Info 01 2014 0004
Info 01 2014 0004
Info 01 2014 0004
Evaluating social media privacy settings for personal and advertising purposes
Heyman Rob De Wolf Ralf Pierson Jo
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To cite this document:
Heyman Rob De Wolf Ralf Pierson Jo , (2014),"Evaluating social media privacy settings for personal and advertising
purposes", info, Vol. 16 Iss 4 pp. 18 - 32
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Wolf and Jo Pierson are Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to define two types of privacy, which are distinct but often
based at iMinds-SMIT, reduced to each other. It also investigates which form of privacy is most prominent in privacy settings of
Vrije Universiteit Brussel, online social networks (OSN). Privacy between users is different from privacy between a user and a third
Brussels, Belgium. party. OSN, and to a lesser extent researchers, often reduce the former to the latter, which results in
misleading users and public debate about privacy.
Design/methodology/approach – The authors define two types of privacy that account for the
difference between interpersonal and third-party disclosure. The first definition draws on symbolic
interactionist accounts of privacy, wherein users are performing dramaturgically for an intended
audience. Third-party privacy is based on the data that represent the user in data mining and
knowledge discovery processes, which ultimately manipulate users into audience commodities. This
typology was applied to the privacy settings of Facebook, LinkedIn and Twitter. The results are
presented as a flowchart.
Findings – The research indicates that users are granted more options in controlling their interpersonal
information flow towards other users than third parties or service providers.
Research limitations/implications – This distinction needs to be furthered empirically, by comparing
user’s privacy expectations in both situations. On more theoretical grounds, this typology could also be
linked to Habermas’ system and life-world.
Originality/value – A typology has been provided to compare the relative autonomy users receive for
settings that drive revenue and settings, which are independent from revenue.
Keywords Online social networks, Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn, Advertising, Privacy settings
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Received 24 January 2014 Studies related to social media and privacy refer to at least two types of privacy
Revised 2 April 2014 interchangeably. The latter is problematic, as both interpretations downplay important
Accepted 17 April 2014
actors in social media (Karahasanovic et al., 2009). Users are either portrayed as cattle
This research was funded by
EMSOC. EMSOC (User generating money for platform owners (Cohen, 2008; Fuchs, 2012a; 2012b) without a
Empowerment in a Social choice or users are lauded as empowered agents writing themselves into being free from
Media Culture) (www.emsoc.be)
is a four-year project (1 constraints (Boyd, 2007).
December 2010-30 November
2014) in the SBO programme We will maintain two types of privacy throughout the paper to elaborate on their differences.
for strategic basic research The first type, “privacy as subject”, can be summarised as the management of information
with societal goal, funded by
IWT (government agency for about one’s identity vis-à-vis the other users. The latter type of privacy has been called lateral
Innovation by Science and or social privacy. In “privacy as object”, users are not seen by other users. Algorithms sort their
Technology) in Flanders
(Belgium). The research behaviour and user-generated content (UGC) for economic benefits derived from big data.
project is a cooperation
between Vrije Universiteit Both perspectives have a blind spot. The micro-level research exploring benefits for users
Brussel (IBBT-SMIT & LSTS),
Universiteit Gent (IBBT-MICT &
should not underestimate the limits imposed on their system for commercial reasons, which
C&E) and Katholieke are driven by decisions taken on an aggregated level. The surveillance and critical theory
Universiteit Leuven (ICRI &
CUO), coordinated by
studies have better tools to conceptualise these challenges, but it is impossible to
IBBT-SMIT. understand why users join these platforms of exploitation in the first place. Coté and Pybus
PAGE 18 info VOL. 16 NO. 4, 2014, pp. 18-32, © Emerald Group Publishing Limited, ISSN 1463-6697 DOI 10.1108/info-01-2014-0004
(2007) have combined these perspectives. They have illustrated how users willingly
disclose information that can be commodified afterwards. This motivation is situated in the
privacy as subject realm where information disclosure is needed to create and manage an
identity: “A MySpace profile can be seen as a form of digital body where individuals must
write themselves into being” (Boyd, 2007).
We have made this distinction because this blind spot exists and this is counterproductive, as
platforms can claim that they solved privacy issues, while only solving one type. The distinction
enables more fine-grained measuring of particular types of privacy, but will also enable
researchers to compare user preferences vis-à-vis this typology. This is prevalent in privacy
settings that address a majority of privacy as subject issues and neglect privacy as object
issues.
We therefore test the two concepts of privacy through the analysis of privacy settings in the
following social media platforms: Facebook[1], Twitter[2] and LinkedIn[3]. We make use of
the notion of “affordance”[4], as defined by Donald Norman, to assess design decisions
related to privacy settings. Our research questions related to design are: what type of
privacy is offered most and what kind of behaviour is encouraged by default settings?
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The paper is structured to develop a better understanding of the two types of privacy and
the research related to these two interpretations. We start with framing the perspectives
that – implicitly – use the perspective of privacy as subject. Next we do the same for privacy
as object. Further on, Norman’s affordances are operationalised to evaluate design
decisions made in favour or against empowerment in these types of privacy. Finally, we
map the different settings of the aforementioned social networks.
2. Privacy perspectives
Two different logics may occur when talking about privacy and especially privacy in social
media. In social media, information can flow in two directions. Naturally, the first flow of
information is directed towards other users. This is of the utmost importance for users
because it determines how and if they are going to be perceived by peers and other users
(Livingstone et al., 2011). The second flow of information concerns the parties that are not
seen as people or “friends”. These parties collect personal identifiable information (PII)
regardless of the profile being private or public (Clarke, 1988; Fuchs, 2011; Gandy, 2003;
Solove, 2001). We will address the former type as privacy as subject, because both sender
and receiver of information are interpreting, communicating subjects. The latter type,
privacy as object, approaches users and their data as manipulable objects, devoid of any
agency. Table I gives an overview of the two types of privacy and their characteristics.
A recent Eurobarometer research on social media and electronic identity (European
Commission, 2011) surveyed the different opinions and habits Europeans have towards
data disclosure. Forty-four per cent worry about their information being used without their
knowledge, and 38 per cent fear that this information might be shared with third parties
without their agreement. Thirty-two per cent are afraid of the risk of identity theft through
information disclosure. Twenty-eight per cent are afraid that it might be used to send out
unwanted commercial offers, and finally, 25 per cent worry that their information might be
used in different contexts form the one where they originally disclosed the information
(European Commission, 2011, p. 56).
1. general accessibility;
2. social threats;
3. organisational threats; and
4. identity theft.
General accessibility is the fear of users that their information might be found by unintended
recipients, such as students, parents, future employers, etc. Social threats are seen as
threats arising within the SNS environment of a user, through active or passive use of the
service, and typical examples may be cyberbullying or getting tagged in awkward photos.
Organisational threats are instances where personal information is exchanged with
organisations such as the SNS owner or third parties. Finally, one respondent feared
identity theft on SNS. King et al. (2011) have adapted this division as institutional and
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interpersonal privacy threats, which are, respectively, organisational and social threats.
Krasnova et al. (2009) interpret privacy as informational privacy, defined by Westin (1970)
as: “the right of the individual to decide what information about himself should be
communicated to others and under what circumstances”. The same definition is used by
Diaz and Gürses (2012) to describe privacy paradigms. In this paradigm, the “privacy as
control” paradigm, the platform owner is expected to respect the user’s choices with regard
to settings and with regard to the proposed privacy policy (Diaz and Gürses, 2012; Paul
et al., 2011). This is opposed to the conception of a malign or incompetent platform owner
with whom as little information as possible is shared, due to the anticipated consequences
such as data leakage or transgressions of the privacy policy (Diaz and Gürses, 2012).
Another articulation of the access control model approach is Nissenbaum’s (2004) privacy
as contextual integrity. This theory presupposes that every situation of information
disclosure has rules. These rules determine what information flows to whom. A privacy
breach occurs when information is flowing outside these rules.
Informational privacy (Westin, 1970) and contextual integrity (Nissenbaum, 2004) are
general theories of privacy that focus on meta rules to evaluate privacy. The robustness of
these models renders them applicable to both types of privacy. But these robust models
are not able to explain why Gmail users share their inbox with an algorithm[5] but would not
share the same content with friends. We create this division to explain the different logics
at work between third parties and users.
Privacy settings can be seen as an explicit articulation of these rules. But we should not
forget that these settings are man-made and, therefore, exclude certain affordances
(Norman, 1999). An affordance is the relation that a user has with an object with regard to
the properties of that object, for example one of the affordances of a chair is that you can
sit on it. Designers may choose to limit functional properties by disabling them physically;
it is, for example, impossible to fuel a gasoline car with diesel because the nozzle for diesel
is too big to fit in the fuel tank. Privacy settings can also be limited in the same way when
options are not offered at all.
Hewitt (2007), as a contemporary adherent, conceptualises identity as the acting part of the
individual next to emotions and cognitions. It is through actions of announcements and
placements that an identity crystallises. Announcements can be seen as everything an
individual undertakes to be recognised for. Placements are actions of others to recognise
announcements. Identity formation is hence a social process. It is important to denote that
the whole identity formation process does not take place in an empty space, but is
anchored in specific contexts.
Goffman (1990) has discussed the importance of “the presentation of self in everyday life”[7].
He is especially noted for his description of front and back stage. A front stage can be seen as
that part where an actor plays a role for the audience. He defines it as “that part of the
individual’s performance which regularly functions in a general and fixed fashion to define the
situation for those who observe the performance” (Goffman, 1990, p. 32). A back stage has to
be seen as a place where suppressed front-stage material makes an appearance. On the topic
of a back stage he states that “it is here that the capacity of a performance to express
something beyond itself may be painstakingly fabricated; it is here that illusions and
impressions are openly constructed” (Goffman, 1990, p. 114). Goffman (1990) observed how
social institutions were organised and often saw the contours of a back and front stage
determine the context of conduct, e.g. a staffroom within a school can function as back stage
for a teacher. We claim that this process of back and front stage does not have to be so
tangible, but can be expanded to the process of announcements and placements in the
formation of an identity. Individuals will only disclose or announce certain information in one
particular context and withdraw other. Basically, some information remains in one context (back
stage), whereas other is displayed (front stage)[8]. Identity and privacy are thus two sides of the
same coin, whereas their common denominator, that is context, plays a valuable role.
In current mass self-communication society (Castells, 2007), the social media ecology can
be regarded as a collapsed environment (in comparison to older media environments),
where time and space barriers are difficult to draw. In one way this can be considered
liberating and even empowering because an identity can be formed without role and other
limitations related to context (De Wolf and Pierson, 2012)[9]. Then again, this creates
(contextual) privacy problems as well. Context collision (Boyd, 2008), social convergence
(Boyd, 2008) or context collapse (Raynes-Goldie, 2010) all refer to a same process that
indicates how offline barriers have faded away online[10]. Boyd (2008) points out that this
absence of barriers problematises the audience for whom the identity is performed. This is
due to invisible audiences: audiences to whom the information flow in time (e.g. future
audiences) and space (e.g. friends of friends) was not intended or perceived. Related to
this is the privacy problem of blurring boundaries between public and private (Boyd, 2008),
e.g. a boss reading a negative announcement on his person by one of his employees on
KDD is the tool to objectify individuals and their data into profiles: “The data are recorded
as a type of brute facts, de-contextualised and – as far as the machine is concerned –
without meaning.” (Hildebrandt, 2006b) (Figure 1).
The general goal of KDD is “the nontrivial process of identifying valid, novel, potentially
useful, and ultimately understandable patterns in data” (Fayyad et al., 1996, pp. 40-41).
Two types of knowledge are generated through this process: verification and discovery of
new information. In the first type, the data are used to verify existing hypothesizes, and in
the second type, the data are used to predict whether someone belongs to a certain profile.
Commercial uses for these data are recognising distinct customer groups, predicting when
people are going to buy a product and recognising fraud or bad customers (Fayyad et al.,
1996, p. 38; Gandy, 2003, pp. 5-6). “Bad” is emphasised because this is defined from an
economic logic, wherein companies do not wish to contact these potential consumers
because they cost more than they return.
The data in KDD processes are ordered and changed to fit KDD needs and this implies that
they change for privacy as subject as well. As KDD is a computer science discipline,
Hildebrandt uses a computer science definition of identity: “the set of true facts that
uniquely defines each and every individual” (Hildebrandt, 2006a, p. 9). This idea of true
facts presupposes that a person can be defined through categories that apply to anyone
(Hildebrandt, 2006a, p. 8).
1. As users visit social media, they are inadvertently looking at advertising and this
attention is bought by advertising companies through demographics, see Figure 2[12].
2. Users produce UGC to create an identity as described in privacy as subject, but this
information may also be used for advertising purposes (targeting or integration of
social content). Cohen (2008) also notes that this content attracts other users to the
platform, which increases the odds that they will look at advertising.
3. Fuchs (2012a, 2012b) and Smythe (1977) also see this exposure to advertising (1) as
an inducement for users to learn how to spend their money.
4. Finally, Coté and Pybus indicated that this teaches users how to write themselves into
being, and this unintentionally adds value to marketable objects, either by liking them
or by writing about them.
Fuchs (2012a, 2012b) refers to a (fictional) minor called Adam, who is being served
Facebook advertising based on his monitored interests. “Facebook thus profits and could
not exist without the unpaid labor that Adam and millions of his fellow Facebook workers
conduct. Adam is the prototypical Facebook child worker” (Fuchs, 2012a, 2012b). This is
clearly intended to provoke, but it fails to account for Adam’s initial intentions to disclose
information. It also exposes a Marxist fallacy shown by Smythe and Livant: “What often
escapes attention is that just because the labourer sells it (his or her labour power) does not
mean that he or she produces it” [Livant, cited in (Smythe, 1977, p. 7)].
Livant’s remark is important because it problematises the over-application of labour to a point
where all free time, except from sleeping, will become labour (Smythe, 1977). In this case, we
wish to draw attention to the fact that the labour on social media is sold, but that the labour is
not deliberately made by the user to be sold. What users generate on social media is made with
a different intention, to manage an identity. Labour performed by users on social media can
therefore be seen as an emergent, implicit property that would not exist in non-commercial
platforms.
To conclude, our distinction (Table II) can now be interpreted differently. The motivations to
manage an online identity can be seen as an inducement to allow privacy as object-related
processes. As long as these two types of privacy remain reduced to one definition, it is
problematical to evaluate privacy settings or policies. This was put very clearly by Mark
Zuckerberg himself: “the privacy is largely false – but for most students, the privacy is good
enough” (Stutzman, 2006).
However, by adding Norman’s affordances to contextual integrity, we have a way to map
empowerment or disempowerment within privacy settings. Empowerment in the general sense
is defined as “enabling people to control their own lives and to take advantage of opportunities”
(van der Maesen and Walker, 2002, p. 24) or in other words “a process, a mechanism by which
people, organisations, and communities gain mastery over their affairs” (Rappaport, 1987).
Previous research (King et al., 2011) has already shown that users are uncertain or do not
know how to use privacy settings for apps. Krasnova et al. (2009) have already argued that
organisational privacy or privacy as object threats are hard to address in privacy settings.
With this distinction, we wish to see how economic motivations shape the design of privacy
settings and thus users’ privacy options.
3. Research set-up
We will map the different privacy settings provided by three popular social media platforms:
LinkedIn, Twitter and Facebook. The mapping was performed in May 2012. The selection
of these platforms is based on previous work where we also mapped the information
collected from users and how this was communicated. The most important reason to select
Due to the popularity of the concept, affordance covered too many meanings and was divided
in two sorts of affordances that are especially useful for the evaluation of computer screens:
[. . .] designers sometimes will say that when they put an icon, cursor, or other target on the
screen, they have added an “affordance” to the system. This is a misuse of the concept. The
affordance exists independently of what is visible on the screen. Those displays are not
affordances; they are visual feedback that advertise the affordances: they are the perceived
affordances (Norman, 1999).
To present the settings in a comprehensible way, we will show them as a flowchart, which
represents the path a user has to take through the website structure to change settings. The
flowchart is colour-coded to show what options are related to privacy as subject (yellow
rectangle), privacy as object (blue oval) or both (green diamond). The analysis is
performed on default settings[14], and default settings are indicated with a ticked
checkbox symbol (✓) (Figure 3).
3.1.1 Twitter. Figure 4 shows Twitter settings.
3.1.2 LinkedIn. Figure 5 shows LinkedIn settings[15].
3.1.3 Facebook. Figure 6 shows Facebook settings.
Users 500 million (January 2011) 101 million (January 2011) 100 million (October 2011)
Average age 48 per cent 18-34 years 38 per cent 35-49 years 42 per cent 30-49 years
IPO 18 May 2012 18 May 2011 N.A.
Sources: Anon (2011); Parr (2011); Verde (2011)
groups. Profile searchability[16] can be customised to remain completely hidden, but this
option is disabled by default and non-existent for Twitter users.
The options displayed in green show an overlap of both privacies. This is the case for
options that are related to advertising and applications. In the case of applications, the user
has to decide how and to what extent information from the platform is shared with the
application. Because, the application can usually post things on behalf of the user, it is
privacy as subject. Applications may also collect data for other purposes, and therefore, it
is also privacy as object.
Green options also refer to advertising, which incorporates users’ names and other
information in the case of LinkedIn and Facebook[17]. These options are enabled by
default, but it is possible to opt-out. The privacy as subject access is limited to connected
contacts only because it would lose its social meaning otherwise.
Blue settings are the scarcest, which implies less user choice for privacy as object. Users
are unable to choose to opt-out of all targeted advertising, and this is the reason why there
are no blue settings in the Twitter flowchart. LinkedIn offers advertisers to advertise outside
its platform, through its ad network (Heyman and Pierson, 2011), and users may choose
to opt-out. Facebook and LinkedIn personalise websites through plug-ins, and it is also
possible to opt-out of this option. Facebook has recently launched an ad exchange, and
this will allow advertisers to retarget users who have visited their website or who did not
finish their online purchase (Edwards, 2012). It is impossible to disable this form of
tracking. Finally, Facebook makes use of “sponsored stories” to integrate UGC, which
promotes a brand, product or service. It is impossible for users to opt-out of these
“sponsored stories”.
commercial messages. This is problematic because the logic of privacy as object interferes
with the logic of privacy as subject, which means that the expanding commodification is
now managing our identity through social and integrated advertising.
The proposed distinction may help us to discern what kind of privacy is more controllable for
users. When we look beyond privacy settings, the same distinction could be used to evaluate
EU privacy legislation, which at first glance favours privacy as object because it is only
concerned with the systematic gathering and use of PII. Personal use of PII or privacy as
subject is an exception to the legislation. Privacy as subject may become more important due
to the friction caused by privacy as object or due to harmful instances such as cyberbullying
and sexting.
Our mapping of privacy settings could also serve as a starting point to discuss what the
default setting should be, but also whether we should get more settings to control what is
left beyond user consideration. The current model allows the freest flow of information, but
this might prove harmful for the less aware and literate social media users.
Finally, further research should be done on comparing these settings with privacy policies
and user perceptions of the access control models offered by social media. The focus on
settings may divert attention to issues that are controllable, which neglects an important
part of possible awareness of other information flows.
Notes
1. www.facebook.com
2. www.twitter.com
3. www.linkedin.com
4. “the term affordance refers to the perceived and actual properties of the thing, primarily those
fundamental properties that determine just how the thing could possibly be used” (Norman, 1998).
5. Gmail uses an algorithm to match the content of email messages to advertising to increase
relevance.
6. Other theoretical frameworks can/should be used to illustrate the nature of privacy as subject.
However, we find this socio-cultural approach especially useful in studying identity – and thereby
privacy. We believe that the affordances and problems created by SNS, and social media in
general, cannot be studied without the context of conduct. A symbolic interactionist framework
emerges as a valuable tool because much attention is paid to the reciprocal relationship between
an individual and the group he or she is embedded in.
7. Goffman does not use the term “context” but uses “stage” or “regions”, making the analogy with
dramaturgy.
15. To keep this diagram readable on one page, we have omitted some of the “on/off” flowchart
branches; the default setting is set in bold to keep all information.
16. By this we mean the chance of being found through search engines. This setting has been
removed from Facebook with the implementation of Graph Search (Bilton, 2012).
17. Twitter does not attach user information to advertising.
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Jo Pierson has been Researcher and Senior Researcher at SMIT – part of iMinds
(Interdisciplinary Institute for Broadband Technology) – since 1996 and holds a PhD in
social science (media and communication studies) since 2003. He has been lecturing on
undergraduate and masters’ courses at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (Belgium) in the
Department of Communication Studies (Faculty of Arts and Philosophy), covering
socio-economic issues relating to the information society, digital media marketing and
qualitative research methods.
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