counsel, the prosecution is categorical
that there will not be 32 accusations but only one x x x" (Rollo, p. 59).
The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the same
period of time, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The strong probability even exists that
the approval of the application for the legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens was done
by a single stroke of the pen, as when the approval was embodied in the same
document.
Likewise, the public prosecutors manifested at the hearing of the motion for a bill of
particulars that the Government suffered a single harm or injury. The Sandiganbayan in
its Order dated November 13, 1992 stated as follows:
"x x x Equally, the prosecution has stated that insofar as the damage and
prejudice to the government is concerned, the same is represented not only by the very
fact of the violation of law itself but because of the adverse effect on the stability and
security of the country in granting citizenship to those not qualified" (Rollo, p. 59).
WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 of
the Sandiganbayan (First Division) is AFFIRMED and its Resolution dated March 11,
1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 is MODIFIED in the sense that the Office of the
Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to consolidate the 32
Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402) into one information
charging only one offense under the original case number, i.e., No. 16698. The
temporary restraining order issued by this Court on March 25, 1993 is LIFTED insofar
as to the disqualification of Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena is concerned.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. Nos. 100382-100385, March 19, 1997 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MARIO
TABACO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
In four related informations, Mario Tabaco was charged with four counts of
Murder for shooting to death on March 22, 1987 Capt. Oscar Tabulog (Criminal Case No.
10-259), Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola (Criminal Case No. 10-270), Felicito Rigunan (Criminal
Case No. 10-284) and Pat. Romeo Regunton (Criminal Case No. 10-317). Except for the
names of the victims, the informations in these four (4) cases identically read:
"That on or about March 22, 1987, in the Municipality of Aparri, Province of
Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Mario
Tabaco, armed with a gun, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with
treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and
shoot one [name], inflicting upon him several wounds which caused his death.
Contrary to Law."[1]
In Criminal Case No. 10-316, accused was charged in the following information
with the complex crime of Homicide and Frustrated Homicide for shooting to death
Jorge Siriban, Jr. and the wounding of Sgt. Benito Raquepo:
"That on or about March 22, 1987, in the municipality of Aparri, province of

Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Mario
Tabaco, armed with a gun, with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault, attack and shoot Jorge Siriban, Jr., and S/Sgt. Benito Raquepo,
inflicting upon them wounds on their bodies, which wounds sustained by Jorge Siriban,
Jr., caused his death.
That the accused had performed all the acts of execution (with respect to the victim Sgt.
Benito Raquepo; which would have produced the crime of Homicide as a consequence
but which nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his own
will."[2]
All cases were consolidated before Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of
Aparri, Cagayan.
The mass of evidence for the prosecution, as found by the trial court, is as follows:
"In the evening of March 22, 1987, the 17th PC stationed at Aparri, Cagayan,
under then Lt. James Andres Melad, sponsored a cock derby, under the name of Jose
Ting, at the Octagon Cockpit Arena located at Aparri, Cagayan.
This being so, peace officers in uniform with long firearms were assigned as guards to
maintain peace and order at the cockpit arena namely: (1) Sgt. Benito Raquepo; (2) CIS
Roque P. Datugan, both from the 117th PC and (3) Pat. Andles Semana, INP, Aparri,
Cagayan. Accused Mario Tabaco who was in civilian clothes claims to have been also
assigned by his Commanding Officer of 117th PC, to verify the presence of NPAs and
assist in the protection of VIPs in the cockpit arena, bringing with him his M-14 issued
firearm.
Other peace officers who came to participate were: (1) Policeman Mariano Retreta of
INP, Buguey, Cagayan, who arrived with the deceased Jorge Siriban and Licerio
Antiporda, Jr., Licerio Antiporda II; (2) Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer of 117th PC Company; (3)
Policeman Romeo Regunton (deceased) who was also armed, arrived in company with
the deceased Ex-Mayor Arreola; (4) Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen, INP Buguey; (5) Pat.
Barba; and (6) CIC PC Paragas.
At about nine (9) o'clock in the evening of same date, the group of the late Mayor Jorge
Arreola of Buguey, Cagayan, arrived at the cockpit arena. His companions were (1)
Antonio Villasin; (2) Rosario Peneyra; (3) victim Lorclo Pita, Jr. and/or five (5) of them
including the Mayor. They occupied and were (4th row) north western part cockpit-gate.
Others seated with the Mayor were: (1) the late Capt. Oscar Tabulog; (2) the late Pat.
Romeo Regunton, who was at the back of the mayor; (3) the late Felicito Rigunan. The
accused CIC Tabaco was seated on the arm of the bench situated at the lower portion of
the arena about more than three (3) meters away, (infront and a little bit in the west),
from the place where the late Mayor and his group were seated (at the 4th row of seats
upper portion). During the ocular inspection conducted, the Court noticed the distance
to be more than three (3) meters, and/or probably 4-5 meters.
At about ten(10) o'clock 1987, while the accused Mario Tabaco was seated as described
above, he suddenly without warning or provocation, shot the late mayor Jorge Arreola,
with his M-14 rifle, followed by several successive burst of gunfire, resulting in the
shooting to death of the late Mayor Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and
Pat. Romeo Regunton, although the latter managed to run passing through the western
gate near the gaffers cage but was chased by accused Tabaco. Regunton was later found
dead inside the canteen of Mrs. Amparo Go inside the Octagon cockpit arena.
Pat. Mariano Retreta of INP Buguey, who was then at the Co's canteen, saw the accused
going out rushing from the cockpit arena, at a distance of one meter. Pat. Retreta is a
relative and neighbor of the accused Tabaco in Buguey, Cagayan. He tried to pacify
Tabaco telling him 'what is that happened again Mario.' Meanwhile, Sgt. Benito
Raquepo of 117th PC, and one of those assigned to maintain peace and order at the
Octagon cockpit arena, who was at the canteen taking snacks, heard five (5) successive
gun reports coming from inside the cockpit arena. In a little while, he saw the accused
Tabaco coming from inside the cockpit arena. Raquepo advised Tabaco — 'Mario relax
ka lang' — 'Mario keep calm.' They stood face to face holding their rifles and when
Tabaco pointed his gun towards Sgt. Raquepo, Pat. Retreta grappled for the possession
of the gun to disarm Tabaco, and in the process, the gun went off hitting Sgt. Raquepo
and also the late Jorge Siriban who happened to be near Raquepo. Siriban died on the
spot while Raquepo survived his wounds on his legs due to adequate medical treatment.
There were other persons injured that evening namely: (1) Antonio Chan — injured on
his right foot; (2) Salvador Berbano — injured on his right forearm and on his right
abdomen and (3) Rosario Peneyra on his face and right shoulder. But, the three, did not
file their complaints."[3]
Upon the other hand, the evidence for the defense as stated in the Brief for the
Accused-appellant is as follows:
"Ordered by his commanding officer in the 117th PC Company to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order at the Octagon Cockpit Arena located at Talungan,
Aparri, Cagayan on March 22, 1987, accused Mario Tabaco with his officially issued M-
14 rifle and with the basic load of ammunition went to the Octagon Cockpit arena on
March 22, 1987 in compliance to the orders of a superior officer arriving thereat at
about 12:00 o'clock noon, more or less. He directly went inside the cockpit arena to
make some observations and found out that there were several persons inside the said
cockpit who were in possession of firearms, some short and some long, and were seen
in different places and/or corners of the cockpit. Accused did not bother to verify as to
why the said persons were allowed to carry their firearms because of his impressions
that if they did not have the authority, the guards of the main gate of the cockpit would
surely have confiscated the same from them. It was his belief then that they may have
come from other agencies of the government, assigned to help in the maintenance of
peace and order in the cockpit, Accused thus seated himself at the lowermost seat (first
step) of the slanted bleachers of the Octagon Cockpit arena on March 22, 1987.
At about 9:00 o'clock that very night of March 22, 1987, while accused was seated at the
lowermost seat of the slanted bleachers of the Octagon Cockpit arena, he heard a gun
report fired atop his head. Having been officially assigned to help in the maintenance of
peace and order in the cockpit and that his presence must be known, his immediate
reaction upon hearing the gun report was to fire a warning shot in the air and directed
to the ceiling and/or roof of the Octagon cockpit arena. After firing a warning shot, his
warning was answered by burst of gun fire coming from different directions inside the
cockpit arena, for which reason, he forced to leave and rush outside, holding his M-14
rifle with the muzzle pointed downwards. As he (accused) rushed towards the main gate
of the cockpit arena, Mariano Retreta and Sgt. Benito Raquepo saw him and who told
him, (accused) to relax lang. Accused testified that when Mariano Retreta and Sgt.
Benito Raquepo told him to relax lang, he all the time thought that the gun reports fired
inside the cockpit arena was nothing to said persons. Accused however, insisted to go
out, but in so doing, Mariano Retreta pressed the gun which he was holding downwards
and grabbed said gun from accused. As the gun was pressed by Mariano Retreta, said
gun went off, hitting Sgt. Benito Raquepo and the death of Jorge Siriban, Jr. That
because of such incident, accused had to run away, out of fear to Sgt. Benito Raquepo
and the family of Jorge Siriban who may lay the blame on him. The following morning,
accused surrendered to the police authorities of Lallo, Cagayan, who happened to pass
by, not on account of the death of Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Felicito
Rigunan and Oscar Regunton which he did not know at the time he surrendered, but on
account of the death of Jorge Siriban, Jr. and the injury sustained by Sgt. Benito
Raquepo."[4]
After trial, the court a quo, in a joint decision dated January 14, 1991, found
accused-appellant guilty as charged on all counts. In giving credence to the version of
the prosecution over that of accused-appellant, it found that:
"From the evidence adduced, it is easily discernible that the prosecution and
defense cannot agree on what actually transpired that night of March 22, 1987, at the
Octagon Cockpit Arena, Aparri, Cagayan leading to the shooting to death of subject
victims. For, while the prosecution maintains that it was the accused Mario Tabaco who
shot the victims, the defense insists that he is not the assailant, but somebody else or
others, since the accused merely fired a warning shot upwards the roof of the cockpit
arena.
In fine, the Court is called upon to resolve the issue of credibility versions. 'Where there
are directly conflicting versions of the same incident, the Court, in its search for the
truth, perforce has to look for some facts and circumstances which can be used as
valuable tools in evaluating the probability or improbability of a testimony for after all,
the element of probability is always involved in weighing testimonial evidence. (Carolina
Industries, Inc. vs. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc., et al., L-46908, May 17, 1980, 97 SCRA
734; Lacsan vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-46485, November 21, 1979, 94 SCRA 461, both
citing the case of People vs. Boholst Caballero, L-2349, November 25, 1974, 61 SCRA
180).
Towards this end, the prosecution presented three (3) eyewitnesses, namely: Antonio
Villasin, Rosario Peneyra and Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen in the shooting to death of
the deceased victims, Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Romeo Regunton
and Felicito Rigunan. Also, the prosecution presented Sgt. Benito Raquepo, Pat. Mariano
Retreta and PC Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer, and three (3) eyewitnesses in the shooting to death
of Jorge Siriban and the wounding of Sgt. Raquepo. So too, the prosecution presented
PC Sgt. Antonio Domingo, Pat. Andres Semana, PC Sgt. Jose Algeria and Pat. Merlin
Bautista, as corroborative witnesses in both situational cases/incidents. As well stated in
the above findings of facts, prosecution witnesses Antonio Villasin and Rosario Peneyra
actually saw the accused Mario Tabaco stood up from his seat at the lower front row
and in port arm position directed his M-14 rifle towards the place of the late Mayor
Arreola, and his group at the 4th row upper portion of the bleachers and fired three
successive automatic gun shots that felled Mayor Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog,
Pat. Romeo Regunton and one Felicito Rigunan. This was corroborated by prosecution
witness Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen who was then ten (10) meters away from the
accused, which was not far, considering that the cockpit arena was well-lighted at that
time.
Not only that, immediately after the gun burst of automatic fire, the accused was seen
coming out rushing from inside the cockpit arena by INP Pat. Mariano Retreta and PC
Sgt. Raquepo, the former being a relative and neighbor, pacified accused Tabaco, telling
— 'what is that happened again Mario,' while the latter told him — 'Mario relax ka lang
keep calm.' After which Mariano Retreta grappled for the possession of the gun assisted
by PC Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer when Tabaco refused to stop. Sgt. Ferrer got the gun M-14 and
surrendered it to his Commanding Officer, as corroborated by Sgt. Antonio Domingo,
while in the process of disarming the accused Mario Tabaco, when the gun went of,
hitting the deceased victim Jorge Siriban and Sgt. Raquepo."[5]
The accused admitted that the M-14 rifle which he brought with him to the cockpit
arena was heavily loaded, but when the gun was taken from his possession by Pat.
Retreta and PC Sgt. Ferrer, the gun's magazine was already empty.
The court a quo said further:

ATTY. VILLENA:
Q: When you took that M-14 from the accused, do you remember if it had a magazine
that time?
A: Yes, sir with magazine.
Q: Do you have the magazine now?

A: It is with 117th PC Company, sir.
Q: After taking that M-14 from the accused, did you examine the rifle?
A: Yes, sir, I examined it.
Q: Did you examine the magazine of that rifle?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you examine if there are live bullets?

A: No live bullets, sir. "(TSN, direct examination, Sgt. Ferrer, pp. 44-45, March 26, 1990
session, stenographer L. Tamayo).
Further, Sgt. Ferrer continued:
"PROSECUTOR ATAL:
Q: You likewise mentioned in your direct examination that when you surrendered this
gun, M-14, and this magazine, there were no live ammunitions in the magazine?
A: There were two remaining bullets, sir.
Q: How many bullets in all?

A: Twenty, sir.
Q: You said you heard first seven gun reports?
A: Yes, sir I heard seven gun reports. (TSN, continuation of direct examination, Sgt.
Ferrer, May 14, 1990 session, Stenographer L. Tamayo).
MORE, there is evidence that empty/spent shells of bullets were found inside the
cockpit arena (Exh. 'R' & 'R-1', pp. 157-158, record).
ATTY. ARIOLA:
Q: Showing to you Exh. 'R', do you know whose picture is this?
A: Picture of spent shells.
Q: How about Exh. 'R-1', do you know what is this?

A: The same, sir spent shells. (TSN, PC/CIS Sgt. Investigator Jose Algeria, p. 29, Oct. 1,
1990 session, Stenographer L. Tamayo).
Finally, another circumstance which maybe considered as adverse against the accused,
is the fact that he was really arrested and not that he voluntarily surrendered as
appearing in the INP Lallo Police Blotter, as testified to by Pat. Melin Bautista (Exh. 'S', p.
188, record).
Furthermore, it appears that the same accused Mario Tabaco, has still a pending case
for murder before Branch 6, of this Court. (Exh. 'T', p. 187, record).
The Court is impressed with the testimonies of the three prosecution eyewitnesses
namely: Antonio Villasin, Rosario Peneyra and INP Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen who
narrated their versions of the incident with ring of truth, which are both clear and
convincing, in regard to the shooting to death by accused Mario Tabaco of the deceased
victims Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola (Crim. Case No. 10-270), Capt. Oscar Tabulog (Crim. Case
No. 1259), Pat Romeo Regunton (Crim. Case No. 10-317) and the late Felicito Rigunan
(Crim. Case No. 10-284).
Such positive testimonies were corroborated by the testimonies of PC Sgt. Raquepo, PC

Sgt. Ferrer and Pat. Mariano Retreta, who saw the accused rushing outside the cockpit
arena holding his M-14 rifle, immediately after the burst of successive and automatic
gunfire inside the cockpit arena. Although they have not seen the accused shoot the
four victims (Arreola, Tabulog, Rigunan and Regunton), yet their corroborative
testimonies constitute sufficient combination of all circumstances, so as to produce a
conviction of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (People vs. Pimentel, 147 SCRA 251;
People vs. Trinidad, 162 SCRA 714), even as such circumstances proved reasonable leads
to the conclusion pointing to the accused Tabaco, to the exclusion of all others, as the
author of the crime. (People vs. Magallanes, 147 SCRA 92; People vs. Macatana, 161
SCRA 235). And, in the face of all these circumstances, the burden of proof to establish
his innocence LIES on the accused, as the ONUS PROBANDI from that moment is now
shifted to the accused. (Dulpo vs. Sandiganbayan, 150 SCRA 138). A resort to
circumstantial evidence is in the very nature of things, a necessity, and as crimes are
usually committed in secret and under conditions where concealment is highly probable,
and to require direct testimony would in many cases result in freeing criminals and
would deny the proper protection of society. (People vs. ROA, 167 SCRA 116).
As to the death of Jorge Siriban (Crim. Case No. 10-316) and the wounding of Sgt.
Raquepo, there is no adventure of doubt, that accused Mario Tabaco was the author of
the crime charged and thus be held responsible for the same. The evidence adduced in
this case is overwhelming, coming no less from accused's brothers PC personnel, who,
aside from their direct testimonies, are entitled to the settled rule that they have
regularly performed their official duty. (Section 5[M], Rule 131, Revised Rules of Court).
Accordingly, the Court is not impressed with the defense put up by the accused, even as
it does not inspire confidence, hence, the same deserves no credence.
The accused contends that he merely fired his gun up towards the roof, and that he
could have not shot the four (4) deceased victims with the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola
considering the elevation of the 4th step or row in the upper bleachers of the cockpit
arena, in relation to where the accused was, the front row, in much lower elevation. The
accused further contends that he could not have shot afore-said victims, as maybe
gleaned from the testimony of Dr. Rivera, especially to wound No. 2, inflicted upon the
body of the late Mayor Arreola.
The Court believes otherwise. In the first place, the three (3) eyewitnesses Antonio
Villasin, Rosario Peneyra and INP Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen, testified that they saw
the accused stood up from his seat and directed his gun M-14 towards the group of Ex-
Mayor Arreola who were then at the upper 4th row of cemented seats at the bleachers.
They could have been inaccurate of the distance of meters, as it could have been
around 5 meters from where the accused stood up, which is a little bit west of the group
of Ex-Mayor Arreola, who were then facing south, face to face with the accused. This is
true and the same will jibe with the findings of Dr. Rivera, where the gun shot wounds
inflicted upon the body of the late Capt. Tabulog, were on the left portion of his
forehead front to back (Wound No. 1); Wound No. 2, in his left temple; Wound No. 3,
below his right clavicle of his right shoulder and Wound No. 4, on his left thigh
downward.
In the case of the late Mayor Arreola his wounds are: Wound No. 1, is on the left side of
his head above the hairline; Wound No. 2, right base of his neck and exited at the upper
shoulder base through and through. Wound No. 3, was on his left lower abdomen and
his lower back as exit for wound Nos. 1 and 2, the relative position of the assailant and
the victim is face to face, so with Wound No. 3. For wound No. 2, the point of entry is
higher than the point of exit, but there is a possibility that the victim Arreola, probably
bent forward and the bullet ricocheted.
It must be noted that the seats in the upper bleachers where the group of the late
Mayor stayed were all cemented including their back rests and the bullets fired from the
gun of the accused must have rebounded or deflected from surface to surface, on the
cemented back rests and seats hitting wound No. 2, on the body of the Mayor and the
bodies of Romeo Regunton and Felicito Rigunan. The bullets RICOCHETED, at the place
where the group of the Mayor stayed. Anent the cemented railguard dividing the lower
and upper bleachers, the same is not too high so as to obviate the possibility of hitting
the group of the late Mayor Arreola, especially as in this case, when the accused stood
up from his seat and fired at his victims. Witness Rosario Peneyra testified that his
wound on his face and right abdomen must have been caused by the debris of the said
cemented railguard which was hit by the bullets.
In the case of the death of Jorge Siriban, there is not much dispute as the evidence
adduced is overwhelming and even the defense admits that Siriban died due to gunshot
wounds — inflicted upon him during the grappling of the subject gun (Exh. 'K').
The Court believes in the reliability and intrinsic credibility of the prosecution witnesses,
there being no competent evidence presented for them to falsely testify against the
accused. There is no issue of motive, as the accused was clearly and positively identified.
All told, the Court believes and so holds that herein accused Mario Tabaco is the
author/culprit in the shooting to death of the deceased victims, Jorge Arreola, Oscar
Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, as well as the deceased Jorge Siriban
and the wounding of Benito Raquepo."[6]
The dispositive part of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, prescinding from the foregoing, and fortified by the balm of clear judicial
conscience, the Court finds the accused Mario Tabaco guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of all the crimes charged against him:
1. In Criminal Cases Nos. (a) 10-259 (Oscar Tabulog); (b) No. 10-270 (Jorge Arreola);
(c) 10-284 (Felicito Rigunan); and (d) 10-317 (Romeo Regunton), involving four (4)
murder victims, but declared to have been prosecuted in one Information; the same
being a complex crime under Art. 248, Revised Penal Code, the accused Mario Tabaco is
sentenced to a single penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, in its maximum period, with all
the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased victims
— Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, the amount of P50,000.00
each for a total of P150,00.00 subject to the lien herein imposed for payment of the
appropriate docket fees if collected, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. However, in Criminal Case No. 10-270, the accused Mario Tabaco is further
ordered to pay the heirs of the late Mayor Jorge Arreola, the grand total amount of
P633,500.00, by way of total civil liability, subject to the lien herein imposed for
payment of the appropriate docket fees, in case of successful collection, both without
subsidiary imprisonment in case insolvency.
2. In Criminal Case No. 10-316 for Homicide with Frustrated Homicide, the
accused Mario Tabaco is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from, ten
(10) years and one(1) day Prision Mayor as MINIMUM, to Seventeen (17) years, Four(4)
months, one (1) day of RECLUSION TEMPORAL as MAXIMUM, and to pay the heirs of the
deceased Jorge Siriban, the amount of P50,000.00, by way of death indemnity, plus
P30,000.00 to Sgt. Benito Raquepo, by way of medical expenses incurred, subject to the
lien herein imposed for payment of the appropriate docket fees in case of successful
collection; both without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
3. The M-14 rifle (Exh. 'K' and 'K-2') the corpus delicti, presently deposited with
117th PC Company, Aparri, Cagayan, is hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the
government; Perforce, the Commanding Officer of the 117th PC, Aparri, Cagayan, is
peremptorily ordered to deposit to the Acting Branch Clerk of Court of this court, the
said M-14 rifle with magazines, for proper disposition in accordance with law and the
rules.
4. The accused to pay the costs.
5. In the service hereof, the accused shall be entitled to the full length of time, he
underwent preventive imprisonment (March 23, 1987), provided he voluntarily agreed
in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners,
otherwise, he shall be credited to only four-fifth (4/5) thereof. (Art. 29, NCC; as
amended by RA 6127, June 17, 1970; U.S. vs. Ortencio, 38 Phil. 341; People vs. Chavez,
126 SCRA 1).
SO ORDERED."[7] (Underscoring ours)
Notwithstanding the single penalty imposed by the trial court, accused still interposed
the present appeal on the following grounds:
(1) The trial court erred in convicting Mario Tabaco of the crime of murder in connection
with the deaths of Oscar Tibulog, Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan, and Romeo Regunton.
(2) The trial court erred in holding Mario Tabaco liable for homicide on the death of
Jorge Siriban and the injury sustained by Benito Raquepo.
(3) The trial court erred in not giving credence to the testimony of accused-appellant
Tabaco.
The pivotal issue presented in this case is one of credibility. Time and again, we have
ruled that when the issue hinges on the credibility of witnesses vis-a-vis the accused's
denials, the trial court's findings with respect thereto are generally not disturbed on
appeal,[8] unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been
misinterpreted.[9] The reason for the rule is eloquently stated in the case of People vs. de
Guzman,[10] thus:
"In the resolution of factual issues, the court relies heavily on the trial court for its
evaluation of the witnesses and their credibility. Having the opportunity to observe
them on the stand, the trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin line between
fact and prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. That
line may not be discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal record by the
reviewing court. The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm the truth
or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden
pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright
tone of a ready reply. The record will not show if the eyes have darted in evasion or
looked down in confession or gazed steadily with a serenity that has nothing to distort
or conceal. The record will not show if tears were shed in anger, or in shame, or in
remembered pain, or in feigned innocence. Only the judge trying the case can see all
these and on the basis of his observations arrive at an informed and reasoned
verdict."[11]
After a careful examination of the records, we find no ground or reason to set aside or
disturb the trial court's assessment of credibility of the eyewitnesses when they testified
pointing to accused-appellant as the assailant in the shooting of the group of Ex-Mayor
Arreola and his companions.
1. Eyewitnesses Antonio Villasin and Rosario Peneyra, who were with the group of Ex-
Mayor Arreola on that fateful night of March 22, 1989, categorically testified that it was
accused-appellant, whom they positively identified in court, who fired his M-14 Rifle at
their direction hitting the ex-mayor and his companions.
Villasin's testimony on this point is as follows:

COURT:
Q: You heard gun report, what can you say?

A: I saw that he was the one who made the gun report, sir.
ATTY ARRIOLA:
Q: Who was that 'he' you are referring to?

A: Mario Tabaco, sir. (p. 19, tsn, March 19, 1990)
Q: Why do you say that Mario Tabaco was the one from whom those gun reports come
from?
A: Because he was the only person from whom I saw a gun, sir.
Q: What did you do also upon hearing those gun reports?
A: I had to seek shelter, sir.
Q: What happened to Ex-Mayor Arreola?

A: He was hit, sir.
PROSECUTOR MIGUEL:
Q: You said that the accused shot Ex-Mayor Arreola, what kind of weapon did he use if
you know?
A: M-14, sir.
xxx
xxx xxx
Q: After the incident (precedent) have you come to learn what happened to Regunton?
A: I came to know that he was dead, sir.
Q: Was that all you gathered?

A: Also Capt. Tabulog, sir.
xxx
xxx xxx
Q: How many shots did you hear?

A: Three (3) shots, sir.
Q: All those three (3) shots were directed to Ex-Mayor?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: You heard three shots according to you, was that successive or automatic?
A: Successive, sir.
Q: You were seated at the left side of Ex-Mayor Arreola, who was seated on his right
side?
A: None, sir.
xxx
xxx xxx
Q: Mr. witness, you said that you saw the deceased holding a gun when you first heard
gun shot, will you please describe the stands (position) of the accused?
A: Like this. (The witness demonstrated that the accused was standing on a forth (port)
arm position).
xxx
xxx xxx
Q: What did he do with the gun when you saw him?
A: He fired the gun, sir.
Q: To what the gun was directed when he fired the gun?
A: To Ex-Mayor Arreola, sir.
ATTY. VILLENA:
Q: You said earlier that after the incident you left the cockpit and returned, when you
returned, what did you see?
A: I saw two dead persons, sir.
Q: Whose cadavers were these that you saw?
A: The cadavers of Ex-Mayor Arreola and Capt. Tabulog, sir.
Q: How far was the cadaver of Tabulog to Arreola?

A: Less than a meter, sir.
xxx
xxx xxx
Q: When you saw the corpse of Capt. Tabulog, can you identify the person passing as
you mentioned?
A: They have similarity, sir.
xxx
xxx xxx
Q: When you heard first gun shot, can you tell the position of Arreola, you and your
companions?
A: We were sitting at the backrest of the 4th seat, sir.
Q: Where were you facing?

A: We were facing south the arena.
Q: Where did the first gun shot came from?

A: It came from Mario Tabaco, sir.
Q: From what direction?

A: Infront of us, sir.
Q: Where was he, was he in your front?

A: He was in the first row of seats.
Q: After the first gun shot, what happened?

A: Somebody was killed, sir.
Q: Who was that?
A: Ex-Mayor Arreola, sir.
xxx
xxx xxx
COURT:
Q: How many gun shot reports did you hear?

A: Many, sir.
ATTY. VILLENA:
Q: You said that you heard more gun shots, can you tell the nature, was there in
succession or automatic?
A: Automatic, sir.
xxx
xxx xxx
Q: Can you tell us your previous occupation?

A: An army man, sir.
Q: How long have you been employed with the army?
A: Five (5) years, sir.
Q: As an army before, have you ever been handled an M-14?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you tell us if you are familiar with M-14 being fired?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, you said earlier that you heard many more shots after you run, would you say
that these gun shots you heard were fired from M-14 rifle?
A: Those are that came from M-14, sir.
Q: Where were you at the time when you heard the automatic gun shot?
A: I was outside the cockpit, sir." [12]
On cross-examination by the defense counsel, witness Villasin testified, thus:
"ATTY. CONSIGNA:
Q: You said that after the first gun shot or gun report, Mr. Tabaco was on the first seat
downward, is it not?
A: Mr. Tabaco placed his left foot on the first seat aiming his gun, sir.
Q: Directly toward the first seat, is that what you mean?
A: It was directed to Ex-Mayor Arreola.
xxx
xxx xxx
Q: I want to make it clear, Mr. witness, it was the first gun that you went to hide
yourself at the gate of the cockpit, is that correct?
A: After the 3rd gun shot, sir.
Q: And these three (3) gun reports, they were in a single successive shot, is it not Mr.
witness?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx
xxx xxx
Q: That person who allegedly passed by you or infront of you prior to the first gun
report, did you notice if he had a gun with him?
A: He passed by our back, sir.
xxx
xxx xxx
Q: And that person according to you was still there when the late Mayor Arreola was
shot?
A: He was directly behind him when the gun reports were made, sir.
Q: You mean to say the first gun report?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that first gun report was hit Ex-Mayor Arreola?
A: The three gun reports hit the Mayor, sir." [13]
For his part, Peneyra testified as follows:
"ATTY. ARRIOLA
Q: Do you remember what particular place of the cockpit when you go with Mayor
Arreola?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What part of the cockpit?

A: We went up to the bleacher, sir.
Q: Do you remember how the bleachers were arranged inside the cockpit?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How were they arranged?

A: In rows, step by step, sir.
COURT:
Q: How many rows?

A: Four rows, sir.
ATTY. ARRIOLA:
Q: And what row did you stay together with the late Mayor Arreola?
A: The late Mayor Arreola and Antonio Villasin took the 4th step, sir.
Q: And how about you?

A: We stood at their back west of them, sir.
Q: By the way, can you tell to the court what were your respective position of the place
where you stayed?
A: The late Mayor Arreola and Antonio Villasin sat at the backrest of the fourth step,
sir.
Q: And how about you, where did you stay also?
A: I stood at the right back of Mayor Arreola, sir.
Q: And how about Romeo Regunton?

A: He also stayed at the back of Mayor Arreola, sir.
xxx
xxx xxx
Q: While you were in that position together with your companions, do you remember
if there was untoward incident that happened?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that untoward incident that happened?

A: That was the time when Mario Tabaco shot the late Mayor Arreola, sir.
Q: Do you know what did Mario Tabaco use in shooting the late Arreola?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What kind of firearm?

A: M-14, sir.
Q: And do you know if Mayor Arreola was hit when Mario Tabaco shot him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How do you know that Mayor Arreola was hit?
A: Because I saw it, sir.
Q: What did you do also?

A: When Mayor Arreola was already dead, I sought cover because I was also wounded.
Q: Do you know what happened also to Romeo Regunton?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened to him?

A: When I was wounded he also said, 'uncle I was also wounded.'
Q: What did you tell when he told you that?

A: I told him, 'you seek cover also my son'.
Q: How did Romeo Regunton took cover?

A: He moved slowly by dragging his body along the ground, sir.
xxx
xxx xxx
Q: By the way, how far were you from Mario Tabaco who fired upon the person of
Mayor Arreola?
A: Probably more than 3 meters, sir." [14]
On cross-examination, this witness testified as follows:
"ATTY. CONSIGNA:
Q: When for the first time when you were already in the cockpit arena did you see the
accused Mario Tabaco?
A: Before the shooting, sir.
Q: And approximately how many minutes or seconds did you see Mario Tabaco for the
first time prior to the shooting incident?
A: Probably 5 minutes before, sir.
Q: And in that place of the cockpit arena have you seen the accused herein Mario
Tabaco?
A: He sat on the first row of the seats.
Q: And sitting on the first row of the bleachers, on what part of the cockpit arena did
Mario Tabaco, the accused sit?
A: He sat a little bit west of us, sir.
COURT:
Q: How far?

A: Probably more than 3 meters, sir.
Q: A little bit to the west, do I get from you that he was seated on the western part o
the cockpit?
A: A little to the west, sir.
Q: And you together with the late Mayor Arreola were also on the western part of the
cockpit?
A: We were on the northwest.
Q: Mario Tabaco, therefore, the accused in these cases was not directly in front of you?
A: A little bit west of us, sir.
Q: It was on that position of the accused Mario Tabaco and your position with the late
Arreola on the northwest when you according to you saw Mario Tabaco fired his gun, is
that what you mean?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: That the accused Mario Tabaco was on the first row when he allegedly shot on
Mayor Arreola who was on 4th row, is that what you mean?
A: Mario Tabaco stood up and faced us, sir.
Q: So while Mario Tabaco stood up and faced towards the direction where you were
together with the late Mayor Arreola still Mario Tabaco was on the floor of the cockpit
arena?
A: Yes, sir, on the cemented floor.
Q: And immediately after you heard the first shot coming from the accused Mario
Tabaco considering that you were right behind the late Mayor Arreola, as you have
stated in your direct examination you immediately sought cover?
A: I only lay flat to the floor of the cockpit when Mario Tabaco fired three (3) shots.
xxx
xxx xxx
Q: At the time you laid flat facing down and you did not come to know that Mayor
Arreola was dead already?
A: Why not, the first and second shots, I know him that he was already dead.
Q: And the three (3) shots that you heard were all directed towards Mayor Arreola?
A: Yes, sir, in our place.
xxx
xxx xxx
COURT:
Q: To whom the 3rd shot directed?

A: In our place, sir.
Q: No person was involved on the 3rd shot?

A: That was also the time when Romeo Regunton came toward me and told me that
he was also hit.
xxx
xxx xxx
COURT:
Q: You don't know the person who shot him?

A: It was Mario Tabaco because he was still firing then, sir.
Q: You do not know the person who shot him?

A: It was Mario Tabaco because he was still firing then, sir." [15]
The above testimonies of Villasin and Peneyra pointing to accused-appellant as the

assailant in the shooting of the ex-mayor and his companions were corroborated further
by the testimony of another eyewitness in the person of Rogelio Guimmayen. His
account of the incident is as follows:
"PROSECUTOR ABAD:
xxx
xxx xxx
Q: How far were you from Tabaco when you saw him holding that gun?
A: More or less ten (10) meters, sir.
Q: Where was he at that specific time and place?

A: Inside the cockpit, sir.
Q: Where were you also?

A: I was at the stairs, sir.
Q: When you saw him what happened if any?

A: When he entered he stopped and then the gun fired and that was the time when I
got down, sir.
Q: Did you see to whom he was directing the gun?

A: It was directed to the Mayor's place, sir.
Q: How far was the Mayor from the accused Mario Tabaco?
A: More or less three (3) meters only. There was only one bench between them, sir.
Q: Did you see the accused firing his gun towards the Mayor?
A: With his first shot which was directed to the Mayor that was the time I got down to
hide myself, sir."[16]
On cross-examination, this witness testified as follows:
"ATTY. CONSIGNA:
Q: So, it was at the time you were inside the cockpit arena that you heard gunfire?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you did not see who fired that gunfire while you were inside the cockpit arena?
A: When I was inside, I saw Mario Tabaco pointing a gun to the Mayor and the gun
went off and that's the time I took cover, sir.
xxx
xxx xxx
Q: And that was the last time you heard burst of gunfire inside the cockpit arena?
A: When I went outside, I heard shots inside and outside." [17]
Set over against the foregoing positive and categorical testimonial declaration of
the abovenamed eyewitnesses for the prosecution is the accused-appellant's bare
denial of the charges against him. As between the positive identification of the accused
by the prosecution witnesses and the bare denial of accused, the choice is not difficult
to make. For, it is a settled rule that positive identification by the prosecution witnesses
of the accused as perpetrator of the crime is entitled to greater weight than his bare
denial and explanation.[18]
Likewise, there is no evidence from the record, as none was adduced by accused-
appellant, of any ill-motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses as to why would
they testify adversely against accused-appellant in the way that they did. Well-settled is
the rule that where there is no evidence and nothing to indicate, that the principal
witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, the presumption was
that they were not so actuated and their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.
[19]
2. Accused-appellant contends that eyewitnesses Villasin and Peneyra were not telling
the truth when they testified that it was accused-appellant who was the assailant in the
shooting of Ex-Mayor Arreola and his companions considering that Dr. Rivera, who
examined the cadaver of Ex-Mayor Arreola, testified that the trajectory of the bullets
that hit the Ex-Mayor shows that the assailant was on the same level as the Ex-Mayor,
and the trajectory of the third bullet shows that the assailant was at a higher level as the
point of entry was higher than the point of exit. Appellant states that he was seated at
the first row which was the lowest while the Ex-Mayor and his companions were seated
at the fourth row which was the highest. This contention, however, is untenable.
Eyewitnesses Villasin and Peneyra testified that accused-appellant was at the first row
of seats of the slanted bleachers of the cockpit arena, when he stood up, stepped on
one of the seats, aimed his rifle at Ex-Mayor Arreola and his companions and fired at
them.[20]
The abovequoted testimonies explain very well why two gunshot wounds found on the
cadaver of Ex-mayor Arreola appear to have been inflicted while he and his assailant
were face to face and at the same level.
Upon the other hand, according to Dr. Rivera, one of the gunshot wounds of Ex-Mayor
Arreola had a point of entry higher than the point of exit because he must have already
been lying down when his wound was inflicted. [21]
Well-established, too, from the evidence on record is accused-appellant's liability for the
death of Jorge Siriban, Jr. and the near-fatal wounding of Sgt. Benito Raquepo.
Not seriously disputed by accused-appellant are the testimonies of Sgt. Benito Raquepo
and policeman Mario Retreta. Sgt. Benito Raquepo testified that at about 9:00 o'clock in
the evening of March 22, 1987 while he was taking his snacks at the canteen of Co
located at the left side of the gate of the cockpit arena, he heard five successive gun
reports coming from inside the cockpit arena. While he was on his way inside the
cockpit arena, he saw the accused-appellant coming from inside the cockpit arena. He
told the accused "Mario relax ka lang", after which the accused pointed his gun at him.
At that point in time, Mario Retreta who was among the persons near Mario Tabaco,
grabbed the gun from the latter. It was at that point when the gun went off hitting him
on the right thigh and the bullet exiting on his left thigh. He also saw that Jorge Siriban,
who was then about three meters away from his left side, was hit at his testicles.
Mario Retreta, a policeman and relative of accused-appellant, on the other hand

corroborated in part the testimony of Sgt. Raquepo. He testified that at about 10:00
o'clock in the evening of March 22, 1987, he was at the canteen of Mrs. Co. While
thereat, he saw accused-appellant rushing out from the cockpit arena. Before he saw
accused-appellant, he heard a gun report from inside the cockpit arena. He was then
about one meter away from accused-appellant when he noticed Sgt. Raquepo whom he
is acquainted with, and Jorge Siriban who was then standing at the gate of the cockpit
arena. Sgt. Raquepo was facing accused-appellant and at that distance and position, he
heard Sgt. Raquepo said: "Mario keep calm". He also told accused-appellant: "What is
that happened again, Mario." When he saw accused-appellant change his gun position
from port arm to horizontal position, he got near accused-appellant and pressed down
the muzzle of the gun when accused appellant squeezed the trigger hitting Sgt. Raquepo
on both thighs and also Jorge Siriban. A certain Sgt. Ferrer joined in the grapple and was
able to take away the gun from accused-appellant.
Sgt. Raquepo survived the gunshot wounds due to adequate medical assistance but
Siriban was not as lucky.
Accused-appellant claims that he did not have the criminal intent to kill Siriban or
wound Sgt. Raquepo, and that the gun would not have been fired in the first place had
Mario Retreta, for no apparent reason, not tried to grab the gun from him, are without
merit.
Retreta testified that he grabbed the gun from accused-appellant because the latter
changed his gun from port arm position to horizontal position, and at that instance he
thought accused-appellant might harm Sgt. Raquepo.[22]
Furthermore, even assuming that he lacked criminal intent in the killing of Sgt. Raquepo
and the near-fatal wounding of Siriban, his claim of innocence cannot be sustained. His
undisputed act of firing the gun, which is by itself felonious in total disregard of the
consequences it might produce, is equivalent to criminal intent.
Accused-appellant cannot evade responsibility for his felonious acts, even if he did not
intend the consequences thereof for, in accordance with Art. 4 of the Revised Penal
Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
We note that while the accused was found guilty in all four (4) murder charges and the
penalty of reclusion perpetua should have been imposed on him in all four (4) murder
charges, the trial court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua for all four murder
charges. The trial court explained the single sentence for four murder charges in this
wise:
"Whether or not the criminal cases Nos. 259, 270, 284 and 317, involving the killings of
Oscar Tabulog, Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, respectively,
should have been prosecuted under only one Information.
The law provides:
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes.
'When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious
crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. (as amended by
Art. No. 400). (Art. 48, Revised Penal Code).'
Read as it should be, this article provides for two classes of crimes where a single
penalty is to be imposed; first, where the single act constitutes two or more g rave or
less grave felonies (delito compuesto); and second, when the offense is a necessarily
means for committing the other (delito complejo) and/or complex proper (People vs.
Pineda, 20 SCRA 748).
In the cases at bar, the Provincial Prosecutor filed four (4) separate Informations of
murder, which should have been otherwise, as the shooting to death of the four (4)
victims should have been prosecuted under one information, involving four (4) murder
victims.
The evidence shows that the four (4) victims were FELLED by one single shot/burst of
fire and/or successive automatic gun fires, meaning continuous. Hence, it is a complex
crime involving four murdered victims, under the first category, where a single act of
shooting constituted two or more grave or less grave felonies (delito compuesto), as
decided in the cases of People vs. Dama, CA 44 O.G. 3339; People vs. Lawas, 97 Phil.
975; People vs. Pineda, L-26222, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 748.
Paraphrasing a more recent decision of the Supreme Court, we say -- as the deaths of
Oscar Tahulog, Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, in Criminal Cases
Nos. 259, 270, 284 and 317 respectively, were the result of one single act of the accused
Mario Tabaco, (People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307) the penalty --- is the penalty imposed for
the more serious offense. The more serious offense is murder, the killing have been
attended by TREACHERY because the victims were completely taken by surprise and had
no means of defending themselves against Mario Tabaco's sudden attack. The penalty is
imposable in its maximum degree (People vs. Fernandez, 99 Phil. 515), but as the death
penalty is no longer permitted the same is hereby reduced to a single penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA for the four (4) murders. (People vs. Herson Maghanoy, GR Nos.
67170-72, December 15, 1989).
Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. 10-316, for homicide with Frustrated Homicide and it
appearing also that the death of Jorge Siriban and the wounding of Benito Raquepo, was
the result of one single act of the accused Tabaco, the applicable penalty is the penalty
imposed for the more serious offense. The more serious offense is HOMICIDE, to be
imposed in its maximum degree of reclusion temporal, which is 17 years, 4 months, 1
day to 20 years. There being no modifying circumstances and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty that should be imposed, and which is hereby
imposed, upon the accused Mario Tabaco is 10 years and 1 day of Prision Mayor as the
minimum, to 17 years, 4 months, 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, plus
P30,000.00 actual damages for medical expenses of Benito Raquepo.
It was duly proved beyond doubt that the gun (Exhs. 'K', SN No. 1492932, 'K-2' —
magazine of M-14 and Exh. 'L' — Memo Receipt of M-14 issued to Tabaco), used by the
accused, is admittedly an automatic powerful weapon, more powerful than an M-16
armalite rifle. It is so powerful that the bullets can penetrate even more than five (5)
persons resulting to their deaths. And, this was proven when, according to witness
Rosario Peneyra, the bullets even destroyed the cemented rail guard separating the
lower and upper bleachers of the cockpit arena, and causing wounds on his face and on
his right shoulder. Additionally, we have the used/spent empty shells (Exh. 'R' and 'R-
1')."[23]
We hold that the trial court was in error in imposing only a single penalty of reclusion
perpetua for all four murder cases. The trial court holding that a complex crime was
committed since "the evidence shows that the four (4) victims were FELLED by one
single shot/burst of fire and/or successive automatic gun fires, meaning continuous
(emphasis ours)"[24] does not hold water.
Of course, to justify the penalty imposed, the trial court relied on the doctrines
enunciated in People vs. Pama[25] (not People vs. Dama, as cited by the trial court),
People vs. Lawas,[26] and People vs. Pineda.[27]
The trial court misappreciated the facts in People vs. Pama. In said case, there
was only one bullet which killed two persons. Hence, there was only a single act which
produced two crimes, resulting in a specie of complex crime known as a compound
crime, wherein a single act produces two or more grave or less grave felonies. In the
case at bench, there was more than one bullet expended by the accused-appellant in
killing the four victims. The evidence adduced by the prosecution show that Tabaco
entered the cockpit with a fully loaded M-14 sub-machine gun. [28] He fired the weapon,
which contained 20 rounds of bullets in its magazine, continuously. When the rifle was
recovered from Tabaco, the magazine was already empty. Moreover, several spent
shells were recovered from the scene of the crime. Hence, the ruling enunciated in
People vs. Pama cannot be applied. On the contrary, what is on all fours with the case at
bench is the ruling laid down in People vs. Desierto [29]. The accused in that case killed
five persons with a Thompson sub-machine gun, an automatic firearm which, like the M-
14, is capable of firing continuously. As stated therein:
"In the case at bar, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable because the
death of each of the five persons who were killed by appellant and the physical injuries
inflicted upon each of the two other persons injured were not caused by the
performance by the accused of one simple act as provided for by said article. Although it
is true that several successive shots were fired by the accused in a short space of time,
yet the factor which must be taken into consideration is that, to each death caused or
physical injuries inflicted upon the victims, corresponds a distinct and separate shot
fired by the accused, who thus made himself criminally liable for as many offenses as
those resulting from every singe act that produced the same. Although apparently he
perpetrated a series of offenses successively in a matter of seconds, yet each person
killed and each person injured by him became the victim, respectively, of a separate
crime of homicide or frustrated homicide. Except for the fact that five crimes of
homicide and two cases of frustrated homicide were committed successively during the
tragic incident, legally speaking there is nothing that would connect one of them with its
companion offenses." (emphasis ours)
In Desierto, although the burst of shots was caused by one single act of pressing
the trigger of the Thompson sub-machine gun, in view of its special mechanism, the
person firing it has only to keep pressing the trigger with his finger and it would fire
continually. Hence, it is not the act of pressing the trigger which should produce the
several felonies, but the number of bullets which actually produced them.[30]
The trial court also misread People vs. Pineda. [31] True, the case of Pineda provided us
with a definition of what a complex crime is. But that is not the point. What is relevant is
that Art. 48 was not applied in the said case because the Supreme Court found that
there were actually several homicides committed by the perpetrators. Had the trial
court read further, it would have seen that the Supreme Court in fact recognized the
"deeply rooted x x x doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots, such
acts constitute separate and distinct crimes." [32]Clarifying the applicability of Art. 48 of
the Revised Penal Code, the Supreme Court further stated in Pineda that "to apply the
first half of Article 48, x x x there must be singularity of criminal act; singularity of
criminal impulse is not written into the law."[33] (emphasis supplied) The firing of several
bullets by Tabaco, although resulting from one continuous burst of gunfire, constitutes
several acts. Each person, felled by different shots, is a victim of a separate crime of
murder. There is no showing that only a single missile passed through the bodies of all
four victims. The killing of each victim is thus separate and distinct from the other. In
People vs. Pardo[34]we held that:
"Where the death of two persons does not result from a single act but from two
different shots, two separate murders, and not a complex crime, are committed."
Furthermore, the trial court's reliance on the case of People vs. Lawas [35] is
misplaced. The doctrine enunciated in said case only applies when it is impossible to
ascertain the individual deaths caused by numerous killers. In the case at bench, all of
the deaths are attributed, beyond a shadow of a doubt, to the accused-appellant.
Consequently, the four murders which resulted from a burst of gunfire cannot be
considered a complex crime. They are separate crimes. The accused-appellant must
therefore be held liable for each and every death he has caused, and sentenced
accordingly to four sentences of reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by the trial court in finding
accused-appellant guilty of four (4) counts of Murder and one (1) count of Homicide
with frustrated homicide, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is,
hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that four sentences of reclusion perpetua
be hereby imposed.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 133888, March 01, 2001 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ALFREDO
NARDO Y ROSALES, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This case is before this Court on automatic review from the Regional Trial Court of
Legazpi City, Albay, Branch III, which imposed on accused-appellant the death penalty
for rape in Criminal Case No. 7170.
The victim, Lorielyn R. Nardo, is the eldest daughter of accused- appellant. She was born
on September 11, 1981 and, at the time of the incident, was fourteen ( 14) years old.[1]
On February 24, 1996, around noon, Lorielyn was in their house located in Barangay 3,
Camalig, Albay, together with her father, accused- appellant Alfredo Nardo, two younger
brothers, Leonel and Louie, and maternal grandfather, Vicente Remot. At 1 :30 o'clock in
the afternoon, after they had lunch, Vicente left for work. Alfredo told his sons, Leonel
and Louie, to go out. He then ordered Lorielyn to get his cigarettes in his bedroom. When
Lorielyn went inside the bedroom, her father followed her. He embraced Lorielyn from
behind and began mashing her breasts. Lorielyn pleaded, "Papa, please stop it. Have
mercy. " Her father ignored her. Instead, he undressed her and pushed her to the bed.
Lorielyn started to cry , while Alfredo took off his clothes. Then, he lay on top of her and
had sexual intercourse with her. He kissed her from the neck down. She tried to free
herself but Alfredo took hold of a knife from a nearby cabinet and pointed it at her right
ear. He threatened to kill their whole family if Lorielyn told anyone what he did. When
he was finished, Alfredo left the house. During all this time, Lorielyn's mother, Elizabeth
Nardo, was washing clothes about five houses away.[2]
Elizabeth returned home at about 3:00 o'clock p.m. She saw Lorielyn crying while
washing the dishes. She asked Lorielyn why she was crying, but her daughter said
nothing.[3]
On March 19, 1996, Lorielyn was washing clothes when her father approached her and
whispered, "We will play tonight near the river. " Lorielyn understood this to mean that
her father wanted to have sexual intercourse with her again. She finished the laundry and
left the house. She took a passenger jeepney to Barangay Libod, Camalig, Albay and
proceeded to the house of her aunt, Carol Navera. She stayed there until her aunt arrived
at around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. When it became late, Carol told Lorielyn to go
home, but she decided to spend the night at her aunt's house because she was afraid to
undergo the ordeal from her father again.[4]
The next day, Lorielyn's brother, Leone, was sent by her father to fetch her, but she
refused to go with him. Her aunt asked her again why she did not want to go home. She
merely said she had a problem. She slept at her aunt's house again that night. The
following day, her mother came to fetch her. Lorielyn told her mother she did not want to
go home. She said, "Mama, do you want me to become pregnant in that house? " Her
mother asked, "Who will impregnate you there? " Lorielyn replied, "Your husband. " Her
mother retorted that Alfredo could not do that to her, then left.[5]
Lorielyn stayed at her aunt's house until March 22, 1996. On that date, Carol again asked
Lorielyn what her problem was. Finally, she told her aunt that her father raped her.
Immediately, Carol went to report the matter to the police. She later returned home with
two policemen, and together they brought Lorielyn to the Camalig Police Station. The
rape was entered in the police blotter.[6] The policemen then brought Lorielyn to the
Municipal Health Office of Camalig, Albay, where she was examined by Dr. Melvyn F .
Orbe, the Municipal Health Officer.[7] From there Lorielyn was brought to the Municipal
Trial Court of Camalig-Albay to file a formal complaint for rape against her father,
Alfredo Nardo.[8]
On May 29, 1996, an Information for rape was filed against Alfredo Nardo, charging as
follows:
That on or about the 24th day of February 1996, at more or less 1:30 o'clock in the
afternoon, at Brgy. No.3, Municipality of Camalig, Province of Albay, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the
father of the herein victim, with lewd and unchaste design, by means of violence, force
and intimidation, armed with a knife, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with her (sic) own daughter, LORIELYN R.
NARDO, a 14 year old girl, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW[9]

At the arraignment on August 8, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. [10]
The prosecution presented Dr. Melvyn Orbe, who testified on the following findings as a
result of his examination of the victim, Lorielyn Nardo:
Pelvic Examination:
whitish to yellowish discharge
irritation lateral aspect of the posterior vulva at 3 o ' clock .
healed laceration hymenal in origin posterior aspect of the fourchet [11]

Dr. Orbe stated that based on these findings, it is possible that Lorielyn had sexual
intercourse.[12]
Carolina Navera, testifying for the prosecution, corroborated Lorielyn's statement that the
latter went to her house on March 20, 1996. Lorielyn cried and told her that she did not
want to go home because she had a problem. Elizabeth, Lorielyn's mother, came to fetch
her but she refused to go home, saying that she was raped by her father. Upon hearing
this, Elizabeth left and told Carolina not to let Lorielyn leave her house. After Elizabeth
was gone, Carolina went to the police station. She returned later .with two policemen,
who then brought Lorielyn to the police headquarters. [13]
Ma. Francia Aguilar, the social welfare officer of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development, also testified that in the evening of March 22, 1996, she responded to a
report of a rape incident. She met the victim, Lorielyn Nardo, at the house of Cely
Bantog, a social worker, at Camalig, Albay. She interviewed Lorielyn and her mother,
Elizabeth, tor the purpose of preparing a Social Case Study report.[14] Thereafter, she
endorsed Lorielyn to the DSWD Center for Girls in Sorsogon, Sorsogon to undergo
therapeutics.[15]
SPO3 Jose Nuylan, a member of the Camalig police force, testified that he investigated
the rape incident and took the statement of Lorielyn Nardo.[16]
Elizabeth Nardo, the victim's mother, was called to the witness stand. She testified that
she and Alfredo are not married, but they have been living together. They have seven
children, the eldest of whom is Lorielyn. She stated that Lorielyn was born on September
11, 1981 at Anei, Claveria, Misamis Oriental; that Lorielyn's birth certificate was burned
in the Municipal Building of Misamis Oriental.[17] However, Elizabeth presented and
identified Lorielyn's baptismal certificate showing that she was born on September
11,1981.[18]
The defense, on the other hand, presented lawyer Santer G. Gonzales, the employer of
accused-appellant. He testified that accused-appellant worked as a helper at his farm in
Quirangay, Camalig, Albay. On February 24, 1996, accused-appellant arrived at his farm
before 8:00 o'clock in the morning. He was followed by his father-in-law, Vicente Remot,
who lived with him in the same house. It started to rain hard, so they decided not to work
that day. Vicente Remot went home at around 8:30 or 9:00 o'clock in the morning.
Accused-appellant stayed behind. After a while, Paterno Ramas, a neighbor of Atty.
Gonzales, arrived. They started to drink. None of them left the farmhouse since Atty.
Gonzales kept bottles of gin and cigarettes in stock. They were joined later in thc
afternoon by. Didjo Mujar, another friend of Atty. Gonzales. They drank about five
bottles of gin and sang while Atty. Gonzales played the guitar. The rain subsided at
around 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon, so they stopped drinking. At 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, accused-appellant left.[19] The farm is located around 400 to 500 meters away
from Barangay 3, where accused-appellant and the victim reside, and can be reached in
15 minutes.[20]
When asked to comment on the victim, Lorielyn Nardo, Atty. Gonzales described her as
one capable of telling a lie. He narrated that once, she went to his farm to collect the
amount of P50.00 as daily wage of her grandfather, Vicente Remot, but she gave only
P35.00 to her mother. Elizabeth thus went to Atty. Gonzales' to ask about the deficiency.
They later learned from Lorielyn ' s younger sister that she spent the missing P15.00 on
snacks.[21]
Vicente Remot, accused-appellant's father-in-law, corroborated Atty. Gonzales' testimony

that he reported for work at the latter's farm in the morning of February 24, 1996, but he
was unable to work because of the rain, so he went home instead, leaving accused-
appellant in the farm. At 1 :00 o ' clock in the afternoon of that day, he was at home
watching television with Elizabeth and his grandchildren, including Lorielyn. He refuted
Lorielyn's claim that he left after lunch to work, saying that he stayed in the house the
whole afternoon since it was raining.[22]
Elizabeth also testified that on February 24, 1996, she was at home watching television
with her father and children, namely, Lorielyn, Lewcherd, Lailani, Leonel, Louie Boy
and Leo Boy. All her children were at home because it was a Saturday. She claimed that
Lorielyn filed the complaint for rape against her father because he was very strict with
her. She learned from Lorielyn's best friend that she had a problem with her boyfriend, a
certain Erwin Loreno. At one time, Lorielyn asked permission to attend a holy retreat, but
Elizabeth found out from the school that there was no such retreat. Lorielyn lied on
another occasion, when she told Mrs. Bonifacia "Paz" Nieva that her grandfather was sick
so she can borrow money.[23]
Mrs. Bonifacia Nieva testified that her daughter was a classmate of Lorielyn. Once,
Lorielyn visited her saying that she was sent by Elizabeth to borrow money because her
grandfather was sick. Mrs. Nieva gave Lorielyn P200.00. Later, when she went to see
Elizabeth to collect payment, she found out that Lorielyn ' s grandfather did not get sick.
Lorielyn admitted to her that she lied about it to be able to borrow money.[24]
The prosecution recalled Lorielyn to the witness stand by way of rebuttal evidence. She
refuted Atty. Gonzales' statement that she did not turn over in full the salary of her
grandfather in the amount of P50.00. She denied that she lied to her mother about a holy
retreat held by her school. Anent the amount of P200.00 she borrowed from Mrs. Nieva,
she asserted that it was her father who ordered her to do that, and that she gave the whole
sum of P200.00 to him.[25]
On clarificatory questioning by the presiding judge, Lorielyn maintained that her

grandfather, Vicente Remot, indeed came home in the morning of February 24, 1996, but
he left again to go to Atty. Gonzales' farm after lunch. That afternoon, her mother was at
the public faucet located far away from their house washing clothes. The judge wondered
aloud why she was doing the laundry in the afternoon when this is usually done in the
morning. Lorielyn replied that her mother had started doing the laundry in the morning
but that she was not able to finish it, so she returned in the afternoon to continue her
chore. She denied having any male friends, saying all her friends are girls. When asked
once more by the judge, Lorielyn reiterated that her father had sexual intercourse with
her.[26]
Carolina Nieva and Elizabeth Nardo were presented as sur-rebuttal witnesses. They
testified in sum that Lorielyn had a boyfriend.[27]
Accused-appellant was presented as the last witness. He denied that he raped his daughter
on February 24, 1997, saying that he was at the farm of Atty. Gonzales. He scolded
Lorielyn when he learned from her sister and brother that she was always going around
with a boy. He also stated that
Lorielyn got mad at him because he did not permit her to leave the house whenever she
wanted to.[28]
On March 3, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, this court
finds the accused ALFREDO NARDO Y ROSALES GUlLTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of RAPE and sentences him to suffer the penalty
of DEATH. The said accused in likewise ordered to pay Lorielyn Nardo the amount of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for moral damages.
For humanitarian reasons, however, it is recommended that the DEATH penalty be

commuted to RECLUSION PERPETUA.
SO ORDERED.[29]
Accused-appellant raises the following assignment of errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF
THE VICTIM LORIELYN AND DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE FOR THE
DEFENSE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO RECITE THE REASONS WHY IT

WAS RECOMMENDING EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY FOR THE ACCUSED. [30]
Accused-appellant assails the trial court's finding that Atty. Gonzales was his employer
and therefore was likely to testify in his favor; and that he could not have noticed
accused-appellant leave the farm in the afternoon of February 24, 1996 because he had
one drink too many. Accused-appellant contends that the court should not have been too
quick to condemn him when his witness was a lawyer. Furthermore, he argues that
Lorielyn's conduct after the alleged rape, specifically from February 25 to March 19,
1996, during which she stayed in the house with her father and continued to do her daily
chores, creates a doubt on the veracity of the charge.
In the Reply Brief for accused-appellant,[31] defense counsel reveals that Lorielyn wrote
her the following letter:
7-13-99
Dear Atty. De Guzman:
Ako nga po pala si Lorielyn Nardo na anak ni Alfredo Nardo na nakabinbin pa sa

ngayon sa Maximum Security Compound NBP I-D Muntinlupa City. Sumulat po ako sa
inyo upang humingi ng tulong na gawin po sana ang lahat, wala po talagang kasalanan
ang aking ama ako na po mismong nag-akusa ang nagsasabi na walang katotohanan
ang lahat ng mga sinabi ko na pinagsamantalahan niya ako. Nagawa ko lang po yon
dahil masyado po kasi siyang mahigpit sa aming magkakapatid. Atty. tulungan ninyo
sana ako, nalaman ko nga po pala ang inyong address dahil dumalaw po ang mama ko
noon sa papa ko at hiningi ko naman po para masulatan ko po kayo.
Umaasa po akong lubos na ako'y inyong matutulungan.
Lubos na umaasa
LORIELYN NARDO[32]
On May 4, 2000, counsel for accused-appellant filed a Supplemental Reply Brief,
[33]
alleging that she received another letter from Lorielyn Nardo which states:
04-17-2000
Dear Atty. Teresita de Guzman,
Unang-una po sa lahat ay nagpapasalamat po ako sa pag-response mo sa letter, Ako nga

po pala si Lorielyn Nardo na anak ni Mr. Alfredo Nardo na nakapiit ngayon sa DORM I-
D ng Muntinlupa ako po yung nagpadala ng liham sa inyo. Attorney, lagi ko pong
ipinagdarasal na nawa' y matapos na ang paghihirap at pagdurusa ng aking ama sa
loob ng piitan, nawa'y matapos na ang lahat ng problema upang manumbalik muli ang
sigla ng aming pamilya. Nagpapasalamat nga rin po pala ako sa ginagawa mong
pagtulong sa amin, attorney nawa po ay makamit nyo ang tagumpay.
Hanggang na lamang po ang aking liham, umaasa po ako sa inyong pang-unawa at

tagumpay.
Nagpapasalamat at umaasa,
Lorielyn Nardo[34]
In compliance with the Court's Resolution dated November 14, 2000,[35] the Office of the
Solicitor General filed its comment on the letters of Lorielyn Nardo,[36] contending that
there is no mention of her father's innocence in her letter dated April 17, 2000. Rather,
she merely expressed therein her deep sympathy for her father's situation in prison. The
Solicitor General argues that a recantation is not sufficient to warrant the exoneration of
accused-appellant after he has been proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt based on
Lorielyn's candid, categorical and straightforwarrd testimony before the trial court.
In the meantime, counsel for accused-appellant, by way of a Manifestation and Motion,

[37]
submitted two more letters from Lorielyn Nardo which are hereunder reproduced, viz:
August 10, 2000
Dear Attorney,
Unang-una po sa lahat ay ang taos-puso kong pasasalamat, sa dahilang pagpapaunlak

niyo sa kahilingan kong maipasa sa korte ang isang liham ng katotohanan, at kahit wala
pa po ang isang desisyon mula sa korte ay lubos po akong umaasa at nagtitiwala sa
inyong kakayahan. Attorney, kung alam niyo lang po ng matanggap at mabasa ang isang
letter na nagmula sa' yo ay punung-puno po ng kaligayahan ang aking puso dahil kahit
papaano ay nabawasan na ang pag-aalinlangan sa aking isipan. Sa ngayon po ay
patuloy na lang akong umaasa na sana isang araw ay makita kong muling masaya ang
aking pamilya. Attorney, isang pabor po ang nais kong hilingin, na sana bago magpasko
ay muli ko ng makasama ang aking ama, at gusto ko pong maging ninyo 'to sa akin sa
darating na pasko.
Hanggang dito na lamang po ang aking liham, at lubos po akong nagtitiwala sa inyong
kakayahan na mapapawalang sala ang aking ama.
Truly yours,
Lorielyn Nardo[38]
January 17, 2001
Dear Atty. Teresita De Guzman,
Ako po muli si Lorielyn Nardo na anak ni Alfredo Nardo na nakabinbin sa NBP Dorm-I-
D Muntinlupa. Kahit hindi po natupad ang hinihiling kong sana'y makalaya ang aking
ama noong nakaraang Disyembre ay patuloy ko pa rin pong inaasahan at hinihiling ang
inyong tulong na sana po ay makalaya na ang aking ama. Patuloy pong nangingibabaw
ang aking konsensiya dahil sa aking ginawa, umaasa po ako na sana ay lalo pang
mapadali ang paglabas niya sa loob ng kulungan, maniwala po kayo wala siyang
kasalanan. Attorney, alam ko po na ginagawa niyo (po) ang lahat kaya't ngayon pa lang
po ay nagpapasalamat ako sa inyo at patuloy na umaasa ng inyong tulong at sana'y
maunawaan niyo ako.
Patuloy na umaasa,
Lorielyn Nardo
(anak)[39]
Accused-appellant relies on these letters to obtain a reversal of the trial court's judgment
of his conviction. However, the said letters were not subscribed and sworn to by
Lorielyn.
Be that as it may, recantations are frowned upon by the courts. A recantation of a

testimony is exceedingly unreliable, for there is always the probability that such
recantation may later on be itself repudiated. Courts look with disfavor upon retractions,
because they can easily be obtained from witnesses through intimidation or for monetary
consideration. A retraction does not necessarily negate an earlier declaration.
[40]
Especially, recantations made after the conviction of the accused deserve only scant
consideration.[41]
Moreover, any recantation or affidavit of desistance, by itself, even when construed as a

pardon in the so-called "private crimes," is not a ground for the dismissal of the criminal
case once the action has been instituted.[42] The pardon to justify the dismissal of the
complaint should be made prior to the institution of the criminal action.
[43]
Parenthetically, the crime in the case at bar was committed in 1996, i.e., prior to the
passage of the R.A. 8353, The Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which reclassified rape as a crime
against persons.
Even if it were sworn, Lorielyn's recantation could hardly suffice to overturn the finding
of guilt by the trial court which was based on her own clear and convincing testimony,
given during a full-blown trial. An affidavit of recantation, being usually taken ex
parte, would be considered inferior to the testimony given in open court. It would be a
dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before a court of justice simply because the
witness who gave it later on changed his/her mind for one reason or another. Such a rule
would make a solemn trial a mockery, and place the proceedings at the mercy of
unscrupulous witnesses.[44]
As stated, the trial court arrived at its finding of guilt after a careful assessment of the
evidence presented, foremost of which was the testimony of the victim in open court,
where the trial judge was able to personally evaluate her manner of testifying, and from
there reach a studied opinion as to her credibility. As a rule, we do not disturb the
findings by the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, for the trial court is in a better
position to pass upon the same.[45]
"The trial judge is in a better position to decide the question of credibility, since he
personally heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying.
He had before him the essential aids to determine whether a witness was telling the truth
or lying. Truth does not always stalk boldly forth naked; she often hides in nooks and
crannies visible only to the mind`s eye of the judge who tried the case. To him appears
the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the sincere or flippant or
sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the
scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien." [46]
We find nothing in the records which would indicate that the findings of fact of the trial
court are not supported by the evidence or were arrived at in manifest or palpable error,
such as to warrant a departure from the foregoing rule. The trial court was correct in
lending credibility to the testimony of Lorielyn. The sole testimony of Lorielyn was
sufficient to establish the guilt of accused-appellant. It is settled that a person accused of
rape can be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim if the trial court finds said
testimony to be credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the
course of things.[47]
Indeed, a daughter, especially one in her minority, would not accuse her own father of
such an unspeakable crime as incestuous rape had she really not been aggrieved. [48] More
importantly, Lorielyn withstood all the rigors of the case, starting from the initial police
interrogation, the medical examination, the formal charge, the public trial, to the cross-
examination. She went through the court hearings, where she came face to face with her
father. If it was true that she merely made up the charge, she should have been bothered
by her conscience at the sight of her father in prison garb and upon the realization of his
sorry state while in detention. The fact that she maintained her story during her
testimony-in-chief all the way up to her rebuttal testimony only serves to substantiate the
veracity of her claim.
Well settled is the rule that no woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts and submit herself to public humiliation and scrutiny via
an open trial, if her sordid tale was not true and her sole motivation was not to have the
culprit apprehended and punished.[49] A young girl`s revelation that she has been raped,
coupled with her voluntary submission to medical examination and her willingness to
undergo public trial where she could be compelled to give out the details of an assault on
her dignity by, as in this case, her own father, cannot be so easily dismissed as a mere
concoction.[50] Courts usually give credence to the testimony of a girl who is a victim of
sexual assault, particularly if it constitutes incestuous rape because, normally, no person
would be willing to undergo the humiliation of a public trial and to testify on the details
of her ordeal were it not to condemn an injustice. Needless to say, it is settled
jurisprudence that testimonies of child-victims are given full weight and credit, since
when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect
all that is necessary to show that rape was committed. Youth and immaturity are
generally badges of truth and sincerity.[51]
During the trial, the defense endeavored to portray Lorielyn as an incorrigible liar.
Occasions were cited wherein Lorielyn supposedly lied in order to obtain money or her
parents' permission to leave the house. However, Rule 130, Section 34, of the Rules of
Court provides that: "Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not
admissible to prove that he did nor did not do the same or a similar thing at another time;
but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system,
scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like. "While lying may constitute a habit, we
believe that the falsehoods committed by Lorielyn, assuming them for the moment to be
true, are petty and inconsequential. They are not as serious as charging one's own father
of the sordid crime of rape, with all of its serious repercussions.
Accused-appellant argues that the trial court should have given credence to his witness,
Atty. Santer G. Gonzales, because he is a member of the bar. Atty. Gonzales, however,
took the witness stand not as a lawyer but as an ordinary person. He testified in his
capacity as accused-appellant's employer. As such, no special privilege should be
accorded him by the trial court by reason only of his being a member of the bar. He did
not appear in that case as an officer of the court but as a mere witness, and hence should
be treated as one.
Likewise, accused-appellant insists that Lorielyn's conduct after the rape, during which
she continued to perform her tasks and lived with her father in their house, negates the
commission of rape. Accused-appellant's proposition is derived from Lorielyn's
perfunctory yes-or-no answers to the leading questions propounded to her on cross-
examination. Rather than sustain this argument, we rely instead on the observations of the
Social Welfare Officer, whom we find to be an impartial witness, in this wise:
Per observation, Lorielyn is a shy and silent type person. She talked in a very small voice
and during the interview she only talks when being asked. She also appears to be very
sad and have been staring blankly (sic).[52]
Accused-appellant assigns as error the trial court's failure to give the reasons for
recommending the commutation of his sentence from death to reclusion perpetua. As
correctly observed by the Solicitor General, the trial court was impelled by humanitarian
reason.[53] Moreover, the commutation of sentence is a prerogative of the Chief Executive.
As against the positive and categorical testimony of Lorielyn, accused-appellant can only
proffer the defense of alibi. However, in order to overcome the evidence of the
prosecution with the defense of alibi, he must establish not only that he was somewhere
else when the crime was committed but also that it was physically impossible for him to
have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. [54] In the instant case, the
testimonies for the defense sought to establish that accused-appellant was 400 to 500
meters, or 15 minutes, away from the scene of the crime. This hardly qualifies as proof
that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime when it was
committed. Accused-appellant's defense of alibi must, therefore, necessarily fail.
Carefully sifting through the entire body of evidence presented in this case, we find
nothing which would destroy the moral certainty of accused-appellant's guilt. While there
may be some inconsistencies in the testimony of Lorielyn, these to our mind are minor
inconsistencies which serve to strengthen her credibility as they are badges of truth rather
than indicia of falsehood.[55] Minor inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of
witnesses, as they may even tend to strengthen rather than weaken their credibility.
Inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details
and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of their declaration, their veracity,
or the weight of their testimony. Such minor flaws may even enhance the worth of a
testimony, for they guard against memorized falsities.[56] Besides, a rape victim can not be
expected to recall vividly all the sordid details of the violation committed against her
virtue.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, provides:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim. xxx.[57]
The concurrence of the two special qualifying circumstances, namely the victim's
minority and the relationship between the victim and the culprit, increases the penalty of
rape to one (1) degree, thus resulting in the imposition of the death penalty. In order to be
appreciated as qualifying circumstances, however, these must be properly pleaded in the
indictment.[58] In addition, the qualifying circumstances should be duly proved during the
trial.[59]
These requirements are met in this case. The Information sufficiently alleges that
accused-appellant is the father of the victim, and that the latter was fourteen (14) years
old at the time of commission of the rape. These elements, furthermore, were
categorically affirmed by Elizabeth Nardo, the victim's mother and the most competent
witness. She testified that accused-appellant is Lorielyn's father, and that Lorielyn was
born on September 11, 1981,[60] thus placing her age at the time of the rape at fourteen
(14) years. Moreover, the Lorielyn's birth date and her relationship to accused-appellant
are shown by her Certificate of Baptism.[61] This was presented by her mother, Elizabeth,
in lieu of her Certificate of Live Birth, which was destroyed by fire.[62] The baptismal
certificate, coupled by her mother's testimony, is sufficient to establish Lorielyn's age. [63]
We therefore affirm the trial court's imposition of the death penalty.
Four justices of the Court have continued to maintain the unconstitutionality of Republic
Act No. 7659 insofar as it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless they submit to the
ruling of the majority to the effect that this law is constitutional and that the death penalty
can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
We likewise affirm the award of P50,000.00 for moral damages which is consistent with
prevailing jurisprudence.[64] No proof is required to substantiate the award of moral
damages in rape cases. In People vs. Prades,[65] we held:
xxx. The Court has also resolved that in crimes of rape, such as that under consideration,
moral damages may additionally be awarded to the victim in the criminal proceeding, in
such amount as the Court deems just, without the need for pleading or proof of the basis
thereof as has heretofore been the practice. Indeed, the conventional requirement
of allegata et probata in civil procedure and for essentially civil cases should be
dispensed with in criminal prosecutions for rape with the civil aspect included therein,
since no appropriate pleadings are filed wherein such allegations can be made.
Corollarily, the fact that complainant has suffered the trauma of mental, physical and
psychological sufferings which constitute the bases for moral damages are too obvious to
still require the recital thereof at the trial by the victim, since the Court itself even
assumes and acknowledges such agony on her part as a gauge of her credibility. What
exists by necessary implication as being ineludibly present in the case need not go
through the superfluity of still being proved through a testimonial charade.
In addition to moral damages, the amount of P75,000.00 is awarded to the victim as
indemnity.
xxx. Indictments for rape continue unabated and the legislative response has been in the
form of higher penalties. The Court believes that, on like considerations, the
jurisprudential path on the civil aspect should follow the same direction. Hence, starting
with the case at bar, if the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by any of
the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by the present amended
law, the indemnity for the victim shall be in the increased amount of not less than
P75,000.00. This is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal
law and the financial fluctuations over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of
the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity.[66]
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, Albay,
Branch III, convicting accused-appellant Alfredo Nardo y Rosales of the crime of rape,
sentencing him to death, and ordering him to pay the victim, Lorielyn Nardo moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
accused-appellant is, further, ordered to pay the victim civil indemnity in the amount of
P75,000.00.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the
Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let certified true copies thereof, as
well as the records of this case, be forwarded without delay to the office of the President
for possible exercise of the clemency or pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 190632, February 26, 2014 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MANOLITO
LUCENA Y VELASQUEZ, ALIAS "MACHETE," ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The subject of this appeal is the Decision [1] dated 24 August 2009 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03371 affirming the Decision [2] dated 30 April 2008 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 260, in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-0763
to 03-0765, finding herein appellant Manolito Lucena y Velasquez alias "Machete" guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of rape, thereby sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count and ordering him to pay AAA [3] the amount
of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity also for each count.
Three (3) similarly worded Informations,[4] all dated 24 June 2003 allege:
That on or about the 28th day of April 2003, in the City of Parañaque, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named [appellant], a Barangay
Tanod Volunteer, who took advantage of his position to facilitate the commission of the
crime, by means of force, threat or intimidation and with the use of a gun did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the
complainant AAA, a minor, 17 years of age, against her will and consent. (Emphasis
and italics supplied).
The appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded NOT GUILTY to all the charges
against him.[5] Thereafter, the cases were jointly tried.
The prosecution presented AAA, the victim herself; and Dr. Merle Tan (Dr. Tan) of the
Child Protection Unit, University of the Philippines – Philippine General Hospital (UP-
PGH), who examined the victim.
The testimonies of the above-named prosecution witnesses established that on 28 April

2003, at around 11:30 p.m., while AAA, who was then 17 years old, having been born on
10 July 1986, was walking and chatting with her friends along one of the streets of San
Dionisio, Parañaque City, two (2) barangay tanods, one of whom is the appellant,
approached and informed them that they were being arrested for violating a city
ordinance imposing curfew against minors. AAA's companions, however, managed to
escape, thus, she alone was apprehended. [6] AAA was then ordered by the barangay
tanods to board the tricycle. Afraid that she might spend the night in jail, AAA pleaded
with them and protested that she did not commit any offense as she was just chatting with
her friends. AAA’s plea, however, remained unheeded.[7]
AAA was then brought by the two (2) barangay tanods within the vicinity of the San
Dionisio Barangay Hall. Afterwards, one of them alighted from the tricycle and went
inside the barangay hall. The appellant, on the other hand, stayed in the tricycle to guard
AAA. After a while, the barangay tanod, the one who went inside the barangay hall,
returned. But, the appellant told the former that he will just be the one to bring AAA back
to her house.[8]
But, instead of escorting AAA back to her house, the appellant brought her
to Kabuboy Bridge in San Dionisio, Parañaque City. While on their way, the appellant
threatened AAA that he would kill her once she resists or jumps off the tricycle. Upon
arrival, the appellant ordered AAA to alight from the tricycle. AAA asked the appellant
what he would do with her but the former did not respond. The appellant then took out
the backseat of the tricycle and positioned it in a grassy area. He subsequently pointed a
gun at AAA and commanded her to lie down and to take off her clothes. The appellant
later put the gun down on the ground and inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina despite
the latter’s plea not to rape her. Satisfied, the appellant stopped. But, after a short while,
or after about five (5) minutes, the appellant, once again, inserted his penis into AAA’s
vagina. Thereafter, he stopped. On the third time, the appellant inserted again his penis
into AAA’s vagina. Fulfilling his bestial desire, the appellant stopped and finally ordered
AAA to dress up. The appellant even threatened AAA that he would kill her should she
tell anyone about what happened between them.[9]
The appellant, thereafter, directed AAA to board the tricycle. He then brought AAA in
front of a school in Parañaque City. But, before allowing AAA to get off, the appellant
repeated his threat to kill her should she tell anyone about the incident. [10]
The following day, AAA took the courage to seek the assistance of their barangay
kagawad, who simply advised her to just proceed to the barangay hall to lodge her
complaint against the appellant. AAA and her mother subsequently went to PGH, where
she was subjected to physical examination by Dr. Tan, [11] which resulted in the following
findings:
H Tanner Stage 3, healing laceration[s] 3 and 5 o’clock area with petechiae, fresh
YMEN laceration at 9 o’clock area with eccymosi at 8-10 o’clock area, Type of Hymen: Crescentic

x

xxx

ANAL Perianal Skin: fresh laceration[s] at 12 and 1 o’clock area. No evident
EXAMINATION injury at the time of examination.

xxxx

IMPRESSIONS
Disclosure of sexual abuse.
[12]
Genital findings show clear Evidence Of Blunt Force Or Penetrating Trauma. (Emphasis
supplied).
AAA also went to the Coastal Road Police Headquarters, where she executed her sworn
statement accusing the appellant of rape. AAA was able to identify the appellant as her
assailant because the former was wearing a jacket emblazoned with “Barangay Police,”
as well as a Barangay Identification Card, at the time of the incident.[13]
The appellant and Rodel Corpuz (Corpuz) took the witness stand for the defense.
In the course of Corpuz’s direct examination, however, the parties made the following
stipulations: (1) that the [herein appellant] was the assigned barangay radio operator on
that date, [28 April 2003], and he stayed at the barangay hall from 12:00 midnight to
5:00 a.m.; (2) that the witness was there up to 12:00 midnight, but at about past 12:00, he
left and returned after two (2) hours, at 2:00 o’clock a.m.; and (3) that when he woke up
at 5:00 o’clock in the morning, the [appellant] was still there. With these stipulations,
Corpuz’s testimony was dispensed with.[14]
The appellant, for his part, could only muster the defenses of denial and alibi. He, thus,
offered a different version of the story.
On 28 April 2003, the appellant claimed that he was on duty as a radio operator at
the barangay hall. His task as such was to receive complaints from the residents of
the barangay, as well as to receive calls from fellow barangay officials who are in need
of assistance. On the same day, he received a call from his companion, who is also
a barangay tanod. He cannot, however, recall any unusual incident that transpired on that
day.[15]
The appellant admitted that he knew AAA as the one who lodged a complaint against
him but he denied that he knew her personally. He also vehemently denied the following:
(1) that he raped AAA; (2) that he was one of those barangay tanods who apprehended
AAA for violating the curfew ordinance of their barangay; and (3) that he was the one
driving the tricycle in going to the barangay hall. Instead, the appellant claimed that after
12:00 midnight of 28 April 2003, he went home already. In fact, he was shocked when he
was arrested on 25 September 2003 as he did not commit any crime.[16]
In its Decision dated 30 April 2008, the trial court, giving credence to the categorical,
straightforward and positive testimony of AAA, coupled with the medical findings of
sexual abuse, convicted the appellant of three (3) counts of rape as defined and penalized
under paragraph 1(a) of Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal
Code of the Philippines, as amended. The trial court, thus, decreed:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the [herein appellant] MANOLITO
LUCENA y VELASQUEZ alias MACHETE, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
three (3) counts of Rape (under Art. 266-a par. 1(a) in relation to Art. 266-B of the
RPC as amended by RA 8353) and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each count of Rape. In addition, the [appellant] is ordered to
pay [AAA] the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for each count.[17] (Emphasis and italics theirs).
The appellant appealed[18] the trial court’s Decision to the Court of Appeals with the
following assignment of errors:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE [HEREIN

APPELLANT] OF RAPE DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE
THE ELEMENT OF FORCE AND INTIMIDATION.
II.
GRANTING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE [APPELLANT] COMMITTED THE CRIME

CHARGED, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING HIM OF
THREE (3) COUNTS OF RAPE.[19]
After a thorough study of the records, the Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed
Decision dated 24 August 2009 sustaining appellant’s conviction for three (3) counts of
rape, as well as the damages awarded to AAA. In doing so, the Court of Appeals
explained that the facts revealed that the appellant succeeded thrice in inserting his penis
into AAA’s vagina. The said three (3) penetrations happened one after another at an
interval of five (5) minutes, wherein the appellant would take a rest after satiating his lust
and after regaining his strength would again rape AAA. Undoubtedly, the appellant
decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault on AAA. Thus, his
conviction for three (3) counts of rape is irrefutable.[20]
Hence, this appeal.[21]
Both parties in their manifestations[22] before this Court adopted their respective appeal
briefs[23] filed with the Court of Appeals in lieu of Supplemental Briefs.
In his Brief, the appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove that force or
intimidation attended the commission of rape. Records revealed that AAA did not even
attempt to resist his alleged sexual advances over her person. Instead, AAA opted to
remain passive throughout her ordeal despite the fact that during the three (3) episodes of
their sexual intercourse he was unarmed and she, thus, had all the opportunity to escape,
which she never did. These reactions of AAA were contrary to human experience, thus,
cast serious doubts on the veracity of her testimony and on her credibility as a witness.
The appellant similarly argues that the result of AAA’s medical examination is quite
disturbing as it appears that her anal orifice was also penetrated by a hard object though
nothing was said to this effect in her testimony.
The appellant likewise avers that he cannot be convicted of three counts of rape. The
intervening period of five (5) minutes between each penetration does not necessarily
prove that he decided to commit three separate acts of rape. He maintains that what is of
prime importance is that he was motivated by a single criminal intent.
With the foregoing, the appellant believes that his guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt; hence, his acquittal is inevitable.
This Court holds otherwise. The conviction of the appellant, thus, stands but the damages
awarded in favor AAA must be modified.
Primarily, in reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided with three settled principles: (1)
an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to
prove, it is even more difficult for the person accused, although innocent, to disprove; (2)
considering the intrinsic nature of the crime, only two persons being usually involved, the
testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[24]
Rape is a serious transgression with grave consequences both for the accused and the
complainant. Following the above principles, this Court is duty-bound to conduct a
thorough and exhaustive evaluation of a judgment of conviction for rape.[25]
After a careful scrutiny of the entire records, however, this Court finds no justifiable
reason to reverse the rulings of the lower courts.
All the Informations in this case charged the appellant with rape under paragraph 1(a),
Article 266-A, in relation to paragraph 2, Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. These provisions specifically state:
ART. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. - Rape is committed -
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and d) When the

offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.
xxxx
ART. 266-B. Penalties. – Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. (Emphasis supplied).
Certainly, carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following instances constitutes
rape: (1) when force or intimidation is used; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason
or is otherwise unconscious; and (3) when she is under twelve (12) years of age. [26]
The force and violence required in rape cases is relative and need not be overpowering or
irresistible when applied. For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or
intimidation be so great or be of such character as could not be resisted – it is only
necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose
which the accused had in mind.[27] Further, it should be viewed from the perception and
judgment of the victim at the time of the commission of the crime. What is vital is that
the force or intimidation be of such degree as to cow the unprotected and vulnerable
victim into submission. Force is sufficient if it produces fear in the victim, such as
when the latter is threatened with death.[28]
In the case at bench, as can be gleaned from the transcript of stenographic notes and as
observed by the trial court, which the Court of Appeals sustained, AAA’s categorical,
straightforward and positive testimony revealed that the appellant was armed with a gun
and the same was pointed at her while she was ordered to lie down and to take off her
clothes, to which she acceded because of fear for her life and personal safety. The
appellant then put the gun down on the ground and successfully inserted his penis into
AAA’s vagina, not only once but thrice. This happened despite AAA’s plea not to rape
her. And, after satisfying his lust, the appellant threatened AAA that he would kill her
should she tell anyone about the incident. This same threat of killing AAA was first made
by the appellant while the former was still inside the tricycle on their way
to Kabuboy Bridge.[29] It cannot be denied, therefore, that force and intimidation were
employed by the appellant upon AAA in order to achieve his depraved desires.
While it is true that the appellant had already put the gun down on the ground the
moment he inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina and was actually unarmed on those
three (3) episodes of sexual intercourse, the same does not necessarily take away the fear
of being killed that had already been instilled in the mind of AAA. Emphasis must be
given to the fact that the gun was still within appellant’s reach, therefore, he could still
make good of his threat on AAA at anytime the latter would show any resistance to his
evil desires. AAA’s lack of physical resistance, therefore, is understandable and would
not in any way discredit her testimony.
It must be borne in mind that when a rape victim becomes paralyzed with fear, she cannot
be expected to think and act coherently. Further, as has been consistently held by this
Court, physical resistance is not an essential element of rape and need not be
established when intimidation is exercised upon the victim, and, the latter submits
herself, against her will, to the rapist’s embrace because of fear for her life and personal
safety. The victim’s failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance did not make voluntary
her submission to the criminal acts of her aggressor. It bears stressing that not every rape
victim can be expected to act with reason or in conformity with the usual expectations of
everyone. The workings of a human mind placed under emotional stress are
unpredictable; people react differently. Some may shout, some may faint, while others
may be shocked into insensibility.[30]
In his attempt to ruin AAA’s credibility in order to exculpate himself from all the
charges, the appellant puts stress on the portion of the result of AAA’s medical
examination disclosing that even her anal orifice was also penetrated by a hard object,
which she never mentioned in her testimony.
To the mind of this Court, such argument is flimsy and totally misplaced. It would not
even work to appellant’s advantage and would not in any way cast doubt on the veracity
of AAA’s testimony. As this Court has previously stated, a medical examination and a
medical certificate, albeit corroborative of the commission of rape, are not indispensable
to a successful prosecution for rape. [31] Moreover, even though AAA made no mention of
any anal penetration, such omission would not change the fact that she was, indeed, raped
by the appellant. As succinctly found by both lower courts, AAA categorically,
straightforwardly, clearly and positively narrated her harrowing experience in the hands
of the appellant. She recounted in detail how the appellant took advantage of her by
bringing her to Kabuboy Bridge, where nobody was present; commanding her to lie down
and undress herself at a point of a gun; and successfully inserting his penis into her
vagina, not only once but thrice. AAA stated that after the first penetration the appellant
stopped. After about five minutes, however, the appellant, once again, inserted his penis
into her vagina. Thereafter, the appellant stopped. For the third and last time, the
appellant again inserted his penis into her vagina. This narration was consistent with the
rest of the medical findings showing fresh hymenal lacerations on AAA’s vagina, which
according to Dr. Tan is a clear evidence of “blunt force or penetrating trauma” - a
disclosure of sexual abuse.
For his ultimate defense, the appellant puts forward denial and alibi. Notably, these
defenses are totally inconsistent with his line of argument that the rape was committed
without force or intimidation thereby implying that the sexual intercourse between him
and AAA was consensual.
Time and again, this Court has viewed denial and alibi as inherently weak defenses,
unless supported by clear and convincing evidence, the same cannot prevail over the
positive declarations of the victim who, in a simple and straightforward manner,
convincingly identified the appellant as the defiler of her chastity. [32] Simply put, the
positive assertions of AAA that he raped her are entitled to greater weight. While denial
and alibi are legitimate defenses in rape cases, bare assertions to this effect cannot
overcome the categorical testimony of the victim,[33] as in this case.
Also, appellant’s alibi that on the night the rape incident happened, he was at

the barangay hall doing his job as radio operator and at 12:00 midnight he already went
home, failed to sufficiently establish that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime when it was committed. Moreover, the corroborating testimony of
defense witness Corpuz that the appellant left at about past 12:00 midnight, almost the
same time the rape incident happened, and then returned after two (2) hours, even bolster
the possibility of the appellant’s presence at the scene of the crime.
This Court also notes that the appellant failed to show any ill-motive on the part of AAA
to testify falsely against him. This bolsters the veracity of AAA’s accusation since no
woman would concoct a tale that would tarnish her reputation, bring humiliation and
disgrace to herself and her family, and submit herself to the rigors, shame, and stigma
attendant to the prosecution of rape, unless she is motivated by her quest to seek justice
for the crime committed against her.[34]
In light of the foregoing, it is beyond any cavil of doubt that the appellant’s guilt for the
crime of rape has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
As to the number of rapes committed. The appellant, citing People v. Aaron (Aaron

Case),[35] insists that he cannot be convicted of three (3) counts of rape despite the three
(3) penetrations because he was motivated by a single criminal intent. This Court finds
this contention fallacious.
In the Aaron Case, the accused inserted his penis into the victim’s vagina; he then
withdrew it and ordered the latter to lie down on the floor and, for the second time, he
inserted again his penis into the victim’s vagina; the accused, thereafter, stood up and
commanded the victim to lie near the headboard of the makeshift bed and, for the third
time, he inserted again his penis into the victim’s vagina and continued making pumping
motions. From these sets of facts, this Court convicted the accused therein for only one
count of rape despite the three successful penetrations because there is no indication in
the records from which it can be inferred that the accused decided to commit those
separate and distinct acts of sexual assault other than his lustful desire to change
positions inside the room where the crime was committed. This Court, thus, viewed
that the three penetrations occurred during one continuing act of rape in which the
accused was obviously motivated by a single criminal intent.
The circumstances in the present case, however, are far different from the Aaron Case.
Here, we quote with approval the observations of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed
that of the trial court, to wit:
We agree with the trial court that the [herein appellant] should be convicted of three (3)
counts of rape. It appears from the facts that the [appellant] thrice succeeded in inserting
his penis into the private part of [AAA]. The three (3) penetrations occurred one after the
other at an interval of five (5) minutes wherein the [appellant] would rest after
satiating his lust upon his victim and, after he has regained his strength, he would
again rape [AAA]. Hence, it can be clearly inferred from the foregoing that when
the [appellant] decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault
upon [AAA], he was not motivated by a single impulse[,] but rather by several
criminal intent. Hence, his conviction for three (3) counts of rape is indubitable.
[36]
This Court sustains the findings of both lower courts that, indeed, the three insertions into
AAA were in satiation of successive but distinct criminal carnality. Therefore, the
appellant’s conviction for three counts of rape is proper.
As to penalty. The second paragraph of Art. 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as

amended, provides that “[w]henever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly
weapon x x x the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.” As it was properly
alleged and proved that the appellant used a gun in order to consummate his evil desires,
thus, both lower courts correctly imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
each count of rape.
As to damages. Civil indemnity, which is mandatory in a finding of rape is distinct from

and should not be denominated as moral damages which are based on different jural
foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound discretion. [37] The award of
moral damages, on the other hand, is automatically granted in rape cases without need of
further proof other than the commission of the crime because it is assumed that a rape
victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award. [38] Hence, this
Court upholds the P50,000.00 civil indemnity and P50,000.00 moral damages, for each
count of rape, that were awarded by both lower courts in favor of AAA.
In addition, this Court deems it proper to award exemplary damages in favor of AAA.
The award of exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of the Civil Code if
there is an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying. [39] In this case, since
the qualifying circumstance of the use of a deadly weapon was present in the commission
of the crime, exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00, for each count of rape, is
awarded in favor of AAA. Moreover, in line with recent jurisprudence, the interest at the
rate of 6% per annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded from the date of the
finality of this judgment until fully paid.[40]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.

CR-H.C. No. 03371 dated 24 August 2009 finding herein appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of three counts of rape is hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATIONS that: (1) the exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00,
for each count of rape, is awarded in favor of AAA; and (2) the appellant is ordered to
pay AAA the interest on all damages at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of
finality of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. NOS. 136300-02, September 24, 2002 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. EMMANUEL
AARON, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us on appeal is the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Balanga, Bataan,
Branch 3, in Criminal Cases Nos. 6730, 6731 and 6732 convicting herein appellant,
Emmanuel Aaron, of one count of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim P50,000 as civil indemnity.
The appellant, Emmanuel Aaron y Dizon, was charged with three counts of rape defined
and penalized under Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, [2] respectively,
in three separate criminal complaints filed and signed by the private complainant, Jona G.
Grajo, and subscribed and sworn to on January 17, 1998 before 3rd Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Oscar M. Lasam. Save for their docket numbers, the said criminal complaints
are identically worded thus:
That on or about 16 January 1998 at Brgy. San Jose, Balanga, Bataan, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a knife and
by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously succeed in having sexual intercourse with the offended party JONA G.
GRAJO, against the will and consent of the latter, to her damage and prejudice.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment on January 30, 1998, the accused, Emmanuel Aaron, assisted by
counsel of his choice, entered the plea of “not guilty” to each of the three complaints in
Criminal Cases Nos. 6730, 6731 and 6732. Thereafter, joint trial on the merits ensued.
The evidence of the prosecution shows that, on January 16, 1998, at around 7:00 o’clock
in the morning, the private complainant, Jona Grajo, was asleep in bed (“papag”) inside
her room on the second floor of the apartment unit which she shared with her sister and
her brother-in-law, herein appellant Emmanuel Aaron. Jona was wearing only a panty
and was covered with a blanket. Sensing that someone was inside her room, Jona opened
her eyes and was surprised to find Emmanuel sitting beside her in bed totally naked.
Emmanuel immediately went on top of Jona and poked a knife on her neck. Jona’s
attempt to cry for help proved futile as Emmanuel quickly covered her mouth with his
left hand.[3]
Emmanuel removed her panty and succeeded in having carnal intercourse with Jona who
could only manage to cry. Subsequently, Emmanuel withdrew his penis and ordered Jona
to lie down on the floor. He inserted his penis into her vagina for the second time with the
knife still poked on Jona’s neck. Thereafter, Emmanuel stood up and commanded Jona to
lie down near the headboard of the “papag” bed where he inserted his penis into her
vagina for the third time, still armed with a knife, and continued making pumping
motions (“umiindayog”).[4]
After the incident, Jona pleaded to be released but Emmanuel initially refused. He
budged only after Jona told him that she urgently needed to relieve herself (“Ihing-ihi na
ako, puputok na ang pantog ko.”) but not before warning her not to tell anyone about the
incident. Jona quickly put on her panty and hurried down the street in front of the
apartment with only a blanket covering herself. Her cries drew the attention of a
neighbor, Lilibeth Isidro, who tried to persuade Jona to go back inside the apartment, to
no avail, for fear of Emmanuel. Upon the prodding of another neighbor, a certain Agnes,
Jona revealed that she was raped by her brother-in-law,[5] the appellant herein.
Jona proceeded to the nearby store of their landlady upon the latter’s arrival from the
market and she related the misfortune that had befallen her. At that instance, Emmanuel
approached and warned her to be careful with her words. Then he left for the house of
Bong Talastas.[6]
After Emmanuel left, Jona went back to their house and dressed up. Thereafter, she went
to the police station in Balanga, Bataan to report the incident.[7] Police Officers Rommel
Morales and Edgardo Flores proceeded to the residence of the private complainant who
appeared very tense but the neighbors informed them that Emmanuel had left. The police
officers then proceeded to the house of Bong Talastas in San Jose, Balanga, Bataan,
where the victim told them Emmanuel could have possibly gone. On arrival there, they
found Emmanuel conversing with Bong Talastas and they immediately arrested the
appellant herein upon ascertaining his identity.[8]
After bringing Emmanuel to the police station, Police Officers Morales and Flores
accompanied Jona to the provincial hospital in Bataan for physical examination.
Thereupon, the attending physician at the Bataan Provincial Hospital, Dra. Emelita
Firmacion, M.D., found “multiple healed laceration(s) at 1, 3, 5, 6, 9 o’clock position(s),
incomplete type” in Jona Grajo’s private part.
At the trial, Dra. Firmacion identified her signature[9] appearing on the lower right portion
of the medical certificate[10] and affirmed the medical findings contained therein. The
multiple hymenal lacerations sustained by Jona which were respectively indicated in the
medical certificate as 1 o’clock, 3 o’clock, 5 o’clock, 6 o’clock and 9 o’clock could have
been caused by sexual intercourse, masturbation, strenuous exercises or penetration of
any hard object. The appearance of a lacerated hymen could indicate the approximate
time when the laceration was sustained. In the case of Jona Grajo, her hymenal
lacerations were completely healed, indicating that the same were sustained at least one
month before she was examined on January 16, 1998. However, it was possible that she
had sexual intercourse immediately before the said examination.[11]
The defense denied any liability for the three counts of rape charged. Appellant
Emmanuel Aaron testified that he and his wife were residing in an apartment unit
together with his sister-in-law, herein private complainant, Jona Grajo. [12] Jona occupied a
room on the second floor while the couple stayed at the ground floor.[13]
On the date of the incident, Emmanuel admitted that he and Jona were the only persons
inside the apartment. He had just arrived from work as a night-shift waiter at Base One
restaurant in Balanga, Bataan. He had earlier met Bong Talastas at 7:00 o’clock in the
morning as Bong was preparing to leave his house while his wife had gone to the market.
Emmanuel changed his clothes upstairs where the cabinet was located opposite the room
occupied by Jona. Emmanuel noticed that the door of Jona’s room was partly open so he
peeped through the narrow opening and saw her wearing only a panty. He was about to
close the door when Jona woke up and began shouting.[14]
Emmanuel did not know why Jona kept on shouting. She even followed as Emmanuel
descended the stairs and she proceeded to the nearby store of their landlady. Emmanuel
went her to the store to caution Jona about her words (“Ayusin mo ang sinasabi mo”)
because she was telling their landlady that he raped her. However, Jona ignored him so
he left and decided to see Bong Talastas in San Jose, Balanga, Bataan to inquire from the
latter why Jona was accusing him of having raped her. Emmanuel denied that he was
armed with a knife during the incident, much less threatened Jona with it. [15]
On October 14, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision,[16] the dispositive portion of
which read:
WHEREFORE, the guilt of the accused for the single act of rape having been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with the accessory penalty provided by law. The accused is further required to
indemnify the complainant the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Dissatisfied with the decision of the trial court, Emmanuel Aaron interposed the instant
appeal. In his Brief,[17] appellant raised a single assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
Appellant argues that the account of the private complainant, Jona Grajo, of the alleged
incidents of rape appears incredible and contrary to common human experience. Based
on her testimony, the appellant suddenly placed himself on top of her with his right hand
poking a knife on her neck and with his left hand covering her mouth. Subsequently, the
appellant removed her panty and succeeded in inserting his penis into her private part
even without previously opening his zipper or removing his pants. Likewise, the private
complainant did not offer any resistance although she could have done so. After the
alleged acts of rape, the victim did not even complain to her sister who, by then, had
already arrived from the market. The uncharacteristic behavior of the private complainant
could only be explained by the fact that she admittedly had several sexual experiences in
the past with her boyfriend and live-in partner Bong Talastas. The appellant theorizes that
private complainant wanted to get back at him for the embarrassment of being seen by
him in her panty after her boyfriend, Bong Talastas, left the apartment. Appellant
downplays the testimony of PO1 Rommel Morales as not worthy of credence for lack of
corroborative evidence. [18]
On the other hand, the prosecution showed that the appellant was already naked even
before the private complainant was awakened by his presence; that the private
complainant could not effectively offer any resistance as the appellant was armed with a
knife which he used to intimidate her; and that the private complainant’s being a non-
virgin did not discount rape on January 16, 1998.[19]
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed.-- Rape is committed -
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above are present.
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof,
shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth
or anal orifice or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another
person.
Article 266-B of the same Code provides:
Article 266-B. Penalties.—Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
xxx xxx xxx
It should be stressed that in the review of rape cases, this Court is almost invariably
guided by three principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is
difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove;
(2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution and (3) the
evidence of the prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the defense.[20] In other words, the credibility of the
private complainant is determinative of the outcome of these cases for rape. Her
consistency on material points, or lack of it, that can sustain or negate conviction,
becomes the single most important matter in inquiry.[21]
After a thorough review, we find that the testimony of private complainant, Jona Grajo,
sufficiently established all the elements of rape committed under Article 266-A,
paragraph (1) (a) of the Revised Penal Code, namely: a) that the offender, who must be a
man, had carnal knowledge of a woman and (b) that such act is accomplished by using
force or intimidation.[22] The gist of private complainant’s testimony clearly shows that
the appellant, Emmanuel Aaron, forced himself on her at around 7:00 o’clock in the
morning on January 16, 1998. The sexual assault started on the “papag” bed inside her
room on the second floor of their apartment unit. After going on top of the private
complainant, the appellant succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina after which he
made pumping motions while poking a knife on her neck. He then succeeded in inserting
his penis into her vagina two more times on the same occasion after transferring locations
inside the room, with the knife continuously poked on her neck.
We also find no reason to disturb the assessment of the trial court of private
complainant’s credibility. Her testimony during the trial was completely credible as it
was given in an honest and straightforward manner. As noted above, she gave a lucid and
consistent account of the commission of the crime and did not waiver in pinpointing her
brother-in-law, herein appellant, as the perpetrator thereof. Likewise, her actuation after
the incident vividly portrayed a confused and traumatized woman typical of victims of
rape. Thus, after she broke free of the appellant on the pretense that she urgently needed
to relieve herself, the private complainant quickly put on her panty and rushed to the
street with only a blanket to cover her naked body. Her neighbors took note of her
obviously troubled condition and admonished her to go back inside the apartment but she
refused, claiming that she had been raped. She sought refuge at the nearby store of their
landlady to whom she confided that she was raped by her brother-in-law. Private
complainant hurried back to their apartment to get dressed only upon making sure that the
appellant had already left the place. Without losing time, she proceeded directly to the
police station and lodged a complaint for rape against the appellant.
Prosecution witness PO1 Rommel Morales of Balanga, Bataan, who was the police
officer on duty at the time Jona Grajo came to the police station, recounted during the
trial that the private complainant was crying and trembling on arrival at the Balanga,
Bataan police station on January 16, 1998. Private complainant took time to answer the
queries of the police officer since she was crying uncontrollably. When she finally got
hold of herself, the private complainant reported that she had been raped by the appellant
who was subsequently arrested by the police. The actuations of the private complainant
immediately after the incident may be considered as part of the res gestae that
substantially strengthens her claim of sexual assault by the appellant.[23]
On the other hand, all the appellant can offer in his defense is bare denial. He claims that
he had just changed his clothes on the second floor of their apartment where his cabinet
was located when he chanced upon the private complainant naked inside her room as the
door was then slightly ajar. He did not do anything further as the private complainant was
awakened and she already started shouting. In view of the positive and convincing
testimony of the private complainant, however, the defense of denial must fail. It is well-
settled that denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed by strong
evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility.[24]
The appellant argues that it was impossible for him to have inserted his penis into the
private part of the complainant without first opening his zipper or removing his pants.
This argument of the appellant is misleading for the reason that, per the testimony of the
private complainant, the appellant was already naked when his presence roused her from
her sleep:
PROS. LASAM:
Q: While you were in your room on that time and date, do you remember of any incident
that happened?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that incident?
A: While I was inside my room, I sensed that there was a person inside my room and
when I opened my eyes, I saw that he is my brother-in-law.
Q: And that brother-in-law of yours is the person whom you pointed a while ago. Is that
correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How does he look when you saw him inside your room?
A: He was naked sitting beside me. [25]
That the private complainant did not offer sustained resistance despite having been
ordered twice by the appellant to change location inside the room can easily be explained
by the fact that the appellant was threatening to stab her if she resisted. The private
complainant was obviously overwhelmed by intense fear when she woke up with a knife
pointed at her neck. The continuing intimidation of private complainant cowed her into
helpless submission to appellant’s lechery. She could only express her disgust over the
sexual attack of her brother-in-law silently in tears. In this connection, it has been ruled
that physical resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is used on the
victim and the latter submits herself, against her will, to the rapist’s embrace because of
fear for her life and personal safety.[26]
The failure of the private complainant to confide the sexual assault to her sister who,
appellant claimed, had arrived from the market before she (private complainant) went to
report the matter to the police is quite understandable and far from being uncharacteristic
of a rape victim, as what appellant would like to make it appear. The workings of the
human mind which is under a great deal of emotional and psychological stress are
unpredictable and different people will react differently to a given situation.[27] Besides,
the private complainant did not want to drag her sister into the controversy and hurt her in
the process. During the trial, the private complainant revealed that she kept from her
sister the previous sexual advances of the appellant in order not to destroy their good
relationship. Private complainant explained that she did not leave the apartment despite
the said harassments of the appellant inasmuch as she had no other place to go. However,
she confided her ordeal to their landlady, a certain Elsa Navarro. At any rate, what is
important is that the private complainant reported the rape immediately to the police.
Admittedly, private complainant was having an affair with a certain Bong Talastas [28] and
that she was not innocent to the ways of the world. However, such fact alone does not
negate the commission of rape by the appellant against her. Dra. Firmacion testified that
although the lacerations found in the private part of Jona Grajo were completely healed,
such fact did not discount the possibility that she was sexually molested immediately
before she was examined on January 16, 1998. We emphasize that moral character is
immaterial in the prosecution and conviction of the offender in the crime of rape. The
Court has ruled time and again that even a prostitute can be a victim of rape [29] as the
essence is the victim’s lack of consent to the sexual act.
Significantly, the appellant failed to advance any credible motive that could have
impelled the private complainant to testify falsely against him.[30] In a desperate attempt
to avoid any responsibility for his crime, however, the appellant theorizes that the private
complainant merely wanted to exact revenge from him for the embarrassment she
experienced when he chanced upon her clad merely in a panty inside her room. This
alleged motive on the part of the private complainant is too shallow to merit even scant
consideration from this Court. If appellant were to be believed, would not private
complainant have instead opted to keep quiet about the incident to spare herself from
further embarrassment? Common experience dictates that no woman, especially one of
tender age, will concoct a rape complaint, allow a gynecological examination and permit
herself to be subjected to public trial if she is not motivated solely by the desire to have
the culprit apprehended and punished.[31] Indeed, coming out in the open with the
accusation of sexual assault on her by her brother-in-law inevitably entailed risking her
relationship with her boyfriend, Bong Talastas, and with her sister. However, the rape
simply proved too much for her to bear.
We agree with the trial court that the appellant should be convicted of only one count of
rape. It may appear from the facts that the appellant thrice succeeded in inserting his
penis into the private part of Jona Grajo. However, the three penetrations occurred during
one continuing act of rape in which the appellant was obviously motivated by a single
criminal intent. There is no indication in the records, as the trial court correctly observed,
from which it can be inferred that the appellant decided to commit those separate and
distinct acts of sexual assault other than his lustful desire to change positions inside the
room where the crime was committed.
Considering that the crime of rape was committed by the appellant with the use of a
deadly weapon, the imposable penalty under Article 266-B is reclusion perpetua to death.
In the absence of any mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the trial court correctly
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on the appellant. She is also entitled to a civil
indemnity of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000). And due to the emotional distress suffered
by the private complainant who was only nineteen years old at the time of the rape, she is
also entitled to an award of moral damages in the amount of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000).[32]
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo convicting the appellant Emmanuel

Aaron of one count of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the private complainant the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000)
as civil indemnity is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that said appellant
shall pay an additional fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) by way of moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Morales, JJ
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 117033, February 15, 2001 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RAFAEL
AVECILLA Y MOBIDO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Accused-appellant was charged with the crime of Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm,
That on or about December 24, 1991, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
not being allowed or authorized by law to keep, possess and carry a firearm, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, and knowingly have in his possession, control and custody a
firearm, to wit:
One (1) .38 Caliber Revolver Colt (Paltik) marked made in USA
without first obtaining the necessary license and/or permit to carry and possess the same
and in connection and by reason of such possession, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, fire and shoot one Macario Afable, Jr. y
Canqui, thus inflicting upon the latter mortal gunshots and injuries which caused the
death of the latter as a consequence.[1]
It appears from the records that at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening of December 24,
1991, accused-appellant arrived at the basketball court located on Dapo Street, Pandacan,
Manila, and, for no apparent reason, suddenly fired a gun in the air. He then went to a
nearby alley and, minutes later, proceeded to the closed store about four (4) meters away
from the basketball court. There, he initiated an argument with the group of Boy
Manalaysay, Jimmy Tolentino and Macario Afable, Jr. Afable tried to pacify accused-
appellant, whereupon, the latter placed his left arm around Afable's neck and shot him
pointblank on the abdomen. Afable ran toward the alley and accused-appellant ran after
him. Another shot rang out, so one of the bystanders, Carlos Taganas, went to the alley
and there, he saw accused-appellant and Afable grappling for possession of the gun. The
Chief Barangay Tanod arrived and was able to wrest the gun away from accused-
appellant, who immediately fled from the scene of the incident. Afable was rushed to the
Philippine General Hospital, where he eventually expired.
On June 21, 1994, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 38, rendered judgment
convicting accused-appellant of the crime of Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm,
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to indemnify
and pay damages to the victim's heirs.[2] Hence, this appeal filed by accused-appellant.
The records and the evidence show that the elements of the offense of qualified illegal
possession of firearms, defined in the second paragraph of Section 1, Presidential Decree
No. 1866, are present in this case. Specifically, there are:
1. there must be a firearm;
2. the gun was possessed by the accused;
3. the accused had no license from the government; and
4. homicide or murder was committed by the accused with the use of said firearm. [3]
The prosecution sufficiently established by evidence that accused-appellant had in his

custody and possession the following firearms and ammunitions:
1. One (1) .38 cal. Rev., Colt "paltik" without serial number, nickel plated with
brown handle, two and one half inches barrel and marked "BC";
2. Three (3) .38 Caliber cartridge cases marked BC-1, BC-2, BC-3;
3. Two (2) .38 cal. Ammo. (used for test);
4. One (1) .38 cal. slug (deformed) marked "F" from Medico legal.[4]
Likewise, per Certification of the Firearms and Explosives Office dated September 1,
1992,[5] it was proved that accused-appellant was not a licensed or registered firearm
holder of any kind and caliber.
Finally, there was an eyewitness account positively asserting that accused-appellant had
the subject firearm in his possession and used it in shooting the victim.[6] The medical
examination on the victim disclosed that the gunshot wounds he sustained were caused
by the same unlicensed firearm in accused-appellant's possession, and that the same were
the direct cause of the death of the victim. The ballistics report established that the
deformed .38 caliber slugs found in the victim's body were fired from the subject firearm.
[7]
The victim's cause of death was determined as "cardio-respiratory arrest due to shock
and hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wound, left antero-lateral thorax."[8]
However, the law on illegal possession of firearms has been amended by Republic Act
No. 8294, which took effect on July 6, 1994. The pertinent provision of the said law
provides:
SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of
Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture
of Firearms or Ammunition. - The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period
and a fine of not less than Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00) shall be imposed upon
any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess
any low powered firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of
similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or
intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition: Provided, that no
other crime was committed.
xxxxxxxxx
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or incident to, or in connection with the
crime of rebellion or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat, such violation shall
be absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion, or insurrection, sedition, or
attempted coup d'etat. (Underscoring provided)
It is clear from the foregoing that where murder or homicide results from the use of an
unlicensed firearm, the crime is no longer qualified illegal possession, but murder or
homicide, as the case may be. In such a case, the use of the unlicensed firearm is not
considered as a separate crime but shall be appreciated as a mere aggravating
circumstance. In view of the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 8294 to
Presidential Decree No. 1866, separate prosecutions for homicide and illegal possession
are no longer in order. Instead, illegal possession of firearms is merely to be taken as an
aggravating circumstance in the homicide case.[9]
Thus, in People v. Nepomuceno, Jr.,[10] we stated:

But, pursuant to the amendment, the use of an unlicensed firearm in the commission of
murder or homicide is treated as an aggravating circumstance. There, the illegal
possession or use of the unlicensed firearm is no longer separately punished. This Court
emphatically said so in People v. Bergante (286 SCRA 629 [1998]), thus:
The violation of P.D. No. 1866 should have been punished separately conformably with
our ruling in People v. Quijada. Nevertheless, fortunately for appellant Rex Bergante,
P.D. No. 1866 was recently amended by Republic Act. No. 8294, otherwise known as
"An Act Amending the Provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as Amended." The
third paragraph of Section 1 of said Act provides that "if homicide or murder is
committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall
be considered as an aggravating circumstance." In short, only one offense should be
punished, viz., either homicide or murder, and the use of the unlicensed firearm should
only be considered as an aggravating circumstance. Being favorable to Rex Bergante, this
provision may be given retroactive effect pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code, he not being a habitual criminal.
The crime of illegal possession of firearm, in its simple form, is committed only where
the unlicensed firearm is not used to commit any of the crimes of murder, homicide,
rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d'etat. Otherwise, the use of unlicensed
firearm would be treated either: (1) as an essential ingredient in the crimes of rebellion,
insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d'etat; or (2) as an aggravating circumstance in
murder or homicide.
With respect to the conviction of accused-appellant for illegal possession of firearms
under P. D. No. 1866, it was held in the case of People vs. Molina (292 SCRA 742) and
reiterated in the recent case of People vs. Ronaldo Valdez (G.R. No. 127663, March 11,
1999, 304 SCRA 611), that in cases where murder or homicide is committed with the use
of an unlicensed firearm, there can be no separate conviction for the crime of illegal
possession of firearms under P.D. No. 1866 in view of the amendments introduced by
Republic Act No. 8294. Thereunder, the use of unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide
is simply considered as an aggravating circumstance in the murder or homicide and no
longer as a separate offense. Furthermore, the penalty for illegal possession of firearms
shall be imposed provided that no other crime is committed (Section 1 of R.A. No. 8294).
In other words, where murder or homicide was committed, the penalty for illegal
possession of firearms is no longer imposable since it becomes merely a special
aggravating circumstance (People v. Molina, supra, at p. 782).
It bears stressing, however, that the dismissal of the present case for illegal possession of
firearm should not be misinterpreted to mean that there can no longer be any prosecution
for the offense of illegal possession of firearms. In general, all pending cases involving
illegal possession of firearms should continue to be prosecuted and tried if no other
crimes expressly provided in R. A. No. 8294 are involved (murder or homicide, under
Section 1, and rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d' etat, under Section
3) (People v. Valdez, supra).[11]
Inasmuch as the amendatory law is favorable to accused-appellant in this case, the same
may be retroactively applied. This new law applies even to violations that occurred prior
to its effectivity as it may be given retroactive effect under Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code.[12]
R.A. 8294 took effect on July 6, 1997. The crime involved in the case at bench was
committed on May 5, 1991. As a general rule, penal laws will generally have prospective
application except where the new law will be advantageous to the accused. In this case
R.A. 8294 will spare accused-appellant from a separate conviction for the crime of illegal
possession of firearm. Accordingly, said law should be given retroactive application.[13]
Neither can accused-appellant be charged with simple illegal possession. As stated above,
the same may only done where no other crime is committed.[14]
With more reason, accused-appellant cannot be convicted of homicide or murder with

"the use of the unlicensed firearm as aggravating," inasmuch as said felonies are not
charged in the information but merely mentioned as the result of the use of the unlicensed
firearm. Accused-appellant was not arraigned for homicide or murder. Hence, he cannot
be convicted of any of these crimes without violating his right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, not to mention his right to due process.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision

is REVERSED. Criminal Case No. 92-105691, for Qualified Illegal Possession of
Firearm, is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. Nos. 132696-97, February 12, 2001 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RAMON
NAVARRO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Ramon Navarro (accused-appellant) appeals his conviction for the crime of Murder with
the Use of an Unlicensed Firearm for which he was sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount of P100,000.00
as damages by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Alaminos, Pangasinan.
Two (2) separate Informations were filed against accused-appellant for Murder (Criminal
Case No. 3082-A) and Aggravated Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunitions
(Criminal Case No. 3083-A). The Information for murder reads:
That on or about August 28, 1987, in the evening, along the highway in Palamis,
municipality of Alaminos, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation, taking advantage of nighttime and superior strength, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot Romeo Calizar with a handgun which
cause [sic] his untimely death as a consequence, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
CONTRARY to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code.[1]

The Information for aggravated illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions reads:
That on or about August 28, 1987, in the evening along the highway in Palamis,
municipality of Alaminos, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did there and then willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody a handgun without
first securing the necessary license or permit to possesses [sic] the same and the said
handgun was used in shooting to death Romeo Calizar.
CONTRARY to Sec. 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866.[2]

Accused-appellant was not allowed to post bail. At his arraignment, accused-appellant
pleaded not guilty to both charges. Thereafter, a joint trial of the two cases ensued.
The case for the prosecution was based mainly on the testimony of Bob Regaspi. He
testified that on 28 August 1987, at 9:00 in the evening, he was driving a tricycle on his
way home. He noticed that he was following an owner-type jeep. The tricycle was about
several meters behind the jeep. Both vehicles were going towards the south. Before they
reached Bugtong Bridge, the jeep suddenly stopped. Regaspi had to stop the tricycle
behind the jeep because there were several vehicles on the other lane coming from the
opposite direction. Regaspi then saw accused-appellant got off from the right side of the
jeep. Accused-appellant was carrying a .45 caliber gun. Regaspi also saw accused-
appellant pull out a person from the jeep. Accused-appellant kicked said person and then
shot him three (3) times. The victim was Romeo Calizar.[3]
According to Regaspi, he was able to identify accused-appellant as the assailant even if

the killing happened at night because there was sufficient illumination from the light of
the jeep as well as the lights of the other vehicles passing at the time. After he witnessed
the incident, Regaspi proceeded to his home. He did not report the crime to the police as
he was afraid of accused-appellant. He said that there were rumors that accused-appellant
was a killer.[4]
Fearing for his life, Regaspi relocated to Manila and lived there for three (3) years.
Before he left, however, he already told the victim's wife, Demetria, that it was accused-
appellant who killed her husband. He returned to Pangasinan only in 1990 and resided at
his mother's residence in Bolaney, Alaminos, Pangasinan. He also briefly stayed at his
grandfather's house in Barangay Balingasay, Bolinao.[5]
The prosecution also presented as its witnesses Demetria Calizar, Dr. Maria Victoria
Orfinada, PO3 Delfin Estabilla Flores and SPO3 Romeo De Guzman.
Demetria Calizar, wife of the victim, testified that she was in Bolinao, Pangasinan, when
she learned that her husband was killed. It was her sister, Carmen Conde, who broke the
news to her. Demetria just gave birth at the time. Upon hearing about her husband's
death, she immediately went to the funeral parlor and attended to the burial preparations.
She spent about ten thousand pesos for the wake and burial of her husband. At the time of
his death, the victim was earning three hundred pesos a day as an itinerant empty bottle
buyer. He was forty two (42) years old. The victim left behind five (5) children with
Demetria. Finally, Demetria confirmed that Bob Regaspi told her that it was accused-
appellant who shot her husband.[6]
Dr. Maria Victoria Orfinada, Municipal Health Officer of Alaminos, Pangasinan,

identified the Certificate of Death[7] issued in connection with the death of Romeo
Calizar. The certificate showed that the cause of death was "severe hemorrhage due to
multiple gunshot wounds on the different parts of the body."[8] The certificate was issued
by Dr. Manuel Navarro,[9] the Municipal Health Officer at the time. Unfortunately, Dr.
Navarro could no longer testify because he already died.
PO3 Delfin Estabillo Flores testified that he was on duty at the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Alaminos Police Station on 29 August 1987. Around 6:00 in the morning of said
date, Flores received a call to respond to an alleged shooting incident that occurred at
Barangay Palamis, Alaminos, Pangasinan. Together with the other policemen on duty,
Flores immediately proceeded to the said place to investigate. When they arrived at the
crime scene, they saw a man lying face down on the right side of the road going to
Mabini. The said person, later identified to be Romeo Calizar, was already dead. They
recovered two (2) empty shells and two (2) slugs of a .45 caliber gun near the body. [10]
SPO3 Romeo De Guzman testified that he works in the Firearms and Explosives Office
of the PNP Camp Crame and that based on their records, accused-appellant is not
licensed or authorized to possess or carry a firearm.[11]
For its part, the defense presented the following witnesses: Mayor Leon Rivera, Rodolfo
R. Aquino, PO3 Marciano Bacani, Rogelio Banogon, Leonora Arboleda and Danilo
Malapit. Accused-appellant opted not to testify on his behalf.
Leon Rivera testified that during his incumbency as Mayor of Alaminos, he was not
aware of any criminal case having been filed against accused-appellant. He admitted on
cross-examination, however, that the people of Alaminos once held a big rally against the
alleged illegal activities, e.g., killings, robberies and jueteng, of the notorious Aguila
Gang. Accused-appellant was widely believed to be the leader of said gang. [12]
Rodolfo Aquino is a retired provincial prosecutor of Alaminos. He testified that during

his stint as assistant provincial prosecutor and subsequently provincial prosecutor from
1983 up to 1990, he never came across any criminal charge against accused-appellant
apart from the present case.[13]
PO3 Marciano Bacani, member of the PNP of Alaminos, was presented to show that
there was no mention of accused-appellant in the police blotter for 30 August 1987. Entry
No. 4978 on said date stated that the body of Romeo Calizar was found lying face down
at the edge of the road in Barangay Palamis. He sustained multiple gunshot wounds. Two
(2) empty shells and two (2) slugs of .45 caliber gun were found near his body. [14]
In his direct testimony, Rogelio Banogon claimed that on 28 August 1987 at about 9:00
in the evening, he was riding a tricycle going to the town from Bolaney. He was on his
way to buy medicine for his son who was then having a stomachache. When the tricycle
was near the Bugtong Bridge, he heard a gunshot. The driver immediately stopped his
tricycle. Banogon alighted from the tricycle and switched on his flashlight. He saw Bob
Regaspi, the witness for the prosecution, holding a .45 caliber gun. Banogon said he also
saw a man lying down but that he did not see his face. Banogon asked Regaspi what
happened and the latter allegedly said he shot the victim because he had sexual
intercourse with all his (Regaspi's) aunties. Banogon did not report the matter to the
police but proceeded to the town to buy the medicine for his son.[15]
Leonor Arboleda testified that some time on 9 May 1987, the victim, Romeo Calizar, was
having a drinking spree with her (Arboleda's) husband and two other companions at their
(Leonor and Teddy Arboleda's) house. Demetria, wife of the victim, suddenly arrived and
started to quarrel with her husband over money matters. After their argument, Demetria
allegedly uttered "ipapatay kita" to the victim.[16]
Danilo Malapit stated that the victim worked in the junk shop owned by his (Danilo's)
father. Calizar bought empty bottles and delivered them to the junk shop. On 28 August
1987, Danilo saw the victim leave the junk shop at around 8:00 in the evening. The
victim left in a tricycle driven by his companion. The following morning, Danilo heard
about the news of the victim's death.[17]
After consideration of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and defense, the trial
court rendered judgment convicting accused-appellant for the crime of murder with the
use of unlicensed firearm and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, the accused is declared
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder with the use of unlicensed
firearm and Criminal Case No. 3083-A is considered a mere aggravating circumstance of
the crime of Murder, together with the aggravating circumstance of treachery and
nighttime. Accused is sentenced by reason hereof to suffer the single indivisible penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of
P100,000.00.
Considering the recent events at the Provincial Jail in Lingayen, Pangasinan, where a
week ago from this date of judgment, there five detention prisoners who escaped
detention and considering the state of security and even the conditions at the Provincial
Jail in Lingayen, Pangasinan, this Court orders immediately the National Bureau of
Investigation represented by Head Agent, Atty. Teofilo Galang, and/or his agents to bring
the living body of the accused immediately today, upon receipt of this Decision, to the
National Penitentiary at Muntinlupa to serve his sentence, subject to the automatic and
requisite review of this Decision by the highest court of the land.
Accused-appellant accordingly filed his notice of appeal.[19] Thereafter, he filed his
appellant's brief alleging the following:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
First Assignment of Error

The Trial Court committed a reversible error in convicting the accused-appellant upon an
uncorroborated and incredible testimony proceeding from the mouth of an equally
incredible witness;
Second Assignment of Error
The Trial Court committed grave and reversible error when in order to bolster its
unjustified judgment of conviction of the accused-appellant in the above-entitled case,
cavalierly and without legal bases took judicial notice of unproved, extraneous and
doubtful facts and circumstances, in violation of jurisprudence x x x;
Third Assignment of Error
The Trial Court committed reversible error in not taking into consideration the substantial
albeit circumstantial evidence testified to by the witnesses for the defense that point to a
conspiracy among the alleged lone eye witness Bob Regaspi with his blood aunt, the
widow Demetria Calizar as the authors and perpetrators of the murder of Romeo Calizar.
[20]
The appeal must fail.
Accused-appellant impugns the credibility of the prosecution eyewitness, Bob Regaspi,

alleging that his testimony was marred by inconsistencies. Accused-appellant points to,
among others, the following alleged inconsistencies:
1. On direct-examination, Regaspi stated that he is a resident of Brgy. Bolaney,

Alaminos, Pangasinan. However, on cross-examination, he mentioned that he is a
resident of Brgy. Balingasay, Alaminos, Pangasinan;
2. Regaspi denied that he is a relative of Demetria Calizar, the wife of the victim. In
her testimony, however, Demeteria admitted that Regaspi is her nephew as he is
the son of her older sister, Monica Clave;
3. Regaspi claimed that he was driving a tricycle on the night of 28 August 1987
when he witnessed the slaying of Romeo Calizar. He admitted, however, that he
did not possess any license to drive said vehicle. Further, while he (Regaspi)
claimed that he merely borrowed the tricycle he was then driving, he could not
give the name of the owner thereof;
4. Regaspi testified that he saw accused-appellant shoot Romeo Calizar three (3)
times. However, there were only two (2) slugs and two (2) empty shells found near
the body of Romeo Calizar.[21]
The Court finds nothing unusual about the fact that Regaspi stated two different
addresses as his residence. As explained by him, after he came back from Manila, he
resided in Brgy. Bolaney. However, there was also a time when he briefly resided with
his grandfather in Brgy. Balingasay. Also, the fact that he is a relative of the victim's
widow does not detract from Regaspi's credibility as a witness. The weight of testimony
of a witness is not impaired or in any way affected by his relationship to the victim when
there is no showing of improper motive on the part of the witness.[22]
Likewise, Regaspi's admission that he did not have a driver's license does not negate the
fact that he was driving a tricycle at the time when he witnessed accused-appellant gun
down Calizar. Indeed, a person can still drive a vehicle even without possessing the
necessary license albeit violating the traffic rules. Finally, whether there were two or
three gunshots is immaterial. The certificate of death stated that Romeo Calizar died of
multiple gunshot wounds.
In any case, to the mind of the Court, these inconsistencies enumerated by accused-
appellant do not make the testimony of Regaspi unworthy of credence. As found by the
trial court, Regaspi's testimony was straightforward and candid. He testified thus:
Q How long have you known Romeo Calizar?
A It is a long time, sir.
Q Mr. Witness, is Romeo Calizar still alive, if you know?
A He is already dead, sir.
Q Do you know how he died?
A Yes, sir. I know, sir.
Q How did he die?
A He was shot, sir.
Q Do you know who shot Romeo Calizar?
A I know, sir.
Q Who shot Romeo Calizar?
A It was Ramon Navarro, sir.
Q If Ramon Navarro is inside the court room, will you be able to recognize him, identify
him and point to him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please point on the accused, Ramon Navarro?
A (Witness pointing at the accused who was wearing a blue pants and shirt and with sun-
glasses and when asked his name answered Ramon Navarro).
COURT:
Where? The accused with sun-glasses?
PROS. USON:
Yes, your Honor.
Q Why do you say that it was Ramon Navarro who shot Romeo Calizar?
A I saw him with my two eyes, sir.
Q Where did Ramon Navarro shoot Romeo Calizar?
A In Palamis, sir.
Q Palamis. What town is that?
A Alaminos, Pangasinan, sir.
Q When did Ramon Navarro shoot Romeo Calizar at Palamis, Alaminos, Pangasinan?
A August 28, 1987, sir.
Q What time, more or less, if you know, did you see Ramon Navarro shot Romeo
Calizar?
A At 9:00 o'clock, sir.
Q 9:00 o'clock, in the morning or evening?
A In the evening, sir.
Q Now, Mr. Witness, you said that you saw Ramon Navarro shoot Romeo Calizar along
Palamis, Alaminos, Pangasinan on August 28, 1987 at around the hour of 9:00 o'clock
in the evening. Let us go back to that day and time. Where were you when you saw
Ramon Navarro shoot Romeo Calisar?
A I was near them, sir.
Q What were you doing when you were near them?
A I was riding on a tricycle, sir.
Q Were you a passenger or a driver of that tricycle?
A I was the driver, sir.
Q How about Ramon Navarro, where was he in relation to you?
A He went down from the vehicle that they were riding on, sir.
Q He went down from what kind of, may I withdraw that, your Honor.
You said he went down. Are you saying he was also riding a vehicle?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was he riding before he went down?
A An owner-jeep, sir.
Q Where was the owner-jeep heading when you saw Ramon Navarro get down?
A It was facing south, sir.
Q When you said that the jeep was facing south, how about you and your tricycle, where
were you also facing?
A It was also facing the south, sir.
Q How far were you and your tricycle from the jeep that was being ridden by Ramon
Navarro?
A About three (3) meters, sir.
Q So you were following the jeep going south?
A Yes, sir. I was following the jeep.
Q You said a while ago, you saw Ramon Navarro get down from the jeep. Was the jeep
still running when he got down or was it stopped?
A It was stopped, sir.
Q How about you? When the jeep stopped, what did you do while you were following
them?
A I also stopped my tricycle, sir.
Q When you stopped your tricycle, you saw Ramon Navarro get down from the jeep?
A Yes, sir.
Q What part of the jeep did he get off?
A In the right side, sir.
Q When you saw Ramon Navarro, may I withdraw.
Will you describe the appearance of Mr. Navarro when you saw him get down from the
right side of the jeep?
A He was carrying a gun, sir.
Q By what means was he carrying the gun?
A He was holding it with his right hand, sir.
Q After you saw Ramon Navarro get down from the jeep with a gun on his right hand,
what next did you see happen?
A He pulled out a person from the jeep, sir.
Q What happened to the person that he pulled out from the jeep?
A He kicked the person, sir.
Q After Ramon Navarro kicked the person, what next did Ramon Navarro do?
A He shot him three (3) times, sir.
Q What happened to the person whom you saw Ramon Navarro shoot three times?
A When he kicked the person, the person fell down on the ground and he shot him three
times, sir.
Q Mr. Witness, how were you able to see Mr. Ramon Navarro kicked the person and shot
him three times when it was around 9:00 o'clock in the evening?
A The light of their jeep was on, sir, and the light of my tricycle was also on and also the
light of the jeep coming from the opposite direction.
Q What kind of gun was used by Ramon Navarro that you saw in shooting the person he
pulled out from the jeep?
A It was short gun, sir, a 45.
Q A short gun, 45. Are you familiar with 45 caliber guns?
A I know, sir, because I used to see that kind of gun.
Q Now, Mr. Witness, you saw that the gun used was short and according to you, it was a
45 caliber. Will you describe the gun used, let us say the color?
A It was shiny, sir.
Q How could you say it was shiny when it was nighttime at around 9:00 o'clock?
A It was illuminated, sir.
Q And what illuminated the gun to make you so sure that it was a 45 caliber?
A It was illuminated by the light of my tricycle, sir.
Q By the way, Mr. Witness, who was that person whom you saw pulled out from the jeep
by Ramon Navarro, kicked him and then shot him three times with a 45 caliber pistol?
A It was Romeo Calisar, sir.
Q After you saw Ramon Navarro pulled out Calizar out of the jeep, kicked him and shot
him three times with a 45 caliber pistol, what next did you do?
A I drove the tricycle and went home, sir.
Q Mr. Witness, did you come to know later on whatever happened to Romeo Calizar as a
result of his being shot three times with a 45 caliber pistol by Ramon Navarro?
ATTY MONTEMAYOR:
I think that is already answered in the beginning, your Honor. It was already there.
PROS. USON:
Killed.
COURT:
Yes, already answered.
ATTY. MONTEMAYOR:
Yes, your Honor, he knows what happened to him.
COURT:
Objection sustained.
PROS. USON:
Q So, you went home after you witnessed the incident. Did you not report to the Police
station of Alaminos, Pangasinan what you saw?
A No, sir, because there were rumors that he was a killer.[23]
The inconsistencies pointed out by accused-appellant refer merely to inconsequential
details and not to the crux of the case - that Regaspi actually saw accused-appellant gun
down Calizar. Well-settled is the rule that "inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters
only serve to strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of witnesses for they erase the
suspicion of rehearsed testimony."[24]
Accused-appellant likewise attempts to discredit Regaspi by faulting him for not

reporting the crime immediately to the authorities. Regaspi admitted that he fled to
Manila after witnessing the incident and returned to Alaminos, Pangasinan in 1990. He
disclosed to the police what he knew about the killing only in 1995. The fact that it took
Regaspi and the wife of the victim, Demetria, almost eight (8) years before they filed a
criminal complaint against accused-appellant cannot be taken against them. Their initial
reluctance to implicate accused-appellant is undoubtedly borne out of fear given the
latter's reputation in the community. As found by the trial court:
From the time that the incident occurred on or about August 28, 1987, it took the widow
and her witness eight years more or less before a complaint was filed for Murder against
the accused (Pages 3-7, Records). The delay was understandable because of fear of
Ramon Navarro, the alleged leader of the "Aguila Gang."
This Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact that Alaminos, Pangasinan was held
tightly gripped by the criminal elements and its citizenry cowered in fear, of their lives
being endangered and wasted. Hence, literally speaking, the citizens in one occasion in
1995 stood up as one to denounce the Aguila Gang. In that rally referred to, to seek an
assurance from the authorities for justice and protection and for the attainment of a just
and lasting peace and order, the government authorities, with equal vigor and zeal,
responded to the numerous cases filed against the accused of crimes dating back to the
year 1987. Many witnesses and offended parties came up by then, encouraged by their
belief that their government's commitment for their protection from the lawless element
has been revitalized by the entire citizenry, who were awakened and rose up as one to
prevent further destruction of lives and for the protection of the interest of humanity.
This judicial notice adopted by the Court finds its support in the testimony of one of the
witnesses for the defense, in the person of the Honorable Mayor of Alaminos,
Pangasinan, Leon M. Rivera, Jr. Mayor Rivera, Jr. testified that he became mayor of the
municipality of Alaminos from 1973 continuously up to the present; that he knows
Ramon Navarro, the accused in these cases; that there was a rally of Alaminos residents
against accused Ramon Navarro (TSN, January 31, 1997, Page 6) with a very big
participation from the residents of the municipality; that the accused is the leader of the
Aguila Gang and the rally that was conducted in 1995 by the citizens of Alaminos is
precisely centered on the alleged illegal activities of the Aguila Gang, with respect to
unsolved killings, robberies and proliferation of jueteng attributed to the leadership of the
accused (TSN, Page 7, supra).[25]
Accused-appellant opines that it was highly unlikely for accused-appellant to have
committed the crime considering that, as testified to by Regaspi, there were numerous
vehicles passing by the place and there was sufficient illumination from these cars.
Accused-appellant posits that "it is totally and absolutely unbelievable that any man who
is not a total fool or mentally deranged could still proceed and commit such grievous and
brutal act of murder knowing that all his actions can be seen clearly under the full glare
of the lights of numerous oncoming vehicles."[26] This argument is untenable. That
accused-appellant killed Romeo Calizar under the circumstances testified to by Regaspi
is not incredible. Criminal offenders have been known to execute their evil designs in
such audacious and brazen manner. Indeed, crimes are now committed in the most
unexpected places and in brazen disregard of authorities.[27]
In the second assignment of error, accused-appellant contends that the trial court based its
judgment of conviction upon "unproved, extraneous and doubtful facts and
circumstances." Accused-appellant particularly refers to the judicial cognizance taken by
the trial court regarding accused-appellant's notoriety. As a backgrounder, the trial court
quoted in its decision the August 1995 PNP RECOM I BULLETIN thus:
As a backgrounder and by way of judicial notice, the Court quotes the August 1995 PNP
RECOM I BULLETIN, in Pages 32-33 of the Special Report, in order to give a sufficient
background on who the accused is in these cases:
Alaminos, a bustling seaside town of Pangasinan which had been silent witness for seven
years to a series of salvages (summary killings) attributed to a self-styled group of
vigilantes who had become notorious and untouchable, could now be said to be enjoying
once again the serene atmosphere it used to experience in years of yore.
This is so because the leader of the vigilante group, tagged as "Aguila Gang" for the eagle
tattoo sported by its members, had already been arrested by joint elements of the
Alaminos police station and 1st provincial mobile force company of the Pangasinan PNP
provincial command, with the assistance of the intelligence group from the Ilocos PNP
regional command.
With the arrest of gang leader Ramon Navarro y Escobar, second most wanted person in
Region I, the Aguila Gang, reportedly composed of eight to ten armed members and
believed to be behind the violent death of at least 28 persons since it was organized
sometime in 1986 until October in 1993, is now said to be neutralized.
BIRTH OF AGUILA
The execution, mostly of suspected criminals started late 1986 when then Lt. Marlou C.
Chan, then the municipal police chief, organized a vigilante group to go after cattle
rustlers, thieves and drug pushers.
At the core of the group, according to the testimony of Reniedo to the NBI, were he,
Navarro, the slain Bito and two others who are still being tracked down by police and
military intelligence agents. Navarro was a former military informer.
"In the beginning, the people tend to approve of their activities, especially after seeing
known criminals being killed one after another," said Dr. Pedro Braganza in an interview
with the Philippine Daily Inquirer.
OPERATION: MARIA KAPRA
Including the charges filed by the NBI, Navarro was charged for nine counts of criminal
cases, ranging from rape, murder and illegal possession of firearms, before the regional
trial court in Alaminos. This placed him as the second most wanted person in Region I
with a recommended reward of P100,000."[28]
Contrary to accused-appellant's contention, the foregoing "backgrounder" or judicial
notice taken by the trial court was not the basis for his conviction. Rather, accused-
appellant's conviction was based on the strength of the prosecution's evidence against
him. It must be underscored that accused-appellant was positively identified by Regaspi
as the person who shot Romeo Calizar on that fateful day of 28 August 1987. The
defense tried to discredit Regaspi by imputing to him the crime. Rogelio Banogon[29] and
Leonora Arboleda[30] were presented by the defense to support its theory that it was
Regaspi, conspiring with his aunt and the victim's wife, Demetria, who killed Romeo
Calizar. Thus, in his third assignment of error, accused-appellant avers that the trial court
committed reversible when it did not give any credence to the testimonies of these
defense witnesses.
It is doctrinally settled that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimony is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity
to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under
grueling examination.[31] In this case, the trial court found Regaspi to be the more credible
witness and accorded his testimony full faith and credence. Upon the other hand, the trial
court found the testimony of Arboleda "phony and mere fabrication"[32] and that of
Banogon "inherently improbable."[33]
The Court finds no cogent reason to overturn these findings. Regaspi's testimony on the
manner by which accused-appellant killed Romeo Calizar was straightforward, clear and
consistent. The fact that only Regaspi came out as an eyewitness to indict accused-
appellant does not detract from his credibility. Truth is established not by the number of
witnesses but by the quality of their testimonies. The testimony of a single witness if
positive and credible is sufficient to support a conviction. Indeed, criminals are convicted
not on the number of witnesses against them, but on the credibility of the testimony of
even one witness who is able to convince the court of the guilt of the accused beyond a
shadow of doubt.[34] Moreover, the defense failed to prove any ill-motive on the part of
Regaspi to testify against accused-appellant. In the absence of any evidence or any
indicium that the prosecution's main witness harbored ill motives against the accused, the
presumption is that he was not so moved and that his testimony was untainted with bias.
[35]
The guilt of accused-appellant for the killing of Calizar has thus been established beyond
reasonable doubt in this case. Moreover, the trial court correctly appreciated the
aggravating circumstance of treachery in the commission of the crime. Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall
kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death[36] if committed with any of the following circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men,
or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or
afford impunity.
xxx
There is treachery when the shooting was unexpected and sudden, giving the unarmed
victim no chance whatsoever to defend himself. The two conditions for treachery to be
present are: (1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend
himself and (2) the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of
attack employed by him.[37]
As graphically described by the trial court, there is treachery in the case at bar because -
[F]rom the evidence presented, the poor victim was dragged from inside the jeep by the
accused and when he was on the ground, he was kicked and when he fell down, he was
shot three times. The shooting of the victim by the accused is all of a sudden. From all
indications, there was no opportunity for the deceased to defend himself or to retaliate
and the means of execution was deliberately adopted. The accused was in the jeep
together with the deceased. The deceased would not have ridden into that jeep if he
knows that he will be killed. So that when the deceased rode into that jeep before he was
killed, the offender must have consciously adopted that particular means or method by
use of a motor vehicle in order that the accused's dastardly act could be accomplished.
The Court takes note of the time of the killing at night and the fact that the victim was
dragged from inside the jeep by the accused and after the victim was outside of the jeep,
the accused kicked him and shot him three times. These circumstances alone would
provide that scenario that indeed, the victim was not in the position to defend himself. [38]
Finally, following the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Molina[39] and reiterated
in People vs. Feloteo[40] and People vs. Lazaro,[41] among others, the trial court
appropriately considered the separate criminal charge of illegal possession of firearms
against accused-appellant merely as an aggravating circumstance in this case. As the law
stands today, there can no longer be a separate conviction of the crime of illegal
possession of firearms under P.D. No. 1866 in view of the amendments introduced by
Republic Act No. 8294.[42] Instead, illegal possession of firearms is simply taken as an
aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide pursuant to Section 1 of R.A. No. 8294.
Said provision of law reads in part:
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
In illegal possession of firearms, two (2) requisites must be established: (1) the existence
of the subject firearm, and (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the gun
did not have the corresponding license or permit to carry it outside his residence.[43] The
first element - the existence of the firearm - was indubitably established by the
prosecution. Regaspi actually saw accused-appellant shoot the victim with a .45 caliber
gun. Two empty shells and two slugs of a .45 caliber gun were recovered near the body
of the victim by the police authorities and these were offered in evidence by the
prosecution. Further, the testimony of SPO3 Romeo De Guzman of the Firearms and
Explosives Office of the PNP Camp Crame attesting that based on their records, accused-
appellant is not licensed or authorized to possess or carry a firearm suffices to prove the
second element. The trial court, therefore, judiciously convicted accused-appellant for the
crime of murder with the use of an unlicensed firearm.
At the time of the commission of the offense at bar, the penalty prescribed for murder
was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death.[44] Since there was an
aggravating circumstance of the use of an illegally possessed firearm in the commission
thereof,[45] the law enjoins the imposition of the maximum penalty.[46] In this case,
however, the penalty of death cannot be imposed on accused-appellant because the crime
was committed prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 7659, the law imposing the
death penalty on heinous crimes. Accordingly, the trial court correctly imposed on
accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision, dated 25 February 1998, is

hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 183652, February 25, 2015 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND AAA, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF
APPEALS, 21ST DIVISION, MINDANAO STATION, RAYMUND
CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL OPORTO, AND MOISES ALQUIZOLA,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari questioning the Decision[1] of the

Court of Appeals (CA) dated June 6, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00422-MIN. The CA
reversed and set aside the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kapatagan,
Lanao del Norte, Branch 21, dated February 28, 2006 in Criminal Case No. 21-1211, and
acquitted private respondents Raymund Carampatana, Joefhel Oporto, and Moises
Alquizola of the crime of rape for the prosecution’s failure to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
In a Second Amended Information dated June 23, 2004, private respondents

Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola were charged, together with Christian John Lim,
Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, Jansen Roda, Harold Batoctoy, and Joseph
Villame, for allegedly raping AAA,[3] to wit:
That on or about 10:30 o’clock in the evening of March 25, 2004 at Alson’s
Palace, Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd
designs forcefully drunk AAA, a 16-year-old minor, with an intoxicating liquor and once
intoxicated, brought said AAA at about dawn of March 26, 2004 at Alquizola Lodging
house, Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte and also within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, and once inside said lodging house, accused RAYMUND
CARAMPATANA and JOEPHEL OPORTO took turns in having carnal knowledge against
the will of AAA while accused MOISES ALQUIZOLA, with lewd designs, kissed her against
her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Upon arraignment, accused, assisted by their respective counsels, entered a plea of not
guilty to the offense charged. [5]
Following pre-trial,[6] trial on the merits ensued. Accused Christian John Lim, however,
remains at-large.
The factual antecedents follow:
On March 25, 2004, around 8:00 a.m., AAA attended her high school graduation
ceremony. Afterwards, they had a luncheon party at their house in Maranding, Lala,
Lanao del Norte. AAA then asked permission from her mother to go to the Maranding
Stage Plaza because she and her bandmates had to perform for an election campaign.
She went home at around 4:00 p.m. from the plaza. At about 7:00 p.m., AAA told her
father that she would be attending a graduation dinner party with her friends. AAA,
together with Lim, Oporto, and Carampatana, ate dinner at the house of one Mark
Gemeno at Purok, Bulahan, Maranding. After eating, Lim invited them to go to Alson’s
Palace, which was merely a walking distance away from Gemeno’s house. Outside the
Alson’s Palace, they were greeted by Aldrin Montesco, Junver Alquizola, and Cherry Mae
Fiel. After a while, they went inside and proceeded to a bedroom on the second floor
where they again saw Montesco with Harold Batoctoy, Jansen Roda, Emmanuel dela
Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, a certain Diego, and one Angelo. Rudinas suggested that they
have a drinking session to celebrate their graduation, to which the rest agreed.
They all contributed and it was Joseph Villame who bought the drinks – two (2) bottles
of Emperador Brandy. Then they arranged themselves in a circle for the drinking spree.
Two (2) glasses were being passed around: one glass containing the sweetener (Pepsi)
and the other glass containing the liquor. At first, AAA refused to drink because she had
never tried hard liquor before. During the session, they shared their problems with
each other. When it was AAA’s turn, she became emotional and started crying. It was
then that she took her first shot. The glasses were passed around and she consumed
more or less five (5) glasses of Emperador Brandy.
Thereafter, she felt dizzy so she laid her head down on Oporto’s lap. Oporto then
started kissing her head and they would remove her baseball cap. This angered her so
she told them to stop, and simply tried to hide her face with the cap. But they just
laughed at her. Then, Roda also kissed her. At that time, AAA was already sleepy, but
they still forced her to take another shot. They helped her stand up and make her
drink. She even heard Lim say, “Hubuga na, hubuga na,” (You make her drunk, you
make her drunk). She likewise heard someone say, “You drink it, you drink it.” She
leaned on Oporto’s lap again, then she fell asleep. They woke her up and Lim gave her
the Emperador Brandy bottle to drink the remaining liquor inside. She tried to refuse
but they insisted, so she drank directly from the bottle. Again, she fell asleep.
The next thing she knew, Roda and Batoctoy were carrying her down the stairs, and
then she was asleep again. When she regained consciousness, she saw that she was
already at the Alquizola Lodging House. She recognized that place because she had
been there before. She would thereafter fall back asleep and wake up again. And
during one of the times that she was conscious, she saw Oporto on top of her, kissing
her on different parts of her body, and having intercourse with her. She started crying.
She tried to resist when she felt pain in her genitals. She also saw Carampatana and
Moises Alquizola inside the room, watching as Oporto abused her. At one point, AAA
woke up while Carampatana was inserting his penis into her private organ. She cried
and told him to stop. Alquizola then joined and started to kiss her. For the last time,
she fell unconscious.
When she woke up, it was already 7:00 a.m. of the next day. She was all alone. Her
body felt heavy and exhausted. She found herself with her shirt on but without her
lower garments. The upper half of her body was on top of the bed but her feet were on
the floor. There were also red stains on her shirt. After dressing up, she hailed
a trisikad and went home. When AAA reached their house, her father was waiting for
her and was already furious. When she told them that she was raped, her mother
started hitting her. They brought her to the Lala Police Station to make a report.
Thereafter, they proceeded to the district hospital for her medical examination.
Dr. Cyrus Acusta of the Kapatagan District Hospital examined AAA in the morning of
March 26, 2004, and found an old hymenal laceration at 5 o’clock position and
hyperemia or redness at the posterior fornices. The vaginal smear likewise revealed the
presence of sperm.
On the other hand, accused denied that they raped AAA. According to the defense
witnesses, in the evening of March 25, 2004, Oporto, Carampatana, Lim, and AAA had
dinner at Gemeno’s house. Gemeno then invited Oporto to attend the graduation party
hosted by Montesco at Alson’s Palace, owned by the latter’s family. When they reached
the place, Oporto told Montesco that they had to leave for Barangay Tenazas to fetch
one Arcie Ariola. At about 11:30 p.m., Oporto and Carampatana returned to Alson’s
Palace but could not find AAA and Lim. The party subsequently ended, but the group
agreed to celebrate further. AAA, Rudinas, Dela Cruz, Lim, and Oporto contributed for
two (2) bottles of Emperador Brandy and one (1) liter of Pepsi.
Several persons were in the room at that time: AAA, Carampatana, Oporto, Dela Cruz,
Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, Villame, and Lim. Also present but did not join the drinking
were Gemeno, Montesco, Angelo Ugnabia, Al Jalil Diego, Mohamad Janisah Manalao,
one Caga, and a certain Bantulan. Gemeno told AAA not to drink but the latter did not
listen and instead told him not to tell her aunt. During the drinking session, AAA rested
on Oporto’s lap. She even showed her scorpion tattoo on her buttocks. And when her
legs grazed Batoctoy’s crotch, she remarked, “What was that, penis?” Roda then
approached AAA to kiss her, and the latter kissed him back. Oporto did the same and
AAA also kissed him. After Oporto, Roda and AAA kissed each other again.
Meanwhile, earlier that evening, at around 9:00 p.m., Moises Alquizola was at the
Alquizola Lodging House drinking beer with his cousin, Junver, and Fiel. They stopped
drinking at around midnight. Fiel then requested Alquizola to accompany her to Alson’s
Palace to see her friends there. They proceeded to the second floor and there they saw
AAA lying on Oporto’s lap. Fiel told AAA to go home because her mother might get
angry. AAA could not look her in the eye, just shook her head, and said, “I just stay
here.” Alquizola and Fiel then went back to the lodging house. After thirty minutes,
they went to Alson’s Palace again, and saw AAA and Oporto kissing each other. AAA
was lying on his lap while holding his neck. Subsequently, they went back to the lodging
house to resume drinking.
After drinking, Batoctoy offered to bring AAA home. But she refused and instead
instructed them to take her to the Alquizola Lodging House because she has a big
problem. AAA, Lim, and Carampatana rode a motorcycle to the lodging house. When
they arrived, AAA approached Alquizola and told him, “Kuya, I want to sleep here for the
meantime.” Alquizola then opened Room No. 4 where AAA, Oporto, and Carampatana
stayed. There were two beds inside, a single bed and a double-sized bed. AAA lay down
on the single bed and looked at Carampatana. The latter approached her and they
kissed. He then removed her shirt and AAA voluntarily raised her hands to give way.
Carampatana likewise removed her brassiere. All the while, Oporto was at the foot of
the bed. Thereafter, Oporto also removed her pants. AAA even lifted her buttocks to
make it easier for him to pull her underwear down. Oporto then went to AAA and
kissed her on the lips. Carampatana, on the other hand, placed himself in between
AAA’s legs and had intercourse with her. When he finished, he put on his shorts and
went back to Alson’s Palace to get some sleep. When he left, Oporto and AAA were still
kissing. Alquizola then entered the room. When AAA saw him, she said, “Come Kuya,
embrace me because I have a problem.” Alquizola thus started kissing AAA’s breasts.
Oporto stood up and opened his pants. AAA held his penis and performed fellatio on
him. Then Oporto and Alquizola changed positions. Oporto proceeded to have sexual
intercourse with AAA. During that time, AAA was moaning and calling his name.
Afterwards, Oporto went outside and slept with Alquizola on the carpet. Oporto then
had intercourse with AAA two more times. At 3:00 a.m., he went back to Alson’s Palace
to sleep. At around 6:00 a.m., Oporto and Carampatana went back to the lodging
house. They tried to wake AAA up, but she did not move so they just left and went
home. Alquizola had gone outside but he came back before 7:00 a.m. However, AAA
was no longer there when he arrived.
On February 28, 2006, the RTC found private respondents Carampatana, Oporto and
Alquizola guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. It, however, acquitted
Dela Cruz, Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, and Villame for failure of the prosecution to prove
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby

rendered:
a) Finding accused Raymund Carampatana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the

crime charged, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the indivisible prison term
of reclusion perpetua; to pay AAA the amount of P50,000.00 for and by way of civil
indemnity;
b) Finding accused Joefhel Oporto GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged, and the court hereby sentences him to suffer a prison term of six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years also of prision mayor as
maximum; to pay AAA the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages and another amount of
c) Finding accused Moises Alquizola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as ACCOMPLICE in

the commission of the crime charged, and the court hereby sentences him to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum
to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum; to pay AAA the
amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages and another sum of P30,000.00 for and by way
of civil indemnity;
d) Finding accused Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, Jansen Roda, Harold Batoctoy
and Joseph Villame NOT GUILTY of the crime charged for failure of the prosecution to
prove their guilt therefor beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the Court acquits
them of said charge; and
e) Ordering accused Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola to pay, jointly and severally,
the amount of P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees and expenses of litigations; and the costs of
suit.
The full period of the preventive imprisonment of accused Carampatana, Oporto and
Alquizola shall be credited to them and deducted from their prison terms provided they
comply with the requirements of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accused Raymund Carampatana surrendered voluntarily on 26 March 2004 and

detained since then up to the present. Accused Alquizola also surrendered voluntarily
on 26 March 2004 and detained since then up to this time, while accused Joefhel Oporto
who likewise surrendered voluntarily on 26 March 2004 was ordered released to the
custody of the DSWD, Lala, Lanao del Norte on 31 March 2004, and subsequently posted
cash bond for his provisional liberty on 17 September 2004 duly approved by this court,
thus resulted to an order of even date for his release from the custody of the DSWD.
Let the records of this case be sent to the archive files without prejudice on the
prosecution to prosecute the case against accused Christian John Lim as soon as he is
apprehended.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, private respondents brought the case to the CA. On
June 6, 2008, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision reversing the trial
court’s ruling and, consequently, acquitted private respondents. The decretal portion of
said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding reversible errors therefrom, the Decision on appeal is

hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt, accused-
appellants RAYMUND CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL OPORTO and MOISES ALQUIZOLA are
instead ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.[8]
In sum, the CA found that the prosecution failed to prove private respondents’ guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. It gave more credence to the version of the defense and
ruled that AAA consented to the sexual congress. She was wide awake and aware of
what private respondents were doing before the intercourse. She never showed any
physical resistance, never shouted for help, and never fought against her alleged
ravishers. The appellate court further relied on the medical report which showed the
presence of an old hymenal laceration on AAA’s genitalia, giving the impression that she
has had some carnal knowledge with a man before. The CA also stressed that AAA’s
mother’s unusual reaction of hitting her when she discovered what happened to her
daughter was more consistent with that of a parent who found out that her child just
had premarital sex rather than one who was sexually assaulted.
On July 29, 2008, AAA, through her private counsel, filed a Petition for Certiorari[9] under
Rule 65, questioning the CA Decision which reversed private respondents’ conviction
and ardently contending that the same was made with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Thus, AAA raises this lone issue in her petition:
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN ACQUITTING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.[10]
The private respondents present the following arguments in their Comment dated
November 7, 2008 to assail the petition:
I.
A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL IS IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND THE

PROSECUTION CANNOT APPEAL THE ACQUITTAL BECAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROHIBITION AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
II.
THE PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THAT THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION ON THE PART OF PUBLIC
RESPONDENT.
III.
CERTIORARI WILL NOT LIE UNLESS A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS FIRST FILED.
IV.
THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL IS THE APPELLATE COUNSEL OF THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES IN ALL CRIMINAL CASES.[11]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its own Comment on April 1, 2009. It
assigns the following errors:
I.
THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT MAY VALIDLY APPEAL AN ORDER OF ACQUITTAL AS TO THE

CIVIL ASPECT OF THE CRIME.
II.
THE APPELLATE DECISION OF ACQUITTAL IS NULL AND VOID FOR HAVING BEEN
RENDERED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION, AN EXCEPTION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY. [12]
The Court will first resolve the procedural issues.
At the onset, the Court stresses that rules of procedure are meant to be tools to
facilitate a fair and orderly conduct of proceedings. Strict adherence thereto must not
get in the way of achieving substantial justice. As long as their purpose is sufficiently
met and no violation of due process and fair play takes place, the rules should be
liberally construed.[13] Liberal construction of the rules is the controlling principle to
effect substantial justice. The relaxation or suspension of procedural rules, or the
exemption of a case from their operation, is warranted when compelling reasons exist
or when the purpose of justice requires it. Thus, litigations should, as much as possible,
be decided on their merits and not on sheer technicalities. [14]
As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a
judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal case. The reason is that a
judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory, and the prosecution is barred
from appealing lest the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy be violated.
[15]
Section 21, Article III of the Constitution provides:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under
either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Despite acquittal, however, either the offended party or the accused may appeal, but
only with respect to the civil aspect of the decision. Or, said judgment of acquittal may
be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing
that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors
of judgment, but also exercised grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thereby rendering the assailed judgment null and
void.[16] If there is grave abuse of discretion, granting petitioner’s prayer is not
tantamount to putting private respondents in double jeopardy. [17]
As to the party with the proper legal standing to bring the action, the Court said
in People v. Santiago:[18]
wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules
state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the
aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The
complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special
civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional
grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of the
People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in [the] name of said
complainant.[19]
Private respondents argue that the action should have been filed by the State through
the OSG. True, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case
This is because the authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before
the Supreme Court and the CA is solely vested in the OSG. [20]
Here, AAA filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, albeit at the instance of her
private counsel, primarily imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA when
it acquitted private respondents. As the aggrieved party, AAA clearly has the right to
bring the action in her name and maintain the criminal prosecution. She has an
immense interest in obtaining justice in the case precisely because she is the subject of
the violation. Further, as held in Dela Rosa v. CA,[21] where the Court sustained the
private offended party’s right in a criminal case to file a special civil action
for certiorari to question the validity of the judgment of dismissal and ruled that the
Solicitor General’s intervention was not necessary, the recourse of the complainant to
the Court is proper since it was brought in her own name and not in that of the People
of the Philippines. In any event, the OSG joins petitioner’s cause in its Comment,
[22]
thereby fulfilling the requirement that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under
the direction and control of the public prosecutor. [23]
Private respondents further claim that even assuming, merely for the sake of argument,
that AAA can file the special civil action for certiorari without violating their right
against double jeopardy, still, it must be dismissed for petitioner’s failure to previously
file a motion for reconsideration.
True, a motion for reconsideration is a condicio sine qua non for the filing of a petition
for certiorari. Its purpose is for the court to have an opportunity to correct any actual or
perceived error attributed to it by re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances
of the case. This rule, however, is not absolute and admits well-defined exceptions,
such as: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly
raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed
upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the
question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of
the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the
circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was
deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal
case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial
court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of
due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public
interest is involved.[24]
Here, petitioner’s case amply falls within the exception. AAA raises the same questions
as those raised and passed upon in the lower court, essentially revolving on the guilt of
the private respondents. There is also an urgent necessity to resolve the issues, for any
further delay would prejudice the interests, not only of the petitioner, but likewise that
of the Government. And, as will soon be discussed, the CA decision is a patent nullity
for lack of due process and for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
For the writ of certiorari to issue, the respondent court must be shown to have acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An acquittal is
considered tainted with grave abuse of discretion when it is shown that the
prosecution’s right to due process was violated or that the trial conducted was a sham.
The burden is on the petitioner to clearly demonstrate and establish that the
respondent court blatantly abused its authority such as to deprive itself of its very
power to dispense justice.[25]
AAA claims in her petition that the CA, in evident display of grave abuse of judicial
discretion, totally disregarded her testimony as well as the trial court’s findings of fact,
thereby adopting hook, line, and sinker, the private respondents’ narration of facts.
The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or
tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done
in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law,
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility.[26] There is grave abuse of discretion when the disputed act of the
lower court goes beyond the limits of discretion thus effecting an injustice. [27]
The Court finds that the petitioner has sufficiently discharged the burden of proving that
the respondent appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in acquitting
private respondents.
It appears that in reaching its judgment, the CA merely relied on the evidence presented
by the defense and utterly disregarded that of the prosecution. At first, it may seem
that its narration of the facts [28] of the case was meticulously culled from the evidence of
both parties. But a more careful perusal will reveal that it was simply lifted, if not
altogether parroted, from the testimonies of the accused, especially that of Oporto,
[29]
Carampatana,[30] and Alquizola,[31] the accused-appellants in the case before it. The
appellate court merely echoed the private respondents’ testimonies, particularly those
as to the specific events that transpired during the crucial period - from the dinner at
Gemeno’s house to the following morning at the Alquizola Lodging House. As a result, it
presented the private respondents’ account and allegations as though these were the
established facts of the case, which it later conveniently utilized to support its ruling of
acquittal.
Due process requires that, in reaching a decision, a tribunal must consider the entire
evidence presented, regardless of the party who offered the same. [32] It simply cannot
acknowledge that of one party and turn a blind eye to that of the other. It cannot
appreciate one party’s cause and brush the other aside. This rule becomes particularly
significant in this case because the parties tendered contradicting versions of the
incident. The victim is crying rape but the accused are saying it was a consensual sexual
rendezvous. Thus, the CA’s blatant disregard of material prosecution evidence and
outward bias in favor of that of the defense constitutes grave abuse of discretion
resulting in violation of petitioner’s right to due process. [33]
Moreover, the CA likewise easily swept under the rug the observations of the RTC and
made its own flimsy findings to justify its decision of acquittal.
First, the appellate court held that AAA was, in fact, conscious during the whole ordeal.
The fact that she never showed any physical resistance, never cried out for help, and
never fought against the private respondents, bolsters the claim of the latter that the
sexual acts were indeed consensual.
But the CA seemed to forget that AAA was heavily intoxicated at the time of the assault.
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides:
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed–
circumstances:
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present;
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1
hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s
mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of
another person.
Under the aforecited provision, the elements of rape are: (1) the offender had carnal
knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force or
intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
when the victim is under twelve years of age. [34] Here, the accused intentionally made
AAA consume hard liquor more than she could handle. They still forced her to drink
even when she was already obviously inebriated. They never denied having sexual
intercourse with AAA, but the latter was clearly deprived of reason or unconscious at
the time the private respondents ravished her. The CA, however, readily concluded that
she agreed to the sexual act simply because she did not shout or offer any physical
resistance, disregarding her testimony that she was rendered weak and dizzy by
intoxication, thereby facilitating the commission of the crime. [35] The appellate court
never provided any reason why AAA’s testimony should deserve scant or no weight at
all, or why it cannot be accorded any credence. In reviewing rape cases, the lone
testimony of the victim is and should be, by itself, sufficient to warrant a judgment of
conviction if found to be credible. Also, it has been established that when a woman
declares that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to mean that
she has been raped, and where her testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused
can be convicted on that basis alone. This is because from the nature of the offense, the
sole evidence that can usually be offered to establish the guilt of the accused is the
complainant’s testimony itself.[36] The trial court correctly ruled that if AAA was not
truthful to her accusation, she would not have opened herself to the rough and tumble
of a public trial. AAA was certainly not enjoying the prying eyes of those who were
listening as she narrated her harrowing experience. [37]
AAA positively identified the private respondents as the ones who violated her. She
tried to resist, but because of the presence of alcohol, her assaulters still prevailed. The
RTC found AAA’s testimony simple and candid, indicating that she was telling the truth.
The trial court likewise observed that her answers to the lengthy and humiliating
questions were simple and straightforward, negating the possibility of a rehearsed
testimony.[38] Thus:
Atty. Jesus M. Generalao (on direct):
x x x x
Q: Now, you said also when the Court asked you that you went asleep, when did you
regain your consciousness?
A: They woke me up and wanted me to drink the remaining wine inside the bottle of
Emperador Brandy.
x x x x
Q: What do you mean that they hide you (sic) to drink the remaining contained (sic) of
the bottle of Emperador Brandy?
A: They gave me the bottle, sir, and I was trying to refuse but they insisted.
Q: Who handed over to you that bottle, if you can remember?

A: It was Christian John Lim, sir.
Q: Did you drink that Emperador directly from the bottle?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened after that?

Q: When did you regain your consciousness?

A: When somebody was carrying me down to the spiral stairs.
Q: Can you remember the person or persons who was or who were carrying you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who?
A: They were Jansen Roda and Harold Batoctoy.
Q: If you can still remember, how did Jansen Roda and Harold Batoctoy carry you?
A: I placed my hands to their shoulder (sic), sir:
x x x x
Q: After that, what happened, if any?

A: I was already asleep, sir, when we went downstairs.
Q: You mean to say that you cannot remember anymore?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, when again did you regain your consciousness?

A: When we entered the room and the light was switch (sic) on, I was awakened by the
flash of light.
Q: Do you have any idea, where were you when you were awakened that (sic) flash of
light.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where?
A: Alquizola Lodging House, sir.
x x x x
Q: When you regained your consciousness from the flash of light, what happened?
A: I loss (sic) my consciousness again, sir.
Q: So, you fell asleep again?

A: Yes, sir.
x x x x
Q: When did you wake-up (sic) again?

A: When I feel (sic) heavy on top of me, sir.
Q: So you wake-up (sic) again, whom did you see?

A: It was Joefhel Oporto, sir.
Q: He was on top of you?

A: Yes, sir. (Witness is crying while answering)
Q: What was you (sic) reaction when you found that Joefhel Oporto was on top of you?
A: I was starting to cry, sir.
Q: Aside from starting to cry, what else is (sic) your reaction?

A: I was saying don’t because I feel pain my private organ (sic).
Q: What did Joefhel Oporto do, when you (sic) those words?
A: He was kissing on the different part (sic) of my body then he sexually abused me.
ATTY. GENERALAO: We want to make it on record, Your Honor, that the witness is
crying.
x x x x
ATTY. GENERALAO: May I continue, Your Honor.
COURT: Continue.
ATTY. GENERALAO: Aside from Joefhel Oporto was found (sic) on top of you, who else
was there inside that room?
A: Moises Alquizola and Raymund Carampatana, sir.
Q: With respect to Raymund Carampatana, what was he doing?

A: He was at my feet while looking at us.
Q: Was it dress (sic) up or undressed?

A: Dressed up, sir.
Q: What about Moises Alquizola, what was he doing?

A: He was beside us standing and looking at me, sir.
Q: Was he dressed up or undressed?

A: I could not remember, sir.
x x x x
Q: After that, what happened?

A: I went asleep again, sir.
Q: Then, when again did you or when again did you wake up?
A: When I feel (sic) pain something inside my private part (sic), I saw Raymund
Carampatana, sir.
Q: On top of you?
A: No, sir, because he was in between my legs, sir.
Q: What was your reaction?

A: I was starting to cry again, sir, and told him don’t.
Q: At that point, who else was inside that room when you found Raymund
Carampatana?
A: Only the three of them, sir.
Q: Including Moises Alquizola?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was he doing?

A: He was started (sic) to kiss me.
Q: Where in particular?
A: In my face, sir.
Q: Then after that, what happened?

Q: Now, before you went asleep again (sic), what did you feel when you said that you
feel (sic) something in your private part when you saw Raymund Carampatana?
A: He inserted his penis in my private organ, sir.
Q: Then after that you fell asleep again?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: When did you wake-up (sic)?

A: I woke up at about 7:00 o’clock a.m in the next (sic) day, sir.[39]
On the other hand, the RTC was not convinced with the explanation of the defense. It
noted that their account of the events was seemingly unusual and incredible. [40]
Besides, the defense of consensual copulation was belatedly invoked and seemed to
have been a last ditch effort to avoid culpability. The accused never mentioned about
the same at the pre-trial stage. The trial court only came to know about it when it was
their turn to take the witness stand, catching the court by surprise. [41] More
importantly, it must be emphasized that when the accused in a rape case claims that the
sexual intercourse between him and the complainant was consensual, as in this case,
the burden of evidence shifts to him, such that he is now enjoined to adduce sufficient
evidence to prove the relationship. Being an affirmative defense that needs convincing
proof, it must be established with sufficient evidence that the intercourse was indeed
consensual.[42] Generally, the burden of proof is upon the prosecution to establish each
and every element of the crime and that it is the accused who is responsible for its
commission. This is because in criminal cases, conviction must rest on a moral certainty
of guilt.[43] Burden of evidence is that logical necessity which rests on a party at any
particular time during the trial to create a prima facie case in his favor or to overthrow
one when created against him. A prima facie case arises when the party having the
burden of proof has produced evidence sufficient to support a finding and adjudication
for him of the issue in litigation. [44] However, when the accused alleges consensual
sexual congress, he needs convincing proof such as love notes, mementos, and credible
witnesses attesting to the romantic or sexual relationship between the offender and his
supposed victim. Having admitted to carnal knowledge of the complainant, the burden
now shifts to the accused to prove his defense by substantial evidence. [45]
Here, the accused themselves admitted to having carnal knowledge of AAA but
unfortunately failed to discharge the burden required of them. Carampatana narrated
that upon reaching the room at the lodging house, AAA lay down on the bed and looked
at him. He then approached her and they kissed. He removed her shirt and brassiere.
Thereafter, Oporto also removed AAA’s lower garments and then went to kiss AAA.
Carampatana then placed himself in between AAA’s legs and had intercourse with her.
[46]
On the other hand, Oporto himself testified that he had sexual intercourse with AAA
three times. While Carampatana was removing AAA’s shirt and brassiere, Oporto was
watching at the foot of the bed. Then he removed her pants and underwear, and AAA
even lifted her buttocks to make it easier for him to pull the clothes down. When
Carampatana left after having sexual intercourse with AAA, according to Oporto, he
then stood up, opened his pants, and took out his penis so that AAA could
perform fellatio on him. Then he proceeded to have sexual intercourse with AAA.
Afterwards, Oporto went outside and slept with Alquizola on the carpet. After a few
minutes, he woke up and went back to the room and again had intercourse with AAA.
He went back to sleep and after some time, he woke up to the sound of AAA vomitting.
Shortly thereafter, he made love with AAA for the third and last time. [47] Despite said
shameless admission, however, the accused failed to sufficiently prove that the lack of
any physical resistance on AAA’s part amounts to approval or permission. They failed to
show that AAA had sexual intercourse with them out of her own volition, and not simply
because she was seriously intoxicated at that time, and therefore could not have given a
valid and intelligent consent to the sexual act.
The RTC also noticed that Fiel, one of the defense witnesses, was showy and
exaggerated when testifying, even flashing a thumbs-up to some of the accused after
her testimony, an indication of a rehearsed witness. [48] To be believed, the testimony
must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness; it must be credible in itself
such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable
under the attending circumstances.[49]
When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great weight, and is
even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact
or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full
opportunity to observe directly the witnesses’ deportment and manner of testifying, the
trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to properly evaluate
testimonial evidence.[50] Matters of credibility are addressed basically to the trial judge
who is in a better position than the appellate court to appreciate the weight and
evidentiary value of the testimonies of witnesses who have personally appeared before
him.[51] The appellate courts are far detached from the details and drama during trial
and have to rely solely on the records of the case in its review. On the matter of
credence and credibility of witnesses, therefore, the Court acknowledges said
limitations and recognizes the advantage of the trial court whose findings must be given
due deference.[52] Since the CA and the private respondents failed to show any palpable
error, arbitrariness, or capriciousness on the findings of fact of the trial court, these
findings deserve great weight and are deemed conclusive and binding. [53]
The CA continued, belaboring on the fact that the examining physician found old
hymenal laceration on AAA’s private organ. The lack of a fresh hymenal laceration,
which is expected to be present when the alleged sexual encounter is involuntary, could
mean that AAA actually consented to the fornication. According to Dr. Acusta, when sex
is consensual, the vagina becomes lubricated and the insertion of the penis will not
cause any laceration. It presumed that complainant, therefore, was no longer innocent
considering the presence of old hymenal laceration that could have resulted from her
previous sexual encounters. The defense, however, failed to show that AAA was
sexually promiscuous and known for organizing or even joining sex orgies. It must be
noted that AAA was a minor, barely 17 years old at the time of the incident, having just
graduated from high school on that same day. In a similar case,[54] the Court held:
x x x Indeed, no woman would have consented to have sexual intercourse with

two men — or three, according to Antonio Gallardo — in the presence of each other,
unless she were a prostitute or as morally debased as one. Certainly, the record before
Us contains no indication that Farmacita, a 14-year old, first-year high school student,
can be so characterized. On the contrary, her testimony in court evinced the simplicity
and candor peculiar to her youth. In fact, appellants could not even suggest any reason
why Farmacita would falsely impute to them the commission of the crime charged. [55]
No woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts, and be subjected to public trial and humiliation if her
claim were not true.[56] And even if she were indeed highly promiscuous at such a young
age, the same could still not prove that no rape was actually committed. Even a
complainant who was a woman of loose morals could still be the victim of rape. Even a
prostitute may be a victim of rape. The victim’s moral character in rape is immaterial
where, as in this case, it is shown that the victim was deprived of reason or was
rendered unconscious through intoxication to enable the private respondents to have
sex with her. Moreover, the essence of rape is the carnal knowledge of a woman
against her consent.[57] A freshly broken hymen is not one of its essential elements.
Even if the hymen of the victim was still intact, the possibility of rape cannot be ruled
out. Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the vagina, even without rupture
or laceration of the hymen, is enough to justify a conviction for rape. To repeat, rupture
of the hymen or laceration of any part of the woman’s genitalia is not indispensable to a
conviction for rape.[58]
Neither does AAA’s mother’s act of hitting her after learning about the rape prove
anything. It is a truism that “the workings of the human mind when placed under
emotional stress are unpredictable, and the people react differently.” [59] Different
people react differently to a given type of situation, and there is no standard form of
behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful
experience.[60] At most, it merely indicates the frustration and dismay of a mother upon
learning that her daughter had been defiled after partying late the night before. It is a
settled rule that when there is no showing that private complainant was impelled by
improper motive in making the accusation against the accused, her complaint is entitled
to full faith and credence.[61] So if AAA in fact consented to the sexual act, why did she
still need to immediately tell her parents about it when she could have just kept it to
herself? Why did she ever have to shout rape? She was not caught in the act of making
love with any of the private respondents, [62] nor was she shown to have been in a
relationship with any of them of which her family disapproved. [63] She never became
pregnant as a result of the deed. And if AAA cried rape to save her reputation, why
would she have to drag the private respondents into the case and identify them as her
rapists? Absent any circumstance indicating the contrary, she brought the charge
against the private respondents simply because she was, in fact, violated and she wants
to obtain justice. Her zeal in prosecuting the case, even after the CA had already
acquitted the private respondents, evinces the truth that she merely seeks justice for
her honor that has been debased.[64] Unfortunately, the CA chose to ignore these telling
pieces of evidence. Its findings are against the logic and effect of the facts as presented
by AAA in support of her complaint, [65] contrary to common human experience, and in
utter disregard of the relevant laws and jurisprudence on the crime of rape.
Lastly, the trial court pronounced that Alquizola was not part of the conspiracy because
his participation in the crime was uncertain, [66] citing People v. Lobrigo.[67] It found that
his participation was not in furtherance of the plan, if any, to commit the crime of rape.
[68]
The Court, however, finds that the RTC erred in ruling that Alquizola’s liability is not
of a conspirator, but that of a mere accomplice. To establish conspiracy, it is not
essential that there be proof as to previous agreement to commit a crime, it being
sufficient that the malefactors shall have acted in concert pursuant to the same
objective. Conspiracy is proved if there is convincing evidence to sustain a finding that
the malefactors committed an offense in furtherance of a common objective pursued in
concert.[69] Proof of conspiracy need not even rest on direct evidence, as the same may
be inferred from the collective conduct of the parties before, during or after the
commission of the crime indicating a common understanding among them with respect
to the commission of the offense.[70]
In Lobrigo, the Court declared:
We note that the testimonies of witnesses with respect to Gregorio's and

Dominador's participation in the crime conflict on material points.
Doubt exists as to whether Gregorio and Dominador were carrying weapons during
the mauling and whether they participated in the mauling by more than just boxing the
victim. Noel stated that they did not, Domingo stated that they did.
In conspiracy, evidence as to who administered the fatal blow is not necessary. In this
case, the rule is not applicable because conspiracy with respect to Gregorio and
Dominador is not proven. Their exact participation in the crime is uncertain. [71]
(Emphasis Supplied)
In People v. Dela Torre,[72] the Court upheld the findings of the lower courts that there
was conspiracy:
The RTC held that:
While [it] is true that it was only Leo Amoroso who actually ravished the victim based on
the testimony of the private complainant that Amoroso succeeded in inserting his penis
to her private parts and that Reynaldo dela Torre and Ritchie Bisaya merely kissed her
and fondled her private parts, accused [D]ela Torre can likewise be held liable for the
bestial acts of Amoroso as it is quite apparent that the three of them conspired and
mutually helped one another in raping the young victim.
The Court of Appeals held that:
[W]hile [Dela Torre] did not have carnal knowledge with [AAA], his tacit and
spontaneous participation and cooperation of pulling her towards the parked
jeep, molesting her and doing nothing to prevent the commission of the rape, made
him a co-conspirator. As such, he was properly adjudged as a principal in the
commission of the crime.[73]
Here, unlike in the foregoing case of Lobrigo, Alquizola’s participation in the crime is not
at all uncertain. As the caretaker of the Alquizola Lodging House, he provided a room so
the rape could be accomplished with ease and furtiveness. He was likewise inside the
room, intently watching, while Oporto and Carampatana sexually abused AAA. He did
not do anything to stop the bestial acts of his companions. He even admitted to kissing
AAA’s lips, breasts, and other parts of her body. Indubitably, there was conspiracy
among Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola to sexually abuse AAA. Hence, the act of
any one was the act of all, and each of them, Alquizola including, is equally guilty of the
crime of rape. While it is true that the RTC found Alquizola guilty as mere accomplice,
when he appealed from the decision of the trial court, [74] he waived the constitutional
safeguard against double jeopardy and threw the whole case open to the review of the
appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice
dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the accused-appellant. [75]
Finally, the Court notes that although the prosecution filed only a single Information, it,
however, actually charged the accused of several rapes. As a general rule, a complaint
or information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the same is defective.[76] The
rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or informations is to give
the accused the necessary knowledge of the charge against him and enable him to
sufficiently prepare for his defense. The State should not heap upon the accused two or
more charges which might confuse him in his defense. [77] Non-compliance with this rule
is a ground[78] for quashing the duplicitous complaint or information under Rule 117 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the accused may raise the same in a motion to
quash before he enters his plea, [79] otherwise, the defect is deemed waived. [80] The
accused herein, however, cannot avail of this defense simply because they did not file a
motion to quash questioning the validity of the Information during their arraignment.
Thus, they are deemed to have waived their right to question the same. Also, where the
allegations of the acts imputed to the accused are merely different counts specifying the
acts of perpetration of the same crime, as in the instant case, there is no duplicity to
speak of.[81] There is likewise no violation of the right of the accused to be informed of
the charges against them because the Information, in fact, stated that they “took turns
in having carnal knowledge against the will of AAA” on March 25, 2004. [82] Further,
allegations made and the evidence presented to support the same reveal that AAA was
indeed raped and defiled several times. Here, according to the accused themselves,
after undressing AAA, Carampatana positioned himself in between her legs and had
intercourse with her. On the other hand, Oporto admitted that he had sexual
intercourse with AAA three times. When two or more offenses are charged in a single
complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may
convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose upon him the
proper penalty for each offense.[83] Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola can then be
held liable for more than one crime of rape, or a total of four (4) counts in all, with
conspiracy extant among the three of them during the commission of each of the four
violations. Each of the accused shall thus be held liable for every act of rape committed
by the other. But while Oporto himself testified that he inserted his sexual organ into
AAA’s mouth, the Court cannot convict him of rape through sexual assault therefor
because the same was not included in the Information. This is, however, without
prejudice to the filing of a case of rape through sexual assault as long as prescription has
not yet set in.
Anent the appropriate penalty to be imposed, rape committed by two or more persons
is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under Article 266-B of the RPC. But in view
of the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and the absence
of an aggravating circumstance to offset the same, the lighter penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon them,[84] for each count. With regard to Oporto,
appreciating in his favor the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the proper
imposable penalty upon him is reclusion temporal, being the penalty next lower to
reclusion perpetua to death. Being a divisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law
is applicable. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Oporto can be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty the minimum of which shall be within the range of prision mayor
(the penalty next lower in degree to reclusion temporal) and the maximum of which
shall be within the range of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, there being the
ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and there being no aggravating
circumstance.[85] With that, the Court shall impose the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve
(12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, for each count of rape
committed.[86] However, Oporto shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under
Section 51, R.A. No. 9344,[87] which extends even to one who has exceeded the age limit
of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he committed the crime when he was still a child,
[88]
and provides for the confinement of convicted children as follows: [89]
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other

Training Facilities. – A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon
order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a
regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be
established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with
the DSWD.
Hence, in the proper execution of judgment by the lower court, the foregoing provision
should be taken into consideration by the judge in order to accord children in conflict
with the law, who have already gone beyond twenty-one (21) years of age, the proper
treatment envisioned by law.
As to their civil liability, all of them shall pay AAA the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral damages, in each case. Exemplary damages
of P30,000.00 shall likewise be imposed by way of an example and to deter others from
committing the same bestial acts.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision

dated June 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00422-MIN
is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Court hereby renders judgment:
a) Finding accused-respondent Raymund Carampatana GUILTY beyond reasonable

doubt of four (4) counts of rape, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua in each case;
b) Finding accused-respondent Joefhel Oporto GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of four
(4) counts of rape, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12)
years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, in each case; and
c) Finding accused-respondent Moises Alquizola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
four (4) counts of rape, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua in each case.
The Court hereby ORDERS the accused-respondents to pay AAA, jointly and severally,

the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each of the four (4) counts of rape. The case
is REMANDED to the court of origin for its appropriate action in accordance with Section
51 of Republic Act No. 9344.
Let the records of this case be forwarded to the court of origin for the execution of
judgment.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 178323, March 16, 2011 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ARMANDO
CHINGH Y PARCIA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Armando Chingh y Parcia (Armando) seeks the reversal of the Decision [1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01119 convicting him of Statutory Rape and
Rape Through Sexual Assault.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
On March 19, 2005, an Information for Rape was filed against Armando for inserting his
fingers and afterwards his penis into the private part of his minor victim, VVV, [2] the
accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about March 11, 2004 in the City of Manila, Philippines, [Armando],
with lewd design and by means of force, violence and intimidation did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly commit sexual abuse and lascivious conduct upon a
ten (10) year old minor child, [VVV], by then and there pulling her in a dark place then
mashing her breast and inserting his fingers in her vagina and afterwards his penis,
against her will and consent, thereby causing serious danger to the normal growth and
development of the child [VVV], to her damage and prejudice.
Contrary to law.[3]
Upon his arraignment, Armando pleaded not guilty to the charge. Consequently, trial on
the merits ensued.
At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of the victim, VVV; the victim's
father; PO3 Ma. Teresa Solidarios; and Dr. Irene Baluyot. The defense, on the other
hand, presented the lone testimony Armando as evidence.
Evidence for the Prosecution
Born on 16 September 1993, VVV was only 10 years old at the time of the
incident. On 11 March 2004 at around 8:00 p.m., along with five other playmates, VVV
proceeded to a store to buy food. While she was beckoning the storekeeper, who was
not then at her station, Armando approached and pulled her hand and threatened not
to shout for help or talk. Armando brought her to a vacant lot at Tindalo Street, about
400 meters from the store. While in a standing position beside an unoccupied passenger
jeepney, Armando mashed her breast and inserted his right hand index finger into her
private part. Despite VVV's pleas for him to stop, Armando unzipped his pants, lifted
VVV and rammed his phallus inside her vagina, causing her to feel excruciating pain.
Threatened with death if she would tell anyone what had happened, VVV kept mum
about her traumatic experience when she arrived home. Noticing her odd and uneasy
demeanor as well as her blood-stained underwear, however, her father pressed her for
an explanation. VVV confessed to her father about her unfortunate experience.
Immediately, they reported the matter to the police authorities. After his arrest,
Armando was positively identified by VVV in a police line-up.
The genital examination of VVV conducted by Dr. Irene Baluyot (Dr. Baluyot) of the
Philippine General Hospital's Child Protection Unit, in the morning of 12 March 2004,
showed a ''fresh laceration with bleeding at 6 o'clock position" in the child's hymen and
"minimal bleeding from [said] hymen laceration." Her impression was that there was a
"clear evidence"' of "penetrating trauma" which happened within 24 hours prior to the
examination. The photograph of the lacerated genitalia of VVV strongly illustrated and
buttressed Dr. Baluyot's medical report.[4]
Evidence for the Defense
Armando denied that he raped VVV. Under his version, in (sic) the night of 11
March 2004, he and his granddaughter were on their way to his cousin's house at
Payumo St., Tondo, Manila. As it was already late, he told his granddaughter to just go
home ahead of him while he decided to go to Blumentritt market to buy food. While
passing by a small alley on his way thereto, he saw VVV along with some companions,
peeling "dalanghita." VVV approached him and asked if she could go with him to the
market because she will buy "dalanghita" or sunkist. He refused her request and told
VVV instead to go home. He then proceeded towards Blumentritt, but before he could
reach the market, he experienced rheumatic pains that prompted him to return home.
Upon arriving home, at about 8:30 o'clock in the evening, he watched television with his
wife and children. Shortly thereafter, three (3) barangay officials arrived, arrested him,
and brought him to a police precinct where he was informed of VVV's accusation against
him.[5]
On April 29, 2005, the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC), Branch 43, after finding the
evidence of the prosecution overwhelming against the accused's defense of denial and
alibi, rendered a Decision[6] convicting Armando of Statutory Rape. The dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused ARMANDO CHINGH

GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Statutory Rape defined
and penalized under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d) of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by RA 8353 and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua and to indemnify private complainant [VVV] the amount of fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) as compensatory damages, fifty thousand pesos (P50.000.00) as
moral damages and to pay the costs.
It appearing that accused is detained, the period of his detention shall be credited in the
service of his sentence.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, Armando appealed the Decision before the CA, which was docketed as CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01119.
On December 29, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision [7] finding Armando not only guilty of
Statutory Rape, but also of Rape Through Sexual Assault. The decretal portion of said
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED with the

following MODIFICATIONS: accused-appellant is hereby found GUILTY of two counts of
rape and is, accordingly, sentenced to suffer, for the crime of statutory rape, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and, for the offense of rape through sexual assault, the
indeterminate penalty of 3 years, 3 months and 1 day of prision correctional, as
minimum, to 8 years and 11 months and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum. He is
likewise ordered to pay the victim, a total of P80,000.00 as civil indemnity, P80,000.00
as moral damages; and P40,000.00 as exemplary damages, or a grand total of
P200,000.00 for the two counts of rape.
SO ORDERED.[8]
In fine, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, and considering that the appeal opened
the entire case for judicial review, the CA also found Armando guilty of the crime of
Rape Through Sexual Assault. The CA opined that since the Information charged
Armando with two counts of rape: (1) by inserting his finger in the victim's vagina, which
is classified as Rape Through Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended; and (2) for inserting his penis in the private part of his
victim, which is Statutory Rape, and considering that Armando failed to object thereto
through a motion to quash before entering his plea, Armando could be convicted of as
many offenses as are charged and proved.
The CA ratiocinated that coupled with the credible, direct, and candid testimony of the
victim, the elements of Statutory Rape and Rape Through Sexual Assault were
indubitably established by the prosecution.
Armando now comes before this Court for relief.
In a Resolution[9] dated September 26, 2007, the Court required the parties to file their
respective supplemental briefs. In their respective Manifestations, [10] the parties waived
the filing of their supplemental briefs, and instead adopted their respective briefs filed
before the CA.
Hence, Armando raises the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF
RAPE UNDER ARTICLE 266-A, PARAGRAPH 1 (D) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IN SPITE
THE UNNATURAL AND UNREALISTIC TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
Simply stated, Armando is assailing the factual basis of his conviction, which in effect,
mainly questions the credibility of the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution,
particularly his victim, VVV.
Armando maintains that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence that will
overcome the presumption of innocence. Likewise,
Armando insists that the RTC gravely erred in convicting him based on the unrealistic
and unnatural testimony of the victim. Armando claims that VVV's testimony was so
inconsistent with common experience that it deserves careful and critical evaluation.
First, it was so unnatural for VVV to remain quiet and not ask for help when the accused
allegedly pulled her in the presence of several companions and bystanders; second, VVV
did not resist or cry for help while they were on their way to the place where she was
allegedly abused, which was 300 to 400 meters away from where he allegedly pulled
her; third, VVV could have run away while Armando was allegedly molesting her, but
she did not; fourth, Armando could not have inserted his penis in the victim's organ
while both of them were standing, unless the victim did not offer any resistance.
Generally, the Court will not disturb the findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses, as it was in the better position to observe their candor and behavior on the
witness stand. Evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter
best undertaken by the trial court; it had the unique opportunity to observe the
witnesses and their demeanor, conduct, and attitude, especially under cross-
examination. Its assessment is entitled to respect unless certain facts of substance and
value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. [11]
From the testimony of the victim, VVV, she positvely identified Armando as the one who
ravanged her on that fateful night of March 11, 2004. VVV clearly narrated her
harrowing experience in the hands of the accused. Notwithstanding her innocence and
despite the thorough cross-examination by Armando's counsel, VVV never faltered and
gave a very candid and truthful testimony of traumatic events. VVV's testimony was
corroborated and bolstered by the findings of Dr. Irene Baluyot that the victim's genital
area showed a fresh laceration with bleeding at 6 o'clock position in her hymen. [12] Dr.
Baluyot concluded that an acute injury occurred within 24 hours prior to the
examination and that the occurrence of rape within that period was very possible.
[13]
Also, the age of VVV at the time the incident occurred, which was 10 years old, was
duly established by her birth certificate, [14] her testimony,[15] and that of her father's.[16]
Time and again, this Court has held that when the offended parties are young and
immature girls, as in this case, courts are inclined to lend credence to their version of
what transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability, but also the shame and
embarrassment to which they would be exposed if the matter about which they
testified were not true.[17] A young girl would not usually concoct a tale of defloration;
publicly admit having been ravished and her honor tainted; allow the examination of her
private parts; and undergo all the trouble and inconvenience, not to mention the
trauma and scandal of a public trial, had she not in fact been raped and been truly
moved to protect and preserve her honor, and motivated by the desire to obtain justice
for the wicked acts committed against her. [18] Moreover, the Court has repeatedly held
that the lone testimony of the victim in a rape case, if credible, is enough to sustain a
conviction.[19]
On the other hand, Armando admitted that he saw VVV on the date of the incident, but
denied the accusations against him and merely relied on his defense that he was
watching TV with his family when barangay officials arrested him.
Armando's defenses were also unavailing. His contention that it was unnatural and
unrealistic for VVV to remain quiet when he pulled her from her companions and why
she did not cry for help or run away when he was allegedly ravaging her deserves scant
consideration. Clearly, the reason why VVV did not shout for help was because Armando
told her not to shout or talk. [20] Likewise, the reason why VVV did not run when
Armando was molesting her was because his finger was still inside her private part.
[21]
Moreover, Armando's argument that he could not have inserted his penis in the
victim's organ while both of them were standing is preposterous. It is settled that sexual
intercourse in a standing position, while perhaps uncomfortable, is not improbable. [22]
Armando tendered nothing but his bare denial and contention that he was elsewhere
when the crime was committed. Aside from this, he presented no more evidence to
substantiate his claims. Jurisprudence dictates that denial and alibi are the common
defenses in rape cases. Sexual abuse is denied on the allegation that the accused was
somewhere else and could not have physically committed the crime. This Court has
always held that these two defenses are inherently weak and must be supported by
clear and convincing evidence in order to be believed. As negative defenses, they cannot
prevail over the positive testimony of the complainant. [23] Consequently, Armando's bare
denial and alibi must fail against the testimony of VVV and her positive identification
that he was the perpetrator of the horrid deed. Unmistakably, it has been proved
beyond reasonable doubt that Armando had carnal knowledge of VVV.
Anent Armando's conviction for the crime of Rape Through Sexual Assault.
The CA correctly found Armando guilty of the crime of Rape Through Sexual Assault
under paragraph 2, Article 266-A, of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8353, or The Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
[24]
From the Information, it is clear that Armando was being charged with two offenses,
Rape under paragraph 1 (d), Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, and rape as an act
of sexual assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A. Armando was charged with having
carnal knowledge of VVV, who was under twelve years of age at the time, under
paragraph 1 (d) of Article 266-A, and he was also charged with committing an act of
sexual assault by inserting his finger into the genital of VVV under the second paragraph
of Article 266-A. Indeed, two instances of rape were proven at the trial. First, it was
established that Armando inserted his penis into the private part of his victim,
VVV. Second, through the testimony of VVV, it was proven that Armando also inserted
his finger in VVV's private part.
The Information has sufficiently informed accused-appellant that he is being charged

with two counts of rape. Although two offenses were charged, which is a violation of
Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states that "[a]
complaint or information must charge only one offense, except when the law prescribes
a single punishment for various offenses." Nonetheless, Section 3, Rule 120 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure also states that "[w]hen two or more offenses are
charged in a single complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before
trial, the court may convict the appellant of as many as are charged and proved, and
impose on him the penalty for each offense, setting out separately the findings of fact
and law in each offense." Consequently, since Armando failed to file a motion to quash
the Information, he can be convicted with two counts of rape.
As to the proper penalty, We affirm the CA's imposition of Reclusion Perpetua for rape
under paragraph 1 (d), Article 266-A. However, We modify the penalty for Rape Through
Sexual Assault.
It is undisputed that at the time of the commission of the sexual abuse, VVV was ten
(10) years old. This calls for the application of R.A. No. 7610, or "The Special Protection
of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act," which defines
sexual abuse of children and prescribes the penalty therefor in Section 5 (b), Article III,
to wit:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. — Children, whether male or
female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or

xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a
child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That when
the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under
Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That
the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age
shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period.[25]
Paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a child
exploited in prostitution, but also with a child subjected to other sexual abuses. It covers
not only a situation where a child is abused for profit, but also where one — through
coercion, intimidation or influence — engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct with a child.[26]
Corollarilly, Section 2 (h) of the rules and regulations [27] of R.A. No. 7610 defines
"Lascivious conduct" as:
[T]he intentional touching,' either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia,

anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the
genitalia, anus or mouth of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an
intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any
person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a
person.[28]
In this case, the offended party was ten years old at the time of the commission of the
offense. Pursuant to the above-quoted provision of law, Armando was aptly prosecuted
under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No.
8353,[29] for Rape Through Sexual Assault. However, instead of applying the penalty
prescribed therein, which is prision mayor, considering that VVV was below 12 years of
age, and considering further that Armando's act of inserting his finger in VVV's private
part undeniably amounted to lascivious conduct, the appropriate imposable penalty
should be that provided in Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, which is reclusion
temporal in its medium period.
The Court is not unmindful to the fact that the accused who commits acts of
lasciviousness under Article 366, in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610,
suffers the more severe penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period than the one
who commits Rape Through Sexual Assault, which is merely punishable by prision
mayor. This is undeniably unfair to the child victim. To be sure, it was not the intention
of the framers of R.A. No. 8353 to have disallowed the applicability of R.A. No. 7610 to
sexual abuses committed to children. Despite the passage of R.A. No. 8353,
R.A. No. 7610 is still good law, which must be applied when the victims are children or
those "persons below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable to fully
take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation
or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition." [30]
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the indeterminate
penalty shall be that which could be properly imposed under the law, which is fifteen
(15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal. On the other
hand, the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree,
which is reclusion temporal in its minimum period, or twelve (12) years and one (1) day
to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months.
Hence, Armando should be meted the indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years, ten
(10) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15)
years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
As to Armando's civil liabilities, the CA correctly awarded the following damages: civil
indemnity of P50,000.00 and another P50,000.00 as moral damages for Rape under
paragraph l(d), Article 266-A; and civil indemnity of P30,000.00 and moral damages also
of P30,000.00 for Rape under paragraph 2, Article 266-A. In line, however, with
prevailing jurisprudence, we increase the award of exemplary damages from P25,000.00
and PI 5,000.00, for Rape under paragraph 1 (d), Article 266-A and Rape under
paragraph 2, Article 266-A, respectively, to P30,000.00 for each count of rape. [31]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated December 29,
2006 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01119 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. For Rape under
paragraph 1 (d), Article 266-A, Armando Chingh y Parcia is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; and for Rape Through Sexual Assault under paragraph 2,
Article 266-A, he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years,
ten (10) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen
(15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is
likewise ordered to pay VVV the total of P80,000.00 as civil indemnity, P80,000.00 as
moral damages, and P60,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 178205, July 27, 2009 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. LEO
QUEMEGGEN AND JANITO DE LUNA, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
NACHURA, J.:
For review is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated December 28, 2006 in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01498 affirming with modification the Decision[2] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 72, Malabon, Metro Manila, dated August 8, 1997.
As established by the prosecution, the facts are as follows:
On October 31, 1996, at around 11:00 in the evening, Noel Tabernilla (Tabernilla) was
driving his passenger jeep to Navotas, Metro Manila. Along Road 10 in Navotas, four of
the passengers announced a hold-up. One of the robbers poked a balisong on Tabernilla's
nape,[3] while the other three divested the passengers of their valuables. [4] Then, the hold-
uppers alighted from the jeep in a place called "Puting Bato."[5]
From there, Tabernilla and six or seven of his passengers went to the nearest police
detachment to report the incident. Three policemen accompanied them to the scene of the
crime. While there, the policemen chanced upon the robbers riding a pedicab. Socrates
Kagalingan (Kagalingan), one of the passengers-victims, recognized the perpetrators,
since one of them was still wearing the belt bag that was taken from him. [6]
The policemen were able to arrest three suspects, including Janito de Luna (de Luna), but
Leo Quemeggen (Quemeggen) was able to escape. The three suspects were left under the
care of a police officer, Emelito Suing (Suing), while the other police officers pursued
Quemeggen. Taking advantage of the situation, the three suspects ganged up on Suing; de
Luna held his hand, while the other suspect known as "Weng-Weng" shot him on the
head.[7] The suspects thereafter escaped.
Upon the return of the two policemen who unsuccessfully pursued Quemeggen, Suing
was brought to the hospital where he eventually died.[8] Dr. Rosalyn Cosidon (Dr.
Cosidon) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory conducted an
autopsy on the cadaver of Suing.[9] She concluded that the cause of the death of Suing
was hemorrhage as a result of a gunshot wound in the head. The results of her
examination were reflected in Medico-Legal Report No. M-1614-96.[10]
Appellants Quemeggen and de Luna were eventually arrested through follow-up

operations undertaken by the Navotas Police.[11] On November 5, 1996, appellants were
charged in an Information for Robbery with Homicide, the pertinent portion of which
reads:
That on or about the 31st day of October 1996, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and
mutually helping one another, with intent to gain and by means of force, violence and
intimidation employed upon the person of one SOCRATES KAGALINGAN Y ROXAS,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away the
following articles to wit:
One (1) gold necklace worth ----------- P1,800.00

One (1) men's wrist watch ----------- 2,000.00
Cash money amounting to ----------- 500.00_
Total ------------ P4,300.00
belonging to said complainant, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the total
amount of P4,300.00; that on the occasion of the said Robbery one of the arrested
suspect[s] dr[e]w a handgun and shot one PO2 SUING, thereby inflicting upon the said
PO2 Suing, serious physical injuries, which directly caused his death.
Upon arraignment, appellants pleaded "Not Guilty."[13] As the appellants

manifested[14] that they were not availing of the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits
ensued.
During the trial, Tabernilla and Kagalingan testified for the prosecution. Dr. Cosidon's
testimony as an expert witness was dispensed with in view of the appellants' admission of
her qualification and competence; the fact that she conducted the autopsy on the cadaver
of the victim; that she prepared the sketches of a human body; that a slug was recovered
from the head of the victim; and that the body of the victim was identified prior to the
autopsy.[15]
Appellants, on the other hand, interposed the defense of alibi. They maintained that they
were elsewhere when the robbery and shooting incident took place. They claimed that
they were in their respective houses: Quemeggen was helping his grandmother cut pieces
of cloth used in making rugs, while de Luna was sleeping with his wife.[16]
On August 8, 1997, the RTC rendered a Decision[17] convicting the appellants of Robbery
with Homicide, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Leo

Quemeggen y Larawan and Janito de Luna y Rayo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of robbery with homicide defined and penalized under Art. 294, par. 1, of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, for which they are both hereby sentenced
to the prison term of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
Accused Quemeggen and accused de Luna are also ordered to pay (1) the heirs of the
victim the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnification for the loss of the victim's life, and
(2) P4,000.00 to Socrates Kagalingan by way of indemnification of the total value of the
valuables taken from him during the hold-up.
Costs against the two (2) accused.
SO ORDERED.[18]
The case was elevated to this Court for automatic review, but on February 9, 2005,
pursuant to the decision of this Court in People v. Mateo,[19] we transferred the case to the
CA. [20]
On December 28, 2006, the CA modified the RTC Decision by convicting Quemeggen of
Robbery, and de Luna of the separate crimes of Robbery and Homicide. The dispositive
portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 72, in Criminal Case No. 17287-MN dated 8 August
1997 is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1. As to accused-appellant Leo Quemeggen: he is found guilty of the crime of

Robbery and is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment ranging from four (4)
years of prision correc[c]ional as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor as
maximum with the accessories of said penalty; and
2. As to accused-appellant Janito de Luna: he is found guilty of the crime of Robbery

and is sentenced to suffer imprisonment ranging from four (4) years of prision
correc[c]ional as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum with
the accessories of said penalty. He is likewise found guilty of the crime of
Homicide and is sentence[d] to suffer imprisonment of eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal as maximum with the accessories of said penalty.
3. Both accused-appellants area (sic) also ordered to indemnify Socrates Kagalingan
the amount of Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) for the valuables taken from him
during the robbery.
SO ORDERED.[21]
The CA concluded that appellants could not be convicted of the special complex crime of
Robbery with Homicide. It noted that Suing was not killed by reason or on the occasion
of the robbery. Hence, two separate crimes of robbery and homicide were committed. As
the appellants were in conspiracy to commit robbery, both were convicted of such
offense. However, as to the death of Suing, considering that at the time of the killing,
Quemeggen was being chased by the police officers and there was no evidence showing
that there was conspiracy, only de Luna was convicted of homicide.[22]
Hence, this appeal, based on the following arguments:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND

CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES AND IN NOT CONSIDERING THE DEFENSE INTERPOSED BY THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-

APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. [23]
In assailing their conviction, appellants argue that: 1) the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses are incredible, because it was unnatural for the robbers not to leave the crime
scene immediately after the incident; 2) the prosecution failed to present a policeman to
prove that appellants were arrested on board a pedicab, and that the loot from the robbery
was confiscated from them; and 3) no expert testimony was presented to prove the fact of
death of the victim.[24]
We find no merit in the appeal.
Appellants fault the CA for relying on the improbable testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, who testified that they saw the former at the crime scene riding a pedicab.
Appellants add that it was improbable for them not to leave the crime scene immediately
after the robbery. It is well-settled that different people react differently to a given
situation, and there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is
confronted with a strange event.[25] Moreover, when it comes to credibility, the trial
court's assessment deserves great weight and is even conclusive and binding, if not
tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the
witnesses' deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than
the appellate court to evaluate testimonial evidence properly.[26]
Appellants' conviction is not negated by the failure of the prosecution to present any
police officer to testify that appellants were arrested on board a pedicab, and that the loot
from the robbery was confiscated from them; and an expert witness to testify on the cause
of death of the victim. Kagalingan and Tabernilla's testimonies as to the circumstances
surrounding the robbery and the killing were sufficient. It must be recalled that they were
eyewitnesses to the commission of the crimes. These witnesses adequately narrated the
events that transpired from the time the appellants declared a hold-up up to the time they
alighted from the passenger jeep. They also witnessed how de Luna and the other
malefactors strangled and eventually shot Suing.
As to the non-presentation of Dr. Cosidon as an expert witness, records show that

appellants, through their counsel de oficio, admitted in open court her qualifications and
competence, the conduct of autopsy and the results thereof as appearing in Dr. Cosidon's
report, including the cause of death.[27] Hence, the presentation of an expert witness was
no longer necessary.
Now, on the nature of the crime or crimes committed. The Information shows that
appellants were charged with Robbery with Homicide under Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code, which provides in part:
"Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons - Penalties. - Any

person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person
shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on the occasion of the
robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed or when the robbery shall have
been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson."
For the accused to be convicted of the said crime, the prosecution is burdened to prove
the confluence of the following elements:
1. The taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against

persons;
2. The property taken belongs to another;
3. The taking is animo lucrandi; and
4. By reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed.[28]
We reiterate, at this point, the relevant factual circumstances. Appellants, together with
the other suspects, boarded Tabernilla's passenger jeep. Suddenly, they announced a hold-
up. One of them poked a balisong at the neck of Tabernilla, while the others divested the
passengers of their valuables. Obviously, in boarding the passenger jeep, announcing a
hold-up, and eventually taking the personal belongings of the passengers, appellants had
the intent to gain. Thus, the first three elements of the crime were adequately proven.
The only question is whether the fourth element was present, i.e., that by reason or on the
occasion of the robbery, homicide was committed.
Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if it is

committed a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; b) to preserve the
possession by the culprit of the loot; c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the
robbery; or d) to eliminate witnesses to the commission of the crime.[29]
Given the circumstances surrounding the instant case, we agree with the CA that
appellants cannot be convicted of Robbery with Homicide. Indeed, the killing may occur
before, during, or after the robbery. And it is immaterial that death would supervene by
mere accident, or that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that
two or more persons are killed.[30] However, essential for conviction of robbery with
homicide is proof of a direct relation, an intimate connection between the robbery and the
killing, whether the latter be prior or subsequent to the former or whether both crimes are
committed at the same time.[31]
From the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, we cannot see the connection between
the robbery and the homicide. It must be recalled that after taking the passengers'
personal belongings, appellants (and two other suspects) alighted from the jeepney. At
that moment, robbery was consummated. Some of the passengers, however, decided to
report the incident to the proper authorities; hence, they went to the nearest police station.
There, they narrated what happened. The police eventually decided to go back to the
place where the robbery took place. Initially, they saw no one; then finally, Kagalingan
saw the suspects on board a pedicab. De Luna and two other suspects were caught and
left under the care of Suing. It was then that Suing was killed. Clearly, the killing was
distinct from the robbery. There may be a connection between the two crimes, but surely,
there was no "direct connection."
Though appellants were charged with Robbery with Homicide, we find Quemeggen
guilty of robbery, and de Luna of two separate crimes of robbery and homicide. It is
axiomatic that the nature and character of the crime charged are determined not by the
designation of the specific crime, but by the facts alleged in the information.
[32]
Controlling in an information should not be the title of the complaint or the
designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated,
these being, by and large, mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the
description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited.[33] There should
also be no problem in convicting an accused of two or more crimes erroneously charged
in one information or complaint, but later proven to be independent crimes, as if they
were made the subject of separate complaints or informations.[34]
As worded, the Information sufficiently alleged all the elements of both felonies.
Needless to state, appellants failed, before their arraignment, to move for the quashal of
the Information, which appeared to charge more than one offense. They have thereby
waived any objection thereto, and may thus be found guilty of as many offenses as those
charged in the Information and proven during the trial.[35]
As to the proper penalty, we sustain the appellate court. The penalty for simple robbery
is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period,
ranging from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 10 years.[36] Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the maximum term thereof shall be 6 years, 1 month and 11 days to 8
years and 20 days; while the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower in degree or 4 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months. The CA thus correctly
imposed the indeterminate penalty of 4 years of prision correccional as minimum to 8
years of prision mayor as maximum.
On the other hand, the penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal or 12 years and 1 day
to 20 years.[37] The maximum term of the indeterminate penalty shall be 14 years, 8
months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months; while the minimum term shall be within the
range of prision mayor or 6 years and 1 day to 12 years. Therefore, the CA was correct in
imposing the indeterminate penalty of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to
17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal as maximum.
The Court notes that the CA failed to award civil indemnity ex delicto to the heirs of
Suing. Civil indemnity is automatically imposed upon the accused without need of proof
other than the fact of the commission of murder or homicide.[38] Thus, de Luna shall be
liable to pay P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of Suing.
Records show that appellants were committed to prison on November 14, 1996. [39] As to
Quemeggen, considering that he has been incarcerated for more than twelve (12) years
now, which is more than the maximum penalty for the crime of robbery he committed
which is only eight (8) years, he should be released from confinement.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the

Court of Appeals dated December 28, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01498,
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Janito de Luna is further ordered to pay the
heirs of police officer Emelito Suing P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
Considering that Quemeggen has been incarcerated for more than the maximum penalty
for the crime of robbery he committed, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections is
hereby ORDERED to immediately RELEASE LEO QUEMEGGEN from confinement,
unless further detention is justified by some other lawful cause, and inform this Court of
the action taken within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 179477, February 06, 2008 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. JIMMY TABIO,
Appellant.
DECISION
TINGA, J,:
Appellant Jimmy Tabio was charged with three (3) counts of rape in a single
Information,[1] the accusatory portion of which reads as follows:
That between June 13, 2002 and June 28, 2002 in [Aurora [2]] the said accused, did
then and there, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully, have carnal knowledge of mentally
retarded AAA[3] by means of force and intimidation three times all committed while the
victim was alone inside their house and during nighttime which was taken advantage of
to facilitate the commission of the crime.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Baler, Aurora, Branch 96.[4] Trial on the merits ensued. The victim, AAA testified that
one night in June 2002, while she was alone in her home, appellant entered her house.
He pressed a knife on AAA’s breast, removed her clothing, fondled her breast,
undressed himself, and mounted her as she was seated on a bed. He inserted his penis
in her vagina and ejaculated. AAA was able to recognize the appellant as her house was
lighted with a gas lamp. AAA further testified that the appellant on two succeeding
occasions again entered her home and repeated the same acts on her. [5]
Other witnesses for the prosecution presented testimony concerning AAA’s mental
condition. A doctor[6] who had trained with the National Center for Mental Health
testified that he had examined AAA and concluded that while she was 23 years old at
the time of the rape, she nonetheless had the mental age of a six-year old child. [7] AAA’s
mother and grand aunt also testified on her mental retardation and the occurrences
after she had reported the rape to them. [8]
Appellant testified in his own behalf, denying that he had raped AAA and offering as alibi
that he was up in the mountain at the time of the rape. [9] Appellant’s wife[10] and his
brother-in-law, Jaime Bautista,[11] tried to corroborate his alibi through their own
testimony.
On 25 November 2003, the RTC handed down a decision finding appellant guilty and
imposing the penalty of death on three (3) counts of qualified rape, defined in Article
266-A, paragraph 1 (d) and penalized under Article 266-B, paragraph 6 (10) of the
Revised Penal Code. The RTC also ordered appellant to pay P75,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P50,000.00 as moral damages. [12] The records of the case were thereafter
forwarded to this Court on automatic review. On 7 June 2005, the Court issued a
Resolution[13] transferring the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action. [14]
The Court of Appeals[15] affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. The
appellate court found appellant guilty of all three (3) counts for simple rape only and
not qualified rape. It also reduced the civil indemnity to P50,000.00 and added an award
of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. [16]
The case is again before us for our final disposition. Appellant had assigned three (3)
errors in his appeal initially passed upon by the Court of Appeals, to wit: whether the
RTC erred in finding him guilty of qualified rape with the penalty of death in view of the
prosecution’s failure to allege a qualifying circumstance in the information; whether the
RTC erred in finding him guilty of all three (3) counts of rape despite the alleged failure
of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and whether the RTC
erred in awarding P75,000.00 as civil indemnity.
The Court of Appeals properly resolved the first error in appellant’s favor. The
information should have warranted a judgment of guilt only for simple, not qualified
rape. We quote with approval the appellate court when it said:
Under Article 266-B(10)[17] of the Revised Penal Code, knowledge by the offender
of the mental disability, emotional disorder, or physical handicap at the time of the
commission of the rape is the qualifying circumstance that sanctions the imposition of
the death penalty. Rule 110[[18]] of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure requires both
qualifying and aggravating circumstances to be alleged with specificity in the
information.[[19]]
In the case at bench, however, the information merely states that the appellant had
carnal knowledge with a mentally retarded complainant. It does not state that appellant
knew of the mental disability of the complainant at the time of the commission of the
crime. It bears stressing that the rules now require that the qualifying circumstance that
sanctions the imposition of the death penalty should be specifically stated in the
information. Article 266-B (10) of the Revised Penal Code could not, thus, be applied and
the supreme penalty of death could not be validly imposed. [20]
Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure is clear and unequivocal that
both qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be alleged with specificity in the
information.
The Court also observes that there is duplicity [21] of the offenses charged in the
information, which is a ground for a motion to quash. [22] Three (3) separate acts of rape
were charged in one information only. But the failure of appellant to interpose an
objection on this ground constitutes waiver. [23]
We turn to the second issue. While the Court affirms that appellant is guilty of simple
rape, we nonetheless find that only the first rape was conclusively proven. The second
and third rapes of which appellant was charged and found guilty, were not proven
Our courts have been traditionally guided by three settled principles in the prosecution
of the crime of rape: (1) an accusation for rape is easy to make, difficult to prove and
even more difficult to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime, the
testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with utmost caution; and (3) the
evidence of the prosecution must stand on its own merits and cannot draw strength
from the weakness of the evidence of the defense. [24] In a prosecution for rape, the
complainant’s candor is the single most important issue. If a complainant’s testimony
meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the sole basis thereof. [25]
We have thoroughly examined AAA’s testimony and found nothing that would cast
doubt on the credibility of her account of the first rape. We quote the pertinent portion
of her testimony:
PROS. RONQUILLO: to the witness

x x
x
Q Did you have any occasion to see Jimmy inside your house
in June 2002?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What time was that?
A Night time, Sir.
x x
x
Q You said that Jimmy went inside your house. What did he
do there?
A He fondled my breast, Sir.
Q Did you have your clothes on when Jimmy Tabio went to
your house?
A Yes, sir.
x x
x
Q Don't be ashamed. You said that you have your clothes on.
When Jimmy saw you what did he do with your clothes, if any?
A He removed my dress, Sir.
x x
x
Q So you are now without clothes because you said Jimmy
removed your clothes. What did he do after removing your
clothes?
A He placed himself on top of me.
CO to the witness
URT:
Q Was he standing when Jimmy mounted on you?
A I was sitting, Sir.
Q When Jimmy placed himself on top of you was he dressed
or nude?
A He was naked, Sir.
Q You said that he placed himself on top of you. What did
Jimmy do while he was on top of you?
A He pressed a knife on me.
Q On what part of your body did he press the knife?
A Here, Sir. (Witness indicated the upper part of her left
breast)
Q What else did Jimmy do aside from pressing the knife near
your breast?
A Jimmy was in our house, Sir.
Q Do you know what penis is?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Do you know what Jimmy did with hs penis?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What did he do with his penis?
A He placed his penis to my vagina.
Q What did you feel when Jimmy did that?
A I felt pain, Sir.
Q After Jimmy inserted his penis in your vagina, what else
did he do?
A Nothing more, Sir.
Q Did he move while he was on top of you?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Can you demonstrate his movement while he was on top
of you?
A (Witness indicated the movement by moving her body.)
x x
x
Q What else did you notice while the penis of Jimmy was in
your vagina?
A There was some kind of milk, Sir.
COURT: to the witness
Q Where?
A In my vagina, Sir.
Q Why did you notice that? What did you do?
A I watched my vagina, Sir.
Q That is why you saw that thing which looks like milk?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Now, it was night time when Jimmy went into your house,
is it not?
A Yes, Sir.
Q How were you able to see Jimmy while it was night time?
A I have a light, Sir.
Q What kind of light was that?
A Gas l[a]mp, Sir. [26] (Emphasis supplied.)
AAA never wavered in her assertion that appellant raped her. AAA’s testimony is
distinctively clear, frank and definite without any pretension or hint of a concocted story
despite her low intelligence as can be gleaned from her answers in the direct
examination. The fact of her mental retardation does not impair the credibility of her
unequivocal testimony. AAA’s mental deficiency lends greater credence to her
testimony for someone as feeble-minded and guileless as her could not speak so
tenaciously and explicitly on the details of the rape if she has not in fact suffered such
crime at the hands of the appellant.[27]
Appellant’s denials and alibi, which are merely self-serving evidence, cannot prevail over
the positive, consistent and straightforward testimony of AAA. Alibi is an inherently
weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly unreliable. To merit approbation,
the accused must adduce clear and convincing evidence that he was in a place other
than the situs criminis at the time the crime was committed, such that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime when it was committed. [28] We
have meticulously reviewed the records and found no justification to deviate from the
findings of fact of the trial court that—
Accused’s alibi that he was in the mountain gathering woods during the period
when [AAA] was raped deserves no consideration. When the accused took the witness
stand, he gave an evasive, confused and vague account of his whereabouts at the time
the crime was committed as well as with respect to the distance of his whereabouts
from the locus criminis. Accused’s wife and his brother-in-law tried to corroborate his
(accused’s) testimony that he was in the mountain during the commission of rape but to
no avail.
x x x
In the instant case, the distance of the place where the accused allegedly was is less
than half a kilometer (200 meters) which could be negotiated in less than an hour. x x
x[29]
However, as to the alleged second and third rape, we find that the prosecution
failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the elements of the offense e.g., carnal
knowledge and force or intimidation. The only evidence presented to prove the two
other charges were AAA’s monosyllabic affirmative answers to two leading questions if
appellant repeated during the second and third times he was in her house what he had
done during the first time. We quote that only portion of AAA’s testimony relating to
the second and third alleged rapes, to wit:

Q You said that Jimmy went to your house three times.
What did he do during the second time?
A He entered our house, Sir.
Q Yes, he entered your house. Did he repeat what he did
during the first time.
A Yes, Sir.
Q How about the third time? What did he do?
A He has a knife, Sir.
Q Yes. Did he repeat what he did during the first time?
A Yes, Sir.[30] (Emphasis supplied)
AAA’s testimony on these two later rapes was overly generalized and lacked many
specific details on how they were committed. Her bare statement that appellant
repeated what he had done to her the first time is inadequate to establish beyond
reasonable doubt the alleged second and third rapes. Whether or not he raped her is
the fact in issue which the court must determine [31] based on the evidence offered. The
prosecution must demonstrate in sufficient detail the manner by which the crime was
perpetrated. Certainly, the testimony of AAA to the effect that the appellant repeated
what he did in the first rape would not be enough to warrant the conclusion that the
second and third rape had indeed been committed. Each and every charge of rape is a
separate and distinct crime so that each of them should be proven beyond reasonable
doubt. The quantum of evidence in criminal cases requires more than that.
In the case of People v. Garcia,[32] wherein the appellant was charged with 183 counts of
rape, we held that:
x x x Be that as it may, however, on the bases of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution, appellant can be convicted only of the two rapes committed in November,
[sic] 1990 and on July 21, 1994 as testified to by complainant, and for the eight counts of
rape committed in May and June and on July 16, 1994 as admitted in appellants
aforementioned letter of August 24, 1994. We cannot agree with the trial court that
appellant is guilty of 183 counts of rape because, as correctly asserted by the defense,
each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime so that each of them
should be proven beyond reasonable doubt. On that score alone, the indefinite
testimonial evidence that complainant was raped every week is decidedly inadequate
and grossly insufficient to establish the guilt of appellant therefor with the required
quantum of evidence. So much of such indefinite imputations of rape, which are
uncorroborated by any other evidence, fall within this category. [33] (Emphasis supplied)
We must uphold the primacy of the presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused when the evidence at hand falls short of the quantum required to support
conviction.
As to the civil liability of appellant, we affirm the reduction by the appellate court of the
civil indemnity to P50,000.00 only, as well as the additional award of P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages, but on rather different premises, considering our conclusion that
he is only guilty of one, not three counts of rape.
The civil indemnity awarded to the victims of qualified rape shall not be less than
seventy-five thousand pesos (P75,000.00), [34] and P50,000.00 for simple rape.[35] This civil
indemnity is awarded for each and every count of rape, such that one found guilty of
two counts of simple rape would be liable to pay P50,000.00 for each count, or
P100,000.00 in all.
We note that the appellate court implicitly awarded P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for all
three counts of simple rape. Such award would have been improper for a conviction for
three counts of simple rape.[36] Still, because appellant is guilty of one count of simple
rape, P50,000.00 still emerges as the appropriate amount of civil indemnity.
In addition, the victim or heirs, as the case may be, can also recover moral damages
pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code. In rape cases, moral damages are awarded
without need of proof other than the fact of rape because it is assumed that the victim
has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award. [37] In this respect, we agree
with the appellate court in the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages. The appellate
court’s award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages by way of public example is also
proper.[38]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01301 is
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Appellant is found GUILTY of only ONE count of simple
rape and ACQUITTED of the TWO other counts of qualified rape. Appellant is sentenced
to suffer the penalty reclusion perpetua, and ordered to pay to the victim P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 192565, February 28, 2012 ]
UNION BANK OF THE, PHILIPPINES AND DESI TOMAS, PETITIONERS,
VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review in this Rule 45 petition, the decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 65, Makati City (RTC-Makati City) in Civil Case No. 09-1038. The petition seeks to
reverse and set aside the RTC-Makati City decision dismissing the petition
for certiorari of petitioners Union Bank of the Philippines (Union Bank) and Desi Tomas
(collectively, the petitioners). The RTC found that the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
63, Makati City (MeTC-Makati City) did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in
denying the motion to quash the information for perjury filed by Tomas.
The Antecedents
Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) for making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The
Information against her reads:
That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make untruthful
statements under oath upon a material matter before a competent person authorized
to administer oath which the law requires to wit: said accused stated in the
Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a complaint for sum of money with prayer
for a writ of replevin docketed as [Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the Metropolitan Trial
Court[,] Pasay City, that the Union Bank of the Philippines has not commenced any
other action or proceeding involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency,
accused knowing well that said material statement was false thereby making a willful
and deliberate assertion of falsehood.[2]
The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Bank’s two (2) complaints for sum of
money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong
and a John Doe. The first complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0717, was filed
before the RTC, Branch 109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The second complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. 342-000, was filed on March 15, 2000 and raffled to the
MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City. Both complaints showed that Tomas executed and signed
the Certification against Forum Shopping. Accordingly, she was charged of deliberately
violating Article 183 of the RPC by falsely declaring under oath in the Certificate against
Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did not commence any other action
or proceeding involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency.
Tomas filed a Motion to Quash,[3] citing two grounds. First, she argued that the venue
was improperly laid since it is the Pasay City court (where the Certificate against Forum
Shopping was submitted and used) and not the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate
against Forum Shopping was subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjury case.
Second, she argued that the facts charged do not constitute an offense because: (a) the
third element of perjury – the willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood – was not
alleged with particularity without specifying what the other action or proceeding
commenced involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency; (b) there was no
other action or proceeding pending in another court when the second complaint was
filed; and (c) she was charged with perjury by giving false testimony while the
allegations in the Information make out perjury by making a false affidavit.
The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction over
the case since the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized in Makati City.
[4]
The MeTC-Makati City also ruled that the allegations in the Information sufficiently
charged Tomas with perjury.[5] The MeTC-Makati City subsequently denied Tomas’
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC-Makati City to annul and set
aside the MeTC-Makati City orders on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. The
petitioners anchored their petition on the rulings in United States v. Canet[7] and Ilusorio
v. Bildner[8] which ruled that venue and jurisdiction should be in the place where the
false document was presented.
The Assailed RTC Decision
In dismissing the petition for certiorari, the RTC-Makati City held:
[I]nsofar as the petitioner’s stance is concerned[,] the more recent case of [Sy
Tiong Shiou v. Sy] (GR Nos. 174168 & 179438, March 30, 2009) however, reaffirms what
has been the long standing view on the venue with respect to perjury cases. In this
particular case[,] the high court reiterated the rule that the criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was
committed, or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. It went on to declare that
since the subject document[,] the execution of which was the subject of the charge[,]
was subscribed and sworn to in Manila[,] then the court of the said territorial
jurisdiction was the proper venue of the criminal action[.]
xxxx
x x x Given the present state of jurisprudence on the matter, it is not amiss to state that
the city court of Makati City has jurisdiction to try and decide the case for perjury
inasmuch as the gist of the complaint itself which constitute[s] the charge against the
petitioner dwells solely on the act of subscribing to a false certification. On the other
hand, the charge against the accused in the case of Ilusorio v. Bildner, et al., based on
the complaint-affidavits therein[,] was not simply the execution of the questioned
documents but rather the introduction of the false evidence through the subject
documents before the court of Makati City.[9] (emphasis ours)
The RTC-Makati City ruled that the MeTC-Makati City did not commit grave abuse of
discretion since the order denying the Motion to Quash was based on jurisprudence
later than Ilusorio. The RTC-Makati City also observed that the facts in Ilusorio are
different from the facts of the present case. Lastly, the RTC-Makati City ruled that the
Rule 65 petition was improper since the petitioners can later appeal the decision in the
principal case. The RTC-Makati City subsequently denied the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.[10]
The Petition
The petitioners pray that we reverse the RTC-Makati City decision and quash the
Information for perjury against Tomas. The petitioners contend that the Ilusorio ruling is
more applicable to the present facts than our ruling in Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy Chim.[11] They
argued that the facts in Ilusorio showed that the filing of the petitions in court
containing the false statements was the essential ingredient that consummated the
perjury. In Sy Tiong, the perjurious statements were made in a General Information
Sheet (GIS) that was submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Interestingly, Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz shared the petitioners’ view. In
his Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Comment (which we hereby treat as the
Comment to the petition), the Solicitor General also relied on Ilusorio and opined that
the lis mota in the crime of perjury is the deliberate or intentional giving of false
evidence in the court where the evidence is material. The Solicitor General observed
that the criminal intent to assert a falsehood under oath only became manifest before
the MeTC-Pasay City.
The Issue
The case presents to us the issue of what the proper venue of perjury under Article 183
of the RPC should be – Makati City, where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was
notarized, or Pasay City, where the Certification was presented to the trial court.
We deny the petition and hold that the MeTC-Makati City is the proper venue and the
proper court to take cognizance of the perjury case against the petitioners.
Venue of Action and Criminal Jurisdiction

Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines not only the
place where the criminal action is to be instituted, but also the court that has the
jurisdiction to try and hear the case. The reason for this rule is two-fold. First, the
jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-defined territories such that a trial court can
only hear and try cases involving crimes committed within its territorial jurisdiction.
[12]
Second, laying the venue in the locus criminis is grounded on the necessity and justice
of having an accused on trial in the municipality of province where witnesses and other
facilities for his defense are available.[13]
Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal cases carries jurisdictional
consequences. In determining the venue where the criminal action is to be instituted
and the court which has jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in
the court or municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any
of its essential ingredients occurred. [emphasis ours]
The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure which states:
Place of commission of the offense. – The complaint or information is sufficient if

it can be understood from its allegations that the offense was committed or some of its
essential ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless
the particular place where it was committed constitutes an essential element of the
offense charged or is necessary for its identification.
Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not
only in the court where the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential
ingredients took place. In other words, the venue of action and of jurisdiction are
deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information states that the offense was
committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial
Information Charging Perjury

Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, contains the
requirement for a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The Certificate against Forum
Shopping can be made either by a statement under oath in the complaint or initiatory
pleading asserting a claim or relief; it may also be in a sworn certification annexed to the
complaint or initiatory pleading. In both instances, the affiant is required to execute a
statement under oath before a duly commissioned notary public or any competent
person authorized to administer oath that: (a) he or she has not theretofore
commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal
or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his or her knowledge, no such other action or
claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete
statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he or she should thereafter learn that
the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he or she shall report
that fact within five days therefrom to the court wherein his or her aforesaid complaint
or initiatory pleading has been filed. In relation to the crime of perjury, the material
matter in a Certificate against Forum Shopping is the truth of the required declarations
which is designed to guard against litigants pursuing simultaneous remedies in different
fora.[14]
In this case, Tomas is charged with the crime of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC for
making a false Certificate against Forum Shopping. The elements of perjury under Article
183 are:
(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon
a material matter.
(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to

receive and administer oath.
(c) That in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate
assertion of a falsehood.
(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or
made for a legal purpose.[15] (emphasis ours)
Where the jurisdiction of the court is being assailed in a criminal case on the ground of
improper venue, the allegations in the complaint and information must be examined
together with Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
On this basis, we find that the allegations in the Information sufficiently support a
finding that the crime of perjury was committed by Tomas within the territorial
jurisdiction of the MeTC-Makati City.
The first element of the crime of perjury, the execution of the subject Certificate against
Forum Shopping was alleged in the Information to have been committed in Makati City.
Likewise, the second and fourth elements, requiring the Certificate against Forum
Shopping to be under oath before a notary public, were also sufficiently alleged in the
Information to have been made in Makati City:
Verification/Certification/Affidavit x x x.[16]
We also find that the third element of willful and deliberate falsehood was also
sufficiently alleged to have been committed in Makati City, not Pasay City, as indicated
in the last portion of the Information:
[S]aid accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a

complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin docketed as [Civil] Case
No. 342-00 of the Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay City, that the Union Bank of the
Philippines has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same
issues in another tribunal or agency, accused knowing well that said material statement
was false thereby making a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood.
[17]
(underscoring ours)
Tomas’ deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown when she
made the false declarations in the Certificate against Forum Shopping before a notary
public in Makati City, despite her knowledge that the material statements she
subscribed and swore to were not true. Thus, Makati City is the proper venue and
MeTC-Makati City is the proper court to try the perjury case against Tomas, pursuant to
Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as all the
essential elements constituting the crime of perjury were committed within the
territorial jurisdiction of Makati City, not Pasay City.
Referral to the En Banc
The present case was referred to the En Banc primarily to address the seeming conflict
between the division rulings of the Court in the Ilusorio case that is cited as basis of this
petition, and the Sy Tiong case that was the basis of the assailed RTC-Makati City ruling.
The Cited Ilusorio and Sy Tiong Cases
The subject matter of the perjury charge in Ilusorio involved false statements contained
in verified petitions filed with the court for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate
copies of certificates of title. The verified petitions containing the false statements were
subscribed and sworn to in Pasig City, but were filed in Makati City and Tagaytay City.
The question posed was: which court (Pasig City, Makati City and/or Tagaytay City) had
jurisdiction to try and hear the perjury cases?
We ruled that the venues of the action were in Makati City and Tagaytay City, the places
where the verified petitions were filed. The Court reasoned out that it was only upon
filing that the intent to assert an alleged falsehood became manifest and where the
alleged untruthful statement found relevance or materiality. We cited as jurisprudential
authority the case of United States. v. Cañet[18] which ruled:
It is immaterial where the affidavit was subscribed and sworn, so long as it

appears from the information that the defendant, by means of such affidavit, "swore to"
and knowingly submitted false evidence, material to a point at issue in a judicial
proceeding pending in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province. The gist of the
offense charged is not the making of the affidavit in Manila, but the intentional giving of
false evidence in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province by means of such affidavit.
[emphasis and underscoring deleted]
In Sy Tiong, the perjured statements were made in a GIS which was subscribed and
sworn to in Manila. We ruled that the proper venue for the perjury charges was in
Manila where the GIS was subscribed and sworn to. We held that the perjury was
consummated in Manila where the false statement was made. As supporting
jurisprudence, we cited the case of Villanueva v. Secretary of Justice [19] that, in turn,
cited an American case entitled U.S. v. Norris.[20] We ruled in Villanueva that –
Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration well may affect the dearest
concerns of the parties before a tribunal. Deliberate material falsification under oath
constitutes the crime of perjury, and the crime is complete when a witness' statement
has once been made.
The Crime of Perjury: A Background
To have a better appreciation of the issue facing the Court, a look at the historical
background of how the crime of perjury (specifically, Article 183 of the RPC) evolved in
our jurisdiction.
The RPC penalizes three forms of false testimonies. The first is false testimony for and
against the defendant in a criminal case (Articles 180 and 181, RPC); the second is false
testimony in a civil case (Article 182, RPC); and the third is false testimony in other cases
(Article 183, RPC). Based on the Information filed, the present case involves the making
of an untruthful statement in an affidavit on a material matter.
These RPC provisions, however, are not really the bases of the rulings cited by the
parties in their respective arguments. The cited Ilusorio ruling, although issued by this
Court in 2008, harked back to the case of Cañet which was decided in 1915, i.e., before
the present RPC took effect.[21] Sy Tiong, on the other hand, is a 2009 ruling that
cited Villanueva, a 2005 case that in turn cited United States v. Norris, a 1937 American
case. Significantly, unlike Canet, Sy Tiong is entirely based on rulings rendered after the
present RPC took effect.[22]
The perjurious act in Cañet consisted of an information charging perjury through

the presentation in court of a motion accompanied by a false sworn affidavit. At the
time the Cañet ruling was rendered, the prevailing law on perjury and the rules on
prosecution of criminal offenses were found in Section 3, Act No. 1697 of the Philippine
Commission, and in Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No. 58 [23] for the
procedural aspect.
Section 3 of Act No. 1697 reads:

Sec. 3. Any person who, having taken oath before a competent tribunal, officer,
or person, in any case in which a law of the Philippine Islands authorizes an oath to be
administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written
testimony, declaration, disposition, or certificate by him subscribed is true, willfully and
contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not
believe to be true, is guilty of perjury, and shall be punished by a fine of not more than
two thousand pesos and by imprisonment for not more than five years; and shall
moreover, thereafter be incapable of holding any public office or of giving testimony in
any court of the Philippine Islands until such time as the judgment against him is
reversed.
This law was copied, with the necessary changes, from Sections 5392 [24] and 5393[25] of
the Revised Statutes of the United States. [26] Act No. 1697 was intended to make the
mere execution of a false affidavit punishable in our jurisdiction. [27]
In turn, Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No. 58 provided that the venue shall be
the court of the place where the crime was committed.
As applied and interpreted by the Court in Cañet, perjury was committed by the act
of representing a false document in a judicial proceeding. [28] The venue of action was
held by the Court to be at the place where the false document was presented since the
presentation was the act that consummated the crime.
The annotation of Justices Aquino and Griño-Aquino in their textbook on the

RPC[29] interestingly explains the history of the perjury provisions of the present RPC and
traces as well the linkage between Act No. 1697 and the present Code. To quote these
authors:[30]
Art. 180 was taken from art. 318 of the Old Penal Code and art. 154 of Del Pan’s
Proposed Correctional Code, while art. 181 was taken from art. 319 of the old Penal
Code and Art. 157 of Del Pan’s Proposed Correctional Code. Said arts. 318 and 319,
together with art. 321 of the old Penal Code, were impliedly repealed by Act 1697, the
Perjury Law, passed on August 23, 1907, which in turn was expressly repealed by the
Administrative Code of 1916, Act 2657. In view of the express repeal of Act 1697, arts.
318 and 321 of the old Penal Code were deemed revived. However, Act 2718 expressly
revived secs. 3 and 4 of the Perjury Law. Art. 367 of the Revised Penal Code repealed
Act Nos. 1697 and 2718.
It should be noted that perjury under Acts 1697 and 2718 includes false testimony,
whereas, under the Revised Penal Code, false testimony includes perjury. Our law on
false testimony is of Spanish origin, but our law on perjury (art. 183 taken from sec. 3 of
Act 1697) is derived from American statutes. The provisions of the old Penal Code on
false testimony embrace perjury committed in court or in some contentious proceeding,
while perjury as defined in Act 1697 includes the making of a false affidavit. The
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on false testimony “are more severe and strict
than those of Act 1697” on perjury. [italics ours]
With this background, it can be appreciated that Article 183 of the RPC which provides:
The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period shall be imposed upon any person, who knowingly makes untruthful
statements and not being included in the provisions of the next preceding articles,
shall testify under oath, or make an affidavit, upon any material matter before a
competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so
requires. [emphasis supplied; emphases ours]
in fact refers to either of two punishable acts – (1) falsely testifying under oath in a
proceeding other than a criminal or civil case; and (2) making a false affidavit before a
person authorized to administer an oath on any material matter where the law requires
an oath.
As above discussed, Sy Tiong – decided under Article 183 of the RPC – essentially
involved perjured statements made in a GIS that was subscribed and sworn to in Manila
and submitted to the SEC in Mandaluyong City. Thus, the case involved the making of
an affidavit, not an actual testimony in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil.
From this perspective, the situs of the oath, i.e., the place where the oath was taken, is
the place where the offense was committed. By implication, the proper venue would
have been the City of Mandaluyong – the site of the SEC – had the charge involved an
actual testimony made before the SEC.
In contrast, Cañet involved the presentation in court of a motion supported and

accompanied by an affidavit that contained a falsity. With Section 3 of Act No. 1697 as
basis, the issue related to the submission of the affidavit in a judicial proceeding. This
came at a time when Act No. 1697 was the perjury law, and made no distinction
between judicial and other proceedings, and at the same time separately penalized the
making of false statements under oath (unlike the present RPC which separately deals
with false testimony in criminal, civil and other proceedings, while at the same time also
penalizing the making of false affidavits). Understandably, the venue should be the
place where the submission was made to the court or the situs of the court; it could not
have been the place where the affidavit was sworn to simply because this was not the
offense charged in the Information.
The case of Ilusorio cited the Cañet case as its authority, in a situation where the sworn
petitions filed in court for the issuance of duplicate certificates of title (that were
allegedly lost) were the cited sworn statements to support the charge of perjury for the
falsities stated in the sworn petitions. The Court ruled that the proper venue should be
the Cities of Makati and Tagaytay because it was in the courts of these cities “where the
intent to assert an alleged falsehood became manifest and where the alleged untruthful
statement finds relevance or materiality in deciding the issue of whether new owner’s
duplicate copies of the [Certificate of Condominium Title] and [Transfer Certificates of
Title] may issue.”[31] To the Court, “whether the perjurious statements contained in the
four petitions were subscribed and sworn in Pasig is immaterial, the gist of the offense
of perjury being the intentional giving of false statement,” [32] citing Cañet as authority
for its statement.
The statement in Ilusorio may have partly led to the present confusion on venue
because of its very categorical tenor in pointing to the considerations to be made in the
determination of venue; it leaves the impression that the place where the oath was
taken is not at all a material consideration, forgetting that Article 183 of the RPC clearly
speaks of two situations while Article 182 of the RPC likewise applies to false testimony
in civil cases.
The Ilusorio statement would have made perfect sense had the basis for the charge
been Article 182 of the RPC, on the assumption that the petition itself constitutes a false
testimony in a civil case. The Cañet ruling would then have been completely applicable
as the sworn statement is used in a civil case, although no such distinction was made
under Cañet because the applicable law at the time (Act No. 1697) did not make any
distinction.
If Article 183 of the RPC were to be used, as what in fact appears in the Ilusorio ruling,
then only that portion of the article, referring to the making of an affidavit, would have
been applicable as the other portion refers to false testimony in other
proceedings which a judicial petition for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of
a Certificate of Condominium Title is not because it is a civil proceeding in court. As a
perjury based on the making of a false affidavit, what assumes materiality is the site
where the oath was taken as this is the place where the oath was made, in this case,
Pasig City.
Procedurally, the rule on venue of criminal cases has been subject to various changes
from the time General Order No. 58 was replaced by Rules 106 to 122 of the Rules of
Court on July 1, 1940. Section 14, Rule 106 of the Rules of Court provided for the rule on
venue of criminal actions and it expressly included, as proper venue, the place where any
one of the essential ingredients of the crime took place. This change was followed by the
passage of the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure, [33] the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure,[34] and the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which all adopted the
1940 Rules of Criminal Procedure’s expanded venue of criminal actions. Thus, the
venue of criminal cases is not only in the place where the offense was committed, but
also where any of its essential ingredients took place.
In the present case, the Certification against Forum Shopping was made integral parts of
two complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the
respondent spouses Eddie Tamondong and Eliza B. Tamondong, who, in turn, filed a
complaint-affidavit against Tomas for violation of Article 183 of the RPC. As alleged in
the Information that followed, the criminal act charged was for the execution by
Tomas of an affidavit that contained a falsity.
Under the circumstances, Article 183 of the RPC is indeed the applicable provision; thus,
jurisdiction and venue should be determined on the basis of this article which penalizes
one who “make[s] an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person
authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires.” The constitutive
act of the offense is the making of an affidavit; thus, the criminal act is consummated
when the statement containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly
authorized person.
Based on these considerations, we hold that our ruling in Sy Tiong is more in accord with
Article 183 of the RPC and Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. To reiterate for the guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury
committed through the making of a false affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is
committed at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is
at that time that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When the crime
is committed through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal
nor civil, venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of or as
supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor
civil, a written sworn statement is submitted, venue may either be at the place where
the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of the oath
and the submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases,
determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be
constitutive of the crime committed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. Costs
against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G. R. No. 195002, January 25, 2012 ]
HECTOR TREÑAS, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Where life or liberty is affected by its proceedings, courts must keep strictly within the
limits of the law authorizing them to take jurisdiction and to try the case and render
judgment thereon.[1]
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure, seeking to annul and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated
9 July 2010[2] and Resolution dated 4 January 2011.
Statement of the Facts and of the Case
The pertinent facts, as found by the CA, are as follows:
Sometime in December 1999, Margarita Alocilja (Margarita) wanted to buy a house-and-

lot in Iloilo City covered by TCT No. 109266. It was then mortgaged with Maybank. The
bank manager Joselito Palma recommended the appellant Hector Treñas (Hector) to
private complainant Elizabeth, who was an employee and niece of Margarita, for advice
regarding the transfer of the title in the latter's name. Hector informed Elizabeth that for
the titling of the property in the name of her aunt Margarita, the following expenses
would be incurred:
P20,000.00- Attorney's fees,
P90,000.00- Capital Gains Tax,
P24,000.00- Documentary Stamp,
P10,000.00- Miscellaneous Expenses.
Thereafter, Elizabeth gave P150,000.00 to Hector who issued a corresponding receipt

dated December 22, 1999 and prepared [a] Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage.
Subsequently, Hector gave Elizabeth Revenue Official Receipt Nos. 00084370 for
P96,000.00 and 00084369 for P24,000.00. However, when she consulted with the BIR,
she was informed that the receipts were fake. When confronted, Hector admitted to her
that the receipts were fake and that he used the P120,000.00 for his other transactions.
Elizabeth demanded the return of the money.
To settle his accounts, appellant Hector issued in favor of Elizabeth a Bank of Commerce
check No. 0042856 dated November 10, 2000 in the amount of P120,000.00, deducting
from P150,000.00 the P30,000.00 as attorney's fees. When the check was deposited with
the PCIBank, Makati Branch, the same was dishonored for the reason that the account
was closed. Notwithstanding repeated formal and verbal demands, appellant failed to pay.
Thus, the instant case of Estafa was filed against him.[3]
On 29 October 2001, an Information was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), both of Makati City. The Information reads as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
accused, received in trust from ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the amount of P150,000.00
which money was given to her by her aunt Margarita Alocilja, with the express obligation
on the part of the accused to use the said amount for expenses and fees in connection with
the purchase of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-109266, but the said accused,
once in possession of the said amount, with the intent to gain and abuse of confidence,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and
convert to his own personal use and benefit the amount of P130,000.00 less attorney's
fees and the said accused failed and refused and still fails and refuses to do so, to the
damage and prejudice of complainant Elizabeth Luciaja and Margarita Alocilja in the
aforementioned amount of P130,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
During arraignment on 26 April 2002, petitioner, acting as his own counsel, entered a
plea of "Not Guilty." Allegedly due to old age and poor health, and the fact that he lives
in Iloilo City, petitioner was unable to attend the pre-trial and trial of the case.
On 8 January 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision[5] finding petitioner guilty of the crime
of Estafa under section 1, paragraph (b), of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
with the dispositive portion as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered finding accused Hector

Trenas guilty of the crime of Estafa with abuse of confidence as penalized under Article
315 of the Revised Penal Code, and which offense was committed in the manner
described in the aforementioned information. As a consequence of this judgment, accused
Hector Trenas is sentenced to suffer a penalty of Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day
of Prision Mayor to Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4) Months of Reclusion Temporal.
Moreover, he is ordered to indemnify private complainant Elizabeth Luciaja the amount
of P130,000.00 with interest at the legal rate of 12% per annum, reckoned from the date
this case was filed until the amount is fully paid.
SO ORDERED.[6]
We note at this point that petitioner has been variably called Treñas and Trenas in the
pleadings and court issuances, but for consistency, we use the name "Treñas", under
which he was accused in the Information.
On 24 August 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[7] which was denied by

the RTC in a Resolution dated 2 July 2008.[8]
On 25 September 2008, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal before the RTC.[9] The appeal
was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32177. On 9 July 2010, the CA rendered a
Decision[10] affirming that of the RTC. On 4 August 2010, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated 4 January 2011. [11]
On 25 January 2011, petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for
Review on Certiorari[12] before this Court. He asked for a period of 15 days within which
to file a petition for review, and the Court granted his motion in a Resolution dated 9
February 2011.
On 3 February 2011, petitioner filed his Petition for Review on Certiorari before this
Court, with the following assignment of errors:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT AN ACCUSED HAS TO

PRESENT EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE DEFENSE OF LACK OF
JURISDICTION EVEN IF SUCH LACK OF JURISDICTION APPEARS IN THE
EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION;
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT DEMAND MADE BY A

PERSON OTHER THAN THE AGGRIEVED PARTY SATISFIES THE
REQUIREMENT OF DEMAND TO CONSTITUTE THE OFFENSE OF ESTAFA; [13]
On the first issue, petitioner asserts that nowhere in the evidence presented by the
prosecution does it show that P150,000 was given to and received by petitioner in Makati
City. Instead, the evidence shows that the Receipt issued by petitioner for the money was
dated 22 December 1999, without any indication of the place where it was issued.
Meanwhile, the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage prepared by petitioner was
signed and notarized in Iloilo City, also on 22 December 1999. Petitioner claims that the
only logical conclusion is that the money was actually delivered to him in Iloilo City,
especially since his residence and office were situated there as well. Absent any direct
proof as to the place of delivery, one must rely on the disputable presumption that things
happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. The
only time Makati City was mentioned was with respect to the time when the check
provided by petitioner was dishonored by Equitable-PCI Bank in its De la Rosa-Rada
Branch in Makati. Petitioner asserts that the prosecution witness failed to allege that any
of the acts material to the crime of estafa had occurred in Makati City. Thus, the trial
court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner thus argues that an accused is not required to present evidence to prove lack of
jurisdiction, when such lack is already indicated in the prosecution evidence.
As to the second issue, petitioner claims that the amount of P150,000 actually belongs to
Margarita. Assuming there was misappropriation, it was actually she - not Elizabeth -
who was the offended party. Thus, the latter's demand does not satisfy the requirement of
prior demand by the offended party in the offense of estafa. Even assuming that the
demand could have been properly made by Elizabeth, the demand referred to the amount
of P120,000, instead of P150,000. Finally, there is no showing that the demand was
actually received by petitioner. The signature on the Registry Return Receipt was not
proven to be that of petitioner's.
On 30 May 2011, this Court issued a Resolution directing the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) to file the latter's Comment on the Petition. On 27 July 2011, the OSG
filed a Motion for Extension, praying for an additional period of 60 days within which to
submit its Comment. This motion was granted in a Resolution dated 12 September 2011.
On 23 September 2011, the OSG filed a Motion for Special Extension, requesting an
additional period of five days. On 29 September 2011, it filed its Comment on the
Petition.
In its Comment, the OSG asserts that the RTC did not err in convicting petitioner as
charged. The OSG notes that petitioner does not dispute the factual findings of the trial
court with respect to the delivery of P150,000 to him, and that there was a relationship of
trust and confidence between him and Elizabeth. With respect to his claim that the
Complaint should have been filed in Iloilo City, his claim was not supported by any piece
of evidence, as he did not present any. Further, petitioner is, in effect, asking the Court to
weigh the credibility of the prosecution witness, Elizabeth. However, the trial court's
assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, unless tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance, which is not the case here.
With respect to the second issue, the OSG stresses that the defense of "no valid demand"
was not raised in the lower court. Nevertheless, the demand letter sent to Elizabeth
suffices, as she is also one of the complainants alleged in the Information, as an agent of
Margarita. Moreover, no proof was adduced as to the genuineness of petitioner's
signature in the Registry Return Receipt of the demand letter.
The OSG, however, submits that the Court may recommend petitioner for executive
clemency, in view of his advanced age and failing health.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is impressed with merit.
Review of Factual Findings
While the Petition raises questions of law, the resolution of the Petition requires a review
of the factual findings of the lower courts and the evidence upon which they are based.
As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. In many instances, however, this Court has laid down exceptions to
this general rule, as follows:
(1) When the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory;
(2) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
(3) When the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(4) When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
(5) When the appellate court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case, and
such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(6) When the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on misapprehension of facts;
(7) When the Court of Appeals failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion;
(8) When the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;
(9) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on which
they are based; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence
but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record.[14]
In this case, the findings of fact of the trial court and the CA on the issue of the place of
commission of the offense are conclusions without any citation of the specific evidence
on which they are based; they are grounded on conclusions and conjectures.
The trial court, in its Decision, ruled on the commission of the offense without any
finding as to where it was committed:
Based on the evidence presented by the prosecution through private complainant

Elizabeth Luciaja, the Court is convinced that accused Trenas had committed the offense
of Estafa by taking advantage of her trust so that he could misappropriate for his own
personal benefit the amount entrusted to him for payment of the capital gains tax and
documentary stamp tax.
As clearly narrated by private complainant Luciaja, after accused Trenas had obtained the
amount of P150,000.00 from her, he gave her two receipts purportedly issued by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, for the fraudulent purpose of fooling her and making her
believe that he had complied with his duty to pay the aforementioned taxes. Eventually,
private complainant Luciaja discovered that said receipts were fabricated documents. [15]
In his Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, petitioner raised the argument that it
had no jurisdiction over the offense charged. The trial court denied the motion, without
citing any specific evidence upon which its findings were based, and by relying on
conjecture, thus:
That the said amount was given to [Treñas] in Makati City was incontrovertibly
established by the prosecution. Accused Treñas, on the other hand, never appeared in
Court to present countervailing evidence. It is only now that he is suggesting another
possible scenario, not based on the evidence, but on mere "what ifs". x x x
Besides, if this Court were to seriously assay his assertions, the same would still not
warrant a reversal of the assailed judgment. Even if the Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage was executed on 22 December 999 in Iloilo City, it cannot preclude the fact
that the P150,000.00 was delivered to him by private complainant Luciaja in Makati City
the following day. His reasoning the money must have been delivered to him in Iloilo
City because it was to be used for paying the taxes with the BIR office in that city does
not inspire concurrence. The records show that he did not even pay the taxes because the
BIR receipts he gave to private complainant were fake documents. Thus, his
argumentation in this regard is too specious to consider favorably.[16]
For its part, the CA ruled on the issue of the trial court's jurisdiction in this wise:
It is a settled jurisprudence that the court will not entertain evidence unless it is offered in
evidence. It bears emphasis that Hector did not comment on the formal offer of
prosecution's evidence nor present any evidence on his behalf. He failed to substantiate
his allegations that he had received the amount of P150,000.00 in Iloilo City. Hence,
Hector's allegations cannot be given evidentiary weight.
Absent any showing of a fact or circumstance of weight and influence which would
appear to have been overlooked and, if considered, could affect the outcome of the case,
the factual findings and assessment on the credibility of a witness made by the trial court
remain binding on appellate tribunal. They are entitled to great weight and respect and
will not be disturbed on review.[17]
The instant case is thus an exception allowing a review of the factual findings of the
lower courts.
Jurisdiction of the Trial Court
The overarching consideration in this case is the principle that, in criminal cases, venue is
jurisdictional. A court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense
committed outside its limited territory. In Isip v. People,[18] this Court explained:
The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the
action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for
jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been
committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory
where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly
committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged
with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the
jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take
cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that
the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for
want of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)
In a criminal case, the prosecution must not only prove that the offense was committed, it
must also prove the identity of the accused and the fact that the offense was committed
within the jurisdiction of the court.
In Fukuzume v. People,[19] this Court dismissed a Complaint for estafa, wherein the

prosecution failed to prove that the essential elements of the offense took place within the
trial court's jurisdiction. The Court ruled:
More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination of Yu to establish

that he gave any money to Fukuzume or transacted business with him with respect to the
subject aluminum scrap wires inside or within the premises of the Intercontinental Hotel
in Makati, or anywhere in Makati for that matter. Venue in criminal cases is an essential
element of jurisdiction. x x x
In the present case, the criminal information against Fukuzume was filed with and tried
by the RTC of Makati. He was charged with estafa as defined under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of which are as follows: x x x
The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in

Makati. However, aside from the sworn statement executed by Yu on April 19,
1994, the prosecution presented no other evidence, testimonial or documentary, to
corroborate Yu's sworn statement or to prove that any of the above-enumerated
elements of the offense charged was committed in Makati. Indeed, the prosecution
failed to establish that any of the subsequent payments made by Yu in the amounts of
P50,000.00 on July 12, 1991, P20,000.00 on July 22, 1991, P50,000.00 on October 14,
1991 and P170,000.00 on October 18, 1991 was given in Makati. Neither was there proof
to show that the certifications purporting to prove that NAPOCOR has in its custody the
subject aluminum scrap wires and that Fukuzume is authorized by Furukawa to sell the
same were given by Fukuzume to Yu in Makati. On the contrary, the testimony of Yu
established that all the elements of the offense charged had been committed in Parañaque,
to wit: that on July 12, 1991, Yu went to the house of Fukuzume in Parañaque; that with
the intention of selling the subject aluminum scrap wires, the latter pretended that he is a
representative of Furukawa who is authorized to sell the said scrap wires; that based on
the false pretense of Fukuzume, Yu agreed to buy the subject aluminum scrap wires; that
Yu paid Fukuzume the initial amount of P50,000.00; that as a result, Yu suffered damage.
Stated differently, the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, was consummated when Yu and Fukuzume
met at the latter's house in Parañaque and, by falsely pretending to sell aluminum scrap
wires, Fukuzume was able to induce Yu to part with his money.
xxx
From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove that Fukuzume
committed the crime of estafa in Makati or that any of the essential ingredients of
the offense took place in the said city. Hence, the judgment of the trial court
convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafa should be set aside for want of
jurisdiction, without prejudice, however, to the filing of appropriate charges with the
court of competent jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the prosecution failed to show that the offense of estafa under Section 1,
paragraph (b) of Article 315 of the RPC was committed within the jurisdiction of the
RTC of Makati City.
That the offense was committed in Makati City was alleged in the information as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1999, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
accused, received in trust from ELIZABETH LUCIAJA the amount of P150,000.00 x x
x. (Emphasis supplied.)[20]
Ordinarily, this statement would have been sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of
Makati. However, the Affidavit of Complaint executed by Elizabeth does not contain any
allegation as to where the offense was committed. It provides in part:
4. THAT on 23 December 1999, [Elizabeth] personally entrusted to ATTY.

HECTOR TREÑAS the sum of P150,000.00 to be expended as agreed and ATTY.
HECTOR TREÑAS issued to me a receipt, a photo copy of which is hereto
attached as Annex "B",
5. THAT despite my several follow-ups with ATTY. HECTOR TREÑAS, the latter
failed to transfer the title of aforesaid property to MRS. MARGARITA
ALOCILJA. He also failed to pay the capital gains tax, documentary stamps and
BIR-related expenses. What ATTY. HECTOR TREÑAS accomplished was only
the preparation of the Deed of Sale covering aforesaid property. A copy of said
Deed of Sale is hereto attached as Annex "C",
6. THAT in view of my persistent follow-ups, ATTY. HECTOR TREÑAS issued to

me a check for refund of the sum given to him less the attorney's fee of P20,000.00
and the sum of P10,000.00 allegedly paid to BIR or in the net sum of P120,000.00.
xxx
7. THAT when said check was deposited at EQUITABLE PCI BANK dela Rosa-
Rada Branch at Makati City, the same was dishonored by the drawee bank for the
reason: ACCOUNT CLOSED. x x x[21]
Aside from the lone allegation in the Information, no other evidence was presented by the
prosecution to prove that the offense or any of its elements was committed in Makati
City.
Under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC, the elements of estafa are as follows: (1) that
money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to
make delivery of or to return the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion
of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that
such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) there
is demand by the offended party to the offender.[22]
There is nothing in the documentary evidence offered by the prosecution[23] that points to

where the offense, or any of its elements, was committed. A review of the testimony of
Elizabeth also shows that there was no mention of the place where the offense was
allegedly committed:
Q After the manager of Maybank referred Atty. Treñas to you, what happened next?
A We have met and he explained to the expenses and what we will have to... and she will
work for the Deed of Sale.
Q And did he quote any amount when you got to the expenses?
A Yes. I gave him ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND.
Q What was the amount quoted to you?
A ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND.
Q Did he give a breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what is the breakdown of this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?
A TWENTY THOUSAND is for his Attorney's fee, NINETY THOUSAND is for the
capital gain tax TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND is intended for documentary sum (sic)
and TEN THOUSAND PESOS is for other expenses for BIR.
Q And did you give him this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did he issue a receipt?
A Yes, sir.
Q If shown to you a receipt issued by Atty. Treñas for this ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND, will you be able to identify it?
A Yes, sir.
Q I am showing to you a document, madam witness, already identified during the pre-
trial as exhibit "B". This appears to be a receipt dated December 22, 1999. Will you
please go over this document and inform this court what relation has this to the receipt
which you said Atty. Treñas issued to you?
A This is the receipt issued by Atty. Hector Treñas.
Q Now, after the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND was given to Atty.
Treñas by you, what happened next?
A We made several follow-ups but he failed to do his job.[24]
Although the prosecution alleged that the check issued by petitioner was dishonored in a
bank in Makati, such dishonor is not an element of the offense of estafa under Article
315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC.
Indeed, other than the lone allegation in the information, there is nothing in the
prosecution evidence which even mentions that any of the elements of the offense were
committed in Makati. The rule is settled that an objection may be raised based on the
ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged, or it may be
considered motu proprio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal.
[25]
Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred
upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise. That jurisdiction is
conferred
by the sovereign authority that organized the court and is given only by law in the manner
and form prescribed by law.[26]
It has been consistently held by this Court that it is unfair to require a defendant or
accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter or offense or it is not the court of proper venue.[27] Section 15 (a) of
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure of 2000 provides that "[s]ubject to
existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential
ingredients occurred." This fundamental principle is to ensure that the defendant is not
compelled to move to, and appear in, a different court from that of the province where the
crime was committed as it would cause him great inconvenience in looking for his
witnesses and other evidence in another place.[28] This principle echoes more strongly in
this case, where, due to distance constraints, coupled with his advanced age and failing
health, petitioner was unable to present his defense in the charges against him.
There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, the RTC of that
city has no jurisdiction over the case.[29]
As such, there is no more need to discuss the other issue raised by petitioner.
At this juncture, this Court sees it fit to note that the Code of Professional Responsibility
strongly militates against the petitioner's conduct in handling the funds of his client.
Rules 16.01 and 16.02 of the Code provides:
Rule 16.01 -- A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for
or from the client.
Rule 16.02 -- A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his
own and those others kept by him.
When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose (such
as for filing fees, registration fees, transportation and office expenses), he should
promptly account to the client how the money was spent.[30] If he does not use the money
for its intended purpose, he must immediately return it to the client. His failure either to
render an accounting or to return the money (if the intended purpose of the money does
not materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[31]
Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his client's funds or properties as they fall due
or upon demand.[32] His failure to return the client's money upon demand gives rise to the
presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of and in
violation of the trust reposed in him by the client.[33] It is a gross violation of general
morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs public confidence in the legal
profession and deserves punishment.[34]
In Cuizon v. Macalino,[35] this Court ruled that the issuance of checks which were later
dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer's unfitness
for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows lack of personal honesty and good
moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground
for disciplinary action.
This case is thus referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for the initiation
of disciplinary proceedings against petitioner. In any case, should there be a finding that
petitioner has failed to account for the funds received by him in trust, the
recommendation should include an order to immediately return the amount of ?130,000
to his client, with the appropriate rate of interest from the time of demand until full
payment.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 9 July 2010 and the
Resolution dated 4 January 2011 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
32177 are SET ASIDE on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 137, Makati City. Criminal Case No. 01-2409
is DISMISSED without prejudice. This case is REFERRED to the IBP Board of
Governors for investigation and recommendation pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. L-47880, April 30, 1979 ]
WILSON AGBAYANI, CARMELO BAUTISTA, PABLO PASCUAL AND
RENATO ROMEO DUGAY, PETITIONERS, VS. HONORABLE SOFRONIO
G. SAYO, PRESIDING JUDGE OF COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
NUEVA VIZCAYA, BRANCH I, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
CONRADO B. MAHINAN, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the venue of a criminal action for written defamation. Conrado B.
Mahinan, a lawyer, was the manager since September 24, 1973 of the Cagayan Valley
Branch of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) stationed at Cauayan,
Isabela. Among his subordinates in that branch office were Wilson Agbayani, chief of the
investment unit; Carmelo N. Bautista, chief of the production and premium unit; Pablo R.
Pascual, officer-in-charge of the legal and claims unit, and Renato Romeo P. Dugay, an
employee of the claims unit.
On March 8, 1976, Mahinan filed with the fiscal's office at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya a
complaint for written defamation against Agbayani, Bautista, Pascual and Dugay.
Two days later, or on March 10, 1976, the Board of Trustees of the GSIS in its
Resolution No. 373 considered Mahinan as resigned from the service as of the close of
business hours on that date. Mahinan appealed to the Civil Service Commission which
later directed the GSIS Board of Trustees to reinstate him "to his former position, or at
the discretion of the proper official and in the interest of the service, he may be assigned
to another station or branch without demotion in rank, salary and privileges." So,
Mahinan is back in the service (pp. 2-3, Memorandum of Mahinan, pp. 200-1, Rollo).
On July 23, 1976, the provincial fiscal of Nueva Vizcaya filed in the Court of First
Instance of that province an information for libel charging Agbayani, Bautista, Pascual
and Dugay with having maliciously made defamatory imputations against Mahinan on or
about February 17, 1976 in Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya (Criminal Case No. 509).
Quoted in the information were the affidavits of Pascual and Bautista signed at Cauayan,
Isabela on October 6, 1975; Bautista's undated letter asking for Mahinan's dismissal, and
Agbayani's "unusual incident report" of October 3, 1975 subscribed and sworn to before a
Manila notary and enclosing documentary evidence to support his charges of
malversation and falsification against Mahinan and praying for the latter's separation
from the service.
According to the information, all those documents allegedly depicted Mahinan "as an
incorrigible managerial misfit, despoiler of public office, spendthrift of GSIS funds,
inveterate gambler, chronic falsifier," and an "unreformed ex-convict."
The four accused filed a motion to quash. They contended that the Court of First Instance
of Nueva Vizcaya has no jurisdiction over the offense charged because Mahinan was a
public officer holding office at Cauayan, Isabela when the alleged libel was committed
and, under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, the offense charged comes within the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Isabela. They argued that the provincial
fiscal of Nueva Vizcaya had no authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and to
file the information.
That motion was opposed by the fiscal. It was denied by the trial court in its order of
April 25, 1977 on the ground that Mahinan was not a public officer within the meaning of
Article 203 of the Revised Penal Code since the insurance business of the GSIS is not an
inherently governmental function. The court reasoned out that since Mahinan was not a
public officer, his residence, which was allegedly in Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya, and not
Cauayan, Isabela, where he had his office, would be the criterion for determining the
venue of the criminal action for libel.
On March 2, 1978, or after petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of that order was
denied, they filed in this Court the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin
the prosecution of the libel case on the ground of improper venue.
The issue is whether the venue of the criminal action for written defamation filed by
Mahinan is Nueva Vizcaya or Isabela. There is no issue as to whether Mahinan is a
public officer. As GSIS branch manager, he is unquestionably a public officer. (See Sec.
1[1][B], Art. XII and Sec. 5, Art. XIII, Constitution and Sec. 2[a] and [b], Republic Act
No. 3019.)
Mahinan in his memorandum does not support the trial court's theory that he was not a
public officer at the time of the commission of the alleged libel. Instead, he relies on the
rule that the trial court's jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the information
and since it was alleged that the libel was committed in Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya, he
argues that the trial court, prima facie, has jurisdiction over the case. This contention is
devoid of merit and shows unawareness of the provisions of Article 360 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended.
Article 360, which lays down the rules on venue in cases of written defamation and
which specifies the officer or court that should conduct the preliminary investigation,
reads as follows:
"ART. 360. Persons responsible. — x x x
xxx xxx xxx
"The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided
for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first
instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or
where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense:
"Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose
office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action
shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province
where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public officer
does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the
offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the
offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of
the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published:
"Provided, further, That the civil action shall be filed in the same court where the
criminal action is filed and vice versa:
"Provided furthermore, That the court where the criminal action or civil action for
damages is first filed, shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts:

"And provided, finally, That this amendment shall not apply to cases of written
defamations, the civil and/or criminal actions to which have been filed in court at the time
of the effectivity of this law.
"Preliminary investigation of criminal actions for written defamations as provided for in

the chapter shall be conducted by the provincial or city fiscal of the province or city, or
by the municipal court of the city or capital of the province where such actions may be
instituted in accordance with the provisions of this article.
xxx xxx xxx.
(As amended by Republic Act Nos. 1289 and 4363 which were approved on June 15,
1955 and June 19, 1965, respectively.)
Article 360 in its original form provided that the venue of the criminal and civil actions
for written defamations is the province wherein the libel was published, displayed or
exhibited, regardless of the place where the same was written, printed or composed.
Article 360 originally did not specify the public officers and the courts that may conduct
the preliminary investigation of complaints for libel.
Before Article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may be
instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or circulated,
irrespective of where it was written or printed (People vs. Borja, 43 Phil. 618). Under that
rule, the criminal action is transitory and the injured party has a choice of venue.
Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass the
accused in a libel case by laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant
place.
Thus, in connection with an article published in the Daily Mirror and the Philippine Free

Press, Pio Pedrosa, Manuel V. Villareal and Joaquin Roces were charged with libel in the
justice of the peace court of San Fabian, Pangasinan (Amansec vs. De Guzman, 93 Phil.
933).
To forestall such harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays down specific
rules as to the venue of the criminal action so as to prevent the offended party in written
defamation cases from inconveniencing the accused by means of out-of-town libel suits,
meaning complaints filed in remote municipal courts (Explanatory Note for the bill which
became Republic Act No. 4363, Congressional Record of May 20, 1965, pp. 424-
5; Time, Inc. vs. Reyes, L-28882, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA303, 311).
The rules on venue in Article 360 may be restated thus:
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action
may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous
article is printed and first published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the
Court of First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the
commission of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the
commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila.
4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action
may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at
the time of the commission of the offense.
As a corollary and in view of the legislative intent to prevent the harassment of the
accused by means of criminal complaints in remote municipal courts, the preliminary
investigation of the criminal action for written defamation shall be conducted by the
provincial or city fiscal of the province, or city, or by the municipal court of the city or
capital of the province where such action may be instituted.
The Court of First Instance of the province or city where the criminal action may be filed
may also conduct the preliminary investigation of the case pursuant to Section 13, Rule
112 of the Rules of Court (Escribano vs. Avila, L-30375, September 12,1978).
Applying the foregoing rules to this case, we hold that the proper venue of Mahinan's
criminal action for written defamation against the petitioners is the Court of First Instance
of Isabela, since as a GSIS branch manager, he was a public official stationed at
Cauayan, Isabela and the alleged libel was committed when he was (as he still) in the
public service. The preliminary investigation of the complaint should have been
conducted by the provincial fiscal of Isabela, or by the municipal judge of Ilagan, the
provincial capital, or by the Court of First Instance of the same province.
The criminal action could have been filed also in the Court of First Instance of the
province or in the city court of the city where the libel was printed and first published.
In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal action for written
defamation, the complaint or information should contain allegations as to whether, at the
time the offense was committed, the offended party was a public officer or a private
individual and where he was actually residing at that time. Whenever possible, the place
where the written defamation -was printed and first published should likewise be alleged.
That allegation would be a sine qua non if the circumstance as to where the libel was
printed and first published is used as the basis of the venue of the action.
In the instant case, the venue was laid in Nueva Vizcaya. It was alleged in the
information that the libel was committed in Bambang, a town located in that province. It
was not alleged that at the time the libel was committed Bambang was the actual
residence of complainant Mahinan or that it was the place where the libel was printed and
first published or where Mahinan held his office.
The alleged defamatory documents quoted in the information do not justify the filing of
the information in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya. Thus, as already noted,
the affidavits of the accused, Bautista and Pascual, both dated October 6, 1975, were
subscribed and sworn to at Cauayan, Isabela before the municipal judge thereof. The
"Unusual Incident Report" submitted by the accused, Agbayani, also quoted in the
information and likewise alleged to be defamatory, was subscribed and sworn to before a
Manila notary on October 3, 1975. That report indicates Cauayan, Isabela as the place
where Mahinan held office. Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya was not mentioned at all in those
alleged defamatory documents.
We hold that the information in this case is defective or deficient because it does not
show that the Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya, where it was filed, has
jurisdiction to entertain the criminal action for written defamation initiated by Mahinan
against the petitioners and that the provincial fiscal of that province had the authority to
conduct the preliminary investigation.
Consequently, the trial court erred in not sustaining petitioners' motion to quash on the
grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of authority to file the information (Sec. 2[b] and
[c], Rule 117, Rules of Court).
The allegation in the information that the libel was committed in Bambang, Nueva
Vizcaya is not sufficient to show that the Court of First Instance of that province has
jurisdiction over the case. The alleged libelous documents quoted in the information
show that Nueva Vizcaya is not the proper venue of the criminal action.
Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction (Lopez vs. City Judge, L-
25795, October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616; U.S. vs. Pagdayuman, 5 Phi). 265; U.S. vs.
Reyes, 1 Phil. 249; Ragpala vs. J.P. of Tubod, Lanao, 109 Phil. 373, 378).
The trial court in its questioned order admits that if Mahinan was a public officer at the
time the written defamation was committed, it would have no jurisdiction to try the case
since the venue of the action should be Isabela where Mahinan held office at the time of
the commission of the offense. In this memorandum, Mahinan has not questioned his
status as a public officer and he admits that Cauayan, Isabela was his official station.
WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of April 25, 1977, denying petitioners' motion to
quash is set aside. It is directed to dismiss Criminal Case No. 509, the libel case against
the petitioners, without prejudice to the filing of another criminal action for written
defamation in the Court of First Instance of Isabela within the remainder of the
prescriptive period, if warranted according to the result of a proper and duly conducted
preliminary investigation. Costs against respondent Mahinan.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 184800, May 05, 2010 ]
WONINA M. BONIFACIO, JOCELYN UPANO, VICENTE ORTUOSTE AND
JOVENCIO PERECHE, SR., PETITIONERS,VS. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF MAKATI, BRANCH 149, AND JESSIE JOHN P. GIMENEZ,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Via a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners Wonina M. Bonifacio, et

al. assail the issuances of Branch 149 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
(public respondent) - Order[1] of April 22, 2008 which denied their motion to quash the
Amended Information indicting them for libel, and Joint Resolution[2] of August 12, 2008
denying reconsideration of the first issuance.
Private respondent Jessie John P. Gimenez[3] (Gimenez) filed on October 18, 2005, on

behalf of the Yuchengco Family ("in particular," former Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco
and Helen Y. Dee (Helen) and of the Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. (Malayan), [4] a criminal
complaint,[5] before the Makati City Prosecutor's Office, for thirteen (13) counts of libel
under Article 355 in relation to Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) against
Philip Piccio, Mia Gatmaytan and Ma. Anabella Relova Santos, who are officers of
Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI), John Joseph Gutierrez, Jeselyn Upano,
Jose Dizon, Rolanda Pareja, Wonina Bonifacio, Elvira Cruz, Cornelio Zafra, Vicente
Ortueste, Victoria Gomez Jacinto, Jurencio Pereche, Ricardo Loyares and Peter
Suchianco, who are trustees of PEPCI, Trennie Monsod, a member of PEPCI
(collectively, the accused), and a certain John Doe, the administrator of the
website www.pepcoalition.com.
PEPCI appears to have been formed by a large group of disgruntled planholders of

Pacific Plans, Inc. (PPI) - a wholly owned subsidiary of Great Pacific Life Assurance
Corporation, also owned by the Yuchengco Group of Companies (YGC) - who had
previously purchased traditional pre-need educational plans but were unable to collect
thereon or avail of the benefits thereunder after PPI, due to liquidity concerns, filed for
corporate rehabilitation with prayer for suspension of payments before the Makati RTC.
Decrying PPI's refusal/inability to honor its obligations under the educational pre-need
plans, PEPCI sought to provide a forum by which the planholders could seek redress for
their pecuniary loss under their policies by maintaining a website on the internet under
the address of www.pepcoalition.com.
Gimenez alleged that PEPCI also owned, controlled and moderated on the internet a
blogspot[6] under the website address www.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com, as well as a
yahoo e-group[7] at [email protected]. These websites are easily accessible
to the public or by anyone logged on to the internet.
Gimenez further alleged that upon accessing the above-stated websites in Makati on
various dates from August 25 to October 2, 2005, he "was appalled to read numerous
articles [numbering 13], maliciously and recklessly caused to be published by [the
accused] containing highly derogatory statements and false accusations, relentlessly
attacking the Yuchengco Family, YGC, and particularly, Malayan."[8] He cited an article
which was posted/published on www.pepcoalition.com on August 25, 2005 which stated:
Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga

kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak ng negotiation because it was done prematurely since we
had not file any criminal aspect of our case. What is worse is that Yuchengcos
benefited much from the nego. x x x . That is the fact na talagang hindi dapat
pagtiwalaan ang mga Yuchengcos.
LET'S MOVE TO THE BATTLEFIELD. FILE THE CRIMINAL CASES IN COURT,

BSP AND AMLC AND WHEREVER. Pumunta tayong muli sa senado, congreso,
RCBC Plaza, and other venues to air our grievances and call for boycott ng YGC. Let us
start within ourselves. Alisin natin ang mga investments and deposits natin sa lahat
ng YGC and I mean lahat and again convince friends to do the same. Yung mga
nanonood lang noon ay dapat makisali na talaga ngayon specially those who joined only
after knowing that there was a negotiation for amicable settlements.
FOR SURE MAY TACTICS PA SILANG NAKABASTA SA ATIN. LET US BE

READY FOR IT BECAUSE THEY HAD SUCCESSFULLY LULL US AND THE
NEXT TIME THEY WILL TRY TO KILL US NA. x x x [9] (emphasis in the original)
By Resolution of May 5, 2006,[10] the Makati City Prosecutor's Office, finding probable

cause to indict the accused, filed thirteen (13) separate Informations[11] charging them
with libel. The accusatory portion of one Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-
876, which was raffled off to public respondent reads:
That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines,
a place within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being
then the trustees of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition and as such trustees they hold the
legal title to the website www.pepcoalition.com which is of general circulation, and
publication to the public conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with one another
together with John Does, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and
publicly and maliciously with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and
integrity, character and reputation of complainant Malayan Insurance Co. Inc.,
Yuchengco Family particularly Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee and for
further purpose exposing the complainant to public hatred and contempt published an
article imputing a vice or defect to the complainant and caused to be composed, posted
and published in the said website www.pepcoalition.com and injurious and defamatory
article as follows:
Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga

kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak ng negotiation. x x x x x x x x x
For sure may tactics pa silang nakabasta sa atin. Let us be ready for it because they had
successfully lull us and the next time they will try to kill us na. x x x
A copy of the full text of the foregoing article as published/posted

in www.pepcoalition.com is attached as Annex "F" of the complaint.
That the keyword and password to be used in order to post and publish the above
defamatory article are known to the accused as trustees holding legal title to the above-
cited website and that the accused are the ones
responsible for the posting and publication of the defamatory articles that the article in
question was posted and published with the object of the discrediting and ridiculing the
complainant before the public.
Several of the accused appealed the Makati City Prosecutor's Resolution by a petition for
review to the Secretary of Justice who, by Resolution of June 20, 2007, [13] reversed the
finding of probable cause and accordingly directed the withdrawal of the Informations for
libel filed in court. The Justice Secretary opined that the crime of "internet libel" was
non-existent, hence, the accused could not be charged with libel under Article 353 of the
RPC.[14]
Petitioners, as co-accused,[15] thereupon filed on June 6, 2006, before the public

respondent, a Motion to Quash[16] the Information in Criminal Case No. 06-876 on the
grounds that it failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; the acts complained of in
the Information are not punishable by law since internet libel is not covered by Article
353 of the RPC; and the Information is fatally defective for failure to designate the
offense charged and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense of
libel.
Citing Macasaet v. People,[17] petitioners maintained that the Information failed to allege

a particular place within the trial court's jurisdiction where the subject article was printed
and first published or that the offended parties resided in Makati at the time the alleged
defamatory material was printed and first published.
By Order of October 3, 2006,[18] the public respondent, albeit finding that probable cause
existed, quashed the Information, citing Agustin v. Pamintuan.[19] It found that the
Information lacked any allegations that the offended parties were actually residing in
Makati at the time of the commission of the offense as in fact they listed their address in
the complaint-affidavit at Yuchengco Tower in Binondo, Manila; or that the alleged
libelous article was printed and first published in Makati.
The prosecution moved to reconsider the quashal of the Information,[20] insisting that the
Information sufficiently conferred jurisdiction on the public respondent. It cited Banal III
v. Panganiban[21] which held that the Information need not allege verbatim that the
libelous publication was "printed and first published" in the appropriate venue. And it
pointed out that Malayan has an office in Makati of which Helen is a resident. Moreover,
the prosecution alleged that even assuming that the Information was deficient, it merely
needed a formal amendment.
Petitioners opposed the prosecution's motion for reconsideration, contending, inter alia,

that since venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases, any defect in an information for libel
pertaining to jurisdiction is not a mere matter of form that may be cured by amendment.
[22]
By Order of March 8, 2007,[23] the public respondent granted the prosecution's motion for
reconsideration and accordingly ordered the public prosecutor to "amend the Information
to cure the defect of want of venue."
The prosecution thereupon moved to admit the Amended Information dated March 20,
2007,[24] the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines,
a place within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being
then the trustees of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition and as such trustees they hold the
legal title to the website www.pepcoalition.com which is of general circulation, and
publication to the public conspiring, confederating together with John Does, whose true
names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and all of
them mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously and publicly and maliciously with intention of attacking the honesty,
virtue, honor and integrity, character and reputation of complainant Malayan Insurance
Co. Inc., Yuchengco Family particularly Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Dee
and for further purpose exposing the complainant to public hatred and contempt
published an article imputing a vice or defect to the complainant and caused to be
composed, posted and published in the said website www.pepcoalition.com, a website
accessible in Makati City, an injurious and defamatory article, which was first
published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City, as follows:
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring in the original; italics supplied)
Petitioners moved to quash the Amended Information[25] which, they alleged, still failed
to vest jurisdiction upon the public respondent because it failed to allege that the libelous
articles were "printed and first published" by the accused in Makati; and the prosecution
erroneously laid the venue of the case in the place where the offended party accessed the
internet-published article.
By the assailed Order of April 22, 2008, the public respondent, applying Banal III, found
the Amended Information to be sufficient in form.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration[26] having been denied by the public respondent by

Joint Resolution of August 12, 2008, they filed the present petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition faulting the public respondent for:
1. ... NOT FINDING THAT THE ACTS ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION ARE
NOT PUNISHABLE BY LAW;
2. ... ADMITTING AN AMENDED INFORMATION WHOSE JURISDICTIONAL
ALLEGATIONS CONTINUES TO BE DEFICIENT; and
3. ...NOT RULING THAT AN AMENDMENT IN THE INFORMATION FOR

THE PURPOSE OF CURING JURISDICTIONAL DEFECTS IS ILLEGAL. [27]
With the filing of Gimenez's Comment[28] to the petition, the issues are: (1) whether
petitioners violated the rule on hierarchy of courts to thus render the petition dismissible;
and (2) whether grave abuse of discretion attended the public respondent's admission of
the Amended Information.
The established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts,[29] as a rule,
requires that recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent
jurisdiction with a higher court.[30] A regard for judicial hierarchy clearly indicates that
petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level courts should be filed in
the RTC and those against the latter should be filed in the Court of Appeals. [31] The rule is
not iron-clad, however, as it admits of certain exceptions.
Thus, a strict application of the rule is unnecessary when cases brought before the
appellate courts do not involve factual but purely legal questions.[32]
In the present case, the substantive issue calls for the Court's exercise of its discretionary
authority, by way of exception, in order to abbreviate the review process as petitioners
raise a pure question of law involving jurisdiction in criminal complaints for libel under
Article 360 of the RPC -whether the Amended Information is sufficient to sustain a
charge for written defamation in light of the requirements under Article 360 of the RPC,
as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 4363, reading:
Art. 360. Persons responsible.— Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the
newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations
contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.
The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as
provided for in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of
First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense: Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is
a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the
offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of
the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case
such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in
the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the
commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published and
in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the
Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published x x
x. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was
committed determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential
element of jurisdiction.[33] This principle acquires even greater import in libel cases, given
that Article 360, as amended, specifically provides for the possible venues for the
institution of the criminal and civil aspects of such cases.
In Macasaet,[34] the Court reiterated its earlier pronouncements in Agbayani v.

Sayo[35] which laid out the rules on venue in libel cases, viz:
For the guidance, therefore, of both the bench and the bar, this Court finds it appropriate
to reiterate our earlier pronouncement in the case of Agbayani, to wit:
In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal action for written
defamation, the complaint or information should contain allegations as to whether, at the
time the offense was committed, the offended party was a public officer or a private
individual and where he was actually residing at that time. Whenever possible, the
place where the written defamation was printed and first published should likewise
be alleged. That allegation would be a sine qua non if the circumstance as to where
the libel was printed and first published is used as the basis of the venue of the
action. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It becomes clear that the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private
individual is limited to only either of two places, namely: 1) where the complainant
actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged
defamatory article was printed and first published. The Amended Information in the
present case opted to lay the venue by availing of the second. Thus, it stated that the
offending article "was first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati
City." In other words, it considered the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite allegation
of printing and first publication.
The insufficiency of the allegations in the Amended Information to vest jurisdiction in

Makati becomes pronounced upon an examination of the rationale for the amendment to
Article 360 by RA No. 4363. Chavez v. Court of Appeals[36] explained the nature of these
changes:
Agbayani supplies a comprehensive restatement of the rules of venue in actions for

criminal libel, following the amendment by Rep. Act No. 4363 of the Revised Penal
Code:
"Article 360 in its original form provided that the venue of the criminal and civil actions
for written defamations is the province wherein the libel was published, displayed or
exhibited, regardless of the place where the same was written, printed or composed.
Article 360 originally did not specify the public officers and the courts that may conduct
the preliminary investigation of complaints for libel.
Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may be
instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or circulated,
irrespective of where it was written or printed (People v. Borja, 43 Phil. 618). Under that
rule, the criminal action is transitory and the injured party has a choice of venue.
Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass the
accused in a libel case by laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or
distant place.
Thus, in connection with an article published in the Daily Mirror and the Philippine Free
Press, Pio Pedrosa, Manuel V. Villareal and Joaquin Roces were charged with libel in the
justice of the peace court of San Fabian, Pangasinan (Amansec v. De Guzman, 93 Phil.
933).
To forestall such harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays down
specific rules as to the venue of the criminal action so as to prevent the offended
party in written defamation cases from inconveniencing the accused by means of
out-of-town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote municipal
courts (Explanatory Note for the bill which became Republic Act No. 4363,
Congressional Record of May 20, 1965, pp. 424-5; Time, Inc. v. Reyes, L-28882, May 31,
1971, 39 SCRA 303, 311).
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Clearly, the evil sought to be prevented by the amendment to Article 360 was the
indiscriminate or arbitrary laying of the venue in libel cases in distant, isolated or far-
flung areas, meant to accomplish nothing more than harass or intimidate an accused. The
disparity or unevenness of the situation becomes even more acute where the offended
party is a person of sufficient means or possesses influence, and is motivated by spite or
the need for revenge.
If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used by the
offended party as basis for the venue in the criminal action, the Information must allege
with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published, as
evidenced or supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business offices
in the case of newspapers, magazines or serial publications. This pre-condition becomes
necessary in order to forestall any inclination to harass.
The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material
appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way of determining
the situs of its printing and first publication. To credit Gimenez's premise of equating his
first access to the defamatory article on petitioners' website in Makati with "printing and
first publication" would spawn the very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC
sought to discourage and prevent. It hardly requires much imagination to see the chaos
that would ensue in situations where the website's author or writer, a blogger or anyone
who posts messages therein could be sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines that the
private complainant may have allegedly accessed the offending website.
For the Court to hold that the Amended Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the
courts of Makati simply because the defamatory article was accessed therein would open
the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other locations where
the pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or capable of being accessed.
Respecting the contention that the venue requirements imposed by Article 360, as
amended, are unduly oppressive, the Court's pronouncements in Chavez[37] are instructive:
For us to grant the present petition, it would be necessary to abandon the Agbayani rule

providing that a private person must file the complaint for libel either in the place of
printing and first publication, or at the complainant's place of residence. We would also
have to abandon the subsequent cases that reiterate this rule in Agbayani, such
as Soriano, Agustin, and Macasaet. There is no convincing reason to resort to such a
radical action. These limitations imposed on libel actions filed by private persons are
hardly onerous, especially as they still allow such persons to file the civil or criminal
complaint in their respective places of residence, in which situation there is no need
to embark on a quest to determine with precision where the libelous matter was
printed and first published.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
IN FINE, the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in denying

petitioners' motion to quash the Amended Information.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of April 22, 2008 and
the Joint Resolution of August 12, 2008 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Br. 149 is hereby DIRECTED TO QUASH the Amended
Information in Criminal Case No. 06-876 and DISMISS the case.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 167764, October 09, 2009 ]
VICENTE FOZ, JR. AND DANNY G. FAJARDO, PETITIONERS, VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), Cebu City, dated
November 24, 2004 in CA-G.R. CR No. 22522, which affirmed the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Iloilo City, dated December 4, 1997 in Criminal
Case No. 44527 finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of libel.
Also assailed is the CA Resolution [2] dated April 8, 2005 denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
In an Information[3] dated October 17, 1994 filed before the RTC of Iloilo City, petitioners
Vicente Foz, Jr. and Danny G. Fajardo were charged with the crime of libel committed as
follows:
That on or about the 5th day of July, 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this court, both the accused as columnist and Editor-Publisher,
respectively, of Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation in the
City of Iloilo and throughout the region, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with malicious intent of impeaching the virtue, honesty, integrity and
reputation of Dr. Edgar Portigo, a physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City, and
with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said Dr. Edgar Portigo to public
hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said daily
publication on July 5, 1994, a certain article entitled "MEET DR. PORTIGO, COMPANY
PHYSICIAN," quoted verbatim hereunder, to wit:
MEET DR. PORTIGO,

COMPANY PHYSICIAN
PHYSICIAN (sic) are duly sworn to help to do all their best to promote the health
of their patients. Especially if they are employed by a company to serve its employees.
However, the opposite appears to be happening in the Local San Miguel Corporation
office, SMC employees are fuming mad about their company physician, Dr. Portigo,
because the latter is not doing well in his sworn obligation in looking after the health
problems of employees, reports reaching Aim.. Fire say.
One patient, Lita Payunan, wife of employee Wilfredo Payunan, and residing in Burgos,
Lapaz, Iloilo City, has a sad tale to say about Dr. Portigo. Her story began September 19
last year when she felt ill and had to go to Dr. Portigo for consultation. The doctor put
her under observation, taking seven months to conclude that she had rectum myoma
and must undergo an operation.
Subsequently, the family sought the services of a Dr. Celis and a Dr. de los Reyes at
Doctor's Hospital. Incidentally, where Dr. Portigo also maintains a clinic. Dr. Portigo got
angry, sources said, after knowing that the family chose a surgeon (Dr. Celis) on their
own without his nod as he had one to recommend.
Lita was operated by Dr. de los Reyes last March and was released from the hospital two
weeks after. Later, however, she again complained of difficulty in urinating and
defecating[. On] June 24, she was readmitted to the hospital.
The second operation, done by Dr. Portigo's recommendee, was devastating to the
family and the patient herself who woke to find out her anus and vagina closed and a
hole with a catheter punched on her right side.
This was followed by a bad news that she had cancer.
Dr. Portigo recommended another operation, this time to bore another hole on the left
side of Lita. But a Dr. Rivera to whom he made the referral frankly turned it down
because it would only be a waste of money since the disease was already on the
terminal state.
The company and the family spent some P150,000.00 to pay for the wrong diagnosis of
the company physician.
My sympathy for Lita and her family. May the good Lord, Healer of all healers, be on
your side, May the Healer of all healers likewise touch the conscience of physicians to
remind them that their profession is no license for self-enrichment at the expense of the
poor. But, sad to say, Lita passed away, July 2, 1994.
Lita is not alone. Society is replete with similar experience where physicians treat their
patients for profits. Where physicians prefer to act like agents of multinational
corporations prescribing expensive drugs seen if there are equivalent drugs sold at the
counter for much lower price. Yes, Lita, we also have hospitals, owned by a so-called
charitable religious institutions and so-called civic groups, too greedy for profits. Instead
of promoting baby-and mother-friendly practices which are cheaper and more effective,
they still prefer the expensive yet unhealthy practices.
The (sic) shun breast feeding and promote infant milk formula although mother's milk is
many times cheaper and more nutrious (sic) than the brands they peddle. These
hospitals separate newly born from their moms for days, conditioning the former to
milk formula while at the same time stunting the mother's mammalia from
manufacturing milk. Kadiri to death!
My deepest sympathy to the bereaved family of Mrs. Lita Payunan who died July 2,
1994, Her body lies at the Payunan residence located at 236-G Burgos St., Lapaz, Iloilo
City. May you rest in peace, Inday Lita.
wherein said Dr. Portigo was portrayed as wanting in high sense of professional
integrity, trust and responsibility expected of him as a physician, which imputation and
insinuation as both accused knew were entirely false and malicious and without
foundation in fact and therefore highly libelous, offensive and derogatory to the good
name, character and reputation of the said Dr. Edgar Portigo.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Upon being arraigned[5] on March 1, 1995, petitioners, assisted by counsel de parte,

pleaded not guilty to the crime charged in the Information. Trial thereafter ensued.
On December 4, 1997, the RTC rendered its Decision [6] finding petitioners guilty as
charged. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the facts obtaining and the jurisprudence aforecited,
JUDGMENT is hereby rendered finding both accused Danny Fajardo and Vicente Foz, Jr.
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT for the crime of Libel defined in Article 353 and
punishable under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentencing aforenamed
accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Three (3) Months and
Eleven (11) Days of Arresto Mayor, as Minimum, to One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and
Twenty-One (21) Days of Prision Correccional, as Maximum, and to pay a fine of
P1,000.00 each.[7]
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order [8] dated February 20,
1998.
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed an appeal with the CA.
On November 24, 2004, the CA rendered its assailed Decision which affirmed in toto the
RTC decision.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in a Resolution

dated April 8, 2005.
Hence, herein petition filed by petitioners based on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE SUBJECT ARTICLE "LIBELOUS"

WITHIN THE MEANING AND INTENDMENT OF ARTICLE 353 OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE EXISTENCE OF MALICE IN THIS CASE
AND IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SUBJECT ARTICLE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED AS
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER

FAJARDO WHO HAPPENS TO BE MERELY PUBLISHER OF PANAY NEWS AND COULD NOT
POSSIBLY SHARE ALL THE OPINIONS OF THE NEWSPAPER'S OPINION COLUMNISTS. [9]
Petitioners argue that the CA erred in finding that the element of defamatory
imputation was satisfied when petitioner Foz, as columnist, portrayed Dr. Portigo as an
incompetent doctor and an opportunist who enriched himself at the expense of the
poor. Petitioners pose the question of whether a newspaper opinion columnist, who
sympathizes with a patient and her family and expresses the family's outrage in print,
commits libel when the columnist criticizes the doctor's competence or lack of it, and
such criticism turns out to be lacking in basis if not entirely false. Petitioners claim that
the article was written in good faith in the belief that it would serve the public good.
They contend that the CA erred in finding the existence of malice in the publication of
the article; that no malice in law or actual malice was proven by the prosecution; and
that the article was printed pursuant to the bounden duty of the press to report matters
of public interest. Petitioners further contend that the subject article was an opinion
column, which was the columnist's exclusive views; and that petitioner Fajardo, as the
editor and publisher of Panay News, did not have to share those views and should not
be held responsible for the crime of libel.
The Solicitor General filed his Comment, alleging that only errors of law are reviewable
by this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45; that petitioners are
raising a factual issue, i.e., whether or not the element of malice required in every
indictment for libel was established by the prosecution, which would require the
weighing anew of the evidence already passed upon by the CA and the RTC; and that
factual findings of the CA, affirming those of the RTC, are accorded finality, unless there
appears on records some facts or circumstance of weight which the court may have
overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and which, if properly considered, may
alter the result of the case − a situation that is not, however, obtaining in this case.
In their Reply, petitioners claim that the first two issues presented in their petition do
not require the evaluation of evidence submitted in court; that malice, as an element of
libel, has always been discussed whenever raised as an issue via a petition for review
on certiorari. Petitioners raise for the first time the issue that the information charging
them with libel did not contain allegations sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of
Iloilo City.
The Court finds that the threshold issue for resolution is whether or not the RTC of Iloilo
City, Branch 23, had jurisdiction over the offense of libel as charged in the Information
dated October 17, 1994.
The Court notes that petitioners raised for the first time the issue of the RTC's
jurisdiction over the offense charged only in their Reply filed before this Court and finds
that petitioners are not precluded from doing so.
In Fukuzume v. People,[10] the Court ruled:
It is noted that it was only in his petition with the CA that Fukuzume raised the
issue of the trial court's jurisdiction over the offense charged. Nonetheless, the rule is
settled that an objection based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the
offense charged may be raised or considered motu proprio by the court at any stage of
the proceedings or on appeal. Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a
criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or
otherwise, since such jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority which
organized the court, and is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by law.
While an exception to this rule was recognized by this Court beginning with the
landmark case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, wherein the defense of lack of jurisdiction by
the court which rendered the questioned ruling was considered to be barred by laches,
we find that the factual circumstances involved in said case, a civil case, which justified
the departure from the general rule are not present in the instant criminal case. [11]
The Court finds merit in the petition.
Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. The Court held

in Macasaet v. People[12] that:
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal

cases the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients
took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in
criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to
try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take
jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that
limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is
determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so
shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence
adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the
court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.) [13]
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, provides
the specific rules as to the venue in cases of written defamation, to wit:
Article 360. Persons responsible.--Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause

the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be
The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as
provided for in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of
first instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense: Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties
is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of
the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or
of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in
case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be
filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time
of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first
published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall
be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at
the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and
first published x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Agbayani v. Sayo,[14] the rules on venue in Article 360 were restated as follows:
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal
action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the
libelous article is printed and first published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the
Court of First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the
commission of the offense.
Manila.
may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at
the time of the commission of the offense.[15]
Applying the foregoing law to this case, since Dr. Portigo is a private individual at the
time of the publication of the alleged libelous article, the venue of the libel case may be
in the province or city where the libelous article was printed and first published, or in
the province where Dr. Portigo actually resided at the time of the commission of the
offense.
The relevant portion of the Information for libel filed in this case which for convenience
the Court quotes again, to wit:
That on or about the 5th day of July, 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this court, both the accused as columnists and Editor-Publisher,
respectively, of Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation in the
City of Iloilo and throughout the region, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with malicious intent of impeaching the virtue, honesty, integrity and
reputation of Dr. Edgar Portigo, a physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City, and
with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said Dr. Edgar Portigo to public
hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said daily
publication on July 5, 1994, a certain article entitled "MEET DR. PORTIGO, COMPANY
PHYSICIAN...."
The allegations in the Information that "Panay News, a daily publication with a
considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region" only showed
that Iloilo was the place where Panay News was in considerable circulation but did not
establish that the said publication was printed and first published in Iloilo City.
In Chavez v. Court of Appeals,[16] which involved a libel case filed by a private individual

with the RTC of Manila, a portion of the Information of which reads:
That on or about March 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
[Baskinas and Manapat] conspiring and confederating with others whose true names,
real identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, with
malicious intent of impeaching the honesty, virtue, character and reputation of one
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, former Solicitor General of the Philippines, and with the evident
purpose of injuring and exposing him to public ridicule, hatred and contempt, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and maliciously cause to be published in "Smart File," a
magazine of general circulation in Manila, and in their respective capacity as Editor-in-
Chief and Author-Reporter, ....[17]
the Court ruled that the Information did not sufficiently vest jurisdiction in the RTC of
Manila to hear the libel charge in consonance with Article 360. The Court made the
following disquisition:
x x x Still, a perusal of the Information in this case reveals that the word
"published" is utilized in the precise context of noting that the defendants "cause[d] to
be published in 'Smart File', a magazine of general circulation in Manila." The
Information states that the libelous articles were published in Smart File, and not that
they were published in Manila. The place "Manila" is in turn employed to situate
where Smart File was in general circulation, and not where the libel was published or
first printed. The fact that Smart File was in general circulation in Manila does not
necessarily establish that it was published and first printed in Manila, in the same way
that while leading national dailies such as the Philippine Daily Inquirer or the Philippine
Star are in general circulation in Cebu, it does not mean that these newspapers are
published and first printed in Cebu.
Indeed, if we hold that the Information at hand sufficiently vests jurisdiction in Manila
courts since the publication is in general circulation in Manila, there would be no
impediment to the filing of the libel action in other locations where Smart File is in
general circulation. Using the example of the Inquirer or the Star, the granting of this
petition would allow a resident of Aparri to file a criminal case for libel against a
reporter or editor in Jolo, simply because these newspapers are in general circulation in
Jolo. Such a consequence is precisely what Rep. Act No. 4363 sought to avoid. [18]
In Agustin v. Pamintuan,[19] which also involved a libel case filed by a private individual,

the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club, with the RTC of Baguio City
where the Information therein alleged that the libelous article was "published in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer, a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Baguio and
the entire Philippines," the Court did not consider the Information sufficient to show
that Baguio City was the venue of the printing and first publication of the alleged
libelous article.
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as amended provides that a private individual may
also file the libel case in the RTC of the province where he actually resided at the time of
the commission of the offense. The Information filed against petitioners failed to allege
the residence of Dr. Portigo. While the Information alleges that "Dr. Edgar Portigo is a
physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City," such allegation did not clearly and
positively indicate that he was actually residing in Iloilo City at the time of the
commission of the offense. It is possible that Dr. Portigo was actually residing in another
place.
Again, in Agustin v. Pamintuan,[20] where the Information for libel alleged that the
"offended party was the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club and of
good standing and reputation in the community," the Court did not find such allegation
sufficient to establish that the offended party was actually residing in Baguio City. The
Court explained its ruling in this wise:
The residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation or his

actual residence or place of abode provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency; no particular length of time of residence is required. However, the
residence must be more than temporary. The term residence involves the idea of
something beyond a transient stay in the place; and to be a resident, one must abide in
a place where he had a house therein. To create a residence in a particular place, two
fundamental elements are essential: The actual bodily presence in the place, combined
with a freely exercised intention of remaining there permanently or for an indefinite
time. While it is possible that as the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club,
the petitioner may have been actually residing in Baguio City, the Informations did not
state that he was actually residing therein when the alleged crimes were committed. It
is entirely possible that the private complainant may have been actually residing in
another place. One who transacts business in a place and spends considerable time
thereat does not render such person a resident therein. Where one may have or own a
business does not of itself constitute residence within the meaning of the statute.
Pursuit of business in a place is not conclusive of residence there for purposes of venue.
[21]
Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the
allegations of the complaint or information, and the offense must have been committed
or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court.[22] Considering that the Information failed to allege the venue requirements for a
libel case under Article 360, the Court finds that the RTC of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction
to hear this case. Thus, its decision convicting petitioners of the crime of libel should be
set aside for want of jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing with the court of
competent jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 24, 2004 and the
Resolution dated April 8, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22522 are SET
ASIDE on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 23, Iloilo City. Criminal Case No. 44527 is DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
[ G.R. No. L-29169, August 19, 1968 ]

ROGER CHAVEZ, PETITIONER VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES & THE WARDEN OF THE
CITY JAIL OF MANILA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
SANCHEZ, J.:
The thrust of petitioner's case presented in his original and supplementary

petitions invoking jurisdiction of this Court is that he is entitled, on habeas corpus, to be
freed from imprisonment upon the ground that in the trial which resulted in his
conviction[1] he was denied his constitutional right not to be compelled to testify against
himself. There is his prayer, too, that, should he fail in this, he be granted the alternative
remedies of certiorari to strike down the two resolutions of the Court of Appeals
dismissing his appeal for failure to file brief, and of mandamus to direct the said court to
forward his appeal to this Court for the reason that he was raising purely questions of
law.
The indictment in the court below—the third amended information—upon which the
judgment of conviction herein challenged was rendered, was for qualified theft of a
motor vehicle, one (1) Thunderbird car, Motor No. H9YH-143003, with Plate No. H-
16648 Pasay City '62 together with its accessories worth P22,200.00. Accused were the
following: Petitioner herein, Roger Chavez, Ricardo Sumilang alias "Romeo Vasquez",
Edgardo P. Pascual alias "Ging" Pascual, Pedro Rebullo alias "Pita", Luis Asistio alias
"Baby" Asistio, Lorenzo Meneses alias "Lory" Meneses, Peter Doe, Charlie Doe and Paul
Doe.[2]
Averred in the aforesaid information was that on or about the 14th day of November,
1962, in Quezon City, the accused conspired, with intent of gain, abuse of confidence
and without the consent of the owner thereof, Dy Sun Hiok y Lim, in asporting the
motor vehicle above-described.
Upon arraignment, all the accused, except the three Does who have not been identified
nor apprehended, pleaded not guilty.
On July 23, 1963, trial commenced before the judge presiding Branch IX of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal in Quezon City.
The trial opened with the following dialogue, which for the great bearing it has on this
case, is here reproduced:
"COURT:
The parties may proceed.
FISCAL GRECIA:
Our first witness is Roger Chavez [one of the accused].
ATTY. CARBON [Counsel for petitioner Chavez]:
I am quite taken by surprise, as counsel for the accused Roger Chavez, with this move of
the fiscal in presenting him as his witness. / object.
COURT:
On what ground, counsel?
ATTY. CARBON:
On the ground that I have to confer with my client.
It is really surprising that at this stage, without my being notified by the Fiscal, my client
is being presented as witness for the prosecution. I want to say in passing that it is only
at this very moment that I come to know about this strategy of the prosecution.
COURT (To the Fiscal):
You are not withdrawing the information against the accused Roger Chavez by making
[him a] state witness?
FISCAL GRECIA:
I am not making him as state witness, Your Honor..

I am only presenting him as an ordinary witness.
ATTY. CARBON:
As a matter of right, because it will incriminate my client, I object.
COURT:
The Court will give counsel for Roger Chavez fifteen minutes within which to confer and
explain to his client about the giving of his testimony.
COURT: [after the recess]
Are the parties ready?
FISCAL:
We are ready to call on our first witness, Roger Chavez.
ATTY. CARBON:
As per understanding, the proceedings was suspended in order to enable me to confer

with my client.
I conferred with my client and he assured me that he will not testify for the prosecution
this morning after 1 have explained to him the consequences of what will transpire.
COURT:
What he will testify to does not necessarily incriminate him, counsel.
And there is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to-act as witness on the
witness-stand including the accused.
If there should be any question that is incriminating then that is the time for counsel to
interpose his objection and the court will sustain him if and when the court feels that
the answer of this witness to the question would incriminate him.
Counsel has all the assurance that the court will not require the witness to answer
questions which would incriminate him.
But surely, counsel could not object to have the accused called on the witness stand.
ATTY. CARBON: I submit.
ATTY. CRUZ [Counsel for defendants Pascual and Meneses]:
MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT:
This incident of the accused Roger Chavez being called to testify for the prosecution is
something so sudden that has come to the knowledge of this counsel.
This representation has been apprised of the witnesses embraced in the information.
For which reason I pray this court that I be given at least some days to meet whatever
testimony this witness will bring about.
I therefore move for postponement of today's hearing.
COURT:
The court will give counsel time within which to prepare his cross-examination of this
witness.
ATTY. CRUZ:
I labored under the impression that the witnesses for the prosecution in this criminal
case are those only listed in the information.
I did not know until this morning that one of the accused will testify as witness for the
prosecution.
COURT:
That's the reason why the court will go along with counsels for the accused and will give
them time within which to prepare for their cross-examination of this witness.
The court will not defer the taking of the direct examination of the witness.
Call the witness to the witness-stand.
EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION
ROGER CHAVEZ, 31 years old, single, buy and sell merchant, presently detained at the
Manila Police Department headquarters, after being duly sworn according to law,
declared as follows:
ATTY. 1BASCO [Counsel for defendant Luis Asistio]:
WITH THE LEAVE OF THE COURT:
This witness, Roger Chavez is one of the accused in this case No. 0-5311. The
information alleges conspiracy. Under Rule 123, Section 12, it states:
'The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.'
COURT:
That is premature, counsel. Neither the court nor counsels for the accused know what
the prosecution wants to establish by calling this witness to the witness-stand.
ATTY. IBASCO:
I submit. COURT:
The Fiscal may proceed."[3]

And so did the trial proceed. It began with the "direct examination" of Roger
Chavez by "Fiscal Grecia".
Came the judgment of February 1, 1965. The version of the prosecution as found by the
court below may be briefly narrated as follows:
A few days before November 12, 1962, Roger Chavez saw Johnson Lee, a Chinese,
driving a Thunderbird car. With Ricardo Sumilang (movie actor Romeo Vasquez) in mind,
whom he knew was in the market for such a car, Chavez asked Lee whether his car was
for sale. Lee answered affirmatively and left his address with Chavez. Then, on
November 12, Chavez met Sumilang at a barbershop, informed him about the
Thunderbird. But Sumilang said that he had changed his mind about buying a new car.
Instead, he told Chavez that he wanted to mortgage his Buick car for P10,000.00 to
cover an indebtedness in Pasay City. Upon the suggestion of Chavez, they went to see
Luis Asistio, who he knew was lending money on car mortgages and who, on one
occasion, already lent Romeo Vasquez P3,000.00 on the same Buick car. Asistio however
told the two that he had a better idea on how to raise the money. His plan was to
capitalize on Romeo Vasquez' reputation as a wealthy movie star, introduce him as a
buyer to someone who was selling a car and, after the deed of sale is signed, by trickery
to run away with the car. Asistio would then register it, sell it to a third person for a
profit. Chavez, known to be a car agent, was included in the plan. He furnished the
name of Johnson Lee who was selling his Thunderbird.
In the morning of November 14, Chavez telephoned Johnson Lee and arranged for an
appointment. Sometime in the afternoon, Chavez and Sumilang met Lee in his
Thunderbird on Highway 54. Sumilang was introduced as the interested buyer.
Sumilang's driver inspected the car, took the wheel for a while. After Sumilang and Lee
agreed on the purchase price (P21,000.00), they went to Binondo to Johnson Lee's
cousin, Dy Sun Hiok, in whose name the car was registered. Thereafter, they went to see
a lawyer-notary public in Quezon City, known to Chavez, for the drafting of the deed of
sale. After the deed of sale was drawn up, it was signed by Sumilang as the vendee, Dy
Sun Hiok the vendor, and Sumilang's driver and Johnson Lee the witnesses thereto.
As payment was to be made at Eugene's restaurant in Quezon City, all of them then
drove in the Thunderbird car to that place. The deed of sale and other papers remained
in the pockets of Johnson Lee.
At Eugene's, a man approached Sumilang with a note which stated that the money was
ready at the Dalisay Theater. Sumilang then wrote on the same note that the money
should be brought to the restaurant. At the same time he requested Lee to exhibit the
deed of sale of the car to the note bearer. [4]
Then, the two Chinese were left alone in the restaurant. For Sumilang, who had left the
table to pose for pictures with some fans and came back, again left never to return. So
did Chavez, who disappeared after he left on the pretext of buying cigarettes. The two
Chinese could not locate Sumilang and Chavez. They went out to the place where the
Thunderbird was parked, found that it was gone. They then immediately reported its
loss to the police. Much later, the NBI recovered the already repainted car and
impounded it.
Right after the meeting at Eugene's, Chavez, Sumilang and Asistio converged that same
day at Barrio Fiesta, a restaurant at Highway 54 near the Balintawak monument in
Caloocan. There, Asistio handed to Sumilang PI ,000.00 cash and a golf set worth
P800.00 as the latter's share in the transaction. On the 14th of November, the
registration of the car was transferred in the name of Sumilang in Cavite City, and three
days later, in the name of Asistio in Caloocan.
From the court's decision, Ricardo Sumilang's version, corroborated in part by Asistio,
may be condensed as follows:
In the last week of September, 1962, Sumilang saw Roger Chavez at a gas station. The
latter informed him that there was a Thunderbird from Clark Field for sale for a price
between P20,000.00 and P22,000.00. Chavez said that it could be held for him with a
down payment of P10,000.00.
To raise this sum, Sumilang and Chavez, on October 1, went to the house of a certain
Nena Hernaez de los Reyes who wrote out-4check for P5,000.00 as a loan to Sumilang.
That check was exhibited in court. Sumilang and Chavez then went to Pasay City to see a
certain Mario Baltazar, an agent of the Pasay City Mayor, and Narsing Cailles, Chief of
the Fire Department. Sumilang asked the two for a P10,000.00-loan backed up by the
P5,000.00-check aforesaid on condition that it should not be cashed immediately as
there were not enough funds therefor. Baltazar and Cailles agreed to give the money
the next day, as long as the check would be left with them and Sumilang would sign a
promissory note for P10,000.00. Baltazar later informed Sumilang that Chavez picked up
the money the next day. Four or five days afterwards, Chavez returned P4,000.00 to
Sumilang because P6,000.00 was enough for the deposit. And so, Sumilang gave back
the P4,000.00 to Baltazar.
About the end of October or at the beginning of November, Chavez asked Sumilang for
another P3,000.00. Sumilang sent Chavez to Baltazar and Cailles, with a note requesting
that they accommodate him once more. He also sent a check, again without funds.
Baltazar gave the money after verifying the authenticity of the note.
On November 14, Chavez appeared at Sumilang's house with the news that the car was
ready if Sumilang was ready with the rest of the money. So Sumilang got P9,000.00 from
his mother and another P4,000.00 from his aparador. He immediately gave P6,000.00 to
Chavez, intending to pay out the balance upon the car's delivery. It was then that
Chavez told Sumilang that the car was already bought by a Chinese who would be the
vendor.
The purchase price finally agreed upon between Sumilang and Johnson Lee was
P21,000.00, plus P500.00 agent's commission at the expense of the buyer. Sumilang told
Lee that he already paid part of the price to Chavez.
At Eugene's, Chavez asked Sumilang for the balance, Sumilang accommodated. There,
Sumilang also saw a friend, "Ging" Pascual. In the course of their conversation at the
bar, Sumilang mentioned the proposed transaction thru Chavez. Pascual warned that
Chavez was a "smart" agent and advised that Sumilang should have a receipt for his
money. A certain Bimbo, a friend of Pascual, offered to make out a receipt for Chavez to
sign.
After Sumilang returned from posing for some photographs with some of his fans,
Bimbo showed him the receipt already signed by Chavez. Sumilang requested Pascual
and Bimbo to sign the receipt as witnesses. And they did. This receipt was offered as an
exhibit by the prosecution and by Sumilang.
When Sumilang was ready to leave Eugene's, Johnson Lee turned over to him the deed
of sale, the registration papers and the keys to the car. After shaking hands with Lee,
Sumilang drove away in the car with his driver at the wheel.
Two or three days afterwards, Sumilang dropped by the Barrio Fiesta on his way to a
film shooting at Bulacan. He saw Asistio with many companions. Asistio liked his
Thunderbird parked outside. Asistio offered to buy it from him for P22,500.00. As the
offer was good, and knowing Asistio's and his friends' reputation for always getting what
they wanted, Sumilang consented to the sale. Asistio tendered a down payment of
PI,000.00; the balance he promised to pay the next day after negotiating with some
financing company. Before said balance could be paid, the car was impounded.
The trial court gave credence to Sumilang's averment, strengthened by Baltazar's and
Cailles' corroborations, that he paid good money for the car. Sumilang was thus cleared.
So was Asistio whom the trial court believed to be a mere buyer of the car. And so, the
prosecution's theory of conspiracy was discounted.
As to the other accused, the court found no case against Pedro Rebullo alias "Pita" and
Lorenzo Meneses alias "Lory". The accused "Ging" Pascual was also acquitted for in the
first place he was not identified by Johnson Lee in court.
As to Roger Chavez, however, the court had this to say: "Roger Chavez does not offer
any defense. As a matter of fact, his testimony as witness for the prosecution establishes
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt."[5] The trial court branded him "a self-confessed
culprit".[6] The court further continued:
"It is not improbable that true to the saying that misery loves company Roger
Chavez tried to drag his co-accused down with him by coloring his story with
fabrications which he expected would easily stick together what with the newspaper
notoriety of one and the sensationalism caused by the other. But Roger Chavez's
accusations of Asistio's participation is utterly uncorroborated. And coming, as it does,
from a man who has had at least two convictions for acts not very different from those
charged in this information, the Court would be too gullible if it were to give full
credence to his words even if they concerned a man no tess notorious than himself." [7]
The trial court then came to the conclusion that if Johnson Lee was not paid for
his car, he had no one but Roger Chavez to blame.
The sum of all these is that the trial court freed all the accused except Roger Chavez
who was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft. He was
accordingly sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of not less than ten (10) years,
one (1) day, as minimum and not more than fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day as maximum, to indemnify Dy Sun Hiok and/or Johnson Lee in the sum of
P21,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, to undergo the
accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay the costs. The Thunderbird car then in
the custody of the NB1 was ordered to be turned over to Ricardo Sumilang, who was
directed to return to Asistio the sum of PI,000.00 unless the latter chose to pay
P21,500.00, representing the balance of the contract price for the car.
The foregoing sentence was promulgated on March 8, 1965. Roger Chavez appealed to
the Court of Appeals.
On April 18, 1968, the Court of Appeals required Atty. Natividad Marquez, counsel for
Roger Chavez, to show cause within ten days from notice why Chavez' appeal should not
be considered abandoned and dismissed. Reason for this is that said lawyer received
notice to file brief on December 28, 1967 and the period for the filing thereof lapsed on
January 27, 1968 without any brief having been filed.
On May 13, 1968, Atty. Marquez registered a detailed written explanation. She also
stated that if she were allowed to file appellant's brief she would go along with the
factual findings of the court below but will show however that its conclusion is
erroneous.[8]
On May 14, 1968, the Court of Appeals, despite the foregoing explanation, resolved to
dismiss the appeal. A move to reconsider was unavailing. For, on June 21, 1968, the
Court of Appeals, through a per curiam resolution, disposed to maintain its May 14
resolution dismissing the appeal, directed the City Warden of Manila where Chavez is
confined by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by the Court of Appeals, to turn
him over to Muntinglupa Bilibid Prisons pending execution of the judgment below, and
ordered remand of the case to the Quezon City court for execution of judgment.
It was at this stage that the present proceedings were commenced in this Court.
Upon the petitions, the return, and the reply, and after hearing on oral arguments, we
now come to grips with the main problem presented.
We concentrate attention on that phase of the issues which relates to petitioner's

assertion that he was compelled to testify against himself. For indeed if this one
question is resolved in the affirmative, we need not reach the others; in which case,
these should not be pursued here.
1. Petitioner's plea on this score rests upon his averment, with proof, of violation of his
right — constitutionally entrenched — against self-incrimination. He asks that the hand
of this Court be made to bear down upon his conviction; that he be relieved -of the
effects thereof. He asks us to consider the constitutional injunction that: "No person
shall be compelled to be a witness against himself," [9] fully echoed in Section 1, Rule 115,
Rules of Court where, in all criminal prosecutions, the defendant shall be entitled: "(e)
To be exempt from being a witness against himself."
It has been said that forcing a man to be a witness against himself is at war with "the
fundamentals of a republican government"; [10] that "[i]t may suit the purposes of
despotic power but it can not abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty and
personal freedom."[11] Mr. Justice Abad Santos recounts the historical background of this
constitutional inhibition, thus: " 'The maxim Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare had its
origin in a protest against the inquisitorial and manifestly unjust methods of
interrogating accused persons, which has long obtained in the continental system, and,
until the expulsion of the Stuarts from the British throne in 1688, and the erection of
additional barriers for the protection of the people against the exercise of arbitrary
power, was not uncommon even in England. While the admissions of confessions of the
prisoner, when voluntarily and freely made, have always ranked high in the scale of
incriminating evidence, if an accused person be asked to explain his apparent
connection with a crime under investigation, the ease with which the questions put to
him may assume an inquisitorial character, the temptation to press the witness unduly,
to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, to push him into a corner, and to entrap
him into fatal contradictions, which is so painfully evident in many of the earlier state
trials, notably in those of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, and Udal, the Puritan minister,
made the system so odious as to give rise to a demand for its total abolition. The change
in the English criminal procedure in that particular seems to be founded upon no statute
and no judicial opinion, but upon a general and silent acquiescence of the courts in a
popular demand. But, however, adopted, it has become firmly embedded in English, as
well as in American jurisprudence. So deeply did the iniquities of the ancient system
impress themselves upon the minds of the American colonists that the states, with one
accord, made a denial of the right to question an accused person a part of their
fundamental law, so that a maxim which in England was a mere rule of evidence
became clothed in this country with the impregnability of a constitutional enactment.'
(Brown vs. Walker, 161 U.S., 591, 597; 40 Law. ed., 819, 821.)." [12] Mr. Justice Malcolm,
in expressive language, tells us that this maxim was recognized in England in the early
days "in a revolt against the thumbscrew and the rack." [13] An old Philippine case [1904]
[14] speaks of this constitutional injunction as "older than the Government of the
United States"; as having "its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial methods of
interrogating the accused person"; and as having been adopted in the Philippines "to
wipe out such practices as formerly prevailed in these Islands of requiring accused
persons to submit to judicial, examinations, and to give testimony regarding the
offenses with which they were charged."
So it is then that this right is "not merely a formal technical rule the enforcement of
which is left to the discretion of the court"; it is mandatory; it secures to a defendant a
valuable and substantive right;[15] it is fundamental to our scheme of justice. Just a few
months ago, the Supreme Court of the United States (January 29, 1968), speaking thru
Mr. Justice Harlan warned that "[t]he constitutional privilege was intended to shield the
guilty and imprudent as well as the innocent and foresighted." [16]
It is in this context that we say that the constitutional guarantee may not be treated
with unconcern. To repeat, it is mandatory; it secures to every defendant a valuable and
substantive right. Tanada and Fernando (Constitution of the Philippines, 4th ed., vol. I,
pp. 583-584) takes note of U.S. vs. Navarro, supra, which reaffirms the rule that the
constitutional proscription was established on broad grounds of public policy and
humanity; of policy because it would place the witness against the strongest temptation
to commit perjury, and of humanity because it would be to extort a confession of truth
by a kind of duress every species and degree of which the law abhors. [17]
Therefore, the court may not extract from a defendant's own lips and against his will an
admission of his guilt. Nor may a court as much as resort to compulsory disclosure,
directly or indirectly, of facts usable against him as a confession of the crime or the
tendency of which is to prove the commission of a crime. Because, it is his right to
forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand — with
undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free, genuine will.
Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it
may be the product of unintentional statements. Pressure which operates to overbear
his will, disable him from making a free and rational choice, or impair his capacity for
rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. So is moral coercion "tending to
force testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant." [18]
2. With the foregoing as guideposts, we now turn to the facts. Petitioner is a defendant
in a criminal case. He was called by the prosecution as the first witness in that case to
testify for the People during the first day of trial thereof. Petitioner objected and
invoked the privilege of self-incrimination. This he broadened by the clear-cut statement
that he will not testify. But petitioner's protestations were met with the judge's
emphatic statement that it "is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as
witness on the witness-stand including the accused," and that defense counsel "could
not object to have the accused called on the witness stand." The cumulative impact of
all these is that accused-petitioner had to take the stand. He was thus peremptorily
asked to create evidence against himself. The foregoing situation molds a solid case for
petitioner, backed by the Constitution, the law, and jurisprudence.
Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness.

Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the
privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him, [19] an accused
may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all
questions.[20] For, in reality, the purpose of calling an accused as a witness for the People
would be to incriminate him.[21] The rule positively intends to avoid and prohibit the
certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person "to furnish the missing evidence
necessary for his conviction."[22] This rule may apply even to a co-defendant in a joint
trial.[23]
And the guide in the interpretation of the constitutional precept that the accused shall
not be compelled to furnish evidence against himself "is not the probability of the
evidence but it is the capability of abuse."[24] Thus it is, ihat it was undoubtedly
erroneous for the trial judge to placate petitioner with these words:
"What he will testify to does not necessarily incriminate him, counsel.
And there is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the
witness-stand including the accused.
If there should be any question that is incriminating then that is the time for counsel to
interpose his Objection and the court will sustain him if and when the court feels that
the answer of this witness to the question would incriminate him.
Counsel has all the assurance that the court will not require the witness to answer
questions which would incriminate him.
But surely, counsel could not object to have the accused called on the witness-stand."
Paraphrasing Chief Justice Marshall in Aaron Burr's Trial, Robertsons Rep. I, 208,
244, quoted in VIII Wigmore, p. 355, [25] while a defendant's knowledge of the facts
"remains concealed within his bosom, he is safe; but draw it from thence, and he is
exposed" — to conviction.
The judge's words heretofore quoted — "But surely, counsel could not object to have
the accused called on the witness-stand" — wielded authority. By those words,
petitioner was enveloped by a coercive force; they deprived him of his will to resist;
they foreclosed choice: the realities of human nature tell us that as he took his oath to
tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, no genuine consent underlay
submission to take the witness stand. Constitutionally sound consent was absent.
3. Prejudice to the accused for having been compelled over his objections to be a
witness for the People is at once apparent. The record discloses that by leading
questions Chavez, the accused, was made to affirm his statement given to the NBI
agents on July 17, 1963 at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. [26] And this statement detailed
the plan and execution thereof by Sumilang (Vasquez), Asistio and himself to deprive
the Chinese of his Thunderbird car. And he himself proceeded to narrate the same anew
in open court. He identified the Thunderbird car involved in the case. [27]
The decision convicting Roger Chavez was clearly of the view that the case for the
People was built primarily around the admissions of Chavez himself. The trial court
described Chavez as the "star witness for the prosecution." Indeed, the damaging facts
forged in the decision were drawn directly from the lips of Chavez as a prosecution
witness and of course Ricardo Sumilang for the defense. There are the unequivocal
statements in the decision that "even accused Chavez" identified "the very same
Thunderbird that Johnson Lee had offered for sale"; that Chavez' "testimony as witness
for the prosecution establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt"; and that Chavez is
"a self-confessed culprit."
4. With all these, we have no hesitancy in saying that petitioner was forced to testify to
incriminate himself, in full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be
said now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the stand and in his
own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness; on the contrary, he claimed the right
upon being called to testify. If petitioner nevertheless answered the questions in spite of
his fear of being accused of perjury or being put under contempt, this circumstance
cannot be counted against him. His testimony is not of his own choice. To him it was a
case of compelled submission. He was a cowed participant in proceedings before a
judge who possessed the power to put him under contempt had he chosen to remain
silent. Nor could he escape testifying. The court made it abundantly clear that his
testimony at least on direct examination would be taken right then and there on the
first day of the trial.
It matters not that, after all efforts to stave off petitioner's taking the stand became
fruitless, no objections to questions propounded to him were made. Here involved is
not a mere question of self-incrimination. It is a defendant's constitutional immunity
from being called to testify against himself. And the objection made at the beginning is a
continuing one.
There is therefore no waiver of the privilege. "To be effective, a waiver must be certain
and unequivocal, and intelligently, understandably, and willingly made; such waiver
follows only where liberty of choice has been fully accorded. After a claim a witness
cannot properly be held to have waived his privilege on vague and uncertain
evidence."[28] The teaching in Johnson vs. Zerbst[29] is this: "It has been pointed out that
'courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver' of fundamental
constitutional rights and that we 'do not presume acquiescence in the loss of
fundamental rights.' A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquisnment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege." Renuntiatio non praesumitur.
The foregoing guidelines, juxtaposed with the circumstances of the case heretofore
adverted to, make waiver a shaky defense. It cannot stand. If, by his own admission,
defendant proved his guilty still, his original claim remains valid. For the privilege, we
say again, is a rampart that gives protection — even to the. guilty.[30]
5. The course which petitioner takes is correct. Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ.
[31]
It is traditionally considered as an : exceptional remedy to release a person whose
liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accused's constitutional rights are ,
disregarded.[32] Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction [33] and therefore
invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental
right was violated.[34] That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral
attack, which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. [35] This writ may issue even if
another remedy which is less effective may be availed of by the defendant. [36] Thus,
failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of Appeals does not
preclude a recourse to the writ. [37] The writ may be granted upon a judgment already
final.[38] For, as explained in Johnson vs. Zerbst,[39] the writ of habeas corpus as an
extraordinary remedy must be liberally given effect [40] so as to protect well a person
whose liberty is at stake. The propriety of the writ was given the nod in that case,
involving a violation of another constitutional right, in this wise:
"Since the Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged with crime to
the assistance of Counsel, compliance with this constitutional mandate is an essential
jurisdictional prerequisite to a Federal Court's authority to deprive an accused of his life
or liberty. When this right is properly waived, the assistance of Counsel is no longer a
necessary element of the Court's jurisdiction to proceed to conviction and sentence. If
the accused, however, is not represented by Counsel and has not competently and
intelligently waived his constitutional right, the Sixth Amendment stands as a
jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence depriving him of his life or liberty. A
court's jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost 'in the course of the proceedings'
due to failure to complete the court — as the Sixth Amendment requires — by providing
Counsel for an accused who is unable to obtain Counsel, who has not intelligently
waived this constitutional guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at stake. If this
requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not complied with, the court no longer has
jurisdiction to proceed. The judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without
jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain release by habeas
corpus.[41]
Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to the accused Roger Chavez
whose case presents a clear picture of disregard of a constitutional right is absolutely
proper. Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the writ, unless otherwise expressly provided by
law, ''to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of
his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person
entitled thereto."
Just as we are about to write finis to our task, we are prompted to restate that: "A void
judgment is in legal effect no judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights
can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are equally
worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one. All acts performed under it and all claims
flowing out of it are void. The parties attempting to enforce it may be responsible as
trespassers. [42]
6. Respondent's return[43] shows that petitioner is still serving under a final and valid
judgment of conviction for another offense. We should guard against the improvident
issuance of an order discharging a petitioner from confinement. The position we take
here is that petitioner herein is entitled to liberty thru habeas corpus only with respect
to Criminal Case Q-5311 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch,
under which he was prosecuted and convicted.
Upon the view we take of this case, judgment is hereby rendered directing the
respondent Warden of the City Jail of Manila or the Director of Prisons or any other
officer or person in custody of petitioner Roger Chavez by reason of the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, in Criminal Case Q-5311, entitled
"People of the Philippines, plaintiff, vs. Ricardo Sumilang, et al., accused," to discharge
said Roger Chavez from custody, unless he is held, kept in custody or detained for any
cause or reason other than the said judgment in said Criminal Case Q-5311 of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, in which event the discharge herein
directed shall be effected when such other cause or reason ceases to exist.
No costs. SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 164938, August 22, 2005 ]
VICTOR C. AGUSTIN, PETITIONER, VS. HON. FERNANDO VIL
PAMINTUAN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BAGUIO CITY, BRANCH 3; ANTHONY DE
LEON AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals' (CA)
Decision[1] in CA-G.R. SP No. 70629 dismissing the petition for certiorari and
prohibition filed by petitioner Victor C. Agustin which, in turn, assailed the Order of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3, denying the motion to quash the
Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 17892-R to 17895-R, for libel.
On June 13, 2000, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City, filed four separate
Informations[2] charging the petitioner, a Philippine Daily Inquirer columnist, with libel.
The inculpatory portion of that in Criminal Case No. 17892-R is quoted infra, as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of March 2000, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent
and malicious intent and evil motive of attacking, injuring and impeaching the character,
honesty, integrity, virtue and reputation of one Anthony De Leon the acting general
manager of the Baguio Country Club, and as a private citizen of good standing and
reputation in the community and with malicious intent of exposing the (sic) Anthony De
Leon to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, discredit and dishonor, without any justifiable
motive, did then and there willfully, maliciously and criminally prepare or cause to
prepare, write in his column "Cocktails" and publish in the Philippine Daily Inquirer, a
newspaper of general circulation in the City of Baguio and in the entire Philippines,
wherein in said column the said accused did then and there defame the complainant
Anthony De Leon by branding and imputing upon him the following defamatory and
libelous statements, to wit:
"The trysting place between the President Marcos and Hollywood actress Dovie Beams
is not the subject of a high level tax evasion investigation ordered by no less than the new
BIR Commissioner, Dakila Fonacier.
That bungalow on Northwestern Street had hastily changed hands in the last two years,
and had supposedly been sold to, first Anthony De Leon, the acting general manager of
the exclusive Baguio Country Club, who in turn disposed of it to an unwitting Chinoy
couple.
According to preliminary BIR findings, the transfer to Mr. De Leon is already spurious
since the cook De Leon had been missing and had gone "TNT" in New York more than
eight years ago. The spurious sale to the male De Leon who is not related to the cook,
was necessary to make it appear that it had been an intra-family transfer.
Second, the Baguio Country Club manager made it appear that he and his family had
been using the house himself, but the BIR had now gotten a certification from the
Greenhills homeowners' association that the said bungalow has all these years been
rented to third parties, the last of which was an ADB executive.
The most damaging of the findings was the supposed transfer price of the bungalow
between the De Leons and how much the bungalow was later palmed off to the Chinese-
Filipino couple.
We will leave those details for the BIR Commissioner to announce himself, that, if he
could overcome the tremendous and well-oiled lobbying efforts by De Leon's principals.
Tip: One of the principals is a lawyer and self-proclaimed best friend of Lenny "Dragon
Lady" de Jesus."
which aforesaid defamatory, malicious and libelous words and statements have been read
by the personnel of the Baguio Country Club, by the residents of the City of Baguio, and
by the public in the other parts of the country, and that those libelous and defamatory
words and statements aforementioned are untrue, false and malicious tending to impeach
the character, integrity, virtue and reputation of the said Anthony De Leon as Acting
General Manager of the Baguio Country Club, thus, placing and causing said Anthony
De Leon to public hatred, contempt, dishonor, discredit and ridicule which acts are
serious and insulting in nature, to the damage and prejudice of the said Anthony De Leon.
[3]
Except for the alleged libelous articles, as well as the dates of the commission of the
crimes charged therein, the three other Informations are similarly worded.
Agustin was arraigned on September 10, 2001, and pleaded not guilty to all the charges. [4]
Agustin then filed a Motion to Quash the Informations, on the sole ground that the court
had no jurisdiction over the offenses charged. He pointed out that the said Informations
did not contain any allegation that the offended party, Anthony de Leon, was actually
residing in Baguio City, or that the alleged libelous articles were printed and first
published in a newspaper of general circulation in Baguio City.
Private complainant De Leon, through counsel, opposed the motion, alleging that he was
a bona fide resident of the Baguio Country Club located at the Country Club Road,
Baguio City; he was also the acting general manager of the club at the time the alleged
libelous article was published. He emphasized that the Informations alleged that he was
of good standing and reputation in the community, and that the word "community" meant
Baguio City, where he was residing. Moreover, Agustin was estopped from assailing the
court's lack of jurisdiction since he was arraigned before he filed his motion to quash the
Information. Even if it may be assumed that there was some ambiguity in the
Informations as to whether he was an actual resident of Baguio City, amending them
would suffice; based on the entirety of the context and applying the doctrine of necessary
implication, there can be no other conclusion than that he was a resident of Baguio City.
By way of Reply, Agustin averred that the allegations in the Informations (that the
private complainant was the acting general manager of the Baguio Country Club and was
a private citizen of good standing and reputation in the community) do not constitute an
allegation that the private complainant was an actual resident of Baguio City. He insisted
that to construe the word "community" in the Informations to mean the community in
Baguio City would be to unduly strain the limits of a fair interpretation; there must be
clear and positive allegations in the Informations that the private complainant actually
resided in Baguio City. He argued that he was not estopped from assailing the court's
jurisdiction over the crimes charged even after his arraignment because lack of
jurisdiction is a matter which can be dealt with at any time.
On January 16, 2002, the trial court issued an Order[5] denying the motion to quash,
holding that in the light of the petitioner's admission that the private complainant was the
General Manager of the Baguio Country Club, "it was reasonable to infer therefrom that
the private complainant was actually a resident of Baguio City at the time the alleged
libelous articles were published."
Agustin filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order, insisting that the mere fact that
the private complainant was the General Manager of the Baguio Country Club did not
necessarily mean that the latter was actually residing in Baguio City, as it was also
possible that he was actually residing in a place nearby. The trial court, however, denied
the motion on April 1, 2002.
Agustin forthwith filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with a plea for an
injunctive relief before the Court of Appeals (CA), claiming that the trial court committed
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying his
Motion to Quash.
On February 24, 2004, the CA rendered a decision dismissing the petition. It disagreed
with Agustin, and held that the trial court did not commit a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in so ruling. According to the CA, while the
Informations filed by the prosecution did not contain allegations that the complainant was
actually a resident of Baguio City at the time the alleged libelous articles were printed
and first published, and that the alleged libelous articles were printed and first published
in Baguio City, such defects were merely of form and not of substance. Thus, there is no
need to quash the Informations, as they may merely be amended pursuant to Section 14,
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that "an
amendment, either of form or substance, may be made at any time before the accused
enters a plea to the charge, and thereafter, as to all matters of form with leave of
court."[6] The CA further ruled that any amendment that would be made to conform to the
private complainant's residency requirements would not place the accused at a
disadvantage.
Agustin filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, which the appellate court
denied for lack of merit.[7]
Agustin, now the petitioner, insists that the CA erred in dismissing his petition
for certiorari and prohibition, it appearing that the trial court committed a grave abuse of
its discretion in denying his Motion to Quash the Informations, as well as his motion for
reconsideration of the trial court's order denying the same.
The petitioner maintains that in the absence of any allegations in the Informations that the
private respondent was actually residing in Baguio City, or that the alleged libelous
articles were printed and first published in Baguio City as mandated by Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code, the trial court had no jurisdiction over the offenses charged. He
asserts that the amendments of the Informations would likewise be improper, considering
that the defects of the Informations were not merely of form but of substance. The
petitioner posits that venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional and mandatory; hence,
conformably with the decisions of the Court in Lopez v. City Judge,[8] and Agbayani v.
Sayo,[9] the Informations must be quashed.
In its Comment on the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that
the failure of the Informations to allege that the private respondent is a resident of Baguio
City (where the Informations were filed) is not a jurisdictional defect. It asserts that the
averment in the Informations that the crimes charged were committed within the
jurisdiction of the trial court in Baguio City, taken in conjunction with the other
allegations therein, are sufficient to vest jurisdiction over the subject cases in the RTC of
Baguio City.
For his part, the private complainant reiterated his arguments in the RTC and in the CA in
his Comment on the Petition.
The threshold issues in the present petition are (1) whether or not the RTC of Baguio City
has jurisdiction over the offenses charged in the four Informations on the premise that the
Informations are defective; and (2) whether the Informations may be amended to cure the
said defects.
Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. [10] The jurisdiction of a

court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or
Information, and the offense must have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.[11]
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code provides -

ART. 360. Persons responsible.- Any person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause the
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for
in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance
of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where
any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense; Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer
whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the
action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or
province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public
officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of
First Instance or the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission
of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case one
of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of
the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published: Provided, further,
That the civil action shall be filed in the same court where the criminal action is filed and
vice versa: Provided, furthermore, That the court where the criminal action or civil action
for damages is first filed, shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts:
And provided, finally, That this amendment shall not apply to cases of written
defamations, the civil and/or criminal actions to which have been filed in court at the time
of the effectivity of this law.
Preliminary investigation of criminal actions for written defamations as provided for in

the chapter shall be conducted by the provincial or city fiscal of the province or city, or
by the municipal court of the city or capital of the province where such actions may be
instituted in accordance with the provisions of this article.
No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation of a crime which
cannot be prosecuted de oficio shall be brought except at the instance of and upon
complaint expressly filed by the offended party.
Thus, the rules on venue in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code are as follows:
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal
action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the
libelous article is printed and first published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed
in the Court of First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time
of the commission of the offense.
Manila.
may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held
office at the time of the commission of the offense.[12]
Experience has shown that under the old rule, the offended party could harass the accused
in a libel case by laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant places.
[13]
To obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal action from written
defamation, the complaint or Information should contain allegations as to whether the
offended party was a public officer or a private individual at the time the offense was
committed, and where he was actually residing at that time; whenever possible, the place
where the written defamation was printed and first published should likewise be alleged.
[14]
In this case, the Informations did not allege that the offended party was actually residing
in Baguio City at the time of the commission of the offenses, or that the alleged libelous
articles were printed and first published in Baguio City. It cannot even be inferred from
the allegation "the offended party was the Acting General Manager of the Baguio
Country Club and of good standing and reputation in the community" that the private
respondent (complainant) was actually residing in Baguio City.
The residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation or his actual
residence or place of abode provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency;
no particular length of time of residence is required. However, the residence must be
more than temporary.[15] The term residence involves the idea of something beyond a
transient stay in the place; and to be a resident, one must abide in a place where he had a
house therein.[16] To create a residence in a particular place, two fundamental elements are
essential: The actual bodily presence in the place, combined with a freely exercised
intention of remaining there permanently or for an indefinite time.[17] While it is possible
that as the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club, the petitioner may have
been actually residing in Baguio City, the Informations did not state that he was actually
residing therein when the alleged crimes were committed. It is entirely possible that the
private complainant may have been actually residing in another place. One who transacts
business in a place and spends considerable time thereat does not render such person a
resident therein.[18] Where one may have or own a business does not of itself constitute
residence within the meaning of the statute. Pursuit of business in a place is not
conclusive of residence there for purposes of venue.[19]
We do not agree with the ruling of the CA that the defects in the Informations are merely
formal. Indeed, the absence of any allegations in the Informations that the offended party
was actually residing in Baguio City, where the crimes charged were allegedly
committed, is a substantial defect. Indeed, the amendments of the Informations to vest
jurisdiction upon the court cannot be allowed.[20]
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 70629 are SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City, Branch 3, is hereby DIRECTED TO QUASH the Informations
and DISMISS the cases against petitioner Victor C. Agustin in Criminal Case Nos.
17892-R to 17895-R.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 192565, February 28, 2012 ]
UNION BANK OF THE, PHILIPPINES AND DESI TOMAS, PETITIONERS,
VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review in this Rule 45 petition, the decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 65, Makati City (RTC-Makati City) in Civil Case No. 09-1038. The petition seeks to
reverse and set aside the RTC-Makati City decision dismissing the petition
for certiorari of petitioners Union Bank of the Philippines (Union Bank) and Desi Tomas
(collectively, the petitioners). The RTC found that the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
63, Makati City (MeTC-Makati City) did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in
denying the motion to quash the information for perjury filed by Tomas.
The Antecedents
Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) for making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The
Information against her reads:
Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a complaint for sum of money with prayer
for a writ of replevin docketed as [Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the Metropolitan Trial
Court[,] Pasay City, that the Union Bank of the Philippines has not commenced any
other action or proceeding involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency,
accused knowing well that said material statement was false thereby making a willful
and deliberate assertion of falsehood.[2]
The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Bank’s two (2) complaints for sum of
money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong
and a John Doe. The first complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0717, was filed
before the RTC, Branch 109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The second complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. 342-000, was filed on March 15, 2000 and raffled to the
MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City. Both complaints showed that Tomas executed and signed
the Certification against Forum Shopping. Accordingly, she was charged of deliberately
violating Article 183 of the RPC by falsely declaring under oath in the Certificate against
Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did not commence any other action
or proceeding involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency.
Tomas filed a Motion to Quash,[3] citing two grounds. First, she argued that the venue
was improperly laid since it is the Pasay City court (where the Certificate against Forum
Shopping was submitted and used) and not the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate
against Forum Shopping was subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjury case.
Second, she argued that the facts charged do not constitute an offense because: (a) the
third element of perjury – the willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood – was not
alleged with particularity without specifying what the other action or proceeding
commenced involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency; (b) there was no
other action or proceeding pending in another court when the second complaint was
filed; and (c) she was charged with perjury by giving false testimony while the
allegations in the Information make out perjury by making a false affidavit.
The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction over
the case since the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized in Makati City.
[4]
The MeTC-Makati City also ruled that the allegations in the Information sufficiently
charged Tomas with perjury.[5] The MeTC-Makati City subsequently denied Tomas’
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC-Makati City to annul and set
aside the MeTC-Makati City orders on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. The
petitioners anchored their petition on the rulings in United States v. Canet[7] and Ilusorio
v. Bildner[8] which ruled that venue and jurisdiction should be in the place where the
false document was presented.
The Assailed RTC Decision
In dismissing the petition for certiorari, the RTC-Makati City held:

[I]nsofar as the petitioner’s stance is concerned[,] the more recent case of [Sy
Tiong Shiou v. Sy] (GR Nos. 174168 & 179438, March 30, 2009) however, reaffirms what
has been the long standing view on the venue with respect to perjury cases. In this
particular case[,] the high court reiterated the rule that the criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was
committed, or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. It went on to declare that
since the subject document[,] the execution of which was the subject of the charge[,]
was subscribed and sworn to in Manila[,] then the court of the said territorial
jurisdiction was the proper venue of the criminal action[.]
xxxx
x x x Given the present state of jurisprudence on the matter, it is not amiss to state that
the city court of Makati City has jurisdiction to try and decide the case for perjury
inasmuch as the gist of the complaint itself which constitute[s] the charge against the
petitioner dwells solely on the act of subscribing to a false certification. On the other
hand, the charge against the accused in the case of Ilusorio v. Bildner, et al., based on
the complaint-affidavits therein[,] was not simply the execution of the questioned
documents but rather the introduction of the false evidence through the subject
documents before the court of Makati City.[9] (emphasis ours)
The RTC-Makati City ruled that the MeTC-Makati City did not commit grave abuse of
discretion since the order denying the Motion to Quash was based on jurisprudence
later than Ilusorio. The RTC-Makati City also observed that the facts in Ilusorio are
different from the facts of the present case. Lastly, the RTC-Makati City ruled that the
Rule 65 petition was improper since the petitioners can later appeal the decision in the
principal case. The RTC-Makati City subsequently denied the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.[10]
The Petition
The petitioners pray that we reverse the RTC-Makati City decision and quash the
Information for perjury against Tomas. The petitioners contend that the Ilusorio ruling is
more applicable to the present facts than our ruling in Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy Chim.[11] They
argued that the facts in Ilusorio showed that the filing of the petitions in court
containing the false statements was the essential ingredient that consummated the
perjury. In Sy Tiong, the perjurious statements were made in a General Information
Sheet (GIS) that was submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Interestingly, Solicitor General Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz shared the petitioners’ view. In
his Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Comment (which we hereby treat as the
Comment to the petition), the Solicitor General also relied on Ilusorio and opined that
the lis mota in the crime of perjury is the deliberate or intentional giving of false
evidence in the court where the evidence is material. The Solicitor General observed
that the criminal intent to assert a falsehood under oath only became manifest before
the MeTC-Pasay City.
The Issue
The case presents to us the issue of what the proper venue of perjury under Article 183
of the RPC should be – Makati City, where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was
notarized, or Pasay City, where the Certification was presented to the trial court.
We deny the petition and hold that the MeTC-Makati City is the proper venue and the
proper court to take cognizance of the perjury case against the petitioners.
Venue of Action and Criminal Jurisdiction
Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines not only the
place where the criminal action is to be instituted, but also the court that has the
jurisdiction to try and hear the case. The reason for this rule is two-fold. First, the
jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-defined territories such that a trial court can
only hear and try cases involving crimes committed within its territorial jurisdiction.
[12]
Second, laying the venue in the locus criminis is grounded on the necessity and justice
of having an accused on trial in the municipality of province where witnesses and other
facilities for his defense are available.[13]
Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal cases carries jurisdictional
consequences. In determining the venue where the criminal action is to be instituted
and the court which has jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in
the court or municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any
of its essential ingredients occurred. [emphasis ours]
The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure which states:
Place of commission of the offense. – The complaint or information is sufficient if

it can be understood from its allegations that the offense was committed or some of its
essential ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless
the particular place where it was committed constitutes an essential element of the
offense charged or is necessary for its identification.
Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not
only in the court where the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential
ingredients took place. In other words, the venue of action and of jurisdiction are
deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information states that the offense was
committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial
Information Charging Perjury
Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, contains the
requirement for a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The Certificate against Forum
Shopping can be made either by a statement under oath in the complaint or initiatory
pleading asserting a claim or relief; it may also be in a sworn certification annexed to the
complaint or initiatory pleading. In both instances, the affiant is required to execute a
statement under oath before a duly commissioned notary public or any competent
person authorized to administer oath that: (a) he or she has not theretofore
commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal
or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his or her knowledge, no such other action or
claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete
statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he or she should thereafter learn that
the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he or she shall report
that fact within five days therefrom to the court wherein his or her aforesaid complaint
or initiatory pleading has been filed. In relation to the crime of perjury, the material
matter in a Certificate against Forum Shopping is the truth of the required declarations
which is designed to guard against litigants pursuing simultaneous remedies in different
fora.[14]
In this case, Tomas is charged with the crime of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC for
making a false Certificate against Forum Shopping. The elements of perjury under Article
183 are:
(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon
a material matter.
(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to

receive and administer oath.
(c) That in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate
assertion of a falsehood.
(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or
made for a legal purpose.[15] (emphasis ours)
Where the jurisdiction of the court is being assailed in a criminal case on the ground of
improper venue, the allegations in the complaint and information must be examined
together with Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
On this basis, we find that the allegations in the Information sufficiently support a
finding that the crime of perjury was committed by Tomas within the territorial
jurisdiction of the MeTC-Makati City.
The first element of the crime of perjury, the execution of the subject Certificate against
Forum Shopping was alleged in the Information to have been committed in Makati City.
Likewise, the second and fourth elements, requiring the Certificate against Forum
Shopping to be under oath before a notary public, were also sufficiently alleged in the
Information to have been made in Makati City:
Verification/Certification/Affidavit x x x.[16]
We also find that the third element of willful and deliberate falsehood was also
sufficiently alleged to have been committed in Makati City, not Pasay City, as indicated
in the last portion of the Information:
[S]aid accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a

complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin docketed as [Civil] Case
No. 342-00 of the Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay City, that the Union Bank of the
Philippines has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same
issues in another tribunal or agency, accused knowing well that said material statement
was false thereby making a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood.
[17]
(underscoring ours)
Tomas’ deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown when she
made the false declarations in the Certificate against Forum Shopping before a notary
public in Makati City, despite her knowledge that the material statements she
subscribed and swore to were not true. Thus, Makati City is the proper venue and
MeTC-Makati City is the proper court to try the perjury case against Tomas, pursuant to
Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as all the
essential elements constituting the crime of perjury were committed within the
territorial jurisdiction of Makati City, not Pasay City.
Referral to the En Banc
The present case was referred to the En Banc primarily to address the seeming conflict
between the division rulings of the Court in the Ilusorio case that is cited as basis of this
petition, and the Sy Tiong case that was the basis of the assailed RTC-Makati City ruling.
The Cited Ilusorio and Sy Tiong Cases

The subject matter of the perjury charge in Ilusorio involved false statements contained
in verified petitions filed with the court for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate
copies of certificates of title. The verified petitions containing the false statements were
subscribed and sworn to in Pasig City, but were filed in Makati City and Tagaytay City.
The question posed was: which court (Pasig City, Makati City and/or Tagaytay City) had
jurisdiction to try and hear the perjury cases?
We ruled that the venues of the action were in Makati City and Tagaytay City, the places
where the verified petitions were filed. The Court reasoned out that it was only upon
filing that the intent to assert an alleged falsehood became manifest and where the
alleged untruthful statement found relevance or materiality. We cited as jurisprudential
authority the case of United States. v. Cañet[18] which ruled:
It is immaterial where the affidavit was subscribed and sworn, so long as it

appears from the information that the defendant, by means of such affidavit, "swore to"
and knowingly submitted false evidence, material to a point at issue in a judicial
proceeding pending in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province. The gist of the
offense charged is not the making of the affidavit in Manila, but the intentional giving of
false evidence in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo Province by means of such affidavit.
[emphasis and underscoring deleted]
In Sy Tiong, the perjured statements were made in a GIS which was subscribed and
sworn to in Manila. We ruled that the proper venue for the perjury charges was in
Manila where the GIS was subscribed and sworn to. We held that the perjury was
consummated in Manila where the false statement was made. As supporting
jurisprudence, we cited the case of Villanueva v. Secretary of Justice [19] that, in turn,
cited an American case entitled U.S. v. Norris.[20] We ruled in Villanueva that –
Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration well may affect the dearest
concerns of the parties before a tribunal. Deliberate material falsification under oath
constitutes the crime of perjury, and the crime is complete when a witness' statement
has once been made.
The Crime of Perjury: A Background
To have a better appreciation of the issue facing the Court, a look at the historical
background of how the crime of perjury (specifically, Article 183 of the RPC) evolved in
our jurisdiction.
The RPC penalizes three forms of false testimonies. The first is false testimony for and
against the defendant in a criminal case (Articles 180 and 181, RPC); the second is false
testimony in a civil case (Article 182, RPC); and the third is false testimony in other cases
(Article 183, RPC). Based on the Information filed, the present case involves the making
of an untruthful statement in an affidavit on a material matter.
These RPC provisions, however, are not really the bases of the rulings cited by the
parties in their respective arguments. The cited Ilusorio ruling, although issued by this
Court in 2008, harked back to the case of Cañet which was decided in 1915, i.e., before
the present RPC took effect.[21] Sy Tiong, on the other hand, is a 2009 ruling that
cited Villanueva, a 2005 case that in turn cited United States v. Norris, a 1937 American
case. Significantly, unlike Canet, Sy Tiong is entirely based on rulings rendered after the
present RPC took effect.[22]
The perjurious act in Cañet consisted of an information charging perjury through

the presentation in court of a motion accompanied by a false sworn affidavit. At the
time the Cañet ruling was rendered, the prevailing law on perjury and the rules on
prosecution of criminal offenses were found in Section 3, Act No. 1697 of the Philippine
Commission, and in Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No. 58 [23] for the
procedural aspect.
Section 3 of Act No. 1697 reads:
Sec. 3. Any person who, having taken oath before a competent tribunal, officer,
or person, in any case in which a law of the Philippine Islands authorizes an oath to be
administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written
testimony, declaration, disposition, or certificate by him subscribed is true, willfully and
contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not
believe to be true, is guilty of perjury, and shall be punished by a fine of not more than
two thousand pesos and by imprisonment for not more than five years; and shall
moreover, thereafter be incapable of holding any public office or of giving testimony in
any court of the Philippine Islands until such time as the judgment against him is
reversed.
This law was copied, with the necessary changes, from Sections 5392 [24] and 5393[25] of
the Revised Statutes of the United States. [26] Act No. 1697 was intended to make the
mere execution of a false affidavit punishable in our jurisdiction. [27]
In turn, Subsection 4, Section 6 of General Order No. 58 provided that the venue shall be
the court of the place where the crime was committed.
As applied and interpreted by the Court in Cañet, perjury was committed by the act
of representing a false document in a judicial proceeding. [28] The venue of action was
held by the Court to be at the place where the false document was presented since the
presentation was the act that consummated the crime.
The annotation of Justices Aquino and Griño-Aquino in their textbook on the

RPC[29] interestingly explains the history of the perjury provisions of the present RPC and
traces as well the linkage between Act No. 1697 and the present Code. To quote these
authors:[30]
Art. 180 was taken from art. 318 of the Old Penal Code and art. 154 of Del Pan’s
Proposed Correctional Code, while art. 181 was taken from art. 319 of the old Penal
Code and Art. 157 of Del Pan’s Proposed Correctional Code. Said arts. 318 and 319,
together with art. 321 of the old Penal Code, were impliedly repealed by Act 1697, the
Perjury Law, passed on August 23, 1907, which in turn was expressly repealed by the
Administrative Code of 1916, Act 2657. In view of the express repeal of Act 1697, arts.
318 and 321 of the old Penal Code were deemed revived. However, Act 2718 expressly
revived secs. 3 and 4 of the Perjury Law. Art. 367 of the Revised Penal Code repealed
Act Nos. 1697 and 2718.
It should be noted that perjury under Acts 1697 and 2718 includes false testimony,
whereas, under the Revised Penal Code, false testimony includes perjury. Our law on
false testimony is of Spanish origin, but our law on perjury (art. 183 taken from sec. 3 of
Act 1697) is derived from American statutes. The provisions of the old Penal Code on
false testimony embrace perjury committed in court or in some contentious proceeding,
while perjury as defined in Act 1697 includes the making of a false affidavit. The
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on false testimony “are more severe and strict
than those of Act 1697” on perjury. [italics ours]
With this background, it can be appreciated that Article 183 of the RPC which provides:
The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period shall be imposed upon any person, who knowingly makes untruthful
statements and not being included in the provisions of the next preceding articles,
shall testify under oath, or make an affidavit, upon any material matter before a
competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so
requires. [emphasis supplied; emphases ours]
in fact refers to either of two punishable acts – (1) falsely testifying under oath in a
proceeding other than a criminal or civil case; and (2) making a false affidavit before a
person authorized to administer an oath on any material matter where the law requires
an oath.
As above discussed, Sy Tiong – decided under Article 183 of the RPC – essentially
involved perjured statements made in a GIS that was subscribed and sworn to in Manila
and submitted to the SEC in Mandaluyong City. Thus, the case involved the making of
an affidavit, not an actual testimony in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil.
From this perspective, the situs of the oath, i.e., the place where the oath was taken, is
the place where the offense was committed. By implication, the proper venue would
have been the City of Mandaluyong – the site of the SEC – had the charge involved an
actual testimony made before the SEC.
In contrast, Cañet involved the presentation in court of a motion supported and

accompanied by an affidavit that contained a falsity. With Section 3 of Act No. 1697 as
basis, the issue related to the submission of the affidavit in a judicial proceeding. This
came at a time when Act No. 1697 was the perjury law, and made no distinction
between judicial and other proceedings, and at the same time separately penalized the
making of false statements under oath (unlike the present RPC which separately deals
with false testimony in criminal, civil and other proceedings, while at the same time also
penalizing the making of false affidavits). Understandably, the venue should be the
place where the submission was made to the court or the situs of the court; it could not
have been the place where the affidavit was sworn to simply because this was not the
offense charged in the Information.
The case of Ilusorio cited the Cañet case as its authority, in a situation where the sworn
petitions filed in court for the issuance of duplicate certificates of title (that were
allegedly lost) were the cited sworn statements to support the charge of perjury for the
falsities stated in the sworn petitions. The Court ruled that the proper venue should be
the Cities of Makati and Tagaytay because it was in the courts of these cities “where the
intent to assert an alleged falsehood became manifest and where the alleged untruthful
statement finds relevance or materiality in deciding the issue of whether new owner’s
duplicate copies of the [Certificate of Condominium Title] and [Transfer Certificates of
Title] may issue.”[31] To the Court, “whether the perjurious statements contained in the
four petitions were subscribed and sworn in Pasig is immaterial, the gist of the offense
of perjury being the intentional giving of false statement,” [32] citing Cañet as authority
for its statement.
The statement in Ilusorio may have partly led to the present confusion on venue
because of its very categorical tenor in pointing to the considerations to be made in the
determination of venue; it leaves the impression that the place where the oath was
taken is not at all a material consideration, forgetting that Article 183 of the RPC clearly
speaks of two situations while Article 182 of the RPC likewise applies to false testimony
in civil cases.
The Ilusorio statement would have made perfect sense had the basis for the charge
been Article 182 of the RPC, on the assumption that the petition itself constitutes a false
testimony in a civil case. The Cañet ruling would then have been completely applicable
as the sworn statement is used in a civil case, although no such distinction was made
under Cañet because the applicable law at the time (Act No. 1697) did not make any
distinction.
If Article 183 of the RPC were to be used, as what in fact appears in the Ilusorio ruling,
then only that portion of the article, referring to the making of an affidavit, would have
been applicable as the other portion refers to false testimony in other
proceedings which a judicial petition for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of
a Certificate of Condominium Title is not because it is a civil proceeding in court. As a
perjury based on the making of a false affidavit, what assumes materiality is the site
where the oath was taken as this is the place where the oath was made, in this case,
Pasig City.
Procedurally, the rule on venue of criminal cases has been subject to various changes
from the time General Order No. 58 was replaced by Rules 106 to 122 of the Rules of
Court on July 1, 1940. Section 14, Rule 106 of the Rules of Court provided for the rule on
venue of criminal actions and it expressly included, as proper venue, the place where any
one of the essential ingredients of the crime took place. This change was followed by the
passage of the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure, [33] the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure,[34] and the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which all adopted the
1940 Rules of Criminal Procedure’s expanded venue of criminal actions. Thus, the
venue of criminal cases is not only in the place where the offense was committed, but
also where any of its essential ingredients took place.
In the present case, the Certification against Forum Shopping was made integral parts of
two complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the
respondent spouses Eddie Tamondong and Eliza B. Tamondong, who, in turn, filed a
complaint-affidavit against Tomas for violation of Article 183 of the RPC. As alleged in
the Information that followed, the criminal act charged was for the execution by
Tomas of an affidavit that contained a falsity.
Under the circumstances, Article 183 of the RPC is indeed the applicable provision; thus,
jurisdiction and venue should be determined on the basis of this article which penalizes
one who “make[s] an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person
authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires.” The constitutive
act of the offense is the making of an affidavit; thus, the criminal act is consummated
when the statement containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly
authorized person.
Based on these considerations, we hold that our ruling in Sy Tiong is more in accord with
Article 183 of the RPC and Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. To reiterate for the guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury
committed through the making of a false affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is
committed at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is
at that time that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When the crime
is committed through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal
nor civil, venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of or as
supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor
civil, a written sworn statement is submitted, venue may either be at the place where
the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of the oath
and the submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases,
determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be
constitutive of the crime committed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. Costs
against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 152642, November 13, 2012 ]
HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, ROSALINDA BALDOZ AND LUCITA
LAZO, PETITIONERS, VS. REY SALAC, WILLIE D. ESPIRITU, MARIO
MONTENEGRO, DODGIE BELONIO, LOLIT SALINEL AND BUDDY
BONNEVIE, RESPONDENTS.
[ G.R. NO. 152710]
HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, IN HER CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT (DOLE), HON.
ROSALINDA D. BALDOZ, IN HER CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR,
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA),
AND THE PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION
GOVERNING BOARD, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. JOSE G. PANEDA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 220, QUEZON CITY,
ASIAN RECRUITMENT COUNCIL PHILIPPINE CHAPTER, INC.
(ARCOPHIL), FOR ITSELF AND IN BEHALF OF ITS MEMBERS:
WORLDCARE PHILIPPINES SERVIZO INTERNATIONALE, INC.,
STEADFAST INTERNATIONAL RECRUITMENT CORP., VERDANT
MANPOWER MOBILIZATION CORP., BRENT OVERSEAS PERSONNEL,
INC., ARL MANPOWER SERVICES, INC., DAHLZEN INTERNATIONAL
SERVICES, INC., INTERWORLD PLACEMENT CENTER, INC., LAKAS
TAO CONTRACT SERVICES LTD. CO., SSC MULTI-SERVICES, DMJ
INTERNATIONAL, AND MIP INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER SERVICES,
REPRESENTED BY ITS PROPRIETRESS, MARCELINA I. PAGSIBIGAN,
RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. NO. 167590]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE HONORABLE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT (DOLE), THE PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA), THE OVERSEAS WORKERS
WELFARE ADMINISTRATION (OWWA), THE LABOR ARBITERS OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), THE
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT
(COA), PETITIONERS, VS. PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE
EXPORTERS, INC. (PASEI), RESPONDENT.
[G.R. NOS. 182978-79]
BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER AND PROMOTION, INC., PETITIONER,

VS. SPOUSES SIMPLICIO AND MILA CUARESMA (FOR AND IN BEHALF
OF DAUGHTER, JASMIN G. CUARESMA), WHITE FALCON SERVICES,
INC., AND JAIME ORTIZ (PRESIDENT OF WHITE FALCON SERVICES,
INC.), RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. NOS. 184298-99]
SPOUSES SIMPLICIO AND MILA CUARESMA (FOR AND IN BEHALF OF

DECEASED DAUGHTER, JASMIN G. CUARESMA), PETITIONERS, VS.
WHITE FALCON SERVICES, INC. AND BECMEN SERVICES EXPORTER
AND PROMOTION, INC., RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
These consolidated cases pertain to the constitutionality of certain provisions of

Republic Act 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act
of 1995.
On June 7, 1995 Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) 8042 or the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 that, for among other purposes, sets the Government’s
policies on overseas employment and establishes a higher standard of protection and
promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, their families, and overseas Filipinos in
distress.
G.R. 152642 and G.R. 152710

(Constitutionality of Sections 29 and 30, R.A. 8042)
Sections 29 and 30 of the Act[1] commanded the Department of Labor and Employment

(DOLE) to begin deregulating within one year of its passage the business of handling the
recruitment and migration of overseas Filipino workers and phase out within five years
the regulatory functions of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).
On January 8, 2002 respondents Rey Salac, Willie D. Espiritu, Mario Montenegro, Dodgie
Belonio, Lolit Salinel, and Buddy Bonnevie (Salac, et al.) filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and
preliminary injunction against petitioners, the DOLE Secretary, the POEA Administrator,
and the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) Secretary-
General before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 96. [2]
Salac, et al. sought to: 1) nullify DOLE Department Order 10 (DOLE DO 10) and POEA
Memorandum Circular 15 (POEA MC 15); 2) prohibit the DOLE, POEA, and TESDA from
implementing the same and from further issuing rules and regulations that would
regulate the recruitment and placement of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs);
and 3) also enjoin them to comply with the policy of deregulation mandated under
Sections 29 and 30 of Republic Act 8042.
On March 20, 2002 the Quezon City RTC granted Salac, et al.’s petition and ordered the
government agencies mentioned to deregulate the recruitment and placement of
OFWs.[3] The RTC also annulled DOLE DO 10, POEA MC 15, and all other orders, circulars
and issuances that are inconsistent with the policy of deregulation under R.A. 8042.
Prompted by the RTC’s above actions, the government officials concerned filed the
present petition in G.R. 152642 seeking to annul the RTC’s decision and have the same
enjoined pending action on the petition.
On April 17, 2002 the Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. intervened in the
case before the Court, claiming that the RTC March 20, 2002 Decision gravely affected
them since it paralyzed the deployment abroad of OFWs and performing artists. The
Confederated Association of Licensed Entertainment Agencies, Incorporated (CALEA)
intervened for the same purpose.[4]
On May 23, 2002 the Court[5] issued a TRO in the case, enjoining the Quezon City RTC,
Branch 96, from enforcing its decision.
In a parallel case, on February 12, 2002 respondents Asian Recruitment Council

Philippine Chapter, Inc. and others (Arcophil, et al.) filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with application for TRO and preliminary injunction against the DOLE
Secretary, the POEA Administrator, and the TESDA Director-General, [6] before the RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 220, to enjoin the latter from implementing the 2002 Rules and
Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Overseas Workers and to
cease and desist from issuing other orders, circulars, and policies that tend to regulate
the recruitment and placement of OFWs in violation of the policy of deregulation
provided in Sections 29 and 30 of R.A. 8042.
On March 12, 2002 the Quezon City RTC rendered an Order, granting the petition and
enjoining the government agencies involved from exercising regulatory functions over
the recruitment and placement of OFWs. This prompted the DOLE Secretary, the POEA
Administrator, and the TESDA Director-General to file the present action in G.R.
152710. As in G.R. 152642, the Court issued on May 23, 2002 a TRO enjoining the
Quezon City RTC, Branch 220 from enforcing its decision.
On December 4, 2008, however, the Republic informed[7] the Court that on April 10,
2007 former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. 9422 [8] which
expressly repealed Sections 29 and 30 of R.A. 8042 and adopted the policy of close
government regulation of the recruitment and deployment of OFWs. R.A. 9422
pertinently provides:
x x x x
SEC. 1. Section 23, paragraph (b.1) of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the
“Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995” is hereby amended to read as
follows:
(b.1) Philippine Overseas Employment Administration – The Administration shall

regulate private sector participation in the recruitment and overseas placement of
workers by setting up a licensing and registration system. It shall also formulate and
implement, in coordination with appropriate entities concerned, when necessary, a
system for promoting and monitoring the overseas employment of Filipino workers
taking into consideration their welfare and the domestic manpower requirements.
In addition to its powers and functions, the administration shall inform migrant workers
not only of their rights as workers but also of their rights as human beings, instruct and
guide the workers how to assert their rights and provide the available mechanism to
redress violation of their rights.
In the recruitment and placement of workers to service the requirements for trained
and competent Filipino workers of foreign governments and their instrumentalities, and
such other employers as public interests may require, the administration shall deploy
only to countries where the Philippines has concluded bilateral labor agreements or
arrangements: Provided, That such countries shall guarantee to protect the rights of
Filipino migrant workers; and: Provided, further, That such countries shall observe
and/or comply with the international laws and standards for migrant workers.
SEC. 2. Section 29 of the same law is hereby repealed.
SEC. 3. Section 30 of the same law is also hereby repealed.
xxxx
On August 20, 2009 respondents Salac, et al. told the Court in G.R. 152642 that
they agree[9] with the Republic’s view that the repeal of Sections 29 and 30 of R.A. 8042
renders the issues they raised by their action moot and academic. The Court has no
reason to disagree. Consequently, the two cases, G.R. 152642 and 152710, should be
dismissed for being moot and academic.
G.R. 167590
(Constitutionality of Sections 6, 7, and 9 of R.A. 8042)
On August 21, 1995 respondent Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI)
filed a petition for declaratory relief and prohibition with prayer for issuance of TRO and
writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of Manila, seeking to annul Sections 6, 7,
and 9 of R.A. 8042 for being unconstitutional. (PASEI also sought to annul a portion of
Section 10 but the Court will take up this point later together with a related case.)
Section 6 defines the crime of “illegal recruitment” and enumerates the acts constituting
the same. Section 7 provides the penalties for prohibited acts. Thus:
SEC. 6. Definition. – For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any
act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, procuring workers
and includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment
abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-license or non-holder of
authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended,
otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That such non-license
or non-holder, who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to
two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include the following
acts, whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee
or holder of authority:
x x x x
SEC. 7. Penalties. –
(a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than twelve
(12) years and a fine not less than two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) nor more
than five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than five hundred thousand
pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than one million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed
if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein.
Provided, however, That the maximum penalty shall be imposed if the person illegally
recruited is less than eighteen (18) years of age or committed by a non-licensee or non-
holder of authority.[10]
Finally, Section 9 of R.A. 8042 allowed the filing of criminal actions arising from “illegal
recruitment” before the RTC of the province or city where the offense was committed or
where the offended party actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense.
The RTC of Manila declared Section 6 unconstitutional after hearing on the ground that
its definition of “illegal recruitment” is vague as it fails to distinguish between licensed
and non-licensed recruiters[11] and for that reason gives undue advantage to the non-
licensed recruiters in violation of the right to equal protection of those that operate
with government licenses or authorities.
But “illegal recruitment” as defined in Section 6 is clear and unambiguous and, contrary
to the RTC’s finding, actually makes a distinction between licensed and non-licensed
recruiters. By its terms, persons who engage in “canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers” without the appropriate
government license or authority are guilty of illegal recruitment whether or not they
commit the wrongful acts enumerated in that section. On the other hand, recruiters
who engage in the canvassing, enlisting, etc. of OFWs, although with the appropriate
government license or authority, are guilty of illegal recruitment only if they commit any
of the wrongful acts enumerated in Section 6.
The Manila RTC also declared Section 7 unconstitutional on the ground that its sweeping
application of the penalties failed to make any distinction as to the seriousness of the
act committed for the application of the penalty imposed on such violation. As an
example, said the trial court, the mere failure to render a report under Section 6(h) or
obstructing the inspection by the Labor Department under Section 6(g) are penalized by
imprisonment for six years and one day and a minimum fine of P200,000.00 but which
could unreasonably go even as high as life imprisonment if committed by at least three
persons.
Apparently, the Manila RTC did not agree that the law can impose such grave penalties
upon what it believed were specific acts that were not as condemnable as the others in
the lists. But, in fixing uniform penalties for each of the enumerated acts under Section
6, Congress was within its prerogative to determine what individual acts are equally
reprehensible, consistent with the State policy of according full protection to labor, and
deserving of the same penalties. It is not within the power of the Court to question the
wisdom of this kind of choice. Notably, this legislative policy has been further stressed
in July 2010 with the enactment of R.A. 10022 [12] which increased even more the
duration of the penalties of imprisonment and the amounts of fine for the commission
of the acts listed under Section 7.
Obviously, in fixing such tough penalties, the law considered the unsettling fact that
OFWs must work outside the country’s borders and beyond its immediate protection.
The law must, therefore, make an effort to somehow protect them from conscienceless
individuals within its jurisdiction who, fueled by greed, are willing to ship them out
without clear assurance that their contracted principals would treat such OFWs fairly
and humanely.
As the Court held in People v. Ventura,[13] the State under its police power “may
prescribe such regulations as in its judgment will secure or tend to secure the general
welfare of the people, to protect them against the consequence of ignorance and
incapacity as well as of deception and fraud.” Police power is “that inherent and
plenary power of the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort,
safety, and welfare of society.” [14]
The Manila RTC also invalidated Section 9 of R.A. 8042 on the ground that allowing the
offended parties to file the criminal case in their place of residence would negate the
general rule on venue of criminal cases which is the place where the crime or any of its
essential elements were committed. Venue, said the RTC, is jurisdictional in penal laws
and, allowing the filing of criminal actions at the place of residence of the offended
parties violates their right to due process. Section 9 provides:
SEC. 9. Venue. – A criminal action arising from illegal recruitment as defined

herein shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the
offense was committed or where the offended party actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense: Provided, That the court where the criminal action is first
filed shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts: Provided, however, That
the aforestated provisions shall also apply to those criminal actions that have already
been filed in court at the time of the effectivity of this Act.
But there is nothing arbitrary or unconstitutional in Congress fixing an alternative venue

for violations of Section 6 of R.A. 8042 that differs from the venue established by the
Rules on Criminal Procedure. Indeed, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the latter Rules allows
exceptions provided by laws. Thus:
SEC. 15. Place where action is to be instituted.— (a) Subject to existing laws, the

criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory
where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.
(Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Section 9 of R.A. 8042, as an exception to the rule on venue of criminal actions is,
consistent with that law’s declared policy [15] of providing a criminal justice system that
protects and serves the best interests of the victims of illegal recruitment.
G.R. 167590, G.R. 182978-79,[16] and G.R. 184298-99[17]

(Constitutionality of Section 10, last sentence of 2nd paragraph)
G.R. 182978-79 and G.R. 184298-99 are consolidated cases. Respondent spouses
Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma (the Cuaresmas) filed a claim for death and insurance
benefits and damages against petitioners Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc.
(Becmen) and White Falcon Services, Inc. (White Falcon) for the death of their daughter
Jasmin Cuaresma while working as staff nurse in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the claim on the ground that the Cuaresmas had
already received insurance benefits arising from their daughter’s death from the
Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA). The LA also gave due credence to
the findings of the Saudi Arabian authorities that Jasmin committed suicide.
On appeal, however, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) found Becmen
and White Falcon jointly and severally liable for Jasmin’s death and ordered them to pay
the Cuaresmas the amount of US$113,000.00 as actual damages. The NLRC relied on
the Cabanatuan City Health Office’s autopsy finding that Jasmin died of criminal violence
and rape.
Becmen and White Falcon appealed the NLRC Decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). [18]
On June 28, 2006 the CA held Becmen and White Falcon jointly and severally liable with
their Saudi Arabian employer for actual damages, with Becmen having a right of
reimbursement from White Falcon. Becmen and White Falcon appealed the CA Decision
to this Court.
On April 7, 2009 the Court found Jasmin’s death not work-related or work-connected
since her rape and death did not occur while she was on duty at the hospital or doing
acts incidental to her employment. The Court deleted the award of actual damages but
ruled that Becmen’s corporate directors and officers are solidarily liable with their
company for its failure to investigate the true nature of her death. Becmen and White
Falcon abandoned their legal, moral, and social duty to assist the Cuaresmas in
obtaining justice for their daughter. Consequently, the Court held the foreign employer
Rajab and Silsilah, White Falcon, Becmen, and the latter’s corporate directors and
officers jointly and severally liable to the Cuaresmas for: 1) P2,500,000.00 as moral
damages; 2) P2,500,000.00 as exemplary damages; 3) attorney’s fees of 10% of the total
monetary award; and 4) cost of suit.
On July 16, 2009 the corporate directors and officers of Becmen, namely, Eufrocina
Gumabay, Elvira Taguiam, Lourdes Bonifacio and Eddie De Guzman (Gumabay, et al.)
filed a motion for leave to Intervene. They questioned the constitutionality of the last
sentence of the second paragraph of Section 10, R.A. 8042 which holds the corporate
directors, officers and partners jointly and solidarily liable with their company for money
claims filed by OFWs against their employers and the recruitment firms. On September
9, 2009 the Court allowed the intervention and admitted Gumabay, et al.’s motion for
reconsideration.
The key issue that Gumabay, et al. present is whether or not the 2nd paragraph of
Section 10, R.A. 8042, which holds the corporate directors, officers, and partners of
recruitment and placement agencies jointly and solidarily liable for money claims and
damages that may be adjudged against the latter agencies, is unconstitutional.
In G.R. 167590 (the PASEI case), the Quezon City RTC held as unconstitutional the last
sentence of the 2nd paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. 8042. It pointed out that, absent
sufficient proof that the corporate officers and directors of the erring company had
knowledge of and allowed the illegal recruitment, making them automatically liable
would violate their right to due process of law.
The pertinent portion of Section 10 provides:
SEC. 10. Money Claims. – x x x
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any
and all claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be
incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition
precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the
recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money
claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement
agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the
case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or
partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. (Emphasis supplied)
But the Court has already held, pending adjudication of this case, that the liability of
corporate directors and officers is not automatic. To make them jointly and solidarily
liable with their company, there must be a finding that they were remiss in directing the
affairs of that company, such as sponsoring or tolerating the conduct of illegal activities.
[19]
In the case of Becmen and White Falcon, [20] while there is evidence that these
companies were at fault in not investigating the cause of Jasmin’s death, there is no
mention of any evidence in the case against them that intervenors Gumabay, et al.,
Becmen’s corporate officers and directors, were personally involved in their company’s
particular actions or omissions in Jasmin’s case.
As a final note, R.A. 8042 is a police power measure intended to regulate the
recruitment and deployment of OFWs. It aims to curb, if not eliminate, the injustices
and abuses suffered by numerous OFWs seeking to work abroad. The rule is settled that
every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The Court cannot
inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the laws enacted by the Legislative
Department. Hence, in the absence of a clear and unmistakable case that the statute is
unconstitutional, the Court must uphold its validity.
WHEREFORE, in G.R. 152642 and 152710, the Court DISMISSES the petitions for having

become moot and academic.
In G.R. 167590, the Court SETS ASIDE the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
dated December 8, 2004 and DECLARES Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Republic Act 8042 valid
and constitutional.
In G.R. 182978-79 and G.R. 184298-99 as well as in G.R. 167590, the Court HOLDS the
last sentence of the second paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act 8042 valid and
constitutional. The Court, however, RECONSIDERS and SETS ASIDE the portion of its
Decision in G.R. 182978-79 and G.R. 184298-99 that held intervenors Eufrocina
Gumabay, Elvira Taguiam, Lourdes Bonifacio, and Eddie De Guzman jointly and solidarily
liable with respondent Becmen Services Exporter and Promotion, Inc. to spouses
Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma for lack of a finding in those cases that such intervenors
had a part in the act or omission imputed to their corporation.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 144887, November 17, 2004 ]
ALFREDO RIGOR, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals,
in CA-G.R. CR No. 18855, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Branch 163, in Criminal Case No. 86025, convicting petitioner Alfredo Rigor of
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law), and imposing upon him
the penalty of imprisonment for six (6) months and ordering him to restitute to the
Rural Bank of San Juan the sum of P500,000 and to pay the costs.
The Information[1] against petitioner reads:

That on or about the 16th day of November 1989 in the Municipality of San Juan,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw
and issue to Rural Bank of San Juan, Inc. thru its loan officer Carlos N. Garcia, a
postdated check to apply on account or for value the check described below:

Check 165476
No.
Drawn Associated Bank, Tarlac Branch
against
In the P500,000.00
Amount of
Dated February 16, 1990
Payable Rural Bank of San Juan
to
said accused well knowing that at the time of issue on 16 November 1989, he has
already insufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the
face amount of such check and that as of 2 February 1990 his bank accounts were
already closed and that check when presented for payment from and after the date
thereof, was subsequently dishonored for the reason “Account Closed” and despite
receipt of notice of such dishonor, the accused failed to pay said payee the face amount
of said check or to make arrangement for full payment thereof during the period of not
less than five (5) banking days after receiving notice.
When arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued.
The facts, as narrated by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

The prosecution evidence was furnished by witnesses Edmarcos Basangan of
Rural Bank of San Juan (RBSJ) and Esteban Pasion, employee of the Associated Bank. It
was shown that on November 16, 1989, appellant (petitioner herein) applied for a
commercial loan from the Rural Bank of San Juan, Inc., at N. Domingo St., San Juan,
Metro Manila in the sum of P500,000.00 (Exh. “A”). He signed a promissory note stating
that an interest of 24% per annum from its date will be charged on the loan (Exh. “B”).
The loan was approved by RBSJ’s Bank Manager Melquecedes de Guzman and
Controller Agustin Uy. A cashier’s check with RBSJ No. 2023424 in the amount of
P487,000.00, net proceeds of the loan, was issued to appellant (Exh. “C”). Appellant
endorsed, then encashed the check with RBSJ Teller Eleneth Cruz, who stamped thereon
the word “paid” (Exh. “C-4”). After appellant received the proceeds,
he issued an undated check, Associated Bank Check No. 165476, Tarlac Branch, in the
amount of P500,000, payable to RBSJ (Exh. “D”).
It was not the bank policy for a borrower to apply for a loan, obtain its approval and its
proceeds on the same day. Appellant’s case was a special one considering that he is the
“kumpare” of the President of RBSJ and he is well-known to all the bank’s directors since
he, like them, comes from Tarlac.
Appellant failed to pay his loan upon its maturity on December 16, 1989. He personally
asked de Guzman for a two-month extension and advised RBSJ to date to February 16,
1990 his Associated Bank check no. 165476. Failing anew to pay, he asked for another
two-month extension or up to April 16, 1990. Both requests de Guzman granted. On
April 16, 1990, appellant still failed to pay his loan. Basangan and his co-employee,
Carlos Garcia, went to Tarlac to collect from appellant the amount of the loan.
Appellant’s written request for another 30-day extension was denied by de Guzman
who instead, sent him a formal demand letter dated April 25, 1990.
On May 25, 1990, Associated Bank check no. 165476 was deposited with PS Bank, San
Juan Branch. The check was later returned with the words “closed account” stamped on
its face. Associated Bank employee PASION declared that appellant’s Current Account
No. 1022-001197-9 with Associated Bank had been closed since February 2, 1990.
Appellant’s balance under the bank’s statement of account as of November 16, 1989
was only P859. The most appellant had on his account was P40,000 recorded on
November 19, 1989 (Exh. “K”).
Basangan and Garcia, in Tarlac, advised appellant of the dishonor of his check.
Appellant wrote Atty. Joselito Lim, RBSJ Chairman of the Board, about the loan and
arrangements as to the schedule of his payment. His letter was referred to de Guzman,
who, in turn, sent to him another demand letter dated September 17, 1990. The letter
informed him of the dishonor of his check. De Guzman required him to take the
necessary step for the early settlement of his obligation. He still refused to pay.
Appellant denied the charge. He claimed that on November 16, 1989, Agapito Uy and
his sister Agnes Angeles proposed to him that he secure a loan from the RBSJ for
P500,000. P200,000 of it will be for him and the P300,000 will go to Uy and to his sister
to pay unpaid loans of borrowers in their “side banking” activities. For the approval of
his loan, Uy told him that appellant can put up his four-door Mercedes Benz as collateral
for the P200,000 loan. The P300,000 will have no collateral. Uy also told him the he
(Uy) has complete control of the bank and his Mercedes Benz will be enough collateral
for the P500,000.
Appellant agreed to the proposal. He signed a blank loan application form and a
promissory note plus a chattel mortgage for his Mercedes Benz. Thereafter, he was told
to come back in two days. Uy gave him two Premiere Bank checks worth P100,000
each. He gave one check to his brother Efren Rigor and the other to his sister-in-law for
encashment in Tarlac. He issued to Uy a personal check for P500,000 undated. This
check was deposited in the bank for encashment in the later part of May, 1990 but it
bounced. When demand was made for him to pay his loan, he told Uy to get his
Mercedes Benz as payment for P200,000 but Uy refused. Uy wanted him to pay the
whole amount of P500,000.[2]
On July 8, 1994, the trial court rendered judgment against petitioner, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, this Court finds accused Alfredo
Rigor guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Section 1 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 and there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance on record,
imposes upon him the penalty of imprisonment for six (6) months and to restitute to the
Rural Bank of San Juan the sum of P500,000.00 and to pay the costs. [3]
The trial court stated the reasons for petitioner’s conviction, thus:
In the case at bar, accused admitted having issued Associated Bank Check No.
165476 in the amount of P500,000.00. the check was undated when issued. Records,
however, show that it was issued on 16 November 1989 but as it appear[s] now it is
dated 16 February 1990. The probable reason must be because upon the maturity of his
loan on 16 December 1989, accused asked for extension of two (2) months to pay the
same. And the expiration of that two (2) months period is 16 February 1990.
Nevertheless, Exhibit “K” for the prosecution including its submarkings show that the
highest outstanding amount in the current account of accused with the Associated
Bank, Tarlac Branch for the month of November 1989, the month Rigor issued aforesaid
check, is only about P40,000.00. Hence, Rigor has no sufficient deposit in the bank to
cover the amount of P500,000.00 when he issued Check No. 165476. Therefore, Rigor
knowingly issued the same he having no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank in violation of section 1 of [B.P.] Blg. 22.
The defense of the accused that the amount of loan he secured from the Rural Bank of
San Juan is only P200,000.00 is of no moment. The fact is he admitted having issued
Associated Bank Check No. 165476 in the amount of P500,000.00 and upon its deposit
for encashment, the same was dishonored for reason account closed. [4]
Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
trial court’s decision. The dispositive portion of the appellate court’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the modification that the
reference to lack of mitigating or aggravating circumstances should be deleted and
disregarded.[5]
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner raises the following:

Absent the element of knowingly issuing a worthless check entitles the petitioner to
) acquittal;
Without proof that accused actually received a notice of dishonor, a prosecution for
) violation of the Bouncing Checks Law cannot prosper;
The Pasig Court below had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case for violation of Batas
) Pambansa Bilang 22.[6]
Petitioner contends that he did not violate Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 because he
told the officers of the complainant bank from the very beginning that he did not have
sufficient funds in the bank; he was merely enticed by Agustin Uy, the bank’s managing
director and comptroller, to obtain the instant loan where he received only P200,000,
while Uy took P300,000; and his check was partly used to collateralize an
accommodation in favor of Uy in the amount of P300,000.
The contention is without merit.

Petitioner is charged with violation of Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, thus:
SECTION 1.Checks without sufficient funds.-- Any person who makes or draws
and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that
he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of
such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more
than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of
the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two hundred thousand pesos, or both such
fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
The elements of the offense are: (1) Making, drawing, and issuance of any check
to apply on account or for value; (2) knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at
the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) subsequent dishonor of
the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor of the
check for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the
bank to stop payment.[7]
As found by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals, all the aforementioned
elements are present in this case.
The evidence shows that on November 16, 1989, petitioner applied [8] for a loan in the
amount of P500,000 with the Rural Bank of San Juan and on the same day, he issued an
undated Associated Bank Check No. 165476 [9] worth P500,000 payable to Rural Bank of
San Juan in connection with the loan, which check was later dated February 16, 1990.
[10]
The check was thus issued to apply for value. [11] This shows the presence of the first
element of the offense.
The presence of the second element of the offense is shown by petitioner’s

admission[12] that he knew of the insufficiency of his funds in the drawee bank when he
issued the check and he allegedly did not hide the fact from the officials of the Rural
Bank of San Juan.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled, thus:
x x x
Knowledge involves a state of mind difficult to establish. We hold that appellant’s

admission of the insufficiency of his fund at the time he issued the check constitutes the
very element of “knowledge” contemplated in Sec. 1 of BP 22. The prima
facie presumption of knowledge required in Sec. 2, Ibid., does not apply because (a) the
check was presented for payment only on May 25, 1990 or beyond the 90-day period,
which expired on May 16, 1990, counted from the maturity date of the check on
February 16, 1990 and (b) an actually admitted knowledge of a fact needs no
presumption.
While it is true that if a check is presented beyond ninety (90) days from its due date,
there is no more presumption of knowledge by the drawer that at the time of issue his
check has no sufficient funds, the presumption in this case is supplanted by appellant’s
own admission that he did not hide the fact that he had no sufficient funds for the
check. In fact, it appears that when he authorized RBSJ to date his check on February
16, 1990, his current account was already closed two weeks earlier, on February 2,
1990.[13]
Petitioner, however, argues that since the officers of the bank knew that he did
not have sufficient funds, he has not violated Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.
Assuming arguendo that the payee had knowledge that he had insufficient funds at the
time he issued the check, such knowledge by the payee is immaterial as deceit is not an
essential element of the offense under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.[14] The gravamen of
the offense is the issuance of a bad check; hence, malice and intent in the issuance
thereof are inconsequential.[15]
Moreover, the cited case of Magno v. Court of Appeals,[16] which resulted in the acquittal
of the accused therein, is inapplicable to petitioner as the facts of said case are
different. In Magno, the bounced checks were issued to cover a warranty deposit in a
lease contract, where the lessor-supplier was also the financier of the deposit. [17] It was
a modus operandi whereby the supplier of the goods is also able to sell or lease the
same goods at the same time privately financing those in desperate need so they may
be accommodated.[18] The Court therein held:
To charge the petitioner for the refund of a “warranty deposit” which he did not
withdraw as it was not his own account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to even
make him pay an unjust “debt,” to say the least, since petitioner did not receive the
amount in question. All the while, said amount was in the safekeeping of the financing
company, which is managed, supervised and operated by the corporation officials and
employees of LS Finance. Petitioner did not even know that the checks he issued were
turned over by Joey Gomez to Mrs. Teng, whose operation was kept from his knowledge
on her instruction. This fact alone evoke suspicion that the transaction is irregular and
immoral per se, hence, she specifically requested Gomez not to divulge the source of
the “warrant deposit.”
It is intriguing to realize that Mrs. Teng did not want the petitioner to know that it was
she who “accommodated” petitioner’s request for Joey Gomez, to source out the
needed funds for the “warranty deposit.” Thus it unfolds the kind of transaction that is
shrouded with mystery, gimmickry and doubtful legality. It is in simple language, a
scheme whereby Mrs. Teng as the supplier of the equipment in the name of her
corporation, Mancor, would be able to “sell or lease” its goods as in this case, and at the
same time, privately financing those who desperately need petty accommodations as
this one. This modus operandi has in so many instances victimized unsuspecting
businessmen, who likewise need protection from the law, by availing of the deceptively
called “warranty deposit” not realizing that they also fall prey to leasing equipment
under the guise of a lease purchase agreement when it is a scheme designed to skim off
business clients.[19]
This case, however, involves an ordinary loan transaction between petitioner and
the Rural Bank of San Juan wherein petitioner issued the check certainly to be applied to
the payment of his loan since the check and the loan have the same value of P500,000.
Whether petitioner agreed to give a portion of the proceeds of his loan to Agustin Uy,
an officer of complainant bank, to finance Uy’s and his (petitioner) sister’s alleged “side-
banking” activity, such agreement is immaterial to petitioner’s liability for issuing the
dishonored check under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.
Lozano v. Martinez[20] states:
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is
not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended
or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit,
under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in
circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is
proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but
an offense against public order.
People v. Nitafan[21] held that to require that the agreement surrounding the
issuance of checks be first looked into and thereafter exempt such issuance from the
provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 on the basis of such agreement or
understanding would frustrate the very purpose for which the law was enacted.
Further, the presence of the third element of the offense is shown by the fact that after
the check was deposited for encashment, it was dishonored by Associated Bank for
reason of “closed account” as evidenced by its Check Return Slip. [22] Despite receipt of a
notice of dishonor from complainant bank, petitioner failed to pay his obligation.
Petitioner next contends that he did not receive a notice of dishonor, the absence of
which precludes criminal prosecution.
The contention is likewise of no merit.
The notice of dishonor of a check may be sent to the drawer or maker by the drawee
bank, the holder of the check, or the offended party either by personal delivery or by
registered mail.[23] The notice of dishonor to the maker of a check must be in writing. [24]
In this case, prosecution witness Edmarcos Basangan testified that after petitioner’s
check was dishonored, he and co-employee Carlos Garcia went to petitioner’s residence
in Tarlac to inform him about it. Thereafter, petitioner wrote a letter dated June 28,
1990 to Atty. Joselito Lim, RBSJ chairman of the Board of Directors, proposing a manner
of paying the loan. The letter was referred to the bank manager who sent petitioner
another demand letter[25] dated September 17, 1990 through registered mail. [26] Said
letter informed petitioner of the dishonor of his check for the reason of account closed,
and required him to settle his obligation, thus:
xxx
September 17, 1990
Mr. Alfredo Rigor

Victoria, Tarlac
Dear Mr. Rigor,
Please be informed that the check dated February 16, 1990, that you issued purportedly
for the payment of your loan, which has already become due and demandable in the
sum of PESOS: Five Hundred Thousand Pesos Only (P500,000.00) was dishonored on
February 16, 1990 (should be May 25, 1990) for the reason Account Closed (AC).
We trust that you will take the necessary step for the early settlement of your
obligation to us.
Very truly yours,
MELQUECEDES DE GUZMAN
[27]
The transcript of records shows that petitioner admitted knowledge of the
dishonor of his check through a demand letter sent to him. Hence, petitioner cannot
pretend that he did not receive a notice of dishonor of his check.
Lastly, petitioner contends that the Regional Trial Court of Pasig had no jurisdiction over
this case since no proof has been offered that his check was issued, delivered,
dishonored or that knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in the Municipality of
San Juan, Metro Manila.
The contention is untenable.
As regards venue of a criminal action, Section 15, paragraph (a), of Rule 110 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reflects the old rule, [28] provides:
Sec. 15. Place where action is to be instituted. –
(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court
of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its
essential ingredients occurred. (Emphasis supplied.)
Violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 are categorized as transitory or
continuing crimes.[29] In such crimes, some acts material and essential to the crimes and
requisite to their consummation occur in one municipality or territory and some in
another, in which event, the court of either has jurisdiction to try the cases, it being
understood that the first court taking cognizance of the case excludes the other.
[30]
Hence, a person charged with a transitory crime may be validly tried in any
municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed. [31]
The evidence clearly shows that the undated check was issued and delivered at the
Rural Bank of San Juan, Metro Manila [32] on November 16, 1989, and subsequently the
check was dated February 16, 1990 thereat. On May 25, 1990, the check was deposited
with PS Bank, San Juan Branch, Metro Manila. [33] Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly
ruled:
Violations of B.P. 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes. A suit on
the check can be filed in any of the places where any of the elements of the offense
occurred, that is, where the check is drawn, issued, delivered or dishonored. x x x
The information at bar effectively charges San Juan as the place of drawing and issuing.
The jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the
complaint or information. Although, the check was dishonored by the drawee,
Associated Bank, in its Tarlac Branch, appellant has drawn, issued and delivered it at
RBSJ, San Juan. The place of issue and delivery was San Juan and knowledge, as an
essential part of the offense, was also overtly manifested in San Juan. There is no
question that crimes committed in November, 1989 in San Juan are triable by the RTC
stationed in Pasig. In short both allegation and proof in this case sufficiently vest
jurisdiction upon the RTC in Pasig City. [34]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR No. 18855, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 187174, August 28, 2013 ]
FELY Y. YALONG, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
LUCILA C. YLAGAN, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Resolutions dated

August 1, 2008[2] and March 10, 2009[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
104075 which dismissed petitioner Fely Y. Yalong’s (Yalong) Petition for Review [4] dated
June 26, 2008 (subject petition for review), finding the same to be the improper mode
of appeal.
The Facts
Stemming from a complaint filed by respondent Lucila C. Ylagan (Ylagan), an Information

was filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Batangas City, Branch 1 (MTCC),
docketed as Criminal Case No. 45414, charging Yalong for the crime of violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22[5] (BP 22) as follows:
That on or about April 2, 2002 at Batangas City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, well-knowing that she
does not have funds in or credit with the Export and Industry Bank, Juan Luna Branch,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously draw, make and issue to Major
Lucila Ylagan, Export and Industry Bank Check No. 0002578833 dated May 3, 2002 in the
amount of FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P450,000.00), Philippine Currency,
to apply on account or for value, but when said check was presented for full payment
with the drawee bank, the same was dishonored by the drawee bank on the ground of
“Account Closed,” which in effect is even more than a dishonor for insufficiency of
funds, despite notice of dishonor and demands made upon her to make good her check
by making proper arrangement with the drawee bank or pay her obligation in full
directly to Major Lucila Ylagan, accused failed and refused to do so, which acts
constitute a clear violation of the aforecited law, to the damage and prejudice of
transaction in commercial documents in general and of Major Lucila Ylagan in particular
in the aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW. [6]
Upon arraignment, Yalong pleaded not guilty to the aforesaid charge. Hence, the
case was set for pre-trial and thereafter, trial ensued. [7]
During trial, Ylagan testified that sometime on April 2, 2002, Yalong borrowed from her
the amount of P450,000.00 with a verbal agreement that the same would be paid back
to her in cash and, as payment thereof, issued to her, inter alia, a postdated check dated
May 3, 2002 in the similar amount of P450,000.00 (subject check). However, when
Ylagan presented the subject check for payment on August 27, 2002, it was dishonored
and returned to her for the reason “Account Closed.” As verbal and written demands
made on Yalong to pay her loan proved futile, Ylagan was constrained to file the instant
criminal case.[8]
In her defense, Yalong averred that she already paid her loan but did not require Ylagan
to issue a receipt or acknowledge the same. Likewise, she claimed that the subject check
belonged to her husband and that while she knew that the said check was not covered
by sufficient funds, it was already signed by her husband when she handed it to Ylagan.
[9]
The MTCC Ruling and Subsequent Proceedings
On August 24, 2006, the MTCC rendered its Judgment[10] (MTCC Decision), finding Yalong
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of BP 22 and accordingly
sentenced her to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a term of one year and ordered
her to pay Ylagan the amount of P450,000.00, with legal interest of 12% per annum
from October 10, 2002, including P25,000.00 as attorney’s fees and costs of suit. [11]
The MTCC found all the elements of the crime charged to have been duly established. It
did not give credence to Yalong’s defense that she did not own the checking account
and that she was not the one who issued the subject check. On this score, it cited the
case of Ruiz v. People[12] wherein it was held that “[BP 22] is broad enough to include,
within its coverage, the making and issuing of a check by one who has no account with a
bank, or where such account was already closed when the check was presented for
payment.”[13] Further, it observed that Yalong failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that she has completely paid the loan and thus, such defense must likewise
fail.[14]
Yalong filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and Recall the Warrant of
Arrest[15] dated October 15, 2006 which the MTCC treated as an original motion for
reconsideration. The said motion was, however, denied in an Order[16] dated December
5, 2006.
Consequently, Yalong filed a Notice of Appeal[17] dated January 2, 2007 which was

denied due course in an Order[18] dated January 19, 2007, considering that the judgment
against her was promulgated in absentia on account of her unjustified absence.
Dissatisfied, Yalong filed a Petition for Relief from Order and Denial of Appeal [19] which
was dismissed in an Order[20] dated July 25, 2007 on the ground that Yalong had lost the
remedies available to her under the law when she: (a) failed to appear without
justifiable reason at the scheduled promulgation of the MTCC Decision; (b) did not
surrender within 15 days from the date of such promulgation; (c) did not file a motion
for leave of court to avail of the remedies under the law; and (d) remained at large.
Yalong moved for reconsideration[21] which was, however, denied in an Order[22] dated
October 25, 2007. Aggrieved, Yalong filed a Petition for Certiorari with Petition for Bail
(certiorari petition), docketed as Civil Case No. 8278, before the Regional Trial Court of
Batangas City, Branch 7 (RTC).[23]
The RTC Ruling
In a Resolution[24] dated April 2, 2008 (RTC Resolution), the RTC denied

Yalong’s certiorari petition, finding the promulgation of the MTCC Decision in
absentia to be valid as Yalong was duly notified of the scheduled date of promulgation
on October 6, 2006 and yet failed to appear thereat.[25] Furthermore, the RTC observed
that Yalong did not make any effort to surrender within the time allowed by the rules
and thus, lost the remedies available to her under the law. [26]
Yalong filed a motion for reconsideration on April 30, 2008[27] which was eventually
denied in an Order[28] dated May 27, 2008. As such, on June 26, 2008, she filed the
subject petition for review before the CA.[29]
The CA Ruling
In a Resolution[30] dated August 1, 2008, the CA dismissed the subject petition for review
on the ground that the “Order of the [RTC] was issued in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction – where appeal [by filing a notice of appeal with the RTC] – and not a
petition for review is the proper remedy.”
Yalong filed a motion for reconsideration dated November 20, 2008 [31] which was,
however, denied in a Resolution[32] dated March 10, 2009. Hence, this petition.
The essential issue in this case is whether or not the CA properly dismissed the subject
petition for review on the ground of improper appeal.
The petition is bereft of merit.
While the Rules of Court (Rules) do not specifically state that the inappropriate filing of
a petition for review instead of a required notice of appeal is dismissible (unlike its
converse, i.e., the filing of a notice of appeal when what is required is the filing of a
petition for review),[33] Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules nonetheless provides that
appeals to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction
shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the latter court. The said provision reads:
SEC. 2. Modes of appeal. –
(a) Ordinary appeal. – The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a
notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed
from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be
required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals
where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be
filed and served in like manner. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the case at bar, records reveal that Yalong filed a petition for certiorari with
the RTC and that the latter court rendered a Resolution dated April 2, 2008 dismissing
the same. It is fundamental that a petition for certiorari is an original action[34] and, as
such, it cannot be gainsaid that the RTC took cognizance of and resolved the aforesaid
petition in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. Hence, based on the above-cited rule,
Yalong should have filed a notice of appeal with the RTC instead of a petition for review
with the CA. As a consequence of Yalong’s failure to file a notice of appeal with the RTC
within the proper reglementary period, the RTC Decision had attained finality which
thereby bars Yalong from further contesting the same.
In this relation, it must be pointed out that Yalong’s contention that a petition for
review may be treated as a notice of appeal since the contents of the former already
include the required contents of the latter cannot be given credence since these modes
of appeal clearly remain distinct procedures which cannot, absent any compelling
reason therefor, be loosely interchanged with one another. For one, a notice of appeal
is filed with the regional trial court that rendered the assailed decision, judgment or
final order, while a petition for review is filed with the CA. Also, a notice of appeal is
required when the RTC issues a decision, judgment or final order in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction, while a petition for review is required when such issuance was in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Thus, owing to these differences, Yalong’s filing
of the subject petition for review cannot be simply accorded the same effect as the filing
of a notice of appeal.
Verily, jurisprudence dictates that the perfection of an appeal within the period and in
the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-compliance with such
requirements is considered fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and
executory. To be sure, the rules on appeal must be strictly followed as they are
considered indispensable to forestall or avoid unreasonable delays in the administration
of justice, to ensure an orderly discharge of judicial business, and to put an end to
controversies. Though as a general rule, rules of procedures are liberally construed, the
provisions with respect to the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting appeals
are strictly applied and are only relaxed in very exceptional circumstances on equitable
considerations, which are not present in the instant case. [35] As it stands, the subject
petition for review was the wrong remedy and perforce was properly dismissed by the
CA.
Besides, even discounting the above-discussed considerations, Yalong’s appeal still

remains dismissible on the ground that, inter alia, the MTCC had properly acquired
jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 45414. It is well-settled that violation of BP 22 cases
is categorized as transitory or continuing crimes, which means that the acts material and
essential thereto occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another.
Accordingly, the court wherein any of the crime’s essential and material acts have been
committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court
taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Stated differently, a person charged
with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory
where the offense was in part committed. [36] Applying these principles, a criminal case
for violation of BP 22 may be filed in any of the places where any of its elements
occurred – in particular, the place where the check is drawn, issued, delivered, or
dishonored.[37]
In this case, while it is undisputed that the subject check was drawn, issued, and
delivered in Manila, records reveal that Ylagan presented the same for deposit and
encashment at the LBC Bank in Batangas City where she learned of its dishonor. [38] As
such, the MTCC correctly took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 45414 as it had the
territorial jurisdiction to try and resolve the same. In this light, the denial of the present
petition remains warranted.
As the Court finds the above-stated reasons already sufficient to deny the present
petition, it is unnecessary to delve on the other ancillary issues in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Resolutions dated August 1, 2008
and March 10, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 104075 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R.Nos. 74053-54, January 20, 1988 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION,
PETITIONERS, VS. NATHANIEL M. GROSPE, PRESIDING JUDGE,
BRANCH 44, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PAMPANGA AND MANUEL
PARULAN, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
A special civil action for Certiorari seeking to set aside the Decision of respondent
Presiding Judge of Branch 44, Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, dismissing Criminal
Case No. 2800 for Violation of B.P. Blg. 22, and Criminal Case No. 2813 for Estafa, for
being “bereft of jurisdiction to pass judgment on the accused on the basis of the merits
of these cases.”
Respondent-accused, Manuel Parulan, is an authorized wholesale dealer of petitioner

San Miguel Corporation (SMC, for short) in Bulacan.
In Criminal Case No. 2800 of the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, he was charged with
Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22) for having issued a check on 13 June
1983 for P86,071.20) in favor of SMC but which was dishonored for having been drawn
against “insufficient funds” and, in spite of repeated demands, for having failed and
refused to make good said check to the damage and prejudice of SMC.
In Criminal Case No. 2813 of the same Court, Respondent- accused was charged with
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code for having made out
a check on 18 June 1983 in the sum of P11,918.80 in favor of SMC in payment of beer
he had purchased, but which check was refused payment for “insufficient funds” and, in
spite of repeated demands, for having failed and refused to redeem said check to the
damage and prejudice of SMC.
The two cases were tried jointly, the witnesses for both prosecution and defense being
the same for the two suits.
Based on the facts and the evidence, Respondent Judge arrived at the following
“Findings and Resolution”:
“From the welter of evidence adduced in these two cases, this Court is convinced
that the two checks involved herein were issued and signed by the accused in
connection with the beer purchases made by him on various occasions at the Guiguinto
sales office of SMC at Guiguinto, Bulacan and which checks he handed and delivered to
the sales Supervisor of SMC, Mr. Ruben Cornelio, who holds office in that municipality.
The Court finds it rather difficult to believe the claim and testimony of the accused that
these checks which he admittedly signed and which he delivered to Mr. Cornelio in
blank were filled up without his knowledge particularly the amounts appearing therein
which in the case of the check involved in Criminal Case No. 2800 amounted to
P86,071.20, and, in the case of the checks involved in Criminal Case No. 2813, amounted
to P11,918.80. The accused had been engaged in business for some time involving
amounts that are quite considerable, and it is hard to believe that he will agree to this
kind of arrangement which placed or exposed him to too much risks and uncertainties.
But even as this Court is convinced that the accused had issued these checks to the
representative of SMC on the occasions testified to in these cases by the witnesses for
the prosecution which two checks were subsequently dishonored due to lack of funds
resulting in damage to SMC, the offended party herein, this Court, after considering the
totality of the evidence and the circumstances that attended the issuance of these two
checks until they were both dishonored by the drawee bank, the Planters Development
Bank, at Santa Maria, Bulacan, has come to the conclusion that it is bereft of jurisdiction
to pass judgment on the accused on the basis of the merits of these cases.”
which he reasoned out, thus:
“Deceit and damage are the two essential elements that make up the offenses
involving dishonored checks. And in order that this Court may have jurisdiction to try
these cases, it must be established that both or any one of these elements composing
the offenses charged must occur or take place within the area over which this Court has
territorial jurisdiction,. Here, however, it is clear that none of these elements took place
or occurred within the jurisdiction at area of this Court.
As gleaned from the evidence, the two checks involved herein were issued by the
accused at Guiguinto, Bulacan. They were delivered and handed to Supervisor Ruben
Cornelio of San Miguel Corporation in his capacity as the representative of the company
holding office in that municipality where the transactions of the accused with SMC took
place. It was before Supervisor Cornelio at Guiguinto, Bulacan that false assurances
were made by the accused that the checks issued by him were good and backed by
sufficient funds in his bank, the Planters Development Bank, at Santa Maria, Bulacan,
only to turn out later on that this was not so.
The other element of damage pertaining to the offenses charged in these cases was
inflicted on the offended party, the SMC, right at the moment the checks issued by the
accused were dishonored by the Planters Development Bank, the drawee bank, at Santa
Maria, Bulacan which received them from the BPI, San Fernando, Pampanga branch for
clearing purposes. The argument advanced by the prosecution in its memorandum filed
herein that the two checks were deposited by SMC at the BPI, San Fernando Branch, San
Fernando, Pampanga, where it maintained its accounts after receiving these checks
from its Guiguinto Sales Office which bank later on made the corresponding deductions
from the account of SMC in the amounts covered by the dishonored checks upon
receiving information that the checks so issued by the accused had been dishonored by
the drawee bank at Santa Maria, Bulacan, is inconsequential. As earlier stated, the
element of damage was inflicted on the offended party herein right at the moment and
at the place where the checks issued in its favor were dishonored which is in Santa
Maria, Bulacan.”
Respondent Judge then decreed:
“WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
dismissing these cases for lack of jurisdiction,
“The bail bond posted by the accused in these cases are ordered cancelled.”
This Petition for Certiorari challenges the dismissal of the two criminal cases on
the ground that they were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
Respondent-accused adopts the contrary proposition and argues that the order of
dismissal was, in effect, an acquittal not reviewable by certiorari, and that to set the
order aside after plea and trial on the merits, would subject Respondent-accused to
double jeopardy.
Upon the attendant facts and circumstances, we uphold the Petition.

The principal ground relied upon by Respondent Judge in dismissing the criminal cases
is that deceit and damage, the two essential elements that make up the offenses
involving dishonored checks, did not occur within the territorial jurisdiction of his Court
in Pampanga, but rather in Bulacan where false assurances were given by Respondent-
accused and where the checks he had issued were dishonored. The People maintain, on
the other hand, that jurisdiction is properly vested in the Regional Trial Court of
Pampanga.

At the outset, it should be pointed out, as the Solicitor General has aptly called attention
to, that there are two dishonored checks involved, each the subject of different penal
laws and with different basic elements: (1) On June 13, 1983, Respondent-accused
issued Planters Development Bank (Santa Maria, Bulacan Branch) [PDB] Check No. 5
9040865 in the sum of P86,071.20 in favor of SMC, which was received by the SMC
Supervisor at Guiguinto, Bulacan. The check was forwarded to the SMC Regional Office
at San Fernando, Pampanga, where it was delivered to and received by the SMC Finance
Officer, who then deposited the check with the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), San
Fernando Branch, which is the SMC depository bank. On July 8, 1983, the SMC
depository bank received a notice of dishonor of the said check for “insufficiency of
funds” from the PDB, the drawee bank in Santa Maria, Bulacan. This dishonored check is
the subject of the charge of Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (BP Big. 22) in
Criminal Case No. 2800 of the lower Court (hereafter, the Bouncing Checks Case).
(2) On June 18, 1983, Respondent-accused likewise issued PDB Check No. 19040872 in
the amount of P11,918.80 in favor of SMC, which was received also by the SMC
Supervisor at Guiguinto, Bulacan, as direct payment for the spot sale of beer. That check
was similarly forwarded by the SMC Supervisor to the SMC Regional Office in San
Fernando, Pampanga, where it was delivered to the Finance Officer thereat and who, in
turn, deposited the check with the SMC depository bank in San Fernando, Pampanga.
On July 8, 1983, the SMC depository bank received a notice of dishonor for
“insufficiency of funds” from the drawee bank, the PDB, in Santa Maria, Bulacan. This
dishonored check is the subject of the prosecution for Estafa by postdating or issuing a
bad check under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code in Criminal Case
No. 2813 of the lower Court (briefly, the Estafa Case).
In the crime of Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check, deceit and damage are
essential elements of the offense (U.S. vs. Rivera, 23 Phil. 383-390) and have to be
established with satisfactory proof to warrant conviction.
For Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, on the other hand, the elements of deceit and
damage are not essential nor required. An essential element of that offense is
knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his
funds (Lozano vs. Hon. Martinez, No. 63419, etc., December 18, 1986; 146 SCRA 323;
Dingle vs. 1AC, G.R. No. 75243, March 16, 1987, 148 SCRA 595). The Anti-Bouncing
Checks Law makes the mere act of issuing a worthless check a special offense
punishable thereunder (Cruz vs. IAC, No, 66327, May 28, 1984, 129 SCRA 490. Malice
and intent in issuing the worthless check are immaterial, the offense
being malum prohibitum (Que vs. People of the Philippines, et al., G.R. Nos. 75217-18,
September 21, 1987). The gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a check, not the
non-payment of an obligation (Lozano vs. Hon. Martinez, supra).
A. With the distinction clarified, the threshold question is whether or not venue was
sufficiently conferred in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga in the two cases.
Section 14 (a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, which has been carried over in
Section 15(a) of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically provides:
“SEC. 14. Place where action is to be instituted. —
(a) In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential
ingredients thereof took place.”
In other words, a person charged with a transitory crime may be validly tried in
any municipality or province where the offense was in part committed. In transitory or
continuing offenses in which some acts material and essential to the crime and requisite
to its consummation occur in one province and some in another, the Court of either
province has jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that the first Court taking
cognizance of the case will exclude the others (Tuzon vs. Cruz, No. L-27410, August 28,
1975, 66 SCRA 235). However, if all the acts material and essential to the crime and
requisite of its consummation occurred in one municipality or territory, the Court of that
municipality or territory has the sole jurisdiction to try the case (People vs. Yabut, L-
42902, April 29, 1977, 76 SCRA 624).

Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check may be a transitory or continuing offense. Its
basic elements of deceit and damage may arise independently in separate places
(People vs. Yabut, supra). In this case, deceit took place in San Fernando, Pampanga,
while the damage was inflicted in Bulacan where the check was dishonored by the
drawee bank in that place (See People vs. Yabut, supra). Jurisdiction may, therefore, be
entertained by either the Bulacan Court or the Pampanga Court.
For while the subject check was issued in Guiguinto, Bulacan, it was not completely
drawn thereat, but in San Fernando, Pampanga, where it was uttered and delivered.
“What is of decisive importance is the delivery thereof. The delivery of the instrument is
the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation.” (People vs. Larue, 83 P. 2d
725, cited in People vs. Yabut, supra). For although the check was received by the SMC
Sales Supervisor at Guiguinto, Bulacan, that was not the delivery in contemplation of
law to the payee, SMC. Said supervisor was not the person who could take the check as
a holder, that is, as a payee or indorsee thereof, with the intent to transfer title thereto.
The rule is that the issuance as well as the delivery of the check must be to a person
who takes it as a holder; which means “the payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in
possession of it, or the bearer, thereof (Sec. 190, Negotiable Instruments Law, cited
in People vs. Yabut, supra.) Thus, said representative had to forward the check to the
SMC Regional Office in San Fernando, Pampanga, which was delivered to the Finance
Officer thereat who, in turn, deposited it at the SMC depository bank in San Fernando,
Pampanga. The element of deceit, therefore, took place in San Fernando, Pampanga,
where the rubber check was legally issued and delivered so that jurisdiction could
properly be laid upon the Court in that locality.
“The estafa charged in the two informations involved in the case before Us
appears to be transitory or continuing in nature. Deceit has taken place in Malolos,
Bulacan, while the damage in Caloocan City, where the checks were dishonored by the
drawee banks there. Jurisdiction can, therefore, be entertained by either the Malolos
court or the Caloocan court. While the subject checks were written, signed, or dated in
Caloocan City, they were not completely made or drawn there, but in Malolos, Bulacan,
where they were uttered and delivered. That is the place of business and residence of
the payee. The place where the bills were written, signed or dated does not necessarily
fix or determine the place where they were executed. What is of decisive importance is
the delivery thereof. The delivery of the instrument is the final act essential to its
consummation as an obligation (People vs. Larue, 83 P. 2d 725). An undelivered bill or
note is inoperative. Until delivery, the contract is revocable (Ogden, Negotiable
Instruments, 5th ed., at 107). And the issuance as well as the delivery of the check must
be to a person who takes it as a holder, which means ‘(t)he payee or indorsee of a bill or
note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof (Sec. 190, Negotiable Instruments
Law). Delivery of the check signifies transfer of possession, whether actual or
constructive, from one person to another with intent to transfer title thereto (Bailey,
Brady on Bank Checks, 3rd ed. at 57-59; Sec. 190, Negotiable Instruments Law). Thus,
the penalizing clause of the provision of Art. 315, par. 2(d) states: ‘By postdating a
check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in
the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the
check,’ Clearly, therefore, the element of deceit thru the issuance and delivery, of the
worthless checks to the complainant took place in Malolos, Bulacan, conferring upon a
court in that locality jurisdiction to try the case.”
In respect of the Bouncing Checks Case, the offense also appears to be continuing
in nature, it is true that the offense is committed by the very fact of its performance
(Colmenares vs. Villar, No. L-27I26, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 186); and that the Bouncing
Checks Law penalizes not only the fact of dishonor of a check but also the act of making
or drawing and issuance of a bouncing check (People vs. Hon. Veridiano, II, No. 62243,
132 SCRA 523). The case, therefore, could have been filed also in Bulacan. As held
in Que vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 75217-18, September 11, 1987 “the
determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check.”
However, it is likewise true that knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the
check of the insufficiency of his funds, which is an essential ingredient of the offense is
by itself a continuing eventuality, whether the accused be within one territory or
another (People vs. Hon. Manzanilla, G.R. Nos. 66003-04, December 11, 1987).
Accordingly, jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense also lies in the Regional Trial
Court of Pampanga.
And, as pointed out in the Manzanilla case, jurisdiction or venue is determined by the

allegations in the Information, which are controlling (Arches vs. Bellosillo, 81 Phil. 190,
193, cited in Tuzon vs. Cruz, No. L-27410, August 28, 1975, 66 SCRA 235). The
Information filed herein specifically alleges that the crime was committed in San
Fernando, Pampanga, and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the Court below.
B. The dismissal of the subject criminal cases by Respondent Judge, predicated on his
lack of jurisdiction, is correctible by Certiorari. The error committed is one of jurisdiction
and not an error of judgment on the merits. Well-settled is the rule that questions
covering jurisdictional matters may be averred in a petition for certiorari, inclusive of
matters of grave abuse of discretion, which are equivalent to lack of jurisdiction ( City of
Davao vs, Dept. of Labor,No. L-19488, January 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 111, 115). An error of
jurisdiction renders whatever order of the Trial Court null and void.
C. The present petition for Certiorari seeking to set aside the void Decision of
Respondent Judge does not place Respondent- accused in double jeopardy for the same
offense. It will be recalled that the questioned judgment was not an adjudication on the
merits. It was a dismissal upon Respondent Judge’s erroneous conclusion that his Court
had no “territorial jurisdiction” over the cases. Where an order dismissing a criminal
case is not a decision on the merits, it cannot bar as res judicata a subsequent case
based on the same offense (People vs. Bellosillo, No. L-18512, December 27, 1963, 9.
SCRA 835, 837).
The dismissal being null and void the proceedings before the Trial Court may not be said
to have been lawfully terminated. There is therefore, no second proceeding which
would subject the accused to double jeopardy.
“Since the order of dismissal was without authority and, therefore, null and void,
the proceedings before the Municipal Court have not been lawfully terminated.
Accordingly, there is no second proceeding to speak of and no double jeopardy. A
continuation of the proceedings against the accused for serious physical injuries is in
order.” (People vs. Mogot, 131 SCRA 306, 308).
In sum, Respondent Judge had jurisdiction to try and decide the subject criminal
case, venue having been properly laid.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of Respondent Judge of February 17, 1986 is hereby set aside
and he is hereby ordered to re- assume jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 2800 and
2813 of his Court and to render judgment of either conviction or acquittal in accordance
with the evidence already adduced during the joint trial of said two cases.
SO ORDERED.
[ G.R. No. L-28519, February 17, 1968 ]

RICARDO PARULAN, PETITIONER, VS. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS,
RESPONDENT.
RESOLUTION
ANGELES, J.:
On petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed by Ricardo Parulan, directed to the Director

of the Bureau of Prisons, praying that the latter be ordered "to release immediately and
without delay the body of the petitioner from unlawful and illegal confinement",
anchoring the relief prayed for on certain allegations in the petition, to the effect that
petitioner's confinement in the state penitentiary at Muntinglupa, Rizal, under the
administrative and supervisory control of the respondent Director of Prisons, is illegal,
for the reason that the sentence of conviction impose upon said petitioner for the crime of
evasion of service of sentence, penalized under Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code,
was rendered by a court without jurisdiction over his person and of the offense with
which he was charged.
It appears that the petitioner as alleged in the petition, was confined in the state peniten-
tiary at Muntinglupa, Rizal, serving a sentence of life imprisonment which, however, was
commuted to twenty (20) years by the President of the Philippines. In October, 1964, he
was transferred to the military barracks of Fort Bonifacio (formerly Fort Wm. McKinley)
situated at Makati, Rizal, under the custody of the Stockade Officer of the said military
barracks. In that month of October, 1964, while still serving his prison term as aforesaid,
he effected his escape from his confinement. Petitioner was recaptured in the City
of Manila. Prosecuted for the crime of evasion of service of sentence, penalized under
Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, before the Court of First Instance of Manila, after
due trial, petitioner was found guilty of the offense charged and sentenced accordingly
with the impossable penalty prescribed by law, on August 3, 1966.
Assuming the correctness of the facts as alleged in the petition, and on the basis thereof,
we shall proceed to discuss the merits of the case regarding the validity and legality of the
decision sentencing the petitioner to a prison term for the crime of evasion of sentence.
Settled is the rule that for deprivation of any fundamental or constitutional rights, lack of
jurisdiction of the court to impose the sentence, or excessive penalty affords grounds for
relief by habeas corpus.
The issue, therefore, as posed in the petition is: Was the Court of First Instance of
Manila with jurisdiction to try and decide case and to impose the sentence upon the
petitioner, for, the offense with which he was charged - evasion of service of sentence?
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

"Place where action is to be instituted. - (a) In all criminal prosecutions the action
shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province where the
offense was committed or any of the essential ingredients thereof took place."
There are crimes which are called transitory or continuing offenses because some acts
material and essential to the crime occur in one province and some in another, in which
case, the rule is settled that the court of either province where any of the essential
ingredients of the crime took place has jurisdiction to try the case. As Go- [1]
mez Orbaneja opines -
Que habiendo en
el delito continuado tantos resultados como hechos independientes en sentido natural,
el principio del resultado no basta para fijar el forum delicti commisi, y ha
de aceptarse que el delicto se comete en cualquira de los lugares donde se produzca un
o de esos plurales resultados." [2]
There are, however, crimes which although all the elements thereof for its consummation
may have occurred in a single place, yet by reason of the nature of the offense committed,
the violation of the law is deemed to be continuing. Of the first class, the crime
of estafa or malversation, and abduction, may be mentioned; and as belonging to the
[3] [4]
second class are the crimes of kidnapping and illegal detention where the deprivation of
liberty is persistent and continuing from one place to another, and libel where the
[5]
libelous matter is published or circulated from one province to another. To this latter
[6]
class may also be included the crime of evasion of service of sentence, when the prisoner
in his attempt to evade the service of the sentence imposed upon him by the courts and
thus defeat the purpose of the law, moves from one place to another; for, in this case, the
act of the escaped prisoner is a continuous or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse
and operated by an uninterminent force, however long it may be. It may not be validly
said that after the convict shall have escaped from the place of his confinement the crime
is fully consummated, for, as long as he continues to evade the service of his sentence, he
is deemed to continue committing the crime, and may be arrested without warrant, at any
place where he may be found. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court may be invoked in
support of this conclusion, for, under section 6[c] thereof, one of the instances when a
person may be validly arrested without a warrant is where he has escaped from
confinement. Undoubtedly, this right of arrest without a warrant is founded on the
[7]
principle that at the time of the arrest, the escapee is in the continuous act of committing a
crime - evading the service of his sentence.
WHEREFORE, the writ is denied. Without costs.

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 193960, January 07, 2013 ]
KARLO ANGELO DABALOS Y SAN DIEGO, VS. PETITIONER, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 59, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA),
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDING JUDGE MA. ANGELICA T. PARAS
QUIAMBAO; THE OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR, ANGELES CITY
(PAMPANGA); AND ABC,[1] RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The Court will not read into Republic Act (RA) No. 9262 a provision that would
render it toothless in the pursuit of the declared policy of the State to protect women
and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the Orders dated
September 13, 2010[2] and October 5, 2010[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles
City, Branch 59 in Criminal Case No. 09-5210 which denied petitioner’s Motion for
Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with Motion to Quash the Information.
The Facts
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9262 before the RTC of
Angeles City, Branch 59, in an Information which states:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 2009, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, being then
the boyfriend of the complainant, x x x did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously use personal violence [on] the complainant, by pulling her hair, punching
complainant’s back, shoulder and left eye, thereby demeaning and degrading the
complainant’s intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being, in violation of Section 5(a)
of the Republic Act 9262.[4]
After examining the supporting evidence, the RTC found probable cause and
consequently, issued a warrant of arrest against petitioner on November 19, 2009. The
latter posted a cash bond for his provisional liberty and on August 12, 2010, filed a
Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with Motion to Quash the
Information. Petitioner averred that at the time of the alleged incident on July 13, 2009,
he was no longer in a dating relationship with private respondent; hence, RA 9262 was
inapplicable.
In her affidavit, private respondent admitted that her relationship with petitioner had
ended prior to the subject incident. She narrated that on July 13, 2009, she sought
payment of the money she had lent to petitioner but the latter could not pay. She then
inquired from petitioner if he was responsible for spreading rumors about her which he
admitted. Thereupon, private respondent slapped petitioner causing the latter to inflict
on her the physical injuries alleged in the Information.
The RTC Ruling
The RTC denied petitioner’s motion. It did not consider material the fact that the
parties’ dating relationship had ceased prior to the incident, ratiocinating that since the
parties had admitted a prior dating relationship, the infliction of slight physical injuries
constituted an act of violence against women and their children as defined in Sec. 3(a)
of RA 9262.
Issues
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues: 1) whether the RTC has
jurisdiction over the offense; 2) whether RA 9262 should be construed in a manner that
will favor the accused; and 3) whether the Information alleging a fact contrary to what
has been admitted should be quashed.
Petitioner insists that the act which resulted in physical injuries to private respondent is
not covered by RA 9262 because its proximate cause was not their dating relationship.
Instead, he claims that the offense committed was only slight physical injuries under the
Revised Penal Code which falls under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.
The Court is not persuaded. Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262 reads:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act, (a) "Violence against women and
their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a
woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or
had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her
child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result
in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic
abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty. x x x.
The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series of
acts to be considered as a crime of violence against women through physical harm,
namely: 1) it is committed against a woman or her child and the woman is the offender’s
wife, former wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or dating relationship or with
whom he has a common child; and 2) it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or
suffering.
In Ang v. Court of Appeals,[5] the Court enumerated the elements of the crime of

violence against women through harassment, to wit:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended
woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of

harassment against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to

her.[6]
Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship
with the offended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the
act of violence be a consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such
limitation be inferred. Hence, applying the rule on statutory construction that when the
law does not distinguish, neither should the courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts
refer to all acts of violence against women with whom the offender has or had a sexual
or dating relationship. As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is immaterial whether the
relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or
present existence of such relationship between the offender and the victim when the
physical harm was committed. Consequently, the Court cannot depart from the
parallelism in Ang and give credence to petitioner's assertion that the act of violence
should be due to the sexual or dating relationship.
Neither can the Court construe the statute in favor of petitioner using the rule of
lenity[7] because there is no ambiguity in RA 9262 that would necessitate any
construction. While the degree of physical harm under RA 9262 and Article 266 [8] of the
Revised Penal Code are the same, there is sufficient justification for prescribing a higher
penalty for the former. Clearly, the legislative intent is to purposely impose a more
severe sanction on the offenders whose violent act/s physically harm women with
whom they have or had a sexual or dating relationship, and/or their children with the
end in view of promoting the protection of women and children.
Accordingly, the Information having sufficiently alleged the necessary elements of the
crime, such as: a dating relationship between the petitioner and the private respondent;
the act of violence committed by the petitioner; and the resulting physical harm to
private respondent, the offense is covered by RA 9262 which falls under the jurisdiction
of the RTC in accordance with Sec. 7 of the said law which reads:
SEC. 7. Venue – The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their
children under this law. In the absence of such court in the place where the offense was
committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of
its elements was committed at the option of the complainant.
Finally, the Court finds the Order[9] of the RTC, giving the prosecutor a period of two (2)
days to amend the Information to reflect the cessation of the dating relationship
between the petitioner and the offended party, to be in accord with Sec. 4 of Rule 117
of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information.- If the motion to quash is based
on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by
amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made.
Furthermore, Sec. 14 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that an information may
be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the
accused enters his plea. In the present case, the accused petitioner has not yet been
arraigned, hence, the RTC was correct in directing the amendment of the Information
and in denying the motion to quash the same.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Orders dated September 13, 20 I 0 and
October 5, 2010 of the Regional 'I'rial Court (KfC) of Angeles City, Branch 59 in Criminal
Case No. 09-5210 are AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court
is LIFTED and the RTC is directed to continue with the proceedings in Criminal Case No.
09-5210.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 160451, February 09, 2007 ]
EDUARDO G. RICARZE, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS,
PEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES, CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC., PHILIPPINE
COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK (PCIBANK), RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68492, and its Resolution[2] which denied the Motion for
Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration thereof.
The Antecedents
Petitioner Eduardo G. Ricarze was employed as a collector-messenger by City Service

Corporation, a domestic corporation engaged in messengerial services. He was assigned
to the main office of Caltex Philippines, Inc. (Caltex) in Makati City. His primary task
was to collect checks payable to Caltex and deliver them to the cashier. He also delivered
invoices to Caltex's customers.[3]
On November 6, 1997, Caltex, through its Banking and Insurance Department Manager
Ramon Romano, filed a criminal complaint against petitioner before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Makati City for estafa through falsification of commercial documents.
Romano alleged that, on October 16, 1997, while his department was conducting a daily
electronic report from Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank (PCIB) Dela Rosa,
Makati Branch, one of its depositary banks, it was discovered that unknown to the
department, a company check, Check No. 74001 dated October 13, 1997 in the amount of
P5,790,570.25 payable to Dante R. Gutierrez, had been cleared through PCIB on October
15, 1997. An investigation also revealed that two other checks (Check Nos. 73999 and
74000) were also missing and that in Check No. 74001, his signature and that of another
signatory, Victor S. Goquinco, were forgeries. Another check, Check No. 72922 dated
September 15, 1997 in the amount of P1,790,757.25 likewise payable to Dante R.
Gutierrez, was also cleared through the same bank on September 24, 1997; this check
was likewise not issued by Caltex, and the signatures appearing thereon had also been
forged. Upon verification, it was uncovered that Check Nos. 74001 and 72922 were
deposited at the Banco de Oro's SM Makati Branch under Savings Account No. S/A
2004-0047245-7, in the name of a regular customer of Caltex, Dante R. Gutierrez.
Gutierrez, however, disowned the savings account as well as his signatures on the dorsal
portions thereof. He also denied having withdrawn any amount from said savings
account. Further investigation revealed that said savings account had actually been
opened by petitioner; the forged checks were deposited and endorsed by him under
Gutierrez's name. A bank teller from the Banco de Oro, Winnie P. Donable Dela Cruz,
positively identified petitioner as the person who opened the savings account using
Gutierrez's name.[4]
In the meantime, the PCIB credited the amount of P581,229.00 to Caltex on March 29,
1998. However, the City Prosecutor of Makati City was not informed of this
development. After the requisite preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor filed two
(2) Informations for estafa through falsification of commercial documents on June 29,
1998 against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63.
The Informations are worded as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of September 1997 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
no. 72922 dated September 15, 1997 payable to Dante R. Gutierrez, in the amount of
amount of Php1,790,757.50.
That on or about the 15th day of October 1997 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
no. 74001 dated October 13, 1997 payable to Dante R. Gutierrez, in the amount of
amount of Php5,790,570.25.[5]
Petitioner was arraigned on August 18, 1998, and pleaded not guilty to both charges.
[6]
Pre-trial ensued and the cases were jointly tried. The prosecution presented its
witnesses, after which the Siguion Reyna, Montecillio and Ongsiako Law Offices
(SRMO) as private prosecutor filed a Formal Offer of Evidence.[7] Petitioner opposed the
pleading, contending that the private complainant was represented by the ACCRA Law
Offices and the Balgos and Perez Law Office during trial, and it was only after the
prosecution had rested its case that SRMO entered its appearance as private prosecutor
representing the PCIB. Since the ACCRA and Balgos and Perez Law Offices had not
withdrawn their appearance, SRMO had no personality to appear as private prosecutor.
Under the Informations, the private complainant is Caltex and not PCIB; hence, the
Formal Offer of Evidence filed by SRMO should be stricken from the records.
Petitioner further averred that unless the Informations were amended to change the
private complainant to PCIB, his right as accused would be prejudiced. He pointed out,
however, that the Informations can no longer be amended because he had already been
arraigned under the original Informations.[8] He insisted that the amendments of the
Informations to substitute PCIB as the offended party for Caltex would place him in
double jeopardy.
PCIB, through SRMO, opposed the motion. It contended that the PCIB had re-credited
the amount to Caltex to the extent of the indemnity; hence, the PCIB had been subrogated
to the rights and interests of Caltex as private complainant. Consequently, the PCIB is
entitled to receive any civil indemnity which the trial court would adjudge against the
accused. Moreover, the re-credited amount was brought out on cross-examination by
Ramon Romano who testified for the Prosecution. PCIB pointed out that petitioner had
marked in evidence the letter of the ACCRA Law Office to PCIBank dated October 10,
1997 and the credit memo sent by PCIB to Caltex.[9]
Petitioner filed a Motion to Expunge the Opposition of SRMO.[10] In his Rejoinder, he

averred that the substitution of PCIB as private complainant cannot be made by mere oral
motion; the Information must be amended to allege that the private complainant was
PCIB and not Caltex after the preliminary investigation of the appropriate complaint of
PCIB before the Makati City Prosecutor.
In response, the PCIB, through SRMO, averred that as provided in Section 2, Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the erroneous designation of the name of the
offended party is a mere formal defect which can be cured by inserting the name of the
offended party in the Information. To support its claim, PCIB cited the ruling of this
Court in Sayson v. People.[11]
On July 18, 2001, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion of the private prosecutor
for the substitution of PCIB as private complainant for Caltex. It however denied
petitioner's motion to have the formal offer of evidence of SRMO expunged from the
record.[12] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied on
November 14, 2001.[13]
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with Urgent
Application for Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals (CA,) praying
for the annulment of the RTC's Orders of July 18, 2001 and November 14, 2001. The
petitioner averred that:
I
RESPONDENT JUDGE GRIEVEOUSLY (SIC) ERRED IN RENDERING ITS ORDER
ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF
OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION BY ALLOWING THE SUBSTITUTION OF
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT, AFTER THE ACUSED WAS ALREADY ARRAIGNED
AND PROSECUTION HAS ALREADY TERMINATED PRESENTING ITS
EVIDENCE THEREBY PATENTLY VIOLATING THE STRICT CONDITION
IMPOSED UPON BY RULE 110 SEC. 14 RULES ON CRIMINAL ROCEDURE.
II
AND AS A COROLLARY GROUND RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN RENDERING AN
ORDER RECOGNIZING THE APPEARANCE OF A NEW PROSECUTOR
WITHOUT WRITTEN OR EVEN ORAL WITHDRAWAL OF THE COUNSEL ON
RECORD.[14]
According to petitioner, damage or injury to the offended party is an essential element of
estafa. The amendment of the Informations substituting the PCIBank for Caltex as the
offended party would prejudice his rights since he is deprived of a defense available
before the amendment, and which would be unavailable if the Informations are amended.
Petitioner further insisted that the ruling in the Sayson case did not apply to this case.
On November 5, 2002, the appellate court rendered judgment dismissing the petition.
The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition to annul the orders dated July 18, 2001
and November 14, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Makati City in Criminal
Case Nos. 98-1611 and 98-1612 is hereby DENIED and consequently DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[15]
The appellate court declared that when PCIB restored the amount of the checks to Caltex,
it was subrogated to the latter's right against petitioner. It further declared that in offenses
against property, the designation of the name of the offended party is not absolutely
indispensable for as long as the criminal act charged in the complaint or information can
be properly identified. The appellate court cited the rulings of this Court in People v.
Ho[16] and People v. Reyes.[17]
On October 17, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.[18]
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition which is anchored on the following grounds:
I. THE PEOPLE V. YU CHAI HO 53 PHILIPPINES 874 IS INAPPLICABLE TO

THE CASE AT BAR CONSIDERING THE PACTS ARE SUBSTANTIALLY
DIFFERENT.
II. LIKEWISE, THE CASE OF PEOPLE VS. REYES CA, 50 (2) OG 665,
NOVEMBER 11, 1953 HAS NO MATERIAL BEARING TO THE PRESENT
CASE.
III. THE SUBSTITUTION OF PCIBANK WILL SUBSTANTIALLY PREJUDICE

THE RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER HENCE, IT IS PROHIBITED BY SEC. 14
OF RULE 110.
IV. THERE IS NO VALID SUBROGATION BETWEEN CALTEX AND

PCIBANK. ASSUMING THERE IS, THE CIVIL CASE SHOULD BE
DISMISSED TO PROSECUTE.
V. THE TWIN INFORMATIONS UPON WHICH PETITIONER WAS INDICTED,

ARRAIGNED, PRE-TRIAL HELD AND PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
TERMINATED THE PRESENTATION OF ITS EVIDENCE IN CHIEF ARE
DEFECTIVE AND VOID, HENCE THE DISMISSAL IS IN ORDER.
VI. PETITIONER TIMELY OBJECTED TO THE APPEARANCE OF PRIVATE

PROSECUTOR FOR PCIBANK.
VII. THE FINDINGS OF MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT SUPORTED BY THE

RECORD NOR EVIDENCE AND BASED ON MISAPPRECIATION OF
FACTS.
VIII. PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DID

NOT VIOLATE THE OMNIBUS MOTION RULE UNDER SEC. 8, RULE 15
OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.[19]
The Court's Ruling
Petitioner argues that the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complainant at this
late stage of the trial is prejudicial to his defense. He argues that the substitution is
tantamount to a substantial amendment of the Informations which is prohibited under
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
Under Section 5, Rule 110[20] of the Revised Rules of Rules, all criminal actions covered
by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direct supervision and
control of the public prosecutor. Thus, even if the felonies or delictual acts of the
accused result in damage or injury to another, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability based on the said criminal acts is impliedly instituted, and the offended party has
not waived the civil action, reserved the right to institute it separately or instituted the
civil action prior to the criminal action, the prosecution of the action (including the civil)
remains under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor. The prosecution of
offenses is a public function. Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the offended party may intervene in the criminal action personally or by
counsel, who will act as private prosecutor for the protection of his interests and in the
interest of the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice. A separate action for the
purpose would only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties
and further delay the final disposition of the case. The multiplicity of suits must be
avoided. With the implied institution of the civil action in the criminal action, the two
actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the criminal action
predominating the civil. The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the
offender in order to deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to
isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social
order.[21]
ART. 104. What is included in civil liability. - The civil liability established in Articles
1. Restitution;
On the other hand, Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
states:
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. - A complaint or information may be amended,
in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his
accused.
Thus, before the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the
complaint or information may be made without leave of court. After the entry of a plea,
only a formal amendment may be made but with leave of court and if it does not
prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment, a substantial amendment is
proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused.[23]
[24]
The following have been held to be mere formal amendments: (1) new allegations
substantial right of the accused; and (5) an amendment that merely adds specifications to
charged.[25]
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense

under the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is
made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the
information in the one form as in the other. An amendment to an information which does
not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the
offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new
averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance. [26]
In the case at bar, the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complaint is not a
substantial amendment. The substitution did not alter the basis of the charge in both
Informations, nor did it result in any prejudice to petitioner. The documentary evidence in
the form of the forged checks remained the same, and all such evidence was available to
petitioner well before the trial. Thus, he cannot claim any surprise by virtue of the
substitution.
Petitioner next argues that in no way was PCIB subrogated to the rights of Caltex,
considering that he has no knowledge of the subrogation much less gave his consent to it.
Alternatively, he posits that if subrogation was proper, then the charges against him
should be dismissed, the two Informations being "defective and void due to false
allegations."
Petitioner was charged of the crime of estafa complex with falsification document. In
estafa one of the essential elements "to prejudice of another" as mandated by article 315
of the Revise Penal Code.
The element of "to the prejudice of another" being as essential element of the felony
should be clearly indicated and charged in the information with TRUTH AND LEGAL
PRECISION.
This is not so in the case of petitioner, the twin information filed against him alleged the
felony committed " to the damage and prejudice of Caltex." This allegation is UNTRUE
and FALSE for there is no question that as early as March 24, 1998 or THREE (3)
LONG MONTHS before the twin information were filed on June 29, 1998, the prejudice
party is already PCIBank since the latter Re-Credit the value of the checks to Caltex as
early as March 24, 1998. In effect, assuming there is valid subrogation as the subject
decision concluded, the subrogation took place an occurred on March 24, 1998 THREE
(3) MONTHS before the twin information were filed.
The phrase "to the prejudice to another" as element of the felony is limited to the person
DEFRAUDED in the very act of embezzlement. It should not be expanded to other
persons which the loss may ultimately fall as a result of a contract which contract herein
petitioner is total stranger.
In this case, there is no question that the very act of commission of the offense of
September 24, 1997 and October 15, 1997 respectively, Caltex was the one defrauded by
the act of the felony.
In the light of these facts, petitioner submits that the twin information are DEFECTIVE
AND VOID due to the FALSE ALLEGATIONS that the offense was committed to the
prejudice of Caltex when it truth and in fact the one prejudiced here was PCIBank.
The twin information being DEFECTIVE AND VOID, the same should be dismissed
without prejudice to the filing of another information which should state the offense was
committed to the prejudice of PCIBank if it still legally possible without prejudicing
substantial and statutory rights of the petitioner.[27]
Petitioner's argument on subrogation is misplaced. The Court agrees with respondent
PCIB's comment that petitioner failed to make a distinction between legal and
conventional subrogation. Subrogation is the transfer of all the rights of the creditor to a
third person, who substitutes him in all his rights.[28] It may either be legal or
conventional. Legal subrogation is that which takes place without agreement but by
operation of law because of certain acts.[29] Instances of legal subrogation are those
provided in Article 1302[30] of the Civil Code. Conventional subrogation, on the other
hand, is that which takes place by agreement of the parties. [31] Thus, petitioner's
acquiescence is not necessary for subrogation to take place because the instant case is
one of legal subrogation that occurs by operation of law, and without need of the debtor's
knowledge.
Contrary to petitioner's asseverations, the case of People v. Yu Chai Ho[32] relied upon by

the appellate court is in point. The Court declared -
We do not however, think that the fiscal erred in alleging that the commission of the
crime resulted to the prejudice of Wm. H. Anderson & Co. It is true that originally the
International Banking Corporation was the prejudiced party, but Wm. H. Anderson & Co.
compensated it for its loss and thus became subrogated to all its rights against the
defendant (article 1839, Civil Code). Wm. H. Anderson & Co., therefore, stood exactly in
the shoes of the International Banking Corporation in relation to the defendant's acts, and
the commission of the crime resulted to the prejudice of the firm previously to the filing
of the information in the case. The loss suffered by the firm was the ultimate result of the
defendant's unlawful acts, and we see no valid reason why this fact should not be stated
in the information; it stands to reason that, in the crime of estafa, the damage resulting
therefrom need not necessarily occur simultaneously with the acts constituting the other
essential elements of the crime.
Thus, being subrogated to the right of Caltex, PCIB, through counsel, has the right to
intervene in the proceedings, and under substantive laws is entitled to restitution of its
properties or funds, reparation, or indemnification.
Petitioner's gripe that the charges against him should be dismissed because the allegations
in both Informations failed to name PCIB as true offended party does not hold water.

Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. - A complaint or information is
party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense; and the place wherein the
On the other hand, Section 12 of the same Rule provides:
Section. 12. Name of the offended party. - The complaint or information must state the
name and surname of the person against whom or against whose property the offense was
committed, or any appellation or nickname by which such person has been or is known.
If there is no better way of identifying him, he must be described under a fictitious name.
charged.
was committed is thereafter disclosed or ascertained, the court must cause such true name
to be inserted in the complaint or information and the record.
(c) If the offended party is a juridical person, it is sufficient to state its name, or any name
or designation by which it is known or by which it may be identified, without need of
averring that it is a juridical person or that it is organized in accordance with law. (12a)
In Sayson v. People,[33] the Court held that in case of offenses against property, the
designation of the name of the offended party is not absolutely indispensable for as long
as the criminal act charged in the complaint or information can be properly identified:
and if there is no better way of Identifying him, he must be described under a fictitious
name (Rule 110, Section 11, Revised Rules of Court; now Rule 110, Section 12 of the
Section 11. Name of the offended party-

...
(a) In cases of offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is unknown,
the property, subject matter of the offense, must be described with such particularity as to
properly Identify the particular offense charged.
...
In U.S. v. Kepner [1 Phil. 519 (1902)], this Court laid down the rule that when an offense
shall have been described in the complaint with sufficient certainty as to Identify the act,
an erroneous allegation as to the person injured shall be deemed immaterial as the same is
defendant. Accordingly, in the aforementioned case, which had a factual backdrop similar
to the instant case, where the defendant was charged with estafa for the misappropriation
of the proceeds of a warrant which he had cashed without authority, the erroneous
allegation in the complaint to the effect that the unlawful act was to the prejudice of the
owner of the cheque, when in reality the bank which cashed it was the one which suffered
a loss, was held to be immaterial on the ground that the subject matter of the estafa, the
warrant, was described in the complaint with such particularity as to properly Identify the
particular offense charged. In the instant suit for estafa which is a crime against property
under the Revised Penal Code, since the check, which was the subject-matter of the
offense, was described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged,
it becomes immaterial, for purposes of convicting the accused, that it was established
during the trial that the offended party was actually Mever Films and not Ernesto Rufino,
Sr. nor Bank of America as alleged in the information.
Lastly, on petitioner's claim that he timely objected to the appearance of SRMO [34] as
private prosecutor for PCIB, the Court agrees with the observation of the CA that
contrary to his claim, petitioner did not question the said entry of appearance even as the
RTC acknowledged the same on October 8, 1999.[35] Thus, petitioner cannot feign
ignorance or surprise of the incident, which are "all water under the bridge for [his]
failure to make a timely objection thereto."[36]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of the

Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. This case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 63, for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 165751, April 12, 2005 ]
DATU GUIMID P. MATALAM, PETITIONER, VS. THE SECOND DIVISION
OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure

assailing the resolutions[1] of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26381, admitting
the Amended Information[2] and denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration,[3] dated
12 January 2004 and 03 November 2004, respectively.
An information dated 15 November 2004 was filed before the Sandiganbayan charging
petitioner Datu Guimid Matalam, Habib A. Bajunaid, Ansari M. Lawi, Muslimin Unga
and Naimah Unte with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
for their alleged illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay the monetary claims of Kasan I.
Ayunan, Abdul E. Zailon, Esmael A. Ebrahim, Annabelle Zailon, Pendatun
Mambatawan, Hyria Mastura and Faizal I. Hadil. The accusatory portion of the
information reads:
That from the period January 1998 to June 1999, in Cotobato City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused ARMM Vice-Governor and Regional
Secretary, DAR, DATU GUIMID MATALAM, a high ranking public official, HABIB
A. BAJUNAID, ANSARI M. LAWI, MUSLIMIN UNGA and NAIMAH UNTE, all low-
ranking public officials, committing the offense while in the performance of their official
duties and taking advantage of their public position, conspiring, confederating and
mutually aiding one another, did there and then, willfully, unlawfully and criminally,
cause undue injury to several employees of the Department of Agrarian Reform,
Cotobato City, thru evident bad faith in the performance of their official duties to wit: by
illegally and unjustifiably refusing to pay the monetary claims of the complaining DAR
employees namely: KASAN I. AYUNAN, ABDUL E. ZAILON, ESMAEL A.
EBRAHIM, ANNABELLE ZAILON, PENDATUN MAMBATAWAN, HYRIA
MASTURA and FAIZAL I. HADIL, for the period of January 1998 to June 1999
amounting to P1,606,788.50 as contained in Civil Service Resolutions Nos. 982027 and
990415 in the nature of unpaid salaries during the period when they have been illegally
terminated, including salary differentials and other benefits.[4]
On 14 August 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation.
Per order of the court, a reinvestigation of the case was conducted where petitioner filed
his Counter-Affidavit.[5]
After the reinvestigation, the public prosecutor filed a "Manifestation and Motion to
Admit Amended Information Deleting the Names of Other Accused Except Datu Guimid
Matalam"[6] to which petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to the Motion
to Admit the Alleged Amended Information Against the Accused Guimid P. Matalam.
[7]
Thereafter, the public prosecutor filed his Reply[8] to which petitioner filed a Rejoinder.
The Amended Information reads:

That on December 16, 1997 and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Cotobato
City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused a
public officer being then the ARMM Vice-Governor and Regional Secretary DAR,
committing the offense while in the performance of his official duties and thru evident
bad faith and manifest partiality did there and then, willfully, unlawfully and criminally,
cause undue injury by illegally dismissing from the service complaining DAR-
Maguindanao employees, Cotobato City, namely: Kasan I. Ayunan, Abdul E. Zailon,
Annabelle Zailon, Pendatum Mambatawan, Hyria Mastura and Faizal I. Hadil, to their
damage and prejudice amounting to P1,606,788.50 by way of unpaid salaries during the
period when they have been illegally terminated including salary differentials and other
benefits.[9]
In his Motion to Dismiss, petitioner alleged that the amended information charges an
entirely new cause of action. The corpus delicti of the amended information is no longer
his alleged refusal to pay the backwages ordered by the Civil Service Commission, but
the alleged willful, unlawful and illegal dismissal from the service of the complaining
witnesses. He insists that the amended information charging a separate and entirely
different offense cannot be admitted because there would be a serious violation of due
process of law. He claims he is entitled to a preliminary investigation since he was not
informed that he is being charged for the alleged dismissal of the complaining witnesses
and that he was not given the opportunity to explain.
On 12 January 2004, the Sandiganbayan granted the Manifestation and Motion to Admit
Amended Information Deleting the Names of Other Accused Except Datu Guimid P.
Matalam. It admitted the Amended Information charging solely petitioner for Violation
of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019. The court a quo ruled:
What seems to be more crucial here is, whether the amendments made are not prejudicial
to the rights of the accused and are considered as a matter of form only, so that, if the
Amended Information is admitted, there would be no need to require the Public
Prosecutor to conduct another preliminary investigation in the observance of the rights of
the accused to due process. On the other hand, if the amendment would be substantial,
necessarily, another preliminary investigation should be accorded to the accused.
Distinction of the two is thus imperative.
...
The Amended Information charges essentially the same offense as that charged in the
original Information which is a Violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019. Theoretically,
therefore, the amendment is a matter of form only.
Interestingly, however, the change in the recital of cause of action in the Amended
Information is very much noticeable. As correctly pointed out by accused Matalam,
the corpus delicti in the original Information was the alleged willful and confederated
refusal of the accused to pay the backwages of the complaining witnesses. The corpus
delicti in the Amended Information is now altered into the alleged illegal dismissal of the
complainants from their service by accused Matalam. Certainly, the two causes of action
differ differently from each other.
Following the aforementioned principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the
amendments seem to be substantial considering that the main defense of all the accused
in the original information - the lack of a corresponding appropriation for the payment of
the monetary claims of the complaining witnesses - would not, in itself alone, stands [sic]
as a defense for accused Matalam in the Amended Information anymore. In the same
manner, the evidence that accused Matalam would have to present in the original
Information, had it not been found to be without prima facie evidence, will not be equally
available to bail him out in the Amended Information anymore. And further, although the
nature of the offense charged has not changed, the theory of the case as against accused
Matalam is now deemed to have been changed because the cause of action now varies
and therefore, he would have to formulate another defense again.
However, after making a meticulous and independent assessment on the evidence

obtaining on record, this Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the
Public Prosecutor that the real and exact issue in this case is actually the alleged illegal
dismissal of the complaining witnesses. The issue of non-payment of their backwages is
merely incidental because had it not been for the alleged illegal dismissal, their demand
for monetary claims should have not arisen. Put in another perspective, the surrounding
circumstances that brought about the issue of the alleged illegal dismissal were actually
the ones that spewed the issue of unpaid backwages.
Furthermore, as correctly observed by the Public Prosecutor, the change in the recital of
the cause of action does not conceivably come as a surprise to the accused. In fact, in his
counter-affidavit submitted before the Public Prosecutor, accused Matalam already took
the occasion to elaborate his version on the surrounding circumstances that brought about
the alleged illegal dismissal of the complaining witnesses. And these chain of
circumstances, actually, were the very preceding circumstances as to why the
complaining witnesses had suffered their alleged injury. The need for another preliminary
investigation is therefore not necessary.
Given the foregoing factual milieu, the rights of accused Matalam are not, after all, in any
way prejudiced because an inquiry to the allegations in the original cause of action would
certainly and necessarily elicit substantially the same facts to the inquiry of the
allegations in the new cause of action contained in the Amended Information.
To remand this case again to the Public Prosecutor would certainly be a waste of time
considering that accused, in his counter-affidavit, had already explained extensively his
defense on the new allegations contained in the Amended Information sought to be
admitted. And definitely, his projected defense would be the same assuming that another
preliminary investigation be conducted and that he would be required to submit another
counter-affidavit again.[10]
On 11 February 2004, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[11] which the
prosecution opposed.[12] On 03 November 2004, the Sandiganbayan denied the Motion.
[13]
It explained:
While it is true that accused-movant's defense in the original information could not by
itself stand alone as his defense to the amended one, however, the same would still be
available for the latter because although the two questioned causes of action literally
varied, they are nonetheless interrelated with each other. The essential ingredients of the
amended information are actually identical with those constituting the original, such that,
the inquiry into one would elicit substantially the same facts that an inquiry into the other
would reveal. And since these two causes of action had emanated from the same set of
factual settings, the evidence that accused-movant might have under the original
information would still be available and applicable to the amended one.
Be it noted that the private complainants lodged their complaint due to the alleged injury
they suffered as a consequence of the alleged refusal of the accused-movant to pay them
of their backwages. And notably, based on the affidavit that the accused-movant had
submitted, his defense to this was due to the lack of funds appropriated for the said
purpose. But why was there no appropriation? Because, allegedly, the private
complainants were illegally dismissed from their service and as a result thereof, their
names were subsequently stricken off from the roster of employees in the government
agency where they were connected.
Culled from these factual settings, the root cause of the alleged injury suffered by the
private complainants would therefore be their alleged illegal dismissal from the service.
Otherwise, their names would not have been stricken off from the roster of employees in
the agency which they were connected with and the appropriation for the payment of
their salaries would have been continuously made.
Thus, from the foregoing, although there was a change in the recital of the cause of action
(from non-payment of backwages into illegal dismissal), the amendment of the
information did not however affect or alter the nature of the offense that was originally
charged. Neither did it change the basic theory of the prosecution since this remained to
be a violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019 on account of the alleged injury caused to the
private complainants. And even if the prosecution's theory would now be premised on the
new cause of action (illegal dismissal), this would not however cause surprise to the
accused-movant nor would require him to undergo a material change or modification in
his defense because in presenting his defense, he still has to commence from the very
same set of factual settings that preceded the original cause of action. And evidently, this
is the reason why in the affidavit he submitted during the reinvestigation, his discussions
therein consisted not only of his defense to the original information but also included an
extensive discussion regarding his defense to the amended one.
This being so, the outright admission of the amended information even without affording
the accused-movant a new preliminary investigation did not amount to a violation of his
rights. To afford him another process of preliminary investigation would no longer serve
him and this court any better considering that he had already explained in the said
affidavit his defense to the amended information. Otherwise, if he is allowed to submit
another one, he is likely to elaborate again the very same arguments that he had already
invoked in his previous affidavit.
Petitioner argues that the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated 12 January 2004 and 03
November 2004 admitting the Amended Information charging a new offense without
conducting a preliminary investigation were issued without jurisdiction and/or with grave
abuse of jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
From the arguments raised by petitioner, the issue boils down to whether or not petitioner
was deprived of due process of law when the Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended
Information without conducting another or new preliminary investigation. Firstly,
petitioner maintains that a new preliminary investigation should have been ordered
because the corpus delicti in the Amended Information is the termination of services of
the complaining witnesses, while the corpus delicti in the Original Information is the
alleged refusal to pay the backwages of the complaining witnesses. In other words, there
being a new and distinct offense, he should be entitled to a new preliminary investigation.
Secondly, he contends he was denied due process when the Sandiganbayan ruled that if
"he were allowed to submit another counter-affidavit, he is likely to elaborate again the
very same argument that he had invoked in his previous affidavit" considering that he
would have pointed out certain facts not contained in his counter-affidavit. He added that
despite the finding of the Sandiganbayan that "the theory of the case against him changed
because the cause of action varies, and that he would have to formulate another defense,"
the Sandiganbayan did not remand the case to the public prosecutor for preliminary
investigation because it was a waste of time since he had already explained extensively in
his counter-affidavit his defense on the new allegations contained in the Amended
Information. Thirdly, he asserts he was not given the opportunity to show that he did not
act with manifest partiality and evident bad faith in the dismissal of the seven employees
inasmuch as there are other factors and circumstances that would support his posture.
In its Comment, respondent People of the Philippines, thru the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, stated that the admission of the Amended Information without another
preliminary investigation would not violate petitioner's right to due process on the ground
that the amendment is merely formal, and to require another preliminary investigation
would not be in obedience to, but in disregard of, the prime purpose for which a
preliminary investigation is ordained by law and jurisprudence. It maintains that
petitioner acted with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in illegally terminating the
complainants from service.
On 10 March 2005, petitioner filed his Reply.[14]
The initial question to be resolved is what kind of amendment was made in the
Information?
Section 14 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. - A complaint or information may be amended, in
form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his
accused.
Before the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or
information may be made without leave of court. After the entry of a plea, only a formal
amendment may be made but with leave of court and if it does not prejudice the rights of
the accused. After arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed except if the same
is beneficial to the accused.[15]
and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. [16]
The following have been held to be merely formal amendments: (1) new allegations
substantial right of the accused;[17] (5) an amendment that merely adds specifications to
charged.[18]
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment has been said to be
whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after the
amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally
applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. An amendment to an
information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect
the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to
meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance. [19]
In the case at bar, the amendment was indeed substantial. The recital of facts constituting
the offense charged was definitely altered. In the original information, the prohibited act
allegedly committed by petitioner was the illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay the
monetary claims of the private complainants, while in the amended information, it is the
illegal dismissal from the service of the private complainants. However, it cannot be
denied that the alleged illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay monetary claims is related
to, and arose from, the alleged illegal dismissal from the service of the private
complainants.
According to Retired Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado, before the plea is
taken, the information may be amended in substance and/or form, without leave of
court; but if amended in substance, the accused is entitled to another preliminary
investigation, unless the amended charge is related to or is included in the original
charge.[20]
Thus, the rule is: Before or after a plea, a substantial amendment in an information
entitles an accused to another preliminary investigation. However, if the amended
information contains a charge related to or is included in the original information, a new
preliminary investigation is not required.
The Sandiganbayan and the public prosecutor maintain that petitioner is not entitled to a
new preliminary investigation because the charges in the original information and
amended information are related and the latter has already presented his defense on the
amended charge. Further, remanding the case to the Public Prosecutor for another
preliminary investigation would be a waste of time considering that petitioner had already
explained extensively his defense on the new allegations contained in the Amended
Information, that is, the accused already elaborated his version on the surrounding
circumstances that brought about the alleged dismissal of the complaining witnesses. It
added that the change in the recital of the cause of action will not come as a surprise to
the accused because the causes of action, though different, are nonetheless interrelated,
and that the rights of the accused will not be prejudiced since the inquiry to the
allegations in the original information will certainly and necessarily elicit substantially
the same facts to the inquiry of the allegations in the Amended Information.
On the other hand, petitioner insists he should be given a new preliminary investigation
because he was not, among other things, given the opportunity to show that he did not act
with manifest partiality and evident bad faith in the dismissal of the private complainants.
While it is true that the charges in the original and amended informations are related, i.e.,
an inquiry into one would have elicited substantially, if not precisely, the same facts that
an inquiry into the other would have brought into light,[21] this fact should not necessarily
deprive an accused to his right to a new preliminary investigation. As above-stated, the
rule is that a new preliminary investigation is needed if there is a substantial amendment.
The exception, i.e., charge is related or included in the original information, should not be
applied automatically. The circumstances in every case must be taken into consideration
before the accused is deprived of another preliminary investigation.
The following indispensable elements must be established to constitute a violation of

Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended:
1. The accused is a public officer discharging administrative or official functions or
private persons charged in conspiracy with them;
2. The public officer committed the prohibited act during the performance of his
official duty in relation to his public position;
3. The public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
4. His action caused undue injury to the government or any private party, or gave any
party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to such parties. [22]
The third element of the offense states that the public officer acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence in committing the prohibited
act. Admittedly, the alleged illegal dismissal contained in the amended charge gave rise
to the original charge of failure to pay the monetary claims of private complainants. It
cannot be disputed that petitioner already discussed circumstances surrounding the
termination of services of the private complainants in his counter-affidavit. However, we
find nothing therein that would show that he had already touched the issue of evident bad
faith or manifest partiality. As can be gathered from the counter-affidavit, there were
arguments tending to counter the presence of evident bad faith, manifest partiality or
gross inexcusable negligence, but the same refer to the allegation of failure to pay the
monetary claims and not to the alleged illegal dismissal. Although one allegation
stemmed from the other, the court a quo and the public prosecutor cannot say the element
of evident bad faith, manifest partiality or gross inexcusable negligence is the same in
both. This being an element of the offense charged, petitioner should be given the
opportunity to thoroughly adduce evidence on the matter.
If petitioner is not to be given a new preliminary investigation for the amended charge,
his right will definitely be prejudiced because he will be denied his right to present
evidence to show or rebut evidence regarding the element of evident bad faith and
manifest partiality on the alleged dismissal. He will be denied due process.
A component part of due process in criminal justice, preliminary investigation is a

statutory and substantive right accorded to the accused before trial. To deny their claim to
a preliminary investigation would be to deprive them of the full measure of their right to
due process.[23]
Our rulings in the cases of People v. Magpale[24] and Lava v. Gonzales[25] where no new

preliminary investigation was given because the charges in the amended informations
were related to, or included in, the original charges cannot apply in the case at bar. The
factual milieu in those cases is different from the case before us.
In Magpale, the accused was charged with violation of Article 176 of the Revised Penal
Code for illegal possession of iron brand, and making or ordering the making thereof. In
the notices sent to the accused in connection with the preliminary investigation of the
complaint, the accused was informed not of one but of both. He was given the chance,
and was placed on guard, to defend himself for both charges. Moreover, the right of the
accused to have another preliminary investigation was waived when he went forward
with the trial.
In Lava, the accused was charged with Complex Rebellion but the charge was later
amended to Simple Rebellion. This court held that a new preliminary investigation was
not necessary there being no change in the nature of the crime charged, and that accused
failed to ask for a reinvestigation upon learning of the amended information.
In the case of petitioner herein, although the charge remained the same (Violation of
Section 3(e), Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended), the prohibited act allegedly committed
changed, that is, failure to pay monetary claims to illegal dismissal, and he was not given
the opportunity to submit his evidence on the absence or presence of evident bad faith
and manifest partiality as to the illegal dismissal. Petitioner has not waived his right to a
new preliminary investigation and, instead, is asking for one.
It is settled that the preliminary investigation proper, i.e., the determination of whether

there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and
should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial, is the function of
the prosecution.[26]
Our ruling in this case does not in any way divest the public prosecutor of its duty under
the Rules. This Court is not determining if petitioner should or should not be brought to
trial. What we are looking into is whether or not petitioner was given all the opportunity
to present countervailing evidence on the amended charge. Accordingly, finding that
petitioner was not given the chance to fully present his evidence on the amended
information which contained a substantial amendment, a new preliminary investigation is
in order.
As to statement of the court a quo that the conduct of another preliminary investigation

would be merely a waste of time, it must be emphasized that though the conduct thereof
will hold back the progress of the case, the same is necessary in order that the accused
may be afforded his right to a preliminary investigation. The right of the accused to a
preliminary investigation should never be compromised or sacrificed at the altar of
expediency.
Finally, as to petitioner's prayer that the Amended Information be quashed and dismissed,
the same cannot be ordered. The absence[27] or incompleteness[28] of a preliminary
investigation does not warrant the quashal or dismissal of the information. Neither does it
affect the court's jurisdiction over the case or impair the validity of the information or
otherwise render it defective. The court shall hold in abeyance the proceedings on such
information and order the remand of the case for preliminary investigation or completion
thereof.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. Respondent court's

resolutions dated 12 January 2004 and 03 November 2004 in Criminal Case No. 26381
are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Respondent court is directed to order the Office of
the Ombudsman to forthwith conduct a preliminary investigation of the charge embodied
in the Amended Information filed against petitioner. It is further directed to suspend the
proceedings in the said case pending termination of the preliminary investigation, and
thereafter to take such action on petitioner's case as may be warranted by the results of
said preliminary investigation.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 151785, December 10, 2007 ]
SUSAN FRONDA-BAGGAO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
DECISION
Before us is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the Decision [1] dated August 29,
2001 and Resolution dated January 15, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
58270.
The facts are:
Sometime in 1989, the Provincial Prosecutor of Abra filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 1, Bangued, same province, four separate Informations for illegal recruitment
against Susan Fronda-Baggao, petitioner, and Lawrence Lee, docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. 744, 745, 746 and 749.
Petitioner eluded arrest for more than a decade; hence, the cases against her were
archived. On July 25, 1999, petitioner was finally arrested. [2]
On July 26, 1999, the prosecutor filed with the trial court a motion to amend the
Informations. He prayed that the four separate Informations for illegal recruitment be
amended so that there would only be one Information for illegal recruitment in large
scale. On the same day, the trial court denied the motion for lack of merit.
On August 6, 1999, the prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration. In its Order
dated January 26, 2000, the trial court granted the motion and admitted the
Information for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale, thus:
Accordingly, the Order dated July 26, 1999 denying the motion to amend
Information is hereby set aside and the Information for Illegal Recruitment in Large
Scale is hereby admitted in substitution of the other four Informations.
Moreover, considering that illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in a

large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage, let this case be
forwarded to RTC, Branch 2, a Special Criminal Court.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the trial court
in its Order dated March 21, 2000.
On April 11, 2000, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 58270.
In its Decision dated August 29, 2001, the Court of Appeals denied the petition.
Likewise, in its Resolution dated January 15, 2002, petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied.
Hence, the present petition.
The issue for our resolution is whether the four Informations for illegal recruitment
could be amended and lumped into one Information for illegal recruitment in large
scale.
Petitioner contends that (a) Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure refers to an amendment of one Information only, not four, which cannot be
joined in only one Information; and that (b) the amendment of the four Informations for
illegal recruitment into a single Information for a graver offense violates her substantial
rights.
Respondent, on the other hand, prays that the petition be denied for lack of merit.
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. – A complaint or information may be
amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the
accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may
only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to
the rights of the accused.
charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made
only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of
court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order
shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the
proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the
filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119,
provided the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require
the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial. (Emphasis ours)
Simply stated, before the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial
amendment of the complaint or information may be made without leave of court. After
the entry of a plea, only a formal amendment may be made but with leave of court and
only if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment, a substantial
amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused. [3]
Following the above provisions and considering that petitioner has not yet entered her
plea, the four Informations could still be amended.
Petitioner also contends that the above Rule refers to an amendment of one
Information only, not four or multiple Informations which cannot be joined into only
one Information.
We disagree.
A careful scrutiny of the above Rule shows that although it uses the singular
word complaint or information, it does not mean that two or more complaints or
Informations cannot be amended into only one Information. Surely, such could not have
been intended by this Court. Otherwise, there can be an absurd situation whereby two
or more complaints or Informations could no longer be amended into one or more
Informations. On this point, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court is relevant,
thus:
SEC. 6. Construction. – These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to
promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding.
In fact, in Galvez v. Court of Appeals,[4] before the accused were arraigned, this
Court allowed the amendment of three original Informations for homicide and
frustrated homicide into four Informations for murder, frustrated murder and illegal
possession of firearms.
Petitioner contends that the amendment of the four Informations for illegal recruitment
into a single Information for illegal recruitment in large scale violates her substantial
rights as this would deprive her of the right to bail which she already availed of. Such
contention is misplaced. Obviously, petitioner relies on Section 14 of the same Rule
110 which provides that "after the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may
the rights of the accused." As stated earlier, petitioner has not yet been arraigned.
Hence, she cannot invoke the said provision.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58270 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 174461, September 11, 2013 ]
LETICIA I. KUMMER, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We decide the appeal filed by petitioner Leticia I. Kummer assailing the April 28,
2006 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA – G.R. CR No. 27609. The CA decision
affirmed the July 27, 2000 judgment [2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4,
Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, finding the petitioner and her co-accused Freiderich Johan I.
Kummer guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide in Criminal Case No.
1130.
The Facts
The prosecution’s evidence revealed that on June 19, 1988, between 9:00 and 10:00
p.m., Jesus Mallo, Jr., accompanied by Amiel Malana, went to the house of the
petitioner. Mallo knocked at the front door with a stone and identified himself by
saying, “Auntie, ako si Boy Mallo.”
The petitioner opened the door and at this point, her son and co-accused, Johan, using
his left hand, shot Mallo twice using a gun about six (6) inches long. [3] Malana, who was
with Mallo and who witnessed the shooting, immediately ran towards the west,
followed by Mallo. When Malana turned his back, he saw the petitioner leveling and
firing her long gun at Mallo, hitting the latter’s back and causing him to fall flat on the
ground.[4]
Thereafter, the petitioner went inside the house and came out with a flashlight.
Together with her co-accused, she scoured the pathway up to the place where Mallo
was lying flat.[5] At that point, the petitioner uttered, “Johan, patay na,” in a loud voice.
[6]
The petitioner and her co-accused put down the guns and the flashlight they were
holding, held Mallo’s feet and pulled him to about three (3) to four (4) meters away
from the house. Thereafter, they returned to the house and turned off all the lights. [7]
The following morning, policeman Danilo Pelovello went to the petitioner’s house and
informed her that Mallo had been found dead in front of her house. Pelovello
conducted an investigation through inquiries among the neighbors, including the
petitioner, who all denied having any knowledge of the incident.
The prosecution filed an information[8] for homicide on January 12, 1989 against the
petitioner and Johan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1130. Both accused were arraigned
and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. They waived the pre-trial, and the trial on
the merits accordingly followed.
The petitioner denied the charge and claimed in her defense that she and her children,
Johan, Melanie and Erika, were already asleep in the evening of June 19, 1988. She
claimed that they were awakened by the sound of stones being thrown at their house, a
gun report, and the banging at their door.
Believing that the noise was caused by the members of the New People’s Army
prevalent in their area, and sensing the possible harm that might be inflicted on them,
Johan got a .38 cal. gun from the drawer and fired it twice outside to scare the people
causing the disturbance. The noise continued, however, with a stone hitting the window
and breaking the glass; another stone hit Melanie who was then sick. This prompted
Johan to get the shotgun placed beside the door and to fire it. The noise thereafter
stopped and they all went back to sleep.
In its judgment dated July 27, 2000, the RTC found the prosecution’s evidence
persuasive based on the testimonies of prosecution eyewitnesses Ramon Cuntapay and
Malana who both testified that the petitioner shot Mallo. The testimonial evidence,
coupled by the positive findings of gunpowder nitrates on the left hand of Johan and on
the petitioner’s right hand, as well as the corroborative testimony of the other
prosecution witnesses, led the RTC to find both the petitioner and Johan guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
Johan, still a minor at the time of the commission of the crime, was released on the
recognizance of his father, Moises Kummer. Johan subsequently left the country
without notifying the court; hence, only the petitioner appealed the judgment of
conviction with the CA.
She contended before the CA that the RTC committed reversible errors in its
appreciation of the evidence, namely: (1) in giving credence to the testimonial evidence
of Cuntapay and of Malana despite the discrepancies between their sworn statements
and direct testimonies; (2) in not considering the failure of the prosecution to cite the
petitioner’s motive in killing the victim; (3) in failing to consider that the writer of the
decision, Judge Lyliha L. Abella-Aquino, was not the judge who heard the testimonies;
and (4) in considering the paraffin test results finding the petitioner positive for
gunpowder residue.
The CA rejected the petitioner’s arguments and affirmed the RTC judgment, holding that
the discrepancies between the sworn statement and the direct testimony of the
witnesses do not necessarily discredit them because the contradictions are minimal and
reconcilable. The CA also ruled that the inconsistencies are minor lapses and are
therefore not substantial. The petitioner’s positive identification by the eyewitnesses as
one of the assailants remained unrefuted. The CA, moreover, held that proof of motive
is only necessary when a serious doubt arises on the identity of the accused. That the
writer of the decision was not the judge who heard the testimonies of the witnesses
does not necessarily make the decision erroneous.
In sum, the CA found Malana and Cuntapay’s positive identification and the
corroborative evidence presented by the prosecution more than sufficient to convict the
petitioner of the crime charged.
On further appeal to this Court, the petitioner submits the issue of whether the CA
committed a reversible error in affirming the RTC’s decision convicting her of the crime
of homicide.
In essence, the case involves the credibility of the prosecution eyewitnesses and the
sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence.
Our Ruling
We find the petition devoid of merit.
The petitioner’s conviction is anchored on the positive and direct testimonies of the
prosecution eyewitnesses, which testimonies the petitioner submits to be both
inconsistent and illogical. The petitioner essentially impugns the credibility of the
witnesses on these grounds. The petitioner moreover claims that her conviction was
based on doctrinal precepts that should not apply to her case.
Variance between the eyewitnesses’ testimonies in open court and their affidavits
does not affect their credibility
In her attempt to impugn the credibility of prosecution eyewitnesses Malana and

Cuntapay, the petitioner pointed to the following inconsistencies: First, in paragraph 7
of Malana’s July 21, 1988 affidavit, he stated that after hearing two gunshots, he dived
to the ground for cover and heard another shot louder than the first two. This
statement is allegedly inconsistent with his declaration during the direct examination
that he saw the petitioner and Johan fire their guns at Mallo. Second, the July 22, 1988
affidavit of Cuntapay likewise stated that he heard two burst of gunfire coming from the
direction of the petitioner’s house and heard another burst from the same direction,
which statement is allegedly inconsistent with his direct testimony where he claimed
that he saw the petitioner shoot Mallo. Third, in his affidavit, Malana declared that he
ran away as he felt the door being opened and heard two shots, while in his testimony
in court, he stated that he ran away after Mallo was already hit. According to the
petitioner, these and some other trivial and minor inconsistencies in the testimony of
the two witnesses effectively destroyed their credibility.
We find these claims far from convincing. The Court has consistently held that
inconsistencies between the testimony of a witness in open court, on one hand, and the
statements in his sworn affidavit, on the other hand, referring only to minor and
collateral matters, do not affect his credibility and the veracity and weight of his
testimony as they do not touch upon the commission of the crime itself. Slight
contradictions, in fact, even serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses, as these
may be considered as badges of truth rather than indicia of bad faith; they tend to prove
that their testimonies have not been rehearsed. Nor are such inconsistencies, and even
improbabilities, unusual, for no person has perfect faculties of senses or recall. [9]
A close scrutiny of the records reveals that Malana and Cuntapay positively and firmly
declared in open court that they saw the petitioner and Johan shoot Mallo. The
inconsistencies in their affidavit, they reasoned, were due to the oversight of the
administering official in typing the exact details of their narration.
It is oft repeated that affidavits are usually abbreviated and inaccurate. Oftentimes, an
affidavit is incomplete, resulting in its seeming contradiction with the declarant’s
testimony in court. Generally, the affiant is asked standard questions, coupled with
ready suggestions intended to elicit answers, that later turn out not to be wholly
descriptive of the series of events as the affiant knows them. [10] Worse, the process of
affidavit-taking may sometimes amount to putting words into the affiant’s mouth, thus
allowing the whole statement to be taken out of context.
The court is not unmindful of these on-the-ground realities. In fact, we have ruled that
the discrepancies between the statements of the affiant in his affidavit and those made
by him on the witness stand do not necessarily discredit him since ex parte affidavits are
generally incomplete.[11] As between the joint affidavit and the testimony given in open
court, the latter prevails because affidavits taken ex-parte are generally considered to
be inferior to the testimony given in court.[12]
In the present case, we find it undeniable that Malana and Cuntapay positively
identified the petitioner as one of the assailants. This is the critical point, not the
inconsistencies that the petitioner repeatedly refers to, which carry no direct bearing on
the crucial issue of the identity of the perpetrator of the crime. Indeed, the
inconsistencies refer only to minor details that are not critical to the main outcome of
the case. Moreover, the basic rule is that the Supreme Court accords great respect and
even finality to the findings of credibility of the trial court, more so if the same were
affirmed by the CA, as in this case.[13] We find no reason to break this rule and thus find
that both the RTC and the CA were correct in giving credence to the testimonies of
Malana and Cuntapay.
It is not necessary for the validity of the judgment that it be rendered by the judge
who heard the case
The petitioner contends that the CA, in affirming the judgment of the RTC, failed to
recognize that the trial court that heard the testimonies of Malana and Cuntapay was
not the same court that rendered the decision. [14]
We do not share this view.
The rule is settled that the validity of a judgment is not rendered erroneous solely
because the judge who heard the case was not the same judge who rendered the
decision. In fact, it is not necessary for the validity of a judgment that the judge who
penned the decision should actually hear the case in its entirety, for he can merely rely
on the transcribed stenographic notes taken during the trial as the basis for his decision.
[15]
Thus, the contention - that since Judge Lyliha L. Abella-Aquino was not the one who
heard the evidence and thereby did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor
of the witnesses - must fail. It is sufficient that the judge, in deciding the case, must base
her ruling completely on the records before her, in the way that appellate courts do
when they review the evidence of the case raised on appeal. [16] Thus, a judgment of
conviction penned by a different trial judge is not erroneous if she relied on the records
available to her.
Motive is irrelevant when the accused has been positively identified by an eyewitness
We agree with the CA’s ruling that motive gains importance only when the identity of
the assailant is in doubt. As held in a long line of cases, the prosecution does not need to
prove the motive of the accused when the latter has been identified as the author of the
crime.[17]
Once again, we point out that the petitioner was positively identified by Malana and
Cuntapay. Thus, the prosecution did not have to identify and prove the motive for the
killing. It is a matter of judicial knowledge that persons have been killed for no apparent
reason at all, and that friendship or even relationship is no deterrent to the commission
of a crime.[18]
The petitioner attempts to offer the justification that the witnesses did not really
witness the shooting as their affidavits merely attested that they heard the shooting of
Mallo (and did not state that they actually witnessed it). We find this to be a lame
argument whose merit we cannot recognize.
That Malana and Cuntapay have been eyewitnesses to the crime remains unrefuted.
They both confirmed in their direct testimony before the RTC that they saw the
petitioner fire a gun at Mallo. This was again re-affirmed by the witnesses during their
cross examination. The fact that their respective affidavits merely stated that they heard
the gunshots does not automatically foreclose the possibility that they also saw the
actual shooting as this was in fact what the witnesses claimed truly happened. Besides,
it has been held that the claim that “whenever a witness discloses in his testimony in
court facts which he failed to state in his affidavit taken ante litem motam, then an
inconsistency exists between the testimony and the affidavit” is erroneous. If what were
stated in open court are but details or additional facts that serve to supplement the
declarations made in the affidavit, these statements cannot be ruled out as inconsistent
and may be considered by the court.
Thus, in light of the direct and positive identification of the petitioner as one of the
perpetrators of the crime by not one but two prosecution eyewitnesses, the failure to
cite the motive of the petitioner is of no moment.
At any rate, we find it noteworthy that the lack or absence of motive for committing the
crime does not preclude conviction where there are reliable witnesses who fully and
satisfactorily identified the petitioner as the perpetrator of the felony, such as in this
case.
There is no absolute uniformity nor a fixed standard form of human behavior
The petitioner imputes error to the CA in giving credence to the testimonies of Malana
and Cuntapay on the claim that these are riddled not only by inconsistencies and
contradictions, but also by improbabilities and illogical claims. She laboriously pointed
out the numerous improbabilities that, taken as a whole, allegedly cast serious doubt on
their reliability and credibility.
She alleged, among others: (1) that it was abnormal and contrary to the ways of the
farmers in the rural areas for Cuntapay to go home from his corral at about 9:00 p.m.,
while everybody else goes home from his farm much earlier, as working late in the farm
(that is, before and after sunset) is taboo to farming; (2) that the act of the petitioner of
putting down her gun in order to pull the victim away does not make any sense because
a criminal would not simply part with his weapon in this manner; (3) that it is highly
incredible that Malana, who accompanied Mallo, was left unharmed and was allowed to
escape if indeed he was just beside the victim; (4) that it is unbelievable that when
Malana heard the cocking of guns and the opening of the door, he did not become
scared at all; (5) that Malana and Cuntapay did not immediately report the incident to
the authorities; (6) that it was highly improbable for Malana to turn his head while
running; and (7) that it was unusual that Cuntapay did not run away when he saw the
shooting.
We rule, without descending to particulars and going over each and every one of these
claims, that without more and stronger indicators, we cannot accord them credit.
Human nature suggests that people may react differently when confronted with a given
situation. Witnesses to a crime cannot be expected to demonstrate an absolute
uniformity and conformity in action and reaction. People may act contrary to the
accepted norm, react differently and act contrary to the expectation of mankind. There
is no standard human behavioral response when one is confronted with an unusual,
strange, startling or frightful experience.[19]
We thus hold that the CA was correct in brushing aside the improbabilities alleged by
the petitioner who, in her present plight, can be overcritical in her attempt to seize
every detail that can favor her case. Unfortunately, if at all, her claims refer only to
minor and even inconsequential details that do not touch on the core of the crime itself.
Public documents are admissible in court without further proof of their due execution
and authenticity
A public document is defined in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court as follows:
SEC. 19. Classes of Documents. – For the purpose of their presentation [in]
evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official
a) bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
Documents acknowledge[d] before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
b)
Public records, kept in the Philippines, [or] private documents required by law to [be]
c) entered therein.
All other writings are private. [emphasis and underscore ours]

The chemistry report showing a positive result of the paraffin test is a public
document. As a public document, the rule on authentication does not apply. It is
admissible in evidence without further proof of its due execution and genuineness; the
person who made the report need not be presented in court to identify, describe and
testify how the report was conducted. Moreover, documents consisting of entries in
public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein. [20]
In the present case, notwithstanding the fact that it was Captain Benjamin Rubio who
was presented in court to identify the chemistry report and not the forensic chemist
who actually conducted the paraffin test on the petitioner, the report may still be
admitted because the requirement for authentication does not apply to public
documents. In other words, the forensic chemist does not need to be presented as
witness to identify and authenticate the chemistry report. Furthermore, the entries in
the chemistry report are prima facie evidence of the facts they state, that is, of the
presence of gunpowder residue on the left hand of Johan and on the right hand of the
petitioner. As a matter of fact, the petitioner herself admitted the presence of
gunpowder nitrates on her fingers, albeit ascribing their presence from a match she
allegedly lighted.[21] Accordingly, we hold that the chemistry report is admissible as
evidence.
On the issue of the normal process versus the actual process conducted during the test
raised by the petitioner, suffice it to say that in the absence of proof to the contrary, it is
presumed that the forensic chemist who conducted the report observed the regular
procedure. Stated otherwise, the courts will not presume irregularity or negligence in
the performance of one’s duties unless facts are shown dictating a contrary conclusion.
The presumption of regularity in favor of the forensic chemist compels us to reject the
petitioner’s contention that an explanation has to be given on how the actual process
was conducted. Since the petitioner presented no evidence of fabrication or irregularity,
we presume that the standard operating procedure has been observed.
We note at this point that while the positive finding of gunpowder residue does not
conclusively show that the petitioner indeed fired a gun, the finding nevertheless serves
to corroborate the prosecution eyewitnesses’ testimony that the petitioner shot the
victim. Furthermore, while it is true that cigarettes, fertilizers, urine or even a match
may leave traces of nitrates, experts confirm that these traces are minimal and may be
washed off with tap water, unlike the evidence nitrates left behind by gunpowder.
Change in the date of the commission of the crime, where the disparity is not great, is
merely a formal amendment, thus, no arraignment is required
The petitioner claims that she was not arraigned on the amended information for which
she was convicted. The petitioner’s argument is founded on the flawed understanding
of the rules on amendment and misconception on the necessity of arraignment in every
case. Thus, we do not see any merit in this claim.
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court permits a formal amendment of a complaint
even after the plea but only if it is made with leave of court and provided that it can be
done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. Section 14 provides:
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be
only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice
to the rights of the accused.
provided the accused [would] not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require
the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial. [emphasis and underscore
ours]
A mere change in the date of the commission of the crime, if the disparity of time
is not great, is more formal than substantial. Such an amendment would not prejudice
the rights of the accused since the proposed amendment would not alter the nature of
the offense.
The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a
complaint or information is when a defense under the complaint or information, as it
originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made, when any
evidence the accused might have would no longer be available after the amendment is
made, and when any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the
complaint or information, as amended. [22]
In People, et al. v. Borromeo, et al.,[23] we ruled that the change of the date of the
commission of the crime from June 24, 1981 to August 28, 1981 is a formal
amendment and would not prejudice the rights of the accused because the nature of
the offense of grave coercion would not be altered. In that case, the difference in the
date was only about two months and five days, which difference, we ruled, would
neither cause substantial prejudice nor cause surprise on the part of the accused.
It is not even necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at
which the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the
offense.[24] The act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near as to the
actual date at which date the offense was committed, as the information will permit.
Under the circumstances, the precise time is not an essential ingredient of the crime of
homicide.
Having established that a change of date of the commission of a crime is a formal
amendment, we proceed to the next question of whether an arraignment is necessary.
Arraignment is indispensable in bringing the accused to court and in notifying him of the
nature and cause of the accusations against him. The importance of arraignment is
based on the constitutional right of the accused to be informed. [25] Procedural due
process requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be informed of the
reason for his indictment, the specific charges he is bound to face, and the
corresponding penalty that could be possibly meted against him. It is at this stage that
the accused, for the first time, is given the opportunity to know the precise charge that
confronts him. It is only imperative that he is thus made fully aware of the possible loss
of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the imputed crime. [26]
The need for arraignment is equally imperative in an amended information or

complaint. This however, we hastily clarify, pertains only to substantial amendments
and not to formal amendments that, by their very nature, do not charge an offense
different from that charged in the original complaint or information; do not alter the
theory of the prosecution; do not cause any surprise and affect the line of defense; and
do not adversely affect the substantial rights of the accused, such as an amendment in
the date of the commission of the offense.
We further stress that an amendment done after the plea and during trial, in accordance
with the rules, does not call for a second plea since the amendment is only as to form.
The purpose of an arraignment, that is, to inform the accused of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, has already been attained when the accused was arraigned
the first time. The subsequent amendment could not have conceivably come as a
surprise to the accused simply because the amendment did not charge a new offense
nor alter the theory of the prosecution.
Applying these rules and principles to the prevailing case, the records of the case
evidently show that the amendment in the complaint was from July 19, 1988 to June 19,
1988, or a difference of only one month. It is clear that consistent with the rule on
amendments and the jurisprudence cited above, the change in the date of the
commission of the crime of homicide is a formal amendment - it does not change the
nature of the crime, does not affect the essence of the offense nor deprive the accused
of an opportunity to meet the new averment, and is not prejudicial to the accused.
Further, the defense under the complaint is still available after the amendment, as this
was, in fact, the same line of defenses used by the petitioner. This is also true with
respect to the pieces of evidence presented by the petitioner. The effected amendment
was of this nature and did not need a second plea.
To sum up, we are satisfied after a review of the records of the case that the
prosecution has proven the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. The
constitutional presumption of innocence has been successfully overcome.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated April 28, 2006,
convicting the petitioner of the crime of homicide, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner Leticia I. Kummer.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 140311, March 30, 2001 ]
DENNIS T. GABIONZA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
May an Information be amended to change the material dates of the commission

of the offense after the accused had been arraigned?
DENNIS T. GABIONZA seeks a review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. 49098-SP[1]dismissing his petition for certiorari assailing the order of the Regional
Trial Court in Crim. Case No. Q-93-50552 [2] which allowed the amendment of the
Information charging him with violation of RA 1161 (The Social Security Law) as
amended.
On 9 November 1993 an Information was filed against petitioner accusing him of
violating Sec. 22, pars. (a) and (d), in relation to Sec. 28, par. (e), of RA 1161. It alleged
that "in and about or during the period from January 1991 to May 1993" petitioner,
President of the Manila City Bus Corporation, a compulsorily-covered employer under
RA 1161, willfully and unlawfully failed, neglected and refused to remit to the Social
Security System (SSS) contributions for SSS, Medicare and Employee Compensation (EC)
amounting to P1,652,330.10 and the 3% penalty imposed thereon in the amount of
P541,417.87.[3]
Petitioner was arraigned on 7 December 1993. On 10 February 1998 or about four (4)
years after he was arraigned, the public prosecutor filed a Motion for Leave of Court to
Amend Information, to change the material dates stated in the Information from
"January 1991 to May 1993" to "January 1991 to May 1992." Petitioner opposed the
motion contending that the proposed amendment was substantial in nature, hence to
allow the same would be a violation of his right to be informed of the cause and nature
of the accusation against him, and would negate or prejudice defenses that were
otherwise available to him.
On 31 March 1998 the trial court granted the motion and allowed amendment of the
Information, ruling that the amendment pertained only to matters of form. It further
ruled that the amendment would not prejudice the rights of the accused as the theory
of the prosecution remained the same. [4] On 2 September 1998 petitioner's motion to
reconsider the order was denied.
Petitioner elevated the issue to the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari under

Rule 65 seeking to annul the order of the trial court. On 9 June 1999 respondent Court
of Appeals upheld the amendment and dismissed the petition. It held that the
amendment "cannot be deemed an amendment in substance, as it will in no wise or
manner impair whatever defense or defenses the accused could or might have
interposed in the original information, even as it will not render unavailable or
inapplicable in the amended information, whatever evidence the accused might or
could have adduced or presented in the original information." [5] Hence this petition for
review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The proper procedure for the amendment of an Information is governed by Sec. 14,
Rule 110, of the Rules on Criminal Procedure -
Sec. 14. Amendment. - The information or complaint may be amended, in
substance or form, without leave of court at any time before the accused pleads; and
thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of
the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused x x
xx
After the accused enters a plea, amendments to the Information may be allowed,
as to matters of form, provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights of the accused.
The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a
Complaint or Information is when a defense under the Complaint or Information, as it
originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when
any evidence the accused might have, would be inapplicable to the Complaint or the
Information as amended.[6]
On the other hand, an amendment which merely states with additional precision
something which is already contained in the original information, and which, therefore,
adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged is an amendment to form
that can be made at any time. [7] Jurisprudence allows amendments to information so
long as: (a) it does not deprive the accused of the right to invoke prescription; [8] (b) it
does not affect or alter the nature of the offense originally charged; [9] (c) it does not
involve a change in the basic theory of the prosecution so as to require the accused to
undergo any material change or modification in his defense; [10] (d) it does not expose the
accused to a charge which would call for a higher penalty; [11] and, (5) it does not cause
surprise nor deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment. [12]
In the case at bar, it is clear that the questioned amendment is one of form and not of
substance. The allegation of time when an offense is committed is a matter of form,
unless time is a material ingredient of the offense. It is not even necessary to state in the
Information the precise time the offense was committed unless time is a material factor.
[13]
It is sufficient that the act is alleged to have been committed at any time as near to
the actual date at which the offense was committed as the Complaint or Information
will permit.[14]
Thus, petitioner's argument that the amendment prejudiced his rights is untenable. We
fail to see how his original defenses would be rendered inapplicable by the amendment,
nor the prosecution's theory in anyway altered by the same. Petitioner failed to adduce
any evidence in support of his allegation that the amendment would adversely affect his
rights.
Petitioner invokes Wong v. Yatco,[15] People v. Opemia[16] and People v. Reyes[17] in

support of his cause. However, we hold that the ratio decidendi of the three (3) cases
does not apply in the present case.
In Wong the prosecution amended the Information of a violation of Commonwealth Act

No. 104 to change the dates of the violation from "May 3, 1954 to October 11, 1954" to
"between January 2, 1955 and March 17, 1955." The Court disallowed the amendment
because in 1954, the law punishing the act had not been published yet, therefore there
was no crime in legal contemplation. The Court said that since an amended Information
retroacted to the time of the original one, the proper course would have been not to
amend the previous Information but to file another one. This crucial fact is not involved
here.
In Opemia the Court held, "the period of almost five years between 1947 and 1952
covers such a long stretch of time that one may be led to believe that another theft
different from that committed by the defendants in 1952 was also perpetrated by them
in 1947. The variance is certainly unfair to them, for it violates their constitutional rights
to be informed before the trial of the specific charge against them and deprives them of
the opportunity to defend themselves."
In Reyes, this Court held that "the disparity of time between the years 1964 and 1969 is
so great as to defy approximation in the commission of one and the same offense."
The last two (2) cases involved changes in dates which were so far removed from each
other that substituting one for the other would clearly work to the detriment of the
right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the charges against him.
This is not so in the present case. For one, a comparison of the amended Information
(January 1991 to May 1992) and the original one (January 1991 to May 1993) shows that
the period stated in the former is even shorter than and is included within the latter.
Also, the averment "in or about and during the period" gives a sufficient approximation
of the date of the commission of the offense. Therefore, the first Information had
adequately informed petitioner of the period of time when the crime was committed.
No surprise, ergo, no violation of rights, could spring from merely replacing the original
period, more so with one that is shorter and included within the same.
Moreover, the imposable penalty will not increase as a result of the amendment. A
reading of Sec. 28, par. (e), RA 1611, shows that it penalizes, among others, the failure
or refusal of a compulsorily-covered employer from remitting compulsory contributions
to the SSS. Neither time nor duration of the offense charged is a material ingredient of
the offense. In fact, the penalty imposed for this violation is constant at six (6) years and
one (1) day to twelve (12) years, regardless of the number of infractions.
Petitioner contends that because of the lapse of time between the filing of the
Information and the amendment laches had set in.
We find no merit in this argument. "Laches" is defined as the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due
diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that a party entitled to assert
it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. [18] As the Solicitor General correctly
pointed out, the principle of laches is inapplicable in this case. The provision in Sec. 14,
Rule 110, of the Rules on Criminal Procedure is explicit that amendments as to form may
still be made after arraignment or during trial. Since the questioned amendment was
made "during trial," the same was made seasonably notwithstanding the lapse of four
(4) years.
It may also be noted that even before the prosecution had the chance to present its
principal evidence petitioner moved for the suspension of trial because he filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning the denial of his motion to
dismiss. Pre-trial was held only on 11 November 1997. As can be seen from the records,
the prosecution did not unnecessary waste time in filing the Motion for Leave of Court
to Amend Information. Again, before the prosecution had the opportunity to present
evidence, trial was suspended because of the filing of the instant case. This, coupled
with the many postponements and resettings requested by petitioner, satisfactorily
explains the reasonable delay in the amendment of the Information. Certainly, the
prosecution cannot be faulted for not filing the amendment earlier since trial was
suspended during the pendency of petitioner's recourse to the Court of Appeals and to
this Court. Petitioner should not then bewail the delay in the amendment because such
delay was principally upon his own behest.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed DECISION of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. No. 49098-SP affirming that of the trial court which allowed the amendment of
the Information charging petitioner with violation of RA No. 1161, as amended,
is AFFIRMED.
Considering the delay already incurred in the process, the trial court should immediately
act on this case with deliberate dispatch upon its remand, which this
Court DIRECTS. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 157472, September 28, 2007 ]
SSGT. JOSE M. PACOY, PETITIONER, VS. HON. AFABLE E. CAJIGAL,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND OLYMPIO L. ESCUETA,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by SSGT.

Jose M. Pacoy[1] (petitioner) seeking to annul and set aside the Orders dated October 25,
2002[2] and December 18, 2002[3] issued by Presiding Judge Afable E. Cajigal (respondent
judge) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68, Camiling, Tarlac in Criminal Case
No. 02-42.
On July 4, 2002, an Information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against petitioner
That on or about the 18th day of March 2002, in the Municipality of Mayantoc, Province
of Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot
his commanding officer 2Lt. Frederick Esquita with his armalite rifle hitting and
sustaining upon 2Lt. Frederick Esquita multiple gunshot wounds on his body which
caused his instantaneous death.
With the aggravating circumstance of killing, 2Lt. Frederick Esquita in disregard of his
rank.[4]
On September 12, 2002, upon arraignment, petitioner, duly assisted by counsel de parte,
pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide. Respondent Judge set the pre-trial
conference and trial on October 8, 2002.[5]
However, on the same day and after the arraignment, the respondent judge issued another
Order,[6] likewise dated September 12, 2002, directing the trial prosecutor to correct and
amend the Information to Murder in view of the aggravating circumstance of disregard of
rank alleged in the Information which public respondent registered as having qualified
the crime to Murder.
Acting upon such Order, the prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word
“Homicide” and instead wrote the word “Murder” in the caption and in the opening
paragraph of the Information. The accusatory portion remained exactly the same as that
of the original Information for Homicide, with the correction of the spelling of the
victim’s name from “Escuita” to “Escueta.”[7]
On October 8, 2002, the date scheduled for pre-trial conference and trial, petitioner was
to be re-arraigned for the crime of Murder. Counsel for petitioner objected on the ground
that the latter would be placed in double jeopardy, considering that his Homicide case
had been terminated without his express consent, resulting in the dismissal of the case. As
petitioner refused to enter his plea on the amended Information for Murder, the public
respondent entered for him a plea of not guilty.[8]
On October 28, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash with Motion to Suspend
Proceedings Pending the Resolution of the Instant Motion[9] on the ground of double
jeopardy. Petitioner alleged that in the Information for Homicide, he was validly indicted
and arraigned before a competent court, and the case was terminated without his express
consent; that when the case for Homicide was terminated without his express consent, the
subsequent filing of the Information for Murder in lieu of Homicide placed him in double
jeopardy.
In an Order[10] dated October 25, 2002,[11] the respondent judge denied the Motion to

Quash. He ruled that a claim of former acquittal or conviction does not constitute double
jeopardy and cannot be sustained unless judgment was rendered acquitting or convicting
the defendant in the former prosecution; that petitioner was never acquitted or convicted
of Homicide, since the Information for Homicide was merely corrected/or amended
before trial commenced and did not terminate the same; that the Information for
Homicide was patently insufficient in substance, so no valid proceedings could be taken
thereon; and that with the allegation of aggravating circumstance of “disregard of rank,”
the crime of Homicide is qualified to Murder.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Inhibit with attached Motion for Reconsideration. In his
Motion to Inhibit, he alleged that the respondent judge exercised jurisdiction in an
arbitrary, capricious and partial manner in mandating the amendment of the charge from
Homicide to Murder in disregard of the provisions of the law and existing jurisprudence.
In his Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner reiterated that the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, which constitutes a
ground to quash the information for murder; and that to try him again for the same
offense constitutes double jeopardy. Petitioner stated that contrary to respondent judge's
conclusion that disregard of rank qualifies the killing to Murder, it is a generic
aggravating circumstance which only serves to affect the imposition of the period of the
penalty. Petitioner also argued that the amendment and/or correction ordered by the
respondent judge was substantial; and under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, this cannot be done, since petitioner had already been arraigned and
he would be placed in double jeopardy.
In his Order dated December 18, 2002,[12] the respondent judge denied the Motion to
Inhibit and granted the Motion for Reconsideration, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion to Inhibit is hereby DENIED while
the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED.
Unless ordered otherwise by the Highest Court, the presiding judge shall continue
hearing this case. Further, the Order dated October 25, 2002 is reconsidered and the
original information charging the crime of homicide stands.[13]
In granting the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent judge found that a close scrutiny
of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code shows that “disregard of rank” is merely a
generic mitigating[14] circumstance which should not elevate the classification of the
crime of homicide to murder.
On April 30, 2003, petitioner filed herein petition for certiorari on the following grounds:
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND
EXCEEDED HIS JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE AMENDMENT OF THE
INFORMATION FROM HOMICIDE TO MURDER.

VIOLATED THE LAW IN DENYING THE MOTION TO QUASH THE
INFORMATION FOR MURDER.
EXCEEDED HIS JURISDICTION AND VIOLATED THE LAW IN ORDERING THE
REINSTATEMENT OF THE INFORMATION FOR HOMICIDE WHICH WAS
ALREADY TERMINATED.[15]
Petitioner alleges that despite having entered his plea of not guilty to the charge of
Homicide, the public respondent ordered the amendment of the Information from
Homicide to Murder because of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of
“disregard of rank,” which is in violation of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure; that the public respondent’s ruling that “disregard of rank” is a
qualifying aggravating circumstance which qualified the killing of 2Lt. Escueta to murder
is erroneous since, under paragraph 3, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, disregard of
rank is only a generic aggravating circumstance which serves to affect the penalty to be
imposed upon the accused and does not qualify the offense into a more serious crime;
that even assuming that disregard of rank is a qualifying aggravating circumstance, such
is a substantial amendment which is not allowed after petitioner has entered his plea.
Petitioner next contends that the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he
denied the Motion to Quash the Information for Murder, considering that the original
Information for Homicide filed against him was terminated without his express consent;
thus, prosecuting him for the same offense would place him in double jeopardy.
Petitioner further argues that although the respondent judge granted his Motion for
Reconsideration, he did not in fact grant the motion, since petitioner's prayer was for the
respondent judge to grant the Motion to Quash the Information for Murder on the ground
of double jeopardy; that his Motion for Reconsideration did not seek the reinstatement of
the Information for Homicide upon the dismissal of the Information for Murder, as he
would again be placed in double jeopardy; thus, the respondent judge committed grave
abuse of discretion in reinstating the Homicide case.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General argues that the respondent judge's Order
reinstating the Information to Homicide after initially motu proprio ordering its
amendment to Murder renders herein petition moot and academic; that petitioner failed to
establish the fourth element of double jeopardy, i.e., the defendant was acquitted or
convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
consent; that petitioner confuses amendment with substitution of Information; that the
respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002 mandated an amendment of the
Information as provided under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure; and that amendments do not entail dismissal or termination of the previous
case.
Private respondent Col. Olimpio Escueta, father of the victim, filed his Comment alleging
that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the respondent judge when he denied
petitioner's Motion to Quash the Amended Information, as petitioner was not placed in
double jeopardy; that the proceedings under the first Information for homicide has not yet
commenced, and the case was not dismissed or terminated when the Information was
amended.
In his Reply, petitioner reiterates his contention that the amendment of the charge of
Homicide to Murder after his arraignment would place him in double jeopardy,
considering that said amendment was without his express consent; and that such
amendment was tantamount to a termination of the charge of Homicide.
The parties filed their respective Memoranda.
Generally, a direct resort to us in a petition for certiorari is highly improper, for it

violates the established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts.
However, the judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule.[16] A strict application of
the rule of hierarchy of courts is not necessary when the cases brought before the
appellate courts do not involve factual but legal questions.[17]
In the present case, petitioner submits pure questions of law involving the proper legal
interpretation of the provisions on amendment and substitution of information under the
Rules of Court. It also involves the issue of double jeopardy, one of the fundamental
rights of the citizens under the Constitution which protects the accused not against the
peril of second punishment but against being tried for the same offense. These important
legal questions and in order to prevent further delay in the trial of the case warrant our
relaxation of the policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts.
The petition is not meritorious.
We find no merit in petitioner's contention that the respondent judge committed grave
abuse of discretion in amending the Information after petitioner had already pleaded not
guilty to the charge in the Information for Homicide. The argument of petitioner --
Considering the fact that the case for Homicide against him was already terminated
without his express consent, he cannot anymore be charged and arraigned for Murder
which involve the same offense. The petitioner argued that the termination of the
information for Homicide without his express consent is equivalent to his acquittal. Thus,
to charge him again, this time for Murder, is tantamount to placing the petitioner in
Double Jeopardy.[18]
is not plausible. Petitioner confuses the procedure and effects of amendment or
substitution under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, to wit --
SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may be amended, in
accused.
xxx
filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section 11,
provided the accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also
require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
with Section 19, Rule 119 of which provides:
SEC. 19. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense. - When it
becomes manifest at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging
the proper offense and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or any
other offense necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be discharged if there
appears good cause to detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the accused to
answer for the proper offense and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper
information.
First, a distinction shall be made between amendment and substitution under Section 14,
Rule 110. For this purpose, Teehankee v. Madayag[19] is instructive, viz:
The first paragraph provides the rules for amendment of the information or complaint,
while the second paragraph refers to the substitution of the information or complaint.
It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of the information
may be made before or after the defendant pleads, but they differ in the following
respects:
1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes, while substitution

necessarily involves a substantial change from the original charge;
2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected without leave of court,
but substitution of information must be with leave of court as the original
information has to be dismissed;
3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another preliminary
investigation and the retaking of the plea of the accused; in substitution of
information, another preliminary investigation is entailed and the accused has to
plead anew to the new information; and
4. An amended information refers to the same offense charged in the original

information or to an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included
in the original charge, hence substantial amendments to the information after the
plea has been taken cannot be made over the objection of the accused, for if the
original information would be withdrawn, the accused could invoke double
jeopardy. On the other hand, substitution requires or presupposes that the new
information involves a different offense which does not include or is not
necessarily included in the original charge, hence the accused cannot claim double
jeopardy.
In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the first

paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, or a substitution of information under the second
paragraph thereof, the rule is that where the second information involves the same
offense, or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first
information, an amendment of the information is sufficient; otherwise, where the new
information charges an offense which is distinct and different from that initially charged,
a substitution is in order.
There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for
one offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other, or when the second
offense is exactly the same as the first, or when the second offense is an attempt to
commit or a frustration of, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily included in,
the offense charged in the first information. In this connection, an offense may be said to
necessarily include another when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the
former, as this is alleged in the information, constitute the latter. And, vice-versa, an
offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when the essential ingredients
of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.[20]
In the present case, the change of the offense charged from Homicide to Murder is merely
a formal amendment and not a substantial amendment or a substitution as defined
in Teehankee.
While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading of the Information shows that
the only change made was in the caption of the case; and in the opening paragraph or
preamble of the Information, with the crossing out of word “Homicide” and its
replacement by the word “Murder.” There was no change in the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged or in the determination of the jurisdiction of the court.
The averments in the amended Information for Murder are exactly the same as those
already alleged in the original Information for Homicide, as there was not at all any
change in the act imputed to petitioner, i.e., the killing of 2Lt. Escueta without any
qualifying circumstance. Thus, we find that the amendment made in the caption and
preamble from “Homicide” to “Murder” as purely formal.[21]
Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing formal amendments in cases in which
the accused has already pleaded, it is necessary that the amendments do not prejudice the
rights of the accused. The test of whether the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the
amendment of a complaint or information is whether a defense under the complaint or
information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is
made; and when any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the
complaint or information.[22] Since the facts alleged in the accusatory portion of the
amended Information are identical with those of the original Information for Homicide,
there could not be any effect on the prosecution's theory of the case; neither would there
be any possible prejudice to the rights or defense of petitioner.
While the respondent judge erroneously thought that “disrespect on account of rank”
qualified the crime to murder, as the same was only a generic aggravating circumstance,
[23]
we do not find that he committed any grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
amendment of the Information after petitioner had already pleaded not guilty to the
charge of Homicide, since the amendment made was only formal and did not adversely
affect any substantial right of petitioner.
Next, we determine whether petitioner was placed in double jeopardy by the change of
the charge from Homicide to Murder; and subsequently, from Murder back to Homicide.
Petitioner's claim that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying his Motion to Quash the Amended Information for Murder on the ground of
double jeopardy is not meritorious.
Petitioner's Motion to Quash was anchored on Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court,
which provides:
SEC. 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any
of the following grounds:
xxxx
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or
the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Section 7 of the same Rule lays down the requisites in order that the defense of double
jeopardy may prosper, to wit:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the
former complaint or information.
Thus, there is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present: (1) a first
jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated;
and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.[24]
As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b)
before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered;
and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.[25]
It is the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal or termination of the case
that bars further prosecution for the same offense or any attempt to commit the same or
the frustration thereof; or prosecution for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.[26]
Petitioner's insistence that the respondent judge dismissed or terminated his case for
homicide without his express consent, which is tantamount to an acquittal, is misplaced.
Dismissal of the first case contemplated by Section 7 presupposes a definite or

unconditional dismissal which terminates the case.[27] And for the dismissal to be a bar
under the jeopardy clause, it must have the effect of acquittal.
The respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002 was for the trial prosecutor to
correct and amend the Information but not to dismiss the same upon the filing of a new
Information charging the proper offense as contemplated under the last paragraph of
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court -- which, for convenience, we quote again --
If it appears at anytime before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the
provided the accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the
witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
and Section 19, Rule 119, which provides:
SEC. 19.-When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense - When it becomes
manifest at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the
proper offense and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or any other
offense necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be discharged if there appears
good cause to detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the accused to answer for
the proper offense and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper information.
Evidently, the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, applies only when the offense
charged is wholly different from the offense proved, i.e., the accused cannot be convicted
of a crime with which he was not charged in the information even if it be proven, in
which case, there must be a dismissal of the charge and a substitution of a new
information charging the proper offense. Section 14 does not apply to a second
information, which involves the same offense or an offense which necessarily includes or
is necessarily included in the first information. In this connection, the offense charged
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter.
And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.[28]
Homicide is necessarily included in the crime of murder; thus, the respondent judge
merely ordered the amendment of the Information and not the dismissal of the original
Information. To repeat, it was the same original information that was amended by merely
crossing out the word “Homicide” and writing the word “Murder,” instead, which
showed that there was no dismissal of the homicide case.
Anent the last issue, petitioner contends that respondent judge gravely abused his
discretion in ordering that the original Information for Homicide stands after realizing
that disregard of rank does not qualify the killing to Murder. That ruling was again a
violation of his right against double jeopardy, as he will be prosecuted anew for a charge
of Homicide, which has already been terminated earlier.
We are not convinced. Respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion.
A reading of the Order dated December 18, 2002 showed that the respondent judge
granted petitioner's motion for reconsideration, not on the ground that double jeopardy
exists, but on his realization that “disregard of rank” is a generic aggravating
circumstance which does not qualify the killing of the victim to murder. Thus, he rightly
corrected himself by reinstating the original Information for Homicide. The requisite of
double jeopardy that the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second is not
present, considering that petitioner was neither convicted nor acquitted; nor was the case
against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.[29]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, there being no grave abuse of discretion

committed by respondent Judge.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 103102, March 06, 1992 ]
CLAUDIO J. TEEHANKEE, JR., PETITIONER, VS. HON. JOB B.
MADAYAG AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
In this special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, petitioner principally

seeks: (1) to nullify the order of respondent judge admitting the amended information
[1]
for murder filed in Criminal Case No. 91-4606; (2) to nullify the arraignment and the plea
of not guilty entered by order of respondent judge when petitioner refused to be arraigned
on the amended information for lack of preliminary investigation therefor; (3) to nullify
the appointment of a counsel de oficio/PAO lawyer to represent petitioner; (4) to prohibit
respondent judge from "over-speedy and preferential scheduling of the trial of the
aforementioned criminal case;" and (5) to compel respondent judge to order a preliminary
investigation of the crime charged in the amended information.
Petitioner was originally charged on July 19, 1991 in an information for the crime of
[2]
frustrated murder allegedly committed as follows:
"That on or about the 13th day of July 1991, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, while armed with a handgun, with intent to kill, treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault
and shoot one Maureen Navarro Hultman on the head, thereby inflicting gunshot
wounds, which ordinarily would have caused the death of said Maureen Navarro
Hultman, thereby performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the
crime of Murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of
cause or causes independent of her will, that is, due to the timely and able medical
assistance rendered to said Maureen Navarro Hultman which prevented her death."
After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner was allowed to file a motion for leave
to file a demurrer to evidence. However, before the said motion could be filed, Maureen
Navarro Hultman died.
Consequently, private prosecutor Rogelio A. Vinluan filed an omnibus motion for leave
[3]
of court to file an amended information and to admit said amended information. The
amended information, filed on October 31, 1991, reads:
[4]
"That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said Claudio Teehankee, Jr. y Javier, armed with a handgun, with intent to kill
and evident premeditation and by means of treachery, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said handgun Maureen
Navarro
Hultman who was hit in the head, thereby inflicting mortal wounds which directly cause
d the death of said Maureen Hultman."
Petitioner filed an opposition thereto, as well as a rejoinder to the reply of the
[5] [6] [7]
prosecution. On November 13, 1991, the trial court issued the questioned order admitting
the amended information.
At the scheduled arraignment on November 26, 1991, petitioner refused to be arraigned

on the amended information for lack of a preliminary investigation thereon. By reason of
such refusal, respondent judge ordered that a plea of "not guilty" be entered for petitioner.
Thereafter, respondent judge ordered the prosecution to present its evidence. When
petitioner's counsel manifested that he would not take part in the proceedings because of
the legal issue raised, the trial court appointed a counsel de oficio to represent herein
petitioner.
Petitioner now raises the following issues before us:
"(a) Whether or not an amended information involving a substantial amendment,

without preliminary investigation, after the prosecution has rested on the original
information, may legally and validly be admitted;
“(b) Whether or not a counsel de oficio may legally and validly be appointed to
represent an accused who is represented by counsel of choice who refuses to
participate in the proceedings because of a perceived denial of due process and
after a plea for appellate remedies within a short period is denied by the trial court; and
“(c) Whether or not a particular criminal case may legally and validly be rushed
and preferentially scheduled for trial over and at the expense and sacrifice of other,
specially older, criminal cases." [8]
In our resolution of January 14, 1992, we required the Solicitor General to file a comment
to the basic petition. It appearing from a further review of the record that the operative
facts and determinant issues involved in this case are sufficiently presented in the petition
and the annexes thereto, both in regard to the respective positions of petitioner and
respondents, the Court has decided to dispense with the aforesaid comment to obviate
needless delay in fairness to petitioner.
I. Petitioner avers that the additional allegation in the amended information, as herein
underscored, that the accused ". . . did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said handgun Maureen Navarro
Hultman who was hit in the head, thereby inflicting mortal wounds which directly caused
the death of said Maureen Hultman x x x" constitutes a substantial amendment since it
involves a change in the nature of the offense charged, that is, from frustrated to
consummated murder. Petitioner further submits that "(t)here is a need then to establish
that the same mortal wounds, which were initially frustrated (sic) by timely and able
medical assistance, ultimately caused the death of the victim, because it could have been
caused by a supervening act or fact which is not imputable to the offender." From this,
[9]
he argues that there being a substantial amendment, the same may no longer be allowed
after arraignment and during the trial.
Corollary thereto, petitioner then postulates that since the amended information for
murder charges an entirely different offense, involving as it does a new fact, that is, the
fact of death whose cause has to be established, it is essential that another preliminary
investigation on the new charge be conducted before the new information can be
admitted.
We find no merit in the petition. There are sufficient legal and jurisprudential moorings
for the orders of the trial court.
Section 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
"Sec. 14. Amendment. - The information or complaint may be amended, in

substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the accused pleads; and
the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or
information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with
Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be placed thereby in double
jeopardy and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the
trial."
respects:
2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected without leave of court, but
substitution of information must be with leave of court as the original information has to
be dismissed;
investigation and the retaking of the plea of the accused; in substitution of information,
another preliminary investigation is entailed and the accused has to plead anew to the
new information; and
information or to an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
original charge, hence substantial amendments to the information after the plea has been
taken cannot be made over the objection of the accused, for if the original information
would be withdrawn, the accused could invoke double jeopardy. On the other hand,
substitution requires or presupposes that the new information involves a different offense
which does not include or is not necessarily included in the original charge, hence the
accused cannot claim double jeopardy.

paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, or a substitution of information under
the second paragraph thereof, the rule is that where the second information involves the
same offense, or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
first information, an amendment of the information is sufficient; otherwise, where the
new information charges an offense which is distinct and different from that initially
charged, a substitution is in order.
of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.
[10]
Going now to the case at bar, it is evident that frustrated murder is but a stage in the
execution of the crime of murder, hence the former is necessarily included in the latter. It
is indispensable that the essential element of intent to kill, as well as qualifying
circumstances such as treachery or evident premeditation, be alleged in both an
information for frustrated murder and for murder, thereby meaning and proving that the
same material allegations are essential to the sufficiency of the informations filed for
both. This is because, except for the death of the victim, the essential elements of
consummated murder likewise constitute the essential ingredients to convict herein
petitioner for the offense of frustrated murder.
In the present case, therefore, there is an identity of offenses charged in both the original
and the amended information. What is involved here is not a variance in the nature of
different offenses charged, but only a change in the stage of execution of the same
offense from frustrated to consummated murder. This being the case, we hold that an
amendment of the original information will suffice and, consequent thereto, the filing of
the amended information for murder is proper.
Petitioner would insist, however, that the additional allegation on the fact of death of the
victim Maureen Navarro Hultman constitutes a substantial amendment which may no
longer be allowed after a plea has been entered. The proposition is erroneous and
untenable.
As earlier indicated, Section 14 of Rule 110 provides that an amendment, either of form
or substance, may be made at any time before the accused enters a plea to the charge and,
thereafter, as to all matters of form with leave of court.
Thus, the following have been held to be merely formal amendments, viz.: (1) new
[11]
allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the
event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different
[12]
or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not
[13]
alter the prosecution's theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect
the form of defense he has or will assume; and (4) an amendment which does not
adversely affect any substantial right of the accused, such as his right to invoke
prescription.[14]
We repeat that after arraignment and during the trial, amendments are allowed, but only
as to matters of form and provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights of the accused.
The test of whether an amendment is only of form and an accused is not prejudiced by
[15]
such amendment has been said to be whether or not a defense under the information as it
originally stood would be equally available after the amendment is made, and whether or
not any evidence the accused might have would be equally applicable to the information
in the one form as in the other; if the answer is in the affirmative, the amendment is one
of form and not of substance. [16]
Now, an objective appraisal of the amended information for murder filed against herein
petitioner will readily show that the nature of the offense originally charged was not
actually changed. Instead, an additional allegation, that is, the supervening fact of the
death of the victim was merely supplied to aid the trial court in determining the proper
penalty for the crime. That the accused committed a felonious act with intent to kill the
victim continues to be the prosecution's theory. There is no question that whatever
defense herein petitioner may adduce under the original information for frustrated murder
equally applies to the amended information for murder. Under the circumstances thus
obtaining, it is irremissible that the amended information for murder is, at most, an
amendment as to form which is allowed even during the trial of the case.
It consequently follows that since only a formal amendment was involved and introduced
in the second information, a preliminary investigation is unnecessary and cannot be
demanded by the accused. The filing of the amended information without the requisite
preliminary investigation does not violate petitioner's right to be secured against hasty,
malicious and oppressive prosecutions, and to be protected from an open and public
accusation of a crime, as well as from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.
The amended information could not conceivably have come as a surprise to petitioner for
the simple and obvious reason that it charges essentially the same offense as that charged
under the original information. Furthermore, as we have heretofore held, if the crime
originally charged is related to the amended charge such that an inquiry into one would
elicit substantially the same facts that an inquiry into the other would reveal, a new
preliminary investigation is not necessary. [17]
We find nothing irregular in the appointment by the trial court of a counsel de oficio for

herein petitioner whose counsel of record refused to participate in the proceedings
because of an alleged legal issue. Such issue having been demonstrated herein as
baseless, we apprehend his refusal to participate in the trial as causative of or contributive
to the delay in the disposition of the case. And, finally, for as long as the substantial
rights of herein petitioner and other persons charged in court are not prejudiced, the
scheduling of cases should be left to the sound discretion of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, it being clearly apparent that respondent judge did not commit the
errors speciously attributed to him, the extraordinary writs prayed for are hereby
DENIED and the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 121211, April 30, 2003 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. RONETO DEGAMO
ALIAS “ROY”, APPELLANT.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us for automatic review is a decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court
(Branch 12) of Ormoc City imposing the supreme penalty of death on appellant Roneto
Degamo alias “Roy” for the crime of rape with the use of a deadly weapon and the
aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime.
On October 4, 1994, a complaint was filed before the trial court charging appellant with
the crime of rape to which, upon arraignment, pleaded not guilty.
On January 17, 1995, before the start of the trial proper, the court a quo allowed the
complaint to be amended to include the allegation that by reason of the incident of rape,
the victim has become insane[1], to wit:
The undersigned Prosecutor accuses RONETO DEGAMO alias Roy of the crime of
RAPE committed as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of October 1994 at around 1:00 o’clock in the early morning,
in Brgy. Punta, Ormoc City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused RONETO DEGAMO alias Roy, being then armed with a bladed
weapon, by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant herein ELLEN
VERTUDAZO, against her will and in her own house.
All contrary to law and with the aggravating circumstances that the said offense was
committed in the dwelling of the offended party, the latter not having given provocation
for the offense; and that by reason of the incident of rape, the victim become insane.
In violation of Article 335, Revised Penal Code.

Upon re-arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.[2]
Trial ensued.
As borne out by its evidence, the following is the version of the prosecution:
Complainant Ellen Vertudazo and her children were living in a rented apartment at
Barangay Punta, Ormoc City. She and her family just moved into the neighborhood on
July 15, 1994.[3] She was not personally acquainted with appellant although she knew him
to be one of their neighbors. On August 2, 1994, her brother-in-law, Venancio, came
from the province for a visit and stayed in her house. It was during this time that
appellant became acquainted with Venancio. On September 30, 1994, appellant invited
Venancio for a night out. Venancio left complainant’s house immediately after supper,
telling her that he would return to the house. Later that night, or on October 1, 1994, at
around 1:00 in the morning, complainant heard someone calling her name. She
unwittingly opened the door thinking that Venancio had returned.[4] Thereupon, appellant
forced his way inside the house and poked a knife at complainant’s neck. She tried to
move away from appellant but he grabbed her and told her that he would kill her if she
will not accede to his demands. Appellant then told her to put off the light, strip off her
clothes and not make any noise. Overwhelmed with fear, complainant meekly followed
the orders of appellant who proceeded to kiss her lips, breasts and all parts of her body.
He laid her on the concrete floor and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her.
Appellant was holding the knife while having sexual intercourse with complainant. He
warned her not to tell anyone about the incident, then he left. Complainant went upstairs
and just cried. In the morning of the same day, complainant reported the incident to the
Barangay Captain and to the police. She submitted herself for medical examination at the
health. center on October 3, 1994. Upon learning of the incident, her husband, who was
working in Saudi Arabia, immediately came home.[5]
Due to her traumatic experience at the hands of appellant, complainant underwent

psychiatric treatment in Tacloban City.[6] She was first brought to Dr. Gemelina Cerro-
Go[7] for treatment on November 8, 1994. Dr. Go found her case of psychosis already
acute and chronic. Complainant was talking to herself and each time Dr. Go would ask
her a question, she repeatedly said, “Gi padlock ang akong hunahuna.” Dr. Go also
observed that complainant talked irrelevantly, had lost association and had severe
destructive inclinations. She did not listen to anybody and just kept staring outside the
window. Dr. Go concluded that complainant was suffering from psychosis, a form of
mental disorder, induced by an overwhelming trauma secondary to rape. Complainant
visited Dr. Go again on December 15, 1994 and on January 3, 1995. Dr. Go prescribed
anti-psychotic drugs to complainant who, after three weeks of treatment, showed signs of
improvement. Complainant could already sleep although she has not yet regained her
normal or regular sleeping pattern. Her delusions and hallucinations were not as serious
anymore, but she was still out of contact. She could not function normally as a wife and
as a mother. Since complainant still suffered from psychosis, Dr. Go administered to her
a dose of low acting tranquilizer injections, anti-depressants and short acting oral tablets.
[8]
Dr. Go clarified that psychosis is usually the technical term for insanity. [9] She declared
that complainant has not fully recovered from psychosis and that without continuous
treatment, complainant would regress and she would completely lose all aspects of
functioning.[10]
Appellant’s version is based on his lone testimony. He admits that he and complainant
were neighbors but claims that they were lovers. He further testified that he met
complainant for the first time during the last week of August 1994 at a neighborhood
store. Complainant readily agreed when he asked her if it would be possible for them to
get to know each other better. Later, at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening, he and
complainant had a conversation in front of the gate of her apartment. He learned from her
that her husband was working abroad. When he told the complainant that he wanted to
court her, complainant said, “It’s up to you.” Encouraged by complainant’s reply, he
returned at midnight and knocked at the gate of her apartment. Complainant peeped
through the jalousies and went down to the first floor. She opened the gate and let him in.
Upon having entered the house, he sat at the sofa, placed his hands on the shoulder of
complainant, who by then had already sat beside him, and touched her ears. She did
nothing to repel appellant’s advances but just looked up. When asked to remove her shirt,
complainant willingly obliged. He proceeded to kiss complainant all over. She removed
her short pants when appellant asked her to do so. He then removed his shirt and
continued to kiss complainant’s breasts, chest and thighs. He wanted that they move
upstairs but she demurred saying that her children were upstairs. Complainant instead
suggested that they move to the cement floor since the sofa was noisy. He got aroused
after transferring to the floor, so he removed his short pants and briefs. Complainant
likewise removed her underwear. They had sexual intercourse without him having to use
force on complainant. Thereafter, they dressed up. He left the place at 1:00 in the
morning. They repeated the same act on four more occasions usually at 12:00 midnight.
He did not have to use force, much less threaten complainant with a knife when they had
sexual intercourse on October 1, 1994.[11]
On May 22, 1995, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered finding the accused RONETO DEGAMO, a.
k. a. Roy, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape defined and penalized under
paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act 7659. Appreciating the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime with no
mitigating circumstance to offset any of the two and pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code, this court imposes upon the same Roneto Degamo, a.k.a. Roy, the extreme
penalty of DEATH. Further, the same Roneto Degamo, a. k. a. Roy, is directed to
indemnify Ellen Vertudazo the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) and to
pay the costs.
As the sentence imposed is death, the jail warden of Ormoc City is directed to
immediately commit the person of Roneto Degamo, a. k. a. Roy, to the National Bilibid
Prisons at Muntinlupa, Metro Manila while awaiting the review of this decision by the
Supreme Court.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Hence, this automatic review.
A discussion of certain procedural rules is in order before going into the merits of the
case. It has not escaped our notice that the complaint for rape with use of a deadly
weapon was amended after arraignment of appellant to include the allegation that the
victim has become insane by reason or on the occasion of the rape. Although the penalty
for rape with the use of a deadly weapon under the original Information is reclusion
perpetua to death, the mandatory penalty of death is imposed where the victim has
become insane by reason or on the occasion of rape as alleged in the Amended
Information.
Under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, an amendment after the plea of the
accused is permitted only as to matters of form, provided: (i) leave of court is obtained;
and (ii) such amendment is not prejudicial to the rights of the accused. A substantial
amendment is not permitted after the accused had already been arraigned.
In Teehankee, Jr. vs. Madayag,[13] we had occasion to state that a substantial amendment
consists of recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the
jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. The following were held to
be merely formal amendments: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the
penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which
does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one;
(3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution’s theory of the case so as to
cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; and
(4) amendment, which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused, such
as his right to invoke prescription.
We further elucidated in the Teehankee case that the test as to whether an amendment is

only of form and an accused is not prejudiced by such amendment is whether or not a
defense under the information as it originally stood would be equally available after the
amendment is made, and whether or not any evidence which the accused might have
would be equally applicable to the information in one form as in the other; if the answer
is in the affirmative, the amendment is one of form and not of substance.[14]
Tested against the foregoing guidelines, the subject amendment is clearly not one of
substance as it falls under all of the formal amendments enumerated in
the Teehankee case. The insertion of the phrase that the victim has become insane by
reason or on occasion of the rape in the Information merely raised the penalty that may be
imposed in case of conviction and does not charge another offense different from that
charged in the original Information. Whatever defense appellant may have raised under
the original information for rape committed with a deadly weapon equally applies to rape
committed with a deadly weapon where the victim has become insane by reason or on
occasion of the rape. The amendment did not adversely affect any substantial right of
appellant. Therefore, the trial court correctly allowed the amendment.
Furthermore, it is also settled that amendment of an information to charge a more serious

offense is permissible and does not constitute double jeopardy even where the accused
was already arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charge, where the basis of the more
serious charge did not exist, but comes as a subsequent event. [15] In this case the basis for
the amendment was the psychosis of complainant which was determined after the filing
of the information.
Unlike other qualifying circumstances, insanity of the victim by reason or on occasion of

the rape may not be readily discerned right after the commission of the crime. The
resultant insanity of the victim could be easily mistaken as a mere initial reaction, such as
shock, to the incident. In other cases, it may take some weeks or even months for the
insanity of the victim to manifest. Consequently, a psychiatrist would need some time
with the victim before concluding that she is indeed suffering from insanity as a result of
rape. Under these circumstances, the subsequent diagnosis of insanity by reason or on
occasion of the rape is akin to a supervening event; in which case, the corresponding
amendment of the information may be allowed, as correctly done by the trial court.
Besides, the trial proper started only after appellant had been re-arraigned and appellant
never objected to the amendment at any stage of the proceedings. It is basic that objection
to the amendment of an information or complaint must be raised at the time the
amendment is made, otherwise, silence would be deemed a consent to said amendment. It
is a time-honored doctrine that objection to the amendment must be seasonably made, for
when the trial was had upon an information substituted for the complaint or information
without any objection by the defense, the defect is deemed waived. It cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal.[16]
We shall now proceed to the merits of the case.
The trial court gave credence to the testimony of victim Ellen Vertudazo that appellant
raped her with the use of a deadly weapon. It held that she would not have agreed to
endure the indignities of physical examination of her private parts and the embarrassment
of a public trial were it not for a desire to seek justice for herself. Moreover, the trial
court found that other than the self-serving testimony of appellant, no evidence was
introduced to support his claim that he and complainant were having an illicit love affair;
and that there was no ill motive on the part of complainant for imputing the serious
charge of rape against appellant.
In his Appellant’s Brief, appellant raises a single assignment of error, to wit: “The trial
court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape”,
in support of which, he argues:
1. The fact that at first complainant said she opened the door for the accused and later
denied this, is not an inconsequential contradiction.
2. Complainant had not become insane by reason of the rape because she gave
intelligent answers on the witness stand.
We find the appeal without merit.
It is doctrinal that the evaluation of testimonial evidence by trial courts is accorded great
respect precisely because of its chance to observe first-hand the demeanor of the
witnesses, a matter which is important in determining whether what has been testified to
may be taken to be the truth or falsehood.[17] Appellant failed to show any cogent reason
for us to disturb the findings of the trial court.
Complainant and her family had just moved in the neighborhood a little more than two
months before she was raped. Prior to the incident of rape, she only knew appellant as
one of her neighbors but did not personally know him.[18] Appellant would have us to
believe that hours after a chance meeting at a nearby sari-sari store, complainant, a
married woman with children, was so morally debased as to readily accede to his sexual
advances at her own apartment while her children were asleep. Like the trial court, we
find it unlikely for a married woman with children who had just moved into the
neighborhood to place herself on public trial for rape where she would be subjected to
suspicion, morbid curiosity, malicious imputations and close scrutiny of her personal life
and character, not to speak of the humiliation and scandal she and her family would
suffer, if she were merely concocting her charge against appellant and would not be able
to prove it in court.
Appellant insists that the complaint was prompted by complainant’s fear that her
husband’s relatives might discover her infidelity. We are not convinced. Aside from the
bare assertion of appellant that he and complainant were having an affair, he failed to
present corroborative evidence of any kind such as love notes, mementos or pictures [19] or
the testimonies of neighbors, relatives or friends. There is no showing that the relatives of
complainant’s husband even suspected that she was having an illicit affair. Further,
complainant not only filed the charges of rape immediately after the incident, she also
submitted herself for medical examination and sought psychiatric treatment due to the
trauma caused by her ordeal. If she and appellant were indeed lovers, there would have
been no reason for her to be so traumatized by their sexual liaisons and undergo
psychiatric treatment.
Worth noting too is the fact that there is no evidence nor even an indication that
complainant was impelled by an improper motive in making the accusation against
appellant. The absence of any improper motive of complainant to impute such a serious
offense against appellant persuades us that complainant filed the rape charge against
appellant for no other reason than to seek justice for the bestial deed committed against
her. Settled is the doctrine that when there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or
improper motive why a prosecution witness should testify falsely against the accused or
implicate him in a serious offense, the testimony deserves full faith and credit. [20]
Appellant presses that the trial court should have taken note that complainant gave
contradicting testimonies as she had earlier testified that she opened the door to appellant
but later denied this on cross examination; and that complainant must have perceived the
serious implications of her earlier testimony so she deliberately changed her testimony.
After a review of the testimony of complainant, we find no such contradictions.

Complainant clearly testified that she opened the door when she heard someone calling
her name to open it because she thought that her brother-in-law, Venancio, who left the
house earlier at the invitation of appellant, had already come home for the night. It was
too late when she realized that it was appellant alone who had called on her to open the
door.[21]
Appellant further argues that the qualifying circumstance of the use of a deadly weapon
in the commission of the crime should not be considered since the weapon was never
presented as evidence in court. We are not persuaded.
It is settled that the non-presentation of the weapon used in the commission of rape is not
essential to the conviction of the accused.[22] The testimony of the rape victim that
appellant was armed with a deadly weapon when he committed the crime is sufficient to
establish that fact for so long as the victim is credible.[23] It must be stressed that in rape, it
is usually only the victim who can attest to its occurrence and that is why courts subject
the testimony of the alleged victims to strict scrutiny before relying on it for the
conviction of the accused.[24] In the present case, complainant positively described how
appellant, armed with a knife, threatened and raped her. Appellant failed to show any
compelling reason for us to brush aside the probative weight given by the trial court to
the testimony of herein complainant. Absent any showing that certain facts of substance
and significance have been plainly overlooked or that the trial court’s findings are clearly
arbitrary, the conclusions reached by the trial court must be respected and the judgment
rendered should be affirmed.[25]
We take note that Dr. Ernesto Calipayan conducted a physical examination of the victim
on October 3, 1994, and he issued a Medical Certificate wherein it is stated that the
“entire vulva and vestibule are normally looking and showed no signs of traumatic
injury” and that a microscopic examination of the cervical and vaginal smear showed that
it is negative for sperm cells.[26] Said findings however, do not demolish the positive
testimony of the victim that she had been raped by appellant. The absence of traumatic
injury on her vulva and vestibule is not a strong proof that appellant did not use force on
the victim who submitted to the dastardly act of appellant because of the knife wielded by
him. It is within the realm of logic, reason and human experience that the victim, who
had given birth to two children, because of the fear for her life, may not have exerted that
degree of resistance that would have been needed to produce traumatic injury on her
private parts.
Moreover, the fact that no sperm was found in the cervical and vaginal smear is
satisfactorily explained by Dr. Calipayan that human spermatozoa will not survive
between forty-eight to seventy-two hours.[27] In complainant’s case, she was examined on
October 3, 1994, or more than forty-eight hours after she was raped on October 1, 1994
between 12:00 midnight and 1:00 in the morning.
It is a settled rule that proof beyond reasonable doubt does not connote absolute certainty,
it means that degree of proof which, after an investigation of the whole record, produces
moral certainty in an unprejudiced mind of the accused’s culpability.[28] It signifies such
proof that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon
it that appellant is guilty of the crime charged.[29]
In the case at bar, there is no doubt that appellant had committed the crime of rape.
Appellant failed to show that the trial court committed any reversible error in finding him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of raping complainant with the use of a deadly weapon.
Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, whenever the crime of rape is
committed with the use of a deadly weapon, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to
death.
In meting out the penalty of death, the trial court considered dwelling and nighttime as
aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime of rape committed with a
deadly weapon.
The trial court should not have considered the aggravating circumstance of nighttime
against appellant. Not only was it not alleged as an aggravating circumstance in the
Information, but also, there is no clear proof that appellant deliberately took advantage of
the cover of darkness to facilitate the commission of the crime. Complainant herself even
testified that the flourescent light at the ground floor of the house was not switched off
until after appellant had already entered the house and told her to turn it off.[30]
However, the trial court did not err in imposing the penalty of death on appellant. It is
established by the prosecution that the crime of rape with the use of a deadly weapon was
committed in the dwelling of complainant. Dwelling is alleged in the Information and
was unrefuted by appellant. Under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, in cases where
the law provides a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the presence of an
aggravating circumstance warrants the imposition of the greater penalty which is death.
We now turn to the issue as to whether or not the qualifying circumstance of insanity of
the victim by reason or on occasion of the rape committed against complainant should
likewise be considered in the imposition of the proper penalty.
Republic Act No. 7659[31] expressly provides that when by reason or on the occasion of
the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be death.
The trial court observes:

There is no jurisprudence yet, however, which construed the provision “has become
insane.” Though there is no doubt that the death penalty shall be imposed if the victim
becomes permanently insane, there is no ruling yet whether temporary insanity by reason
of rape (when the victim responded to psychiatric treatment as in the present case) still
falls within the purview of the same provision.[32]
For the guidance of the Bench and the Bar, we deem it proper to resolve what should be
the correct construction of the provision “has become insane” by reason or on occasion of
the rape committed.
It is a hornbook doctrine in statutory construction that it is the duty of the court in

construing a law to determine legislative intention from its language.[33] The history of
events that transpired during the process of enacting a law, from its introduction in the
legislature to its final validation has generally been the first extrinsic aid to which courts
turn to construe an ambiguous act.[34]
Republic Act No. 2632[35] is the first law that introduced the qualifying circumstance of
insanity by reason or on occasion of rape, amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code. An examination of the deliberation of the lawmakers in enacting R.A. No. 2632,
convinces us that the degree of insanity, whether permanent or temporary, is not relevant
in considering the same as a qualifying circumstance for as long as the victim has become
insane by reason or on occasion of the rape.
Congressional records[36] disclose that when Senator Pedro Sabido first broached the
possibility of regarding insanity as a qualifying circumstance in rape, he described it as
“perpetual incapacity or insanity”. The interpellations on Senate Bill No. 21 which later
evolved into R.A. No. 2632 did not include the rationale for the inclusion of the victim’s
insanity by reason or occasion of rape as a qualifying circumstance. Neither did the
legislators discuss the degree of insanity of the victim by reason or on occasion of rape
for it to be considered as a qualifying circumstance. After the interpellations on the other
proposed amendments to Senate Bill No. 21, the Senate session was suspended. Upon
resumption of the session, the legislators agreed, among other matters, that the provision,
“when by reason or on occasion of rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua shall be likewise reclusion perpetua”, be incorporated in the law.
[37]
Thus, Article 335, as amended by R.A. No. 2632, read as follows:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Penalties - Rape is committed by having
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the
circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion temporal.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or
more persons, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period.
When by reason or on the occasion of rape, a homicide is committed the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.
When the rape is frustrated or attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the
occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape the victim has become insane, the
penalty shall be likewise reclusion perpetua. [Emphasis supplied]
Significantly, the words “perpetual” and “incapacity” were not retained by the
legislators. They merely used the word “insanity”. It is well-established in legal
hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part or word
thereof be given effect since the lawmaking body is presumed to know the meaning of
the words employed in the statute and to have used them advisedly. [38] Applied inversely,
the courts should not interject a condition, make a distinction, or impose any limitation
where the legislators did not opt to do so.
Thus, it is without any doubt that when the legislators included the victim’s resultant
insanity as a qualifying circumstance in rape cases, it did not intend or impose as a
condition that the insanity must be of permanent nature, or that it should have been
manifested by the victim before the filing of the complaint of information, before, during
or after trial. Otherwise, it would have been so expressly stated, especially so, that
Senator Sabido had initially suggested “perpetual incapacity or insanity,” As the
Congressional records reveal, the legislators chose not to include the word “perpetual” in
the bill enacted into law.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 2632, was further
amended by Republic Act No. 4111 whereby the penalty is increased to death “when by
reason or on the occasion of rape, the victim has become insane”.
R.A. No. 7659 which took effect on December 31, 1993, merely reiterated the imposition
of death penalty “when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become
insane.”
In the enactment of both R.A. Nos. 4111 and 7659, the legislators merely reiterated or
reproduced the provision on insanity under R.A. No. 2632 except as to the imposable
penalty, without making any distinction as to the degree of insanity that may or may not
be considered as a qualifying circumstance.
Consequently, the fact that the victim during trial or while the case is pending, has
returned to normal behavior after undergoing treatment, does not exculpate the appellant
from the penalty of death.
It is inherently difficult for us to set the parameters or fix a hard and fast rule as to when
insanity may be considered a qualifying circumstance. Whether the rape resulted in the
insanity of the victim shall have to be resolved by the courts on a case to case basis.
Suffice it to be stated that the resultant insanity of the victim in rape cases must at least be
manifest at the time of filing the complaint or information or at any time thereafter before
judgment is rendered, in which case, the information may accordingly be amended.
[39]
The reason for this is simple. Rape is always a traumatic experience for the victim
who necessarily suffers untold psychological and emotional damage. Like victims of
other crimes, rape victims have different ways of coping with the trauma brought about
by the crime. While one may exhibit shock or depression immediately after the crime and
recover thereafter, another might require a longer period to exhibit these same symptoms
and not return to normalcy. Certainly, one can never calculate or measure the depths of
the psychological and emotional damage that rape inflicts on the victim.
In the case at bar, Dr. Go had competently and convincingly testified that victim Ellen
Vertudazo suffered psychosis or insanity from which she seems to have improved due to
her treatment which treatment should be continuous and may last from six months to five
years so that the victim may not suffer from regression; and that as of February 16, 1995,
the date Dr. Go testified, complainant has not fully recovered from her psychosis. [40] The
qualifying circumstance of insanity had already attached notwithstanding the recovery of
the victim from her illness. The penalty of death is imposable.
As to the damages awarded, the trial court erred in awarding the mere sum of P30,000.00
to complainant as civil indemnity. Complainant is entitled to P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity in accordance with our established rulings in cases where the crime of rape is
committed, qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is
authorized by law.[41] In the present case, the victim became insane by reason of the rape
committed against her; and in the commission of rape with the use of a deadly weapon,
the aggravating circumstance of dwelling is present. Actually, the trial court had two
grounds for the imposition of death penalty.
Complainant is likewise entitled to moral damages without need of further proof in the
sum of P50,000.00.[42] The fact that complainant has suffered the trauma of mental,
physical and psychological sufferings which constitute the basis for moral damages is too
obvious to still require the recital thereof at the trial by the victim since the court itself
even assumes and acknowledges such agony on her part as a gauge of her credibility. [43]
In addition, complainant is entitled to the amount of P25,000.00 as and for exemplary

damages[44] considering the aggravating circumstance of dwelling; and to the amount of
P25,000.00 by way of temperate damages[45] in lieu of actual damages, considering that
complainant had to undergo psychiatric treatment but was not able to present proof of the
expenses she incurred in her treatment.
Three members of the Court maintain their position that R.A. No. 7659, insofar as it
prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional; however, they submit to the ruling of the
Court, by majority vote, that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should be
imposed accordingly.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court convicting appellant Roneto Degamo
alias “Roy” of qualified rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of DEATH is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant is ordered to pay
complainant Ellen Vertudazo the amounts of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00),
as civil indemnity; Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), as moral damages; Twenty-Five
Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages; and Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00) as temperate damages. Costs against appellant.
Upon the finality of this decision and pursuant to Section 25 of R.A. No. 7659, amending
Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded
to the Office of the President of the Philippines for possible exercise of the pardoning
power.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 151785, December 10, 2007 ]
SUSAN FRONDA-BAGGAO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
DECISION
Before us is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the Decision [1] dated August 29,
2001 and Resolution dated January 15, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
58270.
The facts are:
Sometime in 1989, the Provincial Prosecutor of Abra filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 1, Bangued, same province, four separate Informations for illegal recruitment
against Susan Fronda-Baggao, petitioner, and Lawrence Lee, docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. 744, 745, 746 and 749.
Petitioner eluded arrest for more than a decade; hence, the cases against her were
archived. On July 25, 1999, petitioner was finally arrested. [2]
On July 26, 1999, the prosecutor filed with the trial court a motion to amend the
Informations. He prayed that the four separate Informations for illegal recruitment be
amended so that there would only be one Information for illegal recruitment in large
scale. On the same day, the trial court denied the motion for lack of merit.
On August 6, 1999, the prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration. In its Order
dated January 26, 2000, the trial court granted the motion and admitted the
Information for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale, thus:
Accordingly, the Order dated July 26, 1999 denying the motion to amend
Information is hereby set aside and the Information for Illegal Recruitment in Large
Scale is hereby admitted in substitution of the other four Informations.
Moreover, considering that illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in a

large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage, let this case be
forwarded to RTC, Branch 2, a Special Criminal Court.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the trial court
in its Order dated March 21, 2000.
On April 11, 2000, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 58270.
In its Decision dated August 29, 2001, the Court of Appeals denied the petition.
Likewise, in its Resolution dated January 15, 2002, petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied.
Hence, the present petition.
The issue for our resolution is whether the four Informations for illegal recruitment
could be amended and lumped into one Information for illegal recruitment in large
scale.
Petitioner contends that (a) Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure refers to an amendment of one Information only, not four, which cannot be
joined in only one Information; and that (b) the amendment of the four Informations for
illegal recruitment into a single Information for a graver offense violates her substantial
rights.
Respondent, on the other hand, prays that the petition be denied for lack of merit.
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. – A complaint or information may be
the rights of the accused.
provided the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require
the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial. (Emphasis ours)
Simply stated, before the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial
amendment of the complaint or information may be made without leave of court. After
the entry of a plea, only a formal amendment may be made but with leave of court and
only if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment, a substantial
amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused. [3]
Following the above provisions and considering that petitioner has not yet entered her
plea, the four Informations could still be amended.
Petitioner also contends that the above Rule refers to an amendment of one
Information only, not four or multiple Informations which cannot be joined into only
one Information.
We disagree.
A careful scrutiny of the above Rule shows that although it uses the singular
word complaint or information, it does not mean that two or more complaints or
Informations cannot be amended into only one Information. Surely, such could not have
been intended by this Court. Otherwise, there can be an absurd situation whereby two
or more complaints or Informations could no longer be amended into one or more
Informations. On this point, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court is relevant,
thus:
SEC. 6. Construction. – These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to
promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding.
In fact, in Galvez v. Court of Appeals,[4] before the accused were arraigned, this
Court allowed the amendment of three original Informations for homicide and
frustrated homicide into four Informations for murder, frustrated murder and illegal
possession of firearms.
Petitioner contends that the amendment of the four Informations for illegal recruitment
into a single Information for illegal recruitment in large scale violates her substantial
rights as this would deprive her of the right to bail which she already availed of. Such
contention is misplaced. Obviously, petitioner relies on Section 14 of the same Rule
110 which provides that "after the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may
the rights of the accused." As stated earlier, petitioner has not yet been arraigned.
Hence, she cannot invoke the said provision.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58270 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 102645, April 07, 1993 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROMEO
PADICA Y LORICA, LESLIE GANS Y MELENDRES, FLORENTINO
FABRIGAS, ROMEO PRADEZ, LEONARDO MARAJAS, LEOPOLDO
MARAJAS AND LEON MARAJAS, JR. Y RAMOS,* ACCUSED. LEON
MARAJAS, JR. Y RAMOS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Accused-appellant Leon Marajas, Jr. y Ramos appeals from the judgment of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch CXVI, dated January 8, 1990, finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for ransom with murder upon an
amended information dated November 16, 1984 and reading as follows:
"That on or about the 8th day of February, 1978, in the Municipality of

Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together with John Doe @ Boy
Taga, Peter Doe @ Eddie Boy Marajas, Richard Doe @ Tito and Edward Doe @ Elmer
whose true names, identities and whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping
and aiding one another, with the use of three (3) firearms with the different caliber (sic)
by means of craft, violence against and intimidation of person, did then and there
kidnap Francis Banaga, detain and deprive him of his liberty for a period of three (3)
days and demanded (sic) five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) for his release and
while thus illegally detaining the latter, said accused, pursuant to said conspiracy did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and with treachery
shoot Francis Banaga, thereby inflicting on him gunshot wounds on the head and other
parts of his body which caused his instantaneous death as a consequences." [1]
The records show that Leon Marajas, Jr., Romeo Padica, Leslie Gans, Florentino
Fabrigas, Romeo Pradez, Leonardo Marajas and Leopoldo Marajas were originally
charged in the latter part of 1978 with kidnapping for ransom with murder and illegal
possession of firearms before Military Commission No. 27 in Criminal Case No. 27-163
thereof. However, on January 11, 1979, counsel for accused Leon Marajas, Jr. prayed for
the transfer of the case to the civil courts.
[2]
On August 17, 1981, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal filed an information for
kidnapping for ransom with murder, docketed as Criminal Case No. Pq-81-1596-P,
before Branch III of the then Court of First Instance of Pasay City against the
aforementioned accused, but with the exception of herein appellant whose name was
inadvertently not included therein. A separate charge for illegal possession of firearms
[3]
was lodged before Branch 146 of the Makati Regional Trial Court but the case was later
placed in the archives some time in 1985. [4]
Accused Romeo Padica and herein appellant were both arraigned on January 15, 1982
and, with the assistance of their respective counsel, both pleaded not guilty. It appears,
[5]
however, that appellant entered his plea during the arraignment under the name of
"Leonardo Marajas." Trial thereafter ensued but, subsequently, the case was reraffled to
[6]
Branch CXVI, Pasay City, of the Regional Trial Court where it remained until the
conclusion of the trial in 1990.
Earlier thereto, however, upon discovery of the omission of herein appellant’s name in
the original information, the prosecution filed a motion on November 16, 1984 for the
admission of an amended information including appellant's name as one of the accused.
On May 30, 1985, the trial court issued an order admitting the amended information.
[7]
Thereafter, or on July 17, 1985, appellant, duly assisted by counsel, entered a plea of
[8]
guilty upon being arraigned on the amended information. On the other hand, in an order
[9]
dated August 27, 1985, accused Padica was discharged from the information to be
[10]
utilized as a state witness.
The People’s brief, drawing principally from the factual findings of the court a quo based
on the evidence adduced in this case, with supplemental data and documentation of the
testimonial evidence as borne out by the transcripts, which we find to be correct,
presented the prosecution's case in this wise:
"On or about 9:00 o'clock in the morning of February 8, 1978, appellant and his

brother, Leopoldo Marajas, using a car driven by Leopoldo, visited Romeo Padica in his
house in Muntiniupa, Metro Manila. Leopoldo requested Padica, his compadre, to drive
for Eddie Boy Marajas, a brother of Leopoldo and appellant, and his classmates, giving
Padica P100.00 for the purpose. Upon receiving the amount, Padica, pursuant to the
instructions of Leopoldo, drove the car, with Leopoldo and appellant on board, and
proceeded to Samson Tech in Pasay City, arriving there at about 10:00 A.M. Leopoldo
left the vehicle and, upon coming back after a while, he told Padica that they were going
to Sukat, Parañaque. In Sukat, the three stopped at a restaurant when (sic) they ordered
something to eat (TSN, November 17, 1988, pp. 6-10).
"Thereafter, with Padica still driving the car, they proceeded to the Superville
Subdivision, also in Sukat, where they arrived at about 11:30 A.M. of the same date.
Eddie Boy Marajas and Francis Banaga, both fourteen (14) years of age, more or less,
were in said subdivision. Leopoldo alighted from the car and talked to them.
Subsequently, Leopoldo together with Francis and Eddie Boy, boarded the car. All of
them proceeded to Calamba, Laguna, with Padica still driving the vehicle. Seated beside
Padica was Leopoldo Marajas, while appellant and Eddie Boy occupied the back seat,
with Francis Banaga between them (Ibid, pp. 10-13).
"Upon reaching Calamba at about 12:00 noon of the same date, Leopoldo
Marajas told Padica to drive the car into the sugarcane plantation at the side of the
road. Once inside the plantation, Padica stopped the car when told to do so by
Leopoldo, who then alighted from the vehicle and told Francis Banaga to alight.
However, Francis refused to get down from the car. Notwithstanding his resistance, he
was forced out of the car by Leopoldo Marajas, Eddie Boy and appellant, who pulled him
out of the vehicle. Thereafter, the three brought Francis Banaga to a place inside the
sugarcane plantation, more or less ten (10) meters away from the car, while Padica
remained in the vehicle. Leopoldo Marajas then delivered several stabbing blows at
Banaga after which appellant shot Banaga with a handgun. Banaga fell on the ground.
Leopoldo, Eddie Boy and appellant returned to the car. Leopoldo took the wheel from
Padica and drove the car to Muntinlupa, where Padica alighted and was left behind with
Leopoldo warning Padica, ‘Pare, steady ka lang, isang bala ka lang.’ (Ibid., pp. 10-19).
"On or about 5:00 P.M. of the same day, while in his house at Gatchalian
Subdivision in Parañaque, Tomas Banaga, father of Francis, became alarmed when his
son failed to come home. A few minutes after 6:00 P.M. of (the) same date, someone
called up by phone, telling Tomas not to look for his son as he was in good condition,
and demanding P500,000.00 for his (Francis’) release. Tomas reported the incident to
the Philippine Constabulary authorities in Camp Crame, Quezon City. Sgt. Rodolfo
Bucao, Sgt. Villanueva and Sgt. Cierlito were dispatched to the Banaga residence (TSN,
January 15, 1982, pp. 4-6).
"On February 9, 1978, Tomas received a second phone call in the course of which
the caller reduced the amount demanded to P200,000.00. On February 10, 1978, there
was another phone call with (the) caller lowering the amount to P23,000.00 and giving
instructions that the money be wrapped in a newspaper, placed in a paper bag, and
delivered by a girl wearing a T-shirt to Luneta, in front of the National Library, under a
tree with red flowers, at 8:30 P.M. of February 10, 1978 (Ibid., pp. 6-10).
"Norma Camello, sister-in-law of Tomas Banaga, volunteered to deliver the
money as the maid of (the) Banaga family who was supposed to do it was scared.
Between 7:00 and 7:30 P.M. of February 10, 1978, Camello was brought by Sgt. Bucao
and CIC Ocampo in front of Bayview Hotel at Roxas Blvd., Manila. At about 8:00 P.M. of
the same date, she went to the National Library at Luneta and positioned herself under
a tree with red flowers, pursuant to the instructions of the caller. A few minutes later, a
taxicab arrived. Appellant alighted from the vehicle, approached Camello and got the
money from her which was in a paper bag, saying: 'Hihintayin na lang ninyo ang bata
mamaya sa bahay’ (TSN, Sept. 19, 1985, pp. 6-12). When appellant returned to the
waiting taxicab and was about to board it, Sgt. Simplicio Dulay, one of those sent to
Luneta to entrap the person who would receive the ransom money, apprehended and
arrested appellant (TSN, March 11, 1986, pp. 2-5).
"(At) or about 2:00 P.M. of February 11, 1978, pursuant to the information given
by appellant during the investigation, a Philippine Constabulary team led by Lt.
Napoleon Cachuela, accompanied by appellant, went to Calamba, Laguna to search for
the body of Francis Banaga. Appellant led the team to the place where the cadaver was
dumped, which was inside a sugarcane plantation about 75 meters away from the road.
The team recovered the body of Francis Banaga and brought it to the Municipal Health
Officer of Calamba for autopsy (TSN, October 2, 1986, pp. 10-17).
"According to the necropsy report of Dr. Eusebio Panganiban of the Calamba
Municipal Health Office, Francis Banaga sustained two (2) entry gunshot wounds, one
on the head and the other on the chest, with two (2) exit gunshot wounds and several
lacerated wounds. The death of Francis was caused by ‘intra-thoracic brain hemorrhage
due to gunshot wounds.’ (TSN, July 25, 1986, pp. 17- 69).
"After three (3) years in hiding out of fear for his life, Romeo Padica finally
revealed to Lt. Cruz (sic) of Regional Security Unit Intelligence Division, Lucena City that
he (Padica) witnessed the killing of Francis Banaga. Padica had met Lt. Cruz (sic) near the
Lucena City Market and after making the disclosure, surrendered to the authorities
(TSN, December 12, 1988, p. 6)." [11]
Appellant predictably presented a different narration of the events that led to his arrest.
He insists that he was the victim of an elaborate frame-up by the Military authorities
assigned to investigate the case. Appellant claims that on February 8, 1978, the day that
the victim disappeared, he was in Batangas province, where he was a resident. In the
early morning of February 10, 1978, he decided to go to Manila, with Sto. Tomas,
Batangas as his point of departure, in order to thresh out some financial matters in
connection with his business of buy and sell. [12]
He arrived in Manila at around 9:00 A.M. and proceeded to the office of Mrs. Aquilina
Marquez-Marajas, his sister-in-law, at Mabini Street in Malate to talk to his brother,
Leonardo. Not finding Leonardo there, he then went to the house of his sister, Nelly
Marajas, a neighbor of the Banaga family, at Gatchalian Subdivision in Parañaque. He
was about to board a tricycle at the main gate of the subdivision at around 930 A.M.
when he was suddenly accosted by two Metrocom officers in civilian clothes who
forcibly took him to a car. Appellant was later brought at about 12:00 noon to the Siesta
Court Hotel, also in Malate, where he was repeatedly beaten and subjected to torture by
his abductors who tried in vain to extract information about the disappearance of Francis
Banaga. [13]
In the evening of the same day, he was taken out of the hotel and was taken by the men to
an unspecified safehouse where, once again, his ordeal at their hands was resumed.
Unable to bear the maltreatment any further, appellant then tried to fool them by
admitting that the missing Francis Banaga could be found in Paete, Laguna. He then led a
group of his captors to the said place but they found no trace of the missing boy. Incensed
at the deception, the men took him back to the safehouse. [14]
Later, appellant was again taken out of the safehouse and, together with another captive
whom he identified only as "Florentino," he was brought to an isolated sugarcane
plantation. There Florentino led the military team to the cadaver of Francis Banaga.
Appellant and Florentino were later brought back to the safehouse. The former claims
[15]
that he was kept there for about two months, during which time he helped in the
maintenance and care of the safehouse and its surroundings. He also met at the safehouse
Leslie Gans, one of the accused, but he had no occasion to discuss their predicament with
him. After appellant's confinement, he was turned over to the prison authorities of
Bicutan Rehabilitation Center where he remained until the start of the trial.[16]
After more than eight years of trial, which for one reason or another was punctuated by
numerous and needless postponements, the trial court rendered its assailed decision
pronouncing the guilt of appellant for the crime of kidnapping for ransom with murder
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay Tomas Banaga,
father of Francis Banaga, the sum of P30,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the child,
without pronouncement as to costs. [17]
Appellant is now before us insisting on the reversal of the judgment of conviction by

theorizing that the court below erred: (a) in ruling that the guilt of appellant was proven
beyond reasonable doubt; (b) in giving full credence to the testimony of state witness
Romeo Padica; (c) in laying emphasis on the weakness of the defense interposed by
appellant; and (d) in disregarding the inconsistencies raised by the defense as minor and
insubstantial.
[18]
After a careful and exhaustive review of the records, the testimonial and documentary
evidence, and the arguments of the prosecution and the defense, we are satisfactorily
persuaded that the prosecution has duly discharged its onus probandi insofar as the
culpability of appellant is concerned, but we do not adopt as correct the nature or
categorization of the offense for which he must do penance.
1. At the outset, from the evidence on record, we are not convinced that the crime of
kidnapping for ransom was committed as charged in both the original and amended
informations. Rather the crime committed was murder, attended by the qualifying
circumstances of treachery and/or abuse of superior strength, and not the complex crime
of kidnapping for ransom with murder as found by the trial court without objection by
either the prosecution or defense. The essential element in the crime of kidnapping that
the victim must have been restrained or deprived of his liberty, or that he was
[19]
transported away against his will with the primary or original intent to effect that
restraint, is absent in this case. The malefactors evidently had only murder in their hearts
when they invited the trusting Francis Banaga to go with them to Laguna, and not to
confine or detain him for any length of time or for any other purpose.
We have consistently held that where the taking of the victim was incidental to the basic
purpose to kill, the crime is only murder, and this is true even if, before the killing but
[20]
for purposes thereof, the victim was taken from one place to another. Thus, where the
[21]
evident purpose of taking the victims was to kill them, and from the acts of the accused it
cannot be inferred that the latter's purpose was actually to detain or deprive the victims of
their liberty, the subsequent killing of the victims constitute the crime of murder, hence
[22]
the crime of kidnapping does not exist and cannot be considered as a component felony
to produce a complex crime of kidnapping with murder. In fact, as we held in the
aforecited case of Masilang, et al., although the accused had planned to kidnap the victim
for ransom but they first killed him and it was only later that they demanded and obtained
the money, such demand for ransom did not convert the crime into kidnapping since no
detention or deprivation of liberty was involved, hence the crime committed was only
murder. [23]
That from the beginning of their criminal venture appellant and his brothers intended to
kill the victim can readily be deduced from the manner by which they swiftly and cold-
bloodedly snuffed out his life once they reached the isolated sugarcane plantation in
Calamba, Laguna. Furthermore, there was no evidence whatsoever to show or from
which it can be inferred that from the outset the killers of the victim intended to exchange
his freedom for ransom money. On the contrary, the demand for ransom appears to have
arisen and was consequently made as an afterthought, as it was relayed to the victim's
family very much later that afternoon after a sufficient interval for consultation and
deliberation among the felons who had killed the victim around five hours earlier.
It will be observed that under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the circumstance
that the kidnapping is perpetrated for the purpose of ransom raises the imposable penalty
to death. It is essential, however, that the element of deprivation or restraint of liberty of
[24]
the victim be present. The fact alone that ransom money is demanded would
not per se qualify the act of preventing the liberty of movement of the victim into the
crime of kidnapping, unless the victim is actually restrained or deprived of his liberty for
some appreciable period of time or that such restraint was the basic intent of the accused.
Absent such determinant intent and duration of restraint, the mere curtailment of freedom
of movement would at most constitute coercion.
In addition, Francis Banaga, then already fourteen years of age and a fourth year high
school student, was neither forced nor coerced unlawfully into going along with his
killers. He voluntarily boarded the car and went with the Marajas brothers to Laguna. The
victim had every reason to trust them as they were his neighbors in Gatchalian
Subdivision. In fact, one of the brothers, accused Leonardo Marajas alias “Eddie Boy,"
was his schoolmate and a playmate. [25]
There was treachery since, under the aforestated circumstances, the victim was lured by
his killers into going with them to Laguna without the slightest inkling of their nefarious
design, coupled with the sudden and unexpected assault by the malefactors on the hapless
victim in the isolated sugarcane plantation in Calamba, which thereby divested him of an
opportunity either to effectively resist or to escape. Abuse of superior strength was
[26]
likewise present, for the accused deliberately resorted to their collective strength for the
purpose of overpowering whatever feeble defense the poor Francis Banaga could offer.
They thus insured the commission of the crime with practically no risk at all to
[27]
themselves.
Under the factual features present in the commission of the crime, however, we are
inclined to grant that the circumstance of superior strength should not be appreciated
distinctly but should be considered as being absorbed in and by treachery, and the same
[28]
is true with regard to the allegation of craft. Hence, abuse of superior strength may not be
taken into account separately in this case, either as a qualifying or as an aggravating
circumstance. On the other hand, although the trial court and both parties herein have
again passed sub silentio thereon, it is evident that the aggravating circumstance of
uninhabited place was present since appellant and his co-accused obviously and
deliberately chose the desolation and isolation of the sugarcane plantation to perpetrate
the crime far from the gaze of potential eyewitnesses. This circumstance is underscored
[29]
by the fact that they committed the crime at about 12:00 noon, a time of day when any
passersby or assistance could hardly be expected in the vicinity of the locus criminis.
This aggravating circumstance of despoblado should, therefore, be
[30]
considered against appellant even if it was not alleged in the informations since it was

duly proved. [31]
Appellant's defense that he was in another place at the time of Francis Banaga's
disappearance and killing must necessarily fail. Indeed, trite as our innumerable
reiterations have already made this statement of rejection, we must perforce again
reprobate appellant's alibi as an inherently weak defense decidedly easy of concoction.
Apart from that, it is considered as clearly negative in nature. Hence, when arrayed
against the positive declarations of the witnesses for the prosecution, the same would all
the more be given little consideration.[32]
For it to prosper, it must be shown that not only was the accused at some other place
at the time of the commission of the offense, but that it was also physically impossible for
him to have been there when it happened. Indeed, as correctly pointed out by the trial
[33]
court in its decision, appellant was not even sure as to his whereabouts on February 8,
1978. He simply offered as an explanation therefor that he was "more or less" in
Batangas, which allegation was completely uncorroborated. [34]
In light of the foregoing, appellant's further denial that he was entrapped on the night of
February 10, 1978 by the authorities after receiving ransom money from Norma Camello
must likewise be rejected. Both Norma Camello and Sgt. Simplicio Dulay, one of the
police operatives, positively and without hesitation identified appellant as the person who
was collared at Luneta Park. Moreover, the police report clearly and definitely bears out
[35]
the fact that appellant was arrested by the investigating police officers on that night
pursuant to the dragnet plan that was prepared for the purpose, the veracity of which
[36]
record further enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties
which appellant failed to rebut.
2. Appellant asserts that the trial court should not have given credence to the
testimony of Romeo Padica as it is incredible and inconsistent with the other evidence on
record. He affects surprise as to why the Marajas brothers would go to the extent of
hiring Padica to drive for them when, in fact, Padica himself knew that Leopoldo Marajas
was a skilled driver. Moreover, he expresses disbelief that Romeo Padica never
conversed with the group while they were on the road and that, although the latter claims
to be a close friend of Leopoldo, he never even knew what was Leopoldo's profession and
what was the surname of their common “compadre." He likewise characterizes as
incredible the circumstance that he and his cohorts supposedly carried out the crime in
broad daylight and that thereafter they simply dismissed Padica with a casual threat of
"Pare, steady ka lang isang bala ka lang.”
There is no merit in all the foregoing submissions and pretensions of appellant. It is true
that the testimony of a particeps criminis is to be invariably viewed with much caution,
coming as it does from a polluted, source. However, in the case at bar and after a careful
[37]
evaluation, we find no plausible reason to depart from the favorable appreciation by the
trial court of Padica's testimony which the said court characterized as reasonable and
probable, given in a clear, straightforward and convincing manner thereby leaving no
doubt in the mind of said court that he was telling the truth.
[38]
Jurisprudentially embedded is the rule that the stamp of approval given by the trial court
on the testimony of a particular witness as a consequence of its factual findings is
normally accorded finality by appellate courts, the court below having had the
opportunity to observe closely the manner by which such witness testified. Furthermore,
[39]
not a single shred of evidence was introduced by the defense to show any ill motive on
the part of Padica to impute such a serious crime on appellant and his brothers, thus
entitling to considerable credit his testimony regarding the circumstances surrounding
Francis Banaga's death. These conclusions we confirm, not by mere reliance on dicta, but
from our own review and calibration of the evidence.
There is certainly nothing strange in the matter of the Marajas brothers requesting Padica
to drive for them. As testified to by the latter, he was then a close friend of one of the
brothers, Leopoldo, who was the one who requested him to drive, and the latter
presumably had full confidence in him as he was at the time a professional driver of
taxicabs. Romeo Padica, likewise, can not be discredited just because of his silence on
the road and for not knowing Leopoldo's profession and the surname of a common
"compadre." It is of common knowledge that there are persons who are taciturn and not
as inquisitive as others, or who disdain prying into the affairs even of their close friends.
Be that as it may, this witness did testify to and narrate in his sworn statement some
personal matters regarding the Marajas siblings, such as the fact that
Leopoldo was staying at a house adjacent to that of the Banagas in Tionguiao Street at
Gatchalian Subdivision together with his wife, children and Eddie Boy Marajas; that said
house was owned by a sister of the brothers; and that Francis Banaga, whose picture he
positively identified in court, was a playmate and schoolmate of Eddie Boy Marajas, thus
lending credence to his claim of close and fraternal ties with Leopoldo Marajas. [40]
The fact that appellant and his co-accused carried out the murder of Francis Banaga in
broad daylight is hardly surprising. As pointedly noted by the Solicitor General, "it is not
difficult to believe that appellant and his co-accused committed the crime in broad
daylight because there were no other persons at the scene of the incident,” as the same
was inside a desolate sugarcane plantation in the outskirts of Calamba, Laguna and the
crime was perpetrated at noon of that day, as we have earlier explained.
Having demonstrated to Padica the brutal and merciless manner in which they disposed
of Francis Banaga, appellant and his brothers were undoubtedly secure in the thought that
Padica would have been sufficiently terrorized thereby and would thereafter keep his
silence, and so, just for good measure, they uttered the threat on the latter's life simply as
a reminder of what they had in store for him should he waver and ignore that injunctive
warning.
It is further contended by appellant that the trial court should not have granted the motion
to discharge Romeo Padica from the information, as one of the conditions for its grant
has not been met, namely, that the prosecution has not shown that Padica did not appear
to be the most guilty. Incidentally, appellant slurs over the fact that this order of the trial
court was sustained by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 16302 which denied
appellant's petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing said order, the judgment
therein having become final and executory on January 20, 1989. [41]
Appellant has also clearly lost sight of the rule that the discharge of an accused to be a
state witness, lies within the sound discretion of the court before whom it is sought and in
the exercise of that discretion, it is not required that the court be absolutely certain that all
the requirements for the proper discharge of a co-accused be present. In the case under
[42]
consideration, the prosecution presented enough evidence to support its motion for the
discharge of Padica. The trial court's reliance thereon and its consequent finding on the
basis thereof that Padica did not appear to be the most guilty must be respected as it was
in better position to evaluate such evidence.
Appellant likewise points to portions in the testimony of Padica which are allegedly not
substantiated by the evidence on record. Thus, appellant argues that while Padica claimed
that the victim was stabbed by Leopoldo Marajas and then shot at four times by appellant,
yet the necropsy report of the medico-legal officer, Dr. Eusebio P. Panganiban, showed
no stab wounds but only lacerated wounds and two gunshot wounds. Further, Padica's
testimony that the victim was dragged inside the plantation and instantly stabbed and shot
to death is supposedly belied by the findings in the necropsy report that Francis Banaga's
body had several hematomas and contusions. [43]
We nonetheless agree with and give due credit to the following explanation of the court
below regarding these seeming conflicting aspects:
"The defense counsel also capitalized on the supposed inconsistency between

the allegation of Padica that Leon Marajas, Jr. shot Banaga four (4) times and the
autopsy report stating that the victim sustained two (2) entry gunshot wounds. Padica
testified that Leon Marajas, Jr. shot Francis Banaga four (4) times without stating that
the victim was hit also four (4) times. The fact that he suffered two (2) entry gunshot
wounds clearly indicates that Francis was shot, supporting the version of Padica that the
child was fired upon by Leon Marajas, Jr.
"Also pointed out as a basis for not believing the testimony of Padica is the
supposed conflict between his assertion that Leopoldo Marajas stabbed Banaga with a
knife and the finding of Dr. Panganiban that the victim, aside from the gunshot wounds,
sustained only lacerated wounds and contusions. The defense implied that Banaga was
not stabbed by Leopoldo Marajas as there is no finding that he sustained stab wounds.
A logical analysis of this point shows that there is no inconsistency. Padica stated that he
saw the accused Leopoldo Marajas stab the victim but he did not say that Banaga was
hit by the stabbing blows delivered by the said accused. It could also be that one of the
blows hit the boy but without piercing his body, causing only lacerations thereon." [44]
As for the several hematomas and contusions that were discovered on the body of Francis
Banaga, it is entirely possible that the same were inflicted when the victim put up a
furious struggle for his life against his assailants. According to Padica, the Marajas
brothers forcefully pulled out Banaga from the car when they stopped by the roadside.
They continued to inflict physical harm on the boy while prodding him to proceed inside
the sugarcane plantation until they reached a clearing where, after Leopoldo Marajas
delivered stabbing blows on the victim which may not have inflicted knife wounds but
contusions from the assailant's clenched fists, Leon Marajas, Jr. then fired away with the
fatal shots. All the while and just before he was shot to death, Padica narrated that the
victim desperately exerted all efforts to ward off the assault on his person.
[45]
Appellant also raises as an issue the questionable manner in which Padica surrendered,
after nearly three years of hiding, to Lt. Cesar Perez of the Lucena PC Regional Security
Unit whom he met only for the first time at the Lucena City marketplace.
But, as Padica candidly revealed, and we find his explanation satisfactory and credible,
he had desired all along to surrender as he had grown tired of constantly fearing for his
life and of his difficult plight as a fugitive froth justice. He was obviously always on the
lookout for persons in authority whom he could trust during his stay of two to three
months in Lucena City where he had in the meantime found work as a porter in the public
market. In the course of his stay there, he had heard about the "kind-hearted" Lt. Perez, a
ranking officer of the local constabulary. His subsequent meeting and surrender to Lt.
[46]
Perez at the marketplace was no strange coincidence as it is obviously a place where all
kinds of people go to and cross paths.
That it may have taken Padica over two years to finally give himself up to the authorities
is understandable. He had witnessed a heinous crime perpetrated on a defenseless
fourteen-year old boy by his killers, and the latter had threatened him with bodily harm
should he reveal what they had done. In view thereof, it was but natural that Padica
would hide, away from the possible clutches of the Marajas brothers, and keep unto
himself the dark secret lest he suffer the same grim fate that befell Francis Banaga.
3. Appellant finally contends that the failure of the prosecution to charge him as an
accused in the original information is a fatal defect. Again, we find no merit in this
fatuous assertion.
The rule is that the complaint or information should sufficiently allege the name of the
accused, failing which the complaint or information would be rendered invalid. The test
of sufficiency is laid down in Section 7, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which states:
"Sec. 7. Name of the accused. - A complaint or information must state the name
and surname of the accused or any appellation or nickname by which he has been or is
known, or if his name cannot be discovered he must be described under a fictitious
name with a statement that his true name is unknown.
If in the course of the proceeding the true name of the accused is disclosed by
him, or appears in some other manner to the court, the true name of the accused shall
be inserted in the complaint or information and record."
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that appellant was arraigned under the original
information and that he entered thereto a plea of not guilty under the name of "Leonardo
Marajas." At that juncture, appellant should have raised the error as to his identity by
filing a motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over his person, in
line with the doctrine explained in People vs. Narvaes laid down as early as 1934.
[47]
But, as aforestated, appellant did not do so but instead voluntarily appeared at the
arraignment and pleaded not guilty thereat, albeit under a different name. Consequently,
the trial court acquired jurisdiction over his person and it could have rendered a valid
judgment of conviction based on the original information even without need of an
amendatory information to correct appellant's name. What we stated in Narvaes is worth
repeating:
"x x x (w)hen the appellant was arraigned under the name of Pedro Narvaes,
which is the name appearing in the information, he merely entered his plea of ‘not
guilty’ under the said name. It was on that occasion that he should have for the first
time raised the question of his identity, by filing a demurrer based on the court's lack of
jurisdiction over his person, inasmuch as he was then considered as Pedro Narvaes, not
Primo Narvaes. Not having filed the said demurrer, it must necessarily be understood
that he renounced it and therefore he is now estopped from raising, or insisting to raise,
the same question, not only in this appeal but even at the trial. x x x."
The subsequent amendment to insert in the information Leon Marajas, Jr.‘s real name
involved merely a matter of form as it did not, in any way, deprive appellant of a fair
opportunity to present his defense. Moreover, the amendment neither affected nor
[48]
altered the nature of the offense charged since the basic theory of the prosecution was not
changed nor did it introduce new and material facts. Such an amendment is explicitly
[49]
allowed under the second paragraph of Section 7, in relation to Section 14, Rule
110 of the Rules of Court, the pertinent portion of which provides that "(t)he information
or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time
before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by
leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to
the rights of the accused." At any rate, whatever irregularity may have attended the
inclusion of appellant's name as an accused in the amended information has been waived
by his subsequent appearance and entry of plea at his arraignment under said amendatory
information.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE and
another one is rendered CONVICTING accused-appellant Leon Marajas, Jr. y Ramos of
the crime of murder and IMPOSING upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Accused-appellant is further ORDERED to pay the heirs of the late Francis Banaga the
sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity, in line with current jurisprudential policy, and
likewise to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 119601, December 17, 1996 ]
DANILO BUHAT, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Delicate and sensitive is the issue in this case, which is, whether or not the
upgrading of the crime charged from homicide to the more serious offense of murder is
such a substantial amendment that it is proscribed if made after the accused had
pleaded "not guilty" to the crime of homicide, displaying as alleged by the defense,
inordinate prejudice to the rights of the defendant.
On March 25, 1993, an information for HOMICIDE[1] was filed in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC)[2] against petitioner Danny Buhat, "John Doe" and "Richard Doe". The information
alleged that on October 16, 1992, petitioner Danilo Buhat, armed with a knife,
unlawfully attacked and killed one Ramon George Yu while the said two unknown
assailants held his arms, "using superior strength, inflicting x x x mortal wounds which
were x x x the direct x x x cause of his death" [3].
Even before petitioner could be arraigned, the prosecution moved for the deferment of
the arraignment on the ground that the private complainant in the case, one Betty Yu,
moved for the reconsideration of the resolution of the City Prosecutor which ordered
the filing of the aforementioned information for homicide. Petitioner however, invoking
his right to a speedy trial, opposed the motion. Thus, petitioner was arraigned on June
9, 1993 and, since petitioner pleaded "not guilty", trial ensued.
On February 3, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, finding Betty Yu’s
appeal meritorious, ordered the City Prosecutor of Roxas City "to amend the
information by upgrading the offense charged to MURDER and implead therein
additional accused Herminia Altavas, Osmeña Altavas and Renato Buhat" [4]
On March 10, 1994, the Assistant City Prosecutor filed a motion for leave to amend
information. The amendment as proposed was opposed by the petitioner.
The amended information read:
"The undersigned assistant City Prosecutor accuses DANNY BUHAT, of Capricho II,
Barangay V, Roxas City, Philippines, HERMINIA ALTAVAS AND OSMEÑA ALTAVAS both
resident of Punta Tabuc, Roxas City, Philippines, of the crime of Murder, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 16th day of October, 1992, in the City of Roxas, Philippines, the
above-named accused, Danny Buhat armed with a knife, conspiring, confederating and
helping one another, did and then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously [sic]
without justifiable motive and with intent to kill, attack, stab and injure one RAMON
GEORGE YU, while the two other accused held the arms of the latter, thus using superior
strength, inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Ramon
George Yu in such amount as maybe [sic] awarded to them by the court under the
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW."[5]
The prosecution had by then already presented at least two witnesses.
In an order,[6] dated June 2, 1994, the RTC denied the motion for leave to amend
information. The denial was premised on (1) an invocation of the trial court’s discretion
in disregarding the opinion of the Secretary of Justice as allegedly held in Crespo vs.
Mogul[7] and (2) a conclusion reached by the trial court that the resolution of the inquest
prosecutor is more persuasive than that of the Secretary of Justice, the former having
actually conducted the preliminary investigation "where he was able to observe the
demeanor of those he investigated" [8]
The Solicitor General promptly elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. He filed a
petition for certiorari[9] assailing the aforecited order denying the motion for leave to
amend information. Finding the proposed amendment as non-prejudicial to petitioner’s
rights, respondent court granted the petition for certiorari in a decision, dated March
28, 1995, the decretal portion of which reads:
"THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, herein petition is hereby granted: the Order
dated June 2, 1994 is set aside and annulled; amendment of the information from
homicide to murder, and including as additional accused Herminia Altavas and Osmeña
Altavas is allowed; and finally, the writ of preliminary injunction we issued on January
30, 1995 is made permanent by prohibiting the public respondent from hearing
aforementioned criminal case under the original information." [10]
Hence this petition raising the sole issue of whether or not the questioned
amendment to the information is procedurally infirm.
The additional allegation of conspiracy is only a formal amendment, petitioner’s

participation as principal not having been affected by such amendment
-------------------------------------------------
Petitioner asseverates that the inclusion of additional defendants in the information on

the ground of conspiracy "is a substantial amendment which is prohibited by Sec. 14,
Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, because the allegation of conspiracy
x x x is a substantial amendment saddling the [p]etitioner with the need of a new
defense in order to met [sic] a different situation at the trial [c]ourt"[11]
Petitioner cites the case of People v. Montenegro[12] as jurisprudential support. Indeed,

we stated in the Montenegro case that "the allegation of conspiracy among all the
private respondents-accused, which was not previously included in the original
information, is x x x a substantial amendment saddling the respondents with the need of
a new defense in order to meet a different situation in the trial court" [13]. And to explain
the new defense theory as a bar to substantial amendment after plea, we cited the case
of People v. Zulueta[14] where we elucidated, thus:
"Surely the preparations made by herein accused to face the original charges will
have to be radically modified to meet the new situation. For undoubtedly the allegation
of conspiracy enables the prosecution to attribute and ascribe to the accused Zulueta all
the acts, knowledge, admissions and even omissions of his co-conspirator Angel Llanes
in furtherance of the conspiracy. The amendment thereby widens the battlefront to
allow the use by the prosecution of newly discovered weapons, to the evident
discomfiture of the opposite camp. Thus it would seem inequitable to sanction the
tactical movement at this stage of the controversy, bearing in mind that the accused is
only guaranteed two-days’ preparation for trial. Needless to emphasize, as in criminal
cases the liberty, even the life, of the accused is at stake, it is always wise and proper
that he be fully apprised of the charges, to avoid any possible surprise that may lead to
injustice. The prosecution has too many facilities to covet the added advantage of
meeting unprepared adversaries."
This jurisprudential rule, however, is not without an exception. And it is in the
same case of Zulueta that we highlighted the case of Regala v. Court of first Instance of
Bataan[15] as proffering a situation where an amendment after plea resulting in the
inclusion of an allegation of conspiracy and in the indictment of some other persons in
addition to the original accused, constitutes a mere formal amendment permissible
even after arraignment. In Zulueta, we distinguished the Regala case in this wise:
"Some passages from ‘Regala contra El Juez del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de
Bataan’ are quoted by petitioners. Therein the accused pleaded not guilty to an
information for murder, and later the fiscal amended the indictment by including two
other persons charged with the same offense and alleging conspiracy between the
three. Five justices held that the amendment was not substantial. But that situation
differs from the one at bar. The amendment there did not modify theory of the
prosecution that the accused had killed the deceased by a voluntary act and deed. Here
there is an innovation, or the introduction of another alternative imputation, which, to
make matters worse, is inconsistent with the original allegations."[16]
Applying our aforegoing disquisition in the 1946 case of Regala, we likewise ruled
in the 1983 case of People v. Court of Appeals [17] that a post-arraignment amendment to
further allege conspiracy, is only a formal amendment not prejudicial to the rights of the
accused and proper even after the accused has pleaded "not guilty" to the charge under
the original information. We held in said case of People v. Court of Appeals:
"x x x The trial Judge should have allowed the amendment x x x considering that
the amendments sought were only formal. As aptly stated by the Solicitor General in his
memorandum, ‘there was no change in the prosecution’s theory that respondent Ruiz
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and shot with a gun Ernesto and
Rogelio Bello x x x. The amendments would not have been prejudicial to him because
his participation as principal in the crime charged with respondent Ruiz in the original
informations, could not be prejudiced by the proposed amendments.’
In a case (Regala vs. CFI, 77 Phil. 684), the defendant was charged with murder. After
plea, the fiscal presented an amended information wherein two other persons were
included as co-accused. There was further allegation that the accused and his co-
defendants had conspired and confederated together and mutually aided one another
to commit the offense charged. The amended information was admitted x x x
xxx xxx xxx
Otherwise stated, the amendments x x x would not have prejudiced Ruiz whose
participation as principal in the crimes charged did not change. When the incident was
investigated by the fiscal’s office, the respondents were Ruiz, Padilla and Ongchenco.
The fiscal did not include Padilla and Ongchenco in the two informations because of
‘insufficiency of evidence.’ It was only later when Francisco Pagcalinawan testified at
the reinvestigation that the participation of Padilla and Ongchenco surfaced and, as a
consequence, there was the need for the information of the informations x x x."
The aforegoing principle, by way of exception to the general rule, also appositely
applies in the present controversy.
Petitioner undoubtedly is charged as a principal in the killing of Ramon George Yu whom

petitioner is alleged to have stabbed while two unknown persons held the victim's
arms. The addition of the phrase, "conspiring, confederating and helping one another"
does not change the nature of petitioner's participation as principal in the killing.
Whether under the original or the amended information, petitioner would have to
defend himself as the People makes a case against him and secures for public protection
the punishment of petitioner for stabbing to death, using superior strength, a fellow
citizen in whose help and safety society as a whole is interested. Petitioner, thus, has no
tenable basis to decry the amendment in question.
Furthermore, neither may the amendment in question be struck down on the ground
that Herminia Altavas, Osmeña Altavas and Renato Buhat would be placed in double
jeopardy by virtue of said amendment. In the first place, no first jeopardy can be
spoken of insofar as the Altavases are concerned since the first information did not
precisely include them as accused therein. In the second place, the amendment to
replace the name, "John Doe" with the name of Renato Buhat who was found by the
Secretary of Justice to be one of the two persons who held the arms of the victim while
petitioner was stabbing him,[18] is only a formal amendment and one that does not
prejudice any of the accused's rights. Such amendment to insert in the information real
name of the accused involves merely a matter of form as it does not, in any way, deprive
any of the accused of a fair opportunity to present a defense; neither is the nature of
the offense charged affected or altered since the revelation of accused's real name does
not change the theory of the prosecution nor does it introduce any new and material
fact.[19] In fact, it is to be expected that the information has to be amended as the
unknown participants in the crime became known to the public prosecutor. [20]
"Abuse of superior strength" having already been alleged in the original information
charging homicide, the amendment of the name of the crime to murder, constitutes a
mere formal amendment permissible even after arraignment
-------------------------------------------
In the case of Dimalibot v. Salcedo,[21] we ruled that the amendment of the information
so as to change the crime charged from homicide to murder, may be made "even if it
may result in altering the nature of the charge so long as it can be done without
prejudice to the rights of the accused." In that case, several accused were originally
charged with homicide, but before they were arraigned, an amended information for
murder was filed. Understandably raised before us was the issue of the propriety and
legality of the afore-described amendment, and we ruled, thus:
"x x x it is undisputed that the herein accused were not yet arraigned before the
competent court when the complaint for homicide was amended so as to charge the
crime of murder. x x x the amendment could therefore be made even as to substance in
order that the proper charge may be made. x x x The change may also be made even if
it may result in altering the nature of the charge so long as it can be done without
prejudice to the rights of the defendant." [22]
Thus, at the outset, the main consideration should be whether or not the accused
had already made his plea under the original information, for this is the index of
prejudice to, and the violation of, the rights of the accused. The question as to whether
the changing of the crime charged from homicide to the more serious offense of murder
is a substantial amendment proscribed after the accused had pleaded "not guilty" to the
crime of homicide was, it should be noted, categorically answered in the affirmative by
us in the case of Dionaldo v. Dacuycuy,[23] for then we ruled:
"x x x the provision which is relevant to the problem is Rule 110, Sec. 13 [now
Sec. 14 under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure] of the Rules of Court which
stipulates:
‘x x x The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without

leave of court, at any time before the defendants pleads; and thereafter and during the
trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same
can be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant.
xxx xxx xxx’
xxx xxx xxx
To amend the information so as to change the crime charged for homicide to the more
serious offense of murder after the petitioner had pleaded not guilty to the former is
indubitably proscribed by the first paragraph of the above-quoted provision. For
certainly a change from homicide to murder is not a matter of form; it is one of
substance with very serious consequences."[24]
Indeed, petitioner forcefully and strongly submits that, in the light of this ruling,
we are allegedly obliged to grant his prayer for the reversal of the assailed decision of
respondent Court of Appeals and the affirmance of the trial court’s ruling that the post-
arraignment amendment sought by the People is prohibited under Section 14, Rule 110,
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the same being a substantial amendment
prejudicial to the rights of the accused.
The cited ruling, however, differs from the case at bench because the facts herein
sustain a contrary holding. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals:
"x x x the original Information, while only mentioning homicide, alleged:
Danny Buhat, John Doe and Richard Doe as the accused; [sic] of Danny Buhat stabbing
the deceased Ramon while his two other companions were holding the arms of Ramon,
thus, ‘the information already alleged superior strength’; and inflicting mortal wounds
which led to the death of Ramon.
Superior strength qualifies the offense to murder (Article 248).
xxx xxx xxx
Before us, the Information already alleged superior strength, and the additional
allegation that the deceased was stabbed by Buhat while the arms of the former were
being held by the two other accused, referring to John Doe and Richard Doe. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
If the killing is characterized as having been committed by superior strength, then to

repeat, there is murder x x x
Also the case of Dacuycuy was mentioned, as a justification for not allowing change of
designation from homicide to murder, but then the body of the Information in the
Dacuycuy ruling did not allege averments which qualifies [sic] the offense of murder.
The case before us instead is different in that the Information already alleges that Buhat
attacked the deceased while his two other companions held him by the arms, ‘using
superior strength.’ x x x We would even express the possibility that if supported by
evidence, Buhat and the Altavases could still be penalized for murder even without
changing the designation from homicide to murder, precisely because of
aforementioned allegations. The proposed change of the word form homicide to
murder, to us, is not a substantial change that should be prohibited." [25]
In the matter of amending a criminal information, what is primarily guarded
against is the impairment of the accused’s right to intelligently know the nature of the
charge against him. This right has been guaranteed the accused under all Philippine
Constitutions[26] and incorporated in Section 1 (b), Rule 115, of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure[27]
In a criminal case, due process requires that, among others, the accusation be in due
form, and that notice thereof and an opportunity to answer the charged be given the
accused;[28] hence, the constitutional and reglementary guarantees as to accused’s right
"to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him." An accused
should be given the necessary data as to why he is being proceeded against and not be
left in the unenviable state of speculating why he is made the object of a prosecution,
[29]
it being the fact that, in criminal cases, the liberty, even the life, of the accused is at
stake. It is always wise and proper that the accused be fully apprised of the charged
against him in order to avoid any possible surprise that may lead to injustice. [30]
In order to sufficiently inform the accused of the charged against him, a written
accusation, in the form of a criminal information indicting the accused and subscribed
by the fiscal, must first be filed in court. [31] Such information must state, among others,
the name of the accused, the designation of the offense by the statute, and the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense. [32] Evidently, the important end to
be accomplished is to describe the act with sufficient certainty in order that the accused
may be apprised of the nature of the charged against him. [33] In the event, however, that
the appellation of the crime charged as determined by the public prosecutor, does not
exactly correspond to the actual crime constituted by the criminal acts described in the
information to have been committed by the accused, what controls is the description of
the said criminal acts and not the technical name of the crime supplied by the public
prosecutor. As this court, through Justice Moreland’s authoritative disquisition, has
held:
"x x x Notwithstanding apparent contradiction between caption and body, x x x
the characterization of the crime by the fiscal in the caption of the information is
immaterial and purposeless x x x the facts stated in the body of the pleading must
determine the crime of which the defendant stands charged and for which he must be
tried. The establishment of this doctrine x x x is thoroughly in accord with common
sense and with the requirements of plain justice. x x x Procedure in criminal actions
should always be so framed as to insure to each criminal that retributive punishment
which ought swiftly and surely to visit him who willfully and maliciously violates the
penal laws of society. We believe that a doctrine which does not produce such a result
is illogical and unsound and works irreparable injury to the community in which it
prevails.
what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids
him in a defense on the merits. x x x That to which his attention should be directed, and
in which he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The
real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific
name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the matter
therein set forth. If he did, it is of no consequence to him, either as a matter of
procedure or of substantive right, how the law denominates the crime which those acts
constitute. The designation of the crime by name in the caption of the information from
the facts alleged in the body of that pleading is a conclusion of law made by the fiscal. x
x x For his full and complete defense he need not know the name of the crime at all. It
is of no consequence whatever for the protection of his substantial rights. The real and
important question to him is, ‘Did you perform the acts alleged in the manner alleged?’
not, ‘Did you commit a crime named murder?’ If he performed the acts alleged, in the
manner stated, the law determines what the name of the crime is and fixes the penalty
therefore. It is the province of the court alone to say what the crime is or what it is
named. If the accused performed the acts alleged in the manner alleged, then he ought
to be punished and punished adequately, whatever may be the name of the crime
which those acts constitute.
The plea of not guilty ought always to raise a question of fact and not of law. The
characterization of the crime is a conclusion of law on the part of the fiscal. The denial
by the accused that he committed that specific crime so characterized raises no real
question. No issue can be raised by the assertion of a conclusion of law by one party
and a denial of such conclusion by the other. The issues raised by the pleadings in
criminal actions x x x are primarily and really issues of fact and not of law. x x x
x x x Issues are not made by asserting and denying names. They are framed by the
allegation and denial of facts. x x x To quibble about names is to lose sight of realities.
To permit an accused to stand by and watch the fiscal while he guesses as to the name
which ought to be applied to the crime of which he charges the accused, and then take
advantage [sic] of the guess if it happens to be wrong, while the acts or omissions upon
which that guess was made and which are the real and only foundation of the charge
against him are clearly and fully stated in the information, is to change the battle ground
in criminal cases from issues to guesses and from fact to fancy. It changes lawyers into
dialecticians and law into metaphysics -- that fertile field of delusion propagated by
language."[34] [Underscoring ours]
In other words, the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the
caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of the
law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law which in no way affect
the legal aspects of the information, but from the actual recital of facts as alleged in the
body of the information.[35]
Petitioner in the case at bench maintains that, having already pleaded "not guilty" to the
crime of homicide, the amendment of the crime charged in the information from
homicide to murder is a substantial amendment prejudicial to his right to be informed
of the nature of the accusation against him. He utterly fails to dispute, however, that
the original information did allege that petitioner stabbed his victim "using superior
strength". And this particular allegation qualifies a killing to murder, regardless of how
such a killing is technically designated in the information filed by the public prosecutor.
Our ruling in the case of People v. Resayaga[36] is clearly apropos:

"The appellant maintains that the information filed in this case is only for
Homicide. x x x
The contention is without merit. Reliance is placed mainly upon the designation of the
offense given to it by the fiscal. x x x In the instant case, the information specifically
alleges that ‘the said accused conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping
one another, with intent to kill and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with ice picks one
Paulo Balane x x x’ Since the killing is characterized as having been committed by ‘taking
advantage of superior strength,’ a circumstance which qualifies a killing to murder, the
information sufficiently charged the commission of murder." [37]
On another aspect, we find merit in the manifestation of the Solicitor General to
the effect that the respondent Court of Appeals erroneously supposed that petitioner
and Renato Buhat are one and the same person, hence the non-inclusion of Renato
Buhat as additional accused in its order allowing the amendment of the information.
[38]
We also agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the amended
information filed in this case still fails to embody the correct identity of all of the
persons found to be indictable in the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice. Explained
the Solicitor General:
"In its Decision under review, the Court of Appeals erroneously supposed that
Danny Buhat and Renato Buhat are one and the same person (CA Decision, 1st par.).
This, however, is not correct because Danny Buhat and Renato Buhat are, in fact,
brothers. Moreover, it was not Osmeña Altavas and his wife Herminia Altavas who held
the arms of the victim while Danny Buhat stabbed him. According to the Resolution of
the Secretary of Justice, which is requoted hereunder:
‘The evidence on hand clearly shows that while Osmeña Altavas was continuously
hitting Ramon Yu with his fists, his wife Herminia aided him by hitting the victim with a
chair. It was also during this time that Danny Buhat and two (2) unidentified persons
appeared and joined spouses Osmeña and Herminia. One of the unidentified persons
was later identified as Renato Buhat. Renato Buhat and the other unidentified held the
arms of Ramon Yu while Danny Buhat stabbed Ramon Yu twice on the chest which
resulted in his death. The restraint on the person of Ramon Yu before he was stabbed
was described by eyewitness Susan Labrador during the continuation of the preliminary
investigation of the instant case on December 2, 1992.’
The Amendment Information to be filed in this case must, therefore, reflect the above
facts set forth in the aforesaid Resolution of the Secretary of Justice - which was the
result of the preliminary investigation (as reviewed by the Secretary of Justice)
conducted in this case. Strangely enough, however, the Amended Information (Annex
‘C’) that was subsequently filed before the Roxas City RTC in this case by Assistant City
Prosecutor Alvin D. Calvez of Roxas City does not reflect the above facts set forth in the
aforesaid Resolution of the Secretary of Justice. Said Amended Information in effect
alleges that Osmeña and Herminia Altavas were the ones who held the arms of the
victim while Danny Buhat stabbed him, whereas, according to the Resolution of the
Secretary of Justice abovecited, it was Renato Buhat and another unidentified person
who held the arms of the victim while Danny Buhat stabbed him. According to the said
Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, the participation of Osmeña Altavas in the crime
was that of hitting the victim with his fists, while x x x the participation of Herminia
Altavas in the crime was that of hitting the victim with a chair.
Verily, the statement of facts in the Information or Amended Information must conform
with the findings of fact in the preliminary investigation (in this case, as reviewed by the
Secretary of Justice) so as to make it jibe with the evidence x x x to be presented at the
trial. x x x
The decision of the Court of Appeals in this case (which merely resolved affirmatively
the legal issues of whether or not the offense charged in the Information could be
upgraded to Murder and additional accused could be included in said Information)
should not be made the basis of the Amended Information herein as the said Decision
does not constitute the preliminary investigation conducted in this case. Such Amended
Information should be based on the findings of fact set forth in the Resolution of the
Secretary of Justice, as above quoted and requoted."[39] [Underscoring theirs]
The Solicitor General prays for at least the remanding of this case to respondent
Court of appeals for the correction of the error abovecited and for the ordering of the
filing of the correct Amended Information by the City Prosecutor of Roxas City.
Considering, however, that further delay of the trial of this case is repugnant to our
inveterate desire for speedy justice and that the full and complete disposition of this
case virtually serves this end, we see it to be within our jurisdiction and authority to
order the correct amended information to be filed in this case without the need to
remand the same to respondent appellate court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The City Prosecutor of Roxas

City is HEREBY ORDERED to file the correct Amended Information fully in accordance
with the findings of fact set forth in the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, dated
February 3, 1994, and in disregard of the finding of the Court of Appeals in its Decision,
dated March 28, 1995, in CA-G.R. SP No. 35554 to the effect that "Danny Buhat and
Renato Buhat are one and the same person."
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 55357, October 30, 1981 ]
ROLANDO DIONALDO, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE AUXENCIO
DACUYCUY, JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, BRANCH IV,
PROVINCE OF LEYTE, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
ABAD SANTOS, J.:

In this petition We are asked to rule whether an information for the crime of homicide
can be amended so as to charge the crime of murder after the accused had entered a plea
of not guilty.
Petitioner Rolando Dionaldo stands charged with the crime of homicide in Criminal Case

No. 3835 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch IV, presided by the respondent
judge. After the accused had entered a plea of not guilty, the prosecution filed a motion
for leave to amend the information, attaching thereto an amended information charging
the accused with murder qualified by treachery and evident premeditation — a more
serious offense. No explanation was given in the motion for alleging evident
premeditation but as to the allegation of treachery it was explained that, "the affidavit of
the complaining witness indicates that the attack was sudden and it was only after they
sustained the wounds consequent to the treacherous attack that they were forced to fight
back to repel further aggression." It can thus be seen that all along this claimed
circumstance was known to the prosecution but it was not alleged.
Counsel for the accused opposed the motion to amend the information but the respondent
judge granted the motion; hence the petition to nullify the action of the respondent.
It is admitted that the provision which is relevant to the problem is Rule 110, Sec. 13 of
the Rules of Court which stipulates:
"Section 13. Amendment. - The information or complaint may be amended, in

substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the defendant pleads; and
the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant.
"If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, the court may dismiss the original complaint or information
and order the filing of a new one charging the proper offense, provided the defendant
would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to
give bail for their appearance at the trial."
The petitioner invokes the first paragraph, whereas the respondent relies on the second.
To amend the information so as to change the crime charged from homicide to the more
serious offense of murder after the petitioner had pleaded not guilty to the former is
indubitably proscribed by the first paragraph of the above-quoted provision. For
certainly a change from homicide to murder is not a matter of form; it is one of substance
with very serious consequences.
But can the amendment be justified under the second paragraph? The answer is, No. For
the provision speaks not of amendment but of dismissal of the information. In other
words the provision contemplates the filing of a substitute, not an
amended information. But, it may be asked, can not the information for homicide against
the petitioner be dismissed since no judgment has yet been rendered and another
information for murder be filed? The answer, again, is, No. For the petitioner having
pleaded not guilty to homicide, to dismiss the charge against him so as to file another
charge for murder will place him thereby in double jeopardy.
We have not overlooked the fact that People of the Philippines, thru the Solicitor General,
should have been made a party to this case. But the participation of the People while
necessary is not indispensable under the circumstances. Besides an early resolution of
this case is necessary to provide affirmative justice to the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the order of the respondent admitting the
amended information is hereby set aside. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. L-45772, March 25, 1988 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. EDUARDO
MONTENEGRO, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH IV-B, CFI-RIZAL,
QUEZON CITY; ANTONIO CIMARRA, ULPIANO VILLAR, BAYANI
CATINDIG, AND AVELINO DE LEON, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or restraining

order, to set aside the order of the respondent court, dated 10 February 1977, denying
petitioner's Motion to Admit Amended Information and the order, dated 22 February
1977, of the same court, denying the Motion for Reconsideration of said earlier order.
On 21 March 1977, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent
court from proceeding to hear and decide the case until further orders from the Court.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On 20 September 1976, the City Fiscal of Quezon City, thru Assistant Fiscal Virginia G.
Valdez, filed an Information for "Robbery" before the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch IV-B, Quezon City, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-6821, against Antonio
Cimarra, Ulpiano Villar, Bayani Catindig and Avelino de Leon. Said accused (now private
respondents) were all members of the police force of Quezon City and were charged as
accessories-after-the-fact in the robbery committed by the minor Ricardo Cabaloza, who
had already pleaded guilty and had been convicted in Criminal Case No. QF-76-051
before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City. Ricardo Cabaloza was
convicted for the robbery of the same items, articles and jewelries belonging to Ding
Velayo, Inc. valued at P75,591.40 and enumerated in the original information [1] against
herein private respondents as:
One (1) Arminius revolver, cal. 22 with six ammo SN-165928

One (1) gold men's ring ‘signet’

Five (5) ID plates yellow gold

Four (4) ID plates yellow gold

Six (6) bracelets lock yellow gold

One (1) anniversary pendant yellow gold

Three (3) heart shape with assorted birthstones

One (1) lady's (ring) white gold setting

One (1) white gold ring mounting 18 karats

One (1) white gold ring mounting 18 karats

One (1) yellow gold stud

One (1) lady's white gold ring setting

One (1) white gold ring mounting

One (1) pc. white gold earring mounting

Twelve (12) pcs. of semi-precious stone bands with one broken

Two (2) Ivory bracelets

One (1) Silver bracelet

One (1) yellow ring gold with blue stone

Two (2) wedding gold rings yellow

One (1) Minolta pocket size camera

One (1) pink handbag

One (1) bunch keys
Upon arraignment on 25 October 1976, all of the accused (now private
respondents) entered a plea of "not guilty" to the charge filed against them.
Accordingly, trial on the merits was scheduled by the respondent court. However,
before the trial could proceed, the prosecuting fiscal filed a Motion to Admit Amended
Information, dated 28 December 1976, seeking to amend the original information by:
(1) changing the offense charged from "Robbery" to "Robbery in an Uninhabited Place",
(2) alleging conspiracy among all the accused, and (3) deleting all items, articles and
jewelries alleged to have been stolen in the original Information and substituting them
with a different set of items valued at P71,336.80 [2] to wit:
Four (4) pcs. of I.D. Plates
14 Karat yellow gold P 24.00 each

Thirteen (13) pcs. of I.D.
Plates KYG P 26.40 each

Five (5) pcs. of anniversary
Pendant 14 KYG P 17.00 each

Three (3) pcs. of pendant w/
birthstones 14 KYG P 16.00 each

Two (2) pcs. of Signet plain
14 Karat yellow gold rings P 204.00 each

Four (4) pcs. of lady's bracelet
14 KYG oval shape P 30.00 each

Four (4) pcs. of necklace 14 KYG P 140.00 each

One (1) set of ring & earrings mounting
w/ 23 brills 14 KWG

Two (2) pcs. of ladies I.D.
bracelet 14 KYG P 120.00 each

Nine (9) pcs. of diamond design
earring 14 KYG P 32.00 each

Five (5) pcs. of Sput-nik cross
4 KYG P 99.00 each

One (1) pc. of ladies ring
mounting 14 KYG P 290.00

One (1) pc. of lady's sole diamond
ring, about .40ct w/ yellow gold ring
mounting, and one pair of earrings
white gold solo diamond about .25ct
w/ black onyx P 2,000.00

One (1) pc. lady's bracelet 14 KYG P 1,500.00

One (1) pc. chain 24KYG necklace
w/small diamond P 1,500.00

One (1) pc. Lapiz Lazuli ring 14 KYG P 1,000.00

One (1) pc. Lapiz Lazuli 18 KYG P 1,000.00

One (1) pc. lady's ring w/ 2 Jade
stone, white gold w/ small diamonds
and one pc. lady's ring white gold,
14 K w/ 2 small diamonds w/ one Jade P 2,000.00

Six (6) pcs. of fancy chains and bracelets. P 40.00 each

One (1) pair of yellow gold earrings w/ pearl
P 70.00
for children

One (1) pc. yellow gold ring w/blue sapphire
P 150.00
for children

One (1) brown envelope, containing
2 pairs of 1/g loop earrings, 14 karat P 780.00

Cash money (inside the said envelope) P 555.00

One (1) pc. silver bracelet P 50.00

One (1) pc. bronze bracelet P 30.00

One (1) pc. ring blue stone YG P 250.00

One (1) pc. Lapiz Lazuli band P 100.00

One (1) pc. Coral band P 30.00

One (1) pc. ring w/ diamond stone,
14 KWG mounting P 250.00

Two (2) pcs. of 14 YG part bracelet P 200.00

Three (3) pcs. of men's ring 14 KYG P 1,500.00

One (1) pc. pendant 14 KYG P 2,000.00

One (1) pc. loose diamond about
4.50 karats antigo P27,000.00

One (1) pc. loose diamond about
2.05 carats each antigo cut P20,000.00

One (1) pc. Cannon camera w/black case P 1,200.00

One (1) pc. Yashika camera w/lens cover P 1,300.00

One (1) PC. Cannon camera w/black case P 1,100.00
Private respondents opposed the admission of the Amended Information. The
respondent court resolved to deny the proposed amendments contained in the
Amended Information in the previously referred to order dated 10 February 1977.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the aforesaid order but the respondent court,
on 22 February 1977, denied said motion; hence, this petition.
Amendment of an information under Sec. 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure (formerly, Section 13, Rule 110 of the old Rules on Criminal Procedure) may
be made at any time before the accused enters a plea to the charge. Thereafter and
during the trial, amendments to the information may also be allowed, as to matters of
form, provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights of the accused. The test as to
when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or
information is when a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood,
would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the
accused might have, would be inapplicable to the complaint or information as
amended[3].
On the other hand, an amendment which merely states with additional precision
something which is already contained in the original information, and which, therefore,
adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged is an amendment to form
that can be made at anytime[4].
The proposed amendments in the amended information, in the instant case, are clearly
substantial and have the effect of changing the crime charged from "Robbery" punisha-
ble under Article 209 to "Robbery in an Uninhabited Place" punishable under Art. 302 of
the Revised Penal Code, thereby exposing the private respondents-accused to a higher
penalty as compared to the penalty imposable for the offense charged in the original
information to which the accused had already entered a plea of "not guilty" during their
arraignment.
Moreover, the change in the items, articles and jewelries allegedly stolen into entirely
different articles from those originally complained of, affects the essence of the imputed
crime, and would deprive the accused of the opportunity to meet all the allegations in
the amended information, in the preparation of their defenses to the charge filed
against them. It will be observed that private respondents were accused as accessories-
after-the-fact of the minor Ricardo Cabaloza who had already been convicted of robbery
of the items listed in the original information. To charge them now as accessories-after-
the-fact for a crime different from that committed by the principal, would be manifestly
incongruous as to be allowed by the Court.
The allegation of conspiracy among all the private respondents-accused, which was not
previously included in the original information, is likewise a substantial amendment
saddling the respondents with the need of a new defense in order to meet a different
situation in the trial court. In People v. Zulueta[5], it was held that:
"Surely the preparations made by herein accused to face the original charges will
have to be radically modified to meet the new situation. For undoubtedly the allegation
of conspiracy enables the prosecution to attribute and ascribe to the accused Zulueta all
the acts, knowledge, admissions and even omissions of his co-conspirator Angel Llanes
in furtherance of the conspiracy. The amendment thereby widens the battlefront to
allow the use by the prosecution of newly discovered weapons, to the evident
discomfiture of the opposite camp. Thus it would seem inequitable to sanction the
tactical movement at this stage of the controversy, bearing in mind that the accused is
only guaranteed two-days’ preparation for trial. Needless to emphasize, as in criminal
cases, the liberty, even the life, of the accused is at stake, it is always wise and proper
that he be fully apprised of the charges, to avoid any possible suprise that may lead to
injustice. The prosecution has too many facilities to covet the added advantage of
meeting unprepared adversaries".
To allow at this stage the proposed amendment alleging conspiracy among all the
accused, will make all of the latter liable not only for their own individual transgressions
or acts but also for the acts of their co-conspirators.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The orders of the respondent court, dated 10

February 1977 and 22 February 1977 are AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order
issued on 21 March 1977 is LIFTED.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 176830, February 11, 2014 ]
SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO,
IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF HILONGOS, LEYTE, BRANCH 18, CESAR M. MERIN, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS APPROVING PROSECUTOR AND OFFICER-IN-CHARGE,
ROSULO U. VIVERO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS INVESTIGATING
PROSECUTOR, RAUL M. GONZALEZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 185587]

RANDALL B. ECHANIS, PETITIONER, VS. HON. THELMA BUNYI-
MEDINA, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 32, HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, IN
HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
[G.R. No. 185636]
RAFAEL G. BAYLOSIS, PETITIONER, VS. HON. THELMA BUNYI-

MEDINA, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 32, HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, IN
HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
[G.R. No. 190005]
VICENTE P. LADLAD, PETITIONER, VS. HON. THELMA BUNYI-MEDINA,

IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 32, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
On 26 August 2006, a mass grave was discovered by elements of the 43 rd Infantry

Brigade of the Philippine Army at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan,
Leyte.[1] The mass grave contained skeletal remains of individuals believed to be victims
of “Operation Venereal Disease” (Operation VD) launched by members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army/National Democratic Front of
the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) to purge their ranks of suspected military informers.
While the doctrine of hierarchy of courts normally precludes a direct invocation of this
Court’s jurisdiction, we take cognizance of these petitions considering that petitioners
have chosen to take recourse directly before us and that the cases are of significant
national interest.
Petitioners have raised several issues, but most are too insubstantial to require
consideration. Accordingly, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion and economy, this
Court will pass primarily upon the following:
1. Whether petitioners were denied due process during preliminary investigation and
in the issuance of the warrants of arrest.
2. Whether the murder charges against petitioners should be dismissed under the
political offense doctrine.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
These are petitions for certiorari and prohibition[2] seeking the annulment of the orders
and resolutions of public respondents with regard to the indictment and issuance of
warrants of arrest against petitioners for the crime of multiple murder.
Police Chief Inspector George L. Almaden (P C/Insp. Almaden) of the Philippine

National Police (PNP) Regional Office 8 and Staff Judge Advocate Captain Allan Tiu
(Army Captain Tiu) of the 8th Infantry Division of the Philippine Army sent 12 undated
letters to the Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte through Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Rosulo U. Vivero (Prosecutor Vivero).[3] The letters requested appropriate legal action on
12 complaint-affidavits attached therewith accusing 71 named members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army/National Democratic Front of
the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) of murder, including petitioners herein along with
several other unnamed members.
The letters narrated that on 26 August 2006, elements of the 43rd Infantry Brigade of the
Philippine Army discovered a mass grave site of the CPP/NPA/NDFP at Sitio Sapang
Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte.[4] Recovered from the grave site were 67
severely deteriorated skeletal remains believed to be victims of Operation VD. [5]
The PNP Scene of the Crime Operation (SOCO) Team based in Regional Office 8 was
immediately dispatched to the mass grave site to conduct crime investigation, and to
collect, preserve and analyze the skeletal remains.[6] Also, from 11-17 September 2006,
an investigation team composed of intelligence officers, and medico-legal and DNA
experts, conducted forensic crime analysis and collected from alleged relatives of the
victims DNA samples for matching.[7]
The Initial Specialist Report[8] dated 18 September 2006 issued by the PNP Crime
Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City, was inconclusive with regard to the identities
of the skeletal remains and even the length of time that they had been buried. The report
recommended the conduct of further tests to confirm the identities of the remains and the
time window of death.[9]
However, in a Special Report[10] dated 2 October 2006, the Case Secretariat of the

Regional and National Inter-Agency Legal Action Group (IALAG) came up with the
names of ten (10) possible victims after comparison and examination based on
testimonies of relatives and witnesses.[11]
The 12 complaint-affidavits were from relatives of the alleged victims of Operation VD.
All of them swore that their relatives had been abducted or last seen with members of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP and were never seen again. They also expressed belief that their
relatives’ remains were among those discovered at the mass grave site.
Also attached to the letters were the affidavits of Zacarias Piedad, [12] Leonardo C. Tanaid,
Floro M. Tanaid, Numeriano Beringuel, Glecerio Roluna and Veronica P. Tabara. They
narrated that they were former members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP. [13] According to them,
Operation VD was ordered in 1985 by the CPP/NPA/NDFP Central Committee.
[14]
Allegedly, petitioners Saturnino C. Ocampo (Ocampo),[15] Randall B. Echanis
(Echanis),[16] Rafael G. Baylosis (Baylosis),[17] and Vicente P. Ladlad (Ladlad)[18] were
then members of the Central Committee.
According to these former members, four sub-groups were formed to implement

Operation VD, namely, (1) the Intel Group responsible for gathering information on
suspected military spies and civilians who would not support the movement; (2) the
Arresting Group charged with their arrests; (3) the Investigation Group which would
subject those arrested to questioning; and (4) the Execution Group or the “cleaners” of
those confirmed to be military spies and civilians who would not support the movement.
[19]
From 1985 to 1992, at least 100 people had been abducted, hog-tied, tortured and
executed by members of the CPP/NPA/NDFP[20] pursuant to Operation VD.[21]
On the basis of the 12 letters and their attachments, Prosecutor Vivero issued a subpoena
requiring, among others, petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits and those of their
witnesses.[22] Petitioner Ocampo submitted his counter-affidavit.[23] Petitioners
Echanis[24] and Baylosis[25] did not file counter-affidavits because they were allegedly not
served the copy of the complaint and the attached documents or evidence. Counsel of
petitioner Ladlad made a formal entry of appearance on 8 December 2006 during the
preliminary investigation.[26] However, petitioner Ladlad did not file a counter-affidavit
because he was allegedly not served a subpoena.[27]
In a Resolution[28] dated 16 February 2007, Prosecutor Vivero recommended the filing of
an Information for 15 counts of multiple murder against 54 named members of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP, including petitioners herein, for the death of the following: 1) Juanita
Aviola, 2) Concepcion Aragon, 3) Gregorio Eras, 4) Teodoro Recones, Jr., 5) Restituto
Ejoc, 6) Rolando Vasquez, 7) Junior Milyapis, 8) Crispin Dalmacio, 9) Zacarias Casil,
10) Pablo Daniel, 11) Romeo Tayabas, 12) Domingo Napoles, 13) Ciriaco Daniel, 14)
Crispin Prado, and 15) Ereberto Prado.[29]
Prosecutor Vivero also recommended that Zacarias Piedad, Leonardo Tanaid, Numeriano
Beringuel and Glecerio Roluna be dropped as respondents and utilized as state witnesses,
as their testimonies were vital to the success of the prosecution. [30] The Resolution was
silent with regard to Veronica Tabara.
The Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Hilongos, Leyte,
Branch 18 (RTC Hilongos, Leyte) presided by Judge Ephrem S. Abando (Judge Abando)
on 28 February 2007, and docketed as Criminal Case No. H-1581.[31] Petitioner Ocampo
filed an Ex Parte Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory Hearing dated 5 March 2007 prior
to receiving a copy of the Resolution recommending the filing of the Information.[32]
On 6 March 2007, Judge Abando issued an Order finding probable cause “in the
commission by all mentioned accused of the crime charged.”[33] He ordered the issuance
of warrants of arrest against them with no recommended bail for their temporary liberty.
[34]
On 16 March 2007, petitioner Ocampo filed before us this special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and docketed as G.R.
No. 176830 seeking the annulment of the 6 March 2007 Order of Judge Abando and the
16 February 2007 Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero.[35] The petition prayed for the
unconditional release of petitioner Ocampo from PNP custody, as well as the issuance of
a temporary restraining order/ writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the conduct of
further proceedings during the pendency of the petition.[36]
Petitioner Ocampo argued that a case for rebellion against him and 44 others (including
petitioners Echanis and Baylosis[37] and Ladlad[38] docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-944
was then pending before the RTC Makati, Branch 150 (RTC Makati). [39] Putting forward
the political offense doctrine, petitioner Ocampo argues that common crimes, such as
murder in this case, are already absorbed by the crime of rebellion when committed as a
necessary means, in connection with and in furtherance of rebellion.[40]
We required[41] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the petition and
the prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order/ writ of preliminary
injunction, and set[42] the case for oral arguments on 30 March 2007. The OSG filed its
Comment on 27 March 2007.[43]
The following were the legal issues discussed by the parties during the oral arguments:
1. Whether the present petition for certiorari and prohibition is the proper remedy of
petitioner Ocampo;
2. Assuming it is the proper remedy, whether he was denied due process during
preliminary investigation and in the issuance of the warrant of arrest;
3. Whether the murder charges against him are already included in the rebellion
charge against him in the RTC.[44]
Afterwards, the parties were ordered to submit their memoranda within 10 days. [45] On 3
April 2007, the Court ordered the provisional release of petitioner Ocampo under a
P100,000 cash bond.[46]
Acting on the observation of the Court during the oral arguments that the single
Information filed before the RTC Hilongos, Leyte was defective for charging 15 counts
of murder, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information and New
Informations on 11 April 2007.[47] In an Order dated 27 July 2007, Judge Abando held in
abeyance the resolution thereof and effectively suspended the proceedings during the
pendency of G.R. No. 176830 before this Court.[48]
While the proceedings were suspended, petitioner Echanis was arrested on 28 January
2008 by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Abando on 6 March 2007.[49] On 1
February 2008, petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed a Motion for Judicial
Reinvestigation/ Determination of Probable Cause with Prayer to Dismiss the Case
Outright and Alternative Prayer to Recall/ Suspend Service of Warrant.[50]
On 30 April 2008, Judge Abando issued an Order denying the motion.[51] Petitioners

Echanis and Baylosis filed a Motion for Reconsideration[52] dated 30 May 2008, but
before being able to rule thereon, Judge Abando issued an Order dated 12 June 2008
transmitting the records of Criminal Case No. H-1581 to the Office of the Clerk of Court,
RTC Manila.[53] The Order was issued in compliance with the Resolution dated 23 April
2008 of this Court granting the request of then Secretary of Justice Raul Gonzales to
transfer the venue of the case.
The case was re-raffled to RTC Manila, Branch 32 (RTC Manila) presided by Judge
Thelma Bunyi-Medina (Judge Medina) and re-docketed as Criminal Case No. 08-262163.
[54]
Petitioner Echanis was transferred to the PNP Custodial Center in Camp Crame,
Quezon City. On 12 August 2008, petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed their
Supplemental Arguments to Motion for Reconsideration.[55]
In an Order[56] dated 27 October 2008, Judge Medina suspended the proceedings of the
case pending the resolution of G.R. No. 176830 by this Court.
On 18 December 2008, petitioner Ladlad filed with the RTC Manila a Motion to Quash
and/or Dismiss.[57]
On 23 December 2008, petitioner Echanis filed before us a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of
the 30 April 2008 Order of Judge Abando and the 27 October 2008 Order of Judge
Medina.[58] The petition, docketed as G.R. No. 185587, prayed for the unconditional and
immediate release of petitioner Echanis, as well as the issuance of a temporary restraining
order/ writ of preliminary injunction to restrain his further incarceration.[59]
On 5 January 2009, petitioner Baylosis filed before us a special civil action for certiorari
and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court also seeking the annulment of the 30
April 2008 Order of Judge Abando and the 27 October 2008 Order of Judge Medina.
[60]
The petition, docketed as G.R. No. 185636, prayed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order/ writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the implementation of the
warrant of arrest against petitioner Baylosis.[61]
The Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 185587 and 185636 on 12 January 2009.[62]
On 3 March 2009, the Court ordered the further consolidation of these two cases with
G.R. No. 176830.[63] We required[64] the OSG to comment on the prayer for petitioner
Echanis’s immediate release, to which the OSG did not interpose any objection on these
conditions: that the temporary release shall only be for the purpose of his attendance and
participation in the formal peace negotiations between the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines (GRP) and the CPP/NPA/NDFP, set to begin in August 2009; and that his
temporary release shall not exceed six (6) months.[65] The latter condition was later
modified, such that his temporary liberty shall continue for the duration of his actual
participation in the peace negotiations.[66]
On 11 August 2009, the Court ordered the provisional release of petitioner Echanis under
a P100,000 cash bond, for the purpose of his participation in the formal peace
negotiations.[67]
Meanwhile, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed its Opposition[68] to petitioner Ladlad’s
motion to quash before the RTC Manila. The trial court conducted a hearing on the
motion on 13 February 2009.[69]
On 6 May 2009, Judge Medina issued an Order[70] denying the motion to quash. The
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Ladlad was also denied on 27 August 2009.
[71]
On 9 November 2009, petitioner Ladlad filed before us a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the 6 May 2009 and 27
August 2009 Orders of Judge Medina.[72] The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 190005.
On 11 January 2010, we ordered the consolidation of G.R. No. 190005 with G.R.
Nos. 176830, 185587 and 185636.[73] We also required the OSG to file its comment
thereon. The OSG submitted its Comment[74] on 7 May 2010.
On 27 July 2010, we likewise required the OSG to file its Comment in G.R. Nos. 185636
and 185587.[75] These Comments were filed by the OSG on 13 December 2010[76] and on
21 January 2011,[77] respectively. Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis filed their
Consolidated Reply[78] on 7 June 2011.
On 2 May 2011, petitioner Ladlad filed an Urgent Motion to Fix Bail.[79] On 21 July
2011, petitioner Baylosis filed A Motion to Allow Petitioner to Post Bail.[80] The OSG
interposed no objection to the grant of a ?100,000 cash bail to them considering that they
were consultants of the NDFP negotiating team, which was then holding negotiations
with the GRP peace panel for the signing of a peace accord. [81]
On 17 January 2012, we granted the motions of petitioners Ladlad and Baylosis and fixed
their bail in the amount of P100,000, subject to the condition that their temporary release
shall be limited to the period of their actual participation in the peace negotiations. [82]
Petitioner Ladlad filed his Reply[83] to the OSG Comment on 18 January 2013.
OUR RULING
Petitioners were accorded due process during preliminary investigation and in the
issuance of the warrants of arrest.
A. Preliminary Investigation
A preliminary investigation is “not a casual affair.”[84] It is conducted to protect the

innocent from the embarrassment, expense and anxiety of a public trial.[85] While the right
to have a preliminary investigation before trial is statutory rather than constitutional, it is
a substantive right and a component of due process in the administration of criminal
justice.[86]
In the context of a preliminary investigation, the right to due process of law entails the
opportunity to be heard.[87] It serves to accord an opportunity for the presentation of the
respondent’s side with regard to the accusation. Afterwards, the investigating officer shall
decide whether the allegations and defenses lead to a reasonable belief that a crime has
been committed, and that it was the respondent who committed it. Otherwise, the
investigating officer is bound to dismiss the complaint.
“The essence of due process is reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in
support of one's defense.”[88] What is proscribed is lack of opportunity to be heard.
[89]
Thus, one who has been afforded a chance to present one’s own side of the story
cannot claim denial of due process.[90]
Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis allege that they did not receive a copy of the complaint
and the attached documents or evidence.[91] Petitioner Ladlad claims that he was not
served a subpoena due to the false address indicated in the 12 undated letters of P C/Insp.
Almaden and Army Captain Tiu to Prosecutor Vivero.[92] Furthermore, even though his
counsels filed their formal entry of appearance before the Office of the Prosecutor,
petitioner Ladlad was still not sent a subpoena through his counsels’ addresses.[93] Thus,
they were deprived of the right to file counter-affidavits.
Petitioner Ocampo claims that Prosecutor Vivero, in collusion with P C/Insp. Almaden
and Army Captain Tiu, surreptitiously inserted the Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias
Piedad in the records of the case without furnishing petitioner Ocampo a copy. [94] The
original affidavit of Zacarias Piedad dated 14 September 2006 stated that a meeting
presided by petitioner Ocampo was held in 1984, when the launching of Operation VD
was agreed upon.[95] Petitioner Ocampo refuted this claim in his Counter-affidavit dated
22 December 2006 stating that he was in military custody from October 1976 until his
escape in May 1985.[96] Thereafter, the Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad dated
12 January 2007 admitted that he made a mistake in his original affidavit, and that the
meeting actually took place in June 1985.[97] Petitioner Ocampo argues that he was denied
the opportunity to reply to the Supplemental Affidavit by not being furnished a copy
thereof.
Petitioner Ocampo also claims that he was denied the right to file a motion for
reconsideration or to appeal the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero, because the latter
deliberately delayed the service of the Resolution by 19 days, effectively denying
petitioner Ocampo his right to due process.[98]
As to the claim of petitioners Echanis and Baylosis, we quote the pertinent portion of
Prosecutor Vivero’s Resolution, which states:
In connection with the foregoing and pursuant to the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure[,] the respondents were issued and served with Subpoena at their last known
address for them to submit their counter-affidavits and that of their witnesses.
Majority of the respondents did not submit their counter-affidavits because they could no
longer be found in their last known address, per return of the subpoenas. On the other
hand, Saturnino Ocampo @ Satur, Fides Lim, Maureen Palejaro and Ruben Manatad
submitted their Counter-Affidavits. However, Vicente Ladlad and Jasmin Jerusalem
failed to submit the required Counter Affidavits in spite entry of appearance by their
respective counsels.[99]
Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to resolve the
complaint based on the evidence before him if a respondent could not be subpoenaed. As
long as efforts to reach a respondent were made, and he was given an opportunity to
present countervailing evidence, the preliminary investigation remains valid.[100] The rule
was put in place in order to foil underhanded attempts of a respondent to delay the
prosecution of offenses.[101]
In this case, the Resolution stated that efforts were undertaken to serve subpoenas on the
named respondents at their last known addresses. This is sufficient for due process. It was
only because a majority of them could no longer be found at their last known addresses
that they were not served copies of the complaint and the attached documents or
evidence.
Petitioner Ladlad claims that his subpoena was sent to the nonexistent address “53 Sct.
Rallos St., QC,”[102] which had never been his address at any time.[103] In connection with
this claim, we take note of the fact that the subpoena to Fides Lim, petitioner Ladlad’s
wife,[104] was sent to the same address, and that she was among those mentioned in the
Resolution as having timely submitted their counter-affidavits.
Despite supposedly never receiving a subpoena, petitioner Ladlad’s counsel filed a

formal entry of appearance on 8 December 2006.[105] Prosecutor Vivero had a reason to
believe that petitioner Ladlad had received the subpoena and accordingly instructed his
counsel to prepare his defense.
Petitioner Ladlad, through his counsel, had every opportunity to secure copies of the
complaint after his counsel’s formal entry of appearance and, thereafter, to participate
fully in the preliminary investigation. Instead, he refused to participate.
We have previously cautioned that “litigants represented by counsel should not expect
that all they need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their case.” [106] Having
opted to remain passive during the preliminary investigation, petitioner Ladlad and his
counsel cannot now claim a denial of due process, since their failure to file a counter-
affidavit was of their own doing.
Neither do we find any merit in petitioner Ocampo’s allegation of collusion to

surreptitiously insert the Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad in the records. There
was nothing surreptitious about the Supplemental Affidavit since it clearly alludes to an
earlier affidavit and admits the mistake committed regarding the date of the alleged
meeting. The date of the execution of the Supplemental Affidavit was also clearly stated.
Thus, it was clear that it was executed after petitioner Ocampo had submitted his counter-
affidavit. Should the case go to trial, that will provide petitioner Ocampo with the
opportunity to question the execution of Zacarias Piedad’s Supplemental Affidavit.
Neither can we uphold petitioner Ocampo’s contention that he was denied the right to be
heard. For him to claim that he was denied due process by not being furnished a copy of
the Supplemental Affidavit of Zacarias Piedad would imply that the entire case of the
prosecution rested on the Supplemental Affidavit. The OSG has asserted that the
indictment of petitioner Ocampo was based on the collective affidavits of several other
witnesses[107] attesting to the allegation that he was a member of the CPP/NPA/NDFP
Central Committee, which had ordered the launch of Operation VD.
As to his claim that he was denied the right to file a motion for reconsideration or to
appeal the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero due to the 19-day delay in the service of the
Resolution, it must be pointed out that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration
or an appeal to the Secretary of Justice is reckoned from the date of receipt of the
resolution of the prosecutor, not from the date of the resolution. This is clear from
Section 3 of the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal:
Sec. 3. Period to appeal. – The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the resolution, or of the denial of the motion for reconsideration/
reinvestigation if one has been filed within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
assailed resolution. Only one motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, when petitioner Ocampo received the Resolution of Prosecutor Vivero on 12
March 2007,[108] the former had until 27 March 2007 within which to file either a motion
for reconsideration before the latter or an appeal before the Secretary of Justice. Instead,
petitioner Ocampo chose to file the instant petition for certiorari directly before this Court
on 16 March 2007.
B. Issuance of the Warrants of Arrest
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that “no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce.”
Petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando did not comply with the requirements of
the Constitution in finding the existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of
arrest against petitioners.[109]
Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as “such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.”[110] Although the
Constitution provides that probable cause shall be determined by the judge after an
examination under oath or an affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses, we have
ruled that a hearing is not necessary for the determination thereof.[111] In fact, the judge’s
personal examination of the complainant and the witnesses is not mandatory and
indispensable for determining the aptness of issuing a warrant of arrest. [112]
It is enough that the judge personally evaluates the prosecutor’s report and supporting
documents showing the existence of probable cause for the indictment and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or if, on the basis of his evaluation, he finds no probable
cause, to disregard the prosecutor's resolution and require the submission of additional
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its existence.[113]
Petitioners Echanis and Baylosis claim that, had Judge Abando painstakingly examined
the records submitted by Prosecutor Vivero, the judge would have inevitably dismissed
the charge against them.[114] Additionally, petitioner Ocampo alleges that Judge Abando
did not point out facts and evidence in the record that were used as bases for his finding
of probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest.[115]
The determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against
petitioners is addressed to the sound discretion of Judge Abando as the trial judge.
[116]
Further elucidating on the wide latitude given to trial judges in the issuance of
warrants of arrest, this Court stated in Sarigumba v. Sandiganbayan[117] as follows:
x x x. The trial court's exercise of its judicial discretion should not, as a general rule, be
interfered with in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, certiorari will not lie
to cure errors in the trial court's appreciation of the evidence of the parties, the conclusion
of facts it reached based on the said findings, as well as the conclusions of law. x x x.
Whether or not there is probable cause for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the
accused is a question of fact based on the allegations in the Informations, the Resolution
of the Investigating Prosecutor, including other documents and/or evidence appended to
the Information.
Here, the allegations of petitioners point to factual matters indicated in the affidavits of
the complainants and witnesses as bases for the contention that there was no probable
cause for petitioners’ indictment for multiple murder or for the issuance of warrants for
their arrest. As stated above, the trial judge’s appreciation of the evidence and conclusion
of facts based thereon are not interfered with in the absence of grave abuse of discretion.
Again, “he sufficiently complies with the requirement of personal determination if he
reviews the [I]nformation and the documents attached thereto, and on the basis thereof
forms a belief that the accused is probably guilty of the crime with which he is being
charged.”[118]
Judge Abando’s review of the Information and the supporting documents is shown by the
following portion of the judge’s 6 March 2007 Order:
On the evaluation of the Resolution and its Information as submitted and filed by the
Provincial Prosecution of Leyte Province supported by the following documents:
Affidavits of Complainants, Sworn Statements of Witnesses and other pertinent
documents issued by the Regional Crime Laboratory Office, PNP, Region VIII and Camp
Crame, Quezon City, pictures of the grave site and skeletal remains, this court has the
findings [sic] of probable cause in the commission by all mentioned accused of the crime
charged.[119]
At bottom, issues involving the finding of probable cause for an indictment and issuance
of a warrant of arrest, as petitioners are doubtless aware, are primarily questions of fact
that are normally not within the purview of a petition for certiorari,[120] such as the
petitions filed in the instant consolidated cases.
The political offense doctrine is not a ground to dismiss the charge against petitioners
prior to a determination by the trial court that the murders were committed in
furtherance of rebellion.
Under the political offense doctrine, “common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a

political offense, are divested of their character as “common” offenses and assume the
political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients, and,
consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or complexed
with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty.”[121]
Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion.
[122]
Thus, when a killing is committed in furtherance of rebellion, the killing is not
homicide or murder. Rather, the killing assumes the political complexion of rebellion as
its mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and punished as rebellion alone.
However, this is not to say that public prosecutors are obliged to consistently charge
respondents with simple rebellion instead of common crimes. No one disputes the well-
entrenched principle in criminal procedure that the institution of criminal charges,
including whom and what to charge, is addressed to the sound discretion of the public
prosecutor.[123]
But when the political offense doctrine is asserted as a defense in the trial court, it
becomes crucial for the court to determine whether the act of killing was done in
furtherance of a political end, and for the political motive of the act to be conclusively
demonstrated.[124]
Petitioners aver that the records show that the alleged murders were committed in
furtherance of the CPP/NPA/NDFP rebellion, and that the political motivation behind the
alleged murders can be clearly seen from the charge against the alleged top leaders of the
CPP/NPA/NDFP as co-conspirators.
We had already ruled that the burden of demonstrating political motivation must be
discharged by the defense, since motive is a state of mind which only the accused knows.
[125]
The proof showing political motivation is adduced during trial where the accused is
assured an opportunity to present evidence supporting his defense. It is not for this Court
to determine this factual matter in the instant petitions.
As held in the case of Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga Del Norte v. CA,
[126]
if during trial, petitioners are able to show that the alleged murders were indeed
committed in furtherance of rebellion, Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
provides the remedy, to wit:
SECTION 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may be
amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused
enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made
with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the
accused.
furnished all parties, especially the offended party. (n)
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging
the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information
upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Section
19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court
may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, if it is shown that the proper charge against petitioners should have been simple
rebellion, the trial court shall dismiss the murder charges upon the filing of the
Information for simple rebellion, as long as petitioners would not be placed in double
jeopardy.
Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, states:

Based on the above provision, double jeopardy only applies when: (1) a first jeopardy
attached; (2) it has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same
offense as in the first.[127]
A first jeopardy attaches only after the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the
case has been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, by a
competent court in a valid indictment for which the accused has entered a valid plea
during arraignment.[128]
To recall, on 12 May 2006, an Information for the crime of rebellion, as defined and
penalized under Article 134 in relation to Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-944 was filed before the RTC Makati against
petitioners and several others.[129]
However, petitioners were never arraigned in Criminal Case No. 06-944. Even before the
indictment for rebellion was filed before the RTC Makati, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis
and Ladlad had already filed a petition before this Court to seek the nullification of the
Orders of the DOJ denying their motion for the inhibition of the members of the
prosecution panel due to lack of impartiality and independence.[130] When the indictment
was filed, petitioners Ocampo, Echanis and Ladlad filed supplemental petitions to enjoin
the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 06-944.[131] We eventually ordered the dismissal of
the rebellion case. It is clear then that a first jeopardy never had a chance to attach.
Petitioner Ocampo shall remain on provisional liberty under the P100,000 cash bond
posted before the Office of the Clerk of Court. He shall remain on provisional liberty
until the termination of the proceedings before the RTC Manila.
The OSG has given its conformity to the provisional liberty of petitioners Echanis,
Baylosis and Ladlad in view of the ongoing peace negotiations. Their provisional release
from detention under the cash bond of P100,000 each shall continue under the condition
that their temporary release shall be limited to the period of their actual participation as
CPP-NDF consultants in the peace negotiations with the government or until the
termination of the proceedings before the RTC Manila, whichever is sooner. It shall be
the duty of the government to inform this Court the moment that peace negotiations are
concluded.
WHEREFORE, the instant consolidated petitions are DISMISSED. The RTC of

Manila, Branch 32, is hereby ORDERED to proceed with dispatch with the hearing of
Criminal Case No. 08-262163. Petitioner Saturnino C. Ocampo shall remain on
temporary liberty under the same bail granted by this Court until the termination of the
proceedings before the RTC Manila. Petitioners Randall B. Echanis, Rafael G. Baylosis
and Vicente P. Ladlad shall remain on temporary liberty under the same bail granted by
this Court until their actual participation as CPP-NDF consultants in the peace
negotiations with the government are concluded or terminated, or until the termination of
the proceedings before the RTC Manila, whichever is sooner.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 157472, September 28, 2007 ]
SSGT. JOSE M. PACOY, PETITIONER, VS. HON. AFABLE E. CAJIGAL,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND OLYMPIO L. ESCUETA,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by SSGT.

Jose M. Pacoy[1] (petitioner) seeking to annul and set aside the Orders dated October 25,
2002[2] and December 18, 2002[3] issued by Presiding Judge Afable E. Cajigal (respondent
judge) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68, Camiling, Tarlac in Criminal Case
No. 02-42.
On July 4, 2002, an Information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against petitioner
That on or about the 18th day of March 2002, in the Municipality of Mayantoc, Province
of Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot
his commanding officer 2Lt. Frederick Esquita with his armalite rifle hitting and
sustaining upon 2Lt. Frederick Esquita multiple gunshot wounds on his body which
caused his instantaneous death.
With the aggravating circumstance of killing, 2Lt. Frederick Esquita in disregard of his
rank.[4]
On September 12, 2002, upon arraignment, petitioner, duly assisted by counsel de parte,
pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide. Respondent Judge set the pre-trial
conference and trial on October 8, 2002.[5]
However, on the same day and after the arraignment, the respondent judge issued another
Order,[6] likewise dated September 12, 2002, directing the trial prosecutor to correct and
amend the Information to Murder in view of the aggravating circumstance of disregard of
rank alleged in the Information which public respondent registered as having qualified
the crime to Murder.
Acting upon such Order, the prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word
“Homicide” and instead wrote the word “Murder” in the caption and in the opening
paragraph of the Information. The accusatory portion remained exactly the same as that
of the original Information for Homicide, with the correction of the spelling of the
victim’s name from “Escuita” to “Escueta.”[7]
On October 8, 2002, the date scheduled for pre-trial conference and trial, petitioner was
to be re-arraigned for the crime of Murder. Counsel for petitioner objected on the ground
that the latter would be placed in double jeopardy, considering that his Homicide case
had been terminated without his express consent, resulting in the dismissal of the case. As
petitioner refused to enter his plea on the amended Information for Murder, the public
respondent entered for him a plea of not guilty.[8]
On October 28, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash with Motion to Suspend
Proceedings Pending the Resolution of the Instant Motion[9] on the ground of double
jeopardy. Petitioner alleged that in the Information for Homicide, he was validly indicted
and arraigned before a competent court, and the case was terminated without his express
consent; that when the case for Homicide was terminated without his express consent, the
subsequent filing of the Information for Murder in lieu of Homicide placed him in double
jeopardy.
In an Order[10] dated October 25, 2002,[11] the respondent judge denied the Motion to

Quash. He ruled that a claim of former acquittal or conviction does not constitute double
jeopardy and cannot be sustained unless judgment was rendered acquitting or convicting
the defendant in the former prosecution; that petitioner was never acquitted or convicted
of Homicide, since the Information for Homicide was merely corrected/or amended
before trial commenced and did not terminate the same; that the Information for
Homicide was patently insufficient in substance, so no valid proceedings could be taken
thereon; and that with the allegation of aggravating circumstance of “disregard of rank,”
the crime of Homicide is qualified to Murder.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Inhibit with attached Motion for Reconsideration. In his
Motion to Inhibit, he alleged that the respondent judge exercised jurisdiction in an
arbitrary, capricious and partial manner in mandating the amendment of the charge from
Homicide to Murder in disregard of the provisions of the law and existing jurisprudence.
In his Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner reiterated that the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, which constitutes a
ground to quash the information for murder; and that to try him again for the same
offense constitutes double jeopardy. Petitioner stated that contrary to respondent judge's
conclusion that disregard of rank qualifies the killing to Murder, it is a generic
aggravating circumstance which only serves to affect the imposition of the period of the
penalty. Petitioner also argued that the amendment and/or correction ordered by the
respondent judge was substantial; and under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, this cannot be done, since petitioner had already been arraigned and
he would be placed in double jeopardy.
In his Order dated December 18, 2002,[12] the respondent judge denied the Motion to
Inhibit and granted the Motion for Reconsideration, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion to Inhibit is hereby DENIED while
the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED.
Unless ordered otherwise by the Highest Court, the presiding judge shall continue
hearing this case. Further, the Order dated October 25, 2002 is reconsidered and the
original information charging the crime of homicide stands.[13]
In granting the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent judge found that a close scrutiny
of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code shows that “disregard of rank” is merely a
generic mitigating[14] circumstance which should not elevate the classification of the
crime of homicide to murder.
On April 30, 2003, petitioner filed herein petition for certiorari on the following grounds:
EXCEEDED HIS JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE AMENDMENT OF THE
INFORMATION FROM HOMICIDE TO MURDER.

VIOLATED THE LAW IN DENYING THE MOTION TO QUASH THE
INFORMATION FOR MURDER.

EXCEEDED HIS JURISDICTION AND VIOLATED THE LAW IN ORDERING THE
REINSTATEMENT OF THE INFORMATION FOR HOMICIDE WHICH WAS
ALREADY TERMINATED.[15]
Petitioner alleges that despite having entered his plea of not guilty to the charge of
Homicide, the public respondent ordered the amendment of the Information from
Homicide to Murder because of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of
“disregard of rank,” which is in violation of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure; that the public respondent’s ruling that “disregard of rank” is a
qualifying aggravating circumstance which qualified the killing of 2Lt. Escueta to murder
is erroneous since, under paragraph 3, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, disregard of
rank is only a generic aggravating circumstance which serves to affect the penalty to be
imposed upon the accused and does not qualify the offense into a more serious crime;
that even assuming that disregard of rank is a qualifying aggravating circumstance, such
is a substantial amendment which is not allowed after petitioner has entered his plea.
Petitioner next contends that the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he
denied the Motion to Quash the Information for Murder, considering that the original
Information for Homicide filed against him was terminated without his express consent;
thus, prosecuting him for the same offense would place him in double jeopardy.
Petitioner further argues that although the respondent judge granted his Motion for
Reconsideration, he did not in fact grant the motion, since petitioner's prayer was for the
respondent judge to grant the Motion to Quash the Information for Murder on the ground
of double jeopardy; that his Motion for Reconsideration did not seek the reinstatement of
the Information for Homicide upon the dismissal of the Information for Murder, as he
would again be placed in double jeopardy; thus, the respondent judge committed grave
abuse of discretion in reinstating the Homicide case.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General argues that the respondent judge's Order
reinstating the Information to Homicide after initially motu proprio ordering its
amendment to Murder renders herein petition moot and academic; that petitioner failed to
establish the fourth element of double jeopardy, i.e., the defendant was acquitted or
convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
consent; that petitioner confuses amendment with substitution of Information; that the
respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002 mandated an amendment of the
Information as provided under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure; and that amendments do not entail dismissal or termination of the previous
case.
Private respondent Col. Olimpio Escueta, father of the victim, filed his Comment alleging
that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the respondent judge when he denied
petitioner's Motion to Quash the Amended Information, as petitioner was not placed in
double jeopardy; that the proceedings under the first Information for homicide has not yet
commenced, and the case was not dismissed or terminated when the Information was
amended.
In his Reply, petitioner reiterates his contention that the amendment of the charge of
Homicide to Murder after his arraignment would place him in double jeopardy,
considering that said amendment was without his express consent; and that such
amendment was tantamount to a termination of the charge of Homicide.
The parties filed their respective Memoranda.
Generally, a direct resort to us in a petition for certiorari is highly improper, for it

violates the established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts.
However, the judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule.[16] A strict application of
the rule of hierarchy of courts is not necessary when the cases brought before the
appellate courts do not involve factual but legal questions.[17]
In the present case, petitioner submits pure questions of law involving the proper legal
interpretation of the provisions on amendment and substitution of information under the
Rules of Court. It also involves the issue of double jeopardy, one of the fundamental
rights of the citizens under the Constitution which protects the accused not against the
peril of second punishment but against being tried for the same offense. These important
legal questions and in order to prevent further delay in the trial of the case warrant our
relaxation of the policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts.
The petition is not meritorious.
We find no merit in petitioner's contention that the respondent judge committed grave
abuse of discretion in amending the Information after petitioner had already pleaded not
guilty to the charge in the Information for Homicide. The argument of petitioner --
Considering the fact that the case for Homicide against him was already terminated
without his express consent, he cannot anymore be charged and arraigned for Murder
which involve the same offense. The petitioner argued that the termination of the
information for Homicide without his express consent is equivalent to his acquittal. Thus,
to charge him again, this time for Murder, is tantamount to placing the petitioner in
Double Jeopardy.[18]
is not plausible. Petitioner confuses the procedure and effects of amendment or
substitution under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, to wit --
SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may be amended, in
accused.
xxx
filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section 11,
provided the accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also
require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
with Section 19, Rule 119 of which provides:
SEC. 19. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense. - When it
becomes manifest at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging
the proper offense and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or any
other offense necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be discharged if there
appears good cause to detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the accused to
answer for the proper offense and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper
information.
First, a distinction shall be made between amendment and substitution under Section 14,
Rule 110. For this purpose, Teehankee v. Madayag[19] is instructive, viz:
respects:

2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected without leave of court,
but substitution of information must be with leave of court as the original
information has to be dismissed;
investigation and the retaking of the plea of the accused; in substitution of
information, another preliminary investigation is entailed and the accused has to
plead anew to the new information; and

information or to an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included
in the original charge, hence substantial amendments to the information after the
plea has been taken cannot be made over the objection of the accused, for if the
original information would be withdrawn, the accused could invoke double
jeopardy. On the other hand, substitution requires or presupposes that the new
information involves a different offense which does not include or is not
necessarily included in the original charge, hence the accused cannot claim double
jeopardy.

paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, or a substitution of information under the second
paragraph thereof, the rule is that where the second information involves the same
offense, or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first
information, an amendment of the information is sufficient; otherwise, where the new
information charges an offense which is distinct and different from that initially charged,
a substitution is in order.
of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.[20]
In the present case, the change of the offense charged from Homicide to Murder is merely
a formal amendment and not a substantial amendment or a substitution as defined
in Teehankee.
While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading of the Information shows that
the only change made was in the caption of the case; and in the opening paragraph or
preamble of the Information, with the crossing out of word “Homicide” and its
replacement by the word “Murder.” There was no change in the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged or in the determination of the jurisdiction of the court.
The averments in the amended Information for Murder are exactly the same as those
already alleged in the original Information for Homicide, as there was not at all any
change in the act imputed to petitioner, i.e., the killing of 2Lt. Escueta without any
qualifying circumstance. Thus, we find that the amendment made in the caption and
preamble from “Homicide” to “Murder” as purely formal.[21]
Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing formal amendments in cases in which
the accused has already pleaded, it is necessary that the amendments do not prejudice the
rights of the accused. The test of whether the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the
amendment of a complaint or information is whether a defense under the complaint or
information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is
made; and when any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the
complaint or information.[22] Since the facts alleged in the accusatory portion of the
amended Information are identical with those of the original Information for Homicide,
there could not be any effect on the prosecution's theory of the case; neither would there
be any possible prejudice to the rights or defense of petitioner.
While the respondent judge erroneously thought that “disrespect on account of rank”
qualified the crime to murder, as the same was only a generic aggravating circumstance,
[23]
we do not find that he committed any grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
amendment of the Information after petitioner had already pleaded not guilty to the
charge of Homicide, since the amendment made was only formal and did not adversely
affect any substantial right of petitioner.
Next, we determine whether petitioner was placed in double jeopardy by the change of
the charge from Homicide to Murder; and subsequently, from Murder back to Homicide.
Petitioner's claim that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying his Motion to Quash the Amended Information for Murder on the ground of
double jeopardy is not meritorious.
Petitioner's Motion to Quash was anchored on Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court,
which provides:
SEC. 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any
of the following grounds:
xxxx
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or
the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Section 7 of the same Rule lays down the requisites in order that the defense of double
jeopardy may prosper, to wit:
Thus, there is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present: (1) a first
jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated;
and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.[24]
As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b)
before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered;
and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.[25]
It is the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal or termination of the case
that bars further prosecution for the same offense or any attempt to commit the same or
the frustration thereof; or prosecution for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.[26]
Petitioner's insistence that the respondent judge dismissed or terminated his case for
homicide without his express consent, which is tantamount to an acquittal, is misplaced.
Dismissal of the first case contemplated by Section 7 presupposes a definite or

unconditional dismissal which terminates the case.[27] And for the dismissal to be a bar
under the jeopardy clause, it must have the effect of acquittal.
The respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002 was for the trial prosecutor to
correct and amend the Information but not to dismiss the same upon the filing of a new
Information charging the proper offense as contemplated under the last paragraph of
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court -- which, for convenience, we quote again --
If it appears at anytime before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the
provided the accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the
witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
and Section 19, Rule 119, which provides:
SEC. 19.-When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense - When it becomes
manifest at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the
proper offense and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or any other
offense necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be discharged if there appears
good cause to detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the accused to answer for
the proper offense and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper information.
Evidently, the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, applies only when the offense
charged is wholly different from the offense proved, i.e., the accused cannot be convicted
of a crime with which he was not charged in the information even if it be proven, in
which case, there must be a dismissal of the charge and a substitution of a new
information charging the proper offense. Section 14 does not apply to a second
information, which involves the same offense or an offense which necessarily includes or
is necessarily included in the first information. In this connection, the offense charged
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter.
And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.[28]
Homicide is necessarily included in the crime of murder; thus, the respondent judge
merely ordered the amendment of the Information and not the dismissal of the original
Information. To repeat, it was the same original information that was amended by merely
crossing out the word “Homicide” and writing the word “Murder,” instead, which
showed that there was no dismissal of the homicide case.
Anent the last issue, petitioner contends that respondent judge gravely abused his
discretion in ordering that the original Information for Homicide stands after realizing
that disregard of rank does not qualify the killing to Murder. That ruling was again a
violation of his right against double jeopardy, as he will be prosecuted anew for a charge
of Homicide, which has already been terminated earlier.
We are not convinced. Respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion.
A reading of the Order dated December 18, 2002 showed that the respondent judge
granted petitioner's motion for reconsideration, not on the ground that double jeopardy
exists, but on his realization that “disregard of rank” is a generic aggravating
circumstance which does not qualify the killing of the victim to murder. Thus, he rightly
corrected himself by reinstating the original Information for Homicide. The requisite of
double jeopardy that the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second is not
present, considering that petitioner was neither convicted nor acquitted; nor was the case
against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.[29]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, there being no grave abuse of discretion

committed by respondent Judge.
SO ORDERED.

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SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 169711, February 08, 2010 ]

The Facts and the Case

After 10 years or on September 5, 2002 respondent Co surrendered to the National

On September 25, 2002 respondent Co filed a petition for admission to bail.[5] After

The Court's Ruling

In Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz,[29] this Court allowed the offended party to challenge

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals

The antecedents are as follows:

MAGTIGIL KA, SHARON!

Hayan at buong ingat na sinulat namin yung interview sa kaibigan ng may-ari ng

Magsalita ka, Missed Cuneta, at sabihin mong hindi ito totoo.

thereby casting publicly upon complainant, malicious contemptuous imputations of a

NABURYONG SA KAPLASTIKAN NI SHARON ANG MILYONARY[A]NG

thereby casting publicly upon complainant, malicious contemptuous imputation of a vice,

Respondent’s undated Complaint-Affidavit[7] alleged that Bautista and Alcantara were

On April 25, 2008, the RTC issued an Order[16] granting petitioners’ Demurrer to

[RESPONDENT'S] PETITION FOR CERTIORARI BEFORE THE COURT OF

[RESPONDENT'S] PETITION FOR CERTIORARI BEFORE THE COURT OF

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT

The petition is impressed with merit.

In Fermin v. People,[32] therein petitioner argued that to sustain a conviction for libel

Similarly, in Tulfo v. People,[33] therein petitioners, who were Managing Editor, National

The aforestated provision is clear and unambiguous. It equally applies to an editor of a

Nevertheless, petitioners could no longer be held liable in view of the procedural

The granting of a demurrer to evidence should, therefore, be exercised with caution,

on October 2, 1990. [3]

These offenses are not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

Petitioner Sanrio Company Limited, a Japanese corporation, owns the copyright of

On April 4, 2002, petitioner, through its attorney-in-fact Teodoro Y. Kalaw IV of the

(d) In all cases, subsidiary imprisonment in cases of insolvency.

On September 25, 2002, the TAPP found that:

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the

2. knowledge or suspicion that the copy is an infringement of the genuine article.

FILING OF THE COMPLAINT IN THE DOJ TOLLED THE PRESCRIPTIVE

IN THE ABSENCE OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, THE FACTUAL

In a preliminary investigation, a public prosecutor determines whether a crime has been

As a general rule, a public prosecutor is afforded a wide latitude of discretion in the

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

The facts, as culled from the records, follow.

In 1992, Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed various sums of money amounting to

On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson[4] for

To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's

In a resolution dated 6 December 1995,[9] City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found

However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004,[22] the DOJ, presumably acting on a

The petition is meritorious.

First on the technical issues.

Indeed, the verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance

Now, on the substantive aspects.

There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to Establish

In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan[49] and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,[50] which involved

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,

The antecedent facts of the present case are as follows.

On 6 August 1994, the Board of Directors of IRC approved a Memorandum of

Respondents also filed a Motion for Continuance of Proceedings on 24 October 1994,

No formal hearings were conducted in connection with the aforementioned motions,

3. To deny the Motion for Continuance for lack of merit.