Cambridge University Press, University of Notre Dame Du Lac On Behalf of Review of Politics The Review of Politics

The Failure of U Nu and the Return of the Armed Forces in Burma
Author(s): Frank N. Trager

Source: The Review of Politics, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Jul., 1963), pp. 309-328
Published by: Cambridge University Press for the University of Notre Dame du lac on
behalf of Review of Politics
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The Failure of U Nu and the Return of the
Armed Forces in Burma
Frank N. Trager
U NU,Government
in 1947,of Burma.
became thethatPrime
He retained post after Minister
inde- of the Provisional
pendence in 1948 and, except for seven months in 1956-
1957, he had been the duly elected Prime Minister until he gave
up office in September, 1958, after the serious split in the ruling
party, the Anti-Fascist Peoples' Freedom League (AFPFL). From
then until the third national elections of February, 1960, General
Ne Win, Chief of the Burma Defense Forces, held the reins of
what was called a "caretaker government," in which he proceeded
strictly according to the constitution adopted in 1947. U Nu's Party
won an overwhelming victory at the polls in 1960 and once again,
with almost 80 per cent parliamentary backing in the 250-man
Chamber of Deputies, the more powerful chamber in the bi-
cameral parliament, he set about to govern Burma.' On March
2, 1962, General Ne Win staged a coup. He took over the govern-
ment in the name of a military Revolutionary Council, arrested
the previous cabinet members, and set aside Burma's constitution.
When on April 5, 1960, Prime Minister U Nu delivered his
policy speech to the Chamber of Deputies, he took pains to reiterate
the more significant promises he had made in the election cam-
paign. As there was "no alternative to democracy," he pledged
'"action" until "it becomes native to our soil." He announced
that his Pyidaungsu or Union Party, despite its huge majorit
the parliament, would operate in "strict compliance with the
principles of democracy." It would respect and welcome
structive" opposition in and out of the parliament; above
pledged that the "politicians" would not interfere with "t
ministration." He reviewed the many "undemocratic" mis
which he and his party had made during the previous ye
rule and now would seek to avoid. This meant, among o
1 See the author's "The Political Split in Burma," Far Eastern Surv
XXVII (October, 1958), 145-155; "Political Divorce in Burma," Foreign
Affairs, (January, 1959), pp. 317-327; and John S. Thomson, a "Supplement on
the Ne Win Administration, A Second Chance for Burma: The Interim Gov-
ernment and the 1960 Elections," in J.S. Furnivall, The Governance of Modern
Burma (New York, 1960), pp. 133-154.
309
310 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS
things, that his party and government w

sphere so as to entrench their power
limits to the intrusion of the state in
four-year plan for a balanced economy.
He indicated that if their desire for s
would implement his promise of state
the Mons and, in this connection, he
unity, stability, and prosperity of th
time recognizing that such unity "does
of the "specific characteristics" of cultu
groups. He also indicated, however, t
out the promise "to make Buddhism th
while protecting "the rights and privile
in the state."
This was another notable speech by U Nu and for the newly
elected parliament the occasion was particularly moving after
what had appeared, perhaps more below than on the surface, as
a warning to, if not an interruption of, the democratic system in
Burma. The speech signified that U Nu would seek to carry out
as policies, aspirations to which he had previously given voice.
And, simultaneously, he would try to heal the wounds caused by
the bitterness of the political split and the hard campaign prior
to his electoral victory.2 Curiously, he was silent on one of the
central issues faced by all earlier governments: a policy concern-
ing the insurrectionists, Communist and ethnic, the very matter
that had brought him into conflict with the armed forces in 1958.
There was no item among his promises, save that of statehood
to the Mons, which could not be reasonably defended and, if care-
fully carried out, would not command sizable majorities in the
parliament and in public opinion. Statehood for the Mons was,
at best, a sentimental gesture to eighteenth-century Burmese his-
tory. For since then, except for a few tens-of-thousands of Mons
who lived in noncontiguous Tenasserim villages, still retained their
language, but were otherwise culturally indistinguishable from the
Buddhist Burmans, there was no basis, geographically, economically,
or culturally, for a Mon state.
2 All quotations from "Crusade for Democracy," Speech, April 5, Chamber

of Deputies, Burma Weekly Bulletin (Rangoon), April 7, 1960. See, ibid.,
September 1, 1960, for substantial repetition of same themes at the August
meeting of parliament.
RETURN OF THE ARMED FORCES IN BURMA 311
U Nu had certain advantages. Gross domestic prod

1948 prices) stood at 111 per cent for 1959-1960 an
mates for 1960-1961 were slightly higher. Rice expo
an all-time postwar high of almost 2.1 million tons for
and, though the estimate for the succeeding year fore
what lower volume, the value of these exports would b
by the 7 per cent rise in world prices. In addition, at t
ning of 1961 the government negotiated with Peking a
free, ten-year line of credit for ?30 million and a se
Bank loan for the further development of the Bur
(the cumulative total being $33.35 million). Except f
in the cost of living when the government withdre
controls instituted by the Ne Win regime, Burma s
set for the launching of the Second Four-Year Plan
if to signify the hands-off policy of the armed forces,
Win, at the end of May, 1960, went to the United K
the United States for medical treatment. The Tim
February 3, 1961) commented favorably on the "imp
in Burma during 1960, brought about, it said, by
Win and U Nu who had learned to "trim" their "overbold
attempts at national planning."
Politically, however, all was not well. A number of ove
lapping factors combined to cause some uneasiness, and in
end and in combination, they brought to a close U Nu's cru
for democracy. These were: dissension and division in U N
Union Party; the promulgation of Buddhism as the state religi
the rise of insurrectionary activity, particularly among the K
National Defense Organization (KNDO) and other minor
and this problem was complicated by the remnants of the
mintang (KMT) Nationalist troops still active in the Shan St
new demands for "federalism," particularly among the Sha
demands which were interpreted as an indirect attack on
integrity of the Union; and U Nu's apparent inability or unwilli
ness to use his great popular appeal to restore order where it w
lacking or where it was under attack. At almost any time duri
this period he could have dissolved the parliament, dismissed h
factional government, and asked the people for a new man
which he most probably would have received. Instead, he exhor
and temporized until it seemed likely that Burma would split ap
These issues at various stages of development combined
achieve an early crescendo which sudden

explanation appeared as an "army reshu
1961, it was announced that Brigadiers
Maung would be named as ambassadors, fiv
to be assigned abroad as military attach
resign to go into politics and business."3
planation has ever been forthcoming, the
an interpretation of this event.
Dissension within the Union Party had
after victory in February, 1960. There ensu
sue of membership on the Executive Comm
barred officers of the constituent organiz
Burma Peasant Organization, the Federat
tion, the Union Labor Organization, fro
E.C.). Tension grew between two groups
sequently identified as the "Thakins" (th
named organizations) and the U-Bos (tho
ported U Nu's insistence on a Party bas
bership). In December, 1960, U Nu anno
soon relinquish the Party leadership thoug
as Prime Minister. It appeared that the
headed for the same fate as the old AFP
In the same month the Chins, who un
least some geographic and cultural basis
their claims to statehood to parallel thos
the Mons while the former first President
Shan sawbwa, the late Sao Shwe Thaike,
ticulars designed to loosen the federal-stat
stitution. He obviously spoke for a group,
sought a better financial settlement from
for relinquishing their princely rule or, in
of "separation" or "secession" from Ran
ciates had been suspected of encouraging
given difficulty to Ne Win during his car
stitution had allowed for such secession for
1958. But at that time the central gover
forces, partially located in the Shan Stat
3 The Guardian (Rangoon), February 7, 1961. Som

"decided . . . to retire . . . and take up business
Times, February 19, 1961.
allowing any secessionist move. Sao Shwe Thaike include

cism of the armed service because it "could station units in
State territory and recruit personnel without reference to t
concerned."4 More narrowly, in December, U Nu appea
take a negative stand against continuing the National D
College established by the Ne Win regime, and against th
tion of a Central Intelligence Organization, both of which B
dier Maung Maung, one of the two leading Army officer
Ne Win, had specifically encouraged. Earlier in the year
removed the police from Army jurisdiction and given it the
sibility for its own training, thus weakening the strength
armed forces. He also announced that a new Economic D
ment Corporation would gradually relieve the armed forces
hold on various economic activities carried on under the umbrella
of the Defense Services Institute. (The latter had originally started
as a kind of PX operation. During the caretaker regime it took
over some 30 commercial and manufacturing enterprises.)
All in all, it must have appeared to the military officers already
mentioned that the country was again going downhill and that
a new military take-over was desirable. There was very little con-
cealment in Rangoon that some military held such judgments.
U Nu is said to have confronted General Ne Win with this situa-
tion. And in February, 1961, Ne Win sided with him and against
his politically minded officers, presumably expecting that U Nu
would straighten things out. The officers were posted out of the
country or allowed to resign. Later that month, on February 26,
the Prime Minister spoke at Myitkyina and said that if it had
not been "for his tension-easing campaign the country would have
by now suffered a similar fate to that of the Congo or Laos."5
He also agreed to retain the leadership of the party for "a year
more" and proceeded to revamp the membership of its Executive
Committee so as to harmonize the differences between the two
factions. He bemoaned the "16,000" - a Buddhist reference to
troubles - problems which he and his colleagues faced.6
Thus ended the first internal crisis of U Nu's most recent
regime.
In a two-hour address delivered at the opening of the March,
4 The Guardian, December 23, 1960.

5 Ibid., March 3, 1961.
6 Ibid., March 17, 1961.
1961, meeting of parliament the Prime Mi

of his stewardship during the past 11 mo
his efforts "to redeem the election pled
He also presented the outlines of the Se
renewed his promises on such issues as
religion. The latter he expected to have
1961, meeting of parliament and he anno
commissions to prepare the statehood of t
The state religious issue had already
though minority, opposition. In Octob
Baptist Convention representing 250,000
a statement to the effect that they feared
their "fundamental rights," if Burma off
as the religion of the state.8 Early in 1
the Baptists, Burmese Muslims, animists, a
particularly from the Shan and Kachin
Thaike, organized the National Religi
(NRMA) to oppose U Nu's determined dr
of the necessary legislation. The former p
cated that such legislation would violat
referring to the Panglong Conference o
insured the unity of the majority Burma
Burma.9
There was little if any opposition to statehood for the Arak-
anese. They inhabit an area, fronting on the Bay of Bengal, south
of East Pakistan and the Special Division of the Chins. On the
east, in the typical Burma pattern, there is a north-south-oriented
mountain, hill and jungle range, the Arakan Yoma, stretching
almost to the Delta at the Andaman Sea. This range, with few
usable east-west roads, separates Arakan from "Burma Proper,"
the central plains and Irrawady River valley. (The main road
from Taungup on the coast to Prome on the river is currently
being improved.) Though geographically and culturally more
susceptible to ancient Indian influences than other groups in
7U Nu, Speech, Chamber of Deputies, March 13, Burma Weekly Bulletin,

March 23, March 30, and April 6, 1961. In this speech U Nu lauded the
Army for its role against the Kuomintang "aggressors," upbraiding the latter
for joining forces with the Shan and Karen rebels and insisted that the United
States put a stop to the Kuomintang activity in Burma.
8 The Guardian, October 20, 1960.
9Ibid., February 13, 1961.
Burma, the Arakanese are ethnically kin to the dominant Burm

Their language is a somewhat differently accented Burm
there is for example much less difference between these two g
than between the analogous Iberians who inhabit Portugal
Spain. The culture of the Arakanese is predominantly Bud
- there are some Muslims -as is 85 to 90 per cent of the
population.
Few took seriously the proposals for a Mon state. In the fi
analysis it was expected that the Arakanese, and eventually
Chins, a "hill" people, mainly animists with some Christians, w
join the Kachins, the Shans, the Karens, and the Kayahs as pe
in Burma entitled to some form of statehood, provided all rem
in a united Burma.
Religious criticism of the state religion was both sincere an

seriously treated by U Nu so as to reassure the religious minorit
But on any test of public sentiment in Burma and in the light
experience outside of Burma which clearly exhibited succes
and peaceful examples of state religions with toleration for othe
it was clear that this issue, taken separately, would not serious
damage the fabric of Burmese unity.
Of greater significance, and not unrelated to the stateh
issue, particularly in the Shan state area, was the gradual declin
of security from the peak that had been achieved under th
Win caretaker regime. It is quite probable that prior to th
advent of the latter in 1958 Burma had no national counterin-
surgency plan. Earlier, strategy was developed as the Burmes
armed forces proceeded to recruit, train, and arm regular uni
(usually at the platoon level,) constabulary and paramilitary
police, and one form or another of local anti-insurgent defen
groups. Maximum tactical authority was given to commander
in the field in conjunction with what we now call "civic actio
local leadership. Since 1958, the armed forces have prepared
anti-insurgent manuals and stepped up their campaigns of psych
logical warfare. They had come to believe that this latter in con-
junction with their use of the offense, their morale, their militar
training, and civil-military action had ground down and push
back the Communists and other rebels to the point of near-com-
plete victory. The task had been long and costly.
At the beginning of U Nu's 1960 government it appeared
that the assorted Communist rebels were close to exhaustion and
certainly to ineffectiveness. The com

Communist National Unity Front (N
had accentuated this condition. There was still a hard core of
Communist rebels but they were on the run. Leaders in the ra
were captured as in the case of the Central Committee mem
Bo Tin Thein, who had been "in charge" of the Communists
the Delta.1o Well-known Communist wives were coming "ou
the jungle" and were being apprehended, for example, in M
1960, Daw Khin Gyi, wife of BCP Politbureau leader, Thak
Than Myaing, and in November, Daw Hla May, wife of
second most important BCP leader, H. Goshal. In this same mon
Military Intelligence cracked a Communist rebel headquar
concealed in the Rangoon area.'" In January, 1961, an import
group of seventeen (Red Flag) Communists who had been o
erating in the Insein and Maubin districts surrendered wi
considerable quantity of arms. When Communist leader Th
Tun again expressed, in a letter to U Nu, his readiness to "n
tiate"12 peace with the government, its arrival caused neith
surprise nor much interest. The Communist rebels could oc
sionally make trouble in outlying areas; they were then no thr
to the security of the country.
Despite this improvement in one sector of the long-foug
battle against insurgency, difficulties increased in the ethnic in
rectionary areas. Early in Ne Win's caretaker regime, after
Shan sawbwas had surrendered by constitutional arrangeme
their remaining powers to the Shan State and central gover
ments - in return for compensation for their loss of hereditar
and other rights - a small group of "rebels" took up arms again
the central government.13 Their ire was directed against the Ar
which had earlier positioned detachments in the Shan State
combat remnants of the Kuomintang's and roving bands of
KNDO's; also to anticipate any trouble that might be cau
with the termination of power (1958) of the hereditary sawbw
At the beginning of U Nu's government (1960) Shan insurg
activity increased.'4 Concurrently, the KNDO's were able to
10 The Nation (Rangoon), August 28, 1960.

11 The New York Times, November 9, 1960.
12 The Guardian, January 22, 1961.
1a See editorial, "Shan Rebellion," The Nation, August 27, 1959.
14 See The New York Times, February 12, 1960; The Nation, March
1960; The Guardian, April 19, 1960.
up their campaign against the government in apparent

with the Shan rebels.15 By the end of the year, Rangoon w
ried at the deterioration of security in these ethnic-po
areas.16
Further complications arose when the Army, in November,

1960, engaged in the task of demarcating the Sino-Burmese bound-
ary, and in this effort, cooperating with official detachments of
the Chinese Communist Army, encountered newly trained KMT
forces equipped with some American material, at Keng Lap and
other border areas in the Shan State of Kentung on the Laos-
Thailand border. In ensuing battles at the beginning of 1961,
Shan and later KNDO rebels joined forces with the KMT's. This
new conflict between Rangoon and Taipeh created a furor in
Burma, especially when, after a Chinese-manned American plane
had been shot down, it was reported that the English-language
China News (Taipeh) admitted that it had participated in "an-
other case of overflight" for a "noble cause" and that "if we are
caught we are caught." In February students rioted before the
American Embassy in Rangoon in protest against "American
complicity." The Opposition AFPFL party, ordinarily not un-
friendly to the United States, called upon the U Nu government
to make representations both to the United States and United
Nations, and it did.17 A small remaining KMT group, esti-
mated at about 750, merged with the Shan and Karen rebels
and continued to cooperate with them in insurrectionary actions.
The country seemed to be alarmed by these events. U Nu
admitted that "though some people were inclined to panic, the
situation was not out of hand." He blamed "luck for the worsen-
ing security . . . and admitted that the security conditions in the
country were bad but comparatively not so bad as things were in
1949-1950."18 Incidentally, 1949 was the worst year of the in-
surrection. The press in Burma did not take kindly to U Nu's
attempt to blame "luck." They called upon him to increase the
15 The Nation, August 27, 1960.
16 "Elusive Peace," editorial, The Guardian, December 28, 1960.
17 Burma Weekly Bulletin, March 2, 1961. The Burmese press unanimously
condemned the United States and KMT throughout January and February.
During March-April, the United States and Thailand again helped to evacuate
considerable numbers of KMT's. The first group numbered about 1200 (The
New York Times, March 15, 1961). They were to be followed by about 4 to
5,000 more (The Guardian, March 17, 1961).
18 The Guardian, April 1, 1961.
size of the armed forces and especially of

which could hold territory cleared in an o
It is probable that if U Nu could hav
tively from this point forward (early 196
tained control of the situation, for the c
face of an external aggressor, the KMT
claims of Shan and Karen separatists an
mon cause with the hated Kuomintang
party friction and factionalism broke out
voked the temper of irascible General Ne
U Nu decided to adhere to his schedule
ship of the Party for an additional year be
he would remain as Prime Minister. T
at the All-Burma Conference of his Union
from Party control and become an "ord
rently he had, at first privately, then pu
would retire from politics at or after t
in 1964. Thus, at stake within the Unio
one imminently and the other eventua
1962 and the Premiership in 1964 whi
Party won the election, usually fell to th
In May, 1961, the press provided ind
attempt to revamp the Union Party w
six-man reorganization committee, design
factions, the Thakins and the U Bos, wa
zational leader of the former, Thakin Ky
ment to the secretaryship of the AFPF
tinuing support of U Nu, precipitated t
During late May and June of 1961, U
45-day Buddhist retreat and Party faction
the background until his return. Early in
Sao Shwe Thaike and then apparently
minister and head of the Shan State, S
minority peoples' conference in Taung
alliances to press forward their demands
eralized type of constitution. The tone
reported as so bitterly anti-Burman and a
Kachin, Chin, and Karen representatives d
from it. U Nu, however, indicated tha
were democratically proposed, they shoul
No one, least of all his Constitution Revision Commi

cerned with the proposed amendments for the state rel
for the new states, knew how to interpret this Nu re
the Buddhist doctrine of "Metta" or loving kindness.
The Buddhist state religion amendment was authorize
August session of parliament which later passed a second
ment protecting the rights of religious minorities. Each
ment created a vocal opposition and troubles multip
monsoon brought devastating floods, described as the w
years. Some 200,000 people were made homeless and
acres of paddy land lost the 1961 crop. Cost of living pr
rising and taxes were increased.
At the end of the monsoon in October the Union P
tions began to prepare for the 1962 conference, now
for January 27, 1962. There followed a vicious coun
primary fight for control of the Party, if anything, m
than that which had characterized the rivalries of the two factions
of the AFPFL after the split in 1958. U Nu's position was gen-
erally unknown. As he was planning retirement from the Party
leadership, it appeared that he was remaining aloof from the
struggle. Charges and countercharges by each faction filled the
press in the late fall and early winter 1961-2. When the con-
ference was over in January, it appeared that U Nu had given
the nod to the Thakin faction joined by his Home and Defense
Minister, Dr. E Maung and his political secretary, U Ohn. The
Thakins emerged, led by E Maung, as the Party leadership in
February, 1962; and the Union Party was for all practical pur-
poses split. Almost as a last irrational gesture U Nu withdrew
the remaining 15% of the import business from the private sector
in apparent violation of his promise to involve the state less rather
than more in the economy of the country. The affected sector of
the business community shut down their premises in a three-day
protest strike.
There are several interpretations of why U Nu who had done
so much for the country allowed this over-all deterioration in
public life. Former political allies who are not personally un-
friendly to him accuse him of political weakness. They cite epi-
sodes since 1947 which are designed to prove that U Nu "follows"
and "fronts" for strength, that he is really unable to lead. Others
in the same camp accuse him of wiliness, of being a shrewd poli-
tician who is patient enough to see his opp

knock each other out by the virulence of
was charged, he gained for himself the
the pieces and appear as savior. Friends wh
as his political allies either exonerate U
the bad advice of others such as E Maun
him with an increasing and praiseworth
dhist life which, however, unfitted him for
the day, or they combine these approac
something of each; he has been a temporiz
ing was necessary; he has been wily; he ha
and has stood loyally by these advisers bec
connections; and he has increasingly bec
Buddhist way is what he prefers to trod
him a religious hypocrite.
These are all partial explanations. I h
him a charismatic leader. By its very natu
indefinable. Certainly he demonstrated
population of Burma when he wanted th
election in 1960, he appears to have beco
ized, never fully using his popular appe
leader groups hoping perhaps to convert t
Buddhist effort. In this he certainly fai
could no longer reconcile the requirements
with his desire to achieve Buddhist religio
out in public life its consequences.
Early in the morning of March 2, 19
led by General Ne Win staged a coup d'&
U Nu, the President, the Chief Justice
(who had certain constitutional powers
thwart the Army), and certain Shan le
were charged with advocating policies a
(following the above-mentioned minorit
Taunggyi) which would help break up
were all arrested and placed in an army
of Rangoon. The political leadership of t
factions), AFPFL and NUF, was not mol
the Union Revolutionary Council and la
Government, took power and set about
time (I was in Burma in late March, 19
little surface or undersurface expression of hostility

If anything, there was a feeling of relief: at least, t
ward would be stopped.
General Ne Win's announcement of the coup w
advised the people of the Union that the armed forc
over the responsibility and the task of keeping the c
owing to the greatly deteriorating conditions in t
appealed to the people to carry on with their dail
government servants to attend to their duties withou
and he specifically asked that the education autho
with the then current examination period.19 This ti
no reference to the constitution, the parliament,
democratic institutions. Nor was there any prom
taker" government which looked forward early to
elections. The Revolutionary Council - it has not
been called a cabinet - was announced as contain
or chairman, the General, and 16 other high-rankin
were to take over the different ministries. Later it was also an-
nounced that the General retained the powers of the forme
president as well as "supreme legislative, executive and judicia
authority." A separate Communiquei No. 3, also dated March
called for friendly relations with all nations based on internationa
justice and morality; "wholehearted" support for the principles of t
United Nations as embodied in its charter; and the determination
of the government to continue its policy of "positive neutrality.
The Revolutionary Council proceeded swiftly to announce i
domestic policies. It dissolved both chambers of parliament an
the existing state councils, replacing the latter by new state suprem
councils with some central military figure as a member in eac
It deferred for at least two years the recent change in the impor
policy, that is, it restored the private sector to its business.
banned horse racing (as of 1963) and public gambling and beau
contests forthwith. It reinstituted its practice of controlling the
prices of essential household commodities but otherwise proceede
slowly on economic measures. It reduced the former minister
and councillor salaries to those drawn by top officers. It abolishe
the existing Supreme and High Courts replacing them by a fin
Court of Appeal. It reinstituted its former practice of raisin
19 Burma Weekly Bulletin, March 8, 1962.
animals for meat and abolished the sabb

extra holiday if it occurred on a workday
U Nu. However, with respect to the state
cautious policy, announcing its respect for fr
"did not emphasize one religion at the ex
But most of all, it promised to take imme
out" insurgency and on April 23 and M
announced the capture of the headquar
Maingmaw and of a combined Shan-KMT g
To heighten its security offensives, it too
constabulary police force into the regular
set about re-creating central, regional, and l
for more effective prosecution of its civic ac
warfare campaigns to wipe out insurgency
The Revolutionary Council carefully in
maintain a "no Press-censorship policy." P
to criticize the Revolutionary Government
not support the insurgents." And it had in
of existing parties as aspects of the ongoing
Later it aimed at forming a new, all-Bur
Party which the existing parties were aske
NUF did. The matter is at this time (May
The two main parties, Union and AFPFL, end
but not the organization proposed by the Re
More startling to outsiders than to the Bu
major domestic policy statement: The Burme
which appeared on April 30, 1962. In it
Council repeated, as its leaders had in a
1958 document, The National Ideology
Defense Services,21 its commitment to a Soci
20 The most recent and fullest account of the KND

tion, known as the National Liberation Alliance will b
June 18-20, 1962.
21 This will be found in Is Trust Vindicated? A C
Accomplishments of the Government Headed by Ge
Period of Tenure from November 1959 to February
pp. 534-541. All other reference to the policies, d
Revolutionary Council noted above are taken from th
March 8 to May 31, 1962. The Burmese Way To S
followed by the Philosophy or ideological stateme
Council and its Party. This statement is a composite
Marx, Engels, and Buddhism in fairly classical and
in line with the outlook of Burmese nationalist leaders at least

since the Two-Year Plan of Economic Development for Burm
was adopted at the 1947 Aung San-Sorrento Villa Conference
A number of passages in this Declaration repeat or parallel th
third part of the 1958 National Ideology document, entitled "T
Build a Socialist Economy." There is in effect little novelty
its classic exposition of and support for a planned socialist econom
which nonetheless rejects "neglecting the owners of national pri-
vate enterprise" and expects to "enable them to occupy a worthy
place in the course of further national development."
What is new in The Burmese Way to Socialism is its brea
with parliamentary democracy. It acknowledges the superiority o
the latter system as "the best in comparison with all . . . precedin
systems" but it goes on to point out that it has failed in Burm
"due to its very defects, weaknesses and loopholes, its abuses and
the absence of a mature public opinion ... until at last indications
of its heading imperceptibly towards just the reverse have becom
apparent." Elsewhere it had made clear that the coup had bee
made necessary by the breakdown in the political party process,
by the decline in the economy, by the demands for a loosely organ
ized federal structure and for a state religion, and by the continui
phenomenon of insurgency.
Hence, the Declaration went on, the Revolutionary Counci
"must develop, in conformity with existing conditions and enviro
ment and everchanging circumstances, only such a form of d
mocracy as will promote and safeguard the socialist development
This development is possible "only when the solidarity of all the
indigenous groups has been established," only when in the words
of Aung San quoted in the Declaration, the "people acquired
sense of oneness . . . and a will to live in unity through weal and
woe that binds a people together and makes them a nation an
their spirit a patriotism."
The coup d'etat of March 2, 1962, was a decisive step b
one of the important sectors of Burmese nationalist and patrioti
life to preserve the Union. They, the armed forces, though n
only they, had demonstrated their loyalty throughout independenc
to this essential ideal.
text was published in The Nation, January 18, 1963. For a recent review
article see, Fred R. von der Mehden, "The Burmese Way to Socialism," Asian
Survey, III (March, 1963), 129-135.
A glance at the armed forces now in co

be helpful. Total military strength is a lit
organized as battalions and companies
two brigade commands. This figure also i
and navy, each under 4,000. In addition
police and security force of some 45,0
Rangoon Police, and the like) once aga
the Defense Services. There appears to
rename these the People's Security Fo
uniforms similar, if not identical, to tha
forces are under the direct command of
Services, and his deputy, Vice Chief of
for Army. There are also Vice Chiefs of
the Inspector General of Police and the n
ister. These are among the key personnel
General Ne Win is Chairman of the Revo
the Ministries of Defense, Finance and R
and National Planning, and is Chief of St
In the year since the Revolutionary
March 1962, it has used the army to
student opposition at the University of Ra
ing a number of students in the riot of
the Student Union building, a center o
reassumed control over the renamed B
ment Corporation (BEDC) embracing b
ness enterprises. It has set up throughout
organization, Security and Administrative
(SAC) for the improvement of agricultur
with the organized cultivators, their coo
tutions, and the land distribution ag
results from the Land Nationalization Ac
of which some 3.34 million acres have
half of that number distributed by 1
benefit of a good rice crop year in 1962
the base for the country's economy. A
in meeting the more recent challenges of
All in all the Revolutionary Council has
what puritanical course, carefully main
government-to-government relations on
trality." General Ne Win's annoyance
based on what he considered to be ill-treatment during

trip to the United States in the summer of 1960 and on
that the United States has continuously supported the h
mintang "irregulars" who in turn assist the ethnic insur
has not deflected him from the course of Burmese neutralism. If
he has dealt in friendly fashion, albeit cautiously, with the Chinese
Communists it is because Burma shares some 1,200 miles of a
now demarcated but unprotectable border with Peking. His gov-
ernment's budget for fiscal year 1962-63 provides for about equal
assistance from the Communist bloc and from the free world, with,
however, the expectation that the latter will deliver what it prom-
ises, while the former has not infrequently been unable to fulfill
its commitments (for example, tractors from Communist China
and the Soviet Union). Burma under any government wishes to
avoid the fate of Laos - or Finland!22
Finally, with respect to the armed forces, two facts must be
noted. Its leadership has been historically and deeply involved
the development of Burmese nationalism on the road to ind
pendence and since. Secondly, the armed forces as an institut
has almost from the beginning of the Union shown itself as capab
of cohesion and as one of the few disciplined sectors of Burmese
life. These two facts, however, have not prevented it from suffe
ing internally in some degree from the blight of Burmese polit
life - its personal rather than political factionalism. I have alread
referred to the elimination of the "Colonels" in February, 19
In February 1963, Brigadier Aung Gyi, Vice Chief of Staff, Arm
hence apparent second-in-command of the armed forces, sudden
resigned. He had been also Minister of Trade Development a
Industry, head of the BEDC, generally regarded as a moder
socialist, somewhat close, in his earlier days, to such socialist lead
in the Anti-Fascist Peoples' Freedom League as former Premi
U Ba Swe, and Deputy Premier, U Kyaw Nyein. His riv
Brigadier Tin Pe, Army Quartermaster General, Minister f
Supplies and Cooperatives, Agriculture and Forests, Land N
tionalization and head of SAC, won out. What this will mean
the armed forces cannot yet be fully evaluated. It does mean tha
"2 See Editorial, "Chinese Communities in Southeast Asia," The Natio

(Rangoon), March 11, 1963, for a typical expression, appearing frequentl
if irregularly, over the years, of Burmese caution about Communist Chin
"aggressive policies."
General Ne Win is still firmly in the sad

time arrange for future succession.
In the light of the Burmese experienc
raise two questions: are Western-style repr
unworkable for countries newly emerged f
desirable to further the careers of their arm
representative institutions the respective co
lished or hope to establish?
Such questions merit sober and intensive
prejudice to one's own institutional loyaltie
question is in a sense more difficult to h
the questionable short-run policy implicati
sarism, reliable and sufficient data abou
hardly on hand and hardly comparable.
of these armies, their size and capability
ought to be so related, to problems of the
Cambodia, for example, has, thus far, be
Burma, Laos, the Republic of Vietnam,
forces, therefore, have a very different h
in comparison with those of its Southeast
land, having in effect, a more or less beni
virtually since the first coup in 1932, is
nesia's considerable armed forces are vigo
in the main anti-Communist. They are
largest Communist party outside the Sino-
each new country needs a law and order fo
writ of its governmental mandate is respec
Whether such a force is police, constabu
army is of little moment. What counts is
its ability to carry it out.
Normally, whatever that word may m
force is proportionately small. New Yor
inhabitants, has about 22,000 police. Bur
22 million, has built up its police and a
forces to seven times the size of New York
ever, has had the extraordinary problem o
British estimates in Malaya called for a rat
armed forces to insurgents and in that cou
lasted from 1948 to 1960. At the start
in Burma, the proportion was ten to one i
Without pressing these points, it seems that we do not k

enough, nor do we have data enough to guide us toward
judgment on the second question. There are too many v
and too many as yet unteased-out propositions in the comp
question of newly independent nation cum problem of
order cum size, command and control, and deployment of a
force for security. We need further data and study before f
hypotheses can be tested.23
The first question, the applicability and workability of W
style representative institutions to countries newly emerge
colonialism is much easier to answer. Such institutions are rela-
tively recent in the West and have not had so continuous a histo
as we sometimes think when we call England or Iceland t
"mother of Parliaments." Western-style democracy has foun
short shrift in too many countries, in Europe and Latin America
for us to feel that its institutional base and structure can be read
transplanted to differing societies. Where such institutions have
worked they have been attractive and have lured others to imita
tion. However flattering such imitation is, it hardly suffices
sustain the transplant. Obviously, each new country will ha
to search out those unifying as well as diversifying elements in it
culture pattern which permit it to survive. Without a unity capab
of sustaining diversity, there will certainly be no nation, and mo
probably no state. Our task, it seems to me, is to help others dis
cover and utilize their own traditions and culture patterns,
help them where possible construct relevant political process
which in time will produce consensus and tolerate choice an
opposition, to permit and help them to borrow from us what
relevant to them, but carefully avoid the futility of superimpositi
Useful as this device is in geometry, it has no place in free politic
Burma at this stage in her history, as U Nu said on reassumin
office, exhibits certain unique features which require fundamen
exploration and understanding before conclusions can be reached
The military and civilian leaders who now govern and defen
23 Even a casual reading of John J. Johnson (ed.), Role of the Military in

Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton, 1962) reveals the extraordinary numb
of variables, including the unpredictability of individual leaders, which at t
stage points up the gaps in our knowledge. The easy generalizations in th
volume concerning modernizing effects, substitute bureaucracies, failure
civilian authorities, and the like, merely give names to the problems to
studied and even these names contain many patent and latent ambiguities.
Burma still have much to learn about th

recently have they reacquired the opportu
history, other than through old chronicle
cently have they reacquired the right
experiencing their own country and
opportunity to share in that enterprise
sympathetically and have the patience to w
It may now be said that the Burmese,
newly independent country, have discover
of law and order can be established, bu
that a genuine nationality- and nation-bui
started; that their state is politically via
that self-sustaining unity requires both res
sively, democracy. Burma's difficulties b
1948 and the military coup of 1962 have b
tinuity has been sustained through a varie
some of which have been questioned bot
We can watch, wait and see, and, when c
the Burmese to have what they say the
socialism and democracy - in that order

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Cambridge University Press, University of Notre Dame Du Lac On Behalf of Review of Politics The Review of Politics

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The Failure of U Nu and the Return of the Armed Forces in Burma

Author(s): Frank N. Trager

Cambridge University Press, University of Notre Dame du lac on behalf of Review of

things, that his party and government w

2 All quotations from "Crusade for Democracy," Speech, April 5, Chamber

U Nu had certain advantages. Gross domestic prod

achieve an early crescendo which sudden

3 The Guardian (Rangoon), February 7, 1961. Som

allowing any secessionist move. Sao Shwe Thaike include

4 The Guardian, December 23, 1960.

1961, meeting of parliament the Prime Mi

7U Nu, Speech, Chamber of Deputies, March 13, Burma Weekly Bulletin,

Burma, the Arakanese are ethnically kin to the dominant Burm

Religious criticism of the state religion was both sincere an

certainly to ineffectiveness. The com

10 The Nation (Rangoon), August 28, 1960.

up their campaign against the government in apparent

Further complications arose when the Army, in November,

size of the armed forces and especially of

No one, least of all his Constitution Revision Commi

tician who is patient enough to see his opp

little surface or undersurface expression of hostility

19 Burma Weekly Bulletin, March 8, 1962.

animals for meat and abolished the sabb

20 The most recent and fullest account of the KND

in line with the outlook of Burmese nationalist leaders at least

A glance at the armed forces now in co

based on what he considered to be ill-treatment during

"2 See Editorial, "Chinese Communities in Southeast Asia," The Natio

General Ne Win is still firmly in the sad

Without pressing these points, it seems that we do not k

23 Even a casual reading of John J. Johnson (ed.), Role of the Military in

Burma still have much to learn about th

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