Hink Wice: Harnessing The Power of Counterintuition
Hink Wice: Harnessing The Power of Counterintuition
Hink Wice: Harnessing The Power of Counterintuition
MICHAEL MAUBOUSSIN is chief investment strategist at Legg Mason Capital Management. He has been
adjunct professor of finance at Columbia Business School since 1993. Mr. Mauboussin has served as
managing director of Credit Suisse and is the former president of the Consumer Analyst Group of New York.
Mr. Mauboussin is the author of More Than You Know and the coauthor of Expectations Investing. He is a
graduate of Georgetown University.
Mr. Mauboussin’s Web site is at www.MichaelMauboussin.com.
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Think Twice - Page 1
MAIN IDEA
Why do smart people sometimes make appalling bad decisions, especially when the stakes are high? It really comes down to the
mental software hardwired into the human brain. We genuinely are not well equipped to deal with many of today’s most pressing
problems. We see the world we want to see rather than letting the facts speak for themselves. We also have no problems harboring
false beliefs, even if irrational. And most of us would rather do whatever comes to mind first rather than properly calibrating the
evidence which lies at hand and applying that to our decision making.
To reduce the number of mistakes you make, try and think twice about your choices. To do that, three steps are involved:
ý Poor
Decisions Prepare Recognize Apply
þ Great
Decisions
The eight most common decision mistakes – and how to offset them . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pages 2 - 7
Mistake Solution
ý þ
Most executives acknowledge their chances of success in
creating value by making an acquisition are not good, but they Poor Decisions 2 Great Decisions
believe they can beat the odds. This is a prime example of
making decisions using an inside perspective alone. Executives We all suffer from tunnel Make a conscious decision
believe the synergies which will be created by combining the vision at times and fail to to consider other alternatives
companies will more than compensate for the premium the adequately consider all and give voice to dissenters.
acquiring company has to pay. There is the unstated belief the the alternatives. And always know the
acquiring company is getting more than it is paying for because incentives involved.
the executives know what they’re doing. Unfortunately for
investors, this usually turns out not to be the case at all.
To avoid falling into the trap of making decisions from an inside Most people start with a mental “anchor” when making a
perspective alone, the three-step process is: decision. An anchor is a first approximation of what you expect
the end result to be. It will be based on the model you expect to
Prepare Recognize Apply apply in this situation. When you have an anchor in place, then
you often end up with tunnel vision or a very narrow focus.
To illustrate:
n Prepare – look at how other companies have fared in making
acquisitions work for them rather than against them. n If someone were to ask you what the freezing point of vodka
is, you would probably start thinking about this by saying: “OK,
n Recognize – that you may be trying to move ahead on the the freezing point of water is thirty-two degrees Fahrenheit.”
basis of unwarranted optimism. That’s your mental anchor and you would then try and
n Apply – come up with a framework you can use to make better estimate whether you need to adjust upwards or downwards
decisions which incorporates all the available facts. Look for from water’s freezing point to reach vodka’s freezing point.
comparable situations which can provide a statistical basis for When a large group was asked this question, the mean
making a decision rather than viewing your problem as estimate was a reasonable twelve degrees but the correct
unique. It rarely is. answer is vodka freezes at minus twenty degrees.
So how do you incorporate an outside view into your decisions? n When a group of real estate agents were asked to appraise a
The specific steps involved are: house, they were given all given identical background
1. Select your reference data sample – a big enough group to materials except for one key point – the agents were given
be significant but narrow enough to be useful. It’s helpful if different listing prices for the same house. When they all came
your reference group is stable over time and not in an back with their appraisals, those who were given a higher
industry which is undergoing large-scale changes. listing price had valued the house for substantially more than
those who had been provided with a low listing price. The
2. Analyze and assess outcomes – figure out under which
agents were influenced by that starting point anchor, even
conditions success is more likely. For example, in the case of
though they believed they were making a completely
acquisitions, you may find when an acquisition is made using
independent and unbiased assessment of market price.
an all cash transaction and the premium paid is 5 percent or
less, then the deal is more likely than not to generate n In negotiations, the initial offer which either party makes can
synergies which add value. Look for patterns. have a strong effect on how the negotiation as a whole turns
out. This is very pronounced in ambiguous situations.
Think Twice - Page 3
So how do you cope with the power of the situation and make We tend to look at Avoid focusing on just one part
better decisions? As for all the other sources of bad decisions, complex systems and of the system and instead try
the three-step approach is: seek ways to come up to gain an appreciation of the
with a simplifying overall system dynamics. If
mental model. feasible, use simulations.
Prepare Recognize Apply
ý þ
The same kind of thing plays out when companies hire superstar
CEOs or other top performers. Companies routinely pay a Poor Decisions 6 Great Decisions
premium to secure the services of top performers in anticipation
of superior results. Often, things don’t go as planned and the top We form inaccurate Acknowledge that
performers end up delivering only an average performance level. cause-and-effect circumstances can and
It turns out superstars typically have a surrounding support relationships, especially do change constantly and
system which is optimized for their talents. When they are placed for situations generated there are no universal rules
in another setting without the support system they are by circumstances. which will apply at all times.
accustomed to, their productivity reverts back to average
performance. The mistake is we isolated their individual
performance rather than seeing them as one part of a large Whether you’re conscious of it or not, what you do in business is
interrelated system. grounded in the theories you hold to be true. When you do
These mistakes arise whenever you focus on an isolated part of something different, you’re doing so in anticipation of deriving
a complex system without appreciating all of the system the benefits of a different theory. A sound theory will lead to
dynamics involved. To make better decisions when dealing with predictable and worthwhile results being delivered.
complex adaptive systems, the suggestions are: New theories generally get built in three stages:
1. Learn to look at systems at the right level – meaning if you’re
watching the performance of the market as a whole, study it Observation – we measure some kind of
at market level. When doing that, you would pay no attention 1
phenomena and document the results
to what’s happening to individual components because that
will just be background noise. Classification – we try and simplify the results
2
2. Be on the alert for tightly coupled systems – where processes and categorize things systematically
need to go from one stage to another. A commercial aircraft
is a good example of a tightly coupled system. All Definition – we start defining what the
3
components work together in a coordinated fashion. Most underlying cause-and-effect relationships are
complex or adaptive systems are much more loosely coupled
which means removing some elements will have no impact Theories then get fine-tuned and improved by testing predictions
on the larger system. In a stock market, for example, against the real-world data which gets collected. Anomalies can
removing a number of investors will have no impact at all. be highlighted and worked into the theory as things move
However, when all investors lose their diversity and start forward. Business is never as simple and clear-cut as taking a
acting in a coordinated fashion, then you start getting a single set of “keys to success” or “formula for winning” and
market boom or a bust. applying it.
3. Try developing simulations – especially if you’re dealing with A good example of this is Boeing’s experience with its
a complex system where there are no clear linkages between next-generation airliner, the 787 Dreamliner. Over the last few
cause and effect. Simulations help the learning process to decades, many people have talked about the benefits of
take root. Military planners and pilots use simulations outsourcing to drive down costs within a supply chain. To gain
extensively and more companies should pick up on this these benefits, Boeing decided to move from doing everything
learning and planning tool. in-house to using suppliers who would build complete airplane
“Even though complex adaptive systems surround us more now, sections according to the detailed blueprints Boeing provided.
our minds are no more adept at understanding them. Our innate Boeing hoped in this way, what was traditionally a capital
desire to cause and effect leads us to understand the system at intensive and labor intensive final assembly process of thirty
the wrong level, resulting in predictable mistakes. Unintended days could be pared back to three days.
consequences can lead to failure when well-meaning individuals Unfortunately, what sounded reasonable in theory ended up
attempt to manage the system to achieve a particular goal. So if being a disaster in practice. Despite the fact suppliers had
you deal with a complex adaptive system, make sure you detailed blueprints and specifications, Boeing found suppliers
carefully set your system-level goal and proceed with caution in interpreted those blueprints in subtly different ways. The end
implementing agent-level changes for achieving your objective.” result was components made by different suppliers would not
– Michael Mauboussin match up to other modules as planned. Boeing ended up having
to bring much design work back in house in order to get
“Thinking twice is really a story of opportunity. The opportunity everything to integrate properly. The 787 is two years behind
comes in two flavors. You can reduce the number of mistakes schedule and many billions over budget as a result of Boeing
you make by thinking about problems more clearly. Also, you can embracing a management theory that sounds good but does not
see and capitalize on the mistakes other people make. As work for complex products like a commercial airliner.
shrewd businesspeople know, one man’s mistakes is another’s
opportunity. Over time, the most rational thinker will win. “Outsourcing does make sense for industries where
Thinking twice is about identifying those opportunities.” subcomponents are modules. In these cases, the performance
– Michael Mauboussin of the subcomponents is well defined, and the final assembly is
straightforward. Today, you can build a personal computer
“Intelligent people perform better only when you tell them what to yourself with standardized modules. Once an industry defines
do.” the modules, then it makes more sense for suppliers to
– Keith Stanovich, psychologist, University of Toronto specialize in one component instead of trying to make them all.
Assemblers like Dell can then focus on design, marketing and
Think Twice - Page 6
4. Do what you can to mitigate the downside while at the same enjoy great leadership, a visionary strategy or superior financial
time still harnessing the upside – which essentially means controls. We then recommend others embrace those same
you should never bet more than you can afford to lose on any attributes to also become successful. The halo effect completely
particular outcome. The ideal is to get cost-effective ignores the role of luck. If stellar performance subsequently
exposure to positive events at the same time as you insure reverts back to average performance, observers then conclude
against the arrival of major negative events. those features went wrong whereas in reality nothing has
changed. The people are doing all the same things but a run of
“Consequences are more important than probabilities.” good luck has ended as it always does.
– Peter Bernstein, investor
This halo effect is prominent in the business press. Frequently,
“Increasingly, people must deal with systems that are marked by companies which are featured in glowing terms as cover stories
abrupt, unforeseeable change and rare but possible outcomes. in Business Week, Forbes and Fortune magazines then end up
We are all particularly mistake-prone with these systems turning in an abysmal performance over the next two or so years.
because we intuitively want to treat the system as being simpler Their run of success which attracted the attention of the
than it is and to extrapolate the past into the future. Flag those magazine’s editors ultimately reverts to the mean. Professional
systems w hen you see them, and slow down your sports teams observe this same phenomena – appropriately
decision-making procedures.” termed the “Sports Illustrated Jinx” – where teams or athletes
– Michael Mauboussin which appear on the magazine’s cover will immediately go into a
prolonged slump.
Poor Decisions ý 8
þ Great Decisions
So how do you avoid these reversion to the mean style mistakes
when making decisions? Some suggestions:
1. Become more realistic about evaluating the amount of luck
We overemphasize the Evaluate the mix of skill and involved in the system you are analyzing – which is rarely
effect our skill has on the luck in the system you’re easy to do. When something good happens, it’s human
result and minimize the looking at and be careful about nature to assume that was because of skill. Similarly,
impact of luck in our any conclusions you draw whenever something bad happens, you’re more likely to
successes. which rely on luck. consider it to be the result of bad luck. Be realistic and careful
about drawing conclusions around anything which involves
How much of your past successes have been due to good luck luck.
and how much has been the result of skill? Humans have a very 2. Consider the sample size you’re looking at – and see whether
difficult time differentiating between the two. As a result, we fail to enlarging your data sample will allow you to draw more robust
acknowledge over the long run, results always revert to the conclusions. The more data you’re using in your sample, the
mean. Because of this, you can make three kinds of mistakes: better you understand everything involved and can draw the
n You think the person you’re dealing with is “special” – and correct conclusions.
therefore not bound by the law of averages. This is what 3. Watch out for changes in the system – because not all
happens when corporate leaders think they’ve figured out a systems remain stable over an extended period. Whenever a
better way to run their businesses and therefore they will system changes, the mix of skill and luck changes as well.
always turn in above average performance. Don’t fall for it. Keep this in mind as you analyze the data.
Luck has more impact than they’re admitting to themselves. 4. Always remain on the lookout for the halo effect – where
This is why investors pour money into funds run by managers someone wants to offer you a tidy solution to your problems
which have beaten the market over the past couple of years based on emulating what’s worked for someone else.
only to pull it out when that fund’s lucky streak ends and its Business is much too complex for simple solutions which are
performance reverts back to average. These people are guaranteed to work under any conditions and circumstances
buying high and selling low because they ignore reversion. to exist. Anyone who offers you a proven formula, a set of
n You can easily misinterpret the data – and look for cases of rules to live by or a set of attributes you need to have is trying
sustained outstanding performance when in reality what to sell you the Brooklyn Bridge. They’re trying to sell
you’re actually seeing would be a reversion towards the something they don’t even have themselves. Be very wary.
long-term average. Put another way, all markets tend towards
“Here’s a simple test of whether an activity involves skill: ask if
mediocrity. Competitive advantage is never absolute and
you can lose it on purpose. Think about casino games like
inexhaustible. Eventually, everyone reverts to the mean.
roulette or slots. Winning or losing is purely a matter of luck. It
Extreme results, based on either really good luck or really bad
doesn’t matter what you do. But if you can lose on purpose, then
luck, will be followed by other periods which will be less
skill is involved. This simple test reveals the role of luck in
extreme and which will even things out.
investing. When most people recognize that it is hard to
n You can get confused about what kind of feedback is most construct a portfolio that beats the S&P 500, most people don’t
productive – and base your actions on that part of the know how hard it is to build a portfolio that will do a lot worse than
outcome the person can’t control (the luck) rather than that the benchmark.”
part they can control (their skill). Giving your people feedback – Michael Mauboussin
based only on outcomes is of no practical value whatsoever if
you fail to differentiate between skill and luck. “When outcomes are really good because of a dose of good luck,
The existence of a “halo effect” is well documented in business. prepare for the times when they will be closer to the average.
In practical terms, this means we observe successful When outcomes are disappointing as the result of bad luck,
organizations and attach attributes to their success – like they recognize things will get better.”
– Michael Mauboussin
Think Twice - Page 8