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A.C. No. 8854. July 3, 2018.

JULIETA DIMAYUGA, complainant, vs. ATTY. VIVIAN G.


RUBIA, respondent.

Attorneys; Legal Ethics; A Supreme CourtÊs (SCÊs) Resolution is


not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with
partially, inadequately, or selectively.·Preliminarily, We shall
address respondentÊs apathetic attitude towards this case, to which
this Court has been very tolerant. We have given respondent
several opportunities to file her comment and explain her side on
the accusations against her since 2011 but, up to present,
respondent has yet to file the required comment. This Court cannot,
anymore, accept respondentÊs excuses for such defiance, i.e.,
trauma, stress, and life​-threatening situations, considering that she
was able to file pleadings stating such explanation but still failed to
file the required

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* EN BANC.

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VOL. 869, JULY 3, 2018 429


Dimayuga vs. Rubia

comment. Nothing can be concluded therefrom but that


respondentÊs acts or inaction for that matter, were deliberate and
manipulating, which unreasonably delay this CourtÊs action on the
case. These acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders
of this Court, which, not only works against her case as she is now
deemed to have waived the filing of her comment, but more
importantly is in itself a sufficient cause for suspension or
disbarment pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Such attitude constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution.
„A CourtÊs Resolution is not to be construed as a mere request, nor
should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively.‰
Administrative Proceedings; Substantial Evidence; In
administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a
finding of guilt is substantial evidence or such evidence as a
reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion.·
In Sebastian v. Atty. Bajar, 532 SCRA 435 (2007) the Court,
considered the failure to comply with the courtÊs order, resolution,
or directive as constitutive of gross misconduct and insubordination.
Proceeding to the merits of the Complaint, We find that the
allegations of delay in the performance of duty and
misappropriation of funds were not sufficiently substantiated. „In
administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a
finding of guilt is substantial evidence or such evidence as a
reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion.‰
Corollary to this is the established rule that he who alleges a fact
has the burden of proving it for mere allegation is not evidence.
„The complainant has the burden of proving by substantial evidence
the allegations in the complaint.‰
Attorneys; Legal Ethics; In preparing and notarizing a deed of
sale within the prohibited period to sell the subject property under
the law, respondent assisted, if not led, the contracting parties, who
relied on her knowledge of the law being their lawyer, to an act
constitutive of a blatant disregard for or defiance of the law.·Time
and again, We have held that a lawyerÊs conduct ought to and must
always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. CANON 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) provides that a
lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws, and promote
respect for law and legal processes. Also, Rule 15.07 thereof
mandates a lawyer to impress upon his client compliance with the
laws and principles of fairness. Indeed, in preparing and notarizing
a deed of sale within

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430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Dimayuga vs. Rubia
the prohibited period to sell the subject property under the law,
respondent assisted, if not led, the contracting parties, who relied
on her knowledge of the law being their lawyer, to an act
constitutive of a blatant disregard for or defiance of the law.
Notarization; Notarization is not an empty or meaningless
routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such
that only those who are qualified or authorized may be
commissioned to perform the same.·Respondent likewise displayed
lack of respect and made a mockery of the solemnity of the oath in
an Acknowledgment as her act of notarizing such illegal document
entitled it full faith and credit upon its face, when it obviously does
not deserve such entitlement, considering its illegality due to the
prohibition above cited. In the case of Caalim-Verzonilla v. Atty.
Pascua, 658 SCRA 762 (2011), We aptly explained: [W]hile
respondentÊs duty as a notary public is principally to ascertain the
identity of the affiant and the voluntariness of the declaration, it is
nevertheless incumbent upon him to guard against any illegal or
immoral arrangement or at least refrain from being a party to its
consummation. Rule IV, Section 4 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice in fact proscribes notaries public from performing any
notarial act for transactions similar to the herein document of sale,
to wit: SEC. 4. Refusal to Notarize.·A notary public shall not
perform any notarial act described in these Rules for any person
requesting such an act even if he tenders the appropriate fee
specified by these Rules if: (a) the notary knows or has good reason
to believe that the notarial act or transaction is unlawful or
immoral. x x x x It cannot be overstressed that notarization is not
an empty or meaningless routinary act. It is invested with
substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified
or authorized may be commissioned to perform the same. In all, for
these acts of misconduct, „the Court has sanctioned erring lawyers
with suspension from the practice of law, revocation of the notarial
commission and disqualification from acting as such, and even
disbarment.‰
Attorneys; Disbarment; Disbarment should not be decreed where
any punishment less severe such as reprimand, fine, or suspension
would accomplish the end desired.·Considering that this is not the
first time that respondent was administratively sanctioned by this
Court, We have already warned her that future infractions shall be
dealt with more severely. However, We are also reminded that

431
VOL. 869, JULY 3, 2018 431
Dimayuga vs. Rubia

„disbarment should not be decreed where any punishment less


severe such as reprimand, fine, or suspension would accomplish the
end desired.‰

ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Gross


Negligence, Misrepresentation and Violation of the
LawyerÊs Oath.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

TIJAM, J.:

For Our resolution is a Complaint1 for disciplinary


action, charging Atty. Vivian G. Rubia (respondent) with
gross negligence, misrepresentation, and violation of the
lawyerÊs oath.
Julieta Dimayuga (complainant) averred in her
Complaint that sometime in June 2002, she and her family
engaged respondentÊs legal services to effect the transfer of
their deceased fatherÊs property to them, which services
were supposed to include preparation, notarization, and
processing of the transfer document and payment of taxes
and other fees for such transfer. Respondent prepared a
document denominated as Amended Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights,2 which they
signed on June 17, 2002.3 However, the transfer did not
happen soon thereafter. Upon inquiry, her family learned
that respondent paid the transfer tax only on October 25,
2007;4 the donorÊs tax was paid on April 2, 2007;5 and
contrary to her representations with the complainantÊs
family, respondent only entered the Amended Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate with Waiver of Rights with the
Register of Deeds of Davao del Sur only on November 28,
2007 and reentered on December 1, 2008. It is
complainantÊs

_______________

1 Rollo, pp. 1-7.


2 Id., at pp. 10-15.
3 Id., at p. 3.
4 Id., at pp. 4, 16.
5 Id., at pp. 4, 17.

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432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Dimayuga vs. Rubia

theory that respondent may have misappropriated the


money that the family paid for her services on June 17,
2002 for her personal use, hence, the belated payment of
the required taxes and fees.6
Complainant also alleged that in June 2003, she also
sought respondentÊs legal services for the purchase of a real
property in Digos City. However, contrary to her
representation that the property shall be registered in their
names after one month, the title was not transferred to
them.7 Moreover, the Deed of Absolute Sale8 dated June 27,
2003 for the purchase of a 600-square-meter parcel of land
prepared by respondent, was covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. CARP-03000,9 coming from
Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No.
00394433. The title was issued on February 5, 1997 and
registered with the Registry of Deeds of Davao del Sur on
February 6, 1997. Being a land covered by CLOA, the
following limitation was stated on the face of the TCT, viz.:

[S]ubject to the condition that it shall not be sold, transferred or


conveyed except through hereditary succession, or to the
Government, or to the Land Bank of the Philippines, or to other
qualified beneficiaries for a period of ten (10) years. x x x.10

Thus, on June 27, 2003, the sale of the property was still
prohibited. Complainant averred that they merely relied on
the ability and knowledge of respondent as lawyer, who
should not have assented to the sale of the said property
due to the prohibition.11

_______________

6 Id., at pp. 4-5.


7 Id., at pp. 1-1A.
8 Id., at p. 8.
9 Id., at p. 9.
10 Id.
11 Id., at p. 3.

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VOL. 869, JULY 3, 2018 433


Dimayuga vs. Rubia

Hence, complainant prayed that respondent be


administratively disciplined for her actions.
In a Resolution12 dated January 31, 2011, the Court
required the respondent to comment on the complaint
within ten days from notice.
Respondent moved for an extension of time to file her
comment,13 which was granted by the Court in its
Resolution14 dated August 15, 2012.
However, within the period of the granted extension, respondent
still failed to file the required comment. Hence, in a
Resolution15 dated July 14, 2014, the Court imposed upon
respondent a fine of P2,000 and reiterated its order requiring
respondent to file her comment.
Respondent neither paid the fine nor filed a comment. Hence, in
a Resolution16 dated January 13, 2016, the Court imposed upon
respondent an increased fine of P4,000 and again, required
respondent to file comment.
On April 7, 2016, respondent paid the imposed increased fine
and explained that her failure to pay the original fine was because
the first notice was lost. Respondent also informed the Court of her
transfer of office.17
On June 29, 2016, the Court noted respondentÊs
compliance. However, We reiterated Our order in the
January 13, 2016 Resolution, considering that per Office of
the Bar ConfidantÊ (OBC), no postal money orders were
enclosed in the aforesaid compliance.18

_______________

12 Id., at p. 21.
13 Id., at pp. 22-26.
14 Id., at p. 29.
15 Id., at pp. 33-34.
16 Id., at pp. 37-38.
17 Id., at pp. 39-41.
18 Id., at pp. 44-45.

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434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Dimayuga vs. Rubia

In its September 19, 2016 Resolution,19 the Court noted


the OBCÊs Letter20 dated July 26, 2016, stating the return
to respondent of the two postal money orders for being
received by the CourtÊs cashier beyond the 90-day period
from its validity. The Court also resolved to await
respondentÊs compliance with the June 29, 2016 Resolution.
On November 14, 2016 Resolution,21 the Court noted
respondentÊs remittance of two postal money orders as
replacement for the expired ones. Respondent still failed to
file her comment, thus, the Court also required her to show
cause why she should not be disciplinarily dealt with or
held in contempt for such failure and, again ordered her to
comply with the January 31, 2016 Resolution.
On December 27, 2016, respondent complied with the show
cause order, explaining that she suffered from trauma and stress
due to the previous cases filed against her and also that she had
undergone life​-threatening situations due to some high-profile cases
that she handled, hence, her failure to file her comment.22
However, respondent still failed to file her comment to
the Complaint. Thus, on June 28, 2017 Resolution,23 while
the Court noted her explanation, the Court again required
her to file a comment in compliance with the January 31,
2011 Resolution. Despite receipt of the June 28, 2017
Resolution, respondent still failed to file the required
comment.24
Necessarily, this Court will now act on the resolution of
the Complaint.
Preliminarily, We shall address respondentÊs apathetic
attitude towards this case, to which this Court has been
very

_______________
19 Id., at p. 58.
20 Id., at p. 47.
21 Id., at p. 77.
22 Id., at pp. 64-65.
23 Id., at pp. 80-81.
24 Id., at p. 83.

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VOL. 869, JULY 3, 2018 435


Dimayuga vs. Rubia

tolerant. We have given respondent several opportunities to file her


comment and explain her side on the accusations against her since
2011 but, up to present, respondent has yet to file the required
comment. This Court cannot, anymore, accept respondentÊs excuses
for such defiance, i.e., trauma, stress, and life​-threatening
situations, considering that she was able to file pleadings stating
such explanation but still failed to file the required comment.
Nothing can be concluded therefrom but that respondentÊs acts or
inaction for that matter, were deliberate and manipulating, which
unreasonably delay this CourtÊs action on the case. These acts
constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court,
which, not only works against her case as she is now deemed to
have waived the filing of her comment, but more importantly is in
itself a sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment pursuant to
Section 27,25 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Such attitude
constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. „A CourtÊs
Resolution is not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be
complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively.‰26
In Sebastian v. Atty. Bajar,27 the Court, considered the
failure to comply with the courtÊs order, resolution, or
directive as constitutive of gross misconduct and
insubordination.28

_______________

25 Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on


what grounds.·A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from
his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice,
or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority so to do. x x x
26 Sebastian v. Bajar, 559 Phil. 211, 224; 532 SCRA 435, 449 (2007).
27 Id.
28 Id., at p. 225; p. 450.

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436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Dimayuga vs. Rubia

Proceeding to the merits of the Complaint, We find that


the allegations of delay in the performance of duty and
misappropriation of funds were not sufficiently
substantiated. „In administrative proceedings, the
quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is
substantial evidence or such evidence as a reasonable mind
may accept as adequate to support a conclusion.‰29
Corollary to this is the established rule that he who alleges
a fact has the burden of proving it for mere allegation is not
evidence. „The complainant has the burden of proving by
substantial evidence the allegations in the complaint.‰30
In this case, complainant alleged that she and her
family gave respondent P150,000 on June 17, 2002,
inclusive of respondentÊs attorneyÊs fees and the legal fees
necessary for the transfer of the property. Despite that,
respondent did not pay the transfer tax and donorÊs tax
until 2007. However, there is nothing on the records, except
for complainantÊs bare allegation, which proves that such
amount was indeed given to respondent on the claimed
date. Hence, We cannot judiciously rule on the alleged
delay and misappropriation without relying upon
assumptions, surmises, and conjectures.
What is apparent in the Complaint, however, is the fact
that respondent prepared and notarized a deed of sale,
covering a parcel of land, which was evidently prohibited to
be sold, transferred, or conveyed under Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6657.
Time and again, We have held that a lawyerÊs conduct
ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the
law and ethics.31 CANON 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) provides that a lawyer shall uphold
the Constitution, obey the laws, and promote respect for
law and legal processes. Also, Rule 15.07 thereof mandates
a lawyer to

_______________

29 Concerned Citizen v. Divina, 676 Phil. 166, 176; 660 SCRA 167,
175 (2011).
30 Id.
31 Rural Bank of Calape, Inc. (RBCI) Bohol v. Florido, 635 Phil. 176,
181; 621 SCRA 182, 187 (2010).

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VOL. 869, JULY 3, 2018 437


Dimayuga vs. Rubia

impress upon his client compliance with the laws and principles of
fairness.
Indeed, in preparing and notarizing a deed of sale within
the prohibited period to sell the subject property under the
law, respondent assisted, if not led, the contracting parties,
who relied on her knowledge of the law being their lawyer,
to an act constitutive of a blatant disregard for or defiance
of the law.
Moreover, respondent likewise displayed lack of respect
and made a mockery of the solemnity of the oath in an
Acknowledgment as her act of notarizing such illegal
document entitled it full faith and credit upon its face,
when it obviously does not deserve such entitlement,
considering its illegality due to the prohibition above cited.
In the case of Caalim-Verzonilla v. Atty. Pascua,32 We aptly
explained:

[W]hile respondentÊs duty as a notary public is


principally to ascertain the identity of the affiant and
the voluntariness of the declaration, it is nevertheless
incumbent upon him to guard against any illegal or
immoral arrangement or at least refrain from being a
party to its consummation. Rule IV, Section 4 of
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice in fact proscribes
notaries public from performing any notarial act for
transactions similar to the herein document of sale, to
wit:
SEC. 4. Refusal to Notarize.·A notary public
shall not perform any notarial act described in these
Rules for any person requesting such an act even if he
tenders the appropriate fee specified by these Rules if:
(a) the notary knows or has good reason to believe
that the notarial act or transaction is unlawful
or immoral.
x x x x33

_______________

32 674 Phil. 550; 658 SCRA 762 (2011).


33 Id., at p. 561; p. 771.

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438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Dimayuga vs. Rubia

It cannot be overstressed that notarization is not an


empty or meaningless routinary act. It is invested with
substantive public interest, such that only those who are
qualified or authorized may be commissioned to perform
the same.34
In all, for these acts of misconduct, „the Court has
sanctioned erring lawyers with suspension from the
practice of law, revocation of the notarial commission and
disqualification from acting as such, and even
disbarment.‰35
Considering that this is not the first time that
respondent was administratively sanctioned by this Court,
We have already warned her that future infractions shall
be dealt with more severely.36 However, We are also
reminded that „disbarment should not be decreed where
any punishment less severe such as reprimand, fine, or
suspension would accomplish the end desired.‰37
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Vivian G.
Rubia is found GUILTY of violating Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, CANON 1 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Rules on Notarial
Practice. Accordingly, she is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three (3) years effective immediately
with a STERN WARNING that future infractions shall be
dealt with more severely. She is
likewise DISQUALIFIED from being com-

_______________

34 Almazan, Sr. v. Suerte-Felipe, 743 Phil. 131, 136-137; 735 SCRA


230, 236-237 (2014).
35 Saquing v. Mora, 535 Phil. 1, 7; 504 SCRA 1, 7 (2006).
36 In Mondejar v. Rubia, 528 Phil. 462, 467; 496 SCRA 1, 12 (2006),
respondent was found guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of CANON 1 of the
CPR and thereby suspended from the practice of law for one (1) month
and warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely; In Ceniza v. Rubia, 617 Phil. 202; 602 SCRA 1
(2009), respondent was found guilty of violating Rule 18.03 and CANON
22 of the CPR and thereby suspended from the practice of law for six (6)
months with a warning that similar infractions in the future will be dealt
with more severely.
37 Saquing v. Mora, supra.

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Dimayuga vs. Rubia

missioned as a notary public for a period of three (3) years


and her notarial commission, if currently existing, is
hereby REVOKED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the
Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondentÊs personal
record as attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to
circulate them to all the courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

Carpio,** Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta,


Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, Jardeleza,
Caguioa, Martires, Reyes, Jr. and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.

Atty. Vivian G. Rubia is suspended from practice of law


for three (3) years for violating Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, Canon 1 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Rules on Notarial
Practice.

Notes.·Notarization is not an empty, meaningless routi


nary act but one invested with substantive public interest.
The notarization by a notary public converts a private
document into a public document, making it admissible in
evidence without further proof of its authenticity. (Agbulos
vs. Viray, 691 SCRA 1 [2013])
A resolution of the Supreme Court is not a mere request
but an order which should be complied with promptly and
completely. (Warriner vs. Dublin, 709 SCRA 545 [2013])

··o0o··

_______________

** Designated Senior Associate Justice per Section 12, R.A. No. 296,
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.

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