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Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts, and to his clients. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the profession.

Facts: Complainant Rosita Nadayag charged respondent Atty. Jose Grageda, a practicing attorney and notary public in Iligan City, with conduct unbecoming of a lawyer in connection with a Pacto de Retro transaction wherein complainant was the vendee. In her letter-complaint, Nadayag alleged that Grageda prepared and notarized the sale using a stolen Original Certificate of Land Title, as a result of which she was swindled P108,000 because the land was already sold ahead of her using the owners duplicate copy of the title. Suspicious of the OCTs appearance, she had brought the matter to Gragedas attention, to which he simply answered that the t itle was all right told her not to worry as he is an attorney and knew very well the Vendor-a- Retro whose business transactions especially notarial matter has been and in fact always handled by him. However, the OCT was confiscated by the Iligan ROD, Atty. Baguio when the complainant applied for registration of the pacto de retro. Nadayag filed a complaint against the vendor-a-retro and accomplices, including Grageda coursed through the local Brgy. Captain and city fiscal, but the information did not include Grageda, hence this report. In his counter-affidavit, Grageda claimed that he notarization was based on the documents presented.

Issue: W/N respondent should be disciplined

Held: Yes. The Commission on Bar Discipline found reason to discipline based on respondents admission of notarizing the deed of sale a retro based on title presented to him. It turns out that the title presented to him is the OCT which only the Register of Deeds has custody of and he should have sensed foul-play or irregularity. As a lawyer and officer of the court, he should have been alerted and should have reported the irregularity of an OCT, which should be in the exclusive safekeeping of the Register of Deeds, in the possession of unauthorized persons. Even if it were the photostat copy of said Original Certificate of Title that was presented to him, the same did not bear any certification by the Register of Deeds which could have alerted him of the irregularity. The testimony that the Original was shown to him has not been controverted. The Vendee was in fact in possession of the Original because it was testified that when the Register of Deeds found that respondent was in possession, the original certificate was confiscated by the Register of Deeds. The Commission takes special note of a notary public acting more than a notary public and goes beyond mere certification of the presence of the signatories, their having signed, and having contracted. By transcending these bounds, such notary public has entered the realm of giving legal advice thus acting also as counsel aside from notary public to the parties to the contract. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients require in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the public. The bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts, and to his clients. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the profession. In the case at bar, respondent should have been conscientious in seeing to it that justice permeated every aspect of a transaction for which his services had been engaged, in conformity with the avowed duties of a worthy member of the Bar. He should have fully explained the legal intricacies and consequences of the subject transaction as would aid the parties in making an informed decision. Such responsibility was plainly incumbent upon him, and failing therein, he must now face the commensurate consequences of his professional indiscretion. After all, notarization is not an empty routine. Notarization of a private document converts such document into a public one and renders it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. Respondent is suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months, with the warning that a repetition of the same or any other misconduct will be dealt with more severely. Javellana v. Lutero GR. No. G.R. No. L-23956 July 21, 1967 FACTS:On March 1963, the Roman Archbishop in Jaro, Iloilo filed a detainer complaint against Elpidio Javellana in the municipal court which was presided by Judge Nicolas Lutero. The hearing was reset four times, all at the behest of Elpidio Javellanas lawyer who gave reasons as flimsy as a painful toe, or an unfinished business transactions in Manila. This last postponement was granted by the municipal court, with a warning that no further postponements shall be allowed. When the case was called for trial on August 27, 1963, neither the defendant nor his counsel Atty. Hautea appeared although one Atty. Romy Pea who was present in court verbally moved for the postponement of the trial on the ground that Atty. Hautea was in Manila attending to a business transaction. The plaintiff's counsel objected to the motion on the ground that the defendant and his counsel were well aware of the court's previous admonition that no further postponement of the case would be granted, and then manifested that the witnesses and the evidence for the plaintiff were ready for presentation on that date.

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The verbal motion was denied, and plaintiff was directed to adduce his evidence. During the hearing, a telegram arrived from Atty. Hautea asking for a postponement of the hearing. However, the hearing still continued. The court on the same date rendered judgment for the plaintiff and against the defendant. About 50 days later, the defendant thru his same counsel filed a petition for relief (from the judgment of the municipal court)with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, praying that the decision in question be set aside, that the detainer case be set for trial on the merits, and, pending determination of the petition, that an injunction issue restraining the enforcement of the decision. Counsel for the petitioner averred that his absence on the date of the trial was excusable as he attended to a very urgent business transaction in Manila; that before his departure for the latter city, he verbally informed the respondent judge that his return to Iloilo might be delayed and that he might not arrive on time for the trial of the case as set; that he called at both the law office and the residence of the counsel for the private respondent to inform him of the desired postponement and the reason therefor, but the latter was in Bacolod at the time; that he exercised utmost diligence and precaution in the sense that while in Manila he sent a telegram to the respondent judge, asking for postponement; and that notwithstanding all the foregoing, the municipal court nevertheless proceeded with the trial in his absence and that of his client, allowed the private respondent to present his evidence ex parte, and rendered a decision against the petitioner, thus depriving the latter of his day in court. Counsel for the petitioner further asserted that his client has a good and substantial defense, which is, that the complainant had given his client an option to buy the premises subject-matter of the complaint below, and that a reopening of the case would cause the private respondent no real injury. Issue: W/N Atty. Hautea was negligent in his duties as a lawyer. HELD: A counsel for any party in a judicial controversy, by mandate of the canons of legal ethics, and with due regard for the elementary standards of fair play, is duty bound to prepare for trial with diligence and deliberate speed. This norm of conduct is no less applicable in a detainer case, such as the one at bar, even if the issues are essentially simple and uncomplicated. It is obvious that the counsel for the petitioner-appellant has been remiss in this respect. The case was set for trial six times. Thrice it was postponed at the behest of the said counsel. The last postponement was granted on July 24, 1963 with the unequivocal admonition by the judgment that no further postponement would be countenanced. The case was reset for hearing on August 27, 1963, which means that the appellant's counsel had more than a month's time to so adjust his schedule of activities as to obviate a conflict between his business transactions and his calendar of hearings. Came August 27, and neither he nor the appellant appeared at the trial. His absence on the latter date was not occasioned by illness or some other supervening occurrence which unavoidably and justifiably prevented him from appearing in court. It was the bounden duty of the said counsel, under the circumstances, to give preferential attention to the case. As things were, he regarded the municipal court as a mere marionette that must ever await his pleasure. This attitude on his part is censurable as it reveals more than just a modicum of disrespect for the judiciary and the established machinery of justice

SECOND DIVISION Adm. Case No. 5505 (CBD Case No. 99-624) September 27, 2001

SEVERINO RAMOS, complainant, vs. ATTY. ELLIS JACOBA and ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO JACOBA, respondents. MENDOZA, J.: This is a complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Severino Ramos against Atty. Ellis Jacoba for the latter's failure, as counsel for complainant and his wife, to file the appellants' brief in the Court of Appeals, as a result of which the appeal filed by complainant and his wife was dismissed and the decision of the Regional Trial Court against them became final. Complainant Severino Ramos and his wife were defendants in a civil case for collection of a sum of money before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Cabanatuan City. As judgment was rendered against the spouses Ramos, they engaged the services of Atty. Ellis Jacoba and Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba as their counsel to appeal the said decision to the Court of Appeals. However, despite the extensions of time granted to them totaling 135 days, Atty. Ellis Jacoba failed to file the appellants' brief, resulting in the dismissal of 2 the appeal. The complainant and his wife filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of their appeal, but their motion was 3 denied. Complainant subsequently filed a verified complaint, entitled " Sinumpaang Salaysay," before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), in which he alleged that he and his wife paid P10,000.00 to respondents as attorney's fees 4 and acceptance fee, and, in addition, the amount of P8,000.00 for expenses in the preparation of the appellants' brief. Because Atty. Ellis Jacoba failed to file the appellants' brief, complainant prayed for his disbarment. Respondents were required to answer the complaint against them but neither of them filed an answer despite two extensions of time granted to them for filing the same. Neither did they appear before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP despite due notice to them. As consequence, the allegations made and the evidence proffered by complainant remain uncontroverted. On January 12, 2001, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP recommended that
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(a) respondent Atty. Ellis Jacoba be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for the period of SIX (6) months; (b) respondent Atty. Ellis Jacoba be ordered to return to complainant Severino Ramos the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) within fifteen (15) days from notice; (c) respondent Atty. Olivia Velasco Jacoba be ADMONISHED to exercise more diligence in attending to legal matters entrusted by a client, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same negligent act charged in this complaint will be dealt 5 with more severely. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with the modification that respondent Atty. Ellis Jacoba be suspended from the practice of law for three months for gross negligence and 6 malpractice causing actual loss to complainant. After a review of the records of this case, the Court finds the IBP recommendation to be well taken. However, instead of a threemonth suspension as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, we find that the suspension of respondent Atty. Ellis Jacoba from the practice of law should be increased to one year considering that this is the second time he is found guilty of neglect of his client's case. The records clearly show that respondent Atty. Ellis Jacoba was remiss in the performance of his duties to complainant. He was given by the Court of Appeals extensions of time totaling 135 days within which to file the appellants' brief, but he failed to file the same. No reason has been given in extenuation of respondent's failure. What this Court said in another case is apropos: Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal 7 profession. Indeed, a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client. He should ever be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him, 8 remembering always that his actions or omissions are binding on his clients. In this case, the failure of respondent to file the appellants' brief resulted in the dismissal of the appeal. As a consequence, the adverse decision in the trial court against complainant and his wife became final and executory and they were made to pay P107,000.00 to the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 20149 10 AF. His wife was so aggrieved that she died upon learning of the final dismissal of their appeal. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides in particular: Rule 12.03. A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so. Rule 18.03. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Thus, this Court has held: An attorney is bound to protect his client's interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. (Del Rosario vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 159) A failure to file brief for his client certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part. (People vs. Villar, 46 SCRA 107) The respondent has indeed committed a serious lapse in the duty owed by him to his client as well as to the Court not to delay litigation and to aid in the speedy administration of justice. (People vs. Daban, 43 SCRA 11 185; People vs. Estocada, 43 SCRA 515) As already noted, this is not the first violation committed by respondent. In Adm. Case No. 2594, this Court, in a resolution dated June 3, 1985, suspended Atty. Ellis Jacoba from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for his failure to file an action for the recovery of possession of property despite the lapse of two and a half (2 1/2) years from receipt by him of P550.00 which his client gave him as filing and sheriff's fees. In addition, he was ordered to return the same amount to the complainant, Liberato Soriano, and warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely. Apparently, respondent Atty. Ellis Jacoba has not learned his lesson. Instead, he has shown an appalling indifference to his client's interest and willful neglect of his duties as an officer of the court, thus warranting the imposition of a more severe penalty on him. In

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addition, as the IBP recommends, respondent Atty. Ellis Jacoba should be ordered to return to complainant the amount of P10,000.00 considering that this amount represents his fees and no service was rendered by him to complainant. The additional P8,000.00 allegedly paid by complainant to respondents to defray the expenses for the preparation of the appellants' brief cannot be ordered reimbursed for lack of a receipt to prove such payment. As regards the recommendation of the IBP that respondent Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba be admonished, the records show that her participation was limited to the assistance she rendered complainant in filing the notice of appeal before the trial court. She does not appear as counsel for complainant in the records of the Court of Appeals. The Court, therefore, finds no basis for sanctioning or admonishing her. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Ellis Jacoba is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year effective upon finality hereof and ORDERED to return to complainant the amount of P10,000.00 with WARNING that a repetition of the same negligent act charged in this complaint will be dealt with even more severely. The complaint against respondent Atty. Olivia VelascoJacoba is dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. EN BANC

G.R. No. 112844 June 2, 1995 PHILIPPINE MERCHANT MARINE SCHOOL, INC., represented by JUAN O. NOLASCO III, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, THE OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, EDELMIRO AMANTE, RENATO CORONA, and the DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, JR., J.: PHILIPPINE MERCHANT MARINE SCHOOL, INC. (PMMSI), was established in Manila in 1950 to train and produce competent marine officers. It offers a two-year course in Marine Engineering (A.M.E.) and a four-year course in Marine Transportation (B.S.M.T.). In 1978 it established a branch in Talon, Las Pias, Metro Manila. But we are here concerned only with the main school in Manila. For several times prior to 1985 respondent Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) disapproved petitioner's requests for renewal permit/recognition. However, on 11 March 1986 the DECS issued petitioner a renewal permit for SY 1985-1986. Later, petitioner applied for a summer permit for 1986 which the DECS favorably indorsed to the Minister of Education in consideration of the graduating students for summer. Thereafter the application was returned to Director Modesta Boquiren of the DECS for evaluation and decision pursuant to the authority delegated to the Regions under Department Order No. 22, series of 1975. Director Boquiren issued petitioner the summer permit for 1986 based on the previously stated humanitarian reason but subject to the condition that petitioner should not enroll students for the first semester of SY 1986-1987 until a permit therefor was granted and that the enrollment list for the summer term be submitted immediately. Sometime in 1986 the DECS received a complaint from Felixberto B. Galvez, president of petitioner's Faculty Association, NAFLUKMU, concerning the issuance of summer permit to petitioner and of its holding of classes for courses not recognized by the Government. Galvez requested that the matter be looked into as well as the possible revocation of petitioner's authority due to persistent violation of the orders of the DECS. In response, the DECS through Director Boquiren recommended that petitioner's summer permit be revoked and that the school be closed effective SY 1986-1987 on the ground that: (a) petitioner did not have a renewal permit/recognition for SY 1986-1987; (b) several communications were sent to petitioner's head telling him not to operate without permit and to explain within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of Director Boquiren's letter dated 9 July 1986 why no drastic action should be taken against it but said communication was never answered; and, (c) petitioner did not correct the deficiencies indicated in the renewal permit for 19851986. Accordingly, in a 3rd Indorsement dated 23 September 1986 the DECS through then Minister Lourdes R. Quisumbing approved the following courses of action for petitioner: (a) the students in the two courses who were graduating for SY 1986-1987 would be allowed to graduate even without permit for said courses as a special case provided that they completed the requirements for graduation and subject to prior issuance of Special Order; and, (b) the remaining students should be allowed to transfer to other authorized schools.

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In a letter dated 30 September 1986 Director Boquiren, informed petitioner of the aforementioned courses of action and directed immediate implementation thereof. On 9 April 1987 the DECS Inter-Agency Technical Committee (IATCOM) recommended renewal of permits for the maritime courses offered by petitioner provided that a development plan for the improvement of its buildings classrooms, laboratory rooms, library offices and other rooms be formulated and implemented before the start of school year 1987-1988. Despite lack of permit, petitioner continued to enroll students and offer courses in Marine Engineering and Marine Transportation for SY 1987-1988. This prompted the DECS through Director Hernando Dizon to write petitioner on 4 August 1988 directing it not to 1 operate without permit and inviting its attention to the provisions of the Private School Law as reiterated in the Education Act of 2 1982 which prohibits operation of unauthorized schools/courses. On 28 October 1988 petitioner sent a letter to Director Dizon applying for permit/recognition to conduct classes for the two (2) maritime courses retroactive from summer of 1987 up to SY 1988-1989 and informing him of its transfer to the 5th Floor of the Republic Supermarket Building, corner Rizal Avenue and Soler St., Sta. Cruz, Manila. On the basis of the favorable report of a supervisor of the Bureau of Higher Education who visited the premises of petitioner on 14 November 1988, a director of said Bureau recommended renewal of petitioner's permit. However, in a DECS-PAMI survey conducted by the DECS technical staff in 1988, petitioner scored only 32 points out of a possible 1,026 points for requirements in Nautical Engineering, and only 207 points out of 905 points in Marine Engineering, way below the DECS requirements. Subsequent inspection of petitioner's premises by the Bureau of Higher Education-DECS Technical Panel for Maritime Education (TPME) affirmed the findings of the DECS-PAMI survey. It found petitioner deficient in terms of the minimum requirements as provided in DECS Order No. III, series of 1987, which refers to the policies and standards for Maritime Education Plan. In a memorandum dated 19 January 1989 addressed to DECS Director Nilo Rosas, it set forth the following recommendations: 1. The PMMS administration may be given a last chance to put up at least 60% of the minimum standard equipment for a period of about two months (January-March 1989). 2. The DECS with TPME will conduct a re-inspection sometime the first week of April to monitor the progress of the requirements. 3. No new and old students will be allowed to enroll during summer of 1989 and the subsequent semesters pending issuance of a permit. 4. Therefore, issuance of a school permit for 1987-1988 to 1988-89 shall be held in abeyance pending compliance of at least 60% of the requirements. 5. DECS higher authorities shall decide whether the graduating students for the second semester 1988-89 will be 3 allowed to graduate and a retroactive school permit for the school years 1987-88, 1988-89 can be granted. As recommended, the TPME Secretariat conducted a reinspection of petitioner's premises, then submitted a report dated 18 April 1989 with the following new recommendations 1. Gradual phasing out of the BSMT Nautical Studies and Associate in Marine Engineering programs. Under this scheme, no new enrollees should be accepted anymore for the 1st year BSMT Nautical Studies and AME starting 1st semester of school year 1989-90. 2. If the school can come up with the DECS minimum standard within the phasing out period, suspension order may be lifted. 3. If the school fails to meet the DECS minimum standard at the end of the phasing out period, closure order will be issued. 4. No special permit for the BSMT Nautical Studies and AME courses should be granted as a special case. However, during the phasing out period students may be allowed to graduate under PMMS, Talon, Las Pias, based on these considerations 1. PMMS, Manila, has inadequate training facilities and equipment for BSMT Nautical Studies and AME programs. 2. The school has not acquired its own school site and building. The present school campus is not conducive for training and is found to be very limited in space so that there is difficulty for school development and expansion.

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3. On 23 September 1986, the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports already issued a cease to operate order to the school head of PMMS. The said indorsement letter also provided humanitarian decision (reason?) which granted permit to PMMS as a special case, just to allow BSMT and AME students to graduate and the remaining students were advised to transfer to authorized/recognized schools. 4. Labor dispute occurred in 1987. The conflict between the employees and employer is a manifestation of 4 mismanagement of school. In a letter dated 27 April 1989 Director Rosas informed petitioner of the TPME report and recommendations and invited it for a conference on 2 May 1989 before any major decision and action would be made. On 2 May 1989, the TPME Secretariat submitted another memorandum on its reinspection of petitioner's premises made on 28 April 1989. Based on its findings that no substantial improvement in terms of minimum requirements, equipment and training facilities since the January 1989 inspection was made, it reiterated the recommendations it submitted to the DECS Bureau of Higher Education. For this reason, in the letter dated 25 May 1989 Director Rosas notified petitioner about the aforementioned report and the DECS' decision that: 1. The BSMT Nautical Studies and Associate in Marine Engineering courses be gradually phased out. Such being the case, the school shall no longer be allowed to accept 1st year students and new enrollees starting 1st semester of school year 1989-90. 2. The second year and third year students may be allowed to remain until they graduate. However, the school may opt to transfer these students to PMMS, Talon, Las Pias, due to the following considerations: 1. The school's training equipment and instructional facilities are very far below the standards set by DECS. 2. The school site and building are not owned by the school but only leased with contract of renewal to be made annually. 3. The present location of the school does not warrant for expansion, development and improvement. 4. The present location of the school is not conducive for learning, it being located on the 5th floor of a supermarket in the downtown section of the city. 5. A cease to operate order was issued by Secretary Lourdes R. Quisumbing sometime in 1986, which order was violated by the 5 school. In a letter dated 11 July 1989 the DECS through Secretary Quisumbing informed petitioner that it had received reports that petitioner enrolled freshmen for its maritime programs which were ordered phased out effective SY 1989-1990 per letter of Director Rosas dated 25 May 1989; called petitioner's attention to the provision of Sec. 1, Rule 1, Part V, of the Implementing Rules of the Education Act of 1982 which makes it punishable and subject to penalties the operation of a school through the conduct or offering of Educational Programs or Courses of Studies/Training, without prior government authorization and/or in violation of any of the terms and conditions of said permit or recognition; directed that in accordance with the phase-out order, petitioner's Manila campus is allowed to operate only the 2nd, 3rd and 4th years of the authorized maritime programs which shall be gradually phased out; and, required petitioner to comment on the reported unauthorized enrollment. In its letter to the DECS dated 26 July 1989, petitioner moved for reconsideration stating that the finding that it had not complied with the minimum requirements was due to the following: that as early as 21 June 1989 it filed a letter requesting reconsideration of the letter dated 25 May 1989 of Director Rosas; that since there was no reply it believed that the 25 May 1989 order was reconsidered sub-silencio and that petitioner was allowed to enroll 1st year students for SY 1989-1990; and, that it had undertaken improvements in all of its facilities in compliance with DECS requirements. In this regard, it requested another inspection of its premises. Pursuant to petitioner's request, another inspection of the Manila premises was conducted by the TPME-Secretariat on 8 August 1989. However, petitioner only obtained a general rating of 31.17% for Nautical Studies and 28.53% for Marine Engineering. Consequently, the inspection team reiterated its previous recommendation to gradually phase out the maritime programs of petitioner's Manila campus effective SY 1990-1991 and that no new freshman students be accepted beginning SY 1990-1991. Accordingly, in a letter dated 25 September 1989 the DECS through Secretary Quisumbing ordered petitioner to discontinue its Maritime program in the Manila campus effective school year 1990-1991 and suggested that efforts be made towards the 6 development of PMMS, Las Pias, which has a great potential of being a good Maritime School. The phase-out order was reiterated in subsequent letters dated 19 February 1990 and 9 May 1990 of Director Rosas and then DECS Secretary Isidro D. Cario, respectively.

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Subsequently, petitioner moved to reconsider the phase-out order in its letter of 21 May 1990, which request was denied by the DECS through Undersecretary Benjamin Tayabas in his letter of 1 June 1990. The letter reads With reference to your request to rescind an order to phase-out the maritime courses at PMMS, Manila, please be informed that this Department sees no reason for such action as the conditions obtaining in the school when the phase-out order was issued haven't shown any significant improvement inspite of the fact that the PMMS had been given reasonable period to comply with the minimum standard requirements prescribed by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports. Maritime Education courses are highly specialized and require adequate training facilities and equipment in order to ensure quality. However, the series of visits made by the staff of the BHE, NCR, and members of the Technical Panel on Maritime Education revealed the following findings: (a) On April 9, 1987 the Inter-Agency Technical Committee (IATCOM) recommended the renewal of permits of the maritime courses, provided, that a development plan for the improvement of the buildings, classrooms, laboratory rooms, library offices and other rooms shall be formulated and implemented before the start of SY 1987-1988. (b) In 1988, the DECS-PAMI survey conducted by technical persons, revealed that PMMS, then located at the 5th floor of the Republic Supermarket, obtained a general score of 32 out of 1,026 points for requirements in the Nautical course and 207 out of 905 points for the Marina Engineering course. It is needless to say that these findings are way below the DECS requirements. Above all, the school site was described as not conducive for offering maritime program due to its limited area. Furthermore, the lease on the premises is not a long term lease (2 years), a condition which would deter the school from fully developing the school site. (c) In January of 1989, the findings of the Secretariat for the Technical Panel for Maritime Education (TPME) re-affirmed the findings of the DECS-PAMI Survey. Very few equipment were found for the Maritime courses. You concurred with these findings in a dialogue with the Director of the Bureau of Higher Education Secretariat. You appealed for another chance and requested for re-inspection before the opening of SY 1989-1990. (d) As per agreement, on April 28, 1989 another re-inspection was made and it showed that the school did not show any substantial improvement. Then on May 25, 1989, Secretary Lourdes Quisumbing issued the phase-out order of our maritime programs in Manila campus. However, the Department again allowed PMMS, Manila, to operate the maritime courses for SY 1989-1990 despite the above phase-out order. (e) Another evaluation of your school was conducted by technical people on August 8, 1989, as requested. The findings revealed that your school obtained a general rating of 31.17% for Nautical Studies and 28.53% for Marine Engineering. The PMMS has been provided with the Policies and Standards for Maritime Education and, as revealed by the foregoing facts, the series of inspection and evaluation were (sic) done by technical persons who have expertise in the field of maritime education. Therefore, the requests relative to these are not valid. It is therefore with regrets that this Department cannot rescind its order to phase-out the Maritime courses at PMMS, Manila and the school is admonished not to accept incoming first year students starting school year 19901991. So that by school year 1992-1993, the maritime courses at the Manila campus would be fully phased-out. . . 7 . It is suggested that PMMS concentrate its development plans in the Las Pias Campus which has a great potential of being a good maritime school. Not satisfied therewith, petitioner appealed the matter to respondent Office of the President. During the pendency of the appeal the DECS thru Secretary Cario issued a Closure Order dated 27 August 1991 In view of the report which was confirmed by the evaluation team from the National Capital Region DECS Regional Office, that Philippine Merchant Marine School (PMMS), Manila, has been accepting freshman students of the maritime programs despite the phase-out order which was issued last September 28, (sic) 1989 by former Secretary Lourdes R. Quisumbing and further reiterated by the undersigned, dated May 9, 1990, the Department, hereby orders Closure of your maritime programs of your school effective second semester school year 1991-1992,

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otherwise this Department shall be constrained to institute the appropriate administrative, civil and criminal proceedings against you and the other responsible officers of your school pursuant to Section 68, Batas Pambansa Blg. 232. . . . The transfer of the affected students shall be facilitated by the National Capital Region in accordance with our Memorandum dated August 16, 1991, xerox copy of which is hereto attached for your information. For your guidance and strict compliance.
8

In a Letter dated 24 August 1992 petitioner sought reconsideration of the 27 August 1991 Closure Order and at the same time requested that special orders be issued to its graduates for SY 1991-1992. In letters filed with the Office of the President dated 2 and 3 October 1992 petitioner alleged compliance with DECS requirements. The letters were referred to the DECS for consideration. On 10 November 1992 the Office of the President through respondent Executive Secretary Edelmiro Amante rendered a Resolution 9 dismissing petitioner's appeal. It found no plausible reason to disturb the action of the DECS Secretary in the light of the conspicuous fact that petitioner had repeatedly failed to comply with the phase-out order since 1986. Moreover, the grounds advanced by petitioner have already been passed upon by the DECS. Petitioner moved for reconsideration praying that the case be remanded to the DECS for another ocular inspection and evaluation of its alleged improved facilities. Petitioner anchored its motion on the proposition that since it had made substantial improvements on school equipment and facilities there existed no valid ground to deny them a permit to offer maritime courses. After another circumspect review of the case, the Office of the President found no cogent reason to set aside its previous resolution. It opined that Mere alleged efforts to improve the facilities and equipments (sic) which were long due since 1986, do not warrant the reversal of our previous resolution. It bears stressing as the records may show, that the phase-out order of DECS was based not only on PMMSI's failure to provide adequate equipment and facilities but also on PMMSI's failure to comply with the standard requirements prescribed for a school site. xxx xxx xxx Apart from these, PMMSI's adamant refusal to comply with the orders of the DECS to phase out its unauthorized courses is sufficient ground to uphold the order appealed from. Since 1986, PMMSI has been applying for a permit to offer maritime courses but has been invariably denied for failure to comply with the minimum requirements prescribed by DECS. Notwithstanding these denials, PMMSI continues to offer maritime courses and to admit freshmen students in clear violation of Section 1, Rule 1, of the Education Act of 1982 . . . . xxx xxx xxx PMMSI's refusal to comply with the phase-out order on the ground that the same is not yet final and executory is untenable. While said phase-out may not be final and executory, there was no reason for PMMSI to offer maritime courses without the requisite prior authority of the DECS. PMMSI possessed no valid permit prior to the issuance 10 of the phase-out. There was no authority to speak of. Thus the motion was denied in the Resolution dated 12 January 1993 through respondent Assistant Executive Secretary Renato 11 Corona. Petitioner assailed both resolutions of the Office of the President before respondent Court of Appeals by way of certiorari. It alleged that the resolutions failed to meet the constitutional requirement of due process because the basis for affirming the DECS phase-out and closure orders was not sufficiently disclosed. Furthermore, its letters dated 2 and 3 October 1992 which presented incontrovertible proof that it had introduced substantial improvements on its facilities for the past two and a half years while its appeal was pending were not taken into account, thereby gravely abusing its discretion. Respondent Court of Appeals brushed aside the allegations of petitioner since [T]he Office of the President, in the resolution dated November 10, 1992, appears to have restated the report of the respondent DECS, meaning, that it adopted as its own the DECS' report, but that is not a violation of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, in line with Alba Patio De Makati vs. Alba Patio De Makati Employees Association, 128 SCRA 253, 264- 265 . . . Petitioner's latest attempt at improving its facilities does not warrant a reversal of the phase-out order. For, in spite of the claim that it spent on improvements, the basic problem remained as it still occupies the fifth floor of the William Liao building, which is not conducive to learning and has a 12 limited area for expansion and development. On 22 July 1993 the petition was dismissed.
13

On 26 November 1993 the motion for reconsideration was denied.

14

9
Petitioner imputes error on respondent court: (1) in not setting aside the questioned resolutions and orders of public respondents which were rendered without due process of law since (a) petitioner was not afforded the right to fully present its case and submit evidence in support thereof; (b) public respondents did not consider the evidence presented by petitioner; (c) public respondents' decisions have no substantial evidence to support them; (d) public respondents' decisions did not disclose the bases therefor; and, (2) in implementing the closure orders which had not become final and executory. Petitioner asseverates that the DECS denied its right to a hearing on the supposed deficiencies which allegedly justified denial of its request for issuance of a renewal permit. Likewise, the DECS denied petitioner the opportunity to correct such deficiencies. The Office of the President totally ignored supervening events properly brought to its attention in the letters of petitioner dated 2 and 3 October 1992. It issued resolutions strictly on the basis of the DECS' representations which do not amount to substantial evidence. The 10 November 1992 Resolution failed to sufficiently disclose the basis for affirmation of the DECS' phase-out and closure orders. The 12 January 1993 Resolution still refused to take into consideration petitioner's compliance with the DECS' requirements. Petitioner did not violate the Education Act of 1992 because it was authorized to operate by virtue of the provisional authorities issued by the DECS. The DECS orders were not final and executory because petitioner challenged them and appropriately availed itself of the remedies available to it under the law. Before proceeding to resolve the merits of this case, we shall state briefly the concept regarding establishment of schools. The educational operation of schools is subject to prior authorization of the government and is effected by recognition. In the case of government-operated schools, whether local, regional or national, recognition of educational programs and/or operations is deemed granted simultaneously with establishment. In all other cases the rules and regulations governing recognition are prescribed and enforced by the DECS, defining therein who are qualified to apply, providing for a permit system, stating the conditions for the 15 grant of recognition and for its cancellation and withdrawal, and providing for related matters. The requirement on prior government authorization is pursuant to the State policy that educational programs and/or operations shall be of good quality and therefore shall at least satisfy minimum standards with respect to curricula, teaching staff, physical plant and facilities and of 16 administrative or management viability. Set against the records of the case, the assertion of petitioner that it was deprived of its right to a hearing and any opportunity whatsoever to correct the alleged deficiencies readily collapses. The earlier narration of facts clearly demonstrates that before the DECS issued the phase-out and closure orders, petitioner was duly notified, warned and given several opportunities to correct its deficiencies and to comply with pertinent orders and regulations. Petitioner has gone all the way up to the Office of the President to seek a reversal of the phase-out and closure orders. There is thus 17 no reason to complain of lack of opportunity to explain its side as well as to comply with the alleged deficiencies. We agree with the observation of the Office of the Solicitor General that As long as the parties were given opportunity to be heard before judgment was rendered, the demands of due process were sufficiently met (Lindo v. COMELEC, 194 SCRA 25). It should also be noted that petitioner herein repeatedly sought reconsideration of the various orders of respondent DECS and its motions were duly considered by respondent DECS to the extent of allowing and granting its request for re-inspection of its premises. In connection therewith, it has been ruled that the opportunity to be heard is the essence of procedural due process and that any defect is cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration (Medenilla v. Civil Service Commission, 18 194 SCRA 278). Furthermore, the Office of the President properly ignored (in the sense that it did not find worthy of consideration) the alleged supervening events, i.e., substantial improvements on school equipment and facilities during the pendency of the case before said Office because the improvements should have been undertaken starting 1986. Moreover, the phase-out and closure orders were based not only on petitioner's deficiencies as a maritime institute but also on its continued operation without the requisite authorization from the DECS and acceptance of freshman students in blatant violation of the latter's orders and/or persistent warnings not to do so. Verily, there are sufficient grounds to uphold the phase-out and closure orders of the DECS which were issued conformably with Sec. 28 of the Education Act of 1982 which provides: Sec. 28. . . . . Punishable Violation. . . . Operation of schools and educational programs without authorization, and/or operation thereof in violation of the terms of recognition, are hereby declared punishable violations subject to the penalties provided in this Act. Secs. 68 and 69 of the same Act provide the penalties: Sec. 68. Penalty Clause. Any person upon conviction for an act in violation of Section 28, Chapter 3, Title III, shall be punished with a fine of not less than two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) nor more than ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) or imprisonment for a maximum period of two (2) years, or both, in the discretion of the court. If the act is committed by a school corporation, the school head together with the person or persons responsible for the offense or violation shall be equally liable. Sec. 69. Administrative Sanction. The Minister (Secretary) of Education, Culture and Sports may prescribe and impose such administrative sanction as he may deem reasonable and appropriate in the implementing rules and

10
regulations promulgated pursuant to this Act for any of the following causes . . . . 5. Unauthorized operation of a school, or course, or any component thereof . . . . The corresponding rules implementing Secs. 68 and 69 read Sec. 1. Punishable Acts and Penalties. The operation of a school, through the conduct or offering of educational programs or courses of studies/training without prior government authorization in the form of permit or recognition as provided for in Rule III, PART III of these Rules, and/or in violation of any of the terms and conditions of the said permit or recognition, have been declared punishable violations of the Act, subject to the penalties provided therein. Any person, therefore, upon conviction for an act constituting any of the foregoing punishable violations, shall be punished with a fine of not less than Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) nor more than Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), or imprisonment for a maximum period of two (2) years, or both, in the discretion of the Court: Provided, however, that when the act is committed by a school corporation, the school head together with the person or persons responsible for the violation or offense shall be deemed equally liable. Sec. 2. Administrative Sanction. Without prejudice to the interest of students, teachers and employees, and independently of the penalty imposed in Sec. 1 under this Rule, the Minister may withdraw, suspend, revoke or cancel a school's authority to operate as an educational institution or to conduct educational programs or courses of studies/training, for any of the following causes, viz: . . . . e. Unauthorized operation of a school, or program or course of studies or component thereof, or any violation of the prescribed rules governing advertisements or announcements of educational institutions. Substantial evidence has been defined to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 19 conclusion. A perusal of the questioned resolutions of the Office of the President reveals that they are based on the records of the case which constitute substantial evidence, proving distinctly not only petitioner's consistent failure to meet the DECS' minimum standards for maritime institutes and correct its deficiencies but also its continued operation and offering of maritime courses despite the lack of permit. Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the 10 November 1992 Resolution of the Office of the President sufficiently disclosed the basis for its affirmance of the DECS' phase-out and closure orders: After a careful study, we are constrained to resolve that there exists no sufficient justification to modify, alter or reverse the appealed order. We find no plausible reason to disturb the action of the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, more so in light of the conspicuous fact that PMMS has repeatedly failed to comply with the phase out order since 1986. What is more, the grounds advanced by PMMS have already been passed upon, and 20 separately resolved by the office a quo. Petitioner's persistent refusal to comply with the phase-out orders on the ground that the same were not yet final and executory is untenable. As correctly held by the Office of the President . . . . While said phase-out (orders) may not be final and executory, there was no reason for PMMSI to offer maritime courses without, the requisite prior authority of the DECS. PMMSI possessed no valid permit prior to the 21 issuance of the phase-out. There was no authority to speak of. By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of administrative departments over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon and their findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded respect, if not finality, by the courts. In the case at bench, it is not the function of this Court nor any other court for that matter . . . to review the decisions and orders of the Secretary on the issue of whether or not an educational institution meets the norms and standards required for permission to operate and to continue operating as such. On this question, no Court has the power or prerogative to substitute its opinion for that of the Secretary. Indeed, it is obviously not expected that any Court would have the competence to do so. The only authority reposed in the Courts on the matter is the determination of whether or not the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports has acted within the scope of powers granted him by law and the Constitution. As long as it appears that he has done so, any decision rendered by him should not and will not be subject to review and reversal by any court. Of course, if it should be made to appear to the Court that those powers were in a case exercised so whimsically, capriciously, oppressively, despotically or arbitrarily as to call for peremptory correction or stated otherwise, that the Secretary had acted with grave abuse of discretion, or had unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty, or excluded another from the use or enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled it becomes the Court's duty to rectify such action through the extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus, whichever may properly apply. Yet even in these extreme

11
instances, where a Court finds that there has been abuse of powers by the Secretary and consequently nullifies and/or forbids such an abuse of power, or commands whatever is needful to keep its exercise within bounds, the Court, absent any compelling reason to do otherwise, should still leave to the Secretary the ultimate determination of the issue of the satisfaction of fulfillment by an educational institution of the standards set down for its legitimate operation, as to which it should not ordinarily substitute its own judgment for that of said 22 office. There being no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondents representing the Office of the President in issuing the Resolutions of 10 November 1992 and 12 January 1993, respondent Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the resolutions in question. WHEREFORE , the petition is DENIED. The questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 22 July 1993, as well as its Resolution of 26 November 1993, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur. Quiason, J., is on leave.

Complainant: Alfonso C. Chua Respondent: Judge Roberto S. Chiongson Ponente: J. Davide, Jr. FACTS: A complaint was filed against Alfonso Choa for making untruthful statements or falsehoods in his Petition for Naturalization. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 50322 and was assigned to Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MCTC) of Bacolod City Branch III presided by the respondent Judge Roberto Chiongson. On February 21, 1995, respondent Judge found the complainant guilty of the crime of perjury and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of six months and one day of prision correccional and to pay the costs. The complainant moved for a reconsideration of the judgment but was subsequently denied for lack of merit. He then filed the instant complaint against the respondent Judge and prayed for the latters removal from office alleging, inter alia, that he was sentenced to suffer a penalty higher than that provided by law, without applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Judge erred in not applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law in the crime of perjury. HELD: No. Section 2 of R.A. No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law) substantially provides that the Act shall not apply to those penalties whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year. The penalty for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code is arresto mayor in its maximum period which is one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months to prision correccional in its minimum period which is six (6) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. The complainant was sentenced to suffer the penalty of six months and one day of prision correccional. Thus, the respondent Judge was correct in not applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Facts: After Cosmos Foundry Shop was burned , Ong Ting established Century Foundry Shop where he and his family resided in the premises. After several attempts to settle a pending unfair labor practice case proved unsuccessful, Ong Ting sold all his business, including equipment and rights in the New Century Foundry Shop to his compadre Lo Bu, for Php20,000. On Jan 16, 1973, petitioner CFSWU obtained from the Court of Industrial Relations the third alias writ of execution for the satisfaction and enforcement of the judgment in its favor. Thereafter, writ was served January 17 and 18, 1973, levying on the personal properties of the Cosmos Foundry Shop or the New Century Foundry Shop for the purpose of conducting the public auction sale. Respondent Lo Bu filed an urgent motion to recall writ of execution, asserting lack of jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations(CIR). The CIR, in its order dated Feb 23, 1973, denied his motion. So likewise was the motion for reconsideration. Lo Bu appealed by certiorari but the Court denied this petition in its resolution dated July 17, 1993. In the meanwhile, there was a replevin suit by Lo Bu in the Court of First Instance (CFI) Manila covering the same properties. Upon receipt of order from the Court denying certiorari, petitioner Labor Union filed a second motion to dismiss complaint. After the complaint was dismissed by the lower court, decision was elevated to the Court of Appeals. Issues:

12
(1) Whether or not petitioner Labor union has made out a case for certiorari and prohibition. (2) Whether or not counsel Atty Busmente performed his obligation as an officer of the court while sustaining the dignity of the profession while acting as counsel for Lo Bu. Held: Writ of certiorari is granted and the order of Respondent CA reinstating appeal is nullified and set aside. The writ of prohibition is likewise granted, respondent CA being perpetually restrained from taking any further action in such appeal, except that of dismissing it. Courts should dismiss a suit which has all the earmarks of a subterfuge that was resorted to for the purpose of frustrating the execution of a judgment in an unfair labor controversy. There was a replevin suit by the same vendee in bad faith, Lo Bu, which was dismissed by the CFI Manila. What is worse, private respondent Lo Bu certainly cannot plead ignorance , as he himself was the petitioner in the certiorari proceedings before this Court. He was a prinicipal in the nefarious scheme to frustrate the award in favor of the petitioner labor union. Rule that certiorari will not be granted where petitioners have plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law will not be enforced where it would result in further delay in satisfaction ofjudgment that ought to have been enforced years ago. It is about time that a halt be called to the schemes utilized by respondent Lo Bu in his far-from-commendable efforts to defeat labors just claim. A legal counsel is expected to defend a clients cause but not at the expense of truth and in defiance of the clear purpose of labor laws. For even such case, Atty Busmente had not exculpated himself. He ought to remember that his obligation as an officer of the court, no less than the dignity of the profession, requires that should not act like an errand-boy at the beck and call of his client, ready and eager to do his every bidding. If he fails to keep that admonition in mind, then he puts into serious question his good standing in the bar. EN BANC G.R. No. L-46365 April 26, 1939

THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, plaintiff-appellant, vs. PARDO Y ROBLES HERMANOS, ET AL., defendants-appellees. Ramon Diokno and E. Benitez for appellant. J. Exequiel Espinas for the appellees and in his own behalf. CONCEPCION, J.: After the public sale of the mortgaged properties, which were in the hands of a receiver, and the adjudication thereof to the plaintiff Philippine National Bank, as the highest bidder, the latter moved that the receiver be ordered to yield possession of said properties in its favor and to present a final accounting. The defendants objected to the delivery of the properties to the plaintiff, signifying, however, their conformity to the closure of the receivership, provided their attorney, J. Exequiel Espinas, be first paid the amount of P1,700, being the balance of his attorney's fees of P2,000. Attorney J. Exequiel Espinas also put in a motion asking that the receiver be ordered to turn over to him the amount of P1,700, to be taken from any amount in the receiver's possession as a result of the sale of the properties in receivership. By its order of August 20, 1936, the court ruled, among other things, that: The amount of attorney's fees to which counsel for the defendants is entitled for his professional services, not having been fixed either by judicial order or by agreement of the parties, the petition of said attorney for the payment to him of P2,000 as such attorney's fees is denied, without prejudice to his right to ask this court, upon notice to the interested parties, to fix the said amount, which shall be paid by the plaintiff. The quoted portion of the order was appealed by the plaintiff, and in its brief it is contended that the trial court erred in holding that it was empowered to fix the amount of the fees of counsel for the defendants and to order that the same be paid by the plaintiff as receiver of the properties in litigation. As a general rule, the fees of attorneys should be paid by the party to whom they have rendered their services. (Section 29, Code of Civil Procedure.) Pursuant to this rule, the defendants are the ones bound to pay attorney's fees. The said fees cannot be paid from the funds in the hands of the receiver because there is neither evidence nor allegation that the services rendered by the said

13
attorney for the defendants redounded to the benefit of the receivership or to that of the plaintiff who asked for the appointment of a receiver. Ordinarily the services of an attorney employed by defendant to represent him in the receivership proceedings are solely for his benefit and are not to be paid for out of funds brought into court for the benefit of plaintiff and other claimants against the defendant. (Atkinson & Co. vs. Aldrich-Clisbee Co., 248 Fed., 134; Barker vs. Southern Bldg. & Loan Ass'n., 181 Fed., 636; Interstate Trust & Banking Co. vs.United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 133 La., 781; O'Connor vs. Keiser, 85 S. C., 522; 67 S.E., 737.) The defendants-appellees argue that the plaintiff has no reason to question the payment of P1,700 inasmuch as the P300 of the total amount of P2,000, as fees of said attorney, were paid by the appellant Philippine National Bank without appealing from the various orders requiring it to pay the aforesaid P300. It is true that by the orders of November 26, 1935 and December 16th of the same year, the court ordered the payment of P300 to Attorney J. Exequiel Espinas on account of his fees as counsel for the defendants; it is also true that the plaintiff did not appeal either from the first order or from that of December 16, 1935 denying its motion for reconsideration; but plaintiff's conformity to the payment by the receiver of the said sum of P300 as fees of Attorney Espinas does not mean conformity to the obligation to pay the balance of P1,700 as ordered by the appealed resolution. It is alleged, however, by the appellees that their attorney, J. Exequiel Espinas, defended the attached properties against extravagance and waste and that his services redounded to the benefit of the parties; but the plaintiff, in turn, contends that the appointment of a receiver was opposed by the defendants and that at no stage of the proceedings in the trial court did the said attorney render any service to increase or protect the properties in the hands of the receiver. No evidence upon the above allegations of the parties having been adduced, we adhere to the general principle above stated that each party should pay the fees of its attorney. The appealed order is reversed, with the cost of both instance to the defendants. So ordered. Avancea, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, and Moran, JJ., concur. EN BANC G.R. Nos. L-20117-20130, 20261-20314 December 20, 1923 LIBERATO ULANDAY, plaintiff-appellee, vs. THE MANILA RAILROAD CO., defendant-appellant. Jose C. Abreu for appellant. E.G. Turner, C.W. Rheberg, and Teofilo Sison for appellee. Antonio de las Alas for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.: While the appeals in sixty-eight cases brought by more than two hundred plaintiffs to recover and damages from the Manila Railroad Company, defendant and appellant, hereafter called the Binday cases, were in process of development for submission to the court, Attorney Antonio de las Alas attempted to substitute Attorney E.G. Turner and associate counsel as the legal representatives of the plaintiffs. On resistance of Attorney Turner to the attempted substitution, the issue came down to a determination of whether or not the alleged power of attorney in favor of Ambrosio Erfe-Mejia pursuant to which Attorney De las Alas was assuming to act, is valid and controlling as claimed by Attorney De las Alas, or fraudulent, null, and void as claimed by Attorney Turner. To get the issue into its immediate background, a little further explanation is advisable. Attorney E.G. Turner, along with Attorneys C.W. Rheberg and Teofilo Sison, were looked upon as counsel for all of the plaintiffs in the Binday cases until July 17, 1923, when Attorney Antonio de las Alas, signing himself as attorney for the plaintiffs, entered his appearance. On the same date, Attorney De las Alas for plaintiffs-appellees and Attorney Abreu for the defendant-appellant, stated to the court by motion that "they had terminated, adjusted, and settled each and everyone of these cases amicably. Wherefore, it is moved that all these cases be dismissed without costs." The court accepting the motion for dismissal at its face value, granted the same two days later. That very day also, Attorneys Turner, Rheberg, and Sison, gave notice of a lien upon the judgments, which has been noted by the court. If the cases had stopped here, they would have terminated themselves, but on July 24, 1923, it having been brought to the attention of the court that the motion for dismissal in the Binday cases was pursuant to an appearance by Attorney De las Alas which did not conform to the rules expressly laid down in the case of United States vs. Borromeo ([1911], 20 Phil., 189), it was ordered that the resolution of the court of July 19, 1923, granting the motion for dismissal be set aside. Incidental thereto, Attorney Turner asked for

14
a restraining order against the Manila Railroad Company, its manager and attorney, and others who may represent said defendant, from paying to Ambrosio Erfe-Mejia the amount of P20,000 still in the possession of the company until further orders in the premises, which motion the court granted. About the same time also, Attorney Antonio de las Alas complied with the Rules of the Court in a motion for substitution which relied on a power of attorney in favor of Ambrosio Erfe-Mejia of June 21, 1923, acknowledged before the justice of the peace of San Fabian, Pangasinan, on June 22, 1923. But as was intimated in the beginning of the decision, Attorney Turner contending that the supposed power of attorney which Ambrosio Erfe-Mejia has, is fraudulent and obtained through deceit and misrepresentation, and Attorney De las Alas claiming the exact contrary, the court framed the issue for the parties and gave them full opportunity to demonstrate the correctness of their divergent theories. Both parties have taken full advantage of this permission and have overwhelmed the court with memoranda and argument, supported by affidavits and other documents. To fit the issue into its proper setting, a more extended elucidation will now be begun. In 1907 the Manila Railroad Company constructed a branch line from San Fabian, Pangasinan, to Camp One. This branch line skirted along the north side of the Bued River in the barrio Binday, San Fabian, and was built over the Binday irrigation system, which had been in operation for a long time. On September 17, 1911, on account of an unusually heavy rainfall, the Bued River rose, overflowing the dam and began to undermine the buttresses of the bridge of the railroad company. To prevent the water from destroying the bridge, the company cut the dam with resulting damage to the surrounding property owners. To secure damages from the Manila Railroad Company for the value of the crops destroyed, the property owners first bethought themselves to transfer all their claims to Attorney E.G. Turner in order that their claims might be litigated in a single action. In the lower court, however, a demurrer was interposed for the railroad company alleging that it is not permissible for an attorney to accumulate distinct causes of action in himself, and to sue in his own name for the benefit of the clients directly interested. This demurrer was sustained by the trial judge and the order was affirmed on appeal to the Supreme Court. (Turner vs. Manila Railroad 1 Co., R.G. No. 10165.) On notification of the last cited decision of the Supreme Court, seventy one separate actions were instituted against the Manila Railroad Company. The first of the separate actions to be tried was that of Ambrosio Erfe vs. Manila Railroad Company wherein the decision of the trial court was in favor of the defendant railroad company. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of 2 the court below. (Erfe vs. Manila Railroad Co., R.G. No. 11500.) The next case to be called was that of Demetrio Maxion vs. Manila Railroad Company. The trial judge in this case found on the issues of the controversy favorably to the plaintiff and awarded to him the sum of P1,250 as damages. On appeal, this judgment was affirmed. (Maxion vs. Manila Railroad Co., 44 Phil., 597.) Of the remaining sixty-nine cases, one was dismissed because of failure of the plaintiff to appear and the remaining sixty-eight were tried with favorable results to the plaintiffs. The aggregate judgment against the Manila Railroad Company were approximately P118,000 with interest and costs. These are the sixty-eight cases now affected by the controversy between Attorney De las Alas on the one side, and Attorney Turner, on the other. (See statement of Attorney Rheberg and memorandum of Attorney Turner.) To return again to the incidents relating to the development of the present issues, from Exhibit U presented by Attorney De las Alas, it appears that on May 26, 1913, the Binday property owners entered into an agreement with Ambrosio Erfe-Mejia which, in effect, authorized Erfe to secure lawyers to prosecute the claims and to pay them fifty per cent of the proceeds, Erfe to retain twenty per cent for his services. This document prepared in the dialect and signed by a large number of individuals but not ratified before a notary, reads as follows: CONTRATO Sicamin manfirmad lecsab to nia patuaen mi onguendan: Ta pasimbaloen mi sipan mi ed contrato ya fecha 13 de Junio, 1912, nipaacar ed: (a) Impangiter mi poder ed Sr. Ambrosio Erfe ed pananap toy Abogados ya mangicolcol ed incaderal na tanaman ed dalin ya cadanum ed Payas na Binday nen taon a 1911. (b) Patuaen mi ta nayarian ton isipan ed saray Abogados so cincuenta por ciento ed bili nasingil a bayar na aderal a intanem. (c) Patuaen mi ta iter mi ed Sr. Ambrosio Erfe so veinte por ciento na bayar a nabetangan mi. (Veinte por ciento na queran ibayar ed saray Abogados.) (d) Tan angapoy bayaran min bengat lan gastos ed panacar na sayan colcol. San Fabian, Pangasinan, Mayo 26, 1913. According to Exhibit A-3 presented by Attorney Turner, the agreement of May 26, 1913, was partially confirmed by the property owners in June, 1923. This document reads as follows:

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We the undersigned do hereby state: That we are plaintiffs in a case against the M.R.R. Co., for damages caused to our properties. That we ratify in all its parts the agreement executed on May 26, 1913, whereby Mr. Ambrosio Erfe-Mejia was given power to conduct negotiations and engage an attorney to be selected by him for the purpose of suing the M.R.R. Co. We hereby authorize Ambrosio Erfe, in conjunction with our attorney, Mr. Turner, to accept a compromise of the case upon previous instructions from the latter, but only in the manner to be indicated by said attorney, Mr. Turner; so that he should act only according to instructions and indication of Mr. Turner. That we give Mr. Ambrosio Erfe power to recover on our behalf such amount as may be awarded to us in the aforesaid case, and distribute the same among us according to the instructions he may receive from our attorney, Mr. E.G. Turner. That we authorize Mr. Ambrosio Erfe to retain twenty per cent of the net amount that may be awarded to us, the same to be spent in the dealings and transactions to be later specified by us in a resolution (registration of lands of property owners, donation, etc., etc.). xxx xxx xxx

NOTE. I have spoken with them for the registration and survey of their lands, and they gave me authority to engage your services in this case, but we have no surveyor. Presumably, in conformity with Exhibit U, the services of Attorney Ritchey were first secured to represent the Binday property owners. After Mr. Ritchey left the Philippines, Attorney Turner became the legal representative of the claimants and he associated with himself Attorneys Rheberg and Sison. The Maxion case being decided favorably to the plaintiffs and being in nature a test case, it was naturally for the benefit of the Manila Railroad Company to conclude a compromise agreement with the plaintiffs. Negotiations were entered into by Attorney Turner, on behalf of the plaintiffs, and Attorney Abreu and later by President Paez of the railroad, on behalf of the railroad. The effort of Mr. Turner apparently was to secure at least P100,000 for his clients and himself. At least such an offer by Mr. Turner limited until July 16, 1923, was finally made. (Exhibit H.) President Paez on the other hand would only agree to pay P80,000 in settlement of the Binday cases. There the matter rested until Mr. Erfe and Attorney De las Alas produced the power of attorney in favor of Mr. Erfe-Mejia of June 21, 1923, when a settlement was speedily arrived at in the sum of P90,000. After the execution of the document of settlement, the sum of P70,000 was delivered to Erfe and the sum of P20,000 was retained by the Manila Railroad Company. (See affidavits, Exhibits, A and A, of Jose Paez and E.G. Turner.) The contested power of attorney omitting the signatures of about two hundred persons at the end, which it is not feasible to try to decipher, as handed to President Paez, reads as follows: SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY We, who have signed below or placed our finger marks in the middle of our names, all of age, and residents of the municipality of San Fabian, Province of Pangasinan, and plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 1884 to 1993; 1938 to 1954; 1979, 1980 and 1841 of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Philippine Islands, against the Manila Railroad Company, for damages caused by said company to our properties situated in the barrio of Binday, municipality of San Fabian, Province of Pangasinan, which cases are now pending in the Supreme Court upon an appeal taken by said defendant, except one of them, that numbered 1931, which is already definitely terminated; We do hereby voluntarily, freely and spontaneously declare and state that we give and grant Mr. Ambrosio Erfe-Mejia, of age, married, and resident of San Fabian, Province of Pangasinan, P.I., special power; 1. To withdraw from the hands of Attorney E.G. Turner, resident of Lingayen, Pangasinan, our aforesaid cases in such a manner so as to sever all connection with said attorney from the date said Mr. E.G. Turner is notified of this power of attorney by Mr. Ambrosio Erfe-Mejia; 2. To annul any such power as we may have granted, or any such agreement as we may have executed prior to this date with any person or persons to compromise the aforesaid cases; 3. To compromise on our behalf and in our place and stead directly with the defendant Manila Railroad Company the aforesaid cases for such sum and in such a manner as he may deem to be to our best interests; 4. To recover on our behalf and in our place and stead from the Manila Railroad Company all such amount as may be awarded to us and paid by said company by virtue of such a compromise, should any be made; lawphi1.net 5. To engage, and pay for the professional services of an attorney or various attorneys for the purpose of protecting our rights and interests:

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(a) In the execution or making of the compromise; (b) In the prosecution in the Supreme Court of our aforesaid cases in the event that no compromise is made; (c) In any such action as any person may bring against us upon this special power of attorney; (6) To pay Attorney E.G. Turner such fees as said Mr. Ambrosio Erfe-Mejia may deem just and reasonable or equitable, taking into account the professional services rendered by him up to this date in connection with said cases; 7. To invest not more than twenty-five thousand pesos of the amount that may be recovered from the aforesaid company, that is, the M.R.R. Co., in the purchase of an agricultural land with Torrens title in any municipality of the Province of Pangasinan; 8. To deduct from the total amount to be paid by the defendant company (the M.R.R. Co.) twenty per cent thereof as compensation for his labor, work, services, expenses and troubles in the institution, prosecution and termination of said cases; 1awphi1.net 9. Also to deduct 10 per cent (ten per cent) of the total sum to be paid by the aforementioned M.R.R. Company, the same to constitute a fund available for any purpose in case of emergency or any event that may affect our interests or cases; 10. To distribute the money among all of us, giving each such portion as may be allowed in the judgments of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan or in the Supreme Court (that is to say, in the Supreme Court) in the awarding of the damages claimed, after deducting all the amounts mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. We also do hereby ratify and approve and accept whatever Mr. Ambrosio Erfe-Mejia may do, perform or carry out pursuant to the terms of this special power of attorney, and the same shall be considered by all and each of us for all legal purposes as if it were done, performed or carried out by us collectively or individually. In testimony whereof, we have hereunto set our hands in San Fabian, Pangasinan, this 21st day of June, nineteen hundred twenty-three. Having given more than enough attention to the past and present incidents connected with these sixty-eight cases, we are now in a position to approach more directly the issue and decide as best we may if the power of attorney in question is valid or invalid. Attorney Turner in opposing the substitution of Attorney De las Alas complains of various fraudulent acts on the part of Erfe, De las Alas, and others. Attorney Turner claims that the power of attorney has been dressed up, added to, and changed in many ways since June 22, 1923 (Exhibit C). He claims that it contains a number of signatures of persons who are not legally qualified to sign a document of this class. He claims that of those who did sign the document many did so not understanding its contents, and under force and duress. (Exhibits in A-6V.) Attorney Turner says that "Erfe has not only availed himself of undue influence, misrepresentation, falsehood and deceit, but has also used force, intimidation and coercion in order to impose his acts and will upon the ignorant plaintiffs." Therefore, in view of the fraud practiced by Erfe, De las Alas, Lamberto Siguion Reyna, and Paez, Attorney Turner argues that the fraudulent contract should be set aside and declared null and void. Attorney De las Alas defends the power of attorney in favor of Ambrosio Erfe-Mejia as truly and legally executed by the plaintiffs. He endeavors to show how the power was executed, and how it was examined by the president and attorney of the Manila Railroad Company who satisfied themselves of the genuineness of the document. Attorney De las Alas naturally takes the position that the plaintiffs signed the power of attorney with full knowledge of its contents, and that since then they have confirmed their action not only once but many times. In turn, Attorney De las Alas makes counter charges against Attorney Turner, Representative Camacho, and others. Attorney De las Alas argues that as the power of attorney is valid, he should be recognized as the counsel for the plaintiffs with power to enter into a settlement with the Manila Railroad Company. The leading actors on either side are painted in the blackest of colors by their opponents. But as none of these alleged crimes and misdemeanors are properly before us, without even mentioning them, we are glad to pass immediately to matters of present interest. We only dip our fingers into the cauldron to pick out such facts as will illuminate the instant issue. Getting at last to the facts, we must confess that the court is nearly helpless in the face of actuality. This situation results not because of lack of incentive on the part of opposing counsel or because of the paucity of the affidavits, but arises from the nature of the proof presented. The poor plaintiffs have been induced to sign affidavits of exactly contrary effect; have been told one thing by one party and another thing by another party, and finally, at the instance of the special investigator of the Governor-General, have been corralled to secure their statements. Probably, the plaintiffs are only too glad to sign any affidavit placed before them. Probably also they are not especially interested in whether Attorney Turner or Attorney De las Alas represents them. They align themselves with Attorney Turner because he promises them a larger return. They align themselves with Attorney De las Alas because he promises them a more prompt payment. What they have wanted is the money due them from the Manila Railroad Company.

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To demonstrate the value of the affidavits. As illustrations, let us look into the affidavits presented by the plaintiffs Luis Sion (Repudiated Exhibits A and G, confirmed Exhibits A-5, A-6, G, H): Marciano Zarate (Repudiated Exhibits D, Z, confirmed Exhibit BB); Esteban Manoot (Repudiated Exhibit XX, confirmed Exhibit A-1); Venancio Amansec (Repudiated Exhibit Y, confirmed Exhibit A-10); Inocencio Calicdan (Repudiated QQ, confirmed Exhibit A-11); Antonio Tabito (Repudiated Exhibit UUU, confirmed Exhibit A-12); Filomena Generalao (Repudiated Exhibits GG, VVV, confirmed Exhibit A-13); Bernardo Mayugba (Repudiated Exhibit EE, confirmed Exhibit A-14); Carlos de Nieva (Repudiated Exhibits F, JJJ, and BBBBB, confirmed before investigator.) Other plaintiffs have been as easily duped if we had the patience to hunt out their respective cases. To please Attorney Turner, they have repudiated their act in signing the power of attorney. To Erfe and Attorney De las Alas, they have ratified their act in signing the power of attorney. Some cold facts can be fixed upon to give assistance. The number of plaintiffs is something over two hundred. The power of attorney now contains two hundred and six signatures, although it is claimed that originally it had only one hundred and seventy-two signatures. The justice of the peace and notary and the two attesting witnesses affirm that the document was read in the dialect and signed in their presence by all of the principals (Exhibits A-21, 2-6.) Doubt being cast upon the authenticity of the plaintiff's act, ratification is disclosed in Exhibit H with something like two hundred and fifty names; in exhibit I with something like two hundred names, and in Exhibits 1, G, and K in the local dialect with more than one hundred names. A comparison discloses that most of the persons, who signed the affidavits presented by Attorney turner, have also ratified their action in taking part in the execution of the power of attorney, as is disclosed by the affidavits presented by Attorney De las Alas. The power of attorney is now available in the local dialect and known to the plaintiffs. Probably all of them have received money on account of their claims from Erfe. (See, for instance, Exhibits EE, JJ.) The hacienda Binday has been transferred to the plaintiffs by Rafael Corpus. (Exhibit J.) On suggestion of the parties, the Governor-General was led to send an attorney of the Bureau of Justice to San Fabian, Pangasinan, to investigate the irregularities alleged to have taken place in the transactions between the landowners of that municipality and the Manila Railroad Company. While we entertain grave doubt as to the probative value of this report and of our right to look into the evidence before the investigator, inasmuch as both parties rely on the investigation and as no objection is made, we will make at least incidental mention of certain facts appearing in the report of Assistant Attorney Sabino Padilla, the representative of the Department of Justice and the Governor-General. It may be said parenthetically that on account of the agreement of the parties, the witnesses were heard before Attorney Padilla without either Attorney Turner of Attorney De las Alas being present. The classification of the testimony of the plaintiffs as made by Attorney Padilla discloses the following: One hundred twenty-five plaintiffs accept the compromise with the Manila Railroad Company and agree that the signature of the power of attorney was their free, spontaneous, and voluntarily action. Thirty-nine witnesses declare that they signed the document voluntarily on behalf of deceased and absent plaintiffs. One plaintiff testifies that he did not sign the power of attorney but that he had no complaint relative to the settlement. Eighteen persons whose names appear in the power of attorney did not testify. Four persons admitted that they signed the power of attorney in question and had no complaint against Erfe, but that they did not understand the terms of the document. Thirteen plaintiffs or their representatives testified that they signed without understanding the terms of the power of attorney in question and did not agree with the settlement or compromise concluded by Erfe. In other words, practically all of the plaintiffs, with the exception of thirteen against whom, however, some contrary testimony exists, agree with the compromise and admit that they signed the power of attorney voluntarily (Exhibits 2-6). It at once comes to mind, as an easy resolution of the problem, to select those persons who have repented of the action taken on their behalf by Erfe and permit their appeals to go on, while recognizing the compromise agreement as to all the other plaintiffs. The trouble with this suggestion is that it is impossible to know exactly which plaintiffs affirm the compromise and which plaintiffs disaffirm it. It is also evident that the plaintiffs have not been proceeding individually against the Manila Railroad Company, but that it was a community affair. They first made Erfe their representative. They next assigned all of their interests to Attorney Turner. They next proceeded with their individual cases under the guidance of Attorney Turner. They next signed the power of attorney in favor of Erfe. They have held meetings in San Fabian and have proceeded on the theory of joint action. The only recourse then is either to hold the power of attorney good as to all of the plaintiffs or hold it bad as to all of them. This brings us to look into the actual financial status of the plaintiffs in these cases. The Maxion case was the first decided. The judgment was for P1,250 with interest and costs. According to the affidavit of Maxion, the total judgment reached P1,518.68; expenses, P460; balance, P1,058.68; attorney's fees, P529.34; amount received by Maxion, P529.34. This settlement does not take into consideration the possible twenty per cent due Erfe. In other words, Attorney De las Alas claims that through the machinations of Attorney Turner, Maxion obtained only about thirty-four per cent of the total adjudicated. (Exhibit DD.) As to the plaintiffs in the remaining sixty-eight cases, Erfe has made a report which includes the following data: Amount adjudicated by the various judgments, P118,000; amount obtained through the compromise, P90,000; expenses, amount left with the Railroad Company to pay Attorney Turner and his companions, P20,000; honorarium of Attorney De las Alas P3,000; emergency expenses, P1,000; consultation of Attorneys Enage and Sison, P1,000; compensation of the agent and expenses, P18,000; paid in cash to the plaintiffs, P26,000; paid for the hacienda Binday for the plaintiffs, P21,000. Total expenses, forty-eight per cent; total received by the property owners, fifty-two percent. Up to this point, we have exerted ourselves to search out the facts. Before announcing our conclusions, a few words should be added relative to the applicable law. The power of attorney created the relation of principal and agent. It was a contract which should be enforced unless vitiated by fraud or found to be an agreement contrary to the public policy. It attempted, among other things, to dismiss the lawyer and substitute another, which may be done at any time by the client with or without cause (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 32). The power

18
of Attorney further attempted to compromise pending cases, and in this connection, it is well to recall that, as provided by section 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, lawyers "cannot, without special authority, compromise their client's litigation, or receive anything in discharge of the client's claim but the full amount in cash." A contingent fee was originally provided for the attorney. Contingent fees are not prohibited in the Philippines, and since impliedly sanctioned by law "should be under the supervision of the court in order that clients may be protected from unjust charges." (Canons of Professional Ethics, No. 13.) Where it is shown that the contract for a contingent fee was obtained by any undue influence of the attorney over the client, or by any fraud or imposition, or that the compensation is so clearly excessive as to amount to extortion, the court will in a proper case protect the aggrieved part. (Taylor vs. Bemiss [1883]; 110 U.S., 42.) In this court, the liens of Attorney Turner are placed at thirty per cent of the judgments in one document and at P40,000 in another document. Considering the long and difficult litigation and the annoyance and trouble in connection with the trial of the cases, these charges for the lawyer's services are not unreasonable. We treat the liens as attaching to the proceeds of the settlement and propose to protect the right of the attorney to his liens. The fraud will be considered as still in the hands of the defendant company and subject to court order. (See 2 R.C.L., 1076 et seq,; Greenleaf vs. Minneapolis, etc. Railway Co. [1915], 30 N.D., 112.) As to the power of attorney, part of it invite suspicion. P26,000 in cash for the plaintiffs out of a total of P90,000 is little enough under any view of the cases. On the supposition that the compromise reached P100,000, as will be explained in a moment, and on the further supposition that the terms of the power of attorney are given effect, Attorney Turner and associate counsel would receive P30,000, Erfe about P20,000, all expenses to be paid by the lawyers and the agent, and the litigants about P50,000. The plaintiffs do in fact obtain nearly P50,000, if we take into account the hacienda Binday as belonging to them, which we do with hesitancy, for if they wish to enter into this community purchase, it of course is no affair of ours. We conclude this distasteful and arduous task by making the findings which follow. We find that the power of attorney of June 21, 1923, in connection with the prior authorization in favor of Ambrosio Erfe-Mejia and subsequent ratification, is valid and controlling. We find further that as the power of attorney is valid and controlling, there has been a proper substitution of attorneys in this court, and that Attorney Antonio de las Alas must be recognized as counsel for the plaintiffs. We find further that Attorney E.G. Turner and associate counsel have liens on the judgments for professional services the reasonable value of which we fix at P30,000. Inasmuch as there only remains a balance of P20,000 available for the purpose of paying Attorney Turner and associate counsel, inasmuch as this happened through no fault of Attorney Turner, and inasmuch as to make him look to the plaintiffs for further payment would be unfair, the compromise agreement is modified and approved as of the amount of P100,000. Subject generally to the conditions above stated, and subject specifically to proof by the Manila Railroad Company that Attorneys Turner, Rheberg, and Sison have been paid P30,000 in satisfaction of their liens, the motion to dismiss the appeals in these sixtyeight cases, is approved. So ordered. Johnson, Street, Avancea, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. L-32684 September 20, 1988 RAMON TUMBAGAHAN petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, TEODULO C. TANDAYAG, TIMOTEA LASMARIAS, JOSE F. DEL ROSARIO, and THE IISMI SUPERVISORS HOUSING ASSOCIATION, INC., through TIBURCIO ESPENIDO respondents. Demetrio P. Sira, Sr. for petitioner. Francisco Ma. Garcia for respondent Timotea Lasmarias.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: In this present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner assails the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of his petition for mandamus to compel the trial court to give due course to his appeal. The appellate court dismissed his appeal on the ground that it was filed beyond the reglementary period to appeal. The issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner validly terminated the services of his counsels of record-Attys. Melvyn Salise and Jose Amarga such that service on them of processes and notices would no longer bind him. The resolution of this issue will also resolve the question raised in the petition whether the receipt by Atty. Amarga of the trial court's order of dismissal would start the running of the period within which the petitioner should file his appeal.

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The records show that the petitioner filed two cases with the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, Branch II, namely: (1) Civil Case No. 1257, for declaration of ownership and reconveyance of Lot Nos. 3050 and 3051 of the Iligan Cadastre; and (2) Cadastral Case No. IL-N-4, for the review of the decree of registration issued by the Land Registration Commission in favor of Timotea Lasmarias and cancellation of her titles to the same lots. When the cases were called for joint trial on April 10, 1968, the petitioner relieved Atty. Salise as his counsel. Atty. Salise filed his withdrawal of appearance which was approved by the court. On April 15, 1968, the cases were again called for trial. This time, the petitioner personally appeared and filed a written motion for postponement on the ground that he still had no counsel and was not ready for trial. Upon motion of the other party, the motion for postponement was denied and the court issued an order dismissing the two cases. A copy of the order was sent to Atty. Amarga which he received on April 26, 1968. The petitioner received his copy of the order on May 17, 1968. Thereafter, he filed his motion for reconsideration. After the motion was denied, he filed a notice of appeal and record on appeal which the Court dismissed for being filed out of time, counting the period to appeal from the day Atty. Amarga received a copy of the order of dismissal. The petitioner alleges that he had neither engaged the services of Atty. Amarga nor authorized the latter to represent him in his two cases. From an examination of the records, however, this Court finds that these allegations are without merit. The pleadings filed with the trial court bear the names of Atty. Salise and Atty. Amarga as counsels for the petitioner. Copies of some of the pleadings of the opposing party were furnished to Atty. Amarga who received the same and signed for Atty. Salise. Such being the case, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in agreeing with the trial court in its rejection of the claim that the petitioner had not even authorized the said counsel to represent him and to take part in the conduct of the case. As stated by the Court of Appeals: The only issue raised in petitioner's petition for mandamus is whether or not petitioner's appeal from the order dismissing his complaint in Civil Case No. 1257 was perfected on time. The resolution of the issue depends upon a determination of the date when services of notice of the order of April 15,1968, was legally effected upon petitioner. Was service made on April 26, 1968, when Atty. Jose Amarga actually received a copy of the order of April 15, 1968, as held by the respondent court and maintained by private respondent Lasmarias? Or on May 17,1968, when petitioner actually received a copy of said order, as contended by petitioner? Or on the date Benjamin Sta. Maria received the other copy of said order? At the outset we can eliminate for consideration the date Mr. Sta. Maria received a copy of said order of dismissal for there is nothing in the record to show that Mr. Sta. Maria was authorized by petitioner to receive the latter's mail. Petitioner alleges that Atty. Jose Amarga is not his counsel, and that he has never engaged the services of said lawyer and has not authorized said lawyer to represent him in Civil Case No. 1257 or Cadastral Case No. II-N-4, and that his counsel in said cases was Atty. Melvyn Salise only. The record, however, negates, petitioner's allegations. Petitionees answer to the counterclaim of private respondents del Rosario and the IISMI Supervisors Housing Association, Inc. was filed by Attys. M. Salise and J. Amarga and signed by Atty. Jose B. Amarga (p. 14, record on appeal). This fact sufficiently shows that Atty. Jose B. Amarga was one of the counsel for petitioner in said cases. When Atty. Melvyn T. Salise filed his motion to withdraw as counsel for petitioner, he stated that petitioner has terminated his legal services and that he was withdrawing as such counsel. There was no indication in said motion that petitioner had likewise discharged Atty. Amarga as his counsel for petitioner. Therefore, Atty. Amarga continued to be the counsel for petitioner. There is another clear indication to show that petitioner had the assistance and services of legal counsel even after Atty. Salise had withdrawn as his counsel. When the cases were called for hearing on April 15, 1968, petitioner personally filed a motion captioned "Motion For Longer Time To Prepare For Trial." This motion is quite long and raises legal points which only a lawyer can be conversant with. We quote with approval respondent court's observation on this point.: On the other hand, the court is of the observation and belief that the motion under consideration could not have been prepared by Ramon Tumbagahan himself, who is not a lawyer but prepared by lawyer who is afraid to show his face before the court by not signing the motion himself, as counsel for Ramon Tumbagahan, and apparently to deceive the court to believe the allegation of Ramon Tumbagahan that he has not until the present, retained the services of counsel in order to secure the postponement of the trial of the above cases to the prejudice of the oppositors and defendants.' (Record on Appeal, p. 65).

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Petitioner having been represented by counsel, service of a copy of the order of April 15, 1968, was legally effected upon him on the date Atty. Amarga, his remaining counsel of record, actually received said copy, i.e., on April 26, 1968. The Supreme Court and this Court have invariably adhered to the rule that, where a party is represented by counsel, service of notices must be made upon counsel and not upon the party personally. Service upon counsel is sufficient and binding upon the party (Perez v. Ysip 81 Phil. 218; Hernandez v. Clapis 87 Phil. 437; Tanpinco vs. Lozada, L-17335, January 31, 1962; Valdez vs. Valdez, CA-G.R. No. 28393, May 24, 1962). This rule is mandatory and service of notice upon the party personally is not only superfluous but also legally ineffective; notice given to a party personally is not notice in law (Chaivani vs. Tancinco, 90 Phil. 862; Perez vs. Araneta, L-11788, May 16, 1958; Cabili v. Badelles, L-17786, September 29, 1962; Capicon v. Abbas, CA-G.R. No. 16870-R, 52 O.G. 6960; Aseniero vs. Fernandez, CA-G.R. No. 23527-B, May 22, 1962. (Rollo, pp. 14-18) This Court, therefore, affirms the appellate court's findings that Atty. Amarga was one of the counsels for petitioner and that he remained as the petitioner's counsel after Atty. Salise withdrew from the case and was discharge by the court. There is a need to observe the legal formalities before a counsel of record may be considered relieved of his responsibility as such counsel (Cubar vs. Mendoza, 120 SCRA 768). The withdrawal as counsel of a client, or the dismissal by the client of his counsel, must be made in a formal petition filed in the case Baquiran vs. Court of Appeals, 2 SCRA 873, 878). In this case, the termination of the attorney-client relationship between the petitioner and Atty. Salise does not automatically severe the same relations between the petitioner and Atty. Amarga. Only Atty. Salise's dismissal was made of record. None was made with regard to the other counsel. The attorney-client relation does not terminate formally until there is a withdrawal made of record; at least so far as the opposite party is concerned, the relation otherwise continues until the end of the litigation (Visitacion vs. Manit 27 SCRA 523). Unless properly relieved, the counsel is responsible for the conduct of the case (Cortez vs. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 31). WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

A.M. No. 2144 April 10, 1989 CELEDONIO QUILBAN, ROMUALDO DALAGAN, FORTUNATO RAMIREZ AMADOR ALARCON and LUIS AGAWAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. SANTIAGO R. ROBINOL, respondent. A.M. No. 2180 April 10, 1989 ATTY. SANTIAGO R. ROBINOL, complainant, vs. ATTY. A. R. MONTEMAYOR, respondent. RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM: Subjected to frustrations were the dreams of thirty-two (32) squatter families to own the land of approximately 50 square meters each on which their respective homes were built. To vindicate their rights they have aired their plight before this Court. Thwarted, too, was the benevolence shown by the original owner of the land which parted with its property at a giveaway price thinking that it was accommodating the landless squatters. The antecedent facts follow: The Colegio de San Jose, a Jesuit corporation, (Colegio, for short) used to own a parcel of land at the Seminary Road, Barrio Bathala, Quezon City. Through its administrator, Father Federico Escaler, it sold said land to the Quezon City Government as the site for the Quezon City General Hospital but reserved an area of 2,743 square meters as a possible development site. Squatters, however, settled in the area since 1965 or 1966.

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Sometime in 1970, the Colegio, through Father Escaler gave permission to Congressman Luis R. Taruc to build on the reserved site a house for his residence and a training center for the Christian Social Movement. Seeing the crowded shanties of squatters, Congressman Taruc broached to Father Escaler the Idea of donating or selling the land cheap to the squatters. Congressman Taruc then advised the squatters to form an organization and choose a leader authorized to negotiate with Father Escaler. Following that advice, the squatters formed the "Samahang Pagkakaisa ng Barrio Bathala" (Samahan, for brevity), with Bernabe Martin as President (Exhibit "24", Robinol), who was entrusted with the task of negotiating on their behalf for the sale of the land to them. But instead of working for the welfare of the Samahan, Martin went to one Maximo Rivera, a realtor, with whom he connived to obtain the sale to the exclusion of the other Samahan members. On 28 March 1971, the land was ultimately sold to Rivera at P 15 per square meter or a total consideration of P 41,961.65. The prevailing price of the land in the vicinity then was P 100 to P 120 per square meter. It was evident that Father Escaler had been made to believe that Rivera represented the squatters on the property. On the same date, 28 March 1971, Rivera obtained TCT No. 175662 to the property in his name alone. In 1972, thirty-two heads of families of the Samahan filed Civil Case No. Q-16433, Branch IV, Quezon City, entitled "Celedonio Quilban, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. Maximo Rivera, et al., Defendants." with the principal prayer that said defendants be ordered to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of said plaintiffs after reimbursement by the latter of the corresponding amount paid by Rivera to the Colegio. The Court of First Instance of Quezon City, however, dismissed the case. To prosecute the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Samahan members hired as their counsel Atty. Santiago R. Robinol for which the latter was paid P 2,000.00 as attorney's fees on 8 October 1975 (Exhibit "I"). Atty. Robinol was also to be given by the members a part of the land, subject matter of the case, equal to the portion that would pertain to each of them. What was initially a verbal commitment on the land sharing was confirmed in writing on 10 March 1979 (Exhibit "2"). On 14 November 1978, the Court of Appeals reversed the CFI Decision by: (1) ordering defendant Maximo Rivera and all his co-defendants to execute a deed of conveyance of the land in question in favor of herein plaintiffs after the payment of the corresponding amount paid by the defendants to the Colegio de San Jose, Inc., and in case of refusal or failure on their part to do so, ordering the Clerk of Court to execute the same in favor of plaintiffs and declaring TCT No. 175662 (Annex E) null and void and ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel said certificate and issue a new one in lieu thereof in the name of plaintiffsappellants, upon presentation of the deed of conveyance to be executed in favor of appellants and (2) ordering appellees jointly and severally to pay appellants the sum of P 2,000.00 as attomey's fees, plus costs." (p. 30, Report and Recommendation) To raise the amount of P 41,961.65 ordered paid by the Court of Appeals, plus expenses for ejectment of the non-plaintiffs occupying the property, conveyance, documentation, transfer of title etc., the five officers of the Samahan collected, little by little, P 2,500.00 from each head of family. The Treasurer, Luis Agawan, issued the proper receipts prepared by Atty. Robinol. On 18 May 1979, the sum of P 68,970.00 was turned over to Atty. Robinol by the officers; on 31 May 1979 the amounts of P l,030.00 and P 2,500.00 respectively; and on 2 June 1979, the sum of P 2,500.00, or a total of P 75,000.00. After almost a year, the five officers discovered that no payment had been made to Rivera. When queried, Atty. Robinol replied that there was an intervention filed in the civil case and that a Writ of Execution had not yet been issued by the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. However, it turned out that the motion for intervention had already been dismissed. After confronting Atty. Robinol with that fact, the latter gave other excuses, which the officers discovered to have no basis at all. On 6 March 1980, 21 out of 32 plaintiffs arrived at a "first consensus" to change their counsel, Atty. Robinol (Exhibit "3"). The officers of the Samahan thereafter approached Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor, who agreed to be their counsel, after he was shown the document of 6 March 1980 containing the consensus of the Samahan members to change Atty. Robinol as their lawyer. Upon Atty. Montemayor's advice, the officers sent Atty. Robinol a letter dated 17 March 1980 informing the latter of their decision to terminate his services and demanding the return of the P 75,000.00 deposited with him (Exhibit "5"). Atty. Robinol turned deaf ears to the demand. A subsequent letter of the same tenor, dated 31 March 1980 (Exhibit "6"), was similarly disregarded by Atty. Robinol. On 20 March 1980, Atty. Montemayor formally entered his appearance in Civil Case No. Q-16433 as counsel for the plaintiffs (Exhibit "8"), vice Atty. Robinol, on the strength of the authority dated 18 March 1980 given him by plaintiffs in said civil case through the five officers (Exhibit "9"). Atty. Montemayor then filed on 20 March 1980 a Motion for Execution praying that the defendants and/or the Clerk of Court be directed to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of the plaintiffs (Exhibit "10"). At the hearing of the Motion for Execution on 5 June 1980, Atty. Robinol manifested that he had no objection to the appearance of and his substitution by Atty. Montemayor (Exhibits "11" & "11-A"). Because Atty. Robinol, however, still questioned the first consensus dated 6 March 1980, another document labelled the "second consensus" (Exhibit "E") was signed by 21 plaintiffs during a meeting held for the purpose on 24 November 1980 to the effect that they had decided to change Atty. Robinol as their counsel because he had delayed paying for their land notwithstanding the Decision of the Court of Appeals in their favor.

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Administrative Case No. 2144 On 15 April 1980 the Samahan officers filed this Administrative Complaint before this Court requesting the invention of Atty. Robinol for refusal to return the P 75,000.00 and praying that the Court exercise its power of discipline over members of the Bar unworthy to practice law. The details of their Complaint were embodied in their Joint Affidavit executed on 14 April 1980 describing what had transpired between them and Atty. Robinol. In his defense, Atty. Robinol maintains that he was hired by Complainants to appeal their case to the Court of appeals after they had lost in the lower Court; that their agreement as to attomey's fees was on a contingent basis if he obtains a reversal of the lower Court Decision, they wig give him a portion of the property subject matter of the litigation equal to the portion that will pertain to each of the 32 plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-16433; that he did not receive P 70,000.00 from Complainants on 18 May 1979 but only P 56,470.00; that he prepared and signed the receipt dated 18 May 1979 showing that he received P 70,000.00 only to save complainants from embarrassment and shame should their co-plaintiff ask for proof that they (Complainants) have paid their shares, which they have not; that the correct amount in his possession is only P 62,470.00-it would really be P 75,000.00 had the five Complainants paid their shares in the amount of P 12,500.00 at P 2,500.00 each and one Fortunate Ramirez paid his balance of P 30.00; that he had the right to hold the money in his possession as guarantee for the payment of his attomey's fees of get a portion of the property that win pertain to each of the plaintiffs, he wants his portion converted to cash, and the cash equivalent of his portion is P 50,000.00 (2,743 square meters divided by 32 plaintiffs equals 85 square meters for each plaintiff, multiplied by P 500.00 up per square meter); that considering that P 50,000.00 is even less than one-half (1/ 2) per cent of the total value of the property, which is more than a million pesos, such amount is not unreasonable; that he is ready to give back the amount of P 12,470.00, representing the difference between P 50,000.00 and the amount of P 62,470.00 in his possession; that complainants cannot make this Court a collection agency and that while this Court has the exclusive disciplinary power over members of the Bar, it is equally true that the Court cannot pass judgment on Complainants' plea that the amount deposited by respondent be returned to them as this prayer should be ventilated in an ordinary action; that he does not have the slightest intention to appropriate the money in his possession (P 62,470.00) for himself, but he is holding it until his attomey's fees are satisfied there being no guarantee for its satisfaction because of Complainants' adamant refusal to pay him; that there was no previous notice to him of his discharge; and that Atty. Montemayor accepted the case without his Robinols formal withdrawal and conformity. Administrative Case No. 2180 Pursuing that tack on 29 July 1980, Atty. Robinol filed a complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor for alleged gross unethical conduct unbecoming of a lawyer in that Atty. Montemayor readily accepted the case without his Robinols formal withdrawal and conformity and knowing fully well that there was no consensus of all the plaintiffs to discharge him as their counsel. For his part, Atty. Montemayor denied that the attomey's fees agreed upon by plaintiffs and Atty. Robinol were purely on a contingent basis, the truth being that the attomey's fees were payable on a cash basis of P 2,000.00 retainer fee, as evidenced by the receipt signed by Atty. Robinol (Annex "I"), plus whatever amount is adjudicated as attomey's fees by the Court of Appeals; that the contingent fee referred to by Atty. Robinol was the result of his insistent demand after the Court of Appeals Decision in Civil Case No. Q-16433 was already final, as shown by the date of the agreement (Annex "2"); that twenty [20] out of thirty-two [32] members of the Samahan signed the agreement to discharge Atty. Robinol and hire a substitute counsel as shown by Annex "3", which is a majority of the membership and, therefore, a valid consensus; that he agreed to act as counsel if only to arrest the growing belief of the Samahan that most members of the Philippine Bar are unprincipled; that although there was no formal Motion for substitution, there was substantial compliance with Sec. 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as shown by the formal entry of appearance in Civil Case No. Q-1 6433 (Annex "8"), the written consent of the clients (Annex "9"), notice to Atty. Robinol of his discharge and substitution (Annexes "10' and "11"), non-objection by Robinol of his appearance as counsel (Annex "l 2"), and implied consent of the Court to the substitution as shown by its Order of 29 May 1980 (Annex "l 3"); that his professional and personal actuations as counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-16433, CFI-Quezon City, do not cause dishonor either to himself or to the Philippine Bar; and that the Complaint against him should be dismissed. On 1 September 1980 and on 17 December 1980, the Court referred Adm. Case No. 2144 and Adm. Case No. 2180, respectively, to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. On 15 December 1988, the Solicitor General submitted his compliance and recommended: 1. That Atty. Santiago R. Robinol be suspended for three months for refusing to deliver the funds of the plaintiffs in his possession, with the warning that a more severe penalty will be imposed for a repetition of the same or similar act, and that he be ordered to return to the plaintiffs, through the complainants in Adm. Case No. 2134, the sum of P 75,000.00. 2. That the case against Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor, Adm. Case No. 2180, be dismissed, since he has not committed any misconduct imputed to him by Atty. Robinol. (pp. 59-60, Rollo) Except for the disciplinary sanction suggested for Atty. Robinol, we concur with the recommendations. Re: Atty. Santiago R. Robinol

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Atty. Robinol has, in fact, been guilty of ethical infractions and grave misconduct that make him unworthy to continue in the practice of the profession. After the Court of Appeals had rendered a Decision favorable to his clients and he had received the latter's funds, suddenly, he had a change of mind and decided to convert the payment of his fees from a portion of land equivalent to that of each of the plaintiffs to P 50,000.00, which he alleges to be the monetary value of that area. Certainly, Atty. Robinol had no right to unilaterally appropriate his clients' money not only because he is bound by a written agreement but also because, under the circumstances, it was highly unjust for him to have done so. His clients were mere squatters who could barely eke out an existence They had painstakingly raised their respective quotas of P 2,500.00 per family with which to pay for the land only to be deprived of the same by one who, after having seen the color of money, heart lessly took advantage of them. Atty. Robinol has no basis to claim that since he was unjustly dismissed by his clients he had the legal right to retain the money in his possession. Firstly, there was justifiable ground for his discharge as counsel. His clients had lost confidence in him for he had obviously engaged in dilatory tactics to the detriment of their interests, which he was duty-bound to protect. Secondly, even if there were no valid ground, he is bereft of any legal right to retain his clients' funds intended for a specific purpose the purchase of land. He stands obliged to return the money immediately to their rightful owners. The principle of quantum meruit applies if a lawyer is employed without a price agreed upon for his services in which case he would be entitled to receive what he merits for his services, as much as he has earned. In this case, however, there was an express contract and a stipulated mode of compensation. The implied assumpsit on quantum meruit therefore, is inapplicable. But Atty. Robinol seeks to impress upon the Court that he had received only the sum of P 62,470.00 and not P 75,000.00 claiming that five (5) officers of the Samahan had not yet paid their shares to P 12,500.00. We agree with the Solicitor General that complainants' evidence on this score is the more credible and that he had, in fact, received the total sum of P 75,000.00 inclusive of the share of P 12,500.00 of the five (5) officers of the Somalian For, in the pleadings filed by Atty. Robinol himself in the civil case below, namely, the Motion for Execution on 5 June 1979; the Motion for Postponement on 31 August 1979; and the Motion to Set Hearing of Motion for Execution on 10 March 1980, he made mention of seven (7) persons, who, as of that time, had not yet submitted their corresponding shares which list, however, did not include any of the five (5) officers of the Samahan. Inevitable, therefore, is the conclusion that Atty. Robinol has rendered himself unfit to continue in the practice of law. He has not only violated his oath not to delay any man for money and to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his clients. He has also brought the profession into disrepute with people who had reposed in it full faith and reliance for the fulfillment of a life-time ambition to acquire a homelot they could call their own. Re: Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor In so far as Atty. Montemayor is concerned, we agree with the findings of the Solicitor General that he has not exposed himself to any plausible charge of unethical conduct in the exercise of his profession when he agreed to serve as counsel for the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-16433. Of the thirty-two (32) plaintiffs in said civil case, twenty-one (21) had signed the first consensus of 6 March 1980 expressing their resolve to change their lawyer. In as much as Atty. Robinol sought to exclude seven (7) of the plaintiffs (out of 32) for non-payment of their shares, only twenty five (25) of them should be considered in determining the majority. Consequently, twenty-one (21) out of twenty-five (25) is sufficient to make the said consensus binding. It is more than a simple majority. Moreover, the following developments estop Atty. Robinol from questioning his discharge as counsel: On 17 March 1980 he was informed in writing by plaintiffs of the termination of his services (Exhibit "5"). That was followed by another letter of 31 March 1980 of the same tenor (Exhibit "6"). In his Memorandum of 12 December 1985 and during the proceedings before the lower Court on 5 June 1980 he had stated that he had no objection to Atty. Montemayor's appearance in Civil Case Q-16433. When the latter did enter his appearance, therefore, on 20 March 1980 it was only after assuring himself that Atty. Robinol's services had been formally terminated. He had in no way encroached upon the professional employment of a colleague. There is no gainsaying that clients are free to change their counsel in a pending case at any time (Section 26, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and thereafter employ another lawyer who may then enter his appearance. In this case, the plaintiffs in the civil suit below decided to change their lawyer, Atty. Robinol, for loss of trust and confidence. That act was well within their prerogative. In so far as the complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Robinol against Atty. Montemayor is concerned, therefore, we find the same absolutely without merit. ACCORDINGLY, 1) In Administrative Case No. 2144, Atty. Santiago R. Robinol is hereby DISBARRED for having violated his lawyer's oath to delay no man for money, broken the fiduciary relation between lawyer and client, and proven himself unworthy to continue in the practice of law. By reason of his unethical actuations, he is hereby declared to have forfeited his rights to attomey's fees and is ordered to return the amount of P 75,000.00 to the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Q-16433 through the complainant in the aforementioned Administrative Case. 2) Administrative Case No. 2180 against Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor for disbarment is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

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Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the respective personal records of Attys. Santiago R. Robinol and Anacleto R. Montemayor. This Resolution is immediately executory. SO ORDERED. Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, GrioAquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.