Intuition and the concept of

knowledge
Joseph Hinchey

Introduction
Epistemological inquiry often depends on the comparison of claims about the
classification of certain beliefs with our intuitions about these beliefs. A proposed framework
for determining whether particular beliefs constitute knowledge may be evaluated by
applying it to a hypothetical scenario and examining whether the classifications provided by
the framework match those provided by our intuitions. Intuition, generally, consists of
inclinations characterised by a lack of conscious reasoning in their formation. Doubts have
been raised regarding the validity of intuitions as tools for epistemological classification.
These include the fact that intuitions are not necessarily accurate, that they vary between
individuals and that they are significantly influenced by otherwise irrelevant factors,
resulting in unreliability.

In this paper, I outline my view that intuition is an indispensable tool for studying
knowledge. I examine notable instances of its use in epistemological discussion in order to
identify its function as a tool of inquiry in these instances and in epistemology generally. I
argue that knowledge does not exist as a natural kind, contrary to Kornblith (2002), but a
concept whose content is unfixed and subject to individual variation. I show that this position
resolves many issues raised in objection to intuition’s use in the study of knowledge and
discuss its implications for epistemology as a field.

Intuition in epistemology
Intuition has traditionally occupied a central position in epistemological and general
philosophical inquiry. A famous example is the trolley problem, which in asking whether one
should allow more to die through inaction or cause fewer deaths through action, prompts
intuitions about morality in order to investigate ethics. Another, formulated by Keith Lehrer,
is Mr Truetemp, who is constantly aware of the precise temperature of his environment but
unaware and unquestioning of the mechanism behind this ability (1990). Lehrer asks whether
Mr Truetemp knows the temperature, prompting intuitions about knowledge in order to
investigate reliabilism. The Gettier cases present scenarios that satisfy all conditions of the
justified true belief (JTB) account of knowledge and yet result in classifications that contradict
intuition, calling into question the completeness of the framework.

In all of these cases, intuition operates as a dialectical instrument; it guides discourse

by flagging counterintuitive outcomes and prompting further refinement of theory. These
intuitive judgments, while not conclusive, enable philosophers to draw out and scrutinise
aspects of theory, identifying ideas that lead to absurd or otherwise unintuitive outcomes
when applied in concrete cases.

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 The target of epistemology

Why do epistemologists give such weight to intuitions? If a theory has been carefully
developed through a rigorous process of reason, observation or both, why throw it aside
based on what is essentially a hunch? How we address these questions depends on what we
hold to be the target of epistemology. Intuition about knowledge classifications provides
insight into individuals’ understanding of knowledge as an abstract concept. It is useful for
investigating individual and, where intuitions are shared, folk conceptualisations of
knowledge. It is less useful, and certainly not a valid standalone tool, where the classifications
we are trying to distinguish are real ones that exist independently of our concepts: natural
kinds. If knowledge is only a concept, not a natural kind, then intuition’s traditional
epistemological role is valid.

Hilary Kornblith argues that this is not the case, explaining, “There is a robust
phenomenon of human knowledge…”, and that epistemologists presuppose a “theoretical unity”
that underlies observable cases of knowledge (2002, pp. 11-12). Theoretical unity, in this case,
refers to some distinct common mechanism that generates observable cases of knowledge.
Kornblith uses the example of gold, explaining that many of its seemingly unrelated
observable characteristics, for example its colour, malleability and conductivity, have been
shown to share a common underlying cause (2002, p. 12). Gold is thus a natural kind because
it has a real and unique characteristic that sets it apart from other things (its atomic
structure). Additionally, whenever we want to verify whether something should be classified
as gold, we only need to check whether it has that characteristic. If an essential mechanism
underlies knowledge, it would allow epistemologists to bypass intuition in their thought
experiments, since the only condition needing to be satisfied in a knowledge classification
would be its presence.

Perhaps a good place to start our search for such a mechanism is the observation that
many non-human animals exhibit behaviours that indicate at least a basic capacity for the
reliable formation of approximate mental representations of reality (beliefs that are true).
The development of this capacity in so many organisms is an example of convergent evolution
and suggests that there is a natural role filled by knowledge. Is this role the essence we are
searching for? I suggest that our perception of animal behaviour as knowledge-indicating
behaviour supports the objective reality of knowledge no more than the interpretation of our
own mental states as knowledge does.

Let’s assume that when we say we know something, essentially, we mean that we hold
a certain type of belief. Broadly, this belief should be appropriately justified and true. There
is nothing physically significant about appropriately justified, true beliefs. Like any belief,
they are composed of neural circuitry representing various memories and attitudes. A bird
that is able to reliably return to its nest after travelling great distances possesses physical
neural states that represent the location of its nest. If I change the nest’s location while the
bird isn’t looking, its belief about the nest is unaffected. It seems clear that the bird no longer
knows where its nest is, but nothing about the representation of the belief in the bird’s brain
changes. Thus, the essential mechanism behind knowledge cannot be found in the physical
representation of beliefs.

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 Still, maybe there are common and essential processes that give rise to knowledge -
like behaviour in different cases. It is useful to have beliefs that represent the truth, and this
is why organisms tend to develop sensory and cognitive mechanisms that facilitate the
formation of at least approximately true beliefs. For many organisms, the most reliable way
for these beliefs to be formed is through the interpretation and analysis of sensory signals
(empirical observation) and the encoding of these processes in memory. This is what we
observe in most cases, but it is not the only way that animals come to hold knowledge-like
beliefs. Many animals migrate over great distances without ever having learned the route.
They operate based on tendencies that are encoded in their genetics, not ones formed
through a process of observation or reflection. Importantly, the mechanisms that give rise to
their knowledge-like behaviour are not the same as the ones behind ours. This suggests that
there is no single, unique mechanism that fills the role we identify as knowledge.

Regardless, we are yet to address the principal crux in the search for the natural kind,
knowledge. It becomes apparent when we consider the dependence of our search on our
conceptual understanding of knowledge. In order to make any progress, we must first be able
to distinguish the observable phenomena that are caused by knowledge from those that are
not. But just as the discovery the gold atom required the study of samples of what was already
known to be gold, in order to isolate observable phenomena caused by knowledge, we must
have access to known instances of knowledge. What criteria would we use to identify these?
JTB? Reliabilism? The moment we try to develop such criteria, we find ourselves relying on
our conceptual understanding of knowledge – an understanding heavily informed by
intuition. Thus, any argument for knowledge’s classification as a natural kind seems doomed
to circularity.

Implications
For intuition

In light of the conclusion that knowledge is not a natural kind but a concept and in
order to investigate its implications for the role of intuition in epistemology, some
contentions regarding intuition’s validity in epistemological enquiry should be addressed.
Specifically, paraphrased versions of those identified by Goldman (2007) will be discussed.

1. Intuitions can be inaccurate.

We occasionally intuit classifications that are demonstrably false. For instance, until
the 1900s, fungi were classified as plants (Moore, n.d.). At first glance, plants and fungi share
many similarities, leading to the intuitive conclusion that they should share a taxonomical
classification. Following investigations into the genetic, evolutionary and functional
differences between the two groups, it was found that fungi and plants are more accurately
classified as two entirely separate kingdoms (the highest level of biological grouping). If
intuitions can lead to such inaccuracies, perhaps we should question their use in other cases.

Of course, this contention becomes weightless given the conclusion that knowledge is
not a natural kind, unlike taxonomical classifications. Plants and fungi have observable
characteristics that set them apart on a rather fundamental level. Our intuitions about them

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thus do not necessarily correlate with objective reality. Since knowledge is a concept, its
nature is determined by our understanding of it. Intuition is a valuable tool in the
investigation of this understanding.

2. Intuitions are inconsistent.

Some research has indicated that people’s intuitions about philosophical thought
experiments are significantly influenced by demographic and circumstantial factors
(Machery et al., 2004; Swain et al., 2008). This may seem concerning; how can we hope to
learn anything meaningful about knowledge if some of our primary investigative instruments
are unreliable?

More recent investigation has shown that intuitions are more stable than was
originally found (Knobe, 2021). Regardless, the consistency of intuitions about knowledge
across demographic groups, individuals or circumstances has no bearing on intuition’s
validity in epistemology given knowledge’s conceptual nature. Individual intuitive
classifications reveal real individual conceptualisations of knowledge. Differences in intution
help to reveal how cultural, social and demographic factors influence individuals’
understanding of concepts like knowledge. Where groups share intuitions, the folk
understanding can be investigated.

Variability in intuitions is not a problem for their validity as a tool of inquiry because
the subject of the inquiry in question, knowledge, is itself subject to variation. Intuitions
merely reveal this.

3. Intuitions are uncalibrated.

Measurement instruments usually need to be calibrated according to a known

standard before they can be used accurately. For example, until 2019 the kilogram was
officially defined as the mass of a particular platinum-iridium cylinder in France
(Encyclopedia Britannica, n.d.). This cylinder (and copies) were used as known standards
with which instruments for measuring mass could be calibrated. It is contended that
intuitions should be held to the same standards as other tools of enquiry if they are to be
treated as such. Since intuitions are not calibrated with respect to any known truth, they may
not be valid instruments.

Knowledge’s conceptual nature dissolves this contention as well. Mass is a natural

kind, and so physical measurements are authoritative in determining the masses of objects.
The accuracy of a knowledge classification depends only on an individual’s conceptual
understanding of knowledge, from which intuitions directly result. In this sense, intuition is
not a scale that needs calibration. Instead, like the standard kilogram, it is the definitive
authority against which knowledge classifications made by other means can be tested. This is
the precise role it serves in epistemological thought experiments.

For epistemology

What does this mean for epistemology? Is it still “…as worthy of our attention as most
epistemologists believe…” (Kornblith, 2002, p. 10), or does the subjective nature of knowledge
restrict the field to speculative philosophical reflection?

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 According to the present view, the pursuit of an absolute definition of knowledge was
always pointless, but this does not lessen the significance of epistemology as a field. In fact,
it strengthens it. Instead of an academic exercise in semantics and metaphysics,
epistemology is the study of logic, reason and the dynamics of belief formation.
Epistemologists analyse the validity of scientific methodologies, furthering our ability to
understand reality and manipulate it to our advantage. They also classify how ideas are
disseminated through populations, providing crucial insight into human attitudes and the
ways people respond to social changes and interpret novel information.

Epistemology informs us about different ways of gathering knowledge, allowing us to

choose scientific methodologies that facilitate the formation of beliefs that reflect reality
more closely. The promotion of falsifiability as a foundational tenet of modern science by
epistemologist Karl Popper (1934) was pivotal in the development of the modern scientific
method. Understanding how different groups understand and gather knowledge enables us
to refine educational techniques. This is not only valuable in the context of formal schooling
but also in public education campaigns, such as those intended to encourage vaccination or
discourage smoking. In the modern world, a more pressing issue than simple ignorance
seems to be distrust of the scientific establishment. If we can properly understand the
epistemological reasons for this distrust, we can frame information in ways that are more
likely to align beliefs with reality.

Conclusion
Knowledge is a high-level classification. It is a useful concept, but given the sheer
complexity of the workings of living things, especially sentient animals, whose neural
circuitry is so astoundingly complex that it generates real, tangible conscious experience, it
seems irrational to expect such broad patterns of behaviour and cognition to be represented
on a fundamental level in any meaningful way. In reality, what we call knowledge is most likely
a dynamic conceptual entity composed of more basic mental faculties such as memory as
well as other high-level psychological tendencies like attitudes and opinions. This
understanding does not detract from the importance of epistemology; it emphasises its actual
value. Focus is shifted from the quest for an elusive, absolute definition of knowledge and
instead directed towards the continuous investigation of the diverse ways in which knowledge
is perceived, constructed, and applied in the real world.

References
Encyclopedia Britannica. (n.d.). kilogram. Retrieved November 17, 2023, from Encyclopedia
Britannica: https://www.britannica.com/science/kilogram

Goldman, A. I. (2007). Philosophical Intuitions: Their target, their source, and their
academic status. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 74(1), 1-26.
https://doi.org/10.1163/9789401204651_002

Knobe, J. (2021). Philosophical Intuitions Are Surprisingly Stable Across both Demographic
Groups and Situations. Filozofia Nauki, 29(2), 11-76.
https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2021.0007

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Kornblith, H. (2002). Investigating Knowledge Itself.

Lehrer, K. (1990). Theory of Knowledge. Westview Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/2220236

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Moore, D. (n.d.). Evolution and phylogeny of fungi. Retrieved November 17, 2023, from
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and-phylogeny-of-fungi

Popper, K. (1934). Logik der Forschung. Julius Springer, Hutchinson & Co.

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