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SM-62 Snark
Although unofficially designated a surface-to-surface ICM, the Snark was essentially a
small, turbojet-powered, unmanned aircraft. It was designed to be fired from a short
mobile launcher by means of two solid-fueled rocket boosters. Once air-borne, the Snark
was powered by a single Pratt and Whitney J-57 turbojet I engine capable of cruising at
Mach 0.9 to an altitude of approximately 150,000 feet. After a programmed flight of
1,500 to 5,500 nautical miles, the Snark's airframe separated from its nose cone, and the
missile's nuclear warhead followed a ballistic trajectory to its target. Plans developed by
the Strategic Air Command employed the Snark against enemy defensive systems,
especially radars, to ensure the effective penetration of enemy territory by manned
bombers

Throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s, work on the Snark missile program
progressed very slowly as a result of both limited research and development (R&D)
funding and the low national priority accorded to all guided missile programs. This
situation changed dramatically on 8 September 1955 when President Dwight D.
Eisenhower assigned the highest national priority to the intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) development program. Even though the Snark was not an ICBM, the Air Force
ordered its development program accelerated along with that of the Atlas missile.

In August 1945, the AAF established a requirement for a 600 mph, 5,000-mile- range
missile with a 2,000-pound warhead. In response to an Air Force solicitation for such a
device, Northrop presented a proposal in January 1946 for a subsonic, turbojet-powered,
3,000-mile range missile. That March, the company received one-year research and study
contracts for a subsonic and a supersonic missile with a range of 1,500 to 5,000 statute
miles, and a 5,000-pound payload. Jack Northrop, the company president, nicknamed the
former (MX-775A) Snark, and the latter (MX-775B) Boojum, both names from the pages
of Lewis Carroll.

The 1946 Christmas budget reduction deleted the subsonic Snark from the AAF missile
program, but retained the supersonic Boojum. But the matter did not end there. Jack
Northrop personally contacted Carl Spaatz, Chief of the Air Arm, and others, to save the
Snark. He promised development in two and one-half years, at an average cost of
$80,000 for each of the 5,000-mile missiles in a 5,000-unit production run. The noted
aircraft designer and manufacturer contended that it would take several years to develop
the turbojet-powered missile, with 60 percent of the effort going into the guidance
system. Before 1947 passed into history, USAF reconstituted the Snark program, slightly
modified from the August 1945 specifications, at the same time relegating the Boojum to
a follow-on status.

Air Materiel Command authorized 10 flight tests of the Snark, the first by March 1949. In
July, General Joseph McNarney called the Snark America's most promising missile
project. But the Army and the Navy criticized both the Snark and Navaho for their high
cost relative to their overall priority and unproven concept. Even Air Force enthusiasm
for the Snark cooled; in March 1950, the airmen reduced the program to the development
of only its guidance system.

The company designated the initial version N-25. Larger and heavier than previous
"flying bombs," Snark also possessed much greater performance; its J33 engine pushed it
at a cruising speed of Mach .85 (with a maximum level speed of Mach .9) to a range of
1,550 statute miles. A B-45 mother ship controlled the N-25, which Northrop designed to
be recovered by means of skids and a drag chute. The designers expected that recovering
the test vehicles would cut the time and money required to develop the missile.

Numerous problems became apparent in testing the N-25 at Holloman Air Force Base.
Despite a schedule calling for flight tests in 1949, the experimenters did not make the
first attempted launch until December 1950. It failed. After another failure, the first
successful flight took place in April 1951 when the missile flew 38 minutes before
recovery. During this series of tests, the 16 sled-launched missiles flew 21 times,
achieving a maximum speed of Mach .9 and a maximum endurance of 2 hours, 46
minutes. With the conclusion of these tests in March 1952, 5 of the 16 N-25s remained.

The prose description and a quick glance at a photograph of a Snark fails to highlight the
uniqueness of the missile. The Snark flew in a nose-high flying altitude because it lacked
a horizontal tail surface as did so many of Northrop's machines. Instead of conventional
control surfaces (ailerons, elevation), the Snark used elevons. A profile view reveals that
the missile also had a disproportionally small vertical tail.

To meet the toughest challenge for the program, guidance over the proposed
intercontinental distances, Northrop proposed an inertial navigation system monitored by
stellar navigation. Northrop accomplished the first daylight (ground) test of this stellar
device in January 1948. This was followed by flight tests aboard B-29s in 1951-52.
Between 1953 and 1958, 196 flight tests aboard B-45 aircraft provided about 450 hours
of guidance experience. The large and heavy (almost one ton) guidance system worked,
but not for very long. The company claimed that the Snark could achieve a CEP* of 1.4
nm.

In June 1950, the Air Force increased Snark requirements to include a supersonic dash at
the end of the 5,500 nm mission (6,350 statute miles), a payload of 7,000 pounds (later
reduced to 6,250 pounds), and a CEP of 1,500 feet. This key decision, increasing
performance requirements, invalidated the N-25.

Northrop therefore produced a new design. Basically a scaled-up N-25, the N-69 was
initially called "Super Snark." The new requirements that swept the N-25 aside for the
larger and more difficult N-69 hurt the Snark program. As a result the program lost
considerable time (38 months between the first flight of each). This overstates the impact
somewhat, however, as difficulties with the guidance system as well as airframe sank the
program.
The company lengthened the fuselage, sharpened the nose shape, replaced the external
scoop with a flush scoop, and increased the launch weight. More noticeably, Northrop
added a larger wing. Although Northrop slightly shortened the wing span, it broadened
the wing by extending it further aft, thus increasing the wing area from 280 to 326 square
feet. In addition, because wind tunnel and N-25 tests showed some instability in pitch
(pitch-up), Northrop redesigned the wing with a leading edge extension, thereby giving
the Snark wing its "saw tooth" shape. A J71 engine powered the "A," ''B," and "C"
models before USAF adopted the J57 in December 1953 for the "D" models.

But testing was necessary before this could occur. First, the experimentors tested three
unpowered dummy missiles with ballast to simulate the N-69. Then between November
1952 and March 1953, they flew four modified N-25s fitted with two 47,000-pound-
thrust boosters. In contrast, the N-69A used twin, four-second duration, 105,000-pound-
thrust boosters, while N-69C and later models relied on twin, four-second duration,
130,000-pound-thrust rockets.

But numerous problems beset the Northrop missile during testing. The Snark proved
unstable in all but straight and level flight. Northrop compounded these difficulties when
it took engineers off the Snark project to help the company's ailing, but priority, F-89 all-
weather interceptor program. Despite the reduction of test vehicles to 13 (as of February
1953), the program exceeded its budget by $18.3 million. The movement of testing from
Holloman to the Atlantic Missile Range in 1952, a move opposed by Northrop, also
hindered the program. In fact, the slow construction of test facilities in Florida restricted
testing between 1953 and 1957. There were also powerplant problems because the J71
engine exceeded its fuel consumption specifications, necessitating a number of engine
changes. If these problems were not enough, the first missile delivered for flight tests was
in serious disrepair.

The program also suffered numerous test failures. The initial launch attempt on 6 August
1953 failed, as did the next four. On 3 June 1954, the missile flew three and one-half
hours but exploded on landing. While USAF recovered 10 N-25s on its 21 flights, the
first successful N-69 recovery occurred on the 31st flight on 2 October 1956. The lack of
recoveries retarded the testing of the N-69. Northrop completed these tests by May 1955,
well after the Snark's tentative activation date of April 1953 and operational date of
October 1953.

The problems grew worse. By May 1955, wind tunnel and flight tests indicated that
Northrop's operational concept, terminal dive of the missile into the target, would not
work because of inadequate eleven control. Five flight tests of the IC, a nonrecoverable
radio-controlled missile with fuselage speed brakes (designed to test the Snark from
launch into the target) confirmed these findings. In July 1955, the Air Force accepted the
company's proposal for a different delivery concept involving a nose which detached
from the airframe near the target and then followed a ballistic trajectory. The redesigned
missile (N-69C, modified) first flew on 26 September l955
These aerodynamic, cost, and scheduling problems brought the missile under fire and
generated unfavorable publicity. One bit of ridicule which outlived the program dubbed
the waters off Canaveral "Snark infested waters" because of the numerous crashes. (In
fact, to some, this may well be the most memorable aspect of the entire program.) At the
other extreme, a Snark in December 1956 flew too far, that is, it failed to respond to
control and was last seen heading toward the jungles of Brazil As one Miami paper put it,
with apologies to Henry Wadsworth Longfellow. "They shot a Snark into the air, it fell to
the earth they know not where." In 1982, a Brazilian farmer found the errant missile.

More importantly, Strategic Air Command (SAC), the intended user of the missile, began
to express doubts about the Snark by late 1951. Although some may suspect the motives
of a unit dominated by bomber pilots regarding a pilotless bomber that would take the
man out of the machine, valid questions concerning the weapon's reliability and
vulnerability emerged at this point. As early as 1951, SAC decried Snark's vulnerability
both on the ground and in the air. On the ground, the missile would be based at
unhardened fixed sites. In the air, the subsonic (Mach .9) Snark lacked both defensive
armament and the ability for evasive maneuver. Indeed, it is difficult to quarrel with the
1954 SAC command position, which was "conservative concerning the integration of
pilotless aircraft into the active inventory in order to insure that reliance is not placed on a
capability which does not in fact exist." But some SAC officers in 1951 saw value in the
Snark program as a way to get the command into the missile business. Or perhaps they
just wished to make the most of a bad situation.

Criticism of the Snark came from other quarters as well. In early 1954, a blue ribbon
panel, The Strategic Missile Evaluation Committee, found important aspects of all three
American long-range missile programs (Snark, Navaho, and Atlas) unsatisfactory. The
committee concluded that, in general, the missiles' CEPs were outdated and their bases
were vulnerable. The panel assessed the Snark as an "overly complex" missile which
would not become operational until "substantially later" than scheduled.

The panel went on to make three recommendations. First, it recommended that USAF
employ a variety of means to assist heavy bombers: area decoys, local decoys, and ECM
(electronics countermeasures). Second, it suggested that USAF extend missile CEP
requirements from one quarter nm to three-to-five nm. Clearly, this relaxation made sense
in view of the much greater warhead capability soon to be available with the evolution
from atomic to hydrogen explosives, and the accuracy limitations of the existing
guidance systems. (By mid-1954, USAF had loosened Snark's CEP requirement from
1,500 to 8,000 feet.) Third, the panel recommended simplification of the Northrop
vehicle, entailing cancellation of both the Northrop and North American celestial
navigation systems. The committee estimated that Northrop could produce a simplified
Snark by 1957 with quantity production in 1958-59.

But the Snark program did not appreciably improve. In fact, test problems demonstrated
serious deficiencies in the weapon. In 1958, General Irvine of Air Research and
Development Command (ARDC) cited the Snark as an outstanding example of
unwarranted funding; and General Power, Commander of SAC, noted that the missile
added little to the command's strength. The latter wanted a reevaluation of Snark in order
to either correct deficiencies or terminate the program.

Despite Air Force reservations about the Snark, journalists presented the case for the
Northrop missile in the aviation press in the period 1955-58. They emphasized the
missile's major advantages, chiefly resulting from the fact that it was a one-way,
unmanned weapon. Besides not requiring a tanker fleet, advantages included fewer
requirements for ground handling, repair, and safety. Snark's advocates noted that it could
fly as fast as contemporary bombers, could be programmed for evasive maneuvers (so
they claimed), and could be adapted for low-level (500-foot) operations. Suggestions that
would reduce prelaunch vulnerability included rotating the missiles between sites (more
sites than missiles) and deploying them on old aircraft carriers. But the crucial argument
for Snark focused on low cost. About 1/8th to 1/l0th the size of a B-52, the Snark cost as
little as 1/20th as much as the Boeing bomber. Simply put, the Snark was cost effective.

Meanwhile, the program lumbered along. Northrop designed the "D" model Snark as a
recoverable vehicle equipped with a 24-hour stellar-inertial system. In the most visible
change, Northrop added two pylon tanks carrying a total of 593 gallons of fuel to the
wing. The overall result increased the Snark's empty weight from 16,616 pounds ("C") to
20,649 pounds ("D") and the gross flying weight from 36,074 pounds to 44,106 pounds.
The N-69D first flew in November 1955, but did not accomplish its first successful
stellar-guided flight until October 1956.

The "E" model followed shortly. While Northrop cut 2,000 pounds from the "D's" empty
weight, the ''E" weighed 5,000 pounds more at gross flying weight. The company first
launched the N-69E, the prototype vehicle for the SM-62 (the operational designation,
"strategic missile"), in June 1957 (it crashed within seconds), initially with a workable
rudder that it later deactivated. An Air Force crew launched its first Snark on 1 October
1957. These operations by SAC crews illustrated the Snark's severe problems. Of the first
seven Air Force launches, only two reached the drop zone and only one of these impacted
within four miles of the aiming point.

The central problems remained guidance and reliability. While the first full-range test
revealed that existing maps mislocated Ascension Island, this meant little to the Snark
program because of the missile's gross inaccuracy. On flights out to 2,100 miles, the
Northrop missile averaged a CEP of 20 miles. The most accurate of seven full-range
flights between June 1958 and May 1959 impacted 4.2 nm left and .3 nm short of the
target; in fact, it was the only one to reach the target area, and one of only two missiles to
pass the 4,400 rim distance mark. Not until February 1960 did Snark successfully
complete a guidance trial. Based upon the last ten launches in the program, the guidance
system showed less than a 50 percent chance of performing to specifications. In addition,
the guidance system, along with the control system, accounted for about half the test
failures; the other half were attributed to random factors. Test results indicated that Snark
had only a one in three chance of getting off the ground and only one of the last ten
launches went the planned distance.
In the mid and late 1950s, as more progress was made toward the deployment of the
Snark ICM, SAC began to lose enthusiasm for the Snark weapon system, due primarily to
two factors. First, SAC was greatly concerned with the relatively low speed of the Snark
and its inability to operate in the stratosphere, characteristics which rendered the missile
highly vulnerable to enemy interception and destruction.

Secondly, and of even greater importance, was the Snark's poor test performance record.
Throughout the Snark test program, initiated in 1952, numerous launch and guidance
failures had raised serious questions regarding the weapon system's reliability. In light of
these liabilities, SAC advocated termination of the program. On 16 December 1958,
General Thomas S. Power, Commander in Chief Strategic Air Command, informed
General Curtis E. LeMay, the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, that: . . . the limited
operational capability of this system adds little or nothing to the strategic offensive force
and I believe that a re-evaluation of this program is in order . . . either we should take
necessary action to integrate the Snark into the strategic inventory with a capability
compatible with our concept of operating or . . . take immediate action to cancel the
program.

Nevertheless, the Air Force began to incorporate the Snark into its inventory. While
responsibility for the development and testing of guided missiles rested with the Air
Research and Development Command, (predecessor of today's Air Force Materiel
Command), the Strategic Air Command maintained a close liaison with the various
missile programs by presenting SAC requirements, offering technical assistance, and
sending representatives to various conferences, meetings, and field demonstrations. At
the same time, SAC was actively engaged in developing operations plans for those
guided missiles destined for eventual deployment with the command. Thus, on 10
December 1956, SAC published a Snark operational plan that outlined the mission and
requirements for equipping, manning, siting, activating, and operating Snark units. Two
months earlier, on 22 October, the command had established a Strategic Missile Site
Selection Panel to survey potential missile site locations. The panel considered range,
expected target assignment, and the overall capabilities of the Snark ICM system when
surveying sites. On 21 March 1957, the Air Force, acting on the recommendation of the
Strategic Missile Site Selection Panel, designated Presque Isle AFB, Maine, as the site for
the first Snark missile base. Two months later, on 17 May, the Air Staff selected Patrick
AFB, Florida, as the training and operational testing locale for the Snark ICM. To carry
out this important dual assignment at Patrick AFB, SAC activated the 556th Strategic
Missile Squadron on 15 December 1957, making it SAC's first Snark and first strategic
surface-to-surface guided missile squadron. On 27 June 1958, little more than six months
after being activated, the 556th SMS successfully launched its first Snark from Cape
Canaveral, Florida -- shortly before USAF deactivated the unit.

But in November 1959, within a year of Power's request for a program evaluation, SAC
recommended cancellation of Snark (the recommendation was endorsed by ARDC).
Headquarters USAF, however, rejected that proposal. Despite General Power's
recommendation, the Air Force and the Department of Defense decided to continue a
limited program for the operational deployment of one Snark squadron to acquire some
missile capability until ballistic missiles became available in quantity. On 1 January
1959, SAC activated the 702nd Strategic Missile Wing (ICM-Snark) at Presque Isle AFB,
Maine, and assigned it to the Eighth Air Force, thus making it the first SAC missile wing
to be assigned to a numbered air force. The 556th SMS at Patrick AFB was assigned to
the 702d SMW on 1 April 1959 and was scheduled to move to Presque Isle in July, but
SAC inactivated the squadron on 15 July 1959 before the move could be consummated.
As a result of this action and the subsequent cancellation of the programmed activation of
the 702nd Missile Maintenance Squadron, the 702nd SMW was put in the unique
position of having no assigned subordinate units. All operational and maintenance
functions associated with the Snark ICM were handled by the 702nd SMW's deputy
commander for missiles. The 702d SMW placed the first Snark ICM on alert on 18
March 1960 and by the end of fiscal year 1960, a total of four Snark missiles were on
strategic alert. Yet, it was not until 28 February 1961 that SAC was able to declare the
702d SMW operational.

But the Snark was living on borrowed time. Shortly after taking office in 1961, John F.
Kennedy scrapped the project. The Strategic Air Command's negative evaluation of the
Snark's potential was reinforced on 28 March 1961 when President John F. Kennedy, in a
special defense budget message, directed the phase out of the missile because it was
"obsolete and of marginal military value" relative to ballistic missiles. The President cited
the weapon's low reliability (a particularly sore point to his Secretary of Defense),
inability to penetrate, lack of positive control, and vulnerable, unprotected launch sites.
Accordingly, in June 1961 [various sources report either 2 June or 25 June], SAC
inactivated the 702d Strategic Missile Wing at Presque Isle AFB less than four months
after it had been declared operational.

Surely the unit's and Snark's service trust rank as one of the briefest in peacetime US
military history. While the operational life of the Snark ICM was extremely short, the
program was not without its benefits. Chief among these was the experience gained by
the Strategic Air Command in planning and carrying out the activation, training, and
deployment of guided missile squadrons and wings. Such experience would be invaluable
to SAC as it prepared for the deployment of such follow-on missile weapon systems as
the Atlas, Titan, Jupiter, and Minuteman.
SM-64 Navaho

Concurrent with the Snark, another cruise missile had its brief moment in the sun.
Compared to the Snark, the North American Navaho was much more dramatic and
ambitious. Although the two air-breathing intercontinental missiles developed together,
USAF planned to get the subsonic Snark into operations first, followed by the supersonic
Navaho. Eventually, both would move aside for ballistic missiles.

In December 1945, the Technical Research Laboratory of North American Aviation

submitted a proposal to the Air Force to continue German missile research, apparently in
response to military requirements issued late that year. North American proposed a three
stage effort: first add wings to a V-2, then substitute a turbojet-ramjet powerplant for the
German rocket engine, and finally couple this missile with a booster rocket for
intercontinental range. In April 1946, the Air Force bought the first part of this scheme
under project MX-770, a 175- to 500 mile range surface-to-surface missile. In July 1947,
it added the 1,500-mile range, supersonic ramjet to the program. By March 1948, the
program called for a 1,000-mile test vehicle, a 3,000-mile test vehicle, and a 5,000-mile
operational missile. In 1950, the Air Force considered launching a Navaho from a B-36,
an idea dropped the next year. Finally, in September, USAF firmed up the program, that
is, not further changing it. The Navaho program called first for the design, construction,
and test of a turbojet test vehicle, followed by a 3,600-mile-range interim missiles and
culminating in a 5,500-mile-range operational weapon.

USAF designated the first step, the turbojet test vehicle, the X-10. Two Westinghouse
J40WE-1 turbojets powered the X-10, which first flew in October 1953. The missile was
70 feet long, configured with a canard, "V" tail, and 28-foot delta wing. Radio controls
and landing gear permitted recovery. In all, 11 vehicles flew 27 flights. On the 19th test,
the North American missile reached a maximum speed of Mach 2.05, establishing a
speed record for turbojet-powered aircraft.

Unfortunately, problems hindered the follow-on (interim) missile, the XSM-64, and
schedules slipped badly. In March 1952, USAF estimated that the first acceptance would
occur in January 1954; it occurred in April 1956, 27 months late. Similarly, a January
1954 estimate expected the first flight in September 1954, a flight actually not attempted
until November 1956. The first successful flight did not come until well into 1957. There
was no single problem; difficulties seem to affect just about everything except the
airframe. The most serious problems, however, centered on the ramjets and auxiliary
power unit, the latter not operating successfully until February 1956.

Between the summers of 1954 and 1955, USAF considered pushing the XSM-64 into
operational service, but problems and delays in the basic program killed that idea. The
Air Force did accelerate the Navaho program in late 1955, giving it a priority second only
to that of the ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles) and IRBMs (Intermediate Range
Ballistic Missiles), aiming to get the intercontinental- range missile operational by
October 1960.

The XSM-64 resembled the X-10 in size and configuration. The big difference was a 76-
foot, 3-inch long booster that was used piggy-back fashion with the XSM- 64. Together,
the two measured 82 feet 5 inches in length and were launched vertically.

As impressive as the XSM-64 looked on paper and to the eye, in reality the system
proved far different. The XSM-64 flight tests disappointed all, earning the project the
uncomplimentary appellation, "Never go, Navaho." The first XSM-64 launch attempted
in November 1956 ended in failure after a mere 26 seconds of flight. Ten unsuccessful
launch attempts occurred before a second Navaho got airborne on 22 March 1957, for
four minutes and 39 seconds. A 25 April attempt ended in an explosion seconds after
liftoff, while a fourth flight on 26 June 1957 lasted a mere four minutes and 29 seconds.

Little wonder then, with the lack of positive results, cost pressures, schedules slippages,
and increasing competition from ballistic missiles, that USAF canceled the program a
few weeks later in early July 1957. The Air Force did authorize up to five more XSM-64
flights at a cost not to exceed $5 million. These tests, "Fly Five," occurred between 12
August 1957 and 25 February 1958. Although harassed by problems and failures, the
vehicle exceeded Mach 3, with the longest flight lasting 42 minutes and 24 seconds. The
final Navaho tests consisted of two launches in project RISE (Research in Supersonic
Environment), which were equally unsuccessful. On the first flight on 11 September
1958, the ramjets did not start and on the second and last flight on 18 November 1958,
the missile broke up at 77,000 feet. It cost the taxpayers over $700 million to gain less
than 1 hours of flight time. So ended the Navaho project.

Nevertheless, USAF saw the Navaho project as a leap forward in the state of the art of
missile technology. The Navaho required new technology that resulted in a complex
missile. For example, aerodynamic heating (300 at Mach 2 and 660 at Mach 3) demanded
new materials. North American used titanium alloys, much stronger than aluminum and
yet 40 percent lighter than steel, as well as precious and rare metals at contact points on
much of the electrical gear. Other untested technology and areas of risk included the
canard configuration, ramjets, guidance, and the massive rocket booster. The situation
required North American to develop and then manufacture these various pieces of new
technology concurrently.

On the positive side, although the Navaho did not get into service, some of its
components did. Some went into other equally unsuccessful North American projects
such as the F-108 and B-70. Others fared better. The Redstone used the rocket engine
concept, and the Thor and the Atlas adapted the engine. The Hound Dog, the nuclear
submarine Nautilus for its epic under-the-ice passage of the North Pole, and the Navy's
A3J-1 Vigilante bomber, all adapted the Navaho's inertial autonavigation system.
Therefore, while the Navaho proved costly, the program did have positive benefits.
SM-73 Bull Goose
The XSM-73 (WS-123A) Bull Goose was an intercontinental range surface- launched
decoy missile. Work on the concept started in December 1952, although USAF did not
release a request (GOR 16) until March 1953, and did not sign a contract with Fairchild
until December 1955.

The Air Force planned to field 10 Bull Goose squadrons and buy 2,328 missiles in
addition to 53 for research and development. The first squadron was to be operational in
the first quarter of Fiscal Year 1961, the last at the end of Fiscal Year 1963. But problems
with funding, the subcontractor's fiberglass-resin bonded wing, the booster, and the
engine (J83-3) delayed the program.

The delta-wing XSM-73 weighed 7,700 pounds at launch, including a 500-pound

payload. A J83 or J85 engine provided the Bull Goose with 2,450 pounds of thrust after a
booster with a 50,000-pound thrust got it aloft. The specifications called for a 4,000-mile
range at Mach .85 with an accuracy of plus or minus 100 nm. Sled tests began at
Holloman in February 1957, with the first of 15 flights taking place at the Atlantic
Missile Range in June 1957. While five tests in 1957 were successful, those in 1958 were
less so. Construction of the missile sites began in August 1958, a few months before the
first Bull Goose flight with the YJ83 engine in November. USAF considered arming the
Goose, but in early December canceled the program because of budgetary pressures and
because the Fairchild missile could not simulate a B-52 on enemy radar. The Goose
program amassed a total of 28~/2 flying hours at a cost of $70 million.93
SM-65 Atlas
The Western Development Division awarded a development
contract for the Atlas to Convair in January 1955, and
Convair completed construction of the test stands in 1956.
Convair Division of General Dynamics Corporation
conducted static test firings of an Atlas missile at its
Sycamore Canyon test facility northeast of San Diego.

The Atlas A was the first R&D configuration that ultimately

led to the operational Atlas D, E, and F missiles. It consisted
of minimum propellant, propulsion, and guidance systems. Its maximum range was only
600 nautical miles, and its maximum altitude was 57.5 nautical miles. A total of eight
Atlas As were launched--all on the Atlantic Missile Range--during the period June 1957
to June 1958. The B series was the second Atlas developmental configuration. Its
propulsion system was close to operational capability, and one series B missile traveled
5,500 nautical miles down the Atlantic Missile Range. Atlas 4-B, the second in the series
B test flights, was launched successfully on 2 August 1958. The eighth missile in the
series, Atlas 10-B, placed itself into orbit with the Project SCORE payload on 18
December 1958, becoming the world’s first communications satellite in the first
successful use of the Atlas as a space launch vehicle.

The Convair Division of General Dynamics produced three different models of the Atlas
ICBM destined for deployment with the Strategic Air Command. The first operational
version of the Atlas, the "D" model, was a one and one-half stage, liquid-fueled, rocket-
powered (360,000 pounds of thrust) ICBM equipped with radio-inertial guidance and a
nuclear warhead. It was stored in a horizontal position on a "soft" above-ground launcher,
unprotected from the effects of nuclear blast, and had an effective range, like all Atlas
models, of approximately 6,500 nautical miles. The second Atlas ICBM configuration,
the series E, possessed all-inertial guidance, improved engines (389,000 pounds of
thrust), a larger warhead, and was stored in a horizontal position in a "semi-hard" coffin-
type launcher. The series "F" missile was superior to its predecessors in several ways.
Like the E model, the Atlas F was equipped with all-inertial guidance, but possessed
improved engines (390,000 pounds of thrust) and a quicker reaction time due to its
storable liquid fuel. The Atlas F missiles also were deployed in "hard" silo-lift launchers
which stored the missiles vertically in underground, blast-protected silos and used
elevators to raise the missiles to ground level for launch.

Meanwhile, considerable progress was made in developing second-generation ICBMs

such as the Minuteman. Among the numerous advantages the newer missiles had over the
Atlas was their ability to be launched from hardened and widely dispersed underground
silos. Minuteman was also more economical to operate, more reliable, and because of its
silo-launch capability, better able to survive a nuclear first strike than their first-
generation counterparts.
Consequently, on 24 May 1963, General Curtis E. LeMay, Air Force Chief of Staff,
approved the recommendations of the Air Force Ad Hoc Group for phaseout of Atlas D
by the end of FY 1965 and the Atlas E's by the end of FY 1967. On 16 May 1964,
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara accelerated the phase-out of the Series E Atlas
from the end of FY 1968 to the close of FY 1965. In addition, Secretary McNamara
ordered the retirement of all Atlas F ICBMs by the end of FY 1968.

Project "Added Effort", the Air Force nickname for the programmed phaseout of all first-
generation IC8Ms, began on 1 May 1964 when the first Atlas D's were taken off alert at
the 576th Strategic Missile Squadron, Vandenberg AFB, California. Project Added Effort
reached completion on 20 April 1965 when the last (first-generation) ICBM, an Atlas F.
was shipped from the 551st Strategic Missile Squadron, Lincoln AFB, Nebraska, to
Norton AFB, California, where it and other retired Atlas ICBMs were stored for future
use as launch vehicles in research and development programs.
SM-68 Titan I
The Titan I, produced by the Glenn L. Martin Company, was a two-stage, liquid-fueled,
rocket-powered (first stage - 300,000 pounds of thrust; second stage - 80,000 pounds of
thrust) ICBM which incorporated both radio and all-inertial guidance. Deployed in a
"hard" silo-lift launcher, the Titan I had an effective range of 5,500 nautical miles.

The second-generation Titan II could be launched from hardened and widely dispersed
underground silos, and was thus better able to survive a nuclear first strike than their first-
generation counterparts.

Consequently, on 24 May 1963, General Curtis E. LeMay, Air Force Chief of Staff,
approved the recommendations of the Air Force Ad Hoc Group for phaseout of the Titan
I by the close of FY 1968. On 16 May 1964, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara
accelerated the phase-out of the Titan I from the end of FY 1968 to the close of FY 1965.

Project "Added Effort" was the Air Force nickname for the programmed phaseout of all
first-generation ICBMs. The operational phaseout of the Titan I weapon system was
completed on 1 April 1965 when the last Titan I was removed from alert at the 569th
Strategic Missile Squadron, Mountain Home AFB, Idaho. The retired Titans were moved
to Miro Loma AFB, California, for storage.
SM-68B Titan II
The Titan II, manufactured by the Martin Company, was a large two-stage, liquid-fueled,
rocket-powered ICBM that incorporated significant performance improvements over the
earlier model Titan I weapon system. Titan II had more powerful engines (first stage -
430,000 pounds of thrust, second stage - 100,000 pounds of thrust, compared to 300,000
pounds and 80,000 pounds for the Titan I), a larger warhead, all-inertial guidance,
hyperbolic fuel. and an on-board oxidizer, and the capability of being fired from a
hardened underground-silo launcher.

Each Titan II silo was directly connected to an underground launch control capsule
manned by a missile combat crew of two officers and two airman. The Titan II, like the
Titan I, had an effective range of ~approximately 5,500 nautical miles. The Air Force had
approved the development of the Titan II ICBM in October 1959. By 28 March 1961, the
missile force included six Titan I and six Titan II squadrons. SAC activated the first Titan
II squadron on 1 January 1962 and during the next eight months activated five more
squadrons.

On 8 June 1963, the 570th Strategic Missile Squadron at Davis-Monthan became the first
Titan II unit to achieve operational status. Headquarters SAC completed the deployment
of the second-generation ICBM weapon system on the last day of 1963 when it declared
the sixth and last Titan II unit, the 374th Strategic Missile Squadron at Little Rock Air
Force Base, Arkansas, operational.

By 1981, the Titan II weapon system had served the nation for eighteen years, eight years
longer than its predicted service life. The system's advanced age, combined with three
accidents that destroyed two sites and killed four airmen, had cast doubts on its safety and
effectiveness. SAC, anticipating a Department of Defense (DOD) initiative, began to
consider replacement options in October 1980. One month later, the Senate Armed
Services Committee asked the Defense Department to prepare a formal Titan II safety
report. SAC's replacement options review became the basis for the DOD safety report
released in February 1981. The DOD study acknowledged Titan II's significant, albeit
declining usefulness in preserving nuclear deterrence, and recommended deactivation of
the Titan system as part of the ICBM modernization plan. During the interim, SAC would
continue to improve Titan hardware and safety procedures.

On 2 October 1981, Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci directed the

retirement of the Titan II at the earliest possible time. The deactivation program,
designated Rivet Cap, formally began with the removal from alert of site 571-6 at Davis-
Monthan AFB, Arizona, on 30 September 1982. Titan II deactivation was completed on
23 June 1987 when technicians removed the last Titan II missile from its silo at Little
Rock AFB, Arkansas. The era of liquid propellant ICBMs came to a close on 18 August
1987 with the inactivation of the last Titan II wing, the 308th Strategic Missile Wing at
Little Rock AFB.
LGM-30A/B Minuteman I
Minuteman is a three-stage, solid-propellant, rocket-powered ICBM with a range of
approximately 5,500 nautical miles. Minuteman also possessed an all-inertial guidance
system and the capability of being fired from hardened and widely-dispersed
underground-silo launchers. A consortium of five contractors produced four distinct
models of the Minuteman ICBM weapon system, each model being an improvement over
the former: Minuteman I (models "A" and "B"), Minuteman II (model "F"), and
Minuteman III (model "G"), the latter capable of carrying multiple independently-
targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs).

The Minuteman I was deactivated in 1972 when the Air Force began its modernization
process to the Minuteman III.

The Air Force secured approval from the Department of Defense on 27 February 1958 to
develop the Minuteman. From its very inception, the Minuteman program was oriented
towards mass production of a simple, efficient, and highly survivable ICBM capable of
destroying all types of enemy targets with consistent reliability. The Air Force hoped that
such a program would reverse the unfavorable trend towards succeeding generations of
progressively more costly ICBMs and provide the Strategic Air Command with a weapon
system that was inexpensive to operate and maintain.

During the early development phase of Minuteman, the Strategic Air Command favored
the concept of deploying at least a portion of the programmed force (from 50 to 150
ICBMs) on railroad cars. SAC submitted a requirement to the Air Staff on 12 February
1959 calling for the first mobile Minuteman unit to be operational no later than January
1963. To determine the feasibility of deploying Minuteman ICBMs on mobile launchers,
SAC ordered a series of tests to be conducted, nicknamed "Operation Big Star."
Beginning 20 June 1960, a modified test train, operating out of Hill Air Force Base, Utah,
traveled across the western and central United States so technicians could study factors
such as the ability of the nation's railroads to support mobile missile trains; problems
associated with command, control, and communications; the effect of vibration on
sensitive missiles and launch equipment; and human factors involved in the operation of
a mobile missile system. Originally, six trial runs were projected, but only four were
necessary to realize all test objectives. On 27 August 1960, the last of four Minuteman
ICBM test trains arrived back at Hill AFB and the Air Force announced that the test of
the Minuteman mobility concept had been completed satisfactorily.

Despite SAC's repeated pleas in favor of mobile Minuteman, the Air Force assigned top
priority to the fixed silo-based Minuteman concept. Furthermore, on 28 March 1961,
President John F. Kennedy deferred further action on the development of the three mobile
Minuteman squadrons in favor of three additional squadrons of silo-based Minuteman
units. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara finally settled the issue on 7 December
1961 when he canceled the mobile Minuteman development program.
A decision regarding the final size of the silo-based Minuteman ICBM force was not
made until December 1964. A new Minuteman system program directive issued on 11
December 1964 established the final Minuteman force at 1,000 missiles. Three years
earlier, on 1 December 1961, Headquarters SAC had activated the first Minuteman
squadron, the 10th Strategic Missile Squadron (ICBM-Model A Minuteman I) at
Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana. Only two other model "A" ICBM squadrons were
activated by Headquarters SAC. These were the 12th Strategic Missile Squadron,
activated on 1 March 1962, and the 490th Strategic Missile Squadron, activated on 1 May
1962, also located at Malmstrom. The next thirteen Minuteman squadrons activated by
the Strategic Air Command were all model "B" Minuteman I units.

Strategic Air Command housed each Minuteman I, whether a model "A" or "B", in an
unmanned, hardened, and widely-dispersed (three-to-seven mile intervals) underground-
silo launch facility. A missile combat crew of two officers stationed in a hardened,
underground launch control center monitored each flight of 10 launch facilities (five
flights per squadron). For purposes of command, control, and communications, hardened
underground cables linked all five launch control centers of a Minuteman squadron.

The Minuteman Force Modernization Program initiated in 1966 to replace all Minuteman
I's with either Minuteman II's or Minuteman III's continued through the latter 1960s and
into the mid-70s. The last Minuteman I series "An missiles were removed from their
launch facilities at Malmstrom AFB, Montana, on 12 February 1969. These facilities
were refurbished and outfitted with Minuteman II series "F" missiles. Boeing Aerospace
Company, the contractor responsible for remodeling the launch facilities, completed the
nine year modernization effort on 26 January 1975 when it turned over to SAC the last
flight of ten Minuteman III missiles at the 90th Strategic Missile Wing, F.E. Warren
AFB, Wyoming.
LGM-30F Minuteman II
In service since 1965, the Minuteman "F" was a three stage, solid propellant,
intercontinental ballistic missile. Because solid propellant is so stable in storage, the
missile can be stored almost indefinitely and yet be ready to launch on short notice. This
ICBM had a range of over 7,000 nautical miles and carried a single nuclear warhead. 450
missiles were fielded at one time, though the Minuteman II has been decommissioned
and the missiles disassembled.

On 2 October 1963, shortly after the first model "A" and "B" Minuteman I squadrons
achieved operational status, Headquarters USAF issued Annex A to Specific Operational
Requirement 171 which established a requirement for the Minuteman II ICBM (Model
"F"). A more advanced missile than either model of the Minuteman I, the "F" model
incorporated a new, larger second-stage, improved guidance system, a greater range and
payload capacity, and an increased capability to survive the effects of nuclear blast. In
view of the numerous advantages of the Minuteman II, Secretary of Defense Robert S.
McNamara approved the Minuteman Force Modernization Program on 8 November
1963. The project entailed the eventual replacement of the entire force of deployed
Minuteman I ICBMs, 150 "A" and 650 "B" models, with Minuteman IIs.

To prepare for the emplacement of the newer model Minuteman II ICBM, it was
necessary to completely retrofit the original Minuteman I launch facilities, launch control
facilities, and associated ground equipment. The Minuteman Force Modernization
Program began at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, on 7 May 1966 when the first
flight of ten model "B" Minuteman missiles were removed from their silos at the 509th
Strategic Missile Squadron. On 1 February 1965, Headquarters SAC activated the 447th
SMS at Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota, making it the seventeenth Minuteman squadron
and the first to be equipped with "F" model missiles. Fourteen months later on 1 April
1966, SAC activated the fourth Minuteman II, and the twentieth and last Minuteman
squadron, the 564th SMS, at Malmstrom AFB, Montana. Once the 564th SMS achieved
operational status on 21 April 1967, the deployment of the programmed force of 1,000
Minuteman ICBMs was completed.
LGM-30 Minuteman III
Five hundred Minuteman III missiles are deployed at four bases in the north-
central United States: Minot AFB and Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota,
Malmstrom AFB, Montana, and F. E. Warren AFB, Wyoming. Operational since
1968, the model "G" differs from the "F" in the third stage and reentry system.
The third stage is larger and provides more thrust for a heavier payload. The
payload, the Mark 12 reentry system, consists of a payload mounting platform,
penetration aids, three reentry vehicles (RVs) and an aerodynamic shroud. The
shroud protects the RVs during the early phases of flight. The mounting platform
is also a "payload bus" and contains a restartable hypergolic rocket engine
powered by hydrazine and nitrogen tetroxide. With this configuration, the RVs
can be independently aimed at different targets within the missile's overall target
area or "footprint". This concept is known as Multiple Independently Targeted
Reentry Vehicles (MIRV).

The LGM-30 Minuteman missiles are dispersed in hardened silos to protect

against attack and connected to an underground launch control center through a
system of hardened cables. Launch crews, consisting of two officers, perform
around-the-clock alert in the launch control center. A variety of communication
systems provide the National Command Authorities with highly reliable, virtually
instantaneous direct contact with each launch crew. Should command capability be lost
between the launch control center and remote missile launch facilities, specially-
configured EC-135 airborne launch control center aircraft automatically assume
command and control of the isolated missile or missiles. Fully qualified airborne missile
combat crews aboard airborne launch control center aircraft would execute the NCA
orders.

The Minuteman weapon system was conceived in the late 1950s and
deployed in the early 1960s. Minuteman was a revolutionary concept and
an extraordinary technical achievement. Both the missile and basing
components incorporated significant advances beyond the relatively slow-
reacting, liquid-fueled, remotely-controlled intercontinental ballistic
missiles of the previous generation. From the beginning, Minuteman
missiles have provided a quick-reacting, inertially guided, highly
survivable component to America's nuclear Triad. Minuteman's
maintenance concept capitalizes on high reliability and a "remove and
replace" approach to achieve a near 100 percent alert rate.

By the time the last Minuteman IIs of the 564th SMS were placed on strategic alert in the
spring of 1967, significant progress had been made on the development of an even more
advanced ICBM. The Minuteman III, using modernized Minuteman I and Minuteman II
ground facilities, provided reentry vehicle and penetration aids deployment flexibility,
increased payload, and improved survivability in a nuclear environment. Its liquid
injection attitude control system with a fixed nozzle on an improved third stage motor
increased the Minuteman's range and the Minuteman III reentry system could deploy
penetration aids and up to three Mark 12 or Mark 12A multiple independently-targetable
reentry vehicles. A liquid-fueled post-boost propulsion system maneuvered the missile
prior to deployment of the reentry vehicles, while upgraded guidance system electronics
enhanced computer memory and accuracy.

On 17 April 1970, an important Minuteman III milestone was reached when the first
missile was placed in a silo assigned to the 741st Strategic Missile Squadron, Minot AFB,
North Dakota. At the end of December, the 741st SMS became the first SAC Minuteman
III squadron to achieve operational status.

Strategic Air Command expected Minuteman to play an important role in the command's
force structure beyond the year 2000. To ensure the reliability and maintainability of the
Minuteman force into the next century, the Air Force initiated a major Minuteman
upgrade and modification program. Rivet MILE (Minuteman Integrated Life Extension
Program) began 1 April 1985 at the 341st Strategic Missile Wing, Malmstrom AFB,
Montana. This joint Strategic Air Command and Air Force Logistics Command effort
was the largest single missile logistics program ever undertaken within the ICBM
program.

Through state-of-the-art improvements, the Minuteman system has evolved to meet new
challenges and assume new missions. Modernization programs have resulted in new
versions of the missile, expanded targeting options, significantly improved accuracy and
survivability. Today's Minuteman weapon system is the product of almost 35 years of
continuous enhancement.

Peacekeeper missile deployment also affected the Minuteman force. As part of the
strategic modernization program undertaken in 1982, Strategic Air Command deployed
fifty Peacekeeper missiles in modified Minuteman III silos assigned to the 400th
Strategic Missile Squadron, 90th Strategic Missile Wing, F.E. Warren AFB, Wyoming.
Conversion began on 3 January 1986, when the first Minuteman came off alert, and the
phaseout of the 400th SMS's Minuteman IIIs was completed on 11 April 1988.

The current Minuteman force consists of 530 Minuteman III's located at F.E. Warren Air
Force Base, Wyo.; Malmstrom AFB, Mont.; Minot AFB, N.D.; and Grand Forks AFB,
N.D. As a result of U.S. initiatives to cancel development programs for new
intercontinental ballistic missiles and retire the Peacekeeper ICBM, Minuteman will
become the only land-based ICBM in the Triad. To compensate for termination of the
Small ICBM and Peacekeeper Rail Garrison programs, DOD will conduct an extensive
life extension program to keep Minuteman viable beyond the turn of the century. These
major programs include replacement of the aging guidance system, remanufacture of the
solid-propellant rocket motors, replacement of standby power systems, repair of launch
facilities, and installation of updated, survivable communications equipment and new
command and control consoles to enhance immediate communications.
In order to meet warhead levels set by START II, the United States has decided to
permanently DEMIRV Minuteman III missiles from their current capability to carry up to
three reentry vehicles to a newly configured single reentry vehicle system once the treaty
enters into force. "Downloading" Minuteman III missiles from three reentry vehicles to
one lowers the military value of each missile; reduces the likelihood of any
country expending resources to preemptively attack America's ICBM
force; and decreases the probability of future US leaders being force into a
"use or lose" position. For a downsized force of 500 single reentry vehicle
Minuteman III to continue to be an effective deterrent force, the guidance
replacement program will improve the needed accuracy and supportability
that is inherent in a smaller missile force. Peacekeeper missiles will be
deactivated by 2003, provided START II is ratified and enters into force.
Ultimately, a total of 500 single RV Minuteman IIIs will be the nation's
ICBM deterrent force through 2020.

Specifications
Primary function: Intercontinental ballistic missile
Contractor: Boeing Co.
Three solid-propellant rocket motors;
first stage, Thiokol;
Power plant: second stage, Aerojet-General;
third stage, United Technologies Chemical Systems
Division
Thrust: First stage, 202,600 pounds (91,170 kilograms)
Length: 59.9 feet (18 meters)
Weight: 79,432 pounds (32,158 kilograms)
Diameter: 5.5 feet (1.67 meters)
Range: 6,000-plus miles (5,218 nautical miles)
Approximately 15,000 mph (Mach 23 or 24,000 kph) at
Speed: burnout
Ceiling: 700 miles (1,120 kilometers)
Inertial system: Autonetics Division of Rockwell
International;
Guidance systems:
ground electronic/security system: Sylvania Electronics
Systems and Boeing Co.
Load: Re-entry vehicle: General Electric MK 12 or MK 12A
Three (downloaded to one as required by the
Warheads: Washington Summit Agreement, June 1992)
Yield:
Circular Error
Probable:
Unit cost: $7 million
Date deployed: June 1970, production cessation: December 1978
Inventory: Active force, 530; Reserve, 0; ANG, 0
20th Air Force

o 91st Space Wing, Minot AFB, ND

 91st Operations Group
 91st Operations Support
Squadron
 740th Missile Squadron
 741st Missile Squadron
Operational Units:
 742d Missile Squadron
o 321st Missile Group,Grand Forks AFB,
ND
o 341th Space Wing, Malmstrom AFB,
MT
o 90th Space Wing, F.E. Warren AFB,
WY
LGM-118A Peacekeeper
The Peacekeeper missile is America's newest intercontinental
ballistic missile. With the end of the Cold War, the US has begun
to revise its strategic policy, and has agreed to eliminate the
multiple re-entry vehicle Peacekeeper ICBMs by the year 2003
as part of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II. The
Peacekeeper (designated LGM-118A) is a four-stage
intercontinental ballistic missile capable of carrying up to ten
independently-targetable reentry vehicles with greater accuracy
than any other ballistic missile. Its design combines advanced
technology in fuels, guidance, nozzle design, and motor construction with protection
against the hostile nuclear environment associated with land-based systems. The
Peacekeeper is much larger than Minuteman, over 70 feet long and weighing 198,000
pounds. It is a four stage missile like the Minuteman III, with the first three stages being
solid propellant and the fourth stage bu hypergolicly fueled with hydrazine and nitrogen
tetroxide. Although capable of carrying eleven Mark 21 RVs, treaty limits mandated
deploying the Peacekeeper with only ten RVs. The entire missile is encased in a canister
in the silo to protect it against damage and to permit "cold launch". The Minuteman II
and III ignite their first stage engines while in the LF, but the Peacekeeper is ejected by
pressurized gas some fifty feet into the air before first stage ignition.

The Peacekeeper is a three-stage rocket ICBM system consisting of three major sections:
the boost system, the post-boost vehicle system and the re-entry system.

The boost system consists of three rocket stages that launch the missile into space. These
rocket stages are mounted atop one another and fire successively. Three of the four stages
exhausted their solid propellants through a single adjustable nozzle which guided the
missile along its flight path. Motorcases made of kevlar epoxy material held the solid
propellants. The fourth stage post-boost vehicle employed a liquid bi- propellant rocket
propulsion system to provide velocity and attitude correction for missile guidance. The
post-boost vehicle also employed a self-contained inertial navigation system that allowed
the missile to operate independent of ground reference or commands during flight.

The 28-foot first-stage solid-fuel rocket motor weighed approximately 108,000 pounds
and is capable of boosting the missile to about 75,000 feet. The 18-foot long second-stage
motor propelled the missile to an altitude of about 190,000 feet and weighed 60,000
pounds. The rocket motor in the eight-foot third stage weighed 17,000 pounds and
supplied the thrust to boost the missile to about 700,000 feet. The 2,300 pound post-boost
fourth stage vehicle was designed to maneuver the missile into position for the multiple
reentry vehicles to deploy in their respective ballistic trajectories.

Following the burnout and separation of the boost system's third rocket stage, the post-
boost vehicle system, in space, maneuvers the missile as its re-entry vehicles are
deployed in sequence.
The post-boost vehicle system is made up of a maneuvering rocket, and a guidance and
control system. The vehicle rides atop the boost system, weighs about 3,000 pounds
(1,363 kilograms) and is 4 feet (1.21 meters) long.

The top section of the Peacekeeper is the re-entry system. It consists of the deployment
module, up to 10 cone-shaped re-entry vehicles and a protective shroud. The shroud
protects the re-entry vehicles during ascent. It is topped with a nose cap, containing a
rocket motor to separate it from the deployment module.

The deployment module provides structural support for the re-entry vehicles and carries
the electronics needed to activate and deploy them. The vehicles are covered with
material to protect them during re-entry through the atmosphere to their targets and are
mechanically attached to the deployment module. The attachments are unlatched by gas
pressure from an explosive cartridge broken by small, exploding bolts, which free the re-
entry vehicles, allowing them to separate from the deployment module with minimum
disturbance. Each deployed re-entry vehicle follows a ballistic path to its target.

The Peacekeeper was the first U.S. ICBM to use cold launch technology. The missile was
placed inside a canister and loaded into the launch facility. When launched, high-pressure
steam ejected the canister from the launch silo to an altitude of 150 to 300 feet, and once
the missile has cleared the silo, the first stage ignited and sent the missile on its course.
This technique allowed SAC to launch the Peacekeeper from Minuteman silos despite the
fact that the Peacekeeper was three times larger than the Minuteman III.

Background

Once Minuteman III deloyment was underway, Strategic Air Command's planners began
their search for a third-generation ICBM. SAC again sought the most technologically
advanced system to secure increased range, variable warhead yields, and pinpoint
accuracy. Several issues complicated the development and acquisition of a new ICBM
system. The increased accuracy of Soviet missile systems spawned an intense debate over
the survivability of fixed missile sites and the best method for basing the third-generation
ICBM. However, the issue of funding, given an atmosphere of burgeoning federal
deficits and cost-cutting measures, impeded SAC's efforts to acquire a new missile.
Nonetheless, SAC persevered and brought the Missile-X into the ICBM inventory as the
Peacekeeper missile.

The search for a system to replace the Minuteman began in 1971. Strategic Air
Command, believing Minuteman technology to be obsolete, wanted a new missile that
incorporated the most advanced technology available. Essential elements on SAC's list of
requirements were increased range, greater accuracy, and variable yield warheads to
capitalize on multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle technology. Progress
toward the new missile was made on 4 April 1972 when Headquarters Air Force assigned
the designation "Missile-X" (M-X) to the advanced ICBM and made the Space and
Missile Systems Organization (SAMSO) responsible for developing it.
The issue of hardened silos versus mobility surfaced almost immediately as a major M-X
stumbling point. Improvements in Soviet ICBM forces and missile accuracy raised
serious concerns over the ability of silo-based ICBMs to survive an attack. Proposed
solutions to the problem were hardened silos and a mobile basing system. Strategic Air
Command objected to mobile basing in 1973 because of its high expense, poor accuracy,
and slow reaction time. Meanwhile, the defense community continued to explore both
solutions. One approach to mobility was an air-mobile system, and during a 24 October
1974 test of the concept, SAMSO successfully launched a Minuteman I from a C-5A
cargo aircraft. One month later, the Secretary of Defense, under intense political pressure
to resolve basing issues and produce an economical missile system, pushed the M-X's
initial operational capability from 1983 to 1985. At the same time, he initiated studies to
determine the feasibility of developing a common M-X/Trident missile. In July 1976,
Congress, convinced that silo-based missiles would be vulnerable to Soviet ICBMs,
refused to appropriate funds for validation of a silo-based M-X system. Congress also
deleted funds for air-mobile basing and directed validation of either a buried trench or
shelter basing plan.

The defense establishment examined nearly forty basing modes before President Carter
made his 12 June 1979 decision to proceed with full scale engineering development of
the Missile-X. The President augmented this decision on 7 September 1979 with the
selection of a horizontal multiple protective shelter basing plan for the new missile. Full
scale engineering development began one week later.

President Reagan, desiring more rapid deployment of the new missile, canceled the
horizontal shelter plan on 2 October 1981 and advocated the deployment of a limited
number of M-X missiles in superhardened Titan II or Minuteman silos. On 22 November
1982, the President further refined his position by announcing Closely Spaced Basing as
the final solution to the M-X basing problem. President Reagan used the same speech to
indicate his preference for "Peacekeeper" as the name of the M-X missile. Congress,
which had rejected interim Peacekeeper basing in Minuteman silos in

March 1982, also rejected Closely Spaced Basing and refused to approve Peacekeeper
funding. The Congress further insisted that the President undertake a comprehensive
technical assessment of the ICBM and basing alternatives.

President Reagan responded by first directing Headquarters Air Force to conduct a

technical assessment. The Air Force report, completed in March 1983, advocated
deployment of a new, highly accurate ICBM in sufficient numbers to eliminate the Soviet
Union's "coercive advantage." The Air Force also recommended concurrent deployment
of a survivable basing method that allowed credible, effective, and timely retaliation. A
critical point in the Air Force assessment was the need to deploy an ICBM quickly as a
demonstration of national resolve to preserve deterrence.

President Reagan also appointed a Commission on Strategic Forces chaired by Lieutenant

General Brent Scowcroft. The Scowcroft Commission's report, issued on 6 April 1983,
encouraged the development of a small single-warhead ICBM to meet the long-range
threat, but recommended the immediate deployment of 100 Peacekeeper missiles in
existing Minuteman silos to demonstrate national will and to compensate for the
retirement of Titan II ICBMs. The Scowcroft report also encouraged a vigorous
examination of all basing alternatives. President Reagan and Congress concurred with the
Scowcroft Commission's findings and on 10 August 1983 the Secretary of Defense
instructed the Air Force to deploy 100 Peacekeepers in Minuteman silos at F.E. Warren
AFB, Wyoming. At the same time, the Defense Secretary directed the Air Force to
initiate design of a small, single-warhead ICBM.

The Air Force successfully conducted the first test flight of the Peacekeeper June 17,
1983, from Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif. The missile traveled 4,190 miles (6,704
kilometers) before dropping six unarmed test re-entry vehicles on planned target sites in
the Kwajalein Missile Test Range in the Pacific Ocean.

The first two test phases consisted of 12 test flights to ensure the Peacekeeper's
subsystems performed as planned, and to make final assessments of its range and payload
capability. The missile was fired from above-ground canisters in its first eight tests.
Thereafter, test flights were conducted from Minuteman test silos reconfigured to
simulate operational Peacekeeper sites.

Peacekeeper production began in February 1984. Under plans prepared by Strategic Air
Command, 50 Minuteman IIIs assigned to the 400th Strategic Missile Squadron, 90th
Strategic Missile Wing, F.E. Warren AFB, Wyoming, were be removed and replaced
with Peacekeeper missiles, which had an estimated service life of twenty years.
Peacekeeper deployment was scheduled to begin in January 1986 and initial operational
capability was set for December of the same year. The second increment of 50 missiles
would replace Minuteman IIIs belonging to the 319th Strategic Missile Squadron at F.E.
Warren. The expected completion date of the deployment was December 1989.

These plans were interrupted in July 1985 when Congress limited Peacekeeper
deployment to 50 missiles until the administration could produce a more survivable
basing plan. President Reagan's solution for basing the remaining 50 missiles, announced
19 December 1986, was Peacekeeper Rail Garrison. Three days later, the 90th SMW
achieved initial operational capability for Peacekeeper by placing the first flight of ten
missiles on strategic alert. Full operational capability occurred in December 1988, when
the 90th Strategic Missile Wing accepted the fiftieth Peacekeeper missile.

Under the rail garrison concept, the remaining Peacekeeper missiles would be placed on
trains stationed at various U.S. Air Force installations. The 25 trains, each carrying two
missiles, would deploy off-base and onto the national railroad network during periods of
international tension to improve survivability. F.E. Warren AFB would serve as the Main
Operating Base for the rail garrison force. In February 1987, the Air Force selected ten
additional bases as candidate rail garrison locations. That same year, Congress
appropriated $350 million to fund rail garrison research and development. Exercises
conducted in 1988 tested and refined the concept of operations, and in May the Secretary
of Defense authorized the Air Force to proceed with Peacekeeper Rail Garrison full scale
development.

A further review of ICBM moderization produced a Presidential decision in April 1989

that limited the Peacekeeper system to the existing 50 missiles but directed they be
redeployed from silos to rail garrison. In November, the Air Force announced the
selection of seven bases to house Peacekeeper Rail Garrison. The Main Operating Base
would be F.E. Warren AFB, Wyoming, and the other six bases were Barksdale AFB,
Louisiana; Little Rock AFB, Arkansas; Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota; Dyess AFB,
Texas; Wurtsmith AFB, Michigan; and Fairchild AFB, Washington. December 1992 was
the date established for delivery of the first asset.

The Air Force achieved initial operational capability of 10 deployed Peacekeepers at F.E.
Warren AFB, Wyo., in December 1986. Full operational capability was achieved in
December 1988 with the establishment of a squadron of 50 missiles.

Ballistic Missile Organization, Air Force Materiel Command (now Detachment 10, Space
and Missile Systems Center), began full-scale development of the Peacekeeper in 1979.
This organization, located at San Bernadino, Calif., integrated the activities of more than
27 civilian contractors and numerous subcontractors to develop and build the
Peacekeeper system.

Specifications
Primary function: Intercontinental ballistic missile
Basing: Boeing Aerospace and Electronics; assembly
Contractor:
and test: Martin Marietta and Denver Aerospace
First three stages, solid-propellant; fourth stage,
Power Plant: storable liquid (by Thiokol, Aerojet, Hercules and
Rocketdyne)
Length: 71 feet (21.8 meters)
195,000 pounds (87,750 kilograms) including re-entry
Weight:
vehicles
Diameter: 7 feet, 8 inches (2.3 meters)
Range: Greater than 6,000 miles (5,217 nautical miles)
Approximately 15,000 miles per hour at burnout (Mach
Speed:
20 at sea level)
Inertial; integration by Rockwell, IMU by Northrop and
Guidance system: Rockwell
Warheads: 10 Avco MK 21 re-entry vehicles
Yield:
Circular Error
Probable:
Date Deployed: December 1986
Unit Cost: $70 million
Inventory: Active force, 50; ANG, 0; Reserve, 0
Midgetman / Small ICBM
Polaris A1

The Polaris A1 weighed 28,800 lb, with a length 28.5 ft and diameter 54 in., it had a
range of approximately 1000 nm. The first stage (18,400 lb) had a steel motor case;
polyurethane propellant (15,200 lb) with ammonium percholorate (oxidizer) and
aluminum additives. The second stage (9,400 lb) also used a steel motor case;
polyurethane propellant (7,300 lb) with ammonium perchlorate (oxidizer) and aluminum
additives.

The first major development problem in the A1X flight test program manifested itself in
A1X-2, the second stage of which failed in the vicinity of No. 5 thrust termination port,
due to overheating. It was an insulation and bonding problem, and was a continuation of
the type of trouble experienced in earlier flight tests. This failure generated an extensive
investigation of head end insulation and bonding. The head end fix with a continuous
boot and potting solved one problem but introduced another, since later flights
experienced thrust termination port failures; they did not open up and arrest the forward
movement of the second stage, which continued on and bumped the reentry vehicle. The
continuous boot was probably a major contributor to the anomaly. The solution to the
new problem included scoring the boot around the periphery of each thrust termination
port.

The launch of a Lockheed-built Polaris A1 Fleet Ballistic Missile was the first in history
from a submerged submarine, the USS George Washington (SSBN 598). It occurred July
20, 1960, off Cape Canaveral, Florida, and within three hours a second Polaris test
missile was launched. On November 15, 1960, the submarine and its 16 Polaris A1s
began the first patrol.
On 2 June 1964, the USS George Washington (SSBN-598). returned to Charleston, South
Carolina, to off-load missiles in preparation for overhaul at General Dynamics, Electric
Boat Division, shipyard in Groton, Connecticut. This ended the initial deployment of the
first FBM submarine, with POLARIS A1's which began in November 1960. Finally on
14 October 1965, the USS Abraham Lincoln (SSBN-602) returned to the U.S.,
completing her initial deployment. She was the last of the first five SSBNs carrying the
POLARIS A1 to return to the U.S. for overhaul. This marked the official retirement of
the POLARIS A1 missile from active fleet duty. These first five boats were being refitted
to carry POLARIS A3 missiles.
Polaris A2

The Polaris A2 had a 1,500 mile range, weighed 32,500 pounds and was 31 feet long. It
was the same diameter as the Polaris A1 -- four-and-a-half feet--and could be launched
from the same tubes inside a submarine. The first A2 travelled more than 1,400 miles
from Cape Canaveral, Florida, when it was launched on November 10, 1960. It became
operational on June 26, 1962, with the initial deployment of the Ethan Allen, the first
submarine of its class designed from the keel up as an SSBN, a nuclear-powered, ballistic
missile submarine.

SPO on 28 November 1958 directed initiation of the second-generation missile,

POLARIS A2 (1500 nm), to be loaded on the sixth SSBN in October 1961. The Polaris
A2 was dimensionally quite similar to Polaris A1 except the first stage was 30 in. longer.
With a total weight 32,500 Ib and a length of 31 ft; the A-2 had a range approximately
1450 nm. The first stage (22,400 lb) used a steel motor case; polyurethane propellant
(19,200 lb) with ammonium perchlorate (oxidizer) and aluminum additives. The second
stage (9,300 lb) used a fiberglass motor case; composite modified double base propellant
(7,400 lb), DDT-70 motor designed by ABL with rotating nozzles and a Mk I guidance
system (23S Ib);

To achieve a 1500 nm POLARIS A2, the most obvious way would be to make some
components of the missile lighter and improve the performance of the propellants. After
evaluating the most practical approach for maximum improvements with minimum risks,
it was decided to concentrate on the second stage, reducing its associated inert weights
and improving the specific impulse of the second stage motor. Reduction of second stage
inert weight would result in eight times more increase of a range increment than a similar
reduction in the first stage.
The Alleghany Ballistics Laboratory (ABL) under the operation of Hercules Powder
Company, took on the development of an improved propellant, a cast-in-case double base
(nitrocellulose/nitroglycerin) propellant to which was added the aluminum fuel and
ammonium perchlorate oxidizer. The motor chamber's weight was reduced by the use of
a glass filament-wound approach versus steel. It consisted of continuously wound glass
fibers with epoxy resins.

With the improvement in propellant in the second stage came an increase of thrust plume
temperature. There had been previous problems with jetevators on Al's; so an alternate
thrust vector control [TVC] system was developed (e.g., rotatable nozzles). This concept
employed a unique feature in that the axis of rotation on each of four nozzles was set at
an angle and produced pure axial thrust when the nozzle was in the null position. When
the nozzle was rotated about its axis, the jet stream was deflected relative to the centerline
of the motor, thus permitting TVC with a minimum loss in axial thrust. Two opposite
nozzles fuming together produced a component of side force in the direction toward
which they were rotated. If they were rotated in opposite but equal directions, roll-control
torque was produced.

In addition to the second stage improvements, the POLARIS A1 first stage motor design
was lengthened by 30 in. but the same A1 propellant was retained along with jetevators
for TVC.

The A2 missile had considerably less development problems than the A1. The A2, being
an extension of the A1 in many aspects, had greater maturity when it entered the flight
test stage. With the primary difference in the two missiles being in the second stage
motor, it was not surprising, however, that some pre-flight problems should arise in that
area of the A2. The new rotating nozzles, replacing the A1 jetevators, had a tendency to
stick in static motor tests. Considerable effort was expended to correct this fault.
Fortunately, by the time A2X-1 was flight tested, the problem had virtually disappeared.
The comparatively few flight anomalies which the A2X experienced were in the main
random type failures.

The launch of the first A2X missile at Cape Canaveral on 11 November 1960, signaled
the beginning of an extremely successful test program. The entire A2X flight test
program consisted of 28 vehicles, of which 19 were successful, 6 partially successful and
3 fail- ures. However, 8 of these A2Xs were reconfigured for the purpose of testing Mk II
guidance and reentry vehicle materials (both for A3X application) and these were fired at
various times in late 1961 and during 1962. They had designations such as A2G, A2M,
and A2MG.

With the advent of the A2X program came the first experience with flame attenuation of
radio frequency communications during the boost phase. The new propellant used in SS
motors contained a high percentage of aluminum which caused ionized particles in the
exhaust plume. When this ionized cloud came between the missile and the ground-based
radio frequency facilities, blackout of telemetry, destruct, and tracking functions
occurred. The problem was solved by relaying to down-range stations in front of the
missile and the ionized plume.

The first successful submerged launch of the POLARIS A2 came from the USS Ethan
Allen (SSBN-608) on 23 October 1961 off the Florida coast. On 26 June 1962, the
POLARIS A2 began its initial operational patrol when the USS Ethan Allen departed
Charleston, South Carolina.

The USS James Monroe (SSBN-622) on 9 January 1968 became the first submarine with
POLARIS A2's to enter overhaul and to receive POLARIS A3 capability. The USS John
Marshall (SSBN-611) became the last submarine to give up her POLARIS A2's for
POLARIS A3 capability when she went into overhaul on 1 November 1974.

Penetration aids for the FBM reentry vehicles came under consideration several times to
counter potential improvements in the Soviet's ABM defense system. The first of these
Pen-Aids was PX-1 for POLARIS A2 during the 1961 -62 time frame. This was followed
by PX-2 for POLARIS A3 during the 1963 to 65 era. These programs consisted of
concept studies and testing. In the case of PX-1, the program proceeded through
development and into production. One SSBN load of missiles was deployed with PX-1
Pen-Aids but was off-loaded when the perceived ABM threat did not emerge. The range
of the A2 was reduced when loaded with PX-1. Offloading restored the A2's capability.
Polaris A3
The Polaris A3 missile was the first to have a range for 2,500 miles, and, while like the
A2, it was 31 feet long (1.5 in. longer than A2) and four-and-a-half feet in diameter, it
weighed 35,700 pounds--4,000 more than the A2. The design of the POLARIS A3 was
restricted in size by the volume available in the submarine's (SSBN) launch tube. Thus
the A3 was limited to being approximately the same size as A2 but was to fly 2500 nm
versus 1500 nm. Therefore, the A3 was basically a new design missile, rather than an
evolution, as was A1 to A2.

The first stage (24,600 lb) usd a fiberglass motor case and nitroplasticized polyurethane
propellant (21,800 lb). The second stage (10,800 lb) also used a fiberglass motor case;
composite modified double base propellant (9,000 Ib), EJC (Hercules), and a Mk 11
guidance system (80 Ib). The reentry system consisted of three reentry vehicles which
tilted outboard and are ejected by small rocket motor.

The A3's first test flight took place at Cape Canaveral on August 7, 1962,k and the first
A3s went on patrol on September 28, 1964, when the USS Daniel Webster began its
initial deployment from Charleston, South Carolina. The A3 was the first Polaris to have
multiple reentry vehicles.

The 2500 nm range of the POLARIS A3 extended FBM submarines operations to the
Pacific Ocean, providing greater sea room and operating area to offset the expanding
Soviet anti-submarine capabilities. Another consideration for the POLARIS A3 was the
need for improved accuracy from the longer-range and increased-penetrability capability
against the Soviet's emerging anti-ballistic missile defense.

To meet these objectives, the A3's design included reentry vehicle concepts, improved
guidance, fire control, and navigation systems; penetration aids (PenAids); and missile
trajectory shaping techniques. New technologies were also considered such as,
advancements in propellants, electronics, materials, and TVC concepts.

Several A2X test vehicles were launched in late 1961 and 1962 for the purpose of testing
improved guidance systems and reenty vehicles for the A3. So even before POLARIS A2
became operational, POLARIS A3 design and component testing was underway.

Two POLARIS A1 missiles, AlX-50 and 51, were reconfigured for tests of an advanced
TVC system based upon injection of high-density fluid (Freon 114) into the exit cone of
the nozzle, creating a shock pattern and causing the main exhaust stream to deflect. On
29 September 1961, this system was successfully demonstrated during second stage flight
and, after a second test 2 months later, was chosen as the baseline TVC system for the A3
second stage. The outstanding advantages of the fluid injection system were its low
effective inert weight, its insensitivity to the propellant flame temperature, and the
negligible constraint imposed on primary nozzle design. At this time, the rotatable nozzle
concept was retained for the first stage.
Guidance required significant development with the systems weight and volume
allocation set at less than half that allowed in the earlier A1 and A2 missiles. Increased
component accuracy was also a requirement at the longer A3 ranges. To demonstrate the
effectiveness of the new inertial instruments and a simplified computer mechanization,
the proposed system was flown with excellent results on seven special A2 tests during a
1-year period, starting in November 1961.
An attempt was also made to obtain data on reentry vehicle materials. A special A2 flight
test missile evaluated the nylon-phenolic ablative heat shield which had been selected
following an extensive ground test program.
Also included in the innovations which provided the major gain in performance of the
POLARIS A3 over the A2 were improvements in propellants, chamber materials, and
alternate velocity control techniques. The first stage chamber material was changed from
steel to high-strength resin-impregnated glass roving, and the propellants were changed to
formulations with higher specific impulse and density. Another significant development
was the replacement of the single warhead with three reentry vehicles at fixed spacings
for more efficient target coverage and reduced vulnerability to possible defenses.
The first A3 flight test was conducted at Cape Canaveral on 7 August 1962. Considering
the challenge and redesign involved in the development of the A3 missile, it was not until
the seventh development flight that complete success was achieved. It was during the A3
development program that the concept of incorporating production
components/processing was first introduced into the development phase of a program
(A3X- 18) . (This approach was later to be called "production disciplines.")
During June 1963, the A3X was successfully tested for the first time in a tube-launched
firing at sea from the USS Observation Island (EAG-154). The first launching of a
POLARIS A3 missile from a submerged submarine, the USS Andrew Jackson (SSBN-
619), took place on 26 October 1963.
The A3X flight test program started on 7 August 1962 and was completed on 2 July
1964. There were a total of 38 flights, of which 20 were successful, 16 partially
successful, and 2 failures. Of the 20 successes, only 15 had successful reentry vehicle
operation and ejection. It was only until the 15 A3X flights that the program began to
have a continuous series of success.

The first stage at Aerojet was plagued, in early phases, by a most negative reaction
between the propellant and the nozzles. The inability to retain a set of nozzles for full
duration in static firings delayed the beginning of an examination of nozzle rotation. By
using a "cooler" propellant ANP 9969 (about 6000 F flame temperature) and by beefing
up the nozzles to massive proportions, using tungsten throats, the nozzle erosion problem
could be solved, but at the loss of some 90 rim in range. A3X-14, which was launched
from EAG-154, suffered "brain scrambling" of its guidance computer, resulting in early
dumping of the missile (command destructed at 17 sec). This anomaly was given the
code name of CLIP. The phenomenon was found to occur at the time of umbilical
disconnect and to be generated at the missile/ground support interface.

The A3X Reentry System had a series of problems which required a major effort to
correct. For one, the heatshield (between ES and reentry vehicle structure) lacked
structural integrity. On A3X-33 it failed, no doubt due to the thermal environment created
by the reentry vehicle rocket blasts, which were more severe than originally calculated.
The severe environment was confirmed in heatshield tests at Rye Canyon, under
simulated altitude conditions. Deriving from these and other tests, extensive
modifications were made to the heatshield to make it stronger.

The POLARIS A3 missile became operational on 28 September 1964 when the USS
Daniel Webster (SSBN-626) began her initial operational patrol with 16 A3 missiles.
And another milestone was reached on 25 December 1964 when the USS Daniel Boone
(SSBN-629) departed Apra Harbor, Guam and began the first Pacific Ocean operational
patrol. With all the Eurasian land mass covered by the 2500-mile range of the POLARIS
A3 missile, the FBM System became, for the first time, a true global deterrent.

The POLARIS (A3) Operational Test (OT) program which began in September 1965 had
effectiveness results which were significantly less satisfactory than those of the A3
DASO. The POLARIS A3 OT program was suspended in January 1966 and on 17 March
1966, RADM Levering Smith (Director, SPO) convened a special A3 Blue Ribbon
Committee to investigate. The Blue Ribbon Committee findings and recommendations
were providedduring 29 August to 2 September 1966. Preparations to implement the
recommendations were conducted between September and December 1966. The
POLARIS A3 Blue Ribbon Phase II Recertification (corrective action implementation)
program began at POMFLANT, Charleston, South Carolina, on all delivered/deployed
A3 missiles in February 1967 and was completed prior to the start of the POLARIS A3T
conversion program (October 1968). The POLARIS A3 OT program resumed in
November 1967 with greatly improved results.
Polaris B-3 Studies
During the 1962-1964 period strategic analysts postulated the Soviet defense would have
an improved discrimination (radar) capability and a greater defense in depth with
"SPRINT" type interceptors by the post-1967 period. Various advanced POLARIS
preliminary design concepts were studied by LMSC to offset the perceived Soviet threat.
In October 1962, the POLARIS A3a was offered. It was a 66 in. diameter missile versus
the prior 54 in. missiles. Concepts included a large single warhead, a three-warhead
system, and penetration system options compatible with the missile system's desired
maximum range.
This was followed by various POLARIS B3 missile concepts. Various reentry system
configurations were evaluated (e.g., a single warhead, a cluster of multiple warheads, an
aerodynamic maneuvering warhead, a low-altitude terminal dash). These configurations
were code-named B3D, B3H, B3E, etc. Finally in July 1963, Lockheed proposed a
POLARIS B3D to counter the expected (1969 to 1970) increased defense against ballistic
missiles. The POLARIS missile diameter would increase to 74 in. The SSBN launcher's
inner tube sized for a 54 in. diameter missile would be removed and non-launchable seals
(pads) would be installed directly to the outer tube to accommodate the B3D's 74 in.
diameter. The missile range would be in the order of 2000 nm and it would have a three-
warhead system along with Pen-Aids (PX). Deployment of the warheads and PX would
be from a platform with a cold gas (nitrogen) control system for reentry system altitude
control. This was the beginning of what later became a "Bus" for reentry
deployment/targeting. The system as proposed had hard target effectiveness plus
improved penetration capability and versatility against defended urban/industrial targets.
During this same time frame, the Air Force generated (1962) a requirement for a new
reentry vehicle which would become known as the Mk 12. Development of this new
payload was authorized in late 1963 with the Director, Defense Research and
Engineering proviso that it be a joint Navy-Air Force development. During March 1964,
the General Electric Company, Reentry Systems Division, was authorized to develop it
for Minuteman and POLARIS.
In May 1964, Lockheed proposed another POLARIS B3 configuration; a 74 in. diameter
missile. This would double the volume and weight capability for a reentry system when
compared to POLARIS A3. The reentry system would consist of six Mk 12 type
warheads plus Pen-Aids. The range would be 2000 nm. At this time, anti-submarine
warfare (ASW) projections and forward-based tender support did not warrant a further
increase in missile range. Investigations of the performance potential, therefore, focused
on increased payload flexibility and improved defense penetration.
Guidance and controls were within the reentry system deployment platform with a warm
gas reaction system for attitude control. The "Bus" had arrived it was called the
"Mailman" concept. There were other new design concepts for the B3 (e.g., first and
second stage glass filament wound motor cases with thrust termination on the second
stage forward-facing thrust ports). Each motor had a single nozzle with fluid injection for
TVC.
Later in October 1964, after conducting a B3 targeting study, Lockheed proposed a
concept which extended the operation and flexibility of the "Mailman" concept by the use
of modification kits for the deployment platform. The kits provided for changing six Mk
12's to four Mk 12's or twelve (new) small reentry vehicles and interchanging warm gas
generators of the platform's attitude control system. This would vary the available energy
source and provide single or multiple-targeting. This concept was "Flexi-flier."
Also during this 1964 time frame, Lockheed conducted a Large Ballistic Missile (LBM)
study. With accuracy improvement forecasted for the Soviet ICBM system, the U.S.
ICBM system's survivability came under question. Lockheed proposed a large two-stage,
solid-propellant missile weighing approximately 602,000 lb with a range of 5,500 nm
with multiple-reentry vehicles using advanced large payloads. The LBM would involve
sea-basing, encapsulated in ocean depths down to 8000 ft. The Mk 17 RB, another Air
Force-Navy potential development program, briefly came under consideration.
The Navy's role in strategic weapon systems was assigned to the urban/industrial targets,
and the LBM concept was dropped. The proposed POLARIS B3 with Mk 12 RBs was
primarily identified as a single-target weapon. Incorporating a multiple-target capability,
with a large number of smaller RBs (a new Navy Mk 3 RB) resulted in vastly improved
cost-effectiveness (low cost per target). This led to a designation change, B3 to C3.
The multiple-target capability was achieved by the use of a number of smaller RBs and
the "Flexi-flier" concept (e.g., the equipment section acts as a "bus"). It has a gas
generator, thruster valves and a control system which, after separating from the missile's
booster system (rocket motors), provides an added velocity increment and
maneuverability in space to position and separate RBs to separate independent targets.
This Multiple Independently-targeted Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) capability provides the
ability to deliver multiple RVs to a single target or to multiple targets. The impact of
multiple RVs attacking more than one target from a single missile is described as the
missile footprint. The RVs can be laid down in a downrange stick, a crossrange stick, or a
combination of both. A single target attack with multiple RVs from a single missile poses
a special design consideration. To prevent multiple RV kill by a single interceptor, the
RVs must be spaced along the trajectory so that the distance between any two RVs at
intercept, altitude is greater than the (statistical) lethal diameter of the interceptor.
Interceptor lethal diameter is determined primarily by the RB hardness and the assumed
conservative interceptor warhead yield.
Poseidon C3
On 18 January 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson announced in a special message to the
Congress that his administration proposed to develop a new missile for the FBM System
POSEIDON. The POSEIDON C3 was to be 74 in. in diameter as compared to the 54 in.
POLARIS. It was to be 3 ft longer than the 31 ft A3 and approximately 30,000 lb heavier.
Despite this increase in size, the growth potential of the ballistic missile submarine
launching system was to enable POSEIDON to fit into the same 16 launch tubes that
carried POLARIS; modifications to the launch tubes and a new fire control system for the
more complex MIRV targeting problem were to be required. POSEIDON was to carry
twice the payload of the POLARIS A3 with significantly-improved accuracy.

The Poseidon C3 was a two-stage solid propellant missile with a length of 34.1 ft. 74 in.
diameter with a range of approximately 2500 nm, weight of approximately 65,000 lb. The
ES (forward of the SS) is 72 in. in diameter which separates from the booster. It is
equipped with the missile all inertial guidance system, a solid-propellant gas generator
PBCS and RVs. This provides maneuvering of the ES and ejection of reentry vehicles
into ballistics trajectories to individual targets, MIRVs. Both rocket motors have
fiberglass cases, with single movable nozzles. The second stage motor had six thrust
termination ports (thrusting forward) which are activated at ES separation. Multiple
individual-targeted small reentry vehicles (Mk 3) were developed as the POSEIDON
payload.

The POSEIDON C3 could carry up to 14 of the small Mk 3 RVs. These could be targeted
bodies and could be targeted independently in the MIRV mode. Trajectory loft options
were available, and the range could be extended by off-loading portions of the payload.
The Post Boost Control System (PBCS), colloquially known as the "Bus," gave a large
attack The increased accuracy and flexibility of the weapon system would permit its use
against a broader spectrum of possible targets and give added insurance of penetration of
enemy defenses. As envisioned at that time, POSEIDON was to increase the system and
force effectiveness of the FBM System by a factor of eight. This revolutionary multiple
target per missile concept changed the course of national policy, strategic force
structures, targeting doctrines, and operational planning. It also altered the quantitative
and qualitative strategic balance.

Apart from the much-increased size and weight, the main difference between the
POLARIS A3 and the POSEIDON C3 was the latter's capability of delivering reentry
vehicles to single or multiple targets. Thus the principal area of development involved
flight of the ES with the guidance system and reentry vehicles after they had separated
from the booster. The ES's solid-propellant gas generator and associated steering
capability allowed the guidance system to maneuver the ES and to eject reentry vehicles
into ballistic trajectories to individual aim points.

Development of propulsion for C3 was undertaken by a joint venture of Hercules, Inc.,

and Thiokol Chemical Corporation. Both stages now had fiberglass cases. The first stage
used a composite propellant and the second stage propellant was a double base. The C3
rocket motors were the first in the FBM program to feature single-movable nozzles
actuated by a gas generator and by hydraulic power units.

Other work centered on the development of an advanced all-inertial guidance system.

Initial evaluations of a stellar-inertial guidance system were conducted in early 1966.
Advanced development of a Mk 4 stellar-inertial guidance system was started in 1968.
This effort was of an essential element of a new operational capability which became
fully matured in the TRIDENT I and II.

Lockheed entered a 1 year Concept Design Phase (CDP) from February 1965 to February
1966. In March 1966, full-scale engineering development (FSED) began. However it was
not until 12 March 1968 that a contract was executed. The Navy awarded Lockheed
Missiles & Space Company, Inc. (LMSC) a $456.1 million cost-plus-incentive fee
contract for development and production of the POSEIDON missile system. The contract
represents one of the first awards made by the Navy Department providing for total
operational system development and production (OSDP).

The contract called for 25 development (C3X) type flights to be followed by 5 Production
Evaluation Missile (PEM) flights from an SSBN. The first C3X was launched from a
flatpad at Cape Kennedy on 16 August 1968 several hours before the first Minuteman III
launch. In view of the initial success of the development flights, the test plan was
modified to 20 development flights versus 25. The PEMs remained at 5. Of these 20
flights, 13 were complete successes and 7 were failures. The last C3X flight was on 29
June 1970. This was followed on 17 July 1970 by the firsts submerged launch of a
POSEIDON PEM successfully conducted from the USS James Madison (SSBN-627).
The firing was observed by a Russian ship, LAPTEV, whose crew was unsuccessful in
attempts to recover closure plate segments from the water after launch of the missile. The
remaining 4 PEMs were also successfully launched from the SSBN-627.

Finally on 31 March 1971, the USS James Madison (SSBN-627) deployed from
Charleston, South Carolina, for operational patrol with 16 tactical POSEIDON C3
missiles. Deployment of the USS James Madison (SSBN-627) introduced the
POSEIDON missile into the nation's arsenal of operational deterrent weapons and
brought to successful fruition the development program announced in January 1965 for a
successor weapon system to POLARIS. POSEIDON incorporated substantial
improvements in accuracy and resistance to counter-measures over previous generations
of missiles, but its principal advantage was in its flexibility, which provided a capacity
for delivery for multiple warheads, widely spaced, on separate targets over a variety of
target footprints.
Trident I C-4 FBM / SLBM
The TRIDENT I (C-4) is a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) developed to
replace the Poseidon missile in existing strategic missile submarines and to arm the
OHIO class SSBNs. Today it is carried by the eight OHIO class submarines operating in
the Pacific. The C-4 missile was first deployed in 1979.

The TRIDENT C-4 is a long-range, multiple-warhead missile that is launched from

submerged submarines. Depending upon the number of warheads carried, it has almost
double the range of the previous Poseidon missile. The C-4 is a three-stage solid fuel
missile which is powered only during the initial phases of flight. When the third stage is
exhausted the missile follows a ballistic trajectory. When the first stage motor ignites and
aerospike extends from the missile's nose, cutting the friction of the air flowing past the
missile, thus extending its range. The third stage includes the bus that aims and dispenses
the warheads at separate targets.
The missile's manufacturer, Lockheed Missiles and Space company, achieved the
increase in range without a commensurate increase in physical dimensions over the
Poseidon missile through several technological advances. Those advances were made in
several key areas, including propulsion, microelectronics and the weight-saving material
area. Missile range is controlled by trajectory shaping with Generalized Energy
Management Steering [GEMS). In addition, TRIDENT I uses an "aerospike" to increase
its aerodynamic performance. The spike is attached to the front end of the missile and
telescopes into position after launch.
The first TRIDENT missile was launched from a flat pad at Cape Canaveral, Florida, on
January 18, 1977. The missile was first deployed at sea aboard the USS Francis Scott
Key (SSBN 657) in October, 1979. In February of 1995, Florida successfully launched 6
TRIDENT missiles in rapid succession. TRIDENT subs carry 24 of the missiles. Each
can be independently targeted.
To achieve a 4000 nm range [ versus the 2500 nm range of the POSEIDON C3] the
Trident I (C4) is a three-stage solid-propellant missile with basically the same envelope
dimension as a C3 (e.g., 34.1 ft in length and 74 in. in diameter), limited by the space
available in a POSEIDON SSBN launch tube. There was a weight increase to
approximately 73,000 lb. There was an increase in the C4's Nose Fairing [NF] envelope,
compared to C3, to allow introduction of a solid propellant Third Stage [TS] booster in
the center of the ES/NF. Each of the three stages has a boost rocket motor with advanced
propellants, improved case materials, and a single lightweight movable nozzle with a
TVC system of lightweight gas-hydraulic design.

Boost velocity control is achieved by burning all boost propulsion stages to burnout,
shaping the trajectory to use all the energy, without thrust termination. This method is
termed generalized energy management steering (GEMS). The ES is powered by a solid-
propellant PBCS. Miniaturizing and repackaging missile electronic components also
contributed to reduced package sizes, weights, and calibration, thereby allowing more
volume for propulsion.

In the missile electronics, improved system accuracy was achieved by incorporating a

stellar-inertial guidance concept, by improving the Navigation and Fire Control systems,
and by more accurate control of reentry vehicle separation. Inert weights were reduced
with structures fabricated from composite graphite-epoxy materials which represent 40
percent weight saving compared to similar structures made from aluminum.

The largest contribution to attaining the range increase goal came from incorporating a
third boost propulsion stage. To fit within the same cylinder as the POSEIDON this third
stage motor was to be mounted in the center of the post-boost vehicle with the reentry
vehicles carried around the third stage.

The strategy adopted to achieve the remainder of the range goal was to pursue range
gaining technologies in the following general ways all in parallel: decrease inert weight
throughout the entire missile, increase the volume available for propulsive energy, and
increase the usable energy per unit volume. This strategy resulted in efforts directed to
developing a smaller and lighter guidance system, lightweight missile structures, low
volume and lightweight electrical and electronic components, smaller or lighter post-
boost control system, an aerospike to reduce boost phase aerodynamic drag and, most
importantly, higher performance rocket motors. In order to withstand reentry heating at
long ranges and higher ballistic coefficients, new protection materials needed to be
developed for the reentry vehicles.

The range extension dictates for weight reduction were complicated by the unique reentry
vehicle placement around the third stage which made thrust termination difficult to
engineer. And in introducing a third stage of boost propulsion and making maximum use
of the available launch tube volume, the missile nose shape became so much blunter that
aerodynamic drag during boost could have significantly detracted from meeting the range
increase goal. It therefore became important to reduce boost phase drag.

A deployable aerospike, extended shortly after launch, was incorporated to reduce the
frontal drag of the C4 NF by approximately 50 percent. The aerospike is self-contained
and requires no functional interface input from other missile subsystems. A small solid
propellant gas generator provides the energy to extend and lock the aerospike into
position. Its ignition is triggered by acceleration of the missile on ejection from the
submarine. This unique feature, utilized for the first time on a ballistic missile, was
adopted to offset the aerodynamic drag and performance degradation of the unusually
blunt nose fairing. A concentrated effort to reduce the Mk 4 reentry vehicle weight as
much as possible was also conducted.

The remaining major technical challenge to achieving the range increase objective was
the development of solid propellant rocket motors incorporating technological
advancements in both propellants and inert components. In recognition of the importance
in the throat, carbon-carbon entrance and exit segments and either carbon or graphite
cloth phenolic in other areas. An omnidirectional flexible joint enables movement
required for thrust vector control.

Reentry system design objectives included more than doubling the maximum range at
which the reentry vehicle with its high ballistic coefficient (weight-to-drag ratio) could
reliably withstand reentry heating without significant weight increase. The major
technical issues involved in meeting this objective were those of materials technology.
Several alternative design concepts for the nosetip, heatshield, and substrate materials
were examined in parallel during the early stages of development. A highly successful
supplemental flight test program carried out in 1974 and1975 with surplus Atlas and
Minuteman missiles helped in the early selection of materials and design concepts.

The reentry body has a tape-wrapped carbon phenolic (TWCP) heatshield bonded to a
thin-wall aluminum substrate for the shell and a graphite nosetip. The TWCP is similar to
material previously used by the Air Force for reentry bodies, but with the carbon particles
eliminated. It is made from a carbonized rayon cloth, wrapped on a mandrel, and cured in
a female mold. The TWCP ablates during a reentry, leaving at least a minimum amount
of cool material intact to impact. The graphite is a fine-grain graphite, especially
developed for strong and uniform properties. So critical was graphite quality, and so
difficult to inspect the end product, that a separate factory, a computer controlled facility,
was built for its exclusive production where processes could be completed controlled.

Background

Lockheed commenced a TRIDENT I (C4) Advanced Development Program on 15

November 1971, which was the start date for contract N00030-72-C-0108.The IOC of the
C4 was established as CY 1979. The SECDEF on 23 December 1971 approved Navy
Program Budget Decision #317 to increase ULMS budget funding to permit acceleration
of the program calling for deployment of a new class of SSBNs capable of carrying the
4000 nm TRIDENT I missile and, later, the 6000 nm TRIDENT II missile. On 1
November 1973, Lockheed commenced the TRIDENT I (C4) Missile contract for missile
system development plus the production of the first missiles including reentry vehicle
shells. The contract provided for support equipment and technical services to outfit and
support operation of TRIDENT I and backfit submarines, SWFPAC, POMFLANT, and
training facilities.

The major engineering challenges of the TRIDENT missile development, which required
innovation as well as state-of-the-art advances, derived from the goals of doubling the
missile range in the same volume and weight while keeping the already surprisingly good
accuracy at this doubled range. Improving the accuracy involved navigation and fire
control improvements as well as missile and guidance. In addition to these technological
challenges, there were equally important design constraints derived from cost and
reliability goals. Development costs were constrained in a period when inflation was
high, and different in the various segments of the economy, while inventories were
generally very low and lead times long. Production cost was an additional major design
consideration and reliability (hence operational dependability) was, as always, given top
priority.

The accuracy of the new missile system, to maintain effectiveness, was to be equivalent
at 4000 nm to that of the POSEIDON C-3 at 2000 nm. To gain the increased full payload
range, it was necessary to give up some of the maximum possible ABM exchange ratio
which would only be of value should the then proposed ABM Treaty be abrogated. As a
hedge against such a contingency, advanced development of a maneuvering, evader
reentry vehicle capable of being carried by the missile was included in the program.This
provided reasonable assurance that a possible later decision to initiate engineering
development of such a system in response to Soviet ABM deployment would not require
reengineering of the weapon system. Six flight tests from 6 March 1974 to 13 November
1975 developed the new reentry vehicle (Mk 4) for C4, along with a Mk 500
maneuvering reentry vehicle, demonstrating the feasibility of the concept and its
compatibility with the TRIDENT missile system.

The C4 missile development flight test program commenced on 18 January 1977 with the
successful launching of C4X-1 from the flat pad (25C) at Cape Kennedy. This was
followed by 17 additional C4X launches from pad 25C. Of these 18 flights, 15 were
successful, 1 was a partial success, 1 was a failure and1 was a no test (due to ground
support equipment error). The C4X program completed on 23 January 1979. This was
followed by the firing of 7 PEMs (Performance Evaluation Missiles versus Production
Evaluation Missiles) from the SSBN-657 during the period 10 April 1979 through 31
July 1979. PEM-1had a first stage motor failure but PEMs 2 through 7 were successful. It
was this successful flight test program that lead to SECNAV James Woolsey to comment
in January 1980 that TRIDENT I (C4) was "the most successful submarine launched
ballistic missile development program to date."

Moreover, the development flight test program was progressing so satisfactorily that after
the 12th flight test of the C4X was successfully conducted, Lockheed on 19 May 1978
proposed that the total number of development (C4Xs and PEMs) be reduced from 30 to
25. Following the 16th flight test which was successful, the Director of SSPO determined
on 27 November 1978 that the technical objectives of the C4 development program had
been met and that the development flights could be reduced from 30 to 25 flight tests (18
C4Xs and 7 PEMs).

Although the flight test program was progressing satisfactorily, there were problems on
the ground. During static ground firings of rockets motors, there were two internally-
induced detonations which resulted in a major effort to resolve and modify the propellant.
During another static ground firing, exercising of the flight termination system resulted in
an externally-induced detonation. This resulted in a modification to the flight termination
system.

Finally on 20 October 1979, the USS Francis Scott Key (SSBN-657), a POSEIDON
submarine "backfitted" with TRIDENT I (C4) missiles, deployed for deterrent patrol
from Charleston, South Carolina, carrying 16 tactical (4000 nm) TRIDENT I (C4)
missiles.

Specifications
Weight: 73,000 lbs.
Length: 34 feet
Diameter: 74 inches
Propulsion: 3-stage solid propellent rocket
ULMS Missiles
Studies related to the proliferation of POSEIDON C3 led to the conclusion that a new
ULMS (missile) and the new submarine concept with greater missile carrying capacity
would make the ULMS (missile) more cost-effective than POSEIDON proliferation.The
ULMS missile studies tended to culminate in either a 2 or 3 stage missile with a 4500 nm
range and a weight in the order of 130,000 lb. Since the missile was to be encapsulated
and external to the SSBN, it was size limited. This led to a new FBM missile concept
approximately 80 in. in diameter and 56 ft in length. The missile was referred to as LRC3
(Long Range C3) and Lockheed's concepts included a new reentry vehicle (Mk 3A).
About this time, the ULMS began to be known as the Improved Fleet Ballistic Missile
(IFBM) system.
Trident II D-5 Fleet Ballistic Missile
Trident II D-5 is the sixth generation member of the U.S. Navy's Fleet Ballistic Missile
(FBM) program which started in 1956. Systems have included the Polaris (A1), Polaris
(A2), Polaris (A3), Poseidon (C3), and Trident I (C4). The first deployment of Trident II
was in 1990 on the USS Tenessee (SSBN 734). While Trident I was designed to the same
dimensions as the Poseidon missile it replaced, Trident II is a little larger.

The Trident II D-5 is a three-stage, solid propellant, inertially guided FBM with a range
of more than 4,000 nautical miles (4,600 statute miles or 7,360 km) Trident II is more
sophisticated with a significantly greater payload capability. All three stages of the
Trident II are made of lighter, stronger, stiffer graphite epoxy, whose integrated structure
mean considerable weight savings. The missile's range is increased by the aerospike, a
telescoping outward extension that reduces frontal drag by about 50 percent. Trident II is
fired by the pressure of expanding gas in the launch tube. When the missile attains
sufficient distance from the submarine, the first stage motor ignites, the aerospike extends
and the boost stage begins. Within about two minutes, after the third stage motor kicks in,
the missile is traveling in excess of 20,000 feet (6,096 meters) per second.

The ten Trident submarines in the Atlantic fleet were initially equipped with the D-5
Trident II missile. The eight submarines in the Pacific were initially equipped with the C-
4 Trident I missile. In 1996 the Navy started to backfit the eight submarines in the Pacific
to carry the D-5 missile.

Features

The TRIDENT II Weapon System was to be an evolution of the TRIDENT I. However,

going back to be an advanced technology missile capable of 4000 nm range when
carrying a similar payload as the POSEIDON (C3) would carry to approximately 2000
nm. It was also constrained to fit in the submarine's circular cylinder launch tube which
contained the C3. Thus, the new C4 missile could be used in then-existing submarines
(e.g., approximately 74 in. in diameter and close to 34 ft in length). In addition, the
accuracy of the new C4 missile system was to be equivalent at 4000 nm to that of the
POSEIDON C3 at 2000 nm. To satisfy this range requirement, a TS boost propulsion
stage was added to C4 to increase range along with propellant improvements and reduc
tion in inert missile weights. Developments in the guidance system was the major
contributor to maintaining accuracy.

Now that the new bigger TRIDENT submarine was available for the TRIDENT II (D5),
the additional space could be considered in the missile design. Moreover, with the
possibility of a bigger and associated improved performance, a larger payload could be
incorporated. Using the concepts from the IAP, improvements could be developed for the
subsystems of the weapon system to provide the desired improved accuracy, all leading
to hard-target capability.
Thus, with the larger submarine, the TRIDENT II (D5) Weapon System became an
evolution of the TRIDENT I (C4) system with technology improve ments in all
subsystems of the weapon system: missile (guidance and reentry system), fire control,
navigation, launcher and test instrumentation (non-tactical) subsystems, resulting in a
missile with additional range, improved accuracy, and heavier payload.

The TRIDENT 11 (D5) is an evolution of the TRIDENT I (C4). Generically speaking,

the D5 looks like the C4, only bigger, to provide for additional thrust and increased
payload capability. The D5 is 83 in. in diameter versus 74 in. for C4, and 44.6 ft in length
versus 34.1 ft for C4. Both missiles taper to 81 in. and 71 in., respectively, forward of the
second stage motor.
The missile consists of a first stage section, an interstage [IS] section, a second stage
section, an Equipment Section [ES], a Nose Fairing [NF] section, and a nose cap section
with an aerospike. There is no adapter section like there is on C4. The D5 ES, along with
containing all the guidance and electronics, performs the same function as the ES-adapter
section in C4 (e.g., structural support between the aft end of the NF and the forward end
of the second stage motor).

The first stage and second stage motors are also primary structural components of the
missile, connected by an Interstage (IS). Forward of the second stage motor, the adapter
section structure of the C4 has been eliminated in D5, and the equipment section (ES) has
been extended to serve as the adapter section plus ES. The third stage motor is mounted
within and to the ES similar to C4. Structural bracketry on the forward part of the ES is
modified from C4, in order to accommodate the bigger Mk 5 reentry vehicle or, with
added fixtures, a payload of Mk 4 RBs.

The first stage section includes the first stage rocket motor, TVC system, and the
components to initiate first stage ignition. The IS section connects the first stage and
second stage sections and contains electrical and ordnance equipment. The second stage
section includes the second stage rocket motor, TVC system, and components to initiate
second stage ignition.
When compared to C4, for the D5 to achieve the longer range with its larger, heavier
payload, improvements in rocket motor performance would be required plus reductions in
the weight of the missile's components. To improve rocket motor performance, there was
a solid-propellant change. The C4 propellent carried the name of XLDB-70, translated to,
cross-link double-base70 percent solid fuels. The solids consisted of HMX (His Majesty's
Explosive), aluminum, and ammonium perchlorate. The binder of these solids was
Polyglycol Adipate (PGA), Nitrocellulose (NC), Nitroglycerine (NO), and
Hexadiisocryanate (HDI). This propellant could have been called PGA/NG, when we
consider that D5 propellant is called Polythylene Glycol (PEG)/NG. D5 is called this
because the major innovation was the usage of PEG in place of the PGA in the binder. It
was still a cross-link, double-base propellant. The use of PEG made the mixture more
flexible, more rheologic than the C4 mixture with PGA. Thus, the D5 mixture being more
flexible, an increase could be made in the amount of solid fuels; increased to 75 percent
solids resulting in improved performance. Thus, D5 propellant's is PEG/NG75. The Joint
Venture (the propulsion subcontractors, Hercules and Thiokol) have given a trade name
to the propellant NEPE-75.

The motor case material on the D5's first stage and second stage became graphite/epoxy
versus the Kevlar epoxy of C4, an inert weight saver. The TS motor was to be Kevlar
epoxy but, midway through the development program (1988), it was changed to
graphite/epoxy. The change was a range gainer (reduced inert weight) plus eliminated
any electrical static potential associated with Kevlar and graphite. There was also a
change in all D5 rocket motor nozzles' throat material from segmented rings of pyrolytic
graphite in the entrance and throat of the C4 nozzle to a one-piece integral throat and
entrance (ITE) of carbon-carbon on D5. This change was for reliability purposes.

The Equipment Section [ES] houses the major guidance and flight control electronics
packages. The TS rocket motor and its TVC system are mounted to an eject cylinder at
the center of the ES and extends forward of the ES. A small TS eject motor is recessed in
a cavity on the TS motor forward dome. When the TS motor is expended, the eject motor
pushes the TS motor aft, out of the ES to effect TS separation. The Equipment Section
was integrated with the adapter section, using graphite/epoxy versus the aluminum
composite structures on C4. This was a weight saver, providing a range gainer. The IS
did not change, conventional aluminum. The ES mounting for the third stage rocket
motor is similar for both the C4 and D5 with an explosive zip tube used for separation,
and the third stage motor has a similar eject rocket motor on the forward end of the rocket
motor.

The NF section covers the reentry subsystem components and the forward portion of the
TS motor. The NF section consists of a primary structure with provisions for two jettison
rocket motors and a locking mechanism. The nose cap assembly at the forward end of the
NF houses an extendable aerodynamic spike.

The D5 missile has the capability of carrying either Mk 4 or Mk 5 reentry vehicles as its
payload. The D5 reentry subsystem consists of either Mk 4 or Mk 5 reentry vehicle
assemblies attached by four captive bolts to their release assembly and mounted on the
ES. STAS and pre arming signals are transferred to each reentry vehicle shortly before
deployment through the separation sequencer unit. When released, the reentry vehicle
follows a ballistic trajectory to the target where detonation occurs in accordance with the
fuze option selected by fire control through the preset subsystem.

The reentry vehicle contains an AF&F assembly, a nuclear assembly, and electronics.
The AF&F provides a safeguard to prevent detonation of the warhead during storage and
inhibits reentry vehicle detonation until all qualifying arming inputs have been received.
The nuclear assembly is a Department of Energy (DoE) supplied physics package.

Both C4 and D5 ES PBCSs are similar except C4 had only two simultaneously burning
TVC gas generators, whereas D5 has four TVC gas generators. There are two "A"
generators which burn initially and provide thrust to the ES, using integrated valve
assemblies (IVAs). When the gas pressure drops in the "A" generators due to burnout, the
"B" generators are ignited for the remainder of the ES flight.

The post-boost flight of the C4 and D5 ES and reentry vehicle releases are different. With
C4, upon completion of the TS rocket motor burn and separation, the PBCS positions the
ES, which is maneuvered in space to permit the guidance system to conduct its stellar
sightings. Guidance then determines any flight trajectory errors and issues corrections to
the ES flight path in preparation for reentry vehicle deployment. The C4 ES then enters a
high-thrust mode, the PBCS driving it to the proper position in space and correct velocity
for reentry vehicle deployment. During the high-thrust mode, the ES flies "backwards"
(RBs face aft to the trajectory). When the correct velocity for reentry vehicle release is
obtained, the C4 ES goes into a vernier mode. (ES is adjusted so that the reentry vehicle
will be deployed at the proper altitude, velocity, and attitude.)

Upon completion of each reentry vehicle drop, the ES backs off and moves to another
position for subsequent reentry drops. During the backing off, gas plumes from the PBCS
will impact on reentry vehicles differently, causing reentry vehicle velocity deltas.

In the case of D5, the ES uses its PBCS to maneuver for stellar sighting; this enables the
guidance system to update the original inertial guidance as received from the SSBN. The
flight control system responding to guidance reorientates the D5 ES and enters a high-
thrust mode. However, in the D5 case, the ES flies forward. (RBs are basically down the
line of the trajectory.) As in C4, the D5 ES (when it reaches the proper altitude, velocity
and attitude) enters the vernier mode to deploy RVs. However, to eliminate the PBCS
plume from impacting the reentry vehicle upon release, the ES undergoes a Plume
Avoidance Maneuver (PAM). If the reentry vehicle to be released will be disturbed by a
PBCS nozzle's plume, that nozzle will be shut off until the reentry vehicle is away from
the nozzle's plume area. With a nozzle off, the ES will react to the other three nozzles
automatically. This causes the ES to rotate as it backs away from the reentry vehicle just
released. In a very short time, the reentry vehicle will be beyond the influence of the
plume and the nozzle is returned to normal operation. PAM is used only when a nozzle's
plume will disturb the area around an RV. This PAM was one of the design changes to
the D5 to provide improved accuracy.
Another design change to help improve accuracy was to the nosetip of the Mk 5 RV. In
the TRIDENT I (C4) missile, an error condition existed in some cases upon reentry into
the atmosphere when the nosetip ablated at an uneven rate. This caused the reentry
vehicle to drift. As the design of the Mk 5 reentry was developed, the change to a shape
stable nosetip (SSNT) was established. The nose of the Mk 4 reentry vehicle was boron
carbide-coated graphite material. The Mk 5 nose has a metallated center core with
carbon/carbon material, forming the rest of the nosetip ("plug"). The metallated center
core will ablate at a faster rate than the carbon/carbon parent material on the outer portion
of the nosetip. This will result in a blunt, more-symmetrical shape change with less of a
tendency to drift and, consequently, a more-accurate and more-reliable system. Prior
testing of SSNTs on some C4 missile flights had verified the design concept.

In TRIDENT I (C4), the flight control subsystem converted data signals from the
guidance subsystem into steering and valve commands (TVC commands) moderated by
missile response rates fed back from the rate gyro package. In TRIDENT II (D5), the rate
gyro package was eliminated. The D5 flight control computer receives these missile
response rates from the guidance system inertial measuring unit (IMU) as transmitted
through the guidance electronic assembly (EA).

The more-extensive use of composites in D5's structure provided inert weight savings.
Redesign of ordnance system D5-versus-C4, although functionally the same, in particular
the separation ordnance to "cut" structure, contributed to weight savings.

Background

The Deputy SECDEF approved a Decision Coordinating Paper (DCP) No. 67 on 14

September 1971 for the ULMS Program, a long-term modernization plan which called
for a new, larger submarine and a new, longer-range missile while preserving a nearer-
term option to develop an extended-range POSEIDON missile. And in December 1971,
the Deputy SECDEF PBD authorized an accelerated ULMS schedule with a projected
deployment of the new SSBN and missiles in 1978. In May 1972, the term "TRIDENT"
replaced "ULMS," the name "TRIDENT II" was used to designate the ultimate longer-
range missile, and the Navy Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) submission
outlined funding for the TRIDENT II (D5) program based on a 1984 IOC. Later on 3
August, the SECDEF in a Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) advanced the D5 IOC
2 years to FY 1982. So it beganoscillating D5 IOC dates and associated impacts to the
TRIDENT I (C4) development program schedule.

Also on 18 October 1973, a TRIDENT I DSARC (Defense Systems Acquisition Review

Council) II and an overall TRIDENT program review was conducted. On 14 March 1974,
the Deputy SECDEF issued two requirements. The first requirement was parallel (to C4
development) advanced development effort for major accuracy improvement in the C4
and follow-on missiles (beginning of the IAP). The second requirement was for follow-
on alternatives to the C4 missile, or a new D5 missile, or a variant of C4 with larger first
stage motor.
The SSPO responded to this second requirement in May 1974 with a brief report
grouping candidate missile alternatives into three basic categories: (1) C4 alternatives, 74
in. missiles with varying degrees of C4 commonality; (2) various "stepped" D5 missile
alternatives with an 82 in. first stage and 74 in. upper stages that were similar to C4; and
(3) D5 alternatives which were all-new, 82 in. missiles.

An abnormal rate of inflation in 1974, plus future increases projected for 1975 - 76,
resulted in a SECDEF directed IOC slip of the TRIDENT II to CY 1983. This was
followed by a SECDEF decision in January 1975 to a further slip to FY 1985 due to
budgetary problems.

On 10 February 1975, the SECDEF issued a study directive for examining feasible
degrees of the Air Force's Missile X (MX)-TRIDENT II commonality, potential
performance degradations, and resultant cost advantages associated with the various
degrees of commonality. It was also during this time frame that the TRIDENT II
Characteristics Study was underway. The Navy's perception of the specific military
requirement for TRIDENT II were in a state of flux. Hard-target capability appeared to
be in the SECDEF's mind but no firm nuclear weapons employment policy appeared. In
fact, none was likely until MX commonality and possible improved accuracy alternatives
were resolved. In line with this, the SECDEF, on 23 July 1975, deferred TRIDENT II
operational availability date (OAD) to 1987.

On 3 May 1976, the Deputy SECDEF wrote to the SECNAV, outlining the desirability of
SWS having both survivability and a wide range of capability. The TRIDENT submarine,
having invulnerability as well as the potential for increased throwweight, "encourages
consideration of options to expand our SLBM capability against the full spectrum of the
target system." The Navy was therefore requested to develop an overall TRIDENT II
missile development plan for increasing the "utility" of the FBM system for IOC in the
1980s.

In the meantime, in 1976 Congress, for the second consecutive year, denied the Navy's
request for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) funding to initiate
TRIDENT II conceptual development.

On 16 August 1976, when the SECNAV responded to the Deputy SECDEF above-
mentioned guidance outlining TRIDENT II conceptual goals for an all new D5 hard-
target systemhe noted that only minimal in-house effort could be undertaken in FY 1977.
But assuming that TRIDENT II funding would be available in FY 1978, it still appeared
feasible to plan for a 1987 IOC. Meeting such a schedule, however, would definitely be
contingent upon DoD waiver of normal acquisition procedures.

Subequently, trade studies were conducted to define the extent to which the more-
expensive elements of the new Trident-II missile would be common with the new Air
Force MX ICBM, while unique subsystems could be added to utilize the larger missile
sizes usable in the MX weapon system. A TRIDENT II baseline was defined as a point of
departure for the study. Although uncorroborated by detailed study, the probable target
missile that could be accommodated in the TRIDENT submarine (83 in. diameter and 44
ft length) was established in order to provide maximum performance in the MX
application. This baseline TRIDENT II, with a modification to the guidance system,
additional electronics hardening, and the addition of an external protective coating for
dust and debris protection, was determined to be the common missile. It satisfied the
Navy TRIDENT II requirements established for this study but did not satisfy Air Force
payload requirements.

The mostly-common missile was a variant to this common missile where, for Air Force
application, a unique propulsion stage was used between the common first stage and
second stage to configure a longer three-stage missile with increased range/payload
performance. It was estimated that 6 to 6 years would be required to develop these
missiles after an initial year of detailed program, requirements, and interface definition.
The management plan recommended that a single service, either the Air Force or the
Navy, should be responsible for development and acquisition of the common or mostly-
common missiles. Each service would continue to be responsible for development and
acquisition of its unique weapon system elements.

In September 1978, the studies were extended to another variation of commonality

wherein two boost propulsion motors would be common for use as TRIDENT II first
stage and SS, and as MX first stage and TS. Prospects for the TRIDENT II program were
not improved when Congress appropriated only $5 million of the requested $15 million
requested for FY 1979. The SECDEF showed a 1990 IOC of the program was funded at a
decremented level.

By December 1978, it was the consensus of the Navy, Air Force, and USD&RE that the
relatively-small cost advantage (estimated $300 million Navy savings in 1979 dollars)
would not offset the risks and disadvantages of a common missile. SSPO internal
planning guidance was for a stand-alone TRIDENT II, IOC FY 1990. Thus, the Navy felt
free to proceed with TRIDENT II, whatever it might be, and that was the problem.

The Congress felt there was no clearly-delineated requirement for TRIDENT II, and
Congressional conferences on appropriations provided only minimal budgets. In addition,
the DOD and the Navy positions on types of effort and level of funding fluctuated. In
fact, the Navy was instructed in November 1979 to pursue a program of incremental
submarine-launched ballistic missile modernization, citing the Presidential decision for
full MX development and the difficulty of funding more than one program at a time.

In March 1980, the SECDEF, in his budget submittal to Congress for FY 1981, proposed
a significantly-increased level of funding for submarine-launched ballistic missile
modernization. The principle emphasis was accuracy improvement applicable to an
upgraded C4, a long C4, or an all-new D5 missile which would fill the TRIDENT SSBN
launch tube envelope and be capable of increased range, payload, as well as accuracy. A
review was to be conducted at the end of FY 1983 to select a modernization option for an
IOC not later than CY 1989. As to the issue of affordability, the proposed DoD budget
requested $36 million for FY 1981 and reprogramming from other sources of $61 million
which would provide $97 million for the first year of ADP.

The House Armed Services Committee (HASC) recommended no funding, but the Senate
Armed Services Committee (SASC) recommended a full $97 million. However, the
SASC asked for a plan to be provided which incorporates "the fullest possible
competition... (and) should consider competing among contractors for each major
component, including the integrated missile." If the plan were to reveal that competition
of such major components was not in the best interests of the U. S., then a justification
should be supplied. Finally, $65 million was appropriated for submarine-launched
ballistic missile modernization.

On 6 March 1981, as requested by the SASC, the DoD forwarded the Navy's submarine-
launched ballistic missile Modernization Acquisition Plan to the Committees on Armed
Services.The letter of transmittal again endorsed an acquisition approach consonant with
the evolutionary nature of the submarine-launched ballistic missile program and DoD
policy on the issue since 1977. Essential to the plan would be retention of the proven
SSPO management structure and the existing Navy/contractor subsystem management
teams, with maximum competition at the subcontract level. Since accuracy improvement
was a major and challenging objective of the program, use of the existing contractor team
was considered the most-efficient approach. The Plan noted that competition at the prime
contractor level would result in a duplication of efforts and facilities, a significant
increase in program costs, and a delay of the proposed system IOC by approximately 2
years.

On 2 October 1981, President Reagan made an address which called for modernization of
the strategic forces. The Defense Department immediately directed the Navy to fund
development of the D5 missile with a December 1989 IOC. The planned TRIDENT I
missile inventory- would-be reduced from 969 to 630s and all RDT&E effort would be
directed toward "a new development, advanced technology, high accuracy D5 system."

Initially, the Navy planned to introduce D5 by backfitting it into the 12th TRIDENT
submarine constructed for the C4 system. However, a restructured plan announced on 1
June 1982 introduced the new system with the ninth new construction hull, obviating the
need for backfitting four boats, increasing the rate of deployment, and resulting in a cost
avoidance of $680 million (FY 1983 dollars).

And in keeping with the objective of effectiveness against the entire target spectrum,
Deputy SECDEF Frank Carlucci advised the SECNAV in December 1982 to include
funding for a new RV/warhead combination for TRIDENT II. The new reentry vehicle
designated Mk 5, was to have a higher yield than the Mk 4, thus increasing the weapon
system's effectiveness against hard targets.

Finally, the Deputy SECDEF on 28 October 1983 authorized the Navy to proceed to Full
Scale Engipeering Development (FSED) of the TRIDENT II (D5) SWS and initiate
production to meet a December 1989 IOC. Thus, the third and final phase of the Navy's
ULMS program long-term modernization plan was underway.

The D5 Development Flight Test Program originally consisted of 20 D5X missile flat pad
flights and 10 PEM flights from a TRIDENT SSBN. Flight testing began in January 1987
and in 1988. The program was reduced to 19 D5Xs and 9 PEMs.

The flight test program of the missile and the guidance subsystems of the weapon system
began in January 1987, and the overall performance results from the tests indicated that
the missile was achieving its objectives for this phase of the program. Of the 15 tests
conducted as of September 30, 1988, 11 were successful, 1 was partially successful, 2
were failures, and one was a "no-test" [the 15th flight test was destroyed by command
destruct early in its flight while the missile was performing normally at the time the
decision was made to destruct: therefore, the flight was a "no-test"]. Although the
majority of the tests were successful, each of the failures involved different problems and
occurred at different stages of the missile flight.

A problem encountered during the seventh flight requires a redesign of the Post Boost
Control System. During the deployment phase of the seventh flight, one of the valves in
the system, which controls the flow of hot gases through the system, remained closed and
limited the system's steering capability. Engineering evaluations indicate there was
overheating or contamination in the valve, causing it to stay closed. The redesign was
incorporated during the 1989 testing program.

During the ninth flight test, the missile lost control and went off course about 14 seconds
into third stage flight and self-destructed. Engineering verification of the failure indicated
that a short in one of the power supplies, which control the flight control computer,
prevented the computer from providing the proper steering commands for the missile's
third stage. The problem was solved through minor changes in the flight control
computer. Also, there has been no reoccurrence of the problem in subsequent flight tests.

During the 13th flight, the missile encountered a problem with the thrust vector control
subsystem on its first stage, causing it to lose control and go off course about 55 seconds
into flight.) The missile was destroyed by the range safety officer for safety reasons.

During the 15th flight, the missile was destroyed by command destruct early in its flight.
The missile wars performing normally at the time the decision was made to destruct, thus
resulting in a no test. A combination of events prompted the destruct action, including the
specific trajectory selected to be flown, the prelaunch weather conditions, and the missile
dynamics along the flight path, which resulted in the missile looking to the range safety
officer as though itwould cross the boundaries of the safety corridor.

Recent Developments

USS LOUISIANA (SSBN 743), the last of the 18 Trident submarines to be constructed,
successfully launched one unarmed Trident II (D-5) ballistic Missile on 18 December
1997. The launch from the submerged submarine took place on the United States' Eastern
Range, off the coast of Florida, as part of LOUISIANA's Demonstration and Shakedown
Operation (DASO). The purpose of the DASO is to demonstrate the submarine crew's
ability to meet the stringent safety requirements for handling, maintaining and operating
the strategic weapons system. The DASO also confirms the submarine's ability to
correctly target and launch a Trident missile. This was the 77th consecutive successful
launch of the Trident II (D-5) missile since 1989; the longest string of successes in the
history of United States' ballistic missiles

The US Navy's Trident II Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile system routinely

conducts joint DOE/Department of Defense flight tests on instrumented Mk5 Reentry
Bodies known as Joint Test Assemblies (JTAs). During a past flight, the JTA telemetry
experienced a single-event upset occurrence as it flew through the Van Allen Belt and the
South Atlantic Anomaly (an intense, low-altitude high-energy proton belt). A
multidisciplinary effort by Sandia Lab scientists and engineers assembled to determine
the causal elements and to assist in devising a solution. To correct for this event, the
W88-0/JTA telemetry system was redesigned by incorporating into the signal processor
design four high-energy-proton-resistant integrated circuits.

Specifications
Primary Function: Strategic Nuclear Deterrence
Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., Inc., Sunnyvale,
Contractor: Calif.
Unit Cost: $29.1 million (current production)
Power Plant: Three-stage solid-propellant rocket
Length: 44 feet (13.41 meters)
Weight: 130,000 pounds (58,500 kg)
Diameter: 74 inches (1.85 meters)
Greater than 4,000 nautical miles (4,600 statute miles,
Range:
or 7,360 km)
Guidance System: Inertial
Thermonuclear MIRV (Multiple Independently
Warheads: Targetable re-entry Vehicle); Maneuverable Re-entry
Vehicle
Date Deployed: 1990
SSBN-598 George Washington-Class
FBM Submarines
The USS George Washington (SSBN 598) was the world’s first nuclear powered ballistic
missile submarine. Arguably, it can be considered the submarine that has most influenced
world events in the 20th Century. With its entry into service in December 1959 the
United States instantly gained the most powerful deterrent force imaginable - a stealth
platform with enormous nuclear firepower.

These first nuclear-powered submarines armed with long-range strategic missiles were
ordered on 31 December 1957, with orders to convert two attack submarine hulls to
missile-carrying FBM Weapon System ships. With some compromise in delivery
schedules, the Navy agreed in January 1958 to slip the launch dates for two hunter-killer
Skipjack types of fast attack submarines, the just-begun attack submarine Scorpion (SSN-
589) and the not-yet-started USS Sculpin (SSN-590). Funding was provided with a
supplement to the FY 1958 ship construction programm on 11 February 1958.

The first two are essentially of the hunter-killer type with a missile compartment inserted
between the ship's control navigation areas and the nuclear reactor compartment. The
keel of the first of these two ships had already been laid at Electric Boat, Groton,
Connecticut, as the "Scorpion" and it was actually cut apart in order to insert the new 130
ft missile compartment ("Sherwood Forest"), thus extending the ship's length. At other
shipyards, three more ships of the same type were built, making a total of five. The
shipyards were Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company, Mare Island Naval
Shipyard, and Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. These were designated the 598 class ships
since the first submarine, the USS George Washington was the SSBN-598. The term
SSBN means Ship Submersible Ballistic (Nuclear) with the "Nuclear" referring to the
ship's propulsive power.

The President signed the FY 58 Supplemental Appropriation Act on 12 February 1958

funding the first three submarines. The construction, which had begun in January 1958,
used funds "borrowed" from other Navy programs. The President authorized construction
of submarines 4 and 5 on 29 July 1958.
The USS George Washington (SSBN-598) slipped underwater on the first strategic FBM
patrol on 15 November 1960. The USS Patrick Henry (SSBN-599) departed for patrol on
31 January 1961. The USS George Washington (SSBN-598) resumed from patrol on 21
January 1961, coming alongside the tender USS Proteus (AS-19) at New London,
Connecticut. The USS Patrick Henry (SSBN-599) resumed from patrol on 8 March 1961,
but she came alongside the same USS Proteus which had moved to Holy Loch, Scotland
becoming the first SSBN to use Holy Loch as a refit and upkeep anchorage.
On 1 July 1958, Submarine Squadron Fourteen was established.
On 15 November 1960, the USS George Washington (SSBN-598) deployed on
operational patrol with 16 POLARIS At (1200 nm) missiles 4 years 11 months after
 RADM William F. "Red" Raborn became the director of SP, and 3 years 11 months after
the SECDEF authorized the POLARIS

On 2 June 1964, the USS George Washington (SSBN-598). returned to Charleston, South
Carolina, to off-load missiles in preparation for overhaul at General Dynamics, Electric
Boat Division, shipyard in Groton, Connecticut. This ended the initial deployment of the
first FBM submarine, with POLARIS A1's which began in November 1960. Finally on
14 October 1965, the USS Abraham Lincoln (SSBN-602) returned to the U.S.,
completing her initial deployment. She was the last of the first five SSBNs carrying the
POLARIS A1 to return to the U.S. for overhaul. This marked the official retirement of
the POLARIS A1 missile from active fleet duty. These first five boats were being refitted
to carry POLARIS A3 missiles.

in the early 1980s SSBN-598 George Washington, SSBN-599 Patrick Henry and SSBN-
601 Robert E Lee had their missiles removed and were reclassified as attack submarines,
a role in which they served for several years prior to decommissioning.

Specifications
General Dynamics Electric Boat Division; Newport
Builders: News Shipbuilding; Mare Island; Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard
S5W Pressurized Water Nuclear Reactor,
Power Plant: 2 geared turbines at 15,000 shp to one shaft
Length: 381.6 feet ( meters)
Beam: 33 feet ( meters)
Light 5,400 tons
Displacement: Surface 5,959-6,019 tons
Submerged 6709-6888Approx tons
20 knots surfaced,
Speed:
25 knots submerged
Test Depth: 700 feet
Crew: Officers, Enlisted
16 - tubes for Polaris missiles
Armament:
6 - torpedo tubes

Boat List
Boat Name Builder Base Ordered Commissioned Decommissioned
SSBN-598 George Washington Electric Boat Pearl Harbor 31 Dec 57 30 Dec 59 24 Jan 85
SSBN-599 Patrick Henry Electric Boat Holy Loch 31 Dec 57 11 Apr 60 25 May 84
SSBN-600 Theodore Roosevelt Mare Island NSY Guam 13 Mar 58 13 Feb 61 28 Feb 81
SSBN-601 Robert E Lee Newport News Guam 30 Jul 58 16 Sep 60 01 Dec 83
SSBN-602 Abraham Lincoln Portsmouth NSY Guam 30 Jul 58 11 Mar 61 28 Feb 81
SSBN-608 Ethan Allen-Class FBM
Submarines
The USS Ethan Allen, (SSBN-608) operating in the Pacific as a unit of Joint Task Force
8 Operation Frigate-Bird," fired the only nuclear-armed POLARIS missile ever launched
on 6 May 1962. A POLARIS A1 missile was launched from the USS Ethan Allen
(SSBN-608) while submerged in the Pacific, and its nuclear warhead was detonated over
the South Pacific at the end of its programmed flight. The shot was made during the 1962
atomic tests and hit "right in the pickle barrel." The captain of the 608 was Paul Lacy, and
ADM Levering Smith was aboard. To date, this is the only complete proof test of a U.S.
strategic missile. With the ban on atmospheric testing, the chances of another similar test
are remote.

The USS John Marshall (SSBN-611) became the last submarine to give up her POLARIS
A2's for POLARIS A3 capability when she went into overhaul on 1 November 1974.

Some of these submarines were later reclassified as attack submarines under the Strategic
Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) agreements.

Specifications
General Dynamics Electric Boat Division;
Builders:
Newport News Shipbuilding
S5W nuclear reactor
Power Plant:
two geared steam turbines, one shaft
Length: feet ( meters)
Beam: feet ( meters)
Displacement: Approx.00 tons (0 metric tons) submerged
Speed: 20+ knots (23+ miles per hour, 36.8 +kph)
Crew: Officers, Enlisted
Armament: 16 tubes for Polaris, six torpedo tubes.
Date Deployed:

Boat List
Bas Ordere Commissione Decommissione
Boat Name Builder
e d d d
SSBN 17 Jul
Ethan Allen Electric Boat 08 Aug 61 31 Mar 83
-608 58
SSBN Sam Houston Newport 01 Jul 06 Mar 62 06 Sep 91
 -609 News 59
SSBN Thomas A 01 Jul
Electric Boat 10 Mar 62 30 Nov 83
-610 Edison 59
SSBN Newport 01 Jul
John Marshall 21 May 62 22 Jul 92
-611 News 59
SSBN Thomas Newport 22 Jul
04 Jan 63 24 Jan 85
-618 Jefferson News 60
SSBN-616 Lafayette-Class FBM
Submarines
The USS James Monroe (SSBN-622) on 9 January 1968 became the first submarine with
POLARIS A2's to enter overhaul and to receive POLARIS A3 capability.

In 1974 the SSBN Extended Refit Program (ERP). was initiated. Previously, an
operational SSBN was scheduled to undergo an overhaul approximately every 7 ½ years,
which resulted in taking it off line for almost 2 years. To increase the SSBNs at sea
effectiveness, it was decided to initiate a program to accomplish some
preventive/corrective maintenance (mini-overhaul) on SSBNs at its normal refit site. This
was done by extending a normal 32-day refit/upkeep between patrols to provide a 60-day
extended refit period. This was to be conducted at 4-year and 7 ½ year intervals after
initial deployment or overhaul of a SSBN. The time between overhauls was then
extended to 10 years versus the 7 ½ years. The first SSBN to undergo ERP was the USS
James Madison (SSBN-627); the ERP was conducted at the Holy Loch, Scotland, tender
refit site in September- November 1974.

Lockheed commenced the TRIDENT I (C4) program in November of 1973 with the
missile's IOC date established as 1979. The first of the new Ohio-Class submarines was
authorized in 1974 but would not be available until 1979. Thus the Navy decided to
borrow a page from the Extended Refit Program (ERP) book and a C3 to C4 SSBN
"backfit" program was initiated in mid- 1976. Five additional SSBNs 629, 630, and 634
underwent a "pierside backfit" while three other SSBNs (627, 632, and 633) were
backfitted during their normally-scheduled second shipyard overhauls.

On 10 June 1985, the White House announced the decision to dismantle a ballistic
missile submarine to remain within the SALT II ceiling on MIRVed missiles. USS Sam
Rayburn (SSBN-635) was selected to fulfill this requirement and was deactivated on 16
September 1985, with missile tubes filled with concrete and tube hatches removed.
The USS Sam Rayburn was converted into a training platform - Moored Training Ship
(MTS-635). The Sam Rayburn arrived for conversion on February 1, 1986, and on July
29, 1989 the first Moored Training Ship achieved initial criticality. Modifications
included special mooring arrangements including a mechanism to absorb power
generated by the main propulsion shaft. USS Daniel Webster (SSBN 626) was converted
to the second Moored Training Ship (MTS2 / MTS 626) in 1993. The Moored Training
Ship Site is located at Charleston, SC. The USS Sam Rayburn is scheduled to operate as
an MTS until 2014 while undergoing shipyard availabilities at four year intervals.

Specifications
General Dynamics Electric Boat Division. Mare Island
Builders: Naval Shipyard Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Newport
News Shipbuilding
 S5W nuclear reactor
Power Plant: two geared steam turbines, 15,000 SHP, one shaft
Length: 425 feet (129.6 meters)
Beam: 33 feet (10.06 meters)
light 6,650 tons
Displacement: standard 7,250 tons
submerged 8,250 tons
Surfaced 16-20 knots
Speed:
submerged: 22 -25 knots
Test depth: 1,300 feet
Crew: 13 Officers, 130 Enlisted
16 tubes for Polaris or Poseidon
4 - 21" Torpedo Tubes (All Foward)
MK 14/16 Anti-ship Torpedo
Armament:
MK 37 Anti-Submarine Torpedo
MK 45 ASTOR NuclearTorpedo
MK 48 Anti-Submarine Torpedo

Boat List
Homepo Ordere Commissio Decommissio
Boat Name Builder
rt d ned ned
SSB
22 Jul
N- Lafayette Electric Boat Groton 23 Apr 63 12 Aug 91
60
616
SSB
Alexander 22 Jul
N- Electric Boat Groton 27 Jun 63 23 Feb 93
Hamilton 60
617
SSB
Mare Island 23 Jul
N- Andrew Jackson 03 Jul 63 31 Aug 89
NSY 60
619
SSB
Portsmouth 23 Jul
N- John Adams 12 May 64 24 Mar 89
NSY 60
620
SSB
Newport Charlest 03 Feb
N- James Monroe 07 Dec 63 25 Sep 90
News on 61
622
SSB 03 Feb
N- Nathan Hale Electric Boat 23 Nov 63 31 Dec 86
61
623
SSB Woodrow Mare Island Charlest 09 Feb 27 Dec 63 01 Sep 94
 N- Wilson NSY on 61
624
SSB Newport Charlest 03 Feb
N- Henry Clay 20 Feb 64 05 Nov 90
News on 61
625
SSB 03 Feb
N- Daniel Webster Electric Boat Groton 09 Apr 64 30 Aug 90
61
626
SSB Newport Charlest 20 Jul
N- James Madison 28 Jul 64 20 Nov 92
News on 61
627
SSB 20 Jul
N- Tecumseh Electric Boat Norfolk 29 May 64 23 Jul 93
61
628
SSB
Mare Island 21 Jul
N- Daniel Boone Norfolk 23 Apr 64 18 Feb 94
NSY 61
629
SSB
Newport Charlest 20 Jul
N- John C Calhoun 15 Sep 64 28 Mar 94
News on 61
630
SSB
Portsmo 20 Jul
N- Ulysses S Grant Electric Boat 17 Jul 64 12 Jun 92
uth 70
631
SSB
Newport Charlest 20 Jul
N- Von Steuben 30 Sep 64 26 Feb 94
News on 61
632
SSB
Charlest 20 Jul
N- Casimir Pulaski Electric Boat on 14 Aug 64 07 Mar 94
61
633
SSB
Stonewall Mare Island Charlest 21 Jul
N- 26 Aug 64 09 Feb 95
Jackson NSY on 61
634
SSB Newport 20 Jul
N- Sam Rayburn 02 Dec 64 31 Jul 89
News 61
635
SSB Portsmouth 21 Jul
N- Nathaniel Green NSY 19 Dec 64 31 Jan 87
61
636
NOTE: Hull number sequence
SSBN-618 Thomas Jefferson was last Ethan Allen-class FBM Submarine
SSN-621 Haddock attack submarine accounts for the other break in numerical hull
sequence
SSBN-640 Benjamin Franklin-Class FBM
Submarines
Generally similar to the SSBN-616 Lafayette-class, the twelve Benjamin Franklin
(SSBN-640)-class submarines had a quieter machinery design, and were thus considered
a separate class.

Lockheed commenced the TRIDENT I (C4) program in November of 1973 with the
missile's IOC date established as 1979. The first of the new Ohio-Class submarines was
authorized in 1974 but would not be available until 1979. Thus the Navy decided to
borrow a page from the Extended Refit Program (ERP) book and a C3 to C4 SSBN
"backfit" program was initiated in mid- 1976. The first boat in this SSBN backfit was the
Francis Scott Key (SSBN-657). Following the deployment on 20 October 1979 of
TRIDENT I (C4) missiles on the Francis Scott, other selected SSBNs were backfitted
with the C4 [referred to as follow-on backfits]. Two additional SSBNs of this class (655
and 658) underwent the "pierside backfit" while three others (640, 641, and 643) were
backfitted during their normally-scheduled second shipyard overhauls.

Two of these submarines [Kamehameha and James K Polk] were later converted to
SEAL-mission capable attack submarines. In March of 1994 USS JAMES K. POLK
(SSN 645) completed a 19-month conversion from ballistic missile submarine to
attack/special warfare submarine at Newport News Shipbuilding. The January 1999
inactivation of the POLK leaves the KAMEHAMEHA (SSN 642) as the Navy's only
former ballistic missile submarine equiped with Dry Deck Shelters (DDSs).

Specifications
General Dynamics Electric Boat Division. Mare Island
Builders: Naval Shipyard Newport News Shipbuilding
One S5W nuclear reactor
Power Plant:
two geared steam turbines, 15,000 SHP, one shaft
Length: 425 feet (129.6 meters)
Beam: 33 feet (10.06 meters)
light 6,650 tons
Displacement: standard 7,250 tons
submerged 8,250 tons
surface: 20+ knots (23+ miles per hour, 36.8 +kph)
Speed:
submerged: 25 knots
Crew: 13 Officers, 130 Enlisted
Armament: 16 - tubes for Polaris and Poseidon
 4 - torpedo tubes with Mk48 Torpedoes
BPS-11A or BPS-15 surface-search radar
BQR-7 sonar
BQR-15 towed-array sonar
Sensors:
BQR-19 sonar
BQR-21 sonar
BQS-4 sonar

Boat List
Homepo Ordere Commissi Decommissi
Boat Name Builder
rt d oned oned
SSBN- Electric 01 Nov
Benjamin Franklin Norfolk 22 Oct 65 23 Nov 93
640 Boat 62
SSBN- Newport Portsmo 01 Nov
Simon Bolivar 29 Oct 65 24 Feb 95
641 News uth 62
SSBN- Electric Pearl 01 Aug
Kamehameha 10 Dec 65 SSN Jul 92
642 Boat Harbor 62
SSBN- Electric Charlest 01 Nov
George Bancroft 22 Jan 66 21 Sep 93
643 Boat on 62
SSBN- Lewis and Clark Newport Charlest 01 Nov
22 Dec 65 01 Aug 92
644 News on 62
SSBN- James K Polk Electric 01 Nov
Norfolk 16 Apr 66 08 Jan 99
645 Boat 62
SSBN- George C Marshall Newport 29 Jul
Groton 29 Apr 66 24 Sep 92
654 News 63
SSBN- Henry L Stimson Electric Charlest 29 Jul 20 Aug 66 05 May 93
655 Boat on 63
SSBN- George Washington Newport 29 Jul
Groton 15 Jun 66 18 Mar 93
656 Carver News 63
SSBN- Electric Charlest 29 Jul
Francis Scott Key 03 Dec 66 02 Sep 93
657 Boat on 63
SSBN- Mare Island Charlest 29 Jul
Mariano G Vallejo 16 Dec 65 09 Mar 95
658 NSY on 63
SSBN- Electric 29 Jul
Will Rogers Groton 01 Apr 67 12 Apr 93
659 Boat 63
Proposal Cancelled in
SSBN- 1965
1965
Proposal Cancelled in
SSBN- 1965
1965
SSBN- 1965 Proposal Cancelled in
 1965
Proposal Cancelled in
SSBN- 1965
1965
ULMS
Just as project NOBSKA in 1956 "steered" the U.S. Navy to a new generation of smaller
solid-propellant POLARIS-type FBMs, so too STRAT-X/ULMS-I steered" the Navy to
the next generation SSBN/FBM system. SECDEF Robert McNamara, on 1 November
1966, initiated a comprehensive study on U.S. ballistic missile performance
characteristics required to counter potential Soviet strategic offensive forces and anti-
ballistic missile proliferation in the time frame 1975 to 1985 - 90.

The study was conducted under the auspices of the Research and Engineering Support
Division of IDA. The study was known as STRAT-X (for Strategic eXperimental). Based
on a previous study done by the IDA earlier that year called PEN-X (for "penetration of
enemy missiles, experimental"), the deliberately-nebulous title was concocted to prevent
bias in the study toward any land-, sea-, or air-based system. Posting the likelihood that
the Russians would deploy, in the future, extremely-powerful and highly-accurate ICBMs
as well as an effective anti-ballistic missile system, McNamara's study requested
appropriate countermeasures. The STRAT-X study was headed by General Maxwell
Taylor, President of IDA. The "working" study group was headed by Fred Payne of IDA.

The "working" panel included executives from several major defense contractors and
independent corporations. The Advisory Committee were mostly military men. RADM
George H. Miller (OPNAV) and RADM Levering Smith, (SP-00)the Navy contingent on
the STRAT-X panel, "representing both the [Naval Operations] staff and the 'hardware'
side of the Navy"- participated, but Naval Reactors Branch, which furnished the nuclear
power plans for all nuclear-powered Navy vessels, did not.

Candidate STRAT-X system concepts were evaluated for: (Primary) the ability to
retaliate against a Soviet urban-industrial target and (Secondary) flexibility to perform
selected counterforce and controlled-response missions.

STRAT-X investigated and reviewed over 125 different missile-basing systems for the
purpose of finding the most efficient and survivable option, the only prerequisite being
that the candidate system had to be unique in comparison with previous or existing
platforms. Going into the study, the Air Force had lobbied for a replacement for the
Minuteman ICBM, and it appeared initially as though the Air Force missile might be
chosen, but the requirement for new ideas also worked in the Navy's favor.

Other than submitting an improved POSEIDON, the Navy STRAT-X study teams under
Dr. Willie Fiedler of Lockheed proposed a different submarine concept called ULMS.
After examining these and other alternatives that ranged from the sublime to the
ridiculous (such as missile-firing submersibles, ICBMs carried on trucks, surface ships or
barges, new bombers, seabed platforms (perhaps located in Hudson Bay)), the STRAT-X
panel concluded in 1968 that the Navy's ULMS represented the least costly and most
survivable alternative. Miller claimed the panel envisioned a "rather austere" ship with
little speed and, consequently, a small nuclear power plant. The Navy supported the view
that ULMS was to incorporate very-long-range missiles into submarines of rather
conservative design, based on existing submarine technology. The proposed submarine
would not necessarily be deep-diving and would carry more than sixteen missiles.

Upon completion of the DoD's STRAT-X Study, the Navy (SPO) continued its own
studies of advanced undersea system concepts. Lockheed, General Electric, MIT, Sperry,
and Westinghouse were all involved. Electric Boat was funded by Navships for
interfacing submarine studies.

Subsequent to STRAT-X, the ULMS effort was continued by SSP at DDRE direction.
The cost of concurrently developing a new submarine and missile was judged to be
inconsistent with DoD funding and dedication. Since the submarine is the long lead item
(seven years from funding to IOC), minimum subsystem changes were dictated for the
new submarine.

The submarine design work subsequent to STRAT-X was directed along the encapsulated
missile concept as opposed to the FBM concept of bare vertical launch from a fixed
mount tube. RADM Levering Smith, PM- 1, stated that the encapsulated missile would
be retained only if real merit could be established. Electric Boat was requested by CAPT
Gooding (SP-20) to do a submarine feasibility study for both bare vertical and
encapsulated stowage and launch of the LRC3 missile. Missile length and first stage
diameter are dependent variables. Each concept was allowed to consider dimensions best
suited to the stowage mode. The trend for vertical stowage was to make the missile short,
and the trend for horizontal encapsulated stowage was to make it long until it hurts. The
tradeoffs between launch mode concepts were conducted during CY 1968.

In January 1969, the contractors involved in the stowage mode studies presented their
data -- while the ship people favored bare vertical, the missile people favored, and SSPO
would recommend the traditional FBM bare vertical launch and stowage used on
previous Polaris submarines.

Both Electric Boat (Groton, Connecticut) and San Francisco Bay Naval Shipyard (Mare
Island (Vallejo), California) were requested to provide ULMS SSBN concepts. By
December 1969, the ULMS team at Mare Island had developed three basic hull forms,
concentrating their efforts on developing an external launch tube hull.

Two of the Mare Island designs, the "FISHBONE" and " D Frame " concepts, involve
advanced pressure hull construction techniques. The FISHBONE concept, in the missile
section, is configured to present a non-circular pressure hull. It was conceived to use the
inboard half of the missile tube as the primary pressure hull in the missile tube section of
the boat. The "D Frame" achieved a similar non-circular missile tube section by using a
flat plate technique outboard of the missile tube as one portion of the hydrostatic hull.

The third concept, "TWIN TUBE," was Mare Island's preferred configuration. In this hull
form, the missile tubes (located in the water) have port and starboard access tubes
running fore and aft that provide access to the fore and aft part of the boat, as well as
access to the missile tubes.

Four FBM hull configurations were offered by Electric Boat, one "external" (wet) tube
design and three "internal" tube design: single hull, double hull, and oval hull. The three
tube abreast oval hull design had a variant configuration, two tube abreast.

There were also studies made of tilting the launch tubes athwartship and/or fore/aft
attitude. The athwartship angle was limited to something less than +10 deg from the
vertical. The fore and aft angle could be varied quite a bit more (e.g. +90 deg possible but
not practical). A 50 deg fore/aft tilt was studied. However there was a general disbelief in
any merits of loading and launching on any line that was not in line with gravity (e.g.,
vertical).

These studies were evaluated and Lockheed issued a report on 9 January 1970. It stated
that the FBM Weapon System has always accepted the classic, POLARIS-POSEIDON 2
x 8 columnar, vertically-tubed, missile zero pointing center, battery arrangement. The
data indicated no significant advantages, insurmountable problems or even significant
sensitivity to various arrangements. This points to the practical position of "why change,"
when we might, with some assurance, find the unk-unks [unknown unknowns] hidden
within some other arrangement. It is these unk-unks that can react with negative
synergism to create significant problems.

The report concluded then that the classic FBM battery arrangement should be
maintained.
SSBN-726 Ohio-Class FBM Submarines
Strategic deterrence has been the sole mission of the fleet ballistic missile submarine
(SSBN) since its inception in 1960. The SSBN provides the nation's most survivable and
enduring nuclear strike capability. The Ohio class submarine replaced aging fleet ballistic
missile submarines built in the 1960s and is far more capable.

Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay hosted the commissioning of USS LOUISIANA
(SSBN 743) 06 September 1997 at the TRIDENT Refit Facility Drydock. The
commissioning of LOUISIANA completed the Navy's fleet of 18 fleet ballistic missile
submarines. The ten Trident submarines in the Atlantic fleet were initially equipped with
the D-5 Trident II missile. The eight submarines in the Pacific were initially equipped
with the C-4 Trident I missile. In 1996 the Navy started to backfit the eight submarines in
the Pacific to carry the D-5 missile.

Features
SSBN-726 class FBM submarines can carry 24 ballistic missiles with MIRV warheads
that can be accurately delivered to selected targets from almost anywhere in the world's
oceans. Earlier FBM ships carry 16 missiles. A cylindrical pressure hull structure of HY-
80 steel is supported by circular frames and enclosed by hemispherical heads at both
ends. The pressure hull provides an enclosure large enough for weapons, crew, and
equipment with enough strength to enable the ship to operate deep enough to avoid easy
detection.

A streamlined (fish-shaped) outer hull permits the ship to move quietly through the water
at high speeds. This outer hull surrounds the forward and aft end of the pressure hull and
is not built to withstand deep submergence pressure. It is normally considered as the main
ballast tanks. The superstructure is any part of the ship that is above the pressure hull.
This would include the sail or fairwater area, and the area above the missile tubes. The
streamlined hull was designed specifically for efficient cruising underwater; the Skipjack
was the first nuclear-powered ship to adopt this hull form.

The larger hulls accommodate more weapons of larger size and greater range, as well as
sophisticated computerized electronic equipment for improved weapon guidance and
sonar performance. Improved silencing techniques reduce the chances of detection.

The Ohio-class submarines are specifically designed for extended deterrent patrols. To
increase the time in port for crew turnover and replenishment, three large logistics
hatches are fitted to provide large diameter resupply and repair openings. These hatches
allow sailors to rapidly transfer supply pallets, equipment replacement modules and
machinery components, significantly reducing the time required for replenishment and
maintenance. The class design and modern main concepts allow the submarines to
operate for 15+ years between overhauls. Each SSBN is at sea at least 66 percent of the
time, including major overhaul periods of twelve months every nine years. One SSBN
combat employment cycle includes a 70-day patrol and 25-day period of transfer of the
submarine to the other crew, between-deployment maintenance, and reloading of
munitions.

Like all submarines in use by the U.S. Navy today, the Ohio class submarine is powered
by a pressurized water reactor (PWR) driving steam turbines to a single propeller shaft. It
can attain depths in excess of 800 feet at speeds in excess of 25 knots.

Background
The STRAT-X study in 1967 recognized that the submarine-launched ballistic missile
system was one of the more survivable legs in the Triad strategic nuclear deterrent
system. However, it also recognized three important facts concerning American strategic
defense capabilities which had assumed central significance in deliberations of U.S.
defense planners. First, the submarine-launched ballistic system was recognized as the
most survivable element in the triad of strategic nuclear deterrents. Second, though the
POSEIDON missile provided an important upgrade of the system, the SSBN force itself
was aging and would require replacement. Third, the threat of improved Soviet ASW
capability made an enlarged SSBN operating area highly desirable.

The Navy (SSPO) commenced studies of a new Undersea Long-range Missile System
(ULMS), which culminated in the Deputy SECDEF approving a Decision Coordinating
Paper (DCP) No. 67 on 14 September 1971 for the ULMS. The ULMS program was a
long-term modernization plan which proposed development of a new, longer-range
missile and a new, larger submarine, while preserving a nearer-term option to develop an
extended range POSEIDON. In addition to the new ULMS (extended-range POSEIDON)
missile, which was to achieve a range twice that of POSEIDON, the SECDEF decision
described an even longer-range missile to be required for a new submarine, whose
parameters it would, in part, determine. This second missile, subsequently termed ULMS
II, was to be a larger, higher-performance missile than the extended-range POSEIDON
and to have a range capability of approximately 6000 nm. The term TRIDENT (C4)
replaced the extended-range missile (Advanced POSEIDON) nomenclature in May 1972,
and the name TRIDENT II was used to designate the new longer range missile.

On 14 September 1971 the Deputy SECDEF had approved the Navy's DCP No. 67,
which authorized both a new, large, higher-speed submarine and the TRIDENT (C4)
Missile System. It was also constrained to fit in the circular SSBN cylinder launch tube
which just contained the C3 so that the new missile could be used in then-existing
POLARIS submarines.

A Navy decision was made in November 1971 to accelerate the ULMS program with
increased funding for the ULMS SSBN. The SECDEF Program Budget Decision (PBD)
of 23 December 1971 authorized the accelerated schedule with a projected deployment of
the ship in 1978.

The President signed the FY74 Appropriations Authorization Act providing funds for the
first TRIDENT submarine on 15 November 1973, and on 25 July 1974 the Navy awarded
a fixed-price incentive contract to General Dynamics, Electric Boat Division, for
construction of this first TRIDENT SSBN.

In 1974 the initial Ohio program was projecte to consist of 10 submarines deployed at
Bangor Washington carrying the Trident-1 C-4 missile. By 1981 the program had been
modified to include 15 boats, and at least 20 boats were planned by 1985. In 1989 the
Navy anticipated a total fleet of at least 21 boats, while plans the following year
envisioning a total of 24 boats, 21 of which would carry strategic missiles with the
remaining three supporting other missions, such as special forces. However, in 1991
Congress directed the termination of the program with the 18th boat, citing anticipated
force limits under the START-1 arms control agreement and the results of the Bush
Administration's Major Warship Review, which endorsed capping the program at 18
boats.

The first eight Ohio class submarines (Tridents) were originally equipped with 24 Trident
I C-4 ballistic missiles. Beginning with the ninth Trident submarine, USS Tennessee
(SSBN 734), all new ships are equipped with the Trident II D-5 missile system as they
were built, and the earlier ships are being retrofitted to Trident II. Trident II can deliver
significantly more payload than Trident I C-4 and more accurately. All 24 missiles can be
launched in less than one minute.

Ohio-class/Trident ballistic missile submarines provide the sea-based "leg" of the triad of
U.S. strategic offensive forces. By the turn of the century, the 18 Trident SSBNs (each
carrying 24 missiles), will carry 50 percent of the total U.S. strategic warheads. Although
the missiles have no pre-set targets when the submarine goes on patrol, the SSBNs are
capable of rapidly targeting their missiles should the need arise, using secure and constant
at-sea communications links.

The Clinton Administration's Nuclear Posture Review was chartered in October 1993,
and the President approved the recommendations of the NPR on September 18, 1994. As
a result of the NPR, US strategic nuclear force structure will be adjusted to 14 Trident
submarines -- four fewer than previously planned -- carrying 24 D-5 missiles, each with
five warheads, per submarine. This will require backfitting four Trident SSBNs, currently
carrying the Trident I (C- 4) missile, with the more modern and capable D-5 missile
system. Under current plans, following START II's entry into force, the other four
SSBNs will either be converted into special-purpose submarines or be retired.

SSBN 726 Class Submarine shipboard equipment which requires significant maintenance
during the planned operating cycle, industrial level maintenance, which is beyond the
capability of Ship's Force, and which cannot be accomplished during the refit period
(without unacceptable impact on other refit requirements), is supported by TRIDENT
Planned Equipment Repair (TRIPER) program. TRIPER equipment is removed from the
ship for refurbishment ashore, replaced with pre-tested, Ready for Issue units and the
affected system restored to full operational condition prior to completion of the refit
period. Replacement is accomplished on a planned basis at intervals designed to preclude
the failure of the equipment or significant degradation of its associated system.
Recent Developments

As of 1995 the Navy was studying an extension from 30 to 40 years for the SSBN-726
class submarines. While 30 years was long the standard number for submarine operating
lifetime, the SSBNs would seem to have a rather more benign operating history than the
SSNs. They typically operate at somewhat shallower depths, they do not experience
nearly as many excursions from their normal operating depth, and they would not operate
below their test depth with any degree of freqency. Consequently, it would be expected
that they could have a longer operating life than attack submarines [just as fighters wear
out so much faster than bombers or transports]. As of late 1998 Navy cost and planning
factors assumed that the Ohio-class submarines would have an expected operating
lifetime of at least 42 years: two 20-year operating cycles separated by a two-year
refueling overhaul.

As part of its long-term plan to divide the Trident fleet equally between the Atlantic and
Pacific fleets, beginning in 2002 the Navy will transfer three of the 10 Trident subs now
based at King's Bay to Bangor. Of the eight Trident submarines assigned to Bangor --
USS Alaska, USS Nevada, USS Henry M. Jackson and USS Alabama -- will convert
from the older Trident I (C-4) missile to the more powerful Trident II (D-5) missile. The
Nevada is scheduled to enter the Bremerton shipyard in early 2001 to begin its
conversion, and the final pair are scheduled for the refitting in 2005 and 2006.

Specifications
Builders: General Dynamics Electric Boat Division.
One S8G nuclear reactor
core reloaded every nine years
Power Plant:
two geared steam turbines,
one shaft, output of 60,000 hp
Length: 560 feet (170.69 meters)
Beam: 42 feet (10.06 meters)
Surfaced: 16,764 tons
Displacement:
Submerged:18,750 tons
Official: 20+ knots (23+ miles per hour, 36.8 +kph)
Speed:
Actual: 25 knots submerged speed
Official: "greater than 800 feet"
Operating Depth: Actual: greater than 1,000 feet
24 - tubes for Trident I and II,
Armament:
4 - torpedo tubes with Mk48 Torpedoes
BQQ-6 Bow mounted sonar
Sensors:
BQR-19 Navigation
 BQS-13 Active sonar
TB-16 towed array
Crew: 15 Officers, 140 Enlisted
Unit Operating Cost $50,00,000 [source: [FY1996 VAMOSC]
Annual Average
Date Deployed: November 11, 1981 (USS Ohio)

Boat List
FY Laid
Build Commiss Strick
Boat Name Base Ord Launch
er Down ion en
er
SSBN- GD- 10 Apr 7 Apr 11 Nov
Ohio Bangor 1974 2023
726 EB 76 79 81
SSBN- Michigan GD- 4 Apr 26 Apr
Bangor 1975 11 Sep 82 2024
727 EB 77 80
SSBN- Florida GD- 14 Nov
Bangor 1975 9 Jun 77 18 Jun 83 2025
728 EB 81
SSBN- Georgia GD- 7 Apr 6 Nov 11 Feb 84
Bangor 1976 2026
729 EB 79 82
SSBN- Henry M. Jackson GD- Bangor 1977 19 Jan 15 Oct 6 Oct 84 2026
730 (ex-USS Rhode EB 81 83
Island)
SSBN- GD- Bangor 1978 27 Aug 19 May 25 May
Alabama 2027
731 EB 81 84 85
SSBN- GD- 9 Mar 12 Jan 25 Jan 86
Alaska Bangor 1978 2028
732 EB 83 85
SSBN- GD- 8 Aug 14 Sep 16 Aug
Nevada Bangor 1980 2028
733 EB 83 85 86
SSBN- GD- Kings 13 Dec
Tennessee 1981 9 Jun 84 17 Dec 88 2030
734 EB Bay 86
SSBN- GD- Kings 10 Jan 23 Apr
Pennsylvania 1983 9 Sep 89 2031
735 EB Bay 84 88
SSBN- GD- Kings 24 Oct 14 Oct
West Virginia 1984 20 Oct 90 2032
736 EB Bay 87 89
SSBN- GD- Kings 18 Dec 11 Aug
Kentucky 1985 13 Jul 91 2033
737 EB Bay 87 90
SSBN- GD- Kings 18 Dec 15 Jun
Maryland 1986 13 Jun 92 2034
738 EB Bay 89 91
SSBN- Nebraska GD- Kings 1987 26 May 15 Aug 10 Jul 93 2035
 739 EB Bay 87 92
SSBN- GD- Kings 1 Dec 17 Jul
Rhode Island 1988 9 Jul 94 2036
740 EB Bay 90 93
SSBN- GD- Kings 4 Apr 16 Jul
Maine 1989 29 Jul 95 2037
741 EB Bay 89 94
SSBN- GD- Kings 27 Jan 15 Jul
Wyoming 1991 13 Jul 96 2038
742 EB Bay 90 95
SSBN- GD- Kings 19 Dec 27 Jul
Louisiana 1992 06 Sep 97 2039
743 EB Bay 90 96
GD-
SSBN- #19 Bangor 1990 Proposal Cancelled in 1991
EB
GD-
SSBN- #20 Bangor 1991 Proposal Cancelled in 1991
EB
GD-
SSBN- #21 ??? 1992 Proposal Cancelled in 1991
EB
GD-
SSBN- #22 ??? 1993 Proposal Cancelled in 1991
EB
GD-
SSBN- #23 ??? 1994 Proposal Cancelled in 1991
EB
GD-
SSBN- #24 ??? 1995 Proposal Cancelled in 1991
EB
AS-19 USS Proteus
Naval auxiliary ships carry out a variety of missions in support of combatants. Along
with destroyer tenders, the submarine tenders are the largest of the active auxiliaries.
Their crews are formed mainly of technicians and repairmen.

USS Proteus was commissioned as a diesel sub tender in 1944 then overhauled and
reconfigured in 1959-60 to service FBM subs. The Chief of Naval Operations deployed
Submarine Squadron 16 to Rota, Spain, on Jan. 28, 1964, and embarked upon USS
Proteus (AS-19). USS Lafayette (SSBN 616) completed its first FBM deterrent patrol
with the Polaris missile and commenced the first refit and replenishment at Rota. Polaris
system support continued until the last SSBN - the Robert E. Lee, departed Guam in July
1981. Subsequently she was retired from FBM service and was fitted as an attack
submarine tender.

Specifications
Displacement 19,200 tons full load
Length 575 feet
Beam 73 feet
Speed 15.4 knots
Aircraft None
Armament Four 20mm guns
Complement Approximately 557
Builders Moore Shipbuilding and Drydock

Ships
Numbe Homepor Ordere Commissione Decommissione
Name Builder
r t d d d
Proteu Moore SB &
AS-19 Guam 1943 11 Jul 1992
s DD
AS-31 Hunley-class
Naval auxiliary ships carry out a variety of missions in support of combatants. Along
with destroyer tenders, the submarine tenders are the largest of the active auxiliaries.
Their crews are formed mainly of technicians and repairmen. The Hunley class was
configured especially to service FBM submarines. The Holland was in Guam from 1993
through 1996, prior to decommissioning in May 1996 in Bremerton WA.

Specifications
Light Displacement: 12852 tons
Displacement Full Displacement: 17640 tons
Dead Weight: 4788 tons
Length 599 feet
Beam 83 feet
Speed 19 knots
Power Plant Diesel electric, one shaft
Aircraft none
Armament Four 20mm guns
Complement 603

Ships
Numbe Homepo Commission Decommission
Name Builder Ordered
r rt ed ed
Hunle Newport Charlesto 16 Nov
AS-31 16 Jun 1962 30 Sep 1994
y News n 1959
Hollan Charlesto 31 Aug
AS-32 Ingalls 30 Aug 1963 30 Sep 1996
d n 1961
AS-33 Simon Lake class
Naval auxiliary ships carry out a variety of missions in support of combatants. Along
with destroyer tenders, the submarine tenders are the largest of the active auxiliaries.
Their crews are formed mainly of technicians and repairmen. The Simon Lake class ships
are configured especially to service FBM submarines. Submarine tenders such as USS
SIMON LAKE (AS-33) are the mobile repair, weapons handling, and supply bases for
submarines and other ships. They possess all the capabilities required to maintain the
Navy's most modern submarines in the highest state of material readiness.
A principal function of USS SIMON LAKE is Repair, and here she is most impressive.
Highly skilled and trained personnel make ship and submarine repairs in every field
including: pattern making, carpentry, nuclear repair, gyro repair, interior
communications, periscope and optical repair, refrigeration and air conditioning, diving
and underwater hull repair, fire control repair, torpedo overhaul, instrument repair,
electronics repair, chemical analysis and many others. The Supply function of USS
SIMON LAKE is equally impressive. USS SIMON LAKE carries approximately 52,000
general and technical supply items to meet the needs of the ships she serves. She is a
floating general store with a stock inventory in excess of ten million dollars.
USS SIMON LAKE also provides fresh water, fuel oil, lube oil, oxygen, nitrogen, anti-
submarine weapons, pyrotechnics, distilled battery water, food, electrical power, small
boats and crane services. Other important services include: spiritual (chaplain); medical
(doctors, treatment room, operating room, ex-ray facilities); disbursing; barber shops;
laundry and dry cleaning plant; soda fountain; uniform shop and self-service ship's store.
These services are provided on a daily basis for more than 1,500 officer and enlisted
personnel on USS Simon Lake and her supported units. USS SIMON LAKE's mobility
enables her, on short notice, to move to any advanced geographical location in response
to strategic situations, bringing with the ship all its capabilities and services.
Port Services, a component of the USS SIMON LAKE is responsible for providing
logistic support to USS SIMON LAKE and for transporting personnel to and from Santo
Stefano Island by means of converted LCM-8 crafts.
Commander, Submarine Squadron 16, embarked in USS Simon Lake (AS-33), arrived at
Kings Bay on July 2, 1979, and moored at the original Army wharf, approximately one
half mile up-river from what is now Warrior Wharf. Four days later, USS James Monroe
(SSBN 622) entered Kings Bay and moored alongside to begin a routine refit in
preparation for another deterrent patrol. Kings Bay has been an operating submarine base
since that time.

Specifications
AS-33
Light Displacement: 13797 tons
Full Displacement: 20088 tons
Displacement
Dead Weight: 6291 tons
AS-34
Light Displacement: 14316 tons
 Full Displacement: 20922 tons
Dead Weight: 6606 tons
Overall Length: 644 ft
Length
Waterline Length: 620 ft
Extreme Beam: 85 ft
Beam
Waterline Beam: 85 ft
Maximum Navigational Draft: 27 ft
Draft
Draft Limit: 30 ft
Power Plant Two boilers, steam turbines, one shaft
Aircraft none
Armament Four 20mm guns
Complement 601
AS-33, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard;
Builders
AS-34, Ingalls Shipbuilding
USS Simon Lake (AS-33)[ex Holy Loch, Scotland]
Hoemport since 1992 @ Maddalena, Italy
USS Canopus (AS-34);Kings Bay, Ga.

Ships
Numb Homepo Commissio Decommissio
Name Builder Ordered
er rt ned ned
Simon AS-33 Puget Sound Maddale 08 Aug 07 Nov 1964 1999
Lake NSY na 1962
Kings 19 Sep
Canopus AS-34 Ingalls 04 Nov 1965 30 Nov 1994
Bay 1963
AS-35 cancelled in 1964
Honest John M31 / M50
The Honest John was a long-range artillery rocket capable of carrying an atomic or high
explosive warhead. It was a free-flight rocket as opposed to a guided missile. The rocket
was 27 feet long, 30 inches in diameter, weighed 5,800 pounds, used a solid propellant
and had a range of 12 miles. It was first fired at White Sands in 1951. In the Spring of
1954 the Honest John was deployed as an interim system. This was the first US tactical
nuclear weapon. The Basic (M31) HONEST JOHN system was first deployed in 1954. It
was replaced by the Improved (M50) HONEST JOHN in 1961 which reduced the
system's weight, shortened its length, and increased its range. Between 1960 and 1965, a
total of 7,089 improved HONEST JOHN rockets, less warheads, were produced and
delivered. In July 1982, all HONEST JOHN rocket motors, launchers, and related ground
equipment items were type classified obsolete.
Corporal
The U.S. Army's CORPORAL, the first US ballistic guided missile, was about 45 feet
long with control fins located on the ends of the large stabilizing fins. It weighed about
five tons fueled and ready for launching. CORPORAL, with a range of more than 75
miles, could be equipped with either an atomic or conventional type warhead. The
CORPORAL was the first surface-to-surface ballistic guided missile to be produced and
made available to the Army Field Forces for tactical use. This missile system, which
eventually demonstrated high performance and accuracy characteristics and good
reliability, was developed as a natural progression of the ORDCIT program, which
started with the PRIVATE-A and PRIVATE-F, continued with the WAC CORPORAL
and CORPORAL-E, and finally became a separate weapon development program. By the
end of 1957 approximately 900 CORPORAL missiles had been produced, and at the end
of FY 58, there was approximately 190 missiles available for U.S. stockpile. The system
had a circular probable error of less than 300 meters and an in-flight reliability of
approximately 75 percent [as compared to less than 50 percent in 1955].
Redstone
The REDSTONE was a highly accurate, liquid propelled, surface-to-surface missile
capable of transporting nuclear or conventional warheads against targets at ranges up to
approximately 200 miles. The Chrysler Corporation received the first industrial contract
for the REDSTONE missile on 15 June 1955. First deployed in 1958, the REDSTONE
was the forerunner of the JUPITER missile and was also used as the first stage in the
launch vehicle used by the Army to orbit America's first scientific earth satellite,
Explorer 1. With the deployment of the speedier, more mobile PERSHING missile
system. In 1964, the REDSTONE missile system began being phased out as a tactical
Army missile system. It was ceremonially retired at Redstone Arsenal on 30 October
1964.
Pershing 1
Conceived as a replacement for the REDSTONE, the PERSHING I was first deployed in
August 1963. A second generation system, the PERSHING la began replacing the
PERSHING I in 1969. The improved system provided increased reliability and
flexibility, additional ease of maintenance, lower mission cost, and enhanced operational
time.

On 31 October 1956 the Chief of Research and Development Department of the Army
(DA), requested that the Ordnance Corps conduct a feasibility study of a ballistic missile
with a required range of 500 nautical miles and a minimum range of 750 nautical miles.
The Ordnance Corps forwarded the request for a medium range ballistic missile (MRBM)
study to the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) thus generating the basic
requirement for the system to be known as the PERSHING I missile. The Martin
Company of Orlando, Florida, was awarded a cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) letter contract
on 28 March 1958 for research, development, and initial production of the PERSHING I
system under the technical supervision and concept control of the Government.

The first PERSHING I launch was conducted on 25 February 1960, and the first battery
of the first U.S. Army PERSHING I tactical missile battalion-the 2d Missile Battalion,
44th Artillery-was activated in June 1962.

The Secretary of Defense approved the PERSHING la program on 24 May 1965, and
Martin Marietta received the production contract for the PERSHING la in August 1967.
The conversion from PERSHING I to PERSHING la for the first U.S. European battalion
-- the 4th Battalion, 41st Artillery -- was completed in September 1969 under Project
SWAP, a program for replacing PERSHING I equipment deployed to Europe with
PERSHING la equipment which was completed ahead of schedule on 22 January 1970.

In accordance with INF Treaty provisions all of the U.S. Army's Army's PERSHING la
missiles had to be eliminated within 18 months of the treaty's effective date. A total of
169 PERSHING la missiles were covered by the treaty. Army contractors completed the
destruction of the last PERSHING la missiles on July 6, 1989, five months ahead of
schedule.

The majority of PERSHING missile stages were burned (static fired) and then crushed,
primarily at Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant, Texas, or at Pueblo Depot Activity,
Colorado. Representatives from the Soviet Inspection Team and the U.S. On-Site
Inspection Agency were present to witness the elimination process.
Pershing 2
An evolutionary improvement of the PERSHING la system, the PERSHING II was first
deployed in December 1983. Through the use of a terminally guided reentry vehicle with
a new warhead, new propulsion sections, and modified PERSHING la ground support
equipment, the PERSHING II provided increased effectiveness covering longer ranges
with reduced collateral damage over the PERSHING la.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense authorized the Army to proceed with the advanced
development of the PERSHING II on 7 March 1974, with the first PERSHING II missile
advanced development firing taking place on 18 November 1977.

NATO Ministers formally approved the basing of the PERSHING II missile system in
Western Europe in December 1979. The initial operational capability for the PERSHING
II was achieved when the 56th Field Artillery Brigade received its equipment on 15
December 1983, and deployment of the first PERSHING II battalion was completed in
Europe on 30 June 1984. And on 13 December 1985 the PERSHING II weapon system
successfully achieved full operational capability in Europe.

The increased range and pinpoint accuracy of the PERSHING II were major factors
influencing the Soviet Union's decision to seek the Treaty on Intermediate Range Nuclear
Forces in which the United States and the USSR agreed to eliminate an entire class of
nuclear missiles. The United States and the USSR signed the Intermediate Range Nuclear
Forces (INF)Treaty on 8 December 1987, and the U.S. Senate ratified the INF Treaty on
27 May 1988.

In accordance with INF Treaty provisions all of the U.S. Army's tactical PERSHING II
missile stages, launchers, trainers, and deployed reentry vehicles had to be eliminated by
May 31, 1991. A total of 234 PERSHING II missiles were covered by the treaty. Army
contractors completed the destruction of the last PERSHING II in May 1991. The
majority of PERSHING missile stages were burned (static fired) and then crushed,
primarily at Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant, Texas, or at Pueblo Depot Activity,
Colorado. Representatives from the Soviet Inspection Team and the U.S. On-Site
Inspection Agency were present to witness the elimination process.

Each side also had permission to destroy 15 missiles and launchers by disabling, then
permanently exhibiting them in museums and similar facilities. The 15 U.S. missiles and
launchers were split between the Army's PERSHING II and the Air Force's GLCMs. A
PERSHING II missile and launcher were put on display at the Field Artillery Museum,
Fort Sill, Oklahoma; White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico; the Eastern Test Range,
Cape Canaveral, Florida; and the Alabama Space and Rocket Center, Huntsville,
Alabama. A missile only was exhibited also at Langley Air Force Base, Hampton,
Virginia. The final two PERSHING II missiles and the last launcher were donated to the
Smithsonian Institution's Air and Space Museum, which exchanged with the Soviet
Union one PERSHING II for an SS-20 missile.
Jupiter
The Jupiter, produced for the Army by Chrysler Corporation, was a single-stage, liquid-
fueled, rocket-powered (150,000 pounds of thrust) ballistic missile equipped with all-
inertial guidance. The Jupiter was stored vertically on tactical, field-deployed launchers.
The missile could be fueled and fired to an effective range of 1,500 nautical miles upon
approximately 15 to 20 minutes notice.

On 8 November 1955 Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson assigned jointly to the

Army and Navy the development of an intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) with
both a shipboard and landbased capability. Despite subsequent techical progress, by 1957
the JUPITER program was in a precarious position, following the Navy's withdrawal
from the program in late 1956 and the Secretary of Defense's November 1956 decision to
limit the Army's responsibility to missiles having ranges of 200 miles or less. In essence,
the Army was developing a missile which the Army could not use.

Following the Soviet Union's success with Sputnik I a new IRBM plan was approved by
President Eisenhower and the National Security Council on 30 January 1958, which
would deploy four Jupiter IRBM squadrons, each squadron possessing 60 missiles. The
first Jupiter squadron would attain operational status by 31 December 1958, and the
entire force of 60 IRBMs would be operationally deployed by March 1960.

In contrast to the relatively smooth deployment of Thor IRBM units in the United
Kingdom, IRBM negotiations between the United States and other NATO nations
proceeded at a slow pace. The entire IRBM program suffered a severe blow in June 1958
when Charles De Gaulle, the new French President, refused to accept any Jupiter
missiles. This setback was tempered somewhat on 26 March 1959, when the United
States and Italy signed an agreement to deploy two Jupiter squadrons on Italian soil.
Seven months later, on 28 October 1959, the United States and Turkey concluded an
agreement to deploy one Jupiter squadron on NATO's southern flank.
Thor
The Thor, developed for the Air Force by the Douglas Aircraft was single-stage, liquid-
fueled, rocket-powered (150,000 pounds of thrust) ballistic missiles equipped with all-
inertial guidance. The Thor was stored horizontally on tactical field-deployed launchers.
The missile could be fueled and fired to an effective range of 1,500 nautical miles upon
approximately 15 to 20 minutes notice.

On 22 March 1956, Headquarters USAF assigned responsibility for Thor's initial

operational capability Jointly to the Air Research and Development Command and the
Strategic Air Command. Thor IOC would consist of one wing of 120 missiles, situated at
three SAC bases in the United Kingdom. Each base would have four soft, dispersed
launch complexes containing five launchers. Planning called for the first 10 Thor IRBMs
to attain combat status by October 1958, and the entire

120-missile force by 1 July 1959. After a month and a half of negotiations, ARDC and
SAC completed a Thor IOC agreement on 7 May 1956. Under terms of the agreement,
ARDC's Western Development Division would develop, man, train, and equip
operational Thor units. The Strategic

Air Command would deploy operational units overseas and bring them to combat
readiness.

The Thor development program, like Atlas and Titan, underwent a series of changes. On
28 March 1957, President Eisenhower approved a revised Thor IOC plan calling for 60
missiles (four squadrons of 15 missiles each). The first of the squadrons was scheduled to
become operational by July 1959 and the entire force by July 1960. The plan was revised
once again following the Soviet Union's success with Sputnik I. The new IRBM plan
approved by President Eisenhower and the National Security Council on 30 January
1958, would deploy four Thor IRBM squadrons, each squadron possessing 60 missiles.
The first Thor squadron would attain operational status by 31 December 1958, and the
entire force of 60 IRBMs would be operationally deployed by March 1960. Additional
changes to the plan were made late in FY 1958 and in FY 1959.

The first Western European nation to receive American-made IRBMs was Great Britain.
On 25 March 1957, the last day of the Bermuda Conference, President Dwight D.
Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan issued a joint communique
announcing a broad agreement on the deployment of Thor IRBMs in the United
Kingdom. Eleven months later, the two governments signed an agreement providing for
the deployment of four Thor IRBM squadrons to England. Headquarters SAC activated
the 705th Strategic Missile Wing (IRBM-Thor) on 20 February 1958 at Lakenheath
Royal Air Force (RAF) Station, United Kingdom, to monitor the Thor IRBM program in
the United Kingdom and provide technical assistance to the four RAF Thor squadrons.
Shortly thereafter, the Air Force transferred the 705th SMW to South Ruislip and merged
it with Headquarters 7th Air Division.
Transferred to the Royal Air Force on 22 June 1959, the 77th RAF Strategic Missile
Squadron at Feltwell, England became the first British-based Thor IRBM squadron to
reach operational status. At the same time, SAC retained control over the squadron's
nuclear warheads and assigned a detachment to perform four functions: (1) retain custody
and control over, and provide maintenance for, reentry vehicles and warheads; (2) receive
and initiate U. S. warhead release orders; (3) operate USAF communications facilities;
and (4) provide training to the Royal Air Force. On 11 September and 22 December
1959, the second and third British-based Thor IRBM squadrons were declared
operational and assigned to Royal Air Force personnel. When SAC turned over the fourth
and final British-based Thor IRBM to the Royal Air Force on 22 April 1960, the
deployment of the Thor IRBM weapon system in the United Kingdom was completed.

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara informed British Minister of Defense Peter

Thorneycroft on 1 May 1962 that the United States would not provide logistical support
to the Thor squadrons in Britain after 31 October 1964. On 24 January 1963, President
John F. Kennedy confirmed that Jupiter IRBMs would be phased out as announced by the
Italian and Turkish Governments.

In response to Secretary McNamara's announcement, the British government decided to

phase out the four Royal Air Force Thor IRBM squadrons rather than assume the burden
of maintaining an obsolete weapon system. On 1 August 1962, Minister Thorneycroft
announced in Parliament that Thor would be phased out by the end of 1963. Operational
phaseout was planned for 30 September 1963, while technical and equipment
deactivation was scheduled for completion no later than 31 December 1963.

The Strategic Air Command's 7th Air Division was the Air Force's single point of contact
for Thor in the United Kingdom. The 7th Air Division planned and carried out the
phaseout of the four Royal Air Force Thor squadrons. On 29 November 1962, the first
Thor came off alert at the 98th Royal Air Force SMS in Driffield. Nine months later, on
15 August 1963, the last 15 Thor IRBMs were declared non-operational. The technical
and equipment portion of the Thor phaseout program was completed on 20 December
1963, and SAC ended responsibility for the Thor program in the United Kingdom.

The 4300th Support Squadron at Vandenberg AFB, California, conducted one of SAC's
last Thor launches on 8 February 1967. The following month, SAC transferred its
remaining Thor boosters to Air Defense Command. When the Air Force reorganized
Aerospace Defense Command on 1 November 1979, SAC reacquired the Thor boosters.
However, SAC transferred the last modified Thor space booster on 4 September 1981
from the 394th ICBM Test Maintenance Squadron, Vandenberg AFB, California, to
storage facilities at Norton AFB, California.
Matador
In August 1945, the AAF established a requirement for a 175- to 500-mile range 600 mph
surface-to-surface missile. Martin received a one year contract in March 1946 to study
both a subsonic and supersonic version, but the military deleted the latter in December.
Despite its subsonic speed, the Martin missile survived the 1947 cut. In March 1949,
however, the Guided Missile Committee of the Research and Development Board
recommended its elimination. The Matador continued, although USAF cut it back in
August 1949. The Air Force rescinded that decision in December 1949 and then in
September 1950 gave the missile top priority, no doubt because of the Korean War.

The Matador possessed about the same size and looks as a contemporary jet fighter. A
booster generating 57,000 pounds of thrust for 2.4 seconds got the 12,000-pound missile
airborne and up to a flying speed of 200 mph from a zero- length launcher. Powered by a
4,600-pound-thrust J33-A-37 engine, the missile (designated TM-61A) carried a 3,000-
pound warhead over 650 mph to a maximum range of 620 miles.

Testing of the Matador began at Holloman Air Force Base with the first flight on 19
January 1949. Like so many of the missiles, the initial flight ended in a crash. Testing
continued with 46 prototype missiles until March 1954, then with 84 production models
between December 1952 and spring 1954. Between August 1953 and February 1954,
USAF tested a second series of missiles with strengthened tail and wings to alleviate
structural problems.

The Matador's guidance system presented another problem because the guidance radar's
range proved less than the missile's flying range. This guidance system required a
ground-based operator to track and guide the missile, which, with line- of-sight
communications, limited guided range to 250 miles. In late 1954, USAF added a
guidance system called Shanicle and re-designated the missile TM-61C. In this system,
the missile automatically flew a hyperbolic grid. Based upon results of 74 TM-61Cs
launched on the Atlantic missile range between April 1957 and September 1960, USAF
calculated the missile's overall reliability at 71 percent and CEP at 2,700 feet. However,
these accuracy figures included student launches; instructors achieved CEPs of 1,600
feet. But Shanicle still limited the range of TM-61C to that of line-of-sight transmissions;
moreover, this guidance system could be jammed. To break this dependence, the Air
Force installed a third guidance system. ATRAN in the TM-61B variant, nicknamed
Mace.

Like the other guided missile programs, numerous problems beset the Matador project.
Production, engines, and most of all, guidance, were especially troublesome. The Martin
Company must bear much of the responsibility for these difficulties. In 1953, the USAF
Project officer wrote that the "Martin Matador program was delayed excessively because
of [Martin's] poor design, inadequate testing, and difficulty in retaining qualified people."
Throughout its service, observers criticized the Matador for its low in-flight reliability,
high CEPs, and questionable control over long distances. A 1956 study noted that USAF
did not develop Matador according to procedures and military requirements, but rather
devised the missile around existing components and techniques. Further, at the time the
Air Force initially deployed the Martin missile, the weapon had not demonstrated
operationally acceptable performance and required major modifications.

Moreover, the Matador's limited mobility concerned the Air Force. With the prodding of
the Wright Air Development Center, Goodyear developed a combination
transporter/launcher. The new equipment cut both launcher weight (from the original 40
tons to 17 ), and the number of different type vehicles required to support the missile
(from 28 with the Matador to 2 with the Mace).

The Air Force activated the 1st Pilotless Bomber Squadron in October 1951 for test and
training purposes. This unit went to Germany with TM-61As (Matadors) in March 1954
and became operational in 1955. Eventually, six missile squadrons (comprising the 38th
Tactical Missile Wing) served in Europe with just under 200 TM-61s and TM-76s. But
the missile proved less than satisfactory. Missile firings in Florida and Libya dramatically
demonstrated low reliability and poor accuracy. Nevertheless, the Matador soldiered on.
Martin delivered the 1,000th Matador in mid-1957, but in 1959 a phase-out of the
Matador began in favor of a more advanced version, the Martin "Mace." The Air Force
deactivated the last unit, the 71st Tactical Missile Squadron, in April 1969 as the Army's
Pershing missiles took over the Quick Reaction Alert Force role.

Specifications
Span 27 feet, 11 inches
Length 39 feet, 8 inches
Height 9 feet, 8 inches
Weight 13,593 lbs.
Armament Conventional or nuclear warhead
Allison J-33 with 4,600 lbs. of thrust; Aerojet solid-
Engines propellant booster rocket with 57,000 lbs. of thrust
Cost $132,000
Maximum speed 600 mph (level flight; supersonic during final dive)
Range 690 miles
Service Ceiling 44,000 feet
Mace
Mace was an improved version of the Matador. Like its predecessor, the Matador, the
Mace was a tactical surface-launched missile designed to destroy ground targets. It was
first designed as the TM-76 and later the MGM-13. It was launched from a mobile trailer
or from a bomb-proof shelter by a solid-fuel rocket booster which dropped away after
launch; a J33 jet engine then powered the missile to the target.

The Goodyear Aircraft Corporation developed ATRAN (Automatic Terrain Recognition

And Navigation), a radar map-matching system ) in which the return from a radar
scanning antenna was matched with a series of "maps" carried on board the missile which
corrected the flight path if it deviated from the film map. The company began lab tests in
March 1948, flight tests in October of that year. Martin showed little initial interest, but
problems with the Matador's guidance necessitated a change. In August 1952, Air
Materiel Command initiated the mating of the Goodyear ATRAN with the Martin
Matador. This mating resulted in a production contract in June 1954. ATRAN could not
be easily jammed and was not range-limited by line-of sight, but its range was restricted
by the availability of radar maps and missile range. Although in time it became possible
to construct radar maps from topographical maps, ATRAN initially performed poorly.

USAF installed ATRAN in the TM-61B variant, nicknamed Mace. The missile differed
from the "A" and "C" models in more ways than just designation and name. Mace had a
longer fuselage, shorter wings, and more weight than the "A" and "C." The Mace also
had more power, with its 5,200-pound-thrust J33-A-41 turbojet engine and a 97,000-
pound-thrust booster. It first flew in 1956 and could reach Mach .7 to .85 over a 540-mile
range at low level (as low as 750 feet), and 1,285 miles at high altitude. Because of these
substantial differences of configuration and capability, the Air Force redesignated Mace
TM-76A. But these improvements did not come cheaply; the TM-76A cost about
$250,000, compared to $60,000 for the TM-61C.

The Air Force installed a a jam-proof inertial guidance system aboard the Mace "B"
(designated TM-76B) which had a range exceeding 1,300 miles. To enhance mobility,
Martin designed the Mace's wings to fold for transport (the Matador's wings were
transported separately and then bolted on for flight).

USAF deployed the Mace in Europe in 1959, and it served alongside the Matador before
the latter phased out in 1962. Six missile squadrons (comprising the 38th Tactical Missile
Wing) served in Europe with just under 200 TM-61s and TM-76s. In Korea, the 58th
Tactical Missile Group became combat ready with 60 TM- 61Cs in January 1959. It
ceased operations in March 1962, only a few months after the 498th Tactical Missile
Group in December 1961 took up positions in semi-hardened sites on Okinawa.

Development of the "B" missiles began in 1964 and remained operational in Europe and
the Pacific. The two squadrons of TM-76B/MGM- 13C continued on active duty until
December 1969.
 Specifications
Span 22 feet, 11 inches
Length 44 feet, 6 inches
Height 9 feet, 7 inches
Weight 18,000 lbs. at launch
Armament Conventional or nuclear warhead
Allison J33 with 5,200 lbs. of thrust and a Thiokol
Engine solid-propellant booster rocket with 100,000 lbs. of
thrust
Cost $452,000
Maximum speed 650 mph in level flight; supersonic in final dive
Range 1,400 miles
Ceiling 40,000 feet
BGM-109 Ground Launched Cruise
Missile
When not deployed in the field the flights would be garrisoned at sites where the vehicles
and missiles were maintained on quick reaction alert (QRA) in hardened blast resistant
shelters. When deployed, each flight would travel to a designated dispersal area, manned
by 69 combat trained men who maintained and operated the system while in the field.
Once a flight established a launch site, personnel would set up a defensive perimeter
while the LCC was hooked into the launchers via a fiber optic cable.
The LCC could communicate to the command post using HF and VHF satellite links or
directly to the National Command Authority in the US. On receipt of an authorized
emergency message the operators entered the proper coded sequence through the
“Permissive Action Link” allowing the arming and targeting data to be entered into the
system.
The TEL was then raised to an elevation of 45 degrees by a hydraulic ram and the
armored doors at the front and end where opened prior to firing. A solid booster rocket
engine would push the missile out of its launch tube before the main engine ( a Williams
F-107-400 two shaft turbofan) would ignite carrying the missile to its designated target.
After launch the missile would travel a predetermined flight path, using an inertial
guidance system designed to follow a pre-mapped satellite route to its target.
 Specifications
Length 21 ft with booster
Wing Span 8.6 ft

Cruise speed 550 mph

Range 1400 miles
Warhead W-84
Regulus I
In October 1943, Chance Vought signed a study contract for a 300-mile range pilotless
missile that carried a 4,000-pound warhead. But little transpired until the soon-to-be-
separated AAF provided the impetus for the Navy Program. In May 1947, the Army
airmen awarded Martin a contract for a turbojet-powered subsonic missile which became
the Matador. The Navy saw this as a threat to its role in guided missiles and, within days,
ordered BuAer to start a similar Navy missile that could be launched from a submarine,
using the same engine as the Matador (J33) and components on hand. By August 1947,
the project had gained both a name (Regulus) and performance requirements. The Navy
wanted the missile to carry a 3,000-pound warhead to a maximum range of 500 nm at
Mach .85 with a CEP of .5 percent of the range. The vehicle would be 30 feet in length,
10 feet in span, 4 feet in diameter, and would weigh between 10,000 and 12,000 pounds.

Another factor fostering the development of the Regulus program, and which became
increasingly important, was the Navy's desire to deliver a nuclear weapon. The Navy's
problem centered on the heavy weight of atomic weapons in the late 1940s (about five
tons), just too heavy for almost all carrier-launched aircraft. The Navy converted twelve
P2Vs (twin-propeller-powered patrol bombers) for such a role, but while they could take
off from carrier decks, they could not land on them. Only the AJ Savage could do both.
The Navy converted the North American bombers for nuclear delivery, but they were
limited in range to about 800 miles. Captain Fahrney, of World War II drone fame,
proposed a pilotless version of the Al with a range of about 1,400 nm. But the Navy
canceled this TAURUS project in 1948. So despite mechanical and tactical limitations,
the AJ represented the only carrier aircraft capable of delivering a nuclear weapon in the
early 1950s. New urgency to develop nuclear delivery systems followed the Soviet
nuclear test in the summer of 1949. Therefore, the Military Liaison Committee to the
Atomic Energy Commission recommended consideration of Regulus along with three
other missiles for this role.

Certainly interservice competition complicated the missile's development. Navy's

Regulus and USAF's Matador not only looked alike; their performance, schedule, and
costs were about the same, and they used the same engine. With pressure to reduce
defense spending in 1949, the Department of Defense (DOD) impounded fiscal 1950
funds for both missiles. Because most observers considered Matador to be about a year
ahead of the Regulus, DOD ordered the Air Force to determine if Matador would indeed
work, and BuAer to slow development of Regulus and fund a study to determine if
Matador could be adapted for Navy use. But the Navy successfully argued that Regulus
could perform the Navy mission better than could Matador. Regulus advocates pointed to
its simpler guidance system which required only two stations (submarines) while the
Matador required three. Also, the Matador's single booster had to be fitted to the missile
after it was on the launcher while, in contrast, the Regulus was stowed with its two
boosters attached. This meant that in comparison to the Regulus, the Matador would
require more men and machinery and that the submarine had to remain on the surface
longer, thereby increasing its vulnerability to enemy action. In addition, Chance Vought
built a recoverable version of the missile, which meant that while each Regulus test
vehicle cost more than the Martin missile to build, Regulus was cheaper to use than
Matador over the series of tests. While some of the Matador's problems would
doubtlessly have been resolved, the Navy insisted on a separate program; and in June
1950, the joint service Research and Development Board concurred. The Navy program
continued.

Two 33,000-pound-thrust boosters launched Regulus, which first flew in March 1951.
The first submarine launch of Regulus occurred in July 1953 from the deck of the USS
Tunny. After such a launch, the Navy guided the Regulus toward its target by two other
submarines and, later, with the Trounce system, one submarine. Regulus could also be
launched from surface ships. Cruisermen were enthusiastic about this weapon which
would extend both their offensive range and mission. The lack of a capability to pass
control of the missile from the cruisers and submarines, however, limited the weapon.
The Navy also launched the missile from carriers and guided it with a control aircraft.
Problems included booster launch (the launcher weighed eleven tons and sometimes
spectacularly malfunctioned), control aircraft (which lacked adequate speed and range to
do the job), and the entire radio control system. Engineers resolved these problems but
naval aviators, like their Air Force brethren, strongly preferred aircraft and this
preference may well have undermined the Regulus program.

Nevertheless in 1955, Regulus became operational, eventually serving aboard diesel- and
nuclear-powered submarines, cruisers, and aircraft carriers. The last versions of the
missile could carry a 3.8 megaton warhead 575 miles at Mach .87. Regulus phased out of
production in January 1959 with delivery of the 514th missile. The Navy launched
perhaps 1,000, obviously including many of the recoverable versions, before it took
Regulus out of service in August 1964. Admiral Zumwalt calls that decision the "single
worst decision about weapons [the Navy] made during my years of service. " But careful
examination of Regulus reveals few advantages over the V-l. While the Chance Vought
flew somewhat further and faster, American guidance was not much better than the
earlier German missile guidance system. The principal American missile improvements
were the nuclear warhead and increased reliability.

By mid-1958, USS Grayback (SSG-574) and USS Growler (SSG-577) had been
commissioned as the first purpose-built Regulus submarines, each carrying two in a large
bow hangar. At that time, the Navy had four SSGs and four missile-carrying cruisers at
sea. When USS GRAYBACK (SSG 574) slipped it moors and headed into the Pacific
Ocean in September 1959, it began an era of submarine history that would go
unrecognized for almost 40 years. The five REGULUS submarines, USS GRAYBACK
(SSG 574), USS TUNNY (SSG 282), USS BARBERO (SSG 317), USS GROWLER
(SSG 577) and USS HALIBUT (SSGN 687) deployed on 41 deterrent patrols under the
earth's oceans over the course of 5 years.
Regulus II
With the demise of Rigel, the Regulus successor became another Chance Vought product
designated Regulus II. In March 1954, the Navy planned to have Regulus II operational
by 1957 and Triton operational in 1965. Vought began design of the supersonic winged
missile in April 1952, receiving a development contract in June 1953. Thirty-six months
later, the first Regulus II flew when a 115,000-pound- thrust booster launched the canard-
configured missile. Regulus II could carry its 2,920-pound warhead 570 nm at Mach 2,
and over 1,150 nm at reduced speeds. One suggestion in 1957 was to fit wing tanks on
the missile to extend its range.

The Navy successfully tested a recoverable Regulus II test vehicle in 30 of 48 tests,

achieved partial success in 14, and failed in only 4. The government signed a production
contract in January 1958. That September the Navy fired a Regulus II from the submarine
Grayback, the only such launching. The Navy scheduled one other snorkel submarine to
be equipped with Regulus II, along with four cruisers, and planned in 1956 to eventually
put Regulus on 23 submarines.

Despite early promise, the Regulus submarines were severely disadvantaged by the
requirement to prepare and fire their missiles on the surface and then to stay at periscope
depth to exercise command guidance. These shortcomings were overcome when more
compact nuclear warheads and larger solid-fuel rocket motors became available, and with
submarine nuclear propulsion, motivated the concept of submarine-launched ballistic
missiles (SLBMs) as a nuclear deterrent.

The missile's cost (one million dollars each), budget pressures, and the greater
attractiveness of alternative nuclear delivery systems doomed Regulus. The Regulus
missile program was terminated to free funds for the Polaris project. On 19 November
1958, the Office of the Secretary of Defense withdrew its support from the program; and
on 18 December 1958, Secretary of the Navy Gates canceled the project. At that point,
Chance Vought had completed 20 of the missiles with 27 others still on the production
line. SSGNs on order were recast as SSN-593 class attack submarines, though existing
Regulus submarines continued operations.

USS Halibut (SSGN-587) was the first nuclear powered submarine specifically designed
to carry and launch missiles. Commissioned in January 1960, she could carry four
Regulus II missiles in a hangar integral with the hull. She is also the first submarine to
carry the Ships Inertial Navigation System (SINS). In 1964 USS Halibut made the last
Regulus patrol. With Polaris on line, Regulus submarines were phased out.
Rigel
The Grumman Rigel was a Navy cruise missile designed to fly 400 to 500 nm at Mach 2.
In May 1950, the Navy planned to get the Regulus operational in 1953, Rigel operational
in 1955, and the "ultimate cruise missile," the Triton, operational in 1960. Plans called for
a Marquardt ramjet to power Rigel, whose all-up weight was 19,000 pounds with booster.
However, because there were no facilities large enough to test the 48-inch ramjet, the
testers used a 28-inch version. This powered a six-tenth's scale test model which first
flew in March 1950. But the program encountered what proved to be insoluble problems.
By October 1952, 11 of the flight tests had failed. Therefore, the Navy canceled Rigel in
August 1953.
Triton
The "ultimate Navy cruise missile," the Triton, was to have a 12,000 nm range, fly at
Mach 3.5 at 80,000 feet, be guided by radar map-matching, and deliver a 1,500-pound
warhead within 600 yards of its aiming point. It entered full-scale development in 1955,
but never got into production.
Tomahawk Cruise Missile
The Tomahawk long range, subsonic cruise missile can attack targets on land
(Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM)) and at sea (Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile
(TASM)). The TLAM can be fitted with either conventional unitary warhead (TLAM\C),
nuclear warhead (TLAM\N) or submunition dispenser (TLAM\D). On 27 September
1991 President Bush announced a number of initiatives affecting the entire spectrum of
US nuclear weapons. The United States removed all tactical nuclear weapons, including
nuclear cruise missiles, from its surface ships and attack submarines. The nuclear equiped
UGM-109A TLAM-N Tomahawk was withdrawn from service in 1992, though
conventional versions remain operational.