G.R. No. 121917 March 12, 1997 ALL CONTRARY TO LAW.

  4

ROBIN CARIÑO PADILLA @ ROBINHOOD PADILLA, petitioner, The lower court then ordered the arrest of petitioner,  but granted
5

vs. his application for bail.   During the arraignment on January 20,
6

COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES, respondents. 1993, a plea of not guilty was entered for petitioner after he
refused,   upon advice of counsel,   to make any plea.   Petitioner
7 8 9

waived in writing his right to be present in any and all stages of

the case.  10

FRANCISCO, J.:
After trial, Angeles City RTC Judge David Rosete rendered judgment
On October 26, 1992, high-powered firearms with live ammunitions were dated April 25, 1994 convicting petitioner of the crime charged and
found in the possession of petitioner Robin Padilla @ Robinhood sentenced him to an "indeterminate penalty from 17 years, 4 months and
Padilla, i.e.: 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 21 years of reclusion
perpetua, as maximum".   Petitioner filed his notice of appeal on April 28,
11

(1) One .357 Caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson, SN- 1994.   Pending the appeal in the respondent Court of Appeals,   the
12 13

32919 with six (6) live ammunitions; Solicitor-General, convinced that

the conviction shows strong evidence of guilt, filed on December 2, 1994
a motion to cancel petitioner's bail bond. The resolution of this motion
(2) One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four was incorporated in the now assailed respondent court's decision
(4) long and one (1) short magazine with ammunitions; sustaining petitioner's conviction   the dispositive portion of which reads:
14

(3) One .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y with clip and WHEREFORE, the foregoing circumstances considered,
eight (8) ammunitions; and the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, and
furthermore, the P200,000.00 bailbond posted by
(4) Six additional live double action ammunitions of .38 accused-appellant for his provisional liberty, FGU
caliber revolver.
1
Insurance Corporation Bond No. JCR (2) 6523, is hereby
cancelled. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Angeles
Petitioner was correspondingly charged on December 3, 1992, before the City, is directed to issue the Order of Arrest of accused-
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City with illegal possession of appellant and thereafter his transmittal to the National
firearms and ammunitions under P.D. 1866  thru the following
2
Bureau of Prisons thru the Philippine National Police
Information:
3
where the said accused-appellant shall remain under
confinement pending resolution of his appeal, should he
That on or about the 26th day of October, 1992, in the appeal to the Supreme Court. This shall be immediately
City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of executory. The Regional Trial Court is further directed to
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then submit a report of compliance herewith.
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession and under his custody and control one (1) M- SO ORDERED.  15

16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long

and one (1) short magazines with ammunitions, one (1) . Petitioner received a copy of this decision on July 26, 1995.   On 16

357 caliber revolver Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with August 9, 1995 he filed a "motion for reconsideration (and to
six (6) live ammunitions and one (1) .380 Pietro Beretta, recall the warrant of arrest)"   but the same was denied by
17

SN-A35723Y with clip and eight (8) ammunitions, without respondent court in its September 20, 1995 Resolution   copy of
18

having the necessary authority and permit to carry and which was received by petitioner on September 27, 1995. The
possess the same.
 next day, September 28, petitioner filed the instant petition for 9-10, ibid). Manarang, being a member of both the
review on certiorari with application for bail   followed by two
19
Spectrum, a civic group and the Barangay Disaster
"supplemental petitions" filed by different counsels,   a "second
20
Coordinating Council, decided to report the incident to the
supplemental petition"   and an urgent motion for the separate
21
Philippine National Police of Angeles City (p. 10, ibid). He
resolution of his application for bail. Again, the Solicitor- took out his radio and called the Viper, the radio controller
General   sought the denial of the application for bail, to which the
22
of the Philippine National Police of Angeles City (p.
Court agreed in a Resolution promulgated on July 31, 1996.   The 23
10, ibid). By the time Manarang completed the call, the
Court also granted the Solicitor-General's motion to file a vehicle had started to leave the place of the accident
consolidated comment on the petitions and thereafter required taking the general direction to the north (p. 11, ibid).
the petitioner to file his reply.   However, after his vigorous
24

resistance and success on the intramural of bail (both in the Manarang went to the location of the accident and found
respondent court and this Court) and thorough exposition of out that the vehicle had hit somebody (p. 11, ibid).
petitioner's guilt in his 55-page Brief in the respondent court, the
Solicitor-General now makes a complete turnabout by filing a He asked Cruz to look after the victim while he went back
"Manifestation In Lieu Of Comment" praying for petitioner's to the restaurant, rode on his motorcycle and chased the
acquittal.  25
vehicle (p. 11 ibid). During the chase he was able to make
out the plate number of the vehicle as PMA 777 (p. 33,
The People's detailed narration of facts, well-supported by evidence on TSN, February 15, 1193). He called the Viper through the
record and given credence by respondent court, is as follows:  26
radio once again (p. 34, ibid) reporting that a vehicle
heading north with plate number PMA 777 was involved in
At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of October 26, 1992, a hit and run accident (p. 20, TSN, June 8, 1993). The
Enrique Manarang and his compadre Danny Perez were Viper, in the person of SP02 Ruby Buan, upon receipt of
inside the Manukan sa Highway Restaurant in Sto. Kristo, the second radio call flashed the message to all units of
Angeles City where they took shelter from the heavy PNP Angeles City with the order to apprehend the vehicle
downpour (pp. 5-6, TSN, February 15, 1993) that had (p. 20, ibid). One of the units of the PNP Angeles City
interrupted their ride on motorcycles (pp 5-6, ibid.) along reached by the alarm was its Patrol Division at Jake
McArthur Highway (ibid). While inside the restaurant, Gonzales Street near the Traffic Division (pp. 5-7, TSN,
Manarang noticed a vehicle, a Mitsubishi Pajero, running February 23, 1993). SPO2 Juan C. Borja III and SPO2
fast down the highway prompting him to remark that the Emerlito Miranda immediately borded a mobile patrol
vehicle might get into an accident considering the vehicle (Mobile No. 3) and positioned themselves near the
inclement weather. (p. 7, Ibid) In the local vernacular, he south approach of Abacan bridge since it was the only
said thus: "Ka bilis na, mumuran pa naman pota passable way going to the north (pp. 8-9, ibid). It took
makaaksidente ya." (p. 7, ibid). True enough, immediately them about ten (10) seconds to cover the distance
after the vehicle had passed the restaurant, Manarang between their office and the Abacan bridge (p. 9, ibid).
and Perez heard a screeching sound produced by the
sudden and hard braking of a vehicle running very fast Another PNP mobile patrol vehicle that responded to the
(pp. 7-8, ibid) followed by a sickening sound of the vehicle flash message from SPO2 Buan was Mobile No. 7 of the
hitting something (p. 8, ibid). Danny Cruz, quite sure of Pulongmaragal Detachment which was then conducting
what had happened, remarked "oy ta na" signifying that patrol along Don Juico Avenue (pp. 8-9, TSN, March 8,
Manarang had been right in his observation (pp. 8-9, ibid). 1993). On board were SPO Ruben Mercado and SPO3
Tan and SPO2 Odejar (p. 8, ibid). SPO Ruben Mercado
Manarang and Cruz went out to investigate and immediately told SPO3 Tan to proceed to the MacArthur
immediately saw the vehicle occupying the edge or Highway to intercept the vehicle with plate number PMA
shoulder of the highway giving it a slight tilt to its side (pp. 777 (p. 10, ibid).
In the meantime, Manarang continued to chase the 1993) such that when he alighted with both his hands
vehicle which figured in the hit and run incident, even raised, a gun (Exhibit "C") tucked on the left side of his
passing through a flooded portion of the MacArthur waist was revealed (p. 15, TSN, February 23, 1993), its
Highway two (2) feet deep in front of the Iglesia ni Kristo butt protruding (p. 15, ibid). SPO2 Borja made the move
church but he could not catch up with the same vehicle to confiscate the gun but appellant held the former's hand
(pp. 11-12, February 15, 1993). When he saw that the car alleging that the gun was covered by legal papers (p.
he was chasing went towards Magalang, he proceeded to 16, ibid). SPO2 Borja, however, insisted that if the gun
Abacan bridge because he knew Pulongmaragal was not really was covered by legal papers, it would have to be
passable (pp. 12-14, ibid). When he reached the Abacan shown in the office (p. 16, ibid). After disarming appellant,
bridge, he found Mobile No. 3 and SPO2 Borja and SPO2 SPO2 Borja told him about the hit and run incident which
Miranda watching all vehicles coming their way (p. 10, was angrily denied by appellant (p. 17, ibid). By that time,
TSN, February 23, 1993). He approached them and a crowd had formed at the place (p. 19, ibid). SPO2 Borja
informed them that there was a hit and run incident (p. checked the cylinder of the gun and find six (6) live bullets
10, ibid). Upon learning that the two police officers already inside (p. 20, ibid).
knew about the incident, Manarang went back to where
he came from (pp. 10-11; ibid). When Manarang was in While SPO2 Borja and appellant were arguing, Mobile No.
front of Tina's Restaurant, he saw the vehicle that had 7 with SPO Ruben Mercado, SPO3 Tan and SPO2
figured in the hit and run incident emerging from the Odejar on board arrived (pp. 11-12, TSN, March 8, 1993).
corner adjoining Tina's Restaurant (p. 15, TSN, February As the most senior police officer in the group, SPO
15, 1993). He saw that the license plate hanging in front Mercado took over the matter and informed appellant that
of the vehicle bore the identifying number PMA 777 and he was being arrested for the hit and run incident (p.
he followed it (p. 15, ibid) towards the Abacan bridge. 13, ibid). He pointed out to appellant the fact that the plate
number of his vehicle was dangling and the railing and
Soon the vehicle was within sight of SPO2 Borja and the hood were dented (p. 12, ibid). Appellant,
SPO2 Miranda of Mobile No. 3 (p. 10, TSN, February 23, however, arrogantly denied his misdeed and, instead,
1993). When the vehicle was about twelve (12) meters played with the crowd by holding their hands with one
away from their position, the two police officers boarded hand and pointing to SPO3 Borja with his right hand
their Mobile car, switched on the engine, operated the saying "iyan, kinuha ang baril ko" (pp. 13-15, ibid).
siren and strobe light and drove out to intercept the Because appellant's jacket was short, his gesture
vehicle (p. 11, ibid). They cut into the path of the vehicle exposed a long magazine of an armalite rifle tucked in
forcing it to stop (p. 11, ibid). appellant 's back right, pocket (p. 16, ibid). SPO Mercado
saw this and so when appellant turned around as he was
SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda alighted from Mobile No. talking and proceeding to his vehicle, Mercado
3 (P. 12, TSN, February 23, 1993). SPO2 Miranda went to confiscated the magazine from appellant (pp. 16-17, ibid).
the vehicle with plate number PMA 777 and instructed its Suspecting that appellant could also be carrying a rifle
driver to alight (p. 12, ibid). The driver rolled down the inside the vehicle since he had a magazine, SPO2
window and put his head out while raising both his hands. Mercado prevented appellant from going back to his
They recognized the driver as Robin C. Padilla, appellant vehicle by opening himself the door of appellant's vehicle
in this case (p. 13, ibid). There was no one else with him (16-17, ibid). He saw a baby armalite rifle (Exhibit D) lying
inside the vehicle (p. 24). At that moment, Borja noticed horizontally at the front by the driver 's seat. It had a long
that Manarang arrived and stopped his motorcycle behind magazine filled with live bullets in a semi-automatic mode
the vehicle of appellant (p. 14, ibid). SPO2 Miranda told (pp. 17-21, ibid). He asked appellant for the papers
appellant to alight to which appellant complied. Appellant covering the rifle and appellant answered angrily that they
was wearing a short leather jacket (p. 16, TSN, March 8, were at his home (pp. 26-27, ibid). SPO Mercado
 modified the arrest of appellant by including as its ground illegal possession constitutes excessive and cruel punishment proscribed
illegal possession of firearms (p. 28, ibid). SPO Mercado by the 1987 Constitution.
then read to appellant his constitutional rights (pp. 28-
29, ibid). After a careful review of the records   of this case, the Court is convinced
27

that petitioner's guilt of the crime charged stands on terra firma,

The police officers brought appellant to the Traffic Division notwithstanding the Solicitor-General's change of heart.
at Jake Gonzales Boulevard (pp. 31-32, ibid) where
appellant voluntarily surrendered a third firearm, a pietro Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his arrest.
berreta pistol (Exhibit "L") with a single round in its There is no dispute that no warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner,
chamber and a magazine (pp. 33-35, ibid) loaded with but that per se did not make his apprehension at the Abacan bridge
seven (7) other live bullets. Appellant also voluntarily illegal.
surrendered a black bag containing two additional long
magazines and one short magazine (Exhibits M, N, and Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances:  28

O, pp. 36-37, ibid). After appellant had been interrogated

by the Chief of the Traffic Division, he was transferred to
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace
the Police Investigation Division at Sto. Rosario Street
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
beside the City Hall Building where he and the firearms
person:
and ammunitions were turned over to SPO2 Rene Jesus
Gregorio (pp. 5-10, TSN, July 13, 1993). During the
investigation, appellant admitted possession of the (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
firearms stating that he used them for shooting (p. committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
14, ibid). He was not able to produce any permit to carry commit an offense;
or memorandum receipt to cover the three firearms (pp.
16-18, TSN, January 25, 1994). (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and
he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
On November 28, 1992, a certification (Exhibit "F") was person to be arrested has committed it.
issued by Captain, Senior Inspector Mario Espino, PNP,
Chief, Record Branch of the Firearms and Explosives (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
Office (pp. 7-8, TSN, March 4, 1993). The Certification escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
stated that the three firearms confiscated from appellant, serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
an M-16 Baby armalite rifle SN-RP 131280, a .357 caliber case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
revolver Smith and Wesson SN 32919 and a .380 Pietro from one confinement to another.
Beretta SN-A35720, were not registered in the name of
Robin C. Padilla (p. 6, ibid). A second Certification dated Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has
December 11, 1992 issued by Captain Espino stated that committed or while he is actually committing or is at least
the three firearms were not also registered in the name of attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the
Robinhood C. Padilla (p. 10, ibid). arresting officer or private person.   Both elements concurred
29

here, as it has been established that petitioner's vehicle figured in

Petitioner's defenses are as follows: (1) that his arrest was illegal and a hit and run — an offense committed in the "presence" of
consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in the course thereof Manarang, a private person, who then sought to arrest petitioner.
are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule; (2) that he is a It must be stressed at this point that "presence" does not only
confidential agent authorized, under a Mission Order and Memorandum require that the arresting person sees the offense, but also when
Receipt, to carry the subject firearms; and (3) that the penalty for simple he "hears the disturbance created thereby AND proceeds at once
to the scene."   As testified to by Manarang, he heard the
30
 screeching of tires followed by a thud, saw the sideswiped victim between the hit and run and the actual apprehension. Moreover, after
(balut vendor), reported the incident to the police and thereafter having stationed themselves at the Abacan bridge in response to
gave chase to the erring Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in Manarang's report, the policemen saw for themselves the fast
order to apprehend its driver. After having sent a radio report to approaching Pajero of petitioner,   its dangling plate number (PMA 777
38

the PNP for assistance, Manarang proceeded to the Abacan as reported by Manarang), and the dented hood and railings
bridge where he found responding policemen SPO2 Borja and thereof.   These formed part of the arresting police officer's personal
39

SPO2 Miranda already positioned near the bridge who effected knowledge of the facts indicating that petitioner's Pajero was indeed the
the actual arrest of petitioner. 31
vehicle involved in the hit and run incident. Verily then, the arresting
police officers acted upon verified personal knowledge and not on
Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by unreliable hearsay information.  40

arguing that the policemen who actually arrested him were not at the
scene of the hit and run.   We beg to disagree. That Manarang decided
32
Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection,
to seek the aid of the policemen (who admittedly were nowhere in the defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the
vicinity of the hit and run) in effecting petitioner's arrest, did not in any accused enters his plea.   Petitioner's belated challenge thereto aside
41

way affect the propriety of the apprehension. It was in fact the most from his failure to quash the information, his participation in the trial and
prudent action Manarang could have taken rather than collaring petitioner by presenting his evidence, placed him in estoppel to assail the legality of
by himself, inasmuch as policemen are unquestionably better trained and his arrest.   Likewise, by applying for bail, petitioner patently waived such
42

well-equipped in effecting an arrest of a suspect (like herein petitioner) irregularities and defects.  43

who, in all probability, could have put up a degree of resistance which an

untrained civilian may not be able to contain without endangering his own We now go to the firearms and ammunitions seized from petitioner
life. Moreover, it is a reality that curbing lawlessness gains more success without a search warrant, the admissibility in evidence of which, we
when law enforcers function in collaboration with private citizens. It is uphold.
precisely through this cooperation, that the offense herein involved
fortunately did not become an additional entry to the long list of The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure
unreported and unsolved crimes. of property is valid,   are as follows:
44

It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a suspect, like petitioner 1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
herein, cannot defeat the arrest which has been set in motion in a public recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of
place for want of a warrant as the police was confronted by an urgent Court   and by prevailing jurisprudence  ,
45 46

need to render aid or take action.   The exigent circumstances of — hot

33

pursuit,   a fleeing suspect, a moving vehicle, the public place and the
34

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view", the elements of

raining nighttime — all created a situation in which speed is essential and
which are:  47

delay improvident.   The Court acknowledges police authority to make

35

the forcible stop since they had more than mere "reasonable and
articulable" suspicion that the occupant of the vehicle has been engaged (a). a prior valid intrusion based on the
in criminal activity.   Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto with
36 valid warrantless arrest in which the police
possession of an unlicensed firearm (Smith & Wesson) and ammunition are legally present in the pursuit of their
(M-16 magazine), petitioner's warrantless arrest was proper as he was official duties;
again actually committing another offense (illegal possession of firearm
and ammunitions) and this time in the presence of a peace officer.  37 (b). the evidence was inadvertently
discovered by the police who had the right
Besides, the policemen's warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise to be where they are;
be justified under paragraph (b) as he had in fact just committed an
offense. There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time
 (c). the evidence must be immediately With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing
apparent, and assorted magazines, petitioner voluntarily surrendered them to
the police.   This latter gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver of
55

(d). "plain view" justified mere seizure of his right against the alleged search and seizure  , and that his
56

evidence without further search.  48 failure to quash the information estopped him from assailing any
purported defect.  57

3. search of a moving vehicle.   Highly regulated by the

49

government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were products of an
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public active search done by the authorities on the person and vehicle of
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion petitioner, their seizure without a search warrant nonetheless can still be
amounting to probable cause that the occupant justified under a search incidental to a lawful arrest (first instance). Once
committed a criminal activity. 
50 the lawful arrest was effected, the police may undertake a protective
search   of the passenger compartment and containers in the
58

4. consented warrantless search, and vehicle   which are within petitioner's grabbing distance regardless of the
59

nature of the offense.   This satisfied the two-tiered test of an incidental

60

search: (i) the item to be searched (vehicle) was within the arrestee's
5. customs search.
custody or area of immediate control   and (ii) the search was
61

contemporaneous with the arrest.   The products of that search are

62

In conformity with respondent court's observation, it indeed appears that admissible evidence not excluded by the exclusionary rule. Another
the authorities stumbled upon petitioner's firearms and ammunitions justification is a search of a moving vehicle (third instance). In connection
without even undertaking any active search which, as it is commonly therewith, a warrantless search is constitutionally permissible when, as in
understood, is a prying into hidden places for that which is this case, the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable
concealed.   The seizure of the Smith & Wesson revolver and an M-16
51
cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-
rifle magazine was justified for they came within "plain view" of the offender (like herein petitioner with respect to the hit and run) or the
policemen who inadvertently discovered the revolver and magazine contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the
tucked in petitioner's waist and back pocket respectively, when he raised subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense.  63

his hands after alighting from his Pajero. The same justification applies to
the confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle which was immediately
Anent his second defense, petitioner contends that he could not be
apparent to the policemen as they took a casual glance at the Pajero and
convicted of violating P.D. 1866 because he is an appointed civilian agent
saw said rifle lying horizontally near the driver's seat.   Thus it has been
52

authorized to possess and carry the subject firearms and ammunition as

held that:
evidenced by a Mission Order   and Memorandum Receipt duly issued
64

by PNP Supt. Rodialo Gumtang, the deputy commander of Task Force

(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission Aguila, Lianga, Surigao del Sur. The contention lacks merit.
of a criminal offense, the . . . police officers should
happen to discover a criminal offense being committed by
In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites must be
any person, they are not precluded from performing their
established, viz.: (1) the existence of the subject firearm and, (2) the fact
duties as police officers for the apprehension of the guilty
that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the
person and the taking of the, corpus delicti. 
53

corresponding license or permit to possess.   The first element is beyond

65

dispute as the subject firearms and ammunitions   were seized from

66

Objects whose possession are prohibited by law petitioner's possession via a valid warrantless search, identified and
inadvertently found in plain view are subject to seizure offered in evidence during trial. As to the second element, the same was
even without a warrant. 54
convincingly proven by the prosecution. Indeed, petitioner's purported
Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face of the
more formidable evidence for the prosecution as our meticulous review of
the records reveals that the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt Gumtang who appeared in court without subpoena on
were mere afterthoughts contrived and issued under suspicious January 13, 1994.  67

circumstances. On this score, we lift from respondent court's incisive

observation. Thus: The Court is baffled why petitioner failed to produce and present the
Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt if they were really issued and
Appellant's contention is predicated on the assumption existing before his apprehension. Petitioner's alternative excuses that the
that the Memorandum Receipts and Mission Order were subject firearms were intended for theatrical purposes, or that they were
issued before the subject firearms were seized and owned by the Presidential Security Group, or that his Mission Order and
confiscated from him by the police officers in Angeles Memorandum Receipt were left at home, further compound their
City. That is not so. The evidence adduced indicate that irregularity. As to be reasonably expected, an accused claiming
the Memorandum Receipts and Mission Order were innocence, like herein petitioner, would grab the earliest opportunity to
prepared and executed long after appellant had been present the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt in question and
apprehended on October 26, 1992. save himself from the long and agonizing public trial and spare him from
proffering inconsistent excuses. In fact, the Mission Order itself, as well
Appellant, when apprehended, could not show any as the Letter-Directive of the AFP Chief of Staff, is explicit in providing
document as proof of his authority to possess and carry that:
the subject firearms. During the preliminary investigation
of the charge against him for illegal possession of VIII. c. When a Mission Order is requested for verification
firearms and ammunitions he could not, despite the ample by enforcement units/personnels such as PNP, Military
time given him, present any proper document showing his Brigade and other Military Police Units of AFP, the
authority. If he had, in actuality, the Memorandum Mission Order should be shown without resentment to
Receipts and Missions Order, he could have produced avoid embarrassment and/or misunderstanding.
those documents easily, if not at the time of
apprehension, at least during the preliminary IX. d. Implicit to this Mission Order is the injunction that
investigation. But neither appellant nor his counsel inform the confidential instruction will be carried out through all
the prosecutor that appellant is authorized to possess and legal means and do not cover an actuation in violation of
carry the subject firearms under Memorandum Receipt laws. In the latter event, this Mission Order is rendered
and Mission Order. At the initial presentation of his inoperative in respect to such violation.  68

evidence in court, appellant could have produced these

documents to belie the charged against him. Appellant did which directive petitioner failed to heed without cogent
not. He did not even take the witness stand to explain his explanation.
possession of the subject firearms.
The authenticity and validity of the Mission Order and Memorandum
Even in appellant's Demurrer to Evidence filed after the Receipt, moreover, were ably controverted. Witness for the prosecution
prosecution rested contain no allegation of a Police Supt. Durendes denied under oath his signature on the dorsal side
Memorandum Receipts and Mission Order authorizing of the Mission Order and declared further that he did not authorize
appellant to possess and carry the subject firearms. anyone to sign in his
behalf.   His surname thereon, we note, was glaringly misspelled as
69

At the initial presentation of appellant's evidence, the "Durembes."   In addition, only Unit Commanders and Chief of Offices
70

witness cited was one James Neneng to whom a have the authority to issue Mission Orders and Memorandum Receipts
subpoena was issued. Superintendent Gumtang was not under the Guidelines on the Issuance of MOs, MRs, & PCFORs.   PNP 71

even mentioned. James Neneng appeared in court but Supt. Rodialo Gumtang who issued petitioner's Mission Order and
was not presented by the defense. Subsequent hearings Memorandum Receipt is neither a Unit Commander nor the Chief of
were reset until the defense found Superintendent
Office, but a mere deputy commander. Having emanated from an If mission orders are issued to civilians (not members of
unauthorized source, petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum the uniformed service), they must be civilian agents
Receipt are infirm and lacking in force and effect. Besides, the Mission included in the regular plantilla of the government agency
Order covers "Recom 1-12-Baguio City,"   areas outside Supt.
72
involved in law enforcement and are receiving regular
Gumtang's area of responsibility thereby needing prior approval "by next compensation for the service they are rendering.
higher Headquarters"   which is absent in this case. The Memorandum
73

Receipt is also unsupported by a certification as required by the March 5, That petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were
1988 Memorandum of the Secretary of Defense which pertinently fabricated pieces of evidence is accentuated all the more by the
provides that: testimony and certification of the Chief of the Records Branch of
the firearms and Explosives Office of the PNP declaring that
No memorandum receipt shall be issued for a CCS petitioner's confiscated firearms are not licensed or registered in
firearms without corresponding certification from the the name of the petitioner.   Thus:
76

corresponding Responsible Supply Officer of the

appropriate AFP unit that such firearm has been officially Q. In all these files that you have just
taken up in that units property book, and that report of mentioned Mr. Witness, what did you find,
such action has been reported to higher AFP authority. if any?

Had petitioner's Memorandum Receipt been authentic, we see no A. I found that a certain Robin C. Padilla is
reason why he cannot present the corresponding certification as a licensed registered owner of one 9 mm
well. pistol, Smith and Wesson with Serial No.
TCT 8214 and the following firearms being
What is even more peculiar is that petitioner's name, as certified to by the asked whether it is registered or not, I did
Director for Personnel of the PNP, does not even appear in the Plantilla not find any records, the M-16 and the
of Non-Uniform Personnel or in the list of Civilian Agents or Employees of caliber .357 and the caliber .380 but there
the PNP which could justify the issuance of a Mission Order, a fact is a firearm with the same serial number
admitted by petitioner's counsel.   The implementing rules of P.D. 1866
74
which is the same as that licensed and/or
issued by the then PC-INP Chief and Director-General Lt. Gen. Fidel V. registered in the name of one Albert
Ramos are clear and unambiguous, thus: Villanueva Fallorina.

No Mission Order shall be issued to any civilian agent Q. So in short, the only licensed firearms
authorizing the same to carry firearms outside residence in the name of accused Robin C. Padilla is
unless he/she is included in the regular plantilla of the a pistol, Smith and Wesson, caliber 9 mm
government agency involved in law enforcement and is with Serial No. TCT 8214?
receiving regular compensation for the services he/she is
rendering in the agency. Further, the civilian agent must A. Yes, sir.
be included in a specific law
enforcement/police/intelligence project proposal or special Q. And the firearms that were the subject
project which specifically required the use of firearms(s) to of this case are not listed in the names of
insure its accomplishment and that the project is duly the accused in this case?
approved at the PC Regional Command level or its
equivalent level in other major services of the AFP, INP
A. Yes, sir.  77

and NBI, or at higher levels of command.   Circular No. 1,

75

dated January 6, 1986, of the then Ministry of Justice

likewise provides as follows: x x x           x x x          x x x
And the certification which provides as follows: JOSE
Sr.
Republic of the Philippines Chief, R
Department of the Interior and Local Government occasion
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE NATIONAL either
POLICE represen
FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES OFFICE from, t
Camp Crame, Quezon City Explosiv
that a p
PNFEO5 28 November 1992 any firea
beyond
second
CERTIFICATION
possess
vs. Tobia
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: such ce
show th
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that Robin C. Padilla of 59 Labo license.
St., Quezon City is a licensed/registered holder of Pistol discussi
Smith and Wesson Cal 9mm with serial number TCT8214 does no
covered by License No. RL M76C4476687. to poss
proven
Further certify that the following firearms are not certificat
registered with this Office per verification from available dispense
records on file this Office as of this date: evidence
any sho
M16 Baby Armalite SN-RP131120 caliber
confisca
Revolver Cal 357 SN-3219 licensed
case o
Pistol Cal 380 Pietro Beretta SN-35723 therefore
affirming
especial
However, we have on file one Pistol Cal 380, Beretta with reason,
serial number 35723Y, licensed/registered to one Albert to depar
Villanueva Fallorina of 29 San Juan St., Capitol Pasig, of both
MM under Re-Registered License. respond
are acc
This certification is issued pursuant to Subpoena from respect
City of Angeles.
Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent court "in applying
FOR THE CHIEF, FEO: P.D. 1866 in a democratic ambience (sic) and a non-subversive context"
and adds that respondent court should have applied instead the previous
(Sgd.) laws on illegal possession of firearms since the reason for the penalty
imposed under P.D. 1866 no longer exists.   He stresses that the penalty
84
of 17 years and 4 months to 21 years for simple illegal possession of wisdom of the prescribed penalty should not be addressed to us. Courts
firearm is cruel and excessive in contravention of the Constitution.  85
are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. That
question falls exclusively within the province of Congress which enacts
The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial court and them and the Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them. The only
the respondent court are bound to apply the governing law at the time of function of the courts, we reiterate, is to interpret and apply the laws.
appellant's commission of the offense for it is a rule that laws are
repealed only by subsequent ones.   Indeed, it is the duty of judicial
86
With respect to the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed by
officers to respect and apply the law as it stands.   And until its repeal,
87
respondent court (17 years 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as
respondent court can not be faulted for applying P.D. 1866 which minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum), we reduce the
abrogated the previous statutes adverted to by petitioner. same in line with the fairly recent case of People v. Lian   where the
93

Court en banc provided that the indeterminate penalty imposable for

Equally lacking in merit is appellant's allegation that the penalty for simple simple illegal possession of firearm, without any mitigating or aggravating
illegal possession is unconstitutional. The penalty for simple possession circumstance, should be within the range of ten (10) years and one (1)
of firearm, it should be stressed, ranges from reclusion day to twelve years (12) of prision mayor, as minimum, to eighteen (18)
temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua contrary to appellant's years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) of reclusion
erroneous averment. The severity of a penalty does not ipso facto make temporal, as maximum. This is discernible from the following explanation
the same cruel and excessive. by the Court:

It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of In the case at bar, no mitigating or aggravating
proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the circumstances have been alleged or proved, In
Constitution. "The fact that the punishment authorized by accordance with the doctrine regarding special laws
the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual." explained in People v. Simon,   although Presidential
94

(24 C.J.S., 1187-1188). Expressed in other terms, it has Decree No. 1866 is a special law, the penalties therein
been held that to come under the ban, the punishment were taken from the Revised Penal Code, hence the rules
must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive", "wholly in said Code for graduating by degrees or determining the
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock proper period should be applied. Consequently, the
the moral sense of the community"  88 penalty for the offense of simple illegal possession of
firearm is the medium period of the complex penalty in
It is well-settled that as far as the constitutional prohibition goes, it said Section 1, that is, 18 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20
is not so much the extent as the nature of the punishment that years.
determines whether it is, or is not, cruel and unusual and that
sentences of imprisonment, though perceived to be harsh, are not This penalty, being that which is to be actually imposed in
cruel or unusual if within statutory limits. 
89 accordance with the rules therefor and not merely
imposable as a general prescription under the law, shall
Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. be the maximum of the range of the indeterminate
The burden of proving the invalidity of the statute in question lies with the sentence. The minimum thereof shall be taken, as
appellant which burden, we note, was not convincingly discharged. To aforesaid, from any period of the penalty next lower in
justify nullification of the law, there must be a clear and unequivocal degree, which is, prision mayor in its maximum period
breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative to reclusion temporal in its medium
implication,   as in this case. In fact, the constitutionality of P.D. 1866 has
90 period. 95

been upheld twice by this Court.   Just recently, the Court declared that
91

"the pertinent laws on illegal possession of firearms [are not] contrary to WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of
any provision of the Constitution. . . "   Appellant's grievances on the
92 Appeals sustaining petitioner's conviction by the lower court of the crime
of simple illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions is AFFIRMED
EXCEPT that petitioner's indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED to "ten (10)
years and one (1) day, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Footnotes