Daniela Frederick
Daniela Frederick
Daniela Frederick
ABSTRACT
The emerging economy of Romania has been on a yo-yo diet since 1990,
when Eastern Europe opened to the free world. GDP growth rates, inflation and
unemployment went up and down over the years producing great disruptions in the
labor market . At the base of these economic problems there is the disturbing
phenomenon of corruption.
A number of studies, such as those of Daniel Teodorescu (Romanian
Journal of Forecasting,4/2007), looked at the causes of corruption (lack of
democratic tradition, inconsistencies of the reform process in local government
agencies will decrease corruption. A survey by the World Bank and Management
Systems International of more than 1,700 households, businesses and public
officials produced an extensive report that shows the consequences of corruption :
decline in the standard of living, moral decline in society a, less foreign investment
in Romania. The report lists a number of steps that emerging economies should
take to correct this debilitating problem.
My own research on the role of corruption took me in a different
direction. I set out to
prove that the process of privatization and the rampant corruption in this emerging
economy are blended . At the core of the matter there is the flowed privatization
that started in 1990. Until then the state was the owner of all the resources,
enterprises and businesses in the economy. After 1990 the ownership went from
the state to the state again! The Commercial Enterprises (Societati Comerciale)
functioned as state-owned businesses from 1990 to 1997 when they became
private(Almos Telegdy, Privatizare MEBO in Romania, 2002). The former communist
bosses were now the managers and the CEO’s who let these enterprises run to the
ground for seven years. Then they turned around and bought them at auction or
through direct negotiations for pennies on the dollar.
The second type of businesses that went from state ownership to state
ownership(!) were the
Regii Autonome. They were controlled by various ministries and were not supposed
to became private because they operated in strategic sectors of the economy, such
as energy and army goods. Over the
years , these enterprises have become highly inefficient and corrupted, allowing
private and state
firms alike to pay almost nothing for their energy needs. (Ilie Serbanescu, Revista
22, 2005). In the end, t he Romanian government ended up selling the whole
energy sector on the cheap to foreign holdings,
endangering the national security.
applying the reform system (i.e. privatization), lack of traditions that support a
market economy, present administration system reluctant to change, low salaries in
the public sector , lack of financial discipline in the public system, and fluctuations
in the number of civil servants.
As ways to decrease the level of corruption in Romania, Teodorescu and
others suggest the following. First, the reform process at the local level needs to
emphasize descentralization , an increased local authority and a higher pay for civil
servants. Secondly, the tasks and responsibilities assigned to local government
people need to be clear in nature, especially in city halls. The next steps
have to do with a unified pay system for civil servants, more training offered on
topics of reforms and less fluctuations of personnel at city hall as a result of political
changes
The World Bank and Management Systems International, a partner of the
United States Agency for International Development, surveyed more than 1,700
households, businesses and public officials.
67% of households believe that all or almost all public officials are corrupted and
50% think that bribery is widespread. The report also shows that 70% of businesses
think that public officials are corrupted and 44% of the public officials surveyed
think the same. The other 56% must be in a state of denial. It is interesting to look
at the ranking of state agencies by households from the most corrupted to the least
corrupted (page 5) :
*judiciary – courts and prosecution and parliament 55%
*customs officials and ministry/government 52%
*health and police 47%
*state property funds 44%
*notaries/lawyers 43%
*financial guard and presidency 40%
*local elected officials 35%
*housing services and local administration 31%
This is how public officials rank the same state agencies:
*custom officials 62%
*judiciary-courts and prosecution 53%
*state property fund 52%
*health 41%
*police and financial guard 39%
*housing/communal services 38%
*parliament 37%
*notaries/lawyers 35%
*elected officials 27%
*local administration 22%
There are only minor differences in the ranking of the most corrupted state
agencies by households and public officials. It is worrisome that the three
branches of the government ( judiciary, legislative and executive) are in the top
ten, as well as the police, custom officials, health workers and notaries and lawyers.
It seems that everywhere you go where state agencies operate, whether it is the
police station, the hospital room, the housing office or the financial guard, which by
the way is supposed to track down corrupted officials, you need to be prepared to
anoint somebody.
Households feel they need to offer bribes (atentie) as follows (page 13):
*dentist 39%
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The people
According to the Romanian National Institute of Statistics, one third of the
labor force worked for the state at the end of 2007. Romania has the second
highest youth unemployment rate in the EU. Scrieciu and Winker assessed that the
unemployment rate in emerging economies rises with the implementation of free-
market reforms. State-owned businesses, even when they are failing, are less likely
to fire employees because they’re kept afloat by government subsidies.
Scrieciu and Winker also believe that In Romania the agricultural sector acted
as a buffer, absorbing some of the people who lost their jobs in the city. This is how
they explained a lower than normal unemployment rate in 1997, compared with
other emerging economies in the area. The big question here is, in my opinion, how
the unemployment rate is calculated. There is an increasing percentage of the
population that works abroad, where wages are higher than those offered in
Romania. They’re working, but the output they produce is not counted in the
Romanian GDP and the fact that they have a job has nothing to do with how the
economy is performing.
There is another aspect that I want to mention. I came across the fact that a
huge number of Romanians went into retirement even when they did not have the
legal right to do so by accident. Empirically, I was able to assess that able bodies in
the labor force went to the extreme in order to retire, even though they took a big
cut in income. Some of the reasons behind this social phenomenon in the years
1990s were: un uncertain labor market, difficulties adapting to a free market
economy, lack of work ethics, common in the former communist Romania, and a
labor market dominated by low wages.
The fact of the matter is that, according to my research, the
unemployment rate does not reflect the true nature of unemployment. The
tendency as we speak is for qualified and unqualified labor to migrate to EU
countries where the wage rate is higher than in Romania. On the other hand,
construction and trucking companies in Romania face a shortage of workers. Italy,
France and Spain are the countries of preferences of migrant workers. The most
significant social problem, and by far the saddest, s temming from labor migration
is that of the children left behind by parents who went to work abroad. Most of them
live impoverished villages in the countryside. Grandparents or relatives try to raise
these children, some of which are as young as two or three years of age. What will
happen to a whole generation of abandoned children is everyone’s guess.
MY THESIS: PRIVATIZATION AND CORRUPTION: TWO FOR THE PRICE OF
ONE
My thesis will show that corruption has penetrated the socio-economic
fiber of the society to such an extent that the whole mechanism is disabled. Also,
the roots of corruption are to be found in the way the process of privatization took
place in Romania.
The privatization of some of the factor of production in Romania was done
in three stages. Almos Telegdy from the University of Budapest has done an
extensive study of the process of privatization in Romania. I will follow this thread
and will link it to the pervasive corruption that accompanied every step of the
privatization process.
Step one
The first phase of privatization started at the very beginning of the
transition period. In 1990 business firms were divided in two groups. Societati
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Comerciale were those businesses that would be allowed to go private after seven
years. For the time being they were still under the ownership of the state. Regii
Autonome , still under state ownership, remained under the control of various
ministries and although they were eligible to break away in 1997, they were not
included in the process of privatization. These regii autonome covered strategic
sectors of the economy, such as energy and national defense. But soon retail and
cigarettes companies were let in. All these businesses accounted for 47% of the
capital invested in state-owned firms the first seven years, that is until 1997
(Telegdy).
My analysis is that such a plan allowed the people who would become
very rich very soon to
operate in the shadow with the blessing of the state. Disperse ownership and state
subsidies are two major features of a corrupted system, according to my research.
Disperse ownership in the case of the
societati comerciale meant that that good and bad firms, efficient and inefficient
ones will continue to operate for ever and ever. State subsidies will keep afloat
failing enterprises. This is exactly what happened to the regii autonome .
Each Societati comerciale was owned in proportion of 70% by the Fondul
Proprietatii de Stat (FPS) – State Ownership Agency- and in proportion of 30% by the
Fondul Proprietatii Private (FPS) – Private Ownership Agency- (Telegdy). The State
Ownership Agency was present in all the economies in transition in the 1990s. The
second holding, the Private Ownership Agency was instrumental in distributing 30%
of the shares of societati comerciale to the population. These shares supposedly
gave the citizen the ownership and control of such business firms. In reality, the
shares were absolutely worthless. No dividends were ever distributed during the
five years of existence of the program. No control was exercised by citizens, who
had no idea of what was going on, because the board of directors was nominated by
the Parliament.
In conclusion, the first step of the privatization process in Romania, while
claiming to give the people ownership and control of a number of business firms,
ended up by reinforcing the power of the state in the economy. A number of
political figures and mafia-type individuals became CEOs and directors overnight
and this is how the happy hour started. In a short period of time they manipulated
capital, influence and favors and now one can find them of the list of the richest
people in Eastern Europe.
Step two
Next, the travesty continued with the second part of the privatization when
the people holding shares of ownership in societati comerciale were allowed to
exchange them for…new shares, as part of
the so-called mass privatization. According to A. Telegdy, this type of privatization
is criticized frequently because it creates a disperse form of ownership. He
concluded that in Romania, the ownership became even more disperse due to the
piece of legislation that set the program in motion. This legislation prevented
anyone to have a majority of shares at any given time. Furthermore, the buying and
selling of shares were prohibited. It turned out that the mass privatization had little
to do with the masses for the following reason. The state maintained ownership in
proportion of 40% or 51% in each of the societati comerciale (Teledgy).
Again, I want to reiterate the fact that the state and its cohorts
maintained a good grip on the only business firms that were being privatized. How
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easy was it to control, manipulate, subsidize and appropriate funds from such
businesses.
Step three
Finally, the last method of privatization allowed the societati comerciale to
sell their shares at auction, through direct sale or public offering. Between 1996
and 2000 the ownership of the businesses allowed to go private went from the
citizens who sold their shares to domestic or foreign owners who were able to buy
them (Teledgy).
This looks almost decent on paper but in reality things got ugly. The era
of big scandals, traffic of influence, illegal transactions between the local
government or the state and dubious individuals and enterprises. From the
beginning of the privatization process until the last phase, private individuals or
employees of specific businesses that were going to become private, were made
“owners” on paper. They could not benefit from being made “owners” nor could
they exercise any influence in the life of the business. Then, miraculously, a transfer
of ownership took place and this time the new owners were real owners. They could
buy or sell the business, hire or fire employees, and above all, they paid almost
nothing for what they got. Many of the businesses that were privatized in step three
were in such a bad shape that one couldn’t give them away.
The nouveaux rich: how the people of Romania got ripped off
A case in point is that of minister Paul Pacuraru, accused by the National
Anticorruption Agency of traffic of influence. The site Coruptie/Aluzii reveals that in
January 2008 the minister helped his son buy at auction several mines in the region
of Oltenie. However, premier Calin Popescu Tariceanu refused to have the minister
investigated. Eight present and former member of the government were
investigated for corruption this year according to the same site. Here are some of
the charges:
*bribery and traffic of influence (Adrian Nastase, former prime minister)
*bribery, false in public documents (Miron Tudor Mircea, former misiter of housing
and transportion)
*abuse of power contrary the public interest – dossier “Posta Romana” (Tudor
Alexandru Chiuariu, former minister of justice)
*abuse of power contrary to the public interest – dossier “Posta Romana”; high
treason by stealing economic secrets and organizing a criminal group acting
contrary to the national interest (Zsolt Nagy, former minister of communication and
information technology)
*bribery and abuse of power (Victor Babiuc, former defense ministry)
*bribery and helping his son’s business land a contract with the state (Nicolae
Pacuraru, former minister of labor, family and equal opportunity)
*high treason by stealing economic secrets and organizing a criminal group acting
contrary to the national interest (Ioan Codrut Seres, former minister of economics
and commerce)
*traffic of influence (Decebal Remes, former minister of agriculture and rural
development)
Unbelivable! Even the Romanian soccer is riddled with corruption. The site
Coruptie/Aluzii gives the names of agents, clubs presidents and team owners
investigated for money laundering, fraud and tax evasion. During the third step of
the privatization process in Romania, one of the regii autonome acquired in
proportion of 51% by the Austrian firm OMV in 2004 was the national oil company
Petrom. Petrom was at the time not only the largest Romanian company, but also
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one of the most strategic ones in the energy sector. The selling price was $669
million euros, a pittance for a company that has the exclusive right to extract
natural gas and crude oil in Romania. The site Presa zilei reported that the buyer’s
net profit in the first semester of operation was 403 million euros! This is one sad
example of a pattern that accompanied especially the second and third phase of
privatization. The state sold low and bought high. The buyers got rich, the state lost
money and the people who own the stock got nothing. In the case of Petrom, the
buyer got also the privilege of paying low taxes for the next 10 years.
Presa zilei reports that Aro Cimpulung was boughtby Cross Lander USA for
only $153,000, the cost of a medium -size condo ! Aro’s official value was of $15,8
million and its debt amounted to $11.4 million, yet it was purchased for practically
nothing. Cross Lander turned around and sold it for $2.7 million. What happened to
the employees who supposedly were the “owners” after the privatization? What did
they gain? The answer is simple: nothing. In many cases, many people were let go
after such a “smart” move because the new ownership did not need them any
longer or because they wanted to bring in their own people.
How do you become the richest man in Romania. Ask Dinu Patriciu. This is
probably the most egregious example disastrous privatizations. The company
Rompetrol produces petroleum products and petrochemicals. It was founded in
1974 by the communist regime and in 1993 was part of the privatization program.
While in step two, the employees were given certificates of ownership in 1993, in
step three the shares were purchased by a Dinu Patriciu and a local investor group
in 1998 (Wikipedia). My question is: after 45 years of communism and eight years of
painful transition, what private individual had the kind of money that would
purchase shares in a company as Rompetrol? Nobody had extra money under
communistm, except for the communist elite. The Diplomat Bucharest in February
of 2006 talks about the local investment group that purchased Rompetrol in 1998,
managed by US born Philip Stephenson. He claims that his investment group raised
$80 million from institutions around the world. Then he says that he met Dinu
Patriciu in Romanai, whom he refers to as the CEO and owner of Rompetrol.
The timetable given by the Wikipedia shows that in 1998 both Patriciu and
the local investor group managed by Stephenson purchased Rompetrol , yet
according to Stephenson Patriciu was already the owner when the two met in 1998!
Shortly after this miraculous encounter, they went on a shopping spree. The
headquarters were moved in 1999 to the Netherlands and by 2005 the company
operated in 12 countries in Europe. (the Diplomat Bucharest). My guess is that they
moved to Amsterdam right after wrestling the company away from the employees-
owners because they probably had access to the immense bank accounts of former
nut-case Ceausescu. Nobody was able to ever find them and nobody knew where
they were! Also, nobody believes this nonsense. The shopping spree that ended in
2005 during which companies were bought in Romania and all over Europe in the
name of Rompetrol was financed in what way?
In 2007 Patriciu sells 75% of Rompetrol to KazMunaiGaz, a company
controlled by the country Kazahstan. Now he is the richest man in Romania and
Kazahstan has control over Romanian resources of gas and crude oil. He still owes
20% of shares and Stephenson has now 5%. Patriuciu, Stephenson and another
representative of Rompetrol Group BV Olanda were charged last year by the
General Prosecutor’s Office (PG) with money laundering , tax evasion and fraud.
They allegedly did not make the promised investment to the refineries Vega in
Ploiesti and Petromidia at the Black Sea. The alleged crooks turned around the
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