1. People v. Bautista, G.R. No.

168641, 27 April 2007, 522 SCRA 742

Facts:
On June 12, 1999, a dispute arose between respondent and his co-accused Leonida Bautista, on one hand,
and private complainant Felipe Goyena, Jr., on the other.
Private complainant filed a Complaint with the Office of the Barangay of Malate, Manila, but no settlement
was reached. The barangay chairman then issued a Certification to file action dated August 11, 1999.2
On August 16, 1999, private complainant filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) a Complaint for
slight physical injuries against herein respondent and his co-accused. After conducting the preliminary
investigation, Prosecutor Jessica Junsay-Ong issued a Joint Resolution dated November 8, 1999
recommending the filing of an Information against herein respondent. Such recommendation was
approved by the City Prosecutor, represented by First Assistant City Prosecutor Eufrocino A. Sulla, but the
date of such approval cannot be found in the records. The Information was, however, filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 28 only on June 20, 2000.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the case against him on the ground that by the time the Information
was filed, the 60-day period of prescription from the date of the commission of the crime, that is, on June
12, 1999 had already elapsed. The MeTC ruled that the offense had not yet prescribed. RTC upheld the
decision but CA reversed.
Issue:
WON the filing of the Complaint with the OCP effectively interrupted the running of the 60-day
prescriptive period for instituting the criminal action for slight physical injuries.
Ruling:
No. It is not disputed that the filing of the Complaint with the OCP effectively interrupted the running of
the 60-day prescriptive period for instituting the criminal action for slight physical injuries. However, the
sole issue for resolution in this case is whether the prescriptive period began to run anew after the
investigating prosecutor’s recommendation to file the proper criminal information against respondent was
approved by the City Prosecutor.
The proceedings against respondent was not terminated upon the City Prosecutor's approval of the
investigating prosecutor's recommendation that an information be filed with the court. The prescriptive
period remains tolled from the time the complaint was filed with the Office of the Prosecutor until such
time that respondent is either convicted or acquitted by the proper court.
The Office of the Prosecutor miserably incurred some delay in filing the information but such mistake or
negligence should not unduly prejudice the interests of the State and the offended party.

2. Panaguiton, Jr. v. DOJ, G.R. No. 167571, 25 November 2008, 571 SCRA 549
Facts:
Cawili borrowed various sums of money from the petitioner. Cawili and his business associate, Tongson,
jointly issued in favor of petitioner three checks which bear the signature of both in payment of the said
loans. Upon presentment for payment, the checks were dishonored. Petitioner, Panaguiton, made
 demands but to no avail and so he filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson for violating Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22) before the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office.
During the preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit. Tongson
alleged that he himself filed some complaints against Cawili and they are not associates. Panaguiton
showed documents proving the signatures of Tongson to strengthen his complaint against Tongson. In a
resolution, City Prosecutor found probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against
Tongson.
A case was filed against Cawili before the proper court but the petitioner filed a partial appeal before the
Department of Justice. The Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño directed the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned
signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation.
Assistant City Prosecutor Sampaga dismissed the complaint against Tongson since the offense had already
prescribed. An appeal by Panaguiton to the Department of Justice thru Undersecretary Manuel A.J.
Teehankee was dismissed. But on motion for reconsideration, Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez
declared that the offense had not prescribed. On motion for reconsideration, this time by Tongson, DOJ
reversed and held that the offense had already prescribed.
Issue:
WON the offense has prescribed as Act No. 3326 applies to violation of special acts and that Act No. 3326
states that prescription shall be interrupted when judicial proceedings are instituted.
Ruling:
No. SC agreed that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under B.P. Blg. 22
merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a
fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4) years from the commission
of the offense or, if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof. Nevertheless, SC
cannot uphold the position that only the filing of a case in court can toll the running of the prescriptive
period.
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses
was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, “institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment,” and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a
complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense
is halted.
The court ruled and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner’s filing of his complaint-
affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor signified the commencement of the proceedings for the
prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they
had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable cause, with
the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of the
information against petitioner.
3. Jadewell Parking Systems vs. Lidua
Facts:
Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator duly authorized to operate and
manage the parking spaces in Baguio City pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000. It is also authorized under
Section 13 of the City Ordinance to render any motor vehicle immobile by placing its wheels in a clamp if the
vehicle is illegally parked.
Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (Jadewell alleged in their affidavit-complaint that on May 17, 2003,
the respondents Edwin Ang, Benedicto Balajadia and John Doe dismantled, took and carried away the clamp
attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure owned by Edwin Ang.
In his Counter-affidavit, respondent Benedicto Balajadia denied that his car was parked illegally. He admitted
that he removed the clamp restricting the wheel of his car since he alleged that the placing of a clamp on the
wheel of the vehicle was an illegal act. He alleged further that he removed the clamp not to steal it but to
remove the vehicle from its clamp so that he and his family could continue using the car.
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando City, La Union found no probable cause to charge
respondents in these two (2) cases for the felony of Robbery. However according to the Provincial
Prosecutor, the acts of respondents in removing the wheel clamps on the wheels of the cars involved in
these cases and their failure to pay the prescribed fees were in violation of Sec. 21 of Baguio City Ordinance
No. 003-2000.
A case was filed for the violation of said ordinance with the MTC of Baguio City. Respondents then filed a
Motion to Quash. The Motion to Quash and/or Manifestation sought the quashal of the two Informations on
the grounds of extinguishment of criminal action or liability due to prescription. Judge Lidua granted the said
motion to quash on the ground of prescription.
Petitioner contends that the prescription period of the offense in Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763,
does not apply because respondents were charged with the violation of a city ordinance and not a municipal
ordinance. In any case, assuming arguendo that the prescriptive period is indeed two months, filing a
Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor tolled the prescription period of two months. This is
because Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that, in Manila and in other chartered cities, the Complaint
shall be filed with the Office of the Prosecutor unless otherwise provided in their charters.
Issue: Whether or not the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003 tolled
the prescription period of the commission of the offense charged against respondents
Ruling:
NO. As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are
violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is
for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure:
For violation of a special law or ordinance, the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day of
the commission of the violation, and if the same is not known at the time, from the discovery and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted
only by the filing of the complaint or information in court and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy.
Moreover, there is no distinction between the filing of the Information contemplated in the Rules of Criminal
Procedure and in the Rules of Summary Procedure. When the representatives of the petitioner filed the
Complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor of Baguio, the prescription period was running. It continued to run
until the filing of the Information. They had two months to file the Information and institute the judicial
proceedings by filing the Information with the Municipal Trial Court. The conduct of the preliminary
investigation, the original charge of Robbery, and the subsequent finding of the violation of the ordinance did
not alter the period within which to file the Information. Respondents were correct in arguing that the
petitioner only had two months from the discovery and commission of the offense before it prescribed within
which to file the Information with the Municipal Trial Court
4. Zaldivia vs. Reyes
Facts:
The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's permit in violation of
Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal.
The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990.1 The referral-complaint of the police was received by
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990. 2= The corresponding information was filed
with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990.
The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed, but the motion
was denied. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, the denial was sustained by the respondent judge.
Her conclusion citing the Rules on Summary Procedure and Act 3326 is that as the information was filed
way beyond the two-month statutory period from the date of the alleged commission of the offense, the
charge against her should have been dismissed on the ground of prescription.
For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the filing of the
complaint against her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Agreeing with the respondent judge, the
Solicitor General also invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, providing as
follows:
Sec. 1. How Instituted — For offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases, the
institution of criminal action shall be as follows:
a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, by filing the complaint with the
appropriate officer for the purpose of conducting the requisite preliminary investigation therein;
b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, by
filing the complaint directly with the said courts, or a complaint with the fiscal's office. However, in
Metropolitan Manila and other chartered cities, the complaint may be filed only with the office of the fiscal.
In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged
Issue: Whether or not the filing of the information with the office of the Provincial Prosecutor tolled the
running of the prescriptive period
Ruling:
No. As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are violations
of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of
a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
Section 1 Rule 110 meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule on summary
procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies that the section does not apply to offenses which are
subject to summary procedure.
Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly in
court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." 6 Both parties agree that
this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to.
However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the
prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive
period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that. At any
rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule
110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict
between Act. No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because
this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right.
5. STATE PROSECUTOR RINGCAR B. PINOTE v. JUDGE ROBERTO L. AYCO
The judge’s act of allowing the presentation of the defense witnesses in the absence of public prosecutor or a
private prosecutor designated for the purpose is a clear transgression of the Rules.
Judge Roberto L. Ayco of Regional Trial Court (RTC) of South Cotabato allowed the defense in a criminal case
to present evidence consisting of the testimony of two witnesses, even in the absence of State Prosecutor
Ringcar B. Pinote who was prosecuting the case. State Prosecutor Pinote was at that time undergoing medical
treatment at the Philippine Heart Center in Quezon City.
On the subsequent scheduled hearings of the criminal case, Pinote refused to cross-examine the two defense
witnesses, despite being ordered by Judge Ayco, maintaining that prior proceedings conducted in his absence
were void. Judge Ayco considered the prosecution to have waived its right to cross-examine the two defense
witnesses.
Hence, arose the present administrative complaint lodged by Pinote against Judge Ayco for “Gross Ignorance
of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority and Serious Misconduct.”
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Ayco violated the Rules on Criminal Procedure for allowing the defense to
present evidence in the absence of a prosecutor
HELD: Yes. As a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the control and direction of the
public prosecutor. If the schedule of the public prosecutor does not permit, however, or in case there are no
public prosecutors, a private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office
or the Regional State Prosecution Office to prosecute the case, subject to the approval of the court. Once so
authorized, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case until the termination of the trial
even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn.
Violation of criminal laws is an affront to the People of the Philippines as a whole and not merely to the person
directly prejudiced, he being merely the complaining witness. It is on this account that the presence of a public
prosecutor in the trial of criminal cases is necessary to protect vital state interests, foremost of which is its
interest to vindicate the rule of law, the bedrock of peace of the people.
Judge Ayco’s intention to uphold the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of the case, no matter how
noble it may be, cannot justify a breach of the Rules. If the accused is entitled to due process, so is the State.
Judge Ayco’s lament about Pinote’s failure to inform the court of his inability to attend the hearings or to file a
motion for postponement thereof or to subsequently file a motion for reconsideration of his Orders allowing
the defense to present its two witnesses on said dates may be mitigating. It does not absolve Judge Ayco of his
utter disregard of the Rules.

6. People v. Piccio
Facts: Gimenez, President of Phil. Integrated Advertising Agency, advertising arm of Yuchengco Group of
Companies, filed an affidavit for libel before Office of City Prosecutor against Parents Enabling Parents
Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI) for posting “Back to the Trenches: A Call to Arms, AY/HELEN Chose the War Dance w/
Coalition. As alleged in the complaint, was highly defamatory and libelous. The Office of City Prosecution of
Makati City found probable cause to indict 16 trustees, officers, and/or member of PEPCI.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners, being mere private complainants, may appeal an order of the trial court
dismissing a criminal case even without the OSG’s conformity.
Ruling: No.
It is well-settled that the authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Court and
the CA is vested solely in the OSG which is the law office of the Government whose specific powers and
functions include that of representing the Republic and/or the people before any court in any action which
affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require. (remarks: case did not mention rule
110)
Here, it is clear that petitioners did not file their appeal merely to preserve their interest in the civil aspect of
the case. Rather, by seeking the reversal of the RTC’s quashal of the information in Criminal Case No. 06-875
and thereby seeking that the said court be directed to set the case for arraignment and to proceed with trial, it
is sufficiently clear that they sought the reinstatement of the criminal prosecution of respondents for libel.
Being an obvious attempt to meddle in to the criminal aspect of the case without the conformity of the OSG,
their recourse, in view of the above discussed principles, must necessarily fail. To repeat, the right to
prosecute criminal cases pertains exclusively to the People, which is therefore the proper party to bring the
appeal through the representation of the OSG.

7. PEOPLE VS. DELA CERNA

FACTS: Irene Dela Cerna, a 15-year-old, was been sexually abused by her own father in 6 different instances.
The sexual abused began when she was seven years old. She was afraid to tell anyone about the rape as she
feared for her life and her siblings. But eventually she revealed it to two of her best friends in school, who then
told their mother about it which led to bringing up the concern with the DSWD. Six separate complaints of
rape were filed on March 16, 1997.
 On July 3, 1998, Irene executed an affidavit of desistance, stating that she was no longer interested in
pursuing the cases against her father, and that the complaints filed with the Prosecutors Office and in court
were not her voluntary acts as she was only influenced and forced by the people who came to support and
intercede in her action. However, in November 29, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment finding the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The accused-appellant assails said decision and contends that the
trial court erred in convicting him despite the affidavit of desistance executed by the private complainant.

ISSUE: WON the Affidavit of Desistance executed by the private complainant be a ground to dismiss the
case.
RULING: No. It is worthy to note that the rape incidents in this case occurred prior to the effectivity of RA
8353, The Anti- Rape Law of 1997 which took effect on October 22, 1997 and classified the crime of rape as a
crime against persons. Such being the case, we shall apply the old law and treat the acts of rape herein
committed as private crimes. Thus, their institution, prosecution and extinction should still be governed by
Article 344 of the RPC which provides for two modes of extinguishment of criminal liability in cases of
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, which is by pardon and marriage. In all cases, however,
the pardon must come prior to the institution of the criminal action. After the case has been filed in court, any
pardon made by the private complainant, whether by sworn statement or on the witness stand, cannot
extinguish criminal liability.
In the case at bar, the private complainant’s Affidavit of Desistance was made after the institution of
the criminal action. Consequently, it cannot be a ground to dismiss the action in these cases. The reason for
this rule is that the true aggrieved party in a criminal prosecution is the People of the Philippines whose
collective sense of morality, decency and justice has been outraged. In such a case, the offended party
becomes merely a complaining witness. The complaint required by Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code is but
a condition precedent to the exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty parties in
the name of the People of the Philippines. Such condition is imposed out of consideration for the offended
woman and her family who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through with the
scandal of a public trial. Hence, once filed, control of the prosecution is removed from the offended party’s
hands and any change of heart by the victim will not affect the states right to vindicate the atrocity committed
against itself.

8. PEOPLE VS. GO, GR. NO. 201644

FACTS: The complainant Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation(PDIC), as a receiver, filed 7 criminal
information with the RTC against various accused including Go and Dela Rosa, charging them of Estafa through
Falsification of Commercial Documents for allegedly defrauding Orient Commercial Banking Corporation.
The trial of the case was marred by a series of postponements/cancellation of hearings caused mainly
by the prosecution. This prompted respondents to file a Motion to Dismiss for failure to prosecute and for
violation of their right to speedy trial. The RTC dismissed the criminal cases. The prosecution moved for
reconsideration which was granted in the interest of justice, thus resulting in the reinstatement of the criminal
case against the respondents. This time, it was the respondents who moved for the reconsideration which
was, however, denied by the RTC. This prompted them to file a petition for certiorari  before the CA.  A copy of
said petition was served, however, only on the private complainant, i.e., the PDIC, and not the People of the
Philippines (the People), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as it was not even impleaded as
party to the case. The CA, without first ordering the respondents to implead the People, annulled and set
aside the assailed orders of the RTC, and consequently dismissed the criminal cases against respondents.

ISSUE: WON the criminal cases against respondents were properly dismissed by the CA on certiorari,
without the People, as represented by the OSG, having been impleaded.

RULING: No. It is undisputed that in their petition for certiorari before the CA, respondents failed to implead
the People of the Philippines as a party thereto. Because of this, the petition was obviously defective. As
provided in Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, all criminal actions are prosecuted
under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. Therefore, it behooved the petitioners (respondents
herein) to implead the People of the Philippines as respondent in the CA case to enable the Solicitor General
to comment on the petition.
While the failure to implead an indispensable party is not per se a ground for the dismissal of an action,
considering that said party may still be added by order of the court, on motion of the party or on its own
initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just,31 it remains essential – as it is jurisdictional –
that any indispensable party be impleaded in the proceedings before the court renders judgment. This is
because the absence of such indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for
want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.

9. Laude vs. Ginez-Jabalde

FACTS: This involves the celebrated case of Jeffrey “Jennifer” Laude (Jennifer) killed at the Celzone Lodge on
Ramon Magsaysay Drive in Olongapo City allegedly by 19-year-old US Marine L/CPL Joseph Scott Pemberton
(Pemberton). A Complaint for murder was filed by Jennifer’s sibling, Marilou S. Laude, against Pemberton
before the Office of the City Prosecutor which Information was later filed with the RTC in Olongapo City.

On 19 December 2014, Pemberton surrendered personally to the RTC Judge and was later arraigned. On the
same day of Arraignment petitioner Laude filed an Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to Surrender the Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail and a Motion to Allow Media
Coverage. The motion was scheduled on 22 December 2014, 2PM. According to petitioners, they were only
able to serve the Motion on Pemberton’s counsel through registered mail. In any case, they claim to have also
“furnished a copy of the [M]otion personally at the hearing of the [M]otion.  On 23 December 2014, the
Urgent Motion was denied, as well as its motion for reconsideration.

Quoting Rule 110, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Pemberton states that the Public
Prosecutor's lack of consent "rendered the Urgent Motion a mere scrap of paper." He adds that the defect is
"not a mere technicality.

Referring to Rule 110, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, public respondents aver that the requirement for
motions to be "filed in the name of and under the authority of the public prosecutor" is not a mere technical
requirement, but is part of "the essential, inherent, and exclusive power of the State to prosecute criminals.
Public respondents counter petitioners' claim that the Public Prosecutor's approval is superfluous given the
alleged position of Secretary De Lima in the newspaper articles. Public respondents, through their Comment
filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, argue that "[petitioners are not real parties in interest. They claim
that "the real party in interest is the People [of the Philippines], represented by the public prosecutor in the
lower court and by the Office of the Solicitor General

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case.

Ruling: No. The petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case since the main
issue raised by the petitioner involved the criminal aspect of the case, i.e., the existence of probable cause.
The petitioner did not appeal to protect his alleged pecuniary interest as an offended party of the crime, but
to cause the reinstatement of the criminal action against the respondents. This involves the right to prosecute
which pertains exclusively to the People, as represented by the OSG. In this case, petitioners have not shown
why the Motion may be allowed to fall under the exception. The alleged grave abuse of discretion of the
Public Prosecutor was neither clearly pleaded nor argued. The duty and authority to prosecute the criminal
aspects of this case, including the custody issue, are duly lodged in the Public Prosecutor. Her refusal to give
her conforme to the Motion is an act well within the bounds of her position. That petitioners used as bases
newspaper articles for claiming that the Public Prosecutor acted contrary to the position of Secretary De Lima
cannot be given weight. Public respondents are correct in asserting that the proper remedy would have been
for petitioners to have the act reversed by Secretary De Lima through proper legal venues.

10.People v. Sangil, 208 SCRA 696 (1992)

FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision dated September 28, 1989, of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 15, convicting the appellant of the crime of rape.

The victim-complainant Joselyn Sangil, a 19-year old lass testified that one midnight of September, 1983 (she
was only 13 years old then), she was awaken by hands taking off her panty. She saw that it was her father
removing her panty. She tried to push her father away but her father was strong besides he threatened her
that he (father-accused) will kill her if she (witness-victim) will not submit to his advances. Her father-accused
was able to deflower her because of his threat. Even though they were all sleeping in the same room (with her
parents and brothers and sisters), she could not shout for help because of fear.

During the confrontation with her sisters and mother. Araceli and Lourdes also confessed that they also have
been raped by the accused, and it was then when they decided to file a complaint against their father. the
Court finds the accused Felipe Sangil y Velisario guilty by proof beyond reasonable doubt and in accordance
with Art. 335 Revised Penal Code

In due time, the accused appealed to this Court, assailing only the jurisdiction of the trial court but none of its
findings on the criminal liability of the accused. The lone assignment of error alleges that:

The accused alleged that the trial court erred in hearing and deciding this case when it never acquired
jurisdiction over the same due to the lack of a proper complaint from the offended party charging accused-
appellant of rape on September 1983. Since the criminal complaint which Joselin signed on February 2, 1989
accused her father of having raped her in November 1984, the defense contends that he could not be
prosecuted for, and the trial court had no jurisdiction to convict him of having raped his daughter
in September 1983, as alleged in the information.

ISSUE: Whether or not jurisdictional requirement that a prosecution for rape should be commenced by a
complaint of the aggrieved party, by her parents, grandparents or guardian, pursuant to Sec. 5, Par. 3 of Rule
110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, was satisfied in this case.
RULING: Yes, The information was based on the first complaint which Joselin lodged with the Municipal Police
of Calumpit, Bulacan, and which is contained in her Sinumpaang Salaysay dated January 27, 1989. In that
"sworn" statement (it was not actually sworn to before the Municipal Judge although the proper jurat was
typewritten at the bottom of the "salaysay") she categorically stated in Tagalog, that she was raped twice by
her father - the first time in September 1983 and the second time in November 1984. The phrase "complaint
filed by the offended party" as used in Section 5, Rule 110 should be given a liberal or loose interpretation
meaning a "charge, allegation, grievance, accusation or denunciation" (p. 158, West's Legal Thesaurus
Dictionary) - rather than a strict legal construction, for more often than not the offended party who files it is
unschooled in the law. The purpose of the complaint in Section 5, Rule 110, is merely to initiate or commence
the prosecution of the accused. The victim's "sinumpaang salaysay" which was prepared in the vernacular and
the "complaint" in English, which must have been prepared for her by someone else, complement each other,
when read together, and satisfy the legal definition of a "complaint" as "a sworn statement charging a person
with an offense, subscribed by the offended party x x x" (Sec. 3, Rule 110, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure).
The Court is not inclined to disregard her salaysay (complaint) for mere lack of an oath for that would amount
to suppressing her anguished cry for redress.

11. Salvador vs. Chua

Facts: The petitioner and his wife Marinel Salvador were charged in the RTC with estafa. On March 30, 2011, the date
scheduled for the promulgation of the judgment, their counsel moved for the deferment of the promulgation inasmuch
as the petitioner was then suffering from hypertension. Unconvinced of the reason, the RTC proceeded to promulgate
its decision and was found guilty thereof. A Motion for Leave to file Notice of Appeal was filed but the same was denied
for failure to observe Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, but was eventually reconsidered, which
prompted the certiorari petition in the CA by the respondent. CA granted the certiorari denying the motion for
reconsideration on the denial of notice of appeal
Issue: Whether or not the respondent as the complainant in the criminal case had the legal personality to file the
petition for certiorari in the CA to assail the orders of the RTC despite the lack of consent of the OSG
Held: Yes. The OSG is the appellate counsel of the State in criminal proceedings pending in this Court and in the CA. This
is explicitly provided in Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987  Administrative Code, viz.: Section
35. Powers and Functions.—The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring
the services of lawyers x x x. It shall have the following specific powers and functions: (1) Represent the Government in
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in
the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in
which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. The Court has stressed that the People of
the Philippines, being the real party-in-interest in every criminal proceedings, can be represented only by the OSG in
criminal proceedings in the CA or in this Court. 26 Yet, this rule admits of exceptions, A special civil action
for certiorari may be filed by an aggrieved party alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court. It was held that the offended parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest
and personality as “person(s) aggrieved” to file the special civil action of prohibition and certiorari under Sections 1 and
2 of Rule 65. It was further held in De la Rosa  that the complainant has such an interest in the civil aspect of the case
that he may file a special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds.
In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. He should do so and
prosecute it in his name as such complainant. We affirm the CA’s holding on the respondent’s legal standing to institute
the special civil action for certiorari in order to annul the questioned orders of the RTC. For sure, her interest in the
criminal case did not end upon the granting of her Motion for Execution because the questioned orders opened the
possibility of defeating the judgment in her favor should the CA reverse or modify his conviction. She remained an
aggrieved party like the State in every sense, and, consequently, she had as much right as anyone else in the criminal
proceedings to adopt and to take the necessary procedural steps within the bounds of the Rules of Court  to serve and
protect her substantial interest. Although it is true that she could be represented by the OSG if it wanted to, she would
be reckless at that point to be disinterested in the appellate proceedings. Moreover, we would violate her fundamental
right to due process of law if we were to deny her the opportunity to assail and set aside the improperly resurrected
appeal of the petitioner.
12. Burgos, Jr. vs. Naval
Facts: This case stemmed from a letter-complaint 5 dated April 26, 2012 filed by Burgos, before the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, Taytay, Rizal, charging respondents spouses Naval of the crime of Estafa through Falsification of
Public Documents. Burgos alleged that he and his wife, Rubie S. Garcia-Burgos, were the registered owners of a lot with
an area of 1,389 square meters, situated in the Municipality of Taytay, Rizal. On November 19, 1996, the subject lot was
purportedly mortgaged to a certain Antonio Assad, 7 and subsequently, Burgos decided to obtain a loan from Sps. Naval
in order to avoid foreclosure. Respondents agreed and asked spouses Burgos to sign some blank documents in return —
to which they faithfully complied. ON a later date, Burgos discovered that the TCT was cancelled and was issued anew to
Sps. Naval. He claimed that the blank documents which he and his wife previously signed turned out to be a receipt and
a Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject lot through the ploy and conspiracy of respondents. Thereafter, or on February
11, 2013, an Information12 was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, accusing respondents of having
committed the aforesaid crime. RTC dismissed the case due to prescription and observed that the prescriptive period for
the alleged crime commenced from the time Burgos had constructive notice of the alleged falsification. Notably, the RTC
declared that it could not order the public prosecutor to amend the information to include the specific amount of
damage sustained by Burgos amounting to P8,500,000.00, as it would improperly infringe his executive functions. A
certiorari petition was filed to the CA which was consequently dismissed for failure of Burgos to join the People as
required by the Administrative Code of 1987. Significantly, the CA observed that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
has not consented to the filing of the certiorari petition.
Issue: whether or nor CA erred in dismissing the certiorari petition on the ground that the People, as represented by the
OSG, was not impleaded as a party.
Held: No. Jurisprudence dictates that it is the OSG which possesses the requisite authority to represent the People in an
appeal on the criminal aspect of a case. The OSG is “the law office of the Government whose specific powers and
functions include that of representing the Republic and/or the [P]eople before any court in any action which affects the
welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require.” Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code provides that: Section 35. Powers and Functions.—The Office of the Solicitor General shall
represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyer. x x x. It shall have the following specific
powers and functions: (1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts
or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official
capacity is a party. It must, however, be clarified that the CA’s dismissal of Burgos’s certiorari petition is without
prejudice to his filing of the appropriate action to preserve his interest in the civil aspect of the  Estafa through
Falsification of Public Documents case, provided that the parameters of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure are
complied with.
13. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LTSG. DOMINADOR BAYABOS

G.R. Nos. 171222 & 174786, 18 February 2015

The failure by school authorities to take any action to prevent the offenses as provided by the law exposes
them to criminal liability as accomplices in the criminal acts. Thus, the institution and its officers cannot stand
idly by in the face of patently criminal acts committed within their sphere of responsibility. They bear the
commensurate duty to ensure that the crimes covered by the Anti-Hazing Law are not committed.

FACTS: Fernando C. Balidoy, Jr. was admitted as a probationary midshipman at the Philippine Merchant
Marine Academy (PMMA). In order to reach active status, all new entrants were required to successfully
complete the mandatory “Indoctrination and Orientation Period,” which was set from 2 May to 1 June 2001.
Balidoy died on 3 May 2001. PMMA were criminally charged before the Sandiganbayan as accomplices to
hazing under the Anti-Hazing Law. Before they were arraigned, the Sandiganbayan quashed the Information
against them on the basis of the dismissal of the criminal case against the principal accused and, the failure to
include in the Information the material averments required by the Anti-Hazing Law. Consequently, this
petition was filed before this Court questioning the Sandiganbayan’s quashal of the Information.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused can assail the information at any time before entering a plea.

RULING: YES. At any time before entering a plea, an accused may assail the information filed with the court
based on the grounds enumerated in Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, one of which is the claim that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense. In assessing whether an information must be quashed on that
ground, the basic test is to determine if the facts averred would establish the presence of the essential
elements of the crime as defined in the law. The information is examined without consideration of the truth or
veracity of the claims therein, as these are more properly proven or controverted during the trial. In the
appraisal of the information, matters aliunde are not taken into account.

Section 14, Article III of the Constitution, recognizes the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against them. As a manifestation of this constitutional right, the Rules of Court
requires that the information charging persons with an offense be “sufficient.” One of the key components of
a “sufficient information” is the statement of the acts or omissions constituting the offense charged, subject of
the complaint. The information must also be crafted in a language ordinary and concise enough to enable
persons of common understanding to know the offense being charged against them. This approach is intended
to allow them to suitably prepare for their defense, as they are presumed to have no independent knowledge
of the facts constituting the offense they have purportedly committed. The information need not be in the
same kind of language used in the law relied upon.

14. MARCELO LASOY and FELIX BANISA, vs. HON. MONINA A. ZENAROSA
G.R. No. 129472. April 12, 2005

FACTS: On July 2, 1996 the accused were arrested fro possession and transport of marijuana leaves (in bricks).
They were charged with the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, with the information containing the
fact that they were in possession of and were transporting, selling or offering to sell 42.410 grams of dried
marijuana fruiting tops. The accused was then arraigned, pleaded guilty and convicted. Subsequently they
applied for probation. Thereafter the prosecutor’s office filed two motions to admit amended information
(claiming that the marijuana recovered was 42.410 kilos, not grams) and to set aside the arraignment of the
accused; the accused then moved to quash the motion raising the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the first information is valid.

RULING: YES. Pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court under Rule 110 are hereunder quoted:
Section 4. Information defined.—An information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an
offense subscribed by the fiscal and filed with the court.
In Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan,33 this Court citing People v. Marquez affirmed: It should be observed that
section 3 of Rule 110 defines an information as nothing more than “an accusation in writing charging a person
with an offense subscribed by the fiscal and filed with the court.”
An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the offense and the
acts or omissions constitutive thereof. In other words, if the offense is stated in such a way that a person of
ordinary intelligence may immediately know what is meant, and the court can decide the matter according to
law, the inevitable conclusion is that the information is valid. It is not necessary to follow the language of the
statute in the information. The information will be sufficient if it describes the crime defined by law.
 Applying the foregoing, the inescapable conclusion is that the first information is valid inasmuch as it
sufficiently alleges the manner by which the crime was committed. Verily the purpose of the law, that is, to
apprise the accused of the nature of the charge against them, is reasonably complied with. Furthermore, the
first information, applying Rule 110,37Section 6, shows on its face that it is valid.
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.—A complaint or information is sufficient if it states
the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the
offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed.

Moreover, an administrative order of the Supreme Court designated Regional Trial Courts to exclusively try
and decide cases of … violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, regardless of the quantity of
the drugs involved. (PP. vs. Velasco) Therefore, the requisites of double jeopardy being present, the defense
attaches. 
15. People v Puig
Facts: Respondents were conspiring, confederating, and helping one another, with grave abuse of confidence,
being the Cashier and Bookkeeper of the Rural Bank of Pototan, Inc., Pototan, Iloilo, without the knowledge
and/or consent of the management of the Bank and with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, steal and carry away the sum of P15,000.00, Philippine Currency, to the damage and
prejudice of the said bank in the aforesaid amount. However, the trial court did not find the existence of
probable cause because (1) the element of ‗taking without the consent of the owners‘ was missing on the
ground that it is the depositors-clients, and not the Bank, which filed the complaint in these cases, who are the
owners of the money allegedly taken by respondents and hence, are the real parties-in-interest; and (2) the
Informations are bereft of the phrase alleging "dependence, guardianship or vigilance between the
respondents and the offended party that would have created a high degree of confidence between them
which the respondents could have abused.".

Issue: Whether the 112 informations for qualified theft sufficiently allege the element of taking without the
consent of the owner, and the qualifying circumstance of grave abuse of confidence.

Ruling: YES. The dismissal by the RTC of the criminal cases was allegedly due to insufficiency of the
Informations and, therefore, because of this defect, there is no basis for the existence of probable cause which
will justify the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Petitioner assails the dismissal contending that the
Informations for Qualified Theft sufficiently state facts which constitute (a) the qualifying circumstance of
grave abuse of confidence; and (b) the element of taking, with intent to gain and without the consent of the
owner, which is the Bank.
The RTC Judge based his conclusion that there was no probable cause simply on the insufficiency of the
allegations in the Informations concerning the facts constitutive of the elements of the offense charged. The
relationship between banks and depositors has been held to be that of creditor and debtor.

Articles 1953 and 1980 of the New Civil Code, as appropriately pointed out by petitioner, provide as follows:
Article 1953. A person who receives a loan of money or any other fungible thing acquires the ownership
thereof, and is bound to pay to the creditor an equal amount of the same kind and quality. Article 1980. Fixed,
savings, and current deposits of money in banks and similar institutions shall be governed by the provisions
concerning loan.

The Bank acquires ownership of the money deposited by its clients; and the employees of the Bank, who are
entrusted with the possession of money of the Bank due to the confidence reposed in them, occupy positions
of confidence. The Informations, therefore, sufficiently allege all the essential elements constituting the crime
of Qualified Theft.

16. People v Cederon

Facts: Elmer Ceredon y Pagaran was indicted for 10 counts of rape, defined and penalized under Article 266(A)
and (B) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353 and R.A. No. 7659, for raping his youngest
sister, a minor of 10 years of age, all against her will and consent. The series of rape occurred between 1995
until 2000. Elmer initially pleaded not guilty. However, the said plea was later changed to ―guilty.

Five years later, when AAA (the victim) was already 15 years old, she revealed to her sister DDD, friend Giselle,
and teacher Teresa that she was raped by her brother. Teresa, upon hearing AAA‘s revelation, accompanied
her to their head teacher Felix Salvador. Then, together, they went to the barangay captain who told them to
report the matter to the police. This they did. During the confrontation in the police station sometime on
September 2000, Elmer initially admitted to having raped AAA thrice only. Josephine, Elmer‘s wife, told him to
admit so that AAA could forgive him. He then admitted that he had raped her 10 times and asked for
forgiveness, beseeching her to take pity on his family. AAA replied that she could no longer forgive him
because her heart had already hardened like stone.

The RTC convicted Elmer for 10 counts of rape and imposed the supreme penalty of death in each of the 10
criminal information. Upon automatic appeal to the CA, the CA also affirmed Elmer‘s conviction. Elmer claims
that his conviction was based on his ―improvident plea of guilt. He argues that when he was re-arraigned and
he pleaded "guilty" to all ten charges of rape levelled against him, he was not fully apprised of the
consequences of his change of plea from "not guilty" to "guilty." According to him, the trial court did not
inquire as to the voluntariness of his plea and that it failed to explain fully to him that once convicted, he
would be meted the death penalty under R.A. No. 7659. Hence, he contends, his conviction should be set
aside.
Issue/s: 1. Whether the trial court erred in convicting Elmer in nine (9) criminal cases considering that the said
Informations failed to sufficiently establish with particularity the dates of the commission of the offense. NO.

2. Assuming further that the prosecution has sufficiently established with particularity the date of the
commission of the offense, whether the trial court gravely erred in imposing the death penalty on the accused
as the qualifying circumstance that the accused is the brother of the victim and, hence, a relative within the
second degree of consanguinity was not properly alleged. NO.

Ruling/s:
1. The date or time of the commission of the rape need not be alleged with precision. It is enough for the
information or complaint to state that the crime has been committed at a time as near as possible to the date
of its actual commission. Failure to allege the exact date when the crime happened does not render the
information defective, much less void. An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the elements of the
offense and the constitutive acts or omissions. The exact date of the commission of a crime is not an essential
element of it. Thus, in a prosecution for rape, the material fact or circumstance to be considered is the
occurrence of the rape, not the time of its commission. The failure to specify the exact date or time when it
was committed does not ipso facto make the information defective on its face. The date or time of the
commission of rape is not a material ingredient of the said crime because the gravamen of rape is carnal
knowledge of a woman through force and intimidation. In fact, the precise time when the rape takes place has
no substantial bearing on its commission. As such, the date or time need not be stated with absolute accuracy.
It is sufficient that the complaint or information states that the crime has been committed at any time as near
as possible to the date of its actual commission.

2. Nor was there any defect in the Informations when they merely averred that the victim was the youngest
sister of appellant. We do not agree with the defense that in order for relationship to qualify in this case, it
must be mentioned that the victim is a "relative within the second degree of consanguinity." This is not a novel
question. The same issue was addressed by the Court in People v. Sanchez. In the said case, appellant argued
that he could not be meted the death penalty for raping his sister for failure of the information to allege that
said private complainant was a "relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity." The Court struck down
appellant's argument in the following tenor: We have held in People v. Ferolino, that: "If the offender is
merely a relation - not a parent, ascendant, stepparent, or guardian or common law spouse of the mother of
the victim - it must be alleged in the information that he is a relative by consanguinity or affinity (as the case
may be) within the civil degree. That relationship by consanguinity or affinity was not alleged in the
informations in these cases. Even if it was, it was still necessary to further allege that such relationship was
within the third civil degree."
17. PEOPLE VS SORIANO (issues 1 and 2 may suffice)
FACTS: (Father raped minor daughter but there were inconsistencies in her testimony.)
The prosecution charged appellant with raping his then 12-year old daughter AAA. The prosecution presented
AAA who narrated the harrowing ordeal she went through with her father. AAA testified that one evening in
October of 2000 she was awakened from her sleep as she felt someone moving on top of her. She became
aware that it was appellant, her father, sexually molesting her. She tried to push her father away but he was
too strong. She then tried to reach out to her sister, BBB, who was sleeping nearby, but the latter was sleeping
soundly. At that time, her mother was in Manila. Appellant threatened to kill AAA if she would tell her mother
what transpired. Appellant thereafter repeatedly raped AAA and she eventually gave birth to a baby boy.
The defense presented EEE, apellant's wife and victim's mother. On the witness stand, EEE presented the
affidavit of desistance allegedly executed by AAA. The RTC found him guilty of multiple rape.

On appeal, appellant questioned the ruling of the trial court on the ground that there were inconsistencies
in the testimony of AAA as to what transpired during the alleged first rape, in particular as to whether
appellant removed her undergarments prior to the sexual act. Appellant further makes issue of the fact that
the trial court disregarded the affidavit of desistance signed by his daughter.

ISSUES: 1. W/N charging more than one offense in one Information would automatically render the case
worthy of dismissal.
RULING: NO. The Court observes that the information charged more than one offense in violation of Section
13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Considering that appellant did not seasonably
object to the multiple offenses in the information, the court may convict the appellant of as many as are
charged and proved. We note, however, that both the RTC and CA merely found the appellant guilty of
"multiple rape" without specifying the number of rapes that appellant is guilty of. While this may have been
irrelevant considering that appellant would have been sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of death even
if only one count of rape was proven, the same is still important since this would have bearing on appellant's
civil liability. Further, there is no such crime as "multiple rape."

2. W/N the inconsistencies in the oral testimony of AAA is material and should merit the dismissal of the
case or finding AAA as a credible witness.
RULING: NO. Appellant makes issue of the fact that AAA could not remember whether her father had pulled
down her panties. This inconsistency refers merely to a minor and insignificant. The Court has repeatedly
ruled that discrepancies referring only to minor details and not to the central fact of the crime do not affect
the veracity or detract from the credibility of a witness' declaration, as long as these are coherent and
intrinsically believable on the whole.  The Court has recognized that even the most candid of witnesses make
erroneous, confused, or inconsistent statements, especially when they are young and easily overwhelmed by
the atmosphere in the courtroom. It is even expected when the victim is recounting the painful details of a
humiliating experience which are difficult to recall in open court and in the presence of other people.
In any case, this issue goes into the credibility of AAA as a witness. Well-settled is the rule that findings of
facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the trial court because of its unique
position of having observed the witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is
denied to the appellate courts. For this reason, the trial court's findings are accorded finality, unless there
appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight which the lower court may have overlooked,
misunderstood, or misappreciated and which, if properly considered, would alter the result of the case.

3. Whether the Affidavit of Desistance merits dismissal of the case.

RULING: NO. Appellant further argues that the affidavit of desistance is evidence that AAA by her own
declaration was not raped by appellant. This Court looks with disfavor on affidavits of desistance. We have
said in so many cases that retractions are generally unreliable and are looked upon with considerable
disfavor by the courts. The unreliable character of this document is shown by the fact that it is quite
incredible that after going through the process of having the accused-appellant arrested by the police,
positively identifying him as the person who raped her, enduring the humiliation of a physical examination
of her private parts, and then repeating her accusations in open court by recounting her anguish. Thus, we
have declared that at most the retraction is an afterthought which should not be given probative value. It
would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before the court of justice simply because the
witness who has given it later on changed his mind for one reason or another.
The Court notes that it was AAA's mother who presented the affidavit of desistance while on the witness
stand. AAA, however, refused to validate the due execution of the affidavit. Moreover, during cross
examination, EEE admitted that she had personal knowledge of the act committed by her husband against her
daughter and that the affidavit of desistance was executed on the condition that appellant would leave his
family.

18. RICARZE V. COURT OF APPEALS

SHOTGUN FACTS: Petitioner’s gripe that the charges against him should be dismissed because the
allegations in both Informations failed to name PCIB as true offended party does not hold water.
FACTS:
Petitioner Eduardo G. Ricarze was employed as a collector-messenger by City Service Corporation, a
corporation engaged in messengerial services. He was assigned to t Caltex Philippines, Inc. (Caltex). He was
tasked to collect checks payable to Caltex and deliver them to the cashier. He also delivered invoices to
Caltex’s customers.

Caltex filed a criminal complaint against petitioner for estafa through falsification of commercial documents. It
alleged that when a daily electronic report conducted by Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank (PCIB), one
of its depositary banks, it was discovered that unknown to the department, various company checks were
forged, while some were missing. It was later discovered that Ricarze deposited the said checks in a savings
account in BDO in the name of a regular customer of Caltex, Dante Gutierrez. After the requisite preliminary
investigation, two (2) Informations for estafa through falsification of commercial documents were filed
against petitioner naming Caltex as an offended party.

The prosecution presented its witnesses, after which the Siguion Reyna, Montecillio and Ongsiako Law
Offices (SRMO) as private prosecutor filed a Formal Offer of Evidence. Petitioner opposed the pleading,
contending that the private complainant was represented by the ACCRA Law Offices and the Balgos and
Perez Law Office during trial, and it was only after the prosecution had rested its case that SRMO entered its
appearance as private prosecutor representing the PCIB. Since the ACCRA and Balgos and Perez Law Offices
had not withdrawn their appearance, SRMO had no personality to appear as private prosecutor. Under the
Informations, the private complainant is Caltex and not PCIB; hence, the Formal Offer of Evidence filed by
SRMO should be stricken from the records.

Petitioner further averred that unless the Informations were amended to change the private complainant to
PCIB, his right as accused would be prejudiced. He pointed out, however, that the Informations can no
longer be amended because he had already been arraigned under the original Informations. 

Petitioner filed a Motion to Expunge the Opposition of SRMO. He averred that the substitution of PCIB as
private complainant cannot be made by mere oral motion; the Information must be amended to allege that
the private complainant was PCIB and not Caltex after the preliminary investigation of the appropriate
complaint of PCIB.

In response, the PCIB, through SRMO, averred that as provided in Section 2, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the erroneous designation of the name of the offended party is a mere formal defect
which can be cured by inserting the name of the offended party in the Information.

ISSUE:W/N the charges against petitioner should be dismissed because the allegations in both Informations
failed to name PCIB as true offended party.
RULING: NO. The rules on criminal procedure require the complaint or information to state the name and
surname of the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed or any appellation
or nickname by which such person has been or is known and if there is no better way of Identifying him, he
must be described under a fictitious name (Rule 110, Section 11, Revised Rules of Court; now Rule 110, Section
12 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.] In case of offenses against property, the designation of the name
of the offended party is not absolutely indispensable for as long as the criminal act charged in the complaint or
information can be properly identified. Thus, Rule 110, Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Section 11. Name of the offended party-
(a) In cases of offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is unknown, the property,
subject matter of the offense, must be described with such particularity as to properly Identify the
particular offense charged.
(b) If in the course of the trial, the true name of the person against whom or against whose property
the offense was committed is disclosed or ascertained, the court must cause the true name to be
inserted in the complaint or information or record.
When an offense shall have been described in the complaint with sufficient certainty as to Identify the act, an
erroneous allegation as to the person injured shall be deemed immaterial as the same is a mere formal defect
which did not tend to prejudice any substantial right of the defendant.

In this case, there is no question that the very act of commission of the offense of September 24, 1997 and
October 15, 1997 respectively, Caltex was the one defrauded by the act of the felony. In the light of these
facts, petitioner submits that the twin information are DEFECTIVE AND VOID due to the FALSE ALLEGATIONS
that the offense was committed to the prejudice of Caltex when it truth and in fact the one prejudiced here
was PCIBank. However, the Court ruled that being subrogated to the right of Caltex, PCIB, through counsel,
has the right to intervene in the proceedings, and under substantive laws is entitled to restitution of its
properties or funds, reparation, or indemnification.
19. Senador v People
Facts: Rita Jaime (Rita) and her daughter-in-law, Cynthia Jaime (Cynthia), were engaged in a jewelry business
in the City of Dumaguete. In the covering Trust Receipt Agreement signed by Cynthia and Senador (Accused),
the latter undertook to sell the jewelry thus delivered on commission basis and, thereafter, to remit the
proceeds of the sale, or return the unsold items to Cynthia within fifteen (15) days from the delivery. However,
as events turned out, Senador failed to turn over the proceeds of the sale or return the unsold jewelry within
the given period the said accused, having obtained and received various kinds of jewelry valued in the total
amount of ₱705,685.00. Senador asserted that the person named as the offended party in the Information is
not the same person who made the demand and filed the complaint. According to Senador, the private
complainant in the Information went by the name "Cynthia Jaime," whereas, during trial, the private
complainant turned out to be "Rita Jaime." Hence, citing People v. Uba, et al. (Uba) and United States v.
Lahoylahoy and Madanlog (Lahoylahoy),  Senador would insist on her acquittal on the postulate that her
constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the accusation against her has been violated. RTC found
petitioner guilty. CA affirmed.

Issue: Whether or not the erroneous designation of the offended party is material in this case

Ruling: No. In Uba, the appellant was charged with oral defamation, a crime against honor, wherein the
identity of the person against whom the defamatory words were directed is a material element. Thus, an
erroneous designation of the person injured is material. On the contrary, in the instant case, Senador was
charged with estafa, a crime against property that does not absolutely require as indispensable the proper
designation of the name of the offended party. Rather, what is absolutely necessary is the correct
identification of the criminal act charged in the information. Thus, in case of an error in the designation of the
offended party in crimes against property, Rule 110, Sec. 12 of the Rules of Court mandates the correction of
the information, not its dismissal: SEC. 12. Name of the offended party.—The complaint or information must
state the name and surname of the person against whom or against whose property the offense was
committed, or any appellation or nickname by which such person has been or is known. If there is no better
way of identifying him, he must be described under a fictitious name. (a) In offenses against property, if the
name of the offended party is unknown, the property must be described with such particularity as to properly
identify the offense charged. (b) If the true name of the person against whom or against whose property the
offense was committed is thereafter disclosed or ascertained, the court must cause such true name to be
inserted in the complaint or information and the record. x x x (Emphasis supplied.) It is clear from the above
provision that in offenses against property, the materiality of the erroneous designation of the offended party
would depend on whether or not the subject matter of the offense was sufficiently described and identified.

Interpreting the previously discussed cases, We conclude that in offenses against property, if the subject
matter of the offense is generic and not identifiable, such as the money unlawfully taken as in Lahoylahoy, an
error in the designation of the offended party is fatal and would result in the acquittal of the accused.
However, if the subject matter of the offense is specific and identifiable, such as a warrant, as in Kepner, or a
check, such as in Sayson and Ricarze, an error in the designation of the offended party is immaterial. In the
present case, the subject matter of the offense does not refer to money or any other generic property.
Instead, the information specified the subject of the offense as “various kinds of jewelry valued in the total
amount of P705,685.00.” The charge was thereafter sufficiently fleshed out and proved by the Trust Receipt
Agreement signed by Senador and presented during trial, which enumerates these “various kinds of jewelry
valued in the total amount of PhP 705,685,”

20. People v Sandiganbayan

Facts: Jessie B. Castillo (Castillo) was elected mayor of the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite in the May 1998
elections. On September 19, 2000, an Information was filed against Castillo charging him with violation of
Section (e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019,3 in relation to the alleged illegal operation of the Villa Esperanza
dumpsite located in Molino, Bacoor, Cavite. According to the Information, Castillo, while in the performance of
his official functions as Mayor of Bacoor, gave unwarranted benefits to his coaccused Melencio and
Emerenciano Arciaga by allowing the latter to operate the Villa Esperanza dumpsite without the requisite
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) and permit from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB).
The Office of the Ombudsman found Castillo guilty of the administrative charge and On appeal, the Court of
Appeals set aside the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman . After arraignment and pre-trial, Castillo, on
August 21, 2001, filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to Dismiss or Terminate Proceedings. He invoked the
decision of the Court of Appeals absolving him of administrative liability. His motion was initially denied by the
Sandiganbayan.

On September 21, 2001, Castillo filed a Supplemental Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the
same does not charge an offense. He claimed that a public officer may only be held liable for violation of
Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 if he caused undue injury to the government or any private person. Thus, Castillo
argued that the undue injury must not only be mentioned in the Information, its extent must be specified. The
Sandiganbayan Fourth Division failed to decide unanimously on the Supplemental Motion. Thus, a special
division (composed of five Justices of the Sandiganbayan) was constituted. Voting 3 to 2, this Special Division,
in its challenged Resolution dated January 9, 2002, granted Castillo's Supplemental Motion

Issue:

whether an Information alleging the grant of unwarranted benefits and existence of undue injury must state
the precise amount of the alleged benefit unduly granted as well as identify, specify, and prove the alleged
injury to the point of moral certainty.

Ruling: No.

Sections 6 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court are relevant. They state-

Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name
of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the
offense; and the place where the offense was committed.

When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or
information.

xxx

Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. - The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily
in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to
pronounce judgment.

(Emphasis supplied.)

This Court, in Lazarte v. Sandiganbayan, explained the two important purposes underlying the rule. First, it
enables the accused to suitably prepare his defense. Second, it allows the accused, if found guilty, to plead his
conviction in a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. Thus, this Court held that the true test in
ascertaining the validity and sufficiency of an Information is "whether the crime is described in intelligible
terms with such particularity as to apprise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged.

We find that the foregoing Information sufficiently alleges the essential elements of a violation of Section 3(e)
of RA No. 3019.

The Information specifically alleged that Castillo is the Mayor of Bacoor, Cavite who, in such official
capacity, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, and conspiring with the Arciagas, wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally gave unwarranted benefits to the latter, by allowing the illegal operation of the
Villa Esperanza dumpsite, to the undue injury ·of the residents and students in the area who had to endure
the ill-effects of the dumpsite's operation.

For as long as the ultimate facts constituting the offense have been alleged, an Information charging a
violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 need not state, to the point of specificity, the exact amount of
unwarranted benefit granted nor specify, quantify or prove, to the point of moral certainty, the undue
injury caused. We have consistently and repeatedly held in a number of cases that an Information need only
state the ultimate facts constituting the offense and not the finer details of why and how the crime was
committed .

As alleged in the Information, the unwarranted benefit was the privilege granted by Castillo to the
Arciagas to operate the dumpsite without the need to comply with the applicable laws, rules, and
regulations; the undue injury being residents and students were made to endure the ill-effects of the illegal
operation. The details required by the Sandiganbayan (such as the specific peso amount actually received by
the Arciagas as a consequence of the illegal operation of the subject dumpsite or the specific extent of
damage caused to the residents and students) are matters of evidence best raised during the trial; they
need not be stated in the Information. For purposes of informing the accused of the crime charged, the
allegation on the existence of unwarranted benefits and undue injury under the Information suffices.

Moreover, the rationale for the ultimate facts requirement becomes clearer when one considers the period
when a motion to quash is filed, that is, before the accused's arraignment and the parties' presentation of
their evidence. It would be illogical, if not procedurally infirm, to require specific peso amount allegations of
the unwarranted benefit and proof of undue injury - to the point of moral certainty, no less - at this stage of
the criminal proceedings.

21. People v Solar

FACTS: An Information was filed against Rolando and Mark Kenneth Solar (Mark Kenneth) for the murder of
Joseph Capinig y Mato (Joseph). The prosecution presented an eyewitness, namely private complainant Ma.
Theresa Capinig (Ma. Theresa), the wife of Joseph.

The RTC found the testimony of Ma. Theresa, the sole eyewitness of the prosecution, to be clear, positive,
categorical, and credible to establish Rolando's guilt for the crime charged. The RTC also held that the
qualifying circumstance of treachery was present in the killing of Joseph, and hence, the crime committed by
Rolando was Murder.

Aggrieved, Rolando appealed to the CA. In his Brief, he stated that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt by failing to prove his identity as the perpetrator, and that there was lack of
evidence to support a finding of conspiracy among the accused. He argued that since Ma. Theresa testified
that it was Mark Kenneth who inflicted the fatal blow on the victim, a finding of conspiracy was necessary to
convict him and there were no facts available to support such conclusion.

In the assailed Decision, while the CA affirmed the RTC's finding that Rolando indeed killed Joseph, it
downgraded the offense from Murder to Homicide for failure of the Information to sufficiently state the
particular facts establishing the existence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

ISSUE: W/N the CA erred

RULING: YES. It is thus fundamental that every element of which the offense is composed must be alleged in
the Information. No Information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the
elements of the crime charged. The test in determining whether the information validly charges an offense is
whether the material facts alleged in the complaint or information will establish the essential elements of the
offense charged as defined in the law. In this examination, matters aliunde are not considered. To repeat, the
purpose of the law in requiring this is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense, as he is presumed
to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.

An information alleging that treachery exists, to be sufficient, must therefore have factual averments on
how the person charged had deliberately employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the act
that tended directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to the accused arising from the
defense that the victim might make. The Information must so state such means, methods or forms in a
manner that would enable a person of common understanding to know what offense was intended to be
charged.

22. De Lima v Guerrero

FACTS: The DOJ filed criminal complaints against senator delima after several inquiries made by the congress
regarding the proliferation of drugs inside the bilibid prison. On the basis of the evidence presented by the
DOJ and the complaint affidavits, Judge Guerrrero of Muntinlupa issued a warrant of arrest against Senator
Delima. The senator then filed a motion to quash the warrant and pending such motion she also filed a
petition for certiorari under rule 65 alleging that the issuance of the warrant of arrest was with grave abuse of
discretion.

ISSUE: Whether the Regional Trial Court or the Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction over the violation of
Republic Act No. 9165 averred in the assailed Information

RULING: RTC. While it may be argued that some facts may be taken as constitutive of some elements of Direct
Bribery under the Revised Penal Code (RPC), these facts taken together with the other allegations in the
Information portray a much bigger picture, Illegal Drug Trading. The latter crime, described by the United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) as “a global illicit trade involving the cultivation, manufacture,
distribution and sale of substances,” necessarily involves various component crimes, not the least of which is
the bribery and corruption of government officials. An example would be reports of recent vintage regarding
billions of pesos’ worth of illegal drugs allowed to enter Philippine ports without the scrutiny of Customs
officials. Any money and bribery that may have changed hands to allow the importation of the confiscated
drugs are certainly but trivial contributions in the furtherance of the transnational illegal drug trading — the
offense for which the persons involved should be penalized.

Read as a whole, and not picked apart with each word or phrase construed separately, the Information against
De Lima goes beyond an indictment for Direct Bribery under Article 210 of the RPC. As Justice Martires
articulately explained, the averments on solicitation of money in the Information, which may be taken as
constitutive of bribery, form “part of the description on how illegal drug trading took place at the NBP.” The
averments on how petitioner asked for and received money from the NBP inmates simply complete the links
of conspiracy between her, Ragos, Dayan and the NBP inmates in willfully and unlawfully trading dangerous
drugs through the use of mobile phones and other electronic devices under Section 5, in relation to Section 3
(jj), Section 26 (b), and Section 28, of RA 9165.

Granting without conceding that the information contains averments which constitute the elements of Direct
Bribery or that more than one offence is charged or as in this case, possibly bribery and violation of RA 9165,
still the prosecution has the authority to amend the information at any time before arraignment. Since
petitioner has not yet been arraigned, then the information subject of Criminal Case No. 17-165 can still be
amended pursuant to Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court which reads:

SECTION 14. Amendment or Substitution. — A complaint or information may be amended, in form or

in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and
during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

Now the question that irresistibly demands an answer is whether it is the Sandiganbayan or the RTC that has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of Criminal Case No. 17-165, i.e., violation of RA 9165.

It is basic that jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case is given only by law in the manner and
form prescribed by law. It is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the
action. Indeed, Congress has the plenary power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of various
courts. It follows then that Congress may also, by law, provide that a certain class of cases should be
exclusively heard and determined by one court. Such would be a special law that is construed as an exception
to the general law on jurisdiction of courts.

The pertinent special law governing drug-related cases is RA 9165, which updated the rules provided in RA
6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. A plain reading of RA 9165, as of RA 6425, will
reveal that jurisdiction over drug-related cases is exclusively vested with the Regional Trial Court and no
other. The designation of the RTC as the court with the exclusive jurisdiction over drug-related cases is
apparent in the following provisions where it was expressly mentioned and recognized as the only court
with the authority to hear drug-related cases.

23. People vs Valdez

Estrella Sayson was at the canteen preparing for the celebration of the birthday of her second husband.
Estrella’s son, the deceased Moises Sayson, a former policeman owned the said canteen and managed a
betting station. Estrella’s other sons Joselito and Ferdinand Sayson arrived at the canteen to greet their
stepfather.

The celebration was interrupted with the arrival of Eduardo and Edwin. Eduardo and Edwin asked the jai alai
teller, Jonathan Rubio, to come out. Moises approached Eduardo and Edwin and tried to reason with them.
Estrella saw Eduardo and Edwin armed with guns. Moises went out and advised Eduardo and Edwin not to
force Jonathan to go out of the fronton. Successive shots were thereafter heard. Moises fell and was
continuously fired upon even after he was sprawled on the ground. Ferdinand approached the scene to help
his brother Moises. Ferdinand, however was shot on the left temporal portion of his head and fell. Somebody
told Joselito to run away, but he was hit at the back while running. After shooting the Sayson brothers,
Eduardo and Edwin escaped from the scene of the crime.

The RTC convicted the two accused of three counts of murder.

Issue: W/N the Court should pronounce PO2 Valdez guilty of three homicides, instead of three murders, on
account of the informations not sufficiently alleging the attendance of treachery
Ruling: Yes.

For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense
was committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense
charged or the particular law allegedly violated, but the description of the crime charged and the particular
facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the
court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and
clearly allege the elements of the crime charged.

Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary
to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified
crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of
the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The
presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.

A practical consequence of the non-allegation of a detail that aggravates his liability is to prohibit the
introduction or consideration against the accused of evidence that tends to establish that detail.

24. Zapanta vs People

An Information was filed with the RTC charging the petitioner, with the crime of qualified theft, committed as
follows: That sometime in the month of October 2001, in the City of Baguio, Philippine,… accused ANTHONY
V. ZAPANTA, being then the Project Manager of the Porta Vaga Building Construction, a project being
undertaken then by the Construction Firm, ANMAR, Inc. … steal and carry away from the Porta Vaga project
site, wide flange steel beams of different sizes without the knowledge and consent of the owner ANMAR.

The petitioner submits that, while the information charged him for acts committed sometime in the month of
October 2001, he was convicted for acts not covered by the information, i.e., theft in November 2001, thus
depriving him of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

Issue: W/N the information was sufficient

Ruling: Yes

Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense
given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed. When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the
complaint or information.

As to the sufficiency of the allegation of the date of the commission of the offense, Section 11, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure adds:
Section 11. Date of commission of the offense. - It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the
precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense
may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission.
When the date given in the complaint is not of the essence of the offense, it need not be proven as alleged;
thus, the complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the offense was committed at any date within the
period of the statute of limitations and before the commencement of the action.

In this case, the petitioner had been fully apprised of the charge of qualified theft since the information stated
the approximate date of the commission of the offense through the words "sometime in the month of
October, 2001." The petitioner could reasonably deduce the nature of the criminal act with which he was
charged from a reading of the contents of the information, as well as gather by such reading whatever he
needed to know about the charge to enable him to prepare his defense.
25. Jose Paulo Legaspi y Navera v. People [GR. 225753, Oct. 15, 2018]

FACTS: Legaspi and Daganas were charged with the crime of estafa defined and penalized under Article 315,
paragraph 1(b) of the RPC, for defrauding with abuse of confidence Fung Hing Kit (FHK) by inducing the latter
to invest at iGen-Portal, and the latter invested and deposited the amount of P9.5M. And after receiving the
amount from FHK, petitioners allegedly converted the said amount to their own and personal use and benefit.
Petitioners alleged that private complainant wanted to purchase shares of iGen-Portal. However, because
there were no more shares available and because private complainant is a foreigner prohibited to engage in
retail trade business, petitioners refused. Petitioners sold the shares to Balisi, the Filipino house helper of FHK
—such shares were actually paid for by FHK.

ISSUE: WON petitioners should be held liable for the crime of estafa defined and penalized under Article 315,
paragraph 1(b) of the RPC.

HELD: No. In general, the elements of estafa are: (1) that the accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of
confidence, or (b) by means of deceit; and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is
caused to the offended party or third person. Invariably, unlawful abuse of confidence or deceit is the essence
of estafa. The Information itself is bereft of any indication that petitioners received private complainant's
money in such manner as to create a fiduciary relationship between them. On the contrary, the Information
reads that private complainant "invested" his money with iGen-Portal. It is undisputed that at the time
material to the instant case, iGen-Portal was a duly-registered corporation engaged in wholesale and retail
business, the existence of which was never denied by private complainant as he himself admitted having
scrutinized iGen-Portal's Articles of Incorporation, income analysis and projected income analysis. Clearly, by
the transfer of stocks in exchange for the amount of P9.5M, no fiduciary relationship was created between
petitioners and private complainant. FHK’s demand for the issuance of a stock certificate in his name in return
for his investment negates the claim that petitioners received the money with the obligation to return the
same (element of abuse of confidence). It is an unfortunate occurrence that after his investment, iGen-Portal
suffered successive breakaways of its distributors. The Court cannot hold petitioners liable, much less
criminally, only because of private complainant's unfruitful investment.

MP: What controls is the recital facts of the commission of the offense, not the nomenclature of the offense,
that determines the crime being alleged in the information.

26. People v. Alglen Reyes y Paulina [GR. 225736, Oct. 15, 2018]

FACTS: Accused was arrested after a successful buy bust operation. He was eventually found guilty of violating
RA 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act) for the sale of shabu. Accused alleged that he was in fact
fueling his motorcycle after buying medicine for his mother, when 4 men suddenly handcuffed him and
searched him, but found nothing illegal from him. RTC found him guilty, CA affirmed.

ISSUE: WON the RTC and CA erred in convicting Reyes

HELD: Yes. The Information filed against Reyes in this case was defective, for which reason alone Reyes
should be acquitted. The importance of sufficiency of the Information cannot be more emphasized; it is an
essential component of the right to due process in criminal proceedings as the accused possesses the right to
be sufficiently informed of the cause of the accusation against him. This is implemented through Rule 110,
Sections 8 and 9 of the Rules of Court. In the case at bar, the Information filed against Reyes failed to
sufficiently identify therein all the components of the first element of the crime of sale of dangerous drugs,
namely: the identity of the buyer, the object, and the consideration. The prosecution did not try to offer an
explanation as to why not one of the three required witnesses – a representative from the DOJ, a media
representative, and an elective official – was present in the buy-bust operation conducted against Reyes. The
prosecution did not also address the issue in their pleadings, and the RTC and the CA instead had to rely only
on the presumption that police officers performed their functions in the regular manner to support Reyes'
conviction. It bears emphasis that the presence of the required witnesses at the time of the apprehension and
inventory is mandatory, and that the law imposes the said requirement because their presence serves an
essential purpose.

27. DANILO BUHAT vs CA and PPL of the PH, G.R. No. 119601 December 17, 1996
FACTS:
On March 25, 1993, an information for HOMICIDE 1 was filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) 2 against
petitioner Danny Buhat, "John Doe" and "Richard Doe" alleging that on October 16, 1992, petitioner Danilo
Buhat, armed with a knife, unlawfully attacked and killed one Ramon George Yu while the said two unknown
assailants held his arms, "using superior strength, inflicting . . . mortal wounds which were . . . the direct . . .
cause of his death". Even before petitioner could be arraigned, the prosecution moved for the deferment of
the arraignment on the ground that the private complainant in the case, one Betty Yu, moved for the
reconsideration of the resolution of the City Prosecutor which ordered the filing of the aforementioned
information for homicide. Petitioner however, invoking his right to a speedy trial, opposed the motion. Thus,
petitioner was arraigned on June 9, 1993 and, since petitioner pleaded "not guilty", trial ensued. On March 10,
1994, the Assistant City Prosecutor filed a motion for leave to amend information. The amendment as
proposed was opposed by the petitioner. The amended information read: The undersigned assistant City
Prosecutor accuses DANNY BUHAT, of Capricho II, Barangay V, Roxas City, Philippines, HERMIÑIA ALTAVAS
AND OSMEÑA ALTAVAS both resident of Punta Tabuc, Roxas City, Philippines, of the crime of Murder…

ISSUE: WON the upgrading of the crime charged from homicide to the more serious offense of murder is such
a substantial amendment that it is proscribed if made after the accused had pleaded "not guilty" to the crime
of homicide?

HELD:
NO. In People v. Montenegro the allegation of conspiracy among all the private respondents-accused,
which was not previously included in the original information, is . . . a substantial amendment saddling the
respondents with the need of a new defense in order to meet a different situation in the trial court. This
jurisprudential rule, however, is not without an exception such that a post-arraignment amendment to further
allege conspiracy, is only a formal amendment not prejudicial to the rights of the accused and proper even
after the accused has pleaded "not guilty" to the charge under the original information. The aforegoing
principle, by way of exception to the general rule, also appositely applies in the present controversy. Petitioner
undoubtedly is charged as a principal in the killing of Ramon George Yu whom petitioner is alleged to have
stabbed while two unknown persons held the victim's arms. The addition of the phrase, "conspiring,
confederating and helping one another" does not change the nature of petitioner's participation as principal in
the killing.

Aside from this, Petitioner in the case at bench maintains that, having already pleaded "not guilty" to
the crime of homicide, the amendment of the crime charged in the information from homicide to murder is a
substantial amendment prejudicial to his right to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him. He
utterly fails to dispute, however, that the original information did allege that petitioner stabbed his victim
"using superior strength". And this particular allegation qualifies a killing to murder, regardless of how such a
killing is technically designated in the information filed by the public prosecutor. As this court, through Justice
Moreland's authoritative disquisition, has held: the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from
the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of the law alleged to
have been violated, they being conclusions of law which in no way affect the legal aspects of the information,
but from the actual recital of facts as alleged in the body of the information. 

28. SUSAN FRONDA-BAGGAO vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 151785 December 10, 2007
FACTS:
Sometime in 1989, four separate Informations for illegal recruitment against Susan Fronda-Baggao
were filed in the RTC of Bangued, Abra. The petitioner eluded arrest for more than a decade, but was later
arrested.  On July 26, 1999, the prosecutor filed a motion to amend the Informations, lumping them to one
Information for illegal recruitment in large scale. The trial court denied the motion. But, upon motion for
reconsideration, the trial court admitted the Information for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale. Petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration, but was denied by the RTC. The petitioner's petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order was
also denied by the CA. Hence, the present petition to the SC where the petitioner argues that (a) Section 14,
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure refers to an amendment of one Information only, not
four, which cannot be joined in only one Information.

ISSUE: WON the four Informations for illegal recruitment could be amended and lumped into one Information
for illegal recruitment in large scale?

HELD:
YES. [B]efore the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or
information may be made without leave of court. After the entry of a plea, only a formal amendment may be
made but with leave of court and only if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment, a
substantial amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused. [C]onsidering
that petitioner has not yet entered her plea, the four Informations could still be amended. Petitioner also
contends that the above Rule refers to an amendment of one Information only, not four or multiple
Informations which cannot be joined into only one Information. We disagree. A careful scrutiny of the above
Rule shows that although it uses the singular word complaint or information, it does not mean that two or
more complaints or Informations cannot be amended into only one Information. Surely, such could not have
been intended by this Court. Otherwise, there can be an absurd situation whereby two or more complaints or
Informations could no longer be amended into one or more Informations. On this point, Section 6, Rule 1 of
the Revised Rules of Court is relevant, thus: SEC. 6. Construction. - These Rules shall be liberally construed in
order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding.

Petitioner contends that the amendment of the four Informations for illegal recruitment into a single
Information for illegal recruitment in large scale violates her substantial rights as this would deprive her of the
right to bail which she already availed of. Such contention is misplaced. Obviously, petitioner relies on Section
14 of the same Rule 110 which provides that “after the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may
only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the
accused.” As stated earlier, petitioner has not yet been arraigned. Hence, she cannot invoke the said provision.
29. PACOY V. HON. CAJIGAL; G.R. NO. 157472, SEPTEMBER 28, 2007

FACTS: Pacoy seeks to annul the order of Judge Cajigal of RTC 68 of Camiling, Tarlac. On July 4, 2002, an
Information for Homicide was filed against petitioner for shooting and killing commanding officer, 2Lt.
Frederick Esquita with a rifle. Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. However, on the same day and
after the arraignment, Judge Cajigal issued another Order directing the trial prosecutor to amend the
Information to Murder with the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank. The prosecutor entered his
amendment by crossing the word “Homicide” and instead wrote the word “Murder” in the caption and in
the opening paragraph of the Information, while the accusatory portion remained exactly the same as the
original Information for Homicide. Petitioner was to be re-arraigned for the crime of Murder. However,
counsel for the petitioner objected on the ground that doing so would place the petitioner in double jeopardy,
considering that the original charge of Homicide had been terminated without the petitioner’s consent,
resulting in the dismissal of the case.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent Judge erred in ordering the amendment of the Information after the
petitioner had already entered a plea in the original Information for Homicide.
RULING: NO. Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing formal amendments in cases in which the
accused has already pleaded, it is necessary that the amendments do not prejudice the rights of the accused.
The test of whether the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information
is whether a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available
after the amendment is made; and when any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the
complaint or information. Since the facts alleged in the accusatory portion of the amended Information are
identical with those of the original Information for Homicide, there could not be any effect on the
prosecution’s theory of the case; neither would there be any possible prejudice to the rights or defense of
petitioner.

Evidently, the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, applies only when the offense charged is wholly
different from the offense proved, i.e., the accused cannot be convicted of a crime with which he was not
charged in the information even if it be proven, in which case, there must be a dismissal of the charge and a
substitution of a new information charging the proper offense. Section 14 does not apply to a second
information, which involves the same offense or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the first information. In this connection, the offense charged necessarily includes the offense
proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when
the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.

Homicide is necessarily included in the crime of murder; thus, the respondent judge merely ordered
the amendment of the Information and not the dismissal of the original Information. To repeat, it was the
same original information that was amended by merely crossing out the word Homicide and writing the word
Murder, instead, which showed that there was no dismissal of the homicide case.

30. RICARZE V. COURT OF APPEALS; G.R. NO. 160451, FEBRUARY 9, 2007

FACTS: Petitioner Eduardo G. Ricarze’s primary task was to collect checks payable to Caltex and deliver them
to the cashier. He also delivered invoices to Caltex’s customers. Caltex filed a criminal complaint against
petitioner for estafa through falsification of commercial documents because it was discovered that various
company checks were forged, while some were missing. It was discovered that Ricarze deposited the checks in
a savings account in BDO in the name of a regular customer of Caltex, Dante Gutierrez. After the preliminary
investigation, the City Prosecutor filed two (2) Informations for estafa through falsification of commercial
documents against Ricarze before. Petitioner was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to both charges.

The prosecution presented its witnesses, after which the private prosecutor filed a Formal Offer of
Evidence. Petitioner opposed the pleading, contending that the private complainant was represented by the
ACCRA Law Offices and the Balgos and Perez Law Office during trial, and it was only after the prosecution had
rested its case that SRMO entered its appearance as private prosecutor representing the PCIB. Since the
ACCRA and Balgos and Perez Law Offices had not withdrawn their appearance, SRMO had no personality to
appear as private prosecutor. Under the Informations, the private complainant is Caltex and not PCIB; hence,
the Formal Offer of Evidence filed by SRMO should be stricken from the records. Petitioner further averred
that unless the Informations were amended to change the private complainant to PCIB, his right as accused
would be prejudiced. He pointed out, however, that the Informations can no longer be amended because he
had already been arraigned under the original Informations. He insisted that the amendments of the
Informations to substitute PCIB as the offended party for Caltex would place him in double jeopardy.

PCIB, through SRMO, opposed the motion. It contended that the PCIB had re-credited the amount to
Caltex to the extent of the indemnity; hence, the PCIB had been subrogated to the rights and interests of
Caltex as private complainant. Consequently, the PCIB is entitled to receive any civil indemnity which the trial
court would adjudge against the accused.

In response, the PCIB, through SRMO, averred that as provided in Section 2, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the erroneous designation of the name of the offended party is a mere formal
defect which can be cured by inserting the name of the offended party in the Information . RTC issued an
Order granting the motion of the private prosecutor for the prosecution of PCIB as private complainant for
Caltex. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with Urgent Application for
Temporary Restraining Order with the CA. The CA denied the petition.

ISSUE: Whether the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complainant at the late stage of the trial is
prejudicial to Ricarze’s defense.

RULING: NO, SINCE THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL AMENDMENT. Before the accused enters his plea, a formal
or substantial amendment of the complaint or information may be made without leave of court. After the
entry of a plea, only a formal amendment may be made but with leave of court and if it does not prejudice the
rights of the accused. After arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed except if the same is
beneficial to the accused.
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. The following have been
held to be mere formal amendments: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that
the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense
different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the
prosecution’s theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has
or will assume; (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused; and (5)
an amendment that merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the information and not to introduce
new and material facts, and merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in
the original information and which adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged.
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the
information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence
defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. An
amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect
the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new
averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance.
In the case at bar, the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complaint is not a substantial
amendment. The substitution did not alter the basis of the charge in both Informations, nor did it result in
any prejudice to petitioner. The documentary evidence in the form of the forged checks remained the same,
and all such evidence was available to petitioner well before the trial. Thus, he cannot claim any surprise by
virtue of the substitution.

Albert vs Sandiganbayan

Facts:

Ramon Albert, the president of the National Home Mortgage and Finance Corporation hereinafter NHMFC ( a public
office) was charged by the special prosecution officer of the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of Section 3 of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The information alleged that he “in evident bad faith and manifest partiality AND
OR GROSS NEGLECT OF DUTY, caused injury to the government when he made it appear that certain lots in his
possession were residential lands in his tax declarations that were submitted to the NHMF when they were in fact
agricultural lands which allowed him to acquire loans which were higher than what agricultural lands would allow.

A hold departure order was issued by the Sandiganbayan against Albert. He then filed a motion to lift the hold departure
order and be allowed to travel. The prosecution did not object to the motion provided that the accused be
“provisionally” arraigned. Thus, the day after Albert entered a plea of not guilty and was subsequently allowed to travel.

Eventually, the prosecution filed a motion for Leave to Admit Amended Information. Instead of stating that the accused
acted IN GROSS NEGLECT OF DUTY, the information was amended to state AND/OR GROSS INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE
instead.

Accused opposed the amendment arguing that the information is substantial and therefore not allowed after
arraignment.

Issue: W/N The amendment is a substantial amendment or an amendment in form

Ruling: It was an amendment in form.

Section 14 of rule 110 provides that a complaint or information may be made amended in form or in substance, without
leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment
may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

For an arraignment to be provisional, the conditions thereof must be unmistakable, expressed, informed and
enlightened. Moreover, the conditions must be expressly stated in the order disposing the of the arraignment otherwise
it would be simple and unconditional.

In the case at hand, the order did not state the arraignment was unconditional, thus it was a simple arraignment.

Thus, only an amendment in form can be made. Regardless, the amendment is still an amendment in form. The test as
to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by an amendment is when a defense under the complaint or
information as it originally stood would no longer be available under the amendment. A formal amendment states with
additional precision something already contained in the original information, adding nothing essential for conviction.

Thus, the amendment from a “gross neglect of duty” to “gross and inexcusable negligence” is an amendment to form.

People vs Degamo

Facts:

Degamo was charged with the crime of rape with the use of deadly weapon and the aggravating circumstances of
dwelling and nighttime upon which he pleaded not guilty.

Before the start of the trial proper, the court allowed the complaint to be amendment to include the allegation that by
reason of the incident of rape, the victim had become insane.

Issue: W/N the amendment was to form or substance

Ruling: amendment to form

An amendment after the plea of the accused is permitted only as to matters of form provided that 1.) leave of court is
obtained and 2.) such amendment is not prejudicial to the rights of the accused.

In teehankee vs madayag, the court held that a substantial amendment consists of recital of facts constituting the
offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All others are merely of form. For example: 1.) new
allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court may impose in case of conviction, 2.) an
amendment that does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one, 3.)
additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution’s theory of the case as to cause surprise to the accused, 4.)
amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused.

It is also an amendment to form if the defense under the new information is the same as it would have been in the
original information.

As applied, the amendment in this case is not of substance as the inclusion of insanity only raises the penalty that may
be imposed and does not charge a new offense, and the defense against the charge or rape with a weapon is the same
as a charge that states that the victim went insane as a result of the rape with the weapon.

33. Teehankee v Madayag

FACTS: Petitioner, Tehankee, Jr. was charged with the crime of frustrated murder for the act of shooting Maureen
Navarro Hultman on the head, which would have caused her death if not for the timely medical intervention.

Trial ensued. After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner was allowed to file a motion for leave to file a
demurrer to evidence. However, before the said motion could be filed, Maureen Navarro Hultman died.

The prosecution then filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file an amended information. The amended
information was filed, however, the petitioner refused to be arraigned on the said amended information for lack of
preliminary investigation.

ISSUE: Whether or not an amended information involving a substantial amendment, without preliminary investigation,
after the prosecution has rested on the original information, may legally and validly be admitted.

RULING:  Yes, the amendment is legal and valid. Amendments are allowed after arraignment and during the trial but
only as to matters of form and provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights of the accused. An objective appraisal
of the amended information for murder filed against herein petitioner will readily show that the nature of the offense
originally charged was not actually changed. Instead, an additional allegation, that is, the supervening fact of the death
of the victim was merely supplied to aid the trial court in determining the proper penalty for the crime. Under the
circumstances thus obtaining, it is irremissible that the amended information for murder is, at most, an amendment as
to form which is allowed even during the trial of the case. It consequently follows that since only a formal amendment
was involved and introduced in the second information, a preliminary investigation is unnecessary and cannot be
demanded by the accused. The filing of the amended information without the requisite preliminary investigation does
not violate petitioner's right to be secured against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions, and to be protected
from an open and public accusation of a crime, as well as from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.

34. Dionaldo v. Dacuycuy, 108 SCRA 736 - Amendment/Substitution (Section 14)

FACTS: Petitioner Rolando Dionaldo stands charged with the crime of homicide. After the accused had entered
a plea of not guilty, the prosecution filed a motion for leave to amend the information, attaching thereto an
amended information charging the accused with murder qualified by treachery and evident premeditation - a
more serious offense. No explanation was given in the motion for alleging evident premeditation but as to the
allegation of treachery it was explained that, "the affidavit of the complaining witness indicates that the attack
was sudden and it was only after they sustained the wounds consequent to the treacherous attack that they
were forced to fight back to repel further aggression." It can thus be seen that all along this claimed
circumstance was known to the prosecution but it was not alleged. Counsel for the accused opposed the
motion to amend the information but the respondent judge granted the motion: hence the petition to nullify
the action of the respondent.
ISSUE: Whether an information for the crime of homicide can be amended so as to charge the crime of
murder after the accused had entered a plea of not guilty.
HELD: No. Rule 110, Sec. 13 of the Rules of Court which stipulates: 
Section 13. Amendment. - The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave
of court, at any time before the defendant pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form,
by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the
defendant.
To amend the information so as to change the crime charged for homicide to the more serious offense of
murder after the petitioner had pleaded not guilty to the former is indubitably proscribed by the first
paragraph of the above-quoted provision. For certainly a change from homicide to murder is not a matter of
form; it is one of substance with very serious consequences.
But can the amendment be justified under the second paragraph? The answer is, No. For the provision speaks
not of amendment but of dismissal of the information In other words the provision contemplates the filing of
a substitute, not an amended information. But, it may be asked, can not the information for homicide against
the petitioner be dismissed since no judgment has yet been rendered and another information for murder be
filed? The answer, again, is No. For the petitioner having pleaded not guilty to homicide, to dismiss the charge
against him so as to file another charge for murder will place him thereby in double jeopardy.
35. Corpus v. Pamular, 5 September 2018, (Leonen, J.) - Amendment/Substitution (Section 14)
FACTS: Angelito Espinosa (Angelito) was shot by Samonte causing his death. Samonte was caught in flagrante
delicto and thereafter was arrested. After the inquest proceedings, an Information for murder was filed
against him. Upon arraignment, Samonte admitted the killing but pleaded self-defense. The wife of the
deceased filed an unsworn but signed Reply to the Affidavit of Witnesses before First Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor (Florendo). The Assistant Public Prosecutor (Bonifacio) was not able to comply with the directive to
personally submit his resolution, prompting Florendo to order him to surrender the records of the case as the
latter was taking over the resolution of the case based on the evidence presented by the parties. Florendo
found probable cause to indict Corpus for Angelito's murder. He directed the filing of an amended information
before the Regional Trial Court. Despite Florendo taking over the case, Bonifacio still issued a Review
Resolution where he reinstated the Regional Trial Court Resolution and affirmed the dismissal of the murder
complaint against Corpus. They averred that Judge Pamular's action was premature considering that the
Motion to Amend Information has yet to be scheduled for hearing. Moreover, Samonte was already arraigned.
However, despite the manifestation, Judge Pamular issued the assailed Order, which granted the motion to
amend the information and to admit the attached amended information. The assailed Order also directed,
among others, the issuance of a warrant of arrest against a certain Corpus. Corpus was implicated as the one
who instructed Samonte to kill Angelito. The wife of the deceased claims that the alleged lack of
determination of probable cause before the issuance of a warrant has no basis since petitioners failed to
present evidence or facts that would prove their claim. The Office of the Solicitor General also adds that the
insertion of the phrase "conspiring and confederating together" in the amended information will not affect
Samonte's substantial rights. Thus, the original charge against Samonte of murder and his deliberate manner
of shooting Angelita remain unaltered. Petitioners question the inclusion of Corpus and the insertion of the
phrase "conspiring and confederating together" in the amended information. They contend that Rule 110,
Section 14 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibits substantial amendment of information that is
prejudicial to the rights of the accused after his or her arraignment.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Judge Ramon Pamular committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when he allegedly admitted the Amended Information in clear defiance of law
and jurisprudence, which proscribes substantial amendment of information prejudicial to the right of the
accused
HELD: Yes. Before an accused enters his or her plea, either formal or substantial amendment of the complaint
or information may be made without leave of court. After an entry of plea, only a formal amendment can be
made provided it is with leave of court and it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment,
there can be no substantial amendment except if it is beneficial to the accused. Since only petitioner Samonte
has been arraigned, only he can invoke this rule. Petitioner Corpus cannot invoke this argument because he
has not yet been arraigned. Once an accused is arraigned and enters his or her plea, Section 14 prohibits any
substantial amendment especially those that may prejudice his or her rights. One of these rights includes the
constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him or
her, which is given life during arraignment. There can be no substantial amendment after plea because it is
expected that the accused will collate his or her defenses based on the contents of the information. "The
theory in law is that since the accused officially begins to prepare his [or her] defense against the accusation
on the basis of the recitals in the information read to him [or her] during arraignment, then the prosecution
must establish its case on the basis of the same information." Aside from violating the accused's right to due
process, any substantial amendment in the information will burden the accused in preparing for his or her
defense.
Any amendment to an information which only states with precision something which has already been
included in the original information, and therefore, adds nothing crucial for conviction of the crime charged
is only a formal amendment that can be made at anytime. It does not alter the nature of the crime, affect the
essence of the offense, surprise, or divest the accused of an opportunity to meet the new accusation. On the
other hand, "[a] substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court."
The facts alleged in the accusatory part of the amended information are similar to that of the original
information except as to the inclusion of Corpus as Samonte's co-accused and the insertion of the phrase
"conspiring and confederating together." The allegation of conspiracy does not alter the basic theory of the
prosecution that Samonte willfully and intentionally shot Angelita. Hence, the amendment is merely formal.
Rule 110, Section 14 similarly provides that in permitting formal amendments when the accused has already
entered his or her plea, it is important that the amendments made should not prejudice the rights of the
accused. 
In People v. Casey, this Court laid down the test in determining whether an accused is prejudiced by an
amendment. The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment of an information has been
said to be whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after the
amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the
information in the one form as in the other.
It is undisputed that upon arraignment under the original information, Samonte admitted the killing but
pleaded self-defense. While conspiracy is merely a formal amendment, Samonte will be prejudiced if the
amendment will be allowed after his plea. Applying the test, his defense and corresponding evidence will
not be compatible with the allegation of conspiracy in the new information. Therefore, such formal
amendment after plea is not allowed.
36. MENDEZ v. PEOPLE
FACTS:
An information was filed against Dr. Mendez for violation of Art. 255 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997, to which
he plead not guilty.
After his arraignment, the prosecution filed a motion to amend the information, which change in the date in
the commission of the crime from 2001 to 2002; the addition of the phrase "for income earned; Business
name was changed to “WEIGH LES.
Petitioner now assails the validity of the amended information. He contends that the prosecution’s
amendment is a substantial amendment prohibited under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. It is substantial in nature because its additional allegations alter the prosecution’s theory
of the case so as to cause surprise to him and affect the form of his defense. Thus, he was not properly
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
ISSUE:
WON the prosecution’s amendments made after the petitioner’s arraignment are substantial in nature and
must perforce be denied?
HELD: NO.
The "change" in the date from 2001 to 2002 and the addition of the phrase "for income earned" and the
addition of the phrase "doing business under the name and style of Mendez Medical Group do not alter the
prosecution's theory of the case.
Amendments that do not charge another offense different from that charged in the original one;  or do not
alter the prosecution's theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of
defense he has or will assume are considered merely as formal amendments.
37. People vs Caoili

Facts:

 First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Raul O. Nasayao filed an Information against Caoili, charging him
with the crime of rape through sexual intercourse. Upon arraignment the accused Caoili pleaded not guilty of
the crime charged. After the pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued.

Victim AAA, daughter of Caoili testified that his father sexually moslested her at their house, kissed her
lips, touched and mashed her breast, inserted the fourth finger of his left hand into her vagina and made a
push and pull movement into her vagina with such finger for 30 mins. AAA felt excruciating pain during and
after the ordeal. Against her father's harsh warning not to go out of the house, AAA proceeded to the house of
her uncle, BBB, located 20 meters away from their house. When he learned of this, Caoili fetched AAA and
dragged her home. He beat and hit her with a piece of wood, and boxed her on the stomach.

RTC rendered its decision declaring Caoili guilty of rape by sexual assault but CA set aside the case and
remanded its cased back to RTC and held that although the accused is guilty of rape by sexual assault what the
trial court should have done was to direct the State Prosecutor to file a new Information charging the proper
offense and after compliance therewith, to dismiss the original Information.

Caoili and OSG filed their respective petitions for review

Issue:

Whether or not Caoili can be convicted for the crime of rape by sexual assault as proved by the
prosecution although the information charges him with the crime of rape through sexual intercourse

Held:

No.

By jurisprudence, however, an accused charged in the Information with rape by sexual intercourse
cannot be found guilty of rape by sexual assault, even though the latter crime was proven during trial. This
is due to the substantial distinctions between these two modes of rape. The elements of rape through sexual
intercourse are: (1) that the offender is a man; (2) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (3)
that such act is accomplished by using force or intimidation. Rape by sexual intercourse is a crime committed
by a man against a woman, and the central element is carnal knowledge. On the other hand, the elements of
rape by sexual assault are: (1) that the offender commits an act of sexual assault; (2) that the act of sexual
assault is committed by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice or by inserting any
instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person; and that the act of sexual assault is
accomplished by using force or intimidation, among others. In the first mode (rape by sexual intercourse): (1)
the offender is always a man; (2) the offended party is always a woman; (3) rape is committed through penile
penetration of the vagina; and (4) the penalty is reclusion perpertua. In the second mode (rape by sexual
assault): (1) the offender may be a man or a woman; (2) the offended party may be a man or a woman; (3)
rape is committed by inserting the penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or
object into the genital or anal orifice of another person; and (4) the penalty is prisión mayor.

Given the material distinctions between the two (2) modes of rape introduced in Republic Act (RA) No. 8353,
the assault if the crime charged is rape through sexual intercourse, since the former offense cannot be
considered subsumed in the latter.

Caoili had been charged with rape through sexual intercourse in violation of Article 266-A of the RPC
and R.A. No. 7610. Applying the variance doctrine under Section 4, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 120 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Caoili can be held guilty of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness
performed on a child, i.e., lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, which was the offense
proved, because it is included in rape, the offense charged.

Based on the language of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, however, the offense designated as Acts of
Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, in relation to Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610 should be used when the
victim is under 12 years of age at the time the offense was committed. This finds support in the first  proviso in
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 which requires that “when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the
perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as
amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be.” Thus, pursuant to
this proviso, it has been held that before an accused can be convicted of child abuse through lascivious
conduct on a minor below 12 years of age, the requisites for act of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC
must be met in addition to the requisites for sexual abuse under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610. Conversely, when
the victim, at the time the offense was committed, is aged twelve (12) years or over but under eighteen (18),
or is eighteen (18) or older but unable to fully take care of herself/himself or protect herself/himself from
abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition,
the nomenclature of the offense should be Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, since the
law no longer refers to Article 336 of the RPC, and the perpetrator is prosecuted solely under R.A. No. 7610.

38. OCAMPO v. ABANDO

FACTS: A mass graveyard was found at a Barangay in Leyte containing 67 skeletal remains of those believed to
be victims of “Operation Venereal Disease (VD)” by the Communist Party of the Philippines/ New People’s
Army/National Democratic Front (CPP/NPA/NPDF) of the Philippines. This was done to purge their ranks of
suspected military informers.
Relatives of the alleged victims filed a complaint to charge the petitioners (members of the Central
Committee) with murder.
The prosecutor, in a resolution, directed the filing of information for 15 counts of multiple murder against the
petitioners. Said information was filed before RTC Hilongos, Leyte branch 18 presided by Judge Abando.
Prior to the resolution, Ocampo filed an Ex Parte Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory Hearing. Judge Obando
found probable cause and ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against them with no recommended bail.
Ocampo went to the Supreme Court by Rule 65 and asked for the abovementioned order and the prosecutor’s
resolution to be annulled. He said that a case for rebellion against him and 44 others was then already pending
before RTC Makati and so, the crime of murder was absorbed by the rebellion in line with the political offense
doctrine.
ISSUE: Should the prosecutor’s resolution be annulled?
RULING: No. We had already ruled that the burden of demonstrating political motivation must be discharged
by the defense, since motive is a state of mind which only the accused knows. The proof showing political
motivation is adduced during trial where the accused is assured an opportunity to present evidence
supporting his defense. It is not for this Court to determine this factual matter in the instant petitions.
As held in the case of Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Zamboanga Del Norte v. CA, if during trial,
petitioners are able to show that the alleged murders were indeed committed in furtherance of rebellion,
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides the remedy, to wit:
SECTION 14. Amendment or substitution. — A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in
substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during
the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing
prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes
any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice
to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and
copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the
court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper
offense in accordance with Section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy.
The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
Thus, if it is shown that the proper charge against petitioners should have been simple rebellion, the trial court
shall dismiss the murder charges upon the filing of the Information for simple rebellion, as long as petitioners
would not be placed in double jeopardy.

39. Macasaet vs People

Facts: In an Information, Alfie Lorenzo, Allen Macasaet, Nicolas Quijano, Jr., and Roger Parajes, columnist,
publisher, managing editor, and editor, respectively of the newspaper "Abante" were charged before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, with the crime of libel. The trial court rendered an Order dismissing
the case due to lack of jurisdiction. The court a quo noted that although the information alleged the venue of
this case falls within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, the evidence submitted for its consideration indicated
otherwise. First, the editorial box of Abante clearly indicated that the purported libelous article was printed
and first published in the City of Manila. In addition, the trial court relied on the following matters to support
its conclusion that, indeed, jurisdiction was improperly laid in this case: a) on page 4 of the information, the
address of private respondent appeared to be the one in Marikina City although right below it was a
handwritten notation stating "131 Sct. Lozano St., Barangay Sacred Heart, QC"; b) the two barangay
certifications submitted by the petitioners; and c) the Memorandum for Preliminary Investigation and
Affidavit-Complaint attached to the information wherein the given address of private respondent was
Marikina City.
The Court of Appeals reversed the TC, holding that the defect appearing on the original complaint
wherein the residence of private respondent was indicated to be Marikina City was subsequently cured by his
supplemental-affidavit submitted during the preliminary investigation of the case. Moreover, as the
amendment was made during the preliminary investigation phase of this case, the same could be done as a
matter of right pursuant to the Revised Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC of Quezon City has jurisdiction over this case
Ruling: No. In criminal actions, it is a fundamental rule that venue is jurisdictional. Thus, the place
where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of
jurisdiction. In Agbayani v. Sayo, we summarized the rules on libel in the following manner:
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be filed in the
Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission of the
offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in the Court
of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense.
In the case at bar, private respondent was a private citizen at the time of the publication of the alleged
libelous article, hence, he could only file his libel suit in the City of Manila where Abante was first published or
in the province or city where he actually resided at the time the purported libelous article was printed.
A perusal, however, of the information involved in this case easily reveals that the allegations
contained therein are utterly insufficient to vest jurisdiction on the RTC of Quezon City. Other than
perfunctorily stating "Quezon City" at the beginning of the information, the assistant city prosecutor who
prepared the information did not bother to indicate whether the jurisdiction of RTC Quezon City was invoked
either because Abante was printed in that place or private respondent was a resident of said city at the time
the claimed libelous article came out. As these matters deal with the fundamental issue of the court’s
jurisdiction, Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, mandates that either one of these statements
must be alleged in the information itself and the absence of both from the very face of the information
renders the latter fatally defective.l^vvphi1.net Sadly for private respondent, the information filed before the
trial court falls way short of this requirement. The assistant city prosecutor’s failure to properly lay the basis
for invoking the jurisdiction of the RTC, Quezon City, effectively denied said court of the power to take
cognizance of this case.1a\^/phi1.net
40. Bonifacio vs RTC
Facts: Jessie John Gimenez (Gimenez) filed before the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office in behalf of Yuchenco
Family of Yuchenco Group of Companies (YGC) and Malayan Insurance Co., (Malayan), a criminal complain for
13 counts of libel under Art. 355 in relation to Art. 353 of the RPC against the members of Paents Enabling
Parents Coalition Inc (PEPCI), a group of discontented planholders of Pacific Plans, Inc (PPI) which is owned by
the Yuchengco’s, for they previously purchased traditional pre-need educational plans but were unable to
collect thereon or avail of the benefits of such after PPI, due to liquidity concerns, filed for corporate
rehabilitation with prayer of suspension of payments.

That PEPCI members owns and moderates a website and a blog with web domains:
www.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com, www.pepcoalition.com, and [email protected]. Gimenez
further alleged that upon accessing the above-stated websites in Makati on various dates from August 25 to
October 2, 2005, he "was appalled to read numerous articles [numbering 13], maliciously and recklessly
caused to be published by [the accused] containing highly derogatory statements and false accusations,
relentlessly attacking the Yuchengco Family, YGC, and particularly, Malayan." Since the article was first
published and accessed by Gimenez at Makati City, pursuant to Art. 360 of the RPC as amended by RA 4363.

Issue: Whether or not the case should be dismissed.

Ruling: Yes. Art. 360 of the RPC provides: “Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication or
exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same. Xxxx The
criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for in this chapter
shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the RTC of the province or city where the libelous article is
printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission
of the offense. xxxx”

That venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited only to:

1. Where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or

2. Where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published.

If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published was used as basis for the venue of
the action, the Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first
published. The same measures cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material
appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way of determining the point of its printing and
first publication. To give credence to Gimenez’s argument would spawn the very ills that the amendment to
Art. 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It would do chaos wherein website author, writer,
blogger or anyone who post messages in websites could be sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines. The
information is quashed and the case is dismissed.

41. RIGOR V. PEOPLE G.R. NO. 144887, NOVEMBER 17, 2014

Facts: On November 16, 1989, Alfredo Rigor applied for a P500,000 commercial loan from Rural Bank (RB) San
Juan. Rigor signed a promissory note stating a 24% annual interest. A casher’s check with P487,000 net
proceeds of loan was issued to Rigor. Rigor later endorsed and encashed the check with the RB San Juan teller
who stamped the word “Paid”. Rigor then issued an undated Associated Bank (AB) Tarlac Branch check in the
amount of P500,000 payable to RB San Juan. The application, approval and receipt of proceeds were all in one
day because Rigor is the kumpare of RB Sam Juan President and he is well-known to directors because they all
come from Tarlac. Rigor failed to pay the loan upon maturity.

He personally asked a two (2)-month extension but still failed to pay upon expiration of said period. He asked
for another 30-day extension but was denied by the bank manager.On April 25, 1990, the bank manager sent a
formal demand letter. Meanwhile, RB San Juan deposited the AB check previously received from Rigor with
the PSBank (PSB), however the same was returned because the account was closed. When sued before the
Trial Court of Pasig, Rigor was later found guilty of violation of Sec. 1 of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. No. 22).
Rigor contends that the Trial Court of Pasig has no jurisdiction over the case since there was no proof offered
that his check was issued, delivered, dishonored or that knowledge of insufficiency of the funds occurred in
San Juan, Manila.

Issue: Whether the Trial Court of Pasig had jurisdiction to try and decide the case.

Ruling: YES. The rule is, a person charged with a transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or
territory where the offense was in part committed. Violations of B.P. 22 are categorized as transitory or
continuing crimes because some acts material and essential to the crimes and requisite to their consummation
occur in one (1) municipality or territory and some in another. The evidence showed that the undated check
was issued and delivered at RB San Juan on November 16, 1989, and that the same has been deposited on
May 25, 2990 with PS Bank San Juan but dishonored by AB. Clearly, San Juan is the place of drawing and
issuing whereas Tarlac was the place where it was dishonored. Based on the foregoing, the offense is triable
by the Trial Court of Pasig.

RULE 111

Prosecution of Civil Action

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action.

The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts
presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to
make such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal,
temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or information, the
filing fees thereof shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such damages.

Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information, the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.

Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any
cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (1a)

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding
civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees
based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where
the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary
damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the
amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees
based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is
granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing
consolidation of the civil and criminal actions. (cir. 57-97)

42. Unionbank vs People GR No. 192565

Facts: Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for making a
false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Bank’s
two (2) complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin. The first complaint filed before the RTC
of Pasay. The second complaint was filed to the MeTC, Pasay City. Both complaints showed that Tomas
executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping. Accordingly, she was charged of deliberately
violating Article 183 of the RPC by falsely declaring under oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the
second complaint that she did not commence any other action or proceeding involving the same issue in
another tribunal or agency. Tomas filed a Motion to Quash, she argued that the venue was improperly laid
since it is the Pasay City court (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was submitted and used) and not
the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was subscribed) that has jurisdiction
over the perjury case.
Issue: Whether or not the criminal case against the Petitioner was instituted in the proper venue?

Held: Yes, Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or municipality
or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred. The above
provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which
states: Place of commission of the offense. – The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood
from its allegations that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at some
place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place where it was committed constitutes an
essential element of the offense charged or is necessary for its identification.Both provisions categorically
place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not only in the court where the offense was committed,
but also where any of its essential ingredients took place. In other words, the venue of action and of
jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information states that the offense was committed or
some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.

43. TREÑAS vs. People

Facts: Elizabeth Luciaja gave P150,000.00 to Atty. Hector Treñas to assist in the titling of a house and lot
located in Iloilo City. Treñas prepared and issued a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. He also gave
Elizabeth three Revenue Official Receipts amounting to P120,000. However, when Elizabeth consulted with
the BIR, she was informed that the receipts were fake. When confronted, Hector admitted to her that the
receipts were fake and that he used the money for his other transactions. Elizabeth demanded the return of
the money. Thus, the instant case of Estafa was filed against Hector. An Information was filed by the Office of
the City Prosecutor before the RTC Makati City which rendered a Decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime
of Estafa. Petitioner appealed with the CA which also rendered a Decision affirming that of the RTC. Petitioner
asserts that nowhere in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show that ₱ 150,000 was given to
and received by petitioner in Makati City. Also, the evidence shows that the Receipt issued by petitioner was
without any indication of the place where it was issued. Meanwhile, the Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage prepared by petitioner was signed and notarized in Iloilo City. Petitioner claims that the only logical
conclusion is that the money was actually delivered to him in Iloilo City, especially since his residence and
office were situated there as well. Absent any direct proof as to the place of delivery, one must rely on the
disputable presumption that things happened according to the ordinary course of nature.

Issue: Whether RTC Makati has jurisdiction over the controversy.

Ruling: No. The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an
essential element of jurisdiction. For jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should
have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction
to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take
jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information. In this case, the prosecution failed to show that the offense of estafa was
committed within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati City. Also, the Affidavit of Complaint executed by
Elizabeth does not contain any allegation as to where the offense was committed. Aside from the lone
allegation in the Information, no other evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove that the offense
or any of its elements was committed in Makati City. There is nothing in the documentary evidence offered by
the prosecution that points to where the offense, or any of its elements, was committed. There being no
showing that the offense was committed within Makati, The RTC of that city has no jurisdiction over the case.