FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 8210, August 08, 2016

SPOUSES MANOLO AND MILINIA NUEZCA, Complainants, v. ATTY. ERNESTO V.

VILLAGARCIA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

The instant administrative case arose from a verified complaint1 for disbarment filed by complainants
Spouses Manolo and Milinia Nuezca (complainants) against respondent Atty. Ernesto V. Villagarcia
(respondent) for grave misconduct, consisting of alleged unethical conduct in dealings with other persons.

The Facts

In their verified complaint, complainants averred that respondent sent them a demand letter2 dated
February 15, 2009, copy furnished to various offices and persons, which contained not only threatening
but also libelous utterances. Allegedly, the demand letter seriously maligned and ridiculed complainants
to its recipients. Complainants likewise posited that several news clippings3 that were attached to the
demand letter were intended to sow tear in them, and claimed that the circulation thereof caused them
sleepless nights, wounded feelings, and besmirched reputation. 4 Thus, they maintained that respondent
should be held administratively liable therefor.

In a Resolution5 dated July 22, 2009, the Court directed respondent to file his comment to the verified
complaint. However, for failure to serve the aforesaid Resolution at respondent's address given by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), the complainants were then ordered6 to furnish the Court the
complete and correct address of respondent. Still, complainants failed to comply with the Court's
directive; thus, the Court resolved,7 among others, to refer the case to the IBP for investigation, report,
and recommendation, which set the case for a mandatory conference/hearing.8

Unfortunately, despite notices,9 complainants failed to appear for the scheduled mandatory hearings.
Likewise, the notices sent to respondent were returned unserved with the notations "RTS Moved Out" and
"RTS Unknown." Thus, in an Order10 dated October 24, 2014, the IBP directed the parties to submit their
respective verified position papers together with documentary exhibits, if any.

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In its Report and Recommendation11 dated May 29, 2015, the IBP -Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD),
through Commissioner Honesto A. Villamor, recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) months for violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). Likewise, for defying the lawful order of the IBP, the latter recommended that
respondent be declared in contempt of court and fined the amount of PI,000.00, with a warning that
repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.12

The IBP found that respondent failed to rebut complainants' allegations in their verified complaint.
Moreover, despite repeated notices and directives from the IBP to appear for the mandatory hearings, as
well as to file his pleadings, respondent failed to do so, which was tantamount to defiance of the lawful
orders of the IBP amounting to conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. Finding that respondent did not intend to
file any comment and in the process, purposely delayed the resolution of the instant case, the IBP
recommended that respondent be held in contempt of court.13

In a Resolution14 dated June 20, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve with
modification the May 29, 2015 Report and Recommendation of the IBP — CBD by suspending
respondent from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months and deleting the fine imposed on him.
 The Issue Before the Court    

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable
based on the allegations of the verified complaint.    

The Court's Ruling    

The Court has examined the records of this case and partially concurs with the findings and
recommendations of the IBP Board of Governors.

The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and
morality. Any violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.15 Rule 8.01,
Canon 8 of the CPR provides:

Rule 8.01. - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.

In this case, the demand letter that respondent sent to complainants contained not merely a demand for
them to settle their monetary obligations to respondent's client, but also used words that maligned their
character. It also imputed crimes against them, i.e., that they were criminally liable for worthless or bum
checks and estafa. The relevant portion of the demand letter states:

An early check on the records of some courts, credit-reporting agencies and law enforcement
offices revealed that the names 'MANOLO NUEZCA' and/or 'MANUELO NUEZCA' and 'MILINIA
NUEZCA' responded to our search being involved, then and now, in some 'credit-related' cases
and litigations. Other record check outcomes and results use we however opt to defer disclosure
in the meantime and shall be put in issue in the proper forum as the need for them arise, [sic]

All such accumulated derogatory records shall in due time be reported to all the appropriate
entities, for the necessary disposition and "blacklisting" pursuant to the newly-enacted law known
as the "Credit Information Systems Act of 2008."

x  x x x

II.    Your several issued BDO checks in 2003 and thereabouts were all unencashed as they
proved to be "worthless and unfounded." By law, you are liable under BP 22 (Boun[c]ing Checks
Law) and Art. 315, Par. 2 (d) SWINDLING/ESTAFA, RPC.

III.    For all your deceit, fraud, schemes and other manipulations to defraud Mrs. Arcilla, taking
advantage of her helplessness, age and handicaps to her grave and serious damage, you are
also criminally liable under ART. 318, OTHER DECEITS. RPC.16

Indeed, respondent could have simply stated the ultimate facts relative to the alleged indebtedness of
complainants to his client, made the demand for settlement thereof, and refrained from the imputation of
criminal offenses against them, especially considering that there is a proper forum therefor and they have
yet to be found criminally liable by a court of proper jurisdiction. Respondent's use of demeaning and
immoderate language put complainants in shame and disgrace. Moreover, it is important to consider that
several other persons had been copy furnished with the demand letter. As such, respondent could have
besmirched complainants' reputation to its recipients.

At this juncture, it bears noting that respondent failed to answer the verified complaint and attend the
mandatory hearings set by the IBP. Hence, the claims and allegations of the complainants remain
uncontroverted. In Ngayan v. Tugade, 17 the Court ruled that "[a lawyer's] failure to answer the complaint
against him and his failure to appear at the investigation are evidence of his flouting resistance to lawful
orders of the court and illustrate his despiciency for his oath of office in violation of Section 3, Rule 138,
ifules of Court."18
Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful,
befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has
no place in the dignity of judicial forum.19 Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be
emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, and illuminating but not offensive.20 In this regard,
all lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of the courts who are mandated to maintain
the dignity of the legal profession, hence, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly.21 Thus,
respondent ought to temper his words in the performance of his duties as a lawyer and an officer of the
court.

Anent the penalty to be imposed on respondent, the Court takes into consideration the case of Ireneo L.
Torres and Mrs. Natividad Celestino v. Jose Concepcion Javier 22 where respondent-lawyer was
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) month for employing offensive and improper
language in his pleadings. In light thereof, and considering that the IBP's recommended penalty is not
commensurate to respondent's misdeed in this case, the Court finds that the penalty of suspension for
one (1) month from the practice of law should be meted upon respondent.

WHEREFORE, respondent Arty. Ernesto V. Villagarcia is found GUILTY of violation of Rule 8.01, Canon

8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) month, effective upon his receipt of this Resolution, and is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.    

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondent's personal record as a member of the Bar.
Likewise, let copies of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of
the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED. y

Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin and Caguioa, JJ.,  concur

Endnotes:
1
Rollo,  pp. 1-3.
2
 Id. at 5-10.
3
 Id. at 11-27.
4
 Id. at 2.
5
 Id. at 97.
6
 See Resolution dated September 28,2011; id. at 100.
7
 Id. at 103-104.
8
 Id. at 106.
9
 See Order dated August 27, 2014 and Order dated October 24, 2014; id. at 107-108.
10
 Id. at 108, including dorsal portion.
11
 Id. at 115-117.
12
 Id. at 117.
13
 Id. at 116-117.    
14
 See Notice of Resolution in Resolution No. XXI2015-542 signed by IBP National Secretary Nasser A.
Marohomsalic; id. at 114, including dorsal portion.
15
Barandon, Jr. v, Ferrer, Sr., 630 Phil. 524, 530 (2010).
16
 See Demand Letter dated February 15, 2009, rollo, pp. 7-9.
17
 271 Phil. 654(1991).
18
 Id. at 659.
19
Barandon, Jr. v. Ferrer, Sr., supra note 15, at 532.
20
Gimeno v. Zaide, A.C. No. 10303, April 22, 2015, 757 SCRA 11, 25.
21
Reyes v. Chiong, Jr., 453 Phil. 99, 104 (2003).
22
 507 Phil. 397 (2005).
 SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 10631, July 27, 2016

ERNESTO B. BALBURIAS, Complainant, v. ATTY. AMOR MIA J. FRANCISCO, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, J.:
The Case

This case stemmed from a complaint, docketed as CBD Case No. 11- 2930, filed by Ernesto B. Balburias
(Balburias) against Atty. Amor Mia J. Francisco (Atty. Francisco) before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP). The IBP Board of Governors dismissed the complaint and denied Balburias's motion for
reconsideration, prompting Balburias to file the present petition for review before this Court.

The Antecedent Facts

Balburias alleged in his complaint that he filed a criminal case against his former employee, Rosalyn A.
Azogue (Azogue), before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for stealing his company's funds.
Azogue, in turn, filed a labor case against him. Azogue was represented by Atty. Francisco in the labor
case.

Balburias alleged that in one of the hearings of the labor case, Atty. Francisco approached him and
contemptuously and boastfully told him "kaya ka naming bayaran" in front of a lot of people. Balburias
alleged that he was shocked by Atty. Francisco's unprofessional behavior and he asked her, "kaya mo
akong hayaran? "  to which she replied "kaya kitang bayaran  sa halaga rig complaint mo. " Balburias
claimed that he was embarrassed by Atty. Francisco's treatment and he told her, "kahit isang pera lang
ang  halaga ng buhay ko, hindi ako magpapabayad sa iyo."  The incident prompted him to file the
complaint against Atty. Francisco.

In her Comment, Atty. Francisco alleged that Balburias must be referring to the incident that happened
after their mediation conference. During that period, Atty. Francisco was accompanied by Atty. Arnold D.
Naval (Atty. Naval). Atty. Naval approached Balburias and his counsel, Atty. Antonio Abad (Atty. Abad) to
open talks for a possible settlement. Atty. Naval asked Balburias, "puwede ho ba noting ayusin
ito?" Balburias answered "kaya nyo bang bayaran ang nawala sa akin? "  and Atty. Naval replied, "kaya
naming bayaran. "  Atty. Francisco thought that Balburias was referring to the possible settlement and she
was surprised to hear him say in a high tone, "kaya nyo bang bayaran  x x x kaya n 'yo bang bayaran  x x
x ang nawala sa akin? Di nyo mababayaran ng kahit anong halaga ang nawala sa akin! Saksi ang
Diyos." When Atty. Naval realized that Balburias might have misinterpreted him, he tried to pacify him,
saying "kaya naming bayaran ang halaga ng nasa complaint n 'yo. " Atty. Francisco stated that after that,
they had a long cordial discussion at the hallway and later, at the cafeteria of the Bookman Building to
straighten up the misunderstanding. Atty. Francisco insisted that she had no intention to embarrass
Balburias. She expressed surprise at the filing of the case almost two years after the incident occurred.

Balburias, in his Reply, insisted that Atty. Francisco twisted what really happened at the time of the
incident. He alleged that Atty. Francisco's words conveyed that she could buy her opponents, or at least
corrupt them. He further alleged that Atty. Naval was trying to protect his wife by making it appear that he
was the one who talked to him.

The Report and Recommendation

of the Investigating Commissioner

After the mandatory conference and hearing, Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita III (Commissioner Abelita)
found that there was no sufficient evidence to prove that Atty. Francisco violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility. According to Commissioner Abelita, Balburias viewed Atty. Francisco's words as threat
and arrogance while Atty. Francisco viewed them as an effort to reach an amicable settlement.
Commissioner Abelita noted that Balburias did not explain why he filed the case two years after the
incident. He also noted that the parties even proceeded to the cafeteria after the incident. In addition, one
of the witnesses for Balburias testified that the parties were not quarreling during the incident. The sworn
statement of Atty. Pastor Villanueva (Atty. Villanueva) also stated that Atty. Francisco's words "kaya ka
naming bayaran" were immediately followed by "sa halaga ng  complaint mo" thus obviously referring to
the money subject of the complaint. Commissioner Abelita recommended the dismissal of the complaint.

In its Resolution No. XX-2013-2271 dated 20 March 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved Commissioner Abelita's Report and Recommendation and dismissed the case filed by
Balburias.

Balburias filed a motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution No. XXI-2014-223 dated 2 May 2014,2 the
IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for reconsideration and affirmed its Resolution No. XX-2013-
227.

Balburias filed the present petition for review before the Court.

The Issue

Whether the IBP Board of Governors committed a reversible error in adopting the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner Abelita and in dismissing the complaint against Atty. Francisco.

The Ruling of this Court

The Court notes that Atty. Francisco did not personally appear during the mandatory conference/hearing
and was only represented by Atty. Naval. The report did not state the reason for Atty. Francisco's
absence. A reading of the transcript showed that she had to undergo a procedure but no medical
certificate was submitted. In any case, Atty. Naval stated that Atty. Francisco would only confirm what
was taken up during the mandatory conference/hearing. The Court can rule based on the pleadings filed,
the transcript of the case, and the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

The established fact from the records is that Atty. Francisco, not Atty. Naval, approached Balburias after a
hearing in the labor case and told him, "kaya ka naming bayaran, " which she later followed with "kaya
kitang bayaran sa halaga ng complaint mo. " The affidavits of the witnesses, Ana Maria Aquino
(Aquino)3 and Analyn M. Delos Santos (Delos Santos),4 stated that Atty. Francisco added the second
statement after Balburias was  offended. However, the affidavit of Atty. Villanueva5 stated that Atty.
Francisco's first statement was immediately followed by the second statement. Balburias stated that Atty.
Francisco uttered the statements arrogantly while Atty. Naval, who said he was present when it
happened, stated that they were uttered firmly but not arrogantly.6 It was also established that Atty.
Francisco was referring to the criminal case and not to the labor case.

In his petition, Balburias denied that there was a conference or discussion at the cafeteria after the
incident.7 However, during his testimony, Balburias stated:

COMM. LIMPINGCO;
Baka puwede nating pag-usapan ito?

MR. BALBURIAS:
Hindi ho at saka nakita nyo po natutuwa ako sa tao talaga eh, ang salita ng tao talagang
nilalagay ng ano yan e. Ang problema iba ang sinasabi mo dyan sa Affidavit mo sa sinasabi mo
ngayon. Sabi mo kaya mong bayaran, ang sabi sa akin ni Atty. Amor, "kaya ka naming bayaran,"
sabay ganon ako nagalit nong nagalit ako, ito hindi m[a]n tanggapin eh hanggang nagalit ako ang
sabi nga, "kaya ka naming bayaran sa halaga ng Complaint mo," yon ang pinakamaganda na
sinabi yon nagkaliwanagan tayo, nagkakwentuhan tayo pero yong dagdagan mo ulit ng hindi
tama wag naman.8
Obviously, they were able to talk after the incident. The Court's impression is that the case before us is a
result of a misunderstanding between Balburias and Atty. Francisco. The incident happened two years
prior to the filing of this case but it was aggravated by Balburias's dissatisfaction with the progress of the
labor case. Balburias testified:

COMM. LIMPINGCO:
Hindi kung hal[i]mbawa nandyan si Atty. Francisco at mag-ano sa inyo nae-explain sa inyo.

MR. BALBURIAS:
Hindi naman ho sya ang sumagot nyan si Atty. Naval ho.

COMM. LIMPINGCO:
Hindi ho nagtatanong ho, hindi ho ako nakikipag-debate sa inyo. Tinatanong ko po kung
halimbawa po andito si Atty. Francisco at ee[k]splika sa inyo na hindi lang kay[o]
nagkakaintindihan ano hong ano nyo sa ganong sitwasyon, hindi nyo hong makukuhang....

MR. BALBURIAS:
Alam ko ho ang sinasabi nyo matagal ko na hong pinatawad yan pero kailangan din ho nyang
dapat harapin yan. Pinagdasal ko na ho yan eh. Ako'y ... ng kaaway pero parang ako ang laging
inaaway, matanda na ho ako magsi-62 years old na ho ako pero parang hindi ho respetuhin dahil
abogado ho siya, kahit abogado pa ho siya, una titingnan mo kung matanda yong tao.

COMM. LIMPINGCO:
Pero yon ho ang sinabi sa inyo wala na hong dagdag o di kaya'y minura, sinigawan.

MR. BALBURIAS:
Hindi man nya ako kayang murahin, hindi naman pwedeng mangyari yon. Pero yon sabihan mo
akong kaya ka naming bayaran, ako talagang mahirap ako pero hindi ako nagpapabayad kahit
kanino. Parang ang sakit naman para sa akin non. Sino sya para magsalita ng ganon sa akin.9

Atty. Francisco could have avoided the incident if she at least tried to talk to Balburias's counsel on the
matter of amicable settlement of the criminal case instead of talking to Balburias himself. Balburias
misinterpreted the approach as an attempt to "buy her opponents." We rule that Balburias failed to
satisfactorily show that Atty. Francisco acted in bad faith. Delos Santos's affidavit showed that Atty.
Francisco immediately corrected herself when she realized that she might have offended Balburias by
saying that she was referring to the amount of the complaint. We gathered the same impression from the
affidavits of Aquino and Atty. Villanueva. Nevertheless, we deem it proper to admonish Atty. Francisco to
be more careful in dealing with other litigants to avoid a repetition of a similar incident in the future.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We DISMISS the complaint filed by Ernesto B. Balburias against

Atty. Amor Mia J. Francisco. We ADMONISH Atty. Francisco to be more circumspect in her actions and
to be more courteous in dealing with litigants in the future.

SO ORDERED.

Brion, Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:
1
 Rollo,p.  199.
2
 Id. at 261.
3
 Id. at 7-8.
4
 Id. at 9-10.
5
 Id. at 11-12.
6
 Id. at 162; TSN, 2 June 2011, p. 28.
7
 Id. at 245.
8
 Id. at 165-166; TSN, 2 June 2011, pp. 31-32.
794 Phil. 437

THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 10565, September 07, 2016

PROSECUTOR RHODNA A. BACATAN, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. MERARI D. DADULA,

RESPONDENT.

DECISION

JARDELEZA, J.:

In a Complaint[1] dated June 16, 2008 submitted to the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), Rhodna A. Bacatan, Assistant Cebu City Prosecutor (complainant) charged Atty. Merari
D. Dadula (respondent) with violation of: a) Canon 8, Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; b) the disregard of the duties of attorneys, particularly under paragraph (d) of Section 20,
Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court; and c) her lawyer's oath not to do falsehood nor consent to the
doing of any.[2]

Facts

Between September and October 2007, the following cases were raffled to complainant for preliminary
investigation: (1) a complaint for libel (I.S. No. 4760) filed by Rev. Jose Bailey Bernaldez against Dr.
Carlito Impas, Sr.; and (2) a complaint for falsification (I.S. No. 4999-J) filed by Dr. Carlito Impas, Jr.
against Rev. Jose Bailey Bernaldez. Respondent was the counsel of Carlito Impas, Jr.[3] Complainant
found probable cause for libel and recommended its filing in court, while the complaint for falsification was
recommended for dismissal for lack of probable cause.[4] Both recommendations were approved by the
City Prosecutor.[5]

Respondent filed a Motion to Determine Probable Cause With Motion to Hold in Abeyance Trial With
Motion to Defer Issuance of Warrant and Motion to Defer Posting of Reduced Bail Bond[6] in the libel case.
In her pleadings, respondent accused complainant of manifest partiality and bias against her client when
complainant: 1) summarily ruled that the publication of the letter was libelous but miserably failed to point
out, in her Resolution, which portion constituted libel; 2) denied the motion for reconsideration with
dispatch in an undated Order; 3) "sat" on the falsification case for she did not resolve it with dispatch
unlike what she did in this libel case;[7] 4) did not send a copy of the resolution in the libel case to the
accused; 5) dismissed the falsification case even if mere was clear admission from the accused in the
case that it was his signature; and 6) lodged the information in the libel case within the period to appeal
the undated Order.[8] Respondent perceived an obvious disparity in her treatment of these two cases and
further noticing the swiftness of her (Prosecutor Bacatan) Resolution and Order in this libel case which is
utterly adverse against the accused despite the glaring fact that no probable cause exists to hold him for
libel.[9] Respondent then concluded that "[a]ll these adverse actions of prosecutor Bacatan against herein
accused impels him to one inevitable conclusion: the prosecutor must have been bribed."[10]

In her Comment,[11] complainant denied the charges of undue haste on the libel case and undue delay on
the falsification case. According to her, the two cases were raffled on different dates and received by her
office on separate dates. Adopting a first-in-first-out policy, the libel case, which was raffled first was
resolved earlier than the falsification case.[12] Moreover, she did not sit on the falsification case or act with
undue haste in the libel case, but merely followed the procedure in resolving cases at the Cebu City
Prosecutor's Office.[13] In her Rejoinder,[14] respondent claimed that complainant's undue haste and grave
irregularity in handling the case is evident from the Resolution and Information which she prepared and
signed on the same day, November 20, 2007.[15]
On October 13, 2008,[16] the IBP required respondent to file her Answer.[17]

In her Answer, respondent insisted that complainant follow the regular procedure. She reiterated the
arguments raised in her motion to determine probable cause and in her Rejoinder. She also invoked as
an affirmative defense the Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23 of Cebu City (RTC), granting the
motion to determine probable cause for the libel case, dated August 26, 2008.[18] She also presented as
evidence the RTC Decision[19] dated June 29, 2012 acquitting Dr. Impas, Jr. from the charge of libel.[20]

Pending the results of the investigation of this Complaint, respondent also filed on December 20, 2010, a
Complaint for Violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and a Petition for Disbarment and
Imposition of Appropriate Disciplinary Actions[21] before the Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas and
the IBP, respectively. The petition contained the same allegations made on the motion to determine
probable cause and in the Rejoinder, but no new issues were raised against the complainant.

IBP Investigating Commissioner Hector B. Almeyda (Commissioner Almeyda), in his Report and
Recommendation,[22] stated that it is the practice of the National Prosecution Service that where the
resolution is one finding probable cause for the filing of a case, the investigating prosecutor already
prepares the corresponding information to facilitate the movement of the case, should the reviewing
officers affirm the finding of probable cause. The similarity of dates of the resolution that has yet to be
affirmed with the information is inconsequential and hardly gives room to question the regularity of the
process.[23]

Commissioner Almeyda found that respondent failed to abide by the bounds of courtesy, fairness and
candor as provided in Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. She "had overstepped the
bounds of fair play and have drawn herself to the maelstrom of misconduct by dangerously and recklessly
including in her pleadings a completely and irrelevant allegation concerning complainant's character that
did not enter into the equation as a factor in the determination of whether probable cause existed in the
matter tasked by the processes to be resolved by complainant."[24] Commissioner Almeyda observed
however, that respondent was, "a comparatively new member of the profession," and reminded her "to be
a bit more circumspect in her choice of words in championing the cause of her client."[25] The
Commissioner recommended that respondent be "strongly reprimanded, with warning that a similar or
any other future infraction of the Code of Professional Responsibility shall be dealt with more severely."[26]

On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XX-2013-216,[27] adopting and
approving Commissioner Almeyda's Report and Recommendation.

Ruling

The Court concurs with the finding of the IBP but takes exception to the recommended penalty to be
imposed, which is light in relation to the circumstances presented in this case.

Membership in the bar imposes upon lawyers certain obligations to one another, including the observance
of honourable, candid and courteous dealings with other lawyers,[28] as well as maintaining fidelity to
known and recognized customs and practices of the bar that make the practice of law a profession.[29]

The unfavourable resolutions against her client prompted respondent to hurl accusations of irregularity
and bribery against complainant. Strongly worded statements by a lawyer against opposing counsel, if
justified by the records, may not justify disciplinary actions against the former.[30] But such is not the case
here. Respondent's tirades against complainant have proven to be baseless.

As found by the IBP, that the dates of the finding of probable cause and that of the filing of the information
are the same, is explained by the prevailing practice in the National Prosecution Service: an information is
prepared together with the resolution finding probable cause to facilitate the movement of the case.
[31]
 Respondent could have easily verified this practice before she resorted to condemning complainant
and her actions. Respondent failed to substantiate her bare allegations and sweeping conclusion of
irregularity and charge of bribery, basing her charges purely on her flimsy gut feeling. It is unethical for a
lawyer to accuse another lawyer wantonly and maliciously of a serious misconduct in the absence of a
reasonable cause.[32]

Further, the attack on the character of the complainant is also completely unnecessary in the motion for
determination of probable cause on the libel case. Contrary to respondent's contention, her misconduct is
not cured nor justified by the eventual acquittal of her client.

We note the IBP's observation that during the times material to the case, respondent was considerably
new to the profession,[33] and must have been overzealous in protecting the cause of her client, even akin
to overenthusiasm. Members of the Bar must be reminded that "enthusiasm, or even excess of it, is not
really bad. In fact, the one or the other is no less a virtue, if channeled in the right direction. However, it
must be circumscribed within the bounds of propriety and with due regard for the proper place of courts in
our system of government."[34]

In earlier cases, we meted the penalty of fine for a lawyer's use of intemperate language. Saberon v.
Larong[35] declared a lawyer guilty of simple misconduct and imposed upon him a P2,000.00 fine for
referring to a party's pleadings as "a series of blackmail suits" even if the latter were well within their rights
to file cases against the clients of the lawyer.[36] We ruled that while a lawyer is entitled to present his case
with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language.
[37]
 Although lawyers are allowed a latitude of pertinent remark or comment in the furtherance of the
causes they uphold and for the felicity of their clients, they should not trench beyond the bounds of
relevancy and propriety in making such remark or comment.[38] In Ng v. Alar,[39] we modified the IBP's
recommended penalty of reprimand to a fine of P5,000.00, after finding that "[s]ubmitting pleadings
containing countless insults and diatribes against the [National Labor Relations Commission] and
attacking both its moral and intellectual integrity, hardly measures to the sobriety of speech demanded of
a lawyer."[40] The lawyer also filed disbarment cases against his opposing counsels for the latter's alleged
filing of multiple actions based on the same cause of action, interference in the normal course of judicial
proceeding, and instigating the filing of the disbarment complaint against him. Notably, the IBP dismissed
the disbarment charges against opposing counsels. We ruled that the lawyer clearly violated Canons 8
and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for "his actions erode the public's perception of the
legal profession."[41]

We find that respondent violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. While zeal or
enthusiasm in championing a client's cause is desirable, unprofessional conduct stemming from such zeal
or enthusiasm is disfavoured. When without proof nor enough basis on record, respondent swiftly
concluded, based only on gut feeling, that the complainant has been bribed or had acted for a valuable
consideration, her conduct has overstepped the bounds of courtesy, fairness and candor.

ACCORDINGLY, we find respondent Atty. Merari D. Dadula GUILTY of violation of Canon 8 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. She is imposed a FINE of P2,000.00 with STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the respondent's personal records in the Office of the Bar
Confidant.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, and Perez, JJ., concur.

Reyes, J., On official leave.

September 15, 2016

 NOTICE OF JUDGMENT
Sirs / Mesdames:
Please take notice that on September 7, 2016 a Decision, copy attached hereto, was rendered by the
Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this Office on September
15, 2016 at 1:25 p.m.
Very truly yours,

(SGD)
WILFREDO V. LAPITAN
Division Clerk of Court

[1]
 Rollo, pp. 3-12.
[2]
Id. at 11.
[3]
 Id. at 390.
[4]
 Id. at 391.
[5]
 Id. at 52, 391.
[6]
  Id. at 13-17.
[7]
 Id. at 14-15.
[8]
 Id. at 16.
[9]
 Id. at 15.
[10]
 Id. at 16.
[11]
 Id. at 22-26.
[12]
 Id. at 23.
[13]
 Id. at 24-25.
[14]
 Id. at 27-31.
[15]
 Id. at 28.
[16]
 Id. at 33.
[17]
 Id. at 43-49.
[18]
 Id. at 48.
[19]
 Id. at 329-347.
[20]
 Id. at 48.
[21]
 Id. at 87-127.
[22]
 Id. at 390-395.
[23]
 Id. at 393.
[24]
 Id. at 395.
[25]
 Id. at 394.
[26]
 Id. at 395.
[27]
 Id. at 389.
[28]
 CANON 8 – A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
[29]
 Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 2009, p. 107.
[30]
 Phil. Surety & Ins. Co. Inc. v. Royal Oil Products, et al., 102 Phil. 326, 336-339 (1957).
[31]
 Rollo, p. 393.
[32]
 Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 2009, p. 534, citations omitted.
[33]
 Respondent was admitted to the Bar in March 2003, the incidents transpired in 2007. (Last accessed
on August 15, 2016.)
[34]
 Ng v. Alar, A.C. No. 7252, November 22, 2006, 507 SCRA 465, 475, citing Rheem of the Philippines v.
Ferrer, G.R. No. L-22979, June 26, 1967, 20 SCRA 441.
[35]
 A.C. No. 6567, April 16, 2008, 551 SCRA 359.
[36]
 Id. at 363, 370.
[37]
 Id. at 368.
[38]
 Id. at 369.
[39]
 A.C. No. 7252, November 22, 2006, 507 SCRA 465.
[40]
 Id. at 473.
[41]
 Id. at 475.
794 Phil. 308

FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 7045, September 05, 2016

THE LAW FIRM OF CHAVEZ MIRANDA ASEOCHE REPRESENTED BY ITS FOUNDING PARTNER,
ATTY. FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTYS. RESTITUTO S. LAZARO AND RODEL
R. MORTA, RESPONDENTS.

RESOLUTION
SERENO, C.J.:
On 8 February 2006, the Law Firm of Chavez Miranda Aseoche (complainant), through its founding
partner, Atty. Francisco M. Chavez, filed a Complaint-Affidavit[1] before this Court. Complainant sought the
disbarment of Attys. Restitute S. Lazaro and Rodel R. Morta (respondents) for violation of Canons 8 and
10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It was alleged that respondents falsely and maliciously
accused complainant and its lawyers of antedating a Petition for Review filed with the Department of
Justice (DOJ) on 10 October 2005.[2]

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

The circumstances, which led to the filing of this administrative complaint, occurred in connection with
Criminal Case No. Q-05-136678. The latter was a case for libel then pending against Eliseo F. Soriano
before Branch 218 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City.[3] Complainant acted as the legal
counsel of Soriano in that case while respondents represented private complainant Michael M. Sandoval.
[4]

On 11 October 2005, lawyers from complainant law firm, led by Atty. Chavez, appeared before the RTC
to seek the cancellation of Soriano's scheduled arraignment.[5] During the hearing, Atty. Chavez informed
the RTC that a Petition for Review had been filed before the Department of Justice (DOJ) on 10 October
2005. The Petition questioned the resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City finding
probable cause to indict Soriano for libel.[6] Atty. Chavez presented an extra copy of the Petition for
Review before the RTC, and explained that the main copy of the Petition stamped received by the DOJ
was still with the office messenger, who had personally filed the pleading the day before.[7] Citing the filing
of the Petition for Review, Atty. Chavez moved for the suspension of the arraignment for a period of 60
days pursuant to Rule 116, Section 11 (c) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.[8] The RTC,
however, denied the motion and proceeded with Soriano's arraignment.[9]

The events that transpired during the arraignment led complainant to conclude that Presiding Judge
Hilario Laqui of Branch 218 was biased against its client.[10] Consequently, it filed a Motion for Inhibition on
18 October 2005 requesting Judge Laqui to voluntary inhibit himself from the case.[11]

On 11 November 2005, respondents filed with the RTC a pleading entitled "A Vehement Opposition to the
Motion for Inhibition"[12] (Vehement Opposition) to contradict complainant's motion. The following
statements, which have become the subject of the instant disbarment complaint, were contained in that
pleading:
A Vehement Opposition to the Motion for Inhibition

COMES NOW, private complainant, by and through the undersigned counsel, unto this Honorable Court
respectfully states:

1. Allegedly, the Presiding Judge exhibited bias, partiality, prejudice and has pre-judged the
case against the accused when he proceeded with the arraignment despite the pendency
of a petition for review filed with the Department of Justice.
 2. They alleged that on October 10, 2005, or the day before the scheduled arraignment,
they have filed the petition.
3. They cited Rule 116, Section 11 (c) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, where it
is provided that upon motion, the arraignment of the accused shall be suspended when a
petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending.
4. We contemplated over this matter. If indeed the petition was duly filed with the DOJ
on October 10, 2005, why is it that the accused did not present a copy of the
petition stamped "received" by the DOJ? Why did he not make a manifestation that
he forgot to bring a copy? He could have easily convinced the Presiding Judge to
suspend the arraignment upon a promise that a copy thereof will be filed with the
court in the afternoon of October 11, 2005 or even the following day.
5. Thus, we come to the conclusion that the accused was able to antedate the filing
or mailing of the petition.[13] (Emphases supplied)

The allegation of antedating was reiterated by respondents in a Comment/Opposition to the Accused's

Motion for Reconsideration filed with the RTC on 6 December 2006:

4. It is our conclusion that the accused and his lawyers were able to antedate the filing or
mailing of the petition. We cannot conclude otherwise, unless the accused and his battery of
lawyers will admit that on October 11, 2005 that they suddenly or temporarily became amnesiacs.
They forgot that they filed the Petition for Review the day before.[14] (Emphasis supplied)

In the Complaint-Affidavit it filed with this Court, complainant vehemently denied the allegation of
antedating.[15] As proof that the Petition for Review was personally filed with the DOJ on 10 October 2005,
complainant attached to its Complaint-Affidavit a copy of the Petition bearing the DOJ stamp.[16]

In their Comment dated 4 May 2006,[17] respondents alleged that the filing of the disbarment complaint
against them was a mere harassment tactic. As proof, they cited the non-inclusion of another signatory to
the Vehement Opposition, Public Prosecutor Nadine Jaban-Fama, as a respondent in the Complaint.
[18]
 They also contended that the statements they had made in their pleadings were covered by the
doctrine of privileged communication.[19]

In a Resolution dated 7 August 2006, the Court referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[20]

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE IBP

In his Report and Recommendation dated 7 July 2008,[21] Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco found
respondents guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility:

We agree with the complainant that the accusation that they antedated the mailing of the DO.I
petition is violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the duty of all lawyers to
observe civility and propriety in their pleadings. It was somewhat irresponsible for the
respondents to make such an accusation on the basis of pure speculation, considering that they
had no proof to support their accusation and did not even make any attempt to verify from the
DO.I the date and the manner by which the said petition was filed. Moreover, as held in Asa, we
will have to disagree with the respondents argument on privileged communication, the use of
offensive language in pleadings filed in the course of judicial proceedings, constitutes
unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary action.

xxxx

In Asa, the Supreme Court found Atty. Ginger Anne Castillo guilty of breach of Canon 8 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and admonished her to refrain from using offensive and
 improper language in her pleadings. Considering that the respondents' accusation that the
complainant and its lawyers antedated the mailing of Bro. Eliseo Soriano's DOJ Petition is
somewhat more serious than an allegation of wanting additional attorney's fees for opening doors
and serving coffee, we believe that the penalty of reprimand would be proper in this case.

Wherefore, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Attys. Restituto

Lazaro and Rodel Morta be reprimanded for using improper language in their pleadings with a
warning that a repetition of the same will be dealt with more severely.[22]

On 14 August 2008, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVIII-2008-391, which adopted
and approved Commissioner Limpingco's Report and Recommendation:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and for using improper language in their
pleadings Atty. Restituto Lazaro and Atty. Rodel Morta are REPRIMANDED with a Warning that a
repetition of the same will be dealt with more severely.[23]

On 14 November 2008, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 14 August
2008. They argued that the Complaint against them should have been dismissed on the following
grounds: (a) complainant's failure to implead the public prosecutor, who must be considered an
indispensable party to the case, since the pleading in question could not have been filed without her
conformity; (b) as the subject pleadings had been signed by the public prosecutor, their contents enjoyed
the presumption of regularity and legality, upon which respondents were entitled to rely; (c) respondents
relied in good faith on the review, supervision and direction of the public prosecutor in the filing of the
pleading in question; and (d) the statements in the pleading were covered by the doctrine of privileged
communication.[24] Respondents also contended that Atty. Chavez should be disciplined for the
derogatory statements made against them in the pleadings he submitted during the IBP investigation.

Complainant filed a Comment/Opposition[25] to respondents' Motion for Reconsideration on 8 January

2009.

On 22 March 2014, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2014-146 granting
respondent's Motion for Reconsideration and recommending the dismissal of the instant case on the
basis of complainant's failure to implead an indispensable party:

RESOLVED to GRANT Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, considering that complainant's

non-joinder of an indispensable party makes the presumption that Respondents acted according
to regulations and in good faith in the performance of their official duties. Thus, Resolution No.
XVIII-2008-391 dated August 14, 2008 is hereby SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the case against
Respondents is hereby DISMISSED with stern Warning to be more circumspect.

To date, this Court has not received any petition from complainant or any other interested party
questioning Resolution No. XXI-2014-146 of the IBP Board of Governors. However, pursuant to Section
12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court as amended by Bar Matter No. 1645,[26] we must ultimately decide
disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar, regardless of the acts of the complainant.[27] This
rule is consistent with our obligation to preserve the purity of the legal profession and ensure the proper
and honest administration of justice.[28] In accordance with this duty, we now pass upon the
recommendation of the IBP.

OUR RULING

After a judicious examination of the records of this case, the Court resolves to SET ASIDE Resolution No.
XXI-2014-146 of the IBP Board of Governors. Not only are the grounds cited as bases for the dismissal of
the complaint inapplicable to disbarment proceedings. We are also convinced that there is sufficient
justification to discipline respondents for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Non-joinder of a party is not a ground to dismiss a disciplinary proceeding.

In Resolution No. XXI-2014-146, the IBP Board of Governors dismissed the instant case because of
complainant's purported failure to implead an indispensable party. Although this ground for dismissal was
not explained at length in its resolution, the IBP Board of Governors appeared to have given credence to
the argument proffered by respondents. They had argued that the public prosecutor was an indispensable
party to the proceeding, and that her non-joinder was a ground for the dismissal of the case. That ruling is
patently erroneous.

In previous cases, the Court has explained that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.
[29]
 These proceedings are neither purely civil nor purely criminal,[30] but are rather investigations by the
Court into the conduct of its officers.[31] Technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied,[32] but are
construed in a manner that allows us to determine whether lawyers are still fit to fulfill the duties and
exercise the privileges of their office.[33]

We cannot countenance the dismissal of the case against respondents merely because the public
prosecutor has not been joined as a party. We emphasize that in disbarment proceedings, the Court
merely calls upon members of the bar to account for their actuations as officers of the Court.
[34]
 Consequently, only the lawyer who is the subject of the case is indispensable. No other party, not even
a complainant, is needed.[35]

In this case, respondents are only called upon to account for their own conduct. Specifically, their
pleadings contain the accusation that complainant antedated the filing of a petition before the DOJ. The
fact that Public Prosecutor Jaban-Fama also signified her conformity to the pleadings containing these
statements is irrelevant to the issue of whether respondents' conduct warrants the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions.

Respondents cannot utilize the presumption of regularity accorded to acts of the public
prosecutor as a defense for their own misconduct.

Respondents cannot excuse their conduct by invoking the presumption of regularity accorded to official
acts of the public prosecutor. It must be emphasized that the act in question, i.e. the preparation of the
pleadings subject of the Complaint, was performed by respondents and not by the public prosecutor.
Hence, any impropriety in the contents of or the language used in these pleadings originated from
respondents. The mere fact that the public prosecutor signed the pleadings after they were prepared
could not have cured any impropriety contained therein. The presumption that the public prosecutor
performed her duties regularly and in accordance with law cannot shield respondents from liability for their
own conduct.

The claim of respondents that they relied in good faith on the approval of the public prosecutor is likewise
untenable. As lawyers, they have a personal obligation to observe the Code of Professional
Responsibility. This obligation includes the duty to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor
towards their professional colleagues, including opposing counsel. Respondents cannot disregard this
solemn duty solely on the basis of the signature of a public prosecutor and later seek to absolve
themselves from liability by pleading good faith.

Respondents violated Canons 8 and JO of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

There being no cause for the dismissal of the instant case, the Court now proceeds to determine whether
respondents have indeed violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

We note that the essential allegations of the Complaint-Affidavit have already been admitted by
respondents. In the Comment[36] they submitted to this Court, they even reproduced the pertinent
portions[37] of their pleadings that contained the allegations of antedating. Accordingly, the only question
left for us to resolve is whether their conduct violates the ethical code of the profession.

After a thorough evaluation of the pleadings filed by the parties and the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner Limpingco, the Court finds respondents guilty of violating Canons 8[38] and 10[39] of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

This Court has repeatedly urged lawyers to utilize only respectful and temperate language in the
preparation of pleadings, in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession.[40] Their arguments, whether
written or oral, should be gracious to both the court and the opposing counsel and should consist only of
such words as may be properly addressed by one honorable member of the bar to another.[41] In this
case, respondents twice accused complainant of antedating a petition it had filed with the DOJ without
any proof whatsoever. This allegation of impropriety undoubtedly brought complainant and its lawyers into
disrepute. The accusation also tended to mislead the courts, as it was made without hesitation
notwithstanding the absence of any evidentiary support. The Court cannot condone this irresponsible and
unprofessional behavior.

That the statements conveyed the perception by respondents of the events that transpired during the
scheduled arraignment and their "truthful belief regarding a perceived irregularity" in the filing of the
Petition is not an excuse. As this Court emphasized in Re: Supreme Court Resolution Dated 28 April
2003 in G.R. Nos. 145817 & 145822:

The Court cannot countenance the ease with which lawyers, in the hopes of strengthening their
cause in a motion for inhibition, make grave and unfounded accusations of unethical conduct or
even wrongdoing against other members of the legal profession. It is the duty of members of the
Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or
reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justness of the cause with which they are
charged.[42]

Respondents' defense of absolute privilege is likewise untenable. Indulging in offensive personalities in

the course of judicial proceedings constitutes unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary action, even if
the publication thereof is privileged.[43] While lawyers may enjoy immunity from civil and criminal liability
for privileged statements made in their pleadings, they remain subject to this Court's supervisory and
disciplinary powers for lapses in the observance of their duty as members of the legal profession.[44]

We believe, though, that the use of intemperate and abusive language does not merit the ultimate penalty
of disbarment.[45] Nonetheless, respondents should be disciplined for violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility and sternly warned that the Court will deal with future similar conduct more severely.[46]

A final note. We find it necessary to remind the IBP of its duty to judiciously investigate and evaluate each
and every disciplinary action referred to it by this Court. In making its recommendations, the IBP should
bear in mind the purpose of disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar — to maintain the
integrity of the legal profession for the sake of public interest. Needless to state, the Court will not look
with favor upon a recommendation based entirely on technical and procedural grounds.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution dated 22 March 2014 issued by the IBP Board of
Governors is hereby SET ASIDE. Attys. Restituto Lazaro and Rodel Morta are hereby ADMONISHED to
use only respectful and temperate language in the preparation of pleadings and to be more circumspect
in dealing with their professional colleagues. They are likewise STERNLY WARNED that a commission of
the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Leonardo-De Castro, Perlas-Bernabe, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.

Bersamin, J., on official leave.
[1]
 Rollo, Volume 1, pp. 1-13.
[2]
 Id. at 8-11.
[3]
 Id. at 2.
[4]
 Id.
[5]
 Id. at 4.
[6]
 Id.
[7]
 Id. at 4-5.
[8]
 Id.
[9]
 Id. at 5.
[10]
 Id. at 42.
[11]
 Id. at 39-47.
[12]
 Id. at 48-56.
[13]
 Id. 48-49.
[14]
 Id. at 7, 106.
[15]
 Id. at 6-8
[16]
 Id. at 21-38.
[17]
 Id. at 101-115.
[18]
 Id. at 107-108.
[19]
 Id. at 108-109.
[20]
 Id. at 116.
[21]
 Id. (Volume V) at 3-10.
[22]
 Id. at 9-10.
[23]
 Id. at 1-2.
[24]
 Id. at 11-34.
[25]
 Id. at 43-57.
[26]
 Re: Amendment of Rule 139-B, 13 October 2015.
[27]
 Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, as amended by Bar Matter No. 1645 states:

Section 12. Review and recommendation by the Board of Governors.

a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record
and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report.

b) After its review, the Board, by the vole of a majority of its total membership, shall recommend to the
Supreme Court the dismissal of the complaint or the imposition of disciplinary action against the
respondent. The Board shall issue a resolution setting fortli its findings and recommendations, clearly and
distinctly stating the facts and the reasons on which it is based.

The resolution shall be issued within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the
Board following the submission of the Investigator's report.

c) The Board's resolution, together with the entire records and all evidence presented and submitted,
shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action within ten (10) days from issuance of the
resolution.
[28]
 Pena v. Aparicio, 552 Phil. 512-526 (2007); In re: Almacen v. Yaptinchay, 142 Phil. 353-393 (1970).
[29]
 Ylaya v. Gacott, A.C. No. 6475, 30 January 2013, 689 SCRA 452-483; Gonzalez v. Alcaraz, 534 Phil.
471-484 (2006); Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, 481 Phil. 646-660 (2004).
[30]
 Dizon v. De Taza, A.C. No. 7676, 10 June 2014, 726 SCRA 70-83 citing In re: Almacen v. Yaptinchay,
142 Phil. 353-393 (1970).
[31]
 Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma, A.C. No. 2474, 481 Phil. 646-660 (2004).
[32]
 Ferancullo v. Ferancullo, Jr., 538 Phil. 501-517 (2006).
[33]
 Pena v. Aparicio, 552 Phil. 512-526 (2007); Gonzalez v. Alcaraz, 534 Phil. 471-484 (2006) citing In re:
Almacen v. Yaptinchay, 142 Phil. 353-393 (1970).
[34]
 Id.
[35]
 Coronel v. Cunanan, A.C. No. 6738, 12 August 2015.
[36]
 Rollo, pp. 101-115.
[37]
 Id. at 105-106.
[38]
 Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY. FAIRNESS AND CANDOR
TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST
OPPOSING COUNSEL.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.

Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of
another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and
assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
[39]
 Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of paper, the language
or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a
provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not
been proved.

Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends
of justice.
[40]
 Torres v. Javier, 507 Phil. 397-409 (2005).
[41]
 Hueysuwan-Florido v. Florido, 465 Phil. 1-8 (2004).
[42]
 A.C. No. 6332, 17 April 2012.
[43]
 Asa v. Castillo, 532 Phil. 9-28 (2006).
[44]
 Lubiano v. Gordolla, 201 Phil. 47-52 (1982).
[45]
 See: Nuñez v. Astorga, 492 Phil. 450-460 (2005).
[46]
 See: Noble III v. Ailes, A.C. No. 10628 (Resolution), 1 July 2015.