Investigating the biology of consciousness

Antonio R. Damasio
Department of Neurology, Division of Behavioral Neurology and Cognitive Neuroscience, University of Iowa College of Medicine,
200 Hawkins Drive, Iowa City, IA 52242, USA

The fact that consciousness is a private, ¢rst-person phenomenon makes it more di¤cult to study than
other cognitive phenomena that, although being equally private, also have characteristic behavioural
signatures. Nonetheless, by combining cognitive and neurobiological methods, it is possible to approach
consciousness, to describe its cognitive nature, its behavioural correlates, its possible evolutionary origin
and functional role; last but not least, it is possible to investigate its neuroanatomical and neurophysio-
logical underpinnings. In this brief essay I distinguish between two kinds of consciousness: core
consciousness and extended consciousness. Core consciousness corresponds to the transient process that is
incessantly generated relative to any object with which an organism interacts, and during which a
transient core self and transient sense of knowing are automatically generated. Core consciousness
requires neither language nor working memory, and needs only a brief short-term memory. Extended
consciousness is a more complex process. It depends on the gradual build-up of an autobiographical self,
a set of conceptual memories pertaining to both past and anticipated experiences of an individual, and it
requires conventional memory. Extended consciousness is enhanced by language.
Keywords: core consciousness; extended consciousness; cognitive phenomena

It consists of declaring scienti¢c victory by explaining

1. INTRODUCTION
that consciousness was a mere illusion and that the funda-
With a few exceptions to the contrary, consciousness is mental explanations are already available.
presumed to be the most complex and impenetrable Although this is not the place to deal in detail with a
human property, from which follows that it is the most counter-argument to all of these positions, I shall explain
di¤cult to de¢ne and the most problematic to investigate. brie£y some of my fundamental disagreements.
For some of those who are preoccupied with investigating
the relation between mind and brainöneuroscientists,
2. CONSCIOUSNESS IS NOT AN ILLUSION
cognitive scientists and philosophers of mindöconscious-
ness and mind are one and the same, and, as a result, the I shall begin by emphasizing that there is no advantage
intangibility, unapproachability and refractoriness of in considering consciousness as an illusion. The necessa-
consciousness are those usually associated with the mind. rily subjective feeling that we call consciousness is very
Some of those investigators ask the following question: real, is shared by all of us, writing or reading these
how can science approach interior phenomena that can words, and it is that reality that requires explanation. It
be made available only to a single observer and are thus is easy to understand the inclination of a scientist to deal
hopelessly subjective ? They answer the question nega- with phenomena that can be observed by others; that is,
tively and so it is not surprising to discover that the phenomena that can be reported from a second-person or
current discussion on the scienti¢c account of conscious- third-person perspective, rather than dealing exclusively
ness often aligns itself with one of the following positions: with phenomena observable only from a ¢rst-person
perspective. In fact, however, when we deal with mind in
(i) declare consciousness the supreme scienti¢c mystery
general and consciousness in particular, nothing else will
and propose that none of it can ever be explained;
do but precisely using the ¢rst-person perspective.
(ii) declare consciousness a respectable mystery that will
Studying the behaviours of a conscious subject is very
be solvable only when a nearly equivalent mystery,
valuable and can be correlated with the study of the same
for instance quantum gravity, will yield its own
subject's mental processes. But studying the behaviour
solution and permit us to deal with the issue;
alone is simply not enough and misses the mark. A purely
(iii) declare a possible scienti¢c solution in the study of
behaviourist approach is quite adequate for creatures
externally observable manifestations of this internal
presumed to operate largely on the basis of innate
phenomenon, in the hope that the allegedly objective
response mechanisms and of conditioning, but it can
study of a part of the thing will be enough to under-
certainly not do justice to the study of individuals who
stand the whole.
have not just behaviour but also cognition superimposed
For a variety of reasons, none of these defeatist positions on top of behaviour.
is really well founded. On the one hand, a somewhat It is fair to say that some investigators who concede this
more encouraging position is no more acceptable either. point wish to address consciousness by studying the

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B (1998) 353, 1879^1882 1879 & 1998 The Royal Society
1880 A. R. Damasio Investigating the biology of consciousness

mechanisms by which mental images are generated, stimuli consistently produce certain internal states, as
attended, or held on-line. However, the focus on image- veri¢ed by reports from previously tested groups of
making alone also misses the mark. It is conceivable, and individuals. Investigators can certainly not jump into a
in fact it is in all likelihood true, that behaving organisms subject's mind and check the ongoing events, but they can
can generate images of varied sensory modalities for the make well-informed predictions about what is likely to be
purpose of optimizing motor responses. This does not occurring, or not occurring, given the presentation of
mean at all that they use images to create a sense of self certain external stimuli. Moreover, it is possible to relate
or to create subjectivity. In other words, there can be a such internal events to a variety of increasingly precise
substance of mind without the trait of consciousness. neurophysiological and even neuroanatomical indices,
Again, what we must explain if we are to address the and it is possible to produce measurements on the varia-
issue of consciousness is the generation of a sense of self tion of such indices. The latter are based on the
and the generation of the sense that such self is involved techniques of electrophysiological recording, either from
in the process of perceiving the stimulus. Consciousness the scalp or from surgically exposed brain structures, the
occurs when we can generate, automatically, the sense techniques of functional imaging, using either positron
that a given stimulus is being perceived in a personal emission tomography or magnetic resonance, and tech-
perspective; the sense that the stimulus is `owned' by the niques such as magnetoencephalography.
organism involved in the perceiving; and, last but not
least, the sense that the organism can act on the stimulus
5. CONSCIOUSNESS CAN BE DEFINED
(or fail to do so), that is, the sense of `agency'.
The argument that consciousness is impossible to
de¢ne is equally weak. It is certainly true that the
3. CONSCIOUSNESS IS NOT BASED ON LANGUAGE
de¢nition is not easy and that unless special care is taken
An easy way out on discussions of consciousness is the to de¢ne, at the outset of any investigation or presenta-
notion that along with the objective study of behaviours tion, what is really being meant by the term, a consider-
all we need to be concerned with is the study of language, able confusion will ensue. In the end, most of us have a
since language might well be the source of consciousness. sense of what is meant by consciousness. Most of us, if
The idea is that language provides a running commen- pressed, produce a de¢nition of consciousness that is
tary on other events of the mind and that human patently recorded in the appropriate entry of any quality
consciousness, in the end, is nothing but that commentary. dictionary: consciousness is that which permits `awareness
For a variety of reasons this idea is simply not acceptable. of self and surroundings'; or permits `the awareness of
The dependence of consciousness on language would one's own existence, sensations, thoughts, surroundings'.
logically rule out the existence of consciousness in any No dictionary fails to present such a de¢nition, usually at
non-human species and in infants. Yet, although one the top of the list of de¢nitions. It is not a major problem
ought to be cautious about commenting on what cannot to make the point that other meanings, such as for
be observed directly, lucid and comprehensive accounts of instance `social consciousness', or `conscience', are seman-
the biology of complex non-human creatures suggest that tically related to the primary meaning but are not
they too are likely to have a basic process of consciousness primary themselves and are not be the main target of
without which it would be di¤cult to explain some of the biological investigations at this stage.
objective behaviours that they exhibit. I have found it helpful to distinguish between `core
The notion of language dependence, however, easily consciousness', which can also be designated by the single
runs into an even greater objection. The essence of word `awareness', and `extended consciousness', which can
language coding is the translation of a set of non-verbal be designated by the word `consciousness' alone. Both are
representations, that is a `concept', into linguistic repre- internal phenomena of the mind but core consciousness is
sentations, for instance words, signs and sentences. If more basic than the extended variety. Extended
language were to be the primary source of consciousness, consciousness depends on core consciousness. Both occur
it would have to be true that terms such as `I' or `me' automatically, which means that no amount of willpower
would be free-£oating novelties that would be the transla- can either make them happen or prevent them from
tion of nothing. Of course, that would be a patent happening.
absurdity. Terms such as `I' and `me', and phrases such as Core consciousness, or awareness, allows a living
`I feel pain', are translations of non-verbal concepts that organism to sense that the contents of its thoughts are its
are themselves representative of non-verbal entities and own, that they are formulated in the perspective of the
events. They translate in language terms the non-verbal organism, and that the organism can act on those
entities `organism' or `individual', and the non-verbal thoughts. This ability does not rely on language nor does
event of `perceiving in a certain manner'. it require great intelligence or memory. Obviously all
humans have core consciousness but I shall venture to say
that so do individuals of many non-human species.
4. IT IS POSSIBLE TO STUDY CONSCIOUSNESS
Extended consciousness or consciousness proper
The argument that studying consciousness is not surveys a larger canvas of thoughts. Those thoughts
possible is also weak. It is true that the study of interior portray not just the present state of the organism but also
subjective phenomena poses special problems, but the its past and its expected future. They depend on the
problems can be overcome with many of the techniques gradual build-up of an `autobiographical self ', a set of
currently in use in cognitive neuroscience. It is possible to memories of the individual's unique past and expected
design experiments in which well-controlled external experiences. Conventional memory is required for the

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B (1998)

 Investigating the biology of consciousness A. R. Damasio 1881

construction of the autobiographical self, and working biological state attainable but rather as a set of adaptive,
memory is required for the extensive display of items mid-level biological mechanisms of mid-complexity that
recalled from the autobiographical self. Finally, language are necessary for the survival of complex organisms in a
helps the categorizations that enrich the autobiographical complex environment, and that, in turn, come to permit
self. Nonetheless, it should be clear that extended plenty of other more complex biological states. One might
consciousness proper performs, for a larger compass of ask, quite reasonably, to which more complex states I
contents, precisely the same deed that core consciousness refer; I am referring to the creations that arise in the
accomplishes for the simple level: it places mental logical manipulations of knowledge that could not occur
contents in an individual perspective; it confers owner- without a conscious mind. I am referring to the creations
ship of those contents; and it gives the owner the sense that permit the development of rules for social behaviour;
that it can act on them. the development of a corpus of ethics; the development of
laws; the development of the sciences and of technology;
and the cultivation of the arts. Consciousness permits all
6. CONSCIOUSNESS IS NOT THE PINNACLE OF
of this, none of those creations being possible in non-
BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION
conscious individuals. However, all of those creations
Let me now turn to the argument that regards require a far more extensive and complex biological state
consciousness as the pinnacle of biological complexity. than consciousness itself, as witnessed by the multiplicity
This argument, incidentally, is interwoven with other of systems involved in the requisite manipulations, the
arguments such as those that consider consciousness as compass of obligate knowledge and the temporal dimen-
the ultimate mystery, or that propose that consciousness is sion of the creative process.
impossible to grasp because understanding consciousness
would serve no purpose evolutionarily and, accordingly,
7. CONSCIOUSNESS: HOW AND WHAT FOR?
we would lack the evolutionarily developed mental
modules necessary to grasp it. I have a variety of The central issue for the elucidation of consciousness,
comments on these arguments. then, is this: how do the images that constitute the
First, I see no reason to give up on neuroscience yet as normal thought process become the property of the
the source of explanations on consciousness. Not only is it organism that is engendering them? To put it in other
true that we have not exhausted the possibilities of words, how does the organism generate a sense of
explaining consciousness in neuroscienti¢c terms, but it is observer relative to images that are sensed as observed?
also true that we have barely scratched the surface of Without falling into the well-known trap of accounts of
neuroscience in terms of such an attempt. Second, I ¢nd it consciousness that invoke the homunculus, in¢nite regress
premature to turn to explanations depending on yet other and a central theatre, I have proposed that the answer to
mysteries, for instance, explanations that depend on these questions requires the understanding of how the
quantum physics and especially those that rely on hitherto brain can build a representation of `core self ' and how
undeveloped particulars of quantum physics, such as knowing is attributed to such a transiently constructed
quantum gravity. As I see it, the arguments available in representation.
the literature in this regard are well intentioned but some- I have suggested that the self is grounded on a
what naive. Leaving aside the enormous uncertainty as to representation of the organism, that is, on continuously
whether quantum-level e¡ects trespass across neural levels updated representations of the structure and states of the
to have an impact on the behaviour of systems, I have no body. Moreover, I have suggested that the process of
reservations and concern over how mental phenomena are perceiving depends on transient changes in the represen-
de¢ned in the related studies. For instance, it is apparent tation of the body state that occur as a result of processing
that the physicist Sir Roger Penrose, in his intriguing images about whatever object we are to place in
books and articles, is not really addressing the issue of consciousness.
consciousness per se but rather the issue of mind in general. Perceiving a given object, out in our environment or
Seen in this light, his claim, and that of others, could be recalled in our thoughts, engenders a number of responses
paraphrased as follows: it is not possible to give a full in our body, not the least of which concerns the emotional
account of mind processes without relying on quantum- state that inevitably accompanies the process and is based
level explanations. This is actually quite di¡erent from on the object's value to the organism ö as set innately or
saying that quantum physics is speci¢cally necessary to as acquired in prior emotionally laden experiences. In
explain consciousness. In all candour, at this point in the this perspective, consciousness becomes inextricable from
history of studying the neuroscience of mind, it is not the mechanisms of life regulation.
reasonable to disqualify the claim that they paraphrased. Living creatures such as we are, produce core
It might be that a full account of the physicality of mind consciousness when our organisms construct images of a
requires the kind of conception of matter that quantum part of themselves forming images of something else.
physics brought to scienti¢c understanding earlier in the Core consciousness occurs when organisms are, so to
century. However, it does not seem reasonable at this point speak, caught in the act of representing themselves when
to invoke quantum physics when we are dealing with the they represent other things. They, that is we, perform the
speci¢c mechanisms behind the generation of conscious- core consciousness trick because of: (i) its complicated
ness, that is, behind the generation of the sense of owner- interaction between the body-proper and the brain, (ii)
ship, perspective and agency in mind. the multilayered structure of the brain, and (iii) the
Perhaps most importantly in this brief list of counter- brain's inherent obsession with building images that
arguments is to see consciousness not as the most complex represent the organism, which include the body-proper

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B (1998)

1882 A. R. Damasio Investigating the biology of consciousness

and parts of the brain itself. The images that constitute tages that it gave the organisms that had it. And what
the representation of part of the organism in action was that advantage ? It was the possibility of connecting
describe how the organism has been `caught in the act of the very core of life regulation with the processing of
making other images'. The basic constituent of the images images. Put in other words, it was the possibility of
in the set is the internal state of the organism. The bringing the inherent value system of life regulation to
caught-in-the-act description is made in a non-verbal bear on the processing of the images that represent things
language, a language of body states, of somatosensory and events inside and outside the organisms.
information. Why was that an advantage ? It was an advantage
Consciousness in general, and core consciousness in because survival in a complex environment, that is, e¤-
particular, is the means by which the organism indicates cient management of life regulation, depends on taking
to itself that it is engaged by some object or event. The the right action and making the right plan; that, in turn,
object or event can occur outside the organism such as an requires a purposeful manipulation of images in mind.
object you can touch or a scene involving varied objects, In this perspective, core consciousness is the door to a
or it can happen inside the organism ö e.g. a pain in the revelation of regulatory values, the passage into the possi-
chest. The object or event can be directly perceived or bility of constructing in the mind some counterpart of the
indirectly recalled from the memory of past perceptions. regulatory value hidden in the brain core, some new and
No matter what, inside or outside the organism, directly more open way of sensing the life urge and the means to
perceived now or indirectly perceived in recall, the busi- hold on to life. Core consciousness is the rite of passage
ness of core consciousness is to indicate that the conti- that allows an organism armed with re£exes and condi-
nuing processing of images of anything is happening tioning to become a minded organism, an organism in
within the individual organism, in its perspective, owned which responses are shaped by a naturally born concern
by it. In the most general terms, core consciousness with the organism's own life.
consists of having the organism reveal to its imaged refer- When core consciousness began, millions of years and
ence, the core self, that it is engaged in the process of many species ago, we were very far from the current
making mind. The revelation is transient, pulse-like, and sophistication of modern consciousness, very far from the
incessantly generated for any object that engages the ease with which we can describe, using language, the
organism, be it actually present or recalled from memory. reasons behind our actions, past or intended. However,
I do not think the ability to make this revelation when core consciousness began, we were on the right
happened by design, or that it was meant to happen. I track and we transcended the critical threshold. We were
believe instead that it was bound to happen as soon as telling ourselves, without using any words, the answer to
brains had a capacity to represent their own involvement the question we never asked, that yes, there was an indivi-
in the process of representing. Core consciousness was dual perspective to our percepts, and yes, there was an
born once the presence of certain neuroanatomical individual ownership of images, and yes, it was all tied to
devices permitted a description, by one part of the brain, life.
of what other parts of the brain were doing. In its simple, and non-languaged way, core conscious-
Core consciousness might have been born without prior ness was and is now saying, in the mind of an organism,
design, as no doubt occurred for so many of the biological that attention must be paid to the images in the rest of the
devices and processes that we carry today. However, the mind of that organism, that attention must be paid because
reason why it prevailed probably came from the advan- those images probably concern the organism's future.

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B (1998)