Common Cyber Attacks:

Reducing The Impact

Contents
Introduction ....................................................................................................................................................................... 3

Part 1: The Threat Landscape .......................................................................................................................................... 4

Commodity vs bespoke capabilities ................................................................................................................................. 4
Un-targeted attacks ............................................................................................................................................................. 5
Targeted attacks .................................................................................................................................................................. 5
Every organisation is a potential victim ........................................................................................................................... 6

Part 2: Understanding Vulnerabilities .............................................................................................................................. 7

Flaws ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 7
Features ................................................................................................................................................................................ 7
User error .............................................................................................................................................................................. 7

Part 3: Common Cyber Attacks - Stages and Patterns .................................................................................................. 8

Stages of an attack ............................................................................................................................................................. 8
Survey ............................................................................................................................................................................... 8
Delivery ............................................................................................................................................................................. 9
Breach .............................................................................................................................................................................. 9
Affect ................................................................................................................................................................................ 9

Part 4: Reducing Your Exposure to Cyber Attack ........................................................................................................ 10

Breaking the attack pattern ............................................................................................................................................. 10
Reducing your exposure using essential security controls ......................................................................................... 10
Mitigating the stages of an attack .................................................................................................................................. 11
Mitigating the survey stage ......................................................................................................................................... 11
Mitigating the delivery stage ...................................................................................................................................... 11
Mitigating the breach stage ........................................................................................................................................ 12
Mitigating the affect stage .......................................................................................................................................... 12
I’ve been attacked, what do I do? ................................................................................................................................... 12
Closing word: raising your cyber defences ..................................................................................................................... 12

Case Studies ................................................................................................................................................................... 13

Case study 1: Espionage campaign against the UK energy sector ............................................................................ 13
Case study 2: Hundreds of computers infected by remote access malware ........................................................... 14
Case study 3: Spear-phishing attack targets system administrator ......................................................................... 15

Common Cyber Attacks: Reducing The Impact Page 2 of 17

Introduction
Your organisation’s computer systems - and the information they hold - can be compromised in many ways.
It may be through malicious or accidental actions, or simply through the failure of software or electronic
components. And whilst you need to consider all of these potential risks, it is malicious attack from the
Internet that is hitting the headlines and damaging organisations.
“In GCHQ we continue to see
The 2014 Information Security Breaches Survey1 found that 81% of real threats to the UK on a
large companies had reported some form of security breach, daily basis, and I’m afraid the
costing each organisation on average between £600,000 and scale and rate of these
£1.5m. These findings are supported by almost daily stories of large attacks shows little sign of
scale cyber incidents, such as the Gameover ZeuS botnet. As the abating.”
Director of GCHQ says in his 2015 foreword to the republished 10 Robert Hannigan
Steps to Cyber Security, “In GCHQ we continue to see real threats to Director GCHQ
the UK on a daily basis, and I’m afraid the scale and rate of these
attacks shows little sign of abating.”
As the National Technical Authority for Information Assurance, GCHQ believe that understanding the
capabilities behind these attacks, the vulnerabilities they exploit, and how they are exploited is central to
your organisation’s ability to defend itself against them. Security professionals often focus on the security
mechanisms or controls employed without explaining why they are needed, and what they mitigate.
Understanding these details can help you make conscious risk management judgements to ensure that the
required controls are pragmatic, cost effective and appropriate - and actually protect your business.
Common Cyber Attacks: Reducing The Impact has been produced by CESG (the Information Security Arm of
GCHQ) with CERT-UK, and is aimed at all organisations who are vulnerable to attack from the Internet. The
paper helps CEOs, boards, business owners and managers to understand what a common cyber attack looks
like. Using real case studies where the attackers used readily available off-the-shelf tools and techniques, it
provides a rationale for establishing basic security controls and processes (such as those set out in the Cyber
Essentials Scheme2). Understanding these attacks can help you manage the most common cyber risks faced
by your organisation.
More specifically, this paper covers:
 the threat landscape - the types of attackers, their motivations and their technical capabilities
 vulnerabilities - what are they, and how are they exploited?
 cyber attacks, stages and patterns - what is the ‘typical’ structure of a cyber attack?
 reducing the impact of an attack - what controls are needed to reduce the impact of common cyber
attacks?
 case studies - real world examples that demonstrate how cyber attacks have caused financial and
reputational damage to major UK businesses
Note: There are far more comprehensive case studies and more detailed technical information openly
available on the Internet; the case studies in this paper have been simplified to demonstrate where and how
basic controls could have reduced the extent or the impact of the attack. That is, this paper is not intended
to be a comprehensive review of sophisticated or persistent attacks.

1 www.gov.uk/government/publications/information-security-breaches-survey-2014
2 www.gov.uk/government/publications/cyber-essentials-scheme-overview

Common Cyber Attacks: Reducing The Impact Page 3 of 17

Part 1: The Threat Landscape
Although computer systems can be compromised through a variety of means, GCHQ looks to understand
malicious actions and the attackers that carry them out.
TECHNICAL FOCUS: RISK
The risk to information and computer assets comes from a broad
In cyber security terms, risk is the
spectrum of threats with a broad range of capabilities. The impact potential for a threat (a person or
(and therefore the harm) on your business will depend on the thing that is likely to cause
opportunities you present to an attacker (in terms of the damage) to exploit a vulnerability
vulnerabilities within your systems), the capabilities of the attackers (a flaw, feature or user error) that
to exploit them, and ultimately their motivation for attacking you. may result in some form of
negative impact.
WHO MIGHT BE ATTACKING YOU? For example, an easily
Cyber criminals interested in guessed password to an online account takes very little technical
making money through fraud or capability to exploit. With a little more technical knowledge, attackers
from the sale of valuable can also use tools that are readily available on the internet. They can
information. also bring resources (people or money) to bear in order to discover
Industrial competitors and foreign new vulnerabilities. These attackers will go on to develop bespoke
intelligence services, interested in tools and techniques to exploit them; such vulnerabilities enable
gaining an economic advantage for
them to bypass the basic controls provided by schemes like Cyber
their companies or countries.
Essentials. To protect against these bespoke attacks will require you
Hackers who find interfering with
computer systems an enjoyable to invest in a more holistic approach to security, such as that outlined
challenge. in the 10 Steps to Cyber Security.
Hacktivists who wish to attack The motivation of an attacker can vary from demonstrating their
companies for political or technical prowess for personal kudos, financial gain, commercial
ideological motives.
advantage, political protest; through to economic or diplomatic
Employees, or those who have
legitimate access, either by
advantage for their country. You have no control over their
accidental or deliberate misuse. Whilst attackers may have capabilities and motivations,
the capability and the but you can make it harder
motivation, they still need an opportunity to deliver a successful for attackers by reducing your
vulnerabilities.
attack. You have no control over their capabilities and motivations,
but you can make it harder for attackers by reducing your vulnerabilities.

Commodity vs bespoke capabilities

In this paper, we are using the terms ‘commodity’ and ‘bespoke’ to characterise the capabilities attackers
can employ.
Commodity capability involves tools and techniques openly available on the Internet (off-the-shelf) that are
relatively simple to use. This includes tools designed for security specialists (such as system penetration
testers) that can also be used by attackers as they are specifically designed to scan for publicly known
vulnerabilities in operating systems and applications. Poison Ivy is a good example of a commodity tool; it is a
readily available Remote Access Tool (RAT) that has been widely used for a number of years.
Bespoke capability involves tools and techniques that are developed and used for specific purposes, and thus
require more specialist knowledge. This could include malicious code (‘exploits’) that take advantage of
software vulnerabilities (or bugs) that are not yet known to vendors or anti-malware companies, often
known as ‘zero-day’ exploits. It could also include undocumented software features, or poorly designed
applications. Bespoke capabilities usually become commodity capabilities once their use has been
discovered, sometimes within a few days3. By their very nature, the availability of bespoke tools is not
advertised as once released they become a commodity.

3
‘When Vulnerabilities are Exploited: the Timing of First Known Exploits for Remote Code Execution Vulnerabilities’, Tim Rains, 17 June 2014,
http://blogs.microsoft.com/cybertrust/2014/06/17/when-vulnerabilities-are-exploited-the-timing-of-first-known-exploits-for-remote-code-execution-vulnerabilities
‘Before We Knew It: An Empirical Study of Zero-Day Attacks In The Real World’, Leyla Bilge and Tudor Dumitras, CCS ’12, 16-18 October 2012,
http://users.ece.cmu.edu/~tdumitra/public_documents/bilge12_zero_day.pdf

Common Cyber Attacks: Reducing The Impact Page 4 of 17

 Openly available commodity capabilities are effective because basic
Openly available commodity
cyber security principles, such as those described in Cyber Essentials
capabilities are effective
because basic cyber security and 10 Steps to Cyber Security, are not properly followed. Regardless
principles, such as those of their technical capability and motivation, commodity tools and
described in Cyber Essentials techniques are frequently what attackers turn to first.
and 10 Steps to Cyber In section 2 we will look in more detail at the vulnerabilities that
Security, are not properly
attackers exploit using both commodity and bespoke capabilities.
followed.

Un-targeted attacks THE INSIDER THREAT

In un-targeted attacks, attackers indiscriminately target as many Although this paper is focussed on
threats from the Internet, insiders
devices, services or users as possible. They do not care about who (anyone who has legitimate access
the victim is as there will be a number of machines or services with to your systems as an employee or
vulnerabilities. To do this, they use techniques that take advantage a contractor) should also be
of the openness of the Internet, which include: considered as part of a holistic
security regime. They may be
 phishing - sending emails to large numbers of people asking motivated by personal gain or
for sensitive information (such as bank details) or redress against grievances.
encouraging them to visit a fake website An insider could simply use their
normal access to compromise your
 water holing - setting up a fake website or compromising a
information, take advantage of
legitimate one in order to exploit visiting users unlocked computers or guessable
 ransomware - which could include disseminating disk passwords. They could use social
encrypting extortion malware engineering techniques (fooling
people in to breaking normal
 scanning - attacking wide swathes of the Internet at random security procedures) to gain further
accesses. They may even have the
technical skills to use commodity
Targeted attacks tools and techniques to become a
‘hacker within the system’, with
In a targeted attack, your organisation is singled out because the
the opportunity to cause greater
attacker has a specific interest in your business, or has been paid to damage and steal information at
target you. The groundwork for the attack could take months so will. In the worst case scenario, an
that they can find the best route to deliver their exploit directly to insider could be working for an
your systems (or users). A targeted attack is often more damaging adversary who can develop
than an un-targeted one because it has been specifically tailored to bespoke tools, and introduce these
deep within your organisation.
attack your systems, processes or personnel, in the office and Assessing which (if any) of these
sometimes at home. Targeted attacks may include: scenarios is likely should be a
critical part of your risk
 spear-phishing - sending emails to targeted individuals that
assessment process.
could contain an attachment with malicious software, or a
Without appropriate training,
link that downloads malicious software insiders can also accidentally
 deploying a botnet - to deliver a DDOS (Distributed Denial of compromise a system or the
Service) attack information it holds. So make sure
that particular care is taken when
 subverting the supply chain - to attack equipment or evaluating all aspects of the
software being delivered to the organisation insider threat as part of your
organisation’s overall assessment
In general attackers will, in the first instance, use commodity tools of cyber risks, referring to external
and techniques to probe your systems for an exploitable guidance where required.
vulnerability.

Common Cyber Attacks: Reducing The Impact Page 5 of 17

Every organisation is a potential victim
Before investing in defences, many organisations often want concrete evidence that they are, or will be
targeted, by specific threats. Unfortunately, in cyberspace it is often difficult to provide an accurate
assessment of the threats that specific organisations face.
However, every organisation is a potential victim. All organisations
have something of value that is worth something to others. If you If you openly demonstrate
weaknesses in your
openly demonstrate weaknesses in your approach to cyber security
approach to cyber security
by failing to do the basics, you will experience some form of cyber by failing to do the basics,
attack. you will experience some
As part of your risk management processes, you should be assessing form of cyber attack.
whether you are likely to be the victim of a targeted or un-targeted
attack; every organisation connected to the Internet should assume they will be a victim of the latter. Either
way, you should implement basic security controls consistently across your organisation, and where you may
be specifically targeted, ensure you have a more in-depth, holistic approach to cyber security.

Common Cyber Attacks: Reducing The Impact Page 6 of 17

Part 2: Understanding Vulnerabilities
Vulnerabilities provide the opportunities for attackers to gain access to your systems. They can occur
through flaws, features or user error, and attackers will look to exploit any of them, often combining one or
more, to achieve their end goal.
In the context of this paper, a vulnerability is a weakness in an IT system that can be exploited by an attacker
to deliver a successful attack.

Flaws TECHNICAL FOCUS:

A flaw is unintended functionality. This may either be a result of VULNERABILITIES
poor design or through mistakes made during implementation. Vulnerabilities are actively pursued
Flaws may go undetected for a significant period of time. The and exploited by the full range of
attackers. Consequently, a market
majority of common attacks we see today exploit these types of has grown in software flaws, with
vulnerabilities. In the last twelve months nearly 8,000 unique and ‘zero-day’ vulnerabilities (that is
verified software vulnerabilities were disclosed in the US National recently discovered vulnerabilities
Vulnerability Database (NVD).4 that are not yet publically known)
fetching hundreds of thousands of
pounds.
Features Zero-days are frequently used in
bespoke attacks by the more
A feature is intended functionality which can be misused by an capable and resourced attackers.
attacker to breach a system. Features may improve the user’s Once the zero-days become
experience, help diagnose problems or improve management, but publically known, reusable attacks
they can also be exploited by an attacker. are developed and they quickly
become a commodity capability.
When Microsoft introduced macros into their Office suite in the late This poses a risk to any computer
1990s, macros soon became the vulnerability of choice with the or system that has not had the
Melissa worm in 1999 being a prime example. Macros are still relevant patch applied, or updated
its antivirus software.
exploited today; the Dridex banking Trojan that was spreading in
late 2014 relies on spam to deliver Microsoft Word documents The ability for an attacker to find
and attack software flaws or
containing malicious macro code, which then downloads Dridex subvert features depends on the
onto the affected system. nature of the software and their
technical capabilities. Some target
JavaScript, widely used in dynamic web content, continues to be
platforms are relatively simple to
used by attackers. This includes diverting the user’s browser to a access, for example web
malicious website and silently downloading malware, and hiding applications could, by design, be
malicious code to pass through basic web filtering. capable of interacting with the
Internet and may provide an
opportunity for an attacker.
User error
A computer or system that has been carefully designed and implemented can minimise the vulnerabilities of
exposure to the Internet. Unfortunately, such efforts can be easily undone (for example by an inexperienced
system administrator who enables vulnerable features, fails to fix a known flaw5, or leaves default passwords
unchanged).
More generally, users can be a significant source of vulnerabilities. They make mistakes, such as choosing a
common or easily guessed password, or leave their laptop or mobile phone unattended. Even the most
cyber aware users can be fooled into giving away their password, installing malware, or divulging information
that may be useful to an attacker (such as who holds a particular role within an organisation, and their
schedule). These details would allow an attacker to target and time an attack appropriately.

4 https://nvd.nist.gov/
5
Fixes such as applying software patches, removing detected malware and updating device configuration to address issues detected through vulnerability scanning

Common Cyber Attacks: Reducing The Impact Page 7 of 17

Part 3: Common Cyber Attacks - Stages and Patterns
Regardless of whether an attack is targeted or un-targeted, or the attacker is using commodity or bespoke
tools, cyber attacks have a number of stages in common. Some of these will meet their goal whilst others
may be blocked. An attack, particularly if it is carried out by a persistent adversary, may consist of repeated
stages. The attacker is effectively probing your defences for weaknesses that, if exploitable, will take them
closer to their ultimate goal. Understanding these stages will help you to better defend yourself.

Stages of an attack
A number of attack models describe the stages of a cyber attack (the Cyber Kill Chain® produced by
Lockheed Martin is a popular example6). We have adopted a simplified model in this paper that describes the
four main stages present in most cyber attacks:
 Survey - investigating and analysing available information about the target in order to identify
potential vulnerabilities
 Delivery - getting to the point in a system where a vulnerability can be exploited
 Breach - exploiting the vulnerability/vulnerabilities to gain some form of unauthorised access
 Affect - carrying out activities within a system that achieve the attacker’s goal

Survey TECHNICAL FOCUS:

SURVEY
Attackers will use any means available to find technical, procedural The default settings of computer
or physical vulnerabilities which they can attempt to exploit. systems can reveal a lot of useful
information about the software
They will use open source information such as LinkedIn and running on them, and how they are
Facebook, domain name management/search services, and social configured. They can broadcast a
media. They will employ commodity toolkits and techniques, and range of network protocols and
standard network scanning tools to collect and assess any communications channels that
information about your organisation’s computers, security systems can be exploited if they aren’t
removed.
and personnel.
The attacker will point network
User error can also reveal information that can be used in attacks. scanning tools at your network to
Common errors include: try and identify any of the
following:
 releasing information about the organisation’s network on a  open ports
technical support forum
 open services
 neglecting to remove hidden properties from documents  default settings
such as author, software version and file save locations
 vulnerable applications and
Attackers will also use social engineering (often via social media) to operating systems
exploit user naivety and goodwill to elicit further, less openly  the makes and models of your
available information. network equipment

6 The Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain® can be found at www.lockheedmartin.co.uk/us/what-we-do/information-technology/cyber-security/cyber-kill-chain.html

Common Cyber Attacks: Reducing The Impact Page 8 of 17

Delivery
During the delivery stage, the attacker will look to get into a position where they can exploit a vulnerability
that they have identified, or they think could potentially exist. Examples include:
 attempting to access an organisation’s online services
 sending an email containing a link to a malicious website or an attachment which contains malicious
code
 giving an infected USB stick away at a trade fair
 creating a false website in the hope that a user will visit
The crucial decision for the attacker is to select the best delivery path for the malicious software or
commands that will enable them to breach your defences. In the case of a DDOS attack, it may be sufficient
for them to make multiple connections to a computer in order to prevent others from accessing it.

TECHNICAL FOCUS: Breach

BREACH
With the great variety of potential The harm to your business will depend on the nature of the
vulnerabilities in any IT system, vulnerability and the exploitation method. It may allow them to:
there is a similar diversity in the
often highly technical and  make changes that affect the system’s operation
innovative mechanisms used to  gain access to online accounts
exploit them. Although attackers
 achieve full control of a user’s computer, tablet or
continue to develop novel
techniques to exploit smartphone
vulnerabilities, attackers are Having done this, the attacker could pretend to be the victim and use
ultimately successful due to an
unfixed flaw, misused feature or their legitimate access rights to gain access to other systems and
user error. information.
Some types of attack are much
more obvious or easier to detect Affect
than others. DDOS attacks are
often quickly noticed by system Depending on their motivation, the attacker may seek to explore your
users, as they struggle to access or systems, expand their access and establish a persistent presence (a
simply cannot use the targeted process sometimes called ‘consolidation’). Taking over a user’s
service. On the other hand, most
malware is designed to be
account usually guarantees a persistent presence. Taking over an
stealthy, hiding from users and administrator’s account is an attacker’s Holy Grail. With administration
detection mechanisms alike. access to just one system, they can try to install automated scanning
tools to discover more about your networks and take control of more
systems. When doing this they will take great care not to trigger the system’s monitoring processes and they
may even disable them for a time.
Determined and undetected attackers continue until they have achieved their end goals. Depending on their
objectives, the activities they aim to carry out on your systems will differ, but they can include:
 retrieving information they would otherwise not be able to access, such as intellectual property or
commercially sensitive information
 making changes for their own benefit, such as creating payments into a bank account they control
 disrupting normal business operation, such as overloading the organisation’s internet connection so
they cannot communicate externally, or deleting the whole operating system from users’ computers
After achieving their objectives, the more capable attacker will exit, carefully removing any evidence of their
presence. Or they could create an access route for future visits by them, or for others they have sold the
access to. Equally, some attackers will want to seriously damage your system or make as much ‘noise’ as
possible to advertise their success.

Common Cyber Attacks: Reducing The Impact Page 9 of 17

Part 4: Reducing Your Exposure to Cyber Attack
Preventing, detecting or disrupting the attack at the earliest opportunity limits the business impact and the
potential for reputational damage. Once the attacker has consolidated their presence they will be more
difficult to find and remove.
Even though it’s normally the
most motivated attackers
Breaking the attack pattern who have the persistence to
Even though it’s normally the most motivated attackers who have carry out multiple stage
the persistence to carry out multiple stage attacks, they will attacks, they will frequently
do this using commodity
frequently do this using commodity tools and techniques, which are
tools and techniques.
cheaper and easier for them to use. So putting in place security
controls and processes that can mitigate these will go some way to making your business a hard target.
Equally, adopting a defence-in-depth7 approach to mitigate risks through the full range of potential attacks
will give your business more resilience to cope with attacks that use more bespoke tools and techniques.

Reducing your exposure using essential security controls

Fortunately, there are effective and affordable ways to reduce your organisation’s exposure to the more
common types of cyber attack on systems that are exposed to the Internet. The following controls are
contained in the Cyber Essentials, together with more information
about how to implement them: TECHNICAL FOCUS:
SECURE CONFIGURATION
 boundary firewalls and internet gateways - establish network For broader guidance on a range
perimeter defences, particularly web proxy, web filtering, specific technologies (such as
content checking, and firewall policies to detect and block Bring Your Own Device, Cloud
executable downloads, block access to known malicious Security, and End User Device
Security & Configuration), please
domains and prevent users’ computers from
visit the following site:
communicating directly with the Internet https://www.gov.uk/government/
 malware protection - establish and maintain malware organisations/cesg
defences to detect and respond to known attack code
 patch management - patch known vulnerabilities with the latest version of the software, to prevent
attacks which exploit software bugs
 whitelisting and execution control - prevent unknown software from being able to run or install itself,
including AutoRun on USB and CD drives
 secure configuration - restrict the functionality of every device, operating system and application to
the minimum needed for business to function8
 password policy - ensure that an appropriate password policy is in place and followed
 user access control - include limiting normal users’ execution permissions and enforcing the principle
of least privilege9
If your organisation is likely to be targeted by a more technically capable attacker, give yourself greater
confidence by putting in place these additional controls set out in the 10 Steps to Cyber Security:
 security monitoring - to identify any unexpected or suspicious activity
 user training education and awareness - staff should understand their role in keeping your
organisation secure and report any unusual activity

7 Strengthened security achieved by establishing multiple layers of security mechanisms

8 For broader guidance on secure configuration see the following publications:
Cloud Security Principles, www.gov.uk/government/collections/cloud-security-guidance
End user devices security and configuration guidance, www.gov.uk/government/collections/end-user-devices-security-guidance
Bring Your Own Device Guidance, www.gov.uk/government/collections/bring-your-own-device-guidance
9 Applying only those privileges to a user account that are essential to that user's work

Common Cyber Attacks: Reducing The Impact Page 10 of 17

  security incident management - put plans in place to deal with an attack as an effective response will
reduce the impact on your business
The 10 Steps to Cyber Security sets out the features of a complete cyber risk management regime. There are
many effective and comprehensive schemes and open standards that your organisation can apply to support
a defence-in-depth strategy, if this approach isn’t already implemented.

Mitigating the stages of an attack

We’ll look at each stage of an attack in turn, and highlight where the basic security controls mitigate the
activities that take place.

Mitigating the survey stage

Any information which is published for open consumption should be systematically filtered before it is
released to ensure that anything of value to an attacker (such as software and configuration details, the
names/roles/titles of individuals and any hidden data10) is removed.
TECHNICAL FOCUS:
User training, education and awareness is important. All your users CiSP
should understand how published information about your systems The Cyber-security Information
and operation can reveal potential vulnerabilities. They need to be Sharing Partnership (CiSP), part of
aware of the risks of discussing work-related topics on social media, CERT-UK, is a joint industry-
and the potential for them to be targeted by phishing attacks. They government initiative to share
should also understand the risks to the business of releasing cyber threat and vulnerability
information. It does this in order to
sensitive information in general conversations, unsolicited
increase overall situational
telephone calls and email recipients. The Centre for the Protection awareness of the cyber threat, and
of the National Infrastructure (CPNI) have published a guide to therefore reduce the impact of
online reconnaissance to help put into place the most effective cyber threat on UK businesses.
social engineering mitigations11.
Secure Configuration can minimise the information that Internet-facing devices disclose about their
configuration and software versions, and ensures they cannot be probed for any vulnerabilities.

Mitigating the delivery stage

The delivery options available to an attacker can be significantly diminished by applying and maintaining a
small number of security controls, which are even more effective when applied in combination.
Up-to-date malware protection may block malicious emails and prevent malware being downloaded from
websites. Firewalls and proxy servers can block unsecure or unnecessary services and can also maintain a list
of known bad websites. Equally, subscribing to a website reputation service to generate a blacklist of
websites could also provide additional protection.
A technically enforced password policy will prevent users from selecting easily guessed passwords and lock
accounts after a specified number of failed attempts. Additional authentication measures for access to
particularly sensitive corporate or personal information should also be in place.
Secure configuration limits system functionality to the minimum needed for business operation and should
be systematically applied to every device that is used to conduct business.

10
‘Metadata’ many programs automatically add metadata to files, including author, their username and the file save location
11
‘Online reconnaissance’, CPNI, May 2013, www.cpni.gov.uk/documents/publications/2013/2013007-online_reconnaissance.pdf?epslanguage=en-gb

Common Cyber Attacks: Reducing The Impact Page 11 of 17

Mitigating the breach stage
As with the delivery stage, the ability to successfully exploit known vulnerabilities can be effectively
mitigated with just a few controls, which are again best deployed together.
All commodity malware depends on known and predominately patchable software flaws. Effective patch
management of vulnerabilities ensures that patches are applied at the earliest opportunity, limiting the time
your organisation is exposed to known software vulnerabilities.
Malware protection within the internet gateway can detect known malicious code in an imported item, such
as an email. These measures should be supplemented by malware protection at key points on the internal
network and on the users’ computers where available. Devices within the internet gateway should be used to
prevent unauthorised access to critical services or inherently unsecure services that may be required
internally by your organisation. Equally, the gateway should be able to detect any unauthorised inbound or
outbound connections.
Well-implemented and maintained user access controls will restrict the applications, privileges and data that
users can access. Secure configuration can remove unnecessary software and default user accounts. It can
also ensure that default passwords are changed, and any automatic features that could immediately activate
malware (such as AutoRun for media drives) are turned off.
User training, education and awareness are extremely valuable to reduce the likelihood of ‘social engineering’
being successful. However, with the pressures of work and the sheer volume of communications, you cannot
rely on this as a control to mitigate even a commodity attack.
Finally, critical to actually detecting a breach is the capability to monitor all network activity and to analyse it
to identify any malicious or unusual activity.

Mitigating the affect stage

If all the measures for the survey, delivery and breach stages are consistently in place, the majority of attacks
using commodity capability are likely to be unsuccessful. However, if your adversary is able to use bespoke
capabilities then you have to assume that they will evade them and get into your systems. Ideally, you should
have a good understanding of what constitutes ‘normal’ activity on your network, and effective security
monitoring should be capable of identifying any unusual activity.
Once a technically capable and motivated attacker has achieved full access to your systems it can be much
harder to detect their actions and eradicate their presence. This is where a full defence-in-depth strategy can
be beneficial.

I’ve been attacked, what do I do?

There is no such thing as 100% security and your organisation will probably experience some form of cyber
attack at some time. Having an effective security incident response plan can help to reduce the impact of the
attack, clean up the affected systems and get the business back up and running within a short time. Where
relevant, you should also consider the Cyber Security Incident Response services provided by CESG, CPNI and
CERT-UK.

Closing word: raising your cyber defences

Doing nothing is no longer an
The Internet can be a hostile environment. The threat of attack is option; protect your
ever present as new vulnerabilities are released and commodity tools organisation and your
are produced to exploit them. Doing nothing is no longer an option; reputation by establishing
protect your organisation and your reputation by establishing some some basic cyber defences.
basic cyber defences to ensure that your name is not added to the
growing list of victims.

Common Cyber Attacks: Reducing The Impact Page 12 of 17

Case Studies
On a daily basis, GCHQ and CERT-UK see computer systems and the information on them being
compromised by malicious attackers. Although the motivations may vary, they nearly always use commodity
tools and techniques at some point.
The following three case studies demonstrate how effective these attacks can be to gain access to
organisations and, conversely, how widely accepted and cost-effective cyber security controls can disrupt
the different stages in the attack model we discussed earlier.
 In the first two case studies, the attackers added malicious code to legitimate websites that staff
from the target companies regularly visited. This code compromised their computers, giving the
attackers access to the companies’ systems.
 The final case study is an example of a single-staged attack that compromised the computer of a
system administrator.
All of the mitigations listed in these case studies are covered in detail in the Cyber Essentials Scheme and the
10 Steps to Cyber Security. To reduce the risk of commodity and bespoke attacks on your business, fully
implement a comprehensive suite of cyber security controls.

Case study 1: Espionage campaign against the UK energy sector

Attackers used a technique known as a ‘watering hole’ attack to distribute malware into businesses working
in the UK energy sector. The attackers added scripts to legitimate websites frequented by energy sector
staff. Many of the websites were managed by the same web design company. Visitors’ browsers were
automatically and surreptitiously redirected to download malware from an attacker-owned server.
The malware targeted known and patchable vulnerabilities in Java, older internet browsers, and all but the
most recent versions of Microsoft Windows. The malware harvested visitors’ credentials and computer
system information, and sent this information back to the controllers via attacker-owned domains.

How it happened: the technical details

In the survey stage, the attackers discovered that a single web design company hosted a number of energy
sector businesses’ websites. Although we can’t say for sure how the attacker delivered the attack to breach
the site, they may have infiltrated the web design company’s networks by masquerading as a legitimate user
with credentials stolen through successful spear-phishing, or by exploiting an unpatched vulnerability on the
web server.
The attacker compromised the web server and then added code12 which caused their own website to be
loaded whenever the legitimate website was visited. The delivery stage then involved the attacker’s website
delivering the malicious code to the victims’ computers. The unpatched browsers were breached through
known software flaws in Java and common internet browsers.
The attacker’s website installed a Remote Access Tool (RAT) on the visitor’s computer, disguised as a
common type of web application script. The malware then started communicating with the attacker-owned
domains by sending ‘beacons’ to show it was active and to request commands from the attackers. The
malware was designed to capture system information, user keystrokes and clipboard contents to enable the
attackers to consolidate their position as they moved towards affecting their target. However, security
monitoring of network activity detected command and control messages from malware on the infected
computers, and in this case the attack was broken before it could affect the targeted businesses.

12
An ‘iframe’ was inserted to point to malicious content

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We believe that these ‘watering hole’ attacks were part of a continuing espionage campaign against the UK
energy sector.

Capabilities, vulnerabilities and mitigations

The attackers used a number of commodity techniques to compromise their targets within the energy
sector. They probably gained access to the legitimate websites using automated scanning tools and exploit
kits to identify and exploit unpatched vulnerabilities, or used social engineering to take advantage of poor
user training and awareness. The script hosted on the attacker’s website exploited applications with known
software vulnerabilities to install a RAT.
Whilst the attack was spotted by security monitoring, this control is not 100% effective, as it depends heavily
on technology and skills. If the appropriate essential controls had been in place, this attack would not have
been successful. However, that's not to say they wouldn't have kept on trying by using different techniques.
The most effective mitigations against this attack (both at the website and within the victim organisation)
would have been:
 network perimeter defences - deploying a web proxy, web filtering, content checking, and firewall
policies could have prevented executable downloads and access to known malicious domains on the
Internet
 malware protection defences - might have detected the commodity attack code used to exploit the
victims browser
 patching the known software flaws - would have prevented the script from being successful and the
malware from running
 whitelisting and execution control - would have prevented any unknown software from being able to
run or install itself
 user access control - could have restricted the malware’s capabilities
 security monitoring - in this case did identify the suspicious activity

Case study 2: Hundreds of computers infected by remote access malware

This widespread compromise of a large UK company’s internal network originated from an exploit hosted on
their externally-managed corporate website. This was achieved as a result of poor security practices by the
website provider. The attackers used a commonly available RAT to gain information about the internal
network and control a number of computers. The widespread malware infection took extensive effort to
eradicate and remediate.

How it happened: the technical details

As part of their survey of the victim’s network and services, attackers discovered that the corporate website
was hosted by a service provider, and it contained a known vulnerability. In the survey stage of the attack on
the service provider, the attackers exploited this vulnerability to add a specialised exploit delivery script to
the corporate website.
The script compared the IP addresses of the website’s visitors against the IP range used by the company. It
then infected a number of computers within the company, taking advantage of a known software flaw, to
download malware to the visitor’s computer within a directory that allowed file execution.
Over 300 computers were infected during the delivery stage with remote access malware. The malware then
beaconed and delivered network information to attacker-owned domains. The attackers were eventually
detected early in the affect stage. By this time they had installed further tools and were consolidating their
position, carrying out network enumeration and identifying high value users.

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Whilst the compromise was successful, it was detected through network security monitoring, and a well-
defined incident response plan made it possible to investigate the incident using system and network logs,
plus forensic examinations of many computers.
To eradicate the discovered infection it was necessary, at great cost, to return the computers to a known
good state. Further investigation was also required to identify any further malware that could be used to
retain network access. To prevent further attacks through the same route, the contract terms with the
website provider needed to be renegotiated, to ensure they had similar security standards to the targeted
organisation.

Capabilities, vulnerabilities and mitigations

The attackers used a combination of automated scanning tools, exploit kits and technology-specific attacks
to compromise the organisation. They took advantage of a known software flaw and the trust relationship
between the company and its supplier.
The intensive and costly investigation and remediation of the compromise could have been averted by more
effective implementation of the following cyber security controls:
 patching - the corporate website would have not been compromised, nor would the malware
download script have succeeded, had patching on both the web server and users’ computers been
up to date
 network perimeter defences - the malware could have been prevented from being downloaded and
the command and control might not have succeeded with the use of two-way web filtering, content
checking and firewall policies (as part of the internet gateway structure)
 whitelisting and execution control - unauthorised executables such as the exploration tools would
have been unable to run if the company’s corporate computers were subject to whitelisting and
execution control (this could also prevent applications from being able to run from the temporary or
personal profile folders)
 security monitoring - may have detected the compromise at an earlier stage

Case study 3: Spear-phishing attack targets system administrator

A system administrator within a high profile UK organisation was successfully spear-phished and
unknowingly installed a RAT. Taking advantage of the user’s privileged permissions, the attackers were able
to exfiltrate13 information about the network and details for multiple business-critical systems.
Fortunately, the compromise was restricted to one computer, and it was detected and effectively
investigated as appropriate security monitoring and logging were in place. Identifying and mitigating the lost
information impacted the availability of the system to the business and required extensive support from
external forensic and technical architecture specialists.

How it happened: the technical details

The attackers identified the system administrator and their personal subjects of interest. They crafted and
delivered a socially-engineered email to the administrator’s personal email address. Accessing personal
webmail from the admin computer, the administrator read the phishing email and downloaded a Trojanised
document from a file sharing service containing the first stage malware.

13 The unauthorised transfer of data from a computer

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When the Trojanised file was opened, the user was prompted to run an executable which then breached the
defences and installed the first stage malware onto the system. The attacker exploited poor security
awareness by repeatedly requesting approval to run until the administrator finally clicked ‘OK’. Unpacking
itself silently into a temporary folder, this first stage malware hid itself as a legitimate file and changed the
system to ensure it continued to run between reboots of the computer. Once installed, it started
communicating with attacker-controlled domains.
After a number of days, the initial malware downloaded a second stage executable (the RAT) and a
configuration file. To discover more about the victim organisation, the attackers configured the malware to
exfiltrate captured screenshots. Data was covertly delivered for nearly a week until the transfers were
detected. The domains were then blocked and the machine was disconnected from the network for forensic
analysis.
The compromise was detected before any significant damage could be done. However, the investigation and
clean-up operation required the assistance of industry experts and disrupted the day-to-day operation of the
organisation.

Capabilities, vulnerabilities and mitigations

The information to identify the system administrator and topics of interest to socially engineer the spear-
phish was likely to have been derived from surveying publically available information. The clean-up operation
could have been averted by more effective implementation of the following cyber security controls:
 user training education and awareness - would have ensured staff understood how personal
information can be openly accessed, and made them suspicious of unsolicited email with
unexpected attachments and being asked to run executable files
 user access controls - enforcing these on the basis of least privilege, for high risk activities (such as
web browsing), could help to protect privileged accounts; allowing completely open browsing from
the admin computer was the critical security weakness
 network perimeter defences - the Trojan and the delivery stage executable should have been
detected and blocked by firewall policies, a filtering web proxy or corporate malware protection
software, none of which were implemented on the system administration computer
 secure configuration - would have prevented such malware from being able to run

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Disclaimer
This document has been produced jointly by GCHQ and Cert-UK. It is not intended to be an exhaustive guide
to potential cyber threats, is not tailored to individual needs and is not a replacement for specialist advice.
Users should ensure they take appropriate specialist advice where necessary.
This document is provided without any warranty or representation of any kind whether express or implied.
The government departments involved in the production of this document cannot therefore accept any
liability whatsoever for any loss or damage suffered or costs incurred by any person arising from the use of
this document.
Findings and recommendations in this document have not been provided with the intention of avoiding all
risks and following the recommendations will not remove all such risks. Ownership of information risks
remains with the relevant system owner at all times.
Crown Copyright 2015

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