010 Perez and Doria v.

Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company and the fact that no personnel other than petitioners were involved. There was,
(MAGBUHOS for ROSALES, A) therefore, a patent paucity of proof connecting Perez and Doria to the alleged
7 April 2009 | Corona, J. | Just Causes tampering of shipping documents.

PETITIONER: Felix Perez and Amante Doria With regard to due process:
RESPONDENTS: Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company and Jose Luis Perez and Doria were neither apprised of the charges against them nor given a
Santiago chance to defend themselves. They were simply and arbitrarily separated from work
and served notices of termination in total disregard of their rights to due process and
SUMMARY: Perez and Doria were employed by PT&T as shipping clerk and security of tenure. The labor arbiter and the CA correctly found that PT&T and
supervisor, respectively. Acting on an alleged unsigned letter regarding anomalous Santiago failed to comply with the two-notice requirement for terminating
transactions at the shipping section, PT&T and Santiago formed a special audit team employees.
to investigate the matter. It was discovered that the Shipping Section jacked up the
value of the freight costs for goods shipped and that the duplicates of the shipping With regard to absence of hearing:
documents allegedly showed traces of tampering, alteration, and superimposition. Perez and Doria likewise contended that due process was not observed in the
They were placed on preventive suspension for 30 days for their alleged involvement absence of a hearing in which they could have explained their side and refuted the
in the anomaly. Thereafter, PT&T issued a memorandum, in line with the evidence against them. There is no need for a hearing or conference. This Court
recommendation of AVP-Audit report, dismissing Perez and Doria for having falsified has consistently ruled that the due process requirement in cases of termination
company documents. of employment does not require an actual or formal hearing

On November 9, 1993, Perez and Doria filed a complaint for illegal suspension and The Labor Code, on one hand, provides that an employer must provide the
illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter found that the 30-day extension of Perez and employee ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the
Doria suspension and their subsequent dismissal were both illegal. He ordered assistance of his representative if he so desires. The omnibus rules implementing
respondents to pay petitioners their salaries during their 30-day illegal suspension, as the Labor Code, on the other hand, require a hearing and conference during which
well as to reinstate them with backwages and 13th month pay. NLRC, on the other the employee concerned is given the opportunity to respond to the charge, present
hand, reversed the decision of the labor arbiter. It ruled that Perez and Doria were his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him. In case of conflict, the law
dismissed for just cause, that they were accorded due process and that they were prevails over the administrative regulations implementing it. The above rulings are a
illegally suspended for only 15 days (without stating the reason for the reduction of clear recognition that the employer may provide an employee with ample opportunity
the period of their illegal suspension). CA affirmed the NLRC decision insofar as to be heard and defend himself with the assistance of a representative or counsel in
Perez and Doria illegal suspension for 15 days and dismissal for just cause were ways other than a formal hearing. The employee can be fully afforded a chance to
concerned. However, it found that they were dismissed without due process. respond to the charges against him, adduce his evidence or rebut the evidence
against him through a wide array of methods, verbal or written.
The issue is whether or not there was just cause and due process in the Perez and
Doria’s dismissal. NO. Willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him DOCTRINES:
by his employer or duly authorized representative is a just cause for In sum, the following are the guiding principles in connection with the hearing
termination. However, in General Bank and Trust Co. v. CA, it was stated: requirement in dismissal cases:
“[L]oss of confidence should not be simulated. It should not be used as a a. ample opportunity to be heard means any meaningful opportunity (verbal or
subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or unjustified. Loss of
written) given to the employee to answer the charges against him and submit
confidence may not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming
evidence to the contrary. It must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify evidence in support of his defense, whether in a hearing, conference or some
an earlier action taken in bad faith.”The burden of proof rests on the employer to other fair, just and reasonable way.
establish that the dismissal is for cause. The employer’s evidence must clearly and b. a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory only when requested by
convincingly show the facts on which the loss of confidence in the employee may be the employee in writing or substantial evidentiary disputes exist or a company
fairly made to rest. It must be adequately proven by substantial evidence. PT&T failed rule or practice requires it, or when similar circumstances justify it.
to discharge this burden. c. the ample opportunity to be heard standard in the Labor Code prevails over
the hearing or conference requirement in the implementing rules and
The Supreme Court ruled: without undermining the importance of a shipping order or
request, we find PT&T’s evidence insufficient to clearly and convincingly regulations.
establish the facts from which the loss of confidence resulted. Other than their
bare allegations and the fact that such documents came into Perez and Doria’s (See end of digest for the separate opinions.)
hands at some point, PT&T should have provided evidence of their functions, the
extent of their duties, the procedure in the handling and approval of shipping requests FACTS:
 1. Petitioners Felix B. Perez and Amante G. Doria were employed by RATIO:
respondent Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company (PT&T) as PT&T failed to prove just cause and to observe Due Process
shipping clerk and supervisor, respectively, in PT&T’s Shipping Section, 1. The CA, in upholding the NLRC’s decision, reasoned that there was sufficient
Materials Management Group. basis for PT&T to lose their confidence in Perez and Doria for allegedly
2. Acting on an alleged unsigned letter regarding anomalous transactions at tampering with the shipping documents. PT&T emphasized the importance of a
the shipping section, PT&T and Santiago formed a special audit team to shipping order or request, as it was the basis of their liability to a cargo forwarder.
investigate the matter. It was discovered that the Shipping Section jacked up The Supreme Court disagrees.
the value of the freight costs for goods shipped and that the duplicates of the d. Without undermining the importance of a shipping order or request,
shipping documents allegedly showed traces of tampering, alteration, and we find PT&T’s evidence insufficient to clearly and
superimposition. convincingly establish the facts from which the loss of
3. On September 3, 1993, perez and Doria were placed on preventive confidence resulted. Other than their bare allegations and the fact
suspension for 30 days for their alleged involvement in the anomaly. Their that such documents came into Perez and Doria’s hands at some
suspension was extended for 15 days twice: first on October 3, 1993 and point, PT&T should have provided evidence of their functions, the
second on October 18, 1993. extent of their duties, the procedure in the handling and approval of
4. On October 29, 1993, PT&T issued a memorandum, in line with the shipping requests and the fact that no personnel other than
recommendation of AVP-Audit report, dismissing Perez and Doria for having petitioners were involved. There was, therefore, a patent paucity of
falsified company documents. proof connecting Perez and Doria to the alleged tampering of
5. On November 9, 1993, Perez and Doria filed a complaint for illegal shipping documents.
suspension and illegal dismissal. They alleged that they were dismissed on e. The alterations on the shipping documents could not reasonably be
November 8, 1993, the date they received the above-mentioned attributed to Perez and Doria because it was never proven that they
memorandum. alone had control of or access to these documents. Unless duly
6. The labor arbiter found that the 30-day extension of Perez and Doria proved or sufficiently substantiated otherwise, impartial tribunals
suspension and their subsequent dismissal were both illegal. He ordered should not rely only on the statement of the employer that it has lost
respondents to pay petitioners their salaries during their 30-day illegal confidence in its employee.
suspension, as well as to reinstate them with backwages and 13th month 2. Willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his
pay. employer or duly authorized representative is a just cause for
7. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the decision of termination.
the labor arbiter. It ruled that Perez and Doria were dismissed for just cause, 3. However, in General Bank and Trust Co. v. CA, it was stated: “[L]oss of
that they were accorded due process and that they were illegally suspended confidence should not be simulated. It should not be used as a
for only 15 days (without stating the reason for the reduction of the period of subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or unjustified. Loss
their illegal suspension). of confidence may not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of
8. Perez and Doria appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). In decision, the CA overwhelming evidence to the contrary. It must be genuine, not a mere
affirmed the NLRC decision insofar as Perez and Doria illegal suspension for afterthought to justify an earlier action taken in bad faith.”
15 days and dismissal for just cause were concerned. However, it found that 4. The burden of proof rests on the employer to establish that the dismissal is
they were dismissed without due process. for cause in view of the security of tenure that employees enjoy under the
ISSUE/s: Constitution and the Labor Code. The employer’s evidence must clearly and
Whether or not there was just cause and due process in the Perez and Doria’s convincingly show the facts on which the loss of confidence in the employee
dismissal. NO. The burden of proof rests on the employer to establish that the may be fairly made to rest. It must be adequately proven by substantial
dismissal is for cause in view of the security of tenure that employees enjoy under the evidence. PT&T failed to discharge this burden.
Constitution and the Labor Code. The employer’s evidence must clearly and 5. Perez and Doria were neither apprised of the charges against them nor
convincingly show the facts on which the loss of confidence in the employee may be given a chance to defend themselves. They were simply and arbitrarily
fairly made to rest. It must be adequately proven by substantial evidence. PT&T failed separated from work and served notices of termination in total disregard of
to discharge this burden. their rights to due process and security of tenure. The labor arbiter and the
CA correctly found that PT&T and Santiago failed to comply with the
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court two-notice requirement for terminating employees.
of Appeals dated January 29, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 50536 finding that petitioners
Felix B. Perez and Amante G. Doria were not illegally dismissed but were not The absence of hearing
accorded due process and were illegally suspended for 15 days, is SET ASIDE. The 6. Perez and Doria likewise contended that due process was not observed in
decision of the labor arbiter dated December 27, 1995 in NLRC NCR CN. 11-06930- the absence of a hearing in which they could have explained their side and
93 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioners should be paid their refuted the evidence against them.
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. 7. There is no need for a hearing or conference . We note a marked
difference in the standards of due process to be followed as prescribed in
 the Labor Code and its implementing rules. The Labor Code, on one hand, thereof.
provides that an employer must provide the employee ample
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of 15. A hearing means that a party should be given a chance to adduce his
his representative if he so desires evidence to support his side of the case and that the evidence should be
8. The omnibus rules implementing the Labor Code, on the other hand, require taken into account in the adjudication of the controversy. To be heard does
a hearing and conference during which the employee concerned is given the not mean verbal argumentation alone inasmuch as one may be heard just as
opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the effectively through written explanations, submissions or pleadings.
evidence presented against him. Therefore, while the phrase ample opportunity to be heard may in fact
9. At the outset, we reaffirm the time-honored doctrine that, in case of conflict, include an actual hearing, it is not limited to a formal hearing only. In other
the law prevails over the administrative regulations implementing it. The words, the existence of an actual, formal trial-type hearing, although
authority to promulgate implementing rules proceeds from the law itself. To preferred, is not absolutely necessary to satisfy the employees right to be
be valid, a rule or regulation must conform to and be consistent with the heard.
provisions of the enabling statute. As such, it cannot amend the law either by 16. This Court has consistently ruled that the due process requirement in
abridging or expanding its scope. cases of termination of employment does not require an actual or
10. Article 277(b) of the Labor Code provides that, in cases of termination for a formal hearing. (Skippers United Pacific, Inc. v. Maguad; Autobus Workers
just cause, an employee must be given ample opportunity to be heard and to Union v. NLRC; Solid Development Corporation Workers Association v.
defend himself. Thus, the opportunity to be heard afforded by law to the Solid Development Corporation)
employee is qualified by the word ample which ordinarily means 17. The above rulings are a clear recognition that the employer may provide an
considerably more than adequate or sufficient. In this regard, the phrase employee with ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself with the
ample opportunity to be heard can be reasonably interpreted as extensive assistance of a representative or counsel in ways other than a formal
enough to cover actual hearing or conference. To this extent, Section 2(d), hearing. The employee can be fully afforded a chance to respond to the
Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code is in charges against him, adduce his evidence or rebut the evidence against him
conformity with Article 277(b). through a wide array of methods, verbal or written.
11. Nonetheless, Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI 18. After receiving the first notice apprising him of the charges against him, the
of the Labor Code should not be taken to mean that holding an actual employee may submit a written explanation (which may be in the form of a
hearing or conference is a condition sine qua non for compliance with letter, memorandum, affidavit or position paper) and offer evidence in
the due process requirement in termination of employment. The test for support thereof, like relevant company records (such as his 201 file and daily
the fair procedure guaranteed under Article 277(b) cannot be whether there time records) and the sworn statements of his witnesses. For this purpose,
has been a formal pretermination confrontation between the employer and he may prepare his explanation personally or with the assistance of a
the employee. The ample opportunity to be heard standard is neither representative or counsel. He may also ask the employer to provide him
synonymous nor similar to a formal hearing. To confine the employees right copy of records material to his defense. His written explanation may also
to be heard to a solitary form narrows down that right. It deprives him of include a request that a formal hearing or conference be held. In such a
other equally effective forms of adducing evidence in his defense. Certainly, case, the conduct of a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory,
such an exclusivist and absolutist interpretation is overly restrictive. The very just as it is where there exist substantial evidentiary disputes or where
nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures company rules or practice requires an actual hearing as part of employment
universally applicable to every imaginable situation. pretermination procedure. To this extent, we refine the decisions we have
12. The standard for the hearing requirement, ample opportunity, is couched in rendered so far on this point of law.
general language revealing the legislative intent to give some degree of 19. This interpretation of Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book
flexibility or adaptability to meet the peculiarities of a given situation. To VI of the Labor Code reasonably implements the ample opportunity to be
confine it to a single rigid proceeding such as a formal hearing will defeat its heard standard under Article 277(b) of the Labor Code without unduly
spirit. restricting the language of the law or excessively burdening the employer.
13. Significantly, Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of This not only respects the power vested in the Secretary of Labor and
the Labor Code itself provides that the so-called standards of due process Employment to promulgate rules and regulations that will lay down the
outlined therein shall be observed substantially, not strictly. This is a guidelines for the implementation of Article 277(b). More importantly, this is
recognition that while a formal hearing or conference is ideal, it is not an faithful to the mandate of Article 4 of the Labor Code that [a]ll doubts in the
absolute, mandatory or exclusive avenue of due process. implementation and interpretation of the provisions of [the Labor Code],
14. An employees right to be heard in termination cases under Article 277(b) as including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of
implemented by Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of labor.
the Labor Code should be interpreted in broad strokes. It is satisfied not only 20. In sum, the following are the guiding principles in connection with the
by a formal face to face confrontation but by any meaningful opportunity to hearing requirement in dismissal cases:
controvert the charges against him and to submit evidence in support a. ample opportunity to be heard means any meaningful
 opportunity (verbal or written) given to the employee to which his or her dismissal is sought, and a second written notice which
answer the charges against him and submit evidence in informs the worker of the employer’s decision to dismiss him. Between these
support of his defense, whether in a hearing, conference or two notices, the worker must be afforded ample opportunity to be heard in
some other fair, just and reasonable way. the manner the ponencia has very ably discussed.
b. a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory only when
requested by the employee in writing or substantial A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all circumstances
evidentiary disputes exist or a company rule or practice essential to due process, the requirements of which are satisfied where the
requires it, or when similar circumstances justify it. parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side in the
c. the ample opportunity to be heard standard in the Labor Code controversy.
prevails over the hearing or conference requirement in the
implementing rules and regulations. 2. The “ample opportunity” required to be provided by the employer necessity.
To be sure, it cannot refer to, or be compared with, the requirements of a
Perez and Doria were illegally suspended for 30 days judicial proceeding whose strict demands necessarily require a formal
1. An employee may be validly suspended by the employer for just cause hearing. “Judicial declarations are rich to the effect that the essence of due
provided by law. Such suspension shall only be for a period of 30 days, after process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative
which the employee shall either be reinstated or paid his wages during the proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side. A formal or trial type
extended period. hearing is not at all times and in all circumstances essential to due process,
2. In this case, Perez and Doria contended that they were not paid during the the requirements of which are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair
two 15-day extensions, or a total of 30 days, of their preventive suspension. and reasonable opportunity to explain their side in the controversy.”
PT&T failed to adduce evidence to the contrary. Thus, we uphold the ruling
of the labor arbiter on this point.
VELASCO, J., Separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
3. Where the dismissal was without just or authorized cause and there was no
Opportunity to be heard does not exclude an actual or formal hearing since
due process, Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, mandates that the
such requirement would grant more than sufficient chance for an employee to
employee is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and
be heard and adduce evidence.
other privileges and full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other
1. The aforequoted provision states that employees are to be given “ample”
benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time the
opportunity to be heard and defend themselves. However, the word “ample”
compensation was not paid up to the time of actual reinstatement. In this
is vague and not defined in the said provision. Since the meaning of this
case, however, reinstatement is no longer possible because of the length of
word is unclear, then it should be given a liberal construction to favor labor.
time that has passed from the date of the incident to final resolution.
“Ample” means “considerably more than adequate or sufficient.” Ample
Fourteen years have transpired from the time they were wrongfully
opportunity can be construed to be broad enough to encompass an actual
dismissed. To order reinstatement at this juncture will no longer serve any
hearing or conference. To be sure, opportunity to be heard does not exclude
prudent or practical purpose.
an actual or formal hearing since such requirement would grant more than
sufficient chance for an employee to be heard and adduce evidence. In this
SEPARATE OPINIONS
sense, I believe there is no discrepancy between Art. 277 and the
Implementing Rule in question.
BRION, J., Concurring Opinion: The fact that Art. 277 (b) does not expressly mention actual hearing in Art. 277
(b) does not bar the Secretary of Labor from issuing a rule (Sec. 2[d][ii], Rule I,
Employer must furnish the worker to be dismissed with two written notices Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code) implementing the provision
before termination of employment can be effected. that what really is meant is an actual hearing or conference.
2. The ponencia seems to underscore the absence of any mention of an
1. Jurisprudence has expounded on the guarantee and its implementation by “actual hearing” in Art. 277(b). It is conceded that there is no explicit mention
reiterating that the employer must furnish the worker to be dismissed with of an actual hearing or conference in said legal provision. As earlier
two written notices before termination of employment can be effected: a first discussed, the requisite hearing is captured in the phrase “ample opportunity
written notice that informs the worker of the particular acts or omissions for to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative if
 he so desires.” Even if the phrase “actual hearing” is not specified in Art.
277(b), the same thing is true with respect to the second written notice
informing the employee of the employer’s decision which is likewise unclear
in said provision. Thus, the fact that Art. 277(b) does not expressly mention
actual hearing in Art. 277(b) does not bar the Secretary of Labor from
issuing a rule (Sec. 2[d][ii], Rule I, Implementing Rules of Book VI of the
Labor Code) implementing the provision that what really is meant is an
actual hearing or conference. It should be noted that the Secretary of Labor
also issued a rule on the need for a second written notice on the decision
rendered in the illegal dismissal proceedings despite the silence of Art.
277(b) on the need for a written notice of the employer’s decision.
The right to a hearing is one of the cardinal primary rights which must be
respected even in cases of administrative character.—
3. The hearing or conference requirement in termination cases finds support in
the long standing jurisprudence in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations,
wherein we declared that the right to a hearing is one of the cardinal primary
rights which must be respected even in cases of administrative character.
We held: There are cardinal rights which must be respected even in
proceedings of this character. The first of these rights is the right to a
hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present
his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. Not only must the
party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must
consider the evidence presented.