Spinoza and Other Heretics

T H E A D V E N T U R E S OF I M M A N E N C E
 Spinoza
and
Other Heretics

THE A DVENTURES

OF I M M A N E N C E

**

Y I R M I Y A H U Y O V E L

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

 C o p y r i g h t © 1989 b y P r in c e t o n U n iv e r s it y P ress
P u b lis h e d b y P r in c e t o n U n iv e r s it y P re s s, 41 W illia m S tre e t,
P r in c e to n , N e w J e rs e y 08540
In th e U n it e d K i n g d o m : P rin c e to n U n iv e r s it y P re s s,
G u ild f o r d , S u r r e y

A l l R ig h ts R e se rv e d

L ib r a r y o f C o n g r e s s C a ta lo g in g - in - P u b lic a tio n D a ta
Y o v e l, Y ir m ia h u .
S p in o z a an d o th e r h e retics.
Includes bibliographies and indexes.
C o n t e n t s : v. 1. T h e M a rra n o o f rea so n — v. 2 T h e a d v e n tu re s o f im m a n e n c e ,
i . S p in o z a , B e n e d ic tu s d e, 1 6 3 2 -1 6 7 7 . 2. M a rra n o s . 3. I m m a n e n c e ( P h ilo s o p h y ) —
H is t o r y — 17th cen tu ry.
I. T it le .
B 3 9 9 8 .Y 6 7 1988 19 9 '.4 9 2 88-28931
I S B N 0 -6 9 1-0 7 3 4 4 -9 (v. 1 : alk. pap er)
I S B N 0 -6 9 1-0 7 3 4 6 -5 (v. 2 : alk . paper)
P u b lic a tio n o f th is b o o k has been aid ed b y a g ra n t fro m the
W h it n e y D a r r o w F u n d o f P rin c c to n U n iv e r s it y P ress

T h is b o o k has been c o m p o s e d in L in o tro n B e m b o

C lo th b o u n d ed itio n s o f P rin c e to n U n iv e r s ity P ress b o o k s are

p rin te d o n a c id -frc c paper, and b in d in g m aterials are
ch o sen fo r stre n g th and d u rab ility.
P a p erb a c k s, a lth o u g h sa tis fa cto ry fo r p erso n al co lle c tio n s,
arc n o t u su a lly su itab le f o r lib ra ry reb in d in g

P rin ted in the U n ite d States o f A m e ric a b y

P rin c eto n U n iv e rs ity Press,
P rin c eto n , N e w j e r s e v /
A c k n o w le d g m e n t is g ra te fu lly m ad e to D o v e r P u b lic a tio n s, Inc. fo r p e rm issio n to
q u o te fro m T h e C h i e f Works o f Benedict de Spinoza, tr. R .H .M . E lw e s (19 5 1); R a n d o m
H o u se , Inc. fo r q u o tes fro m Basic Writings o f N ietzsche (1968) and N ic tz s c h e , T h e G ay
Science (19 74 ), tr. W alter K a u fm a n n ; T h e V ik in g Press fo r q u o tes fro m T h e Portable
N ietzsche (19 6 5), tr. and ed. W alter K a u fm an n and N ie tzsc h e , T h e W ill to Power (19 6 7),
tr. and cd . W alter K a u fm a n n ; L o y d D . E asto n and K u r t H . G u d d a t (ed. and tr.) for
q u o te s fro m th e Writings o f the Young M arx on Philosophy and Society ( N e w Y o rk :
D o u b le d a y , 1967): S ig m u n d F reud C o p y r ig h ts L td ., T h e Institute o f P sy c h o a n a ly sis,
T h e H o g a rth Press, and W . W . N o r to n 6c C o ., Inc., fo r q u o tes fro m T h e Standard
Edition o f the Com plete Psychological Works o f Sigmund Freud, tr. and ed. Jam es S trach ey;
S u h rk a m p P u b lish ers N e w Y o r k , Inc. fo r q u o tes fro m Germ any: A Winder's T ale in
T h e Com plete Poems o f Heinrich Heine, tr. H al D raper, c o p y rig h t by H al D ra p e r (1982),
u sed w ith p erm ission o f S u h rk a m p P u blishers N e w Y o r k , In c., H a rp er and R o w ,
P u b lish ers, Inc. fo r q u o tes fro m K a n t, Religion Within the Lim its o f Reason A lone, tr.
T .M . G re en e and H . H . H u d so n (i960). “ S p in o za ,” b y jo r g e s L u is B o rg e s and
translated fro m the Spanish b y Y ir m iy a h u Y o v e l, is p u blished by arra n g em en t w ith the
Estate o f j o r g e Luis B o rg e s. A ll rights reserved.
For R on ny
 Spinoza

T h e J e w ’s translucent hands
Shape the crystals in the tw ilig h t.
A n d the d y in g even ing is all fear and chill.
(In the even ings, even in gs are the same).
H is hands and the h yacin th ’s space
P alin g at the p u rv ie w o f the gh etto
A re alm ost inexistent fo r the quiet m an
D re a m in g a clear labyrinth.
Fam e does n o t p erturb h im , that reflection
O f dream s in another kin d o f dream ,
N o r the g ir ls ’ fearful love.
Free o f m etaphor, free o f m yth
H e shapes a rigid crystal: the infinite
M a p o f the O n e that is A ll Its stars.

— -Jorge Luis B o rg e s
translated by Y ir m iy a h u Y o v e l
 Contents

PREFACE IX

NOTE ON SO U RCES XV

ch a p te r i. S p in o za and K a n t: C r itiq u e o f R e lig io n and

B ib lic a l H e rm e n e u tic s 3

ch a p te r 2. S p in o za and H e g e l: T h e Im m a n e n t G o d —
S u b sta n c e o r S p irit? 27

c h a p te r 3. S p in o za in H e in e , H ess, F euerbach : T h e
N a tu r a liz a tio n o f M a n 51

ch a p te r 4. S p in o za and M a rx : M a n - in -N a tu r e and the

S cie n ce o f R e d e m p tio n 78

ch a p te r 5. S p in o za an d N ie tzs ch e : A m or dei and A m o r fa ti 104

ch a p te r 6. S p in o za and F reud: S e lf- K n o w le d g e as

E m a n c ip a tio n 136

ch a p te r 7. E p ilo g u e : Im m a n e n c e and F in itu d e 167

n o te s 187

IN D E X 219

(vii)
 Preface

T h is b o o k is th e seq u el to Spinoza and O ther Heretics: The Marrano o f

Reason, an d is also an in d ep en d en t w o r k in itself. W h a t co n n ects the
tw o v o lu m e s is th e p h ilo so p h ica l re v o lu tio n gen erated b y B a ru c h S p i­
n o za an d its u n d e r ly in g p rin cip le, w h ic h 1 call “ the p h ilo s o p h y o f im ­
m a n e n c e .” T h is p rin cip le v ie w s th is -w o rld ly ex iste n ce as th e o n ly ac­
tu al b e in g , and th e u n iq u e so u rce o f eth ical valu e an d p o litic a l
a u th o r ity . A ll b e in g is th is -w o r ld ly and th ere is n o th in g b e y o n d it,
n e ith e r a p e rso n a l c r c a to r-G o d w h o im p o ses H is d iv in e w ill o n m an ,
n o r s u p ern a tu ra l p o w e rs o r valu es o f a n y k in d . T h e la w s o f m o r a lity
an d p o litic s , to o , and even re lig io n , stem fro m th e th is w o r ld b y the
n a tu ra l p o w e r o f reason; and re c o g n izin g this is the p relu d e and p re ­
co n d itio n fo r h u m a n e m an cip a tio n .
A s su ch , th e idea o f im m a n e n ce ch allen ges th e m a jo r p re m ise o f J u ­
d a ism an d C h r is tia n ity (and Islam ), and is c lo se ly related to n atu ralism
an d se cu la riza tio n . S p in o z a ’s p h ilo so p h ica l r e v o lu tio n had g iv e n th is
id ea its m o s t p o w e rfu l an d s y ste m a tic ex p ressio n in the h is to ry o f p h i­
lo s o p h y , w h e r e b y it serv ed as a p ara d ig m fo r its later m o d e rn varieties.
B u t S p in o za d id n o t d ra w th is id ea fro m th e v o id . H is b e in g an e x -
M a r r a n o w a s an im p o rta n t factor.
T h e firs t b o o k , T h e Marrano o f Reason, id en tified th e o rig in s o f th e
id ea o f im m a n e n c e in th e u n d ercu rren ts o f th e M a rra n o cu ltu re, th e
g r o u p fr o m w h ic h S p in o za sp ran g. M a rra n o s w e r e fo rm e r J e w s in
S p ain an d P o r tu g a l w h o had been fo rc ib ly co n v e rte d to C h ris tia n ity .
F o r g e n e ra tio n s , h o w e v e r, m a n y o f th em m ain tain ed c r y p to -J e w is h
lif e in secret, an ex p e rie n c e that p ro d u c ed m a n y d u alities, su ch as an
o p p o s itio n b e tw e e n th e in n er and o u ter life, and a m ix tu re o f th e tw o
r e lig io n s th a t, in certain cases, led to the b re a k d o w n o f b o th C h r is tia n
an d J e w is h b elie fs. It also m ad e th e m ask, in c lu d in g linguistic m a s k s —
e q u iv o c a tio n and d u al la n g u a g e— in to a life-n ecessity.

(it)
 PREFACE

In T h e M arram o f Reason, I a n a ly ze d th e M a rra n o e x p e r ie n c e an d

id e n tifie d se v e ra l ch a ra c teristic p attern s in it th a t also re c u r in S p in o z a ’ s
case, a lth o u g h th e y are tran slated in to a n e w , s e cu la r an d ra tio n a lis tic
c o n t e x t . T h e s e M a rra n o p attern s in clu d e a th is - w o r ld ly d is p o s itio n , a
s p lit re lig io u s id e n tity , m e ta p h y s ic a l s k e p tic is m , a q u e st fo r a lte rn a tiv e
w a y s to s a lv a tio n th a t o p p o s e th e o ffic ia l d o c trin e , an o p p o s it io n b e ­
tw e e n in n e r b e lie f and th e o u te r w o r ld , and a g ift fo r d u al la n g u a g e an d
e q u iv o c a tio n . B y c lo s e ly e x a m in in g o th e r cases o f M a r r a n o in te lle c ­
tu a ls— b o th a m o n g S p in o z a ’s co n te m p o ra rie s and in th e e a r ly p hases
o f M a rra n is m — I s h o w th e rec u rren t n atu re o f th ese p attern s an d h o w
th e y re a p p e a r in S p in o z a as w e ll, w h ile th e y are b e in g tr a n s fo rm e d
fr o m tr a n s ce n d e n t h is to ric a l re lig io n in to th e w o r ld o f re a so n an d im ­
m a n e n ce . H e n c e m y c a llin g S p in o za T h e Marrano o f Reason.
T h e p re se n t b o o k — T h e Adventures o f Immanence— w ill ta k e a d iffe r ­
e n t p a th an d f o llo w th e a d v en tu res o f the p h ilo s o p h y o f im m a n e n c e
a fte r S p in o z a , in th e w o r k o f later th in k ers w h o h e lp ed sh ap e th e W e s t­
ern m in d .
S p in o z a ’s im m a n e n t re v o lu tio n w a s as s lo w in le a v in g its m a rk o n
fu tu r e th o u g h t as its p rin cip le w a s rad ical. F o r o v e r a c e n tu r y a fte r h is
d e a th , S p in o z a w a s e x c lu d e d fro m resp ecta b le circles, eith e r a b h o rr e d
o r ig n o r e d , an d u s u a lly m o r e g o s s ip e d a b o u t th an read. H is in flu e n c e ,
th o u g h a lre a d y p e n e tra tin g , rem ain e d m a rg in a l an d h a lf- u n d e r ­
g r o u n d .* W h a t m a d e his case p a rticu la rly e m b a r ra s s in g w a s th e c o m ­
b in a tio n o f an in to le ra b ly h eretica l p h ilo s o p h y an d a v ir tu o u s , a lm o s t
s a in tly life — as S p in o z a ’s e x is te n ce , w ith e v id e n t id e a liza tio n , has o fte n
b e e n p e rc e iv e d , e v e n b y m a n y o f his fo es. T o th e c o n v e n tio n a l m in d ,
th e id ea o f a “ v ir tu o u s a th e ist” w a s a s h o c k in g sca n d al an d a c o n tr a d ic ­
tio n in te rm s . A p erso n w it h S p in o z a ’s v ie w s c o u ld n e v e r lea d a life o f
se re n e v ir tu e , and y e t th is w a s re p o rte d to h ave b ee n a fa c t— ir k s o m e ,
u n s e ttlin g , an d p o te n tia lly s u b v e rs iv e to th e v ested b e liefs o f C h r is tia n
E u rop e.
It w a s o n ly in la te e ig h te e n th ce n tu ry G e r m a n y th a t S p in o z a
em erg ed in to p ro m in e n c e , b o th am ong p o e t-p h ilo s o p h e rs lik e
G o e th e , L e s s in g , and later, H e in e , an d w ith in th e m a jo r tre n d s o f p o s t -
K a n tia n p h ilo s o p h y fr o m F ich te to H e g e l and b e y o n d . T o d a y S p in o za
is co n s id e re d , and stu d ie d , as a classic o f m o d e rn p h ilo s o p h y a lo n g
w i t h D e s c a rte s , H u m e , an d K a n t. Y e t e v e n in r e c o g n itio n , S p in o za
fu n d a m e n ta lly rem ain s an o u tsid e r; his th eo rie s h av e n e v e r b e c o m e
p a rt o f a p h ilo s o p h ic a l e s ta b lis h m e n t and h ave c o n tin u e d a ttra c tin g

* F o r a th o ro u g h discu ssion o f his im p act in France, see P. V ernière, Spinoza et la

pensée française avant ¡a Révolution (Paris: P U F , 1954, 1982).

(*)
 PREFACE

n o n p h ilo s o p h e r s . It is ch a ra cteristic o f S p in o za th at he is as im p o rta n t

in n o n p r o fe s s io n a l p h ilo s o p h iz in g as he is in acad em ia. E q u a lly , it is
n o a c c id c n t th a t s o m e o f the m o s t u n o r th o d o x and in n o v a tiv e m in d s
in th e la s t t w o ce n tu ries (G o e th e , M a r x , N ie tz s c h e , F reud , E in stein ,
a n d o th e rs ) h av e eith e r been w h a t w e m ay call ro o t-S p in o z is ts , o r o p ­
e ra te d , as F re u d d e fin e d it, w ith in S p in o za ’s “ clim ate o f id ea s.”
W h a t th e y s h are d w ith S p in o za w a s m o re , h o w e v e r, than an in te l­
le c tu a l c lim a te . It w a s a c o m m o n sy ste m a tic co n te x t: (i) im m a n e n ce is
th e o n ly an d o v e ra ll h o riz o n o f b ein g ; (2) it is e q u a lly the o n ly so u rce
o f v a lu e an d n o rm a tiv e n e s s and (3) a b so rb in g th is re c o g n itio n in to
o n e ’s life is a p re lu d e — an d p re c o n d itio n — fo r w h a te v e r lib e ra tio n (or,
e m a n c ip a tio n ) is in s to re fo r h u m an s.
W ith in th is n u cle a r c o n te x t, o n e can still a rg u e a b o u t th e ad eq u ate
w a y to c o n s tr u e th e w o r ld o fim m a n e n c e . F o r e x a m p le (1) Is it N a tu re ,
as in S p in o z a , o r ra th er S p irit, H is to ry , W ille, o r a n y o th e r su ch m e ta ­
p h y s ic a l c o n s tr u c tio n ? (2) S h o u ld it b e in d iv id u a ted as a sin gle, in fin ite
to ta lity ? (3) S h o u ld it also be d eified ? (4) W h a t structure ap p lies to it:
m e c h a n ic a l ca u sa lity , o rg a n ic p u rp o siv en ess, d ia lectica l lo g ic — o r a
m u c h m o r e flu id an d fle x ib le m o d el? (5) D o e s it h ave this stru ctu re
e te r n a lly ? Is o u r S p in o z is tic q u est fo r fix e d , etern al la w s w e ll-fo u n d e d ,
o r ra th e r a p re p h ilo s o p h ic a l bias, p erh ap s the v e stig e o f th e o lo g ic a l
th in k in g ? (6) S h o u ld th e h u m a n b e in g (either as su b ject, o r as a n atu ral
sp e cie s) b e a s s ig n e d a sp ecia l p o s itio n w ith in the w o r ld o fim m a n e n c e ?
I f s o , in w h a t ca p a c ity ? A n d h o w is th e ro le o f h u m an h is to ry affected
b y a n s w e r in g th e fo r m e r q u e stio n ? F in ally, (7) S h o u ld h u m a n lib e ra ­
tio n ( w h ic h p re s u p p o s e s th e im m a n e n t rev o lu tio n ) tran slate th e reli­
g io u s v ie w o f s a lv a tio n in to an e q u a lly ab so lu te secu lar e s c h a to lo g y , o r
s h o u ld it (b y its v e r y se cu la rity ) b e co n fin e d to a h u m b le r v is io n , re­
stra in e d b y critic a l b o u n d a ries?
T h e s e q u e s tio n s an d a ltern a tiv es w ill e m e rg e as w e f o llo w th e ad­
v e n tu re s o f th e id ea o fim m a n e n c e in s o m e o f th e m ajo r th in k ers w h o
le ft th e ir m a r k o n m o d e rn cu ltu re. W e shall see each o f th em e v o lv in g
h is o w n a lte rn a tiv e v e rs io n in resp o n se to th e fla w s he w a s b o u n d to
fin d e ith e r in S p in o z a ’s o rig in a l m o d e l o r in riv a l varieties o f it, thus
ta k in g p a rt in a ta cit m u ltip le d eb a te. In the end, T h e Adventures o f
Immanence tells a c o n c e p tu a l s to ry , and th ereb y also d ra w s a m a p o f
logical possibilities o f co n s tr u in g a p h ilo so p h y o f im m a n e n ce , as th e y
h a v e a c tu a lly e m e rg e d in th e c o u rs e o f h isto ry. In ad d itio n , I h o p e this
a p p ro a c h can o ffe r fresh v ie w s o f th e in d iv id u a l th in k ers u n d e r d iscu s­
s io n , as seen fr o m th e p e rs p e c tiv e o f th is c o m m o n S p in o zis tic p r o b ­
le m .
T h e E p ilo g u e is a p h ilo so p h ic a l essay in w h ic h I use th e c o n to u rs o f

(xi)
 PREFACE

th e p re c e d in g m ap to d ra w a d istin c tio n b e tw e e n a d o g m a t ic a n d a
critic a l p h ilo s o p h y o fim m a n e n c e , a r g u in g th at th e la tter m u s t a ls o b e
a p h ilo s o p h y o f finitude. W h ile m y co n c lu s io n is fr e q u e n tly c r itic a l o f
S p in o za , I h o p e it w ill s h o w th at he can still be read as a v ita l an d
re le v a n t in tellec tu a l c h a lle n g e tod ay, ju s t as th e p re c e d in g ch a p te rs
s h o w th a t his p resen ce in m o d e rn th o u g h t is far m o r e p e rv a s iv e th an
m o s t p e o p le su spect.
S e le ctio n s are a lw a y s s o m e w h a t arb itrary, an d m in e is n o e x c e p tio n .
I in c lu d e H e in e b ecau se he is s im p ly irre sistib le , an d p re fe r H e g e l to
F ich te and S c h e llin g , and N ie tz s c h e to S c h o p e n h a u e r, b e c a u s e th e ir
im p a c t o n c o n te m p o r a ry th o u g h t is g re a te r and th e ir m o d e ls o f im ­
m an e n ce are m o r e s tr o n g ly d e fin ed . B u t I re a d ily a d m it th a t th e list
can be e x p a n d e d (and w ill o n ly w e lc o m e su ch attem p ts).
A fin al w o r d a b o u t m y ch o ic e o f term s. I th in k th e c o n c e p t o f a
p h ilo s o p h y o f im m a n e n c e is m o re fu n d a m en ta l, an d th e re fo re m o r e
ap t to c o n v e y S p in o z a ’s basic idea, than th e m o r e c u rre n t te r m s
“ p a n th e is m ” o r even “ n a tu ra lism .” P a n th eism is b u t a s p e c ific v a r ie ty
o f the p h ilo s o p h y o f im m a n e n ce . ( O f the cases w e sh all d is cu s s , o n ly
H e g e l an d S p in o za s h o w p an th e istic lea n in gs, w h e re a s all th e o th e r s —
n o ta b ly M a r x , N ie tz s c h e and F reu d — reject th e d e ific a tio n o f im m a ­
n e n t b e in g as an illu sio n ). A s fo r “ n a tu ra lis m ,” this te r m as c u r r e n tly
u sed w i ll h a rd ly c o n v e y th e c o m p le x v ie w S p in o za has o f n a tu re as a
m e n ta l an d lo g ic a l e n tity n o less th an a p h y s ic a l o n e . M o r e im p o r t a n t,
“ n a tu ra lis m ” is b o th to o b ro a d an d to o restrictive ; it m a y w e ll in c lu d e
th e d e is t’s b e lie f in a tran scen d en t G o d w h o h ad created n a tu re an d
th e n let it ru n b y its n atu ral la w s alon e— a p r o fo u n d ly u n - S p in o z is tic
v ie w ; o n th e o th e r h an d , it w ill e x c lu d e su ch u n m is ta k a b le S p in o z is tic
d iscip le s as H e g e l an d M a rx : H e g e l b ecau se he v ie w s im m a n e n t r e a lity
n o t as n atu re m e re ly b u t as its Aujhebung b y h is to r y and S p irit, an d
M a r x b e c a u se his co n c re te re a lity is hum anized n a tu re (h is to r y ag ain )
an d n o t n atu re in a “ r a w ” o r p h y s ic a lis tic sense.
U s in g th e c o n c e p t o f a p h ilo s o p h y o f im m a n e n c e w ill a v o id s u c h
p a ra d o x e s an d w ill be b e tte r su ited , I th in k , to ca p tu re th e fundam ental
S p in o z is tic id ea th at o th e r p h ilo so p h e rs h av e ad a p te d o r re in te rp re te d .
A s fo r th e w o r d “ h e re tic s ,” it s h o u ld be taken w ith a g ra in o f ir o n ic
salt. I u se it to d e sig n a te th in k e rs w h o , w h e n p r o p e r ly u n d e r s to o d ,
m u s t b e d e em ed h e re tica l in term s o f th eir own o r th o d o x tr a d itio n .
A lm o s t e v e r y o r t h o d o x y d e n o u n c e s h e re tics, w h ic h d o es n o t m e a n it
has tr u th o n its sid e. D e n y in g s u p e rstitio n o r false au th o ritie s is also
o fte n ca lled h e re sy. T h e M a rra n o s w e re co n sid e re d h eretics b y th e In­
q u is itio n , an d th e P ro testa n ts w e r e co n sid e re d h eretics b y th e P o p e .

(xii)
 PREFACE

T h e r e f o r e , I u se th is te rm w ith n o d e ro g a to r y u n d erto n es; i f a n y th in g ,

a re a d e r d is c e r n in g a sh ad e o f s y m p a th y in th e title w ill n o t b e to ta lly
m is ta k e n .
E a rlie r v e rs io n s o f s o m e o f th e fo llo w in g ch ap ters have ap p eared in
p r in t as fo llo w s : “ B ib le In te rp reta tio n as P h ilo s o p h ic a l P raxis: A S tu d y
o f S p in o z a an d K a n t "Journ a l o f the History o f Philosophy 11 (1973): 189—
2 12 ; “ S u b sta n c e w ith o u t Sp irit: O n H e g e l’s C r itiq u e o f S p in o z a ,” in
S p in o z a -H is Thought and Work, ed. N . R o ten stre ich and N . S ch n e id e r
(J e ru sa le m : T h e Isreal A c a d e m y o f Scien ces and H u m a n ities, 1983),
p p . 7 1 - 8 4 ; “ H e in ric h H e in e and the M e ssa g e o f P a n th e ism ,"Jerusalem
Q uarterly 35 (198 5): 1 0 1 - 1 r; “ N ie tz s c h e and S p in o za: amorfati and amor
d e i in N ietzsch e as Affirm ative Thinker, ed. Y . Y o v e l (D o rd re ch t:
N ijh o f f , 1986), p p . 183-20 3.

In th e P re fa c e to T h e Marrano o f Reason, I th a n ked th o se w h o in v ario u s

w a y s h a v e h e lp e d w it h th e tw o - v o lu m e w o r k . H ere I w o u ld lik e to
m e n tio n (an d th an k) a g a in , b esid es m y stud en ts, frien d s an d co llea g u e s
w h o s e c o n tr ib u tio n related sp e c ific a lly to th e p resent v o lu m e . T h e y
in c lu d e m y frie n d s A le x a n d r e M a th e ro n , S y lv a in Z a c , P ierre M a c h e -
ray, P ie r re -F r a n ç o is M o re a u , Y v o n B elav al, Jean M a rie B e y ss a d e ,
E tie n n e B a lib a r an d m a n y o th ers in the Association des A m is de Sp in oza.
R a y m o n d P o lin , Ja n in e C h a n te u r and G e n e v iè v e R o d is - L e w is have
m a d e m y t w o - y e a r v is itin g p ro fe sso rsh ip at th e S o rb o n n e even m o re
w o r t h w h ile , as has J e a n -L u c M a rio n . In th e U n ite d States, E d w in
C u r le y , A la n D o n a g a n , M a rg a r e t W ilso n and G e o r g e K le in have m ad e
p e rtin e n t c o m m e n ts o n m y S p in o za in te rp retatio n , as h ave E m ilia
G ia n c o tt i an d F ilip p o M ig n in i in Italy, M a n fred W a lth er in G e rm a n y ,
W im K le v e r an d th e la te H u b e rtu s H u b b e lin g in th e N e th e rla n d s . In
Israel, E lh a n a n Y a k ira , m y fo rm e r assistant and p resent co lle a g u e, p r o ­
v id e d m u c h h e lp in th e e a r ly stages o f this stud y. T h e te x t and notes
w e r e d ilig e n tly ty p e d b y F lo re n ce D a C o s ta . A b o v e all, I am th a n k fu l
to m y lo n g t im e c o lla b o r a to r and frien d E v a S h o rr, M a n a g in g E d ito r
o f th e P h ilo s o p h ic a l Q u a r te r ly lyy u n , fo r in v e s tin g as m u c h o f her
c o m p e te n c e and d e v o tio n in this w o r k as she has in m a n y o f m y earlier
p u b lic a tio n s .
L a s t an d d e a rly , m y frie n d Y iz h a k T o rc h in , a p h y s ic ia n -p h ilo s o p h e r
in th e s ty le o f S p in o z a ’s tim e s, and his e le ga n t w ife S u zan n e, h ave w e l­
c o m e d m e to th e ir c o u n t r y h o u se in B a rb iz o n , F rance, w ith its g ra ­
c io u s s u r r o u n d in g s and its lib ra ry w e ll sto ck e d in S p in o zan a , w h e r e I
w o r k e d m y w a y th ro u g h several ch apters o f th is b o o k . T o b o th o f
th e m , merci encore de tout mon cœur.

(xiii)
 N ote on Sources

B ib lio g r a p h ic a l referen ce s are g iv e n in th e en d n otes to each chapter.

W h e n p o s s ib le , th e m o re accessib le ed ition s w ere used.
T ra n s la tio n s fr o m n o n -E n g lis h d o cu m en ts, w h e n n o t o th e rw is e in­
d ic a te d , w e r e m a d e b y th e auth or.
T h e sta n d a rd e d itio n o f S p in o z a ’s w o r k to date is Spinoza Opera,
e d ite d b y C a r l G e b h a rd t (H e id e lb e rg : C a r l W in ter, 1925). F or th e E n g ­
lish v e r s io n I used T h e Collected Works o f Spinoza, v o l. 1, ed ited and
tran sla ted b y E d w in C u r le y (P rin ceto n : P rin ceto n U n iv e r s ity Press,
1985). T o q u o te fr o m th e Theologico-Political Treatise (due to appear in
C u r l e y ’s v o l. 2), I used th e tran slatio n o f R . H . E lw es in The C h ie f
Works o f Benedict de S p in o za , 2 v o ls. ( N e w Y o rk : D o v e r, 1951), v o l. 2.
S h o r t titles an d a b b re v ia tio n s used in clude:

Treatise on the Intellect Treatise on the Emendation o f the Intellect

(q u o te d b y sectio n num ber).
Short Treatise Short Treatise on God, Man and H is
Well-Being (q u o ted by part and chapter
n u m b ers).
TTP Theologico-Political Treatise (qu o ted b y
E lw e s ’s p age n um bers).
M etaphysical Thoughts A p p en d ix Containing Metaphysical
Thoughts (q u o ted b y C u r le y ’s p age
n u m b e rs).
Ethics Ethics Demonstrated in Geometrical Order.

T h e f o llo w in g a b b re v ia tio n s a p p ly to th e Ethics: pt. = part; p rop .

= p r o p o s itio n ; S = s c h o liu m ; d em . = d em on stration ; ex p . = e x p la ­
n atio n ; ax . = a x io m ; d ef. = d efin itio n ; C = co ro lla ry

(xv)
 Spinoza and Other Heretics

TH E AD VEN TU RES OF I M M A N E N C E
 C H A P T E R I

Spinoza and Kant:

C ritique o f Religion and
Biblical Hermeneutics

B ib il ic a l In t e r p r e t a t io n as P r e p a r a t io n f o r P h il o s o p h y

L e t us im a g in e th a t a re lig io u s fanatic had stolen S p in o za ’s p o st­

h u m o u s p ap ers b e fo re th e y w e re p u b lish ed , in o rd er to save the w o rld
an d p o s t e r ity fr o m a d a n g e ro u s h eretic. In this u n fo rtu n ate case w e
w o u ld h av e lo s t th e Ethics , 1 and S p in o za w o u ld have rem ain ed a m ar­
g in a l fig u r e in th e h is to r y o f p h ilo so p h y .
S till, S p in o z a w o u ld ev e n th en have retained his a b so lu tely central
p la c e in th e h is to r y o f a n o th e r d isciplin e— b ib lical criticism — fo r w h a t
he says o n th is su b je c t in th e Theologico-Political Treatise is su fficien t to
en su re th a t p la c e. S p in o z a ’s c o n trib u tio n to b ib lical criticism is thus
in d e p e n d e n t o f h is c o n trib u tio n to gen eral p h ilo so p h y, and co u ld be
d iscu sse d w i t h little re g a rd to it.
A n d y e t, fr o m S p in o z a ’s o w n v ie w p o in t, the tw o are in tim a tely
c o n n e c te d . H is b ib lic a l h erm en eu tic s is n o t o n ly an in d ep end en t
s cie n c e in itse lf; it is also— an d p rim a rily — a w e a p o n in co m b a tin g
h is to ric a l r e lig io n an d a v e h icle in co n stru ctin g a p u rified substitu te fo r
it.
F o r S p in o z a , th e h isto ric a l re lig io n s (above all, Jud aism and C h ris ­
tia n ity ) are th e g re a te s t o b sta cle s to clear p h ilo so p h ica l k n o w le d g e
an d th e e m e r g e n c e o f th e p rin cip le o f im m an en ce. T h e co u n te r-
ra tio n a l fo r c e th a t D es ca rte s attrib u te d to “ p re ju d ice ” and trad ition in
g e n e ra l, as th e v e il b lu rrin g th e n atural lig h t o f reason, S p in o za,
in a m o r e d a r in g an d ra d ica l m o v e , attributes s p ecifically to the
h is to ric a l r e lig io n s , th eir d o g m a s , im ages, and en trench ed beliefs.
T h e r e fo r e , p r io r to a n y p o s itiv e p h ilo so p h y o fim m a n e n c e , a critiq u e
o f th ese r e lig io n s m u st b e u n d erta k e n , in o rd e r to clear th e m in d o f
tra n s ce n d e n t im a g e s and to p rep are the g ro u n d fo r its a w a k en in g (or
e n lig h te n m e n t) to th e call o f im m a n en t reason . In o th er w o rd s , co n ­

(3 )
 CHAPTER 1

fu s io n and s k e p tic is m a b o u t h isto rical re lig io n are n e ce s s a ry p r e r e q u i­

sites fo r a tta in in g tru e k n o w le d g e and, th ro u g h it, a w o r t h w h ile life
an d e v e n s alva tio n .
S p in o za as an in d iv id u a l had th e b en efit o f his M a rra n o b a c k g r o u n d
w h ic h h e lp e d h im leap o u tsid e J u d a ism and C h r is tia n it y a lik e an d b e ­
c o m e w h a t w e ca lled in v o lu m e i “ a M a rra n o o f re a so n .” B u t th is u n ­
c o m m o n , sp ecia l b a c k g ro u n d ca n n o t serve as a g en era l p a r a d ig m — n o r
d id S p in o za w is h to rem ain seclu d ed lik e a M a rra n o in his in n e r p h i­
lo s o p h y w h ile th e rest o f th e w o r ld o p p o se d and e v e n a b h o re d it. U n ­
lik e fo r m e r M a rra n o h eretics d escrib e d in v o lu m e I, S p in o z a d id n o t
re g a rd his ra tio n alist p h ilo s o p h y as a p riv a te affair. W h a t m a k e s h im a
th in k e r o f m o d e r n ity are n o t his v ie w s alo n e , b u t his d esire to u n i­
v e rsa lize his m essa g e and to m a k e it th e basis fo r a n e w c u ltu ra l and
so cia l u n iv e rse , based u p o n reaso n , secu la riza tio n , m e c h a n ic a l sc ie n c c ,
so cia l to lera n ce, and p o litic a l fre e d o m , and th us o p p o s in g th e m e d ie v a l
w o r ld in its m o s t essential aspects. F o r this p u rp o s e S p in o z a n e e d e d a
cu ltu ra l p o w e r that w o u ld p u rg e re lig io u s superstitio fr o m th e m in d s
n o t o f an es o te ric m in o r ity b u t o f th e multitude— a c a te g o r y th a t g a in s
in S p in o za p h ilo so p h ic a l status in and o f itself. T h is p o w e r S p in o z a
fin d s in th e critiq u e o f re lig io n and its atten d in g b ib lic a l h e rm e n e u tic s .
S o c ra tes h ad also s o u g h t a m ean s by w h ic h to p u r ify th e s o u l o f
p re ju d ice ; he fo u n d it in a se lf-d e fe a tin g s o p h is try , le a d in g th r o u g h
p a ra d o x e s and aporias to fe rtile co n fu sio n . D e s ca rte s , tw o m ille n ia
later, in p r o c la im in g a n e w p h ilo so p h ica l b e g in n in g , s o u g h t to a c h ie v e
th is p u rific a tio n b y a sin gle, p o w e rfu l act o f th e w ill, w h ic h tu rn s
a g a in s t it s e lf an d ab stains fr o m all ju d g m e n t w h e r e n o ra tio n a l c e r­
ta in ty (based u p o n e v id e n t truths) is availab le. D es ca rte s h o p e d th e re b y
to s w e e p a w a y th e w h o le b u rd en o f trad itio n in a s in g le s tr o k e , p r e ­
p a rin g th e m in d , as a k in d o f tabula rasa, to e x p e rie n c e th e in n e r r e v ­
e la tio n o f th e “ n atu ral lig h t” and its ra tio n a lly clear an d d is tin c t id ea s.
W h e th e r D es ca rte s w a s a th o ro u g h C a rte s ia n h im s e lf, o r w h e t h e r he
re m a in e d c o m p r o m is in g and co n v e n tio n a l o n re lig io u s m a tte rs , is an
o p e n q u e s tio n . In a n y case, S p in o za m u st reje ct th e C a rte s ia n “ p re p a ­
ra tio n fo r p h ilo s o p h y ” as in ad eq u ate, sin ce th e free a ct o f w i ll o n w h ic h
D e s ca rte s relies is to S p in o za a m eta p h y sic a l illu s io n . T h e r e is n o fre e
w ill; n o r is th ere a special fa c u lty o f ju d g m e n t ca p a b le o f d e n y in g o r
a ff ir m in g o u r ideas as a separate act, o r ab le to ab stain fr o m p a s s in g
su ch ju d g m e n t b y its o w n ch o ic e. F o r S p in o za , ju d g m e n t is an in te g ra l
p art o f the act o f id e a tio n , n o t a seco n d act ad d ed to it (E th ics, p t. 2,
p ro p . 495). W e ju d g e as w e p e rce iv e (or co n c eiv e); m o r e p re c is e ly , w e
c a n n o t h ave an id ea w ith o u t a u to m a tic a lly a ffirm in g th e e x is te n c e o f
its o b je c t an d o f th e p ro p e rtie s it rep resents as b e lo n g in g to th is o b je c t.

(4)
 SPINOZA AND KANT

N e g a tio n , to o , re s u lts fr o m th e affirm a tiv e p o w e r o f a new idea that is

in c o n g r u e n t w i t h th e firs t and thus rep laces it. T h is o ccu rs in every
c o g n it iv e p ro c e s s : w h e n a tru e id ea co rrects a false one; w h e n a n e w
s u p e r stitio n re p la c e s an o ld on e; and also w h e n the m in d vacillates back
and fo r th in a sta te o f d o u b t an d co n fu sio n , w h ic h can help d estro y
e n tre n c h e d b e lie fs an d cle a r th e w a y fo r p h ilo so p h y. W h atever atti­
tu d es w e h a v e , w h a te v e r h ap p en s to us in tellectu ally, d oes n o t depend
o n an illu s o r y “ w i l l ” b u t o n causal chains o f ideas that affect and m o d ­
ify o u r m in d s in a la w - g o v e r n e d w a y .*
It is w i t h in th is ca u sal p ro c e ss that S p in o za w ish e s to interefere, us­
in g a p r o p e r d o s a g e o f tru th and m eta p h o r. H is critiq u e o f religio n is,
as w e sh a ll see, a c o m b in a tio n o f p h ilo so p h ica l k n o w le d g e and rh eto­
ric. B a s e d o n cle a r an d d is tin c t ideas, it fre q u en tly co uch es them in
m e ta p h o r, p o p u la r la n g u a g e , and d ia lectica l strategem s— and uses the
id io m an d a u t h o r ity o f tr a d itio n as a lev e r to u p ro o t this v ery auth or­
ity. T h e ro le o f th e c r itiq u e o f re lig io n and b ib lical herm eneutics is thus
to p e r fo r m in th e m u ltitu d e th e sam e, o r sim ilar, effects that Spinoza
d r e w fr o m h is fo r m e r M a r r a n o b a c k g ro u n d and that D escartes so u gh t
in v a in to p r o d u c e b y a o n e -tim e p u r ify in g act o f the w ill.

C l e a r in g t h e P ath of th e “T rue Id ea ":

T he Pro blem of M eth od

S p in o z a at firs t trie d to fo llo w in D e s c a rte s ’ fo otstep s. In his first w o rk ,

th e Treatise on the Intellect, he set o u t to w r ite his o w n “ essay on
m e th o d ” th a t w a s to p re ce d e his su b sta n tiv e p h ilo so p h y. B u t even as
he w r o t e it h e fo u n d th a t th e p ro je c t w a s im p o ssib le and self-d efeatin g.
M e t h o d , S p in o z a d is c o v e re d , is re fle ctive k n o w le d g e : it is “ the idea o f
an id e a ." A s s u c h , it p re s u p p o s e s a basic, su bstan tive idea u p on w h ich
to re fle ct. A th e o r y o f k n o w le d g e (or o f m eth o d ) cann ot b e fo rm ed
p u r e ly a p r io r i. T o k n o w w h a t v alid k n o w le d g e is, and to fram e a strat­
e g y fo r g a in in g an d e x p a n d in g it, w e m u st alread y have in o u r p osses­
sio n s o m e tr u e s u b s ta n tiv e k n o w le d g e , w h ic h w e then in vestiga te for
its ty p ic a l fe a tu re s and co n d itio n s . W e m u st, in S p in o za ’s w o rd s, start
a lre a d y w it h an idea vera (tru e idea) in o rd er to k n o w w h a t h av in g such
an id e a e n ta ils.
T o fu lfill its r o le , m o r e o v e r, th e first idea vera ca n n ot rely o n an e x ­
tern a l s ig n o f tr u th , b u t m u s t co n ta in its o w n ju s tifica tio n w ith in itself.
T h is ca lls to m in d th e s e lf-e v id e n c e o f th e C a rte sia n “ clear and distinct
*
* B y “ ca u sa l" S p in o za refers b o th to p sy ch o lo g ica l causes and to logical reason; this
pertains to his assim ila tio n o f causes and reasons generally.

(5)
 CHAPTER I

id e a s” (to w h ic h S p in o za also su b scrib es). B u t n o t a n y o f th e m w ill

d o . T h e b a sic true idea o f S p in o za m akes sen se o n ly i f its o b je c t is th e
o n tic cau se o f itself, that is, the to ta lity o f th e u n iv e rs e ta k e n as G o d .
W e start w ith the re c o g n itio n th at G o d is id en tica l w it h all th e re is, and
is th u s th e sin g le su b sta n ce in ex isten ce — n ecessa ry, s e lf-c a u s e d and
etern al, e n co m p a s s in g all the asp ects and d im e n s io n s o f re a lity , in c lu d ­
in g m a tter and m in d , ex te n sio n and th o u g h t, fin ite an d in fin ite , and
th e lik e . F ro m here the rest o f th e s y s te m , and all th e s p e c ific id eas in
th e u n iv e rse, are to fo llo w as th e internal e x p lic a tio n o f th e c o m p r e h e n ­
siv e first idea.
T h a t S p in o z a ’s idea vera sh o u ld be so n o v e l an d r e v o lu tio n a r y p resen ts
a p ro b le m . I f this idea is in h e re n tly s e lf-e v id e n t, w h y w a s h u m a n it y so
s lo w in re c o g n iz in g it, an d w h y d o es it co n tin u e to g e n e ra te s o m u c h
h o stility ? S p in o za , w h o u n lik e K a n t o r H e g e l d o e s n o t h av e a th e o r y
o f th e h isto ric a l g r o w t h o f ra tio n ality, and w h o u n lik e F re u d la c k s a
th e o ry o f rep ressio n and resistan ce, again ap p eals to his p e r v a s iv e c a t­
e g o r y o f re lig io u s superstitio. W h a t stan d s in th e w a y o f th e tru e id ea —
and m ak es it lo o k re v o lu tio n a r y — is th e e n o r m o u s b u lk o f re v e a le d
re lig io n w ith its false im a g es o f the d eity , n u rtu re d in th e im a g in a tio n
b y fear and ig n o ra n c e o f tru e causes, refin ed in to th e istic t h e o lo g y an d
tra n sm itte d th ro u g h g e n era tio n s by e d u ca tio n an d la n g u a g e . C o n s e ­
q u e n tly , th e in h eren t s e lf-e v id e n ce o f th e idea vera c a n n o t assert it s e lf
in actu a l co n scio u sn e ss unless a critiq u e o f re lig io u s s u p e r s titio n is first
p ro ffe r e d , n o t o n ly as a p u re lo g ic a l a r g u m e n t b u t as a s o c ia l an d c u l­
tu ral p o w e r as w e ll.

K an t and H u m a n is t ic Im m anence

In this c o n te x t, th e n am e o f K a n t c o m e s to m in d as a c o m p a n io n an d
c o u n te rp a rt to S p in o za . D e s p ite th eir o th e r w is e g re a t d iffe re n c e s , h ere
th e y m e e t o n c o m m o n g ro u n d . B o t h u se th e c ritiq u e o f r e lig io n to
p u r ify th e m in d o f false im a g e s and to elim in a te th e s o cia l an d in s titu ­
tio n a l o b sta cles b u ilt u p o n th e m . M o r e o v e r , b o th use b ib lic a l h e r m e ­
n e u tics to d iv e rt th eir a u d ie n c e ’s tran sce n d en t d is p o s itio n s to w a r d an
im m a n e n t re lig io n o f reaso n .
K a n t, h o w e v e r, in spite o f his ra d ica l critiq u e o f r e lig io n , c a n n o t b e
ca lle d a p h ilo so p h e r o fim m a n e n c e w ith o u t q u a lific a tio n . In re s p e c t to
k n o w le d g e K a n t takes th e p o s itio n o f critical im m a n e n c e , an d in e th ics
h e en d s u p in a tran scen d en t p o s itio n th at o p p o s e s an I s / O u g h t d u a l­
is m to S p in o z a ’s n a tu ra lism . Y e t K a n t re m ain s a tta ch ed to th e p rin c ip le
o f im m a n e n c e in w h a t co u n ts m o st; fo r in e s ta b lis h in g th e foundations
o f th e n atu ral and th e m o r a l w o r ld h e a llo w s n o ap p eal to a p o w e r o r

( 6)
 SPINOZA AND KANT

a u th o r ity o v e r an d a b o v e m an. N o C re a to r -G o d is necessary to explain

th e w o r k o f n atu re, an d no D iv in e L eg islato r is allo w ed to p rescribe
th e la w s o f m o r a lity . R e lig io n its e lf m u st e x clu d e the idea o f G o d fro m
its fo u n d a tio n s an d be g ro u n d e d e x clu s iv e ly in the a u to n o m y o f the
ra tio n al h u m a n w ill. N o r is th ere ro o m o th er than rhetorical (to ed u ­
cate th e m u ltitu d e ) fo r rev e la tio n , the L a w o f M o ses, or the love and
p assio n o f C h r is t. T h e h u m a n m in d itself, w h e n ex ercisin g its ratio n ­
a lly s tru c tu r e d sp o n ta n e ity , p rescrib es the basic law s o f m o rality and
re lig io n to itse lf, ju s t as it legislates th e universal and necessary la w like
p atte rn s th a t n a tu re it s e lf o b e y s .
K a n t ’s C o p e r n ic a n re v o lu tio n establishes a h um an istic p h ilo so p h y
o f im m a n e n c e . (P e rc e iv in g this, H ein e, as w e shall see, im p ro p erly
ca lled it “ p a n th e is m .” ) It p laces m an at the center o f b ein g and gro u n d s
all s ig n ific a n t d o m a in s o f rea lity in his free rational p ow ers. A n d it is
e q u a lly a th e o r y o f e m a n c ip a tio n , sin ce it frees m an fro m self-enslave­
m e n t b y false tra n scen d en t im a g e s , and puts h im , as K a n t says, under
his o w n “ tu t e la g e ,” th e ju d g e , m aster, and ed u cato r o f h im s e lf and the
critic a l (h en ce lim ite d ) m easu re o f all th in gs aroun d him .
A t th e s a m e tim e , K a n t co n ce ive s o f reason as external to nature
(in c lu d in g n a tu re w ith in m an ), a fo reig n p o w e r that has to im p o se its
la w s u p o n n a tu re fr o m w ith o u t. R ea son can n ot be construed as part o f
th e actu a l w o r ld b u t co n stitu tes a seco n d , separate w o rld o ver and
a b o v e it, w i t h m a n p a rticip a tin g as “ citize n ” in bo th . T h is is a vestige
o f the o ld C h r is tia n d u a lism , tran slatin g in to secular term s the notion
o f m a n b e in g e n d o w e d w ith a d iv in e facu lty em an atin g fro m heaven.
It is a ls o w h e r e K a n t b re a k s w ith a strict p h ilo so p h y o f im m anen ce,
w h ic h req u ire s th a t all n o rm a tiv ity , all so u rce o f b in d in g value be an­
ch o re d w ith in th e actu a l w o r ld . T h is is an o ffs h o o t o f the sam e dualism
w h ic h , all a lo n g , has g iv e n K a n t his gravest inner p rob lem s; its recu r­
re n ce h e re is n e ith e r sp ecia l n o r p articu larly intentional.
K a n t ’s q u a lifie d p h ilo s o p h y o f im m an en ce is thereby bo th h um an -
ce n te re d an d an ti-n a tu ra listic , tw o features K a n t passed on to H egel
an d w h ic h I sh all d iscu ss in th e n e x t chapter. K a n t, to o , seeks to d estro y
h is to ric a l r e lig io n and to b u ild his ration al ethics and m etaph ysics u p on
its ru in s. T h e c r itiq u e o f reason is also, fo r K an t, its declaration o f
in d e p e n d e n c e . D e s p ite its fin itu d e— and also because o f it— hum an
rea so n ta k es o v e r th e ro le o f G o d as legislato r fo r b o th nature and m o ­
rality. U n a b le to p ro v e o r d isp ro v e the ex isten ce o f G o d (and oth er
m a jo r th e o lo g ic a l cla im s), h u m an reason assum es this fin itud e as a
b in d in g n o r m , fo r b id d in g its e lf to re ly u p on extern al auth orities and
re a ffirm in g its p o w e r to p ro d u c e o f itself, as the ex p lica tio n o f its o w n

(7)
 CHAPTER 1

in h e re n t stru c tu re, th e m e ta p h y s ic a l fea tu res o f n a tu ra l o b je c ts a n d th e

fu n d a m e n ta l m o ral co m m a n d s .
K a n t v ie w s th e finitude o f h u m a n rea so n an d its autonomous p o w e r
as tw o c o m p le m e n ta ry sid es o f th e sam e c r itiq u e o f re a so n . It is as
“ tran scen d en ta l E g o ” th at th e h u m an m in d — n o t G o d — d e te r m in e s
the m e ta p h y s ic a l su b strate o f n atu re, th at is, th e s y s te m o f c a te g o r ie s
and lo g ic a l-s y n th e tic la w s th a t m a k e its o b je c ts p o s s ib le . A n d it is as
ra tio n a l w ill th at, a g ain , h u m a n reason (and n o t d iv in e le g is la tio n ) lays
d o w n th e s u p re m e la w s o fe th ic s as w e ll as th e u ltim a te g o a ls o f p o litic s
an d o f m o ra l h isto ry . T h e en tire d o m a in o f m o r a lity , w ith its a b s o lu te
w o r th an d a w e -in s p irin g s u b lim ity , is based n o t u p o n th e w i ll o f a
tran sce n d e n t G o d w h o s e e x is te n ce ca n n o t b e k n o w n an d m u s t n o t b e
p re su p p o se d , b u t u p o n the w ill o f m an , e x p re s s e d as u n iv e rs a l p ra c tic a l
rea so n w h o s e in h eren t la w s it ex p lica te s and o b e y s . E v e n r e lig io n —
K a n t ’s “ re lig io n o f re a so n ” — co n sists in v ie w in g th e in h e rre n t c o m ­
m an d s o f h u m an reason as d iv in e . K a n t th ereb y se cu la rize s th e h is to r ­
ical co n c e p t o f d iv in ity , and e q u a lly sacralizes his o w n h u m a n is tic m o ­
rality. T h r o u g h o u t his b o o k o n re lig io n , K a n t re d u c e s r e lig io u s
fe e lin g s, m o tifs , and s y m b o ls to a p u re ly m o r a l-s e c u la r c o n t e x t . E v e n
his fa m o u s m o ra l a r g u m e n t fo r G o d ’s e x is te n c e has a p u r e ly h u m a n ­
istic fu n c t io n .2 N o t o n ly is th e co n c e p t o f G o d d e riv e d fr o m m o r a lity ;
it also tells us n o th in g a b o u t G o d , o n ly a b o u t h u m a n p o w e r s an d a b o u t
a moral teleology u n d e rly in g the u n iv erse. W h e n th e m o r a l a r g u m e n t
has b een c o m p le te d , all w e are en titled to b e lie v e is th a t h u m a n s h av e
th e c a p a city to tra n s fo rm the e x is tin g w o r ld in to th e “ h ig h e s t g o o d ” —
a m o r a l-h is to ric a l ideal p ro je c te d as a d u ty b y th e ra tio n a l w i ll. B u t
b o th th e d u ty and the c a p a city are o u rs— and o f G o d w e k n o w at th e
en d ju s t as m u ch as w e k n e w at the b e g in n in g , n a m e ly , n o th in g .
A ll th is w o u ld n o t m a k e o f K a n t th e d e ic id e H e in e d e cla re d h im to
b e (see ch a p . 3), b u t w o u ld s u re ly p lace h im a m o n g th e r e lig io u s h e r­
etics o f th e E n lig h te n m e n t w h o m S p in o za fo re to ld . K a n t ’s a tta c k o n
h isto ric a l re lig io n is, in d e ed , as fierce as S p in o z a ’s in b o th c o n te n t and
s ty le . S o m e o f his d e r o g a to r y ex p re s s io n s b o r d e r o n c o llo q u ia lis m
(Pfaffentum ), even v u lg a r ity (Afterdienst, “ b o t t o m - w o r s h ip ” ). H is d e ­
s c r ip tio n o f J u d a ism , C a th o lic is m , th e B y z a n tin e C h u r c h , an d th e
w a rs o f re lig io n fo llo w in g th e R e fo rm a tio n are fu ll o f re p u d ia tio n an d
m o r a l in d ig n a tio n , s o m e tim e s in je c te d w ith sarcastic v e n o m . K a n t ’s
d u al la n g u a g e and p e rsu asiv e m eta p h o rs d o n o t atten u a te th e fe e lin g
th a t, in a d d itio n to p u re p h ilo so p h y , th e a g in g K a n t is also g e t tin g e v e n
w it h th e p e rp e tra to rs o f w h a t he o n ce ca lled his “ y o u th fu l s la v e r y ” in
th e p ie tist s c h o o l he h ad atten d ed as a ch ild . In th o s e e a rly d a y s , re a d ­
in g o f th e R o m a n s , in c lu d in g L u c re tiu s , w a s a co n s o la tio n ; an d L u c r e ­
tiu s w a s the gre a t E p ic u re a n c r itic o f re lig io n , s e ttin g a m o d e l fo r th e

( 8)
 SPINOZA AND KANT

tra d itio n th a t rc a c h c s th ro u g h S p in o za to K a n t h im self. Sm all w o n d e r

that, d e ca d e s later, w h e n w r itin g his o w n critiq u e o f religio n , K an t
uses the o ld L u c re tia n e x c la m a tio n tantum religio potuit suadere malorum
(such e v il d eed s c o u ld re lig io n p r o m p t).3
It is d o u b tfu l w h e th e r K a n t read S p in o za ’s Theologico-Political Trea­
tise. B u t in all p ro b a b ility , as Ju lius G u ttm an n has sh o w n , he w as in­
d ir e c tly in flu e n c e d by S p in o z a ’s ideas— the m ed iatin g lin k b ein g
M o s e s M e n d e ls s o h n , K a n t ’s J e w is h frien d and rival, and his b o o k , J e ­
rusalem .4 K a n t ad o p ts and elab o rates S p in o za ’s ideas ab ou t t h e je w s and
th eir a n c ie n t state. H e co n te n d s, lik e S p in o za (and, u n k n o w in g ly , like
m a n y m e d ie v a l J e w is h rabbis) that the B ib le m akes no co g n itiv e claim s
and s u p p lie s n o k n o w le d g e , o n ly a m oral lesson; and requires a g o o d
deal o f h is to ric a l an d p h ilo lo g ic a l sch o larsh ip in o rd er to p ut this lesson
to actu a l use. In co n tra st to S p in o za, K a n t subord in ates this bib lical
sch o la rs h ip to e x trin s ic m o ra l interests and thus runs in to in so lu ble
p ro b le m s ; b u t in in v o k in g th e need fo r this kin d o f h istorical learning,
he e c h o e s a r e v o lu tio n a r y d em a n d that S p in o za w as the first to m a k e .5

B ib l ic a l H e r m e n e u t ic s as th e P h il o s o p h e r ’s M ode of A c t io n

E v e n a s s u m in g w ith G e b h a rd t6 that it w as S p in o za w h o laid the fo u n ­

d atio n fo r b ib lic a l critic is m as an o b jectiv e, im m an en t science, it does
n o t f o llo w th a t S p in o z a ’s o w n bib lical in v estiga tio n s w ere d isinter­
ested . L e o S trau ss s h o w s h o w S p in o za had turn ed to this p articu lar
b ra n ch o f k n o w le d g e w ith the in ten t o f p ro p a g a tin g his n ew , su b v e r­
sive id eas an d o f fig h t in g r e lig io u s au th o rity and p ractices. Y e t Spin oza
seem s to h av e b e lie v e d that, g iv e n th e actual n ature o f the B ib le and o f
p ro p h e tic in s p ira tio n , an o b je ctiv e , scien tific ap p roa ch w o u ld prove
m o r e d e tr im e n ta l to th e S c rip tu re ’s au th o rity than an y biased attack:
as i f h e re , to o (as in th e case o f the su p rem e fo rm o f k n o w le d g e ), ra­
tio n a lity w a s a s e lf- r e w a r d in g v irtu e . T h is v ie w has inh eren t d ifficu l­
ties I sh all ad d ress later; fo r n o w , w e m ay co n clu d e that S p in o za saw
b ib lic a l in te r p re ta tio n also as a m eans fo r bro a d er ends.
T h is c o n c lu s io n is e v en clearer in K a n t’s case. T h e s tu d y o f the B ib le
is fo r K a n t a n tiq u a ria n and d e v o id o f value unless it serves m oral ends
an d re in fo rc e s th e w i ll to realize th em . A s a p u rely scientific o b je ct the
B ib le is d ead ; its im p o rta n c e lies in its p o w e r to influence. B u t in
its lite ra l sen se, th e B ib le ’s in flu en ce is in m o st cases p erverse, bo th
fro m th e m o r a l an d th e c o g n itiv e v ie w p o in ts . T h e re fo re on e sh ou ld in
m o s t cases p re fe r an alle g o ric a l in terp retatio n , even at the ex p en se o f
c o n s c io u s ly d is to r tin g th e o rig in a l in ten t o f the auth or. Y e t allego rical
in te r p re ta tio n is n o t a rig id rule. In each case, the sole criterio n by

( 9)
 CHAPTER I

w h ic h to d e te rm in e th e p ro p e r in terp reta tio n is th e m o r a l in te re s t. F o r

K a n t, th en , b ib lic a l ex e g e s is is only a m ean s fo r o th e r en d s.
T h e s e b ro a d er en d s co n c e rn , in b o th cases, th e p h ilo s o p h e r ’s c r i­
tiq u e o f re lig io n in its search to tra n s fo rm th e e x is tin g rea lity. T h is
critiq u e is n o t a p u re science o f re lig io n , b u t e q u a lly an in s tr u m e n t o f
ch a n g e . T h e p h ilo so p h e r is n o t co n ten t w ith k n o w in g , fo r h im s e lf,
th at m iracles o r p erson a l p ro v id e n ce are o n to lo g ic a lly im p o s s ib le , th a t
superstitio is a k in d o f o p ia te fo r th e m asses, that re lig io n is b o r n fr o m
fear and th e imaginatio, o r that su p rara tio n al fa c u ltie s (and th e ir d o c u ­
m e n te d o ffs p rin g s ) are in fact in fe rio r to reaso n . H e w a n ts to sh are this
aw aren ess w ith th e m u ltitu d e , thus p u rg in g th eir liv es an d in s titu tio n s
fr o m th e rule o f irra tio n a l p o w e rs and p rep a rin g an e m a n c ip a te d m o d e
o f e x is te n ce . U n d e rs ta n d in g re lig io n , w h ic h is s u r e ly p a rt o f th e p r o ­
cess, is n o t m e re ly ac a d em ic b u t is ip so facto lib e ra tio n fr o m s u p e r s ti­
tio u s re lig io n — in w h ic h its m a jo r p u rp o s e lies.
T h is d e m o c ra tiza tio n o t reaso n , this a m b itio n to e x te n d its e ffe c ts to
th e m asses and to sh ape h u m a n h is to ry b y it, m a rk s a b re a k w i t h m e ­
d ie v a l attitu d es— a clean b re a k in K a n t’s case, w h ile S p in o z a m a in ta in s
his re se rv e . K a n t, m o re u to p ian , b elieves th at th e ra tio n a l a ttitu d e it s e lf
can b e p ro p a g a te d o n a m ass h isto ric a l scale; he is c o m m itt e d to this
b e lie f b y his v ie w o f rea so n as s tric tly u n iv e rsal, fo u n d e d o r c o n s titu te d
b y h u m a n su b jects, an d b y th e d ic h o to m y he d ra w s b e tw e e n p u re m o ­
ra lity o r n o n e at all. S p in o za , m o r e so b e r and spared th e e ith e r / o r
K a n tia n a ltern a tiv e, w ish e s to p ro p a g a te th e p ro d u c ts o f ra tio n a l en ­
lig h te n m e n t w h ic h in th e m selv es are less th an fu lly ra tio n al: a re­
fo r m e d p o p u la r re lig io n , a m o r e e n lig h te n e d state, an d the lik e . F o r
S p in o za , p u re ra tio n a lity rem ain s an affair fo r the m in o r ity an d , at its
h e ig h t, e v en eso teric.
W h ile S p in o za and K a n t n o t o n ly o v e re s tim a te d th e p o w e r o f re a­
so n , th e y also re c o g n iz e d the w e ig h t o f p s y c h o lo g ic a l an d in s titu tio n a l
o b sta cle s. M a jo r o b sta cle s in th e w a y o f th e c ritiq u e o f r e lig io n are
b e lie f in th e B ib le ’s su p rara tio n al a u th o rity , in th e literal tru th o f its
s to rie s, and in th e sacred v a lid ity o f th e vast d o g m a tic , ritu al, an d in ­
stitu tio n a l ap p aratus th at g r e w up a ro u n d it. T o b e e ffe c tiv e , th e c r itic
m u s t h av e an a ffin ity w ith th e m in d o f his au d ie n ce. A s lo n g as th e
p u b lic is im m e rs e d in vana religio n o m e a n in g fu l d ia lo g u e is p o s s ib le ,
m u c h less a ch a n g e in attitu d e , w ith o u t ta k in g th eir p o in t o f d e p a rtu re
also in to a c co u n t. T h is is w h e re b ib lic a l e x e g e s is b e c o m e s in s tr u m e n ­
tal, s e r v in g as a fic titio u s c o m m o n g ro u n d b e tw e e n th e c r itic an d his
au d ie n ce . S in c e the b eliev e r in rev ealed re lig io n c a n n o t sh are th e p h i­
lo s o p h e r ’s first p rin cip les, th e latter, b y a p p e a lin g to th e B ib le , m u s t
appear to share th e first p rin cip le s o f th e b e lie v e r w h ile a c tu a lly tu r n in g
th e m a g a in st th em selv es.

(i o)
 SPINOZA AND KANT

T h is is n o t to d e n y th at S p in o z a ’s appeal to the B ib le had o th er m o ­

tiv a tio n s as weJl, s u c h as th e need fo r p ru d en ce and p ersonal security.
S p in o z a ’s w o r k s are a m a s te r ly e x a m p le o f allu sio n and dual lan gu age,
and w h a t S tra u ss has ca lled “ th e art o f w r itin g w ith in p ersecu tio n .” 7
P r o b a b ly to a le sse r d e g re e , K a n t w as also in co n flict w ith o ffic ia l­
d o m an d m in d fu l o f his step s. H is o p en co n flict w ith the cen so rsh ip o f
F r ie d r ic h - W ilh e lm II is o n ly o n e sig n o f th is .8 It is clear, then, that bo th
K a n t an d S p in o z a u se d b ib lical e x e g e sis fo r p erson al secu rity: It help s
th e p h ilo s o p h e r d e lin e a te th e d elicate path b e tw ee n faith fuln ess to his
o w n id e a s an d a p p a re n t faith fu ln ess to the ru lin g tra d itio n .9 Y e t this is
n e ith e r th e s o le n o r m a in fu n ctio n o f u sin g the B ib le . E v e n i f secu rity
co n s id e ra tio n s h ad n o t e x is te d , it is safe to assert that b o th p h ilo so ­
p h e rs w o u ld h av e a p p e ale d to th e B ib le fo r an o th er reason: reach in g
o u t to th e m a sses an d s u b v e rtin g th eir establish ed attitudes. M o reo ve r,
p ru d e n c e d o e s n o t re q u ire (and so m e tim es sh o u ld rather d isco u rage)
th e fo r m a tio n o f g e n e ra liz e d h e rm en eu tic m eth o d s— K a n t’s b ein g an
o v e rt c h a lle n g e to th e p io u s m in d . E v en w h e n S p in o za and K a n t intend
to d im in is h th e u n n e c e s s a ry risks, th eir p reo c cu p a tio n w ith the B ib le
reflects a fu n d a m e n ta l re s o lu tio n to assu m e th e n ecessary ones. Its d e­
fen se v a lu e is a s tra te g ic c o ro lla ry , c o m in g fro m the sam e feature that
in itia lly r e c o m m e n d e d it as an o ffe n siv e w ea p o n . In this sense b ib lical
h e rm e n e u tic s is an a g g r e s s iv e a c tiv ity , o ffe rin g th e p h ilo so p h e r a m o d e
o f in v o lv e m e n t in th e s o cia l an d cu ltu ra l p rocesses o f his tim e.
K a n t c o n s id e r e d th e E n lig h te n m e n t and the free d issem in ation o f
id ea s as th e g e n u in e a c tio n o f the p h ilo so p h er, w h ic h can affect so cie ty
and p o litic s n o less th an the m in d s o f the audience; and S p in o za argu ed
in h is Theologico-Political Treatise that free p h ilo so p h ica l th o u g h t is nec­
e s s a ry fo r th e s tr e n g th an d s ta b ility o f th e state. Y e t b o th estim ated
th a t th e p ro c e s s o f lib e ra tin g th o u g h t, w ith its social and p o litical o f f ­
s h o o ts , c o u ld n o t b e h is to ric a lly e ffe c tiv e unless it passed th ro u g h a
c r itiq u e o f re v e a le d re lig io n an d lo o k e d fo r su p p o rt in its sacred d o c u ­
m e n ts. S e e n fr o m th is a n g le , b ib lic a l in terp retatio n is n o t an in cid en tal
a c tiv it y a m o n g m a n y o th ers, b u t a m ajo r avenue fo r th e so cial and
p ra c tic a l in v o lv e m e n t o f th e p h ilo so p h e r.

T h e A im s o f the Critique o f Religion

N o w o n d e r , g iv e n th is b a c k d r o p , that S p in o za and K a n t share th e fu n ­

d a m e n ta l in te r e s t o f “ ra tio n a liz in g ” * the h isto rical relig io n — translat­
in g it o u t o f it s e lf in to a ra tio n al substitu te. B u t this aim m u st take a

* I use this term in the sense o f “ rational pu rification" o r secular reform , not o f an c.v
post facto ju s tific a tio n .

(¡0
 CHAPTER I

d iffe re n t sh ape in each case, m a in ly b ecau se, as p h ilo s o p h e r s , S p in o z a

an d K a n t h o ld d iffe re n t v ie w s o f ra tio n a lity , its n a tu re an d ta sk .
T o g ra sp S p in o z a ’s in ten t w e m u st r e c o g n iz e th a t h e s p e a k s o f re li­
g io n in th ree d iffe re n t senses. In th e first an d s u p r e m e sen se r e lig io n is
id e n tica l w it h the state o f e x is te n ce attain ed th r o u g h th e “ th ir d k in d o f
k n o w le d g e ” and amor dei intellectualis (in te lle c tu a l lo v e o f G o d ) , w h ic h
m ean s th at o n e has a ch ie v ed tru e r e lig io n .10 T h is is th e s e m ir c lig io u s
d im e n s io n in S p in o z a ’s th o u g h t, th e altern a tiv e w a y to s a lv a tio n o f ­
fered to th e h a p p y few . T h a t S p in o za in sists o n th e w o r d religion in th is
c o n te x t has th e sam e fu n d a m e n ta l rea so n as his k e e p in g th e w o r d G o d
( w ith its s u b lim e and re s o u n d in g c o n n o ta tio n s ) to d e n o te th e to t a lity
o f th e u n iv erse. S p in o za in d eed s u g g e s ts a n e w re lig io n , a s u p r e m e
m e ta p h y s ic a l an d m e n ta l lib e ra tio n , a s e m im y s tic a l re u n io n w it h G o d
th a t realizes th e in fin ite w ith in th e re a lm o f fin itu d e a n d , c h a r g e d w it h
p o w e r fu l e m o tio n an d lo v e , tra n s fo rm s th e p e rs o n as a w h o le an d
d o m in a te s a w h o ll y n e w life -c o u rs e . B u t th is s u b lim e s ta g e is as d if f i­
cu lt as it is rare an d n o t a p ro s p e c t fo r th e m u ltitu d e . M o s t m e n an d
w o m e n c a n n o t be e x p e c te d to reach true re lig io n at all. F o r th e m a
d iffe re n t s o rt o f “ r e lig io n ” — a m e re ly so cia l o n e— m u s t b e d e v is e d .
S p in o z a g o e s o n to d iscu ss a seco n d k in d o f re lig io n , th e n , th e religio
catholica (“ u n iv ersal r e lig io n ,” n o t to be c o n fu s e d w ith C a t h o lic is m
th o u g h tr y in g to u su rp its claim to u n iv e rs a lity ). T h is p o p u la r r e lig io n
re m a in s w ith in th e d o m a in o f th e imagination b u t tries to sh a p e its e f­
fe c ts as an e x te rn a l im ita tio n o f ratio (reaso n ), u s in g fo r th a t p u r p o s e th e
p rin c ip le o f o b e d ie n c e to G o d , it s e lf a p r o d u c t o f th e im a g in a tio n .
H e re , in d e ed , th e term G od has a d iffe re n t m e a n in g a lto g e th e r — a m e t­
a p h o ric , m is le a d in g m e a n in g th a t is used d e lib e ra te ly as s u c h . F r o m
th e v ie w p o in t o f m e ta p h y s ic a l tru th th ere is n o p e rs o n a l G o d at all, n o
d iv in e e n tity e n d o w e d w ith w ill and p re s c rib in g c o m m a n d s . B u t th e
G o d o f th e B ib le d id p ro n o u n c e c o m m a n d s , o r p e o p le la r g e ly b e lie v e
h e d id , and th in k th at th e y sh o u ld o b e y his w ill. T h e aim o f religio
catholica is to p u t th ese b eliefs to g o o d so cia l use, assisted b y a p r o p e r
in te r p re ta tio n o f th e B ib le . T h e la tte r is to re d u c e th e im a g in a r y “ w i ll
o f G o d ” to a n u m b e r o f so c ia lly b en efic ia l rules: ju s tic e , m u tu a l h e lp ,
an d o b e d ie n c e to th e la w s o f th e state (w h ic h b e c o m e th e a u th o r ita tiv e
in te r p re te rs o f th e “ w ill o f G o d ” ).
T h is p o p u la r ty p e o f re lig io n is p u re ly s o cia l and se cu lar; an d al­
th o u g h it is based u p o n th e lo w e r p o w e rs o f th e imagination t h e y n o
lo n g e r p r o d u c e w ild and a r b itr a ry c o n d u c t, b u t are so r e g u la te d as to
m a k e p o s s ib le c o n d u c t re s e m b lin g th at w h ic h is p r o d u c e d b y r e a s o n .11
In th e th ird p lace th e re is cru d e h isto ric a l re lig io n (vana religio) b a se d
u p o n im a g in a r y tales, sacred h is to rie s , ritu als, an d a p r e d o m in a n t ly

(12)
 SPINOZA AND KANT

p o litic a l co n s titu tio n . F ro m an cicnt p agan ism to the c o n tin g e n t e le ­

m e n ts o f J u d a is m and C h ris tia n ity , all the m an ifestation s o f this third
fo r m o f re lig io n , stem fro m su p erstition and are g ro u n d e d in h u m an
fears and p assio n s. Its c o g n itiv e claim s are e x p la in ed by a la ck o f
k n o w le d g e o f true causes, w h ic h p ro d u ce w o n d e r and s u p e rstitio n in
th e m asses an d d riv e th em to b elieve in m iracles, final causes, and h id ­
d en fo rc e s o p e ra tin g in n ature. T h e practical aspects o f revealed reli­
g io n h av e a b a s ica lly p o litical character; th e y are in ten d ed to e x p lo it
fear an d ig n o ra n c e in th e se rv ice o f the rulers— b e th e y secular o r th e o ­
cra tic. T h is fo r m o f re lig io n is p articu larly rep u gn an t to S p in o za w h o
m a k e s it th e ta rg e t o f his severest attacks.
G iv e n th is trip le d istin c tio n w e can n o w d efin e th e aim s o f S p in o z a ’s
c r itiq u e . It is clear he w ish e d the sp u riou s fo rm o f re lig io n to b e c o m ­
p le te ly a b o lis h e d . It is e q u a lly clear that S p in o za ’s u ltim ate w is h , at
lea st in th e o ry , w a s to have all m en attain re lig io n in th e p h ilo so p h ica l
sen se. T h is w o u ld in v o lv e re n o u n cin g n o t o n ly h isto rical re lig io n b u t
also in te r m e d ia r y “ u n iv e rsa l re lig io n .” Y e t e lev a tin g th e m asses fro m
i/ana religio to p h ilo s o p h y w a s, as S p in o za realized , a re m o te i f n o t
h o p e le s s ta sk, so his m a jo r e ffo rts w e re d irected to a m o re realistic end:
to n e u tr a liz e th e d a m a g in g effects o f re lig io n and, w h ile le a v in g it
in th e in fe r io r m en ta l d o m a in , to try and m ak e it s o cia lly u sefu l. T h e
fin a l o u tc o m e w o u ld be a re lig io n that p ro v id es co m p le te fre e d o m in
m a tte rs o f b e lie f and co n fin es it s e lf to the general (and vagu e) c o m ­
m a n d s o f s o c ia l ju s tic e and m u tu a l h e lp .12
T h e “ p u r ific a tio n ” o f h isto rical re lig io n is to be a c co m p lis h e d by
re s h a p in g th e e ffe c ts o f th e im a g in a tio n ( th e lo w e r p o w e rs o f th e
m in d ) as an e x te rn a l im ita tio n o f reason. T h e re is no in te n tio n to pass
f r o m s u p e r s titio n to s cie n tific k n o w le d g e ; re lig io n sh ou ld rath er have
n o c o g n it iv e ro le w h a ts o e v e r. N o r is there an in ten tio n to pass fro m
th e p a ssio n s an d b e h a v io r arisin g fro m su p erstition to th o se action s
an d p o s itiv e e m o tio n s (actiones) w h o s e so u rce is reason . R e lig io n , even
p u rifie d , re m a in s in th e rea lm o f im a g in a tio n and rev ela tio n , and all
b e h a v io r w h ic h re lig io n p ro m p ts is m o tiv a ted n o t by reason o r scientia
intuitiva b u t b y o b e d ie n ce .
N e it h e r s u p e r stitio n n o r p h ilo so p h y , p u rified re lig io n is th us a k in d
o f u n iv e rs a l p o p u la r m o ra lity . H is to ric a lly th e idea is n o t n e w , b u t its
p la c e in S p in o z a ’s s y s te m is n o te w o rth y . J u d g in g b y the e p is te m o lo g y
o f th e Ethics th e re is n o in te rm e d ia ry lin k b etw een im a g in a tio n and
re a so n , o r b e tw e e n th e first and th e seco n d kin d s o f k n o w le d g e .13
H o w e v e r , in th e fie ld o f b e h a v io r S p in o za does s u g g e s t such a b rid g e .
T h is to p ic is d e v e lo p e d in fu ll o n ly in the Theologico-Political Treatise,
b u t its p r in c ip le can b e traced in the Ethics as w e ll (pt. 5, p ro p . 10):

( 13)
 CHAPTER I

T h e b e s t th in g , th en , th at w e can d o , so lo n g as w e d o n o t h a v e
p e rfe c t k n o w le d g e o f o u r a ffe cts , is to c o n c e iv e a c o r r e c t p r in c ip le
o f liv in g , o r su re m a x im s o f life , to commit them to m em ory, an d to
a p p ly th e m c o n s ta n tly to th e p a rticu la r cases fr e q u e n t ly e n c o u n ­
te re d in life. In this way our imagination w ill be exten sively affected by
them, an d w e sh all a lw a y s h ave th e m re a d y [e m p h a sis a d d e d ] .14

T h is is in e ssen ce the sam e p r o g r a m as th at o f th e Theologico-Political

Treatise, o n ly w it h o u t th e la rg e -s c a le h is to ric a l a m b itio n a n d , th e r e ­
fo re , w i t h o u t h a v in g to re ly u p o n th e B ib le an d th e p o w e r o f o b e d i­
e n ce . In esse n ce, S p in o z a ’s id ea h ere is re m in is c e n t o f th e A r is to te lia n
h exis an d la ys th e g r o u n d fo r u s in g th e im a g in a tio n as an im ita tio n o f
re a so n .
S p in o z a ’s p r o g r a m is w o r k e d o u t th r o u g h o u t th e Theologico-Political
Treatise', it p ro v id e s th e lin k b e tw e e n th e “ th e o lo g ic a l” an d th e “ p o lit ­
ic a l p a r ts ,” an d g iv e s th e m s y s te m a tic c o n tin u ity . T h e tre a tis e as a
w h o le d eals w it h th e m u ltitu d e , n o t th e p h ilo s o p h e r, an d tre a ts it as a
p h ilo s o p h ic a l q u e s tio n in itse lf. W h a t to d o a b o u t th e m u ltitu d e is th e
g e n e ra l p r o b le m u n d e r ly in g th e w o r k and sp e lle d o u t in b o th its p a rts.
T h e g e n e ra l a n s w e r is to resh ap e th e c o g n it iv e an d e m o t iv e p o w e r g o v ­
e r n in g th e m u ltitu d e — w h a t S p in o za calls imaginatio— as an e x te r n a l
im ita tio n o f ratio, u s in g o b e d ie n c e to a u th o r ity in o r d e r to e n fo r c e an d
in s titu tio n a liz e th e resu lts.
T h is p r o g r a m is ca rrie d o u t in t w o sta g es, th e o lo g ic a l a n d p o litic a l.
F irst, b ib lic a l in te r p re ta tio n red u ces th e m e s sa g e o f S c r ip tu r e to an e m ­
b r y o n ic d o c tr in e o f u n iv e rsa l m o r a lity , d e n y in g th e B ib le a n y c o g n i­
tiv e im p o r t . T h is m in im a l m o r a lity — -justice an d m u tu a l h e lp — is th e
c o n te n t o f th e n e w “ u n iv e rsa l r e lig io n ,” w h ic h is d e s tin e d fo r th e m u l­
titu d e , an d relies o n its re s p e c t an d o b e d ie n c e to “ th e W o rd o f G o d ” as
in c a rn a te d in th e B ib le . O f c o u rs e , th is is n o lo n g e r o b e d ie n c e to all
th e p a rtic u la r an d c h a n g in g d e m a n d s o f th e p ro p h e ts b u t o n ly to th e ir
s e m i-n a tio n a l n u cle u s— th eir “ tru e m e a n in g ” as d e fin e d b y b ib lic a l
in te r p re ta tio n . Y e t th e n ee d to re ly o n a p r o p h e tic te x t p r o d u c e d b y
im a g in a tio n , and o n o b e d ie n c e to e x te rn a l a u th o r ity , te s t ify th a t th e
imaginatio is still in c o n tr o l, a lth o u g h its effe c ts h av e b e en tr a n s fo r m e d :
n o w th e y h a v e tu r n e d a g a in s t th eir usu al a g g r e s s iv e an d d iv is iv e n a­
tu re , to p r o d u c e s o c ia lly b e n e fic ia l resu lts.
T h e “ p u r ifie d ” B ib le th us b e c o m e s th e c o rn e rs to n e in r e s h a p in g th e
im a g in a tio n as an im ita tio n o f re a so n . B u t this also re q u ire s a p o litic a l
c o m p le m e n t an d in s titu tio n a liz a tio n . In th e m s e lv e s , th e p r in c ip le s o f
ju s t ic e an d m u tu a l h e lp are b a re an d ab stra ct. H o w are th e y to b e p r a c ­
tic e d u n d e r a c tu a l le g isla tio n ? W h o is to a p p ly th e m to c o n c r c t e s o c ia l

( ¡ 4)
 SPINOZA AND KANT

situ a tio n s? S p in o za , w h o reco g n izes no o th er a u th o rity o r n o rm a tiv e

p o w e r th an th e p o litic a l, p resents an u n e q u iv o cal answ er. T h e state,
th e p o litic a l g o v e r n m e n t, is to b e c o m e the sole and true “ in te rp re te r”
o f the n u clea r m o r a l-re lig io n , to w h ic h the m essage o f S c rip tu re has
been re d u c e d b y b ib lical h erm en eu tics.
K a n t, to o , s o u g h t to ra tio n ally p u rify relig io n , to d e n y its c o g n itiv e
im p o r t an d red u ce it to p ractical princip les alone. B u t K a n t’s u n d e r­
s ta n d in g o f th e n ature o f ra tio n a lity is at varian ce w ith that o f S p in o za.
F irst, in sh arp co n trast to S p in o za, K a n t is interested in raisin g the
p u rifie d v e rs io n o f relig io n to a gen u in e rational level. L ik e the rest o f
the p ra c tic a l sp h ere, re lig io n is n o lo n g e r g ro u n d e d in th e im a g in a tio n
b u t in p u re rea so n , and even en jo y s the p rim a c y w h ic h K a n t assign s to
p ra c tic a l rea so n o v e r th e th eo retical. In co n fin in g re lig io n to th e p rac­
tical fie ld K a n t th e re fo re assign s it a role that is ratio n al par ex ce lle n ce .
W ith in th e sp h ere K a n t calls “ r e lig io n ,” all action is m o tiv a ted b y p u re
ra tio n a l im p e r a tiv e s , m ix e d w ith n o sensual o r natural m o tiv e . R e li­
g io n an d m o r a lity are fu n d a m en ta lly the sam e, ex cep t that relig io n
refers p r im a r ily to in d iv id u als, w h ile re lig io n lin k s the in d iv id u a l
a g e n ts in to a m o ra l to ta lity (called the “ eth ical c o m m u n ity ” o r “ in v is ­
ib le c h u r c h ” ) an d p ro v id e s in stitu tio n a l aids (“ th e v isib le c h u r c h ” ) fo r
m o r a l e d u ca tio n and th e p ro p a g a tio n o f the eth ical co m m u n ity.
S p in o z a ’s u se o f th e b ib lical h erm en eu tics as a m eans to create an
e x te rn a l im ita tio n o f reaso n m ig h t co u n t, in K an tia n term s, as an an­
s w e r to th e p ro b le m o f sch em atism (that is, o f b u ild in g a b rid g e be­
tw e e n th e ra tio n a l and th e em pirical) in the field o f a c tio n .15 S p in o z a ’s
w a y also s u g g e s ts a n o th e r K a n tia n co n cep t, “ le g a lity ,” s ig n ify in g ac­
tio n th a t c o n fo r m s e x te rn a lly to the m oral la w b u t origin a tes in n atu ral
d esires. T h e t w o ideas are clea rly in co m p a tib le. S ig n ifica n tly , K a n t
a v o id e d u s in g le g a lity to “ sch e m a tize ” rational action , b u t turn ed to
m o r e c o m p lic a te d m e d ia to r s ,16 w h ile in sisting u p on the u n c o m p r o ­
m is in g g a p b e tw e e n m o r a lity and legality, a d istin ctio n w ith o u t w h ic h
his w h o le eth ics w o u ld co llap se . T h u s , n o t o n ly is K a n t unab le to fin d
h e lp in S p in o z a ’s p ro g ra m b u t he m u st o p p o se it.
U n lik e K a n t, S p in o za n eith er bu ild s his ethics as a d o ctrin e o f a b ­
s o lu te im p e r a tiv e s n o r m ak es m o r a lity d epend o n th e su b jectiv e m o d e
o f d e c isio n . H e th e re fo re has ro o m fo r an extern al resem b la n ce b e­
tw e e n th e sen su al an d ra tio n al m o tiv e s and can place such sem iratio n al
c o n d u c t o n a h ig h e r lev el than m ere caprice. K a n t m u st reject this so ­
lu tio n as “ m e re le g a lit y ” and in o rd er to p u rify religio n , he m u st raise
it to th e h ig h e s t— and o n ly — lev e l o f rationality.
L e g a lity d o e s re ig n in K a n t o ve r p olitics and rig h t, b u t these o n ly
p r o v id e an in s titu tio n a l fr a m e w o rk to su p p o rt and e m b o d y th e tru ly

(1 5 )
 CHAPTER I

m o ra l co m m u n ity . L e g a lity and in tern al m o r a lity c o m p le m e n t each

o th e r in fo r m in g th e fin al end o f h isto ry; b u t th e y d o n o t e n jo y th e
sam e status: o n ly th e in n er m o ra l s y s te m is an en d in itse lf, w h ic h b e­
s to w s v a lu e an d m ea n in g to the rest o f th e sy s te m , in c lu d in g th e le g a l
and p o litic a l in stitu tio n s.
T h is lead s to a n o th er sig n ific a n t d ifferen ce. K a n t an d S p in o z a a g re e
that p o litic s sh o u ld be c o m p le te ly d iv o r c e d fro m th e h is to ric a l fo r m o f
re lig io n , w h ic h is based on fear, su p e rstitio n , an d a c leric a l class. T h is
ty p e o f r e lig io n m u st n o t in terven e in the life o f the p o lity in a n y fo rm .
B u t h o w sh o u ld p u rified re lig io n relate to p o litic s? H e re K a n t an d S p i­
n o za are d iv id e d ag ain . K a n t, b y re d u c in g re lig io n to in n e r m o r a lity ,
p laces it o n a h ig h e r le v el than p o litics: the state it s e lf m u s t e m b o d y
m o ra l p rin cip le s and serve th e p ro p a g a tio n o f th e e th ic a l c o m m u n ity .
S p in o za , o n th e o th e r h and , fla tly su b o rd in ate s p u rifie d r e lig io n to th e
secu lar a u th o rities, w h o m he an oin ts as its tru e in te rp re te rs. P u rifie d
re lig io n in b o th cases b e c o m e s a secu lar w a y o f life, b u t in K a n t it sh ares
th e in d e p en d en t and s u b lim e status o f m o ra lity , w h ile S p in o z a a s s im ­
ilates re lig io n to th e state and assign s a p o litic a l ro le to it.
T h is reflects S p in o z a ’s p e ssim ism — o r sense o f re a lism — c o n c e r n in g
the m u ltitu d e . H ad S p in o za b elieved th at vam religio c o u ld b e tran s­
fo r m e d in to p u re p h ilo so p h ica l re lig io n and p reva il u n iv e rs a lly , he
w o u ld free it o f th e state and even co n sid er th e state it s e lf as s u p e r flu ­
o u s .17 B u t S p in o za h o ld s that “ h u m an n atu re is d iffe re n t fr o m th is ”
an d so he co n cen tra te s o n the p o p u la r re lig io n o f o b e d ie n c e an d g iv e s
th e s e cu la r g o v e r n m e n t the p o w e r to tran slate th e p rin c ip le o f ju s tic e
e m b e d d e d in th e B ib le in to co n crete leg isla tio n .

T he M ethods of B ib l ic a l In t e r p r e t a t i o n

S p in o za su m m a rize s his m e th o d in the sta tem en t th a t “ th e k n o w le d g e

o f S c rip tu re m u st b e s o u g h t fro m S c rip tu re alo n e , ev e n as th e k n o w l­
e d g e o f n atu re is s o u g h t fro m n a tu re ” (Opera 3: 99). B u t as a s im p le
re e x a m in a tio n w ill p ro v e, this h e rm e n e u tic s lo g a n (w h ic h e c h o e s th e
s lo g a n sola scriptura, then fash io n ab le in P ro te sta n t circles) d o e s n o t ad ­
e q u a te ly e x p re ss S p in o z a ’s in ten tio n s. T h e B ib le it s e lf d o e s n o t s u p p ly
us w ith all th e rele va n t m aterial fo r u n d e rsta n d in g it in S p in o z a ’s w a y .
K n o w le d g e o f its g ra m m a r and e ty m o lo g y , th e h is to r y o f e ach b o o k ,
th e circu m sta n ce s o f each e p o c h , an d the lik e, are d e riv e d n o t ju s t fr o m
th e b ib lic a l d o cu m e n ts b u t p rim a rily fro m a u x ilia r y scien c es. O n e
sh o u ld , th en , f o llo w S trau ss’s ad v ic e and read S p in o za in a b o u t th e
sam e w a y he treats the B i b le , '8 in te rp re tin g his s lo g a n in te rm s o f th e
c o m p r e h e n s iv e c o n te x t o f his a rg u m en ts. S p in o za d o e s n o t m e a n th a t

(16)
 SPINOZA AND KANT

th e B ib le s h o u ld serve as the e x clu siv e so u rce o f data, b u t th at the

m e th o d o lo g ic a l s ta rtin g p o in t sh ou ld be in the b ib lical te x t alon e. T h e
actu al c o n te n t o f the B ib le is n o t to be d eterm in ed by an a p rio ri idea
(th e o lo g ic a l o r p h ilo so p h ica l) to w h ic h the m ean in g o f the te x t is then
ad ju ste d . R a th er, th e basis fo r research is the d o cu m e n t itself, fro m
w h e n c e o n e can p ro cee d to d isco v er a gen eral pattern.
O v e r s im p lifie d as it is, th e co m p a riso n S p in o za d ra w s b e tw e e n b ib ­
lical cr itic is m and n atural science m ay help in un d ersta n d in g this p oin t.
A s in th e in v e s tig a tio n o f n ature w e m u st start fro m the sim p lest data,
an d p ro c e e d th ro u g h e n u m e ratio n and d ed u ctio n to the d efin itio n s o f
all p h e n o m e n a , so to o in th e s tu d y o f the B ib le , the d ifferen ce b e in g
th a t th e re th e data are p h y sic a l o r b io lo g ic a l and here the data are b ib ­
lical te x ts and th e h isto rical and p h ilo lo g ica l facts that are rele va n t to
th e ir u n d e rs ta n d in g as “ n atu ral” p hen o m en a.
T h e re je c tio n o f p reestab lish ed sch em es im p lies the re jectio n o f an
a lle g o ric a l a p p ro a ch to th e te x t and the p rim a c y o f a literal in terp reta­
tio n . Y e t th is is n o t a rig id rule. In fact, the literal m ean in g it s e lf is n o t
m a n ife s t b u t u s u a lly req u ires a co m p lica ted d ecip h erin g. H ere lies the
m ain d iffe re n c e b e tw e e n S p in o za ’s ap p roa ch and o th er d o ctrin es o f lit­
eral in te r p re ta tio n . S p in o za insists th ere is a gap b etw e en th e actual
litera l m e a n in g and w h a t it appears to be. T h e reader and the an cien t
a u th o r are b o th a ffected b y cu ltural and p erson al asso ciation s and by
c o n t e m p o r a r y b eliefs and w a y s o f speech. In o rd er to u n d erstan d the
o r ig in a l m e a n in g o f th e te x t w e m u st d isco u n t th e e ffe ct o f th ese fac­
to rs u p o n o u rs e lv e s and co n sid er h o w th ey w o rk e d on the b ib lical au­
th o rs; an d th is req u ires a d etailed in v e stig a tio n , based u p o n a grea t deal
o f e x tr a b ib lic a l m ate rial. S p in o za does n o t g iv e a fu ll ac co u n t o f these
fa c to rs , m u c h less o f th e rules b y w h ic h th ey are to b e k n it to g e th e r
an d re e v a lu a te each o th er; b u t his general criteria are clear and his am ­
p le e x a m p le s ad d m u ch p ertin en t detail. In th e Theologico-Political
Treatise he su cc ee d s in sp e llin g o u t the p rin cip les o f, and p art o f the
d e ta ile d a p p ara tu s fo r, treatin g th e B ib le as a p u re ly scien tific o b je ct,
w h o s e s o le n o rm s are reaso n and e x p e rie n c e .19
S p in o z a ’s re je c tio n o f gen era l sch em es is n o t u n q u a lified . It applies
o n ly to s ch e m e s th a t are im p o s e d on the B ib le fro m w ith o u t, th us cre­
a tin g an a p rio ri bias. B u t there are h erm e n eu tic gen e ra liza tio n s d e ­
riv e d fr o m th e o b je c tiv e s tu d y o f the B ib le itself, and these are n o t o n ly
le g itim a te b u t in d isp e n sa b le fo r co rre ct in terp retatio n . T h is is b ecau se
th e te x ts as g iv e n are n o t s e lf-e x p la n a to ry and b ecause a gen u in e
m e th o d req u ire s s o m e d e g re e o f d e d u ctio n and ap p licatio n . “ A s in the
e x a m in a tio n o f n atu ral p h e n o m e n a w e try first to in v estig a te w h a t is
m o s t u n iv e rs a l and c o m m o n to all nature . . . and then w e p ro ce ed to

(*7)
 CHAPTER I

w h a t is less u n iv e rsa l, so , to o , in th e h is to r y o f S c r ip tu r e , w e s e e k firs t

th a t w h ic h is m o s t u n iv e rsa l an d serv es fo r th e b a sis and fo u n d a tio n o f
all S c r ip tu r e ” ( T T P , p. 104, O pera 3: 102). T h e s tu d y o f th e B i b le , lik e
th e s tu d y o f n atu re , is b a sed o n t w o sta g e s , w h ic h are (in C a r te s ia n
la n g u a g e ) e n u m e ra tio n an d d e d u c t io n .20 T h e firs t is a k in d o f in d u c ­
tio n , a “ b ib lic a l h is t o r y ” (p ara llel to n atu ral h is to r y , histovia naturalis)
w h e r e b y all re le v a n t s c ie n tific m a te ria l is g a th e re d an d c a ta lo g u e d .
F r o m th ese sets o f data w e h ave to e x tra ct: (1) p e r m a n e n t p r in c ip le s
e x p r e s s in g th e o v e ra ll a p p ro a ch and s p irit o f th e B ib le ; an d (2) ru le s fo r
in te r p r e tin g s p e c ific ty p e s o f p r o b le m s . W ith th e s e at h a n d , o n e can
assess e v e r y s to r y an d v erse in th e B ib le . I f th e lite ra l m e a n in g fits th e
b a sic p rin c ip le s o f in te r p re ta tio n (even th o u g h it m ig h t c o n flic t w i t h
r e lig io u s d o g m a o r p h ilo s o p h ic a l tru th ), it s h o u ld b e a c c e p te d as s u c h .
Y e t, i f th e lite ra l m e a n in g o f a s p e c ific ite m is n o t c o m p a tib le w i t h th e
h e r m e n e u tic ru les w e h a v e e x tra c te d , th en e v e n i f b y a c c id e n t it fits th e
in te r e s t o f rea so n o r r e lig io n , w e m u s t re je c t it, an d u n d e r s ta n d the
s to r y as an in te n d e d a lle g o r y an d th e w o r d s as m e ta p h o r s ( T T P , p p .
100, 103, O pera 3: 99, 102). T h is is th e c o r r e c t im m a n e n t m e th o d .
D id S p in o za f o llo w his o w n m e th o d ? O n e c a n n o t a n s w e r w i t h an
u n q u a lifie d “ y e s .” H is a p p ro a c h to th e B ib le w a s n o t fre e o f a p r io r i
p rin c ip le s an d p r e s u p p o s itio n s ,21 th e m o s t im p o r t a n t o f w h ic h w a s his
v e r y c la im o f an im m a n e n t a p p ro a c h . In o p t in g fo r an o b je c t iv e s c i­
e n tif ic m e th o d , S p in o z a p re s u p p o s e s a fu n d a m e n ta l p r in c ip le th a t n e ­
g a te s th e s a n c tity o f th e B ib le and d en ies th e a u t h o r ity o f r e v e la tio n ,
re p la c in g it b y rea so n . H e re w e h av e re a ch e d th e in h e re n t s tr u c tu r a l
lim it o f an “ im m a n e n t a p p ro a c h .” Y e t o n c e th is c r u c ia l p r e s u p p o s it io n
has b e e n a d m itte d , S p in o z a ’s m e th o d d o e s n o t p r e s u p p o s e a n y t h in g
b e y o n d it. T h e d e m a n d to lea rn “ o n ly fr o m th e B i b le ” is a c tu a lly th e
d e m a n d to learn o n ly fr o m th e science o f th e B ib le , th a t is, fr o m r e le ­
v a n t s c ie n tific in v e s tig a tio n s . T h is in v o lv e s th e a b s o lu te r e je c tio n o f
a n y r e lig io u s a u th o r ity and its re p la c e m e n t b y re a so n an d s c ie n c e . B i b ­
lic a l h e rm e n e u tic s , s e r v in g th e c r itiq u e o f r e v e la tio n an d ta c itly p r e ­
s u p p o s in g it, s h o u ld th u s h e lp d o fo r th e m asses w h a t S p in o z a ’s o w n
M a r r a n o b a c k g r o u n d d id fo r h im .
It m ig h t b e re m a r k e d , f o llo w in g P. F. M o r e a u , th a t S p in o z a p e r ­
fo r m e d a s e c o n d r e v o lu tio n in b ib lic a l re a d in g (th e firs t r e v o lu tio n w a s
p r o m p te d in th e s ix te e n th c e n tu r y b y th e h u m a n is ts an d th e ir p h i lo lo g ­
ical s c ie n c e ).22 T h e n e w R e n a issa n ce p h ilo lo g y a p p lie d in th e fir s t p la c e
to th e secu lar, e v e n p a g a n an cien ts; V ir g il, T e re n c e , an d C ic e r o w e r e
s tu d ie d in n e w an d d iffe re n t lig h t. S p in o z a a p p lies th is p h ilo lo g ic a l s c i­
e n c e to th e B ib le — d e m a n d in g to see its a u th o r s as a n o th e r g r o u p o f
s e c u la r a n c ien ts. T o b e su re, h u m a n is t p h ilo lo g y has m a d e r e m a r k a b le

(18)
 SPINOZA AND KANT

p ro g re s s in b ib lic a l research as w ell; and, rath er iro n ic a lly , it w a s the

p o l y g lo t B ib le o f C a rd in a l C is n e ro s — a fo rm e r In q u isito r G e n e ra l and
p e r s e c u to r o f th e M a rra n o s , w h o ca p italized o n th e sch o la rsh ip o f
o th e r M a r r a n o s — th at g a v e th e p h ilo lo g ica l s tu d y o f the B ib le a s ig n if­
ic a n t p u sh . T h is m o v e m e n t reach ed its ap ex w ith R ich ard S im o n , the
g re a te s t b ib lic a l s ch o la r o f his age, and in m a n y w a y s the “ fa th e r” o f
m o d e r n b ib lic a l c r itic is m to g e th e r w ith S p in o za. S p in o za , th o u g h a
g re a t b ib lic a l s c h o la r h im se lf, co u ld n o t rival S im o n ’s im m e n se k n o w l­
e d g e ; b u t in w h a t co n cern s method he o ffered a m o re rad ical a p ­
p ro a c h — th e d e -d e ific a tio n o f the text.
M o r e a u s u g g e s ts that th e h u m an ists had tu rn ed the B ib le fro m m ere
s to r y in to a “ t e x t ,” w h ile S p in o z a ’s seco n d re v o lu tio n tu rn ed it in to a
“ d o c u m e n t.” “ B e c o m in g a te x t” m eans that the read er p ays a tten tio n
to th e m a te ria l c o n te n t and co n te x t, n o t o n ly to th e m oral lesson; and
" d o c u m e n t ” m ean s th at th e te x t is m ad e in d icative o f o th er, e x tra te x -
tu a l facts an d p ro c e sse s (cu ltu ral, m en tal, in ten tio n al, e tc .), in a w a y
r e s e m b lin g th e w o r k o f an arch a eo lo g ist. B u t this is n o t th e o n ly n o v ­
e lty. T h e cru cia l p o in t is th at the B ib le , as te x t and as d o c u m e n t, had
ce ase d to b e a d o c u m e n t o f d iv in e w ill— rev ela tio n — and b ec a m e s u b ­
j e c t to th e b a n al and secu lar a u th o rity o f b ib lical sciences. In o th e r
w o r d s , w it h S p in o z a th e B ib le has b e c o m e a secular d o cu m e n t.

K a n t’s M ethod o f Interpretation

K a n t d id n o t e la b o ra te his m e th o d o f b ib lical in terp re tatio n as an e x ­

p lic it to p ic ; b u t fr a g m e n ta r y rem ark s and, esp ecially, d o ze n s o f in ­
sta n ce s in w h ic h K a n t p u ts b ib lic a l verses in to actual use, s u p p ly us
w it h th e r e q u ir e d m aterial. F o r ex am p le:

W h a t is w r itte n h ere m u st n o t be read as th o u g h in ten d ed fo r

Scriptural exegesis, which lies beyond the limits o f the domain o f bare
reason. It is p o s s ib le to ex p la in h o w a h isto rical ac co u n t is to b e p u t
to a m o r a l u se w ith o u t d e cid in g w h e th e r th is is the in ten tio n o f
th e a u th o r o r m e r e ly o u r in terp re tatio n , p ro v id e d this m ean in g is
tru e in itse lf, ap art fr o m all h isto ric a l p ro o f, and is, m o re o v e r, the
o n ly o n e w h e r e b y w e can d eriv e s o m e th in g co n d u c iv e to o u r b et­
te r m e n t fr o m a p assage w h ic h o th e rw is e w o u ld be o n ly an u n ­
fr u itfu l a d d itio n to o u r h isto ric a l k n o w le d g e . { R e l.t p. 39 n .,
Werke 6 : 4 1, em p h a sis added)

H e r e K a n t a d v o c a te s a m e th o d that is co n tra ry to S p in o za. R e n o u n c in g

a p u re s c ie n tific a p p ro a ch to the B ib le , he has little use fo r th e a u th o r s ’
a u th e n tic in te n tio n s. A t th e sam e tim e K a n t au th orizes, and e v en re c­

(19)
 CHAPTER I

o m m e n d s , a ttrib u tin g m e an in gs to th e te x t w h ic h are ta k e n fr o m e x ­

tern al, a p rio ri sch e m e s— in this case fro m his o w n m o r a l p h ilo s o p h y .
A n d th is leads h im to a rg u e th at w h a t d eserves o u r a tte n tio n is n o t th e
B ib le as a w h o le , b u t o n ly th o se selected p assages w h ic h ca n , b y a lle ­
g o r y , b e m o b iliz e d in th e se rv ice o f m o ra lity :

W e m u s t n o t q u a rrel u n n ecessa rily o v e r a q u e s tio n o r o v e r its h is ­

to ric a l a sp ect w h e n , h o w e v e r it is u n d e rs to o d , it in n o w a y h elp s
us to b e b e tte r m en , and w h e n th at w h ic h can a ffo rd su ch h e lp is
d is co v e re d w ith o u t h isto ric a l p ro o f, and in d ee d m u s t b e a p p r e ­
h e n d e d w ith o u t it. (Ibid.)

K a n t s u m m a rize s his rejec tio n o f th e c o g n itiv e a p p ro a c h to th e B ib le

b y re m a r k in g ,

T h a t h isto ric a l k n o w le d g e w h ic h has n o in n e r b e a rin g v a lid fo r all

m e n b e lo n g s to th e class o f adiaphora, w h ic h each m a n is fre e to
h o ld as he fin d s e d ify in g . (Ibid.)

In a p a ssa g e en titled : “ T h e P u re R e lig io u s [P h ilo s o p h ic a l] F aith is th e

S u p re m e In te rp rete r o f the E cclesiastica l F a ith ,” - 3 K a n t la ter re su m e s
th e q u e s tio n fr o m a n o th er an gle . M o r a l p ro g re s s o n a la rg e , h is to r ic a l
scale re q u ires a re cip ro ca l relatio n b e tw e e n rev eale d re lig io n an d m o r a l
p h ilo s o p h y , to b e e sta b lish ed b y b ib lic a l in te rp re ta tio n . T h e c o m m o n
m an c a n n o t atta in a p u re ly ra tio n al p o sitio n in a s in g le lea p . H e m u s t
in ste a d g o th r o u g h a p rocess in w h ic h th e m o ra l p rin c ip le s c o u c h e d in
th e sen su al s t u f f o f b ib lic a l la n g u a g e are g ra d u a lly b r o u g h t to lig h t
th r o u g h a p ro p e r (i.e ., in ten tio n al) in te r p re ta tio n .24
K a n t b elie v e s th at a la ten t ratio n al n u cle u s is c o u c h e d in v a rio u s
sh ad es o f sen su al co v e r in all h isto ric a l faiths and h en ce also in th e B i­
ble. H o w e v e r , it ca n n o t b e p resen t in every b ib lic a l v erse o r p a ssa g e .
W h e re th is is la c k in g , and w h e re the p ro p e r e x c u s e can be fo u n d , K a n t
says w e s h o u ld e n g e n d e r th e m o ral m e a n in g ev en b y d e p a rtin g fr o m
th e lite ra l se n s e .25
In an a r g u m e n t w ith th e b ib lic a l s c h o la r jo h a n n D . M ic h a e lis ,26 K a n t
ask s rh e to r ic a lly “ w h e th e r m o r a lity sh o u ld be e x p o u n d e d a c c o r d in g to
th e B ib le o r w h e th e r the B ib le sh o u ld n o t rath er b e e x p o u n d e d a c c o r d ­
in g to m o r a lity ? ” (p. 101 n ., Werke 6: 110 n .,) . E v id e n tly K a n t a c ce p ts
th e s e c o n d w a y. A u to n o m o u s , se cu lar m o r a lity sets th e n o r m , b o th
fo r it s e lf an d fo r th e B ib le . A n d K a n t’s b o o k o n re lig io n d u ly a b o u n d s
w i t h a lle g o ric a l m a n ip u la tio n s o f b ib lic a l verses, s o m e o f th e m sh a rp
an d w i t t y — and m o r e th an o n ce he even takes the lib e r ty o f m is q u o tin g
th e te x t w h ile u s in g q u o ta tio n m ark s.
In his Contest o f the Faculties, 27 K a n t co n tin u es th e a r g u m e n ts o f th e

(20)
 SPINOZA AND KANT

Religion. H e d en ies th e c o m m o n claim that “ the B ib le , as revela tio n ,

m u st be in terp reted o u t o f its e lf and n ot th ro u g h re a so n ” — a v a rie ty o f
th e P ro te s ta n t s lo g a n sola scriptura that S p in o za had turn ed ag ain st it­
self. K a n t rejects th e m e th o d o f sola scriptura n o t because it d iscovers
c o n tra d ic tio n s in th e B ib le (as the C a th o lic C o u n te r-R e fo rm e r, Fran­
c is c o S u a re z, has a rgu e d again st it), b u t because th e B ib le is m o ra lly
u seless w ith o u t a p ro p e r rational interpretation. P re cisely because it is
[m ere] re v e la tio n , K a n t c r y p tic a lly says, the B ib le needs the gu id a n ce
o f m o r a l reaso n w h ic h alon e can b rin g o u t its d iv in e nature.
C le a r ly , th e d iv in ity o f Scrip tu re is g a u ge d here, as in th e Religion,
b y its c o n fo r m ity w ith a u to n o m o u s h um an ethics. “ In re lig io u s m at­
te rs,” K a n t co n c lu d e s , “ reason is the suprem e in terp reter o f th e S crip ­
tu r e ” (p. 4 1). W h e n a b ib lical sentence co n trad icts m o ral reaso n , it
“ m u s t b e in te rp re te d to th e la tter’s ad v an tage” (p. 38); and this m u st
be d o n e “ in te n tio n a lly ” (absichtlich), alm o st as an im p erative.

T h e Justification o f K a n t’s Method

W h a t can ju s t i fy th is ap p roa ch ? K a n t believes that ration al re lig io n is

la ten t in th e a n cien t te x t itself, sin ce “ earlier b y far than th is [pop ular]
faith , th e p re d is p o s itio n to m o ral religio n lay h id d en in h u m an re a so n ”
(R e l., p. 102, Werke 6: 1 1 1 ) . B u t this v agu e and general im p lica tio n
ca n n o t, o f c o u rs e , be fo u n d in a n y p articular verse. T h e K a n tia n alle­
g o r y relies o n th e in b re d resp ect w h ic h its audience has fo r th e B ib le;
b u t th e a lle g o ris t h im s e lf d o es n o t share the sam e respect, and m ay w e ll
k n o w th at w h a t he attrib u tes to a g iv en verse has n ever ex isted in it
eith e r e x p lic it ly o r b y im p lica tio n .
Is n o t th is, th e n , a v io la tio n o f th e p rin cip le o f tru th b o rd e rin g on
c y n ic is m ? K a n t ’s a n sw ers in the Religion so u nd lik e e x cu ses28 and fail
to g iv e th e o re tica l g ro u n d s fo r his m eth o d s o f in terp retatio n . B u t
K a n t ’s s y s te m re c o g n iz e s an o th er m o d e o f ju s tifica tio n , w h ic h yield s
th e s o -c a lle d “ p o s tu la te s ” o f p ure practical reason. T h e s e are c o g n itiv e
p r o p o s itio n s (lik e “ G o d e x is ts ” or “ the w ill is fre e ” ) w h ic h can n eith er
lie p ro v e d n o r refu te d b y c o g n itiv e m eans. H o w e v e r, acce p tin g th em
as tru e is a c o n d itio n fo r fo s te rin g m oral action. T h is , K a n t h o ld s, p ro ­
v id e s s u ffic ie n t rea so n fo r accep tin g th em and acting o n th eir g ro u n d s,
fo r, in th e a b sen ce o f p o ssib le p ro o f, the m oral interest o f reason takes
p re ce d e n c e o v e r all th e o th ers.
S o , I s u g g e s t th e m e th o d o f b ib lical in terp retatio n m ay b e c o n ­
s tru ed as an e x te n s io n o f th e d o ctrin e o f p ostulates, thus reflectin g
K a n t’s v ie w th a t, S p in o za n o tw ith s ta n d in g , the scien tific s tu d y o f the

(21)
 CHAPTER I

B ib le is o n th e w h o le im p o s s ib le , and th e o rig in a l in te n tio n s o f the

a u th o rs m u st lie fo re v e r b e y o n d o u r reach.
K a n t m ak es r o o m , h o w e v e r, fo r a sp ecia l k in d o f b ib lic a l s ch o la rs h ip
(Schriftgelehrsamkeit; R e l., p. 103, W erke 6 : 1 12 ), to m e d ia te b e t w e e n ra­
tio n a l re lig io n and th e m asses. W h e re p o ssib le, th e b ib lic a l s c h o la r m o ­
b ilize s his m o ra l in s ig h t and e n c y c lo p e d ic k n o w le d g e to fin d a m o r a l
sen se in th e litera l te x t o r, w h e re this is im p o s s ib le , to o ffe r an a d e q u a te
a lle g o ry . In this w a y th e m o r a liz in g b ib lic a l savan t u su rp s th e tra d i­
tio n a l ro le o f the p riest o r th e th e o lo g ia n to b e c o m e th e d irc c t a u th o r ity
fo r th e m asses. K a n t co n so le s h im s e lf th at su ch u se o f a u th o r ity , w h ic h
“ d o e s n o t p ay p ro p e r resp ect to h u m a n n a tu re ,” w ill o n ly b e a p a s s in g
h is to ric a l stage.
H o w w o u ld S p in o za h ave an sw e re d K a n t? W e can g u e s s th e a n s w e r
fro m S p in o z a ’s critiq u e o f M a im o n id e s , w h o also a d v o c a te d a m e th o d
o f p h ilo so p h ic a l a lle g o ry . V io la tin g th e te x t in th e n a m e o f re a so n , says
S p in o za , m ak e s reason co n tra d ic t itse lf. M o re o v e r , su ch b ia se d in te r­
p re ta tio n w o u ld o n ly establish “ a n e w so rt o f p riests o r p o n tiffs , m o r e
lik e ly to e x c ite m e n ’s rid ic u le th an th eir v e n e r a tio n ” ( T T P , p. 1 1 6 ,
O pera 3: 114 ).
T h e o p p o s itio n b e tw e e n th e m e th o d s o f K a n t an d S p in o z a refle cts
to s o m e e x te n t a d iffe re n ce in p h ilo so p h ica l te m p e ra m e n t— e s p e c ia lly
i f w e ju x ta p o s e K a n t’s d e m a n d in g m o r a lism w ith S p in o z a ’s o b je c t iv e
c o m p r e h e n s io n o f n ecessity. B u t even m o re im p o rta n t are th e ir d iv e r ­
g e n t in terests in the critiq u e o f re lig io n , and se ve ral s p e c ific v ie w s each
o f th e m held . T o b e faith fu l to his s y s te m o f ra tio n a l n a tu ra lis m , S p i­
n o z a m u st m a k e th e B ib le an o b je c t fo r scie n tific rese a rch , s in ce this
ap p lies to e v e ry p articu lar th in g in th e w o rld w ith o u t e x c e p tio n .
M o r e o v e r , he a c tu a lly b e liev ed th at th e B ib le is a p r o d u c t o f imaginatio,
an d th u s c o u ld h ave e x p e c te d that a d isin te rested s tu d y o f th e B ib le ,
ap art fr o m its co n trib u tio n to k n o w le d g e , w o u ld also y ie ld th e p ra c ti­
cal resu lt o f e x p o s in g th e B ib le ’s fla w s an d s u b v e rtin g its a u th o r ity .
S p in o za m u st be aw are that s cien tific research ca n n o t d e s tr o y th e a u ­
th o r it y o f th e B ib le unless this a u th o r ity has alre a d y b een re je c te d at
th e o u ts e t b y a c ce p tin g science as th e s u p re m e ju d g e . S o in ste a d o f
sta rtin g w ith a p e rs o n ’s a rg u m e n ts he uses in te rp re ta tio n as a rh e to ric a l
m e an s to p e rp le x and c o n v e rt the n o n p h ilo s o p h e rs . K a n t, o n h is p art,
b e lie v e d th at th e h u m a n m in d a c tu a lly has the p ro p e n s ity to ra tio n a l
re lig io n , and, th e re fo re co u ld e x p e c t his a lle g o ric a l m e th o d to g r a d u ­
a lly d e v e lo p and b rin g to lig h t th e m o ra l p o ten tia l o f th e h u m a n ra ce.
T h is is related to K a n t’s v ie w o f h is to r y (to w h ic h I d e v o te d a d if­
fe re n t b o o k ) .29 F o r K a n t h is to r y is th e p ro cess w h e r e b y rea so n b r in g s
its la te n t p o ten tia l to lig h t, g ra d u a lly lib e ra tin g it s e lf fr o m sen su al

(22)
 SPINOZA AND KANT

c o v c r and s h a p in g th e o b je ctiv e w o rld in its im age. Such a v ie w o f

h is to ry is n o t m e re ly e v o lu tio n a ry , but teleo lo g ica l. H is to ry is n o t sim ­
p ly a c h a n g e fro m o n e state to another; it realizes an u n d e rly in g h um an
p o te n tia l o r essen ce: reason and au to n o m y. R eason has m an ifested it­
s e lf s in ce an cien t tim es un d er the co v er o f m y th and ritual o f the v a r­
io u s h is to ric a l religio n s; th e y are all stages in an o verall p rocess and
s h o u ld b e u se d to en h an ce its advan ce. T h e re fo re , on e m u st start fro m
th e B ib le and th e h isto rical religio n s, but gu id e th em o u t o f th eir sen­
su o u sn e ss, th at is, o u t o f th eir literal form. K a n t’s e x e g e tic a l m eth o d
th u s re flects his h isto ric a l o u tlo o k in a dual w ay. T h e B ib le is an e x ­
a m p le o f the ra tio n al essen ce that b ecam e e m b o d ied sen sually, and it is
also an in s tru m e n t fo r p u sh in g this essence to w ard further d e v e lo p ­
m e n t an d s h e d d in g its sen su ou s shell.

Spinoza and History

D o e s S p in o za h ave a h isto ric a l p erspective? C e rta in ly n o t, i f w h a t w e

h av e in m in d is th e K a n tia n idea o f a latent ra tio n ality g o v e rn in g his­
to r y an d a sse rtin g it s e lf th ro u g h its strifes and v icissitu d es. T h is v ie w
(as w e sh all see in th e ch a p ter on H egel) w o u ld be rejected by S p in o za
as a te le o lo g ic a l illu s io n and a resid ue o f the n o tio n o f p ro v id en ce . S p i­
n o z a ’s ra tio n a lis m — th e v ie w that e v e ry th in g in the un iverse, d o w n to
its m in u te s t d eta ils, is in scrib ed and structured by reason (w h ic h e x ­
presses th e im m a n e n t essen ce o f G o d )— is fu n d am e n ta lly atem p o ral
an d a h is to rica l, co n stru e d sub specia aeternitatis. T h e ration al la w s and
essen ces o f n a tu re tran slate th e n o tio n s o f d iv in e presence in to secu lar
an d s c ie n tific te rm s — b u t th e y are p u re ly m ech an ical and d ed u ctiv e,
la c k in g d e v e lo p m e n t o r p u rp o se.
K a n t— and H e g e l— e x te n d e d the rational structure o f th e u n iverse
in to h is to r y as a sp ecia l, and even p riv ile g e d d o m a in , g o v e rn e d b y p u r­
p o s iv e re a so n . B u t this v ie w is u tte rly fo reig n to S p in o za. H is to ry has
n o sp e c ia l o n to lo g ic a l status. It is b u t th e w a y w e h um an s cut o u t o u r
e x p e rie n c e o f n atu ral o cc u rre n ce s fro m a sta n d p o in t w h ic h interests
us— th a t o f o u r d esires. H is to ric a l even ts are o f th e sam e k in d as natu ­
ral e v e n ts an d fall u n d e r th e sam e eternal law s o f nature. H en ce, th e
s tu d y o f h is to r y is b u t a b ra n ch o f the stu d y o f nature, e x ce p t th at its
d ata are u s u a lly m o r e o b s cu re b ecause o f the rem o ten ess o f tim e. T h is ,
p re cis e ly , is w h a t S p in o z a ’s b ib lic a l criticism b rin g s to th e fo re fro n t. It
p ro v id e s a p a ra d ig m case fo r th e k in d o f natural science o f h is to ry
w h ic h a lo n e is p o s s ib le in S p in o za.
A n d y e t, as S y lv a in Z a c p oin ts o u t, b ib lical in terp retatio n d o es im ­
p ly a h is to r ic a l co n s cio u s n e s s in e m b r y o o n S p in o za ’s p a r t.30 S p in o za

(23)
 CHAPTER 1

p resu p p oses that cu ltu re, la n g u a g e , c u sto m , an d m e n ta litie s c h a n g e

and e v o lv e , w h ile lea vin g th eir d ecip h e ra b le m a rk s; an d th e y flo w in to
th e p resent, w h e re th ey p ro v id e us w ith a tra d itio n w ith in w h ic h a n e w
re v o lu tio n can take p lace. S p in o za , fu rth e r m o re , tries to e x tr a c t fro m
th e B ib le a n u cleu s o fs e m ir a tio n a l m o ra lity , th e basis fo r th e u n iv e rsa l
re lig io n he destin es fo r th e m asses. T h is im p lies th e re in te rp r e ta tio n o f
trad itio n as a m eans fo r h isto rical ad v a n c em en t. P ast an d p re s e n t are
separated by a re v o lu tio n b u t are also b rid g e d b y a h e r m e n e u tic a l en ­
terprise. T h e B ib le is even said to co n tain in fact th e n u cle u s o f p o p u la r
m o ra lity , i f w e take this co n te n tio n at face v a lu e (w h ic h p e rh a p s w e
sh o u ld n o t); and sin ce S p in o za ’s m e th o d is s u p p o s e d to u n v e il th e o r ig ­
in al in te n tio n o f th e au th ors, it w ill fo llo w th at S p in o z a , p e rh a p s u n ­
w ittin g ly , p ostu lates a c o m m o n m o ral in s ig h t th a t u n d e rlie s ce n tu rie s
o f b ib lical au th orsh ip and p ro v id e s, un d er its v a rio u s fo r m s o f the
im a g in a tio n , an e le m e n t o f c o n tin u ity b e tw e e n p ast an d p re s e n t, b e ­
tw e e n s u p erstitio n and reason.
T h e sam e, o n a b ro a d er scale, can be o b s e rv e d in S p in o z a ’s p u re
p h ilo so p h y . W h e n S p in o za ch o o ses to retain su ch w o r d s as G o d , fr e e ­
dom, beatitude, o r right, o r w h e n he uses e x p re s s io n s lik e “ G o d ’s in te l­
le c t,” “ G o d ’s p o w e r,” the “ lo v e o f G o d ,” and th e lik e , h e is n o t m e r e ly
p ra c tic in g su b tle ca m o u flage . H e e m p lo y s the te rm s b y w h ic h tra d i­
tio n c o r r e c tly lo cated and d esign ated ce rtain cru cia l p r o b le m s an d p e r­
en n ial p h ilo so p h ica l tasks, th o u g h it w as led astray in tr y in g to id e n tify
th e tru e o b jects o f th ese term s; and S p in o za feels th at, fo r th e firs t tim e ,
his p h ilo s o p h y su cceed s in d o in g so. S p in o z a ’s champs de chasse co n ta in s
th e in a d e q u a te ideas o f the past (alo n g w ith th eir n am es, th e w o r d s b y
w h ic h th e y are d esign ated ), as a n ecessary su b strate w ith in w h ic h his
o w n co n c e p tu a l and sem an tic re v o lu tio n takes p lace. B e h in d th e m a n ­
tle o f S p in o za 's “ g e o m e tric a l o rd e r,” a fu ll-scale h e rm e n e u tia l e n d e a v o r
is p u rsu e d , n o t d issim ila r to th e o n e w h ic h his b ib lic a l in te r p re ta tio n
im p lie s (th o u g h ad d ressed to a p h ilo so p h ica l, n o t a p o p u la r a u d ie n c e ),
an d lik e w is e im p ly in g a nascen t h isto rical co n scio u sn ess.
S p in o za , m o re o v e r, co u ld have ga in ed this co n s cio u s n e s s b y lo o k in g
c lo s e ly at h im se lf. H is life fro m early ch ild h o o d w a s in te r w o v e n w it h
a m o m e n to u s h isto rical ad ven ture: the retu rn o f th e M a r r a n o s fr o m
C a th o lic is m to Ju d a ism and th eir in ten siv e e ffo rt to create an o ld - n e w
cu ltu re . T h is w a s also a h e rm en eu tic en terp rise to a la rg e e x te n t. T h e
A m s te r d a m J e w s w e re w o r k in g to rein terp ret th e p ast as a m e a n s fo r
cre a tin g a n e w p resen t and fu tu re; th e y s tru g g le d c o n s ta n tly to s u p ­
p re ss fo r m e r s y m b o ls and trad ition s and to re in terp ret o th e rs , in o r d e r
to o v e r c o m e th eir fo rm e r id e n tity and create a n e w cu ltu re . S p in o z a ,
in b re a k in g fr o m th em , m ain tain ed a s im ila r e ffo r t b u t w e n t in th e

( 24)
 SPINOZA AND KANT

o p p o s ite d ire c tio n ; fo r th e y stro ve to resuscitate an even o ld er religio u s

tr a d itio n , w h ile S p in o za tried to transcend the religio u s u n iverse alto­
ge th e r. B u t this o n ly h ig h lig h ts S p in o za ’s p ositio n as a M a rra n o o f
rea so n . H e re , ag ain , S p in o za stands on e step ahead o f the actual fo rm e r
M a rra n o s , re ta in in g a sim ilar pattern o f ex p erien ce y et tu rn in g its con­
tent d ia m e tric a lly ag ain st th em .
H is to r y w a s ce rta in ly stirrin g aroun d Sp in o za. T h e rise o f the D u tc h
re p u b lic , the w a rs o f re lig io n , the rev o lu tio n in E n glan d , th e n e w sun
in V e rs a ille s — an d D e sca rtes, H u y g e n s , the R o y a l S o c iety— m ig h t still
p ass, d e sp ite th eir w e ig h t, as h isto rical routin e, N o t so th e m essian ic
fe r v o r th a t circu la ted a m o n g J e w s and G en tiles alike in S p in o za ’s
n e ig h b o r h o o d . H e re w a s so m e th in g ab solute, the e v id e n ce o f d iv in e
g u id a n c e . A lr e a d y th e return o f th e M arran o s w as p erceived as a m es­
sian ic re d e m p tio n in m in u scu le, a fact that, as G ersh o m S ch o le m
p o in ts o u t, ad d ed its p ecu liar A m ste rd a m flavor to th e m essian ic u p ­
ro ar a r o u n d S a b b etai Z e v i, the m o st g a lv an izin g false m essiah in J e w ­
ish h is to ry , w h ic h eru p ted a fe w years after S p in o za ’s b a n .3' S p in o za
w a s a sk ed a b o u t it b y O ld e n b u r g , h im s e lf o f ch iliastic lean ings, in a
le tte r fr o m L o n d o n . T h o u g h no letter exists w ith S p in o za ’s resp on se,
w e k n o w his a n sw e r v e ry w e ll— it is giv en at the end o f ch apter 3 in
the Theologico-Political Treatise. Sp in o za h o ld s that historia sacra is a
m y th an d m essia n ism a d elu sio n . T h e re is o n ly nature w ith its u n ifo rm
n atu ral causes; h is to r y d o e s n o t e x ist as a special d o m a in and e v e ry ­
th in g in it is th e re su lt o f natural causes— even th o u g h these causes can
b rin g a b o u t th e m o s t asto n ish in g phenom ena: fo r ex am p le, the p er­
s is tin g o f th e J e w is h p eo p le, th e lib eratio n o f th e M a rra n o s, p o ssib ly
e v e n th e re tu rn o f th e J e w s to p olitical in d ep en d en ce in th eir an cien t
lan d . B y re fle ctin g o n his p erson al b a ck g ro u n d and the fate o f his fo r­
m e r p e o p le , an d es p e c ia lly on p h en o m en a that u su ally call fo r p ro v i­
d e n tia l e x p la n a tio n s , S p in o za thus gained a sense o f h isto ry w h ic h w as
u tte rly s e cu la r and n atu ralistic.
A n d th is c o rr e sp o n d s e x a c tly to the ap p roach he ad vo cates in b ib lical
in te r p re ta tio n .
F in ally, a w o r d a b o u t th e inn er lim itatio n s o f the m eth o d s o f S p i­
n o za an d K a n t in b ib lic a l critic ism . S p in o za ’s m ajo r p ro b lem is th at his
a c ce p ta n ce o f th e b e lie v e rs ’ p rin cip les is fictitio u s, and in fact he su b ­
o rd in a te s his o p p o n e n ts to his o w n ration al criteria fro m the o u tset.
F lis c la im o f e th ic a l c o m p a tib ility o f reason and th e B ib le is m islea d in g ,
fo r S p in o za d o e s n o t m ean to say that reason is co m p a tib le w ith the
B ib le as g iv e n , b u t o n ly w ith the criticized B ib le , n am ely, after it has
b een re d u c e d and in terp reted b y this v e ry sam e reason. T h e alleged

(2 5 )
 CHAPTER I

a u t o n o m y o f rea so n and re v e la tio n in S p in o za is r h e to r ic a l, a lip s e r v ic e

p a id an d a b a it e x te n d e d to the re lig io u s an d th e fa it h fu l.32
K a n t ’s m a jo r d iffic u lt y lies in th e p o s s ib le clash b e t w e e n t w o ra tio n a l
in te re sts, tru th an d m o ra l e d u c a tio n . A n e x e g e tic a l m e th o d th a t is c o n ­
s c io u s ly re a d y to o v e r lo o k h is to ric a l tru th is in c o m p a tib le w i t h K a n t ’s
ow n sp irit o f th e E n lig h te n m e n t an d th e a u t o n o m y o f o b je c t iv e
k n o w le d g e . T o little ava il is his d o c trin e o f th e m o r a l p o s tu la te s , s in ce
th e p rin c ip le is fla w e d in i t s e l f ."
In c o n c lu s io n , th e in n e r lim ita tio n s o f th e m e th o d s o f b o th S p in o z a
an d K a n t s te m fr o m th eir a tte m p t to m a in ta in a fic tit io u s p a r a lle lis m
b e tw e e n th e p ra c tic a l an d th e s c h o la r ly in te r e s t in b ib lic a l e x e g e s is .
K a n t s u b o rd in a te d th e o n e to th e o th e r, and S p in o z a a s s u m e d (o r p r e ­
te n d e d h e d id) a p ree sta b lish ed h a r m o n y b e tw e e n th e m . I f th e r e is a
p h ilo s o p h ic a l lesso n to b e d ra w n fr o m th ese a tte m p ts , it is th e n e e d fo r
a ra d ica l se p a ra tio n b e tw e e n th e t w o in tere sts. T u r n in g o n e o f th e m
in to a m e an s fo r th e o th e r m a y p r o d u c e th e o re tic a l c o n t r a d ic tio n s an d
p r a c tic a l d is to rtio n s , o f w h ic h s e lf-d e c e p tio n , c e n s o r s h ip , a n d b r a in ­
w a s h in g are a f e w e x tr e m e e x a m p le s . T h e le s s o n w e are t r y in g to d r a w
is, in o th e r w o r d s , a m o r e r ig o r o u s S p in o z is m . I f s e p a r a tio n is d e ­
c la re d , le t th e re be s e p a ra tio n .34

(26)
 C H A P T E R 2

Spinoza and Hegel:

T he Immanent God—
Substance or Spirit?

In th e p re v io u s ch a p ter w e sa w the p rep h iloso p h ical w o r k w h ic h the

critiq u e o f re lig io n is to p erfo rm in clearin g the m in d o f transcendent
im a g e s an d re lig io u s su p e rstitio n . O n ly after such obstacles have been
re m o v e d , o r at least se rio u sly u n d erm in ed , can the clear and distinct
id eas o f rea so n e m e rg e and assert their self-ev id en ce in the p h ilo so ­
p h e r ’s m in d .
T h e firs t an d m o s t im p o rta n t idea to em erg e is the rec o g n itio n o f
th e a b s o lu te im m a n e n c e o f G o d and his id en tity w ith the w h o le o f
rea lity. T h is is S p in o z a ’s su p rem e ration al in tu itio n , the v ery first and
m o s t c o m p r e h e n s iv e tru e idea (idea vera) fro m w h ic h his p h ilo so p h y
takes its d e p a rtu re (w h a te v e r its fo rm a l o rd er in the Ethics, S p in o za ’s
c h ie f w o r k ) . T h e rest o f the sy stem serves to ex p lica te this idea and
s p e c ify it in d eta il.
It is also a m o s t d a r in g and h e te ro d o x idea— not o n ly fo r the th e o ­
lo g ia n s , S p in o z a ’s u su al o p p o n e n ts, b u t in the h isto ry o f rational phi­
lo s o p h y itse lf. A m o n g th e m a jo r p h ilo so p h ers, o n ly H eg el, a cen tu ry
and a h a lf later, ad h ered to a v ie w p o in t sim ilar to S p in o za ’s, w h ile
tr y in g to tr a n s fo rm it in a m o re co h eren t and, in H e g e l’s v ie w , a m ore
s p iritu a l p e rs p e c tiv e . H e g e l is also th e o n ly h e te ro d o x th in k er w e shall
d iscu ss w h o n o t o n ly d enies the idea o f transcendence, but sees the
re a lm o f im m a n e n c e as d iv in e— a m o v e w h ic h the others refused to
m a k e an d w h ic h N ie tz s c h e d en o u n ced as an illusion and aberration .
T h is p r o v id e s S p in o za and H e g e l w ith a c o m m o n gro u n d and a deep
p h ilo s o p h ic a l a ffin ity , b u t it also serves as th eir m ajo r p oin t o f co n te n ­
tio n . F o r, o n c e th e im m a n e n ce o f G o d , as ab solu te totality, has been
e sta b lish e d , th e q u e s tio n arises: W h at is the nature o f this to tality? Is it
to b e c o n s tr u e d as su b sta n ce, o r as spirit? S h o u ld w e un d erstand it as
an a b s o lu te b e g in n in g o r as a result? A n d is the d iv in e p resent and

(27)
 CHAPTER 2

actu al in p h y s ic a l n ature, o r p erh ap s o n ly in h u m a n h is to ry , as a h ig h e r

o n to lo g ic a l d o m a in ?

A P a r a d ig m o f D i a l e c t i c a l C r it iq u e

H e g e l’s critiq u e o f S p in o za is a d ia lectica l o n e, a im in g to retain th e

essen ce o f S p in o z a ’s d o ctrin e w ith in a d iffe re n t an d “ h ig h e r ” s y s te m .
T h is critiq u e m a y also serv e as a p a ra d ig m fo r a n y d ia le c tic a l re fu ta tio n
in p h ilo so p h y .
It is, in d e ed , w ith re ga rd to S p in o za th at H e g e l states h is m e t h o d o ­
lo g ic a l p rin cip le in clear and v ig o r o u s term s:

In re fu tin g a p h ilo so p h ica l s y s te m . . . o n e s h o u ld e x c lu d e the

w r o n g n o tio n that th e s y s te m m u st be e x p o s e d as b e in g t h r o u g h ­
o u t fa ls e , an d th at th e true s y s te m m u st be m e re ly opposed to th e
f a ls e .. . . R a th er, sp ec u la tiv e th in k in g [ = g e n u in e ly p h ilo s o p h ic a l
th in k in g ] fin d s its e lf in its co u rse o f e v o lu tio n n e c e s s a rily ta k in g
th e sam e sta n d p o in t [as th e criticize d s y s te m ], and to th a t e x te n t
th e s y s te m is p e rfe c tly true.
Y e t it is not the highest standpoint. O n th a t c o u n t, h o w e v e r , th e
s y s te m ca n n o t b e seen as false, as ca llin g fo r re fu ta tio n an d as
le n d in g it s e lf to it. W h a t sh o u ld b e re g a rd ed as false in th is s y s te m
is o n ly th e n o tio n th at it is th e h ig h e st s ta n d p o in t. T h e r e fo r e , th e
true s y s te m ca n n o t relate to it in th e m an n er o f m e re o p p o s itio n ;
fo r i f it d id , th en th e o p p o s e d sy ste m its e lf w o u ld b e o n e -s id e d .
B u t as the h ig h e r s y s te m it m u st rath er co n tain th e s u b o rd in a te
s y s te m w ith in itse lf.'

H e g e l re c o g n ize s tw o p ro p e r fo rm s o f d ia lectica l r e fu ta tio n . O n e is

h is to ric a l and takes p lace in th e su ccessio n o f sy s te m s in tim e; th e o th e r
is s y s te m a tic re fu ta tio n , in scrib ed w ith in the s im u lta n e o u s in te r re la ­
tio n s o f the c o m p o n e n ts w ith in th e final s y s te m o f p h ilo s o p h y .
H is to ric a lly , system s o f p h ilo s o p h y are p r o p e r ly re fu te d b y a c c e p t­
in g th e e le m e n t o f p artial tru th th e y co n tain w h ile d e v e lo p in g th e ir
lo g ic a l im p lic a tio n s to a p o in t w h e re th e in c o n siste n c ie s fr o m w h ic h
th e y su ffe r— b e cau se o f th eir p a rtiality and th e o n e -s id e d n a tu re o f
th e ir g o v e r n in g p rin cip le— are b r o u g h t to lig h t. W h e n w e a d o p t an d
in te r io r iz e su ch a s y s te m , w e also e x p erien c e its d e fic ie n c ie s as o u r
o w n , an d this d riv es us to tran scen d the s y s te m and to ta k e a m o r e
s a tis fa c to ry p o s itio n , o n e th at w ill p reserve th e b a sic tr u th o f th e f o r ­
m e r in a m o r e co h eren t fo rm . A c c o r d in g to H e g e l, th is p ro c e s s w i ll
g o o n u n til th e fin al syn th esis o f p h ilo so p h y — th e s y s te m he ca lls “ a b ­
s o lu te k n o w le d g e ”— has e m e rg ed .

(28)
 SPINOZA AND HEGEL

W h e n th is o c c u rs , a s u p ratem p o ral p ersp ectiv e fo r refu tin g fo rm e r

p h ilo so p h e rs b e c o m e s available. W ithin the final sy stem w e can n o w
d iscern th e w h o le h is to r y o f p h ilo so p h y sk etch ed as in a sh ad o w .
E v e r y g re a t p h ilo so p h e r o f the past n o w figu res as a “ m o m e n t” (or a
lo g ic a l in g re d ie n t) w ith in the o vera ll syn th esis. H is p erson al m ark s
a b o lis h e d , h is h isto ric a l p a rticu la rity elim in ated alto geth er, and his
cla im to e x p re s s th e to tal tru th negated , he has been crystallize d in to a
c o n c e p tu a l c o m p o n e n t w ith in the to tality o f the final syste m .
In his c r itiq u e o f S p in o za , H e g e l uses the sam e p rin cip le in an a lm o st
p a ra d ig m a tic p recisio n :

T h e o n ly re fu ta tio n o f S p in o zis m can th erefo re co n sist, first, in

r e c o g n iz in g its s ta n d p o in t to be essential and n ecessary, and then,
h o w e v e r, in le ttin g th is sta n d p o in t elev ate it s e lf o f itself in to a
h ig h e r o n e . T h e relatio n o f substan ce [S p in o za ’s m ain ca te g o ry ],
w h e n co n s id e re d m e re ly in and fo r itself, leads its e lf o ver to its
o p p o s ite , th e C o n c e p t [H e g e l’s m ain c a te g o ry ]. T h e re fo re , the
e x p o s itio n o f su b sta n ce as o ffe re d in the last b o o k [ o f H e g e l’s
L o g ic ], w h ic h lead s o v e r in to the C o n c e p t, is th e s o le an d true
re fu ta tio n o f S p in o z is m .2

A m o n g th e m a n y fo reru n n ers H eg el w ish e d to assim ilate as “ m o ­

m e n ts ” in to his n e w s y s te m , S p in o za o ccu p ies a p riv ile g e d p o sitio n ,
c o m p a ra b le o n ly to th at o f A ris to tle and K a n t. S p in o za ’s ab so lu te m o ­
n ism , r e v iv in g th e e a r ly G re e k p h ilo so p h e rs, p ro v id e s H e g e l w ith the
n e ce ssa ry s u b s tra te and b e g in n in g o f all p h ilo so p h y. M o r e im p o r ­
ta n tly, S p in o z a m a rk s fo r H e g e l th e cu lm in a tio n o f trad ition al, o b je c t-
o rie n te d m e ta p h y s ic s , w ith its v ie w that the o b je ct, the u n iverse in
itse lf, is in h e re n tly s tru ctu red and g o v ern ed by reason (logos). H e g e l
ca lled th is s ta n d p o in t “ O b je c tiv e L o g ic ,” * his o w n , s o m e w h a t o d d re­
n a m in g o f w h a t K a n t had te rm ed “ d o g m a tic m e ta p h y sic s.”
W h e re a s K a n t s a w his G e rm a n p red ecessor, C h ris tia n W o lff, as “ the
g re a te st a m o n g all d o g m a tic p h ilo so p h e rs ,” 3 H e g e l reserves this title
fo r S p in o z a . “ W h e n b e g in n in g to p h ilo so p h ize, o n e m u st first be a
S p in o z is t,” h e says in o n e ch aracteristic sta te m e n t.4 In H e g e l’s Science
o f Logic, it is S p in o z a ’s sy s te m , d u ly m o d ified , w h ic h b rin g s to a cli­
m a x th e w h o le m a rc h o f trad itio n a l p h ilo so p h y, crystallize d in to “ O b ­

* B y “ L o g ic ,” as the term appears in the title o f his m etaphysical w o rk . Science of

Logic, H e g e l do es n o t understand form al lo g ic but the stu d y o f logos as it structures
bein g , o r rea lity itself. H ence “ O b je ctiv e L o g ic ” signifies the one-sided reco gn itio n o f
logos as o n ly e m b o d ied in external reality; “ Subjective L o g ic ” in vo lves the recognition
( o f id ealism in g eneral) that the rational subject participates in determ ining the rational­
ity and actu ality o f the object.

(29)
 CHAPTER 2

je c t iv e L o g ic .” T h is p u re ly o b je c tiv is t d o ctrin e has b een s u p e r se d e d by

K a n t’s id e a listic re v o lu tio n , a c c o rd in g to w h ic h th e s tru c tu r e o f the
o b je c t is id en tica l w ith (and d e te rm in ed by) th e s tru c tu re o f th e ra tio n al
su b je ct. H e g e l sees this as a m o m e n to u s d is c o v e ry w h ic h b r o u g h t tra­
d itio n a l m e ta p h y sic s to its end; it esta b lish ed th e s ta n d p o in t o f “ S u b ­
je c tiv e L o g ic ” — o r m o d e rn id ea lism — w h ic h w a s th e n to ta k e its ad e­
q u a te fo r m in H e g e l’s o w n p h ilo so p h y : his d ia le ctica l id e n tific a tio n o f
o b je ct and su b ject, o f ac tu a lity and its s e lf-c o n c e p tu a liz a tio n th r o u g h
m an.
F o r H e g e l, th e ab so lu te is n eith e r a th in g lik e s u b s ta n ce (S p in o za ) n o r
a m e re ly s u b je c tiv e “ I th in k " (F ichte, fo llo w in g K a n t), b u t c o m p r is e s
th e m b o th as m o m e n ts in a h ig h e r syn th esis ca lled th e “ C o n c e p t .” H e ­
ge l th e re b y assign s to S p in o za a p o s itio n a n a lo g o u s to his o w n : h a v in g
b r o u g h t to its a p e x th e w h o le h is to ry o f p h ilo s o p h y p r io r to th e a d v e n t
o f id e a lism , S p in o za stan ds at a cru cia l tu rn in g p o in t fo r m e ta p h y s ic s :
fr o m tra d itio n to m o d e rn ity , fr o m d o g m a tic o b je c t iv is m to ( H e g e l’s
o w n ) d ia le ctica l id ealism .
It is, as H e g e l sees it, th e d ia lectica l m a rria g e o f S p in o z a an d K a n t
w h ic h m ak e s his o w n syn th e sis p o ssib le. J u st as K a n t r e m e d ie s th e
o n e -s id e d , th in g -o rie n te d m e ta p h y sic s o f S p in o za , so d o e s S p in o z a ,
w it h his c o n c e p t o f a b so lu te to ta lity , serve to re d e e m th e m a jo r s h o r t­
c o m in g s th a t H e g e l fin d s in K a n t, e sp e c ia lly his ra d ica l d u a lis m an d his
v ie w th a t h u m a n rea so n is fin ite and sev ered fr o m actu a l r e a lity (fr o m
th e s o -c a lle d “ th in g in it s e lf ” ). T h e resu lt is an id e a lis tic v e r s io n o f
S p in o z is m s — d ia lectica l, d y n a m ic , and— as w e sh all see— h is to r ic iz e d .
H e g e l attrib u tes th e sam e p iv o ta l p o s itio n to S p in o z a in a n o th e r m a ­
j o r w o r k , T h e Phenomenology o f Spirit (1807). “ A c c o r d in g to m y v i e w ­
p o in t ,” h e d eclares in th e p reface, “ e v e r y th in g d e p e n d s o n th is , th a t w e
g ra s p an d e x p re ss th e tru e n o t [o n ly] as substance, b u t e q u a lly a ls o as
s u b je c t.” 5 T h e a llu sio n to S p in o za is o b v io u s . S p in o z a 's s u b s ta n c e m u s t
be ta k e n as a basis, b u t g iv e n th e fea tu res o f a d ia le ctica l s u b je c t. T h is
in c lu d e s , as w e sh all see, th e p ro c e ss o f s e lf-c o n s titu tio n , w h e r e b y the
s u b je c t b e c o m e s o th e r than it s e lf an d th en, b y a “ s e c o n d n e g a t io n ,”
re c u p e ra te s an d actualizes its tru e s e lf in and th r o u g h th is o th e r. E v e n ­
tu a lly , th is also m ean s th at th e a b so lu te in H e g e l c a n n o t e n jo y th e s ta ­
tu s o f e te r n ity (su p ra te m p o ra lity ) simpliciter, b u t m u s t rise to th is sta tu s
th r o u g h a p ro c e ss in tim e and w ith in h u m a n h is to r y — a n o v e lty
w h ic h , in its sh eer h e te r o d o x y , ev en su rp asses S p in o za .
I sh all n o w re c o n s tru c t the m ain p o in ts o f H e g e l’s c r itiq u e o f S p i­
n o z a , a v o id in g le n g t h y ex e g e s is and s e c o n d a ry p o in ts ( w h ic h are,
h o w e v e r , fre q u e n tly relev a n t in H e g e l). F o r th e sak e o f cla rity , I sh all
firs t p re sen t an a n a ly tic s u m m a r y o f H e g e l’s m a in c la im s as th e y

(30)
 SPINOZA AND HEGEL

e m e rg e , c o n n e c te d , fro m all relevan t so u rce s.6 T h e n , fo llo w in g the

te x t o f H e g e l’s History o f Philosophy and Logic, I shall c o m p le m e n t these
p oin ts and sp ell th e m o u t in fu rth e r detail.
F ro m this lo g ic a l and o n to lo g ic a l analysis, I shall then d ev elo p its
less a b s tra ct im p lic a tio n s fo r re lig io n and the p h ilo so p h y o f h isto ry.
T h e n , in th e last p art o f this ch apter, I shall d elve beneath the hard core
o f th e S p in o z a - H e g e l c o n tr o v e r s y fo r a p ossib le clash b e tw ee n a h et­
e r o d o x L u th e ra n p h ilo s o p h e r and a fo rm e r e x -M a rr a n o J ew ish h eretic.
F in ally, c o m m e n t in g o n H e g e l’s critiq u e, I shall argue that S p in o za
ca m e c lo s e r to H e g e l th an th e latter a d m itted , and y et the rem ain in g
d iffe re n c e s are irre c o n c ila b le . S h o w in g w h y S p in o za m u st refuse the
d ia le ctica l (and te le o lo g ic a l) Aufhebung b y H e g e l, I shall ind icate h o w
this lea ves t w o o th e r g ra n d altern atives fo r ca rry in g on a «ow teleologi-
cal p h ilo s o p h y o f im m a n e n ce — th at o f M a r x and N ie tzsch e.

O v e r v ie w of H e g e l ’s C r it ic is m

G e n e r a lly s p e a k in g , H e g e l v ie w s his critiq u e o f S p in o za as an attem p t

to s p e c ify th e c o h e re n c e co n d itio n s fo r m ain tain in g S p in o za ’s p rin ci­
p les, a b o v e all his id ea o f G o d as im m a n e n t totality. It is because H e g e l
accep ts an d w is h e s to m ain tain S p in o z a ’s p rin cip le o f ab solu te to tality
that he w a n ts to re m o v e o th e r aspects o f S p in o za ’s th o u g h t that m ake
the c o h e re n t e x p lic a tio n o f his m ain idea im p o ssib le.

A n a ly tic Summary o f H eg el’s Critique

H e g e l, in p a rticu la r, critic ize s S p in o za fo r his o n e-sid ed v ie w o f n e g a ­

tion ; his n o n d ia le ctica l (and, th erefo re , in coh eren t) co n stru al o f the
co n c e p t o f to ta lity ; an d — as a co n seq u en ce— his v ie w o f th e to ta lity as
an in e rt th in g , a s u b sta n ce, rath er than an o rg a n ic and co n scio u s su b ­
je c t. M o s t o f H e g e l's d eta iled critic ism s are such that even n o n -H e g e -
lians m ig h t (an d o fte n d id) v o ic e th em . B u t H e g e l tries to systematize
th e v a rio u s d iffic u ltie s fo u n d in S p in o za , b y attrib u tin g th em to a c o m ­
m o n r o o t— S p in o z a ’s o n e -s id e d v ie w o f n e gatio n , lead in g to his n o n -
d ia le ctica l c o n c e p t o f to ta lity . H e g e l id en tifies the fo llo w in g m ajo r
fla w s in S p in o z a ’s th o u g h t:

1. S u b sta n c e q u a su b sta n ce is o n ly p ure b e in g and sim p le id en ­

tity, e x c lu d in g all n e g a tio n .
2. In th a t, th e a b s o lu te m u st ex clu d e all in n er d ifferen ces and
p a rtic u la riz a tio n .
3. F o r th is rea so n , S p in o za ca n n ot s h o w th e n ecessity o f there

(30
 C HAPTER 2

b e in g p a r t ic u la r th in g s at all; th e fin ite a s p e c t o f th e u n iv e r s e re ­

m a in s in e x p lic a b le a n d at b e s t c o n t in g e n t.
4. E v e n as c o n t in g e n t, S p in o z a c a n n o t a t tr ib u te r e a lit y to th e
fin ite m o d e s . A lt h o u g h d e c la re d to b e rea l, th e y m u s t b e c o n s id ­
e re d th e fr u it o f an “ e x te r n a l r e fle c tio n ” o r th e imaginatio.
5. S im ila r ly , th e s o -c a lle d a ttrib u te s c a n n o t c o u n t as s e lf- s p e c i­
fic a tio n s o f th e s u b s ta n c e , b u t o n ly as e x te r n a l an d s u b je c tiv e p r o ­
j e c t io n s o f o u r m in d s .
6. T h e a b s o lu te is th e re as a b e g in n in g , n o t as a r e s u lt; th e
m o d e s d e p e n d u p o n th e s u b s ta n c e u n ila te ra lly , an d d o n o t c o n d i­
tio n , in tu r n , th e p o s s ib ility o f th e su b s ta n c e its e lf. T h e s u b s ta n c e
is causa sui in itse lf, p r io r to a n d in d e p e n d e n tly o f its b e in g th e
c a u s e o f th e p a rtic u la r m o d e s . (T h is , to H e g e l, is th e s in g le m o s t
im p o r t a n t e x p r e s s io n o f a n o n d ia le c tic a l, n o n r e c ip r o c a l s y s t e m .)
7. T h e fo r m e r p o in ts ad d u p to a fu n d a m e n ta l b re a k b e t w e e n
b o th asp e cts o f th e u n iv erse— th e in fin ite an d th e fin ite , natura ua~
turans an d natura naturata. S p in o z a ’s in te n d e d m o n is m s p lits in to
an a c tu a l d u a lis m — an ad v e rse o u tc o m e fr o m S p in o z a ’s v ie w p o i n t
an d , a g a in , th e re su lt o f his la c k o f d ia le ctica l lo g ic an d its m o v e ­
m e n t o f d u a l n e g a tio n .
8. B e c a u s e th e to ta lity as su ch has n o in n e r n e g a t iv ity , it also
la c k s d e v e lo p m e n t an d life. T h e r e is m o v e m e n t among th e p a r tic ­
u la r m o d e s (m e ch a n ica l m o v e m e n t), b u t n o m o v e m e n t as th e in ­
n e r d e v e lo p m e n t o f th eir p rin cip le o f u n ity ; th e t o t a lity q u a th is
u n it y re m a in s in e rt and static.
9. F in a lly (and p a rtly as a re su lt o f th e fo rm e r), th e a b s o lu te is
p e rc e iv e d as a m e re th in g (res), an u n c o n s c io u s o b je c t, d e v o id o f
s u b je c tiv ity , p e rso n a lity , and spirit.

P o in ts 1 th r o u g h 7 su m up the lack o f dialectical logic in S p in o za . P o in t

9 in d icate s th e lack o f subjectivity, and p o in t 8 serv es as a lin k b e tw e e n
th e m . A c c o r d in g ly , H e g e l w o u ld d em an d (and p e r fo r m s in th e Logic)
t w o d ia lectica l co rre ctio n s in o rd e r to o v e rc o m e S p in o z a ’s s h o r tc o m ­
in g s .
F irst, th e to ta lity m u st be co n stitu ted and g o v e r n e d b y th e n e g a tio n
o f n e g a tio n (or d ia lectica l re c ip ro c ity ); in o th e r w o r d s , th e a b s o lu te
m u s t n o t b e c o n c e iv e d as a re a d y -m a d e b e g in n in g , b u t as a resu lt.
S e c o n d , th e to ta lity m u st also b e co n c e iv e d as su b je c t. T h e firs t d i­
a le ctica l c o rr e ctio n takes p lace o n th e lev e l o f su b sta n ce (o r “ O b je c t iv e
L o g ic ” ); th e seco n d co rre ctio n co m p le te s the p assage o f su b s ta n ce in to
su b ject.

(32)
 SPINOZA AND HEGEL

A theism , Acosm ism , and Pantheism S p in o za w as ch a rged w ith atheism .

H e g e l re v e rse s th is c h a rg e , c la im in g that, on the con trary, the troub le
w ith S p in o z a is th a t “ w ith h im there is to o m u ch G o d .” 7 In o th er
w o r d s , it is n o t G o d , th e in fin ite, b u t the fin ite and p articular m od es
th at are d e n ie d actu a l reality. T h is m akes S p in o za ’s system a fo rm not
o f a th e is m b u t— in H e g e l’s p o le m ic a l phrase— o f “ a c o s m is m ” (denial
o f th e re a lity o f the w o r ld o f fin ite th ings).
H e g e l’s c r itiq u e is based u p o n the s yste m a tic im p lica tio n s o f Sp i­
n o z a ’s d o c trin e , n o t o n his e x p lic it p o sitio n . H a v in g started w ith ab­
s o lu te u n it y an d id e n tity — and la ck in g a d ialectical lo g ic — Sp in o za,
H e g e l c la im s , is u n a b le to m ain tain th e a ctu a lity o f particular and finite
th in g s. H is to t a lity b e c o m e s an o v e rp o w e rin g p rin cip le in w h ic h all
d iffe re n c e s arc o b lite ra te d . T h is b o u n d less to ta lity a llo w s o f no real
d is tin c tio n s in th e u n iv e rs e — o n ly o f m od a l variatio n s o f the sam e.
W h a te v e r d o e s ap p e a r to us as d istin ct and sp ecific is such o n ly becau se
o f the im a g in a tio n — or, in H e g e l’s la n g u a g e, o f an “ extern al reflec­
tio n ” — an d n o t b y v ir tu e o f its o b je c tiv e o n to lo g ic a l status. O n ly the
su b sta n ce e x is tin g in se (in itse lf) and co n ceiva b le per se (th ro u gh itself)
is an a c tu a l in d iv id u a l, w h e re a s th e fin ite m o d es are b u t p assing and
flu c tu a tin g “ a ffe c tio n s ,” o r states, o f this sin gle substan ce. S p in o za ’s
in a b ility to d o ju s t ic e to the re a lm o f the fin ite is w h a t H e g e l m eans by
h a v in g “ to o m u c h G o d .”
A t th e sa m e tim e H e g e l p raises S p in o za ’s ach iev em en t in gra sp in g
th e stru c tu r e o f r e a lity in term s o f a sin gle to tality, in w h ic h the d u al­
ism o f G o d an d w o r ld , th e C r e a to r and the created, the tran scen den t
and th e im m a n e n t, is o v e r c o m e . T h is p an th eism w ill serve as the fo u n ­
d atio n o f H e g e l’s o w n s y s te m ; b u t in H e g e l it w ill be g iv e n a p roces-
sual an d s p iritu a l d im e n s io n . T h e ab so lu te to ta lity d oes n o t exist b e­
fo re h a n d an d e te rn a lly , as in S p in o za , but p ro d u ces its e lf as ab solu te in
th e p ro c e s s o f h is to r y ; an d , rath er than b ein g co n ceived as an inert and
th in g lik e su b s ta n c e , th e to ta lity o f G o d and w o rld is v ie w e d as a free
su b ject.
H e g e l’s m o d ifie d v e rs io n o f S p in o z a ’s p an th eism is n o t less b u t m ore
“ h e r e tic a l” in te rm s o f co n v e n tio n a l th e o lo g y . W ith all his d arin g
ideas, S p in o z a still m a in ta in e d th at G o d w a s eternal and n o t su bject to
b e c o m in g o r ch a n g e . In H e g e l, G o d is n o t o n ly d e p rived o f his ab so­
lu te tr a n s ce n d e n c e , b u t is ev en m ad e the p ro d u c t o f a process in tim e
(n a m e ly , o f th e s e lf-a c tu a liz a tio n o f spirit th ro u g h h u m an h isto ry ).
R a th e r th an b e in g a b s o lu te an d eternal fro m the o utset, G o d , the ab­
s o lu te u n ity o f th e im m a n e n t and th e transcen d ent, em erges in H e g e l
as th e o u tc o m e o f a d ia le ctica l p rocess o f s e lf-co n stitu tio n and self­
m e d ia tio n . T h is v ie w o f th e “ b e c o m in g G o d " sh ou ld have earned H e -

(3 3)
 CHAPTER 2

g e l— fr o m th e v ie w p o in t o f trad itio n a l th e o lo g y — an e v e n g re a te r
c r o w n o f th o rn s than th e o n e p laced o n S p in o z a ’s h ead . Y e t H e g e l al­
re a d y w r o te in a d iffe re n t Zeitgeist— and th at m ak es a d iffe re n c e .

Deduction and Method H e g e l’s seco n d critic is m co n c e rn s S p in o z a ’s use

o f th e g e o m e tric a l— that is, fo rm a l-d e d u c tiv e — m e th o d . H e g e l arg u e s
th at th is m e th o d sh o u ld b e ban ned fro m p h ilo s o p h y b ec a u se p h ilo s o ­
p h y m u st reflect th e “ in n er m o v e m e n t” o f its o w n su b je c t m a tte r. A l ­
re a d y K a n t d istin g u ish ed th e “ m a th e m a tic a l” fr o m th e “ p h ilo s o p h ic a l”
m e th o d . In p h ilo s o p h y (thus K a n t), reaso n has o n ly it s e lf to b u ild
u p o n , w o r k in g its w a y fro m the less clear and artic u la te to th e m o r e
clear and articulate. C la r it y and d istinctn ess can be e x p e c te d in p h ilo s ­
o p h y o n ly at th e end and n o t, as in a d e d u ctiv e s y s te m , at th e b e g in ­
n in g . A c c o r d in g ly , K a n t co n c lu d e s, th e m e th o d o f p h ilo s o p h y is the
gradual self-explication o f reason. In th e “ m a th e m a tic a l” m e th o d , o n the
co n tra ry , fu ll cla rity an d co n c lu s iv e ce rta in ty are atta in ed at a n y sta g e
o f th e d ed u ctio n ; w e d o n o t m o v e , as in p h ilo s o p h y , fr o m le sse r to
g re a te r c la rity o f w h o le c o n te x ts b u t p ro c e e d o n th e le v e l o f a b s o lu te
c la rity fr o m o n e p articu lar ite m to th e n e x t .8
H e g e l accep ts th e th ru st o f th is K a n tia n a r g u m e n t b u t ad d s to it sp e ­
c ific rea so n s o f his o w n . First, v erific a tio n in p h ilo s o p h y d e p e n d s on
th e c o m p le te s y s te m a tic c o n te x t and ca n n o t b e o b ta in e d p r io r to its
fu ll u n fo ld in g (“ th e true is th e w h o le ” ). S e c o n d , th e lo g ic a l g e n e s is o f
an id ea in p h ilo so p h y is an in teg ral p art o f its m e a n in g an d tru th ; it
ca n n o t b e c o m m u n ica te d as a sin g le “ c o n c lu s io n ” and y e t re ta in its
m e a n in g o r tru th v alu e. In th e sam e w a y, th e “ p r o o f ” is n o t an e x te rn a l
la d d e r th at can be d isp o sed o f o n ce the e n su in g “ p r o p o s itio n ” is
re a ch e d . In th e fo rm a l-d e d u c tiv e m e th o d , h o w e v e r, th e p ro c e s s o f
d e m o n s tr a tio n is ex tra n eo u s to th e e n su in g c o n c lu s io n w h ic h h as a
tru th v a lu e and m ean in g in itself, in d e p e n d e n tly o f its g e n e s is . T h e
lo g ic a l e q u ip m e n t o f “ p r o o fs ,” “ p ro p o s itio n s ,” and th e lik e , in d ic a te s
an e x te rn a l relation b e tw een p rocess and co n se q u e n t, and is th e re fo re
su ita b le o n ly to th e fo rm a l and th e em p irica l scien ces (m a th e m a tic s ,
fo r m a l lo g ic , p h y s ic s , e tc .), as w e ll as in d a ily a r g u m e n ta tio n a n d ra­
tio c in a tio n (in c lu d in g p ractical a rg u m e n ts and stra teg ies), b u t n o t in
p h ilo so p h y . T h ir d , p h ilo s o p h y is ba sed o n Vernunft (co n c re te rea so n ),
n o t o n Verstand (fo rm al u n d ersta n d in g); its su b je c t m a tte r is a c tu a l re a l­
ity , w h ic h can be e x p re ssed o n ly in a lo g ic a l fo r m th a t has th e c h a ra c ­
teristics o f its o b je ct— n am ely, o f o rg a n ic to tality, ra th er th a n a series
o f s in g le p ro p o s itio n s . F o u rth , and m o re b r o a d ly sp e a k in g : in p h ilo s ­
o p h y o n e ca n n o t separate fo rm fr o m co n te n t, m e th o d fr o m s u b je c t
m atter; th e p h ilo so p h e r is su p p o se d to f o llo w th e im m a n e n t m o v e ­

<3 4)
 SPINOZA AND HEGEL

m e n t o f fh e s u b je c t m atter it s e lf (die Sache selbst) as it ev o lv e s th ro u g h

c o n tra d ic tio n s an d th eir p artial reso lu tion s; and th e “ m e th o d ” o f p h i­
lo s o p h y is n o th in g b u t th e stru ctu re o f the fin ish ed p rocess as it co m e s
to lig h t in re tro s p e c t. P h ilo s o p h y thus has no a p rio ri m e th o d at all; it
lets its s u b je c t m a tte r structure itself as it e v o lv e s— and th e sh ape that
resu lts is ca lled its “ m e th o d .”
A s can b e seen , all these s p e c ific argu m e n ts fo llo w fro m o n e m ajo r
so u rce: H e g e l’s “ o r g a n ic ” v ie w o f p h ilo so p h ica l tru th as a s e lf-u n fo ld ­
in g d ia le ctica l to ta lity . H e g e l th ereb y applies his o n to lo g ica l critiq u e o f
S p in o z a ’s “ r ig i d ” to ta lity to the field o f m eth o d as w ell. H e fails, h o w ­
e v e r to r e c o g n iz e th at S p in o za (at least in his Treatise on the Intellect)
w a s his m a jo r fo re ru n n e r in re jec tin g an a p rio ri m eth o d .
F ro m B a c o n an d G a lile o th ro u g h D escartes to L o c k e and K a n t,
m o d e rn p h ilo so p h e rs h ave g iv e n lo g ic a l p rio rity to the s tu d y o f
m e th o d — th a t is, m o re b ro a d ly , o fe p is t e m o lo g y , o ver th e su b sta n tiv e
s cie n ce s. In o rd e r to k n o w , o n e w as su p p o sed to learn first w h a t
k n o w le d g e w a s an d h o w it co u ld be c o rre ctly o btain ed . S p in o za, in the
fash io n o f th e d ay, set o u t to w r ite in th e Treatise on the Intellect his o w n
“ essay o n m e th o d ” p rio r to w r itin g his su b sta n tiv e system ; b u t w h a t
h a p p e n e d to h im w a s n o t d issim ila r (in reverse) to the fate o f th e b ib ­
lical B a la a m , w h o in ten d e d to cu rse and en ded up b lessin g. Startin g
w ith th e p r o g r a m o f in v e s tig a tin g m eth o d p rio r to h a v in g su b sta n tiv e
k n o w le d g e , S p in o z a reverses his o rig in a l p o sitio n ; m e th o d , as the
fo rm o f tru e k n o w le d g e , can be k n o w n o n ly in retro sp ect, b y reflectin g
u p o n th e stru c tu r e an d p ro p erties o f so m e true k n o w le d g e th at w e al­
re a d y p o ssess. M e t h o d is an id ea o f an id ea (i.e ., reflective k n o w le d g e );
b u t in o r d e r to h av e th is reflectio n w e m u st first have the b a sic true
id ea. M e t h o d is b e tte r u n d e rs to o d — and the ca p acity to o b ta in true
k n o w le d g e is s tre n g th e n e d — the m o re su b sta n tiv e k n o w le d g e w e in
fact o b ta in .
W h e th e r S p in o za w a s fa ith fu l to this co n c lu sio n is an o th er q u estio n .
B u t th e lite ra l te x t o f th e Treatise on the Intellect, at least, co m es as clo se
to H e g e l’s re je c tio n o f an a p rio ri m e th o d in p h ilo so p h y as a n y im p o r ­
tan t p re d e c e s s o r o r su cc e sso r has ev e r co m e.

T h e A bsolute as a Spiritless Substance T h e th ird criticism H e g e l m akes

in th e H istory o f Philosophy o verlap s w ith his fu lle r d iscu ssio n in the
Logic, an d I sh all c o m b in e th em .
In re je c tin g th e fo rm a l-d e d u c tiv e m eth o d , H e g e l also rejects the
n o n d ia le c tic a l v ie w o f n e g a tio n it im p lies. T h is is the lin k b e tw e e n the
flaw s o f m e th o d and th e fla w s o f co n ten t that H e g e l fin d s in S p in o z a ’s
m e ta p h y s ic s:

(35)
 CHAPTER 2

B e c a u se n e g a tio n w a s thus co n c e iv e d by S p in o za in onfc-sided

fash io n m erely, th ere is, in the th ird p lace, in his s y s te m an u tter
b lo ttin g o u t o f th e p rin cip le o f s u b je c tiv ity , in d iv id u a lity , p e r s o n ­
ality, the m o m e n t o f self-co n scio u sn ess in B e i n g .9

T h is is th e m o st im p o rta n t criticism H e g e l v o ic es, an d it lin k s to g e th e r

m a n y o f th e s p e c ific p oin ts listed ab ove. In p articu lar, w e see th a t, fo r
H e g e l, th e la c k o f a n egatio n and d ialectical lo g ic is also re s p o n s ib le fo r
th e la ck o f s u b je c tiv ity in the ab solu te. T h is o n e sid ed v ie w o f n e g a tio n
seem s to lie at th e ro o t o f S p in o za ’s p ro b le m s , an d th e re fo re it is
w o r t h w h ile to b e g in w ith it.
S p in o za co n c eiv es o f th e ab solu te su b sta n ce in term s o f p u re b e in g
and sim p le id en tity. Its a g reem en t w ith it s e lf is n o t based u p o n a p ri­
m o r d ia l s elf-d ifferen tiatio n ; it is n o t co n stru ed — as in a d ia le ctica l s y s ­
tem — as a retu rn to s e lf o r as a p rocess o f sc\i-identification o n th e basis
o f p re v io u s self-sep ara tio n . R ath er, the id e n tity o f th e s u b s ta n ce is
g iv e n b e fo re h a n d , s im p ly and im m e d ia te ly , in a w a y th a t m a k e s an y
fu rth e r d ifferen tia tio n lo g ic a lly im p o ssib le.
T h is s itu a tio n is d ue p rim a rily to the fact th at S p in o za d e fin e d the
a b s o lu te , G o d , as p u re b e in g that in v o lv e s n o n e g a tio n . T h e to ta lity is
a b s o lu te a ffirm a tio n , w ith n o in h eren t p rin cip le o f n e g a tiv ity . B u t th is,
H e g e l claim s, m akes it im p o ssib le fo r it to h ave in n er d iffe re n c e s , to
p a rticu la riz e itself, and to g iv e rise to fin ite m o d e s o r to a n y o th e r fo rm
o f lim ita tio n , and also to m o v e m e n t, ch a n ge , o r life. In o th e r w o r d s ,
th e e x c lu s io n o f n e g a tiv ity fro m the substan ce qua su b sta n ce m u s t lead
to a P a rm e n id ea n k in d o f u n ity, w ip in g o u t all d is tin c tio n s an d m a k in g
all fin ite en tities, all ch a n ge and d y n a m is m , o n to lo g ic a lly im p o s s ib le .
H e g e l u n d ersta n d s this criticism to b e im m a n e n t. It is based u p o n
S p in o z a ’ s o w n p rin cip le, w h ic h H e g e l e x to lls b e y o n d lim it, th a t deter­
minatio negatio est, and o n the trad itio n a l lo g ic o f p a rtic u la riz a tio n , as
e sta b lish ed e v er sin ce th e P re -S o c ra tics, a c co rd in g to w h ic h all d iffe r ­
e n tia tio n an d m o v e m e n t in the “ o n e ” p re su p p o se the w o r k o f a n e g a ­
tive p rin c ip le in b e in g (P a rm en id es’ “ th at w h ic h is n o t ” ).
I f th e n e g a tio n is ex te rn a l to the su b stan ce, fin ite th in g s ca n n o t have
o n to lo g ic a l re a lity b u t m u st— again in the fa sh io n o f P a rm e n id e s — be
c o n s id e re d th e p ro d u c ts o f a lesser d e g re e o f k n o w le d g e , th e imaginatio
(or, as H e g e l says, an “ ex tern a l refle ctio n ” ). T h is , at lea st in p art, is
a d m itte d b y S p in o za h im s e lf w h e n he claim s th a t n o real d is tin c tio n
e x is ts in th e u n iv e rse— eith er b e tw e e n th e su b sta n ce and its attrib u te s
o r m o d e s , o r b e tw e e n a n y tw o m o d es. In o th e r w o r d s , th ere are n o
real in d iv id u a ls in th e w o rld e x c e p t th e w o rld as a s in g le to ta lity ; and
all d iffe re n c e s m u st be d ism issed as s u p erficia l flu c tu a tio n s o r p a ssin g

(36)
 SPINOZA AND HEGEL

states o f th e sam e en tity. (In claim in g that m od es are unreal, H egel

does n o t rep re sen t S p in o z a ’s o fficial d octrin e, but takes sides in a w ell-
k n o w n in te r p re tiv e d eb a te.)
E v e n a s s u m in g , fo r th e sake o f the argu m en t, that the m od es can be
co n stru e d as real, th e y are still m erely co n tin gen t, in the sense that
th ere is n o n e ce s s ity fo r th e substan ce to p rod u ce them . In fact, Sp i­
n oza is u n a b le to s h o w th e n ecessity o f there bein g particular th in gs at
all, an d th e fin ite asp ect o f rea lity (his natura naturata) rem ains in e x p li­
cable an d at best co n tin g e n t. N o t o n ly is ev e ry particular m od e co n tin ­
gen t in it s e lf— n a m e ly , th ere is n o th in g in con ceivab le in its n o t h av in g
been— b u t th e v e r y e x is te n ce o f a natura naturata m ust co u n t as co n tin ­
gent; g iv e n th e la c k o f n e g a tiv ity in the ab solute, it is p erfectly co n ­
ce iva b le th at th ere w o u ld be no fin ite th in gs at all. T h u s, co n trary to
H e g e l’s d ia le ctica l co n c e p tio n o f a to tality (in w h ic h the co n tin gen t
asp ect o f b e in g is it s e lf lo g ic a lly n ecessary), in Sp in oza there is no lo g ­
ical n e ce s s ity in th ere b e in g co n tin g e n t entities at all; co n tin g en cy itse lf
is co n tin g e n t.
T h is cr itic is m c o u ld be m ad e also by a n o n -H ege lian , w h en clo sely
e x a m in in g o n e o f th e m o s t cru cial p rop o sitio n s in the Ethics: “ From
the n e ce s s ity o f th e d iv in e natu re there m u st fo llo w in fin itely m an y
th in g s in in fin ite ly m a n y m o d es (i.e ., e v e ry th in g w h ic h can fall under
an in fin ite in te lle c t” (pt. I, p ro p . 16). T h is p ro p o sitio n introd uces for
the first tim e th e p lu ra lity o f m o d e s that are supp o sed to flo w “ neces­
s a rily ” fr o m th e su b sta n ce. Y e t p ro p o sitio n 16 its e lf has a so m ew h at
c o n tin g e n t (o r arb itra ry ) status, fo r it is n o t d ed uced fro m the fo re g o ­
in g p ro p o s itio n s o r a x io m s , b u t is rather d efen d ed in isolation , as i f it
rep resen ted a n e w a x io m .
T h e s o -c a lle d “ a ttrib u te s ,” to o , ca n n ot be con strued as inner speci­
fication s o f th e o n e su b sta n ce, and th erefo re w e m u st dism iss th em as
p ro d u c ts o f o u r s u b je c tiv e m in d s, p rod u cts that w e p roject u p on the
stru ctu re o f th e su b sta n ce. In this criticism , again, H e g e l gives a fu n ­
d am en tal in te r p re ta tio n to a w e ll- k n o w n S p in o zistic p rob lem . Sp inoza
d efines an a ttrib u te as “ what the intellect perceives o f a substance, as co n ­
s titu tin g its e s s e n c e ” (Ethics, p t. I, def. 4); and H e g e l reads this as i f the
attrib u te is o n ly s u b je c tiv e , e x p la in in g this by the lack o fin n e r n e g a tiv ­
ity in th e a b s o lu te , w h ic h d ep rives it o f o b je ctiv e self-d ifferen tiation .
H e g e l h ere a g a in ta k e s sid es in a w e ll-k n o w n interpretive co n trov ersy
o ver th e n a tu re o f th e attrib u tes; in d eed , he starts it.
A ll th e fo r m e r p o in ts in d icate a n o n d ialectical construal o f totality.
E v e r sin ce th e M ile s ia n s c h o o l, in fact, the p ro b lem o f to tality— the
relation o f th e O n e an d th e M a n y w ith in a sin gle system — has n o t been
sa tisfa c to rily re s o lv e d . E ith e r th e O n e w as p ut fo rth as p red om in ant—

(37)
 CHAPTER 2

in w h ic h case, as in P a rm e n id e s, even P la to , an d (H e g e l th in k s) c e r­
ta in ly S p in o za , th e M a n y c o u ld n o t b e d o n e ju s tic e ; o r e lse th e M a n y
w e r e p r e d o m in a n t, in w h ic h case th e O n e w a s s a c rific e d an d a fo r m o f
n o m in a lis m o r e m p ir ic is m e n su ed . D u a lis m , to o , w a s n o t th e an ­
s w e r— at lea st n o t fo r an a v o w e d m o n is t lik e S p in o za . T h e o n ly c o h e r ­
e n t c o n s tr u a l o f th e to ta lity , H e g e l a rg u e s, is b y w a y o f d ia le c tic a l lo g ic ;
a n y o th e r c o n s tru a l b rea k s d o w n in to a n e w d u a lis m , o r s a c rific e s o n e
o f th e sid es fo r th e sak e o f the o th er. T h e v e r y c o n c e p t o f to t a lity im ­
p lies a c o n tra d ic tio n : a s y s te m th a t is at o n c e O n e an d M a n y , U n iv e r s a l
an d P a rtic u la r, B e in g and B e c o m in g . In d eed , in th e d ia le c tic a l c o n ­
stru a l o f th e c o n c e p t o f to ta lity , all th e o ld P la to n ic o p p o s ite s are c o n ­
sid e re d as m e d ia tin g e ach o th e r in a sin g le p ro c e s s . T h e u n iv e rs a l b e ­
c o m e s su ch o n ly b y w a y o f its s e lf-p a rtic u la riz a tio n , fr o m w h ic h it is
re c o n s titu te d as a “ c o n c r e te ” u n iv e rsa l. T h e O n e b e c o m e s w h a t it is
o n ly b y w a y o f th e M a n y w h ic h e v o lv e fro m it an d , in th eir re g a in e d
u n ity , c o n s titu te the O n e . T h e id e n tity o f th e s y s te m is c o n s titu te d b y
a p ro c e s s o f s e lf-d iffe re n tia tio n an d as a m o v e m e n t o f “ re tu rn to s e l f ”
fr o m th is d iffe re n tia tio n . Id e n tity is n o t im m e d ia t e ly an d s im p ly
g iv e n , b u t is th e re su lt o f a p ro cess o f reidentification. A d ia le c tic a l c o n ­
stru a l o f th e to ta lity w o u ld req u ire , first, u n d e rs ta n d in g th e a b s o lu te
as in v o lv in g n e g a tio n in its in n er co n s titu tio n , an d c o n s e q u e n tly as
b e in g th e re su lt o f a p ro c e ss o f s e lf-p a rtic u la riz a tio n , b y w h ic h it re ­
g a in s (o r c o n stitu te s) its d ia le ctica l u n ity an d its v e r y statu s as a b s o lu te .
F o r th is re a so n , th e m a jo r fla w th at H e g e l fin d s in S p in o z a ’s t h e o r y o f
su b s ta n c e is th a t th e m o d e s d ep en d u p o n th e s u b s ta n ce u n ila te ra lly ; th e
s u b s ta n c e is first causa sui, in d e p e n d e n tly o f th e m o d e s , an d th e n it is
als o s u p p o s e d to b e th e ca u se o f th e m o d e s as a d is tin c t an d s e c o n d a r y
act.

T h e First Dialectical Correction

M o s t o f H e g e l’s a tte m p t in th e ch a p te r o n th e a b s o lu te in th e L og ic is
to re fu te th is v ie w an d p rese n t his firs t d ia lectica l c o r r e c tio n to S p in o ­
z a ’s o u t lo o k — a c o rr e c tio n , w e h av e seen , th at ta k e s p la c e still o n th e
le v e l o f su b s ta n ce an d “ O b je c tiv e L o g ic .” In H e g e l’s c o rr e c te d v e rs io n ,
th e a b s o lu te is th e re su lt o f its o w n p ro c e ss o f s e lf- c o n s titu tio n , a p r o ­
ce ss th a t ta k e s p la c e b y th e m e d ia tio n o f th e fin ite m o d e s . C e r t a in ly ,
th e su b s ta n c e is th e cause o f it s e lf— b u t w h a t is th is “ i t s e l f ” o f w h ic h it
is th e ca u se? Is it a ta u to lo g ic a l id e n tity , o r is it its o w n “ s e l f ” in th e
fo r m o f an “ o th e r ” ? O n l y th e la tte r w o u ld s a tis fy th e d ia le c tic a l c o n ­
c e p t o f to ta lity , as w e ll as th e co h e re n c e co n d itio n s fo r m a in ta in in g s u c h
a c o n c e p t. T h e su b sta n ce is ca u se o f it s e lf in th a t it is th e ca u se o f th e
in f in it y o f m o d e s w h ic h is n o th in g b u t it s e lf in th e fo r m o f its o p p o s ite ;

(3 8)
 SPINOZA AND HEGEL

or, the in fin ite , etern al, U nitarian asp ect o f the universe is cause o f itse lf
in th at it is th e cause o f th e fin ite, tem p oral, p luralistic aspect o f the
u n iverse— b o th b e in g o p p o s ite m om en ts o f the sam e system , o f the
sam e d ia le ctica l u n ity. T h e w o r ld as natura naturans and the w o rld as
natura naturata are o n e, S p in o za says; let h im then construe th em in
su ch a w a y th a t natura naturans w ill be causa sui not d irectly and in itself,
b u t in th at it is th e cause o f th e natura naturata— w h ic h is n o th in g but
its e lf in th e fo r m o f “ o th e rn e s s .” In a w o rd , the co n ce p t o f causa sui is
realized in th a t th e o n e su b sta n ce particularizes itse lf in to the m odes
and b e c o m e s ca u se o f it s e lf through being the cause o f the modes. O n ly
as th e re su lt o f th is m e d ia tio n , can the ab solu te to tality em erge and be
co n stitu te d as su ch .

T h e Second Dialectical Correction: The Absolute as Subject

B y in tr o d u c in g n e g a t iv ity in to the ab solu te and v ie w in g it as a result,

w e h av e re in te rp re te d th e su b sta n ce as an o rg a n ic totality. A dialectical
to ta lity is o r g a n ic in th at its u n ity is the result o f the in terrelation o f
the m a n y p a rticu la rs— w h ic h also are n o t p rim ord ia l, but em erge fro m
th eir u n ify in g p rin c ip le w h ile at th e sam e tim e recon stitu tin g it. A n
o rg a n ic to ta lity , h o w e v e r, is a su b je c tlik e system . T h e co n cep t o f su b­
je c t d e n o tes in H e g e l n o t o n ly a co n scio u s b ein g, but— in a m ore p rim ­
itive sense— a n y o rg a n iz e d to ta lity w h o s e g o v e rn in g lo g ic is the sam e
as the o n e g o v e r n in g th e a c tiv ity o f th e “ e g o .” T h e u n ity o f a subject
in th e sense o f “ e g o ” o r s e lf-c o n sc io u sn e ss is such— as K an t has already
sh o w n — th a t id e n tity is n o t g iv e n befo reh an d , b u t is a result o f a p ro ­
cess o f s e lf-id e n tific a tio n . O n l y b y ascrib in g to h im self, as his o w n
p articu la riz a tio n s, th e m a n y th o u g h ts he has, can the subject also co n ­
stitu te an d r e c o g n iz e his o w n id e n tity as self. T h e m ain differen ce be­
tw een K a n t an d H e g e l o n th is co u n t is that fo r K a n t the m an ifo ld o f
co g ita tio n s is g iv e n e x te rn a lly , w h ile H eg el speaks o f this m an ifo ld as
s e lf-p a rticu la riza tio n s o f th e su b ject. B u t th e y ag ree on the o th er poin t,
n am e ly , th a t th e id e n tity is co n stitu te d and not g iv e n im m ediately. In
this w a y , the structure o f the subject as “ E go” is a model o f the structure o f any
dialectical totality. T h e E g o , H e g e l says, is the co n ce p t o f the C o n cep t.
A n d sin ce o n th e le v e l o f su b sta n ce w e have alread y fo un d a dialectical
(or o rg a n ic ) to ta lity , this m ean s th at w e have d isco vered there a su b­
je c tlik e s tru c tu re . In o th e r w o r d s , w e have re co g n ize d o ur o w n lo gical
im a g e , as h u m a n s u b je c ts , im p lic it in w h a t had seem ed to be a m erely
“ o b je c tiv e ” and “ t h in g lik e ” su b stan ce. T h e first d ialectical co rrection
thus lead s to th e seco n d : p e r fo r m in g an Aufltebung o f the w h o le sphere
o f the su b s ta n c e w it h its O b je c tiv e L o g ic , and m akin g, w ith K an t, the
re v o lu tio n a r y d is c o v e r y th at th e stru ctu re o f the o b ject is basically the

(39)
 CHAPTER 2

sa m e as th e s tru c tu re o f th e su b je ct. H e g e l asso ciates th e id e a lis tic d is­

c o v e r y o f th e s u b je c t as co n s titu tiv e o f th e a c tu a lity o f th e o b je c t— w ith
his o w n d ia le ctica l lo g ic . T h e la tter is a c o h e re n c e c o n d itio n fo r m a in ­
ta in in g th e fo rm e r. T h e w a y in w h ic h a s u b je c t p a rtic u la riz e s it s e l f and
ga in s s e lf- id e n tity th ro u g h th e m a n ifo ld — its “ o th e r ” — w h ic h he be«
co m e s , is th e p a ra d ig m fo r all p h ilo so p h ica l lo g ic .
B y in tr o d u c in g a d ia lectica l lo g ic in to th e S p in o z is tic to t a lity w e
h av e n o t o n ly b r o u g h t the O b je c tiv e L o g ic to its c lim a x b u t n e g a te d
th e p u r e ly o b je c tiv is t a p p ro a ch to the w o r ld . W ith S p in o z a ’s to ta lity
m a d e o rg a n ic , w e d is co v e r o u r o w n s u b je c tiv e im a g e in w h a t w e h ave
all a lo n g co n s id e re d as s o m e th in g p u re ly e x te rn a l th a t m e r e ly c o n ­
fro n te d us. B u t c o n te m p la tin g th e ex tern a l w o r ld in te rm s o f a to ta lity ,
an d in tr y in g to m a k e th e S p in o z is tic v ie w m o r e c o h e re n t, o u r th in k ­
in g w a s d riv e n b a c k to itself, fin d in g its o w n sh ap e an d m a rk in w h a t
se e m e d to b e an in ert su b sta n ce. It is n o t to it s e lf as m e re s u b je c t, c o n ­
fr o n tin g an o b je c t w h ic h is m e re ly e tern al, th a t o u r th in k in g w a s
p u sh e d b a c k — b u t to it s e lf as a p rin cip le o f th e o b je c tiv e w o r ld , to o ;
th is is th e p rin cip le o f id e a lism — th e b a sic u n ity o f th e s tru c tu r e o f th e
o b je c t an d th e s tru c tu re o f th e su b je c t— th a t has n o w c o m e to th e fo r e ­
gro u n d .
A g a in , at this cru cia l p o in t, th e S p in o z a - K a n t s y n th e s is m a k e s its
ap p e a ra n ce. D ia le c tic a l lo g ic , as w e have seen, is to H e g e l th e lo g ic o f
s u b je c tlik e s y s te m s . A s su ch , it p ro v id e s th e tru e s ig n ific a n c e o f K a n t ’s
p rin c ip le o f th e “ I th in k ” as co n s titu tiv e o f its o b je c t (the C o p e r n ic a n
re v o lu tio n ). O n l y u n d er a d ia lectica l c o n stru a l can th is g re a t K a n tia n
d is c o v e r y , u n k n o w n (and s u re ly o b je ctio n a b le ) to S p in o z a , b e p r o p e r ly
e x p lic a te d an d m a in ta in e d as co h eren t. B u t at th e sa m e tim e , S p in o z a ’s
o w n m a jo r id ea o f a b s o lu te to ta lity (to w h ic h K a n t o b je cts ) can also be
m a in ta in e d as co h e re n t o n ly i f it is co n s tru e d d ia le c tic a lly , th a t is, in
s u b je c tlik e m an n er. D ia le c tic a l lo g ic th us p ro v id e s th e m e d ia tio n , the
b r id g e , an d th e la d d er b y w h ic h K a n t and S p in o za are each led o u ts id e
th e ir a c tu a l— w h ic h are o n e -sid e d and v u ln e ra b le — p o s itio n s in to a
m o r e c o h e r e n t stan d , w h ile b e in g re c o n c ile d to o n e a n o th er. A n d th is,
in tu rn , y ie ld s H e g e l’ s o w n m o m e n to u s Auftiebung w h ic h , a lth o u g h
b u ilt as a s y n th e s is o f fo rm e r s y s te m s th at see m to c o n tr a d ic t each
o th e r, is s o n o v e l and d a rin g th at it can c o u n t as r e v o lu tio n a r y in its
o w n rig h t.

S u bjec t a n d S p ir it : T he R ole of H is t o r y

T h e s u b je c tiv a tio n o f th e a b so lu te b y H e g e l has m a d e it a re s u lt an d

in v e s ts it w ith a k in d o f b e c o m in g . B u t as lo n g as this c h a n g e is c o n ­

(40)
 SPINOZA AND HEGEL

fin ed to th e sp h e re o f th e L o g ic (or o f p ure m etaph ysics), it does not

e x h a u st th e m e a n in g o f sp irit. S u b je ct and spirit are not syn o n ym s.
T h e re is still s o m e d ista n ce to g o fro m the first, lo gical subjectivation
o f the a b s o lu te to the re a liza tio n o f the spirit in its full sense. T o v ie w
the a b s o lu te as sp irit is to e n d o w it, first, w ith self-con sciousness and
p e rso n a lity, and se co n d , w ith a b e c o m in g m ediated by hum an h istory.
O n ly in th is w a y , H e g e l m ain tain s, can w e “ feel at h o m e ” in this ab­
s o lu te an d a c tu a liz e o u r d ia le ctica l id e n tity w ith it. F o r H egel, this is
also a c o rr e c t w a y to in te rp re t the m y th s o f revealed religio n , in clu d in g
their a n th r o p o m o r p h ic e lem e n ts, w h ic h conceal a p rofo u n d p h ilo ­
s o p h ical tru th b en ea th m e ta p h o rs and sensual im ages {Vorstellung, re­
s e m b lin g S p in o z a ’s imaginatio).
T h e h is to riz a tio n o f th e a b s o lu te b y H eg el does n o t m ean its relativ-
izatio n . (T h is w o u ld , in d eed , be a co n trad ictio n in term s.) T h e re is an
end to the p ro c e s s in H e g e l, in w h ic h all fo rm er stages cu lm inate and
b e c o m e s u b lim a te d (aufgehoben) and the ab solu te stan d point o f the
sp irit e m e rg e s . P r io r to this sta ge, ind eed , e v e ry th in g w as partial and
th ereb y relative ; b u t it w a s relative to s o m e th in g ab solute u n d erlyin g
the p ro c e ss an d e m e r g in g fr o m it. M o re o v e r, the v e ry status o f each
stage as p a rtia l is d e te r m in e d b y the en su in g ab solu te w h ic h th ey m ake
p o ssib le and b y w h ic h th e y are supersed ed .
T h e h is to ric a l b e c o m in g o f th e ab so lu te d oes n o t relegate it to social
and p o litic a l h is to r y alo n e. T h e latter is th e substrate and the p reco n ­
d ition fo r th e b e c o m in g o f th e ab so lu te, b u t n o t its essence. H egel, like
A ris to tle (and S p in o z a )— an d u n lik e K a n t or M a rx — sees p hilosop h ical
k n o w le d g e an d c o n te m p la tio n as th e h ig h e s t ach ievem en t, indeed, the
su p re m e sta te o f b e in g . B u t to m ak e this p ossible (here lies H e g e l’s
o rig in a lity ) th e w h o le in te lle c tu a l h is to ry o f m an kind is necessary,
based u p o n th e e v o lu tio n o f so cia l and p o litical p ractices and institu ­
tions. P h ilo s o p h y c o n c e p tu a liz e s the actual h um an experien ce e m b o d ­
ied in life, cu rre n t p ra c tic es, n o rm s , re ligio u s beliefs, and artistic sen­
sibilities o f a g iv e n p e rio d o r Zeitgeist. N o sin gle in d ivid u al, h o w ever
g ifte d , can atta in p h ilo s o p h ic a l tru th i f his cu ltu re and Zeitgeist have
n ot rip e n ed to it. T h is rip e n in g p resu p p oses the entire h isto ry o f phi­
lo s o p h y — an d o f s o c ie ty , state, an d cu ltu re generally. T h u s, o n ly w h en
fre e d o m has b ee n re a lize d , in p rin cip le, in the so cial reality and the
re ligio u s co n s c io u s n e s s o f th e tim e , can its p h ilo so p h ica l counterpart,
ab solu te k n o w le d g e , be p o s s ib le as w ell.
T h e s u b je c t o f p h ilo s o p h ic a l k n o w le d g e and ed ucation , w h ich since
P lato has b e en th e in d iv id u a l th in k e r (a G la u co n , a Th eaetetus, etc.),
b e co m e s in H e g e l th e h u m a n race in its h isto rical ev o lu tio n . T h e self­
d e v e lo p m e n t o f th is c o lle c tiv e su b jec t has taken o ver the role o f the

(41)
 CHAPTER 2

e d u ca tio n (Bildung) and in tellectu a l b io g r a p h y o f th e in d iv id u a l p h ilo s ­

o p h e r in P lato . M o r e o v e r — and this a lread y fo llo w s fr o m H e g e l’ s S p i­
n o z is m — sin ce all b e in g is a sin g le to tality, w h a t o c c u r s in h is to r y to
th e h u m a n race in term s o f its se lf-c o n s c io u s n e s s can b e a ttrib u te d to
th e to ta lity as a sin gle, o rg a n ic w h o le — th a t is, to G o d . T h r o u g h the
h isto ric a l e v o lu tio n and v icissitu d es o f m a n k in d , th e to t a lity g a in s se lf-
k n o w le d g e an d G o d , as a b so lu te sp irit, is b e in g ac tu a liz e d .
In H e g e l’s e v o lu tio n a ry id ea lism , s e lf-c o m p re h e n s io n is a m o d e o f
b e in g , a h ig h e r d eg re e o f actu a lity, b o th fo r the in d iv id u a l p e rs o n and
fo r th e to tality. T h e h is to ric iza tio n o f th e a b s o lu te has th e re fo re in H e g e l
n o t o n ly a cu ltu ra l and s o c io p o litic a l s ig n ific a n c e , b u t an o n to lo g ic a l
sig n ific a n c e as w e ll. It is n o t e x c lu s iv e ly a h u m a n g o a l b u t th e telos o f
re a lity itse lf. T h r o u g h h u m an h is to ry and c o lle c tiv e c o n s c io u s n e s s (al­
w a y s m e d iated b y actu al in d iv id u a ls), rea lity, th e o b je c t, atta in s se lf-
k n o w le d g e an d actu alizes it s e lf as s u b je c t-o b je c t. T h e e v o lu tio n w ith in
th e to ta lity , o r G o d , leads to a sta g e in w h ic h th e c o n c e p tu a l c o m p r e ­
h e n s io n o f this to ta lity o cc u rs w ith in it as p art o f itse lf. B y th is s e lf-
co n s cio u s n e s s , th e ab so lu te is n o t s im p ly k n o w n to it s e lf b u t b e c o m e s
actu a l, th at is, attains a h ig h e r (the su p rem e) sta te o f b e in g . O n l y at
th is sta g e can th ere b e an ab so lu te e n tity at all, a s u b je c t- o b je c t
su p e r se d in g its p artial m o m e n ts , in n er d u alities, an d c o n tra d ic tio n s .
W e m a y say th at G o d attains s e lf- k n o w le d g e and a c tu a liz e s h im s e lf
th r o u g h h u m a n h is to ry (bo th cu ltu ra l and so cia l), th o u g h in the fin a l
s ta g e h e tran scen d s his h isto ricaln ess and m o v e s in to d ia le c tic a l tim e ­
lessn ess.
T h is is to ta lly u n h eard o f in S p in o za o r in a n y o th e r o f H e g e l’s m a jo r
p re d e ce s s o rs . In S p in o za , th e a b so lu te la ck s p erso n a l s e lf- c o n s c io u s -
n ess a lto g e th e r ,10 and it e n jo y s a s u p re m e o n to lo g ic a l ra n k e te rn a lly ,
re g a rd le ss o f tim e and ch a n g e and ce rta in ly re g a rd le ss o f th e tr iv ia l
v ic is s itu d e s o f h u m a n h is to ry (or, fo r th at m atte r, o f a n y p a rticu la r
e v e n ts in th e u n iv erse). In A r is to tle , G o d d o es h av e s e lf- c o n c e p t io n —
in d e e d , he is th is p u re c o n c e p tio n o f h im se lf, w h ic h m o v e s th e re st o f
th e u n iv e rs e as p rim e m o v e r; b u t th is again is an e te rn a l, tim e le ss state
o f p u re a ctu a lity. O n l y H e g e l turn s this sta g e in to th e re s u lt o f a te m ­
p o ra l p ro c e s s , m ed iated b y the w h o le h is to ry o f m a n k in d .11
T h is ra d ica l sh ift fo llo w s fr o m H e g e l’s d ia le ctic b u t can also b e said
to tran sla te fo r h im th e m y th o f C h r is t, th e so n o f G o d . H e g e l’ s p h i­
lo s o p h y o f h is to r y has a s tro n g s e m ire lig io u s u n d e r c u r r e n t.12 U n lik e
S p in o z a , w h o d ism isses h isto ric a l re lig io n as o u tr ig h t superstitio (see
c h a p te r i) , H e g e l’s d ia le ctica l a p p ro a ch o ffe rs a p h ilo s o p h ic a l re in te r­
p re ta tio n o f s o m e o f th e m a jo r m y th s an d s y m b o ls o f h is to r ic a l re li­
g io n , ta k en as m e ta p h o ric a l e x p re s s io n s o f a c o v e rt p h ilo s o p h ic a l

(42)
 SPINOZA AND HEGEL

tru th . T h e re b y , it also g ra n ts ration al validation to certain a n th ro p o ­

m o r p h ic d riv e s in re lig io n — ab ov e all, to their arch etyp al e m b o d im e n t
in th e m y th o f th e G o d -m a n .
Sin ce th e a b s o lu te sp irit can actualize its eternal and supratem p oral
status o n ly in tim e and w ith in h u m an h istory, it acquires, dialectically,
a h u m an d im e n s io n w h ic h H eg el believes the m yth o f the “ son o f
G o d " has ca p tu re d . It is th e w h o le h um an e v o lu tio n , w ith its su fferin g,
p assions, a m b itio n s , and s tru g g le s — its real hum an flesh and b lo o d —
that serv es as th e d ia lectica l e m b o d im en t, o r "in carn a tio n ,” o f the ab­
s o lu te sp irit an d m ed iate s b e tw e e n it and the h um an in d ivid ual. In this
sense, G o d is “ in c a rn a te d ” in all m en and ev olves th ro u g h them to w ard
his o w n s e lf- k n o w le d g e and actuality. H u m an h isto ry is th ereb y the
true m e d ia to r n o t o n ly b etw een in d iv id u al hum ans and G o d but also
b e tw e e n G o d and h im se lf. It is o n ly b y b e c o m in g m an that G o d be­
co m e s G o d , H e g e l’s p h ilo s o p h y o f h isto ry (and, fu n d am en tally, his
m e ta p h y sic s) tells us. G o d d o es n o t exist as ab solu te spirit fro m the
o u tset, etern al an d p e rfect. G o d h im s e lf has a b e c o m in g w h ic h is es­
sential to his s e lf-c o n s titu tio n ; and he h im self, in o rd er to b e co m e ac­
tual, re q u ires m e d ia tio n w ith in d iv id u a l h u m an persons in w h o m
alon e he liv e s an d b e c o m e s k n o w n to h im self.
U s in g a re lig io u s id io m (w h ic h H e g e l h im s e lf avoids) w e co u ld say
that C h r is t re d e e m s G o d n o less than he redeem s m an; or, p ut d iffer­
en tly, th r o u g h C h r is t, th e s y m b o l o f dialectical m ed iation, m an re­
d eem s G o d n o less th an G o d red eem s m a n .1J T h e m ed iation betw een
the fin ite and th e in fin ite co n scio u sn ess is eq u a lly n ecessary fo r bo th in
o rd er to b e c o m e actu al. In this resp ect, H e g e l’s Phenomenology o f Spirit,
his gre a te st s y s te m a tic w o r k p rio r to th e Logic, has a tacit P rotestan t-
h e te ro d o x stru c tu r e n o less than his m o re p op u la r p h ilo so p h y o f his­
tory. T h e m e d ia to r b e tw e e n the fin ite and the infinite is n o t sim p ly
ch u rch h is to ry , a s u p ra h isto ric a l in stitu tion , or any ecclesiastical b u ­
reau cracy, b u t u n iv e rs a l h is to ry ; it is n o t co n fin ed to so m e clerical in­
stitu tio n o r b u re a u c r a c y (H e g e l says to the C a th o lics), b u t resides in
the h eart and life o f real h u m a n exp erien ce— in the m inds, actions,
co n flicts, an d s u ffe rin g o f m en and w o m e n , in w h o m G o d m u st b e­
co m e m an an d w h o s e h is to ry , th o u g h see m in g ly arb itrary and co n tin ­
gen t, has in fa c t th is la ten t to ta lizin g sign ifican ce that th ro u gh it G o d
is alien ated , th e n is red e em ed and b e co m es k n o w n to h im self. H egel
departs fr o m o r t h o d o x y (even P ro testan t o rth o d o x y ) in that his phil­
o so p h ica l c o n c e p tu a liz a tio n o f th e re ligio u s s y m b o l cancels (aujhebt) its
d irect re lig io u s im p o r t (th is is H e g e l’s o w n dialectical w a y to p erform
a critiq u e o f h is to ric a l relig io n ); and also (perhaps p rim arily) because
H e g e l states th a t G o d m u st b e tem p o ralized and incarnated in h istory

( 43)
 CHAPTER 2

in o rd e r to b e c o m e tr u ly G o d . T h is is n o t s o m e th in g G o d d o e s in ad ­
d itio n to b e in g a b so lu te , b u t is a co n d itio n fo r his b e c o m in g s u ch ; and
n o act o f gra ce, lo v e , o r c o m p a s s io n is in v o lv e d in G o d ’s b e c o m in g
m an — o n ly d ia lectica l necessity.
H erein lies a true and p ro fo u n d d iffe re n c e b e tw e e n H e g e l an d S p i­
n o za , w h ic h ev en a d e ep -stru ctu re an a lysis can n o lo n g e r r e m o v e . D i­
ale ctica l lo g ic and th e d o ctrin e o f th e b e c o m in g G o d are e sse n tia l to
H e g e l’s s y ste m ; b o th in terp re t his d em a n d to v ie w th e a b s o lu te as
sp irit— and b o th m u st n ecessa rily b e rejected b y S p in o za .
S p in o za ca n n o t a d m it a d ialectical lo g ic b e cau se it in frin g e s o n th e
la w o f co n tra d ic tio n , fo r h im th e co rn e rs to n e o f r a tio n a lity , an d b e ­
cau se o f its la ten t th e o lo g ic a l n a tu re.'·1 S p in o za p refers in ste a d his o w n
lo g ic o f th e c o m p le m e n ta ry aspects o f th e sam e, w h ic h he b e lie v e s can
d o th e n e cessa ry j o b w ith o u t b re a ch in g the fr a m e w o r k o f (ca u sa l-ty p e )
ra tio n a lity. A s fo r th e n o tio n o f th e (h isto ric a lly ) “ b e c o m in g ” G o d ,
S p in o za m u st reject it b ecau se it im p lies te le o lo g y , a n t h r o p o m o r ­
p h ism , an d a ta cit p ro v id e n c e o r “ sacred h is to r y ” g u id in g th e w o r ld .
A ll th ree are m e ta p h y s ic a l fic tio n s w h o s e re m o v a l is a fu n d a m e n ta l
s y s te m a tic p rin cip le on w h ic h S p in o z a ’s p h ilo s o p h y rests.
S p in o za th us has su ffic ie n t s y s te m a tic reaso n s to reje c t H e g e l’s d e­
m an d to v ie w G o d as spirit. B u t are th ese rea so n s e x h a u s tiv e ? A r e w e
n o t e n title d , in a S p in o zis tic m an n er, to lo o k fo r a c o m p le m e n t a r y c o n ­
te x t o f e x p la n a tio n , ex tern a l to th e s y s te m y e t tr a n s fo rm e d in to its lo g ­
ical te x tu r e b y th e sam e k in d o f in tellectu a l a lc h e m y th at, in a d iffe re n t
(esth etic) c o n te x t, w e have a lread y e n co u n te re d in F e rn a n d o d e R o ­
ja s ? *

T h e E xistential Context: Former Marrano versus Lutheran

O n se ve ral o cc a sio n s, H e g e l stresses the J e w is h (or “ o r ie n ta l” ) o rig in s

o f S p in o z a to ex p la in certain basic features o f h is th o u g h t. H e g e l also
m e n tio n s S p in o z a ’s P o rtu g u e se a n cestry an d re c o u n ts his d is p u te w ith
th e r a b b is .15 It w a s th e J e w in S p in o za , H e g e l m a in ta in s, w h o re jecte d
D e s c a r te s ’ d u a lism an d insisted on th e a b s o lu te u n ity o f G o d — th e
s tricte st p o s s ib le fo rm o f m o n is m and o f m o n o th e is m . It is ag a in th e
J e w , o r th e “ o rie n ta l” in S p in o za w h o refu se d th e (ra th e r C h ris tia n )
id ea o f s e ttin g a “ th ir d ” te rm to m e d iate b e tw e e n th e fin ite an d th e
in fin ite in G o d . 16 T h is id ea is th e p ro p e r m e s sa g e o f C h r is tia n it y fo r
H e g e l, ju s t as its ab sence is th e m ain fea tu re he u s u a lly fin d s in J u d a ­
ism . In his Philosophy o f Religion and e ls e w h e re H e g e l d e s crib e s th e

* See v o lu m e i , T he Marrano o f Reason, chapter 4.

(44)
 SPINOZA AND HEGEL

u n b rid g e d g a p b e tw e e n the fin ite and the in fin ite as the o rig in o f the
te r r ify in g fear an d tr e m b lin g w h ic h the Jew ish G o d inspires in his su b ­
je c ts , a lie n a tin g and re d u c in g m an to n u llity .17
T h e s e fa m ilia r a n ti-J ew ish ton es m ay ech o in H e g e l’s co m m en ts on
S p in o z a ;"4 b u t H e g e l, p erh ap s u n w ittin g ly , m ay have m ade a pertin en t
re m a rk . It m a y w e ll b e the J e w , o r fo rm er M arra n o , in Sp in o za w h o
v ie w s th e C h r is tia n id ea o f a m e d iatin g “ son o f G o d ” as an even greater
superstitio th an th e m y th s o f th e O ld T e s ta m e n t.19 It m ay also be the
fo rm e r M a rra n o in S p in o za w h o , step p in g o u tsid e all revealed reli­
gio n s an d e n g a g e d in a m o m e n to u s co m b a t to secularize h isto ry alto ­
geth er, m u s t b e o p p o s e d to th e su b tle w a y in w h ic h H eg el reinstates a
n e w v e rs io n o f p r o v id e n c e and sacred h isto ry under a p h ilo so p h ica l
and a lle g e d ly ra tio n a l gu ise. M o re o v e r , in q u estio n in g the ration al le­
g itim a c y o f th is m o v e (its u n d e rly in g d ialectical lo gic) it m ay again be
the fo rm e r J e w S p in o za w h o refuses to a c k n o w le d g e such trinitarian
lo g ic w ith its a v o w e d d en ial o f th e la w o f co n trad ictio n — ju s t as Spi­
n o z a ’s fo re fa th e rs , the m e d ie v a l rabbis in d ispute w ith C h ristia n the­
o lo g y , re fu se d to a d m it trin ity and in carnation and clu n g to the la w o f
c o n tra d ic tio n in th eir a tte m p t to s h o w that these ideas, and th erefore
the w h o le basis o f th e C h ris tia n te a ch in g, w e re illo g ica l and in co h e r­
ent.
It is a g ain th e s trict ra tio n alist S p in o za, the J e w and disciple o f M a i-
m o n id e s, w h o rejects all fo rm s o f a n th ro p o m o rp h ism , in clu d in g te­
le o lo g y an d , a b o v e all, th e C h ris tia n arch etyp e o f a n th ro p o m o rp h ic
th in k in g , th e m y th o f th e G o d -m a n . H e g e l dem an d s to v ie w G o d in
h u m an te rm s , as sp irit— th at is, as p erson , and as h isto rically e m b o d ­
ied— fo r o th e r w is e w e c o u ld n o t “ be at h o m e ” in h im . T h is fam iliarity
S p in o za fin d s false. W e d o n o t ap p roa ch G o d by red u cin g him to hu­
m an d im e n s io n s , b u t rath er b y elev atin g o urselves to the “ third d egree
o f k n o w le d g e ,” w h e r e all h u m a n lik e features disappear fro m G o d and
w e id e n tify w i t h th e a b s o lu te o n its o w n in fin ite and eternal term s. I f
H e g e l c o m p la in s th a t in su ch a lo fty and th in g lik e ab solute w e “ are not
at h o m e ,” S p in o za w ill re to rt that this, precisely, was intended; for
o n ly th us can w e attain G o d and n o t an im ag in a ry p ro jectio n o f o u r
o w n self. S p in o z a ’s w a y is ce rta in ly m o re d iffic u lt p sy c h o lo g ica lly , in ­
ten d ed fo r th o se o f rare ca p acities— ju s t as N ie tzs c h e ’s later version o f
it w ill be. W h e n S p in o za co n c lu d es his Ethics w ith the rem ark that
“ e v e ry e x c e lle n t th in g is as d iffic u lt as it is rare,” he m ig h t have ad­
dressed it to H e g e l as w e ll.
T h e d iv e r g e n c e b e tw e e n H e g e l and Sp in o za m ay thus be construed
also, th o u g h n o t e x c lu s iv e ly , as a cleavage betw een a Protestan t heter­
o d o x p h ilo s o p h e r and a e x -M a rr a n o J ew ish heretic. H egel rem ains

( 45)
 CHAPTER 2

fu n d a m e n ta lly fa ith fu l to a C h ris tia n , e v en L u th e ra n o u t lo o k . H e

p u ts fo rth a d ia lectica l fo rm o f trin ity as the h ig h e s t p h ilo s o p h ic a l
lo g ic ; h e stresses th e n eed fo r G o d , o r sp irit, to b e c o m e “ in c a r n a te d ”
in th e lives and p assio ns o f h u m a n ity ; and he in sists, m o r e g e n e r a lly —
an d s p e a k in g e x p lic itly ag ain st th e “J e w ” S p in o za — o n th e n e e d fo r a
m e d ia to r b e tw e e n G o d and m an , the in fin ite an d th e fin ite , n o t s im p ly
in th e fo r m o f a ch u rch as C h r is t ’s m y s tic a l b o d y b u t in th e a c tu a l life
e x p e rie n c e s o f h u m a n ity. H is to r y is th us th e n e w corpus christi in a s y m ­
b o lic w a y — b u t it is also corpus dei, th e n e cessa ry e m b o d im e n t and
alie n a tio n o f G o d h im s e lf b y w h ic h h e b e c o m e s a b s o lu te . T h is d ia le c­
tica l n e ce s s ity fo r G o d to b e a resu lt o f his s e lf- e n g e n d e r in g p ro c e ss
m a k e s H e g e l a re v is io n is t and h e te ro d o x e v en in his o w n ca m p — as
d o e s also, p erh ap s in a lesser d e g ree , th e p re fe re n ce h e u lt im a t e ly g iv e s
to p h ilo s o p h y o ve r re lig io n , to the “ c o n c e p t” o v e r its m e ta p h o ric a l
e x p re ssio n s.

Nature, History, and D iv in e Presence

H e g e l’s h isto ric a l p an th eism co n tin u es S p in o z a ’s p h ilo s o p h y o f im ­

m an e n ce , b u t also d eparts irre m e d ia b ly fr o m S p in o za . D e s p ite its h et­
e r o d o x y , th is H e g e lia n stand can also be seen as a r o u n d a b o u t retu rn
to C h ris tia n ity , s p u rn in g w h a t S p in o za d id to b o th n a tu re an d h is to ry .
N a tu r e ca n n o t b e d eified , and h is to r y s h o u ld n o t, in s u b s ta n c e , be sec­
u la rize d .
H e g e l tran sfers th e d iv in e p resen ce, th e p a n th e istic e le m e n t in S p i­
n o za , fro m n atu re to h u m an h is to r y as a h ig h e r an d m o r e c o m p r e h e n ­
siv e d o m a in o f reality. T h e r e b y h e ta c itly sacralizes h is to r y w h ile d e-
sa c ra lizin g n atu re w h ic h S p in o za d eclared to be id e n tica l w it h G o d .
T h e r e can b e n o natura sive deus in H e g e l, b u t ra th er natura sine deus.
N a tu r e as su ch is an in ert su b stan ce, a lo w fo r m o f b e in g , u n fit to h o st
th e d iv in e p resen ce. U s in g th e m e ta p h o r o f C h r is tia n d o g m a , n atu re
rep resen ts to H e g e l o n ly th e m o m e n t o f “ c r e a tio n ” — the sp iritle ss e x -
te m a liz a tio n o f G o d as n atu ral substan ce— b u t n o t y e t o f “ in c a rn a ­
t io n ,” w h ic h alo n e can rein state th e d iv in e p re sen ce w ith in a n atu ral
u n iv e rs e w h ic h in it s e lf is d e v o id o f i t . 20 In ca rn atio n , h o w e v e r , req u ire s
s p irit— first th e fin ite sp irit o f in d iv id u a l p erso n s, real p a rtic u la r m e n
an d w o m e n , and seco n d , th e u n iversal S p irit w h ic h e v o lv e s an d is c o n ­
stitu te d th ro u g h th eir in te rre la tio n s. T h e la tter is S p irit in th e d iv in e
sen se, G o d b e c o m in g m an and m o v in g th ro u g h h u m a n h is to r y to s e lf-
k n o w le d g e an d a ctu a lizatio n . N a tu r e is in c o rp o ra te d in this p ro c e s s as
th e in e rt su b strate o f h u m an life and a c tio n , w h ic h serv es h is to r y and
is su p e rsed ed b y it. H u m a n h is to r y acq u ires a sp ecia l o n to lo g ic a l statu s

( 4 *)
 SPINOZA AND HEGEL

and a h id d en sacre d sense; it is th e e m b o d im en t and vehicle o f G o d ’s

s e lf-c re a tio n .
T h is sta n d s in d ia m e trica l o p p o s itio n to S p in o za ’s th eo ry o f h isto ry
(as w e s k e tc h e d it at the e n d o f ch apter i). Sp in o za sets o u t to ex p lo d e
the n o tio n s o f p r o v id e n c e and sacred h isto ry alto geth er, red u cin g
all e v e n ts an d e n tities in th e u n iverse to a sin gle syste m o f p u rely
n atu ral causes. H e th e re b y to ta lly secularizes h isto ry and a llo w s it no
special d o m a in o f its o w n ; W h a te v e r d iv in e presence there is in hum an
affairs is n o d iffe re n t fr o m th e d iv in e presence there is in an y oth er
se g m e n t o f n a tu re — an d is ex p ressed by the p u rely causal law s that
g o v e rn n a tu re t h r o u g h o u t .21
“ T h e la w s o f G o d are in scrib ed n o t in th e B ib le, b u t in natu re” — thus
ran a s a y in g a m o n g M a rra n o h eretics, w h ic h Sp in oza shared and sys­
te m a tize d . T h e d iv in ity o f n atu re is m an ifested in its o m n ip resen t
causal la w s an d in th e ir in tersectio n s that p ro d u ce the sin gular essences
o f all th in g s . S p in o z a ’s u n iv e rs e as substance is fu ll o f d iv in e presence
in th at it is in te llig ib le and ra tio n a lly transparent th ro u g h o u t— w ith ­
ou t, h o w e v e r, a llo w in g a n y such categories as purposes, inherent
trends an d g o a ls (n o t to m e n tio n d iv in e gu id an ce and m iracles), o r
o th er s u c h m a n -m a d e im a g e s and fictio n s w h ic h , Sp in oza claim s, w e
p ro je c t u p o n th e n e u tr a lly causal u n iverse fro m the depths o f o u r d e­
sires and th e s e lf- d e lu s o r y v is io n s th e y en gen d er. It is rather w ith the
u n iverse s trip p e d o f su ch m a n -m a d e fictio n al attire that the hum an
m in d is to be u n ited th r o u g h th e th ird d egree o f k n o w le d g e , turned
in to a p o w e r fu l lo v e an d p r o c u r in g su p rem e em ancipation.
Su ch e m a n c ip a tio n is th e c o n tra ry o f self-d ecep tion , w h ic h is the
state o f s e rv itu d e ; it re q u ire s g iv in g up the m eta p h ysical co m fo rts o f
m an lik e G o d , a te le o lo g ic a l u n iv erse, and a p rovid en tial h isto ry (under
an y g u is e ), an d le a rn in g to e x tra c t the in fin ite m eanin gfuln ess o f the
u n iverse fr o m its etern a l causal lin k s (as the su fficien t and o n ly valid
e x p re s s io n o f th e d iv in e ).
T h is a ttitu d e m a d e S p in o z a — in co n trast to H e g e l— on e o f the m ajor
“ dark e n lig h t e n e r s ” o f m o d e rn th o u g h t. It also h igh lig h ts a line that
go es fr o m S p in o z a to o th e r d ark en lig h ten ers, all p h ilo so p h ers o f i m ­
m an en ce, in th e p o s t-H e g e lia n p e rio d , in clu d in g Freud and, especially,
N ie tzs ch e . W h ile H e g e l says in rea ction to S p in o za that in a universe
w ith o u t t e le o lo g y an d w ith o u t a h u m an ized G o d w e cannot be at
h o m e, N ie t z s c h e , o n th e co n tra ry , w ill argu e that even the causal ra­
tio n a lity o f S p in o z a is still a “ s h a d o w o f the dead G o d ,” another fiction
w e p ro je c t u p o n th e u n iv e rs e b ecau se o f o u r desire fo r im agin a ry co m ­
fort and fo r c o n t r o l o v e r a to ta lly ch a o tic and irrational universe; and
that it is th e la tter, as su ch , th at w e m u st co m e to grip s in a suprem e

(47)
 CHAPTER 2

act o f ce le b ra tin g accep tan ce— amor fa ti re p la c in g S p in o z a ’s amor dei

intellectualis.

Assessing H eg el’s Critique

H o w are w e to assess H e g e l’s critiq u e o f S p in o za? H e g e l se em s to c o n ­

fu se in te rp re ta tio n and critic ism w h e n he says th a t th e fin ite th in g s are
u n real in S p in o z a ’s s y s te m and th e attrib u tes o f G o d are m e r e ly s u b ­
je c t iv e p r o je c tio n .- 2 W h a te v e r th e d iffic u ltie s S p in o za m a y h ave in su s­
ta in in g his v ie w s , th ere is n o d o u b t th at fo r h im th e a ttrib u te s are real
a sp ects o f th e u n iv erse, and th at (this is e v en m o r e o b v io u s ) fin ite
th in g s h av e th eir o w n m o d e o f real e x is te n ce (duratio), an d th e ir o w n
fo r m o f actu a l in d iv id u a lity (cotiatus)·, th e y e v e n h av e ete rn al essen ces,
d e riv e d tim e le ss ly fro m G o d . M o re o v e r , lo o k in g u p o n th e re la tio n o f
th e fin ite and th e in fin ite fro m the p ersp e c tiv e o (scientia intuitiva, it can
be c o n c lu d e d , as a p lau sib le in te rp reta tio n o f S p in o z a ’s p o s itio n , that
th e y are m u tu a lly d ep en d en t. G o d in th e asp ect o f in fin ity , as natura
naturans, is th e cause o f h im s e lf o n ly b y b e in g th e ca u se o f his o w n
fin ite asp ect, as natura naturata.
T h is w ill ren d er s u p erflu o u s th e first d ia le ctica l c o r r e c tio n de­
m a n d e d b y H e g e l. M o re o v e r , i f w e c o n s id e r th at S p in o za p re ce d e d
H e g e l in re je c tin g an a p rio ri m e th o d in p h ilo s o p h y , th a t his tru e
m e th o d , u n d er th e “ d e d u c tiv e ” m an tle, is th e in n e r e x p lic a tio n o f a
b a sic idea vera, and th at his an a lysis o f th e in fin ity o f G o d as q u a lita tiv e
an d n o t q u a n tita tiv e and o p e n -e n d e d p re ce d ed (and c le a rly in sp ire d )
H e g e l’s o w n , w e can see th at, in th e d eep s tru c tu re o f his s y s te m , S p i­
n o za h ad alre a d y c o m e a grea t d eal clo se r to H e g e l th an th e la tte r re c­
o g n iz e d o r a d m itte d .
A n d y e t a rig id g u l f still separates t h e m .23 S p in o za is b a rre d fr o m
ta k in g th e se co n d an d d ecisive step— v ie w in g th e a b s o lu te as s u b je c t
an d sp irit— and d e ify in g h is to ry in stead o f n atu re. T h is is n o d e fa u lt
o n his p art b u t a m a tter o f p h ilo so p h ica l p rin cip le . S p in o za m a y c riti­
cize th e H e g e lia n s y s te m in tu rn , e sp e c ia lly its trin ita rian lo g ic , its p e r­
v a d in g te le o lo g y , its d e ep -sea ted a n th r o p o m o r p h is m , its d e ific a tio n o f
h is to ry , its resto ra tio n o f th e n o tio n s o f p ro v id e n c e an d sacred h is to r y
in a n e w g u is e , an d its s e e k in g m e ta p h y s ic a l c o m fo r t in a m e r e ly
n a tu ra l u n iv e rs e b y p ro je c tin g a false h u m a n im a g e u p o n it an d th e n
p e r fo r m in g an im a g in a ry “ u n ific a tio n ” w ith this fic tio n . O n th ese m a ­
j o r p o in ts (all o f w h ic h are im p lie d by H e g e l’s s p iritu a liz a tio n o f th e
a b so lu te ) n o re c o n c ilia tio n is p o s s ib le b e tw e e n th ese tw o p h ilo s o ­
p h e rs — and ce rta in ly n o Aujliebung o f S p in o za in H e g e lia n s ty le . I f o u r

(48)
 SPINOZA AND HEGEL

analysis has lessen e d th e d ifferen ces b etw een Sp in o za and H egel, it has
also h a rd en ed th e ir co re .
T h is d o c s n o t m ean , o f co u rse, that S p in o za is righ t. O n the co n ­
trary, H e g e l is fu lly ju s tifie d in his m ajo r co m p lain t against Sp inoza—
that is, i f w e ta k e it as cr itic is m and n o t as in terpretation. T h ere is
indeed a b re a k b e tw e e n th e fin ite and the in fin ite aspects o f the uni­
verse— a ra th er a d v e rs e re su lt fro m th e stan d po in t o f S p in o za’s in­
ten d ed m o n is m .24 G iv e n S p in o z a ’s v ie w o f n e g a tio n ,25 he cannot, in
fact, su stain th e m u tu a l im p lic a tio n he seeks to establish betw een the
p articu lars and th e to ta lity , an d th e tw o facets o f the universe m ust,
again st his w is h , re m a in u n b rid g e d . M o reo ve r, H eg el m ay w ell be
righ t in c la im in g th a t o n ly a d ia lectica l co n stru al o f to tality can render
this c o n c e p t c o h e r e n t an d th a t d ialectics, in general, co u ld rem e d y the
flaws an d im p a sse s o f d u a lis m as w e k n o w it since the Pre-S ocratics.
Y e t H e g e l’s w a y is im p o s s ib le fo r S p in o za because o f the reasons w e
have ju s t m e n tio n e d . H e g e lia n d ialectics go e s hand in hand w ith te­
le o lo g y , and w ith v a rio u s illu s o r y im p lica tio n s o f the absolute as spirit.
I f H e g e l w a s r ig h t in d ia g n o s in g S p in o z a ’s lo g ic a l troubles, he offered
an alte rn a tiv e th a t o n ly w o rs e n e d th e situ ation , for it depended upon
m an -m ad e fic tio n s w h ic h th e w h o le th ru st o f S p in o za ’s p h ilo so p h y set
o u t to a b o lis h . In th e fin a l a n a lysis, H e g e l w as n o t a dark enlightener
but ra th er an in d ire c t m e ta p h y s ic a l s o o th e r.26

C ro ssr o a d s after H egel: P a ssa g e t o N ie t z s c h e a n d M arx

Is th ere a v a ila b le, th e n , a n o th e r altern a tive, that w ill avoid the teleo­
lo g ical fa lla c y an d illu s io n (in c lu d in g its appearance as d isguised P ro v ­
idence) an d y e t re m a in a s tric t p h ilo s o p h y o f im m an en ce? T h is chal­
lenge w ill p r o v id e o u r g u id in g q u e stio n as w e lo o k past H egel at other
m ajor a tte m p ts to c o n s tr u e a p h ilo s o p h y o fim m a n e n c e , lin ked to Spi­
noza b y a ff in ity a n d riv a lry . W h a t th e y had to g iv e up w as, first o f all,
the d iv in e n a tu re o f th e u n iv e rs e , and even (as did N ietzsch e) the very
idea o f ra tio n a l to ta lity .
W h y s h o u ld a w o r ld o f p u re im m a n e n ce be co n ceived as a rational
and o rg a n iz e d to ta lity ? T h is is h o w w e can reph rase N ie tzs c h e ’s o bjec­
tion. Is th is n o t still a n o th e r, m o r e d eep -sea ted fo rm o f an th ro p o m o r­
p hism , w h ic h S p in o z a j u s t l y sh u n n ed ? A m ore co n sequen tial Sp in o­
zism , so th e a r g u m e n t w i ll g o , m u st strip the universe even o f the
ca u sa l-m ec h a n ic a l re la tio n s in w h ic h S p in o za saw its d ivin ity, but
w h ich N ie t z s c h e id e n tifie s as v e stig e s o f th e sam e m etaph ysical illusion
w h ich S p in o z a r e c o g n iz e d in te le o lo g y . T h e u n iverse is thereby de­
p rived o f a n y ra tio n a l an d , n eed less to say, d iv in e attributes and is seen

( 49)
 CHAPTER 2

as p u re fo rm le s s im m a n e n c e , an e tern al “ w ill to p o w e r ” in w h ic h n o
ra tio n a l m e a n in g in h eres. Y e t p re c is e ly th is strip p e d an d d e h u m a n iz e d
u n iv e rs e is to b e th e o b je c t o f a j o y f u l an d c e le b ra tin g sta n c e , e v e n o f a
k in d o f p a ra d o x ic a l lo v e, an amor fa d as rare and as d iffic u lt as S p in o z a ’s
amor dei and re q u ir in g the sam e, o r s im ila r, m e n ta l s tr e n g th .
A n o t h e r altern a tiv e to H e g e l’s in h e re n t te le o lo g y w a s o ffe r e d by
M a r x . W h ile ra w n atu re, as su ch , has n o in h e re n t g o a ls , th e p u r p o s iv e
f o r m is im p a rte d to n a tu re b y h u m a n w o r k , a b o v e all b y g o a l-o r ie n t e d
m a te ria l p r o d u c tio n , w h ic h ta k es in M a r x th e r o le th a t th e “ p u re s u b ­
j e c t ” h ad in G e rm a n id e a lis m in d e te r m in in g th e w o r ld an d th e fa te o f
th e h u m a n race itse lf. M a r x th e re b y retain s th e g e n e ra l p a tte rn o f the
C o p e r n ic a n r e v o lu tio n sta rte d b y K a n t an d e x p a n d e d b y H e g e l, b u t
ch a n g e s its su b stra te an d b rin g s it d o w n to e a rth an d b a c k to n a tu re —
th a t is, b a c k in S p in o z a ’s d ire c tio n .
M o r e o v e r , M a r x sh ared w it h H e g e l th e v ie w o f h is t o r y as th e v e h i­
cle o f p ro g re s s, ev e n o f th a t w h ic h re lig io u s m e ta p h o r la b e le d “ sa lv a ­
t io n ” ; b u t, lik e S p in o za , he o b je c te d to H e g e l’s v ie w o f h is to r y as a
d iv in e S p irit s u p e r se d in g in e rt n a tu re. H e s a w h is to r y , in S p in o z is tic
fa s h io n , as c o m p le te ly se cu la rize d , an in te g r a l p art o f n a tu re itse lf,
e v o lv in g b y th e im m a n e n t la w s o f natu re— w h o s e c o n c e p t w a s th e re b y
d ia le c tic a lly en ric h e d .
M a r x an d N ie tz s c h e th u s re p re se n t t w o g re a t n in e te e n t h -c e n tu r y al­
te rn a tiv e s to a S p in o z is m th a t re fu se H e g e l’s id e a lis tic c o r r e c tio n , and
fig h t, lik e S p in o za , ag a in st c u ltu ra l id e o lo g ie s an d s e lf- d e c e p t io n s . Y e t
M a r x , lik e th e le ft-H e g e lia n s p re c e d in g h im , still v ie w s th e im m a n e n t
r e a lity as in te llig ib le and ev e n as le a d in g , b y its o w n d y n a m ic s , to a
fo r m o f h u m a n s a lv a tio n o th e r th an th e o n e w h ic h h is to r ic a l r e lig io n
h ad p ro m is e d . N ie tz s c h e , o n th e o th e r h an d , b e lo n g s to (an d clim a x e s )
th e tre n d o f irra tio n a lis t S p in o z is m ( o f w h ic h S c h o p e n h a u e r b e fo r e
h im an d B e r g s o n after h im are o th e r re p re s e n ta tiv e s ). It is in F re u d th at
th e N ie tz s c h e a n k in d o f S p in o z is m m a k e s its p e a c e a g a in w i t h s c ie n ­
tific re a so n , s a c rific in g th e “ d iv in e ” fea tu re s w h ic h re a so n h ad in S p i­
n o z a b u t n o t its e m a n c ip a tin g p o w e r s . T h is m a y o ffe r a s y s te m a t ic an ­
g le fo r c o n s id e rin g th e h is to r y o f la te r S p in o z is tic in flu e n c e s an d th e
a d v e n tu re s o f th e id ea o fim m a n e n c e .

( 50)
 C H A P T E R 3

Spinoza in Heine, Hess, Feuerbach:

T h e Naturalization o f Man

M a r x ’s S p in o z is tic a ffin itie s w e r e a lread y p resent in the left-H egelian

m ilieu in w h ic h h e g r e w and fr o m w h ic h he to o k his departure. T h e
radical y o u n g H e g e lia n s b r o u g h t m an b ack to S p in o za’s natura fro m
w h a t th e y s a w as th e ab stra ct h e ig h ts o f H e g e l’s Geist, and proclaim ed
a u n ity o f s p irit an d m a tte r w h ic h w a s con sid ered an essential S p in o ­
zistic p rin c ip le an d w h ic h led s o m e o f th em to socialist con clusion s. 1
shall d iscu ss th re e le ft- H e g e lia n fig u res, especially H eine, both for
their in trin s ic in te re s t an d as a te llin g b rid g e to M a r x .*
S p in o za w a s a le ft- H e g e lia n h ero . “ T h e M o ses o f m o d e m free­
th in kers and m a te r ia lis ts ” — so L u d w ig F euerbach, a m ajor influence
on th e y o u n g M a r x , a n o in te d S p in o za. U n q u estio n ab ly, Feuerbach
th o u g h t o f h im s e lf in th e sa m e term s. S p in o za appealed to le ft-H e g e -
lians b o th in h is n e g a t iv e an d his p o s itiv e p h ilo so p h y. First, his critique
o f re lig io n h ad b ra n d e d th e w o r ld o f tran scen d en ce as illusory. T h is
w as, to th e le ft- H e g e lia n s , a m a jo r avenue to h um an em ancipation,
p ro v id e d th a t r e lig io u s im a g e s w e re n o t s im p ly rejected o u trig h t, but
e x p la in e d in th e lig h t o f th e ir o rig in s in the needs, m ental conflicts,
asp iratio n s, an d fa ls e se lf-c o n s c io u s n e s s o f m an. T h e y w ere to be
b ro u g h t b a c k to th e im m a n e n t d o m a in as its o w n aberration, its o w n
w o rld s to o d o n its h ead an d p ro je c te d o u tw a rd . A critiq ue o f religion ,
g o in g b e y o n d S p in o z a ’s E n lig h te n m e n t m o o d and enriched w ith H e­
gelian c a te g o r ie s an d te c h n iq u e s , s to o d at the center o f left-H egelian
e ffo rts. T h e J e ft-H e g e lia n s d eep en ed the analysis w h ile d em o tin g its

* T h e aim o f this ch ap ter and the n ex t is not, how ever, to lay out the com plete pan­
oram a b u t to trace the co n to u rs o f a post-H egelian philosoph y o f im m anence free o f
id e o lo g y and o f H e g e l's im p lic it th e o lo g y — o r at least seeking to renounce them— w hile
retaining the em p h asis H e g e l pu t o n the hum an subject and on history. T his is the main
perspective fro m w h ic h H e in e , H ess, Feuerbach, and especially M arx w ill be consid­
ered.

( S I )
 CHAPTER 3

re su lts to an a lm o s t o n e -d im e n s io n a l cla im ; an d m a n y e x c e lle d in a

h ig h - p o w e r e d , s lo g a n ish s ty le th a t s a c rific e d d e p th to w h a t th e y c o n ­
sid e re d as “ p r a c tic e ” (i.e ., th e n eed to p e rsu ad e).
B e y o n d his c r itiq u e o f r e lig io n , S p in o za a p p e a le d to lc ft- H e g c lia n s
b e c a u s e his s o -c a lle d p a n th e is m w a s u n d e r s to o d as r e s to r in g w o r t h and
s o lid it y to ea rth ly, th is - w o r ld ly life and to m a n as a n a tu ra l (an d c o r ­
p o re a l) b e in g . T h e u n ity o f m a tte r and s p irit w a s a le ft - H e g e lia n b y ­
w o r d an d id eal w h ic h S p in o z a , n o t H e g e l, w a s p c r c e iv c d as s a tis fy in g .
H e g e l s a w m an b a s ic a lly as sp irit s u p e r s e d in g an d o v e r p o w e r in g his
sen su al n atu re. In th a t, H e g e l re m a in e d a C h r is tia n th in k e r. S p in o z a
a lo n e , a m o n g m o d e rn p h ilo s o p h e rs , p u t m a tte r and s p ir it, e x te n s io n
an d th o u g h t, b o d y an d m in d o n th e sa m e le v e l, as t w o e q u a l m a n ife s ­
ta tio n s o f th e sa m e im m a n e n t h u m a n it y an d in e q u a l n e e d o f cach
o th e r. T h is w a s th e su b s ta n tiv e m e s sa g e , p r o c la im in g a fre e , s e lf­
e m a n c ip a te d h u m a n e x is te n c e , w h ic h le ft- H e g e lia n s d r e w fr o m th eir
o w n c ritiq u e o f C h r is tia n it y an d w h ic h th e y fo u n d c le a r ly d e fin e d in
S p in o za . T h e d issid en t J e w is h th in k e r, w h o tw o c e n tu rie s e a r lie r h ad
a b a n d o n e d all tra n s ce n d e n t r e lig io n , w a s th e n e w h e ro o f m o d e rn
tim e s, th e “ p h ilo s o p h e r o f th e fu tu r e ” as H e in e ca lle d h im , a n e w
M o s e s , o n a p ar w ith Jesus o f N a z a r e th , an d lik e b o th th e s e p r o p h e ts ,
th e h a rb in g e r o f a n e w era.
T h is y o u n g H e g e lia n en th u s ia s m d e s e rv e s s o m e a tte n tio n . In m o o d
n o less th an in co n te n t, s o m e o f it fo u n d its w a y in to M a r x ’s s y s te m
an d p e rso n a l ac tio n . O f c o u rs e it lo s t its p u e rile a p p e a ra n c e an d a g o o d
d eal o f i t s n a iv e te in M a r x , b u t n o t its s e c u la r-m e s s ia n ic fire , w h ic h th e
h e a v y lo a d o f s c ie n tific a n a ly sis an d ja r g o n in th e C a p ita l c o u ld at best
s cre e n o f f b u t n o t e x tin g u is h . S a lv a tio n d id lo o m o n th e h o r iz o n ; y e t
it w a s n o t to c o m e a b o u t b y im p o s in g a m o r a l u to p ia u p o n an in d iffe r ­
e n t n a tu re , b u t rath er, in S p in o z is tic m an n er, b y u n c o v e r in g an d sh ar­
in g in th e in n er la w s and fo rc e s o f n a tu re it s e l f (h u m a n iz e d n a tu re , o f
co u rse — th a t o f e c o n o m ic p r o d u c tio n ). S p in o z a , at b e s t, w a s o n ly the
se cu la r S t. J o h n o f this p ro c e s s , b a p tiz in g an era he d id n o t b e lo n g to .
T h e tru e n e w M o s e s (or C h r is t), th e s c ie n tific p r o p h e t o f s a lv a tio n ,
w a s still a n o th e r fo r m e r J e w , b o r n tw o ce n tu rie s la ter, n o t in A m s t e r ­
d a m b u t in T r i e r .*

H e in e

“ A ll o u r c o n t e m p o r a r y p h ilo so p h e rs , p erh ap s w i t h o u t k n o w in g it, are

lo o k in g th r o u g h th e e y e g la s s e s th at B a ru c h S p in o z a p o lis h e d .” T h e

* M a r x ’s n ative to w n .

(52)
 SPINOZA IN HEINE, HESS, FEUERBACH

w r ite r o f th ese w o r d s , H e in ric h H eine, d oes n ot d en y that a sim ilar

pair o f sp e c ta cle s is s ittin g o n his o w n n o s e .1 H ein e is best k n o w n for
his p o e try , w h ic h w o n h im a p lace in G erm an letters at G o e th e ’s side.
H e w a s, h o w e v e r , also an o u ts p o k e n social critic, essayist, visionary,
jo u rn a lis t, c u ltu ra l h isto ria n , th e greatest w it o f the nineteenth cen­
tu ry — and o n e o f th e firs t le ft-H e g e lia n s. A s a student, H eine attended
H e g e l’s le c tu re s in B e r lin (1 8 2 1 -18 2 3 ) and established personal con tact
w ith th e m a s te r w h o m he u n d e rs to o d — w ith a typ ical left-H egelian
tw is t— as s a y in g th a t m an has taken o ver fro m G o d and has been dei­
fied. T h is id ea w a s to im p re ss H e in e ’s prose and part o f his p o etry for
a lo n g tim e.
A t t w e n t y - e ig h t H e in e co n v e rte d fro m a Judaism he no lo n g er be­
lie ved in to a C h r is tia n it y h e n eve r tru ly ad op ted . It w as a con version
o f c o n v e n ie n c e th a t faile d to p ro d u c e the p ractical rew ards H eine had
h o p ed fo r. H is m illio n a ir e u n cle, S o lo m o n H eine, had to g o on sup­
p o rtin g h is r e n e g a d e an d le ft - w in g re v o lu tio n a ry n eph ew , earning for
h im s e lf an d fo r J e w is h ca p ita lists a n u m b er o f w ell-a im e d barbs from
H e in e ’s p en.
W h e n “ th e su n o f th e J u ly re v o lu tio n rose in France” H eine, then
th irty -th re e , w e n t to P a ris, “ th e fatherland o f C h a m p a g n e and the
M a rs e illa is e ,” 2 w h e r e he liv e d fo r th e rest o f his life. In Paris he becam e
an e x p e rt o n th e G e r m a n in te lle ctu a l scene, rivallin g V ic to r C o u sin and
M m c . d e S tae l. P a n th e is m , H e in e to ld the French, w as the liberating
essence o f co n te m p o ra ry G e rm a n cu lture, and Spinoza w as its
p ro p h e t. F o r a w h ile he w a s also ca u g h t up w ith Sain t-Sim on ian so­
cialist id eas— th e s e cu la r “ N e w C h r is tia n ity ” — w h ic h tainted but did
not d o m in a te h is le ft- H e g e lia n th in k in g . Later he was draw n tow ard
M a rx , w ith w h o m — d e sp ite d ifferen ces in character and age (M arx
was tw o d e ca d e s y o u n g e r ) — he s tru c k up a personal friendship. “ I w ish
I co u ld p a c k y o u u p and ta k e y o u w ith m e ,” the unsentim ental M a rx
(“ m y h a rd -n u t fr ie n d ,” H e in e ca lled him ) to ld the p oet w h en forced by
the F ren ch g o v e r n m e n t to leave P a ris .3
H e in e p h ilo s o p h iz e d as he e v o lv e d ; he w as a p h ilo so p h er-po et, given
to s u b je c tiv e m o o d s an d v aria tio n s and to the tem ptations o f style and
bon mot. H is c a re fre e , w i t t y p ro se fle w o ver an unm istakable personal
depth s tu d d e d w ith s u ffe r in g , an earth -b o u n d yearn in g for salvation,
and an o c c a s io n a l h e a rte n in g n aivete.
H e in e ’s p r e d ile c tio n fo r e p ig ra m and bon mot is n o t the o n ly trait that
u nites h im w i t h N ie t z s c h e . A d eep er lin k lies in H e in e’s w o rsh ip o f
life, p u re, s e lf- in v ig o r a t in g life in a G o d less w o rld . H eine preceded
(and p o s s ib ly in sp ired )·1 N ie tz s c h e in d eclaring that G o d w as dead,
“ m a s s a c re d ” b y th e h an d o f K a n t w h o left the o verlord o f the w orld

(53)
 CHAPTER 3

“ s w im m in g u n p r o v e d in his o w n b lo o d .” 5 E ls e w h e r e H e in e d e s crib e s
th e an cien t G o d Jehow a p re p a rin g to d ie as th e c h u r c h b e lls to ll h is last
s a c ra m e n t.6 T h e J e w is h G o d , as it tu rn s o u t, has b e e n b a p tiz e d , lik e
H e in e h im s e lf, and dies a C h ris tia n .
T h e d eath o f G o d leaves m an n o t an o rp h a n , b u t h is o w n p o te n tia l
m aste r— a m in i- G o d , cr e a to r o f all v a lu es an d o f h is o w n u n iv e rs e .
H o w e v e r , m an is still su b d u e d an d e x p lo ite d b y h im s e lf, th a t is, b y
o th e r m en ; h e n ce th e n eed fo r a so cia l and p o litic a l r e v o lu tio n to c o m ­
p le te th e re lig io u s o n e . H e re H e in e ’s s o c ia lis m an d c o m m it m e n t to
p o litic s ta k e o v e r and in c o rp o ra te h is p r o t o - N ie tz s c h e a n sta n ce . T h a t
b o th th ese s e e m in g ly o p p o s e d tre n d s s h o u ld re sid e in th e s a m e p e r­
so n — an d b ra n ch o ff, as I th in k th e y d o , fr o m th e s a m e s te m : h is S p i­
n o z is tic e x p e rie n c e o f life as p u re im m a n e n c e — w i ll s u rp ris e o n ly th o s e
a c c u s to m e d to th in k in rig id , e x p o s t fa c to c a te g o r ie s . M a r x , in a n y
case, th r o u g h his frien d H ein e, c o u ld h av e b e c o m e a c q u a in te d w ith
s o m e th in g lik e the N ie tz s c h e a n u n iv e rs e , an d p e rh a p s id e n t ify in it
m o r e a ffin ities to h im s e lf an d to h is o w n b a c k g r o u n d th a n la te r o ffic ia l
M a r x is m c o u ld ev e r d are a d m it.
A s in N ie tz s c h e , life re ig n s s u p r e m e in H e in e — p u re , s e n s u a l, th is-
w o r ld ly life , o f w h ic h “ e v e r y in sta n t is to m e an e te r n ity .” 7 E a r t h ly life
as su ch , says H e in e , s h o u ld re g a in th e s p iritu a lity w h ic h th e J e w s and,
e v e n m o r e so , th e C h ris tia n s h ad d e n ie d it fo r c e n tu rie s , b u t w h ic h
S p in o za ( w h o w a s, lik e H e in e h im s e lf, n e ith e r J e w n o r C h r is tia n ) fi­
n a lly re sto red . L ife , E a r th ly life , is th e b e -a ll an d e n d - a ll, a n d is p as­
s io n a te ly a ffirm e d b y H e in e , as b y N ie t z s c h e , b o th in its e x u b e r a n t
v ig o r an d in th e face o f tr a g e d y an d s u ffe r in g (an d H e in e k n e w th e m
b o th ). “ I need n o p riest to p ro m is e m e a s e c o n d life , fo r I ca n liv e
e n o u g h in th is life ,” H e in e d eclares in his y o u t h fu l R eisebilder (ib id .).
“ R e d life p u lses in m y v ein s, earth y ie ld s b e n e a th m y fe e t, in th e g lo w
o f lo v e I e m b ra c e trees an d statu es, and th e y liv e in m y e m b r a c e .”
T h e s e are th e w o r d s o f an O l y m p ic m a n , e x p e r ie n c in g c o s m ic lib ­
e ra tio n . H e e n jo y s life, first, as th e v e r y act o f liv in g — p u re , im m a n e n t
life as su ch — an d th us e n jo y s p a rticu la r p le asu res an d fu lfillm e n ts , e x ­
h a u s tin g e v e r y in sta n t to its d e p th , e x tr a c tin g th e s p ir itu a lity e m b e d ­
d ed in th e rea lm o f th e sen su al, an d sh a p in g p le a su re in to a lib e r a tin g
h u m a n e x p e rie n c e . H is e n jo y m e n t is b o th se n su al an d m e ta p h y s ic a l,
m a te ria l and s p iritu a l in th e sam e a ct. A n d th is, to o , is S p in o z is m to
H e in e , th e “ p a n th e is t” m e s sa g e he p ro fe s s e s in his H istory o f R eligion
and Philosophy in Germ any an d sin g s p o e t ic a lly in Germ any: A W inter’s
Tale.
Winter’s Ta le b e g in s w ith H e in e ’s trip to G e r m a n y a fte r a th ir te e n -
y e a r a b sen ce. H e m eets his o ld w o r ld in th e fo r m o f a little g ir l s in g in g

( 54)
 SPINOZA IN HEINE, HESS, FEUERBACH

in a c h a rm in g v o ic c a little o u t o f tune, a w e ll-k n o w n , m y stifyin g

song:

S h e sang o f love and lover’s woes,

O f sacrifice, till the morrow
We meet up in that better world
T h at knows no pain or sorrow.

Sh e sang o f this earthly vale o f tears,

O f jo y one never recaptures,
O f the great Beyond where souls are glad,
Transfigured in deathless raptures.H

H e in e r e c o g n iz e s th e s o n g . It is the old d evice by w h ich the people,

that “ g ia n t f o o l ,” has a lw a y s been h y p n o tize d and b ro u g h t to su bm is­
sion. H e in e b r in g s th e g ir l an o th er song:

A newer song, a better song,

M y frien ds, let’s bring to birth now!
We shall proceed right here to build
T h e Kingdom o f Heaven on earth now.

T h e soil produces bread enough

For all mankind's nutrition,
P lus rose and myrtle, beauty and joy,
A n d green peas in addition.9

H ein e g o e s o n in a fa m o u s co u p let:

T h e heavens we can safely leave

T o the angels and the sparrows

T h is a g a in is H e in e ’s “ S p in o z is m ” : a b o lish in g an im agin a ry w o rld o f

B e y o n d w h ile ra is in g e a rth ly , m aterial life to spiritual status. T h e di­
v in e is retain ed in m a n k in d and n atu re itself; and the j o y o f life for its
o w n sak e rep la ces th e false “ s p iritu a lity ” o f C h ristian m ortificatio n.
T ru e life is c o n c re te , e a rth ly , sensual, m ade o f bread and green peas
bu t also o f ro s e s , b e a u ty , and j o y ; and as such it is d ivine, the s tu ff o f
w h ic h th e k in g d o m o f h eav en is m ade.
W e m ay, at th is p o in t, r e m e m b e r Fernando de R ojas, another neo-
“ p a g a n ” a rtis t o f J e w is h d e scen t, w h o fo u r centuries earlier had also
p ro c la im e d a w o r ld w it h o u t tran scen d en ce.* Y e t Rojas was left
th ereb y w i t h a m e ta p h y s ic a l d esert w ith no inh eren t m eanin g, a m ere
“ vale o f tea rs.” 10 H e in e rejects th e “ v ale o f tears” m o t if as a C h ristian

* See voJu m e I , T h e Marrano o f Reason, ch aptcr 4.

(5 5 )
 CHAPTER 3

in v e n tio n and d ep icts th e w o r ld o f im m a n e n c e as s p iritu a l an d m e a n ­

in g fu l in itself, ev en as d iv in e and p o te n tia lly s a t is fy in g — i f it is re­
fo rm e d b y m an in to w h a t it can and s h o u ld b e c o m e . H e in e is in this
re sp e ct clo ser to S p in o za th an to R o ja s , th o u g h h e c o lo r s his S p in o ­
z is m w ith m a n -ce n te re d H e g e lia n e lem e n ts th a t S p in o z a re je c ts . N e x t
in th e p o e m - c y c le 11 H e in e passes th ro u g h c u s to m s an d w a tc h e s the
Pru ssian o fficia ls d o th eir d u ty o n his lu g g a g e . T h e p o o r b lo c k h e a d s ,
he m u se s, are u n a w a re it is n o t in his b a g s, b u t in h is h ead th a t H e in e
carries th e co n trab a n d . F o r in d e ed he is s m u g g lin g p r e c io u s sto n es,
“ th e c r o w n J e w e ls o f the fu tu r e ,” p r o m u lg a tin g an u n - C h r is tia n “ G o d
o f th e R e n e w a l.” H e in e ev e n a n n o u n ces a n e w , e a r th ly H o l y F am ily.
T h e m aid en E u r o p e is alre a d y m a k in g lo v e to th e S p irit o f F re e d o m ,
an d a lth o u g h n o p riest has b lessed th e m w it h h o ly w a te r s , th e y have
b e c o m e in sep a ra b le. S o o n th ere w ill b e c h ild re n b o r n o f th e ir h o ly
w e d lo c k .
A h u m a n m e sse n g e r p e r fo r m in g a n e w a n n u n c ia tio n , a s e c u la r a p o s ­
tle o f a n e w creed , H e in e d o e s n o t lo se his s e lf-iro n y . W h e n h e cro sse s
th e R h in e , th e o ld riv e r in q u ires a b o u t th e F re n ch , w h o m it re m e m b e rs
p o u r in g v ic to r io u s w a ters in to its cu rren t u n d e r N a p o le o n , an d seem s
to m iss th eir dash and esprit. H e in e reassures th e riv er:

O h fea r you not, dear fa ther R hine,

These jib e s in the French tradition;
T h e y ’re not the Frenchmen o f old any more,
A n d they wear different pants, in addition.

T h ey ph ilosop hize now all over the place,

K ant, F isch te [Fichte] and H egel extolling;
T h ey smoke tobacco, they g u z z le beer,
A n d many even go bow ling.12

B u t w h o g o t th e F ren ch in tere sted in “ F is c h te ” an d K a n t, i f n o t th e

sam e “ H en ri” H e in e w h o n o w m a k es fu n o f his o w n s u c c e s s ? '3 H e in e ’s
D e VAllem agne, th e F ren ch v e rsio n o f his H istory o f R eligion and P h ilos­
ophy in Germ any1* and p u b lis h e d a b o u t a d eca d e b e fo r e W inter’s T a le ,
e x p re sse s in v iv id essay fo r m th e sam e b a sic p h ilo s o p h y o f im m a n e n c e
as th e p o e m - c y c le .
T h e H istory is w r itte n in s e m i-H e g e lia n fa s h io n , its m a te ria l o r g a n ­
ize d fr o m th e v a n ta g e p o in t o f th e resu lt to w h ic h it p u r p o r ts to lead .
T h is re su lt is H e g e l’s p h ilo s o p h y , b r in g in g to its c lim a x th e id e a list
re v o lu tio n in G e rm a n y , w h ic h H e in e calls “ th e la s t c o n s e q u e n c e o f
P ro te s ta n tis m .” 15 T h e sa m e H e g e lia n resu lt, h o w e v e r , is a ls o ca lle d
“ p a n th e is m ” an d id e n tifie d w ith th e “ p o in t o f v i e w ” (th o u g h n o t th e

( 56)
 SPINOZA IN HEINE, HESS, FEUERBACH

literal s y s te m ) o f S p in o z a — w h o thus e n jo ys a p rivilege d position like

H egel h im s e lf. I f H e g e l b rin g s the process to its apex, Spinoza under­
lies it th r o u g h o u t.
H e in e s p e a k s v e r y little o f H e g e l directly. T h e H egel that em erges
fro m H e in e ’s a c c o u n t is the p h ilo so p h er w h o did everyth in g that
S c h e llin g s h o u ld h a v e d o n e an d failed to do. H e is also a reform er w h o
u n d e rm in e d th e s o c ia l an d re lig io u s o rd er and heralded a n ew era o f
fre e d o m . L ik e S p in o z a , he is a p an th eist and a naturalist, im bued w ith
E n lig h te n m e n t id ea s an d w e a rin g a m ask o f prudence (to shield him
fro m th e r ig o r s o f th e R e s to ra tio n ). H ein e not o n ly revises the conser­
v a tive im a g e o f H e g e l, he also v ie w s h im s e lf as un veilin g the Germ an
idealists sin ce K a n t, w h o s e tru e, su b v e rsive m essage was couched in
f o g g y ja r g o n an d “ d ra p e d in s ch o la stic fo rm u la s” that clouded and
even re v e rs e d its m e a n in g . K a n t had p e rfo rm ed in the G erm an m ind a
r e v o lu tio n as p r o fo u n d as, and far m o re lastin g than, the p olitical re v ­
o lu tio n in F ra n ce. “ A s in F ran ce n o p rivile ge, so in G erm an y no
th o u g h t is to le r a te d w it h o u t p r o v id in g its rig h t to exist. . . . A n d as in
France fell th e m o n a r c h y , th e k e y s to n e o f the old social system , so in
G e rm a n y fell th e is m , th e k e y s to n e o f the intellectual ancien régime."16
K a n t is p e r c e iv e d as c o m p le tin g the w o r k o f Sp in oza. H e is an “ arch-
d e s tro y e r in th e re a lm o f t h o u g h t” w h o “ far surpassed R obespierre in
te r ro r is m ” 17 ( th o u g h he sh ared his “ sh o p k e e p e r’s” self-righteousness).
T h e F re n ch o n ly k ille d a k in g , b u t K a n t and his fo llo w ers killed a G o d .
A s s o c ia tin g K a n t w it h S p in o z a ’s “ p an th eism ” is m ore than dubious.
B u t H e in e , I th in k , has h ere in m in d th eir ro le as critics o f transcendent
r e lig io n , o r as h e calls it, “ th e is m .” * W ith K an t, hum an reason— that
is, m a n k in d as im m a n e n t ex iste n ce— is left to itse lf as its o w n la w ­
g iv e r an d s u b je c t at o n c e , th e m aster and the slave o f itself; it is thus
a u to n o m o u s o r in h e r e n tly free , w ith no d iv in e au th ority to gu id e (or
su bd u e) it fr o m a b o v e (see ch a p te r i).
O n this n e g a tiv e an d q u a s i-fo rm a l basis H eine observes a m ore full-
b o d ie d p a n th e is m ta k in g sh ap e. W ith F ichte, the K antian “ I” has be­
c o m e a “ u n iv e rs a l w o r ld - I e n d o w e d w ith self-con sciousness,” 18 and
thus a s u b je c tiv iz e d fo r m o f th e S p in o zistic w o rld -sub stan ce. Likew ise
S c h e llin g , “ w h ile h e w a s still a p h ilo so p h er, p u t fo rth a p h ilo so p h y o f
n atu re w h ic h is b a s ic a lly n o th in g else than S p in o za’s idea o f panthe­
is m ,” 19 th e m o s t o u ts p o k e n p ro c la m a tio n o f “ the sanctification o f na­
ture an d th e re s titu tio n o f m a n in to his d iv in e righ ts.” In art, pantheism

* H ere and e lse w h e re H e in e u ses the w o rd deism but means w hat w e usually call
"th eism ,” n am ely, b e lie f in the ex isten ce o f a transcendent G od , separate from the world
he had created.

(57)
 CHAPTER 3

w a s “ e x p ressed m o s t u n m is ta k e a b ly ” b y n o n e o th e r th an G o e th e ; his
Werther, Faust, and a b o v e all, th e Ballads, m o v e d H e in e to sa y th a t “ the
e a r ly p h ilo s o p h y o f S p in o za has sh ed its m a th e m a tic a l sh e ll an d n o w
flu tters a b o u t in G o e th e ’s p o e tr y .” 20 “ G o e th e ,” says H e in e , “ w a s the
S p in o za o f p o e tr y ,” 21 an a v o w e d p an th eist w h o o c c u p ie d h im s e lf w ith
S p in o z a ’s p h ilo s o p h y his en tire life.
W ith H e g e l, “ o u r re v o lu tio n is te r m in a te d ” an d th e c irc le is c o m ­
p le te .22 H e in e , c u rio u s ly b u t c h a ra c te ristic a lly , secs H e g e l’s s y s te m as
a k in d o f Naturphilosophie (p h ilo s o p h y o f n atu re), an o d d la b e l fo r on e
w h ic h had p u t sp irit o v e r and a b o v e n atu re an d s a w th e la tte r as in ert
s u b sta n ce, a m e re s e lf-“ e x te rn a liz a tio n ” o f G o d . H e in e read s (or
rather, m isread s) H e g e l w ith th e sam e gla sses “ th a t S p in o z a h ad p o l­
is h e d ” ; he tries to p e rfo r m a sy n th e sis b e tw e e n th e m th a t te n d s b a c k in
S p in o z a ’s d irec tio n , and so his H e g e l, to o , s e e m s to g iv e e q u a l statu s
to n atu re an d sp irit as tw o asp ects o f th e sa m e im m a n e n t to ta lity , and
to v ie w the h u m an m in d as a s e lf-re fle c tio n o f n a tu re th a t re m a in s an
in te g ra l p art o f it. T h is is a d e fin ite d e p a rtu re fr o m th e real H e g e l to ­
w a r d S p in o za.
B e sid e s b e in g in te r w o v e n in to th e rest o f th e s to ry , S p in o z a also o c ­
cu p ies a ch a p ter fo r h im s e lf in H e in e ’s a c c o u n t o f Germ an p h ilo s o p h y .23
H e in e , lik e H e g e l, takes tim e to re c o u n t S p in o z a ’s life an d b a c k ­
g ro u n d — an e x c e p tio n in b o th th ese w r ite rs . S p in o z a is e x to lle d in rare
la n g u a g e . R e a d in g h im , “ o n e in h ales th e air o f th e fu tu r e ” ; th e re is an
“ in e x p lica b le b re a th ” in h im , “ a grandezza o f t h o u g h t ” w h ic h m u st
c o m e fro m his d irect an cesto rs, th e H is p a n o -J e w is h m a rty rs ; m o r e ­
o ve r, “ th e sp irit o f th e a n cien t H e b r e w p ro p h e ts s e e m s to h o v e r o v e r
this d ista n t o ffs p rin g o f th e irs ” w h o , in p e rs o n a l p u r ity an d in th e
c r o w n o f th o rn s he w o r e o n his h ead , also r e s e m b le d a n o th e r d iv in e
p aren t o f h is, Jesus C h r is t .24 It is n o w o n d e r th at H e in e ’s c u s t o m a r y
s c o ffin g an d m o c k e ry , w h ic h spared n e ith e r h im s e lf n o r m o s t o f th o se
h e a d m ire d o r ag re ed w ith , to ta lly ev a p o ra te s at S p in o z a ’s d o o r s te p .
L ik e H e g e l, H e in e also m a k e s m u c h o f S p in o z a ’s j e w i s h o r ig in s , b u t
in an a b s o lu te ly d ifferen t m o o d and in clo se e x is te n tia l in tim a c y . H e in e
cle a rly feels S p in o za to b e his b ro th e r in n o n -Jesu s, in n o n - M o s e s , in
so m e th in g n e w tra n scen d in g b o th . H e in e p ric k s at S p in o z a ’s e x c o m ­
m u n ica to rs w ith th eir b o m b a s tic b lo w in g o f th e s h o fa r, th e an cie n t
s y m b o l o f re lig io u s a w e w h ic h H ein e, in c o o l, p r o fa n e v e n g e a n c e ,
strips d o w n to th e p ro sa ic p iece o f ra m h o rn it a c tu a lly is. T h e ra b b is,
H e in e says, d eclared S p in o za “ u n d e s e rv in g to c a rry th e n a m e o f j e w , ”
y e t “ his en em ies w e re m a g n a n im o u s e n o u g h to le a v e th is n a m e to
h im .” 25 H e in e k n o w s th is e x p e rie n c e all to o w e ll. S p in o z a h e ra ld s fo r
h im th e lo t o f th e m o d e rn J e w w h o , p ro je c te d b e y o n d J u d a is m and

(58)
 SPINOZA IN HEINE, HESS, FEUERBACH

C h r is tia n ity a lik e , s till ca rrie s o v e r w ith h im a n e w creed, a n ew

e a rth ly r o u te to s o m e t h in g re s e m b lin g red em p tio n . T h e h o pe, the
m e ssa g e, an d th e m e s s ia n ic d r iv e are in je cted in to secular so ciety— and
H ein e, w h e n d r ift in g fo r a w h ile to w a rd th e Sain t-S im o n ian s, cou ld
n ot h av e b e e n s u rp ris e d b y th e n u m b e r o f J e w s in th eir lead in g ra n ks,26
as he w a s s u r e ly n o t a s to n is h e d b y th e ex-J u d aism o f his “ h ard -n u t”
frien d M a r x , th e s c ie n t ific p r o p h e t, n o r b y the la tter’s co n v o lu ted and
a lm o st a u t o - a n tis e m it ic s t r u g g le ag a in st this transcended part o f his
o w n self.
S p in o z a , h o w e v e r , is n o t o n ly a p erson ; his life is in terw o ven w ith
the p a n th e is m h e a n n o u n c e s . W h a t d o es this co n c e p t m ean to H eine?
In b rie f, it h as t w o m a jo r a n d co n n e cte d aspects.
P a n th e is m is fir s t th e m e ta p h y s ic a l d o ctrin e o f G o d ’s id en tity w ith
the w o r ld . “ T h e G o d o f th e p an th eists d istin g u ish es H im s e lf fro m that
o f th e th eists in th a t H e is w ith in th e w o rld itself, w h ile the latter is
o u tsid e it o r, w h a t a m o u n ts to th e sam e th in g , is ab ove the w o rld . T h e
G o d o f th e th e is ts g o v e r n s th e w o r ld as a separate in stitu tion fro m
a b o v e .” 27 H e in e h e re p u ts th e eth ic a l and p o litical corollaries o f theism
into its v e r y d e fin itio n . B e in g o u ts id e the w o rld m eans that G o d rules
o ve r it as an a b s o lu te m o n a r c h . It is o n ly w ith regard to the m od e ot
this g o v e r n m e n t th a t th e th eists are d iv id ed .

T h e H e b r e w s th in k o f G o d as a th u n d e rin g tyrant; the Christian s

as a lo v in g fa th e r; R o u s s e a u and his d iscip les, the w h o le G eneva
s c h o o l, th in k o f H im as a c le v e r artist w h o fabricated the w o rld
m o re o r less as th e ir Papa [D a d d y ] used to fabricate his clocks,
and, b e in g connoisseurs, th e y a d o re th e w o r k and praise the M aster
th e r e - a b o v e .28

H ein e m u s t b e a w a r e th a t th is “ c lo c k w o r k ” th e o lo g y (w h ich alone

a m o n g h is e x a m p le s m e r its th e term deism) is n o t a G enevan m o n o p ­
o ly; it w a s p r o fe s s e d b y L e ib n iz and certain “ o ccasio n alist” Cartesians,
and m a rk s, in a m o r e g e n e ra l sense, th e w h o le trend o f the “ G o d o f
the p h ilo s o p h e r s ” — e x c e p tin g , o f co u rse, Sp in o za. W h at H eine tells us
u n d er h is j o k e s is th a t S p in o z a w a s u n iq u e and so litary not o n ly am on g
Jew s an d C h r is tia n s , b u t also a m o n g th e rationalist philosop h ers them ­
selves. B u t n o t a n y m o r e , at least n o t in G erm an y:

P a n th e ism is th e o p e n s e cre t o f G e rm an y. In fact w e have o ut­

g r o w n th e is m . W e are free an d w a n t n o th u n d erin g tyrants. We
are o f a g e an d n e e d n o p a tern a l care. N o r are w e the artifacts o f a
grea t c r a fts m a n . T h e is m is a re lig io n fo r slaves, for children, for
G e n e v a n s , fo r w a tc h m a k e r s !29

(5 9)
 CHAPTER 3

G e n e v a n o tw ith s ta n d in g , H e in e ’s rh e to ric s h o w s th a t h e h as little

u se fo r m e ta p h y s ic a l a r g u m e n ts p er se. T h e is m is w r o n g an d p a n th e -
!sm is r ig h t b ecau se o f its im p lic a tio n s fo r m a n ’s s e lf- im a g e , life , eth ­
ics, an d p o litic s . N o r is th e ism so m u c h refu ted as it is o u t g r o w n . It is
a p h a se in h u m a n d e v e lo p m e n t s ig n ify in g im m a tu r ity , an d is shed
w h e n m a n k in d , th ro u g h s e lf-e d u c a tio n , g r o w s u p to asse rt its o w n
a u t o n o m y and d iv in ity . H e in e fo llo w s h ere K a n t, H e rd e r, S c h ille r , and
o th e r th in k ers o f th e A u jk la n m g , w h o m he c lo th e s in a H e g e lia n m a n tle
an d lead s b a ck to S p in o za.
H o w e v e r , w h e n s p e a k in g o f th e d iv in ity o f m a n an d n o t s im p ly o f
his a u to n o m y , H e in e also H e g c lia n iz e s S p in o z a , far b e y o n d w h a t the
la tte r ’s d o c trin e w ill s u p p o rt. R a th e r th an b r in g in g H e g e l b a c k to S p i­
n o z a , H e in e takes h ere th e o p p o s ite d ire c tio n . G o d , says H e in e , is
id e n tic a l w i t h n atu re. H e m a n ifests h im s e lf in p la n ts a n d a n im a ls , y e t
h u m a n s h av e a d is tin c t a d v a n ta g e — in m an th e d iv in ity atta in s se lf-
co n s cio u s n e s s , H e in e states in fa m ilia r H e g e lia n te r m s . M o r e o v e r ,
“ h u m a n ity as a w h o le is th e in c a rn a tio n o f G o d ” w h o is “ th e tru e h ero
o f h u m a n h is to ry .” 30 T h is , p recise ly , is th e a s p e ct o f H e g e l’s “ a b s o lu te
as s p ir it” w h ic h S p in o za m u st u n e q u iv o c a lly rejec t. Y e t th is is n o t the
H e g e lia n G eist su p e rse d in g n ature; it is n a tu re itse lf, in its v e r y in d iv id ­
u a lity , w h ic h p ro d u c e s s e lf-c o n s c io u s n e s s in m an . E v e n w h e r e H e in e
o v e rste p s S p in o za to w a rd a s p e c ific H e g e lia n id ea, h e S p in o z is e s , as it
w e r e , th is id ea to o .
T h e s e co n d m a jo r sen se o f p a n th e is m fo r H e in e is th e u n it y o f m a t­
ter an d sp irit. H e re , a g a in , H ein e lea d s H e g e l b a c k to w a r d S p in o z a . H e
ab o lish e s „the s u p e r io r ity o f th e H e g e lia n G eist o v e r n a tu re a n d resto re s
th eir p ara llel and c o m p le m e n ta r y statu s. P a n th e is m , H e in e e x p la in s ,
en tails “ th e re h a b ilita tio n o f m atte r, its re s to ra tio n to d ig n it y , its re li­
g io u s re c o g n itio n , its m o r a l s a n c tific a tio n , its r e c o n c ilia tio n w ith
s p irit.” 31 “ H o l y M a tte r!” 32 H e in e e x c la im s , p a ra p h ra s in g th e C h r is tia n
H o ly S p irit in reverse. H e d o es n o t w is h to a b o lis h s p irit b u t to u n ite
it w it h m a tte r o n an e q u a l basis. T h e r e b y h e re tu rn s to S p in o z a and
sta n d s, lik e h im , ag a in st ce n tu rie s o f C h r is tia n an d J e w is h c u ltu re . T h e
J e w s , says H ein e, d esp ised th e b o d y and e s p o u s e d a u s te re s p iritu a lity ,
w h ic h th e y b e q u e a th e d to th e p ag a n w o r ld in th e fo r m o f C h r is tia n it y .
(E ls e w h e re H e in e sees th is as a s u b tle re v e n g e o f j u d e a o v e r th e R o m e
th a t h ad cru sh ed it— a n o th e r p r o to -N ie tz s c h e a n id e a .33) C h r is tia n it y
w e n t e v e n fu rth e r, in sistin g o n u n n atu ral d e m a n d s th a t w e r e im p o s s i­
b le to fu lfill an d th us in tr o d u c in g e v il an d h y p o c r is y in to th e w o r ld .
C h r is tia n it y m o r tifie d th e flesh and c o n d e m n e d th e b o d y as v ile and
e v il in itself. T h e r e b y it fo rc e d e v e r y p e rso n in to sin , th e n s u b d u e d h im
o r h e r b y th e fear o f d iv in e re trib u tio n in th e n e x t w o r ld . T h e tw o
asp e cts o f th e ism are h ere u n ite d fr o m a p o litic a l s ta n d p o in t. C h r is t i­

(60)
 SPINOZA IN HEINE, HESS, FEUERBACH

anity, m o r e o v e r, h ad to re lin q u ish th e real w o rld ro the dom inion o f

C aesar "a n d his J e w is h p a g e s ’’^ — to sheer p ow er, greed, am bition, and
the o p p re s s io n o f th e p e o p le in w h ic h it u ltim ate ly jo in ed ; dialectically,
by d e m a n d in g lo f t y an d ab stra ct spiritu ality, C h ristian ity had actually
drained th e real w o r ld o f all sp iritu a lity.
H ein e, far fr o m b e in g a m aterialist, seeks to restore the link between
the real an d th e s p iritu a l. H e insists that spirit resides w ith in the ma­
terial w o r ld , w it h in th e n eed s an d sensual aspirations o f hum anity, the
o n ly su b je c t o f d iv in it y an d w o rth , and th at the h igh est degree o f spir­
ituality, th e k in g d o m o f G o d itself, is “ b aked w ith leaven” and made
w ith “ g ree n p eas a p le n t y ” a lo n g w ith m o re refined pleasures.
T h is c o n c e p tio n has v a rio u s co n seq u en ces, both political and es-
th e tic-m o ra l. R e s to r in g th e v a lu e o f m atter adds a n e w socialist (and
e c o n o m ic) d im e n s io n to p o litic s . H e n ce fo rth , the political revolution
m ust p u t fo rth th e m a te ria l w e lfa re o f the p eop le as its objective, as
s o m e th in g c a r r y in g m o r a l an d sp iritu al w o rth in itse lf,35 and not be
satisfied w i t h fo r m a l d e m o c r a c y and p o litical freed o m alone, as i f this
w ere a “ p u r e r ” d o m a in in w h ic h , as in H e g e l, spirituality m igh t m an­
ifest it s e l f T h is a n ti- H e g e lia n an d p ro to -M a rx ia n dem and is also made
by H e in e as a c o r o lla r y to th e p an th eism he finds in Spinoza.
M o r e o v e r , s o c ia lis m c o u ld n o t ch erish a cu lt o f p overty or austere
person al m o r a lity . H e in e ch id e s the self-d en ial o f m an y revolutionar­
ies, w h ic h is b u t a n e w fo r m o f C h ristia n ity . It is not the sharing o f
w an t he is a fte r, b u t th e p le n itu d e o f life— rich, abundant, sensual, cel­
ebratin g.

W e are fo u n d in g a d e m o c r a c y o f G o d s eq u a lly holy, blessed, and

g lo r io u s . Y o u d e s ire s im p le d ress, ascetic m orals, and unseasoned
e n jo y m e n t; w e , o n th e co n tra ry , desire nectar and am brosia, pur­
p le m a n tle s , c o s tly p e rfu m e s , p leasu re and splendor, dance and
la u g h in g , m u s ic an d p lays.-’6

O n e is re m in d e d , e v e n b y th e p h rasin g, o f S p in o za’s w e ll-kn o w n

w o rd s:

T h e g r e a te r th e j o y w it h w h ic h w e are affected , the greater the

p e rfe c tio n to w h ic h w e pass. . . . It is the part o f a w ise man to
re fresh an d r e s to r e h im s e lf in m o d e ra tio n w ith pleasant fo od and
d rin k , w it h sc e n ts , w it h th e b e a u ty o f green plants, w ith decora­
tio n , m u s ic , s p o r ts , th e th e a te r and o th er th in gs o f this kind. (Ef/i-
ics, p t. 4, p r o p . 45S)

P le asu re, fo r H e in e , is sen su al and m eta p h ysical experience, en jo y­

in g th e s e lf as a u t o n o m o u s b y w a y o f e n jo y in g sensual existence. Such
p leasu re s h o u ld n o t b e co n s tr u e d as m erely h ed on istic or utilitarian.

(61)
 CHAPTER 3

B u t, e q u a lly , it m u st n o t lo se its c o n c re te s e n s u a lity an d b e in te rp re te d

as a m e ta p h o r (the usu al s tra te g y o f th e o lo g ia n s ). M a tt e r a n d sen su al
e x is te n ce are sp iritu a l in th eir o w n b e in g , in th e ir v e r y n a tu ra ln e s s, and
b o th asp ects resid e in each o th er: M a tte r, th e s t u f f o f life , is a m b r o s ia
th r o u g h o u t. E v e n b rea d an d g re e n peas are a m b r o s ia , i f w e ca re to
lo o k at th e m this w a y , as H e in e s u g g e s ts w e d o .
In M a y 1848 H e in e w a lk e d th e streets o f P a ris fo r th e la st tim e . H e
d ie d afte r e ig h t m o r e b e d rid d e n yea rs— in h is “ m a t tr e s s - g r a v e ,” as he
d u b b e d it, s u ffe rin g fr o m a d v an ced m u s c le d e g e n e r a tio n , liv in g on
m o r p h in e and o p iu m , his n e w am b ro s ia , f ig h t in g his e n e m ie s , his n o c ­
tu rn al g h o s ts , his past, his s e lf-p ity , an d w r it in g n e w p o e m s an d p o ­
le m ic s. H e in e ’s fin a n cia l s u p p o rt co lla p s e d a lo n g w it h h is h e a lth , and
he w a s a lw a y s m in d fu l o f m o n e y . T h e s e lo n g la st y e a rs w e r e H e in e ’s
m o s t tr u ly N ie tzs c h e a n p e rio d — a ffir m in g life w it h p a s s io n in face o f
a cu te pain and im p e n d in g d eath , and m o b iliz in g th e re s o u rc e s o f art,
b e a u ty , w it, an d h u m o r to tr a n s fo rm s u ffe r in g in to a life fo r c e . B u t
H e in e w a s n o lo n g e r a th e o re tica l N ie tz s c h e a n . H is a th e is m w a s sh at­
tered a lo n g w ith his h ealth and in c o m e (and b o th are n e e d e d in a b u n ­
d an ce, H e in e h a lf m uses in his Confessions, in o r d e r to b e a s o lid a th e ­
ist). T h is w a s H e in e ’s “ c o n v e r s io n ,” as it is s o m e t im e s c a lle d , p e rh a p s
e x a g g e r a te d ly .37 H e in e says he has c o m m itt e d a m a n u s c r ip t o n H e g e l’s
p h ilo s o p h y to th e fla m e s ,38 an d he retracts th e m a in id ea s o f his Histor)>
in a n e w p reface co m p o s e d in 1852. G o d is aliv e an d w e ll, H e in e n o w
re p o rts. T h e g o o d K a n t n e v e r re a lly m e a n t a n y g r e a t h a r m to h im . In
fact, as H e in e n o w re c o g n iz e s , K a n t d id n o t d is p r o v e th e e x is te n c e o f
G o d b u t le ft th e m a tter u n re s o lv e d in p rin c ip le , w it h m a n k in d h a v in g
o n ly its a u to n o m o u s rea so n to re ly u p o n ; an d all th e “ s p id e r y B e r lin
d ia le c tic ” (H e g e l, o f co u rse) c a n n o t ev e n k ill a ca t, le t a lo n e a G o d .
“ N o w the s h ip w re c k e d m e ta p h y s ic ia n clin g s fa s t to th e B i b le .” 39
T h r o u g h th e B ib le H e in e tries to c o m e to te rm s w i t h h is a ssu m e d
P ro te s ta n tis m and w ith his n e v e r q u ite b e tra y e d J u d a is m . H e retu rn s
to his J e w is h o rig in s , n o t in re lig io u s a ffilia tio n b u t in h is to r ic a l se n ti­
m e n t an d p r id e ,40 c o m p o s in g his Hebrew M elodies. B u t , n o le ss, H e in e
fin d s in th e B ib le — the P ro te sta n t b o o k , re d is c o v e re d an d d is s e m in a te d
b y L u th e r— a n e w v in d ic a tio n o f his ap o sta sy , w h ic h se e m s to h ave
w e ig h e d m o re o n his m in d th an th e s im p le “ c h a n g e o f c lo t h e s ” h e had
at first said it w a s. M u c h as, in his H istory, H e in e c la im e d p a r a d o x ic a lly
th a t P ro te s ta n tis m w a s th e o r ig in o f the lib e ra tin g a th e is m th a t later
e m e rg e d in G e rm a n y , so n o w he sees P ro te s ta n tis m as th e g e n u in e re ­
lig io n o f th e B ib le , its n e w fo u n d s p r in g o f life. L u th e r is n e v e r ac­
ce p te d b y H e in e as su ch , y e t is a lw a y s p u t at th e s o u r c e o f w h a te v e r
sp iritu a l m e rit th e H e in e o f the d a y r e c o g n iz e s .41

(62)
 SPINOZA IN HEINE, HESS, FEUERBACH

H e in e ’s s o c ia l v is io n , to o , d a rk e n e d to w ard the end. H e was a friend

o f Lassale, b u t r e c o ile d w i t h h o r r o r fro m the “ m o st co m m u n istic co m ­
m u n is m ” w h ic h , lik e in d u s tria l ca p ita lism , threatened to level all hu­
m a n ity to s h a llo w n e s s an d k ill b e a u ty and p oetry. H e started seeing
the p e o p le as p le b ia n s , an d w a s frig h te n e d by a future m ore o m in o u s than
his y o u th fu l e n th u s ia s m s e e m e d to p ro m ise . H is fo rm er integral H el­
len istic d re a m w a s n o w b r o k e n in to scraps o f re lie f sculpture fro m his
o w n s a r c o p h a g u s , w h e r e H e in e , in o n e o f his later p oem s, im agines
h im s e lf ly in g , as b its fa lle n fr o m his c o ffin , so m e en graved w ith G reek
and s o m e w i t h H e b r e w m o t ifs , m ix and fig h t all aroun d h im , and the
m y s te rio u s M ouch e, th e m a r t y r ’s flo w e r m ad e o f C h r is t’s b lo o d , flour­
ishes o v e r th e p o e t b e fo r e tu r n in g in to a sensual, lo v in g w o m a n .* T h is
was th e t o m b s to n e H e in e cre a te d fo r h im s e lf w h ile ly in g in his other,
m attress s a r c o p h a g u s .
It w a s n o t an in a c c u r a te s e lf-p o r tra it, th o u g h perhaps not co m p lex
e n o u g h . D e s p it e h is a lle g e d “ c o n v e r s io n ” H ein e died the dualist he had
alw ays b ee n (e v e n u n d e r his d e e p ly assu m ed H ellen ism ), w averin g be­
tw een A th e n s an d J e ru s a le m , b e tw e e n so cia lism and art, and, above
all, b e tw e e n an a th e is m h e n o lo n g e r b e lieved in and a n e w religious
feelin g he d id n o t q u it e tru st.
It is, h o w e v e r (p e rh a p s u n fo rtu n a te ly ), n o t the later H eine w h o in­
terests us h e re , b u t th e H e in e up to 1848 and especially betw een the
tw o r e v o lu tio n s . L e t m e c o n c lu d e b y s u m m in g up his relation to Spi­
noza and his ro le in th e b r o a d e r p ictu re.
T h e c o n t e x t in w h ic h H e in e w r o t e w a s d ra w n by the Pantheismus-
slreil (the strife o v e r p a n th e is m ) th at had raged in G erm an y about a
g e n e ra tio n e a rlier. F rie d ric h H e in ric h J a co b i, the p rop on ent o f super­
sensible fa ith , c la im e d th a t n o ra tio n al p h ilo so p h y can establish the
truth o f re lig io n . O n th e c o n tra ry , w h e n ration al m etaph ysics is m ost
co h eren t it is d o o m e d to en d in S p in o z a ’s p an th eism , w h ich is funda­
m e n ta lly a th e is tic . J a c o b i also alle g e d that L essin g, befo re his death,
had c o n fe s s e d to h im th a t h e a g re e d fu n d am e n ta lly w ith Spinoza. Ja­
co b i c h a lle n g e d M o s e s M e n d e ls s o h n , L e s s in g ’s friend and a rationalist
m e ta p h y sic ia n (i.e . m a in ta in in g th a t G o d ’s existen ce, im m ortality o f
the s o u l, an d o th e r r e lig io u s id eas have ration al p roo fs), to respond.
T h e c o n t r o v e r s y th a t e n s u e d s p a rk e d lik e fire; K an t, G o eth e, and H er­
der a m o n g o th e rs fo u n d th e m s e lv e s in v o lv e d , K a n t tryin g to “ cleanse
m y s e lf o f th e s u s p ic io n o f S p in o z is m ” 42 (as he w r o te to ja c o b i), G oeth e
and H e rd e r t r y in g to e x c u lp a te S p in o za o f th e ch a rge o f atheism . T h is

* La Mouche (“ F ly " ) w as th e n ic k n a m e H ein e used for a yo u n g w om an, C am ille Sel-

den, w h o b ec a m e atta ch e d to h im and w as his last love.

(63 )
 CHAPTER 3

s trife w a s , s o c io lo g ic a lly , a far m o r e im p o rta n t e v e n t in G e r m a n cu l­

tu re than th e m e re m e rit o f th e case m a y s u g g e s t; an d as H e in e r e c o g ­
n izes, it p u t S p in o za at th e h eart o f G e rm a n id e a lis m , w i t h F ich te,
S c h e llin g , and H e g e l tr y in g to u n ite K a n t an d S p in o z a , e ach in his o w n
m an n er.
A g e n e ra tio n later, H ein e lo o k s b a c k o n th e b a ttle an d fin d s h im s e lf
w ith in it. H e p o u rs d erisio n o n J a c o b i in e v e r y p o s s ib le w a y , c a llin g
h im an “ o ld w o m a n ,” a n o n p h ilo s o p h e r in d is g u is e , an d th e lik e ; but
w h e n all is said and d o n e and th e sarcasm s u b s id e s , w e see th a t H e in e
h ad su b s crib e d to J a c o b i’s thesis: S p in o z a ’s p a n th e is m is in d e e d the
lo g ic a l co n s e q u e n c e o f ra tio n al p h ilo s o p h y , an d it is in d e e d ath e ism .
B u t th e re is n o th in g to h id e o r to be e x c u lp a te d fr o m : th is is th e n e w
m a tu r ity o f th e G e rm a n sp irit, h e ra ld in g , in S p in o z a ’s n a m e , a n e w era
o f lib e ra tio n . J a c o b i w o n th e e x e g e tic a l b a ttle , b u t lo s t th e s u b s ta n tiv e
w a r .43
H o w d o es H e in e relate to S p in o za and H e g e l? H e in e s ta rte d w ith
H e g e l, b u t in several w a y s b r o u g h t h im b a ck to S p in o z a . F irs t, h e re in ­
v e ste d H e g e l w ith elem en ts o f th e E n lig h te n m e n t th a t S p in o z a had
fo r e to ld b u t H e g e l a lre a d y tran scen d e d ; h is H e g e l is r e fr e s h in g ly less
d ia le ctica l, m o r e a critic (e sp e c ia lly o f re lig io n ) th a n a s y s te m b u ild e r,
a H e g e l retu rn ed to his y o u th and m a d e a y o u n g H e g e lia n . T h e r e b y ,
in e v ita b ly , he is also flatten ed , an d su ffers fr o m th e s a m e o n e -s id e d n e s s
w h ic h th e real H e g e l sa w as the fla w o f th e A ujklárung.
S e c o n d , H e in e ab o lish e s th e s u p e r io r ity o f s p irit o v e r m a tte r that
d o m in a te d H e g e l’s th o u g h t and rep la ce s it w i t h a s tric t S p in o z is tic p ar­
a lle lism . H e g e l’s p a n th e is m w a s h isto ric a l; H e in e , f o llo w in g S p in o za ,
re sto re s n atu re as a p rim o rd ia l and c o m p r e h e n s iv e c a te g o r y , o f w h ic h
m a tte r and sp irit, th e id eal and th e real, are e q u a l a n d c o m p le m e n t a r y
asp e cts. T h is en ab les H e in e to “ s a n c tify m a tte r ,” as h e s a y s , an d to
re s to re it to m o r a l an d r e lig io u s w o r t h . H e in e , h o w e v e r , is n o m a te ri­
alist; lik e S p in o za , h e rejects m e ta p h y s ic a l m a te ria lis m — th e v ie w that
s p irit is re d u c ib le to m a tte r o r d e riv e d fr o m it as an e p ip h e n o m e n o n —
as w e ll as m a te ria lism as eth ics, th e h e d o n ist (an d u tilita ria n ) e m p h a sis
o n cru d e m a tter as such an d fo r its o w n o n e -s id e d sak e. H e in e ’ s d is g u s t
w it h th e p u r e ly carn al la s civ io u s n e ss o f th e R o m a n E m p ir e e q u a ls o n ly
his av e rsio n to its an tid o te: C h r is tia n s u p r a s p iritu a lity .
H e in e jo in s S p in o za in his a n ti- C h r is tia n (an d , h e b e lie v e s , w ith
m u c h less re a so n , a n ti-J ew ish )44 r e d is c o v e ry o f th e s p ir itu a lit y in h e re n t
in m a tte r an d the sen sual b e in g o f m an . T h is le a d s H e in e , o n th e on e
h a n d , to his an ti-a sc etic m o r a lity , c e le b ra tin g t h is - w o r ld ly life , an d on
th e o th e r h a n d to his so cia lis m . T h e k in g d o m o f G o d can b e es ta b ­
lish e d o n ly o n earth and m u st en ta il m a te ria l w e lfa r e a n d th e s h a rin g

<64)
 SPINOZA IN HEINE, HESS, FEUERBACH

o f w ea lth . F o rm a l d e m o c r a c y is n o t su fficien t, but calls for econom ic

d e m o c ra c y as w e ll. N o t o n ly is th ere n o th in g v ile in the material needs
and in terests o f m a n k in d , th e y are gen u in e expression s o f hum anity
and the n e c e s s a ry su b s tr a te fo r all h u m an liberation.
T h is lea d s w e ll b e y o n d H e g e l and, th ro u g h a return to Spinoza, on­
ward, via F e u e rb a ch to M a r x : H e g e l ab an d o n ed the w o rld o f econom ic
p ro d u c tio n an d e x c h a n g e to th e re ig n o f eg o is tic particular interests, a
war o f all a g a in s t all, d e v o id o f in h eren t rational m ean in g and basically
spiritless. O n l y th e d o m a in o f p o litic s and righ t was ‘‘spiritual” for
H egel, an d th u s th e a p p ro p ria te field in w h ic h hum an liberation is to
be a c h ie v ed an d th e o ld re lig io u s ideals secularized and projected into
history. H e in e an d th e o th e r le ft-H e g e lia n s— up to and in cluding
M arx— b y th e ir S p in o z is tic re h a b ilita tio n o f m atter as the o n ly place
w h ere sp irit can in h e re , m a d e it p o ssib le fo r socialism to em erge as a
w o rth y h u m a n p r o s p e c t, r e p la c in g the transcendent religious ideals
and in tr o d u c in g e th ic a l w o r t h and ratio n al m eanin g into the w orld o f
e co n o m ic fo rc e s a n d in te re st.
H ein e th u s p e r fo r m s a k in d o f syn th esis (as L efeb vre suggests)45 be­
tw een S p in o z a an d H e g e l ty p ic a l o f le ft-H e g elia n ism m ore generally,
a syn th esis s p r in k le d w ith e le m e n ts o f the E n ligh ten m en t and leaning
largely in S p in o z a ’s d ir e c tio n . Y e t this “ retu rn ” to Spinoza is future-
oriented: it s e rv e s to tra n s ce n d H e g e l and m o v e to w ard a n e w version
o f S p in o z a ’s n a tu ra lis m , e n ric h e d w ith co n tem p o ra ry concerns and
m arked b y a s o c ia lis t te n d e n c y . T h is n e w naturalism is h istoricized, as
in H e g e l, w i t h o u t g iv in g h is to r y th e su p rem e “ spiritual” status that
H egel d id , b u t ra th e r le a v in g h is to ry , in pure Spin ozistic manner,
w ith in n a tu re it s e l f as its o w n in te g ra l m an ifestation . H eine, like D . F.
Strauss, H e s s , a n d F e u e rb a c h , sees th e d iv in e as best em bod ied in hu­
man h is to ry ; b u t e v e n th is H e g e lia n step , w h ic h Spinoza h im se lf could
not a llo w , is c lo th e d in S p in o z is tic g a rb . N o con cession is m ade to the
o ve rrid in g “ s p ir itu a lit y ” o f h is to ry as co m p a re d to nature. H isto ry it­
se lf is n a tu ra lize d , ju s t as s e lf-c o n s c io u s n e s s b eco m es an inner reflectiv­
ity w ith in n a tu re , an d th e S p in o z is tic parallelism o f equal aspects o f
the to ta lity — th e c r u c ia l p o in t a llo w in g le ft-H eg elia n s to rem ain natu­
ralists— is s tr ic t ly p re s e rv e d .
H e in e ’s w a s o n ly o n e o f th e v e r y first expressio n s o f this n ew think­
ing, w h e r e H e g e l w a s b r o u g h t b a c k to S p in o za and the latter was his­
to ricized w i t h o u t c e a s in g to b e a n atu ralist. T h e m ost outstanding sys­
tem o f th o u g h t th a t d e v e lo p e d fr o m this is that o f M a rx. A n d the m ost
influential y o u n g H e g e lia n e x p o u n d in g o n M a rx was not his friend
H eine, b u t th e m o r e s y s te m a t ic F euerbach .

(6 5 )
 CHAPTER 3

S p in o z a and H ess

S e v e ra l y ea rs after H e in e ’s History o f Religion and Ph ilosop hy in G er­

many, th e first so cia list b o o k w a s p u b lis h e d in G e r m a n y , a c u rio u s,
h a lf-b a k e d w o r k , b u t also re v e a lin g in m a n y w a y s . It c a m e fr o m the
p en o f th e y o u n g M o s e s H ess, th e fu tu r e s o c ia lis t le a d e r an d M a r x ’s
u n e a s y c o lle a g u e and s o m e tim e c o m p a n io n . H e ss e n title d h is b o o k
T h e H oly History o f M ankind and s ig n e d it, a n o n y m o u s ly , “ b y a ju n io r
(d isciple) o f S p in o z a ” (von einem Jünger S p in oza s)— a ra th e r p a ra d o x ic a l
title p a g e , c o n s id e rin g th at S p in o za w a s th e firs t to a b o lis h th e n o tio n
o f “ sacre d h is to r y ” and c o u ld n o t a llo w it e v e n in th e m e ta p h o r ic H e ­
g e lia n sen se th a t H ess is s u r e ly u s in g .4*
T h e p a ra d o x is h e ig h te n e d as w e see th e ro le w h ic h th e y o u n g H ess
assign s to S p in o za as th e th ird J e w is h p ro p h e t a fte r M o s e s an d Jesus.
T h e sacred h is to r y o f m a n k in d (its la ten t m e a n in g ) u n fo ld s in a tr in ity
o f rea lm s. First, th ere is th e rea lm o f G o d th e F ath er, m a r k e d b y an ­
cie n t J u d a ism an d th e O l d T e s ta m e n t; th en , w i t h j e s u s ’ b ir th , th e rea lm
o f G o d th e S o n takes p re ce d e n ce, m a rk e d b y C h r is t ia n it y a n d th e N e w
T e s ta m e n t. C h r is tia n ity is th en su p e rse d e d in tu rn w it h th e b ir th o f
“ o u r M a s te r,” S p in o za , w h o o p en s th e th ird an d fin a l re a lm , th a t o f
th e H o ly S p irit, th e rea lm in w h ic h w e still liv e . T h is la s t era w i ll lead,
th r o u g h a series o f re v o lu tio n s (sp iritu al in G e r m a n y [cf. H e in e ], p o ­
litical in F rance and th e U n ite d States, and m o r e to c o m e ) to th e u lti­
m ate re d e m p tio n o f th e h u m a n ra ce, w h e n th e N e w J e r u s a le m w i ll be
esta b lish ed in th e h eart o f E u r o p e . T h is w i ll b e a p e r fe c t s o c ia lis t s o c i­
ety, a b o lis h in g p riv a te p r o p e r t y and th e r ig h t o f in h e rita n c e , d e th r o n ­
in g M a m m o n and his d e h u m a n iz in g re g im e , an d a llo w in g th e in n er
s o lid a r ity o f th e h u m a n h eart to assert it s e lf fre e ly , u n h in d e r e d b y the
d e v io u s so cia l in s titu tio n s w h ic h , so far, h av e p e r v e r te d it in to an
e g o is tic s trife o f ail ag a in st all. T h is , says H e ss in p r o p h e tic e x u lta ­
tio n — a n e w Isaiah tr a n s c rib in g th e o ld o n e— w i ll h e ra ld th e e n d o f
d ay s in w h ic h th e an cien t J e w is h m e s sa g e , lib e ra te d fr o m its n a r r o w
re lig io u s sh ell, w ill b e p r o p e r ly tran sla ted and re a lize d o n a w o r ld - h is -
to ric a l scale. A n d all th is w i ll ta k e p lace u n d e r S p in o z a ’s b a n n e r and to
th e a w e s o m e s o u n d o f th e J e w is h sh o fa r— th e sa m e in s tr u m e n t th at
a c c o m p a n ie d S p in o z a ’s ban (and o f w h ic h H e in e s p o k e in d e ris io n ).
T h e y o u n g H ess in d u lg e s in a fa s c in a tin g m ix t u r e o f J e w is h and
C h r is tia n s y m b o ls fo r m e r ly k n o w n m a in ly a m o n g th e M a r r a n o s and
th eir d e sce n d a n ts. B u t H ess is n o M a rra n o ; h e is a le ft - H e g e lia n J e w is h
h e re tic w h o , w h ile tra n sce n d in g th e h is to ric a l r e lig io n s , tries n e v e rth e ­
less to re c a p tu re h is o w n lo s t J u d a is m w ith in th e s o c ia lis t u to p ia , the
fin a l o u tc o m e o f h isto ry. T h is is an u n m is ta k a b le d r iv e in th e y o u n g

(66)
 SPINOZA IN HEINE, HESS, FEUERBACH

Hess. H e p ro c la im s a sp iritu a l recall o f the Jew s, ju s t as, tw o decades

later and after s e v e ra l v a ria tio n s , he w ill recom m en d the material recall
o f the J e w s as w e ll.
T h is d riv e a ls o e x p la in s a d is to rtio n H ess m akes. W h at Spinoza saw
as the fla w o f a n c ie n t J u d a is m — its u n io n o f p olitics and religion—
Hess, in S p in o z a ’s n a m e , d eclares to be an advantage. T h e Jew s, says
Hess, k n e w n o d is tin c tio n b e tw e e n the in ner and the outer m an and
b etw een re a lity an d its s p iritu a l m ean in g; C h ristian s broke this unity,
severin g G o d fr o m C a e s a r and a b a n d o n in g (as H eine has charged) the
real w o rld to th e d o m in io n o f b ru te fo rce, greed, and exploitation.
W ith S p in o za , h o w e v e r , th e u n ity o f m atter and spirit, the real and the
ideal, is resto red ; n o w w e can p ro c e e d to reunite politics and its reli­
gious m e a n in g o n a h ig h e r le v e l, th at o f the co m m u n ist society, w hich
w ill e m b o d y a m o r a l v is io n w ith in the actual w o rk in g s o f econom ic
and p o litic a l fo rce s .
H ess in la te r y e a rs re n o u n c e d his early b o o k , w h ich was m ore en­
thusiastic th an c o h e r e n t an d im m a tu r e in its socialist thinking. B u t to
H ess’s b io g r a p h e r s th e w o r k rem ain s in d icative o f the lasting concerns
o f its au th o r; an d to u s, it rep resen ts the characteristic link between
Spinoza and th e s e c u la riz a tio n o f re lig io u s m essianism in left-H egelian
socialist th in k in g . T h is H e g e lia n iz e s S p in o za, but also undercuts H e­
g el’s p h ilo s o p h y o f th e s p irit in fa v o r o f a S p in o zistic “ un ity o f m atter
and s p irit” — an d th e la tter c o u ld b e co n stru ed as im plem en tin g an eth­
ical v is io n w ith in th e b ru te m a c h in e ry o f p olitics and econom ics, a
main g a te fo r th e s o c ia lis t a s s im ila tio n o f S p in o za w h ich the “ utopian”
socialists sh are w i t h M a r x h im s e lf. M a r x ’s differen ce from the utopian
socialists m a k e s h im e v e n m o r e S p in o zistic , fo r he allow s no role for
the pure m o r a l w i l l as s u c h — an illu sio n to Sp in oza— but assigns the
task o f p r o d u c in g c o m m u n is t s o c ie ty to the inner (dialectical) deter­
m ination o f th e s o c io e c o n o m ic s y s te m itse lf— M a r x ’s n ew causa sui and
w orld o f im m a n e n c e .
H ess n e v e r b e c a m e a M a r x is t in this sense. H e had inspired M arx;
he had w o n E n g e ls o v e r to th e idea o f co m m u n ism ; he was attacked by
M arx and E n g e ls (in th e Com m unist Manifesto) under the m ock title o f
“ the true s o c ia lis m ” ; an d he la te r ca m e p artly under M a rx ’s influence
and fo r a w h ile also u n d e r his p o litic a l tutelage. T h e m ature Hess be­
cam e p e rsu a d ed (o r b e lie v e d th a t he w as) that pure ideas and the m oral
w ill w e re in s u ffic ie n t in an d o f th em selv es to ch ange the w orld, and
that th e fo rce s o f p r o d u c tio n , e c o n o m ics , the proletariat, labor orga­
nization, and s e lf-in te re s te d a ctio n w ere fundam ental in bringing
about th e s o c ie t y o f th e fu tu re . N e v e rth e le ss, H ess’s approach to so­
cialism re m a in e d p r e d o m in a n t ly eth ical, and in later years he associ-

(6?)
 CHAPTER 3

ated h im s e lf w ith Lassale. H ess c o u ld n o t liv e in p c a c c w it h th e “ h a rd -

n u t” sid e o f M a r x , as H e in e h ad d u b b e d it, th e ru th le ss a m o r a lis m put
in th e s e rv ic e o f h u m a n re d e m p tio n and w h ic h L e n in la ter in fu s e d in to
B o ls h e v ik th e o ry ; and H ess rem a in e d to o m u c h o f a m o r a lis t fo r the
m o r e “ s c ie n tific ” (and, in this sense, m o r e S p in o z is tic ) M a r x is t s to ac­
c e p t .47
H e ss w a s, in th e w o r d s o f a n o te d h is to ria n o f s o c ia lis m , “ a d e e p ly
h o n e s t th in k er, and a m an in cap ab le o f a n im o s ity , u n iv e r s a lly lo v e d
and re sp ected , a s o rt o f J e w is h sain t fallen a m o n g r e v o lu tio n a r ie s .” 4H
Y e t it w a s n o accid e n t th at b r o u g h t H ess in to su ch c o m p a n y . It w a s
p re cis e ly as a J e w — in th e m o d e rn , h e re tica l sen se crea te d b y S p in o za
an d w h ic h H ess sh ared w ith H ein e, M a r x , L a ssale, an d th e J e w is h
S a in t-S im o n ia n s — th at H ess b e c a m e a r e v o lu tio n a r y . H e h ad n o t so
m u c h “ fa lle n ” a m o n g th e m as he h ad g r o w n to w a r d th e m .
T h e so cia list v is io n as H ess s a w it w a s th e n e w m e s sia n ic ca ll, w h ic h
w e n t b e y o n d J u d a ism and C h r is tia n ity b u t re s to re d an a n c ie n t J e w is h
m e s sa g e o n a secu lar and u n iv e rs a lize d le v e l. U n lik e M a r x ( w h o re­
p re sse d his J e w is h o rig in s) o r H e in e (w h o s a w J u d a is m as an o b je c t o f
e th n ic id e n tifica tio n an d cu ltu ra l h is to ric a l resea rch ) H e s s , w h o n e v e r
co n v e rte d , a tte m p te d to re c o v e r th e o ld J u d a is m , w h o s e re lig io u s fo r m
h e h ad left, w ith in th e n e w m e ssia n ic s o c ia lis m th a t tra n sce n d e d
it .49 F o r H ess, m o d e rn J e w s , lik e h im s e lf an d his M a s te r, S p in o z a , had
to s e rv e as ch an n els and m e d ia to rs fo r th is p ro c e s s an d to e m b o d y it in
th eir p e rso n s. A t first H ess b e lie v e d th at o n l y j e w i s h in d iv id u a ls c o u ld
be re d e e m ed b y s e rv in g in su ch ro les; d eca d e s la ter, h o w e v e r , H ess
re tu rn e d to J u d a ism also as a n atio n al e n tity an d b e c a m e th e fa th e r o f
so cia list z io n is m . In Rome and Jerusalem (1862) he a d v o c a te d th e retu rn
o f th e J e w s to th eir an cien t lan d , w h e r e th e y s h o u ld set u p a m o d e l
so cia list s o cie ty , thus h a v in g th e v is io n o f u n iv e rs a l re d e m p t io n fu l­
fille d b y the sam e n atio n th at h ad ch e ris h e d it m o s t in tim a te ly
th r o u g h o u t th e ag e s w h ile la c k in g it th e m o st.
F ro m acro ss a co n sid era b le d ista n ce, o n e is te m p te d to th in k o f an ­
o th e r m e ssian ic d rea m er, a n n o u n c in g th e “ re c a ll o f th e J e w s ,” Isaac la
P e y re re . H ess w a s m o re re a lis tica lly o rie n te d , a m a n o f a c tio n w h o , in
re tro s p e ct, also h ad th e a d v a n ta g e o f h a v in g p a rt o f h is d re a m c o m e
clo se to w h a t m a y seem true. B u t in m e s sia n ic d r iv e he d id n o t la g
b e h in d La P e y re re , and, lik e h im , in his e a r ly d a y s, h e u s e d a th re e fo ld
p e rio d iza tio n o f historia sacra to ex p re ss, a lb e it m e ta p h o r ic a lly , the
m a rc h o f h u m a n ity to w a rd an im m a n e n t fo r m o f s a lv a tio n .
E v e n in m a tu rity , H ess retain ed th e lin k b e tw e e n c o m m u n is m as the
cu lm in a tio n o f h isto ric a l re lig io n and th e h u m a n iz e d p a n th e is m he at­
trib u te d to S p in o za . T h is can b e illu stra ted b y a p o p u la r t e x t h e w r o te

(68)
 SPINOZA IN HEINE, HESS, FEUERBACH

a dccade later to e d u c a te th e w o r k in g C h ristian m asses. Hess defines

co m m u n ism as a “ c r e e d ” (Bekenntnis) and as a “ universal religion ”
w h ich , far fr o m b e in g u n - C h r is tia n , serves to b rin g C h ristian ity to its
co m p letio n . T h is it d o e s b y p re s e rv in g the o rigin a l Christian ideas—
love and h u m a n it y — b u t b r in g in g th em b a ck fro m a w orld beyond
into this w o r ld , w h e r e th e y are to b e realized b y the co m m un ist soci­
ety. A n d h ere, lik e H e in e , H e ss b e c o m e s panth eistic (or Spinozistic) in
a le ft-H e g e lia n m a n n e r:

7 1 . Is o u r G o d . . . a n y t h in g else than the human race— or man­

kind united in love [s o c ia lis t s o lid a r ity and affin ity]?
— N o , n o th in g else.

72. W h y d id w e b e lie v e u n til n o w that the d ev il was w ith in the

w o rld , an d th a t o u r G o d w a s n o t w ith in us, b u t in heaven?— B e­
cause w e o u r s e lv e s d id n o t liv e in lo v e b u t in separation and hos­
tility [earlier h e said “ u n d e r th e d o m in io n o f Mammon, w h o in­
deed is th e d e v i l ” ] . . . th e re fo re d id w e b elieve that o ur G o d was
ou tsid e us an d b e y o n d th is b a d w o r ld , w h ereas the d evil was in
us, in this w o r ld , th e v e r y esse n ce o f th e w o r ld .50

T h is s o u n d s c lo s e to F e u e rb a c h and H ein e, but there is a difference.

Hess shares M a r x ’s d is b e lie f in p u re p h ilo so p h ica l criticism as the w ay
to ch a n ge o u r fa ls e s e J f-co n scio u sn e ss. T h e pan th eist revolution that
Heine and o th e r G e r m a n s h ad p raised w as ineffectual, fo r one has to
change re a lity firs t. T h is is b e c a u s e th e false self-con sciousn ess im plied
in d u alistic th e is m is p a r tly tru e , n o t fu n d a m en ta lly but historically, that
is, as lo n g as e x p lo it a t io n an d p riv a te p ro p e rty prevail. H ence, Spinoza
cannot w in b e fo r e h a n d in m e re th e o ry . V e rify in g his th eo ry— w e may
co m plete H e s s ’s id ea in a M a r x ia n vein — m eans ch a n gin g the w orld to
suit it.
Hess w a s , in d e e d , th e firs t to p ro c la im th e need to un ify theory and
practice— a n o th e r fa c e t o f S p in o z is tic p arallelism that he bequeathed to
M arx. R e a lity , says H e s s , is d e te rm in e d by acts, n o t m erely by con­
cepts. T h e in h e re n t e n d o f u n d e rs ta n d in g is action, and action creates
a n e w g r o u n d fo r u n d e r s ta n d in g . H e re again H ess relies on Spinoza.
In an u n p u b lis h e d c o m m e n t a r y o n th e Ethics, 51 H ess stresses that Spi­
n oza’s is in d e e d an e th ic a l th e o ry . T h e m eta p h ysical part o f the Ethics
is p re p a ra to ry fo r th e p ra c tic a l d o c trin e in part 3. Freedom resides pri­
m arily in th e acts o f an in d iv id u a l w h o clea rly understands his or her
actions an d e m o t io n as t h e y f o llo w ca u sa lly fro m the nature o f desire;
and this e n ta ils s o c ia l im p lic a tio n s as w e ll. So cialism is then actually
anchored in th e e th ic a l p a rt o f S p in o z a ’s syste m , even th ough he had

(69)
 CHAPTER 3

n o t y e t b een aw a re o f th is. A c c o r d in g to H ess in th e Ph ilosop hy o f A c ­

tion (18 4 3), th e fu tu r e p h ilo s o p h y o f a c tio n is b u t a fu r th e r d e v e lo p ­
m e n t o f S p in o z a ’s Ethics.
S p in o z a , H e ss ad d s in th e European Triarchy, w a s also u n a w a re that
his a b s o lu te w a s alread y, in itse lf, a s u b je c t- o b je c t an d n o t m e r e ly an
o b je c t; th ese im p lic a tio n s o f his d o c trin e c o u ld o n ly b e u n c o v e r e d by
H e g e l an d S c h e llin g . H ess m ean s th a t, im p lic itly , S p in o z a has a lre ad y
attrib u te d to th e im m a n e n t G o d a h is to ric a l d im e n s io n as w e ll as a
n atu ral o n e . G o d e x ists an d is re a lize d th r o u g h th e h u m a n ra ce as it
e v o lv e s to w a rd re d e m p tio n . T h is is an e x a g g e r a te d , in d e e d a false v ie w
o f S p in o za ; b u t H e s s ’s relian ce o n S p in o za is n o t m e r e ly in te lle c tu a l
b u t also p erso n a l and e x iste n tia l. S p in o za w a s to H e ss w h a t S o c ra te s,
M o s e s , J esu s, o r B u d d h a are fo r th in k e rs o r b e lie v e rs p a s s in g fr o m o n e
v ie w to a n o th e r w h ile a lw a y s c lin g in g to th e s a m e te a c h e r - fig u r e .
A ls o , S p in o za w a s n o t a r e m o te and h a lf- le g e n d a r y f ig u r e b u t a c o n ­
cre te p e rs o n w ith w h o m H e ss c o u ld id e n tify , a J e w w h o , lik e h im s e lf,
h ad le ft th e tra d itio n a l c o m m u n ity to c o n fr o n t, s in g ly , th e m o d e rn
w o r ld .
W h e n H e ss claim s S p in o za as a s o u rc e w h ile m is r e p r e s e n tin g his lit­
e ral m e a n in g , h e d o e s u se s o m e a c tu a l S p in o z is tic m o t i f a d a p te d to his
o w n p h ilo s o p h ic an d rh e to ric a l in tere sts. B u t th is a d a p ta tio n is to o far­
fe tc h e d . F o r e x a m p le , S p in o za w a s a d a m a n t a b o u t fr e e in g g o v e r n m e n t
f r o m th e in flu en ce o f re lig io n , w h e re a s H e ss re p e a te d ly d e m a n d e d a
lin k b e tw e e n th e m an d p ra ise d th e a n c ien t H e b r e w state— in S p in o z a ’s
n am e !— fo r h a v in g so t ig h tly u n ited r e lig io n w it h th e sta te. T h is is p a r­
a d o x ic a l. S p in o za s p e c ific a lly c r itic iz e d th e a n c ie n t H e b r e w sta te as a
p a ra d ig m case o f th e o c r a c y , an d th e s o u rc e o f t w o o th e r, e v e n w o r s e ,
th e o c r a tic d isto rtio n s: (1) J e w is h life in th e d ia sp o ra , in w h ic h re lig io n
fu n c tio n e d as an im a g in a r y state; an d (2) th e v a rie tie s o f C h r is tia n th e ­
o c r a c y — fr o m the p o p e , c la im in g m e ta p h y s ic a l a u t h o r ity o v e r te rre s­
trial m atters; to th e I n q u is itio n , e n fo r c in g a m o n o lit h ic r e lig io n b y the
s w o r d (and th e stake) o f th e s ecu la r g o v e r n m e n t; to th e w a r s o f re lig io n
an d th e c o m p r o m is e th e y p ro d u c e d (cuius regio eius religio— “ sta te reli­
g io n g o e s b y th e ru le r” — im p ly in g th a t th e re w a sta te re lig io n ); and,
in a p r iv ile g e d p lace, to th e D u tc h C a lv in is t e s ta b lis h m e n t w h ic h
p re sse d th e la y g o v e r n m e n t to im p le m e n t its d ir e c tiv e s an d c la im e d to
co n s titu te , in S p in o z a ’s w o r d s , “ a re a lm w ith in th e r e a lm ” (imperium
in imperio). S p in o z a ’s o b je c tio n to all th e o c r a tic fo r m s h ad th e o re tic a l
g ro u n d s , p o w e r fu lly s y s te m a tiz e d , b u t n o t u n re la te d to h is tr ip le e x ­
iste n tia l s itu a tio n (as a so n o f fo r m e r M a rra n o s w h o s u ffe r e d fr o m the
In q u isitio n ; as a h e re tica l J e w e x p e lle d fo r h is v ie w s ; a n d as a p o litic a l

(7 0 )
 SPINOZA IN HEINE, HESS, FEUERBACH

m odern izer c lo se to th e re p u b lic a n party, w h o w ish ed to emancipate

state g o v e r n m e n t fr o m th e c l e r g y ’s im p a ct and to have each individual
relate to th e sta te d ir e c tly as citize n ).
H ow , th en , d o w e e x p la in th e fact that H ess praises the ancient He­
brew th e o c r a c y an d in S p in o z a ’s o w n nam e?
Perhaps th e c lu e is to b e fo u n d in th e m o st parad oxical text o f all. In
Holy H istory, H e ss p raises th e an cien t H e b re w s fo r recogn izin g no split
between a p e r s o n ’s in n e r an d o u te r life (as in Protestantism ) or between
reality and its s p iritu a l m e a n in g (as in C a th o licism ). It was Christianity
that sh attered th is a n c ie n t u n ity an d p osited a dualism instead, separat­
ing G o d an d C a e s a r an d th e re b y ab a n d o n in g the real w orld to the do­
main o f g re e d an d b ru te fo rc e . O n l y Sp in o za, in his pantheism , re­
stores th e u n ity o f th e real an d th e ideal, the m aterial and the spiritual.
H en ceforth it b e c o m e s p o s s ib le to unite the w o rld o f m on ey and poli­
tics w ith its re lig io u s ( i.e ., sp iritu a l) m eanin g— and this is realized in
socialist s o c ie ty w h e r e a s u b lim e m o ra l p rin cip le in form s the material
w orld.
So cialism is fo r H e ss th e h ig h e s t fo rm o f religion; hence w hat he
actually w a n ts is to u n ite socialism w ith the state. H ess rejects the lib­
eral state th at s e rv e s as a n eu tra l fr a m e w o rk la ck in g an ideological ( =
spiritual) c o n te n t o f its o w n . It is an in stru m en t o f capitalist exploita­
tion that d rain s th e a c tu a l w o r ld o f a n y spiritual d im ension and aban­
dons it to a w a r o f all a g a in s t all. In o b je ctin g to the separation o f state
and re lig io n H e ss re a lly o b je c ts to separatin g the state from m oral and
spiritual v alu es; an d s in ce th e h ig h e s t p olitical m orality resides in so­
cialist eth ics ( = tru e re lig io n ), th e ideal state H ess has in m ind is the
socialist state, w h ic h ac tu a liz e s a m o ra l v isio n in its politico-econom ic
institutions.
A t the sam e tim e — an d h e re H ess takes a m ajo r leap, alm ost a salto
mortale— re a listic c o n d itio n s o f p ro g ress also require a coarser, more
concrete re lig io n , w h o s e e sta b lish ed in fluen ce on the state w ill express
the latter’s s p iritu a l d im e n s io n (h en ce the lin k that Hess insists must
exist n o t o n ly b e tw e e n th e fu tu r e state and the socialist religion o f rea­
son, b u t also b e t w e e n th e e x is tin g state and the historical religion o f its
inhabitants). H e s s d o c s n o t m e an , o f co u rse, go vern m en t by the clergy
or a m a n d a to ry r e lig io n ; rath er, he w a n ts the go vern m en t to em body
the n a tio n ’s m o r a l- r e lig io u s sp irit in its w a ys and institutions. But
Hess fails to e x p la in w h y th is n atio n al m o ra lity sh ould be entrusted to
the re lig io u s e s ta b lis h m e n t. P e rh a p s he did not have m uch trust in the
p rofu n d ity o f s e c u la riz a tio n an d ex p ec te d the p u b lic’s m ind to be im ­
bued w ith r e lig io n fo r a lo n g tim e to co m e . In any case, in the European

(7 1 )
 CHAPTER 3

Triarchy he w r ite s w i t h a p p ro v a l o f th e E n g lis h e x a m p le , w h e r e an

o ffic ia l state r e lig io n e x e rcis e s a p r a g m a tic in flu e n c e o n sta te affairs
w ith o u t e x c lu d in g o th e r re lig io n s. H e ss also d e m a n d s r e lig io u s to le r­
atio n , e m a n c ip a tio n fo r t h e j e w s , an d c iv il m a r r ia g e , and c r itic iz e s the
P ru ssia n state fo r h a v in g failed to in s titu te th is.
H e s s ’s p ro n o u n c e m e n ts s o m e tim e s b o rd e r o n th e d e ific a tio n o f the
s ta te .5- In a ch a ra c te ris tic m is ta k e h e a ttrib u te s to S p in o z a th e s acrali­
za tio n o f th e sta te and o f terrestria l in s titu tio n s in g e n e ra l. P e rh a p s he
w a s m isle d b y a sen se o f s y m m e tr y . S in c e r e lig io n is s e c u la riz e d and
re d e m p tio n takes o n a terre stria l d im e n s io n , th en p o litic a l in s titu tio n s
m a y w e ll a c q u ire a sacre d d im e n s io n . B u t th e la tte r is n o t tru e in S p i­
n o za. T h e state in h e rits th e a u th o r ity th a t r e lig io u s in s titu tio n s used to
h ave b u t n o t th e ir in h e re n tly sacred status; it has a b s o lu te s o v e r e ig n ty
b u t n o t a re lig io u s aura.

Sp in o za in H ess’s Z ion ism

In his m id d le p e rio d H ess d id n o t re fer m u c h to S p in o z a o r J u d a ism .

A d d re s s in g a p r e d o m in a n tly C h r is tia n a u d ie n c e , h e h ad to r e ly on
C h ris tia n attitu d es an d s y m b o lis m as a basis fo r p r o m o t in g h is s o cia list
re lig io n o f rea so n . B u t in th e s ix tie s t w o s ig n ific a n t tu rn s o c c u r r e d in
H e s s ’s e v o lu tio n , and b o th b r o u g h t h im b a c k to S p in o z a . O n e tu rn
w a s th e fo u n d a tio n o f th e G e r m a n S o c ia l D e m o c r a t ic p a rty , in w h ic h
H ess c o lla b o ra te d w ith Lassale; th e o th e r tu rn (w h ic h H e s s ’s frien d s
co n sid e re d a p e rso n a l w h im b o r d e r in g o n lu n a c y ) w a s h is re tu rn to
J e w is h n a tio n a lis m and th e p u b lic a tio n o f R om e and Jerusalem , b y w h ic h
H ess b e c a m e th e p re c u rs o r o f s e cu la r Z io n is m .
H e ss h ad a lw a y s b e lie v e d th at m o d e rn J e w s lik e h im s e lf an d S p i­
n o za , w h o had step p ed o u ts id e th e re lig io u s c o m m u n ity , w e r e p a rtic ­
u la rly su ited (H ess n e a r ly said “ d e s tin e d ” ) to s e rv e as m e d ia to r s in
m a n k in d ’ s p assage fr o m h is to ric a l re lig io n to s o cia lis t lib e ra tio n and
th e re lig io n o f rea so n . F o r a lo n g tim e H ess also b e lie v e d th a t th is re­
q u ire d th e J e w s to re lin q u ish th eir sp ecia l cla im to p e o p le h o o d and
m in g le as in d iv id u a ls in th e s o c ie ty o f th e fu tu re . B u t in th e six tie s,
d is illu s io n e d b y E u r o p e a n lib e ra lism an d b y th e a ttitu d e o f p a rt o f his
fe llo w so cia lists, H e ss tu rn ed to ju d a is m as a n a tio n a l e n tity an d , d r a w ­
in g in sp ira tio n fr o m G iu s e p p e M a z z in i and th e Italian n a tio n a l m o v e ­
m e n t, he w r o t e Rom e and Jerusalem. T h e j e w s , he n o w m a in ta in e d , w ill
fu lfill th e ir u n iv e rsa l m is s io n in h is to r y n o t as a ssim ila te d in d iv id u a ls
b u t as a n a tio n a l e n tity w h ic h a ssu m es its p lace in th e fa m ily o f n atio n s
an d , re g a in in g p o litic a l in d e p e n d e n c e , w ill e sta b lish an e x e m p la r y s o ­
cialist s o c ie ty in its a n cien t h o m e la n d .

(72)
 SPINOZA IN HEINE, HESS, FEUERBACH

O v e r t w e n t y - fiv e y e a rs la te r H e rz l, th e fo u n d er o f political Zionism ,

published T h e J e w ish State w it h o u t k n o w in g o f H ess’s bo o k. When he
finally read R om e and Jerusalem , H e rz l rem arked that despite the He­
gelian ja r g o n , H e s s w a s “ th e fin e st fru it o fju d a is m since Spinoza.” 53
N o o n e w o u ld h a v e w e lc o m e d th e co m p a riso n m ore than Hess, w ho
in his m a tu r ity re tu r n e d to S p in o z a b o th as the prop h et o f m odernity
and the p r e c u r s o r o f J e w is h n a tio n a l em an cip a tio n . Hess relied on a
fam ous p a s s a g e in c h a p te r 3 o f th e Theologico-Political Treatise where
Spinoza in v o k e s th e p o s s ib ility th a t t h e je w s w ill reestablish their state
and " G o d w i ll a g a in e le c t th e m .” H ess seem s to have been the first to
read this te x t in m o d e r n Z io n is t v e in , as did o th er Z io n ist writers and
activists w h o a d m ir e d S p in o z a , lik e N a h u m S o k o lo v , Joseph Klausner,
and D a v id B e n - G u r i o n , Is ra e l’s firs t p re m ier w h o actually proclaim ed
the J e w ish sta te. Y e t H e s s an d th ese o th er Z io n is ts stretched their case
too far. S p in o z a ra ise d th e p o s s ib ility o f a ren ew ed Jew ish state, but
did not call fo r its e s ta b lis h m e n t. T h e cited passage constitutes his an­
swer to th e m e s s ia n ic f r e n z y w h ic h ra g ed in 1666 around the false mes-
siah S a b b e tai Z e v i . T h e S a b b a te a n s e x p e c te d the im m inent redem p­
tion to o c c u r b y a g r a n d h is to ric a l m iracle; Sp in oza, the rationalist
disciple o f M a im o n id e s a n d th e p h ilo so p h e r o f secular history, retorts
that, as h is to r y is fu ll o f v ic is s itu d e s , th ere m ay indeed one day arise a
situation fa v o r in g th e r e c a ll o f th e J e w s; yet n o th in g w ill occur by
p rovid en ce an d m ir a c le s . S a c re d h is to r y — pace the y o u n g Hess— does
not ex ist, an d e v e r y t h in g in th e life o f n atio n s and individuals should
be ex p la in ed b y p e r fe c t ly n a tu ra l an d n ecessa ry causes. T h is is the main
sign ificance o f S p in o z a ’ s “ Z i o n i s t ” d ic tu m . H e says little about the de­
sirability o f a n e w J e w is h sta te, o n ly a b o u t its probability and the only
way in w h ic h it m a y c o m e in to e x iste n ce .
Sp in oza d o e s , h o w e v e r , v ie w t h e j e w s as a nation or ethnic group
over and a b o v e th e ir r e lig io u s a ffilia tio n . E v en to the Christian M ar­
ranos he refers as J e w s , a n d cite s th eir h is to ry in Iberia as paradigm atic
o f Jew ish h is t o r y at l a r g e .* S p in o z a m a y also have endorsed (and in­
d irectly in s p ire d ) a m a jo r c la im o f classical Z io n ism , nam ely, that
w h atever r e d e m p t io n th e J e w s m a y attain does n o t depend on the
M essiah, b u t o n w h a t t h e j e w s th em selv es w ill d o in the context o f
actual, s e cu la r h is to r y . In th is lim ite d sense, H ess w as indeed entitled
to say o f th e m o d e r n m e s s ia n ic tre n d a m o n g t h e je w s that “ its false
prophet w a s S a b b e ta i Z e v i , a n d its tru e p ro p h e t w as Sp in oza” (ibid.,
p. 52).

* See v o lu m e 1, T h e Marrano 0/Reason, ep ilo g u e.

(7 3 )
 CHAPTER 3

S p in oza an d Feuerbach

L u d w ig F e u erb a ch w a s n o t a s o c ia lis t,* b u t n o o th e r le ft- H e g e lia n had

m o r e in flu e n c e o n M a r x o r b e tte r k n o w le d g e o f H e g e l. 54 S o o n , h o w ­
ev er, he d e v e lo p e d his o w n c r itiq u e o f H e g e lia n p h i lo s o p h y ,55 w h ic h
led to his s e lf- s ty le d “ m a te r ia lis m ” an d to c la im in g S p in o z a as m aster.
F e u e rb a c h ’s k in d o f m a te ria lis m p re s e rv e s th e e le m e n t o f s p irit w ith in
m a tte r (and th u s his S p in o z is tic h erita g e); h e re v e rse s H e g e l b y g iv in g
p r io r ity to th e sen su al o v e r th e c o n c e p tu a l fo r m o f re a lity , b u t w ith o u t
a b o lis h in g th e ir su b s ta n tiv e u n ity. T h is is a H e g e lia n v ie w w h ic h
F e u e rb a ch a ttrib u te s to S p in o za as w e ll.* 6
F e u e rb a ch is a s trict p h ilo s o p h e r o fim m a n e n c e . A ll tr a n s c e n d e n t en ­
tities are e x p la in e d b a c k to th eir o r ig in in th e h u m a n w o r ld , as its o w n
p ro je c tio n an d s e lf-a lie n a tio n . T h e r e is o n ly m a n , se n s u a l m a n w ith in
n a tu re (w h o s e th in k in g is a s e lf-re fle c tio n o f n a tu re it s e lf) . B u t m an
p ro je c ts h is essen ce o u tw a r d , in to a sep a ra te , d iv in e w o r ld , fro m
w h e r e it c o n fr o n ts h im as e x te rn a l an d o p p re s s iv e . W h a t w e are, w h a t
w e w is h an d d esire, in c lu d in g o u r c r a v in g fo r in fin ity , w e o b je c t ify as
an alien b e in g w h ic h u su rp s o u r o w n d iv in ity as h u m a n s . R e lig io n is
th e re b y a false an d r o u n d a b o u t s e lf- c o n s c io u s n e s s o f m a n , th o u g h the
re lig io u s b e lie v e r is n o t aw a re o f th is and is th e r e fo r e m y s tifie d .

[In re lig io n ] th e o b je c t o f a n y s u b je c t is n o th in g else th a n the

s u b je c t’s o w n n a tu re ta k en o b je c tiv e ly . S u c h as are a m a n ’s
th o u g h ts and d is p o s itio n s , su ch is h is G o d . . . C o n s c io u s n e s s o f
G o d is s e lf-c o n s c io u s n e s s . . . . G o d is th e m a n ife s te d in w a r d n a­
tu re, the e x p re s s e d s e lf o f a m a n .57

R e lig io n is th e re la tio n o f m a n to h is o w n n a tu re . . . b u t to his

n atu re n o t r e c o g n iz e d as his o w n , b u t re g a rd e d as a n o th e r n a tu re ,
se p a ra te, nay, c o n tr a d is tin g u is h e d fr o m his o w n . 50

T h is is n o t o n ly S p in o z a , n o r is it th e tr a d itio n a l c r itiq u e o f re lig io n

re je c tin g th e n o tio n o f “ G o d in th e im a g e o f m a n .”
F e u e rb a ch ad d s a n e w tier to th is c r itiq u e , b a se d u p o n th e c o n c e p t
o f s e lf-a lie n a tio n , e s p e c ia lly re lig io u s s e lf-a lie n a tio n , w h ic h H e g e l had
a n a ly z e d in re la tio n to th e “ u n h a p p y c o n s c io u s n e s s ” an d illu s tra te d u s-
i n g ju d a is m as his p r im e e x a m p le .59 E ls e w h e r e I h a v e a r g u e d th a t this
id e a ta k e s its d e p a rtu re fr o m K a n t ’s a n a ly sis o f s u b lim it y in C ritiq u e o f
Judgm ent: b y an im a g in a r y re v ersa l (Subreption), th e in fin it y b e lo n g in g
to h u m a n it y (K a n t says: b y v ir tu e o f its c o s m ic - m o r a l d e s tin y ) is tran s­

* E x c e p t in his last tw o years, w h e n he jo in e d the G erm a n S o cial D e m o c r a tic party

after rea d in g M a r x ’ s Capital.

( 74)
 SPINOZA IN HEINE, HESS, FEUERBACH

posed to an e x te r n a l n a tu ra l o b je c t, in fro n t o f w h ich w e feel over­

w h e lm e d / ’0 W h a t K a n t h ad d ia g n o s e d as the structure o f an esthetic
exp erien ce, H e g e l a n d F e u e rb a c h e x te n d to relig io n and M a rx carries
over in to e c o n o m i c a n d s o c ia l p h e n o m e n a .
F e u crb ach , h o w e v e r , tu r n s th e H e g e lia n m o d el against H egel him ­
self. W h e re a s o th e r le ft - H e g e lia n s su ch as H ein e and Strauss attributed
to H e g e l th e d e ific a t io n o f m a n k in d , F eu erbach com plain ed that H egel
had failed to a c c o m p lis h th is b e c a u se he red u ced the actual essence o f
man— w h ic h is n a tu ra l an d se n su a l— to a rarified abstraction, a pure
s e lf-c o n sc io u s G e ist, in w h ic h a lo n e H e g e l placed the elem ent o f d ivin ­
ity. T h is le ft th e real e x is te n c e o f m a n o u tsid e the d ivin e and confined
the latter, in th e m a n n e r o f C h r is tia n trad ition , to spirit alone, as a
distinct (and h y p o s ta tiz e d ) “ d iv in e p a rt” in m an. H egel thereby re­
m ained a C h r is tia n t h e o lo g ia n in d is g u is e , su fferin g from a character­
istic s e lf-a lie n a tio n . In s te a d o f u n itin g th e h u m an and the d ivine within
the to ta lity o f h u m a n e x is te n c e (as d id S p in o za), H eg el o n ly gave their
separation a n e w a n d m o r e d e v e lo p e d fo rm — a fact that, according to
Feuerbach, “ th e le a rn e d m o b ” w a s to o p reju d ice d to recogn ize.61
For F e u e rb a ch , a b o lis h in g th e w o r ld o f transcendence requires that
man be r e trie v e d as d iv in e in h is v e r y n atu ral b ein g. A true philosophy
o f im m a n e n c e w i l l m a k e h u m a n ity , o r m an -w ith in -n atu re, into the
new to ta lity in w h ic h e v e r y t h in g else in h eres and th ro u gh w h ich the
rest o f r e a lity is a p p r e h e n d e d . T h is im p lie s that anth rop ology, the
study o f n a tu ra l m a n , s h o u ld rep la ce th e o lo g y and m etaphysics as
the fu n d a m e n ta l a n d c o m p r e h e n s iv e scien ce, a n e w kind o f prima
philosophia62 (s u ite d to th e “ p h ilo s o p h y o f th e fu tu re” w h ich Feuer­
bach, in a b o o k o f th e s a m e n a m e , atte m p ts to prepare).
H ere a g a in , w h e n d e te r m in in g th e essen tial features o f hum anity,
F euerbach p e r fo r m s a H e g e lia n - in s p ir e d reversal o f H egel. T h e essence
o f m an lies in h is s e n s ib ility ; y e t s e n s ib ility its e lf is hum an ized in Feuer­
bach. “ W e n e e d n o t g o b e y o n d th e d o m a in o f sen sibility in order to
recogn ize m a n as a b e in g h ig h e r th a n th e an im als.” 63 “ M an does not
d istingu ish h im s e lf b y h is t h in k in g ,” n o r b y an y o th er special faculty
such as fre e w i ll, r e lig io u s s e n tim e n t, and the lik e. T h ese are all deriv­
atives, n e c e s s a ry c o r o lla r ie s o f th e state o f h u m a n ity b u t not its consti­
tutive cau ses. W h a t d is tin g u is h e s h u m a n s p rim o rd ia lly is the “ universal
sensible b e in g ” (a c a t e g o r y p a v in g th e w a y to M a r x ’s anthropology).
O u r u n iv e r s a lity in h e re s in o u r v e r y se n sib ility o r natural existence,
the features o f h u m a n k in d w h ic h C h r is tia n ity and its philosophical
cou n terparts— b u t n o t S p in o z a — h y p o s ta tiz e d in to special “ faculties”
and re le g a ted to a s e p a ra te , G o d - g iv e n “ sp irit.”

(7 5 )
 CHAPTER 3

Spiritual Materialism

T h is d o es n o t m ean th at F e u e rb a c h ’s m a te ria lis m e x c lu d e s sp iritu a lity

fr o m m an; it o n ly re in te rp rets it. “ U n iv e r s a l s e n s ib ility is s p iritu a lity ”
F eu erbach d eclares. W e are sp iritu a l b e in g s b y th e n atu ral fact o f be­
lo n g in g to o u r sp ecies an d b y s h a rin g its p e c u lia r s e n s ib ility . M o re o v e r,
sin ce this s e n s ib ility p erva d e s th e to ta lity o f o u r e x is te n c e , it also hu­
m an izes us th r o u g h o u t. W e are h u m a n n o t o n ly w h ile p e r fo r m in g cer­
tain “ e x a lte d ” fu n c tio n s, b u t in w h a te v e r w c d o (or su ffe r); n o t on ly
d o w e see and feel d iffe r e n tly fr o m an im a ls , w c also b re a th e , digest,
and co p u la te d iffe re n tly . O u r b o d y , b o th th e s u b je c t an d th e o b je c t o f
o u r se n sib ility, is th e first e x p re s s io n o f o u r d is tin c t h u m a n ity ; and it
is, says F eu erb ach , to this m a te ria l e x is te n c e o f m a n , in v e s te d as it is
w ith s p iritu a lity th r o u g h o u t, th a t th e d iv in e a ttrib u te s s h o u ld b e re­
sto red as th eir p ro p e r and s o le le g itim a te bearer.
F e u e rb a ch ’s b ra n d o f m a te ria lis m (lik e M a r x ’s) is d is tin g u is h e d fro m
th at o f th e e ig h te e n th -c e n tu r y F re n ch m a te ria lis ts , o r th e E p icu rean s;
it d o es n o t red u ce re a lity to a p la y o f m a te ria l p a rticle s in m o t io n but
to a h u m a n ize d s u b s tr a tu m , s e n s ib ility , ta k e n as b o th s u b je c t an d o b ­
je c t, b o d y and spirit. F eu erb a ch , lik e M a r x , reje c ts H e g e lia n “ s p iritu ­
a lity ” w ith o u t e s p o u s in g cru d e m a te ria lis m e ith e r as p h y s ic a lis m o r as
h e d o n ism . M a tte r has its o w n s p iritu a l d im e n s io n , b e c a u s e it is the
o b je ct sid e o f th e sam e fu n d a m e n ta l p rin c ip le , h u m a n se n sib ility ,
w h ic h is sp iritu a l in it s e lf.64
T h is is ce rta in ly a tu rn — ty p ic a l o f all le ft - H e g e lia n s an d o f M a r x —
aw a y fr o m H e g e l in th e d ire c tio n o f w h a t w a s p e r c e iv e d as S p in o zis m .
B u t at th e sam e tim e — an d th is is e q u a lly c h a ra c te r is tic , e v e n essen tial,
to th e p o s itio n w e are in v e s tig a tin g h ere— it retain s fr o m H e g e l (and
fro m K a n t) th e p r iv ile g e d p o s itio n o f h u m a n ity , th e “ s u b je c t,” as a
special fo cu s in relatio n to w h ic h th e n a tu ra l u n iv e rs e is ap p ro a ch e d
an d a p p re h en d e d . T h is an ticip a tes M a r x an d , in a d iffe r e n t w a y , H e i­
d e g g e r; m o r e g e n e ra lly , it also in d icates th a t F e u e rb a c h re m a in s w ith in
the b o u n d o f th e C o p e r n ic a n r e v o lu tio n in itia te d b y K a n t (and u su ally
k n o w n as “ id e a lis t” — w h ic h s h o w s h o w m is le a d in g la b els can be)
w h ic h assign s to h u m a n s u b je c tiv ity a ce n tral ro le in d e te r m in in g the
sh ap e o f rea lity. M a r x w ill c o n v e r t this ro le fr o m an e p is tc m o lo g ic a l
to a p ra c tic a l-h is to rica l o n e , b u t w i ll re tain it th r o u g h o u t.
T o su m up : F e u e rb a ch o ffe re d a m a n -c e n te re d p a n th e is m , n o t deus
sive natura b u t deus sive homo naturalis. W ith the a b o litio n o f tran sce n ­
d en ce, m an is resto red to th e ce n te r o f b e in g an d re fle c tio n , a p la c e he
o cc u p ie s as a p u re ch ild o f n atu re, a b e in g o f a b s o lu te im m a n e n c e . H e
n o lo n g e r has a G o d - g iv e n s o u l o r o th e r g ifts an d fa c u ltie s e m a n a tin g

( 76)
 SPINOZA IN HEINE, HESS, FEUERBACH

from an im a g i n a r y m e ta p h y s ic a l “ B e y o n d .” A s such he becom es the

focus th r o u g h w h ic h th e to t a lity o f b e in g is approached. T h is is a new
h u m a n ism , to b e s u re , b u t a ls o tain ted , perhaps un w itting ly, w ith a
sen sualist v e r s io n o f K a n tia n (o r ra th er H egelian ) idealism .65 In Feuer­
bach, as in M a r x , n a tu re is seen th ro u g h m an no less than m an is seen
th ro u g h n a tu re . H u m a n s are n o t o n e o f m an y entities w ith in a uniform
natural s u b s ta n c e , as in S p in o z a ; th e y m ain tain , as in K an t, a privileged
p o sitio n , as th e p r is m th r o u g h w h ic h nature its e lf and the w h o le realm
o fim m a n e n c e is q u a lifie d an d p e r c e iv e d .“
T h is d iffic u lt s y n th e s is , i f o n e m a y call it that, betw een Spin oza’s
s ta n d p o in t a n d a K a n t ia n - lik e id e a lis m (or C o p ern ican revolution), is
the ce n tral th e m e o f th is c h a p te r an d the n ext. T h e left-H egelians, in­
clu d in g M a r x , r e v e r t f r o m H e g e l’s sp irit to nature as the fundam ental
c a te g o ry o f a p h i lo s o p h y o f im m a n e n c e , w h ile retaining the special
p o sitio n o f th e s u b je c t w h ic h H e g e l w a s rig h t to stress against Spinoza.
H o w can th e (S p in o z is tic ) p r in c ip le o f im m an en ce be “ subjectivized ”
w ith o u t lo s in g its s tr ic t n atu ral ch a racter and w ith o u t falling back
u p on t e l e o l o g y a n d d is g u is e d th e o lo g y ?
T h is is th e p e r s p e c t iv e fr o m w h ic h 1sh all n o w approach M a rx. M y
aim is to e x a m in e th e k in d o f p h ilo s o p h ic a l o p tio n he construes in re­
spon se to th e S p in o z is t ic h e r it a g e an d its H egelia n turn. C o n sequen dy,
I shall d eal p r e d o m in a n t ly w i t h M a r x as philosopher, and not as social
thinker, e c o n o m i s t , o r r e v o lu tio n a r y , even th o u g h all these aspects are
tied t o g e t h e r f r o m M a r x ’ s own v ie w p o in t.

(77)
 C H A P T E R 4

Spinoza and M arx:

M an-in-N ature and the Science
o f Redem ption

A t th e ag e o f tw e n ty -th r e e — a lm o s t th e a g e S p in o z a w a s w h e n he was
ba n n ed — a n o th e r so n o f J e w is h p aren ts, t w o ce n tu rie s la ter, p lu n g e d
in to th e s tu d y o f S p in o z a ’s Theologico-Political Treatise an d Correspon­
dence. H e c o p ie d e x te n s iv e ly fr o m S p in o z a ’s o r ig in a l L a tin an d fro m
an e x ta n t G e rm a n tran sla tio n , a rra n g e d th e e x c e r p ts in a s lig h t ly pe­
cu liar o rd er, and p e n n ed th e fo llo w in g title to th e m a n u s c r ip t:

S p in o z a ’s
T h e o lo g ic a l- P o litic a l T re a tis e
by
K a rl H e in ric h M a r x , B e r lin 1841

B y K a rl M a r x ? I f so , this w a s a p e rfe c t case o f p la g ia r is m . T h e r e is not

a s in g le sen ten ce in this n o te b o o k w h ic h M a r x h ad n o t c o p ie d fro m
S p in o za . B u t this m a y be an act o f p h ilo s o p h ic a l a p p r o p r ia t io n .’ For
in d e e d , S p in o z a ’s th o u g h t, ad a p ted to th e p h ilo s o p h ic a l n e e d s o f the
tim e , re m ain e d at th e fo u n d a tio n o f M a r x ’ s la te r th in k in g , a lm o s t as
d e e p ly ro o te d an d as p rese n t as it h ad b een to H e g e l an d as H e g e l had
been to M a rx .
M a r x u sed S p in o z a ’s th o u g h t far m o r e th a n h e a d m itte d . S p in o za
w a s a b o v e all a co u n te rb a la n c e an d c o r r e c tiv e to H e g e l, r e s to r in g the
co n c e p t o f n atu re and m an as a c o n c re te , n a tu ra l b e in g fr o m w h a t
s e e m e d to M a r x his im m e rs io n in th e lo f t y an d s e m ir e lig io u s h eig h ts
o f th e H e g e lia n G eist. M a r x did n o t ta k e th is m o v e in d e p e n d e n tly ; he
w a s rath er th e ch ild — a p ro d ig a l ch ild , to b e sure— o f his o w n Zeitgeist,
e s p e c ia lly o f th e le ft-H e g e lia n m ilie u in w h ic h h e g r e w u p , an d fro m
w h ic h he to o k his d ep a rtu re to w a rd th e s o c io e c o n o m ic a n a ly s is that
b e c a m e asso ciated w ith his n am e.
W h e n M a r x d e n o u n c e d th e le ft-H e g e lia n c r itiq u e o f r e lig io n as fu n ­
d a m e n ta lly in s u ffic ie n t, he also sa w it as a n e c e s s a ry s ta g e th a t h a d been

(78)
 SPINOZA AND MARX

co m p leted ;2 its fla w , in H e g e lia n term s, w as that its one-sided role has
been fu lfille d . M a r x w a s lo o k in g p ast th e p u rely p hilosophical analysis
o f co n scio u sn ess, an d w a s s e a rc h in g fo r th e fundamental causes o f the
self-alienated m in d , in w h ic h F e u e rb a ch had ro o ted the religious illu­
sion. T h e s e ca u ses M a r x fo u n d in th e e c o n o m ic forces o f production
and the n e tw o r k o f s o c ia l re la tio n s th e y in v o lve d . H ere was the true
reality u n d e r ly in g all h u m a n a ffairs, in c lu d in g m an ’s dialectical rela­
tions w ith n a tu re , h im s e lf, an d o th e r hum an s.
T h is e c o n o m ic s u b s tr a te M a r x m a d e in to the arche, the first princi­
ple, the fo u n d a tio n o f th e w h o le rea lm o f im m an en ce. V iew ed in on ­
tological te r m s , it w a s fo r h im w h a t w a te r w as fo r Thales, fire for
H eraclitus, G e ist f o r H e g e l, and deus sive natura fo r Spinoza. It was
neither p h y s ic a l m a tte r n o r p u re sp irit, b u t a p ractical* synthesis o f the
tw o p ro d u c e d b y h u m a n la b o r an d p ro d u c in g m an h im self in turn.
R eligion , la w , p o litic s , art, an d all the m etap h ysical Weltanschauungiw
were d iffe re n t c o n fig u r a tio n s in w h ic h this practico-m aterial sub­
stance— a k in d o f S p in o z is tic causa sui— w a s reflected in cultural im ages
and in stitu tio n s.
In m a k in g th is m o v e , M a r x retu rn s fro m H e g e l’s absolute spirit to
a S p in o zism o f h is o w n , e n ta ilin g a n e w version o f nature. It is no
longer S p in o z a ’s u n ifo r m n a tu re , in w h ic h m an is a sim ple m em ber
am ong o th e rs, o n a p a r w i t h sn ak es and ra in b o w s. N ature has been
h um an ized in M a r x b u t, u n lik e H e g e l, w ith o u t spiritualizing it and
w ith o u t in v o l v in g an in h e re n t te le o lo g y . T h r o u g h hum an labor and
m aterial (and m e n ta l) p r o d u c tio n , m an and nature constitute a dialec­
tical u n ity, in w h ic h e v e r y t h in g else inheres. It is their separation that
becom es an a b s tra c tio n — a false reflectio n o f reality that is, however,
in evitable u n d e r th e e c o n o m ic alien atio n in w h ic h w e live and thus
must affe ct an d p r e ju d ic e o u r m in d s , beliefs, and cu ltu re.3
M a r x ’s n e w p h ilo s o p h y o f im m a n e n c e , th o u g h stro n gly influenced
by H e g e l an d h is m ilie u , g o e s b a c k to S p in o za in m ore w ays than one.
Indeed, S p in o z a is a lm o s t a lw a y s p resen t in M a r x ’s th ough t. But, w e
may add, th e a c tu a l p re s e n c e o f S p in o z a in M a rx far surpasses his direct
m ention b y n a m e.·1 In w h a t fo llo w s I shall tr y to reconstruct this pres­
ence in th ree m a jo r areas o f M a r x ’s th o u gh t: (i) in the preparatory
critique o f r e lig io n , w h ic h M a r x — lik e S p in o za, but under m ore re­
strictive c o n d it io n s — ta k e s to be a real p o w e r o f change; (2) in the way
M arx co n stru e s th e p ra c tic a l re la tio n b e tw e e n m an and nature as a new

* I use “ p ractica l” as a d e riv a tiv e o f p raxis in its philosophical sense (follow ing Aris­
totle, Kant, and M a r x h im s e lf) , m ea n in g ro u g h ly, deliberate or reasoned human action
afFecting so m e m atter.

( 79)
 CHAPTER 4

im m a n e n t to ta lity , and m ak es r o o m fo r a m a n - m a d e t e le o lo g y as an
o b je c tiv e feature o f rea lity ; and (3) in th e a lle g e d s c ie n tific fo r m that
th e Ca pital, as a “ scien ce o f s a lv a tio n ,” g iv e s to M a r x ’s e a r ly ethical
v is io n . T h e Capital spells o u t th e d y n a m ic b y w h ic h th e g o a l o f h um an
em a n c ip a tio n can b e attain ed “ S p in o z is tic a lly ,” b y th e in n e r la w s o f
re a lity its e lf— th e sam e p ra c tic o -m a te ria l (o r e c o n o m ic ) re a lity w h ic h
M a r x fr o m e a r ly o n h ad c o m e to see as th e n e w im m a n e n t su b sta n ce.

T he C r it iq u e o f R e l ig io n a n d th e R ole of th e M u l t it u d e

Ju st as th e y o u n g M a r x w a s p lo u g h in g his w a y th r o u g h S p in o z a ’s
Theologico-Political Treatise and a ffix in g his o w n n a m e to th e ex ce rp ts
he d ilig e n tly co p ie d fr o m it, F e u e rb a ch ’s Essence o f C hristianity (1841)
w a s b rin g in g S p in o z a ’s critiq u e o f re lig io n u p -to -d a te . T h e lin k be­
tw e e n th e tw o b o o k s w a s to o tim e ly an d a p p a re n t fo r M a r x to o ve r­
lo o k . F e u e rb a ch ’s atta ck o n re lig io n tran sla ted S p in o z a in te r m s o f H e ­
g e l’s co n c e p t o f alien atio n and, m o r e im p o r t a n tly , u p d a te d him
h is to ric a lly in term s o f th e m o d e rn G e r m a n s itu a tio n . T h e r e b y , as
M a r x sa w it, F eu erb a ch c o m p le te d th e w o r k o f th e le ft-H e g e lia n s ,
w h ic h w as n o t m e re ly th e o re tica l b u t also a fo r m o f a c tio n , a k in d o f
so cial p raxis: it cleared th e w a y fo r a still d e e p e r an d m o r e ra d ica l fu ­
sio n o f critic ism and p ra c tic e w h ic h M a r x c a m e to sec as his task to
u n leash.
In S p in o z a ’s Theologico-Political Treatise M a r x c o u ld h a v e fo u n d , i f
n o t th e first s u g g e s tio n , th e n at least s tr o n g s u p p o r t fo r h is id ea that
th e o ry it s e lf can serv e as p ractical fo rc e and le v e r o f c h a n g e , o n c e it is
m ad e to suit th e m in d s and real in terests o f th e m u lt it u d e .5 A s ch ap ter
1 has s h o w n , S p in o za w r o t e th e Theologico-Political Treatise w it h p re ­
cise ly this aim in m in d — to g e t in v o lv e d as p h ilo s o p h e r in th e subtle
m e ch a n ism o f so cia l and cu ltu ra l e v o lu tio n . B u t th e Theologico-Political
Treatise is m o re th an a o n e -tim e act o f e n g a g e m e n t; it also co n ta in s a
g e n e ra lize d m etatheory, d e m o n s tr a tin g h o w t h e o r y can b e c o m e a p rac­
tical fo rc e and o ffe rin g s p e c ific to o ls and s tra te g ie s fo r a c h ie v in g this
en d . A m o n g o th e r th in g s, as w e h ave seen, S p in o z a d e v is e s a certain
use o f la n g u a g e , o f m y th , and o f h e rm e n e u tic s as a p e r m a n e n t in sti­
tu tio n su ited to th e le v e l o f co n scio u sn e ss o f th e m u ltitu d e an d s e rv in g
to sh ap e th eir m in d s in a s o c ia lly b en eficia l w ay.
B u t h ere M a r x takes issu e w ith S p in o za o n t w o m a jo r c o u n ts . First,
M a r x rejects S p in o z a ’s co n c e p tio n o f th e m u ltitu d e as a lo w e r g ro u p ,
in cap ab le o f tru e s alva tio n and re q u ir in g s o m e s o rt o f r e lig io u s illusion
an d an in fe rio r state o f k n o w le d g e . In M a r x it is th e m u ltitu d e itself,
tra n sfo rm ed in to the p ro leta ria t, th a t is to b r in g a b o u t r e d e m p tio n for

(So)
 SPINOZA AND MARX

the rest o f h u m a n ity ; it is th e s u b je c t o f ration al em ancipation as well

as its o b je c t, an d to p e r fo r m its ro le it m u st have as clear, as sober, and
d em ystified a c o n s c io u s n e s s o f it s e lf and the w o rld as an y philosopher
can p o ssess— p e rh a p s e x p re s s e d in sim p ler term s than the p hiloso­
pher’s, b u t e n jo y in g th e a d d e d a d v an tag e o f b ein g im m ersed in real
life. W h ereas S p in o z a h ad sep a ra ted th e m u ltitu d e and the philosopher
as tw o d is tin c t e n titie s , M a r x u n ifies th em : the proletariat is p hiloso­
phy in carn a te, th e m a te ria l w e a p o n and em b o d im e n t o f p hilo so p h y.6
Perhaps p a r a d o x ic a lly , b u t a ls o ty p ic a lly , M a r x transports the qualities
o f trad ition al e s o te r ic g r o u p s to his o w n k in d o f m ultitude, underm in­
ing this c a te g o r y a lto g e th e r an d fo rm in g instead the concept o f the
proletariat as th e a v a n t- g a r d e o f re v o lu tio n and redem ption.
Seco n d , M a r x in s is ts th a t fo r th e o r y to be translated into practice, it
cannot m e re ly e x p r e s s a tim e le ss tru th (as in Spinoza), but m ust rouse
the co n s cio u s n e s s o f th e m asses to so m e real predicam ent they expe­
rience, so th a t th e ir a c tu a l w a n t w ill p rep are them to becom e aware o f
it. “ T h e o r y ,” he s a y s , “ is a c tu a liz e d in a p eop le o n ly in so far as it ac­
tualizes its n e e d s ” 7— an d M a r x m ean s this in the h istorical sense, as a
H egelian c o r r e c tio n o f S p in o z a . A th e o ry that sim p ly states the woes
and d e fic ie n cie s o f h u m a n it y in g en era l, in so m e ahistorical way, w ill
not do, fo r it w i ll n o t h a v e re a lity o n its side and w ill therefore lack a
significant ch a n c e to fu r t h e r a ffe c t reality.
W h ile th is is c e r ta in ly an im p lie d criticism o f Spinoza, it is clearly
made v e r y m u c h in S p in o z a ’s o w n sp irit. B o th M a rx and Spinoza v iew
natural ca u s a lity as th e s o le v e h ic le o f so cial ch an ge, th o u gh they give
it d ifferen t in te r p r e ta tio n s . S p in o z a , an av o w ed d eterm inist, w o uld ac­
cept w ith o u t q u a lm s (in d e e d , he fo retells) M a r x ’s principle that
changes r e c o m m e n d e d fo r th e fu tu r e sh o u ld n o t be projected as mere
dreams o f th e u to p ia n w i ll, b u t m u s t h ave a scien tific grasp o f w hat the
actual s itu a tio n a lr e a d y fo re te lls . Y e t S p in o za, child o f the seventeenth-
century an d its s c ie n tific r e v o lu tio n , und erstand s all natural causality
under th e s e m im e c h a n is tic m o d e l o f the p h ysical sciences, whereas
M arx, f o llo w in g H e g e l, v ie w s s o cia l ch a n ge as dialectical and bound
and d e te rm in e d b y h is to ry .
A t this c r u c ia l p o in t, M a r x ’s n atu ralism takes on a distinctly histo-
ricized* c o m p le x io n : it is H e g e l’s le g a c y b ro u g h t back to Spinoza
w ith o u t th e H e g e lia n G eist. N a tu r e its e lf is n o w taken as the substrate
o f h isto ry — an a p p r o a c h th a t p re s u p p o s e d , o f course, a reinterprcta-
tion o f w h a t is u n d e r s to o d b y “ n a tu re .” N o lo n g e r seen as a finished

* B y “ h isto ric ize d " o r “ h isto ric ist,” 1d o not mean “ relativized" but only the property
o f being u n d ersto o d t h r o u g h h isto ry , and b e in g subject to its dynam ics.

(81)
 CHAPTER 4

and alien e n tity th at m e re ly c o n fro n ts us, n a tu re is c o n c c iv c d b y M a rx

as the sy n th esis b e tw e e n p ractical h u m a n s u b je c tiv ity an d th e ra w s tu ff
o f th e u n iverse.
A s M a r x sees it, S p in o z a ’s c ritiq u e o f r e lig io n c a m e b e fo r e its tim e
and w a s th e re fo re a n tic ip a to ry and h is to r ic a lly a b s tra ct. F eu e rb a ch and
the le ft-H e g e lia n s had a clear a d v a n ta g e o v e r S p in o z a , s in ce th e y w ere
o p e ra tin g w h e n co n d itio n s in G e r m a n y w e r e h is to r ic a lly rip e. N o w an
en th u siastic y o u n g M a r x can d e cla re th a t “ fo r G e r m a n y th e c r itiq u e o f
re lig io n has been c o m p le te d ,” a d d in g that “ th e c r itiq u e o f re lig io n is
the p re su p p o sitio n o f all c r itiq u e .” * T h is is a t w o f o ld s ta te m e n t, u sin g,
lik e H e g e l, p artial a p p ro v a l as a m ean s o f c r itic is m . O n th e o n e hand,
it hails th e w o r k o f F eu erb a ch and o th e r le ft - H e g e lia n s , s in ce o n the
le v e l o f ideas— o f mere id eas, as M a r x w ill a d d — th e y h av e ab o lish e d
th e fic tio n o f tran scen d en ce and e x p o s e d r e lig io n as a m e n ta l fo r m o f
se lf-a lie n atio n , an in v e rte d c o n s cio u s n e s s o f th is w o r l d an d an illu s o r y
c o n so la tio n fo r its w o e s (“ the o p iu m o f th e p e o p le ,” as M a r x d u b s it
fo r p o p u la r c o n s u m p tio n ).9 Y e t F e u e rb a c h ’s c r itiq u e w a s s e lf-d e fe a tin g
b ecau se it w a s n o t rad ical e n o u g h . T h e t w o fo ld s ta te m e n t a b o v e also
m eans th at th e critiq u e o f re lig io n is fu n d a m e n ta lly in s u ffic ie n t; it is
o n ly a p re su p p o sitio n o f tru e s o cia l c r itic is m , an d i f le ft at th a t, it w ill
o n ly add to th e m y s tific a tio n and th e re b y r e in fo r c e th e o p p r e s s io n that
lies at the b o tto m o f re lig io n .
A s M a r x p u ts it in a w e ll- k n o w n a p h o ris m :

T h e a b o litio n o f r e lig io n as th e p e o p le ’s illusory h a p p in e s s is the

d em an d fo r th eir real h a p p in ess. T h e demand lo abandon illusion
about their condition is a demand to abandon a condition w hich requires
illusion. T h e critiq u e o f re lig io n is th u s in e m b r y o a c r itiq u e o f the
v ale o f tears w h o s e h a lo is re lig io n . (“ T o w a r d s th e C r it iq u e ,” p.
250; em p h a sis add ed )

T h e critiq u e o f re lig io n en d s w ith th e d o c t r in e th a t man is the

h ig h e st b e in g fo r m an , h e n ce w it h th e c a te g o r ic a l im p e r a tiv e to
o v e r th r o w all co n d itio n s in w h ic h m a n is a d e g r a d e d , e n sla v e d ,
n e g le c ted , co n te m p tib le b e in g . . . . (Ib id ., p p . 2 5 7 —58; em p h a sis
add ed )

W h ile these tones m a y re m in d us o f H e in e , M a r x c a rrie s th e m even

fu rth e r an d ag ain st th e le ft-H e g e lia n s . M a r x c o n d e m n s im m a tu r e and
su p e rficia l calls fo r a c tio n , d riv e n (as H e in e ’ s) b y an a b s tra c t s o c ia l co n ­
scien ce th at im p ed es a so b e r (i.e ., S p in o z is tic ) a n a ly s is o f re a lity . T h e
critiq u e o f th e “ h o ly ” fo r m o f a lie n a tio n — r e lig io n — m u s t b e c o m e an
o v e ra ll critiq u e o f its “ u n h o ly ” fo r m s , firs t as a c r itiq u e o f la w and

(82)
 SPINOZA AND MARX

politics an d th e n , m o r e t h o r o u g h ly , as th e critiq u e o f w ealth, property,

and e c o n o m ic p r o d u c tio n , th e fu n d a m e n ta l co n d ition s o f w h ich polit­
ical and r e lig io u s a lie n a tio n are co n seq u en ces.
Since th e le ft - H e g e lia n s faile d to fa th o m the m eanin g o f their own
w o rk , th e y s to p p e d at th e s y m p t o m s and n eglected the ro o t o f the
m alady. It is o n b o th sid e s o f th e th e o ry/p ra ctice equation that M arx
takes issue w i t h th e m . E ith e r th e y sh u n n ed social action, believin g that
by m ere in te lle c tu a l a n a ly s is th e y c o u ld m o v e the w o rld and em anci­
pate m an , o r t h e y p lu n g e d in to cr u d e and h asty calls fo r action— and
to m ere political a c tio n at th a t, u n g u id e d by fundam ental theory and
blind to th e u n d e r ly in g e c o n o m ic su bstan ce. In bo th respects they
m issed th e tr u e fu n c t io n o f th e o r y , e ith e r b y aggran d izin g its pow er or
by m a k in g d o w i t h o u t it; a n d in b o th respects th ey w ere d oom ed, not
only to fa ilu re b u t , d ia le c tic a lly , to s e rv in g th e cause o f the sam e ruling
p ow ers th e y w is h e d to ro u t.
D o e s th is c r itic is m a p p ly to S p in o za as w ell? In its broader outlines,
certainly; b u t w e m u s t a ls o r e m e m b e r that S p in o za’s critique was part
o f a th eo lo gico-p o /fifcd / trea tise, w h ic h p ro v id e d an elaborate and fairly
radical th e o r y o f p o litic a l a c tio n . T h is th eo ry, m oreover, n ot o n ly
stated w h a t w a s d e s ira b le , b u t also delin eated a g o o d part o f the so-
c io p s y c h o lo g ic a l m e c h a n is m b y w h ic h to advan ce it. M a rx m ay be at
odds w ith p arts o f S p in o z a ’s s o cia l th e o ry , in clu d in g his concept o f the
m u ltitu d e an d h is v i e w th a t s o m e s o rt o f illu sio n is required to main­
tain a sta b le p o lit y ; an d M a r x c e rta in ly v ie w s Sp in oza h im self as pris­
oner o f th e tr a d itio n a l illu s io n o f m e ta p h y sic s, lackin g true funda­
m ental t h e o r y — th e a n a ly s is of e c o n o m ic forces and their
p re s u p p o s itio n s .10 B u t M a r x , d ilig e n t stu d en t o f the Theologico-Politi­
cal Treatise, c o u ld n o t fail to see th e lin k it established betw een theory
and p ractice o n th e o n e h a n d , and b etw e en political and religious
em an cip a tio n o n th e o th e r. T h is w i ll m itig ate, th o u gh not revoke,
M a rx ’s c r itic is m o f S p in o z a ’s c r itiq u e o f religio n .

Im m an en ce an d M an -M ade T eleology

T h e N e w C a u s a Sui

In a b o lis h in g th e o th e r w o r l d an d G o d , the critiq u e o f religion leaves

man w ith h im s e lf as th e b e -a ll an d th e e n d -all, a n e w beginning and
the true c o n t e x t o f b e in g an d refle ctio n . M a n is not o n ly the highest
being fo r man (r e p la c in g G o d in th is resp ect), b u t he is also the active
creature w h o c o n fe r s m e a n in g fu l fo rm o n the rest o f being, and

(S3 )
 CHAPTER 4

th ro u g h w h ic h his o w n e n v ir o n m e n t— an d th e re b y he h im s e lf— is
m o ld e d an d p ro d u c e d .
Y e t m an in h erits th ese fo r m e r ly d iv in e ro les as a fin ite b e in g . It is
n o t m an as s e lf-s u ffic ie n t, b u t as a crca tu re o f w a n ts , p la c e d in d ia lec­
tical relatio n to his n atu ral e n v ir o n m e n t, th a t b e c o m e s th e o v e ra ll p rin ­
cip le. B e c a u se o f his fin itu d e, m an d o e s n o t h av e h is b e in g all in h im ­
self; he is n o t self-s u ffic ie n t n o r can he su stain his e x is te n c e b y his o w n
re so u rce s. H e is in co n sta n t n eed o f s o m e th in g th a t c o m e s fr o m the
o u tsid e , fr o m a n atu re th a t in it s e lf is alien to m an an d co n ta in s an
e le m e n t o f th e “ o th e r.” Y e t th is o th e rn e ss is n o t a b s o lu te , s in ce n atu re
is c o n s ta n tly ch a n g e d and resh ap ed b y th e h u m a n ra ce an d acqu ires
fo rm s and m e a n in g s— p r im a r ily u s a g e - m e a n in g s (la ter tr a n s fo rm e d
an d alien ated in to o th e r s o c ia lly d e te r m in e d c o n fig u r a tio n s ) — w h ic h
are co n fe rre d u p o n n atu re b y h u m a n w o r k an d p ra x is .
T h e fin itu d e o f m an n eed s o b je c tiv e n a tu re as a c o m p le m e n t , and
to g e th e r, in th eir d ia le ctica l re la tio n , th e y c o n s titu te th e n e w im m a ­
n en t to ta lity , re p la cin g S p in o z a ’s G o d o r s u b s ta n c e w h ile esta b lis h in g
its d iv in e co n n o ta tio n s. M a r x th e re b y fo llo w s H e g e l in g iv in g m an , as
su b je ct, a special co n s titu tiv e ro le in b e in g , w h e r e b y b e in g is n o t o n ly
an o b je c t, a m ere su b sta n ce, b u t is su b je c t. Y e t th is is d o n e b y h u m an
w o r k and p ro d u c tio n , n o t b y k n o w le d g e ; th e ro le o f m a n in b e in g is
to sh ap e an d h u m a n ize it th r o u g h p ra x is , n o t to raise it, as in H e g e l,
to sp e c u la tiv e se lf-c o n s c io u s n e s s . M o r e o v e r , th e h u m a n sp e c ie s fu lfills
this ro le as a n atu ral en tity, and n o t as s u p e r io r G e ist th a t su rp asse s or
aujhebt n ature.
In this w a y, th e p riv ile g e d p o s itio n M a r x g iv e s m a n as s u b je c t does
n o t p lace h im in H e g e l’s ca m p , b ec a u se m a n p e r fo r m s h is w o r ld -s h a p -
in g ro le fro m w ith in n atu re and in th e p ra c tic a l m o d e o f w o r k . T h is ,
as w e shall see in th e fo llo w in g se ctio n , is a p r a c tic a l an d m a te ria l C o -
p e m ic a n re v o lu tio n , a n e w fo r m o f m e d ia tio n b e t w e e n S p in o z a and
H e g e l w h ic h p e rfo r m s a n atu ralist “ s u b je c tiv a t io n ” o f b e in g (as re­
qu ire d b y M a r x ’s first T h e s is o n F e u e r b a c h )."
A m e th o d o lo g ic a l re m a rk is in o rd e r at th is p o in t. M a r x ’s o n to l­
o g y — fo r this is w h a t in terests us h ere— is n o t e a s ily d e te r m in e d . M a r x
ra re ly d iscu sses it as a s u b je c t in itse lf, b u t his v ie w s are e m b e d d e d in
his a n t h r o p o lo g y and in th e s o c io e c o n o m ic d o c t r in e h e la te r o ffe re d
instead o f p u re p h ilo so p h y . M o r e o v e r , a lth o u g h n o m a jo r g u l f d iv id e s,
in m y o p in io n , th e ea rly fr o m th e later M a r x o n th is is s u e , d u a litie s do
e x is t in each p e rio d . M a r x ’s v ie w s o n o n t o lo g y d id n o t s o m u ch
c h a n g e w ith tim e as th e y h ad th eir a m b ig u itie s at a n y g iv e n tim e .
T h is leaves us w ith th e u n e a s y ta sk o f r e c o n s t r u c t in g M a r x ’ s u n d e r­
ly in g o n t o lo g y fro m c o n te x ts th a t s e ld o m re fe r to it e x p li c i t ly .12 A k e y

( S4)
 SPINOZA AND MARX

conccpt I sh all u s e fo r th is p u r p o s e is “ m an -in -n atu re,” w ith the new

type o f re la tio n it e n ta ils b e t w e e n b e in g and action , ob ject and subject,
the in -its e lf an d t e l e o l o g y .*

T h e In -Its elf in Nature

The status o f n a tu re p r io r to a n y h u m a n a g e n c y and outside its actual

(or p oten tial) s c o p e is a m b ig u o u s in M a r x ’s th o u gh t. W hile he fre­
quently r e c o g n iz e s a r a w o r “ in o r g a n ic ” nature (as he calls it) confront­
ing m a n ,13 he s o m e t im e s s e e m s to d ism iss this idea as a transcendent
ab stra ctio n .14 W it h o u t t r y in g to re s o lv e the am b ig u ity or to attribute
to M a rx a m o r e c o h e r e n t p o s it io n than he holds, tw o points can be
made w ith s o m e c o n f id e n c e .15
First, M a r x at le a s t re c o g n iz e s an in -its e lf ingredient in nature,
w hose rig id g iv e n n e s s m u s t b e a d m itte d and rew ork ed as such. A l­
though a c o r r e la te o f h u m a n s e n s ib ility (an idea the yo u n g M arx bor­
rowed fro m F e u e rb a c h ), th is n a tu ra l in - its e lf can not be reduced to any­
thing h u m an ; it is a th in g lik e b e in g th at co n fro n ts m an and in which
we can n ot fin d a tra c e o f o u r o w n im a g e . O r , to use the term o f the
S p in o za -H eg el d is p u te , it is m e r e “ s u b sta n ce” w ith no inherent subjec­
tive features.
Second , h o w e v e r — a n d in th e fin a l an alysis— this “ ra w ” natural in­
gredient c a n n o t m e a n in g fu lly b e ap p ro a ch e d outsid e the interaction o f
man and n a tu re , w h e r e b y b o th sh ap e each o th er w h ile retaining the
elem ent o f d u a lity an d c o n fr o n ta tio n w ith in this prim ordial lin k .16 If
so, w e m a y sa y th a t n a tu re in th e co n c re te sense is a shaped, even a
hum anized b e in g , a n d th a t M a r x starts w ith a u n ity o f subject and ob­
ject (a p ra c tic a l, n o t a c o g n it iv e u n ity ) w h ic h serves as substrate to all
that fo llo w s . T h e s u b je c t- o b je c t as p ractical u n ity is a latent structure
in M a rx th a t g e n e ra te s an d u n d e rlie s th e h istorical process all along.
This also e x p la in s th e a lie n a tio n th a t o ccu rs in the m eantim e, for only
against th e b a c k g r o u n d o f a la te n t u n ity o f subject and object, or man-
in-nature, can th e ir u n n a tu ra l sep a ra tio n be seen as “ alienation” and
not s im p ly as d u a lis m .

* T h e en tity w h ic h M a r x co n sid e rs o n to lo g ic a lly self-sufficient is not “ nature” in the

hom ogeneous sense o f S p in o za , b u t a dialectical interaction o f nature and nun, whereby
cach affects the o th e r in a practica l m o d e (w o rk , shaping, reproduction). The hyphen­
ated term man-in-nature seem s m o re ad equ ate to express this idea than M arx s man and
nature, since M a rx cle a rly d o e s n o t have a sim p le conjunction in niind but a dialectical
reciprocity. H o w e v e r, th e w h o le sy s te m can also be called “ nature ’ in a secondary and
expanded sense, sin ce, as w e shall see, m ail w h o shapes the natural w orld is a natura!
agent h im self and is sh a p in g and rep ro d u c in g h im se lf in the act.

(Ss)
 CHAPTER 4

“ Man and Nature E x ist on T h eir O w n A cco u n t”

T h e p rim o rd ia lity o f m a n -in -n a tu re p re clu d e s a n y q u e r y a b o u t their

o rig in o r “ creatio n .” In a s tro n g S p in o z is tic train o f th o u g h t, the
y o u n g M a r x argues in th e Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts that
o n ce the w o rld o f tran scen d en ce has b een e lim in a te d , th e re is n o sense
in w o n d e rin g a b o u t th e o rig in s o f th e w o r ld as a w h o le . “ M a n and
n atu re e x ist o n th eir o w n a c c o u n t,” 17 and im m a n e n c e as the firs t p rin ­
ciple asserts its e lf o f itself.

I f y o u ask a q u estion a b o u t the cre a tio n o f n a tu re an d m a n , y o u

ab stract fro m natu re and fr o m m an . Y o u s u p p o s e th e m non-exis-
tent and y o u w a n t m e to d e m o n s tra te th a t th e y e.xisf. I re p ly : g iv e
up y o u r ab stra ction and at th e sam e tim e y o u a b a n d o n y o u r q u e s ­
tion . (Manuscripts, “ P riva te P r o p e r ty an d C o m m u n i s m ,” Early
Writings, p. 166)

M a r x con tin ues:

O r else, i f y o u w a n t to m ain tain y o u r a b s tra c tio n , b e co n sisten t;

i f y o u th in k o f m an and n atu re as n o n - e x is te n t, th in k o f y o u r s e lf
to o as n o n -e x isten t, fo r y o u are also m a n a n d n a tu re [sic]. D o n o t
th in k [ = d o n o t e n g a g e in th e a ct o f th in k in g ], d o n o t ask m e
qu estion s, fo r as so o n as y o u th in k and ask q u e s tio n s , y o u r ab ­
straction fro m the e x isten ce o f m a n an d n a tu re b e c o m e s m e a n in g ­
less. O r are y o u su ch an e g o is t th a t y o u c o n c e iv e e v e r y t h in g as
n o n -e x is te n t and y e t w a n t to e x is t y o u r s e lf? (Ib id .)

T h e s e are tw o d ifferen t a r g u m e n ts . T h e firs t is fu n d a m e n ta lly Sp i­

n o zistic. It establish es th e n e ce ssity and s e lf- s u ffie n c y o f th e im m a n e n t
w o rld b y d ism issin g the idea o f its p o s s ib le n o n e x is t e n c e as a lo g ic a l
ab su rd ity. Im m a n en t b e in g (“ m an and n a tu r e ” ) is o v e ra ll b e in g to
M a rx ; as su ch it is there n e ce ssa rily— s e lf- c o n ta in e d , s e lf- g r o u n d e d ,
a llo w in g o f n o extern al e x p la n a tio n s an d c a llin g fo r n o n e . W h ile K a n t
ban ned tran scen d en t sta tem en ts fr o m p h ilo s o p h y , M a r x , in a S p in o ­
zis tic vein , ex p e ls tran scen d en t q u e s tio n s as w e ll. A n y ta lk a b o u t “ cre­
a tio n ” (i.e ., search in g fo r ex tern a l so u rce s o f re a lity ) p re s u p p o s e s that
the u n iverse is c o n tin g e n t and c o n c e iv a b le as n o n e x is te n t; b u t th is, as
S p in o za, to o , had a rgu ed , is th e fo r e m o s t p h ilo s o p h ic a l fa lla cy .
In the seco n d part o f the q u o ta tio n , M a r x sta rts w i t h th e h u m a n ego
cogito, th e su b jectiv e act o f th in k in g , and n o lo n g e r w i t h th e u n iv erse
at la rge. A t first his m o v e m a y seem C a rte s ia n , b u t M a r x , in effect,
departs fro m D esca rtes in K a n t’s d ire c tio n a n d fin a lly en d s u p w ith
S p in o za again.

(86)
 SPINOZA AND MARX
In the act o f t h in k in g , M a r x says in cssence, I assert m y ow n exis­
tence as a firs t u n s h a k c a b le d a tu m . B u t I d o n o t d o so in a Cartesian
manner— as a b o d y le s s , w o rld le s s e g o — but rather as being in the
w orld and with th e w o r ld . H e re M a r x , perhaps un w ittin g ly, espouses
Kant’s p a ra d ig m a r g u m e n t in the tran scend en tal deduction, according
to w h ich th e e g o ’s s e lf- c o n s c io u s th in k in g is p ossible on ly i f the ego
con fron ts an o b je c t iv e w o r ld d is tin c t fro m itself. In other w ords, I can
be co n scio u s o f m y o w n th in k in g s e lf o n ly i f there is also a w orld other
than m y s e lf to w h ic h I re la te (K a n t says: constitu tively) and o f which
I am e q u a lly c o n s c io u s .
T o the in h e re n t lin k e s ta b lis h e d b y K a n t betw een the “ I think” and
the w o rld , H e g e l a d d e d a practical lin k b etw een the “ I th in k” and other
persons as an a d d itio n a l s tru c tu r e th a t m akes self-consciousness pos­
sible. A ll th ese lin k s — b e t w e e n th e self, the w o rld , and other persons—
are co n sid ered p r im o r d ia l, th a t is, th e y are precon dition s to the very
first d atu m o f s e lf- c o n s c io u s th in k in g .
M a rx , e v en w i t h o u t s p e llin g it o u t, accepts this prim ordiality and
reinstates it w ith in a S p in o z is tic c o n te x t. M an -in -n ature is the prim or­
dial d atu m , in e x o r a b ly im p lie d in self-co n scio u s thinking; and this
co m plex d a tu m w it h a ll its in g re d ie n ts (the in dividual, nature, and
other h u m a n s — o r th e sp ecies) n o w e n jo y s in M a rx the status o f causa
sui, o r s e lf-s u s ta in in g b e in g ; it can n o lo n g e r be open to doubt or sub­
jected to a s e a rc h fo r its tr a n s ce n d e n t o rigin s, because— here the for­
mer S p in o z is tic tra in o f t h o u g h t takes o ve r again— in doin g so w e im ­
ply that th e n e w im m a n e n t to ta lity , m an -in -n ature, can be conceived
as n o n e x isten t.
T h u s, in a s o m e w h a t r o u n d a b o u t w ay, th e sem i-Cartesian begin­
ning is re v e rs e d t h r o u g h K a n t an d H e g e l and is planted in Spinozistic
terrain again .
A w o r d o f c a u tio n is in o r d e r h ere. T h e n e w causa sui w hich I attrib­
ute to M a r x is, o f c o u r s e , m e a n t to be taken w ith a grain o fsalt. M a rx ’s
overall p rin c ip le o f im m a n e n c e is n eith er a d iv in e n or a necessary being
in the s e m ith e o lo g ic a l se n s e o f S p in o za . M a rx avoids the high-flow n
religious c o n n o ta tio n s th a t S p in o z a d elib e rately em phasized as pertain­
ing to his n a t u r e - G o d an d e x p lo ite d in his th eo ry o f salvation. Th e
sign ifican ce o f M a r x ’s n e w causa sui is m o re prosaic: it is the underlying
principle o f all n a tu ra l e n titie s w h ic h , as such, are necessarily finite and
dependent. " A b e in g w h ic h d o e s n o t have its nature outside o f itself is
not a n atu ral b e in g ,” 18 M a r x says in a statem en t that, i f taken strictly,
w ould a b o lis h th e id ea o f a s in g u la r and in fin ite nature-G od — an entity
w hich, in d e e d , is a b s e n t in M a r x .
M a rx , in o th e r w o r d s (and u s in g S p in o za ’s o w n terms), abolishes

(*7)
 CHAPTER 4

S p in o z a ’s natura naturans. W h a t is le ft is th e natura naturata, th a t is, the

im m a n e n t to ta lity seen fr o m th e s ta n d p o in t o f fin itu d e ; an d th is n o w
b e c o m e s th e o v era ll b e in g in M a r x , a n e w (and d iffe re n t) k in d o f causa
sui. It is a u n iv erse w h e r e p u re im m a n e n c e is in e v ita b ly lin k e d w ith
fin itu d e , a llo w in g o f n o d iv in ity eith er w it h o u t o r w ith in ; an d as such
it e x ists p rim o rd ia lly , o u t o f itself, b a rrin g a n y tr a n s c e n d e n t queries
and s e rv in g as th e a b s o lu te s ta rtin g p o in t fo r a c tio n an d fo r all m e an ­
in g fu l d isco u rse and r e fle c tio n .19

M an, Nature, and Production

T h e r e is a d iffe re n t sen se in w h ic h a v a ria n t o f causa sui a p p lie s in M a rx :

m an as self-c rea to r. H u m a n p ra c tic a l a c tiv it y tr a n s fo r m s th e n atu ral
in - it s e lf and th ereb y creates th e h is to ric a l u n iv e rs e b y w h ic h m an h im ­
s e lf is p ro d u c e d an d tra n s fo rm e d .
M a r x fo llo w s an id ea a d v an ced b y V ic o , g iv in g it a fa r - r e a c h in g n e w
in te rp re tatio n . H is to ry , o f w h ic h m a n is b o th c h ild an d p a re n t, is not
o n ly a d istin ct rea lm o f b e in g a lo n g sid e n a tu re , b u t b e c o m e s an e x ­
ten d ed d o m a in th a t c o m p ris e s n a tu re it s e lf as a m o m e n t o f m a n ’s self-
p ro d u c tiv e a c tiv ity . T h e re la tio n “ m a n - in - n a tu r e ” a c q u ire s its co n c re te
m e a n in g o n ly w ith in a h isto ric a l c o n te x t. M a n - in -n a tu r e im p lie s , first,
th e so cia l d im e n s io n o f h u m a n ex iste n ce — th e d is tin c tiv e “ s p e c ie s -a c -
t i v it y ” o f m an as d e te rm in e d b y his c o m m u n a l ties; a n d s e c o n d , the
s e lf-p ro d u c tiv e a c tiv ity in w h ic h “ r a w ” n a tu re is tr a n s fo r m e d and the
h u m a n race creates and resh ap es it s e lf in th e p ro c e s s . H o w e v e r , in h is-
to ric iz in g th e m a n -in -n a tu re relatio n , M a r x d o e s n o t e le v a te h is to r y to
a s e m ith e o lo g ic a l statu s lik e H e g e l’s G eist. H is t o r y is ra th e r b r o u g h t
b a ck to n atu re, as th e la tte r’s fu lly d e v e lo p e d and d ia le c t ic a lly en ric h e d
sense.
T h e s e lf-p ro d u c tiv e ro le o f m a n -in -n a tu re h as n o t o n ly s o cia l and
a n th ro p o lo g ic a l im p lic a tio n s in th e e a r ly M a r x , b u t a ls o o n tic o n es.
N a tu ra l en tities are o b je c ts o f h u m a n s e n s ib ility (b o th p ra c tic a l and
c o g n itiv e ), a fact th at b e lo n g s to th eir v e r y c o n s titu tio n . B e in g n atu ral
means b e in g related to h u m a n s e n s ib ility as its a c tu a l o r p o te n tia l o b ­
je c t— n o t o n ly to o u r p e rce p tio n s b u t e q u a lly , an d p r im a r ily , to h u m a n
need s an d d esires (w h e th e r actu al o r p ro je c te d ) an d , o f c o u r s e , to o u r
p ractical re sh ap in g . T h is is n o t a B e r k e le y - t y p e id e a lis m b u t ra th e r an
e x te n s io n o f F e u e rb a ch ’s p e cu lia r b ra n d o f m a te ria lis m , w h e r e m aterial
o b je cts are seen b o th as real an d as n e ce ssa rily re la te d to h u m a n sen si­
b ility as its “ o b je c t iv iz e d ” side.
M o re o v e r , h u m a n s e n s ib ility it s e lf is n o t a fix e d an d tim e le ss facto r,
b u t e v o lv e s in h is to r y a lo n g w ith its o b je cts an d as a re s u lt o f its rela­

(88)
 SPINOZA AND MARX

tion w ith th e m . A s n e w m a te ria l p ro d u c ts and cultural experiences

becom e a v a ila b le , as ta ste, k n o w le d g e , and life-styles and patterns
evolve, so d o th e fo r m s o f o u r sen sib ility. “ T h e creation and cultiva­
tion o f th e fiv e sen ses is th e w o r k o f all p revio u s h is to ry ” M a rx notes
in a salien t e p ig r a m (in “ P r iv a te P r o p e r ty and C o m m u n is m ,” Early
Writings, p. 1 6 1 ). N o t o n ly are o u r need s and desires socially deter­
mined; p e rc e p tio n it s e l f is a ffe c te d b y cu ltu re (bo th material and spir­
itual), w h ic h in tu rn is th e h is to ric a l p ro d u c t o f m an changing nature
and th e reb y a ls o c h a n g in g his o w n “ n a tu re” to reflect the m ost prim i­
tive m o d es o f fe e lin g an d p e r c e iv in g .
T h e m a n n e r in w h ic h th e h u m a n race creates and hum anizes itselfis
by e m b o d y in g i t s e l f in its m a te ria l o b jects. M a n breaks aw ay from his
state o f a n im a lity b y im p r in tin g a h u m a n ized (his ow n) form upon
objects in his e n v ir o n m e n t, th a t is, th ro u g h a teleolog ica lly oriented
tran sfo rm a tio n o f th e m a te ria l o b je c ts a ro u n d h im . T h e distinctive hu­
man e le m e n t, w h ic h th e G r e e k s s a w in logos, C h ristian ity in a G od -
given s o u l, K a n t in th e tra n s ce n d e n ta l e g o , and Feuerbach in a univer­
sal kin d o f s e n s ib ility , M a r x sees in th e p ro d u c tio n o f the means o fo u r
subsistence. T h is is “ th e fir s t h is to ric a l a c t” and th e m ost fundamental
hum an fe a tu r e .* C o n s c io u s n e s s , re lig io n , lo g ic , and other mental
products o f c u ltu r e ( w h ic h a ls o d is tin g u is h hum ans) are o n ly deriva­
tive o f th e fa c t o f m a te ria l p r o d u c tio n , w h ic h is, to M a rx, the prim or­
dial e x p re s s io n o f th e m a n - in - n a tu r e relation and o f the dialectical to­
tality it e sta b lish e s.
T h e c o n c e p t o f p r o d u c tio n has th e re b y a m etaeco n om ic function,
g ro u n d in g M a r x ’s e c o n o m i c th e o r y w ith in his an th ro p o lo gy and its
im plied o n t o lo g y .20 E a r lie r I h av e attrib u te d to M a rx a kind o f eco­
nom ic m o n is m , e v e n fa s h io n e d o n the p re-S o cra tic m odel; yet the
"e c o n o m ic ” s u b s tr a te o f r e a lity d ra w s its m ean in g fro m the m etaeco­
n om ic p re m ise s (m a n - in - n a tu r e , p r o d u c tio n as the teleological subjec-
tivation o f m a tte r, e tc .) an d s h o u ld b e u n d ersto o d as their concretiza-
tion.21
M a teria l s e lf- p r o d u c tio n is a ls o m o re fu n d am en tal than the universal

* M an can b e d istin g u ish e d fro m th e anim al b y consciousness, religion, or anything

else you please. H e b e g in s to d istin g u ish h im s e lf fro m the animal the moment he begins
fo produce his m ea n s o f su b sisten ce, a step required by his physical organization. By
producing fo o d , m an in d ire c tly p ro d u ce s his m aterial life itself (German Ideology, in
Writings o f the Young M arx, p. 409).
T he first historical act, th e act b y w h ic h th ey [hum an individuals] distinguish them­
selves fro m an im als is n o t th e (act that th ey tlu n k, but the tact that they begin t o producc
their means o f subsistence. T h e first fact to b e established, then, is the physical organization
o f these in d iv id u a ls and their co n s e q u e n t relationsh ip to the rest o f nature. (Ibid.)

(s9)
 CHAPTER 4

s e n s ib ility b y w h ic h F e u e rb a ch ’s s e lf- s ty le d m a te ria lis m s o u g h t to d e­

fin e m a n ’s u n iq u en ess. M a r x a ccep ts the g e n e ra l (and ra th e r S p in o z is ­
tic) tre n d o f F eu erbach : to m a in ta in u n iv e rs a lity as th e d is tin c tiv e h u ­
m an fe a tu re w h ile r e in te g ra tin g it w ith in m a n ’s n a tu ra l b e in g ; and
M a r x , o f c o u rs e , s u b scrib es to F e u e rb a c h ’s v ie w o f h u m a n s as “ sp e-
c ie s -b e in g s ," related b y n a tu re to o th e r h u m a n s an d m a k in g th is their
p r im a r y o b je c t. B u t F e u erb a ch , h ere a g a in , w a s n o t s u ffic ie n tly fu n ­
d a m e n ta l. T h e d is tin c tiv e h u m a n s e n s ib ility is n o t a firs t n a tu ra l d atu m
b u t rath er th e h isto ric a l p r o d u c t o f o u r s e lf- h u m a n iz a tio n , w h ic h is
ro o te d in m aterial p ro d u c tio n — a b o v e all in p r o d u c in g th e means o f
p r o d u c tio n . T h is n o w assu m es in M a r x th e u n iv e rs a l c h a ra c te r d is tin c ­
tive o f th e h u m a n race:

O f co u rse , a n im a ls also p ro d u c e . T h e y c o n s tr u c t n e s ts , d w e llin g s ,

as in th e case o f bees, b e a vers, an ts, etc . B u t t h e y o n ly p ro d u c e
w h a t is s tr ic tly n ecessa ry fo r th e m s e lv e s o r th e ir y o u n g . T h e y
p ro d u c e o n ly in a s in g le d ire c tio n , w h ile m an p r o d u c e s u n iv e r ­
sally. T h e y p ro d u c e o n ly u n d e r th e c o m p u ls io n o f d ir e c t p h y s ic a l
n eed s, w h ile m an p ro d u c e s w h e n he is fre e fr o m p h y s ic a l n eed .
A n im a ls p ro d u c e o n ly th e m s e lv e s w h ile m a n p r o d u c e s th e w h o le
o f n atu re. T h e p ro d u c ts o f a n im a l p r o d u c tio n b e lo n g d ir e c tly to
th eir p h y s ic a l b o d ie s, w h ile m an is free in fa c e o f h is p r o d u c t. A n ­
im als c o n s tr u c t o n ly in a c c o rd a n c e w it h th e s ta n d a rd s an d n eed s
to w h ic h th e y b e lo n g , w h ile m an k n o w s h o w to c o n s tr u c t in ac­
c o rd a n ce w ith th e sta n d ard s o f e v e r y sp e c ie s. . . . T h u s m a n c o n ­
stru c ts also in ac co rd a n ce w ith th e la w s o f b e a u ty . (E arly Writings,
p. 128)

A s the essen tial life a c tiv it y o f m a n b y w h ic h o b je c t iv e r e a lity its e lf

is sh ap ed , m a te ria l p r o d u c tio n in h erits in M a r x th e r o le o f th e K a n t ’s
tran sce n d en ta l e g o in e x p re s s in g ( i) m a n ’s u n iv e r s a lity (an d th u s also
fre e d o m ); (2) h is in h eren t lin k to his c o m m u n it y (h ere to th e “ s p e c ie s ”
taken as a n atu ral e n tity ); a n d , a b o v e all, (3) his s h a p in g a n d c o n s titu t­
in g p o w e rs v is -à -v is th e w o r ld o f o b je c ts , w h e r e b y n a tu re a p p e a rs as
his w o r k an d his reality.

Work and Self-A lien a tion

M a r x ’s a n t h r o p o lo g y o f p r o d u c tio n also p r o v id e s th e s o u r c e o f h is e th ­
ics o f w o r k as s e lf-e x p re s s io n an d s e lf- a c tu a liz a t io n .22 T h r o u g h his
p r o d u c tiv e w o r k , m an e n g ra v e s h is im a g e o n in o r g a n ic n a tu re , re p ro ­
d u c in g h im s e lf in th e o b je c t an d th e re b y c o m in g b a c k in to h is o w n as
a c tu a lly h u m an :

(90)
 SPINOZA AND MAIIX

T h e o b je c t o f la b o r is th e re fo re th e objectification o f man's species-

life·, fo r [in m a te ria l p r o d u c tio n ! lie no lo n g e r reproduces him self
m erely in te lle c tu a lly , as in co n s cio u s n e s s , b u t actively and in a real
sense, an d he sees h is o w n re fle ctio n in a w o rld w h ich he has con ­
structed. (“ A lie n a t e d L a b o u r ,” p. 128)

This is an a n a lo g u e o f th e ty p ic a l relation o f consciousness and its ob­

ject as p u t fo r th b y G e r m a n id e a lism sin ce K a n t, w h ich M a rx n o w
translates in to a p r a c tic o - m a t e r ia l c o n te x t. M an asserts his actual (and
natural) s p e c ie s - b e in g b y im p r in tin g h im s e lf in the w o rld o f objects—
an a c tiv ity th a t has n o o th e r p u rp o s e than se lf-ex p ressio n .2' Material
p rod u ctio n is n o t m e r e ly u tilita ria n b u t an essential activity for hu­
mans, w h e r e b y th e y e x p r e s s an d actu a lize their being; as such it carries
the value a ttrib u te s th a t w e r e fo r m e r ly attached to lo ftier hum an activ­
ities such as k n o w l e d g e , ra tio n a l sp ecu la tio n , religious or moral de­
votion, and s o fo r th . M a te r ia l p ro d u c tio n has in this sense a spiritual
sign ificance in h e r in g in its v e r y m ateriality. It represents a unity o f
matter and s p irit w h ic h le ft- H e g e lia n s , as w e have seen, were prone to
view as th e fo r e m o s t S p in o z is tic tr a it.24
T ru e h u m a n it y e n ta ils d e m a n d s th a t w o r k be d one in a self-oriented
(and thus fre e o r a u t o n o m o u s ) m o d e . In the state o f alienation, h o w ­
ever (w h ic h th e r e fo r e is, s tr ic t ly s p e a k in g , less than hum an), the w o rk­
ers v ie w th e ir “ life a c t i v it y ,” la b o r, o n ly as a m eans for m aintaining
their sheer p h y s ic a l e x is te n c e ; an d in se llin g it to another they turn the
m ost g e n u in e e x p r e s s io n o f th e ir b e in g in to a co m m od ity. A s M arx
notes:

B u t la b o r is th e w o r k e r ’s o w n life -a c tiv ity , the m anifestation o f

his o w n life. A n d th is life-activity he sells to an oth er person in or­
der to s e cu re th e n e c e s s a r y means o f subsistence. T h u s, his life-activ­
ity is fo r h im o n ly a means to e n a b le h im to exist. (From “ Wage
Labor an d C a p i t a l,” in M a r x - E n g e ls , Collected Works [N e w York:
In tern atio n al P u b lis h e r s , 1 9 7 7 ), 9: 202)

This alie n a tio n c r e a te s a s e lf- s u s ta in in g circle. V ie w in g m y genuine life

activity as m e r e ly a m e a n s o f su b siste n ce is a fo rm o f false self-con­
sciousness, fo r c e d u p o n m e b y th e alienated m aterial conditions in
w hich 1 liv e a n d at o n c c r e in fo r c in g these co n d ition s. T h e product o f
w ork— th e p u r p o r t e d o b je c t ific a t io n o f m y o w n s e lf through w hich I
am to rea lize an d e n ric h m y life as a p erson — is not o n ly taken away
from m e b y th e m a r k e t fo r c c s b u t a c tu a lly turns against m e, bccause
from the o u ts e t it is in te g r a te d w ith in , and serves to sustain, a system

(9 0
 CHAPTER 4

th a t b lo c k s , d ep rive s, and sup resses th e v e r y s u b je c tiv e h u m a n it y it is

su p p o s e d to e n h a n c e .25
H e re M a r x co m e s clo se — p erh ap s d a n g e r o u s ly so — to th e classic te­
le o lo g ic a l p attern w h e r e b y h u m a n s are to rise to a h ig h e r le v e l b y re­
a liz in g s o m e th in g co n s id e re d as th eir cssen c e . T h e h u m a n ra ce can hu­
m a n ize it s e lf eith er g e n u in e ly o r d e v io u s ly , th e la tte r b e in g th e cu rren t
h isto ric a l co n d itio n u n d e r ca p ita lism . A n y t h in g s h o r t o f c o m m u n is tic
life and the lib e ra tio n o f w o r k and its p r o d u c ts is still a d e h u m a n ize d
an d u n n atu ral w a y fo r h u m an s to e x is t, e v e n i f it is a n e c e s s a ry p rep a­
ra tio n fo r th eir e m a n c ip a tio n . T h u s , n e ith e r a v o id a b le n o r an eternal
h u m a n lo t, alien atio n w it h its se v e ra l faces m a rk s th e lo n g in te r m e d i­
a ry state b e tw e e n a n im a lity and s a lv a tio n — th e t w o p o le s tr a d itio n a lly
re ifie d in to separate w o rld s , th e n atu ral an d th e d iv in e , w i t h m a n par­
ta k in g o f b o th — b u t w h ic h M a r x in c o rp o ra te s w it h in h is t o r y as a sin­
g le , d y n a m ic , and n atu ral to tality.
W h ile this is a d e fin ite S p in o z is tic m o v e — im m a n e n t, n atu ralistic,
and m o n is tic — it also resem b les H e g e l’s a tte m p t to u n d e r g ir d h is to ry
w ith a la ten t stru ctu re b o r r o w e d fr o m re lig io u s c o n s c io u s n e s s . A lie n ­
atio n in M a r x is a se cu lar v e rs io n o f “ fa lle n n e s s ,” a sta te o f d e fe ctiv e
b e in g fr o m w h ic h , in d ee d , n o t a tra n sce n d e n t G o d o r h is S o n b u t the
n atu ral co u rse o f h is to ry is to re d e e m th e h u m a n ra ce th r o u g h toil,
su ffe rin g , and th e d e e p e n in g o f a lie n a tio n th a t w i ll s e rv e as a le v e r in
its co n q u est.
T h e s e m ire lig io u s u n d erto n e s are u n m is ta k a b le . T h e e s c h a to lo g y o f
th e J e w is h p ro p h ets is tran slated in to im m a n e n t e c o n o m ic te rm s (a
S p in o z is tic u n ity o f sp irit an d m a tte r), and th e h o p e fo r th e seco n d
c o m in g is tra n sfo rm e d in to a th e o ry o f r e v o lu tio n , w i t h th e p ro leta ria t
p la y in g an av a n t-g a rd e ro le in th is n a tu ra l-d ia le c tic a l d ra m a o f re­
d e m p tio n .
Is th is a ta cit th e o lo g y (as in H e g e l) and a ra d ica l d e p a rtu re fro m
S p in o za? T o a n sw e r this q u e s tio n w e m u st d r a w a lin e b e t w e e n th e o l­
o g y in g e n era l and h isto ric a l p ro v id e n c e in p a rticu la r. S p in o z a w a s the
firs t to s u g g e s t a s e m ith e o lo g ic a l h e rm e n e u tic s as th e v e h ic le o f secu ­
la riza tio n . B u t n o t all re lig io u s m o tifs w e r e a c c e p ta b le e v e n as m eta­
p h o rs, and p ro v id e n c e w a s th e first to b e b a n n e d . M o r e o v e r , as the
M a rra n o o f reaso n , S p in o za w a s n o less m o t iv a te d b y th e p a th o s o f
secu lar re d e m p tio n th an M a r x , b u t fo r h im re d e m p t io n w a s a p erson a l
m atte r, a ffe c tin g a m in o r ity and le a v in g th e m u ltitu d e o u ts id e its sco p e
(see v o l. I, ch ap. 6). It h ad n o g lo b a l h is to ric a l a im a n d n o u to p ian
d im e n sio n s. W ith M a r x , o n th e c o n tra ry , u to p ia s e r v e d b o th in e n v is -
a g in g th e h ig h e s t h u m an lib e ra tio n fo r th e m a sse s, a n d in as s u m in g
th a t th e fo rces o f rea lity can y ie ld this fo r m id a b le re s u lt b y th e ir o w n

(92)
 SPINOZA AND MARX

dynam ic. It w a s, p a r a d o x ic a lly , b y tr y in g to avoid utopia and opt for

Sp inozistic re a lis m th a t M a r x en d ed up w ith a tacit, n ew historical
p roviden ce, b e c a u s e h e a s s u m e d an u n lik e ly correspondence between
what the fo rce s o f r e a lity w i ll b rin g a b o u t and w h a t hum an ity deeply
needs and asp ires to .
I shall retu rn to M a r x ’s u to p ia in m y discussion o f the Capital.
M ea n w h ile, w c s h o u ld a d d ress the b ro a d er question o f teleology,
w hich p ro m p te d o u r d is c u s s io n o f M a r x in the first place. Based upon
the fo re g o in g a n a ly s is o f m a n -in -n a tu re , h o w docs M a rx ’s philosophy
o fim m a n e n c e — la c k in g an in h e re n t te le o lo g y w h ile m aintaining a his­
torical p e rs p e c tiv e — tra c e its o w n w a y b etw een H egel and Spinoza?

T eleology , A l ie n n e s s , and A l ie n a t io n

T he road, I th in k , lea d s th r o u g h K a n t. Indeed, on this issue M arx o f ­

fers his o w n s y n th e s is o f K a n t and S p in o za, w h ich w e shall now ex­
amine.

K a n t and Teleology

Kant in h e rite d th e p r o b le m o f te le o lo g y fro m Leibn iz and the seven­

teen th -cen tu ry s c ie n tific r e v o lu tio n . T h e natural universe must be con­
ceived as a p u r e ly m e c h a n ic a l s y s te m , w ith no inherent ends and pur­
poses. A s s u ch , it c o n fr o n ts m an as an alien pow er, indifferent to
hum an n eed s, a s p ira tio n s , an d m o r a l tasks. In his attem pt to reconcile
this m e ch a n istic “ k in g d o m o f n a tu re ” to a teleological “ kingdom o f
grace,” L e ib n iz c o n c e iv e d o f th e m as tw o co m p lem en tary systems be­
tween w h ic h G o d h ad p re e s ta b lis h e d a p erm anent harm ony. With
Kant, h o w e v e r, th e tra n s c e n d e n t p rin cip le o f G o d is no longer avail­
able. Instead o f G o d , it is m a n w h o has to create the harm ony (or syn­
thesis) b e tw e e n n a tu re an d te le o lo g y , by im p rin tin g his practical and
moral g o a ls u p o n n a tu re as g iv e n ; and instead o f the harm ony being
preestablished fr o m th e o u ts e t, it b ec o m es in K an t the task and the
result o f h u m a n e ffo r ts in h is to ry .
T h is is n o t s im p ly a lo g ic a l-s y s te m a tic change, but a w h ole new
Weltanschauung an d m e n ta l r e v o lu tio n . It introduces the m odern his­
torical o u tlo o k to w h ic h M a r x w a s a (p rod igal) heir. It is also signifi­
cant fo r o u r a n a ly s is th a t K a n t tried , b u t failed, to discover a cognitive
way in w h ic h m a n g iv e s r e a lity an o b je ctiv e teleological fo rm .:6 This
failure in p a rtic u la r p o in ts th e w a y fro m K a n t to M arx. A lready in
Kant it is m a n as p ra c tic a l a g e n t and homo faber, not as homo sapiens,
w ho b rin g s n a tu re an d t e le o lo g y o b je c tiv e ly together. This is ex­

(93)
 CHAPTER 4

p ressed in K a n t’s w id e r m o v e fr o m th e tr a d itio n a l c o g n it iv e m eta­

p h y s ic s in to his n e w m e ta p h y sic s o f m o ra l p ra c tic e . A c t u a l re a lity can
ta k e te le o lo g ic a l sh ape o n ly by the a ctio n o f m a n , w h o u ses th e m e ch ­
an istic la w s o f n ature to tra n s fo rm n atu re in a c c o r d a n c e w ith hum an
in terests and m o ra l d em an d s. T h is is d o n e th r o u g h all fo r m s o f civ ili­
za tio n — tech n ica l, p o litical, and, a b o v e all, m o r a l. W h ile n a tu re itse lf
is d e v o id o f in h eren t p u rp o siv e n e ss, m an as p ra c tic a l a g e n t m u s t im ­
p rin t his im a g e u p o n th e w o r ld and resh ap e th e e x is tin g n a tu re (in clu d ­
in g his o w n “ in n e r” nature) in to a “ n e w n a tu r e ,” m o d e lle d o n the
m o ra l idea. T h is gen era tes h is to r y as th e o v e ra ll te le o lo g ic a l co n te x t,
and e v e n g iv es the w o rld it s e lf its o b je c tiv e “ fin a l e n d .” -7

M a rx ’s Synthesis o f Sp in o za and K ant

W ith ce rtain im p o rta n t m o d ific a tio n s (all S p in o z is tic in s p irit), M a rx

ad o p ts this b a sic K a n tia n sch e m e , in c lu d in g its p r im a c y o f p ractice.
T h e w o r ld as such has n o in h eren t te le o lo g y ; it is m a n as p ractical
b e in g (homo faber) w h o in tro d u c e s p u rp o s iv e fo r m in to a n a tu re that
la ck s it in itself. B u t o n ce this is p e rfo r m e d , th e te le o lo g ic a l fo rm is
in te r w o v e n w ith th e te x tu r e o f re a lity and b e c o m e s an a c tu a l d e te r m i­
n a tiv e facto r.
In a ss u m in g this p o s itio n , M a r x splits H e g e l’s s y n th e s is o f K a n t and
S p in o za in to its basic co m p o n e n ts , an d th e n b u ild s a n e w o n e in its
p lace. H e g e l claim ed th at a s u b je c tlik e fe a tu re can b e d is c o v e r e d in the
d eep s tru ctu re o f w h a t seem s to b e a th in g lik e , o b je c t iv e re a lity , b e­
cau se it is u n d erlaid b y d ia lectica l lo g ic — th e lo g ic o f s u b je c tlik e s y s ­
tem s. In this v ie w , th e u n iv e rs e as a n atu ral s y s te m a lr e a d y h as a latent
h u m a n lik e fo rm , so th at in “ s u b je c tiv iz in g ” it w e o n ly e x p lic a te and
realize its in h eren t stru ctu re . T h is v ie w , w h ic h I sh all ca ll “ o n to lo g ic a l
a n th r o p o m o r p h is m ,” led H e g e l to th e fu rth e r A ufhebung o f n atu re
w ith in th e G o d -lik e S p irit an d to h is s e m ith e o lo g ic a l re a d in g o f h is ­
to ry .
Is th e re a s im ila r o n to lo g ic a l a n t h r o p o m o r p h is m in M a r x ? C e r t a in ly
n o t, i f b y this w e u n d ersta n d th e a sc rip tio n o f a h u m a n fe a tu re to the
n atu ral w o r ld itself, as in h e re n tly la ten t in it. M a r x , o n th e co n tra ry ,
alig n s h im s e lf w ith S p in o za in v ie w in g n a tu re w it h n o in h e r e n t p rin ­
cip le o f s u b je c tiv ity . T h e s u b je c tiv a tio n o f n a tu re o c c u r s th r o u g h the
h u m a n race as a d istin ct n atu ral p rin cip le , a p o w e r th a t c o n fr o n ts and
su b d u e s th e n atural in - its e lf w ith o u t in itia lly r e c o g n iz in g its o w n im ­
ag e w ith in it. T h e h u m an im a g e , as in K a n t, is o n ly im p a r te d to ra w
n atu re; it is n eith er d isco v e re d in it n o r e x p lic a te d fr o m its la te n t s tru c ­
tu re.

( 94)
 SPINOZA AND MARX

T h e m o s t w e can a s c rib e to M a r x , by lo g ic a l im plication , is that the

natural in - it s e lf ca n le n d its e lf, at least in part, to hum an shape-giving
action. B u t th is d o c s n o t in v o lv e in M a r x an extran eous postulate (like
K an t’s d iv in e g u a ra n te e ) s in c c fo r M a r x b o th m an and nature belong
to the sam e im m a n e n t d o m a in .
T h is is w h e r e M a r x re m a in s fu n d a m e n ta lly Spinozistic. W hile fol­
lo w in g th e K a n tia n s c h e m e , h e rejects K a n t’s dualism o f reason and
nature and its c o n s e q u c n c e s (su ch as uto p ian ism , the identification o f
h u m an izatio n w it h m o r a liz a t io n , and the v ie w o f practical reason as a
transcendental p r in c ip le th a t im p o s e s its e lf u p on nature from w ith ­
out). In M a r x m a n b c c o m e s a n atu ral b ein g h im self, albeit in a special
(dialectical) sen se . M a n is n o lo n g e r a dual creature w h o partakes
equally in n a tu re a n d in a su p ran atu ra l d o m a in o f “ pure” reason.
Hence, his p ra c tic a l a c t i v it y is m a teria l and sensuous, not purely moral
and a p rio ri, an d in fu lfillin g his o n to lo g ic a l role he acts as a real em ­
pirical e n tity an d n o lo n g e r as a tran scen d en ta l ego .
In this sen se it m a y b e said th a t it is n ature its e lf that w orks upon
itself th ro u g h th e h u m a n b e in g — a reflex iv e feature that preserves the
im m anent S p in o z is tic f r a m e w o r k o f M a r x ’s system . B u t w e m ust also
recognize a m a jo r d iffe r e n c e th a t ten d s in H e g e l’s direction. M an does
not b e lo n g to n a tu re in th e s im p le u n ifo rm sense o f Sp in oza’s res, but
in a d ia le ctica l m a n n e r, th a t is, b o th as o b ject and as subject. M an in
his w o rk is a n a tu ra l p r in c ip le o f s u b je c tiv ity , a natural fo r-itself w hich
depends o n th e i n - it s e l f o f n a tu re fo r b o th subsistence and for exercis­
ing m a n ’s d is tin c tiv e o n t o lo g ic a l a c tiv ity (production); yet he cannot
be red u ced to th is in - it s e lf, n o r b e fu lly explain ed and constituted by
its m e re ly o b je c t iv e a n d m e c h a n ic a l causality. M a r x ’s materialism, as
has been fr e q u e n t ly o b s e r v e d , is p ra c tic a l and e con o m ic, but not on­
tological.

A M aterialist Copernican Revolution?

This, I th in k , is M a r x ’ s m a jo r n o v e lty w ith respect to both H egel and

Spinoza. H e d o e s n o t ta k e a “ m id d le w a y ” b u t engenders his ow n dis­
tinctive s y n th e s is fr o m th e ir o p p o s itio n . It can be seen as a naturalist
way o f m a in ta in in g m a n ’s p r iv ile g e d ro le as a w o rld -sh apin g subject,
or as a m a te ria lis t C o p e r n i c a n re v o lu tio n . N a tu re in the broad sense,
as the o vera ll r e a lm o f im m a n e n c e (N ,), is m ark ed fro m the start by an
inner b ifu r c a tio n ; o n th e o n e h a n d th ere is an inert natural in-itself (N ,,
or nature in th e n a r r o w in o r g a n ic sense), facin g a natural principle o f
s u b je ctiv ity th a t tr a n s fo r m s th is in - it s e lf in to a “ hum an ized ” world.
N either o f th e s e n a tu ra l p rin c ip le s can be red uced to the other, and

( 95)
 CHAPTER 4

th e ir in te rre la tio n co n stitu te s m a n -in -n a tu rc as th e o v e r a ll to tality

(N ,). A n d it is as a n atu ral (and p ractical) b e in g (in th e se n se o f N ,),
an d n o t as se lf-c o n s c io u s G e ist, th a t m an retain s h is d is tin c t p o w e r and
o n to lo g ic a l ro le in th e im m a n e n t n atu ral s y s te m to w h ic h he b e lo n g s
as b o th su b je c t and o b ject.
In th is sense, M a r x rem ain s w ith in th e tr a d itio n o f G e r m a n id ealism
(or better, w ith in the C o p e r n ic a n re v o lu tio n ) th o u g h h e g iv e s it a prac­
tical and m e ta e c o n o m ic in te r p r e ta tio n .28 M a r x ’s s e lf- a s c r ib e d m ateri­
a lism im p lies, a b o v e all, th e p r im a c y o f p ra x is o v e r s p e c u la tiv e k n o w l­
e d g e (ag ain st H e g e l) and o f se n s u o u s , o r n a tu r a l- m a te r ia l praxis
(p ro d u c tio n ) as ag ain st th e m o r a l-tra n s c e n d e n ta l o n e (K a n t). T h is is a
n atu raliza tio n o f the ro le o f th e s u b je c t as c o n c e iv e d in G e r m a n id eal­
ism (or th e C o p e rn ic a n p rin cip le ), b u t n o t its a b o litio n . M a r x ’s m ate­
rialism m eans th at the C o p e r n ic a n p rin c ip le is m a t e r ia liz e d an d m an,
th ro u g h m aterial p ro d u c tio n , p e r fo r m s his ro le as a n a tu ra l and p rac­
tical en tity. T h e resu lt can b e seen as “ p ra c tic a l m a t e r ia lis m ,” w h ic h is
to b e d istin g u ish ed fro m o n to lo g ic a l m a te ria lis m a n d , in d e e d , is in ­
co m p a tib le w ith it .29
T o su m up: In S p in o za n atu re w a s p u re an d u n ifo r m s u b s ta n c e , and
n o su b je c tiv a tio n o f natu re w a s p o s s ib le , e ith e r fr o m w it h in (as in H e ­
gel) o r fr o m w ith o u t (as in K a n t an d M a r x ) . T h e t e le o lo g ic a l p ro je c ­
tion s o f th e su b jec t w e re p u re fic tio n s th at h ad n o sh a re in th e sh ap e o f
reality. In H e g e l, on the co n tra ry , a te le o lo g ic a l an d s u b je c tlik e feature
w a s la ten t in w h a t seem s to b e a th in g lik e s u b s ta n c e . In M a r x , fo llo w ­
in g K a n t, m an as a p ractical b e in g in tr o d u c e s p u r p o s iv it y in to a natural
in - its e lf th at la ck s it in itia lly ; h e d o e s so b y w o r k an d p r o d u c tio n and
th eir lo ftie r cu ltu ra l d eriv a tiv es, an d first o f all b y p r o d u c in g th e m eans
o f p ro d u c tio n — a s e c o n d -o r d e r te le o lo g ic a l p a tte rn . T h is is a m aterial
relation that su b je c tiv ize s n atu re in a real sen se. T h e p u r p o s iv it y it en­
g e n d e rs is n o lo n g e r fic titio u s an d illu s o r y as in S p in o z a , b u t b e c o m e s
a d e te r m in in g fa c to r in th e n atu ral te x tu r e o f th e w o r ld . It co n stitu te s
th e “ e c o n o m ic ” substrate o f re a lity w h o s e in v e s tig a tio n p r o v id e s the
n e w prima philosophia. 3°

A lienation Reconsidered

T h is also e x p la in s th e m a jo r ro le o f a lie n a tio n as a p h ilo s o p h ic a l p ro b ­

le m in M a r x .31 T h e cru cia l p o in t a b o u t a lie n a tio n is n o t th a t n atu re is
alien to m an , b u t th a t it is d is to r t in g ly h u m a n iz e d . I f m a n h ad not
in itia lly e x isted by im p r in tin g and o b je c t ify in g h im s e lf in h is natural
p ro d u c ts , th e o n to lo g ic a l p ro b le m o f a lie n a tio n w o u l d n o t h a v e arisen.
In the state o f alien atio n , m a n ’s s e lf- o b je c tific a t io n tu r n s again st

( 96)
 SPINOZA AND MARX

him. In stead o f p r o m o t in g lib e ra tio n and self-realization, it takes the

form o f (and h e lp s to su sta in ) a s o cia l and eco n o m ic system that de­
grades and im p e d e s h is h u m a n ity . F o r th e p urpose o f the present anal­
ysis w c n e ed n o t e la b o r a te th e s o cia l and ethical details o f alienation
but o n ly in d ic a te th e ir u n d e r ly in g p h ilo so p h ica l principle. T h e prob­
lem is n o t th at m a n is im p e d e d b y an alien p o w er that sim ply confronts
him; this w o u ld b e alienness, b u t n o t (se\()-alienation. Rather, the prob­
lem is th at th e im p e d in g p o w e r is m y o w n m aterial em bodim ent by
w hich I w a s to im p a r t a p u r p o s iv e fo rm to alien nature in order to
realize and lib e ra te m y s e lf. W h ile n ature is in itially supposed to be sub-
jectiv ized th r o u g h p ra x is in a w a y th a t enhances hum an developm ent,
the h u m an im a g e , as e m b o d ie d in th e so cio eco n o m ic system o f pro­
duction, is p r o je c te d b a c k to us as a p o w e r that distorts our humanity.
M a rx ’s m a jo r p r o b le m — a lie n a tio n — is thus ro o ted in the same theory
by w h ich he a d d re sse s th e issu es o f te le o lo g y and anthropom orphism ,
m ovin g a w a y fr o m H e g e l in S p in o z a ’s direction.
M a r x ’s w a y to o v e r c o m e a lie n a tio n is again Spinozistic, though in a
different sense. It p o s its th e g o a l o f secu lar red em ption and demands a
scientific w a y to it.

S p in o z a a n d t h e C a p it a l : T h e S c i e n c e o f R e d e m p tio n

Later in his ca re e r M a r x b r o k e c o m p le te ly w ith pure philosophy and

felt u n easy a b o u t th e e th ic a l v e in o f his early reflections. B ut this does
not m ean th a t his o n t o lo g y an d a n th r o p o lo g y sign ificantly changed or
that he d is m is se d p h ilo s o p h y in th e m an n er o f the positivists. O n the
contrary, M a r x ’s e c o n o m i c t h e o r y is laden w ith elem ents w h ose meta­
physical p a r e n ta g e is u n m is ta k a b le . Y e t m e taph ysics no lon ger had an
independent p o s t u r e o r c la im . H a v in g fu lfilled its role as pure theory,
it was n o t to b e s u b m e r g e d a n d aujgehoben (w h ich also means pre­
served) w ith in th e m o r e c o n c r e te th eo ries o f econ o m ic and social
change, an d a ls o w it h in th e r e v o lu tio n a r y action into w hich they
should b e tra n sla ted .
“ Y o u c a n n o t c a n c e l [aujheben] p h ilo so p h y w ith o u t realizing it,”
M arx a lread y said in an e a r ly essay (“ T o w a rd s the C ritiq u e,” p. 256).
This is a sp ec ia l u n it y o f s p irit an d m atter w h ic h left-H egelians, as w c
have seen, u n d e r s to o d as th e p r im e m e a n in g o f Spin ozism . T h e young
M arx im p lie d th is u n it y as w e ll w h e n he d eclared the proletariat to be
“ p h ilo so p h y in c a r n a te ” ; la ter, as h e set o u t in the Capital to provide the
proleteriat w i t h its th e o r e tic a l self-c o n sc io u sn ess, he also supplied the
new s u b s titu te fo r p u r e p h ilo s o p h y , its p ractically em bodied transfor­
mation.

(97)
 CHAPTER 4

H e n ce , d esp ite th e u n d en ia b le d iffe re n c e s in s ty le , s c o p e , an d scien ­

tific m o o d , I see n o real rift b e tw e e n the e a r ly an d th e m a tu re M a rx .
T h e Capital ex p a n d s and c o n c re tiz e s M a r x ’s o r ig in a l v is io n , to w h ich
it g iv e s scie n tific e x p re s s io n and th ereb y , w e m a y a d d , a S p in o z is tic
fo rm . A lr e a d y th e e a r ly M a r x h ad d is c o v e re d w h a t h e s a w as th e ec o ­
n o m ic su b strate o f reality, in c lu d in g th e s e lf- s h a p in g a c t iv it y o f m an -
in -n a tu re th at u n d erlies e c o n o m ic p r o d u c tio n . T h e m a tu re M a r x , in a
S p in o z is tic m o d e , p ro c e e d e d in th e C a pital to e x p lic a te an d s p e ll o u t
th e b a sic ca te g o ries and d y n a m ic s o f th is re a lity , o ffe r in g n o t o n ly an
e c o n o m ic th e o ry in th e n a r r o w sen se b u t a k in d o f “ firs t p h ilo s o ­
p h y ” — M a r x ’ s o w n im m a n e n t su b s titu te fo r tr a d itio n a l t h e o lo g y and
m e ta p h y s ic s. M a r x ’s e c o n o m ic s , in d ee d , is n o t to b e c o n c e iv c d as one
d is tin c t d iscip lin e a m o n g o th e rs b u t as a c o m p r e h e n s iv e an d fu n d a­
m e n ta l science— the co n c re te e x p lic a tio n o f th a t h u m a n iz e d su b sta n ce
and n e w causa sui th at co n stitu te s im m a n e n t rea lity.
T h e C apital has, m o re o v e r, th e d iffic u lt ta sk o f r e c o n c ilin g rea lity
w ith eth ical u to p ia . I f H e in e said th a t th e k in g d o m o f h eav en w as
b a k e d in lea ven and m ad e o f g re e n p eas, M a r x in th e C a p ita l sp ells this
id ea o u t as scie n tific th eo ry. T h e d ry an d s o m e tim e s s c h o la s tic b u lk o f
this m a g n u m o p u s is M a r x ’s o w n w a y , f o llo w in g S p in o z a , o f d iscu ss­
in g eth ical v is io n an d p o w e rfu l h u m a n a s p ira tio n s as i f th e y w e re
p o in ts , lines, and b o d ies. E c o n o m ic an a ly s is re p la ce s S p in o z a ’s mos
geometricus and o ffers in stea d a mos economicus as a ro a d to s a lv a tio n .32
T o be m o re specific: th e m a tu re M a r x p re s e rv e s th e w is h , in d e e d the
fire, th at an im a ted th e e a r ly Manuscripts: to e s ta b lis h a K a n t- lik e “ k in g ­
d o m o f e n d s ” w ith in th e d o m a in o f e c o n o m ic p r o d u c tio n and e x ­
ch a n g e — th e v e r y d o m a in w h ic h K a n t and H e g e l c o n s id e r e d as fit o n ly
fo r strife an d c o m p e titio n and th e re fo re a b a n d o n e d to an e g o is tic w ar
o f all ag ain st all. T h e sam e u n iv e rs a lity , b a se d u p o n m u tu a l r e c o g n i­
tio n o f th e o th e r ’s h u m a n ity , w h ic h K a n t m a d e th e basis o f in n e r m o ­
ra lity and H e g e l p ro je c te d in to the p o litic a l in s titu tio n s o f th e state,
M a r x seeks to e m b o d y w ith in the w o r ld o f s o c io e c o n o m ic relation s
( H e g e l’s “ c iv il s o c ie t y ” ), as th e m o s t fu n d a m e n ta l d o m a in th a t d e te r­
m in es all th e o th ers.
B u t to d o th is, M a r x in sists, o n e m u s t g o b y th e la w s o f s o c io ­
e c o n o m ic re a lity itself, as it d eterm in e s its o w n d ia le c tic a l c o u r s e in a
m a n n e r o p en to scie n tific a n a lysis an d p re d ic tio n . A t th is c r u c ia l p oin t,
M a r x ’s K a n tia n d riv e s m a k e w a y fo r h is fu n d a m e n ta l S p in o z is m .
W h a te v e r e m a n c ip a tio n is in s to re fo r h u m a n ity w i ll b e a tta in e d b y the
in n e r w o r k in g and im m a n e n t la w s o f re a lity itse lf, n o t, as in K a n t and
th e u to p ia n so cia lists, b y im p o s in g an e x te rn a l m o r a l w i ll u p o n reality.
T h e Capital w a s to serv e as th e th e o r y o f th is d e v e lo p m e n t— at o n c e a

(98)
 SPINOZA AND MARX

fundam ental p h ilo s o p h y , an e m p ir ic a lly usable science, a moral vision

brought d o w n to e a rth , an d th e fo rm e d self-consciousness o f the pro­
letariat, the n e w “ u n iv e rs a l class.” A s such it also offers the kind o f
theory that su its th e era o f th e “ end o f p hilo so p h y," since it is sub­
merged in p ra c tic e an d is p o te n tia lly a practical tool it s e l f 33
M a rx ’s d e m a n d to a p p ro a c h s o c ie ty scientifically distinguishes him
from v e ry e a r ly o n . E v e n w h e n still m arked by a blend o f Enlighten­
ment and le ft- H e g e lia n th o u g h t and cen terin g on politics as the major
area for re fo rm , th e tw e n ty - fo u r - y e a r - o ld M a rx w rote:

P h ilo so p h y h ad d o n e n o th in g in p olitics that physics, mathemat­

ics, m ed icin e, e v e r y s cie n c e has n o t d one in its o w n sphere. Bacon
o f V e ru lam d e cla re d th e o lo g ic a l p hysics to be a maiden conse­
crated to G o d an d b a rren ; h e em an cip a ted physics from theology
and she b e c a m e fe rtile . . . . S im ila rly M ach iavelli and Campanella
earlier, an d H o b b e s , S p in o z a , and H u g o G rotius later, down to
R ousseau, F ic h te , an d H e g e l, b eg a n co n sid erin g the state from the
hum an v ie w p o in t and d e v e lo p e d its natural law s from reason and
experience. (“ R e lig io n , F ree P ress, and P h iloso p h y," in Writings of
the Young M a r x , p p . 12 8 -2 9 )

Th is scie n tific , re a lis tic a ttitu d e is even m ore constant than M arx’s
econom ic m a te ria lis m . P h ilo s o p h y , says the y o u n g M arx, must dis­
cover the in n er la w s o f s o c ie ty , ta ken as natural law s, no less than the
laws o f p h y s ic s . T h e m a tu re M a r x e x te n d s this approach from politics
to e co n o m ic t h e o r y an d c o n c e iv e s o f the “ la w s ” in question as dialec­
tical and n o lo n g e r in a s s o c ia tio n w ith p h ysics or m athem atics;34 but
he m aintains th is b a s ic S p in o z is tic ap p roa ch and am plifies it in the
Capital in to a fu ll- fle d g e d n e w scien ce.
M a rx ’s a p p ro a c h is S p in o z is tic o n tw o counts: not o n ly because he
views s o c ie ty as s c ie n t ific a lly d e te rm in e d by its natural processes (this,
as M a rx r e c o g n iz e s , w a s s u g g e s te d b y M a ch ia velli and H obbes before
Spinoza), b u t b e c a u s e h e c o m b in e s th is v ie w w ith a perspective o f sec­
ular salva tio n w h ic h th e s cie n c e in q u estio n is to serve and help ap­
proach. T h is c o m b in a tio n is w h a t d istin g u ish es Spinoza and M arx—
and also w h a t c o n s titu te s fo r each o f th e m a m ajor p roblem . Rejecting
utopia and v o lu n ta r is m , d e n y in g a ro le in the affairs o f history (or o f
one’s p erson a l e v o lu tio n ) n o t o n ly to G o d b u t also to the alleged moral
will, M a rx and S p in o z a , e a c h in te rm s o f his o w n system , must expli­
cate rea lity in s u c h a w a y th a t its o w n e v o lu tio n w ill serve as a vehicle
o f red em p tio n .
In S p in o za th is p r o b le m ta k e s o n th e fo rm o f a paradox: liberation
seems to b e th e p r o d u c t o f c o e r c io n . M eta p h y sica l freedom , w here it

(99)
 CHAPTER 4

e x ists, is n o t attained b u t, rath er, occurs to us. E v e r y p e r s o n starts out

u n fre e , and his o r h er p assage fr o m e x te rn a l to in te r n a l d ete rm in a tio n
(S p in o z a ’s d e fin itio n o f fre e d o m ) m u s t it s e lf b e d e te r m in e d by the
ch a in o f ex te rn a l causes th at p reced ed it. T h e p e rs o n liv in g in freed o m
is, in d e e d , su p p o sed to e n jo y in te rn al d e te r m in a tio n , b u t to g e t there
he o r sh e m u st d e p en d o n th e sam e c o e r c iv e c a u s a lity w h ic h his o r her
fre e d o m reverses. N o h iatu s, n o s p o n ta n e o u s ju m p o r re v o lu tio n a r y
“ in s ta n t,” is a llo w e d b y th e lo g ic o f S p in o z a ’s u n iv e rs e , e v e n th o u g h
his th e o ry o f lib eratio n seem s to call fo r s o m e t h in g o f th e k i n d .15
M a r x ’s v e rsio n o f th e p r o b le m is m o r e s e rio u s — at least fr o m the
sta n d p o in t o f te le o lo g y and p ro v id e n c e . S p in o z a , w h o v ie w s salvatio n
as a p erson a l affair, is ab le to a c c o u n t fo r its o c c u r r e n c e b y a d e te r m in ­
istic p ro b a b ility affe ctin g the h a p p y fe w . H e c a n n o t— a n d d o c s n o t—
m a k e a tacit ap p eal to s o m e o v e ra ll t e le o lo g y o r s e c u la r p ro v id e n c e ; his
p ro b le m arises, so to sp ea k, fr o m a su rp lu s o f d e te r m in is m . B u t M a rx ,
b ecau se h e h isto ric izes re d e m p tio n an d sees th e e n tire h u m a n race as
its su b je ct, m u st in d u lg e in s o m e s o rt o f s e cu la r e s c h a to lo g y . R e d e m p ­
tion can n o lo n g e r b e p re d icte d b y a ca lc u lu s o f d e te r m in is tic p ro b a ­
b ility , and th e s h a d o w o f illicit te le o lo g y a g a in lo o m s o n th e h o rizo n .
A ll th at M a r x can lo g ic a lly d o is a ffirm th a t, as a m a tte r o f h isto rical
fact, w e are n earin g the g o a l, g r o u n d in g his c la im in a d ia le c tic a l anal­
y sis o f th e rise o f ca p ita lism and its in h e re n t c o n flic ts , in w h ic h a n ew
era seem s to be in cip ie n t. B u t, p re c is e ly at th e la tte r p o in t , p re d ictio n
and te le o lo g y seem to be in te r m in g le d (w h ic h m a y b e th e rea so n for
s o m e o f M a r x ’s rash p ro g n o s tic s w h ic h so far h a v e fa ile d ). M o re o v e r ,
even a ssu m in g the p re d ictio n to be a u s te re ly g r o u n d e d in its o w n th e­
o r y and facts, w h a t, on th e m e ta p h ilo s o p h ic a l le v e l, ca n a c c o u n t for
this w o n d ro u s c o rre sp o n d e n c e , in w h ic h r e a lity b y its o w n d y n a m ic s
e v e n tu a lly agrees w ith th e d eep est d esires an d a s p ira tio n s o f h u m a n ity ?
A s S a rtre has re c o g n iz e d , in a w o r ld tr u ly d e v o id o f p r o v id e n c e , no
su ch g u a ran tee can e x is t .36 B u t S a rtre, in d e e d , is fa r m o r e S p in o zis tic
in this resp ect than M a r x , w h o still c lin g s , in th e fin a l a n a ly s is , to a
resid u e o f p ro v id e n tia l th e o lo g y . A s in L e ib n iz , as in a n y v ie w that
a cce p ts s o m e v e rsio n o f the “ m o r a l w o r ld - o r d e r ,” th e re s e e m s to exist
in M a r x at least a factu a l h a r m o n y b e tw e e n th e r e a lm o f n a tu re an d the
realm o f fre e d o m , even th o u g h n o G o d , n o p r o v id e n c e , a n d n o prees­
ta b lish ed h a r m o n y are o ffic ia lly a llo w e d to g u a ra n te e th is w o n d e r.
M a r x ’s h isto ric a l u to p ia (in w h ic h he c e r ta in ly c o n flic ts w it h Spi­
n o za) is related again to th eir d iffe re n c e s o n th e q u e s tio n o f th e m u l­
titu d e . F o r S p in o za , the u n iv e rs a liza tio n o f r e d e m p t io n w a s n eith e r a
c o n c e iv a b le g o a l in it s e lf n o r a p re c o n d itio n (as in H e g e l a n d M a r x ) for
re d e e m in g the in d iv id u a l. T h is is w h y S p in o z a n e e d e d a s ep a ra te the­

(100)
 SPINOZA AND MARX

ory (and s tra te g y ) fo r th e m u ltitu d e , as it w ill alw ays remain outside

the scope o f tru e s a lv a tio n . M a r x , o n th e contrary, because he envis­
ages re d e m p tio n o n a g r a n d h is to ric a l scale— but expects, like Spinoza,
everyth in g to h a p p e n b y th e im m a n e n t fo rces o f reality— turns to the
m ultitude, in th e fo r m o f th e p ro le ta ria t and the masses, as the lever o f
universal r e d e m p tio n .
Here a w h o le c o m p l e x o f d iffe re n c e s betw een M a rx and Spinoza can
be discerned. S p in o z a , to o ( c o m m o n o p in io n notw ithstan din g), had a
historical p e r s p e c tiv e an d a p lan fo r the future, based upon the m ulti­
tude as the s u b s tr a te o f c h a n g e (see ch apter i). Y et in the absence o f
providence an d o f a n y h id d e n te le o lo g y , this m eant to Spinoza that all
changes m u s t b e s u ite d to th e lo w e r n atural faculties o f their medium,
the m u ltitu d e . A l l th a t can b e e x p e c te d (th o u gh this is a revolution in
itself), is ra is in g th e m u ltitu d e to th e level o f purified im agination,
where s e m ira tio n a l c o n d u c t is p r o d u c e d th ro u g h obedience to author­
ity, w h ile all p r iv a te b e lie fs an d s e n tim en ts (even the low er ones) could
flourish. T h is — th e ta c it p r o g r a m o f the Theologico-Political Treatise—
will create an e n lig h t e n e d so cia l e n v iro n m e n t, based upon freedom,
security, to le r a n c e , a n d in s titu tio n a liz e d so lid arity— but not upon the
third d egree o f k n o w le d g e . T r u e re d e m p tio n , th o u gh perhaps more
accessible, re m a in s a m a t te r fo r th e m in o rity.
W ith M a r x , th e d e m o c r a t iz a tio n o f red em p tio n becom es the inevi­
table and m o s t u to p ia n fe a tu re o f his th eo ry. Paradoxically, this is a
result o f M a r x ’s S p in o z is tic a tte m p ts to avoid utopia and to base his
expectations o n th e fo r c e s o f r e a lity .37 T h is led him to endow the
masses w ith far h ig h e r p o w e r s o f e n lig h te n m en t and self-awareness
than seem s re a lis tic , a n d , m o r e g e n e ra lly , to p resuppose the providen­
tial c o rr e sp o n d e n c e o f r e a lit y a n d th e ideal indicated above. H ere M arx
is as u to p ian as K a n t w h ile c la im in g to replace Kantian utopia with
Spinozistic n a tu ra l d e t e r m in is m .38
T h is is n o t o n ly a th e o r e tic a l fla w ; h isto rically, it becam e the source
o f m uch s u ffe r in g an d re p re s s io n . T h e un realistic v ie w o f the masses
led to an in e v ita b le s p lit b e t w e e n th ese m asses and their alleged repre­
sentation in le a d e rs an d in s titu tio n s , u su a lly bureaucratic, w h o , within
the d ictato rsh ip o f th e p ro le ta ria t, w e r e sup p o sed to em b o d y the avant-
garde p rin cip le o f h is t o r y w h ile a c tu a lly d o m in a tin g the masses w ith
superior k n o w le d g e a n d fr e q u e n t ly w ith d esp o tism and terror.
W hile S p in o z a ’ s p o litic a l th e o r y is n o t im m u n e to possible infringe­
ments on f r e e d o m ,39 its g r e a te r rea lism m akes it m ore hum ane, espe­
cially w ith r e s p e c t to th e m u ltitu d e . P eo p le are not com pelled to rise
to levels a b o v e th e ir re a c h ;40 th e y are n eith er seen from the outset as
m obilized in th e ca u s e o f an id e o lo g y su p p o sed to express their “ true"

(101)
 CHAPTEH 4

b e in g , n o r co n sid ered tra ito rs i f th e y fail to d e v o te p e r m a n e n t service

to th e cau se. R e c o g n iz in g the d iffe re n t le v e ls o f h u m a n co n s cio u s n e s s
and th e rig h t o f h u m a n s to in d u lg e in lo w e r - th a n - id c a l sta tes o f m ind
is a b a sic p rin cip le o f h u m a n is m , b ec a u se it s h o w s r c s p c c t fo r h u m a n ­
ity as it a c tu a lly is and w h e r e v e r it is fo u n d ; w h e r e a s th e a tte m p t to lift
all p e o p le to th e h e ig h t o f s o m e ra tio n a l id e a l (o r a m o r a l, re lig io u s,
n a tio n a listic o n e, etc.) m a y o p e n th e w a y to ty r a n n y an d te r r o r .4' Im ­
p o s in g u to p ia u p o n an u n w illin g w o r ld o r u p o n a n a tu r a lly u n su ita b le
o n e w ill e a sily tu rn u to p ia in to its o p p o s ite — a fa c t th a t h is to r y attests
in re c u rre n t w a v es o f s u ffe rin g . S p in o z a c o u ld h a v e le a rn e d it fr o m his
fe llo w M a rra n o s and the I n q u is itio n , an d s o m e o f M a r x ’s d isciples
h ave g iv e n it n e w e x p re s s io n in o u r o w n ce n tu ry . A n d w h ile M a r x is
n o t re sp o n sib le fo r e v e r y ab u se c o m m itt e d in his n a m e , th e re is still a
s e lf-d e fe a tin g e le m e n t in his u to p ia th a t a lm o s t in e v ita b ly in v ite s
ab u se. O n th e w h o le , i f a ta u to lo g y can b e a llo w e d to s u m u p this
ch ap ter, S p in o za is far m o r e S p in o z is tic th an M a r x .
O n th e o th e r h an d , M a r x had a m o r e p e n e tr a tin g v i e w o f s o cia l real­
ity, w h ic h led h im to ad d th e in d is p e n s a b le e c o n o m ic d im e n s io n to
b o th th e co n c e p t o f fre e d o m an d th e p r o je c t o f s e lf- k n o w le d g e . H e re
w e m a y fin d in M a r x an a d v a n ta g e o v e r S p in o z a an d in te r m s o f S p i­
n o z a ’s o w n p h ilo so p h y .
S p in o za d efin es th e aim o f th e state as fr e e d o m , b u t u n d ersta n d s
fre e d o m m a in ly , i f n o t e x c lu s iv e ly , as m e n ta l an d p o litic a l. M a rx ,
h o w e v e r, ad d ed th e cru cia l m o d ific a tio n th a t fr e e d o m has a ls o , and
p rim a rily , an e c o n o m ic sid e. A s a re su lt, fr e e d o m m u s t n o t b e seen as
th e aim o f th e state alo n e, b u t o f s o cia l o r g a n iz a t io n in g e n e ra l, and
m u s t b e e m b o d ie d w ith in th e s o c io e c o n o m ic s y s te m th a t u n d e rlie s the
state it s e lf and m a k es it p o ssib le . S e c o n d , s e lf- k n o w le d g e a n d d e m y s ­
tifica tio n in S p in o za are based u p o n d is c o v e r in g th e tru e , i f h id d e n ,
n atu ral causes th at affe ct o u r e x is te n ce . T h is is a m a jo r S p in o z is tic idea.
B u t S p in o za u n d ersta n d s th ese causes m a in ly as p h y s ic a l an d p s y c h o ­
lo g ic a l. Ig n o ra n ce o f h o w th e u n iv e rs e w o r k s b re e d s re lig io u s su p e r­
s titio n and m en ta l in s ta b ility ; ig n o ra n c e o f th e n a tu ra l w a y th e m in d
o p e ra te s breed s p a s s iv ity and o p p re s s io n o f th e se lf. S p in o z a traces
h ere a w a y w h ic h b o th M a r x and F re u d w i ll f o llo w an d e n ric h , each in
his o w n m an n er. In this re sp e ct, M a r x ’s d is c o v e r y o f th e e c o n o m ic
fo rce s th at c o v e r tly d e te rm in e o u r liv e s an d th e im a g e s w e fo r m o f
th e m is v e r y m u c h a S p in o z is tic m o v e — b u t it ca rries S p in o z a ’s p r o ­
g r a m in to fu rth e r re g io n s and ad d s a ric h e r d im e n s io n to it.
H o w e v e r , M a r x faile d o r re fu se d to f o llo w S p in o z a ’s r ig o r o u s rejec­
tio n o f all fo rm s o f te le o lo g y an d a n th r o p o m o r p h is m . In p r o je c tin g a

(102)
 SPINOZA AND MARX

w o rld w id e id ea l o f r e d e m p tio n and p u ttin g fo rth his o w n , secular kind

o f m essianism , M a r x o u tre a c h e d the lim its o f im m anence w hich (as I
shall argu e in th e E p ilo g u e ) are in se p a ra b ly bo u n d w ith finitude. Mes­
sianic c o m m u n is m is a fa ilu re . B u t so is an y other messianism. Th e
value o f M a r x ’s d is c o v e rie s , an d his en rich m en t o f the philosophy o f
im m anence, w i ll b e retain e d o n ly i f a m u ch m ore m odest v iew o f
em ancipation, a p a rtia l, fin ite v ie w , is to replace the hopes and pitfalls
o f utopia.
S p in oza’s a n t ia n t h r o p o m o r p h ic rigo r, w h ic h M a rx failed to ob­
serve, w ill b e ta k e n u p b y N ie tz s c h e w h o , had he k n o w n M a rx ’s doc­
trine, w o u ld c e r ta in ly h a v e said th a t alth o u g h in M a rx , too, G od seems
to be dead, his “ s h a d o w s ” are still alive and th rivin g. A s w e shall see,
if M arx w a s less S p in o z is tic th an S p in o za, N ietzsch e, in a sense, was
more so.

(i 03)
 C H A P T E R 5

Spinoza and Nietzsche:

A m o r dei and A m o r f a t i

A m or fa ti— lo v e o f fate— is th e d efia n t fo r m u la b y w h ic h N ie tz s c h e

su m s up his p h ilo so p h ic a l a ffirm a tio n . T h e te r m , n e v e r b e fo r e used in
p h ilo s o p h y ,1 is cle a rly a p o le m ic a l tr a n s fo rm a tio n o f S p in o z a ’s amor dei
intelJectualis, re jec tin g the p r im a c y o f th e in te lle c t an d p u ttin g fatum
(fate) in p lace o f S p in o z a ’s n a tu r e - G o d as th e o b je c t o f lo v e .
T h e p air amor dei and am orfati p ro v id e s an a p t v e r b a l re p re se n ta tio n
o f th e c o m p le x re latio n sh ip b e tw e e n N ie t z s c h e an d S p in o z a , th e tw o
e n e m y -b ro th e rs o f m o d e rn p h ilo s o p h y . P erh a p s n o t w o p h ilo so p h e rs
are as ak in as S p in o za an d N ie tz s c h e , y e t n o t w o are as o p p o s e d . If
S p in o za in itiated the m o d e m p h ilo s o p h y o f im m a n e n c e an d u n d e r-
g ird s it th r o u g h o u t, th en N ie tz s c h e b rin g s it to its m o s t ra d ica l c o n c lu ­
sio n — an d , as w e sh all see, tu rn s th is c o n c lu s io n a g a in s t S p in o z a h im ­
self.
N ie tz s c h e e x p lic itly re c o g n iz e s his d e b t an d k in s h ip to S p in o za .
S p e a k in g o f his “ a n c e s to rs ,” N ie tz s c h e at v a r io u s tim e s g iv e s several
lists, b u t he a lw a y s m e n tio n s S p in o za an d G o e th e — an d a lw a y s as a
p air.- T h is is n o ac cid e n t, fo r N ie tz s c h e sees G o e th e as in c o r p o r a tin g
S p in o za and as a n ticip a tin g his o w n “ D io n y s ia n ” id ea l.
G o e th e , N ie tz s c h e says, w a s a “ m a g n ific e n t a tte m p t to o v e r c o m e
th e e ig h te e n th c e n tu ry b y a retu rn to n a tu r e ,” an e n d e a v o r in w h ic h he
“ s o u g h t h elp fro m h is to ry , n atu ral scien c e, a n tiq u ity , an d a ls o S p i­
n o za . . . G o e th e , N ie tz s c h e ad d s, w a n te d “ t o t a li t y ” ( o f sen se, rea­
so n , fe e lin g , w ill); he “ d iscip lin e d h im s e lf in w h o le n e s s ,” an d he “ cre­
ated h im s e lf.”

G o e th e c o n c e iv e d a h u m a n b e in g w h o w o u ld b e s tr o n g , h ig h ly
e d u ca te d , s k illfu l in all b o d ily m a tte rs, s e lf- c o n t r o lle d . . . w h o
m ig h t d are to a ffo rd the w h o le ra n g e an d w e a lth o f b e in g n atu ral,
b e in g s tro n g e n o u g h fo r su ch fre e d o m ; th e m a n o f to le r a n c e , n o t

(104)
 SPINOZA AND NIETZSCHE

fro m w e a k n e s s b u t f r o m s tre n g th . . . th e m an for w h o m there is

no lo n g e r a n y t h in g th a t is fo rb id d e n — unless it be weakness,
w h e th er ca lle d v ic e o r v ir tu e .

T h is s tr o n g ly S p in o z is tic id e a l o f G o e th e N ietzsch e then turns in his

ow n d irectio n :

Such a s p irit w h o h as become fr e e am id the co sm os w ith a jo yo u s

and tr u stin g fa ta lis m , in th e fa ith that o n ly the particular is loath­
som e, an d th a t all is re d e e m e d and affirm ed in the w h ole— he does
not negate any more. S u c h a faith , h o w ev e r, is the highest o f all: I
have b a p tize d it w i t h th e n a m e o f Dionysus.*

In this r e v e a lin g p a s s a g e N ie t z s c h e attribu tes his o w n idea o f Über­

mensch to G o e th e w h ile p a in tin g it in m ild e r and m ore harmonious
colors. In a ce rta in re s p e c t, in d e e d , N ie tz s c h e is a kin d o f intemperate
G oethe, a s t o r m y c u ltu r a l ra d ica l w h o lacks G o e th e ’s delicate artistic
balance an d is ca rrie d a w a y b y c o n tra d ic to ry drives and by the more
ferocious a sp ects o f h is n a tu ra lis tic rev o lt. B u t, at bo ttom , as he looks
at G o e th e ’s id ea l, N ie t z s c h e re c o g n iz e s h im s e lf in it, assimilates this
ideal to his o w n D io n y s u s , an d traces it p artly back to Spinoza. Spi­
noza thus has a p r iv ile g e d ro le in fo r m in g G o e th e ’s position which
N ietzsch e sees as th e k e r n e l o f h is o w n .
T h e e x te n t o f th e ir k in s h ip c a m e as a flash to N ietzsch e in the sum­
mer o f 1 881 w h e n , p r o b a b ly a fte r rea d in g K u n o Fischer’s bo o k on Spi­
noza (w h e re th e c o n c e p t o f p o w e r is em ph asized ), he exclaim ed in a
postcard to his frie n d F ra n z O v e r b e c k :

I am u tte r ly a m a z e d , u tt e r ly en ch a n ted . I have a precursor, and

w h a t a p re c u rs o r! I h a r d ly k n e w S p inoza: that I should have
turned to h im j u s t now w a s in sp ire d by “ in s tin c t" N o t o nly is his
over-all te n d e n c y lik e m in e — m a k in g k n o w le d g e the most powerful
affect— b u t in fiv e m a in p o in ts o f his d o ctrin e I recognize myself;
this m o s t u n u s u a l an d lo n e lie s t th in k e r is closest to m e precisely
in these m a tte rs : h e d e n ie s th e fre e d o m o f the w ill, teleology, the
m oral w o r ld o rd e r, th e u n e g o is tic , and evil. E ven though the di­
ve rg e n cies are a d m it te d ly tr e m e n d o u s , th e y are due m ore to the
d ifferen ces in tim e , c u ltu r e , an d science. In sumnta: m y solitude,
w h ich , as o n v e r y h ig h m o u n ta in s , o ften m ade it hard for me to
breathe an d m a d e m y b lo o d ru sh o u t, is at least a dualitude.·1

N ie tzsch e , in h is e n th u s ia s m , ten d s to m in im ize the divergencies be­

tween h im s e lf an d S p in o z a , w h ic h h e attribu tes to the distance in time,
culture, an d so o n . O n o th e r o c c a s io n s , h o w ev er, he disputes w ith Spi­

( ¡ 05)
 CHAPTER 5

n o za q u ite b itin g ly . W h a t h ad in c ite d N ie t z s c h e ’s e n th u s ia s m w as,

a b o v e all, S p in o z a ’s strict n a tu ra lis m w ith its m a n y d e r iv a tiv e s (w h ic h
N ie tz s c h e lists on the p o s tca rd ), in c lu d in g th e a b o litio n o f g o o d and
e v il, th e d enial o f a b u ilt-in m o r a l w o r ld o rd e r, and an e m p h a sis on
s e lf-in te re st an d p o w e r as th e basis o f life an d th e le v e r fo r e th ic a l ad­
v a n ce m e n t.
N ie tz s c h e also sin gles o u t th e ir c o m m o n te n d e n c y “ to m a k e o f
k n o w le d g e th e m o s t p o w e r fu l a ff e c t,” m e a n in g th a t k n o w le d g e is de­
te rm in e d b y th e in stin ctu a l p art o f life and is n o lo n g e r seen as an au­
to n o m o u s in terest; and also th at as a ffe ct, k n o w le d g e retain s its ro le in
lib e ra tin g life. B u t h ere a m a jo r d iffe re n c e arises. N ie t z s c h e , in a m ore
S o c ra tic m an n er, attrib u tes a sa lu ta ry a ffe c tiv e p o w e r to k n o w le d g e in
th e critica l, n o t th e d o c trin a l sense; it is th e k in d o f k n o w le d g e gain ed
th ro u g h d is illu s io n m e n t. T h is k n o w le d g e te a ch e s n o fix e d p o sitiv e
tru th , b u t p u rifies th e in d iv id u a l o f d e ca d e n t im a g e s an d false m eta­
p h y s ic a l co n s o la tio n s, p re p a rin g h im o r h e r fo r th e fin a l s e lf- o v e r c o m -
in g assen t o f amor fa ti.
In S p in o za , th e im m e d ia te a ffe c tiv e to n e o f k n o w le d g e is j o y , the
sen satio n o f th e en h an ce d p o w e r o f life; N ie t z s c h e , o n th e co n tra ry ,
in c e ssa n tly stresses th e p a in fu l n a tu re o f k n o w le d g e an d m e a su res the
p o w e r (and w o rth ) o f a p e rso n b y “ h o w m u c h tr u th he can b ear.”
K n o w le d g e , in th e sen se o f d is illu s io n m e n t o r c r itic a l e n lig h te n m e n t,
is a so u rce o f s u ffe rin g and p r im a r ily a te m p ta tio n to d e s p a ir— w h ic h
th e N ie tzs c h e a n m an w i ll o v e r c o m e an d tr a n s fo r m in to D io n y s ia n jo y .
Gaya scienza— jo y f u l k n o w le d g e 5— is a ta sk an d g o a l in N ie t z s c h e , n ot
th e n o rm a l o u tc o m e . Y e t e v e n w h e n this g o a l is a c h ie v e d , th e co n ­
q u ered te m p ta tio n to d e sp a ir re m a in s an in e v ita b le c o m p o n e n t o f
D io n y s ia n jo y . J o y is n o t th e n atu ral o u tc o m e b u t th e p r o d u c t o f self-
o v e rc o m in g .
T h is a lread y h in ts at s o m e o f th e c r u c ia l d iffe re n c e s b e tw e e n
N ie tz s c h e an d S p in o za . In d eed , i f S p in o z a , as N ie t z s c h e p u n s , red eem s
h im o f his so litu d e in to a state o f “ d u a litu d e ,” h e a ls o p re s e n ts h im
w ith a p o w e rfu l a ltern a tiv e. N ie tz s c h e an d S p in o z a o ffe r t w o riv a l o p ­
tio n s w ith in th e sam e ra d ica l c o n c e p tio n , th a t o f to ta l im m a n e n ce .
B o t h d eclare th e “ d e a th ” o f th e tra n sce n d e n t G o d , a n d see life w ith in
im m a n e n ce as all th ere is. T h is - w o r ld lin e s s is c o - e x te n s iv e w i t h b e in g
in ge n e ra l. M o re o v e r , th e u n iv e rse , pace H e g e l, is d e v o id o f a n y su b ­
je c tlik e fea tu res o r in h eren t te le o lo g y , an d th u s o ffe r s m a n n o c o n s o l­
in g se m b la n c e o f his o w n im a g e e n g ra v e d in th e n a tu re o f th in g s . M an
h im s e lf is a fu lly im m a n e n t (or, in S p in o z a ’s te r m s , “ n a tu r a l” ) b e in g ,
w it h n o su p ern atu ral g ifts , o b lig a tio n s , o r d e fic ie n c ie s ; h e n e ith e r lacks
s o m e th in g m o re elev ated re sid in g in a s u p e r io r w o r ld , n o r is he en­

(106)
 SPINOZA AND NIETZSCHE

dowed w ith sp e c ia l p o w e r s e m a n a tin g fro m such a transcendent do­

main. M an has n o se p a ra te , e tern al s o u l,6 no “ transcendental self" to
replace it, n o a p r io r i re a so n d e m a n d in g to im pose itself externally
upon n ature an d life . A s a fin ite m o d e , m an is, h ow ever, but a drop in
the im m a n e n t u n iv e rs e an d as su ch is in escapably bound and con­
strained by it; th is fa c t (o r d e s tin y ) he muse in teriorize, understand, and
assent to w ith th e fu ll in te n s ity o f his life, i f he is to en dow his bare
existence w ith a w o r t h w h ile m e a n in g co m p a tib le w ith the boundaries
o fim m a n e n c e ( fr e e d o m in S p in o z a , auth en tic existence in Nietzsche).
This in v o lv e s s o m e fo r m o f “ lo v e o f n e ce s s ity ” ; y e t the crucial question
is h o w to in te r p re t th is n e c e s s ity , w h e th e r as a self-justifyin g system
o f rational la w s o r as o p a q u e an d in d eterm in ate fatum w hich nothing
can ju s tify o r c a p tu r e b y ra tio n a l ca teg o rie s, causes, or laws. This ques­
tion is th e w a te r s h e d at w h ic h , u p o n the co m m o n ground o fim m a ­
nence, N ie t z s c h e a n d S p in o z a sta n d in co n flict and each argues, indeed,
pleads and s e d u c e s , to w a r d a to ta lly d ifferen t experience o f im m a­
nence.
In S p in o za th e im m a n e n t w o r ld inh erits d ivin e status and m any o f
the p ro p erties o f th e d e fu n c t tran scen d en t G o d . Self-caused and self-
justified, it is e te r n a l an d in fin ite b o th in qu an tity and in perfection. Its
existence fo llo w s n e c e s s a r ily fr o m its essence, governed by fixed and
eternal la w s , an d is a ls o r a tio n a lly in te llig ib le th ro u gh o u t. A s for man,
he exists “ in G o d ” a n d sh a res in th e sam e universal rationality by
which e v e n tu a lly h e can rise a b o v e his fin itud e and realize eternity
w ithin his te m p o r a l e x is te n c e . B y co n trast, N ie tzsch e ’s experience o f
im m an en ce lea ve s n o r o o m fo r o rd er, perm an en ce, fixed laws, inher­
ent ra tio n ality, o r tr u th ; it p re s u p p o s e s a m o d e o f existence from which
not o n ly G o d , b u t (as N ie t z s c h e says) G o d ’s “ sh ad o w s” have also been
rem oved. M a n e x is ts h e re in an e v er-tra n sie n t flu x o f (cosmic) “ w ill to
pow er,” w i t h o u t r e d e m p t io n , w it h o u t fix ed truth, w ith nothing to ex­
plain his life o r j u s t i f y h is d e a th . A s fo r the co n cep t o f necessity— the
object o f lo v e — it s ig n ifie s th a t e x is te n ce flo w s fro m the essence o f God
and is ra tio n a l an d d iv in e th r o u g h o u t, w h erea s in N ietzsch e necessity
is opaqu e and u n in te llig ib le fa tu m , d e v o id o f essence o r rational ground
and p re ssin g u p o n all c r e a tu re s as an in escapable burden.
Th ese are t w o r a d ic a lly o p p o s e d ex p erien ces o f the w orld, one se­
curing o rd er, p e r m a n e n c e , an d e v e n , in a pantheistic vein, the sense o f
cosm ic m e a n in g fu ln e s s a n d sh e lte r p ro v id e d by the old religions
(though it d e n ie s th e ir h is to r ic a l fo rm ), th e o th er leaving man in a
m etaph ysical w a s te la n d , a w o r ld o f co n flicts and transience w hich can­
not be ca p tu re d b y ra tio n a l c a te g o r ie s and fro m w h ich all m etaphysical
co n solation is b a n n e d . C o n s e q u e n tly , th e assent and celebrating accep-

(107)
 CHAPTER 5

ta n ce o f im m a n e n t e x is te n c e in N i c t z s c h c ’s amor fa t i m u s t ta k e th e d e ­
fia n t a n d s e lf- o v e r c o m in g fo r m o f a “ n e v e r th e le s s .” A m o r fa t i is ba sed
u p o n a fu n d a m e n ta l d is s o n a n c e b e t w e e n th e in d iv id u a l an d th e w o r ld ,
as a g a in s t th e ir c o n s o n a n t a g r e e m e n t an d s e m im y s t ic a l id e n tific a tio n
in S p in o z a ’s amor dei intellectua/is.

Personal A ffin ities

T h e s tr ik in g p e rs o n a l k in s h ip o f N ie t z s c h e a n d S p in o z a c a n n o t pass
w i t h o u t c o m m e n t . W h e n N ie t z s c h e s p e a k s a b o u t th e ir “ d u a lit u d e ,” he
th r o w s in to r e lie f th e p ic tu re o f t w o in d e p e n d e n t an d s o lit a r y th in k e rs ,
each liv in g in re la tiv e is o la tio n , th e ir liv e s a lm o s t c o n s u m e d b y th eir
p h ilo s o p h ic a l w o r k , an d b o th m a k in g u n s e tt lin g d is c o v e r ie s th a t alie n ­
ated th e m fr o m m o s t o f th eir c o n t e m p o r a r ie s ( w h o s a w th e m as c u l­
tu ra l v illa in s ) an d fr o m th e m a jo r b u lk o f tr a d it io n . ( N ie t z s c h e , h o w ­
e v e r, h ad S p in o z a to lean u p o n — and c o m p e t e w i t h — in b u ild in g a n e w
c o u n te r tr a d itio n .) T h e o b je c ts o f s h o c k an d h o r r o r , th e y w e r e d e n i­
g ra te d as “ a th e is tic ” o r “ n ih ilis t ic ” (d e p e n d in g o n th e a b u s iv e id io m o f
th e ag e) an d sh u n n ed as s o c ia lly s u b v e r s iv e a n d g r o s s ly a n tim o r a l.
H o w e v e r , b o th N ie t z s c h e an d S p in o z a , t h o u g h t h e y r e je c te d th e c o n ­
ce p ts o f g o o d and e v il, w e r e p r o fo u n d m o r a l p h ilo s o p h e r s , n o t in th e
sen se o f p re s c rib in g d u tie s o r g r o u n d in g m o r a l o b lig a t io n s , b u t in set­
tin g a p e rs p e c tiv e o f h u m a n a s c e n d a n ce an d p e r fe c t ib ilit y a n d t r y in g to
s e d u ce th e ir a u d ie n c e to w a rd it.
T h e h ig h ly e s o te ric n a tu re o f th e ir id e a l re fle cts b o th m e n ’ s e x is te n ­
tial is o la tio n an d a r is to c ra tic fr a m e of m in d . S p in o z a , u n lik e
N ie tz s c h e , w a s p a rtly e q u ip p e d to d eal w i t h th e p r o b le m o fe s o t e r ic is m ,
sin ce h e h ad w o r k e d o u t a d is tin c t m o r a l p e r s p e c tiv e fo r th e m u ltitu d e ,
an d d is tin g u is h e d it c a te g o r ic a lly fr o m th a t o f th e h a p p y f e w (see v o l.
i , ch a p . 5). N o t so N ie tz s c h e , w h o s o m e tim e s s e e m s to s u g g e s t that
his a rtis to c ra tic p s y c h o lo g y s h o u ld a p p ly to e v e r y o n e w i t h in th e n e w
cu ltu re . T h is is b o th in c o h e re n t and d a n g e r o u s , a p o te n tia l fo r in e v i­
ta b le ab u se.
L in k e d to th e ir is o la tio n and r e v o lu tio n a r y m e s s a g e — a n d a ls o , in
N ie tz s c h e , to his sense o f d ep th and a r is to c r a c y — is b o th m e n ’s taste
1 fo r m a s k an d e q u iv o c a tio n . “ W h a te v e r is p r o fo u n d lo v e s m a s k s ” says
N ie tz s c h e , w h o a b u n d a n tly illu stra tes th is b e l ie f in h is w o r k . H is c o m ­
p le x , a p h o ris tic u ttera n ce s, in te n tio n a lly e q u iv o c a l, lo a d e d w i t h a llu ­
sio n s and ir o n ic tw is ts , e x a g g e r a tin g , p r e te n d in g , o v e r - an d u n d e rs ta t­
in g , le a v in g cru cia l p o in ts h a lf-sa id w h ile lin g e r in g u p o n o th e rs o f
lesser im p o rta n c e , p ro v id e th e re a d er w ith a w e a lth o f in s ig h ts as w e ll
as p itfa lls. T h is w ay o f w r itin g n o t o n ly re fle cts th e n a tu re o f

(108)
 SPINOZA AND NIETZSCHE

N ietzsche's lite r a r y g ift s , o r h is c o n s c io u s ch o ic e o f unsystem atic style,

or his need to d iv e r t, s h o c k , an d se d u ce his readers, but also, I think,
betrays an e x is te n tia l n e e d f o r m a s k s p er se. D ep th cannot disclose it­
self d irectly b u t m u s t u s e th e r o u n d a b o u t ro u te o fh id e-an d -seek, over­
whelm and re tre a t, w h ic h in c lu d e s ir o n y as a necessary ingredient.
N ietzsche’s d e p th is f r e q u e n t ly d ra m a tic b u t rarely pom pous; and, like
Heine, he k n o w s th a t g o o d s ty le can be used n o t o n ly to pass on a
message b u t a ls o to e r e c t a p r o t e c t iv e screen. Self-exp osure borders on
bad taste, and s in c e r ity is th e v ir tu e o f th e vulgar.
Spinoza, w it h h is g e o m e tr ic a l m e th o d , o b v io u s ly had no qualms in
using a d ire ct, u n e q u iv o c a l s ty le , at least fo r strict philosophical pur­
poses and w h e n c o m m u n ic a t in g w ith the initiated. Y et Spinoza was
also a great c o n n o is s e u r o f m a s k s and a m aster o f equivocation. Few
surpassed h im in c a r r y i n g o n a d is co u rs e on several levels simultane­
ously, a p ra c tic e h e u s e d p r im a r ily fo r p ru d en ce and persuasion, but
which cle a rly a ls o g a v e h im in te lle c tu a l and esthetic pleasure. It was
not o n ly a s tr a te g ic n e c e s s it y b u t also a laetitia (if not an outright amor)
intellectuafis.
T h e m ask h ad y e t a n o th e r fu n c tio n fo r b o th philosophers. Experts
in using it, th e y w e r e e q u a lly se n sitiv e to its use— and abuse— by
others, e s p e c ia lly w h e n th e m a s k w a s n o t p u t on deliberately. In this
they share w ith th in k e r s lik e M a r x and F reud , w h o set out to unmask
accepted n o tio n s an d e s ta b lis h e d p erso n a l and social facades by digging
into the u n a v o w e d m o t iv e s a n d m ech a n ism s behind them .
Spinoza, in d e e d , la c k s a s o p h is tic a te d apparatus for explaining the
varieties o f s e lf- d e c e p t io n an d id e o lo g ic a l m ystificatio n , but he shares,
and indeed tr ig g e r s , th e m o d e r n tren d o f ed ucatin g the mind to be
suspiciously a tte n tiv e to it s e l f an d its p rojected im ages, and to seek a
deeper, p erh ap s a d a r k e r k in d o f e n lig h te n m e n t than the one provided
by the o ve rt p ro c e s s o f re a s o n in g .
That such a tr e n d o f “ d a r k e n lig h te n m e n t” is tied up w ith a philos­
ophy o f im m a n e n c e w i ll b e a tte ste d b y the list o f its m ajor represent­
atives. M a c h ia v e lli an d H o b b e s , S p in o za , D a rw in , M arx, Nietzsche,
Freud, p erh ap s H e id e g g e r , and S a rtre w e re all bo u n d by a philosophy
that ch allen ges th e “ d iv in e p a r t” in m an and its alleged origin in a tran­
scendent rea lm ; e a c h w o r k e d to sh atter co m placen t self-im ages and
co m fo rtin g illu s io n s an d c la im e d to have d iscovered som ething dark
and u n settlin g a b o u t th e s tru c tu r e o f m an and his w orld. This kind o f
“ k n o w le d g e ” — a lw a y s p a in fu l, as N ie tz s c h e repeatedly says, w ith its
critical “ d a r k ” sid e a n d d is illu s io n in g cu re, and the unrelenting drive
to gain it, to m a k e it a p o w e r fu l an d salu tary affect— is also the com ­

(10g)
 CHAPTER 5

m o n g r o u n d th at N ie tz s c h e see m s to h av e d is c o v e re d b e tw e e n S p in o za
and h im self.
N ie tz s c h e m ak es in n u m e ra b le d ire c t re fe re n c e s to S p in o z a . S o m e o f
his re m a rk s are im p o rta n t, o th ers are m a rg in a l, an d all are b ia sed in
s ty le an d co n te n t b y N ie t z s c h e ’s cu rre n t p h ilo s o p h ic a l em p h a sis.
H e n ce it w i ll n o t serv e o u r p u rp o s e to fo llo w th e lin e o f “ N ie t z s c h e as
read er o f S p in o z a .” 7 In stead , I sh all tr y to re c o n s tr u c t th e ir resp ective
p o s itio n s a ro u n d ce rtain k e y p h ilo s o p h ic a l issu es, e s p e c ia lly th e nature
o fim m a n e n c e and th e p ro p e r h u m a n re sp o n se to it.

C o n a tu s versus W ill to Power

A n e ce ssa ry co n se q u e n c e o f th e p h ilo s o p h y o f im m a n e n c e that

N ie tz s c h e shares w ith S p in o za is th eir a d h e re n c e , in th e ir th e o ry o f
m an , to a strict n atu ralistic m o n is m . F o r b o th p h ilo s o p h e r s th e re is a
sin g le n atu ral p rin cip le ac tive in m an th at c o n s titu te s his in d iv id u a l e x ­
isten ce (as it d o es e v e r y th in g else in n atu re). T h is p rin c ip le is n o t a
static b e in g b u t a d y n a m ic th ru st, s tr iv in g , o r d esire; as s u c h it is also
th e u n iq u e p rin cip le u n d e r ly in g all th e a ffe cts , d r iv e s , an d d iverse
fo rm s o f h u m an b eh a vio r. S p in o za calls it conatus, N ie t z s c h e , “ w ill to
p o w e r.”
Conatus in S p in o za is b a sica lly th e s tr iv in g fo r s e lf-p re s e rv a tio n .
“ E v e r y th in g . . . en d eavo rs to p ersist in its b e in g ” (E th ics, p t. 3, p ro p .
6) is th e first p rin cip le fro m w h ic h th e rest is d e r iv e d , e n c o m p a s s in g
all h u m an affects fro m th e m o s t c o m m o n to th e m o s t p h ilo so p h ica l.
F o r S p in o za , th e m o d e o f b e in g o f in d iv id u a l th in g s is duratio (d u ra­
tion ), d e fin e d n o t in te m p o ra l b u t in m o d a l te rm s . It is th e m o d e o f
b e in g o f a th in g w h o s e e x iste n ce d o es n o t f o llo w n e c e s a r ily fr o m its
essen ce. A s su ch , it need s ex te rn a l causes in o r d e r to c o m e in to e x is­
ten ce, and it w ill en d u re in e x is te n ce as lo n g as e x te rn a l ca u s a lity w ill
p e rm it, co n s ta n tly resistin g its assault and th e d a n g e r s it rep resen ts.
T h is resistance, th e n e g a tiv e asp ect o f conatus, is n o t an a ttrib u te o r an
ad d ed q u a lity o f fin ite th in g s b u t th eir v e r y m o d e o f b e in g ; it co n sti­
tu tes th eir in d iv id u a lity as d istin ct en tities.
In d e fin in g h u m an s b y th eir se lf-c e n te re d d esire, th e conatus is (as
N ie tz s c h e re c o g n ize s w ith ap p roval) th e v e r y o p p o s ite o f d isin te re st­
e d n ess. Y e t its o ffs p rin g in clu d es n o t o n ly c o m m o n p a s s io n s an d de­
sires b u t also the d riv e fo r ratio n al k n o w le d g e (conatus intelligendi) as
w e ll as the s u p rem e e m o tio n and life -fo r m o f amor dei intellectualis.
B o th a g g re ssio n and em p a th y , v io le n c e and m u tu a l h e lp issu e fro m
this sin g le n atu ral p rin cip le, d e p e n d in g o n c irc u m s ta n c e s , th e la w s o f
p s y c h o lo g y , and o n e ’s d eg re e o f k n o w le d g e (i.e ., o f em a n c ip a tio n ).

(1 1 0 )
 SPINOZA AND NIETZSCHE

This m o n is m is, o f c o u r s c , a n e ce s s a ry co ro lla ry o f Spinoza’s strict

naturalism o r p r in c ip le o f im m a n e n c e . Since there is no transcendent
w orld, no m o r a l w o r l d o r d e r , n o a p rio ri n o rm s and obligations, no
p urposive o r g a n iz a t io n o f th e u n iv e rs e , b u t o n ly a w o rld governed by
a play o f m e c h a n ic a l fo r c e s , th e in d iv id u a l’s total life m ust be explained
and g ro u n d e d in a s t r ic t ly n a tu ra l p rin cip le o f desire that individuates
him or h er as a s in g le n a tu ra l e n tity . Conatus, as the striving o f every
natural b e in g to p e r s e v e r e in e x is te n c e and, fo r this purpose, to en­
hance its p o w e r to e x is t, is th u s m a d e b y S p in o za into the single prin­
ciple fro m w h ic h all h u m a n b e h a v io r and all civilized phenom ena are
derived.
T h is m o n is m a g re e s w i t h N ie t z s c h e as w e ll— and for sim ilar rea­
sons. N ie t z s c h e ’s w i ll to p o w e r , lik e th e conatus it replaces, is conceived
as “ the p r im itiv e fo r m o f a ffe c t, [such] that all oth er affects are only
d evelo pm en ts o f it .” B u t h e re ag a in N ie tz s c h e contradicts Spinoza. “ It
can be s h o w n m o s t c le a r ly th a t e v e r y liv in g th in g does everything it
can not to p r e s e r v e i t s e l f b u t to b e c o m e more,” 8 N ietzsch e w rites in a
note to h im s e lf, n a m in g S p in o z a as his sp e cific oppon en t. Elsewhere
he insists: “ A liv in g th in g s e e k s a b o v e all to d isch arge its strength— life
itself is w ill to p o w e r ; s e lf- p r e s e r v a tio n is o n ly one o f the indirect and
most fre q u e n t r e s u lt s .” 9 W h a t e s p e c ia lly d isproves S p in o za’s thesis are
the fre q u en t ca ses ( w h ic h S p in o z a is un ab le to explain except as
"fo lly ” ) in w h ic h o n e is r e a d y to ris k o n e ’s life fo r the sake o f expand­
ing and tr a n s c e n d in g o n e se lf:

T h e w is h to p r e s e r v e o n e s e l f is th e s y m p to m o f a condition o f
distress, o f a lim it a t io n o f th e re a lly fu n d am en tal instinct o f life
w h ich aim s at th e e x p a n s io n o f p o w e r and, w ish in g for that, fre­
qu en tly ris k s an d e v e n s a c rific e s s e lf-p re s e rv a tio n .10

Sp in oza, to o , s p e a k s o f e n h a n c in g the p o w e r o f existence (and o f

action) as his g o a l . 11 F r e q u e n t ly he c o n jo in s this go al w ith self-preser­
vation (eith er as its im p lic a tio n o r as its equivalen t) but then— at least
on one o c c a s io n — s e e m s to s u g g e s t th at th ey are independent con­
cepts.'2 D e s p ite th is a m b iv a le n c e , th e o n ly coh eren t w a y to construe
Spinoza’s th e o r y is to se e th e o n e g o a l as su b servien t to the other. En­
hancing th e p o w e r o f e x is te n c e and o f action is desirable because it
increases the p r o s p e c ts o f s e lf-p re s e rv a tio n . In N ietzsch e, however,
power is n o t an in s tr u m e n t o f life b u t d efin es and encom passes it. We
do not first e x is t a n d th e n s e e k to p r o lo n g o u r ex isten ce by augm enting
its p ow er; ra th e r, w e e x is t fr o m th e start as w ill to pow er, that is, as
the d y n a m ic p r o je c tio n o f o u r b e in g and as the bu ilt-in thrust to en­

(111)
 CHAPTER 5

h an ce and e x p a n d it, fo r w h ic h life as m e r e ly g iv e n m a y s o m e tim e s be

je o p a rd iz e d .
W ill to p o w e r is th us a d riv e to w a r d s e lf-tra n s c e n d e n c e w h ic h is nat­
u ral to all h u m an s (and to all o th e r b e in g s as w e ll). N ie t z s c h e (co r­
re ctly , I th in k ) sees n o c o n tra d ic tio n in th e id ea th a t im m a n e n t en ti­
ties— the o n ly k in d th ere is— striv e b y n a tu re to g o b e y o n d their
b o u n d a rie s and “ b e c o m e m o r e .” T h is d o e s n o t in fr in g e u p o n th e p rin ­
cip le o f im m a n e n c e , b e cau se in tr a n s c e n d in g th e m s e lv e s th e y are not
n e ce ssa rily g u id e d b y a tra n s ce n d e n t re a lm o r b y a p rio ri n o r m s , but
ex p re ss and p ro je c t th eir o w n e x is te n c e an d c o n s titu tio n . H e n c e w c
n eed n o t assu m e a separate w o r ld in o rd e r to th in k th a t all th is - w o r ld ly
en tities e x is t b y n atu re as th is s e lf-tra n s c e n d in g d riv e .
H e id e g g e r la ter ad a p te d th is N ie tz s c h e a n id ea o f se lf-tra n s c e n d e n c e
w ith in im m a n e n c e to his o w n a c c o u n t o f h u m a n e x is te n c e (Daseirt) and
o f th e m e a n in g o f b e in g - in - t h e - w o r ld (In-der-W elt-seiti). B u t H e id e g ­
g e r re stricte d his a n a lysis to h u m a n b e in g s , to w h o m h e a c c o rd e d a
p riv ile g e d o n tic p o s itio n in b e in g ; th e re b y he a lig n e d h im s e lf to the
H e g e lia n stran d w ith in th e p h ilo s o p h y o f im m a n e n c e a n d , lik e F eu er­
bach , p e rfo r m e d an in n er c r itiq u e w ith in it. N ie t z s c h e , o n th e o th er
h an d , sides w ith S p in o z a ’s a n ti-H e g e lia n v ie w th a t h u m a n s h a v e n o th ­
in g sp ecia l th at d is tin g u is h e s th e m o n t o lo g ic a lly fr o m th e rest o f
b e in g , to w h ic h th e y are a ssim ila b le.
T h is u n ifo rm is m lea d s N ie t z s c h e an d S p in o z a to a p p ly th e ir p rin c i­
p les even to p h y s ic a l e n tities. In S p in o z a , th e p h y s ic a l s id e o f conatus is
th e resistan ce a b o d y s h o w s to e x te rn a l ca u ses w h ic h th re a te n to d is­
p ossess it and take its p la c e ;'3 it th u s d is p la y s a “ d e fe n s iv e ” p o s tu re so
to sp ea k, th e e ffo rt to resist e x te rn a l in v a s io n an d p r e s e r v e w h a t is
p h y s ic a lly th e self. B u t in N ie tz s c h e , ch a ra c te r is tic a lly , th e p h y s ic a l id­
io m o r e x p re s s io n o f w ill to p o w e r states th e e x a c t o p p o s ite : “ ev e ry
s p e c ific b o d y strives to b e c o m e m a ste r o v e r all s p a c e an d to . . . th ru st
b a c k all th at resists its e x te n s io n .” 14
T w o fu rth e r p o in ts m u s t b e m ad e. T h e m o n is m o f conatus an d w ill
to p o w e r req u ires a th e o r y to e x p la in h o w th e d iv e r s e a n d o p p o s in g
fo rm s o f m en ta l and cu ltu ra l life can s p r in g fr o m o n e an d th e sam e
p rim o rd ia l p rin cip le. B u t o n ly S p in o za p r o v id e s s u c h an e x p la n a tio n ;
N ie tz s c h e leaves us w o n d e r in g h o w th e w i ll to p o w e r ta k e s th e v a rio u s
fo rm s it d o e s, e s p e c ia lly th o s e fo r m s w h ic h N ie t z s c h e c o n s id e r s d e­
v io u s , alien ated , o r o th e r w is e n o n g e n u in e . W ill to p o w e r can be
h e a lth y o r d e g e n e ra te , D io n y s ia n o r d e ca d e n t. In its n e g a t iv e fo r m , it
w o r k s in th e m o r a lity o f ressentiment, in th e C h r is tia n c u ltu r e , and in
th e a tte m p t o f th e ra tio n alists to d o m in a te th e w o r ld b y s u b je c tin g it
to an im a g in a r y w e b o f fix e d ca te g o rie s an d la w s . W h a t is to d istin ­

( 112)
 SPINOZA AND NIETZSCHE

guish b e tw een th e s e “ n e g a t iv e ” fo rm s o f w ill to p ow er and its “ posi­

tive” o r h e a lth y e x p r e s s io n s ? W h a t w ill explain h o w the one can be
transform ed in to th e o th e r (as S p in o za explain s the transformation o f
a “ p assive” in to an “ a c t i v e ” a ffe c t), and w h y do w e persist in calling
"w eak” a fo r m th a t has d o m in a te d h u m an life th ro u gh o u t tw o millen­
nia o f its h is to r y ? N ie t z s c h e w o u ld h ave been greatly served by a the­
ory o f alien a tio n o f s o m e s o r t, a c c o u n tin g for révérais in the mode o f
will to p o w e r (fr o m g e n u in e to d e v io u s and vice versa) and explaining
how it b e c o m e s a h in d r a n c e to it s e lf and h o w this can be resolved.
Finally, S p in o z a ’s in s is te n c e o n self-p reserva tio n is in accordance
with his m e ta p h y s ic s o f s e lf- id e n tity and perm anence, whereas
N ietzsch e’s w ill to p o w e r , in a ttrib u tin g self-transcendence to all im ­
manent e n tities, a g re e s w i t h h is ge n era l th e o ry o f flux w hich denies
self-identity o f a n y s o r t, fn th is w a y , th eir d ifferences over conatus and
will to p o w e r fa ll w e ll w it h in th e b ro a d e r Sp in o za-N ietzsch e confron­
tation o ver th e n a tu re o f th e im m a n e n t w o rld , to w h ich w e shall re­
turn. M e a n w h ile , le t u s b r ie fly co n s id e r the ethical im plications o f
what has b ee n said s o far, an d its relatio n to the nature o f the philo­
sophical e n te rp ris e .

M ora lity and Self-Overcoming

A lth o u gh N ie t z s c h e a n d S p in o z a re je c t g o o d and evil as values em bod­

ied in n atu re o r im p o s in g th e m s e lv e s u p o n nature fro m w ithout, they
are, w e said , m o r a l p h ilo s o p h e r s in th e sense o f stressing human per­
fectibility. E a c h in s p ire s h is re a d ers to seek a rare ethical achieve­
ment— amor dei in S p in o z a , am orfati in N ietzsch e— or at least to rise to
some m ore a tta in a b le d e g r e e o f e x is te n tia l lib eration . Ethics, however,
cannot be b a sed u p o n s u p r a n a tu ra l p o w e rs, n o rm s, categories, tran­
scendental p re c e p ts , a n d th e lik e , to substitu te fo r the transcendent
God. N o r can e th ic s ta k e its c u e fr o m s o m e latent structure o f the uni­
verse, as i f th e re e x is te d a m o r a l w o r ld -o r d e r im printed upon things,
which has to b e c o p ie d o r rea d o f f th e m as a gu id elin e for m oral obli­
gation. T h e v e r y n o tio n o f m o r a l o b lig a tio n (or m oral duty) has no
sense in a s tr ic tly im m a n e n t s y s te m , and m ust, in both Spinoza and
N ietzsche, m a k e w a y fo r self-overcoming as the k e y ethical concept.
Ethical a c h ie v e m e n ts m u s t h av e n atu re as their sole source, sub­
strate, and p rin c ip le . A s s tr ic t n a tu ra lis m go e s hand in hand in both
N ietzsche and S p in o z a w i t h a p o w e r fu l eth ical p roject, the latter must
be co n strued as an e th ic s o f s e lf- o v e r c o m in g , w h e re b y the im m anent
natural p rin cip le (conatus in S p in o z a , w ill to p o w e r in N ietzsche) shapes
itself in to s o m e t h in g h ig h e r , p r o d u c in g a value that neither conflicts

<1‘3)
 CHAPTER 5

w ith n atu re n o r tran scen d s it to w a r d s o m e s u p r a n a tu ra l n o r m , b u t re­

sid es in th e n e w o rg a n iz a tio n and q u a lity o f th e s a m e n a tu ra l p rin cip le
an d th e m o d e o f life to w h ic h it g iv e s b irth .
S e lf- o v e r c o m in g th us d iffe rs ra d ic a lly fr o m w h a t m a y b ea r a sim ilar
n a m e in K a n t, th e S to ics, o r C h r is tia n m o r a lity an d a s c e tic is m . It does
n o t im p o s e e x te rn a l co n stra in ts u p o n life an d th e e m o t io n s , b u t lets
life resh ap e an d s u b lim a te itse lf, w ith o n e stra in o f e m o t io n s w o r k in g
o n an d g iv in g sh ap e to a n o th e r. N o t rea so n v e rs u s life , b u t life m o ld ­
in g it s e lf an d e n h a n c in g its o w n p o w e r, g e n e ra te s s e lf- o v e r c o m in g in
b o th th ese p h ilo so p h e rs o fim m a n e n c e .
T h is is also a n e w o r a lte rn a tiv e in te r p re ta tio n g iv e n to th e a g e -o ld
c o n c e p t o f “ s p irit” o r “ s p ir itu a lity ,” t h o u g h n e ith e r S p in o z a n or
N ie tz s c h e u se th ese te rm s in o rd e r to a v o id th e a d v e rs e co n n o ta tio n s
o f C h ris tia n a sceticism an d p rie stlin e ss. R e s tr a in ts w h ic h d e p re ss life
b y s u b d u in g it to s o m e s u p e r io r p rin c ip le o v e r an d a b o v e life it s e lf are
lia b le to p ro d u c e a m o r b id an d s e lf- d e n y in g a s c e tic is m th a t S p in o za
sh u n s as m u c h as N ie tz s c h e d e sp ise s. S p irit, o r w h a t s h o u ld s erv e as
its ad e q u a te s u b stitu te , is n o t a se p a ra te p r in c ip le s te m m in g fr o m an­
o th e r w o r ld o r fro m m a n ’s p u re an d a u t o n o m o u s c o n s c io u s n e s s , n or
d o e s it s e rv e to d epress and s u b d u e life. R a th e r, s p irit (o r, in N ie tz s c h e ,
“ fre e s p irit” ) is life itse lf, w it h its f u ll- b lo o d e d d ash an d a ffe c tiv e
p o w e r, as it sh ap es and g iv e s m e a n in g to it s e lf b y th a t m o d e o f self-
o v e r c o m in g w h ic h en h an ces ra th e r th a n re d u c e s its v ita l a n d crea tive
p o w e rs . O n this u n d e rs ta n d in g , th e D io n y s ia n w a y o f life is a ls o the
m o s t “ s p iritu a l.”
T h e im m a n e n t eth ics N ie t z s c h e sh ares w i t h S p in o z a ca n n e ith e r rec­
o g n iz e a ltru ism n o r a c c e p t a m o r a lity o f s e lf-d e n ia l, p ity , o r g u ilt. A t
the sam e tim e it re jects u n re stra in e d lic e n tio u s n e s s a n d all fo r m s o f
laissez aller. G ro u n d e d as it is in th e r e s p e c tiv e p r in c ip le s o f conatus and
w ill to p o w e r, it p laces v irtu e in th e s h ap e d an d s u b lim a te d se lf-a sse r-
tive n e ss o f th e in d iv id u a l, th a t is, in th e in v ig o r a t in g fo r m o f s e lf-o v e r -
c o m in g . B u t h ere a m a jo r d iffe re n c e ap p ears.
In S p in o za th e s u b lim a tio n o f th e a ffe cts is in fo r m e d b y re a so n and
o b je c tiv e scie n tific k n o w le d g e ; h e n ce it o b e y s d e fin ite ru le s an d u n i­
versal p attern s. N o t so in N ie t z s c h e , w h o c o n c e iv e s o f th e life o f his
Übermensch as an o p e n e x is te n tia l e x p e r im e n t, an d w h o r e c o g n iz e s no
o b je c tiv e k n o w le d g e , o n ly p e rs p e c tiv a l in te r p r e ta tio n s . S e lf- o v e r c o m ­
in g th u s has a h e rm e n e u tic a l a sp e ct in N ie t z s c h e ; it is lin k e d to a p e r­
so n a l m o d e o f se lf-in te rp re ta tio n w h e r e b y th e in d iv id u a l p r o je c ts and
g iv e s m e a n in g to his o r h er life . T o b e tte r a p p re c ia te th is p o in t w e m u st
c o n s id e r h o w N ie tz s c h e an d S p in o za see th e n a tu re o f p h ilo s o p h y and
its re la tio n to life.

<1 1 4 )
 SPINOZA AND NIETZSCHE

P h ilosop hy and Life

For N ie tz s c h e th e re is n o o b je c t iv e tru th , o n ly “ perspectives” and

"in te rp re ta tio n s” th a t s e r v e an d are b o u n d by existen tial drives and in­
terests. H e n c c p h i lo s o p h y — o r rath er, p h ilo so p h izin g — is not under­
stood as a s e a rc h fo r o b je c t iv e k n o w le d g e o r as a n e w kind o f science.
It is, fu n d a m e n ta lly , an e v a lu a tiv e attitu d e to w ard life, an attitude that
both e x p resse s a n d fin d s s u p p o r t in certain co g n itiv e im ages. A cco rd ­
ingly, N ie t z s c h e ’s s o - c a lle d “ g e n e a lo g ic a l” m e th o d sets o ut to uncover
the o rigin s o f th e v a r io u s c o g n it iv e b elie fs and claim s to truth within
the typ ical p s y c h o l o g y a n d life -p re fe re n c e s im b u ed in them . (The term
genealogy c o n n o te s a s e a rc h fo r c o v e r t o rig in s that are to be exposed
and also e v a lu a te d as “ n o b le ” o r “ ig n o b le .” )
L ife is a lw a y s th e lif e o f s o m e in d iv id u a l; hence philosophy, as a
m ode o f life a n d an a ttitu d e to w a r d it, m u st have an individual focus
or goal. T o p h ilo s o p h iz e m e a n s th a t a certain in d ivid u al takes a stand
toward life, im p a r ts m e a n in g to it, a ffirm s o r negates it, and thereby
gives it sh ap e. T h is p r o c e s s is n o t c o n fin e d to the in d ivid ual’s intellect
alone but is c a r r ie d o u t b y th e fu lln e ss o f his o r h er life, w ith its affec­
tive (or in s tin c tu a l) b a s is a n d th e w i ll to p o w e r w h ich this life em bodies
and p rojects. H e n c e lif e is a k in d o f e x iste n tial causa sui in N ietzsche,
using th e te r m in a w e a k ( p s y c h o lo g ic a l and n o t ontological) sense.
Life is b o th s u b je c t a n d o b je c t o f th e p ro ce ss o f self-interpretation; it is
the ge n e ra to r an d th e v a lu e - g iv e r , as w e ll as the subject m atter which
is being s h ap ed a n d g iv e n m e a n in g an d valu e to. In the (rather disap­
proving) w o r d s o f j a s p e r s : M a n is h e re his o w n creator in the state o f
“ self-being w i t h o u t G o d . ” 15
T h e in d iv id u a l’s s e lf- c r e a t iv e a ttitu d e to w a rd her o r his life is not a
mode o f c o n s c io u s n e s s b u t o f being, in w h ic h his or her instinctual life,
by im p a rtin g m e a n in g to i t s e l f an d th e w o rld (th ro u gh action, experi­
m entation, in n e r e x p e r ie n c e , s e lf-d is c ip lin e , etc.) also transcends and
shapes its ra w , w i ld s u b s ta n tia lity . S e lf-in te rp reta tio n is thereby sup­
posed to b e lin k e d to s e lf- o v e r c o m in g as w e ll, and to the ethical per­
spective o f life.
This v ie w o f p h i lo s o p h y sta n d s o f co u rse in op p ositio n to the time-
honored id ea l o f p h i lo s o p h y as s cie n c e w h ic h Sp in oza had shared and
renovated, b u t w h ic h N ie t z s c h e traces b a ck to Socrates and Plato.
Faithful to his g e n e a lo g ic a l m e th o d , N ie tz s c h e o bjects to this ideal not
only as a s im p le p h ilo s o p h ic a l fa lla c y , b u t as a decadent perspective
that serves th e s e lf- im a g e a n d life -p re fe re n c e s o f an unhealthy and
w o rld -w eary c u ltu r e , th e o p p o s it e o f his D io n y s ia n ideal.
S p in o za’s g e o m e tr ic a l m e th o d n o t o n ly h ig h lig h ts the ideal o f phi­

( 115)
 CHAPTER 5

lo s o p h y as scicn ce; it also seem s to N ic tz s c h e to a d v o c a te a co ld , re­

p re s siv e attitu d e to life and an a b s o lu te in te lle c tu a l a s c e tic is m :

N o n ridere, non lugere, neque detestari, sed intelligen t [ N o t to la u g h ,

n o t to la m en t, n o r to d ete st, b u t to u n d e rs ta n d ] says S p in o z a as
s im p ly an d s u b lim e ly as is his w o n t. Y e t in th e la st a n a ly s is , w h a t
else is this intelligere th an th e fo r m in w h ic h w e c o m e to feel the
o th e r th re e at o n ce ? O n e re su lt o f th e d iffe r e n t an d m u tu a lly o p ­
p o se d d esires to la u g h , la m e n t, an d cu rse? B e fo r e k n o w le d g e is
p o s s ib le , each o f th ese in stin c ts m u s t firs t h a v e p re s e n te d its o n e ­
sid e d v ie w o f th e th in g o r ev en t. . . . S in c e o n ly th e la st sccn es o f
re c o n c ilia tio n an d th e fin al a c c o u n tin g at th e e n d o f th is lo n g p r o ­
cess rise to o u r co n s cio u s n e s s , w e s u p p o s e th a t intelligere m u s t be
s o m e th in g . . . th at stan d s e s s e n tia lly o p p o s e d to th e in s t in c t s .'6

N ie tz s c h e ad d s th at co n s c io u s k n o w le d g e is o n ly th e tip o f th e ic e b e rg
u n d e r w h ic h a s tr u g g le o f in stin c ts is ra g in g . B u t h e s e e m s to fo rg e t
th at ra tio n al u n d e rs ta n d in g in S p in o z a o n ly s u s p e n d s th e e m o t io n s bu t
d o e s n o t k ill th em ; e v e n tu a lly , it is s u p p o s e d to e n h a n c e th e p o w e r o f
e m o tio n w h ile re c h a n n e llin g its d ir e c tio n an d tu r n in g its q u a lit y fro m
“ p a s s iv e ” (or serv ile ) in to “ a c tiv e ” (o r free). H e re in lie s th e e th ic a l and
a ffe c tiv e g o a l w h ic h p h ilo s o p h y has in S p in o z a . (S p in o z a m a k e s this
g o a l a b u n d a n tly clear, fr o m th e p r o g r a m m a tic o p e n in g o f h is essay on
th e in te lle c t to th e Ethics.) S c ie n ce w it h all its a p p a ra tu s , in c lu d in g the
g e o m e tr ic a l m e th o d , is b u t a p re p a ra tio n fo r a t ta in in g fr e e d o m , jo y ,
a c tiv e p o w e r, an d th e tr a n s fo rm a tio n o f o n e ’s life in to s o m e t h in g re­
s e m b lin g secu lar sa lva tio n .
O f co u rse , to fu lfill this g o a l, k n o w le d g e m u s t b e “ p u r e ,” n o t in the
sen se th a t it has n o b e a rin g o n e x is te n tia l n eed s a n d d r iv e s , b u t in the
sen se th at, in o rd e r to p r o p e r ly s e rv e th ese d r iv e s , k n o w l e d g e m u s t be
fre e o f bias an d fo llo w its o w n lo g ic and th e c o n s tr a in ts o f its s u b je c t
m atte r. O t h e r w is e , a m o n g o th e r ills, it w i ll fa ll p r e y to illu s io n s and
m y s tific a tio n s fr o m w h ic h N ie t z s c h e , to o , w is h e s to lib e ra te th e p h i­
lo s o p h e r.
T h u s S p in o za is n o t th e re p re s s iv e o r c o ld r a tio n a lis t w h o alienates
life fr o m p h ilo s o p h y , as N ie t z s c h e s o m e t im e s p o le m ic a lly p ictu re s
h im . A n d y e t th eir d iffe re n c e s re m a in v a st. S p in o z a d id n o t b e lie v e in
an o b je c tiv e w o r ld and in tru e k n o w le d g e th a t can c a p tu r e it (in the
id io m o f a c o n t e m p o r a r y p h ilo so p h e r, k n o w le d g e is a k in d o f “ m irro r
o f n a tu re ,” th o u g h th e m ir r o r in th is case is p a rt o f n a tu re i t s e l f ) .17
S p in o za d e d u c e d th e c o n c e p ts an d p o s tu la te s o f m o d e r n s c ie n c e as i f
th e y w e r e etern al tru th . M o r e o v e r , h e w is h e d to e x p e r ie n c e th e u n i­
v e rs e n o t o n ly as a s c ie n tific o b je c t b u t as a t h e o lo g ic a l o n e as w e ll— as

(j ¡6)
 SPINOZA AND NIETZSCHE

God. H e n cc , N ie t z s c h e c h a r g e s , S p in o za w as n ot a radical philosopher

o f im m a n en ce. H e d is p o s e d o f th e transcen den t G o d , but kept his
“s h a d o w s ” aliv e .

im m anence and the Shadows o f the Dead Cod

Cen turies a fte r B u d d h a w a s d ea d , N ie tz s c h e tells his readers, people

were still s h o w in g B u d d h a ’s s h a d o w lin g e rin g in a ca v e.18 So it is with
the dead G o d : h is s h a d o w still h o v e rs in and o ver the w orld o fim m a ­
nence, and i f n o t e x o r c is e d , w ill s u r v iv e fo r thousands o f years. But
“ w e ” (m e a n in g th e n e w p h ilo s o p h e r s ), N ie tzs ch e insists, must over­
com e n o t o n ly G o d , b u t h is s h a d o w s as w ell.
W hat are th e s e “ s h a d o w s o f th e dead G o d ” ? T h e y include, on the
one hand, th e id e a o f a m o r a l w o r ld -o r d e r , o f g o o d and evil inscribed
in the o r d e r o f th in g s , w h ic h S p in o z a , as N ie tzs ch e recognizes, had
already set o u t to a b o lis h . O n th e o th e r hand, these shadows also in­
clude the p o s tu la te s o f s c ie n c e an d o f ration al chinking generally, pro­
jected upon th e u n iv e r s e as o b je c tiv e and eternal truths. Here
N ietzsch e c o n fr o n ts S p in o z a as a d ire c t and, in a sense, specific oppo­
nent. M a n y o f th e ra tio n a lis t p o stu la tes that N ietzsch e criticizes are
associated w it h th e c a t e g o r y o f s u b sta n ce, S p in o za ’s main concept; and
Spin oza’s d e ific a t io n o f n a tu re — w h ic h m an y oth er rationalists avoid
and to w h ic h th e s c ie n t ific o u t lo o k is n o t co m m itted — adds a distinct
"sh adow o f G o d ” to his p ic t u r e o f the im m a n en t universe. When will
the w o rld be p u r e o f G o d fo r u s? N ie tz s c h e ex cla im s. Spinoza believed
that in in s is tin g th a t th e im m a n e n t w o rld w as “ substance” and not
"su bject,” an d b y a d h e r in g to a s tr ic tly m ech an istic explication o f the
w orld, he a v o id e d a n y v e s t ig e s o f a n th ro p o m o rp h ism . Y et genealogi­
cally, N ie tz s c h e a r g u e s , th e c o n c e p t o f substan ce is tacitly presupposed
in that o f th e s u b jc c t; a n d m e c h a n is m is no less an th rop om orp h ic than
teleology, o n ly m o r e s u b t ly so.
M e c h a n ism p resu p p oses th e u n fo u n d e d b e lie f (characteristic o f
weak and lif e - w e a r y p e o p le ) in ra tio n a l n ecessity and perm anent laws,
as w ell as a set o f n o tio n s a n d p o s tu la te s w h ic h m ake this b elief possible
although th e y h a v e n o c o r r e s p o n d in g re a lity ,19 but are all fictions.
They are o u r im a g e s , s e r v in g a v a rie ty o f h u m an needs— biological,
p sy ch o lo g ica l, an d e x is te n tia l.

O v e r im m e n s e p e r io d s o f tim e th e in te lle ct p rod u ced nothing but

errors. A f e w o f th e s e p r o v e d to b e u seful and helped to preserve
the species: th o s e w h o h it u p o n o r in h erited these had better luck
in their s t r u g g le fo r th e m s e lv e s an d th e ir p ro g en y. Such erroneous

( n 7)
 CHAPTER 5

articles o f faith . . . in c lu d e th e fo llo w in g : th a t th e re are e n d u rin g

th in g s ; th at th ere are eq u a l th in g s; th a t th e re are th in g s , s u b ­
sta n ces, b o d ies; th at a th in g is w h a t it a p p ea rs to be; th a t o u r w ill
is free; th a t w h a t is g o o d fo r m e is also g o o d in it s e l f .20

L a te r (and e lse w h e re ) N ie tz s c h e e x te n d s th is lis t o f fic tio n s , w h ic h

he also calls “ articles o f fa ith ,” to in c lu d e th e s o u l, th e s u b je c t, cause
an d e ffe c t, fo r m and co n te n t, g e o m e tr ic a l e n titie s (lin es, su rfa ce s , b o d ­
ies), d iv is ib le s p a ce and tim e , an d so o n . M a n y o f th e s e a rtic le s o f faith
(e sp e c ia lly th e b e lie f in s e lf-id e n tic a l and m e a s u ra b le “ th in g s ” an d in
id e n tica l cases u p o n w h ic h lo g ic a l an d n a tu ra l la w s are b a se d ) are n o t
m e re ly in te lle c tu a l a b stra ctio n s; th e y p e n e tra te th e d e e p e s t an d m o st
im m e d ia te o r g a n ic fu n ctio n s an d b u ild th e m s e lv e s in to th e p attern s o f
“ sen se p e rc e p tio n an d e v e r y k in d o f s e n s a tio n .” T h e y e v e n set u p for
th e m s e lv e s a s e lf- im m u n in g s y s te m : “ e v e n in th e r e a lm o f k n o w le d g e
th ese p r o p o s itio n s b e c a m e th e n o r m s a c c o r d in g to w h ic h ‘tr u e ’ and
‘u n tr u e ’ w e r e d e te rm in e d — d o w n to th e m o s t r e m o te r e g io n s o f
lo g ic .” 21
T o b re a k this v ic io u s circle o f s e lf- im m u n iz a t io n — o r ra th er, to b y ­
pass it— N ie tz s c h e turn s to his g e n e a lo g ic a l m e th o d , w h ic h d o e s n o t
ac ce p t ra tio n a l claim s to tru th at face v a lu e , b u t lo o k s fo r th e ir o rig in s
in the v a rio u s n eed s and fu n c tio n s o f life . “ P u re l o g i c ” is n e ith e r pure
n o r p rim o rd ia l; it is th e p ro d u c t o f a life p ro c e s s th a t n e ed s an d p re s u p ­
p o se s its fictio n s.

T h e O rigins o f Logic

L o g ic is b o u n d to th e c o n d itio n : a s s u m e th e re are id e n tic a l cases.

In fact, to m a k e p o s s ib le lo g ic a l th in k in g an d in fe re n c e s , th is c o n ­
d itio n m u s t first b e treated fic tit io u s ly as fu lfille d . T h a t is: th e w ill
to lo g ic a l tru th can b e ca rried th r o u g h o n ly a fte r a fu n d a m e n ta l
falsification o f all ev e n ts is assu m e d . . . . L o g ic d o e s not s p r in g
fr o m w ill to tr u th .22

F o rtu n a te ly fo r s u rv iv a l, o u r sen ses h elp in fo r m in g th is fic tio n , since

“ th e co a rs e r o rg a n sees m u c h a p p aren t e q u a lity .” 23 M o r e o v e r , as in the
p ro c e s s o f d ig e s tio n , the o r g a n is m ass im ila te s as m u c h o f th is fic tio n
as it n eed s, and d isca rd s its ex cesse s. In G a y Science N ie t z s c h e e la b o ­
rates th is id ea in a s e m i- D a r w in ia n vein:

H o w d id lo g ic c o m e in to e x is te n c e in m a n ’s h ead ? C e r t a in ly o u t
o f illo g ic , w h o s e re a lm o r ig in a lly m u s t h av e b e e n im m e n s e . In­
n u m e ra b le b e in g s w h o m a d e in fe re n c e s in a w a y d iffe r e n t fr o m

(nS)
 SPINOZA AND NIETZSCHE

ours p e ris h e d ; fo r a ll th a t, th e ir w a y s m ig h t have been truer.

T h o se , fo r e x a m p le , w h o d id n o t k n o w h o w to find often enough
w h at is “ e q u a l” as r e g a r d s b o th n o u rish m e n t and hostile ani­
mals— th o se , in o t h e r w o r d s , w h o su b su m ed thin gs too slow ly
and c a u tio u s ly — w e r e fa v o r e d w i t h a lesser p ro b ab ility o f survival
than th o se w h o g u e s s e d im m e d ia t e ly u p o n en counterin g similar
instances th a t t h e y m u s t b e e q u a l. T h e d o m in a n t tendency, h o w ­
ever, to tre a t as e q u a l w h a t is m e re ly sim ilar— an illogical ten­
dency, fo r n o t h in g is r e a lly e q u a l— is w h a t first created any basis
for lo g ic . (§ 1 1 1 )

And N ie tz s c h e c o n t in u e s , in a p a ssa g e th at m ay d irectly apply to Spi­

noza (because it p u ts s u b s ta n c e at the cen ter o f rationalist fictions):

In o rd er th a t th e c o n c e p t o f su b sta n ce co u ld originate— w h ich is

in d isp en sable f o r lo g i c a lth o u g h in th e strictest sense nothing real
co rresp o n d s to it— it w a s lik e w is e n ecessa ry that fo r a lo n g time
one did n o t see n o r p e r c e iv e th e ch a n g es in th ings. T h e beings that
did n o t see so p r e c is e ly h a d an advantage o ve r those that saw every­
thing “ in flu x .” (Ib id .)

Th is a d v a n ta g e , as N ie t z s c h e o fte n p oin ts ou t, is not o n ly biological

but also m e n ta l. It is b o th p a in fu l an d a w eso m e to experience the w orld
as the tran sien t in d e te r m in a c y it is. O rd in a r y hum ans crave perm a­
nence, fix e d an d r ig id e n titie s in w h ic h to fin d ord er and consolation.
Just as an im a ls w h o s e p e r c e p tio n w a s m o re precise suffered a bio lo gi­
cal d isad v an tage, s o th e m o r e d is c e r n in g p h ilo so p h ers, the skeptics and
critics o f ra tio n a l illu s io n , in c u r s u ffe rin g and an x iety for themselves.
N ietzsche, h o w e v e r , in h is id ea l o f th e Ubermetisch seeks to overcom e
the effects o f o r d in a r y p s y c h o l o g y in o rd er to create a n ew type o f
response, s u ita b le f o r th e p o w e r fu l an d th e rare.
N ie tzs ch e ’s c r itiq u e o f “ l o g i c ” and ration alist postulates centers
around th e c o n c e p t o f s e lf- id e n tic a l “ th in g s ,” w h ic h is also the basis
for the c a te g o r y o f s u b s ta n c e — S p in o z a ’s m ajo r concept. A “ th in g,”
however, is also t h o u g h t o f as a s elf-id en tica l unit that exercises (or
submits to) ca u sal a g e n c y ; y e t to N ie tz s c h e , causality is as m uch a m an-
made p ro je c tio n as is te le o lo g y . C it in g H um e w ith approval,
N ietzsche c la im s th a t th e re is n o th in g to ju s tify o u r “ faith” that event
A has s o m e th in g in it w h ic h e ffe c ts o r gen erates even t B. T h e causality
we attribute to “ t h in g s ” is th e reified p ro je c tio n o f o ur o w n inner ex­
perience, n a m e ly , o f w h a t w e fe ig n to b e the causality o f o ur w ill.
“ We b e lieve o u r s e lv e s to b e ca u sal in the act o f w illin g: w e thought
that here w e c a u g h t c a u s a lity in th e a ct.” 24 H ence w e generalize from

( * * 9)
 CHAPTER 5

o u r w i ll to the rest o f th e w o r ld an d a ttrib u te w i ll- l ik e e n titie s to e x ­

ternal e v e n ts as w e ll, c a llin g th e m “ p o w e r s ,” “ a g e n t s ,” o r “ ca u s e s .” O n
N ie t z s c h e ’s g e n e a lo g ic a l a n a lysis, th en , ca u ses are m a g ic a l e m b o d i­
m e n ts o f im a g in a ry acts o f w ill. A n d S c h o p e n h a u e r, in h is b iz a rre d o c ­
trin e th a t b e in g is w illin g , h ad th e re fo re o n ly “ e n th r o n e d a p rim e v a l
m y t h o lo g y .”

M a n b e lie v e d o r ig in a lly th a t w h e r e v e r h e s a w s o m e t h in g h a p p e n ,
a w ill had to b e at w o r k in th e b a c k g r o u n d as a c a u se , an d a p e r­
so n a l, w illin g b e in g . . . . T h e fa ith in ca u se and e ffe c t b e c a m e fo r
h im th e b a sic faith th a t he a p p lies w h e r e v e r a n y t h in g h a p p e n s —
an d this is w h a t he still d o e s in s tin c tiv e ly ; it is an a ta v is m o f th e
m o s t a n cie n t o r ig in .25

C a u s a lit y is also ba sed u p o n th e fic tio n o f th e s e ria l u n iv e rs e , c o m ­

p o se d o f d iscrete, self-id e n tica l e n tities. N ie t z s c h e o b je c t s n o t o n ly to
the causal d ep en d e n c e o f e v e n t A u p o n e v e n t B , b u t to th e v e r y s p lic in g
o f th e w o r ld p ro cess in to su ch u n ita r y ite m s as e v e n ts A an d B . “ A n
in te lle c t” he sp ecu la te s, “ th a t c o u ld see ca u se an d e ffe c t as a c o n tin u u m
an d a flu x . . . w o u ld rep u d ia te th e c o n c e p t o f ca u s e an d e ffe c t and
d e n y all c o n d itio n a lity .” 26
T h e m y th o f th e w ill, o r th e s u b je c t as a g e n t, a ls o u n d e rlie s th e c o n ­
ce p t o f su b sta n ce itself. O n se v e ra l o c c a s io n s N ie t z s c h e a n a ly z e s the
c o n c e p t o f s u b sta n ce as a c o n s e q u e n c e o f th e c o n c e p t o f s u b je c t, n o t
th e re v e rse . T h is is b ecau se th e s u b je c t “ is in te r p r e te d f r o m w i t h in o u r ­
selv es, so th at th e e g o co u n ts as s u b s ta n ce , as th e ca u s e o f all its d eed s,
as a d o e r.” H e n ce,

th e lo g ic a l-m e ta p h y s ic a l p o s tu la te s , th e b e l ie f in s u b s ta n c e , a c c i­
d en t, attrib u te , e tc ., d e riv e th eir c o n v in c in g fo r c e fr o m o u r h a b it
o f r e g a rd in g all o u r d eed s as c o n s e q u e n c e s o f o u r w i l l — s o th a t th e
e g o , as su b sta n ce , d o es n o t v a n ish in th e m u lt ip lic it y o f c h a n g e .—
B u t th ere is n o such th in g as w i l l . 27

S e e n in th is lig h t, th e S p in o z a - H e g e l c o n t r o v e r s y w o u l d a p p e a r t o b e
fic titio u s , sin ce H e g e l d o e s n o t re a lly tr a n s c e n d S p in o z a , an d S p in o z a
d o es n o t re a lly o p p o s e H e g e l b u t ra th er in c lu d e s H e g e l’s id e a o f th e
u n iv e rs e as s u b je c t in his o w n c o n c e p t o f su b s ta n c e .

T h e Nature o f Immanence and the Problem o f Truth

W e n e e d n o t g o in to all th e “ s h a d o w s o f G o d ” w h ic h N ie t z s c h e seeks
to e x o rc is e in o rd e r to ca p tu re h is k in d o f w o r ld - p ic tu r e an d e x p e r ie n c e
o f i m m a n e n c e .28 B u t b e fo re lo o k in g at th e p o s it iv e w o r l d - i m a g e th at

(¡20)
 SPINOZA AND NIETZSCHE

N ietzsche o ffe r s , a c r u c ia l q u e s tio n m u s t be addressed: W hat is the sta­

tus o f D io n y s ia n “ t r u t h ” ? W e h a v e seen that N ietzsch e recognizes no
facts, o n ly in te r p r e ta tio n s , a n d n o o b je c tiv e k n o w led g e , only perspec­
tives that are r e la tiv e to e x is te n tia l interests and drives. Yet he also
gives d etailed a c c o u n ts o f th e n a tu re o f the universe his Ubemensch
recognizes and e x p e r ie n c e s . A r e th ese acco u n ts also mere perspectives,
or is th ere a D io n y s ia n tr u th th a t esca p es p erspectivism and applies to
the w o rld p r io r to all in te r p re ta tio n s ?
Th is is p e rh a p s th e m o s t p r o b le m a tic issue in N ietzsch e’s thought.
N either th e te x t n o r th e lo g ic o f N ie t z s c h e ’s w o rk furnishes a satisfac­
tory re s o lu tio n . O n m a n y o c c a s io n s N ie tzs ch e seem s to suggest that
there is a s o b e r an d p a in fu l v i e w o f th e w o rld and o f life that deserves
the nam e o f tr u th sim pliciter. T h e m o r e w e can take and accept o f this
truth, the s tr o n g e r w e are an d th e freer w e m ay becom e. Frequently,
N ietzsche also s p e a k s o f th o s e w h o sh un traged y, transitoriness, or the
m ultifaceted c h a r a c te r o f e x is te n c e as fearin g truth or fleeing from it;
and he calls th e o p p o s it e b e lie fs , th e p ostu lates o f rational science and
m etaphysics, b y th e o u t r ig h t n a m e o f “ e rro rs ” and “ fictions.” It seems
to m e that th is te n d e n c y b e tra y s N ie t z s c h e ’s m ore direct and sponta­
neous m in d , as h e Jets h is “ g u t - p h ilo s o p h y ,” so to speak, express itself
without th e c r itic a l re s tr a in ts h e s h o u ld h o w e v e r have obeyed in light
o f his p h ilo s o p h ic a l m e th o d . F o r o n N ie tz s c h e ’s official v iew o f phi­
losophy, n o th in g ca n e v a d e th e h e rm e n e u tic a l process; there can be no
"bare” facts o r tr u th p r io r to a v a lu e -la d e n interpretation; and perspec­
tivism is th e u n iv e r s a l ru le .
I f so, w h a t is th e s ta tu s o f th e la tte r p ron o u n cem en t? Is not this the­
ory its e lf y e t a n o th e r p e r s p e c tiv e — a w etaperspective, perhaps, but one
that also d e p e n d s u p o n an e x is te n tia l co m m itm e n t? Y es, a Nietzschean
m ight a n sw er, th is is th e c o g n it iv e co u n te rp a rt o f the D ionysian way
o f life, w h ic h it m a k e s p o s s ib le an d to w h ic h it is relative. Existential
options c o m e t o g e t h e r w it h th e ir co rr e sp o n d in g co gn itive images; but
the latter d e p e n d o n th e fo r m e r , n o t th e o th er w a y around.
W hether N ie t z s c h e w o u l d h a v e liv e d in peace w ith this relativization
o f w h at h e s e n s e d as h is p a in fu l an d d ra m a tic discoveries about the
universe is an o p e n q u e s tio n . In th e fin al analysis, N ietzsche can nei­
ther accep t n o r re je c t th e id e a th a t th e D io n y s ia n w o rld -v ie w is a truth
unbound b y p e r s p e c tiv e . B u t th is im p o rta n t question has little bearing
on our p re s e n t d is c u s s io n , fo r w e are co n tra stin g tw o rival experiences
ofim m a n en ce; an d th e re is n o d o u b t that, o n w h ic h e v er interpretation,
the D io n y s ia n w o r l d - i m a g e e n jo y s in N ie tz s c h e a p rivileged position
as the v ie w th a t h e p le a d s fo r an d v a lu es m o st. W h eth er his reasons are
partly also c o g n it iv e o r o n ly e x is te n tia l is a seco n d ary consideration

( 12 1)
 CHAPTER 5

fo r th e p resen t p u rp o ses. W ith th is in m in d w c m a y n o w s u m m a riz e

th e S p in o z a - N ie tz s c h e c o n fr o n ta tio n o n th e im a g e o f th e im m a n e n t
w o rld .
In S p in o za th e im m a n e n t w o r ld is a ra tio n a l causa sui, h a v in g its rea­
so n , m e a n in g , an d ju s tific a tio n w ith in it s e l f E m in e n t ly in te llig ib le , it
is illu m in a te d , as it w e re , fr o m w ith in b y th e lig h t o f re a so n , w h ic h
p e rv a d e s an d co n stitu te s e v e r y e n tity . T h e u n iv e rs e in h e rits th e role
an d statu s o f G o d and o m n ip re s e n t rea so n ta k e s th e p la c e o f th e d iv in e
p re se n ce o r gra ce. M a n , liv in g w ith in th e im m a n e n t u n iv e rs e , exists
w ith in G o d and m a y rise to a d eta ile d k n o w le d g e o f th is re la tio n — w ith
all th e m e n ta l re p ercu ssio n s th a t s u c h a c o n s c io u s n e s s en ta ils.
G o d , in o th e r w o r d s , is n o t d e ad in S p in o z a . H e d o c s n o t d isap p e ar
fr o m the h o riz o n o f S p in o z a ’s p h ilo s o p h y b u t is, as S p in o z a sees it,
c o r r e c tly id e n tifie d fo r th e first tim e . A ll th e s u b lim it y , th e in fin ity , the
s u p re m e “ w is d o m ” (in te llig ib ility ), th e o m n ip r e s e n c e , an d th e d iv in ­
ity o f th e o ld p erson a l G o d are h ere atta ch ed to w h a t is c la im e d to be
th e ir tru e an d o n ly le g itim a te s u b je c t, th e u n iv e r s e o r th e n a tu r e -G o d .
S p in o za n o t o n ly n atu ralizes G o d , b u t also d e ifie s n a tu re .
“ G o d ’s s h a d o w s ” are in d e ed p re se n t e v e r y w h e r e in S p in o z a . S u b ­
stan ce an d cau sality, s e lf- id e n tity an d p e rm a n e n c e are th e d o m in a n t
m a rk s o f his u n iv erse. A n d a lth o u g h th e re is a ls o tr a n s ie n c e in S p in o ­
z a ’s w o r ld (e v e ry p articu lar th in g is in e v ita b ly p e ris h a b le ), th e in d iv id ­
u al th in g also has an etern al a s p e ct w h e r e b y it is g r a s p e d (an d exists)
fr o m th e sta n d p o in t o f etern ity. I n d iv id u a l th in g s are f u lly d e te r m in e d
b y causal la w s w h ic h , far fr o m e x p r e s s in g s o m e t h in g a r b itr a r y or
“ o p a q u e ” a b o u t the u n iv e rse , are th o u g h t to e m b o d y its s u p r e m e ra­
tio n a lity and d iv in ity . M e c h a n ic a l ca u s a tio n is seen as e q u iv a le n t to
lo g ic a l d e riv a tio n ; an d ev en p a rtic u la r th in g s , w h ic h e x is t b y e x te rn a l
causes and n o t b y v irtu e o f th eir o w n e sse n ce , are c o n s id e r e d fr o m the
s ta n d p o in t o f ete rn ity as lo g ic a lly (n o t o n ly fa c tu a lly ) n e ce s s a ry .
In N ie tz s c h e , o n th e o th e r h a n d , th e im m a n e n t w o r ld has n o in h e r­
en t reaso n , o rd er, o r ju s tific a tio n . E v e n its n a tu ra l n e c e s s ity — th e basis
fo r amor Jati— ca n n o t b e co n s tru e d as a ra tio n a l s y s te m o f ca u s e and
e ffe c t. T o S p in o z a ’s b a n n in g o f te le o lo g y N ie t z s c h e a d d s th e a b o litio n
o f m e ch a n ica l ca u sality, as a n o th er, s u b tle r fo r m o f a n t h r o p o m o r ­
p h ism . A s th ere is n o th in g fix e d an d c a p tu ra b le in th e w o r ld , th e re are
n o id e n tica l and even n o ^ //-id en tical ca u ses an d e v e n ts , a n d th u s no
basis fo r p e rm a n e n t u n iv ersa l la w s. T h e m a jo r c a te g o r ie s an d p o s tu ­
lates b y w h ic h w e u n d ersta n d th e u n iv e rs e are b u t u s e fu l fic tio n s ; and
e v e n lo g ic is e x p o s e d as an illu s io n , an im a g in a r y fix a t io n o f w h a t in
it s e lf is in d e te r m in a b le and e v a d es all fo rm s o f “ c o r r e c t ” o r “ tr u e ” p ic ­
tu r in g .

(122)
 SPINOZA AND NIETZSCHE

A g ain st S p in o z a ’ s e m in e n tly ration al, law -governed nature-God

N ietzsch e th u s o p p o s e s a w o r ld in everla stin g flux— never self-identi-
cal, n ever at lo g ic a l re st, n e v e r attain in g equilibrium (by which it
would be c a p tu re d a n d d e fin e d ) o r a fix e d final state; a w orld which is
neither p u re b e in g n o r p u re b e c o m in g b u t alw ays wavering between
both. “ E te r n a lly s e lf- c r e a t in g , e te rn a lly self-d e stro yin g,” 25 the world
must be e x p e r ie n c e d as a c o n t in g e n t and irrational variety o f the causa
sui. T h o u g h it h as n o tr a n s c e n d e n t cause o r inherent rational grounds,
yet it m a in tain s i t s e l f b y it s e l f an d liv es o f itself: “ its excrem ents are its
food.” N ie t z s c h e o ffe r s a v a ria tio n o f this idea in calling the world “ a
work o f art th a t g iv e s b ir th to it s e lf.” 30 T h e artistic m etaphor indicates
that the w o r ld h as som e o r g a n iz a t io n in N ietzsch e, though it is esthetic
rather than s c ie n tific . *' B u t th e m e ta p h o r sh ould n ot be pressed too
hard. E v e n as “ w o r k o f a r t,” th e w o r ld rem ains indeterminable and
elusive, a c lu s te r o f p e r s p e c tiv e s w ith o u t fix e d substance; moreover, its
art fo rm s are th e m s e lv e s tr a n s ito r y an d lia b le to constant change and
tra n s fo rm a tio n .32
T h u s w e are b a c k in th e d o m a in o f flu x . I f Sp in oza’s rational sub­
stance c o n tin u e s th e tr a d it io n o f P a rm e n id e s, N ietzsch e sides w ith his
o pponent, H e r a c lit u s , b u t g o e s m u c h fu rth e r than this pre-Socratic
master, sin ce h e a ls o d e n ie s th e logos, o r fix e d rational order, which in
H eraclitus u n d e r g ir d e d th e w o r l d - f l u x .” T h u s m an has nothing con­
stant to h o ld o n t o in N ie t z s c h e ’s w o r ld ; his experien ce ofim m anen ce
is that o f a m e ta p h y s ic a l d e s e rt, a y o k e , th e everlastin g undoing o f all
transitory f o r m s a n d th e c o n s ta n t s lip p in g o f bein g from under his
feet.
T h e f o llo w in g q u o t a t io n fr o m th e en d o f W ill to Power, w here, using
a m ixtu re o f p o e t ic a n d s e m is c ie n t ific id io m s, N ietzsch e projects his
“ p o sitive” v is io n o f th e w o r l d , s o u n d s lik e the last o f the pre-Socratic
philosop h ers:

A n d d o y o u k n o w w h a t “ th e w o r l d ” is to m e ? . . . T h is w orld: a
m on ster o f e n e r g y , w i t h o u t b e g in n in g , w ith o u t end; a firm iron
m a g n itu d e o f f o r c e th a t d o e s n o t g r o w b ig g e r o r sm aller, that does
not e x p a n d i t s e l f b u t o n ly tr a n s fo r m s itself; . . . at the sam e tim e
one an d m a n y , in c r e a s in g h e re an d at th e sam e tim e decreasing
there; a sea o f fo r c e s f lo w in g and ru s h in g togeth er, eternally
ch a n g in g , e t e r n a ll y f lo o d in g b a c k w ith trem en d o u s years o f re­
cu rren ce, w i t h an e b b a n d a flo o d o f its fo rm s, o u t o f the sim plest
fo rm s s t r i v in g t o w a r d th e m o s t c o m p le x . . . and then again re­
tu rn in g h o m e to th e s im p le o u t o f th is ab u n d an ce, o ut o f the play
o f c o n tr a d ic tio n s . . . a b e c o m in g th a t k n o w s n o satiety, no dis­

(¡23)
 CHAPTER 5

g u s t, n o w e a rin e ss: th is, m y D ionysian w o r ld o f th e e te r n a lly se lf-

c r e a tin g , th e e te r n a lly s e lf- d e s tr o y in g . . . m y “ b e y o n d g o o d and
e v il,” w ith o u t g o a l, u n less th e j o y o f th e c ir c le is it s e l f a g o al;
w it h o u t w ill, u n less a rin g feels g o o d w i ll to w a r d it s e l f . . . do
y o u w a n t a name fo r th is w o r l d ? . . . this world is the w ill to pow er—
and nothing besides! A n d y o u y o u r s e lv e s are a ls o th is w i ll to
p o w e r— an d n o th in g b esid es! (W ill to Pow er 1067)

T h is fa m o u s p assage (o v e r w h ic h w e are to ld th a t N ic t z s c h e to iled )

seem s to be w r itte n m o r e as a m e ta p h y s ic a l fa b le th a n as a fu ll-fle d g e d
s c ie n tific th e o ry . B u t it c o n v e y s th e k in d o f im m a n e n t w o r ld - e x p e r i-
e n ce w h ic h N ie tz s c h e s u g g e s ts as th e s t u f f o f th e D io n y s ia n a ffirm a ­
tio n .
A n o t h e r p e rtin e n t fab le is etern al r e c u rre n c e , w h ic h d o e s n o t as
m u c h im p o s e a fix e d o rd e r o n th e u n iv e rs e as it d ra m a tiz e s th e in esca p -
a b ility o fim m a n e n c e . F o r it bars a n y p e r s p e c tiv e o f life e ith e r o u tsid e
th e w o r ld o r w ith in it (in s o m e b e tte r fu tu re ) b y w h ic h life in th e p res­
e n t can be red e em ed , g u id e d o r g iv e n m e a n in g to . A n d as life has no
s o u rc e o f m e a n in g b e y o n d itse lf, it m u s t b e e n d o w e d w it h m e a n in g on
the basis o f its in sta n ta n e o u s ch a racter.

Eternal Recurrence and A m o r fati

E te rn a l re c u rren ce, says N ie tz s c h e , is th e c h ie f d o c t r in e ta u g h t b y his

Z a ra th u stra . I sh all n o t d iscu ss th e q u e s tio n w h e t h e r e te r n a l re c u rre n ce
w a s also m e an t as a fu ll-fle d g e d c o s m o lo g ic a l th e o r y , b u t ta k e it as an
e x is te n tia l fab le, e x p re s s in g th e k in d o f s e lf- o v e r c o m in g w h ic h amor
fa ti in v o lv e s . S een in this w a y , ete rn al re c u rre n c e s e rv e s to b e tte r e x ­
p lic a te th e co n te n t o f amor fa ti an d also to te st its e x is te n c e .·54
E te rn a l re c u rre n ce d eriv e s its p r im a r y m e a n in g in N ie t z s c h e as the
th e m e o f a m a jo r act o f a ffirm a tio n . W h e th e r in j o y , r o u tin e o r su ffe r­
in g , and a lth o u g h h e d o es n o t see an in h e re n t p u r p o s e o r re a d y -m a d e
m e a n in g in e x is te n ce , th e D io n y s ia n m a n w i ll sa y “ y e s ” to h is life as it
is b y w is h in g this life to rep eat it s e lf o v e r an d o v e r a g a in , e x a c t ly as it
has b een , w ith o u t a n y n o v e lty , b e tte rm e n t, p r o g r e s s , o r th e lik e . In
G a y Science (35 1), N ie tz s c h e e x p re sse s th is id ea in te r m s o f an acu te
te m p ta tio n an d test:

W h a t i f o n e d ay o r n ig h t a d e m o n w e r e to s n e a k a fte r y o u in to
y o u r lo n e lie s t lo n elin e ss and say to y o u , “ T h is life as y o u n o w liv e
it an d h av e liv e d it, y o u w ill h av e to liv e o n c e m o r e an d in n u m e r ­
ab le tim e s m o re; and th e re w ill b e n o th in g n e w in it, b u t e v e r y
p ain an d e v e r y j o y and e v e r y th o u g h t and s ig h an d e v e r y th in g

(124)
 SP IN O ZA AND NIETZSCHE

im m e a s u r a b ly s m a ll o r g r e a t in y o u r life m u st return to to you—

all in th e s a m e s u c c e s s io n a n d s e q u e n ce . . . W o uld y o u now
th ro w y o u r s e l f d o w n a n d g n a s h y o u r teeth and curse the dem on
w h o s p o k e th u s ? O r h a v e y o u o n c e ex p e rie n c e d a tremendous
m o m en t w h e n y o u w o u l d h a v e a n s w e re d h im , “ Y o u are a God
and n e v e r h a v e I h e a r d a n y t h in g m o r e G o d ly ” ? . . . H o w well
disposed w o u l d y o u h a v e t o b e c o m e to y o u r s e lf and to life to crave
nothing more fe r v e n tly th a n th is u ltim a te etern al co n firm ation and
seal?15

This is the u t m o s t a f f ir m a t i o n o f im m a n e n c e . B y cravin g that every

m om ent, e v e r y p a s s in g “j o y a n d s ig h ” b e rep eated forever, I recognize
the closed h o r iz o n o f im m a n e n c e as th e to ta lity o f existence, and also,
in amor fa ti, t r a n s f o r m th is r e c o g n it io n fro m a burden into a celebra­
tion. It is n o t r e s ig n a t io n , b u t th e a c tiv e j o y o f the self-created man,
liberated fr o m th e e x t e r n a l y o k e o f tran scen d e n t religion , m orality,
utopia, o r m e ta p h y s ic s .
It sh o u ld b e n o t e d th a t w h a t I w is h to b e en d lessly repeated is not
only the c o n t e n t o f e v e r y m o m e n t b u t its v e r y m om entariness. Im­
manence is h e re id e n t ifie d w i t h th e p resen t, w ith w h a t exists now as
m erely tr a n s ito r y ; a n d in w i s h in g it to re c u r tim e and again I equally
wish it to p a ss a w a y ; o r ra th e r, I r e c o g n iz e and accept the m ode o f
being in w h ic h t r a n s ie n c e is th e ru le.
H erein a ls o lie s N i e t z s c h e ’s a lte rn a tiv e to G o e th e ’s Faust. Faust
craves b e in g a b le t o s a y t o th e m o m e n t, “ S tay fo re v e r” ; he wants eter­
nity to be p la c e d in t h i s - w o r l d l y m o m e n ts . N ie tzs c h e does as w ell, but
to him t h is - w o r ld ly m o m e n t s c o n ta in th eir p assin g aw ay w ithin them ­
selves; h en ce N ie t z s c h e c a n n o t te ll th e m o m e n t to stay forever but only
to repeat itse lf fo r e v e r . In th is w a y h e b o th adh eres to the m om ent and
affirms and a c c e p ts its in e v it a b le tran sien ce.
S ig n ifica n tly , N ie t z s c h e a ttr ib u te s e tern al recurren ce to Heraclitus,
his m aster in m a tte r s o f flu x a n d tran sito rin ess. B u t N ietzsch e could
also have fo u n d th is th e m e — c o lo r e d in p essim istic and “ decadent”
tones— in th e P r e a c h e r ’ s c o m p la in t th a t “ th ere is n o n ew thing under
the sun” an d “ th e t h in g th a t h a th b een , it is that w h ich shall be." The
Book o f E c c le s ia s te s c o n c lu d e s th a t all is v a n ity and life is a burden;
whereas Z a r a t h u s t r a a n d h is fo llo w e r s are su p p o sed to m ake the ulti­
mate c o n fir m a tio n o f im m a n e n c e a s o u rc e o f celebration.
Eternal r e c u r r e n c e d r a m a tiz e s th e in e sca p a b ility o f im m anence. In
being p rep a red t o liv e e v e r y m o m e n t o f m y life innum erable times
over and a g a in , I r e n o u n c e a n y c la im o r h o p e fo r a “ n ext w o rld ." Even
my h ope fo r th e fu tu r e d o e s n o t re fe r to a better state o f this w orld (as

( ‘2 5 )
 CHAPTER 5

in K a n t, H e g e l, M a r x , and C h ris tia n and J e w is h e s c h a to lo g y ) , b u t to

th e sam e k in d o f ex iste n ce ta ken o v e r an d o v e r a g a in . W h a t is to replacc
m y p resent life is this sam e life a g a in — th at is, nothing is to rc p la c c m y
p re se n t life. Im m a n en t life is all th ere is; in c a llin g fo r its id e n tica l rep­
e titio n I th ereb y assu m e th e w e ig h t o f im m a n e n c c as m y o n ly h o ri­
z o n .36
B u t w h a t k in d o fim m a n e n c e ? C e r t a in ly an im m a n e n c e v e r y d iffe r­
en t fro m th at o f H e g e l o r S p in o za . In H e g e l, th e h is to ric a l p rog ress
to w a rd fre ed o m and s e lf- k n o w le d g e o ffe rs a p e rs p e c tiv e in w h ic h the
h u m a n race (and th ro u g h it, b e in g itse lf) is to b e a c tu a liz e d . A lth o u g h
th e im m a n e n t w o r ld is all th ere is, it has, s o to s p e a k , an in n e r tran­
sce n d e n t d im e n sio n — the telos (go al) it has to re a lize an d b e c o m e . T h is
also g iv e s tim e a q u a litative ch a racter in H e g e l, as th e m e d iu m o f his­
to rical n o v e lty and ad v a n c em en t. S p in o za a d m its o f n o su ch te le o lo g y ,
and lik e N ie tzs ch e , he v ie w s tim e (o r b etter, d u ra tio n ) as q u a lita tiv e ly
n e u tr a l.37 A t best, the n o tio n o f p ro g re s s in S p in o z a has a s u b je c tiv e
m e a n in g relative to conatus and p erso n a l d esire. A n in d iv id u a l m a y in ­
deed attain a ra tio n al w a y o f life, b u t th is o c c u r s b y m e c h a n is tic causes
an d d o es n o t m an ifest a n y in h e re n t s tru c tu r e o r g o a l o f th e w o rld -
su b sta n ce as such . In o th e r w o rd s , G o d (the u n iv e rse ) is u tt e r ly in d if­
feren t to th e h u m an lo t and to h u m a n eth ic a l an d ra tio n a l a c h ie v e m e n t.
T h is v ie w , o f co u rse, m ak e s S p in o za m u c h m o r e a p p e a lin g to
N ie tz s c h e than H e g e l and his fo llo w e rs . B u t S p in o z a , to o , m u s t be
p e rce iv e d b y N ie tz s c h e as h a v in g his o w n e te rn a lis tic, ra th e r th an his­
to ric a l, fo rm o f “ tran scen d en ce w ith in im m a n e n c e ,” b ec a u se he ac­
cepts th e etern al su b sta n ce and la w s o f n atu re as u n d e r ly in g th e w o rld
o f ch a n g e and as reflectin g the in h eren t ra tio n a lity an d tim e le ssn e ss o f
G o d . E v e n w h a t S p in o za calls natura naturata, th e w o r ld o f fin ite and
tra n s ito ry th in g s, is n o t re a lly in flu x , b ecau se it is e te r n a lly sh ap ed by
natura naturans and b ecause, th ereb y, th e tran sie n t p a rticu la rs h av e their
se lf-id e n tity w h ile th e y last.
M o re o v e r , in th e th ird k in d o f k n o w le d g e an d its a c c o m p a n y in g e x ­
p e rie n ce o f amor dei intellectual is, th e tra n scen d en t e le m e n t o f tim e le ss­
ness is even said to en ter the im m a n e n t p a rtic u la r (th e k n o w in g m in d)
an d tra n s fo rm it in such a w a y as to a b o lish its fin itu d e and m a k e it
a lle g e d ly in fin ite. H e re , th e p e n etra tio n o f e te r n ity in to th e d o m a in o f
tran sien ce has n o t o n ly scien tific, b u t s e m im y s tic a l c o n n o ta tio n s .
N ie t z s c h e ’s etern al re cu rre n ce e x c lu d e s b o th h is to r ic is t an d ete rn al­
istic tra n sce n d e n c e . s* T h e o n ly ete r n ity N ie t z s c h e a d m its is th e endless
re c u rre n ce o f tra n s ito ry states, in w h ic h his D io n y s ia c p h ilo s o p h e r w ill
p la c e all th e w o r th that tra d itio n had a ttrib u te d to p e rm a n e n c e . T h is
w i ll n o t b e p assive re sig n a tio n b u t th e a c tiv e j o y an d v ig o r o f a p erson

(126)
 SPINOZA AND NIETZSCHE

delivered fr o m th e g r ip o f tr a n s ce n d e n t religio n . B u t this, it should be

stressed, is an im m e n s e ly d iffic u lt task w h ic h calls for a new type o f
p sych olo gy an d p e rs o n .
It is essential to see th a t amor fa t i, w ith its celebrating assumption o f
im m anence, ru n s c o u n t e r to n o rm a l h um an p sych olo gy. Ordinary
people, N ie tz s c h e e x p e c ts , w i ll e x p e rie n c e pure im m anence as a yoke
and an o p p re s s io n ; th e ir n a tu ra l re sp o n se to it and to recurrence is pes­
simism and w o r ld - w e a r in c s s , th e d ep ressio n o f their vital powers— or
the various fo r m s o f e s c a p e an d s e lf-d e c e p tio n current in religion and
traditional p h ilo s o p h y ( S p in o z a n o t e x cep ted ). It takes a powerful act
o f defiant a ffir m a tio n , a s u p r e m e “ n eve rth eless,” to transform the
oppression o f im m a n e n c e in to its o p p o s ite , j o y and celebrating power;
and this req u ires a n e w a n d ra re k in d o f p sy c h o lo g y , the one which
constitutes and e x p r e s s e s th e Ubermetisch.
To m ake th is tr a n s fo r m a tio n fea sib le, the individual needs support
from a w h o le n e w c u ltu r e , ba sed u p o n the revaluation o f all values (of
which, th e re fo re , a m o r fa ti a n d re c u rren ce are the cornerstone): “ N o
longer j o y in c e r ta in ty b u t in u n c e r ta in ty ; n o lo n ger ‘cause and effect’
but the c o n tin u a lly c r e a tiv e ; n o lo n g e r w ill to preservation but to
power.” W h ile th ese n e w v a lu e s are d ia m e trica lly opposed to Spinoza’s
teaching, th e re are o th e r s o n w h ic h S p in o za h im s e lf had insisted, like
“ freedom fr o m m o r a lity ; . . . th e a b o litio n o f the ‘w ill’; the abolition
o f ‘k n o w le d g e - in - its e lf.’ ” )9
A m orfati th u s d iffe r s fr o m S p in o z a ’s amor dei not o n ly in content
and m ood b u t a ls o in its m e n ta l s tru c tu re . S p in o za ’s amor dei expresses
a harm onious a g r e e m e n t w i t h th e u n iv e rse , w h ereas amorfati involves
an inner ru p tu re a n d d is ta n c e , b r id g e d b y an act o f defiant affirmation.
This has several im p lic a tio n s .
First, the s tr u c tu r e o f d e fia n t a ffirm a tio n en d o w s the Nietzschean
Ubemensch w ith a g r e a te r s h a re o f a g e n c y than can be credited to its
Spinozistic c o u n te r p a r t. In S p in o z a , a n y p ro g re ss o f the m ind is deter­
mined by c o n tin u o u s , s e m im e c h a n is t ic lines o f lo gical inference and
psychological d e te r m in is m . E v e n lib e ra tio n , on ce attained, was not
caused b y us, b u t “ o c c u r r e d ” to u s. In N ie tzs ch e , h ow ever, a person
attains amor fa ti t h r o u g h an a ct o f d e fia n t assent, b y w h ich he or she
introduces a b re a k in to th e o r d in a r y c o u rs e o f events, negating its nor­
mal (and c o n tin u o u s ) o u t c o m e an d p r o d u c in g its opposite instead.
Thus, even w i t h o u t a d m it t in g free w ill, the p erson m ay be credited
with m ore a g e n c y a n d , in d e e d , fre e d o m in b rin g in g about the ethical
state he o r she v a lu e s .
Second, th e m o m e n t o f ru p tu r e an d d efia n ce precludes all m ystical
connotations fr o m amor fa ti. T h e r e can b e no fo rm ofum'fl mystica here,

(127)
 CHAPTER 5

as in S p in o za , b ecau se th e d e fia n t p o s tu re e n ta ils a d is ta n c e b e tw e e n

th e a ff ir m in g p e rs o n and th e u n iv e rs e h e o r sh e a ffir m s an d lo v e s . Am or
fa ti b rid g e s th is g a p b u t d o e s n o t a b o lis h it; o n th e c o n tr a r y , it m ain ­
tains the ten sio n o f “ n e v e rth e le s s ” as a c o n s ta n t fe a tu re o f itse lf. T h u s
D io n y s u s , th o u g h h e b ears a m y s tic a l n a m e , a c tu a lly s ta n d s fo r a n o n -
m y s tic a l attitu d e.
F in ally, amor fa ti is an o v e r c o m in g o f C h r is t i a n it y — e v e n in its ath e­
istic co v er. P es s im is tic a th eism re m a in s at b o t t o m a C h r is tia n fra m e o f
m in d , b e cau se it d en ies all v a lu e to th e im m a n e n t w o r ld as s u ch . W h at
is m o re C h ris tia n th an fe e lin g m is e ra b le an d o p p r e s s e d in a G o d le ss
u n iv e rse ? It is o n ly w h e n th e te m p ta tio n o f p e s s im is m is re siste d and
th e w o r ld as d iv ested o f all “ s h a d o w s o f G o d ” is a c c e p te d an d e x p e r i­
en ced as a so u rce o f j o y th a t m a n b e c o m e s h is o w n c r e a to r a n d , fo r the
firs t tim e , C h r is tia n ity is o v e r c o m e and D io n y s u s s u p p la n ts C h r i s t .40

T h e Tem ptation o f Pantheism

In th e rare m o m e n ts o f re lig io u s te m p ta tio n , w h e n h is “ g o d - fo r m in g

in stin cts o c c a s io n a lly b e c o m e a liv e ,” N ie t z s c h e c o m e s c lo s e to S p in o za
in p ic tu r in g an im p e rso n a l G o d e x is tin g b e y o n d g o o d a n d e v il:

L e t us re m o v e s u p r e m e g o o d n e s s fr o m th e c o n c c p t o f G o d ; it is
u n w o r t h y o f a g o d . L e t us a ls o r e m o v e s u p r e m e w i s d o m ; . . .
G o d th e supreme pow er— th a t su ffic e s! E v e r y t h i n g f o llo w s fr o m it,
“ th e w o r ld ” fo llo w s fr o m it!

A n d in a d iffe re n t m o o d :

Is it n e cessa ry to e la b o ra te th a t a G o d p re fe rs to s ta y b e y o n d
e v e r y th in g b o u r g e o is an d ra tio n a l? A n d , b e t w e e n o u r s e lv e s , also
b e y o n d g o o d an d e v il? 41

Y e t th ese m o m e n ts o f re lig io u s (an d p a n th e is tic ) te m p ta tio n are d e­

clared to b e “ im p o s s ib le ” an d N ie t z s c h e resists th e m . S p in o z a ’s deus
sive natura, N ie tz s c h e says, b e tra y s th e illic it “ lo n g in g to b e lie v e th a t in
s o m e w a y th e o ld G o d still liv e s ” an d “ th e w o r ld is a fte r all lik e th e old
b e lo v e d , in fin ite . . . G o d .” 42 B u t th is is p r e c is e ly w h a t a m o rfa ti and
re c u rre n ce p re clu d e . E v e n D io n y s u s , th e s y m b o l o f tr a n s ie n t im m a ­
n e n ce , s h o u ld n o t b e d e ified . It is tru e th a t Z a r a t h u s t r a , in an im p r u ­
d e n t m o m e n t, d ecla red th at he w o u ld b e lie v e o n ly in a G o d w h o co u ld
d a n c e ( D io n y s u s ). B u t th is, N ie t z s c h e la te r re a ss u r e s u s , w a s m e r e ly a
m a n n e r o f s p e a k in g , a co u n te rfa c tu a l c o n d itio n a l: “ Z a r a t h u s t r a says he
would, b u t h e w ill n o t ” ; fo r “ Z a ra th u s tra h im s e lf is m e r e ly an atheist;
h e b e lie v e s n e ith e r in o ld n o r in n e w G o d s .” 43

(128)
 SPINOZA AND NIETZSCHE

T he p a n th e is tic te m p ta tio n and its resistance reveal som ething else

to us. A G o d e x is t in g b e y o n d g o o d and e v il could suit Nietzsche’s
critiquc o f m o r a lity , b u t is in c o n g r u o u s w ith his sense o f being in the
world, w ith amor f a t i , a n d th u s is rejected . In resisting the pantheistic
tem ptation, N ic t z s c h c m a k e s it c le a r th a t his phiJosophy is not exclu­
sively co n c e rn e d w i t h a c r itiq u e o f m o r a lity but centers on a revalua­
tion o f the w h o le e x p e r ie n c e o f e x is te n ce . T h e n e w values he seeks are
not m oral o n es b u t e x is te n tia l m o d e s and responses to life (like the love
o f transience, th e j o y in u n c e r ta in ty , etc.); th ey constitute, indeed, a
new p s y c h o lo g y th a t c o u ld n o t c o - e x is t w ith pantheism (just as, on
other g ro u n d s , it is in c o m p a t ib le w it h m ysticism ).

P o litica l Normativeness

Amor fa ti and amor dei a re , o f co u rs e , th e h igh est achievements that

Nietzsche and S p in o z a o f f e r as im m a n e n t p hilosop h ers bound by an
ethics o f s e lf- o v e r c o m in g . B u t th e sam e p rin cip le o f radical imma­
nence also a ffe cts th e ir v i e w s o f th e o rig in s o f p olitical normativeness.
To a cco u n t fo r th e o r ig in o f b in d in g rules o f con d uct in a w orld that
has no in h eren t v a lu e s a n d n o r m s , S p in o za had recourse to the notions
o f contract an d c o n s e n t— a fa c t th a t m ak e s h im one o f the first modern
political p h ilo s o p h e r s a n d a n c h o r s h is p ro to d e m o cra tic v iew s directly
within his d o c tr in e o f p u r e im m a n e n c e . A s there is nothing on earth
or beyond it to g e n e r a te b in d in g n o r m s and o b lig ation s, these can only
be drawn fr o m th e c o n s e n t o f a c tu a l h u m a n bein gs w h o set up a go v­
ernment to use a n d d is tr ib u te p o w e r in th e serv ice o f their natural de­
sires. T h u s it is o n ly w i t h th e sta te and its en fo rceable legislation that
normativeness e m e r g e s in th e w o r l d and m akes sense at all.
This in te rp la y o f c o n s e n t a n d p o w e r stan ds at the heart o f Spinoza’s
view o f p o litic a l a u t h o r ity . C o n s e n t is n eed ed to set up political insti­
tutions and state p o w e r is n e e d e d to k eep th e m in effective existence.
Moreover, c o n s e n t i t s e l f is seen b y S p in o za as a fo rm o f pow er that
checks the p o w e r o f th e sta te. W h e n a g o v e rn m e n t is felt to be unjust
or illegitim ate, th is w i l l u n d e r m in e p o litic a l sta b ility and threaten the
survival o f g o v e r n m e n t. O n th e o th e r h an d , state p o w e r cannot pene­
trate the in d iv id u a l’s m in d a n d d o m in a te his o r her inner thoughts (so
Spinoza, liv in g b e fo r e S ta lin , b e lie v e s ). H e n ce liberal dem ocracy (as
we call it to d ay ) is th e p r e fe r a b le s y s te m , n o t because it em bodies a
priori values o r th e in n a te r ig h t s o f m an , b u t because it is best suited
to reconcile state p o w e r t o th e p o w e r o f th o u g h t and p rocure a rela­
tively stable and p e a c e fu l g o v e r n m e n t. In o th e r w o rd s, Spinoza is an
early d em ocrat, n o t b e c a u s e h e b e lie v e s in transcendental norm s but

(129)
 CHAPTER 5

be cau se d e m o c r a c y is b est s u ite d to a w o r ld fr o m w h ic h th e y are ab­

sen t— a w o r ld o f p u re im m a n e n c e .
In U n k in g p o litic a l a u th o r ity to h u m a n c o n s e n t S p in o z a is o b v io u s ly
a d iscip le o f H o b b e s . B u t he o b je c ts to H o b b e s ’ p e s s im is t ic p o rtray al
o f m a n ’s n atu ral d is p o s itio n to o th e rs ; an d , e s p e c ia lly , h e ta k e s H o b b e s
s e rio u s ly to task as an in c o n s e q u e n tia l n a tu ra lis t. H o b b e s w is h e d to
d e riv e all h u m a n affairs, in c lu d in g p o litic a l a u t h o r ity , fr o m nature
alo n e , b u t d id n o t s tr ic tly ad h ere to his o w n p rin c ip le .
H o b b e s ba sed o b lig a tio n o n th e b in d in g p o w e r o f th e co n tra c t. B u t
w h y k e e p th e o rig in a l c o n tra c t? T h is m e t a - o b lig a t io n H o b b e s cou ld
n o t g r o u n d w ith in th e c o n tra c t itse lf, so h e re le g a te d it to a g r e y area
o f p re c o n tra c t n o rm a tiv e n e s s w h ic h h e ca lle d “ n a tu ra l la w ,” a cu rio u s
n a m e an d p ro b le m a tic c o n c e p t fo r th e s tric t n a tu ra lis t p h ilo so p h e r
H o b b e s cla im e d to be. T h e n o tio n o f p r e c o n tr a c t n o r m a tiv e n e s s flirts
d a n g e r o u s ly w ith th at o f a “ n a tu ra l m o r a l o r d e r ” to w h ic h b o th Sp i­
n o za an d N ie tz s c h e m u st o b je c t. In a d d itio n , H o b b e s ’ c o n s tr u a l o f the
co n tra c t in tro d u c e s a d e g re e o f d is c o n tin u ity b e t w e e n n a tu re and c iv i­
liz e d life. In o v e r c o m in g th e n a tu ra l sta te o f m a n , th e o r ig in a l co n tract
esta b lish es the fo u n d a tio n s o f c iv iliz e d life as a n e w d o m a in , a k in d o f
“ re a lm w ith in a re a lm .” It p ro v id e s fo r a u n iv e rs e w h e r e m a n , th ro u g h
this n e w rea lm , is u ltim a te ly said to s p r in g fr o m n a tu re ; it in c lu d e s the
se m i-a p rio ri m o m e n t o f “ n atu ral l a w ” w it h its d o u b tfu l n atu ralistic
c re d e n tia ls, and causes an in n e r ru p tu re w it h in n a tu re th a t g iv e s rise to
civ iliz a tio n as a s e m i- a u to n o m o u s d o m a in . N a t u r e an d rea so n , the
n atu ral and the c iv iliz e d states, are lin k e d b u t n o t q u it e c o n tin u o u s
w ith each o th er. H o b b e s seem s to d e v ia te fr o m a s tr ic t n a tu ra lis tic m o ­
n ism in fa v o r o f th e v e stig e s o f C h r is tia n (o r P la to n ic ) d u a lis m , to
w h ic h , at th e p rice o f lo g ic a l co h e re n c e , h e m a k e s w h a t se e m s to Sp i­
n o za u n a c ce p ta b le co n c essio n s.
Sp in o za , at least in his o ffic ia l d o c trin e , m a k e s n o s u c h co n c essio n s.
H e co n stru es th e p assage fr o m th e n a tu ra l to th e p o litic a l d o m a in as
c o n tin u o u s , and re c o g n ize s n o “ in n e r le a p ” in n a tu re o r a “ realm
w ith in a r e a lm ” fo u n d e d b y c iv iliz a tio n . S t r ic tly s p e a k in g , th e state o f
n atu re is n o t o v e rc o m e b y th e p o litic a l c o n tra c t b u t c o n t in u e d in a d if­
fe re n t m o d e . T h is is w h y , in th e last an a ly s is an d a fte r a llo w in g for
n e ce s s a ry n u an ces, th e idea th a t “ m ig h t is r ig h t ” h as s tr o n g litera l ap­
p lic a tio n in S p in o za . F o r th is re a so n , h o w e v e r , actual c o n s e n t is need ed
n o less th an th e o rig in a l (and ab stra ct) c o n tr a c t in o r d e r to su stain a
sta b le p o litic a l life. S in c e n o th in g , in c lu d in g th e o r ig in a l c o n tra c t, can
g u a ra n te e th e k e e p in g o f c o n tra c ts , state p o w e r is n e e d e d to en fo rce
th e m ; b u t as state p o w e r ca n n o t c o m p e l th e m in d , it b e c o m e s in d is­
p e n sa b le to a c q u ire th e co n s e n t o f th e g o v e r n e d to th e a u th o r ity o f

(130)
 SPINOZA AND NIETZSCHE

their g o v e r n m e n t. A g a i n w c see h o w S p in o za ’s strict naturalism—

view in g th e s ta te , in c lu d in g a lib e ra l d e m o c ra c y , as a natural play o f
forccs— also sta n d s at th e r o o t o f his d e m o c ra tic tendencies. Spinoza is
a h arb in ger o f m o d e r n lib e r a l d e m o c r a c y (as ^gsinst H ob b es’ tyranni­
cal state) b e c a u s e o f h is s tr ic te r a d h e re n c e to naturalism and the prin­
ciple o f im m a n e n c e .
Spin oza re je c ts H o b b e s ’ g r im an d p essim istic portrayal o f m an’s nat­
ural d is p o s itio n to o t h e r h u m a n s . T o H o b b e s ’ homo hotnini lupus est,
Spinoza re to rts p r o v o c a t iv e ly w i t h homo homini deus est. There is in
man a n atu ral p o t e n tia l t o m u tu a l h e lp and m utual benefit, based upon
conatus and n a tu ra l in te r e s ts . H o b b e s ’ p essim istic picture translates the
Christian m y th o f o r ig in a l sin in to s e cu la r term s, but is still a prisoner
o f this m y th . B y n a tu r e , m a n ’s d is p o s itio n to others depends on cir­
cumstances a n d th e p s y c h o l o g ic a l la w s o f asso ciation and resemblance.
On certain o c c a s io n s t h e y w i l l p r o d u c e riv a lry and envy, on others
em pathy and c o m p a s s io n . M a n is th u s m o r a lly indifferen t by nature—
a p osition th a t no lo n g e r c o n c e a ls re lig io u s m otifs and which
N ietzsche w i ll w e l c o m e c o n t r a H o b b e s , as he w ill also hail Spinoza’s
rejection o f p it y as a k e y s t o n e o f m o r a lity .
N ie tzs ch e ’s D io n y s ia n m e ta p h y s ic s o f p o w e r has frequently been
m isrepresented as a p o lit ic a l d o c t r in e , le a d in g to Bism arckian politics
and also to fa s c is m a n d n a z is m . D is p e llin g these gross distortions and
m iscon ception s ( w h ic h c a n n o t b e d o n e here) d o es n ot, however, pro­
vide us w ith a p o s it iv e p o lit ic a l d o c tr in e th at can be attributed to
N ietzsche. B u t th e re are m a n y n e g a tiv e s : N ie tzs c h e opposed nation­
alism, th e m o d e r n n a t io n - s t a t e , p a tr io tis m , racism , anti-Sem itism , lib­
eralism, s o c ia lis m — in d e e d , th o s e id eas th at w ere m ost o f the new
trends o f h is tim e b a s e d u p o n th e p h e n o m e n o n o f the m ass society. In
denouncing th e s e “ m o d e r n id e a s ,” N ie tz s c h e m ay seem to betray a
taste for s o m e t h in g lik e c o n s e r v a t is m , y e t he d o es so under a mislead­
ing m ask; fo r th e re is v e r y little in th e p ast he w ish es to preserve. He
was a cu ltu ra l ra d ic a l l o o k i n g f o r w a r d to a fu tu re w h ere politics w ould
lose its im p o r ta n c e in h u m a n a ffa irs a lto g e th e r. T h e o n ly “ great poli­
tics’’ he s o m e tim e s h in ts at c o n c e r n s th e u n ific a tio n o f E urop e and the
mixing o f its ra ce s; b u t th is , to o , has a cu ltu ra l g o a l fo r N iezsche, not
a political o n e.
In m o o d , ta ste, a n d s e n s ib ilitie s , N ie t z s c h e m a y indeed be placed on
the " r ig h t- w in g ” s p e c t r u m o f p o lit ic s .44 Y e t b e y o n d these vague gen­
eralizations, a p o s it iv e p o litic a l d o c t r in e can h ard ly be derived from
Nietzsche’s th o u g h t . H is fa ilu r e to p r o v id e such a th eo ry is perhaps in
the first p lace d u e to h is b e in g a p r o f o u n d ly a n tip o litical p hilosopher—
a cultural a r is to c ra t, a l o o f f r o m th e ba se co n cern s o f the mass society

(1 3 1 )
 CHAPTER 5

w h ic h he sn u b s b u t ca n n o t c o p e w ith . A ll p o litic a l id e o lo g ie s rep el him

b e cau se o f th e ir s tr o n g relia n ce o n th e m asses. A n d th e re is little he
d e n o u n c e s in s tr o n g e r te rm s th a n th e m o d e r n c u lt o f p o litic s an d the
state— th a t “ n e w id o l” o f w h ic h Z a r a th u s tr a s t r o n g ly w a rn s his
fo llo w e r s 45 and w h ic h N ie t z s c h e r e p e a te d ly d e c la re s to b e th e e n e m y
o f c u ltu r e .46
T h is a r is to cra tic d isd ain o f p o litic s reflects a d a n g e r o u s c o n fu s io n .
I n e v ita b ly , m o d e r n p o litic s is m ass p o litic s . T o c o m b in c th e d re a m s o f
a rare D io n y s ia n h e ro w ith th e rea lities o f m ass s o c ie t y (as N ie tz s c h c
in o f f m o m e n ts is te m p te d to d o ) is as u n re a lis tic as it is a ca ll fo r abuse.
N ie t z s c h e ’s Vbermetisch ca n n o t b e u n iv e r s a liz e d — th a t is, v u lg a r iz e d —
w ith o u t in c u rrin g lo g ic a l c o n tr a d ic tio n an d s o c ia l an d p o litic a l disas­
ter. F ascism , th o u g h a b h o rr e n t to N ie t z s c h e , is o n e o f th e tr a g ic cari­
catu res o f su ch an im p o s s ib le c o m b in a tio n o f th e a r is to c r a tic an d the
v u lg a r. A s th e s h o p k e e p e r, th e b u s d riv e r, a n d th e p e t t y in te lle c tu a l
w o r k e r are e n d o w e d w ith “ D io n y s ia n ” q u a litie s an d p la c e d b e y o n d
g o o d an d e v il, th e re su lt m u s t a s s u m e o n e r o u s d im e n s io n s . N ie tz s c h e
h im s e lf, o f c o u rs e , w o u ld h av e r e c o g n iz e d in n a z is m e v e r y th in g he
lo a th e d — e x tr e m e n a tio n a lis m an d x e n o p h o b ia , m a s s c u ltu r e and the
c u lt o f th e state, ressentiment and th e id e n t ify in g m a r k s o f a “ sla ve m o ­
r a lit y ” w h ic h can assert th e s e lf o n ly by n e g a t in g o th e rs . Y et
N ie t z s c h e ’s g e n e ra l p a ra ly sis w h e n it c o m e s to d e a lin g w it h p o litical
th e o ry , an d his fa ilu re to p r o v id e an a lte rn a tiv e w a y o f e m a n c ip a tio n
fo r th e o rd in a ry m an (the basis o f p o litic a l t h e o r y in S p in o z a ), place
th e te n sio n and th e d a n g e r o f a b u s e w e ll w it h in th e c o n fin e s o f his
p h ilo s o p h y .47

Spittoza as a Genealogical Scandal

P e rh a p s b ecau se o f th eir s tr ik in g “ d u a litu d e ,” th e p e r s o n o f S p in o za

a lw a y s h a u n ted N ie tz s c h e . “ H e r m it, h a v e I r e c o g n iz e d [ i.e ., un ­
m a sk e d ] y o u ? ” N ie tz s c h e asks in a p o e m , T o S p in o z a . * H a s h e in d eed ?
S o m e o f N ie t z s c h e ’s c o m m e n ts o n S p in o z a w o u ld a p p ly e q u a lly to
h im s e lf A “ s ic k h e r m it” N ie t z s c h e calls S p in o z a , a “ s h y ” a n d “ v u ln e r-

* Lovingly facing the “ one is everything"

am o r dei, happy from comprehension—
Take o ff your shoes! That three times holy land—
— Yet secretly beneath this love, devouring,
A fire o f revenge was shimmering,
T he Jewish G od devoured by Jew ish hatred . . .
H erm it! H ave I recognized you?
— (N ietzsch e, Werke
[L eip zig : K ro n e r, 19 19], 8: 369, m y tran slatio n )

(¡32)
 SPINOZA AND NIETZSCHE

able” m an w h o has p u t o n a “ m a sq u e ra d e” (his geom etrical method)

in o rd e r to s h ie ld h is m o s t p erso n a l p h ilo so p h y fro m a p ryin g, vulgar
w o rld . S h ift in g m e ta p h o r s , N ie tz s c h e also calls Spinoza’s mask a
“ ch a stity b e lt” an d h is p e rs o n a l p h ilo so p h y “ a v irg in .” T h e erotic al­
lusion a g a in a p p lie s to b o th th ese b ach elor-p hilosop h ers (a kinship
N ie tzsch e h ig h lig h t s e ls e w h e re ) and sheds m ore lig h t on the term her­
mit. 4*
Y e t th ese s im ilit u d e s ce ase w h e n N ie tzs ch e com es to the core issue—
the lo v e o f p e r m a n e n c e an d e te rn ity . H ere the enem y-broth ers pattern
takes its fu ll fo r c e . S p in o z a is d en o u n ce d as the sym b o l o f weakness
and d e ca d e n ce , a m a n o p p re s s e d b y his o w n existence, fearful o f the
D io n ysian tr u th , an d u n a b le to co p e w ith the tryin g im plications o f his
ow n d is c o v e r y : th a t im m a n e n t e x iste n ce is all there is.
S k e tc h in g a “ p s y c h o l o g y o f m e ta p h y s ic s" that should apply to all
rationalists s in c e P la to , N ie t z s c h e sin gles o u t Spin oza as the prim e ex­
am ple o f th o s e w h o “ h a v e fe a re d ch a n ge, transitoriness,” a stand which
he says b e tra y s “ a s tr a ig h te n e d s o u l fu ll o f m istrust and evil experi­
ences.” E v e n th e conatus, S p in o z a ’s m o st naturalistic principle, is ex­
posed as “ th e s y m p t o m o f a c o n d itio n o f d istress,” because in stressing
s e lf-p re serva tio n i t p u ts an u n h e a lth y lim itatio n on w ill to power, the
actual p rin c ip le o f life .·19 N o w o n d e r, N ie tzsch e surm ises, that the sur­
vival p rin c ip le h as b e e n a d v a n c e d b y sick philosoph ers “ such as the
tu b e rcu lo s is -s tr ick e n S p in o z a ,” s in ce these p eop le “ indeed suffered
distress.”
T h is is n o t all. N ie t z s c h e g o e s o n to attribute rancor and subtle
ven gefu ln ess to S p in o z a , e v e n as th e p sy c h o lo g ic a l essence o f his work:

T h e se o u tc a s ts o f s o c ie ty , th ese lo n g -p u rsu e d , w ick ed ly perse­

cu ted o n e s — a ls o th e c o m p u ls o r y recluses, the Spinozas and G io r­
dano B r u n o s — a lw a y s b e c o m e in th e end, even under the most
spiritual m a s q u e ra d e , an d p erh ap s w ith o u t bein g themselves
aw are o f it, s o p h is tic a te d v e n g ea n ce -see k ers and poison brewers
(let s o m e o n e la y b a re th e fo u n d a tio n s o f Sp in o za’s ethics and the­
o lo g y ! ) .50

The c o n te x t is N ie t z s c h e 's a tta c k o n th e p hilo so p h er-m artyrs w h o are

supposed to h a v e s u ffe r e d “ fo r tr u th ’s sak e” ; b u t w ith m inor differ­
ences, it is a ls o a fo r m o f ressentiment w h ic h N ietzsch e sees at the root
o f S p in o za ’s e th ic s a n d m e ta p h y s ic s .* In e x p o s in g the “ poison" o f res-

* Ressentiment is th e d o m in a n t a ttitu d e o f the w eak and decadent persons w ho cannot

be assured o f th em se lv es u n less th e y n eg a te others; it is the genealogical source o f the
morality o f g o o d and e v il, w h e r e b y the p sy ch o lo g ica l “ slaves" take subtle vengcance on
their betters by su b je c tin g th em to their o w n inverted values.

(133)
 CHAPTER 5

sentiment in S p in o z a ’s p h ilo s o p h y , N ic t z s c h c n o t o n ly b u rd e n s Sp in oza

w ith th e ills o f ra tio n a lism b u t, p a r a d o x ic a lly , also w it h th e ills o f his
fo refath ers, th e J e w is h p riests th r o u g h w h o m C h r is tia n it y had taken
o ve r th e w o rld .
H e re w e start to n o te th e in c o n g r u e n c e in th e p o r tr a it N ie tz s c h e is
b o u n d to d ra w o f S p in o za . In N ie t z s c h e ’s g e n e a lo g y , th e p h ilo so p h y
o f S p in o za m u st be seen as e x p r e s s in g and r e in fo r c in g th e k in d o f per­
son w ith the fo llo w in g ch a ra c te ristic s. H e is th e lo v e r o f p crm a n en c c,
h en ce a d eca d en t and w e a k p e rso n w h o , o p p re s s e d b y th e b u rd en o f
im m a n e n ce and b y his o w n e x is te n c e , esca p es th e p a in fu l p ersp ectiv e
o f D io n y s ia n tru th to w a rd illu s o r y m e ta p h y s ic a l c o m fo r t . In ad d itio n ,
he is also p etty, fu ll o f ra n co r and m is tru s t, th e m a n o f ressentiment w h o
can assert h im s e lf o n ly b y n e g a tin g o th e rs an d w h o tr a n s fo r m s (or su b­
lim ates) his v e n g e fu ln e ss in to th e cre a tio n o f in v e r te d v a lu e s and the­
ories. S u ch a p erso n is also b o u n d to g lo r if y s u ffe r in g an d p ity , to in­
spire (and su b m it to) g u ilt fe e lin g s an d morsus conscientiae. In sh o rt, he
is b o u n d to b e e x a c tly th e k in d o f p e tty “ s la v e ” m o r a lis t w h o m
N ie tzs c h e ab h o rred and w a s e x h ila r a te d to d is c o v e r th a t S p in o za was
not.
T h u s S p in o za up sets N ie t z s c h e ’s g e n e a lo g ic a l s c h e m e . A lth o u g h a
lo v e r o f p e rm a n en ce and ete rn ity , he is, lik e N ie t z s c h e h im s e lf, a phi­
lo s o p h e r o f p o w e r and j o y , re je c tin g th e m o r a lis m o f g o o d and evil,
g u ilt and p ity, and tr y in g to e x p u r g e th e m in d o f th e n e g a t iv e an d self-
p o iso n o u s e m o tio n s o f e n v y , h ate, r a n c o r an d ressentiment, w h ic h he
sees as a fo r m o f s u ffe rin g th a t d e p re sse s th e v i g o r o f life.
S o m e th in g has g o n e w r o n g in N ie t z s c h e ’s g e n e a lo g y . S p in o z a , his
e n e m y -b ro th e r, p resents h im w it h a s in g u la r c o u n t e r e x a m p le . H e is
b o th a N ie tzs ch e a n and y e t a lo v e r o f re a so n an d p e r m a n e n c e . Sp in o za
is th ereb y a g e n e a lo g ica l scan d al fo r N ie t z s c h e — im p o s s ib le , u n th in k ­
able, y e t e m b a r a s s in g ly real.
S p in o za had alre a d y p la y e d th is u n s e ttlin g ro le in th e p a st. T h e im ­
ag e o f th e v irtu o u s ath eist he p ro je c te d w a s an in to le r a b le scan d al to
his c o n te m p o ra rie s and to la ter g e n e ra tio n s . A t h e is m w a s s u p p o s e d to
lead in e v ita b ly to m o ra l a n a rc h y an d d e s tr u c tiv e v io le n c e ; b u t S p in o ­
z a ’s p h ilo s o p h y o f eth ical re stra in t an d m u tu a l h e lp , to g e t h e r w ith the
le g e n d o f his sa in tly life, se e m e d to a tte s t to th e c o n tr a r y . N ie tzs ch e ,
o f co u rse , is th e first to cla im th a t a th e is m an d b a r b a r is m are n o t the
sam e; b u t he is e m b arrassed b y th e s e m i- D io n y s ia n v ir tu e s Sp in o za
a d v o ca te s and m an ifests d e sp ite his d e ca d e n t ra tio n a lis m . T h is again
h ig h lig h ts th e e n e m y - b r o th e r re la tio n s h ip b e t w e e n th e t w o m e n , fo r it
is b y b e in g p a rtly N ie tz s c h e a n th a t S p in o z a u p se ts N ie t z s c h e ’s o ve r­
s im p lifie d u n m a s k in g o f ra tio n a lism .

(‘ 34)
 SPINOZA AND NIETZSCHE

Can there b e , th e n , a m o r e ra tio n alist N ietzschean? Was Goethe

coming clo se to b e in g o n e ? O r H ein e? I thin k that Freud— our next
topic— w ill g iv e us a b e t te r ca se fo r lo o k in g into this question. Freud
continued th e N ie t z s c h e a n stra n d in th e p h ilo so p h y ofim m anence but
mitigates it w i t h th e s p ir it o f scien ce. T h e fragile yet dependable
achievem ents o f s c ie n c e h e lp us lead a disillusioned life in a Godless
world and a c c c p t anatike (n e c e s s ity ) w ith fo rtitu d e and sobriety; they
also (th ro u gh s e lf - k n o w le d g e ) m a k e p o ssib le a fo rm o f human eman­
cipation w h ic h , h o w e v e r , falls s h o r t o f the dram a o f amor fati or the
rare e x ce p tio n o f amor dei. T h u s F re u d tones d o w n the high-flown lan­
guage and e x p e c ta tio n s o f b o th N ie tz s c h e and Spinoza, but he still is
the m od ern th in k e r th a t c o m e s c lo se s t to both.

(135)
 C H A P T E R 6

Spinoza and Freud:

Self-K now ledge as Em ancipation

F reu d is th e gre a test J e w is h h e re tic o f o u r c e n tu ry . S p in o z a , th re e cen ­

turies earlier, w a s his fo r e m o s t “ b r o th e r in n o n f a it h ” (a te r m co in e d by
H e in e and used b y F reu d ). B o t h o f th e m , an d N ie t z s c h e , w h o is in
m a n y w a y s lik e th em , b e lo n g to a g r o u p o f th in k e rs I h a v e called the
“ p h ilo so p h e rs o f th e d a rk e n lig h t e n m e n t” :1 p e o p le w h o b r o u g h t to
lig h t s o m e th in g p ro fo u n d an d r e v o lu tio n a r y — an d o fte n p e rce iv e d as
d ark and frig h te n in g — a b o u t w h a t w c are an d th e w o r l d w e b e lo n g to.
F ro m M a ch ia v e lli and H o b b e s , to D a r w in an d M a r x , and up to
N ie tz s c h e , F reu d , and H e id e g g e r — and p a s s in g t h r o u g h S p in o z a , as its
u n iq u e an d m o s t d is tu r b in g p a r a d ig m — th is p ro c e s s o f d a r k e n lig h t­
en m e n t p ro v o k e d a sh arp a w a k e n in g fr o m r e lig io u s an d m e ta p h y s ic a l
illu sio n s, in c u rrin g pain and c o n flic t in its w a k e . F o r it c h a lle n g e d ac­
ce p ted s e lf-im a g e s an d e n sh rin e d c u ltu ra l id e n titie s , an d th e re b y en­
d an g e re d a w h o le ra n g e o f v ested p s y c h o lo g ic a l in te r e s ts . B u t fo r these
v e r y rea so n s, it w a s also a m o v e m e n t o f e m a n c ip a tio n , s e r v in g to in­
spire a rich er and m o r e lu c id s e lf- k n o w le d g e in m a n , e v e n at th e p ricc
o f u n fla tterin g co n se q u e n c e s w h ic h o fte n s h o c k an d d is m a y . T h is is the
tru e “ O e d ip a l d r iv e ” — n o t o f F r e u d ’s O e d ip u s b u t o f th e o r ig in a l p ro ­
ta g o n is t o f S o p h o c le s ’ tr a g e d y , o f w h o m F re u d h im s e lf is an av id fo l­
lo w e r. T h e F reu d ia n O e d ip u s th e o r y (re g a rd le s s o f h o w a c cu ra te it
m a y be) is a m o d e m w a y o f fu lfillin g th e w is h o f th e m y t h o lo g ic a l kin g
w h o did n o t rest un til he d is c o v e re d th e h id d e n tr u th a b o u t h im s e lf
and his real s itu a tio n in th e w o r ld , e v e n at th e p r ic e o f t r a g e d y and the
lo ss o f his tw o eyes. F reu d , lik e th e o th e r “ d a r k e n lig h t e n e r s ,” b ro u g h t
to lig h t th e h id d en la y ers in h u m a n e x is te n c e b u r ie d in u n co n s cio u s
d e p th s an d w h o s e b u d d in g c o n s c io u s n e s s has lo n g b e e n rep resse d .
T h e fie rc e resistan ce w it h w h ic h F r e u d ’s d is c o v e r ie s w e r e m e t can
o n ly b e m a tch ed b y th e o u tr a g e d r e v u ls io n th a t S p in o z a ’s v ie w s p ro ­
v o k e d fo r a v e ry lo n g tim e . F reu d , a s e rv a n t o fa n a n k e (“ n e c e s s ity ,” his

( 136)
 SPINOZA AND FREUD

milder fo r m o f amor fa ti), m ig h t have co n so led h im self with the

thought th a t s u c h o p p o s it io n w a s in e v ita b le. Was not his ow n theory
the first to p r e d ic t a n d e x p la in th is rea ctio n by the concepts o f “ repres­
sion" and “ r e s is ta n c e ” ? B u t o n e n eed n o t be a d evou t Freudian to re­
alize h o w d iffic u lt , in d e e d im p o s s ib le , it is to shatter a consoling
w o rld -p ic tu re an d s e lf- im a g e th a t p ro v id e a m easure o f metaphysical
and m o ral c o m f o r t , w i t h o u t in c u r r in g pain and torm ent which easily
turn in to a g g r e s s io n , h o s t ilit y , an d o u tc ries o f sh ock and scandal. The
im age w e m a k e o f o u r s e lv e s is n o t o n ly a cherished possession with
which w c a rc r e lu c ta n t to p art; it is also an in tegral part o f our ego, a
cornerstone o f o u r id e n tity . T h e crisis and sufferin g involved in the
loss o f id e n tity are n o less g r a v e th an th o se in v o lved in the loss o f prop­
erty, and h a v e b e e n k n o w n to p r o d u c e as m u ch passionate aggression
as hum an b e in g s are c a p a b le o f
T h e fa c t th a t b o th S p in o z a an d F reu d w ere J ew s cannot be written
o ff in c o n s id e r in g th e ir u n s e tt lin g cu ltu ra l roles. Freud recognized this
about h im se lf:

N o r is it p e rh a p s e n tir e ly a m a tte r o f chance that the first advocate

o f p s y c h o - a n a ly s is w a s a j e w . T o p ro fe ss b e lie fin this new theory
called fo r a c e rta in d e g r e e o f rea d in ess to accept a situation o f sol­
itary o p p o s it io n — a s itu a tio n w it h w h ic h no one is m ore familiar
than a J e w .2

Replacing th e w o r d psychoanalysis w ith , say, immanence or the identity of

God and nature w i l l m a k e th is s ta te m e n t a p p ly equally to Spinoza.
Spinoza, in h is s o litu d e a n d p e rh a p s b efo re his tim e, anticipates yet
another p h e n o m e n o n w h ic h la te r b e c a m e curren t and w hich Freud
strongly e x e m p lifie s . T h is is th e p h e n o m e n o n o f the m odern Jew who,
having lo s t h is r e lig io u s fa ith a n d m o s t o f the ties that bind him to his
tradition, a b s o rb s m u c h o f th e G e n tile cu ltu re around him (usually in
its m ore u n iv e rs a l, le s s d e n o m in a tio n a l aspects), in w hich he perfects
him self an d o fte n e x c e ls , b u t w h ic h , in th e process, he frequently also
challenges o r trie s to r e v o lu t io n iz e . (W e m et a sim ilar pattern in Heine,
Hess, and M a r x .) L i k e S p in o z a , F reu d w a s the stranger within the
gates, n e ith e r q u it e in te g r a t e d in his ad o p ted so ciety nor fully severed
from his o r ig in s , a m a n b o th w it h in and w ith o u t, or better, whose way
o f being w ith in w a s b y h is b e in g an o u tsid er, w ith o u t. Th is made him
detached b u t n o t a lo o f, s o b e r b u t n o t cy n ica l; he m aintained an interest
in ch a n gin g re a lity , w h ic h h e c o u p le d w ith rem arkable clearsighted­
ness, u n m a rred b y d e v o t io n to ru lin g id e o lo g ie s or by a slavish respect
for social an d r e lig io u s ta b o o s . S u c h a p erso n , b y his situation, may be
better placed to u n c o v e r th e h id d e n la yers o f life and the m ind which

(137)
 CHAPTER 6

o th e r p erson s, b e tter in te g ra te d in th e r u lin g c u ltu r e , w i ll b e p ro n e to

m iss e v e n i f th eir in te lle c tu a l g ifts eq u a l o r su rp a ss h is.

Freud an d P h il o s o p h y

F reu d w a s a m b iv a le n t to w a rd p h ilo s o p h y . In his y o u t h he h ad studied

s o m e p h ilo s o p h y w ith F ra n z B r e n ta n o (and o th e r m e m b e r s o f his
sch o o l) b u t n eve r c o m p le te d h is stu d ies, a fa c t w h ic h m a y h av e m ade
h im o v e rsen sitiv e o n th e s u b je c t o f p h ilo s o p h y . F re u d read p h ilo ­
so p h ic a l b o o k s w ith in te rest, b u t also w it h s u s p ic io n . W h a t p u t him
o f f w a s the “ sp e c u la tiv e ” n a tu re o f p h ilo s o p h y , w h ic h h e s a w as o p ­
p o se d to the “ s c ie n tific ” o r “ e m p ir ic a l” c h a ra c te r h e a ttrib u te d to his
o w n in v e stig a tio n s. T h is , a c c o r d in g to F re u d , w a s th e re a so n he never
m ad e a th o ro u g h s tu d y o f N ie tz s c h e — n o t b e c a u s e N ie t z s c h e w a s alien
to h im , b u t p re cis e ly th e co n tra ry . F re u d s a y s h e fe lt s o d ra w n to
N ie tz s c h e and ak in to his w o r ld th a t h e s to p p e d r e a d in g h im fo r fear
o f b e in g biased b y a s p e c u la tiv e th in k e r o n m a tte rs th a t d em an d a
p u re ly e m p irica l a p p ro a ch .
N o t all F reud sch o la rs w o u ld a c c e p t th is s ta te m e n t at face value.
F reud m a y have been b e tte r a c q u a in te d w ith N ie t z s c h e th a n he was
w illin g to a d m it. It is n o te w o r t h y th a t F re u d h ad a s im ila r p ro b le m
w ith S c h o p en h a u er— and he tried to s o lv e it, o r at lea st s u m m e d it up,
w ith th e fo llo w in g c o m m e n t:

Y o u m a y p erh ap s s h ru g y o u r s h o u ld e rs an d say: “ T h a t is n ’t nat­

ural science, it ’s S c h o p e n h a u e r’s p h ilo s o p h y ! ” B u t , L a d ie s and
G e n tle m e n , why should not a bold thinker have guessed something that
is afterwards confirmed by sober and painstaking research?3

T h is re m a rk , w h ic h th r o u g h his im a g in a r y a u d ie n c e F re u d seem s to
be ad d re ssin g to h im s e lf, a p p lies also to h is a ttitu d e tow ard
N ie tzs c h e — and to S p in o z a .4

F reud’s References to Sp in o za

F reu d h a rd ly ev er m en tio n s S p in o za b y n a m e ; b u t w h e n h e d o e s, it is
a lw a y s to a c k n o w le d g e th e ir c lo se a ffin ity . H e r e a g a in is a p h ilo so p h e r
w h o s e p r o x im ity to h im s e lf F reu d m u s t trea t w i t h ca u tio n . In the
F reu d ia n co rp u s th ere ap p ear to b e o n ly th re e d ir e c t r e fe re n c e s to Sp i­
n o za , w r itte n at d iffe re n t tim e s y e t s h o w in g r e m a r k a b le co n sisten cy.
T h e y all reiterate the sam e idea: F re u d an d S p in o z a sh a re a sim ilar
“ m o d e o f th in k in g ” and a c o m m o n “ a t m o s p h e r e ” in th e ir b ack­
g ro u n d s .

(1 3 8 )
 SPINOZA AND FREUD

In his essay “ L e o n a r d o da V in c i and a M e m o ry o f His C h ildhood”

(1910), F reu d says:

Because o f his in s a tia b le an d in d efa tig a b le thirst for knowledge,

L eon ard o has b e e n c a lle d th e Italian Faust. B u t . . . the view may
be h azard ed th a t L e o n a r d o ’s d e v e lo p m e n t approaches Spinoza’s
mode 0/thinking. (Standard Edition 9: 75; em phasis added)

Years later, D r . L o t h a r B ic k e l, a S p in o zist w ith psychoanalytic lean­

ings, d e m a n d e d o f th e o ld F re u d a sta tem en t o f his debt to Spinoza and
an e x p lan atio n w h y S p in o z a ’s n a m e is hardJy m entioned. Freud repJies
frankly and w i t h o u t h e s ita tio n :

/ readily admit m y dependence on S p in o za ’s doctrine. There was no

reason w h y I s h o u ld e x p r e s s ly m e n tio n his nam e, since I con­
ceived m y h y p o t h e s e s fr o m th e atmosphere created by him, rather
than fr o m th e s t u d y o f h is w o r k . M o re o v e r, Ì did not seek a philo­
sophical le g i t im iz a t io n .5

Freud’s r e p ly a tte sts to h is “ d e p e n d e n c e ” on S p in o za’s doctrine, not in

its letter b u t in th e in te lle c tu a l clim a te and “ atm osphere” it created.
The affin ity b e t w e e n th e m is so g re a t that Freud feels Spinoza could
have p ro v id e d h im w i t h p h ilo s o p h ic a l leg itim atio n , had Freud felt the
need for on e; b u t, as in re a d in g N ie tz s c h e , Freud shuns the unsolicited
legitim ation an d th e s p e c u la tiv e in flu en c e to w h ic h he m igh t have sub­
mitted fro m a p h ilo s o p h e r m u c h to o d a n g e ro u sly akin to himself.
Shortly a fte r th is e p is o d e , F re u d w a s asked to contribute a paper to
a volum e c o m m e m o r a t in g S p in o z a 's three h undredth anniversary.
Freud d eclin ed , s a y in g h e h a d n o th in g special to offer, but nonetheless
took the o p p o r t u n it y to re s ta te his feelin g fo r Spinoza in extrem ely
strong la n g u a g e :

T h ro u g h o u t m y lo n g life I [tim id ly ] sustain ed an extraordinarily

high resp ect fo r th e p e r s o n as w e ll as fo r the results o f the thought
[Denkleistung] o f th e g r e a t p h ilo s o p h e r S p in o za .6

Freud uses far s t r o n g e r w o r d s th an m ere d eco ru m w o uld require.

His sin cerity is e v id e n t. N o r is it in s ig n ific a n t that Freud’s “ extraordi­
narily h igh r e s p e c t” a tta c h e s to S p in o z a ’s person n o less than to his
philosophical a c c o m p lis h m e n t . In th e fig u re o f Spinoza Freud could
see a reflection o f h im s e lf — a s o lita r y y o u n g revolution ary, adhering to
a truth e x ca v a ted fr o m u n d e r th e su rfa ce o f the ruling culture, and fac­
ing h o stility an d ^ c o rn as a re s u lt. S p in o za is a kin d o f distant brother
to Freud, his b r o th e r in th e h o n e s t y o f his th o u g h t and the difficulties
of his path , in h is s o litu d e an d his gen iu s. Indeed, Freud indirectly

(139)
 CHAPTER 6

(th ro u g h H ein e) refers to S p in o z a as his “ b r o th e r in n o n f a it h ,” 7 a Jew

w h o has lo s t his faith y e t c o n tin u e s to b e a r th e traits o f th e J e w b o th in
his o w n e ye s and, ev en m o r e so , in th e e y e s o f th e o u ts id e w o r ld .

Freud, Leonardo, and S p in o za

A n e x a m in a tio n o f w h a t F reu d says a b o u t L e o n a r d o w i ll h elp us to

b e tte r u n d ersta n d th e c o m p a r is o n b e t w e e n h im s e lf a n d S p in o za and
s h o w h o w s o m e o f S p in o z a - lik e traits th a t F re u d fin d s in L e o n a r d o are
also, to a ce rta in e x te n t, tru e o f h im .
T h e k e y to L e o n a r d o ’s ch a racter, says F re u d , lie s in his v ie w that
“ o n e has n o rig h t to lo v e o r to h ate a n y t h in g i f o n e h as n o t a cq u ire d a
th o r o u g h k n o w le d g e o f i t s n a tu re .” 8 L e o n a r d o — lik e F re u d h im s e lf and
lik e S p in o za — restrain s h is d esires, h is e ro s , u n til h e lea rn s an d u n d er­
stands; and he m a k es k n o w le d g e it s e l f in to h is p a s s io n (cf. S p in o z a ’s
conatus intelligendi). T h u s — a g a in lik e S p in o z a a n d lik e F re u d — L e o ­
n a rd o “ did n o t lo v e an d h ate, b u t a sk e d h im s e lf a b o u t th e o r ig in and
s ig n ific a n c e o f w h a t he w a s to lo v e o r h a te .”
L ik e S p in o za , w h o in v e s tig a te d th e m o s t v io le n t p a s s io n s o f th e h u ­
m an s o u l as i f he w e r e d e a lin g w it h g e o m e t r ic fo r m s , an d lik e Freud,
w h o s tu d ie d th e m o s t d is tr e ss in g and “ d is g u s t in g ” o f h u m a n instin cts
w ith th e scie n tis t’s a n a ly tic c o o l, so L e o n a r d o p u r s u e d h is in v e s tig a ­
tio n s fro m a p o s itio n o u ts id e g o o d an d e v il an d fre e o f lo v e an d hate.
B u t L e o n a r d o d o e s n o t d e n y e ro s o r re p re s s it: h e s im p ly suspen ds
it. E r o s is c o n v e rte d in to th e p a s s io n fo r k n o w l e d g e a n d th u s is able
in th e en d to m a n ifest it s e lf in all its p o w e r . H e r e w e m a y b e rem in d ed
o f S p in o z a ’s h ig h e s t d e g re e o f k n o w le d g e in w h ic h e r o s , in th e su b li­
m a te d fo r m o f the “ in te lle c tu a l lo v e o f G o d ,” fin a lly e ru p ts as th e m ost
p o w e r fu l affe ct o f th e h u m a n s o u l. “ F o r in t r u t h ,” says L e o n a rd o ,
“ gre a t lo v e s p rin g s fr o m g re a t k n o w le d g e o f th e b e lo v e d o b je c t, and if
y o u k n o w it b u t little y o u w i ll b e a b le to lo v e it o n ly a little o r n o t at
all. . . .” T h is w a s S p in o z a ’s v ie w a lm o s t e x a c tly , at le a s t as re g a rd s the
h ig h e s t (th ird) d e g re e o f k n o w le d g e . T h e lo v e o f G o d — th a t is, o f the
n a tu ra l u n iv e rs e in its a b s o lu te an d ra tio n a l n e c e s s ity — d o e s n o t burst
fo rth as fu z z y en th u sia sm o r an o th e r w is e o p a q u e an d im m e d ia t e e m o ­
tion ; it is rath er m e d ia te d b y th e in te lle c t an d its s c ie n t ific k n o w le d g e
w h ic h , at its h ig h e s t, p ro d u c e s a p o w e r fu l a ffe c t th a t tr a n s fo r m s and
lib e rate s th e k n o w e r ’s life an d p e rs o n a lity . T h is is a fo r m o f s e m ire li­
g io u s e x a lta tio n w h ic h F reu d , f o llo w in g E d m u n d S o lm i, id e n tifie s in
L e o n a r d o ’s w r itin g s as w e ll. “ O mirabile necessita!” L e o n a r d o cries out
in a v e in n o t far fr o m S p in o z a ’s w h e n , at th e e n d o f a p a in s ta k in g and
d e ta ile d s tu d y , he d is c o v e rs h o w all th in g s c o m b in e a n d co alesce
w ith in th e g ra n d tissu e o f th e u n iv e rs e . S c ie n c e g iv e s h im an in k lin g ,

(140)
 SPINOZA AND FREUD

p ow erfu l an d v i v i d , o f “ th e g r a n d e u r o f th e universe w ith all its com­

p lexities" an d th e n e c e s s it y o f its la w s , w h ic h m akes him “ readily for­
get his o w n in s ig n ific a n t s e l f ” ;5 an d S o lm i, w ith Freud’s approval,
co m m ents th a t h e re is a “ tr a n s fig u ra tio n o f natural science into a sort
o f re lig io u s e m o t i o n ” — a p a tte r n th a t is also essential in Spinoza.
T h e lin k F r e u d e s ta b lis h e s b e tw e e n L eo n ard o and Spinoza betrays
his o w n t h in k in g . H e p a r t ly r e c o g n iz e s h im s e lf in their comparison.
Freud also s u s p e n d e d e r o s an d s u b lim a te d its p o w er into a relentless
drive to k n o w . T h is h e lp e d h im p e n etra te his o w n repressions into the
d im m est an d m o s t t r o u b le d re cesses o f the m ind; it also gave him
strength to p e r s e v e r e in th e fa c e o f h o stile resistance from others. Hav­
ing “ c o n v e r te d h is p a s s io n in to a th irst fo r k n o w le d g e , he then applied
h im self to in v e s t ig a t io n w i t h th e p ersisten ce, constan cy and penetra­
tion w h ic h is d e r iv e d f r o m p a s s io n .” 10 T h e s e w o rd s, by w hich Freud
describes L e o n a r d o (a n d th r o u g h h im , Sp in o za), serve as his own self-
portrait. F re u d to o h a d u n d e r g o n e a sim ila r sublim ation ; like Leonardo
and S p in o za , h e s u s p e n d s lo v e an d h ate, valu e ju d gm en ts, good and
evil, and ste p s b e y o n d th e m in c o n te m p la tio n o f the w o rld 's necessity.
A s F reu d w i l l a g r e e w i t h N ie t z s c h e , n o pure, idealistic “ will to
kn o w le d g e ” is in v o l v e d h e re . It is ero s set against its o w n doings, sub­
limated in w a y s th a t a l lo w it to c r a c k the defenses it had previously
erected. T h u s F r e u d j o i n s n o t o n ly S p in o za and Leonardo but also
N ietzsche in th e w i s h to m a k e o f k n o w le d g e the m ost pow erful affect
(see N ie t z s c h e ’s p o s t c a r d q u o t e d in ch a p . 5).
Freud, h o w e v e r , tr a c e s h is o w n p ath w ith in this larger intellectual
family. H e o b je c t s to N ie t z s c h e ’s d is c r e d itin g o f science, but also to
the s e m im y s tic a l e x p e c ta tio n s th a t S p in o za and Leonardo had o f sci­
ence." U n til L e o n a r d o a tta in s h is g o a l o f k n o w le d g e , eros is power­
fully ke p t in c h e c k a n d r e s h a p e d b y th e in tellectu al process; then, at the
end, it b u rsts fo r th as a k in d o f r e lig io u s exaltatio n , taking up a uni­
versal c o s m ic d im e n s io n . T h is is n o t u n lik e the link that exists in Spi­
noza b e tw e e n th e a d v a n c e o f k n o w le d g e and its affective clim ax in amor
dei inlelleclnalis. F r e u d t o o se es k n o w le d g e as an ethical force and lib­
erator— b u t w i t h in m u c h n a r r o w e r co n fin e s and w ith n o such broad
m etaphysical im p lic a t io n s . F re u d d eals in therapy, n ot salvation; and
even w h e n c o n s id e r in g th e w o r ld at la rg e he rem ains prosaic and ra­
tionalistic th r o u g h o u t .

T he C l im a t e o f Id e a s

To a certain e x te n t b o t h S p in o z a an d F reud e x e m p lify the situation o f

the Jew w h o , a b a n d o n in g h is o r t h o d o x trad ition w ith o u t being inte­

<‘ 4‘ )
 CHAPTER 6

g ra te d in th e C h ris tia n w o r ld , d e v e lo p s a p e n e tr a tin g e y e fo r both

w o r ld s and th e a b ility to free h im s e lf fr o m th e ir c o n v e n tio n s . A s a
resu lt, F reud and S p in o za b e c a m e u n c o m p r o m is in g c r itic s o f h istorical
re lig io n , a d h e rin g to a ra d ica l p h ilo s o p h y o f im m a n e n c e w h ile d e n y ­
in g a n y tran scen d e n t h o r iz o n to e x is te n c e . T h e r e are o n ly natural
p h e n o m e n a , th o u g h th e m e a n in g o f n a tu re is e x p a n d e d b y b o th th in k ­
ers to in c lu d e th e p s y c h ic d o m a in . M o r e o v e r , th e k n o w l e d g e o f nature
acq u ires sp iritu a l d im e n s io n s . In S p in o z a , it e v e n e n g e n d e r s m ental
states w h ic h , at th eir h e ig h t, riv a l th o s e o f r e lig io n , w h e r e a s in Freud,
the u n c o m p r o m is in g ath eist, it g iv e s rise to a m o r e lim it e d fo r m o f
h u m a n e m a n c ip a tio n .
W ith all th eir n a tu ra listic d e te r m in is m , b o th F re u d a n d S p in o z a are
m o tiv a te d , p erh ap s p a ra d o x ic a lly , b y th e p a th o s o f h u m a n lib e ra tio n —
lib e ra tio n n o t o n ly fr o m illu s io n s an d in h ib it io n s , b u t fr o m w h at
F reu d called “ n e u ro s e s ” and S p in o z a “ b o n d a g e ” to th e p a s s io n s . T h is
lib e ra tio n is h a rd -w o n and p a in fu l, fo r c in g as it d o e s a n e w u n d er­
s ta n d in g and s e lf-im a g e o n m a n , free o f illu s io n s an d m e ta p h y s ic a l
s e lf-fla tte ry.
F reu d sh ares S p in o z a ’ s re fu ta tio n o f th e im a g e o f m a n as e n d o w e d
w ith a G o d - g iv e n s o u l, selfless m o t iv e s , o r a tr a n s c e n d e n ta l m in d sep­
arate fr o m n atu re and ca p a b le o f m o d if y in g an d m a n ip u la tin g nature
fr o m w ith o u t. H u m a n b e in g s are f u lly in te g r a te d in n a tu re an d arc
m o v e d b y a d o m in a n t n atu ral s tr iv in g o r s o u r c e o f e n e r g y (conatus in
S p in o za , libido in F reu d ), w h ic h stre a m s fo r th in a v a r ie t y o f outlets,
an d o f w h ic h k n o w le d g e and th e p r o d u c ts o f h ig h c u ltu r e are b u t su b­
lim a te d co n fig u r a tio n s . T h is has an ir r ita tin g r in g in th e ears o f tradi­
tio n a l b e lie v ers, w h e th e r re lig io u s o r m e ta p h y s ic a l, w h o are used to
th in k in g o f m an as h a lfw a y b e tw e e n a n im a l a n d a n g e l. M o r e o v e r , in
v ie w o f th e n atu ral d e te r m in is m w h ic h th e y h o ld to r e ig n e n tir e ly over
h u m a n life , F reu d an d S p in o za p r o b e th e fie r c e s t p a s s io n s an d m ost
c o m p le x a b erra tio n s o f th e h u m a n s o u l w i t h th e c o ld e y e o f n ecessity.
T h e y abstain fro m all m o r a liz in g ; th e y s u s p e n d th e ir o w n fears and
a n x ie tie s, th eir p assio n s and h o p e s , an d th e te m p ta tio n to a llo c a te g u ilt
an d to assu m e p o w e r th r o u g h p o n t ific a tin g . In s te a d , th e y penetrate
in to th e o b je cts o f th eir in v e s tig a tio n w i t h c o o l in te lle c tu a l askesis—
w h ic h N ie tz s c h e c ritic ize d in S p in o z a 12 b u t w h ic h F r e u d a c ce p ts as a
v ita l in g re d ie n t in th e “ a tm o s p h e r e ” h e has in c o m m o n w i t h S p in o za.
H e , to o , treats th e d a rk e st p a ssio n s o f th e s o u l as i f th e y w e r e lines,
su rfa ce s, an d b o d ie s , e x c e p t th a t h is s c ie n tific id io m is n o lo n g e r g e o ­
m e tr ic a l.13
T h e c lim a te o f id eas th a t F reu d sh ares w i t h S p in o z a is n atu ralistic
an d d e te r m in is tic , y e t th e m e a n in g o f “ n a t u r e ” is e x p a n d e d in b o th to

(‘ 42)
 SPINOZA AND FREUD

includc th e p s y c h ic (e v e n th e lo g ic a l) d o m a in . N ature acquires an ad­

ditional d e p th d im e n s io n ; in F re u d it in clud es the psychological depths
o f the u n c o n s c io u s , a n d in S p in o z a it takes the fo rm o f the attribute o f
“ th o u g h t,” in w h ic h n a tu r e is in te r n a lly reflected and w hich is consid­
ered an in te g ra l p a rt o f n a tu re . T h e r e are indeed o n ly natural phenom­
ena, b u t n a tu re is n e ith e r m a tte r alo n e , n o r is it exhausted by its appar­
ent surface. T h e k in d o f n a tu r a lis m w h ic h F reud shares w ith Spinoza
can th e refo re b e s a id to b e n e ith e r m aterialistic n or positivist.
W hile S p in o z a v i e w s n a tu re as a s in g le substance to w hich he trans­
fers the d iv in ity a n d th e u n iq u e n e s s o f G o d , Freud avoids such panthe­
istic o v e rto n es. H is c o n c e p t (an d ex p erie n c e) o f nature remains prosaic
and critical (e v e n in th e K a n tia n sense) th ro u g h o u t. Th ere is no single
totality in F re u d c a lle d “ n a tu r e .” T h e r e are natural phenomena, but
nature as su ch is n o t re ifie d in to a s in g le substance, let alone a divine
one.
T h e d ep th d im e n s io n in n a tu re has fu rth e r im plications. Both Freud
and S p in o za p o s t u la t e h id d e n fo r c e s w h ic h m o tiv a te and determine the
human m in d w i t h o u t it b e in g a w a re o f th em . T h is ignorance produces
a wealth o f m y s t i f y i n g f ic tio n s th a t m a sk h um an existence to itself
D eterm in ism , as m e n ta l th e r a p y , is p rim a rily concerned w ith this type
of hidden c a u s a tio n , s ta tin g its e x is te n c e w h ile m akin g it a purely nat­
ural and e x p lic a b le p h e n o m e n o n . In F reu d , the covert forces take an
additional d im e n s io n , as a n e w k in d o f “ d e m o n s ” that control human
fate; yet th ere is n o t h in g m a g ic a l a b o u t th em , fo r they are exposed as
purely n atu ral, are lo c a t e d in th e in n e r d epth s o f the m ind itself, and
are capable o f b e in g “ e x o r c is e d ” th ro u g h k n o w le d g e and interpreta­
tion. T h is, in d e e d , is th e g e r m o f lib e ra tio n in bo th Spinoza and Freud:
admitting th e e x is te n c e o f th e c o v e r t a g e n ts w h ile d em ystifyin g them
through k n o w le d g e and tr a n s fo r m in g th eir effects through self-
knowledge.

T he C r it iq u e o f R e l ig io n

Spinoza sees all f o r m s o f h is to r ic a l re lig io n as superstition (siiperstitio)

and vain re lig io n (vana religio)', h e w ish e s to see it grad ually abolished
and replaced w i t h a r e lig io n o f re a so n , o f w h ic h he conceives two
forms, p o p u la r a n d p h ilo s o p h ic a l. F reu d sees all form s o f religion as
illusion, the p r o d u c t o f h u m a n a n x ie t y and o u r sense o f im potence in
the w orld, w h ic h c r e a te th e n e e d fo r sh elter and protection. It is the
intense w ish to s a t is fy th is n e e d th a t en g e n d e rs the universe o f religious
beliefs and im a g e s as a s y s te m w h o s e aim is im aginary w ish-fulfill-
mcnt.

( ¡ 43)
 CHAPTER 6

H e re F reu d jo in s S p in o z a in a d o p tin g th e c la s s ic p o s it io n o f the En­

lig h te n m e n t, o r ev en o f th e ra tio n a lis t c r itic s o f r e lig io n w h o , since
E p ic u ru s , tried to re d u c e v a rio u s r e lig io u s m a n ife s ta tio n s to a fe w nat­
ural p h e n o m e n a , e s p e c ia lly to fear in its v a r io u s fo r m s and to ig n o ­
ran ce o f true causes, th e re b y d e p r iv in g r e lig io n o f its c la im to m eta­
p h y s ic a l statu s and in s is tin g o n its re p re s s iv e s o c ia l ro le .
T h is w a s n o t a p u re ly d is in te re ste d a n a ly sis: it h ad a p o le m ic a l and
e m a n c ip a to ry aim . T h e ra tio n a lists b e lie v e d — a n d th e o ld F reu d , the
a u th o r o f Future o f an Illusion, h e s ita n tly e n d o r s e d th e ir a ssu m p tio n
(w as this his illu sio n ?)— th a t a p e rs o n w h o g ra s p s th e n a tu ra l causes o f
th e re lig io u s m y s tific a tio n o f w h ic h he o r sh e h as b e e n a v ic t im w ill
th e re b y be set o n th e ro ad to lib e ra tio n . O n c e th e p s y c h o s o c ia l factors
at w o r k b e h in d h er im a g in in g h a v e b een m a d e c le a r to th e s u b je c t, she
w i ll realize th at h er re lig io u s fa ith is a c tu a lly a fo r m o f b o n d a g e : to her
in stin cts, to h er fears, to h er ig n o r a n c e , an d to th e s o c ia l an d religio u s
e sta b lis h m e n t o f th e c le r g y w h ic h d ra w s its p o w e r fr o m h e r fears and
ig n o ra n c e and p e rp e tu ates th e ir re p re s s iv e e ffe c ts b y m e a n s o f san cti­
fied in s titu tio n s and ritu als.
B u t w h a t sh o u ld rep la ce h is to ric a l r e lig io n ? H e r e a m a jo r d ifferen ce
separates F reud fro m S p in o za . S p in o z a p r o p o s e s a k in d o f un iversal
re lig io n in w h ic h th e p o w e rs o f p a s s io n a n d th e im a g in a tio n w ill be
resh ap ed in to an e x te rn a l im ita tio n o f re a so n . T h is r e lig io n is destined
fo r th e m asses; it d e m a n d s n o t d o g m a t ic b e lie f, o n l y s o c ia lly ben eficial
actio n , an d its p recep ts are su b je c t to th e in te r p r e t a t io n o f th e p olitical
au th o ritie s. T o th e m in o r ity o f tru e p h ilo s o p h e r s S p in o z a p ro p o se s a
h ig h e r id eal, th e in te lle c tu a l lo v e o f G o d , w h ic h is s u p p o s e d to attain
b y the p o w e r o f rea so n th e sa m e a b s o lu te g o a ls th a t m y s tic is m and
h isto rical re lig io n h ave c la im e d and v a in ly tr ie d to a c h ie v e b y irrational
p ractices.
A ll th e p o w e r, th e p le n itu d e (F re u d w o u ld say: all th e libido) o f tra­
d itio n a l re lig io n has b een p o u re d h ere in to a p h ilo s o p h ic a l- e th ic a l sys­
te m e n tire ly o rie n te d to w a rd th is w o r ld . T h e s o u l’s u n it y w it h G od
w h ic h m y s tic s u sed to seek a b o v e an d b e y o n d th e w o r l d is to be real­
ize d in this e a rth ly w o r ld , f o llo w in g a n a tu ra l p r o c e s s b y w h ic h we
c o m e to k n o w th e u n iv e rs e b y its ra tio n a l la w s a n d to k n o w o u rselves
v ia th e th ird k in d o f k n o w le d g e as p a rt o f t h e n a t u r e - G o d . T h is k n o w l­
e d g e has an in tu itiv e p o w e r o f illu m in a tio n ; an d it e n g e n d e r s a m ost
p o w e r fu l lo v e (an o th e r m y s tic a l p ara lle l). Y e t th e lo v e o f th e p h ilo so ­
p h e r to w a rd th e u n iv e r s e - G o d is n o t th e s a m e as th e m y s t i c ’s lo v e , for
it is im p e rso n a l and in te llec tu a l. G o d is n o t a p e r s o n an d has n o sin­
g u la r co n scio u sn ess; th e re fo re he can b e lo v e d a n d b e u n ite d w ith o n ly
b y m e an s o f in tellec tu a l u n d e rs ta n d in g . The la tte r, h o w e v e r (as
N ie tz s c h e realized ), b e c o m e s th e m o s t p o w e r fu l a ffe c t, tr a n s fo rm in g

( ¡ 44)
 SPINOZA AND FREUD

one’s w h o le life a n d p e r s o n a lit y an d se rv in g as a springboard to the

secular k in d o f s a lv a tio n S p in o z a s o u g h t.
N o th in g o f th is is fo u n d in F re u d . F reud o ffers no substitute for
absolute r e lig io n a n d , lik e N ie t z s c h e , he w o u ld certainly have rejected
Spinoza’s id ea o f s e c u la r s a lv a tio n as y e t another illusion. Atheism ,
says Freud ( w i t h o u t c o n c e a lin g his s u b scrip tio n to it), m ust resign it­
self to m a n ’s im p o t e n c e in th e u n iv e rs e w ith o u t seeking illusory com ­
pensations; all th a t is o p e n to it are fo rtitu d e , sobriety, and a modest
measure o f s e lf - k n o w l e d g e . (S a rtre , to o , in m an y w ays Freud’s disci­
ple, cam e to see a th e is m n o t s im p ly as la ck o f faith but as an active
attitude to w a r d life w h e r e r e d e m p tio n is no lo n g e r a concept on the
horizon; an d th e la te r S a rtr e c r itic iz e s h im s e lf fo r h avin g sought a sense
o f s e m ire d e m p tio n in h is e s o te r ic k n o w le d g e that redem ption was im ­
possible; he d id n o t re a liz e h o w d iffic u lt true atheism w a s.1·4) Freud
lacks S p in o z a ’s v a s t m e ta p h y s ic a l h o rizo n s ; he neither deifies the uni­
verse n o r sets a b s o lu te g o a ls fo r th e in d iv id u a l. N o r does he experience
the existential d r a m a o f th e la c k o f sa lv a tio n as intensely as Nietzsche,
Cam us, o r th e e a r ly S a rtr e . H e is tr u ly an atheist, w ith no pantheistic
or other c o m p e n s a tio n s , a n d w i t h n o sense fo r the m ystical. A ll he can
offer as e x is te n tia l v ir t u e is fo r titu d e , so b rie ty, and a m odest measure
o f u n d ersta n d in g a n d s e lf - k n o w le d g e . T h e rest is ananke (necessity),
which m ust a ls o b e c o m e th e o b je c t o f so b er recognition . Th is is not
fatalistic r e s ig n a tio n b u t an a c tiv e c h o ic e and attitude tow ard life; it is
a quiet, u n d r a m a tic f o r m o f amor fa ti. U n lik e N ietzsch e, however, it
admits o f o b je c t iv e s c ie n t ific k n o w le d g e and self-k n o w led ge as the le­
ver for e m a n c ip a tio n . T h u s th e th re e o f th e m fo rm an intellectual fam­
ily in w h ic h th e e n e m y - b r o t h e r re la tio n s h ip w e analyzed in chapter 5
obtains b e tw e e n any p a ir o f th e th re e. T h e m ain gap that separates
Freud fro m S p in o z a is F r e u d ’s la c k o f ab so lu te goals and a pantheistic
dimension. T h is e x p la in s m a n y p a rtic u la r tension s betw een these two
intellectual b r o th e r s , ra d ic a l c h a lle n g e rs o f trad ition a n d je w s without
faith.

L ib id o verses C o n atu s : T h e H u m a n B e in g a s D e s ir e

The n aturalist v i e w w h ic h F re u d an d S p in o za share is also expressed

in their th eo ries o f h u m a n b e h a v io r an d m o tiv a tio n — at least in fun­
damental o u tlin e . H u m a n b e in g s , fo r b o th o f th em , arc dynam ic nat­
ural entities c o n s titu te d b y s o m e p rin c ip le o f desire. Spinoza calls this
desire conatus; F re u d e x p o u n d s it in his th e o ry o f libido.
Conatus is th e s t r i v in g f o r s e lf-p re s e rv a tio n , w h ic h also entails the
effort to e n h an ce th e p o w e r a n d v ita lit y o f ex isten ce. A s such it is the
sole and u n iq u e s o u r c e o f h u m a n e m o tio n s and behavior; from the

( 145)
 CHAPTER 6

basest fo rm s o f lu st and a g g r e s s io n to th e s u p r e m e in te lle c tu a l lo v e o f

G o d , all are co n fig u r a tio n s o f th is o n e n atu ral conatus. In F reu d , libido,
th o u g h n o t th e u n iq u e p rin c ip le , serv es as a fu n d a m e n ta l p s y c h ic en­
e r g y w h ic h all a ffe c tiv e p h e n o m e n a p re s u p p o s e an d w h ic h d ete rm in e s
our c o n s c io u s an d u n c o n s c io u s p ro c e s s e s. B o th c o n c e p ts (like
N ie t z s c h e ’s w ill to p o w e r) u n d e rs c o re th e p u r e ly n a tu ra lis tic ch aracter
o f h u m a n b e in g s , and th e ir d y n a m ic m o d e o f b e in g as fin ite and s triv ­
in g (o r d e sirin g) en tities. W h a te v e r “ h ig h e r ” fa c u ltie s w e p o s s e s s — rea­
s o n , cu ltu re, co n c e p ts o f ju s tic e , m o r a l p re fe re n c e s , an d th e lik e — arc
n o t th e p ro d u c t o f s o m e su p ra n a tu ra l p rin c ip le in us b u t sp e c ia l c o n fig ­
u ra tio n s o f th e p rim a l n atu ral d e sire th a t c h a ra c te r iz e s o u r ex iste n ce
fro m th e o u tset.
D e s p ite th is fu n d a m e n ta l k in s h ip , th e re are im p o r t a n t d ifferen ce s
b e tw e e n libido and conatus.15 Libido is c o n c e iv e d as th e e n e r g y beh in d
th e se xu a l in stin cts, w h ic h g iv e s it a ra th er r e s tr ic te d s ig n ific a n c e fro m
S p in o z a ’s s ta n d p o in t (and in a w a y , as w e sh a ll p r e s e n tly see, e v e n fro m
F re u d ’s). In a d d itio n , libido is im m e d ia t e ly c o n n e c te d w it h pleasure,
n o t w ith self-p re s e rv a tio n ; an d th e t w o , says F re u d , are n o t th e s a m e .16
S e lf-p re s e rv a tio n in F reu d is th e g o a l o f th e s o -c a lle d “ e g o - in s tin c ts ,”
w h ic h F reud (at least th e classic, o r e a rly F reu d ) o p p o s e s to th e sexu a l
in stin cts w h o s e e n e r g y libido i s . 17 F u r th e r m o r e , conatus im p lie s th e en­
d e a v o r to e n h an ce p o w e r, w h e re a s libido is c o n c e iv e d in a m o r e static
fash io n , as the flo w o f a g iv e n q u a n tity o f e n e r g y w h o s e o u tle ts and
d is trib u tio n are d e te rm in e d in a s e m im e c h a n is tic an d “ e c o n o m ic ” id ­
io m .
T h e m a jo r d iffe re n c e , h o w e v e r , lies in th e d u a lis tic p ic tu re F reud
o p p o s e s to S p in o z a ’s strict m o n is m . In h is e a r ly th e o r y o f th e in stin cts
F reu d h ad used tw o o p p o s in g p rin c ip le s , th e e g o - in s tin c ts an d th e s e x ­
u al in stin cts, w ith libido u n d e r ly in g o n ly th e la t t e r .18 T h e n , fo r a sh ort
w h ile , he m ain tain e d th at th e e g o it s e lf w a s th e m a in r e s e r v o ir o f libido,
b o th as th e s o u rce an d th e d e s tin a tio n o f all its v ic is s itu d e s ; th e re fo re
th e te rm libido c o u ld eith e r b e d is p e n s e d w it h o r s e rv e to d e n o te an y
p s y c h ic e n erg y. Y e t, as th e o ld e r F re u d r e v is e d h is t h e o r y o f the in ­
s tin cts, th is fa irly m o n is tic v ie w g a v e w a y to an e v e n m o r e radical
d u a lis m — th a t o f eros and thanatos.
Eros, o r lo v e , n o w s to o d fo r b o th the s e x u a l an d th e s e lf-p re s e rv a tiv e
in stin c ts, u n ited in a s in g le co n c e p t; b u t e v e n as s u c h , eros w a s n o t the
u n iq u e and o v e ra ll p rin cip le. O p p o s in g it w a s thanatos, th e d ea th -in -
stin c t, a c o n s u m m a te , se lf-re fe re n tia l a g g r e s s io n in h e r e n t in e v e r y o r­
g a n ism an d c o n flic tin g w ith its in s tin c t fo r s e lf- p r e s e r v a tio n . Eros seeks
life , u n ity , and g r o w in g o rg a n iz a tio n ; thanatos s e e k s d is o rg a n iz a tio n ,
in e rtia, and d eath . T o av o id to ta l s e lf- d e s tr u c tio n b y th e d e a th -in stin ct
w e m u s t tu rn p art o f o u r a g g r e s s io n o u tw a r d , t r y in g to d e s tr o y o th er

(146)
 SPINOZA AND FREUD

person s o r e x te r n a l o b je c ts ; b u t sin ce rea lity im pedes our efforts, we

are in m a n y ca se s b o u n d to re -in te rio rize the aggression w ith even
greater d a m a g e t o o u r s e lv e s .19
A t w e n t ie t h - c e n t u r y p r e - S o c r a tic , a m o d e m E m pedocles opposing
u n iversal lo v e a n d h a t r e d ,“ F reu d in his revised th eo ry o f libido is at
odds w ith S p in o z a o n t w o m a jo r co u n ts. H e opposes a radical dualism
to S p in o z a ’ s m o n is m o f th e conatus,“ and he m akes the death-in­
stinct— th e v e r y o p p o s it e o f conatus— a p rim al d rive o f the organism .
T h a t an e n t it y s h o u ld s e e k its o w n d estru ctio n — and not m erely be­
cause o f a s p e c ia l c o n ju n c t io n o f causes, b u t as a built-in, fundamental
drive— is u n th in k a b le f o r S p in o z a , w h o based his system on the op­
posite p r in c ip le , n a m e ly , th a t “ n o th in g contains in itself anything
w h e re b y it ca n b e d e s t r o y e d ” an d th at “ n o th in g can be destroyed ex­
cept b y ca u s e s extern a l to it s e lf.” -2
T h e s e m a jo r s ta te m e n ts are m a d e as p art o f the explication o f the
conatus; th e y m a k e it u n d e r s ta n d a b ly h ard , i f n o t o utright impossible,
for S p in o z a to a c c o u n t fo r acts o f su icid e, and eventually they lead to
his fa m o u s d ic t u m th a t th e fre e o r ra tio n al m an “ thinks o f death least
o f all th in g s , a n d h is w i s d o m is a m ed ita tio n not o f death, but o f life.” 2’
S p in o za , th e c o g n it iv e ra tio n a lis t, w as bo u n d to reduce all irrational
actions an d d r iv e s to fa u lt y u n d e rs ta n d in g and inadequate ideas. Freud,
in his g r im m e r a n d m o r e v o lc a n ic v ie w o f hum anity, had perhaps a
better a p p r e c ia tio n o f th e d a r k recesses o f desire (w hich, follow in g
Sc h o p e n h a u er, h e e v e n e x c lu d e d fr o m the d o m ain o f time, space, and
lo g ic ) .2·1 A t a n y ra te , o n th e issu e o f p rim al m otivation , or libido and
conatus, th e d is ta n c e b e t w e e n th e m is vast.
Y et F re u d a n d S p in o z a re m a in c lo s e ly akin on the fundam ental issue:
u n d e rsta n d in g h u m a n b e in g s as fin ite natural beings constituted by a
p rin cip le o f d e s ire , w h o s e v ic is s itu d e s and transform ations underlie all
form s o f b e h a v io r , m o t iv a t io n , an d h ig h e r culture. From this point o f
v ie w w e m a y a g r e e w i t h H a m p s h ir e ’s claim that the parallel o f libido
and conatus “ is m o r e th a n s u p e r fic ia l.” 25 Indeed, the resem blance exists
only on th e fu n d a m e n ta l le v e l, w h e re a s a detailed exam ination must
yield, as w e h a v e b r ie fly s k e tc h e d , im p o rta n t and even crucial dis­
a g re e m e n ts .26

S e l i^ K now ledge

S p in o z a and the T h ird K in d o f Knowledge

T h e a ff in ity a n d th e te n s io n b e tw e e n F reud and Sp in oza w ill becom e

clearer i f w e c o n c e n t r a te o n a ce n tra l p re o c cu p a tio n co m m on to both:
s e lf- k n o w le d g e . F o r F r e u d as fo r S p in o za this is the main road to

( ¡47)
 CHAPTER 6

e m a n c ip a tio n ; it is th e c o r n e r s to n e o f S p in o z a 's e th ic s an d o f F re u d ’s
th e ra p y . B u t th e d iffe re n c e b e tw e e n th e te r m s cthics a n d therapy alread y
in d icate s th e g a p th at sep a ra tes th e m .
S e lf- k n o w le d g e fo r S p in o z a m u s t p ass t h r o u g h k n o w l e d g e o f the
w o r ld . 1 d o n o t u n d e rsta n d m y s e lf in d ire c t a w a r e n e s s , o r b y s im p ly
c o n c e n tra tin g o n m y o w n p e rs o n a l h is to r y , as s is te d (as in F reu d ) b y a
lim ite d in v e n to r y o f g e n e ra l h e r m e n e u tic a l c o d e s . T h e ro a d to self-
k n o w le d g e is m u c h lo n g e r an d in d ire c t. I d o n o t s ta rt w i t h m y s e lf bu t
w it h th e u n iv e rs e at la rg e , w h ic h fr o m th e o u ts e t I h a v e to g ra s p as a
s in g le to ta lity id en tica l w i t h G o d . T h e n , e q u ip p e d w i t h th e gen e ra l
k n o w le d g e o f th e la w s an d ca u sal p a tte rn s g o v e r n i n g th e u n iv e rs e , I
h av e to lo c a te m y o w n p a rtic u la r p lace an d m o d e o f a c t i v it y w ith in the
to ta lity . T h is p re s u p p o s e s th e s e c o n d k in d o f k n o w l e d g e in w h ic h I
e n g a g e in d iv e rs ifie d s c ie n tific s tu d y , b o th o f p h y s ic s a n d p h y s io lo g y
an d o f p s y c h o lo g y and s o c io lo g y . I m u s t u n d e r s ta n d w h a t p a rticu la r
th in g s are; h o w th e b o d y is related to th e m in d ; h o w b o d ie s w o r k and
h o w affects arise; w h a t th e g e n e s is o f s o c ia l c o n t e x t s is; an d h o w m y
o w n b o d y , a ffects, and s o c ia l lin k s are d e te r m in e d b y th e ca u s a l e n v i­
ro n m e n t. T h u s I p ro c e e d to d e c ip h e r m y o w n b e in g fr o m w ith o u t,
th at is, fr o m th e g e n e ra l p a ttern s an d la w s g o v e r n i n g th e u n iv e rse .
H o w e v e r , in th e th ird k in d o f k n o w le d g e , all th is e x t e r n a lly d e riv e d
in fo r m a tio n fits to g e th e r an d c o a le s c e s in to th e s p e c ific “ e s s e n c e ,” or
in tern al e x p lic a tio n o f th e s in g u la r e n tit y I a m . A t th is (ra th er rare)
p o in t, h a v in g a c q u ire d a s te p - b y - s te p s c ie n tific k n o w l e d g e o f m y s e lf
fr o m d iffe re n t causal p o in ts o f v ie w , I n o w p e r fo r m an in tu itiv e leap
w h ic h , S p in o za b e lie v e s , a llo w s m e to ta k e a s y n o p t i c v i e w o f m y sin­
g u la r e x is te n ce as it in h eres in G o d an d f o llo w s in te r n a lly fr o m his
e te rn al essen ce. T h e m e d ia tin g ca u sal lin k s h a v e b e e n in te r n a liz e d and
s y n th e s ize d in to a s in g u la r essen ce th e y are said to c o n s titu te an d are
e q u iv a le n t to . T h e r e is n o a d d itio n a l in fo r m a t io n h e re , o n ly a n e w u n ­
d e rs ta n d in g and o r g a n iz a tio n o f th e s a m e c o g n it iv e in g r e d ie n t s .27
T h is is also th e h ig h e s t d e g re e o f s e lf- k n o w le d g e , w i t h its a c c o m ­
p a n y in g in te lle c tu a l lo v e o f G o d w h ic h lib e ra te s an d r e d e e m s . A t first,
m y d ire c t aw areness o f m y s e lf has b e e n m e r e ly c o n fu s e d k n o w le d g e ,
imaginatio. T o p ro g re s s, I h ad to re p la ce it w i t h k n o w l e d g e o f th e sec­
o n d k in d , the s c ie n tific k n o w le d g e b y w h ic h I a p p r o a c h m y b e in g
fro m w ith o u t. B u t k n o w le d g e o f th is k in d la c k s th e a ffe c tiv e p o w e r
re q u ire d to tr a n s fo rm an d lib e ra te m e . In o r d e r fo r it to p r o d u c e such
e ffe c ts , s c ie n tific k n o w le d g e m u s t fu lfill t w o c o n d it io n s . F irs t, it m u st
fr o m th e sta rt b e c o n c e iv e d an d fe lt as e x p lic a tin g a b a s ic m e ta p h y s ic a l
tru th , n a m e ly , th e id e n tity o f n a tu re w it h G o d a n d o f th e in d iv id u a l’s
e sse n ce w ith th e n a tu r e -G o d . U lt im a te ly g r o u n d e d in in te lle c tu a l in ­

(148)
 SPINOZA AND FREUD

tu ition , th is tr u th u n d e rlie s the scien tific process throughout. Second,

d iscu rsive s c ie n tific p ro g re s s m u st ev en tu ally give w ay to the synthetic
in tu itio n d e s c rib e d a b o v e , w h ic h generates sufficient affective power
to take o v e r o n e ’ s life an d to tran sfo rm o n e’s passions. Scientific
k n o w le d g e is fla n k e d , so to sp eak, on bo th sides by intuitive strata,
one u n d e r ly in g th e p ro c e s s fr o m the start and the other taking it to its
clim ax.
A t th e sa m e tim e — and this is S p in o za ’s n o velty— the high ethical
o b je ctiv e can o n ly b e rea ch ed b y w a y o f a detailed m echanistic science.
M e ta p h y sica l g e n e ra liz a tio n s in th em selves arc worthless even when
true. T h e m o r e p a rtic u la r th in g s w e k n o w , the m ore we know God;
th erefore, in k n o w in g o u rs e lv e s a cco rd in g to the detailed particular
causes w h ic h d e te r m in e us, w e spell o u t o u r inherence in God in con­
crete e m p ir ic a l term s; an d this is indispensable to the next, intuitive
stage, w h e r e ca u sal k n o w le d g e is in tern alized and our singular essence
em erges as in h e r in g in G o d th ro u g h a chain o f im m ediately grasped
relations.
T o re a ch th is s e m im y s t ic a l sta ge, w e m ust therefore em bark on a
d iversified p r o g r a m o f s tu d y , aim ed at k n o w in g ourselves more and
m ore as cre a tu re s o f n a tu re , h a v in g acquired the general knowledge
d escribed a b o v e . I m u s t k n o w m y sp ecific place w ithin the chain o f
being; th e a c tu a l circ u m s ta n c e s o f m y bein g in the w orld; the causes
w h ich e x p la in m y b o d ily s itu a tio n , m y personal biography, m y struc­
ture, and th e m e n ta l an d so cia l fo rces active in me; the hidden causes
o f m y fear; m y e rro rs ; th e ig n o ra n c e o f w h ich I am victim ; m y suffer­
ing, m y a m b itio n s , m y c o v e rt m o tiv e s, the p ow ers that make me wa­
ver b e tw e e n fe a r an d h o p e , j o y and g rief, and other unstable emotions
that h o ld m y life in b o n d a g e . A ll this requires a thorough scientific
stu d y n o t o n ly o f th e b o d y — th ro u g h physics and other sciences o f
“ e x te n s io n ” ( p h y s io lo g y , ch e m is try , clim atology, etc.)— but also o f
p sy c h o lo g y .
It is n o a c c id e n t th a t S p in o z a d ev o tes an entire bo o k out o f the five
bo o ks o f h is Ethics to p s y c h o lo g y . T h e science o f psych ology must
replace an d illu m in a te th e d ire c t aw areness w e have o f our minds as a
means to s e lf- k n o w le d g e (and o n the h igh er level, p sych ology should
take the p la c e o f t h e o lo g y as a m ean s to salvation). Th is undercuts the
role n o t o n ly o f o r d in a r y in tro s p e ctio n , b u t also o f the more refined
tech n iques o f m y s tic a l c o n c e n tra tio n , direct self-contem plation, and
the like. A ll th e se m u s t g iv e w a y to a m ediated b o d y o f science, using
general Jaws an d p a tte rn s , a “ g e o m e tr ic ” science, says Spinoza, ex­
plaining h u m a n fo llie s an d th e m o s t irrational passions through the
d ear and d is tin c t p o w e r o f re a s o n in g .28 T h e w ay from ourselves to

( ¡ 49)
 CHAPTER 6

o u rselves— fro m th e c o n fu s e d d ire c t c o n s c io u s n e s s w e h ave o f our

b o d ies and m in d s to th e n e w , ra tio n a l (an d e v e n t u a lly re d e e m in g ) self-
k n o w le d g e w e gain at th e en d — th u s p asses t h r o u g h p s y c h o lo g y as a
u n iversal n atural scien ce, a scien c e, m o r e o v e r , w h o s e o b je c ts are sui
generis and ca n n ot be re d u c ed to th o s e o f p h y s ic s o r a n y o th e r science.
T h is n ot o n ly c o n firm s th e a u t o n o m o u s s ta tu s o f p s y c h o lo g y , which
D escartes had alread y g ra n ted , b u t m a k e s th is p u r e ly n atu ral sciencc a
necessary and p riv ile g e d ro ad to r e d e m p tio n . T h e s a m e can n o longer
be said o f D escartes, n o r o f a n y o th e r p h ilo s o p h e r w h o re m a in e d faith­
ful to the religio u s and th e o lo g ic a l m o n o p o l y o f s a lv a tio n ; and in this
Sp in oza to o k a fu rth er step to w a r d F reu d .

Freud, Self-K now ledge, and Repression

F reu d 's am b itio n s w e re far m o r e m o d e s t th a n S p in o z a ’s. H e w as not

co n cern ed w ith salva tio n b u t w it h th e ra p y . F r e u d la c k e d S p in o za’s
sem irelig io u s p ath os and w a s b e tte r a c q u a in te d w i t h th e d e p th s o f hu­
m an irration ality. B u t lik e S p in o z a h e w a s m o t iv a te d b y th e qu est for
h u m an e m an cipatio n and b e lie v e d th a t w h a t e v e r lib e r a tio n m a y be in
sto re fo r hum an s m u st g r o w o u t o f th e ir s e lf - k n o w le d g e . O v e r c o m in g
the repressed, the n eu ro tic , th e a b y s m a l b u r d e n s an d c o m p le x e s that
sh ackle the m in d and d isto rt its fu n c t io n in g d e p e n d s in la r g e measure
on so m e fo rm o f s e lf- k n o w le d g e . S o d o e s th e p r o c e s s b y w h ic h con­
sciousness exten d s its d o m in io n o v e r th e s e e th in g v o lc a n o o f the “ id ”
and enables th e in d iv id u a l to a c h ie v e s ta b ility o r r e s to r e h is o r her ca­
p acity fo r a life o f e n jo y m e n t an d c r e a t iv it y — an d a ls o b y w h ic h civi­
lization , h o w e v e r fra g ile, is a llo w e d to fu n c t io n a n d to p ersist.
F reud e x p lic itly states th at his g o a l in th e r a p y is to b r in g the re­
pressed to co n sciou sn ess. I llu m in a tin g th e h id d e n p s y c h ic fo rces that
gen erate a n eurosis is the p rin cip a l m e a n s o f o v e r c o m in g it. U s in g a
series o f clues, asso ciation s, d re a m s, an d th e in te r p r e ta tio n o f other
sign s and s y m p to m s , a k in d o f a r c h a e o lo g y o f th e m in d is ca rried out,
w h ic h p enetrates to its past, to c h ild h o o d tr a u m a s , a n d to e a rly p sy­
c h o lo g ic a l h isto ry. T h e rep ressed g r a d u a lly re tu rn s to co n scio u sn ess
and the o ld p sy c h ic co n flict is re n e w e d , th e o n e w h ic h o r ig in a lly had
en ded in rep ression , b u t w h ic h n o w is m a n e u v e r e d to w a r d a saner con ­
clu sio n . T h e aim o f th erapy, a c c o r d in g to F re u d , is to d is s o lv e the state
o f rep ression so that the e n e r g y arrested in it ( w h ic h fr e q u e n tly has
been spent o n neurosis) w ill b e d iv e rte d in to n e w c h a n n e ls and,
th ro u g h su b lim a tio n and o th e r m ean s, w i ll e n h a n c e th e p e r s o n ’s ca­
p a c ity fo r e n jo y m e n t, crea tiv ity , an d m e n ta l s ta b ility .
T h e ce n tra lity o f s e lf- k n o w le d g e in F r e u d ’s s y s te m is a ls o indicated

(¡50)
 SPINOZA AND FREUD

by the cru cia l r o le he a s s ig n s to its o p p o site concept, repression. Freud

leaves n o r o o m fo r d o u b t o n th is m atter. “ T h e theory o f repression,”
he says, “ is th e c o r n e r s to n e o n w h ic h the w h o le structure o f psycho­
analysis re s ts .” -9 E ls e w h e r e he reiterates: “ It is possible to take repres­
sion as a ce n te r an d to b r in g all th e elem ents o f psycho-analytic theory
into relation to it .” JO R e p re s s io n and its un coverin g becom e the sys­
tem atizin g c o n c e p t o f h is th e o ry . Freud elaborates:

T h e th e o r y o f re p re s s io n b e c a m e the corner-stone o f our under­

stan d in g o f n e u ro s e s . A d iffe re n t v ie w had n o w to be taken o f the
task o f th e ra p y . Its a im w a s n o lo n g e r to ‘abreact’ an affect which
had g o t o n to th e w r o n g lin es, b u t to u ncover repressions and re­
place th e m b y acts o f ju d g m e n t w h ic h m igh t result either in the
acce p tin g o r th e c o n d e m n in g o f w h a t had fo rm erly been repu­
diated. I s h o w e d m y r e c o g n itio n o f the n e w situation by no longer
callin g m y m e th o d o f in v e s tig a tio n and treatm ent catharsis but
psycho-analysis. J1

It was th us th e d is c o v e r y o f rep re ssio n as the basis o f neurosis— and,

co n sequen tly, th e d is c o v e r y o f th e recall to consciousness as the road
to th era p y— w h ic h fo u n d e d p sy c h o a n a ly s is .
T h e sa m e e m e r g e s fr o m F r e u d ’s a cco u n t o f his abandoning hypnosis
as a m e th o d o f th e r a p y .32 T h is , he says, was the crucial step that sepa­
rated h im fr o m J o s e f B r e u e r an d led to the foun d in g o f the psychoan­
alytic m o v e m e n t. T h e d iffe re n c e b etw een the tw o m ethods is suc­
cinctly p u t b y F re u d : “ H y p n o t ic treatm en t seeks to cover up and gloss
over s o m e th in g in m e n ta l life; a n a lytic treatm ent seeks to expose and
get rid o f s o m e t h in g . T h e fo r m e r acts lik e cosm etics; the latter like
surgery.” 33
T h e s h o r tc o m in g o f h y p n o s is lies in its unconscious nature and the
attem pt at d ire c t m a n ip u la tio n o f th e un con scious. It w orks by sug­
gestion, n o t b y u n d e r s ta n d in g an d in terpretation. T h e hypnotist tries
to get rid o f th e n e u ro s is b y d ire ct in tervention , as it were, in the
psychic d e p th s , b y p a s s in g co n scio u sn ess. B u t in so doing, he reaches
only the s y m p t o m s an d m isse s th e ro o ts o f the disturbance. For— and
this was F r e u d ’s d is c o v e r y — th e d istu rb an ce springs from repression,
nam ely, th e s e lf- in d u c e d c lo u d in g o f consciousness and its conversion
into the u n c o n s c io u s , as a re su lt o f p o w e rfu l, unresolvable conflicts
w hose e n e r g y n o w fe e d s th e n eu ro sis. R epression does not merely
screen o f f a d is tu r b a n c e th a t e x ists in d ep en d en tly o f it, but is the root
o f the d is tu r b a n c e , its v e r y cause. T h e re fo re , it m ust be com pletely
dissolved in o r d e r f o r th e p ro c e s s o f h ealin g to begin.
B y u sin g s u g g e s tio n , h y p n o s is m an ipulates the patient’s uncon­

(151)
 CHAPTER 6

sc io u s w ith o u t le ttin g his o r h e r e g o p la y an a c tiv e ro le in th e th e ra p e u ­

tic p ro c e s s . B u t o n ce it is d is c o v e re d th a t th e r o o t o f th e n e u ro s is lies
in re p re s s io n , th e p a tie n t’s a c tiv e an d c o n s c io u s p a r tic ip a tio n b e c o m e s
e ssen tia l to th e ra p y . T h e o ld s tr u g g le o f th e in s tin c ts (fu n d a m e n ta lly
s e x u a l o n es) w h ic h re p re s s io n cast in to th e d e p th s o f o b liv io n m u s t be
re -e n a c te d in th e p atie n t, a p ro c e s s in w h ic h h is o r h e r c o n s c io u s n e s s
p la y s a ro le o f u n d e rs ta n d in g an d s e lf- in te r p r e ta tio n m e d ia te d b y tran s­
fe re n c e as a sp e cia l e m o t iv e an d in te lle c tu a l r e la tio n s h ip w i t h th e th e r­
a p ist.

In o rd e r to re s o lv e th e s y m p t o m s , w e m u s t g o b a c k as far as th eir
o rig in , w e m u s t r e n e w th e c o n flic t fr o m w h ic h th e y a ro s e , an d ,
w it h th e h elp o f m o t iv e fo rc e s w h ic h w e r e n o t at th e p a tie n t’s
d is p o s a l in th e p ast, w e m u s t g u id e it to a d iffe r e n t o u t c o m e .34

In o rd e r to r e n e w th e c o n flic t it is n e c e s s a ry to b r in g its c a u se s b a ck
to co n s cio u s n e s s , w h ile o v e r c o m in g th e re s is ta n ce s w h ic h cre a te d the
re p re ssio n an d e lim in a tin g th e la tter. T h is is p e r fo r m e d w i t h th e help
o f s e lf-in te rp re ta tio n , w h ic h rep la ces th e m e th o d o f s u g g e s t io n w ith
th e m e th o d p ro p e r to p s y c h o a n a ly s is , b a s e d u p o n th e e x te n s io n o f
co n scio u sn e ss.
T h e c o n c e p t o f re p re s s io n , says F re u d , m a k e s p s y c h o a n a ly s is u n iq u e
an d d istin g u ish e s his o w n c o n c e p t o f th e u n c o n s c io u s fr o m w h a t he
calls ra th er d is p a r a g in g ly th e “ p h ilo s o p h ic a l o p in io n s a b o u t th e u n c o n ­
s c io u s ,” w h ic h e x is te d in his d a y o r b e fo r e h im (sin ce L e i b n iz ’s “ p etites
p e r c e p tio n s ,” o r e v en sin ce S p in o z a ) .35 T h e u n c o n s c io u s w i t h w h ic h
F re u d (e s p e c ia lly th e e a r ly F reu d ) is c o n c e r n e d is p r im a r ily th a t w h ic h
has become u n c o n s c io u s , th a t is, th a t w h ic h t h r o u g h r e p r e s s io n has
su n k in to am n esia . O n th e o th e r h a n d , th is is a ls o th e re a so n w h y p s y ­
ch o a n a ly s is ca n n o t cu re all m e n ta l ills , b u t, as F r e u d s tre s s e s , o n ly
th o s e b u ilt u p o n th e m u tu a l re la tio n s h ip b e t w e e n th e c o n s c io u s an d the
re p re sse d , e s p e c ia lly n e u ro s e s an d c o m p u ls io n .

Conquering the Id: Enlightenm ent and Its Fragility

T h e ce n tra lity o f re p re s s io n im p lie s th e im p o r t a n c e o f its c o m p le m e n t ,

th e re call to co n s cio u s n e s s an d s e lf- u n d e r s ta n d in g . S o v ita l is th is c o n ­
ce p t fo r p s y c h o a n a ly s is th a t w e m a y see F re u d — th is e x p lo r e r o f the
d a rk re a lm s o f th e m in d , th e p h ilo s o p h e r o f th e u n c o n s c io u s , w h o
stresses th e c h a o tic , v o lc a n ic , an d d is o r d e r ly in h u m a n e x is te n c e — as
a c tu a lly re p re s e n tin g a m o d e rn s tra n d o f th e E n lig h t e n m e n t (a m o v e ­
m e n t o f w h ic h S p in o za w a s a c h ie f fo r e r u n n e r o v e r t w o c e n tu rie s b e­
fo re ). F r e u d ’s id ea l is th e h e ig h te n in g o f c o n s c io u s n e s s an d th e e x te n ­

(¡52)
 SPINOZA AND FREUD

sion o f its d o m a in . H is m o t to is “ k n o w th y s e lf” ; he aspires for

lucidity, fo r d e m y s tifie d s e lf- k n o w le d g e . T h is w as the ideal o f the En­
lighten m en t, b u t n o w it is re c o g n iz e d as infinitely m ore difficult to
attain b ecau se o f th e h ith e r to u n im a g in e d depths o f the unconscious
and its p o w e r o f re s is ta n c e . S e lf- k n o w le d g e n o w becom es a momen­
tous task w h ic h ca n o n ly b e ac h ie v e d on a lim ited scale. In addition,
Freud (at lea st in h is e a r ly w o r k ) fo cu sed m ore on the unconscious
which resu lts f r o m r e p re s s io n th an on the full extent o f unconscious
life. T h u s th e c e n t r a lity o f re p re s s io n n o t o n ly highlights the goal o f
self-aw areness b u t a ls o re s tr icts its sco p e. Later, w h en Freud developed
his m e ta p s y c h o lo g ic a l th e o r y (and clearly defined repression as only
part o f the v a st u n c o n s c io u s fie ld ) ,36 he not o n ly maintained the ideal
o f s e lf- k n o w le d g e b u t fu r th e r e x p a n d e d it. In the follow ing passage he
rephrases th e a im s o f p s y c h o a n a ly s is in term s o f his new metapsychol­
o gy (the e g o , th e id , an d th e su p ereg o ):

Its in te n tio n is, in d e e d , to stre n g th e n the ego, to make it more

in d ep end en t o f th e s u p e r - e g o , to w id e n its field o f perception and
enlarge its o r g a n iz a t io n , s o th a t it can appropriate fresh portions
o f the i d .37

The recall to c o n s c io u s n e s s is retain ed but its role as a method o f lib­

eration is e x p a n d e d . W e are n o lo n g e r concern ed w ith the products o f
repression a lo n e , b u t w i t h th e c o n q u e s t o f the id in general— the ¿na­
tional and o p a q u e p r in c ip le th a t is th e fo u n d ation o f life and its energy.
It is in this d a r k v o lc a n ic m a s s th a t th e e g o m ust conquer ever-increas­
ing areas i f th e p e r s o n is to e x p e r ie n c e a m o re stable and liberated per­
sonality. H o w e v e r , in o r d e r to su cc ee d in this conquest the ego must al­
ready be s ig n ific a n t ly s t r o n g an d lib erated — and especially free o f that
unconscious fo r m o f s e lf- o p p r e s s io n exercised by the superego w ith its
gu ilt-feclings, c o n s c ie n c e , an d in tern alize d self-destruction. Here lies
another fo r m o f o b liv io n , o r am n esia, parallel but not identical to
repression in th e c la s s ic sen se. W h a t the e g o ignores here are its true
relations w ith th e s u p e r e g o , an d th e actual nature o f many o f the
norms w h ic h , in te r n a liz e d , e n g e n d e r distressing conflicts within the
individual an d th e r e b y m a k e h im o r her suffer acute repressions and
neuroses.
Freud’s m e t a p s y c h o lo g y th u s ex p a n d s the scope and emancipatory
role o f s e lf- k n o w le d g e b o th w ith in the in d ivid u al and in the critique
o f culture an d id e o lo g y . H e r e F reu d co m es close to Spinoza, since self-
kn ow ledge o f th is k in d re q u ir e s us to rely m ore on science and less on
herm eneutics, th a t is, it p re s u p p o s e s that w e understand mental and
cultural m e c h a n is m s an d th e ir h id d e n action , and no longer concen­

(‘53)
 CHAPTER 6

trate o n th e in te rp re ta tio n o f p a r tic u la r s ig n s a n d c lu e s fr o m the indi­

v id u a l b io g ra p h y .
A t th e sam e tim e , F r e u d ’ s a n a ly s is o f th e r e p r e s s iv e p o te n tia l o f the
su p e re g o b rin g s h im c lo se to N ie t z s c h e , w h o a ls o o ffe r e d a critiq u c o f
m o ral valu es, g u ilt, c o n s c ie n c e , a n d th e lik e (a n d th e ir c u ltu ra l effects
and price) b y a n a ly z in g th e ir p s y c h o l o g ic a l g e n e s is a n d m echanism s.
B u t, in co n tra st to N ie t z s c h e , F r e u d m a in ta in s th a t s e lf- k n o w le d g e can
have a so lid basis in scie n c e as o b je c t iv e tr u th . F r e u d a ls o sees lucid­
ity — a d e m y s tifie d c o n s c io u s n e s s in v a r io u s m o d e s — as an en d in itself
and as a lea d in g cu ltu ra l v a lu e ; an d a lth o u g h h e w a s a w a r e o f its w eak­
ness, lim its, an d fra g ility , h e s tre s s e d th e n e e d to c u ltiv a t e it as much
as p ossib le. N ie tz s c h e w o u ld h a v e see n in F r e u d a d e v ia n t N ietzsch ean
w h o falls b a ck u p o n a fo r m o f s c ie n t ific r a tio n a lis m . H is p rin cip les o f
tru th is a “ p e rs p e c tiv e ” w h ic h b e tra y s h is w i s h t o im p o s e illu s o r y order
o n the w o rld o f ch a os, th o u g h h e is m u c h b e t te r a c q u a in te d than others
w ith its ch a o tic d ep th s. F r o m th is p o in t o f v i e w F r e u d sta n d s m idw ay
b e tw e e n N ie tz s c h e and S p in o z a . L ik e S p in o z a , h e a c c e p ts th e principle
o f in tellectu a l s e lf- k n o w le d g e an d th e v a lu e o f tr u th as a nonrelative
ideal; lik e N ie tz s c h e , he a c k n o w le d g e s th e lim it a t io n s an d th e fragility
o f this ideal and the v o lc a n ic d e p th s s e e th in g b e n e a th it.

M a jo r D if f e r e n c e s : T h er apy versu s S a l v a t io n

T h e Road to Em ancipation

T h e r e are, h o w e v e r, im p o r t a n t d iffe r e n c e s b e t w e e n F re u d and Spi­

no za. F o r i f b o th see s e lf- k n o w le d g e as a w a y to e m a n c ip a tio n , they do
n o t u n d ersta n d eith er th e ro a d o r th e e m a n c ip a tio n in th e sam e way.
In th e firs t p lace, in F re u d s e lf - k n o w l e d g e lib e r a te s f r o m co m p lexes
and n eu ro ses; it is th e ra p y a n d n o t s a lv a tio n . F r e u d sees scien ce as a
secu lar su b stitu te fo r th e h ig h e s t s p ir itu a l v a lu e , b u t th e la tter cannot
rep lace re lig io n an d its ric h e m o t io n a l s c o p e . S c ie n c e , as th e e n e m y o f
illu sio n , s h o u ld n o t b e c o m e a n e w illu s io n ; a n d th is w o u l d h ap p en ifit
claim ed to ach iev e im p o s s ib le g o a ls . T h e e n lig h t e n m e n t , th e lucidity,
and th e e m a n c ip a tio n w h ic h s c ie n c e b e s t o w s , are m o r e lim ited in
s co p e. T h e y ca n n o t a lle v ia te o r c o m p e n s a te fo r m a n ’s im p o te n c e and
in sig n ific a n c e in th e u n iv e rse . T h is im p o t e n c e m u s t b e re c o g n iz e d and
acce p te d as su ch , an e x p e r ie n c e w h ic h a c c o m p a n ie s m a n fr o m first to
last. M o re o v e r , it is re in fo rc e d b y s e lf - k n o w le d g e ; an d th e alleviation
o f a n x ie ty en ab les th is e x p e r ie n c e to b e c o m e s ta b iliz e d as m a n ’s au­
th en tic sp iritu a l stance.
S e c o n d , s e lf- k n o w le d g e in F re u d is n o t m e d ia te d b y m u c h m eta-

( 154)
 SPINOZA AND FREUD

p h ysics and gen eral science. A person need not go very far beyond
h im s e lf o r h e rs e lf— she or he need n ot gain detailed know led ge o f the
u n iverse, th e la w s o f nature, G o d , and so on— in order to attain liber­
ation. T h e F reud ian patien t is m uch m ore centered upon h erself and
her o w n p erson a l p sy c h o lo g ica l history.
T h is d ifferen c e is also related to the therapeutic aims o f the Freudian
syste m as d istin g u ish e d fro m the search for salvation that m otivated
S p in o za. F reud rem ain s basically a physician. T ru e, Spinoza saw his
Ethics as a k in d o f “ m ed icin e fo r the so u l” analogous to bo d ily m edi­
cine; b u t this w a s m ean t in a m etaphoric and m etaphysical sense, not
in the p a th o lo g ic a l sense o f m od ern psychoanalysis. T h e soul is in need
o f " c u r e ” b ecau se o f its bo n d age to the passions and the im agination.
Its la w s, in o th er w o rd s , are ethical, not m edical. It is therefore quite
p ossib le fo r the Freudian treatm ent to p roduce a norm al, fairly bal­
anced p e rs o n a lity w h ic h fro m ev e ry other point o f v ie w w ill remain a
m e d io cre h u m a n b e in g w h o m Spinoza w ill see as unfree and liv in g by
his o r h er “ im a g in a tio n .” T h is reflects, indeed, a crucial difference; the
g o a l o f F reu d ia n th e ra p y is to p roduce a norm al person; the go al o f
S p in o za ’s e th ics is to p rod u ce a non-n orm al person— a rare hum an
b ein g o f u n c o m m o n inner excellen ce.

C o n a tu s Reconsidered: Finitude and Salvation

W e m a y n o w return to the question o f conatus versus libido and see a

sim ila r d iffe re n c e im p lied in it. Just as self-know ledge in Spinoza has a
salva tio n p ersp e c tiv e la ck in g in Freud, conatus, too, unlike libido, has a
m e ta p h y s ic a l d im e n sio n that is attached to the quest for salvation.
Conatus, says S p in o za, is the “ actual essence” o f finite things; it is
n o t a p ro p e rty th e y possess but the principle o f their very being. T h e y
all exist as th is striv in g , w h ich has a m etaphysical significance trans­
lated in to th e m o re co m m o n form s o f desire— physical, social, and
in te lle ctu a l. O r , to p u t it differently, conatus prim arily seeks a “ m eta­
p h y s ic a l u t ilit y ” w h ic h then takes the form o f m ore concrete utilities.
S e lf-p re s e rv a tio n , the declared object o f the conatus, can also be under­
s to o d (in m e ta p h y sic a l terms) as the quest to extend duration (duratio)
in d e fin ite ly in an attem p t to prevail over finitude. A s finite beings, hu­
m an s are b o u n d to exist in the tem poral domain o f duration w h ile at
the sam e tim e en d eavorin g to attain the supratem poral existence Sp i­
n o za calls e te r n ity .,8
T h is p a ra d o x is resolved in that the striving to overcom e d uratio n is
ex p re s s e d in term s o f duration itself— as its indefinite exten sion . T ru e
in fin ity (or e tern ity), w h ich by nature is nontem poral and q ualitative,

(155)
 CHAPTER 6

in e v ita b ly b e c o m e s tran sla ted (an d d e g r a d e d ) in to a q u a n tita tiv e and

te m p o ral v ersio n o f it s e lf as th e o b je c t o f conatus, th e fo r m o f indefinite
d u ratio n .
E v e n in this fo r m , h o w e v e r , th e s t r i v in g is d o o m e d to failure. Par­
ticu lar th in gs m u st pass a w a y a n d d ie . T h e m o s t th e y (o r rather, a tri­
flin g n u m b er o f th em ) can d o is, th r o u g h s e lf - k n o w l e d g e o f the “ third
k in d ," b e c o m e id e n tifie d w it h G o d in th e e s s e n tia l p a rt o f th eir minds;
this realizes ete r n ity within d u r a tio n , th a t is, w i t h in th e s p a n o f this life
and as an e v en t in th e im m a n e n t w o r l d . 59 T h e tr u e o b je c t o ( conatus (as
it b e c o m e s conatus intelligendi, th e s t r i v in g f o r k n o w le d g e ) thus turns
o u t to be n o th in g less th a n s a lv a tio n , th e o v e r c o m in g o f fin itu d e by
rea lizin g e te m it y - w it h in - d u r a tio n ; a n d th is g iv e s th e c o n c e p t o f self-
p reserva tio n its d eep , u n d e r ly in g m e a n in g . T h e tr u e fin a l o b je c t o f the
natural s triv in g w h ic h c o n s titu te s o u r b e in g in S p in o z a is in fin ity or
salvation . Conatus in th is sen se is n o t v e r y r e m o t e f r o m th e principle
o f eros in P lato.
F reu d , h o w e v e r, d o es n o t b u r d e n h is o w n t h e o r y w i t h a m etaphysics
o f salvatio n . T h is is a m a jo r d iffe r e n c e b e t w e e n F re u d an d Spinoza
w h ic h w e e n co u n te r all a lo n g . W e h a v e s e e n it w i t h re g a rd to their
v ie w s o f s e lf- k n o w le d g e , an d n o w w e s e e it e x p r e s s e d a g a in in their
resp ective a n th r o p o lo g ie s o f d esire .·10

Hermeneutics and N otnological Science

A fu rth e r d iffe re n c e has a lre a d y b e e n h in te d at: s e lf- k n o w le d g e in

Freu d is m o re th e w o r k o f h e r m e n e u tic s th a n o f r ig o r o u s n o m o lo g ic a l
science. It d ep en d s less o n k n o w l e d g e o f la w l ik e p a tte rn s th at govern
n atu ral p h e n o m e n a (p s y c h o lo g ic a l an d o t h e r w is e ) th a n o n deciphering
sign s and clu es fr o m o n e ’s p e rs o n a l p s y c h ic h is t o r y ; an d its language,
ac co rd in g ly , is m o r e tu n e d to th e in te r p r e t a t io n o f s y m b o ls , m eta­
p h o rs, asso cia tio n s, an d th e lik e , w i t h in a g iv e n c u ltu r a l an d bio graph ­
ical c o n te x t th an to w a r d th e s tr ic t lo g ic a l r ig o r o f s c ie n tific discourse.
A t th e sam e tim e , h e rm e n e u tic s is h e re p u t in to th e s e r v ic e o f causal
e x p la n a tio n . Its aim , lik e th a t o f th e p o lic e d e te c tiv e o r th e archaeolo­
gist, is to u n co v e r a s in g u la r o b je c t iv e tr u th . (In S p in o z a ’s w o rd s, it
seeks to u n co v e r th e p r o x im a t e ca u s e o r e v e n th e “ g e n e t ic ” definition
o f its o b je ct.) In this re s p e ct th e w e a k e r h e r m e n e u tic a l lin k s serve an
u n d e rly in g m o d e l o f r ig o r o u s ca u sal d e te r m in is m .
T h is in tro d u c e s a m a jo r a m b iv a le n c e in t o F r e u d ’s th e o r y . Its m eth­
o d o lo g ic a l status w a v e rs b e tw e e n a lte r n a tiv e s th a t d o n o t seem com ­
p atible. O n th e o n e h an d , F re u d in s is ts th a t h is d o c t r in e is Naturwissen-
schaft (n atural scien ce ). H e b e lie v e s in o b je c t iv e s c ie n t ific truth and

(1 5 6 )
 SPINOZA AND FREUD

co n sid ers his th e o ry to fall w ith in it. A cco rd in g ly (and because o f the
d o m in a n t m e ch a n istic id io m o f natural science), Freud pictures the
p sy c h ic life as a se m im ech an istic apparatus, w h ere instinctual energy
flo w s b a c k and fo rth , in vests itse lf in various objects, retreats, is being
tra n s fo rm e d and su b lim a ted , and so on. A ll these m ovem ents are sub­
j e c t in p rin cip le to q uan titatives analysis and occur under the rules o f
d y n a m ic e ffic ie n c y (also d escribed as p sych ic “ e co n o m ics” ). Y et, on
the o th e r h an d , th e actual causal links that determ ine p sych ic life as
Freu d d escrib es it (esp ecially in therapy, w h ere it counts m ost) are de­
te rm in e d b y m e an in g and by m ean in g-carryin g signs, their interpre­
ta tio n , an d th eir in terio riza tio n . T h is is quite a d ifferent dom ain and
ty p e o f d isco u rse. T h e lin k s betw een signs, m eaning, and interpreta­
tio n , o n th e o n e hand, and the vicissitudes o f instinctual en ergy on the
o th e r h an d , b e lo n g to tw o differen t m eth o d ological paradigm s w h ich
Freu d has taken grea t pains to reconcile. T h is is a m ajor reason w h y
p sy c h o a n a ly s is has alw a ys suffered fro m insufficient recognition and
its s c ie n tific status is d ebated to this day.41

Self-Know ledge and Affect: The Imaginary Love o f the Doctor

T h e m o s t im p o rta n t d ifferen ce betw een Freud and Spinoza concerns

s e lf- k n o w le d g e and affect. In Spinoza, self-kn o w led ge o f the “ th ird ,”
o r h ig h e s t k in d , is supp o sed to produce a m ost p ow erful affect, the
in te lle c tu a l lo v e o f G o d , w h ich dom inates all others and transform s
th em fr o m m o d es o f b o n d age to m odes o f freedom . In oth er w o rd s,
s e lf- k n o w le d g e is the sufficien t cause and lever o f the p sych ic en e rg y
th at r e v o lu tio n iz e s the personality and im parts n ew quality to life.
N o t so in F reud . D esp ite w h a t Freud attributed to Leon ard o (and,
b y im p lic a tio n , to Sp in oza and to him self), these are rare cases. T h e
o rd in a ry p e rso n can n ot attain self-kn o w led ge first and a lib eratin g af­
fect later. H e m u st have an affective support for the process o f self-
k n o w le d g e itse lf— and a v ery p ow erful support at that, since self-
k n o w le d g e m u st stru g gle w ith stubborn repressions and resistance.
T h e e n e r g y fo r this stru g gle is drawn from the process k n o w n as
“ tra n s fe re n ce ,” w h e re the analyst becom es the object o f the p atien t’s
in ten se em o tio n s, usually o f love and attachm ent, but som etim es also
o f h o stility . T ra n sferen ce becom es a necessary m iddle term betw een
th e p atien t and h im s e lf or herself, and as such it is a corn erston e, al­
m o s t a d o g m a o f the Freudian system . T h e patient does n ot attem p t to
k n o w h im s e lf or h e rse lf directly, but o n ly by the m ediation o f his or
h er p o w e r fu l em o tiv e relationship w ith the therapist. T h is lo v e is
im a g in a ry b y nature. It is not built on a real relationship b etw een tw o

(157)
 C H A PTER 6

p e rs o n s , b u t o n an im a g i n a r y s itu a tio n v a lid w it h in th e confm cs o f the

c lin ic an d fo r th e d u r a tio n o f th e tr e a tm e n t (its c h a rg e o f psychic en­
e r g y is, o f c o u r s e , rea l a n d in te n s e ). A s s u c h it is ca p ab le o f mobilizing
s u ffic ie n t lib id in a l p o w e r to b r e a k th e p a tie n t's resistan ce and enable
h im o r h e r to r e v ie w th e re p r e s s e d e x p e r ie n c e an d b rin g its underlying
c o n flic ts to a n e w , m o r e s ta b le r e s o lu t io n . T h e p o w e r by which the
p a tie n t r e trie v e s th e d r a m a o f th e p a s t f r o m th e d e p th s o f self-incurred
o b liv io n (re p re s s io n ), b y w h i c h h e o r s h e re e n a cts th e conflicts and
s tr u g g le s to r e s o lv e it d iffe r e n t ly , is n o t a c o g n it iv e fo rce but an affec­
tiv e o n e . T h e d is p la c e d e r o t ic p o w e r o f tr a n s fe r e n c e m ediates between
th e p a tie n t an d h im s e lf a n d p r o v id e s th e in d is p e n s a b le ladder for the
d iffic u lt a s c e n t to w a r d s e lf - k n o w l e d g e . T h is is n o t amor dei intellectualis
b u t a k in d o f amor medici im aginarius— n o t th e in te lle c tu a l love o f God,
b u t th e “ im a g in a r y lo v e o f th e p h y s ic ia n ” w h ic h is co n v erted into the
p o w e r f u l e m o t io n a l le v e r th a t m a k e s s e lf - k n o w l e d g e possible.

S elf-C on sciou sn ess and the O th er

T r a n s fe r e n c e a ls o im p lie s th a t a p e r s o n (h e re th e p atien t) can gain self-

c o n s c io u s n e s s o n ly b y r e la tin g to a n o th e r c o n s c io u s n e s s , both in the
m o d e o f c o n flic t a n d e m o t io n a l c o n fr o n t a t io n a n d th ro u g h intellectual
in te r c o u r s e . T h is H e g e lia n (a n d , in a n o th e r se n se , Socratic) principle
ab s e n t in S p in o z a ta k e s a s p e c if ic p s y c h o a n a ly t ic a l sh ap e in Freud.
In th e d o c t o r - p a t ie n t s itu a tio n , th e a n a ly s t re p rese n ts for me, the
p a tie n t, th e e le m e n t o f “ o th e r n e s s ” in g e n e r a l, w h ic h I encounter as
a lim it a n d an o p p o s it io n ; th e t h e r a p is t th u s e m b o d ie s the “ reality-
p r in c ip le ” th a t s ta n d s in th e w a y o f m y s h a p e le s s an d u n yield in g drive
fo r satisfactio n .·*2 B u t , in a d d it io n , o th e r n e s s is h e re represented by an­
o th e r m in d , a d iffe r e n t p e r s o n , w i t h w h o m I e n te r a mind-to-mind
re la tio n s h ip o f c o n flic t , lo v e , a n d p o s s ib l y e v e n h atre d . T h e analyst
p r o v o k e s m e to d r a w fr o m m y s e l f m a t e r ia ls w h ic h he o r she turns into
clu e s an d h e r m e n e u tic a l s u g g e s t i o n s c o n c e r n in g m y o w n psyche and
life; a n d w h e n , c h a lle n g e d b y th e th e r a p is t a n d s p u r re d by our emo­
tio n a l r e la tio n s h ip , I f in a lly in t e r io r iz e th e in te r p re ta tio n s thus pro­
d u ce d , o u r c o n flic t g iv e s w a y t o a k in d o f m e n ta l identification; my
c o n s c io u s n e s s , b y lin k in g i t s e l f t o th a t o f th e a n a ly s t, attains that self-
co n s c io u s n e s s w h ic h w a s th e o b je c t o f th e p r o c e s s .
T h is m a y s o u n d (an d p a r t ly is) a S o c r a t ic p r in c ip le m ade to fit the
a n a ly s t’s c o u c h . B u t it h a s a c lo s e r a n d m o r e m o d e r n so u rce in Hegel's
d ia le c tic a l id e a lis m . U n li k e th e a n a ly s t , th e S o c r a t ic teacher can per­
fo r m th e r o le o f “ m i d w i f e ” e v e n i f th e d is c ip le d o e s n o t relate to him
o r h e r e m o t io n a lly ; a n d in S p in o z a , n o te a c h e r is n e c e s s a ry at all. Given
S p in o z a ’s C a r te s ia n d o c t r in e o f th e “ n a tu r a l l i g h t ,” th e m in d is able to

( ¡ 58)
 SPINOZA AND FREUD

p ro d u c e o f itself the clear and distinct ideas that determ ine its k n o w l­
ed g e o f th e w o rld and o f itself. (W h o indeed m ore than the solitary
Je w is h h eretic co u ld te stify to the m in d ’s ability to be its o w n “ m id ­
w if e ” ?) T h a t self-con sciou sn ess presupposes interpersonal desire and
co n flict is a H e gelia n p rin cip le w h ich underm ined the Cartesian tradi­
tion and w h ic h F reud , perhaps u n w ittin g ly, built into the p sych oana­
ly tic s itu a tio n .JJ
Y e t F reud ren o u n ces the idealist n otion o f the e go as subject, and
thus co m e s clo se to S p in o za’s naturalist account o f the m ind. In Spi­
n o za, the m in d is but the n exu s o f co m p lex ideas o f the body. T h e re is
no separate, u n ify in g s e lf w h ic h “ h o ld s” o r “ possesses” these ideas; in
o th e r w o r d s , o u r m in d docs n ot have ideas but is these ideas. Sim ilarly
in F reu d , th e e g o is n o t the subject o f “ its” ideas, but the conscious,
o u tw a r d ly o rien ted fu n ctio n o f the stream o f p sych ic life itself. T h e
e g o , Freud in sists, “ is . . . o n ly a portion o f the id, a portio n that has
been e x p e d ie n tly m o d ified by the p ro x im ity o f the external w o rld w ith
its th reat o f d an ger.” 44 It puts the id in relation to the outer w o rld and
screens it o f f fro m the w o rld th ro u gh the m echanism o f repression and
o th e r p s y c h o lo g ic a l tran sform ation s, all understood as d eterm in in g
co n scio u sn e ss in a natural and quasi-autom atic m anner.
T h e e g o in F reud has no connotation o f a K antian (or even C a rte ­
sian) s u b je c t,45 n o t o n ly because it is causally determ ined and lacks
tran scen d en tal status, but because it has no function o f self-ascrip tion ,
w h e re b y it im p rin ts its id en tity upon “ its” ideas and thus unifies them .
(O n e m a y even add that the idealist notion o f the subject, w ith its co n ­
n o tatio n s o f “ p u r ity ” and “ au to n om y,” m ust seem to Freud a narcis­
sistic illu sio n .) H en ce k n o w led ge, in Freud no less than in Sp in o za, is
m o re a m o d e o f b e in g than o f having, not so m eth in g w e possess but
so m e th in g w e are o r become. A s M o n iq u e Schneider notes, in attain in g
k n o w le d g e w e d o n ot gain an acquisition, as i f so m eth in g n e w w ere
ad d ed to the in v e n to ry o f our possessions, but rather w e exist d iffer­
e n tly , th at is, o u r p sych ic being is m od ified .*6
T h is red uces the scope o f actual self-k n o w led ge to the su ccessfu lly
in te rio rize d one. M e re understanding by the patient o f h erm en eu tic
clu es and explan atio ns w o rk ed o u t w ith the an alyst is n o t e n o u g h .
“ W ell, I have n o w un derstood— so w h at?” is a statem ent that an alysts
keep h earin g. M o reo ver, a superficial acceptance o f the an alyst m ay
serv e as ab n egatio n — a m erely intellectual adm ission o f the repressed
co n te n t th at actu ally changes n oth in g in the repression (and th e n eu ­
rosis) it s e lf and som etim es even serves to defend it. S e lf-k n o w le d g e
then has in F reud both a superficial and a genuine m od e; th e fo rm e r is
o n ly a ch a n ge in o ur state o f consciousness, w h ile the latter entails a
ch a n g e in o u r w h o le p sych ic being.

( ¡ 59)
 CHAPTER 6

T h e M in d ’s Body

A s S p in o z a h ad m a in ta in e d o v e r tly , so F re u d im p lie s ta c itly : p s y c h ic

ch a n g e s h av e th e ir b o d ily c o r r e s p o n d e n ts . T h e e a r ly F re u d w a s a n x ­
io u s to s e cu re an a u t o n o m o u s s c ie n tific ro le fo r p s y c h o a n a ly s is , in d e ­
p e n d e n t o f a n a to m y an d b o d ily m e d ic in e ; h e n c e h e r e s o r te d to lan­
g u a g e th at ig n o r e d th e s o m a tic p a ra lle ls o f p s y c h ic e v e n ts . B u t the
o ld e r F re u d n o lo n g e r h e sita te d to re fe r to th e b o d y as th e lo c u s o f
p s y c h o a n a ly tic s tru c tu re s an d p ro c e s s e s. T h e “ eg o ," h e s a y s , “ is first
a n d fo r e m o s t a b o d ily e g o ” ; it h as a s p a tia l d im e n s io n e v e n in th e “ an­
a t o m ic a l” sense.·17 T h e id is “ o p e n at its e n d to s o m a tic in flu e n c e ,"■** a
less e m p h a tic sta te m e n t w h ic h re v e a ls F r e u d ’s v a g u e n e s s o n th e d eta ils,
y e t stresses h is p rin c ip le o f p s y c h o s o m a t ic c o m p le m e n t a r ity .
It f o llo w s b o th fr o m th e te x t an d th e lo g ic o f F r e u d ’s p o s it io n , that
s o m e p h y s io lo g ic a l su b s tr a te m u s t e x is t to w h ic h p s y c h o a n a ly tic
s tru c tu re s — and ev en p a rtic u la r p ro c e s s e s — are a tta c h e d . A s in S p i­
n o za , in o r d e r to m a in ta in a s tric t p h ilo s o p h y o f i m m a n e n c e w h ile re ­
fu s in g to s im p ly re d u c e m e n ta l p h e n o m e n a to b o d ily s ta te s , s o m e so rt
o f m in d - b o d y p a ra lle lis m m u s t b e a d m it te d , w h e r e b y th e p s y c h ic and
th e s o m a tic asp ects o f th e o r g a n is m are t w o c o m p le m e n t a r y e x p r e s ­
s io n s o f th e sam e. O r p u ttin g it d iffe r e n t ly : i f th e m in d is to b e th e
o b je c t o f a u to n o m o u s s tu d y an d in te r p r e ta tio n , w i t h o u t a d m it tin g a
tra n s ce n d e n t g r o u n d fo r it, th en th e m in d m u s t b e b o th a tta c h e d to a
b o d y an d irre d u c ib le to th e te r m s b y w h ic h th e b o d y is s tu d ie d . T h is
is, fu n d a m e n ta lly , also S p in o z a ’s p o s itio n .
F re u d , it a p p ears, te n d s to th in k o f th e s o m a tic s id e o f m e n ta l life in
“ a n a to m ic ” an d ev en n e u r o p h y s io lo g ic a l te r m s ; b u t F re u d ia n s are n o t
lo g ic a lly c o m m itt e d to th is r e s tr ic tiv e a p p r o a c h . W it h o u t c o n tr a d ic ­
tio n , th e y m a y a g re e w i t h S p in o z a th a t th e a ren a fo r m e n ta l p ro c e s s e s
is th e w h o le b o d ily o r g a n is m , d o w n to its m in u te s t fu n c tio n s and
e v e n ts . In t o d a y ’s te rm s , th e s o m a tic p r o c e s s e s u n d e r ly in g p s y c h o a n ­
a ly tic ch a n g e s m a y h a v e to d o w it h m e ta b o lis m , im m u n iz a t io n , g e ­
n e tic m o d ific a tio n , an d o th e r s u b tle b io c h e m ic a l p r o c e s s e s , as w e ll as
w it h b o d ily fu n c tio n s fo r w h ic h th e sta te o f th e s c ie n c e d o e s n o t y e t
s u p p ly in fo r m a tio n . I m p lic itly , th e n — i f o n ly im p l ic i t ly — F re u d is h e re
c lo se r to S p in o z a th an his b io lo g y - s h y id io m w o u l d s u g g e s t.

L ogos and A nan ke

T h e r e is a se n se in w h ic h ra tio n a l k n o w l e d g e a n d d is illu s io n e d self-

u n d e rs ta n d in g re p la ce r e lig io n in F re u d , to o , a lb e it in a lo w k e y w ith
n o s u g g e s tio n o f s a lv a tio n . O n s e v e r a l o c c a s io n s F re u d s p e a k s , a lm o s t

(160)
 SPINOZA AND FREUD

S p in o zis tic a lly , o f th e lib e ra tin g p o w e r o f the rational understanding

o f n e ce ssity. A n a n k e an d logos, n ecessity and the rational intellect, are
his tw in g o d s .4y A n a n ke is th e o ld reality principle, n o w understood as
harsh n e c e s s ity ;50 as su ch it rep laces the moira o f ancient Greek tragedy
and b e c o m e s th e o b je c t o f m atu re acceptance. Ananke has several con­
n o tatio n s in F re u d , ra n g in g fro m the stringent im pedim ents o f daily
life to a u n iv e rs a l c o s m ic p rin cip le ;51 in the latter (major) role it stands
for s o m e t h in g lik e S p in o z a ’s im p erso n al w o rld o f necessity, though
w ith o u t th e la tt e r ’s d iv in e attrib u tes and inherent rationality. Ananke
reign s in a g o d le s s , a n o n y m o u s universe, stripped o f all the consoling
features th a t h u m a n d esire— especially, as Freud believes, our narcis­
sism and in fa n tile c r a v in g fo r a father figure— w o ve into it through
illu sio n . T h u s ananke c o m e s clo ser to N ietzsch e’s fatum than to Spi­
n o za ’s natura.
H ere, in d e e d , F re u d d eals w ith th e self-kn o w led ge not o f the patient
but o f m a n in g e n e ra l; and he lin k s it to logos. Logos is the counterpart
o f ananke, n e v e r as a c o s m ic b u t as an educational principle, a human
resp on se to th e r e ig n o f n ecessity. Logos does not inhere in reality itself
(again tin lik e S p in o z a ) b u t o n ly in m an, w h ere it helps him shed his
illu so ry c o n s o la t io n s , ed u ca te h im s e lf in the discipline o f ananke, and
learn to a c c e p t it w i t h fo rtitu d e and m aturity. T h is is w isdom , even a
m od e o f fr e e d o m in F reu d ; b u t it is neither amor dei nor amor fati.
F reu d ’s c a lm a c c e p ta n c e o f ananke in v o lves no potent em otion or ex­
istential d ra m a ; th e re is n o fo r m o f exaltatio n, no love for the totality
o f the u n iv e rs e , n o p r o u d and j o y o u s defiance o f nothingness. Freud’s
is a m ild e r, m o r e re stra in e d , p erh ap s paler attitude, less metaphysical
in m o o d an d m u c h m o r e m o d e s t in its claim s and expectations. Pow ­
ered by th e fe e b le i f u n r e m ittin g logos,52 F reud’s version o f wisdom
perhaps c o r r e s p o n d s to S p in o z a ’s seco n d kin d o f know ledge but cer­
tainly n o t to th e t h ir d .53
A nanke h as, h o w e v e r , its o w n b u ilt-in fo rm o f consolation. Freud
rem arks th a t “ it is easier to s u b m it to a rem orseless law o f nature, to
the s u b lim e * A v a v x r |, th a n to ch a n ce.” 54 T h u s, i f w e kn o w that death
is u n iversal an d in e v ita b le , w e can better accept o ur ow n death and that
o f o u r lo v e d o n e s. D o e s th is m ean , F reud w o n d ers in m om ents o f self­
su spicion , th a t th e n o tio n o f n atu ral necessity is yet another illusion we
form in th e q u e s t fo r c o n s o la tio n ? H ad Freud persisted in this Nietz-
schean s u s p ic io n , h e w o u ld h av e been led to a relativist theory rejecting
the co n cep ts o f s c ie n t ific tru th an d o b jectiv e reality. Y et Freud ends up
rejectin g th is “ a n a r c h is t” v ie w (as he calls it) w ith rigor. “ N o , our sci­
ence is n o t an illu s io n ,” h e d e clares. “ B u t an illusion it w ould be to sup­
pose that w h a t s c ie n c e c a n n o t g iv e us w e can get elsew here.” 55

(161)
 CHAPTER 6

W h e n u s in g th e id io m o f ananke in ste a d o f th e “ r e a lit y p r in c ip le ,”

F re u d te n d s to ta k e th e s ta n d p o in t o f th e p h ilo s o p h e r ra th e r th an that
o f th e p s y c h o a n a ly tic th era p ist; at tim e s , h e s p e a k s as th e th e ra p ist o f
culture. ( A tte m p tin g a p s y c h o a n a ly s is o f c u ltu r e m a y b e a m o r e p ro p e r
ta sk , o r re p la c e m e n t, fo r p h ilo s o p h y w h ic h u s u a lly , a c c o r d in g to
F re u d , is an e x p r e s s io n o f n a r c is s is m .il6) R e lig io n is a n a ly z e d as an in ­
fa n tile n e u ro s is to w h ic h h u m a n it y m u s t s u b m it in its p a in s ta k in g
g r o w t h to w a r d m a tu rity , b u t fr o m w h ic h , in th e d is ta n t th o u g h n o t
in d e fin ite fu tu r e , w e sh all b e c u re d b y s c ie n c e (and p a r tic u la r ly , so it
se e m s, b y th a t s c ie n tific s e lf- u n d e r s ta n d in g th a t p s y c h o a n a ly s is w ill
p r o v id e ) .57 F re u d h e re m a k e s h im s e lf an h e ir to th e p h i lo s o p h y o f th e
E n lig h te n m e n t a n d e c h o e s its o p t im is m , to w h ic h , h o w e v e r , o n th e
basis o f h is o w n p rin cip le s , h e is n o t q u ite e n title d . “ T h e v o ic e o f the
in te lle c t is a s o ft o n e , b u t it d o e s n o t rest u n til it h as g a in e d a h e a r in g ,”
F reu d d e clares. “ In th e lo n g ru n , n o th in g can w ith s ta n d re a so n and
e x p e r ie n c e .” 58 C o m i n g fr o m a D id e r o t , a K a n t, a F e u e rb a c h — o r even
a S p in o z a — su ch w o r d s w o u ld n o t h av e th e d is s o n a n t r in g th e y h av e in
F re u d , th e g re a t c o n n o is s e u r o f h u m a n ir r a tio n a lity , w h o h a d o th e r­
w is e d e n ie d th a t b y m e r e ly e x p o s in g an illu s io n o r a n e u ro s is w e can
a b ro g a te an d o v e r c o m e th e p o w e r s b e h in d it. In th e ca se o f th e in d iv id ­
ual p atie n t, F reu d s a w th e n e ed to in d ic a te (in h is t h e o r y o f tra n s fe r­
en ce) a s o u rce o f lib id in a l e n e r g y b y w h ic h re s is ta n c e a n d re p re s s io n
can be r e m o v e d . W h e re th en , in p a ra lle l m a n n e r, d o w e fin d th e a u x ­
ilia ry e ro s b y w h ic h th e in te lle c t (logos) is to w i n its lo n g - f o u g h t b a ttle
a g a in st re lig io n and fo r th e d e m y s tifie d a c c e p ta n c e o f ananke?
F r e u d ’s fa ilu re to p r o v id e an a d e q u a te a n s w e r to th is p r o b le m m a k e s
h im , o n this s p e c ific b u t im p o r t a n t issu e , m o r e o f a n a iv e th a n a d ark
e n lig h te n e r .59 T h a t F re u d h im s e lf w a s c a p a b le o f o v e r c o m in g illu s io n
an d a c c e p tin g th e v a rio u s asp e cts o f ananke is u n q u e s tio n a b le ; it is at­
te ste d to b y b o th h is in te lle c tu a l sta n d an d a ls o b y th e q u ie t fo r c e and
en d u ra n c e he s h o w e d th r o u g h o u t h is a d u lt life , e s p e c ia lly in th e last
s ix te e n y e a rs d u r in g w h ic h h e s u ffe re d d is c o m fo r t an d d a ily p ain and
h ad to u n d e r g o th ir t y - t w o s u r g ic a l o p e r a tio n s (an a v e r a g e o f o n e e v e ry
s ix m o n th s)— w it h o u t c o m p la in t, s e lf-p ra is e , o r fa ls e c o n s o la t io n s . H e
c lu n g to life w ith s to ic fo r titu d e an d v ig o r — w o r k in g , w r it in g , a n a ly z ­
in g p atie n ts, an d p r o d u c in g s o m e o f his m o s t in n o v a tiv e th e o rie s and
s o m e o f h is b est and m o s t e le g a n t p ie ce s o f lit e r a r y s ty le .
Y e t, i f F r e u d ’s life w a s to s e rv e as an e d u c a tio n a l m o d e l, d id it p r o ­
v id e a re a lis tic e x a m p le ? Is e v e r y o n e ca p a b le o f s u c h a c r e a tiv e (o r at
lea st n o n d e p re s s iv e ) re s ig n a tio n to ananke? W h y s h o u ld th e c o m m o n
p e rs o n g iv e u p his o r h e r c o n s o lin g illu s io n , so d e e p ly in g r a in e d in his
o r h e r in s tin c tu a l c o n s titu tio n ? F re u d th u s fa c e s th e c la s s ic p r o b le m o f

(162)
 SPINOZA AND FREUD

the re latio n b e t w e e n th e e n lig h te n e d fe w and the multitude. Yet,

w h ereas S p in o z a h a d a s p e c ia l th e o r y fo r the masses— and thereby a
vehicle fo r h is to r ic a l c h a n g e an d p ro g re ss— in Freud no such theory
(or s tra te g y ) o f p r o g r e s s is av a ilab le.
It w ill n o t b e s u r p r is in g to d is c o v e r that, on F reud’s account, Leo­
nardo, th e lin k b e t w e e n h im s e lf an d S p in o za, had also resigned him self
to the w is d o m o f a n an ke/’0 T h o u g h L eo n ard o frequently expressed ad­
m iration fo r th e C r e a t o r as th e u ltim a te cause o f nature, there is no
indication “ th a t h e w is h e d to m a in ta in a personal relation with this
divine p o w e r .” R a th e r, “ th e reflectio n s in w h ic h he recorded the deep
w isd o m o f h is la s t y e a rs b re a th e th e resign atio n o f the human being
w h o su b je c ts h i m s e lf to ¿ v a y X T i, to th e law s o f nature, and w ho ex­
pects n o a lle v ia t io n fr o m th e g o o d n e s s o r grace o f G o d .”
A su b tler, t h o u g h p e rh a p s e v e n s tro n g e r threat unites Freud to Spi­
noza th r o u g h H e in e , th e p o e t-p h ilo s o p h e r w h o m Freud liked to
quote w ith e v id e n t e m p a th y . In Future o f an Illusion, Freud has just
declared his a im to b e th e e d u c a to r o f h u m a n ity to the painfuJ maturity
o f ananke, p a in t in g th is id e a l in c o lo rs that are borrow ed, at least in
part, fro m th e p a le tte s o f S p in o z a and N ietzsch e . Then , to sum up and
h igh light th is e x p e r ie n c e o f to ta l th is-w orld lin ess, Freud joins his
“ broth er in n o n f a it h ” in th e e x c la m a tio n :

T h e heaven we shall leave

T o the angels and to the sparrows.

This is, o f c o u r s e , th e fa m o u s c o u p le t in w h ic h H eine encapsulated his

Spin ozistic p h i lo s o p h y o f im m a n e n c e . In callin g H eine a “ brother in
nonfaith” ( Unglaubensgenossen) F reu d is u sin g a w itticism that Heine
him self h ad fo i m e d in re fe re n c e to S p in o za; thus the three o f them are
co n sciously u n iie d b y F re u d . T h e s u b tle ty o f the appellation is even
greater. T h e te r m “ y o u r Glaubensgenossen” (co-religionists) was used,
for e x a m p le, w h e n s p e a k in g o f o th e r J e w s to a Jew ; thus Freud, in
reversing it to Unglaubensgenossen, im p lie s a co n gregation not only o f
heretics in g e n e r a l b u t, s p e c ific a lly o f Jewish heretics— a distinct phe­
nom enon in th e h is t o r y o f E u r o p e a n m o d ern izatio n. M oses Hess saw
in Spinoza th e a r c h e ty p e o f th is p h e n o m e n o n — a J ew w h o transcended
all h isto rical r e lig io n s to b e c o m e th e p rop h et o f a secular and this-
worldly r e lig io n o f re a so n . T h is im a g e m ay ap p ly even m ore to Freud
who, u n lik e th e s o lita r y a n d e s o te ric S p in o za, had the temperament
and w ill- t o - p o w e r o f a le a d e r an d ev e n a fo u n d er o f a church.
It is n o te w o r t h y th a t w h ile c la im in g th at psychoanalysis is a science,
Freud also ca lls it a “ m o v e m e n t ” (Bewegung), d enouncing dissenters as
secessionists.61 T o d is a g r e e w i t h h im w a s n ot so m uch to make false

(163)
 CHAPTER 6

s ta te m e n ts as to b e c o m e a tra ito r. E q u a lly im p o r t a n t is th e ro le o f

F r e u d ’s o w n life (b o th its re a lity an d its m y t h o lo g ic a l im a g e ) in es ta b ­
lis h in g his m o v e m e n t. F r e u d ’s lo n g s t r u g g le a g a in s t re s is ta n ce and
p re ju d ic e , his p e rs e v e ra n ce , c o u r a g e , h o n e s ty , a n d lu c id ity , his p e r­
so n a l g e n tle n e s s an d la c k o f ra n c o r— his m o r a l n o less th a n in te lle c tu a l
v irtu e s — b e c a m e im p o r ta n t in s p r e a d in g h is w o r d . E r n e s t J o n e s ’ life o f
F re u d h ad in th is re s p e c t n o t o n ly a h is to r ic a l fu n c t io n b u t a ls o an in ­
d ire c t a p o s to lic o n e . N o less ce n tra l w a s th e s a g a o f F r e u d ’s in te lle c tu a l
jo u r n e y (w h o s e sta g e s h e m a d e k n o w n to th e w o r ld in s e v e r a l essay s),
in p a rtic u la r th e y e a rs o f h is s e lf a n a ly sis: F r e u d ’ s c o n c e n t r a te d s tr u g g le
w ith h im s e lf an d his d re a m s fr o m w h ic h h is n e w th e o r e tic a l in s ig h ts
s p r a n g m a y ca ll to m in d th e liv e s o f g r e a t m y s tic s , p r o p h e ts , an d
sain ts, th e ir g o in g to th e “ d e s e r t” fo r c o n c e n t r a tio n an d s e lf- o v e r c o m -
in g in th e ab yss o f so litu d e . L ik e J esu s o r M o s e s ( w h o h ad a lw a y s fas­
cin a te d F reud ) an d lik e S o c ra te s an d S p in o z a , F r e u d ’s o w n life has a
m y th ic a l d im e n s io n in se p a ra b le fr o m h is m e s s a g e .

C o n c l u s io n

In c o n c lu s io n , F re u d an d S p in o z a are u n ite d b y a n a tu ra lis t d e te r m in ­

is m w h ic h in c lu d e s th e p a th o s o f h u m a n e m a n c ip a tio n b y m e a n s o f
s e lf- k n o w le d g e . B u t in F re u d th is is an e m a n c ip a tio n f r o m c o m p le x e s
a n d n e u ro s is , it is th e r a p y an d n o t s a lv a tio n . F r e u d is a p r o s a ic ath e ist,
w i t h o u t S p in o z a ’s a b s o lu te and s e m im y s t ic a l m e ta p h y s ic a l a s p ira tio n s .
T h e F re u d ia n m e th o d is m a d e to p r o d u c e a n o r m a l p e rs o n ; S p in o ­
z a ’s w a y is m e a n t to p r o d u c e a non-normal p e r s o n , a ra re an d e x c e p ­
tio n a l h u m a n b e in g . A s S p in o z a says in c o n c lu s io n o f h is Ethics: “ A ll
th in g s e x c e lle n t are as d iffic u lt as th e y are r a re .”
S e lf - k n o w le d g e in F re u d is n o t m e d ia te d , as in S p in o z a , b y m e ta ­
p h y s ic s o r b y a d e ta ile d n o m o lo g ic a l k n o w l e d g e o f n a tu re . U s in g a
m in im u m o f g e n e ra l co d e s an d s tru c tu r e s , it is e s s e n tia lly c o n c e r n e d
w i t h th e in te r p re ta tio n o f p a rtic u la r s ig n s , u tte ra n c e s , d re a m s , slip s,
fr a g m e n te d m e m o r ie s , an d th e lik e , d r a w n fr o m th e p a tie n t’s p e rs o n a l
b io g r a p h y . T h u s it is m o r e h e r m e n e u tic s th a n s c ie n c e , o r h o ld s an a m ­
b iv a le n t p o s it io n b e tw e e n th e tw o .
S p in o z a an d F re u d b o th see m a n as a n a tu ra l c r e a tu re o n ly , a p r in c i­
p le o f d e s ire o r r e s e r v o ir o f lib id o , w h o d e s p ite h is b e in g d e te r m in e d
b y n a tu ra l a g e n ts s triv e s fo r e m a n c ip a tio n an d is c a p a b le o f a c h ie v in g
it. B o t h th u s stress th e te n s io n b e tw e e n h u m a n b o n d a g e an d th e lib ­
e ra tio n o f m a n b y m e a n s o f s e lf- k n o w le d g e , w h ic h re m a in s an in tr in s ic
n a tu ra l p h e n o m e n o n an d is n o lo n g e r “ G o d - g i v e n .” T h e i r h u m a n is m
re je c ts r e lig io u s an d m e ta p h y s ic a l illu s io n s an d o ffe r s a k in d o f d ark

(164)
 SPINOZA AND FREUD

en lig h ten m en t, w h ic h S p in o z a ’s p h ilo so p h y brightens up by making

nature and re a so n th e s u b s titu te fo r an absolute religion. Spinoza’s
world c o u ld h o r r if y an d o u tr a g e o n ly those schooled in a theistic frame
o f m ind; in fa c t, it is a w o r l d o f o rd e r and absolute meaning, a world
illum inated fr o m w it h in b y th e lig h t o f reason, w hich offers man the
perspective o f m e ta p h y s ic a l s a lv a tio n . O f the tw o thinkers, Freud is
the m ore u n c o m p r o m is in g ath eist, w h o has internalized Kant’s cri­
tique and ra ised it to its u t m o s t co n scq u en tia lity . H um an liberation in
Spinoza lead s m a n to th e in fin ite ; in Freud, liberation leaves man in his
im potent fm itu d c in th e u n iv e rs e .
A final w o r d a b o u t th e J e w is h situ a tion o f Freud and Spinoza. Spi­
noza had n o w a y o f r e t a in in g h is J e w is h affiliation while rejecting the
religious b e lie fs o f t h e j e w s an d s te p p in g outside their organized com­
munity. B u t fo r F re u d , liv in g a fte r the structures o f traditionaljew ish
life had been s h a tte r e d , th is w a s a v ia b le possibility. Freud was a non­
religious J e w , a h e r e tic a l J e w , b u t a J e w nevertheless, as he regarded
himself*2 and w a s s e e n b y th e o th e r J e w s and by non-Jews as well (in­
cluding th e N a z is , w h o b u r n t his b o o k s and drove him in old age to
exile).
Freud r e p e a te d ly s tre s s e d his J e w is h o rig in . H e even surmised that
only a J e w c o u ld h a v e c o n c e iv e d o f p syc h o a n a lysis, because o f his mar­
ginal p o sitio n . L a te r h e a d d e d th a t o n ly a “ G od less J e w " was capable
of that.6) F o r m a n y y e a r s F re u d w a s a m em b er o f B'tiei B'rith, and on
joining in 1897 h e in d ic a te d th e J e w is h n e s s o f his colleagues as partic­
ularly w e lc o m e to h im , s in c e h e to o ca m e fro m the sam e people. Both
his sons h ad jo in e d Z io n is t y o u t h m o v em en ts but Freud, who sus­
pected n a tio n a lis m , w a s n o t a Z io n is t. A b o v e all he rejected religion.
He reiterated h is b e in g a J e w is h h e re tic, an “ infidel J e w ” as he once
referred to h im s e lf in E n g lis h ; an d H e in e he considered his “ brother in
nonfaith.” T h e b o n d w h ic h lin k s h im to ju d a is m , Freud w rote in 1926
to his B ’nei B ’rith c o lle a g u e s , is n e ith e r faith n or national feelings, yet
what rem ains is s u ffic ie n t to m a k e h is attra ctio n to ju d a ism irresistible,
consisting o f “ m a n y d a r k m e n ta l fo rc e s w h o s e p ow er is as great as they
are u n u tterab le, a n d y e t a c le a r co n scio u sn ess o f an inner identity,
which is the s e c r e t o f th is m e n ta l s tru c tu re .” F reud thus experienced
his Jew ishness e v e n as it re m a in e d p a rtly en ig m a tic to him (the kind o f
enigma one is te m p te d to s a y “ o n ly F re u d ” co u ld solve). In his old age
he w rote to an u n k n o w n a d d re sse e : “ I h o p e y o u are not unaware that
I have alw a ys r e m a in e d fa ith fu l to o u r p eop le, and have never pre­
tended to b e n o th in g e ls e b u t w h a t I am : A J e w fro m M oravia whose
parents cam e fr o m A u s t r ia n G a lic ia .”

(>65)
 CHAPTER 6

In th e s a m e v e in h e w r o t e in 1930 in a s p e c ia l p r e fa c e to th e H e b r e w
e d itio n o f Totem and Taboo:

N o re a d er o f [th e H e b r e w v e r s io n o f ] th is b o o k w i ll fin d it ea sy
to p u t h im s e lf in th e e m o t io n a l p o s it io n o f an a u t h o r w h o is ig ­
n o ra n t o f th e la n g u a g e o f h o ly w r it , w h o is c o m p le t e ly e s tra n g e d
f r o m th e r e lig io n o f h is fa th e rs— as w e ll as f r o m e v e r y o th e r re li­
g io n — an d w h o c a n n o t ta k e a sh a re in n a tio n a lis t id e a ls , b u t w h o
h as y e t n e v e r r e p u d ia te d h is p e o p le , w h o fe e ls th a t he is in his
e sse n tia l n a tu re a J e w an d w h o h as n o d e s ire to a lte r th a t n a tu re .
I f th e q u e s tio n w e r e p u t to h im : “ S in c e y o u h a v e a b a n d o n e d all
th e se c o m m o n ch a ra c te r is tic s o f y o u r c o u n t r y m e n , w h a t is th ere
le ft to y o u th a t is J e w is h ? ” h e w o u ld r e p ly : “ A v e r y g r e a t d e a l, and
p r o b a b ly its v e r y e s s e n c e .”

F re u d says th a t h e c a n n o t c le a r ly e x p r e s s th is e s s e n c e in w o r d s , and
ad d s ra th e r o p tim is tic a lly : “ S o m e d a y n o d o u b t it w i ll b e c o m e a c ce s ­
sib le to th e s c ie n tific m in d .”
Y e t e v e n as h e s tre ssed his J e w is h n e s s w i t h fe e lin g a n d p r id e , th e old
F re u d w a s n o t d e te r re d fr o m d e p r iv in g h is f e llo w J e w s o f th e ir g re a te st
p r o p h e t, M o s e s , w h o m h e d e cla re d to h a v e b e e n an E g y p t i a n .64 S p i­
n o z a , to o , h ad u n d e rc u t M o s e s ’ ro le b y d e c la r in g th e P e n ta te u c h to
h a v e b e e n w r itt e n b y a la ter a u th o r , E z ra ; b u t th e s a m e k in d o f h eresies
th a t m a d e S p in o za s u b m it to a b a n an d b e d e c r ie d a r e n e g a d e d id n o t
p r e v e n t F reu d fr o m b e in g a c c e p te d an d r e c o g n iz e d as a b r o th e r . T h is
w a s a ra d ica l h is to ric a l c h a n g e , w h ic h S p in o z a h a d p r e fig u r e d an d e m ­
b o d ie d w h ile b e in g d e p r iv e d o f it h i m s e lf In th e tw e n tie t h c e n t u r y a
J e w c o u ld liv e o u ts id e th e o r g a n iz e d c o m m u n it y a n d h o ld h eretica l
v ie w s w it h o u t h a v in g to re n o u n c e h is o r h e r J e w is h id e n t it y o r b e re­
je c t e d as a tra ito r. W h a t h ad b e e n a n tic ip a te d b y S p in o z a h as m e a n ­
w h ile b e c o m e a liv in g c o n c e p t an d a s o c ia l re a lity . T o d a y o n e can de­
b a te w h a t a “ n o n r e lig io u s J e w ” m ean s; o n e ca n p o le m ic iz e w i t h su ch
a J e w , d e n o u n c e o r e x to l h im , o r t r y to m a k e h im “ r e p e n t” ; b u t o n e
can n o lo n g e r d e n y his e x is te n c e . T h e g u l f w h ic h s e p a ra te s F r e u d ’s
J e w is h s itu a tio n fr o m S p in o z a ’s th r o w s th is m a jo r h is to r ic a l c h a n g e
in to sh a rp relief.

(166)
 C H A P T E R 7

Epilogue:
Immanence and Finitude

Sp in oza w a s n o t th e firs t p h ilo so p h e r o f im m anence; pre-Socratics,

E p icu re an s, an d S to ic s h ad p reced ed h im in ancient times. But with
Sp in oza th e id e a o f im m a n e n c e , p o w e rfu lly system atized, re-emerged
after h a v in g b e en d is cre d ite d and repressed by the overpowering
w e ig h t o f m e d ie v a l C h r is tia n ity . O f course, Christianity had extended
and a m p lifie d a J e w is h w o r ld - v ie w , to w h ich it added a theological
stru ctu re d e r iv e d fr o m G r e e k p h ilo so p h y ; and Judaism itselfhas been
affected b y s o m e o f its C h ris tia n transform ation s. Y et originally, the
Jew ish B ib le w a s v e r y far fr o m th e transcendent o u tlo o k professed by
later th e o lo g ia n s .
T h e id eas o f a p u r e ly tra n scen d en t G o d , o f an afterlife and an after­
w o rld , o f a d iv in e d o m a in o n to lo g ic a lly separate from ours, are pos­
terior to th e B ib le an d p a r tly fo re ig n to it. T h e biblical G od is awe­
som e, re m o te , a n d u n see n , b u t n onetheless im m ersed in this world
and in h u m a n a ffa irs . H is p u n ish m e n ts and rew ards are purely o f this
w orld ; th e re is n o h e ll o r p ara d ise, ex cep t an earthly paradise, the Gar­
den o f E d e n , lo n g lo s t (and p erh ap s on e day retrieved— also upon
earth). M e a n w h ile th e O l d T e s ta m e n t offers a Prom ised Land as the
su prem e r e lig io u s re s to ra tio n . G o d co n trols the earthly lives o f indi­
vid u als, th e d e s tin ie s o f p e o p le s , th e course o f the stars, the seasons,
the o cea n s— all a s p e cts o f th e actu al w o rld . G o d even has a w orldly
im age in w h ic h h e cre a te d m an , and th o u gh no hum an being (save
M oses) can lo o k at it an d liv e , th e im a g e , a visual entity, literally exists.
T h e a tte m p ts o f M a im o n id e s an d o th er Jew ish theologians to explain
it aw ay a lle g o r ic a lly are p o s te r io r to the B ib le by over a millennium
and a half.
T h u s th e m o s t a b s tra c t an d lo ft y G o d o f antiquity remains attached
to this w o r ld in a lm o s t e v e r y resp ect. T h o u g h personified as a separate
entity, G o d re s id e s w ith in th e w o r ld , giv es life and governance to it,

(167)
 CHAPTER 7

r e w a r d s , s a n c tio n s , d e s tr o y s , an d re s u s c ita te s — all w i t h in th e (en­

la rg e d ) b o u n d a rie s o f im m a n e n c e . H e is th e fo r m , th e o rd e r, th e g o v ­
e rn m e n t, th e m o r a lity o f th is w o r ld , p e r s o n ifie d (an d th e r e b y d is tin ­
g u is h e d ) as a s in g le s u b je c t— th e K in g o f k i n g s . 1
T h e s u p e r n a tu r a l it s e l f is p art o f th e a n c ie n t H e b r e w ’ s this-worldly
e x p e r ie n c e . G o d ’s e n to u r a g e r e s e m b le s th a t o f a k in g ; h is “ a n g e ls ”
(inala’khim , o r ig in a lly m e a n in g : m e s s e n g e r s ) a p p e a r to c o n s titu te a h u ­
m a n lik e , i f s u p e r io r , c o m m u n it y w it h in th e s a m e w o r ld s y s te m . M ir ­
a cle s, to o , are e x p e r ie n c e d as w o n d e r o u s w o r l d ly e v e n ts , s in c e a w o r ld
th a t c o n ta in s G o d as re s id e n t is lik e ly to b e a r h is m a r k s . A f t e r all, i f
g re a t w o r l d ly p o w e r s (th e w in d , th e L e v ia th a n , E m p e r o r C y r u s ) can
e ffe c t th in g s o u t o f th e o r d in a r y , w h y s h o u ld J e h o v a h , a s till g re a te r
w o r l d ly p o w e r , n o t b e c a p a b le o f e v e n g r e a te r e x p lo it s ?
It w a s m o s t ly in th e n o r m a tiv e d o m a in th a t th e a n c ie n t H e b r e w e x ­
p e rie n c e d th e tr a n s c e n d e n t b r u n t o f h is r e lig io n . G o d as an a w e s o m e
fa th e r w a s a ls o a ru le r, a s o v e r e ig n , a la w g i v e r ; an d h is la w s d id n o t
e x p re s s th e im m a n e n t, n a tu ra l life o f th e p e o p le b u t an e x te r n a l w ill
th a t is ra d ic a lly , e v e n b r u ta lly , fo r e ig n to it. T h is o p p o s it io n w a s n o t
an o r d in a r y c iv iliz in g e ffe c t, n o t s im p ly “ c u lt u r e ” s u b lim a t in g “ ra w na­
tu r e ,” b u t a r e v o lu tio n w ith in c u ltu r e i t s e l f T o o v e r c o m e th e d o m i­
n a n t p a g a n c u ltu re , th e la w s o f J e h o v a h h a d to ca u s e an in n e r ru p tu re
w it h in life , d e n a tu ra te it, u p r o o t its im m e d ia c y , a n d im b u e e v e r y d a y
a cts w i t h a n e w , sacred d im e n s io n th a t tr a n s c e n d s th e m . M o r e o v e r , it
w a s o b e d ie n c e to th e e x te rn a l le g is la tio n w h ic h c o n s titu te d th e H e ­
b r e w ’s v e r y id e n tity , h is b e lo n g in g to th e p e o p le o f th e c o v e n a n t and
th e s o u r c e o f w h a t h e w a s.
T h u s , as o p p o s e d to th e im m a n e n t te n d e n c y o f h is w o r l d p ic tu re ,
th e a n c ie n t H e b r e w e x p e r ie n c e d th e m o r a l u n iv e r s e as r o o te d in tra n ­
s c e n d e n c e . T h e in v is ib le , s u p r a n a tu ra l p o w e r o f tr a n s c e n d e n c e did
h o v e r o v e r h is life , n o t so m u c h a m e ta p h y s ic a l e n tit y as a m e ta p h y s ic a l
norm and authority. H e r e lie s a m a jo r d iffe r e n c e b e t w e e n h is w o r ld -
e x p e r ie n c e an d S p in o z a ’s. A n o t h e r c r u c ia l d iffe r e n c e is th a t in th e H e ­
b r e w B ib le , th e im m a n e n t te n d e n c y o f life w a s n o t c o m p le m e n t e d b y
n a tu ra lis m b u t b y its o p p o s it e , th e a tte m p t to s a c r a liz e life b y e ffe c tin g
a r u p tu re b e tw e e n it and n a tu re .
T h is te n d e n c y b c c a m e d o m in a n t in s e c o n d te m p le J u d a is m , w h e n
an o t h e r w o r l d ly d im e n s io n e m e r g e d an d an e la b o r a te s y s te m o f oral
la w s p re a d its d o m in io n o v e r life . H o w e v e r , w i t h th e P h a r is e e s and
la te r ra b b is , th e th ru s t a g a in s t n a tu re c r y s ta lliz e d in to a k in d o f th is-
w o r l d ly s a c ra lis m , w h e r e a s th e ir r e v o lu tio n a r y o f f s p r in g , th e C h r is ­
tia n s, tu r n e d th is th ru s t to w a r d h e a v e n , to th e p u re s p ir itu a lit y o f th e
w o r ld a b o v e . T h e d u a lity o f th e e a r th ly an d th e c e le s tia l, th e te m p o r a l

(*tS)
 EPILOGUE

and the e te rn a l, s a lv a tio n an d d a m n atio n , the celebration o f pure spirit

in c o n q u e s t o f th e flesh , an d th e re-o rien tatio n o f life’s meaning from
this w o rld an d th e b e y o n d — th is d u ality, although it had its origins in
sccond t c m p l e ju d a is m (P h arisee s and Essenes)— w ent far beyond what­
ever th e J e w is h ra b b is p r o c la im e d , and reached its refinement and
g lo ry — also its d o c tr in a l s y s te m a tiza tio n (and frequent ossification)—
in the th e o lo g ic a l w o r k o f th e ch u rch . T a lm u d ic, then Rabbinical Ju­
daism re m a in e d m u c h c lo s e r to earth , m uch m ore im m anent in its re­
ligiou s c o n c e r n s , a lth o u g h at th e sam e tim e extrem ely opposed to nat­
uralism .
J ew s s p e n t m o s t o f th e ir re lig io u s en ergies w o rry in g about the daily
o b se rv an ce o f th e ir la w s , th e h u n d re d s o f old precepts and n ew rulings
a p p ly in g to a lm o s t e v e r y a s p e ct o f life: fo od , sex, marriage, business,
fam ily, fe s tiv it y , h y g ie n e , an d d o ze n s o f other concrete issues, some­
times m in u te an d s e e m in g ly tr iv ia l, but, because o f their embedded­
ness in th e L a w , th e y w e r e in v e s te d w ith m etaphysical sanctity. Yet if
Jew ish r e lig io u s life re m a in e d la r g e ly practical and earthbound, its
p rag m atism w a s n e v e r u tilita ria n , b u t m etaphysical. Jews were spend­
ing gre a t e ffo r t a n d s k ill s o lv i n g p ro b le m s o f ritual and observance
w h ich to n o n - J e w s w i l l s e e m a b s o lu te ly useless. T h is again is their pe­
culiar k in d o f i m m a n e n c e , an an tin atu ralistic im m anence: nature is re­
placed w i t h its o p p o s it e , th e n e tw o r k o f transcendent-anchored
norm s, as th e s t u f f a n d s u b s ta n c e o f earth ly life.
S p in o za, o f c o u r s e , r e je c te d b o th th e dualistic transcendence o f the
C h ristians a n d th e d e n a tu r iz e d , tran scend en ce-rid d en this-worldliness
o f his f e llo w J e w s . A “ M a r r a n o o f rea so n ,” he shed all historical reli­
gions (th o u g h n o t all r e lig io u s co n c e rn s), and offered salvation neither
in C h ris t n o r in th e L a w o f M o s e s , b u t in his o w n kind o f religion o f
reason— n a tu r a lis tic , m o n is t ic , and s trictly im m anent.
T h o u g h a s o lit a r y a n d r e v o lu tio n a r y thinker, Spinoza did not spring
from a v o id . H is u n iq u e n e s s sta n d s o u t in a rich historical tapestry: the
D utch r e p u b lic , w i t h its p re c a p ita lis t o lig a rch y and incipient worldly
outlook; th e s c ie n t ific r e v o lu tio n c o m p o u n d in g the n ew learning o f
the R en a issa n ce; th e e m e r g e n c e o f p o litic a l interests and ideas placing
so ve re ig n ty a n d s ta te a u t h o r it y w ith in m an -m ad e institutions— are all
indispensable, i f in s u ffic ie n t, fo r e x p la in in g Spinoza. B u t perhaps even
more im p o r ta n t are h is M a r r a n o ro o ts. W h en at the age o f twenty-
four, a lo n e r a n d h e r e tic , S p in o z a w a s ex p elled from the Jewish com ­
munity, h e c a rrie d w i t h h im n o t o n ly M a im on id es and the Hebrew
Bible, C re s c a s a n d th e C a b b a lis ts , bu t, ex isten tially and prior to all, he
carried o v e r a s p e c ia l a n d u n iq u e e x p e rie n c e , that o f the Marranos and
their d e s ce n d a n ts , w h i c h h a d a lre a d y affected his queries as a young

(169)
 CHAPTER 7

m a n an d w h ic h , tr a n s fo r m e d an d in c o r p o r a t e d in h is la te r w o r k , S p i­
n o z a h e lp e d tr a n s p o rt fr o m a p r o v in c ia l Ib e ria n s u b c u ltu r e in to th e
o p e n aren a o f W e s te rn in te lle c tu a l h is to ry .
T h is m o v e has d iv id e d th e p re s e n t w o r k in t w o . T h e M arrano o f R ea ­
son s itu a te d S p in o z a w ith in th e M a r r a n o c u ltu r e , c o m p a r in g an d c o n ­
tr a s tin g h im w it h o th e r M a r r a n o in te lle c tu a ls a n d lif e - fo r m s . W it h o u t
tr y in g to “ r e d u c e ” S p in o z a to th is (o r a n y o th e r ) d o m in a n t e le m e n t in
his b a c k g r o u n d , w e s a w th e id ea o f im m a n e n c e e m e r g in g an d re c u r­
rin g in th e M a r r a n o e x p e r ie n c e , n o t a lw a y s an a r tic u la te d p h ilo s o p h y
b u t as a p e rs o n a l sta n d , a m a n n e r o f life , an e x is te n tia l an d a esth e tic
o u tlo o k .
S p in o z a g a v e th is id ea its p h ilo s o p h ic a l fo r m a n d p o w e r . A n o u ts id e r
b o th b y b ir th an d c h o ic e , b a n n e d b y t h e j e w s w h il e r e fu s in g to c o n v e rt
to C h r is tia n it y , he b e c a m e th e firs t E u r o p e a n o f im p o r t a n c e w h o tran ­
sce n d e d th e u n iv e rs e o f re v e a le d r e lig io n w h il e p r e s e n t in g it w it h a
p o w e r fu l s y s te m a tic a lte rn a tiv e . H is m o v e e n c a p s u la te d th e p rin cip le
o f m o d e r n ity in a m o s t ra d ica l fo r m . W h ile o th e r r a tio n a lis ts , D e s ­
ca rte s an d L e ib n iz in c lu d e d , r e v iv e d in th e ir o n t o lo g ie s th e th e istic
w o r ld - p ic tu r e o f C h r is tia n it y , S p in o z a a llo w e d n o v e s t ig e o f th e w o r ld
b e y o n d to s u r v iv e , e ith e r as a m e ta p h y s ic a l e n t it y o r as a s o u r c e o f
n o r m a tiv e v a lu e . T h e r e b y S p in o z a b e c a m e th e fo u n d e r o f m o d e r n p h i­
lo s o p h y o f im m a n e n c e , e ffe c tin g an in te lle c tu a l r e v o lu t io n n o less m o ­
m e n to u s an d c o n s e q u e n tia l th a n K a n t ’s, a n d w h ic h , h a v in g re a c h e d its
m a in im p a c t s e v e ra l g e n e r a tio n s a fte r S p in o z a , s till h as o ffs p r in g
w h ic h u p se t an d u n s e ttle tr a d itio n a l th in k in g to d a y .
S p in o z a ’s im m a n e n t r e v o lu tio n se t th e g r o u n d fo r la te r “ h e r e tic a l”
th in k e rs , w h o s o u g h t to c o n s tr u e th e p h ilo s o p h y o f i m m a n e n c e eith er
m o r e c o h e r e n t ly o r still m o r e ra d ic a lly , o r to e x te n d its b a s ic id ea s to
n e w areas ( e c o n o m ic s , d e p th p s y c h o l o g y , e tc .). W h a t t h e y s h a re d w ith
S p in o z a w a s n o t o n ly a “ c lim a te o f id e a s ,” as F r e u d p u t it, b u t a sy s­
te m a tic c o n te x t: ( i) im m a n e n c e is th e o n ly a n d o v e r a ll h o r iz o n o f
b e in g ; (2) it is e q u a lly th e o n ly s o u r c e o f v a lu e a n d n o r m a t iv it y ; and
(3) a b s o r b in g th is r e c o g n itio n in to o n e ’ s life is a p r e lu d e — a n d p re c o n ­
d itio n — fo r w h a te v e r “ s a lv a tio n ” (o r e m a n c ip a tio n ) h u m a n s can attain.
W it h in th is n u c le a r c o n t e x t o n e ca n fu r th e r a r g u e a b o u t th e ad eq u ate
w a y to c o n s tr u e th e w o r ld o f im m a n e n c e (see P r e fa c e ). (1) Is it n atu re,
as in S p in o z a , o r s p irit, h is to ry , W ille, durée, o r s o m e o th e r s u c h m e ta ­
p h y s ic a l c o n s tr u c tio n ? (2) S h o u ld it b e in d iv id u a t e d as a s in g le , in fin ite
to ta lity ? (3) S h o u ld it b e d e ifie d ? (4) W h a t s tr u c tu r e a p p lie s to it— m e ­
c h a n ic a l ca u s a lity , o r g a n ic p u r p o s iv ity , d ia le c tic a l lo g ic , o r a m u ch
m o r e flu id an d fle x ib le m o d e l? (5) D o e s it h a v e th is s tr u c tu r e e te rn a lly ?
Is o u r S p in o z is tic q u e st fo r fix e d , e te rn a l la w s w e ll fo u n d e d o r ra th e r a

(170)
 EPILOGUE

p r c p h ilo s o p h ic a l bias, perhaps a vestige o f th eo lo gical thinking? (6)

S h o u ld th e h u m an b e in g (cither as subject o r as natural species) be as­
sig n e d a sp ecia l p o sitio n w ith in the w o rld o fim m a n e n ce? Ifs o , in w hat
ca p a city? H o w is the ro le o f h um an h isto ry affected by answ ering the
fo rm e r q u estio n ? F inally, (7) sh ould hum an liberation (w h ich presup­
p oses th e im m a n e n t rev o lu tio n ) translate the religio us v ie w o f salva­
tio n in to an e q u a lly ab solu te secular esch a to lo gy, or should it (by its
v e ry se cu la rity ) be co n fin ed to a narrow er, m ore m od est vision , lim ­
ited b y critic a l bo un d aries?
T h e s e q u e stio n s can be m u ltip lied or arranged differently, and the
list o f p h ilo so p h e rs to w h ic h th ey refer can be enlarged. B u t togeth er
th e y d ra w a lo g ic a l m ap o f altern atives by w h ic h a p h ilo so p h y o f i m ­
m an e n ce can be— and h isto ric a lly has been— construed.
W e s a w h o w vario u s p h ilo so p h ers ev o lv e d their alternative versions
in re latio n b o th to S p in o za and, th ro u g h h im , to others, thus taking
p art in a ta cit m u ltip le d ia lo gu e. A n d because in each case the co m p a r­
iso n w ith S p in o za co n cern ed the question o f the adequate interpreta­
tion o fim m a n e n c e , it w as an essential co m p ariso n , w h ic h also stresses
a cru cia l d im e n s io n in th e o th e r p h ilo so p h e r’s w o rk . In o th er w o rd s,
w e d o n o t o n ly s tu d y the p ro b lem o fim m a n e n c e th ro u gh these th in k ­
ers, w e also take a fresh lo o k at th em fro m the perspective o f this c o m ­
m o n p ro b le m .
T h u s , to S p in o za ’s co n c ep t o f nature, H eg el o pp oses his co n cep t o f
sp irit, M a r x th e idea o f m an -in -n ature, N ie tzs ch e the fo rm less m ass o f
w ill to p o w e r, and F reud a n e w co n cep t o f nature, stressin g its u n co n ­
s cio u s and in stin ctu a l side.
T h e s e are n o t p articular so lu tio n s o n ly but general typ es, each re­
lated to a d iffe re n t structure attributed to the im m an en t w o rld . T h u s
in S p in o za , im m an en ce is structured by m ech anistic cau sality co n ­
ce ive d as a p ure lo g ic a l chain; in H e g e l by the su b jectlike lo g ic o f d e­
v e lo p m e n t he calls dialectic; in M a rx by his o w n brand o f dialectic, that
o f e c o n o m ic p ro d u c tio n and the m an -m ad e p u rp o siv ity inscribed
w ith in o b je c tiv e reality; in N ietzsch e by the constant flu x and tran­
s ie n c y o f b e in g cou p led w ith the self-transcen d ing o f w ill to p o w e r;2
an d in F reu d b y a natural causality exten d ed to depth p s y c h o lo g y and
th e s tu d y o f cu lture, w h ic h uses s y m b o lic and sem io tic relation s as
a lle g e d ly n atural causes.
In S p in o za and H egel, the structure o f reality im plies that the im ­
m an e n t w o rld is in h erently in telligible and rational th ro u g h o u t (albeit
u n d e r d ifferen t m od els o f rationality); in M a rx and Freud, no rational
causa sui is im p lied . Scientific determ in ism falls w ith in th e w o rld o f
fin itu d e and bears no w itness to the inherent m eanin gfulness o f bein g;

(171)
 CHAPTER 7

N ie t z s c h e ( fo llo w in g S c h o p e n h a u e r) re je c ts d e te r m in is m as b a s e d on
th e illu s io n o f ca u s a lity , an d c o n s tr u e s th e w o r l d o f i m m a n e n c e as in ­
d e te r m in a te flu x s u b je c t to c h a n g in g , m a n - m a d e in te r p r e ta tio n s .

D o g m a t ic versu s C r it ic a l P h il o s o p h y o f Im m an en ce

W e c o u ld g o o n d r a w in g p a ra lle ls , o p p o s it io n s , an d lo g ic a l lin k s b e ­
tw e e n th e v a rio u s w a y s o f c o n s tr u in g a p h i lo s o p h y o f im m a n e n c e . W e
w o u ld th e re b y re fin e th e lo g ic a l m a p an d fill in its c o n t o u r s . B u t then
a fu rth e r q u e s tio n arises. G iv e n th e g e n e ra l c o o r d in a t e s o f th e a b o v e
m a p , can o n e d e c id e w h ic h is th e m o r e a d e q u a te a p p r o a c h to im m a ­
n en ce?
I d o n o t th in k a n y s in g le d o c t r in e w i ll p r o v id e th e a n s w e r . In e scap ­
a b le a n d o m n ip re s e n t, th e c o n t e x t o f im m a n e n c e is b o u n d b y fin itu d e ,
h e n c e also b y c o n s ta n t o p e n n e s s to c h a n g e . Y e t th e r e is n o t h in g e x te r ­
n al to c h a n g e it; all w e h a v e is th e e v o l v in g s u b s ta n c e o f o u r o w n life
a n d c u ltu re as it b e c o m e s re fle cte d in id ea s. T h is is th e u lt im a t e c o n te x t
o f e x is te n c e , th e w o r ld o f im m a n e n c e in w h ic h e v e r y t h in g e lse in h eres.
(In th is lo o s e sen se it is in d e e d o u r “ s u b s ta n c e .” ) A n d w h il e n o th in g
e x te rn a l to it can d ic ta te ru les, p r o v id e a n s w e rs , o r c r itic iz e an d c h a n g e
th e c o n te n ts w ith in th is s p h e re o f im m a n e n c e , th e re is a ls o n o th in g
w ith in it to g u a ra n te e a b s o lu te , e te r n a l tru th .
Im m a n e n c e th u s im p lie s a u t o n o m y , a lb e it a lim it e d , fin ite a u to n ­
o m y . It in v o lv e s a s e lf- s tr u c tu r in g p r o c e s s w h e r e b y fo r m s an d c o n ­
stra in s are p r o d u c e d b y th e sa m e a g e n ts w h o a s s u m e th e m — h u m a n s
in th e ir c o lle c tiv e e x p e r ie n c e . T h u s w e h a v e m o r a l v a lu e s , lo g ic a l and
s c ie n tific p ro c e d u re s , an d p a tte rn s o f p u b lic d e b a te a n d p e r s u a s io n (and
o f so cia l and e c o n o m ic o r g a n iz a tio n ) b y w h ic h th e s e n o r m s an d p ro ­
ce d u re s are e v e n tu a lly m o d ifie d . A n d t h o u g h n o n e o f th e m can claim
a b s o lu te o r tra n s ce n d e n t v a lid ity , th e y p r o v id e a g a u g e , a s tru c tu r e , a
p r o v is io n a l s o lid ific a tio n o f th e flu x o f life in to m e a n in g fu l p attern s
a n d c o n s tr a in ts , all p r o d u c e d b y th e fin ite p o w e r o f im m a n e n c e w h ile
g iv in g it fo r m and im p e tu s .
T h e d ic h o t o m y “ e ith e r G o d o r m o r a l a n a r c h y ” (o r its s e e m in g ly
s e cu la r tr a n s la tio n , “ e ith e r a b s o lu te v a lu e s o r n ih ilis m ” ) are v e s tig e s o f
th e tra n s c e n d e n t o u tlo o k . A c r itic a l p h ilo s o p h y o f im m a n e n c e rejects
th e tim e le ss n e s s o f m a n - m a d e n o r m s as w e ll as th e ir d is m is s a l as m ean ­
in g le ss . H u m a n s e x is t b y p la c in g v a lu e o n th in g s b e y o n d th e ir n atu ­
ra lly g iv e n state. T h is is th e w a y w e tr a n s c e n d o u r s e lv e s an d g iv e our
liv e s s tru c tu r e , m e a n in g , d ir e c tio n , an d an id e n t i t y fo r w h ic h it is
w o r t h w h ile s tr u g g lin g an d m a k in g s a c rific e s e v e n in th e a b se n ce o f
tim e le ss a b s o lu te s . S e lf- tr a n s c e n d e n c e , th e e x is te n tia l d r iv e to g o be­

(172)
 EPILOGUE

y o n d o u rselv es to w ard a value and a m ean in gful identity, is sufficient

to e x p la in b o th the genesis o f value (w ith its em b o d im en t in social life-
fo rm s and in stitu tion s) and the bin d in g p ow er it has over us, as lo n g
as w e re c o g n ize o u rselves in it o r sense it as part o f o ur o w n identity.
A s su ch , values are alive— th ey are “ relevan t” and w o rth fig h tin g for
even w h e n la ck in g a tran scend en t h alo and im prim atur.
A p h ilo s o p h y o fim m a n e n c e can be either critical o r d o gm a tic. Spi­
n o z a ’s p a ra d ig m w as critical w ith regard to the o rigin o f n o rm a tivity,
b u t d o g m a tic in its m eta p h ysics and th eo ry o f salvation, since it turned
th e im m a n e n t w o rld in to a n e w ab solute an d .offered a th e o ry o f sal­
v atio n w h ic h m akes it p ossible to o verco m e fin itude. H egel, the early
so cia lists, and even M a rx ad o p ted a sem ireligiou s v ie w o f hum an sal­
v atio n . A critical p h ilo so p h y o fim m a n e n c e , h o w ever, accepts finitude
as th e irrem ed ia b le h um an co n d ition . K a n t was the first to stress the
in n er lin k b e tw ee n criticism and finitud e, th o u g h in co n c e iv in g p h ilo s­
o p h y as a clo sed , tim eless “ science” he failed to g iv e fin itud e its full
(and d istu rb in g) fo rce. In lik e m anner, im m an en ce and finitude are
tw in co n ce p ts, each n ecessarily im p lied by the other. B u t w h a t fo llo w s
fro m this m u tu a l im plicatio n ?
A b o v e all (and against Sp in oza), it fo llo w s that im m an en ce can n ot
be co n stru e d as causa sui, let alone deified. N o r can w e exp ect it to
p ro v id e a tim eless, im m u tab le system o f truth or value (an o b jectio n
a p p ly in g to b o th K a n t and Sp inoza). H ere it is N ie tzsch e w h o bears
th e critical banner: the im m an en t “ w o r ld ,” as he claim s, m u st be open
to a v a rie ty o f in terpretations by w h ic h the stream o f hum an life stru c­
tu res its e lf and its experien ce. B u t N ietzsch e co m m its the o p p o site
m ista k e in id ea lizin g transitoriness, w h ic h is no less fallacious than dei­
f y in g p erm a n en ce. T h e quest fo r o rd er and m ean in g in the w o rld is a
v alid and au th en tic h um an enterprise, p ro v id ed that its ten tative nature
is n o t o b jectifie d in to a tim eless truth o r alleged to be gro u n d ed in one.
M o re o v e r— and this m ay be the m ost delicate o r co n troversial
p o in t— as fin ite bein gs w e can neith er affirm the transcendent d o m ain
n o r rid o u rselv es co m p le te ly o f its em p ty y et m e an in gfu l h o rizo n . B y
“ e m p t y ” I m ean that it cann ot be filled w ith any p ositive co n tents o r
even be asserted to exist. Y e t this e m p ty h o rizo n is m ea n in g fu l as a
m e m e n to o f o u r o w n finitude and a critical barrier again st tu rn in g the
im m a n e n t w o rld into an absolute o r a kin d o f G o d .
For th e sam e reason, a critical p h ilo so p h y o f im m an en ce ca n n ot lead
to “ sa lva tio n ,” i f by that w e understand a sccular tran slation o f the re­
lig io u s ideal in its plenitude. H um an s m ay indeed attain a d egree o f
fre e d o m , o f m ental and p hysical em an cipatio n and, w h e n lu c k y and
creative, e n d o w their lives w ith a m easure o f auth en tic m ean in g. E ven

(173)
 CHAPTER 7

so , th e y re m ain ir r e m e d ia b ly fin ite , an d s a lv a tio n in th e sen se o f o ve r­

c o m in g fin itu d e (w h ic h w a s also S p in o z a ’s g o a l) c a n n o t b e c la im e d or
e n v is a g e d e x c e p t as an illu s io n .
In a w o r d , to be critical, a ph ilosop hy o f imm anence must also be a philos­
ophy o f finitude. L e t m e n o w e la b o ra te th e im p lic a t io n s o f th is co n d itio n
in th ese s ix issues: ( i) th e sta tu s o f tr a n s c e n d e n c e ; (2) m o n is m and
p an th e ism ; (3) th e o r ig in o f n o r m a tiv e n e s s ; (4) tr u th a n d in terp re ta­
tion; (5) th e h u m a n ro le; (6) e m a n c ip a tio n a n d s a lv a tio n .

(1) T h e Status of Transcendence

W e b e g in by co n s id e rin g K a n t, fr o m w h o m th e te r m s critical and dog­

matic are e v id e n tly b o r r o w e d . K a n t ’s c r itic a l s ta n d f o llo w s fr o m his
re c o g n itio n o f m a n ’s fin itu d e . T h is im p lie s th a t w e h a v e n o access to
th e tran sce n d en t d o m a in . G o d , th e im m o r t a l it y o f th e s o u l, freed o m
fr o m n atu ral d e te r m in a tio n , an d th e p r o p e r t ie s o f th e w o r l d as one
to ta lity , are tra n sce n d e n t is s u e s w h ic h in e v it a b ly p r o v o k e o u r rational
in terest, b u t also lu re us in to m a k in g v a c u o u s s ta te m e n ts a b o u t them .
T h e cr itic a lly ra tio n a l a ttitu d e is to a b s ta in f r o m s u c h c la im s and accept
liv in g w ith th e q u erie s as fu n d a m e n ta lly u n a n s w e r a b le .
It m u st b e stressed th a t c o n c e r n w i t h tr a n s c e n d e n t issu e s is a rational
n e ce ssity a c c o r d in g to K a n t an d an a u t h e n tic h u m a n sta n ce . W h at he
d e n o u n c e s as u n critic a l is th e a t te m p t to a n s w e r th e s e q u e r ie s o r supply
th em w ith p o s itiv e o b je c ts . B e c a u s e tr a n s c e n d e n t q u e s tio n s ca n n ot be
ra tio n a lly a n s w e re d , it d o e s n o t f o l l o w th a t t h e y a re m e a n in g le ss or
th at w e m a y tu rn to irra tio n a l p r in c ip le s ( r e lig io u s , m y s t ic , nation al­
istic, e tc .) to fill th e v o id . C r it ic a l r a tio n a lity r e q u ir e s m a in ta in in g the
m in d ’s tra n scen d en t q u e s t a lo n g w i t h th e r e c o g n i t io n th a t it can n ot be
fu lfille d . It th e re b y creates an u n fu lfille d g a p , a v o i d , a te n s io n , w hich
is th e m a rk o f h u m a n fin it u d e a n d a d is t in c t iv e fe a tu r e o f th e critical
p h ilo so p h e r.
T h u s critic a l ra tio n a lity ca n n e ith e r a b o lis h th e p e r s p e c tiv e o f tran­
scen d en ce n o r g iv e it c o n c r e te c o n t e n t a n d s u b s ta n c e . T ra n scen d e n ce
h o vers o v e r the im m a n e n t d o m a in as a q u e s t i o n m a r k , a p ossibility
th at w ill a lw a y s re m a in e m p t y f o r u s . S in c e t r a n s c e n d e n c e , o n this crit­
ical v ie w , is n e ith e r an e n tit y n o r a s t r a ig h t f o r w a r d fic tio n , w e may
refer to it as a “ h o r iz o n ” w h ic h o u r fin it u d e p r o je c t s o v e r b e in g but
w h ic h w e m a y n o t s o lid ify o r fill w i t h a n y o b je c t s . N o r can w e ade­
q u a te ly ta lk a b o u t it e x c e p t in a r o u n d a b o u t w a y , b y m e ta p h o r which
p o in ts to this h o r iz o n w i t h o u t f ix in g a n y t h in g a c tu a l a b o u t o r within
it .J
O u r aw aren ess o f th is e m p t y h o r iz o n p r o v id e s n o k n o w le d g e o f an

(¡74)
 EPILOGUE

actu al th in g , o n ly an in d irect realization o f o ur o w n finitude; it also

keep s us fr o m in fla tin g th e status o f the im m an en t w o rld — the o n ly
o n e w c m a y a d m it, k n o w , and act u p o n — in to a n e w absolute, adorn­
in g it w ith s e m ire lig io u s p rop erties. T h u s p antheism , either in Spino­
z a ’s o r H e g e l’s v e rs io n , is e x clu d e d by a critical v ie w o fim m a n e n ce .
A t th e sam e tim e , critical p h ilo so p h y re-directs the transcendent
d riv e b a ck in to the actual w o rld , w h e re it serves an im m anen t func­
tio n . In K a n t th is takes the fo rm o f the “ regu lative id ea” ; but seen m ore
b ro a d ly , N ie t z s c h e ’s ideas o f self-o v e rco m in g and w ill to p o w er also
tran slate this n o tio n o f tran scen d e n ce-w ith in -im m an e n ce, as does H ei­
d e g g e r ’s e x is te n tia l an alysis o f m an. W ith o u t o verstepp in g his fini-
tu d e, m an su rp asses h im s e lf in to w h a t he is not yet, that is, he projects
h im s e lf in to his realm o f p ossibilities.
In S p in o za , im m a n e n t self-tran scen d en ce is expressed in the conatus
s tr iv in g to o v e rc o m e fin itu d e and attain salvation w ith in this w o rld ;
m e a n w h ile it leads the p erson to e x cel and stretch the boundaries o f his
o r h er h u m a n ity to th e u tm o st. B u t because its aim is to abolish fini­
tu d e, it is in c o m p a tib le w ith a critical p h ilo so p h y o f im m anence,
w h e r e fin itu d e and im m a n en ce g o hand in hand.

(2) Monism and Pantheism

A critical p h ilo s o p h y o fim m a n e n c e can n o lo n g e r v ie w the w o rld as a

u n iq u e to ta lity , and ce rta in ly n o t as G o d . H ere again K a n t’s critical
p rin cip le m a y serve as gu id elin e . F ro m the stan d po in t o f finitude— the
o n ly o n e a critical p h ilo so p h e r m ay ad m it— all b ein g is in h eren tly co n ­
tin g e n t and th e co n c e p t o f a n ecessary b ein g o r causa sui is therefore
in co h e re n t. A ls o (and again , as in K a n t), as finite rational creatures w e
can k n o w o r in terpret “ the w o r ld ” (i.e., o u r o w n field o f experience)
in fra g m e n ta ry sectors o n ly , n o t as a sin gle, o verall totality. E ven i f all
the fra g m e n ts p o te n tia lly b e lo n g to the u n ity o f the sam e w o rld (as they
d o in K a n t), th e y rem ain fra gm en ts o n ly, and w h a t w e k n o w as “ the
w o r ld ” is at e v e ry giv en p o in t a jig s a w p u zzle w ith m an y pieces m iss­
in g and all h o rizo n s in d e fin ite ly o p e n .4
T h is is K a n t’s w a y o f s ayin g th at the critical stan d p o in t o fh n itu d e is
in c o m p a tib le w ith the id ea o f the w o rld as totality. It also m eans that
th ere is n o natura naturans in S p in o z a ’s sense, n o in fin ite substan tive
u n ity u n d e rly in g finite th in gs in the w o rld and e n d o w in g th em w ith
in h eren t rationality. T h e im m an e n t w o rld , critic a lly co n ceived , is a
s y s te m o f fin itu d e and fragm cn tarin ess o n ly ; in S p in o za ’s term s it is
natura naturata w ith o u t a natura naturans su p p o rtin g it either in ternally

(175)
 CHAPTER 7

o r f r o m w ith o u t. In th is, N ie t z s c h e , M a r x , an d F re u d h a v e ta k e n the

m o r e c r itic a l p o s it io n as a g a in s t S p in o z a an d H e g e l.
A n o t h e r re a so n w h y th e im m a n e n t w o r ld m a y n o t b e seen as a b s o ­
lu te is th e res id u a l h o r iz o n o f tr a n s c e n d e n c e d is c u s s e d a b o v e . B e c a u s e
it c a n n o t b e v a lid ly e lim in a te d , th e re re m a in s n e c e s s a r ily a g a p , a r u p ­
tu re , w h ic h lea ves th is w o r ld in c o m p le te an d , s o to s p e a k , “ d e fic ie n t”
in its o n to lo g ic a l s ta tu s ,5 e v e n th o u g h n o o th e r w o r ld m a y b e a ffirm e d
b e y o n d it. T h is g a p o r fissu re h u m a n s can fill o n ly w i t h th e ir o w n
im m a n e n t w o r k , p r o d u c in g th e m s e lv e s , th e ir v a lu e s , th e ir e n v ir o n ­
m e n t, th r o u g h th e ir o w n a g e n c y , b u t w i t h o u t b e in g a b le to c lo s e th e
o n t o lo g ic a l g a p o r to e x p e c t c o m p le te s a lv a tio n . In o th e r w o r d s , n o
causa sui ca n b e a d m itte d eith e r b e y o n d th e w o r ld o r w it h in it, th o u g h
its c o n c e p t is in e v ita b le fo r us as an e v e r - e v a s iv e id e a l, a n e g a t iv e im a g e
th a t o n ly h ig h lig h t s o u r o w n fin itu d e an d th a t o f th e im m a n e n t w o r ld .

(3) T h e O rigin o f Normativeness

S in c e n o p o s it iv e tra n s ce n d e n t p rin c ip le is a d m itte d , all v a lu e s , n o r m s ,

an d th e lik e can ste m o n ly fr o m h u m a n s in th e ir a c tu a l life an d c u ltu re ,
th a t is, im m a n e n tly . B u t th is also m ean s th a t h u m a n s are m a r k e d b y
fin itu d e and th e re b y b y th e la c k o f m o r a l a b s o lu te s . I m m a n e n t n o r ­
m a tiv e n e s s is lin k e d to e v o lu tio n s in m a n ’s s e lf- im a g e , in s titu tio n s ,
p a tte rn s o f a c tio n an d d is c o u rs e , an d th e s u b c o n s c io u s in s tin c ts an d
p r o je c ts in te r a c tin g w i t h th ese c u ltu ra l fo rc e s . H e n c e , th e re is n o s in g le
se t o f b in d in g n o r m s an d n o u n iq u e p r o c e d u r e f o r d e c la r in g an d te s t­
in g th e m , w h ic h can b e v a lid u n iv e r s a lly an d fo r all tim e s .
C la im in g th a t u n iv e r s a lity it s e lf is th e test w ill b e g th e q u e s tio n , b e ­
c a u s e th e re is n o w a y to d e te r m in e a p rio ri w h a t is u n iv e rs a l. T h is lim ­
ita tio n , th e m o s t e m b a r ra s s in g fo r a K a n tia n - lik e m o r a lity , is n o t s im ­
p ly d u e to p r o b le m s o f a p p lic a tio n b u t to th e n a tu re o f fin ite h u m a n
ra tio n a lity . U n a p p lie d , h a v in g n o basis in actu a l h u m a n a ttitu d e s , a c­
tio n , an d c o m m u n ic a tio n , a p rio ri m o r a l p rin c ip le s are e m p ty . T h e y
e n jo y n o tim e le ss sta tu s in th e m s e lv e s , fr o m w h ic h th e y are th e n “ ap ­
p lie d ” to a c tu a l life, in c u r r in g d iffe re n t d e g re e s o f “ d e v ia t io n ” an d “ in ­
c o m p le te n e s s .” R a th e r, their embeddedness in actual life is their initial and
only way to exist. W h a te v e r im p u r ity , v a g u e n e s s , d e v ia t io n , c o n t r o v e r ­
sial in te r p r e ta tio n , o r fa u lty c o m m u n ic a tio n m a y a ffe c t th e ra tio n a l
p r in c ip le s is n o t a s e c o n d a r y fa c t, a m a tte r o f m e re a p p lic a tio n , b u t
e x p re s s e s an e sse n tia l fe a tu re o f h u m a n r a tio n a lity as fin ite r a tio n a lity .
W h a t e v e r w e p o sse ss as ra tio n a l e le m e n ts m u s t n e c e s s a rily e x is t as
e m b e d d e d in o u r im m a n e n t life an d p ra c tic e , an d th u s also b e p r o n e to
d is a g r e e m e n t an d ch a n g e .

(1 7 6 )
 EPILOGUE

K a n t’s b e lie f th at he co u ld fo u n d m o rality on an absolute led him

b e y o n d th e im m a n e n t and critical d o m ain because he postulated (as in
k n o w le d g e ) a u n iqu e, tim eless parad igm o f hum an rationality, w h ich
h is to r y o n ly serves to ex p lica te b u t does n o t affect; and because he
g ro u n d e d m o r a lity (u n lik e k n o w led g e) d irectly in the “ n o u m en al” d o ­
m ain . T h e r e b y K a n t turned transcendence fro m an em p ty h o rizo n into
th e co n s titu tiv e g ro u n d o f m oral im peratives and their alleged tim eless
u n iv e rs a lity .6
O n th e q u estio n o f n o rm a tiven ess then, it is K a n t w h o represents the
d o g m a tic v ie w o f im m an e n ce w h ereas Sp in o za offers a critical one.
R e a so n in K a n t ca n n ot be con stru ed , as in Sp in oza, as part o f the actual
w o r ld b u t co n stitu tes a seco n d , separate w o rld o ver and above it, w ith
m an p a rticip a tin g as “ citize n ” in bo th . T h is is a secular vestige o f
C h ris tia n d u alism , e n d o w in g m an w ith a d ivin e facu lty em anating
fro m h eaven.
A p h ilo s o p h y o fim m a n e n c e m u st place the source o fa ll norm ativen ess
in th e actual w o rld . In S p in o za, m oral n o rm s derive (for the general
p u b lic) fro m the fo rces o f desire and consen t, san ction ed by p olitical
p o w e r and legislatio n ; and the p h ilo so p h e r’s best w a y o f life derives
fro m his o w n reason, also co n stru ed as desire and as an in tegral part o f
n atu re. B u t S p in o za to o adhered to a sin gle p ara d igm o f rationality,
and his “ h ig h e r” m o ra lity ( o f salvation ), th o u g h im p ly in g no transcen­
d en t O u g h t , is neverth eless co m m itted to a un ique ethical g o o d .
H e re again th e v ie w p o in t o f fin itu d e m ay serve us as criticism . A l­
th o u g h th e im m an en t w o rld is all th ere is, in its e lf it is in e x p lica b le and
la ck s in h eren t m eanin g; it is n o t causa sui. M an , h o w ev er, e x istin g as
self-tran scen d en ce w ith in im m an en ce, creates m ean in gs fo r h im s e lf
and the w o rld aroun d him ; it is th ro u g h his o w n w o rk s, desires, p ro j­
ects, and en d eavors that m o ra lly sign ifican t m ean in gs em e rg e in the
w o rld . N o extern al, tim eless gu id an ce is available to h im , w h e th e r he
w e lc o m e s it as salvation o r rejects it as bo n d age. A n d since h u m an life
is n eith er static n or repetitive, the ethical u niverse, to o , assum es v ar­
io u s faces and is open to change.
T h e v eh icle o f these changes is hum an desire, em b o d ied in actual life
and p ractice and structured by social habits and in stitu tion s in w h ic h
trad ition and change, o rth o d o x y and re v o lt b o th p lay th eir re sp ec­
tive parts. (T h e stabilizin g p ow ers o f routine and co n fo rm ity , h o w ­
ever, w ill u sually carry a h eavier w e ig h t e x cep t in tim es o f crisis.) A n d
the carrier o f ch an ge is freq u en tly the in d ivid u al con sciou sn ess p artly
alienated fro m the m ainstream o f society, th o u g h sh arin g a g o o d deal
o f its latent principles and in cipien t n e w se lf-im ag e and desires. M a r­
gin a l stand points, lik e S p in o za’s, m ay anticipate and even fo ster

(n?)
 CHAPTEH 7

c h a n g e w h e n th e y are s u ffic ie n tly re p re s e n ta tiv e o f w h a t is s u b c o n ­

s c io u s ly fe lt as a la cu n a b y le a d in g s e g m e n ts o f th e s o c ie t y — e v e n w h e n
th is fe e lin g is n o t c o n s c io u s ly a d m itte d .
B e s id e s m a te ria l n o r m s , th e re m u s t b e c u ltu r a lly s a n c tio n e d p r o c e ­
d u re s fo r c h a lle n g in g o r r e v is in g m o r a l a ttitu d e s , w h e t h e r t h e y be ra­
tio n a l o r a u th o r ita ria n . B u t e v e n w h e n th e y c la im to h a v e a tr a n s c e n ­
d e n t basis in G o d ’s w i ll, in e ffe c t th e y all h a v e th e ir s o u r c e in
im m a n e n c e as h u m a n c re a tio n s (and in v e rte d s e lf- p r o je c tio n ) .
R e c o g n iz in g th e n a tu ra l basis and m u ta b ilit y o f th e m o r a l u n iv e rs e ,
a c r itic a l p h ilo s o p h y o f im m a n e n c e is n o t, h o w e v e r , c o m m it t e d to
m o r a l a n a r c h y o r to a n y s p e c ific m o d e o f a c c e p tin g an d c h a n g in g
n o r m s . O f c o u rs e , a c c e p tin g a n o r m a tiv e f r a m e w o r k o r m o d if y in g it
r e q u ir e s s o c ia l d is c o u rs e a n d c o m m u n ic a tio n as an a p r io r i p rin c ip le ,
o n e w h ic h a p h ilo s o p h e r m u s t r e c o g n iz e as an in h e re n t c o n d it io n o f
r a tio n a lity ; an d th is m a k e s a ce rta in a m o u n t o f r h e to r ic (in th e b ro a d
sen se) in d is p e n s a b le . Y e t in th e ir h a rd c o re , all s u c h p ro c e s s e s an d d e ­
b a te s m u s t c o m p l y w i t h ra tio n a l c o n s tr a in ts in o r d e r to b e a c c e p te d as
c r itic a l. O n e ca n v io la t e th ese c o n s tr a in ts o n ly at th e r is k o f b e in g ir ­
ra tio n a l, o r o f s in n in g a g a in s t w h a t th e e m b e d d e d fu n d a m e n ta l v a lu e s
p r o je c t as th e ir fu r th e r o r b e tte r e x p lic a tio n . (T h e la tte r e le m e n t serv es
to a v o id c o n s e r v a tis m an d a llo w s fo r v a lid ra tio n a l c r itic is m o f a s o c i­
e t y e v e n w h e n re fu s in g th e “ tr a n s c e n d e n ta l” s e v e r a n c e o f v a lu e fr o m
its n a tu ra l s o c ia l h a b ita t.)
T o c o n c lu d e , th e fact o f la c k in g a b s o lu te v a lid ity (lik e th a t o f G o d ’ s
a lle g e d c o m m a n d s ) d o e s n o t m a k e m o r a l p re c e p ts v o id o r v a c u o u s .
A c c e p t i n g th is d ic h o t o m y is a n o th e r v e s t ig e o f th e tr a n s c e n d e n t fra m e
o f m in d , th a t o f r e lig io u s a b s o lu tis m tran sla ted ( in c o n g r u o u s ly ) in to
th e w o r l d o f im m a n e n c e an d fin itu d e . It is, a m o n g o th e r w a y s , b y p r o ­
j e c t i n g v a lu e s an d n o r m s th a t h u m a n s o v e r c o m e th e ir n a tu ra l sta te an d
g iv e m e a n in g an d d ir e c tio n to th e ir e x is te n c e ; an d th is re m a in s tru e
e v e n i f th e re is n o d is e m b o d ie d , e x tr a h is to r ic a l g u id e to d ir e c t th e ir
w a y f r o m th e v ie w p o i n t o f e tern ity.

(4) Truth and Interpretation

A s im ila r p o in t a p p lie s to th e c o g n it iv e d o m a in . In K a n t th e fr a g m e n ts
o f e x p e r ie n c e b e lo n g in p rin c ip le to th e u n ity o f a s in g le w o r ld , b e c a u s e
th e y are all g o v e r n e d a p r io r i b y th e sa m e set o f fu n d a m e n ta l ca te ­
g o r ie s . T h is is a n o th e r w a y o f s a y in g th a t th e re is a s in g le , im m u ta b le
tr u th b o th f o r m e ta p h y s ic s an d th e n a tu ra l scien c es.
In S p in o z a , tr u th is u n iq u e b e c a u s e it m o d e ls it s e l f o n th e s tru c tu r e
o f th e u n iq u e w o r ld - s u b s t a n c e , w it h its a lle g e d ly d e d u c t iv e la w s . R e -

(178)
 EPILOGUE

jc c t in g this v ie w as d o g m a tic , K an t m odels truth on the structure and

u n ity o f th e h u m an m in d , w h o se a priori form s are said to p rovid e the
basic fr a m e w o r k fo r the natural sciences and for nature itself. T h ereb y
th e h u m a n m in d , th o u g h finite, assum es in K an t the role o f G o d in
p r o v id in g th e a n ch o rag e fo r a single, im m u tab le system o f k n o w l­
e d g e .7
A critical p h ilo so p h y o f im m an en ce cannot, h ow ever, be a priori
c o m m itte d to the p ostu late that hum an ration ality is exhausted by a set
o f p u re, im m u ta b le fo rm s that can be captured once and fo r all. H u ­
m an ra tio n a lity is an a ctivity, not a set o f form s; it is also a self-stru c-
tu rin g a c tiv ity , w h ic h shapes its o w n patterns by usin g th em , that is,
b y p ro je c tin g m ean in g and ord er o n to w h at it calls the “ w o rld ,” w ith ­
o u t b e in g able— o r en titled — to o b je ctify it into a single, un ivocal en­
tity.
Ju st as K a n t’s critiq u e d oes aw ay w ith the n o tio n that the w o rld is
an actu al to tality, so his o w n u n ity o fe x p e rie n c e can no lo n g er be gu a r­
an teed as th e p erm a n en t and unique w a y in w h ic h to ratio n ally e x p e ­
rien ce th e w o rld . B e y o n d S p in o za ’s to tality and K a n t’s un ique system
o f reaso n , th e “ w o r ld ” lends its e lf to several possible system s o f in ter­
p re ta tio n , each w ith a claim to express so m e fo rm o f hum an ratio n al­
ity , th at is, th e a c tiv ity o f b rin g in g m ean in g and tentative o rd er to o u r
b e in g -in -th e -w o rld (“ ex p e rie n c e ” ). I f transcendence is an e m p ty h o ri­
zo n , th e im m a n en t “ w o r ld ” is a d e-totalized a g glo m erate o f possible
h o rizo n s w h ic h can be filled w ith co n tent and shaped th ro u gh an in ter­
p reta tio n .
In terp retatio n s, h o w ev e r, are n o t all born equal. S o m e are preferable
to o th ers fo r reasons w h ic h can be d efen d ed ratio n ally even w h en they
la ck a co n c lu siv e e d g e. S o m e in terpretations m ake better sense than
o th ers, are m o re fu n d am en tal (as in a scientific parad igm relating to a
sp e c ific h yp o th esis), fit better w ith w h a t is taken as “ facts” or w ith
o th er, co rre la tive in terpretatio ns, or are m ore akin to the cu ltural co n ­
te x t in w h ic h th ey arise and th e rest o f the Z e itg eist. H en ce there are
and m u st be clues and rules fo r a d o p tin g, m o d ify in g , and u p ro o tin g
in terp retatio n s. Y e t n o n e o f these m ay claim a tim eless status.
N o th in g in the im m an en t w o rld can help us p u ll ourselves by the
hair ou tsid e it. E v en B a ro n M iinch h au sen , an ex p ert in this field, m ust
fail us, because in this case th ere is n o w h ere to exit. B u t this is no
reason to ren o u n ce ra tio n ality alto geth er, lik e an an gry ch ild w h o
breaks his to y s because he has n o t been g iv en better ones. A s finite
ration al bein gs, w e can re c o g n ize the w o rth o f coherence, reasonable
argu m en tatio n , o ptim al un iversality, and o th er cross-cultural factors,
even w ith o u t co m m ittin g o u rselves to the idea that hum an rationality

( 179)
 CHAPTER 7

is a fix e d , c lo se d s y s te m o r th a t th e w o r k o f s e lf- tr a n s c e n d e n c e and

in te r p re ta tio n can b e a c h ie v e d o n c e an d fo r all.
W h ile th e m in im a l fea tu res o f r a tio n a lity m u s t a d d re ss th e m s e lv e s
to h u m a n it y at la r g e (re p re se n te d as a c o m m u n it y o f id e a l in te r lo c u ­
to rs ), in e ffe c t, th e y are m e r e ly r e g u la tiv e a b s tr a c tio n s . A c t u a l h u m a n
c o m m u n ic a tio n , b o th w ith in and b e tw e e n c o m m u n itie s , is at best
s e m ira tio n a l; an d th o u g h ra tio n a l e le m e n ts are e m b e d d e d in all fo rm s
o f life , th is e m b e d d e d n e ss , a lo n g w it h th e “ im p u r itie s ” an d “ d e v ia ­
t io n s ” it e n ta ils , is th eir natural w a y to e x is t. E v e n th e m o s t u n iv e rs a lly
a lle g e d fo r m ca n n o t b e a p p lie d o u ts id e a d e fin ite c o n t e x t , d e te r m in e d
b y p r e v io u s life -fo r m s an d in te r p re ta tio n s . T h is lim ita tio n is n o t a c ci­
d e n ta l b u t in h e re n t; w e c a n n o t d is m is s it as a m e r e g a p b e t w e e n an
“ id e a l” and its “ a p p lic a tio n ” sin ce it d e riv e s fr o m th e fin itu d e w h ic h
a ffe cts h u m a n r a tio n a lity in its v e r y essen ce.
T h e a p rio ri e le m e n ts in o u r e x p e rie n c e are a ls o s u b je c t to s u c h lim ­
ita tio n s . A lt h o u g h in d is p e n s a b le to all m e a n in g fu l d is c o u r s e an d p e r ­
c e p tio n , th e ir co n te n t, sh ap e, an d a p p lic a tio n m a y v a r y an d e v e n c o n ­
flic t becau se o f e x is te n tia l an d h is to r ic a l c o n d it io n s . T h e r e fo r e ,
p h ilo s o p h e r s w h o b r in g th ese a p rio ri e le m e n ts to lig h t — a w o r t h ­
w h ile , tim e - h o n o r e d p r o je c t— are n o t u n v e ilin g th e im m u ta b le s tru c ­
tu r e o f s o m e p u re in te lle c t, eith e r d iv in e (S p in o z a , L e ib n iz ) o r h u m a n
( K a n t). R a th e r, th e y u n e a rth th e d eep la y e rs o f s o m e h u m a n life fo r m
o r u n iv e rs e o f d is c o u rs e . W ith in a n y s u c h d o m a in , th e re is r o o m fo r
a r g u m e n t an d h ie ra rch ic a l ju d g m e n t; b u t m o r e th a n a s in g le o n e can
v a lid ly b e a d m itte d , an d to g e th e r th e y illu m in a te th e “ w o r l d ” (o r o u r
b e in g w it h in it)— n o t as a fix e d , m o n o lit h ic e n tity b u t as an a g g lo m ­
e ra te o f p o s s ib le p e rs p e c tiv e s , s o m e o f w h ic h m a y c o m p le m e n t o th e rs
b u t w h ic h c a n n o t ad d u p to a clo se d and fu lly c o h e r e n t s y s te m .
T h is v i e w ra d ica lize s K a n t ’s re fu sa l to see th e w o r ld as a th in g - in -
its e lf—lik e to ta lity . W h a t K a n t p u ts fo r w a r d in s te a d — h is im m u ta b le
u n it y o f e x p e rie n c e — s h o u ld be m e t w ith s im ila r r e lu c ta n c e , s in ce all
are “ d o g m a t ic ” p o s tu la te s , tr a n s c e n d in g th e b o u n d a rie s o f h u m a n fin i­
tu d e . H u m a n ra tio n a lity ca n n o t g u a ra n te e th a t th e u n it y o f e x p e r ie n c e
is im m u ta b le an d fu lly co h e re n t, a n y m o r e th an it can v o u c h fo r th e
in h e r e n t n e c e s s ity o f its a p r io r i fo r m s o r fo r a n y o th e r tr a n s c e n d e n t
p r in c ip le . W h a t w e d o h av e is a c tu a l h u m a n life , w i t h r a tio n a lity as an
o p e n - e n d e d p ro c e s s b y w h ic h th is life s tru c tu re s an d tr a n s c e n d s it s e lf
a n d g iv e s m e a n in g to its e n v ir o n m e n t, all th e w h ile r e m a in in g w ith in
th e c o n fin e s o f th e p ro c e s s itse lf.
Is th is a s k e p tic a l v ie w ? I f so , th en o n ly in th e a ffir m a tiv e o r c o n ­
s tr u c tiv e sen se o f s k e p tic is m sta rted b y H u m e an d fu r th e r e v o lv e d b y
N ie t z s c h e . W h a t H u m e has d o n e fo r th e in d u c t iv e - p o s itiv is tic m o d e l

(180)
 EPILOGUE

o f k n o w le d g e , N ie tz s c h e m ay help us do fo r a n o n p ositivistic (or her­

m en eu tical) one: turn skep ticism into an affirm ative position. A sci­
e n tific a c co u n t m ay be valid and enlightenin g even w h en not linked to
so m e u n iq u e p ictu re o f truth. B y bein g open to cu lturally m utable
in te rp re tatio n s, the w o rld is no less real or im m anent; it o n ly escapes
e n ca p su latio n b y “ etern al” fo rm s, essences, and the like, either in Pla­
to ’s o r S p in o z a ’s w ay. N o r m ust w e postulate such tim eless aids in
o rd e r to be able to evaluate, select, and m o d ify interpretations accord­
in g to ra tio n a lly ju s tifia b le clues. Just as our societies, social institu­
tion s, and cu ltu ra l fo rm s have m ean in gfu l and constraining patterns
w ith o u t b e in g etern al, so h u m an rationality, the self-structu rin g pow er
o f life th a t in fo rm s th em all and extern alizes itse lf in them , can assum e
m e a n in g fu l fo rm s and con straints even w h e n its no rm s lack the tran­
scen d en t s u p p o rt (and fanatic edge) o f a sin gle, im m u tab le truth.
N ie tz s c h e , th erefo re, w as w r o n g in w ish in g to replace the cult o f
e te rn ity w ith a w o rs h ip o f transitoriness and flux. T h ere is no inau­
th e n ticity in v o lv e d n ecessarily in the h um an d rive to create ord er and
m e an in g — even i f the w o rld “ in its e lf” lacks them . We do the sam e in
b u ild in g h o u ses, em p ires, cities, and o th er civilized form s o f life.
C h a o s and flu x are o n ly o n e in gred ien t o f the im m an en t w o rld ; there
is also th e h u m an a c tiv ity by w h ic h o rd er and shape are injected into
ch aos an d the co s m ic flu x is cap tured and so lid ified in to tentative, yet
sig n ific a n t and fa irly stable structures. D o in g this is the gen uin e activ ­
ity o f h u m an s, the w a y w e ex ist and p roject ourselves w ith in b e in g .8

(5) The Human Role

O n e o f S p in o za ’s bo ld est m oves w as to e x p u rg e nature o f h u m an lik e

featu res and to red uce m an h im s e lf to nature at large. T h e h um an fea­
tures he th ereb y banned fro m nature w ere p rim arily p urposes and p er­
fe ctio n s (in clud in g gen eric fo rm s). A t the sam e tim e, he allo w ed cau­
sa lity and lo g ic a l inference as o b je ctiv e features o f the w o rld , inherent
in the v e ry nature o f things.
N ie tzs ch e , as w e saw , o bjected that causality is also a feature p ro ­
je c te d b y m an, by w h ic h he falsifies a w o rld -in -flu x w h ic h in its e lf has
n o th in g in scribed on it. W h ile N ietzsch e m eant this as criticism , K an t
in his C o p ern ican rev olu tio n , and the various idealist p ositio ns he en ­
gen d ered , to o k a different v iew . Y es, w as the idealist p o sitio n , all
fo rm s attributed to reality are fo rm ed o r affected by th e h um an m in d.
B u t this does not n ecessarily m ake th em illu so ry o r useless. K n o w l­
ed g e m eans the application o f h um an -sh ap ed categories to th e raw ,
un in terpreted m ass o f b ein g in w h ic h w e live. T h e re arc no fo rm s “ in

(1S1)
 CHAPTER 7

th e m s e lv e s ,” n o in h e re n t m e a n in g s in s c r ib e d o n th e b o o k o f n atu re
w h ic h , as g o o d c o p y is ts , w e m u s t re p r o d u c e in o u r m in d s . S p in o za
h im s e lf u n w it t in g ly p ro je c te d his c o n c e p t o f d e d u c t iv e c a u s a lity u p o n
n a tu re , an d th e n th o u g h t h e w a s re a d in g it o f f th e e te rn a l n a tu re o f the
su b s ta n ce . I f th is in v e rte d p r o je c tio n lo o k s a n a lo g o u s to th e w a y the
critics o f r e lig io n (in c lu d in g S p in o z a ) e x p la in th e g e n e s is o f G o d ’s tr a n ­
s ce n d e n t im a g e , th is is n o ac cid en t: w e c a n n o t rid n a tu re o f h u m a n lik e
(o r h u m a n -b re d ) fea tu re s, b e c a u s e n o n a tu re w o u ld th e n b e le ft, o n ly
an in d e fin ite , m e a n in g le ss m ass o f b e in g in -itse lf.
In S p in o z a , m e a n in g s - in - th e m s e lv e s are m a d e p o s s ib le b y th e lo g ic a l
su b s ta n ce in w h ic h th e y are said to in h ere. B u t th is v ie w , as K a n t and
N ie t z s c h e w i ll ag re e , in v ite s tra n s ce n d e n t p o s tu la te s in th r o u g h th e
b a c k d o o r. If, in stea d , w e c o n s tr u e th e im m a n e n t w o r l d n o t as s u b ­
sta n ce o r to ta lity b u t as a h o r iz o n o p e n to m u ltip le an d p a rtia l in te r­
p re ta tio n s , th en th e a g e n t o f su ch in te r p r e ta tio n , th e h u m a n ra ce , ca n ­
n o t b e s im p ly re d u c e d to a n a tu re e x is tin g in - its e lf, b u t m u s t b e
r e c o g n iz e d as p la y in g a c o n s titu tiv e o n to lo g ic a l ro le . T h e im m a n e n t
w o r ld in c o rp o ra te s m a n ’s a c tiv it y o f in te r p re ta tio n ; an d m a n ’s b c in g -
th e re e n lig h te n s an d im p a rts m e a n in g to w h a t in it s e l f is, at le a s t fo r us
fin ite cre atu res, o p a q u e .
T h e act o f in te r p re ta tio n , h o w e v e r , m u s t n o t b e u n d e r s to o d as e x ­
c lu s iv e ly o r e v e n p r im a r ily in te lle c tu a l. It e x p re s s e s it s e l f firs t as p ra x is ,
th e a c t iv it y w h e r e b y h u m a n s liv e , a ct, relate to th in g s an d to o th e r
p e o p le , fu lfill ro le s , an d so o n , and b y th us in te r a c tin g w i t h th e w o r ld ,
th e y ta c itly sh ap e and g iv e m e a n in g to th e v a r io u s th in g s in th e ir e x ­
p e rie n c e . O f co u rs e , n o in d iv id u a l d o e s th is as an is o la te d C a r te s ia n
e g o . W e a lre a d y e x is t in a la r g e ly in te r p re te d w o r ld , u s in g la n g u a g e ,
tr a d itio n , s o c ia l in s titu tio n s , and th e lik e , as o u r m o d e s o f re la tin g to
th in g s an d th u s as th e ca rrie rs o f m e a n in g w h ic h w e in te r io r iz e , tran s­
late o r re v is e , an d p r o je c t a g a in . B u t w h a t c o u n ts as p r im a r y arc n o t
th e to o ls b u t th e a c tiv it y o f life it s e lf as it p r o je c ts it s e l f th r o u g h th e m .
R e fle c tio n is a la te c o m e r, th e o w l o f M in e r v a s p r e a d in g its w in g s
o n c e th e d a y ’s w o r k is d o rie. B e fo r e w e a rtic u la te o u r e x p e r ie n c e in
id e a s an d o th e r c u ltu ra l im a g e s , w e “ liv e th e m o u t ,” s o to s p e a k , in te r­
p r e tin g o u r s e lv e s an d th e th in g s in th e w o r ld b y o u r b e h a v io r , lif e ­
s ty le s , w o r k an d p r o d u c tio n , b y p a rtic ip a tin g in s o c ia l ro le s a n d re la t­
in g to o th e r p e rs o n s , o rg a n is m s , an d in ert th in g s a r o u n d us. S o m e o f
th is s u b s ta n tiv e in te r p re ta tio n se em s to b e g o in g o n u n c o n s c io u s ly , a f­
fe c te d b y s u c h fo r c e s as th e in d iv id u a l’s p s y c h ic h is to r y , b y s o c ia l p e r­
s u a s io n a n d p r o p a g a n d a , o r b y m o r e la te n t s o c ia l, e c o n o m ic , a n d d e ­
m o g r a p h ic u n d e rc u rre n ts a n n o u n c in g a c u ltu ra l sh ift.
In o th e r w o r d s , in te r p re ta tio n is th e m o v e m e n t o f life itse lf, n o t

(1 8 2 )
 EPILOGUE

m e re ly c o n s c io u s reflection u p on it. We interpret being, and thereby

sh ape the w o rld and o u rselves, the w a y M o n sieu rjo u rd a in in M o lie rc’s
c o m e d y used to speak p rose. Later on w e can verbalize these m odes o f
life, tra n s fo rm th em in to im ages, m etaphors, m yth s, concepts, art, re­
lig io u s cu lt, so cia l and p olitical theories, and so on, and also into so­
p h istica ted s cien tific structures: but this intellectual p rod uctio n , as H e­
gel h ad n o te d b e fo re M a rx , is p osterio r to the form s o f life them selves
and cry s ta lliz e s it s e lf fro m th em ex post facto. W hen w e reflect and
v e rb a lize, th e su b sta n tiv e w o rk o f interpretation is already done.
T h is p u ts us, o n to lo g ic a lly sp eakin g, neither “ in fro n t” o f bein g or
“ fa c in g ” it fro m the o u tsid e (K an t), n or su bm erged and effaced w ith in
it as sim p le m o d es (Sp in o za), but rather ex istin g in -th e-w o rld as con ­
stitu tiv e p articip an ts o f w h a te v e r “ the im m an en t w o r ld ” m ay m ean or
be. “ T h e w o rld is h u m a n ” said Sartre, ech o in g w h a t others fro m K an t
to M a r x to H e id e g g e r had m aintained. T h e im m an en t w o rld is not
m e re ly an in -itself. K a n t had alread y sh ow n this v ie w to be “ d o g ­
m a tic.” Im m a n en ce is m a n ’s w o rld , the c o m p le x o f h o rizo n s and per­
sp e ctiv e s in w h ic h h u m an life takes and giv es shape. T h a t this w o rld
sh o u ld be o n to lo g ic a lly related to so m e fo rm o f hum an activ ity or cu l­
tu re is a critical requ irem en t. B u t w h a t d o w e understand here by the
“ h u m a n b e in g ” ?
C e r ta in ly n o t an isolated C artesian in d iv id u al, o r a p ure, transcen­
den ta l K a n tia n subject. N o r is the hum an b e in g p rim arily a k n o w in g
creatu re. Idealism w en t o f f m ark by fe ig n in g a pure su bject that co n ­
stitu tes th e w o rld th ro u g h k n o w le d g e . T h u s the actual h um an b ein g
and th e v ie w p o in t o f im m an en ce w ere lost. It is as an in n e r-w o rld ly
(“ n a tu ra l” ) en tity, n o t as a transcendental subject, that the h u m an race
fu lfills its ro le in b ein g, and also as a social creature, fu n ctio n in g in
h isto ric a l co llectiv es w h ich in d ivid uals m ake w o r k and also cause to
m o d ify . H u m an beings fulfill this ro le by their actual life and praxis,
th at is, by the em b o d ied interpretation o f b e in g w h ic h p recedes its ex ­
p lic it cu ltu ral im ages. In these respects, M a rx m akes his o w n co n tri­
b u tio n to a critical p h ilo so p h y o fim m a n e n c e .9
T o co n clu d e, hum an ag ency is o n to lo g ica lly relevan t to w h a tev e r
sh ape and m ean in g the w o rld acquires, because it is fro m hum an s
alon e that m ean in g can flow . A ttr ib u tin g m ean in g to b ein g in its e lf is
n o less an th ro p o m o rp h ic than attribu tin g purposes to it. I f this sound s
lik e hubris, w e m ay rem em ber it is, rather, an exp ressio n o f h u m an
fin itu d e. T h e in ability to overstep im m an en ce is a so u rce o f h u m ility
and o n to lo gica l loneliness w h ic h also, as se lf-o v e rco m in g , breed s a
sense o f freedom and pride.

( i * 3)
 CHAPTER 7

(6) Emancipation and Salvation

A s w e h av e seen t h r o u g h o u t th is b o o k , a p h ilo s o p h y o f im m a n e n c e is
c h a ra c te r is tic a lly a p h ilo s o p h y o f e m a n c ip a tio n . It a s s u m e s th a t the
r e c o g n itio n o f im m a n e n c e as th e o v e ra ll s u b s ta n c e o f life , w h e n in te -
r io r iz e d b y th e in d iv id u a l an d im p r e g n a tin g th e d o m in a n t c u ltu r e and
s o c ie ty , is lik e ly to b e c o m e a m a jo r lib e r a tin g fo r c e . W c e n c o u n te r e d
th is lin k b e tw e e n im m a n e n c e an d e m a n c ip a tio n in all th e p re c e d in g
ch a p te rs . B u t w e a ls o n o tic e d th e v a rie tie s in w h ic h it has b e e n in te r­
p re te d . T w o ty p e s o f q u e s tio n s arise: (a) can e m a n c ip a tio n a ffe c t the
in d iv id u a l d ire c tly , as d is tin g u is h e d o r ev en o p p o s e d to th e rest o f his
o r h e r s o c ia l tim e an d p lace? A n d (b) can it tra n sla te th e r e lig io u s ideal
o f s a lv a tio n in its fu ll fo rce?
S p in o z a a n s w e rs b o th q u e s tio n s a ffir m a tiv e ly . A n e s o te r ic th in k e r
(an d d e s c e n d a n t o f th e M a rra n o s ), he s a w th e a tta in m e n t o f tr u th as
in d e p e n d e n t o f th e p o litic a l an d c u ltu ra l s itu a tio n . A lt h o u g h im p r o v e d
p o litic a l c o n d itio n s e n h a n c e th e ch a n ces o f p h ilo s o p h ic a l life , th e y are
n o t a n e c e s s a ry c o n d itio n fo r it. T h e s a g e can atta in th e h ig h e s t p h ilo ­
s o p h ic a l d e g re e in is o la tio n , ev en w h e n th e g e n e ra l m u ltitu d e is far
f r o m its p ath .
T h is M a r r a n e s q u e o u tlo o k is n o t, I th in k , as d o g m a t ic as it is n aive.
T h e h is to r ic a lity o f h u m a n life an d a d v a n c e m e n t w a s n o t s u ffic ie n tly
r e c o g n iz e d in S p in o z a ’s tim e . N a tu r e and re a so n “ as s u c h ” w e r e th e
o b je c ts o f c o n c e rn , w h ile h is to ry , as in D e s c a r te s , w a s m e r e ly th e a c­
c u m u la te d b u rd e n o f p a st e rro rs an d p re ju d ic e s fr o m w h ic h th e p h ilo s ­
o p h e r h ad to tea r h im s e lf a w a y as he to o k th e s ta n d p o in t o f p u r e rea­
so n . It w a s K a n t w h o , firs t a m o n g th e m a jo r p h ilo s o p h e r s , m a in ta in e d
th a t r e a so n it s e l f d e p e n d e d u p o n h is to r y fo r its s e lf- e x p lic a tio n an d im ­
p le m e n ta tio n in th e w o r ld . T h is id ea H e g e l e la b o ra te d in to a g lo b a l
a n d s e m ir e lig io u s p h ilo s o p h y o f h is to ry , w h ile M a r x tr a n s p o s e d it to
a n a tu ra lis tic , e c o n o m ic o - s o c ia l c o n t e x t an d im p r is o n e d it w it h in th e
c o n fin e s o f r ig id h is to ric a l d e te r m in is m .
T h e r e b y n a ïv e té has tu rn e d in to d o g m a tis m . A c r itic a l c o n c e p t o f
im m a n e n c e , w h ile r e c o g n iz in g th e in te r d e p e n d e n c e o f th e in d iv id u a l
an d th e h is to r ic a l s itu a tio n , w i ll n o t see it as d e te r m in is tic . E x is te n -
tia lly , in d iv id u a ls esca p e fu ll ra tio n a l d e fin itio n ; an d h u m a n in d iv id u ­
als, as s e lf- tr a n s c e n d in g b e in g s , c a n n o t ev en b e d e fin e d b y w h a t th e y
h a v e th e m s e lv e s b e en o r d o n e . T h e r e a lw a y s re m a in s an irre d u c ib le
fa c to r th a t d e fie s s c ie n tific , h is to ric a l, o r ra tio n a l d e te r m in a tio n e v e n
w h il e a d m it tin g a s ta tis tic a lly p re d ic ta b le s itu a tio n w h e n la r g e r s o cia l
e n titie s are c o n c e r n e d ( g r o u p s , p e rio d s , s u b c u ltu r e s , e tc .).
A s fin ite , th e in d iv id u a l’s p o s itio n is a m b iv a le n t at its v e r y co re ; he

(¡ 84 )
 EPILOGUE

or she is b o th d eterm in a b le w ith in a larger co n text and indeterm inable

in his o r h er m o s t in tim a te in d ivid uality. M oreover, he o r she is nec­
e ssarily a co n s titu tiv e ag ent o f the broader social structure w h ich af­
fects h im o r her, becau se this structure cannot exist other than by being
in te rio rize d and re-en acted b y co n crete in dividuals w h o , as such, reit­
erate and c o lo r th eir ro les in th eir o w n , id io syn cratic w ays.
In a n y c o n te x t, in a n y society, in d ivid uals as such represent the prin­
ciple o f d e v ia tio n , the un p red ictab le existential factor escaping full de­
te rm in a tio n ; y e t it is o n ly th ro u g h them that glo bal historical form s
exist. H e n ce th e p o w e r w h ic h builds and m aintains these form s (and is
la rg e ly h arn essed b y th em ) is also w h a t underm ines their so lid ity and
keep s th e m in co n sta n t m o v em en t and openness to change. A s Spino­
za ’s o w n case illustrates, it is o ften the alienated m arginal individual,
fa llin g o u t o f tu n e w ith m ain stream so ciety (th o u gh still sharing part
o f its u n d e rly in g go als and in cip ien t aspirations) w h o serves as the cat­
a ly s t o f s o cia l and cu ltural ch an ge.
It is th e re fo re n o t from h isto ry that hum ans beco m e em ancipated,
b u t through an d within it. W h atever lib eratio n w e m ay ex p ect m ust o c­
cu r th ro u g h its m ed iu m . T h is im p lies, against w h a t H egel and M a rx
seem to b elieve, that there can be no end o f h isto ry, no transhistorical
state a n n o u n cin g full h um an lib eration . Secular m essianism is a co n ­
trad ictio n in term s. I f it translates the religio u s idea o f salvation in its
a b so lu te fo rce and p len itud e, then it is neith er secular n or tru ly im ­
m an en t, b u t rem ains attached to a transcendent religio us ideal. F rom
th e critical stan d p o in t o f fin itude, th e m essian ic “ k in g d o m o f G o d
u p o n e a rth ” is at best a regu lative transcendent d ream . T o v ie w hum an
h is to ry as lead in g to it— either n ecessarily o r even as a p lausib le o u t­
co m e — is to m aintain the d o g m a tic im p o rt o f transcen d ent religio n
w ith in w h a t p u rpo rts to be a p h ilo so p h y o fim m a n e n c e .
S e cu la r illusions are freq u en tly w o rse and m ay have m ore o m in o u s
co n seq u en ces than religio u s ones; and as the last ce n tu ry has d e m o n ­
strated d ram atically, secular esch a to lo g y is not m e re ly a p h ilo so p h ical
fa lla cy b u t a m ajo r source o f hum an su fferin g and in h um an atrocities.
E q u a lly uncritical is S p in o za’s v ie w o f in d iv id u al salvation, because
it is su p p o sed to p rovid e a w ay fo r the individual to o verco m e his or her
fin itu d e. A critical v ie w o fim m a n e n c e recogn izes that hum an s are ir­
re m e d ia b ly finite and n o th in g, n ot even this re co gn itio n , can red eem
th e m o f it. T h e em an cipating p o w er o fim m a n e n c e , in o th e r w o rd s,
ca n n ot m atch the absolute rew ards that religio n prom ises; and sin ce it
is b y d e m y s tify in g such prom ises that the idea o f im m an en ce has its
lib eratin g effect, it w ill be iro n ically self-d efeatin g to replace a religio u s
illu sion b y a secular one. E m an cip ation fro m re ligio u s illu sio n e x -

(185)
 CHAPTER 7

elu d e s all a b s o lu te cla im s ; it s h rin k s th e h o r iz o n o f h u m a n e m a n c ip a ­

tio n to m u c h m o r e lim ite d d im e n s io n s , as b e fits a c r itic a l an d im m a ­
n en t o u tlo o k . A n d th is m ean s a b o v e all: fin itu d e is n e v e r a b o lis h e d ;
w h a te v e r lib e ra tio n w e can atta in m u s t re m a in w it h in it's p e rv a s iv e
b o u n d a rie s.
T h e o p p o s ite d a n g e r also e x is ts . R e c o g n iz in g th a t m a n is ir r e m e d i­
a b ly fin ite g a v e th e e a r ly S a rtre a sen se o f r e d e m p t io n as s tr o n g as that
o f r e lig io u s b e lie v e rs ; later h e co n fe s s e d th is h ad b e e n o n e o f his g r e a t­
est m is ta k e s , an in v e rte d fo r m o f th e is m . It is still a d o g m a t ic re lig io u s
te m p e r a m e n t th a t in te rp re ts h u m a n fin itu d e a n d c o n t in g e n c y as “ lo s t ”
o r “ c o n d e m n e d ,” a “ u seless p a s s io n ” as S a rtre c a lle d it; it is e q u a lly a
tra n s c e n d e n t re lig io u s im p u ls e th a t s e ek s, d ia le c tic a lly , to fin d an
“ a th e ist r e d e m p t io n ” in th is v e r y “ d a m n a tio n .” C r it ic a l im m a n e n c e is
m o r e s o b e r, th o u g h n o less in ten se; as in F reu d , it ta k e s a c a lm e r to n e ,
a v o id in g th e g re a t d ra m a an d s e m ir c lig io u s h e r o is m fr e q u e n t ly a sso ­
ciate d w it h th e a c c e p ta n c e o f fin itu d e . A n d th is m a y b e e v e n h a rd e r to
do.
In r e c o g n iz in g fin itu d e — an d fin ite r a tio n a lity — as th e fo r e m o s t h u ­
m a n m a rk , w e a s s u m e b o th its p o te n tia l an d lim it a t io n s , its p r o m is e
a n d b u rd e n , as s p e c ific a lly ours. W e a c c e p t fin ite r a tio n a lity as th e
o v e r a ll c o n t e x t o f im m a n e n c e , fr o m w h ic h n o th in g can lift o r “ s a v e ”
u s, b u t w ith in w h ic h h u m a n life can g iv e s tr u c tu r e a n d m e a n in g to
itse lf, a lw a y s p ro n e to tra n sce n d e n t illu s io n an d s e lf- d e c e p t io n , and
c o n s ta n tly in n ee d o f re s tr a in in g m e m e n to s . I n te r io r iz in g th is r e c o g ­
n itio n m a y p r o v id e th e k in d o f p h ilo s o p h ic a l s e lf- k n o w le d g e , p e rh a p s
e v e n w i s d o m , w h ic h lea d s to e m a n c ip a tio n , n o t fr o m fin itu d e , as in
S p in o z a , b u t fr o m its a lle g e d ly in to le ra b le b u rd e n . A c c e p t i n g a natura
naturata w i t h o u t G o d m a y p ro v e to b e m o r e d iffic u lt th a n p a r t a k in g in
th e e x u b e r a n c e o f amor dei intellectualis, b u t it is a ls o a m o r e c r itic a l and
a u th e n tic h u m a n sta n ce.

T h e p r e c e d in g p o in ts are m e a n t to d e lin e a te o n ly th e g e n e ra l c o n t o u r s
o f a c r itic a l p h ilo s o p h y o f im m a n e n c e . M a n y w a y s still e x is t to c o n ­
s tru e it. B u t S p in o z a an d th e o th e r “ h e re tic s ” h e e n g e n d e r e d , w it h
th e ir q u a rre ls , a d v e n tu re s , in s ig h ts , and m is ta k e s , ad d u p to a w o r t h ­
w h ile , i f p a rtia l an d o p e n -e n d e d , p h ilo s o p h ic a l e n te r p ris e . T h e se a rc h
f o r lu c id it y an d d is illu s io n m e n t m a y n e v e r atta in a fin a l g o a l o r p r o v id e
m o r e th a n p a rtia l e m a n c ip a tio n ; y e t it w i ll a lw a y s a c c e p t th e im m a n e n t
w o r ld , w i t h its fin itu d e an d in h e re n t u n c e r ta in tie s , as th e o v e ra ll d o ­
m a in o f b e in g an d v a lu e , n e ith e r h ell n o r p a ra d is e b u t m a n ’ s m e ta ­
p h y s ic a l h o m e la n d , a c r e a tiv e , e v e n j o y f u l v a le o f tea rs w h e r e s u ffe r in g
an d p e r s e v e r a n c e , fin itu d e an d a u t o n o m y in fo r m o n e a n o th e r.

(186)
 Notes

C hapter i

1. Retaining only the Theologico-Political Treatise and some earlier works,

like Descartes’ Principles, with the appended Metaphysical Thoughts, which do
not necessarily express the author's intent.
2. Yirm iyahu Yovel, Kant and the Philosophy of History (Princeton: Princeton
U niversity Press, 1980), esp. pp. 88if.
3. Lucretius, De rerum natura 1.101; quoted by Kant in his Religion Within the
Limits o f Reason Alone, tr. T. M . Greene and H. H. Hudson (New York: Har-
p e r& R o w , 1950), p. 122; Kants Werke, Akadem ieTextausgabe (Berlin: Walter
de Gruyter, 1968), 6: 131.
4. Julius Guttmann, Mendelssohns Jerusalem und Spinozas Theologisch-Poli-
tischer Traktat (48. Bericht der Hochschule fur die Wissenschaft desjudentums,
Berlin, 1931), p· 36 n. See also idem., Religion and Science (Hebrew; Jerusalem:
Magnes Press, 1955).
5. For other and different aspects o f the Spinoza-Kant relation, see Henry
Allison, “ Kant’s Critique o f Spinoza,” in Richard Kennington (ed.), The Phi­
losophy of Baruch Spinoza (Washington: Catholic University o f America Press,
1980), pp. 199-228; cf. Jose Castaing, Kant el Spinoza (mimeograph, Paris,
1988).
6. See Carl Gebhardt, Spinoza (Leipzig: Reclam Verlag, 1932), p. 65.
7. Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press,
1952). This involves hiding the esoteric meaning under a cover o f intentional
ambiguities, sometimes even contradictions, and extensive use o f pious
phraseology and quotations. When Spinoza in his Theologico-Political Treatise
(p. 182, Opera 3: 173) quotes ironically the Dutch saying keen kettersonder letter
(there is no hcretic without a (biblical] verse), he scores another masterly coup,
since the irony lies on a higher level and the saying applies to the author as
well. The need for prudence is explicitly declared when Spinoza, follow ing
Descartes (Discourse on Method, pt. 3), lays down the rule o f conform ing to the
ways o f speech o f the masses (sec Treatise on the Intellect 17); and when Spinoza

(¡s?)
 NOTES TO PAGES 11- 1 $

w rites to O ld enb u rg (letter 73, 2: 298, Opera 4: 306-8) that in his Theologico-
Political Treatise he tried to clear h im self o f the charge o f atheism .
8. O n K a n t’s relationship w ith contem porary censorship E m il F rom m of­
fers a detailed analysis, based on the R o yal A rch ives o f Berlin (see Kant und die
preussische Censur (nach den A kten im K o n igl. geh eim cn Staatsarchiv, H am ­
bu rg & Leipzig: Voss, 1894]). O th er signs o f this conflict are K an t's prudent
discussions o f political authority (see Theory and Practice in Werke, A kad cm ic
Textau sgabe 8: 273-313; Metaphysics o f Morals, pt. 1: The Metaphysical Elements
o f Justice, tr. J. Ladd [N e w Y o rk: Library o f Liberal A rts, 1965)1 Werke 6: 203-
356); his apparent am bivalence concerning revolutions in general and the
French R evolution in particular (cf., e. g . , the con clud in g chapter o f Theor)> and
Practice to par. 6 in Der Streit der Fakultaten [Werke 7]; and the attem pt he made
in Religion, pp. 112 -13 [ Werke 6: 121-22]) to find a place, even i f far-fetched,
to counter rational principles o f th eology. It is clear that K a n t was m otivated
by a desire to avoid open conflict w ith the religious p ublic (see Kant and the
Philosophy o f History, pp. 2i5flf).
9. A m ajor device w h ich both Spinoza and K ant use is to declare the co m ­
p atibility o f reason w ith Scripture (or w ith th eo lo gy; see Metaphysical
Thoughts, chap. 8; Theologico-Political Treatise, chap. 15; Religion, p. 11 [Werke
6: 13]). H ow ever, this is m ere lip service to an idea that both philosophers
actually refute in their books.
10. T h is is indicated in the Ethics (pt. 4, prop. 37): “ W hatsoever w e desire or
do, w h e re o f w e are the cause in so far as w e possess the idea o f G o d or kn o w
G o d , I set dow n to religion." T h is description refers neither to historical reli­
gio n nor to purified religio catholica, but to the highest m etaphysical stage. T h e
man w h o understands, through an articulated system , the identity o f G od
w ith the totality o f the w orld and his o w n place w ith in this totality, has at­
tained liberation and a n ew em otional status, dom inated by j o y and the love o f
G o d and m arked by “ active’' (free) desires and m otivations. In line w ith this,
Spinoza in the same proposition gives the concept o f p iety (pietas) a philosoph­
ical definition par excellence, as distinguished from the popular m eaning o f
this concept in his Theologico-Political Treatise.
11. T h is idea m ay partly invoke A ristotle's concept o f practical reason.
12. Spinoza em ploys w h at he calls the “ co m m on ” definition o f (distributive)
ju stice, i.e ., “ the constant and perpetual w ill to render every m an his d u e”
( T T P , chap. 4, O pera 3: 59).
13. Spinoza does form ulate such a transition in his treatm ent o f notiones com­
munes (see Ethics, pt. 2, props. 37-39, and note 6 to the T T P ).
14. T h e idea is that the man w h o falls short o f philosophical reason can in
the m eantim e rearrange his low er pow ers o f im agination and association
(m em ory) in a w ay that is conducive to sem irational behavior. T h is behavior
w ill have all the outer features and social benefits o f rational conduct, o n ly it
w ill be less stable and, m ost im portant, it w ill lack pow er to liberate the agent
and transform his inner life and personality.
15. I refer to all m odes o f m ediation between spontaneity and receptivity, as

(188)
 N OT E S TO PAGES I 5 - 2 O

expressed in the fields o f action, volition, natural teleology, etc., and not only
in the field o f knowledge.
16. Such as the “ typics,” the historical process, or the postulate o f God’s
existence.
17. “ If men were so constituted by nature that they desired nothing but what
is designated by true reason, society would obviously have no need o f laws; it
would be sufficient to inculcate true moral doctrines; and men would freely,
w ithout hesitation, act in accordance with their true interests" (T T P , p. 73,
Opera 3: 73).
18. See Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing, p. 46.
19. Spinoza’s critical attitude toward literal meaning is similar to the critical
attitude required in his and Descartes’ science to sensations and empirical data.
T h ey serve as a starting point for knowledge and present the investigator with
his questions; but in order to understand and define them he needs additional
data and principles.
20. Spinoza does not use this terminology, but a perusal o f chapter 7 o f the
Theologico-Political Treatise will show a strong analogy.
21. O n e such presupposition was that the Bible uses language ad captum vulgi
(according to the comprehension o f the multitude). Spinoza, who also knew
the Talm udic equivalent (“ Torah spoke the language o f men” [Babylonian Tal­
m ud, Brakhot 31b; Yebamot 71a]) and the ways in which the idea was formerly
interpreted, differed radically in his own interpretation. He denies that the Bi­
ble transmits higher knowledge in popular language, or that it is composed o f
tw o levels, esoteric and exoteric. For him both the significance and the word­
ing o f the Bible belong to the same level o f imaginatio; and therefore it is futile
to look for any hidden meaning that transcends the comprehension o f the vul­
gar. Th is view is clearly derived from Spinoza’s own scientific account o f the
nature o f prophecy; and although he attempts to find support for it in the Bible
itself, in fact this is a general rationalistic presupposition derived from his phi­
losophy and then superimposed on the text.
22. P. F. Moreau, “ La méthode d ’interprétation de PEcriture Sainte,” in Spi­
noza, science et religion, ed. R. Bouveresse, Actes du CoUoque, Cerisy-la-Salle,
1982 (Paris: Vrin, 1988), pp. 109-14.
23. Rel., pp. 100-105; Werke 6: 109-14.
24. Ibid., p. 100, Werke 6: 110: “ If such an empirical faith, which chance, it
would seem, has tossed into our hands, is to be united with the basis o fa moral
faith . . . an exposition o f the revelation which has come into our possession
is required, that is, a thoroughgoing interpretation o f it in a sense agreeing
with the universal practical rules o fa religion o f pure reason. For the theoret­
ical part o f ecclesiastical faith cannot interest us morally i f it does not conduce
to the performance o f all human duties as divine commands (that which con­
stitutes the essence o f all religion).”
25. Rel., p. 101, Werke 6: 110: “ This interpretation may, in the light o f the
text [o f the revelationj, appear forced— it may often really be forced·, and yet if
the text can possibly support it, it must be preferred to a literal interpretation

(1S9)
 NOTES TO PAGES 2 0 -2 9

w hich either contains nothing at all (helpful] to m orality or else actually w orks
counter to m oral incentives” (emphasis added).
26. Johann D avid M ichaelis (1 7 17 -17 9 1 ). K an t contends w ith M ich aelis’s
posthum ous essay, published in 1792 (a year prior to the p ublication o f the
Religion), w here M ichaelis accepts the literal m eaning o f Psalm 5 9 :11-16 , in
w h ich the poet prays for a cruel revenge on his enem ies (“ C o n su m e them in
w rath . . .” ).
27. See Der Streit der Fakultäten, Werke 7: 38-47.
28. In the Religion, Kant gives a series o f d oubtful reasons: (1) that it is tra­
ditional in all religions to tw ist a text for desirable purposes; (2) that his
m ethod does not violate the literal m eaning to a great extent, since ancient
m yth ologies share a hidden disposition to m orality; (3) that the author m ight
have meant w hat Kant attributes to him . Y et these argum ents sound rather
like excuses: (1) A prevalent custom is clearly not ipso facto ju stified . (2) What
about cases in w h ich the violation does occur? A n d even w h ere there is a hid­
den m oral im plication, it is certainly not identical w ith the literal m eaning. (3)
T h e probability o f such a case is v ery lo w (cf. Psalm 59 :11-16 ). It is ju st as
probable (and even m ore so), that the poet meant w h at he actually said.
29. See Kant and the Philosophy o f History, esp. chap. 6.
30. Sylvain Z ac, Spinoza et ¡'interprétation de l'Ecriture (Paris: Presses U n i­
versitaires de France, 1965).
31. G ershom Scholem , Sabbatai Sevi— The Mystical Messiah, ¡626-1676
(Princeton: Princeton U niversity Press. 1973).
32. N on contrad iction is maintained by violating the literal m eaning o f the
B ible, especially o f those verses that have to do w ith the nature o f reason and
rationality. T yp ical exam ples are his com m ents on K in g S o lo m on ( T T P , p.
44, Opera 3: 45); his casuistic argum ents about the proh ibition to eat fro m the
tree o f kn o w led ge ( T T P , pp. 63fr., Opera 3: 63fr.); or the allegorical and rather
tw isted interpretation o f the critical dictum , “ he that increaseth kn o w led g e
increaseth so rro w ,” w h ich flatly contradicts the crux o f Sp in oza’s ethics and
an th rop o lo gy (Ethics, pt. 4, prop. 17S).
33. See m y detailed criticism o f this doctrine in Kant and the Philosophy of
History, pp. 287-98.
34. In saying this I do not mean to uphold Sp in oza’s scientific m ethod in
detail. Reducing the B ible to m ere p hilological and historical factors cannot
p rovid e an exhaustive understanding o f the phenom enon and even misses the
centra] point. Biblical science m ust un doubtedly use genuine religious cate­
gories and treat the B ible as a religious docum ent.

C hapter 2

1. H egel, Wissenschaft der Logik, ed. G. Lasson (H am burg: M einer, 1963), 2:

2 17, m y translation; cf. H egel’s Science o f Logic, tr. A . V. M iller (London: A llen
& U n w in , 1969), p. 580.
2. Ibid., p. 218 / p. 581; m y translation.

(190)
 NOTE S TO PAGES 2 9 - 4 4

3. Critique of Pure Reason, tr. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan,

1929, 1970), B xxxvi.
4. “ Wenn man anfangt zu philosophieren, so muss man zuerst Spinozist
sein” (Geschichte der Philosophie, in Werke [Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1971) 20:165);
Eng.: Lectures on the History of Philosophy, tr. E. S. Haldane & F. H. Simson
(London: Routledge & Kcgan Paul, 1955), 3: 257 (my translation).
5. Pltanomenologie des Geistes, cd. J. Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Meiner, 1952),
p. 19.
6. B y “ all relevant sources” I mean both explicit and implicit sources. The
first includes, o f course, H egel’s overt references to Spinoza in his Lectures on
the History of Philosophy and in specific notes in the Logic and elsewhere. But in
addition— and taking H egel’s own advice— I shall draw from the actual dis­
cussion o f the Logic, where an implicit critique o f Spinoza is being carried out
in the rew orking o f such categories as Substance and Absolute, and in the cru­
cial transition from the Objective Logic to the Subjective Logic.
7. History of Philosophy, 3: 282.
8. See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 725-737/B 752-766; also, Yirmiyahu
Yovel, Kant and the Renewal of Metaphysics (Hebrew; Jerusalem: Bialik Institute,
1973), chap. 8.
9. History of Philosophy, 3: 287.
10. There is indeed a reflective idea (Idea ideae) mounted over any particular
idea, but there is no single divine ego cogito which unices them by ascribing
them all to his singular subjective identity.
11. For a further analysis o f H egel’s “ becoming G od” and the “ truly revo­
lutionary rupture it makes with the tradition o f theology as a whole,” see
L. Œ ing-H anhoff, “ La nécessité historique du concept hégélien de Dieu,” in
G u y Planty-Bonjour (éd.), Hegel et la Religion (Paris: PUF, 1982), pp. 78-100.
12. Em il Fackcnheim has stressed this in his Religious Dimension in Hegel’s
Thought (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967). It must be added that this is only a
dimension, a moment o f the Hegelian synthesis and not its totality. Social,
political, and cultural processes are equally present; and by giving history a
sem ircligious dimension they are elevated in their ontological status. The im­
portance o f social praxis in Hegel is not diminished, but rather emphasized by
recognizing its semireligious context.
13. See Œ ing-Hanhoff, “ La nécessité historique” ; and: “ The realization o f
freedom is the realization o f the unity o f the divine and human na­
ture. . . . Hegel recognizes, o f course, that this historical development toward
the full consciousness o f man’s rational freedom involves a reciprocal action on
the part o f God and man, a ‘cooperation’ which is one o f the truths manifest
in the Lutheran conception o f the Eucharistie celebration” (James Yerkes, The
Christohgy of Hegel (Albany, N .Y .:S U N Y , 1983], pp. 156, 158.
14. See Pierre Macherey, Hegel 011 Spinoza (Paris: Maspero, 1979), p. 32.
15. History of Philosophy, 3: 252; Hegel’s Logic (tr. from the Encyclopaedia, part
1, 1830), by William Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975), par. 151.
16. In speaking o f Spinoza as “ oriental,” Hegel avoids a problem. The nov­

(>9>J
 NOTES TO PAGES 4 5 - 4 6

elty o fju d aism , for H egel, is that the form er, m erely naturalistic G o d has been
personified. This does not fit very w ell w ith Spinoza, so H egel sees him as
retreating from Judaism to som e oriental paganism .
17. See H egel’s Early Theological Writings, tr. T . M . K n o x (C h icago: C h i­
cago U n iversity Press, 1948), pp. 68-69; see als ° Vorlesungen iiber die Philoso­
phic der Religion, the section on “ D ie Religion der Erhaben h eit” ; also the sec­
tion in the Phanomenologie w here Judaism is analyzed as alienation w ith ou t
expressly nam ing it (pp. 158-60). I have dealt w ith this p rob lem in m y “ H e-
gels B e g riff der R eligion und die Religion dcr E rhabenheit,” Theologie und Phi­
losophic 51 (1976): 512-37; French version in Hegel et la Religion, ed. G . Planty-
B o n jo u r (Paris: PU F , 1982), pp. 151-7 5.
18. Ironically, it is Spinoza— mediated by M endelssohn and K ant— who
strengthened H egel’s one-sided v ie w o fju d a is m as pure “ lega lism ,” in w hich
the servitude o f man to G od (the essence o fju d a is m fo r Spinoza) was ex­
pressed. In Spinoza, however, this “ fear and trem b lin g’’ posture is not d om i­
nant or specific for Judaism.
19. Spinoza rejects the idea o f the incarnated “ son o f G o d ” as he does all
miracles. Even in his m ost sym pathetic w ords concerning Jesus, Spinoza pre­
sents him as a man w h o had attained perfection, not as G o d — a n otion w hich
Spinoza clearly says he does not understand. M oreover, even the flattering
things he says about Jesus as a man are attributed not to Jesus him self, but to
the Scripture. Even on the basis o f the B ible itself, i f w e avoid the additional
burden o f church dogm ata, all w e can infer is the superiority o fje s u s over all
other prophets, but on ly as a man.
20. In the Phanomenologie [o f Spirit], H egel even seems to insist on the incar­
nation as a real and particular historical event, A b solu te Spirit em bodied in the
particular person o fjesu s. T h is is a bizarre idea, incoherent in H eg el’s system ,
w hich— as Charles Taylo r suggests— m ust see incarnation as a universal phe­
nom enon, carried equally by all men and w om en in their history, and w h o
view ed Jesus as an exem plary m an, not G o d . T h e statem ent in Phanom enoU
ogie, i f it is not made in the language o f m etaphoric Vorstellung, either stands
unexplained or is to be taken as a critique o f C a th o lic fetishism , ending in the
absurdity o f the Crusades. See Charles T aylor, Hegel (Cam bridge: C a m brid ge
U n iversity Press, 1975), pp. 489-94; see also Em il Fackenheim , The Religious
Dimension in Hegel’s Thought (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), esp. chap. 5. In
this section I adhere m ore closely to the letter o f H egel’s interpretations o f
C hristian d ogm a in the narrow sense (which, how ever, as w c see from the
literature, are also a m atter o f som e debate). In m y fo rego in g discussion I went
beyon d this narrow sense to expose the theological allegory em bodied in the
broader contours o f H egel’s system — especially his philosop h y o f history, in
w h ich I found a heterodox Protestant deep-structure w h ich provides a broader
philosophical interpretation o f incarnation. D . F. Strauss has bro u gh t out this
idea in his Das Leben Jesu (1839), esp. vol. 2, par. 149. I certainly concur w ith
K arl L o w ith , w h o says that Strauss’ reading is im plied in H egel h im self (From

(192)
 NOTES TO PAGES 4 7 - 4 8

Hegel to Nietzsche (N ew York: Anchor Books, 1967J, p. 330). Sec also CEing-
H anhoff, "La nécessité historique.”
21. it can be argued that Hegel also secularizes “ divine history,” but this is
true only in form , not in content. Hegel retains the substance o f this idea and
only translates it from the metaphor o f religion to the conceptual language o f
philosophy. His secularization is also sacralization, whereas Spinoza dcsacral-
izes history altogether and under whatever form it may take.
22. If this view is true, how can we explain that there is for Spinoza an
infinity o f attributes which the human mind cannot know? What sense is there
in a subjective projection o f the mind to which the mind itself has no access?
T he limitation o f our knowledge o f the attributes will make sense only if the
attributes are understood as real aspects o f God— as Spinoza indeed intends
them to be. It is true that Spinoza has problems deriving the material qualities
o f the attributes (“ extension,” “ thought” ) by sheer analysis o f the concept o f
substances. Therefore, he must appeal to the actual experiencing o f the mind
(as intellectus, not as imaginatio) to fill in the undeducible contents. To what
extent this is incongruent with the rest o f Spinoza’s system depends on how
strict an a priorist we construe him to be. But the problem concerns in any
case the method o f knowledge and not its outcome. There is no doubt that
what the intellect thus attributes to the substance is considered by Spinoza to
be tw o real and objective aspects o f the universe. O nly this enables us to have
objective knowledge at all, for such knowledge takes place only by laws and
causal explanations that necessarily presuppose either “ extension” or
“ thought” as their fundamental category. Denying natural entities any one o f
these characteristics as real will make objective knowledge impossible, just as
their underlying presence is a necessary condition for it. The attributes are
“ low er” epistem ologically than the substance in that they are necessary only
for know ing particular things in the universe, which must fall within some
qualified range o f phenomena and under specific natural laws, but they are not
necessary for knowing a priori the substance-God as such. In this sense, the
attributes are the aspects in which God opens up toward the realm o f particu­
larity; they are the material substrate o f the natura naturata— but as such, pre­
cisely, they are real and objective.
Similarly, there is no doubt that Spinoza considered the particular modes as
real entities, enjoying individuality and their own mode o f existence (even o f
necessary existence). All existence is necessary in Spinoza, but there are two
different kinds o f existence (and o f necessity). Existence can flow, necessarily,
either from the essence o f an entity or from something else, considered as its
cause. The first kind o f existence is eternal (in the sense o f supratemporal),
belonging to God or substance alone; the second kind is finite existence, be­
longing to the particular modes and expressed in their duratio. This term docs
not signify time in Spinoza, but a certain mode o f being, the kind which must
eventually pass away— a mode o f existence which is proper to finite (and there­
fore perishable) things. T hey are real; but they merely endure.
The endeavor (conatus) to so endure also gives finite things their singular

( ‘ 93)
 NOTE TO PAGE 4 8

in d ividuality (another sign o f their actuality). Conatus is defined as the very

being o f the finite m ode, not as a special activity on its part. Duratio and cona­
tus, the specific m ode o f being o f finite things and w h at m akes them separate
individuals, are thus, not surprisingly, linked togeth er in Spinoza.
T h e o n ly reality that finite m odes seem to lack is the eternal kind; but this
statement, too, m ust be qualified. In a series o f concise and connected pas­
sages, the m ost speculative in his w o rk , Spinoza m akes clear that finite m odes,
too, w hen grasped from the highest standpoint o f k n o w led g e (scientia intuitiva)
are conceived as “ true and real” even in the sense o f etern ity (Ethics, pt. 5, prop.
29S). Existence is then attributed to them not m erely as duration but also in
terms o f “ the very nature o f existence, w h ich is assigned to particular things
because they fo llo w . . . from the eternal necessity o f G o d ’s nature” (pt. 2,
prop. 45S). Th is is based on the crucial principle o f particularization (pt. 1,
prop. 16) w h ich states that an infinite range o f particulars m ust ensue neces­
sarily from G o d in a logical-eternal order.
T h is conclusion is taken a step forw ard i f w e consider that scientia intuitiva,
the highest degree o f kn ow ledge, involves grasping a particular m od e through
its inherence in G od , and thereby also v iew s G o d th rough his finite expression
in particular things. T h is reciprocity is essential to Spinoza and w h at gives it
pow er and depth also provides the deepest grasp o f reality, applicable not only
to individual things but to the totality as such. Equipped w ith this higher
view p oin t, w e can com e back, as it were, from bo o k 5 to bo o k 1 o f the Ethics
and gain a deeper insight into G od and his ontological structure. W hat Spinoza
says is chat G od to o is grasped and exists in his true reality o n ly as particular­
ized; and, therefore, his particularization, according to proposition 1.16 , is not
an additional act o f the absolute but one w hich is constitucive o f it. In ocher
w o rd s, from che standpoint o f scientia intuitiva, the finite and the infinite sides
o f the totality are m utually dependent; G o d in the aspect o f infinity, as natura
naturans, is cause o f h im self only by being the cause o f his o w n finite aspect, as
natura naturata.
23. R ecently there has been a trend to bring Spinoza and H egel m uch closer
than can be, I think, adm itted. Errol Harris criticizes H egel fo r not h avin g seen
chat Spinoza is already h im self alm ost a H egelian. T h is seem s to take m atters
too far— and m uch beyond the hard core o f difference w h ich I m aintain re­
m ains. Pierre M acherey, in a m ore restricted m ove, also leads Spinoza a lo n g
w ay coward H egel w h ile taking, on the rem aining issues, the Spin ozistic alter­
native against H egel and seeking, w ith o u t pretending to find, another dialectic
than H e g e l’s (possibly a materialistic one) to do che jo b that, M ach erey feels,
Spinoza was gro p in g for and H egel perform ed w ith a w ro n g kind o f dialectic
(see his Hegel ou Spinoza, note 14, above). A part fro m m y scepticism about
the conceptual possibility o f a materialistic dialectic (dialectical lo g ic requires
a subject-m atter capable o f interiorization and a kind o f “ m em o ry,” oth erw ise
dual negation w ill n ot result in som ething n ew but w ill, as in form al logic,
m erely return to the point o f departure), I am m ore at peace than M acherey
w ith the current v ie w that in Spinoza an actual breach occurs betw een the finite

(194 )
 NOTE S TO PAGES 4 9 - 3 6

and che infinice, even if this comes as a result o f criticism and is opposed co
Spinoza’s ow n intencion.
24. M acherey tries co minimize this resulc, but wich little conviction. See his
Hegel on Spinoza (note 14).
25. I mean his theory that God as infinite comprises no negation (Ethics, pt.
1, ax. 6, exp., pt. 1, prop. 8S)— while determinate items involve ic necessarily
(determinatio negatio est). The latter principle is highJy praised by Hegel as a
predialectical intuicion, which it is not. Spinoza did see, o f course, that nega-
cion is conscitucive o f any specification; but precisely for this reason he denied
negacion from God as cocality and arrived ac his basically undialectical syscem.
26. I stress the word ultimately, for this is true onJy in globaJ contours and in
the final analysis, not in the detailed texture o f Hegel’s work, which pays deep
dialectical tribute to the forces o f the irrational and the “ cunning o f reason.”

C h apter 3

1. “ D ie romantiche Schule,” Sätntliche Werke (Munich: Kindler Taschen­

bücher, 1964), 9: 84·
2. Confessions in Heine’s Prose Writings, tr. Havelock Ellis (London, 1877;
repr. N ew York: Arno Press, 1974), pp. 294-9S.
3. Q uoted by Ludw ig Marcuse in his biography o f Heinrich Heine from a
letter by M a rx ’s daughter to Karl Kautsky. Marx, a failed poet, wrote verses
w ith Heine and loved him, but declared him politically unreliable.
4. See Eugen Biser, Gottsucher oder Anti-Christ? (Salzburg: O tto Miller,
1982), pp. 63-64. See also Hanna Spencer, “ Heine und Nietzsche,” Heine-Jahr-
buch 11 (1972): 126-61.
5. “ Zur Geschichte der Religion und Philosophie in Deutschland (1834—
35),” Sämtliche Werke 9: 250. A partial English translation can be found in Prose
Writings, “ Religion and Philosophy,” pp. 142-78.
6. “ Geschichte,” p. 237.
7. Reisebilder, in Prose Writings, p. 8.
8. Germany: A Winter's Tale 1844, Cr. Hal Draper, in The Complete Poems of
Heinrich Heine (Boston: Suhrkamp/Insel, 1982), caput 1.
9. Ibid. Draper translated Zuckererbse (see Sätntliche Werke 2: 150) as “sugar
peas,” which I modified into “ green peas” to make clear the term refers to a
vegetable, not a candy. “ Green peas” is also the rendering in the older transla­
tion by Herman Salinger (N ew York: L. B. Fischer, 1944, p. 21). Incidentally,
in defining Zuckererbse as “ a kind o f tasty peas savored in their shells” the clas­
sic Deutsches Wörterbuch o fja c o b Grimm and Wilhelm Grim m (revised by Dr.
G. Rosenhagen, Leipzig, 1914, 1954) actually quotes the same line from Heine
as illustration.
10. See volume 1, chap. 4.
11. Germany: Winter's Tale, caput 2.
12. Ibid., caput 5.
13. But also very probably, o f his academic rival Victor Cousin. O n their

(¡ 9 5 )
 N O T E S T O PAGES 56-62

relationship see Joseph Dresch, “ Heine et Victor Cousin,” E t u d e s g e r m a n i q u e s

11 (1956): 122-32.
14. Heine picked the same name for che French version o f his history o(
German literature (English title, T h e R o m a n t i c S c h o o l ) as M m e de Stael’s book
D e l ' A l l e m a g n e , on which he commented: “ M m e de Staël, o f glorious mem­
ory, here opened, in the form o fa book, a salon in which she received German
authors and gave them an opportunity to make themselves known to the civ­
ilized world o f France” (P r o s e W r i t i n g s , p. 69; S a m t l u h t W e r k e 9: 13-14). Heine
was clearly no feminist.
15. “ Geschichte,” p. 201. This idea too is o f Hegelian origin, but in Heine it
acquires a touch o f paradox in that Hegel is seen as a pantheist and atheist.
There is also, I think, a deeper personal reason for this. Heme, perhaps unwit·
tingly, seeks to vindicate his assumed Protestantism to himselt— and what is
better than to see it as the root o f its own leading to the new ideas
o f freedom, che vanguard o f humanity at which Heine place* himself?
16. “ Geschichte,” pp. 236-37; Hiiiory, p. 170
17. “ Geschichte,” p. 242; H i s t o r y , p. 173
18. “ Geschichte," p. 256.
19. Ibid., p. 275.
20. Ibid., p. 265; H i s t o r y , p. 174.
21. Ibid., p. 264.
22. Ibid., p. 280. Heine devotes surprisingly little actcncioo 10 Hegel. In later
years he prepared (so he reported) a special monograph on Hegel that he de­
stroyed after his conversion (sec P r o s e p. 306).
23. “ Geschichte,” pp. 209-18.
24. Ibid., pp. 209-10.
25. Ibid., p. 210.
26. Especially the brothers Rodrigues, rhe brothers Pereira, the poet Léon
HaJévy, Feliden David, and others. O n this phenomenon, see J. L. TaJmon.
P o l i t i c a l M e s s i a n i s m : T h e R o m a n t i c P h a s e (London: Sacker & Warburg, i960),
esp. pp. 77ff; see also the epilogue in volume i .
27. “ Geschichte,” p. 213; H i s t o r y , p. 166 (my translation).
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., p. 218.
30. Ibid.. p. 217.
31. Ibid., p. 216.
32. Ibid., p. 213.
33. T h e R o m a n t i c S c h o o l , in P r o s e W r i t i n g s , p. 72; S â m ü i c h e W e r k e 9: 16.
34. J ü d i s c h e K s m m e r im e c h t e (“ Geschichte," p. 214). The French translation
reads “ the Talm udic bankers.”
33. Ibid.. p. 217.
36. Ibid.
37. Heine's biographer, Ludwig Marcuse, rej ects the word c o n v e r s i o n . But
het too, paints a picture o f a wavermg skeptic, no longer a stout atheist.
38. C o n f e s s i o n s , in P r o s e W r i t i n g s , p. 306.

(1 9 6 )
 N O T E S TO PAGES 6 2 - 6 8

J9. Ibid., p. 310.

4.0. Heine, as a young man, was a founder o f the epoch-making Association
lor Jewish Culture and Scholarship (Verein for Kultur und Wissenschaft der Ju­
den). Th is was for him a modern, nonreligious form o f attachment to one’s
Jewish origins— which he did not quite renounce by his insincere conversion
to Lutheranism. He saw Judaism as an ethnic and historical partnership which
should continue as such.
41. This is customary: how Protestant theologians tend to relate to Luther,
Christian philosophers (the young Hegel) relate to Christ, and all philosophers
relate to Socrates.
42. See Kant's letter ro Jacobi o f August 30, 1789, in Philosophical Correspon­
dence, ed. and tr. A m u lf Z w eig (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1967),
p. 158. Kant here misunderstands Spinoza who, he says, sought “ a teleological
(5(c) road to theology."
43. A s for Mendelssohn, w ho equally lost the war becausc he was a theistic
m etaphysician, Herne nevertheless praises him for his reform ofjudaism . This
was. for Heine as historian, another phase in the evolution o f religion in Ger­
many: Mendelssohn did for die Jews what Luther did for the Christians—
restoring the Bible in face o f the Talmud, which is the "Catholic" clement in
Judaism. Heine oversimplifies the fact that Mendelssohn was, indeed, a major
figure in Jewish history, leading to secular learning and through it to religious
skepticism (this against Mendelssohn's wish). Mendelssohn, dialectically, en­
couraged a “ Spinozistic" phenomenon among later Jewish generations.
44. Jews wrote much more about this-worldly affairs and their sanctified
meaning, though they did so in a clearly defined and regimented way. This is
what hostile critics viewed as the “ mere’' legalism o f thejew s. In this respect,
Hess had a more adequate view ofjudaism (see discussion below), viewing its
difference from Christian mortification not as quandtative, as did Heine, but
as a difference in kind.
45. Jean-Pierre Lcfebvrc, “ Heine, Hegel et Spinoza," Cahiers Spinoza 4
(1982-1983): 212.
46. Die heilige Geschuhte der Menschheit von einem Jünger Spinozas, 1837.
For a more detailed account o f this w ork see S. Avineri, Moses Hess (New
Y ork: N e w York University Press. 1985), pp. 21-46. See a ls o j. L. Talmon,
Political Messianism, p. 211. Moses Hess's works have been recently edited by
W olfgang Mönkc, M ars Hess: Philosophische und sozialistische Schriften, ¡837-
î 8so, 2d ed. (Huggell (Liechtenstein): Topos, 1980).
47. For detailed accounts o f Hess, consult Edmund Silberner, Moses Hess—
Geschichte seines Lebens (Leiden: Brill, 1966); Auguste Cornu, Moses Hess et la
gauche hégélienne (Pans: Alcan, 1931); Shlomo N a ’aman, Emanzipation und
Messianismus: Leben und Werk des Moses Hess (Frankfurt: Campus, 1982); Z v i
Rosen, “ Der Einfluss von Moses Hess auf die Frühschriften von Karl M arx,"
lahrifuch des Instituts für deutsche Geschichte, ed. W. Grab (Tel-Aviv: T el-A viv
University, 1979), 8: 143-74. English works include Avineri’s book cited in
note 46 and essays or book chapters by Isaiah Berlin, “ The Life and Opinions

(¡97)
 NOTES TO PAGES 6 8 - 7 4

o fM o s e s H ess,” repr. in Against the Current (N e w Y o rk: V ik in g , 1980), Sidney

H o o k (repr. in From Hegel to Marx [A nn A rb o r, U n iv e rsity o f M ich iga n Press,
1962)), and G eo rg Lukács (repr. as “ M oses Hess and the P ro blem o f Idealist
D ialectics,” Telos 10 [ 1971 ]: 3-34), am o n g others. O n Hess and Spinoza sec
M ich el Espagne, “ Lc Spinozism e de M oses H ess,” in Spinoza entre Lumiere et
Romantisme, Les Cahiers de Fontenay, 1985, pp. 143-55.
48. G . D . C o le , A History o f Social Thought (London: M acm illan , 1955), 1:
240.
49. O n this I concur w ith A vin eri. H ow ever, A vin eri (Moses Hess, p. 44)
sees in the socialist synthesis “ a n ew synthesis o fju d a is m and C h ristian ity"
w hereas I m aintain that it transcends both Judaism and C h ristian ity and m oves
tow ard a n e w secular universe w h ich negates all historical religion s yet pre­
serves and elevates their vision o f redem ption to a universal level. Still, the
universal vision had itself issued from a Jew ish nucleus.
50. “ K o m m un istisch es Bekenntnis in Fragen und A n tw o rte n ” §6, in Rhein­
ische Jahrbücher zur gesellschaftlichen Reform (Constanz, 1846), pp. i66ff.
51. R ecently discovered by M ichel Espagne in the archives o f the A m ste r­
dam International Institute for Social H istory. See his “ Lc Sp in ozism e de
M oses H ess” (cited in note 47), pp. 146-47.
52. Som etim es Hess uses far-reaching term s, as in stating that the future all-
G erm an state cannot but be religious, because religion has so deeply pene­
trated the bloo d o f the G erm an nation w hich this state is ab out to express “ as
its m ost authentic and free creation” (Die Europäische Triarchie, in H ess, Ph i­
losophische und sozialistische Schriften, 1837-1850, p. 144). Espagne points out
that even w ith respect to the French im perial state H ess sh ow ed m anifest
w eaknesses (Espagne, p. 152).
53. Silberner, Moses Hess, p. 443.
54. Feuerbach began by defending H egel against a bo o k by C . F. von B ach -
m ann entitled Antihegel (see L u d w ig Feuerbach, Kleine Schriften [Frankfurt:
S u h rkam p, 1966], pp. 14-77); and K arl L ö w ith , Front Hegel to Nietzsche (N e w
Y o rk: D ou bled ay, 1967), p. 70 and note 64. O n Feuerbach generally, sec M arx
W. W artofsky, Feuerbach (Cam bridge: C a m b rid ge U n ive rsity Press, 1977); and
E u gen e K am e nk a, The Philosophy o f Ludwig Feuerbach (London: R o u tled ge and
K ega n Paul, 1970).
55. Starting in 1839 w ith an article, “ O n the criticism o f H egelian P h iloso ­
p h y ,” and fo llo w in g up in O n Theses Toward a Reform in Philosophy, Principles
o f the Philosophy o f the Future, and Essence o f Christianity.
56. In a fragm en t on Spinoza published in 1978 by W. Schuffenhaucr, “ A u t
deus aut n atura,” in Archivio di Filosofia: Lo Spinozismo ieri e oggi (Padova,
1978); repr. in Cahiers Spinoza, tr. J.-P. O sier (4 [1982-1983]: 205-10). A s it
turns ou t, Feuerbach adapts Spinoza’s parallelism to his sensualist principle: a
given truth can be either expressed as thought or as a sensual, extended picture.
B o th are identical and the latter, in its sensibility, captures the w h o le content
o f the conceptual thought; it is a full, syn o nym o u s translation o f it. T h is re­
v o k e s the K an tian idea o f schem atism , but also H eg el’s b elie f that conceptual
and im agin ative th o u gh t d iffer in form but not in content, w ith the form er

(198)
 N OTE S TO PAGES 7 4 - 7 8

being higher than the latter. Feuerbach reverses this order and, it seems, attrib­
utes this theory to Spinoza himself.
57. The Essence of Christianity, tr. George Eliot (New York: Harper Torch-
books, 1957), pp. 12-13.
58. Ibid., p. 197.
59. Die Phänomenologie des Geistes, ed. J. Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Meiner,
1952), esp. pp. 158-62. Without mentioning Judaism by name, the analysis
here fits the account o fju d aism by the young Hegel. See Hegels theologische
Jugendschriften, cd. H. Nohl (Tübingen: Mohr [Siebeck], 1907) and elsewhere;
and the m ore mature but fundamentally similar analysis ofjudaism as a reli­
gion o f sublim ity in H egel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. 1have dealt
w ith this topic in “ Hegels B eg riff der Religion und die Religion der Erhaben­
heit,” Theologie und Philosophie 51 (1976): 512-37 (partly reprinted in Hegel et
la Religion, ed. G. Planty-Bonjour [Paris: PUF, 1982J, pp. 151-75).
60. See m y essay on H egel’s concept o f the religion o f sublimity, mentioned
in note 59.
61. Essence o f Christianity, pp. 532-35.
62. Ibid., p. 231.
63. Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft, par. 53, in Werke 2: 315fr; Eng.
tr.: Principles o f the Philosophy of the Future (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966),
p. 69.
64. Even though this is an odd theory, I was not persuaded by Wartofsky’s
attempt to construe it as naive realism and a direct sequel to French eighteenth-
century materialism. W artofsky is led by this interpretation to dismiss as
m erely “ careless” or confused the attempt Feuerbach makes to say something
less ordinary and indeed original— i f certainly incoherent. The theory (of the
senses) Feuerbach suggests is a kind o f inverted Hegelianism, or rather a “ He­
gelianism o f the senses” : actual reality (Wiklichkeit) is attained by sense percep­
tion rather than reason, but in such a way that the subject side o f perception is
united w ith its object side (just as was the case with reason in Hegel). Or,
com paring this theory with Kant: the subject’s perception is necessary (though
not sufficient) for the object to be actual, but (1) this is a sensual rather than
intellectual perception; and (2) it gives us the thing itself and not a mere phe­
nomenon. This peculiar epistemology, despite its flaws, distinguishes Feuer­
bach’s intent from naive realism and the French materialists as well as from
idealism o f Kant and Hegel.
65. I say “ rather Hegelian,” because sensibility to Feuerbach is both subject
and object, both the sensing activity and its corporeal counterpart.
66. From this standpoint, I cannot agree with M arx’s statement in his fa­
mous Second Thesis on Feuerbach, that Feuerbach lacked the principle o f sub­
jectivity. He lacked it only in the practical sense used by M arx, that o f human­
ity shaping its world (and itself) through work.

C hapter 4

1. Maximilien Rubel, “ M arx a la rencontre de Spinoza,” Cahiers Spinoza 1

(1977): 14. For M arx’s Spinoza excerpts and the slight departures from the

(‘99)
 NOTES TO PAGES 7 9 - 8 3

o rigin al, see A lexan d re M atheron, “ Le Traité Théologico-Politique v u par le

jeu n e M a rx ,” Cahiers Spinoza 1 (1977): 159-212.
2. “ T o w ard s the C ritiq u e o f H egel’s P h iloso ph y o f Law [sc. R igh t): Intro­
d u ctio n ,” in Writings o f the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society, tr. and ed.
L o y d D . Easton and K u rt H . G ud d at (N e w Y o rk: D o u bled ay, 1967), p. 249
(henceforth: “ T o w ard s the C ritiq u e ” ).
3. T h e severance o f man from nature under eco n o m ic alienation is itself
partly real— but as a historical, not a fundam ental, state. T h e “ false reflection
o f reality” is here in part a true reflection o f false (alienated) reality.
4. R ubel, “ M a rx à la rencontre de Sp inoza,” p. 14; see also his “ M a rx à
l’école de Sp in oza,” in Proceedings o f the First Italian International Congress on
Spinoza, ed. E. G iancotti (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1985), pp. 381-400. C f. Rainer
B ielin g in his doctoral dissertation, “ Spinoza im U rteil von M a rx und E n g e ls,”
P h .D . diss. (Berlin, 1979). A lth o u g h B ieling, in a curious and unw arranted
way, dism isses R u bel’s w o rk as “ quantité n égligeable,” he takes m ore or less
the sam e stance. H is m ain top ic is the ju d g m e n t passed by M a rx and Engels
on Spinoza at different tim es and not so m uch the und erlyin g presence o f Spi­
n oza's ideas in M a rx ’s th ough t. B ielin g ’s conclusion— that S p in o za’s im age
varies as a function o f M a rx ’s attitude tow ard H egel (and Feuerbach)— m ay be
true con cern in g Feuerbach, but is not co n vin cin g w ith regard to M a rx. For, if
w e fo llo w a them atic analysis (as attem pted in this chapter), w e w ill see h o w
Sp in oza underlies the texture o f M a rx ’s th ough t, w h atever his express ju d g ­
m ent o f Spinoza.
5. N eith er M a rx nor Spinoza takes this to be mere propaganda, th ough , as
w e shall see, the m anipulative elem ent is stronger in Spinoza. M a rx, in trans­
fo rm in g the “ m ultitud e” into the “ proletariat,” postulates that its co n sciou s­
ness is essentially the same as that o f the philosopher, and ad m ittin g o n ly sim ­
pler expression, not inferior content. A t the sam e tim e, he subjects the
p hilosoph er, to o , to the constraints and lim itations o f his historical situation,
thus ach ievin g an essential par betw een “ p hilosopher” and “ m ultitu d e” and
fu sin g them together in the form o f the action and class-consciousness o f the
organ ized proletariat.
6. “ T o w a rd s the C ritiq u e ,” in Writings o f the Young Marx, p. 249.
7. Ibid ., p. 259.
8. Ibid ., o pen in g sentence.
9. M a rx has even been credited w ith the enthusiastic pun that henceforth,
“ there is no other road to truth and freedom except that leading th rough the
stream o f fire (Feuer-Bach)” (lately quoted in Easton and G uddat, Writings o f the
Young M arx, p. 95). B u t it has been show n that actually Feuerbach h im self was
the o rig in a to r o f the pun. See Hans M artin Sass, “ Feuerbach statt M a r x ,” In­
ternational Review o f Social History 12(1964): 118.
10. In the H oly Family (London, 1957), p. 186, M a rx lists Spinoza, D e s­
cartes, and others as a gro up o f “ seventeenth-century m etaphysicians,” a term
he uses in the negative sense (but also dialectically; at the tim e he could not do

(200)
 N OT E S TO PAGE 8 4

otherwise). French materialism is seen in this text as a higher stage, correcting

this m etaphysical bias.
11. This thesis criticizes previous materialism, including Feuerbach’s, for
being m erely cognitive and not practical. Marx defines this as a lack o f “ sub­
je ctiv e ” approach, and sees praxis as the proper subjectivation o f reality. Ide­
alism was in this sense superior to inert, perceptual materialism, for (in Kant
and Hegel) it stressed the activity proper to the subject yet still conceived o f
this subjectivation as cognitive and therefore abstract. The true subjectivation
o f reality is practical; this is M arx’s own practical, or “ materialist,” version o f
the Copernican revolution referred to above.
I should add that the primacy o f praxis in Marx, both in the social and the
ontological sense, is the first and foremost meaning o f “ materialism.” On this
general issue, see also S. Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx
(Cam bridge: Cam bridge University Press, 1970), chap. 3; and N. Roten-
streich’s analysis o f M arx’s theses on Feuerbach (Basic Problems of Marx’s Phi­
losophy (Indianapolis: Bobbs-M errill, 1965J). Avineri misrepresents Hegel’s
o n tology, which he reads through Marx's allegations while accepting M arx’s
chargcs and characterizations o f Hegel at face value; but J fuJly concur with the
thesis o f this chapter, namely, that “ the pre-eminence in M arx’s discussion o f
econom ic activity does not derive from the pre-eminence o f material economic
values, but from M arx’s view o f man as homo faber" (p. 77). Rotenstreich,
w hile criticizing M arx’s placing homofaber over homo sapiens (p. 46), recognizes
the prim acy o f praxis as the crucial materialist issue in Marx, and states that
“ M a rx ’s concept o f practice is parallel to Hegel’s concept o f Spirit and was
developed to replace it” (p. 41)— a correct observation that also underscores
M a rx ’s Spinozistic departure from Hegel. Since I had the opportunity ofread-
ing these two works in earlier Hebrew versions, let me add still another— not
yet translated from the Hebrew— which I found inspiring: Meshulam Groll,
“ M arx's A nthropology,” in his Selected Writings (Hebrew), ed. M. Brinker, 2
vols. (Tel A viv: Tel A viv University, 1969), 2: 9-78.
12. A systematic reconstruction is based upon the texts not as sources for
quotation, but as a basis for construing an argument or a train o f thought; it
aims at tracing the inner logic and commitments o fa philosophical position
even when they are not spelled out explicitly; and at rimes it may even overrule
an explicit thrust o f their implications. Such a reconstruction must be made
from a certain systematic point o f view; and it must draw a line between fun­
damental incongruities which must be brought to light, and minor ones which
may be overlooked. In this chapter, m y point o f view is that o f the problem o f
a philosophy o f immanence without inherent teleology, which underlies this
part o f the book.
13. E .g., “ the worker can create nothing without nature, without the sen­
suous external world. The latter is the material in which our labor is realized”
(Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, “ Alienated Labor,” in Marx's Early
IVritings, ed. T. B. Bottomore [N ew York: M cGraw Hill, 1964], p. 123). Or:
“ Man has not created matter itself. And he cannot even create any productive

(2 0 1 )
 NOTES TO PAGES 8 5 - 8 8

capacity i f the m atter does not exist beforehand" (Holy Family, p. 65). In the
fo rm er (and similar) texts M a rx speaks o f “ in organ ic" nature as the given sub­
strate o f w o rk , using the term inorganic in an o n to lo gical rather than biological
or chem ical sense. It is the raw s tu ff o f nature upon w h ich the hum an izing
activity exercises itself. (See also A . Sch m id t’s rephrasing o f M a rx ’s concept
o f nature in The Concept 0/Nature in Marx [London: N .L .B ., 1 9 7 1 1, pp. 63-
64.) T h e idea o f an "interchange” between nature and m an in this raw or “ in­
organ ic” sense is constant in M arx, go in g from the Manuscripts to the Capital,
w here it is som etim es reform ulated as “ the m etabolism betw een m an and na­
ture” — equivalent to “ hum an life itse lf” (Capital, tr. B en F o w kes [Penguin,
1976], 1: 133. A lso: “ Labour is first o f all a process betw een m an and nature;
in this process m an, through his o w n actions, regulates and controls the m e­
tabolism between h im self and nature" (ibid., p. 283).
14. A s in his rem ark in German Ideology that raw nature exists n o w h ere “ e x ­
cept perhaps on a few Australian islands” ( o f ¡he Young Marx, p. 418).
Ironically, M arx does n ot notice that in calling these islands “ A ustralian ” he
already puts them in a hum an con text and underm ines his o w n statem ent.
F rom another angle, this v iew is reinforced by the claim that the senses them ­
selves are historically determ ined. L ivin g after the era o f the great discoveries
in astronom y, geography, and the like, and prior to o ur o w n space era, M arx,
his th in kin g im m ersed in social and historical m atters, seem s to have been in­
sensitive to the cosm os as such, w hich he observed o n ly th rough the prism o f
culture and history, and o f natural science as a historical entity. W hile K an t had
experienced “ the starry heavens above m e” and “ the m oral law w ith in m e” as
tw o independent dom ains, o f equal infinity and sublim ity, M a rx fro m the o u t­
set v ie w s the form er through the latter. T h e cosm os is seen th rough its role in
hum an affairs, as a m om ent o f history and praxis and the object studied by the
natural sciences, w h ich are hum an-historical products them selves.
15. T h e am biguity gave place, on the one hand, to the crude m aterialism o f
E n gels and the Soviet physicalism , and on the other hand to the analyses o f the
en soi, the pratico-inerie (Sartre), or the distinction betw een vorhanden and zu-
handen (H eidegger).
16. Even natural science, the m edium by w h ich such “ ra w ” nature can be
addressed is a historical phenom enon and thus the product o f the practical re­
lation o f m an-in-nature, falling w ithin its context.
17. Manuscripts, “ Private Property and C o m m u n ism ,” in Early Huntings, 165.
18. Manuscripts, “ C ritiq u e o f H egel’s D ialectic,” in Early Writings, p. 207. In
Spinoza, o f course, this rule applies o n ly to particular things, whereas the to­
tality— G o d — has its nature (or essence) w ithin itself and still is natural (it is
nature itself).
19. I f so, then the contem porary M arxist philosopher, Karel K o sik , n ot­
w ith stan din g (see Dialektik des Konkreten [Frankfurt a. M . : Suhrkam p, 1971],
pp. 34-35), Spinoza serves as prim e m odel for M arxist philosop h y not in his
origin al u n ity o f natura naturans and natura naturata, but in m aking the latter the
n e w causa sui (see also n. 21).

<202)
 N OTE S TO PACES 8 9 - 9 1

20. T h e concept o f “ production” provides the categorical link between the

"econom ic” and the “ philosophical” aspects o f Marx's deliberation in the Man­
uscripts and elsewhere. This is a systematic structure that is retained through­
out. In the Capital it is called “ the metabolism [Stojfwechsel] between nature
and m an” (see note 13 above). And in the Grundrisse for the Capital, Marx
speaks explicitly o f production and reproduction as changing the producers
themselves along with the objective conditions.
21. This is approached from a different angle by Kosik. He sees Spinoza’s
unity o f natura naturans and natura naturata as the prime model o f “ concrete
totality,” which is primary to materialistic (Marxist) philosophy and consti­
tutes its answer to the question. What is actuality? That this concrete totality
has fundamental economic categories is M arx’s innovation, his contribution
to on to lo gy no less than to social analysis. Kosik himself explicitly speaks o f
econom ic categories as “ forms o f being” and “existential determinations” o f
the subject, and o f their complete set as providing an analysis o f “ social being”
(Dialektik des Konkreten, pp. i84ff.). But, we may add, since social being is
mediated in M arx by the relations o f persons to things and encompasses all
modes o f approaching being in general, the economic categories have even
more fundamental ontological significance. For another way oflinking M arx’s
on tology to his concept o f activity (and work), consult Guy Haarscher. L ’on-
tologie de Marx (Ed. de’Universite de Bruxelles, 1980).
22. T h e mature M arx may have gone beyond this ethics to a less teleological
standpoint— perhaps the single most important shift between his so-called
“ tw o periods.” See Myriam Bienenstock, “ On the Problem o f Abstraction in
Capital" (Hebrew) Iyyun 30 (1981): 75-91.
23. This mode o f production must not be viewed simply as reproduction o f
the physical existence o f individuals. Rather, it is a definite form o f activity, a
definite form o f expressing their lives.
24. O n the other hand, this was lost on many Soviet Spinoza scholars. Spi­
noza, as George Kline tells us, was a favorite with Russian Marxists: “ Spinoza
has received more attention from Soviet writers than any other pre-Marxian
philosopher with the possible exception o f H egel” (Spinoza in Soviet Philoso­
phy [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952], p. 1). Even before the revo­
lution, Plechanov, a founding father o f Russian Marxism and o f the Russian
Social-Democratic party, took to Spinoza, considering that M arxism itself was
a variety o f Spinozism, or, a Spinozism stripped o f its theological attire. See
also A . M. Deborin, who quotes Plechanov on this point in his essay in Kline’s
collection, and also his contribution, “ Spinozismus und Marxism us,” in
Chronicon Spinozannm 5 (1927), where he further quotes Plechanov (p. 153),
and declares that “ Marxism, the leading revolutionary doctrine o f the present,
which is materialistic through and through, stems in its philosophical world­
view from Spinozism” (p. 152). Deborin founded a whole school around this
notion, and one o f his colleagues even called Spinoza "M arx without a beard”
(Spinoza in Soviet Philosophy, p. 15). Stalin later denounced this school— an
ultima ratio in Soviet intellectual life— and it declined. (nofe continued)

( 2 03 )
 NOTES TO PAGES 9 2 - 9 6

T h a t D ebo rin (like M arx and Spinoza him self) was o f Jew ish o rigin (his
form er nam e was lofe), is a m inor, th ough n ot an irrelevant, fact. We have
seen h o w assim ilated Jew s in search o f a universal hum an m essage have used
Spinoza as a vehicle for th ough t. B u t even am o n g the non-Jew ish So viet phi­
losophers, their attitude to Spinoza was, indeed, id eological appropriation
rather than balanced scholarship. For this reason, neither their em brace nor
Stalin’s rebuke can serve our analytic purposes here. T h e y did indicate som e
im portan t particular points, but their vu d'ensemble is usually unacceptably
biased— not o n ly w ith respect to Spinoza but also w ith respect to M a rx him ­
self. T h eir M a rx is a rigid o n tological realist, w o rk ed o ut by E n gels and shrunk
by Plechanov to an official doctrine o f “ historical m aterialism ,, 111 the m ost
rigid id eological sense; and their Spinoza is an atheist and a “ m aterialist” in a
one-sided sense. T h e y fail to realize the spiritual significance o f S p in o za’s iden­
tity o f th ough t and extension, and v ie w the d ivin ity o f the n ature-G o d as spu­
rious and the personal salvation perspective in Spinoza as irrelevant. O n e may
think this a better philosop h y than Sp in oza’s— but it certainly is v ery different
from his.
25. O f course it is n ot the actual product w h ich the w o rk er in capitalist so ­
ciety m akes that should have enhanced his or her su bjectivity— not the bo lt he
o r she screw s or the electronic chip he o r she w elds. T h is p rod uct is already
affected or determ ined by the current “ alienated” system , its d ivision o f labor,
m od e o f production, and distribution. Th erefore, the “ p roduct that opposes
and dehum anizes its creator” has to be understood in M a rx in term s o f the
system it creates and underlies (i.e., capitalism); whereas the liberating m od e o f
p rod u ctio n m ust equally involve a new system o f prod uction and distribution
(for M a rx , com m unism ).
26. T h e so-called “ reflective ju d g m en t” o f purpose that K ant devised for the
field o f k n o w led ge (in the Critique o f Judgment) has no bearing 011 reality— not
even in its new , C opernican sense. It is not an object-shapin g category.
W hen stu d yin g certain types o f phenom ena, such as liv in g organism s or em ­
pirical history, this principle calls for using the form o f purpose as a pure m eth ­
o d ologica l device, necessary from the standpoint o f all rational investigators
but unable to determ ine the ontic features o f the object as a real entity in na­
ture. T h u s by K a n t’s ow n construal the cognitive form o f purpose is in su ffi­
cient and neither reaches nor affects the actual texture o f reality.
27. I have dealt w ith these questions in Kant and the Philosophy o f History
(Princeton: Princeton U n iversity Press, 1980), esp. chaps. 3 and 4.
28. I say “ m eta-eco n om ic,” for I mean the anthropological and on to lo gical
sign ifican ce o f material production w hich underlies M a rx ’s concept o f eco­
n om ics.
29. M a rx h im se lf used the term practical materialism to distinguish his v iew s
fro m Feuerbach’s (see The German Ideology, in Writings o f the Young Marx, p.
416). E n gels and Lenin— and m ost o f the Soviet M arxists— blurred the issue
b y ascribing to M a rx an ontological realism (or m aterialism ) he never asserted.
M a n y other scholars, since Lukács and even before him , righ tly contested this

(204)
 N OTE S TO PAGES 9 6 - 9 9

view. Recent analyses can be found in Schmidt (The Concept of Nature in Marx)
and in KJinc (Spinoza in Soviet Philosophy). Kline calls M arx’s materialism
“ econ om ic,” but I prefer M arx’s own term (practical materialism) because it
hints at the broader context o f economics.
30. Th e constitution o f this substrate includes, o f course, the social relations
between humans, which both mediate and are mediated by the man-nature
relation. But this dimension, important in itself, need not be spelled out in the
present discussion, which centers on the origin o f teleology and the natural-
in-itsclf.
31. Alienation is central in M arx’s work throughout; in his mature years he
renounces the word, but not the issue.
32. A Frenchman w h o M arx frequently visited described him, with some
sim plification but also w ith some justice, as “ the powerful investigator who
had applied Spinoza’s method to social science.” More importantly, Marx
him self struggled with Spinoza’s method, writing to Lassale (May 31, 1858),
that the inner structure o f Spinoza’s system was quite different from its overt
and conscious exposition— and M arx later makes the same remark about his
ow n Capital, in an afterword to the second edition o f 1873. M. Rubel, who
quotes these tw o facts, concludes that “ the wish to make o f his ‘Economics’ a
w ork comparable to a construction tnoregeometrico was certainly not foreign to
the author o f the Capital” (“ M arx á la rencontre de Spinoza,” p. 25). But,
perhaps, what M arx sought was not the same method but another, as strictly
scientific but better suited to its subject matter.
33. Allen Wood claimed that M arx’s critical analysis o f capitalism was not
motivated by concepts o f justice but by a scientific approach. (The American
M arx debate is echoed in Marx, Justice and Histoty, a Philosophy and Public
A ffairs Reader [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980], where Wood’s
original essay is republished.) As I sec it, both motivations are equally present
in M arx, who offers in the Capital “ a science o f redemption” and inevitably
ends with providential teleology.
34. This, o f course, is both following H egel’s method and dem ystifying it,
as M arx claims he does. See Joseph J. O ’Malley, “ M arx, Marxism and
M ethod,” in Varieties of Marxism, ed. S. Avineri (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977),
pp. 7-42. Whether Marx can consistently hold to both is another question.
But, interestingly, in both ways he opposed Spinoza: in opting for dialectics
instead o f deduction, and in criticizing H egel’s “ m ystified” dialectics because
it deifies the rational totality. The latter move had already been taken by Spi­
noza, albeit without historical teleology. M arx’s dialectics opposes both Spi­
noza and Hegel in that it cannot allow for any divine connotations; to be con­
sistent, it must be construed as a dialectic o f pure finitude (or o f the natura
naturata taken as the whole totality). In this sense, Sartre’s attempts in the Cri-
tique of Dialectical Reason were, at least programmatically, a consistent offshoot
o f M arx’s dialectic o f finitude, in its opposition to both the deductive and the
dialectical explications o f the absolute offered by Spinoza and Hegel, respec­
tively.

( 205)
 NOTES TO PAGES IO O - I O I

35. Spinoza confirm s this alm ost literally in a letter (no. 78) to O ld en b u rg ,
and the conclusion fo llo w s from the lo gic o f his theory. T h ere are various
attem pts to resolve this problem ; but m y aim here is n ot to discuss it in itself,
but to trace a structural sim ilarity w ith M arx.
36. See his Critique de la Raison Dialectique, w here this becam e a m ajor prob­
lem in the philosophy o f history. See also the epilogue to vol. 1 and m y articles:
“ Existentialism and H istorical D ialectic,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Re­
search 39 (1979): 480-97; “ D ialectic W ithout M ed ia tio n ,” in Varieties o f Marx­
ism, ed. S. A vin eri, pp. 175-94.
37. I concur here w ith Schm idt (review ing E. B lo c h ’s M arxian analyses in
Das Prinzip Hojjiiung)·, see his Concept o f Nature m Marx, pp. 127-28. Karel
K o sik (Dialektik des Konkreten, pp. 189-90) dism isses those w h o sec in the Cap­
ital a “ m essianic” or “ H egelian izing” drive as “ b o u rgeo is” and “ refo rm ist,”
m eaning, probably, all four terms as derogatory, but o fferin g little m ore than
verbal confusion to support his objections.
38. T h is paradox m ay well affect M a rx ’s very m aterialism , i f the essence o f
the latter consists, as Balibar suggests, in a critique o f m ys tify in g im ages and
speculative ideologies, rather than in som e substantive p h ilo so p h y o f history
(Etienne Balibar, “ La vacillation de l’ideologie dans le M arxism e, Part 1 ,” in
Raison Présente 66 [1983]. 1 quote fro m a m im eograph o f the m anuscript, p.
8.) Balibar, a distinguished proponent (since Lire Marx, in w h ich he collab o­
rated w ith Louis Althusser) o f the so-called “ structuralist” reading o f M arx,
adds in the present essay that elim inating speculation (the prim e m eaning o f
m aterialism , according to him ), signifies “ releasing h isto ry fro m the h old o f
te le o lo g y ” (soustraire l'histoire à l ’emprise de la téléologie) both “ from its religious
fo rm s” (Providence, the notion o f the m eaning o f h istory, origin s and final
ends), and from its philosophical forms: the periodization in accordance w ith
the m anifestation o f the principle o f the “ Progress o f H um anity. . . . In short,
any identification o f a subject o f h isto ry” (ibid., pp. 7-8). T h is M a rxist cri­
tique, says Balibar, also denounces m aking man, “ a universal abstraction ,” into
the illu sory subject o f the historical process. H ow ever, upon m y reading,
M arx did not free h im self o f a teleological illusion. I f so, then his o w n m ate­
rialistic critique should apply to the residual deep structure o f M a rx him self.
M arx had chased G od from being but, to paraphrase N ietzsch e’s language, he
did not o verco m e the shadows o f the dead G o d . O r, in term s o f this bo o k —
M a rx did not g o back from H egel to Spinoza’s objective naturalism , free o f
an y teleological patterns— as Balibar and the disciples o f A lthusser w o u ld per­
haps have him do.
Specifically, I agree w ith Balibar that in M arx there is no universal “ subject
o f h isto ry,” as in H egel’s idealism; nor is there utopia in the Kantian sense o f
the hum an m oral w ill im posing itself upon an alien nature. M a rx, as I have
stressed all along, is Spinozistic in seeking all historical changes w ith in the
inner forces and pregnancy o f im m anent reality. B u t this leads him to expcct,
o r presuppose, that reality in and o f itself w ill lead to a state w here the deepest
aspirations o f hum an ity and its true need (alleviation o f alienation and resto­

(206)
 N OT E S TO PAGES IO I-IO 7

ration o f hum anity) will be fulfilled. The problem, or the paradox, arises in
M a rx ’s broader sense o f Spinozism: his combining a vision o f universal liber­
ation w ith the inner natural laws o f reality. The teleology lies in the presup­
posed harm ony between the tw o realms, and is closer in type to that o f Leib­
niz's harm ony or K an t’s postulate o f “ G od ” (i.e., to what Nietzsche criticized
as a “ moral w orld-order” ) than to Hegel. In a word, it is a natural harmony
w ithout a direct subject o f history. But in this sense it is a momentous depar­
ture from Spinozism . (I concede that the old Marx became more sober and
som ew hat pessimistic; his predictions were less strong and high-flown, but
this is perhaps a personal more than a systematic fact.)
39. Its main danger is the total politicization o f values. There can be no nor­
m ative authority other than the state by which to judge the deeds o f the state.
In his (still Hobbesian) concern to avoid a “ realm within a realm,” Spinoza did
not provide a higher ethical viewpoint from which to judge the polity. The
rational philosopher can advise, but can set no real norms.
40. Recall the story o f Spinoza advising his good landlady to go to church
as planned: he respected her in her very stage o f imaginatio.
41. A t the other extreme, the multitude cannot be completely brainwashed
according to Spinoza, and this provides a natural barrier to the possibility o f
totalitarianism. As Balibar put it (“ Spinoza: la crainte des masses” in Proceed-
tugs o f the First Italian International Congress on Spinoza, ed. £. Giancotti [Na­
ples: Bibliopolis, 1985], pp. 293-320), “ Spinoza is the anti-Orwell." Whether
this is realism or the naivete o f the pre-Enlightenment is another question.

C hapter 5

1. See W illiam S. Wurzer, “ Nietzsche und Spinoza” (doctoral dissertation,

U niversity o f Freiburg, 1974), p. 84. This study seems to contain all the quo­
tations in Nietzsche where Spinoza is mentioned or alluded to, as well as many
helpful insights. Wurzer reports having failed to find a precedent to amor fati
in all the philosophical handbooks and encyclopedias he perused.
2. N ietzsche mentions “ Heraclitus, Empedocles, Spinoza, Goethe” (Ge-
sammelte Werke [Munich: Musarion, 1920-1929], 23 vols., 14: 109); “ Plato,
Pascal, Spinoza, and Goethe” (21: 98); in Human, AU-Too-Human, §408 he
mentions three pairs as follows: “ Epicurus and Montaigne, Goethe and Spi­
noza, Plato and Rousseau.”
3. Twilight of the Idols, “ Skirmishes o f an Untim ely Man," 49, in The Portable
Nietzsche, ed. Walter Kaufmann (N ew York: Viking, 1965). In all refs, to
N ietzsche’s works, numbers refer to sections, not pages.
4. Postcard to Franz Overbeck from Sils Maria, July 30, 1881; I used Kauf­
mann ’s translation (Portable Nietzsche, p. 92) but rendered Einsamkeit as “ soli­
tude” (not "lonesomeness”) and the pun Zweisamkeit as “ dualitude” (not “ two-
someness” ).
5. I render this term according to its philosophical meaning, not its literal
translation, which is, o f course, "gay science.”
6. In Spinoza, the alleged eternity o f the soul, discussed in the last part o f

(207)
 NOTES TO PAGES I I O -I I 8

his Ethics (5) is impersonal; it is the eternal idea o f m y s e lf in the “ infinite intel­
lect” w hich exists w ith o u t the body. T h e m in d -bod y parallelism is not broken
but the problem is shifted to another duality, that o f etern ity and duration.
7. T h ey w ere collected and analyzed by W urzer (see note 1 above).
8. The Will to Power 688, tr. W alter Kaufm ann and R. J. H ollin gd alc (N ew
Y ork: V ik in g , 196$).
9. Beyond Good and Evil 13, in Basic Writings o f Nietzsche, tr. and ed. Walter
K aufm ann (N e w Y ork: Random H ouse, 1968).
10. Gay Science 349 (N e w Y ork: Random H ouse, 1974).
11. For exam ple, in Ethics, pt. 3, prop. 13, Spinoza shifts from the original
conatus to the concept o f “ the pow er o f a ctivity” o f the b o d y and/or the m ind.
12. In the preface to Ethics 4, Spinoza rejects the usual concept o f perfection
and im perfection, then gives them a new use: greater perfection means that the
pow er o f activity has increased (meaning self-originating activity o r freedom ).
T h is is independent o f duration; one cannot say that a thing is m ore perfect
because it has persisted longer in existence. H ence, the go al o f increasing the
pow er o f activity o f the individual is dissociated from self-preservation and
linked d irectly to freedom .
13. T h is contrast remains significant even if w e choose to read N ietzsch e ’s
w ords m etaphorically rather than literally. Such a reading is invited because
the crude physicalistic translation o f w ill to pow er runs into grave difficulties,
not the least o f w hich results from N ietzsch e’s ow n critique o f the concepts o f
“ m atter,” “ bo d y,” and “ quantifiable space” as "fiction s.”
14. Will to Power 636. Th is corresponds ro ugh ly to w h a t non-C artesian phi­
losophers (such as Locke and his followers) called “ im penetrability," nam ely,
the ontic quality that constitutes materiality. (In Spinoza and D escartes, exten ­
sion alone is sufficient for this purpose, but Spinoza, in the physical side o f the
conatus, im plies a form o f im penetrability as well.)
15. K arl Jaspers, “ M an as H is O w n C reato r,” reprinted in Nietzsche, A C o l­
lection o f Essays, ed. R. C . Solom on (N otre Dam e: U n ive rsity o f N o tre D am e
Press, 1980), p. 153. Recall also N ietzsch e’s com m ent on Goethe: “ he created
h im self.”
16. Gay Science 333.
17. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror o f Nature (Princeton: Princeton
U n iversity Press, 1980). T h e “ m irror” in this case is the o bjective order and
connection o f ideas, w hich Spinoza also calls (m etaphorically) “ the infinite in­
tellect o f G o d ,” nam ely, all the true ideas w ith their true connections. T h is set
exists in itself in nature, as part o f the attribute o f th ough t that docs n ot depend
upon o u r actual subjective thinking. H ence nature, so to speak, has its ow n
“ m irro r” w ith in it; the “ m irro r” is its inner self-reflection.
18. Gay Science 108.
19. N eith er in the realist sense, nor in the Kantian sense o f a necessary uni­
versal structure o f self-consciousness.
20. Gay Science 110. B y “ appearance,” N ietzsche seems to mean the scien­
tific picture o f a phenom enon, not its bare sensual face. Scientific “ explana­

(2 0 8 )
 N O T E S T O P A G E S I I 8 —I 2 4

tions” arc phenomenal, but taken to express some “ true being” o f what they
stand for.
21. Gay Science n o .
22. Will to Power 512. B y “ logic” we should understand beside formal logic
also rationalist thinking in general which uses it as a basis.
23. Will to Power 511.
24. Twilight of the Idols, “ The Four Great Errors,” 3.
25. Gay Science 127.
26. Ibid. 112.
27. Will to Power 488.
28. That immanence is Nietzsche’s main theme and the meaning o f his claim
that “ G od is dead” was recognized by Heidegger. God, says Heidegger, stands
for the supersensible world in general, which since Plato (or more precisely,
his late Greek and Christian interpreters) has been “ considered the true and
genuinely real w orld” in contrast to the sensible and changeable world down
here, which therefore is unreal. “ The world down here is the vale o f tears in
contrast to the mountain o f everlasting bliss in the beyond.” Therefore, Hei­
degger concludes, Nietzsche’s word that God is dead means the denial o f this
transcendent world, the “ supersensible world is without effective power.”
Transcendencc is negated; immanence is all there is. (M. Heidegger,
“ Nictzsches Wort: ‘Gott ist T o t,1 " in Holzwege (Frankfurt a. M.: Kloster-
mann, 1963], p. 200; English tr. “ The Word o f Nietzsche: ‘God is Dead,’ ” in
The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (New York: Harper &
Row, 1977], p. 61). Heidegger, incidentally, comes close to Heine at this point
(see chap. 3).
29. Will to Power 1067.
30. Ibid. 1066, 796.
31. This suggests, as Schacht holds (see Nietzsche [London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1983], that Nietzsche does recognize causation, but objects to the
duality o f cause and effect as separate items. The world process is a continuum
and a totality, where both simultaneously and consecutively innumerable fea­
tures take shape and flow into each other; it is flux in the ancient sense o f Her­
aclitus, or rather Cratylus, where one cannot enter the same river even once,
yet the river flows on.
32. For a detailed study o f Nietzsche from this perspective, see Alexander
Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1985).
33. Nietzsche would agree with Cratylus, who radicalized Heraclitus in say­
ing that one cannot enter the same river even once, since flux undermines selt-
identity and there is no such thing as the same river. But even Cratylus did not
deny— as Nietzsche does— the eternal logical order o f the universe which the
flux constitutes and reproduces.
34. I share Schacht’s view that eternal recurrence appears primarily as a test
for the Dionysian life; only later did Nietzsche also try to see “ whether it
might as well be true” (Schacht, Nietzsche, p. 260). This attempt powerfully

(209)
 NOTES TO PAGES I 2 5- I 3 2

tem pted N ietzsche but is overridden w ith problem s, both w ith in the theory
proper and in its status as m etaphysical “ truth.” O n this last issue it ties in w ith
the general problem o f truth 1 sketched above. B u t even as a perspectival
h ypothesis it has its problem s o f coherence, both w ith in the rest o f science and
concerning its postulates. H o w can identical states recur i f there is nothing
identical in the w orld? T h is in itself should have underm ined all efforts by
N ietzsche to canonize his existential fable o f recurrence into a sem iscientific
theory. Fortunately, how ever, the existential and ethical function (and m ean­
ing) o f this fable does not depend on its being also a full-fledged co sm ological
theory; hence I m ay ign ore this question w hen tryin g to use eternal recurrence
to explicate the experience o f im m anence in amor fati. B . M agn u s calls it a
“ co u n term yth ” (Nietzsche’s Existential Imperative [Indiana U .P ., 1978], chap. 6).
35. I am using M agn u s’s slight corrections.
36. B u t N ietzsch e is less naive than the yo u n g Heine. N ietzsch ean m an is no
stranger to suffering and the tem ptation o f pessim ism and there is a Sisyphean
elem ent in the fable o f eternal recurrence.
37. “ D u ratio n ” is Spinoza’s term for the tem poral process as a real m ode o f
being, before its continuity is broken by lim its and m easurem ents. T h e latter
is called tempus and is considered unreal, a mere (though necessary) “ auxiliary
o f the im agination .”
38. H egel, incidentally, unites them both in the sam e telos. T h e go al o f his­
torical progress in H egel is the suprahistorical (or eternalistic) standpoint
w h ich is to em erge from it. A fter this occurs, there w ill be a kind o f eternal
recurrence o f the sam e in H egel’s w orld too— nam ely, the sam e rational and
tim eless principle m aintaining itself as actualized th rough out the em pirical va­
rieties in tim e. T im e w ill again lose its qualitative nature; there w ill be o n ly
ch ron ological tim e, but not a strictly historical one.
39. Will to Power 1059, 1060.
40. O n e can, how ever, argue w hether this overco m in g o f C h ristian ity is
essential to the D ion ysian posture or o nly a necessary historical condition; but
N ietzsch e w rites for his contem poraries. Even i f the future Übermensch w ill
celebrate im m anence im m ediately, Zarathustra can o n ly do so as an o verco m ­
in g o f C hristianity.
41. Will to Power 1038, 1037, 1038.
42. Ibid. 1062.
43. Ibid. 1038.
44. Perhaps there is som e doubtful room for a kind o f left-N ietzschean ism
as tried in A m erica since the 1960s, to w hich N ietzsche h im self w o u ld alm ost
certainly have objected. For another objection, see A llan B lo o m , The Closing
o f the American Mind (N e w Y ork: Sim on and Schuster, 1987), pp. 225-26.
45. Thus Spoke Zarathustra, “ O n T h e N e w Id ol” (Portable Nietzsche, p. 160).
46. Twilight o f the Idols, “ W hat the Germ ans L ack ,” pp. 1, 4.
47. O n this and related issues, see also Z v i Rosen, “ Friedrich N ietzsches
politisch e W elt,” Jahrbuch des Instituts Jur Deutsche Geschichte 14 (1985): 221;

(210)
 N O T E S TO PAGES I 3 3“ I 45

Raym ond Polin, “ Nictzsche und der Staat,” in Hans Steffen (ed.), Nietzsche,
Wet’k und Wirkung (Gottingen, 1974).
48. Genealogy of Morals 3, in Basic Writings, p. 543.
49. Gay Science 349.
50. Beyond Good and Evil 25.

C hapter 6

1. See chapter 5.
2. From “ T he Resistance to Psycho-Analysis,” in S. Freud, Standard Edition
tr. from the German under the general editorship ofjam es Strachey in collab­
oration with Anna Freud (London: Hogarth, 1953) 19: 222; see also “ An Au­
tobiographical Study,” 1, Standard Edition 20: 9.
3. From "N e w Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis,” Lecture 32,
Standard Edition 22: 107; emphasis added.
4. O n Freud’s problematic relation to philosophy, see P.-L. Assoun, Freud,
La Philosophie et les Philosophes (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1976).
5. Letter to Lothar Bickel o f June 28, 1931; English translation in H. Z.
Winnik, “ A Long-Lost and Recently Recovered Letter o f Freud,” Israel Annals
of Psychiatry 13 (1975): 1-5. Original German (with facsimile) recently repro­
duced in Spinoza in newer Sicht, ed. Leo Sonntag and Heinz Stoltc (Meisen-
heim: Anton Hain, 1977). PP· 169-71 ·
6. From a letter to S. Hessing, in S. Hessing (ed.), Spinoza-Festschrift (Hei­
delberg: Karl Winter, 1932), p. 221; see also Hessing’s paper, “ Freud’s Relation
with Spinoza,” in his Speculum Spinozatwtn 1677-1977 (London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1977), pp. 224-39. See also J. Golomb, “ Freud’s Spinoza: A Re­
construction,” Israel Annals of Psychiatry 16 (1978): 275-88.
7. His Unglaubensgenossen, a pun used by Heine with reference to Spinoza,
and quoted by Freud ("The Future o f an Illusion,” 9, Standard Edition 21: 50)
w ho therebyjoins them both.
8. “ Leonardo,” 1, Standard Edition 11: 73.
9. Ibid., 11: 75-76.
10. Ibid., 11: 74.
11. I mean “ science” as the metatheory o f psychoanalysis (or other natural
sciences). Freud saw his theory as a Naturwissenschaft, not as particular knowl­
edge gained by the individual about himself or herself through psychoanalytic
hermeneutics.
12. See chapter 5.
13. Freud’s idiom is in part hermeneutical and in part semimechanistic; the
latter, roughly speaking, obtains in his description o f mental processes in gen­
eral, and the former in the investigation o f individual case histories. But the
ambivalence o f the two affected psychoanalysis for a long time and marred its
scientific standing. For a recent discussion o f this ambivalence, see Carlo
Strenger, Between Hermeneutics and Science (New York: International U niver­
sities Press, in press).
14. Sartre, Les Mots (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), pp. 210-11.

(211)
 NOTES TO PAGES I 4 6 -1 5 I

15. Stuart Ham pshire, in his stim ulating discussion lin king libido and cona­
tus, has not, however, taken som e o f the m ajor differences into considération.
See his Spinoza (Penguin, 1962), pp. 141-44. O n som e other differences see
Véron ique M . Foti, “ T h o u gh t, A ffect, D rive and Pathogenesis in Spinoza and
Freud,” History o f European Ideas 3 (1982): 221-36.
16. “ N e w Introductory Lectures,” Lecture 32, Standard Edition 22: 94.
17. Ibid., pp. 102-3. See also “ Instincts and T h eir V icissitud es,” Standard
Edition 14: I24ff., w here the definition o f the cgo-instincts as “ self-preservative
instincts” and their distinction from and rivalry w ith the sexual instincts are
restated.
18. T h is does not contradict m y previous statem ent, that libido is presup­
posed by all affective phenom ena; yet it is not their unique presupposition. Sex­
ual instincts are active in opposing the ego-instincts from w h ich they are to be
distinguished; but as such they still are psych olo gically ubiquitous.
19. T h is has similarities w ith N ietzsch e’s account o f the origin s o f con ­
science, guilt, and interiorized m oral norms.
20. In his fam ous letter to Einstein, Freud calls this “ a theoretical clarifica­
tion o f the universally fam iliar opposition between Love and H ate” (“ W h y
W ar,” Standard Edition 22: 209).
21. For a clear restatem ent o f this dualism (including its definition) in “ Ego
and Id,” see Standard Edition 19: 40-41.
22. Ethics, pt. 3, prop. 6 dem . and pt. 3, prop. 4, respectively. C f. the exact
opposite in Freud; “ E verythin g livin g dies for internal reasons . . . the aim o f
all life is death” (“ B eyon d the Pleasure Principle,” Standard Edition 18: 36).
23. Ethics, pt. 4, prop. 68.
24. See “ N e w Introductory Lectures,” Lecture 31, Standard Edition 22: 73 -
74; on Schopenhauer’s role as a link between Spinoza and Freud— and also
betw een N ietzsch e and Spinoza— m any interesting com m ents can be made
(e.g., that Schopenhauer, as another “ irrationalist,” attem pts to com bine Spi­
noza and Kant, understanding the Ding an sich in term s o f an irrational, im ­
m anent m onism ).
25. H am pshire, Spinoza, p. 141.
26. Even on the fundam ental level, a pertinent difference w ill be noted later:
conatus, n ot libido, is ultim ately a striving for infinity, or salvation.
27. T h is account o f the third kind o f know led ge is not the standard one, but
includes m y o w n interpretation. I have elaborated it in vol. 1, chap. 6.
28. Preface to Ethics, pt. 3.
29. “ O n the H isto ry o f the Psycho-A nalytical M o v em en t,” Standard Edition
14: 16.
30. “ A u to bio grap h ical Study,” Standard Edition 20: 30.
31. Ibid.
32. “ O n the H isto ry o f the P sycho-A nalytical M o v em en t,” Standard Edition
14: 16; “ A u to bio grap h ical Study,” Standard Edition 20: 27-30. See also note 33.
33. “ In tro d u ctory Lectures on P sych o -A n a lysis,” Lecture 28, Standard Edi­
tion 16: 450. “ H ypn o sis had screened from v ie w an interplay o f forces w hich

(212)
 N O T E S TO PAGES I 5 2—I 5 7

now came in sight and the understanding o f which gave a solid foundation to
m y theory” (“ Autobiographical Study,” Standard Edition 20: 29).
34. “ Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis,” Lecture 28, Standard Edi­
tion 16: 454.
35. Spinoza seems to attribute some degree o f mental life to any individual
in nature, even w ithout attaching consciousness to it.
36. C f , e .g ., “ U nconscious,” or “ Ego and Id.”
37. “ N e w Introductory Lectures,” Lecture 31, Standard Edition 22: 80.
38. Eternity in Spinoza is the mode o f existence specific to things whose
existence follow s from their essence o f definition, as a timeless truth. Thus
defined, eternity has no relation to time or duration, not even to endless du­
ration (Ethics, pt. 1, def. 8). As for duration, it is the other mode o f existence,
the one pertaining to finite things whose existence does not follow from their
cssence but from external causes. Tim e is distinguished from duration; it is the
external device by which duration is quantified and measured. Tim e is thereby,
according to Spinoza, only an “ auxiliary o f the imagination” ; in providing
relative and comparative values, it renders no specific knowledge o f a real en­
tity. D uration (the object which time measures), however, is considered real
by Spinoza; it is the mode o f being specific to finite things, whose essence does
not entail existence.
39. Herein lies a crucial difference between Spinoza and the Aristotelian tra­
dition (by which he is certainly inspired): the cognitive act by which my mind
is identified w ith a universal kind o f logos is an act o f sef/^-knowledge, not the
know ledge o f God or the universe as such. In Aristotle wc attain this stage by
know ledge o f an object, here by knowledge o f ourselves. In Aristotle God has
self-intellection (God knows himself eternally); in Spinoza only man does.
This is an important modern feature o f Spinoza's doctrine.
40. A n interesting return to the metaphysical tradition occurs in Sartre.
Sartre combines Freud and Spinoza. He, too, defines man as desire— the meta­
physical desire to become a causa sui, which is impossible and therefore
doom ed to failure; and even the “ libidinal” and other concretely erotic mani­
festations o f life, on which Sartre, following Freud, insists in great detail in
his existential psychoanalysis, is fundamentally a metaphysical desire to over­
com e our contingent existence. While the substance o f Sartre’s analysis is
heavily influenced by Freud, the fundamental structure o f desire is Spinozistic,
only the salvation is in principle impossible and man is therefore by nature
doom ed to metaphysical frustration.
41. Though this topic falls outside our present concern, I may venture a
speculation based upon Spinoza's “ complementarity,, principle, which may be
o f some assistance to Freud. Spinoza saw the study o f the body and the study
o f the mind as two parallel approaches to describe a single entity, using differ­
ent language and methods which cannot be mixed or reduced to each other
without committing a fallacy, but which have the same ontological reference.
Similarly— with certain adjustments— a Freudian might say that mental phe­
nomena are to be investigated on three different levels, each subject to a differ­

(2 1 3 )
 NOTES TO PAGES I 5 8 —I 6 I

ent m ethodological paradigm : (1) biophysical analysis o fth c som atic substrate;
(2) analysis o f the corresponding “ psychic e n e rg y ” and its structural vicissi­
tudes; (3) analysis o f m eaning-relations and the w o rk o f interpretation that
constitute and m ove che same mental system . Sp in o za’s b o d y-m in d parallel­
ism is here adapted and expanded into a b o d y-m in d -m ca n in g parallelism based
on three com plem entary approaches to the sam e ontic system — nam ely, the
integral organism .
If this speculation holds for Freud (even in part), then w e have found another
link to Spinoza, this time on che level o f ep istcm ology. B u t the actual sim ilar­
ity resides in the integral v iew o f man as a p sych osom atic system ; the m eth­
odological rapprochement o n ly fo llo w s from here.
42. O n this see P. Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy (N e w Haven: Y ale U n ive r­
sity Press, 1970), p. 474.
43. Ibid. R icoeur even sees “ a rem arkable structural h o m o lo g y ’’ betw een the
patient-analyst situation and H egel’s dialectic o f m aster and slave. C f. also Jean
H ypp o lite, “ Ph énom énologie de H egel et la Psychan alyse,” in La Psychanalyse
3 ( 1957): I 7ff-
44. “ N e w Introductory Lectures,” Lecture 31, Standard Edition 22: 75, 76 -
77-
45. Paul R icoeur has tried to ascribe a “ subject” to Freud, but he does so,
adm ittedly, as part o f his ow n philosophy, w hich is im bued w ith H u sserl’s
p h en o m en ology and accepts the I think, I am as prim ary. R icoeur, how ever,
points o u t “ the absence in Freudianism o f any radical question ing about the
existential and thinking subject” (Freud and Philosophy, p. 420) and goes on to
illustrate the im possibility o f locating the subject in any o f the m ental struc­
tures and typ ologies offered by the literal theory o f Freud (p. 421). R ico e u r’s
o w n “ arch aeology o f the subject” avow edly puts F reud’s ideas “ in a different
philosophical d im ension” (p. 422).
46. “ Spinoza et Freud: La problém atique du savoir dans ses rapports avec
rén te n d u ," in Spinoza, science et religion, ed. R. B ouveresse, A ctes du C o l­
loque, C erisy-la-Salle, 1982 (Paris: V rin, 1988), pp. 77-8 7; see also “ Le fini,
l’autre et le savoir chez Spinoza et Freud,” Cahiers Spinoza 1 (1977): 2 6 7 -3 19·
47. “ E g o and Id,” Standard Edition 19: 26.
48. Freud seems to have in m ind a literal meaning o f “ surface” and “ d ep th ” :
the surface o f the body, the parts spatially closer to the environm ent, serve the
function o f the ego m ore specifically than the hidden and protected parts. A t
the sam e tim e, Freud insists that the ego-id-superego distinction is n ot rigid,
fo r their lim its m erge in various degrees (“ N e w Introductory Lectures,” end
o f Lecture 31, Standard Edition 22: 79).
49. “ Future o f an Illusion,” Standard Edition 21: 53-54, and note 1. A b o u t the
private in form ation I learned from P.-L. Assoun.
50. R icoeur, Freud and Philosophy, p. 262.
51. H erb ert M arcuse, in Eros and Civilization (N e w Y o rk: V in ta ge B o o k s,
J955)> P· 16 identifies ananke w ith the struggle for existence and econ o m ic
scarcity (Lebensnot); but this is a M arxian bias far from faithful to the concept.

(21 4 )
 N O T E S T O P A G E S I 6 I —I 6 6

52. R icocur (Freud and Philosophy, p. 328) suggests that it may have elements
o f both.
53. B y the second kind o f knowledge, wc perceive things from the stand­
point o f necessity and acquire in ethics the foundations for new and correct
understanding. B ut this kind o f knowledge is still general and abstract; there­
fore, its em otional resonance cannot supply sufficient power to overcome the
affects and provoke an overall transformation o f the person. One o f the results
is the notorious gap, o f which moralists have always complained, between
understanding and m otivation: what we know to be better for us we arc unable
to realize in fact. Th is gap is typical o f the level o f mere ratio, or abstract ra­
tional understanding in Spinoza.
54. “ B ey o n d the Pleasure Principle,” Standard Edition rS; 45.
55. “ Future o f an Illusion,” Standard Edition 21: 56. For Freud’s defense of
scientific objectivism and his attack on “ anarchist” epistemology, see "New
Introductory Lectures,” Lecture 35, Standard Edition 22: 175-76; also the end
o f “ Future o f an Illusion,” where scicnce is, by implication, deified as part of
the feeble G o d , logos. (“ O u r God Λ όγος is perhaps not a very almighty one’’
but, by it, “ it is im possible for scientific work to gain some knowledge o f the
reality o f the w orld by means o f which we can increase our power and in ac­
cordance w ith w hich we can arrange our life.’’)
56. See P.-L. Assoun, Freud, la Philosophic et les Philosophes (Paris: Presses
U niversitaires de France, 1976), pp. 99-105.
57. “ N e w Introductory Lectures," Lecture 35, Standard Edition 22: 168; also
“ Future o f an Illusion,” Standard Edition 21: 43, 53-55.
58. “ Future o f an Illusion,” Standard Edition 21: 53—55-
59. W ould Freud suggest that a collective form o f transference is needed
here, spun about the figure o fa new spiritual leader, an antireligious prophet,
a m odern M oses, Jesus, Spinoza or Freud? Is that one o f the reasons why psy­
choanalysis, ostensibly a science, was also called a movement (Bewegung), and
organized like one, w ith dissenters seen as heretics?
60. It is indeed in the “ Leonardo" that ananke makes its first appearance in
Freud. Sec “ Leonardo,” Standard Edition 11: 124-25.
61. See, e .g ., “ Autobiographical Study,” Standard Edition 20: 51-53.
62. O n Freud’s Jewish affiliation see Ernst Simon, “ Sigmund Freud the
Jew ,” Are We Still Jews (Hebrew) (Tel-Aviv: Sifriat Poalim, 1982), pp. 173-
213; see also “ Freud und M oses," in his Entscheidung zum Judentuni (Frankfurt
a. M . . Suhrkam p, 1980), pp. 196-211. See also the concluding chapter in Peter
G a y ’s biograph y o f Freud: Freud, A Life for Our Times (New York-London:
N o rto n , 1988).
63. For Freud’s statements mentioned in this paragraph, see Peter Gay’s
chapter cited in note 62; and also his A Godless Jew: Freud, Atheism, and the
Making o f Psychoanalysis (N ew Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).
64. O n Freud’s hesitation to publish Moses and Monotheism while the Nazis
reigned, see Standard Edition 23: 55-56. See also Marthe Robert, From Oedipus
to Moses (N e w Y ork: Anchor, 1976).

(215)
 NOTES TO PACES I 6 8 —I 8 1

C h apter 7

1. Th is cosm ic and m oral order is pictured as h avin g been planted in the

w orld as specific events in time; hence the K in g is also C rea to r, L a w giver, and
the M aker o f a covenant. (Creation in the B ible is not ex nihilo, but o rd er from
disorder, cosm os from chaos.)
2. U n d er another interpretation (how ever hard to sustain), b y the recurring
patterns o f “ eternal return” ; but (as explained in chap. 5), eternal return as an
objective cosm ological truth is incom patible w ith the rest o f N ietzsch e’s teach­
ing. T h e idea should be accepted as he intended it at first— as a D ion ysian
m yth , sym b o lizin g the “ burden” and inescapability o fim m a n e n ce.
3. I refrain, however, from W ittgenstein’s term the mystical, because it su g­
gests filling the void w ith arbitrary m ystical experiences, cults, and the like,
m uch against W ittgenstein’s ow n intention. In W ittgenstein there is so m e­
thing “ about w h ic h ” (woriiber) one keeps silent, th ough it can be given no pos­
itive being o r content. B e y o n d the paradoxes o f discourse, W ittgenstein
tended to think o f this as a kind o f thing in itself. So did K an t and Sch op en ­
hauer; but Kant had no valid claim to his view . C ritically, he could n ot affirm
the existence o f “ things in them selves.”
4 . Here I refer to a horizon w hich (unlike transcendence) can in p rinciple be
filled w ith positive content but never be com pleted.
5. I use the w o rd deficient as a façon de parler only; actually, Spinoza was right
in claim in g that nothing can be m issing in a w orld for w h ich no transcendent
paradigm exists. O n the other hand, i f w e adm it even an em p ty horizon o f
transcendence, and see the causa sui as on to lo gically im possible yet inevitable
as an ideal, then w e do attribute som e sh ortcom ing to this w o rld even w h ile
refusing to adm it another w orld beyond it.
6. O f course, the transcendental elem ent is said to inhere in m an him self,
w h o is seen as autonom ous and the founder o f his o w n m oral w o rld . B u t the
actual agent is n ot the “ em pirical” man enm eshed in nature and h isto ry bu t his
“ n o u m en al” w ill, w hich Kant conceives as a transcendent pow er fo reign to
nature and em pirical history and projecting itself against them as an O u g h t.
7. G rasp in g the im m anent w orld as related to som e form o f hum an experi­
ence is indeed a critical requirem ent. T o this extent idealism (in a v e ry general
sense) is related to an im m anent approach. B ut w hatever m an ’s role in this
relation, he can fulfill it o n ly as a finite being, not as a substitute G o d . K a n t’s
critical revolution should apply not only to the “ thing in itse lf” but also to the
o th er great d o gm a o f rationalism as w ell, that o f reason as a unique, im m utable
system . Y et for K ant this was unthinkable; indeed, it was to save the b e lie f in
an im m u tab le truth that Kant sacrificed (and thus happily overcam e) the other
rationalist d o gm a about the thing in itself.
8. M a rx secs this, though he im prisons this idea w ith in a rigid concept o f
m aterial p rod uction . In chapter 4, w hen analyzing M a rx ’s tacit o n to lo g y in
term s o f “ m an -in -nature,” I tried to extract a broader structure from under­
neath the n arrow M arxian doctrine. T h is structure recurs in a different form
in H e id e g g e r’s concept o f “ b ein g-in -th e-w o rld ” ; both o w e som eth in g to

(216)
 N O T E TO PAGE I 8 3

Feuerbach and, especially, translate Kant’s Copernican revolution into onto­

logical (and practical) terms.
9. In an alyzin g M a rx I attribute to him a kind o f “ practical idealism," a ma­
terial variety o f the Copernican revolution. This may indicate the way in which
idealism sh ould be transformed: making the human role in being inner-
worldly, practical, and carried out by the preconscious process of life itself.
And, like life itself, this process also has a historical dimension: no interpreta­
tion or life-fo rm w h ich em bodies it is produced by a single individual or iso­
lated Cartesian ego cogito, nor does it emerge ex nihilo. In this sense humans
and their histories are ontologically related to whatever shape and meaning the
im m anent w o rld has.
 índex

absolute, the, 35 -3 8 , 4 1, 42, 44, 48, 60, autonomy, 23, 172, 186; of reason, B, 26
[91; h isto riciza tio n o f, 42 Avineri, S., 197-98, 201
“absolute k n o w le d g e ,” 28
absolutism , relig io u s, 178 Bachmann, C. F. von, 198

acosm ism , 33 Balibar, E., 206-7

affect, 157 Ben-Gurion, David, 73

alienation, 80, 9 1 -9 3 , 9 6 -9 7, 200; theory Berkeley, 89

Berlin, Isaiah, 197
o f, 113
Bible, 9-12, 14, 16-25, 62, 167-69,189-
alienness, 93, 97
90, 197; science of, 18
allegory, 22
biblical criticism, 3, 9, 17, 19, 25, 26; her­
A lliso n , H e n ry, 187
meneutics, 3-26, 92; and natural sci­
Althu sser, L ., 206
ence, 17
amor dei, 12, 104, 108, n o , 113 , 126-27,
biblical exegesis, practical and scholarly
129, 135, 14 1, 158, 16 1, 186
interests in, 26
amorfati, 106, 108, 113 , 122, 124, 125,
B ickel, Lothar, 139
12 7-2 9 , 13 5 -3 6 , 145, 16 1, 207, 210
Bieling, Rainer, 200
am o ralism , 68
Bienenstock, Myriam, 203
ananke (n ecessity), 136, 145, 16 0 -6 3 ,2 1 4 -
Biser, Eugen, 195
15 Bismarck, 131
an th ro p o lo g y , 75 , 84, 89
Bloch, Ernst, 206
a n th ro p o m o rp h ism , 44, 45, 48, 49, 97.
B lo o m , Allan, 210
102, 1 1 7 , 122; o n to lo g ic a l, 94
B olshevik theory, 68
an ti-S em itism , 131
Brentano, Franz, 13B
arche, 79
Breuer, Josef, 151
A ris to tle, 29, 4 1 , 42, 188, 213
Buddha, 117
articles o f faith , 118
asceticism , 11 4 , 116 Cabbalists, 169
askesis, 142 C am us, Albert, 145
A sso u n , P .- L ., 2 1 1 , 2 1 4 - 1 5 Castaing, Jose, 187
atheism , 33, 62, 6 4, 128, 134, 145, 164, catharsis, 151
165, 188 Catholicism , 24
attributes, 3 7-3 8 causa sui, 38-39, 67, 79, 87-88, 98, u s ,
Aujltehung, 3 1, 39, 40, 48, 94, 196 122-23, 171, [73, 175- 77, 202,213,
Aufklarung, 60, 64 216

(219)
 INDEX

D ra p e r, H a l, 195
causality, 119 -2 0 , 122, 1 7 0 - 7 1
D r e s c h , J o se p h , 196
causality, natural, 81, 181
d u a l la n g u a g e , ix , x , 8, 11
causation (m echanical), 122, 209
“ d u a litu d e ," 10 4 -8 , 132, 207
C h ristian du alism , 7
d u ra tio n (duratio), 48, n o , 15 5 -5 6 , 19 3-
C h ristian ity, 3, 4· U . 44. 4<5, 52 , 6 0 -6 1 ,
94, 208, 2 io , 2 13
66, 69, 75, 128, 167, 198. 210; “ N e w
d u ty , 8, 113
C h ristian ity," 53
church, in v isib le and v isib le , 15
e c o n o m ic th e o ry , 59; a n a ly sis, 98
C isn ero s, C a rd in a l, 19
ed u c a tio n , 4 1 - 4 2
clear and d istin ct ideas, 4—6, 2 7
e g o , 39. t 52- 53. 1 5 9 -6 0
“ clim ate o f id eas,” xi
e g o - in s t in c t s , 146
C o le , G . D ., 198
E in ste in , x i
co m m u n ism , 63, 6 7 -6 9 , 103, 204
e m a n c ip a tio n , 1 3 7 - 6 6 , 1 73—74. 184-85
conatus, 48, 110—14, 126, 13 1, 133» ! 45-
e m o t io n s , 1 16, 149
47. 15 5 -5 6 , 175. 19 3-9 4. 212; conatus
E n g e ls . 6 7 , 200, 202, 204
intelligendi, 156
E n lig h t e n m e n t, 1 1 , 26, 57, 6 4 -6 5 , 99,
“ C o n c e p t," the, 30. 39
136. 144, 1 5 2 - 5 3 . 162
consent, n o tio n o f, 129
e p is t e m o lo g y , 35
Contest o f the Faculties, 20, 190
e q u iv o c a t io n , ix , x , 108—9
contract, n o tio n o f, 129-30
e ro s, 1 4 0 -4 1 , 146, 156
C o p ern ica n rev o lu tio n , 7, 40, 7^ - 77. 9^.
e s c h a to lo g y , x i
181, 2 0 i, 217; m aterialist, 95; practical
e s o tc r ic is m , 108
and m aterial, 84
E s p a g n e , M ., 198
C o rn u , A ., 197
e tern a l r e c u rre n c e , 12 4
corpus christi, 46
e te rn ity , 15 5 , 208, 2 13 ; e t e m ity - w ith in -
corpus dei, 46
d u ra tio n , 156
C o u sin , V icto r, 53, 19 5-96
e th ic a l c o m m u n it y , 1 5 - 1 6
C ra tyfu s, 209
Ethics, 3 - 4 . 13. 2 7, 37. 45. 6 1, 6 9-70 , n o ,
C rescas, 169
n 6 , 149 , 15 5 , 16 4, 208, 2 1 2 -1 3
criticism . See biblical criticism
e th ic s , im m a n e n t, 114
Critique o f Judgment (K an t), 74
e x is te n c e in se a n d p er se, 3 3
critique o f relig io n , 3, 11, 27, 5 1, 52, 74,
78 -79. 82, 143 F a c k e n h e im , E ., 1 9 1 -9 2
culture, 89, 146, 162, 1 7 1 , 183; critiq u e fa sc ism , 1 3 1 - 3 2
o f, 153; the e n e m y o f, 132 fatum (fate), 10 7 , 16 1
F e u e rb a c h , 5 1 - 7 7 , 7 9 -8 0 , 82, 85, 88, 90,
D a rw in , 109, 136 1 1 2 , 19 8 - 2 0 1 , 2 1 7
D eb o rin , A . M ., 203-4 F ic h te , x , x ii, 30, 64
deism , 57, 59 fin itu d e , 88, 1 5 5 -5 6 , 1 7 2 - 7 6 , 178, 180,
D escartes, x, 4 -5 , 25, 86, 150, 170, 184, 183, 186, 205
187, 189 F isch er, K u n o , 105
determ inism , 10 0 -10 1, 143, 156, 1 7 1 - 7 2 , F ó ti, V . M ., 2 12
184; natura], 142; p sy ch o lo g ica l, 127 fre e d o m ( m e ta p h y s ic a l) , 9 9 -10 2
deus sive natura, 46, 79 , 128 fre e d o m o f th e w ill, 105
deviation, principle o f, 185 fre e w ill, 4
dialectical lo g ic, 28, 40, 44 -4 5 , 94, 170, F re u d , x i, x ii, 6, 4 7 , 102, 109, 135, 13 7 -
*94 66, 1 7 1 , 17 6 , 2 1 3 - 1 5
D io n ysian truth, 133-34 F r o m m , E m il, 188
D io n ysu s, D io n y s ia n , 10 4 -6 , 1 1 4 - 1 5 ,
12 1, 124, 126, 128, 1 3 1 , 132, 2 0 9 -10 , G a y , P ., 2 15
216 G e b h a r d t, C . , 9, 187

(220)
 INDEX

Ceist (spirit), 5 1, 60, 75, 7 8 -7 9 , 8 i, 84, human mind, 7-8, 22

68, 96 humanism, 76, 102, 164
geom étrica! m e th o d , 34 humanist philology, /8-19
G od, xii, 6 - 7 , 12, 2 1 , 24, 42, 53-54 , 58, humanized nature, xii, 52, 79
60, 62-63 , 74, 9 2 -9 3 , 9 9 -10 0 , 103, Hume, x, 119, 180
106-7, n 3, 11 5 . 1 1 7 , 122, 126, 128-29, H uygens, C ., 25
143-44, 148 -4 9 , 163, 16 7-6 8 , 173-74 , hypnosis, 151
178- 79» 18 8-89, *92- 95. 202, 206-7, H yppolite.J., 214
209, 2 13. 2 16 ; th e dead G o d , 56, 117;
the G o d -m a n , 43, 47, G o d o f the phi­ id, [50, 152-53, 160
lo sophers, 59; im m a n e n t, 2 7-50 , 7o; idea: dear and distinct, 4-6, 27; moral, 96
the J ew ish G o d , 54, 16 7-6 8 ; nature- idea ideae (reflective idea), 191
G o d , 87, 104, 1 2 2 -2 3 , * 37. *44. *4®. idea vera (true idea), 5—6, 27, 48
204 idealism, 30, 40, 42, 7 6 -77 ,88, ¡$8, r6j,
G oethe, x , x i, 58, 63, 10 4 -5 , 135 199, 201, 206, 217; German, jo, 64, 96
G olo m b, J ., 211 imaginatio (imagination) for Hegel: “ex­
G rinin), J a c o b and W ilh e lm , 195 ternal reflection/' 10, 12, 14,22,32-33,
G roll, M ., 201 36, 41, 148, 155, 189, 193, 207
G u t t m a n n , 9, 287 imitation o f reason, 14-15
immanence, ix, x, xi, xii, 3, 6, 27,50, $4,
Haarscher, G ., 203 6 7. 76. 79, 86-87, 106-7, 110-11, 117,
H am pshire, S ., 14 7 , 2 12 120-30, 134, 167-68, 170-7}, /7J, /78,
harm ony, p ree stab lish e d , 93, 100 183-86, 209-10, 216; antinaturalisric,
Harris, E rro l, 194 169; realm of, 95
H egel, x , x ii, 6 - 7 , 23, 2 7 -5 0 , 60, 80, 82, immanent being (entity), 86, 112; reason,
84, 87, 9 2 -9 6 , 100, 126, 158, 17 1, 173, 3; revolution, xi, 171; totality, 31;
175—76, 18 3-8 5 , )9 0 -9 9 , 201, 206, 210, w orld, 122, 126, 130. 171-72, 175, 179,

214 181-83, 186, 216-17

H egelians, y o u n g , 5 1, 64-65 imperatives, 15
H eidegger, M ., 109, 11 2 , 136, 175, 183, in-itself, the naruraJ, 85, 88, 94-96
202, 209, 2 16 Inquisition, 70, 102

51-77, 82, 109,

Heine, H ., x, x ii, 7 - 8 , interest: moral, 21; rational, 26

135- 37, 163, 165, 195- 97, 210 interpretation, 17. 174, 178, 182. See also

Heine, S ., 53 biblical criticism; hermeneutics

ls/O ught dualism, 6
H ellenism , 63
H eraclitus, 123, 12 5 , 209
Jacobi, F. H., 63-64
heretics, x ii, 136, 163, 186
Jaspers, K ., 115, 208
herm eneutics, 156, 2 1 1 . See also biblical
Jews, 9, 24, 60, 72, 169; nonreligious, 166
criticism ; in terp re ta tio n
Jones, Ernest, 164
Herzl, T ., 73 jo y , 106, 186
Hess, M ., 51-77, *3 7 . 16 3 , 197-98 Judaism, 3-4, 13, 24, 44, 66, 165, 167-69,
H essing, S ., 2 11 192, 197-99; ancient, 66-67; second
hexis (A risto te lia n ), 14
temple, 168-69
historia sacra (sacred h is to ry ), 25, 44, 48,
66, 68 Kamcnka, E., 198
history, x i, 23, 40, 42, 4 6 -4 7 , 50, 65, 8 i, Kant, x, 3-26
88, 94, 170, 18 4 -8 5 , 19 1, 206 kingdom o f ends, 98
history, natu ral (historia naturalis), arid kingdom o f grace, 93
"b ib lical h is to r y ,” 18 kingdom o f nature, 93
History o f Philosophy (H e g e l), 3 1, 35 Klausner, Joseph, 73
H obbes, 99, 109, 1 3 0 -3 1 , 136 Kline, G ., 203. 205

(22 l)
 INDEX

k n o w l e d g e , 28, 4 1 . 106, 10 9 , 1 1 6 , 1 4 0 - 7 3 - 1 0 3 , 10 9 , 12 6 , 1 3 6 - 3 7 , 1 7 1 , 17 3 ,
4 1 , 1 4 8 -4 9 , 15 5 , 179, 18 1 , 18 3, 193- 94. 1 7 6 , 1 8 3 -8 5 , 1 9 9 - 2 0 7 , 2 1 6 - 1 7
2 1 1 , 2 13 ; s e c o n d k in d o f, 148 , 1 6 1 , 2 1 5 ; M a r x is m , 5 4 , 203
th ir d k in d o f, 12 , 4 5 , 47i 1 0 1 , 1 4 1 . M 4» m a s k , ix , 10 8 -9

147. 15 6 . * 57. 161 m a s s e s . S e e m u lt it u d e

K o s ik , K a r l, 2 0 2 -3 , 206 m a t e r ia lis m , 7 6 , 90, 9 5 —9 6 , 2 0 1 - 2 , 204,
206; e c o n o m ic , 9 9; m e t a p h y s ic a l, 64;
La P e y r e r e , Isa ac, 68 o n t o l o g ic a l , 96; p r a c tic a l, 96, 2 0 4 -5 ;
L a ssa le , F., 6 3, 68, 7 2 , 205 s p ir itu a l, 76
la w s , n a tu ra l, 99; m e c h a n is tic , 94 M a t h e r o n , A . , 200
la w s o f s o c ie t y , 99 m a tte r, 52, 60, 6 2 , 6 7 , 7 4 , 79
L e fe b v r e , J e a n -P ie r r e , 6 5, 19 7 M a z z in i, G u is e p p e , 72
le ft - H e g e lia n s , 5 0 -5 3 , 65, 6 7 , 69, 7 4 -7 8 , m e a n s o f p r o d u c t io n , 90, 96
80, 82, 9 1 , 9 7 , 99 M e n d e ls s o h n , M o s e s , 9, 6 3 , 19 7
le g a lit y , 15 —16 m e s s ia n is m , s e c u la r, 103, 185
L e ib n iz , 59, 93, 100, 15 2 , 170 , 180, 207 m e t a p h y s ic s , 2 9 -3 0 , 7 5 , 94, 164
L e n in , 68 m e t h o d , 3 4 - 3 5 , 48; f o r m a l- d e d u c t iv e ,
L e o n a r d o , 13 9 -4 0 , 15 7 , 163 34-3 5
L e s s in g , x , 3, 63 M i c h a e l is ,J. D . , 20, 190
lib e r a tio n , 6 5, 92, 97. 99» * 42” 44. * 5° . m o d e s , 37—39
15 3 . 16 5, 18 5 -8 6 ; t h e o r y o f, 100 ntoira, 161
libido, 1 4 5 - 4 7 , 15 5 , 2 12 M o lie r e , 183
life -a c tiv ity , 91 m o n is m , 29, 44, 49, 1 1 0 - 1 2 , 130 , 147,
lo g i c , 1 1 8 - 1 9 , 122, 209; d ia le ctic a l, 40, * 74- 75! e c o n o m ic , 89
44- 45. 94. 17° . *94; O b j e c t iv e L o g ic , M ö n k e , W ., 19 7
2 9 -3 0 , 32, 3 8 -4 0 , 19 1; S u b je c tiv e m o n o t h e is m , 44
45» 48
L o g ic , 2 9 -3 0 , 19 [; trin ita ria n , m o r a l id e a , th e, 94; a c tio n , 2 1 ; in te re st ( o f
Logic ( H e g e l) , 29, 3 1 - 3 2 . 35. 38, 43 re a so n ), 2 1; o b lig a t io n (d u ty ) , 1 1 3 ; p h i­
l o g o s , 16 0 -6 2 lo s o p h y , 20; t e le o lo g y , 8; w ill, 9
lo v e o f G o d , in te lle ctu a l, 148, 15 7 m o r a lit y , 7 - 8 , 15—16 , 20, 24, 1 1 3 , 129,
L o w it h , K ., 192, 198 1 3 1 , 1 7 6 - 7 7 , 190; h u m a n is tic , 8; p e r­
L u c re tiu s, 8 -9 , 187 so n a l, 6 1 ; p o litic a l, 7 1 ; sla v e , 132, 134
L u k á c s, G ., 198, 204 M o r e a u , P. F ., 1 8 - 1 9 , 189
m u ltitu d e , th e (m a sse s), 4, 10, 12 , 14, 16
M a c h e r e y , P ., 19 1, 1 9 4 -9 5 8 0 - 8 1 ,9 2 , 1 0 0 -1 0 1 , 108, 13 2 , 14 5 , 163,
M a c h ia v e lli, 99, 109, 136 18 4, 200
M a im o n id e s , 22, 45, 73, 16 7 , 169 M ü n c h h a u s e n , B a r o n , 179
m a n , 43, 7 5 , 77, 79 , 82, 86, 88, 95, 106, m y s tic is m , 144
122 , 16 4 , 1 7 5 , i 8 i , 200, 2 1 6 ; n atu ra li­
z a tio n o f, 5 1 ; O l y m p i c , 54; th e o r y o f, N a ’a m a n , S ., 19 7
110 natura naturans, natura naturata, 32, 37, 39,
m a n -in -n a tu re , 8 5-8 9 , 96, 98, 171 48, 88, 126, 1 7 5 , 19 3 -9 4 , 2 0 2 -3 , 205
M a rc u se , H e rb e rt, 2 14 “ natu ra l la w ,” 130
M a rc u se , L u d w ig , 19 5 -9 6 " n a tu ra l l ig h t ,” 4, 158
M a rra n o , ix , 4 - 5 , 18, 19, 2 4 -2 5 , 4 4 -4 5 , “ natu ra l m o ra l o r d e r ,” 130
66, 73 , 102, 169, 184; c u ltu re, ix , x , n a tu ra lism , ix , x ii, 6 5, 8 r. 106, i n , 113 ,
170; e x p e rie n ce , ix , x , 170; h e retics, 4, 1 3 1 , 14 2 -4 3 , 169
47; in telle ctu a ls, x . 170 n a tu ra liza tio n o f m a n , 51
“ M a rra n o o f re a so n ,” 4, 25, 169 n atu re , x i, x ii, 7 - 8 , 18. 23, 46, 5 1 , 77, 79,
M a r x , x i, x ii, 3 1, 4 1, 4 9 -5 4 , 59, 6 5 -6 9 , 8 1 , 85- 89, 93 - 9 7 . 100, 1 1 6 , 130, 142-

(222)
 INDEX

43. 148, 16 1, 165, 168, 17 0 -7 1, 179, Polin, R., 2 11

181-82, 184, 200; hu m anized , xii, 52, politics, 61, 67, 101, 129-32
79 postulates o f pure practical reason, l\
Naturwissenschaft (natural science), 156, practicc, primacy of, 94, 96, 201
211 praxis (social), 80, 64, 96, 97, 183, [91
nazism , r 3 1-3 2 prima philosophia, 75
negation, 3 1-3 2 , 35 -3 6, 48 production: concept of, 89, 20); means
N cham as, A ,, 209 of, 90, 96
neurosis, 150-54 proletariat, 80-81, 97, 99, 101. 200; dicta­
N ietzsche, x i, x ii, 27, 31, 45, 47, 49-50, torship of, 101
53- 54. 10 3 -36 , 138, 14 1, 144-46. 154. prophecy, 189
16 ], 163, 1 7 1 - 7 6 , 18 0 -8 1, 206-10, 212, providencc, 23, 48, 49, 100—101; histori­
216 cal, 93
norm ativeness, 129-32 , 174, 176-78 psychoanalysis, 137, 150, 152, 157, 160,
163, 2 11; ofculture, 162
"O b je c tiv e L o g ic ," 29-30 psychology, 149-50
O ccasio nalists, 59 psychosomatic complementarity, 160
O edip us (ocd ip al d rive), 136
C E ing-H anhoff, L ., 19 1, 193 rabbis, 44, 58
O ld e n b u rg , H ., 25, /88 rational ethics, 7
O ’ M alley, J. J ., 205 rational will. 8; interests, 26
O v e rb e ck , F ranz, 105, 207 rationality, ιο, 15, 23, 44, 107, 176-81,
190; causal, 47; critical, 174; finite, 186
pagan, p a ga n ism , 13, 55, 168, 192 reason {ratio), x, 7-8, 10, 12-15, 21, 23,
pantheism , x ii, 7, 33, 46, 52 -53, 56-57, 25. 95. 130, 146, 165. 177, 184, 190,
5 9 -6 1, 6 3 -6 4 , 7 1 , 76, 107, 128-29, 137. 199; democratizatioD of, io; practical,
143, 145. 174-75 188
pantheist re v o lu tio n , 69; hum anized, 68 redemption, 99-101, 150, 186; secular,
Parm enides, 36, 38, 123 92, 97, 103; science o f (Marx), 97-102.
“ petitcs p e rc e p tio n s," 152 See also salvation
Phenomenology o f the Spirit, 30, 43 religio catholica (universal religion), 12-13,
philo so ph er o fim m a n e n c e , 6, 74, 117, 24,188
167 religion, 7, 10-13, 15—16, 20, 67, 70-71,
p h ilo so p h er-m a rtyrs, 133 74, 82. 89, 142-44, 165, 185, 188-89;
ph ilo so ph y, 20, 4 1, 99, 1 1 4 - 1 6 , 138, 162, moral, 15, 21
2 11; pu re, 97 religion, historical, 23,50, 68
— o f actio n , 70 religion, purified, 16
— o f fin itud e, x ii, 174 religion o f reason (rational religion), 4,8.
— o f h isto ry, 31 21-22, 143, 169, 189; revealed religion,
— o fim m a n e n c e , ix , x , x i, xii, 7, 31, 46, 20, 41
47. 49. 51. 75. 77. 79. 93. i ° 4. 109-10, religion o f reason, socialist, 72
112, 135, 160, 163, 170 -75 , 177, 179, Religion ci'if/t/n the Limits of Reason Alone,
183-86; d o g m a tic v s. critical, xii, 6, 19, 21
172 -7 3 . 175. 177 repression, theory of, 150-53, 157-58
— o f n atu re (Naturphilosophie), 58 ressentiment, 132-34
— o f relig io n , 44 Ricoeur, P., 214-15
p h ysica lism , S o v ie t, 202 Robert, M ., 215
Plato, 38, 4 1 - 4 2 , 115 , 156 Rojas, Fernando de, 44, 55-56
pleasure, 6 1, 146 Rorty, R ., 116, 208
Plechanov, 203 Rosen, Z ., 197, 210

(2 2 3 )
 INDKX

R o te n s tr e ic h , N . , 201 s p o n t a n e ity a n d r e c e p t iv ity , 189

R o u s s e a u , 59 S ta ël, M m e . d e, 53, 196
R u b e l, M ., 199, 205 S ta lin , 12 9, 203
S tra u ss, D . F ., 6 5, 192
S a b b e ta i, Z e v i, 25, 73 S tra u ss, L e o , 9, 1 1 , 16 , 18 7, 189
S a in t-S im o n ia n s , 53, 59; J e w is h , 68 S tre n g e r, C . , 2 11
S a lin g e r, H ., 195 S u a re z , F ra n c is c o , 21
s a lv a tio n , x i, 12, 50, 52, 87, 9 2, 1 0 0 -1 0 1 , s u b je c t, 50; p u re , 50
116 , 1 4 1 - 4 5 . M 9- 50. ^54- 55. 160, 1 6 9 - s u b je c tiv it y , p r in c ip le o f, 94
74 . 17 7 , 18 4 -8 5 , 2 13 ; sc ie n c e o f, 80 s u b sta n c e , 2 7 , 2 9 - 3 2 , 35, 3 7 - 4 0 , 85, 96,
S artre, J .- P ., 100, 109, 145, 183, 186, 202, 117, 120, 12 2 , 172 , 18 2, 1 9 1 , 193;
2 1 1 , 213 w o r ld -s u b s t a n c e , 5 7 , 178
S c h a c h t, R ., 209 s u p e r - e g o , 1 5 3 -5 4
S c h e llin g , x ii, 57, 64, 70 superstitio (s u p e rs titio n ), 4—6 , 10, 2 7, 42,
s c h e m a tis m . 15 45. 102, 143
S c h m id t, A ., 202, 2 0 5 -6
S ch n eid er, M o n iq u e , 159, 2 14 T a l m o n .J . L ., 1 9 6 - 9 7
T a lm u d , 18 9, 197
S c h o le m , G e r s h o m , 25, 190
T a y lo r , C h a r le s , 192
S c h o p e n h a u e r, xii, 120, 138, 14 7 , 172 ,
t e le o lo g ic a l fa lla c y , 49
2 12 , 2 16
S c h u ffe n h a u e r, W ., 198 t e le o lo g y , 49- 5° . 77. 79. 85, 93- 94. 97.
10 0 -10 2 , l O J , I I 7 , 1 1 9 , 12 6, 2 0 6 -7
sc ie n c e o f re d e m p tio n (M a rx ), 7 8 -10 3
thanatos, 146
scientia intuitiva, 13, 48, 194
th e is m , 5 7, 5 9 -6 0 , 6 9, 186
se lf-a lie n a tio n , 74, 90; c o n s cio u sn e s s, 42,
th e o c ra c y , H e b r e w , 7 0 - 7 1
57, 60, 69 (false), 74 . 84. 97. 99, 1 5 8 -
T heologico-Political T reatise, 3, 9, 11, 1 3 -
59; d iffe re n tia tio n , 3 6 -3 7 ; id e n tific a ­
14, 1 7 - 1 8 , 25, 7 3 , 78 , 80, 101
tio n , 36, 40, 122; k n o w le d g e , 102, 126,
t h e ra p y , 14 1 , 143, 148 , 1 5 0 - 5 2 , 1 5 4 -5 6
135. 1 3 7 -6 6 , 186; o v e r c o m in g , 1 1 3 - 1 5 ,
" t h in g in it s e lf,” 30
164, 175 ; p a rtic u la riza tio n , 39-40; p re s­
th ird k in d (d e g re e ) o f k n o w le d g e . See
e rv a tio n , h i , 14 5 -4 6 , 156; tra n sc en ­
k n o w le d g e
d e n ce , 1 1 2 - 1 3 , 172 , 175
to ta lity , c o n c e p t o f, 3 1 - 4 0 , 49, 58, 104,
S ilb e m e r, E ., 19 7-9 8
148 , 1 7 5 , 202; im m a n e n t, 84; p ro b le m
S im o n , E ., 215
o f (th e O n e an d th e M a n y ) , 3 7 -3 8 ; ra­
S im o n , R ic h a rd , 19
tio n a l, 49
sk e p tic ism , x , 180
tra n sc e n d e n ta l d e d u c t io n , 87
so c ia lism , 53, 6 1, 6 4 -6 7 , 69, 7 1 , 98, 131
T r a n s c e n d e n ta l E g o , 8, 89, 95
S o cra te s, 4, 115
tra n sfe re n c e , 1 5 7 -5 8 , 162
S o c ra tic p rin c ip le, 158
Treatise on the Intellect, 35
S o k o lo v , N a h u m , 73
tru e id ea (idea vera), 5 -6 , 2 7, 48
sola scriptura, 16, 21
tru th , p r o b le m o f, 1 2 0 - 2 1 ; D io n y s ia n ,
S o lm i, E d w a r d , 140 -4 1
121
“ son o f G o d ,” 43, 45 tru th an d in te rp re ta tio n , 17 4 , 178, 181
so u l, 89, 15 5 , 174
sp e cie s-b e in g s, 9 0 -9 1 Uhennensch, 105, 11 4 , 11 9 , 1 2 1 , 12 7, 132,
S p en cer, H a n n a, 195 210
S p in o z ism , 26, 2 9 -3 0 , 50, 5 4 -5 5 , 63, 76, u n c o n s c io u s , th e, 143 , 15 2 , 153
79 , 98, 203, 207 unio mystica, 127
sp irit, x , x ii, 40 -4 6, 52, 67, 74- 75. 79. 94. u n ity o f m a tte r a n d s p irit, 52, 60, 67
1 1 4 , 1 7 0 -7 1 . See also G eist u to p ia ( M a r x ) , 1 0 1 - 3
sp iritu a lism , 76 u to p ia n so c ia lis m , 66, 98

(224)
 INDEX

vana religio, io , 12, 13, 16, 143 Wittgenstein, L., 217

Verniere, P., x Wolff, Christian, 29
Vernunft (reason), 34 Wood. Allen, 205
Verstand (u n d erstan d in g ), 34 w ork, 90-92
V ico , 89 world-in-flux, 181
"v irtu o u s a th eist,” x world-order, moral, 117
vo lu ntarism , 99 Wurzer, W. S., 207
Vorstellung, 41
Yerkes, James, 191
W allace, W ., 191 Yovel, Yirmiyahu, 187, 191, 204
W artofsky, M . W ., 198-99
w ill, 4, 7, 8, 2 1, 105, 120 Zac, Sylvain, 23, 190
“ w ill to k n o w le d g e ,” 141 Zeitgeist, 7B
“ w ill to p o w e r,” 110 , 1 1 2 -1 3 , 124, 146, Zionism , 72-73, 16$; political, 73; secu­
.
171 175 lar, 72; socialist, 68
Wille, xi, 170 Z w eig, Arnulf, 197

(225 )