THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. UNION KAYANAN and HON.

ENRIQUE AGANA and PELAGIO ORGANO G.R. No. L-30355. May 31, 1978.

Barredo, J.

Facts
Pelagio Organo and two others were charged with Murder for the killing of Alfredo
Puyal. Pelagio was originally arraigned and tried before Branch III, CFI, Gumaca and said
accused pleaded guilty.

Although the information was filed by Assistant Provincial Fiscal (APF) Eufemio
Caparros of the same province, the preliminary investigation was actually conducted with the
assistance of State prosecutor (SP) Lilia Lopez and Provincial Fiscal (PF) Juan Aquino. At the
trial, the prosecution was handled by Lopez and Aquino.

After a protracted trial, the prosecution was able to rest its case and the defense started
presenting its evidence. However, before the defense rested, Organo on the 13th day of February
1968 asked the Court permission to change his plea of not guilty to the crime of murder to that of
guilty to the lesser crime of homicide and invoked the mitigating circumstances of voluntary
surrender and incomplete self-defense.

Fiscal Celso B. Florido of the office of the PF appeared for the prosecution and consented
to the change of plea of the accused. The said hearing was not calendared and without notice to
any of the prosecutors handling it.

As a result, Judge Kayanan convicted the accused for the lesser crime of homicide. It was
also stated in the decision that the victim Alfredo Puyal was a habitual delinquent and that he
was paroled.

Outraged by the decision, SP Lopez filed an urgent motion for reconsideration alleging
that:
(1) They (Lopez and Aquino) were duly designated by the Secretary of Justice to handle the
investigation and prosecution of the case;
(2) The evidence of the defense was disproved by the testimony of Catanauan policeman shown
in the records who testified that the accused was actually arrested and did not voluntarily
surrender;
(3) They were not notified of the hearing;
(4) It is extremely irregular to allow the accused to enter a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of
homicide after all the evidence for the prosecution had already been received as well as that of
the defense;
(5) Fiscal Florido did not consent to the change of plea of the accused as provided for in Section
4 of Rule 118;
(6) It does not appear that any evidence was received by the Court to support the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender and incomplete self-defense as claimed by the accused
hence the accused should not be credited these two mitigating circumstances;
(7) Assuming that the plea to a lesser offense could have been allowed by the Court, and that the
two mitigating circumstances should be credited to the accused, the Court failed to consider that
when the accused entered a plea of guilty to the information, he entered a plea of guilty to the
aggravating circumstances alleged therein. Hence, there is no justification for the court to impose
a penalty two degrees lower than that prescribed by law for the crime of homicide; and
(8) There is no such evidence whatever that the victim is a habitual delinquent nor does the
record show that any such evidence was received by the court.

Judge Kayanan acted on the motion for reconsideration by issuing an order on March 18,
1968 where he simply stated that, "the Court finds meritorious the ground that the phrase 'The
victim Alfredo Puyal was a habitual delinquent ...” is not supported by positive evidence. The
portion of the decision dated February 13, 1968 to that effect is ordered deleted.”

Since the order did not directly resolve her motion for reconsideration, SP Lopez filed a
supplemental motion for reconsideration. Judge Enrique Agana, who had taken over Branch III,
issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration and holding that to grant the same would
place the accused in double jeopardy.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Issue
 W/N Judge Kayanan acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the his order.
 W/N Judge Agana's refusal to reconsider the matter is a manifest legal error.

Ruling
i. Yes. No explanation at all has been given as to how the case to which special prosecutors
have been specifically assigned by the secretary of Justice, already tried, with the
prosecution already rested and the defense about to close, was called for a new
arraignment without any formal calendaring thereof and without so much as even a
verbal or informal notice, if not to the special prosecutors, at least to assistant provincial
fiscal assigned to the case. Worse, not even the counsel of record of the accused was
present, and there is no reason given why the judge had to appoint a counsel de oficio for
him for the arraignment only.

No effort was even made to present evidence on the proposed mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender and how incomplete self-defense could be reconciled. It does not appear that
some evidence had been offered to prove the elements of the alleged incomplete self-defense.
Besides, there was the aggravating circumstance of superiority of strength alleged in the
information, together with treachery and evident premeditation, as qualifying circumstances. It
has not been explained how there could be self-defense in any sense where there is treachery
and/or evident premeditation.

A plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed
as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the accused. The rules allow
such a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish guilt of the
crime charged. Indeed, when such an offer is made, the court is duty bound to inquire carefully
into the circumstances on which it is premised.

ii. Yes. The whole proceeding in question is manifestly illegal and unjustified. It is
completely void, and, accordingly, jeopardy could not have attached to it We are not
saying, however, that a plea of guilty may not be made in the midst of trial. Surely, the
accused can confess guilt at any time even after arraigmment and after trial has began,
but the law is clear that he shall not thereby be entitled to have such plea considered as a
mitigating circumstance. Here, Organo was not only irregularly credited with the
mitigating circumstance of a plea of guilty to a lesser offense than that already proven by
the evidence on record, but he was also given credit for voluntary surrender and
incomplete self-defense, as to which he did not even offer, much less present an iota of
evidence.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.ROMUALDO CAPILLAS and AQUILINO
PACALA G.R. No. L-38756 November 13, 1984

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

Facts:

Romualdo Capillas sentenced to death for robbery in band with homicide by the Court of
First Instance of Samar but when he committed the murder on September 9, 1971, his sentence
had not yet become final because it was still under review by this Court; and Aquilino Palaca
sentenced to death for a crime committed in Laya, Samar, and that he had been previously
convicted of trespass, were accused of the crime of murder while theye were confined in the
New Bilibid prison using an improvised deadly weapon attacked Patricio Gallardo a sentenced
prisoner in the same institution who incurred multiple stab wounds which caused his death. The
offense when committed by the accused was attended by the aggravating circumstances of
recidivism in the case of both accused.

The death sentence imposed on Romualdo Capillas was reduced to reclusion perpetua for
lack of necessary votes in a decision promulgated on October 21, 1981. to Aquiline Pacala the
death sentence imposed on him was likewise reduced to reclusion perpetua in a decision
promulgated on August 15, 1974.

When the accused were arraigned on July 5, 1973, with the assistance of counsel, both
pleaded guilty. The accused were apprised by the Court of the consequence of their plea of guilty
that there is no other penalty to be meted upon them except death and the said accused
manifested that although they are aware that they might be punished with death, still they are
pleading guilty to the crime they have committed.

Pursuant to the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of People vs. Daeng,
et al., the Court ordered the presentation of evidence to determine the degree of culpability of the
accused.

The trial court rendered the accused Romualdo Capillas and Aquilino Pacala guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of Murder in accordance with Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code and sentenced them death penalty because according to the court, "this being a case
of quasi-recidivism, as special aggravating circumstance, the same cannot be offset by any
ordinary mitigating circumstance because of the mandatory provision of Article 160 of the
Revised Penal Code which specifically provides that the offender shall be punished by the
maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony.

Issue:
Whether or not the imposition of death penalty was correct.

Ruling:
No. It is true that the information alleges recidivism as an aggravating circumstance for the two
accused. True it is also that a plea of guilty is deemed as an admission of all the material
allegations in the information including the attendant circumstances. But in the instant case the
trial court proceeded to receive evidence despite the plea of guilty because of the serious nature
of the offense and the evidence shows that the appellants are not recidivists. The evidence, under
the circumstances, must prevail over the admission.The Solicitor General concedes that Capillas
is entitled to two mitigating circumstances: voluntary surrender and plea of guilty.

The Solicitor General concedes that Pacala is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
plea of guilty but denies that he can invoke voluntary surrender because it is not supported by the
evidence. The latter point is well-taken because Pacala himself stated during the hearing that he
did not surrender; he merely waited in his cell until prison employees took him out.
The penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Capillas has two
mitigating circumstances in his favor so that the penalty is reduced by one degree to prision
mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium. As to Pacala who has one mitigating
circumstance in his favor, the minimum period of the penalty for murder is applicable.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,vs. BRUNO OCBINA Y DE LOS
SANTOS (alias BRUNO OCVINA) and MANUEL PAMERO G.R. No. 45178 September
30, 1936

Facts:
Appellant was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the crime of theft. Upon his
plea of guilty, he was sentenced to suffer four months and one day of arresto mayor, and an
additional penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor for habitual delinquency.

Issues:
1. W/N the lower court erred in not advising the appelant of his right to have counsel? ;
2. W/N the lower court erred in sentencing him to suffer the penalty above indicated?

Ruling:
1. In United States vs. Escalante (36 Phil., 743), this court held that the failure the record
to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused of his right to have counsel is
not sufficient ground to reverse a judgment of conviction. The reason for this doctrine is that the
trial court must be presumed to have complied with the procedure prescribed by law for the
hearing and trial of cases; and that such a presumption can only be overcome by an affirmative
showing to the contrary.
In the instant case, there is no affirmative showing that the appellant was not advised of his right
to have counsel. We, therefore, find no merit in the first error assigned by counsel for the
appellant.
2. Although the point is not discussed in the brief of counsel for the appellant, the second
assignment of error is sufficiently broad to raise the question of whether the additional penalty of
six years and one day of prision mayor for habitual delinquency was properly imposed. The only
allegation in the information concerning this matter is the following:

That the accused Bruno Ocbina y De los Santos (alias Bruno Ocvina) is an habitual
delinquent, he having already been convicted three (3) times of the crime of theft, by virtue of
final judgments of a competent court, the date of his last conviction being December 13, 1935.
In the recent case of People vs. Venus (G. R. No. 45141, p. 435, ante), this court held that an
allegation of this nature in an information was too general and therefore insufficient to sustain a
conviction for habitual delinquency upon a plea of guilty. It follows that the additional penalty of
sixyears and one day of prision mayor imposed on the appellant must be eliminated from the
judgment below.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.ELIAS NANA alias Commander Delfin et
al.G.R. No. L-9483             January 30, 1960

CONCEPCION, J.:

Facts:

Delfin Bumanglag and Alejandro Briones alias Commander Delfin and Florante
respectively in pursuance of paragraph of Article 135, Revised Penal Code, to ten (10) years of
prision mayor and to pay a fine of P10,000 AND P20,000 RESPECTIVELY.

The Court also find Delfin Bumanglag and Alejandro Briones guilty of the murder of
Emilio Dayao and sentences each of them to reclusion perpetua. AND finds Alejandro Briones
guilty of the murders of Desiderio Ordinario, Alfredo Lacsamana and Bonifacio Nariz

All accused are entitled to one-half of their preventive imprisonment they have already
undergone.

Appellants do not question the judgment against them for simple rebellion. They merely
impugn their additional conviction for multiple murder and murder, upon the theory that these
offenses form part of, and are absorbed by, said crime of rebellion, as held in People vs.
Hernandez.

Issue:
Whether or not the crime of multiple murder in connection with rebellion should be
absorbed.

Ruling:

No.The information in the case at bar alleges, not only in its opening paragraph, but, also,
in each specific count, that the acts therein charged were commitment in furtherance of the
rebellion.

Hence, the doctrine laid down in the Romagosa case is not on point. Moreover, the record
shows that Desiderio Ordinario, Alfredo Lacsamana and Bonifacio Nariz were possessors of
shotguns; that when Lacsamana and Nariz were kidnapped, in the evening of April 22, 1951,
they were performing guard duty upon orders of the barrio lieutenant seemingly, to maintain
peace and order in the locality and to forestall any disturbance that the Huks may cause therein;
and that, when the Huks entered the house of Ordinario, that same evening, they found his
shotgun leaning by the wall, apparently in readiness for use should the Huks show up.
Accordingly, the Solicitor General agrees, with the defense, that Ordinario Lacsamana and Nariz
were kidnapped and possibly killed as a means to commit the crime of rebellion or in furtherance
thereof.

Lastly, the specific allegation, in each count of the information herein, to the effect that
the acts describe in such count were performed in furtherance of the conspiracy to commit
rebellion, was evidently made to forestall a possible motion to quash, upon the ground of
municipality of crimes charged in said information, as held in People vs. Geronimo (100 Phil.,
90, 53 Off. Gaz., 68) and People vs. Romagosa (supra). In other words, the information is so
drafted as to necessarily, to a person of average intelligence, the impression that the accused
were meant to be charged, and arte actually charged, with a series of acts constituting a single
offense. Hence, appellant's conviction for murder and multiple murder, as crimes independent of
that of rebellion, violates their constitutional right to b "informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation" against them (Tubb vs. People 101, Phil., 114, 53, Off. Gaz., 6096), constitutes a
denial of due process.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.ABUNDIO ROMAGOSA alias DAVID G.R.
No. L-8476             February 28, 1958

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Facts:
Abundio Romagosa alias David was accused in the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur of the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings, under three
counts that are the last three of the five counts charged against Federico Geronimo, et al.

As in the case of Federico Geronimo, appellant Romagosa, upon arraignment, entered a

plea of guilty to the information. In view of the voluntary plea of guilty, the prosecution
recommended that the penalty of life imprisonment be imposed on the accused, on the ground
that the charge being a complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings, the
penalty provided for by law is the maximum of the most serious crime which is murder. Counsel
for the accused, on the other hand, argued that the proper penalty imposable upon the accused
was only prision mayor, since there is no such complex crime as rebellion with murders,
robberies, and kidnappings, because the latter being the natural consequences of the crime of
rebellion, the crime charged against the accused should be considered only as simple rebellion.

On October 13, 1954, the lower court rendered judgment finding accused Romagosa
guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings; and giving
him the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty, sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to pay a fine of P10,000; to indemnify the heirs of the
two persons killed named in the information, in the sum of P6,000 each; and to pay the cost of
the proceedings.

From the judgment accused Romagosa appealed to this Court, insisting that there is no
crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings, and that he should have been
convicted only of simple rebellion and imposed the penalty of prison mayor in its minimum
period, in view of his voluntary plea of guilty.

Issue:
Whether or not there is a complex crime of rebellion with murder, robbery, and kidnapping
under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.

Ruling:

No. The lower court erred in holding appellant Romagosa guilty of the complex crime of
rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings, and in imposing upon him the penalty for
such crime.
As in the Geronimo case, there is the further question of whether, in view of appellant's
plea of guilty to the information, he should be deemed to have admitted the commission of the
simple crime of rebellion alone, or of rebellion and other separate crimes, if any of the counts of
the information charges crimes independent of and not constituting essential acts or ingredients
of the rebellion charged.
The same majority of six justices of this Court maintain their view express in the
Geronimo case that by his plea of guilty, appellant has admitted the commission of the
independent crime of murder alleged in count 3 of the information, the averment that said crime
was perpetrated "in furtherance" of the rebellion being a mere conclusion and not a bar to
appellant's conviction and punishment for said offense, appellant having failed, at the
arraignment, to object to the information on the ground of multiplicity of crimes charged.
Therefore, appellant must be held guilty, and sentenced for the commission, of two separate
offenses, simple rebellion and murder.