Steve Rothwell

From: Sent: To: Subject: [email protected] on behalf of Tom Johnson <[email protected]> 03 January 2013 05:06 [email protected] Re: [TOandEs] Soviet WWII on-call artillery support

Hi Bruce; On 1/2/2013 9:05 PM, brucew wrote: > > Hi Tom (and all), > > Thanks for a most informative paper; I'd never see that one before! But my > understanding of certain practices, alas, remains fuzzy ...perhaps some > other Soviet experts have some insights? > > Much has been written about Soviet artillery in static situations, > particularly at the commencement of great offensives, and in defense of > established positions. What I'm particularly interested in is how and how > well it responded in support of mobile formations and non-static > situations, > i.e., the spearhead units that had long outrun their Army or Front > artillery > units. LTC Edgar only hinted at these operations without actually > addressing them; TM 30-430 was similarly sketchy. > TJ: I have some of the regulations for the period, and will check to see what they have to say on this area. I think you will find that the support in mobile operations was set up first in accord with pre-operation planning (move the batteries forward to selected positions at these times). During and at the front edge of an operation, especially when the force had penetrated deeper than really adequate pre-attack intell was good, the job was in the hands of the self propelled artillery, and they fired at short range, open open sights. Usually deployed a few hundred meters back to overwatch the advancing force firing on targets selected by the battery commander. > Advancing armor units would be assigned artillery units "commensurate with > the operation" , Edgar says, and additional army arty units could provide > additional fire support. But how? He notes that artillery observers rode > in tanks with the tank unit commander; this implies that mobile arty units > are nearby and in radio contact with forward units ...but how much > indirect > fire support could those observers summon up, and how long might that > take? > Fire direction is exercised at all headquarters down to battalion level, > Edgar says, but "The exact system is not clear." Drat! > TJ: As the force was advancing deeper, support would come more from the
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long range guns, between the time the range increased to the pint where the 'standard' guns would have to re-position, and they resumed operations. Except for the direct fire guns, the control always remains with the central fire command. The 'implication' is more a matter of mirroring' when unsure on how something is done. > As a rule of thumb, we know that a firing battery usually directly > supported > a maneuver battalion when the latter was advancing or in defensive > positions. What if that battalion ran into a lot of trouble, more than its > own battery could handle? If we assume a similar role for tank-borne > observers and observation posts (when the army is on the defense) ...and > that communication between OPs is "installed where possible", as Edgar > notes, doesn't that imply that the batteries could theoretically talk to > each other, at least through their common artillery battalion command > posts? > And if so, couldn't a maneuver battalion request the fire of more than one > battery from their battery's parent battalion? Further, couldn't a > maneuver regiment somehow request the fire of the division's whole > artillery > regiment the same way? > TJ: No fire was NEVER tied to the regiment, and all guns were coordinated by higher HQs without regard to ground unit boundaries (inside the higher HQ sector). The divisions artillery was controlled by corps or even army, and they would allocate the indirect fires. As noted in the article, the observers REPORTED potential targets, but the decisions (other than the direct fire unit right there) were taken higher up than even division. > Granted, I'm mirror-imaging a Western system here, where doctrine and > communications were focused on providing the maximum indirect firepower > possible in the least time possible. The Russians simply couldn't do that. > But they must have been able -- as Edgar has hinted -- of doing more than > either firing according to a meticulous plan worked out long in > advance, or > responding to a no-notice threat with just indigenous mortars (and the > direct fire of whatever field guns happened to be nearby). Has anyone got > some good info on just what they COULD do? > TJ: I think that is the greatest cause of problems, your mirroring. They simply did NOT work the way the Germans, or the British, or the US, or anyone else did. Planning fire strikes is not a western invention, and preplanning an intensive bombardment is not something that requires radios, or even telephones. the area to be targeted is selected, and a concentration of shells is decided upon that will either destroy, neutralize, or harass the area is selected. You stack up the shells close to the guns, and open up when told to. Keep slamming the rounds up the spout till the required mission is done, and go have some borsht. Look a the number of tubes per sector, and the rounds fired, the Soviets mainly fired up from prestocked rounds on preplanned targets, often firing fewer rounds per tube than you would think.
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The weapons allocated directly to the infantry were under their control and would engage targets as directed by their commander, and the direct fire guns (usually SP) would likewise engage targets as they could see them. Indirect fire engagement such as would be expected from German or Western Allied forces was not a feature here. I will continue the hunt to get more definate structure for you, and perhaps somebody else may have something to hand! Tom J [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] __._,_.___
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Steve Rothwell
From: Sent: To: Subject: [email protected] on behalf of MARK BEVIS <[email protected]> 03 January 2013 09:59 [email protected] Re: [TOandEs] Soviet WWII on-call artillery support

Bruce, this is how I deal with non-western artillery structures in wargames terms: If the artillery is not being used on a pre-planned fire mission (which most of the time it would be) then, artillery batteries are allocated to teeth arm HQs. In gaming terms, the Bttn HQ, the rifle company, recce company and tank company CHQs are allocated batteries. You don't have model OP teams like you would for your Germans, CW, Finnish, US forces. In reality an artillery officer with a signaller or runner (telephones early war, radios maybe 1944+) would accompany said CHQ, without a vehicle usually. When that CHQ sees targets, it can call in it's assigned artillery, in effect acting like an OP. But there are caveats. 1) Being HQs for their respective arm, they are not as well trained to do the calling in as a proper OP, so the chance of success is lower, and the deviation of a miss is greater. As has been stated, the decision about whether the guns arrive is made higher up, so the lower chance of calling the guns can be used to represent this. 2) Whilst calling in artillery, that HQ isn't ordering its subordinate units about, so it's one or the other at that moment in time. 3) If that HQ is knocked out or pinned, then you lose that artillery support, as no else is authorised to command it. The good thing is that the amount of assigned artillery can be from a section of 2 tubes to a full regiment. This would depend entirely on the scenario, and the mission assigned to those teeth arm HQs. If you set it up right, as we have, for Soviet style armies, they will benefit from using pre-planned fire as much as possible. Trying to look for a way to emulate western style fire control is doomed to failure, or giving them abilities they didn't have. Users of non-western armies should just get used to using their artillery pre-planned, even if it means they actually have to do some writing before game set up. One thing I have found is that we don't use enough artillery. The typical "one battery per battalion" has become a wargamers comfort zone for fair play, based on there being, typically, 9 battalions in a division with 9 batteries in the divisional artillery, or net effects the same. However, every army, even poor quality ones, tended to have lots of corps artillery that was allocated down for select missions. If you are doing a typical wargame, you are still doing some kind of select mission. Once you crunch the numbers, you'll find that one battery PER COMPANY on table is more appropriate. Of course, too much artillery will make your wargame a dull
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one..... One of my friends was looking at the 1973 Egyptians, and we were surprised to find this was the case. Now, that doesn't mean each company HQ had a battery assigned, but that on aggregate each infantry battalion had a full battalion of artillery assigned to it, sometimes two. Or that each infantry regiment had 3 full artillery battalions assigned to it. That is on top of battalion and regimental mortars/infantry guns. We use an unwritten rule for artillery (even if it is off-table) that you can't field it in a game unless you have the models to put out. In 6mm that gives you an excuse to field all those lovely artillery models, and I now buy them by the battalion, but it gets a bit expensive in 15mm though. And of course, if you have the models, they can always be fielded on table as emergency anti-tank guns instead :) Mark [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] __._,_.___
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Steve Rothwell
From: Sent: To: Subject: [email protected] on behalf of Mike Reese <[email protected]> 05 January 2013 18:23 [email protected] [TOandEs] Re: Soviet WWII on-call artillery support

Soviet mobile units had a small battalion of towed batteries and these were light 76mm with some 122mm howitzers. Their main use would be as anti-tank weapons or direct fire guns or in pinning a German unit by supporting the pinning unit, which meant they had time to be set up and ranged in or would fire over open sights. Breakthrough artillery stayed in the rear - 1) the light stuff was horsedrawn and 2) the heavier stuff was towed by artillery tractors which were powerful but slow. The guns couldn't keep up. Mortars in the mobile units would hook in by land line to support infantry units that had gone on the defense. Support of attacking units would be by direct mortar fire on targets identified by the battery commander. The Mechanized Corps and Tank Corps were normally supported by a SU-76M and SU-152/ISU-152/ISU-122 regiment (one of each). These provided HE support in lieu of the towed gun with direct fire. The SU-76M was capable of indirect fire but I have only seen one reference (in 50 years) to their being used in an indirect fire role. The guns fired over direct sights. The IS-2m Regiment in the Corps was also used as a direct fire support weapon. It was intended to be a breakthrough tank and was used as such but once the Corps had moved through the German defense lines they would be used as support to the lighter T34 tanks with long range fires or like the ISU brought up to fire point blank. Apparently their reliability was pretty good - better than the T34 - so the IS-2m managed to keep up with the faster medium tanks. Soviet doctrine, once a break through had been accomplished by the infantry, artillery, and supporting Tank battalions was to push the mobile units (Tank Army, Tank Corps, Mechanized Corps) through the hole and deep into the German rear. Objectives would be key geographical features and supply/transportation centers in the German rear. The Soviets used an advance guard ahead of the breakthrough forces in platoon-company-battalion-brigade strength (a brigade would be assigned to lead, it would assign a battalion to lead the brigade, the battalion would assign a company to lead the battalion, the company would assign a reinforced platoon to lead the company). These advance detachments had the objective of locating and pinning German reserves. The main force would try and bypass any German defenses. This was helped by Soviet reconnaissance elements reporting directly to the Corps/Army/Front HQ. Towed artillery pulled by trucks would be set-up and used in direct fire support or kept one terrain feature behind the main lines with a
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Command/Forward FO position on the high ground linked by wire (and later radio) to the batteries. These would support the advance guard units in contact. In most cases they would bypass the Germans and moved up to support the defense of the final objective of the breakthrough. Once on the objective the Mechanized Corps had the infantry and artillery and AT assets as well as tanks to hold an objective 300 km behind the original German lines. Mike Reese __._,_.___
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