The Registration Act 100 Sample Questions On

100 sample questions on The Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 for Maharashtra

Judiciary Examination
(preliminary)
1. Indian Evidence Act was drafted by
(a) Lord Macaulay
(b) Sir James F. Stephen
(c) Huxley
(d) Sir Henry Summer Maine.
2. The law of evidence consists of

(a) ordinary rules of reasoning
(b) legal rules of evidence
(c) rules of logic
(d) all the above.
3. Relevancy and admissibility under the

Indian Evidence Act are
(a) synonymous
(b) co-extensive
(c) neither synonymous nor co-extensive
(d) synonymous & co-extensive both.
4. ‘Self-regarding’ statements
(a) can be self-serving statements
(b) can be self-harming statements
(c) can be self-serving or self-harming
(d) none of the above.
5. What is correct as regards the admissibility

of self-regarding statements
(a) self-harming statement is admissible but a self-serving
statement is not generally admissible
(b) self-serving statement is admissible but a self-harming

statement is not generally admissible
(c) self-serving and self-harming statements both are

generally admissible
(d) self-serving and self-harming statements both are

generally inadmissible.
6. Under the law of evidence, as a general rule

(a) opinion on a matter of fact is relevant but not on a
matter of law
(b) opinion on a matter of law is relevant but not on a

matter of fact
(c) opinion on a matter of fact and law both are relevant
(d) opinion whether on a matter of fact or law, is irrelevant.

7. Indian Evidence Act applies to
(a) proceedings before tribunals
(b) proceedings before the arbitrator
(c) judicial proceedings in courts
(d) all the above.
8. Law of evidence is
(a) lex tallienis
(b) lex fori
(c) lex loci solutionis
(d) lex situs.
9. Law of evidence is
(a) a substantive law
(b) an adjective law
(c) both (a) & (b)
(d) neither (a) nor (b).
10. Facts can be

(a) physical facts
(b) psychological facts
(c) physical as well as psychological facts
(d) only physical facts & not psychological facts.

11. Under the Evidence Act, fact means
(a) factum probandum
(b) factum probans
(c) both factum probandum and factum probans
12. Fact in issue means

(a) fact, existence or non-existence of which is admitted by
the parties
(b) fact, existence or non-existence of which is disputed by

the parties
(c) fact existence or non-existence of which is not disputed

by the parties
(d) all the above.
13. Evidence under the Indian Evidence Act means &

includes
(a) ocular evidence
(b) documentary evidence
(c) ocular and documentary evidence both
(d) ocular evidence based on documents only.
14. Propositions under Evidence Act are

I. Affidavit is an evidence.
II. Everything produced before the court for
inspection is evidence.
III. Anything of which judicial notice can be taken is
evidence.
IV. Written statement of an accused is evidence.
Which of the following is true in respect of the
aforesaid propositions
(a) I, II, III & IV all are correct
(b) I, II & III are correct but IV is incorrect
(c) I, II & IV are correct but III is incorrect
(d) I, II & IV are incorrect but III is correct
(e) I & II are correct but III & IV are incorrect
(f) I is incorrect but II, III & IV are correct.
15. Proof of a fact depends on

(a) accuracy of the statement and not upon the probability
of its existence
(b) not upon the accuracy of the statement but upon the
probability of its existence
(c) artificial probative value assigned to a fact
(d) rigid mathematical demonstration.
16. Standard of proof in

(a) civil and criminal cases is the same
(b) criminal cases is much more higher than in civil cases
(c) criminal case is lower than in civil cases
(d) either (a) or (c) are correct
17. Presumptions under the law of evidence are

(a) presumption of facts
(b) presumptions of law
(c) both (a) & (b)
(d) only (b) & not (a).

I. Presumptions of facts are always rebuttable
II. Presumption of facts can be either rebuttable or
irrebuttable
III. Presumption of law are always irrebuttable
IV. Presumption of law can be either rebuttable or
irrebuttable.
Which is true of the aforesaid propositions
(a) I & III are correct but II & IV are incorrect
(b) I & IV are correct but II & III are incorrect
(c) II & III are correct but I & IV are incorrect.
(d) II & IV are correct but I & III are incorrect.
19. Under the law of evidence, the relevant fact

(a) must be legally relevant
(b) must be logically relevant
(c) must be legally & logically relevant
(d) must be legally & logically relevant and admissible.
20. Relevancy is
(a) question of law and can be raised at any time
(b) question of law but can be raised at the first
opportunity
(c) question of law which can be waived
(d) question of procedure which can be waived.
21. Question of mode of proof is
(a) a question of law which can be raised at any time
(b) a question of procedure but has to be raised at the first

opportunity and stands waived if not raised at the first
opportunity
(c) a question of procedure & can be raised at any time
(d) a mixed question of law & fact.
22. Which of the following documents are not

admissible in evidence
(a) documents improperly procured
(b) documents procured by illegal means
(c) both (a) & (b)

23. The facts which form part of the same
transaction are relevant
(a) under section 5 of Evidence Act
(b) under section 6 of Evidence Act
(c) under section 7 of Evidence Act
(d) under section 8 of Evidence Act.
24. A fact forming part of the same transaction is

relevant under section 6 of Evidence Act
(a) if it is in issue and have occurred at the same time &
place
(b) if it is in issue and may have occurred at different times

& places
(c) though not in issue and may have occurred at the same
time & place or at different times & places
(d) though not in issue, must have occurred at the same

time & place.
25. Several classes of facts, which are connected

with the transaction(s) in a particular mode, are
relevant

26. Motives of preparation and conduct are I

relevant
27. Under section 8 of Evidence Act

(a) motive is relevant
(b) preparation is relevant
(c) conduct is relevant
(d) all the above.
28. For conduct to be relevant under section 8 of

Evidence Act, it
(a) must be previous
(b) must be subsequent
(c) may be either previous or subsequent
(d) only subsequent & not previous.
29. Facts which are necessary to explain or

introduce relevant facts of place, name, date,
relationship & identity of parties are relevant

(a) the identification parades of suspects are relevant
(b) the identification parades of chattels are relevant
(c) both (a) & (b) are relevant
(d) only (a) & not (b) is relevant.
31. Identification of a suspect by photo is

(a) admissible in evidence
(b) not admissible in evidence
(c) section 9 of Evidence Act excludes identification by

photo
(d) section 8 of Evidence Act excludes identification by

photo.
32. Things said or done by a conspirator in reference

to the common design is relevant

33. A confession made by a conspirator involving

other members is relevant against the co-
conspirator jointly tried with him and is admissible
(d) both (b) & (c).
34. Alibi is governed by

(a) section 6 of Evidence Act
(b) section 8 of Evidence Act
(c) section 15 of Evidence Act
(d) section 11 of Evidence Act.
35. Transaction and instances relating to a right or

custom are relevant

36. Section 13 of Evidence Act applies to
(a) corporal rights
(b) incorporal rights
(c) both corporal and incorporal rights
37. Section 13 of Evidence Act

(a) is confined to public rights & does not cover private
rights
(b) is not confined to public rights and covers private rights

also
(c) is confined to private rights and does not cover public

rights
(d) either (a) or (c) is correct.
38. Mode of proof of a custom is contained in

(a) section 32(4) of Evidence Act
(b) section 32(7) of Evidence Act
(d) all the above.
39. Section 14 of Evidence Act makes relevant the

facts which show the existence of
(a) any state of mind
(b) any state of body or bodily feeling
(c) either state of mind or of body or bodily feeling
(d) a particular state of mind and a state of body.
40. Under section 14 of Evidence Act – Explanation I

(a) evidence of general disposition, habit or tendencies is
inadmissible
(b) evidence having a distinct and immediate reference to

the particular matter in question is admissible
(c) both (a) & (b) are correct
(d) both (a) & (b) are incorrect.
41. Previous conviction of a person is relevant under

(a) explanation I to section 14 of Evidence Act
(b) explanation II to section 14 of Evidence Act
(c) explanation III to section 14 of Evidence Act
(d) explanation IV to section 14 of Evidence Act.
Multiple Choice Questions for Judicial Service Examination
42. Under section 15 of Evidence Act, facts showing

series of similar occurrences, involving the same
person are relevant
(a) when it is uncertain whether the act is intentional or
accidental
(b) when it is certain that the act is with guilty knowledge
(c) when it is certain that the act is done innocently
(d) either (b) or (c).
43. Admission has been defined as a statement

made by a party or any person connected with him,
suggesting any inference as to a fact in issue or
relevant fact under certain circumstances, under
44. Admissions
(a) must be examined as a whole and not in parts
(b) can be examined in parts
(c) can be examined as a whole or in parts
(d) both (b) & (c) are correct.
45. Admissions bind the maker

(a) in so far as it relates to facts
(b) in so far as it relates to question of law
(c) both on questions of facts & of law

46. Admissions
(a) must be in writing
(b) must be oral
(c) either oral or in writing
(d) only in writing & not oral.
47. Admission to be relevant

(a) must be made to the party concerned & not to a
stranger
(b) must be made to a stranger
(c) it is immaterial as to whom admission is made and an

admission made to a stranger is relevant
(d) it is immaterial to whom the admission is made but

must be made to someone intimately connected & not a
stranger.

I. Statement is a genus, admission is a species
& confession is a sub species.
II. Statement & admission are species & confession
is a sub species.
III. Statement & admission are genus & confession is
a species.
In this context which of the following is correct
(a) I is correct, II & III are incorrect
(b) I & II are correct & III is incorrect
(c) II & III are correct & I is incorrect
(d) III is correct & I & II are incorrect.
49. Admission can be

(a) formal only
(b) informal only
(c) either formal or informal
(d) only formal & not informal.
50. Admissions
(a) are conclusive proof of the matters admitted
(b) are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted but

operate as estoppel
(c) are conclusive proof of the matter and also operate as

estoppel
(d) both (a) & (c) are correct.
51. Persons who can make admissions are

mentioned in

52. Admissions by agents are

(a) admissible in civil proceedings under all circumstances
(b) admissible in civil proceedings only if the agent has the

authority to make admissions
(c) never admissible in criminal proceedings
(d) both (b) & (c).
53. Admissions made by a party are evidence

against
(a) privies in blood
(b) privies in law
(c) privies in estate
(d) all the above.
54. Which of the following admission is no evidence

(a) an admission by one of the several defendants in a suit
against another defendant
(b) an admission by a guardian ad litem against a minor
(c) an admission by one of the partners of a firm against

the firm or other partners
(d) only (a) & (b).

55. When the liability of a person who is one of the
parties to the suit depends upon the liability of a
stranger to the suit, then an admission by the
stranger in respect of his liability shall be an
admission on the part of that person who is a party
to the suit. It has been so provided
56. In a reference made over a disputed matter to a

third person, the declaration so made by that person
shall be an evidence against the party making a
reference, by virtue of
57. Communication made ‘without prejudice’ are

protected

58. Confession caused by inducement, threat or

promise is contained in
59. Section 24 of Evidence Act applies

(a) when the inducement, threat or promise comes from a
person in authority
(b) when the inducement is of a temporal kind
(c) when the inducement is spiritual or religious
(d) only (a) & (b) are correct.
60. A confession made to a police officer is

inadmissible under
(a) , section 24 of Evidence Act
61. A confession to be inadmissible under section 25

of Evidence Act
(a) must relate to the same crime for which he is charged
(b) must relate to another crime
(c) may relate to the same crime or another crime
(d) only (a) is correct and (b) is incorrect.
62. Which of the following is not given by section 25

of Evidence Act
(a) confessions made to custom officers
(b) confession made to a member of Railway Protection

Force
(c) confession made to an officer under FERA
(d) all the above.
63. A retracted confession

(a) can be made solely the basis of conviction
(b) cannot be made solely the basis of conviction under any

circumstances
(c) can not be made solely the basis of conviction unless

the same is corroborated
(d) both (a) & (c) are incorrect.
64. A confession made by a person while in police

custody is inadmissible as per
65. A confession made while in police custody is

admissible under section 26 of Evidence Act
(a) if made in the presence of a doctor
(b) if made in the presence of a captain of a vessel
(c) if made in the presence of a Magistrate
(d) all the above.
66. Section 27 control

(d) all the above.
67. Section 27 applies to

(a) discovery of some fact which the police had not
previously learnt from other sources and was first derived
from the information given by the accused
(b) discovery of some fact which the police had previously

learnt from other sources
(c) discovery of some fact which the police had previously
learnt from other sources and the accused has also given
information regarding the same
(d) all the above.
68. Under section 27 of Evidence Act, ‘discovery of

fact’ includes
(a) the object found
(b) the place from where it is produced
(c) both (a) & (b)
69. Section 27 of Evidence Act applies

(a) when the person giving information is an accused but
not in police custody
(b) when the person giving information is an accused and is

in police custody
(c) when the person is in police custody but not an accused
(d) when the person is neither in police custody nor an

accused.

(a) the whole statement is admissible
(b) only that portion which distinctly relates to the

discovery is admissible
(c) both are admissible depending on the facts &
circumstances of the case
(d) only (a) & not (b).
71. Facts discovered in consequences of a joint

information
(a) are not admissible and can not be used against any of
the accused person
(b) are admissible and can be used against any one of the
accused person
(c) are admissible and can be used against all the accused
persons
72. Confession of an accused is admissible against

the other co-accused
73. Confession of one accused is admissible against

co-accused
(a) if they are tried jointly for the same offences
(b) if they are tried jointly for different offences

(c) if they are tried for the same offences but not jointly
(d) if they are tried for different offences and not jointly.
74. Confession of a co-accused, not required to be

on oath and cannot be tested by cross- examination
I. is no evidence within the meaning of section 3 of
Evidence Act and cannot be the foundation of a
conviction
II. the only limited use which can be made of a
confession of a co-accused is by way of furnishing an
additional reason for believing such other evidences
as exists
III. it is a very weak type of evidence and is much
weaker even than the evidence of an approver.
In the aforesaid propositions
(a) all I, II & III are correct
(b) only I & III are correct
(c) only I & II are correct
(d) only II & III are correct.
75. ‘Necessity rule’ as to the admissibility of

evidence is contained in

76. Necessity rule as to the admissibility of evidence

is applicable, when the maker of a statement
(a) is dead or has become incapable of giving evidence
(b) is a person who can be found but his attendance can

not be procured without unreasonable delay or expenses
(c) is a person who can not be found
(d) all the above.
77. Under section 32 of Evidence Act, a statement of

a person who is dead, to be admissible
(a) must relate to the cause of his own death
(b) may relate to the cause of someone else’ death
(c) may relate to the cause of his own death or someone

else’ death
(d) both (b) & (c) are correct.
78. The person whose statement is admitted under

section 32 of Evidence Act
(a) must be competent to testify
(b) need not be competent to testify
(c) may or may not be competent to testify
(d) only (a) is correct and (b) & (c) are incorrect.
79. A dying declaration is admissible
(a) only in criminal proceedings
(b) only in civil proceedings
(c) in civil as well as criminal proceedings both
(d) in criminal proceedings alone & not in civil proceedings.
80. A dying declaration

(a) can form the sole basis of conviction without any
corroboration by independent evidence
(b) can form the basis of conviction only on corroboration

by independent witness
(c) cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless

corroborated by independent witness
(d) only (b) & (c) are correct.
81. A dying declaration to be admissible

(a) must be made before a Magistrate
(b) must be made before the police officer
(c) may be made before a doctor or a private person
(d) may be made either before a magistrate or a police

officer or a doctor or a private person.
82. Declaration in course of business are admissible

(a) under section 32(1) of Evidence Act
(b) under section 32(2) of Evidence Act
(c) under section 32(4) of Evidence Act
(d) under section 32(7) of Evidence Act.
83. Declaration as to custom are admissible

(a) under section 32(1) of Evidence Act
(b) under section 32(2) of Evidence Act
(c) under section 32(4) of Evidence Act
(d) under section 32(7) of Evidence Act.
84. Under section 32(4) of Evidence Act, the

declaration
(a) as to public rights & customs are admissible
(b) as to private rights & customs are admissible
(c) as to both public and private rights and customs are

admissible
(d) only as to customs are admissible.
85. Opinions of experts are relevant


86. Under section 45 of Evidence Act, the opinion of
expert can be for
(a) identity of hand writing
(b) identity of finger impression
(c) both (a) & (b)
87. Under section 45 of Evidence Act the opinion of

expert can be on the question of
(a) Indian law
(b) Foreign law
(c) both (a) & (b)
88. Opinion of an expert under section 45 of

Evidence Act
(a) is a conclusive proof
(b) is not a conclusive proof
(c) is supportive & corroborative in nature
(d) either (a) or (c).
89. A disputed handwriting can be proved

(a) by calling an expert
(b) by examining a person acquainted with the handwriting
of the writer of the questioned document
(c) by comparison of the two-admitted & disputed

handwritings
(d) all the above.
90. The res inter alia acta is receivable

91. Entries in the books of accounts regularly kept in

the course of business are admissible under section
34 of Evidence Act
(a) if they by themselves create a liability
(b) if they by themselves do not create a liability
(c) irrespective of whether they themselves create a

liability or not
(d) either (a) or (b).
92. When the court has to ascertain the relationship

between one person and another, the opinion of any
person having special means of knowledge and
expressed by conduct is admissible
93. The relationship in section 50 of Evidence Act

means
(a) relationship by blood only
(b) relationship by blood or marriage
(c) relationship by blood or marriage or adoption
(d) only (a) and not (b) & (c).
94. Opinion as to relationship of marriage under

section 50 of CPC
(a) is admissible in cases of offences against marriage
(b) is admissible in proceedings under Indian Divorce Act
(c) is admissible both in (a) & (b)
(d) is neither admissible in cases of offences against

marriage nor in proceedings under Indian Divorce Act

I. In civil cases, character evidence is inadmissible
unless the character of a party is a fact in issue.
II. In criminal cases, the evidence of good character
is admissible generally.
III. In criminal proceedings, evidence of bad
character is inadmissible unless the same is a fact in
issue.
IV. In criminal proceedings evidence of bad
character is admissible when evidence of good
character has been given. In relation to the above
propositions which of the following is correct
statement
(a) all the four (I, II, III & IV) are correct
(b) I, II & III are correct but IV is incorrect
(c) I & II are correct but III & IV are incorrect
(d) I & III are correct but II & IV are incorrect
(e) I, II & IV are correct but III is incorrect
(f) II, III & IV are correct but I is incorrect.

96. Facts of which the judicial notice is to be taken
are stated in
section 55 of Evidence Act.

97. List of facts of which the judicial notice has to be
taken under section 57 of Evidence Act
(a) is exhaustive
(b) is illustrative only
(c) is both (a) & (b)
(d) is neither (a) nor (b).
98. Facts which need not be proved by the parties

include
(a) facts of which judicial notice has to be taken
(b) facts which have been admitted by the parties at or

before the hearing
(c) both (a) & (b)
99. The court may in its discretion call for proving the

facts
(a) of which judicial notice has to be taken
(b) which have been admitted otherwise than such

admissions
(c) both (a) & (b)

100. Oral evidence under section 60 of Evidence Act
may be
(a) direct only
(b) hearsay
(c) both (a) & (b)
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50 sample questions on The Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 for Assam
(preliminary)
Article Shared By
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50 sample questions on The Code of Criminal Procedure,

1973 for Assam Judiciary Examination (preliminary)
1. As per Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment)

Act, 2008 (5 of 2009), assented on 7th January,
2009, by President of India, which inserted clause
(wa) in section 2 in Cr.P.C. and which defines
“victim” as a person who has suffered any loss or
injury caused by reason of the act or omission for
which the accused person has been charged includes
(a) victim’s guardian
ADVERTISEMENTS:
(b) victim’s guardian or legal heir
(c) victim’s neighbour
(d) victim’s close friend.
2. According to section 41A(1) of Cr.P.C. as inserted

by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act,
2008 (5 of 2009) the Police Officer may issue a
notice directing the alleged accused though he has
committed a cognizable offence, to appear before
him or at such other place as specified in notice in
all the cases where the arrest of a person is not
required nnder the
ADVERTISEMENTS:
(a) provisions of sub-section (l)(a) of section 41
(b) provisions of sub-section (l)(b) of section 41
(c) provisions of sub-section (l)(c) of section 41
(d) provisions of sub-section (1) of section 41
ADVERTISEMENTS:
3. Within the meaning of provisions under section

41C(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code which was
inserted by the Code of Criminal Procedure
(Amendment) Act, 2008 (5 of 2009) every State
Government shall establish a Police Control Room
(PCR) in
(a) every district
(b) State level only
(c) both district and at State level
ADVERTISEMENTS:
(d) State Secretariat only.
4. Criminal Procedure Code which comes under

Concurrent List of Constitution of India is
(a) unduly rigid and does not make room for any special
law & procedure
(b) not unduly rigid and makes room for any special law &
procedure and generally gives precedence to such special
law and procedure
ADVERTISEMENTS:
(c) not unduly rigid and makes room for any special law &
procedure but generally gives precedence to the law &
procedure given under the Code
5. What is true to Code of Criminal Procedure

(a) it is mainly, though not purely, an adjective or
procedural law
(b) there are also certain provisions which are partly in the
nature of substantive law
(c) both (a) & (b)
6. Which classification of offence comes under

Criminal Procedure Code
(a) cognizable & non-cognizable
(b) bailable & non-bailable
(c) summons cases & warrant cases
(d) all the above.

7. Classification of offences given in the Code of
Criminal Procedure under
(a) section 320
(b) the 1st Schedule
(c) the Ilnd Schedule
(d) section 482.
8. Cognizable offence under IPC has been defined

(a) under section 2(a) of Cr.P.C.
(b) under section 2(c) of Cr.P.C.
(c) under section 2(i) of Cr.P.C.
(d) under section 2(1) of Cr.P.C.
9. In a cognizable case under IPC, the police has the

(a) authority to arrest a person without warrant
(b) authority to investigate the offence without permission

of the Magistrate
(c) both (a) & (b)
10. In a cognizable case under IPC, the police will

have all the powers to
(a) investigate except the power to arrest without warrant
(b) investigate including the power to arrest without
warrant
(c) investigate and arrest without warrant only after

seeking permission from the Magistrate
(d) investigate and arrest without warrant only after

informing the Magistrate having jurisdiction to inquire into
or try the offence.
11. A Magistrate has the power to direct the police

to investigate into an offence in IPC under
(a) section 156(1) of Cr PC
(b) section 156(2) of Cr PC
(c) section 156(3) of Cr PC
(d) all of the above.
12. A Magistrate has the power under Cr. P.C. to

direct the police to investigate into
(a) a non-cognizable offence
(b) a cognizable offence
(c) only a non-cognizable offence, as in a cognizable

offence the police is under a duty to investigate
(d) both (a) and (b).
13. In a non-cognizable case under IPC, the

police has the authority
(a) to investigate into the offence without order given by
the Magistrate but cannot arrest the accused without
warrant
(b) to investigate and even arrest the accused without

warrant
(c) neither to investigate without order of the Magistrate

nor can arrest the accused without warrant
(d) cannot investigate without orders of the Magistrate but

can arrest without warrant.
14. Non-cognizable offence has been defined

(a) under section 2(a)
(b) under section 2(c)
(c) under section 2(i)
(d) under section 2(1).
15. A case which includes cognizable offences

and non-cognizable offences is
(a) a cognizable case but requires sanction of the
Magistrate for investigation into the non-cognizable part
under section 155(2) of Cr PC
(b) a cognizable case and as such the investigation of the

case does not require any sanction of the Magistrate under
section 155(2) of Cr PC
(c) a non-cognizable case and as such the investigation of
the case requires sanction of the Magistrate under section
155(2) of Cr PC
(d) a non-cognizable case but does not require sanction of

the Magistrate under section 155(2) of Cr PC
16. In a non-cognizable case, the accused

(a) can object to the grant of permission under section
155(2) of Cr PC as a matter of right
(b) can object to the grant of permission under section

155(2) of Cr PC with the leave of the Magistrate
(c) can object to the grant of permission under section

155(2) of Cr PC with the leave of the High Court
(d) has no right to participate in the proceedings and

cannot object to the grant of permission under section
155(2) of Cr PC
17. Under the Scheme of Criminal Procedure non-

cognizable offences are
(a) public wrongs
(b) private wrongs
(c) both public and private wrongs
18. A Magistrate has the power to direct the

police to investigate in respect of an offence
(a) under the Indian Penal Code
(b) under any local or special law
(c) both (a) and (b)
(d) only (a) and not (b).
19. Leave to investigate into a non-cognizable

offence can be granted by a
(a) Magistrate in any part of India
(b) Magistrate in any part of the State
(c) Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the case
(d) either (a) or (b) or (c).
20. In a bailable offence, the bail is granted as a

matter of right
(a) by the police officer
(b) by the court
(c) both by the police officer & the court
21. In a bailable offence

(a) conditions can be imposed while granting bail by the
police officer
(b) conditions can be imposed while granting bail by the

court
(c) no condition can be imposed while granting bail by the
police officer or by the court
(d) only mild conditions can be imposed by the court only.
22. Warrant case has been defined under section

2(x) of Cr PC as a case relating to an offence
punishable with death, imprisonment for life or
imprisonment for a term
(a) exceeding three years
(b) exceeding two years
(c) exceeding one year
(d) exceeding one year but less than two years.
23. Classification of summons case & warrant case

(a) is useful to determine the trial procedure to be adopted
(b) is useful to determine the investigation procedure to be

adopted
(c) is useful to decide the question of issuance of process

to the accused
(d) (a) & (c) are correct.
24. Complaint, as provided under section 2(d) of Cr

PC
(a) can be in writing only
(b) can be oral

(c) either in writing or oral
(d) can be by gestures.
25. Complaint as provided under section 2(d) of Cr

PC
(a) can be to a police officer
(b) can be to a Magistrate
(c) both (a) & (b)
(d) must necessarily to be a Magistrate only.
26. Complaint may relate to

(a) a cognizable offence
(b) a non-cognizable offence
(d) must be for a non-cognizable offence as the police has

no power to investigate such an offence.
27. In respect of investigation as provided under

section 2(h) of Cr PC, which of the following is
incorrect
(a) investigation can be conducted by a police officer
(b) investigation can be conducted by any person so

authorised by a Magistrate
(c) investigation can be conducted by a Magistrate himself

(d) both (a) & (b).
28. When a complaint is presented to a Magistrate,

and the Magistrate proceeds to examine the
complainant & the witnesses
(a) the Magistrate is conducting investigation
(b) the Magistrate is conducting an inquiry
(c) Magistrate is conducting a trial
(d) both (b) & (c).
29. The word Magistrate mentioned in section 156(3)

of Cr PC means
(a) a Judicial Magistrate
(b) a Special Executive Magistrate
(c) an Executive Magistrate
30. A Metropolitan Magistrate, has the power to pass

sentence, as provided under section 29 of Cr PC
(a) any sentence authorised by law except a sentence of
death, or
(b) imprisonment for life or of imprisonment for a term

exceeding seven years
(c) imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years and

fine not exceeding Rs. 10,000
(d) imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year and
fine not exceeding Rs. 1,000.
31. A Metropolitan Magistrate can award sentence of

imprisonment in default of payment of fine
(a) equal to the term of imprisonment which he is
competent to inflict as substantive punishment
(b) not exceeding half of the term of imprisonment which

he is competent to inflict as substantive sentence
(c) not exceeding one-third of the term of imprisonment

which he is competent to inflict as substantive sentence
(d) not exceeding one-fourth of the term of imprisonment

which he is competent to inflict as substantive sentence.
32. The imprisonment in default of fine

(a) shall be in addition to a substantive sentence maximum
awardable under section 29 without any specific order
(b) shall be in addition to a substantive sentence only when

a specific order to that effect is passed
(c) shall not be in addition to the substantive sentence

awardable by the Magistrate
(d) shall be in addition to the substantive sentence

awardable but subject to the upper limit for substantive
sentence prescribed under section 29.
33. In cases of consecutive sentence on conviction of
several offences at one trial by a Metropolitan
Magistrate the aggregate punishment
(a) shall not exceed twice the amount of punishment which
the Magistrate is competent to inflict for a single offence
(b) shall not exceed the amount of punishment which the

Magistrate is competent to inflict for a single offence as
prescribed under section 29 of Cr PC
(c) shall not exceed three times the amount of punishment

which the Magistrate is competent to inflict for a single
offence
(d) shall not exceed 14 years.
34. Classification of compoundable & non-

compoundable offences has been provided under
(a) 1st Schedule
(b) IInd Schedule
(c) section 320 Of Cr PC
(d) section 321 of Cr PC.
35. Offences other than those mentioned in section

320 of Cr PC are
(a) not compoundable
(b) compoundable with the permission of the court
(c) compoundable by the Court of Sessions

(d) compoundable by the High Court.
36. Arrest means

(a) every compulsion or physical restraint
(b) total restraint and complete deprivation of liberty
(c) both (a) & (b)
37. A warrant of arrest is a command

(a) must be a written order
(b) signed, sealed & issued by a Magistrate
(c) addressed to a police officer
38. A person can be arrested without warrant

(a) for securing attendance of accused at trial
(b) as a preventive or precautionary measure
(c) for obtaining correct name & address
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(d) all the above.
39. Which of the following is correct

(a) Magistrate cannot arrest a person
(b) a private person cannot arrest a person

(c) a police officer can arrest a person
(d) both (a) & (b).
40. It is mandatory for a police officer to inform the

person arrested, the grounds of arrest and right of
bail if the offence is not non-bailable, under
(a) section 49 of Cr PC
(b) section 50 of Cr PC
(c) section 51 of Cr PC
41. A police officer arresting a person may carry out

the personal search of the person arrested, as
provided
(a) under section 50 of Cr PC
(b) under section 51 of Cr PC
(c) under section 54 of Cr PC
(d) under section 56 of Cr PC.
42. Section 54 of Cr PC provides for

(a) medical examination of the accused at the request of
the police officer
(b) medical examination of the accused at the request of

the accused
(c) both (a) & (b)
43. It is mandatory to produce the person arrested

before the Magistrate, within 24 hours of his arrest,
under
(a) section 56 of Cr PC
(b) section 57 of Cr PC
(c) section 58 of Cr PC
44. A proclamation under section 82 of Cr PC can be

issued against a person against whom a warrant has
been issued. Thus a proclamation can be issued
against
(a) accused offender
(b) a surety
(c) a witness
(d) all the above.
45. A proclamation requiring a person to appear

must be published giving
(a) not less than 30 days time to the person concerned
(b) not less than 10 days time to the person concerned

(c) not less than 20 days time to the person concerned
(d) not less than 15 days time to the person concerned.
46. Attachment of the property of the person

absconding
(a) can only be issued after publication of the proclamation
under section 82 of Cr PC
(b) can be issued before publication of the proclamation

under section 82 of Cr PC
(c) can be issued simultaneously with the issue of

proclamation under section 82 of Cr PC
(d) all the above.
47. Period of limitation for filing claims & objections

to the attachment of any property attached under
section 83 of Cr PC, by any person other than the
proclaimed person, as provided under section 84 of
Cr PC
(a) within three months of attachment
(b) within six months of attachment
(c) within one year of attachment
(d) within two months of attachment.
48. Period of limitation for filing a suit to establish

the right over the property attached, by a person
other than the person proclaimed, who has filed
claims & objection to attachment, is
(a) three months from the date of disallowing the claim
(b) six months from the date of disallowing the claim
(c) one year from the date of disallowing the claim
(d) three years from the date of disallowing the claim.
49. If the person proclaimed appears within the

period specified in the proclamation, the property
attached
(a) shall not be released from attachment
(b) shall be released from attachment
(c) shall be forfeited
(d) both (a) & (c).
50. If the proclaimed person does not appear within

the time specified in the proclamation, the property
under attachment
(a) shall not be sold until expiry of six months from the
date of attachment
(b) shall not be sold until any claim or objection under

section 84 have been disposed of
(c) both (a) & (b)

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MCQs on Transfer of Property Act

(With Answers)
1. Under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act,
1882, the seller is duty bound to disclose:
A. Patent defects in the property
B. Latent defects in the property
C. both A and B
D. neither A nor B
Ans. B
2. Under the provisions of the Transfer of the Property
Act, 1882, the benefits of a contract can be assigned as an
actionable claim and transferred unless:
A. The contract is one which had been induced by personal
qualifications or considerations as to the parties to it
B. The benefit is coupled with an obligation which the assignor is
bound to discharge
C. either A or B
D. neither A nor B
Ans. C
3. Under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, vested
interest is __________.
A. Defeated by the death of the transferor
B. Defeated by the death of the transferee
C. either or both A and B
D. neither A nor B
Ans. D
4. What is the default interest payable under section 63
and 63 A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882?
A. 8% per annum
B. 9% per annum
C. 10% per annum
D. Interest rate is not mentioned in the sections
Ans. B
5. Where the mortgage is illegal for want of registration
but the mortgagee continues in possession of the
mortgaged property, a valid mortgage comes in existence
after the expiry of:
A. 5 years
B. 10 years
C. 12 years
D. 20 years
Ans. C
6. Which e following is the right of mortgager to redeem as
conferred by the Transfer of Property Act, 1882?
A. Right to demand that the mortgagee at his cost, should transfer
the mortgaged property to any such third person as the mortgagor
directs
B. Right to demand that the mortgagee at his cost, should transfer
the mortgaged property to the mortgagor
C. either A or B
D. neither A nor B
Ans. D
7. Which of the following is not valid consideration for
establishing a lease:
A. Rent partly in money and partly in kind
B. A stipulation to pay government assessment or taxes payable by
the lessor
C. a personal agreement by a tenant to pay a certain sum or a
certain quantity in kind to the landlord
D. None of these
Ans. C
8. Which of the following are valid illustrations of an
anamolous mortgage?
A. A possessory mortgage without a conditional sale
B. A possessory mortgage with a right to cause the mortgaged
property to sale in the event of default in payment
C. both A and B
D. neither A nor B
Ans. B
9. Which of the following can be considered implied
surrender of the lease?
A. Non acceptance of a new lease taking effect during the
continuance of the existing lease
B. Abandonment of possession by the lessee
C. A surrender by one of the two joint lessee’s, implied surrender on
the part of second lessee
D. None of these
Ans. B
10. Which of the following can be transferred under the
provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882?
A. The right to mesne profits
B. A decree for mesne profits
C. A transfer of property to a prostitute for future cohabitation
D. A sub-lease of a farm for the retail sale of opium
Ans. B
11. Which of the following contracts are implied in case of
mortgages under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882?
A. That the mortgagee will pay all public charges accruing due in
respect of the property
B. Where the property mortgaged is lease property, and mortgagee
renews the lease, the mortgagee has the right to continue enjoying
the property until the lease runs out
C. both A and B
D. neither A nor B
Ans. D
12. Which of the following instruments have been
excluded by the application of section 137 of the Transfer
of Property Act, 1882?
A. Shares
B. Bills of Exchange
C. both A and B
D. neither A nor B
Ans. C
13. Which of the following is a valid example of a vested
interest as defined by the Transfer of Property Act, 1882?
A. B a deceased, in his will leaves a residential property to C, to be
transferred on the death of B’s daughter-in- law
B. B a deceased, in his will left Rs.65,000 to A, to be paid on A’s
50th birthday
C. both A and B
D. Neither A nor B
Ans. A
14. Which of the following is a valid example of contingent
interest as defined by the Transfer of Property Act, 1882?
A. B gifted his property to his daughter-in-law, with a condition that
the possession of the property will transfer to her only after B’s
death
B. B made a gift of Rs.15,000 to A, deposited in an account to be
transferred to A when he attains age of majority
C. both A and B
D. neither A nor B
Ans. B
15. Which of the following is nearest to meaning of the
phrase ‘English mortgaged’ as defined by the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882?
A. Where on payment of certain sum by the mortgagee the property
passes to him
B. Where there are two sales made, one at the start of mortgage with
the condition that after the mortgage amount is paid back, the
property will sold back
C. Where the mortgagee gets the possession of the property with the
rights of profits, rents etc.
D. Where the mortgage is made by submitting the title deed
Ans. B
16. Which of the following is the definition of the term
‘Exchange’ as given under the Transfer of Property Act,
1882?
A. When two or more persons mutually transfer the ownership of
one thing for the ownership of another, neither thing or both things
being money only
B. When two persons mutually transfer the ownership of one thing
for the ownership of another, either thing or both things being
money only
C. When two or more persons mutually transfer the ownership of
one thing for the ownership of another, either thing or both things
being money only
D. When two persons mutually transfer the ownership of one thing
for the ownership of another, neither thing or both things being
money only
Ans. D
17. Which of the following is the presumption made for
lease under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, unless a
contract or local usage states otherwise?
A. The lease of immovable property for agriculture will be assumed
to be for a period of three years
B. The lease of immovable property for purpose other than
agriculture and manufacturing will be deemed to be for a period of
one month
C. both A and B
D. neither A nor B
Ans. B
18. Which of the following is the time limit given under
Section 17 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882?
A. Life of the transferee
B. A period of 18 years from the date of transfer
C. either A or B whichever is longer
D. neither A nor B
Ans. B
19. Which of the following is true regarding the ‘right of
subrogation’ as defined under the Transfer of Property
Act, 1882?
A. Any person redeeming the property under provisions of section
91 of the Act, has the same rights as the mortgagor against the
mortgagee
B. Any person redeeming the property under provisions of section
91 of the Act, has the same right as the mortgagee against the
mortgagor
C. either A or B depending on the facts of the case
D. neither A nor B
Ans. A
20. Which of the following is valid gift under the Transfer
A. A gift of interest in a house to a donee by a donor, allowing him
to stay in it as long as he pays maintenance charges of Rs.30,000
per month to the donor. The rental value of the property is
Rs.26,000
B. A gift of land by donor to a done, in return of a stone necklace
worth Rs.3,000. The value of land being Rs.33,000
C. A gift of single rose valued at Rs.3 to a donee, in return of the
donee being a considerate person
D. All of these
Ans. C
21. Which of the following properties can be transferred
under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882?
A. Salary of a public officer
B. Right to sue
C. both A and B
D. neither A nor B
Ans. D
22. Which of the following propositions for distinguishing
between a lease and a licence were made by Justice J
Subba Rao in Associated Hotels of India v. RN Kapoor?
A. To ascertain whether a document creates a lease or a licence, the
form of the document must be preferred to its substance
B. The real test is the intention of the parties, whether they intended
to create a lease or a licence
C. If the document creates an interest in the property, it is a licence;
but, if it only permits another to make use of the property, of which
legal possession continues with the owner, it is a lease
D. both A and B
Ans. B
23. Which of the following section of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882 deal with the appointment of a
receiver?
A. Section 68
B. Section 68A
C. Section 69
D. Section 69A
Ans. D
24. Which of the following sections of the provisions of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 deals with relief against
forfeiture for the non-payment of rent?
A. Section 114
B. Section 114A
C. Section 113
D. Section 113A
Ans. A
25. Which of the following sections of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882 do not apply to persons governed by
Muhammadan law?
A. Section 55
B. Section 11
C. both A and B
D. neither A nor B
Ans. B
26. Which of the following sections of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882 were repealed by the Transfer of
Property (Amendment) Act 1929?
A. Section 74
B. Section 75
C. both A and B
D. neither A nor B
Ans. C
27. Which of the following statements are true regarding
rights and liabilities of a lessor under the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882?
A. The lessee is bound on the lessor’s request to put him in
possession of the property
B. The lessor is bound to pay or tender, at the proper time and
place, the premium or rent to the lessee or his agent in this behalf
C. Lessee must not without permission erect on the property any
permanent structure, except for agricultural purpose
D. Lessee must not without permission erect on the property any
temporary or permanent structure, except for agricultural purpose
Ans. C
28. Which of the following statements hold true regarding
receiver under the provisions of the Transfer of Property
Act, 1882?
A. A person paying money to the receiver must make sure that the
appointment of receiver is valid
B. The receiver can use the insurance money received, subject to
other provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, for the
payment of interest falling due under the mortgage, if so directed in
writing by the mortgagee
C. The receiver can use the insurance money received, subject to
other provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, for the
payment of principle money, if so directed in writing by the
mortgagee
D. None of these
Ans. C
29. Which of the following statements is true regarding
definitions given under the Transfer of Property Act,
1882?
A. Term ‘instrument’ means both testamentary and non-
testamentary instrument
B. Term ‘actionable claims’ include debt secured by mortgage on the
residential house
C. The term ‘attached to earth’ will not means trees and shrubs
D. The term ‘attested’ means attested by two or more witness
Ans. D
suit for redemption of mortgaged property under the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882?
A. Only mortgagor can bring the suit
B. Any creditor of the mortgagor who has obtained a decree, can
bring the suit
C. Any creditor irrespective of decree for the same, can bring the
suit
D. Any surety for the payment of the mortgage debt, can bring the
suit
Ans. D
31. Based on court rulings in India which of the following
activities will qualify for the purpose of provisions of
section 18 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882?
A. A gift for maintenance of property for the benefit of distinguished
visitors to neighbourhood
B. A permanent bequest by a Parsi for the performance of muktad
ceremonies
C. A gift for dharma
D. A gift for the spread of the Hindu religion
Ans. B
32. C and B are two brothers living as joint family. They
decided to have a partition. In the partition deed the
house with well fell on C, and B was allowed to take water
from the well out of brotherly love. The right to take water
will be in form of:
A. Easement
B. Revocable license
C. Irrevocable license
D. Interest in the property
Ans. C
33. Charge can be created by:
A. Act of parties
B. Operation of Law
C. Both A and B
D. Neither A nor B
Ans. C
34. Contract of tenancy can be split up by:
A. Court in eviction proceedings
B. Operation of Law
C. Either A or B
D. Neither A nor B
Ans. B
35. In case a lease is made for a certain period mentioning
that it is terminable before its expiration, without
mentioning at whose option________.
A. Only lessee will have the option of termination
B. Only lessor will have the option of termination
C. The lease will be terminable only in case of mutual agreement
D. Both lessor and lessee will have option of terminating the lease
Ans. A
36. In certain areas, the zamindar has a customary right to
recover one-fourth of the sale consideration for a house
sold by the riyaya. This is a customary right of antiquity
mentioned in the wajibularz of the village. It is based not
on contract or encumbrance, but arises only on sale. The
riyaya has no saleable interest in a house in an
agricultural village, but such a right is given to him on the
understanding that if he leaves or abandons it, the
zamindar gets one- fourth as zare chahorum. This custom
was acknowledged because in settling the house, the
zamindar had to make certain investments. The custom is
not unreasonable or opposed to law. Which of the
following statement will apply?
A. The transaction will attract provision of section 55 of the Transfer
of Property Act, 1882
B. The transaction will be saved by section 2(c) of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882 from the operation of section 55 of the act
C. The transaction is in form of customs, and customs and usage
supersede the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
D. The transaction is in forms of customs, and provisions of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 supersede the customs and usage
Ans. B
37. In Dinendronath Sannyal v Ramcoomar Ghose it was
held that:
A. The transfer by operation of law occurs in case of testamentary
and intestate succession
B. An involuntary ‘sale’ is not necessarily a transfer by the operation
of law
C. Legislature can modify, annul and substitute the contracts inter-
vivos
D. None of these
Ans. A
38. In England, express surrenders of the lease are
required by the Statute of Frauds to be in writing, in India
the express surrenders of the lease:
A. Must be in writing
B. Must be registered if there are facts de hors
C. Both A and B
D. Neither A nor B
Ans. D
39. In English law, a minor cannot hold a legal estate in
land, in India, a lease by a minor is_______.
A. Valid
B. Void
C. Voidable
D. Depends on the facts of the case
Ans. B
40. In Roman law, the earliest type of security was:
A. The fiducia
B. The pignus
C. The hypotheca
D. None of these
Ans. A
41. In which of the following cases did J Kekewich said
that “You cannot limit an estate to a man and his heirs
until he shall convey the land to a stranger, because it is of
the essence of an estate in fee that it confers free power of
alienation, and it has long been settled that the same
principle is applicable to gifts of personality.”
A. Metcalfe v Metcalfe
B. Deo v Bevan
C. Tamaya v Timpa
D. Hippolite v Stuart
Ans. A
42. In which of the following cases is rule against
perpetuity not applicable under the Transfer of Property
Act, 1882?
A. In case property is transferred for the benefit of lineal decedents
B. In case property is transferred for the purpose of construction of
a winery
C. In case property is transferred for the purpose of creating a
temple promoting Sati
D. In case property is transferred for building a library for comic
books
Ans. D
43. In which of the following cases will the puisne
mortgagee has no right to redeem a prior mortgage?
A. Puisne mortgage is invalid
B. Puisne mortgage is time-barred
C. Puisne mortgagee has lost all remedies of foreclosure
D. All of these
Ans. D
44. Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882:
A. Applies to property sold in auction sale
B. Does not apply to property sold in auction sale
C. Applies to compromise of doubtful rights
D. Does not apply to compromises of doubtful rights
Ans. B
45. Section 99 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 deals
with____________.
A. Provisions related to charges on property
B. Provisions related to anomalous mortgage
C. Provisions related to mortgage by depositing of title deeds
D. None of these
Ans. D
46. Subrogation as defined in Section 92 of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882 can be:
A. Conventional
B. Legal
C. either A or B
D. neither A nor B
Ans. C
47. The basic ingredients of the doctrine of lis pendens
are:
A. The suit should be collusive
B. Property should have been transferred or otherwise dealt with
C. A litigation should be pending in a court of competent
jurisdiction
D. The suit must not be related to a specific immovable property
Ans. C
48. The doctrine of lis pendens:
A. Is applicable on both movable and immovable property
B. Is applicable on both partial and absolute transfers
C. Is applicable on both specified and unspecified properties
D. All of these
Ans. B
49. The English Law:
A. Recognises the concept of Universal Donee
B. Recognises the concept of Universal Succession
C. Both A and B
D. Neither A nor B
Ans. D
50. The English rule against perpetuities deals with:
A. Interests to arise in future
B. Interests in proesenti
C. Both A and B
D. Neither A nor B
Ans. C
51. The English rule that a grant should be construed most
favourably to the sovereign:
A. Is applicable in India in its totality
B. Is not applicable in India
C. Partially applicable in all the cases in India
D. Partially applicable to some of the cases in India
Ans. B
52. The first draft bill of Transfer of Property Act, 1882
was made by:
A. First Law Commission
B. Second Law Commission
C. Third Law Commission
D. Fourth Law Commission
Ans. A
53. The forfeiture under section 111(g) of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882 can________.
A. Not be waived off, except by express declaration of the same
B. Can be waived off by acceptance of rent becoming due after
forfeiture, after the suit to eject lessee has been initiated
C. Can be waived off by accepting of rent becoming due after
forfeiture, in case lessor is not aware that forfeiture has incurred
D. Can be waived off by accepting of rent becoming due after
forfeiture, as long as lessor knows that forfeiture has incurred
Ans. d
54. The notice period for termination of lease for
residential purpose is_______, in absence of contract or
usage to the contrary.
A. Fifteen days
B. One month
C. Two months
D. Forty-Five days
Ans. A
55. The Privy Council in Mohammed Sher Khan v. Seth
Swami Dayal has settled that:
A. Section 98 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is subject to
Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
B. Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is subject to
Section 98 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
C. Either A or B depending on the facts of the individual cases
D. Neither A nor B
Ans. A
56. The provisions of section 60A of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882 do not apply when_________.
A. The mortgagor is in possession of the property
B. The mortgagor has recovered possession of the property
C. The mortgagee has defaulted in receiving payment
D. The mortgagor has not defaulted in making payments
Ans. B
57. The rule against perpetuity as given in section 14 of the
Transfer of Property Act 1882, applies to:
A. Immovable property
B. Movable property
C. Both A and B
D. Unconditionally to A, conditionally to B
Ans. C
58. Transfer of Spes Succession is:
A. Valid
B. Void
C. Voidable
D. Either A or B
Ans. B
1882, if there are patent defects in the property:
A. The maxim of caveat emptor will apply
B. The maxim of uberrimae fidei will apply
C. Both A and B
D. Neither A nor B
Ans. A
1882, the seller is duty bound to disclose:
A. Patent defects in the property
B. Latent defects in the property
C. Both A and B
D. Neither A nor B
Ans. B
61. Under the provisions of the Transfer of the Property
Act, 1882, the benefits of a contract can be assigned as an
actionable claims and transferred unless:
A. The contract is one which had been induced by personal
qualifications or considerations as to the parties to it
B. The benefit is coupled with an obligation which the assignor is
bound to discharge
C. Either A or B
D. Neither A nor B
Ans. C
62. Under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, vested
interest is_______.
A. Defeated by the death of the transferor
B. Defeated by the death of the transferee
C. Either or both A and B
D. Neither A nor B
Ans. D
63. What is the default interest payable under section 63
and 63 A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882?
A. 8% per annum
B. 9% per annum
C. 10% per annum
D. Interest rate is not mentioned in the sections
Ans. B
64. Where the mortgage is illegal for want of registration
but the mortgagee continues in possession of the
mortgaged property, a valid mortgage comes in existence
after the expiry of:
A. 5 years
B. 10 years
C. 12 years
D. 20 years
Ans. C
65. Which e following is the right of mortgager to redeem
as conferred by the Transfer of Property Act, 1882?
directs
C. Either A or B
D. Neither A nor B
Ans. D
66. Which of the following are not valid consideration for
establishing a lease:
A. Rent partly in money and partly in kind
B. A stipulation to pay government assessment or taxes payable by
the lessor
C. A personal agreement by a tenant to pay a certain sum or a
certain quantity in kind to the landlord
D. None of these
Ans. C
67. Which of the following are valid illustrations of an
anamolous mortgage?
A. A possessory mortgage without a conditional sale
B. A possessory mortgage with a right to cause the mortgaged
property to sale in the event of default in payment
C. Both A and B
D. Neither A nor B
Ans. B
68. A transfers property to B for life and after his death to
C and D, equally to be divided between them or to the
survivors of them. C dies during life of B. D survives B. At
B’s death the property:
(a) shall pass to D
(b) shall pass to any person
(c) shall pass to person who is specifically named in transfer
Ans. a
69. The provisions of conditional transfer is provided in
the Transfer of Property Act, 1882:
(a) section 25
(b) section 26
(c) section 27
(d) section 29.
Ans. a
70. X transfers Rs.500 to Y on condition that he shall
execute a certain lease within three months after Y’s
death, and, if he should neglect to do so to Z. If Y dies in
X’s life time:
(a) the disposition in favour of Z takes effect
(b) the disposition shall not take effect in favour of Z
(c) the disposition requires further conditions
Ans. a
71. X marries to Y but in case she dies in his lifetime, he
would transfer the property to Z. X and Y perish together,
under circumstances which make it impossible to probe
that she died before him. The disposition of property in
favour of Z:
(a) does not take effect
(b) takes effect
(c) disposition is subject to another contract
Ans. a
72. Under the provisions of section 29 of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882 an ulterior disposition of the kind
contemplated in the provision of section 28 cannot take
effect unless:
(a) condition is strictly fulfilled
(b) condition is not fulfilled
(c) only (b) is correct
Ans. a
73. In case of transfer of property under the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882, if the ulterior disposition is not valid
then:
(a) the prior disposition is affected by it
(b) the prior disposition is not affected by it
(c) no such condition is prevailed under the Transfer of Property
Act, 1882
Ans. b
74. A transfer a garden to B for her life, with a proviso
that, in case B cuts down a certain wood, the transfer shall
cease to have any effect. B cuts down the wood. Decide the
case in the light of Transfer of Property Act, 1882:
(a) B loses his life interest in the firm
(b) B does not lose his life interest in the firm
(c) no such provision is made under the Transfer of Property Act,
1882
Ans. a
Property Act, 1882, where a person professes to transfer
property which he has no right to transfer, and as part of
the same transaction confers any benefit on the owner of
the property then:
(a) such owner must elect either to confirm such transfer or to
dissent from it
(b) such owner can elect to confirm such transfer only
(c) such owner can dissent from transfer only
Ans. a
76. The foundation of doctrine of election under the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is that a person taking the
benefit of an instrument:
(a) must bear the burden
(b) must not bear the burden
(c) burden is not the subject of election
Ans. a
77. The rule of election under the Transfer of Property Act,
1882, as applied to Will is enacted in sections 180 and 192
of the:
(a) Indian Succession Act, 1925
(b) Indian Registration Act, 1908
(c) Sale of Goods Act, 1930
(d) General Clauses Act, 1897.
Ans. a
78. A person is not put to his election, unless he has a
proprietary interest in the property disposed off in
derogation of his rights. This is the subject matter under
provisions of:
(a) section 35 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
(b) section 35 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908
(c) section 35 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925
Ans. a
79. Section 37 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 refers
to apportionment by estate. In this light, before the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882, when a transfer was
severed by the sale of shares in the version the tenant was
still obliged to pay the rent to all shares jointly:
(a) unless an apportionment had been agreed to by all the parties
(b) any party is agreed by all the parties
(c) any two parties are agreed
Ans. a
80. In the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, sections 33 to 37
apply to both immovable and movable property whereas
sections 38 to 53 apply to:
(a) movable property only
(b) immovable property
(c) both immovable and movable property
Ans. b
81. Provisions of section 38 of the Transfer of Property
Act, 1882 does not apply to cases falling under:
(a) benamidars or ostensible owners who can give no title except by
estoppel
(b) contingent transfer which is based on happening and not
happening of certain events
(c) perpetual transfer
Ans. a
82. Section 38 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, has
no application:
(a) to previous transfer where the transaction is still incomplete
(b) to succeeding transfer where the transaction is to be completed
in future
(c) to perpetuity transfer
Ans. a
83. Under section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
the provision is made for transfer where the third person
is entitled to maintenance. In this context the court held
that right of maintenance, even of a Hindu widow, is an
identified right which falls short of a charge. This was
decided in case of:
(a) Ramanandan v. Rangammal, (1889) 12 Mad 260
(b) Ram Kumar v. Ram Dai, (1900) 22 All 326
(c) Rachawa v. Shivayogoda, (1893) 18 Bom 679
Ans. a
84. Right to maintenance under the provisions of section
39 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 includes the
enhanced maintenance in future to these if there has been
a material change in the circumstances. This was decided
in case of:
(a) Adiveppa v. Tengawzva, (1974) 2 Karn LJ 45
(b) Kaveri v. Parameswari, AIR 1971 Ker 216
(c) Dattatreya v. Julsabai, (1943) Bom 646
(d) Pranlal v. Chapsey, AIR 1945 Bom 34.
Ans. b
85. Within the provisions of section 39 of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882 the word “maintenance” covers also
residence. This was decided in case of:
(a) Kaveri v. Parameswari, AIR 1971 Ker 216
(b) Ramamurthi v. Kanakaratnam, (1948) Mad 315
(c) Akhoy Kumar v. Corporation of Calcutta, (1915) 42 Cal 625
(d) Maina v. Bachchi, (1906) 26 All 655.
Ans. a
86. Within the meaning of provision under section 39 of
the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 a woman is entitled to
maintenance not only from the husband, but also from
sons who are members of joint family. This was decided in
case of:
(a) S. Periaswami v. Chellawal, (1980) 1 Mad LJ 46
(b) Raghvan v. Nagamal, (1979) 1 Mad LJ 172
(c) Chandramna v. Maniam Vankettareddy, AIR 1958 AP 396
(d) Basudev Dey Sarkar v. Chhaya Dey Sarkar, AIR 1991 Cal 399.
Ans. a
87. Section 41 of the Transfer of the Property Act, 1882
applies to voluntary transfers and has no application to:
(a) court sale
(b) contingent sale
(c) perpetuity sale
(d) price less sale.
Ans. a
Property Act, 1882, these are some conditions:
(1) Transferer is the ostensible owner.
(2) He is so by the consent, express or implied, of the real owner.
(3) Transfer is for consideration.
(4) Transferee has acted in good faith, taking reasonable care to
ascertain that the transferer had power to transfer.
(a) only (1) and (2) are required
(b) only (1), (2) and (3) are required
(c) only (3) and (4) are required
(d) all are required.
Ans. d
89. Possession of a manager cannot be treated as
ostensible ownership with the consent of the real owner.
This was held in case of:
(a) Seshumulla M. Shah v. Sayed Abdul Rashid, AIR 1991 Kant 273
(b) Ved Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1989 NOC 136
(c) Motimul Sowvar v. Vijalakshi Ammal, AIR 1965 Mad 432
(d) B. Sitaram Rao v. Bibhushana, AIR 1978 Ori 222.
Ans. a
90. Inaccuracy in the recitals describing the property:
(a) cannot whitle down the effect of clear recitals in the documents
about the property to be sold thereby
(b) can whitle down the effect of clear recitals in the document
about the property to be sold thereby
(c) cannot depend upon the inaccuracy or accuracy of recital
describing property
Ans. a
91. Under section 42 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
if a person has a right to transfer property, after
exercising a right to revoke a previous transfer, a transfer
of such property by him will imply an exercise of:
(a) right of revocation
(b) right of transfer
(c) right of surrender
Ans. a
92. Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
enables a transferee to whom a transferer has made a
fraudulent or erroneous representation to lay hold, at his
option, of any interest:
(a) which the transferor may subsequently acquire with property,
provided he does not adversely affect the right of any subsequent
purchaser for value without notice
(b) which the transferee may rescind the proceeding
(c) which both transferor and transferee rescind
Ans. a
93. In order to get the benefit of the section 43 of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 some conditions are
necessary:
(1) Contract of transfer was made by a person who was competent to
contract.
(2) Contract would be subsisting at the time when a claim for
recovery of the property is made.
(a) both (1) and (2) necessary
(b) only (1) is necessary
(c) only (2) is necessary.
Ans. a
94. Section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, deals
with:
(a) transfer by two co-owner
(b) transfer by one co-owner
(c) transfer by 3 co-owners
(d) transfers by all co-owners.
Ans. b
95. When one of several co-owners transfers his share, the
transferee acquires as against the other co-owners the
same rights that of transferor had but is subject to any
condition and liabilities affecting the share at the date of
transfer. This is the provision under:
(b) section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
(c) section 42 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
(d) section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
Ans. d
96. The provision for the joint transfer for consideration
is dealt in:
Ans. a
97. Presumption of equity pertains to:
Ans. a
1882, where immovable property is transferred for
consideration by persons having distinct interests therein,
the transferors are:
(a) entitled to share in the considerations equally
(b) entitled to share unequally
(c) entitled to share equally but subject to further
Ans. a
99. Where several co-owners of immovable property
transfer a share therein without specifying that the
transfer is to take effect on any particular share or shares
of the transfers, the transfer, as among such transferors,
takes effect on such share:
(a) inequally where the shares were equal and where they are
unequal proportionally to the extent of such shares
(b) equally where the share were equal and where they are unequal
proportionately to the extent of such shares
(c) only (a) is correct
Ans. b
100. Which of the following statements will hold true
regarding exchange under the Transfer of Property Act,
1882?
A. All the liabilities and responsibilities under normal sale apply to
exchange
B. All the liabilities and responsibilities under normal sale apply to
exchange, subject to provisions of section 119 and 121 of the Act
C. No liability and responsibility under normal sale will apply to
exchange unless specifically stated
D. Liabilities and responsibilities under normal sale will not apply
to exchange under any circumstances
Ans. B
101. Which of the following transfers and conditions will
be valid under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882?
A. A sells the property to B absolutely, with a direction that B
cannot sell it without the permission of A
B. A makes a gift to B with a condition that in case B does not
divorce his wife, the property will revert back to A
C. A gifts the property to his wife with a condition that his wife
cannot sell without A’s permission
D. None of these
Ans. D
the definition of rent of lease as given under the Transfer
A. The rent must be in form of money and not in kind
B. The rent can be in form of money or service but not in kind
C. The rent can be in money or in kind
D. The rent cannot be in form of money
Ans. C
transfer of actionable claims under the provisions of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882?
A. The transferee of an actionable claims steps into the shoes of the
transferor for all purposes
B. The transfer of an actionable claim for the purpose of gift, can be
done by delivery of the instrument and oral statement to the effect.
C. both A and b
D. neither A nor B
Ans. A
104. Which of the following statements is true under the
provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882?
A. Prepaid rent is regarded as rent
B. The foundation of the doctrine of election is that a person taking
the benefit of an instrument need not bear the burden
C. Election is a breach of the general rule that no one may
approbate and reprobate
D. The doctrine of election is based on intention to this extent that
the law presumes that the author of an instrument intended to give
effect to every part of it
Ans. D
105. Which of the following statements will apply in case a
landlord in a suit for ejectment of tenant, obtains a decree
for ejectment?
A. A notice would need to be given under section 106 of the Transfer
B. A notice under section 106 of the Transfer of the Property Act,
1882 will be needed in case the lease is not terminable at will
C. A notice under section 106 of the Transfer of the Property Act,
1882 is not needed
D. A notice under section 106 of the Transfer of the Property Act,
1882 will be needed unless there is a contract to the contrary
Ans. C
106. Which of the following statements will hold true
regarding exchange under the Transfer of Property Act,
1882?
A. All the liabilities and responsibilities under normal sale apply to
exchange
B. All the liabilities and responsibilities under normal sale apply to
exchange, subject to provisions of section 119 and 121 of the Act
C. No liability and responsibility under normal sale will apply to
exchange unless specifically stated
D. Liabilities and responsibilities under normal sale will not apply
to exchange under any circumstances
Ans. B
D. None of these
Ans. D
108. Which of the following is nearest to meaning of the
phrase ‘English mortgaged’ as defined by the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882?
A. Where on payment of certain sum by the mortgagee the property
passes to him
B. Where there are two sales made, one at the start of mortgage with
the condition that after the mortgage amount is paid back, the
property will sold back
C. Where the mortgagee gets the possession of the property with the
rights of profits, rents etc.
D. Where the mortgage is made by submitting the title deed
Ans. B
109. Which of the following is the right of mortgager to
redeem as conferred by the Transfer of Property Act,
1882?
directs
C. either A or B
D. neither A nor B
Ans. D
110. Which of the following properties can be transferred
under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882?
A. Salary of a public officer
B. Right to sue
C. both A and B
D. neither A nor B
Ans. D
D. None of these
Ans. D
Releted Articles:
 Questions and Answers on Transfer of Property Act
 Objective Questions and Answers on Transfer of Property Act
 Indian Penal Code: GK Questions and Answers
 Quiz Questions on the Code of Criminal Procedure (With Answers)
100 sample questions on The

Registration Act, 1908 for Kerala
(preliminary)
1. In the Registration Act immovable property has
been defined
(a) under section 2(7)
ADVERTISEMENTS:
(b) under section 2(9)
(c) under section 2(6)

2. Which is not an immovable property under the

Registration Act
ADVERTISEMENTS:
(a) hereditary allowances
(b) lights
(c) fisheries
ADVERTISEMENTS:
3. ‘Immovable property’ has been defined in

(a) The Registration Act, 1908
(b) The Transfer of Property Act, 1882
(c) The General Clauses Act, 1897
ADVERTISEMENTS:
(d) all the above.
4. A growing tree, drawing substance from the soil,

is
(a) a movable property
(b) an immovable property
ADVERTISEMENTS:
(c) either (a) or (b)
5. ‘A profits a prendre’ – an incorporeal right, a right

to take something of another person’s land is
(a) an immovable property
(b) not an immovable property
(c) a movable property
6. A right to pluck fruits, carry away & appropriate is

(b) not an immovable property
(c) a movable property
7. Which of the following is an immovable property

(a) to take out sand
(b) to extract granite from mines
(c) to take manganese ore from the soil
(d) all the above.
8. ‘Lease’ has been defined in

(a) The Registration Act, 1908
(b) The Transfer of Property Act, 1882
(c) The General Clauses Act, 1897
(d) only in (a) & (b).
9. Section 17 of the Registration Act provides for

(a) documents which are not at all registrable
(b) documents which are compulsorily registrable
(c) documents the registration of which is optional
(d) both (a) & (c).
10. A Muslim gift deed is

(a) compulsorily registrable
(b) not compulsorily registrable
(c) optionally registrable
(d) only (b) & (c).
11. A gift of a debt secured by a mortgage of

immovable property
(a) is a gift of immovable property
(b) is not a gift of immovable property
(c) is a gift of movable property
(d) both (b) & (c).
12. Gift in lieu of dower is

(a) compulsorily registrable
(b) not compulsorily registrable
(c) optionally registrable
(d) both (b) & (c).
13. Which of the following is compulsorily

registrable
(a) gift in lieu of dower
(b) Hiba-bil-iwaz
(c) both (a) & (b)
14. A non-testamentary document is one

(a) which is intended to take effect or be operative
immediately on its execution
(b) which is final
(c) which is irrevocable
all the above.
15. The words ‘purport or operate’ in section 17(l)

(b), refers to
(a) the ultimate consequences of the instrument
(b) immediate intention of the instrument

(c) collateral effects of the instrument
(d) all the above.
16. Which of the following documents has the effect

of a definite change of legal relation to a property
(a) a document executed by the parties within an hour of
the alleged completed oral partition which starts with the
recitals of details in the past tense but concludes in the
present tense and describes itself as a partition deed
(b) A document as a result of which immovable property

standing in the names of the parties in certain shares, is to
stand in their names but in different shares
(c) A document recitals of which declare the existence of a

given state of affairs
(d) both (a) & (b).
17. In case of mortgage by deposit of title deeds

(a) a letter stating that the deeds are to be held as security
for antecedent debt, is compulsorily registrable
(b) an agreement executed for repayment of the mortgage

dues & payment of dues thereon, is compulsorily
registrable
(c) a letter not mentioning the details of the title/deeds nor

mentioning the principal amount or interest thereon, is
compulsorily registrable
(d) only (a) & (b).
18. Which of the following require compulsory

registration under section 17(l)(b)
(a) an agreement by which the mortgagor agrees to pay or
the mortgagee agrees to accept interest at a rate, different
than the one fixed by the registered mortgage deed
(b) an agreement by which the period of redemption fixed

by the mortgage deed is reduced or enhanced
(c) an agreement to accept on redemption smaller amount

than what is due under a registered mortgage deed
(d) all the above.
19. The records made by the Panchas about the

division of properties
(a) is not compulsorily registrable
(b) optionally registrable
(c) compulsorily registrable
(d) both (a) & (c).
20. Section 17(l)(d) of the Registration Act applies to

(a) a lease for any term exceeding one year
(b) a lease from year to year
(c) a lease reserving a yearly rent

(d) all the above.
21. The lease covered under Section 17(l)(d) is

(a) not compulsorily registrable
(b) registration of such a lease is optional
(c) compulsorily registrable
22. Section 17(2) of the Registration Act carves out

an exception to
(a) section 17(l)(a)
(b) section 17(l)(b)
(c) section 17(l)(d)
(d) all the above.
23. Exceptions under section 17(2) of the

Registration Act relate to
(a) section 17(l)(b)
(b) section 17(l)(c)
(c) both section 17(l)(b) and section
24. The documents registration of which is optional

have been dealt in
(a) section 16
(b) section 17
(c) section 18
(d) section 19.
25. A registering officer may refuse the registration

of the documents
(a) which are in a language not understood by the
registering officer & not commonly used
(b) which contain interlineations, blanks, erasures or

alterations
(c) both (a) & (b)
26. Section 21 of the Registration Act applies to

(a) non-testamentary documents relating to immovable
property
(b) non-testamentary documents relating to movable

property
(c) testamentary documents relating to movable property
(d) testamentary documents relating to 34 immovable

property.
27. The provisions of section 21 of the Registration

Act are
(a) directory in nature
(b) positive & imperative in nature
(c) discretionary in nature
(d) either (a) or (c). 35.
28. The time for presentation of document for

registration has been provided in
(a) section 22
(b) section 23
(c) section 24
(d) section 25.
29. Section 23 provides the time for presentation of

document for registration, before the proper officer,
of
(a) four months from the date of execution
(b) two months from the date of execution
(c) three months from the date of execution
(d) six months from the date of execution. 37.
30. Delay in presentation of a document for

registration can be condoned upto
(a) two months
(b) four months
(c) six months

(d) one month. 38.
31. Which section of the Registration Act provides

for condonation of delay in presentation of
document for registration
(a) section 23A
(b) section 24
(c) section 25
(d) section 26.
32. Under section 25 of the Registration Act,

who has the power to condone the delay in
presentation of document
(a) Registrar only
(b) Sub-registrar only
(c) both Registrar & Sub-registrar
(d) either Registrar or Sub-registrar.
33. Registration of a document presented after the

expiry of total period prescribed in Part- IV of the
Act is
(a) valid
(b) invalid
(c) voidable
(d) void.
34. A document can be presented for registration

beyond the period of 4 months of its execution
(a) as a matter of right
(b) owing to urgent necessity
(c) owing to unavoidable accident
(d) only if (b) & (c) are present.
35. Where there are several persons executing a

document at different times, such document can be
presented for registration within four months from
(a) the first execution
(b) each execution
(c) the last execution
(d) any of the above.
36. A document executed out of India can be

registered if presented within
(a) two months of its arrival in India
(b) four months of its arrival in India
(c) one month of its arrival in India
(d) six months of its arrival in India.
37. Will can be presented for registration within

(a) four months of its execution
(b) six months of its execution
(c) at any time
(d) two months of its execution.
38. Non-compliance of the provisions of Section 19

of Registration Act is
(a) an error of jurisdiction not curable under section 87
(b) a defect of procedure & is curable under section 87
(c) an error in exercise of jurisdiction curable under section

87
(d) both (b) & (c).
39. An authority to adopt is

(a) not compulsorily registrable
(b) compulsorily registrable
(c) registration is optional
(d) both (a) & (c).
40. A deed of adoption requires

(a) compulsory registration
(b) optional registration
(c) no registration
41. A document relating to land can be presented for

registration in the office of a Sub-registrar within
whose sub-district
(a) the whole of the property to which the document
relates is situate
(b) some portion of the property is situate
(c) the whole or some portion of the property is situate
(d) no part of the property is situate.
42. A document relating to land, registered at a

place where no part of the property is situate, the
registration is
(a) void ab initio
(b) void only if parties in collusion with each other,

committed fraud on the registering authority
(c) voidable & may be set aside within the period of

limitations
43. A document other than the one relating to land,

can be presented for registration in the office of
Sub-registrar within whose sub- district
(a) the document was executed
(b) the document was delivered to the person in whose
favour the same stands executed
44. A Registrar
(a) can receive & register any document which might be
registered by any Sub- registrar subordinate to him
(b) can receive & register any document which might be

registered by any Sub- registrar not subordinate to him
(c) can receive & register any document which might be

registered by any other Registrar
45. A document, registration of which has been

refused by the Sub-registrar of a sub-district
(a) can be received & registered by a sub- registrar of
another sub-district within the same district
(b) can be received & registered by a sub- registrar of

another sub-district in another district
(c) can be received & registered by the registrar of the

district of whose sub-
district, the Sub-registrar has refused registration (d) can

be received & registered by the registrar of another
district.
(a) a registrar only can receive a document at the
residence of a person desiring to present the document for
registration
(b) a Sub-registrar only of the concerned sub-district can

receive the document at the residence
(c) both (a) & (b)
47. Registrar can accept the documents for

registration at the residence of the person
(a) ordinarily
(b) under special circumstances only
(c) both (a) & (b)
48. Under section 32 a document for registration can

be presented
(a) by the person executing the document
(b) by the representative of the executor
(c) by the agent of the executor authorised through a valid

power of attorney

49. Registration of a document, presented by a
person who is not a proper person within the
meaning of Section 32 is
(a) void
(b) voidable
(c) invalid
(d) valid.
50. A document, registered without being presented

by a proper person under section 23 A
(a) can not be re-registered
(b) can be re-registered if presented by a proper person
(c) can be re-registered even if represented again by not a

proper person
51. The presentation of document for re-

registration by the proper person should be
(a) within one year of becoming aware of the invalidity of
registration
(b) within four months of becoming aware of the invalidity

of registration
(c) within three years of becoming aware of the invalidity of

registration
(d) within one month of becoming aware of the invalidity of
registration.
52. On re-registration, the registration shall be

effective
(a) from the date of original registration
(b) from the date of presentation for re- registration
(c) from the date of re-registration
(d) from the date which the Registrar fixes.
53. Section 40 of the Registration Act refers to

(a) documents which are irrevocable and have the binding
effect
(b) documents which can be revoked at any moment and

have no binding effect even after the death of the
executant
(c) documents which can be revoked at any moment and

have no binding effect till the death of the executant
(d) both (a) & (c).
54. The doctrine of ‘relation back’ in the

Registration Act is contained in
(a) section 42
(b) section 47
(c) section 48
(d) section 50.
55. The ‘rule of precedence’ amongst the various

registered documents relating to the same property
is contained in
(a) section 42
(b) section 46
(c) section 47
(d) section 48.
56. Under the Registration Act, a registered

document operates
(a) from the date of its registration
(b) from the date of its execution
(c) from the date as given for the operation of the

document, in the document
(d) either of the aforesaid date.
57. The object of section 47 is

(a) to decide which of the two or more registered
instruments in respect of the same property is to have
effect
(b) to decide which of the two-a registered document and

dual agreement, in respect of the same property is to have
effect
(c) to decide which of the two – a registered instrument
and an
unregistered instrument – in respect of the same property

is to have effect (d) all the above.
58. ‘X’ executed a sale deed in favour of ‘Y’ on 1-1-

2002. Subsequently on 10-1-2002, ‘X’ executed a
sale deed in respect of the same property in favour
of ‘Z’. Thereafter the sale deed in favour of ‘Z’
executed on 10-1-2002 was registered on 20-1-2002.
Whereas the sale deed in favour of ‘Y was registered
on 30-1-2002.
In the said case, by virtue of section 47
(a) the sale deed executed in favour of ‘Y’ on 1-1-2002 &
registered on 30.1.2002 shall have precedence & confer
title on ‘Y’
(b) the sale deed executed in favour of ‘Z’ on 10-1-2002 &

registered on 20-1-2002 shall have precedence & confer
title on ‘Z’
(c) both the sale deeds shall be void
(d) the sale deeds in favour of ‘Y’ & ‘Z’ shall remain valid to
the extent of 50% of the property.
59. ‘X’ a Muslim executes a deed of gift on 1-1- 2002

of his property to ‘Y’, but delivery of possession is
not given. Later, on 10-1-2002 executed another gift
deed in favour of ‘Z’ which was accompanied by
delivery of possession to ‘Z’. The gift deeds in
favour of ‘Y’ & ‘Z’ were registered on 30-1-2002 &
20-1-2002 respectively.
In these facts,
(a) the gift deed executed in favour of ‘Y’ on 1-1-2002 &
registered on 30-1-2002 shall have precedence even if
possession was not delivered to ‘Y’ & gift was not complete
(b) the gift deed executed in favour of ‘Z’ on 10-1-2002 &

registered on 20-1-2002 shall have precedence as
possession was delivered to ‘Z’ as the gift was complete
under Muslim law
(c) both the gift deeds shall be void
60. Section 48 of the Registration Act

(a) protects oral agreement accompanied with delivery of
possession against the rule of priority
(b) protects oral agreement unaccompanied with delivery

of possession against the rule of priority
(c) neither (a) nor (b)
61. Section 48 of the Registration Act gives

(a) precedence to the registered document over oral
agreement unaccompanied with delivery of possession
(b) precedence to the registered document over oral
agreement accompanied with delivery of possession
62. Under section 50 of the Registration Act

(a) a registered document relating to a property stands on
the same footing as an unregistered document relating to
the same property
(b) a registered document relating to a property takes

precedence over the unregistered document relating to the
same property
(c) an unregistered document relating to a property taken

precedence over the registered document over the same
property
63. By virtue of section 49, an unregistered

authority to adopt
(a) confers power to adopt
(b) does not confer the power to adopt

64. An unregistered document affecting immovable
property
(a) shall not affect any immovable property comprised
therein
(b) is inadmissible in evidence
(c) both (a) & (b)
65. An unregistered document can be admitted in

evidence as regards an existence of contract in a
(a) suit for possession
(b) suit for injunction
(c) suit for specific performance
(d) all the above.
66. An unregistered document can be admitted in

evidence, as evidence of
(a) part performance of contract for the purposes of section
53A, Transfer of Property Act
(b) collateral transaction/facts
(c) both (a) & (b)
67. Which of the following is not a collateral purpose

(a) nature & character of possession
(b) purpose of lease
(c) consent of sub-let
68. A deed purporting to bestow residence in the

house and food from the rent of the house is a
(a) declaration of what his interest in the house to be in
future and thus requires compulsory registration under
section 17
(b) declaration of an existing right of a person in respect of

that house and thus does not require registration
compulsorily under section 17
(c) a document the registration of which is optional
69. A document in writing agreeing to separate a

coparcenary property but without effecting any
division as such
(a) is required to be compulsorily registrable
(b) is not required to be compulsorily registrable
(c) registration is optional

70. Which of the following is not compulsorily
registrable
(a) partition list recording what had already happened
(b) chittas which are memorandum containing the list of

shares which each of the parties got at the time of
partition, duly signed by the parties in order to
authenticate the list
(c) A family arrangement recorded in writing, as a record of

what has been agreed upon in order that they are not lazy
notions about it in future
(d) all the above.
71. A family settlement reduced in writing for the

purpose of using as proof of what they had arranged
& when the arrangement is brought by the
document, as such
(a) it is a document of title declaring for future what rights
and in what properties the parties possess, requiring
compulsory registration
(b) it is a document amounting to memorandum of what

had been agreed to between the parties, not requiring
compulsory registration
(c) it is a record of an arrangement arrived at between the

parties regarding the manners in which the properties have
to be dealt with, not requiring compulsory registration
72. When the parties set up competing titles to the

property and the differences are resolved by a
compromise which is recorded in writing
(a) the written compromise amounts to a document
whereby one party is deriving title from the other requiring
compulsory registration under section 17
(b) the written compromise amounts to a document

whereby one party is not deriving title from the other not
requiring compulsory registration under section 17
(c) the written compromise amounts to a document

whereby interest is created or declared by the document
for the first time requiring compulsory registration under
section 17
73. Which of the following documents do not cause

any change in the legal relationship to the property
(a) a deed of adoption despite the fact that
as consequences of adoption, the adopted son may

become entitled to immovable property under Hindu law
(b) a document stating that the house, which is the

absolute property of ‘A’ shall be enjoyed by ‘A’ with powers
of
gift & sale

(c) award on mortgage declaring amount due and stating
that on default property might be sold
(d) all the above.
74. The share of a partner in the partnership

property which includes movable and immovable
assets, for the purposes of the Indian Registration
Act, 1908, is
(a) a movable property
(b) an immovable property
(c) a movable property in respect of movable assets and an

immovable property in respect of immovable assets
75. The transfer of his interest by a partner in the

partnership assets, to a third party, is
(a) an immovable property requiring compulsory
registration
(b) an immovable property requiring optional registration
(c) a movable property requiring no registration
(d) a movable property requiring compulsory registration.
76. Release of his share/interest in the partnership

property by a partner, in favour of other partners is
(a) a movable property requiring compulsory registration
being in the nature of gift
(b) a movable property requiring no registration
(c) an immovable property requiring compulsory

registration
77. The Indian Registration Act, 1908 came into

force on
(a) 30-9-1908
(b) 31-12-1908
(c) 01-01-1909
(d) 01-04-1909
78. The Indian Registration Act, 1908, is applicable

to the whole of India except
(a) the State of Jammu & Kashmir
(b) the North-Eastern States
(c) the State of Sikkim
(d) all the above.
79. ‘India’ has been defined in the Indian

Registration Act, 1908, under
(a) section 2(6)
(b) section 2(6A)
(c) section 2(10)

(d) section 3.
80. ‘India’ has been defined under section 2(6A) of

the Indian Registration Act, 1908, as
(a) means the territory of India including the places situate
outside India under the authority of the Government of
India
(b) means the territory of India including the State of

Jammu and Kashmir
(c) means the territory of India excluding the State of

Jammu and Kashmir
(d) the territory of India excluding places situate outside

India under the authority of the Government of India.
81. The Indian Registration Act, 1908 defines

immovable property, under
(a) section 2(2)
(b) section 2(4)
(c) section 2(6A)
(d) section 2(6)
82. ‘Lease’ has been defined in the Indian

Registration Act, 1908, under
(a) , section 2(3)
(b) section 2(5)

(c) section 2(7)
(d) section 2(8)
83. Under section 2(9) of the Indian Registration Act,

1908, defines movable property as
(a) property of every description except immovable
property
(b) movable property includes standing timber, growing

crops and grass, fruit upon and juices in trees and property
of every description except immovable property
(c) ‘movable property’ includes standing trees, growing

crops and grass, and property of every other description,
except immovable property
(d) ‘movable property’ includes fruit upon and juice in trees

and property of every other description, except immovable
property.

within the meaning of section 2(6) of the Indian
Registration Act, 1908
(a) rights to ferries
(b) rights to lights
(c) rights to ways
(d) all the above.

85. Right of taking or running water from a river,
under the Indian Registration Act, 1908 is
(b) a lease
(c) movable property
(d) either (b) or (c)

within the meaning of section 2(6) of the Indian
Registration Act, 1908, as benefit arising out of land
(a) a transfer of future rents in respect of land
(b) a transfer of rents which have already accrued

is
(a) an exception to section 17(l)(a) of the Indian
(b) supplemental to section 17(l)(a) of the Indian

(c) an exception to section 17(l)(b) of the Indian

(d) supplemental to section 17(l)(b) of the Indian
Registration Act, 1908.
88. A registered document relating to a property

takes precedence over the unregistered document
relating to the same property under
(a) Section 49 of the Registration Act
(b) Section 50 of the Registration Act
(c) Section 51 of the Registration Act
(d) Section 52 of the Registration Act.
89. In which among the following cases, the

Supreme Court held that Registration of Will did not
dispense with need of proving execution and
attestation of it?
(a) Bhagat Ram v. Suresh (2004)
(b) Archana Kumar v. Benu Kumar (2003)
(c) Bikash Bora v. Anil Gupta (2002)
(d) Chunni Lai v.Munni Lai (2001).
90. The Registrar and Sub-Registrar can receive a

document at the residence of a person desiring to
present the document for registration. The
statement is?
(a) true
(b) false
(c) only Registrar can receive
(d) only Sub-Registrar can receive.
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Specific Relief Act, 1963 for
Manipur Judiciary Examination
(preliminary)
Article Shared By
ADVERTISEMENTS:
100 sample questions on The Specific Relief Act, 1963 for

Manipur Judiciary Examination (preliminary)
1. Readiness may mean capacity of plaintiff to

perform contract which includes
(a) performance of plaintiff
ADVERTISEMENTS:
(b) potential of plaintiff

(c) willingness of plaintiff
(d) financial ability of plaintiff.
2. Where applicant neither necessary nor proper

party in suit of specific performance whether his
presence is necessary for effective adjudication?
ADVERTISEMENTS:
(a) yes
(b) no
(c) conditional one
(d) none of above.
ADVERTISEMENTS:
3. Specific relief can be granted for

(a) enforcing individual civil rights
(b) enforcing penal laws
(c) both civil rights and penal laws
ADVERTISEMENTS:
(d) neither civil rights nor penal laws.
4. Under the Specific Relief Act, a suit for recovery

of possession can be filed
(a) only in respect of movable property
(b) only in respect of immovable property
ADVERTISEMENTS:
(c) in respect of both movable and immovable property
(d) neither movable nor immovable property.
5. Specific Relief Act, 1963 is the product of

(a) 8th Report of Law Commission of India on Specific Relief
Act of 1877
(b) 9th Report of Law Commission of India on Specific Relief

Act of 1877
(c) 10th Report of Law Commission of India on Specific

Relief Act of 1877
(d) none of above.
6. A suit for possession of an immovable property,

under section 6 of Specific Relief Act can be filed
within
(a) 1 year of dispossession
(b) 6 months of dispossession
(c) 3 years of dispossession
(d) 12 years of dispossession.

7. A suit for recovery of possession of an immovable
property under section 6 of Specific Relief Act can
be filed against
(a) a private individual only
(b) a government
(c) both a private individual and a government
8. Burden to prove adverse possession is on

(a) court
(b) defendant ,(c) plaintiff
(d) none of above.
9. To maintain suit under section & of the Act, the

possession must be
(a) actual judicial possession
(b) symbolic possession
(c) constructive possession
(d) either actual or symbolic or constructive.
10. An order or decree under section 6 of the Act is

(a) appealable
(b) reviewable
(c) neither appealable nor reviewable

(d) both appealable and reviewable.
11. A suit under section 6 can be brought by

(a) trespasser
(b) tenant holding over
(c) servant
(d) manager.
12. In a suit under section 6

(a) title of the plaintiff is relevant
(b) title of dispossessor is relevant
(c) the defendant is allowed to prove his title
13. A suit for possession under section 5 of Specific

Relief Act, can be filed within
(a) 3 years
(b) 6 months
(c) 12 years
(d) 30 years.
14. In a suit under section 6, the court can

(a) adjudicate on the title
(b) direct the defendant(s) to remove the structures

(c) permit the plaintiff to pull down the structure
(d) neither (a) nor (b) nor (c).
15. The question of title is

(a) relevant under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
(b) irrelevant under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act,

1963
(c) question of title is not a provision under the Specific

Relief Act, 1963
(d) none of above.
The object of section 6 of the Specific Relief Act,

1963 is to
(a) restrain a person from using force and to disposes a
person without his consent
(b) is not to restrain a person to dispossess a person
(d) none of above.
17. A suit under section 7 may be brought by a

person
(a) who is not the owner of the property
(b) who may not have the possession of the property

(c) from whose possession the goods may not have been
removed
(d) either (a), (b) or (c).
18.For application of section 7 of the Act, the

[ goods must be
(a) in original form
(b) capable of identification & delivery
(c) without alteration
(d) all the above.
19.Section 7 does not apply to

(a) money & currency notes
(b) wrongful taking of the property
(c) wrongful detaining of the property
(d) wrongful disposal of the property.
20.Section 8 of Specific Relief Act can be I invoked

(a) against a person who has possession or control over the
article
(b) against a person who is the owner of the article claimed
(c) by a person not entitled to the possession of the article
(d) in respect of an ordinary article.

21.Section 8 can be invoked
(a) if compensation in money is an adequate relief
(b)if the damages can be easily ascertained
(c) if the article is held by the person as agent or trustee of

the claimant
(d) if the article has been rightly transferred from the

claimant.
22. Suit under section 8 is not competent

(a) against a person who is the owner of the article claimed
(b) against a person who has the possession or control over

the article
(c) in respect of an article for which compensation in

money is not an adequate relief
(d) in cases where ascertainment of damages is extremely

difficult.
23. What is true of Specific Relief Act

(a) it is a procedural law
(b) it supplements the Code of Civil Procedure
(c) it is founded on English Law
(d) all the above.

24. Under section 10 of Specific Relief Act, the
specific performance of the contract cannot be
granted
(a) if there is no concluded contract
(b) if there is a concluded contract
(c) if the compensation in money is not an adequate relief
(d) if there exists no standard for ascertaining the actual

damages.
25. Under section 10 the specific performance can

be granted
(a) if there is a concluded contract
(b) if there exists no standard for ascertaining the actual

damages
(c) if compensation in money is not an adequate relief
(d) all the above.
26. Under section 10 which of the following can be

specifically enforced
(a) contingent contract
(b) to form a partnership
(c) chattel of special value
(d) separation deeds.

27. In case of specific performance of part of
contract the purchaser
(a) may relinquish claim to further performance of the
remaining part of contract and has right to compensation
(b) may not relinquish claim to further performance of the

remaining part of contract and has no right to
compensation
(c) specific performance of part of contract not possible
(d) none of above.
28. Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 has no

application when the transfer has been affected in
respect of a property
(a) in which vendor has no title or has an imperfect title
(b) in which vendor has title
(c) in which vendor has imperfect title
(d) none of above.
29. Within the meaning of section 15 of the Specific

Relief Act, 1963, the assignee falls
(a) within the meaning of representative in interest or
principal
(b) representative of interest only
(c) representative of principal only

(d) none of above.
30. Remedy of rectification available under section

26 relates to
(a)mistake in expression of contract only
(b)the contract itself i.e. the formation of the contract
(c) matters which were overlooked by the parties
(d) addition of terms in the agreement which was not

considered.
31. Mistake contemplated under section 26 is

(a) mutual mistake
(b) bilateral mistake
(c) mistake in framing of the instrument
(d) all the above.
32. Section 26 fixes the time limit for discovery of

mistake or fraud to be
(a) six months
(b) three months
(c) 1 year
(d) no time limit is fixed.
33. Remedy of rescission of contract

(a) is the same as specific performance
(b) is opposite of specific performance
(c) does not affect specific performance
(d) makes specific performance easy.
34. Relief of rescission is granted in cases

(a) where the contract is void
(b) where the contract is voidable
(c) both void & voidable contracts
(d) neither void nor voidable contracts.
35. Rescission cannot be granted

(a) where the plaintiff has ratified the contract
(b) where there is a valid contract
(c) where the third party have acquired any interest under
the contract
(d) all the above.
36. Rescission cannot be granted

(a) in severeable contracts
(b) where the restitution to original position not possible
(c) contract stands ratified
(d) all the above.
37. Cancellation of instrument can be granted

(a) if the instrument is void or void-able
(b) if the instrument is valid
(c) both (a) & (b)
38. Section 31 in its application is

(a) based on protective or preventive justice
(b) restricted to contracts only
(c) restricted to the parties to the contract
(d) mandatory in nature.
39. Cancellation under section 31 can be claimed

(a) by party to the instrument
(b) by any person against whom the instrument is void or

voidable
(c) in respect of any instrument not necessarily a contract
(d) all the above.
40. In case of cancellation under section 31 the

relief of specific performance
(a) can be supplemented
(b) can be in the alternative
(c) out of question

(d) all the above.
41. Cancellation under section 31 relates to

(a) mistake in expression of any instrument
(b) formation of the instrument
(c) ratification of the instrument
(d) all the above.
42. Under section 33 compensation is payable if

(a) the benefit have been received by the party
(b) the contract is without considera-tion
(c) in both (a) & (b)
43. Under section 32 an instrument can be cancelled

in part when
(a) it relates to different rights
(b) it relates to different obligations
(c) the part to be cancelled is severable from the rest
(d) all the above.
44. Under section 34, a declaration can be sought by

(a) a stranger who has no interest
(b) a person having a legal character or a right as to
property which is denied
(c) a person whose legal character or right to property not

denied
(d) all the above.
45. Section 34 sanctions

(a) every type of declaration
(b) only a declaration of a legal character or of a right to

property
(c) both (a) & (b)
46. Character or right sought to be declared must be

(a) an existing right on the date of the suit or upto the date
of decree
(b) legal one
(c) valid one
(d) all the above.
47. Legal character or right under section 34 must

be
(a) specific
(b) abstract
(c) contingent
48. Proviso to section 34 relates to

(a) suits for specific performance
(b) suits for declaration
(c) suits for injunctions
(d) all the above.
49. The further relief under section 34 must be

(a) the one available as additional on the date of the suit
(b) the one available after the filing of the suit
(c) the one available as alternative on the date of the suit
(d) the one available as alternative during the pendency of

the suit.
50. The objection as to maintainability of suit of

declaration without further relief
(a) must be taken at the earliest stage
(b) can be taken at any step of the
proceedings
(c) can be taken for the first time in appeal
(d) all the above.

51. A declaration made is binding on
(a) the parties to the suit
(b) persons claiming through the parties to the suit
(c) where any party is a trustee, in the persons for whom

such parties would be trustees
(d) all the above.
52. The grant or refusal of relief of declaration and

injunction under the provisions of section 34 is
(a) discretionary
(b) mandatory
(c) prohibitory
(d) none of above.
53. Injunctions cannot be granted in a suit

(a) in which the specific performance cannot be enforced
(b) for breach of negative contract to enforce specific

performance
(c) for declaration where the plaintiff is in possession
54. What is true of temporary injunction

(a) continues until a certain specific time
(b) is permanent between the parties

(c) concludes the right
(d) cannot be granted ex-parte.
55. Which is incorrect of temporary injunctions

(a) continues until a specific time
(b) finally settles the mutual rights of the parties & directs
a party for all time to do or obtain from doing a thing
(c) can be granted ex-parte
(d) preserves the property in dispute in status quo till the

disposal of the suit.
56. The general principles on which the , perpetual

injunctions could be granted are contained in
(a) Section 37
(b) Section 38
(c) Section 39
(d) Section 40.
57. What is true of perpetual injunction

(a) it is a judicial process
(b) preventive in nature
(c) the thing prevented is a wrongful act
(d) all the above.

58. Injunction is granted
(a) to prevent torts
(b) to restrain breaches of contracts
(c) both (a) & (b)
59. What is true of mandatory injunction

(a) compels performance of certain positive acts
(b) is awarded where the temporary injunction is

meaningless
(c) is retrospective in nature as restores things to their

former conditions
(d) all the above.
60. Perpetual injunction can be granted under

section 38 of the Act
(a) when there exists standard for ascertaining the actual
damages caused
(b) when compensation would afford adequate remedy
(c) when it is necessary to prevent multiplicity of

proceedings
(d) when the defendant is not a trustee of property for the

plaintiff.
61. Perpetual injunction under section 38 can be
granted
(a) when there exists no standard for ascertaining the
actual damages caused
(b) when compensation would not afford adequate relief
(c) when the defendant is a trustee of the property for the

plantiff
(d) all the above.
62. A claim for damages in suits for injunction can

be laid
(a) under section 38
(b) under section 39
(c) under section 40
(d) under section 37.
63. Damages in suits for injunctions cannot be

granted
(a) if the plaintiff has not claimed damages
(b) if the suit of the plaintiff is dismissed
(c) both (a) & (b)

64. Section 10 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
provides for
(a) the contracts which can be specifically enforced
(b) the contracts which cannot be specifically enforced
65. Section 10 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963,

applies to
(a) promises which are not completed contracts
(b) completed contracts which are valid in law and capable

of enforcement
(c) inchoate agreements
(d) all the above.
66. In cases of specific performance of a contract,

the rights of the parties are governed by the
principles of
(a) equity
(b) law
(c) equity and law
(d) only equity and not law.

67. Under section 10 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963,
which of the following contracts can be specifically
enforced
(a) a written agreement whereby the defendant had agreed
with the plaintiff to take the lease of a house for a certain
term at a certain rent subject to the preparation and
approval of a formal contract, no other contract has even
been entered into between the parties
(b) an agreement to transfer certain properties subject to

sanction by the sanctioning authority
68. Specific performance of a contract means

(a) actual execution of the contract according to its
stipulation and terms
(b) claim of damages or compensation for the non-

execution of the contract
69. Jurisdiction of the court to enforce specific

performance of a contract is
(a) absolute
(b) discretionary
(c) general & not exceptional
(d) extensive.
70. Specific performance of a contract

(a) will be ordered generally where damages are an
adequate remedy
(b) may be ordered where damages are an adequate

remedy
(c) will never be ordered if damages are an adequate

remedy
(d) may not be ordered if damages are an adequate

remedy.
71. In which of the following cases, the specific

performance of a contract will not be ordered
(a) where pecuniary compensation would afford adequate
relief
(b) where the acts would require continued supervision by

the court
(c) where the contract provides for personal affirmative

acts or personal service
(d) all the above.
72. Specific performance of contract to build or

repair can be ordered
(a) where the plaintiff has a substantial interest in the
performance of the contract and he cannot be
compensated adequately in damages
(b) where the plaintiff has a substantial interest in the

performance of a contract but he can be compensated in
damages
(c) where the plaintiff has no substantial interest in the

performance of the contract and can be compensated in
damages
(d) all the above.

provides for
(a) the grounds on which specific performance of contract
can be granted
(b) the defences which a person against whom the relief of

specific performance is claimed may plead
(c) the defences which a person against whom the relief of

specific performance is claimed cannot plead
(d) the grounds on which specific performance of a

contract cannot be granted.
74. Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1930, lays

down that in a suit for specific performance of a
contract
(a) the defendant can plead all the defences available to
the defendant in a suit for damages for breach of a
contract
(b) the defendant cannot plead the defences available to

the defendant in a suit for damages for breach of a
contract
(c) the defendant can plead the defences available to the

defendant in a suit for damages for breach of a contract,
only with the permission of the court
75. An agreement to form a partnership

(a) is enforced as a general rule
(b) is enforced where parties have in part performance of

the contract carried on the partnership business
76. The propositions are

I. A contract for the sale of a patent can be
specifically enforced.
II. A contract to assign a copyright is specifically
enforceable.
III. An agreement to form a partnership is
specifically enforceable as a general rule.
Which of the following is true in respect of the said
propositions
(a) III is correct and I & II are incorrect
(b) III & II are correct and I is incorrect
(c) III & I are correct and II is incorrect
(d) I & II are correct and III is incorrect.
77. Specific performance of a contract can be

granted in respect of
(a) immovable property
(b) chattels
(c) immovable property as well as chattels
78. Rise in value since agreement is

(a) a ground to refuse specific per-formance in case of an
agreement to sell immovable property
(b) a ground to refuse specific per-formance in case of an

agreement to sell movable property
(c) a ground to refuse specific per-formance in case of an

agreement to sell immovable and movable property both
(d) not a ground to refuse specific performance in case of

an agreement to sell either immovable or movable
property. 79. Explanation to section 10 of the Specific
Relief Act, 1963, lays down
(a) certain presumptions of fact
(b) certain rebuttable presumptions of law
(c) certain irrebuttable presumptions of law
(d) certain conclusive presumptions.

the presumption is that
(a) breach of a contract to transfer immovable property
cannot be adequately compensated in money
(b) breach of a contract to transfer movable property

cannot be adequately compensated in money
(c) breach of a contract to transfer immovable property can

be adequately compensated in money

provides for
(a) specific performance of a part of the contract
(b) defences respecting suits for relief based on contract
(c) specific performance of contracts connected with trusts
(d) circumstances in which specific performance of a

contract is enforceable.
82. Section 11 of the Specific Relief Act,
1930 applies where
(a) the relief claimed partakes the nature of
the specific performance
(b) the enforcement of an obligation is in the
nature of trust
83. A contract made by a trustee in excess of his

powers or in breach of trust, under section 11 of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963 is
(a) specifically enforceable at the instance of the trustee
(b) specifically enforceable at the instance of the second

party
(c) specifically enforceable either at the instances of the

trustee or at the instance of a second party
(d) not specifically enforceable.
84. Specific performance of a part of the contract,

has been dealt with under
(a) section 12 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
(b) section 10 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963

(c) section 11 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
(d) section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

the general rule is that
(a) the specific performance of a part of the contract can
be granted
(b) the specific performance of a part of the contract shall

not be granted
(c) the specific performance of a part of the contract may

not be granted
(d) a contract can be performed in piecemeal.

permits the grant of specific performance of a part
of a contract
(a) where the part left unperformed bears only a small
portion of the whole in value and admits of compensation
in money
(b) where the part left unperformed is a substantial portion

of the whole in value and admits of compensation in money
(c) where the part left unperformed is a small portion of the

whole in subject matter and does not admit a
compensation in money

87. Under section 12(2) of the Specific Relief Act,
1963, part performance of a contract can be
enforced by
(a) the promisor
(b) the promisee
(c) either the promisor or the promisee
(d) only promisor and not the promisee.
88. Section 12(3) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963,

applies where the part which remains unperformed,
of the contract is
(a) small
(b) considerable
(c) inconsiderable
89. For section 12(4) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963,

to apply
(a) the parts of the contract must be divisible
(b) the part that can be specifically enforced is

independent and separate from the other part

90. Contracts not specifically enforceable have been
enumerated in
91. Preventive relief is granted by the court, under

section 36 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
(a) by declarations
(b) by specific performance
(c) by injunctions

classifies injunction into
(a) two
(b) three
(c) four
(d) five.

provides that a perpetual injunction can be granted
(a) during the pendency of a suit
(b) by the decree
94. An injunction granted during the pendency of a

suit, under section 37 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
is known as a
(a) perpetual injunction
(b) mandatory injunction
(c) temporary injunction
(d) either (a) or,(c).

a temporary injunction can be granted
(a) on or before the settlement of issues
(b) before the conclusion of plaintiff’s evidence
(c) before the conclusion of defendant’s evidence
(d) at any stage of the suit.
96. Grant of temporary injunctions by virtue of

section 37 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, is
regulated by
(a) the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(b) the Indian Contract Act, 1872

(c) the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
(d) all the above.
97. The circumstances under which a perpetual

injunction can be granted have been enumerated
under
98. On the principles laid down under section 38 of

the Specific Relief Act, 1963, perpetual injunction
can be granted in cases of
(a) contracts
(b) torts
99. The principle of qua timet means

(a) some future probable injury to the rights or interests of
a person
(b) some past injury to the rights or interests of a person

(c) some past injury to the rights or interests of a person
requires
(d) some small injury capable of being estimated in money.
100. Grant of a mandatory injunction is regulated by

(a) section 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 ;
(c) section 40 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 .
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100 sample questions on The Limitation Act, 1963 for Uttar

1. All instruments for the purpose of Limitation Act,

1963 shall be deemed to be made with reference to
(a) Gregorian Calendar
ADVERTISEMENTS:
(b) English Calendar
(c) Roman Calendar
(d) Swis Calendar.
2. The Limitation Act, 1963 applies to

ADVERTISEMENTS:
(a) proceedings before courts
(b) proceedings before an executive authority
(c) proceedings before a quasi-judicial tribunal
(d) all the above.
ADVERTISEMENTS:
3. Period spent in prosecuting the case before the

Consumer Forum can be
(a) partly excluded
(b) included
(c) excluded
ADVERTISEMENTS:
(d) partly included.
4. Under the Limitation Act, 1963, the court has no…

power, outside the Act, to relieve a litigant from the
provisions of the Act
(a) general
(b) inherent
ADVERTISEMENTS:
(c) over-riding
(d) general or inherent or over-riding.
5. Which of the following statements is correct as

regards the sections and the articles in the
Limitation Act, 1963
(a) the sections and the articles lay down the general
principles of jurisdiction
(b) the sections and the articles prescribe the period of

limitation
(c) the sections lay down the general principles of

jurisdiction and the articles prescribe the period of
limitation applicable in matters provided therein
(d) the sections prescribe the period of limitation applicable
in matters provided therein ana the articles lay down the
general principles of jurisdiction.
6. If the money suit filed within three years from the

date on which cause of action arises then the suit
(a) does not relate to Limitation Act
(b) is not barred by limitation
(c) is barred by limitation
(d) depends on application for condonation of delay.
7. The Limitation Act, 1963 applies to

(a) the whole of India except the State of Jammu and
Kashmir
(b) the whole of India including the State of Jammu and

Kashmir
(c) the whole of India except the North- Eastern States of

India
(d) the whole of India except the State of Jammu and

Kashmir and the North- Eastern States of India.
8. Delay in filing the suit

(a) cannot be condoned
(b) can be condoned under section 3, Limitation Act
(c) can be condoned under Order VII, Rule 6, C.P.C.

(d) can be condoned under section 5, Limitation Act.
9. Under section 2(1) of Limitation Act suit includes

(a) appeal
(b) application
10. Under section 2(1) of Limitation Act suit includes

(a) appeal
(b) application
(c) execution
11. Section 3 Limitation Act does not apply to

(a) suits
(b) appeals
(c) application
(d) execution.
12. Under section 3, Limitation Act, 1963, a claim by

way of is treated as a cross-suit
(a) set-off
(b) counter-claim
(c) set-off or counter-claim
(d) set-off and counter-claim.
13. Under section 3, Limitation Act, 1963 cross suit

by way of set-off shall be deemed to have been
instituted
(a) on the same day as the suit in which setoff is pleaded
has been filed
(b) on the day on which the set-off is pleaded
(c) either (a) or (b) whichever is beneficial to the defendant
(d) either (a) or (b) whichever is beneficial to the plaintiff.
14. Counter-claim, under section 3, Limitation Act,

1963, shall be deemed to have been instituted
(a) on the same day as the suit in which counter-claim is
made has been filed
(b) on the day on which the counter-claim is made
(c) either (a) or (b) whichever is beneficial to the defendant
(d) either (a) or (b) whichever is beneficial to the plaintiff.
15. Section 3, Limitation Act, 1963, does not apply

to
(a) suits
(b) appeals
(c) applications
(d) execution proceedings.
16. The provisions of section 3, Limitation Act [ are

(a) mandatory
(b) directory
(c) discretionary
(d) optional.
17. Under section 3, Limitation Act, 1963 the court is

required to consider the question of limitation
(a) only when objection to limitation is raised by the
defendant
(b) only when the defendant does not confess judgment
(c) only when the defendant does not admit his liability
(d) suo motu even when the defendant has not taken any
objection of limitation or has confessed judgment or has
admitted this liability in the written statement.
18. A suitor, under section 3, Limitation Act, 1963 I

(a) can be relieved of the bar of limitation on the ground of
hardship, mistake or injustice
(b) can be relieved of the bar of limitation on the ground

that its application would be inconsistent with the
principles of natural justice
(c) can be relieved of the bar of limitation on the ground of
equitable considerations
(d) cannot be relieved on the ground either (a) or (b) or (c).
19. Section 3, Limitation Act is applicable to the i

period of limitation prescribed by any
(a) local law
(b) special law
20. Section 3, Limitation Act,’l963 is

(a) an independent section in its operation and effect
(b) not an independent section in its operation and effect,

and is subject to and controlled by sections 4 to 24
(c) not an independent section in its operation and effect

and is subject to and controlled by sections 4 to 27
(d) not an independent section in its operation and effect

and in respect to and controlled by sections 4 to 32.
21.For the purposes of section 3, Limitation Act,

1963, limitation is checked
(a) when the plaint is actually presented in the proper court
(b) when the plaint is presented even in a court not

competent to try the suit
(c) when the plaint in presented by the part
(d) all the above.
22. A time barred debt can be claimed

(a) as a set off
(b) as a counter claim
(c) as a fresh suit
23. Under the Limitation Act, 1963, the court has no

power to extend the limitation on the ground of
(a) equitable considerations
(b) hardship
(c) necessary implication
24. Section 4 of Limitation Act applies to

(a) suits
(b) appeal & applications
25. Section 5, Limitation Act, is

(a) applicable to the proceedings under section 34,
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the time limit
prescribed under section 34 can be extended generally
(b) not applicable to the proceedings under section 34,

Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 and the time limit
prescribed under section 34 is absolute and unextendable
(c) applicable to the proceedings under section 34,

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and time limit
prescribed under section 34 can be extended only in
exceptional circumstances
(d) not applicable to the proceedings under section 34

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996-however, the time
limit prescribed under section 34 can be extended under
inherent powers of the court.
26. Section 4, Limitation Act, 1963 applies where the

case is governed by
(a) the Limitation Act, 1963
(b) any local law
(c) any special law
27. An application for leave to contest the eviction

proceedings before the Rent Controller attracts
(a) section 4, Limitation Act, 1963
(b) section 10, General Clauses Act, 1897
28. Section 4, Limitation Act, 1963 applies

(a) where a certain period has been prescribed by a statute
(b) where a certain period is fixed by agreement of parties
(c) where a certain date is fixed by agreement of parties
(d) all the above.
29. In order to attract section 4, Limitation Act, 1963

(a) the court should be closed for the whole of the day
(b) it is not necessary that the court should be closed for

the whole day and it is sufficient if the court is Closed
during any part of its normal working hours
(c) the court should be closed for substantial part of the

day if not for the whole of the day
(d) the court should be closed for more than half of the
normal working hours.
30. The extension of time granted by section 4,

Limitation Act ,1963
(a) can be combined with section 5, Limitation Act
(b) can be combined with section 12, Limitation Act

(c) can be combined with section 5 and section 12,
Limitation Act
(d) cannot be combined with section 5 and section 12,

Limitation Act.

(a) suit
(b) appeal & application
(c) execution
(d) all the above.

(a) suits
(b) execution of a decree

(a) suits
(b) execution
(c) election petitions

34. In matters of condonation of delay under section
5, Limitation Act the Government, has to be
accorded
(a) treatment similar to a private citizen and no latitude is
permissible
(b) treatment stricter than a private citizen as the

Government is supposed to act in a more responsible
manner
(c) treatment similar to a private citizen, however, certain

amount of latitude is not impermissible
35. For condonation of delay under section 5,

Limitation Act, 1963
(a) length of delay is the only criterion
(b) length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the

explanation is the only criterion
(c) length of delay certainly matters apart from the

acceptability of the explanation
36. In the matters of condonation of delay under

section 5, Limitation Act 1963, relating to
Government
(a) strict proof of everyday’s delay by the Government
should not be insisted upon
(b) strict proof of everyday’s delay by the Government
should be insisted upon
(c) strict proof of everyday’s delay by the Government may

not be insisted upon
(d) strict proof of everyday’s delay by the Government may

be insisted upon.
37. In the matters of condonation of delay under

section 5, Limitation Act, 1963, public institutions
like banks should
(a) be treated at par with private individuals
(b) be treated at par with private institutions
(c) be treated at par with corporate body
(d) neither be treated at par with (a), nor (b), nor (c).
38. Section 5, Limitation Act 1963, can

(a) be availed of for the purposes of extending the period
of limitation prescribed by any local law unless such focal
law excludes the applicability of section 5
(b) be availed of for the purposes of extending the period

of limitation prescribed by any special law unless such
special law excludes the applicability of section 5
(c) not be availed for the purposes of extending the period

or limitation prescribed by any local or special law unless
such local or special law expressly makes section 5,
Limitation Act applicable
(d) (a) and (b) both.
39. The delay under section 5, Limitation Act, 1963

can be condoned on
(a) an oral application
(b) a verbal application
(c) a written application
40. An application for condonation of delay under

section 5, Limitation Act
(a) has to be considered by the court on merits and order
has to be passed with reasons
(b) has to be considered by the courts on merits-however,

the order need not be passed with reasons
(c) has to be considered by the court on merits-however,

the order may not be passed with reasons
(d) has to be considered by the court on merits-however, it

is discretionary for the court to pass order with or without
reasons.

(a) suits
42. Section 6 of Limitation Act does not apply to

(a) suits
(c) appeal
(d) all the above.
43. Section 6 of Limitation Act can be availed by

(a) plaintiff(s)
(b) defendant(s)
44. Legal disabilities are

(a) minority
(b) insanity
(c) idiocy
(d) all the above.

(a) insolvent
(b) minor
(c) insane
(d) idiot.

(a) suits
(c) suits to enforce rights of pre-emption
47. Period of limitation stands extended, by virtue of

section 6 of Limitation Act for a maximum period of
(a) 1 year
(b) 3 years
(c) 6 years
(d) 12 years.
48. Can a plea of limitation be

(a) waived by a party
(b) ignored by the court
(c) waived by both the parties by consent

49. Time which has begun to run can be stopped in
case of
(a) minority
(b) insanity
(c) idiocy
50. Section 6 of Limitation Act does apply in cases of

(a) illness
(b) poverty
(c) insolvency
51. In computing the period of limitation for appeal,

review or revision, the time requisite for obtaining a
copy of the decree or order appealed shall be
excluded under
(a) section 12(1)
(b) section 12(2)
(c) section 13(3)
(d) section 14(4).
52. In computing the period of limitation for

application to set aside an award, the time requisite
in obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded
under
(a) section 12(1)
(b) section 12(2)
(c) section 12(3)
(d) section 12(4).
53. Limitation for filing an appeal commences from

(a) the date of judgment
(b) the date of signing of the decree
(c) the date of application for copy of the judgment
(d) the date of availability of copy of the judgment.
54. ‘Time requisite’ under section 12(2) of Limitation

Act means
(a) minimum time
(b) maximum time
(c) actual time taken
(d) absolutely necessary time.
55. Time excluded has to be considered on the basis

of
(a) information available from the copy of judgment/decree
placed on record
(b) information as to copies obtained by the parties for
court purposes
(c) information as to copies obtained by the parties for

other purposes
(d) information as to copies not placed on record but made

available to the court.

(a) suit filed in forma pauperis
(b) appeal filed in forma pauperies
57. Under section 13 of Limitation Act, the time is

excluded
(a) if the application for leave to sue or appeal as a pauper
is allowed
(b) if the application for leave to sue or appeal as a pauper

is rejected
(c) in both the cases
(d) in none of the case.
58. Section 14 & section 5 of Limitation Act are

(a) independent of each other
(b) mutually exclusive of each other
(c) both independent & mutually exclusive
(d) neither independent nor mutually exclusive.
59. Under section 14 defect in jurisdiction must

relate to
(a) territorial jurisdiction
(b) pecuniary jurisdiction
(c) subject matter jurisdiction
60. Section 15 excludes from computation of

limitation
(a) period of notice
(b) time taken in granting previous consent
(c) time taken in grant of sanction
(d) all the above.
61. Section 15 does not apply to

(a) suits
(b) appeal
(c) execution application

62. Period during which proceedings stand stayed
by an injunction or order is excluded
(a) under section 14
(b) under section 15
(c) under section 13
(d) under section 16.

(a) suits
(b) execution applications
(c) both suits & execution applications
(d) neither suits nor execution proceedings.
64. Time taken in proceedings to set aside the sale,

in suit for possession by a purchaser in execution, is
liable to be excluded
(a) under section 15(4)
(b) under section 15(2)
(c) under section 15(3)

(a) suits to enforce rights of pre-emption
(b) suits for possession of immovable property

(c) suits to enforce right to a hereditary office
66. Section 17 takes within its ambit

(a) frauds
(b) mistakes
(c) concealments
(d) all the above.
67. Section 17, Limitation Act, 1963, does not apply

to
(a) criminal proceedings
(b) civil proceedings
(c) execution proceedings
(d) both (a) and (c).
68. The fraud contemplated by section 17, Limitation

Act, 1963 is that of
(a) the plaintiff
(b) the defendant
(c) a third person

69. Whether a plaintiff could with reasonable
diligence have discovered the fraud or mistake
under section 17, Limitation Act, is a
(a) question of fact to be decided on the basis of facts
disclosed in each case
(b) question of law
(c) mixed question of fact and law
(d) substantial question of law.
70. Under section 17, Limitation Act, 1963, the

limitation starts running from
(a) the date of the mistake
(b) the date of discovery of mistake
(c) either (a) or (b), depending on the facts and

circumstances or the case
(d) either (a) or (b), as per the discretion of the court.
71. In case of mistake, under section 17, Limitation

Act, 1963, the limitation shall start running from
(a) the date of the mistake
(b) the date when the mistake with due diligence could
have been discovered
(c) either (a) or (b), whichever is earlier
(d) either (a) or (b), whichever is beneficial to the suitor.

(a) suits
(b) execution proceedings
(c) both suits and execution proceed-ings
(d) neither to suits nor to execution proceeding.
73. Section 17 does not take within its ambit

(a) suits
(b) appeals
(d) all the above.
74. Under section 19, Limitation Act, 1963

(a) payment by cheque which is dishonoured on
presentation amounts to part payment and shall save
limitation
(b) payment by cheque which is dishonoured on

presentation does not amount to part payment and will not
save limitation
(c) mere handing over the cheque which is dishonoured on

presenta-tion amounts to acknowledgment

75. Which of the following is not required for a valid
acknowledgement
(a) in writing
(b) made before the expiration of period of limitation
(c) signed by the person concerned
(d) in the handwriting of the person concerned.
76. Section 22 refers to cases of

(a) continuing breach of contract
(b) successive breach of contract
(c) both continuing & successive breaches
(d) neither continuing nor successive breaches.
77. Under section 25 the easement rights are

acquired by continuous & uninterrupted user
(a) for 12 years
(b) for 20 years
(c) for 30 years
(d) for 3 years.
78. Under section 25, the easement rights over the

property belonging to the Government are acquired
by continuous & uninterrupted user
(a) for 12 years
(b) for 20 years
(c) for 30 years
(d) for 60 years.
79. A suit against the obstruction in the enjoyment

of easementary rights acquired under section 25
must be filed
(a) within 2 years of such obstruction
(b) within 1 year of such obstruction
(c) within 3 years of such obstruction
(d) within 12 years of such obstruction.
80.Which is correct
(a) limitation bars the judicial remedy
(b) limitation extinguishes the right
(c) limitation is a substantive law
(d) limitation bars the extra judicial remedies.
81.Which is not correct of law of limitation

(a) limitation bars the judicial remedies
(b) limitation is an adjective law
(c) limitation extinguishes the right
(d) limitation is a procedural law.

82.Which is not correct of law of limitation
(a) limitation bars the judicial remedies
(b) limitation is negative in its operation
(c) limitation is a procedural law
(d) limitation bars the extra judicial remedies.
83.A suit for possession based on the right of

previous possession & not on title can be filed
(a) within one year of dispossession
(b) within three years of dispossession
(c) within twelve years of dispossession
(d) within six months of dispossession.
84.A suit for possession of immovable property

based on title can be filed
(a) within one year
(b) within three years
(c) within twelve years
(d) within six months.
85.For a suit filed by or on behalf of Central

Government or any State Government, the period of
limitation is
(a) one year
(b) three years
(c) twelve years
(d) thirty years.
86. In England, the law of limitation can be

(a) waived by the party entitled to the benefit thereof
(b) is indefinite & flexible
(c) is variable
(d) all the above.
87. Law of limitation is

(a) lex loci
(b) lex fori
(c) non-obstante
(d) all the above.
88. Under section 21, a suit is deemed to have been

instituted, in case of a new plaintiff
impleaded/added
(a) on the date on which the new plaintiff is impleaded
(b) on the date on which the suit was initially instituted
(c) on the date on which the application for impleading a

new plaintiff is made
89. Under section 21, qua a defendant a suit is

deemed to have been instituted against a newly
added defendant
(a) on the date on which the new defendant is impleaded
(b) on the date on which the suit was initially instituted
(c) on the date on which the application for impleading a

new defendant is made
90. Under section 21, can the court direct the suit to
have been instituted on an earlier date
(a) yes, if the omission to include the party was due to a
mistake made in good faith
(b) yes, if the omission to include party was deliberate
(c) in both (a) & (b)
91. Section 21 does not apply in

(a) cases of adding of a new plaintiff for the first time
(b) cases of adding of a new defendant for the first time
(c) cases of transposition of parties

92. Section 21 does not apply in
(a) cases of devolution of interest during the pendency of
the suit
(b) cases of assignment of interest during the pendency of

the suit
(c) case of transposition of a plaintiff as a defendant & vice-

versa
(d) all the above.
93. Section 21 applies only to

(a) suits
(b) appeals & application
(c) executions
(d) all the above.
94. Law of limitation has to be strictly construed. In

view of the same section 5 of Limitation Act has to
be construed
(a) strictly
(b) liberally
(c) harmoniously
(d) ejusdem-generis.
95. Easementary rights under section 25 can be
acquired by
(a) tenant
(b) a co-owner
(c) both a tenant and a co-owner
(d) neither a tenant nor a co-owner.
96. Section 27 of Limitation Act

(a) bars the remedy
(b) extinguishes the right
(c) both (a) & (b)

(a) suits
(b) appeals
(d) all the above.
98. Section 27 of Limitation Act does not extinguish

the right in
(a) suits
(b) appeals
(d) all the above.

cases for recovery of possession
(a) where no limitation period has been prescribed
(b) where the limitation period has been prescribed
(c) Doth (a) & (b)
100. Which is true of acknowledgements

(a) extends the period of limitation
(b) confers an independent right on a person
(c) confers a title on the person
(d) all the above.
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100 sample questions on
Mohammedan Law for Andhra
(preliminary)
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100 sample questions on Mohammedan Law for Andhra

1. Religion taught by the Prophet Mohammed is

(a) Islam
ADVERTISEMENTS:
(b) Mohammedan
(c) Muslim
(d) all the above.
2. System developed by the Muslim doctors is

ADVERTISEMENTS:
(a) Mohammedan law
(b) Fiqh
(c) Muslim law
(d) all the above.
ADVERTISEMENTS:
3. Which of the following is Arabian virtue

(a) hospitality
(b) fortitude
(c) manliness
ADVERTISEMENTS:
(d) all the above.
4. Muta under Mohammedan law means

(a) a temporary marriage
(b) a permanent marriage
ADVERTISEMENTS:
(c) a joint venture marriage
(d) an illegal marriage.
5. Muta marriages are allowed today by the

(a) Sunnite Schools of Mohammedan law
(b) Shiites Schools of Mohammedan law
(c) Ithna Ashari School of Mohammedan Law
(d) all the above.
6. Muta marriages are considered to be illicit by

(a) Sunnite School of Mohammedan law
(b) Ismailis
(c) Zaydis
(d) all the above.
7. Islam in Arabic means

(a) submission to the will of God
(b) deliberate adoption of a new faith
(c) adoption of the faith of Islam
(d) all the above.
8. Religion of Islam is essentially

(a) monotheistic
(b) polytheistic
(c) paganistic
(d) either (b) or (c) and not (a).
9. Strict monotheism is the creed of

(a) Jews
(b) Christians
(c) both Jews and Christians
(d) neither Jews nor Christians.
10. Hadith
(a) are the very words of God
(b) are the traditions of the Prophet – the records of his

action and his sayings
(c) are the dictates of secular reason in accordance with

certain definite principles
(d) all the above.
11. According to Shariat the kinds of religious

injunctions are
(a) nine
(b) seven
(c) five
(d) three.
12. Formal sources of Islamic law are

(a) two
(b) four
(c) six
(d) seven.
13. Islamic law is formally contained in

(a) Koran
(b) Hadith
(c) Ijma & Giyas
(d) all the above.
14. Originator of the Modern theory of Islamic law is

(a) Ignaz Goldziher
(b) Bergstrasser
(c) Sahacht
(d) Shafi.
15. Shariat Act, 1937 came into operation on

(a) 7th January, 1937
(b) 7th April, 1937
(c) 7th July, 1937
(d) 7th October, 1937.
16. Mohammedan law applies to
(a) all persons who are Muslims by birth
(b) all persons who are Muslims by conversion

(c) all persons who are Muslims either by birth or by
conversion
(d) all persons who are Muslims by birth only and not to
Muslims by conversion.
17. According to the Shariat, if one of the parents is

a Muslim, the child is to be treated as
(a) a Muslim
(b) belonging to the religion of the father
(c) belonging to the religion of the mother
(d) belonging to the religion mutually agreed by the

parents.
18. In India, if one of the parents is a Muslim, the

child is to be treated as
(a) belonging to the religion of the mother
(b) belonging to the religion of the father
(c) belonging to the religion mutually agreed by the

parents
(d) a Muslim.
19. Marriage in Islam is

(a) a contract
(b) a sacrament
(c) a contract as well as a sacrament
(d) either a contract or a sacrament.
20. Islamic law provides for

(a) monogamy
(b) unlimited polygamy
(c) controlled polygamy
(d) bigamy.
21. In Mohammedan law marriage is a

(a) contract for the legalisation of intercourse and the
procreation of children
(b) contract for the procreation of children
(c) contract for legalisation of intercourse
(d) contract for different forms of sex relationship.
22. Essential requirements of Muslim marriage are

(a) ijab
(b) qabul
(c) both ijab and qabul
(d) either ijab or qabul.
23. Witnesses to the marriage have been provided

under
(a) Hanafi law
(b) Shiite law
24. Marriage under Hanafi law must be

performed before
(a) two witnesses
(b) three witnesses
(c) four witnesses
(d) six witnesses.
25. Shiite law provides that

(a) marriage must be performed before one witness
(b) marriage must be performed before two witnesses
(c) marriage must be performed before one male & one

female witness
(d) for the marriage witnesses are not necessary.
26. For a valid Muslim marriage

(a) offer and acceptance must be at the same time
(b) offer and acceptance must be at the same place

(c) offer and acceptance must be at the same time and
place
(d) offer and acceptance may be at different times and at

different places.
27. Under Mohammedan law legal

incompetency to marriage means
(a) minority
(b) unsoundness of mind
(c) both minority as well as unsoundness of mind
(d) only unsoundness of mind & not minority.
28. In cases of legal incompetency in

Mohammedan law
(a) the guardians can validly enter into a contract of

marriage on behalf of their wards
(b) the guardians of a female only can validly enter into a

contract of marriage on behalf of the female
(c) the guardians of a male only can validly enter into a

contract of marriage on behalf of the male
(d) the guardians cannot validly enter into a contract of

marriage on behalf of their wards.
29. In Muslim law, the majority is attained at

(a) the age of 12 years
(b) the age of 9 years
(c) the age of 18 years
(d) the puberty.
30. A marriage entered into by a girl while she has

not attained puberty under Muslim law is a
(a) valid marriage
(b) void marriage
(c) voidable marriage
31. A marriage contracted by the guardian of a girl,

while she has not attained the puberty is a
(a) valid marriage
(b) valid marriage but the minor girl has a right to

repudiate the marriage on attaining majority
(c) void marriage
32. Option of puberty means

(a) a Muslim minor girl married during minority by a
guardian has a right to repudiate such marriage on
attaining puberty
(b) a Muslim minor girl married during minority by a
guardian has no right to repudiate such marriage on
attaining puberty
(c) a Muslim minor girl married during minority by a

guardian has a right to repudiate such marriage on
attaining puberty only with the permission of the court
(d) a Muslim minor girl married during minority by a

guardian can repudiate such marriage with the consent of
her husband.
33. ‘The option of puberty’ can be exercised by the

female before attaining the age of
(a) 21 years
(b) 18 years
(c) 15 years
34. Consummation of marriage before the age of

puberty
(a) deprives the wife of her option of puberty always
(b) deprives the wife of her option of puberty only under

certain circumstances
(c) does not deprive the wife of her option of puberty

35. Option of puberty is lost
(a) on consummation after attaining puberty
(b) on non-repudiation of marriage before attaining the age

of 18 years
(d) only (b) and not (a).
36. Option of puberty is available to

(a) wife only
(b) husband only
(c) wife and husband both
(d) only wife and not husband.
37. Husband married during minority

(a) has the same right to dissolve the marriage, but there is
no statutory period within which he must exercise such
right
(b) has the same right to dissolve the marriage, and has to
exercise that right before attaining the age of 15 years
(c) has the same right to dissolve the marriage and has to
exercise that right before attaining the age of 18 years
(d) has the same right to dissolve the marriage and has to
exercise that right before attaining the age of 21 years.
38. Husband married during minority loses his
right to repudiate the marriage on
(a) payment of dower
(b) cohabitation after attaining majority
39. Mere exercise of the option to repudiate the

marriage
(a) severes the marital tie
(b) does not severe the marital tie
(c) may severe the marital tie if consented to by the other

party
40. Zina in Mohammedan law means

(a) Sexual intercourse not permitted by law
(b) sexual intercourse permitted by law
(c) fornication or adultery
41. Offsprings of ‘Zina’ are

(a) illegitimate and can be legitimated by
acknowledgement
(b) illegitimate and cannot be legitimated by
acknowledgement
(c) legitimate
42. In Mohammedan law, a marriage may be

(a) sahih
(b) fasid
(c) batil
43. Main limitations to the capacity of a Muslim to

marry are
(a) three
(b) five
(c) seven
(d) eight.
44. A Muslim can marry any number of wives not

exceeding
(a) four
(b) three
(c) two
(d) one.
45. A Muslim can marry any number of wives not

exceeding four. If a Muslim marries a fifth wife, such
a marriage shall be
(a) valid
(b) irregular
(c) void
46. If a Muslim woman marries a second husband,

such a marriage shall be
(a) valid
(b) irregular
(c) void
47. Offsprings of a Muslim woman marrying second

husband shall be
(a) legitimate
(b) illegitimate but can be legitimised by subsequent

acknowledgement
(c) illegitimate and cannot be legitimised by any

subsequent acknowledgement
48.Muslims belonging to different schools of

Mohammedan law
(a) may intermarry freely with one another
(b) cannot intermarry freely with one another
(c) cannot intermarry at all
(d) can intermarry with one another only with the consent
of the Qazi.
49. ‘Kitabi’ and ‘Kitabiyya’ refer to

(a) a man and a woman respectively
(b) a woman and a man respectively
(c) a woman
(d) a man.
50. In India, the terms ‘Kitabi’ or ‘Kitabiyya’ applies

to
(a) Christians
(b) Jews
(c) both Christians and Jews
(d) only Christians and not Jews.
51. A man in Hanafi law can marry

(a) a Muslim woman
(b) a Kitabiyya
52. A man in Shiite law can marry in the nikah

(a) a Muslim woman
(b) a Kitabiyya
53. A Muslim man cannot marry

(a) a Muslim woman
(b) a Jews
(c) a Christian
(d) an idolateress or a fire-worshipper.
54. Marriage of a Muslim man with an idolateress or

a fire-worshipper shall be
(a) void
(b) irregular
(c) valid
55. A Muslim woman can marry

(a) a Muslim man
(b) a Kitabi
56. Marriage of a Muslim woman with a non- Muslim

shall be
(a) valid
(b) irregular
(c) void
57. On the apostasy of one of the parties to the

marriage, a Muslim marriage
(a) stands dissolved automatically
(b) remains valid
(c) becomes irregular
(d) stands dissolved after the decree of the court.
58. In Muslim Law marriage with a woman prohibited

by reason of blood relationship is
(a) valid & the issue legitimate
(b) irregular & the issue legitimate

(c) void but the issue legitimate
(d) void and the issue illegitimate.
59. A marriage of a Muslim man with his niece or

great niece is
(a) void
(b) irregular
(c) valid
(d) muta.
60. A Muslim is prohibited from marrying his sister

who is related to him
(a) by full blood
(b) by uterine blood
(c) a consanguine
(d) all the above.
61. A marriage of a Muslim with a woman prohibited

by reason of affinity shall be
(a) irregular
(b) void
(c) valid

62. A Muslim can marry the
(a) descendant of a wife, if the marriage with that wife has
not been consummated
(b) descendant of a wife, if the marriage with that wife has

been consummated
(c) descendant of a wife irrespective of whether the

marriage with that wife has been consummated or not
(d) descendant of a wife only with the leave of the Qazi.
63. A marriage with foster relations is

(a) prohibited absolutely
(b) permitted absolutely
(c) prohibited generally except certain foster relations
64. A marriage forbidden by reason of foster age is

(a) irregular
(b) void
(c) valid
65. With whom amongst the following a valid

marriage can be contracted
(a) foster-son’s sister
(b) foster-brother’s sister
(c) foster-sister’s mother
(d) all the above.
66. With whom a valid marriage can be contracted

by a Muslim
(a) ascendants or descendants of his wife
(b) the wife of any ascendant or descendant
67. A Muslim can contract a valid marriage with

(a) his consanguine or uterine sister
(b) his niece
68. Unlawful conjunction arises when a Muslim

marries two wives who are related to each other by
(a) consanguinity
(b) affirmity
(c) forsterage

69. A Muslim is prevented from marrying his wife’s
sister
(a) during the subsistence of marriage with his wife
(b) after the death of his wife
(c) after the divorce of his wife
(d) all the above.
70. Under Hanafi law, disregard to the bar of

unlawful conjunction renders the marriage
(a) valid & issues legitimate
(b) irregular & issues legitimate
(c) void & issues illegitimate
(d) void but issues legitimate.
71. Shia law does not provide for

(a) valid marriage
(b) irregular marriage
(c) void marriage
72. Marriages which are irregular under the Sunni

law, under the Shia law, the same are
(a) void marriages
(b) valid marriages

(c) voidable marriages
(d) either valid or void as decided by the Qazi.
73. A Muslim marriage is void when the prohibition

against marriage is
(a) perpetual and absolute
(b) temporary and relative
74. An irregular marriage can be terminated

(a) by the wife
(b) by the husband
(c) either by the wife or by the husband
(d) only by the husband and not the wife.

(a) before consummation
(b) after consummation
(c) either before or after consummation
(d) only before consummation & not after consummation.

(a) by saying ‘I have relinquished you’
(b) by divorce
(c) by the intervention of the court
(d) by either (a) or (b) or (c).
77. In an irregular marriage, the wife

(a) is entitled to dower if the marriage is consummated
before termination
(b) is entitled to dower if the marriage is not consummated

before termination
(c) is entitled to dower irrespective of whether

consummated or not
(d) not entitled to dower at all.
78. A wife of an irregular marriage is

(a) not bound to observe the iddat at all
(b) is bound to observe the iddat in case of death of the

husband
(c) is bound to observe the iddat in case of divorce
(d) is bound to observe iddat in case of death of the

husband or divorce if the marriage is consummated.
79. In an irregular marriage, the duration of iddat is

(a) four courses
(b) three courses

(c) two courses
(d) one course.
80. An irregular marriage

(a) creates mutual rights of inheritance between husband
and wife, if the marriage is consummated
(b) creates mutual rights of inheritance between husband

and wife, if the marriage is not consummated
(c) does not create mutual rights of inheritance between

husband and wife, irrespective of whether the marriage is
consummated or not
(d) does not create mutual rights of inheritance between

husband and wife, if the marriage is not consummated.
81. In the absence of a direct proof of a valid

marriage, a presumption of a valid marriage arises
(a) where there is a prolonged and continuous cohabitation
as husband and wife
(b) where a man acknowledges the woman as his wife
(c) where a man acknowledges the issue of the union as

legitimate
82. Which of the following is not a legal effect of a

valid Muslim marriage
(a) status of woman changes and she is subjected to the
husband’s school of law
(b) status of woman does not change and she is subject to

her own pre-marital school of law
(c) neither the husband nor the wife acquires any interest
in the property of the other by reason of marriage
(d) Mutual rights of inheritance are established.
83. A Shia male cannot contract a muta marriage

with
(a) a Mohammedan woman
(b) a Christian woman
(c) a fire-worshipper woman
(d) any other religion.
84. A Muslim woman can contract a muta marriage

with a
(a) Mohammedan
(b) Kitabi
(c) a fire-worshipper
85. A valid muta marriage must

(a) prescribe the period of cohabitation
(b) specify the dower
86. A marriage contracted as muta, shall be void

(a) if prescribes the period of cohabitation but does not
specify the dower
(b) if does not prescribe the period of cohabitation but

specifies the dower
(d) only (b) and not (a).
87. A marriage contracted as muta specifying the

dower, but not prescribing the period of
cohabitation
(a) shall be void
(b) may operate as a permanent marriage
(c) shall be presumed to be for a period of one year
(d) shall be presumed to be for a period of three years.
88. A contract of muta marriage can be put to an

end by the husband
(a) by divorce
(b) by hiba-i-muddat
(c) by both (a) and (b)
(d) by either (a) or (b).
89. During the term of muta marriage

(a) husband has a right to divorce
(b) wife has a right to divorce
(c) husband and the wife both have a right to divorce
(d) neither the husband nor the wife has a right to divorce.
90. In a muta marriage, the wife

(a) has a right to leave the husband before the expiry of
the term
(b) has a right to leave the husband before the expiry of

the term only with the permission of the Qazi
(c) has a right to leave the husband before the expiry of

the term only with the permission of the court
(d) has no right to leave the husband before the expiry of

the term.
91. A muta marriage is dissolved

(a) ipso-facto by the efflux of the period
(b) by death
(c) by hiba-e-muddat

92. On consummation of a muta marriage, the wife
is entitled to
(a) Half dower
(b) full dower
(c) double dower
(d) no dower.
93. If a muta marriage is not consummated, the wife

is entitled to
(a) no dower
(b) one third dower
(c) half dower
(d) full dower.
94. If the husband puts to an end the muta marriage

by way of hiba-e-muddat
(a) wife is entitled to full dower
(b) wife is entitled to double dower
(c) husband has a right to deduct the proportionate part of

the dower for the unexpired period
(d) husband has a discretion to fix and give the dower

according to the circumstances.
95. In case the wife leaves the husband before the
expiry of the term of the muta marriage
(a) wife is entitled to full dower
(b) wife is entitled to half dower
(c) husband has a discretion to fix and give the dower

according to the circumstances
(d) husband has a right to deduct the proportionate part of

the dower for the unexpired period.
96. On the expiry of the term of muta marriage the

wife is
(a) not bound to observe iddat
(b) bound to observe iddat if the marriage has been

consummated
(c) bound to observe iddat if the marriage has not been

consummated.
(d) bound to observe iddat irrespective of whether the

marriage has been consummated or not.
97. No iddat is necessary, in case of a muta

marriage
(a) where the marriage has not been consummated
(b) where the husband puts to an end the contract of

marriage by hiba-e-muddat
(c) where the wife leaves the husband before the expiry of
the term of cohabitation
(d) all the above.
98. Period of iddat prescribed in cases of dissolution

of muta marriage is
(a) four courses and 10 days
(b) four courses
(c) three courses
(d) two courses.
99. If there is evidence of the term for which the

muta marriage was fixed and cohabitation continues
after that term
(a) cohabitation after the expiry of the term shall be void
(b) muta marriage stands extended for the whole period of

cohabitation
(c) children conceived during the extended period shall be

illegitimate
100. ‘Dower’ under the Mohammedan law has been

defined as a sum of money or other property
presented by the husband to be paid or delivered to
the wife in consideration of marriage by
(a) Robertson Smith
(b) Ameer Ali
(c) Justice Mahmood
(d) Hamilton.
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5. 100 sample objective type questions on Hindu Laws for Preliminary
examination

Easements Act, 1882 for Madhya
(preliminary)
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25 sample questions on The Indian Easements Act, 1882

for Madhya Pradesh Judiciary Examination (preliminary)
25 sample questions on The Indian Easements Act, 1882

for Madhya Pradesh Judiciary Examination (preliminary)
1. The Indian Easements Act came into force on

ADVERTISEMENTS:
(a) 1st June 1882.
(b) 1st July 1882.
(c) 1st August 1882.
(d) 1st September 1882.
ADVERTISEMENTS:
2. Easement is an offshoot of the law of

(a) property
(b) limitation
(c) specific relief
ADVERTISEMENTS:
(d) contract
3. Which of the following is not an easement right?

(a) A, as the owner of certain house, has a right of way
thither over his neighbour B’s land for purposes connected
with the beneficial enjoyment of the house.
(b) A, as the owner of certain house, has a right to go on

his neighbour B’s land, and to take water for purposes of
his household, out of a spring therein.
ADVERTISEMENTS:
(c) A dedicates to the public the right to occupy the surface

e of certain land for the purpose of passing and re-passing.
(d) A, as the owner of a certain house, has the right to
conduct water from B’s stream to supply the fountains in
the garden attached to the house.
4. Easement is a right
(a) in rem
ADVERTISEMENTS:
(b) in personam
(d) in rem in general but in personam in exceptional cases.
5. Match the following

(I) dominant tenement (i) the owner of the land, for the
ben- ficial enjoyment of which, the right exists
(II) dominant owner (ii) the land on which the liability is

imposed
(III) servient owner (iii) the land, for the beneficial enjoy-
ment of which, the right exists
(IV) servient tenement (iv) the owner or occupier of the

land on which the liability is imposed
(a) (I)-(ii), (U)-(i), (IH)-(iv), (IV)-(iii)
(b) (I)-(iii), (II)-(i), (Ill)-(iv), (IV)-(ii)
(c) (I)-(iii), (Il)-(ii), (Ill)-(i), (IV)-(iv)

(d) (I)-(ii), (Il)-(iv), (Ill)-(i), (IV)-(iii)
6. Choose the correct answer

(a) There can be no easement without dominant tenement
and a servient tenement.
(b) Rights, which are by a community or class of persons by

virtue of a customary right, are not easement but are right
in gross.
(c) Both (a) and (b).
(d) Neither (a) nor (b).
7. The branches of the trees extended over the

neighbouring soil for a continuous length of time.
(a) the owner of the trees acquired no right over the land of
the neighbour.
(b) the owner of the trees acquired right over the land of
the neighbour.
(c) The neighbour acquired right over the portion of the

tree falling on his soil.
(d) The neighbour acquired right over the tree, since part
of the tree is falling on his soil.
8. Match the following

(I) continuous easement (i) A right of way annexed to A’s
house over B’s land.
(II) non-apparent easement(ii) Rights annexed to A’s land
to lead water thither across B’s land by an aqueduct and to
draw off water thence by a drain. The drain would be
discovered upon careful inspection by a person conversant
with such maters.
(III) discontinous (iii) A right annexed to easement B’s

house to receive light by the windows without obstruction
by his neighbour A.
(IV) apparent (iv) A right annexed to easement A’s house to
prevent B from building on his own land.
(a) (I)-(ii), (II)-(i), (Ill)-(iv), (IV)-(iii)
(b) (I)-(iii), (H)-(i), (Ill)-(iv), (IV)-(ii)
(c) (I)-(iii), (Il)-(ii), (IH)-(i), (IV)-(iv)
(d) (I)-(iii), (Il)-(iv), (Ill)-(i), (IV)-(ii)
9. Which of the following is not an ingredient of

easement?
(a) Easement must be a fractional right.
(b) Easement is a personal right.
(c) The dominant and the servient tenements must be

distinct.
(d) Easement is an incorporeal right in-rem.

10. Easement cannot be created by
(a) law
(b) grant
(c) necessity
(d) prescription
11. Easement by grant may be created

(a) expressly
(b) impliedly
(c) by presumption
(d) all the above

(a) Inconvenience is the test of easement of necessity.
(b) Easement by necessity can be claimed on availability of

alternative way.
13. Quasi-easement is
(a) that which is not being an easement of absolute
necessity, came into existence by presumed grant or
operation of law.
(b) one without which the property in question cannot be
enjoyed at all.
(c) one which is acquired by virtue of local custom.
(d) one that may be imposed by anyone in the

circumstances, and to the extent, in and to which he may
transfer his interest in the heritage on which the liability is
to be imposed.
14. Necessary conditions for creation of easement

by prescription are all, but one, of the following
(a) the right claimed must be certain
(b) enjoyment must be independent, peaceful without

interruption
(c) enjoyment must be for twenty five years and in case of

government estate, for fifty years
(d) without any agreement with the owner of servient land
15. Right which cannot be acquired by prescription

(a) A right for over 5 years.
(b) A right which has the effect of destroying the servient

tenement.
(c) A right to the free passage of light or air to an open

space or ground.
(d) A right to underground water not passing in a definite

channed.
(a) Customary rights under Section 2(b) are rights arising
by custom but unappurtenent to a dominant tenement.
(b) No fixed period of enjoyment is necessary to establish

customary rights, but the custom must be reasonable and
certain.
17. Essentials of a valid custom exclude

(a) immemorial antiquity.
(b) Reasonableness.
(c) Certainty.

(a) Customary easements are private rights whereas
customary rights are public rights.
(b) Customary easements look upon the interest of the

locality as a whole whereas customary rights look upon the
owner of the dominant tenement and servient tenement.

19. The expenses which can be defrayed by the
dominant owner
(a) expenses incurred in construction works.
(b) expenses on making repairs.
(c) expenses for preservation of an easement.
(d) all the above.
20. Land used as pathway by villagers for going to

river Ghat because there was no other way for going
to river Ghat and that villagers were using river
water for domestic and drinking purposes as there
was no well or tank in village, it was proved
(a) customary easement
(b) easement by prescription
(c) easement by necessity
(d) continuous easement
21. A, the owner of a mill, has acquired a

prescriptive right, to divert to his mill part of the
water of a stream. A alters the machinery of his mill.
He
(a) cannot increase his right to divert water.
(b) can increase his right to divert water.
(c) needs permission from concerned authority to divert

water.
(d) Has no right to alter the machinery of his mill.
22. An easement
(a) is extinguished when the servient owner leaves on his
own.
(b) cannot be extinguished.
(c) Upon the death of the dominant owner.
(d) is extinguished when the dominant owner releases it

expressly or impliedly to the servient owner.

(I) Simple licence is always revocable at the will of the
licensor and it is also not assignable.
(II) Simple licence is not revocable at the will of the licensor

and it is assignable.
(III) In licence coupled with a grant of interest the licensor

cannot in general revoke it so as to defeat the grant to
which it is incident.
(IV) In licence coupled with a grant of interest the licensor

can in general revoke it.
(a) (I), (HI)
(b) (I), (IV)
(c) (II), (HI)

(d) (II), (IV)

(a) An easement can be revoked at the will of the servient
owner.
(b) A license is not transferable at all under any

circumstance.
(c) A license is always bound to be of positive nature.
(d) A dominant tenement follows the easement right.
25. A license is not deemed to be revoked under

section 62 of the Indian Easements Act
(a) when the grantor ceases to have any interest in the

property.;
(b) when the grantor dies;
(c) when the licensee releases it to the grantor or to his

legal representative;
(d) where it has been granted for a limited period.
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Transfer of Property Act, 1882 for
Goa Judiciary Examination
(preliminary)
Article Shared By
ADVERTISEMENTS:
100 sample questions on The Transfer of Property Act,

1882 for Goa Judiciary Examination (preliminary)
1. Before the commencement of the Transfer of

Property Act, 1882, the transfer of immovable
properties in India were governed by the
(a) principles of English law and equity
ADVERTISEMENTS:
(c) British State of Goods Act, 1880

(d) Indian Contract Act, 1872.
2. The courts, before the enactment of the Transfer

of Property Act, 1882, were forcing to decide
property disputes according to their own notion and
justice and fairplay,
ADVERTISEMENTS:
(a) because judges were making own laws
(b) because of absence of any specific statutory provisions

on the property matters
(c) because British Judges were confused with Indian

property disputes
(d) because judges were educated in British property laws.
ADVERTISEMENTS:
3. Law Commission for the Transfer of Property

matters was appointed in England and the Draft Bill
prepared by the Commission was introduced in
Legislative Council in
(a) 1870
(b) 1875
(c) 1877
ADVERTISEMENTS:
(d) 1882.
4. The Bill on Transfer of Property was referred to
(a) First Law Commission
(b) Second Law Commission
ADVERTISEMENTS:
(c) Third Law Commission
(d) Fourth Law Commission.
5. The Transfer of Property Act was enacted in the

year
(a) 1880
(b) 1881
(c) 1882
(d) 1883.
6. The Transfer of Property Act received its assent

on
(a) 17th February, 1882
(b) 22nd February, 1882
(c) 23rd February, 1882
(d) 27th February, 1882.
7. First Amendment was made in the Transfer of

Property Act, 1882 in the year
(a) 1880
(b) 1883
(c) 1884
(d) 1885.
8. The Transfer of Property Act, 1882, came into

effect from
(a) 17th February, 1882
(b) 27th February, 1882
(c) 17th March, 1882
(d) 1st July, 1882.
9. The Transfer of Property Act, 1882, extends in

first instance to the whole of India except:
(a) territories which, immediately before 1st November,
1956 were comprised in Part B States or in State of
Bombay, Punjab and Delhi
(b) territories which immediately before 1st November,

1956, were comprised in Part B State or in States of
Bombay, Bihar and West Bengal
(c) it extends in first instance to the whole of India except

the territories which immediately before 1st November,
1956, were comprised in Part B States of Madras, West
Bengal and Manipur
(d) it extends in first instance to the whole of India except

the territories which immediately before 1st November,
1956 were comprised in Part B States of Assam, Manipur
and Tripura.
10. According to the Transfer of Property Act, 1882

any State Government may from time to time
exempt either any part of territories from all or any
of sections
(a) 54, paragraphs 2 and 3, 59,107 and 123
(b) 54,107 and 123
(c) 54, 107 and 120
(d) 54,107 and 113.
11. Within the meaning of provisions of the Transfer

of Property Act, 1882, the immovable property does
not include:
(a) standing timber or grass
(b) standing timber, jewellery and crops
(c) standing timber, growing crops or grass
(d) only grass.
12. According to Transfer of Property Act, 1882

(a) instrument means a non-testamentary instrument
(b) testamentary instrument
(c) both testamentary and non- testamentary instrument

13. Under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the

term “attested” means
(a) attested by two or more witnesses
(b) attested by one witness only
(c) attested by two witnesses only
(d) no condition prevails.
14. Under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882,

registered pertains to
(a) registration of property
(b) registration of documents
(c) registration of parties
15. Under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882,

“attached to earth” means:
(I) routed in the earth, as in the case of trees and
shrubs;
(II) imbedded in the earth as in the case of walls and
buildings; or
(III) attached to what is so imbedded for the
permanent beneficial enjoyment of that to which it
is attached.
(a) only (I) and (II) are correct
(b) only (II) and (III) are correct
(c) only (I) and (III) are correct
(d) all (I), (II) and (III) are correct.
16. The chapters and sections of the Transfer of

Property Act, 1882, which relate to contracts shall
be part of:
(a) Indian Registration Act, 1908
(b) Sale of Goods Act, 1930
(c) General Clauses Act, 1897
(d) Indian Contract Act, 1872.
17. Within the meaning of section 4 of the Transfer

of Property Act, 1882 the provisions of sections 54,
paragraphs 2 and 3, sections 59, 107 and 123 shall
be read as supplemented to:
(a) Indian Contract Act, 1872
(c) General Clauses Act, 1897
(d) Sale of Goods Act, 1930.
18. Chapter II of the Transfer of Property Act shall

not be deemed to effect any rule of
(a) Mohammadan law
(b) Christian law
(c) Parsi law
19. According to section 5 of the Transfer of

Property Act, 1882, living person includes:
(a) company or association or body of individuals
(b) individual human being only
(c) only important company or associations
20. Under the provisions of section 6 of the Transfer

of Property Act, 1882, the chance of an heir-
apparent succeeding to an estate, the chance of a
relation abstaining a legacy on the death of a
kinsman, or any other mere possibility of like
nature:
(a) cannot be transferred
(b) can be transferred
(c) can be transferred subject to certain conditions

of Property Act, 1882, a mere right of re-entry for
breach of a condition subsequent cannot be
transferred to any one except the owner of the
property affected thereby
(a) the statement is true
(b) the statement is false
(c) the statement is partly true
22. Under the provisions of the Transfer of Property

Act, 1882, an easement cannot be transferred apart
from the dominant heritage
23. According to the provisions of the Transfer of

Property Act, 1882, all interest in property restricted
in its enjoyment to the owner personally cannot be
transferred by him

(a) a right to future maintenance can be transferred
(b) cannot be transferred
(c) no such provision is made in the Act

Act, 1882
(a) a mere right to sue can be transferred
(b) a mere right to sue cannot be transferred
(c) no such provision is made in the Act
26. Under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882

(a) the salary of a public officer can be transferred
(b) the salary of a public officer cannot be transferred
(c) no such provision is found in the Act
27. Under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882

(a) a public office cannot be transferred
(b) a public office can be transferred

(c) such provision is absent in the Act

of Property Act, 1882, no transfer can be made for
an unlawful object or consideration within the
meaning of section 23 of the Indian Contract Act,
1872
(a) the statement is false
(b) the statement is true

of Property Act, 1882, the competent person to
transfer means:
I. Every person competent to contract only;
II. Every person entitled to transferable property or
authorised to dispose of transferable property.
(a) only (I) is correct
(b) both (I) and (II) are correct
(c) (II) is correct
(d) neither is correct.
30. The term “transfer” under the Transfer of

Property Act, 1882, refers to
(a) partly or whole transfer
(b) absolute or conditional transfer
(c) contingent transfer
(d) both (a) and (b) are correct.
31. Under section 8 of the Transfer of Property Act,

1882 the legal incidents also includes-
(a) machinery attached to earth and the moveable parts
thereof
(b) only machinery attached to earth
(c) only moveable parts of the machinery attached to earth

of Property Act, 1882 the transfer includes-
(a) also oral transfer
(b) written transfer only
(d) only (b) is correct.
33. Under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, where

a writing is not expressly required by law:
(a) a transfer of properties may be made without writing in
every case
(b) a transfer of property is subject to only writing
(c) no provision of oral transfer is made
34. Under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 the

condition restraining alienation is provided in
(a) section 10
(b) section 9
(c) section 8
(d) section 7.
35. Where in a Transfer of Property, an interest is

created absolutely in favour of any person though
the terms of the transfer direct that such interest
shall be applied or enjoyed by him in a particular
member:
(a) he shall be entitled to receive and dispose of such
interest as if there were no such direction
(b) he shall not be entitled to interest
(c) he shall be entitled to interest subject to terms and

conditions

1882 where the transfer of property is subject to
conditions or limitations making interest therein to
the benefit of person to lease on his becoming
involved or endeavouring to transfer or dispose of
property, such condition is:
(a) valid
(b) void
(c) partly void
37. Provisions of section 12 of the Transfer of

Property Act, 1882
(a) does not apply to lease condition in the benefit of the
lessor
(b) does apply to a condition in a lease for the benefit of

lessor
(c) no such condition is made under such provision
38. The rules against the perpetuity is provided in

section …….of the Transfer of Property
Act, 1882
(a) 14
(b) 15
(c) 16
(d) 17.
39. No transfer of property can operate to create an

interest which is to take effect after the life time of
one or more persons living at the date of such
transfer. These provisions come under:
(a) rules against retrospective transfer only
(b) rules against perpetuity
(c) rules against prospective transfer

1882 where an interest created for the benefit of a
person or class of persons fails then:
(a) any interest created in the same transaction intended
to take effect after
or upon failure of such prior interest also fails
(b) any interest created in the same transaction and

intended to take effect after or upon failure of such prior
interest does not fail
(c) such failure does not affect
41. Provision of longer period in the matter of

accumulation of property under section 17 of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 amounts to
(a) 18 years
(b) 20 years
(c) 22 years
(d) 25 years.
42. Under the provisions of section 17 of the

Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the income arising
from the property shall be accumulated either
wholly or in part during a period
(a) longer than life of the transferor
(b) shorter than life of transferor
(c) no such period is mentioned

Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the provisions of
some sections shall not apply in case of a transfer of
property for the benefit of the public in the
advancement of religion, knowledge, commerce,
health, safety or any other object beneficial to
mankind. These sections are:
(a) 13,14, 15 and 16
(b) 14,16 and 17
(c) 14,16,17 and 18

(d) 14,15 and 20.
44. The provision of vested interest is provided in:

45. According to the provisions of section 19 of the

Transfer of Property Act, 1882
(a) the vested interest is not defeated by the death of the
transferee before he obtains possession
(b) vested interest is defeated by the death of transferee

before he obtains possession
(c) no such provision is made

Act, 1882, the unborn person acquires vested
interest on transfer for his benefit:
(a) upon his birth
(b) 7 days after his birth
(c) J2 days after his birth
(d) no such provision is made in the Act.

Act, 1882 an unborn person acquires vested interest
on transfer upon his birth, although
(a) he may not be entitled to the enjoyment immediately
on his birth
(b) he is entitled after 7 days after his birth
(c) no such provision is made
48. In the context of contingent interest in case of

happening of a uncertain event or if a specified
uncertain event shall not happen, such person
acquires a contingent interest in the property. Such
interest
(a) becomes vested interest in the former case, on the
happening of the event, in the later, when the happening of
event becomes impossible
(b) does not become vested interest
(c) vested interest does not depend upon happening or not

happening of event
49. The provision of contingent interest is provided

in:
50. Where interest on transfer of property is created

in favour of members only of a class as shall attain a
particular age:
(a) such interest does not vest in any member of the class
who has not attained that age
(b) such interest vests in any member irrespective of class

who has not attained that age
(c) no such provision is made under the Act
51. A transfers property to B for life and after his

death to C and D, equally to be divided between
them or to the survivors of them. C dies during life
of B. D survives B. At B’s death the property:
(a) shall pass to D
(b) shall pass to any person
(c) shall pass to person who is specifically named in

transfer

52. The provisions of conditional transfer is provided
in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
(a) section 25
(b) section 26
(c) section 27
(d) section 29.
53. X transfers Rs. 500 to Y on condition that he

shall execute a certain lease within three months
after V’s death, and, if he should neglect to do so to
Z. If Y dies in X’s life time.
(a) the disposition in favour of Z takes effect
(b) the disposition shall not take effect in favour of Z
(c) the disposition requires further conditions
54. X marries to Y but in case she dies in his

lifetime, he would transfer the property to Z. X and
Y perish together, under circumstances which make
it impossible to probe that she died before him. The
disposition of property in favour of Z:
(a) does not take effect
(b) takes effect
(c) disposition is subject to another contract


Transfer of Property Act, 1882 an ulterior
disposition of the kind contemplated in the provision
of section 28 can not take effect unless:
(a) condition is strictly fulfilled
(b) condition is not fulfilled
56. In case of transfer of property under the

Transfer of Property Act, 1882, if the ulterior
disposition is not valid then
(a) the prior disposition is affected by it
(b) the prior disposition is not affected by it
(c) no such condition is prevailed under the Transfer of

Property Act, 1882
57. A transfer a garden to B for her life, with a

proviso that, in case B cuts down a certain wood, the
transfer shall cease to have any effect. B cuts down
the wood. Decide the case in the light of Transfer of
Property Act, 1882
(a) B loses his life interest in the firm
(b) B does not lose his life interest in the firm
(c) no such provision is made under the Transfer of

Property Act, 1882

Transfer of Property Act, 1882, where a person
professes to transfer property which he has no right
to transfer, and as part of the same transaction
confers any benefit on the owner of the property
then
(a) such owner must elect either to confirm such transfer or
to dissent from it
(b) such owner can elect to confirm such transfer only
(c) such owner can dissent from transfer only
59. The foundation of doctrine of election under the

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is that a person
taking the benefit of an instrument:
(a) must bear the burden
(b) must not bear the burden
(c) burden is not the subject of election

60. The rule of election under the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882, as applied to Will is enacted in
sections 180 and 192 of the:
(a) Indian Succession Act, 1925
(c) Sale of Goods Act, 1930
61. A person is not put to his election, unless he has

a proprietary interest in the property disposed off in
derogation of his rights. This is the subject matter
under provisions of:
(b) section 35 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908
(c) section 35 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925

refers to apportionment by estate. In this light,
before the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, when a
transfer was severed by the sale of shares in the
version the tenant was still obliged to pay the rent
to all shares jointly:
(a) unless an apportionment had been agreed to by all the
parties
(b) any party is agreed by all the parties
(c) any two parties are agreed
63. In the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, sections

33 to 37 apply to both immovable and movable
property whereas sections 38 to 53 apply to:
(a) movable property only
(b) immovable property
(c) both immovable and movable property
64. Provisions of section 38 of the Transfer of

Property Act, 1882 does not apply to cases falling
under:
(a) benamidars or ostensible owners who can give no title
except by estoppel
(b) contingent transfer which is based on happening and

not happening of certain events
(c) perpetual transfer
65. Section 38 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882,

has no application
(a) to previous transfer where the transaction is still
incomplete
(b) to succeeding transfer where the transaction is to be

completed in future
(c) to perpetuity transfer

1882 the provision is made for transfer where the
third person is entitled to maintenance. In this
context the court held that right of maintenance,
even of a Hindu widow, is an identified right which
falls short of a charge. This was decided in case of:
(a) Ramanandan v. Rangammal, (1889) 12 Mad 260
(b) Ram Kumar v. Ram Dai, (1900) 22 All 326
(c) Rachawa v. Shivayogoda, (1893) 18 Bom 679
67. Right to maintenance under the provisions of

section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
includes the enhanced maintenance in future to
these if there has been a material change in the
circumstances. This was decided in case of:
(a) Adiveppa v. Tengawum, (1974) 2 Karn LJ 45
(b) Kaveri v. Parameswari, AIR 1971 Ker 216

(c) Dattatreya v. Julsabai, (1943) Bom 646
(d) Pranlal v. Chapsey, AIR 1945 Bom 34.
68. Within the provisions of section 39 of the

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 the word
“maintenance” covers also residence. This was
decided in case of:
(a) Kaveri v. Parameswari, AIR 1971 Ker 216
(b) Ramamurtlii v. Kanakaratnam, (1948) Mad 315
(c) Akhoy Kumar v. Corporation of Calcutta, (1915) 42 Cal

625
(d) Mama v. Bachchi, (1906) 26 All 655.
69. Within the meaning of provision under section

39 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 a woman is
entitled to maintenance not only from the husband,
but also from sons who are members of joint family.
This was decided in case of:
(a) S. Periaswami v. Cliellaival, (1980) 1 Mad LJ 46
(b) Raghvan v. Nagamal, (1979) 1 Mad LJ 172
(c) Chandramna v. Mamam Vankettareddy, AIR 1958 AP

396
(d) Basudev Dei Sarkar v. Chhaya Dey Sarkar, AIR 1991 Cal
399.
Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the right referred to
in First Paragraph of this section refers to:
(a) right of transferer as against purchase from a
transferee to restrain the breach of a negative covenant
(b) negative right of transferer as against purchaser from a

transferee to restrain the breach of a negative covenant
(c) mixed right of both purchaser and transferer

of Property Act, 1882, the right referred to in First
Paragraph of this section refers to:
(a) is not a transferee by operation of law
(b) is a transferee by operation of law
(c) is a transferee by operation of law and is not a

transferee within the meaning of section 40
72. The transfer by ostensible owner is provided in

…….section of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
(a) section 38
(b) section 39
(c) section 40
(d) section 41.
73. With the express or implied consent of

interested person in immovable property, a person
is the ostensible owner of such property and
transfers the same for consideration, then the
transfer shall not be:
(a) voidable
(b) void
(c) valid
74. The section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act,

1882 is the statutory application of the law of
estoppel. The statement is
(a) true
(b) false
(c) partly true
75. Section 41 of the Transfer of the Property Act,

1882 applies to voluntary transfers and
has no application to:
(a) court sale
(b) contingent sale

(c) perpetuity sale
(d) price less sale.

Transfer of Property Act, 1882, these are some
conditions:
(1) Transferer is the ostensible owner.
(2) He is so by the consent, express or implied, of
the real owner.
(3) Transfer is for consideration.
(4) Transferee has acted in good faith, taking
reasonable care to ascertain that the transferer had
power to transfer.
(a) only (1) and (2) are required 81.
(b) only (1), (2) and (3) are required
(c) only (3) and (4) are required
(d) all are required. (D
77. Possession of a manager cannot be treated

as ostensible ownership with the consent of (2) the
real owner. This was held in case of:
(a) Seshumulla M. Shah v. Sayed Abdul Rashid, AIR 1991
Kant 273
(b) Ved Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1989 NOC 136
(c) Motimul Sowvar v. Vijalakshi Ammal, AIR 1965 Mad 432

(d) B. Sitaram Rao v. Bibhushana, AIR 1978 Ori 222.
78. Inaccuracy in the recitals describing the

property:
(a) cannot whitle down the effect of clear recitals in the
documents about the
property to be sold thereby
(b) can whitle down the effect of clear recitals in the

document about the property to be sold thereby
(c) cannot depend upon the inaccuracy or accuracy of

recital describing property

1882 if a person has a right to transfer property,
after exercising a right to revoke a previous
transfer, a transfer of such property by him will
imply an exercise of:
(a) right of revocation
(b) right of transfer
(c) right of surrender

enables a transferee to whom a transferer has made
a fraudulent or erroneous representation to lay hold,
at his option, of any interest:
(a) which the transferor may subsequently acquire with
property, provided he does not adversely affect the right of
any subsequent purchaser for value without notice
(b) which the transferee may rescind the proceeding
(c) which both transferor and transferee rescind
81. In order to get the benefit of the section 43 of

the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 some conditions
are necessary:
(1) Contract of transfer was made by a person who
was competent to contract.
(2) Contract would be subsisting at the time when a
claim for recovery of the property is made.
(a) both (1) and (2) necessary
(b) only (1) is necessary
(c) only (2) is necessary

deals with:
(a) transfer by two co-owner
(b) transfer by one co-owner

(c) transfer by 3 co-owners
(d) transfers by all co-owners.
83.When one of several co-owners transfers his

share, the transferee acquires as against the other
co-owners the same rights that of transferor had but
is subject to any condition and liabilities affecting
the share at the date of transfer. This is the
provision under:
(b)section 41 of the transfer of property Act,1882
(c) ) section 42 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
(d) ) section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
84. The provision for the joint transfer for

consideration is dealt in:
85. Presumption of equity pertains to:



Act, 1882, where immovable property is transferred
for consideration by persons having distinct
interests therein, the transferors are:
(a) entitled to share in the considerations equally
(b) entitled to share unequally
(c) entitled to share equally but subject to further
87. Where several co-owners of immovable property

transfer a share therein without specifying that the
transfer is to take effect on any particular share or
shares of the transfers, the transfer, as among such
transferors, takes effect on such share:
(a) inequally where the shares were equal and where they
are unequal proportionally to the extent of such shares
(b) equally where the share were equal and where they are
unequal proportionately to the extent of such shares

of Property Act, 1882, the transfer cannot prejudice
the rights of the transferee by any subsequent
dealing with the property. This self-evident
proposition is expressed in
(a) equitable maxim qui prior est tempore potior est jure
(b) quid pro co
(c) bona fide transfer
89. The provision of improvements made by bona

fide holders under defective titles is dealt in:
90. A lessee cannot appeal to this section 51 of the

Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The statement is
(a) true
(b) false
(c) partly true
91. Some conditions must be fulfilled before the

equity provided in section 51, arises
(1) The person evicted must be transferee.
(2) The person must have made the improvements

believing in good faith that he was absolutely entitled.
(a) only (1) is correct
(b) only (2) is correct
(c) both (1) and (2) are correct
92. A treepasser is not a transferee within the

meaning of section 51 of the Transfer of Property
Act, 1882 and he is not entitled to compensation for
improvements. This was decided in:
(a) Daya Ram v. Shyam Sundari, (1965) 1 SCR 231
(b) Krishan Prasad v. Adyanath Ghatak, AIR 1944 Pat 77
(c) Bhupendra v. Pyari, (1917) 40 IC 464
93. The terms good faith in section 51 of the

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is used in the light of
(a) Sale of Goods Act, 1930
(b) General Clauses Act, 1897
(c) Indian Registration Act, 1908
(d) Specific Relief Act, 1963.

does not apply to
(a) court sale
(b) auction sale

of Property Act, 1882, the transferee:
(a) has lien on land for the value of improvements
(b) has no lien on the land for the value of improvements
(c) has condition lien on the land for the value of

improvements
96. Section 52 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882

imposes a prohibition on transfer or otherwise
dealing of any property during the pendency of a
suit, provided the conditions laid down in section
are satisfied. The statement is:
(a) false
(b) true
(c) partly true

97. The principle of lis pendens embodied in section
52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 pertains to:
(a) bona fide purchase
(b) public policy
(c) auction sale
98. Rule of lis pendens is applicable to suits for

specific performance of contracts to transfer
immovable property. The statement is:
(a) true
(b) false
(c) partly true
99. Rule of lis pendens is applicable to suits for

specific performance of contracts to transfer
immovable property. This statement is:
(a) false
(b) true
(c) partly false

100. In case of a transfer hit by the doctrine of lis
pendens, the question of good faith which is
essential to be established before a equitable relief
can be granted in favour of a subsequent vendee
under sections 41 or 51 of the Transfer of Property
Act, 1882 is:
(a) relevant
(b) partly relevant
(c) totally irrelevant
(d) partly irrelevant.
Related Posts:
100 sample questions on The Code

of Civil Procedure, 1908 for
Arunachal Pradesh Judiciary
Examination (preliminary)
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ADVERTISEMENTS:
100 sample questions on The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
for Arunachal Pradesh Judiciary Examination (preliminary)
1. Under the provisions of Civil Procedure Code plea

of adverse possession is a defence available
(a) only to plaintiff against defendant
ADVERTISEMENTS:
(b) only to defendant against plaintiff
(c) both plaintiff and defendant
(d) only to movable property.
2. The reappreciation of evidence in second appeal

ADVERTISEMENTS:
(a) is subject to review
(b) is permissible
(c) is not permissible
(d) is an admitted fact.
ADVERTISEMENTS:
3. Sweeping change introduced by Civil Procedure

Code (Amendment) Act, 2002 is with the object to
(a) give more power to Civil Courts
(b) reduce the power of Civil Courts

(c) cut short delay in disposal of suit
ADVERTISEMENTS:
(d) make provisions stringent.
4. Preliminary decree can be passed in a suit

(a) for partition
(b) of partnership
ADVERTISEMENTS:
(c) for possession and mesne profits
(d) all the above.
5. Preliminary decree is one

(a) which determines the rights of the parties with regard
to some or one of the matters in controversy in the suit but
does not finally dispose of the suit
(b) which determines the rights of the parties with regard

to some or one of the matters in controversy in the suit,
which may have the effect of final disposal of the suit
(c) both (a) & (b)
6. A decree becomes final

(a) when it conclusively determines the rights of the parties
(b) when no appeal has been preferred against the decree

(c) both (a) & (b)
7. Which of the following is not a decree

(a) dismissal in default
(b) rejection of a plaint
(c) both (a) & (b)
8. Order has been defined as a formal expression of

any decision of a civil court which is not a decree,
under
(a) section 2(1) of CPC
(b) section 2(14) of CPC
(c) section 2(9) of CPC
(d) section 2(16) of CPC.
9. A decree holder has been defined as a person in

whose favour a decree has been passed or an order
capable of execution has been made, under
(a) section 2(3) of CPC
(b) section 2(13) of CPC
(c) section 2(4) of CPC
(d) section 2(16) of CPC.

10. A decree holder
(a) need not be a party to the suit
(b) the term is not confined to plaintiff
(c) both (a) & (b)
11. Foreign court under section 2(5) of means

(a) a court situated outside India
(b) a court situated outside India and not established under

the authority of Government of India
(c) a court situated in India applying foreign law
(d) all the above.
12. Judgment under section 2(9) means

(a) a decree
(b) dismissal of an appeal summarily
(c) statement of grounds of an order or decree
(d) all the above.
13. Legal representative under section 2(11) of CPC

means a person who is a
(a) Relative of parties to the suit
(b) co-sharer of the benefits assuming to parties to the suit

(c) who in law represents the estate of the deceased
(d) all the above.
14. ‘A’ dies leaving behind a son X & a married

daughter Y, a suit filed by ‘A’, after his death, can
be continued by
(a) ‘X’ alone as legal representative
(b) ‘Y’ alone as legal representative
(c) ‘X’, ‘Y’ and the husband of Y as legal representatives
(d) ‘X’ and ‘Y’ both, as legal representatives.
15. A judgment contains

(a) concise statement of the case
(b) the points for determination
(c) the decision on the points of determinations & the

reason thereof
(d) all the above.
16. Who amongst the following is not a legal

representative
(a) a trespasser
(b) an intermeddler
(c) a creditor
(d) both (a) & (c).

17. ‘Mesne profits’ as defined under section 2(12)
means
(a) those profits which the person in wrongful possession of
such property actually received or might have received
together with interest
(b) those profits which the person in wrongful possession of

property actually received including profits due to
improvements made by such person
(c) those profits which the person in wrongful possession of

such property actually received or might have received but
without any interest on such profits
(d) those profits which the person in wrongful possession of

such property actually received.
18. Foreign judgment as defined under section 2(6)

of CPC means
(a) judgment given by an Indian Court in respect of
foreigners
(b) judgment given by a foreign court
(c) both (a) & (b)
19. Who amongst the following is not a ‘public

officer’ within the meaning of section 2(17) of CPC
(a) a Judge
(b) a person in service under the pay of Government
(c) Sarpanch of a Gram Panchayat
20. Basis of distribution of the jurisdiction of Indian

Courts is
(a) pecuniary jurisdiction
(b) territorial jurisdiction
(c) subject-matter jurisdiction
(d) all the above.
21. Court of small causes, under section 3 of CPC is

subordinate to
(a) District Court
(b) High Court
(c) both (a) & (b)
22. Pecuniary jurisdiction of the court has been

dealt with in
(a) section 3 of CPC
(b) section 4 of CPC
(c) section 5 of CPC

(d) section 6 of CPC.
23. Courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil

nature excepting suits, the cognizance of which is
either expressly or impliedly barred, by virtue of
24. Which of the following is a right of civil nature

(a) right to worship in a temple
(b) right to share in offerings in a temple
(c) right to take out procession
(d) all the above.
25. Which of the following is not a right of civil

nature
(a) caste & religion
(b) right to services which are honorary and gratuitous
(c) brij jijmam rights
(d) both (a) & (b).
26. Jurisdiction of civil court can be barred

(a) expressly only
(b) impliedly only
(c) either expressly or impliedly
(d) neither expressly nor impliedly.
27. Principle of res-subjudice is contained in

28. Dhulabhai etc. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and

another, AIR 1969 SC 78, lays down certain
principles regarding the exclusion of jurisdiction of
civil courts. Which of the following is not a principle
laid down:
(a) where a statute gives a finality to the orders of the
special tribunals, the civil courts jurisdiction must be held
to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the
civil court would normally do in a suit
(b) where there is an express bar of jurisdiction of the

court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act
to find out the adequacy or sufficiency of the remedies
provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the
jurisdiction of the civil court
(c) questions as to the correctness of the assessment apart
from its constitutionality are the decisions of the authorities
and a civil suit lies even if the orders of the authorities are
declared to be final
29. Under section 10 of CPC, a suit is liable to be

(a) stayed
(b) dismissed
(c) rejected
30. For the application of the principle of

res- subjudice, which of the following is essential
(a) suits between the same parties or litigating under the
same title
(b) the two suits must be pending disposal in a court
(c) the matters in issue in the two suits must be directly

and substantially the same
(d) all the above.
31. Section 10 of CPC does not apply

(a) when the previous suit is pending in the same court
(b) when the previous suit is pending in a foreign court

(c) when the previous suit is pending in any other court in
India
(d) when the previous suit is pending in a court outside

India established or contained by the Central Government.
32. Under the principle of res-subjudice

(a) the second suit has to be stayed
(b) the previous suit has to be stayed
(c) either (a) or (b) depending on the facts & circumstances

of the case
(d) either (a) or (b) depending on the valuation of the suit

for the purposes of jurisdiction.
33. Provisions of section 10 of CPC are

(a) directory
(b) mandatory
(c) non mandatory
(d) discretionary.
34. Section 10 can come into operation

(a) before filing of written statement inthe subsequent suit
(b) before settlement of issues in subsequent suit
(c) after settlement of issues in subsequent suit
(d)all the above.

35. Doctrine of res-judicata as contained in section
11 of CPC is based on the maxim
(a) Nemo debet bis vexari pro uno eteadem causa
(b) interest republicae ut sit finis litium
(c) both (a) & (b)
36. Principle of res-judicata applies

(a) between co-defendants
(b) between co-plaintiffs
(c) both (a) & (b)
37. Which of the following is not true of res- judicata

(a) it can be invoked in a separate subsequent proceedings
(b) it can be invoked at a subsequent stage in the same

proceedings
(c) it can not be invoked at a subsequent stage in the same

proceedings but only in a separate subsequent proceedings
(d) both (b) & (c).
38. As regards res-judicata, it has been stated that

the right of an individual is to be protected from
multiplication of suits and prosecution at the
instance of an opponent whose superior resources &
power unless curbed, may render futile judicially
declared right and innocence, by
(a) Spences Bower
(b) Lord Denning
(c) Salmond
(d) Black Stone.
39. Res-judicata applies

(a) when the matter in former suit is directly &
substantially in issue
(b) when the matter in former suit is collaterally &

incidentally in issue
(c) both (a) & (b)
40. Res-judicata applies

(a) when the matter is directly & substantially in issue in
two suits and should have been decided on merits
(b) when the prior suit is between the same parties or

persons claiming under them and litigating under the same
title
(c) when the court which determined the earlier suit is

competent to try the subsequent suit wherein the issue is
subsequently raised
(d) when all (a), (b) & (c) combine.
43. Plea of res-judicata

(a) has to be specifically raised
(b) need not be specifically raised
(c) is for the court to see of its own
(d) neither (a) nor (b) but only (c).
42. Constructive res-judicata is contained in

(a) explanation III to section 11
(b) explanation IV to section 11
(c) explanation VI to section 11
(d) explanation VII to section 11.
43. Principle of res-judicata applies

(a) to suits only
(b) to execution proceedings
(c) to arbitration proceedings
(d) to suits as well as execution proceedings.
44. A decision on issue of law

(a) shall always operate as res-judicata
(b) shall never operate as res-judicata
(c) may or may not operate as res-judicata

45. A decision on an issue of law operates as res-

judicata
(a) if the cause of action in the subsequent suit is the same
as in the former suit, only when the decision on the point of
law is correct
(b) if the cause of action in the subsequent suit is the same

as in the former suit, even though the decision on the point
of law is erroneous
(c) if the cause of action in the subsequent suit is different

from that in the former suit, even though the decision on
the point of law is correct
(d) all the above.
46. A decision in a suit may operate as res- judicata

against persons not expressly named as parties to
the suit by virtue of explanation
(a) II to section 11 of CPC
(b) IV to section 11 of CPC
(c) VI to section 11 of CPC
(d) VIII to section 11 of CPC.
47. Res-judicata does not operate

(a) between co-defendants
(b) between co-plaintiffs

(c) against a per-forma defendant
48. In which of the following cases res-judicata is

not applicable
(a) consent compromise decrees
(b) dismissal in default
(c) both (a) & (b)
49. Principle of res-judicata is

(a) mandatory
(b) directory
(c) discretionary
(d) all the above.
50. With respect to the principle of res-judicata

which of the following is not correct
(a) ex-parte decree will operate as res-judicata
(b) writ petition dismissed on merits operates as res-

judicata
(c) writ petition dismissed in limine operates as res-judicata
(d) both (a) & (c).

51. In a suit, where the doctrine of res-judicata
applies, the suit is liable to be
(a) stayed
(b) dismissed
(c) may be stayed & may be dismissed
(d) both (a) & (c).
52. A decision or finding given by a court or a

tribunal without jurisdiction
(a) can operate as res-judicata under all circumstances
(b) cannot operate as res-judicata
(c) can operate as res-judicata under certain circumstances

only
(d) may operate as res-judicata or may not- operate as res-

judicata.
53. On production of a certified copy of the foreign

judgment, the presumption as to the competency of
the court, under section 14 of CPC is a
(a) presumption of fact
(b) presumption of fact & law both
(c) rebuttable presumption of law
(d) irrebuttable presumption of law.

54. Validity of a foreign judgment can be challenged
under section 13 of CPC
(a) in a civil court only
(b) in a criminal court only
(c) in both civil and criminal court
(d) neither in civil nor in criminal court.
55. Under section 13 of CPC, a foreign judgment can

be challenged on the grounds of
(a) competency of the court pronouncing the judgment
(b) being obtained by fraud
(c) sustaining a claim founded on a breach of law in force in

India
(d) all the above.
56. How many grounds of attack the foreign

judgment have been provided under section 13 of
CPC
(a) seven
(b) six
(c) five
(d) four.
57. On the ground of jurisdiction, under section 13
of CPC
(a) only a judgment in personam can be challenged
(b) only a judgment in rem can be challenged
(c) both judgment in personam and judgment in rem, can

be challenged
(d) neither a judgment in personam nor judgment in rem

can be challenged.
58. A person who institutes a suit in foreign court

and claims a decree in personam, after the judgment
is pronounced against him
(a) can always challenge the judgment on the ground of
competency
(b) can never challenge the judgment on the ground of

competency
(c) can challenge the judgment on the ground of

competency under certain circumstances
59. Under section 15 of CPC, every suit shall be

instituted in
(a) the district court
(b) the court of the lowest grade
(c) the court of higher grade

(d) all the above.
60. Section 15 of CPC lays down

(a) a rule of procedure
(b) a rule of jurisdiction
(c) a rule of evidence
(d) all the above.
61. Under section 16 of CPC, a suit relating to

immoveable property can be filed in a court within
whose local jurisdiction
(a) the property is situate
(b) the defendant voluntarily resides or personally works

for gain
(c) the defendant voluntarily resides or carries on business
62. Suit in respect of immoveable property, where

the entire relief sought can be obtained through the
personal obedience of the defendant, can be
instituted in a court within whose local jurisdiction
(a) the property is situate
(b) the defendant voluntarily resides or carries on business
(c) the defendant voluntarily resides or personally works for

gain
(d) all the above.
63. Place of institution of suit in respect of

immoveable property, situated within the
jurisdiction of different courts, has been provided
(a) under section 17 of CPC
(b) under section 18 of CPC
(c) under section 19 of CPC
(d) under section 20 of CPC.
64. Section 18 of CPC provides for

(a) place of institution of suit in respect of immoveable
property where the property is situate in the jurisdiction of
one cot
(b) place of institution of suit in respect of immoveable

property where the property is situate in the jurisdiction of
different court
(c) place of institution of suit in respect of immoveable

property where the limits of jurisdiction of courts uncertain
(d) all the above.
65. Place of suing in respect of suits for

compensation for wrongs to persons or moveable
property has been dealt with
(b) under section 19 of CPC

66. A suit for compensation for wrong done to the

person or to moveable property, where the wrong
was done within the local jurisdiction of one court
and the defendant resides within the local limits of
an other court
(a) can be instituted in the court within whose local
jurisdiction the wrong has been committed
(b) can be instituted in the court within whose local

jurisdiction the defendant resides
(c) either (a) or (b) at the option of the plaintiff
(d) anywhere in India.
67. ‘X’ residing in Delhi, publishes statements

defamatory to ‘Y’ in Calcutta. ‘Y’ can sue at
(a) Delhi
(b) Calcutta
(c) anywhere in India
(d) either in Delhi or in Calcutta.
68. Suits under section 20 of CPC can be instituted

where the cause of action arises
(a) wholly
(b) partly
(c) either wholly or in part
(d) only (a) and not (b) or (c).
69. In cases where there are more than one

defendant, a suit can be instituted in a court within
whose local jurisdiction
(a) each of the defendant at the time of commencement of
the suit, actually & voluntarily resides or carries on
business or personally works for gain
(b) any of the defendant, at the time of the

commencement of the suit, actually & voluntarily resides,
or carries on business, or personally works for gain and the
defendant(s) not so residing etc. acquiesce
70. A suit for damages for breach of contract can be

filed, at a place
(a) where the contract was made
(b) where the contract was to be performed or breach

occurred
(c) anywhere in India

71. A suit relating to partnership may be instituted
at a place
(a) where the partnership was constituted
(b) where the partnership business was carried on
(c) where partnership accounts are maintained
(d) all the above.
72. A suit relating to partnership dissolved in a

foreign country can be filed at a place
(a) in foreign country
(b) where the parties to the suit reside in India
(c) both (a) & (b)
(d) all over India.
73. Objection as to the place of suiting

(a) can only be taken before the court of first instance at
the earliest possible opportunity
(b) can be taken before the appellate court for the first
time
(c) can be taken before the court of revision for the first
time
(d) all the above.
74. Section 21 of CPC cures

(a) want of subject-matter jurisdiction
(b) want of pecuniary jurisdiction
(c) want of territorial jurisdiction
(d) both (b) and (c).
75. A suit to set aside a decree on the ground of lack

of territorial jurisdiction is barred
(b) under section 21A of CPC
76. Parties by their consent agreement

(a) can confer jurisdiction on a court, where there is none
in law
(b) can oust the jurisdiction of the court where there is one
in law
(c) can oust the jurisdiction of one of the courts when there
are two courts simultaneously having jurisdiction in law
(d) all the above.
77. Section 20 of CPC does not apply to

(a) arbitration proceedings
(b) civil proceedings

(c) both (a) & (b)
78. Agreement between the parties to institute the

suit relating to disputes in a particular court
(a) does not oust the jurisdiction of other courts
(b) may operate as estoppel between the parties
(c) both (a) & (b)
79. In cases of the commercial contracts between

parties of two different countries, the jurisdiction of
the court shall be governed by
(a) lex loci contractors
(b) lex loci solutions
(c) les situs
(d) rule of freedom of choice i.e., intention of the parties.
80. A corporation, under section 20 of CPC, is

deemed to carry on business at
(a) its principal office in India
(b) its subordinate office in India
(c) both (a) & (b)

81. In case of a cause of action arising at a place
where a corporation has a subordinate office, the
corporation is deemed to carry on business
(a) its principal office in India
(b) its subordinate office where the cause of action did

arise
(c) both (a) & (b)
82. In every plaint, under section 26 of CPC, facts

should be proved by
(a) oral evidence
(b) affidavit
(c) document
(d) oral evidence as well as document.
83. According to section 27 of CPC summons to the

defendant to be served on such date not beyond
(a) 30 days from the date of institution of suits
(b) 60 days from the date of institution of suits
(c) 45 days from the date of institution of suits
(d) 90 days from the date of institution of suits

84. The court may impose a fine for default upon a
person required to give evidence or to produce
documents directed under section 30(b) of CPC, and
such fine as per section 32(c) not to exceed
(a) Rs. 500
(b) Rs. 1,000
(c) Rs. 5,000
(d) Rs. 10,000.
85. Under section 39(4) of CPC, the court passing

the decree is
(a) authorised to execute such decree against any person
outside local limits of its jurisdiction
(b) authorised to execute such decree against any property

outside the local limits of its jurisdiction
(d) neither (a) or (b).
86. A private transfer or delivery of the property

attached under section 64(2) shall not be void if
(a) made in persuance of any contract for such transfer or
delivery entered into and registered before the attachment
(b) made in persuance of any contract for such transfer or

delivery entered into and registered after the attachment
(c) made in persuance of any contract for such transfer or
delivery entered into before the attachment but registered
after the attachment
87. The court under section 89(1) of CPC can refer

the dispute for
(a) arbitration or conciliation
(b) conciliation or mediation
(c) mediation or Lok Adalat
(d) arbitration or conciliation or Lok Adalat or mediation.
88. The court can award compensation against

plaintiff under section 95 of CPC, not exceeding
(a) Rs. 10,000 or the limits of its pecuniary jurisdiction
whichever is less
(b) Rs. 10,000 or the limits of its pecuniary jurisdiction

whichever is more
(c) Rs. 50,000 and this amount not to exceed the limits of
its pecuniary jurisdiction
(d) Rs. 50,000 and this amount to exceed the limits of its
pecuniary jurisdiction whichever is more.
89. Under section 100A of the CPC, where any

appeal from an original or appellate decree or order
is heard and decided by a single judge of a High
Court
(a) no further appeal shall lie the from judgment and
decree of such single judge
(b) further appeal shall lie under the Latters Patent for the
High Court
(c) further appeal shall lie with the leave of the Supreme
Court
(d) further appeal shall lie before the Division Bench of the
High Court.
90. Second appeal shall not lie from any decree, as

provided under section 102 of CPC when the subject
matter of the original suit is for recovery of money
not exceeding
(a) Rs. 10,000
(b) Rs. 25,000
(c) Rs. 50,000
(d) Rs. 1,00,000.
91. A revision under section 115shall not operate as

a stay of suit or other proceeding before the court
except where such suit or other proceeding is
stayed by
(a) the High Court
(b) the Supreme Court
(c) the Appellate Court
(d) District and Sessions Court.
92. The court can enlarge the time under section

148 of CPC for doing any act prescribed or allowed
under the Code of Civil Procedure, not exceeding in
total
(a) 90 days
(b) 60 days
(c) 45 days
(d) 30 days.
93. Under Order IV, Rule 1, sub-rule (1) of CPC, a

suit is instituted when
(a) a plaint is presented to the court
(b) a plaint in duplicate is presented to the court
(c) a plaint in triplicate is presented to the court
94. A defendant under Order V, Rule 1(1) of CPC is

required to appear, answer the claim and to file the
written statement
(a) within 60 days from the date of service of summons
(b) within 45 days from the date of service of summons
(c) within 30 days from the date of service of summons
(d) within 90 days from the date of service of summons.
95. In case of failure of filing the written statement

within thirty days, the defendant can be allowed to
file the same on such other day specified by the
court for reasons recorded in writing
(a) within 90 days from the date of service of summons
(b) within 120 days from the date of service of summons
(c) within 60 days from the date of service summons
(d) within 45 days from the date of service summons.
96. Summons to the defendant under Order V, Rule

9(1) of CPC, can be delivered for the purposes of
serving the same on the defendant, to a courier
services as
(a) approved by the defendant
(b) approved by the court
(c) approved by the plaintiff
97. Under section 32 of CPC, to compel the

attendance of a person to whom a summon has been
issued under section 30 of CPC, the court is
empowered to
(a) issue a warrant for his arrest
(b) attach and sell his property
(c) impose a fine not exceeding Rs. 5,000
98. Under Order VI, Rule 17 at any stage of

proceedings the court can allow to alter or amend
pleadings to
(a) either party
(b) to plaintiff only
(c) to defendant only
(d) to only one defendant if there are more than one

defendant
99. The expenses for the service of summons to the

defendant have to be borne, under Order V, Rule
9(3) of CPC, by
(a) the plaintiff
(b) the court
(c) the defendant
(d) partly by the plaintiff and partly by the defendant.

100. The court can reject the plaint under Order VII,
Rule 11(e) of CPC, if it is not filed in
(a) triplicate
(b) duplicate
(c) quadruplicate
(d) only (c) and not (a) or (b).
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honoured and that legal remedies are made available to an
aggrieved party against the party failing to honour his part
of agreement. The Indian Contract Act makes it obligatory
that this is done and compels the defaulters to honour their
commitments. According to Sir William Anson. “The
objective of law is to maintain order because only in a state
of order can a man feel safe and secure.”
Historical Background :
ADVERTISEMENTS:
According to Indian Contract Act, 1872 Section 1, this Act

may be called the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
Extent and Commencement :

It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu
and Kashmir; and it shall come into force on the first day of
September, 1872.
According to Section 1 of the Act:- “Nothing contained

herein shall affect the provisions of any Statute, Act or
Regulation not hereby expressly repealed, nor any usage
or custom of trade, nor any incident of any contract, not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.”
ADVERTISEMENTS:
Division of the Indian Contract Act :

In the past, Indian Contract Act had a wide scope and
included:
1. General Principles of Contract – Sections 1 to 75.
2. Sale of Goods Act – Sections 76-123.
ADVERTISEMENTS:
3. Contracts of Indemnity and Guarantee – Sections 124 =

147.
4. Contracts of Bailment and Pledge – Sections 148-181.
5. Contracts of Agency – Sections 182 – 238.
6. Partnership Act – Sections 239-266.
ADVERTISEMENTS:
Present Positions:
Today, the scope of the Indian Contract Act has been
restricted. The sale of Goods was repealed from this Indian
Contract Act in 1930. Contracts relating to partnership
were repealed in 1932.
Past Contract Act

(i) Basic Principles of Contract (Sections 1 to 75)
ADVERTISEMENTS:
(ii) Sale of Goods Act (Sections 76 to 123)
(iii) Indemnity and Guarantee (Sections 124 to 147)

(iv) Bailment
(Sections 148 to 181) Agency (Sees. 182 to 238)
(v) Partnership Act (Sees. 239 to 266)
Present Contract Act

(i) Basic Principles of Contract (Sections 1 to 75)
(ii) Indemnity and Guarantee (Sections 124 to 147)
(iii) Bailment
(Sections 148 to 181)
(iv) Agency
(Sections 182 to 238)
Fundamental Definitions:
Interpretation Clause:
In this Act, the following words and expressions are used in
the following senses, unless a contrary intention appears
from the context:
(a) “Proposal”:
When one person signifies to another his willingness to do
or to abstain from doing anything, with a view to obtaining
the assent of the other to such act or abstinence, he said to
make a proposal.
(b) “Promise”:
When the person to whom the proposal is made signifies
his assent thereto, the proposal is said to be accepted. A
proposal when accepted, becomes a promise.
(c) “Promisor and Promise”:

The person making the proposal is called the “Promisor”
and the person accepting the proposal is called the
“promise”.
(d) “Consideration”:
When at the desire of the promisor, the promise or any
other person has done or abstained from doing, or does or
abstains from doing, or promises to do or to abstain from
doing something, such act or abstinence or promise is
called a consideration for the promise.
(e) “Agreement”:
Every promise and every set of promises, forming the
consideration for each other is an agreement.
(f) “Reciprocal Promises”:

Promises which form the consideration or part of the
consideration for each other are called reciprocal promises.
(g) “Void agreement”:

An agreement not enforceable by law is said to be void.
(h) “Contract” – An agreement enforceable by law is a

contract.
(i) “Voidable Contract”:

An agreement which is enforceable by law at the option of
one or more of the parties thereto, but not at the option of
the other or others, is a voidable contract.
(j) “Void Contract”:

A contract which ceases to be enforceable by law becomes
a void contract.
(k) “Plaintiff”:
A person who files a suit in a court of law against the
another for breech of contract is called the plaintiff.
(l) “Defendant”:
The person against whom a suit has been filed in court and
who has to defend against the charges of breech of
contract is called the defendant.

Penal Code, 1860 for West Bengal
(preliminary)
1. The Fundamental principle of criminal liability is
embodied in the maxim “actus non facit reum nisi
mens sit rea”. The maxim was developed by:
(a) Equity Courts
ADVERTISEMENTS:
(b) Common Law Courts

(c) Sadar Nizamat Court
2. ‘Wrongful gain’ means

ADVERTISEMENTS:
(a) gain by lawful means of property which the person

gaining is not entitled
(b) gain by unlawful means of property which the person

gaining is not entitled
(c) gain by unlawful means of property which the person

gaining is entitled
(d) all the above.
ADVERTISEMENTS:
3. ‘Wrongful loss’ means

(a) loss by unlawful means of property which the person
losing it, is legally entitled
(b) loss by lawful means of property which the person

losing it is not legally entitled
(c) loss by lawful means of property which the person

losing is not legally entitled
ADVERTISEMENTS:
(d) all the above.

4. The provision of personation at elections under
section 171D of IPC
(a) shall apply to a person who has been authorised to vote
as proxy for an elector under any law in force
(b) shall not apply to a person who has been authorised to

vote as proxy for an elector under any law in force
ADVERTISEMENTS:
(c) does not lead to any restriction under any law in force
5. ‘Dishonestly’ has been defined as doing anything

with intention to cause wrongful gain to one person
& wrongful loss to another, under
(a) section 21
(b) section 23
(c) section 24
(d) section 25.
6. ‘Fraudulently’ has been defined as doing anything

with intent to defraud
(a) section 23
(b) section 25
(c) section 24
(d) section 26.
7. When a criminal act is done by several persons in

furtherance of the common intention of all
(a) each of such person is liable for that act in the same
manner as if it were done by him alone
(b) each of such person is liable for his own overt act
(c) each of such person shall be liable according to the

extent of his participation in the crime
(d) both (b) & (c).
8. Which among these Codes, is included in the

Schedule to the Prevention of Money- Laundering
Act, 2002.
(a) Civil Procedure Code
(b) Criminal Procedure Code
(c) Indian Penal Code
(d) none of these.
9. To establish section 34 of IPC

(a) common intention be proved but not overt act be
proved
(b) common intention and overt act both be proved
(c) common intention need not be proved but overt act be

proved
(d) all the above.
10. Section 34 of IPC

(a) creates a substantive offence
(b) is a rule of evidence
11. ‘X’ & ‘Y’ go to murder ‘Z’. ‘X’ stood on guard

with a spear in hand but did not hit ‘Z’ at all. Y killed
‘Z’
(a) only ‘Y’ is liable for murder of Z
(b) ‘X’ & ‘Y’ both are liable for murder of ‘Z’
(c) ‘X’ is not liable as he did not perform any overt act
(d) both (a) & (c).
12. ‘Voluntarily’ has been defined as an effect

caused by means whereby a person intended to
cause it or by means, at the time of employing those
means, know or had reason to believe to be likely to
cause it under
(a) section 39
(b) section 38
(c) section 37
(d) section 40.
13. Under section 45 of IPC, life denotes

(a) life of a human being
(b) life of an animal
(c) life of human being and of an animal both
(d) life of either human being or animal.
14. Under section 46 of IPC, death denotes

(a) death of a human being
(b) death of an animal
(c) death of a human being and of an animal both
(d) death of either human being or an animal.
15. Illegal signifies

(a) everything which is an offence
(b) everything which is prohibited by law
(c) everything which furnishes ground for civil action
(d) all the above.
16. Animal denotes

(a) any living creature including human being
(b) any living creature other than a human being
(c) any creature – live or dead

17. How many types of punishments have been

prescribed under the Indian Penal Code
(a) three
(b) six
(c) five
(d) four.
18. Under section 60 of IPC, in certain cases of

imprisonment, the sentence of imprisonment
(a) has to be wholly rigorous
(b) has to be wholly simple
(c) can be partly rigorous and partly simple
19. Sentence of imprisonment for non-payment of

fine under section 64 of IPC
(a) shall be in excess of any other imprisonment to which
an offender has been sentenced
(b) shall be concurrent of any other imprisonment
(c) shall not be in excess of any other imprisonment
(d) both (b) & (c).

20. Under section 65 of IPC sentence of
imprisonment for non-payment of fine shall be
limited to
(a) one-third of the maximum term of imprisonment fixed
for the offence
(b) one-fourth of the maximum term of imprisonment fixed

for the offence
(c) one-half of the maximum term of imprisonment fixed

for the offence
(d) equal to the maximum term of imprisonment fixed for

the offence.
21. In case of an offence punishable with fine only,

imprisonment for non-payment of fine
(a) has to be rigorous
(b) has to be simple
(c) can be rigorous or simple
(d) can be partly rigorous and partly simple.
22. Under section 498A of IPC cruelty includes

(a) harassment of the woman
(b) physical cruelty only
(c) mental cruelty only
(d) cruelty by wife.

an offender who is sentenced to pay a fine of not
exceeding Rs. 100 but exceeding Rs. 50, the
imprisonment in default of payment of fine shall not
exceed
(a) two months
(b) three months
(c) four months
(d) six months.

an offender who is sentenced to pay a fine
exceeding Rs. 100, the imprisonment in default of
payment of fine shall not exceed
(a) one year
(b) six months
(c) four months
(d) two months.
25. Section 64 of IPC provides for

(a) nature & maximum limit of imprisonment for non-
payment of fine
(b) nature & minimum limit of imprisonment for non-

payment of fine
(c) nature but does not prescribe any limit of imprisonment
for non-payment of fine
(d) limit of imprisonment for non-payment of fine but does
not prescribe the nature of imprisonment.
26. Imprisonment for non-payment of fine shall
terminate
(a) on payment of fine
(b) on expiry of the term of imprisonment for non-payment
(c) both (a) & (b)
27. In case of imprisonment for non-payment of fine,

if a part of the fine is paid, such sentence
(a) shall be reduced proportionately
(b) shall not be reduced in direct proportion to the fine paid
(c) shall be reduced but subject to the discretion of the

court as to the quantum of reduction
28. Section 73 of IPC provides for the maximum limit

of solitary confinement to be
(a) one year
(b) two years
(c) three months

(d) six months.
29. If an offender has been sentenced to

imprisonment not exceeding six months, the solitary
confinement
(a) shall not exceed 15 days
(b) shall not exceed one month
(c) shall not exceed two months
(d) shall not exceed forty-five days.
30. If an offender is sentenced to imprisonment for a

term exceeding six months but not exceeding one
year, the term of solitary confinement
(a) shall not exceed one month
(b) shall not exceed forty-five days
(c) shall not exceed two months
(d) shall not exceed three months.
31. If an offender is sentenced to imprisonment for a

term exceeding one year, the term of solitary
confinement shall not exceed
(a) one month
(b) two months
(c) three months

(d) six months.
32. Nothing is said to be done or believed to be done

in goodfaith which is done or believed without due
care & intention – is the definition of goodfaith
contained in
(a) section 29 of IPC
(b) section 29A of IPC
(c) section 52 of IPC
(d) section 52A of IPC.
33. General exceptions are contained in

(a) chapter III of IPC
(b) chapter IV of IPC
(c) chapter V of IPC
(d) chapter VI of IPC.
34. Section 76 provides that nothing is an offence

which is done by a person who is or who by reason
of
(a) mistake of fact in good faith believes himself to be
bound by law to do it
(b) mistake of law in good faith believes himself to be

bound by law to do it
(c) mistake of fact believes himself to be bound by morals
to do it
(d) all the above.
35. Under section 79, nothing is an offence which is

done by a person who is justified by law or who by
reason of mistake of fact in goodfaith believes
himself to be
(a) bound by law to do it
(b) justified by law to do it
(c) bound by morality to do it
(d) all the above.
36. The maximum ‘ignorantia juris non excusat’

means
(a) ignorance of law is no excuse
(b) ignorance of fact is no excuse
(c) ignorance of law is an excuse
(d) ignorance of fact is an excuse.
37. Section 76 & section 79 of IPC provide the

general exception of
(a) mistake of law
(b) mistake of fact

(c) both mistake of law and fact
(d) either mistake of law or of fact.
38. Accident as an exception has been dealt with in

(a) section 77
(b) section 78
(c) section 80
(d) section 82.
39. Under section 80, the exception of accident is

available when an offence is committed while
(a) doing a lawful act in a lawful manner by lawful means
(b) doing a lawful act in any manner by any means
(c) doing a lawful act in a lawful manner by any means
(d) all the above.
40. The principle as to the way in which a man

should behave when he has to make a choice
between two evils is illustrated in
(b) section 81 of IPC
(d) section 78 of IPC.

41. The motive under section 81 of IPC should be
(a) prevention of harm to person
(b) prevention of harm to property
42. ‘Infancy’ as an exception has been provided

under
(a) section 80
(b) section 81
(c) section 82
(d) section 84.
43. Section 82 of IPC provides that nothing is an

offence which is done by a child under
(a) six years of age
(b) seven years of age
(c) nine years of age
(d) ten years of age.
44. Section 82 of IPC enunciates

(a) a presumption of fact
(b) a rebuttable presumption of law

(c) a conclusive or irrebuttable presumption of law
45. A person is stated to be partially incapax under

section 83, IPC if he is aged
(a) above seven years and under twelve years
(b) above seven years and under ten years
(c) above seven years and under sixteen years
(d) above seven years and under eighteen years.
46. Section 83 of IPC lays down

(a) a presumption of fact
(b) an inconclusive or rebuttable presumption of law
(c) conclusive or irrebuttable presumption of law
(d) irrebuttable presumption of fact.
47. Section 82 of IPC lays down the rule of

(a) wholly incapax
(b) partially incapax
(c) both (a) & (b)
48. Under section 82 & section 83 of IPC an offence

is punishable if it is done by a child
(a) of below seven years of age
(b) of above seven years of age but below twelve years if

he has not attained sufficient maturity and understanding
(c) of above seven years of age but below twelve years

having attained sufficient maturity and understanding
(d) all the above.
49. The maxim ‘actus nott facit rea nisi mens sit rea’
means
(a) crime has to be coupled with guilty mind
(b) there can be no crime without a guilty mind
(c) crime is the result of guilty mind
(d) criminal mind leads to crime.
50.1. The physical aspect of crime is actus reas.

II. The mental aspect of crime is mens rea.
III. The motive is the desire to commit crime Which
of the following is correct for the aforesaid
(a) I & II are correct but III is not correct
(b) only II & III
(c) only II & III
(d) all the above.
51. Section 84 of IPC provides for

(a) medical insanity
(b) legal insanity
(c) moral insanity
(d) unsoundness of mind of any kind.
52. Irresistible impulse is a defence

(a) in India
(b) in England
(c) in India and England both
(d) neither in India nor in England.
53. A hangman who hangs the prisoners pursuant to

the order of the court is exempt from criminal
liability by virtue of
54. Insanity as a defence means that a person at the

time of doing an act, by reason of unsoundness of
mind is incapable of knowing
(a) the nature of the act
(b) that what he is doing is wrong

(c) that what he is doing is contrary to law

(a) the burden of proof that the accused was not insane at
the time of commission of offence is on the prosecution
(b) the burden of proving that the accused was insane at

the time of commission of offence is on the accused
(c) there is a rebuttable presumption of fact that accused

was insane at the time of commission of the offence
(d) it is a matter of inference to be drawn by the court on

the facts proved by the prosecution.
56. For unsoundness of mind, the impairment of the

cognitive faculty of mind to escape criminal liability
(a) must be total
(b) must be partial
(c) both (a) & (b)
57. Intoxication as defence is contained in


(d) both (a) & (b).
58. For a defence of intoxication, to escape criminal

liability, the degeneration of mental faculties
(a) must be total
(b) must be partial
(c) both (a) & (b)
(d) only (b) above is correct & (a) is incorrect.
59. For a defence of intoxication, to escape criminal

liability, the intoxication
(a) can be self administered
(b) administered against his will or knowledge
(c) should not be self administered
(d) all the above.
60. In cases where the act involves a specific mens

rea, in cases of intoxication under section 86 of IPC
(a) the existence of mens rea is presumed
(b) the specific mens rea is not presumed
(c) the specific mens rea depends upon the attending

circumstances & the degree of intoxication

61. The doctrine ‘volenti non fit injuria’ is contained
in
(d) all the above.
62. The defence of ‘consent’ applies to

(a) private wrongs
(b) public wrongs
(c) both (a) & (b)
63. The defence of ‘consent’ is restrictive in its

applicability in cases involving
(a) alienable rights
(b) inalienable rights
(c) both (a) &(b)
64. The defence of ‘consent’ is not available in cases

of
(a) consent to cause death
(b) consent to cause grievous hurt

(c) both (a) & (b)
65. Operation of consent to all offences, short of

causing death intentionally, has been extended
under
66. Under section 89 the consent in respect of

infants under 12 years of age or persons of unsound
mind
(a) can be given by their guardians without any restriction
(b) can be given by the guardian subject to restrictions

mutually agreed upon
(c) can be given by the guardians subject to restrictions

imposed by law
(d) all the above.
67. The consent is not a valid consent under section

90
(a) if given under a fear of injury or misconception of fact
(b) if given by a person of unsound mind

(c) if given by a child below 12 years of age
(d) all the above.
68. Consent given under compulsion arising out of

threat of injury
(a) excuses the causing of death
(b) excuses causing of any offence against the state

punishable with death
(c) both (a) & (b)
69. The maxim ‘de minimus non curat lex’ means

(a) law would not take action on small & trifling matter
(b) law does not ignore any act which causes the slightest
harm
(c) law would not take action in serious matters
(d) all the above.
70. The principle ‘de minimus non curat lex’ is

contained in

71. The right of private defence is contained in
72. The right to private defence is based on the

natural instinct of
(a) self-preservation
(b) self-respect
(c) self-sufficiency
(d) self-reliance.
73. The right to private defence is

(a) unrestricted
(b) subject to restriction contained in section 99 of IPC
(c) subject to restrictions contained in Chapter IV of IPC
(d) subject to restrictions contained in any other provision

of IPC.
74. Right to private defence is

(a) available under all circumstances
(b) available where there is time to have the recourse to

the protection of public authorities
(c) available where there is no time to have recourse to the
protection of public authorities
75. The law on private defence in India

(a) is the same as in England
(b) is narrower than the one in England
(c) is wider than the one in England
76. The right to private defence is available with

respect to
(a) harm to body
(b) harm to movable property
(c) harm to immovable property
(d) all the above.
77. Under section 98 right to private defence also is

available against a
(a) person of unsound mind
(b) person who does not have maturity of understanding
(c) both (a) & (b)

78. Every person has a right of private defence of
his own body and the body of any other person
against any offence affecting the human body, has
been provided
(a) under section 96 of IPC
(b) under section 97 of IPC
(c) under section 98 of IPC
(d) under section 99 of IPC.
79. Every person has a right of private defence of

his property or of any other person against certain
offences affecting the property, has been provided
(a) under section 95 of IPC
(b) under section 96 of IPC
(c) under section 97 of IPC
(d) under section 98 of IPC.
80. Right of private defence is not available

(a) to the aggressor
(b) to the person who is attacked
(c) to the aggressor against an act done in private defence

by the person attacked
(d) only (a) & (c) are correct.

81. In a case of free fight between two parties
(a) right of private defence is available to both the parties
(b) right of private defence is available to individuals

against individual
(c) no right of private defence is available to either party
(d) right to private defence is available only to one party.
82. Under section 99, the right of private defence is

(a) not available at all against public servants engaged in
the discharge of their lawful duties
(b) available under all circumstances against public

servants engaged in the discharge of their lawful duties
(c) available against public servants only when their acts

cause reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt
(d) available against public servants only when their acts

cause reasonable apprehension of damage to property.
83. Right to private defence under section 99

(a) extends to causing more harm than is necessary for the
purpose of defence
(b) does not extend to causing more harm than is

necessary for the purpose of defence
(c) does not extend to causing the harm necessary for the
purpose of defence
(d) restricts the harm caused to be less than the one
necessary for the purpose of defence.
84. Right of private defence extends to causing

death, under the circumstances laid down in
(a) sections 100 & 101 of IPC
(b) sections 101 & 102 of IPC
(c) sections 102 & 103 of IPC
(d) sections 100 & 103 of IPC.
85. Right of private defence of the body extends to

causing death has been dealt with under
86. Right of private defence of property extending

to causing death has been dealt with under

87. In cases of assault causing reasonable
apprehension of death or of grievous hurt, the right
of private defence extends voluntarily
(a) causing grievous hurt
(b) causing death
(c) causing any harm other than death
(d) causing any harm other than death or grievous hurt.
88. In cases of assault with intention of committing

rape or of gratifying unnatural lust, the right of
private defence extends voluntarily
(a) causing any harm including death
(b) causing any harm other than death
(c) causing any harm other than grievous hurt
(d) both (b) & (c).
89. In cases of kidnapping & abduction the right of

private defence extends voluntarily causing
(a) any harm other than death
(b) any harm other than death & grievous hurt
(c) any harm including death
(d) both (a) & (b).

90. In cases of robbery or dacoity, the right of
private defence extends voluntarily causing
(a) any harm including death
(b) any harm other than death
(c) any harm other than grievous hurt
(d) both (b) & (c).
91. Where a wrong doer commits house breaking by

night, the right to private defence extends to
voluntarily causing
(a) any harm other than death
(b) any harm including death
(c) any harm other than death and grievous hurt
92. Where a wrong leads to mischief by fire on a

building used as a human dwelling or a place for
custody of property the right of private defence
extends voluntarily causing
(a) any harm including death
(b) any harm other than death
(c) any harm other than death & grievous hurt

93. Under section 102 of IPC the right to private
defence of the body
(a) commences as soon as a reasonable apprehension of
danger to the body arises and continues as long as that
apprehension continues
(b) commences as soon as a reasonable apprehension of

danger to the body arises and continues even after that
apprehension ceases
(c) commences only when the assault is actually done &

continues during the period of assault
(d) commences only when the assault is actually done &

continues after the assailant has left.
94. Under section 105 of IPC, the right of private

defence of property in cases of theft commences
when a reasonable apprehension of danger to the
property commences and
(a) continues till the offender has effected his retreat with
the property
(b) continues till the assistance of public authorities is

obtained
(c) continues till the property has been recovered
(d) all the above.

95. Section 106 of IPC extends the right of private
defence, in case of apprehension of death, to
causing
(a) any harm other than death to any innocent person
(b) any harm other than grievous hurt to any innocent

person
(c) any harm including death to any innocent person
96. Chapter V of Indian Penal Code deals with

(a) abetment
(b) attempt
(c) elections
(d) religion.
97. Right of private defence is not available

(a) against any act which in itself is not an offence
(b) against any act which is not legal wrong
(c) against any act which is a moral wrong
(d) all the above.
98. Section 97 of IPC extends the right of private

defence of property, to the offence of
(a) cheating
(b) misappropriation
(c) theft & robbery
(d) criminal breach of trust.
99. Abetment under section 107 of IPC can be

constituted by
(a) instigation
(b) conspiracy
(c) intentional aid
(d) all the above.
100. Abettor is a person

(a) who commits the offence
(b) who instigates the commission of offence
(c) against whom the offence is committed
(d) who is innocent.
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1. On what maxim is section 95 of the Indian Penal Code based?
5. 100 sample questions on The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 for
Maharashtra Judiciary Examination (preliminary)
Contract Act, 1872 for Bihar
(preliminary)
1. An agreement enforceable at law is a
(a) enforceable acceptance
(b) accepted offer
(c) approved promise
(d) contract
2. Every promise and every set of promises, forming

the consideration for each other, is an
ADVERTISEMENTS:
(a) agreement
(b) contract
(c) offer
(d) acceptance.
ADVERTISEMENTS:
3. Promises which form the consideration or part of

the consideration for each other are called
(a) reciprocal promises
(b) cross offers
(c) conditional offer
ADVERTISEMENTS:
(d) conditional promises.
4. An agreement not enforceable by law is stated to

be void under
(a) section 2(d)
(b) section 2(e)
ADVERTISEMENTS:
(c) section 2(f)
(d) section 2(g).
5. Void agreement signifies

(a) agreement illegal in nature
(b) agreement not enforceable by law
(c) agreement violating legal procedure
(d) agreement against public policy.
6. Offer as defined under section 2(a) is

(a) communication from one person to another
(b) suggestion by one person to another

(c) willingness to do or abstain from doing an act in order
to obtain the assent of other thereto
7. Under section 2(b) if the person to whom the

proposal is made signifies his assent the proposal is
said to have been
(a) accepted
(b) agreed
(c) provisionally agreed
(d) tentatively accepted.
8. A proposal when accepted becomes

(a) promise under section 2(b)
(b) agreement under section 2(e)
(c) contract under section 2(h)
9. When, at the desire of the promisor, the promisee

or any other person has done or abstained from
doing or, does or abstain from doing or promises to
do or to abstain from doing something, such act or
abstinence or promise under section 2(d) is called
(a) reciprocal promise
(b) consideration for the promise

(c) counter offer
(d) acceptance.
10. Promises which form the consideration or part

thereof, for each other under section 2(F) are called
(a) acceptances for different proposals
(b) agreements
(c) reciprocal promises
(d) consideration.
11. Every promise or set of promises forming the

consideration for each other under section 2(e) is
called
(a) reciprocal promise
(b) contract
(c) agreement
12. An agreement enforceable by law at the instance

of one party & not of other party under section 2(i)
is called
(a) a valid contract
(b) an illegal contract
(c) void contract

(d) a voidable contract.
13. Which is correct

(a) proposal + acceptance = promise
(b) promise + consideration = agreement
(c) agreement + enforceability = contract
(d) all the above.
14. In a valid contract, what comes first

(a) enforceability
(b) acceptance
(c) promise
(d) proposal.
15. Under section 2(c) promisor is the

(a) person who makes the proposal
(b) person who accepts the proposal
(c) person who makes the promise
(d) person to whom the proposal is made.
16. Under section 2(c) promisee is the

(a) person who makes the proposal
(b) person who accepts the proposal
(c) person who makes the promise

(d) person to whom proposal is made.
17. Goods displayed in a shop with a price tag is an

(a) offer
(b) invitation to offer
(c) counter offer
18. Tender is
(a) an offer
(b) an invitation to offer
(c) a counter offer
(d) a promise.
19. Communication of a proposal is complete

(a) when it is put in the course of transmission
(b) when it comes to the knowledge of the person to whom

it is made
(c) when the proposal is communicated to the person to

whom it is made
(d) all the above.
20. Communication of acceptance is complete as

against the proposer
(a) when it comes to the knowledge of the proposer
(b) when it is put in the course of transmission to him so as
to be out of power of the acceptor
(c) when the acceptance is communicated to the proposer
(d) all the above.
21. Communication of acceptance is complete as

against the acceptor
(a) when it comes to the knowledge of the proposer
(b) when it is put in the course of transmission
(c) when it is communicated to the acceptor that the

acceptance has reached the proposer
(d) when the proposer conveys the acceptance to the

acceptor.
22. Revocation of offer by letter or telegram can be

complete
(a) when it is despatched
(b) when it is received by the offeree
(c) when it reaches the offeree
23. Acceptance to be valid must

(a) be absolute
(b) be unqualified
(c) both be absolute & unqualified
(d) be conditional.
24. A contract with or by a minor is a

(a) valid contract
(b) void contract
(c) voidable contract
(d) voidable at the option of either party.
25. A contract which ceases to be enforceable by law

becomes void
(a) when it ceases to be enforceable
(b) before it ceases to be enforceable
(c) no such condition necessary
(d) none of above.
26. An acceptance can be revoked

(a) at any time before the communication of acceptance is
complete as against the promisee
(b) after its acceptance comes to the knowledge of the

promisee
(c) both (a) & (b)

27. A proposal stands revoked
(a) by communication of notice of revocation by the
proposer
(b) by failure of acceptor to fulfil a condition precedent
(c) by death or insanity of proposer to the knowledge of

acceptor
(d) all the above.
28. A proposal can be accepted

(a) by notice of acceptance
(b) by performance of condition of proposal
(c) by acceptance of consideration for a reciprocal promise
(d) all the above.
29. Enforceable agreements are the one

(a) made by free consent
(b) parties to the contract are competent to enter into an

agreement
(c) having lawful consideration & lawful object
(d) all the above.
30. Competency to contract relates to

(a) age of the parties
(b) soundness of mind of the parties

(c) both age & soundness of mind
(d) intelligence of the parties.
31. Which one of the following is correct

(a) past consideration is no consideration
(b) consideration can be past, present or future
(c) consideration can only be present
(d) consideration can only be present & future.
32. Past consideration is valid in

(a) England only
(b) India only
(c) both in England & India
(d) neither in England nor in India.
33. An agreement not to raise the plea of limitation

is
(a) valid & binding
(b) void
(c) voidable
(d) illegal.
34. A letter of acceptance sent by post is lost in

transit
(a) there is a concluded contract as the letter of
acceptance is put in the course of transmission
(b) there is no concluded contract as the acceptance has

not come to the knowledge of the proposer
(c) there is no concluded contract as the acceptance has

not been communicated to the proposer
(d) all the above.
35. When the consent to the contract is caused by

coercion, the contract under section 19 is
(a) valid
(b) voidable
(c) void
(d) illegal.
36. A’s son forged B’s name to a promissory note. B

under threat of prosecuting A’s son obtains a bond
from A for the amount of the forged note. If B sues
on this bond the court
(a) has no jurisdiction in this case
(b) must not set aside the bond
(c) may set aside the bond
(d) none of above.

37. When the consent is caused by misrepresent--
tation, the contract under section 19 is
(a) valid
(b) void
(c) voidable
(d) illegal.
38. When the consent is caused by undue influence,

the contract under section 19A is
(a) valid
(b) void
(c) voidable
(d) illegal.
39. Where both the parties are under mistake as to

matter of fact, the contract under section 20 is
(a) voidable
(b) void
(c) valid
(d) illegal.
40. Where one of the parties is under a mistake as

to matter of fact the contract is
(a) valid
(b) void
(c) voidable
(d) illegal.
41. Considerations & objects are unlawful where it is

(a) forbidden by law or defeat the provision of any law
(b) which is fraudulent
(c) which is immoral & against the public policy
(d) all the above.
42. If only a part of the consideration or object is

unlawful, the contract under section 24 shall be
(a) valid
(b) voidable
(c) void
(d) illegal.
43. A contract without consideration under section

25 is
(a) valid
(b) voidable
(c) void
(d) illegal.
44. Consideration should be something in return of
promise which
(a) both the law and parties regard, as having some value
(b) only law regards a having some value
(c) only the parties regard some value
(d) only adequate value necessary.
45. If the proposer prescribes the mode & manner of

acceptance, the acceptance
(a) can be in any manner & mode
(b) should be in the manner & mode prescribed
(c) can be in any reasonable mode & manner
(d) all the above.
46. Parties are not competent to contract if any of

them is
(a) minor
(b) insane
(c) declared unqualified
(d) all the above.
47. Consent is free under section 14 if not caused by

(a) coercion & undue influence
(b) fraud and misrepresentation

(c) mistake subject to the provisions of sections 20, 21 and
22
(d) all the above.
48. Consent under section 13 means

(a) agreeing on the same thing in the same sense
(b) agreeing on the same thing at the same time
(c)agreeing on the same thing at different time
(d) agreeing on different things at different times.
49. A contract which is valid initially however,

ceases to be enforceable subsequently, the contract
(a) remains valid
(b) becomes voidable when enforceable
(c) becomes void when it enforceable
(d) becomes void since inception.
50. Agreements, the meaning of which is not certain

or not capable of being made certain under section
29 is
(a) void
(b) voidable
(c) illegal
(d) valid
51. An agreement in restraint of trade under section
27 is
(a) valid
(b) voidable
(c) void
(d) unenforceable
52. An agreement restraint of trade is valid under

section 27 if relates to
(a) sale of goodwill
(b) mutual adjustment
(c) business contingency
53. An agreement not to pursue any legal remedy to

enforce the rights under section 28 is
(a) valid
(b) voidable
(c) void
(d) unenforceable.
54. An agreement not to persue legal remedies but

to refer the dispute to the arbitrator, under section
28 is
(a) valid
(b) voidable
(c) void
(d) unenforceable.
55. An agreement to refer the dispute to the

arbitrator is valid
(a) in respect of disputes already arisen
(b) in respect of disputes which may arise in future
(c) both (a) & (b)
(d) neither (a) nor (b)
56. An agreement by way of wager under section 30
is
(a) void
(b) voidable
(c) valid
(d) unenforceable
57. An agreement in connection with horse- racing

under section 30 is
(a) unlawful
(b) void
(c) voidable
(d) valid.
58. An agreement in restraint of marriage under
section 26 is
(a) void
(b) voidable
(c) valid
(d) unenforceable
59. If only a part of the consideration or object is

unlawful, the contract under section 24 shall be
(a) valid to the extent the same are lawful
(b) void to the extent the same are unlawful
(c) void as a whole
(d) valid as a whole.
60. An agreement shall be void on account of

(a) mistake of fact by one party
(b) mistake of fact by both the parties
(c) mistake of foreign law
(d) both (a) & (b).
61. Coercion which vitiates free consent under

section 15 is
(a) committing or threatening to commit any act which is
forbidden by law
(b) committing or threatening to commit any act which is
forbidden by Indian Penal Code
(c) unlawful detaining or threatening to detain any property

with an intention to causing any person to enter into an
agreement
(d) all the above.
62. What is correct of a standard form contract

(a) it is a valid contract
(b) one party has no choice but to accept & sign the
contract
(c) both (a) & (b)
(d) the consent is not a free consent.
63. Law of contract primarily

(a) specifies the circumstances in which promises are
binding on the parties to the contract
(b) lays down certain norms by which the parties are bound
(c) lays down the circumstances under which a promise

may be made
(d) all the above.
64. Misrepresentation under section 18 means

(a) a positive assertion, in a manner not warranted by the
information of the person making it, not true but he
believes it to be true
(b) any breach of duty, which gains an advantage to the

person committing it, by misleading another to his
prejudice
(c) causing a party to make an agreement to make a

mistake as to the subject matter of contract
(d) all the above.
65. A person is deemed to be in a position to

dominate the will of another by undue influence if
the mental capacity is affected temporarily or
permanently by
(a) reason of age
(b) reason of illness
(c) mental or bodily distress
(d) all the above.
66. An agreement to remain unmarried is

(a) valid
(b) voidable
(c) void
(d) unenforceable.
67. A general offer open for world at large can be
accepted
(a) by sending a communication of acceptance
(b) by complying with the conditions of offer
(c) by tendering himself to comply the conditions of offer
68. The term consensus ad-idem means

(a) general consensus
(b) reaching an agreement
(c) meeting of minds upon the same thing in( the same
sense
(d) all the above.
69. Which one of the following does not amount to

fraud
(a) suggestion as a fact which is not true, by one who does
not believe it to be true
(b) active concealment of a fact
(c) a representation made without knowing it to be false,

honestly believing it to be true
(d) a promise made without any intention of performing it.

70. Contract without consideration made in writing
& registered and made on account of natural love
and affection is
(a) void
(b) voidable
(c) valid
(d) unenforceable.
71. Inadequacy of consideration does not make the

contract
(a) void
(b) voidable
(c) unenforceable
(d) neither void nor voidable.
72. Inadequacy of consideration is relevant in

determining the question of
(a) fraud
(b) misrepresentation
(c) undue influence
(d) free consent.
73. Agreement without consideration is valid

(a) when made out of love & affection due to near
relationship
(b) when made to compensate a person who has already

done something voluntarily
(c) when made to pay a time barred debt
(d) all the above.
74. A contract based on the happening or non-

happening of a future event under section 31 is
called
(a) a contingent contract
(b) a wagering contract
(c) a contract marked with uncertainty and hence void
75. A contingent contract to do or not to do anything

on the happening of an uncertain future event under
section 32
(a) is never enforceable
(b) becomes enforceable only on the happening of that

event
(c) enforceable since the time of making it
(d) becomes enforceable in the immediate possibility of

happening of that event.
76. A contingent contract
(a) is void
(b) never becomes void
(c) becomes void when the event becomes impossible
(d) is voidable.
77. A contingent agreement based on an impossible

event under section 36
(a) is void
(b) is void till the impossibility is known
(c) becomes void on the knowledge of impossibility
(d) all the above.
78. What is true of misrepresentation

(a) it is the same thing as fraud
(b) it renders the contract voidable
(c) it may be due to innocence
(d) both (b) & (c).
79. Two persons have the capacity to contract under

section 11
(a) if both are major
(b) if both are not of unsound mind

(c) if none is declared unqualified to contract
(d) all are correct.
80. A contract with minor is

(a) voidable at the instance of the minor
(b) voidable at the instance of other party
(c) void
(d) valid.
81. An agreement to do an act impossible in itself

under section 56 is
(a) void
(b) valid
(c) voidable
(d) unenforceable.
82. A contingent contract based on the specified

uncertain event happening within a fixed time under
section 35
(a) remains valid even if the event does not happen within
that fixed time
(b) becomes void at the expiration of the time fixed
(c) becomes void if the happening of that event becomes

impossible before the expiry of time fixed
(d) both (b) & (c).
83. A contingent contract based on the specified

uncertain event not happening within a fixed time
under section 35
(a) can be enforced if the event does not happen within the
time fixed
(b) can be enforced if before the expiry of time fixed, it

becomes certain that such an event shall not happen
(c) cannot be enforced at all, being void
(d) both (a) & (b).
84. A promisor can perform

(a) the promise himself
(b) the promise through his representa-tive competent to

perform
(c) the promise through his representa-tive irrespective of

the competency of that representative
(d) both (a) & (b).
85. A promisee can accept the performance (a) from

the promisor himself
(b) from the representative of the promisor competent to
perform
(c) from a third person

(d) all the above.
86. In case of joint promise, generally the

performance must be by
(a) all the promisors jointly
(b) any one of them individually
(c) one not authorised to perform
87. In cases of joint promise generally a promisee

can compel
(a) all the joint promisors to perform
(b) any one of them to perform
(c) some of them to perform
(d) all the above.
88. Generally, the joint promisors can

(a) compel each other to contribute equally
(b) not to compel each other to contribute equally
(c) cannot compel each other to contribute
89. Where one of the joint promisors makes a

default in contribution of performance
(a) the other joint promisors have no right against the
defaulter
(b) have to bear the loss in equal share
(c) not supposed to bear the loss
(d) the contract becomes void to that extent.
90. In case of default by joint promisors the

promisee
(a) can sue any one of them for the entire promise
(b) can sue any one of them to the extent of his share in
the joint promise
(c) both (a) & (b)
(d) cannot sue any single promisee.
91. In case of death of a joint promisor(s) the

promisee
(a) can enforce the contract against the survivor(s) of the
said joint promisor(s) alongwith the joint promisors who are
alive
(b) cannot enforce the contract against the survivor(s) of

the said joint promisor(s)
(c) both (a) & (b)
(d) cannot enforce the contract against any of them.

92. In a contract not specifying the time for
performance, the promisor can perform the contract
(a) within any time howsoever long it may be
(b) within the shortest time
(c) within a reasonable time
93. What is a reasonable time for performance of a

contract
(a) is a question of fact
(b) is a question of law
(c) is a mixed question of fact & law
(d) is a question of prudence.
94. A contract not specifying the place of

performance
(a) performed at any place to the knowledge of the
promisee
(b) the promisor has to apply to the promisee for

appointment of a place of performance & perform the
promise at that place
(c) the promisor need not seek any instructions from the
promisee as to the place of performance
(d) the promisor can perform the promise at a place other
than the place appointed by the promisee.
95. In case the promisee prescribes the manner and

time of performance of promise
(a) the performance must be in the manner and at the time
prescribed
(b) the performance can be in a different manner but at the

time prescribed
(c) the performance can be in the manner prescribed but at

a time beyond the time prescribed
(d) the performance need not be in the manner and time

prescribed.
96. If the time of performance of the contract is the

essence of the contract and the promisor fails to
perform the contract by the specified time
(a) the contract becomes void
(b) the contract remains valid
(c) the contract becomes voidable at the instance of the

promisee
(d) the contract becomes unenforceable.
97. If the time is not the essence of the contract the

failure to perform the contract by the specified time
makes the contract
(a) void
(b) voidable at the instance of the promisee
(c) remains valid but the promisee can claim compensation

for the loss suffered by him by such failure
(d) remains valid & can be performed at any subsequent

time without being liable for the loss suffered by the
promisee.
98. In contract for sale of immovable property the

presumption is that the time is
(a) the essence of the contract
(b) not the essence of the contract
(c) the essence of the contract but failure does not make
the contract voidable
(d) not the essence of the contract but makes the contract
voidable at the instance of the other party.
99. Reciprocal promises provide for doing certain

things which are legal & certain others which are
illegal, under section 57
(a) the entire set of promises is void
(b) the first set is voidable, but the second set is void
(c) the first set is valid but the second set is void
(d) the entire set of promises is valid.

100. A contract, performance of which becomes
impossible or unlawful becomes
(a) void when the performance becomes unlawful or
impossible
(b) void
(c) voidable when the performance becomes impossible.
(d) neither becomes void nor voidable
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Expected Questions for Indian

Judicial Services Mains
Examination
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Expected questions on Constitutional Law of India, Indian Penal
Code, Law of Contract and Law of Torts for Indian Judicial Services
mains examination.
Q.1. What are the constitutional protection in respect of
conviction for offence?
[Assam Judicial Service (Grade-III) Written Examination, 2011]
Ans. The Constitution of India guarantees various rights
in which Article 20 deals with protection in respect of
conviction for offences as under:
1. Ex post facto law- Article 20 (1)
2. Double jeopardy-Article 20 (2)
3. Prohibition against self-incrimination-Article 20 (3)
An ex post facto law is a law which imposes penalties
retrospectively. Article 20 (1) states that no person shall be
convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the
time of the commission of the Act charged as an offence, nor be
subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been
inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the
offence.
Article 20 (2) states that, no person shall be prosecuted and
punished for the same offence more than once. Article 20 (2) is
based on the rule of nemo debet vis vexari which means that no
man should be put twice in peril for the same offence. Sec. 300 of
Cr.P.C. also protect us against double jeopardy but Article 20 (2) is
wider than section 300.
Article 20 (3) states that no person accused of any offence shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself. The provision contained
in this Article embodies the general principles of English and
American law that no one shall be compelled to give testimony
which may expose him to prosecution for crime.
In M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra, AIR 1954 SC 300 the
Supreme Court observed that this right embodies the
following essentials:
1. It is a right pertaining to a person who is accused of an offence.
2. It is protection against compulsion to be a witness.
3. It is a protection against such compulsion relating to his giving
evidence against himself.
Sml. Selvi v. State of Karnataka AIR 2010 SC 1974 is a landmark
case on this point where Supreme Court declared unconstitutional
conducting the NARCO, Brain Mapping and Polygraphy on the
basis of Article 20 (3).
Q.2. Whether recommendation of the President is
necessary in moving a Bill, if so, explain?
Ans. In general, there is no requirement of President’s
recommendation for moving a Bill but there are some
circumstances in which recommendation of the President is
necessary in moving a Bill. Such as under Article 3 of the Indian
Constitution Parliament may by law form a new State and alter the
areas, boundaries or names of existing States.
But no Bill for the purpose shall be introduced in either House of
Parliament except on the recommendation of the President and
unless, where the proposal contained in the Bill affects the area,
boundaries or name of any of the States, the Bill has been referred
by the President to the Legislature of that State for expressing its
views thereon within such period as may be specified in the
reference or within such further period as the President may allow
and the period so specified or allowed has expired.
Q.3. ln what cases does joint sitting of both the houses
take place? Discuss briefly the special procedure in
respect to Money Bills.
Ans. The framers of the Constitution of India were fully aware
about the situations of deadlock between the upper house i.e. Rajya
Sabha and the lower house i.e. Lok Sabha and accordingly they
provided for joint sittings of both the Houses to break the deadlock.
In Constituent Assembly it was said that in a Federal Constitution,
the Upper House is composed of the representatives of the various
units or states.
It is not like the House of Lords which is hereditary or which by its
very character is conservative. Our Upper House is elected by the
representatives of the various States and therefore it is as
representative as the Lower House itself in a particular manner.
The object of providing an Upper House in the Centre is to see that
the States voice or the voice of the units is adequately represented.
Therefore the third way of providing to resolve the deadlock is by
Joint session.
Now that is not a very ideal solution no doubt but it is a solution
which is as good as possibly can be conceived of. When both the
Houses meet together it is possible that either by compromise they
resolve their differences or the majority of the Lower House will
carry the day.
Article 108 of the Constitution provides that a Joint
Session of the Parliament can be summoned by the
President of India in the following situations:
If after a Bill has been passed by one House and transmitted to the
other House-
(a) The Bill is rejected by the other House; or
(b) The Houses have finally disagreed as to the amendments to be
made in the Bill; or
(c) More than six months elapse from the date of the reception of
the Bill by the other House without the Bill being passed by it, the
President may, unless the Bill has elapsed by reason of a dissolution
of the House of the People, notify to the Houses by message if they
are sitting or by public notification if they are not sitting, his
intention to summon them to meet in a joint sitting for the purpose
of deli berating and voting on the Bill.
In calculating period of six months, those days are not considered
when House is prorogued or adjourned for more than four
consecutive days.
The joint sitting of the Parliament is called by the President and is
presided over by the Speaker of Lok Sabha or in his absence by the
Deputy Speaker of the Lok Sabha or in his absence, the Deputy-
Chairman of the Rajya Sabha.
The Constitution has specified that at a joint sitting, new
amendments to the Bill cannot be proposed except –
(1) Those amendments that have caused final disagreement between
the Houses;
(2) Those amendments that might have become necessary due to
the delay in the passage of the Bill.
Till date, the joint sessions of Indian Parliament have been called
for only three times i.e. Dowry Prohibition Act, 1960, Banking
Service Commission Repeal Bill, 1977, and Prevention of Terrorism
Act, 2002.
Money Bill and Constitution Amendment Bill are exception to joint
sitting of Parliament.
Special procedure in respect of Money Bills is contained in Article
109 which states that a Money Bill shall not be introduced in the
Rajya Sabha. After a Money Bill has been passed by the Lok Sabha it
shall be transmitted to the Rajya Sabha for its recommendations
and the Rajya Sabha shall within a period of fourteen days from the
date of its receipt of the Bill return the Bill to the Lok Sabha with its
recommendations and the Lok Sabha may thereupon either accept
or reject all or any of the recommendations of the Rajya Sabha.
Even if Rajya Sabha does not pass a money Bill within 14 days, it is
deemed to have been passed by both the Houses of Parliament after
expiry of the above period. Therefore, the need to summon a joint
session does not arise in the case of Money Bill.
Q.4. Is the scope of Article 32 wider than that of Article
226 of the Constitution of India? Assign reasons for your
answer.
Ans. No, the scope of the provisions of Article 226 is wider than
Article 32. The Writ Jurisdiction of Supreme Court can be invoked
under Article 32 of the Constitution for the violation of fundamental
rights guaranteed under Part – III of the Constitution.
Any provision in any Constitution for Fundamental Rights is
meaningless unless there are adequate safeguards to ensure
enforcement of such provisions.
Since the reality of such rights is tested only through the judiciary,
the safeguards assume even more importance. Article 32 is referred
to as the “Constitutional Remedy” for enforcement of Fundamental
Rights. This provision itself has been included in the Fundamental
Rights and hence it cannot be denied to any person.
Dr. Ambedkar described Article 32 as the most important one,
without which the Constitution would be reduced to nullity. It is
also referred to as the heart and soul of the Constitution. By
including Article 32 in the Fundamental Rights, the Supreme Court
has been made the protector and guarantor of these Rights.
Article 226 empowers High Court to issue certain writs for the
enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any
other purpose. A High Court cannot issue a writ to another High
Court, nor can one Bench of a High Court issue a writ to a different
Bench of the High Court; much less can the writ jurisdiction of a
High Court be invoked to seek issuance of a writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court. The High Courts are not constituted as inferior
courts in our constitutional scheme.
Thus, it is evident from the above that Article 32 is applicable only
in case of enforcing fundamental rights but Article 226 is applied for
other constitutional rights also including fundamental rights.
Moreover, Article 32 may be suspended but there is no provision to
suspend Article 226.
Q.5. Write short note on Supervisory Jurisdiction of the
High Court.
Ans. Power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court is
contained in Article 227 of the Constitution. A perusal of Article 227
of the Constitution would indicate that the power of
superintendence conferred on the High Court is a power that is
confined to courts and tribunals in relation to which it exercises
jurisdiction.
The power of superintendence conferred upon every High Court by
Article 227 is a supervisory jurisdiction intended to ensure that
subordinate courts and tribunals act within the limits of their
authority and according to law.
The jurisdiction under Article 227 on the other hand is not original
nor is it appellate. This jurisdiction of superintendence under
Article 227 is for both administrative and judicial superintendence.
Court’s power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be
curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic
structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court
in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261.
Q.6. Distinguish between Preparation and attempt to
commit a crime.
[Assam Judicial Service (Grade-III) Main Examination, 2011]
Ans. There is a very fine line between preparation and attempt.
While IPC does not define either of them, it is very important to
distinguish between them because attempt is a crime but
preparation is not. Both, preparation and attempt are physical
manifestations of the criminal intention.
But attempt goes a lot further than preparation towards the actual
happening of crime. While in preparation, there is a possibility that
the person may abandon his plan, but attempt leaves no room for
that. For example- keeping a pistol in pocket and looking for the
enemy to kill is a preparation because one can abandon the plan
anytime, but taking out the pistol and pulling the trigger is attempt
because it leaves no room for turning back. Thus, in general,
Preparation involves collecting material, resources, and planning
for committing an act while attempt signifies a direct movement
towards commission after the preparations are made.
Ordinarily, to constitute an attempt the following
elements are needed:
i. Mens rea to commit the crime
ii. An act which constitutes the actus reus of a criminal attempt
failure in accomplishment
In the case of R v. Cheesman 1862, Lord Blackburn identified a key
difference between the two. He says that if the actual transaction
has commenced which would have ended in the crime if not
interrupted, there is clearly an attempt to commit the crime.
However, this is not the only criteria for determining an attempt.
The following are four tests that come in handy in
distinguishing between the two:
1. Last Step Test or Proximity Rule:
As per this test, anything short of last step is preparation and not
attempt. This is because as long as there is a step remaining for
completion of the crime, the person can abandon it. For example- A
obtains poison to kill B and mixes it with food that B is supposed to
eat. But he has not yet given the food to B. Thus, it is
still preparation. As soon as he keeps the food on the table from
where B eats every day, the last step is done and it becomes an
attempt.
In the case of R v. Riyasat Ali, the accused gave orders to print
forms that looked like they were from Bengal Coal Company. He
proofread the samples two times and gave orders for correction as
well so that they would appear exactly as forms of the said company.
At this time he was arrested for attempt to make false document
under section 464. However, it was held that it was not an attempt
because the name of the company and the seal were not put on the
forms and until that was done, the forgery would not be complete.
In the case of Abhayanand Mishra v. State of Bihar, A applied to the
Patna University for MA exam and he supplied documents proving
that he was a graduate and was working as a headmaster of a
school. Later on it was found that the documents were fake. It was
held that it was an attempt to cheat because he had done everything
towards achieving his goal.
2. Indispensable Element Test or Theory of Impossibility:
As per this test, all of indispensable elements must be present to
equal attempt. For example, a person has the gun to kill but he
forgot the bullets. In this case, it would not be an attempt. Further,
he goes to place where victim should be but is not then he is not
guilty of attempt under this test. In other words, if there is
something a person needs to commit the crime but it is not present,
then there is not an attempt.
This test has generated a lot of controversy ever since it was laid in
the case of Queen v. Collins, where it was held that a pickpocket was
not guilty of attempt even when he put his hand into the pocket of
someone with an intention to steal but did not find anything.
Similarly, in the case of R v. Mc Pherson, the accused was held not
guilty of attempting to break into a building and steal goods because
the goods were not there.
However, these cases were overruled in R v. King, where the
accused was convicted for attempting to steal from the hand bag of
a woman although there was nothing in the bag. Illustration (b) of
section 511 is based on this decision.
3. Interruption Test:
But for interruption test if the action proves that the person would
have gone through with the plan if not for the interruption such as
arrest, then it is an attempt. For example- a person points a gun at
another and is about to pull the trigger. He is overpowered and was
stopped from pulling the trigger. This shows that if he had not been
interrupted, he would have committed the crime and he is thus
guilty of attempt even though the last step of the crime has not been
performed.
4. Unequivocally Test or on the job Theory:
If a person does something that shows his commitment to follow
through and commit the crime then it is an attempt. For example, in
the case of State of Maharastra v. Mohd. Yakub, three persons were
found with a truck loaded with silver near the sea dock. Further, the
sound of engine of a mechanized boat was heard from a nearby
creek.
They were convicted of attempting to smuggle silver. J Sarkaria
observed that what constitute an attempt is a mixed question of law
and fact. Attempt is done when the culprit takes deliberate and
overt steps that show an unequivocal intention to commit the
offence even if the step is not the penultimate one.
Q.7. Write short note on insanity as a defence in a criminal
trial.
[Goa Judicial Service (Junior Division) Examination, 2010]
Ans. The provisions relating to insanity as a general defence are
contained in section 84 IPC which is based on Mc’Naghten Rule.
Sec. 84 IPC mentions as under-
84. Act of a Person of Unsound Mind.- Nothing is an offence which
is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of
unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act,
or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law.
For application of section 84, following two conditions
should be fulfilled:
i. At the time of commission of the act, the person must be of
unsound mind.
ii. He must be incapable of knowing nature of the act or that what
he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law.
The legal conception of insanity defers considerably from the
medical conception. It is not every form of insanity or madness that
is recognised by law as a sufficient cause. The court is concerned
with legal insanity and not with medical insanity. According to
medical science insanity is another name for mental abnormality
due to various causes and existing in various degrees.
Every form of insanity or madness is not recognized by law as legal
insanity. The crucial point of time for deciding whether the benefit
of section 84 could be given or not is the material time when the
offence was committed.
Unsoundness of mind non-compos mentis covers a wide range and
is synonymous with insanity, lunacy, madness, mental
derangement, mental disorder and mental aberration or alienation.
The insane persons may be divided into four kinds:
(i) A lunatic;
(ii) An idiot;
(iii) One non compos mentis by sickness, or
(iv) By drink.
A lunatic and an idiot, may be permanently so, or they may be
subject to only temporary and occasional fits of malady. A person
suffering from a total alienation of the mind is called ‘insane’ or
‘mad’, the term ‘lunatic’ being reserved for one whose disorder is
intermittent with lucid intervals.
An idiot is one who is of non-sane memory from his birth of
perpetual infirmity, without lucid intervals. A person made non
compos mentis by illness is excused in criminal cases for such acts
as are committed while under the influence of his disorder.
‘Unsoundness of mind’ naturally impairs the cognitive faculties of
the mind and exempts a person from criminal responsibility.
Whether a person, who, under an insane delusion as to the existing
facts, commits an offence in consequence thereof is, therefore, to be
excused, depends upon the nature of the delusion. If he is laboring
under a partial delusion, and it is not in other respects insane he
must be considered in the same situation as to the responsibility as
if the facts, with respect to which the delusion exists, were real.
If a person afflicted with insane delusion, in respect of one or more
particular subjects or persons, commits a crime, knowing that he
was acting contrary to law, but did the act complained of with a
view, under the influence of insane delusion, of redressing or
revenging some supposed grievance or injury or of producing some
public benefit, he is nevertheless punishable according to the nature
of the crime committed.
Section 84 lays down the legal test of responsibility in cases of
alleged unsoundness of mind, and it is by that test, as distinguished
from medical test, that the criminality of an act is to be determined.
The burden to proof the insanity is on the person who is claiming
for this. The procedure of trial in respect of an unsound accused is
contained in section 328-329 IPC.
Act not intended and not known to be likely to cause death
or grievous hurt, done by consent:
Nothing which is not intended to cause death, or grievous hurt, and
which is not known by the doer to be likely to cause death or
grievous hurt, is an offence by reason of any harm which it may
cause, or be intended by the doer to cause, to any person, above
eighteen years of age, who has given consent, whether express or
implied, to suffer that harm; or by reason of any harm which it may
be known by the doer to be likely to cause to any such person who
has consented to take the risk of that harm.
Kerala High Court in Deepa and others v. S.I. of Police, and another,
1986 CriLJ 1120 said that Section 87 deals with cases where persons
above 18 years of age agree to suffer the harm other than death or
grievous hurt. Here the question of consent of individuals does not
arise. What is paramount is the interest of the society.
Q.8. A says to B, “I shall shoot you tomorrow.” Next day B
waits with a pistol and as soon as he sees A, he shoots A. A
dies. Can B successfully utilize his plea of right to self
defence?
[Uttarakhand Civil Judge (J.D.) Mains Examination, 2011]
Ans. No. B cannot successfully utilize his plea of right to self
defence because under section 99 of IPC, there is no right of private
defence in cases in which there is time to have recourse to the
protection of the public authorities. Sec. 99 mentions as under-
There is no right of private defence against an act which does not
reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt, if
done, or attempted to be done, by a public servant acting in good
faith under colour of his office, though that act may not be strictly
justifiable by law.
There is no right of private defence against an act which does not
reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt, if
done, or attempted to be done, by the direction of a public servant
acting in good faith under colour of his office though that direction
may not be strictly justifiable by law.
There is no right of private defence in cases in which there is time to
have recourse to protection of the public authorities. Clause (3) of
section 99 is based on the principle that no man has the right to
take the law into his own hands for the protection of his person or
property if there is a reasonable opportunity of redress by recourse
to public authorities.
Here, B had the time to have recourse of public authority but he
failed to do so and hence he cannot exercise the right of private
defence against A.
Q.9. A while addressing a rally, says “This is the
government of corrupt people. Go, torch their houses and
kill them so that corruption is uprooted in this country.”
Has A committed a crime?
Ans. Yes, A has committed the offence of Sedition defined under
section 124-Aof IPC. Sec. 124-A mentions that-
Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by
visible representation, or otherwise, brings or attempts to bring into
hatred or contempt, or excites or attempts to excite disaffection
towards, the Government established by law in India, shall be
punished with imprisonment for life, to which fine may be added, or
with imprisonment which may extend to three years, to which fine
may be added, or with fine.
As A’s words amount to attempt to excite disaffection towards
government established by law in India, he has committed sedition.
Q.10. X says at an electoral meeting, “This is a government
of persons neck deep in corruption. Give them a befitting
reply at the hustings.” Has X committed a crime?
Ans. X has not committed any offence whatsoever under IPC or
under any other law by the aforesaid statement. Article 19 (1) of the
Constitution of India provides freedom of speech and expression to
all Indian citizens but this fundamental right is not absolute right.
Restrictions on freedom of speech and expression may be imposed
under Article 19(2) which says that nothing in sub-clause (a) of
clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent
the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes
reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the
said sub-clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of
India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign
States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt
of court, defamation or incitement to an offence.
Statement made by X at an electoral meeting does not come in
purview of Art. 19 (2).
Q.11. Write short note on rioting.
Ans. As per section 146 IPC, whenever force or violence is used by
an unlawful assembly, or by any member thereof, in prosecution of
the common object of such assembly, every member of such
assembly is guilty of the offence of rioting. Thus, it is clear that there
should be minimum five persons for committing rioting. To
constitute the offence of rioting, the following five essential
ingredients must remain present-
(a) An assembly of five or more persons
(b) An unlawful assembly
(c) Members of the assembly used force or violence
(d) Offender was a member of that assembly and
(e) Force or violence was used by the assembly in pursuance of their
common object.
It has been held in Samaruddinv. Emperor (1913) ILR 40 Cal 367,
that the word violence in Section 146, I.P.C. is not restricted to force
used against persons only, but extends also to force against
inanimate objects.
Rioting is punishable under section 147 IPC with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with
fine, or with both.
Bombay High Court in Suresh v. State of Maharashtra, on 28
November, 2008 said that the offence under Section 147 of the
I.P.C. is an individual offence and each member is guilty of offence
of rioting if conditions of Section 146 of the I.P.C. are fulfilled. In
fact, offence under Section 147 of the I.P.C. is aggravated form of
the offence punishable under Section 143 of the I.P.C.
Himachal Pradesh High Court in A mar Singh v. State of Himachal
Pradesh, on 25 June, 2015 said that the offence of rioting can only
be committed by an unlawful assembly for which there have to be
an assembly of five or more persons.
Jharkhand High Court in Basudeo Yadav v. State of Jharkhand, on
10 March, 2017 said that the major element of rioting is the use of
force or violence by unlawful assembly or a person of that unlawful
assembly in prosecution of common object.
Q.12. A intentionally causes Z’s death, partly by illegally
omitting to give Z food and partly by beating Z. What
offence, if any, has been committed by A? Support your
answer with the help of provisions of law and
illustrations.
[Himachal Pradesh Judicial Service (Grade-III) Main Examination,
2014]
Ans. A has committed murder of Z. The question is based on
section 36 IPC which is reproduced here under-
Effect Caused Partly by Act and Partly by Omission:
Wherever the causing of a certain effect, or an attempt to cause that
effect, by an act or by an omission, is an offence, it is to be
understood that the causing of that effect partly by an act and partly
by an omission is the same offence.
Supreme Court of India in P. B. Desai v. State of Maharashtra &
another, on 13 September, 2013 said that an omission is sometimes
called a negative act, but this seems dangerous practice, for it too
easily permits an omission to be substituted for an act without
requiring the special requirement for omission liability such as legal
duty and the physical capacity to perform the act.
Criminal liability for an omission is also well accepted where the
actor has a legal duty and the capacity to act. It is said that this
rather fundamental exception to the act requirement is permitted
because an actor’s failure to perform a legal duty of which he is
capable, satisfies the purposes of the act requirement or at least
satisfies them as well as an act does.
Specifically these two special requirements for omission liability
help to exclude from liability cases of fantasizing and irresolute
intentions, important purposes of the act requirement.
Q.13. Two brothers decide to teach a lesson to Mahadeva
as he had attempted to molest their sister and when
questioned, he insults and abused them in vulgar language
in front of public. Hence, along with three friends, they
conspire and decide to assault him, while he is in his
house. All of them get armed with weapons like choppers,
axe and clubs and go to his house. They forcibly enter the
house and attack him. At that time Mahadeva is carrying
his four year old son in his arms. One of the accused in
order to attack Mahadeva snatches the child and throws it
down on the ground. While falling, the head of the child
hits grinding stone and it dies instantaneously. The two of
the accused hold Mahadeva and the other accused, attack
him with weapons indiscriminately. When Mahadeva falls
down unconscious they leave the place. Then after
Mahadeva is taken to a hospital but while under treatment
breathes his last. The post-mortem report indicates that
the death was due to excessive haemorrhage and multiple
injuries to vital organs like brain, liver and kidney.
What are all the offences committed by the accused? Give
reasons with reference to provisions of IPC.
[Karnataka District Judge Examination, 2007]
Ans. All accused are liable for house trespass-and murder read with
section 149 IPC. House trespass is defined in section 442 as under-
Whoever commits criminal trespass by entering into or remaining
in any building, tent or vessel used as a human dwelling or any
building used as a place for worship, or as a place for the custody of
property, is said to commit “house- trespass “.
When two brothers along with three friends entered in Mahadeva’s
house, they committed house trespass which is punishable in
section 448 IPC.
As one of the accused snatched child from deceased and threw on
ground, all accused were fully aware about the possibility of this
incident so all accused are liable for committing murder of child as
well as of Mahadeva as post mortem report indicates that death was
caused due to excessive haemorrhage and multiple injuries to vital
organs like brain, liver and kidney which were caused by accused.
Hence, all are punishable under section 302 IPC. Sec. 149 deals with
every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in
prosecution of common object. In question, there are five persons
(two brothers and three friends). Thus, they have formed unlawful
assembly.
In short, they have committed offences under sections 448, 302/149
IPC.
Q.14. A private detective, who is entrusted with the
detection of a crime, follows a woman who is suspected of
the commission of the crime, in the course of which he
attempts to contact her to foster personal interaction with
her repeatedly, though she rebuffed him. What is the
offence, if any, committed by him? State reasons.
[Kerala HJS Examination, 2012]
Ans. He has not committed any offence.
The question is related with Section 354D of IPC which defines
‘stalking’ as any man who-
(i) Follows a woman and contacts, or attempts to contact such
woman to foster personal interaction repeatedly despite a clear
indication of disinterest by such woman; or
(ii) Monitors the use by a woman of the internet, email or any other
form of electronic communication; or
(iii) Watches or spies on a woman in any manner, that results in a
fear of violence or serious alarm or distress in the mind of such
woman, or interferes with the mental peace of the woman, commits
the offence of stalking:
But the Provision attached with this section says that such conduct
shall not amount to stalking if the man who pursued it proves that—
(i) It was pursued for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime
and the man accused of stalking had been entrusted with the
responsibility of prevention and detection of crime by the State; or
(ii) It was pursued under any law or to comply with any condition or
requirement imposed by any person under any law; or
(iii) In the particular circumstances such conduct was reasonable
and justified.
Thus, it is clear from the Provision that the private detective has not
committed any offence.
Q.15. Write short note on Voyeurism.
Ans. The term ‘voyeurism’ means gaining sexual pleasure from
watching others when they are naked or engaged in sexual activity.
It is a psychosexual disorder in which a person derives sexual
pleasure and gratification from looking at the naked bodies and
genital organs or observing the sexual acts of others. The voyeur is
usually hidden from view of others. It is defined in section 354C IPC
as under-
354C. Voyeurism:
Any man who watches, or captures the image of a woman engaging
in a private act in circumstances where she would usually have the
expectation of not being observed either by the perpetrator or by
any other person at the behest of the perpetrator or disseminates
such image shall be punished on first conviction with imprisonment
of either description for a term which shall not be less than one
year, but which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to
fine, and be punished on a second or subsequent conviction, with
imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be
less than three years, but which may extend to seven years, and
shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation 1:
For the purpose of this section, “private act” includes an act of
watching carried out in a place which, in the circumstances, would
reasonably be expected to provide privacy and where the victim’s
genitals, posterior or breasts are exposed or covered only in
underwear; or the victim is using a lavatory; or the victim is doing a
sexual act that is not of a kind ordinarily done in public.
Explanation 2:
Where the victim consents to the capture of the images or any act,
but not to their dissemination to third persons and where such
image or act is disseminated, such dissemination shall be
considered an offence under this section.
Voyeurism is the practice of spying on people who are engaged in
some sort of an intimate behavior such as sexual activity, act of
undressing or any other kind of act, which is considered to be of a
private nature. Voyeurism was added in IPC by the Criminal Law
(Amendment) Act, 2013.
Q.16. What is criminal force? What is the difference
between criminal force and assault?
Ans. As per section 350 IPC, whoever intentionally uses force to
any person, without that person’s consent, in order to the
committing of any offence, or intending by the use of such force to
cause, or knowing it to be likely that by the use of such force he will
cause injury, fear or annoyance to the person to whom the force is
used, is said to use criminal force to that other.
The essential elements of criminal force are as under:
a. There must be an intentional use of force to any person
b. Such force must have been used without that person’s consent
c. It must have been used –
(i) In order to commit any offence; or
(ii) With intent to cause injury, fear or annoyance to the person
against whom it is used.
Patna High Court in State of Bihar v. Musa Ansari, on 6 October,
2015 held that a close and cautious reading of the definition of
criminal force, as contained in Section 350 of the Indian Penal
Code, means that whoever, intentionally uses force to any person,
without that person’s consent, in order to the committing of any
offence, or intending, by the use of such force, to cause, or knowing
it to be likely that by the use of such force, he will cause injury, fear,
or annoyance to the person to whom the force is used, is said to use
criminal force to that other.
Assault, section 351 IPC, is defined as whoever makes any gesture,
or any preparation intending or knowing it to be likely that such
gesture or preparation will cause any person present to apprehend
that he who makes that gesture or preparation is about to use
criminal force to that person, is said to commit an assault.
Explanation- Mere words do not amount to an assault. But the
words which a person uses may give to his gestures or preparation
such a meaning as may make those gestures or preparations
amount to an assault.
The differences between the two are as: The criminal force is
intentional use of force to other person without his consent but the
assault is the gesture and preparation to apprehend the other
person that the offender will use criminal force. Criminal force
includes assault but assault may not include criminal force
necessarily.
Punjab-Haryana High Court in Major Singh Lachhman Singh v.
State, AIR 1963 P H 443 said that the use of criminal force per se is
punishable under Section 350 of the Indian Penal Code and the
commission of assault under Section 351.
Q.17. A threatens to publish a defamatory libel concerning
Z unless Z gives him money. He thus induces Z to give
money. State as to what offence, if any, A has committed.
[West Bengal Judicial Service (Written) Examination, 2016]
Ans. A has committed extortion defined in section 383 IPC which
says that-
Whoever intentionally puts any person in fear of any injury to that
person, or to any other, and thereby dishonestly induces the person
so put in fear to deliver to any person any property, or valuable
security or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a
valuable security, commits “extortion”.
Section 383 IPC defines ‘extortion’ whereas Section 384 IPC is the
penal section for extortion whereas Section 385 IPC is for attempt
to commit extortion. In order to complete the act of extortion the
person who was put in fear, must have been induced to deliver the
property.
If the act of inducement caused by the wrong doer should bring
forth its result at least by the victim consenting to deliver property
even if actual delivery does not take place due to any fortuitous
circumstances which would constitute extortion, but if it falls to
produce the requisite effect, the act would remain only at the stage
of attempt to commit extortion.
The question is based on illustration (a) of section 383 IPC.
Q.18. A finds a purse with money lying on the road. A did
not know to whom did the purse belong. Subsequently, A
learns that purse belonged to B but A retained the purse
and appropriated the money. What offence, if any, has A
committed?
Ans. A has committed criminal misappropriation of property
defined in section 403 IPC. Section 403 provides that whoever
dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use any movable
property, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
The question is based on illustration (e) of section 403 IPC.
Q.19. A makes an attempt to pick, the pocket of Z by
thrusting his hand in to Z’s Pocket. A fails in the attempt
in consequence of Zs having nothing in the Pocket. State
as to what offence, if any, A has committed.
Ans. A has committed the offence of attempt to theft and he is
guilty under section 379/ 511 IPC. Section 511 deals with
punishment for attempting to commit offences punishable with
imprisonment for life or other imprisonment.
Section 511 IPC is the solitary provision included in the last chapter
of the IPC under the title Of Attempts to Commit Offences. It makes
attempt to commit an offence punishable. The offence attempted
should be one punishable by the Code with imprisonment.
The conditions stipulated in the provision for completion
of the said offence are:
(1) The offender should have done some act towards commission of
the main offence.
(2) Such an attempt is not expressly covered as a penal provision
elsewhere in the Code. Thus, attempt on the part of the accused is
sine qua non for the offence under Section 511.
The question is based on illustration (b) of section 511 IPC.
Q.20. Write a note on “offer and invitation to offer”.
[Manipur Judicial Service (Grade-III) Written Examination, 2015]
Explain with appropriate example ‘Implied Offer’ and
‘invitation to make an offer’. Whether announcement of
voluntary retirement Scheme by a Nationalised Bank is a
valid offer?
Ans. When the offer is made orally or in writing, it is express and
when the offer is inferred from the conduct of parties it is implied
offer. In other words, an express offer is made by words spoken or
written and an implied offer is not made by words spoken or
written. It is implied from the conduct of the parties or from the
circumstances.
Invitation to Offer:
It comes from Latin phrase invitatio ad offerendum. In invitation to
offer, the person invites others to offer him in respect of any item.
In simple terms, in invitation to offer the offer or does not wish to
implement terms, but merely seeks to initiate negotiations. For
example- displaying of books in book stand is not offer rather it is
invitation to offer or goods displaced in a shop window with a price
tag are an invitation to offer.
In Hyde v. Wrench, [1840] 49 ER 132 the defendant offered to sell
his farm for £1000. The plaintiff made an offer of £950 which was
refused. The plaintiff then wrote saying that he was ready to pay
£1000 and attempted to enforce the contract of sale at that price.
The court held that there was no longer offer which he could accept.
In Harvey v. Facie, [1893] AC 552 the plaintiffs telegraphed to the
defendants writing: “Will you sell us Bumper Hall Pen? Telegraph
lowest cash price.” The defendants replied also by a telegram,
“Lowest price for Bumper Hall Pen £900”. The plaintiffs
immediately sent their last telegram stating: “We agree to buy
Bumper Hall Pen for £900 asked by you”.
The defendants refused to sell the plot of land (Bumper Hall Pen) at
that price. The plaintiffs contention that by quoting their minimum
price in response to the inquiry, the defendants had made an offer
to sell at that price, was turned down by the Judicial Committee.
Their Lordship pointed out that in their first telegram, the plaintiffs
had asked two questions, first as to the willingness to sell and
second, as to the lowest price. They reserved their answer as to the
willingness to sell. Thus, they had made no offer.
Announcement of Voluntary Retirement Scheme by a nationalized
bank is not an offer rather it is an invitation to offer. In Madhya
Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. Manoj Kumar, on 29
August, 2016 Supreme Court held that Voluntary Retirement
Scheme is an invitation to offer and not an offer.
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Expected Questions on Indian

Penal Code: Indian Judicial
Services Mains Exam
Expected questions on Indian Penal Code for Judicial
Services mains exam!
Q.1. Distinguish between theft and extortion.
Distinguish extortion from robbery.
[Assam Judicial Service (Grade-III) Written Examination, 2008J
What is extortion? How it differs from theft? Describe
with illustration.
[M.P. Judicial Service (Civil Judge) Main Examination, 2015]
Ans. In general, theft is committed when a person’s property is
taken without his consent by someone. For example, A enters the
house of B and takes B’s watch without B seeing and puts it in his
pocket with an intention to take it for himself.
A commits theft. However, besides the ordinary meaning conveyed
by the word theft, the scope of theft is quite wide. Section 378 of IPC
defines theft as follows-
Whoever, intending to take dishonestly any movable property out of
the possession of any person without that person’s consent, moves
that property in order to such taking, is said to commit theft.
In extortion, a person takes the property of another by threat
without any legal justification. Section 383 defines extortion as
follows-
so put in fear to deliver to any person any property or valuable
security or anything signed or sealed, which may be converted into a
valuable security, commits extortion.
Extortion is committed by wrongful obtaining of consent and
inducing the person to deliver the property by putting any person in
fear of injury.
The essential ingredients for punishment of extortion are
as follows-
(i) Intentionally putting a person in feat of injury to himself or
another;
(ii) Dishonestly inducing the person so put in fear to deliver to any
person any property or valuable security.
For example- A threatens to publish a defamatory libel about B
unless B gives him money. A has committed extortion. A threatens
B that he will keep B’s child in wrongful confinement, unless B will
sign and deliver to A a promissory note binding B to pay certain
moneys to A. B signs and delivers such noted. A has committed
extortion.
In National Insurance Co. v. Manvendra Singh, on 12 February,

2009 extortion is distinguished from theft in the following manner-
(1) Extortion is committed by the wrongful obtaining of consent. In
theft, the offender takes without the owner’s consent.
(2) The property obtained by extortion is not limited as in theft to
movable property only. Immovable property may be the subject of
extortion.
(3) In extortion, the property is obtained by intentionally putting a
person in fear of injury to that person or to any other, and thereby
dishonestly inducing him to part with his property. In theft the
element of force does not arise.
Gujarat High Court in Gordhanbhai Dhulabhai Damor v. State of

Gujarat, (1996) 2 GLR 251 said that robbery is a special and
aggravated form of either theft or extortion. The chief
distinguishing element in robbery is the presence of imminent fear
of violence.
Q.2. A, by putting Z in fear of grievous hurt, dishonestly
induces Z to sign or affix his seal to a lank paper and
deliver it to A. Z signs and delivers the paper to A. Here,
paper so signed may be converted into a valuable security.
What offence, if any, has been committed by A? Support
your answer with the help of law and reasons.
2014]
Ans. A has committed the offence of extortion defined in
section 383 IPC as under:
383. Extortion:
so put in fear to deliver to any person any property or valuable
security, or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a
valuable security, commits “extortion”.
As mentioned in the question, the paper signed may be converted
into a valuable security A has committed the offence of extortion.
In R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay & another, 1986 SCR (2)
621the Supreme Court observed that the main ingredients
of the offence of extortion in s. 383 IPC are:
(i) The accused must put any person in fear of injury to that person
or any other person;
(ii) The putting of a person in such fear must be intentional;
(iii) The accused must thereby induce the person so put in fear to
deliver to any person any property, valuable security or anything
signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable security;
and
(iv) Such inducement must be done dishonestly. Before a person
can be said to put any person to fear of any injury to that person, it
must appear that he has held out some threat to do or omit to do
what he is legally bound to do in future.
If all that a man does is to promise to do a thing which he is not
legally bound to do and says that if money is not paid to him he
would not do that thing, such act would not amount to an offence of
extortion.
Delhi High Court in Tasim & others v. State NCT of Delhi, on 24
March, 2014 held that to constitute extortion, it is not enough that
the wrongdoer had done his part; it must produce the result also. If
it fails to produce the requisite effect, the act would remain only at
the stage of attempt.
Bombay High Court in M/S, GIC Housing Finance Ltd, v, State of
Maharashtra, on 12 August, 2015 held that a bare reading of this
section would indicate that the offence is committed when
somebody intentionally puts any person under fear of any injury to
that person or to any other and thereby dishonestly induces the
person so put in fear to deliver to any person any property or
valuable security, or anything signed or sealed which may be
converted into a valuable security. Such an act is stated to be
extortion.
Q.3. Write short note on Robbery and Dacoity.
Under what circumstances theft and extortion become
robbery? Explain with illustrations.
[Uttar Pradesh APO Main Examination, 2002]
Ans. Robbery is the crime of taking or attempting to take
something of value by force or threat of force or by putting the
victim in fear. At common law, robbery is defined as taking the
property of another, with the intent to permanently deprive the
person of that property, by means of force or fear. Robbery is
defined in section 390 IPC as under-
390. Robbery:
In all robbery there is either theft or extortion.
When Theft is Robbery:
Theft is “robbery” if, in order to the committing of the theft, or in
committing the theft, or in carrying away or attempting to carry
away property obtained by the theft, the offender, for that end,
voluntarily causes or attempts to cause to any person death or hurt
or wrongful restraint, or fear of instant death or of instant hurt, or
of instant wrongful restraint.
When Extortion is Robbery:
Extortion is “robbery” if the offender, at the time of committing the
extortion, is in the presence of the person put in fear, and commits
the extortion by putting that person in fear of instant death, of
instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint to that person or to
some other person, and, by so putting in fear, induces the person, so
put in fear then and there to deliver up the thing extorted.
Explanation- The offender is said to be present if he is sufficiently
near to put the other person in fear of instant death, of instant hurt,
or of instant wrongful restraint.
In State of Haryana v. Balvinder Singh and another 2003 (4) RCR
(Criminal) 645 (P & H) robbery of Rs.3-4 lacs was committed. The
description of the accused was not given in the FIR nor did the
police collect their description during investigation. The police
arrested three accused persons and recovered part of the robbed
money. The police could not link the accused with the robbery and
they were acquitted.
In State v. Mohd. Asif on 29 October, 2009 the Court said that
robbery means a felonious taking from the person of another or in
his presence against his will, by violence or putting him in fear. The
chief distinguishing element in robbery is the presence of imminent
fear of violence.
Sec. 293 IPC mentions that whoever commits robbery shall be
punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend
to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and, if the robbery be
committed on the highway between sunset and sunrise, the
imprisonment may be extended to fourteen years.
Dacoity involves ‘robbery’ which, in its turn, includes ‘theft’ and
‘extortion’. Sec. 391 IPC runs thus-
391. Dacoity:
When five or more persons conjointly commit or attempt to commit
a robbery, or where the whole number of persons conjointly
committing or attempting to commit a robbery, and persons present
and aiding such commission or attempt, amount to five or more,
every person so committing, attempting or aiding, is said to commit
“dacoity”.
Essential ingredients of Section 391 are:
1. Five or more persons must act in association.
2. Such act must be robbery or attempt to commit robbery.
3. The five persons must consist of those who themselves commit or
attempt to commit robbery or those who are present and aid the
principal actors in the commission or attempt of such robbery.
In simple terms, dacoity is the aggravated form of Robbery. All the
persons should share the common intention of committing robbery.
The accused must be shown to have committed robbery or aided in
the commission of it and that they must be among the body of
persons who extorted money or aided them in extorting money.
In Dhanpat v. State AIR 1960 Pat 582, it was observed that dacoity
is perhaps the only offence which the Code has made punishable at
four stages. When five or more persons assemble for the purpose of
committing a dacoity, each of them is punishable under Section 402
merely on the ground of joining the assembly.
The main difference between robbery and dacoity is number of
participants in committing wrong. In an offence of dacoity, there
must be five or more persons. Dacoity is most serious and heinous
offence than robbery. In dacoity, every member of the gang of
dacoity is punished, whether he takes active part or not. If one of
members of dacoity commits wrong defined under this section, all
the members are held liable for punishment.
Every member of dacoity group need not present at the victim. In a
circumstance, where one is watching at the centre, another at door
of the house, remain commit terror in the minds of the owner, all
the members are liable, including those who do not present at the
very spot of offence.
Q.4. What is dacoity? Distinguish between ‘robbery’ and
dacoity.
[Tripura Judicial Service (Grade-III) Written Examination, 2010]
Ans. Section 391 of the Indian Penal Code defines Dacoity. It
provides that where five or more persons conjointly commit or
attempt to commit a robbery or where the whole number of persons
conjointly committing or attempting to commit a robbery and
persons present and aiding such commission or attempt amounts to
five or more, then every such person so committing, attempting or
aiding is said commit dacoity.
Dacoity is nothing but robbery committed by five or more persons.
The total number of persons involved at whatever level, either as the
main persons or the aiders, should be five. They should be involved
in either committing, attempting to commit or in aiding the
commission of robbery.
The punishment for dacoity has been provided in the section 395
which provides imprisonment for life, or a rigorous imprisonment
for a term which may extend to ten years and fine, as punishment
for dacoity.
It comes into play only when the prosecution makes out an offence
under Section 390 i.e. robbery and the number of assailants reached
to the statutory minimum i.e. 5. Dacoity is considered as a very
grave and serious crime and hence the Courts have held that in
cases of dacoity, deterrent sentence is called for.
So, far as the difference between robbery and dacoity is concerned,
it is to emphasize that the offence of dacoity to be completed
requires first of all robbery to committed. All cases of dacoity will
invariably consist of commission of a robbery.
The differences between the two have enumerated as
follows:
1. The number of person required to commit an offence of robbery is
one whereas in case of dacoity the requisite number is 5 or more.
2. Robbery is less serious in nature as compared to dacoity, whereas
dacoity due to the presence of greater number of offenders is more
serious and creates more terror.
3. In case of robbery the abettors are held liable independently,
whereas in case of dacoity even the abettors are treated at par with
the main perpetrators of the offence and are liable to same
punishment.
4. The punishment for the offence of robbery is rigorous
imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years and fine,
whereas the punishment for the dacoity is life imprisonment or
rigorous imprisonment for a period of 10 years and fine.
Thus aforesaid is the difference between the robbery and dacoity. It
can be said that dacoity is more aggravated form of robbery.
Q.5. A commits house trespass by making a hole through
the wall of Z’s house and putting his hand through the
aperture. What is the offence committed by ‘A’?
[West Bengal Judicial (Mains) Examination, 2015]
Ans. A has committed the offence of house-breaking defined in
section 445 IPC as: A person is said to commit “house-breaking”
who commits house-trespass if he effects his entrance into the
house or any part of it in any of the six ways hereinafter de-scribed;
or if, being in the house or any part of it for the purpose of
committing an offence, or, having committed an offence therein, he
quits the house or any part of it in any of such six ways, that is to say
—
(First):
If he enters or quits through a passage by himself, or by any abettor
of the house-trespass, in order to the committing of the house-
trespass.
(Secondly):
If he enters or quits through any passage not intended by any
person, other than himself or an abettor of the offence, for human
entrance; or through any passage to which he has obtained access
by scaling or climbing over any wall or building.
(Thirdly):
If he enters or quits through any passage which he or any abettor of
the house-trespass has opened, in order to the committing of the
house-trespass by any means by which that passage was not
intended by the occupier of the house to be opened.
(Fourthly):
If he enters or quits by opening any lock in order to the committing
of the house-trespass, or in order to the quitting of the house after a
house-trespass.
(Fifthly):
If he effects his entrance or departure by using criminal force or
committing an assault or by threatening any person with assault.
(Sixthly):
If he enters or quits by any passage which he knows to have been
fastened against such entrance or departure, and to have been
unfastened by himself or by an abettor of the house-trespass.
Explanation- Any out-house or building occupied with a house, and
between which and such house there is an immediate internal
communication, is part of the house within the meaning of this
section.
The question is based on illustration (a) of section 445 IPC.
Q.6. A finds the key of Z’s house door, which Z has lost and
commits house trespass by entering Z’s house, having
opened the door with that key. What offence, if any, has
been committed by A? Give your answer with the help of
legal provisions and reasons.
2014]
Ans. A has committed the offence of house-breaking defined in
section 445 IPC. Section 445 IPC mentions the methods of seeking
entry into a house are-
(1) Through the passage made by the accused himself or his
accomplice of the house trespass;
(2) Through any passage not meant for human entrance other than
himself or an abettor of the offence;
(3) Through any passage opened by himself or by any of the
abettors of the house-trespass; (4) by opening any lock to seek entry
into, or exit from, the house;
(5) By using criminal force to seek entry into, or depart from, the
house; and
(6) By entering or quitting through any passage fastened against
such entrance or exit.
As house-breaking involves house-trespass and house-trespass in
its turn involves criminal trespass, the definition of house-breaking
will be complete only if the definition of house- trespass and
criminal trespass are also set out. The house-trespass and criminal
trespass are defined in section 441 and 442 IPC respectively.
In Bijender v. State, on 13 February, 2014 a lady along with her
sister went market after locking her house. When she came back her
lock on the door was found missing and the door was open. Delhi
High Court held that a person is said to commit “house- breaking” if
he commits house- trespass by effecting his entrance into the house
or any part of it by opening any lock in order to commit house
trespass or in order to quit the house after house trespass. The
Court justified the decision of lower court regarding house breaking
punishable under Section 454 of the Act.
Q.7. Are section 498-A and Section 304-B mutually
exclusive? Whether a person charged under section 304-B
can be convicted under section 498-A without charge
being there?
For the purpose of section 498A of the Indian Penal Code
what does cruelty mean?
[Rajasthan Civil Judge Main Examination, 2013]
Ans. No, both sections are not mutually exclusive. Section 498A
IPC deals with husband or relative of husband of a woman
subjecting her to cruelty and Section 304B IPC deals with dowry
death.
Section 498A is as under:
498A. Husband or Relative of Husband of a Woman
Subjecting Her to Cruelty:
Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a
woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall
also be liable to fine.
304B. Dowry Death:
(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily
injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within
seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her
death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or
any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand
for dowry, such death shall be called “dowry death”, and such
husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.
Explanation- For the purposes of this sub-section, “dowry” shall
have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act,
1961.
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years
but which may extend to imprisonment for life.
Honorable Apex Court in Shanti v. State of Haryana, (1991) 1
SCC371 held that Sections 304-B and 498-A cannot be held to be
mutually exclusive. These provisions deal with two distinct offences.
It is true that “cruelty” is a common essential to both the Sections
and that has to be proved.
The Explanation to Section 498-A gives the meaning of “cruelty”. In
Section 304-B there is no such explanation about the meaning of
“cruelty” but having regard to the common background to these
offences, the meaning of “cruelty or harassment” will be the same as
found in the explanation to Section 498-A under which “cruelty” by
itself mounts to an offence and is punishable.
Under Section 304-B, it is the “dowry death” that is punishable and
such death should have occurred within seven years of the marriage.
No such period is mentioned in Section 498-A and the husband or
his relative would be liable for subjecting the woman to “cruelty”
any time after the marriage.
Further a person charged and acquitted under section 304-B can be
convicted under Section 498-A without charge being there, if such a
case, is made out. But from the point of view of practice and
procedure and to avoid technical defects it is necessary in such cases
to frame charges under both the Section and if the case is
established they can be convicted under both the Sections but no
separate sentence need be awarded under Section 498-A in view of
the substantive sentence being awarded for the major offence under
Section 304-B.
In Raju Ghosh and others v. State of Assam, Crl. A. No. 320 of 2013
Gauhati High Court ruled that sections 304B and 498A are not
mutually exclusive. This provision deals with two distinct offences.
Cruelty is a common essential to both the sections and that has to
be proved.
Q.8. Discuss the law relating to criminal intimidation by
referring relevant case law. In what way extortion is a
different from criminal intimidation?
[Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service Main Examination, 2015]
Write short note on criminal intimidation.
Write short note on criminal intimidation.
[Assam Judicial Service (Grade-lII) Main Examination, 2011]
Ans. “Criminal intimidation” is defined in Section 503 IPC. Section
503 contemplates threatening another with any injury to his person,
reputation or property or to the person or reputation of any one in
whom the person is interested, with an intention to cause alarm to
that person or to cause that person to do an act which he is not
legally bound to do or to omit to do any act which that person is
legally entitled to do, as a means of avoiding the execution of such a
threat. Intimidation involves threat with intention to create fear.
The offence involving intimidation can be proved by proving the
intention of the accused and it is not necessary for the prosecution
to prove that the result was actually attained. Section 503 is as
under-
503. Criminal Intimidation:
Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person,
reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in
whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that
person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally
bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally
entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat,
commits criminal intimidation.
Explanation- A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased
person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this
section. Illustration A, for the purpose of inducing B to desist from
prosecuting a civil suit, threatens to burn B’s house. A is guilty of
criminal intimidation.
A reading of the definition of “Criminal intimidation” would
indicate that there must be an act of threatening to another person,
of causing an injury to the person, reputation, or property of the
person threatened, or to the person in whom the threatened person
is interested and the threat must be with the intent to cause alarm
to the person threatened or it must be to do any act which he is not
legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled
to do.
Punishment for criminal intimidation is provided in section 506
IPC.
Orissa High Court in Ramaji Bisi v. State of Orissa, on 4 May, 2017
said that the offence of “criminal intimidation” requires that there
must be an intent to cause alarm by a threat to him of injury to
himself. The intent itself might be complete, though it could not be
effected.
But, the existence of the intent seems essential to the offence, as
also and equally to the attempt to commit the offence.
This section has the following essentials:
1. Threatening a person with any injury-
(i) To his person, reputation or property; or
(ii) To the person, or reputation of any one in whom that person is
interested.
2. The threat must be with intent-
(i) To cause alarm to that person, or
(ii) To cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound
to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat; or
(iii) To cause that person to omit to do any act which that person is
legally entitled to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such
threat.
The gist of the offence is the effect which the threat is intended to
have upon the mind of the person threatened. Before an offence of
“criminal intimidation” can be made out, it must be established that
the accused had any intention to cause an alarm to the complainant.
Mere threat given by the accused not with an intention to cause
alarm to the complainant does not come within the meaning of
“criminal intimidation”.
Q.9. What is house trespass? Discuss the difference
between the offences under sections 451 and 452 of the
Indian Penal Code.
[Kerala Judicial Service (Main) Examination, 2016]
Ans. Section 451 IPC prescribes punishment for offence of House-
trespass in order to commit offence punishable with imprisonment.
The essential ingredient of the offence of house-trespass under
Section 451 is the dominant intention of the accused to be
considered on the facts of each case. If the dominant intention was
to make the entry peacefully no offence of criminal trespass would
be made out.
If any offence is actually committed after entry is made or during its
course, though it was not part of the intent, the person committing
that offence would be guilty of it. In each case facts will have to be
ascertained first and on the basis of those facts the court will have to
adjudicate whether the dominant intent was merely to make entry
peacefully or to commit some offence. Section 451 is as under-
451. House-Trespass in Order to Commit Offence
Punishable with Imprisonment:
Whoever commits house-trespass in order to the committing of any
offence punishable with imprisonment, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
two years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if the offence intended
to be committed is theft, the term of the imprisonment may be
extended to seven years.
Section 452 is for house-trespass which has been committed after
having made preparation for causing hurt to any person or for
assaulting any person, or for wrongfully restraining any person, or
for putting any person in bear of hurt, or of assault, or of wrongful
restraint. Section 452 is as under-
452. House-Trespass after Preparation for Hurt, Assault
or Wrongful Restraint:
Whoever commits house-trespass, having made preparation for
causing hurt to any person or for assaulting any person, or for
wrongfully restraining any person, or for putting and person in fear
of hurt, or of assault, or of wrongful restraint, shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
In Pasupuleti Siva Ramakrishna Rao v. State of A.R, on 20
February, 2014 Supreme Court held that there is nothing in Section
452 IPC to suggest that the use to which the house is put makes any
difference. It is not the requirement of Section 452 IPC that for a
trespass to be an offence the house must be a private place and not
an office.
The law protects any house from trespass, vide Section 448 IPC and
further protects persons within the house from being assaulted or
even put in fear of hurt or wrongful restraint within their own
house.
Delhi High Court in State v. Sonu Sharma, on 28 May, 2015 held
that to sustain the conviction Under Section 452 of the Indian Penal
Code, the following essential ingredients are to be established-
1. The accused should have committed house-trespass;
2. He should have committed it having made preparation for-
(a) Causing hurt to any person or
(b) Assaulting any person or
(c) For wrongfully restraining any person or
(d) For putting any such person in fear of hurt, assault or wrongful
restraint.
It is well settled law that before a person could be convicted under
Section 452 of Indian Penal Code, it is necessary that the person
should have entered into a building, tent or vessel used as a human
dwelling.
Q.10. A kidnaps B, a minor living with her uncle at
Mumbai, while she was away for work on the streets at
Mumbai. A then locks her up, threatens her and brings
her to Pune, where she had studied. A, then manages to
procure false certificate of B’s age showing her a major
girl. On the strength of the said certificate A goes through
a ceremony of marriage and calls B his wife. Afterwards, it
is discovered that A, who is a Hindu, was already married.
What offence/s, if any, is/are committed by A?
[Maharashtra ADJ Examination, 2011]
Ans. In this question A is responsible for kidnapping under section
363, causing criminal intimidation under section 506, wrongful
confinement under section 340, forgery under section 463 , bigamy
under section 494 of IPC.
The relevant sections are as under:
363-Punishment for kidnapping- Whoever kidnaps any person from
India or from lawful guardianship, shall be punished with
seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
When A removed B from lawful guardianship of B’s uncle,
committed kidnapping.
When A locked her up, committed wrongful confinement
defined in section 340 as:
Whoever wrongfully restrains any person in such a manner as to
prevent that person from proceeding beyond certain circumscribing
limits, is said “wrongfully to confine” that person.
When A threatens B to bring her Pune, committed criminal
intimidation defined in section 503 and punished in section 506 as-
503 – Criminal intimidation- Whoever threatens another with any
injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or
reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent
to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act
which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which
that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the
execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation.
506- Punishment for criminal intimidation- Whoever commits the
offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with
two years, or with fine, or with both.
In procuring false certificates, A committed forgery defined under
section 463 as-
Whoever makes any false document or part of a document with
intent to cause damage or injury, to the public or to any person, or
to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with
property, or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with
intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed, commits
forgery.
Next when A goes through a ceremony of marriage and calls B his
wife, committed offences provided in sections 493 and 494 as
under-
494- Marrying again during lifetime of husband or wife- Whoever,
having a husband or wife living, marries in any case in which such
marriage is void by reason of its taking place during the life of such
husband or wife, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall
Q.11. Discuss the difference between the offence under
section 332 and the offence under section 353 of the
Indian Penal Code.
Ans. Section 332 IPC deals with the offence which is related with
where the accused voluntarily caused hurt to any person being a
public servant in the discharge of his duty. It is not necessary to
establish that hurt was voluntarily caused to prevent or deter that
person from discharging his duty as a public servant.
On the other hand, if hurt was voluntarily caused to a public
servant, while not discharging his duty as a public servant, it is
necessary to prove that hurt was caused with intent to prevent or
deter that person or any other public servant from discharging his
duty.
On the other hand, if hurt was voluntarily caused to a public
servant, while he was discharging his official duty as such public
servant, it is not necessary to establish further that it was so caused
with the intention to prevent or deter that person from discharging
his duty as such public servant.
On the other hand, even if hurt was caused voluntarily to a public
servant, if he was not discharging his duty as a public servant at that
time, it is necessary to prove additionally that hurt was caused to
prevent or deter that person from discharging his duty as a public
servant.
Section 332 is as under:
332. Voluntarily Causing Hurt to Deter Public Servant
from his Duty:
Whoever voluntarily causes hurt to any person being a public
servant in the discharge of his duty as such public servant, or with
intent to prevent or deter that person or any other public servant
from discharging his duty as such public servant, or in consequence
of anything done or attempted to be done by that person in the
lawful discharge of his duty as such public servant, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
Kerala High Court in Rajan v. State of Kerala, on 9 July, 2010 said
that the ingredients of an offence under Section 332 of Indian Penal
Code are-
(1) Hurt must have been caused to a public servant and
(2) It must have been caused –
(a) While such public servant was acting in the discharge of his duty
as such, or
(b) In order to prevent or deter him from discharging his duty as a
public servant or
(c) In consequence of his having done or attempted to do anything
in the lawful discharge of his duty as such a public servant.
Evidence necessary to establish an offence under Section
332 of Indian Penal Code are:
(a) The accused voluntarily caused bodily pain, disease or infirmity
to the victim (as provided under Section 321 of Indian Penal Code),
(b) The victim of the hurt is a public servant and
(c) At the time of causing of hurt, the public servant concerned was
discharging his duties qua public servant.
An analysis of Section 332 of Indian Penal Code would establish
that if prosecution case is that accused voluntarily caused hurt to a
public servant while he was discharging his official duty as a public
servant, ingredients of an offence under Section 332 of Indian Penal
Code are satisfied.
Assaulting the public servant or using criminal force with the
intention to prevent or deter the public servant from discharging his
duty as such public servant is offence in section 353 IPC which is as
under-
353. Assault or Criminal Force to Deter Public Servant
from Discharge of his Duty:
Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any person being a
public servant in the execution of his duty as such public servant, or
with intent to prevent or deter that person from discharging his
duty as such public servant, or in consequence of anything done or
attempted to be done by such person to the lawful discharge of his
duty as such public servant, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with
fine, or with both.
From its bare perusal, it is clear that one commits offence under
Section 353 of the Indian Penal Code, if he does assault or uses a
criminal force to any public servant in the execution of his duty with
intent to prevent or deter that person from discharge his duty.
In Akhilesh Kumar & others v. State of Bihar, on 23 August, 2017
Patna High Court said that from plain reading of section 353, the
following ingredients are found necessary to constitute the offence-
(a) There should be assault or use of criminal force.
(b) Such force could have been applied on public servant.
(c) The aforesaid exercise must be while the public servant was
acting in execution of his duty or with intent to prevent or deter him
from discharging his duty,
(d) In consequence of anything done or attempted to be done by the
public servant in due discharge of the duty.
In Durgacharan v. State of Orissa, AIR 1966 SC 1775 it has been laid
down that under Section 353 of the Indian Penal Code, the
ingredients of assault or use of criminal force while the public
servant is doing his duty as such is necessary. In Chandrika Sao v.
State of Bihar, 1967 Cri. L.J. 261 the Supreme Court has laid down
that, mere use of force, however is not enough to bring an Act
within the terms of Section 353 IPC.
It has further to be shown that force was used intentionally to any
person without that person’s consent in order to commit an offence
or with the intention or with the knowledge that the use of force will
cause injury, fear or annoyance to the person against whom the
force is used.
Gauhati High Court in Suresh Narayan Roy v. State of Arunachal
Pradesh, 1978 Cri. L.J. 1514 held that the assault committed on a
public servant due to personal grudge would not be covered by the
provisions of Section 353 IPC.
Madras High Court in Jayaseeli v. State, on 2 February, 2010 said
that the main ingredients of the offence under Section 353 IPC are
that the person accused of the said charge should have assaulted the
public servant or used criminal force with intent to prevent or deter
the public servant from discharging his duty as such public servant.
Therefore, the main ingredients of the offence are that the accused
should be shown to have assaulted the public servant or used
criminal force.
Q.12. Explain acid attack.
Ans. Acid attack has its steep rise in past few years and as usual the
most of the victim are women. The horrific act of attacking people
with acid has been taking place across different parts of country.
“Acid attack” means any act of throwing acid or using acid in any
form on the victim with the intention of or with knowledge that
such person is likely to cause to the other person Permanent or
partial damage or deformity or disfiguration to any part of the
body of such person. In simple terms, acid attacks can be termed as
an act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result
in, physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering to women.
Before the Criminal Law (amendment) Act, 2013 there was no any
specific law dealing with this menace but now sections 326A and
326B have been inserted in IPC as under-
326A- Voluntarily Causing Grievous Hurt by Use of Acid,
etc:
Whoever causes permanent or partial damage or deformity to, or
bums or maims or disfigures or disables, any part or parts of the
body of a person or causes grievous hurt by throwing acid on or by
administering acid to that person, or by using any other means with
the intention of causing or with the knowledge that he is likely to
cause such injury or hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which shall not be less than ten years
but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and with fine;
Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable to meet the
medical expenses of the treatment of the victim;
Provided further that any fine imposed under this section shall be
paid to the victim.
326B- Voluntarily Throwing or Attempting to Throw Acid:
Whoever throws or attempts to throw acid on any person or
attempts to administer acid to any person, or attempts to use any
other means, with the intention of causing permanent or partial
damage or deformity or bums or maiming or disfigurement or
disability or grievous hurt to that person, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be
less than five years but which may extend to seven years, and shall
Explanation 1:
For the purposes of section 326A and this section, “acid” includes
any substance which has acidic or corrosive character or burning
nature, that is capable of causing bodily injury leading to scars or
disfigurement or temporary or permanent disability.
Explanation 2:
For the purposes of section 326A and this section, permanent or
partial damage or deformity shall not be required to be irreversible.
Provision of section 154 CrPC provides that if the information is
given by the woman against whom an offence under section 326A,
section 326B etc. of the Indian Penal Code is alleged to have been
committed or attempted, then such information shall be recorded,
by a woman police officer or any woman officer.
The offences under sections 326A and 326B IPC are cognizable,
non-bailable and triable by the Court of Session.
As per National Crime Records Bureau publication ‘Crime in India
2016’, the number of incidents of acid attack and attempt to acid
attack was 283 in 2016. The highest number (76) of these offences
took place in West Bengal.
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Expected Questions for OJS Mains
Exam [Odisha Judicial Services
Main Exam]
Expected questions on Constitutional Law of India, Indian Penal
Code, Law of Contract and Law of Torts for OJS Mains Exam
[Odisha Judicial Services Main Exam]
Q.1. “Right to freedom of speech and expression includes
right to acquire and disseminate information”. Explain
this proposition with reference to relevant case law.
Right to information is a fundamental right. Explain.
[Assam Judicial Service (Grade-I) Written Examination, 2014]
Ans. The statement is question is taken from Secretary, Ministry of
Information & Broadcasting, Govt, of India and others v. Cricket
Association of Bengal and another, [1995] 2 SCC 161 wherein the
Court, after citing Article 10 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, went on to state that the freedom of speech and expression
includes right to acquire information and to disseminate it.
Freedom of speech and expression is necessary, for self-expression
which is an important means of free conscience and self-fulfillment.
It enables people to contribute to debates on social and moral
issues. It is the best way to find a truest model of anything, since it
is only through it that the widest possible range of ideas can
circulate.
It is the only vehicle of political discourse so essential to democracy.
Equally important is the role it plays in facilitating artistic and
scholarly endeavours of all sorts. The right to communicate,
therefore, includes right to communicate through any media that is
available whether print or electronic or audio- visual such as
advertisement, movie, article, speech etc.
The fact that the right to information is included in the
Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and expression has
been recognised by Supreme Court decisions challenging
governmental control over newsprint and bans on the distribution
of newspapers. Liberty of thought is the basis of freedom speech
and expression under Article 19(l)(a), which is an essential
component of a democratic governance.
As the information will be at the genesis of thought and expression,
the right to information has to be an invisible integral part of the
right of free speech. ‘The right to know,’ it was observed is derived
from the concept of freedom of speech, though not absolute is a
factor which should make one wary, when secrecy is claimed for
transactions which can, at any rate, have no repercussion on public
security”.
It was said very aptly that in a Government of responsibility like
ours, where all the agents of the public must be responsible for their
conduct, there can be but few secrets. The people of this country
have a right to know every public act, everything that is done in a
public way, by their public functionaries.
In Secretary, Ministry of I & B v. Cricket Association of Bengal,
(1995) 2 SCC 161 the court said that the right to impart and receive
information is a species of the right of freedom of speech and
expression guaranteed by Article 19(l)(a) of the Constitution. A
citizen has a fundamental right to use the best means of imparting
and receiving information and as such to have an access to
telecasting for the purpose.
The information is currency that every citizen requires to
participate in the life and governance of the society. In any
democratic polity, greater the access, greater will be the
responsiveness, and greater the restrictions, greater the feeling of
powerlessness and alienation.
In true sense, communication and information is the life blood of
any organization. Devoid of free flow of information any
organization will not be able to survive. Recently, there has been a
lot of emphasis globally towards recognition of the Right to
Information by countries, inter-governmental organizations, civil
societies and the people.
The RTI has been universally recognized as a fundamental human
right which upholds the inherent respect and dignity of all human
beings. This right is based on the potentiality and role of the
individual in the process of nation building. It recognizes the role of
each and every citizen in this respect and accordingly this right has
been vested in each and every citizen of the country. As Henry Clay
stated, “Government is a trust and officers of the government are
trustees and both the trust and trustees are created for the benefit of
the people.”
According to the above quotation people in the democracy are the
beneficiary of self-created trust in the form of democratic
government. Thus, people have always wanted a transparency in the
working of trust created by them.
Q.2. What is the procedure of impeachment of the
President?
Ans. The founding fathers in their wisdom provided in
Article 61 of the Constitution for the removal of the
President from office by impeachment which is as under:
61. Procedure for Impeachment of the President:
(1) When a President is to be impeached for violation of the
Constitution, the charge shall be preferred by either House of
Parliament.
(2) No such charge shall be preferred unless.
(a) The proposal to prefer such charge is contained in a resolution
which has been moved after at least fourteen days’ notice in writing
signed by not less than one- fourth of the total number of members
of the House has been given of their intention to move the
resolution, and
(b) Such resolution has been passed by a majority of not less than
two-thirds of the total membership of the House.
(3) When a charge has been so preferred by either House of
Parliament, the other House shall investigate the charge or cause
the charge to be investigated and the President shall have the right
to appear and to be represented as such investigation.
(4) If as a result of the investigation a resolution is passed by a
majority of not less than two-thirds of the total membership of the
House by which the charge was investigated or cause to be
investigated, declaring that the charge preferred against the
President has been sustained, such resolution shall have the effect
of removing the President from his office as from the date on which
the resolution is so passed.
It is evident from Article 61 that the President can be removed from
office by a process of impeachment for ‘violation of the
Constitution’. However, the Constitution does not define the
meaning of the phrase ‘violation of the Constitution’. The
impeachment charges can be initiated by either House of
Parliament.
These charges should be signed by one-fourth members of the
House (that framed the charges), and a 14 days’ notice should be
given to the President. After the impeachment resolution is passed
by a majority of two-thirds of the total membership of that House, it
is sent to the other House, which should investigate the charges.
The President has the right to appear and to be represented at such
investigation. If the other House also sustains the charges and
passes the impeachment resolution by a majority of two-thirds of
the total membership, then the President stands removed from his
office from the date on which the Bill is so passed.
The impeachment process is a quasi-judicial procedure. In this
context, it is important to note that the nominated members of
either House of Parliament can participate in the impeachment of
the President though they do not participate in his election.
Further, the elected members of the legislative assemblies of states
and the Union Territories of Delhi and Puducherry do not
participate in the impeachment of the President though they
participate in his election.
In India, till date, no President has been impeached.
Q.3. Write short note on electronic record.
Ans. Section 29-A of IPC defines electronic record as: The words
“electronic record” shall have the meaning assigned to them in
clause (t) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Information
Technology Act, 2000. According to section 2 (1) (t) of the
Information Technology Act, 2000 “electronic record” means data,
record or data generated, image or sound stored, received or sent in
an electronic form or micro film or computer generated micro fiche.
The Act recognizes electronic record in a wide sense thereby
including electronic data in any form such as videos or voice
messages.
Further, in section 4, the IT Act 2000 provides:
Where any law provides that information or any other matter shall
be in writing or in the typewritten or printed form, then,
notwithstanding anything contained in such law, such requirement
shall be deemed to have been satisfied if such information or matter
is-
(a) Rendered made available in an electronic form; and
(b) Accessible so as to be usable for a subsequent reference.
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 has widely dealt with the evidentiary
value of the electronic records. Section 3 of Indian Evidence Act
defines Evidence as the documents which are being submitted in
the court of Law. These evidences are basically known as “digital
evidence”, and electronic devices come under this classification.
Thus the section clarifies that documentary evidence can be in the
form of electronic record and stands at par with conventional form
of documents. The evidentiary value of electronic records is widely
discussed under section 65A and 65B of the Evidence Act, 1872.
The sections provide that if the four conditions listed are satisfied
any information contained in an electronic record which is printed
on paper, stored, recorded or copied in an optical or magnetic
media, produced by a computer is deemed to be a document and
becomes admissible in proceedings without further proof or
production of the original, as evidence of any contacts of the
original or any facts stated therein, which direct evidence would be
admissible.
The four conditions referred to above are:
(1) The computer output containing such information should have
been produced by the computer during the period when the
computer was used regularly to store or process information for the
purpose of any activities regularly carried on during that period by
the person having lawful control over the use of the computer.
(2) During such period, information of the kind contained in the
electronic record was regularly fed into the computer in the
ordinary course of such activities.
(3) Throughout the material part of such period, the computer must
have been operating properly. In case the computer was not
properly operating during such period, it must be shown that this
did not affect the electronic record or the accuracy of the contents.
(4) The information contained in the electronic record should be
such as reproduces or is derived from such information fed into the
computer in the ordinary course of such activities
It is further provided that where in any proceedings, evidence of an
electronic record is to be given, a certificate containing the
particulars prescribed by 65B of the Act, and signed by a person
occupying a responsible official position in relation to the operation
of the relevant device or the management of the relevant activities
would be sufficient evidence of the matters stated in the certificate.
Q.4. Write a short note on Article 142 of the Constitution.
[Advocates-on-Record Examination, 2011]
Ans. Article 142, clause 1 of the Constitution of India provides that,
“the Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such
decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice
in any cause or matter pending before it, and any decree so passed
or orders so made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of
India in such manner as may be prescribed by or under any law
made by Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so made,
in such manner as the President may by order prescribe.”
The mentioned power of the Supreme Court of India is often
referred to as its ‘extraordinary power’; resting solely on one
criterion- the need to do complete justice. The expression ’cause’ or
‘matter’ includes any proceeding pending in the Court and would
cover almost every kind of proceeding in the Court, including civil
or criminal; or appellate or original.
The powers in exercise are circumscribed only by two conditions.
“Firstly, that it can be exercised only when the Supreme Court
otherwise exercises its jurisdictions, and secondly, that the order
which the Supreme Court passes must be necessary for doing
complete justice in the cause or matter pending before it.” However,
“the power should not be exercised frequently, but sparingly.
In Zahira Habibullah Sheikh v. State of Gujarat (2004) 5 SCC 353,
power under this Article was invoked to transfer a criminal trial
from one State to another within the jurisdiction of Supreme Court.
Similarly, direction was issued to transfer prisoners from one prison
to another in the case of Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan
alia Pappu Yadav (2005) AIR SC 972.
This power was also invoked under this Article in the case of Vijay
Shekhar v. Union of India (2004) 4 SCC 666 to quash criminal
proceedings filed against eminent persons which was found to be
false, and a product of fraud and total abuse of process of court.
Q.5. Can Parliament amend Part III of the Constitution of
India relating to Fundamental Rights? Discuss.
[Uttar Pradesh Civil Judge (J.D.) Mains Examination, 2016]
Ans. Yes, the Parliament has power to amend the Constitution of
India relating to fundamental rights till the time it does not damage,
alter or abrogate its basic structure as held by the Supreme Court of
India in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225.
The amending powers of the Parliament are provided in Article 368
of the constitution.
It does not put any restrictions on the Parliament regarding which
portion of the Constitution cannot be amended. Restrictions
originate from Article 13 which does not allow Parliament to make
such laws which are inconsistent with the provisions of
fundamental rights. However, this issue has been well settled in
above mentioned case by holding that the Parliament can amend
any part of the Constitution apart from basic structure.
Q.6. A sent an SMS to B whose bitch has given birth to
several puppies- “will you sell me one pup”. B replied the
SMS minimum price is. Rs. 5000. A sent another SMS to
B- “I agree to buy one pup for Rs. 5000 but send me the
pedigrees certificate first”. B did not respond. A came to
know that B sold all the puppies at a higher price. A
intends to sue B for breach of contract. Advise as to the
rights and liabilities.
[Bihar District Judge (Entry Level) Competitive Mains
Examination, 2013]
Ans. There is no breach of contract as there is no contract at all. At
the first place when A has asked whether A would sell him one pup
but B did not say anything rather he said that the minimum price is
Rs. 5000. Second time when A asked for pedigree certificate, but B
did not respond it means he did not accept the offer made by A.
The problem is like the fact of Harvey v. Facey (1893) where their
Lordships were of opinion that the mere statement of the lowest
price at which the vendor would sell contains no implied contract to
sell at the price to the person making the inquiry.
Q.7. Write note on contract and persons who are
competent to contract.
Who are persons “not competent to contract”? Write a
note.
[Manipur Judicial Service (Grade-III) Written Examination, 2015]
Ans. Section 10 of the Indian Contract Act 1872 says that all
agreements are contracts if they are made by the free consent of
parties competent to contract or a lawful consideration and with a
lawful object and are not hereby expressly declared to be void.
Further Section 11 says that who are competent to contract and it
explains that every person is competent to contract who is of the age
of majority according to the law to which he is subject and who is of
sound mind and is not disqualified from contracting by any law to
which he is subject.
Privy Council in a leading case of Mohiri Bibi v. Dharmodas Ghose
(1903) held that contract made by a minor is void-ab-initio.
Q.8. A laundry receipt contained a condition that the
customer would be entitled to claim only 15% of the
market price or value of the article in case of loss. The
plaintiff’s new sari was lost. Decide the liability of laundry
owner.
Ans. The laundry owner is liable to compensate whole loss and not
only 15% of the value of sari. This matter is related with
unreasonable terms of standard form contract. Like this, there is a
case viz. Lilly White v. Mannuswami, AIR 1966 Mad 13 wherein a
laundry receipt contained a condition that the customer would be
entitled to claim only fifteen per cent of the market price or value of
the article in case of loss.
The plaintiff’s new sari was lost. The term would place a premium
upon dishonesty inasmuch as it would enable the cleaner to
purchase new garments at 15% of their price, and that would not be
in public interest.
Q.9. State the essential conditions for a valid offer of
performance.
Ans. As every contract is made for some specific purpose, it is the
primary duty of each contracting party to either perform or offer to
perform its promise. The essential ingredients of offer of
performance are-
i. It should be unconditional.
ii. It must be made at reasonable time and place.
iii. As partial performance is of no effect, it must be for entire
contractual obligation.
iv. Promisee must be given reasonable opportunity to inspect the
goods.
v. It must be made in good faith, and in such manner as is most
likely, under the circumstances, to benefit the creditor.
vi. It is of no effect if the person making it is not able and willing to
perform according to the offer.
Q.10. What do you understand by anticipatory breach of
contract?
Discuss the law relating to “anticipatory breach of
contract”.
[Tripura Judicial Service (Grade-III) Written Examination, 2015]
Explain with illustrations ‘anticipatory breach of
contract’. What is the measure of damages in cases of such
breach?
Write short note on anticipatory breach of contract.
[Bihar Judicial Service (Mains) Examination, 2000]
Ans. There can be no doubt that a breach of contract may take
place before the time fixed for performance of the contract has
arrived. This is called anticipatory breach of contract which takes
place when any party of the contract shows his final decision not to
perform his contractual obligations before the performance is due.
Sec. 39 deals with anticipatory breach of contract which says that
when a party to a contract has refused to perform, or disabled
himself from performing, his promise in its entirety, the promisee
may put an end to the contract, unless he has signified, by words or
conduct, his acquiescence in its continuance.
For example- If A promises to marry B after his father’s death. But
in lifetime of his father, he marries with C. It is anticipatory breach
of contract as again A cannot marry with others so he has breached
the contract before the intended time. If B chooses, she can claim
for compensation.
In simple term, anticipatory breach of contract does not discharge
the contract but it may be if the aggrieved party so chooses.
In Frost v. Knight, L.R. 7 Ex. 111 A promised to marry B as soon as
his father should die.
During the father’s life time,
A absolutely refused to marry B. Although the time for performance
had not arrived, B was held entitled to sue for breach of promise.
In Hochster v De La Tour, (1853) 2 E&B 678 the claimant agreed to
be a courier for the defendant for 3 months starting on 1st June
1852. On the 11th May the defendant wrote to the claimant stating
he no longer wanted his services and refused to pay compensation.
The claimant obtained a service contract elsewhere but this was not
to start until 4th July. The claimant brought an action on 22nd May
for breach of contract.
The defendant argued that there was no breach of contract on 22nd
May as the contract was not due to start until 1st of June. The court
held that where one party communicates his intention not to
perform the contract, the innocent party need not wait until the
breach has occurred before bringing their claim. They may sue
immediately or they can choose to continue with the contract and
wait for the breach to occur.
In McCloskey & Co. v. Minweld Steel Co., 220 F.2d 101, 1955 U.S.
App. plaintiff sued defendant for anticipatory breach of three
construction contracts when defendant indicated that it was having
difficulty procuring materials. The court held that in order for a
party to recover on a claim of anticipatory breach of contract, the
other party must have unequivocally refused to perform, or have
made clear and affirmative statements indicating that he is unable
to perform.
Supreme Court of India in Jawaharlal Wadhwa and another v.
Haripada Chakroberty, 1988 SCR Supl. (3)513held that it is settled
in law that where a party to a contract commits an anticipatory
breach of the contract, the other party to the contract may treat the
breach as putting an end to the contract and sue for damages.
Q.11. A found a Purse in a Cinema hall. He deposited the
Purse with the manager of the hall so that the true owner
can claim it back. However, no one claimed the Purse. A
wants the Purse. Can he succeed?
Ans. Yes, A will succeed. The question is related with section 160 of
the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The manager of the hall is in the
position of a bailee. Section 160 provides that it is the duty of the
bailee to return or deliver the goods bailed without demand, as soon
as the time for which they were bailed has expired or the purpose
for which they were bailed has been accomplished.
If the purpose for which goods bailed is not accomplished, the
bailee is liable to return the goods to the bailor.
Supreme Court of India in Governor General in Council v. Musaddi
Lai, 1961 SCR (3) 647 held that by sections 160 and 161 of the
Indian Contract Act, the bailee is under an obligation to return or
deliver according to the bailor’s direction the goods bailed as soon
as the time for which the good were bailed has expired or the
purpose for which the goods were bailed has been accomplished
and if on account of default of the bailee the goods are not returned,
delivered or tendered at the proper time, he is responsible to the
bailor for any loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods.
Q.12. Write short note on doctrine of Ratification.
Explain the “Doctrine of Ratification”.
What are the acts that cannot be ratified?
What is ratification and what is its effect?
[Manipur Judicial Service (Grade-III) Written Examination, 2014-
15]
Ans. Sec. 196 of the Contract Act mentions that where acts are done
by one person on behalf of another, but without his knowledge or
authority, he may elect to ratify or to disown such acts. If he ratifies
them, the same effects will follow as if they had been performed by
his authority.
In simple terms, the principal can accept the work which was done
without his knowledge by another person for him. If he accepts, it is
called agency by ratification. Ratification may be expressed or may
be implied in the conduct of the person on whose behalf the acts are
done. But a valid ratification cannot be made by a person whose
knowledge of the facts of the case is materially defective.
For Example- K, without S’s authority, lends S’s money to T.
Afterwards S accepts interest on the money from T. S’s conduct
implies a ratification of the loan.
An act done by one person on behalf of another, without such other
person’s authority, which, if done with authority, would have the
effect of subjecting a third person to damages, or of terminating any
right or interest of a third person, cannot, by ratification, be made
to have such effect.
Q.13. A customer of the bank gives an amount to the bank
employee in his capacity as a friend, for being deposited in
the account of the customer, without obtaining any receipt
for the same. The bank employee misappropriates the
amount for his personal gain. A suit for damages is filed
by customer against the bank and employee of bank.
Discuss the responsibility of bank, if any, and the
principle on which your answer is based.
Ans. Bank is not liable for the acts of its employee as the employee
did not receive money in course of employment rather it was in his
personal capacity. The question is based on the case of State Bank of
India v. Shyama Devi, 1978 SCR (3)1009 wherein the court held
that the legal principle which governs the vicarious liability of an
employer for the loss caused to a customer through the
misdemeanour or negligence of an employee are-
(a) The employer is not liable for the act of the servant if the cause
of the loss or damage arose without his actual fault or privity or
without the fault or neglect of his agents or servants in the course,
of their employment;
(b) The damage complained of must be shown to have been caused

by any wrongful act of his servant or agent done within the scope or
course of the servant or agent’s employment even if the wrongful
Act amounted to a crime; and
(c) A master is liable for his servants fraud perpetrated in the course
of master’s business whether the fraud was for the master’s benefit
or not, if it was committed by the servant in the course of his
employment. There is no difference in the liability of the master for
wrongs whether for fraud or any other wrong committed by a
servant in the course of his employment and it is a question of fact
in each case whether it was committed in the course of the
employment.
Q.14. A, a surgeon, knowing that a particular operation is

likely to cause the death of Z, who suffers under a painful
complaint for Z’s benefit, performs that operation on Z. Z
dies in consequence. What offence, if any, has been
committed by A? Give reasons and provisions of law in
support of your answers.
2014]
Ans. A has not committed any offence as he is protected under
section 88 IPC which is given below-
88. Act not intended to cause death, done by consent in
good faith for person’s benefit:
Nothing which is not intended to cause death, is an offence by
reason of any harm which it may cause, or be intended by the doer
to cause, or be known by the doer to be likely to cause, to any person
for whose benefit it is done in good faith, and who has given a
consent, whether express or implied, to suffer that harm, or to take
the risk of that harm.
In R.P. Dhanda v. Bhurelal, 1987 CriLJ 1316 the appellant, a
medical doctor, performed an eye- operation for cataract with the
patient’s consent. The operation, however, resulted in loss of sight.
It was held that since the doctor had acted in good faith for the
benefit of the patient, he was protected under section 88 of the
Code.
Q.15. A, a villager goes to police station to lodge a report.
He finds that the policemen at the police station are
sleeping and pay no heed to his grievances. He removes a
handcuff from the police station and brings the same
before the Superintendent of Police to show the state of
affairs. A is prosecuted for having committed theft of
handcuff. Will the prosecution succeed?
[Maharashtra AD J Examination, 2011]
Ans. Yes, the prosecution will succeed. Theft is defined in section
378 IPC as under- Whoever, intending to take dishonestly any
movable property out of the possession of any person without that
person’s consent, moves that property in order to such taking, is
said to commit theft.
In question, A has removed handcuff which is movable property
from the possession of policemen sleeping at the police station
without his consent. Only one ingredient i.e. dishonestly is doubtful
as from question it seems that the villager has not acted dishonestly.
But when we analyse the definition of ‘dishonestly’, we find that
there should be wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to
another. Sec. 23 of IPC defines these terms as under-
“Wrongful gain” is gain by unlawful means of property to which the
person gaining is not legally entitled.
“Wrongful loss” is the loss by unlawful means of property to which
the person losing it is legally entitled.
In question, there is wrongful loss to the police department as the
police department is legally entitled to have that handcuff which is
removed by A.
Thus, all the essential ingredients of theft are there. Hence, A has
committed theft.
Q.16. Write short note on reciprocal promises.
Ans. Section 2 (f) of the Contract Act provides that promises, which
form the consideration or part, of the consideration for each other
are called reciprocal promises. In case of reciprocal promises, each
party to the contract is a promisor as well as promisee.
The reciprocal promises may be classified into three
categories:
(1) Mutual and independent,
(2) Mutual and dependent and
(3) Mutual and concurrent.
The rules regarding the order of performance of reciprocal promises
are contained in sections 51-54 of the Contract Act.
Q.17. When is communication of a revocation complete as
against (i) the person who makes it (ii) the person to
whom it is made?
Ans. The word ‘revocation’ means “taking back”. Both an offer as
well as an acceptance may be revoked. Section 4 of the Contract Act
mentions that the communication of a revocation is complete-
i. Is against the person who makes it, when it is put into a course of
transmission to the person to whom it is made, so as “to be out of
the power of the person who makes it;
ii. As against the person to whom it is made, when it comes, to his
knowledge.
Further, section 5 says that a proposal may be revoked at any time
before the communication of its acceptance is complete as against
the proposer, but not afterwards. An acceptance may be revoked at
any time before the communication of the acceptance is complete as
against the acceptor, but not afterwards.
Q.18. Write an essay on persons who should perform
contracts.
Ans. The Indian Contract Act provides that the promise under a
contract can be performed by any one of the following-
Promisor:
This is general rule that the promise has to be performed by the
promisor where the contracts are entered into for performance of
personal skills, or diligence or personal confidence, it becomes
absolutely necessary that the promisor performs it himself.
Agent:
Where personal consideration is not the foundation of a contract,
the promisor or his representative can employ a competent person
to perform it.
Representatives:
Generally upon the death of promisor, the legal representatives of
the deceased are bound by the promise unless it is a promise for
performance involving personal skill or ability of the promisor.
However the liability of the legal representative is limited to the
value of property inherited by him from the promisor.
Third Person:
The question here is whether a total stranger to a contract who is
identified as a third person can perform a promise. Where a
promisee accepts performance from a third party he cannot
afterwards enforce it against the promisor.
Such a performance, where accepted by the promisor has the effect
of discharging the promisor though he has neither authorized nor
ratified the act of the third party.
Joint Promisors:
Where two or more persons jointly promise, the promise must be
performed jointly unless a contrary intention appears from the
contract.
Where one of the joint promisors dies, the legal representative of
the deceased along with the other joint promisor(s) is bound to
perform the contract. Where all the joint promisors die, the legal
representatives of all of them are bound to perform the promise.
In Kamal Gupta v. Bank of India AIR 2008 Delhi 51 Delhi High
Court said that promise to perform an obligation under contract is
not personal to the contracting party but is also binding on his
representatives.
Legal representative under law is liable for the debts of their
predecessor to the extent of any property inherited by them from
their predecessor in interest. Legal representatives are not
personally liable for the liability but the liability is to the extent of
the estate of the deceased inherited by them.
Q.19. A agrees to sell his house to B for Rs.105000.
Provided that on breach of contract the defaulting Party
will Pay Rs. 1000 as damages to the other. B broke the
contract and A resold house to C for Rs.104000. A sued B
and claimed Rs. 1000. Will he succeed?
Ans. Yes, A will succeed. The question is based on section 73 of the
Indian Contract Act, 1872 which mentions that when a contract has
been broken, the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to
receive, from the party who has broken the contract, compensation
for any loss or damage caused to him thereby, which naturally arose
in the usual course of things from such breach, or which the parties
knew, when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the
breach of it.
Such compensation is not to be given for any remote and indirect
loss or damage sustained by reason of the breach.
Compensation for failure to discharge obligation resembling those
created by contract.- When an obligation resembling those created
by contract has been incurred and has not been discharged, any
person injured by the failure to discharge it is entitled to receive the
same compensation from the party in default, as if such person had
contracted to discharge it and had broken his contract.
Explanation- In estimating the loss or damage arising from a breach
of contract, the means which existed of remedying the
inconvenience caused by the non-performance of the contract must
be taken into account.
Bombay High Court in K.G. Hiranandani v. Bharat Barrel and Drum
Mfg. Co., 1969 LabIC 1324 held that the substantive portion of that
section lays down the basic rule that a party who suffers by the
breach is entitled to receive from the party in breach “compensation
for any loss or damage caused to him thereby, which naturally arose
in the usual course of things from such breach”.
The Explanation to the section lays down that in estimating the loss
or damage arising from the breach of a contract, “the means which
existed of remedying the inconvenience caused by the non-
performance of the contract must be taken into account”. Though
what the Explanation enacts is popularly called the “rule” in regard
to mitigation of damages, and has been so referred to even in some
decided cases and standard works, and though it is loosely called a
“duty” to mitigate, the position really is, as out legislature has
rightly stated, merely this, that what the Explanation enacts is not
in the nature of an independent rule or duty but is merely a factor to
be taken into account in assessing the damages naturally arising
from the breach, for the purpose of the main part of Section 73.
Q.20. A, under the influence of passion, excited by a
provocation given by Z, intentionally killed Y, Z’s child.
Here, what offence has A committed?
[Arunachal Pradesh Judicial Service (Grade-I) Examination, 2013]
Ans. A has committed the offence of murder defined in section 300
IPC as the provocation was not given by the child, and the death of
the child was not caused by accident or misfortune in doing an act
caused by the provocation.
Provocation may be a valid ground to convert murder into culpable
homicide where the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-
control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the
person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other
person by mistake or accident. This is contained in Exception-1
attached with section 300 IPC.
The above exception is subject to the following provisions:
First:
That the provocation is not sought or voluntarily provoked by the
offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person.
Secondly:
That the provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to
the law, or by a public servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of
such public servant.
Thirdly:
That the provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful
exercise of the right of private defence.
Explanation- Whether the provocation was grave and sudden
enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder is a
question of fact. The problem is based on illustration (a) attached
with Exception-1 of section 300 IPC.
Q.21. What is the legal consequence when a sub-agent is
appointed without authority?
Ans. The answer of this question will depend upon the particular
circumstances. If the agent is restricted by the principal not to
appoint any sub-agent and in such case sub-agent is appointed, the
agent will be treated as principal and he will be completely
responsible for all the acts of sub-agent. In this respect, section 193
is relevant which is reproduced as under-
193. Agent’s Responsibility for Sub-Agent Appointed without
Authority- Where an agent, without having authority to do so, has
appointed a person to act as a sub- agent, the agent stands towards
such person in the relation of a principal to an agent, and is
responsible for his acts both to the principal and to third person; the
principal is not represented, by or responsible for the acts of the
person so employed, nor is that person responsible to the principal.
But, in the following cases an agent can appoint a sub-agent unless
he is expressly forbidden to do so-
(a) When the ordinary custom of trade permits the appointment of a
sub-agent.
(b) When the nature of the agency business requires the
appointment to a sub-agent.
(c) When the act to be done is purely ministerial and involves no
exercise of discretion or confidence, e.g. routine clerks and
assistants.
(d) When the principal agrees to the appointment of such a sub-
agent expressly or impliedly.
(e) When some unforeseen emergency has arisen.
Q.22. Discuss the plea of insanity within the meaning of
Indian Penal Code.
Distinguish between legal and medical insanity.
Ans. To get the protection under section 84 IPC, the legal insanity
is required. There may be some circumstances where a person is
mentally insane but not legally insane. In Hari Singh Gond v. State
of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2009 SC 31 the Court held that Section 84
lays down the legal test of responsibility in cases of alleged
unsoundness of mind. There is no definition of ‘unsoundness of
mind’ in IPC. The courts have, however, mainly treated this
expression as equivalent to insanity.
But the term ‘insanity’ itself has no precise definition. It is a term
used to describe varying degrees of mental disorder. So, every
person, who is mentally diseased, is not ipso facto exempted from
criminal responsibility. A distinction is to be made between legal
insanity and medical insanity. A court is concerned with legal
insanity, and not with medical insanity.
Supreme Court of India in Surendra Mishra v. State of Jharkhand,
on 6 January, 2011 held that every person who is suffering from
mental disease is not ipso facto exempted from criminal liability.
The mere fact that the accused is conceited, odd, irascible and his
brain is not quite all right, or that the physical and mental ailments
from which he suffered had rendered his intellect weak and affected
his emotions or indulges in certain unusual acts, or had fits of
insanity at short intervals or that he was subject to epileptic fits and
there was abnormal behaviour or the behaviour is queer are not
sufficient to attract the application of Section 84 of the Indian Penal
Code.
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Indian Judicial Service Mains

Exam Mock Test
Mock test questions on the Constitutional Law of India, Indian
Penal Code, Law of Contract and Law of Torts for Indian Judicial
Service mains examination!
Q.1. Is there any protection under the Constitution of
India against arrest and detention? Mention the
categories of persons who are so protected?
Ans. The Constitution of India prescribes many safeguards against
Illegal arrest and detention. Article 21 guarantees life and personal
liberty which has been liberally interpreted by Indian Judiciary
including protection against Illegal arrest and detention. D.K. Basu
v. State of West Bengal MR 1997 SC 610 is a landmark case where
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India laid down various guidelines to be
followed in respect of arrest.
Specifically, Article 22 of the Indian Constitution provides
protection against arrest and detention in certain cases. Article 22
(1) and 22 (2) deal with detention under the ordinary law of crimes
and lay down the procedure to be followed in case of arrest. Article
22 (3)-22 (6) deal with persons detained under a preventive
detention law.
Article 22 has been divided in two parts:
(1) Persons Arrested under the Ordinary Law of Crimes:
Under this part the following rights are available to all-
citizens and non-citizens:
1. The right to be informed as soon as may be the ground of arrest.
2. The right to consult and to be represented by a lawyer of his own
choice.
3. The right to be produced before a Magistrate within 25 hours.
4. The freedom from detention beyond the said period except by the
order of the Magistrate.
But these rights are not available to-enemy aliens and any person
who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive
detention. In C.B.I, v. Anupam J. Kulkarni, (1992) 3 SCC 141, the
Supreme Court laid down the guidelines governing arrest of an
accused when investigation cannot be completed within 24 hours.
(2) Persons Detained under the Law of Preventive Detention-Under
this part, the person can be detained for maximum three months
without authorization by Advisory Board. Article 22 (5) mentions
that when any person is detained in pursuance of an order made
under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority
making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such
person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall
afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation
against the order.
Q.2. “A declaration of fundamental rights is meaningless
unless there is an effective judicial remedy for their
enforcement.” Comment on this statement explaining the
judicial remedies provided in the Constitution of India.
What is the difference between a writ of habeas corpus,
the writ of mandamus and a writ of quo warranto?
[Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Examination, 2017]
Ans. The Constitution of India provides six fundamental rights, in
Part-III, including right to constitutional remedies as a fundamental
right contained in Article 32 which indicates the intention of
Constitution framers that they were fully aware and in favour of
effective judicial remedy for enforcing fundamental rights.
It is wholly correct that the declaration of fundamental rights in the
Constitution is meaningless unless there is effective machinery for
the enforcement of the rights. It is the remedy, which makes the
right real. If there is no remedy there is no right at all. Additionally,
Article 226 also empowers all the High Courts to issue the
directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of fundamental
rights and for any other purpose.
Articles 32 and 226 have empowered the Supreme Court and all
High Courts of India to issue Writs in the nature of Habeas Corpus,
Mandamus, Prohibition, Quo-Warranto and Certiorari.
Habeas Corpus:
Habeas Corpus literally means ‘to have the body of’. This writ is
called bulwark of individual liberty against arbitrary detention. A
general rule of filing the petition is that a person whose right has
been infringed must file a petition.
But Habeas corpus is an exception and anybody on behalf of the
detainee can file a petition. Habeas corpus writ is applicable to
preventive detention also. This writ can be issued against both
public authorities as well as individuals.
However, if all the material facts relating to the detention of the
person are made available to the court, the court may not insist
upon the physical production of detained person. When the court
finds the detention Illegal or unlawful, it will order the release of the
person henceforth.
Mandamus:
The writ of mandamus is in the form of command directed to the
inferior Court, tribunal, a board, corporation or any administrative
authority, or a person requiring the performance of a specific duty
fixed by law or associated with the office occupied by the person.
Writ of Mandamus may be applied by any person who seeks a legal
duty to be performed by a person or a body.
This writ may be also issued against inferior courts or other judicial
bodies when they have refused to exercise their jurisdiction. It
cannot be issued against an individual or private organisation.
Prohibition:
This writ is issued to the inferior court by the Supreme Court or
High Court forbidding to proceed with a case that is beyond its
jurisdiction. While Mandamus can be issued against any public
official, public body, corporation, inferior court, tribunal or
government; Prohibition can be issued only against judicial and
quasi-judicial authorities and not against administrative
authorities, legislative bodies. The purpose of the court is to
prohibit the judicial/ quasi-judicial body from proceeding further
with the case.
Certiorari:
Certiorari is a Latin word meaning “to be informed of, or to be made
certain in regard to”. It is also the name given to certain appellate
proceedings for re-examination of actions of a trial court, or inferior
appeals court. It is issued by a higher court to a lower court or
tribunal either to transfer a case pending with it or squash its order.
This is generally done because superior court believes that either
the inferior court had no jurisdiction or committed an error of law.
The purpose of the writ is to quash or nullify the
judgement/direction/order issued by such a judicial/quasi-judicial
body. Therefore, it is a kind of corrective/curative writ.
Quo-Warranto:
‘Quo warranto’ means “by what authority.” Whenever a person
wrongfully usurps an office, he is prevented by the writ of quo
warranto from continuing that office. This writ is applicable to the
public offices only and not to private offices. This is very powerful
tool against the usurpation of public offices.
The Indian judiciary being very sensitive and alive to the protection
of the human rights of the people has provided other platform also
where the people may approach for redressing their grievances i.e.
Public Interest Litigation and Judicial Activism. In true sense,
through judicial activism and Public Interest Litigation, the scope
and ambit of these rights has been widened.
In Dr. Upendra Baxi v. State of U. P., (1986) 4 SCC 106 it was
observed that the public interest litigation is not a litigation of an
adversary character undertaken for the purpose of holding the State
Government or its Officers responsible for making reparation.
This kind of litigation involves a collaborative and co-operative
effort on the part of the State Government and its officers, the
lawyers appearing in the case and the Bench for the purpose of
making human rights, meaningful for the weaker sections of the
community.
It marks a step forward in the direction of reaching socio-economic
justice to the depraved and vulnerable sections of humanity in this
country.
In Bihar Legal Support Society v. Chief Justice of India, (1986) 4
SCC 767 the Court observed that in the matters of life and liberty of
people Supreme Court is more concerned with weaker, deprived,
vulnerable and ignorant class of people than the affluent class.
Q.3. What are the basic structures of the Constitution of
India?
Ans. The expression “Basic Structure” is not mentioned in the
Constitution of India but it has been developed gradually with the
interference of the judiciary from time to time to protect the basic
rights of the people and the ideals and the philosophy of the
Constitution. The Supreme Court recognised this concept for the
first time in the historic Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR
1973SC 1461.
In this case, basic features of the Constitution are
separately stated by each judge as under:
Sikri, C.J. explained the concept of basic structure
including:
i. Supremacy of the Constitution
ii. Republican and democratic form of government
iii. Secular character of the Constitution
iv. Separation of powers between the legislature, executive and the
judiciary
v. Federal character of the Constitution
Shelat, J. and Grover, J. added three more basic features
to this list:
i. The mandate to build a welfare state contained in the Directive
Principles of State Policy
ii. Unity and integrity of the nation
iii. Sovereignty of the country.
Hegde, J. and Mukherjea, J. mentioned a separate list of
basic features as:
i. Sovereignty of India
ii. Democratic character of our polity
iii. Unity of the country
iv. Essential features of the individual freedoms secured to the
citizens
v. Mandate to build a welfare state
Jaganmohan Reddy, J. stated that elements of the basic
features were to be found in the Preamble of the
Constitution and the provisions into which they are
translated such as:
i. Sovereign democratic republic
ii. Justice – social, economic and political
iii. Liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship
iv. Equality of status and the opportunity.
In Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, 1981 SCR (1) 206 the
Supreme Court by majority struck down clauses (4) and (5) of
Article 368 inserted by 42nd Amendment, on the ground that these
clauses destroyed the essential feature of the basic structure of the
constitution. It was ruled by court that a limited amending power
itself is a basic feature of the Constitution.
In L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and others, AIR 1997 SC
1125 a larger Bench of seven Judges unequivocally declared that the
power of judicial review over legislative action vested in the High
Courts under Article 226 and in the Supreme Court under Article 32
of the Constitution is an integral and essential feature of the
Constitution, constituting part of its basic structure.
Supreme Court of India in I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, on 11
January, 2007 held that even though an Act is put in the Ninth
Schedule by a constitutional amendment, its provisions would be
open to attack on the ground that they destroy or damage the basic
structure if the fundamental right or rights taken away or abrogated
pertains or pertain to the basic structure.
Supreme Court of India in Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India,
on 10 April, 2008 held that imposing reservation on unaided
institutions violates the Basic Structure by stripping citizens of their
fundamental right under Article 19(l)(g) to carry on an occupation.
Supreme Court of India in Glanrock Estate (P) Ltd v. State of Tamil
Nadu, on 9 September, 2010 held that right to Equality before law,
Right to Equality of Opportunity in matters of public employment,
Right to Protection of life and personal liberty, Right against
Exploitation, Right to Freedom of Religion etc. are all fundamental
rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution and a common
thread running through all the Articles in Part III of the
Constitution have a common identity committed to an overarching
principle which is the basic structure of the Constitution.
Q.4. What do you mean by solitary confinement? What is
the maximum limit of solitary confinement under IPC?
[Himachal Pradesh Judicial Service Mains Examination, 2016]
Ans. There are three types of punishment namely-
(i) Solitary confinement,
(ii) Cellular confinement, and
(iii) Separate confinement.
Solitary Confinement means such confinement with or without
labour as entirely secludes the prisoner both from sight of, and
communication with, other prisoners.
Solitary confinement as a punishment is regarded as “the complete
isolation of the prisoner from all human society and his
confinement in a cell of considerable size so arranged that he had no
direct intercourse or sight of any human being and no employment
or instruction. Complete isolation from all human society is solitary
confinement in its stricter sense.
The separate confinement of a person with occasional access of
other persons is also solitary confinement. The punishment of
solitary confinement can be imposed by a Court only, and, in view of
its dangerous potentialities stringent conditions are imposed
thereon. Cellular confinement is a punishment which can be
imposed on a prisoner by a Superintendent of Jail.
A Superintendent of Jail can punish in a suitable case a prisoner by
imposing on him cellular confinement for a period not exceeding
fourteen days, provided that after each period of cellular
confinement an interval of not less than such period must elapse
before the prisoner is again sentenced to cellular or solitary
confinement. Cellular confinement in defined to mean such
confinement with or without labour as entirely secludes a prisoner
from communication with, but not from sight of, other prisoners.
Separate confinement is defined to mean such confinement with or
without labour as secludes a prisoner from communication with,
but not from sight of, other prisoners, and allows him not less than
one hour’s exercise per diem and to have his meals in association
with one or more other prisoners. Separate confinement for a
period not exceeding three months can be imposed on prisoner in a
suitable case by the Superintendent of Jail.
The relevant provisions relating to solitary confinement
are contained in sections 73 and 74 IPC as under:
73. Solitary Confinement:
Whenever any person is convicted of an offence for which under
this Code the Court has power to sentence him to rigorous
imprisonment, the Court may, by its sentence, order that the
offender shall be kept in solitary confinement for any portion or
portions of the imprisonment to which he is sentenced, not
exceeding three months in the whole, according to the following
scale, that is to say-
i. A time not exceeding one month if the term of imprisonment shall
not exceed six months.
ii. A tittle not exceeding two months if the term of imprisonment
shall exceed six months and shall not exceed one year.
iii. A time not exceeding three months if the term of imprisonment
shall exceed one year.
74. Limit of Solitary Confinement:
In executing a sentence of solitary confinement, such confinement
shall in no case exceed fourteen days at a time, with intervals
between the periods of solitary confinement of not less duration
than such periods; and when the imprisonment awarded shall
exceed three months, the solitary confinement shall not exceed
seven days in any one month of the whole imprisonment awarded,
with intervals between the periods of solitary confinement of not
less duration than such periods.
It means no person can be sentenced to undergo solitary
confinement for more than three months.
There is a limit prescribed on the punishment of solitary
confinement that can be imposed on a prisoner- it shall
not exceed:
(a) One month, if the term of imprisonment does not exceed six
months,
(b) Two months, if the term of imprisonment exceeds six months,
but does not exceed one year, and
(c) Three months if the term exceeds one year.
Section 74 IPC says, in executing a sentence of solitary confinement,
such confinement hall in no case exceed fourteen days at a time
less duration than such periods, and when the imprisonment
awarded shall exceed three months, the solitary confinement shall
not exceed seven days in any one month of the whole imprisonment
awarded, with intervals between the periods of solitary confinement
of not less duration than such periods.
Supreme Court of India in Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, 1979
SCR (1) 392 held that sections 73 and 74 of the Indian Penal Code
leave no room for doubt that solitary confinement is by itself a
substantive punishment which can be imposed by a court of law. It
cannot be left to the whim and caprice of prison authorities.
The limit of solitary confinement that can be imposed under Court’s
order is strictly prescribed by the Penal Code. Solitary confinement
is so revolting to the modern sociologist and law reformer that the
Law Commission recommended that the punishment of solitaiy
confinement is out of tune with modern thinking and should not
find a place in the Penal Code as a punishment to be ordered by any
criminal court even though it may be necessary as a measure of jail
discipline. Law is not a formal label, nor logomachy but a working
technique of justice.
The Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code regard punitive
solitude too harsh and the Legislature cannot be intended to permit
preventive solitary confinement, released even from the restrictions
of Sections 73 and 74 IPC.
Q.5. What is an unlawful assembly is as defined in IPC?
Assess the criminal liability, if force or violence is used by
any member of unlawful assembly?
Write short note on unlawful assembly.
What is unlawful assembly?
Write short note on Unlawful Assembly and Rioting.
Distinguish between rioting and unlawful assembly.
Ans. The gathering of five or more than five persons for the
purpose of committing either a crime or a non-criminal act in a
manner likely to terrify the public is unlawful assembly. This term is
defined in section 141 IPC as an assembly of five or more persons is
designated an “unlawful assembly”, if the common object of the
persons composing that assembly is-
First:
To overawe by criminal force, or show of criminal force, 1 [the
Central or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of
any State, or any public servant in the exercise of the lawful power
of such public servant; or
Second:
To resist the execution of any law, or of any legal process; or
Third:
To commit any mischief or criminal trespass, or other offence; or
Fourth:
By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to any person,
to take or obtain possession of any property, or to deprive any
person of the enjoyment of a right of way, or of the use of water or
other incorporeal right of which he is in possession or enjoyment, or
to enforce any right or supposed right; or
Fifth:
By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to compel any
person to do what he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do
what he is legally entitled to do.
Explanation:
An assembly which was not unlawful when it assembled, may
subsequently become an unlawful assembly.
Thus, the essential ingredients of unlawful assembly are
as under:
i. An assembly of five or more persons with a common object
ii. The object is common to all the members
iii. Members joined or continued to join such assembly
iv. They acted dishonestly
v. They assembled knowingly
Supreme Court of India in Gangadhar Behera and ors v. State of
Orissa on 10 October, 2002 observed that the emphasis is on the
common object and not on common intention. Mere presence in an
unlawful assembly cannot render a person liable unless there was a
common object and he was actuated by that common object and
that object is one of those set out in Section 141.
In Lalji v. State of U.P., 1989 SCR (1) 130 the Court held that once
the case of a person falls within the ingredients of the section the
question that he did nothing with his own hands would be
immaterial. He cannot put forward the defence that he did not with
his own hand commit the offence committed in prosecution of the
common object of the unlawful assembly or such as the members of
the assembly knew likely to be committed in prosecution of that
object.
Everyone must be taken to have intended the probable and natural
results of the combination of the acts in which he joined. It is not
necessary that all the persons forming an unlawful assembly must
do some overt act.
Section 149 IPC says that if an offence is committed by any member
of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of
that assembly, or such as the members or that assembly knew to be
likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person
who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of
the same assembly, is guilty of that offence.
It is well settled that once a membership of an unlawful assembly is
established, it is not incumbent on the prosecution to establish
whether any specific overt act has been assigned to any accused.
Mere membership of the unlawful assembly is sufficient.
Every member of an unlawful assembly is vicariously liable for the
acts done by others either in the prosecution of the common object
of the unlawful assembly or such which the members of the
unlawful assembly knew were likely to be committed; State of
Maharashtra v. Joseph Mingel Koli, (1997) 2 Crimes 228 (Bom).
Q.6. What is the difference between common intention
and common object?
Write a note on Joint Liability in the Criminal Law. Also
distinguish between Common Intention (Under Sec34
IPC) and Common Object (Under Section 149 IPC). Cite
anyone related case law.
[Uttarakhand Higher Judicial Service Mains Examination, 2012]
Ans. The terms ‘common intention’ and ‘common object’ have been
used in sections 34 and 149 IPC respectively. In Queen v. SabedAli,
(1873) it was pointed out that Section 149 did not ascribe every
offence which might be committed by one member of an unlawful
assembly while the assembly was existing, to every other member.
The section describes the offence which is to be so
attributed under two alternative forms:
(1) It must be either an offence committed by a member of the
unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that
assembly; or
(2) An offence such as the members of that assembly knew to be
likely to be committed in prosecution of that object.
In Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. Emperor, AIR 1925 PC 1 the
distinction between Sections 149 and 34 IPC was pointed out. It was
observed that Section 149 postulates an assembly of five or more
persons having a common object, namely, one of those objects
named in Section 141, and then the doing of acts by members of the
assembly in prosecution of that object or such as the members knew
were likely to be committed in prosecution of that object.
There is a difference between common object and common
intention; though the object might be common, the intention of the
several members might differ. The leading feature of Section 34 is
the element of participation in action, whereas membership of the
assembly at the time of the committing of the offence is the
important element in Section 149. The two sections have a certain
resemblance and may to a certain extent overlap, but it cannot be
said that both have the same meaning.
In Munna Chanda v. State of Assam, [(2006) 3 SCC 752], the Court
held that the concept of common object, it is well known, is
different from common intention. It is true that so far as common
object is concerned no prior concert is required. Common object
can be formed on the spur of the moment.
Course of conduct adopted by the members of the assembly,
however, is a relevant factor. At what point of time the common
object of the unlawful assembly was formed would depend upon the
facts and circumstances of each case. Section 149 IPC creates a
specific and distinct offence. There are two essential ingredients
thereof-
(i) Commission of an offence by any member of an unlawful
assembly, and
(ii) Such offence must have been committed in prosecution of the
common object of that assembly or must be such as the members of
that assembly knew to be likely to be committed.
In Maranadu v. State, 2008 (12) SCALE 420, the Court stated the
law as: Common object’ is different from common intention’ as it
does not require a prior concert and a common meeting of minds
before the attack. It is enough if each has the same object in view
and their number is five or more and that they act as an assembly to
achieve that object.
The ‘common object’ of an assembly is to be ascertained from the
acts and language of the members composing it, and from a
consideration of all the surrounding circumstances. It may be
gathered from the course of conduct adopted by the members of the
assembly.
For determination of the common object of the unlawful assembly,
the conduct of each of the members of the unlawful assembly,
before and at the time of attack and thereafter, the motive for the
crime, are some of the relevant considerations.
What the common object of the unlawful assembly is at a particular
stage of the incident is essentially a question of fact to be
determined, keeping in view the nature of the assembly, the arms
carried by the members, and the behaviour of the members at or
near the scene of the incident. It is not necessary under law that in
all cases of unlawful assembly, with an unlawful common object, the
same must be translated into action or be successful.
Under the Explanation to Section 141, an assembly which was not
unlawful when it was assembled, may subsequently become
unlawful. It is not necessary that the intention or the purpose,
which is necessary to render an assembly an unlawful one comes
into existence at the outset. The time of forming an unlawful intent
is not material. An assembly which, at its commencement or even
for some time thereafter, is lawful, may subsequently become
unlawful. In other words it can develop during the course of
incident at the spot co instanti.
Q.7. A, in support of a just claim which B has against Z for
one thousand rupees, falsely swears on a trial that he
heard Z admit the justice of B’s claim. Has A committed
any offence?
[Kerala Judicial Test (Higher) Examination, 2016]
Ans. Yes, A has given false evidence. Giving false evidence is
punishable under section 191 IPC which provides that-
191. Giving False Evidence:
Whoever, being legally bound by an oath or by an express provision
of law to state the truth, or being bound by law to make a
declaration upon any subject, makes any statement which is false,
and which he either knows or believes to be false or does not believe
to be true, is said to give false evidence.
Explanation 1:
A statement is within the meaning of this section whether it is made
verbally or otherwise.
Explanation 2:
A false statement as to the belief of the person attesting is within the
meaning of this section, and a person may be guilty of giving false
evidence by stating that he believes a thing which he does not
believe, as well as by stating that he knows a thing which he does
not know.
Section 191 makes the giving of false evidence an offence. Such
offence is known as perjury in English law. A person is said to give
false evidence, if he-
(i) Being legally bound by an oath or by an express provision of the
law to state the truth, or to make a declaration, upon any subject
(ii) Makes a false statement
(iii) Which he either-
(a) Knows or believes to be false, or
(b) Does not believe to be true.
Allahabad High Court in Mahesh Tiwari v. State of U.P. and another
(24 August, 2016) observed that the salient features of giving false
evidence under Section 191 IPC are- (i) intentionally making a false
statement, or (ii) declaration by a person who is under a legal
obligation to speak the truth. The giving of false evidence amounts
to practicing of fraud upon the court.
Thus to make a statement of false evidence within the meaning of
this section, it must be established that the person was legally
bound by an oath or an express provision of law (a) to state the
truth, or (b) to make a declaration upon any subject.
Q.8. Explain the provision of section 277 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860.
[Tripura Judicial Sen’ice (Grade-III) Written Examination, 2014]
Ans. The water of public spring or reservoir belongs to
every member of the community, and if a person
voluntarily fouls it, he comes within the ambit of Section
277 as it renders the water of the spring less fit for the
purpose for which it is ordinarily used. Section 277 as
mentioned below:
277. Fouling Water of Public Spring or Reservoir:
Whoever voluntarily corrupts or fouls the water of any public spring
or reservoir, so as to render it less fit for the purpose for which it is
ordinarily used, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to three months, or with
fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.
The ingredients of Section 277 of the code are:
i. Voluntary corruption or fouling of water;
ii. The water must be of public spring or reservoir; and
iii. The water must be rendered less fit for the purpose for which it
is ordinarily used.
The offence under Section 277 is cognizable but summons should
ordinarily issue in the first instance. It is bailable but not
compoundable and is triable by any Magistrate summarily.
Q.9. A young man of 26 years is in love with a girl. But she
does not respond to the same. Angered by the same, the
young man in order to teach her a lesson, procures
sulphuric acid and throws it on her face, causing severe
acid burn injuries including loss of both eyesight and
permanent disfiguration of face and hands. What is the
offence committed? Name the latest law laid down by the
High Court of Karnataka on the subject.
Ans. When the question was asked, the young man committed
grievous hurt but by Criminal Law Amendment Act, 2013 the
specific provisions in IPC have been provided. Section 326A and
326B deal with acid attack. Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by use
of acid, etc. is punishable with not less than ten years but which may
extend to imprisonment for life and with fine under section 326A.
Sec. 326B deals with voluntarily throwing or attempting to throw
acid. These both sections are mentioned above.
Q.10. ‘A’ out of natural love and affection promises to pay
his son Rs 10,000. He puts promise in writing and
registers it. How far is the contract valid?
[Jharkhand PCS J Mains Examination, 2014]
Ans. The term “natural love and affection” is mentioned in Section
25(1) of Indian Contract Act. The Section provides that an
agreement made without consideration is void, unless it is
expressed in writing and registered under the law for the time being
in force for the registration of documents, and is made on account
of natural love and affection between parties standing in a near
relation to each other.
The Indian Contract considers a promise made in consideration of
natural love and affection void unless the parties stand in near
relation to each other. Similarly, a promise between two parties
stand in near relation is consider void if there is no love and
affection between them. In addition to this, the promise has to be
written and registered for it to be valid contract.
In past the judges has interpreted natural love and affection in
contradictory ways. Such two contradictory cases are-
Rajlukhy Dabee v. Bhootnath Mookerjee, (1900) 4 Cal WN 488, in
this case the defendant promised his wife a certain amount every
month as maintenance. The agreement contained in a registered
document which mentioned certain quarrels and disagreements
between the two. A case was filed to recover the amount promised
to be paid as maintenance. However, the judge decided in favour of
the defendant as although they were in near relation court held that
there was no natural love and affection between them.
Bhiwa v. Shivaram, (1899) 1 Bom LR 495, in this case two brother
has quarreled regarding some property. One of them lost upon
which the other brother has promised through a written and duly
registered agreement that he would give half his property but he
later backed out, Court held that inspite of property dispute section
25(1) of the Act applies as the promise was made out of natural love
and affection for someone who was a near relative.
However the abovementioned judgments are extremely
contradictory, if natural love and affection does not apply in first
case, then how it can be applied in second one.
An agreement though made without consideration will be valid if it
is in writing and registered and is made on account of natural love
and affection between parties standing in a near relation to each
other.
An agreement without consideration will be valid
provided:
(i) It is expressed in writing;
(ii) It is registered under the law for the time being a force;
(iii) It is made on account of natural love and affection; and
(iv) It is between parties standing in a near relation to each other.
All these essentials must be present to enforce an agreement made
without consideration. The presence of only one or some of them
will not suffice. Thus, the mere registration of document in the
absence of nearness of relationship or natural love and affection will
not suffice.
Q.11. What are the rules governing appropriation of
payments?
[Kerala Judicial Service NCA (Main) Examination, 2011]
Ans. Appropriation means ‘application’ of payments, Appropriation
rules apply only in case of several and distinct debts and do not
apply where there is only one debt, though payable by installments.
Appropriation is considered a primary right of a debtor. Sections 59
to 61 lay down three rules regarding appropriation of payments
which are based on English law.
A Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Jia Ram v. Sulakhan Mai,
A.I.R. 1941 Lahore 386 dealt with the scope of Section 59 to
Sections 61 of the Indian Contract Act and held that Sections 59 to
61, Contract Act, embody the general rules as to appropriation of
payments in cases where a debtor owes several distinct debts to one
person and voluntarily makes payment to him.
They do not deal with cases in which principal and interest are due
on a single debt, or where a decree has been passed on such a debt,
carrying interest on the sum adjudged to be due on the decree.
These sections are based upon the rule of English Law, well settled
since Clayton’s case, that where a debtor, owing several distinct
debts to one person, makes a payment to him intimating that the
payment is to be applied in discharge of particular debt, the
creditor, if he accepts the payment, must apply it accordingly.
If, however, the debtor has omitted to intimate and there are no
circumstances indicating to which debt the payment is to be applied
the creditor may, at his discretion, apply it to any debt actually due
and payable to him by the debtor at the time. In case neither party
makes the appropriation, the payment is to be applied in discharge
of the debts in order of time; and if the debts are of equal standing
the payment is made in the discharge of each of them
proportionately.
The above judgment of the Lahore High Court is based upon sound
principle and has kept in mind the intention of the Legislature in
enacting Sections 59 to 61 of the Act as observed by the Supreme
Court of India in Industrial Credit v. Smt. Smithaben H. Patel and
Others on 10 February, 1999.
Appropriation by Debtor:
Where the debtor owes several debts to creditor, he has right to
request to creditor to apply the payment for discharge of some
particular debt. If the debtor does not agree to the specific
instruction of the debtor, he must refuse to accept the payment. In
this regard, section 59 provides as under-
59. Application of payment where debt to be discharged is
indicated- Where a debtor, owing several distinct debts to one
person, makes a payment to him, either with express intimation, or
under circumstances implying that the payment is to be applied to
the discharge of some particular debt, the payment, if accepted,
must be applied accordingly.
Illustrations:
(a) A owes B, among other debts, 1,000 rupees upon a promissory
note which falls due on the’ first June. He owes B no other debt of
that amount. On the first June A pays to B 1,000 rupees. The
payment is to be applied to the discharge of the promissory note.
(b) A owes to B, among other debts, the sum of 567 rupees. B writes
to A and demands payment’ of this sum A sends to B 567 rupees.
This payment is to be applied to the discharge of the debt of which B
had demanded payment.
Supreme Court of India in Industrial Credit v. Smt. Smithaben H.
Patel and Others on 10 February, 1999 held that a perusal of Section
59 would clearly indicate that it refers to several distinct debts
payable by a person and not to the various heads of one debt. The
principal and interest due on a single debt or decree passed on such
debt carrying subsequent interest cannot be held to be several
distinct debts.
Appropriation by Creditor:
If the debtor has not intimated to creditor regarding appropriation
of payment made to creditor and the circumstances indicate that it
should be appropriated with a particular debt then it must be
adjusted with that debt. Sec. 60 is relevant in this regard which is as
under-
60. Application of payment where debt to be discharged is not
indicated- Where the debtor has omitted to intimate and there are
no other circumstances, indicating to which debt the payment is to
be applied, the creditor may apply it at his discretion to any lawful
debt actually due and payable to him from the debtor, whether its
recovery is or is not barred by the law in force for the time being as
to the limitation of suits.
Where neither Party Appropriates:
In absence of appropriation by the debtor or the creditor, the
payment may be appropriated towards the debts in chronological
order including the time-barred debt. In this regard, section 61 is
relevant.
61. Application of payment where neither party
appropriates- Where neither party makes any appropriation the
payment shall be applied in discharge of the debts in order of time,
whether they are or are not barred by the law in force for the time
being as to the limitation of suits. If the debts are of equal standing,
the payment shall be applied in discharge of each proportionately.
Rule in Re Hallett’s Estate case- This is an exception to the
provisions contained in section 61. The rule applies where a trustee
had mixed up trust funds with his own funds. In such a case, if the
trustee misappropriates any money belonging to the trust, the first
amount so withdrawn by him would be first debited to his own
money and then to the trust funds.
Similarly, any deposits made by him would be first credited to trust
fund and then to his own fund, whatever be the order of withdrawal
and deposit.
Q.12. Write short note on trespass to land.
Ans. The trespass to land, unlawful intrusion of an individual to
another’s land voluntarily, occurs where a person directly enters
upon another’s land without permission, or remains upon the land,
or places or projects any object upon the land.
The maxim ‘cui us est solum, eius est usque ad coelum et ad
infernos ‘, is relevant on this issue. This rule means: “Whose is the
soil, his it is up to the sky’, or in a more simple explanation “He who
possesses the land possesses also that which is above it”.
Trespass to land may be committed in the following three
ways:
(a) Trespass by Wrongful Entry:
The most common form of trespass is a wrongful personal entry by
the defendant on the plaintiff’s land. The slightest crossing of the
boundary suffices e.g. putting a hand through a window, or sitting
on a fence.
(b) Trespass by Remaining on the Land:
A person who has lawfully entered on the land in the possession of
another commits a trespass if he remains there after his right of
entry has ceased. Thus, a person who has entered by leave or licence
of the occupier will be liable as a trespasser if, after request, he fails
to leave the premises.
(c) Trespass by Placing Things on the Land:
It is a trespass to cause any physical object to cross the boundary of
the plaintiff’s land, or even to come into physical contact with the
plaintiff’s land, even though there may be no crossing of the
boundary. For instance, driving a nail into plaintiff’s wall, or
throwing a stone upon his land or piling rubbish against plaintiff’s
wall would technically amount to a trespass.
Generally, it is civil wrong but it may give rise to criminal
proceeding also. The tort of trespass to land is actionable per se
without the proof of damage.
The following are the essential elements of tort of trespass
to land:
(i) A man is not liable for a trespass committed involuntarily, but he
is liable if the entry is intentional, even though made under a
mistake, e.g., if, moving his own land one inadvertently allows his
blade to cut through into his neighbor’s field, he is guilty of a
trespass.
(ii) If a person who has lawfully entered on the land of another,
remains there, after his right of entry has ceased, he commits
trespass.
(iii) Every interference with the land of another, e. g., throwing
stones or materials over neighbour’s lands, is deemed constructive
entry and amounts to trespass.
In order to prove that a defendant is liable for trespass to
land, the plaintiff has to show that:
(i) The defendant must intend enter the land that is the subject of
the trespass. It’s not required that the defendant intended to do so
wrongfully. Causing an object or thing to enter someone’s properly
can also be considered trespass.
(ii) Entry onto the property must be unauthorized, either expressly
or implied. For example, the police and postal carriers has implied
consent to be on most residential property, so a trespass cause of
action would fail in such cases.
The defences available in case of this tort are licence, necessity,
acquiesce or estoppels, right to entry, justified by the law and
consent. The available remedies are-damages, injunction,
expulsion, self-help.
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Indian Judicial Service Mains

Exam Mock Test
Mock test questions on the Constitutional Law of India, Indian
Penal Code, Law of Contract and Law of Torts for Indian Judicial
Service mains examination!
Q.1. Is there any protection under the Constitution of
India against arrest and detention? Mention the
categories of persons who are so protected?
Ans. The Constitution of India prescribes many safeguards against
Illegal arrest and detention. Article 21 guarantees life and personal
liberty which has been liberally interpreted by Indian Judiciary
including protection against Illegal arrest and detention. D.K. Basu
v. State of West Bengal MR 1997 SC 610 is a landmark case where
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India laid down various guidelines to be
followed in respect of arrest.
Specifically, Article 22 of the Indian Constitution provides
protection against arrest and detention in certain cases. Article 22
(1) and 22 (2) deal with detention under the ordinary law of crimes
and lay down the procedure to be followed in case of arrest. Article
22 (3)-22 (6) deal with persons detained under a preventive
detention law.
Article 22 has been divided in two parts:
(1) Persons Arrested under the Ordinary Law of Crimes:
Under this part the following rights are available to all-
citizens and non-citizens:
1. The right to be informed as soon as may be the ground of arrest.
2. The right to consult and to be represented by a lawyer of his own
choice.
3. The right to be produced before a Magistrate within 25 hours.
4. The freedom from detention beyond the said period except by the
order of the Magistrate.
But these rights are not available to-enemy aliens and any person
who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive
detention. In C.B.I, v. Anupam J. Kulkarni, (1992) 3 SCC 141, the
Supreme Court laid down the guidelines governing arrest of an
accused when investigation cannot be completed within 24 hours.
(2) Persons Detained under the Law of Preventive Detention-Under
this part, the person can be detained for maximum three months
without authorization by Advisory Board. Article 22 (5) mentions
that when any person is detained in pursuance of an order made
under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority
making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such
person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall
afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation
against the order.
Q.2. “A declaration of fundamental rights is meaningless
unless there is an effective judicial remedy for their
enforcement.” Comment on this statement explaining the
judicial remedies provided in the Constitution of India.
What is the difference between a writ of habeas corpus,
the writ of mandamus and a writ of quo warranto?
[Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Examination, 2017]
Ans. The Constitution of India provides six fundamental rights, in
Part-III, including right to constitutional remedies as a fundamental
right contained in Article 32 which indicates the intention of
Constitution framers that they were fully aware and in favour of
effective judicial remedy for enforcing fundamental rights.
It is wholly correct that the declaration of fundamental rights in the
Constitution is meaningless unless there is effective machinery for
the enforcement of the rights. It is the remedy, which makes the
right real. If there is no remedy there is no right at all. Additionally,
Article 226 also empowers all the High Courts to issue the
directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of fundamental
rights and for any other purpose.
Articles 32 and 226 have empowered the Supreme Court and all
High Courts of India to issue Writs in the nature of Habeas Corpus,
Mandamus, Prohibition, Quo-Warranto and Certiorari.
Habeas Corpus:
Habeas Corpus literally means ‘to have the body of’. This writ is
called bulwark of individual liberty against arbitrary detention. A
general rule of filing the petition is that a person whose right has
been infringed must file a petition.
But Habeas corpus is an exception and anybody on behalf of the
detainee can file a petition. Habeas corpus writ is applicable to
preventive detention also. This writ can be issued against both
public authorities as well as individuals.
However, if all the material facts relating to the detention of the
person are made available to the court, the court may not insist
upon the physical production of detained person. When the court
finds the detention Illegal or unlawful, it will order the release of the
person henceforth.
Mandamus:
The writ of mandamus is in the form of command directed to the
inferior Court, tribunal, a board, corporation or any administrative
authority, or a person requiring the performance of a specific duty
fixed by law or associated with the office occupied by the person.
Writ of Mandamus may be applied by any person who seeks a legal
duty to be performed by a person or a body.
This writ may be also issued against inferior courts or other judicial
bodies when they have refused to exercise their jurisdiction. It
cannot be issued against an individual or private organisation.
Prohibition:
This writ is issued to the inferior court by the Supreme Court or
High Court forbidding to proceed with a case that is beyond its
jurisdiction. While Mandamus can be issued against any public
official, public body, corporation, inferior court, tribunal or
government; Prohibition can be issued only against judicial and
quasi-judicial authorities and not against administrative
authorities, legislative bodies. The purpose of the court is to
prohibit the judicial/ quasi-judicial body from proceeding further
with the case.
Certiorari:
Certiorari is a Latin word meaning “to be informed of, or to be made
certain in regard to”. It is also the name given to certain appellate
proceedings for re-examination of actions of a trial court, or inferior
appeals court. It is issued by a higher court to a lower court or
tribunal either to transfer a case pending with it or squash its order.
This is generally done because superior court believes that either
the inferior court had no jurisdiction or committed an error of law.
The purpose of the writ is to quash or nullify the
judgement/direction/order issued by such a judicial/quasi-judicial
body. Therefore, it is a kind of corrective/curative writ.
Quo-Warranto:
‘Quo warranto’ means “by what authority.” Whenever a person
wrongfully usurps an office, he is prevented by the writ of quo
warranto from continuing that office. This writ is applicable to the
public offices only and not to private offices. This is very powerful
tool against the usurpation of public offices.
The Indian judiciary being very sensitive and alive to the protection
of the human rights of the people has provided other platform also
where the people may approach for redressing their grievances i.e.
Public Interest Litigation and Judicial Activism. In true sense,
through judicial activism and Public Interest Litigation, the scope
and ambit of these rights has been widened.
In Dr. Upendra Baxi v. State of U. P., (1986) 4 SCC 106 it was
observed that the public interest litigation is not a litigation of an
adversary character undertaken for the purpose of holding the State
Government or its Officers responsible for making reparation.
This kind of litigation involves a collaborative and co-operative
effort on the part of the State Government and its officers, the
lawyers appearing in the case and the Bench for the purpose of
making human rights, meaningful for the weaker sections of the
community.
It marks a step forward in the direction of reaching socio-economic
justice to the depraved and vulnerable sections of humanity in this
country.
In Bihar Legal Support Society v. Chief Justice of India, (1986) 4
SCC 767 the Court observed that in the matters of life and liberty of
people Supreme Court is more concerned with weaker, deprived,
vulnerable and ignorant class of people than the affluent class.
Q.3. What are the basic structures of the Constitution of
India?
Ans. The expression “Basic Structure” is not mentioned in the
Constitution of India but it has been developed gradually with the
interference of the judiciary from time to time to protect the basic
rights of the people and the ideals and the philosophy of the
Constitution. The Supreme Court recognised this concept for the
first time in the historic Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, AIR
1973SC 1461.
In this case, basic features of the Constitution are
separately stated by each judge as under:
Sikri, C.J. explained the concept of basic structure
including:
i. Supremacy of the Constitution
ii. Republican and democratic form of government
iii. Secular character of the Constitution
iv. Separation of powers between the legislature, executive and the
judiciary
v. Federal character of the Constitution
Shelat, J. and Grover, J. added three more basic features
to this list:
i. The mandate to build a welfare state contained in the Directive
Principles of State Policy
ii. Unity and integrity of the nation
iii. Sovereignty of the country.
Hegde, J. and Mukherjea, J. mentioned a separate list of
basic features as:
i. Sovereignty of India
ii. Democratic character of our polity
iii. Unity of the country
iv. Essential features of the individual freedoms secured to the
citizens
v. Mandate to build a welfare state
Jaganmohan Reddy, J. stated that elements of the basic
features were to be found in the Preamble of the
Constitution and the provisions into which they are
translated such as:
i. Sovereign democratic republic
ii. Justice – social, economic and political
iii. Liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship
iv. Equality of status and the opportunity.
In Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, 1981 SCR (1) 206 the
Supreme Court by majority struck down clauses (4) and (5) of
Article 368 inserted by 42nd Amendment, on the ground that these
clauses destroyed the essential feature of the basic structure of the
constitution. It was ruled by court that a limited amending power
itself is a basic feature of the Constitution.
In L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and others, AIR 1997 SC
1125 a larger Bench of seven Judges unequivocally declared that the
power of judicial review over legislative action vested in the High
Courts under Article 226 and in the Supreme Court under Article 32
of the Constitution is an integral and essential feature of the
Constitution, constituting part of its basic structure.
Supreme Court of India in I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, on 11
January, 2007 held that even though an Act is put in the Ninth
Schedule by a constitutional amendment, its provisions would be
open to attack on the ground that they destroy or damage the basic
structure if the fundamental right or rights taken away or abrogated
pertains or pertain to the basic structure.
Supreme Court of India in Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India,
on 10 April, 2008 held that imposing reservation on unaided
institutions violates the Basic Structure by stripping citizens of their
fundamental right under Article 19(l)(g) to carry on an occupation.
Supreme Court of India in Glanrock Estate (P) Ltd v. State of Tamil
Nadu, on 9 September, 2010 held that right to Equality before law,
Right to Equality of Opportunity in matters of public employment,
Right to Protection of life and personal liberty, Right against
Exploitation, Right to Freedom of Religion etc. are all fundamental
rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution and a common
thread running through all the Articles in Part III of the
Constitution have a common identity committed to an overarching
principle which is the basic structure of the Constitution.
Q.4. What do you mean by solitary confinement? What is
the maximum limit of solitary confinement under IPC?
Ans. There are three types of punishment namely-
(i) Solitary confinement,
(ii) Cellular confinement, and
(iii) Separate confinement.
Solitary Confinement means such confinement with or without
labour as entirely secludes the prisoner both from sight of, and
communication with, other prisoners.
Solitary confinement as a punishment is regarded as “the complete
isolation of the prisoner from all human society and his
confinement in a cell of considerable size so arranged that he had no
direct intercourse or sight of any human being and no employment
or instruction. Complete isolation from all human society is solitary
confinement in its stricter sense.
The separate confinement of a person with occasional access of
other persons is also solitary confinement. The punishment of
solitary confinement can be imposed by a Court only, and, in view of
its dangerous potentialities stringent conditions are imposed
thereon. Cellular confinement is a punishment which can be
imposed on a prisoner by a Superintendent of Jail.
A Superintendent of Jail can punish in a suitable case a prisoner by
imposing on him cellular confinement for a period not exceeding
fourteen days, provided that after each period of cellular
confinement an interval of not less than such period must elapse
before the prisoner is again sentenced to cellular or solitary
confinement. Cellular confinement in defined to mean such
confinement with or without labour as entirely secludes a prisoner
from communication with, but not from sight of, other prisoners.
Separate confinement is defined to mean such confinement with or
without labour as secludes a prisoner from communication with,
but not from sight of, other prisoners, and allows him not less than
one hour’s exercise per diem and to have his meals in association
with one or more other prisoners. Separate confinement for a
period not exceeding three months can be imposed on prisoner in a
suitable case by the Superintendent of Jail.
The relevant provisions relating to solitary confinement
are contained in sections 73 and 74 IPC as under:
73. Solitary Confinement:
Whenever any person is convicted of an offence for which under
this Code the Court has power to sentence him to rigorous
imprisonment, the Court may, by its sentence, order that the
offender shall be kept in solitary confinement for any portion or
portions of the imprisonment to which he is sentenced, not
exceeding three months in the whole, according to the following
scale, that is to say-
i. A time not exceeding one month if the term of imprisonment shall
not exceed six months.
ii. A tittle not exceeding two months if the term of imprisonment
shall exceed six months and shall not exceed one year.
iii. A time not exceeding three months if the term of imprisonment
shall exceed one year.
74. Limit of Solitary Confinement:
In executing a sentence of solitary confinement, such confinement
shall in no case exceed fourteen days at a time, with intervals
between the periods of solitary confinement of not less duration
than such periods; and when the imprisonment awarded shall
exceed three months, the solitary confinement shall not exceed
seven days in any one month of the whole imprisonment awarded,
less duration than such periods.
It means no person can be sentenced to undergo solitary
confinement for more than three months.
There is a limit prescribed on the punishment of solitary
confinement that can be imposed on a prisoner- it shall
not exceed:
(a) One month, if the term of imprisonment does not exceed six
months,
(b) Two months, if the term of imprisonment exceeds six months,
but does not exceed one year, and
(c) Three months if the term exceeds one year.
Section 74 IPC says, in executing a sentence of solitary confinement,
such confinement hall in no case exceed fourteen days at a time
less duration than such periods, and when the imprisonment
awarded shall exceed three months, the solitary confinement shall
not exceed seven days in any one month of the whole imprisonment
awarded, with intervals between the periods of solitary confinement
of not less duration than such periods.
Supreme Court of India in Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, 1979
SCR (1) 392 held that sections 73 and 74 of the Indian Penal Code
leave no room for doubt that solitary confinement is by itself a
substantive punishment which can be imposed by a court of law. It
cannot be left to the whim and caprice of prison authorities.
The limit of solitary confinement that can be imposed under Court’s
order is strictly prescribed by the Penal Code. Solitary confinement
is so revolting to the modern sociologist and law reformer that the
Law Commission recommended that the punishment of solitaiy
confinement is out of tune with modern thinking and should not
find a place in the Penal Code as a punishment to be ordered by any
criminal court even though it may be necessary as a measure of jail
discipline. Law is not a formal label, nor logomachy but a working
technique of justice.
The Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code regard punitive
solitude too harsh and the Legislature cannot be intended to permit
preventive solitary confinement, released even from the restrictions
of Sections 73 and 74 IPC.
Q.5. What is an unlawful assembly is as defined in IPC?
Assess the criminal liability, if force or violence is used by
any member of unlawful assembly?
Write short note on unlawful assembly.
What is unlawful assembly?
Write short note on Unlawful Assembly and Rioting.
Distinguish between rioting and unlawful assembly.
Ans. The gathering of five or more than five persons for the
purpose of committing either a crime or a non-criminal act in a
manner likely to terrify the public is unlawful assembly. This term is
defined in section 141 IPC as an assembly of five or more persons is
designated an “unlawful assembly”, if the common object of the
persons composing that assembly is-
First:
To overawe by criminal force, or show of criminal force, 1 [the
Central or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of
any State, or any public servant in the exercise of the lawful power
of such public servant; or
Second:
To resist the execution of any law, or of any legal process; or
Third:
To commit any mischief or criminal trespass, or other offence; or
Fourth:
By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to any person,
to take or obtain possession of any property, or to deprive any
person of the enjoyment of a right of way, or of the use of water or
other incorporeal right of which he is in possession or enjoyment, or
to enforce any right or supposed right; or
Fifth:
By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to compel any
person to do what he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do
what he is legally entitled to do.
Explanation:
An assembly which was not unlawful when it assembled, may
subsequently become an unlawful assembly.
Thus, the essential ingredients of unlawful assembly are
as under:
i. An assembly of five or more persons with a common object
ii. The object is common to all the members
iii. Members joined or continued to join such assembly
iv. They acted dishonestly
v. They assembled knowingly
Supreme Court of India in Gangadhar Behera and ors v. State of
Orissa on 10 October, 2002 observed that the emphasis is on the
common object and not on common intention. Mere presence in an
unlawful assembly cannot render a person liable unless there was a
common object and he was actuated by that common object and
that object is one of those set out in Section 141.
In Lalji v. State of U.P., 1989 SCR (1) 130 the Court held that once
the case of a person falls within the ingredients of the section the
question that he did nothing with his own hands would be
immaterial. He cannot put forward the defence that he did not with
his own hand commit the offence committed in prosecution of the
common object of the unlawful assembly or such as the members of
the assembly knew likely to be committed in prosecution of that
object.
Everyone must be taken to have intended the probable and natural
results of the combination of the acts in which he joined. It is not
necessary that all the persons forming an unlawful assembly must
do some overt act.
Section 149 IPC says that if an offence is committed by any member
of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of
that assembly, or such as the members or that assembly knew to be
likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person
who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of
the same assembly, is guilty of that offence.
It is well settled that once a membership of an unlawful assembly is
established, it is not incumbent on the prosecution to establish
whether any specific overt act has been assigned to any accused.
Mere membership of the unlawful assembly is sufficient.
Every member of an unlawful assembly is vicariously liable for the
acts done by others either in the prosecution of the common object
of the unlawful assembly or such which the members of the
unlawful assembly knew were likely to be committed; State of
Maharashtra v. Joseph Mingel Koli, (1997) 2 Crimes 228 (Bom).
Q.6. What is the difference between common intention
and common object?
Write a note on Joint Liability in the Criminal Law. Also
distinguish between Common Intention (Under Sec34
IPC) and Common Object (Under Section 149 IPC). Cite
anyone related case law.
[Uttarakhand Higher Judicial Service Mains Examination, 2012]
Ans. The terms ‘common intention’ and ‘common object’ have been
used in sections 34 and 149 IPC respectively. In Queen v. SabedAli,
(1873) it was pointed out that Section 149 did not ascribe every
offence which might be committed by one member of an unlawful
assembly while the assembly was existing, to every other member.
The section describes the offence which is to be so
attributed under two alternative forms:
(1) It must be either an offence committed by a member of the
unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that
assembly; or
(2) An offence such as the members of that assembly knew to be
likely to be committed in prosecution of that object.
In Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. Emperor, AIR 1925 PC 1 the
distinction between Sections 149 and 34 IPC was pointed out. It was
observed that Section 149 postulates an assembly of five or more
persons having a common object, namely, one of those objects
named in Section 141, and then the doing of acts by members of the
assembly in prosecution of that object or such as the members knew
were likely to be committed in prosecution of that object.
There is a difference between common object and common
intention; though the object might be common, the intention of the
several members might differ. The leading feature of Section 34 is
the element of participation in action, whereas membership of the
assembly at the time of the committing of the offence is the
important element in Section 149. The two sections have a certain
resemblance and may to a certain extent overlap, but it cannot be
said that both have the same meaning.
In Munna Chanda v. State of Assam, [(2006) 3 SCC 752], the Court
held that the concept of common object, it is well known, is
different from common intention. It is true that so far as common
object is concerned no prior concert is required. Common object
can be formed on the spur of the moment.
Course of conduct adopted by the members of the assembly,
however, is a relevant factor. At what point of time the common
object of the unlawful assembly was formed would depend upon the
facts and circumstances of each case. Section 149 IPC creates a
specific and distinct offence. There are two essential ingredients
thereof-
(i) Commission of an offence by any member of an unlawful
assembly, and
(ii) Such offence must have been committed in prosecution of the
common object of that assembly or must be such as the members of
that assembly knew to be likely to be committed.
In Maranadu v. State, 2008 (12) SCALE 420, the Court stated the
law as: Common object’ is different from common intention’ as it
does not require a prior concert and a common meeting of minds
before the attack. It is enough if each has the same object in view
and their number is five or more and that they act as an assembly to
achieve that object.
The ‘common object’ of an assembly is to be ascertained from the
acts and language of the members composing it, and from a
consideration of all the surrounding circumstances. It may be
gathered from the course of conduct adopted by the members of the
assembly.
For determination of the common object of the unlawful assembly,
the conduct of each of the members of the unlawful assembly,
before and at the time of attack and thereafter, the motive for the
crime, are some of the relevant considerations.
What the common object of the unlawful assembly is at a particular
stage of the incident is essentially a question of fact to be
determined, keeping in view the nature of the assembly, the arms
carried by the members, and the behaviour of the members at or
near the scene of the incident. It is not necessary under law that in
all cases of unlawful assembly, with an unlawful common object, the
same must be translated into action or be successful.
Under the Explanation to Section 141, an assembly which was not
unlawful when it was assembled, may subsequently become
unlawful. It is not necessary that the intention or the purpose,
which is necessary to render an assembly an unlawful one comes
into existence at the outset. The time of forming an unlawful intent
is not material. An assembly which, at its commencement or even
for some time thereafter, is lawful, may subsequently become
unlawful. In other words it can develop during the course of
incident at the spot co instanti.
Q.7. A, in support of a just claim which B has against Z for
one thousand rupees, falsely swears on a trial that he
heard Z admit the justice of B’s claim. Has A committed
any offence?
[Kerala Judicial Test (Higher) Examination, 2016]
Ans. Yes, A has given false evidence. Giving false evidence is
punishable under section 191 IPC which provides that-
191. Giving False Evidence:
Whoever, being legally bound by an oath or by an express provision
of law to state the truth, or being bound by law to make a
declaration upon any subject, makes any statement which is false,
and which he either knows or believes to be false or does not believe
to be true, is said to give false evidence.
Explanation 1:
A statement is within the meaning of this section whether it is made
verbally or otherwise.
Explanation 2:
A false statement as to the belief of the person attesting is within the
meaning of this section, and a person may be guilty of giving false
evidence by stating that he believes a thing which he does not
believe, as well as by stating that he knows a thing which he does
not know.
Section 191 makes the giving of false evidence an offence. Such
offence is known as perjury in English law. A person is said to give
false evidence, if he-
(i) Being legally bound by an oath or by an express provision of the
law to state the truth, or to make a declaration, upon any subject
(ii) Makes a false statement
(iii) Which he either-
(a) Knows or believes to be false, or
(b) Does not believe to be true.
Allahabad High Court in Mahesh Tiwari v. State of U.P. and another
(24 August, 2016) observed that the salient features of giving false
evidence under Section 191 IPC are- (i) intentionally making a false
statement, or (ii) declaration by a person who is under a legal
obligation to speak the truth. The giving of false evidence amounts
to practicing of fraud upon the court.
Thus to make a statement of false evidence within the meaning of
this section, it must be established that the person was legally
bound by an oath or an express provision of law (a) to state the
truth, or (b) to make a declaration upon any subject.
Q.8. Explain the provision of section 277 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860.
[Tripura Judicial Sen’ice (Grade-III) Written Examination, 2014]
Ans. The water of public spring or reservoir belongs to
every member of the community, and if a person
voluntarily fouls it, he comes within the ambit of Section
277 as it renders the water of the spring less fit for the
purpose for which it is ordinarily used. Section 277 as
mentioned below:
277. Fouling Water of Public Spring or Reservoir:
Whoever voluntarily corrupts or fouls the water of any public spring
or reservoir, so as to render it less fit for the purpose for which it is
ordinarily used, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to three months, or with
fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.
The ingredients of Section 277 of the code are:
i. Voluntary corruption or fouling of water;
ii. The water must be of public spring or reservoir; and
iii. The water must be rendered less fit for the purpose for which it
is ordinarily used.
The offence under Section 277 is cognizable but summons should
ordinarily issue in the first instance. It is bailable but not
compoundable and is triable by any Magistrate summarily.
Q.9. A young man of 26 years is in love with a girl. But she
does not respond to the same. Angered by the same, the
young man in order to teach her a lesson, procures
sulphuric acid and throws it on her face, causing severe
acid burn injuries including loss of both eyesight and
permanent disfiguration of face and hands. What is the
offence committed? Name the latest law laid down by the
High Court of Karnataka on the subject.
Ans. When the question was asked, the young man committed
grievous hurt but by Criminal Law Amendment Act, 2013 the
specific provisions in IPC have been provided. Section 326A and
326B deal with acid attack. Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by use
of acid, etc. is punishable with not less than ten years but which may
extend to imprisonment for life and with fine under section 326A.
Sec. 326B deals with voluntarily throwing or attempting to throw
acid. These both sections are mentioned above.
Q.10. ‘A’ out of natural love and affection promises to pay
his son Rs 10,000. He puts promise in writing and
registers it. How far is the contract valid?
[Jharkhand PCS J Mains Examination, 2014]
Ans. The term “natural love and affection” is mentioned in Section
25(1) of Indian Contract Act. The Section provides that an
agreement made without consideration is void, unless it is
expressed in writing and registered under the law for the time being
in force for the registration of documents, and is made on account
of natural love and affection between parties standing in a near
relation to each other.
The Indian Contract considers a promise made in consideration of
natural love and affection void unless the parties stand in near
relation to each other. Similarly, a promise between two parties
stand in near relation is consider void if there is no love and
affection between them. In addition to this, the promise has to be
written and registered for it to be valid contract.
In past the judges has interpreted natural love and affection in
contradictory ways. Such two contradictory cases are-
Rajlukhy Dabee v. Bhootnath Mookerjee, (1900) 4 Cal WN 488, in
this case the defendant promised his wife a certain amount every
month as maintenance. The agreement contained in a registered
document which mentioned certain quarrels and disagreements
between the two. A case was filed to recover the amount promised
to be paid as maintenance. However, the judge decided in favour of
the defendant as although they were in near relation court held that
there was no natural love and affection between them.
Bhiwa v. Shivaram, (1899) 1 Bom LR 495, in this case two brother
has quarreled regarding some property. One of them lost upon
which the other brother has promised through a written and duly
registered agreement that he would give half his property but he
later backed out, Court held that inspite of property dispute section
25(1) of the Act applies as the promise was made out of natural love
and affection for someone who was a near relative.
However the abovementioned judgments are extremely
contradictory, if natural love and affection does not apply in first
case, then how it can be applied in second one.
An agreement though made without consideration will be valid if it
is in writing and registered and is made on account of natural love
and affection between parties standing in a near relation to each
other.
An agreement without consideration will be valid
provided:
(i) It is expressed in writing;
(ii) It is registered under the law for the time being a force;
(iii) It is made on account of natural love and affection; and
(iv) It is between parties standing in a near relation to each other.
All these essentials must be present to enforce an agreement made
without consideration. The presence of only one or some of them
will not suffice. Thus, the mere registration of document in the
absence of nearness of relationship or natural love and affection will
not suffice.
Q.11. What are the rules governing appropriation of
payments?
[Kerala Judicial Service NCA (Main) Examination, 2011]
Ans. Appropriation means ‘application’ of payments, Appropriation
rules apply only in case of several and distinct debts and do not
apply where there is only one debt, though payable by installments.
Appropriation is considered a primary right of a debtor. Sections 59
to 61 lay down three rules regarding appropriation of payments
which are based on English law.
A Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Jia Ram v. Sulakhan Mai,
A.I.R. 1941 Lahore 386 dealt with the scope of Section 59 to
Sections 61 of the Indian Contract Act and held that Sections 59 to
61, Contract Act, embody the general rules as to appropriation of
payments in cases where a debtor owes several distinct debts to one
person and voluntarily makes payment to him.
They do not deal with cases in which principal and interest are due
on a single debt, or where a decree has been passed on such a debt,
carrying interest on the sum adjudged to be due on the decree.
These sections are based upon the rule of English Law, well settled
since Clayton’s case, that where a debtor, owing several distinct
debts to one person, makes a payment to him intimating that the
payment is to be applied in discharge of particular debt, the
creditor, if he accepts the payment, must apply it accordingly.
If, however, the debtor has omitted to intimate and there are no
circumstances indicating to which debt the payment is to be applied
the creditor may, at his discretion, apply it to any debt actually due
and payable to him by the debtor at the time. In case neither party
makes the appropriation, the payment is to be applied in discharge
of the debts in order of time; and if the debts are of equal standing
the payment is made in the discharge of each of them
proportionately.
The above judgment of the Lahore High Court is based upon sound
principle and has kept in mind the intention of the Legislature in
enacting Sections 59 to 61 of the Act as observed by the Supreme
Court of India in Industrial Credit v. Smt. Smithaben H. Patel and
Others on 10 February, 1999.
Appropriation by Debtor:
Where the debtor owes several debts to creditor, he has right to
request to creditor to apply the payment for discharge of some
particular debt. If the debtor does not agree to the specific
instruction of the debtor, he must refuse to accept the payment. In
this regard, section 59 provides as under-
59. Application of payment where debt to be discharged is
indicated- Where a debtor, owing several distinct debts to one
person, makes a payment to him, either with express intimation, or
under circumstances implying that the payment is to be applied to
the discharge of some particular debt, the payment, if accepted,
must be applied accordingly.
Illustrations:
(a) A owes B, among other debts, 1,000 rupees upon a promissory
note which falls due on the’ first June. He owes B no other debt of
that amount. On the first June A pays to B 1,000 rupees. The
payment is to be applied to the discharge of the promissory note.
(b) A owes to B, among other debts, the sum of 567 rupees. B writes
to A and demands payment’ of this sum A sends to B 567 rupees.
This payment is to be applied to the discharge of the debt of which B
had demanded payment.
Supreme Court of India in Industrial Credit v. Smt. Smithaben H.
Patel and Others on 10 February, 1999 held that a perusal of Section
59 would clearly indicate that it refers to several distinct debts
payable by a person and not to the various heads of one debt. The
principal and interest due on a single debt or decree passed on such
debt carrying subsequent interest cannot be held to be several
distinct debts.
Appropriation by Creditor:
If the debtor has not intimated to creditor regarding appropriation
of payment made to creditor and the circumstances indicate that it
should be appropriated with a particular debt then it must be
adjusted with that debt. Sec. 60 is relevant in this regard which is as
under-
60. Application of payment where debt to be discharged is not
indicated- Where the debtor has omitted to intimate and there are
no other circumstances, indicating to which debt the payment is to
be applied, the creditor may apply it at his discretion to any lawful
debt actually due and payable to him from the debtor, whether its
recovery is or is not barred by the law in force for the time being as
to the limitation of suits.
Where neither Party Appropriates:
In absence of appropriation by the debtor or the creditor, the
payment may be appropriated towards the debts in chronological
order including the time-barred debt. In this regard, section 61 is
relevant.
61. Application of payment where neither party
appropriates- Where neither party makes any appropriation the
payment shall be applied in discharge of the debts in order of time,
whether they are or are not barred by the law in force for the time
being as to the limitation of suits. If the debts are of equal standing,
the payment shall be applied in discharge of each proportionately.
Rule in Re Hallett’s Estate case- This is an exception to the
provisions contained in section 61. The rule applies where a trustee
had mixed up trust funds with his own funds. In such a case, if the
trustee misappropriates any money belonging to the trust, the first
amount so withdrawn by him would be first debited to his own
money and then to the trust funds.
Similarly, any deposits made by him would be first credited to trust
fund and then to his own fund, whatever be the order of withdrawal
and deposit.
Q.12. Write short note on trespass to land.
Ans. The trespass to land, unlawful intrusion of an individual to
another’s land voluntarily, occurs where a person directly enters
upon another’s land without permission, or remains upon the land,
or places or projects any object upon the land.
The maxim ‘cui us est solum, eius est usque ad coelum et ad
infernos ‘, is relevant on this issue. This rule means: “Whose is the
soil, his it is up to the sky’, or in a more simple explanation “He who
possesses the land possesses also that which is above it”.
Trespass to land may be committed in the following three
ways:
(a) Trespass by Wrongful Entry:
The most common form of trespass is a wrongful personal entry by
the defendant on the plaintiff’s land. The slightest crossing of the
boundary suffices e.g. putting a hand through a window, or sitting
on a fence.
(b) Trespass by Remaining on the Land:
A person who has lawfully entered on the land in the possession of
another commits a trespass if he remains there after his right of
entry has ceased. Thus, a person who has entered by leave or licence
of the occupier will be liable as a trespasser if, after request, he fails
to leave the premises.
(c) Trespass by Placing Things on the Land:
It is a trespass to cause any physical object to cross the boundary of
the plaintiff’s land, or even to come into physical contact with the
plaintiff’s land, even though there may be no crossing of the
boundary. For instance, driving a nail into plaintiff’s wall, or
throwing a stone upon his land or piling rubbish against plaintiff’s
wall would technically amount to a trespass.
Generally, it is civil wrong but it may give rise to criminal
proceeding also. The tort of trespass to land is actionable per se
without the proof of damage.
The following are the essential elements of tort of trespass
to land:
(i) A man is not liable for a trespass committed involuntarily, but he
is liable if the entry is intentional, even though made under a
mistake, e.g., if, moving his own land one inadvertently allows his
blade to cut through into his neighbor’s field, he is guilty of a
trespass.
(ii) If a person who has lawfully entered on the land of another,
remains there, after his right of entry has ceased, he commits
trespass.
(iii) Every interference with the land of another, e. g., throwing
stones or materials over neighbour’s lands, is deemed constructive
entry and amounts to trespass.
In order to prove that a defendant is liable for trespass to
land, the plaintiff has to show that:
(i) The defendant must intend enter the land that is the subject of
the trespass. It’s not required that the defendant intended to do so
wrongfully. Causing an object or thing to enter someone’s properly
can also be considered trespass.
(ii) Entry onto the property must be unauthorized, either expressly
or implied. For example, the police and postal carriers has implied
consent to be on most residential property, so a trespass cause of
action would fail in such cases.
The defences available in case of this tort are licence, necessity,
acquiesce or estoppels, right to entry, justified by the law and
consent. The available remedies are-damages, injunction,
expulsion, self-help.
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100 sample questions on The Indian

Evidence Act, 1872 for Maharashtra

(b) Sir James F. Stephen

(d) Sir Henry Summer Maine.

2. The law of evidence consists of

(b) legal rules of evidence

(c) rules of logic

(d) all the above.

3. Relevancy and admissibility under the

(c) neither synonymous nor co-extensive

(d) synonymous & co-extensive both.

(b) can be self-harming statements

(c) can be self-serving or self-harming

(d) none of the above.

5. What is correct as regards the admissibility

(b) self-serving statement is admissible but a self-harming

(c) self-serving and self-harming statements both are

(d) self-serving and self-harming statements both are

6. Under the law of evidence, as a general rule

(b) opinion on a matter of law is relevant but not on a

(c) opinion on a matter of fact and law both are relevant

(d) opinion whether on a matter of fact or law, is irrelevant.

(b) proceedings before the arbitrator

(c) judicial proceedings in courts

(d) all the above.

(b) lex fori

(c) lex loci solutionis

(d) lex situs.

(b) an adjective law

(c) both (a) & (b)

(d) neither (a) nor (b).

10. Facts can be

(b) psychological facts

(c) physical as well as psychological facts

(d) only physical facts & not psychological facts.

(b) factum probans

(c) both factum probandum and factum probans

(d) none of the above.

12. Fact in issue means

(b) fact, existence or non-existence of which is disputed by

(c) fact existence or non-existence of which is not disputed

(d) all the above.

13. Evidence under the Indian Evidence Act means &

(b) documentary evidence

(c) ocular and documentary evidence both

(d) ocular evidence based on documents only.

14. Propositions under Evidence Act are

(b) I, II & III are correct but IV is incorrect

(c) I, II & IV are correct but III is incorrect

(d) I, II & IV are incorrect but III is correct

(e) I & II are correct but III & IV are incorrect

(f) I is incorrect but II, III & IV are correct.

15. Proof of a fact depends on

(c) artificial probative value assigned to a fact

(d) rigid mathematical demonstration.

16. Standard of proof in

(c) criminal case is lower than in civil cases

(d) either (a) or (c) are correct

17. Presumptions under the law of evidence are