Board of Commissioners vs. Hon.

Joselito Dela Rosa

SUMMARY:
DOCTRINE:
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to
be the same as those of the Philippines.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the Solicitor General seeking 1) to set
aside the Resolution/Temporary Restraining Order dated September 7, 1990, issued by
respondent Judge de la Rosa in Civil Case No. 90-54214 which denied petitioners' motion to
dismiss and restrained petitioners from commencing or continuing with any of the proceedings
which would lead to the deportation of respondent William Gatchalian, docketed as D.C. No. 90-
523, as well as the Order of respondent Judge Capulong dated September 6, 1990 in Civil Case
No. 3431-V-90 which likewise enjoined petitioners from proceeding with the deportation charges
against respondent Gatchalian, and 2) to prohibit respondent judges from further acting in the
aforesaid civil cases.
On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by
the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of his natural
mother, Marciana Gatchalian. Before the Citizenship Evaluation Board, Santiago Gatchalian
testified that he has five (5) children with his wife Chu Gim Tee, namely: Jose Gatchalian, Gloria
Gatchalian, Francisco Gatchalian, Elena Gatchalian and Benjamin Gatchalian.
On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian, then a twelve-year old minor, arrived in Manila from
Hongkong together with Gloria, Francisco, and Johnson, all surnamed Gatchalian. After
investigation, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 rendered a decision dated July 6, 1961,
admitting William Gatchalian and his companions as Filipino citizens.
On July 6, 1962, the new Board of Commissioners, after a review motu proprio of the
proceedings had in the Board of Special Inquiry, reversed the decision of the latter and ordered
the exclusion of, among others, respondent Gatchalian.
On March 15, 1973, Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an order reaffirming the July 6, 1961
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry thereby admitting respondent Gatchalian as a Filipino
citizen and recalled the warrant of arrest issued against him.
On June 7, 1990, the acting director of the National Bureau of Investigation wrote the Secretary
of Justice recommending that respondent Gatchalian along with the other applicants covered by
the warrant of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 be charged with violation of Sec. 37 (a), pars. 1 and
2, in relation to Secs. 45 (c), and (d) and (e) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, also
known as the Immigration Act of 1940. The Secretary of Justice subsequently indorsed the
recommendation of the National Bureau of Investigation to the Commissioner of Immigration.
On August 15, 1990, petitioner Commissioner Domingo of the Commission of Immigration and
Deportation issued a mission order commanding the arrest of respondent William Gatchalian.
The latter appeared before Commissioner Domingo on August 20, 1990 and was released on
the same day upon posting P200,000.00 cash bond.
On August 29, 1990, William Gatchalian filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 29, presided by respondent Judge Dela
Rosa.
On September 4, 1990, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging that respondent judge has
no jurisdiction over the Board of Commissioners and/or the Board of Special Inquiry.
Nonetheless, respondent judge Dela Rosa issued the assailed order dated September 7, 1990,
denying the motion to dismiss.
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case
2.) Whether or not William Gatchalian is a Filipino citizen
HELD:
1.) Yes, the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
Under Sec. 21 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with this Court and the Court of Appeals to issue "writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any part of
their respective regions, . . ." Thus, the RTC’s are vested with the power to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the government.
It is true that under Sec. 9 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Court of Appeals is vested with
—
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, order,
or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, board
or commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of sub-paragraph (1)
of the third paragraph of and sub-paragraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of
the Judiciary Act of 1948.
It does not provide, however, that said exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
extends to all quasi-judicial agencies. The Bureau of Immigration (or CID) is not among those
quasi-judicial agencies specified by law whose decisions, orders, and resolutions are directly
appealable to the Court of Appeals.
B.P. Blg. 129 did not intend to raise all quasi-judicial bodies to the same level or rank of the
RTC except those specifically provided for under the law as aforestated. As the Bureau of
Immigration is not of equal rank as the RTC, its decisions may be appealable to, and may be
reviewed through a special civil action for certiorari by, the RTC.
True, it is beyond cavil that the Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive authority and
jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an alleged alien, and in the process, determine also
their citizenship. And a mere claim of citizenship cannot operate to divest the Board of
Commissioners of its jurisdiction in deportation proceedings.
However, the rule admits of an exception, at least insofar as deportation proceedings are
concerned.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction of petitioners Board of Commissioners over deportation
proceedings is, therefore, not without exception. Judicial intervention should be granted only in
cases where the "claim of citizenship is so substantial that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the claim is correct. In other words, the remedy should be allowed only on sound
discretion of a competent court in a proper proceeding (Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board,
supra; Co. vs. Deportation Board, 78 SCRA 107 [1977]). It appearing from the records that
respondent's claim of citizenship is substantial, judicial intervention should be allowed.
2.) Yes, William Gatchalian is a Filipino citizen.
In Miciano vs. Brimo (50 Phil. 867 [1924]; Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil. 472;
Yam Ka Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46 [1915]), this Court held that in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as
those of the Philippines. In the case at bar, there being no proof of Chinese law relating to
marriage, there arises the presumption that it is the same as that of Philippine law.
The lack of proof of Chinese law on the matter cannot be blamed on Santiago Gatchalian much
more on respondent William Gatchalian who was then a twelve-year old minor. The fact is, as
records indicate, Santiago was not pressed by the Citizenship Investigation Board to prove the
laws of China relating to marriage, having been content with the testimony of Santiago that the
Marriage Certificate was lost or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of China. Neither
was Francisco Gatchalian's testimony subjected to the same scrutiny by the Board of Special
Inquiry. Nevertheless, the testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian before
the Philippine consular and immigration authorities regarding their marriages, birth and
relationship to each other are not self-serving but are admissible in evidence as statements or
declarations regarding family reputation or tradition in matters of pedigree (Sec. 34, Rule 130).
Furtheremore, this salutary rule of evidence finds support in substantive law. Thus, Art. 267 of
the Civil Code provides:
Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or
possession of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws. (See also Art. 172 of the Family Code)
Consequently, the testimonies/affidavits of Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian
aforementioned are not self-serving but are competent proof of filiation (Art. 172 [2], Family
Code).
Philippine law, following the lex loci celebrationis, adheres to the rule that a marriage formally
valid where celebrated is valid everywhere. Referring to marriages contracted abroad, Art. 71 of
the Civil Code (now Art. 26 of the Family Code) provides that "all marriages performed outside
of the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country . . ." And any doubt as to
the validity of the matrimonial unity and the extent as to how far the validity of such marriage
may be extended to the consequences of the coverture is answered by Art. 220 of the Civil
Code in this manner: "In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus,
every intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the
marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during marriage, the
authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of the family
in case of unlawful aggression.". Bearing in mind the "processual presumption" enunciated in
Miciano and other cases, he who asserts that the marriage is not valid under our law bears the
burden of proof to present the foreign law.
Having declared the assailed marriages as valid, respondent William Gatchalian follows the
citizenship of his father Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of the latter. Francisco, in turn
is likewise a Filipino being the legitimate child of Santiago Gatchalian who (the latter) is
admittedly a Filipino citizen whose Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of
Immigration in an order dated July 12, 1960.