No.

15-1500

In the Supreme Court of the United States

_____________

BRIAN LEWIS, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

WILLIAM CLARKE
_____________

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF CONNECTICUT

_____________

BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS

_____________

JAMES M. HARRINGTON ERIC D. MILLER

POLITO & ASSOCIATES, LLC Counsel of Record
567 Vauxhall Street Ext. L UKE M. R ONA
Waterford, CT 06385 P ERKINS C OIE LLP
(860) 447-3300 1201 Third Ave., Suite 4900
Seattle, WA 98101
JENNIFER A. MACLEAN (206) 359-8000
P ERKINS C OIE LLP [email protected]
700 Thirteenth St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 654-6200
 QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the sovereign immunity of an Indian tribe
bars individual-capacity damages actions against tribal
employees for torts committed within the scope of
their employment.

(I)
 PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Petitioners are Brian Lewis and Michelle Lewis,
plaintiffs and appellees below.
Respondent is William Clarke, defendant and ap-
pellant below.
The Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority was initial-
ly named as a defendant but was subsequently dis-
missed from the case and was not a party in the Su-
preme Court of Connecticut.

(II)
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Opinions below ........................................................................ 1
Jurisdiction .............................................................................. 1
Introduction............................................................................. 2
Statement ................................................................................ 3
Summary of argument ........................................................... 5
Argument................................................................................. 7
A. Sovereign immunity does not apply to
actions seeking relief from individual
government officials .................................................... 7
B. The law governing actions against federal
and state officials provides additional
evidence that sovereign immunity does not
apply to individual-capacity damages
actions.......................................................................... 12
1. The sovereign immunity of the United
States does not bar damages actions
against federal officials ........................................ 13
2. State sovereign immunity does not bar
damages actions against state officials ............. 18
C. Tribal sovereign immunity should not be
extended to bar individual-capacity
damages actions against tribal officials .................. 20
1. Tribal sovereign immunity is no broader
than the sovereign immunity of the
United States or the States ................................ 20
2. Barring claims against individual
officials would not serve the purposes of
sovereign immunity ............................................. 23
3. Actions against tribal employees serve
important state interests .................................... 26

(III)
 IV
Page
D. A tribe cannot expand its sovereign
immunity by statute .................................................. 29
Conclusion.............................................................................. 32

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) ............ 9, 10, 18, 23, 24
Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645
(2001) ................................................................................. 29
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) .................... 13
Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464 (1985) .................................. 8
C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi
Indian Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 411 (2001) .................. 28
Chayoon v. Chao, 355 F.3d 141 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 543 U.S. 966 (2004) ............................................ 10
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1
(1831) ................................................................................. 20
Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) ......... 27
Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de Mexicali,
A.C. v. United States, 482 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir.
2007) .................................................................................. 14
Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306 (1973)............................... 17
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) .................................... 27
FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994) .................................. 14
Federal Mar. Comm’n v. South Carolina State
Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002) ............................. 23, 24
Florida Paraplegic Ass’n v. Miccosukee Tribe of
Indians of Fla., 166 F.3d 1126 (11th Cir. 1999) .......... 25
 V
Cases—Continued: Page
Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323
U.S. 459, 462 (1945) ......................................................... 18
Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991) ....................... 8, 11, 12, 19
Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57 (1963) .................................. 9
In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887) ..................................... 9, 23
Jefferson Cty. v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423 (1999) ..................... 15
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985) ........ 5, 6, 7, 8, 19
Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Manufacturing Techs.,
Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998) ..................................... 21, 22, 25
Koke v. Little Shell Tribe of Chippewa Indians of
Mont., Inc., 68 P.3d 814 (Mont. 2003) ........................... 11
Lapides v. Board of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga.,
535 U.S. 613 (2002) .......................................................... 18
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp.,
337 U.S. 682 (1949) ................................................ 9, 10, 11
Maxwell v. County of San Diego, 708 F.3d 1075
(9th Cir. 2013) ........................................................ 3, 10, 21
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 411
U.S. 164 (1973) ................................................................. 25
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145
(1973) ................................................................................. 25
Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct.
2024 (2014) ...................................................... 22, 26, 27, 28
Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978) ........................................................ 5, 7
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) .......... 30, 31
Native Am. Distrib. v. Seneca–Cayuga Tobacco
Co., 546 F.3d 1288 (10th Cir. 2008) ............................... 12
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) ................................ 26
 VI
Cases—Continued: Page
New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S.
324 (1983) .......................................................................... 25
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S.
191 (1978) .......................................................................... 30
Pistor v. Garcia, 791 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2015) ................ 12
Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land &
Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008) ................................ 29, 31
Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf
& Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 (1993) ................................. 23
Reich v. Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d
174 (2d Cir. 1996) ............................................................. 26
Romanella v. Hayward, 933 F. Supp. 163 (D.
Conn. 1996), aff’d, 114 F.3d 15 (2d Cir. 1997) .......... 4, 11
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359
U.S. 236 (1959) ................................................................. 27
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49
(1978) ........................................................................... 20, 21
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) ....................... 12, 19
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996) ................................................................................. 18
Solis v. Matheson, 563 F.3d 425 (9th Cir. 2009) ............... 25
Strate v. A–1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) ................ 30
Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold
Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, 476 U.S. 877 (1986) ......... 21
United States v. Bormes, 133 S. Ct. 12 (2012) .................. 13
United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975) ................. 29
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) .................. 29
Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546
U.S. 95 (2005) ................................................................... 27
Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., 551 U.S. 142
(2007) ........................................................................... 14, 15
 VII
Cases—Continued: Page
Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292 (1988) ........................ 16, 17
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448
U.S. 136 (1980) ................................................................. 25
Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58
(1989) ......................................................................... 7, 8, 19

Constitution, statutes, and rules:

U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 3 (Indian Commerce
Clause) .............................................................................. 17
U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 18 (Necessary and
Proper Clause) ................................................................. 17
U.S. Const. Amend. XI ........................................................ 18
Act of Feb. 4, 1815, ch. 31, § 8, 3 Stat. 198 ......................... 14
Act of Oct. 8, 1976 (Gonzalez Act), Pub. L. No. 94-
464, 90 Stat. 1985 ............................................................. 16
Act of Oct. 31, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-311, § 6, 79
Stat. 1156 .......................................................................... 16
Act of Sept. 21, 1961 (Federal Drivers Act), Pub.
L. No. 87-258, 75 Stat. 539 ............................................. 15
Emergency Health Personnel Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-623, § 4, 84 Stat. 1870 ......................................... 16
Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort
Compensation Act of 1988 (Westfall Act), Pub.
L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563........................................ 17
28 U.S.C. 2679(b)(1) ........................................................ 17
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq. .............. 15
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year
1977, Pub. L. No. 94-350, § 119, 90 Stat. 828 ............... 16
28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1) .............................................................. 14
42 U.S.C. 1983 ................................................................. 18, 19
Alaska Stat. Ann. § 09.50.253 .............................................. 19
 VIII
Statutes and rules—Continued: Page
Cal. Gov’t Code Ann. § 825 .................................................. 19
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-10-110 ....................................... 19
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 4-165 ............................................. 19
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.28 ........................................................ 19
Ga. Code Ann. § 50-21-25 ..................................................... 19
Iowa Code Ann. § 669.5........................................................ 19
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 75-6109 .................................................... 19
La. Stat. Ann. § 13:5108.1 .................................................... 19
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 8112 ...................................... 19
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 258, § 2...................................... 19
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 691.1408.................................... 19
N.Y. Pub. Off. Law § 17 ....................................................... 19
N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 32-12.2-03..................................... 20
Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 30.285 ................................................ 19
S.D. Codified Laws § 21-32-17 ............................................ 20
Mohegan Tribal Code § 2-27................................................ 24
Mohegan Tribal Code § 3-248(a) ......................................... 28
Mohegan Tribal Code § 3-248(d)......................................... 28
Mohegan Tribal Code § 3-249(a) ......................................... 29
Mohegan Tribal Code § 3-251(a) ......................................... 28
Mohegan Tribal Code § 4-51 et seq. .................................... 24
Mohegan Tribal Code § 4-52................................................ 24
Mohegan Tribal Code § 4-116(c) ......................................... 29
Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).......................................................... 8
Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d) ............................................................... 8
Sup. Ct. R. 35.3........................................................................ 8
 IX
Miscellaneous: Page
5 Fowler V. Harper et al., Harper, James and
Gray on Torts (3d ed. 2008) ....................................... 9, 10
H.R. Rep. No. 297, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) ............... 15
H.R. Rep. No. 333, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) ............... 16
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 901 (1979) ..................... 27
S. Rep. No. 736, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) .................... 16
S. Rep. No. 1264, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) ................... 16
Steven W. Perry, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of
Justice Statistics, Census of Tribal Justice
Agencies in Indian Country, 2002 (2005) .................... 28
In the Supreme Court of the United States
_____________

No. 15-1500

BRIAN LEWIS, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

WILLIAM CLARKE
_____________

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF CONNECTICUT

_____________

BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS

_____________

OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Connecticut Supreme Court
(Pet. App. 1a-17a) is reported at 320 Conn. 706 and 135
A.3d 677. The opinion of the Connecticut Superior
Court (Pet. App. 18a-36a) is unreported but is availa-
ble at 2014 WL 5354956.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Connecticut Supreme Court
was entered on March 15, 2016. The petition for a writ
of certiorari was filed on June 13, 2016, and was grant-
ed on September 29, 2016. The jurisdiction of this
court rests on 28 U.S.C. 1257(a).

(1)
 2
INTRODUCTION
This Court has held that individual-capacity dam-
ages actions against government officials do not impli-
cate sovereign immunity because they do not operate
against a sovereign. The Connecticut Supreme Court,
however, created a different rule for employees of an
Indian tribe. Applying that rule here, it concluded
that the victims of negligent driving on an interstate
highway in Connecticut—70 miles from an Indian res-
ervation—were prohibited from invoking Connecticut
tort law to seek compensation for their injuries in a
Connecticut court because the driver who ran into
them happened to be an employee of an Indian tribe.
That decision ignores the distinction this Court
has long maintained between individual-capacity and
official-capacity actions. It extends the sovereign im-
munity of an Indian tribe to a context—a damages ac-
tion seeking relief only from an individual employee—
in which the sovereign immunity of the United States
or a State would not apply. And it gives tribal em-
ployees an absolute immunity from suit that under-
mines the State’s interest in deterring wrongful con-
duct and tort victims’ interest in receiving compensa-
tion for their injuries.
That expansive immunity has no basis in law or pol-
icy. A tribal employee transporting gamblers to and
from a casino should not be treated as somehow akin
to a foreign ambassador. This Court should reverse
the decision below and hold that tribal employees, like
all other persons subject to a State’s jurisdiction, can
be held personally accountable for their wrongful con-
duct.
 3
STATEMENT
1. On October 22, 2011, petitioners Brian and
Michelle Lewis were driving southbound on Interstate
95 in Norwalk, Connecticut, when their car was struck
from behind by a limousine driven by respondent Wil-
liam Clarke. The impact propelled the Lewises’ car
forward with such force that it landed on top of the
concrete barrier separating opposite directions of traf-
fic. Both of the Lewises were injured. Pet. App. 2a.
Clarke is a Connecticut resident who holds a Con-
necticut driver’s license. At the time of the accident,
he was employed by the Mohegan Tribal Gaming Au-
thority (MTGA), an arm of the Mohegan Tribe of Indi-
ans of Connecticut, and his passengers were patrons of
the Mohegan Sun Casino, which is approximately 70
miles from Norwalk. Pet. App. 2a.
2. The Lewises brought a negligence action against
Clarke in the Connecticut Superior Court. They ini-
tially named both Clarke and the MTGA as defend-
ants, but before any of the defendants appeared, the
Lewises voluntarily dismissed the MTGA and filed an
amended complaint against only Clarke. Pet. App. 3a,
18a-19a.
Clarke moved to dismiss. He argued that the
MTGA was entitled to sovereign immunity because it
is an arm of the Mohegan Tribe and that he, in turn,
was entitled to sovereign immunity because he was an
employee of the MTGA acting within the scope of his
employment at the time of the accident. Pet. App. 22a.
The Connecticut Superior Court denied the motion
to dismiss. Pet. App. 18a-36a. The court applied the
test adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Maxwell v. Coun-
ty of San Diego, 708 F.3d 1075 (2013), under which
 4
tribal employees do not enjoy sovereign immunity
when “the remedy sought by the plaintiffs would op-
erate only against them personally.” Pet. App. 27a.
Here, the court explained, Clarke is “being sued solely
in his individual capacity for an alleged tort occurring
off the tribal reservation,” and “because the remedy
sought is not against the MTGA, Clarke is not immune
from suit.” Id. at 25a. The court acknowledged that
the MTGA had agreed to indemnify Clarke, but it re-
jected the suggestion “that the MTGA has the unilat-
eral power to expand the boundaries of sovereign im-
munity based on tribal legislation, contract or other
form of tribal indemnification of an employee.” Id. at
36a.
3. The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed. Pet.
App. 1a-17a. The court stated that “[t]he doctrine of
tribal immunity extends to individual tribal officials
acting in their representative capacity and within the
scope of their authority.” Id. at 10a (quoting
Romanella v. Hayward, 933 F. Supp. 163, 167 (D.
Conn. 1996), aff’d, 114 F.3d 15 (2d Cir. 1997)) (brackets
in original). It noted that “the tribe is neither a party,
nor the real party in interest because the remedy
sought will be paid by the defendant himself, and not
the tribe.” Pet. App. 13a. And it acknowledged that,
in Maxwell, the Ninth Circuit had concluded that sov-
ereign immunity is inapplicable when plaintiffs seek a
remedy only from individual tribal employees, not
from the tribe itself. Id. at 14a. But it reasoned that
Maxwell was inapposite because that case involved
allegations of gross negligence, not ordinary negli-
gence, and “[a]ctions involving claims of more than
negligence are often deemed to be outside the scope of
 5
employment and, therefore, not subject to sovereign
immunity.” Ibid. The court concluded that “plaintiffs
cannot circumvent tribal immunity by merely naming
the defendant, an employee of the tribe, when the
complaint concerns actions taken within the scope of
his duties and the complaint does not allege, nor have
the plaintiffs offered any other evidence, that he acted
outside the scope of his authority.” Id. at 16a-17a.
The court therefore remanded with instructions to
grant the motion to dismiss. Id. at 17a.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The sovereign immunity of an Indian tribe does not
bar individual-capacity damages actions against tribal
employees for torts committed within the scope of
their employment.
This Court has consistently distinguished between
suits seeking relief from a sovereign and suits seeking
damages from government employees or representa-
tives. When a plaintiff seeks damages from the sover-
eign, whether the sovereign is sued directly or
through its named officials, sovereign immunity ap-
plies. In an official-capacity action, although the offi-
cial is the nominal defendant, the plaintiff seeks relief
that runs against the government. Official-capacity
suits thus “represent only another way of pleading an
action against an entity of which an officer is an
agent,” and they may be barred by sovereign immuni-
ty. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)
(quoting Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)).
By contrast, sovereign immunity does not bar an
individual-capacity damages action, even if the action
arises out of conduct the official undertook while car-
 6
rying out official duties. That is because in an individ-
ual-capacity action, the plaintiff seeks to impose per-
sonal liability on the official, and any award of damag-
es “can be executed only against the official’s personal
assets.” Graham, 473 U.S. at 166. This understanding
of sovereign immunity is confirmed by examining ac-
tions against federal and state employees. This Court
has repeatedly held that the sovereign immunity of
the United States does not bar individual-capacity
damages actions against federal employees, and that
state sovereign immunity does not bar individual-
capacity damages actions against state employees.
The rule should be no different here. This Court
has never suggested that tribal sovereign immunity is
broader than the immunity enjoyed by the United
States or the States. The policies underlying immuni-
ty do not support expanding tribal sovereign immuni-
ty to bar individual-capacity damages actions against
tribal employees: doing so is not necessary to protect
the sovereign dignity of Indian tribes or to protect the
tribal fisc, nor is it needed to protect tribal autonomy
and self-government. On the other hand, barring
state-law tort actions against individual tribal employ-
ees would represent an unwarranted intrusion on
state regulatory authority and would deprive tort vic-
tims of compensation.
An Indian tribe has the power to enact statutes
permitting the resolution of tort claims in tribal court,
but it cannot expand its sovereign immunity from suit
in other forums. Even within a reservation, a tribe
has only limited authority to legislate with respect to
nonmembers. In the circumstances of this case, a tribe
does not have the authority to deprive nonmember
 7
tort victims of their state-law right to recover for
their injuries.
ARGUMENT
A. Sovereign immunity does not apply to actions
seeking relief from individual government
officials
This Court has held that “damages actions against
public officials require[] careful adherence to the dis-
tinction between personal- and official-capacity suits.”
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). Be-
cause an official-capacity action operates against the
sovereign, government officials sued in their official
capacity may assert sovereign immunity. Id. at 165-
166. By contrast, individual-capacity actions—also re-
ferred to as personal-capacity actions—do not impli-
cate sovereign immunity because a “victory in a per-
sonal-capacity action is a victory against the individual
defendant,” not the sovereign. Id. at 167.
1. “Official-capacity suits * * * ‘generally repre-
sent only another way of pleading an action against an
entity of which an officer is an agent.’” Graham, 473
U.S. at 165 (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)). Such a suit
“is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit
against the official’s office. As such it is no different
from a suit against the State itself.” Will v. Michigan
Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (citation
omitted); accord Graham, 473 U.S. at 166 (“[A]n offi-
cial-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to
be treated as a suit against the entity.”). Recognizing
the reality that an official-capacity suit is one against
the office, not the individual officeholder, the Federal
 8
Rules of Civil Procedure provide that “[a]n action does
not abate when a public officer who is a party in an of-
ficial capacity dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold
office while the action is pending.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
25(d). Instead, “[t]he officer’s successor is automati-
cally substituted as a party.” Ibid.; accord Fed. R.
App. P. 43(c)(2); Sup. Ct. R. 35.3. And if damages are
awarded in an official-capacity action, “a plaintiff seek-
ing to recover * * * must look to the government en-
tity itself.” Graham, 473 U.S. at 166; see Brandon v.
Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471 (1985) (“[A] judgment against a
public servant ‘in his official capacity’ imposes liability
on the entity that he represents.”).
“Personal-capacity suits,” by contrast, “seek to im-
pose personal liability upon a government official for
actions he takes under color of state law.” Graham,
473 U.S. at 165. While “officers sued for damages in
their official capacity * * * assume the identity of
the government that employs them,” officers who are
“sued in their personal capacity come to court as indi-
viduals.” Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27 (1991). That
distinction “is more than ‘a mere pleading device,’”
ibid. (quoting Will, 491 U.S. at 71), and it has im-
portant consequences in litigation. If the defendant in
an individual-capacity action leaves office, the defend-
ant’s successor is not automatically substituted. If the
defendant dies, “the plaintiff would have to pursue his
action against the decedent’s estate.” Graham, 473
U.S. at 166 n.11. And, most importantly, any “award
of damages against an official in his personal capacity
can be executed only against the official’s personal as-
sets,” not against the government. Id. at 166.
 9
2. Because an official-capacity action is really an
action against the sovereign, government officials sued
in their official capacity may assert sovereign immuni-
ty. “The general rule,” this Court has observed, “is
that relief sought nominally against an officer is in fact
against the sovereign if the decree would operate
against the latter.” Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58
(1963) (per curiam). In other words, when a plaintiff
seeks relief “against the sovereign, although nominally
directed against the individual officer,” then the plain-
tiff’s “suit is barred, not because it is a suit against an
officer of the Government, but because it is, in sub-
stance, a suit against the Government over which the
court, in the absence of consent, has no jurisdiction.”
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337
U.S. 682, 688 (1949); accord Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 756 (1999) (explaining that “sovereign immunity is
not limited to suits which name the State as a party if
the suits are, in fact, against the State”); In re Ayers,
123 U.S. 443, 506 (1887) (Sovereign immunity covers
“not only suits brought against a State by name, but
those also against its officers, agents, and representa-
tives, where the State, though not named as such, is,
nevertheless, the only real party * * * against which
the judgment or decree effectively operates.”).
By contrast, sovereign immunity does not bar dam-
ages actions against officials in their individual capaci-
ty. As a leading treatise explains, “[t]he Anglo-
American tradition did not include a general theory of
immunity from suit or from liability on the part of pub-
lic officers.” 5 Fowler V. Harper et al., Harper, James
and Gray on Torts § 29.8, at 786 (3d ed. 2008). While
“[i]n some circumstances [a] suit against an officer will
 10
in reality be a suit against the state, so that its allow-
ance would circumvent the state’s own immunity,”
that “would seldom, if ever, be the case if the action is
to recover tort damages out of the officer’s own pock-
et.” Id. § 29.9, at 790. Accordingly, this Court has
held that if an officer’s conduct is “such as to create a
personal liability, whether sounding in tort or in con-
tract, the fact that the officer is an instrumentality of
the sovereign does not, of course, forbid a court from
taking jurisdiction over a suit against him.” Larson,
337 U.S. at 686; accord Alden, 527 U.S. at 757 (“Even a
suit for money damages may be prosecuted against a
state officer in his individual capacity for unconstitu-
tional or wrongful conduct fairly attributable to the
officer himself, so long as the relief is sought not from
the state treasury but from the officer personally.”).
3. In the decision below, the Connecticut Supreme
Court expressly rejected what it called “the ‘remedy
sought’ approach” as articulated in Maxwell v. County
of San Diego, 708 F.3d 1075, 1088-1089 (9th Cir.
2013)—that is, an inquiry into whether the relief
sought in the litigation would run against the sover-
eign or only against the officer personally. Pet. App.
16a. Instead, the court focused on the capacity in
which the defendant was alleged to have acted; in its
view, the critical fact was Clarke’s status as “an em-
ployee of the tribe [who] was acting within the scope
of his employment when the accident occurred.” Ibid.
The other courts that have taken the same position as
the court below have employed similar reasoning.
See, e.g., Chayoon v. Chao, 355 F.3d 141, 143 (2d Cir.)
(holding that a plaintiff “cannot circumvent tribal im-
munity by merely naming officers or employees of the
 11
Tribe when the complaint concerns actions taken in
defendants’ official or representative capacities and
the complaint does not allege they acted outside the
scope of their authority”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 966
(2004); Koke v. Little Shell Tribe of Chippewa Indians
of Mont., Inc., 68 P.3d 814, 817 (Mont. 2003) (sovereign
immunity barred an action against tribal officials be-
cause “the tribal officials acted in their official capaci-
ties” in the events giving rise to the litigation).
That approach is contrary to this Court’s cases,
which make clear that “the crucial question is whether
the relief sought in a suit nominally addressed to the
officer is relief against the sovereign.” Larson, 337
U.S. at 687. And “[i]n a suit against the officer to re-
cover damages for the agent’s personal actions that
question is easily answered” because “[t]he judgment
sought will not require action by the sovereign or dis-
turb the sovereign’s property.” Ibid.
In focusing on whether Clarke was acting in his of-
ficial capacity, the court below ignored this Court’s in-
struction to determine whether a defendant is being
sued in his official capacity. Pet. App. 10a (observing
that Clarke was “acting in [his] representative capaci-
ty and within the scope of [his] authority” at the time
of the accident) (quoting Romanella v. Hayward, 933
F. Supp. 163, 167 (D. Conn. 1996), aff’d, 114 F.3d 15 (2d
Cir. 1997)). As this Court has explained, “the phrase
‘acting in their official capacities,’” when used in de-
scribing official-capacity claims, “is best understood as
a reference to the capacity in which the state officer is
sued, not the capacity in which the officer inflicts the
alleged injury.” Hafer, 502 U.S. at 26. In other words,
the “bar against official-capacity claims * * * does
 12
not mean that tribal officials are immunized from indi-
vidual-capacity suits arising out of actions they took in
their official capacities”; instead, immunity extends
only to “suits brought against them because of their
official capacities—that is, because the powers they
possess in those capacities enable them to grant the
plaintiffs relief on behalf of the tribe.” Native Am.
Distrib. v. Seneca–Cayuga Tobacco Co., 546 F.3d 1288,
1296 (10th Cir. 2008).
For that reason, in an individual-capacity action,
“whether defendants were acting in their official ca-
pacities under color of state or under color of tribal
law is wholly irrelevant” to the availability of sover-
eign immunity. Pistor v. Garcia, 791 F.3d 1104, 1114
(9th Cir. 2015). An individual-capacity suit against an
officer always “seeks to hold the officer personally lia-
ble for wrongful conduct taken in the course of her of-
ficial duties,” but “[a]s the officer personally is the
target of the litigation, she may not claim sovereign
immunity.” Ibid.; accord Hafer, 502 U.S. at 28. The
principle of sovereign immunity simply “does not erect
a barrier against suits to impose ‘individual and per-
sonal liability’” on government officials, even if that
liability is based on acts they performed in the course
of their official duties. Hafer, 502 U.S. at 30-31 (quot-
ing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238 (1974)).
B. The law governing actions against federal and
state officials provides additional evidence that
sovereign immunity does not apply to individual-
capacity damages actions
As explained above, the conclusion that sovereign
immunity does not bar individual-capacity damages
 13
actions follows from this Court’s statements about the
nature of such actions. That conclusion is also sup-
ported by a long history of litigation against both fed-
eral and state officials.
1. The sovereign immunity of the United States
does not bar damages actions against federal
officials
In the absence of an express statutory waiver,
“[s]overeign immunity shields the United States from
suit.” United States v. Bormes, 133 S. Ct. 12, 16
(2012). But the sovereign immunity of the United
States does not prohibit individual-capacity damages
actions against federal officers. Examples of such ac-
tions are plentiful.
One common type of damages action against federal
officials is that brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971), for certain constitutional violations.
In a Bivens action, the plaintiff seeks to recover dam-
ages from the defendants in their individual capacities.
Bivens actions are possible not because the Constitu-
tion creates an exception to sovereign immunity but
rather because imposing individual monetary liability
on federal officers is consistent with that immunity.
That principle is illustrated by Bivens itself, in which
the Court recognized a cause of action for constitu-
tional violations while acknowledging that it could not
create an exception to federal sovereign immunity:
“However desirable a direct remedy against the Gov-
ernment might be as a substitute for individual official
liability, the sovereign still remains immune to suit.”
Id. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
 14
The Court “implied a cause of action against federal
officials in Bivens in part because a direct action
against the Government was not available.” FDIC v.
Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 485 (1994). The premise of
Bivens, therefore, is that sovereign immunity applies
to actions against the government but does not apply
to individual-capacity damages actions against federal
officers. See Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de
Mexicali, A.C. v. United States, 482 F.3d 1157, 1173
(9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that a Bivens plaintiff
“seeks to impose personal liability upon a federal offi-
cial” and that “a Bivens suit against a defendant in his
or her official capacity would merely be another way of
pleading an action against the United States, which
would be barred by the doctrine of sovereign immuni-
ty”).
Another type of damages action that has historical-
ly been available against federal officials is one based
on state tort law. Congress has passed a series of
statutes addressing such actions, and the premise of
all of those statutes is that sovereign immunity is not a
barrier to damages actions against individual officials.
Early in the Nation’s history, Congress provided
for the removal to federal court of state-court claims
against federal officers “for any thing done, or omitted
to be done, as an officer of the customs.” Act of Feb. 4,
1815, ch. 31, § 8, 3 Stat. 198. That act was the prede-
cessor of the modern federal-officer removal statute,
which now permits the removal of any state-court civil
action against “any officer * * * of the United States
* * * in an official or individual capacity, for or relat-
ing to any act under color of such office.” 28 U.S.C.
1442(a)(1); see Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., 551 U.S.
 15
142, 147-149 (2007) (describing the history of the stat-
ute). “[T]he main point” of the statute, this Court has
observed, “is to give officers a federal forum in which
to litigate the merits of immunity defenses.” Id. at 151
(quoting Jefferson Cty. v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 447
(1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)). Litigating those official immunity defenses
would be unnecessary, of course, if such actions were
barred by sovereign immunity.
In 1961, Congress enacted a statute providing that
an action against the United States under the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq., would
be the exclusive remedy “for damage to property or
for personal injury, including death, resulting from the
operation by any employee of the Government of any
motor vehicle while acting within the scope of his of-
fice or employment.” Act of Sept. 21, 1961 (Federal
Drivers Act), Pub. L. No. 87-258, 75 Stat. 539. In so
doing, it barred tort actions against individual federal
employees based on motor-vehicle accidents. Explain-
ing the purpose of the legislation, the House Judiciary
Committee observed that while FTCA actions were
already available to the victims of accidents involving
government-employee drivers, accident victims could
choose to sue the employees as individuals. As a re-
sult, “all of the persons who operate vehicles for the
United States face the possibility of being sued as in-
dividuals for incidents which occur while they are per-
forming duties in behalf of the Government.” H.R.
Rep. No. 297, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1961); see id. at 3
(describing examples of tort claims that had been as-
serted against individual government employees). Be-
cause the sovereign immunity of the United States did
 16
not preclude such actions, Congress recognized that
only legislation could “exclude suits against employees
in their individual capacities.” S. Rep. No. 736, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1961).
Congress subsequently enacted similar statutes to
bar medical-malpractice actions against individual fed-
eral employees. See Act of Oct. 8, 1976 (Gonzalez Act),
Pub. L. No. 94-464, 90 Stat. 1985 (Armed Forces medi-
cal personnel); Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
Fiscal Year 1977, Pub. L. No. 94-350, § 119, 90 Stat.
828 (State Department medical personnel); Emergen-
cy Health Personnel Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-623,
§ 4, 84 Stat. 1870 (Public Health Service); Act of Oct.
31, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-311, § 6, 79 Stat. 1156 (Veter-
ans Administration medical personnel). As in the con-
text of federal drivers, the House Judiciary Commit-
tee recognized that if a “claimant chooses to sue the
officer or employee individually in a state court for al-
leged malpractice,” then “the only advantage [the de-
fendant] has is to remove the case to a Federal Dis-
trict Court and be represented by the Department of
Justice. If the defendant loses the case he must pay
the judgment.” H.R. Rep. 333, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1975); see S. Rep. No. 1264, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1976) (“Defense medical personnel have long been
subject to personal liability for actions arising out of
their official medical duties.”).
Then, in 1988, this Court decided Westfall v. Erwin,
484 U.S. 292, holding that state-law tort suits against
federal officers may be subject to an individual “offi-
cial immunity”—not to sovereign immunity—but that
the individual immunity is limited to situations in
which “the challenged conduct is within the outer pe-
 17
rimeter of an official’s duties and is discretionary in
nature.” Id. at 300. The Court observed that “abso-
lute immunity contravenes the basic tenet that indi-
viduals be held accountable for their wrongful con-
duct” and that “absolute immunity for federal officials
is justified only when ‘the contributions of immunity to
effective government in particular contexts outweigh
the perhaps recurring harm to individual citizens.’”
Id. at 295-296 (quoting Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306,
320 (1973)).
The decision in Westfall left plaintiffs free to pur-
sue individual-capacity damages actions against feder-
al officials whose conduct was not discretionary. Con-
gress altered that rule by enacting the Federal Em-
ployees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act
of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563, commonly
known as the Westfall Act. The Westfall Act makes
an FTCA action against the United States the exclu-
sive remedy for any “injury or loss of property, or per-
sonal injury or death arising or resulting from the neg-
ligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of
the government while acting within the scope of his
office or employment,” and, with limited exceptions, it
forecloses tort actions against individual federal em-
ployees. 28 U.S.C. 2679(b)(1). The Westfall decision
and the Westfall Act provide further evidence that the
sovereign immunity of the United States does not
eliminate the personal liability of federal employees. 1

1
The Westfall Act does not apply to this case because it gov-
erns only actions against federal employees. Under the Indian
Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 3, and the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 18, Congress
 18
2. State sovereign immunity does not bar
damages actions against state officials
The “fundamental postulates implicit in the consti-
tutional design,” Alden, 527 U.S. at 729, include the
principles that “each State is a sovereign entity in our
federal system” and that immunity from suit is “inher-
ent in the nature of sovereignty,” Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (internal
quotation marks omitted). State sovereign immunity
is protected by the Eleventh Amendment. But as in
the federal context, sovereign immunity does not bar
actions “against a state officer in his individual capaci-
ty for unconstitutional or wrongful conduct fairly at-
tributable to the officer himself.” Alden, 527 U.S. at
757; Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323
U.S. 459, 462 (1945) (“Where relief is sought under
general law from wrongful acts of state officials, the
sovereign’s immunity under the Eleventh Amendment
does not extend to wrongful individual action, and the
citizen is allowed a remedy against the wrongdoer
personally.”), overruled on other grounds, Lapides v.
Board of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613
(2002).
Individual-capacity damages actions are commonly
brought against state officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983.
In opposing the petition for a writ of certiorari, Clarke
suggested (Br. in Opp. 23) that such actions are possi-

likely would have authority to enact a similar statute governing

actions against tribal officials; if it were to do so, it could consider
whether to extend immunity to employees of tribal commercial
enterprises. As explained below, however, see pp. 29-31, infra,
the legislative authority of an Indian tribe is significantly more
limited than that of Congress or a state legislature.
 19
ble only because “Section 1983 abrogates sovereign
immunity,” but that is incorrect. This Court has held
that Section 1983 does not authorize a suit against a
State, in part because “Congress, in passing § 1983,
had no intention to disturb the States’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity.” Will, 491 U.S. at 66; accord
Graham, 473 U.S. at 169 n.17. Thus, damages actions
against state officials are permissible not because Sec-
tion 1983 has eliminated sovereign immunity but be-
cause “the Eleventh Amendment,” which guarantees
that immunity, simply “does not erect a barrier
against suits to impose ‘individual and personal liabil-
ity’ on state officials.” Hafer, 502 U.S. at 30-31 (quot-
ing Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 238).
Sovereign immunity also does not create a barrier
to non-constitutional tort actions against individual
state employees. As a consequence, many States have
adopted legislation to regulate such actions. In some
States, statutes provide for the indemnification of em-
ployees who are subject to individual liability based on
the performance of their official duties. See, e.g., Cal.
Gov’t Code Ann. § 825; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-10-
110; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 75-6109; La. Stat. Ann.
§ 13:5108.1; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 8112; Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 691.1408; N.Y. Pub. Off. Law § 17;
Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 30.285. Other States have enact-
ed statutes like the Westfall Act that make an action
against the State the exclusive remedy for torts com-
mitted by state employees, thereby barring suits
against the employees themselves. See, e.g., Alaska
Stat. Ann. § 09.50.253; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 4-165;
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.28; Ga. Code Ann. § 50-21-25;
Iowa Code Ann. § 669.5; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch.
 20
258, § 2; N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 32-12.2-03; S.D. Codi-
fied Laws § 21-32-17. The existence of those statutes
confirms the general rule that, in the absence of legis-
lation, state officials are not immune from individual
damages liability for acts within the scope of their em-
ployment.
C. Tribal sovereign immunity should not be
extended to bar individual-capacity damages
actions against tribal officials
In holding that tribal sovereign immunity bars
Clarke’s claims, the Connecticut Supreme Court in-
terpreted tribal sovereign immunity to be broader
than that of both the United States and the States.
That expansion cannot be justified by reference to the
traditional understanding of sovereign immunity; it is
not supported by the policies underlying immunity;
and it represents an unwarranted intrusion on state
regulatory authority.
1. Tribal sovereign immunity is no broader than
the sovereign immunity of the United States
or the States
As “domestic dependent nations,” Indian tribes en-
joy some of the attributes of sovereignty. Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). One
such attribute is sovereign immunity, and for that rea-
son, “Indian tribes have long been recognized as pos-
sessing the common-law immunity from suit tradition-
ally enjoyed by sovereign powers.” Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978). Insofar as
tribal sovereign immunity rests on the “traditional[]”
understanding of the immunity “enjoyed by sovereign
powers,” that immunity should not extend more
 21
broadly than that of other sovereigns, such as the
United States and the States. Ibid.; see Maxwell, 708
F.3d at 1089 (“We see no reason to give tribal officers
broader sovereign immunity protections than state or
federal officers given that tribal sovereign immunity is
coextensive with other common law immunity princi-
ples.”).
Nothing in this Court’s cases suggest that tribal
sovereign immunity is broader than that of the States
or the federal government. To the contrary, this
Court has recognized that it is narrower in some re-
spects: “[B]ecause of the peculiar ‘quasi-sovereign’
status of the Indian tribes, the Tribe’s immunity is not
congruent with that which the Federal Government,
or the States, enjoy.” Three Affiliated Tribes of the
Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, 476 U.S.
877, 890 (1986). There is accordingly no basis in prec-
edent for a broad rule of tribal sovereign immunity
that would insulate tribal employees from individual-
capacity damages actions.
This Court has expressed concerns about the scope
of tribal sovereign immunity. In Kiowa Tribe of Okla-
homa v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S.
751 (1998), the Court recognized that “[t]here are rea-
sons to doubt the wisdom of perpetuating the doc-
trine” of tribal sovereign immunity. Id. at 758. As the
Court observed, the doctrine “extends beyond what is
needed to safeguard tribal self-governance”; it is “in-
apposite to modern, wide-ranging tribal enterprises
extending well beyond traditional tribal customs and
activities”; and it “can harm those who are unaware
that they are dealing with a tribe * * * or who have
no choice in the matter, as in the case of tort victims.”
 22
Id. at 757-758. In Kiowa, the Court nevertheless ad-
hered to the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity be-
cause of principles of stare decisis. Id. at 760 (“[W]e
decline to revisit our case law and choose to defer to
Congress.”). It did the same in Michigan v. Bay Mills
Indian Community, 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2036 (2014)
(“[T]his Court does not overturn its precedents light-
ly.”). In so doing, however, the Court noted that it
had “never * * * specifically addressed * * *
whether immunity should apply in the ordinary way”
in the circumstances of this case—that is, when “a tort
victim, or other plaintiff who has not chosen to deal
with a tribe, has no alternative way to obtain relief for
off-reservation commercial conduct.” Id. at 2036 n.8.
The Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision disre-
gards those considerations to extend immunity to a
kind of action that the doctrine of sovereign immunity
never previously covered. This case presents no occa-
sion for this Court to decide whether the sovereign
immunity of the Mohegan Tribe itself extends to tort
claims arising from off-reservation commercial con-
duct. That issue was not raised below, and it is not
within the scope of the question presented. But the
Court’s expression of doubt as to the existence of trib-
al sovereign immunity in this context counsels strong-
ly against expanding that immunity to bar tort claims
against individual tribal employees. 2

2
Clarke has not argued that he enjoys any personal official im-
munity. Any such argument would be outside the scope of the
question presented and would lack merit in any event. This
Court has never held that the official immunity addressed in
Westfall extends to officials of Indian tribes, and the principles of
federal supremacy that support official immunity for federal em-
 23
2. Barring claims against individual officials
would not serve the purposes of sovereign
immunity
This Court has identified several interests that
sovereign immunity promotes. Extending immunity
to bar claims against individual tribal officials would
not serve those interests.
First, suits against tribal employees do not impair a
tribe’s sovereign dignity. In the context of state im-
munity, this Court has observed that “the Framers
thought it an impermissible affront to a State’s dignity
to be required to answer the complaints of private
parties in federal courts.” Federal Mar. Comm’n v.
South Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760
(2002); see Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v.
Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993) (“The
very object and purpose of the 11th Amendment were
to prevent the indignity of subjecting a State to the
coercive process of judicial tribunals at the instance of
private parties.”) (quoting Ayers, 123 U.S. at 505).
Suits seeking relief only from a tribe’s employees,
however, do not force the tribe “to answer the com-
plaints of private parties” and thus do not impair that
sovereign dignity.
Second, suits against tribal employees do not
“threaten the financial integrity” of a tribe. Alden,

ployees are not applicable to tribal employees. In addition, to the

extent that the distinction between discretionary and non-
discretionary conduct is relevant to determining whether an in-
dividual-capacity action would be barred, the conduct at issue in
this case—driving a limousine to transport casino patrons—
cannot be characterized as the sort of discretionary conduct that
this Court held to be protected in Westfall.
 24
527 U.S. at 750; see South Carolina State Ports Auth.,
535 U.S. at 765 (“[S]overeign immunity serves the im-
portant function of shielding state treasuries.”). As
explained above, a judgment in an individual-capacity
action may be enforced only against the employee’s
personal assets, not against the tribe itself. Some
tribes, of course, may choose to indemnify their em-
ployees for damage awards. See, e.g., Mohegan Tribal
Code §§ 2-27, 4-51 et seq. But that unilateral decision
does not expand the scope of immunity. This Court
has observed that “private suits for money damages”
directly against sovereigns may impair their “ability
to govern in accordance with the will of their citizens”
because such suits will mean that “the allocation of
scarce resources among competing needs” will be de-
termined by courts rather than through “deliberation
by the political process established by the citizens.”
Alden, 527 U.S. at 750-751. Indemnification, by con-
trast, reflects a tribe’s voluntary decision in accord-
ance with “the will of [its] citizens.” If a tribe finds
that indemnification is unduly burdensome, it can
choose not to engage in it, or to engage in it only in a
limited fashion. For example, as the Mohegan Tribe
has done, it may choose not to indemnify employees
who engage in “wanton, reckless or malicious” activi-
ty. Mohegan Tribal Code § 4-52. A tribe thus remains
free to make its own decisions about “the allocation of
scare resources.” Alden, 527 U.S. at 751.
Third, suits against tribal employees do not threat-
en tribal autonomy or self-governance. In Kiowa, this
Court observed that “the doctrine of tribal immunity
from suit might have been thought necessary to pro-
tect nascent tribal governments from encroachments
 25
by States.” 523 U.S. at 758. In some contexts, the ap-
plication of state law may “infringe[] on the right of
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be
ruled by them.” New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache
Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 332 (1983) (quoting McClanahan
v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 172
(1973)). In those cases, federal laws and policies may
preempt the application of certain state laws to on-
reservation activity, unless the state interests at stake
are sufficient to justify the assertion of state authori-
ty. See Mescalero Apache Tribe, supra; White Moun-
tain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980). But
the application of nondiscriminatory rules of state tort
law to the off-reservation conduct of tribal employees
does not implicate those considerations. See
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-
149 (1973) (“Indians going beyond reservation bounda-
ries have generally been held subject to nondiscrimi-
natory state law otherwise applicable to all citizens of
the State.”).
That is especially so where, as here, the employees
are engaged in a commercial activity. Commercial ac-
tivities conducted by tribes may help fund governmen-
tal functions, but that does not alter their fundamen-
tally commercial nature, nor does it mean that they
implicate tribal self-governance. See Solis v. Mathe-
son, 563 F.3d 425, 434 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]here is noth-
ing * * * involving self-governance about the em-
ployment of Indians and non-Indians by a retail busi-
ness engaged in interstate commerce.”); Florida Par-
aplegic Ass’n v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla.,
166 F.3d 1126, 1129 (11th Cir. 1999) (concluding that “a
commercial enterprise open to non-Indians from which
 26
the Tribe intends to profit * * * does not relate to the
governmental functions of the Tribe”); Reich v.
Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d 174, 181 (2d
Cir. 1996) (concluding that a tribe’s “employment of
non-Indians weighs heavily against its claim that its
activities affect rights of self-governance in purely in-
tramural matters,” and observing that “tribal relations
with non-Indians fall outside the normal ambit of trib-
al self-government”).
3. Actions against tribal employees serve
important state interests
Individual-capacity damages actions against tribal
employees can serve important state regulatory inter-
ests. Expanding sovereign immunity to bar such
claims would impair those interests.
Even within an Indian reservation, a State has con-
siderable regulatory authority. This Court’s “cases
make clear that the Indians’ right to make their own
laws and be governed by them does not exclude all
state regulatory authority on the reservation.” Neva-
da v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361 (2001); see ibid. (“State
sovereignty does not end at a reservation’s border.”).
And the State’s authority is greater still outside of a
reservation. Thus, when this Court reaffirmed in Bay
Mills that tribes do not give up their sovereign im-
munity by engaging in off-reservation commercial ac-
tivity, it emphasized that tribal officials would remain
subject to state regulation and that a State would re-
tain a “panoply of tools * * * to enforce its law on its
own lands.” 134 S. Ct. at 2035. It observed that “to
the extent civil remedies proved inadequate, [a State]
could resort to its criminal law.” Ibid. Those state-
 27
ments are consistent with the principle that a State,
unlike an Indian tribe, retains “the power to enforce
laws against all who come within the sovereign’s terri-
tory.” Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 685 (1990); see
Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546
U.S. 95 (2005).
Tort judgments are an important means by which a
State “enforce[s] its law on its own lands.” Bay Mills,
134 S. Ct. at 2035. As this Court has explained, “[t]he
obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is de-
signed to be, a potent method of governing conduct
and controlling policy.” Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc.,
505 U.S. 504, 521 (1992) (plurality opinion) (quoting
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S.
236, 247 (1959)); see Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 901 (1979). When an enterprise enjoys sovereign
immunity, it need not comply with rules of conduct es-
tablished by state tort law, including taking precau-
tions to prevent accidents, because it will not be forced
to internalize the cost of its misconduct. In that con-
text, the only way to deter tortious conduct is by al-
lowing the victims of a wrong to seek a remedy from
the individuals who injured them.
Tort law also serves a State’s policy of ensuring
compensation for victims. Because sovereign immuni-
ty may bar a suit against a tribe itself, an action
against the individual tortfeasor is the only way for
the victim of a tort committed by a tribal employee to
receive the compensation that state law provides. Of
course, it is possible that some tribes may choose to
waive immunity to allow tort suits directly against the
tribe. Under the Mohegan Tribal Code, for example, a
person injured in circumstances such as those of this
 28
case may bring a claim, but only in the Mohegan Gam-
ing Disputes Court. See Mohegan Tribal Code § 3-
248(a). Such a proceeding carries no right to a jury
trial, and any award is subject to strict limits on non-
economic damages and to a prohibition on punitive
damages and damages for loss of consortium. Mohe-
gan Tribal Code §§ 3-248(d), 3-251(a). More im-
portantly, that remedy exists only at the grace of the
Tribe. Many tribes have not created a tort-claims pro-
cedure; many have no court systems at all. Steven W.
Perry, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statis-
tics, Census of Tribal Justice Agencies in Indian
Country, 2002, at iii (2005). As applied in those set-
tings, an extension of tribal sovereign immunity to bar
actions against tribal employees will leave injured
plaintiffs with no remedy.
In the context of commercial disputes, the potential
for unfairness of a broad application of tribal sovereign
immunity may be limited because parties dealing with
tribes can contract for a waiver of immunity. See, e.g.,
C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indi-
an Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 411, 418 (2001) (tribe
waived immunity by agreeing to a contract with an
arbitration clause). Similarly, as this Court observed
in Bay Mills, a State seeking the ability to sue a tribe
“need only bargain for a waiver of immunity” when
negotiating a gaming compact. 134 S. Ct. at 2035. But
that is not true of “a tort victim, or other plaintiff who
has not chosen to deal with a tribe.” Id. at 2036 n.8.
That reality is vividly illustrated by the facts of this
case: As they were driving on an interstate highway
70 miles away from the Mohegan Tribe’s reservation,
the Lewises had no reason to anticipate that a tribal
 29
employee would run into them, and thus they had no
occasion to negotiate a waiver of immunity. It would
be unfair and anomalous to apply sovereign immunity
to deprive them of their state-law right to seek com-
pensation for their injuries in a state court.
D. A tribe cannot expand its sovereign immunity by
statute
In opposing the petition for a writ of certiorari,
Clarke emphasized (Br. in Opp. 25-26) that the Mohe-
gan Tribe has adopted a statute providing for the reso-
lution of tort claims in a proceeding against the Tribe
(not an individual tribal employee) in tribal court. The
statute also provides that “[t]he sovereign immunity
of The Mohegan Tribe shall attach * * * to the ac-
tions or inactions of any individual acting on behalf of
The Mohegan Tribe.” Mohegan Tribal Code § 4-116(c);
see also Mohegan Tribal Code § 3-249(a) (“Venue for
tort claims * * * against authorized representatives
of the MTGA acting within the scope of their employ-
ment, shall be found exclusively in the Mohegan Gam-
ing Disputes Court.”). The Connecticut Supreme
Court did not rely on those statutes, and with good
reason. While the Tribe has the authority to limit the
jurisdiction of its own courts, it may not limit the ju-
risdiction of the Connecticut courts, and it may not
strip petitioners of their state-law rights by insulating
Clarke from liability for his off-reservation conduct.
This Court has held that tribes do not possess the
authority “to determine their external relations” with
non-Indians. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313,
326 (1978). Even within a reservation, “tribes lack civ-
il authority over the conduct of nonmembers on non-
 30
Indian fee land.” Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532
U.S. 645, 647 (2001). Instead, tribal sovereignty “cen-
ters on the land held by the tribe and on tribal
members within the reservation.” Plains Commerce
Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316,
327 (2008); see also United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S.
544, 557 (1975) (tribes retain authority to govern “both
their members and their territory”). For that reason,
“tribes do not, as a general matter, possess authority
over non-Indians who come within their borders.”
Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 328.
Within its territory, the legislative authority of an
Indian tribe is limited. Tribes “have lost any ‘right of
governing every person within their limits except
themselves,’” subject to two narrow exceptions. Mon-
tana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981) (quot-
ing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191,
209 (1978)). Under the first exception, tribes may
regulate “nonmembers who enter consensual relation-
ships with the tribe or its members.” Ibid.; see
Strate v. A–1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 456-457
(1997)). Under the second exception, tribes may regu-
late nonmember conduct that “threatens or has some
direct effect on the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.” Mon-
tana, 450 U.S. at 566. While the second exception may
appear broad when “[r]ead in isolation,” it is limited to
“‘what is necessary to protect tribal self-government
or to control internal relations.’” Strate, 520 U.S. at
459 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 564). The conduct
to be regulated “must do more than injure the tribe, it
must ‘imperil the subsistence’ of the tribal communi-
 31
ty.” Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 341 (quoting
Montana, 450 U.S. at 566).
Even within a tribe’s territory, neither of the Mon-
tana exceptions would empower a tribe to eliminate
the common-law right to maintain individual-capacity
suits against tortfeasors. As a general matter, tort
victims have not entered into a consensual agreement
with a tribe, nor have they engaged in an activity that
imperils tribal welfare. While a tribe may have the
authority to regulate its employees, it may not regu-
late unconsenting third parties by depriving them of
rights they would otherwise enjoy. And that conclu-
sion has even greater force where, as here, a claim
arises out of off-reservation conduct. In these circum-
stances, allowing a tribe to strip tort victims of their
right to bring state-law causes of action in state court
would represent an unprecedented expansion of tribal
legislative authority.
 32
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the Connecticut Supreme Court
should be reversed, and the case should be remanded
for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted.

JAMES M. HARRINGTON ERIC D. MILLER

POLITO & ASSOCIATES, LLC Counsel of Record
567 Vauxhall Street Ext. L UKE M. R ONA
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NOVEMBER 2016