[G.R. No. 131516.

 March 5, 2003] Kuya Ronnie is accused-appellant Ronnie Rullepa, the

Buenafes house boy, who was sometimes left with Cyra May at
home.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, Gloria asked Cyra May how many times accused-appellant
vs. RONNIE RULLEPA y GUINTO, accused-appellant. did those things to her, to which she answered many
times. Pursuing, Gloria asked Cyra May what else he did to her,
DECISION and Cyra May indicated the room where accused-appellant slept
and pointed at his pillow.
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
As on the night of November 20, 1995 accused-appellant
On complaint of Cyra May Francisco Buenafe, accused- was out with Glorias husband Col. Buenafe,[4] she waited until
appellant Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto was charged with Rape their arrival at past 11:00 p.m. Gloria then sent accused-
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City allegedly appellant out on an errand and informed her husband about
committed as follows: their daughters plaint. Buenafe thereupon talked to Cyra May
who repeated what she had earlier told her mother Gloria.
That on or about the 17th day of November, 1995, in Quezon City, When accused-appellant returned, Buenafe and Gloria
Philippines, the said accused, by means of force and intimidation, to verified from him whether what Cyra May had told them was
wit: by then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously removing true. Ronnie readily admitted doing those things but only once,
her panty, kissing her lips and vagina and thereafter rubbing his penis at 4:00 p.m. of November 17, 1995 or three days earlier. Unable
and inserting the same to the inner portion of the vagina of the to contain her anger, Gloria slapped accused-appellant several
undersigned complainant, 3 years of age, a minor, against her will and times.
without her consent.[1]
Since it was already midnight, the spouses waited until the
Arraigned on January 15, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded following morning to bring accused-appellant to Camp Karingal
not guilty.[2] where he admitted the imputations against him, on account of
which he was detained. Glorias sworn statement[5] was then
From the testimonies of its witnesses, namely Cyra May, taken.[6]
[3]
 her mother Gloria Francisco Buenafe, Dr. Cristina V. Preyra,
and SPO4 Catherine Borda, the prosecution established the Recalling what accused-appellant did to her, Cyra May
following facts: declared at the witness stand: Sinaksak nya ang titi sa pepe ko,
sa puwit ko, at sa bunganga, thus causing her pain and drawing
On November 20, 1995, as Gloria was about to set the table her to cry.She added that accused-appellant did these to her
for dinner at her house in Quezon City, Cyra May, then only twice in his bedroom.
three and a half years old, told her, Mama, si kuya Ronnie lagay
niya titi niya at sinaksak sa puwit at sa bibig ko. Dr. Ma. Cristina V. Preyra, the Medico-Legal Officer and
Chief of the Biological Science Branch of the Philippine National
Police Crime Laboratory who examined Crya May, came up with
her report dated November 21, 1995,[7] containing the following whom he usually accompanied whenever he went out of the
findings and conclusions: house, was womanizing, Gloria would always find fault in
him. He suggested that Gloria was behind the filing of the
FINDINGS: complaint. Thus:
q- According to them you caused the abrasions found in
GENERAL AND EXTRA GENITAL:
her genital?
Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female child a- That is not true, sir.
subject. Breasts are undeveloped. Abdomen is flat and soft.
q- If that is not true, what is the truth?
GENITAL: a- As I have mentioned earlier that before I started
working with the family I was sent to Crame to buy
There is absence of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and medicine for the daughter because she had
coaptated with congested and abraded labia minora presenting in difficulty in urinating.
between. On separating the same is disclosed an abraded posterior
q- Did you know why the child has difficulty in urinating?
fourchette and an elastic, fleshy type intact hymen. External vaginal
orifice does not admit the tip of the examining index finger. a- No, I do not know, sir.

xxx q- And how about the present complaint filed against

you, the complaint filed by the mother of the victim?
CONCLUSION: a- I did not do it, sir.

Subject is in virgin state physically. q- What is the truth, what can you say about this
present complaint filed against you?
There are no external signs of recent application of any form a- As I said Mrs. Buenafe got mad at me because after I
of trauma at the time of examination. (Emphasis supplied.) explained to her that I was going with her gusband
(sic) to the children of the husband with a former
By Dr. Preyras explanation, the abrasions on the labia
marriage.[9]
minora could have been caused by friction with an object,
perhaps an erect penis. She doubted if riding on a bicycle had Finding for the prosecution, Branch 96 of the Quezon City
caused the injuries.[8] RTC rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
The defenses sole witness was accused-appellant, who was
28 and single at the time he took the witness stand on June 9, WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
1997. He denied having anything to do with the abrasions found RONNIE RULLEPA y GUINTO guilty beyond reasonable doubt
in Cyra Mays genitalia, and claimed that prior to the alleged of rape, and he is accordingly sentenced to death.
incident, he used to be ordered to buy medicine for Cyra May
who had difficulty urinating. He further alleged that after he The accused is ordered to pay CYRA MAE BUENAFE the amount
refused to answer Glorias queries if her husband Buenafe, of P40,000.00 as civil indemnity.
Costs to be paid by the accused.[10] (Italics in the original.) voluntary and true. An uncoerced and truthful admission like this
should be absolutely admissible and competent.
Hence, this automatic review, accused-appellant assigning
the following errors to the trial court: xxx
I
Remarkably, the admission was not denied by the accused during trial
despite his freedom to deny it if untrue.Hence, the admission became
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONSIDERING AS
conclusive upon him.[12] (Emphasis supplied.)
ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
ADMISSION.
To accused-appellant, the statements attributed to him are
inadmissible since they were made out of fear, having been
II
elicited only after Cyra Mays parents bullied and questioned
him. He thus submits that it was error for the trial court to take
THE COURT A QUO ERRED ON (sic) RULING THAT THE
his failure to deny the statements during the trial as an
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS SILENCE DURING TRIAL
admission of guilt.
AMOUNTED TO AN IMPLIED ADMISSION OF GUILT.
Accused-appellants submission does not persuade. The
III trial court considered his admission merely as
an additional ground to convince itself of his culpability. Even if
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF such admission, as well as the implication of his failure to deny
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS the same, were disregarded, the evidence suffices to establish
BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The plain, matter-of-fact manner by which Cyra May
IV
described her abuse in the hands of her Kuya Ronnie is an
eloquent testament to the truth of her accusations. Thus she
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE
testified on direct examination:
SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH UPON THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT.[11] (Emphasis supplied.) q- Do you recall if Ronnie Rullepa did anything to you?
a- Yes, sir.
Accused-appellant assails the crediting by the trial court, as
the following portion of its decision shows, of his admission to q- What did he do to you?
Gloria of having sexually assaulted Cyra May:
a- Sinaksak nya ang titi sa pepe ko, sa puwit ko, at sa
bunganga
In addition, the mother asserted that Rullepa had admitted Cyra
Ma[y]s complaint during the confrontation in the house. Indeed, q- How many times did he do that to you?
according to the mother, the admission was even
a- Twice, sir.
expressly qualified by Rullepas insistence that he had committed the
sexual assault only once, specifying the time thereof as 4:00 pm of xxx
November 17, 1995. That qualification proved that the admission was
 q- Do you remember when he did these things to you? a- Opo.
a- Opo. q- Was that in the head of kuya Ronnie?
q- When was that? a- No, sir.
a- When my mother was asleep, he put he removed my q- Which part of his body that titi located?
panty and inserted his penis inside my vagina, my
(Witness pointing to her groin area)
anus and my mouth, sir.
C o u r t:
xxx
Continue
q- After your Kuya Ronnie did those things to you what
did you feel? xxx
a- Sabi nya ganito (Witness putting her finger in her lips) q- Why were you in that room?
Nasaktan po ako at umiyak po ako.
a- Gusto nya po matulog ako sa kuwarto niya.
q- Did you cry because of hurt?
q- When you were in that room, what did Kuya Ronnie
a- Yes. do to you?
q- What part of your body hurt? a- Hinubo po niya ang panty ko.
a- Pepe ko po. When I went to the bathroom to urinate, I q- And after he remove your panty, what did Kuya
felt pain in my organ, sir.[13] Ronnie do, what did he do to you?
Cyra May reiterated her testimony during cross- a- He inserted his penis to my organ, sir.
examination, providing more revolting details of her ordeal:
q- Why did kuya Ronnie, was kuya Ronnie already
q- So, you said that Kuya Ronnie did something to you naked or he was already wearing any clothing?
what did he do to you on November 17, 1995?
a- Still had his clothing on, sir.
a- Sinaksak nga yong titi nya. He inserted his penis to
q- So, where did his penis, saan lumabas ang penis ni
my organ and to my mouth, sir.
Kuya Ronnie?
xxx
a- Dito po, (Witness referring or pointing to her groin
q- When you said that your kuya Ronnie inserted his area)
penis into your organ, into your mouth, and into
xxx
your anus, would you describe what his penis?
q- So, thats the and at the time, you did not cry and you
a- It is a round object, sir.
did not shout for help?
C o u r t:
a- Sabi nya po, not to make any noise because my
Is this titi of your kuya Ronnie a part of his body? mother might be roused from sleep.
 q- How long was kuya Ronnie did that to you? As for the variance in the claim regarding when Gloria was
informed of the rape, Gloria having testified that she learned of it
a- Matagal po.
on November 20, 1995[16] while Cyra May said that immediately
q- After kuya Ronnie scrub his penis to your vagina, after the incident, she awakened her mother who was in the
what other things did he do? adjacent room and reported it:[17] This is a minor matter that
does not detract from Cyra Mays categorical, material testimony
a- After that he inserted his penis to my mouth, and to that accused-appellant inserted his penis into her vagina.
my anus, sir.
Accused-appellant goes on to contend that Cyra May was
q- You did not complain and you did not shout? coached, citing the following portion of her testimony:
a- I cried, sir.[14] q- Yong sinabi mong sinira nya ang buhay mo, where
Accused-appellant draws attention to the statement of Cyra did you get that phrase?
May that he was not in the house on November 17 (1995), as a- It was the word of my Mama, sir.[18]
reflected in the following transcript of her testimony:
On the contrary, the foregoing testimony indicates that Cyra
q- Is it not a fact that you said a while ago that when May was really narrating the truth, that of hearing her mother
your father leaves the house, he [was] usually utter sinira niya ang buhay mo.
accompanied by your kuya Ronnie?
Accused-appellants suggestion that Cyra May merely
a- Opo. imagined the things of which he is accused, perhaps getting the
q- Why is it that Kuya Ronnie was in the house when idea from television programs, is preposterous. It is true that the
you father left the house at that time, on November ordinary child is a great weaver of romances, and her
17? imagination may induce (her) to relate something she has heard
or read in a story as personal experience. [19] But Cyra Mays
a- He was with Kuya Ronnie, sir. account is hardly the stuff of romance or fairy tales. Neither is it
q- So, it is not correct that kuya Ronnie did something to normal TV fare, if at all.
you because your kuya Ronnie [was] always with This Court cannot believe that a victim of Cyra Mays age
your Papa? could concoct a tale of defloration, allow the examination of her
a- Yes, sir.[15] private parts, and undergo the expense, trouble, inconvenience,
not to mention the trauma of public trial.[20]
The above-quoted testimony of Cyra May does not indicate
the time when her father Col. Buenafe left their house on Besides, her testimony is corroborated by the findings of Dr.
November 17, 1995 with accused-appellant and, thus, does not Preyra that there were abrasions in her labia minora, which she
preclude accused-appellants commission of rape on the same opined, could have been caused by friction with an erect penis.
date. In any event, a young child is vulnerable to suggestion, This Court thus accords great weight to the following
hence, her affirmative response to the defense counsels above- assessment of the trial court regarding the competency and
quoted leadingquestions. credibility of Cyra May as a witness:
Her very tender age notwithstanding, Cyra Ma(y) nonetheless desire to incarcerate the person responsible for the childs
appeared to possess the necessary intelligence and perceptiveness defilement.[24] Courts are seldom, if at all, convinced that a
sufficient to invest her with the competence to testify about her mother would stoop so low as to subject her daughter to
experience. She might have been an impressionable child as all others physical hardship and shame concomitant to a rape prosecution
of her age are but her narration of Kuya Ronnies placing his titi in just to assuage her own hurt feelings.[25]
her pepe was certainly one which could not be considered as a
Alternatively, accused-appellant prays that he be held liable
common childs tale. Her responses during the examination of counsel
for acts of lasciviousness instead of rape, apparently on the
and of the Court established her consciousness of
basis of the following testimony of Cyra May, quoted verbatim,
the distinction between good and bad, which rendered inconceivable
that he merely scrubbed his penis against her vagina:
for her to describe a bad act of the accused unless it really happened to
her.Needless to state, she described the act of the accused as bad. Her q- Is it not a fact that kuya Ronnie just made some
demeanor as a witness manifested during trial by her unhesitant, scrubbed his penis into your vagina?
spontaneous, and plain responses to questions further enhanced her
claim to credit and trustworthiness.[21] (Italics in the original.) a- Yes, sir.
q- And when he did not actually penetrated your
In a futile attempt at exculpation, accused-appellant claims vagina?
that even before the alleged incident Cyra May was already
suffering from pain in urinating. He surmises that she could have a- Yes, sir.[26]
scratched herself which caused the abrasions. Dr. Preyra, Dr. Preya, however, found abrasions in the labia minora, which
however, was quick to rule out this possibility. She stated is directly beneath the labia majora,[27] proving that there was
categorically that that part of the female organ is very sensitive indeed penetration of the vagina, not just a mere rubbing or
and rubbing or scratching it is painful.[22] The abrasions could scrubbing of the penis against its surface.
not, therefore, have been self-inflicted.
In fine, the crime committed by accused-appellant is not
That the Medical-Legal Officer found no external signs of merely acts of lasciviousness but statutory rape.
recent application of any form of trauma at the time of the
examination does not preclude accused-appellants conviction The two elements of statutory rape are (1) that the accused
since the infliction of force is immaterial in statutory rape.[23] had carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) that the woman is
below twelve years of age.[28] As shown in the previous
More. That Cyra May suffered pain in her vagina but not in discussion, the first element, carnal knowledge, had been
her anus despite her testimony that accused-appellant inserted established beyond reasonable doubt. The same is true with
his penis in both orifices does not diminish her credibility. It is respect to the second element.
possible that accused-appellants penis failed to penetrate her
anus as deeply as it did her vagina, the former being more The victims age is relevant in rape cases since it may
resistant to extreme forces than the latter. constitute an element of the offense. Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,[29] provides:
Accused-appellants imputation of ill motive on the part of
Gloria is puerile. No mother in her right mind would subject her Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by
child to the humiliation, disgrace and trauma attendant to a having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
prosecution for rape if she were not motivated solely by the circumstances:
x x x. 2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic
documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age x x x. show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.

x x x. 3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have

been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. and credible, of the victims mother or a member of the family either by
affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters
x x x. respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the
offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Furthermore, the victims age may constitute a qualifying Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
circumstance, warranting the imposition of the death
sentence. The same Article states: a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought
to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought
to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is
consanguinity or affinity with the third civil degree, or the common- sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
law spouse of the parent of the victim.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or
x x x. the testimony of the victims mother or relatives concerning the victims
age, the complainants testimony will suffice provided that it is
4. when the victim is x x x a child below seven (7) years old. expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.

x x x. 5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the
offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial
Because of the seemingly conflicting decisions regarding evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.
the sufficiency of evidence of the victims age in rape cases, this
Court, in the recently decided case of People v. Pruna, 6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the
[30]
 established a set of guidelines in appreciating age as an age of the victim.
element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, to wit:
Applying the foregoing guidelines, this Court in
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an the Pruna case held that the therein accused-appellant could
original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such only be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
party. perpetua since:
x x x no birth certificate or any similar authentic document, such as a January 1995. Such being the case, PRUNA cannot be convicted of
baptismal certificate of LIZETTE, was presented to prove her age. x x qualified rape, and hence the death penalty cannot be imposed on him.
x.
However, conformably with no. 3 (b) of the foregoing guidelines, the
x x x. testimony of LIZETTEs mother that she was 3 years old at the time of
the commission of the crime is sufficient for purposes of holding
However, the Medico-Legal Report relied upon by the trial court does PRUNA liable for statutory rape, or rape of a girl below 12 years of
not in any way prove the age of LIZETTE, for there is nothing therein age. Under the second paragraph of Article 335, as amended by R.A.
which even mentions her age. Only testimonial evidence was No. 7659, in relation to no. 3 of the first paragraph thereof, having
presented to establish LIZETTEs age. Her mother, Jacqueline, testified carnal knowledge of a woman under 12 years of age is punishable
(that the victim was three years old at the time of the commission of by reclusion perpetua. Thus, the penalty to be imposed on PRUNA
the crime). should be reclusion perpetua, and not death penalty. (Italics in the
original.)
xxx
Several cases[31] suggest that courts may take judicial notice
Likewise, LIZETTE testified on 20 November 1996, or almost two of the appearance of the victim in determining her age. For
years after the incident, that she was 5 years old. However, when the example, the Court, in People v. Tipay,[32] qualified the ruling
defense counsel asked her how old she was on 3 January 1995, or at in People v. Javier,[33] which required the presentation of the
the time of the rape, she replied that she was 5 years old. Upon further birth certificate to prove the rape victims age, with the following
question as to the date she was born, she could not answer. pronouncement:

For PRUNA to be convicted of rape in its qualified form and meted the This does not mean, however, that the presentation of the certificate of
supreme penalty of death, it must be established with certainty that birth is at all times necessary to prove minority. The minority of a
LIZETTE was below 7 years old at the time of the commission of the victim of tender age who may be below the age of ten is quite manifest
crime. It must be stressed that the severity of the death penalty, and the court can take judicial notice thereof. The crucial years pertain
especially its irreversible and final nature once carried out, makes the to the ages of fifteen to seventeen where minority may seem to be
decision-making process in capital offenses aptly subject to the most dubitable due to ones physical appearance. In this situation, the
exacting rules of procedure and evidence. prosecution has the burden of proving with certainty the fact that the
victim was under 18 years of age when the rape was committed in
In view of the uncertainty of LIZETTEs exact age, corroborative order to justify the imposition of the death penalty under the above-
evidence such as her birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other cited provision. (Emphasis supplied.)
authentic document should be introduced in evidence in order that the
qualifying circumstance of below seven (7) years old is appreciated On the other hand, a handful of cases[34] holds that courts,
against the appellant. The lack of objection on the part of the defense without the requisite hearing prescribed by Section 3, Rule 129
as to her age did not excuse the prosecution from discharging its of the Rules of Court,[35] cannot take judicial notice of the victims
burden.That the defense invoked LIZETTEs tender age for purposes of age.
questioning her competency to testify is not necessarily an admission
Judicial notice signifies that there are certain facta
that she was below 7 years of age when PRUNA raped her on 3
probanda, or propositions in a partys case, as to which he will
not be required to offer evidence; these will be taken for true by Nothing is older or commoner in the administration of law in all
the tribunal without the need of evidence.[36] Judicial notice, countries than the submission to the senses of the tribunal itself,
however, is a phrase sometimes used in a loose way to cover whether judge or jury, of objects which furnish evidence. The view of
some other judicial action. Certain rules of Evidence, usually the land by the jury, in real actions, of a wound by the judge where
known under other names, are frequently referred to in terms of mayhem was alleged, and of the person of one alleged to be an
judicial notice.[37] infant, in order to fix his age, the inspection and comparison of seals,
the examination of writings, to determine whether they are
The process by which the trier of facts judges a persons age
()blemished,() the implements with which a crime was committed or of
from his or her appearance cannot be categorized as judicial
a person alleged, in a bastardy proceeding, to be the child of another,
notice. Judicial notice is based upon convenience and
are few illustrations of what may be found abundantly in our own legal
expediency for it would certainly be superfluous, inconvenient,
records and textbooks for seven centuries past.[40] (Emphasis supplied.)
and expensive both to parties and the court to require proof, in
the ordinary way, of facts which are already known to courts.
[38] A persons appearance, as evidence of age (for example, of
 As Tundag puts it, it is the cognizance of certain facts which
infancy, or of being under the age of consent to
judges may properly take and act on without proof because
intercourse), is usually regarded as relevant; and, if so, the
they already know them. Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, where
tribunal may properly observe the person brought before it.
the provisions governing judicial notice are found, is entitled [41]
 Experience teaches that corporal appearances are
What Need Not Be Proved. When the trier of facts observes the
approximately an index of the age of their bearer, particularly for
appearance of a person to ascertain his or her age, he is not
the marked extremes of old age and youth. In every case such
taking judicial notice of such fact; rather, he is conducting
evidence should be accepted and weighed for what it may be in
an examination of the evidence, the evidence being the
each case worth. In particular, the outward physical appearance
appearance of the person.Such a process militates against the
of an alleged minor may be considered in judging his age; a
very concept of judicial notice, the object of which is to do away
contrary rule would for such an inference be pedantically over-
with the presentation of evidence.
cautious.[42]Consequently, the jury or the court trying an issue of
This is not to say that the process is not sanctioned by the fact may be allowed to judge the age of persons in court by
Rules of Court; on the contrary, it does. A persons appearance, observation of such persons.[43] The formal offer of the person
where relevant, is admissible as object evidence, the same as evidence is not necessary. The examination and cross-
being addressed to the senses of the court. Section 1, Rule 130 examination of a party before the jury are equivalent to
provides: exhibiting him before the jury and an offer of such person as an
exhibit is properly refused. [44]
SECTION 1. Object as evidence. Objects as evidence are those
This Court itself has sanctioned the determination of an
addressed to the senses of the court. When an object is relevant to the
aliens age from his appearance. In Braca v. Collector of
fact in issue, it may be exhibited to, examined or viewed by the court.
Customs,[45] this Court ruled that:
To be sure, one author writes, this practice of inspection by
The customs authorities may also determine from the personal
the court of objects, things or persons relevant to the fact in
appearance of the immigrant what his age is.The person of a Chinese
dispute, has its roots in ancient judicial procedure.[39] The author
alien seeking admission into the Philippine Islands is evidence in an
proceeds to quote from another authority:
investigation by the board of special inquiry to determine his right to
enter; and such body may take into consideration his appearance to We presume that the trial court reached this conclusion with reference
determine or assist in determining his age and a finding that the to the age of Estavillo from the latters personal appearance. There is no
applicant is not a minor based upon such appearance is not without proof in the record, as we have said, which even tends to establish the
evidence to support it. assertion that this appellant understated his age. * * * It is true that the
trial court had an opportunity to note the personal appearance of
This Court has also implicitly recognized the same process Estavillo for the purpose of determining his age, and by so doing
in a criminal case. Thus, in United States v. Agadas,[46] this reached the conclusion that he was at least 20, just two years over
Court held: 18. This appellant testified that he was only 16, and this testimony
stands uncontradicted. Taking into consideration the marked difference
Rosario Sabacahan testified that he was 17 years of age; that he had in the penalties to be imposed upon that age, we must, therefore,
never purchased a cedula; and that he was going to purchase a cedula conclude (resolving all doubts in favor of the appellants) that the
the following january. Thereupon the court asked this defendant these appellants ages were 16 and 14 respectively.
questions: You are a pretty big boy for seventeen. Answer: I cannot
tell exactly because I do not remember when I was born, but 17 years While it is true that in the instant case Rosario testified that he was 17
is my guess. Court: If you are going to take advantage of that excuse, years of age, yet the trial court reached the conclusion, judging from
you had better get some positive evidence to that effect. Answer: I do the personal appearance of Rosario, that he is a youth 18 or 19 years
not remember, as I already stated on what date and in what year I was old.Applying the rule enunciated in the case just cited, we must
born. The court, in determining the question of the age of the conclude that there exists a reasonable doubt, at least, with reference to
defendant, Rosario Sabacahan, said: the question whether Rosario was, in fact 18 years of age at the time
the robbery was committed. This doubt must be resolved in favor of
The defendant, Rosario Sabacahan, testified that he thought that he the defendant, and he is, therefore, sentenced to six months of arresto
was about 17 years of age, but judging by his appearance he is a mayor in lieu of six years ten months and one day of presidio mayor. x
youth 18 or 19 years old. He has shown that he has no positive x x.
information on the subject and no effort was made by the defense to
prove the fact that he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of There can be no question, therefore, as to
article 9, paragraph 2, of the Penal code, which fact it is held to be the admissibility of a persons appearance in determining his or
incumbent upon the defense to establish by satisfactory evidence in her age. As to the weight to accord such appearance,
order to enable the court to give an accused person the benefit of the especially in rape cases, Pruna laid down guideline no. 3, which
mitigating circumstance. is again reproduced hereunder:

In United States vs. Estavillo and Perez (10 Off. Gaz., 1984) Estavillo 3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have
testified, when the case was tried in the court below, that he then was been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear
only 16 years of age. There was no other testimony in the record with and credible, of the victims mother or a member of the family either by
reference to his age. But the trial judge said: The accused Estavillo, affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters
notwithstanding his testimony giving his age as 16 years, is, as a respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the
matter of fact, not less than 20. This court, in passing upon the age of offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Estavillo, held: Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought a- Yes, sir.
to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
q- And you are 3 years old?
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought a- Yes, sir.[48]
to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
That of her mother goes:
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is Q How old was your daughter when there things
sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old. happened?
A 3 and years old.
Under the above guideline, the testimony of a relative with
respect to the age of the victim is sufficient to constitute proof Q When was she born?
beyond reasonable doubt in cases (a), (b) and (c) above. In
such cases, the disparity between the allegation and the proof of A In Manila, May 10, 1992.[49]
age is so great that the court can easily determine from the Because of the vast disparity between the alleged age
appearance of the victim the veracity of the testimony. The (three years old) and the age sought to be proved (below twelve
appearance corroborates the relatives testimony. years), the trial court would have had no difficulty ascertaining
As the alleged age approaches the age sought to be the victims age from her appearance. No reasonable doubt,
proved, the persons appearance, as object evidence of her age, therefore, exists that the second element of statutory rape, i.e.,
loses probative value. Doubt as to her true age becomes greater that the victim was below twelve years of age at the time of the
and, following Agadas, supra, such doubt must be resolved in commission of the offense, is present.
favor of the accused. Whether the victim was below seven years old, however, is
another matter. Here, reasonable doubt exists. A mature three
This is because in the era of modernism and rapid growth, the victims and a half-year old can easily be mistaken for an
mere physical appearance is not enough to gauge her exact age. For the underdeveloped seven-year old. The appearance of the victim,
extreme penalty of death to be upheld, nothing but proof beyond as object evidence, cannot be accorded much weight and,
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime must following Pruna, the testimony of the mother is, by itself,
be substantiated. Verily, the minority of the victim should be not only insufficient.
alleged but likewise proved with equal certainty and clearness as the
crime itself. Be it remembered that the proof of the victims age in the As it has not been established with moral certainty that Cyra
present case spells the difference between life and death.[47] May was below seven years old at the time of the commission of
the offense, accused-appellant cannot be sentenced to suffer
In the present case, the prosecution did not offer the victims the death penalty. Only the penalty of reclusion perpetua can be
certificate of live birth or similar authentic documents in imposed upon him.
evidence. The victim and her mother, however, testified that she In line with settled jurisprudence, the civil indemnity
was only three years old at the time of the rape. Cyra Mays awarded by the trial court is increased to P50,000.00. In
testimony goes: addition, Cyra May is entitled to an award of moral damages in
q- Your name is Cyra Mae is that correct? the amount of P50,000.00.[50]
 WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Quezon City, Branch 96,  
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Ronnie
Rullepa y Guinto is found GUILTY of Statutory Rape, defined Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
and punished by Article 335 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, as Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the Decision [1]  of
amended, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion the Court of Appeals (CA) dated October 29, 2002 as well as its
perpetua. He is ordered to pay private complainant, Cyra May
Resolution [2]  dated February 12, 2003, which affirmed with
Buenafe y Francisco, the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
SO ORDERED. Makati, Branch 142, in Civil Case No. 91-3453, [3]  requiring
Bank of Philippine Islands (petitioner) to return to spouses
Jesusa P. Reyes and Conrado B. Reyes (respondents) the amount
of P 100,000.00 plus interest and damages.
The conflicting versions of the parties are aptly
summarized by the trial court, to wit:
 
BANK OF THE   G.R. No. 157177 On December 7, 1990 at around 2:00 p.m.,
PHILIPPINE plaintiff Jesusa Reyes together with her daughter,
ISLANDS,     Joan Reyes, went to BPI Zapote Branch to open an
Petitioner,   Present: ATM account, she being interested with the
      ongoing promotions of BPI entitling every
    YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., depositor with a deposit amounting to P 2,000.00 to
    Chairperson, a ticket with a car as its prize to be raffled every
- versus -   AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, month.
    CORONA,*  
    NACHURA, and She was accommodated, in lieu of the bank
    REYES, JJ. manager Mr. Nicasio, by Cicero Capati (Pats) who
JESUSA P. REYES and     was an employee of the bank and in charge of the
CONRADO B. REYES,   Promulgated: new accounts and time deposits characteristically
Respondents.   February 11, 2008 described as having homosexual inclinations. They
x------------------------------------------------ were entertained by Capati and were made to sit at
x a table occupied by a certain Liza.
   
  Plaintiff informed Capati that they wanted
DECISION to open an ATM account for the amount
  of P 200,000.00, P 100,000.00 of which shall be
  withdrawn from her exiting savings account with
BPI bank which is account no. 0233-2433-88 and Plaintiff and daughter then left.
the other P 100,000.00 will be given by her in cash.  
  On December 14, 1990, Mrs. Jesusa
Capati allegedly made a mistake and received her express teller card from said bank.
prepared a withdrawal slip for P 200,00.00 to be  
withdrawn from her existing savings account with Thereafter on December 26, 1990, plaintiff
said bank and the plaintiff Jesusa Reyes believing left for the United States (Exhs. T, U- U-1) and
in good faith that Capati prepared the papers with returned to Manila on January 31, 1991 (Exhs. V-
the correct amount signed the same unaware of the V-1).
mistakes in figures.  
  When she went to her pawnshop, she was
While she was being entertained by Capati, made aware by her statement of account sent to her
her daughter Joan Reyes was filling up the by BPI bank that her ATM account only contained
signature cards and several other forms. the amount of P 100,000.00 with interest.
   
Minutes later after the slips were presented She then sent her daughter to inquire,
to the teller, Capati returned to where the plaintiff however, the bank manager assured her that they
was seating and informed the latter that the would look into the matter.
withdrawable balance could not  
accommodate P 200,000.00. On February 6, 1991, plaintiff instructed
  Efren Luna, one of her employees, to update her
Plaintiff explained that she is withdrawing savings account passbook at the BPI with the
the amount of P 100,000.00 only and then changed folded deposit slip forP 200,000.00 stapled at the
and correct the figure two (2) into one (1) with her outer cover of said passbook. After presenting the
signature super-imposed thereto signifying the passbook to be updated and when the same was
change, afterwhich the amount of P 100,000.00 in returned, Luna noticed that the deposit slip stapled
cash in two bundles containing 100 pieces at the cover was removed and validated at the back
of P 500.00 peso bill were given to Capati with her portion thereof.
daughter Joan witnessing the same. Thereafter  
Capati prepared a deposit slip for P 200,000.00 in Thereafter, Luna returned with the passbook
the name of plaintiff Jesusa Reyes with the new to the plaintiff and when the latter saw the
account no. 0235-0767-48 and brought the same to validation, she got angry.
the teller's booth.  
  Plaintiff then asked the bank manager why
After a while, he returned and handed to the the deposit slip was validated, whereupon the
plaintiff her duplicate copy of her deposit to manager assured her that the matter will be
account no. 0235-0767-48 reflecting the amount investigated into.
of P 200,000.00 with receipt stamp showing  
December 7, as the date.
 When no word was heard as to the documents were subsequently machine validated
investigation made by the bank, Mrs. Reyes sent for the amount of P 100,000.00 (Exhs. 2 and 4).
two (2) demand letters thru her lawyer demanding  
return of the missing P 100,000.00 plus interest Defendant claimed that there was actually
(Exhs. B and C). The same was received by no cash involved with the transactions which
defendant on July 25, 1991 and October 7, 1991, happened on December 7, 1990 as contained in the
respectively. banks teller tape (Exhs.1 to 1-C).
   
The last letter prompted reply from Defendant further claimed that when they
defendant inviting plaintiff to sit down and discuss subjected Cicero Capati to a lie detector test, the
the problem. latter passed the same with flying colors (Exhs. 5
  to 5-C), indicative of the fact that he was not lying
The meeting resulted to the bank promising when he said that there really was no cash
that Capati will be submitted to a lie detector test. transaction involved when plaintiff Jesusa Reyes
  went to the defendant bank on December 7, 1990;
Plaintiff, however, never learned of the defendant further alleged that they even went to
result of said test. Plaintiff filed this instant case. the extent of informing Jesusa Reyes that her claim
  would not be given credit (Exh. 6) considering that
Defendant on the other hand claimed that no such transaction was really made on December
Bank of the Philippine Island admitted that Jesusa 7, 1990.  [4]
Reyes had effected a fund transfer in the amount On August 12, 1994, the RTC issued a Decision [5]  upholding the
of P 100,000.00 from her ordinary savings account
to the express teller account she opened versions of respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:
on December 7, 1990 (Exhs. 3 to 3-C), however, it WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
was the only amount she deposited and no Court finds in favor of the plaintiff Jesusa P.
additional cash deposit of P 100,000.00 was made. Reyes and Conrado Reyes and against defendant
That plaintiff wanted to effect the transfer Bank of the Philippine Islands ordering the latter
of P 200,000.00 but the balance in her account was to:
not sufficient and could not accommodate the  
same. Plaintiff thereafter agreed to reduce the 1.    Return to plaintiffs their P 100,000.00 with
amount to be withdrawn from P 200,000.00 interest at 14% per annum from December 7,
to P 100,000.00 with plaintiffs signature 1990;
superimposed on said corrections; that the original 2.    Pay plaintiffs P 1,000,000.00 as moral
copy of the deposit slip was also altered damages;
from P 200,000.00 to P 100,000.00, however, 2.    Pay plaintiffs P 350,000.00 as exemplary
instead of plaintiff signing the same, the clerk-in- damages;
charge of the bank, in this case Cicero Capati, 3.    Pay plaintiffs P 250,000.00 for and attorney's
signed the alteration himself for Jesusa Reyes had fees. [6]
already left without signing the deposit slip. The
The RTC found that petitioner's claim that respondent Jesusa Also, we have to reduce the P 1 million
award of moral damages to a reasonable sum
deposited only P 100,000.00 instead of P 200,000.00 was hazy; of P 50,000.00. Moral damages are not intended to
that what should control was the deposit slip issued by the bank enrich a plaintiff at the expense of a defendant.
to respondent, for there was no chance by which respondent They are awarded only to enable the injured party
to obtain means, diversion, or amusements that
could write the amount of P 200,000.00 without petitioner's
will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has
employee noticing it and making the necessary corrections; that undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable
it was deplorable to note that it was when respondent Jesusa's action. The award of moral damages must be
proportionate to the suffering inflicted.
bankbook was submitted to be updated after the lapse of several
 
months when the alleged error claimed by petitioner was In addition, we have to delete the award
corrected; that Article 1962 of the New Civil Code provides that of P 350,000.00 as exemplary damages. The
a deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a absence of malice and bad faith, as in this case,
renders the award of exemplary damages
thing belonging to another with the obligation of safely keeping improper.
it and of returning the same; that under Article 1972, the  
depositary is obliged to keep the thing safely and to return it Finally, we have to reduce the award of
attorney's fees to a reasonable sum of P 30,000.00,
when required to the depositor or to his heirs and successors or as the prosecution of this case has not been
to the person who may have been designated in the contract. attended with any unusual difficulty.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA which in a Decision  
WHEREFORE, with the modifications thus
dated October 29, 2002affirmed the RTC decision with
indicated, the judgment appealed from is in all
modification as follows: other respects AFFIRMED. Without costs. [7]
 
 
Nonetheless, the award of 14% interest per
annum on the missing P 100,000.00 can stand some In finding petitioner liable for the missing P 100,000.00,
modification. The interest thereon should be 12% the CA held that the RTC correctly gave credence to the
per annum, reckonedfrom May 12, 1991, the last testimonies of respondent Jesusa and Joan Reyes to the effect
day of the five day-grace period given by plaintiff-
appellees' counsel under the first demand letter that aside from the fund transfer of P 100,000.00 from Jesusa's
dated May 6, 1991 (Exhibit B), or counted from savings account, Jesusa also made a cash deposit of P 100,000.00
May 7, 1991, the date when defendant-appellant in the afternoon of December 7, 1990; that it is unlikely for
received said letter. Interest is demandable when
the obligation consist in the payment of money these two to concoct a story of falsification against a banking
and the debtor incurs in delay. institution of the stature of petitioner if their claims were not
  true; that the duplicate copy of the deposit slip showed a deposit
of P 200,000.00; this, juxtaposed with the fact that it was not C. This Honorable Court gravely abused its
discretion, being as it is contrary to law, in
machine-validated and the original copy altered by the bank's holding BPI liable for moral damages and
clerk from P 200,000.00 to P 100,000.00 with the altered amount attorney's fees at the reduced amounts
validated, is indicative of anomaly; that even if it was bank of P 50,000.00 and P 30,000.00, respectively.  [8]
employee Cicero Capati who prepared the deposit slip, Jesusa  
stood her ground and categorically denied having any The main issue for resolution is whether the CA erred in
knowledge of the alteration therein made; that petitioner must sustaining the RTC's finding that respondent Jesusa made an
account for the missing P 100,000.00 because it was the author initial deposit of P 200,000.00 in her newly opened Express
of the loss; that banks are engaged in business imbued with Teller account on December 7, 1990.
public interest and are under strict obligation to exercise utmost  
fidelity in dealing with its clients, in seeing to it that the funds The issue raises a factual question.  The Court is not a trier of
therein invested or by them received are properly accounted for facts, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only errors of
and duly posted in their ledgers. law that may have been committed by the lower courts. [9]  As a
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a rule, the findings of fact of the trial court when affirmed by the
Resolution dated February 12, 2003. CA are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal
  by this Court, as long as they are borne out by the record or are
Hence, the present petition on the following grounds: based on substantial evidence. [10]  Such rule however is not
  absolute, but is subject to well-established exceptions, which
A. In affirming the decision of the trial court are: 1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd
holding BPI liable for the amount
of P 100,000.00 representing an alleged or impossible; 2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; 3)
additional deposit of respondents, the when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises
Honorable Court of Appeals gravely abused its or conjectures; 4) when the judgment of the CA is based on a
discretion by resolving the issue based on a
conjecture and ignoring physical evidence in misapprehension of facts; 5) when the findings of facts are
favor of testimonial evidence. conflicting; 6) when the CA, in making its findings, went
  beyond the issues of the case, and those findings are contrary to
B. The Court of Appeals gravely abused its
the admissions of both appellant and appellee; 7) when the
discretion, being as it is contrary to law, in
holding BPI liable to respondents for the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court; 8)
payment of interest at the rate of 12% per when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
annum. specific evidence on which they are based; 9) when the CA
 
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a witnesses, though the preponderance is not
necessarily with the greater number.
different conclusion; and 10) when the findings of fact of the
For a better perspective on the calibration of the evidence on
CA are premised on the absence of evidence and are
hand, it must first be stressed that the judge who had heard and
contradicted by the evidence on record. [11]  We hold that this case
seen the witnesses testify was not the same judge who penned
falls under exception Nos. 1, 3, 4, and 9 which constrain us to
the decision. Thus, not having heard the testimonies himself, the
resolve the factual issue.
trial judge or the appellate court would not be in a better
It is a basic rule in evidence that each party to a case must prove
position than this Court to assess the credibility of witnesses on
his own affirmative allegations by the degree of evidence
the basis of their demeanor.
required by law. [12]  In civil cases, the party having the burden of
 
proof must establish his case by preponderance of evidence, [13] or
Hence, to arrive at the truth, we thoroughly reviewed the
that evidence which is of greater weight or is more convincing
transcripts of the witnesses' testimonies and examined the pieces
than that which is in opposition to it.  It does not mean absolute
of evidence on record.
truth; rather, it means that the testimony of one side is more
After a careful and close examination of the records and
believable than that of the other side, and that the probability of
evidence presented by the parties, we find that respondents
truth is on one side than on the other. [14]
failed to successfully prove by preponderance of evidence that
Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides the
respondent Jesusa made an initial deposit of P 200,000.00 in her
guidelines for determining preponderance of evidence, thus:
SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, Express Teller account.
how determined.- In civil cases, the party having Respondent Jesusa and her daughter Joan testified that at the
the burden of proof must establish his case by a outset, respondent Jesusa told Capati that she was opening an
preponderance of evidence. In determining where
the preponderance or superior weight of evidence Express Teller account for P 200,000.00; that she was going to
on the issues involved lies the court may consider withdraw and transfer P 100,000.00 from her savings account to
all the facts and circumstances of the case, the her new account, and that she had an additional  P 100,000.00
witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence,
cash. However, these assertions are not borne out by the other
their means and opportunity of knowing the facts
to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts evidence presented. Notably, it is not refuted that Capati
to which they testify, the probability or prepared a withdrawal slip [15]  for P 200,000.00. This is contrary
improbability of their testimony, their interest or to the claim of respondent Jesusa that she instructed Capati to
want of interest, and also their personal credibility
so far as the same legitimately appear upon the make a fund transfer of only P 100,000.00 from her savings
trial. The court may also consider the number of account to the Express Teller account she was opening. Yet,
respondent Jesusa signed the withdrawal slip. We find it strange
that she would sign the withdrawal slip if her intention in the ***200000.00
151309 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
first place was to withdraw only P 100,000.00 from her savings ***200000.00
account and deposit P 100,000.00 in cash with her. PB BALANCE ERROR
  BAL. 229,257.64
 
Moreover, respondent Jesusa's claim that she signed the
151338 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
withdrawal slip without looking at the amount indicated therein ***200000.00
fails to convince us, for respondent Jesusa, as a businesswoman BIG AMOUNT
151344 07DEC90 1601 288J 233243388
in the regular course of business and taking ordinary care of her
***200000.00
concerns, [16]  would make sure that she would check the amount 151404 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
written on the withdrawal slip before affixing her ***200000.00
signature. Significantly, we note that the space provided for her TOD
 
signature is very near the space where the amount 151520 07DEC90 1601 288A 233320145
of P 200,000.00 in words and figures are written; thus, she could ***2000.00
not have failed to notice that the amount of P 200,000.00 was 151705 07DEC90 1789 288A 233324299
***22917.00
written instead of P 100,000.00. 151727 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
The fact that respondent Jesusa initially intended to transfer the ***100000.00
amount of P 200,000.00 from her savings account to her new BIG AMOUNT
151730 07DEC90 1601 288J 233243388
Express Teller account was further established by the teller's
***100000.00
tape presented as petitioner's evidence and by the testimony of 151746 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
Emerenciana Torneros, the teller who had attended to ***100000.00 [19]
respondent Jesusa's transactions. 151810 07DEC90 1370 288A 235076748
151827 07DEC90 1790 288A 235076748
  ***100000.00 ***100000.00 [20]
The teller's tape, [17]  Exhibit 1 unequivocally shows the following  
data: 151903 07DEC90 1301 288A 233282405
  151914 07DEC90 1690 288A 235008955
151159 07DEC90 1370 288A 233324299 ***1778.05
  152107 07DEC90 1601 288A 3333241381
151245 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388 ***5000.00
***200000.00 [18] 152322 07DEC90 1601 288A 233314374
BIG AMOUNT ***2000.00
151251 07DEC90 1601 288J 233243388 152435 07DEC90 1370 288A 235076764
152506 07DEC90 1790 288A 235076764
 ***4000.00 ***4000.00 the withdrawal using an officer's override with the latter's
152557 07DEC90 1601 288A 233069469
***2000.00 approval. [23]  The letter J appears after Figure 288 in the fourth
152736 07DEC90 1601 288A 233254584 column to show that she overrode the transaction.  She then
***2000.00 keyed again the amount of P 200,000.00 at 3 o'clock 13 minutes
152849 07DEC90 0600 288A 231017585
and 9 seconds; however, her computer rejected the transaction,
***3150.00 686448
152941 07DEC90 1790 288A 3135052255 because the balance she keyed in based on respondent Jesusa's
***2800.00 ***2800.00 passbook was wrong; [24]  thus appeared the phrase balance error
153252 07DEC90 1601 288A 233098264 on the tape, and the computer produced the balance
(Emphasis supplied)
of P 229,257.64, and so she keyed in the withdrawal
 
of P 200,000.00. [25]  Since it was a big amount, she again had to
The first column shows the exact time of the transactions; the
override it, so she could process the amount. However, the
second column shows the date of the transactions; the third
withdrawal was again rejected for the reason TOD, overdraft,
column shows the bank transaction code; the fourth column [26]
 which meant that the amount to be withdrawn was more than
shows the teller's code; and the fifth column shows the client's
the balance, considering that there was a debited amount
account number. The teller's tape reflected various transactions
of P 30,935.16 reflected in respondent Jesusa's passbook,
involving different accounts on December 7, 1990 which
reducing the available balance to only P 198,322.48. [27]
included respondent Jesusa's Savings Account No. 233243388
 
and her new Express Teller Account No. 235076748. It shows
Torneros then called Capati to her cage and told him of the
that respondent Jesusa's initial intention to
insufficiency of respondent Jesusa's balance. [28]  Capati then
withdraw P 200,000.00, not P 100,000.00, from her Savings
motioned respondent Jesusa to the teller's cage; and when she
Account No. 233324299 was begun at 3 o'clock, 12 minutes and
was already in front of the teller's cage, Torneros told her that
45 seconds as shown in Exhibit 1-c.
she could not withdraw P 200,000.00 because of overdraft; thus,
 
respondent Jesusa decided to just withdraw P 100,000.00. [29]
In explaining the entries in the teller's tape, Torneros testified
This explains the alteration in the withdrawal slip with the
that when she was processing respondent Jesusa's withdrawal in
superimposition of the figure 1 on the figure 2 and the change of
the amount of P 200,000.00, her computer rejected the
the word two to one to show that the withdrawn amount from
transaction because there was a discrepancy; [21]  thus, the word
respondent Jesusa's savings account was only P 100,000.00, and
BIG AMOUNT appeared on the tape. Big amount means that the
that respondent Jesusa herself signed the alterations.
amount was so big for her to approve, [22]  so she keyed in the
The teller's tape showed that the withdrawal of the amount
amount again and overrode the transaction to be able to process
of P 100,000.00 by fund transfer was resumed at 3 o'clock 17
minutes and 27 seconds; but since it was a big amount, there deposit. This demolishes the testimonies of respondent Jesusa
was a need to override it again, and the withdrawal/fund transfer and her daughter Joan.
was completed. At 3 o'clock 18 minutes and 27 seconds, the  
amount of P 100,000.00 was deposited to respondent Jesusa's Furthermore, teller Torneros's explanation of why the duplicate
new Express Teller Account No. 235076748. copy of the deposit slip in the amount of P 200,000.00 bore the
  teller's stamp mark is convincing and consistent with logic and
The teller's tape definitely establishes the fact of respondent the ordinary course of business. She testified that Capati went to
Jesusa's original intention to withdraw the amount her cage bringing with him a withdrawal slip for P 200,000.00
of P 200,000.00, and not P 100,000.00 as she claims, from her signed by respondent Jesusa, two copies of the deposit slip
savings account, to be transferred as her initial deposit to her for P 200,000.00 in respondent Jesusa's name for her new
new Express Teller account, the insufficiency of her balance in Express Teller account, and the latter's savings passbook
her savings account, and finally the fund transfer of the amount reflecting a balance of P 249,657.64 [31]  as of November 19, 1990.
[32]
of P 100,000.00 from her savings account to her new Express  Thus, at first glance, these appeared to Torneros to be
Teller account. We give great evidentiary weight to the teller's sufficient for the withdrawal of P 200,000.00 by fund
tape, considering that it is inserted into the bank's computer transfer. Capati then got her teller's stamp mark, stamped it on
terminal, which records the teller's daily transactions  in the the duplicate copy of the deposit slip, and gave the duplicate to
ordinary course of business, and there is no showing that the respondent Jesusa, while the original copy [33]  of the deposit slip
same had been purposely manipulated to prove petitioner's was left in her cage. [34]  However, as Torneros started processing
claim. the transaction, it turned out that respondent Jesusa's balance
  was insufficient to accommodate the P 200,000.00 fund transfer
Respondent Jesusa's bare claim, although corroborated by her as narrated earlier.
daughter, that the former deposited P 100,000.00 cash in  
addition to the fund transfer of P 100,000.00, is not established Since respondent Jesusa had signed the alteration in the
by physical evidence. While the duplicate copy of the deposit withdrawal slip and had already left the teller's counter
slip [30]  was in the amount of P 200,000.00 and bore the stamp thereafter and Capati was still inside the teller's cage, Torneros
mark of teller Torneros, such duplicate copy failed to show that asked Capati about the original deposit slip and the latter told
there was a cash deposit of P 100,000.00. An examination of the her, Ok naman iyan, [35]  and Capati superimposed the figures 1
deposit slip shows that it did not contain any entry in the on 2 on the deposit slip [36]  to reflect the initial deposit
breakdown portion for the specific denominations of the cash of P 100,000.00 for respondent Jesusa's new Express Teller
account and signed the alteration. Torneros then machine-
validated the deposit slip. Thus, the duplicate copy of the WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the
deposit slip, which bore Torneross stamp mark and which was Court of Appeals dated October 29, 2002 as well as its
given to respondent Jesusa prior to the processing of her Resolution dated February 12, 2003 are
transaction, was not machine-validated unlike the original copy hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint filed by
of the deposit slip. respondents, together with the counterclaim of petitioner,
While the fact that the alteration in the original deposit slip was is DISMISSED.
signed by Capati and not by respondent Jesusa herself was a  
violation of the bank's policy requiring the depositor to sign the No costs.
correction, [37]  nevertheless, we find that respondents failed to  
satisfactorily establish by preponderance of evidence that indeed SO ORDERED.
there was an additional cash of P 100,000.00 deposited to the
new Express Teller account.
 
Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth,
and it ranks high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence.
[38]
 We have, on many occasions, relied principally upon
G.R. No. 211002               January 21, 2015
physical evidence in ascertaining the truth. Where the physical
evidence on record runs counter to the testimonial evidence of RICHARD RICALDE, Petitioner, 
the prosecution witnesses, we consistently rule that the physical vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
evidence should prevail. [39]
  DECISION
In addition, to uphold the declaration of the CA that it is
LEONEN, J.:
unlikely for respondent Jesusa and her daughter to concoct a
false story against a banking institution is to give weight to Even men can become victims of rape.
conjectures and surmises, which we cannot countenance.
In fine, respondents failed to establish their claim by Before us is a criminal case for rape through sexual assault
committed against a 10-year-old boy. Accused Richard Ricalde
preponderance of evidence. (Ricalde) was charged with rape as described under the second
Considering the foregoing, we find no need to tackle the other paragraph of Section 266-A of the Revised Penal Code,
issues raised by petitioner. committed "[b ]y any person who, under any of the
circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit
an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another It was around 2:00 a.m. when XXX awoke as "he felt pain in his
person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into anus and stomach and something inserted in his anus."14 He
the genital or anal orifice of another person." 1 saw that Ricalde "fondled his penis."15 When Ricalde returned to
the sofa, XXX ran toward his mother’s room to tell her what
This is a Petition for Review2 assailing the Court of Appeals’ happened.16 He also told his mother that Ricalde played with his
August 28, 2013 Decision3 affirming Ricalde’s conviction for sexual organ.17
rape through sexual assault and January 15, 2014
Resolution4 denying reconsideration. XXX’s mother armed herself with a knife for self-defense when
she confronted Ricalde about the incident, but he remained
The Provincial Prosecutor of Biñan, Laguna filed an Information silent.18 She asked him to leave.19
charging Ricalde of rape through sexual assault:
XXX’s mother then accompanied XXX to the barangay hall
That on or about January 31, 2002, in the Municipality of Sta. where they were directed to report the incident to the Sta. Rosa
Rosa, Province of Laguna, Philippines, and within the police station.20 The police referred them to the municipal health
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Richard Ricalde, center for medical examination.21 Dr. Roy Camarillo
prompted with lewd design, did then and there willfully, examined22 XXX and found no signs of recent trauma in his anal
unlawfully and feloniously inserting [sic] his penis into the anus orifice23 that was also "NEGATIVE for [s]permatozoa."24
of XXX who was then ten (10) years of age against his will and
consent, to his damage and prejudice. On February 4, 2002, XXX and his mother executed their sworn
statements at the Sta. Rosa police station, leading to the
CONTRARY TO LAW.5 criminal complaint filed against Ricalde.25

Ricalde pleaded not guilty during his arraignment on August 21, Ricalde denied the accusations.26 He testified that he met XXX
2002.6 The prosecution presented the victim (XXX),7 his mother, during the 2001 town fiesta of Calaca, Batangas and learned
and the medico-legal as witnesses, while the defense presented that XXX’s mother is the cousin of his cousin Arlan Ricalde.27 He
Ricalde as its sole witness.8 and XXX became textmates, and XXX invited him to his
house.28 On January 30, 2002, XXX’s mother picked him up to
The facts as found by the lower courts follow. sleep at their house.29 He slept at 10:00 p.m. on the living room
sofa while XXX slept on the floor.30 He denied the alleged rape
On January 30, 2002, XXX requested his mother to pick up through sexual assault.31
Ricalde at McDonald’s Bel-Air, Sta. Rosa at past 8:00
p.m.9 Ricalde, then 31 years old,10 is a distant relative and The Regional Trial Court in its Decision32 dated June 20, 2011
textmate of XXX, then 10 years old.11 found Ricalde guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape through
sexual assault:
After dinner, XXX’s mother told Ricalde to spend the night at
their house as it was late.12 He slept on the sofa while XXX slept WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused Richard Ricalde guilty
on the living room floor.13 beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape by sexual assault
and, accordingly, sentences him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from four (4) years, two (2) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) immediately pushed petitioner away, but in another instance, he
years of prision mayor as maximum. Accused is ordered to pay testified as follows: "I felt that he was inserting his penis inside
[XXX] the sums of 50,000.00 as moral damages and 50,000.00 my anus because I was even able to hold his penis. He was
as civil indemnity. also playing with my penis."45 XXX also stated in his salaysay
that "the penis reached only the periphery of his anal orifice."46
SO ORDERED.33
Third, XXX testified that after he had pushed petitioner away, he
34
The Court of Appeals in its Decision  dated August 28, 2013 saw that petitioner was wearing pants with the zipper
affirmed the conviction with the modification of lowering the open.47 Petitioner submits that performing anal coitus while
amounts of damages awarded: wearing pants with an open zipper poses a challenge — the risk
of injuring the sexual organ or having pubic hair entangled in the
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 20 June 2011 of Branch 34 zipper. 48 Petitioner argues that the court must consider every
of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, in Crim. Case circumstance favoring the innocence of an accused.49
No. 11906-B, is AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATION as to the
award of damages. Accused-appellant RICHARD RICALDE is Assuming he committed an offense, petitioner contends that the
ordered to pay the victim civil indemnity in the amount of Thirty court should have applied the "variance doctrine" in People v.
Thousand (30,000.00) Pesos and moral damages likewise in the Sumingwa,50 and the court would have found him guilty for the
amount of Thirty Thousand (30,000.00) Pesos, both with interest lesser offense of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the
at the legal rate of six (6%) percent per annum from the date of Revised Penal Code.51 The petition then enumerated
finality of this judgment until fully paid.35 circumstances showing possible homosexual affections
between petitioner and XXX.52 These include the fact that they
Ricalde filed this Petition praying for his acquittal.36 were textmates and that petitioner played with XXX’s penis.53

Petitioner argues the existence of reasonable doubt in his favor. Petitioner argues that this masturbation could have caused an
First, the medico-legal testified that he found "no physical signs irritation that XXX mistook as penetration.54 XXX could also
or external signs of recent trauma [in XXX’s] anus,"37 or any have mistaken the "overreaching fingers as a male organ trying
trace of spermatozoa.38 He contends that physical evidence to enter his [anus]."55 Assuming these acts took place, these
"ranks high in [the court’s] hierarchy of trustworthy evidence." 39 would only be considered as acts of lasciviousness.56

Second, XXX did not categorically say that a penis was inserted The People of the Philippines counters that the prosecution
into his anal orifice, or that he saw a penis or any object being proved beyond reasonable doubt all elements of the crime
inserted into his anal orifice.40 XXX was also able to immediately charged.
push him away.41 Thus, no push and pull movement happened
that would explain XXX’s alleged stomach ache.42 Petitioner The Comment57 discussed that it is neither improbable nor
submits that the alleged stomach ache was an attempt to contrary to human experience that XXX’s mother allowed her
aggravate the charge against him.43 son to be left alone with a stranger.58 Petitioner was not a
complete stranger, and she could not have foreseen such abuse
Petitioner argues that XXX’s inconsistent testimony raises since "rape by sexual assault or any form of sexual abuse of a
reasonable doubt on his guilt.44 XXX claimed that he boy by a grown man is fairly uncommon in our culture."59
Petitioner’s reliance on the medico-legal’s findings deserves d) When the offended party is under twelve (12)
scant consideration.60 The Comment quoted People v. years of age or is demented, even though none of
Penilla61 in that "[a] medical examination of the victim is not the circumstances mentioned above be present;
indispensable in a prosecution for rape inasmuch as the victim’s
testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused 2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances
of the crime."62 In any case, the medico-legal testified on the mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of
sphincter’s flexibility and how an insertion into the anal orifice sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
would not necessarily cause injury.63 person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or
object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Lastly, the prosecution established all elements of rape through (Emphasis supplied)
sexual assault based on XXX’s clear and categorical
testimony.64 Petitioner’s defense of mere denial cannot outweigh Rape under the second paragraph of Article 266-A is also
positive testimony.65 Consequently, petitioner’s contention that known as "instrument or object rape,"69 "gender-free rape,"70 or
the incident only amounts to acts of lasciviousness lacks merit.66 "homosexual rape."71 The gravamen of rape through sexual
assault is "the insertion of the penis into another person’s mouth
The issue before us for resolution is whether the prosecution or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into another person’s
proved beyond reasonable doubt petitioner Richard Ricalde’s genital or anal orifice."72
guilt for the crime of rape through sexual assault.
Jurisprudence holds that "the findings of the trial court, its
We affirm petitioner’s conviction with modification on the penalty calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its
imposed. assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its
conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded respect if
The Anti-Rape Law of 199767 classified rape as a crime against not conclusive effect."73
persons68 and amended the Revised Penal Code to include
Article 266-A on rape through sexual assault: The trial court found that XXX’s "straightforward, unequivocal
and convincing testimony"74 sufficiently proved that petitioner
Article 266–A. Rape; When and How Committed.—Rape is committed an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into
Committed— XXX’s anal orifice.75 There was no showing of ill motive on the
part of XXX to falsely accuse petitioner.76 The Court of Appeals
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a accorded great weight to the trial court’s findings and affirmed
woman under any of the following circumstances: petitioner’s conviction.77

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation; No cogent reason exists for this court to overturn the lower
courts’ findings.
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason
or otherwise unconscious; First, petitioner’s argument highlighting alleged inconsistencies
in XXX’s testimony fails to convince.
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave
abuse of authority; and
In a long line of cases,78 this court has given full weight and Q: So when you said he was inserting his penis to your
credit to the testimonies of child victims. Their "[y]outh and anus and he was even playing with your private part, who
immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity."79 XXX, is this person you are referring to as "he"?
then only 10 years old, had no reason to concoct lies against
petitioner.80 A: Richard, sir.85

This court has also held that "[l]eeway should be given to In People v. Soria,86 this court discussed that a victim need not
witnesses who are minors, especially when they are relating identify what was inserted into his or her genital or anal orifice
past incidents of abuse."81 for the court to find that rape through sexual assault was
committed:
Petitioner contends that XXX did not categorically say that a
penis was inserted into his anal orifice, or that he saw a penis or We find it inconsequential that "AAA" could not specifically
any object being inserted into his anal orifice. identify the particular instrument or object that was inserted into
her genital. What is important and relevant is that indeed
This contradicts petitioner’s earlier statement in his appellant’s something was inserted into her vagina. To require "AAA" to
brief82 that "[a]lthough it is true that the Supreme Court, in a long identify the instrument or object that was inserted into her
line of cases, did not rule out the possibility of rape in cases vagina would be contrary to the fundamental tenets of due
where the victim remained physically intact at the time she or he process.87
was physically examined, still, it bears stressing that in the
instant case, the private complainant testified that the accused- Second, petitioner’s reliance on the medico-legal’s finding of no
appellant’s penis fully penetrated his anus."83 recent trauma in XXX’s anal orifice, or any trace of
spermatozoa, lacks merit. The absence of spermatozoa in
The trial court also quoted portions of the transcript of XXX’s XXX’s anal orifice does not negate the possibility of an erection
testimony in that he "felt something was inserted in [his] anus."84 and penetration. This result does not contradict the positive
testimony of XXX that the lower courts found credible, natural,
Q: That early morning of January 31, 2002, while you and consistent with human nature.
were sleeping at your house, do you recall any unusual
incident that happened to you? This court has explained the merely corroborative character of
expert testimony and the possibility of convictions for rape
A: Yes sir, I felt something was inserted in my anus. based on the victim’s credible lone testimony.88

.... In any case, the medico-legal explained that his negative finding
of trauma in the anal orifice does not remove the possibility of
Q: When you said that you felt something was inserted in an insertion considering the flexibility of the sphincter:
your anus, what did you do?
Q: Now, a while ago you testified that he was sodomized and
A: I felt that he was inserting his penis inside my anus your findings states [sic] that you did not find any congestion or
because I was even able to hold his penis. He was also abrasion, can you explain to this court why you stated in your
playing with my penis. findings that you did not find any congestion or abrasion?
A: Again, based on my examination[,] there were no external established beyond reasonable doubt all elements of the crime
signs of recent trauma to the anus. It should be realized that the of rape through sexual assault.
sphincter, that is the particular portion of the anus controlling the
bowel movement, it exhibits a certain flexibility such that it can XXX testified that he "felt something was inserted [into his]
resist any objected [sic] inserted and that area is very vascular, anus."93 The slightest penetration into one’s sexual organ
meaning to say, it is rich in blood supply, such that any injuries distinguishes an act of lasciviousness from the crime of rape.
would be healed in 24 hours or less than 24 hours, sir?89 People v. Bonaagua94 discussed this distinction:

Lastly, we address petitioner’s invocation of the "variance It must be emphasized, however, that like in the crime of rape
doctrine" citing People v. Sumingwa.90 Section 4 in relation to whereby the slightest penetration of the male organ or even its
Section 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure slightest contact with the outer lip or the labia majora of the
provides for the "variance doctrine": vagina already consummates the crime, in like manner, if the
tongue, in an act of cunnilingus, touches the outer lip of the
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and vagina, the act should also be considered as already
proof.—When there is variance between the offense charged in consummating the crime of rape through sexual assault, not the
the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as crime of acts of lasciviousness. Notwithstanding, in the present
charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense case, such logical interpretation could not be applied. It must be
proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved pointed out that the victim testified that Ireno only touched her
which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense private part and licked it, but did not insert his finger in her
charged which is included in the offense proved. vagina. This testimony of the victim, however, is open to various
interpretation, since it cannot be identified what specific part of
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another.— the vagina was defiled by Ireno. Thus, in conformity with the
An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved principle that the guilt of an accused must be proven beyond
when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the reasonable doubt, the statement cannot be the basis for
former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the convicting Ireno with the crime of rape through sexual
latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the assault.95 (Emphasis supplied)
offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former
continue or form part of those constituting the latter. People v. Bonaagua considers a woman’s private organ since
most if not all existing jurisprudence on rape involves a woman
In Sumingwa, the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 1649 and victim. Nevertheless, this interpretation can apply by analogy
1654 was charged with qualified rape but was convicted for the when the victim is a man in that the slightest penetration to the
lesser offense of acts of lasciviousness committed against a victim’s anal orifice consummates the crime of rape through
child under Article III, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. sexual assault.
761091 since "there was no penetration, or even an attempt to
insert [the accused’s] penis into [the victim’s] vagina."92 The gravamen of the crime is the violation of the victim’s dignity.
The degree of penetration is not important. Rape is an "assault
In the instant case, no variance exists between what was on human dignity."96
charged and what was proven during trial. The prosecution
People v. Quintos97 discussed how rape causes incalculable penalty for rape committed by inserting the penis into the mouth
damage on a victim’s dignity, regardless of the manner of its of the victim.98 (Citations omitted)
commission:
We affirm petitioner’s conviction but modify the penalty imposed
The classifications of rape in Article 266-A of the Revised Penal by the lower court to the penalty under Article III, Section 5(b) of
Code are relevant only insofar as these define the manners of Republic Act No. 7610 known as the "Special Protection of
commission of rape. However, it does not mean that one Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
manner is less heinous or wrong than the other. Whether rape is Act":99
committed by nonconsensual carnal knowledge of a woman or
by insertion of the penis into the mouth of another person, the SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse.— Children,
damage to the victim’s dignity is incalculable. Child sexual whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other
abuse in general has been associated with negative consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
psychological impacts such as trauma, sustained fearfulness, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
anxiety, self-destructive behavior, emotional pain, impaired conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and
sense of self, and interpersonal difficulties. Hence, one other sexual abuse.
experience of sexual abuse should not be trivialized just
because it was committed in a relatively unusual manner. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to
reclusion perpertua shall be imposed upon the following:
"The prime purpose of [a] criminal action is to punish the
offender in order to deter him and others from committing the ....
same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform and
rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order." Crimes (b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
are punished as retribution so that society would understand conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
that the act punished was wrong. other sexual abuse: Provided, That when the victim is under
twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted
Imposing different penalties for different manners of committing under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act
rape creates a message that one experience of rape is relatively No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or
trivial or less serious than another. It attaches different levels of lascivious conduct, as the case maybe: Provided, That the
wrongfulness to equally degrading acts. Rape, in whatever penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve
manner, is a desecration of a person’s will and body. In terms of (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium
penalties, treating one manner of committing rape as greater or period; (Emphasis supplied)
less in heinousness than another may be of doubtful
constitutionality. The Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No.
7610 defines "lascivious conduct": [T]he intentional touching,
However, the discriminatory treatment of these two acts with the either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin,
same result was not raised in this case. Acknowledging that breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object
every presumption must be accorded in favor of accused in into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the
criminal cases, we have no choice but to impose a lesser same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass,
degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person,
bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or merely punishable by prision mayor. This is undeniably unfair to
pubic area of a person.100 the child victim. To be sure, it was not the intention of the
framers of R.A. No. 8353 to have disallowed the applicability of
In People v. Chingh,101 the accused was charged with rape "for R.A. No. 7610 to sexual abuses committed to children. Despite
inserting his fingers and afterwards his penis into the private the passage of R.A. No. 8353, R.A. No. 7610 is still good law,
part of his minor victim[.]"102 The Court of Appeals found the which must be applied when the victims are children or those
accused guilty of two counts of rape: statutory rape and rape "persons below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are
through sexual assault.103 This court modified the penalty unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves
imposed for rape through sexual assault to the penalty provided from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination
in Article III, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, discussing because of a physical or mental disability or
as follows: condition."104 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

It is undisputed that at the time of the commission of the sexual Thus, "for Rape Through Sexual Assault under paragraph 2,
abuse, VVV was ten (10) years old. This calls for the application Article 266-A, [the accused Chingh was] sentenced to suffer the
of R.A. No. 7610, or "The Special Protection of Children Against indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and
Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act," which defines twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to
sexual abuse of children and prescribes the penalty therefor in fifteen (15) years, six (6) months, and twenty (20) days of
Section 5(b), Article III, to wit: reclusion temporal, as maximum."105

.... The imposable penalty under Republic Act No. 7610, Section
5(b) "for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12)
In this case, the offended party was ten years old at the time of years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period."
the commission of the offense. Pursuant to the above-quoted This penalty is higher than the imposable penalty of prision
provision of law, Armando was aptly prosecuted under correccional for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the
paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as Revised Penal Code.
amended by R.A. No. 8353, for Rape Through Sexual Assault.
However, instead of applying the penalty prescribed therein, In enacting Republic Act No. 7610, the legislature intended to
which is prision mayor, considering that VVV was below 12 impose a higher penalty when the victi m is a child.
years of age, and considering further that Armando’s act of
inserting his finger in VVV’s private part undeniably amounted to The fact that XXX was only 10 years old when the incident
lascivious conduct, the appropriate imposable penalty should be happened was established by his birth certificate, and this was
that provided in Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, which admitted by the defense.106 His age of 10 years old was alleged
is reclusion temporal in its medium period. in the Information.107 The higher penalty under Republic Act No.
7610, as discussed in People v. Chingh, applies in this case.
The Court is not unmindful to the fact that the accused who
commits acts of lasciviousness under Article 366, in relation to Having sex with a 10-year-old is child abuse and is punished by
Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, suffers the more a special law (Republic Act No. 7610). It is a progression from
severe penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period than the Revised Penal Code to provide greater protection for
the one who commits Rape Through Sexual Assault, which is children. Justice Velasco suggests that this is not so. He
anchors his view on his interpretation that Republic Act No. Rape is rape. Rape of a child is clearly, definitely, and
7610 requires a showing that apart from the actual coerced universally child abuse.
sexual act on the 10-year-old, the child must also be exploited
by prostitution or by other sexual acts. This view is inaccurate Justice Velasco further observes that the right to due process of
on grounds of verba legis and ratione legis. the accused will be violated should we impose the penalty under
Republic Act No. 7610. I disagree.
The first paragraph of Article III, Section 5 of Republic Act No.
7610 clearly provides that "children . . . who . . . due to the The Information was clear about the facts constitutive of the
coercion . . . of any adult . . . indulge in sexual intercourse . . . offense. The facts constitutive of the offense will suggest the
are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other crime punishable by law. The principle is that ignorantia legis
sexual abuse." The label "children exploited in . . . other sexual non excusat. With the facts clearly laid out in the Information,
abuse" inheres in a child who has been the subject of coercion the law which punishes the offense should already be clear and
and sexual intercourse. the accused put on notice of the charges against him.

Thus, paragraph (b) refers to a specification only as to who is Additionally, there is no argument that the accused was not
liable and the penalty to be imposed. The person who engages represented by counsel. Clear from the records is the entry and
in sexual intercourse with a child already coerced is liable. active participation of his lawyer up to and including this appeal.

It does not make sense for the law not to consider rape of a On the award of damages, we maintain the amount of 30,000.00
child as child abuse. The proposal of Justice Velasco implies in favor of XXX as a victim of rape through sexual assault,
that there has to be other acts of a sexual nature other than the consistent with jurisprudence.108
rape itself that will characterize rape as child abuse. One count
of rape is not enough. Child abuse, in his view, is not yet This court has stated that "jurisprudence from 2001 up to the
present with one count of rape. present yields the information that the prevailing amount
awarded as civil indemnity to victims of simple rape committed
This is a dangerous calculus which borders on judicial by means other than penile insertion is ₱30,000."109
insensitivity to the purpose of the law. If we adopt his view, it
would amount to our collective official sanction to the idea that a This statement considered the prevailing situation in our
single act of rape is not debilitating to a child. That a single act jurisprudence where victims of rape are all
of rape is not a tormenting memory that will sear into a child’s women.1âwphi1However, as in this case, men can also become
memory, frame his or her view of the world, rob him or her of the victims of rape through sexual assault, and this can involve
trust that will enable him or her to have full and diverse penile insertion.
meaningful interactions with other human beings. In my view, a
single act of sexual abuse to a child, by law, is already WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. C.R.
reprehensible. Our society has expressed that this is conduct No. 34387 dated August 28, 2013 is AFFIRMED with
which should be punishable. The purpose and text of the law MODIFICATION in that for rape through sexual assault under
already punish that single act as child abuse. Article 266-A, paragraph 2, accused-appellant Richard Ricalde
is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12)
years, ten (10) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion
temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is
ordered to pay the victim civil indemnity in the amount of  
₱30,000.00 and moral damages likewise in the amount of
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[2] of the
₱30,000.00, both with interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum
from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid. Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 16886 entitled, The

SO ORDERED. Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation (SOLIDBANK) v. Del Monte

Motor Works, Inc., Narciso O. Morales and Spouse promulgated on 25

November 1999 and of the Resolution of the appellate court dated 11

May 2000 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. Said

THE CONSOLIDATED   G.R. No. 143338 decision and resolution affirmed the order dated 28 December 1987 of
BANK AND TRUST   the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27, Manila.
CORPORATION  
(SOLIDBANK), Present:  
P e t i t i o n e r,  
  PUNO, The facts of the case are as follows:
  Chairman,
 
  AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus CALLEJO, SR., On 13 June 1984, petitioner filed before the RTC of Manila a
  TINGA, and
  CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. complaint[3] for recovery of sum of money against respondents,
   
DEL MONTE MOTOR Promulgated: impleading the spouse of respondent Narciso O. Morales (respondent
WORKS, INC., NARCISO  
Morales) in order to bind their conjugal partnership of gains.
G. MORALES,[1] AND July 29, 2005
SPOUSE, Petitioner, a domestic banking and trust corporation, alleges therein
R e s p o n d e n t s.
x------------------------------------------------ that on 23 April 1982, it extended in favor of respondents a loan in the
--x
  amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as evidenced by a

DECISION promissory note executed by respondents on the same date. Under the
  promissory note, respondents Del Monte Motor Works, Inc.
 
(respondent corporation) and Morales bound themselves jointly and On 23 November 1984, respondent corporation filed before the trial

severally to pay petitioner the full amount of the loan through twenty- court a manifestation attaching thereto its answer to petitioners

five monthly installments of P40,000.00 a month with interest pegged complaint which states the following:

at 23% per annum. The note was to be paid in full by 23 May 1984. As  
2- That it denies generally and specifically the
respondents defaulted on their monthly installments, the full amount of allegations contained in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8
thereof for lack of knowledge and information
the loan became due and demandable pursuant to the terms of the
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the matters
promissory note. Petitioner likewise alleges that it made oral and therein alleged, the truth being those alleged in the
Special and Affirmative Defenses hereinbelow
written demands upon respondents to settle their obligation but contained;
 
notwithstanding these demands, respondents still failed to pay their 3- ANSWERING FURTHER, and by way of a first
special and affirmative defense, defendant herein states
indebtedness which, as of 09 March 1984, stood at P1,332,474.55.
that the promissory note in question is void for want of
Petitioner attached to its complaint as Annexes A, B, and C, valid consideration and/or there was no valuable
consideration involved as defendant herein did not
respectively, a photocopy of the promissory note supposedly executed receive any consideration at all;
 
by respondents, a copy of the demand letter it sent respondents dated 4- ANSWERING FURTHER, and by way of a second
20 January 1983, and statement of account pertaining to respondents special affirmative defense, defendant herein alleges
that no demand has ever been sent to nor received by
loan. herein defendant and if ever demands were made,
denies any liability as averred therein.
   
5- ANSWERING FURTHER, and by way of a third
On 31 October 1984, petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Declare special and affirmative defense, defendant herein avers
the Defendants in Default which was opposed by the defendants upon that the complaint states no cause of action and has no
basis either in fact or in law;
the ground that they were never served with copies of the summons
 
and of petitioners complaint.
VERIFICATION
  I, JEANETTE D. TOLENTINO, of legal age, after
having been duly sworn to in accordance with law,
depose and state:
   4. He has never signed the promissory note attached to
That I am the Controller of Del Monte Motor Works, the complaint in his personal and/or individual capacity
Inc., one of the defendants in this case. as such;
   
That for and in behalf of the defendant corporation, I 5. That the said promissory note is ineffective,
caused the preparation of the above-narrated answer. unenforceable and void for lack of valid consideration;
   
That I have read the contents thereof and they are true 6. That even admitting, argumenti gratia, the validity
of my own knowledge. and execution of the questioned promissory note, still,
  defendant herein cannot be bound personally and
(SGD) JEANNETTE D. TOLENTINO[4] individually to the said obligations as banking
  procedures requires, it being a standard operating
  procedure of all known banking institution, that to hold
  a borrower jointly and severally liable in his official as
well as personal capacity, the borrower must sign a
On 06 December 1984, respondent Morales filed his manifestation Suretyship Agreement or at least, a continuing
guarranty with that of the corporation he represent(s)
together with his answer wherein he likewise renounced any liability
but which in this case is wanting;
on the promissory note, thus:  
7. That transaction/obligation in question did not, in any
  way, redound/inure to the benefit of the conjugal
1. He ADMIT[S] paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the partnership of gain, as there is no conjugal partnership
complaint with a qualification in paragraph 3 thereof of gain to speak with, defendant having long been
that he has long been separated from his wife and the separated from his wife and their property relation is
system governing their property relations is that of governed by the system of complete separation of
complete separation of property and not that of conjugal property, and more importantly, he has never signed the
partnership of gain[s]; said promissory note in his personal and individual
  capacity as such;
2. He [DENIES], generally and specifically, the  
allegations contained in paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8  
thereof, for lack of knowledge and information VERIFICATION
sufficient to form a belief and as to the truth of the  
matter therein averred, the truth being those alleged in That I, NARCISO MORALES, after having been duly
the Special And Affirmative Defenses hereinbelow sworn to in accordance with law, hereby depose and
pleaded; declare that:
   
  I am one of the named defendant[s] in the above-
SPECIAL AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES entitled case;
   
 I have cause[d] the preparation of the foregoing Answer
upon facts and figures supplied by me to my retained enclosed to said letter a check with a face value of P220,020.00 to be
counsel; have read each and every allegations contained
therein and hereby certify that the same are true and discounted by petitioner with the proceeds being applied as partial
correct of my own knowledge and information.
  payment to their companys obligation to petitioner; that after receipt of
(SGD) NARCISO MORALES
Affiant[5] this partial payment, respondents obligation again became stagnant
  prompting petitioner to serve respondents with another demand letter
 
which, unfortunately, was unheeded by respondents. Lavarino also
On 26 December 1984, the trial court denied petitioners motion to
identified the following exhibits for petitioner: photocopy of the
declare respondents in default and admitted their respective answers.[6]
duplicate original of the promissory note attached to the complaint as
 
Exhibit A;[7] petitioners 20 January 1983 demand letter marked as
During the trial on the merits of this case, petitioner presented as its
Exhibit B;[8] Tolentinos letter to petitioner dated 10 February 1983 and
sole witness, Liberato A. Lavarino (Lavarino), then the manager of its
marked as Exhibit C;[9] and the 09 March 1984 statement of account
Collection Department. Substantially, Lavarino stated that respondents
sent to respondents marked as Exhibit D.[10]
obtained the loan, subject of this case, from petitioner and due to
 
respondents failure to pay a single monthly installment on this loan,
On 26 September 1985, petitioner made its formal offer of
petitioner was constrained to send a demand letter to respondents; that
evidence. However, as the original copy of Exhibit A could no longer
as a result of this demand letter, Jeannette Tolentino (Tolentino),
be found, petitioner instead sought the admission of the duplicate
respondent corporations controller, wrote a letter to petitioner
original of the promissory note which was identified and marked as
requesting for some consideration because of the unfavorable business
Exhibit E.
atmosphere then buffeting their business operation; that Tolentino  
 
The trial court initially admitted into evidence Exhibit E and granted insisting that the due execution and genuineness of the promissory

respondents motion that they be allowed to amend their respective note were not established as far as he was concerned, essentially raised

answers to conform with this new evidence.[11] the same arguments contained in respondent corporations

  manifestation with motion for reconsideration referred to above.

On 30 September 1985, respondent corporation filed a manifestation  

and motion for reconsideration[12] of the trial courts order admitting On 06 December 1985, the trial court granted respondents motions for

into evidence petitioners Exhibit E. Respondent corporation claims reconsideration.[14]Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of this

that Exhibit E should not have been admitted as it was immaterial, order which was denied by the court a quo on 20 December 1985.[15]

irrelevant, was not properly identified and hearsay evidence.  

Respondent corporation insists that Exhibit E was not properly On 26 December 1985, respondents separately filed their motions to

identified by Lavarino who testified that he had nothing to do in the dismiss on the similar ground that with the exclusion of Exhibits A and

preparation and execution of petitioners exhibits, one of which was E, petitioner no longer possessed any proof of respondents alleged

Exhibit E. Further, as there were markings in Exhibit A which were indebtedness.[16]

not contained in Exhibit E, the latter could not possibly be considered  

an original copy of Exhibit A. Lastly, respondent corporation claims On 08 April 1986, petitioner filed a motion [17] praying that the

that the exhibit in question had no bearing on the complaint as presiding judge, Judge Ricardo D. Diaz, of the court a quo inhibit

Lavarino admitted that Exhibit E was not the original of Exhibit A himself from this case maintaining that the latter rushed into resolving

which was the foundation of the complaint and upon which respondent its motion for reconsideration of the trial courts order of 06 December

corporation based its own answer. 1985 thereby depriving it the opportunity of presenting proof that the

  original of Exhibit A was delivered to respondents as early as 02 April

Respondent Morales similarly filed a manifestation with motion to 1983. Such haste on the part of the presiding judge, according to

reconsider order admitting as evidence Exhibit E[13] which, other than

petitioner, cast doubt on his objectivity and fairness. This motion to  
inhibit was denied by the trial court on 06 August 1987.[18] Aggrieved by the appellate courts ruling, petitioner now seeks redress
 
from this Court imputing the following errors on the Court of Appeals:
[19]
In an order dated 28 December 1987,  the case before the trial court
 
was dismissed, the dispositive portion of which reads: I
 
  THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
WHEREFORE, the instant case against defendants Del GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT
Monte Motor Works, Inc. and Narciso O. Morales and PRIVATE RESPONDENTS DENIED THE
spouse, is hereby DISMISSED, with costs against the MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS OF PETITIONER
plaintiff. SOLIDBANKS COMPLAINT, DESPITE THE
  PRESENCE OF INDUBITABLE FACTS CLEARLY
  POINTING TO THE FACT THAT SAID PRIVATE
  RESPONDENTS ADMITTED THE GENUINENESS
AND DUE EXECUTION OF THE SUBJECT
The trial courts finding was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in the PROMISSORY NOTE.
assailed decision now before us. The dispositive portion of the  
II
appellate courts decision reads:  
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
  GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT UPHELD THE
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the EXCLUSION OF EXHIBIT E, THE SECOND
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch ORIGINAL OF THE PROMISSORY NOTE,
27, dated December 28, 1987 dismissing plaintiff- DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE ORIGINAL OF
appellant['s] complaint is hereby AFFIRMED. Cost EXHIBIT A (XEROX COPY OF THE DUPLICATE
against the plaintiff-appellant.[20] ORIGINAL OF THE PROMISSORY NOTE) WAS
  ACTUALLY IN THE POSSESSION OF PRIVATE
  RESPONDENTS, THUS WARRANTING THE
  ADMISSION OF SECONDARY EVIDENCE.
 
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration dated 14 III
 
December 1999 which was denied for lack of merit in a resolution of THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
the Court of Appeals promulgated on 11 May 2000.[21] TRIAL JUDGE SHOULD HAVE INHIBITED
 HIMSELF FROM TAKING COGNIZANCE OF AND
FROM TRYING AND DECIDING THE INSTANT We hold otherwise.
CASE CONSIDERING HIS PERCEIVED AND
MANIFEST BIAS AND PARTIALITY IN FAVOR  
OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO THE
GRAVE PREJUDICE OF PETITIONER The pertinent portion of the Rules of Court on the matter provides:
SOLIDBANK.[22]
 
 
SEC. 8. How to contest such documents. When an
 
action or defense is founded upon a written instrument,
 
copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as
provided in the preceding section, the genuineness and
The petition is meritorious.
due execution of the instrument shall be deemed
admitted unless the adverse party, under oath,
In resolving the case against petitioner, the appellate court held that
specifically denies them and sets forth what he claims
to be the facts; but the requirement of an oath does not
contrary to petitioners stance, respondents were able to generally and
apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a
party to the instrument or when compliance with an
specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the order for an inspection of the original instrument is
refused.[24]
promissory note, thus:
 
 
There can be no dispute to the fact that the allegations In the case of Permanent Savings and Loan Bank v. Mariano Velarde,
in the answer (Record, p. 20, 26-27), of both
[25]
defendants, they denied generally and specifically under  this Court held that
oath the genuineness and due execution of the
promissory note and by way of special and affirmative  
defenses herein states that he (MORALES) never . . . Respondent also denied any liability on the
signed the promissory note attached to the complaint promissory note as he allegedly did not receive the
(Exh. A) in his personal and/or individual capacity. amount stated therein, and the loan documents do not
Moreover, what appears in the record (Record, p. 20) express the true intention of the parties. Respondent
was an admission of paragraphs 1 & 2 but they deny reiterated these allegations in his denial under oath,
generally and specifically the rest of the allegations. It stating that the promissory note sued upon, assuming
would be considered that there is a sufficient that it exists and bears the genuine signature of herein
compliance of the requirement of the law for specific defendant, the same does not bind him and that it did
denial.[23] not truly express the real intention of the parties as
  stated in the defenses
   
 
 Respondents denials do not constitute an effective
specific denial as contemplated by law. In the early case purpose of the proof is to establish the terms of the writing meaning
of Songco vs. Sellner,[26] the Court expounded on how
the alleged promissory note as it is the basis of the recovery of the
to deny the genuineness and due execution of an
actionable document, viz.: money allegedly loaned to the defendants (respondents herein).[28]
 
. . . This means that the defendant must  
declare under oath that he did not sign
the document or that it is otherwise false The best evidence rule is encapsulated in Rule 130, Section 3, of the
or fabricated. Neither does the statement Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which provides:
of the answer to the effect that the
instrument was procured by fraudulent  
representation raise any issue as to its Sec. 3. Original document must be produced;
genuineness or due execution. On the exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents
contrary such a plea is an admission both of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other
of the genuineness and due execution than the original document itself, except in the
thereof, since it seeks to avoid the following cases:
instrument upon a ground not affecting  
either.[27] (a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or
  cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the
  part of the offeror;
   
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the
In this case, both the court a quo and the Court of Appeals erred in control of the party against whom the evidence is
ruling that respondents were able to specifically deny the allegations in offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable
notice;
petitioners complaint in the manner specifically required by the rules.  
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or
In effect, respondents had, to all intents and purposes, admitted the other documents which cannot be examined in court
without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
genuineness and due execution of the subject promissory note and
established from them is only the general result of the
recognized their obligation to petitioner. whole; and
 
  (d) When the original is a public record in the custody
of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
The appellate court likewise sustained the ruling of the trial court that  
 
the best evidence rule or primary evidence must be applied as the
 
 contracts, since a slight variation in words may mean a
The best evidence rule, according to Professor Thayer, first great difference in rights, (2) that there is a substantial
hazard of inaccuracy in the human process of making a
appeared in the year 1699-1700 when in one case involving a
copy by handwriting or typewriting, and (3) as respects
goldsmith, Holt, C. J., was quoted as stating that they should take into oral testimony purporting to give from memory the
terms of a writing, there is a special risk of error,
consideration the usages of trade and that the best proof that the nature greater than in the case of attempts at describing other
situations generally. In the light of these dangers of
of the thing will afford is only required.[29] Over the years, the phrase mistransmission, accompanying the use of written
copies or of recollection, largely avoided through
was used to describe rules which were already existing such as the rule
proving the terms by presenting the writing itself, the
that the terms of a document must be proved by the production of the preference for the original writing is justified.[32]
 
document itself, in preference to evidence about the document; it was  
 
also utilized to designate the hearsay rule or the rule excluding
Bearing in mind that the risk of mistransmission of the contents of a
assertions made out of court and not subject to the rigors of cross-
writing is the justification for the best evidence rule, we declare that
examination; and the phrase was likewise used to designate the group
this rule finds no application to this case. It should be noted that
of rules by which testimony of particular classes of witnesses was
respondents never disputed the terms and conditions of the promissory
preferred to that of others.[30]
note thus leaving us to conclude that as far as the parties herein are
 
concerned, the wording or content of said note is clear enough and
According to McCormick, an authority on the rules of
leaves no room for disagreement. In their responsive pleadings,
evidence, the only actual rule that the best evidence phrase denotes
respondents principal defense rests on the alleged lack of consideration
today is the rule requiring the production of the original writing [31] the of the promissory note. In addition, respondent Morales also claims

rationale being: that he did not sign the note in his personal capacity. These contentions

  clearly do not question the precise wording[33] of the promissory note

(1) that precision in presenting to the court the exact which should have paved the way for the application of the best
words of the writing is of more than average
importance, particularly as respects operative or
dispositive instruments, such as deeds, wills and
evidence rule. It was, therefore, an error for the Court of Appeals to complaint, the plaintiff need not prove that fact as it is considered

sustain the decision of the trial court on this point. admitted by the defendant.[35] In the case of Asia Banking Corporation

  v. Walter E. Olsen & Co.,[36] this Court held that

Besides, the best evidence rule as stated in our Revised Rules of Civil  
Another error assigned by the appellant is the fact that
Procedure is not absolute. As quoted earlier, the rule accepts of the lower court took into consideration the documents
attached to the complaint as a part thereof, without
exceptions one of which is when the original of the subject document
having been expressly introduced in evidence. This was
is in the possession of the adverse party. As pointed out by petitioner no error. In the answer of the defendants there was no
denial under oath of the authenticity of these
in its motion to inhibit, had it been given the opportunity by the documents. Under Section 103 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the authenticity and due execution of these
court a quo, it would have sufficiently established that the original of documents must, in that case, be deemed admitted. The
effect of this is to relieve the plaintiff from the duty of
Exhibit A was in the possession of respondents which would have
expressly presenting such documents as evidence. The
called into application one of the exceptions to the best evidence rule. court, for the proper decision of the case, may and
should consider, without the introduction of evidence,
  the facts admitted by the parties.[37]
 
Significantly, and as discussed earlier, respondents failed to deny  
specifically the execution of the promissory note. This being the case,  

there was no need for petitioner to present the original of the Anent petitioners allegation that the presiding judge of the court a

promissory note in question. Their judicial admission with respect to quo should have inhibited himself from this case, we resolve this issue

the genuineness and execution of the promissory note sufficiently against petitioner.

established their liability to petitioner regardless of the fact that  

petitioner failed to present the original of said note.[34] In order for this Court to sustain a charge of partiality and prejudice

  brought against a judge, there must be convincing proof to show that

Indeed, when the defendant fails to deny specifically and under oath he or she is, indeed, biased and partial. Bare allegations are not

the due execution and genuineness of a document copied in a enough. Bias and prejudice are serious charges which cannot be
presumed particularly if weighed against a judges sacred obligation however, must be exercised by the party seeking the dismissal of a

under his oath of office to administer justice without respect to person case upon this ground as under the rules, if the movants plea for the

and do equal right to the poor and the rich. [38] There must be a showing dismissal on demurrer to evidence is granted and the order of dismissal

of bias and prejudice stemming from an extrajudicial source resulting is reversed on appeal, he loses his right to adduce evidence. If the

in an opinion in the merits on some basis other than what the judge defendants motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence is granted

learned from his participation in the case.[39] and the order is subsequently reversed on appeal, judgment is rendered

In this case, as petitioner failed to proffer any evidence indicating that in favor of the adverse party because the movant loses his right to

Judge Diaz was guilty of bias and prejudice, we affirm the Court of present evidence.[40] The reviewing court cannot remand the case for

Appeals holding that there was no cogent reason for him to disqualify further proceedings; rather, it should render judgment on the basis of

himself from this case. the evidence presented by the plaintiff.[41]

Finally, Rule 33, Section 1, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure  

states the rule on the effect of judgment on demurrer to evidence. It Under the promissory note executed by respondents in this case, they

reads: are obligated to petitioner in the amount of One Million Pesos, this
 
SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence.- After the plaintiff being the amount of loan they obtained on 23 April 1982. In addition,
has completed the presentation of his evidence, the
they also bound themselves to pay the 23% interest per annum on the
defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that
upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no loan; and a penalty charge of 3% per annum on the amount due until
right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the
right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on fully paid. Respondents likewise agreed to pay attorneys fees
appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be
deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. equivalent to 10% of the total amount due, but in no case less
  than P200.00, plus costs of suit with both these amounts bearing a 1%
 
  interest per month until paid. Costs against respondents.
A demurrer to evidence abbreviates judicial proceedings, it being an WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals decision
instrument for the expeditious termination of an action. Caution, dated 25 November 1999 as well as its Resolution of 11 May 2000,
 CALLEJO, SR., J.:
affirming the order of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 27,

dated 28 December 1987, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by
petitioner Engr. Bayani Magdayao of the Decision[1] of the Court
Respondents are ordered to pay One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20549 affirming the Decision[2] of
the Regional Trial Court, Dipolog City, Branch 8, convicting the
plus 23% interest per annum, penalty charge of 3% interest per annum, petitioner of violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22.
and 10% of the amount due as attorneys fees together with a 1%

interest per month until fully paid. The sum of P220,020.00 which was The Antecedents

the value of the postdated check given

An Information was filed charging petitioner with violation of
  B.P. Blg. 22 on September 16, 1993, the accusatory portion of
which reads:
 
On or about September 30, 1991, at Dipolog City, Philippines, and
by respondents to petitioner as partial payment should be deducted within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
from the amount due from respondents. accused, knowing fully well that he did not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank, Philippine National Bank, Dipolog
  Branch, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make,
draw, issue and deliver to one RICKY OLVIS, in payment of his
SO ORDERED. obligation to the latter, PNB Check No. 399967 dated September 30,
1991 in the amount of SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P600,000.00), Philippine Currency, which check, however, when
presented for payment with PNB-Dipolog Branch, was dishonored and
refused payment for the reason that it was drawn against insufficient
funds, and despite repeated demands made by the private complainant
on the accused, the latter, failed to make good the checks value, to the
damage and prejudice of RICKY OLVIS in the aforestated amount.

[G.R. No. 152881. August 17, 2004] CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

When arraigned, the petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered

ENGR. BAYANI MAGDAYAO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF a plea of not guilty.
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. When the case for trial was called on June 7, 1995 for the
prosecution to adduce its evidence, the petitioner and his
DECISION counsel were absent. On motion of the prosecution, the court
allowed it to adduce evidence. The prosecution presented the case was called for continuation of trial on November 21, 1995.
private complainant, Ricky Olvis, who testified on direct The prosecution offered in evidence the photocopy of PNB
examination that on September 30, 1991, the petitioner drew Check No. 399967, which the court admitted. The trial court,
and issued to him Philippine National Bank (PNB) Check No. thereafter, issued an Order declaring the case submitted for
399967 dated September 30, 1991 in the amount decision.[4] The petitioner filed a motion for a reconsideration of
of P600,000.00. The said check was drawn against the latters the Order, which the trial court denied on January 26, 1996.
account with the PNB, Dipolog City Branch, and issued in
The petitioner then filed an Omnibus Supplemental Motion
payment of the petitioners obligation with Olvis. The latter
and to Allow Him to Adduce Evidence alleging, inter alia, that:
deposited the check on October 1, 1991 in his account with the
BPI-Family Bank, Dipolog City Branch, but the drawee bank
h) Despite the absence of the original, with only a xerox copy of the
dishonored the check for the reason Drawn Against Insufficient
PNB Check worth P600,000.00, and further stressing that the same
Funds stamped on the dorsal portion of the check. Olvis testified
was paid, the prosecutor insisted, against the vigorous objection of
that when informed that his check was dishonored, the petitioner
accused, in filing the case in Court. Plenty of water passed under the
pleaded for time to pay the amount thereof, but reneged on his
bridge since then;[5]
promise. Olvis then filed a criminal complaint against the
petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 on September 4, 1992,
In its Opposition to the said motion, the prosecution averred
docketed as I.S. No. 92-368. The petitioner again offered to
that it dispensed with the presentation of the original of the
repay Olvis the amount of the obligation by retrieving the
dishonored check because the same had been returned to the
dishonored check and replacing the same with two other
petitioner. It also pointed out that the petitioner failed to object to
checks: one for P400,000.00 and another for P200,000.00
the presentation of the photocopy of the dishonored check.
payable to Olvis. Taking pity on the petitioner, he agreed. He
then returned the original copy of the check to the petitioner, but In a Special Manifestation, the petitioner insisted that the
the latter again failed to make good on his promise and failed to photocopy of the subject check was inadmissible in evidence
pay the P600,000.00. because of the prosecutions failure to produce the original
thereof. On July 8, 1996, the trial court issued an Order denying
The prosecution wanted Olvis to identify the petitioner as
the petitioners motion. The petitioners motion for
the drawer of the check, but because of the latters absence and
reconsideration thereon was, likewise, denied by the trial court.
that of his counsel, the direct examination on the witness could
not be terminated. The prosecution moved that such direct On January 29, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment
examination of Olvis be continued on another date, and that the convicting the petitioner of the crime charged. The fallo of the
petitioner be ordered to appear before the court so that he could decision reads:
be identified as the drawer of the subject check. The trial court
granted the motion and set the continuation of the trial on June WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of the accused established beyond
13, 1997. In the meantime, the prosecution marked a photocopy reasonable doubt, the herein accused, Engr. Bayani Magdayao is
of PNB Check No. 399967 as Exhibit A, and the dorsal portion convicted of the crime charged against him for Violation of Batas
thereof as Exhibit A-1. Pambansa Bilang 22, as principal by direct participation, and pursuant
to Section 1 thereof sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
After several postponements at the instance of the
for a period of six (6) months of arresto mayor and to pay the costs.
petitioner, he and his counsel failed to appear before the court
The accused is further ordered to pay the private complainant the sum
for continuation of trial. They again failed to appear when the
of P600,000.00 corresponding to his obligation due to the private THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING CIVIL
offended party. INDEMNITY TO PRIVATE COMPLAINANT IN THE AMOUNT
OF SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS.[7]
SO ORDERED.[6]
On December 21, 2001, the CA rendered judgment
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the petitioner assigned affirming the decision of the trial court. The appellate court also
the following errors: denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
I In his petition at bar, the petitioner merely reiterates the
errors he ascribed to the RTC in his appeal before the CA, and
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED prays that the decisions of the trial and appellate courts be set
OF THE CRIME CHARGED SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF THE aside.
FOLLOWING EVIDENCE:

A. MACHINE OR PHOTOSTATIC COPY OF PNB The Ruling of the Court

CHECK NO. 399967 DATED SEPTEMBER 30,
1991;
The petition has no merit.
B. WORD DAIF AT THE BACK OF THE On the first three assignments of error, the petitioner avers
PHOTOSTATIC COPY OF SAID CHECK; that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged because of the following: (a) the
C. UNCORROBORATED ORAL TESTIMONY OF photocopy of PNB Check No. 399967, adduced in evidence by
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT. the prosecution, is inadmissible in evidence under Rule 129,
Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Evidence; hence, has no
II probative weight; b) the prosecution failed to present the BPI-
Family Bank teller to testify on the presentment of PNB Check
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED No. 399967 and the dishonor thereof; and (c) the prosecution
WITHOUT HIM BEING POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY THE failed to prove that it was he who drew and delivered the
COMPLAINANT OR OTHER WITNESS. dishonored check to the private complainant, and that he was
properly notified of the dishonor of the said check. The petitioner
III also asserts that there was no legal basis for the award of the
amount of P6,000.00 as civil indemnity.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT RENDERED THE
We rule against the petitioner.
DECISION WITH ALLEGED FINDINGS OF FACTS NOT
SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE. Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 for which the petitioner was
charged, reads:
IV
Section 1. Checks without sufficient funds. Any person who makes or
draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing
at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The making,
with the drawee bank for the payment of such in full upon drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the
presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer without any valid be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds
reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the
imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the
(1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving
amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion
of the court. We agree with the petitioner that it was incumbent upon the
prosecution to adduce in evidence the original copy of PNB
To warrant the petitioners conviction of the crime charged, Check No. 399967 to prove the contents thereof, more
the prosecution was burdened to prove the following essential specifically the names of the drawer and endorsee, the date and
elements thereof: amount and the dishonor thereof, as well as the reason for such
dishonor. Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
(1) The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for specifically provides that when the subject of inquiry is the
account or for value; contents of the document, no evidence shall be admissible other
than the original thereof. The purpose of the rule requiring the
(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of production by the offeror of the best evidence is the prevention
issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee of fraud, because if a party is in possession of such evidence
bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and and withholds it and presents inferior or secondary evidence in
its place, the presumption is that the latter evidence is withheld
(3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for from the court and the adverse party for a fraudulent or devious
insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not purpose which its production would expose and defeat.[10] As
the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. long as the original evidence can be had, the court should not
[8]
receive in evidence that which is substitutionary in nature, such
as photocopies, in the absence of any clear showing that the
The gravamen of the offense is the act of making or issuing original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be
a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon produced in court. Such photocopies must be disregarded,
presentment for payment.[9] As to the second element, being inadmissible evidence and barren of probative weight.[11]
knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of
Furthermore, under Section 3(b), Rule 130 of the said
the insufficiency of the funds in or credit with the bank to cover
Rules, secondary evidence of a writing may be admitted when
the check upon its presentment refers to the state of mind of the
the original is in the custody or under the control of the party
drawer; hence, it is difficult for the prosecution to prove. The law
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
creates a prima facie knowledge on the insufficiency of funds or
produce it after reasonable notice. To warrant the admissibility
credit, coincidental with the attendance of the two other
of secondary evidence when the original of a writing is in the
elements. As such, Section 2 provides:
custody or control of the adverse party, Section 6 of Rule 130
provides that the adverse party must be given reasonable Q What did the accused in this case issue to you?
notice, that he fails or refuses to produce the same in court and
A He issued me a check worth six hundred thousand
that the offeror offers satisfactory proof of its existence:
pesos (P600,000.00).
When original document is in adverse partys custody or control. If the Q If the photostatic copy of the check [would] be
document is in the custody or under the control of the adverse party, he presented to you, would you be able to identify it?
must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after
A Yes, Sir.
satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document,
secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of its loss. Q I am showing to you a photostatic copy of PNB
Dipolog Branch Check # 399967 with a maturity
The mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custody date on September 30, 1991 in the amount of six
or control of the party against whom it is offered does not hundred thousand pesos (P600,000.00), is this the
warrant the admission of secondary evidence. The offeror must check issued to you?
prove that he has done all in his power to secure the best
evidence by giving notice to the said party to produce the A Yes, Sir.
document.[12] The notice may be in the form of a motion for the Q Here is a signature at the bottom corner of this check,
production of the original or made in open court in the presence whose signature is this?
of the adverse party or via a subpoena duces tecum, provided
that the party in custody of the original has sufficient time to A Bayani Magdayao[s].
produce the same. When such party has the original of the Q In other words, this check was issued for a valuable
writing and does not voluntarily offer to produce it or refuses to consideration in connection with the project you
produce it, secondary evidence may be admitted.[13] have in Ipil?
In this case, Olvis, the private complainant, testified that A Yes, Sir.
after the check was dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds, he returned it to the petitioner upon the Q What did you do with the check?
latters offer to pay the amount of the check by drawing and A I deposited this in BPI-Family Bank, but it was drawn
issuing two checks, one for P400,000.00 and the other against insufficient fund.
for P200,000.00. However, the petitioner still failed to satisfy his
obligation to Olvis: Q When did you deposit the check?

Q Sometime in the month of May 1991, do you A Sometime in October.

remember that (sic) you have any transaction with Q October, what year?
the accused?
A In 1991, Sir.
A Yes, Sir.
Q Within a reasonable period from the maturity date of
Q What was the transaction about? the check, you caused it to be deposited?
A It was about our joint venture in Ipil. A Yes, Sir.
Q And this check was dishonored by the depository was the case already pending before the City
bank, that the account to which it was drawn does Fiscals Office or before this Honorable Court?
not have sufficient fund, is that indicated in this
A Yes, Sir, it is pending.
check?
Q Until now the amount of six hundred thousand pesos
A Yes, Sir.
(P600,000.00) has not been paid to you?
Q Where is that indication of dishonor for lack of
A Yes, Sir.[14]
sufficient fund?
In his Motion to Suspend Proceedings in the trial court, the
A Here, Sir.
petitioner admitted that he received the original copy of the
INTERPRETER: Witness pointing to the check. dishonored check from the private complainant [15] and that he
caused the non-payment of the dishonored check.[16] The
ATTY. CO:
petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the need for the production
We pray, Your Honor, that the photostatic copy of the of the original copy of PNB Check No. 399967, and the fact that
check be marked as Exhibit A. The reason why it the prosecution was able to present in evidence only a
was dishonored, found at the back of this check, photocopy thereof because the original was in his possession.
indicated as DAIF meaning to say: Drawn Against In fact, in the Omnibus Supplemental Motion dated February 8,
Insufficient Fund be marked as Exhibit A-1. 1996, and in his Special Manifestation filed on May 28, 1996,
the petitioner complained of the prosecutions violation of the
Q After being informed that the check was dishonored best evidence rule. The petitioner, however, never produced the
by the drawee bank, what did you do? original of the check, much less offered to produce the same.
A I went to Magdayaos house and asked for payment The petitioner deliberately withheld the original of the check as a
but he refused to pay. bargaining chip for the court to grant him an opportunity to
adduce evidence in his defense, which he failed to do following
Q When you say Magdayao, are you referring to the his numerous unjustified postponements as shown by the
accused in this case, Bayani Magdayao? records.
A Yes, Sir. There was no longer a need for the prosecution to present
Q It appears that this is merely a photostatic copy of the as witness the employee of the drawee bank who made the
check, where is the original of the check? notation at the dorsal portion of the dishonored check[17] to
testify that the same was dishonored for having been drawn
A Magdayao replaced the original check worth six against insufficient funds. The petitioner had already been
hundred thousand pesos (P600,000.00), and he informed of such fact of dishonor and the reason therefor when
gave me another check worth four hundred Olvis returned the original of the check to him. In fact, as shown
thousand pesos (P400,000.00) and two hundred by the testimony of Olvis, the petitioner drew and issued two
thousand pesos (P200,000.00). other separate checks, one for P400,000.00 and the other
Q At the time the accused in this case replaced this for P200,000.00, to replace the dishonored check.
check worth six hundred thousand (P600,000.00), Because of his dilatory tactics, the petitioner failed to
adduce evidence to overcome that of the prosecutions.
 The petitioners contention that Olvis failed to identify him as reserving the right of cross-examination on the part of the accused, and
the drawer of the subject check is nettlesome. It bears stressing setting the case for the purpose on June 13, 1995.
that Olvis was ready to identify the petitioner after his direct
examination, but the latter and his counsel inexplicably failed to (15) June 13, 1995 The accused did not appear, but the defense
appear. The direct examination of Olvis had to be continued to counsel requested for a resetting of the cross-examination to be
enable him to point to and identify the petitioner as the drawer of conducted. The request was granted over the objection of the
the check. This is shown by the transcript of the stenographic prosecution, and set the continuation of the trial to August 31, 1995.
notes taken during the trial, viz:
(16) August 31, 1995 As in previous occasions, the accused did not
ATTY. CO: appear and defense counsel requested for another resetting, and despite
the vigorous opposition by the prosecution, the trial was postponed to
Considering that the accused is not present, Your Honor, I would like October 3, 1995, with the understanding that if the accused will not
to manifest that the private offended party be given the opportunity to appear, it would be taken to mean that he waived his right to cross-
identify the accused for purposes of this case.[18] examination and to present evidence in his defense.

The trial court issued an Order on June 7, 1995, directing (17) October 3, 1995 Atty. Narciso Barbaso appeared as a new counsel
the petitioner, under pain of contempt, to appear before it to for the accused but requested that he be allowed to read first the
enable Olvis to identify him: transcript of the direct testimony of the plaintiffs witness to be cross-
examined. The request was granted, and the trial was reset to
After the declaration of the first and only witness for the prosecution, November 21, 1995.
the private prosecutor prayed to set the case for continuation of the
trial, and ordering the defendant to appear to allow the prosecution to (18) November 21, 1995 The accused and his counsel both did not
establish his identity. appear. The prosecution formally offered Exh. A in evidence, and
upon its admission, the prosecution rested its case, and prayed that as
Set the case for continuation of the trial on June 13, 1995, ordering the stated in the previous order of the court dated August 31, 1995, the
accused to appear personally for purposes of his identification in court case shall be considered submitted for judgment, which request was
under pain of contempt if he fails to comply unjustifiably with this granted.
order. The defense shall be allowed to cross examine the witness for
the prosecution if desired, otherwise, his right of cross-examination (19) December 7, 1995 The defense filed a motion for reconsideration
shall be considered waived completely. of the order dated November 21, 1995. The court required the defense
to file a supplemental motion stating the nature of its evidence to be
SO ORDERED.[19] presented if allowed to enable the court to determine the merit of the
motion for reconsideration, but despite the lapsed (sic) of the period
The petitioner defied the Order of the court and failed to set by the court, the accused did not comply; hence, the denial of the
appear as directed, and as gleaned from the records motion for reconsideration, and set the case for promulgation of the
judgment on February 19, 1996.
(14) June 7, 1995 The accused and counsel did not appear; hence, the
prosecution was allowed to present its evidence ex-parte. The private (20) Then came the Omnibus Supplemental Motion, etc., by the
complainant was presented to testify in the direct-examination, accused dated February 8, 1996, and by reason thereof, the
promulgation of the judgment set on February 19, 1996, was held in 2. The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and
abeyance. taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case,
determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the
(21) The defense counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for the interest of justice, or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment
accused dated February 27, 1996, and which was granted by the order would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the
of the court dated March 1, 1996. social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice;

[(22)] May 28, 1996 A Special Manifestation dated May 21, 1996 in 3. Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the
support of the Omnibus Supplemental Motion filed thru another fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal
lawyer appearing as a new counsel for the accused, now under Code on subsidiary imprisonment.[22]
consideration.[20]
The records show that despite the numerous opportunities
Contrary to the petitioners claim, the trial court did not given to him by the trial court, the petitioner refused to adduce
award P6,000.00 as civil indemnity in favor of Olvis; it ordered any evidence in his behalf. Moreover, the Court of Appeals
the petitioner to pay him P600,000.00, the amount of the subject found the petitioners appeal to be devoid of merit. Considering
check. Having failed to pay the amount of the check, the the factual milieu in this case, there is every reason for the Court
petitioner is liable therefor and should be ordered to pay the to reject the plea for a penalty of fine and maintain the penalty of
same to the private complainant in this case.[21] imprisonment the trial court imposed on the petitioner.
On the second assigned error, the petitioner faulted the trial IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
court for imposing a penalty of imprisonment instead of a DENIED DUE COURSE. The assailed decision of the Court of
penalty of fine, and cites SC Circular No. 12-2000 to bolster his Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
contention. He suggests that since he is merely a first offender,
SO ORDERED.
he should be sentenced to pay a fine double the amount of the
check.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand,
objects to the petitioners plea on the ground that when the latter
drew and issued the dishonored check to the private
complainant, he knew that the residue of his funds in the drawee
bank was insufficient to pay the amount thereof.
ALBINO JOSEF, G.R. No. 146424
Considering the facts and circumstances attendant in this Petitioner,
case, we find the petitioners plea to be barren of merit. Present:
Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 provides: PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman
SANDOVAL-
It is, therefore, understood that: GUTIERREZ,*
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
1. Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment as
an alternative penalty for violations of BP 22;
 CARPIO
MORALES and should be impleaded as a respondent in line with Section
GARCIA, JJ. 2, Rule 125 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
 
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES** [4]
 Nonetheless, petitioner, in filing this petition,
and AGUSTIN ALARILLA,
Respondents. Promulgated: incorrectly entitled it Albino Josef v. Agustin Alarilla. In
 
accord with Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court, [5] we
November 18,
2005 have allowed petitioner Josef to subsequently implead the
 
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - People
x of the Philippines as respondent in this case.
   
 
DECISION Now, the facts.
  From June to August, 1991, petitioner, a Marikina-
 
CORONA, J.: based manufacturer and seller of shoes, purchased
 
  materials from respondent Agustin Alarilla, a seller of

This is a petition for review on certiorari [1] of a decision of leather products from Meycauayan, Bulacan, for which

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR no. 23234, [2] which the former issued a total of 26 postdated checks against

affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of his account with the Associated Bank and Far East Bank

Malolos Bulacan convicting Albino Josef of 26 counts of & Trust Company (Marikina Branches). When private

violation of BP 22, also known as the Anti-Bouncing respondent presented these checks for encashment, they

Checks Law.[3] were dishonored because the accounts against which they

By way of a preliminary clarification, this is a were drawn were closed. Private respondent informed

petition for review of the CAs decision affirming Albino petitioner of the dishonor and demanded payment of their

Josefs conviction for 26 counts of violation of BP 22. It is value. After some negotiations, petitioner drew and

therefore a criminal case and the People of the Philippines delivered a new set of postdated checks in replacement of
the dishonored ones. Private respondent, in turn, as evidence photocopies of the original checks and 3) he

returned to petitioner the originals of the dishonored acted in good faith. He likewise adopts the dissenting
postdated checks but retained photocopies thereof. When opinion of CA Justice Martin Villarama, Jr., [7] which

private respondent deposited the replacement checks in states that the penalty of imprisonment was incorrectly

his account with the Westmont Bank, these were also imposed on petitioner in the light of Administrative

dishonored by the drawee bank. As a result, the private Circular No. 12-2000.[8]
 
respondent filed criminal complaints against petitioner for
The petition is without merit.
violation of BP 22 with the Office of the Provincial  
Prosecutor of Bulacan. After preliminary investigation, the The elements of violation of BP 22 are:
Provincial Prosecutor filed 26 Informations against  
1)                             making, drawing and issuing any
petitioner with the RTC of Bulacan for violation of BP 22, check to apply on account or for value;
 
entitled People v. Josef, Criminal Case Nos. 2113-M-93 to 2)                             knowledge of the maker, drawer or
issuer that at the time of issue he does not
2138-M-93, for the original 26 postdated checks.[6]
have sufficient funds in or credit with the
 
drawee bank for the payment of the check in
The trial court convicted petitioner on all counts full upon its presentment; and
 
and imposed the penalty of six months for each 3)                             subsequent dishonor of the check
by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds
conviction. The Court of Appeals, in the assailed decision, or credit, or dishonor of the check for the
affirmed the trial court. same reason had not the drawer, without any
  valid cause, ordered the bank to stop
payment.[9]
Petitioner admits having issued the 26 dishonored  
 
checks. However, he claims the following defenses: 1) he
All three elements are present here.
has already paid private respondent the amount of the  
checks in cash; 2) the trial court was incorrect to accept
 photostatic copies of the subject checks in lieu of
Petitioner categorically admits the fact of issuance the originals thereof in the possession of the
[Petitioner]. It bears stressing that the raison
of the checks and their dishonor, [10]the first and third
detre of the proscription against the admission of
elements. He has likewise failed to rebut the statutory secondary evidence in lieu or in substitution of the
original thereof is to prevent the commission of
presumption[11] of knowledge of insufficient funds, the fraud on the part of the offeror who is in
possession of the best evidence but, in lieu
second element, which attaches if the check is presented thereof, adduced secondary evidence:
and dishonored within 90 days from its issuance. [12] While  
xxx xxx xxx
petitioner alleges to have paid private respondent the  
When he testified in the Court a quo, the
amount of the checks, he failed to specify if he had done [Petitioner] brought out the originals of the checks
and even marked the same in evidence
so within five banking days from receiving notice of the as Exhibits 1 to 21, except five (5) of the subject
checks dishonor and to present any evidence of such checks, which he claimed as missing and the
Prosecution even adopted the original checks as
payment. In addition, his unsubstantiated claim of cash its evidence:
 
payment contradicts his earlier defense that he had xxx xxx xxx
 
replaced the checks. The [Petitioner] admitted, before the Court a quo,
  that the originals of the subject checks were in his
Moving onto the procedural aspects of the case, possession. The [Petitioner] never alleged that
the photostatic copies of the checks marked
petitioner claims that, under the Best Evidence Rule, the and offered in evidence by the Prosecution
were not faithful copies of the originals of the
trial court should not have admitted in evidence the checks. In point of fact, when he testified in the
Court a quo, he was shown, by his counsel, the
photocopies of the checks until after he had been given photostatic copies of the subject checks and
reasonable notice to produce the originals. The Court of admitted that the originals of said checks were in
his possession on his claim that he had paid the
Appeals, in disposing of this contention, said:[13] Private Complainant the amount of P600,000.00
  in cash and the balance in the form of checks
However, in the light of the factual milieu in which he drew and issued to the Private
the present recourse, (we) find and so declare Complainant by way of replacement of the
that the Court a quo did not commit any aforesaid other checks:
reversible error in admitting in evidence the  
 xxx xxx xxx
  own admission, five of the original checks were lost, thus
By his testimony, the [Petitioner] thereby
rendering the photocopies thereof admissible as
admitted that the photostatic copies of the
checks marked and offered in evidence by the exceptions to the Best Evidence Rule.[14]
Prosecution were the faithful reproductions of  
the originals of the checks in his possession.
Hence, the Prosecution may mark and offer in Regarding petitioners allegation of good faith,
evidence the photostatic copies of the checks.
  suffice it to say that such a claim is immaterial, the
xxx xxx xxx offense in question being malum prohibitum.[15] The
 
Having admitted, albeit impliedly, that the gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a bad check
photostatic copies of the checks admitted in
evidence by the Court a quo were the faithful and therefore, whether or not malice and intent attended
reproduction of the original copies in his
possession, the Petitioner was thus estopped such issuance is unimportant.[16]
from invoking Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised  
Rules of Evidence. In invoking of A.C. No. 12-2000, petitioner adopts
  the interpretation of Justice Villarama to the effect that
 
the circular mandates judges to impose fines rather than
We agree with the Court of Appeals. By admitting
imprisonment on violators of BP 22. In affirming the
that the originals were in his possession and even
sentence imposed by the trial court, the majority pointed
producing them in open court, petitioner cured whatever
out that it is only under certain conditions that trial court
flaw might have existed in the prosecutions evidence. The
judges may impose fines rather than imprisonment. The
fact that these originals were all stamped account closed
Circular provides, in part:
merely confirmed the allegations of the respondent that
In its decision in Eduardo Vaca, v. Court of
the checks were dishonored by reason of the account Appeals the Supreme Court (Second Division) per
Mr. Justice V. Mendoza, modified the sentence
being closed. Because they were entirely consistent with
imposed for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 by deleting
its main theory, the prosecution correctly adopted these the penalty of imprisonment and imposing only the
penalty of fine in an amount double the amount of
originals as its own evidence. In addition, by petitioners the check. In justification thereof, the Court said:
   All courts and judges concerned should
henceforth take note of the foregoing policy of the
Petitioners are first-time offenders.
Supreme Court on the matter of the imposition of
They are Filipino entrepreneurs who
penalties for violations of B.P. Blg. 22.
presumably contribute to the national
economy. Apparently, they brought  
this appeal, believing in all good
faith, although mistakenly that they Considerable confusion arose as a result of this
had not committed a violation of B.P.
circular. Like Justice Villarama, many came to believe
Blg. 22. Otherwise they could simply
have accepted the judgment of the that the policy enunciated in this circular was to
trial court and applied for probation
to evade a prison term. It would best altogether remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty
serve the ends of criminal justice if in
fixing the penalty within the range of for violation of BP 22. The circular created so much
discretion allowed by 1, par. 1, the confusion, in fact, that less than three months later, we
same philosophy underlying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is had to issue yet another circular, Administrative Circular
observed, namely, that of redeeming
valuable human material and No. 13-2001,[17] for the specific purpose of clarifying
preventing unnecessary deprivation
of personal liberty and economic exactly what the implications of A.C. No. 12-2000 were. In
usefulness with due regard to the order to put all doubts to rest, the second circular
protection of the social order. In this
case we believe that a fine in an provides:
amount equal to double the amount The clear tenor and intention of
of the check involved is an Administrative Order No. 12-2000 is not to remove
appropriate penalty to impose on imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay
each of the petitioners. down a rule of preference in the application of the
  penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22.
 
In the recent case of Rosa Lim v. People of The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not
the Philippines, the Supreme Court en banc, foreclose the possibility of imprisonment for
applying Vaca also deleted the penalty of violators of B.P. Blg. 22. Neither does it defeat the
imprisonment and sentenced the drawer of the legislative intent behind the law.
bounced check to the maximum of the fine allowed  
by B.P. Blg. 22, i.e., P200,000, and concluded that Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000
such would best serve the ends of criminal justice. establishes a rule of preference in the application
  of the penal provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 such that
 where the circumstances of both the offense and
the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23234
imposition of a fine alone should be considered as
the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say, is hereby AFFIRMED.
the determination of whether the  
circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine
alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the Costs against petitioner.
Judge decide that imprisonment is the more  
appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular
No. 12-2000 ought not to be deemed a SO ORDERED.
hindrance (emphasis ours).
 
 
Clearly, the imposition of either a fine or imprisonment

remains entirely within the sound discretion of the judge

trying the case, based on his assessment of the offender

and the facts. Justice Villarama premised his dissent on

JARDELEZA, J.:
the absence of a distinction in A.C. No. 12-2000 between

which offenders deserve the relatively lenient penalty of a This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the
fine and which deserve imprisonment. As A.C. No. 13- Revised Rules of Court filed by Anita U. Lorenzana (petitioner)
from the Court of Appeals' (CA) Decision[2] dated April 30, 2008
2001 states, the application of the circular is selective (CA Decision) and the Resolution[3] dated April 27, 2009 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 86187. The CA affirmed the Regional Trial Court
and it is entirely up to the trial court judge to make that (RTC) Decision[4] dated March 7, 2005 (RTC Decision)
upholding Rodolfo Lelina's (respondent) ownership over the
distinction, given the circumstances obtaining. This half of the 16,047 square meters (sq. m.) of land claimed by
petitioner, and cancelling the Deed of Final Conveyance and Tax
brings us to the factual issue of petitioners worthiness of
Declaration in petitioner's name.[5]
the lighter penalty. On this, we see no reason to disturb

the findings of the trial court.

  Facts
 20, 1975, with an Entry of Judgment issued on April 10, 1975.
[15]
 Thereafter, by virtue of a writ of execution to enforce the
decision in the collection case, the sheriff levied on a land with
an area of 16,047 sq. m. covered by the TD No. 11-05370-
On April 1, 1975, Ambrosia Lelina (Ambrosia), married to A[16] (levied property) under the name of Ambrosia. Petitioner
Aquilino Lelina (Aquilino), executed a Deed of Absolute Sale [6]  claimed that she emerged as the sole and highest bidder when
over one-half (1/2) of an undivided parcel of land covered by the levied property was auctioned. An auction sale was
Tax Declaration (TD) No. 14324-C (property) in favor of her son, conducted on September 29, 1977 and a Certificate of Sale was
the respondent. The Deed of Absolute Sale, however, specified issued in favor of petitioner. The same Certificate of Sale was
only an area of 810 sq. m. as the one-half (1/2) of the property registered with the Register of Deeds on October 18, 1977.[17] No
covered by the tax declaration.[7]Nevertheless, the Deed of redemption having been made despite the lapse of the one year
Absolute Sale contained the description of the land covered by period for redemption, a Deed of Final Conveyance [18] was issued
TD No. 14324-C, as follows: "[b]ounded on the: North by in her favor on October 9, 1978. The same was registered with
Constancio Batac-& National highway[,] East by Cecilio the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur on October 16, 1978.[19]
Lorenzana, South by Cr[ee]k, and West by Andres Cuaresma."[8]
During trial, it was undisputed that the property is found within
Immediately after the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the levied property.[20] The levied property has the following
respondent took possession of the property. Since then, the boundaries: North by Constancio Batac; East by National Road
tenants of the property, Fidel Labiano, Venancio Lagria, and and heirs of Pedro Mina & Cecilio Lorenzana; South by Creek;
Magdalena Lopez, continued to deliver his share of the produce and West by Andres Cuaresma, Eladio Ma and Creek.[21] It was
of the property as well as produce of the remaining half of the further shown that the Deed of Final Conveyance expressly
land covered by TD No. 14324-C until December 1995.[9] describes the levied property as registered and owned by
Ambrosia.[22] Petitioner testified that she did not immediately
Around August 1996,[10] respondent and his three tenants were possess the levied property, but only did so in 1995. [23] On the
invited at the Municipal Agrarian Office of Tagudin, Ilocos Sur other hand, respondent testified that sometime in 1975 and
for a conference where they were informed that the property is prior to the sale of the property to him, the other half of the
already owned by petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Final levied property was owned by Godofredo Lorenzana
Conveyance and TD No. 11-21367-A both in the name of (Godofredo).[24] He also claimed that he and Godofredo have
petitioner.[11] Alerted by the turn of events, respondent filed a agreed that he will hold in trust the latter's share of produce
complaint for quieting of title and cancellation of from the other half of the land.[25]
documents[12] on September 24, 1996, with the RTC Branch 25,
Tagudin, Ilocos Sur, claiming that there appears to be a cloud After trial, respondent submitted his Memorandum[26] dated
over his ownership and possession of the property. December 16, 2004 where he explained that the land he was
claiming was the one-half (1/2) of the 16,047 sq. m. formerly
In her Answer,[13] petitioner alleged that she acquired a land with covered by TD No. 14324-C described in the Deed of Absolute
an area of 16,047 sq. m. through a foreclosure sale. Petitioner Sale. Thus, he prayed that his title to the property, i.e. the one-
claims that she became the judgment creditor in a case for half (1/2) of the levied property, be upheld.
collection of sum of money[14] (collection case) she filed against
Aquilino, and the decision in her favor became final on March The RTC upheld respondent's ownership over the half of the
levied property.[27]  It  ruled that the  levied property  is 
exclusively  owned  by Ambrosia, and could not be held to Arguments
answer for the obligations of her husband in the collection case.
As a result, it declared the Deed of Final Conveyance dated
October 9, 1978, as well as the proceedings taken during the
alleged auction sale of levied property, invalid and without force
and effect on Ambrosia's paraphernal property.[29] It also Petitioner argues that respondent's sole basis for his claim of
cancelled the TD No. 11-21367-A in the name of petitioner. [30] ownership over the property is the Deed of Absolute Sale, the
original of which was not presented in court. Since only the
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal from the RTC Decision. In her photocopy of the Deed of  Absolute Sale was presented, its
Appellant's Brief,[31] petitioner argued that the trial court erred: contents are inadmissible for violating the best evidence rule.
(1) in awarding one-half (1/2) of the levied property, which is Thus, respondent's claim of ownership should be denied. [36]
more than the 810 sq. m. prayed for in the complaint; (2) in
ruling that the Deed of Final Conveyance in favor of petitioner is Petitioner next claims that even if the Deed of Absolute Sale be
invalid; and (3) in awarding litigation expenses and attorney's considered in evidence, it only proves respondent's ownership
fees in favor of respondent. over the 810 sq. m., and not the half of the 16,047 sq. m. levied
property. Accordingly, the area of the lot awarded should be
The CA affirmed the findings of the RTC and upheld limited to what was prayed for in the Complaint. [37]
respondent's ownership over the property.[32] It ruled that the
power of the court in the execution of its judgment extends only Lastly, petitioner assails the finding that Ambrosia is the
to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor. exclusive owner of the levied property. She asserts that at the
Since Ambrosia exclusively owned the levied property, the very least, the levied property is jointly owned by the spouses
sheriff in the collection case, on behalf of the court, acted Ambrosia and Aquilino and therefore, it may be validly held
beyond its power and authority when it levied on the property. answerable for the obligations incurred by Aquilino.
Consequently, petitioner cannot rely on the execution sale in Accordingly, she asserts that the Deed of Final Conveyance
proving that she has better right over the property because such should not have been totally invalidated but should have been
execution sale is void.[33] Finding petitioner's claim over the upheld as to the other half of the levied property. [38] In this
property as invalid, the CA upheld respondent's right to the connection, she maintains that the lower courts should not have
removal of the cloud on his title.[34] The CA deleted the award of ordered the remaining half of the levied property be held in trust
litigation expenses and attorney's fees, there being no finding of by respondent because the alleged landholding of Godofredo
facts in the RTC Decision that warrants the same.[35] was not proven to be the same or even part of the levied
property.[39]

Hence, this petition.

Issues
 lower courts to cancel the Deed of Final Conveyance and TD No.
11-21367-A under petitioner's name.

I. We find no reversible error committed by the RTC and CA in

Whether respondent is the owner of one-half (1/2) of the ruling that the Deed of Absolute Sale proves respondent's
levied property comprising of 16,047 sq. m. ownership over the property, and that petitioner failed to
establish a registrable title on the property and levied property.

II. I.    Respondent is the owner of half 

Whether the Deed of Final Conveyance and TD No. 11- of the levied property.
21367-A, both in the name of petitioner, were correctly
cancelled. We affirm the finding that respondent is the owner of the
property equivalent to half of the levied property.

A. Waiver of objection to the Best 

Evidence Rule.

Ruling Petitioner claims that the photocopy of the Deed of Absolute

Sale should not have been admitted in evidence to prove
respondent's ownership over the property. We disagree.

The best evidence rule requires that when the subject of inquiry
is the contents of a document, no evidence is admissible other
We deny the petition. than the original document itself except in the instances
mentioned in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court.
As such, mere photocopies of documents are inadmissible
pursuant to the best evidence rule.[42] Nevertheless, evidence not
objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly considered
The issues raised invite a re-determination of questions of fact
by the court in arriving at its judgment.[43] Courts are not
which is not within the province of a petition for review
precluded to accept in evidence a mere photocopy of a document
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
when no objection was raised when it was formally offered. [44]
Factual findings of the trial court affirmed by the CA are final
and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal.[40] In certain
In order to exclude  evidence,  the  objection to  admissibility  of
cases, we held that as an exception, a review of such factual
evidence must be made at the proper time, and the grounds
findings may be made when the judgment of the CA is premised
specified.[45] Objection to evidence must be made at the time it is
on a misapprehension of facts or a failure to consider certain
formally offered.[46] In case of documentary evidence, offer is
relevant facts, which, if properly considered, would justify a
made after all the witnesses of the party making the offer have
different conclusion.[41] Petitioner invokes this exception urging
testified, specifying the purpose for which the evidence is being
us to pass upon anew the RTC and CA's findings, regarding the
offered.[47] It is only at this time, and not at any other, that
ownership of the property and levied property which led the
objection to the documentary evidence may be made. And when the CA Decision, respondent's ownership of the land should only
a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the be limited to 810 sq. m. in accordance with his complaint and
time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be evidence presented. Thus, the CA went over and beyond the
considered as waived.[48] This is true even if by its nature the allegations in the complaint making its finding devoid of factual
evidence is inadmissible and would have surely been rejected if basis.[57] 
it had been challenged at the proper time.[49] Moreover, grounds
for objection must be specified in any case.[50] Grounds for We note that petitioner actively participated in the proceedings
objections not raised at the proper time shall be considered below. During the course of trial she was confronted with the
waived, even if the evidence was objected to on some other issue of ownership of the levied property, and she admitted that
ground.[51] Thus, even on appeal, the appellate court may not the property is found within the former.[58]  From the beginning,
consider any other ground of objection, except those that were petitioner was apprised of respondent's claim over the half of
raised at the proper time.[52] the land described in the Deed of Absolute Sale, which has the
same boundaries as the land described in TD No. 11-05730-A.
In this case, the objection to the Deed of Absolute Sale was While respondent in his complaint stated a claim for an area of
belatedly raised. Respondent submitted his Formal Offer of only 810 sq. m., he adequately clarified his claim for the one-half
Evidence[53] on February 12, 2003 which included the Deed of (1/2) of the levied property in his Memorandum[59]  dated
Absolute Sale as Exhibit A. While petitioner filed a Comment December 16, 2004 before the RTC. Hence, it could not be said
and Objection[54] on February 21, 2003, she only objected to the that petitioner was deprived of due process by not being notified
Deed of Absolute Sale for being self-serving. In the or given the opportunity to oppose the claim over half of the
Order[55] dated February 27, 2003, the RTC admitted the Deed of levied property.
Absolute Sale, rejecting the objection of petitioner. Having failed
to object on the ground of inadmissibility under the best At any rate, we have consistently ruled that what really defines a
evidence rule, petitioner is now deemed to have waived her piece of land is not the area, calculated with more or less
objection on this ground and cannot raise it for the first time on certainty mentioned in the description, but its boundaries laid
appeal.[56] down, as enclosing the land and indicating its limits. [60] Where
land is sold for a lump sum and not so much per unit of measure
B. The Deed of Absolute Sale  or number, the boundaries of the land stated in the contract
sufficiently proves respondent's  determine the effects and scope of the sale, and not its area.
[61]
ownership over the property.  This is consistent with Article 1542 of the Civil Code which
provides:
We stress that petitioner does not question the validity of the
sale, but merely the admissibility of the deed. Having been
admitted in evidence as to its contents, the Deed of Absolute Art. 1542. In the sale of real estate, made for a lump sum and not
Sale sufficiently proves respondent's ownership over the at the rate of a certain sum for a unit of measure or number,
property. The deed, coupled with respondent's possession over there shall be no increase or decrease of the price, although
the property since its sale in 1975 until 1995, proves his there be a greater or lesser areas or number than that stated in
ownership. the contract.

Petitioner maintains that without conceding the correctness of The same rule shall be applied when two or more immovables
are sold for a single price; but if, besides mentioning the concept of "preponderance of evidence" refers to evidence which
boundaries, which is indispensable in every is of greater weight, or more convincing, that which is offered in
conveyance of real estate, its area or number should be opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.[65]
designated in the contract, the vendor shall be bound As correctly found by both the RTC and CA, petitioner failed to
to deliver all that is included within said boundaries, establish her claim over the levied property. Petitioner has been
even when it exceeds the area or number specified in inconsistent in her versions as to how she acquired ownership
the contract; and, should he not be able to do so, he shall over the levied property. In her Answer, she claims that she is
suffer a reduction in the price, in proportion to what is lacking in the owner of the levied property by virtue of having been the
the area or number, unless the contract is rescinded because the highest bidder in the public auction to execute the decision in
vendee does not accede to the failure to deliver what has been the collection case.[66] During her testimony, however, she
stipulated. (Emphasis supplied.) contradicts herself by claiming that the levied property was
In this case, the land covered by TD No. 14324-C in the Deed of awarded to her husband by her father-in-law or the brother of
Absolute Sale, from where the one-half (1/2) portion belonging Ambrosia, and the latter's husband Aquilino was merely
to respondent is taken, has the following boundaries: North by appointed as administrator of the land.[67]The inconsistencies
Constancio Batac & National Highway; East by Cecilio between these claims are glaring because if the levied property
Lorenzana; South by Creek; and West by Andres Cuaresma.[62]  was truly awarded to her by her father-in-law, she could have
This is the same extent and location of the lot covered in the just vindicated her claim in an independent action, and not
Deed of Final Conveyance, TD No. 11-05730-A in Ambrosia's participate in the public auction. Moreover, this is inconsistent
name, and petitioner's TD No. 11-21367-A. This description with her claim that Aquilino was the owner of the levied
should prevail over the area specified in the Deed of Absolute property which is answerable for Aquilino's debt.[68] Thus, the
Sale. Thus, we agree with the courts below that respondent owns RTC and CA correctly did not give credence to these versions but
half of the levied property. instead considered that her claim of ownership is anchored only
on the Deed of Final Conveyance.
Respondent having been able to make a prima facie case as to
his ownership over the property, it was incumbent upon Petitioner's ownership anchored on this Deed of Final
petitioner to prove her claim of ownership over the levied Conveyance, however, likewise fails.
property by preponderance of evidence. In Dantis v.
Maghinang, Jr.,[63]citing Jison v. Court of Appeals,[64] we held: II. The Deed of Final 
Conveyance and TD No. 
Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the 11-21367-A were correctly 
burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden cancelled.
of proof never parts. However, in the course of trial in a civil
case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the Money judgments are enforceable only against property
duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone.[69] If
plaintiff’s prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned property belonging to any third person is mistakenly levied upon
in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the to answer for another man's indebtedness, the Rules of Court
burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence gives such person all the right to challenge the levy through any
thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own of the remedies provided for under the rules, including an
evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant's. The independent "separate action" to vindicate his or her claim of
ownership and/or possession over the foreclosed property. [70]
Thus, we find that the levied property may not answer for the
The determinative question here is to whom the property obligations of Aquilino because the latter does not own it at the
belongs at the time of the levy and execution sale. To recall, time of the levy. Hence, the Deed of Final Conveyance and TD
respondent acquired the property through the Deed of Absolute No. 11-21367-A were correctly cancelled for being the outcome
Sale dated April 1, 1975, while petitioner bought the levied of an invalid levy.
property at the public auction held on September 29, 1977.
Obviously, respondent already owned the property at the time
petitioner bought the levied property, and thus cannot be levied A final note.
and attached for the obligations of Aquilino in the collection
case.

As to the other half of the levied property, we uphold the CA and Petitioner does not have a legal claim of ownership over the
the RTC's finding that prior to its transfer to respondent and one property because her alleged title results from an invalid levy
Godofredo Lorenzana, the levied property was paraphernal and execution. Thus, it is of no moment that respondent never
property of Ambrosia. The records show that Ambrosia owned registered the Deed of Absolute Sale, or that he never declared it
the levied property as evidenced by: (1) TD No. 11-05370-A in for taxation purposes—petitioner does not have a valid claim
her name; (2) a provision in the Deed of Final Conveyance that over the property that would benefit from respondent's lapses.
it is Ambrosia who exclusively owns the land;[71] and (3) an
admission from petitioner herself in her Appellant's Brief that This likewise holds true as to the other half of the levied
Ambrosia is the declared owner of the levied property. [72] These property determined to be the property of Godofredo.
pieces of evidence vis-a¬vis petitioner's inconsistent theories of Petitioner's claim that there is no basis in ordering respondent
ownership, undoubtedly have more weight, and in fact had been to hold in trust the other half of the levied property in favor of
given more weight by the courts below. Godofredo fails. Records show that the CA gave credence to
respondent's testimony that the other half of the levied property
As a rule, if at the time of the levy and sale by the sheriff, the was sold to Godofredo, and that the latter agreed that
property did not belong to the conjugal partnership, but was respondent shall receive the proceeds of the produce on behalf
paraphernal property, such property may not be answerable for of Godofredo.[75] Upon such findings, it became incumbent upon
the obligations of the husband which resulted in the judgment petitioner to show otherwise by proving her ownership. This,
against him in favor of another person.[73] The levied property however, she failed to do. Thus, petitioner cannot claim that the
being exclusive property of Ambrosia, and Ambrosia not being a courts below erred in not awarding Godofredo's portion to her.
party to the collection case, the levied property may not answer
for Aquilino's obligations. Even assuming that the levied From the foregoing, we uphold respondent's ownership over the
property belonged to the conjugal partnership of Ambrosia and subject property, as well as the cancellation of Deed of Final
Aquilino, it may still not be levied upon because petitioner did Conveyance and TD No. 11-21367-A under the name of
not present proof that the obligation redounded to the benefit of petitioner.
the family. More importantly, Aquilino's interest over a portion
of the levied property as conjugal property is merely inchoate WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed
prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.[74] Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
hereby AFFIRMED. Alpha Jane shouted in pain which startled the appellant who
sprayed her with tear gas and left.4
SO ORDERED.
Her mother, Metchie arrived shortly thereafter and Alpha Jane
told her what had happened. She immediately reported the
incident to the barangay officials and brought Alpha Jane to the
Philippine Air Force General Hospital for medical examination.
She also sought assistance from the police at the 521st Air
Police Squadron who, after gathering information from the
G.R. No. 167147 August 3, 2005 victim, arrested the appellant at his house.5 Alpha Jane was
brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory at CampCrame the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,  following day,6 and on August 10, 2001, to the Child Protection
vs. Unit (CPU) at UP-PGH7 for further medical examinations, which
GENARO CAYABYAB y FERNANDEZ, Appellant. both found hymenal abrasions and lacerations, respectively, on
the victim's genitalia.8
DECISION
On August 10, 2001, appellant was charged with rape before
PER CURIAM: the RegionalTrialCourtofPasayCity in an Information that reads:

Appellant Genaro Cayabyab y Fernandez was sentenced to That on or about the 07th day of August 2001, in Pasay City,
death by the RegionalTrialCourtofPasayCity, Branch 109, in Metro , Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Criminal Case No. 01-1311, for rape committed against six- Court, the above-named accused, GENARO CAYABYAB Y
year-old Alpha Jane Bertiz.1 FERNANDEZ, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously by means of force and intimidation have carnal
Alpha Jane was born on November 26, 1994,2 and the eldest knowledge of ALPHA JEAN BERTIS Y JONGCO, a minor six
among the six children of Conrado and Metchie Bertiz.3 She was (6) years of age, against her will and consent.
six years and nine months old when the rape was committed on
August 7, 2001. CONTRARY TO LAW.9

On that day, at around 6:00 p.m., Alpha Jane was at home in When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial
Manlunas St., Lagoon Area, Villamor Airbase, PasayCity, taking then ensued.
care of her younger siblings. Her mother went to buy kerosene,
while her father was out. On the guise of teaching arithmetic, Appellant raised the defenses of denial and alibi. He testified
appellant went to the victim's house and asked her to lie down that on August 7, 2001, he was plying his normal route inside
on her father's bed. When she refused, appellant removed her the Villamor Airbase as a tricycle driver from 6:00 a.m. until 7:00
clothes and his own clothes, then forced her to lie down on the p.m.10 After returning the tricycle to its owner Roberto Gabo at
bed and laid on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. the corner of 14th and 15th Sts., Villamor Airbase, he reached
home at around 7:30 p.m and went to sleep after eating
dinner.11 At around 9:30 p.m., he woke up to urinate at the back
of their house when three (3) policemen arrested and mauled penalty of death is AFFIRMED intoto, and
him.12 At the headquarters, he was forced to admit the accordingly certifies the case and elevate the entire records to
rape13 while the victim's father asked for money in exchange for the Supreme Court for review pursuant to Rule124, Section
his release, which he refused.14 13[a] of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended
by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC.
The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. It found the victim's testimony consistent SO ORDERED.18
with the medical findings of the doctors from the PNP Crime
Laboratory and CPU, UP-PGH. Moreover, it applied the rule that We have painstakingly reviewed the evidence on record and
an unsubstantiated defense of denial and alibi cannot prevail found no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the trial court
over a positive and categorical testimony of a minor victim. and the appellate court. There is no doubt that appellant raped
Finally, it appreciated the qualifying circumstance of minority Alpha Jane on August 7, 2001 inside their house at Villamor
and imposed the penalty of death. The dispositive portion reads: Airbase, PasayCity. This credibility given by the trial court to the
rape victim is an important aspect of evidence19 which appellate
In view of all the foregoing, the Court opines that the courts can rely on because of its unique opportunity to observe
prosecution has proven the guilt of the accused Genaro the witnesses, particularly their demeanor, conduct, and
Cayabyab y Fernandez beyond reasonable doubt for rape as attitude, during the direct and cross-examination by counsel.
defined and penalized under Article 335, paragraph 3 and 4 as
the victim herein is only six (6) years old and hereby sentence On direct examination, Alpha Jane narrated the incident and
accused Genaro Cayabyab y Fernandez to DEATH and to pay positively identified appellant as her assailant, thus:
civil indemnity in the amount of Php 75,000.00 and moral and
exemplary damages in the amount of Php 50,000.00 with Fiscal Barrera:
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Now at around 6:00 p.m. of August 7, 2001 where were you?
SO ORDERED.15
A. I was inside our house.
The case was directly elevated to this Court for automatic
review. However, pursuant to our decision in People v. Q. You mean your house at lagoon area, Villamor Air Base,
Mateo16 modifying the pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules Pasay City?
on Criminal Procedure insofar as direct appeals from the
Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court in cases where the A. Yes, sir.
penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetuaor life
imprisonment, this case was transferred to the Court of Q. What about you mother and father where were they on that
Appeals,17 which affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court, date and time?
thus:
A. My mother bought gas while my father was 'naglalakad ng
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial spray gun for painting.
court finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the supreme
Q. Who were left in your house on August 7, 2001 at 6:00 p.m. A. 'Pinatungan po niya ako', he laid on top of me.
while your mother bought gas and your father was walking with
his spray gun used for painting? Q. What happened when he laid on top of you?

A. My brothers and sisters. A. He inserted his penis inside my private part.

Q. While in your house on said date and time do you know of Fiscal Barrera:
any unusual incident that happened to you?
What did you do when this Kuya Jimmy inserted his penis to
A. Yes, sir. your private part?

Q. What was that unusual incident that happened to you? A. I shouted, sir.

A. Kuya Jimmy entered our house. Q. After Kuya Jimmy inserted his penis inside your vagina and
you shouted, what happened?
Q. After Kuya Jimmy entered your house, what happened next?
A. 'Pinakawalan niya ako', he released me.
A. Kuya Jimmy called for me inside our house.
Q. Then what happened?
Q. What did you do when Kuya Jimmy called for you?
A. 'Tinergas niya ako.
A. He asked me one plus one and I answered two.
Q. After Kuya Jimmy teargas you, what happened?
Q. After that what else happened?
A. I run away.
A. He asked me to lie down on my father's bed.
Q. Regarding what Kuya Jimmy did to you, did you report it to
Q. Did you follow him? your mother?

A. No, sir, I did not follow. A. Yes, sir.

Q. And so what else happened? Q. This Kuya Jimmy whom you said went inside your house and
removed your shorts and panty and thereafter inserted his penis
A. He removed my clothes 'hinubaran niya ako; he removed my inside your vagina on August 7, 2001 can you point at him if you
shorts and panty. see him?

Q. After Kuya Jimmy removed your shorts and panty, what A. Yes, sir.
happened?
Q. If this Kuya Jimmy Cayabyab is inside the courtroom will you hymen which might have been caused by the insertion of a blunt
be able to identify him? object such as an erected penis which was compatible with the
victim's claim that she had been raped (TSN, November 20,
A. Yes, sir. 2001, pp. 6-7).21

Q. Is he inside the courtroom? The trial court correctly imposed the death penalty.

Interpreter: Rape, such as committed against a 'child below seven (7) years
old', is a dastardly and repulsive crime which merit no less than
Witness pointed to a person who answered by the name of the penalty of death pursuant to Article 266-B of the Revised
Genaro Cayabyab.20 Penal Code. This special qualifying circumstance of age must
be specifically pleaded or alleged with certainty in the
Despite grueling cross-examination by the defense suggesting information and proven during the trial; otherwise the penalty of
extortion by the victim's father, Alpha Jane remained steadfast death cannot be imposed.
and consistent that it was appellant who raped her. The victim's
testimony was supported by the medico-legal report of the In the case of People v. Pruna,22 this Court took note of
medico-legal experts from the PNP Crime Laboratory and CPU, conflicting pronouncements concerning the appreciation of
UP-PGH, to wit: minority, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying
circumstance. There were a number of cases where no birth
ANO-GENITAL certificate was presented where the Court ruled that the age of
the victim was not duly proved.23 On the other hand, there were
EXAMINATION also several cases where we ruled that the age of the rape
victim was sufficiently established despite the failure of the
Hymen: Tanner Stage 2, hymenal transection at 5 oclock, Type prosecution to present the birth certificate of the offended party
of Hymen: Anullar to prove her age.24 Thus, in order to remove any confusion, we
set in Pruna the following guidelines in appreciating age, either
... as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance.

IMPRESSIONS 1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is
an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of
Evidence of blunt force or penetrating trauma. such party.

(Exh. 'L', p. 8, Records) 2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic
documents such as baptismal certificate and school records
Dr. Baluyut explained that in her findings, the terms hymenal which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove
transection at 5 oclock and laceration at 5 oclock are age.
synonymous (TSN, November 20, 2001, p. 6). Dr. Baluyut
further explained that there was prior injury to the victim's 3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to
have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the
testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a In Pruna, no birth certificate or any similar authentic
member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is document, such as the baptismal certificate of the victim was
qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the presented to prove her age. The trial court based its finding that
exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Lizette was 3 years old when she was raped on the Medico-
Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be Legal Report, and the fact that the defense did not contest her
sufficient under the following circumstances: age and questioned her qualification to testify because of her
tender age. It was however noted that the Medico-Legal Report
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is never mentioned her age and only the testimony of her mother
sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old; was presented to establish Lizette's age. The Court found that
there was uncertainty as to the victim's exact age, hence, it
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is required that corroborative evidence, such as her birth
sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old; certificate, baptismal certificate or any other authentic document
should be introduced in evidence in order that the qualifying
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is circumstance of 'below seven (7) years old is appreciated.
sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
Unlike in Pruna, the trial court in this case made a categorical
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic finding that Alpha Jane was only 6 years old at the time she was
document, or the testimony of the victim's mother or relatives raped, based not only on the testimonies of the complainant and
concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will her mother, but also on the strength of the photocopy of Alpha
suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the Jane's birth certificate. It is well to note that the defense did not
accused.78 object to the presentation of the birth certificate; on the contrary
it admitted the same 'as to fact of birth.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of
the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the We are not unaware of our ruling in People v. Mantis26 that a
testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against mere photocopy of the birth certificate, in the absence of any
him.25 showing that the original copy was lost or destroyed, or was
unavailable, without the fault of the prosecution, does not prove
To paraphrase Pruna, the best evidence to prove the age of a the victim's minority, for said photocopy does not qualify as
person is the original birth certificate or certified true copy competent evidence for that purpose.
thereof; in their absence, similar authentic documents may be
presented such as baptismal certificates and school records. If However, there are other exceptions to the 'best evidence rule
the original or certified true copy of the birth certificate is not as expressly provided under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of
available, credible testimonies of the victim's mother or a Court, which reads:
member of the family may be sufficient under certain
circumstances. In the event that both the birth certificate or other Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. '
authentic documents and the testimonies of the victim's mother When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document,
or other qualified relative are unavailable, the testimony of the no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
victim may be admitted in evidence provided that it is expressly document itself, except in the following cases:
and clearly admitted by the accused.
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be jurisprudence that if the crime is qualified by circumstances
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror; which warrant the imposition of the death penalty by applicable
amendatory laws, the accused should be ordered to pay the
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the complainant the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity.
party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails
to produce it after reasonable notice; The Court notes that the trial court awarded P50,000.00 as
moral and exemplary damages. Moral damages is distinct from
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other exemplary damages, hence must be awarded separately. The
documents which cannot be examined in court without great award of moral damages is automatically granted in rape cases
loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is without need of further proof other than the commission of the
only the general result of the whole; and crime because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually
suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award.29 However,
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a the award of P50,000.00 must be increased to P75,000.00 in
public officer or is recorded in a public office. [Emphasis accord with prevailing jurisprudence.30 As regards exemplary
supplied] damages, we held in People v. Catubig31 that the presence of an
aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying,
Without doubt, a certificate of live birth is a public record in the entitles the offended party to an award of exemplary damages.
custody of the local civil registrar who is a public officer. Clearly, Conformably, we award the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary
therefore, the presentation of the photocopy of the birth damages in accord with the prevailing jurisprudence.32
certificate of Alpha Jane is admissible as secondary evidence to
prove its contents. Production of the original may be dispensed WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
with, in the trial court's discretion, whenever in the case at hand City, Branch 109, in Criminal Case No. 01-1311, as affirmed in
the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the toto by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00258,
document and no other useful purpose will be served by finding appellant Genaro Cayabyab y Fernandez guilty beyond
requiring production.27 reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and imposing the penalty
of DEATH33 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
In the case at bar, the defense did not dispute the contents of appellant is further ordered to pay the victim P75,000.00 as
the photocopied birth certificate; in fact it admitted the same. moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Having failed to raise a valid and timely objection against the
presentation of this secondary evidence the same became a SO ORDERED.
primary evidence, and deemed admitted and the other party is
bound thereby.28

In fine, we find that the prosecution sufficiently proved that

Alpha Jane was only six-years-old, being born on November 26,
1994, when the rape incident happened on August 7, 2001.

Anent the award of damages, we sustain the award of G.R. No. 170604               September 2, 2013
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity consistent with the prevailing
HEIRS OF MARGARITA PRODON, PETITIONERS,  parents’ deaths, they had continued the possession of the
vs. property as heirs, paying the real property taxes due thereon;
HEIRS OF MAXIMO S. ALVAREZ AND VALENTINA CLAVE, that they could not locate the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No.
REPRESENTED BY REV. MAXIMO ALVAREZ, 84797, but the original copy of TCT No. 84797 on file with the
JR.,RESPONDENTS. Register of Deeds of Manila was intact; that the original copy
contained an entry stating that the property had been sold to
DECISION defendant Prodon subject to the right of repurchase; and that
the entry had been maliciously done by Prodon because the
BERSAMIN, J.: deed of sale with right to repurchase covering the property did
not exist. Consequently, they prayed that the entry be cancelled,
The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a and that Prodon be adjudged liable for damages.
written document are the subject of the inquiry. In an action for
quieting of title based on the inexistence of a deed of sale with The entry sought to be cancelled reads:
right to repurchase that purportedly cast a cloud on the title of a
property, therefore, the Best Evidence Rule does not apply, and ENTRY NO. 3816/T-84797 – SALE W/ RIGHT TO
the defendant is not precluded from presenting evidence other REPURCHASE IN FAVOR OF: MARGARITA PRODON,
than the original document. SINGLE, FOR THE SUM OF ₱120,000.00, THE HEREIN
REGISTERED OWNER RESERVING FOR HIMSELF THE
The Case RIGHTS TO REPURCHASE SAID PROPERTY FOR THE
SAME AMOUNT WITHIN THE PERIOD OF SIX MONTH (sic)
This appeal seeks the review and reversal of the decision FROM EXECUTION THEREOF. OTHER CONDITION SET
promulgated on August 18, 2005,1 whereby the Court of FORTH IN (DOC. NO. 321, PAGE 66, BOOK NO. VIII OF
Appeals (CA) reversed the judgment rendered on November 5, LISEO A. RAZON, NOT.PUB. OF MANILA)
1997 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 35, in Manila in
Civil Case No. 96-78481 entitled Heirs of Maximo S Alvarez and DATE OF INSTRUMENT – SEPT. 9, 1975
Valentina Clave, represented by Rev. Maximo S. Alvarez and
Valentina Clave, represented by Rev. Maximo Alvarez, Jr. v. DATE OF INSCRIPTION – SEPT. 10, 1975,
Margarita Prodon and the Register of Deeds of the City of AT 3:42 P.M.4
Manila dismissing the respondents’ action for quieting of title.2
In her answer,5 Prodon claimed that the late Maximo Alvarez,
Antecedents Sr. had executed on September 9, 1975 the deed of sale with
right to repurchase; that the deed had been registered with the
In their complaint for quieting of title and damages against Register of Deeds and duly annotated on the title; that the late
Margarita Prodon,3 the respondents averred as the plaintiffs that Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had been granted six months from
their parents, the late spouses Maximo S. Alvarez, Sr. and September 9, 1975 within which to repurchase the property; and
Valentina Clave, were the registered owners of that parcel of that she had then become the absolute owner of the property
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 84797 of due to its non-repurchase within the given 6-month period.
the Register of Deeds of Manila; that their parents had been in
possession of the property during their lifetime; that upon their
During trial, the custodian of the records of the property attested 1975; Hour and Minute: 3:42 p.m.; Nature of Contract: Sale with
that the copy of the deed of sale with right to repurchase could Right to Repurchase; Executed by: Maximo S. Alvarez; In favor:
not be found in the files of the Register of Deeds of Manila. Margarita Prodon; Date of Document: 9-9-75; Contract value:
120,000.’ (Exhibit 4-a). Under these premises the Court
On November 5, 1997, the RTC rendered judgment,6 finding entertains no doubt about the execution and existence of the
untenable the plaintiffs’ contention that the deed of sale with controverted deed of sale with right to repurchase.7
right to repurchase did not exist. It opined that although the
deed itself could not be presented as evidence in court, its The RTC rejected the plaintiffs’ submission that the late Maximo
contents could nevertheless be proved by secondary evidence Alvarez, Sr. could not have executed the deed of sale with right
in accordance with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to repurchase because of illness and poor eyesight from
upon proof of its execution or existence and of the cause of its cataract. It held that there was no proof that the illness had
unavailability being without bad faith. It found that the defendant rendered him bedridden and immobile; and that his poor
had established the execution and existence of the deed, to wit: eyesight could be corrected by wearing lenses.

In the case under consideration, the execution and existence of The RTC concluded that the original copy of the deed of sale
the disputed deed of sale with right to repurchase accomplished with right to repurchase had been lost, and that earnest efforts
by the late Maximo Alvarez in favor of defendant Margarita had been exerted to produce it before the court. It believed Jose
Prodon has been adequately established by reliable and Camilon’s testimony that he had handed the original to one Atty.
trustworthy evidences (sic). Defendant Prodon swore that on Anacleto Lacanilao, but that he could not anymore retrieve such
September 9, 1975 she purchased the land covered by TCT No. original from Atty. Lacanilao because the latter had meanwhile
84747 (Exhibit 1) from its registered owners Maximo S. Alvarez, suffered from a heart ailment and had been recuperating.
Sr. and Valentina Clave (TSN, Aug. 1, 1997, pp.5-7); that the
deed of sale with right to repurchase was drawn and prepared Ruling of the CA
by Notary Public Eliseo Razon (Ibid., p. 9); and that on
September 10, 1975, she registered the document in the On appeal, the respondents assigned the following errors,
Register of Deeds of Manila (Ibid., pp.18-19). namely:

The testimony of Margarita Prodon has been confirmed by the A.

Notarial Register of Notary Public Eliseo Razon dated
September 10, 1975 (Exhibit 2), and by the Primary Entry Book THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
of the Register of Deeds of Manila (Exhibit 4). THE DUE EXECUTION AND EXISTENCE OF THE
QUESTIONED DEED OF SALE WITH RIGHT TO
Page 66 of Exhibit 2 discloses, among others, the following REPURCHASE HAS BEEN DULY PROVED BY THE
entries, to wit: "No. 321; Nature of Instrument: Deed of Sale with DEFENDANT.
Right to Repurchase; Name of Persons: Maximo S. Alvarez and
Valentina Alvarez (ack.); Date and Month: 9 Sept." (Exhibit 2-a). B.

Exhibit 4, on the other hand, also reveals the following data, to THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE
wit: ‘Number of Entry: 3816; Month, Day and Year: Sept. 10, PIECES OF EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE DEFENDANTS
AS PROOFS OF THE DUE EXECUTION AND EXISTENCE OF It is clear, therefore, that before secondary evidence as to the
THE QUESTIONED DEED OF SALE WITH RIGHT TO contents of a document may be admitted in evidence, the
REPURCHASE. existence of [the] document must first be proved, likewise, its
execution and its subsequent loss.
C.
In the present case, the trial court found all three (3)
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT prerequisites ha[ve] been established by Margarita Prodon. This
THE QUESTIONED DEED OF SALE WITH RIGHT TO Court, however, after going through the records of the case,
REPURCHASE HAS BEEN LOST OR OTHERWISE COULD believes otherwise. The Court finds that the following
NOT BE PRODUCED IN COURT WITHOUT THE FAULT OF circumstances put doubt on the very existence of the alleged
THE DEFENDANT. deed of sale. Evidence on record showed that Maximo Alvarez
was hospitalized between August 23, 1975 to September 3,
D. 1975 (Exhibit "K"). It was also established by said Exhibit "L"
that Maximo Alvarez suffered from paralysis of half of his body
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN REJECTING THE and blindness due to cataract. It should further be noted that
PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIM THAT THEIR FATHER COULD NOT barely 6 days later, on September 15, 1975, Maximo Alvarez
HAVE EXECUTED THE QUESTIONED DOCUMENT AT THE was again hospitalized for the last time because he died on
TIME OF ITS ALLEGED EXECUTION.8 October of 1975 without having left the hospital. This lends
credence to plaintiffs-appellants’ assertion that their father,
On August 18, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed decision, Maximo Alvarez, was not physically able to personally execute
reversing the RTC, and ruling as follows: the deed of sale and puts to serious doubt [on] Jose Camilion’s
testimony that Maximo Alvarez, with his wife, went to his
The case of the Department of Education Culture and Sports residence on September 5, 1975 to sell the property and that
(DECS) v. Del Rosario in GR No. 146586 (January 26, 2005) is again they met on September 9, 1975 to sign the alleged deed
instructive in resolving this issue. The said case held: of sale (Exhibits "A" and "1"). The Court also notes that from the
sale in 1975 to 1996 when the case was finally filed, defendant-
"Secondary evidence of the contents of a document refers to appellee never tried to recover possession of the property nor
evidence other than the original document itself. A party may had she shown that she ever paid Real Property Tax thereon.
introduce secondary evidence of the contents of a written Additionally, the Transfer Certificate of Title had not been
instrument not only when the original is lost or destroyed, but transferred in the name of the alleged present owner. These
also when it cannot be produced in court, provided there is no actions put to doubt the validity of the claim of ownership
bad faith on the part of the offeror. However, a party must first because their actions are contrary to that expected of legitimate
satisfactorily explain the loss of the best or primary evidence owners of property.
before he can resort to secondary evidence. A party must first
present to the court proof of loss or other satisfactory
explanation for non-production of the original instrument. The
correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss,
contents, although the court in its discretion may change this
order if necessary."
Moreover, granting, in arguendo, that the deed of sale did exist, xxxx
the fact of its loss had not been duly established. In De Vera, et
al. v Sps. Aguilar (218 SCRA 602 1993), the Supreme Court held The foregoing testimony does not convince this Court that Jose
that after proof of the execution of the Deed it must also be Camilion had exerted sufficient effort to obtain the copy which
established that the said document had been lost or destroyed, he said was with Atty. Lacanilao. It should be noted that he
thus: never claimed that Atty. Lacanilao was already too sick to even
try looking for the copy he had. But even assuming this is to be
"After the due execution of the document has been established, so, Jose Camilion did not testify that Atty. Lacanilao had no one
it must next be proved that said document has been lost or in his office to help him find said copy. In fine, this Court
destroyed. The destruction of the instrument may be proved by believes that the trial court erred in admitting the secondary
any person knowing the fact. The loss may be shown by any evidence because Margarita Prodon failed to prove the loss or
person who knew the fact of its loss, or by anyone who had destruction of the deed.
made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in
the place or places where the document or papers of similar In fine, the Court finds that the secondary evidence should not
character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the have been admitted because Margarita Prodon failed to prove
document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has the existence of the original deed of sale and to establish its
made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the loss.
court that the instrument is indeed lost.
xxxx
However, all duplicates or counterparts must be accounted for
before using copies. For, since all the duplicates or multiplicates WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the
are parts of the writing itself to be proved, no excuse for non- Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 35 in Civil Case No. 96-
production of the writing itself can be regarded as established 78481 is hereby REVERSED and a new one entered ordering
until it appears that all of its parts are unavailable (i.e. lost, the cancellation of Entry No. 3816/T-84797 inscribed at the back
retained by the opponent or by a third person or the like). of TCT No. 84797 in order to remove the cloud over plaintiff-
appellants’ title.
In the case at bar, Atty. Emiliano Ibasco, Jr., notary public who
notarized the document testified that the alleged deed of sale SO ORDERED.9
has about four or five original copies. Hence, all originals must
be accounted for before secondary evidence can be given of The heirs of Margarita Prodon (who meanwhile died on March 3,
any one. This[,] petitioners failed to do. Records show that 2002) filed an Omnibus Motion for Substitution of Defendant and
petitioners merely accounted for three out of four or five original for Reconsideration of the Decision,10 wherein they alleged that
copies." (218 SCRA at 607-608) the CA erred: (a) in finding that the pre-requisites for the
admission of secondary evidence had not been complied with;
In the case at bar, Jose Camilion’s testimony showed that a (b) in concluding that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had been
copy was given to Atty. Anacleto Lacanilao but he could not physically incapable of personally executing the deed of sale
recover said copy. A perusal of the testimony does not convince with right to repurchase; and (c) in blaming them for not
this Court that Jose Camilion had exerted sufficient effort to recovering the property, for not paying the realty taxes thereon,
recover said copy. x x x and for not transferring the title in their names.
On November 22, 2005, the CA issued itsresolution,11 allowing Rule, to wit:
the substitution of the heirs of Margarita Prodon, and denying
their motion for reconsideration for its lack of merit. Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. —
When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
Hence, the heirs of Margarita Prodon (petitioners) have evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
appealed to the Court through petition for review on certiorari. itself, except in the following cases:

Issues (a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or

cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part
In this appeal, the petitioners submit the following as issues, of the offeror;
namely: (a) whether the pre-requisites for the admission of
secondary evidence had been complied with; (b) whether the (b) When the original is in the custody or under control of
late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had been physically incapable of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the
personally executing the deed of sale with right to latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
repurchase;and (c) whether Prodon’s claim of ownership was
already barred by laches.12 (c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or
other documents which cannot be examined in court
Ruling without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the
The appeal has no merit. whole; and

1. (d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a

public officer or is recorded in a public office.
Best Evidence Rulewas not applicable herein
The Best Evidence Rule stipulates that in proving the terms of a
We focus first on an unseemly error on the part of the CA that, written document the original of the document must be produced
albeit a harmless one, requires us to re-examine and rectify in in court. The rule excludes any evidence other than the original
order to carry out our essential responsibility of educating the writing to prove the contents thereof, unless the offeror proves:
Bench and the Bar on the admissibility of evidence. An analysis (a) the existence or due execution of the original; (b) the loss
leads us to conclude that the CA and the RTC both misapplied and destruction of the original, or the reason for its non-
the Best Evidence Rule to this case, and their misapplication production in court; and (c) the absence of bad faith on the part
diverted the attention from the decisive issue in this action for of the offeror to which the unavailability of the original can be
quieting of title. We shall endeavor to correct the error in order attributed.13
to turn the case to the right track.
The primary purpose of the Best Evidence Rule is to ensure that
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court embodies the Best the exact contents of a writing are brought before the
Evidence court,14 considering that (a) the precision in presenting to the
court the exact words of the writing is of more than average
importance, particularly as respects operative or dispositive
instruments, such as deeds, wills and contracts, because a improvements, as well as use, and even abuse the property. For
slight variation in words may mean a great difference in rights; an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites
(b) there is a substantial hazard of inaccuracy in the human must concur, namely: (a) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal
process of making a copy by handwriting or typewriting; and (c) or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of
as respects oral testimony purporting to give from memory the the action; and (b) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding
terms of a writing, there is a special risk of error, greater than in claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in
the case of attempts at describing other situations fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
generally.15 The rule further acts as an insurance against validity or legal efficacy.20
fraud.16Verily, if a party is in the possession of the best evidence
and withholds it, and seeks to substitute inferior evidence in its The action for quieting of title may be based on the fact that a
place, the presumption naturally arises that the better evidence deed is invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable. The
is withheld for fraudulent purposes that its production would terms of the writing may or may not be material to an action for
expose and defeat.17 Lastly, the rule protects against misleading quieting of title, depending on the ground alleged by the plaintiff.
inferences resulting from the intentional or unintentional For instance, when an action for quieting of title is based on the
introduction of selected portions of a larger set of writings.18 unenforceability of a contract for not complying with the Statute
of Frauds, Article 1403 of the Civil Code specifically provides
But the evils of mistransmission of critical facts, fraud, and that evidence of the agreement cannot be received without the
misleading inferences arise only when the issue relates to the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents. There is then
terms of the writing. Hence, the Best Evidence Rule applies only no doubt that the Best Evidence Rule will come into play.
when the terms of a writing are in issue. When the evidence
sought to be introduced concerns external facts, such as the It is not denied that this action does not involve the terms or
existence, execution or delivery of the writing, without reference contents of the deed of sale with right to repurchase. The
to its terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot be invoked.19 In principal issue raised by the respondents as the plaintiffs, which
such a case, secondary evidence may be admitted even without Prodon challenged head on, was whether or not the deed of
accounting for the original. sale with right to repurchase, duly executed by the late Maximo
Alvarez, Sr., had really existed. They alleged in the complaint
This case involves an action for quieting of title, a common-law that:
remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on
the title to real property by reason of any instrument, record, xxxx
claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid or
effective, but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, 9. Such entry which could have been maliciously and
or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title. In such an deliberately done by the defendant Margarita Prodon created
action, the competent court is tasked to determine the cloud and [is] prejudicial to the title of the property subject
respective rights of the complainant and other claimants to place matter of this case, since while it is apparently valid or effective,
things in their proper place and to make the one who has no but in truth and in fact it is invalid, ineffective or unenforceable
rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other. The inasmuch that the instrument purporting to be a Deed of Sale
action is for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right with right of repurchase mentioned in the said entry does not
would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, exist.21
and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce any desired
 xxxx evidence should not have been admitted, but like the RTC the
CA did not state what excluded secondary evidence it was
On her part, Prodon specifically denied the allegation, averring referring to.
in her answer that "sometime [o]n September 9, 1975,
deceased Maximo S. Alvarez lawfully entered into a Contract of Considering that the Best Evidence Rule was not applicable
Sale with Right to Repurchase, object of which is the titled lot because the terms of the deed of sale with right to repurchase
located at Endaya Street, Tondo, Manila, in favor of were not the issue, the CA did not have to address and
defendant."22 In the pre-trial order, the RTC defined the issue to determine whether the existence, execution, and loss, as pre-
be tried as "[w]hether or not the alleged document mentioned in requisites for the presentation of secondary evidence, had been
the said entry is existing, valid or unenforceable,"23 and did not established by Prodon’s evidence. It should have simply
include the terms of the deed of sale with right to repurchase addressed and determined whether or not the "existence" and
among the issues. "execution" of the deed as the facts in issue had been proved by
preponderance of evidence.
Apparently, the parties were fully cognizant of the issues as
defined, for none of them thereafter ventured to present Indeed, for Prodon who had the burden to prove the existence
evidence to establish the terms of the deed of sale with right to and due execution of the deed of sale with right to repurchase,
repurchase. In the course of the trial, however, a question was the presentation of evidence other than the original document,
propounded to Prodon as to who had signed or executed the like the testimonies of Prodon and Jose Camilon, the Notarial
deed, and the question was objected to based on the Best Register of Notary Eliseo Razon, and the Primary Entry Book of
Evidence Rule. The RTC then sustained the objection.24 At that the Register of Deeds, would have sufficed even without first
point began the diversion of the focus in the case. The RTC proving the loss or unavailability of the original of the deed.
should have outrightly overruled the objection because the fact
sought to be established by the requested testimony was the 2.
execution of the deed, not its terms.25 Despite the fact that the
terms of the writing were not in issue, the RTC inexplicably Prodon did not preponderantly establish the existence and due
applied the Best Evidence Rule to the case and proceeded to execution of the deed of sale with right to repurchase
determine whether the requisites for the admission of secondary
evidence had been complied with, without being clear as to what The foregoing notwithstanding, good trial tactics still required
secondary evidence was sought to be excluded. In the end, the Prodon to establish and explain the loss of the original of the
RTC found in its judgment that Prodon had complied with the deed of sale with right to repurchase to establish the
requisites for the introduction of secondary evidence, and gave genuineness and due execution of the deed.26 This was
full credence to the testimony of Jose Camilon explaining the because the deed, although a collateral document, was the
non-production of the original. On appeal, the CA seconded the foundation of her defense in this action for quieting of title.27 Her
RTC’s mistake by likewise applying the Best Evidence Rule, inability to produce the original logically gave rise to the need for
except that the CA concluded differently, in that it held that her to prove its existence and due execution by other means
Prodon had not established the existence, execution, and loss that could only be secondary under the rules on evidence.
of the original document as the pre-requisites for the Towards that end, however, it was not required to subject the
presentation of secondary evidence. Its application of the Best proof of the loss of the original to the same strict standard to
Evidence Rule naturally led the CA to rule that secondary which it would be subjected had the loss or unavailability been a
precondition for presenting secondary evidence to prove the Under what circumstance were you able to know the deceased
terms of a writing. plaintiff Maximo Alvarez, Sr. and his wife?

A review of the records reveals that Prodon did not adduce When they went to our house, sir.
proof sufficient to show the lossor explain the unavailability of
the original as to justify the presentation of secondary evidence. When was this specifically?
Camilon, one of her witnesses, testified that he had given the
original to her lawyer, Atty. Anacleto Lacanilao, but that he A
(Camilon) could not anymore retrieve the original because Atty.
Lacanilao had been recuperating from his heart ailment. Such Sometime the first week of September or about September 5,
evidence without showing the inability to locate the original from 1975, sir.
among Atty. Lacanilao’s belongings by himself or by any of his
assistants or representatives was inadequate. Moreover, a Q
duplicate original could have been secured from Notary Public
Razon, but no effort was shown to have been exerted in that What was the purpose of the spouses Maximo and Valentina in
direction. meeting you on that date?

In contrast, the records contained ample indicia of the A

improbability of the existence of the deed. Camilon claimed that
the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had twice gone to his residence in They were selling a piece of land, sir.
Meycauayan, Bulacan, the first on September 5, 1975, to
negotiate the sale of the property in question, and the second on xxxx
September 9, 1975, to execute the deed of sale with right to
repurchase, viz: Q

Q At the time when the spouses Maximo Alvarez, Sr. and

Valentina Clave approached you to sell their piece of land
Do you also know the deceased plaintiff in this case, Maximo located at Endaya, Tondo, Manila, what document, if any, did
Alvarez, Sr. and his wife Valentina Clave, Mr. Witness? they show you?

A A

Yes, sir. The title of the land, sir.

Q xxxx

A Q

Q
You said that on the first week of September or September 5, Q
1975 spouses Maximo and Valentina approached you at the
time, what did you tell the spouses, if any? After Margarita Prodon told you that[,] what happened next, if
any?
A
A
I asked them to come back telling them that I was going to look
for a buyer, sir. I waited for the spouses Alvarez to bring them to my aunt, sir.

xxxx Q

Q Were you able to finally bring the spouses before Margarita

Prodon?
You said that you told the spouse[s] Alvarez to just come back
later and that you will look for a buyer, what happened next, if A
any?
Valentina Clave returned to our house and asked me if they can
A now sell the piece of land, sir.

I went to see my aunt Margarita Prodon, sir. Q

Q What did you tell Valentina Clave?

A A

What did you tell your aunt Margarita Prodon? Q

I convinced her to buy the lot. We went to the house of my aunt so she can meet her
personally, sir.
ATTY. REAL
And did the meeting occur?
Q
WITNESS
What was the reply of Margarita Prodon, if any?
A
A
Yes, sir.
She agreed, provided that she should meet the spouses, sir.
 ATTY. REAL • Congestive heart failure
• CFC III29
Q
June 2- June 6, 1975 • Chest pains (Atrial Flutter)
What happened at the meeting? • Painful urination (Chronic prostatitis)3

A August 23-September 3, 1975 • Arteriosclerotic heart disease

• Congestive heart failure, mild
I told Valentina Clave in front of the aunt of my wife that they, • Atrial fibrillation
the spouses, wanted to sell the land, sir. • Cardiac functional capacity III-B31
September 15-October 2, 1975 • Arteriosclerotic heart disease
Q
• Atrial fibrillation
• Congestive heart failure
What was the reply of your aunt Margarita Prodon at the time?
• Pneumonia
• Urinary tract infection
A • Cerebrovascular accident, old
• Upper GI bleeding probably seconda
That Valentina Clave should come back with her husband stress ulcers32
because she was going to buy the lot, sir.28

The foregoing testimony could not be credible for the purpose of The medical history showing the number of very serious
proving the due execution of the deed of sale with right to ailments the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had been suffering from
repurchase for three reasons.1âwphi1 rendered it highly improbable for him to travel from Manila all the
way to Meycauayan, Bulacan, where Prodon and Camilon were
The first is that the respondents preponderantly established that then residing in order only to negotiate and consummate the
the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had been in and out of the hospital sale of the property. This high improbability was fully confirmed
around the time that the deed of sale with right to repurchase by his son, Maximo, Jr., who attested that his father had been
had been supposedly executed on September 9, 1975. The seriously ill, and had been in and out of the hospital in
records manifested that he had been admitted to the Veterans 1975.33 The medical records revealed, too, that on September
Memorial Hospital in Quezon City on several occasions, and 12, 1975, or three days prior to his final admission to the
had then been diagnosed with the serious ailments or hospital, the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had suffered from "[h]igh
conditions, as follows: grade fever, accompanied by chills, vomiting and cough
productive of whitish sticky sputum;"had been observed to be
"conscious" but "weak" and "bedridden" with his heart having
Period of confinement Diagnosis "faint" sounds, irregular rhythm, but no murmurs; and his left
31 – May 19, 1975 • Prostatitis, chronic upper extremity and left lower extremity had suffered 90% motor
• Arteriosclerotic heart disease loss.34 Truly, Prodon’s allegation that the deed of sale with right
• Atrial fibrillation to repurchase had been executed on September 9, 1975 could
not command belief.
The second is that the annotation on TCT No. 84797 of the WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated
deed of sale with right to repurchase and the entry in the on August 18, 2005 by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV
primary entry book of the Register of Deeds did not themselves No. 58624 entitled Heirs of Maximo S. Alvarez and Valentina
establish the existence of the deed. They proved at best that a Clave, represented by Rev. Maximo Alvarez, Jr. v. Margarita
document purporting to be a deed of sale with right to Prodon and the Register of Deeds of the City Manila; and
repurchase had been registered with the Register of Deeds. ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
Verily, the registration alone of the deed was not conclusive
proof of its authenticity or its due execution by the registered SO ORDERED.
owner of the property, which was precisely the issue in this
case. The explanation for this is that registration, being a specie
of notice, is simply a ministerial act by which an instrument is
inscribed in the records of the Register of Deeds and annotated
on the dorsal side of the certificate of title covering the land
subject of the instrument.35 It is relevant to mention that the law
on land registration does not require that only valid instruments SALUN-AT MARQUEZ and   G.R. No. 168387
be registered, because the purpose of registration is only to give NESTOR DELA CRUZ,
notice.36 Petitioners,    
    Present:
By the same token, the entry in the notarial register of Notary
Public Razon could only be proof that a deed of sale with right to - versus -    
repurchase had been notarized by him, but did not establish the   CORONA, C.
due execution of the deed. J., Chairperson,
ELOISA ESPEJO, ELENITA   VELASCO, JR.,
The third is that the respondents’ remaining in the peaceful ESPEJO, EMERITA ESPEJO, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
possession of the property was further convincing evidence OPHIRRO ESPEJO, OTHNIEL DEL CASTILLO, and
demonstrating that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. did not execute ESPEJO, ORLANDO ESPEJO, PEREZ, J.
the deed of sale with right to repurchase. Otherwise, Prodon OSMUNDO ESPEJO,  
would have herself asserted and exercised her right to take over ODELEJO ESPEJO and NEMI Promulgated:
the property, legally and physically speaking, upon the FERNANDEZ,
expiration in 1976 of the repurchase period stipulated under the Respondents.   August 25, 2010
deed, including transferring the TCT in her name and paying the x------------------------------------------------------
real property taxes due on the properly. Her inaction was an --x
index of the falsity of her claim against the respondents.  
 
In view of the foregoing circumstances, we concur with the CA DECISION
that the respondents preponderantly, proved that the deed of  
sale with right to repurchase executed by the late Maximo  
Alvarez, Sr. did not exist in fact. DEL CASTILLO, J.
   
When the parties admit the contents of written documents but put in issue Accordingly, judgment is rendered:
 
whether these documents adequately and correctly express the true intention 1.                  Finding [respondents] to be the owner by re-
of the parties, the deciding body is authorized to look beyond these purchase from RBBI [of] the Murong property covered
instruments and into the contemporaneous and subsequent actions of the by TCT No. [T-]62096 (formerly TCT No. 43258);
 
parties in order to determine such intent.
2.                  Ordering the cancellation of TCT with CLOA
  Nos. 395 and 396 in the name[s] of Salun-at Marquez
Well-settled is the rule that in case of doubt, it is the intention of the and Nestor de la Cruz respectively, as they are
disqualified to become tenants of the Lantap property;
contracting parties that prevails, for the intention is the soul of a contract, not
 
its wording which is prone to mistakes, inadequacies, or ambiguities. To hold 3.                  Directing RBBI to sell through VOS the
otherwise would give life, validity, and precedence to mere typographical Lantap property to its rightful beneficiary, herein tenant-
errors and defeat the very purpose of agreements. farmer Nemi Fernandez under reasonable terms and
conditions;
This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] assails the October 7, 2003  
Decision,[2] as well as the May 11, 2005 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals 4.                  Ordering RBBI to return the amount paid to it
(CA) in CA G.R. SP No. 69981. The dispositive portion of the appellate by Nestor and Salun-at; and ordering the latter to pay 20
cavans of palay per hectare at 46 kilos per cavan unto
courts Decision reads: [respondents] plus such accrued and unpaid rentals for
  the past years as may be duly accounted for with the
WHEREFORE, finding reversible error committed by the assistance of the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, the Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya who is also hereby instructed
instant petition for review is GRANTED. The assailed to assist the parties execute their leasehold contracts
Decision, dated 17 January 2001, rendered by the and;
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board is  
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the  
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board of 5.                  The order to supervise harvest dated March
Bayombong[,] Nueva Vizcaya, dated 17 March 1998, is 11, 1998 shall be observed until otherwise modified or
REINSTATED. Costs against respondents. dissolved by the appellate body.
   
SO ORDERED.[4] SO ORDERED.[5]
   
The reinstated Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication  
Factual Antecedents
Board (DARAB) of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, in turn, contained the
 
following dispositive portion:  
Respondents Espejos were the original registered owners of two parcels of the Bureau of Lands by H.O. Bauman Public Land
Surveyor, [in] December 1912-March 1913. Note: All
agricultural land, with an area of two hectares each. One is located corners are Conc. Mons. 15x15x60 cm. This is Lot No. 79-
at Barangay Lantap, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya (the Lantap property) while A=Lot No. 159 of Bagabag Townsite, K-27.[9]
the other is located in Barangay Murong, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya  
 
(the Murong property). There is no dispute among the parties that the Lantap
Subsequently, TCT No. T-62836 dated June 4, 1985 was issued for the
property is tenanted by respondent Nemi Fernandez (Nemi)[6] (who is the
Lantap property and contained the following description:
husband[7] of respondent Elenita Espejo (Elenita), while the Murong property
 
is tenanted by petitioners Salun-at Marquez (Marquez) and Nestor Dela Cruz
Beginning at a point marked 1 on plan H-105520, N. 80 deg.
(Dela Cruz).[8] 32 W., 1150.21 m. from BLLM No. 122, Irrigation project,
  thence N. 61 deg. 40E., 200.00 m. to point 2;
thence N. 28 deg. 20E, 100.00 m. to point 3;
The respondents mortgaged both parcels of land to Rural Bank of
thence S. 61 deg. 40E, 200.00 m. to point 4;
Bayombong, Inc. (RBBI) to secure certain loans. Upon their failure to pay thence S. 28 deg. 20W, 100.00 m. to point 1; point of
the loans, the mortgaged properties were foreclosed and sold to RBBI. RBBI beginning; containing an area of 2.0000 hectares.Bounded
eventually consolidated title to the properties and transfer certificates of title on the northeast, southeast, and southwest by Public land;
and on the northwest by Road and public land. Bearings
(TCTs) were issued in the name of RBBI. TCT No. T-62096 dated January true. Declination 0 deg. 31E., points referred to are marked
14, 1985 was issued for the Murong property. It contained the following on plan H-105520.Surveyed under authority of Section 12-
description: 22, Act No. 2874 and in accordance with existing
regulations of the Bureau of Lands, by H.O. Bauman Public
  Land Surveyor, [in] Dec. 1912-Mar. 1913 and approved on
Beginning at a point marked I on plan H-176292, S. 44034 January 6, 1932. Note: This is Lot No. 119-A Lot No. 225
W. 1656.31 m. more or less from B.L.L.M. No 1, Bagabag of Bagabag Townsite K-27. All corners are B.I. Conc.
Townsite, K-27, Mons. 15x60 cm.[10]
thence N. 28 deg. 20 E., 200.00 m. to point 2;  
thence S. 61 deg. 40 E., 100.00 m. to point 3;  
thence S. 28 deg. 20 W., 200.00 m. to point 4;
thence N. 61 deg. 40 W., 100.00 m. to point 1; point of Both TCTs describe their respective subjects as located in Bagabag
beginning; Townsite, K-27, without any reference to either Barangay Lantap
Containing an area of 2.000 hectares. Bounded on the or Barangay Murong.
northeast, by Road; on the southeast, and southwest by
public land; and on the northwest by Public Land, properties  
claimed by Hilario Gaudia and Santos Navarrete. Bearings On February 26, 1985, respondents Espejos bought back one of their lots
true. Declination 0131 E. Points referred to are marked on from RBBI. The Deed of Sale[11] described the property sold as follows:
plan H-176292. Surveyed under authority of sections 12-22
 
Act No. 2874 and in accordance with existing regulations of
 x x x do hereby SELL, TRANSFER, and CONVEY,  
absolutely and unconditionally x x x that certain parcel of
land, situated in the Municipality of Bagabag, Province of Meanwhile, on June 20, 1990, RBBI, pursuant to Sections 20[13] and 21[14] of
Nueva Vizcaya, and more particularly bounded and Republic Act (RA) No. 6657,[15] executed separate Deeds of Voluntary Land
described as follows, to wit: Transfer (VLTs) in favor of petitioners Marquez and Dela Cruz, the tenants
 
of the Murong property. Both VLTs described the subject thereof as an
Beginning at a point marked 1 on plan x x x
x Containing an area of 2.000 agricultural land located in Barangay Murong and covered by TCT No. T-
hectares.Bounded on the NE., by Road; on 62836 (which, however, is the title corresponding to the Lantap property).[16]
the SE., and SW by Public Land; and on the  
NW., by Public Land, properties claimed by
Hilario Gaudia and Santos After the petitioners completed the payment of the purchase price
Navarrete. Bearing true.Declination 013 of P90,000.00 to RBBI, the DAR issued the corresponding Certificates of
B. Points referred to are marked on plan H- Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to petitioners Marquez[17]and Dela
176292.
  Cruz[18] on September 5, 1991. Both CLOAs stated that their subjects were
of which the Rural Bank of Bayombong (NV) Inc., is the parcels of agricultural land situated in Barangay Murong.[19] The CLOAs
registered owner in fee simple in accordance with the Land were registered in the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya on September 5,
Registration Act, its title thereto being evidenced by
1991.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-62096 issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya.  
  On February 10, 1997 (more than 10 years after the Deed of Sale in favor of
 
the respondents and almost seven years after the execution of VLTs in favor
As may be seen from the foregoing, the Deed of Sale did not mention
of the petitioners), respondents filed a Complaint[20] before the Regional
the barangay where the property was located but mentioned the title of the
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for
property (TCT No. T-62096), which title corresponds to the Murong
the cancellation of petitioners CLOAs, the deposit of leasehold rentals by
property. There is no evidence, however, that respondents took possession of
petitioners in favor of respondents, and the execution of a deed of voluntary
the Murong property, or demanded lease rentals from the petitioners (who
land transfer by RBBI in favor of respondent Nemi. The complaint was
continued to be the tenants of the Murong property), or otherwise exercised
based on respondents theory that the Murong property, occupied by the
acts of ownership over the Murong property.On the other hand, respondent
petitioners, was owned by the respondents by virtue of the 1985 buy-back, as
Nemi (husband of respondent Elenita and brother-in-law of the other
documented in the Deed of Sale. They based their claim on the fact that their
respondents), continued working on the other property -- the Lantap property
Deed of Sale refers to TCT No. 62096, which pertains to the Murong
-- without any evidence that he ever paid rentals to RBBI or to any
property.
landowner. The Deed of Sale was annotated on TCT No. T-62096 almost a
 
decade later, on July 1, 1994.[12]
Petitioners filed their Answer[21] and insisted that they bought the Murong disqualified to become tenants of the Lantap property and ordered the
property as farmer-beneficiaries thereof. They maintained that they have cancellation of their CLOAs. It then ordered RBBI to execute a leasehold
always displayed good faith, paid lease rentals to RBBI when it became the contract with the real tenant of the Lantap property, Nemi.
owner of the Murong property, bought the same from RBBI upon the honest  
belief that they were buying the Murong property, and occupied and The OIC-RARAD recognized that petitioners only right as the actual tillers
exercised acts of ownership over the Murong property. Petitioners also of the Murong property is to remain as the tenants thereof after the execution
argued that what respondents Espejos repurchased from RBBI in 1985 was of leasehold contracts with and payment of rentals in arrears to respondents.
actually the Lantap property, as evidenced by their continued occupation and  
possession of the Lantap property through respondent Nemi. DARAB Decision[24]
   
RBBI answered[22] that it was the Lantap property which was the subject of Upon appeal filed by petitioners, the DARAB reversed the OIC-RARAD
the buy-back transaction with respondents Espejos. It denied committing a Decision. It ruled that in assailing the validity of the CLOAs issued to
grave mistake in the transaction and maintained its good faith in the petitioners as bona fide tenant-farmers, the burden of proof rests on the
disposition of its acquired assets in conformity with the rural banking rules respondents. There being no evidence that the DAR field personnel were
and regulations. remiss in the performance of their official duties when they issued the
  corresponding CLOAs in favor of petitioners, the presumption of regular
OIC-RARAD Decision[23] performance of duty prevails. This conclusion is made more imperative by
  the respondents admission that petitioners are the actual tillers of the Murong
The OIC-RARAD gave precedence to the TCT numbers appearing on the property, hence qualified beneficiaries thereof.
Deed of Sale and the VLTs. Since TCT No. T-62096 appeared on  
respondents Deed of Sale and the said title refers to the Murong property, the As for respondents allegation that they bought back the Murong property
OIC-RARAD concluded that the subject of sale was indeed the Murong from RBBI, the DARAB ruled that they failed to support their allegation
property. On the other hand, since the petitioners VLTs referred to TCT No. with substantial evidence. It gave more credence to RBBIs claim that
T-62836, which corresponds to the Lantap property, the OIC-RARAD ruled respondents repurchased the Lantap property, not the Murong
that petitioners CLOAs necessarily refer to the Lantap property. As for the property.Respondents, as owners of the Lantap property, were ordered to
particular description contained in the VLTs that the subject thereof is the enter into an agricultural leasehold contract with their brother-in-law Nemi,
Murong property, the OIC-RARAD ruled that it was a mere typographical who is the actual tenant of the Lantap property.
error.  
Further, since the VLTs covered the Lantap property and petitioners are not The DARAB ended its January 17, 2001 Decision in this wise:
the actual tillers thereof, the OIC-RARAD declared that they were  
 We find no basis or justification to question the authenticity In appealing to the CA, the respondents insisted that the DARAB erred in
and validity of the CLOAs issued to appellants as they are by
operation of law qualified beneficiaries over the ruling that they repurchased the Lantap property, while the petitioners were
landholdings; there is nothing to quiet as these titles were awarded the Murong property. They were adamant that the title numbers
awarded in conformity with the CARP program indicated in their respective deeds of conveyance should control in
implementation; and finally, the Board declares that all
determining the subjects thereof. Since respondents Deed of Sale expressed
controverted claims to or against the subject landholding
must be completely and finally laid to rest. that its subject is the property with TCT No. T-62096, then what was sold to
  them was the Murong property. On the other hand, petitioners VLTs and
WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding reversible CLOAs say that they cover the property with TCT No. T-62836; thus it
errors[,] the assailed decision is ANNULLED and a new
judgment is hereby rendered, declaring: should be understood that they were awarded the Lantap
  property. Respondents added that since petitioners are not the actual tillers of
1.              Appellants Salun-at Marquez and Nestor the Lantap property, their CLOAs should be cancelled due to their lack of
Dela Cruz as the bona fide tenant-tillers over the Murong
property and therefore they are the qualified beneficiaries qualification.
thereof;  
  The CA agreed with the respondents. Using the Best Evidence Rule
2.              Declaring Transfer Certificate of Title
embodied in Rule 130, Section 3, the CA held that the Deed of Sale is the
(TCT) Nos. 395 and 396 issued in the name of [farmer-
beneficiaries] Salun-at Marquez and Nestor Dela Cruz best evidence as to its contents, particularly the description of the land which
respectively, covered formerly by TCT No. 62096 (TCT No. was the object of the sale. Since the Deed of Sale expressed that its subject is
43258) of the Murong property as valid and legal;
the land covered by TCT No. T-62096 the Murong property then that is the
 
3.              Ordering the co-[respondents] to firm-up property that the respondents repurchased.
an agricultural leasehold contract with bona fide tenant-tiller The CA further ruled that as for petitioners VLTs, the same refer to the
Nemi Fernandez over the Lantap property, [the latter] being property with TCT No. T-62836; thus, the subject of their CLOAs is the
the subject matter of the buy back arrangement entered into
between [respondents] and Rural Bank of Bayombong, Lantap property. The additional description in the VLTs that the subject
Incorporated, and other incidental matters are deemed thereof is located in Barangay Murong was considered to be a mere
resolved. typographical error. The CA ruled that the technical description contained in
 
SO ORDERED.[25] the TCT is more accurate in identifying the subject property since the same
  particularly describes the properties metes and bounds.
   
Ruling of the Court of Appeals Both the RBBI[26] and petitioners[27] filed their respective motions for
  reconsideration, which were separately denied.[28]
 
On June 22, 2004, RBBI filed a separate Petition for Review on Certiorari, Whether the CA erred in utilizing the Best Evidence Rule to determine the
subject of the contracts
docketed as G.R. No. 163320, with this Court.[29] RBBI raised the issue that  
the CA failed to appreciate that respondents did not come to court with clean III
hands because they misled RBBI to believe at the time of the sale that the What are the subject properties of the parties respective contracts with RBBI
 
two lots were not tenanted. RBBI also asked that they be declared free from
 
any liability to the parties as it did not enrich itself at anyones Our Ruling
expense. RBBIs petition was dismissed on July 26, 2004 for lack of  
 
merit. The said Resolution reads:
Propriety of the Petition
 
Respondents maintain that the instant petition for review raises factual issues
Considering the allegations, issues[,] and arguments adduced
in the petition for review on certiorari, the Court Resolves to which are beyond the province of Rule 45.[34]
DENY the petition for lack of sufficient showing that the  
Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error in the
The issues involved herein are not entirely factual. Petitioners assail the
questioned judgment to warrant the exercise by this Court of
its discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this case.[30] appellate courts rejection of their evidence (as to the contractual intent) as
  inadmissible under the Best Evidence Rule. The question involving the
  admissibility of evidence is a legal question that is within the Courts
Their Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied with finality.[31] Entry authority to review.[35]
of judgment was made in that case on December 15, 2004.[32]  
  Besides, even if it were a factual question, the Court is not precluded to
On July 27, 2005,[33] petitioners filed the instant petition. review the same. The rule that a petition for review should raise only
  questions of law admits of exceptions, among which are (1) when the
Issues findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2)
  when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3)
Rephrased and consolidated, the parties present the following issues for the when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on
Courts determination: a misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
  when, in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both
I appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial
What is the effect of the final judgment dismissing RBBIs Petition for
Review on Certiorari, which assailed the same CA Decision court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
  evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition
II as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed equitable considerations such as the clean hands doctrine without a clear-cut
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.[36] legal basis and cogent arguments to support his claim, there should be no
  surprise if the Court is not swayed to exercise its appellate jurisdiction and
In the instant case, we find sufficient basis to apply the exceptions to the the appeal is dismissed outright. The dismissal of an appeal does not always
general rule because the appellate court misappreciated the facts of the case and necessarily mean that the appealed decision is correct, for it could simply
through its erroneous application of the Best Evidence Rule, as will be be the result of the appellants inadequate discussion, ineffectual arguments,
discussed below. Moreover, the disparate rulings of the three reviewing or even procedural lapses.
bodies below are sufficient for the Court to exercise its jurisdiction under  
Rule 45. RBBIs failure to convince the Court of the merits of its appeal should not
  prejudice petitioners who were not parties to RBBIs appeal, especially
First Issue because petitioners duly filed a separate appeal and were able to articulately
Dismissal of RBBIs appeal
  and effectively present their arguments. A party cannot be deprived of his
  right to appeal an adverse decision just because another party had already
Respondents maintain that the Courts earlier dismissal of RBBIs petition appealed ahead of him,[38] or just because the other partys separate appeal had
for review of the same CA Decision is eloquent proof that there is no already been dismissed.[39]
reversible error in the appellate courts decision in favor of the respondents.[37]  
  There is another reason not to bind the petitioners to the final judgment
We are not persuaded. This Court dismissed RBBIs earlier petition in G.R. against RBBI. RBBI executed the transfer (VLTs) in favor of
No. 163320 because it failed to convincingly demonstrate the alleged errors petitioners prior to the commencement of the action. Thus, when the action
in the CA Decision. The bank did not point out the inadequacies and errors for cancellation of CLOA was filed, RBBI had already divested itself of its
in the appellate courts decision but simply placed the responsibility for the title to the two properties involved. Under the rule on res judicata, a
confusion on the respondents for allegedly misleading the bank as to the judgment (in personam) is conclusive only between the parties and their
identity of the properties and for misrepresenting that the two lots were not successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the
tenanted. Thus, RBBI argued that respondents did not come to court with action.[40] Thus, when the vendor (in this case RBBI) has already transferred
clean hands. his title to third persons (petitioners), the said transferees are not bound by
  any judgment which may be rendered against the vendor.[41]
These arguments were ineffectual in convincing the Court to review the  
appellate courts Decision. It is the appellants responsibility to point out the Second Issue
Is it correct to apply the Best Evidence Rule?
perceived errors in the appealed decision. When a party merely raises  
  Transfer referred to TCT No. T-62836 as its subject, which is further
Citing the Best Evidence Rule in Rule 130, Section 3, the CA held that the described as located in Barangay Murong.
Deed of Sale between respondents and RBBI is the best evidence as to the  
property that was sold by RBBI to the respondents. Since the Deed of Sale The real issue is whether the admitted contents of these documents
stated that its subject is the land covered by TCT No. T-62096 the title for the adequately and correctly express the true intention of the parties. As to the
Murong property then the property repurchased by the respondents was the Deed of Sale, petitioners (and RBBI) maintain that while it refers to TCT No.
Murong property. Likewise, the CA held that since the VLTs between T-62096, the parties actually intended the sale of the Lantap property
petitioners and RBBI refer to TCT No. T-62836 the title for the Lantap (covered by TCT No. T-62836).
property then the property transferred to petitioners was the Lantap property.  
  As to the VLTs, respondents contend that the reference to TCT No. T-62836
Petitioners argue that the appellate court erred in using the best evidence rule (corresponding to the Lantap property) reflects the true intention of RBBI
to determine the subject of the Deed of Sale and the Deeds of Voluntary and the petitioners, and the reference to BarangayMurong was a
Land Transfer. They maintain that the issue in the case is not the contents of typographical error. On the other hand, petitioners claim that the reference
the contracts but the intention of the parties that was not adequately to BarangayMurong reflects their true intention, while the reference to TCT
expressed in their contracts. Petitioners then argue that it is the Parol No. T-62836 was a mere error. This dispute reflects an intrinsic ambiguity in
Evidence Rule that should be applied in order to adequately resolve the the contracts, arising from an apparent failure of the instruments to
dispute. adequately express the true intention of the parties. To resolve the ambiguity,
  resort must be had to evidence outside of the instruments.
Indeed, the appellate court erred in its application of the Best Evidence  
Rule. The Best Evidence Rule states that when the subject of inquiry is The CA, however, refused to look beyond the literal wording of the
the contents of a document, the best evidence is the original document itself documents and rejected any other evidence that could shed light on the actual
and no other evidence (such as a reproduction, photocopy or oral evidence) is intention of the contracting parties. Though the CA cited the Best Evidence
admissible as a general rule. The original is preferred because it reduces the Rule, it appears that what it actually applied was the Parol Evidence Rule
chance of undetected tampering with the document.[42] instead, which provides:
   
In the instant case, there is no room for the application of the Best Evidence When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to
Rule because there is no dispute regarding the contents of the documents. It writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed
upon and there can be, between the parties and their
is admitted by the parties that the respondents Deed of Sale referred to TCT successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than
No. T-62096 as its subject; while the petitioners Deeds of Voluntary Land the contents of the written agreement.[43]
 
The Parol Evidence Rule excludes parol or extrinsic evidence by which a x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
 
party seeks to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the terms of a valid  
agreement or instrument. Thus, it appears that what the CA actually applied Here, the petitioners VLTs suffer from intrinsic ambiguity. The VLTs
in its assailed Decision when it refused to look beyond the words of the described the subject property as covered by TCT No. T-62836 (Lantap
contracts was the Parol Evidence Rule, not the Best Evidence Rule. The property), but they also describe the subject property as being located
appellate court gave primacy to the literal terms of the two contracts and in Barangay Murong. Even the respondents Deed of Sale falls under the
refused to admit any other evidence that would contradict such terms. exception to the Parol Evidence Rule. It refers to TCT No. T-62096 (Murong
  property), but RBBI contended that the true intent was to sell the Lantap
However, even the application of the Parol Evidence Rule is improper in the property. In short, it was squarely put in issue that the written agreement
case at bar. In the first place, respondents are not parties to the VLTs failed to express the true intent of the parties.
executed between RBBI and petitioners; they are strangers to the written  
contracts. Rule 130, Section 9 specifically provides that parol evidence rule Based on the foregoing, the resolution of the instant case necessitates an
is exclusive only as between the parties and their successors-in-interest. The examination of the parties respective parol evidence, in order to determine
parol evidence rule may not be invoked where at least one of the parties to the true intent of the parties. Well-settled is the rule that in case of doubt, it is
the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the written document in the intention of the contracting parties that prevails, for the intention is the
question, and does not base his claim on the instrument or assert a right soul of a contract,[45] not its wording which is prone to mistakes,
originating in the instrument.[44] inadequacies, or ambiguities. To hold otherwise would give life, validity, and
  precedence to mere typographical errors and defeat the very purpose of
Moreover, the instant case falls under the exceptions to the Parol Evidence agreements.
Rule, as provided in the second paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9:  
  In this regard, guidance is provided by the following articles of the Civil
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain
or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in Code involving the interpretation of contracts:
issue in his pleading:  
  Article 1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no
(1)                       An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal
or imperfection in the written agreement; meaning of its stipulations shall control.
   
(2)                       The failure of the written If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of
agreement to express the true intent and the parties, the latter shall prevail over the former.
agreement of the parties thereto;  
 
 Article 1371. In order to judge the intention of the any objection from the respondents. Moreover, petitioners paid leasehold
contracting parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent
acts shall be principally considered. rentals for using the Murong property to RBBI, not to the respondents.
   
  Aside from respondents neglect of their alleged ownership rights over the
Rule 130, Section 13 which provides for the rules on the interpretation of Murong property, there is one other circumstance that convinces us that what
documents is likewise enlightening: respondents really repurchased was the Lantap property. Respondent Nemi
  (husband of respondent Elenita) is the farmer actually tilling the Lantap
Section 13. Interpretation according to circumstances. For
property, without turning over the supposed landowners share to RBBI. This
the proper construction of an instrument, the circumstances
under which it was made, including the situation of the strongly indicates that the respondents considered themselves (and not
subject thereof and of the parties to it, may be shown, so that RBBI) as the owners of the Lantap property. For if respondents (particularly
the judge may be placed in the position of those whose spouses Elenita and Nemi) truly believed that RBBI retained ownership of
language he is to interpret.
  the Lantap property, how come they never complied with their obligations as
  supposed tenants of RBBIs land? The factual circumstances of the case
Applying the foregoing guiding rules, it is clear that the Deed of Sale was simply do not support the theory propounded by the respondents.
intended to transfer the Lantap property to the respondents, while the VLTs We are likewise convinced that the subject of the Deeds of Voluntary Land
were intended to convey the Murong property to the petitioners. This may be Transfer (VLTs) in favor of petitioners was the Murong property, and not
seen from the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties. the Lantap property. When the VLTs were executed in 1990, petitioners
  were already the tenant-farmers of the Murong property, and had been
Third issue paying rentals to RBBI accordingly. It is therefore natural that the Murong
Determining the intention of the parties
regarding the subjects of their contracts property and no other was the one that they had intended to acquire from
  RBBI with the execution of the VLTs. Moreover, after the execution of the
  VLTs, petitioners remained in possession of the Murong property, enjoying
We are convinced that the subject of the Deed of Sale between RBBI and the and tilling it without any opposition from anybody. Subsequently, after the
respondents was the Lantap property, and not the Murong property. After petitioners completed their payment of the total purchase price of P90,000.00
the execution in 1985 of the Deed of Sale, the respondents did not exercise to RBBI, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) officials conducted
acts of ownership that could show that they indeed knew and believed that their investigation of the Murong property which, with the presumption of
they repurchased the Murong property. They did not take possession of the regularity in the performance of official duty, did not reveal any
Murong property. As admitted by the parties, the Murong property was in anomaly. Petitioners were found to be in actual possession of the Murong
the possession of the petitioners, who occupied and tilled the same without property and were the qualified beneficiaries thereof. Thus, the DAR
officials issued CLOAs in petitioners favor; and these CLOAs explicitly refer
to the land in Barangay Murong. All this time, petitioners were in All told, we rule that the Deed of Sale dated February 26, 1985 between
possession of the Murong property, undisturbed by anyone for several long respondents and RBBI covers the Lantap property under TCT No. T-62836,
years, until respondents started the controversy in 1997. while the Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer and TCT Nos. CLOA-395 and
  CLOA-396 of the petitioners cover the Murong property under TCT No. T-
All of these contemporaneous and subsequent actions of RBBI and 62096. In consequence, the CAs ruling against RBBI should not be executed
petitioners support their position that the subject of their contract (VLTs) is as such execution would be inconsistent with our ruling herein. Although the
the Murong property, not the Lantap property. Conversely, there has been no CAs decision had already become final and executory as against RBBI with
contrary evidence of the parties actuations to indicate that they intended the the dismissal of RBBIs petition in G.R. No. 163320, our ruling herein in
sale of the Lantap property. Thus, it appears that the reference in their VLT favor of petitioners is a supervening cause which renders the execution of the
to TCT No. T-62836 (Lantap property) was due to their honest but mistaken CA decision against RBBI unjust and inequitable.
belief that the said title covers the Murong property.Such a mistake is not  
farfetched considering that TCT No. T-62836 only refers to the Municipality WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The
of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, and does not indicate the assailed October 7, 2003 Decision, as well as the May 11, 2005 Resolution
particular barangay where the property is located. Moreover, both properties of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69981
are bounded by a road and public land. Hence, were it not for the detailed are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The January 17, 2001 Decision of the
technical description, the titles for the two properties are very similar. DARAB Central Office is REINSTATED. The Deed of Sale dated
The respondents attempt to discredit petitioners argument that their VLTs February 26, 1985 between respondents and Rural Bank of Bayombong, Inc.
were intrinsically ambiguous and failed to express their true intention by covers the Lantap property under TCT No. T-62836, while the Deeds of
asking why petitioners never filed an action for the reformation of their Voluntary Land Transfer and TCT Nos. CLOA-395 and CLOA-396 of the
contract.[46] A cause of action for the reformation of a contract only arises petitioners cover the Murong property under TCT No. T-62096. The
when one of the contracting parties manifests an intention, by overt acts, not Register of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya is directed to make the necessary
to abide by the true agreement of the parties. [47] It seems fairly obvious that corrections to the titles of the said properties in accordance with this
petitioners had no cause to reform their VLTs because the parties thereto Decision. Costs against respondents.
(RBBI and petitioners) never had any dispute as to the interpretation and SO ORDERED.
application thereof. They both understood the VLTs to cover the Murong  
property (and not the Lantap property). It was only much later, when
strangers to the contracts argued for a different interpretation, that the issue
became relevant for the first time.