1

A.C. No. 7298

June 25, 2007
[Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1565]
FERNANDO MARTIN O. PENA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LOLITO G. APARICIO, respondent.
R E S O LU TI O N
TINGA, J.:
In this administrative complaint, a lawyer is charged with violation of Rule
19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for writing a
demand letter the contents of which threatened complainant with the filing of
criminal cases for tax evasion and falsification of documents.
Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio (respondent) appeared as legal counsel for Grace C.
Hufana in an illegal dismissal case before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). Sometime in August 2005, complainant Fernando
Martin O. Pena, as President of MOF Company, Inc. (Subic), received a notice
from the Conciliation and Mediation Center of the NLRC for a
mediation/conciliation conference. In the conference, respondent, in behalf of
his client, submitted a claim for separation pay arising from her alleged illegal
dismissal. Complainant rejected the claim as being baseless. Complainant
thereafter sent notices to Hufana for the latter to explain her absences and to
return to work. In reply to this return to work notice, respondent wrote a letter
to complainant reiterating his client's claim for separation pay. The letter also
contained the following threat to the company:
BUT if these are not paid on August 10, 2005, we will be
constrained to file and claim bigger amounts including moral
damages to the tune of millions under established precedence of
cases and laws. In addition to other multiple charges like:
1. Tax evasion by the millions of pesos of income not
reported to the government.
2. Criminal Charges for Tax Evasion
3. Criminal Charges for Falsification of Documents
4. Cancellation of business license to operate due to
violations of laws.
These are reserved for future actions in case of failure to pay the
above amounts as settlements in the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC).1
Believing that the contents of the letter deviated from accepted ethical
standards, complainant filed an administrative complaint2 with the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
Respondent filed an Answer with Impleader (Motion to Dismiss and
Counterclaims)3 claiming that Atty. Emmanuel A. Jocson, complainant's legal
counsel, also played an important part in imputing the malicious, defamatory,
and fabricated charges against him. Respondent also pointed out that the
complaint had no certification against forum shopping and was motivated only
to confuse the issues then pending before the Labor Arbiter. By way of
counterclaim, respondent asked for damages and for the disbarment of Atty.
Jocson. Respondent also asked the IBP to endorse the prosecution of Atty.
Jocson for Usurpation of Public Functions4 and for violation of the Notarial
Law.5

A mandatory conference was held on 6 December 2005 but respondent failed

to appear.6 Both parties were thereafter required to submit their position
papers.
The Report and Recommendation7 of Investigating Commissioner Milagros V.
San Juan found that complainant, failed to file his position paper and to
comply with Administrative Circular No. 04-94 requiring a certificate against
forum shopping and, accordingly, recommended the dismissal of the
complaint against respondent. On 26 May 2006, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner.8 On 10 July 2006, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
transmitted to the Supreme Court the notice of said Resolution and the records
of the case.9 Thereafter, on 18 August 2006, respondent filed with the IBP a
Motion for Reconsideration (for Modification of Decision)10 reiterating his
claim of damages against complainant in the amount of four hundred million
pesos (P400,000,000.00), or its equivalent in dollars, for filing the "false,
malicious, defamers [sic], fraudulent, illegal fabricators [sic], malevolent[,]
oppressive, evasive filing [of] a groundless and false suit." 11
Complainant thereafter filed this Petition for Review (of the Resolution of the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline)12alleging that he personally submitted and
filed with the IBP his position paper, after serving a copy thereof on
respondent by registered mail. He further alleges that he was deprived of his
right to due process when the IBP dismissed his complaint without
considering his position paper and without ruling on the merits thereof.
Complainant accordingly prays for the reversal and setting aside of the 26
May 2006 Resolution13 of the IBP Board of Governors and the remand of the
case to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline for proper adjudication and
disposition on the merits.
Based on the records, there is truth to complainant's assertion that he filed his
position paper on 21 December 2005, after serving a copy of the same to
respondent. The IBP stamp on the front page of said document shows that it
was received by the IBP on 21 December 2005. The registry receipt attached
to the same document also shows that it was sent by registered mail to
respondent on the same date. 14
Complainant, however, omitted to offer any explanation in his petition before
this Court for his failure to attach a certification against forum shopping in his
complaint against respondent.
The requirement of a certification against forum shopping was originally
required by Circular No. 28-91, dated 8 February 1994, issued by this Court
for every petition filed with the Court or the Court of Appeals. Administrative
Circular No. 04-94, made effective on 1 April 1994, expanded the certification
requirement to include cases filed in courts and quasi-judicial agencies below
this Court and the Court of Appeals. Ultimately, the Court adopted paragraphs
(1) and (2) of Administrative Circular No. 04-94 to become Section 5, Rule 7
of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.15 Said rule states that a violation thereof would
constitute contempt of court and be cause for the summary dismissal of both
petitions without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the
counsel of the party concerned.16
The Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors took against
complainant his failure to attach the certification against forum shopping to
his complaint and consequently dismissed his complaint. This Court, however,
disagrees and, accordingly, grants the petition. However, a remand of the case
to the IBP would unduly prolong its adjudication.

2
The Court's determination is anchored on the sui generis nature of disbarment
proceedings, the reasons for the certification against forum shopping
requirement, complainant's subsequent compliance with the requirement, and
the merit of complainant's complaint against respondent.
The Court, in the case of In re Almacen,17 dwelt on the sui generis character of
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, thus:
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an
action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into
the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict
punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor
therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public
interest is its primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person
to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of
the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court
with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice
by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct
have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with
the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to
speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.18 [Emphasis supplied]

ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedurewhich

is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible."23
At any rate, complainant's subsequent compliance with the requirement cured
the supposed defect in the original complaint. The records show that
complainant submitted the required certification against forum shopping on 6
December 2006 when he filed his Comment/Opposition to respondent's
Motion to Dismiss the present petition.
Finally, the intrinsic merit of complainant's case against respondent justifies
the grant of the present petition. Respondent does not deny authorship of the
threatening letter to complainant, even spiritedly contesting the charge that the
letter is unethical.
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall
represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law," reminding legal
practitioners that a lawyer's duty is not to his client but to the administration of
justice; to that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct
ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.24 In
particular, Rule 19.01 commands that a "lawyer shall employ only fair and
honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present,
participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to
obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding." Under this Rule, a
lawyer should not file or threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal
case or cases against the adversaries of his client designed to secure a leverage
to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases against the
lawyer's client.25

In view of the nature of disbarment proceedings, the certification against

forum shopping to be attached to the complaint, if one is required at all in
such proceedings, must refer to another administrative case for disciplinary
proceedings against the same respondent, because such other proceedings or
"action" is one that necessarily involves "the same issues" as the one posed in
the disbarment complaint to which the certification is supposedly to be
attached.

In the case at bar, respondent did exactly what Canon 19 and its Rule
proscribe. Through his letter, he threatened complainant that should the latter
fail to pay the amounts they propose as settlement, he would file and claim
bigger amounts including moral damages, as well as multiple charges such as
tax evasion, falsification of documents, and cancellation of business license to
operate due to violations of laws. The threats are not only unethical for
violating Canon 19, but they also amount to blackmail.

Further, the rationale for the requirement of a certification against forum

shopping is to apprise the Court of the pendency of another action or claim
involving the same issues in another court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency,
and thereby precisely avoid the forum shopping situation. Filing multiple
petitions or complaints constitutes abuse of court processes,19 which tends to
degrade the administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial
procedure, and adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the
courts.20 Furthermore, the rule proscribing forum shopping seeks to promote
candor and transparency among lawyers and their clients in the pursuit of their
cases before the courts to promote the orderly administration of justice,
prevent undue inconvenience upon the other party, and save the precious time
of the courts. It also aims to prevent the embarrassing situation of two or more
courts or agencies rendering conflicting resolutions or decisions upon the
same issue.21

Blackmail is "the extortion of money from a person by threats of accusation or

exposure or opposition in the public prints,obtaining of value from a person
as a condition of refraining from making an accusation against him, or
disclosing some secret calculated to operate to his prejudice." In common
parlance and in general acceptation, it is equivalent to and synonymous with
extortion, the exaction of money either for the performance of a duty, the
prevention of an injury, or the exercise of an influence. Not infrequently, it is
extorted by threats, or by operating on the fears or the credulity, or by
promises to conceal or offers to expose the weaknesses, the follies, or the
crime of the victim.26

It is in this light that we take a further look at the necessity of attaching a

certification against forum shopping to a disbarment complaint. It would seem
that the scenario sought to be avoided, i.e., the filing of multiple suits and the
possibility of conflicting decisions, rarely happens in disbarment complaints
considering that said proceedings are either "taken by the Supreme
Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the
verified complaint of any person."22 Thus, if the complainant in a disbarment
case fails to attach a certification against forum shopping, the pendency of
another disciplinary action against the same respondent may still be
ascertained with ease. We have previously held that the rule requiring a
certification of forum shopping to accompany every initiatory pleading,
"should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own

In Sps. Boyboy v. Atty. Yabut, Jr.,27 we held that "[a]n accusation for
blackmail and extortion is a very serious one which, if properly substantiated,
would entail not only respondent's disbarment from the practice of law, but
also a possible criminal prosecution."28 While the respondent in Boyboy was
exonerated for lack of evidence, the same may not be said of respondent in the
present case for he admits to writing the offensive letter.
In fact, respondent does not find anything wrong with what he wrote,
dismissing the same as merely an act of pointing out massive violations of the
law by the other party, and, with boldness, asserting that "a lawyer is under
obligation to tell the truth, to report to the government commission of offenses
punishable by the State."29 He further asserts that the writing of demand letters
is a standard practice and tradition and that our laws allow and encourage the
settlement of disputes.

3
Respondent's assertions, however, are misleading, for it is quite obvious that
respondent's threat to file the cases against complainant was designed to
secure some leverage to compel the latter to give in to his client's demands. It
was not respondent's intention to point out complainant's violations of the law
as he so gallantly claims. Far from it, the letter even contains an implied
promise to "keep silent" about the said violations if payment of the claim is
made on the date indicated.
Indeed, the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition in this
jurisdiction. It is usually done by a lawyer pursuant to the principal-agent
relationship that he has with his client, the principal. Thus, in the performance
of his role as agent, the lawyer may be tasked to enforce his client's claim and
to take all the steps necessary to collect it, such as writing a letter of demand
requiring payment within a specified period. However, the letter in this case
contains more than just a simple demand to pay. It even contains a threat to
file retaliatory charges against complainant which have nothing to do with his
client's claim for separation pay. The letter was obviously designed to secure
leverage to compel complainant to yield to their claims. Indeed, letters of this
nature are definitely proscribed by the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent cannot claim the sanctuary provided by the privileged
communication rule under which a private communication executed in the
performance of a legal duty is not actionable. The privileged nature of the
letter was removed when respondent used it to blackmail complainant and
extort from the latter compliance with the demands of his client.
However, while the writing of the letter went beyond ethical standards, we
hold that disbarment is too severe a penalty to be imposed on respondent,
considering that he wrote the same out of his overzealousness to protect his
client's interests. Accordingly, the more appropriate penalty is reprimand.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is granted. The 26 May
2006 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Respondent Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio is hereby found liable for
violation of Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and is accordingly meted out the penalty of REPRIMAND,
with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 40457 May 8, 1992
MOBIL OIL PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH VI, GEMINIANO
F. YABUT and AGUEDA ENRIQUEZ YABUT, respondents.
Ramon O. Nolasco and Manuel N. Camacho for petitioner.

petitioner's Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution and Appointment

of Special Sheriff.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On November 8, 1972, petitioner filed a complaint 1 in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal against the partnership La Mallorca and its general partners,
which included private respondents, for collection of a sum of money arising
from gasoline purchased on credit but not paid, for damages and attorney's
fees.
On December 22, 1972, petitioner, with leave of court, filed an Amended
Complaint 2 impleading the heirs of the deceased partners as defendants.
During the hearing held on April 1, 1974, after petitioner had presented its
evidence, the parties agreed to submit the case for decision on the basis of the
evidence on record adduced by petitioner but "to exclude past interest in the
amount of P150,000.00 and to award nominal attorney's fees." Consequently,
on July 25, 1974, a Decision 3was rendered in favor of the petitioner and
against defendants. Private respondents thereafter filed a Petition to Modify
Decision and/or Petition for Reconsideration, 4 which was opposed 5 by
petitioner.
The Petition to Modify Decision and/or Reconsideration is predicated on the
following grounds:
1. That there was no stipulation or agreement of the parties on the award of
attorney's fees;
2. That Miguel Enriquez, not being a general partner, could not bind the
partnership in the Sales Agreement he signed with plaintiff; and
3. That defendant Geminiano Yabut already withdrew as partner and president
of La Mallorca as of September 14, 1972.
On November 20, 1974, respondent court issued its disputed Order 6 declaring
its decision null and void insofar as private respondents were concerned on the
ground that there was no evidence to show that the counsel for the defendants
had been duly authorized by their respective clients to enter into a stipulation
or facts, a compromise agreement or a confession judgment with petitioner, a
ground never raised by the parties. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and Clarification,7 seeking the reconsideration of said order
or, if not reconsidered, clarification from respondent court as to whether or not
there will be further proceedings for reception of private respondents'
evidence in court. Respondent court denied the motion, as well as petitioner's
Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution and Appointment of Special
Sheriff, by way of the Order dated February 20, 1975. Hence, this petition.
The issue presented before Us is whether or not public respondent acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in declaring null
and void its earlier decision of July 25, 1974.

Felipe C. Magat for private respondents.

We find merit in the instant petition.

NOCON, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Mobil Oil
Philippines, Inc. questioning (1) the Order of respondent Court of First
Instance, Branch VI, Pasig, Rizal, promulgated on November 20, 1974
declaring its earlier Decision dated July 25, 1974 as null and void insofar as it
concerned private respondents Geminiano F. Yabut and Agueda EnriquezYabut, and (2) the Order promulgated on February 20, 1975 and denying

In the Order of November 20, 1974, 8 respondent court declared the decision
dated July 25, 1974 null and void for the following reason:
There is no evidence on record to show that the
attorneys of record for the defendants had been duly
authorized by their respective clients, including present
movants, to enter into a stipulation of facts or a
compromise agreement of confession of judgment. Ant
any settlement or confession of judgment which an

4
attorney may enter for his client without any written
authority cannot bind the client. To be sure, the
stipulation of facts which amounts to or approximates a
compromise agreement, or waives a right or practically
confesses judgment, entered into by a lawyer without
the consent and conformity of his clients, is an absolute
nullity. This precisely is what appears to be the
stipulation of the movants, as well as the other
defendants as the records show. In view of the
conclusion thus reached, it would appear that there is no
necessity to discuss the other grounds raised by the
movants.
The records show that the petitioner had already adduced evidence and
formally offered its evidence in court; that at the hearing of April 1, 1974, for
the presentation of defendants' evidence, the parties through their
counsels, 9 mutually agreed to the waiver of the presentation of defendants'
evidence on one hand, and the waiver of past interest in the amount of
P150,000.00 on the part of the plaintiff and the payment of only nominal
attorney's fees, thus the respondent court issued the following Order:
Calling this case for hearing today, the parties pray the
Court that they are submitting the case for decision on
the basis of the evidence thus presented but to exclude
past interest in the amount of about P150,000.00 and to
award nominal attorney's fees.
Finding the said motion in order, let judgment be
rendered in accordance with the evidence so far
presented. 10
The foregoing Order is not a stipulation of facts nor a confession of judgment.
If at all, there has been a mutual waiver by the parties of the right to present
evidence in court on the part of the defendants on one hand, and waiver of
interest in the amount of P150,000.00 and the stipulated attorney's fees of 25%
of the principal amount on the part of the plaintiff, except a nominal one.
The counsels of the parties in this case had the implied authority to do all acts
necessary or incidental to the prosecution and management of the suit in
behalf of their clients of their clients who were all present and never objected
to the disputed order of the respondent court. They have the exclusive
management of the procedural aspect of the litigation including the
enforcement of the rights and remedies of their client. Thus, when the case
was submitted for decision on the evidence so far presented, the counsel for
private respondents acted within the scope of his authority as agent and lawyer
in negotiating for favorable terms for his clients. It may be that in waiving the
presentation of defendants' evidence, counsel believed that petitioner's
evidence was insufficient to prove its cause of action or knowing the futility of
resisting the claim, defendants opted to waive their right to present evidence in
exchange for the condonation of past interest in the amount of around
P150,000.00 and the award of a nominal attorney's fees instead of the 25%
stipulated in the Sales Agreement and Invoices. In fact, when counsel secured
a waiver of the accumulated interest of P150,000.00 and the 25% stipulated
attorney's fees, the defendants were certainly benefited.
Parties are bound by the acts and mistakes of their counsel in procedural
matters. Mistakes of counsel as to the relevancy or irrelevancy of certain
evidence or mistakes in the proper defense, in the introduction of certain
evidence, or in argumentation are, among others all mistakes of procedure,
and they bind the clients, as in the instant case. 11

Having obtained what defendants bargained for and having wrongly

appreciated the sufficiency or insufficiency of petitioner's evidence, private
respondents are now estopped from assailing the decision dated July 25, 1974.
Records would show that private respondents have not submitted any
evidence or pleading to contest the authority of their counsel to waive as he
did waive presentation of their evidence in exchange for and in consideration
of petitioner's waiver of past interest and the stipulated 25% of attorney' fees.
Even if We construe the Order of April 1, 1974 to be based on an oral
compromise agreement, the same is valid for as held in the case of Cadano
vs. Cadano 12 an oral compromise may be the basis of a judgment although
written evidence thereof is not signed. It has been said that the elements
necessary to a valid agreement of compromise are the reality of the claim
made and the bona fides of the compromise. 13
The validity of a judgment or order of a court cannot be assailed collaterally
unless the ground of attack is lack of jurisdiction or irregularity in their entry
apparent on the face of the record or because it is vitiated by fraud. If the
purported nullity of the judgment lies on the party's lack of consent to the
compromise agreement, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to have it
reconsidered, and if denied, to appeal from such judgment, or if final to apply
for relief under rule 38. 14 It is well settled that a judgment on compromise is
not appealable and is immediately executory unless a motion is field to set
aside the compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, in which case
an appeal may be taken from the order denying the motion. 15
Moreover, We do not find the grounds relied upon in private respondents'
Petition to Modify Decision to be meritorious.
Mr. Miguel Enriquez automatically became a general partner of the
partnership La Mallorca being one of the heirs of the deceased partner
Mariano Enriquez. Article IV of the uncontested Articles of Co-Partnership of
La Mallorca provides:
IV. Partners. The parties above-named, with their
civil status, citizenship and residences set forth after
their respective names, shall be members comprising
this partnership, all of whom shall be general partners.
If during the existence of this co-partnership, any of the
herein partners should die, the co-partnership shall
continue to exist amongst the surviving partners and the
heir or heirs of the deceased partner or
partners; Provided, However, that if the heir or heirs of
the deceased partner or partners elect not to continue in
the co-partnership, the surviving partners shall have the
right to acquire the interests of the deceased partner or
partners at their book value based upon the last balance
sheet of the co-partnership, and in proportion to their
respective capital contributions; And, Provided Further,
that should a partner or partners desire to withdraw
from the co-partnership and the remaining partners are
not willing to acquire his or their shares or interest in
the co-partnership in accordance with the foregoing
provisions, the co-partnership shall not thereby be
dissolved, but such retiring partner or partners shall
only be entitled to his or their shares in the assets of the
co-partnership according to the latest balance sheet
which have been drawn prior to the date of his or their
withdrawal. In such event, the co-partnership shall
continue amongst the remaining partners. 16

5
As to respondent Geminiano Yabut's claim that he cannot be liable as a
partner, he having withdrawn as such, does not convince Us. The debt was
incurred long before his withdrawal as partner and his resignation as President
of La Mallorca on September 14, 1972. Respondent Geminiano Yabut could
not just withdraw unilaterally from the partnership to avoid his liability as a
general partner to third persons like the petitioner in the instant case.
This is likewise true with regard to the alleged non-active participation of
respondent Agueda Yabut in the partnership. Active participation in a
partnership is not a condition precedent for membership in a partnership so as
to be entitled to its profits nor be burdened with its liabilities.
From the foregoing, it is evident that the court a quo erred in issuing the
Orders of November 20, 1974 and February 20, 1975 nullifying the decision
dated July 25, 1974 and dismissing the complaint against private respondents
Geminiano Yabut and Agueda Enriquez Yabut.
WHEREFORE, the Orders of November 20, 1974 and February 20, 1975 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision dated July 25, 1975 is
reinstated and declaring the same valid and binding against private
respondents Geminiano Yabut and Agueda Enriquez-Yabut. With costs de
officio.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 4552. December 14, 2004]
JOSE A. ROLDAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. NATALIO PANGANIBAN
and ATTY. JUANITO P. NOEL, respondents.
R E S O LU TI O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is an administrative case for disbarment filed by complainant
Jose A. Roldan against respondents Atty. Natalio M. Panganiban and Atty.
Juanito P. Noel. Complainant charges that respondent lawyers reneged in their
duties and obligations towards him as their client, especially in the
complainants right to appeal to the higher court after losing his case in the
lower courts. The allegations in the complaint dated February 12, 1996[1] in
support of the accusations are as follows:
1.
Na ako ang plaintiff sa Civil Case No. 144860-CV M.I.T. Branch 25
Jose A. Roldan vs. Ramon Montano & Robert Montano, na ang Judge ay si
Honorable Severino De Castro, Jr. na ang kaso ay Recovery of possession
with damages. Itoy iniapila ko sa RTC Branch 43 with Civil Case No. 9573739 na ang Judge naman dito ay si Honorable Manuel F. Lorenzo ng RTC.
Si Atty. Panganiban at Atty. Noel ang abogado ko.
...
4.
Na noong February 6, 1995 bago kami pumasok sa court room ay
nagtanong sa akin si Atty. Noel, ng ganito: Mr. Roldan nasaan nga pala yung
resibo na ibinigay ni Tessie sa iyo na nagbigay ka ng down payment na Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) noong March 1, 1986. Agad akong sumagot at
sinabi ko sa kaniya, Atty. Noel lahat po ng original ay hiningi ninyo sa akin,
lahat po ay binigay ko sa inyo kasama iyong resibo ni Tessie Dalusong, na
akoy magbigay ng Ten Thousand Pesos bilang downpayment sa ipinagbili
niyang bahay sa akin. Agad siyang sumagot Wala kang ibinibigay sa akin!

5.
Na kaya nga sinabi ko kay Atty. Noel na: Ibigay ninyo sa akin ang
folder at ako ang hahanap ng resibo ni Tessie Dalusong. Tumulong din si
Atty. Noel, at nakita din namin. Sinabi ni Atty. Noel Sayang hindi na natin
maipasok ito, hindi na kasi pwedeng magpasok pa ng mga ibidensya. Di ko
alam kung bakit hindi niya ipinasok noon pa man. (Ang resibo na
nagpapatunay na ako ang unang nakabili ng bahay sa 1723 Pedro Gil St.,
Paco, Maynila).
6.
Na noong nasa loob na kami ng court room ay handa na ako sa sinasabi
ni Atty. Noel no Rebuttal pero nagtaka ako kinumbinsi ako na diumano ay
malinaw na ang aking deklarasyon at malinaw ang mga ebidensya kaya hindi
na raw dapat mag rebuttal i-waive na lang daw sa Memorandum kaya nga
sinabi ng Judge na: Gumawa kayo ng Memoranda within fifteen days
submitted for decision. Noong March 8, 1995 ang memorandum ay
submitted for decision;
7.
Na noong Abril 7, 1995 sinabi ko kay Atty. Noel, Bakit may ibinigay
na zerox copies ng decision si Robert Montano na aking kalaban sumagot si
Atty. Noel, at sinabi sa akin Tsekin mo sa court. Gayon nga ang aking
ginawa. At bumalik ako kay Atty. Noel, at sinabi ko: Totoo nga na may
decision na. Sinabi ni Atty. Noel na: Ginapang nila yun, sapalagay mo,
magkano ang inilagay nila? Sa palagay ko ay hindi lang trenta mil
(P30,000.00) pesos ang magagastos nila sa kasong ito, yun ang isinagot ko;
8.
Na iminungkahi ko kay Atty. Noel na magpayl ng motion for
reconsideration, sinagat ako ni Atty. Noel na: Ginapang na nila yun kaya
dapat umapila na lang tayo. Sinabi ko kay Atty. Noel na: Kung matalo pa rin
ako dito, ay dalhin natin sa Supreme Court para parehas ang laban; Na
bilang bahagi nito inilakip ko dito ang decision ng MTC; at ang apilasyon sa
RTC, at ang petsa ng decision ng RTC na tinaggap ni Atty. Noel.
9.
Na noong Abril 24, 1995 umapila ako sa Court of Appeal makaraan
ang ilang buwan ay dumating sa office ni Atty. Noel at Atty. Panganiban,
noong November 13, 1995 ang decision subalit tinawagan ako ng sekretarya
nila Atty. Noel at Atty. Panganiban noon lang November 24, 1995. Tinanong
ko ang sekretarya ni Atty. Panganiban kung nasaan si Atty. Noel, ang sagot ng
sekretarya ay Nasa probinsiya maraming inaasikaso doon. Agad kong
sinabi: Hindi ba fifteen days lang para maka-apila sa Supreme Court.
Sumagot si Zeny at sinabi Isang buwan daw yun para sagutin.
10. Na madalas kong tawagan si Zeny (ang sekretarya ni Atty. Panganiban)
na sinasabi kong nakahanda na ang pangbayad gawin na ninyo ang apilasyon
sa Supreme Court, itoy madalas kong sabihin sa sekretarya (si Zeny) kayat
ibinigay niya ang bagong office ni Atty. Noel sa Gedisco Centre Rm. 134,
1564 Mabini St., Ermita, Manila.
11. Na madalas akong magpunta sa bagong office ni Atty. Noel gaya noong
Dec. 1, 1995, Dec. 4, 1995, Dec. 5, 1995, Dec. 7, 1995, Dec. 8, 1995 at noon
pang huling linggo ng November ay sisimulan ko ng sabihin sa dalawang
sekretarya (si Zeny at Marie Cris) na gawin na ang aking apilasyon sabihin
kay Atty. Noel sa Supreme Court.
12. Na noong December 12, 1995 maaga pa ay nagpunta ako sa office ni
Atty. Noel sa Gedisco 3rd Flr. Mabini St., Ermita, Manila. Tinanong ko ang
kaniyang sekretarya kung nakausap si Atty. Noel, sinagot ako ng sekretarya at
sinabing Tinanong ko si Atty. Noel kung yari na yung apilasyong
ipinagagawa ninyo (Jose Roldan) hindi po niya ako sinasagot.
13. Na kaya agad akong magpunta sa RTC Branch 43 upang alamin ang
katotohanan nabatid ko noon lang, na akoy natalo ng walang kalaban-laban,
pagkat nag-laps na o lampas na ang panahong ibinibigay ng batas para
makapag-payl ng apilasyon sa Supreme Court.

6
14. Na dahil dito sa mga panloloko, at pagwawalang bahala sa aking kaso ni
Atty. Noel, at Atty. Panganiban ay idinidimanda ko sila ng Damages na
halagang one hundred fifty thousand (P150,000.00) pesos at dapat silang
alisan ng karapatan na makapag-practice sa kanilang propesyon.
In his Comment dated August 8, 1996, Atty. Panganiban avers that he
was neither aware nor did he participate in the prosecution of Civil Case No.
144860-CV M.I.T. Branch 25 Jose A. Roldan vs. Ramon Montano & Robert
Montano and in the appeal of said case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 43; they do not have a lawyer-client relationship because he is on
leave in the practice of law since October 18, 1993 when he was designated
Acting Mayor of Laurel, Batangas, and during his incumbency as such, and up
to the filing of this administrative complaint in 1996, he is still on leave as law
practitioner because he was elected Mayor of Laurel, Batangas in the last 1995
election; probably, complainant included him as respondent because he
thought that he is practicing law and is still an associate of Atty. Juanito P.
Noel, due to the fact that on some occasions complainant might have seen him
or they might have talked casually in the law office from which he was on
leave in his practice of law because he drops there from time to time to meet
visitors from Laurel who are living and who have problems in Metro Manila;
and he has not received any single centavo from the complainant.
In his Comment, dated August 29, 1996, Atty. Noel alleges: Sometime
in 1994, he agreed to represent complainant in recovering a one-half portion
of the ground floor of a house located at 1723 Pedro Gil St., Paco, Manila
which complainant bought from one Simplicia Villanueva represented by her
daughter Teresita Dalusong on November 28, 1986. A civil complaint for
recovery of ownership and possession was filed on February 8, 1994 with the
RTC but upon the effectivity of the law expanding the jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) the case was transferred to the MTC. From
the evidence of the defendant, he honestly saw no need to present a rebuttal
evidence. The MTC rendered a decision dismissing the case on the alleged
ground that the identity of the subject matter of the action was not clearly
established. He filed an appeal in due time to the RTC of Manila (Branch 43)
and not with the Court of Appeals as stated in paragraph 9 of the complaint.
On November 13, 1995, he received a copy of the RTC decision dated
October 10, 1995, affirming the decision of the MTC. Through the telephone,
he informed the complainant about the decision of the RTC. Complainant
instructed him to prepare an appeal to the higher court which actually refers to
the Court of Appeals and not with the Supreme Court as complainant claims.
He advised the complainant that he could find no error in the said decision and
a further appeal would be frivolous and without merit and requested the
complainant to come over so that he could discuss the matter with him.
Whenever the complainant went to the law office, he failed to see him because
the latter was still attending court hearings. The complainant asked for the
records of the case which was given by his secretary. Complainant never
returned the case folder to him, neither did he call up by phone, or see him
personally. He then assumed that the complainant had hired another lawyer to
handle the appeal. He was surprised when he received on July 18, 1996 a
copy of the resolution of this Honorable Court dated June 19, 1996, requiring
them to file their comment on the complaint of Jose A. Roldan.

Panganiban went on leave from the practice of law since October 18, 1993
when he was designated as acting mayor of Laurel, Batangas [2] due to the
indefinite leave of absence filed by the mayor and by reason of his election as
mayor of the said municipality in 1995. The complainant claims that he
secured the services of Atty. Panganiban on January 6, 1994. [3] It is thus clear
that Atty. Panganiban was not an active associate of the law firm, since at that
time, he was already on leave from the practice of law. Moreover, the
complaint filed in 1996 before the RTC for Recovery of Possession and
Ownership with Damages was prepared and signed by Atty. Noel alone and
not in any representation of any law firm. In fact from the filing of the said
civil case in the RTC, it was Atty. Noel who represented the complainant. Not
once did Atty. Panganiban appear for the complainant nor did he sign any
document pertaining with the aforesaid case. Necessarily, the complaint
against Atty. Panganiban must be dismissed.
As to the complaint against Atty. Noel.
The main issues to be resolved are: (1) whether there was a deliberate
attempt to suppress evidence on the part of Atty. Noel, to the prejudice of
complainant and (2) whether it was correct for Atty. Noel to refuse to file a
further appeal of the case to the Court of Appeals by way of petition for
review despite the manifest desire of the complainant to do so.
Anent the first issue.
Complainant insists that Atty. Noels failure to present in evidence the
receipt dated March 1, 1986 was fatal to his cause. The receipt shows that
complainant made a partial payment ofP10,000.00 of the P40,000.00 price of
the subject property. Complainant claims that this piece of document proves
that complainant bought the subject property ahead of the defendants who
bought it only on July 30, 1986. Thus, to the mind of the complainant, the
non-presentation of the subject receipt is suppression of evidence.
Atty. Noel denied receiving the subject receipt and asserts that the same
was mere fabrication of the complainant. He insists that said receipt did not
exist during the preparation and filing of the complaint and even during the
presentation of evidence. Otherwise, he argues that such fact should have
been alleged in the complaint to show that complainant bought the subject
property ahead of the other buyer. Atty. Noel also claims that assuming that
the receipt was given to him, the same cannot be used as evidence because the
receipt shows that it was signed by one Romeo Dalusong who is not a party to
the sale; neither does it appear in the receipt that Romeo was acting in a
representative capacity.
A short historical backdrop is necessary for a clearer insight of this
issue.

We shall first resolve the issue of the existence or non-existence of

lawyer-client relationship between Atty. Panganiban and the complainant.

It appears that the subject property was subjected to a double sale by

the same seller. The Deed of Sale of the complainant is dated November 28,
1986 while that of the other buyer is dated July 30, 1986. But complainant
claims that actually the sale as to him took place on March 1, 1986 as
evidenced by the subject receipt. Complainant however failed to take
possession of the subject property as the same is already in the possession of
the other buyer. Complainant filed an ejectment case [4] against the tenant of
the other buyer but the same was dismissed for the reason that complainant
failed to show that he had proprietary right over the property in question.
Unable to take possession of the subject property, complainant filed a case
against the seller for the annulment of the contract of sale, the Deed of Sale
dated November 28, 1986. Complainant won and the court awarded him
damages of P80,000.00.

From a careful reading of the records of this case, it appears that Atty.
Panganiban and Atty. Noel used to be law associates. However, Atty.

Subsequently, the seller and the complainant entered into a

Compromise Agreement.[5] The seller, agreed to sell one-half of her duplex

We referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation. After hearing, IBP Investigating Commissioner Manuel A.
Quiambao submitted his Report and Recommendation dismissing the
complaint against Atty. Panganiban and imposing censure to Atty. Noel. In a
Resolution dated February 27, 2004, the IBP adopted and approved the said
Report and Recommendation.

7
house which is the same property that was previously sold to complainant on
November 28, 1986, including all her proprietary rights over the land, in the
amount of P80,000.00. Since the Court awarded damages to the complainant
in the same amount, this was set-off against the price of the property.
Pursuant to the said compromise agreement, a Deed of Absolute Sale and
Transfer of Right[6] in favor of the complainant was executed on December 22,
1990 by the seller over the said property.
Even with the sale on December 22, 1990 over the subject property as a
result of the compromise agreement, complainant still failed to take
possession of the subject property, hence he filed a complaint for Recovery of
Possession and Ownership with Damages against the other buyer. It is in this
case that complainant claims that Atty. Noel failed to present the subject
receipt. The MTC dismissed the complaint and the RTC on appeal, dismissed
it again. Upon failure of Atty. Noel to file a petition for review with the Court
of Appeals, complainant filed the present administrative complaint against
him.
We find credence to the allegation of Atty. Noel that the subject receipt
was not in existence at the time he prepared the complaint or even at the time
of presentation of evidence. The complaint was verified by the complainant
stating the fact that he caused its preparation, that he read the same and
attested that the contents thereof are true and correct. If complainants
allegation that he gave the receipt to Atty. Noel at that time, and considering
the importance of the subject receipt to his case, he should have called the
attention of Atty. Noel that there was no allegation of the existence of the
subject receipt.
We thus hold that Atty. Noel is not guilty of suppressing evidence.
As to the second issue, that is, the issue of propriety of Atty. Noels
refusal or failure to file a petition for review before the Court of Appeals.
It is the contention of the complainant that he lost the right to file a
further appeal because he was not informed immediately of the result of the
appeal to the RTC. Complainant insists that Atty. Noel, through his secretary,
called the complainant only on November 24, 1995 or 11 days after the receipt
of the adverse RTC decision and was given the impression that he has still one
month within which to file an appeal. The complainant also said that he paid
the respondents visits on December 1, 4, 5, 7 and 8, 1995, to follow up the
filing of the appeal to the higher court but that he was not able to talk to Atty.
Noel; that it was only when he went to the RTC that he learned that he lost the
case because the period of the appeal has lapsed.
Atty. Noel contends that he received the RTC decision on November
13, 1995 and on the following day, he instructed his secretary to contact the
complainant to inform him of the adverse RTC decision with the directive for
the complainant to call up Atty. Noel; that when complainant called, he was
instructed by the complainant to prepare an appeal to the higher court; that he
told the complainant that there is no need to appeal the case because, first, the
decision of the court is correct, and second, he is obligated by the code of
professional responsibilities to refrain from filing a frivolous and
unmeritorious appeal; that thereafter, complainant went to his office twice, the
last of this instance was when complainant took all the records of the case and
never came back which led him to believe that complainant will not appeal the
adverse RTC decision. Atty. Noel further states that, in any event, his
relationship with the complainant ended upon the issuance of the decision and
that the complainant should not expect that he would still appeal the case.
We find for the complainant.
It is noted that the complainant has been very diligent in following up
the status of the case. From the time, complainant filed the case with the

MTC up to the time he appealed with the RTC, complainant was vigilant with
his rights constantly in contact with Atty. Noel. We find it strange therefore
that upon receipt of the adverse RTC decision, it would seem, if Atty. Noels
version is to be given credence, the complainant had lost his zeal and just
allowed the time to appeal to lapse. As correctly observed by the
Investigating Commissioner in his Report:
Here was a complainant who went through several litigations over the same
subject matter, including a case of ejectment, a case of annulment of contract
of sale with damages, a case of action for recovery of ownership and
possession, an appeal to the Regional Trial Court, and he did not seem perturb
that he lost it (the appeal) and did not find it essential to discuss the matter
with his lawyer for possible remedial action? That is, as claimed by his
lawyer?
...
As opposed to the general denial given by the respondent about the claim that
the complainant followed up his case several times with his office (outside of
the two occasions that he conceded the complainant did so), the complainant
was precise in detailing the circumstances which described how he tried his
best to seek the presence of Atty. Noel to no avail. There were dates, detailed
circumstances, and specific places. Given the character which had
characterized the effort of the complainant to seek appropriate legal remedies
for his complaints, the assertions would be consistent, that is, that he made
great efforts to find Atty. Noel.
We note that the complainant was informed about the adverse RTC
decision within the 15-day prescriptive period to appeal. As stated elsewhere,
Atty. Noel received the adverse RTC decision on November 13, 1995 and the
complainant was informed about the adverse RTC decision on November 24,
1995. Hence, complainant has still four days to file an appeal. However, Atty.
Noel failed to ensure that the client was advised appropriately. Atty. Noel
entrusted entirely with his secretary the duty to inform the complainant about
the adverse decision. And the secretary informed the complainant rather late
and worse with the wrong information that the complainant has still a month
within which to file an appeal. This resulted to the lapse of the prescriptive
period to appeal without complainant having availed of the said remedy.
A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. [7] If only Atty.
Noels position of not filing an appeal because it would only be frivolous has
been properly communicated to the complainant at the earliest possible time
so that the complainant would be able to seek the services of another lawyer
for help, it would have been commendable. A lawyers duty is not to his client
but to the administration of justice; to that end, his clients success is wholly
subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics. [8] But as it was, Atty. Noels negligence as aforediscussed robbed the complainant of the opportunity to at least look for
another lawyer for professional help and file an appeal, after all, it is the client
who finally decides whether to appeal or not an adverse decision.
We cannot also accept the reasoning of Atty. Noel that he should not be
expected to file an appeal for the complainant because their lawyer-client
relationship ended with the RTC decision. First, a lawyer continues to be a
counsel of record until the lawyer-client relationship is terminated either by
the act of his client or his own act, with permission of the court. Until such
time, the lawyer is expected to do his best for the interest of his client.
[9]
Second, Atty. Noel admitted that complainant instructed him to file an
appeal with the higher court. Even assuming that their contract does not
include filing of an appeal with the higher courts, it is still the duty of Atty.
Noel to protect the interest of the complainant by informing and discussing
with the complainant of the said decision and his assessment of the same. A
lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law.[10]It is

8
the obligation of counsel to comply with his clients lawful request. Counsel
should exert all effort to protect the interest of his client.
The determination of the appropriate penalty to be imposed on an errant
lawyer involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the facts of
the case.[11] In cases of similar nature, the penalty imposed by the Court
consisted of reprimand,[12] fine of five hundred pesos with warning,
[13]
suspension of three months,[14] six months[15] and even disbarment[16] in
aggravated case.
The facts of the case show that Atty. Noel failed to live up to his duties
as a lawyer pursuant to the Code of Professional Responsibility. We conclude
that a suspension from the practice of law for one month is just penalty under
the circumstances.
Complainants claim for damages cannot be entertained in the present
disbarment case as it is not the proper forum. It is not an ordinary civil case
where damages could be awarded.[17] A disbarment case is a proceeding that is
intended to protect the Court and the public from the misconduct of its
officers; to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who
exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable,
men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. [18] It has been
emphasized in a number of cases that disbarment proceedings belong to a
class of their own, distinct from that of a civil or a criminal action. [19]

As gathered from the records, the antecedent facts of this case are as follows:
Plaintiff Reparations Commission (Repacom, for short) is a government entity
created by virtue of Republic Act No. 1789, with offices at the 5th Floor,
Development Bank of the Philippines Building No. 2, Port Area, Manila while
the defendants, Visayan Packing Corporation (Vispac, for short) and the
Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc. (FICI, for short) are corporations duly
organized and registered under the laws of the Philippines, with offices in
Bacolod City, Philippines and Singson Bldg., Plaza Moraga, Manila,
respectively.
On May 19, 1960, plaintiff Repacom adopted Resolution No. 262 awarding to
the defendant Vispac by way of a contract of conditional purchase and sale
subsequently executed on November 15, 1960 (Exhibit "A") the following
reparations goods with a total F.O.B. value of P1,242,424.67 (Exhibit "A-2"):
one (1) Cannery Plant, divested from M/S "Estancia"; two (2) Fishing Boats
M/S "SONIA" and M/S "ANA LARES", 75 G.T. and one (1) Fishing Boat
M/S "SALVADOR "B"", 100 G.T.; including all its corresponding accessories
and appurtenances. These reparations goods were delivered to the defendant
Vispac, on May 30, 1960 (Exhibit "A-2").
Attached with said contract and forming part thereof is the questioned
Schedule of Installment Payments, herein reproduced, as follows:
SCHEDULE OF INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS

Wherefore, the complaint against Atty. Natalio M. Panganiban is

DISMISSED. Atty. Juanito P. Noel is SUSPENDED for one month with a
warning that a repetition of the same would be meted a more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this decision be attached to respondents personal record in the
Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts of the land.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-30712 February 6, 1991

THE REPARATIONS COMMISSION, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
THE VISAYAN PACKING CORPORATION and THE FIELDMENS
INSURANCE CO., INC., defendants-appellants.
Panfilo M. Manguera & Associates for plaintiff-appellee.

NAME OF USER VISAYAN PACKING

CORPORATION
ADDRESS Bacolod City
NATURE OF CAPITAL GOODS/SERVICES One (1)
Cannery Plant and appurtenances; Two (2) Fishing
Vessels, 75 G.T. M/S "SONIA" and M/S "ANA
LARES" and one (1) fishing vessel "M/S SALVADOR
B", 100 G.T., together with all equipment and
appurtenances.
DATE OF COMPLETE DELIVERY May 30,1960
TOTAL F.O.B. COST P1,24 2,424.67
AMOUNT OF FIRST INSTALLMENT (10% of FOB
COST
P1,24,242.47)

BIDIN, J.:p

DUE DATE OF 1ST INSTALLMENT May 30,1962

This is an appeal originally filed with the Court of Appeals but certified to this
Court for disposition since it involves purely questions of law, from the
decision of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, * Branch IX, dated June
23, 1964, in Civil Case No. 51712, ordering the defendants-appellants herein
to pay, jointly and severally, to the plaintiff-appellee the sum of P124,242.47,
with interest at the legal rate from the date of the filing of the complaint until
fully paid and denying plaintiff s prayer for attorney's fees. With respect to the
cross-claim of Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc., the said court ordered Visayan
Packing Corporation to pay Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc. such amount which
the latter may pay to the plaintiff-appellee with interest at 12% per
annum until fully paid, and attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the amount,
paid by Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc. to the plaintiff-appellee. With costs
against the defendants-appellants.

TERM: Ten (10) EQUAL YEARLY INSTALLMENTS

RATE OF INTEREST: THREE PERCENT (3%) PER
ANNUM
NO. OF DATE DUE AMOUNT
INSTALLMENTS
1 May 30, 1963 P131,085.07

9
2 " " 1964 P131,085.07

paragraph 1

3 " " 1965 P131,085.07

9 " " 1971 P131,085.07

That in order to abbreviate proceeding they have agreed

that the transcript of notes taken in Civil Case No.
51713, The Reparations Commission vs. Fieldmen's
Insurance Co., Inc., Branch III, CFI, Manila, be
submitted as evidence in the above entitled case. This
agreement stemmed from the fact that both Civil Case
51712, the case now being litigated and Civil Case No.
51713 mentioned earlier in this paragraph are both
collection cases instituted by the Reparations
Commission against the defendant, The Visayan
Packing Corporation and the Fieldmen's Insurance Co.,
Inc., based on similar Contracts of Conditional
Purchase and Sale, drafted in the usual standard form
and containing practically the same standard provisions
and stipulations.

10 " " 1972 P131,085.07

paragraph 2

MANILA, PHILIPPINES 1960

That Civil Case No. 51713 has already been decided on

March 27, 1963 granting relief for the plaintiff, The
Reparations Commission as prayed for, a copy of said
decision is hereto attached and marked Annex "A" for
purposes of identification and is hereby made an
integral part of this Stipulation of Facts.

4 " " 1966 P131,085.07

5 " " 1967 P131,085.07
6 " " 1968 P131,085.07
7 " " 1969 P131,085.07
8 " " 1970 P131,085.07

VISAYAN PACKING CORPORATION

REPARATIONS
END-USER COMMISSION
BY: BY:
HERNAN DE LA RAMA RODOLFO MASLOG
President & General Manager Chairman
(Ibid., Exhibit "A-1", p. 11)
Defendant-appellant FICI is impleaded as bondsman for the principal
defendant Vispac, under Surety Bond No. 4122 (Exhibit "B") issued by the
former on May 30, 1960, to guarantee "faithful observance and compliance by
the principal of all its obligations" recited in the Contract of Conditional
Purchase and Sale of Reparations Goods (Exhibit "A") and in the annexed
Schedule of Payments (Exhibit "A-1 ").
On September 27, 1962, Repacom filed a complaint for specific performance
with the court a quo against Vispac seeking collection of the amount of
P124,242.47 allegedly due on May 30, 1962 as payment of the 1st installment
of the reparations goods and impleaded the FICI as defendant.
In its answer dated November 8, 1962, Vispac claimed that the Schedule of
Payments (Exhibit "A") is vague and ambiguous with respect to the date when
the first installment falls due and that by reason thereof, the ambiguity should
be construed against Repacom, the party which drafted the contract.
Thus, while Repacom maintains that the 1st installment is due on May 30,
1962, Vispac, on the other hand, argues that it is due on May 30, 1963.
On January 13, 1964, Repacom and Vispac submitted a "Stipulation of Facts"
and both prayed that this case be submitted for decision after their respective
memoranda have been filed. FICI joined with this move and request of the
principal parties.
Pertinent provisions of said Stipulation of Facts are quoted as follows:

paragraph 3
That Civil Case No. 51712 refers to reparations goods,
denominated, one (1) cannery plant, two (2) fishing
boats, M/S "Sonia" and M/S "Ana Lares", 100 G.T.
including all its corresponding accessories and
appurtenances, which is the subject matter of a Contract
of Conditional Purchase and Sale dated November 15,
1960 entered into by and between the plaintiff
Reparations Commission as Conditional Vendor and the
defendant, The Visayan Packing Corporation as
Conditional Vendee, the legality and due execution of
which is not disputed by the herein parties, a copy of
which contract together with its annex "B" were
introduced in evidence by plaintiffs as Exhibits "A" and
"A-1" respectively and were admitted by the Court
without objection on the part of the defendants. That,
likewise, there were introduced in evidence and
admitted by the Court without objection on the part of
the defendants as additional exhibits, Exh. "A-2" (Date
of complete delivery as it appears in Annex "B" [May
30, 1960]; Exh. "A-1"; Exh. "A-2", amount due in the
sum of P124,242.47; Exh. "A-4", date of first
installment as it appears in Annex "B" (Exh. "A-1") and
as Exh. "B", FICI Bond No. 4122.
On the basis of the said Stipulations of Facts and the pleadings submitted by
the parties, the court a quorendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby
renders judgment ordering the defendant to pay, jointly
and severally, to the plaintiff the sum of P124,242.47
with interest at the legal rate from the date of filing of
the complaint until fully paid. The plaintiffs prayer for
attorney's fees is denied, inasmuch as there is no

10
showing that the defendants were motivated with bad
faith in failing to pay plaintiffs claim.
With respect to the cross-claim of defendant Fieldmen's
Insurance Co., Inc., the Court hereby orders defendant
Visayan Packing Corporation to pay defendant
Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc., such amount which the
latter may pay to the plaintiff by reason of this
judgment, with interest at 12% per annum until fully
paid, and attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the
amount paid by Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc., to the
plaintiff. With costs against the defendants.

Vispac as per their Stipulation of Facts. Consequently, as reflected in the

Schedule of Payments, Exhibit "A-1 ", the 1st installment without interest in
the amount of P124,242.47 representing 10% of the F.O.B. cost of reparations
goods, became due and demandable on May 30, 1962, or exactly 24 months
from the date of the complete delivery of the reparations goods to Vispac.
The rest of the schedule clearly refers to the payment of the balance of the
sales on credit which in accordance with law (Section 12, Rep. Act 1789) must
be paid within a period not exceeding ten (10) years, and chargeable with
interest at 3% per annum. Said schedule of payment for the balance i.e., after
payment of the first installment is, in turn, payable in ten (10) equal yearly
installments, as follows:

From said decision, Vispac and FICI filed on July 24, 1964 and July 27, 1964,
respectively, a motion for reconsideration of the said decision. On August 8, 1
964, the court a quo issued its order denying the said motion.

Term: Ten (10) equal yearly installments

Feeling aggrieved, Vispac and FICI appealed the case to the Court of Appeals,
docketed therein as CA-G.R. No. 34552-R.

No. of Date Due Amount

After the parties have submitted their respective briefs, Repacom on April 28,
1965; Vispac on January 2, 1965; and FICI on January 15, 1965, the case was
submitted for decision on September 6, 1965. In a resolution promulgated
June 14, 1969, the Court of Appeals ** certified the instant case to this Court
for proper disposition for being pure question of law.

Rate of Interest: Three per cent (3%) per annum

Installments
1 May 30, 1963 P131,086.07
2 " " 1964 P131,086.07

While Vispac and FICI raised several issues, the focal issue involved in the
instant case, as correctly stated by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, is
the interpretation of the Schedule of Payments (Exhibit "A-1 ").

3 " " 1965 P131,086.07

It is the contention of the Repacom that under the abovequoted Schedule of

Payments, the amount of P124,242.47 representing the 1st installment without
interest, which is equivalent to 10% of the entire F.O.B. costs, has already
become due and demandable on May 30, 1962. However, Vispac and FICI
argue that as there are two dates given for the first installment in the said
Schedule of Payment, the lst installment should be on May 30, 1963
considering that it was Repacom which prepared the contract and therefore
such ambiguity should be taken against the latter which caused the ambiguity.

5 " " 1967 P131,086.07

The petition is devoid of merit.

9 " " 1971 P131,086.07

Section 12, Republic Act 1789, reads as follows:

10 " " 1972 P131,086.07

Section 12 Terms of Sale

Capital goods and complimentary services disposed to
private parties as provided for in sub-section (1) of
Section 2 hereof, shall be sold on a cash or credit basis
under the rules and regulations as maybe determined by
the Commission. Sales on credit basis shall be paid in
installments. Provided that the lst installment shall be
paid within 24 months after complete delivery of the
capital goods and the balance within a period not
exceeding 10 years. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in the Schedule of Payments, Exhibit "A-1", the amount of
P124,242.47, now being claimed by the Repacom from Vispac, represents the
1st installment or initial payment without interest as said amount is equivalent
to 10% of the total F.O.B. cost of the reparation goods received by Vispac
which is P1,242,424.67. Exhibit "A-2" of the Schedule of Payments
specifically states the date when the reparations goods in question were
delivered which was on May 30, 1960. This particular date was not denied by

4 " " 1966 P131,086.07

6 " " 1968 P131,086.07

7 " " 1969 P131,086.07
8 " " 1970 P131,086.07

While it is a statutory and decisional rule in this jurisdiction that the contract
is the law between the contracting parties (Art. 1306, Civil Code; Phoenix
Assurance Co., Ltd. vs. United States Lines, 22 SCRA 674 [1968]; Phil.
American General Insurance v. Mutuc, 61 SCRA 22 [1974]; Herrera v.
Petrophil Corporation, 146 SCRA 360 [1986]; Syjuco v. CA, 172 SCRA 111
[1989]), there is a proviso that nothing therein must be contrary to law,
morals, good customs public policy, or public order (Art. 1306, Civil Code;
Lagunsad v. Soto, 92 SCRA 476 [1979]). To sustain the contention of Vispac
and FICI that the 1st installment should be due on May 30, 1963, instead of
May 30, 1962. would render the said installment payment unenforceable as it
would run counter to the provision of the said law (Section 12, R.A. 1789)
which specifically provides that "the 1st installment shall be paid within 24
months after complete delivery of the capital goods", or on May 30, 1962, the
complete delivery thereof having been made on May 30, 1960.
Finally, it is basic that a contract is what the law defines it to be, and not what
it is called by the contracting parties Novesteras v. CA, 149 SCRA 48 [1987]).

11
Having disposed of the main case, discussion of other ancillary issues raised
by the appellant Vispac becomes unnecessary.

respondents Attys. Clodualdo de Jesus, Carlos Ambrosio and Emmanuel

Mariano.

As to the issue of FICI's liability arising from its issuance of Surety Bond No.
4122 dated May 30, 1960, it will be noted that FICI interposed for the first
time, on appeal, the defense that Surety Bond No. 4122 has already expired.
FICI did not allege any defense to the effect that Surety Bond No. 4122 has
already expired either in its answer to the complaint dated October 26, 1962
nor in the entire proceedings below. In fact, it adopted as its own whatever
defenses its co-defendant-appellant Vispac may interpose (Rollo, Record on
Appeal, FICI, p. 25; p. 44). It is settled jurisprudence that an issue which was
neither averred in the complaint nor raised during the trial in the court below
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal as it would be offensive to the
basic rules of fair play, justice and due process Dihiansan v. CA, 153 SCRA
713 [1987]; Anchuelo v. IAC, 147 SCRA 434 [1987]; Dulos Realty &
Development Corp. v. CA, 157 SCRA 425 [1988]; Ramos v. IAC, 175 SCRA
70 [1989]; Gevero v. IAC, G.R. 77029, August 30, 1990).

During the pendency of the case, Aurora proposed a settlement to petitioner

regarding her visitation rights over their minor child and the separation of
their properties. The proposal was accepted by petitioner and both parties
subsequently filed a motion for approval of their agreement. This was
approved by the trial court. On November 25, 1998, the marriage between
petitioner and Aurora Pineda was declared null and void.

Anent the contention of FICI that the trial court erred in ordering Vispac to
pay to FICI attorney's fees equivalent to only 10% of the amount due despite
the fact that Vispac bound itself to pay to FICI attorney's fees equivalent to
20% of the total amount due but in no case less than P200.00 as per their
Indemnity Agreement (Exhibit "1-FICI"), it has been held that a stipulation
regarding the payment of attorney's fees is neither illegal nor immoral and is
enforceable as the law between the parties (Santiago v. Dimayuga, 3 SCRA
919 [1961]), as long as such stipulation does not contravene law, good morals,
good customs, public order or public policy (Polytrade Corp. v. Blanco, 30
SCRA 187 [1969]; Social Security Commission v. Almeda, 168 SCRA 474
[1988]).

Still not satisfied, respondents filed in the same trial court7 a motion

Considering, therefore, that the 20% attorney's fees provided under the parties'
Indemnity Agreement (Exhibit "1-FICI") is not contrary to the existing
jurisprudence on the matter *** and is not considered excessive nor
unconscionable, the same should be awarded to FICI.

The issues raised in this petition are:

Throughout the proceedings, respondent counsels were wellcompensated.3 They, including their relatives and friends, even availed of free
products and treatments from petitioners dermatology clinic. This
notwithstanding, they billed petitioner additional legal fees amounting
to P16.5 million4 which the latter, however, refused to pay. Instead, petitioner
issued them several checks totaling P1.12 million5 as "full payment for
settlement."6

for payment of lawyers fees for P50 million.8

On April 14, 2000, the trial court ordered petitioner to pay P5 million to Atty.
de Jesus, P2 million to Atty. Ambrosio and P2 million to Atty. Mariano.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reduced the amount as follows: P1 million to
Atty. de Jesus, P500,000 to Atty. Ambrosio and P500,000 to Atty. Mariano.
The motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this recourse.

(1) whether the Pasig RTC, Branch 151 had jurisdiction over the claim for
additional legal fees and

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is Affirmed with the modification

that the amount of the attorney's fees due from Vispac to FICI should be 20%
of the amount due as per Indemnity Agreement.

(2) whether respondents were entitled to additional legal fees.

SO ORDERED.

First, a lawyer may enforce his right to his fees by filing the necessary petition
as an incident of the main action in which his services were rendered or in an
independent suit against his client. The former is preferable to avoid
multiplicity of suits.9

G.R. No. 155224 August 23, 2006

VINSON B. PINEDA, Petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. CLODUALDO C. DE JESUS, ATTY. CARLOS AMBROSIO and
ATTY. EMMANUEL MARIANO,Respondents.

The Pasig RTC, Branch 151, where the case for the declaration of nullity of
marriage was filed, had jurisdiction over the motion for the payment of legal
fees. Respondents sought to collect P50 million which was equivalent to 10%
of the value of the properties awarded to petitioner in that case. Clearly, what
respondents were demanding was additional payment for legal services
rendered in the same case.

DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The subject of this petition for review is the April 30, 2002 decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68080 which modified the order2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 151, in JDRC Case No.
2568 entitled Ma. Aurora D. Pineda v. Vinson B. Pineda.
The facts follow.
On April 6, 1993, Aurora Pineda filed an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage against petitioner Vinson Pineda in the RTC of Pasig City, Branch
151, docketed as JDRC Case No. 2568. Petitioner was represented by

Second, the professional engagement between petitioner and respondents was

governed by the principle ofquantum meruit which means "as much as the
lawyer deserves."10 The recovery of attorneys fees on this basis is permitted,
as in this case, where there is no express agreement for the payment of
attorneys fees. Basically, it is a legal mechanism which prevents an
unscrupulous client from running away with the fruits of the legal services of
counsel without paying for it. In the same vein, it avoids unjust enrichment on
the part of the lawyer himself.

12
Further, Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility advises lawyers
to avoid controversies with clients concerning their compensation and to
resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Suits to
collect fees should be avoided and should be filed only when circumstances
force lawyers to resort to it.11
In the case at bar, respondents motion for payment of their lawyers fees was
not meant to collect what was justly due them; the fact was, they had already
been adequately paid.
Demanding P50 million on top of the generous sums and perks already given
to them was an act of unconscionable greed which is shocking to this Court.
As lawyers, respondents should be reminded that they are members of an
honorable profession, the primary vision of which is justice. It is respondents
despicable behavior which gives lawyering a bad name in the minds of some
people. The vernacular has a word for it: nagsasamantala. The practice of law
is a decent profession and not a money-making trade. Compensation should be
but a mere incident.12
Respondents claim for additional legal fees was not justified. They could not
charge petitioner a fee based on percentage, absent an express agreement to
that effect. The payments to them in cash, checks, free products and services
from petitioners business all of which were not denied by respondents
more than sufficed for the work they did. The "full payment for
settlement"13 should have discharged petitioners obligation to them.
The power of this Court to reduce or even delete the award of attorneys fees
cannot be denied. Lawyers are officers of the Court and they participate in the
fundamental function of administering justice.14 When they took their oath,
they submitted themselves to the authority of the Court and subjected their
professional fees to judicial control. 15
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 2002 in CAG.R. CV No.
68080 is hereby MODIFIED. The award of additional attorneys fees in favor
of respondents is hereby DELETED.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 162571. June 15, 2005]

ARNEL L. AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND
MINOR MARTIN JOSE PROLLAMANTE, REPRESENTED
BY
HIS
MOTHER/GUARDIAN FE
ANGELA
PROLLAMANTE, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
At issue in this petition for certiorari [1] is whether or not the Court of
Appeals (CA) gravely erred in exercising its discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, in issuing a decision [2] and resolution[3] upholding the
resolution and order of the trial court, [4] which denied petitioners motion to
dismiss private respondents complaint for support and directed the parties to
submit themselves to deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) paternity testing.

Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martins

alleged biological father, petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support and
support pendente lite before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 106.[5]
In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe in 1992,
after which they entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly
impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday on November 10, 1999. Despite Arnels
insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise and gave birth to their child out
of wedlock, Martin, on August 11, 2000 at the Capitol Medical Hospital in
Quezon City. The babys birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as
the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later
refused Fes repeated requests for Martins support despite his adequate
financial capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for
adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child.
On January 19, 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at
the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van,
with the open car door hitting Fes leg. This incident was reported to the
police. In July 2001, Fe was diagnosed with leukemia and has, since then,
been undergoing chemotherapy. On March 5, 2002, Fe and Martin sued Arnel
for support.[6]
In his amended answer, Arnel denied having sired Martin because his
affair and intimacy with Fe had allegedly ended in 1998, long before Martins
conception. He claimed that Fe had at least one other secret lover. Arnel
admitted that their relationship started in 1993 but he never really fell in love
with (Fe) not only because (she) had at least one secret lover, a certain Jun,
but also because she proved to be scheming and overly demanding and
possessive. As a result, theirs was a stormy on-and-off affair. What started as a
romantic liaison between two consenting adults eventually turned out to be a
case of fatal attraction where (Fe) became so obsessed with (Arnel), to the
point of even entertaining the idea of marrying him, that she resorted to
various devious ways and means to alienate (him) from his wife and family.
Unable to bear the prospect of losing his wife and children, Arnel terminated
the affair although he still treated her as a friend such as by referring potential
customers to the car aircon repair shop[7] where she worked. Later on, Arnel
found out that Fe had another erstwhile secret lover. In May 2000, Arnel and
his entire family went to the United States for a vacation. Upon their return in
June 2000, Arnel learned that Fe was telling people that he had impregnated
her. Arnel refused to acknowledge the child as his because their last intimacy
was sometime in 1998.[8] Exasperated, Fe started calling Arnels wife and
family. On January 19, 2001, Fe followed Arnel to the Capitol Hills Golf and
Country Club parking lot to demand that he acknowledge Martin as his child.
According to Arnel, he could not get through Fe and the discussion became so
heated that he had no alternative but to move on but without bumping or
hitting any part of her body. [9] Finally, Arnel claimed that the signature and
the community tax certificate (CTC) attributed to him in the acknowledgment
of Martins birth certificate were falsified. The CTC erroneously reflected his
marital status as single when he was actually married and that his birth year
was 1965 when it should have been 1964.[10]
In his pre-trial brief filed on May 17, 2002, Arnel vehemently denied
having sired Martin but expressed willingness to consider any proposal to
settle the case.[11]
On July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order
directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing
pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court.[12]
Arnel opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right against
self-incrimination.[13] He also moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause
of action, considering that his signature on the birth certificate was a forgery
and that, under the law, an illegitimate child is not entitled to support if not

13
recognized by the putative father.[14] In his motion, Arnel manifested that he
had filed criminal charges for falsification of documents against Fe (I.S. Nos.
02-5723 and 02-7192) and a petition for cancellation of his name appearing in
Martins birth certificate (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-02-46669). He
attached the certification of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory
that his signature in the birth certificate was forged.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered
the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the
applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
Thus, this petition.
In a nutshell, petitioner raises two issues: (1) whether a complaint for
support can be converted to a petition for recognition and (2) whether DNA
paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without violating
petitioners constitutional right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.
[15]

The petition is without merit.

First of all, the trial court properly denied the petitioners motion to
dismiss because the private respondents complaint on its face showed that
they had a cause of action against the petitioner. The elements of a cause of
action are: (1) the plaintiffs primary right and the defendants corresponding
primary duty, and (2) the delict or wrongful act or omission of the defendant,
by which the primary right and duty have been violated. The cause of action is
determined not by the prayer of the complaint but by the facts alleged.[16]
In the complaint, private respondents alleged that Fe had amorous
relations with the petitioner, as a result of which she gave birth to Martin out
of wedlock. In his answer, petitioner admitted that he had sexual relations with
Fe but denied that he fathered Martin, claiming that he had ended the
relationship long before the childs conception and birth. It is undisputed and
even admitted by the parties that there existed a sexual relationship between
Arnel and Fe. The only remaining question is whether such sexual
relationship produced the child, Martin. If it did, as respondents have alleged,
then Martin should be supported by his father Arnel. If not, petitioner and
Martin are strangers to each other and Martin has no right to demand and
petitioner has no obligation to give support.
Preliminaries aside, we now tackle the main issues.
Petitioner refuses to recognize Martin as his own child and denies the
genuineness and authenticity of the childs birth certificate which he
purportedly signed as the father. He also claims that the order and resolution
of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, effectively converted
the complaint for support to a petition for recognition, which is supposedly
proscribed by law. According to petitioner, Martin, as an unrecognized child,
has no right to ask for support and must first establish his filiation in a
separate suit under Article 283[17] in relation to Article 265[18] of the Civil Code
and Section 1, Rule 105[19] of the Rules of Court.
The petitioners contentions are without merit.
The assailed resolution and order did not convert the action for support
into one for recognition but merely allowed the respondents to prove their
cause of action against petitioner who had been denying the authenticity of the
documentary evidence of acknowledgement. But even if the assailed
resolution and order effectively integrated an action to compel recognition
with an action for support, such was valid and in accordance with

jurisprudence. In Tayag v. Court of Appeals, [20] we allowed the integration of

an action to compel recognition with an action to claim ones inheritance:
In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and
successional rights from the putative or presumed parent, must prove his
filiation to the latter. We also said that it is necessary to allege in the
complaint that the putative father had acknowledged and recognized the
illegitimate child because such acknowledgment is essential to and is the basis
of the right to inherit. There being no allegation of such acknowledgment, the
action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be brought after the
death of the putative father. The ratio decidendi in Paulino, therefore, is not
the absence of a cause of action for failure of the petitioner to allege the fact
of acknowledgment in the complaint, but the prescription of the action.
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although petitioner
contends that the complaint filed by herein private respondent merely alleges
that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of the deceased and is
actually a claim for inheritance, from the allegations therein the same may be
considered as one to compel recognition. Further, that the two causes of
action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may
be joined in one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.
As early as [1922] we had occasion to rule thereon in Briz vs. Briz, et al. (43
Phil. 763 [1922]) wherein we said:
The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can in
any event maintain a complex action to compel recognition as a natural child
and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one
which in the opinion of this court must be answered in the affirmative,
provided always that the conditions justifying the joinder of the two distinct
causes of action are present in the particular case. In other words, there is
no absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment
should have been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion
prior to the action in which that same plaintiff seeks additional relief in
the character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the action to
compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here applied
different from that generally applicable in other cases. x x x
The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by
this court, is undoubtedly to some extent supported by our prior decisions.
Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and the doctrine must be
considered well settled, that a natural child having a right to compel
acknowledgment, but who has not been in fact legally acknowledged, may
maintain partition proceedings for the division of the inheritance against
his coheirs x x x; and the same person may intervene in proceedings for the
distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother x x x. In
neither of these situations has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to
show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that
in partition suits and distribution proceedings the other persons who might
take by inheritance are before the court; and the declaration of heirship is
appropriate to such proceedings. (Underscoring supplied)
Although the instant case deals with support rather than inheritance, as
in Tayag, the basis or rationale for integrating them remains the same.
Whether or not respondent Martin is entitled to support depends completely
on the determination of filiation. A separate action will only result in a
multiplicity of suits, given how intimately related the main issues in both
cases are. To paraphrase Tayag, the declaration of filiation is entirely
appropriate to these proceedings.

14
On the second issue, petitioner posits that DNA is not recognized by
this Court as a conclusive means of proving paternity. He also contends that
compulsory testing violates his right to privacy and right against selfincrimination as guaranteed under the 1987 Constitution. These contentions
have no merit.
Given that this is the very first time that the admissibility of DNA
testing as a means for determining paternity has actually been the focal issue
in a controversy, a brief historical sketch of our past decisions featuring or
mentioning DNA testing is called for.
In the 1995 case of People v. Teehankee[21] where the appellant was
convicted of murder on the testimony of three eyewitnesses, we stated as
an obiter dictum that while eyewitness identification is significant, it is not as
accurate and authoritative as the scientific forms of identification evidence
such as the fingerprint or the DNA test result (emphasis supplied).
Our faith in DNA testing, however, was not quite so steadfast in the
previous decade. In Pe Lim v. Court of Appeals,[22] promulgated in 1997, we
cautioned against the use of DNA because DNA, being a relatively new
science, (had) not as yet been accorded official recognition by our courts.
Paternity (would) still have to be resolved by such conventional evidence as
the relevant incriminating acts, verbal and written, by the putative father.
In 2001, however, we opened the possibility of admitting DNA as
evidence of parentage, as enunciated in Tijing v. Court of Appeals:[23]
A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods
unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we
have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and
parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research
Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to
conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis
is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one
copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the
mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of
course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is
still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts
should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was
said, that courts should apply the results of science when competently
obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny
progress.
The first real breakthrough of DNA as admissible and authoritative
evidence in Philippine jurisprudence came in 2002 with our en banc decision
in People v. Vallejo[24] where the rape and murder victims DNA samples from
the bloodstained clothes of the accused were admitted in evidence. We
reasoned that the purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain whether an
association exist(ed) between the evidence sample and the reference sample.
The samples collected (were) subjected to various chemical processes to
establish their profile.
A year later, in People v. Janson,[25] we acquitted the accused charged
with rape for lack of evidence because doubts persist(ed) in our mind as to
who (were) the real malefactors. Yes, a complex offense (had) been
perpetrated but who (were) the perpetrators? How we wish we had DNA or
other scientific evidence to still our doubts!
In 2004, in Tecson, et al. v. COMELEC[26] where the Court en banc was
faced with the issue of filiation of then presidential candidate Fernando Poe
Jr., we stated:

In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily

establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic
codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical
residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would
clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals, this Court has
acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing
Moreover, in our en banc decision in People v. Yatar,[27] we affirmed the
conviction of the accused for rape with homicide, the principal evidence for
which included DNA test results. We did a lengthy discussion of DNA, the
process of DNA testing and the reasons for its admissibility in the context of
our own Rules of Evidence:
Deoxyribonucleic Acid, or DNA, is a molecule that encodes the genetic
information in all living organisms. A persons DNA is the same in each cell
and it does not change throughout a persons lifetime; the DNA in a persons
blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and
shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells.
Most importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no
two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception of identical
twins.
xxx

xxx

xxx

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should

consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the samples were collected,
how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the
procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the
analyst who conducted the tests.
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified
by the prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or identification
techniques. Based on Dr. de Ungrias testimony, it was determined that the
gene type and DNA profile of appellant are identical to that of the extracts
subject of examination. The blood sample taken from the appellant showed
that he was of the following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP29/10
and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with semen taken from the victims
vaginal canal. Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen found in the
victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in open court during the
course of the trial.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and
technology in the Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious
as we traverse these relatively uncharted waters. Fortunately, we can benefit
from the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that has developed in other
jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven
instructive.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow (509 U.S. 579 (1993); 125 L. Ed. 2d 469) it was
ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be
used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were
allowed greater discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial,
including the introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing
is one such novel procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in
issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Applying
the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained through PCR
testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a
quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid
principles of human genetics and molecular biology.

15
Significantly, we upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA
testing and the admissibility of the results thereof as evidence. In that case,
DNA samples from semen recovered from a rape victims vagina were used to
positively identify the accused Joel Kawit Yatar as the rapist. Yatar claimed
that the compulsory extraction of his blood sample for DNA testing, as well as
the testing itself, violated his right against self-incrimination, as embodied in
both Sections 12 and 17 of Article III of the Constitution. We addressed this as
follows:
The contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all
compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The right against selfincrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of
the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought
to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.
Over the years, we have expressly excluded several kinds of object
evidence taken from the person of the accused from the realm of selfincrimination. These include photographs,[28]hair,[29] and other bodily
substances.[30] We have also declared as constitutional several procedures
performed on the accused such as pregnancy tests for women accused of
adultery,[31]expulsion of morphine from ones mouth[32] and the tracing of ones
foot to determine its identity with bloody footprints. [33] In Jimenez v.
Caizares,[34] we even authorized the examination of a womans genitalia, in
an action for annulment filed by her husband, to verify his claim that she was
impotent, her orifice being too small for his penis. Some of these procedures
were, to be sure, rather invasive and involuntary, but all of them were
constitutionally sound. DNA testing and its results, per our ruling in Yatar,
[35]
are now similarly acceptable.
Nor does petitioners invocation of his right to privacy persuade us.
In Ople v. Torres,[36] where we struck down the proposed national
computerized identification system embodied in Administrative Order No.
308, we said:
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not
bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle
scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the
common good... Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper
safeguards that enhance public service and the common good.
Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and
seizures,[37] and the infringement of privacy of communication [38] where the
constitutional right to privacy has been critically at issue. Petitioners case
involves neither and, as already stated, his argument that his right against selfincrimination is in jeopardy holds no water. His hollow invocation of his
constitutional rights elicits no sympathy here for the simple reason that they
are not in any way being violated. If, in a criminal case, an accused whose
very life is at stake can be compelled to submit to DNA testing, we see no
reason why, in this civil case, petitioner herein who does not face such dire
consequences cannot be ordered to do the same.
DNA paternity testing first came to prominence in the United States,
where it yielded its first official results sometime in 1985. In the decade that
followed, DNA rapidly found widespread general acceptance.[39] Several cases
decided by various State Supreme Courts reflect the total assimilation of DNA
testing into their rules of procedure and evidence.

Court examiner had the duty, upon receipt of the challenge, to order DNA
tests:[41]
516-a. Acknowledgment of paternity. (a) An acknowledgment of paternity
executed pursuant to section one hundred eleven-k of the social services law
or section four thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of the public health law
shall establish the paternity of and liability for the support of a child pursuant
to this act. Such acknowledgment must be reduced to writing and filed
pursuant to section four thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of the public
health law with the registrar of the district in which the birth occurred and in
which the birth certificate has been filed. No further judicial or administrative
proceedings are required to ratify an unchallenged acknowledgment of
paternity.
(b) An acknowledgment of paternity executed pursuant to section one hundred
eleven-k of the social services law or section four thousand one hundred
thirty-five-b of the public health law may be rescinded by either signators
filing of a petition with the court to vacate the acknowledgment within the
earlier of sixty days of the date of signing the acknowledgment or the date of
an administrative or a judicial proceeding (including a proceeding to establish
a support order) relating to the child in which either signator is a party. For
purposes of this section, the "date of an administrative or a judicial
proceeding" shall be the date by which the respondent is required to answer
the petition. After the expiration of sixty days of the execution of the
acknowledgment, either signator may challenge the acknowledgment of
paternity in court only on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of
fact, with the burden of proof on the party challenging the voluntary
acknowledgment. Upon receiving a partys challenge to an
acknowledgment, the court shall order genetic marker tests or DNA tests
for the determination of the childs paternity and shall make a finding of
paternity, if appropriate, in accordance with this article. Neither
signators legal obligations, including the obligation for child support arising
from the acknowledgment, may be suspended during the challenge to the
acknowledgment except for good cause as the court may find. If a party
petitions to rescind an acknowledgment and if the court determines that the
alleged father is not the father of the child, or if the court finds that an
acknowledgment is invalid because it was executed on the basis of fraud,
duress, or material mistake of fact, the court shall vacate the acknowledgment
of paternity and shall immediately provide a copy of the order to the registrar
of the district in which the childs birth certificate is filed and also to the
putative father registry operated by the department of social services pursuant
to section three hundred seventy-two-c of the social services law. In addition,
if the mother of the child who is the subject of the acknowledgment is in
receipt of child support services pursuant to title six-A of article three of the
social services law, the court shall immediately provide a copy of the order to
the child support enforcement unit of the social services district that provides
the mother with such services.
(c) A determination of paternity made by any other state, whether established
through the parents acknowledgment of paternity or through an
administrative or judicial process, must be accorded full faith and credit, if
and only if such acknowledgment meets the requirements set forth in section
452(a)(7) of the social security act.
(emphasis supplied)
DNA testing also appears elsewhere in the New York Family Court Act:
[42]

[40]

The case of Wilson v. Lumb shows that DNA testing is so commonly

accepted that, in some instances, ordering the procedure has become a
ministerial act. The Supreme Court of St. Lawrence County, New York
allowed a party who had already acknowledged paternity to subsequently
challenge his prior acknowledgment. The Court pointed out that, under the
law, specifically Section 516 of the New York Family Court Act, the Family

532. Genetic marker and DNA tests; admissibility of records or reports of

test results; costs of tests.

16
a) The court shall advise the parties of their right to one or more genetic
marker tests or DNA tests and, on the courts own motion or the motion of any
party, shall order the mother, her child and the alleged father to submit to one
or more genetic marker or DNA tests of a type generally acknowledged as
reliable by an accreditation body designated by the secretary of the federal
department of health and human services and performed by a laboratory
approved by such an accreditation body and by the commissioner of health or
by a duly qualified physician to aid in the determination of whether the
alleged father is or is not the father of the child. No such test shall be
ordered, however, upon a written finding by the court that it is not in the
best interests of the child on the basis of res judicata, equitable estoppel,
or the presumption of legitimacy of a child born to a married woman.
The record or report of the results of any such genetic marker or DNA test
ordered pursuant to this section or pursuant to section one hundred eleven-k of
the social services law shall be received in evidence by the court pursuant to
subdivision (e) of rule forty-five hundred eighteen of the civil practice law and
rules where no timely objection in writing has been made thereto and that if
such timely objections are not made, they shall be deemed waived and shall
not be heard by the court. If the record or report of the results of any such
genetic marker or DNA test or tests indicate at least a ninety-five percent
probability of paternity, the admission of such record or report shall
create a rebuttable presumption of paternity, and shall establish, if
unrebutted, the paternity of and liability for the support of a child
pursuant to this article and article four of this act.
(b) Whenever the court directs a genetic marker or DNA test pursuant to this
section, a report made as provided in subdivision (a) of this section may be
received in evidence pursuant to rule forty-five hundred eighteen of the civil
practice law and rules if offered by any party.
(c) The cost of any test ordered pursuant to subdivision (a) of this section shall
be, in the first instance, paid by the moving party. If the moving party is
financially unable to pay such cost, the court may direct any qualified public
health officer to conduct such test, if practicable; otherwise, the court may
direct payment from the funds of the appropriate local social services district.
In its order of disposition, however, the court may direct that the cost of any
such test be apportioned between the parties according to their respective
abilities to pay or be assessed against the party who does not prevail on the
issue of paternity, unless such party is financially unable to pay. (emphasis
supplied)
In R.E. v. C.E.W.,[43] a decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court, DNA
tests were used to prove that H.W., previously thought to be an offspring of
the marriage between A.C.W. and C.E.W., was actually the child of R.E. with
whom C.E.W. had, at the time of conception, maintained an adulterous
relationship.
In Erie County Department of Social Services on behalf of Tiffany M.H.
v. Greg G.,[44] the 4th Department of the New York Supreme Courts Appellate
Division allowed G.G., who had been adjudicated as T.M.H.s father by
default, to have the said judgment vacated, even after six years, once he had
shown through a genetic marker test that he was not the childs father. In this
case, G.G. only requested the tests after the Department of Social Services, six
years after G.G. had been adjudicated as T.M.H.s father, sought an increase in
his support obligation to her.

support agreement(current testing methods can determine the probability of

paternity to 99.999999% accuracy). However, at the time the parties before us
entered into the disputed agreement, proving paternity was a very significant
obstacle to an illegitimate child's access to child support. The first reported
results of modern DNA paternity testing did not occur until 1985. ("In fact,
since its first reported results in 1985, DNA matching has progressed to
'general acceptance in less than a decade'"). Of course, while prior bloodtesting methods could exclude some males from being the possible father of a
child, those methods could not affirmatively pinpoint a particular male as
being the father. Thus, when the settlement agreement between the present
parties was entered in 1980, establishing paternity was a far more difficult
ordeal than at present. Contested paternity actions at that time were often no
more than credibility contests. Consequently, in every contested paternity
action, obtaining child support depended not merely on whether the putative
father was, in fact, the child's biological father, but rather on whether the
mother could prove to a court of law that she was only sexually involved with
one man--the putative father. Allowing parties the option of entering into
private agreements in lieu of proving paternity eliminated the risk that the
mother would be unable meet her burden of proof.
It is worth noting that amendments to Michigans Paternity law have
included the use of DNA testing:[46]
722.716 Pretrial proceedings; blood or tissue typing determinations as to
mother, child, and alleged father; court order; refusal to submit to typing or
identification profiling; qualifications of person conducting typing or
identification profiling; compensation of expert; result of typing or
identification profiling; filing summary report; objection; admissibility;
presumption; burden of proof; summary disposition.
Sec. 6.
(1) In a proceeding under this act before trial, the court, upon application
made by or on behalf of either party, or on its own motion, shall order
that the mother, child, and alleged father submit to blood or tissue typing
determinations, which may include, but are not limited to, determinations
of red cell antigens, red cell isoenzymes, human leukocyte antigens, serum
proteins, or DNAidentification profiling, to determine whether the alleged
father is likely to be, or is not, the father of the child. If the court orders a
blood or tissue typing or DNA identification profiling to be conducted and
a party refuses to submit to the typing or DNA identification profiling, in
addition to any other remedies available, the court may do either of the
following:
(a) Enter a default judgment at the request of the appropriate party.
(b) If a trial is held, allow the disclosure of the fact of the refusal unless
good cause is shown for not disclosing the fact of refusal.
(2) A blood or tissue typing or DNA identification profiling shall be conducted
by a person accredited for paternity determinations by a nationally recognized
scientific organization, including, but not limited to, the American association
of blood banks.
xxx

In Greco v. Coleman,[45] the Michigan Supreme Court while ruling on

the constitutionality of a provision of law allowing non-modifiable support
agreements pointed out that it was because of the difficulty of determining
paternity before the advent of DNA testing that such support agreements were
necessary:
As a result of DNA testing, the accuracy with which paternity can be proven
has increased significantly since the parties in this lawsuit entered into their

xxx

xxx

(5) If the probability of paternity determined by the qualified person

described in subsection (2) conducting the blood or tissue typing
or DNA identification profiling is 99% or higher, and
theDNA identification profile and summary report are admissible as
provided in subsection (4), paternity is presumed. If the results of the
analysis of genetic testing material from 2 or more persons indicate a
probability of paternity greater than 99%, the contracting laboratory

17
shall conduct additional genetic paternity testing until all but 1 of the
putative fathers is eliminated, unless the dispute involves 2 or more
putative fathers who have identical DNA.
(6) Upon the establishment of the presumption of paternity as provided in
subsection (5), either party may move for summary disposition under the court
rules. this section does not abrogate the right of either party to child support
from the date of birth of the child if applicable under section 7. (emphasis
supplied)
In Rafferty v. Perkins,[47] the Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled that
DNA test results showing paternity were sufficient to overthrow the
presumption of legitimacy of a child born during the course of a marriage:
The presumption of legitimacy having been rebutted by the results of the
blood test eliminating Perkins as Justin's father, even considering the evidence
in the light most favorable to Perkins, we find that no reasonable jury could
find that Easter is not Justin's father based upon the 99.94% probability of
paternity concluded by the DNA testing.
In S.J.F. and J.C.F. v. R.C.W.,[48] the North Dakota Supreme Court
upheld an order for genetic testing given by the Court of Appeals, even after
trial on the merits had concluded without such order being given.
Significantly, when J.C.F., the mother, first filed the case for paternity and
support with the District Court, neither party requested genetic testing. It was
only upon appeal from dismissal of the case that the appellate court remanded
the case and ordered the testing, which the North Dakota Supreme Court
upheld.
The case of Kohl v. Amundson,[49] decided by the Supreme Court of
South Dakota, demonstrated that even default judgments of paternity could be
vacated after the adjudicated father had, through DNA testing, established
non-paternity. In this case, Kohl, having excluded himself as the father of
Amundsons child through DNA testing, was able to have the default
judgment against him vacated. He then obtained a ruling ordering Amundson
to reimburse him for the amounts withheld from his wages for child support.
The Court said (w)hile Amundson may have a remedy against the father of
the child, she submit(ted) no authority that require(d) Kohl to support her
child. Contrary to Amundson's position, the fact that a default judgment was
entered, but subsequently vacated, (did) not foreclose Kohl from obtaining a
money judgment for the amount withheld from his wages.
In M.A.S. v. Mississippi Dept. of Human Services,[50] another case
decided by the Supreme Court of Mississippi, it was held that even if paternity
was established through an earlier agreed order of filiation, child support and
visitation orders could still be vacated once DNA testing established someone
other than the named individual to be the biological father. The Mississippi
High Court reiterated this doctrine in Williams v. Williams.[51]
The foregoing considered, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the public respondent for upholding the orders of the trial court which
both denied the petitioners motion to dismiss and ordered him to submit
himself for DNA testing. Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, the remedy of certiorari is only available when any tribunal, board
or officer has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.[52] In Land Bank of the Philippines v. the Court of Appeals [53] where we
dismissed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, we discussed at
length the nature of such a petition and just what was meant by grave abuse
of discretion:

Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of

judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion,
prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
The special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction
of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The raison detre for the
rule is when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so
engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error
is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of
its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. In
such a scenario, the administration of justice would not survive. Hence, where
the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the
decisionnot the jurisdiction of the court to render said decisionthe same is
beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari.
The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the CA is a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
On the other hand, if the error subject of the recourse is one of jurisdiction, or
the act complained of was perpetrated by a quasi-judicial officer or agency
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the
proper remedy available to the aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the said Rules. (emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, the petitioner has in no way shown any arbitrariness,
passion, prejudice or personal hostility that would amount to grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. The respondent court acted
entirely within its jurisdiction in promulgating its decision and resolution, and
any error made would have only been an error in judgment. As we have
discussed, however, the decision of the respondent court, being firmly
anchored in law and jurisprudence, was correct.
Epilogue
For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers
who choose to deny their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA
testing technology finally provides a much needed equalizer for such
ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the merits of
DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case
comes at a perfect time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a
dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering. We therefore take
this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a valid
means of determining paternity.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby
DENIED. The Court of Appeals decision dated January 28, 2004 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 80961 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.