VAN DORN VS. ROMILLO to exercise control over conjugal assets.

FACTS: In 1972, Alice Reyes, a Filipina, He is bound by the decision of his own
and Richard Upton, an American, country’s court, which validly exercised
married in Hong Kong. However, in 1982, jurisdiction over him, and whose decision
Upton obtained a divorce decree in he does not repudiate, he is estopped by
Nevada, USA. his own representation before said court
Later, Reyes married Theodore Van from asserting his right over the alleged
Dorn. conjugal property.
In 1983, Upton filed a civil case against Further, the SC declared, Alice Reyes
Reyes in Pasay City. Upton was van Dorn should not be discriminated
petitioning that he be granted against in her own country if the ends of
management rights over a property in justice are to be served.
Manila (The Galleon). It was his
contention that the divorce decree they QUITA VS. CA
obtained abroad do not apply to Facts:
properties in the Philippines, hence, Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both
despite the divorce, Reyes’s property in Filipinos, were married in the Philippines
the Philippines remained conjugal with on May 18, 1941. No children were born
Upton. Judge Manuel Romillo, Jr. agreed out of their marriage. On July 23, 1954,
with Upton. The judge ruled that the petitioner obtained a final judgment of
divorce decree issued by the Nevada divorce in San Francisco, California,
court, a foreign court, cannot prevail over U.S.A. On April 16, 1972, Arturo died
the declared national policy of the leaving no will. On August 31, 1972, Lino
Philippines which prohibits divorce. Javier Inciong filed a petition with the
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Romillo, RTC for issuance of letters of
Jr. is correct. administration concerning the estate of
HELD: No. Under Article 15 of the Civil Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust
Code, only Philippine nationals are Company. Respondent Blandina
covered by the policy against absolute Dandan, claiming to be the surviving
divorces the same being considered spouse of Arturo Dandan and the
contrary to our concept of public policy surviving children, all surnamed Padlan,
and morality (nationality principle). Aliens opposed the petition. The RTC
may obtain divorces abroad, which may expressed that the marriage between
be recognized in the Philippines, Antonio and petitioner subsisted until the
provided they are valid according to their death of Arturo in 1972, that the marriage
national law. In this case, the divorce in existed between private respondent and
Nevada Upton from the marriage from Arturo was clearly void since it was
the standards of American Law, under celebrated during the existence of his
which divorce dissolves the previous marriage to petitioner. The
marriage. Thus, pursuant to his national Court of Appeals remanded the case to
law, Upton is no longer the husband of the trial court for further proceedings.
Reyes. He would have no standing to sue Issues:
as Reyes’s husband as he is not entitled
1. Should the case be remanded to the blessed with a son and a daughter. In
lower court? 1986, Lady Myros left for the U. S.
2. Who between the petitioner and bringing along their son and after a few
private respondent is the proper heir of years she was naturalized as an
the decedent? American citizen.
Held: Sometime in 2000, respondent Orbecido
If there is a controversy before the court learned from his son – who was living
as to who are the lawful heirs of the with his wife in the States – that his wife
deceased person or as to the distributive had remarried after obtaining her divorce
shares to which each person is entitled decree. Thereafter, he filed a petition for
under the law, the controversy shall be authority to remarry with the trial court
heard and decided as in ordinary cases. invoking par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family
No dispute exists as to the right of the six Code.
Padlan children to inherit from the Having no opposition, on May 15, 2002,
decedent because there are proofs that the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga
they have been duly acknowledged by del Sur granted the petition of the
him and petitioner herself even respondent and allowed him to remarry.
recognizes them as heirs of Arturo The Solicitor General’s motion for
Padlan, nor as to their respective reconsideration was denied. In view of
hereditary shares. that, petitioner filed this petition for review
Private respondent is not a surviving on certiorari of the Decision of the
spouse that can inherit from him as this Regional Trial Court. Herein petitioner
status presupposes a legitimate raised the issue of the applicability of Art.
relationship. Her marriage to Arturo being 26 par. 2 to the instant case.
a bigamous marriage considered void ab Issue:
inito under Articles 80 and 83 of the Civil WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT
Code renders her not a surviving spouse. CAN REMARRY UNDER THE ARTICLE
The decision of the Court of Appeals 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE
ordering the remand of the case is PHILIPPINES.
affirmed. Held: Respondent Orbecido who has the
burden of proof, failed to submit
REPUBLIC VS. ORBECIDO III competent evidence showing his
Facts: allegations that his naturalized American
This is a petition for review on certiorari wife had obtained a divorce decree and
of the decision and resolution of the had remarried. Therefore, the Petition of
Regional Trial Court of Molave, the Republic of the Philippines is
Zamboaga del Sur, Branch 23, granting GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution
respondent’s petition for authority to of the RTC Br. 32 of Molave, Zamboanga
remarry invoking par. 2 of Article 26 of del Sur is hereby SET ASIDE.
the Family Code. “Art. 26 (2) Where a marriage between a
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
and Lady Myros Villanueva were married celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
in Lam-an, Ozamis City and were validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to meaning of its terms, so long as they
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have come within its spirits or intent.
capacity to remarry under the Philippine
laws.” CORPUZ VS. STO. TOMAS
Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only FACTS:
applies to case where at the time of the Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz is a
celebration of the marriage, the parties naturalized Canadian citizen who
are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The married respondent Daisylyn Tirol Sto.
instant case is one where at the time the Tomas but subsequently left
marriage was solemnized, the parties for Canada due to work and other
were two Filipino citizens, but later on, professional commitments. When he
the wife was naturalized as an American returned to the Philippines, he
citizen and subsequently obtained a discovered that Sto. Tomas was already
divorce granting her capacity to remarry, romantically involved with another man.
and indeed she remarried an American This brought about the filing of a petition
citizen while residing in the U. S. A. for divorce by Corpuz in Canada which
Therefore, the 2nd par. of Art. 26 does was eventually granted by the Court
not apply to the instant case. Justice of Windsor, Ontario, Canada. A
However, the legislative intent must be month later, the divorce decree
taken into consideration and rule of took effect. Two years later, Corpuz has
reason must be applied. The Supreme fallen in love with another Filipina and
Court ruled that par. 2 of Art. 26 should wished to marry her. He went to Civil
be construed and interpreted to include Registry Office of Pasig City
cases involving parties who, at the time to register the Canadian divorce decree
of the celebration of the marriage were on his marriage certificate with Sto.
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of then Tomas. However, despite the
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen registration, an official of National
and obtains a divorce decree. The Statistics Office informed Corpuz that the
Filipino spouse should likewise be former marriage still subsists under the
allowed to remarry as if the other party Philippine law until there has been a
were a foreigner at the time of the judicial recognition of the Canadian
solemnization of the marriage. To rule divorce decree by a competent judicial
otherwise would be sanction absurdity court in view of NSO Circular No. 4,
and injustice. Were the interpretation of a series of 1982. Consequently, he filed a
statute according to its exact and literal petition for judicial recognition of foreign
import would lead to mischievous results divorce and/or declaration
or contravene the clear purpose of the of dissolution of marriage with the RTC.
legislature, it should be construed However, the RTC denied the petition
according to its spirit and reason, reasoning out that Corpuz cannot
disregarding as far as necessary the institute the action for judicial recognition
letter of the law. A stature may therefore of the foreign divorce decree because he
be extended to case not within the literal is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It was
provided further that Sto. Tomas was the
proper party who can institute an action law or fact. Needless to state, every
under the principle of Article 26 of the precaution must be taken
Family Code which capacitates to ensure conformity with our laws before
a Filipino citizen to remarry in case a recognition is made, as the foreign
the alien spouse obtains a foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have
divorce decree. Hence, this petition. the effect of res judicata between the
ISSUE: parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule
Whether the second paragraph of Article 39 of the Rules of Court.
26 of the Family Code grants alienslike
Corpuz the right to institute a petition for GARCIA VS. RECIO
judicial recognition of a foreign divorce FACTS:
decree? Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married
HELD: Petition GRANTED. to Editha Samson an Australian citizen,
RTC Decision REVERSED. on March 1, 1987. On May 18, 1989 a
The Supreme Court qualifies the above decree of divorce dissolving the marriage
conclusion – i.e., that the second was issued by the Australian Family
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Court. On June 26, 1992, Recio became
Code bestows no rights in favor an Australian citizen. Subsequently,
of aliens -with the complementary Recio entered into marriage with Grace
statement that this conclusion is not Garcia, a Filipina, on January 12, 1994.
sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s Starting October 22, 1995, Recio and
petition before the RTC. In other Garcia lived separately without prior
words, the unavailability of the judicial dissolution of their marriage. On
second paragraph of Article 26 of the March 3, 1998, Garcia filed a complaint
Family Code to aliensdoes not for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest the ground of bigamy. Recio contended
to petition the RTC for the recognition of that his prior marriage had been validly
his foreign divorce decree. dissolved by a decree of divorce obtained
The foreign divorce decree itself, after its in Australia thus he is legally capacitated
authenticity and conformity with the to marry Garcia. The trial court rendered
alien’s national law have been duly the decision declaring the marriage
proven according to our rules of between Garcia and Recio dissolved and
evidence, serves as a presumptive both parties can now remarry. Hence,
evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, this petition.
pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce
Rules of Court which provides for the obtained by Recio in Australia ipso
effect of foreign judgments. A remand, at facto capacitated him to remarry.
the same time, will allow other interested HELD: The SC remanded the case to the
parties to oppose the foreign judgment court a quo to receive evidence. Based
and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive on the records, the court cannot conclude
evidence of aright by proving want of that Recio who was then a naturalized
jurisdiction, want of notice to a Australian citizen was legally capacitated
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of to marry Garcia. Neither can the court
grant Garcia’s prayer to declare her California and the conflict rule for
marriage null and void on the ground of Californians domiciled outside of
bigamy. After all it may turn out that California. Christensen being domiciled
under Australian law he was really in the Philippines, the law of his domicile
capacitated to marry Garcia as result of must be followed. The case was
the divorce decree. The SC laid down the remanded to the lower court for further
following basic legal principles; a proceedings – the determination of the
marriage between two Filipino cannot be successional rights under Philippine law
dissolved even by a divorce decree only.
obtained abroad because of Articles 15
and 17 of the Civil Code. PIMENTEL VS. PIMENTEL
FACTS:
AZNAR VS GARCIA On 25 October 2004, Maria Pimentel y
FACTS: Edward Christensen was born in Lacap(private respondent) filed an action
New York but he migrated to California for frustrated parricide against Joselito
where he resided for a period of 9 years. Pimentel (petitioner) before the Regional
In 1913, he came to the Philippines Trial Court of Quezon City.
where he became a domiciliary until his On 7 February 2005, petitioner received
death. In his will, he instituted an summons to appear before the Regional
acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Trial Court of Antipolo City for the pre-trial
Lucy Christensen (legitimate), as his only and trial of a civil case (Maria Pimentel v.
heir, but left a legacy sum of money in Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of
favor of Helen Christensen Garcia Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the
(illegitimate). Adolfo Aznar was the Family Code on the ground of
executor of the estate. Counsel for Helen psychological incapacity.
claims that under Article 16, paragraph 2 On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an
of the Civil Code, California law should urgent motion to suspend the
be applied; that under California law, the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City
matter is referred back to the law of the on the ground of the existence of a
domicile. On the other hand, counsel for prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted
Maria, averred that the national law of the that since the relationship between
deceased must apply, illegitimate the offender and the victim is a key
children not being entitled to anything element in parricide, the outcome of the
under California law. civil case would have a bearing in the
ISSUE: Whether or not the national law criminal case filed against him before the
of the deceased should be applied in RTC Quezon City.
determining the successional rights of his The RTC Quezon City held that the
heirs. pendency of the case before the RTC
HELD: The Supreme Court deciding to Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that
grant more successional rights to Helen warrants the suspension of the criminal
said in effect that there are two rules in case before it.
California on the matter; the internal law Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
which applies to Californians domiciled in with application for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary or any of
restraining order before the Court his ascendants or descendants, or his
of Appeals. However, The Court spouse.” However, the issue in the
of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage annulment of marriage is not similar or
between petitioner and respondent intimately related to the issue in the
would be declared void, it would be criminal case for parricide. Further, the
immaterial to the criminal case because relationship between the offender and
prior to the declaration of nullity, the the victim is not determinative of the guilt
alleged acts constituting the crime of or innocence of the accused.
frustrated parricide had already been The issue in the civil case for annulment
committed. of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
ISSUE: Code is whether petitioner is
Whether the resolution of the action for psychologically incapacitated to comply
annulment of marriage is a prejudicial with the essential marital obligations.
question that warrants the suspension of The issue in parricide is whether the
the criminal case for frustrated parricide accused killed the victim. In this case,
against petitioner. since petitioner was charged with
HELD: frustrated parricide, the issue is whether
No. he performed all the acts of execution
RATIO: which would have killed respondent as a
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on consequence but which, nevertheless,
Criminal Procedure provides that did not produce it by reason of
elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) causes independent of petitioner’s will.
the previously instituted civil action At the time of the commission of the
involves an issue similar or intimately alleged crime, petitioner and respondent
related to the issue raised in the were married. The
subsequent criminal action and (b) the subsequent dissolution of their marriage
resolution of such issue determines will have no effect on the alleged crime
whether or not the criminal action that was committed at the time of the
may proceed. subsistence of the marriage. In short,
In the case at bar, the civil case for even if the marriage
annulment was filed after the filing of the between petitioner and respondent is
criminal case for frustrated parricide. As annulled, petitioner could still be held
such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule criminally liable since at the time of the
111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal commission of the alleged crime, he was
Procedure was not met since the civil still married to respondent.
action was filed subsequent to the filing We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on
of the criminal action. Tenebro v. Court of Appeals that “the
The relationship between the offender judicial declaration of the nullity of a
and the victim is a key element in the marriage on the ground of psychological
crime of parricide, which punishes any incapacity retroacts to the date of
person “who shall kill his father, mother, the celebration of the
or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, marriage insofar as the vinculum
between the spouses is concerned x x x.” the Court of Appeals reversed the
First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of dismissal and remanded the case to the
the judicial declaration of nullity of a trial court.
second or subsequent marriage on the ISSUE: Whether or not a declaration of
ground of psychological incapacity on a nullity of the second marriage avoids a
criminal liability for bigamy. There was no prosecution for bigamy.
issue of prejudicial question in that case. HELD: No. The elements of bigamy are:
Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that 1. That the offender has been legally
“[t]here is x x x a recognition written into married;
the law itself that such a marriage, 2. That the first marriage has not been
although void ab initio, may still produce legally dissolved or, in case his or her
legal consequences.” In fact, the Court spouse is absent, the absent spouse
declared in that case that “a declaration could not yet be presumed dead
of the nullity of the second marriage on according to the Civil Code;
the ground of psychological incapacity is 3. That he contracts a second or
of absolutely no moment insofar as the subsequent marriage;
State’s penal laws are concerned.” 4. That the second or subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites
CAPILI VS. PEOPLE for validity.
FACTS: In September 1999, James When Capili married Tismo, all the above
Capili married Karla Medina. But then, elements are present. The crime of
just three months later in December bigamy was already consummated. It is
1999, he married another woman named already immaterial if the second (or first
Shirley Tismo. marriage, see Mercado vs Tan) was
In 2004, Karla Medina filed an action for subsequently declared void. The
declaration of nullity of the second outcome of the civil case filed by Karla
marriage between Capili and Tismo. In Medina had no bearing to the
June 2004, Tismo filed a bigamy case determination of Capili’s guilt or
against Capili. innocence in the bigamy case because
Before a decision can be had in the all that is required for the charge of
bigamy case, the action filed by Karla bigamy to prosper is that the first
Medina was granted and Capili’s marriage be subsisting at the time the
marriage with Tismo was declared void second marriage is contracted. He who
by reason of the subsisting marriage contracts a second marriage before the
between Medina and Capili. Thereafter, judicial declaration of the first marriage
Capili filed a motion to dismiss in the assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy case. He alleged that since the bigamy.
second marriage was already declared The Supreme Court also notes that even
void ab initio that marriage never took if a party has reason to believe that his
place and that therefore, there is no first marriage is void, he cannot simply
bigamy to speak of. contract a second marriage without
The trial court agreed with Capili and it having such first marriage be judicially
dismissed the bigamy case. On appeal, declared as void. The parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to be presumed dead according to the Civil
judge for themselves its nullity, for the Code;
same must be submitted to the judgment 3. That he contracts a second or
of competent courts and only when the subsequent marriage;
nullity of the marriage is so declared can 4. That the second or subsequent
it be held as void, and so long as there is marriage has all the essential requisites
no such declaration the presumption is for validity
that the marriage exists. All the elements are present when
Mercado married Tan. When he married
MERCADO VS. TAN Tan, his first marriage was still subsisting
FACTS: In April 1976, Dr. Vincent and was not declared void. In fact,
Mercado married Ma. Thelma Oliva. But Mercado only filed an action to declare
in June 1991, Mercado married a second his first marriage void after Tan filed the
time. He married a certain Consuelo Tan. bigamy case. By then, the crime of
In October 1992, Tan filed a bigamy case bigamy had already been consummated.
against Mercado. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, a
In November 1992, Mercado filed an judicial declaration of nullity of a void
action to have his first marriage with previous marriage must be obtained
Oliva be declared void ab initio under before a person can marry for a
Article 36 of the Family Code subsequent time. Absent that declaration
(psychological incapacity). a person who marries a second time shall
In January 1993, the prosecutor filed a be guilty of bigamy.
criminal information for bigamy against
Mercado. ARLEGUI VS. CA
In May 1993, Mercado’s marriage with Facts:
Oliva was declared void ab initio. The object of a controversy is a
Mercado now sought the dismissal of the residential apartment unit which was
bigamy case filed against him. He formerly owned by Serafia Real Estate
contended that since his first marriage Inc. and leased to spouses Genguyon.
was declared void ab initio, there was no Thereafter the spouses were informed
first marriage to speak of, hence, his that Serafia and its assets had been
“second” marriage with Tan was actually assigned to A. B. Barreto enterprises,
his first marriage. which was subsequently sold to Mateo
ISSUE: Whether or not Mercado is Tan Lu. Spouses Genguyon continued to
correct. make payments for the rental of the
HELD: No. The elements of bigamy are aforementioned apartment. Before the
as follows: sale to Mateo Tan Lu and to Arlegui, the
1. That the offender has been legally Genguyon Spouses expressed their
married; desire to purchase the said apartment
2. That the marriage has not been legally unit from A. B. Barreto Enterprises; offers
dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is for this was made through Barreto
absent, the absent spouse could not yet Apartments Tenant Association, with
Mateo Tan Lu and Arlegui made officer s
in this association. The sale of the fraud, it is against equity that it should be
property was done after Arlegui and Tan retained by the person holding it.
Lu were made officers in the An action for reconveyance of
aforementioned association. registered land on an implied trust
Issue: prescribes in 10 years even if the decree
Whether or no Mateo Tan Lu and of registration is no longer open to
Josue Arlegui cannot be considered review.
innocent purchasers for value for
violating the trust reposed upon them by AMONOY VS. GUTIERREZ
the spouses Genguyon when they Facts:
surreptitiously purchased the object Amonoy was the counsel of the
property. successors of the
Held: deceased Julio Cantolos for the
Yes. It can be gainsaid that settlement of the latter’s estate. On
Arlegui violated the constructive trust that January 1965, the lots were adjudicated
was created when Tan Lu and the to Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso
Petitioner appropriated for themselves Formilda. On January 20, 1965,
the property for which they were Pasamba and Formilda executed a deed
negotiating for in behalf of the of real estate mortgage on the said two
Association. There is the presence of lots adjudicated to them, in favor of
abuse of confidence. Petitioner avers Amonoy to secure the payment of his
that there was no constructive trust attorney’s fees. But on August 6, 1969,
created; however, constructive trusts do after the taxes had been paid, the claims
not only arise from fraud or duress, but settled and the properties adjudicated,
also by abuse of confidence, in order to the estate was declared closed and
satisfy the demands of justice. There is terminated. When Pasamba and
ample documentary and testimonial Formilda passed away, Formilda was
evidence to establish the existence of a succeeded by the spouses Gutierrez. On
fiduciary relationship between them, and January 21, 1970, Amonoy filed for the
those subsequent acts of the petitioner closure of the two lots alleging the non-
betrayed the trust and confidence payment of attorney’s fees. The herein
reposed on him. Petitioner cannot argue respondents denied the allegation, but
that the spouses Genguyon should and judgment was rendered in favor of
could have negotiated directly with the Amonoy.
Barretos after he had already accepted Still for failure to pay attorney’s fees, the
the responsibility and authority to lots were foreclosed. Amonoy was able
negotiate in their behalf. American to buy the lots by auction where
jurisprudence provides precedent rulings the house of the spouses Gutierrez was
that a constructive trust is an appropriate situated. On Amonoy’s motion of April 24,
remedy against unjust enrichment; it is 1986, orders were implemented for
raised by equity in respect of property, the demolition of structures in the said
although acquired originally without lot, including herein respondents’ house.
On September 27, 1985, David Formilda
petitioned to the Supreme Court for a petition is denied. The decision of CA is
TRO for the suspension of affirmed.
the demolition, which was granted, but
the houses have already been BUNAG VS. CA
demolished. A complaint for damages FACTS:
was filed by respondents, which was On the afternoon of September 8, 1973,
denied by RTC but granted by CA, thus defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. brought
this case. plaintiff-appellant to a motel or hotel
Issue: where they had sexual intercourse. Later
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that that evening, said defendant-appellant
Amonoy was liable for damages to brought plaintiff-appellant to the house of
respondents. his grandmother Juana de Leon in
Ruling: Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro Manila,
Petitioner invokes that it is well-settled where they lived together as husband
that the maxim of damage resulting from and wife for 21 days, or until September
the legitimate exercise of a person’s 29, 1973. On September 10, 1973,
rights is a loss without injury — damnum defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and
absque injuria — for which the law gives plaintiff-appellant filed their respective
no remedy, saying he is not liable for applications for a marriage license with
damages. The precept of Damnum the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Absque Injuria has no application is this Bacoor, Cavite. On October 1, 1973,
case. Petitioner did not heed the TRO after leaving plaintiff-appellant,
suspending the demolition of structures. defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. filed an
Although the acts of petitioner may have affidavit withdrawing his application for a
been legally justified at the outset, their marriage license.
continuation after the issuance of the Plaintiff-appellant contends that on the
TRO amounted to an insidious abuse of afternoon of September 8, 1973,
his right. Indubitably, his actions were defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., together
tainted with bad faith. with an unidentified male companion,
Article 19, known to contain what is abducted her in the vicinity of the San
commonly referred to as the principle of Juan de Dios Hospital in Pasay City and
abuse of rights, sets certain standards brought her to a motel where she was
which may be observed not only in the raped.
exercise of one’s rights but also in the ISSUE:
performance of one’s duties. These Whether, since action involves a breach
standards are the following: to act with of promise to marry, the trial court erred
justice; to give everyone his due; and to in awarding damages.
observe honesty and good faith. This RULING:
must be observed. Clearly then, It is true that in this jurisdiction, we
the demolition of respondents’ house by adhere to the time-honored rule that an
petitioner, despite his receipt of the TRO, action for breach of promise to marry has
was not only an abuse but also an no standing in the civil law, apart from the
unlawful exercise of such right. The right to recover money or property
advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of 2219, and Article 2229 and 2234 of Civil
such promise. 8 Generally, therefore, a Code.
breach of promise to marry per se is not Petitioner would, however, belabor the
actionable, except where the plaintiff has fact that said damages were awarded by
actually incurred expenses for the the trial court on the basis of a finding that
wedding and the necessary incidents he is guilty of forcible abduction with
thereof. rape, despite the prior dismissal of the
However, the award of moral damages is complaint therefor filed by private
allowed in cases specified in or respondent with the Pasay City Fiscal's
analogous to those provided in Article Office.
2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively, Generally, the basis of civil liability from
under Article 21 of said Code, in relation crime is the fundamental postulate of our
to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any law that every person criminally liable for
person who wilfully causes loss or injury a felony is also civilly liable. In other
to another in a manner that is contrary to words, criminal liability will give rise to
morals, good customs or public policy civil liability ex delicto only if the same
shall compensate the latter for moral felonious act or omission results in
damages. 9 Article 21 was adopted to damage or injury to another and is the
remedy the countless gaps in the direct and proximate cause
statutes which leave so many victims of thereof. 11 Hence, extinction of the penal
moral wrongs helpless even though they action does not carry with it the extinction
have actually suffered material and moral of civil liability unless the extinction
injury, and is intended to vouchsafe proceeds from a declaration in a final
adequate legal remedy for that untold judgment that the fact from which the civil
number of moral wrongs which is might arise did not exist. 12
impossible for human foresight to In the instant case, the dismissal of the
specifically provide for in the statutes. 10 complaint for forcible abduction with rape
Under the circumstances obtaining in the was by mere resolution of the fiscal at the
case at bar, the acts of petitioner in preliminary investigation stage. There is
forcibly abducting private respondent no declaration in a final judgment that the
and having carnal knowledge with her fact from which the civil case might arise
against her will, and thereafter promising did not exist. Consequently, the dismissal
to marry her in order to escape criminal did not in any way affect the right of
liability, only to thereafter renege on such herein private respondent to institute a
promise after cohabiting with her for civil action arising from the offense
twenty-one days, irremissibly constitute because such preliminary dismissal of
acts contrary to morals and good the penal action did not carry with it the
customs. These are grossly insensate extinction of the civil action.
and reprehensible transgressions which The reason most often given for this
indisputably warrant and abundantly holding is that the two proceedings
justify the award of moral and exemplary involved are not between the same
damages, pursuant to Article 21 in parties. Furthermore, it has long been
relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article emphasized, with continuing validity up
to now, that there are different rules as to On appeal, Velez argued that his failure
the competency of witnesses and the to attend the scheduled wedding was
quantum of evidence in criminal and civil because of fortuitous events. He further
proceedings. In a criminal action, the argued that he cannot be held civilly
State must prove its case by evidence liable for breaching his promise to marry
which shows the guilt of the accused Wassmer because there is no law upon
beyond reasonable doubt, while in a civil which such an action may be grounded.
action it is sufficient for the plaintiff to He also contested the award of
sustain his cause by preponderance of exemplary and moral damages against
evidence only. 13 Thus, in Rillon, et al. him.
vs. Rillon, 14 we stressed that it is not ISSUE: Whether or not the award of
now necessary that a criminal damages is proper.
prosecution for rape be first instituted and HELD: Yes. The defense of fortuitous
prosecuted to final judgment before a events raised by Velez is not tenable and
civil action based on said offense in favor also unsubstantiated. It is true that a
of the offended woman can likewise be breach of promise to marry per se is not
instituted and prosecuted to final an actionable wrong. However, in this
judgment. case, it was not a simple breach of
promise to marry. because of such
WASSMER VS. VELEZ promise, Wassmer made preparations
In 1954, Francisco Velez and Beatriz for the wedding. Velez’s unreasonable
Wassmer planned their marriage. They withdrawal from the wedding is
decided to schedule it on September 4, contrary to morals, good customs or
1954. And so Wassmer made public policy. Wassmer’s cause of action
preparations such as: making and is supported under Article 21 of the Civil
sending wedding invitations, bought her Code which provides in part “any person
wedding dress and other apparels, and who wilfully causes loss or injury to
other wedding necessities. But 2 days another in a manner that is contrary to
before the scheduled day of wedding, morals, good customs or public policy
Velez sent a letter to Wassmer advising shall compensate the latter for the
her that he will not be able to attend the damage.”
wedding because his mom was opposed And under the law, any violation of Article
to said wedding. And one day before the 21 entitles the injured party to receive an
wedding, he sent another message to award for moral damages as properly
Wassmer advising her that nothing has awarded by the lower court in this case.
changed and that he will be returning Further, the award of exemplary
soon. However, he never returned. damages is also proper. Here, the
This prompted Wassmer to file a civil circumstances of this case show that
case against Velez. Velez never filed an Velez, in breaching his promise to
answer and eventually judgment was Wassmer, acted in wanton, reckless, and
made in favor of Wassmer. The court oppressive manner – this warrants the
awarded exemplary and moral damages imposition of exemplary damages
in favor of Wassmer. against him.
 (1) Whether or not the petitioner’s case
LIANG VS PEOPLE, JAN. 28 is covered with immunity from legal
FACTS: process with regard to Section 45 of the
Petitioner is an economist working with Agreement between the ADB and the
the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Philippine Gov’t.
Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering (2) Whether or not the conduct of
defamatory words against fellow ADB preliminary investigation was imperative.
worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged HELD:
before the MeTC of Mandaluyong City (1) NO. The petitioner’s case is not
with two counts of oral defamation. covered by the immunity. Courts cannot
Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a blindly adhere to the communication from
warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing the DFA that the petitioner is covered by
petitioner’s bail, the MeTC released him any immunity. It has no binding effect in
to the custody of the Security Officer of courts. The court needs to protect the
ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge right to due process not only of the
received an “office of protocol” from the accused but also of the prosecution.
DFA stating that petitioner is covered by Secondly, the immunity under Section 45
immunity from legal process under of the Agreement is not absolute, but
section 45 of the Agreement between the subject to the exception that the acts
ADB and the Philippine Government must be done in “official capacity”.
regarding the Headquarters of the ADB Hence, slandering a person could not
in the country. Based on the said protocol possibly be covered by the immunity
communication that petitioner is immune agreement because our laws do not
from suit, the MeTC judge without notice allow the commission of a crime, such as
to the prosecution dismissed the criminal defamation, in the name of official duty.
cases. The latter filed a motion for (2) NO. Preliminary Investigation is not
reconsideration which was opposed by a matter of right in cases cognizable by
the DFA. When its motion was denied, the MeTC such as this case. Being purely
the prosecution filed a petition for a statutory right, preliminary investigation
certiorari and mandamus with the RTC of may be invoked only when specifically
Pasig City which set aside the MeTC granted by law. The rule on criminal
rulings and ordered the latter court to procedure is clear that no preliminary
enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier investigation is required in cases falling
issued. After the motion for within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.
reconsideration was denied, the Hence, SC denied the petition.
petitioner elevated the case to the SC via
a petition for review arguing that he is CORPUZ VS PEOPLE
covered by immunity under the FACTS:
Agreement and that no preliminary Accused Corpuz received from
investigation was held before the criminal complainant Tangcoy pieces of jewelry
case. with an obligation to sell the same and
ISSUES: remit the proceeds of the sale or to return
the same if not sold, after the expiration Is the date of occurrence of time material
of 30 days. in estafa cases with abuse of
The period expired without Corpuz confidence?
remitting anything to Tangcoy. No. It is true that the gravamen of the
When Corpuz and Tangcoy met, Corpuz crime of estafa with abuse of confidence
promised that he will pay, but to no avail. under Article 315, paragraph 1,
Tangcoy filed a case for estafa with subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the
abuse of confidence against Corpuz. appropriation or conversion of money or
Corpuz argued as follows: property received to the prejudice of the
a. The proof submitted by Tangcoy owner and that the time of occurrence is
(receipt) is inadmissible for being a mere not a material ingredient of the crime.
photocopy. Hence, the exclusion of the period and
b. The information was defective the wrong date of the occurrence of the
because the date when the jewelry crime, as reflected in the Information, do
should be returned and the date when not make the latter fatally defective.
crime occurred is different from the one Further, the following satisfies the
testified to by Tangcoy. sufficiency of information:
c. Fourth element of estafa or demand is 1. The designation of the offense by the
not proved. statute;
d. Sole testimony of Tangcoy is not 2. The acts or omissions complained of
sufficient for conviction as constituting the offense;
3. The name of the offended party; and
ISSUES and RULING 4. The approximate time of the
Can the court admit as evidence a commission of the offense, and the place
photocopy of document without violating wherein the offense was committed.
the best evidence rule (only original The 4th element is satisfied. Even though
documents, as a general rule, is the information indicates that the time of
admissible as evidence)? offense was committed “on or about the
Yes. The established doctrine is that 5th of July 1991,” such is not fatal to the
when a party failed to interpose a timely prosecution’s cause considering that
objection to evidence at the time they Section 11 of the same Rule requires a
were offered in evidence, such objection statement of the precise time only when
shall be considered as waived. the same is a material ingredient of the
Here, Corpuz never objected to the offense.
admissibility of the said evidence at the What is the form of demand required in
time it was identified, marked and estafa with abuse of confidence?
testified upon in court by Tangcoy. Note first that the elements of estafa with
Corpuz also failed to raise an objection in abuse of confidence are as follows:
his Comment to the prosecution’s formal (a) that money, goods or other personal
offer of evidence and even admitted property is received by the offender in
having signed the said receipt. trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make number of witnesses, but by the quality of
delivery of, or to return the same; their testimonies, for in determining the
(b) that there be misappropriation or value and credibility of evidence, the
conversion of such money or property by witnesses are to be weighed not
the offender or denial on his part of such numbered.
receipt;
(c) that such misappropriation or
conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and
(d) that there is a demand made by the
offended party on the offender.
No specific type of proof is required to
show that there was demand. Demand
need not even be formal; it may be
verbal. The specific word “demand” need
not even be used to show that it has
indeed been made upon the person
charged, since even a mere query as to
the whereabouts of the money [in this
case, property], would be tantamount to
a demand.
In Tubb v. People, where the
complainant merely verbally inquired
about the money entrusted to the
accused, the query was tantamount to a
demand.
May a sole witness be considered
credible?
Yes. Note first that settled is the rule that
in assessing the credibility of witnesses,
SC gives great respect to the evaluation
of the trial court for it had the unique
opportunity to observe the demeanor of
witnesses and their deportment on the
witness stand, an opportunity denied the
appellate courts, which merely rely on the
records of the case.
The assessment by the trial court is even
conclusive and binding if not tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence,
especially when such finding is affirmed
by the CA. Truth is established not by the