Iberoamericana.

Nordic Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies

Vol. XXXII: 2 2002, pp. 73-96

DEMOCRATISATION AND STATE-CIVIL SOCIETY RELATIONS IN CHILE,

1983-2000: FROM EFFERVESCENCE TO DEACTIVATION

Patricio Silva

I. INTRODUCTION
The 1973 military coup in Chile did not only put an end to the
Socialist experiment led by Salvador Allende, it also destroyed one of the
oldest democracies of Latin America. For more than seventeen years, a
military regime led by General Augusto Pinochet ruled the country in an
extremely repressive manner. Political parties and leaders were persecuted,
tortured and assassinated, while all kind of social organizations and
associations came under state surveillance or were outlawed. In this way,
the nature of the traditional state-civil society relations in Chile, based in
the existence of a complex and good organized civil society which was
connected to the state through the active mediation of strong and
representative political parties, abruptly came to an end.
During the 1980s, however, Chile experienced a peculiar process of
democratic liberalization, which was eventually facilitated by the 1980
Constitution imposed by Pinochet himself. This process culminated with
the full restoration of democratic rule in March 1990. Since then, Chile has
experienced a relatively successful process of democratic consolidation in
which for a long time government and opposition reached a high degree of
consensus in several areas of policy-making, while the country’s economic
performance has been among the best within the developing world.
Nevertheless, a series of ‘authoritarian enclaves’ remain within Chile’s
institutional and legal system, as a heritage of the former regime. In
addition, even today the influence of General Pinochet has continued to put
the country’s political stability under permanent strain.
The Chilean nation has not yet found the way to adequately deal with its
recent political past, as both the Allende and Pinochet years continue to
exert a very strong influence on current political events. For instance,
questions such as the responsibility of the Right and the Left (concepts

doi:https://doi.org/10.16993/ibero.152
74 Democratisation and State-Civil Society Relations in Chile, 1983-2000

which are still very alive in this country) in the destruction of the former
democratic system, and particularly the human rights violations committed
by the Pinochet regime, still keep Chilean society divided in two almost
irreconcilable camps. On the one hand, there are many Chileans who
enthusiastically supported the former military regime and now forcefully
defend the ‘oeuvre’ of General Pinochet and his person. On the other hand,
there is another part of Chilean society which decisively opposed the
military government and now demands justice and punishment for those
involved in the human rights violations committed by the military in the
period 1973-1989. The existence of these two Chiles became clear for
international public opinion when Pinochet was detained in London in
October 1998. A part of Chile euphorically celebrated this historical event,
while the rest of the country frenetically defended the old General and
demanded his immediate release.
In this paper, I explore the role Chilean civil society has played in
national affairs both during the military government and the current
democratic period inaugurated in 1990. I attempt to analyze one of the key
paradoxes of the process of democratic transition in Chile: the fact that
Chile’s civil society has become extremely deactivated following the
democratic restoration, while during the military government, particularly
in its final stage, civil society was very active in national affairs. How can
one explain the relative apathy and demobilization one can find in present
day Chilean civil society? As I will argue here, we are dealing with an
extremely complex phenomenon representing the result of the combination
of a series of historical, political, social, cultural and institutional factors.
Among these factors one can mention the traumatic experience of Chile’s
recent political history and the fears for populism, the pacted nature of the
democratic transition, and the moderate and reconciliatory character of the
new democratic authorities. Also, the good performance shown by the
Chilean economy, and the relatively good functioning of institutions and
the strength of the country’s political parties system have contributed to the
further demobilization of civil society. Last but not least, the social and
cultural impact of the neoliberal model of society imposed by Pinochet, and
the relative absence (and hence lack of influence) of the international donor
community to actively promote a larger role for civil society in this
country, have also produced negative effects on the citizen’s disposition to
actively participate in national affairs.

II. CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA

The wave of democratization moving across Latin America since the
mid-1980s generated a vigorous debate about its causes and the prospects for
 Patricio Silva 75

democratic consolidation in the continent (cf. O’Donnell et al., 1986;

Malloy and Seligson, 1987; Baloyra, 1987; Munck, 1989; Mainwairing et
al., 1992; Peeler, 1998). Among the most contested issues in the transition
debate, we find the assessment of the role played by civil society in
precipitating the final crisis of authoritarian rule in Latin America and the
definition of civil society itself. Following Diamond (1999:221), I
understand civil society as “the realm of organized social life that is open,
voluntary, self-generating, at least partially self-supporting, autonomous
from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared values”.
However, under the concept civil society we have to understand all sectors
of society, and not just the poor and the repressed and not only that part of
society who resists authoritarian rule, as it has frequently occurred in
studies centered on the nature of civil society in Latin America. One also
has to include into the equation those sectors in society that tacitly or
openly support the undemocratic regime. By stressing this point, I only
want to make clear that civil society is far from being a cohesive entity and
that its internal strong contradictions and conflicts can be present, as the
Chilean case clearly shows. As Stepan points out, civil society represents
an “arena where manifold social movements (such as neighborhood
associations, women’s groups, religious groupings, and intellectual
currents) and civic organizations from all classes (such as lawyers,
journalists, trade unions, and entrepreneurs) attempt to constitute
themselves in an ensemble of arrangements so that they can express
themselves and advance their interests” (Stepan, 1988:3-4; emphasis mine).
But, again, how important was the role played by civil society in
causing the terminal crisis of military government in the Southern Cone of
South America? To this respect, two rather antagonistic interpretations
have been put forwards. In the seminal and influential study by O’Donnell
and Schmitter (1986:19) a clear state-oriented interpretation is presented in
which the end of the military regimes is related to deep internal
disagreements and conflicts within the ruling coalition. As they
categorically put it: “we assert that there is no transition whose beginning is
not the consequence, direct or indirect, of important divisions within the
authoritarian regime itself, principally along the fluctuating cleavage
between hard-liners and soft-liners”. From this perspective, only when the
moderate sector imposes its position within the inner circle to ‘decompress’
the political system, civil organizations make use of the broader political
space to reactive themselves and to press for more freedom and eventually
for the restoration of democratic rule. This mobilization, however, is
according to them only temporary. As they argue, “the ‘opening’ … of
authoritarian rule, usually produces a sharp and rapid increase in general
76 Democratisation and State-Civil Society Relations in Chile, 1983-2000

politicization and popular activation (..). However, this wave crests sooner
or later, depending on the case. A certain normality is subsequently
reasserted as some individuals and groups depoliticize themselves again,
having run out of resources or become disillusioned, and as others
deradicalize themselves, having recognized that their maximal hopes will
not be achieved. Still others simply become tired of constant mobilization
and its intrusion into their private lives” (Ibid.:26). Unfortunately, they do
not provide explicit evidences or examples of the ways this process of
depoliticization and deradicalization take place in specific countries. Later,
I will illustrate these phenomena for the case of Chile.
Contrasting to this interpretation, Stepan (1985) vindicates the
importance of the mobilization of civil society against authoritarian rule in
forcing the regime change. In addition, he stresses the need to pay more
attention to the dynamics of state-civil society relations in order to
understand the changes at state level. In his view, however, the nature of
this relation not always necessarily represents a zero-sum situation (in
which a strong state led to a weak civil society or that a weak state is
generally accompanied by a strong civil society). For instance, he mentions
the case of Argentina where in the early 1980s a decline in state power
went hand in hand with a decline in the strength of civil society. In
contrast, Brazil experienced a brief positive-sum period (1970-1973) in
which civil society began to rebuild its institutions while the state
continued to acquire additional coercive capacity. In the Chilean case, as he
correctly points out, state power under Pinochet in the period 1973-1981
radically increased while the power of civil society dramatically declined.
This was made possible by a series of factors such as the intensity of the
class conflict during the period that preceded the coup, making it relatively
easy for the military to obtain a broad acceptance of their political project
from the large and powerful middle and upper classes. In addition, during
that period the repressive apparatus of the Pinochet regime possessed a
high degree of internal institutional cohesion, which, for many years, made
the organization of active opposition coming from civil society practically
impossible (Stepan, 1985:320).

III. DISARTICULATING CHILEAN CIVIL SOCIETY: THE ROLE OF

CONSUMERISM
The disarticulation of civil society during the largest part of the
Pinochet regime cannot be exclusively attributed to repression alone. The
neoliberal model of society imposed by Pinochet and his Chicago boys1
produced profound social and cultural transformations that for many years
also helped to keep Chilean civil society in a state of disarray. The Chicago
 Patricio Silva 77

boys rejected collective efforts among the population and stimulated the
achievement of individualistic goals. Happiness and individual rewards had
to be found in the market in a constant attempt to increase the personal
levels of consumption of goods. The new value system supported by them
represented in fact an open appeal to the population to liberate its
consumerist desires (cf. Silva, 1995).
The project of authoritarian modernization imposed by the military
regime was oriented toward the full opening of the Chilean economy to
foreign competition and the total integration of the country into the world
market. The neo-liberal economic policies led to a full-scale privatization
of the state-owned industries and almost to the elimination of the traditional
role played by the state in the country's socioeconomic development. The
idea was to replace the state by the alleged `impersonal rule of the market'
as the main mechanism for the allocation of resources in society (cf.
Foxley, 1985).
By the full integration of the Chilean economy into the world market,
Chilean upper and middle classes did dramatically enlarge their access to
consumer goods from the core countries, leading to the adoption of very
sophisticated patterns of consumption. Although the import wave of
consumer goods mainly benefited the dominant social sectors in society,
the popular sectors were not entirely marginalized from the new
phenomenon of consumerism. In a sense this is true even for those who did
not obtain 'effective' access to those goods, as they at least ideologically
assimilated the idea of modernity as formulated by the military regime in
which 'modernity' became almost equalized with 'consumerism'. In the
authoritarian conception of modernity the 'liberty to consume' has to
replace political liberty in an effort to depoliticize society and consolidate
the personal rule of general Pinochet (cf. Moulian, 1998).
The attempt by the military government to redefine Chileans as
'consumers' instead of 'citizens' was mainly directed to privatize the nature
of the social relations within civil society. For this purpose, the regime tried
to destroy all kind of collective identities existing in Chilean society such
as party and neighborhood loyalties and social solidarity with the needy,
which were officially seen as unwanted heritages of a 'socialistic' past. As a
substitute for the search of collective goals, the military government
offered a neo-liberal ideology that was entirely directed to obtaining
'individual' achievements (Moulian and Vergara, 1980; Vergara, 1985). In
this manner, individual freedom was redefined so as to encourage free
access to open markets, while the `pleasure of consumption' was presented
as an instrument to express social differentiation and as a way to obtain
personal rewards. From this perspective, the Chicago boys pointed out that
78 Democratisation and State-Civil Society Relations in Chile, 1983-2000

social mobility was in fact mainly a question of personal achievement. At

the end, the expansion of consumerist behavior in Chile generated a kind of
passive conformism among the population, who eventually accepted the
individualistic tenets of the neo-liberal economic model based on the
search for private satisfactions. Chile had in fact become a consumer
society, this despite the country's strong social stratification and ine-
qualities.
The internationalization of the Chilean economy has not only
strengthened consumerism in the local culture, but it also has led to the
adoption of values, beliefs, ideas and even patterns of behavior and cultural
orientations similar of those of the core countries. Indeed, one can state that
Chilean society has been deeply shaken by the modernizing neoliberal
project. Actually, with the relative expansion of the market relations also
the patterns of behavior regulated by economic calculations have been
expanded. In addition, many people incorporated themselves to a system of
meritocratic and individualistic mobility, replacing the old system in which
one had to be part of a group (mainly political parties) and in which
mobility was conditioned mainly by the capability of the group to exert
political pressure on the state.
The consumption-oriented model introduced by the military govern-
ment had from the very beginning a structural weakness. To wit, the
expansion of consumption was not based on a sound economic
development based on real production, but it had been mainly financed by
external loans. Although the Chilean economy experienced growth in the
period 1977-1981, this was far from sufficient to cope with the country’s
increasing financial indebtedness towards the international banks.
Politically, the military government had linked her legitimating toward the
population with the continuous expansion of the consumption of consumer
goods. In 1981, however, the neoliberal model collapsed as a result of a
wave of financial speculation and the enormous foreign debt Chile had
incurred to the tune of almost 20 billion dollars. A deep economic recession
followed, which suddenly interrupted the consumerist boom. This produced
great discontent and frustration among the upper and middle classes becau-
se the crisis had destroyed the life styles they had developed in the previous
years. The economic crisis also activated the opposition to the military
government, which in the boom years proved not to be able to counteract
the neo-liberal ideological machine.

IV. THE SHORT-LIVED REAWAKENING OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Since 1983, Chile experienced a true resurrection of the old political
parties who mobilized the population around the demand for the restoration
 Patricio Silva 79

of democratic rule. After almost a decade, the outlawed political

organizations began gradually to reestablish its partisan activities in an
increasingly open manner, while the military government, showing clear
signs of weakness, searched for some formula to tackle the new political
situation (cf. Valenzuela and Valenzuela, 1986; Cavarozzi and Garretón,
1989). A mass protest against the government, held on May 11, 1983, marked
the definitive reactivation of Chilean civil society. Since that historical
demonstration, several `days of national protest' were organized in a monthly
basis in Chile's largest cities, demanding the restoration of democracy. At the
beginning, the protest movement succeeded in mobilizing not only the
popular sectors, but also an important part of the urban middle classes who
had become extremely frustrated and angry due to the persisting depression.
The period 1983-1988 were glorious years for several actors in Chilean civil
society such as labor unions, the squatter movements, women organizations,
human rights groups, Indian confederations, and the like. These movements
and related NGOs obtained huge financial support of developmental agencies
and political organizations from Western countries. The spectacular
reactivation of social movements in Chile since 1983 has more recently
originated a rich debate about the role of grassroots movements and civil
society as large played in the opposition against the Pinochet regime (cf.
Oxhorn, 1995; Schneider, 1995; Guillaudat and Mouterde, 1998). Oxhorn,
for instance, refers to the paradoxical effect of state repression in making
possible the generation of a more relative autonomous civil society. As he
indicates; “authoritarian rule causes the multiplication of different
organizations in society and, in particular, if the cessation of traditional forms
of political activity enhances the autonomy of such organizations to define
and pursue their own interests, [a] variegated civil society (..) may actually
begin to emerge in embryonic form under the authoritarian regime. (..) Under
certain circumstances, the resumption of significant base-level organizational
activity is not only possible under an authoritarian regime, but also a direct
result of the authoritarian experience itself” (Oxhorn, 1995:6).
After some months of broad opposition activity against the authoritarian
regime, the `days of national protest' began to gain an unexpected radical
character, while the democratic opposition parties proved unable to channel
and to guide the protest actions of the exalted masses. This was particularly
the case in the shantytowns surrounding Santiago where the protests against
the government reached almost insurrectional dimensions. Radical segments
of the opposition, like the Communist party and the Movement of
Revolutionary Left (MIR), actively supported the violent actions of the
pobladores, as they had chosen for a strategy of 'popular insurrection' to bring
down the dictatorship. The government answered this challenge with massive
80 Democratisation and State-Civil Society Relations in Chile, 1983-2000

military operations in the shantytowns that led to the death of dozens of

pobladores. This demonstration of military power deeply shocked
shantytown dwellers, as it resembled the methods used by the military forces
following the 1973 coup (Martínez, 1986; Salazar, 1990).
As Tironi points out; “the violence which broke out as a result of the
protests of 1983 and 1984 automatically revived in the collective memory the
images of the traumatic crisis of 1973” (1990:181). The military government
did ingeniously use through the mass media the images of pobladores’
violence in order to reactivate the middle class’ fears for chaos and
insurrection of the popular sectors. At the end of 1984, most of the
manifestation of protests that has been previously observed in Santiago’s
middle class neighborhoods had virtually disappeared. Both the ‘threat from
bellow’ and the strong recovery experienced by the Chilean economy since
mid-1984, deactivated middle class' agitation, permitting Pinochet to regain
control of the situation. In other words, class cleavages did eventually divided
Chilean civil society about the desirability to put an end to military rule.
The democratic opposition took major lessons from the ‘days of protest’
that proved decisive for the later adoption of a workable political strategy to
put an end to military rule in the country. First, the protests had showed that
mass political actions would not bring down this dictatorship, which proved
still to be strong and to count on a considerable support from the population.
After this experience, the democratic opposition parties chose for a top-down
approach, directed rather to the achievement of agreements at the directive
levels of the political organizations than the political activation of the masses.
Second, the use of violence results counterproductive as this provides
legitimacy to the military rulers to repress the people, and permitted the
reactivation of the fears of regression to old forms of confrontation. The
protest experience also proved that the objective to constitute a single front
against Pinochet was unreal: left-wing extremism had clearly chosen for a
violent and armed path, while the rest of the opposition had now very
convincingly opted for a political outlet. Third, it became manifest that the
first priority of the democratic opposition was to constitute as soon as
possible a alliance of parties that should have to become a moderate and
credible alternative to the military regime. And finally, it seemed very
unlikely that the military government should deviate from its institutional
agenda as stipulated in its own 1980 Constitution. It implies that sooner or
later the democratic opposition would have to accept the validity of that
controversial constitution, by fully using the few political spaces permitted by
the authoritarian legislation.
In the end, center and moderate leftist political parties managed to
regain their control on a large part of grassroots organizations that became
 Patricio Silva 81

largely subordinated to the general goal to defeat Pinochet at a Plebiscite,

which according to the 1980 constitution had to take place in October 1988
(by which Pinochet attempted to obtain the population's approval for the
continuation of his regime for another eight years).
The opposition forces were realistic enough not to ignore the fact that
Chile as a whole had experienced a profound process of modernization since
the late 1970s. So during 1988 referendum, they did not center their
campaign around economic issues, but on the human right abuses of the
military to which the Pinochet government had no clear-cut answers or
explanations. At the eve of the referendum, it was clear that Chilean society
has been radically modernized, this being true not only at the economic field.
To wit, the new pattern of accumulation introduced by the neo-liberals had
indeed helped to reduce the traditional dependency of society on the state,
and has stimulated a process of individualization and diversification,
enlarging the distance between public and private life. In addition, social
organizations had become less politicized, while political parties have
become less corporative. In short, Chilean culture had become, in general
terms, more pragmatic, more secular, and more individualistic (Tironi, 1990).

V. THE OTHER SIDE OF CIVIL SOCIETY: THE ENTREPRENEURIAL ELITES

When dealing with the role played by civil society in the Chilean
transition, the politically influential entrepreneurial organizations have also
to be incorporated into the analysis. So while progressive social movements
and the popular sectors mobilized themselves in an attempt to bring down
the military regime, this other side of civil society directed a considerable
part of their financial, political and ideological resources towards the
objective of keeping Pinochet in power (cf. Montero, 1997).
O'Donnell et al (1986) managed to place the elites back in the center
of the political analysis, after more than a decade in which only the study of
social movements and the popular sectors under the authoritarian regimes
had captivated the attention of most scholars. They strongly emphasize the
extraordinary degree of uncertainty characterizing the transition process. In
a context of rapid social changes, a set of specific actors may take crucial
decisions without having a full understanding of the future significance of
these decisions for the evolution of the new political regime. Potter
summarizes this elite-oriented approach towards transitions in the
following words: “democratization is largely contingent on what elites and
individuals do when, where and how. (..) The historical route to liberal
democracy is determined fundamentally by the agency of elite initiatives
and actions, not by changing structures” (1997:17-18). Indeed, in most
Latin American cases, democratic transition has been facilitated by some
82 Democratisation and State-Civil Society Relations in Chile, 1983-2000

sort of pact or pacts (or even clear cut elite settlements such as in the cases
of Uruguay and El Salvador) that served to regulate competition and
conflict between competing political elites. Peeler, for instance, recognizes
the important role played by successful mass mobilization of opposition
elites, as their credibility as potential negotiators with the government
depends substantially on their ability to mobilize and guide a mass of their
followers. This is especially important at the beginning of the transition
process, but once political parties retake their pivotal position in national
politics, much less room is left for social movements and other autonomous
political manifestations (1998:83-88, 193).
This process of negotiation between regime and opposition elites can
evolve into what Higley and Gunther have called 'elite convergence',
representing a series of deliberate, tactical decisions by rival elites that
have the cumulative effect of creating elite consensual unity. As they point
out, the opposition elite can arrive at the conclusion that there is no way to
challenge their rivals' hegemonic position except to beat them at their own
game. Thus, “they decide to compete according to the regime's rules of the
game, implicitly or explicitly acknowledging the legitimacy of its
institutions” (Higley and Gunther, 1992:xi-xii, 24-30). This is precisely
what happened in Chile as the democratic opposition to Pinochet implicitly
accepted the rule of the game imposed by the authoritarian regime by
deciding to challenge the government by using the few legal mechanisms
allowed by the 1980 constitution (particularly the 1988 plebiscite and the
subsequent 1989 general elections).
It is important to stress here that the concept elites is generally used to
indicate political elites, i.e. representatives of the regimes (both military
and civilians) and leaders of the opposition political parties. Time and
again, the role played by economic elites and their associations in the
course of the transition process is generally neglected – Cardoso (1986) and
Campero (1991) being among the few exceptions.
If we look at the Chilean case, the negotiations between some civilian
officials of the military government and the Concertación coalition,
certainly was a decisive step towards the restoration of democratic rule in
the country (cf. Cavarozzi, 1992). However, the strategic position adopted
by entrepreneurial groups towards the democratic opposition during the
transition process became also dramatically important.
As mentioned before, the 1981-1983 economic crisis had produced the
formation of active political opposition to the military government who
then had to deal with a major political challenge coming from the center
and the left. Many entrepreneurs, who feared the consequences of
widespread changes in the political and economic spheres, responded by
 Patricio Silva 83

renewing their political support for Pinochet. They followed the main
strategy adopted by all the major national entrepreneurial organizations
such as Sociedad de Fomento Fabril (SFF) and the Confederación de la
Producción y el Comercio (CPC). Their pressures on the government to
adopt a ‘pragmatic’ economic policy in answer to the crisis were directed at
defending both their own immediate economic interests and the political
regime as well. According to many entrepreneurs, the government's
persistence in maintaining neo-liberal policies (as it initially did) would not
only continue to destroy hundreds of enterprises, but would also strengthen
the radical sectors of the opposition. To strengthen the extreme left could
have unforeseeable consequences, putting in danger even the very
existence of the free market system in a period of great political uncertainty
(cf. Campero, 1988).
The outbreak of the economic crisis brought with it a national political
debate on issues of social justice and social inequality in Chile. Indeed,
these questions were at the center of political debate, as it had become
evident that the neoliberal model had brought affluence for a few and
poverty for large sections of the Chilean population. In other words, the
distribution of the fruits of progress and modernization had taken place in a
very unequal manner. Amidst a climate of growing opposition against the
military government and its neoliberal model, entrepreneurial organizations
decided to play a more active role in the political discussion by initiating a
strong defense of the free market system and its alleged potential to
eliminate poverty.
For the first time since the military coup, entrepreneurs felt that they
were alone in the defense of a market-oriented society, as both right-wing
political parties and the military government itself proved unable to
generate a firm ideological answer to the criticism coming from the
opposition forces. By entering into debate with the moderate forces in the
opposition the entrepreneurs hoped to reduce distances and to prevent their
radicalization.
As the 1988 plebiscite came closer, the entrepreneurial organizations
intensified their discourse of modernity and social development, by
stressing the achievements of the Pinochet regime with respect to economic
modernization. The entrepreneurs supposed that the economic theme would
prove decisive in that plebiscite, assuring victory for the government
because of the strong recovery of the Chilean economy since 1984.
The defeat of Pinochet during the plebiscite of October 5, 1988
produced a veritable earthquake for the government's supporters who had
been convinced that Pinochet would receive strong backing from the
population. After a short period of confusion and hesitation the
84 Democratisation and State-Civil Society Relations in Chile, 1983-2000

Confederación de la Producción y el Comercio (CPC), under the leadership

of its president Manuel Feliú, decisively initiated what he called 'the battle
of ideas' in defense of the liberal project the future of which had become
very uncertain. Pinochet's defeat meant that general elections had to take
place in December 1989 which, in its turn, could easily be won by the
opposition (cf. Montero, 1998).
The tactics followed by the entrepreneurs were directed at obtaining
the largest number of concessions from the moderate opposition parties and
even from the labor movement. Already in October 1988 the CPC had
initiated talks with the Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT) and the
Central Democrática de Trabajadores (CDT) to discuss future social and
labour agreements. At the same time, the CPC began talks with
representatives of the ‘Coalición de Partidos por el NO’, the coalition
which united all the political forces which fought Pinochet during the 1988
plebiscite (which later became the ‘Concertación de Partidos por la
Democracia’ during the December 1989 general elections). It is important
to stress here that within the major opposition parties (the Christian
Democratic Party, PDC, and the Socialist Party, PS), as well as in the labor
movement, there was a positive disposition to negotiate with both the
military government and the entrepreneurial organizations. This was the
result of a large process of ideological re-conversion experienced by the
PDC and the moderate socialists during the military dictatorship (cf. Silva,
1993). For this purpose, the opposition forces had to reduce or eliminate
the profound distrust existing within entrepreneurial circles about their
economic plans for the near future. The greatest fear among the
entrepreneurs was the possible dismantling of the neoliberal economic
model by the future democratic authorities, and the re-adoption of a statist
and dirigist economic model. The entrepreneurs also feared the generation
of a confrontational climate in the country as a result of the re-
establishment of democratic rule and the subsequent overflow of political
and social claims from radical sectors. This 'rain of claims' that they
visualized could also be the product of the populist stance the future
democratic authorities might adopt in order to maintain the political
support of the masses. This possible scenario increased the sense of threat
among the entrepreneurs who feared that the securities they had obtained
from the military regime on private property protection could be in danger.
But this was not their only fear. They had also serious apprehensions about
the negative effects such politico-social instability could have on the
economic stability achieved by the country under Pinochet.
During 1989 there were numerous contacts between the Concertación
parties, the labor unions and the entrepreneurial organizations. What did
 Patricio Silva 85

become clear was that none of the country's major actors was interested in
polarizing the political situation and creating a climate of political
instability. The political forces participating in the Concertación were
convinced that it should be possible to achieve consensus on a large
number of issues and that the return to democracy did not have to mean a
reversal in terms of economic development and social stability.
The victory of the Concertación coalition in the general elections of
December 14, 1989 marked the beginning of a new chapter in Chile’s
political history. For the entrepreneurs, a new political scene was
inaugurated, full of uncertainties about the real objectives of the new
government, and above all, about President Patricio Aylwin’s authority
being able to prevent a polarization of the political process.

VI. THE (SELF-) RESTRAIN OF CIVIL SOCIETY UNDER DEMOCRATIC RULE

Contrary to what was broadly expected, the restoration of democratic
rule in Chile was not followed by a strong revitalization of civil society. On
the contrary, one of the most striking features of the new Chilean
democracy have been the growing depoliticization of civil society and the
marked absence of national political debates. This phenomenon of
increasing depoliticization has been the product of a complex blend of past
and current political experiences faced by the people, as well as a
consequence of the neo-liberal modernization project and its ideological
impact on the people's political behavior.
As I mentioned before, the origins of this process of political
deactivation has to be sought during the Pinochet regime, when systematic
repression against any independent political expressions inaugurated a dark
period of 'forced depoliticization'. Paradoxically, state repression eventually
led to the emergence of a firm response from certain sectors of civil society,
expressed in the germination of active social movements and many non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) in defense of human rights in general,
and in an attempt to ameliorate the social conditions of the rural and urban
poor.
Another factor contributing to the further depoliticization of Chile’s
civil society following democratic restoration has been the negotiated nature
of the transition, as democracy was finally achieved following a series of
bargains between the democratic forces of the Concertación coalition and
representatives of the military regime. During these negotiations the
opposition forces involved did tacitly or explicitly agree in not actively
encouraging political effervescence among the people. Furthermore, several
democratic political leaders came to regard the continuation of the masses'
political demobilization as a prerequisite for achieving an ordered and
86 Democratisation and State-Civil Society Relations in Chile, 1983-2000

peaceful democratic transition and to guarantee governability under the new

democratic scenario.
Also strong calls for political moderation came from academic circles.
For instance, O'Donnell and Schmitter recommended, among other things, to
provide the armed forces with a honourable role in accomplishing national
goals, whilst political parties were asked to leave behind their traditional role
as agents of mobilization to become instruments of social and political
control of the population (O'Donnell et al., 1986:32, 58). They furthermore
recommended that democratic leaders should not affect the interests of the
dominant groups, and not threaten the institutional existence, assets, and
hierarchy of the armed forces. With respect to the left-wing forces, they
advised them to accept the political restrictions of the transition process,
leaving for them only “to hope that somehow in the future more attractive
opportunities will open up” (Ibid.:69).
The cupular or top-down nature of the democratization process, which
has been often portrayed as an 'elite settlement' (Highley and Gunther,
1992), produced a deep disillusion (and a subsequent demobilisation)
among many people who had participated in the formal social movements
and other organizations of the popular sector, who had expected a more
participatory process of democratic reconstruction. This, together with the
conscious decision of political leaders of maintaining the legacy of political
demobilization, has certainly played an important role in the further
depoliticization of society following the restoration of democracy in the
country.
The good economic performance of the democratic governments has
also helped to deactivate civil society. During the last decade, the dramatic
improvement in the general socioeconomic conditions and living standards
of the Chilean population has also generated a marked political apathy
among many people. During recent parliamentary and municipal elections
(voting is compulsory), many people who attend voting-stations do not vote
for any candidate (by leaving their vote void or by invalidating it).
Moreover, there is more than 1,5 million youngsters, and a half million
adults who have not even enlisted themselves on the electoral register.
Although the Chilean political class has become alarmed by the increased
political indifference among the population, there are observers who
explain this phenomenon as just being the consequence of the high levels
of political and economic stability existing in the country, as is the case in
most Western democracies. In any case, what one generally can observe is
that the disenchantment with democracy has not resulted in the adoption of
anti-system attitudes, but has rather strengthened the general mood of
apathy and apoliticism.
 Patricio Silva 87

On the other hand, the restoration of democracy and the country’s

good economic performance led to a radical reduction of international
financial support to hundreds of non-governmental organizations which
had arisen during the Pinochet regime, and to numerous cultural, political
and productive activities which were deployed by civil society. So the
deactivation of Chile’s civil society after 1990 has also to do with the
severe 'financial dehydration' affecting the popular sectors’ side of civil
society. In addition to this, many mass organizations and NGOs lost their
best cadres as following democratic restoration hundreds of them found a
new job at state institutions and in the government. This severely affected
the capacity of civil society to formulate its goals and to maintain the
existence of many grassroots organizations.
As Chile successfully introduced market reforms (even before the
international financial institutions began to recommend it and to demand it
from developing countries), and the country has not required special
financial support packages, actors such as the World Bank and the IMF
have not even got the chance to propagate the expansion of civil society
activities in Chile, as they have done in other parts of the world. And
finally, due to the relatively high levels of efficiency characterizing the
Chilean state institutions (having the lowest levels of corruption in the
developing world), and the relatively good functioning of local
governments and institutions in general, no urgent and powerful call for a
more active involvement of civil society in national affairs has emerged. As
we shall see in the final section, one of the few exceptions to this general
pattern has been the question of human rights.

VII. THE DETENTION OF PINOCHET AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTION

Following the restoration of democratic rule, the expectation among
popular organizations that the new authorities will bring to justice those
responsible for human right abuses during the military governments, kept
them mobilized for a while. However, the specific way in which the
Aylwin government finally dealt with the highly controversial question of
human rights’ abuses also contributed for many years to the demobilization
of the human rights movement.
The Aylwin government had to be extremely cautious in handling this
matter as the specific nature of the Chilean transition made very difficult to
find an adequate solution for the human rights problem, without producing
a negative impact on the military-civil relations and the repudiation of one
of the two (or both) parts in which Chile is divided. One part of the
population, including the armed forces and the social sectors which
supported their authoritarian rule, do still evoke the thesis that since
88 Democratisation and State-Civil Society Relations in Chile, 1983-2000

September 11, 1973 Chile was in a ‘state of internal war’; hence, all that
occurred during those years was the unavoidable result of the war waged
by the armed forces against subversive groups. The other part of Chile -
including the Concertación parties, the left-wing movement, the human
rights organizations and the rest of the population – considered that the
armed forces had been responsible for the systematic violations of the most
elemental human rights.
In contrast to other countries in the region, the Chilean military went
back to their barracks with full confidence and even with a certain
triumphal mood. In their opinion, they had proved their competence,
efficiency and reliance by having established a political calendar
(according to the 1980 Constitution) and for having kept themselves
faithful to its outcome (lost of 1988 referendum and 1989 elections, and
reestablishment of democratic rule in March 1990). Moreover, they were
also proud of having modernized Chilean economy and society and knew
that around half of the population had supported their rule. They were also
confidence that the democratic authorities could not bring them to justice as
Pinochet had passed in 1978, an amnesty law granted for all the crimes
committed until that moment. It is common knowledge that the greater
number of the most flagrant human rights abuses occurred during the
Pinochet regime (including the cases of ‘disappearances’) took place in the
period 1973-1978. Indeed, Chilean Supreme Court had already confirmed
the validity of the 1978 amnesty law.
One of the first decisions adopted by Aylwin as president was to use
his prerogative of mercy to liberate most of the political prisoners. Those
who were convicted by military tribunals for grave offences (assassination
of military personnel and civilians) obtained a new trail in civil courts of
law. The next step was to establish what really happened with the victims
of the military government. For this purpose, the Aylwin government
announced in April 1990 the formation of the `Commission for Truth and
Reconciliation' in order to investigate all the cases of human right abuses
culminating in death. This Commission was chaired by Raúl Rettig, a
prestigious legal expert, and comprised a group of experienced jurists from
several political orientations. The Armed Forces expressed their discontent
with this investigation as they considered it in contention with the 1978
amnesty law. The government rejected this objection by arguing that the
Rettig Commission was not judging anyone but just trying to establish the
truth. On March 4, 1991, President Aylwin addressed the nation in an
historic TV broadcast in which he informed the Chilean people about the
main findings of the Rettig Commission. It established among other thing
that 2,279 persons had been killed, victims of human rights abuses. Aylwin
 Patricio Silva 89

ended his address by asking for forgiveness from the families of the
victims, in the name of the entire Chilean nation (cf. Oppenheim,
1993:210-22).
Despite the country's good economic performance and the clear
improvements in the conditions of the poorest social sectors during the
Aylwin government, the immaterial issues of the past remained almost
intact in the minds of the Chilean population.
President Eduardo Frei treated the human rights question as has
having been ‘solved’ by his predecessor Aylwin, concentrating his
attention to the further internationalization of the Chilean economy and the
political and commercial integration of the country into several regional
and international organizations. Despite these attempts ‘from above’ to
eliminate from the political agenda the question of human rights abuse
committed in the past, human rights organizations (and particularly the
Asociación de Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos, representing the
relatives of people who ‘disappeared’ during the Pinochet regime),
maintained the pressure on the government to provide some solution to this
problem (see Ensalaco, 2000).
Nevertheless, it was definitely Pinochet’s detention in London what
abruptly reopened the national debate on the issue of human rights abuses
during the military government. The radical left and many human rights
groups immediately organized large public campaigns and demanded,
through the mass media, the re-opening of many legal cases against military
men who had participated in gross human right violations during the
dictatorship.
In addition, the government sent some discrete signals to the judiciary,
urging it to show some real action demonstrating its independence and
inclination to do something about the human right issues. Perhaps this is
also related to the international attacks about the inability or incapacity of
Chile's judicial system to deal with the human rights issues.
Chilean human right organizations argued that the Concertación’s
goal to achieve reconciliation within the Chilean nation had failed because
the human rights question had not been treated satisfactorily by the Aylwin
and Frei governments. In their opinion, Chile was now paying the price for
its attempt to cover up the past.
With the return of Pinochet to Chile in March 2000, the pressures of
human rights organisations and a growing part of the public opinion on the
government to punish Pinochet increased dramatically, putting the country’s
political stability and the state-military relations under severe strain. Pinochet
found a quite different country than the one he had left in October 1998.
The victory of the Socialist Ricardo Lagos in the second round of the
90 Democratisation and State-Civil Society Relations in Chile, 1983-2000

presidential elections held in January 2000 made Pinochet’s political future

very uncertain. The elected president was one of his most fervent
opponents during the military regime. So the joy of the General’s
supporters following his return to the country was constrained by the real
prospects that he could be legally prosecuted in Chile.
President Lagos decided to put the fate of Pinochet in the hands of the
Chilean judicial system. By rejecting any possible political solution to the
Pinochet case (as the Right had demanded) and by passing the decision to
the legal system, the mobilization and activation of a part of civil society
became less intense. At the same time, Lagos attempted to reduce the
tensions with the armed forces. For instance, during 2000 he was able to
establish a remarkable good personal relationship with the chief of the
army, General Ricardo Izurieta. This generated a favorable climate between
the two leaders to discuss in a direct way a series of pending issues. This
direct line of communication had certainly facilitated the historical
agreement achieved on 12 June 2000 within the so-called ‘Mesa de
Diálogo’. This was a high-level discussion group established in October
1999 by the Defense Minister under Frei, Edmundo Pérez Yoma, in an
attempt to bring new life into the difficult process of reconciliation among
Chileans. One of the mesa’s main objectives has been to find a workable
way to recover the bodies of the one thousand political adversaries who
disappeared during the military regime. For the very first time since the
restoration of democratic rule in 1990, members of the armed forces, legal
representatives of human rights organisations, and a group of highly
respected ‘wise men’ from different religious and social backgrounds, have
held for many months a series of difficult discussions. Following
Pinochet’s return to Chile this initiative was almost completely paralyzed
and many people expected it would soon end in a total failure. However,
the rapid improvement in the relations between the Lagos government and
the military leadership made this agreement possible. In this historical
agreement the Chilean armed forces recognize for the first time since the
1973 coup the human rights abuses committed during their regime. They
also promise to gather and to provide within a period of six months (later
extended for another month) all the information available within the armed
institutions about the location of the bodies of the desaparecidos.
The Mesa de Diálogo represents the largest and most important direct
involvement of various sectors from civil society in national affairs since
the restoration of democratic rule in 1990. In addition, for the first time in
Chile’s democratic history, political parties did not play a direct role in an
important national event, as they were consciously not invited to participate
in its deliberations. The Mesa initiative was strongly criticized by both
 Patricio Silva 91

Pinochetista circles and by sectors of the radical left. While these rightwing
groups saw it as an act of treason on the part of the armed forces to
Pinochet´s legacy, the radical left qualifies it as a strategy directed to obtain
a ‘punto final’ for the human rights question in Chile. The Mesa initiative
also produced a painful schism within the human rights movement itself.
Thus while some representatives accepted the invitation to participate at the
Mesa, others strongly rejected it. But finally the Mesa de Diálogo survived
all obstacles and reached it goal to find the ways to obtain the required
information from the armed forces about the whereabouts of the
desaparecidos, and the location where their bodies can be found. On
January 6, 2001, the armed forces handed President Lagos an extensive
report with the information gathered by these institutions among active and
former military personnel about the fate of these people. It is expected that
this information would lead to finding of the remains of about 200
desaparecidos. It was again the legal system that would be in charge of the
excavations and that would decide if this information could lead to further
legal prosecution of the people involved in these disappearances. In the
meantime, Pinochet continues his legal battle in the courts of law in an
attempt to avoid further criminal prosecution.

VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In the pre-1973 Chilean democracy, state-civil society relations were
characterized by the dominant interface of a well-organized system of
political parties. Representatives and organizations of civil society had to
negotiate with political parties, in a patron-client fashion, in order to defend
their interests vis-à-vis the parliament and the government. Prior to the
coup, Chile never experienced the existence of, or rather an independent or
autonomous civil society in this manner. As de Riz has put it, `Chilean
political history, unlike any other in the Southern Cone, developed with, and
through, the political parties' (de Riz, 1989:57). This state of affairs led
Garretón to state that in the former democracy the political parties formed
`the backbone' of Chilean society.
The military government deliberately destroyed this traditional pattern
of state civil-society relations. By proscribing and repressing the existing
political parties, civil society lost its main intermediary between the state.
In addition, the systematic application of state repression to any dissident
of contesting force in the country impeded for many years the generation of
strong opposition voices coming from civil society. On the other hand,
during the Pinochet years Chilean society continued to be divided in two
fronts, as it had been the case during the Allende government: the Right
versus the Left, conservative versus progressive forces, supporters versus
92 Democratisation and State-Civil Society Relations in Chile, 1983-2000

opponents to the military rulers. In this manner, the possible gestation of

opposition forces within civil society was not only repressed from the state
but it was also aggressively contested from other sectors within civil
society itself.
The cultural impact of neoliberalism on the Chilean people cannot be
sufficiently stressed. All forms of collective actions for solving national
problems were systematically attacked by the regime’s ideologues (through
the mass media, educational system, etc.). Participation in public affairs
was equated with to populism, anarchy and chaos. In contrast, the
achievement of personal socioeconomic improvement by following
individualistic strategies was strongly encouraged by the regime’s
technocrats. The message was: society had not to direct its attention and
energy in trying to get things done by the state, but each individual had to
make an efficient use of his own abilities to achieve a better life within the
confines of the market. The force obtained by the neoliberal discourse in
Chile (not equaled in any other Latin American country) was directly
related to the visible success of the neo-liberal reforms implemented by the
Chicago boys (also an exception in Latin America). As the policies proved
to work, many Chileans were well disposed to believe and to follow the
new path of development offered by the regime. This phenomenon
weakened even further the readiness of sectors within civil society to
aggregate their social and economic demands and to exert pressure against
the government.
The sudden collapse of the economy in 1981 that witnessed negative
growth of 14 per cent that same year reawakened civil society. The key
element upon which the regime had attempted to legitimize its very reason
d’etre that of being the successful provider and guarantor of economic
growth and development suddenly evaporated. This explains at least the
readiness of some sectors of the large middle classes to temporarily join the
opposition movement that emerged in response to the economic crisis.
They did not suddenly become concerned with the human rights issues, nor
did they abruptly realize that Chile needed a democracy, but they became
frustrated and even angry with the military government because their living
standards had been severely hit by the recession. However, the
radicalization among the popular sectors finally frightened the middle
classes who were traumatized with the memories of intense class struggle
as it took place during the Allende years.
In the period 1983-1988 the involvement of civil society in national
affairs radically increased as a large variety of social movements made use
of the political space which emerged following the economic crisis and the
subsequent (temporary) weakening of the military regime. However, the
 Patricio Silva 93

relative autonomy achieved during that period by social movements was

only the product of the inability of the opposition political parties, at that
time, to regain their control of the political developments. Only when the
date for the 1988 referendum came closer did the democratic opposition
parties, such as the Christian Democratic Party and the Socialist Party,
manage to obtain the direction of most of the social and political forces
who opposed the military regime. So following Pinochet’s defeat at the
referendum, the social movements and the popular sectors were no longer
the big protagonists in the battle against the authoritarian regime. In fact,
the most important role played by the social movements in the Chilean
democratic transition was indirect and unintended: as a result of the
radicalization of this section of civil society in the period 1983-1988, the
military government realized that it was in its own interest and in the
interest of the social sectors its represented, to seriously consider the
possibility of accepting a possible triumph of the moderate forces of the
opposition, in order to avoid a insurrectional situation in the country. The
moderate opposition took a similar conclusion about the situation created
by the radicalization of the social movements: the need to deactivate them
and to conduct the further advancement of the transition process ‘from
above’, without the mobilization of the masses. It was in this particular
situation that both the governmental and the moderate opposition elites
were disposed to reach a transitional pact with each other, without the
inclusion of the mass movement. It facilitated the relatively smooth nature
of the Chilean democratic transition (without armed confrontations, without
civil war, without severe street clashes between supporters of both camps,
and without requiring foreign political and/or humanitarian interventions as
it has been the case in other Latin American countries).
Following the democratic restoration, the Concertación governments
have made no real attempt to reactivate civil society or to expand their role
in the political realm. The reasons for this was the conviction that the
reactivation of civil society could lead to an uncontrollable process of
social confrontation which, by its part, could seriously jeopardize the
political stability in the country and the consolidation of democratic rule.
So although the Concertación governments have been able to radically
improve the social situation of millions of Chileans (for instance, the
existence of extreme poverty has been dramatically reduced in the last
decade), this has occurred without much of public participation. A series of
social problems have been depoliticized, translated into technocratic terms,
and attacked by making use of a ‘bottom-down’ approach (the so-called
asistencialismo).
94 Democratisation and State-Civil Society Relations in Chile, 1983-2000

The democratic authorities, however, have been less successful in

dealing with difficult ‘immaterial’ issues, such as the struggle of the
indigenous people (particularly the Mapuches) for cultural self-
determination and respect from the Chilean population, and even more
strongly, the question of the human rights abuses committed by the former
military regime. These are normally excluded from consideration in matters
concerning high levels of economic growth and state efficiency. As we
have seen in this paper, the attempts of the democratic governments to give
a ‘solution’ to this problem ‘from above’ (through the Rettig Commission,
and other initiatives) finally failed. Since the restoration of democratic rule
a decade ago, human rights organizations have persistently maintained their
demands for justice and punishment for those who are responsible for the
crimes. The presentation early this year of the armed forces’ report to the
Mesa de Diálogo in which their horrendous methods to get rid of the bodies
of the disappeared are described, shocked a significant section of Chile’s
public opinion who began to support the positions defended by the human
rights movement. However, if the Lagos government declares ‘closed’ the
question of the disappeared after the presentation of the armed forces’
rapport, and the judicial system finally decides that Pinochet cannot be
prosecuted for medical reasons, it can be expected that in the coming
period the human rights movement will gradually lose both its strength and
its ability to generate solidarity and support for its cause within the rest of
Chilean society.

Notes

1 A group of young Chilean technocrats who became the main designers and executors of the
orthodox neoliberal economic policies applied by the government of General Pinochet since
1975. They eventually evolved as key ideologues of the regime as they attempted to provide
an ideological answer for the coexistence of economic liberalism and political
authoritarianism (see Silva, 1991; Valdés, 1995).

References

Baloyra, Enrique, Ed. (1987), Comparing New Democracies: Transition and Consolidation in
Mediterranean Europe and the Southern Cone. Boulder: Westview.
Biekart, Kees (1999), The Politics of Civil Society Building. Utrecht: International Books.
Cammack, Paul (1985), “Democratization: A Review of the Issues”. In Bulletin of Latin American
Research, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 39-46.
 Patricio Silva 95

Campero, Guillermo (1991), “Entrepreneurs under the Military Regime”. In Drake, Paul W. and
Iván Jaksic (Eds.), The Struggle for Democracy in Chile, 1982-1990. Lincoln and
London: University of Nebraska Press. pp. 128-158.
Cardoso, Fernando H. (1986), “Entrepreneurs in the Transition Process: The Brazilian Case”. In
O'Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (Eds), Transitions
from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press. pp. 137-153.
Cavarozzi M. and M.A. Garretón, Eds. (1989), Muerte y resurrección: Los partidos políticos en
el autoritarismo y las transiciones del Cono Sur. Santiago: FLACSO.
Diamond, Larry (1999), Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Domínguez, Jorge and Abraham F. Lowenthal, Eds. (1996) Constructing Democratic
Governance: South America in the 1990s. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press.
Drake, Paul W. and Iván Jaksic, Eds. (1991), The Struggle for Democracy in Chile, 1982-1990.
Lincoln: Nebraska University Press.
Drake, Paul W. and Iván Jaksic, Eds. (1999), El modelo chileno: Democracia y desarollo en los
noventa. Santiago: LOM Ediciones.
Ensalaco, Mark (2000), Chile under Pinochet: Recovering the Truth. Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press.
Foxley, Alejandro (1982), Latin American Experiments in Neo-conservative Economics
.Berkeley: University of California Press.
Galjart, Benno en Patricio Silva, Eds. (1989), Democratization and the State in the Southern Cone:
Essays on South American Politics. Amsterdam: CEDLA.
Guillaudat, Patrick and Pierre Mouterde (1998), Los movimientos sociales en Chile, 1973-1993.
Santiago: LOM Ediciones.
Higley, John en Richard Gunther, Eds. (1992), Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin
America and Southern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hojman, David (1993), Chile: The Political Economy of Development and Democracy in the
1990s. London: Macmillan.
Mainwaring, Scott, Guillermo O'Donnell en J. Samuel Valenzuela, Eds. (1992), Issues in
Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative
Perspective. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Malloy, James M. en Michael A. Selligson, Eds. (1987), Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime
Transition in Latin America. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press.
Montero, Cecilia (1997), La revolución empresarial chilena. Santiago: Dolmen.
Moulian, Tomás (1998), El Consumo me consume. Santiago: LOM Ediciones.
Moulian, Tomás and Pilar Vergara (1985), “Estado, ideología y políticas económicas en Chile,
1973-1978”. In Colección de Estudios CIEPLAN , Vol. 3, pp. 65-120.
Munck, Ronaldo (1989), Latin America: The Transition to Democracy. London: Zed Books.
O'Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, Eds (1986), Transitions
from Authoritarian Rule. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Oppenheim Lois Hecht (1993), Politics in Chile: Democracy, Authoritarianism, and the Search for
Development. Boulder: Westview Press.
96 Democratisation and State-Civil Society Relations in Chile, 1983-2000

Oxhorn, Philip D. (1995), Organizing Civil Society: The Popular Sectors and the Struggle for
Democracy in Chile. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
Peeler, John (1998), Building Democracy in Latin America. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Petras, James and Fernando I. Leiva (1994), Democracy and Poverty in Chile: The Limits to
Electoral Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Politzer, Patricia (1989), Fear in Chile. New York: Pantheon Press.
Puryear, Jeffrey M. (1994), Thinking Politics: Intellectuals and Democracy in Chile, 1973-1988.
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Riz, Liliana de (1989), “Política y partidos. Ejercicio de análisis comparado: Argentina, Chile,
Brasil y Uruguay”. In Cavarozzi, Marcelo and Manuel Antonio Garretón (Eds.), Muerte y
Resurrección. Los partidos políticos en el autoritarianismo y las transiciones del Cono
Sur. Santiago: FLACSO. pp. 35-78.
Schneider, Cathy Lisa (1995), Shantytown Protest in Pinochet’s Chile. Philadelphia: Temple
University Press.
Silva, Patricio (1991), “Technocrats and Politics in Chile: From the Chicago Boys to the CIEPLAN
Monks”. In Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 23, pp. 385-410.
_______ (1993), “Social Democracy, Neoliberalism and Ideological Change in the Chilean
Socialist Movement, 1973-1993”. In Nordic Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 23,
Nos. 1-2), pp. 89-110.
_______ (1995), “Modernization, Consumerism and Politics in Chile”. In Hojman, David E. (Ed.),
Neo-Liberalism with a Human Face? The Politics and Economics of the Chilean Model.
Monograph Series No.. 20. Liverpool: The University of Liverpool. pp. 118-132.
_______ (1999a), “The New Political Order in Latin America: Towards Technocratic
Democracies?”. In Gwynne, Robert N. and Cristobal Kay (Eds.), Latin America
Transformed: Globalization and Modernity. London: Arnold. pp. 51-65.
_______ (1999b), “Collective Memories, Fears and Consensus: The Political Psychology of the
Chilean Democratic Transition”. In Koonings, Kees and Dirk Kruijt (Eds), Societies of
Fear: The Legacy of Civil War, Violence and Terror in Latin America. London: Zed
Books. pp. 171-196.
Stepan, Alfred (1985), “State Power and the Strength of Civil Society in The Southern Cone of
Latin America”. In Evans, P., D. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol (Eds.) Bringing the
State Back In. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 317-343.
_______ (1988), Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Tulchin, Joseph S. and Augusto Varas (1991), From Dictatorship to Democracy: Rebuilding
Political Consensus in Chile. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Valdés, Juan Gabriel (1995), Pinochet's Economists: The Chicago School in Chile. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Valenzuela, J. Samuel and Arturo Valenzuela, Eds. (1986), Military Rule in Chile: Dictatorship
and Oppositions. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Vergara, Pilar (1985), Auge y caída del neoliberalismo en Chile. Santiago: FLACSO.