Burma (1948-2000) 2023 Lectures 6-8

LECTURE 6
BURMA: FROM COLONY TO INDEPENDENCE
▪ In Burma, the provision of Western education was geared towards providing the civil
service and modern economic enterprises with English-speaking clerks and other
functionaries and providing the government with the skills a modern state requires. During
this period, a new middle class emerged, including those administrators who ran the colony
but also those who developed and fashioned Burmese nationalism.1 By the 1930s, younger
men challenged the established politicians. A movement centered initially in the Rangoon
University Student Union, formed in 1931, took shape when a group took control of the
Dobama Asiayone (We Burmese Association). The organisation became a focus of the
strongly nationalist youth who called themselves the Thakins, meaning master, implying
that they and not the British were the rightful rulers of Burma. These student leaders
included Aung San and U Nu.2
Aung San (1915-1947), Burmese nationalist leader and assassinated hero who was instrumental in securing Burma’s
independence from Great Britain. Before World War II, Aung San was actively anti-British; he then allied with the Japanese during
World War II, but switched to the Allies before leading the Burmese drive for autonomy. When seeking foreign support for Burma’s
independence, the Japanese assisted him in establishing a military force in their invasion of Burma in 1942. Aung San served as
minister of defence in the puppet government of Ba Maw. Increasingly sceptical of Japanese promises of Burmese independence,
he transferred allegiance to the Allies in March 1945. After the Japanese surrender, Aung San used the Anti-Fascist People’s
Freedom League (AFPFL), which had been formed in 1944, to become deputy chairman of Burma’s Executive Council in late 1946.
Negotiations with Prime Minister Clement Attlee in January 1947 led to an agreement that provided for Burma’s independence
within a year. Elections for the constitutional assembly saw the AFPFL secure an almost total victory. Though communists had
denounced him as a “tool of British imperialism,” he supported a resolution for Burmese independence outside the British
Commonwealth. Aung San and six colleagues were however assassinated on 19 July 1947 when the Executive Council was in
session. His political rival, U Saw, was later executed for his role in the killings.
U Nu (1907-1995), one of the key Thakin leaders, he served as foreign minister in Ba Maw’s puppet government. Following the
assassination in 1947 of Aung San, U Nu became the leader of the government and Burma’s leading political party, the Anti-Fascist
People’s Freedom League (AFPFL). When independence was declared in January 1948, U Nu became the first prime minister of
Myanmar and served for 10 years, with only a brief interlude out of office in 1956–57. His government was plagued by communist
and ethnic-minority insurrections, economic stagnation, and administrative inefficiency. U Nu was one of the founders of the
Non-aligned Movement in the 1950s. In 1958, he resigned his post as prime minister and a “caretaker” government took over,
headed by General Ne Win. In 1960, U Nu again became prime minister after his party won elections. In March 1962, however, Ne
Win staged a coup d’état, establishing a military government and putting U Nu in prison. Following his release from prison, U Nu left
Myanmar and began organising a resistance movement against the Ne Win government. When this movement failed, he took up
residence in India, but he returned to Myanmar in 1980 at the invitation of Ne Win. He made an unsuccessful bid for power after
pro-democracy demonstrations toppled Ne Win’s government in 1988.
1
David Joel Steinberg (ed.), In Search of Southeast Asia, p. 284. Ricklefs, A New History of Southeast Asia, p. 174.
2
Owen, Modern Southeast Asia, p. 329.
1
▪ Although Burma was ruled as an Indian province, it was treated differently in the area of
political reforms. In 1917, London announced its intention to move towards a greater
measure of self-government in India.3 The passage of the Government of India Act (1919)
did not extend its provisions for the establishment of a dyarchy system of tutelary
democracy to Burma.4 Delegations sent to London eventually obtained similar concessions
– constitutional dyarchy under which some limited government functions would be
transferred to two Burmese ministers in a more representative Legislative Council.5 After a
review of dyarchy, the British eventually passed the Government of Burma Act, effecting
separation from India in 1937.6 This was a significant document in the development of the
modern state in Burma. It established a system of parliamentary government similar in form
to that of the Westminster model of British cabinet government, providing a means for
Burmese politicians to involve themselves in the management of the central state. It further
legitimised in the eyes of many Burmese politicians the electoral institutions of the dyarchy
government, including political parties.7
DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE WAR (1942-1945)
▪ During World War II, Japan extended independence to Burma by the Japanese in August
1943, with the constitution placing ultimate authority in the hands of the head of state. The
Minister of War, was always to be a serving military officer, setting the constitutional basis of
the cabinet position of Aung San, the head of the Burma National Army (BNA).8 The core of
the army was formed in July 1942 when the Burma Defence Army (BDA) was established
under Japanese supervision from the youths who had made up the Burma Independence
Army (BIA). It was renamed the Burma National Army (BNA) in August 1943. The BIA drew
many of its recruits from the highly commercialised zones in Lower Burma, excluding from
its ranks the immigrant communities and hill peoples. Many of its officer corps were from
urban communities, possessing secondary and even university education. During the war,
the BNA developed two characteristics. One was its loyalty to the notion of independence
and having mass support. The other was the need to involve itself in politics to compete
against other groups and achieve the officer corps’ notion of a correct social and political
order.
▪ The Burmese nationalists’ experience with Japanese rule – its brutality and illusory
independence granted to Burma in 1943 dampened their enthusiasm for Fascism and
totalitarianism. This was reflected in the very name of the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom
League. As the tide of the war turned against Japan, the British saw the BNA under Aung
San as a ‘quisling’ organisation to be deprived of any role in post-war Burma. Aung San
found the solution in the form of a coalition with the Burma Communist Party which was
formed in August 1944, the Anti-Fascist Organisation (AFO). When the army marched
against Japanese troops in March 1945 as the armed force of the now renamed
Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL), it helped guarantee the officer corps a role
in the future of Burma, demonstrate its loyalty and power to the British, and make itself
indispensable as an armed force to the civilian political leadership.9 Despite British refusal
to acknowledge the AFPFL’s claims of having formed a provisional government, the AFPFL
3
The Montagu-Chelmsford reforms resulted in a dyarchy constitution allowing for a limited degree of native participation in colonial
government. Burma was excluded from the arrangement, setting off waves of nationalist protests and strikes.
4
John F. Cady, History of Modern Burma, pp. 199-212.
5
Ibid., p. 286.
6
Owen, Modern Southeast Asia, p. 328.
7
Robert H. Taylor, The State in Myanmar, p. 124.
8
Ibid., pp. 225-228.
9
Taylor, The State in Myanmar, pp. 234-237.
2
cooperated by and large with the British because of the policy advocated by the leading
Communists and the negotiations with the army’s leadership by the British supreme
commander Lord Louis Mountbatten.10
POST-WAR DEVELOPMENTS (1945-1948)
▪ Accepting democratic norms was also a tactical weapon in the nationalists’ fight for
independence. By doing so, they hoped to attract Western sympathy and diplomatic
support for their struggle against undemocratic colonial rule. Post-war plans for Burma had
emphasised reconstruction rather than constitutional advance. These also aimed to create
a more effective democratic system. Dorman-Smith was unable to come to terms with the
nationalist front, the AFPFL over the nature of democracy in Burma. He wanted to institute
a multi-party system and saw the AFPFL as a one-party regime against which the war had
been fought. Although he failed, the struggle did force the AFPFL to gain a popular backing
and adopt constitutional practices.11 British plans were not to be, for between May 1945 and
October 1946, the AFPFL applied pressure on the British to withdraw from Burma. Once it
became clear to the British that Indian troops were no longer at their disposal, there was no
other viable alternative but to grant independence. The Labour government under Clement
Attlee recognised that any attempt to hold on to power in the face of widespread nationalist
armed resistance might result in a victory for the Burma Communist Party.12
Reginald Dorman-Smith (1899-1977), the second Governor of Burma (May 1941-August 1946). The Japanese invasion saw the British going into
exile in Simla, India. After the war, he returned as Governor but his relationship with Aung San and other Thakin leaders was frosty. This culminated
in his replacement with Hubert Rance, who was backed by Lord Louis Mountbatten, the Viceroy of India, to provide unconditional independence to
Burma under the AFPFL.
Sir Hubert Elvin Rance (1898-1974) was the last Governor of British Burma between 1946 and 1948.In January 1947, Prime Minister Attlee made
an agreement with Aung San that independence would come as soon as possible, with elections in April. British hopes of a smooth handover of
power allowing Britain to retain some influence were threatened when Aung San was assassinated in July 1947. Rance's prompt action in making U
Nu prime minister within hours is believed to have been a decisive factor in avoiding greater upheaval.
▪ Democracy’s emphasis on consensus, rather than authoritarian politics, was also valuable
to nationalist leaders who needed to mobilise all social groups, not only during the
anti-colonial struggle but also in the post-independence nation-building phase.13 Burma’s
10
Steinberg, In Search of Southeast Asia, p. 395.
11
Tarling, Southeast Asia: A Modern History, p. 408.
12
Taylor, The State in Myanmar, p. 233.
13
Ricklefs, A New History of Southeast Asia, p. 366.
3
leaders attempted to forge a civil ideology or a national culture which would provide the
legitimacy needed for a consensual political order. Consensus was vital to the survival of
Burma as a state; the British only granted independence when an amicable settlement was
reached between Burma proper and the surrounding upland territories inhabited by ethnic
minorities. Aung San’s negotiations with the Shan sawbwas and leaders of the Chins and
Kachins led to the formation of a Union federal government. By the Panglong Agreement in
1947, the frontier areas and the Shan States pledged their allegiance to the Union. Aung
San visualised Burma as a plural society in which diverse political structures would co-exist
within a framework of overarching consensus. He also argued for the separation of religion
and state. His policy on the ethnic minorities proposed in May 1947 was a very liberal one
by proposing that the status of ‘Union State’, ‘Autonomous State’ or ‘National Area’ be
conferred on territories with the following characteristics.
A defined geographical area with a character of its own

Unity of language different from the Burmese
Unity of culture
Community of historical traditions
Community of economic interests and a measure of economic self-sufficiency
A fairly large population
The desire to maintain its distinct identity as a separate unit14
▪ However, increasingly splits within the AFPFL between Aung San’s leadership and the
communists emerged. Soe had broken away from the Communist Party of Burma in
February 1946 to form a splinter group called the Red Flags. He accused the CPB
leadership of Browderism, the form of revisionism espoused by Earl Browder, leader of the
American Communist Party, who proposed that armed struggle would no longer be
necessary, as world fascism and imperialism had been weakened, making constitutional
methods a real option to achieve “national liberation”. The majority remained with Thakins
Than Tun and Thein Pe and continued to co-operate with the AFPFL; this main group
became known as the White Flag communists. The key question was whether the
communists would work or be allowed to work within the system; or challenge the system
itself. Soe chose direct confrontation with the British as a means of achieving independence
while Than Tun chose mass opposition. In July 1947, Aung San was assassinated by
agents of U Saw.15
Thakin Soe (1906-1989) was a founding member of the Communist Party of Burma, formed in 1939 and one of Burma's most
prominent Communist leaders. He joined the nationalist Dobama Asiayone ("Our Burma" Association) in the 1930s. In 1939, Soe
together with Thakin Ba Tin and other nationalists founded the Communist Party of Burma. He spent most of his life underground
and for a time led the Red Flag Communists. He was captured by government forces in November 1970 near the Arakan Yoma but
released in a 1980 amnesty by the socialist government. After nationwide demonstrations against Ne Win's government in 1988,
Soe re-entered politics in August 1988 and became the patron of the Unity and Peace Party in September 1988, which he hoped
would contest in the 1990 elections.
▪ In September 1946, Hubert Rance offered Aung San and others seats in the Executive
Council. The Communists, except very briefly, received none of the seats on the council
14
Yong, Political Structures, pp. 80-81.
15
Tarling, Southeast Asia: A Modern History, p. 408. In 1946, the British declared the Red Flags illegal. In March 1948, the White
Flags went underground after the home secretary Kyaw Nyein ordered their arrest.
4
and relations between them and the non-Communist leaders became strained. Towards the
end of 1946, an increasing number of non-Communist and conservative leaders from the
pre-war period had joined the AFPFL and the Communists were eased out of their previous
leading positions.16 The British declared the Red Flag Communists under Thakin Soe illegal
which led to the outbreak of insurrections. By 1947, the White Flag Communists were also
expelled from the AFPFL.17
Than Tun (1911-1968) was the leader of the Communist Party of Burma from 1945 until his death. Than Tun was educated at
Rangoon (Yangon) Teachers’ Training School and taught at a high school in Rangoon. Influenced at an early age by Marxist
writings, in 1936 he joined the nationalist Dobama Asiayone (“We-Burmans Association or “Our Burma Association”). Than Tun
helped form the alliance between Ba Maw’s Sinyetha (“Proletarian”) Party and the Dobama Asiayone, which resulted in the
“freedom bloc” of 1940. That same year he was imprisoned by the British for sedition. When Ba Maw’s pro-Japanese government
was established in 1942, Than Tun served as minister of land and agriculture. In 1943, however, he became a leader of the
underground resistance movement. After World War II, he was general secretary of the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League
(AFPFL). When Thakin Soe’s Red Flag Communists left the Communist Party in early 1946, Than Tun and the majority of
communists continued to cooperate with the AFPFL. In the face of increasing disagreements with the AFPFL, however, he was
forced to revolt in March 1948. He organised guerrilla forces in central Burma, but the government was largely successful in
containing his insurgents. In 1964, the Burmese communist movement was split by the Sino-Soviet rift. Than Tun took the side of
Beijing, accusing Thakin Soe’s Red Flag Party of being Trotskyite, and he sent a number of party members to China to be trained
by Chinese revolutionaries. In 1967 he carried out his own cultural revolution, purging the White Flag Party of “revisionists.” The
next year, Than Tun was assassinated in the Bago (Pegu) Mountains by one of his subordinates.
▪ The programme that the AFPFL had for an independent Burma combined an emphasis on
parliamentary democracy (necessary to reassure the outgoing British), with broadly
state-socialist economic objectives (necessary to placate the Communist factions in the
AFPFL), and (in order to mollify the anxieties of the minorities), a federalised structure of
government that gave certain guarantees to the Shans, Kachins, Chins and Karens. The
decade of independence however revealed the weaknesses of the new state. A case could
be argued that Burma was not sufficiently prepared for self-government, given the wartime
devastation inflicted on the society and economy. In the event, the attempt to build a
socialist-oriented economy did not avert communist rebellions in 1947 and 1948 and the
carefully constructed federal structure did not prevent minority rebellions. The fact that
Burma’s north-eastern border with China and Laos made it a front-line in the Cold War
meant that both the Communist and separatist rebellions were embroiled in, and prolonged
by, the wider conflicts in the region.18
▪ It has been noted that the key difference between the state before the war and after
independence in 1948 was that the political elite sought to control the country through the
institutions of a liberal constitution without the coercive force of their British predecessors.
The consequence was perhaps inevitable, since forces unwilling to accept their exclusion
from state power launched the civil war to achieve political power. The leaders of the
various groups formed during the war years, secular and religious, Communist and
non-Communist, each vigorously disputed the legitimacy of those who inherited the
post-colonial state.19
16
17
Ibid., p. 397.
18
Christie, A Modern History of Southeast Asia, pp. 265-266.
19
5
Questions: What were the sources of power/legitimacy of Burmese political leaders?
What were the factors shaping the adoption of a democratic system of government in
Burma at the point of independence?
Where were the sources of challenges to attempts by Burmese leaders to consolidate
power in the period after independence?
TIMELINE
1917 The British announce their intention to extend a measure of self-government of India.
1919 The passage of the Government of India Act however did not extend similar concessions to Burma.
1923 Burmese delegations to London secure the extension of dyarchy to Burma.
1929 A review of dyarchy recommends separation from India.
1930s Student nationalists, calling themselves the Thakins, rise to prominence. Chief amongst their leaders are Aung
San and U Nu.
1935 Government of Burma is passed.
1937 Burma is separated from India.
1943 Japan extends ‘independence’ to Burma. Aung San becomes the Minister of War in the puppet government of
Ba Maw.
March 1945 The Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) is formed through the collaboration with the Communists
and other groups. Aung San turns against the Japanese.
May British attempts to restore control are challenged by Aung San and the AFPFL.
1945-October
1946
February Thakin Soe breaks away from the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) to form the Red Flags. The majority of the
1946 party under Than Tun and Thein Pe form the White Flags.
August 1946 Governor Dorman-Smith is replaced by Hubert Rance who proceeds to work with the AFPFL in preparing
Burma for independence.
February The Panglong Agreement is signed.
1947
19 July 1947 Aung San and his cabinet colleagues are assassinated by agents of his political rival U Saw.
4 January Burma becomes independent from British colonial rule.
1948
LECTURE 7
BURMA: THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT (1948-1962)
U Nu (1948-1956, 1957-1958, 1960-1962)
▪ The government of independent Burma sought to win popular support through programmes
couched in terms of socialism and popular Buddhist tradition with the object being a welfare
state, Pyidawtha (Happy Land). U Nu sought to create a political structure based on a
synthesis of Buddhism and socialism, with emphasis on the former. One of the reasons was
due to his experience during World War II made him a more religious man and he felt that
his public image as a religious man was a way to national salvation.20 It was said that he
was fashioning himself like the Burmese kings of the past and he showed his support of
Buddhism by having the government sponsor a “peace pagoda” and the promotion of the
study of Buddhism.21 Also, he was already advocating socialism in his earliest days in
politics because of the exploitation of the locals by the British during the colonial era and
20
Butwell, U Nu of Burma, p. 65.
21
Ibid..
6
often alludes his speeches to Western socialist literature. 22 This appealed to many
Burmese who were Buddhists but it aroused the fear of the minorities who feared
marginalisation. Buddhism also opened the way to Burmanisation and the decline of
non-Burman ethnic traditions. The programme also failed to win support from the
socialists.23 Electoral participation increased which indicated a growing success of the
system. In 1956, 3.9 million voted and the figure rose to 6.6 million in 1960.
POLITICAL CHALLENGES AND POPULAR OPPOSITION
▪ Within three months of independence, the new government and its one-time Communist
allies became locked in civil war when in March 1948, Than Tun led a Communist
insurrection. The area of intense activity was central Burma, including the strategic oil
fields. The Communists also failed to organise a general strike in Rangoon and other urban
centres. In July, they were joined by the largest faction of Aung San’s veterans’
organisation, the People’s Volunteer Organisation (PVO) as well as half the former BIA
troops in the government army.24
▪ U Nu's government, assisted by India and Britain, suppressed the insurrection. This was
largely due to the general antipathy among the population towards Communism. After the
insurrection, the AFPFL took measures to purge the All Burma Peasants Union of its
Communist leadership. The All Burma Trade Union Congress was rid of Thein Pe's Marxist
control in favour of the AFPFL's U Ba Swe. In 1953, the government banned the Burma
Communist Party (CPB) and remnants of the Communists continued their struggle in the
north-eastern Shan region.25
▪ In the 1950s, growing splits within the ruling AFPFL were not an indication that the system
had failed, but they were a challenge to the system to accommodate them but the challenge
was not met. By this time, the AFPFL’s efficacy as a political organisation had declined and
the government’s legitimacy became increasingly dependent on the charisma of the
devoutly Buddhist prime minister U Nu.26 The AFPFL had been formed as an anti-fascist
united front and before independence had become a coalition of forces – peasant and
workers’ unions, ethnic organisations, political parties, and independent members bound by
opposition to the British and the goal of independence. Many organisations were the
personal domains of other leaders who guarded them jealously. Followers were territorially
based and this contributed to inherent rivalries within the AFPFL.27 Splits became endemic
in the party, first with the expulsion of the communists and later the Burma Workers’ and
Peasants’ Party in 1950 when it disputed the government’s approval of the United Nations
entry into the Korean War.28
▪ The prosperity brought about by the Korean War (1950-1953) faded by 1955, and
encouraged growing tensions among the AFPFL leaders. Factional rivalry became linked to
issues which involved the future of the state and policies to be pursued, which became
intertwined with allocation and priority of resources, power and patronage. Although the
agreed aim was a welfare state, not all the elite agreed on pursuing industrialisation.
22
Ibid..
23
Yong, Political Structures, p. 87.
24
Ibid..
25
SarDesai, Southeast Asia: Past and Present, p. 234.
26
27
28
7
Deteriorating economic conditions worsened the divisions since individual leaders had
based their political support on particular programmes and on the patronage they offered.
The differences over the role of industrialisation partly reflected the different levels of
Westernisation among the Thakins and among the popular elements to which they
appealed. The Socialist core of the AFPFL was divided between Thakin Tin and Kyaw Tun,
and Kyaw Nyein and U Ba Swe. Tin and Kyaw Tun were not graduates and concerned
themselves with the agricultural programme. Kyaw Nyein and Ba Swe were graduates. In
order to counter Ba Swe and Kyaw Nyein, U Nu sought support from the minorities and
contradictorily among the Buddhists.29
▪ Indeed, pressures from the minorities seeking greater autonomy increased during U Nu’s
tenure of office. Under the federal political structure, statehood was conferred on the
Kachin, Kayah and Shan frontier regions. The Shans and Kayahs were given the right to
secede in 1958. The Chins were administered in a special division and the Karens were
allowed to create a state in 1951. However, these liberal provisions were more form than
substance. All the states and divisions were dependent on the central government for
funds. Their governments were responsible not to the state legislatures but to councils
made up of members of the central government, albeit drawn from their states. The
minorities tolerated U Nu, if only because his government was so ineffective that the proper
exercise of authority was not consistently applied.30
▪ The 1951 elections witnessed a near complete triumph for the AFPFL, though the voter
turnout was only twenty per cent. The AFPFL secured 147 seats out of the total 250 and
gained the support from another 50 or so candidates from affiliated organisations. Despite
the sweep of the legislature, the AFPFL only won about 60 per cent of the votes cast.31 The
1956 elections saw the emergence of a new opposition group, the National Unity Front. It
was more left wing and reflected popular disappointment with the achievement of the
welfare state programme. The core of this party was the Burma Workers’ and Peasants’
Party, a vehicle for extremist elements who operated underground after it had been banned
in 1953. The NUF also claimed capable leadership which included Aung Than, the brother
of Aung San.32 As the AFPFL split, the Communists exploited the opportunity to stage
violent uprisings in various parts of the country and even helped ethnic dissident groups
such as the Kachins and Shans to revive their demands for separate states.33
▪ The 1956 elections revealed the continued erosion of AFPFL popularity. Although it won
173 out of 230 seats compared to the NUF’s 47, the AFPFL only secured 48 per cent of the
votes while the NUF had 30 per cent. U Nu retired from office for a period to restore
organisational discipline, but this fuelled even greater factional tendencies within the AFPFL
as he attacked the power bases of his political opponents.34 In order to maintain his position
as the elections loomed, U Nu was increasingly under pressure to satisfy one special
interest or another, to reinvigorate the bureaucracy and boost the morale of his followers.
He and his socialist cabinet colleagues strove to combine Buddhist and Marxist values in a
new national ideology called Buddhist Socialism. It represented a return to fundamental
29
Tarling, Southeast Asia: A Modern History, p. 409. Thakin Tin headed the All Burma Peasants Organisation (ABPO) while U Ba
Swe and Kyaw Nyein led the Trade Union Council (TUC).
30
31
Robert H. Taylor, The State in Myanmar, p. 250.
32
33
Ibid., pp. 235-236.
34
Ibid.
8
ethical principles and an attempt to avoid the abuses that capitalism was alleged to have
inflicted on the country under colonial rule.35
▪ Although the electoral victories in 1951-52 and 1956 tended to hide the fissures within the
AFPFL, these emerged at the third All-Burma AFPFL Congress in January 1958. U Nu
declared that the AFPFL would be transformed from a coalition to a unitary party. All
affiliates would have to adhere to the party ideology and accept a subordinate status in the
party hierarchy.36 In mid-1958, the AFPFL split and this led to a severe drop in the
parliamentary majority for U Nu. He and the Tin faction turned to the National Unity Front for
support and to the Shan and Arakanese minorities, even coming out openly for an
Arakanese state. This cost him the support within his own party though he survived a
no-confidence motion in the Chamber of Deputies because the leftist NUF sided with the
government. U Nu’s faction, called the ‘Clean’ AFPFL, prepared for the elections by seeking
support from the minorities by holding out the prospect of a Mon state, and from the left,
offering amnesty to surrendering communists, PVOs and other rebels.
▪ In September 1958, pro-Stable officers stepped in, concerned about the advance of
Communism, the decline of security and the threat to the Union itself. Hampered by
bureaucratic paralysis caused by political interference in the administration of government
programmes, by the disaffection of the minorities and by the threat of civil war within
government armed forces, U Nu formally asked Ne Win to intervene and established a
caretaker government.37 Tarling notes that at this juncture, politicians were prepared to step
outside the system with the idea that the military might put it right. Ne Win assumed the
premiership on a caretaker basis and worked against U Nu, of whom Ne Win was a
long-standing rival. His caretaker government ended in 1960 and elections held in February
saw U Nu and Thakin Tin triumph.
▪ U Nu’s electoral victory was partly based on patronage. His party, Pyidaungsu (Union
Party), split and a rural faction calling itself the Thakins challenged the urban elite. The
Thakins wanted the cancellation of import licenses, crucial to the businessmen who
financed the party, and the setting up of government companies which they hoped to
dominate. This group was made up of the leftist members who had supported U Nu in the
earlier split in 1958. Another group under U Bo was made up of relative newcomers who
were more conservative in their ideology. These internal divisions led to the loss of the
party’s credibility, contributing in part to the military takeover in 1962.38
▪ U Nu’s electoral success was not only due to left-wing and minority support as well as
popular disdain of the military’s authoritarianism. It was due also to his charisma and
association with Buddhism. However, the 1961 constitutional amendment to make
Buddhism the state religion alienated the National Religious Minorities Alliance, which
represented 3 million non-Buddhists. Even the Buddhist minorities were also alienated
because U Nu promised them more political autonomy than he could offer. At the same
time, he also antagonised Buddhist militants by passing a constitutional amendment
guaranteeing freedom of religion.39
35
36
37
38
39
Steinberg, In Search of Southeast Asia, p. 399. Official observance of Uposatha, the Buddhist day of observance was declared.
On these days, state radio devoted airtime to religious programmes, state schools and government offices were closed and liquor
was not served in public places, and the slaughter of cattle was banned.
9
▪ U Nu’s policies on the maintenance of the federal structure also contributed to his downfall.
In 1960, he had made promises proposing the establishment for states for the Arakanese
and Mons. However, he reneged and delayed the statehood bills after the elections thus
alienating the Arakanese, Mons and others. Insurgency increased and by 1961, U Nu
admitted that the minority rebels controlled one-tenth of the country.40 Opposed to U Nu’s
religious and federalist policies which endangered national unity, Ne Win carried out a coup
in March 1962. This was triggered by U Nu’s negotiations with the leadership of various
groups seeking ethnic autonomy, which endangered the integrity of the Union. To the
military, it appeared that U Nu could no longer provide effective leadership and the country
seemed to be heading back to the situation in 1958.41 The examples of Laos and South
Vietnam, both riven by civil war and consequently under foreign domination, were still very
much alive in the minds of many people, including the coup leaders.42
Questions: What were the sources of power/legitimacy of Burmese political leaders

during this period?
Where were the sources of political challenges/popular opposition that emerged? How
effectively were they managed?
What circumstances shaped the development of different forms of political
structures/system between 1948 and 1962?
TIMELINE
March 1948 The Communists under Than Tun launches an insurrection.

December The Karen and Kachin units rebel against the government.
1948
1950 Splits begin to emerge in the APFPL. The Burma Workers’ and Peasants’ Party is expelled when it disputed the
government’s approval of the United Nations entry into the Korean War
1951 The AFPFL emerges victorious in elections.
The Karens are allowed to create a state.
1953 The Communist Party of Burma is banned.
1956 The elections see the emergence of a new political rival, the National Unity Front (NUF). Communists exploit
the splits in the APFPL and support growing ethnic insurgencies.
1958 The Shans and Kayahs are given the right to secede from the federal union.
January 1958 Third All-Burma AFPFL Congress. U Nu announces the decision to make the AFPFL a unitary party.
Mid-1958 Further splits in the AFPFL leads to a severe drop in the parliamentary majority for U Nu.
September U Nu asks Ne Win to form a caretaker government.
1958
February New elections see U Nu return to power. He promises to extend statehood bills to the Arakanese and Mons.
1960 These promises are reneged after the elections.
1961 A constitutional amendment to make Buddhism the state religion alienates religious and ethnic minorities.
March 1962 Ne Win stages a coup.
LECTURE 8
BURMA UNDER MILITARY RULE
▪ After 1962, those who wished to restore ‘state dominance’ chose to ‘force the state upon the
remainder of society with the few weapons at its disposal, eliminating its rivals and ensuring
40
41
42
Taylor, The State in Burma, p. 291.
10
that the institutions permitted to exist are dependent on the state.’43 Ethnic consensus was
lacking and political feuds had racked U Nu’s government. Ne Win considered it his task to
overcome the disintegrative tendencies. In the course of establishing political structures to
achieve that goal, maximum government was also developed. While U Nu’s government was
partisan, sectarian and communal, Ne Win aimed to remodel the political structure along
non-partisan, non-sectarian and non-ethnic lines. 44
▪ After the coup, the army began dismantling the political structures that had arisen since
independence and replacing them with others that the Revolutionary Council could supervise.
The two chambers of the legislature were dissolved, the president was removed, the various
state governments were abolished and the courts were centralised under a new supreme
court.45 It became evident that the focus definitively shifted from tolerance of plural political
structures towards the creation of maximum government.46 In April, the Revolutionary Council
led by Ne Win formulated a programme, The Burmese Way to Socialism. The Lanzin (Burma
Socialist Programme Party) was formed and in 1964, the remnants of all other parties
outlawed.47 It had abandoned the democratic commitment that the civilian government had
included.
Ne Win (1911-2002) was originally named Shu Maung and he became involved in the struggle for Burmese independence from the
British during the 1930s. During World War II, after the Japanese invasion of Burma, he was one of the Thirty Comrades who, in
1941, went to Hainan province in China to receive military training from the occupying Japanese there. It was at that time that he
adopted the name Ne Win. He subsequently served as an officer in the Japanese-sponsored Burma National Army from 1943 to
1945, but, becoming disillusioned with the Japanese, he helped organise the underground resistance. After Burma gained
independence from Britain on 4 January 1948, he served as the second commander in chief of the army. In 1958, Ne Win was
asked to serve as prime minister in a caretaker government after the administration of former prime minister U Nu proved incapable
of suppressing the ethnic insurgencies that were crippling the country. Ne Win held general elections in 1960, stepping down that
same year after U Nu’s re-election and the restoration of parliamentary government. However, on 2 March 1962, Ne Win carried out
a coup d’état, imprisoning U Nu and establishing the Revolutionary Council of the Union of Burma, whose members were drawn
almost exclusively from the armed forces. Ne Win combined a repressive military dictatorship with a socialist economic programme,
the cornerstone of which was the nationalisation of Burma’s major economic enterprises. His government broke the control of
Indian, Chinese, and Pakistani traders over the country’s economy and embarked on an ambitious though unsuccessful
programme of rapid industrialisation. Ne Win steered a neutralist course in foreign policy and isolated Burma from contacts with the
outside world. His regime made Burma into a one-party state in 1964; the sole party permitted to exist was the Burmese Socialist
Programme Party (BSPP), which had been founded by Ne Win and which was dominated by military officers. Ne Win and his
colleagues formulated a new constitution in 1972–73 that provided for a one-party state in Burma. A new government was elected
in 1974 with Ne Win as president (1974–81). He subsequently retained the post of chairman of the BSPP, remaining the country’s
preeminent leader. By the late 1980s Ne Win’s socialist and isolationist policies had turned Burma into one of the world’s poorest
countries. Governmental corruption and mismanagement had driven much of the country’s economic activity underground into the
black market, and Burma, which had once been a leading rice exporter, was beginning to experience food shortages. It can be said
that Ne Win’s style of governance was rather eccentric. He often consulted numerologists and astrologists when he needed advice
on policies and thought that nine was a lucky number, to the extent that the currency was printed in denominations of 45 and 90. In
late 1987 widespread anti-government rioting broke out in the major cities and was followed in the spring and summer of 1988 by
even larger student-led protests. In both instances the government resorted to brutal measures to suppress the uprisings that
included killing hundreds of demonstrators and jailing thousands more. The disturbances prompted Ne Win in July 1988 to resign
from the BSPP chairmanship. The BSPP subsequently fell from power in the government and was replaced in September by the
State Law and Order Restoration Council, which was also headed by military officers. Ne Win is largely thought to have remained
active behind the scenes, at least into the 1990s. In March 2002, however, he was placed under house arrest following the
43
44
45
46
47
11
imprisonment of several family members who were accused of plotting a coup against the country’s military junta. Although no
charges were brought against Ne Win, he remained under house arrest until his death.
I. SOURCES OF POWER AND LEGITIMACY

RESTRUCTURING CIVIL POLITICAL STRUCTURES: EROSION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES
▪ The political structure established after the coup was the Revolutionary Council, which
combined all state powers with Ne Win as the chairman. The Council ruled by decree till 1974
until a new constitution was promulgated. From 1962 to 1974, the old constitution was still
theoretically operative but in reality, the Revolutionary Council authorised Ne Win to exercise
all legislative, executive and judicial powers. A cabinet was formed from the Council to assist
Ne Win in his executive duties.48 At the local level, control over the implementation of
government policies was taken away from the various ad-hoc organisations and passed to
Security and Administrative Committees (SACs) which, led by military commanders,
coordinated and supervised the activities of the civil bureaucracy and political activities as
well.49 Having army personnel in coordinating positions at all levels gave the Revolutionary
Council direct access to all subordinate administrative organs through two networks, the civil
administrative hierarchy and the military chain of command. During the first decade of their
existence, the SACs had no non-official personnel among their members. In 1972, at the time
when the district level of administration was abolished, the SACs were instructed to add to their
membership representatives from the relevant Party units and Peasants’ and Workers’
Councils, with others appointed by the government.50
▪ The new constitution gave power to a People’s Assembly with Ne Win as the president. The
drafting of the constitution had solicited popular opinion and comment. The comment was that
the 1947 constitution had been drafted by lawyers and conservative politicians without the
participation of the people. Hence it was incapable of achieving socialism and national unity.
What emerged was not dissimilar to any other one-party socialist state and the communists
could no longer claim that they desire to create a socialist state structure in Burma.51 The local
SACs were replaced by People’s Councils with the role in carrying out government policies.52
▪ To seek the support of the population at more than a symbolic level, the Revolutionary Council
developed a system of elections to administrative bodies at various levels, which served to
engender a sense of responsibility to the state and to involve some people in the management
of affairs. The local government elected bodies were the village and ward People’s Councils,
the township People’s Councils, the State and Division People’s Councils, and at the top of the
state structure, the repository of state sovereignty on behalf of the people, the Pyithu Hluttaw.
Direct popular participation in the Pyithu Hluttaw could only be achieved through the ritual of
elections, though the obligation of members to report back to their constituents after each of its
biannual sessions required a public meeting to be held by Pyithu Hluttaw members, further
linking the members who attended with the formal centre of the state.
▪ Elections for the Pyithu Hluttaw took place every four years simultaneously with elections for
the village, ward, township and state and divisional People’s Councils. Only nationals of the
country could be elected to those posts, and while it was not mandatory that a candidate must
be a member of the BSPP, in practice, most of them were, as the single candidate put up for
each position was previously selected by the relevant level Party unit and approved by the
Central Executive Committee. At the voting booth, the elector was faced with the choice of
either accepting or rejecting the Party’s nominee.
48
49
50
51
52
12
▪ The function of elections was not presented as a possible redistribution of power but as an
affirmation of the existing power. But the elections were more than just legitimising rituals. Like
the process of mass public discussion and the referendum campaign that preceded the
introduction of the 1974 constitution, or the intense public touring and discussion by state
officials before the passage of the 1983 Citizenship Law, elections were means of socialising
individuals into the norms of the state, of legitimising its activities, and of communicating policy
and other data to the public.53
A NEW POLITICAL ORGANISATION
▪ Between 1962 and 1964, the Revolutionary Council declared all political opposition illegal and
established a new political party called the BSPP (Burma Socialist Programme Party) or Lanzin
in 1962 with its ancillary mass organisations and own ideology to mobilise support for the state.
Its aim was to steer the nation towards the ideological goals of The Burmese Way to Socialism
(BWS). It was not initially conceived as a mass party; its members drawn from the police and
military. It was based in the urban areas. The rural population and minorities did not support it.
Reconstituted as a mass party in 1971, the members who joined tended to be more interested
in securing favours or positions of power.54 By 1972, there were only about 79 500 members in
the party, 58 per cent of which came from the military. In 1981, the number reached 1.5 million,
nearly 5 per cent of the population. Advancement in government employment and preferment
in other areas such as scholarships and paid holidays were increasingly linked to party
leadership.55 The BSPP remained the sole governing body with subordinate organisations for
peasants, workers, youth, women and veterans intended to serve as the means through which
the people’s will is expressed. As the party expanded, efforts were apparently made to make it
more representative by recruiting more vigorously in the peripheral states and from groups not
formally attached to the state.56
SUPPORT FROM THE MILITARY
▪ The army’s military and political experiences were crucial in shaping the officer corps’ attitudes
and policies in the years after 1962. Faced with a plethora of enemies, Communist and ethnic
separatist, and supported by a weak and uncertain civilian government, the army leadership
had developed the ability to function independently of civilian control.57 Although there was a
small military oligarchy in the Revolutionary Council, Ne Win was the one who wielded ultimate
power. Even after he retired from the military in 1971 and entrusted the civil administration to a
prime minister in 1974, he was still acknowledged as the leader in control. He was able to
bolster his legitimacy by drawing upon the legacy and reputation of Aung San.58 His power was
also backed by the military. By the 1960s, the military had overcome factionalism within itself.
At the same time, it saved the civilian government of the day from the threats of ethnic and
communist insurgents. The civilian governments had little to offer in way of assistance. This
accounted for the substantial claims throughout the 1950s on the national budget for internal
security, one-third or even half of the total amount. The army budget was not challenged and
the army remained well-treated and well-provided as compared to the rest of the population.59
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
Ibid.
13
▪ After 1962, the armed forces grew in size and expense but not disproportionately to population
growth or the expansion of the economy and government expenditure generally. However, by
comparison with other non-communist states in Southeast Asia, the proportion of the
population in the armed forces was relatively high. It stood at 6.8 per thousand in 1973, but
declined to 5.9 per thousand in 1983, compared with 2.4 and 1.7 for these respective years in
Indonesia and 5.8 and 4.9 for Thailand.60
IDEOLOGY AS A SOURCE OF POWER/LEGITIMACY
▪ An ideological statement, The Burmese Way to Socialism (BWS) was issued after the coup
which served as a guide to government policies. Its aim was to focus loyalty on and mobilise
popular support for the political structures of the state. It specified that the state rested on the
people. Its anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist rhetoric was derived from the civil war experiences
of the military. It was opposed to parliamentary democracy, noting its failure to achieve national
unity under the U Nu government. The BWS was non-partisan because its socialist roots were
indigenously Burmese. Drawing on the experience of the civil war (1948-1949), when army
officers had been compelled to choose between the Burmese Communist Party or U Nu’s
government, Ne Win tried to reconcile warring factions divided on ideology. The BWS could
thus be seen as a way of establishing consensus among opposing factions.61
NON-SECTARIAN POLICIES AND CONTROL OVER RELIGION
▪ Ne Win also pursued his non-sectarian goals after 1962, convinced that U Nu’s promise to
make Buddhism the state religion was divisive. The BWS stated that “the Revolutionary
Council recognises the right of everybody freely to profess and practise his religion”.62 He was
most intent on restricting the political activities of the monks. In 1962, he required all monks to
be registered. This was aimed at the individual who wished to pass himself off as a monk by
merely shaving his head and donning the yellow robe. In April 1964, the Revolutionary Council
decreed that all Buddhist organisations must vow not to engage in political activities, a decision
rescinded in May after protests. In March 1965, the Revolutionary Council sponsored a
Buddhist conference, which among other things, outlined a programme of religious education
reform. Several monasteries and individual monks objected to the results of the conference
and subsequently, Buddhist clergy were excluded from voting or holding office in many kinds of
organisations.63
▪ Large-scale involvement of Buddhist monks in overt political activity did not appear after 1965
until the 1974 demonstrations over the death of U Thant. However, the state was always
concerned about the possibility of development of opposition to the regime through the
monkhood, a body to which individuals could retreat and gain immunity from the state’s laws.
In May 1980, the relationship between the state and the sangha was fundamentally altered. In
Rangoon, the First Congregation of the Sangha of All Orders for the Purification, Perpetuation
and Propagation of the Sasana was held. This meeting adopted a constitution and other rules
for the removal of individuals who did not fulfil the requirements of proper monks, according to
the terms of the organisation, controlled by senior monks cooperating with the state.
Committees of leading monks were organised from the village tract and ward level upwards to
a state central working committee which managed the sects in its area and which, through the
executive committee, ensured that monks behaved according to the Vinaya, the Buddhist code
60
61
62
Maung Maung, Burma and General Ne Win, London: Asia Publishing House (1969), p. 307.
63
14
of behaviour. From the state’s perspective, the successful conclusion of the 1980 meeting and
a second congregational meeting in mid-1985 indicated greater control by the state over the
Buddhist monkhood than for many years previously. 64
II. POLITICAL CHALLENGES AND POPULAR OPPOSITION

THE COMMUNIST CHALLENGE
▪ The 1960s saw the CPB increasingly divided. There were increasing differences between
the party and the above ground leftist opposition groups such as the Burmese Workers and
Peasants Party and the NUF. One concern was the issue of armed struggle. A meeting in
1964 confirmed the primacy of armed struggle against Ne Win and the establishment of a
broad alliance of nationalities and peasants in a united front. The Sino-Soviet split also saw
the CPB supporting the CCP, becoming its most important ally among the regional
Communist parties. In 1967, a series of purges wrought destruction and confusion within
the CPB. Government offensives in 1968 saw the deaths of more CPB leaders. Than Tun
was assassinated by a bodyguard in September 1968. The military government continued
its reprisals to thwart the Communists’ aim to connect the party’s heartland of central
Burma with the northeast. The government now resorted to the ‘Four Cuts’ campaign to cut
the links of food, funds, information and recruits between the insurgents and the local
populace.
▪ The 1974 Constitution in effect did not recognise the diversity of Burma which led to the
formation of the NDF in 1975, a coalition of the ethnic movements. In 1980, the Kachin
Independence Organisation (KIO) left the NDF and allied itself with the CPB in a fight
against the Ne Win government. In 1981, Ne Win met with leaders of the KIO and their ally
the CPB. Three new conditions were proposed by the government: The CPB must be
abolished, the People’s Army under the command of the CPB must be abolished, and all
‘liberated areas’ must be abolished. The Communists wanted the inclusion of their armed
forces as a military unit under the State Defence Council with representatives on that body.
The CPB was told that there was no place for another political party since Article 11 of the
1974 Constitution had established Burma as a one-party state.
▪ By the 1980s, the government policy towards the Communists was one which combined
continual armed pressure as well as political and organisational work to undercut their
recruitment bases. The CPB due in part to the changes of the CCP towards Southeast
Asian Communists, was also much weakened. As China’s relations with Burma improved
from the early 1970s, external support waned. By the mid-1980s, the Chinese were
providing economic aid to the Rangoon regime.65 In mid-1982, the NDF, a coalition of ethnic
movements opposing the military government and the CPB, held its first congress. It
considered the Communists the tool of foreign interests. While the government had not
been able to suppress the insurgent movements, the Communists have developed a close
relationship with the Kachins and the Shans and exploited the drug traffic as a source of
revenue to offset the lack of assistance from the People's Republic of China.66
CURBING POLITICAL DISSENT
▪ The regime sought support from mass peasant and worker associations but also ruthlessly
repressed its opponents. After its coup, the military had occupied Rangoon University and
blown up its students’ association, the cradle of the Thakin movement. Further massacres
64
65
66
SarDesai, Southeast Asia: Past and Present, pp. 240-241.
15
occurred in 1974.67 Students had used the occasion of the return of the body of former United
Nations general secretary U Thant to express not only their dissatisfaction with the fact that this
world leader was not given a state funeral, but also their sense of isolation and lack of
opportunities.68 In 1967, U Nu and several hundred political prisoners were released. In 1968,
over 30 civilian leaders were appointed to the Internal Unity Advisory Board. In 1969, the Board
published a report recommending reverting to constitutional government, restoring the judiciary
and reappointing U Nu premier. Ne Win would then be appointed president by parliament. A
new national convention would be held to draft a new constitution. The military government
rejected the report. U Nu left the country and denounced the Revolutionary Council. He
announced the formation of a rival government on the Thai border which failed to make any
impact given the repression of dissent by the military regime.69
MANAGING THE MINORITY CHALLENGE
▪ Ne Win also destroyed the autonomous ethnic political structures which were allowed to
develop under U Nu. His civil war experiences reinforced his distaste for organisations based
on ethnicity. In 1948, the army was still organised on a communal basis and ethnic loyalty
rather than state loyalty was the guiding principle. In December, the Karen and Kachin units
rebelled and Ne Win had to fight both the ethnic insurgents and those army units which had
joined the communists in revolt. After the coup, he ordered the arrest or removal of hereditary
leaders, especially among the Shans. State councils of the Shan, Kachin, Kayah and Karen
states and the Chin Special Division, along with their chief ministers were abolished. In April,
the separate Mon and Arakanese ministries were dissolved, thus ending the prospect of
semi-autonomous states for those regions. State Supreme Councils consisting of local civilian
leaders and military commanders were established and linked in a hierarchy all the way to the
Revolutionary Council.70 At the state level, a committee consisting of the local head of the
civilian administration, the local police chief and area army commander was established to
work in liaison with the State Supreme Councils. These helped the Revolutionary Council
maintain a tight control over the country from the capital to the village level.71
▪ After 1962, the state sought means to depoliticise ethnicity. Ethnic identities, when politicised
into non-negotiable demands for administrative and policy autonomy, are normally irresolvable
by short-term political means, and every state attempts to translate such demands into lesser
ones of a more negotiable and non-personal nature. The effect of the Revolutionary Council’s
policies was to eliminate ethnicity as a constitutional issue and replace it with more tractable
ones such as regional development and cultural diversity. In subsequent years, the state
carried out other steps to unify the population around symbols and institutions of a non-divisible
nature. In 1965, an Academy for the Development of National Groups was opened to train
individuals from border areas to appreciate the diverse culture of the country while recognising
the need for the unity of the state. Graduates returned to their home areas where they taught
and often assumed leadership positions in state and party organisations. In keeping with the
imposition of a uniform administrative pattern throughout the country, legal codes previously
applicable only to certain ethnic groups or areas were standardised. By the end of the 1960s,
for the first time, a common administrative and legal system for the entire state had been
achieved.72
67
68
69
70
71
72
16
▪ The new constitution in 1974 stipulated a unitary state in place of the old federal polity. Along
with the new citizenship act, it aimed at dismantling the traditional quasi-autonomous
relationship between the central government and the multi-ethnic society which had existed for
nearly a millennium. Only citizens, who included those ethnic groups residing in the country
before 1823, were eligible to sit on policymaking bodies. Citizenship status could be
reclassified or revoked by a body made up of the ministers of home affairs, defence and
foreign affairs.73 Its wording made it absolutely clear that the sub-states of the Union possess
no political or administrative sovereignty or autonomy. Reiterating at many points that Burma is
a country composed of many national groups, Article 4 states that ‘state sovereignty must
reside in the entire nation’.74
THE 8888 UPRISING
▪ The political upheaval of 1988 resulted from a combination of systemic problems coupled with
several specific ones. The trigger was an international financial crisis, the inability of the state
to service its international debt, but inflation and economic stagnation, fuelled by the inability of
the state to import essential consumer goods and raw materials for industry, brought the
people out into the streets. Unemployment grew as factories closed, a further reversal in the
country’s terms of trade in the 1980s compounded these problems as the international price for
agricultural and timber products declined. In 1987, the United Nations, in a move designed to
achieve debt relief, designated the country a Least Developed Country (LDC).75
▪ Ne Win called a joint meeting of the Central Committee of the BSPP and the central organs of
state power, the various People’s Councils in August 1987 and instructed them to develop
plans for economic and political reform in one year. His call for reform resulted in economic
speculation and inflation, driven by uncertainty, was exacerbated. In the first step in what many
hoped would be the further liberalisation of the economy, the state monopoly of trade of seven
key items was ended in September, but this encouraged inflation as private traders began
hoarding even scarcer goods, hoping to create windfall profits in the future. On 5 September,
the government eroded what little public confidence remained when it announced the overnight
demonetisation of larger denomination banknotes. No partial compensation was offered to
cushion the effective confiscation of the people’s liquid assets. The next day, students
demonstrated against the measure and schools and universities across the country closed for
several weeks. Ne Win announced further liberalisation measures in October when he called
on the BSPP Central Committee to speed up economic reforms. While some stability returned,
the government proved unable to improve the economic position of its increasingly
demoralised and dwindling ranks of supporters. 76
▪ Events between March and September 1988 would show that the state was no longer capable
of maintaining public order without resort to extreme physical coercion. Events in the
Philippines also encouraged pro-democracy activists in Burma. Demonstrations developed on
the Rangoon University campus in March 1988. They spread to the center of the capital and
were put down with excessive force. New clashes took place in June and Ne Win resigned in
July. Ne Win’s unexpected departure speech at the Extraordinary BSPP Congress called to
deal with the growing social unrest changed the nature of the informal public debate that had
seized the country since his announcement the previous August of the need to consider
economic and political reforms. Until then, public protests had been geared to specific issues
such as student rights, economic grievances or religious tensions between Buddhists and
73
SarDesai, Southeast Asia, pp. 239-240.
74
75
Ibid., p. 379.
76
Ibid., pp. 381-382.
17
Muslims. A proposal by Ne Win, rejected by the BSPP Congress for a referendum on whether
the public wished to revert to a multi-party political system raised political change and the
demand for restoration of multi-party politics to the centre of political attention. The reluctance
of the BSPP Extraordinary Congress to consider conceding power in an orderly process, or
propose a viable means of resolving the current crisis resulted in growing public disorder
ended only by the eventual military takeover two months later.77
▪ His successor Sein Lwin who had led the troops in 1962 and 1974 during the crackdown on
student demonstrations lasted only 17 days. The BSPP elected Dr. Maung Maung as party
chairman. He was later elected by the People's Assembly as the president of the country.
Maung Maung tried to restore public trust in the government by making measured concessions
to political demands, including the release of a number of prominent individuals. However,
these concessions did not satisfy the spokesmen who had emerged during August to attempt
to lead the protests. Feeling the strength of public opinion and Western embassies behind
them, incipient public leaders were demanding the formation of a new interim government.78
Questions: What were the sources of power and legitimacy for the Ne Win regime?
TIMELINE
March 1962 Ne Win establishes the Revolutionary Council after the coup.
April 1962 The Revolutionary Council formulates the Burmese Way to Socialism (BWS) and sets up the BSPP.
The separate Mon and Arakanese ministries are dissolved, thus ending the prospect of semi-autonomous
states for those regions.
1962 The military government begins to regulate the religious activities of the monkhood (sangha).
The military government arrests and removes hereditary leaders, especially among the Shans. State councils of
the Shan, Kachin, Kayah and Karen states and the Chin Special Division, along with their chief ministers were
abolished.
1964 All other political parties except the BSPP are banned.
1964 A meeting of the CPB confirms the primacy of armed struggle against the Ne Win and the establishment of a
broad alliance of nationalities and peasants in a united front.
March 1965 The Revolutionary Council sponsors a Buddhist conference, which among other things, outlined a programme
of religious education reform.
1965 An Academy for the Development of National Groups is opened to train individuals from border areas to
appreciate the diverse culture of the country while recognising the need for the unity of the state.
1968 Civilian leaders are appointed to the Internal Unity Advisory Board.
Than Tun, the leader of the CPB is assassinated by a subordinate.
1969 The Internal Unity Advisory Board publishes a report recommending reverting to constitutional government,
restoring the judiciary and reappointing U Nu premier. Ne Win would then be appointed president by parliament.
A new national convention would be held to draft a new constitution. The military rejects the report. U Nu goes
into exile and sets up a rival government in Thailand.
1974 Nationwide demonstrations are held on the occasion of the return of the body of UN Secretary-General U Thant
to Burma.
Further crackdowns are carried out by the military.
A new constitution declares Burma a unitary state.
1975 The NDF, a coalition of ethnic movements is formed.
May 1980 The First Congregation of the Sangha of All Orders for the Purification, Perpetuation and Propagation of the
Sasana is held. This meeting adopts a constitution and other rules for the removal of individuals who did not
fulfil the requirements of proper monks, according to the terms of the organisation, controlled by senior monks
cooperating with the state.
1980 The Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) left the NDF and allied itself with the CPB in a fight against the
Ne Win government.
1982 The NDF holds its first congress.
77
Ibid., p. 385.
78
Ibid., p. 386.
18
1987 Burma is designated ‘Least Developed Country’ status by the UN.
March-Septe A series of demonstrations, marches and riots that began early in the year came to a head on 8 August. A
mber 1988 general strike, as planned, begins on that day. Mass demonstrations are held across Burma as ethnic
minorities, Buddhists, Christians, Muslims, students, workers and the young and old all come out onto the
streets. These are put down by the military under the command of Sein Lwin.
July 1988 Ne Win resigns as chairman of the BSPP. He is replaced by Sein Lwin, known as the Butcher of Rangoon.
August 1988 Dr. Maung Maung becomes chairman of the BSPP.
THE COLLAPSE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF BURMA
▪ The outbreak of the 1988 uprisings was laid at the CPB’s door by the military junta. The
CPB continually answered the question of how to translate the sentiments of the people into
political action in a traditionally tolerant society by remaining loyal to the Maoist approach of
concentrating mobilisation efforts upon the rural peasantry. As a result, the CPB missed the
opportunities for connecting their struggle with that of the pro-democracy movement in
1988. As Lintner suggests, the Burmese-speaking members of the CPB disagreed for too
long on whether or not to connect themselves with the uprisings in the cities, while much of
the hill tribe rank-and-file was unaware of what was occurring.79
▪ In early 1989, following a decision by the CCP to end its support for the CPB, the ethnic
minority troops that had formed the overwhelming majority of the local communist forces
revolted against their ageing Burman leaders. The troops then entered into ceasefire
agreements with the Myanmar military. These allowed former insurgents to keep their
weapons and administer their territories with a significant measure of autonomy.80 When the
CPB did collapse, it was due to pressures from within rather than from without. By 1989, the
CPB had been greatly weakened by internal rebellions that resulted in the exile of its
leaders to China. The leadership of the CPB had, by 1989, become an anachronism, a relic
of Maoist exportation of Communism abroad, and its rank-and-file had become enticed by
the drug trade, which offered attractive short-term benefits when compared to years of
continued struggle. In 1985, regulations against opium trade were introduced prohibiting
party members from involvement in narcotics including the death penalty for large scale
traffickers. When the CPB leadership decided to suppress the drug trade in its zones, the
rank-and-file rebelled and destroyed the party.81
THE FORMATION OF SLORC
▪ Leading dissidents, among them former prime minister U Nu, set up the Democracy and Peace
(Interim) League. In September, U Nu declared the formation of a provisional government and
the Democracy and Peace (Interim) League registered itself as the National League for
Democracy. The worsening situation prompted Saw Maung, the Minister of Defence and Khin
Nyunt, Director of Defence Services Intelligence to report to Ne Win that order could not be
restored under the civilian government. In September, the military set up the State Law and
Order Restoration Council.82 Saw Maung became the chairman of the council and its members
79
Michael W. Charney, Review of The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Burma, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Volume
29, 1998.
80
Norman G. Owen, The Emergence of Southeast Asia, p. 504.
81
Ibid.. See also Bertil Lintner, The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast
Asia Program, 1990.
82
19
all came from the military, including eight out of nine regional commanders and
Brigadier-General Khin Nyunt, director of Defence Services Intelligence.83
Aung San Suu Kyi (1945- ) politician and opposition leader of Myanmar, daughter of Aung San (a martyred national hero of independent Burma)
and Khin Kyi (a prominent Burmese diplomat), and winner of the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1991. Aung San Suu Kyi was two years old when her
father, then the de facto prime minister of what would shortly become independent Burma, was assassinated. She attended schools in Burma until
1960, when her mother was appointed ambassador to India. After further study in India, she attended the University of Oxford, where she met her
future husband, the British scholar Michael Aris. She and Aris had two children and lived a rather quiet life until 1988, when she returned to Burma
to nurse her dying mother, leaving her husband and sons behind. There the mass slaughter of protesters against the brutal and unresponsive rule of
military strongman Ne Win led her to speak out against him and to begin a nonviolent struggle for democracy and human rights in that country. In
July 1989, the military government of the newly named Union of Myanmar placed Suu Kyi under house arrest in Yangon. The National League for
Democracy (NLD), which Suu Kyi had co-founded in 1988, won elections held in 1990, but the results of that election were ignored by the military
government. Suu Kyi was freed from house arrest in July 1995, although restrictions were placed on her ability to travel outside Yangon. The
following year she attended the NLD party congress, but the military government continued to harass both her and her party. In 1998 she
announced the formation of a representative committee that she declared was the country’s legitimate ruling parliament. Michael Aris died in
London in early 1999. Prior to his death, the military junta denied him a visa to visit Suu Kyi in Myanmar, and Suu Kyi, anticipating that she would
not be allowed to re-enter the country if she left, remained in Myanmar. The junta
once again placed Suu Kyi under house arrest from September 2000 to May 2002, ostensibly for having violated restrictions by attempting to travel
outside Yangon. Following clashes between the NLD and pro-government demonstrators in 2003, the government returned her to house arrest.
Calls for her release continued throughout the international community in the face of her sentence’s annual renewal, and in 2009 a United Nations
body declared her detention illegal under Myanmar’s own law. In 2008, the conditions of her house arrest were somewhat loosened, allowing her to
receive some magazines as well as letters from her children, who were both living abroad. In May 2009, shortly before her most recent sentence
was to be completed, Suu Kyi was arrested and charged with having breached the terms of her house arrest after an intruder (a U.S. citizen)
entered her house compound and spent two nights there. In August, she was convicted and sentenced to three years in prison, though the
sentence immediately was reduced to 18 months, and she was allowed to serve it while remaining under house arrest. Elections due in March 2010
were boycotted by the NLD and government parties easily won an overwhelming majority of legislative seats amid widespread allegations of voter
fraud. Suu Kyi was released from house arrest six days after the election and vowed to continue her opposition to military rule. In August 2011, she
met in the capital, Nay Pyi Taw (Naypyidaw), with Thein Sein, who had become the civilian president of Myanmar in March. As rules on political
participation were eased, and, in advance of parliamentary by-elections scheduled for April 2012, the NLD was officially reinstated. In January 2012,
Suu Kyi announced that she was seeking election to a constituency in Yangon, and her bid to run for office was approved by the government in
February. She easily won her seat in April elections. In 2015, the first openly contested parliamentary election produced a major victory for the NLD,
which was able to secure large-enough majorities of seats in both legislative chambers to allow the party to form the next national government. As
Suu Kyi was not able to stand for the presidency, the NLD selected her close confidant, Htin Kyaw, as the party’s candidate, though Suu Kyi clearly
indicated her intent to rule the country by proxy. In March 2016, legislative members elected Htin Kyaw to serve as the country’s new president. A
new post of State Counsellor was created for Aung San Suu Kyi.
▪ The military continued repression but promised elections which were held in May 1990.
Politicians were not allowed to speak or rally against SLORC but the National League for
Democracy won a landslide victory with 87.7 per cent of the seats. SLORC then refused to
transfer power and placed Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest.84 The SLORC brutally
suppressed all dissent, annulling the representative status of elected NLD candidates and
imprisoning many NLD leaders. It smothered dissent through the use of arbitrary arrests,
imprisonment and torture of political prisoners. Political parties were deregistered and students
kept under strict surveillance. A new National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma was
formed by the elected leaders, minorities, students and dissident monks but this was not
recognised by any state.85
▪ At the same time, SLORC began an attempt to draft a new authoritarian constitution through a
largely appointed constitutional convention.86 In April 1992, the SLORC promised to hold a
political convention in eight months to formulate principles for drafting a new constitution.
Negotiations with the NLD were inconclusive and the deadline passed without any progress
83
84
85
86
20
towards holding the promised convention. In January 1993, the Constitution-drafting
convention met. A number of military officers selected to represent the tatmadaw (military elite)
were appointed to the convention. By April, when it adjourned for six months, only some
guidelines were approved, one of which provided for a crucial role for the military in any future
government.87 The NLD decided to boycott the national convention in 1995 which led to its
expulsion. Suu Kyi’s decision to hold the NLD party convention in May 1996 led to the
government’s arrest of some 256 NLD members, including 232 representatives elected during
the 1990 elections.88
▪ The regime also depended on external support on top of eliminating the opposition. In
December 1990, SLORC declared its legitimacy came not from the people but from the fact
that it was accepted as the government of Burma by the United Nations and the world at large.
Its repressive policies limited Western support but gave the Chinese the opportunity to become
a source of arms and a major trading partner. The establishment of a Western style democracy
appears unlikely despite the endorsement the Burmese gave it in 1990.89 However, the
country’s beleaguered status was greatly eased by developments in Asia. The original
members of ASEAN at the end of the Cold War wished to incorporate all the ten countries in
the region. Myanmar became a member in July 1997, despite opposition from the United
States and EU member countries.90
▪ By this time, the military as a political structure was no longer the monolith of earlier years. In
1962, the Revolutionary Council comprised military officers who had forged bonds during the
days of the Thirty Comrades. There was also a common desire to consolidate power. These
factors bound the Revolutionary Council as a solid political structure. After 1962, the military
was required to second officers to new party organisations and government postings.
Commanders who were engaged in fighting the insurgencies transferred their unwanted
officers to the administrative and party positions. When the BSPP was transformed from a
cadre to a mass party in 1971, combat officers found their second party officers were now in
charge. Subsequent political manoeuvring in the party congresses reflected the contest
between combat and party officers which culminated in a victory of the combat officers after
1973. In 1988, power laid with the combat officers who earned their spurs fighting ethnic
insurgents and not the British or the Japanese soldiers as in Ne Win’s generation.91
▪ Because of the near equality in terms of age and experience of the major members of the
SLORC, a new title, Senior General, had to be devised to distinguish its chairman from his
colleagues. The first Chairman, General Saw Maung, did not dominate his colleagues, many of
whom served as cabinet ministers, and were given independent resources and power bases
outside the army. He was later replaced in April 1992 by Senior General Than Shwe, who
assumed the posts of Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and Prime Minister. His
deputy was Maung Aye, who eventually rose to the position of Vice-Senior General. Despite
appearances of continuity, only 2 out of the original 19 men were still in office 20 years after the
formation of SLORC.92
THE FORMATION OF SPDC
87
88
Ibid., p. 246.
89
90
91
92
21
▪ In November 1997, the SLORC was replaced by the State Peace and Development Council
(SPDC). This was made up of commanders of the service branches and regional military
commands. Some of the 19 members of the junta also hold cabinet portfolios. A purge left only
the Chairman, Vice Chairman and the two Secretaries in their positions. From then on, the
structure of the ruling group became hierarchical, as the senior four members were recognised
as the top figures of the regime. Lt. General Khin Nyunt became an increasingly visible figure.
His appointees occupied top government posts and though he was not a formal member of the
cabinet, he often chaired its meetings in the absence of the Senior General.
▪ Two of the appointees to the SPDC were new commanders of the navy and air force, with Lt.
General Maung Aye remaining Commander in Chief of the infantry. The other new members
were 12 regional commanders. A new cabinet was formed composed of serving and retired
officers and a few civilians in portfolios such as foreign affairs, education and health. Some
analysts perceived the twelve regional commanders as the real powers in the land, given the
fact that they were the heads of administration in their territories and had no need to coordinate
their activities with local party officials as before 1988. However, it overstated their
independence from central command and their dependence on their army position as the basis
of their authority. It was not personal command but the authority that came with rank and the
collective nature of the army that gave them power.93
SOURCES OF POWER AND LEGITIMACY
▪ With the abolition of the one-party political system in 1988, it allowed revival of both officially
sponsored and privately organised clubs, societies, foundations and other civic organisations in
the towns and cities. The promise of a developing and thriving civil society was not fulfilled.
The SLORC’s Law Relating to Forming Organisations gave such organisations legal form
separate from overtly political organisations, thus ensuring that their potential political roles
were emasculated from birth. After the annulment of the 1990 election results, the lack of an
organic link between the state and the people led to the formation of the Union Solidarity and
Development Association (USDA) in 1993. The chairman of SLORC was its patron and senior
ministers became its top officials. Every township had a branch of the USDA, as did nearly
every ward and village tract. Membership was essentially compulsory for civil servants and
those who sought to do business with or receive services from the state. When government
ministers and top state officials toured the country, local USDA officials were normally present
at meetings and other public discussions.
▪ The USDA, with its extensive membership base and close government support, engages in
social and economic research as well as its organisational activities. Some members have
been accused of being involved in attacks on opposition politicians and demonstrators. While it
is seen by the country’s rulers as an organisation to control and direct public opinion in support
of regime goals, it is difficult to know how successful it has been in that task.94
▪ The military after 1988 realised that religious beliefs of the armed ethnic insurgents have to be
balanced with the necessity to appeal for support from the sangha and the Buddhist majority.
The leadership has lavishly venerated the sangha, especially senior monks and abbots, as well
as building new pagodas and temples and renovating many old ones. The state has been
involved in a number of visible public displays, such as the circulation of a Buddha’s tooth relic
on loan from China in the mid-1990s, and placing a new finial on the Shwedagon Pagoda in
1999. Major events do not reveal the daily displays of religious devotion which top army
93
Ibid., p. 480.
94
Ibid., pp. 446-448.
22
officers are seen to make on television and in public. The participation of senior government
officials in the religious festivals of other faiths demonstrates their tolerance and acceptance of
religious diversity but this was belied by a policy of denying promotion to non-Buddhists in the
armed forces.95
▪ While it is acknowledged that the economy since 1988 has not grown as fast as other countries
such as Vietnam, this is blamed on Western economic sanctions. Much credit has been taken
for the various projects without reliance on foreign assistance. The record of achievement in
terms of human resource development has been far less impressive and many new schools
and university buildings remain largely empty shells with few material resources to assist in
teaching and learning. In other ways, the public does experience the transformation that has
taken place under the military regime in terms of opening up communications and integration of
the country’s transportation networks.96
Questions: What were the sources of power and legitimacy for the military junta in the
1990s?
95
Ibid., p. 476.
96
Ibid., p. 473.
23

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LECTURE 6

BURMA: FROM COLONY TO INDEPENDENCE

DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE WAR (1942-1945)

POST-WAR DEVELOPMENTS (1945-1948)

A defined geographical area with a character of its own

U Nu (1948-1956, 1957-1958, 1960-1962)

POLITICAL CHALLENGES AND POPULAR OPPOSITION

Questions: What were the sources of power/legitimacy of Burmese political leaders

March 1948 The Communists under Than Tun launches an insurrection.

I. SOURCES OF POWER AND LEGITIMACY

A NEW POLITICAL ORGANISATION

SUPPORT FROM THE MILITARY

IDEOLOGY AS A SOURCE OF POWER/LEGITIMACY

NON-SECTARIAN POLICIES AND CONTROL OVER RELIGION

II. POLITICAL CHALLENGES AND POPULAR OPPOSITION

CURBING POLITICAL DISSENT

MANAGING THE MINORITY CHALLENGE

THE 8888 UPRISING

THE COLLAPSE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF BURMA

THE FORMATION OF SLORC

THE FORMATION OF SPDC

SOURCES OF POWER AND LEGITIMACY

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