See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/286508333

Relevance, Meaning and the Cognitive Science of Wisdom

Chapter · November 2013

CITATIONS READS
9 1,523

2 authors, including:

John Vervaeke
University of Toronto
21 PUBLICATIONS   189 CITATIONS   

SEE PROFILE

Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:

Limits of Intelligence View project

All content following this page was uploaded by John Vervaeke on 17 April 2017.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

RELEVANCE,
MEANING
AND
THE
COGNITIVE
SCIENCE
OF
WISDOM


By


John
Vervaeke
and
Leo
Ferraro


Let
us
begin
the
study
of
wisdom
by
noting
that
it
involves
some
kind
of
cognitive

improvement
that
affords
the
living
of
a
good
life.


When
we
use
the
term
“cognition”
or
“cognitive”,

it
should
be
broadly
construed
as
the
terms
are
used
in
cognitive
science,
meaning
thinking,

reasoning,
memory,
emotion
and
perception.

There
are
factors
such
as
good
fortune
that
can

improve
life,
but
wisdom
centres
on
a
kind
of
self‐transformation
of
cognitive
processing
that

enhances
the
quality
of
life
in
some
comprehensive
manner.

Philosophers
(especially
ancient

philosophers)
have
devoted
a
lot
of
time
to
addressing
the
related
questions
of
what
is
wisdom
and

what
it
is
to
live
a
good
life.
Recently
psychologists
have
also
broached
the
topic
because
of
the

central
role
of
cognitive
processes
in
wisdom
(Sternberg
1990,
Sternberg
200?,
Brown
2000).


Neuroscientists
have
also
begun
to
explore
the
topic

as
they
have
forayed
into
explaining
higher

cognitive
processes
and
wisdom
seems
to
involve
higher
cognitive
processes
such
as
self‐regulation

and
problem
solving
(Meeks
and
Jeste
2009;
Goldberg

2005).
It
stands
to
reason
that
cognitive

science,
which
attempts
to
create
theoretical
links
between
philosophical,
psychological,
and

neuroscientific
theories
(by
making
use
of
information
processing
ideas
drawn
from
the
fields
of

machine
learning
and
artificial
intelligence),
could
have
a
lot
to
say
about
wisdom.
In
a
sense,
wisdom

is
a
quintessential
cognitive
science
topic:

cognitive
science
offers
both
a
diverse
and
integrated

theoretical
perspective
that
makes
it
uniquely
suited
to
investigating
and
explicating
a
phenomenon

as
cognitively
complex
as
wisdom.



 In
this
chapter
we
will
explore
what
cognitive
science
contributes
to
the
understanding
of

the
nature
and
development
of
wisdom
by
explicitly
drawing
upon
philosophical,
psychological
and

neuroscientific
theories
that
are
integrated
through
information
processing/machine
learning
ideas.


In
doing
so
we
expressly
are
not
attempting
some
simple
reduction
of
wisdom
but
rather
we
hope
to

enrich
the
construct
in
a
way
that
will
make
it
more
empirically
tractable.
To
do
this
we
hope
to
tie

our
theoretical
account
of
wisdom
to
independently
established
constructs
within
psychology,

machine
learning,
and
neuroscience,
and
to
thereby
provide
a
process
theory
that
explains
how
one

undergoes
processes
of
self‐transformation
that
results
in
wisdom,
as
well
as
explicating
and

specifying
those
processes
to
some
degree.




Why
a
process
theory?

As
an
analogy,
let
us
consider
the
study
of
epistemology:

Chisholm
(1982)

distinguishes
between
two
broad
methods
for
studying
knowledge.


One
is
to
define
knowledge
and


Vervaeke
&
Ferraro
‐‐
1

 Relevance,
Meaning
and
the
Cognitive
Science
of
Wisdom


then
to
use
that
definition
to
formulate
the
question
“How
is
knowledge
acquired?
Which

psychological
processes
result
in
knowledge
as
their
product?”

The
second
method
is
to
define
a

process
by
which
knowledge
is
acquired
and
to
use
that
procedural
specification
as
the
basis
for
a

definition
of
what
knowledge
itself
is.

Chisholm’s
point
was
not
to
set
these
two
methods
in

competition
with
each
other,
but
rather
to
reveal
their
fundamental
interdependence.


Any
definition

of
a
product
implicitly
presupposes
the
process
by
which
it
is
generated.

Any
theory
of
a
process

likewise
relies
upon
an
implicit
concept
of
the
resulting
product.

In
coming
to
understand
wisdom,

simply
knowing
the
features
of
wisdom
is
insufficient.


Such
an
understanding
is
fundamentally

dependent
upon
our
understanding
of
the
processes
by
which
someone
becomes
wiser.


Over
the

past
30
years,
there
has
been
a
sustained
and
fruitful
effort
to
produce
an
account
of
what
wisdom
is.



Researchers
such
as
(Sternberg
1998;
Baltes
and
Staudinger
2000;
Ardelt
2004)
have
produced

various
accounts
of
what
the
fundamental
features
of
wisdom
are.

However,
by
and
large,
the

processes
by
which
an
individual
comes
to
be
wise
have
remained
relatively
unexamined.

In
short,

none
of
the
current
theories
offer
guidance
in
the
project
of
personal
self‐transformation
with
the

goal
of
wisdom.


This
is
consistent
with
the
modern
western
scientific
approach,
which
favours

beginning
an
intellectual
endeavour
with
a
taxonomy.

However,
in
the
ancient
world,
wisdom
was

understood
in
a
medicinal/therapeutic
framework.

In
this
way,
the
alleviation
of
suffering
and
the

enhancement
of
flourishing
were
central
to
Hellenistic
understanding
the
nature
of
wisdom
(Hadot

1995;
2004).

In
the
ancient
world,
any
attempt
to
generate
an
account
of
wisdom
was
situated

within
the
context
of
an
account
of
foolishness,
an
account
of
flourishing
and,
most
importantly,
how

to
navigate
from
one
to
the
other
through
a
process
of
personal
self‐transformation.

A
theory
of

wisdom
guided
one
in
the
process
of
personal
development,
whereby
one
came
to
recognize
the

causes
of
foolishness
in
one’s
own
life
and
to
cultivate
the
skills
and
virtues
both
to
alleviate
that

foolishness
and
to
produce
a
flourishing
life.




This
ancient
approach
embodies
Chisholm’s
insight
that
process
and
product
are
tightly
intertwined.


We
propose
that
the
modern
scientific
study
of
wisdom
needs
to
complement
its
current

taxonomic/product
approach
with
a
developmental/process
approach.


As
such,
we
will
seek
to

emulate
the
ancient
tradition:

we
will
provide
a
psychological
theory
of
foolishness,
a
theory
of
the

psychological
conditions
for
the
possibility
of
flourishing
and
our
theory
of
cognitive
and
affective

self‐transformation
that
leads
one
from
a
life
dominated
by
foolishness
to
a
life
pervaded
by

flourishing.





 What
kind
of
cognitive
processes
might
be
central
to
wisdom?

McKee
and
Barber
(1999)

after
reviewing
both
a
priori
and
empirically
based
accounts
of
wisdom
point
to
the
central
feature
of

seeing
through
illusion
and
by
implication
seeing
into
reality.

Wisdom
seems
to
involve
a
special

kind
of
insight,
and
this
is
born
out
by
the
intuition
that
it
is
not
odd
to
say
“
Sam
is
not
that
educated

but
he
is
very
wise”
nor
is
it
odd
to
say
“Sarah
is
not
that
artistic
but
she
is
very
wise;”
however,
it


Vervaeke
&
Ferraro
‐‐
2

 Relevance,
Meaning
and
the
Cognitive
Science
of
Wisdom


does
seem
quite
odd
to
say
“Sam
is
not
very
insightful
but
he
is
very
wise.”

In
a
recent
neuroscientific

review
of
the
literature
Meeks
and
Jeste
(2009)
explicitly
note
the
importance
of
insight
when
they

say
that
one
of
the
central
components
of
wisdom
is
self‐reflection
because
it
“is
an
essential

prerequisite
for
insight,
which
is
commonly
included
in
many
researchers’
concept
of
wisdom.”

(Meeks
&
Jeste
2009,
p.

360).

However,
McKee
and
Barber
note
that
it
is
not
just
any
kind
of
insight

that
constitutes
wisdom.
Rather
it
is
some
kind
of
insight
through
illusion
and
into
reality.

Meeks

and
Jeste
indicate
that
the
insight
involved
in
wisdom
also
has
importantly
to
do
with
self‐
reflection/self‐understanding.

The
connection
here
is
that
illusion
is
some
form
of
self‐deception,
so

seeing
through
illusion
and
into
reality
involves
important
insight
into
one’s
own
cognition
and
how

it
might
be
impeding
contact
with
reality.

This
type
of
insight,
therefore,
involves
and
enables
the

self‐transformation
needed
to
dispel
the
illusory
processing
and
facilitate
an
enhanced
interaction

with
reality.

Let’s
call
these
depth
insights
because
they
involve
seeing
deeper
into
our
cognition,
i.e.

into
the
patterns
and
processes
of
one’s
own
learning
and
perception,
in
order
to
break
through

misleading
appearances
to
an
underlying
(deeper)
reality.

Such
insights
also
involve
increased

abilities
of
self‐understanding
and
self‐transformation,
i.e.
one
becomes
a
deeper
person.




Three
questions
immediately
arise.

The
first
is
what
is
insight
and
why
is
it
so
cognitively

central?

The
second
is
what
is
the
nature
of
the
special
kind
of
depth
insight
found
within
wisdom

and
how
is
it
related
to
the
more
mundane
kind?

Finally,
is
the
special
type
of
depth
insight
sufficient

for
being
wise,
and
if
not
how
is
it
integrated
into
other
cognitive
processes
to
help
develop
wise

individuals?



 In
order
to
understand
the
central
role
of
insight
and
how
it
could
have
an
impact

comprehensively
on
all
of
one’s
life,
we
need
to
see
insight
as
a
specific
and
explicit

phenomenological
experience
of
a
more
pervasive
and
often
implicit
cognitive
process
that
is
central

to
cognition,
viz.
relevance
realization
(Vervaeke
et.
al.
2009).
In order to both explicate the nature of
relevance realization and to demonstrate its cognitive centrality let us consider problem solving.
Historically, we have tried to mechanize problem solving as the following: an initial state, a goal state, a
set of operators for moving between states and some set of path-constraints that limit their application.
This results in what is conceptualized as a problem-space, which immediately falls prey to the issue of
combinatorial explosion: even a relatively small set of parameters can result in a vast number of paths
through the problem-space, a number that exceeds human computational capability. This brings into focus
what is sometimes referred to as the finitary predicament (Cherniak 1990): our finite computational
abilities preclude simple search-space procedures as the means by which we approach problem solving
(and cognition as a whole); there is simply too much information, too many possibilities, too many
contingencies for us to process. As such, algorithmic strategies of exhaustive search are generally doomed
to failure. Rather, our ability to solve problems, to navigate combinatorially dense problem spaces, is
contingent upon our ability to constrain that space. This puts the focus on the problem formulation aspect

Vervaeke
&
Ferraro
‐‐
3

 Relevance,
Meaning
and
the
Cognitive
Science
of
Wisdom


of problem-solving, rather than the execution of the solution – we need to be able to construct problems in
a manner that sufficiently constrains the set of options to one that is computationally manageable. Again,
this is the role of relevance realization: the ability to ignore vast numbers of options (hopefully poor ones)
and focus on a small set of potentially fruitful ones.

Thus far, in using the classical search-space framework for describing problems, we are still
discussing a massively simplified domain, that of well-defined problems. Even with the combinatorial
pitfalls thus far encountered, we have not yet fully articulated the difficulties we face in the act of problem
solving. Above, we articulated problems in terms of clear initial and goal states, with known sets of
operations and constraints allowing us to navigate from one to the other. However, such well-defined
problems are rare in our day-to-day existence. Rather, we are most often faced with ill-defined problems:
problems in which any or even all of the above parameters are mysterious to us. Consider the problem we
(the authors) are currently attempting to solve: writing a good chapter for a scholarly anthology. Our
initial state? The blank page. The goal state? A good chapter. But what constitutes a “good chapter”?
There is no homogeneous class of “good chapters” that we can look to as a clear goal state; every chapter,
good or otherwise is largely unique (certainly, we hope to offer something resembling a unique
contribution). Moreover, the set of operations and constraints do not seem to offer much utility in solving
our problem: we know a lot of things we should not do (i.e., do not plagiarize, adhere to the word-limits set
forth, etc.), but those proscriptions offer little help in guiding us towards positive action in the service of
our goal. As mentioned above, problem formulation is the key: the ability to resolve a nebulous intent into
a specified problem. In the same way that we must use relevance realization to constrain our set of
solutions in a well-defined problem, we must employ this machinery to constrain our problem formulation
from the ill-defined set of goals and challenges we face every day.

As such, successful problem solving is contingent upon our relevance realization abilities, which
is aptly demonstrated when we consider insight problems. The most famous insight problem is the
classical nine-dot problem (e.g Weisberg and Alba 1981). The nine-dot problem presents an array of dots:
three rows of three dots evenly spaced and aligned. The problem is to connect all of the dots with four
connected straight lines. This presents a seemingly unsolvable problem, as most initial attempts at a
solution fall prey to a poor problem formulation: the array of dots is taken to signify a square, whose edges
form a boundary. And within that boundary, there is no solution to the problem. However, without that
boundary, the solution is simple (simple enough to generally elicit negative reactions from those who are
shown the solution after giving up on the problem, often with claims that the solution is a “cheat”).

Vervaeke
&
Ferraro
‐‐
4

 Relevance,
Meaning
and
the
Cognitive
Science
of
Wisdom


This is the genesis of the often-misused phrase “think outside of the box”: the common formulation of the
problem precludes its solution. However, by interacting with one’s relevance realization machinery, one
can reframe the problem in a way that enables the solution. Another good example of this is the mutilated
chessboard problem. Consider a standard chessboard: an 8x8 array of alternating black and white squares.
It is trivial to see that the entire board can be perfectly covered with a set of 32 dominos (each of which is a
rectangle precisely the size of two adjoining squares).

However, if two diagonally opposite corners are removed, can the board be perfectly covered by 31
dominos? Well, mathematically, initially, it seems so: the board has 64 squares and is coverable with 32
dominos. Remove two squares and we are left with 62 squares to be covered by 31 squares. And yet,
attempts to produce a pattern of dominos that perfectly covers this mutilated chessboard fail over and over.
Over and over, people tasked with this problem try various covering strategies and generally come to
believe that it cannot be done, but are unable to provide a proof of this impossibility other than their own
repeated failure.

Vervaeke
&
Ferraro
‐‐
5

 Relevance,
Meaning
and
the
Cognitive
Science
of
Wisdom


This is due to a poor problem formulation: the board is seen as a grid with simple arithmetic properties,
which then result in large number of possible covering configurations. On the other hand, if one considers
the colours of the chessboard, the solution becomes extremely simple: a given domino must cover both a
white and black square, but removing diagonally opposite corners results in the loss of two squares of the
same colour. As such, the board cannot be covered as specified, because an unequal number of black and
white squares remain. Note how the framing of the problem is essential in its solution: treating it as a
covering problem results in intractability, while focusing on the colours of the squares results in a clear,
simple solution. Insight problems are good examples of the central nature of relevance realization and also
reveal the value of being able to purposefully interact with that relevance machinery.

If we step back, we can consider problem solving in increasingly abstract scales; simple
interaction with the world is the messiest, most ill defined problem of all. Acting in the world involves the
consideration of the consequences of those actions in diverse domains from the simple mechanical, to the
social, all the way up to the moral and ethical. This consideration of consequences and outcomes is what
distinguishes one’s actions from mere behaviour – we can talk about the behaviour of quasars, but we do
not generally consider them to be actors with an intended goal. The consideration of consequences is an
extremely broad domain of combinatorial entanglement (Dennett 1987): any action will result in an
uncountably large set of consequences. A small subset of these will comprise our intended goals, while the
rest fall under the broad heading of side effects. The difficulty lies in the appropriate treatment of these
consequences – the relevance of our goals is clear, but only some of the side effects are worth considering,
while others are immaterial to the matter at hand. As has been noted before, this set of relevant side effects
is not a stable, homogeneous class and is extremely contextually sensitive. How then, do we manage to
navigate our existence in the face of this sea of information? We cannot evaluate it all, moment to moment,
to arrive at a principled determination of what matters and what does not; to attempt to do so would
paralyze us into inactivity in even the simplest of circumstances. Rather, we must be able to ignore the vast
majority of this information. This is the heart of relevance realization: to be able to usefully ignore
information in a contextually sensitive manner so as to enable our actions. Taken together, combinatorial

Vervaeke
&
Ferraro
‐‐
6

 Relevance,
Meaning
and
the
Cognitive
Science
of
Wisdom


complexity in problem solving, the largely ill-defined nature of most problems and the consideration of
consequences serve to indicate the centrality of our relevance realization machinery.




 Thus,
relevance
realization
is
central;
it
involves
the
ability
to
frame
our
cognition
and,
most

importantly,
to
do
this
flexibly,
i.e.
to
be
able
to
reframe.
This
ability
to
reframe
how
we
find
things

relevant
is
sometimes
experienced
as
the
“aha”
moment
called
insight.
However,
if
the
above

arguments
are
correct,
there
is
a
more
implicit
form
of
insight
(i.e.
relevance
realization
and

reframing)
that
is
pervasive
and
crucial
to
our
successful
learning
and
interaction
with
the
world.


However
we
should
note
that
there
are
three
kinds
of
relevance
that
need
to
be
distinguished.

There

is
also
a
central
feature
of
relevance
realization
that
needs
to
be
significantly
emphasized.
Finally,

there
is
also
a
very
important
theoretical
feature
of
relevance
realization
that
needs
to
be
briefly

discussed
because
of
its
important
implications
for
the
theory
of
wisdom.



 First
let
us
discuss
the
three
kinds
of
relevance.
We
need
to
note
that
there
is
a
difference

between
two
pieces
of
information
being
relevant
to
each
other,
e.g.
how
the
words
of
this
sentence

are
all
co­relevant
to
each
other,
and
how
the
sentence
is
relevant
to
you
the
reader
i.e.
how

important
this
sentence
is
to
you.


Co‐relevance
is
how
pieces
of
information
belong
together
while

importance
is
how
they
belong
to
you.
Importance
signifies
information
that
is
relevant
to
satisfying

your
goals
while
co‐relevance
is
about
patterns
in
information
that
help
one
to
find
and
make
use
of

important
information.
These
patterns
help
one
to
overcome
our
pervasive
problems
in
managing

the
information
we
get
from
the
world.

This
information
is
generally
partial,
polluted
with
irrelevant

information,
and
is
(as
we’ve
seen)
too
vast
to
exhaustively
search.

By
finding
patterns
of
co‐
relevance
one
can
facilitate
the
discovery
of
important
information.

Some
of
the
patterns
we
realize

are
patterns
in
events.
This
patterning
gives
us
the
ability
to
intervene
in
causal
processes,
i.e.,
it

affords
us
knowing
how
to
interact
with
the
world.
This
is
our
procedural
knowledge.

We
can
also

find
patterns
of
patterns,
i.e.,
higher‐order
patterns.
Especially
important
are
finding
patterns
that

are
invariant
across
many
different
contexts
and
are
multiply
realized
in
many
different
causal

processes.


Such
patterns
indications
causal
conditions
as
general
principles.
Knowledge
of
such

principles
that
constrain
and
enable
how
events
unfold
is
knowledge
of
facts.
This
is
our
knowing

that
something
is
the
case.
It
is
our
propositional
knowledge1.





 In
addition,
to
co‐relevance
and
importance
there
is
a
third
aspect
to
the
phenomenology
of

relevance.

As
inherently
social
creatures
we
need
to
be
relevant
to
others.

We
need
to
say
and
do

things
that
are
relevant
to
others.

Not
only
does
information
need
to
belong
together
and
to
us,
we

also
need
to
emit
and
transmit
information
that
can
belong
to
others,
i.e.
we
need
to
participate
in


























































1
Note
that
here
we
are
invoking
a
version
of
dual
processing
theory,
as
reviewed
in
Stanovich
2002.


Vervaeke
&
Ferraro
‐‐
7

 Relevance,
Meaning
and
the
Cognitive
Science
of
Wisdom


and
belong
to
a
group.

Loneliness
and
alienation
are
powerful
experiences
of
suffering
that
indicate

to
us
that
we
are
somehow
lacking
in
this
dimension
of
relevance.

This
is
the
form
of
relevance
that

carries
us
beyond
ourselves.

Let
us
call
this
dimension
transcendence.

The
knowledge
of
these

patterns
of
participation
and
identification
is
our
perspectival
knowledge2.

Perspectival
knowledge
is

not
just
knowledge
of
how
events
are
relevant
to
each
other
or
how
facts
are
relevant
to
each
other.

It
is
knowledge
of
how
facts
are
relevant
to
events
(constrain
and
enable
sequences
of
events)
and

how
events
are
relevant
to
facts
(how
events
can
change
constraining
and
enabling
conditions).

This

enables
one
to
narrtively
know
what
it
is
like
to
be
in
a
particular
situation,
i.e.
to
participate
in
it

with
a
particular
role/
identity.
This
is
to
have
a
perspective.
It
enables
one
to
be
relevant
to
the

world.



 So,
to
summarize,
there
are
three
dimensions
to
relevance
realization:

co‐relevance,

importance,
and
transcendence.

These
abilities
to
realize
relevance
support
the
finding
of
different

kinds
of
patterns.
There
are
patterns
in
events,
which
afford
procedural
knowledge;
patterns
in
facts,

which
afford
propositional
knowledge;
and,
finally,
patterns
in
participation,
which
afford

perspectival
knowledge.




 Science
is
largely
the
project
of
finding
co‐relevant
patterns
of
facts
that
are
expressible
as

propositional
knowledge.
The
kind
of
insight
found
in
science
is
theoretical
and
explanatory
insight.


How
might
wisdom
differ
from
scientific
knowledge,
and
what
kind
of
insight
is
specific
to
it?

Since

wisdom
is
tied
to
both
self‐transformation
and
the
cultivation
of
a
good
life,
it
stands
to
reason
that

wisdom
must
centre
upon
the
procedural
knowledge
that
realizes
the
important
information
that

affords
one
the
ability
to
intervene
in
the
causal
processes
of
self‐transformation
and
the

construction
of
a
good
life.



However,
this
is
not
to
say
that
propositional
knowledge
will
play
no

role.

The
wise
person
must
be
able
to
acquire
and
use
the
propositional
knowledge
of
causal

principles
and
conditions
that
factually
constrain
(and
enable)
the
processes
of
self‐transformation

and
good
life
cultivation.
So
the
wise
person
must
have
good
insight
into
the
important
information

that
facilitates
beneficial
causal
intervention
into
the
self
and
towards
the
cultivation
of
a
good
life.



The
wise
person
must
also
have
good
insight
into
those
causal
principles
and
facts
that
bear
upon

these
processes
of
self‐intervention.

Moreover,
her
or
she
must
crucially
have
insight
into
how
the

procedural
and
propositional
knowledge
are
perspectivally
relevant
to
each
other.


Specifically,
how

the
procedural
knowledge
of
self‐intervention
and
the
propositional
knowledge
of
factual
constraint

interact
and
how
to
advantageously
manage
that
interaction.



 Expertise
is
largely
about
finding
co‐relevant
patterns
of
events
that
are
expressible
as

sophisticated
procedural
knowledge.

The
kind
of
insight
found
in
expertise
is
intuition
(Hogarth


























































2
We
owe
this
idea
to
work
currently
being
done
with
Greg
Katsoras.





Vervaeke
&
Ferraro
‐‐
8

 Relevance,
Meaning
and
the
Cognitive
Science
of
Wisdom


2006).

How
might
wisdom
differ
from
expertise?

One
significant
difference
is
that
expertise
is

largely
value
neutral.

One
can
use
one’s
expertise
for
good
or
for
evil,
yet
wisdom
seems
to
be

inherently
normative.
It
can
only
be
about
making
life
good.

Also,
expertise
seems
to
be
limited
to


specific
domains
with
redundant
features
that
support
specific
practice
and
provide
feedback.

(Vicente
and
Wang
1998;
Ericisson
and
Towne
2010).

Wisdom
seems
to
be
of
a
higher
order.
It
does

not
apply
to
specific
domains,
and
in
this
way
it
is
more
like
intelligence
and
relevance
realization

(see
below
on
intelligence
and
relevance
realization)
than
expertise.

There
does
not
seem
to
be
any

aspect
of
life
that
is
not
threatened
by
foolishness
and
self‐deception
or
that
cannot
afford

opportunities
for
contributing
to
a
good
life.

Wisdom
seems
to
be
much
more
like
a
cognitive
style

(see
below)
that
can
apply
broadly.

However,
this
is
not
to
say
that
procedural
knowledge
will
not

play
a
significant
role
in
wisdom.

It
is
just
that
this
procedural
knowledge
of
the
wise
person
must
be

integrated
with
propositional
knowledge
about
important
factual
constraints
and
causal
principles

that
govern
the
transformations
of
selves,
and
that
this
integration
always
takes
place
in
light
of
the

perspective
of
a
good
life
for
human
beings.

Wisdom
involves
the
perspectival
knowledge
of
saying

and
doing
things
that
are
highly
relevant
to
creating
good
lives
for
human
beings.

Wisdom
therefore

involves
seeing
the
world
comprehensively
in
such
a
way
that
one
can
regulate
one’s
actions
into

alignment
with
realizing
a
good
life.

Wisdom
involves
the
cultivation
of
character,
which
is
a

procedural
system
more
comprehensive
than
expertise
and
that
is
intricately
integrated
with

perspectival
knowledge
of
what
it
like
to
be
self
leading
a
good
life.




 All
this
talk
about
kinds
of
knowledge
may
give
the
impression
that
wisdom
is
largely
an

intellectual
affair.
However,
this
would
be
to
misconstrue
the
nature
of
the
relevance
realization

process.
Relevance
realization
is
always
a
matter
of
the
selective
direction
of
attention,
the
appraisal

of
value,
and
the
rationing
and
commitment
of
processing
resources.
Relevance
realization
is

simultaneously
attentional,
affective,
and
motivational.

Relevance
realization
largely
concerns
how

you
care
about
and
care
for
information.

Since
it
involves
selection,
judgment
of
value,
and
the

rationing
of
resources
it
can
be
evaluated
according
to
standards
of
rationality.
However,
the

rationality
involved
will
not
be
the
rationality
of
theoretical
argumentation
but
a
rationality
of

construal
and
caring,
i.e.
it
will
be
a
type
of
rationality
that
prominently
figures
depth
insights.




 The
third
overall
point
about
relevance
realization
concerns
an
important
theoretical

feature.

In
a
very
deep
sense
we
cannot
theoretically
define
the
content
of
relevance.

Science

requires
homogenous
and
invariant
classes
of
features
in
order
to
support
broad
inductive

generalizations.

Any
set
of
entities
that
does
not
form
a
homogenous
or
stable
class
cannot
be
the

basis
of
a
scientific
definition.
So,
for
example,
there
cannot
be
a
science
of
things
that
happen
on

Tuesday
or
a
science
of
white
things.

In
a
similar
manner,
any
information
that
we
find
relevant
also

does
not
form
some
stable
or
homogenous
class.

Things
we
find
relevant
one
minute
can
be

completely
irrelevant
the
next.

The
classes
of
things
we
can
find
relevant
are
extremely


Vervaeke
&
Ferraro
‐‐
9

 Relevance,
Meaning
and
the
Cognitive
Science
of
Wisdom


heterogeneous.
We
can
find
things
that
happen
on
Tuesdays
relevant,
or
all
white
things
relevant.

This
has
two
important
consequences
(See
Vervaeke
et
al.
2009
for
a
more
developed
version
of
the

following
argument).

The
first
is
that
there
cannot
be
a
theory
of
relevance,
there
can
only
be
a

theory
of
relevance
realization.

However,
this
is
no
cause
for
despair:

consider
that
the
class
of

features
that
make
any
creature
fit,
in
a
Darwinian
sense,
is
neither
stable
nor
homogenous.
There
is

no
theory
of
fitness.

Natural
selection
is
a
theory
of
how
fitness
is
continually
being
realized
and
re‐
realized
in
the
world.
Fitness
is
inherently
pluralistic.

What
it
is
differs
greatly
from
time
to
time
and

place
to
place,
on
many
different
scales.
In
contrast,
the
processes
that
generate
it
are
universal,
so
it

is
not
an
arbitrary
or
purely
relativistic
phenomenon.
In
the
same
way
what
counts
as
relevant

differs
from
time
to
time,
and
place
to
place,
but
the
processes
that
realize
it
are
universal
and

therefore
non‐arbitrary
and
non‐relativistic.

It
is
important
not
to
confuse
the
universality
of

processing
and
the
relativity
of
content.

While
such
a
theory
admits
of
many
possible
instantiations

of
wisdom,
it
nevertheless
affords
discriminatory
evaluation
–
it
is
possible
to
determine
what
is
and

is
not
wise
by
the
application
of
the
process
model.

As
such,
while
not
privileging
a
specific

individual
or
tradition
as
defining
wisdom,
this
theory
nevertheless
allows
for
the
principled

distinction
of
the
wise
from
the
unwise
necessary
for
any
scientific
account
of
wisdom.



 Since
relevance
cannot
be
pre‐specified
nor
made
constant
in
terms
of
its
content,
this

means
that,
like
the
process
of
evolution,
it
must
be
a
self‐organizing
and
self‐defining
process
(See

Lewis
2000
for
a
discussion
of
the
nature
of
self‐organizing
systems
within
development.)

Evolutionary
processes
are
constantly
redefining
from
within
evolution
what
it
means
to
be
fit.


Relevance
realization
must
constantly
be
redefining
from
within
relevance
realization
what
it
means

for
information
to
be
relevant.

This
in
turn
means
that
if
relevance
realization
is
central
to
both

cognition
and
wisdom,
then
both
cognition
and
wisdom
must
also
be
self‐organizing
and
self‐
defining
processes
to
some
significant
degree.
It
also
means
that
wisdom
is
an
inherently
pluralistic

phenomenon.

What
counts
as
wise
is
going
to
vary
from
time
to
time
and
place
to
place.
However,

the
self‐organizing
and
self‐defining
processes
of
relevance
realization
that
comprise
wisdom
are

universal,
and
therefore,
there
can
be
a
science
of
how
wisdom
is
realized
within
cognitive
processes.

This
means
that
in
a
deep
sense
there
cannot
be
a
universal
and
complete
product
theory
of
wisdom.



 The
self‐organizing
nature
of
relevance
realization
helps
to
explain
both
its
adaptive
nature

and
how
it
is
realized
in
the
brain.
Also,
this
theoretical
feature
makes
important
contributions
to
a

theory
of
foolishness.

Perkins
(2002)
has
argued
that
a
specific
form
of
self‐organizing
processing
is

responsible
both
for
making
the
brain
adaptive,
and
importantly,
how
this
can
be
a
source
of

foolishness.

Following
the
seminal
work
of
Bak,
Tang
and
Wiesenfeld
(Bak,
Tang
&
Wiesenfeld,

1987),
he
argues
that
the
human
brain
demonstrates
self­organizing
criticality.

Consider
a
pile
of

sand
that
has
a
stream
of
sand
falling
onto
its
apex.
The
causal
constraints
of
gravity
and
friction

enable
the
sand
pile
to
organize
itself
into
a
cone
shape.

This
cone
shape
channels
the
sand
in
such
a


Vervaeke
&
Ferraro
‐‐
10

 Relevance,
Meaning
and
the
Cognitive
Science
of
Wisdom


manner
to
reinforce
the
cone.

So
we
see
a
feedback
loop
in
which
the
shape
of
the
pile
directs
the

sand,
which
helps
to
further
shape
the
pile.

For
a
period
the
feedback
loop
maintains
a
stable
system.


However
at
some
point
the
sand
pile
becomes
too
tall
for
its
base,
and
there
is
an
avalanche.

There
is

a
period
of
instability
and
loss
of
integrity
for
the
system.
However,
this
instability
makes
possible
a

wider
base
for
the
sand
that
then
starts
to
constrain
the
placement
of
the
sand,
and
the
whole
system

has
now
re‐organized
into
a
newer,
more
stable
one.



 Perkins
argues
that
much
of
cognition
runs
in
this
manner.
The
brain
is
a
dynamical
system

with
multiple
feedback
loops
that
create
periods
of
stable
organization
followed
by
transition

periods
of
instability
in
response
to
inputs
to
the
system.
These
periods
make
possible
new
emergent

structures
that
re‐organize
and
re‐stabilize
the
system.

There
is
now
considerable
evidence
that
the

brain
works
this
way
at
many
levels
and
scales
of
analysis
(Beggs
and
Plenz
2003;
Beggs
and
Plenz

2004;
Bassett
et.
al.
2006;
Bullmore
and
Sporns
2009).



Perkins
agues
that
this
is
how
most

decisions
are
made
in
what
he
calls
“emergent
activity
switching.”

The
brain
is
like
the
pile
of
sand

receiving
input
from
the
world.
Like
the
pile
receiving
more
sand,
the
brain
configures
itself
into
a

stable
feedback
loop
of
activity.

But
as
the
input
to
the
brain
changes,
the
brain
goes
through
a

transition
period
of
instability
that
affords
a
new
structure
of
activity,
and
this
is
how
the
brain

constantly
redesigns
its
behaviour
in
order
to
adjust
to
changes
in
the
environment.

The
brain

switches
activities
in
an
emergent,
self‐organizing
manner.
This
helps
to
explain
how
the
brain
is

constantly
making
“decisions”
about
when
and
how
to
switch
activities
and
modes
of
processing

without
any
direct
deliberative
decision‐making.

It
also
helps
to
explain
how
the
brain
switches

activities
under
circumstances
that
are
too
rapid
for
deliberation
(e.g.
in
the
middle
of
playing

sports),
yet
still
in
a
highly
sophisticated
and
intelligent
manner.



 Irving,
Vervaeke,
and
Ferraro
(2010)
have
recently
argued
that
the
self‐organizing
criticality

found
in
the
brain
is
a
powerful
way
that
the
brain
implements
the
self‐organizing
process
of

relevance
realization,
and,
moreover,
that
this
is
the
basic
ability
that
makes
us
intelligent.

This
is

evident
in
that
relevance
realization
has
a
central
role
at
every
level
of
cognition;
likewise,
self‐
organizing
criticality
is
found
in
the
brain
at
all
scales
and
levels
of
analysis.

Likewise,
this
helps
to

explain
how
the
self‐organizing
criticality
of
emergent
activity
switching
results
in
sophisticated
and

intelligent
behaviour.

With
its
self‐organizing
criticality
the
brain
engages
in
a
kind
of
on‐going

opponent
processing
between
integration
and
differentiation
of
information
processing.

This
means

that
the
brain
is
constantly
complexifying
(simultaneously
integrating
as
a
system
while

differentiates
its
component
parts)
its
processing
as
a
way
of
continually
adapting
to
a
dynamically

complex
environment.

One
important
property
of
such
self‐complexification
in
any
system
is
that
it

results
in
emergent
functions
and
abilities
for
that
system.

Complex
systems
can
do
more
while

retaining
their
integrity
as
systems.

The
brain
is
thus
constantly
transcending
itself
in
its
ability
to

realize
relevant
information.
It
is
constantly
evolving
its
cognitive
fitness
to
its
environment.

So
the


Vervaeke
&
Ferraro
‐‐
11

 Relevance,
Meaning
and
the
Cognitive
Science
of
Wisdom


connection
between
relevance
realizing
self‐organizing
criticality
and
intelligence
helps
to
explain

how
brains
can
be
dynamically
intelligent
in
a
dynamically
complex
world.


However,
this

connection
has
yet
more
promise,
offering
significant
insights
into
a
process
theory
of
wisdom
via
a

process
theory
of
foolishness.



 Perkins
argues
that
the
emergent
activity
switching
that
makes
one
so
adaptive
is
also
the

source
of
human
folly,
which
he
defines
as
maladaptive
behaviour
that
is
not
explained
by
ignorance

(lack
of
factual
knowledge)
nor
by
lack
of
intelligence.

His
idea
is
that
the
emergent
activity

switching
very
much
has
a
life
of
its
own:

the
feedback
loops
that
constitute
it
are
self‐reinforcing

and
self‐maintaining,
robust
and
resilient.

They
can
become
very
complex
and
stable
structures
of

behaviour.

In
a
manner
analogous
to
a
computer
virus,
the
dynamical
processes
of
the
brain
can
get

caught
up
in
self‐destructive
feedback
loops
that
are
very
compulsive
and
highly
resistant
to
change

because
they
have
hijacked
the
self‐organizing
criticality
of
the
brain.

Foolishness
is
parasitic

processing.

Figure
4
provides
a
schematic
example
of
such
parasitic
processing.

In
it
we
can
see
how

various
construals,
biases,
and
factors
of
cognitive
processing
such
as
encoding
specificity
can
all

powerfully
reinforce
one
another
such
that
a
complex,
compulsive
(because
of
positive
feedback),

and
resilient/resistant
self‐
organizing
system
can
take
shape
within
one’s
cognition.

It
is
a
system

that
warps
our
sense
of
reality
and
robs
life
from
us.

Ironically,
the
very
thing
that
enables
our

intelligence
and
makes
us
adaptive,
i.e.
complex
self‐organization,
is
also
what
makes
us
vulnerable

to
foolishness.



Vervaeke
&
Ferraro
‐‐
12

 Relevance,
Meaning
and
the
Cognitive
Science
of
Wisdom


This
proposal
by
Perkins
leads
us
to
make
an
important
suggestion:

perhaps
wisdom

involves
the
purposeful
cultivation
of
self‐organizing
processes
within
cognition
that
enhance
depth

insights
and
the
rationality
of
framing.

Many
schools
of
thought
suggest
that
wisdom
involves
just

such
a
self‐organizing
nature.

Examples
include:

Taoism
emphasizes
that
wisdom
involves

becoming
an
empty
vessel
for
the
Tao;
Buddhism
emphasizes
that
the
eightfold
path
should
be

understood
as
an
eight
spoked
wheel
in
which
all
the
components
feed
into
each
other
and
“roll”

along;
the
Platonic
tradition
emphasizes
the
importance
of
a
dialogue
between
people
that
has
a
life

of
its
own;
the
Neo‐platonic
tradition
emphasizes
the
advent
of
the
One
being
something
that

happens
to
someone
seeking
enlightenment;
Czikszentmihalyi
and
Rathmunde
(1990)
emphasize
the

importance
of
“flow”
to
wisdom,
etc.

In
short,
it
is
commonly
believed
that
the
pursuit
of
wisdom

involves
the
cultivation
of
the
conditions
for
wisdom,
but
that
wisdom
itself
takes
shape
within

individuals
and
very
much
has
a
life
of
its
own.
In
this
sense,
wisdom
is
the
obverse
of
the
parasitic

processing
we
see
at
work
in
foolishness.

It
is
plausible
that
the
only
way
to
deal
with
the
dynamic

self‐organizing
nature
of
foolishness
is
with
a
counteractive
self‐organizing
system
within
cognition

and
behaviour.





Vervaeke
&
Ferraro
‐‐
13

 Relevance,
Meaning
and
the
Cognitive
Science
of
Wisdom


This
common
element
of
the
basic
natures
of
both
foolishness
and
wisdom
suggests
another

important
theoretical
insight.

Thus
far,
the
terms
‘wisdom’
and
‘foolishness’
have
been
treated
as

categorical
concepts.

However,
given
their
common
machinery,
a
machinery
that
pervades
human

cognition
in
general,
it
makes
sense
to
consider
wisdom
and
foolishness
as
opposed
points
on
a

single
continuum.






 As
it
stands
Perkins’
theory
has
much
going
for
it
in
that
it
helps
dissolve
the
paradox
of

foolishness,
i.e.,
how
can
knowledgeable
intelligent
people
perform
such
stupid
actions?

There
is
no

paradox
in
that
this
is
not
a
matter
of

not
possessing
factual
knowledge
nor
does
it
involve

mysterious
processing,
for
the
very
same
processing
that
makes
us
intelligent
makes
us
vulnerable
to

foolishness.

Foolishness
is,
in
this
sense,
inevitable.





However,
there
are
two
important
and
related
lacunae
in
Perkins
account.
The
first
is
that

Perkins
really
has
not
explained
the
self‐deceptive
nature
of
foolishness,
only
its
self‐destructive

nature.

If
we
return
to
Figure
4,
we
can
see
that
an
important
element
of
the
self‐reinforcing
nature

of
depression
is
the
attributional
bias
that
shapes
one’s
perception
of
one’s
circumstances.

This

damaged
construal
of
situations
is
one
of
the
sorts
of
illusions
that
wisdom
allows
one
to
penetrate.


If
wisdom
is
going
to
ameliorate
the
self‐destructive
nature
of
foolishness
it
is
going
to
do
this

through
cognitive
processes
that
see
through
the
illusions
of
self‐deception.

Second,
while
Perkins

names
top
down
processes
that
tune
and
manage
emergent
activity
switching,
their
overall
place
in

the
cognitive
ontology
is
left
unclear.

Perkins
does
not
explain
how
a
process
other
than
our

intelligence
can
make
use
of
that
intelligence
to
redesign
how
that
intelligence
is
being
applied.

We

argue,
following
Stanovich
(Stanovich
and
West
2000;
Stanovich
2002;
Stanovich
2006;
Stanovich

2009),
that
these
processes
are
processes
of
rationality,
which
is
derived
from
but
also
measurably

distinct
from
intelligence.

However,
we
argue
that
Stanovich’s
account
of
self‐deception,
while

valuable,
is
inadequate
for
a
theory
of
wisdom.




Stanovich
(Stanovich
and
West
2000;
Stanovich
2002;
Stanovich
2006;
Stanovich
2009)

argues
that
what
he
calls
dysrationalia
is
largely
due
to
a
failure
of
reflectively
cultivating
and

applying
a
cognitive
style
that
protects
propositional
processing
from
interference
by
procedural

processing.

Very
often,
intelligent
and
knowledgeable
people
allow
themselves
to
use
procedural

processing
when
propositional
processing
is
needed.
Stanovich
(2002;
2009)
has
good
evidence
that

this
failure
is
not
due
to
a
lack
of
intelligence
and
that
intelligence
is
largely
not
predictive
of
the

ability
to
behave
rationally
[cite
things,
plus
book).

Instead,
what
is
missing
is
a
cognitive
style
that

can
be
cultivated
and
applied
through
reflective
awareness
(i.e.,
a
metacognitive,
phenomenological

awareness,
not
a
theoretical
one)
of
both
our
propositional
and
procedural
processing
so
that
their

relationship
is
properly
managed.

A
cognitive
style
is
a
configuration
of
domain
general
abilities
of

directing
attention,
valuation,
and
motivation
that
produces
a
particular
salience
landscape
within


Vervaeke
&
Ferraro
‐‐
14

 Relevance,
Meaning
and
the
Cognitive
Science
of
Wisdom


which
one
undertakes
one’s
tasks.

We
need
a
cognitive
style
that
directs
attention,
valuation,
and

motivation
such
that
propositional
information
should
be
processed
by
formal
inferential

procedures,
i.e.
what
we
need
is
a
cognitive
style
that
protects
and
promotes
the
rationality
of

computation.
This
is
a
reflective
monitoring
and
managing
of
cognition
that
insures
that

propositional
information
is
being
properly
encoded
and
manipulated
by
formal
inferential

procedures
such
as
logic
and
probability
theory.




There
are
key
ideas
within
Stanovich’s
theory
with
which
we
strongly
agree.

The
first
is
that

wisdom
(the
rationality
for
overcoming
foolishness)
is
a
matter
of
reflection,
i.e.
it
crucially
involves

directing
attention
to
the
medium
of
cognitive
processing
rather
than
the
content
of
the
cognitive

product,
such
as
a
new
belief
or
decision
to
act.

Rationality,
as
a
cognitive
style,
is
not
directed

primarily
at
the
content
of
one’s
beliefs,
but
rather
the
process
by
which
beliefs
are
generated
and

validated.

Being
rational
means,
in
part,
that
one’s
cognitive
medium
of
computational
processing
is

salient.


The
second
insight
with
which
we
agree
is
that
self‐deception
involves
conflict
and

misalignment
between
different
cognitive
processes.

Finally,
the
third
is
that
rationality
is
not
a

matter
of
simple
intelligence
but
rather
how
intelligence
is
reflectively
applied
to
its
own
operations

through
the
cultivation
of
cognitive
styles.

Such
cognitive
styles
(Kozhevnikov
2007;
Sternberg
200?)

involve
learned
skills
and
sensitivities
of
learning
to
learn
(Mercado
2008;
Harlow
1949).


Intelligence
can
be
directed
not
only
to
learning
about
and
interacting
with
the
world
to

produce
a
particular
cognitive
product
e.g.
some
knowledge
or
behaviour,
but
it
can
also
be
directed

to
learning
about
the
cognitive
processes
of
learning
itself,
i.e.
it
can
become
learning
to
learn.


A

habitual
way
of
learning
to
learn
results
in
a
cognitive
style
for
an
organism.
Such
learning
to
learn

means
that
an
organism
notices
important
patterns
in
how
it
is
processing
information
and

intervenes
in
those
patterns,
i.e.,
restructures
them,
in
order
to
improve
how
the
information
is
being

processed.

Rationality
presupposes
such
learning
to
learn,
for
without
the
ability
to
intelligently

intervene
in
its
own
cognition
a
creature
cannot
be
held
responsible
for
its
cognition
nor
deemed

subject
to
rational
standards.

Such
intervention
also
means
that
the
creature
is
using
intelligence
to

improve
how
intelligence
is
being
used
and
developed.

This
leads
to
an
interesting
suggestion:

if

rationality
is
the
reflective
application
of
intelligence
to
the
use
and
development
of
intelligence,
then

perhaps,
in
a
similar
manner,
wisdom
is
the
reflective
application
of
rationality
to
the
use
and

development
of
rationality.

Perhaps
wisdom
is
using
rationality
to
improve
how
rationality
is
being

used
and
developed.

However,
we
should
note
that
such
learning
to
learn
is
often
initially
associated

with
insight
since
insight
involves
restructuring
what
patterns
ones
finds
relevant.
It
involves

altering
how
co‐relevance
is
being
realized
so
that
to
better
facilitate
the
finding
and
using
of

information
that
is
important
to
the
organism.
Learning
to
learn
would
also
be
needed
by
the
depth


Vervaeke
&
Ferraro
‐‐
15

 Relevance,
Meaning
and
the
Cognitive
Science
of
Wisdom


insights
associated
with
wisdom,
since
these
involve
self‐reflective
insights,
i.e.,
insights
into
one’s

own
cognitive
processing.





We
argue
that
in
addition
to
the
rationality
of
computation
advocated
by
Stanovich
that
we

also
need
a
rationality
of
framing.

As
previously
argued,
this
framing
is
always
simultaneously
a

matter
of
attention,
motivation
and
valuation.

We
will
call
this
a
rationality
of
construal,
however,

this
should
not
be
conflated
with
our
previously
articulated
notion
of
perspectival
rationality,
what

we
will
later
articulate
in
more
depth
as
our
rationality
of
communion.
We
argue
that
the
self‐
deception
of
foolishness
is
largely
about
being
locked
into
a
feedback
loop
that
maintains
and

reinforces
an
inappropriate
construal
of
problems,
i.e.
a
mis‐framing
of
problems
and
situations,
that

cause
one
to
misjudge
the
co‐relevance
and
importance
of
the
information
presented
[fig
1].
This
is

why
our
foolish
behaviour
persists
–
it
leverages
the
same
adaptive
self‐organization
that
underlies

all
of
our
intelligent
cognition.

It
possesses
the
same
persistence,
resilience
and
growth
that
is
the

hallmark
of
human
adaptivity.

In
short,
self‐deception
is
a
self‐imposed
lack
of
the
cognitive

flexibility
needed
for
depth
insights,
so
that
we
trap
ourselves
in
illusion.
This
entrapment
follows

from
the
self‐organizing
nature
of
relevance
realization;
this
means
that
a
rationality
of
construal
will

have
to
be
one
that
can
counteract
the
formation
and
persistence
of
such
parasitic
processing.

We

will
also
argue,
following
the
literature
on
insight
problem
solving
(Weisberg
and
Alba
1981;

Adams

et.
al.
1988;
Lockhart
et
al.
1988;

Needham
and
Begg;
1991;

Schooler
et
al.
1993)
that
factual

knowledge
is
largely
impotent
to
overcome
such
mis‐framing
and
parasitic
processing.
Instead,

highly
related
skills
of
construal,
self‐awareness,
and
self‐regulation
are
needed
to
overcome
the
mis‐
framing
at
the
heart
of
foolishness.

These
skills
need
to
be
deployed
in
a
self‐organizing
system
in

order
to
counteract
parasitic
processing.

Computation
alone
is
largely
inadequate
to
the
task
of

realizing
the
depth
insights
needed
to
reframe
the
problems
of
life
and
escape
foolishness.

Moreover,

computation
is
also
largely
inadequate
on
its
own
for
manifesting
the
self‐regulation
needed
to

change
patterns
of
behaviour.

Instead,
success
or
failure
in
self‐regulation
is
largely
dependent
upon

the
skills
and
sensitivities
of
construal.

(Ayduk

and
Mischel
2002;
Myrseth
and
Fishbach
2009).


So,
in
addition
to
a
reflective
cognitive
style
that
protects
and
promotes
a
rationality
of

computation,
the
wise
person
needs
to
develop
a
reflective
cognitive
style
that
protects
and

promotes
the
rationality
of
construal,
i.e.,
how
we
are
framing
events
so
that
we
may
interact
with

the
world
free
from
parasitic
processing.
The
wise
person
would
also
need
to
have
skills
and

sensitivities
for
how
to
co‐ordinate
these
two
cognitive
styles,
both
within
themselves
and
also
in
the

context
of
a
larger
community.
They
would
need
to
know
how
to
govern
the
relationships
between

the
rationality
of
computation
and
the
rationality
of
construal
and
balance
these
within
a
rationality

of
communion
(both
inter‐
and
intrapersonal
communion).
The
manner
in
which
these
cognitive

styles
are
coordinated
within
an
individual
is
an
internalization
of
how
we
perspectivally
manage
our

belonging
to
other
people
and
participating
in
a
culture.

One
learns
how
to
get
the
two
cognitive


Vervaeke
&
Ferraro
‐‐
16

 Relevance,
Meaning
and
the
Cognitive
Science
of
Wisdom


styles
to
belong
together
by
internalizing
knowing
what
it
is
like
to
belong
to
a
social
group,
i.e.

knowing
what
it
is
like
for
different
takes
on
the
world
to
fit
together.

In
a
similar
manner,
one
learns

how
to
commune
with
one’s
envisioned
future
self
leading
a
good
life,
and
thereby
belong
to
one’s

future
self,
by
means
of
internalizing
how
one
currently
communes
with
others.
In
this
way
the

rationality
of
communion
involves
perspectivally
appropriating
one’s
development
in
order
to

transform
oneself
into
a
better
future
self.
This
involves
internalizing
the
perspectives
of
appropriate

role
models.
One
powerful
way
to
enhance
learning
to
learn
it
to
look
at
one’s
processing
from
the

perspective
of
someone
who
is
performing
better.


From
these
role
models
the
person
cultivating

wisdom
would
through
such
learning
to
learn
come
to
emmulate
a
higher
order
cognitive
style
of

perspectival
rationality
for
the
application
and
co‐ordination
of
the
lower
order
computational
and

construal
cognitive
styles
of
rationality.

This
higher
order
process
would
realize
a
cognitive
meta‐
style
for
rationally
improving
how
rationality
is
being
applied
and
developed.

Wisdom
is
such
a

rationally
self‐transcending
rationality.



Stanovich
has
considerable
work
supporting
the
conclusion
that
Baron’s
active
open

mindedness
(AOM)
(
Baron
1994)
is
an
optimal
cognitive
style
for
a
rationality
of
computation

(Stanovich
and
West
2000;
Stanovich
2002;
Stanovich
2006;
Stanovich
2009).

AOM
means
actively

looking
for
how
bias
is
warping
and
thwarting
our
problem
solving.

A
bias
is
when
a
heuristic
of

procedural
processing
is
being
used
on
a
problem
for
which
computational
processing
is
better
for

achieving
the
goals
of
the
problem.

A
bias
is
a
misplaced
heuristic
that
interferes
with
computational

processing.
AOM
requires
learning
about
cognitive
biases
and
actively
searching
for
them
in
one’s

processing
in
order
to
actively
counteract
their
effect
by
applying
more
formal
computational

procedures
(Baron
1994).
It
should
be
noted
that
AOM
is
applied
to
deduction,
induction,
and

abduction
(plausibility
reasoning)
as
well
as
to
their
successful
integration
within
reasoning.


AOM

enhances
our
sense
of
how
information
is
relevant
to
and
within
our
propositional
grasp
of
facts.
It

enhances
our
sense
of
reasonableness.
If
affords
that
good
vision
of
factual
reality
that
Aristotle
called

sophia
(Aristotle,
Nichomachaen
Ethics).


However,
a
rationality
of
construal
is
also
needed.
Langer
(1989;
1997;
2000)
[footnote]

and
current
independent
work
within
clinical
psychology
(Teasdale
1999;
Baer
2003;
Hayes
et.
al.

2004)
and
neuroscience
(Farb
et.
al
2007)
point
to
the
cognitive
style
of
mindfulness
as
being
very

important
for
comprehensively
transforming
and
improving
the
framing
of
situations
so
as
to

facilitate
not
being
trapped
in
self‐defeating
construals
of
situations
and
problems.

It
sees
through

parasitic
processing.
Mindfulness
involves
paying
attention
not
to
one’s
propositional
encoding
or

inferences.
Instead
it
involves
paying
attention
to
how
one
is
paying
attention
to
situations,
i.e.
to

how
one
is
distinguishing
relevance
from
irrelevance.
This
involves
training
skills
of
the
shifting
of

the
direction,
aspect
and
scale
of
attention
and
thereby
enhancing
the
cognitive
flexibility
of

construal.

Mindfulness
enhances
our
situational
insight,
foresight
(insight
into
potentials
within


Vervaeke
&
Ferraro
‐‐
17

 Relevance,
Meaning
and
the
Cognitive
Science
of
Wisdom


situations)
and
mindsight
(insight
into
others’
cognition
(Siegel
2007;
2010),
and
the
interaction

between
them.
These
skills
are
trained
in
mindfulness
cultivation
practices
such
as
meditation
and

contemplation.

Mindfulness
is
an
optimal
cognitive
style
for
the
rationality
of
construal.

Mindfulness

enhances
our
sense
or
how
information
is
relevant
to
and
within
our
procedural
grasp
of
events.
It

enhances
our
sense
of
fluency.

It
affords
that
efficacy
of
interaction
with
situations
that
Aristotle

called
phronesis
(Aristotle,
Nichomachean
Ethics).













Wisdom
relies
upon
a
meta‐style
of
rationally
self‐transcending
rationality
that
governs
the

rational
cognitive
styles
of
mindfulness
and
AOM
in
a
manner
that
enhances
the
developmental

complexification
of
information
processing
that
is
constitutive
of
basic
general
intelligence.
Wisdom

involves
simultaneously
differentially
developing
each
cognitive
style
of
rationality
and
integrating

them
together
in
a
self‐organizing
system
which
thus
enhances
relevance
realization
overall.
We

become
more
fluently
reasonable
and
more
reasonable
in
our
fluency.

However,
while
this

framework
may
provide
a
theory
of
how
foolishness
is
overcome,
and
this
may
be
the
central

therapeutic
aspect
of
wisdom,
it
is
questionable
that
this
will
provide
for
a
sufficient
account
of

wisdom.

It
is
very
plausible
that
there
is
much
more
to
leading
a
good
life
than
merely
avoiding

foolishness.

As
we’ve
argued,
a
person
cultivating
wisdom
needs
to
appropriate
their
own

development
by
learning
how
to
commune
with
their
future
flourishing
self.

A
theory
of
wisdom

needs
a
theory
of
the
cognitive
processes
that
afford
such
communing
and
flourishing.

There
has

been
a
lot
of
important
work
by
psychologists

(Diener
et.
al.
1999;
Diener
2000;
Ryan
and
Deci
2000;

Deci
and
Ryan
2000;
Ryan
and
Deci
2003)
and
philosophers
(Kekes

1986;1995:
2000;
2002:2006;

Frankfurt
2004;2006;

Russon
2009;
Wolf
2010)


about
the
cognitive
processes
that
create
the

conditions
for
the
possibility
of
a
good
life.

All
these
theorists
realize
that
wisdom
can
at
most
create

conditions
of
possibility
for
flourishing.

The
world
must
co‐operate
for
an
individual
to
be

flourishing.




 By
drawing
on
all
of
this
work
it
seems
plausible
that
there
are
three
central
dimensions
that

must
be
in
place
in
order
for
an
individual
to
be
leading
a
good
life.

The
individual
must
have

subjective
well‐being
(Diener
et.
al.
1999;
Diener
2000).

The
individual
must
judge
and
experience

their
life
as
satisfying.

Second
they
must
judge
and
experience
that
their
lives
are
morally

respectable,
both
by
themselves
and
by
others
whose
moral
judgment
they
respect
(Kekes


1986;1995:
2000;
2002:2006).

Finally,
and
more
recently,
Susan
Wolf

(2009;
2010)
has
argued
for

the
independent
dimension
of
meaning
in
life.

Meaning
in
life
is
to
judge
and
experience
oneself
as

connected
appropriately
to
something
that
has
an
important
value
independent
from
one’s
valuing
of

it.

More
loosely,
this
can
be
put
as
that
one
judges
and
experiences
that
one
is
connected
to

something
“bigger”
than
oneself
or
as
Wolf
puts
its
“subjective
attraction
meets
objective

attractiveness”
(Wolf
2010).

To
use
our
terminology
meaning
in
life
is
to
judge
that
one
has


Vervaeke
&
Ferraro
‐‐
18

 Relevance,
Meaning
and
the
Cognitive
Science
of
Wisdom


significant
transcendence.

So
overall
the
conditions
that
makes
one’s’
life
good
are
that
one
judges

and
experiences
that
ones
life
is
satisfying,
virtuous
(morally
good),
and
deeply
connected.



 A
theory
of
the
cognitive
conditions
that
afford
achieving
such
ends
would
be
a
theory
of
the

flourishing
that
is
necessary
to
wisdom.

What
might
those
cognitive
conditions
be?

One
helpful

suggestion,
that
draws
these
three
dimensions
together,
is
that
a
wise
person
must
have
a

constellation
of
abilities
focused
on
the
making
and
protection
of
selves
(identities,
persons)
and

communities
of
selves.
It
is
plausible
that
conditions
of
satisfaction
(subjective
well
being)
mark
out

conditions
for
the
agency
necessary
to
being
a
self.
This
is
a
subjective
sense
of
well‐being
based
on

the
sense
that
one
has
the
autonomy
and
competence
to
have
succeeded
and
to
continue
to
succeed

reliably
(not
perfectly)
in
one’s
projects
(Ryan
and
Deci
2000;
Deci
and
Ryan
2000;
Ryan
and
Deci

2003).

It
is
also
plausible
that
meaning
in
life
marks
out
those
conditions
that
create
the
kinds
of

connections
that
are
constitutive
of
selves
such
as
connections
between
mind
and
body,
mind
and

mind
(both
intra
and
inter
personal
connections)
and
between
mind
and
world
(conditions
for
action

and
interaction).
It
is
also
plausible
that
virtue
marks
out
the
conditions
that
protect,
as
inherently

valuable,
persons
and
their
communities.
The
wise
person
would
have
depth
insights
into
the

processes
by
which
selves/identities/persons
are
constituted,
protected,
and
promoted.





 These
depth
insights
mean
that
the
wise
person
is
very
focused
on
the
transcendence

dimension
of
relevance
realization.

The
wise
person
is
not
only
aware
of
how
pieces
of
information

are
relevant
to
each
other
(co‐relevance)
or
how
they
are
relevant
to
the
wise
person
himself

(importance),
they
are
also
aware
of
and
concerned
for
how
he/she
is
relevant
to
others.
As
we
have

argued,
the
wise
person
is
not
only
concerned
with
realizing
what
is
relevant
they
are
also
concerned

with
saying
and
doing
relevant
things.
Agency,
and
meaning
in
life,
virtue
come
together
in
actions

that
connect
one
to
others
in
ways
that
value
those
relations
for
their
own
sake



 This
concern
for
transcendence
means
that
the
self‐knowledge
involved
is
not
primarily

autobiographical
knowledge
nor
is
it
narcissism.

It
is
the
perspectival
knowledge
of
what
it
is
like
to

be
a
self
and
the
linked
procedural
and
propositional
abilities
to
cultivate
selves.

This
knowledge

results
in
knowing
what
is
good
for
selves
and
how
to
bring
it
about.

It
means
knowing
how
to
make

and
share
those
identity‐making
connections
between
mind
and
body,
mind
and
mind
(both

intrapersonal
and
interpersonal
connections)
and
between
mind
and
world
that
support
a
sense
of

successful
agency.



The
self‐knowledge
involved
also
means
knowing
how
to
care
for
the
dynamic
and

reciprocal
connections
of
identification
(and
therefore
identity
creation)
between
agency
and

meaning
in
life,
i.e.
skillfully
understanding
that
we
want
meaning
in
life
that
fosters
agency
and

agency
that
fosters
meaning
in
life,
and
that
we
have
a
process
of
dynamic
reflective
equilibrium


Vervaeke
&
Ferraro
‐‐
19

 Relevance,
Meaning
and
the
Cognitive
Science
of
Wisdom


between
them.

We
sometimes
alter
which
aspects
of
our
actions
we
identify
with
(agency

transformation)
under
the
normative
guidance
of
our
sense
of
meaning
in
life,
i.e.,
we
evaluate
what

kind
of
agent
we
are
in
terms
of
how
it
is
effecting
our
meaning
in
life.
For
example,
we
sometimes

may
wonder
if
our
actions
are
messing
up
our
ability
to
find
and
feel
at
home/at
peace
in
the
world.

We
sometimes
realize
that
our
attempts
to
find
satisfaction
are
undermining
our
sense
of
connection.

We
also
sometimes
alter
which
aspects
of
our
meaning
in
life
that
we
identify
with
(meaning
in
life

transformation)
under
the
normative
guidance
of
our
sense
of
agency,
i.e.,
we
evaluate
what
kind
of

home
in
the
universe
we
are
making
with
ourselves
and
with
others
in
terms
of
the
kinds
of
agency

we
are
fostering,
For
example,
we
may
wonder
if
our
meaning
in
life
is
causing
the
existential

confusion
or
foolishness
that
undermine
agency.


We
sometimes
realize
that
our
attempts
to
connect

are
undermining
our
ability
to
find
satisfaction.


Finally,
the
self‐knowledge
involved
is
eudaemonisitc
in
nature.

It
involves
knowing
how
to

create
and
implement
those
rules
of
attitude
and
conduct
that
protect
selves,
their
projects,
and
their

meaning
in
life.

Such
self‐knowledge
involves
knowing
how
to
be
virtuous
and
how
to
promote

virtue
and
how
to
protect
selves,
their
projects,
and
meaning
in
life
from
vice.

This
means
that
self‐
knowledge
involves
the
perspectival
awareness
of
how
to
align
actions
to
a
self‐transcending
vision

of
a
good
life
to
which
the
person
cultivating
wisdom
is
committed
and
to
which
they
belong.




Wise
people
have
the
knowledge
of
the
nature
of
selves
such
that
they
can
promote
and

protect:
agency,
meaning
in
life,
the
agency‐meaning
in
life
identity
formation
relation,
and
the

virtues
needed
to
protect
selves
and
communities
of
selves
and
to
afford
participation
in
this
way
of

life..

Although
these
four
areas
of
knowledge
are
analytically
distinguishable,
the
four
greatly

interpenetrate
and
interact
in
reality.

Knowing
how
to
cultivate
this
dynamic
system
of
knowledge

constitutes
knowing
how
to
flourish,
and
how
to
promote
and
protect
flourishing.



How
then
does
one
personally
enact
the
cultivation
of
wisdom
in
one’s
own
life?

We’ve

argued
that
wisdom
requires
the
cultivation
of
the
cognitive
styles
of
AOM
and
mindfulness
as
well
as

the
cognitive
meta‐style
that
affords
their
mutual
complexification.

We’ve
already
discussed

practices
such
as
meditation
and
contemplation
for
the
cultivation
of
mindfulness,
and
practices
such

as
bias
identification
and
counteraction
for
the
cultivation
of
AOM.
These
practices
have
already
been

examined
in
considerable
detail
elsewhere.

However,
the
enactment
and
training
of
our
proposed

cognitive
meta‐style
requires
explication.

Implicated
in
this
cognitive
meta‐style
is
the
management

of
perspectival
knowledge
under
the
normativity
of
the
rationality
of
communion.

This
can
be

accomplished
by
a
process
we
are
going
call
“internalizing
the
sage”.

By
taking
the
perspective
of
the

sage
on
one’s
cognition
one
can
enhance
learning
to
learn
until
one
comes
to
emulate
the
perspective

of
the
sage.

This
a
common
strategy
used
by
many
wisdom
traditions
in
different
times
and
places.


For
example,
St.
Paul
emphasizes
that
it
“not
I
who
live
but
Christ
who
lives
in
me”
(Galatians
2:20).



Vervaeke
&
Ferraro
‐‐
20

 Relevance,
Meaning
and
the
Cognitive
Science
of
Wisdom


Within
Buddhism
one
is
to
realize
one’s
own
Buddha
nature.
Stoicism
has
been
described
as
the

process
of
becoming
like
Socrates
(Long
2004).
The
followers
of
Epicurus
explicitly
practiced

imagining
how
Epicurus
would
reflect
upon
their
actions.

A
plausible
explanation
of
Plato’s
use
of

Socratic
dialogues
is
to
create
a
“spiritual
exercise”
(Hadot
1995;
2004)
for
internalizing
Socrates
and

his
method
of
enlenkos.

The
Tao
Te
Ching
continually
talks
about
the
Sage
and
how
the
sage
sees
the

world
and
acts
within
it.

More
recently,
Baltes
and
Staudinger
have
produced
empirical
evidence

that
simply
imaging
talking
to
another
person
improves
ones
performance
on
tasks
related
to

wisdom
(Baltes
and
Staudinger
2000).


This
work
indicates
that
simply
viewing
one’s
cognition
form

the
perspective
of
another
does
facilitate
becoming
more
insightful.

It
is
reasonable
that
Vygotsky’s

(1978)
concept
of
internalization
within
proximal
development
helps
to
explain
why
internalizing

someone
with
more
wisdom
could
even
further
enhance
one’s
insight.
Why
would
taking
the

perspective
of
the
sage
be
good
for
overcoming
foolishness
and
affording
flourishing?

One

suggestion
is
that
by
taking
the
perspective
of
the
sage
one
comes
to
have
a
salience
landscape
that
is

similar
to
that
of
a
wise
person.

One
tends
to
find
salient
those
things
that
a
sage
would.
This
is
a

method
for
procedurally
implementing
the
factual
knowledge
we
have
concerning
the
good
life
and

revealing
that
gap
between
who
we
are
and
who
we
want
to
be.
All
of
the
above
wisdom
traditions

placed
a
high
priority
on
turning
theory
into
practice.

Recently,
Kosslyn
and
Moulton
(2009)
have

described
a
similar
process
in
athletic
training
in
which
mental
practice
is
used
to
enhance

performance.
The
athlete
first
stores
motion
images
from
the
coach.
The
athlete
then
tunes
the

images
to
their
own
body,
but
from
the
third
person
perspective.

The
athlete
then
compares
the

imagined
action
to
real
actions
and
shifts
from
the
third
person
perspective
to
first
person

perspective.

Finally
the
athlete
trains
to
make
this
response
habitual.

So
it
is
plausible
that

internalizing
the
sage
involves
both
taking
the
perspective
of
the
sage
on
one’s
cognition,
a
kind
of

heightened
third
person
perspective
on
one’s
cognitive
processing
that
enhances
learning
to
learn,

and
then
taking
the
perspective
of
the
sage
on
the
world
as
a
kind
of
heightened
first
person

perspective
that
transforms
one’s
salience
landscape
so
as
to
implement
the
insights
gained
through

the
learning
to
learn.

Finally,
this
orientation
is
trained
until
it
becomes
a
habit
of
mind
and
way
of

life.




Internalizing
the
sage
also
engages
processes
of
transforming
one’s
salience
landscape,
and

such
salience
transformations
are
key
to
self‐regulation
(Metcalfe
and
Mischel
1999;
Ayduk
and

Mischel
2002;
Myrseth
and
Fishbach
2009)
required
to
appropriate
the
development
of
one’s

character.

Finally,
internalizing
the
sage
develops
the
narrative
skills
for
excellence
in
perspectival

knowing.

Following
the
ancient
Greek
wisdom
tradition,
having
the
salience
landscape
of
the
sage

such
that
one
naturally
self‐regulates
so
as
to
realize
the
good
life
was
called
sophrosyne
(
Schmid

1998;
McGhee
2000)

As
such,
we
propose
calling
the
cognitive
meta‐style
upon
which
wisdom
relies

sophrosyne.

In
sum,
the
pursuit
of
wisdom
requires
cultivating
sophrosyne
by
internalizing
the
sage,


Vervaeke
&
Ferraro
‐‐
21

 Relevance,
Meaning
and
the
Cognitive
Science
of
Wisdom


and
using
sophrosyne
to
govern
the
complexification
of
AOM
and
mindfulness.

One
can
cultivate

AOM
by
becoming
aware
of
inferential
bias
and
actively
counteracting
it.
One
can
cultivate

mindfulness
through
meditative
and
contemplative
practices
and
break
up
parasitic
processing.

In

this
way
one
cultivates
a
self‐organizing
system
that
enhances
and
develops
the
relevance
realization

central
to
cognition

(See
Figure
5).
One
improves
one’s
ability
to
see
through
foolishness
and
into

the
good
life.




Acknowledgement:

We
would
like
to
thank
Greg
Katsoras
for
his
help
with
the
idea
of

perspectival
knowing.
We
would
like
to
thank
Najam
Tirimizi
for
his
help
with
the
idea
of
rationally
self­
transcending
rationality.

Finally,
we
would
like
to
thank
David
Kim
for
his
help
in
discussions
of
the
role

of
wisdom
in
resolving
internal
conflict.



Vervaeke
&
Ferraro
‐‐
22


View publication stats