CHAPTER - VI

RISK ANALYSIS

The risk analysis has been carried out for leakage of chlorine from chlorine
tonner proposed to be used for water treatment .

MODEL USED FOR RISK ANALYSIS

2. DNV's Process Hazard Analysis Software Tools (PHAST) Micro ver. 6.1 is
used for the risk analysis. The PHAST program is a complete package for
consequence analysis and risk analysis for onshore process engineering. The
model predicts any accidental releases from the plant having the potential to
reach people or critical equipment, and calculates the risk that these releases
can pose to the surroundings.

MODEL DESCRIPTION
MATERIAL DATA AND PARAMETER DATA
3. The program is supplied with a default set of data for material properties,
covering most common hazardous materials, and with default set of Parameter
Data (covering the large set of variables used in the calculations). The model
has the capabilities to use the default values directly or create user defined
modified versions.

WEATHER DATA

4. The model also has a default set of weather data i.e. wind speed and
atmospheric stability that will probably suite the model analysis. The model
has the flexibility to check the values and modify them before starting the
calculations.

INPUT FAILURE CASES

5. The 930 kg of Chlorine inventory has been considered for 2 mm pinhole leak.
Chlorine gas leaks from a pressurised tonner at 7 psi (g) from gas end.
Chemical and physical property of chlorine is shown in Appendix-23.

CONSEQUENCE CALCULATIONS FOR FAILURE CASES

6. The consequence calculations perform dispersion modelling and effect
modelling for each weather condition specified in the Weather Data. The
dispersion modelling calculates the distance to critical concentrations—i.e.
flammability limits for flammable materials and to minimum toxic levels for toxic
materials.
7. The calculations can be divided into three stages, as shown in the illustration.

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 Figure - VI.1
Consequence Calculations for Failure Cases

Pool Spreading and Vaporisation

If the release contains liquid droplets, this may rain out
and form a pool. Any evaporation from this pool will
contribute to the dispersing cloud.

Evaporation-rate, to add to initial vapour release-rate

Dispersion Modelling
Models the dispersion of the vapour cloud in the
atmosphere until is has reached a harmless
concentration.
Dimensions and concentration-profile for cloud

Flammable Effects
Models various types of fires.

8. The fate of the liquid that rains out is determined by using the liquid rate or the
total liquid mass removed from the cloud as input to a liquid spill model, and
then establishing a vaporisation rate, or set of rates, to simulate a time-varying
vaporisation rate.
9. The shape of the pool is idealised to be a circular cylinder of radius and uniform
thickness, with a point source located at its centre. Different equations are used
to calculate the pool radius depending upon whether the spill is on land or water,
and whether it is an instantaneous or a continuous release.
10. Dispersion describes the process by which hazardous material released into the
atmosphere is diluted by the air and transported away from the source. The
degree of dilution is dependent upon the amount of turbulence present, either in
the atmosphere or generated by the released material itself. The latter depends
upon the type of release: high momentum or low momentum, denser than air or
buoyant, etc. The following ―entrainment regimes‖ can be identified for these
different types of release:
MOMENTUM OR DENSITY DOMINATED ENTRAINMENT REGIME
11. This is relevant during the early phases of release. Many releases have high
momentum immediately after discharge, and the turbulence generated from
the momentum entrains air. The release will also generate its own turbulence if
the released material has a density greater than air: the cloud slumps under
gravity, and the eddies entrain air.

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 AMBIENT ENTRAINMENT REGIME

12. This occurs when the released material does not have a velocity or density
significantly different than the surrounding air and does not generate its own
turbulence. In this situation, entrainment is due to the intrinsic turbulence in the
atmosphere.
13. Models have been developed which are appropriate for each of these dispersion
regimes individually, and the models have been linked together. The approach
here has been to develop a Unified Dispersion Model (UDM) which treats all
regimes of dispersion in a similar manner with smooth transitions from one phase
to another as needed.
14. The Unified Dispersion Model (UDM) is an advanced similarity model capable
of describing a wide range of types of accidental releases. The main
characteristic of similarity models is that profiles for concentration, velocity,
and temperature are assumed. The Unified Dispersion Model uses a
particularly flexible form, allowing for sharp-edged profiles, which become
more diffuse downwind. Both instantaneous and continuous releases are
treated, for which many model equations are common. The vertical cross
section of each is, in general, an ellipse while elevated, and a truncated ellipse
while touching the ground (or impinging the mixing height ceiling). A
continuous release profile extends from the source downwind, whereas an
instantaneous release profile is a volume defined by revolving the vertical
cross section around the vertical axis.

15. An example of a general case continuous release is shown in the illustration

Figure - VI.2.
Figure - VI.2
A Profile of a Continuous Release

Idealised Cloud Section

B
A
D
Two-Phase C
Release

A
B Side View
Liquid Pool
C
D

AA
BB
CC
DD

Cross Section

16. The illustration shows the following aspects of cloud-behaviour:

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 An elevated, heavy vapour/aerosol release, which starts out with a circular
cross section then, tends to flatten into an ellipse as the cloud settles. (AA
to BB)
Upon touching down, the cross section becomes a truncated ellipse, and
the cloud levels off as the vertical component of momentum is dissipated.
(CC to DD)
Aerosol droplets may rain out shortly after touchdown. Rainout produces a
pool which spreads and vaporises. If spilled onto water, part of the
material may also dissolve.
The vapour from the pool is added back to the plume, as a function of
time.
The plume can become buoyant after evaporating all aerosol droplets and
picking up heat by ground conduction, or by condensing water picked up
over a wet surface. A buoyant plume lifts off and rises until constrained by
the mixing layer.
17. Dense gas and aerosol clouds are known to suppress dispersion below that
obtained by ambient turbulence (passive dispersion) in the surrounding
atmosphere. This phenomenon is described in the UDM by making the dominant
(top) entrainment velocity depend on the layer Richardson Number, an indicator
of cloud buoyancy.

18. The type of thermal effects that will be appropriate will depend on the release
behaviour. At present this involves the sorting of flammable releases into two
types, refrigerated and pressurised, and the consequence calculations may
decide to reclassify some releases on the basis of how they behaved during
dispersion.

19. Releases, which are either described as, or behave as, ―pressurised‖ may form a
fireball if ignited immediately. Alternatively, any release of type BLEVE will just be
modelled this way.
20. The radiation models developed for the stand alone program FLARE are
described in Cook, Bahrami and Whitehouse (l990).
21. The explosion model performs the calculations for two ignition times and
locations (early and late), and calculates the distances to various damage levels
resulting from the explosion of a vapour cloud. The explosion model is based
entirely on the TNO vapour cloud explosion correlation model (Wiekema 1979).

INPUTS TO MODELLING

22. The following are the modelling inputs used for the study:

MATERIAL DATA

23. The 930 kg of Chlorine inventory has been considered for 2 mm pinhole leak.
Chlorine gas may leak from a pressurised tonner at 7 psi (g) from gas end.

WEATHER DATA
24. The weather data used for the study is given in Table VI.1.

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 Table - VI.1

Weather Data Used for Risk Analysis

Weather Data
Value Remarks
Parameter

Most frequently occurring

Ambient temperature 30 oC
temperature

Same as ambient
Surface temperature 30 oC
temperature

Surface roughness For the rural and industrial

0.17
factor area

Most frequently occurring

Relative humidity 87 %
humidity

1.5 m/s and Lowest wind speed and

Wind speed considered maximum wind speed
5 m/s excluding the extremes

Neutral stability class and

Stability classes D and F
stable condition at night

Average solar radiation

Solar Radiation 0.75 kW/m2 varies from 0.74 to 1.04
kW/m2

FAILURE CASES

25. Chlorine gas is stored in pressurised tonners from which it is dosed. Credible
scenario is considered to be chlorine gas 2 mm pinhole leak from the
pressurised tonner. The maximum inventory of one tonner containing 930 Kg
quantity of Cl2 released through 2 mm pinehole leak.

26. The Indian Standard for Code of Safety for Chlorine (IS : 4263 – 1967) has
tabulated the effect of chlorine at various concentrations. This is given in
following Table.
Table - VI.2
Effect of Chlorine at Various Concentrations

Sr. Effects Cl2 Concentration In

No. Air (ppm)
Least amount required to produce slight
1 1.0
symptoms after several hours exposure
2 Least detectable odour 3.5

3 Maximum amount that may be inhaled for 1 4.0

hour without serious disturbances (for

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 making emergency response planning
guideline)
4 Least amount required to cause coughing 30.2

5 Amount dangerous in 30 minutes to 1 hour 40.0 – 60.0

6 Kills most animals in very short time 1000.0

RESULTS OF MODELLING
27. The distance to equivalent toxic dose (Maximum amount that may be inhaled
for 1 hour without serious disturbances) for released Chlorine Gas is given in
following Table IV.3 and Table IV.4. Side view of the cloud consequence of
2mm pinehole leak is shown as Figure VI.3.Contor for effective toxic distances
is shown in Figure VI.4.
Table VI.3

Distance To Equivalent Toxic Dose of Chlorine Gas

User Concentration Reference Time Distance
(ppm) (s) (m)
1.5 F 1.5 D 5.0 D
1 (ERPG) 3600 1006 303 152
3 (ERPG) 3600 470 153 79
4 (ERPG) 3600 378 127 65
20 (ERPG) 3600 82 41 13

Table VI.4

Equivalent Toxic Dose of Chlorine Gas at Boundary Level (250m)

User Concentration Reference Time Concentration (PPM)

(ppm) (s)
1.5 F 1.5 D 5.0 D
4 (ERPG) 3600 No Hazard No Hazard No Hazard
40 (STEL) 900 No Hazard No Hazard No Hazard

CONCLUSION

28. Considering the credible scenario for release of chlorine gas from tonner, the
equivalent toxic dose for 4 ppm (Maximum amount that may be inhaled for 1
hour without serious disturbances) may occur up to a distance of 378 m during
the worst case meteorological condition. Therefore, distance of 378 m should
be considered for emergency response planning.

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29. However, hazard that may be dangerous to life and health is not expected
beyond the plant boundary considering 40 ppm STEL (Amount dangerous in
30 minutes).

Figure VI.3

Side View of The Cloud Consequence 0f 2mm Pin-hole Leak

Safety Practises to Reduce Risk

Chlorine Leakages

IDENTIFYING CHLORINE LEAKS

30. Presence of chlorine in the atmosphere, even in low concentrations, can be

easily detected by its pungent smell.

31. In order to ascertain the exact location of the leak, an ‗Ammonia Torch‘ is
generally used. This consists of a stock with a cloth bulb at one end. The cloth
bulb is soaked in aqua ammonia and held over the area of suspected leak. If
there is any leakage, a white cloud will form.

PRELIMINARY MEASURES IN FACING LEAKS

32. The first step to be taken when chlorine leaks occurs is to remove all persons
not directly concerned, from the affected area.

33. Only trained personnel equipped with suitable gas masks and emergency kits
should investigate the leakage and take appropriate action.

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 Figure VI.4
Chlorine Contour

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34. Chlorine gas is approximately 2.5 times heavier than air and it usually
accumulates close to the ground. If the leak is extensive, all persons in the
path of the fumes must be immediately warned to leave the area and proceed
upwind of the leak and to a higher plane in the open.

35. Water should never be used on a chlorine leak. The combined corrosive action
of water and chlorine will always make the leak worse.

36. If the leak is from a process system, supply of chlorine to that line must be
immediately cut off.

37. If a chlorine container is leaking, the first step to be taken is to ensure that only
chlorine gas and not liquid escapes. The quantity of chlorine that escapes from
a gas leak is only about 1/15th of what would escape from a liquid leak through
a hole of the same size.

CONTROLLING LEAKS
38. Trained personnel suitably equipped with safety appliances and emergency
kits can control most chlorine leaks. However after controlling the leakage, it
should be the endeavour to use up the chlorine inside the container with the
least possible delay.
39. If all efforts to control leak fails, and the leak continues, suitable provision
should be available for emergency disposal of chlorine from the leaking
containers. Chlorine may be absorbed in solution of caustic soda, soda ash or
hydrated lime. A chlorine leak detection and absorption system should be
provided to trap chlorine leakage from chlorine tonners.

Hydrogen Gas

40. Hydrogen gas is used for cooling of the generators. It would be required for the
initial filling and continuous make-up during normal operation for maintaining
the required purity in the generator. The normal Hydrogen gas requirement for
two units is about 24 N cu. m / day. This requirement would be met by
procuring the Hydrogen gas cylinders from the external sources.

41. Hydrogen gas is highly flammable and Hydrogen burns with a nearly invisible
bluish flame. The temperature of burning hydrogen inair is high (3,713¡ F, as
compared with 2,276o F for gasoline), and warm hydrogen gas rises rapidly
because of its buoyancy. Hydrogen forms a flammable mixture over a wide
range of concentrations in air and requires a minimum ignition source, only
one-tenth of the energy required for gasoline vapors. It is the combination of
these factors that contributes to the flammability hazard associated with
hydrogen gas.

42. The following table IV.5 lists the physical properties and characteristics of
hydrogen and their values.

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 Table VI.5
Physical Properties and Characteristics of Hydrogen

Property/Characteristic Values (approximate)

Color None Color None
Odor None Odor None
Toxicity Nontoxic
liquid (boiling point) 4.4 lb/ft3 (0.07
Density
g/cm3)
Boiling point (1 atm) 423.2 F
Critical temperature (188.2 psia) 400.4 F (
Stoichiometric mixture in air 29 vol %
Flammability limits in air 4–75 vol %
Detonation limits in air 18–60 vol %
Minimum ignition energy in air 20 mJ
Auto ignition temperature 1,085° F (585° C)
Volume expansion:
liquid (-252.9° C) to gas (-252.9° C) 1:53
gas (from -252.9° C to 20° C) 1:16
liquid (-252.9° C) to gas (20° C) 1:848

Hazards of Hydrogen

Flammability and explosively

43. The primary physical hazards associated with hydrogen gas are its
flammability and exclusivity. This is because hydrogen can form a flammable
mixture with air over a wide range of concentrations (4%Ð75%), and very low
energy is needed to ignite hydrogen-air mixtures. Once hydrogen is ignited,
the reaction can proceed either by deflagration (subsonic propagation) or
detonation (supersonic propagation). Deflagration in a closed volume can
cause a pressure increase of almost eight times the initial pressure.
Detonation from a low-energy ignition source is possible in hydrogen-air
mixtures of 18 Ð60% vol that are well mixed and confined. Although hydrogen
air mixtures have the same calorific value per pound as TNT, the rate of
energy release is much slower for hydrogen-air mixtures.

44. Hydrogen detonations, although rare, are characterized by pressure increases

so rapid that pressure-relief devices are usually ineffective. When using
hydrogen in enclosed areas, consult National Fire Protection Association
documents 68 and 69.
Effects on Health
45. Hydrogen is nontoxic and has even been used as filler for oxygen sources for
underwater diving. The primary health effect associated with hydrogen is the

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 possibility that it could displace air in a poorly ventilated or confined space,
resulting in asphyxiation.

46. However, because it is flammable at only 4% in air, the most significant

concern should be the physical hazard of flammability and the possibility of
burns resulting from fires and explosions. When working with liquid hydrogen,
there is an additional health hazard of cryogenic burns.

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 CHAPTER - VII

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

The emergency management plan gives a broad idea of the detailed

emergency preparedness in case of an accident. The detailed emergency
preparedness plan should be prepared on commissioning of the plant with the
help of staffs working at the plant.
2. The Emergency Management Plan (EMP) envisages the need for providing
appropriate action so as to minimize loss of life/property and for restoration of
normalcy within the minimum time. Adequate manpower, training and
infrastructure shall achieve this. An appropriate fire protection system is also
developed to meet any emergency.

3. The emergencies are classified as construction hazard, natural hazard and

operational hazard. During the construction time good construction practice
and safety requirement should be enforced by the contractor at site. The
construction manager can be the co-ordinator for the emergency
management. Depending on the severity of the injury/ disaster outside medical
help can be obtained. Before commencement of the work the hospital facilities
should be identified and the address and phone numbers to be available to the
contractor as well as the construction manager. During natural hazard the
emergency plan to be implemented with the help and guidance from the
district collector, who is the co-ordinator for such activity. During operation, the
plant manager become the co-ordinator for the emergency activity and the
emergency cell will be acting in accordance with the disaster management
plan (DMP).

4. During construction phase proper measures should be taken to ensure safety

at heights. Fencing/railing should be provided at construction openings to
prevent physical injuries and fall of construction workers.

5. The following important elements in the disaster management plan (DMP) are
suggested to effectively achieve the objectives of emergency planning:

Reliable and early detection of an emergency and careful planning.

The command, co-ordination, and response organisation structure along
with efficient trained personnel.
The availability of resources for handling emergencies.
Appropriate emergency response actions.
Effective notification and communication facilities.
Regular review and updating of the EMP.
Proper training of the concerned personnel.

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 SEQUENCE OF ACTION
6. In order to handle disaster/emergency situations, an organisational chart
entrusting responsibility to various plant personnel has been prepared along
with their specific roles during an emergency. The possible composition of the
management team is given in Figure VI.3.
INFRASTRUCTURE
7. Following infrastructure & operational systems should be provided to meet
emergencies.
First aid boxes
Gas masks
Telephone line with STD facility
Loud hailers
Emergency lighting system
Stretchers
Transport facility
Fire-fighting machinery
Fire-tenders
Ambulance
ASSEMBLY POINTS
8. Assembly points are to be set up farthest from the location of likely hazardous
events, where pre-designated persons would assemble in case of emergency.
The location near to the entrance gate is one of the safest place. This can be
the assembly point.
EVACUATION PATH
9. The road straight to the entrance gate is quite wide and no hazardous
installation besides the road. This road can be taken as the evacuation path.

COMMUNICATION SYSTEM

10. Different types of alarms to differentiate types of emergencies should be

provided. In case of failure of siren, placards of various colours should be used
to indicate the situations. If everything fails, a messenger should be used for
sending the information and the various placards mentioned would also be
used.
11. Alarms should be followed by announcement over Public Address System. In
case of failure of alarm system, communication should be by telephone
operator who will make announcement in plant through Public Address
System, which should be installed. Walkie-talkie and paging systems using
predetermined codes of communication are very useful during emergency.

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 WARNING SYSTEM AND CONTROL
12. The control centers shall be located at an area of minimum risk or vulnerability
in premises concerned, taking into account the wind direction, areas which
might be affected by fire/explosion, toxic releases etc.
EMERGENCY SERVICES
13. This includes fire-fighting system, first aid center, hospital etc. Alternate
sources of power supply for operating fire-pumps, communication with local
bodies, fire-brigade etc. should also be clearly identified. Adequate number of
external and internal telephone connections should be installed.
FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM
14. The fire protection system for the proposed plant is to consists of :

Hydrant system for all the vulnerable areas of the plant.

Portable carbon-dioxide extinguishers for the control room.

Portable hand appliances of suitable types/ capacities for extinguishing

small fires in selected areas of the plant.

15. The emergency plan will have the key personnel of the organisation and
responsibilities assigned to them in case of an emergency and their telephone
numbers. These telephone numbers and persons will be finalised after
commissioning of the plant.

16. Depend on the severity of the emergency outside agency will be called for the
assistance. The following information will included in case outside
organizations are involved in assisting on-site emergency:
Type of accidents
Responsibility assigned to each of the organisation.
Liaison arrangement between the organisations.

17. The safety equipment installed and fire-fighting equipment available will be
mentioned in the detailed DMP.

18. Small size maps should be available in control tower, fire station, rescue and
fire-fighting and all other supporting vehicles responding to an emergency.

19. The map should contain the site related details such as:
Location of dangerous substances.
Seat of key personnel.
Location of emergency control room.
Quantity of the chemicals stored.
20. The parking points of Ambulances and Fire-fighting vehicles must be located
such that no hindrance will be posed at any time of the day.

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 Figure - VII.1
Structure of Disaster Management Team

Observer
Personally, phone or break
glass
Inform plant
Incharge Personally, phone or break glass

Security / Fire
Fighting Hooter, siren or by public address
system

Declare emergency
By Emergency coordinator

Liaison Officer
Site controller Communication officer

Fire fighting Medical Equipment Technical team

Call for outside help Hospital / Medical Aid

Media representative Fire Station / Police Aid

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